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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an Idaho
nonprofit corporation,

Supreme Court Case No. 40012

Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appe llant-Cross Respondent,
and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, an
Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counterdefendant-Appellant,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited liability partnership;
MRI LIMITED, an Idaho limited partnership; MRI MOBILE
LIMITED, an Idaho limited partnership,
Defendants-Counterc laimants-Respondents-Cross Appellants.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE MIKE WETHERELL

JACK S. GJORDING

THOMAS A. BANDUCCI

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

000001

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant,
and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, an Idaho nonprofit
corporation,
Counterdefendant-Appellant,

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED, an Idaho
limited partnership; MRI MOBILE
LIMITED,an Idaho limited partnership
Defendants-CounterclaimantsRespondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL
Supreme Court Docket No. 40012-2012
Ada County Docket No. 2004-11388

A Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript was filed August 28, 2008, in appeal No.
34885, Saint Alphonsus v. MRI Associate; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the Appeal Record in this case shall be
AUGMENTED to include the Court File, Reporter's Transcript, and Clerk's Record filed in prior
appeal No. 34885.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall contain the documents requested in the
Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any document included
in the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 34885.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare and
lodge a SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT with the District Court, which shall
contain the proceedings requested in the Notice of Appeal, but shall not duplicate any proceedings
ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL- Docket No. 40012-2012
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included in the Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 34885. The LIMITED CLERK'S
RECORD and REPORTER'S TRANSCRlPT shall be filed with this Court after settlement.
DATED this

cc:

!f.!1_ day of June 2012.

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Reporter
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Date: 1/9/2013

Fourth Judicial District Court- Ada County

Time: 09:49 AM

ROA Report

Page 1 of 81

User: CCTHIEBJ

Case: CV-OC-2004-11388 Current Judge: Mike Wetherell
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care Inc vs. MRI Associates LLP, etal.

Date

Code

User

10/18/2004

NEWC

CCCOLEMJ

New Case Filed

Michael Mclaughlin

CCCOLEMJ

Civil Complaint, More Than $1 000, No Prior
Appearance

Michael Mclaughlin

SMIS

CCCOLEMJ

Summons Issued

Michael Mclaughlin

AFOS

CCTAYSSE

Affidavit Of Service & Summons (3/31/05)

Michael Mclaughlin

AFOS

CCTAYSSE

(2) Affidavits Of Service (3/31/05)

Michael Mclaughlin

CCYRAGMA

Answer(t Banducci For Defs) No Prior
Appearance

Michael Mclaughlin

CCYRAGMA

Counterclaim With Prior Appearance

Michael Mclaughlin

SMFI

CCYRAGMA

Summons Filed

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCYRAGMA

(2)notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

5/25/2005

CONF

DCABBOSM

Notice Of Tele Stat Conf (6/24/05 @3:30pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

6/24/2005

NOTS

CCMINEDF

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

ANSW

CCMINEDF

Answer

Michael Mclaughlin

7/12/2005

NOTC

CCEAUCCL

Amended Notice Of Status Conference

Michael Mclaughlin

7/29/2005

CONF

DCABBOSM

Telephone Status Conf (4/3/06@ 9:15am)

Michael Mclaughlin

PTRL

DCABBOSM

Scheduling Order (pt 7/17/06@ 1:30pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

JTSC

DCABBOSM

Jury Trial Scheduled- (08/01/2006) Michael
Mclaughlin

Michael Mclaughlin

9/19/2005

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion To Disqualify Alt Judge

Michael Mclaughlin

9/23/2005

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order Disqualifying Judge Hurlbutt

Michael Mclaughlin

10/21/2005

NOTD

CCSHAPML

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

10/31/2005

AMEN

CCAMESLC

Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

11/7/2005

NOTD

CCLUNDMJ

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

11/18/2005

MOTN

CCC HILER

Motion For Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCC HILER

Affidavit Of JackS Gjording

Michael Mclaughlin

11/22/2005

NOTD

CCLUNDMJ

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

11/23/2005

AMEN

CCWATSCL

Second Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

11/29/2005

NOTD

CCWATSCL

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

12/2/2005

NOTD

CCWATSCL

(3) Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

12/5/2005

MOTN

CCSHAPML

Motion To File Documents Under Seal

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCSHAPML

Motion For Permission To File Memo Over 25pgs Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCSHAPML

Lodged Memorandum In Support Of Motion To

Michael Mclaughlin

CONT

CCSHAPML

File Documents Under Seal

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCSHAPML

Motn To Establish Absence On The Grounds Of

Michael Mclaughlin

CONT

CCSHAPML

Disqualification

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCSHAPML

Notice Of Association Of Special Counsel For

MichaeiiVIclaughlin

CONT

CCSHAPML

Givens Pursley (mcdevitt For Givns Pr)

Michael Mclaughlin

4/1/2005

5/20/2005

Judge
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Date

Code

User

12/5/2005

HRSC

CCSHAPML

Hearing Scheduled - Motn For Disqualification
(12/27/2005) Michael Mclaughlin

Michael Mclaughlin

12/6/2005

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order To File Documents Under Seal

Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order Permitting Memo Over 25 Pages

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCBROWKM

St. Als Memo In Support Of Motion To Dq-seal

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBROWKM

Affidavit Of David Lombardi - Sealed

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBROWKM

Affidavit Of Patrick Miller- Sealed

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBROWKM

Affidavit Of Jack Gjording - Sealed

Michael l\/lclaughlin

12/7/2005

NOTD

CCBLACJE

Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

12/21/2005

NOTS

CCWATSCL

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

12/22/2005

STIP

CCWRIGRM

Stip To Extenhd Deadline To Amend Pleadings

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCBOURPT

Hearing Scheduled -Amen Note Hear
(01 /13/2006) Michael Mclaughlin

Michael Mclaughlin

CCSHAPML

Application For Admission Pro Hac Vice (peter No Michael Mclaughlin
Prior Appearance
R Jarvis)

AFFD

CCSHAPML

Affidavit Of Peter R Jarvis In Supprt Of Appl

Michael Mclaughlin

DECL

CCSHAPML

Declaration Of Thomas A Banducci In Supprt

Michael Mclaughlin

CONT

CCSHAPML

Of Application For Admission Pro Hac

Michael Mclaughlin

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
12/27/2005 04:00PM: Hearing Vacated

Michael Mclaughlin

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Procedural Order On Motn To Establish Grounds Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

DCABBOSM

Order Re: Application For Admission Pro Hac V

Michael Mclaughlin

APPL

CCBOURPT

Application For Admission Pro Hac Vice

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBOURPT

Affidavit Of D. Elkanich In Support Of Appl

Michael Mclaughlin

DECL

CCBOURPT

Declaration OfT Banducci In Support Of Appl

Michael Mclaughlin

1/3/2006

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order Re: App. For Admission - Elkanich

Michaell\/lclaughlin

1/9/2006

RESP

MCBIEHKJ

Response To Motion to Establish Absence of
Grounds for DQ

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Thomas Banducci

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Peter Jarvis

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Joseph Messmer

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCEARLJD

Motion to Strike Affidavits of P Jarvis and T
Banducci

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCEARLJD

Lodged Reply Brief re Motn to Establish Absence Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCEARLJD

Affidavit of Chas McDevitt

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCEARLJD

Affidavit of K Fry

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCLUNDMJ

Affidavit of Lannie Checketts

Michael Mclaughlin

12/27/2005

12/29/2005

1/12/2006

1/13/2006

Judge
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Date

Code
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1/13/2006

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Michael Mclaughlin
01/13/2006 01:30PM: Hearing Held Amen Note
Hear

ADVS

CCBROWKM

Case Taken Under Advisement

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion to Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

AFSM

CCAMESLC

Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCAMESLC

Lodged-Memo in Support of Motion to Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCMAXWSL

Amended Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of
Gem State Radiology

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCMAXWSL

Notice of Deposition of Gem State Radiology

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCMAXWSL

Amended Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of
Intermountain Medical Imaging

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCMAXWSL

Notice of Deposition of Intermountain Medical
Imaging

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCIVIAXWSL

Amended Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of
Imaging Center Radiologists

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCMAXWSL

Notice of Deposition of Imaging Center
Radiologists

Michael Mclaughlin

STIP

CCMAXWSL

Confidentiality Stipulation

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCMAXWSL

Notice of Hearing 2-06-2006 @ 3:00PM

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCMAXWSL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
02/06/2006 03:00 PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Michael Mclaughlin
Memorandum Decision on
Plaintiff's/Counterdefendants' Motion to Establish
Absence of Grounds for Disqualification

AFOS

CCWATSCL

Affidavit Of Service (3) (re:subpoenas)

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion to Shorten Time

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion to quash and for Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Neil D Mcfeeley

Michael Mclaughlin

1/26/2006

NOTS

CCBLACJE

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

1/27/2006

AMEN

CCAMESLC

Amended Notice of Deposition of Intermountain
Medical Imaging

Michael Mclaughlin

1/31/2006

RESP

CCSHAPML

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, inc's and Saint Michael Mclaughlin
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center Response to
MRI Associates Motion to Compel and Request
for Attorneys Fees

AFFD

CCSHAPML

Affidavit of Patrick J Miller in Support of St Al's
Response to MRI Associates Motion to Compel
and Request for Attorneys Fees

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCEARLJD

Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCEARUD

Lodged
Memo In Support of Motn for Leave to Michael Mclaughlin
File First Amended Counterclaim and Third Party
Complaint

1/17/2006

1/19/2006

1/23/2006

Judge
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Date

Code

User

2/1/2006

AMEN

CCEARLJD

(2) Amended Notice of Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

ADVS

CCBROWKM

Case Taken Under Advisement

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

MCBIEHKJ

Reply Brief in Support of MRI Associates Motion
to COmpel

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice of Hearing

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

MCBIEHKJ

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
02/21/2006 02:30PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on
02/06/2006 03:00 PM: Hearing Held

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCDWONCP

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

2/7/2006

NOTD

MCBIEHKJ

Third Amended
Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

2/10/2006

NOTD

CCBLACJE

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCBLACJE

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCBLACJE

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion to Michael Mclaughlin
Compel

HRSC

DCABBOSM

Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone
04/03/2006 02:30 PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

DCABBOSM

Notice of Rescheduled Telephonic Status
Conference

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCWOODCL

Lodged Memorandum In Opposition To
Defendant/Counterclaimant's Motion For Leave
To File First Amened Counterclaim and Third
Party Complaint

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

2/17/2006

NOTS

CCDWONCP

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

2/20/2006

ADVS

CCBROWKM

Case Taken Under Advisement

Michael Mclaughlin

2/21/2006

MISC

MCBIEHKJ

Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Counterclaim

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of G Rey Reinhardt in Support of Motion Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on
02/21/2006 02:30PM: Hearing Held

Michael Mclaughlin

2/22/2006

NOTS

CCDWONCP

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

2/28/2006

NOTS

CCDWONCP

(3) Notices of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

3/2/2006

NOTS

CCHARRAK

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

3/3/2006

LODG

CCSHAPML

Lodged Memorandum in Support of MRI
Associates Motion to Compel Deposition of
SARMC

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCHARRAK

Notice of Continuation of Taking Deposition of
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center Duces
Tecum

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCHARRAK

MRI Associates' Motion To Compel Deposition of Michael Mclaughlin
000007
SARMC

2/2/2006

2/6/2006

2/13/2006

2/14/2006

Judge
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Case: CV-OC-2004-11388 Current Judge: Mike Wetherell
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care Inc vs. MRI Associates LLP, eta I.

Date

Code

User

3/3/2006

AFFD

CCHARRAK

Affidavit of G.Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRI
Associates' Motion to Compel Deposition of
SARMC

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCHARRAK

Non Idaho Cased Cited in Support of MRI
Associates Motion to Compel Deposition of
SARMC

Michael Mclaughlin

3/6/2006

NOTS

CCDWONCP

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

3/7/2006

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision on
Michael Mclaughlin
Defendant!Counterclaimant's Motion for Leave to
Amend Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint

AMEN

CCBLACJE

First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party
Complaint
(Banducci for MRI Associates)

Michael Mclaughlin

3/9/2006

NOTS

CCDWONCP

(2)Notices Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

3/13/2006

NOTC

CCBROWKM

Notice of Hearing 3/16/06

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCBROWKM

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
03/16/2006 01:00PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

SMFI

CCEARLJD

Summons Filed

Michael Mclaughlin

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
03/16/2006 01:00PM: Hearing Vacated

Michael Mclaughlin

CONF

CCBROWKM

Conference scheduled 3/16/06 at 11am

Michael Mclaughlin

3/15/2006

LODG

CCSHAPML

Loqged Memorandum in Aid of Scheduling
Conference

Michael Mclaughlin

3/16/2006

NOTC

CCSHAPML

Notice of Hearing (4/4/06 @ 3:00PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCSHAPML

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/04/2006 03:00
PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

3/17/2006

NOTS

CCEARLJD

(4) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

3/20/2006

HRVC

DCABBOSM

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 08/01/2006
09:00AM: Hearing Vacated

Michael Mclaughlin

HRVC

DCABBOSM

Hearing result for Pre-trial Conference held on
07/17/2006 01:30PM: Hearing Vacated

Michael Mclaughlin

HRVC

DCABBOSM

Hearing result for Status by Phone held on
04/03/2006 02:30PM: Hearing Vacated

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

DCABBOSM

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/26/2007 09:00 Michael Mclaughlin
AM) 20 days

HRSC

DCABBOSM

Hearing Scheduled (Civil Pretrial Conference
02/12/2007 01:30PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

DCABBOSM

Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone
08/21/2006 04:00 PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

DCABBOSM

Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone
10/30/2006 04:00 PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

DCABBOSM

Amended Scheduling Order

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCSHAPML

MRI Associates Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

3/14/2006

3/21/2006

Judge
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3/21/2006

LODG

CCSHAPML

Lodged Memorandum in Support of MRI
Michael Mclaughlin
Associates Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

AFFD

CCSHAPML

Affidavit of G Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRI
Associates Motion for Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCSHAPML

Affidavit of Thomas E Henson M.D in Support
MRI Associates Motion for Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCSHAPML

Non-Idaho Cases in Support of MRis Motion for
Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCSHAPML

MRI's Motion to Compel Production of Discovery
After April 1, 2004

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCSHAPML

Lodged Memoranum in Support of MRI
Associates Motion to Compel Production of
Discovery

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCSHAPML

Non-Idaho Cases in Support of MRis Motion to
Compel Production of Discovery

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCSHAPML

AFfidavit of G Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRI
Associates Motion to Compel Production of
Discovery

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCSHAPML

MRI Associates Motion to Compel Deposition
Responses by Sandra Bruce

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCSHAPML

Lodged Memorandum in Support of MRI
Associates Motion to Compel Depotition
Responses by Sandra Bruce

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCSHAPML

Affidavit of G Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRI
Associates Motion to Compel Deposition
Responses by Sandra Bruce

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCSHAPML

Non-Idaho Cases in Support of MRI Associates
Michael Mclaughlin
Motion to Compel Deposition Answers by Sandra
Bruce

MOTN

CCSHAPML

MRI Associates Motion to Compel Continuation of Michael Mclaughlin
Deposition of Sandra Bruce

MISC

CCSHAPML

Non-Idaho Cases in Support of MRis Motion to
Compel Continuation of Deposition of Sandra
Bruce

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCSHAPML

Lodged Memorandum in Support of MRI
Associates Motion to Compel Continuation of
Deposition of Sandra Bruce

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCSHAPML

Affidavit of G Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRI
Associates Motion to Compel Continuation of
Deposition of Sandra Bruce

Michael Mclaughlin

3/22/2006

NOTC

CCWRIGRM

Notice of Association of Counsel

Michael Mclaughlin

3/28/2006

RSPN

CCSHAPML

Third Party Defendants Response to MRI
Associates Motion to Compel Continuance of
Deposition of Sandra Bruce (Jones for
Intermountain Medical Imaging, Gem State
Radiology, and Imaging Center Radiologists)

Michael Mclaughlin

RSPS

CCEARLJD

Response to Mri Motion to Compel Deposition
Responses

Michael Mclaughlin

Judge
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3/28/2006

LODG

CCEARLJD

Lodged Memo in opposition to Mri Associates
Motion to Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCEARLJD

Affidavit of Stephanie Westermeier

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCEARLJD

Lodged Memorandum in Opposition to Mri Motion Michael Mclaughlin
to Compel Production of Discovery

MISC

CCBLACJE

Non-Idaho Cases Cited in Support of MRI Assoc. Michael Mclaughlin
Opposition to Motion to Quash or Modify
Subpoena and for Protective Order

LODG

CCBLACJE

Lodged Memo in Opposition to Motion and for
Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCBLACJE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/09/2006 03:00
PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

ACCP

CCWRIGRM

Acceptance Of Service (03/29/06)

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCDWONCP

Motion for Disqualification of Alternate Judge

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCSHAPML

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

RESP

MCBIEHKJ

Response To MRI Associates Memo in
Opposition to Motion and Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Jeffrey R Cliff

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Carole L Hanks

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Motion held on 04/04/2006
03:00PM: Hearing Held

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCHUNTAM

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled

Michael Mclaughlin

3/30/2006

4/3/2006

4/4/2006

Judge

0610612006 03:00 PM) Motions for Summary
Judgment

4/12/2006

4/13/2006

4/14/2006

HRVC

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Motion held on 05/09/2006
03:00PM: Hearing Vacated

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCDWONCP

Non-Idaho Cases Cited in Support of MRIA's
Motion to Compel Interrogatory Responses from
SARMC

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCDWONCP

Affidavit of G Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRIA'S Michael Mclaughlin
Motion to Compel Interrogatory Responses from
SARMC

MOTN

CCDWONCP

MRIA"S Motion to Compel Interrogatory
Responses from SARMC

Michael Mclaughlin

MEML

CCDWONCP

Memorandum in Support of Motion Lodged

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCDWONCP

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCCHILER

Notice Of Taking Deposition of Kathleen Elliott as Michael Mclaughlin
Receiver for Client Files of Carl Harder

NOTS

CCDWONCP

Notice Of Service

HRSC

CCDWONCP

Notice of Hearing (Motion to Compel 05/02/2006 Michael Mclaughlin
04:00PM)

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed of 4/4/06 hearing

Michael Mclaughlin

ANSW

MCBIEHKJ

Answer To Amended Counterclaim

Michael Mclaughlin

Michael Mclaughlin
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Date

Code

User

4/17/2006

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision on Defs Motions to
Michael Mclaughlin
Compel, Motion to Quash Subpoenas and Motion
for Protective Order

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order for Disqualification -Judge McKee

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCAMESLC

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCSHAPML

l\lotice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCSHAPML

Amended Notice of Hearing (6/6/06@ 3:00PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

4/19/2006

AFOS

CCEARLJD

Affidavit Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

4/21/2006

NOTS

CCDWONCP

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

4/25/2006

NOTS

CCC HILER

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCEARLJD

Lodged Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCBLAC.IE

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCBLACJE

Motion for Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCBLAC.IE

Lodged Memo in Support of Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

4/27/2006

NOTS

CCHARRAK

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

4/28/2006

ANSW

CCSHAPML

Third Party Defendants Answer to Third Party
Complaint (Jones for Intermountain Medical
Imaging, Gem State Radiology, Imaging Center
Radiologists)

Michael Mclaughlin

5/1/2006

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

5/2/2006

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on
05/02/2006 04:00PM: Hearing Held

Michael Mclaughlin

ADVS

CCBROWKM

Case Taken Under Advisement

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCEARLJD

(2) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

5/3/2006

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision and Order

Michael McLaughlin

5/5/2006

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion for Limited Admission of James R. Wade

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care and St AI RMC Motion to
Strike

Michael McLaughlin

LODG

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care and St Als RMC Lodged
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike

Michael McLaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care and St Als RMC Motion to Michael Mclaughlin
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

LODG

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care and St Als RMC Lodged
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care and St Als RMC Motion for Michael Mclaughlin
Partial Summary Judgment

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller

4/18/2006

4/26/2006

Judge

4.14.06

Michael McLaughlin

Michael Mclaughlin
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5/5/2006

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of St Als Diversified and Michael Mclaughlin
St Als RMC Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

LODG

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care and St Als RMC Lodged
Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (06/06/06@ 3:00pm) Motions

Michael Mclaughlin

5/8/2006

NOTC

CCSHAPML

Saint Alphonsus Notice of Errata Re:
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

5/9/2006

NOTS

CCDWONCP

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

5/10/2006

NOTS

CCAMESLC

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

5/12/2006

NOTS

CCAMESLC

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

5/15/2006

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order for Limited Admission of James R. Wade

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCEARLJD

Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to
Subpoena

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCEARLJD

Affidavit of Warren Jones

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCEARLJD

(2) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCEARLJD

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCEARLJD

Lodged Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCEARLJD

Notice of Hearing
Dismiss

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCSHAPML

(3) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCSHAPML

Third Party Defendant Intermountain Medical
Imaging Lie's Privileged Documents Log

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCBLACJE

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

5/22/2006

NOTS

CCSHAPML

(3) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

5/23/2006

AFFD

CCDWONCP

Affidavit of G Rey Reinhardt in Support of
Opposition to St Alphonsus Diversified Care Inc
and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCDWONCP

Affidavit of Thomas E Henson MD in Support of
Opposition to Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care
Inc and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

MEML

CCDWONCP

Memorandum in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care Inc and Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center's Motion for Partial
Summary Juqgment Loqged

Michael Mclaughlin

5/24/2006

NOTD

CCEARLJD

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

5/26/2006

NOTC

CCWOODCL

MRI A's Notice Of Errata RE: Memorandum In
Support Of MRI A's Motion For Summary
Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

5/16/2006

5/17/2006

5/19/2006

Judge

(6.6.06@3pm)

Motion to
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5/26/2006

AFFD

CCWOODCL

Supplemental Affidavit Of G. Rey Reinhardt In
Support Of MRI Assoc's Motion For Summary
Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

5/30/2006

MOTN

CCBLACJE

Motion to Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCBLACJE

Motion to Strike in Connection with Summary
Judgment Proceedings

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCBLACJE

Lodged Memo in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCBLACJE

Lodged Memo in Support Motion to Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBLACJE

Affidavit of Patrick

HRSC

CCBLACJE

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
06/15/2006 09:00AM)

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCSHAPML

Affidavit of Daniel J Gordon in Support of
Opposition to Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care
and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's
Motion to Strike

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCSHAPML

Lodged Memorandum in Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care and Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center's Motion to Strike

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCSHAPML

Non-Idaho Cases Cited in Memorandum in
Opposition to SADC and SARMC Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Strike

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCSHAPML

Lodged Memorandum in Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Centers, and Third Party
Defendants Motion to Dismiss

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCSHAPML

Loqged Reply Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Michael Mclaughlin
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

MISC

CCSHAPML

Non-Idaho Cases Cited in Reply Memorandum in Michael Mclaughlin
Support of MRIA's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

MISC

CCWRIGRM

Non-Idaho Cases Cited in Memorandum in
Opposition to: St Als Diversified Care, St Als
RMC, and Third Party Defendants Motion to
Dismiss

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCBOURPT

Amended Notice of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCBOURPT

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCDWONCP

Motion to Shorten Time

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCDWONCP

Notice of Hearing (06/06/06 at 3:00 PM) Motion to Michael Mclaughlin
Strike

LODG

CCC HILER

Michael Mclaughlin
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim

LODG

CCC HILER

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike

5/31/2006

6/1/2006

6/2/2006

Judge

~I

Miller

Michael Mclaughlin

Michael Mclaughlin
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6/2/2006

NOTS

CCEARLJD

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

6/5/2006

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order Shortening Time to Hear Motion to Strike

Michael Mclaughlin

LODG

CCBLACJE

Loqged Memo in Opposition to motion to Strike

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
06/06/2006 03:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion to
Dismiss and Motion to Strike

Michael Mclaughlin

ADVS

CCBROWKM

Case Taken Under Advisement

Michael Mclaughlin

6/8/2006

NOTC

CCSHAPML

Notice of Video Deposition Duces Tecum of
Vicken Garabedian M.D

Michael Mclaughlin

6/9/2006

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion Appointing Discovery Master

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCAMESLC

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCBOURPT

MRIA's Opposition to Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

AFSM

CCBOURPT

Affidavit In Support Of Opposition

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCSHAPML

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center Notice of
Objection to Motion for Appointment of Special
Discovery Master

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCSHAPML

Affidavit of Jack S Gjording in Further Support of
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center Motion to
Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCDWONCP

ExParte Motion for Order Shortening Time for
Hearing

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCDWONCP

Motion for Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

MEML

CCDWONCP

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Michael Mclaughlin
Order Lodged

AFFD

CCDWONCP

Affidavit in Support of Motion for Protective Order Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCSHAPML

Michael Mclaughlin
Gem State Radiology Intermountain Medical
Imaging and Imaging Center Radiologists Notice
of Objection to Motion for Appointment of Special
Discovery Master

OPPO

CCEARLJD

Opposition to Motion for Protective Order re
Deposition of Dr Garabedian and Dr Seabourn

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCEARLJD

Affidavit of Daniel Gordon in Support of
Opposition to Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCEARLJD

Ex Parte Motion for Order Shortening Time for
Hearing

Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order Shortening Time (to hear Protective Order) Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
06/15/2006 09:00AM: Hearing Held

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCNAGEDA

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCEARLJD

Notice of Status Conference

NOTS

CCEARLJD

Notice Of Service

6/6/2006

6/13/2006

6/14/2006

6/15/2006

6/19/2006

Judge

(7.6.06@1 :30pm}

Michael Mclaughlin
Michael Mclaughlin
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6/21/2006

ORDR

CCKENNJA

Order re: scheduling of deposition of Jeffrey
Seabourn and Vicken Garabedian

Michael Mclaughlin

NOSV

CCTEELAL

Notice Of Service 6/19/2006

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCWATSCL

Amended Motion for Appointment of Discovery
Master

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWATSCL

Affidavit of Thomas A. Banducci

Michael Mclaughlin

MEML

CCWATSCL

Memorandum Lodged in Support of Amended
Motin for Appointment of Discovery Master

Michael Mclaughlin

NOHG

CCWATSCL

Notice Of Hearing (07/06/06@1 :30pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

6/22/2006

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

6/29/2006

LODG

CCC HILER

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Appoint
Special Discovery Master

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCCHILER

Affidavit of Patrick .1 Miller in Support of
Opposition to the Appointment of a Discovery
Master

Michael Mclaughlin

OBH

CCEARUD

Objection to Motion for Appointment of Discovery Michael Mclaughlin
Master

MOTN

CCWATSCL

Motion to Compel Production of Redacted
Information from Non-Privileged Documents

AFSM

CCWATSCL

MEI\Ill

CCWATSCL

Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon In Support Of Motion Michael Mclaughlin
Document sealed
Michael Mclaughlin
Memorandum Lodged in Support of Motion to
Compel

AFFD

CCWOODCL

Michael Mclaughlin
Affidavit Of Daniel Gordon In Support Of Reply
Memorandum In Support Of Amended Motion To
Appoint Discovery Master

MEMO

CCWOODCL

Reply Memorandum In Support Of Amended
Motion For Appointment Of Discovery Master

Michael Mclaughlin

7/6/2006

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Status held on 07/06/2006
01:30PM: Hearing Held Status Conference

Michael Mclaughlin

71712006

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Taking Deposition of Robin Cioffi

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Taking Deposition of Jack Floyd

Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order Denying Motion for Appointment of
Discovery Master

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCAMESLC

Notice Of Service (3)

Michael Mclaughlin

7/13/2006

MISC

CCAMESLC

Third Party Defendant Gem State Raidology,
LLP's Supplemental Priveleged Documents Log

Michael Mclaughlin

7/24/2006

HRSC

DCABBOSM

Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone
08/21/2006 03:45PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motions to
Strike, Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment,
and Plaintff/Third Party Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss

Michael Mclaughlin

6/30/2006

7/5/2006

7/12/2006

Judge

Michael Mclaughlin
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8/7/2006

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

MRI Associates Motion to Compel Documents
Pursuant to Confidentiality Stipulation

Michael McLaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Michael McLaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Michael McLaughlin

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon
Document sealed
Notice Of Hearing (08/21/06@ 3:00pm)

HRSC

CCWRIGRM

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/21/2006 03:00
PM)

Michael McLaughlin

MOTN

CCYRAGMA

Motion for Reconsideration or for Permission to
Appeal

Michael McLaughlin

MEMO

CCYRAGMA

Memorandum in Support of Pint's Motion for
Reconsideration or for Permission to Appeal

Michael McLaughlin

NOTC

CCYRAGMA

Notice of Hearing (9/1/06@3pm)

Michael McLaughlin

HRSC

CCYRAGMA

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
09/01/2006 03:00PM) Motion for
Reconsideration for Permission to Appeal

Michael McLaughlin

8/8/2006

NOTC

CCWRIGRM

Notice of Vacating Hearing on MRI Associates
Motion to Compel Production of Redacted
Information from Non-Privileged Documents
(08/21/06@ 3:00pm)

Michael McLaughlin

8/14/2006

RSPS

CCBLACJE

Response to MRIA's Motion to Compel

Michael McLaughlin

8/17/2006

RPLY

CCYRAGMA

MRI Assoc Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Compel Documents

Michael McLaughlin

8/21/2006

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion held on 08/21/2006
03:00 PM: Hearing Held

Michael McLaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Status by Phone held on
08/21/2006 03:45PM: Hearing Held

Michael McLaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Status by Phone held on
08/21/2006 04:00PM: Hearing Held

Michael McLaughlin

8/24/2006

MISC

DCJOHNSI

Transcript Filed

Michael McLaughlin

8/25/2006

OPPO

CCWRIGRM

MRIAs Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration

Michael McLaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt

Michael McLaughlin

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 02/26/2007
09:00AM: Hearing Vacated 20 days

Michael McLaughlin

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Civil Pretrial Conference held
on 02/12/2007 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated

Michael McLaughlin

NOHG

CCTEELAL

Michael McLaughlin
Notice Of Hearing ON Motion To Quash And
Motion For Protective Order 8.29.2006 @ 3 pm

HRSC

CCTEELAL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/29/2006 03:00
Michael McLaughlin
PM) Motion To Quash And Motion For Protective
Order

MOTN

CCWOODCL

Motion to Shorten Time

Michael McLaughlin

MOTN

CCTEELAL

Motion To Quash And Motion For Protective
Order

Michael McLaughlin

8/28/2006

Judge

Michael McLaughlin
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8/28/2006

MEMO

CCTEELAL

Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Quash
And Motion For Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCTEELAL

Affidavit In Support Of Motion TO Quash ANd
Motion For Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCTEELAL

Subpeona For Documents And Notice Of Taking
Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

DCABBOSM

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/16/2007 09:00 Michael Mclaughlin
AM) 20 days

HRSC

DCABBOSM

Hearing Scheduled (Civil Pretrial Conference
04/02/2007 03:00PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

DCABBOSM

Notice of Rescheduled Trial and Pretrial

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

St Lukes RMC Motion to Quash Defendant MRA
Assoc Subpoena and for Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Nicole C. Hancock

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

St Luke RMC Memorandum in Support of Motion Michael Mclaughlin
to Quash

NOTC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice of Hearing (8/29/06@ 3 PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion to Quash Subpoena

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice of Hearing (8/29/06@ 3 PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCDWONCP

Opposition to Boise Orthopedic Centers of
Idaho's Motion to Quash and Motion for
Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCDWONCP

Affidavit of Daniel J Gordon in Support of
Opposition

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCDWONCP

Affidavit of Robin Cioffi in Support of Opposition

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCDWONCP

Pinnacle Imaging's and Intermountain
Orthopaedics' Motion to Quash and Motion for
Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCDWONCP

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion held on 08/29/2006
03:00PM: Hearing Held Motion To Quash And
Motion For Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

8/30/2006

RPLY

CCCHILER

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Reconsideration or, in the Alternative,
for Permission to Appeal

Michael Mclaughlin

9/1/2006

ADVS

CCBROWKM

Case Taken Under Advisement

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCSHAPML

Motion to (1) Compel Jack Floyd to Answer
Questions Re: lsoscan, lie and (2) Compel MRI
and its Attorneys to Produce the Subset and
Pre-Dissociation Documents

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCSHAPML

Michael Mclaughlin
Memorandum in Support of Motion (1) Compel
Jack Floyd to Answer Questions Re: lsoscan Lie
and (2) Compel MRI and its Attorneys to Produce
the Subset and Pre-Dissociation Documents

AFFD

CCSHAPML

Affidavit of Jack S Gjording

8/29/2006

Juqge

Michael Mclaughlin
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9/1/2006

NOTC

CCSHAPMl

Notice of Hearing (9/20/06 @4:30PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCSHAPMl

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/20/2006 04:30
PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCSHAPMl

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Sealed Pursuant to Court-Order Contains
Confidential Documents Not to Be Opened,
displayed or Revealed Except to Authorized
Persons
Document sealed
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
09/01/2006 03:00PM: Hearing Held Motion for
Reconsideration for Permission to Appeal

9/5/2006

ORDR

CCBROWKM

(5)0rders Quashing MRI Associates Subpoena
for Documents/Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

9/8/2006

AFOS

CCMAXWSl

Affidavit Of Service 9-07-2006

Michael Mclaughlin

9/13/2006

MISC

CCWRIGRM

Certificate Regarding Compliance with Rule
37(a)(2)

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

MCBIEHKJ

Opposition to Motion to Compel Jack Floyd to
Answer

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Thomas A Banducci

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCNAVATA

Notice of Taking Deposition of Jack Floyd

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCNAVATA

Notice of Continued Deposition Duces Tecum of
Robin Cioffi

Michael Mclaughlin

9/15/2006

RPlY

CCWRIGRM

Michael Mclaughlin

9/18/2006

NOTS

CCSHAPMl

Reply Memorandum in Support of St Als Motion
to Compel
Document sealed
(2) Notice Of Service

RSPN

CCSHAPMl

MRIA's First Supplemental Responses to
Intermountain Medical Imaging First Set of
Interrogatories

Michael Mclaughlin

RSPN

CCSHAPMl

MRIA's Second Supplemental Reponses to Saint Michael Mclaughlin
Alphonsus Diversified Care Inc's and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center Inc's Fifth
Request for Production of Documents

9/20/2006

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion held on 09/20/2006
04:30PM: Hearing Vacated

Michael Mclaughlin

9/22/2006

MOTN

CCNAVATA

Motion for Commissions to Take Out-of-state
Depositions

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCNAVATA

Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of Motion Michael Mclaughlin
for Commissions to take Out-of-state Depositions

AMEN

CCYRAGMA

Amended Notice of Continued Deposition of
Robin Cioffi

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCYRAGMA

Amended Notic of Video Deposition of Grant
Chamberlain

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed (8/29/06 hearing)

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCWRIGRM

Amended Notice of Hearing (10/24/06@ 3:30pm) Michael Mclaughlin

9/14/2006

9/25/2006

9/26/2006

Judge

Michael Mclaughlin

Michael Mclaughlin
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9/26/2006

HRSC

CCWRIGRM

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/24/2006 03:30
PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

10/3/2006

NOTD

CCWRIGRM

(3} Notice Of Taking Video Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCWRIGRM

(2) Amended Notice of Taking Video Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCWRIGRM

2nd Amended Notice of Video Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

OBH

CCWRIGRM

Objection to Notice of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCNAVATA

Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition of Jack
Floyd

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCNAVATA

Notice of Status Conference ( 10/24/06 @
3:30pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Approval of Court to Take Out of State
Depositions

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCBlAC.IE

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

OBJT

CCYRAGMA

Objection to Subpeona and Notice of Taking
Michael Mclaughlin
Deposition of Pricewaterhousecoopers llC and
Objection to Motion for Commissions to Take Out
of State Depositions

NOTD

CCYRAGMA

Notice Of Taking Deposition of Julli Hopkins

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCYRAGMA

Motion to Compel MRIA Financial Statements

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCYRAGMA

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel
MRIA Financial Statements

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCYRAGMA

Affidavit of Jack S Gjording

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCYRAGMA

Notice of Hearing (Hearing Scheduled
10/24/2006 03:00 PM) Motion to Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCYRAGMA

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCEARLJD

Notice of Change of Address

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCEARLJD

1\lotice of Motion and Motion for Reconsideration

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCEARlJD

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Michael Mclaughlin
Decision to Quash Subpoenas

AFFD

CCEARLJD

Affidavit of Bruce Budge

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCEARlJD

Affidavit of John McConnell in Support of Motion
for Reconsideration

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCEARLJD

Affidavit of Daniel Gordon in Support of Motion for Michael Mclaughlin
Reconsideration

NOTC

CCEARUD

Notice of Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration
(10.24.06@3pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCBlACJE

Notice of Motion and Motion to Extend Certain
Pre-Trial Deadlines in Connection with New Trial
Date

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBlACJE

Affidavit of Ed Whitelaw in Support of MRI's
Motion for Reconsideration

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCBlAC.IE

Motion to Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCBlACJE

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

10/4/2006

10/5/2006

10/6/2006

10/10/2006

Judge
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10/10/2006

AFFD

CCBLAC,IE

Affidavit of Warren E. Jones

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCBLACJE

Motion to Strike MRIA's Objection

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCBLAC,IE

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBLACJE

Affidavit of Warren E. Jones

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCBLAC.IE

Notice of Hearing
(10-24-06@ 3:30PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCWRIGRM

Amended Notice of Video Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCTEELAL

St. Luk's regional Medical Center LTD.'s
Michael Mclaughlin
Opposition To Motion To Reconsider Decision To
Quash MRI's Antitrust Subpoenas

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hospital Diagnostic Michael Mclaughlin
Imaging Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Reconsider

NOTC

CCWATSCL

Notice of Association of Counsel (Kendal
McDevitt as attorney for Orthopedic Centers of
Idaho)

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCWATSCL

Opposition to IIIIRI Associates Motin to
Reconsider Court's Order Quashing Subpoena

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWATSCL

Memorandum in Support of Opposition

Michael Mclaughlin

OBJT

CCWRIGRM

Objection to MRIAs Motion to Extend Certain
Pre-Trial Deadlines

llllichael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCWRIGRM

Pinnacle Imaging & Intermountain Orthopaedics
Joinder

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCWOODCL

Opposition to Motion to Compel MRIA Financial
Statements (T. Banducci for MRI Assoc.)

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWOODCL

Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of
Opposition of Motion to Compel MRIA Financial
Statements

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCMORAML

Joinder in IMI's Objection to MRIA's Motion to
Extend Certain Pre-Trial Deadlines

Michael Mclaughlin

10/19/2006

!'JOTS

CCNAVATA

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

10/20/2006

AFFD

CCC HILER

Affidavit of Jeremy G Ladle in Support of Saint
Alphonsus' Motion to Compel MRIA Financial
Statements

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCC HILER

Reply Memorandum in Support of Saint
Alphonsus' Motion in Compel MRIA Financial
Statements

Michael Mclaughlin

REPL

CCWOODCL

Michael Mclaughlin
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Reconsider Decision to Quash MRIA's Anti Trust
Subpoenas (D. Gordon for MRI Assoc.)

REPL

CCWOODCL

MRIA's Reply in Support of Motion to Extend
Certain Pre Trial Deadlines in Connection with
New Trial Date

10/11/2006
10/17/2006

10/18/2006

Judge

Michael Mclaughlin
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10/23/2006

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion for Michael Mclaughlin
Reconsideration, or, in the Alternative, For
Permission to Appeal

10/24/2006

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
10/24/2006 03:00PM: Hearing Held Motion to
Compel and Motion for Reconsideration

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion held on 10/24/2006
03:30PM: Hearing Held

Michael Mclaughlin

ADVS

CCBROWKM

Case Taken Under Advisement

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCHEAT.Il

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCHEATJl

Intermountain Medical lmagings 1st set Of
Michael Mclaughlin
Interrogatories & 2nd Request For Production To
Counterclaimant & 3rd Party Plaintiff MRIA

10/30/2006

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Status by Phone held on
10/30/2006 04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated

Michael Mclaughlin

10/31/2006

NOSV

CCTEElAl

Notice Of Service (2)

Michael Mclaughlin

11/2/2006

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motions to
Compel; Defendant's Motion to Extend Pretrial
Deadlines; Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration; Third-Party Defendant's Motion
to Compel Answers to Interrogatories and
Produce Documents; Third-Party Defendant's
Motion to Strike MRIA's Objection to Producing
Moffat Thomas Documents

Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

DCABBOSM

Order Appointing a Discovery Master and Notice
of Hearing for Scheduling Conference

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

DCABBOSM

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference
11/13/2006 03:00 PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

11/3/2006

NOTS

CCBlACJE

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

11/6/2006

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed Motion Hearing 10/24/06

Michael Mclaughlin

11/8/2006

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion for Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of J. Will Varin

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOSV

CCTEElAl

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on Michael Mclaughlin
11/13/2006 03:00 PM: Hearing Held

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

ADVS

CCBROWKM

Case Taken Under Advisement

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCBROWKM

Third Party Defendant's Proposed Scheduling
Order

Michael Mclaughlin

11/14/2006

RETS

CCWOODCl

Out of State Return Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

11/15/2006

NOTC

CCMAXWSl

Notice of Unavailable Dates for Trial of Counsel
for Third Party Defs

Michael Mclaughlin

10/27/2006

11/13/2006

Juqge
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11/16/2006

NOTS

CCWOODCL

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWOODCL

Motion for Clarification (D. Gordon for MRI
Assoc.)

Michael Mclaughlin

AFSM

CCWOODCL

Affidavit of Daniel J Gordon In Support Of
Motion for Clarification

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTH

CCWOODCL

Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion for Clarification
(12/05/06@ 4pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCWOODCL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/05/2006 04:00
PM) Motion for Clarification

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

11/17/2006

NOTS

CCNAVATA

(3) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

11/20/2006

NOTS

CCDWOI\ICP

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCHEAT.IL

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision and Order to Reset Trial
Dates

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

DCABBOSM

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/06/2007 09:00 Michael Mclaughlin
AM)

HRSC

DCABBOSM

Hearing Scheduled (Civil Pretrial Conference
07/23/2007 03:00PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

DCABBOSM

3rd Amended Scheduling Order

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

(2) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

DCABBOSM

4th Amended Scheduling Order

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCMAXWSL

Third Party Defs' Joiner in Saint Alphonsus'
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Clarification

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCMAXWSL

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCDWONCP

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care Inc and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center Inc's
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Clarification

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCWOODCL

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

OBJT

CCMORAML

St. Luke's Regional Medical Center Ltd.'s
Objection to Mria's Motion for Clarification

Michael Mclaughlin

NOSV

CCTEELAL

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCBLACJE

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

12/1/2006

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

MRI Associates Reply Memorandum in Support
its Motion for Clarification

Michael Mclaughlin

12/4/2006

NOTS

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

12/5/2006

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Supplemental Order Regarding Appointment of
Discovery Master

Michael Mclaughlin

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion held on 12/05/2006
04:00PM: Hearing Vacated Motion for
Clarification

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCNAVATA

Notice Of Service

11/22/2006

11/28/2006

11/29/2006

11/30/2006

Judge
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12/6/2006

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision on Defs Motion for
Clarification

Michael Mclaughlin

AI\IIEN

DCABBOSM

Amended Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs
Motions to Compel ...

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCC HILER

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

12/7/2006

NOTC

CCPRICDL

l\lotice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum Scott Michael Mclaughlin
Berger

12/12/2006

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed (Status Conference 11 /13/06)

Michael Mclaughlin

12/15/2006

NOTS

CCNAVATA

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

12/18/2006

NOTC

CCNAVATA

Notice of Deposition of Blue Cross of Idaho

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

(2) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCWRIGRM

Plntf/Counterdefendant St Als Diversified Care
and St Als RMC's Disclosure of Lay Witnesses

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCBROWKM

Report of Discovery Master re: Defendant and
Counterclaimant's Motions to Compel Nos 1 and
3

l\llichael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCWOODCL

MRIA's Disclosure of Witnessess Pursuant to
Agreement of Parties

Michael Mclaughlin

DEW I

CCEARUD

Third Party Defendants' Preliminart Witness List
and Disclosure of Testimony

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCEARLJD

THird Party Defendant Gem State Radiology,
LLP's Supplimental Privileged Documents Log

Michael Mclaughlin

CCEARLJD

THird Party Defendant Intermountain Medical
Imaging, LLP's Supplimental Privileged
Documents Log

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCNAVATA

(6) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCC HILER

Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
Complaint

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCCHILER

Motion to Amend to Seet Punitive Damages

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCCHILER

Memorandum in Support of MRI Associates,
LLP's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
Complaint

Michael Mclaughlin

I\IIEMO

CCCHILER

Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion to
Amend to Seek Punitive Damages

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCCHILER

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCCHILER

Affidavit of Grey Reinhardt in Support of of
Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion to
Amend to Seek Punitive Damages
Document sealed
Affidavit of Douglas M Branson

NOHG

CCC HILER

Notice Of Hearing

l\llichael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCC HILER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/03/2007 09:00
AM)

Michael Mclaughlin

12/19/2006

12/20/2006

Juqge

Michael Mclaughlin
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12/21/2006

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion to Seal Memorandum In SUpport of
MRIA's Motion to Amend First Amended
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint

AFFD

CCC HILER

Errata Sheet Re: Affidavit of Professor Douglas M Michael Mclaughlin
Branson

12/22/2006

NOTS

CCCHILER

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

12/28/2006

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion held on 01/03/2007
09:00AM: Hearing Vacated

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCBROWKM

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
01/11/2007 10:30 AM)

Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order to Seal Memorandum in Support of Motion Michael Mclaughlin
to Amend First Amended Counterclaim and Third
Party Complaint

AFFD

CCPRICDL

Affidavit of Darrell Fugate

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCNAVATA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/06/2007 03:00
PM) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re:
Lease Term

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCNAVATA

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re: Lease
Term

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCNAVATA

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment re: Lease Term

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCNAVATA

Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of St Als
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re: Lease
Term

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion to Strike Affidavit of Professor Douglas M. Michael Mclaughlin
Branson

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion to Strike References to Privileged
Documents

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care and St Als Reg Med Cntr's Michael Mclaughlin
Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Amend to Seek Punitive Damages

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of jack S. Gjording in Support of
Memorandum

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care and St Als Reg Med Cntr's Michael Mclaughlin
Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Motion for
Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim and
First Amended Third-Party Complaint

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (01/11/07@ 10:30am)

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion for Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Third Party Defendants Memorandum in Support Michael Mclaughlin
of Motion for Summary Judgment

1/4/2007

Judge
Michael Mclaughlin

Michael Mclaughlin
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1/4/2007

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Third Party Defendants Memorandum in
Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Amend to Seek
Punitive Damages

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Third Party Defendants Memorandum in
Opposition to MRIA's Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Counterclaim and First
Amended Third Party Complaint

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (02/06/07@ 3:00pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

1/8/2007

MOTN

CCBROWKM

Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time

Michael Mclaughlin

1/9/2007

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order Shortening Time

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion to Strike SARMC's Motion to Strike
References to Priveleged Documents

Michael Mclaughlin

AFSM

CCAMESLC

Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Strike

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCAMESLC

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike

Michael Mclaughlin

REPL

CCPRICDL

Reply in Support of Motion to Amend to seek
punitive damages againmst sarmc

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCPRICDL

Opposition to Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time

Michael Mclaughlin

REPL

CCBARCCR

Reply In Support of Motion to Amend to Seek
Punitive Damages Against GSR/SARG

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBARCCR

Affidavit of G Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRIA's Michael Mclaughlin
Reply Briefs in Support of Motion

MEMO

CCBARCCR

MRIA's Memorandum in Opposition to SARMC's
Motion to Strike Affidavit of professor Douglas M
Branson

AFFD

CCBARCCR

Affidavit of Yvonne Vaughan in Support of MRIA's Michael Mclaughlin
Memorandum in Opposition of SARMC's Motion
to Strike Affidavit

AFFD

CCBARCCR

Affidavit of Douglas M Branson in Support of
Oppostion to SARMC"s Motion to Strike Affidavit

Michael Mclaughlin

REPL

CCBARCCR

Reply Memorandum in Support of MRI
Associates LLP's Motion for Leave to File 2nd
Amended Counterclaim and First Amended 3rd
Party Complaint

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBARCCR

Affidavit of Daniel J Gordon in Support of Reply
Michael Mclaughlin
Memorandum in Support of MRI Associates LLP's
Motion for Leave to File 2nd Amended
Counterclaim and 1st Amended 3rd Party
Complaint

REPL

CCNAVATA

Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Memorandum
in Opposition to SARMC's Motion to Strike
Affidavit of Professor Douglas M. Branson

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCWRIGRM

Opposition to Motion to Strike References to
Privileged Documents

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt
Document sealed
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
01/11/2007 10:30 AM: Hearing Held

1/10/2007

1/11/2007

Judge

Michael Mclaughlin

Michael Mclaughlin
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1/12/2007

NOTS

CCNAVATA

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

1/16/2007

NOTS

CCEARLJD

(2) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCWOODCL

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

1/17/2007

NOTS

CCDWONCP

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

1/18/2007

NOTS

CCBARCCR

(2) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

1/22/2007

NOTS

CCBARCCR

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

1/23/2007

STIP

CCHUNTAM

Stipulated Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

1/29/2007

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

2/1/2007

AMEN

CCHEATJL

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCHEAT.IL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/27/2007 03:30
PM) Motion For Part Summary Judgment
RE:Lease Term

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion for Leave to Supplement Briefing on
Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
Complaint

Michael Mclaughlin

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision on MRI Associates'
Michael Mclaughlin
Motion to Amend the Counterclaim and third Party
Complaint to Seek Punitive Damages and to File
a Second Amended Counterclaim and First
Amended Third-Party Complaint; St. Alphonsus
Motion to Strike REferences to Privileged
Documents and St. Alphonsus Motion to Strike
Affidavit of Professor Douglas M. Branson

AMEN

CCWATSCL

Amended Notice of Hearing (02/27/07@3:30PM) Michael Mclaughlin

HRVC

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Motion held on 02/06/2007
03:00PM: Hearing Vacated Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment re: Lease Term

Michael Mclaughlin

2/12/2007

NOWD

CCNAVATA

Notice Of Withdrawal of Third Party Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

2/13/2007

OPPO

CCWRIGRM

Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment reLease Term

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt

Michael Mclaughlin

NOSV

CCTEELAL

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCWRIGRM

(2) Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCC HILER

Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Opposition to
Motion for Partial summary Judgment Re: Lease
Term

Michael Mclaughlin

AFSM

CCCHILER

Second Affidavit of Patrick J Miller in Support of
Saint Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Re: Lease Term

Michael Mclaughlin

AFOS

CCWATSCL

Affidavit Of Service (Subpoena)

Michael Mclaughlin

2/6/2007

2/16/2007

2/20/2007

2/21/2007

Judge
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2/22/2007

ACCP

CCC HILER

Acceptance Of Service (2/21/07)

Michael Mclaughlin

1\JOTS

CCNAVATA

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCDWONCP

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion held on 02/27/2007
03:30PM: Hearing Held Motion For Part
Summary Judgment RE:Lease Term

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion to Quash Deposition of SLRMC and
Motion for Protective ORder

Michael Mclaughlin

AFSM

CCAMESLC

Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Quash
Deposition of SLRMC and Motion for Protective
ORder

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCAMESLC

Memorandum In Support Of Motion to Quash
Deposition of SLRMC and Motion for Protective
ORder

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCAMESLC

Notice of Hearing (Motion 04/03/2007 04:00 PM) Michael Mclaughlin
Motion to Quash Deposition of SLRMC and
Motion for Protective ORder

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Order on Mri Accociates, LLPs Motion for Leave
to File Second Amended Counterclaim and First
Amended Third party Complaint

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCGROSPS

2nd Amended Counterclaim and First Amended
Third party Complaint

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCC HILER

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against
MRIA on Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCCHILER

Affidavit of Warren E Jones in Support of Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

NOHG

CCCHILER

Notice Of Hearing

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCCHILER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment 04/17/2007 03:00PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

3/9/2007

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment re: Lease Term

Michael Mclaughlin

3/13/2007

AFFD

CCAMESLC

Affidavit in Support of Motion for Protective
ORder

Michael Mclaughlin

3/16/2007

NOTD

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum Of
Joe Messmer

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum Of
Mike Cacchillo

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum Of
Jim Acevedo

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCBLACJE

Notice Of Service (3)

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCNAVATA

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Status by Phone held on
03/19/2007 04:30 PM: Hearing Held

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

2/27/2007

2/28/2007

3/2/2007

3/7/2007

3/19/2007

3/20/2007

Judge
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3/22/2007

ORDR

DCABBOSM

5th Amended Scheduling Order

Michael Mclaughlin

NODT

CCBARCCR

3 Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum

Michael Mclaughlin

ANSW

CCWATSCL

Third Party Defendants' Answer to Fist Amended Michael Mclaughlin
Third Party Complaint (Jones for Intermountain
Med. Imaging, Gem State Radiology, and
Imaging Center Radiologists)

NOTS

CCWATSCL

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

ANSW

CCTEELAL

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s
Answer to Second Amended Counterclaim
(Gjording for Saint Alphonsus)

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion in Limine Re: Douglas M Branson

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Jack S Gjoulding in Support of Motion Michael Mclaughlin
in Limine

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Support

NOTC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice of Hearing on Motion in Limine(5/8/07 @ 4 Michael Mclaughlin
pm)

MOTN

CCHEATJL

3rd Party Defendant's Motion To Compel
Responeses To IMI'S Requests For Production

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCHEATJL

Affidavit Of Counsel

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCHEATJL

Affidavit Of Dennis R Reinstein

Michael Mclaughlin

NOHG

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Hearing RE:3rd Party Defendant's
Michael Mclaughlin
Motion To Compel Responses To IMI'S Requests
For Production

HRSC

CCHEAT.IL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/09/2007 01 :30
PM) motion to compel

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCAMESLC

Third Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCBARCCR

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCBARCCR

Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCEARLJD

Opposition to Motion to Quash and Motion for
Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCEARLJD

Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Quash

Michael Mclaughlin

3/30/2007

MEMO

CCNAVATA

l\/lichael Mclaughlin
St Lukes Reply Memorandum in Support of its
Motion to Quash Defendant MRI Assoc Notice of
Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of SLRMC & Motion for
Rule 26(c) Protective Order

4/2/2007

NOTC

CCBARCCR

Notice Vacating Hearing RE: St Luke's Regional Michael Mclaughlin
Medical Center LTO's Motion to Quash Def MRI
Assocaites, LLP's Notice of Rule 30 (b)(6)
Deposition of St Luke's Regional Medical Center
and Motion for Rule 26(c) Protective Order

NOTC

CCNAVATA

Notice of Video Deposition Duces Tecum of W.
Ed Whitelaw

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Robin Cioffi

Michael Mclaughlin

3/23/2007

3/26/2007

3/27/2007
3/28/2007

Judge

Michael Mclaughlin
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4/3/2007

MISC

CCBlACJE

Opposition to 3-Party Def's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBlACJE

Affidavit of Julli Hopkins

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBlACJE

Affidavit of David Giles, MD

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBlACJE

Affidavit of Shawn P. Bailey

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion held on 04/03/2007
04:00PM: Hearing Held Motion to Quash
Deposition of SlRMC and Motion for Protective
ORder

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Vacating Deposition of Mike Czech

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Vacating the Deposition Of lyndee Czech Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

MCBIEHKJ

Amended notice of Deposition Deces Tecum of
WEd Whitelaw

Michael Mclaughlin

4/6/2007

NOTC

DCABBOSM

Notice of Amendment to 5th Amended
Scheduling Order

Michael Mclaughlin

4/9/2007

AMEN

CCWRIGRM

Amended Notice of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCWRIGRM

Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion held on 04/09/2007
01:30PM: Hearing Held motion to compel

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCAMESlC

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCWRIGRM

Report of Discovery Master re: Third Party Def
Motion to Compel Responses

Michael Mclaughlin

RSPS

CCEARUD

Response to Opposition to Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCEARLJD

Affidavit regarding Motion for Summary
Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

4/12/2007

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

4/13/2007

NOTS

CCBARCCR

(2) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care and St Als RMC Inc's
Motion for partial Summary Judgment on the
Fourth Claim for Relief in Second Amended
Counterclaim

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording in Support of St Als
Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care and St Als RMC
Memorandum in Support of Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (06/05/07 @3:30pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCWRIGRM

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/05/2007 03:30
PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

4/16/2007

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

4/17/2007

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment held on 04/17/2007 03:00PM:
Hearing Held

Michael Mclaughlin

4/4/2007

4/10/2007

Judge
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4/18/2007

NOTS

CCNAVATA

(2) Amended Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOSV

CCTEElAl

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCEARL.ID

(2) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NODT

CCBARCCR

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

DEW I

CCDWONCP

Third Party Defendants' Expert Witness
Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the
IRCP

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESlC

Motion to SHorten Time

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESlC

Motion to Take Out of State Depositions

Michael Mclaughlin

AFSM

CCAMESlC

Affidavit In Support Of Motion for Out of State
Depositions

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESlC

Motion to Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

AFSM

CCAMESlC

Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCAMESlC

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
05/04/2007 01:30 PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCWRIGRM

(2)Amended Notice of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

OBJT

MCBIEHKJ

Objection to Motion to Take out of State
Depositions

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCTEElAl

Third party Defendants' Motion for partial
Summary Judgment on Defamation Cause of
Action

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCTEElAl

Third Party Defendant's Motion to Exclude
Witnesses

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCTEElAl

Third party Defendants' Memorandum in Support Michael Mclaughlin
of Motion for partial Summary Judgment on
Defamaation Cause of Action

AFFD

CCTEElAl

Affidavit of Warren E jones in Support of Third
party Defendants' Motion to Exclude Expert
Witnesses

AFFD

CCTEElAl

Michael Mclaughlin
Affidavit of Niel D McFeeley in Support of Third
Party Defendants' Motion for Summery Judgment
on Defamation cause of Action

AFFD

CCTEElAl

Affidavit of jeffery T Seabourn MD in Support of
Third Party Defendants' Motion for partial
Summary Judgment on Defamation Cause of
Action

Michael Mclaughlin

NOHG

CCTEElAl

Notice Of Hearing on third party Defendants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 6.5.07 @
3:30pm

Michael Mclaughlin

NOHG

CCTEElAl

Notice Of Hearing on third party Defendants'
Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses 5.21.07@
3:30pm

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCTEElAl

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment 06/05/2007 03:30 PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

4/23/2007

4/25/2007

4/26/2007

Judge

Michael Mclaughlin
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4/26/2007

HRSC

CCTEElAl

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/21/2007 03:30
PM) Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses

Michael Mclaughlin

OBJT

CCDWONCP

St Alphonsus' Objection to MRI Associates'
Expert Witness Disclosures for Charles A
Wilhoite and Bruce P Budge

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCDWONCP

Affidavit of Jack S Gjording in Support of Saint
Alphonsus' Objection

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

DCABBOSM

Approval of Court to Take out of State
Depositions and Affidavit in Support Thereof

Michael Mclaughlin

ADVS

CCBROWKM

Case Taken Under Advisement

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCAMESlC

Memorandum re: Proposed Order of Proof

Michael Mclaughlin

4/30/2007

NOTS

CCPRICDl

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

5/1/2007

MOTN

CCEARL.ID

Motion to Compel Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCEARlJD

Affidavit of Daniel Gordon in Support of Motion to Michael Mclaughlin
Compel

MOTN

CCEARL.ID

Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCEARLJD

Opposition to Motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESlC

Motion to Shorten Time

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESlC

Motion for Protective Order Regarding Discovery
Depositions of Grant Chamberlain and Cindy
Schamp

Michael Mclaughlin

AFSM

CCAMESlC

Affidavit In Support Of Motion for Protective Order Michael Mclaughlin
Regarding Discovery Depositions of Grant
Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp

MEMO

CCAMESlC

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Michael Mclaughlin
Order Regarding Discovery Depositions of Grant
Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp and in
Opposition of Motion to Compel Date Certain for
Depositions of Grant Chamberlain and Cindy
Schamp

NOTH

CCAMESlC

Notice Of Hearing on Motion for Protection Order Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

CCBlAC.IE

Order Shortening Time as Pursuant to Discovery Michael Mclaughlin
Master

JUIN

CCAMESlC

Jury Instructions Filed

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESlC

Joinder in Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCAMESlC

Notice Of Taking Deposition (2)

Michael Mclaughlin

NOSV

CCTEElAl

1\Jotice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCCHilER

Saint Alphonsus' Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion to Compel Deposition of Sandra Bruce

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCC HilER

Affidavit of Jack S Gjording in Support of
Opposition to Motion to Compel Deposition of
Sandra Bruce

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

(2) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

4/27/2007

5/2/2007

5/3/2007

Judge
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5/3/2007

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Reply to MRIA's Opposition to
SARMC's Motion in Limine re Douglas M.
Branson

Michael Mclaughlin

5/4/2007

OBJT

CCEARLJD

Objection to the Expert Witness Disclosure

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (05/19/07@ 3:30pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on
05/04/2007 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated

Michael Mclaughlin

5/7/2007

NOTD

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

5/8/2007

OB,IE

MCBIEHKJ

Objection to Expert Witness disclosure

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Third Party Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Warren E. Jones

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Third Party
Defendant's Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (06/05/07@ 4:00pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCWRIGRM

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/05/2007 04:00
PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion in Limine held on
05/08/2007 04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCKHAMSA

Affidavit Of Jack S. Gjording In Support Of Saint
Alphonsus's Objection To The Expert Witness
Disclosure Of W. Ed Whitelaw/ Econorthwest
Dated March 19,2007

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCBLACJE

Motion to Vacate Hearing

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCBLAC,JE

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBLACJE

Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBLAC,IE

Affidavit of Thomas A. Banducci

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

5/10/2007

NOTD

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

5/11/2007

NOTS

CCNAVATA

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MOSJ

CCNAVATA

Third Party Defendant's Motion For Summary
Judgment Dismissing MRIA's First Amended
Third Party Complaint on the Basis that no
Damages have been Proven

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCNAVATA

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCNAVATA

Third Party Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Idaho Consumer
Protection Act Cause of Action

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCNAVATA

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCNAVATA

Affidavit of Warren E. Jones

Michael Mclaughlin

5/9/2007

Judge
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5/11/2007

NOTS

CCCHilER

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

STIP

CCBROWKM

Stipulation re: Rescheduling Hearing

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCBARCCR

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESlC

Defs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
the Interference with Prospective Contractual
Relationship Cause of Action

Michael Mclaughlin

AFSM

CCAMESlC

(2) Affidavit In Support Of Defs Motion for Partial Michael Mclaughlin
Summary Judgment on the Interference with
Prospective Contractual Relationship Cause of
Action

MEMO

CCAMESlC

Memorandum in Support of Def's Motion for
Michael Mclaughlin
Partial Summary Judgment on the Interference
with Prospective Contractual Relationship Cause
of Action

MOTN

CCAMESlC

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Civil
Conspiracy Cause of Action

AFSM

CCAMESlC

Affidavit In Support Of Motion for Partial
Michael Mclaughlin
Summary Judgment of Civil Conspiracy Cause of
Action

MEMO

CCAMESlC

Memorandum in SUpport of for Partial Summary Michael Mclaughlin
Judgment of Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Third Party Defendants Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Jeffrey R. Cliff

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Jeffrey T. Seabourn

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of J. Timothy Hall MD

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Warren E. Jones

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCWRIGRM

Amended Notice of Hearing (05/29/07 @4:00pm) Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCWRIGRM

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/29/2007 04:00
PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

I\IOTC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice of hearing on Motion to Exclude Experts
Witnesses (5/29/07@ 4pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care and St Als RMC Inc's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

I\IIEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of J. Will Varin

Michael Mclaughlin

STMT

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care Inc and St Als RMC Inc's
Statement of Material Facts

Michael Mclaughlin

5/14/2007

5/15/2007

5/16/2007

Judge

Michael Mclaughlin
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5/17/2007

STMT

CCDWONCP

St Als Diversified Care Inc and St Als Regional
Medical Center Inc's Statement of Undisputed
Facts in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment on MRI Associates llP's Antitrust
Claims

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCDWONCP

St Als Diversified Care Inc's and St Als Regional
Medical Center Inc's Motion for Summary
Judgment on MRI Associates llP's Antitrust
Claims

Michael Mclaughlin

IVIEMO

CCDWONCP

St Als Diiversified Care Inc's and St Als Regional
Medical Center Inc's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment on MRI
Associates llP's Antitrust Claims

Michael Mclaughlin

MOSJ

CCEARUD

Motion For Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCPRICDl

Report of Discovery Master Re: MRI Associates,
llP Motion to Compel Deposition of Sandra
Bruce

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCWRIGRM

Amended Notice of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

St Als Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action

Michael Mclaughlin

STMT

CCWRIGRM

Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of
Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of St. Als Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

STMT

CCWRIGRM

Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of St
Als Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

St Als Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re
lnterferrence with Prospective Contractual
Relationship or Business Expectations

Michael Mclaughlin

STMT

CCWRIGRM

Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of St.
Als Partial Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

OBJT

CCWRIGRM

Objection to Amended Notice of Rule 30(b)(6)
Deposition of St Als RMC

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

St Als Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Misappropriation of Trade Secret Confidential
Information Cause of Action

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller

Michael Mclaughlin

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision on Third Party
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Against MRIA on Breach of Fiduciary
Duty Claim

Michael Mclaughlin

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus'
Motion in Limine Re: Douglas M. Branson

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESlC

Motion to Dismiss MRIA's Twentieth Claim for
Relief (re: Spoiliation)

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCAMESlC

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCAMESlC

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin
000034
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5/22/2007

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion for Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Patrick Miller in Support of Motion for
Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice of Hearing on Motion for Protective Order

Michael Mclaughlin

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion held on 05/21/2007
03:30PM: Hearing Vacated Motion to Exclude
Expert Witnesses

Michael Mclaughlin

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion For Protective Order
Michael Mclaughlin
held on 05/22/2007 11 :00 AM: Hearing Vacated

MEMO

CCBARCCR

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Michael Mclaughlin
of Saint Alphonsus' Motion for Protective Order

OPPO

CCAMESlC

Opposition to SARMC's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Fourth Claim for
Relief on the Second Amended Counterclaim

Michael Mclaughlin

AFSM

CCAMESlC

Affidavit of GRey Reingardt In Support Of
Opposition to SARMC's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Fourth Claim for
Relief on the Second Amended

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCAMESlC

Opposition to Third party Defendant's Motion to
Exclude Expert Witnesses

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCAMESlC

Opposition to SARMC's

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCAMESlC

Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Exclude Expert Michael Mclaughlin
Witnesses

OPPO

CCAMESlC

Opposition to Objection to Expert Witness
Disclosure of Ed WHitelaw

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCAMESlC

Affidavit of Ed Whitelaw in Support of Opposition
to SARMC's Objection to expert Witness
Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCAIVIESlC

Affidavit of Daniel J Gordon in Support of
Opposition to SARMC's Objection to expert
Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCAMESlC

Notice of Voluntary Dismissal

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCAMESlC

Errara Sheet: Notice of Voluntary Dismissal

Michael Mclaughlin

OBJT

CCWATSCl

Saint Alphonsus' Objection to MRIA's Motion to
Increase Number of Interrogatories

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWATSCl

Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of
Objection

Michael Mclaughlin

CERT

CCNAVATA

Certificate Of Mailing (05/18/07)

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCWRIGRM

Errata Sheet Re MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

IVIISC

CCWRIGRM

MRIA's Supplemental Disclosure of Witnesses

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCWRIGRM

Supplemental Briefing to MRIA's Opposition to
Michael Mclaughlin
SARMC's Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure

5/23/2007
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5/23/2007

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Supplemental Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon

5/24/2007

REPT

CCC HILER

Report of Discovery Master Re: St. Alphonsus
Michael Mclaughlin
Diversified Care, Inc., and St. Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center, Inc's Motion for Protective order
Re: MRIA Associates, LLP, Rule 30(b)(6)
Deposition

REPL

CCBARCCR

St Al's Reply to MRI's Opposition to SARMC's
Objection to Expert Witness Discolure of Ed
Whitelaw

Michael Mclaughlin

NOHG

CCBARCCR

Notice Of Hearing

Michael Mclaughlin

NOHG

CCBARCCR

2nd Amended Notice Of Hearing

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCBARCCR

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/02/2007 09:00
AM) Motions

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCPRICDL

Report of Discovery

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCC HILER

Third-party Defendants' Memorandum Joining St. Michael Mclaughlin
Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on Lack of Proof of Damages Causation

AFFD

CCC HILER

Affidavit in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Michael Mclaughlin
Judgment on Damage Causation

MEMO

CCC HILER

Third-Party Defendants' Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Exclude MRIA's Expert
Witnesses

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Reply Memorandum Regarding Motion to Exclude Michael Mclaughlin
Expert Witnesses

NOTS

CCNAVATA

(2) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCNAVATA

St Als Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Fourth Claim
for Relief (re: Fiduciary Duty to Limited
Partnerships)

Michael Mclaughlin

ADVS

CCBROWKM

Case Taken Under Advisement

Michael Mclaughlin

5/30/2007

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion held on 05/29/2007
04:00PM: Hearing Held Amended- Motion to
Exclude Expert Witness

Michael Mclaughlin

5/31/2007

NOTD

CCTEELAL

Notice Of Video Deposition Duces Tecum of
pattie HArneck

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCNAVATA

Notice of Video Deposition Duces Tecum of
Dennis Reinstein

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCNAVATA

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCC HILER

Notice Of Service of Second Supplemental
Discovery Responses

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

(2) Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

RSPS

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus' Response to MRIA's Request to
Set Date for Sandra Bruce Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

5/25/2007

5/29/2007

6/1/2007

Judge
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6/1/2007

MISC

CCCHILER

Plaintiff/Counterdefendants, St Alphonsus
Michael Mclaughlin
Diversified Care, Inc., and St Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center, Inc's Supplemental Disclosure of
Lay Witnesses

NOTS

CCCHILER

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCC HILER

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

AMEN

CCC HILER

Amended Notice of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTS

CCNAVATA

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

N'OTD

CCNAVATA

Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

6/4/2007

NOTS

CCBARCCR

Notice Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

6/5/2007

MISC

CCAMESLC

Michael Mclaughlin
Third Party Defendant's Joinder in Objection to
the Expert Withess Disclosure of W Ed Whitelaw

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

St Als Motion to Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Jack S Gjording

Michael Mclaughlin

1\IOTC

IVICBIEHKJ

Notice of Hearing (6/7/07 @ 2 pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

MCBIEHKJ

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
06/07/2007 02:00PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus'
Objection to MRI Associates' Expert Witness
Disclosures for Charles A Wilhoite and Bruce P.
Budge and Third-Party Defendants' Motion to
Exclude Expert Witnesses

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCBARCCR

3rd Party Defs Notice of Non-Opposition to
MRIA's Voluntary Dismissal of Claims

Michael Mclaughlin

NOHG

CCBARCCR

Notice Of Hearing on Partial Summary Judgment Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCBARCCR

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment 0710212007 09:00AM)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment held on 06/05/2007 03:30 PM:
Hearing Held

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion held on 06/05/2007
03:30PM: Hearing Held

Michael Mclaughlin

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion held on 06/05/2007
04:00PM: Hearing Vacated

Michael Mclaughlin

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on
0610712007 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCC HILER

St Alphonsus Diversified Care and St Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center's Motio in Limine Re:
Shattuck Hammond Memorandum

Michael Mclaughlin

MElillO

CCC HILER

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Shattuck Hammond Memorandum

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCC HILER

St Alphonsus Diversified Care and St Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center's Renewed Motion in
Limine Re: Lease and Partnership Term

Michael Mclaughlin
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6/5/2007

MOTN

CCC HILER

St Alphonsus Diversified Care and St Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center's Motion in Limine Re:
Purchase Price Damage Theory

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCCHILER

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Purchase Price Damage Theory

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus Diversified Care and St Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center's Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCC HILER

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation

Michael Mclaughlin

NOHG

CCC HILER

Notice Of Hearing (7/2/07@ 9am)

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWATSCL

Mria's Motion in Limine Prohibiting SARMC from Michael Mclaughlin
Introducing Evidence of its Intent Re: Term of the
MRIA Partnership

MEMO

CCWATSCL

Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion in
Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Motion in Limine Re:Attempts to
Purchase MRIA and/or MRICI

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWATSCL

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Attempts to Purchase MRIAA and/or 1\/lRICI

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Communications
Between SARMC and MRIA about the Purchase
of MRIA and/or MRICI

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWATSCL

Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion in
Limine RE: Communications Between SARMC
and MRIA about the Purchase of MRIA and/or
MRICI

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Justification for
Withdrawal

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWATSCL

Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion in
Limine Re: Justsification for Withdrawal

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Admissibility of
Shattuck Hammond Memorandum

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWATSCL

Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion in
Limine Re: Admissibility of Shattuck Hammond
Memorandum

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC Promotion
of its Own Best Interests as a Defense to IT
Fiduciary Duty Breaches

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWATSCL

Memorandum in Support MRIA's Motion in Limine Michael Mclaughlin
Re: SARMC Promotion of its Own Best Interests
as a Defense to IT Fiduciary Duty Breaches

MOTN

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Purported Breaches Michael Mclaughlin
by MRIA of Fiduciary Duties

MEMO

CCWATSCL

Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion in
Limine Re: Purported Breaches by MRIA of
Fiduciary Duties

Judge
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6/5/2007

MOTN

CCWATSCL

Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of Patricia
Vandenberg's Status as a FormerCatholic Nun

Michael Mclaughlin

IVIEIVIO

CCWATSCL

Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion in
Limine Re: Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's
Status as a Former Catholic Nun

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Beliefs
About Legality of Withdrawal from MRIA

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWATSCL

Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion in
Limine Re: SARMC's Beliefs About Legality of
Withdrawal from MRIA

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Motion to Strike Gregory S. Vistness

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWATSCL

Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion to
Strike Gregory S. Vistness

Michael Mclaughlin

AFSM

CCWATSCL

Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon In Support Of Motion Michael Mclaughlin
to Strike Gregory S. Bistness

AFFD

CCWATSCL

Affidavit of Ed Whitelaw in Support of MRIA's
Motion to Strike Gregory S. Vistnes

MOTN

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Referring Physicians Michael Mclaughlin
Designated by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses

MEMO

CCWATSCL

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Referring Physicians Designated by SARG/GSR
as Expert Witnesses

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Reliance
on Advice of Counsel

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWATSCL

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
SARMC's Reliance on Advice of Counsel

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Inadvertently
Disclosed Privileged Document

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWATSCL

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Inadvertently Disclosed Privileged Document

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Investments by
Members of DIVIR

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWATSCL

Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion in
Limine Re: Investments by Members of DMR

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWATSCL

Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRIA's Michael Mclaughlin
Motions in Limine (Comprises all of File #28)

MOTN

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Motion to Strike IMI's Joinder in SARMC's Michael Mclaughlin
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of
Proof of Damages Causation

MEMO

CCWATSCL

Michael Mclaughlin
Memorandum in Suppport of MRIA's Motion to
Strike IMI's Joinder in SARMC's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof of
Damages Causation

OPPO

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment Re: Antitrust Claims
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6/5/2007

AFFD

CCWATSCL

Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of MRIA's Michael Mclaughlin
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Re:
Antitrust Claims

MISC

CCWATSCL

Statement of Facts in Support MRIA's Opposition Michael Mclaughlin
to Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Antitrust
Claims

AFFD

CCWATSCL

Affidavit of Ed Whitelaw in Support of MRIA's
Michael Mclaughlin
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Re:
Antitrust Claims

OPPO

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion for Partial Michael MclaugHlin
Summary Judgment Re: Damage Causation or,
in the Alternative, Motion in Limine

AFFD

CCWATSCL

Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRIA's Michael Mclaughlin
Opposition to SARMC's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment REe: Damage Causation or,
in the Alternative, Motion in Limine

OPPO

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Opposition to IMI's Motion for Summary
Michael Mclaughlin
Judgment Dismissing MRIA's 1st Amended Third
Party Complaint on the Basis that No Damages
have been Proven and SARMC's Joinder Thereto

OPPO

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Michael Mclaughlin
Judgment by Third Party Defendants on the
"Interference with Existing Contractual
Relationship" Claim

AFFD

CCWATSCL

Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRIA's Michael Mclaughlin
Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment by Third Party Defendants on the
"Interference with Existing Contractual
Relationship" Claim (Comprises entire File #31)

OPPO

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Opposition to Third Party Defendants'
Michael Mclaughlin
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Civil
Conspiracy Cause of Action and SARMC's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on Civil
Consipiracy Cause of Action (MRIA's 16th Claim
for Relief)

6/6/2007

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (07/02/07@ 9:00am)

Michael Mclaughlin

6/7/2007

RPLY

CCBLACJE

Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

6/8/2007

AMEN

CCWRIGRM

Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

6/11/2007

NOTD

CCBARCCR

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

6/12/2007

NOTD

CCBARCCR

3rd Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion to Dismiss Michael Mclaughlin
Spoliation Claim

OPPO

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine
Re: Dissociation

OPPO

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Renewed Motion Michael Mclaughlin
in Limine Re: Lease and Partnership Term

OPPO

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine
Re: Shattuck Hammond Memorandum
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6/12/2007

OPPO

CCWATSCL

MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine
Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory

AFFD

CCWATSCL

Affidavit of Charles Wilhoite in Support of MRIA's IVIichael Mclaughlin
Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Purchase Price Damage Theory

AFFD

CCWATSCL

Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of MRIA's Michael Mclaughlin
Opposition to SARMC's Motin in Limine Re:
Purchase Price Damage Theory

AFFD

CCTOONAL

Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Spoliation Claim

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCEARUD

Motion in Limine re: Sarmc's Reliance on Advice
of Counsel

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCEARLJD

Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA'S Motion in
Limine re:

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCEARUD

Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Strike Gregory Vistnes

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCEARLJD

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment re: Damage Causation

Michael Mclaughlin

REPT

CCAMESLC

Report of Discovery Master Re: Motion to Compel Michael Mclaughlin
Responses to Fifth Set of Interrogatories and
Fourth Set of Request For Admissions

RSPS

CCEARUD

Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
SARMC's Beliefs about Legality of Withdrawal
from MRIA

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCEARLJD

Affidavit of Patrick J Miller in Support of Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment re Damage Causation

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCAMESLC

Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment on MRIA's Anti Trust Claims

Michael Mclaughlin

RSPS

CCAMESLC

Michael Mclaughlin
Response to Motion and Limine Re: SARMC
Promotion of its Own best Interests as a Defense
to its Fiduciary Duty Breaches

MISC

CCTOONAL

Michael Mclaughlin
Response to Opposition to Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Cause of
Action

OPPO

CCTOONAL

Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Investments
by Members of DMR

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCTOONAL

Response to Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment Re: Antitrust

Michael Mclaughlin

REPL

CCTOONAL

Reply to Opposition to Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment by Third Party Defendants
on "Interference w/ Existing Contractual
Relationship" Claim

IVIichael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCTOONAL

Response to Mira's Motion to Strike IMI's Joinder Michael Mclaughlin
in SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Lack of Proof of Damages
Causation
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6/12/2007

MISC

CCTOONAL

Response to MRIA'S Opposition to SARMC's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
Damages Causation

OB.IE

CCTOONAL

Objection to Motion in Limine Re: Referring
Michael Mclaughlin
Physicians Deignated by SARMC/GSR as Expert
Witnesses

MOTN

CCTOONAL

Motion to Strike

OBJE

CCTOONAL

Objection to Motion in Limine Re: Admissibility of Michael Mclaughlin
Shattuck Hammond Memorandum

REPL

CCTOONAL

Reply to Opposition to Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCTOONAL

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCTOONAL

Affidavit in Support of Motion to Strike Exhibits

Michael Mclaughlin

RESP

MCBIEHKJ

Response to Motion in Limine re Justification for
Withdrawal

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCTOONAL

Affidavit in Support of Response to Opposition to Michael Mclaughlin
SARMC's Motion for Summary Judgment Re:
Damages Causation

AFFD

CCAMESLC

Supplimental Affidavit of Gregory S Gistnes PHD Michael Mclaughlin

RSPS

CCAMESLC

Response to Motion in Limine Re: Referring
Physicians Designated by SARG/GSR as Expert
Witnesses

Michael Mclaughlin

RSPS

CCAMESLC

Response to Motion in Limine Re: Admissability
of Shattuck Hammond Memorandum

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCAMESLC

Affidavit in Response to Admissability of Shattuck Michael Mclaughlin
Hammond Memorandum

RSPS

CCAMESLC

Response to Motion in Limine Re: Purportrated
Breaches by MRIA of Fiduciary Duties

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCAMESLC

Affidavit in Support of Response to Motion in
Limine Re: Purportrated Breaches by MRIA of
Fiduciary Duties

Michael Mclaughlin

RSPS

CCAMESLC

Response to Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of
Patricia Vandenberg's Status as a Former
Catholic Nun

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCAMESLC

Affidavit in Support of Response to Motion in
Limine Re: Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's
Status as a Former Catholic Nun

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCAMESLC

Saint Alphonsus Joinder in Third Party
Defendant's Reply Brief in SUpport of Motion for
Summary Judgment Re: Civil Conpiracy Cause
of Action

Michael Mclaughlin

RESP

MCBIEHKJ

Response to Motion in Limine reAttempts to
Purchase MRIA

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Patruick J Miller

Michael Mclaughlin

RESP

MCBIEHKJ

Response to Motion in Limine reInvestments by
Members

Michael Mclaughlin
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6/12/2007

RESP

MCBIEHKJ

Response to MRIAs Motion in Limine re
Communications

Michael Mclaughlin

RESP

MCBIEHKJ

Response to Motion in Limine re Term of the
Partnership

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Patrick J Miller

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Patrick J Miller

Michael Mclaughlin

6/13/2007

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Michael Mclaughlin
Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care, Inc., and Saint Alphonsus
medical Center, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the Fourth Claim for Relief in
Second Amended Counterclaim

6/14/2007

RPLY

CCBLACJE

Reply to MRI's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
Spoliation Claim

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCBLAC.IE

MRI's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re:
Purchase Price Damage Theory

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCBLACJE

Reply to MRI's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Michael Mclaughlin
Dissociation

RPLY

CCBLACJE

Reply to MRI's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Michael Mclaughlin
Shattuck Hammond Memo

RPLY

CCBLACJE

Reply to MRI's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Michael Mclaughlin
Lease & Partnership Term

AFFD

CCBLAC.IE

Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of MRI's
Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Purchase
Price Damage Theory

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCBLACJE

Reply in Support of Motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCBLACJE

Reply in Support of motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCBLAC.IE

Reply in Support of Motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCBLACJE

Reply in Support of Motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCBLACJE

Reply in Support of Motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCBLACJE

Reply in Support of Motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCBLACJE

Reply in Support of Motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCBLAC.IE

Reply in Support of Motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCBLACJE

Reply in Support of Motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCBLAC.IE

Reply in Support of Motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCBLACJE

Reply in Support of Motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBLACJE

Affidavit of James M. Prochaska

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCBLAC.IE

Reply in Support of Motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCBLACJE

Motion to Strike

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCBLAC.IE

Motion to Shorten Time

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCBLACJE

Notice of Hearing Scheduled
(7-2-07@ 9 AM)

Michael Mclaughlin

RPLY

CCBLAC.IE

Reply in Support of Motion to Strike

Michael Mclaughlin

6/15/2007

Judge
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6/15/2007

AFFD

CCBlAC.IE

Affidavit of Ed Whitelaw

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBlACJE

Affidavit of Ed Whitelaw

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCTOONAl

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike
Supplemental Affidavit of Gregorys S. Vistnes

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESlC

Motion to Strike the Affd of Charles Wilhoite in
Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Purchase
Price Damage Theory

Michael Mclaughlin

RPlY

CCCHilER

MRIA's Reply in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Referring Physicians Designated by SARG/GSR
as Expert Witnesses

Michael Mclaughlin

RPlY

CCC HilER

MRIA's Reply in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Michael Mclaughlin
Admissibility of shattuck Hammond Memorandum

RSPS

CCCHilER

MRIA's Repsonse to Third Party Defendants'
Michael Mclaughlin
Objection to Motion in Limine Re: Investments by
Members of DMR

6/20/2007

STIP

CCC HilER

St Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc Stipulation Re: Michael Mclaughlin
Extension of Briefing Schedule

6/21/2007

RSPS

CCEARUD

Response to Erroneous Statement

Michael Mclaughlin

6/22/2007

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike
Supplemental Affd of Gregory S Vistnes

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

MCBIEHKJ

Errata Sheer re Supplemental Affd of Grefory S
Vlstnes

Michael Mclaughlin

RSPS

CCTHIEBJ

MRIA's Response To ThirdParty Defs Objection
To MRIA's Erroneous Statement Regarding
Untimeliness Of 3rd Party Defs Pleadings

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCTHIEBJ

MRIA's Opposition To SARMC's Motion For
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Interference
w/Prospective Contractual Relationship Claim

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCTHIEBJ

Affidavit Of Daniel J. Gordon In Support Of
MRIA's Opposition To SARMC's Motion For
Partial Summary Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order to Shorten Time - Denied

Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order Extending Briefing Schedule

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCWRIGRM

Opposition to St Alphonsus Diversified Care and
St Als RMC lncs Motion to Strike the Affidavit of
Charles Wilhoite

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCNAVATA

Reply Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion Michael Mclaughlin
to Strike Supplemental Affidavit of Gregory S.
Vistnes, PhD

RPlY

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversity Care and St Als RMC Reply to
Michael Mclaughlin
MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

6/28/2007

ORDR

DCABBOSM

Order on Oral Argument Presentation on Motions Michael Mclaughlin
for July 2nd 2007

6/29/2007

AFFD

CCNAVATA

Affidavit of Yvonne Ketchum

6/18/2007

6/19/2007

6/25/2007

6/27/2007

Judge

Michael Mclaughlin
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7/2/2007

AFOS

CCBARCCR

(2) Affidavit of Service 6/28/07

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment held on 07/02/2007 09:00AM:
Hearing Held

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion held on 07/02/2007
09:00AM: Hearing Held Motions

Michael Mclaughlin

ADVS

CCBROWKM

Case Taken Under Advisement

Michael Mclaughlin

7/3/2007

AFFD

CCDWONCP

Affidavit of Jack S Gjording Re Documents to Be Michael Mclaughlin
Submitted IN CAMERA

7/10/2007

AFOS

CCTOONAL

(4) Affidavit Of Service

7/11/2007

MOTN

CCDWONCP

MRIA"s Motion to Strike Affidavit of Yvonne
Ketchum

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCDWONCP

Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion to
Strike Affidavit of Yvonne Ketchum

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCDWONCP

MRIA's Motion in Limine Re Yvonne Ketchum
Affidavit

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCDWONCP

Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion in
Limine Re Yvonne Ketchum Affidavit

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion to Shorten Time

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCC HILER

St Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc and St
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc's
Witness List

Michael Mclaughlin

AFOS

CCEARLJD

(2) Affidavit Of Service

7.10.07

Michael Mclaughlin

AFOS

CCEARLJD

(3) Affidavit Of Service 7.11.07

Michael Mclaughlin

BREF

CCBARCCR

Pit's Trial Brief

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

MRIA's Motion in Limine re: Third Party
Defendant Settlement

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

MRIA's Motion in Limine re: Purported Breaches
of Fiduciary Duties and Wrongful Conduct by
MRIA, DMR, and Dr Giles

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

MRIA's Motion in Limine re: Third Party
Defendants Expert Witnesses

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

BREF

CCWRIGRM

MRIA's Trial Brief

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Pre-Trial Memorandum

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of G Rey Reinhardt

Michael Mclaughlin

STIP

CCAMESLC

Stipulation for Dismissal of Third Party
Defendants With Prejudice

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTD

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Taking (continued) Video Deposition

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Civil Pretrial Conference held
on 07/23/2007 03:00 PM: Hearing Held

Michael Mclaughlin

7/12/2007

7/16/2007

7/18/2007

7/20/2007

7/23/2007

Judge

7.02.07

Michael Mclaughlin
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7/25/2007

MOTN

CCEARLJD

Motion to Compel Production of Discovery

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCEARLJD

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel
Production of Discovery

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCEARLJD

Affidavit of Jack S Gjording in Support of Motion
to Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTI\1

CCEARLJD

Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCEARLJD

Notice of Hearing re Motion to Compel
(7.31.07@11am)

Michael Mclaughlin

IVIEIVIO

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care Inc and St Als RMC
Memorandum in Opposition to MRIAs Motion in
Limine Re Third Party Defendant Settlement

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care and St Als RMC
Memorandum in Opposition to MRIAs Motion in
Limine re Third Party Defendants Expert
Witnesses

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Memorandum in Opposition to
MRIA's Motion in Limine re Conduct by MRIA,
DMR and Dr Giles

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

(2) Affidavit of J Will Varin

Michael Mclaughlin

STIP

CCDWONCP

Stipulation for Dismissal of Third Party
Defendants With Prejudice

Michael Mclaughlin

7/26/2007

7/30/2007

Judge

000046

Date: 1/9/2013

Fourth Judicial District Court- Ada County

Time: 09:49 AM

ROA Report

Page 44 of 81

User: CCTHIEBJ

Case: CV-OC-2004-11388 Current Judge: Mike Wetherell
SaintAiphonsus Diversified Care Inc vs. MRI Associates LLP, etal.

Date

Code

User

7/30/2007

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Michael Mclaughlin
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
SAINT ALPHONSUS' MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
SHATTUCK HAMMOND MEMORANDUM;
SAINT ALPHONSUS' RENEWED MOTION IN
LIMINE RE: LEASE AND PARTNERSHIP TERM;
SAINT ALPHONSUS' MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
PURCHASE PRICE DAMAGE THEORY; SAINT
ALPHONSUS' MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
DISSOCIATION; MRIA'S MOTIOI\I IN LIMINE
PROHIBITING SARMC FROM INTRODUCING
EVIDENCE OF ITS INTENT RE: TERM OF THE
MRIA PARTNERSHIP; MRIA'S MOTION IN
LIMINE RE: ATTEMPTS TO PURCHASE MRIA
AND/OR MRICI; MRIA'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SARMC AND
MRIA ABOUT THE PURCHASE OF MRIA
AND/OR MRICI; MRIA'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
JUSTIFICATION FOR WITHDRAWAL; MRIA'S
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: ADMISSIBILITY OF
SHATTUCK HAMMOND MEMORANDUM;
MRIA'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: SARMC'S
PROMOTION OF ITS OWN BEST INTERESTS;
MRIA'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: PURPORTED
BREACHES BY MRIA OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES;
MRIA'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: EVIDENCE OF
PATRICIA VANDEBERG'S STATUS AS A
FORMER CATHOLIC NUN; MRIA'S MOTION IN
LIMINE RE: SARMC'S BELIEFS ABOUT
LEGALITY OF WITHDRAWAL FROM MRIA;
MRIA'S MOTION TO STRIKE GREGORY S.
VISTNESS; MRIA'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
REFERRING PHYSICIANS DESIGNATED BY
SARG/GSR AS EXPERT WITNESSES; MRIA'S
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: SARMC'S RELIANCE
ON ADVICE OF COUNSEL;MRIA'S MOTION IN
LIMINE RE: INADVERTENTLY DISCLOSED
PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS; MRIA'S MOTION
IN LIMINE RE: INVESTMENTS BY MEMBERS
OF DMR; SAINT ALPHONSUS' MOTION TO
STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES
WILHOITE IN OPPOSITION TO SARMC'S
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: PURCHASE PRICE
DAMAGE THEORY; MRIA'S MOTION TO
STRIKE SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
GREGORY S. VISTNESS, PHD.

ORDR

DCABBOSM

Order for Dismissal of Third Party Defendants
with Prejudice

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCEARL.ID

Motion for Expedited Hearing

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCEARLJD

Motion to Modify Subpoena

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCEARLJD

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Modify
Subpoena

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCEARLJD

Affidavit of Neil McFeeley

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCEARLJD

Affidavit of Jeffrey Cliff

Michael Mclaughlin
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7/30/2007

NOTC

CCEARLJD

Notice of Hearing re Motion to Amend Subpoena Michael Mclaughlin
(7.31.07@2pm)

7/31/2007

OPPO

CCTEELAL

Opposition to Motion to Modify Subpoena

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCTEELAL

Affidavit of Thomas A Banducci in Support of
Opposition to Motion to Modify Subpoena

Michael Mclaughlin

RQST

CCBLACJE

Request for Clarification

Michael Mclaughlin

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on
07/31/2007 11:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Motion held on 07/31/2007
02:00PM: Hearing Held Motion to Modify
Subpoena

Michael Mclaughlin

8/1/2007

MEMO

CCBLACJE

Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Request
for Clarification

Michael Mclaughlin

8/2/2007

EXLT

CCWRIGRM

Exhibit List

Michael Mclaughlin

8/3/2007

PLEX

CCAMESLC

Plaintiffs Exhibit List

Michael Mclaughlin

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision On MRIA's Request for
Clarification/Reconsideration of Motion in Limine
re: Shattuck Hammond Memorandum and
MRIA's Request for Pre-evidentiary Jury
Instruction re: Duty of Loyalty

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care and St Als RMC Motion in Michael Mclaughlin
Limine re Use of Deposition Testimony in
Opening Statements

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of J Will Varin

l\llichael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESLC

SARMC's Motion in Limine Re: Use of Shattuck
Hammond Doc's in Opening Statement

Michael Mclaughlin

AFOS

CCAMESLC

Affidavit Of Service 8/1/07

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

DCOLSOMA

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and Saint Michael Mclaughlin
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s
Opposition to Mria's Motion to Compel RE:
Sarmc's Failure to Provide Foundational
Objections to Mria's Exhibits

REPL

DCOLSOMA

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and Saint Michael Mclaughlin
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s Reply
to Mria's Opposition to Motion in Limine RE: Use
of Shattuck Hammond Documents in Opening
Statements

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion to Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Thomas Banducci in Support of
Motion to Compel

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

MCBIEHKJ

Opposition to Motion in Limini

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Thomas A Banducci in Support of
Opposition

Michael Mclaughlin

8/6/2007

Judge
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8/6/2007

NOTC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice of Hearing (8/6/07@ 8:15am)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

MCBIEHKJ

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
08/06/2007 08:15AM)

Michael Mclaughlin

JTST

CCKENNJA

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 08/06/2007
09:00AM: Jury Trial Started

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCKENNJA

Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on
08/06/2007 08:15AM: Hearing Held

Michael Mclaughlin

8/7/2007

EX HI

CCTOONAL

Exhibit List

Michael Mclaughlin

8/9/2007

ACOS

CCBLACJE

Acceptance Of Service

Michael Mclaughlin

8/10/2007

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed - Opening Statement of Mr.
Banducci

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed - Opening Statements

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed -Testimony of Jeffrey Cliff

Michael Mclaughlin

ACCP

CCC HILER

Acceptance Of Service (8/8/07)

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus Motion in Limine Re: Dissociation
Damages

Michael Mclaughlin

AFSM

CCCHILER

Affidavit In Support Of Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation Damages

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCC HILER

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation Damages

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCGROSPS

Transcript Filed

Michael Mclaughlin

AFOS

CCBLACJE

Affidavit Of Service
5-1-07

Michael Mclaughlin

AFOS

CCBLACJE

Affidavit Of Service (2)
5-2-07

Michael Mclaughlin

AFOS

CCBLAC.IE

Affidavit Of Service
7-11-07

Michael Mclaughlin

AFOS

CCBLACJE

Affidavit Of Service (6)
7-12-07

Michael Mclaughlin

AFOS

CCBLAC.IE

Affidavit Of Service
7-14-07

Michael Mclaughlin

AFOS

CCBLACJE

Affidavit Of Service
7-31-07

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCTEELAL

MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine
RE Dissociation Damages

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCTEELAL

Affidavit of Daniel J Gordon in Support of MRIA's Michael Mclaughlin
Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine RE
Dissociation Damages

MEMO

CCAMESLC

Memorandum in Support of Admissability of Carl
harder Letter

AFFD

CCAMESLC

Affidavit in Support of Memorandum in Support of Michael Mclaughlin
Admissability of Carl Harder Letter

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed -Trial Testimony of Kenneth Fry

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed- Trial Testimony of Holly Wallace Michael Mclaughlin

8/13/2007

8/14/2007

8/16/2007

8/20/2007

Judge

Michael Mclaughlin

Michael Mclaughlin
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8/20/2007

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed - Trial Testimony of Sandra
Bruce

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

MRIA Motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Wade L Woodward in Support of
Motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

8/22/2007

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Response to Motion in Limine

Michael Mclaughlin

8/23/2007

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed- Trial Testimony Direct
Examination of Charles Wilhoite

Michael Mclaughlin

ACCP

CCC HILER

Acceptance Of Service (8/21/07)

Michael Mclaughlin

ACCP

CCTOWNRD

Acceptance Of Service 8-21-07

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed -Trial Testimony of Jack Havlina Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed- Trial Testimony of Lani O'Malley Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed- Trial Testimony- Dr. James
Giles

Michael Mclaughlin

8/27/2007

MISC

CCTOONAL

MRIA'S Response to Statue of Limitations
Argument

Michael Mclaughlin

8/28/2007

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed -Trial testimony of Carolyn
Corbett

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESLC

MIRA's Motion in Limine Re: Grant chamberlain
Testimony and Supporting Memorandum

Michael Mclaughlin

AFSM

CCAMESLC

Affidavit In Support Of MIRA's Motion in Limine
Michael Mclaughlin
Re: Grant chamberlain Testimony and Supporting
Memorandum

8/29/2007

MISC

CCBROWKM

Saint Alphonsus Objections and Proposed
Additional Jury Instructions

Michael Mclaughlin

8/30/2007

JRYI

CCBROWKM

Jury Instructions Filed

Michael Mclaughlin

JUVD

CCBROWKM

Jury Verdict Filed

Michael Mclaughlin

9/4/2007

OBJT

CCC HILER

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care and St
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's Objection
to MRIA's Proposed Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

9/6/2007

MISC

DCJOHNSI

Transcipt Lodged

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed- Trial Testimony of James
Prochaska

Michael Mclaughlin

RSPN

CCWRIGRM

MRIA's Response to St Als Diversified Care and
St Als RMC's Objection to MRIA's Proposed
Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion to Strike Charles F McDevitt as an Expert Michael Mclaughlin
Witness

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Thomas A Banducci

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Richard H Greener

Michael Mclaughlin

8/24/2007

9/10/2007

Judge
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9/10/2007

MISC

CCWRIGRM

MRIA's Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law re Withdrawing Partners
Interest in the Partnership

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Thomas A Banducci

Michael Mclaughlin

MISC

CCWRIGRM

St Als Diversified Care Proposed Findings of Fact Michael Mclaughlin
and Conclusions of Law regarding Plaintiff St Als
Diversified Care Inc's Claim for Its Partnership
Equity

TRAN

DCTYLENI

Transcript Filed-Closing Argument 8/30/07

TRAN

DCTYLENI

Transcript Filed-Jury Instruction Conference 8/24, Michael Mclaughlin
8/29, 8/30/07

TRAN

DCTYLENI

Transcript Filed-Post-Evidentiary Motions

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCKENNJA

Transcript Filed Jeffrey Cliff 8/28/07 & 8/29/07

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCKENNJA

Transcript Filed Bruce Budge 8/20/07

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

DCTYLENI

Transcript Filed-Jury Verdict

Michael Mclaughlin

DEOP

DCTYLENI

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

CD IS

DCTYLENI

Civil Disposition entered for: Gem State
Michael Mclaughlin
Radiology Up, Defendant; Imaging Center
Radiologists Up, Defendant; Intermountain
Medical Imaging Lie, Defendant; Mri Associates
Up, Defendant; Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care
Inc, Plaintiff.
order date: 9/21/2007

9/24/2007

TRAN

CCKENNJA

Transcript Filed Testomy of Cindy Schamp

Michael Mclaughlin

9/26/2007

TRAN

CCKENNJA

Transcript Filed--Testimony of Julli Hopkins
8/16/07

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCKENNJA

Transcript Filed---Testimony of Mary Elizabeth
River M.D. 8/28/07

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCKENNJA

Transcript Filed---Testimony of Dr. Jeffrey
Seabourn 8/27/07 & 8/28/07

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

DCJOHNSI

Transcript Filed- Test. of Dr. B Anderson

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

DCJOHNSI

Transcript Filed- test of Dr. P Reedy

Michael Mclaughlin

10/1/2007

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed- Motions Hearing 7/2/07

Michael Mclaughlin

10/3/2007

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Michael Mclaughlin
and Motion for New Trial

AFSM

CCAMESLC

Affidavit In Support Of Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New
Trial

MEMO

CCAMESLC

Memorandum in SUpport of Motion for Judgment Michael Mclaughlin
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New
Trial

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion to Enlarge Page Limit

Michael Mclaughlin

AFSM

CCAMESLC

Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Enlarge Page
Limit

Michael Mclaughlin

9/21/2007

9/27/2007

Judge

Michael Mclaughlin

Michael Mclaughlin
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10/3/2007

AFFD

CCAMESLC

Affidavit Re: Settlement Offer

Michael Mclaughlin

10/9/2007

MOTN

CCBARCCR

Motion for Costs and Fees

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBARCCR

Affidavit of Thomas A Banducci in Support of
MRIA's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBARCCR

Affidavit of Counsel RE: Criteria for Awarding
Attorney Fees

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBARCCR

Affidavit of Charles F Cole

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCBARCCR

MRIA's Memorandum in Support of Memorandum Michael Mclaughlin
of Costs and Fees

MOTN

CCBARCCR

MRIA's Motion for Reconsideration of Findings of Michael Mclaughlin
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment

MEMO

CCBARCCR

MRIA's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Michael Mclaughlin
Reconsideration of Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment

MOTN

CCBARCCR

MRIA's Motion for Prejudgment Interest

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBARCCR

Affidavit of Drew Voth

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCBARCCR

MRIA's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Prejudgment Interest

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBARCCR

Affidavit of Thomas A Banducci in Support of
Motion for Prejudgment Interest

Michael Mclaughlin

APPL

CCPRICDL

Saint Alphonsus's Application for Attorney Fees
Relative to Antitrust and Equity Claims

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCPRICDL

Verified Memorandum of Coasts and Attorneys
Fees

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCPRICDL

Affidavit of Stephanie C. Westermeier

Michael Mclaughlin

10/10/2007

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed -Summary Judgment Motion
Hearing 4/17/07

Michael Mclaughlin

10/12/2007

SUBC

CCDWONCP

Notice of Substitution Of Counsel

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed -Trial Testimony of Manfred
Steiner

Michael Mclaughlin

10/15/2007

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order re: Enlarging Page Limit

Michael Mclaughlin

10/16/2007

HRSC

CCBLACJE

Notice of Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Michael Mclaughlin
10/31/2007 09:00AM)

10/18/2007

TRAN

CCKENNJA

Transcript Filed of Grant Robert chamerlian
8/28/07

Michael Mclaughlin

10/19/2007

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed- Motions Hearing 1/11/07

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed- Trial Testimony of Joseph A
Messmer

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed -Trial Testimony ad Dr. Neil
Couchman Davey

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed- Trial Testimony of Cindy
Schamp 8/27/07 Volume II

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed -Trial Testimony of Grant Robert Michael Mclaughlin
Chamberlain 8/16/07 & 8/20/07
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10/19/2007

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed -Partial Trial Testimony Jeffrey
Robert Cliff 8/29/07

Michael Mclaughlin

10/22/2007

OBJT

CCWRIGRM

MRIA's Objection to Verified Memorandum of
Costs and Attorney Fees

Michael Mclaughlin

10/23/2007

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion to Disallow MIRA's Request for Costs and Michael Mclaughlin
Fees

AFSM

CCAMESLC

Affidavit In Support Of Motion tp Disallow Costs
and Fees

MEMO

CCAMESLC

Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum In Opposition To Michael Mclaughlin
MRIA's Motion For Attorney's Fees And Costs

NOTH

CCAMESLC

Notice Of Hearing (10/31/07@ 9am)

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCBOYIDR

MRIA'S Motion to File Overlength Brief

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBOYIDR

Affidavit in Support of MRIA'S Motion to File
Overlenght Brief

Michael Mclaughlin

OPPO

CCBOYIDR

MRIA'S Opposition to Motion for Judgment
l\lotwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New
Trial

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCBOYIDR

Affidavit in Support of MRIA'S Opposition to
Michael Mclaughlin
Motion for Judgement Notwithstanding the Verdict
and Motion for New Trial

MEMO

CCTOWNRD

Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Motion for Michael Mclaughlin
Reconsideration of Findings of Fact

AFFD

CCTOWI\IRD

Affidavit of Jack Gjording in Opposition to Motion Michael Mclaughlin
for Prejudgement Interest

MEMO

CCTOWNRD

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Prejudgement Interest

REPL

CCTOWNRD

Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Michael Mclaughlin
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgement

REPL

CCTOWNRD

Reply in Support of Motion for Prejudgement
Interest

Michael Mclaughlin

REPL

CCTOWNRD

MRIA's Verified Reply in Support of Motion for
Costs and Fees

Michael Mclaughlin

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed - Partial Transcript, Dr. David
Giles

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCDWONCP

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care Inc and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center Inc's Motion
to Enlarge Page Limit

Michael Mclaughlin

MEMO

CCDWONCP

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care Inc and Saint
Michael Mclaughlin
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center Inc's Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New
Trial

10/24/2007

10/26/2007

10/29/2007

Juqge

Michael Mclaughlin

Michael Mclaughlin
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10/29/2007

AFFD

CCDWONCP

Affidavit of Patrick ,I Miller in Support of Saint
Michael Mclaughlin
Alphonsus Diversified Care Inc and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center Inc's Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New
Trial

10/30/2007

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order re: Saint Alphonsus Motion to Enlarge
Page Limit

Michael Mclaughlin

10/31/2007

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
10/31/2007 09:00AM: Hearing Held Motion to
Disallow Costs and Fees

Michael Mclaughlin

ADVS

CCBROWKM

Case Taken Under Advisement

Michael Mclaughlin

11/13/2007

TRAN

CCBROWKM

Transcript Filed- Motion Hearing 10/31/07

Michael Mclaughlin

11/19/2007

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Michael Mclaughlin
Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus's
Application for Attorney Fees Relative to Antitrust
and Equity Claims; St. Alphonsus Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict; St.
Alphonsus's Motion for New Trial; MRIA's Motion
for Prejudgment Interest; MRIA's Motion for
Reconsideration; MRIA's Motion for Attorney
Fees and Costs

12/7/2007

AFFD

CCAMESlC

Affidavit in SUpport of Atty Costs and Fees

Michael Mclaughlin

12/10/2007

MISC

CCEARUD

Acceptance of Remittitur

Michael Mclaughlin

12/20/2007

OBJT

CCPRICDl

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center Objection to
Acceptance of Remittitur

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESlC

Motion for Limited Admission of Donald BAyer

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESlC

Motion for Limited Admission of Christian
Vergonis

Michael Mclaughlin

OBJT

CCEARUD

Objection to Revised Fees and Costs

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCEARlJD

Affidavit in Support of Objection to Revised Fees
and Costs

Michael Mclaughlin

12/27/2007

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Michael Mclaughlin

1/2/2008

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order for Limited Admission - Donald B. Ayer

Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order for Limited Admission - Christian G.
Vergonis

Michael Mclaughlin

AMJD

DClYKEMA

Amended Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

MOTN

CCAMESlC

Motion to Shorten Time

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCAMESlC

Notice of Hearing (Objection to Attorney Fees
and Costs 01/08/2008 03:00 PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order Shortening Time

Michael Mclaughlin

RSPS

CCC HilER

Response to Objection to Acceptance of
Remittitur

Michael Mclaughlin

IVIOTN

CCTOONAl

Motion for Stay of Execution

Michael Mclaughlin

12/21/2007

1/3/2008

1/4/2008

Judge
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1/4/2008

AFFD

CCTOONAl

Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording in Support of Motion
for Stay of Execution

Michael Mclaughlin

1/8/2008

ADVS

CCBROWKM

Case Taken Under Advisement

Michael Mclaughlin

HRHD

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Objection to Attorney Fees and Michael Mclaughlin
Costs held on 01/08/2008 03:00 PM: Hearing
Held

1/10/2008

RQST

CCBlAC,IE

Request for Additional Transcripts & Records

Michael Mclaughlin

1/17/2008

NOTC

CCTHIEBJ

Notice Of Cross-Appeal

Michael Mclaughlin

1/28/2008

DEOP

DCABBOSM

Memorandum Decision on MRIA's Revised
Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs

Michael Mclaughlin

1/29/2008

DEOP

DCTYlENI

Order Clarifying the Court's Memorandum
Decision on MRIA's Motion for ATtorney's Fees
and Costs Issued by the Court on January 28th,
2008

Michael Mclaughlin

1/30/2008

REQU

CCBOYIDR

Request for Additional Clerk's Record

Michael Mclaughlin

2/4/2008

AFFD

CCDWONCP

Affidavit of Wade l Woodard in Support of Award Michael Mclaughlin
of Costs as a Matter of Right and Second
Amended Judgment

2/5/2008

REQU

CCTHIEBJ

Supplemental Request For Additional Clerk's
Records

Michael Mclaughlin

2/6/2008

OBJT

CCWRIGRM

Objection to Proposed Second Amended
Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

2/8/2008

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order Staying Execution

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Thomas A Banducci

Michael Mclaughlin

RQST

CCC HilER

Supplemental Request for Additional Clerk's
Record

Michael Mclaughlin

NOHG

CCCHilER

Notice Of Hearing

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCCHilER

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
02/26/2008 04:00 PM) Objection to MRIA's
Proposed 2nd Amended Jdgmnt

Michael Mclaughlin

OBJC

CCTOWNRD

MRIA 's Objection to Proposed 2nd Amended
Judgement and Motion for Fees

Michael Mclaughlin

NOTC

CCWRIGRM

Notice Vacating Hearing Date ((02/26/08@
4:00pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRVC

CCWRIGRM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
02/26/2008 04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated
Objection to MRIA's Proposed 2nd Amended
Jdgmnt

Michael Mclaughlin

NOHG

CCSTROMJ

Notice Of Hearing RE: Objection to MRIA's
Proposed Second Amended Judgment
(02-26-2008 @4:00pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCSTROMJ

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
02/26/2008 04:00PM) Objection to MRIA
Proposed Second Amended Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

JDMT

CCBROWKM

Second Amended Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

2/11/2008

2/13/2008

2/20/2008

2/26/2008

Judge
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2/26/2008

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
02/26/2008 04:00PM: Hearing Vacated
Objection to IVIRIA Proposed Second Amended
Judgment

Michael Mclaughlin

2/27/2008

RQST

CCWRIGRM

MRIAs Second Supplemental Request for
Additional Clerks Records

Michael Mclaughlin

2/29/2008

MISC

CCWATSCl

l\lotice of Filing Surety Bond/Appeal Bond No.
08864599 Posted/$46,066,840.00

Michael Mclaughlin

4/7/2008

REQU

CCTOWNRD

MRIA's Third Supplemental Request for
Additional Clerk's Records

Michael Mclaughlin

4/25/2008

RQST

CCBARCCR

Request for Additional Transcripts

Michael Mclaughlin

7/14/2008

OBJT

CCRANDJD

Objection to Clerks Record on Appeal and
Request for Additional Items

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCRANDJD

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Objection to
Clerks Record on Appeal and Request for
Additional Items

Michael Mclaughlin

NOHG

CCRANDJD

l\lotice Of Hearing re Objection to Clerks Record
(7.29.08@4pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

HRSC

CCRANDJD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
07/29/2008 04:00 PM) Objection to Clerks
Record on Appeal

Michael Mclaughlin

STAT

CCRANDJD

STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk
action

Michael Mclaughlin

7/16/2008

HRSC

CCAMESlC

Notice of Hearing (Objection to Clerk's Record
on Appeal 07/30/2008 04:00 PM)

Michael Mclaughlin

7/17/2008

OBJT

CCRANDJD

Objection to Reporters Transcript on Appeal and
Request for Additional Items

Michael Mclaughlin

AFFD

CCRANDJD

Affidavit of Wade Woodard in Support of
Objection to Reporters Transcript on Appeal and
Request for Additional Items

Michael Mclaughlin

NOHG

CCRANDJD

Notice Of Hearing re Objection (07.29.08@4pm)

Michael Mclaughlin

7/22/2008

HRSC

DCABBOSM

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
07/29/2008 04:00PM) Objection to Clerks
Record on Appeal

Michael Mclaughlin

7/25/2008

HRVC

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
07/29/2008 04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated
Objection to Clerks Record on Appeal

Michael Mclaughlin

7/30/2008

DCHH

CCBROWKM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Michael Mclaughlin
07/30/2008 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Helc
Court Reporter: Hohenleitner
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50 Objection to Clerks
Record on Appeal

7/31/2008

STIP

CCBROWKM

Stipulation for Corrections and Additions to the
Transcript and Record

Michael Mclaughlin

8/1/2008

ORDR

CCBROWKM

Order for Corrections and Additions to the
Reanscript and Record

Michael Mclaughlin

Judge
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8/1/2008

STAT

CCBROWKM

STATUS CHANGED: closed

Michael Mclaughlin

10/21/2009

MOTN

CCSIMMSM

Motion to Schedule Status Conference

Michael Mclaughlin

10/22/2009

MISC

CCTHIEBJ

Opinion - Supreme Court Docket No. 34885

Michael Mclaughlin

10/26/2009

NOTC

CCWRIGRM

Notice Withdrawing Motion to Schedule Status
Conference

Michael Mclaughlin

1/15/2010

MODQ

CCKEllMA

Motion To Disqualify Judge Without Cause

Michael Mclaughlin

1/22/2010

MISC

CCWATSCl

Opinion - Supreme Court Docket No. 34885-2007 Michael Mclaughlin

1/25/2010

ORDQ

CCKEllMA

Order Granting Disqualification Without Cause

CJWO

CCKEllMA

Notice of Reassignment to Judge Thomas Neville Thomas F. Neville

ORDR

DCElLISJ

Order Of Recusal

Thomas F. Neville

CHJS

DCElLISJ

Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification

Thomas F. Neville

DISF

DCElLISJ

Disqualification Of Judge - Self

Thomas F. Neville

DCElLISJ

Notice of Reassignment

Mike Wetherell

NOHG

CCGARDAl

Notice Of Status Conference 2.17.1 0@ 9am

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

CCGARDAl

Hearing Scheduled (Status 02/17/2010 09:00
AM)
[file stamped 02/05/201 0]

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion for Limited Admission of Thomas J Davis

Mike Wetherell

STIP

CCCHilER

Stipulation for the Release and Return of the
Original Surety Bond

Mike Wetherell

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order for Limited Admission of Thomas Davis

Mike Wetherell

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Releasing and Returning the original Surety Mike Wetherell
Bond No. 08864599 (Mailed to Attorney
02/16/201 0)

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Status held on 02/17/2010
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference
05/07/2010 10:00 AM)

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/06/2011 09:00 Mike Wetherell
AM)

MEMO

DCOATMAD

Memorandum of Actions Taken by the Court on
February 17, 2010

Mike Wetherell

2/19/2010

REMT

CCTHIEBJ

Remittitur- Remanded & Judgment Vacated per
Supreme Court Docket No. 34885

Mike Wetherell

2/25/2010

AFFD

CCSIMMSM

Affidavit of Stephanie C. Westermeier

Mike Wetherell

3/16/2010

.IDMT

DCOATMAD

Judgment for Costs on Appeal

Mike Wetherell

3/22/2010

AMEN

CCWRIGRM

Third Amended Counterclaim

Mike Wetherell

4/16/2010

ANSW

CCGARDAl

Answer to Third Amended Complaint (Gjording
forSt Als)

Mike Wetherell

1/28/2010

2/8/2010

2/10/2010

2/16/2010

2/17/2010

Judge

Michael Mclaughlin
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4/16/2010

MOTN

CCGARDAL

Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter from the Thirda Mike Wetherell
Amended Complaint

5/7/2010

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on Mike Wetherell
05/07/2010 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/01/2010 09:00
AM)

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/09/2010 10:00
AM)

Mike Wetherell

NOHG

CCLATICJ

Notice Of Hearing re Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Mike Wetherell
Strike Immaterial Matter from the Third Amended
Counterclaim (07/09/10@ 10 am)

6/22/2010

NOTH

TCWEGEKE

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Mike Wetherell

7/2/2010

OPPO

TCWEGEKE

Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Strike
Immaterial Matter from Third Amended
Counterclaim

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

TCWEGEKE

Affidavit of Tom Banducci in Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter
from Third Amended Counterclaim

Mike Wetherell

CONT

DCOATMAD

Continued (Motion 07/09/2010 09:00AM) Saint Mike Wetherell
Alphonsus' Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter
from the Third Amended Counterclaim

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

St Als Reply in Support of its Motion to Strike
Immaterial Matter from the Third Amended
Counterclaim

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Motion held on 07/09/2010
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
!\lumber of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike
Immaterial Matter from the Third Amended
Counterclaim less than 50

Mike Wetherell

ORDR

DCDANSEL

Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions From
the Parties and Briefing Schedule

Mike Wetherell

NOTS

CCSIMMSM

Notice Of Service

Mike Wetherell

MOAM

CCSIMMSM

Motion To Amend Order: REScheduling
Preliminary Motions

Mike Wetherell

7/30/2010

MISC

CCKINGAJ

Saint Alphonsus's Response to Mria's Motion to
Amend Order: Re Scheduling Preliminary
Motions

Mike Wetherell

8/3/2010

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/04/2010 10:00
AM)

Mike Wetherell

NOHG

CCSULLJA

Notice Of Hearing (Motion to Amend
Order-08/04/10@ 10:00 AM)

Mike Wetherell

7/6/2010

7/9/2010

7/26/2010

Judge

000058

Date: 1/9/2013

Fourth Judicial District Court- Ada County

Time: 09:49 AM

ROA Report

Page 56 of 81

User: CCTHIEBJ

Case: CV-OC-2004-11388 Current Judge: Mike Wetherell
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care Inc vs. MRI Associates LLP, eta I.

Date

Code

User

8/5/2010

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Motion held on 08/04/201 0
10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50

8/6/2010

MOSJ

CCMCLILI

Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment Mike Wetherell
Based on the Legal Insufficiency of MRIA's
Evidence of Lost Profits

MEMO

CCMCLILI

Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Its Mike Wetherell
Motion for Summary Judgment Based on the
Legal lnsuffiency of MRIA's Evidence of Lost
Profits

MOTN

CCMCLILI

Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment on the
Claims of the Limited Partnerships

MEMO

CCMCLILI

Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Its Mike Wetherell
Motion for Judgment on the Claims of the Limited
Partnerships

MOTN

CCMCLILI

Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment on the
Civil Conspiracy Claim

MEMO

CCMCLILI

Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Its Mike Wetherell
Motion for Judgment on the Civil Conspiracy
Claim

MOSJ

CCMCLILI

Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment Mike Wetherell
on MRIA's Claim for Wrongful Dissociation

IVIEMO

CCMCLILI

Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Its Mike Wetherell
Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Claim
for Wrongful Dissociation

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Denying Defendatn's Motion to Amend
Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCLATICJ

Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on
Claim for Wrongful Dissociation

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCLATICJ

Opposition to Motion for Judgment on the Claims Mike Wetherell
of the Limited Partnerships

MEMO

CCLATICJ

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment Based on MRIA's Civil
Conspiracy Claim

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCLATICJ

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment Based on the Alleged Legal
Insufficiency of MRIA's Evidence of Lost Profits

Mike Wetherell

REPL

CCMASTLW

St. Alphonsus' Reply in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment on Claims of the Limited
Partnerships

Mike Wetherell

REPL

CCMASTLW

St Alphonsus' Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment on NIRIA's Claim
for Wrongful Dissociation

Mike Wetherell

REPL

CCMASTLW

St Alphonsus' Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Claim

Mike Wetherell

8/30/2010

9/13/2010

Judge
Mike Wetherell

Mike Wetherell

Mike Wetherell
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9/13/2010

REPL

CCMASTLW

St. Alphonsus' Reply Memorandum n Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Legal
Insufficiency of MRIA's Evidence of Lost Profits

9/22/2010

NOTC

CCLATICJ

Notice of Association of Counsel (Robert Bakes Mike Wetherell
for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership
and MRI Mobile Limited)

9/27/2010

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Granting Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter Mike Wetherell
From the Third Amended Counterclaim

10/1/2010

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Motion held on 10/01/2010
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 250 pgs

Mike Wetherell

11/16/2010

MEMO

DCOATMAD

Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff's
Motions for Judgment on Pleadings and Motions
for Summary Judgment

Mike Wetherell

12/23/2010

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery

Mike Wetherell

1/6/2011

HRSC

CCAMESLC

Notice of Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reopen
Fact and Expert Discovery Regarding Damages
and Set a Discovery Schedule 02/07/2011 01:30
PM)

Mike Wetherell

1/10/2011

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion to Set a Scheduling Order

Mike Wetherell

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (02/07/11 @ 1:30pm) Motion to Mike Wetherell
Set a Scheduling Order

NOHG

CCMASTLW

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

CCMASTLW

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
02/09/2011 01:30PM) Mo/Reopen Discovery;
Mo/Set Sched Order

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

MCBIEHKJ

Opposition to Motion to Reopen Face and Expert Mike Wetherell
Discovery

OPPO

MCBIEHKJ

Opposition to Motion to Set Scheduling Order

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of COunsel in Opposition to Motion to
Reopen and In opposition to Motion to Set
Scheduling Order

Mike Wetherell

2/4/2011

REPL

MCBIEHKJ

Reply in Support of Motion to Reopen Fact and
Expert Discovery

Mike Wetherell

2/9/2011

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Mike Wetherell
02/09/2011 01:30PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Mo/Reopen Discovery; Mo/Set Sched
Order-- less than 200 pgs

2/15/2011

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Reopening Discovery and Setting Schedule Mike Wetherell

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
08/05/2011 01:30PM)

Mike Wetherell

2/23/2011

NOTS

CCLATICJ

Notice Of Service

Mike Wetherell

3/2/2011

MOTI\l

CCMASTLW

Joint Motion to Amend Discovery Schedule

Mike Wetherell

1/19/2011

2/2/2011

Judge
Mike Wetherell
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3/7/2011

ORDR

CCCHILER

Order Granting Joint Motion to Amend Discovery Mike Wetherell
Schedule

MOSJ

CCSWEECE

Saint Alphonsus Motion For Summary Judgment Mike Wetherell
On MRIA's Unpled Breach Of Contract Theory of
Wrongful Dissociation

MEMO

CCSWEECE

Memorandum In Support Of Saint Alphonsus
Motion For Summary Judgment On MRIA's
Unpled Breach Of Contract Theory of Wrongful
Dissociation

Mike Wetherell

NOHG

CCSWEECE

Notice Of Hearing

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

CCSWEECE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 04/22/2011 09:00AM)

Mike Wetherell

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Mike Wetherell

NOTC

CCWRIGRM

Notice of Errata re St Alphonsus Memorandum in Mike Wetherell
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

NOSV

CCGARDAL

Notice Of Service

Mike Wetherell

CONT

DCOATMAD

Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment
04/22/2011 10:30 AM)

Mike Wetherell

NOTH

TCWEGEKE

Notice Of Hearing

Mike Wetherell

3/22/2011

STIP

CCAMESLC

Stipulation and Covenant Not to Execute

Mike Wetherell

3/23/2011

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Re: Stipulation and Convenant Not to
Execute

Mike Wetherell

3/25/2011

NOTS

CCLATICJ

Notice Of Service

Mike Wetherell

3/28/2011

OPPO

CCSWEECE

MRI Associates Opposition To Motion For
Sumamry Judgment On Breach Of Contract
Theory of Wrongful Withdrawal

Mike Wetherell

NOTS

CCSWEECE

Notice Of Service

Mike Wetherell

4/1/2011

NOTS

CCMASSSL

Notice Of Service

Mike Wetherell

4/7/2011

NOTS

CCAMESLC

Notice Of Service

Mike Wetherell

4/11/2011

NOTS

CCMASTLW

Notice Of Service

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCMASTLW

Motion for Clarification

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCMASTLW

Memorandum in Support

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCMASTLW

Motion In Limine

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCMASTLW

Memorandum in Support

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCMASTLW

Motion In Limine

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCMASTLW

Memorandum in Support

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

CCMASTLW

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of MRIA Motions
Filed 04/11/11

Mike Wetherell

RPLY

CCCHILER

Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Summary Mike Wetherell
Judgment on MRIA's Unpled "Breach of Contract"
Theory of Wrongful Dissociation

MOTN

CCC HILER

St AI phon sus's Motion in Limine Re: Evidenc eof
Competition Following Lawful Dissociation

3/8/2011

3/16/2011

Judge

Mike Wetherell
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4/11/2011

MEMO

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its
Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of Competition
Following Lawful Dissociation

MOSJ

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on Mike Wetherell
its Second Affirmative Defense

MEMO

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment on its Second
Affirmative Defense

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to Exclude
Evidence and Argument that St Alphonsus
Improperly Withdrew from MRIA

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its
Mike Wetherell
Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and
Argument that St Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew
from MRIA

MOTN

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Prior
Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of
Motion in Limine Re: Prior Evidentiary Rulings
from the First Trial

Mike Wetherell

MOSJ

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on l\/like Wetherell
its Claim for its Partnership Interest

MEMO

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its
Mike Wetherell
Motion for Summary Judgment on its Claim for its
Partnership Interest

MOSJ

CCC HILER

St Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on Mike Wetherell
MRI Center and MRI Mobile's Third Party
Beneficiary Claims

MEMO

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment on MRI Center's
and MRI Mobile's Third Party Beneficiary Claims

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to Exclude
Claims of Misappropriation, Defamation or
Wrongful Dissociation

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of
Motion in Limine to Exclude Claims of
Misappropriation, Defamation or Wrongful
Dissociation

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCC HILER

St Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: References
to the Jury's Finding of Liability in the First Trial

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCC HILER

St Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its
Motion in Limine Re: References to the Jury's
Finding of Liability in the First Trial

Mike Wetherell

MOSJ

CCCHILER

St Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on l\/like Wetherell
MRIA's Second Claim of Relief

AFFD

CCCHILER

Affidavit of Jack S Gjording

Judge
Mike Wetherell

Mike Wetherell
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4/11/2011

MEMO

CCC HILER

Mike Wetherell
St Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment of MRIA's Second
Claim of Relief

4/12/2011

NOHG

CCMASTLW

Notice Of Hearing

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

CCMASTLW

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
05/18/2011 10:00 AM) Mas/In Limine;
Me/Clarification

Mike Wetherell

4/15/2011

NOTS

CCRANDJD

Notice Of Service

Mike Wetherell

4/22/2011

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Mike Wetherell
held on 04/22/2011 10:30 AM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 250 pgs

4/25/2011

NOTD

CCMASTLW

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Mike Wetherell

NOTC

CCMASTLW

MRIA's Notice of Non-Opposition to St.
Alphonsus' Motion for Summary Judgment on
MRIA's 2nd Claim for Relief

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCMASTLW

MRIA's Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion for
Summary Judgment on Its Claim for Its
Partnership Interest

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCMASTLW

MRIA's Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion for
Summary Judgment on Its 2nd Affirmative
Defense

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCMASTLW

Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary Mike Wetherell
Judgment on MRI Center and MRI Mobile's
3rd-Party Beneficiary Claims

MISC

CCMASTLW

Response to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine re
Prior Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial

Mike Wetherell

NOTC

CCMASTLW

MRIA's Notice of Non-Opposition to St.
Alphonsus' Motion In Limine re Reference to
Jury's Finding of Liability in the 1st Trial

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCMASTLW

Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine re
Evidence of Competition Following Dissociation

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCMASTLW

Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine to
Exclude Evidence & Argument That St.
Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew From MRIA

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCMASTLW

Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limineto
Exclude Claims of Misappropriation, Defamation
or Wrongful Dissociation

Mike Wetherell

RSPN

MCBIEHKJ

St Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Motion in
Limine to Preclude Reference to the Idaho
Supreme Court Opinion in this Case

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

MCBIEHKJ

Opposition to Motion in Limine to Preclude that
Dissociation was Lawful

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

MCBIEHKJ

St Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion for
Clarification Regarding Withdrawing Partner's
Share

Mike Wetherell

Juqge
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4/25/2011

AFFD

TCWEGEKE

Affidavit of Dr James Prochaska in Opposition to Mike Wetherell
St Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on
MRI Center and MRI Mobile's 3rd Party
Beneficiary Claims

4/27/2011

NOTS

CCVIDASL

Notice Of Service

Mike Wetherell

5/2/2011

RPLY

CCHEAT.IL

MRIA's Reply In Support Of Its Motion For
Claraification regarding Withdrawing Partner's
Share

Mike Wetherell

RPLY

CCHEATJL

MRIA's Reply In Support Of Its Motion In Limine
To Preclude Argument That Dissociation Was
Lawful

Mike Wetherell

RPLY

CCHEATJL

MRIA's Reply In Support Of Its Motion In Limine
To Preclude Reference To The Idaho Supreme
Court Opinion

Mike Wetherell

REPL

CCSWEECE

Saint Alphonsuss Reply Memorandum In
Supporrt Of Its Motion For Summary Juqgment
On Its Claim For Its Partnership Interest

Mike Wetherell

REPL

CCSWEECE

Saint Alphonsuss Reply Memorandum In Support Mike Wetherell
Of Its Motion For Summary Judgment On Its
Second Affirmative Defense

REPL

CCSWEECE

Saint Alphonsuss Reply In Support Of Its Motion
For Summary Judgment On MRI Centers And
MRI Mobiles Third-Party Beneficiary Claims

Mike Wetherell

NOTS

CCSWEECE

Notice Of Service

Mike Wetherell

REPL

CCSWEECE

Saint Alphonsuss Consolidated Reply In Support
of Its Motions In Limine

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

CCSWEECE

Affidavit of Jack S Gjording

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of JackS
Gjording and Memorandum in Support

Mike Wetherell

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (05/18/11 @9:30am)

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

CCWRIGRM

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
05/18/2011 09:30AM) Motion to Strike Second
Affidavit

Mike Wetherell

5/5/2011

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Motion for Recusal by the Court
Based on Relationship with Dr Henson

Mike Wetherell

5/6/2011

RQST

CCRANDJD

Request for Hearing on Motion for Recusal

Mike Wetherell

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Re: St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary
Judgment

Mike Wetherell

JDMT

DCOATMAD

Partial Summary Judgment

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCMASTLW

Opposition to Motion to Strike

Mike Wetherell

5/9/2011

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (05/18/11 @9:30am) St
Alphonsus Motion for Recusal by the Court

Mike Wetherell

5/11/2011

OPPO

CCNELSRF

Opposition to St. Al's Motion for Recusal

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

CCNELSRF

Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to St. Al's
Motion for Recusal

Mike Wetherell

NOTS

CCLATICJ

(2) Notice Of Service

5/3/2011

5/12/2011

Judge
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5/13/2011

HRVC

DCOATMAD

Mike Wetherell
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
05/18/2011 10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated Mas/In
Limine; Me/Clarification

REPL

CCSWEECE

Saint Alphonsuss Reply In Support Of Motion For Mike Wetherell
Recusal By the Court Based On Relationship
With Dr Henson

AFSM

CCSWEECE

Affidavit Of JackS Gjording In Support Of Reply Mike Wetherell
In Support Of Motion For Recusal

REPL

CCSWEECE

Reply in Support ot Motion to Strike the Second
Affidavit of Jack Gjording

Mike Wetherell

5/16/2011

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Withdrawing Rule 54(b) Certification

Mike Wetherell

5/18/2011

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Mike Wetherell
05/18/2011 09:30AM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Motion to Strike Second Affidavit-less than 130 pgs

6/7/2011

NOTS

CCMASTLW

Notice Of Service

MOTN

CCMASTLW

Motion and Memorandum for Orders Concerning Mike Wetherell
Potential Witnesses

AFFD

CCMASTLW

Affidavit of Counsel

Mike Wetherell

NOHG

CCMASTLW

Notice Of Hearing

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

CCMASTLW

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
07/18/2011 10:00 AM) Mo/Orders Concerning
Potential Witnesses

Mike Wetherell

RSPN

CCHEAT.IL

Response To MRI Motion Concerning Potential
Witnesses

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCHEATJL

Motion To Compel Complaince

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

CCHEATJL

Affidavit Of Jack Gjording In Support Of Motion to Mike Wetherell
Compel

MEMO

CCHEATJL

Memorandum in Support Of motion To Compel

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Hearing Scheduled (Motion
06/20/2011 09:00AM)

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCHEATJL

Motion For Pro Hac Vice Admission Of Michelle
Marks

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCHEATJL

Motion For Pro Hac Vice Admissions Of Peter
Romatowski

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCHEATJL

Motion to Shorten Time And change The Hearing Mike Wetherell
Date For MRI's Motion For Orders Concerning
Potential Witnesses

MISC

DCOATMAD

Memorandum of Actions Taken at May 18
Hearing

Mike Wetherell

MISC

DCOATMAD

Consolidated Order Re: Motions in Limine

Mike Wetherell

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Granting Pro Hac Vice -- Peter
Romatowski

Mike Wetherell

6/10/2011

6/13/2011

Judge

Mike Wetherell
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6/13/2011

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Granting Motion Pro Hac Vice Michelle
Marks

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCHOLMEE

MRIA's Opposition to St Alphonsus's Motion to
Shorten Time and Change the Hearing Date for
MRIA's Motion for Orders Concerning Potential
Witnesses

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

CCHOLMEE

Affidavit of Jeri Rose Re Motion to Shorten Time
for Hearing

Mike Wetherell

RQST

CCWRIGRM

Request for Clarification of June 13 2011 Order
Shortening Time

Mike Wetherell

AMEN

CCWRIGRM

Amended Notice of Hearing (06/22/11 @
10:00am) St Alphonsus Motion to Compel

Mike Wetherell

HRVC

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled
on 07/18/201110:00AM: Hearing Vacated
Mo/Orders Concerning Potential Witnesses

Mike Wetherell

ORDR

TCWEGEKE

Order Shortening Time and Moving Up Hearing
Date

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Order Setting Hearing (Hearing Scheduled
06/22/2011 02:00 PM)

Mike Wetherell

HRVC

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Motion held on 06/20/2011
09:00AM: Hearing Vacated

Mike Wetherell

ORDR

TCWEGEKE

Order Vacating Hearing and Setting New Hearing Mike Wetherell
Date

6/15/2011

OPPO

CCWRIGRM

Opposition to St Alphonsus Motion to Compel
Compliance with Statuary Rights to Inspect
Partnership Books and Records

6/17/2011

RPLY

CCAMESLC

Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Compliance Mike Wetherell
with Statutory Rights to Inspect Partnership
Books and Records

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Consoldiated Order Re: Motions for Summary
Judgment Heard May 18,2011

Mike Wetherell

6/20/2011

NOTD

CCNELSRF

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Mike Wetherell

6/21/2011

RPLY

CCSULLJA

MRIA's Reply in Support of its Motion Concerning Mike Wetherell
Potential Witnesses Sandra Bruce and Cindy
Schamp

6/22/2011

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Mike Wetherell
06/22/2011 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pgs

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order RE: Availability at Trial of Witnesses
Sandra Bruce, Cindy Schamp and Dr. THomas
Henson

Mike Wetherell

6/29/2011

BREF

MCBIEHKJ

Brief re Motion to Compel Compliance

Mike Wetherell

7/5/2011

RSPN

CCBOYIDR

Response to Brief Concerning Gilbert v. Summit
County

Mike Wetherell

7/7/2011

AMEN

CCHEAT.IL

Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition

Mike Wetherell

6/14/2011

Judge

Mike Wetherell

000066

Date: 1/9/2013

Fourth Judicial District Court- Ada County

Time: 09:49 AM

ROA Report

Page 64 of 81

User: CCTHIEBJ

Case: CV-OC-2004-11388 Current Judge: Mike Wetherell
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care Inc vs. MRI Associates LLP, eta I.

Date

Code

User

7/13/2011

MOTN

CCJOYCCN

Motion to Release Original Exhibits

Mike Wetherell

7/14/2011

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Releasing Exhibits

Mike Wetherell

MISC

MCBIEHKJ

MRIA's Proposed Jury Instructions

Mike Wetherell

NOTD

CCWRIGRM

(2) Notice Of Taking Video Deposition

Mike Wetherell

STIP

CCWRIGRM

Stipulation to Amend Discovery Schedule

Mike Wetherell

7/20/2011

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Denying St Als Motion to Compel
Compliance with Statutory Right to Inspect
MRIA's Books and Records

Mike Wetherell

7/22/2011

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Mike Wetherell

7/25/2011

MOTN

CCHEATJL

Motion In Limine To Exclude Hearsay Within
Hearsay In Business Records

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCHEAT.IL

St Alphonus Motion For Reconsideration In Part Mike Wetherell
Of June 13 2011 Consolidated Order RE: Motions
In Limine

AFFD

CCHEAT.IL

Affidavit Of Jack S Gjording

MEMO

CCHEATJL

St Alphonus Memorandum In Support Of Motion Mike Wetherell
In Limine To Exclude Hearsay Within Hearsay In
Business Records

MOTN

CCHEATJL

Motion To Shorten Time

Mike Wetherell

I'JOHG

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion In Limine (Aug 2
2011@ 1:30pm)

Mike Wetherell

7/26/2011

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Setting Deadline for Non-Dispositive
Motions

Mike Wetherell

7/28/2011

MOTN

CCHEATJL

Motion To Have Deemed Admitted The Exhibits
Admitted In The Previous Trial

Mike Wetherell

AFSM

CCHEATJL

Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Motion To
Mike Wetherell
Have Deemed Admitted The Exhibits Admitted In
The Previous Trial

MEMO

CCHEAT.IL

Memorandum In Support Of MRIA's Motion To
Mike Wetherell
Have Deemed Admitted The Exhibits Admitted In
The Previous Trial

MOTN

CCHEAT.IL

MRIA's Motion In Limine To Exclude Mention Of
Saint AI phon us's Status As A Non-Profit Entity

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCHEATJL

Memorandum In Support Of MRIA's Motion In
Limine To Exclude Mention Of Saint Alphonus's
Status As A Non-Profit Entity

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCHEAT.IL

MRIA's Opposition To Saint Alphonus's Motion In Mike Wetherell
Limine To Exclude "Hearsay Within Hearsay" In
Business Records

MOTN

CCHEAT.IL

Motion To Shorten Time For Hearing

MEMO

CCHOLMEE

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Exclude the Mike Wetherell
Expert Testimony of Thomas R McCarthy PhD

AFFD

CCHOLMEE

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

TCWEGEKE

Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of
Thomas R McCarthy, Ph.D

Mike Wetherell

7/19/2011

7/29/2011

Judge

Mike Wetherell

Mike Wetherell
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8/1/2011

MOTN

CCVIDASL

Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing

MOTN

CCVIDASL

Motion and Memorandum in Support to Preclude Mike Wetherell
Reference to Saint Alphonsus Departing Partners
Share

MOTN

CCVIDASL

Motion and Memorandum for Clarification That
Saint Alphonsus May not Contend that MRIA
Breached Fiduciary Duties

Mike Wetherell

OBJT

CCVIDASL

Objection to Saint Alphonsuss Motion for
Reconsideration in Part of June 13 2011
Consolidated Order Re Motions in Limine

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCWRIGRM

Opposition to MRIAs Motion to Shorten Time on Mike Wetherell
its Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony and Cross
Motion fro Briefing and Hearing Schedule on
Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony

8/2/2011

REPL

CCKINGAJ

Reply in Support of MRIA's Motion to Shorten
Time on Its Motion to Exclude the Expert
Testimony of Thomas R McCarthy PHD

Mike Wetherell

8/3/2011

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Granting Motion to Shorten Time

Mike Wetherell

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Granting Motion to Shorten Time

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Opposition to MRIAs Motion to
Have Deemed Admitted Exhibits From First Trial

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Opposition to MRIAs Motion to
Preclude Reference to St Alphonsus Departing
Partner Share

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Opposition to MRIAs Motion to
Exclude Mention of St Alphonsus Status as a
NonProfit Entity

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCWRIGRM

Mike Wetherell
St Alphonsus Opposition to MRIAs Motion for
Clarification re Contentions That MRIA Breached
Fiduciary Duties

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

Mike Wetherell
St Alphonsus Reply in Support of its Motion in
Limine to Exclude Hearsay Within Hearsay From
Business Records

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Reply in Support of Reconsideration Mike Wetherell
in Part of June 13 2011 Consolidated Order re
Motions in Limine

MEMO

TCWEGEKE

Memorandum Addressing St Alphonsus's
Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Shorten Time

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCHEAT.IL

Saint Alphonus Opposition To MRI's Motion To
Exclude The Expert Testimony Of Thomas R
McCarthy PHD

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

CCHEATJL

Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Opposition

Mike Wetherell

OBJT

CCMASTLW

Objections to St Alphonsus's Requested Jury
Instructions and Special Verdict Form

Mike Wetherell

MISC

CCMASTLW

MRI's 1st Supplemental Proposed Jury
Instructions

Mike Wetherell

8/4/2011

Judge
Mike Wetherell
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8/4/2011

REPL

MCBIEHKJ

Reply in Support of Motion to Have Deemed
Admitted Exhibits from the First Trial

REPL

TCWEGEKE

Reply in Support of Motion to Exclude Mention of Mike Wetherell
St Alphonsus's Status as a Non-Profit Entity

DEW I

CCAMESLC

Defendant's Witness List

Mike Wetherell

DEEX

CCAMESLC

Defendant's Exhibit List

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 08/05/2011 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: & Motion In Limine -- less than 250
pgs

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
08/09/2011 01:30 PM)

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 08/09/2011 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50 pgs

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCNELSRF

Motion for Order Setting Deadline for Production
of Exhibit List and Motion to Shorten Time

Mike Wetherell

8/16/2011

ORDR

DCDANSEL

Order Rescheduling Jury Questionaire

Mike Wetherell

8/17/2011

MISC

CCLATICJ

DefendanUCounterclaimants' Proposed Amended Mike Wetherell
Exhibit List

EXLT

CCKHAMSA

Plaintiff/Counterdefendants Saint Alphonsus's
Proposed Exhibit List

Mike Wetherell

WI TN

CCKHAMSA

Saint Alphonsus's Witness Designations

Mike Wetherell

OBJC

CCKHAMSA

Saint Alphonsus's Objection To MRIA's
Mike Wetherell
Designations Of Manfred Steiner, Alan Hahn And
Stephanie Westermeier As Witnesses

BREF

CCWRIGRM

Supplemental Brief in Opposition to MRIAs
Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Dr
Thomas McCarthy

Mike Wetherell

8/18/2011

MOTN

CCLATICJ

Motion to Strike Saint Alphonsus' Supplemental
Brief in Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Exclude
Expert Testimony of Dr. Thomas McCarthy

Mike Wetherell

8/19/2011

MISC

CCMASTLW

St. Alphonsus's Proposed Juror Questionnnaire

Mike Wetherell

8/23/2011

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Consolidated Order RE: Motions Heard August 5, Mike Wetherell
2011
[file stamped 08/24/2011]

8/25/2011

MISC

CCNELSRF

DefendanUCounterclaimants' Deposition
Designation

8/26/2011

AMEN

CCBOYIDR

DefendanUCounterclaimant's Proposed Amended Mike Wetherell
Exhibit List

8/5/2011

8/9/2011

Judge
Mike Wetherell

Mike Wetherell
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Date

Code
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8/29/2011

MEMO

DCOATMAD

Memorandum Addressing Communication From
Counsel

Mike Wetherell

8/30/2011

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion in Limine

Mike Wetherell

REQU

DCOATMAD

Request/Approval to Video Record, Broadcase or Mike Wetherell
Photograh Proceedings

AFOS

CCHEATJL

Affidavit Of Service 8.26.11

Mike Wetherell

ACCP

CCHEAT.IL

(4) Acceptance Of Service 8.29.11

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCNELSRF

Supplemental Motion in Limine to Prevent St. Als/ Mike Wetherell
From Arguing that Attorney Carl Harder Engaged
in Inappropriate Conduct

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Motion to Exclude Additional MRIA
Demonstratives

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Opposition to MRIAs Motions in
Limine to Prevent Argument that Giles and
Harder Engaged in Inappropriate Conduct

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCMASTLW

Opposition to St. Alphonsus's Motion to Exclude
Additional MRIA Demonstratives

Mike Wetherell

REPL

CCMASTLW

Reply in Support of MRIA's Motions In Limine

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Review Hearing
09/02/2011 03:00 PM)

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCHEATJL

Saint Alphonus's Motion To Exclude MRIA's New Mike Wetherell
And Improper Damages Theories

AFSM

CCHEAT.IL

Affidavit Of Jack Gjording In Support Of Saint
Alphonus's Motion To Exclude MRIA's New And
Improper Damages Theories

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCHEATJL

Saint Alphonus's Memorandum In Suport Of
Motion To Exclude MRIA's New And Improper
Damages Theories

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Review Hearing scheduled on Mike Wetherell
09/02/2011 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50 pgs

MOTN

DCOATMAD

St Als Motion to Preclude MRIA From Using
Excluded Carl Harder Letter and Related Drafts

Mike Wetherell

MISC

DCOATMAD

Juror Questionnaire

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
IVIike Wetherell
09/06/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 500 pages

HRSC

TCJOHNKA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/07/2011 09:00 Mike Wetherell
AM) 2nd day

HRSC

TCJOHNKA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/09/2011 09:00 Mike Wetherell
AM) 3rd day

8/31/2011

9/1/2011

9/2/2011

9/6/2011

Judge
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9/7/2011

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Mike Wetherell
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
09/07/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: l\licole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 500 pages

9/8/2011

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion to Prevent St Alphonsus from Referring to Mike Wetherell
Extension of Term to 2023

9/9/2011

HRSC

TCJOHNKA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/12/2011 09:00 Mike Wetherell
AM) 4th day

DCHH

TCJOHNKA

Mike Wetherell
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
09/09/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 500 pages

MISC

TCJOHNKA

Saint Alphonsus's Revised Exhibit List

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Mike Wetherell
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
09/12/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: 4th day less than 500 pgs

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
09/13/2011 09:00AM) Day 5 jury trial

Mike Wetherell

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Opening Statement & Witness
James Prochaska
[file stamped 09/09/2011]

Mike Wetherell

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Witness James Prochaska-Sept 9, 2011

Mike Wetherell

MISC

DCOATMAD

St Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Prevent St Als From Referring to Extension of
Term to 2023

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 09/13/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 5 jury trial less than 500 pgs

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
09/14/2011 08:30AM) Day 6

Mike Wetherell

OBJT

CCHEATJL

Objection To Jury Instruction Regarding
Consultant Estimate

Mike Wetherell

ACCP

CCNELSRF

Acceptance Of Service of Trial Subpoena

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 09/14/2011 08:30AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Dianne Cromweii/Nicole Omsber!
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 6 --less than 500 pgs

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
09/16/2011 09:00AM) Jury trial Day 7

9/12/2011

9/13/2011

9/14/2011

Judge

Mike Wetherell

Mike Wetherell

000071
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9/16/2011

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Witness James Prochaska Day 6 Mike Wetherell

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Witness James Prochaska Day 7 Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCHEAT.IL

Saint Alphonus's Supplemental Memorandum In
Support Of Its Motion To Exclude MRIA's New
And Improper Damages Theories

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 09/16/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Jury trial Day 7 --less than 500 pgs

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Day 8 --Witness Jeffrey Cliff

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 09/19/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 8 --less than 200 pgs

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
09/20/2011 09:00AM) Day 9

AFFD

CCKHAMSA

Affidavit Of Counsel In Opposition To Saint
Mike Wetherell
Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude MRIA's Damages
Theories

OPPO

CCKHAMSA

Opposition To Saint Alphonsus's Motion To
Exclude MRIA's Damages Theories

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 09/20/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Ombserg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 9 --less than 500 pgs

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
09/21/2011 09:00AM) Day 10

Mike Wetherell

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Reply in Support of Its Motion to
Exclude MRIAs New and Improper Damages
Theories

Mike Wetherell

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Day 9 Volume 7 --witness
Sandra Bruce

Mike Wetherell

TRAN

DCDANSEL

Transcript Filed Witness Sandra G. Bruce - Day
10 (Volume 8)

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 09/21/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 9 less than 500 pgs

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
09/23/2011 09:00AM) Jury trial Day 10

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Day 11 -- Sandra Bruce

9/19/2011

9/20/2011

9/21/2011

9/22/2011

Judge

Mike Wetherell

Mike Wetherell

Mike Wetherell

Mike Wetherell

Mike Wetherell

000072
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Date: 1/9/2013

Fourth Judicial District Court- Ada County

Time: 09:49 AM

ROA Report

Page 70 of 81

User: CCTHIEBJ

Case: CV-OC-2004-11388 Current Judge: Mike Wetherell
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care Inc vs. MRI Associates LLP, eta I.

Date
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9/22/2011

MOTN

CCBOYIDR

Motion in Limine Concerning out of Court
Statements of Cindy Schamp

9/23/2011

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 09/23/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Jury trial Day 10 --less than 500 pgs

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Jury trial 09/26/2011 09:00AM Day 11 -Jury trial 09/27/11 09:00AM I Day 12

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Jury trial 09/28/2011 09:00a.m. Day 13
Jury trial 09/30/2011 0900 a.m. Day 14

Mike Wetherell

MISC

CCNELSRF

St Al's Opposition to MRIA'S Motion in Limine
Concerning Out of Court Statements of Cindy
Schamp

Mike Wetherell

9/26/2011

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 09/26/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Jury trial Day 11 less than 500 pgs

9/27/2011

TRAN

DCDANSEL

Transcript Filed - Witness Sandra G. Bruce Day 12 -(Volume 10)

Mike Wetherell

TRAN

DCDANSEL

Transcript Filed - Witness Cindy K. Schamp Day 13 (Volume 11)
[file stamped 09/29/2011]

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCVIDASL

Motion for Leave to Offer Prior Trial Exhibit 4332
Into Evidence

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 09/27/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Jury trial Day 12 less than 500 pgs

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories

Mike Wetherell

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Volume 12 --Cindy Schamp
[file stamped 09/29/2011]

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 09/28/2011 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Patty Terry
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Jury trial Day 12 --less than 250 pgs

OBJT

CCWRIGRM

Objection to St Alphonsus Motions for Mistrial

TRAN

DCDANSEL

Transcript Filed -Witness Cindy K. Schamp- Day Mike Wetherell
13(Volume11)
[duplicate entry]

9/28/2011

9/29/2011

Judge
Mike Wetherell

Mike Wetherell

000073
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9/29/2011

TRAN

DCDANSEL

Transcript Filed -Witness Cindy K. Schamp - Day Mike Wetherell
14 (Volume 12)
[duplicate entry]

TRAN

DCDANSEL

Transcript Filed -Witness Cindy K. Schamp - Day Mike Wetherell
15 (Volume 13)

NOTC

CCDWONCP

Notice of Intent to Impeach

MOTN

CCDWONCP

Motion in Limine to Prevent Saint Alphonsus from Mike Wetherell
Presenting Evidence about "Arid Club"
Conversation Unless Court First Determines It Is
Admissable

MOTN

CCDWONCP

Motion in Limine Regarding Lawsuit Threatened
by Dr Knochel

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCHOLMEE

Motion to Quash Trial Subpoena of Jan Hove

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 09/30/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Jury trial Day 14 less than 500 pgs

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/03/2011 08:30AM) Day 15

Mike Wetherell

RPLY

CCRANDJD

Reply in Support of MRIA's Notice of Intent to
Impeach

Mike Wetherell

NOTC

CCRANDJD

Notice of Non Opposition to Proposed Instruction Mike Wetherell
NO. 16 and Proposal for Putting the Parties "On
the Clock"

OPPO

CCRANDJD

Opposition to Motion to Quash Subpoena of Jan
Hove

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 10/03/2011 08:30AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 15 -- less than 500 pgs

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/04/2011 09:00 AM) Day 16

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/05/2011 09:00AM) Day 17

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/07/2011 09:00AM) Day 17

Mike Wetherell

RESP

CCNELSRF

St. Al's Response To MRIA'S Notice of Intent to
Impeach

Mike Wetherell

TRAN

DCOATMAD

2 Transcripts Filed Trial Testimony Sept 30 and
Oct 3

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

DCOATMAD

Memorandum in Support of Admissibility

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Memorandum in Support of Admissibility of
Exhibits 802 and 803 (Dr Currans Handwritten
notes)

Mike Wetherell

9/30/2011

10/3/2011

10/4/2011

Judge

Mike Wetherell

Mike Wetherell
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10/4/2011

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 10/04/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 16 less than 500 pgs

10/5/2011

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 10/05/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 17 less than 250 pgs

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Day 18

Mike Wetherell

TRAN

DCDANSEL

Transcript Filed - Jury Voir Dire -Volume 1
(Pages 1 to 427)

Mike Wetherell

TRAN

DCDANSEL

Transcript Filed- Day 19- Witness Holly Wallace Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion to Exclude Alledged Misconduct of Dr
Giles

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 10/07/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Patty Terry
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 17 -- less than 500 pgs

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/11/2011 09:00AM) Day 18

Mike Wetherell

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Defining Trial Time Restrictions

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 10/11/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 18 less than 500 pgs

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/12/2011 09:00AM) Day 19

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/14/2011 09:00AM) Day 20

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCBOYIDR

Mike Wetherell
Motion in Limine to Prevent Argument and
Evidence that Saint Alphonsus is Entitled to an
Offset Based on its Ownership of the MRI Entities

MOTN

CCBOYIDR

Mike Wetherell
Motion in Limine to Preclude Questioning of
MRIA'S Experts Concerning the Reasonableness
of Non-Technical Factual Assumptions

AFFD

CCBOYIDR

Affidavit in Support of Motion in Limine to
Preclude Questioning of MRIA's Experts
Concerning the Reasonableness of
Non-Technical Factual Assumptions

10/6/2011

10/7/2011

10/11/2011

Judge

Mike Wetherell

Mike Wetherell
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10/11/2011

MEMO

CCBOYIDR

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to
Preclude Questioning of MRIA'S Experts
Concerning the Reasonableness of
Non-Technical Factual Assumptions

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Motion to Quash/Modify Subpoenas or Otherwise Mike Wetherell
Preclude MRIA from Calling Witnesses Without
Adequate Notice

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed VOLUME 18 --Oct 7, 2011 trial

Mike Wetherell

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Volume 19 - Oct 11, 2011 trial

l\/like Wetherell

MOTN

DCOATMAD

Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Alan E.
Friedman

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled l\/like Wetherell
on 10/12/2011 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Patty Terry
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 19 less than 200 pgs

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Allowing Admission Pro Hac Vice of Alan E Mike Wetherell
Friedman

MOTN

CCVIDASL

Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Alan
Friedman

OPPO

CCKHAMSA

St Alphonsus's Opposition To MRIA's Motion To Mike Wetherell
Preclude Questioning About Reasonableness Of
Experts' Factual Assumptions

OPPO

CCKHAMSA

Mike Wetherell
St Alphonsus's Opposition To Motion In Limine
To Prevent Argument And Evidence That St
Alphonsus is Entitled To An "Offset" Based On Its
Ownership Of The MRI Entities

10/13/2011

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Volume 20 --Witness: Giles and Mike Wetherell
Corbett

10/14/2011

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/17/2011 08:30AM) Day 21

10/17/2011

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 10/14/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Patty Terry
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 20 --less than 400 pgs

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 10/17/2011 08:30AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 21 less than 400 pgs

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/18/2011 09:00AM) Day 22

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/19/2011 09:00AM) Day 23

Mike Wetherell

10/12/2011

Judge
Mike Wetherell

Mike Wetherell

Mike Wetherell

000076
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10/17/2011

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/21/2011 09:00AM) Day24

Mike Wetherell

10/18/2011

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Volume 21 Oct 14, 2011

IVIike Wetherell

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Volume 22 Oct 17, 2011

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCPII\IKCN

Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a Verdict on
Claims Related to Enforcement of the Radiology
Services Contract
[file stamped 10/17/2011]

IVIike Wetherell

MOTN

CCPINKCN

Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a Verdict or
Otherwise Preclude MRIA's Tort Claims Alleging
Stark and Anti-Kickback Violations
[file stamped 10/17/2011]

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCPINKCN

Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a Verdict on
MRIA's Damages and Disgorgement Theories
[file stamped 10/17/2011]

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 10/18/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 22 --less than 400 pgs

10/19/2011

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 10/19/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 23 -- less than 200 pgs

10/20/2011

TRAN

DCOATMAD

(2) Transcripts Filed Volume 23 and 24 -- Oct 18
and 19, 2011

10/21/2011

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 10/21/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 24 less than 400 pgs

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/24/2011 09:00AM) Day 25

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/25/2011 09:00AM) Day 26

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/26/2011 09:00AM) Day 27

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCNELSRF

MRIA'S Opposition to St. Al's Motion for Directed
Verdict on Violations of the Stark and
Anti-Kickback Statutes

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

CCNELSRF

Affidavit of Brent S. Bastian in Support of
Opposition to St. Al's Motion for Directed Verdict
on Violations of the Stark and Anti-Kickback
Statutes

Mike Wetherell

Judge

Mike Wetherell

000077
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10/21/2011

OPPO

CCNELSRF

MRIA'S Opposition to St. Al's Motion for Directed Mike Wetherell
Verdict on Claims Related to Enforcement of
Radiology Services Contract

OPPO

CCNELSRF

MRIA'S Opposition to St. Al's Motion for Directed Mike Wetherell
Verdict on MRIA'S Damages and Disgorgement
Theories

RPLY

CCRANDJD

Reply in Support of Directed Verdict Motions Filed Mike Wetherell
October 18, 2011

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Volume 25 --October 21, 2011

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 10/24/2011 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 25 less than 400 pgs

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Volume 26 Oct 24, 2011

Mike Wetherell

MISC

CCDWONCP

MRIA'S Requested Changes to Proposed Jury
Instructions

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 10/25/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 26 less than 400 pgs

MISC

DCOATMAD

St Alphonsus' Redline of Court's Proposed
Mike Wetherell
Post-Evidence Instructions and Proposed Special
Verdict Form

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 10/26/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 27 less than 200 pgs

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/28/2011 09:00 AM) Day 28

Mike Wetherell

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Volume 27 October 25, 2011

Mike Wetherell

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed Volum 28 Oct 26, 2011
[file stamped 10/26/2011]

Mike Wetherell

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Denying Request from St. Alphonsus
[file stamped 10/26/2011]

Mike Wetherell

RSPS

CCAMESLC

Response to Notice of Authority RE: Allocation of Mike Wetherell
of Damages Among Different Causes of Action

OBJT

CCAMESLC

Objection to Language of Proposed Jury
Instruction No. 56

Mike Wetherell

NOTC

DCOATMAD

St Als Notice of Authority RE: Allocation of
Damages and Reply to MRIA's Counter-Notice

Mike Wetherell

10/24/2011

10/25/2011

10/26/2011

10/27/2011

10/28/2011

Judge

Mike Wetherell
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10/28/2011

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 10/28/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Omsberg
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Day 28 --less than 500 pgs

10/31/2011

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/31/2011 09:00AM) jury trial cont'd

Mike Wetherell

EXLT

DCOATMAD

Plaintiff's Exhibit List

Mike Wetherell

EXLT

DCOATMAD

Defendant's Exhibit List

Mike Wetherell

JUVD

DCOATMAD

Jury Verdict

Mike Wetherell

JUIS

DCOATMAD

Jury Instructions

Mike Wetherell

11/1/2011

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 10/31/2011 09:00AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Dianne Cromwell
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: jury trial cont'd -- less than 200 pgs

11/2/2011

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Re: Proposed Judgment

Mike Wetherell

MISC

CCWRIGRM

Submission of Proposed Judgment

Mike Wetherell

IVIEIVIO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Proposed Findings of IVIike Wetherell
Fact and Conclusion of Law Concerning
Disgorgement

OBJT

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Objections and Response to MRIAs Mike Wetherell
Proposed Judgment

11/9/2011

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Motion to Set Date for Response to Mike Wetherell
MRIAs Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law

11/10/2011

TRAN

DCDANSEL

Transcript Filed -Volume 29 - October 28, 2011

Mike Wetherell

TRAN

DCDANSEL

Transcript Filed -Volume 30 - October 31, 2011

Mike Wetherell

11/14/2011

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Setting
Hearing -- Hearing Scheduled (Hearing
Scheduled 12/09/2011 03:30PM)

Mike Wetherell

11/15/2011

RESP

CCNELSRF

Response To St Al's Objections and Response to Mike Wetherell
IVIRIA'S Proposed Judgment

RSPS

CCAMESLC

St Alphonsus's Response to Proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Usurpation
and Disgorgement

RPLY

CCVIDASL

Saint Alphonsus Reply in Support of Objections to IVIike Wetherell
MRIAs Porposed Judgment

RPLY

CCKHAMSA

MRIA's Reply In Support Of Proposed Findings of Mike Wetherell
Fact And Conclusion Of Law Concerning
Disgorgement

11/8/2011

11/21/2011

Judge

Mike Wetherell
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12/9/2011

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 12/09/2011 03:30PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Sue Wolf
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50 pgs

1/18/2012

MISC

DCOATMAD

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Mike Wetherell

JDMT

DCOATMAD

Judgment

Mike Wetherell

CD IS

DCOATMAD

Civil Disposition entered for: Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care Inc, Plaintiff; MRI Associates
LLP, Defendant. Filing date: 1/18/2012

Mike Wetherell

STAT

DCOATMAD

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCNELSRF

St. Al's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict or New Trial

Mike Wetherell

AFSM

CCNELSRF

Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording In Support Of St. Al's Mike Wetherell
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
or New Trial

MEMO

CCNELSRF

Memorandum In Support Of St. Al's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New
Trial

Mike Wetherell

PETN

CCDEREDL

MRIA Entities Petition for Costs and Fees

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

CCDEREDL

Amended Affidavit of Counsel regarding 54(e)(3)
criteria for Awarding Attorneys Fees

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCDEREDL

Memorandum in Support of the MRIA Entities
Petition for Costs and Fees

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

CCDEREDL

Affidavit of Steven Andersen

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

CCDEREDL

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of The MRIA
Entities Memo of Costs and Fees

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCNELSRF

I\IIRIA's Opposition to St Al's Motion for Summary Mike Wetherell
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New
Trial

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Motion to Disallow MRIAs Attorneys Mike Wetherell
Fees and Costs

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Memorandum in Support of Motion Mike Wetherell

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Jack S Gjording in Support of Motion

Mike Wetherell

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

CCWRIGRM

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
Mike Wetherell
03/23/2012 02:30PM) Saint Alphonsus's Motions

STAT

CCWRIGRM

STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk
action

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCHEATJL

Motion For Leave To Conduct Discovery
Regarding The Amount Of Attorney's Fees And
Costs Incurred By Saint Alphonus

Mike Wetherell

1/31/2012

2/14/2012

2/15/2012

2/21/2012

Judge
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2/21/2012

MEMO

CCHEAT.IL

Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Leave To Mike Wetherell
Conduct Discovery Regarding The Amount Of
Attorney's Fees And Costs Incurred By Saint
AI phon us

2/22/2012

NOTH

CCTOLEIL

Notice Of Hearing (3/16/12@ 3:00PM)

Mike Wetherell

NOTH

CCTOLEIL

1\Jotice Of Hearing (3/23/12@ 2:30PM)

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

CCTOLEIL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/16/2012 03:00
PM) Motion For Leave To Conduct Discovery
Regardng The Amount Of Attorney's Fees/Costs

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCHEAT.IL

Saint Alphonus's Motion For A Stay Of
Mike Wetherell
Proceedings To Enforce A Judgment Pursuant To
RRule 62(b)

MEMO

CCHEAT.IL

Saint Alphonus's Memorandum In Support Of Its
Motion For A Stay Of Proceedings To Enforce A
Judgment Pursuant To RRule 62(b)

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCWRIGRM

Saint Alphonsus Opposition to IVIRIAs Motion for
Leave to Conduct Discovery Regarding Saint
Alphonsus Attorneys Fees

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Jack S Gjording in Opposition to
MRIAs Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery
Regarding Saint Alphonsus Attorneys

Mike Wetherell

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (03/23/12@ 2:30pm)

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCKHAMSA

Saint Alphonsus's Motion To Reschedule Hearing Mike Wetherell
On MRIA's Motion For Discovery Regarding Saint
Alphonsus's Attorneys Fees

NOHG

CCKHAMSA

Notice Of Hearing (03/16/2012@ 3:00PM)

Mike Wetherell

3/1/2012

OPPO

CCKHAMSA

Opposition To Saint Alphonsus's Motion To
Reschedule Hearing

Mike Wetherell

3/5/2012

RPLY

CCAMESLC

Reply to Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery
Regarding Saint Alphonsus Attorney Fees

Mike Wetherell

3/6/2012

HRVC

DCOATMAD

Order Vacting Hearing and Setting New Hearing Mike Wetherell
Date -- Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
03/16/2012 03:00PM: Hearing Vacated Motion
For Leave To Conduct Discovery Regardng The
Amount Of Attorney's Fees/Costs

3/13/2012

RPLY

CCKHAMSA

Reply In Support Of Saint Alphonsus's Motion For Mike Wetherell
Judgment Notwishstanding The Verdict Or New
Trial

3/16/2012

OPPO

CCDEREDL

Qualified Opposition to St Al's Motion for Stay of
Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment

Mike Wetherell

OPPO

CCDEREDL

Opposition to St Al's Motion to Disallow MRIA's
Attorneys Fees and Costs

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

CCDEREDL

Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to St Al's
Motion to Disallow MRIA's Attorney Fees and
Costs

Mike Wetherell

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Reply in Support of its Motion for a
Stay of Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment

Mike Wetherell

2/27/2012

2/28/2012

2/29/2012

3/20/2012

Judge
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3/20/2012

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Reply in Support of Motion to
Disallow MRIAs Attorneys Fees and Costs

3/23/2012

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Mike Wetherell
on 03/23/2012 02:30PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nicole Julson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Saint Alphonsus's Motions -- less
than 75 pgs

4/4/2012

NOTC

CCKHAMSA

Notice Of Change Of Address

4/13/2012

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed-- Motion Hearing March 23, 2012 Mike Wetherell

4/25/2012

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Re: Motion for Judgment Nothwithstanding Mike Wetherell
the Verdict or New Trial

4/30/2012

.IDMT

DCOATMAD

Amended Judgment

Mike Wetherell

5/2/2012

JDMT

DCOATMAD

Second Amended Judgment

Mike Wetherell

5/15/2012

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Re: Costs and Atty Fees

Mike Wetherell

5/22/2012

MOTN

CCHOLMEE

Motion for Relief from Judgment

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCHOLMEE

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Mike Wetherell

MOTN

CCNELSRF

MRIA'S Amended Motion for Relief from
Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b)

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCNELSRF

Memorandum in Support of MRIA'S Amended
Mike Wetherell
Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule
60(a) or Rule 60(b)

5/29/2012

AFFD

CCDEREDL

Amended Affidavit of Counsel in Support of the
MRIA Entities Memorandum of Costs and Fees

Mike Wetherell

5/30/2012

APSC

TCWEGEKE

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Mike Wetherell

6/1/2012

NOHG

CCSWEECE

Notice Of Hearing

Mike Wetherell

HRSC

CCSWEECE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/22/2012 02:30
PM) Amended Motion for Relief from Judgment

Mike Wetherell

6/5/2012

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Cross-Appealed To The Supreme Court

Mike Wetherell

6/12/2012

REQU

CCKHAMSA

Request For Additional Transcripts And Records

Mike Wetherell

OBJT

CCWATSCL

Saint Alphonsus's Objection to MRIA's Amended
Fee Petition

Mike Wetherell

6/14/2012

RSPS

CCWATSCL

Response to Saint Alphonsus's Objections to
Amended Fee Petition

Mike Wetherell

6/15/2012

MISC

CCMEYEAR

Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA' Amended Mike Wetherell
Rule 60 Motion

AFFD

CCMEYEAR

Affidavit of Counsel Jack S Gjording in Support of Mike Wetherell
Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Amended
Rule 60 Moton

REPL

MCBIEHKJ

St Als Reply in Support of Objections to MRIAs
Amended Fee Petition

REPL

CCMEYEAR

Reply on Support of MRIA's Amended Motion for Mike Wetherell
Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) or
Rule 60(b)
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6/20/2012

RESP

CCNELSRF

St. Als. Response To MRIA'S New Claims
Regarding Offset Raised for the First Time in It's
Reply Brief

Mike Wetherell

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Notice of Cross-Appeal

Mike Wetherell

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Mike Wetherell
06/22/2012 02:30PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Nicole Julson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Amended Motion for Relief from
Judgment -- less than 100 pgs

HRSC

DCOATMAD

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/24/2012 01:30
PM)

7/2/2012

MEMO

DCOATMAD

Memorandum of Actions Taken at June 22, 2012 Mike Wetherell
Hearing

8/10/2012

PETN

CCWEEKKG

MRIA Entities' Petition for Post Judgment Costs
and Fees

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCWEEKKG

Memorandum in Support of the MRIA Entities'
Petition for Post-Judgment Costs and Fees

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCWEEKKG

Memorandum Concerning Amount of Offset

Mike Wetherell

AFFD

CCWEEKKG

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of the MRIA
Entities' Petition for Post-Judgment Costs and
Fees

Mike Wetherell

NOHG

CCWEEKKG

1\lotice Of Hearing ( 08/24/12@ 1:30PM)

IVIike Wetherell

MOTN

CCSWEECE

Saint Alphonsus Motion to Reschedule Hearing
Scheduled For August 24, 2012

Mike Wetherell

AFSM

CCSWEECE

Affidavit of Julianne S Hallin Support Of Motion
Mike Wetherell
to Reschedule Hearing Scheduled for August 24,
2012

8/17/2012

OPPO

CCKHAMSA

Mike Wetherell
Saint Alphonsus' Opposition To MRIA's Motion
Seeking Post Judgment Attorney Fees And Costs

8/20/2012

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Denying Motion to Reschedule Hearing

Mike Wetherell

RSPN

CCWRIGRM

St Alphonsus Response to MRIAs Supplemental
Brief Regarding Offset

Mike Wetherell

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

Reply in Support of Memorandum Concerning
Amount of Offset

Mike Wetherell

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

Reply in Support of the MRIA Entities Petition for
Post Judgment Costs and Fees

Mike Wetherell

8/24/2012

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Mike Wetherell
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
08/24/2012 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Dianne Cromwell
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: 50 pgs

9/18/2012

TRAN

DCOATMAD

Transcript Filed - Motion Hearing held August 24, Mike Wetherell
2012

9/24/2012

MEMO

DCOATMAD

Memorandum Decision & Order Re: Motions
Heard August 24, 2012

Mike Wetherell

AMEN

DCOATMAD

Third Amended Judgment

Mike Wetherell
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8/15/2012

8/21/2012
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101212012

AFFD

CCDEREDL

Amended Affidavit of Counsel in Support of the
MRIA Entities Petition for Post-Judgment Costs
and Fees

AFFD

CCDEREDL

Second Amended Affidavit of Counsel in Support Mike Wetherell
of the MRIA Entities Memorandum of Costs and
Fees

101312012

NOTC

CCTHIEBJ

(2) Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court
Docket No. 40012

Mike Wetherell

101412012

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Appealed To The Supreme Court I Amended

Mike Wetherell

101512012

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Appealed To The Supreme Court I Amended

Mike Wetherell

NOTA

CCTHIEBJ

AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

Mike Wetherell

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order re: Defendant'siCounterclaimants' Petition
for Costs and Fees

Mike Wetherell

JDMT

DCOATMAD

Fourth Amended Judgment

Mike Wetherell

111112012

AMEN

CCHEATJL

Second Amended Notice Of Appeal

Mike Wetherell

111712012

AMEN

CCHEATJL

Second Amended Notice Of Cross-Appeal

Mike Wetherell

1111412012

AMEN

DCOATMAD

Amended Order re: Defendant's Counterclaim
ants' Petition Costs and Fees

IVIike Wetherell

AMEN

DCOATMAD

Fifth Amended Judgment

Mike Wetherell

AMEN

CCMEYEAR

Third Amended Notice of Appeal

Mike Wetherell

AMEN

CCTHIEKJ

Third Amended Notice of Cross- Appeal

Mike Wetherell

1013112012

1112812012

Judge
Mike Wetherell
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DEPUTY

Attorneys MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 408219D

THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM

v.

(Demand for Jury Trial)

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.
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Defendant/Counter-Claimants MRIA Associates, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited Partnership, by and through their attorneys of record, hereby submit their Third
Amended Counterclaim as follows:
PARTIES

1.

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care ("SADC") is the same entity as Saint Alphonsus

Magnetic Resonance, Inc. ("SAMR"). SAMR changed its name to SADC in July of 1987. SADC
has assumed any and all liabilities of SAMR.
2.

SADC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center

("SARMC") and is controlled by SARMC; therefore, all conduct of SADC and SARMC as
described in this counterclaim shall be attributed to SARMC. SARMC is properly joined as a
counterdefendant pursuant to I.R.C.P. 13(h), 19 and 20, for the reason that SARMC engaged in
the conduct described below in its own right, as well as through SADC.
3.

MRI Limited Partnership ("MRI Limited") is an Idaho Limited Partnership, and is

the operational entity with respect to a fixed MRI imaging center located on the St. Alphonsus
campus, known as MRI Center of Idaho ("MRI Center").
4.

MRI Mobile Limited Partnership ("MRI Mobile") is an Idaho Limited

Partnership, which is the operational entity which provides mobile MRI imaging facilities in
Idaho and elsewhere. At all relevant times, MRI Mobile provided MRI imaging facilities to
Mercy Hospital in Nampa, Idaho, and Holy Rosary Hospital in Ontario, Oregon, with respect to a
mobile MRI imaging center.
5.

MRI Associates, LLP, ("MRIA"), is an Idaho limited liability partnership which

benefitted from the operations ofMRI Limited and MRI Mobile. MRIA acted as a general
partner with management responsibilities for MRI Limited and MRI Mobile.
THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM- PAGE 2
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BACKGROUND
6.

Magnetic resonance imaging, or MRI, was one of the most expensive medical

technologies ever developed when it emerged in the early 1980's. Its uncertain future as a
medical tool and its extremely high cost made it a risky investment for hospitals during that
period. At the time of the technology's introduction to the marketplace, Sister Patricia
Vandenberg (then President of SARMC) saw magnetic resonance technology as an opportunity
that would promote quality health care to the community and offer regional health care providers
a chance to cooperate in the delivery of this technology to the Treasure Valley in a responsible,
collaborative approach that avoided the potential of expensive duplication with the same
technology at other Treasure Valley facilities.
7.

Despite the fact that SARMC had the financial resources to undertake this project

alone, Sister Vandenberg chose this much broader vision, and with the assistance of Chris Anton
(then COO and subsequently CEO of SARMC), enrolled physician leaders and other local and
regional hospitals as partners in this visionary project. The partnership formed to accomplish this
vision was MRIA. The partnership was formed to: (1) share the financial risk associated with
implementing magnetic resonance imaging technology; (2) share the technical and professional
expertise needed to successfully implement and manage the technology; (3) improve the quality
of care offered by all providers; and (4) take advantage of the efficiencies created by the
cooperative effort. If magnetic resonance imaging proved successful as a medical tool, the
partners would also share the financial benefits flowing from the project.

PARTNERSHIP FORMATION AND OPERATION
8.

Articles ofPartnership between the original partners ofMRIA (Doctors Magnetic

Resonance, Inc. (or "DMR"), St. Alphonsus Magnetic Resonance, Inc., Mednow, Inc., and HCA
THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM- PAGE 3
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ofldaho, Inc.) were signed effective April26, 1985. The original purpose ofMRIA, although
stated broadly in the Articles of Partnership, was to serve as the general partner responsible for
operating MRI Center, the magnetic resonance scanning facility to be sited on the SARMC
campus. MRI Limited, formed by MRIA to operate the facility, was created contemporaneously
with MRIA and was originally intended to operate until W.5. This intent to operate for a 30 year
term is reflected in the building lease and ground lease covering MRI Center's construction and
operation. These leases refer to construction of a building that would provide "patient services
with respect to medical diagnostic devices, equipment and accessories" (i.e., magnetic resonance
imaging equipment).
9.

The ground lease further provides that "the building shall only be occupied and

used for the practice of healing arts and the dispensing of services ... by individuals admitted to
and in good standing on the medical staff of the hospital partners that executed the Articles of
Partnership earlier that year.
10.

The term ofthe lease for the MRI Center (which was the only operational project

contemplated by the original partners ofMRIA) originally ran from October 1, 1985 to
December 31, 2015. This lease term for the MRI Center, as well as the term ofMRI Limited,
were both later extended by SARMC and the MRIA board to December 31, 2023.
11.

In the Articles of Partnership, hospital partners, including SARMC, agreed to

narrowly limit the conditions for which a hospital partner might rightfully withdraw from MRIA.
Article 6.1 of the Articles of Partnership provides that a hospital partner may only rightfully
withdraw from MRIA if its continued participation in MRIA: (a) jeopardized the tax-exempt
status of the hospital partner; (b) jeopardized Medicare/Medicaid or insurance reimbursements;
(c) was contrary to the ethical principles of the Catholic Church; or (d) would be in violation of
THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM- PAGE 4
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local, state or federal laws. In their totality, the documents surrounding the formation ofMRIA
and MRI Limited created partnerships for a specific undertaking for a term (2015) from which a
hospital partner could only withdraw for limited reasons. In 1985, SARMC made a long-term
commitment to provide its MRI services through the MRIA partnership and thereby encouraged
three other area hospitals to do likewise.
12.

At the time MRI Center was founded, it was the MRIA partnership's intention,

and SARMC's intention, specifically, to make MRI Center a part of SARMC's facilities and
associate MRI Center with SARMC's name and reputation as the region's premier trauma center.
In practice, SARMC branded the MRI Center as SARMC's only magnetic resonance imaging
service on the SARMC campus. This benefit was SARMC's unique contribution to the MRIA
partnership.
13.

From 1985 to the late 1990's, MRIA' s business flourished under the cooperative

management of the MRIA partners. The purchase of a mobile MRI unit, operated by MRI
Mobile, allowed efficient coverage of overflow at the SARMC campus, and at the same time
allowed expansion of an on-site service to Mercy Medical Center in Nampa, Caldwell Memorial
Hospital in Caldwell, and Holy Rosary Hospital in Ontario, Oregon. Also, during this time
period, a second non-mobile magnet was added to the MRI Center on the SARMC's campus, and
Holy Rosary Hospital joined the MRIA partners. The efficient sharing of costly equipment and
professional expertise created by this partnership ensured a high quality of patient care.
14.

One of the entities that benefited substantially and flourished along with MRIA's

projects was the St. Alphonsus Radiology Group (or as it was later known, "Gem State
Radiology," hereinafter "SARG/GSR"), a group of radiologists under exclusive contract with
SARMC to read all of the radiological images (including magnetic resonance images) performed
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on the SARMC campus. In virtually all instances from 1985 through 2004, SARG/GSR was
designated by SARMC to supervise and interpret magnetic resonance images created by MRI
Center.
15.

SARG/GSR and MRI Center worked as partners for purposes of providing

magnetic resonance imaging evaluations for SARMC in-patients and out-patients, as well as
other individuals referred by physicians which practice at SARMC. While MRI Center provided
the "technical component" of the evaluation (i.e., the magnetic resonance images), SARG/GSR
provided the "professional component" (i.e., interpretation of the images). MRI Center placed its
trust and confidence in SARG/GSR. SARG/GSR had responsibility for assuring that the images
produced at MRI Center were suitable for interpretation. Additionally, a SARG/GSR radiologist
served as "Medical Director" ofMRI Center, with responsibilities for oversight, consultation,
advice, and coordination of physician-level concerns with all day-to-day operations and longterm policy decisions at MRI Center. Additionally, the Medical Director was responsible for
assuring proper medical policies and procedures were implemented and established at MRI
Center.
16.

As part of the SARMC campus facility, MRI Center was regularly referred to as

"Saint Alphonsus MRI." On the SARMC website, MRI Center was identified as one of
SARMC's radiologic services.
17.

Although the provision of the professional component generated substantial

revenues for SARG/GSR, a number of radiologists in that group were not satisfied with these
financial gains, wanting to capture a portion of additional income from ownership of the
magnetic resonance imaging equipment (the technical component). In the late 1990's,
SARG/GSR began formulating plans to establish an independent medical imaging center that it
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would own and operate separate from its radiology practice at SARMC. Because magnetic
resonance imaging was known to be the critical (and most profitable) modality offered by
medical imaging centers, SARG/GSR intended that its imaging center would offer magnetic
resonance imaging in competition with MRIA.
SARMC'S CHANGED BUSINESS STRATEGY

18.

The late 1990's saw a change in leadership at SARMC that dramatically changed

the dynamic of the MRIA partnership. Where prior CEOs, Chris Anton and Sister Vandenberg,
envisioned the MRIA partnership as a cooperative process among Treasure Valley hospitals for
the delivery of magnetic resonance imaging services, and had expressed enthusiastic support for
the magnetic resonance imaging joint venture, the new CEO of SARMC, Sandra Bruce
("Bruce"), did not share, and demonstrated little or no interest in supporting, that vision.
19.

Bruce was interested in forming vertically integrated partnerships ("Integrated

Delivery Networks") that would incorporate physician groups, like SARG/GSR, in the delivery
ofhospital services. When Bruce learned ofSARG/GSR's plans to establish an independent
imaging center, outside of SARMC, she indicated that SARMC should be involved in the project.
20.

During those initial discussions between Bruce and SARG/GSR, SARG/GSR was

led by Dr. David Giles ("Giles"). Giles served as President of SARG/GSR from approximately
1996-1998. Giles is also an owner ofDMR, which is a partner in MRIA. Giles advanced the idea
that SARG/GSR should also become a partner in MRIA, rather than a competitor of MRIA, so
that if SARG/GSR opened its independent imaging center, magnetic resonance imaging would be
offered as part of a cooperative MRIA/SARG/GSR effort. Likewise, if SARG/GSR became a
partner in MRIA, rather than a competitor ofMRIA, SARMC could participate in a SARG/GSR
imaging center without breaching its fiduciary duties to MRIA.
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21.

In October 1998, Bruce and representatives ofSARG/GSR announced to MRIA

their plans to form a joint venture, which would operate a freestanding medical imaging center by
the name of Intermountain Medical Imaging ("IMI") located at 927 W. Myrtle Street in
downtown Boise. IMI would offer the full spectrum of imaging modalities, including CT, X-ray,
ultrasound, special procedures, and magnetic resonance imaging.
22.

Since SARG/GSR was not a partner in MRIA at the time the IMI joint venture

was announced, Bruce and SARMC understood that SARMC could not combine with
SARG/GSR through IMI to compete with MRIA in the provision of magnetic resonance imaging
services without breaching its fiduciary duties to MRIA.
23.

As such, Bruce and other SARMC representatives voiced support for the idea that

any magnetic resonance imaging services provided at IMI would be through lease arrangements
that IMI would make with MRIA, or would occur in conjunction with SARG/GSR's admission
as a partner in MRIA.
24.

During 1998 to mid 1999, numerous meetings and discussions were conducted to

explore possible arrangements between MRIA and SARG/GSR members whereby SARG/GSR
would become a partner in MRIA. During this time, Giles worked diligently on behalf of
SARG/GSR to identify a solution which would result in SARG/GSR's participation in the MRIA
partnership. Unfortunately, SARG/GSR members were unable to reach agreement with MRIA on
terms suitable to both sides that would result in SARG/GSR's admission to the MRIA
partnership.
25.

Because no deal had been consummated between SARG/GSR and MRIA by late

1999, MRIA requested Bruce to assist in brokering an agreement between SARG/GSR and
MRIA so that SARG/GSR could become a partner in the MRIA partnership. MRIA recognized
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the leverage Bruce possessed as SARMC's CEO, given that Bruce had the final word on whether
SARG/GSR received the exclusive contract to read all radiological reports generated on the
SARMC campus.
26.

By late 1999, however, neither Bruce nor SARG/GSR was interested in having

MRIA involved in the operation of the magnetic resonance imaging modality at IMI. Upon
information and belief, this was because SARMC and SARG/GSR had already discussed plans to
operate IMI (including the magnetic resonance imaging modality) for their own benefit. SARMC
and SARG/GSR had also discussed expanding IMI beyond the Myrtle Street facility with the idea
of strategically locating IMI imaging facilities where IMI would compete with the radiology
groups practicing at Mercy Medical Center, Holy Rosary Hospital, and West Valley Medical
Center (the three hospital partners in MRIA). Additionally, SARMC saw the opportunity to shift
patient referrals from MRI Center to IMI, which would make IMI the dominant provider of
magnetic resonance imaging services in the Treasure Valley. SARMC planned to be a 50%
owner in this business as compared to only a 24.75% ownership in MRIA or 21.6% ownership of
MRI Center.
27.

As part of these negotiations, SARG/GSR (operating under the name of Imaging

Center Radiologists, LLP ("ICR")) offered SARMC the option to buy up to a 50% interest in any
magnetic resonance imaging center in which ICR had an ownership interest in Ada or Canyon
Counties. Conversely, SARMC agreed to give ICR the option to buy up to 50% of the MRI
Center located on the SARMC campus, if SARMC was able to acquire ownership of that Center
from MRIA.
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28.

None of these negotiations or partnership opportunities between SARMC and

SARG/GSR/ICR was disclosed to MRIA. In fact, SARG/GSR and SARMC originally agreed
that SARMC should be a "silent partner" with respect to the IMI joint venture.
29.

Although SARMC knew that there was no present solution to its conflict of

interest arising from its participation in two competing businesses, SARMC pitched the IMI joint
venture to the Planning and Finance Committee ofthe Saint Alphonsus Board of Directors in
November of 1999 as providing only "non MRI" modalities (i.e. CT, X-ray, ultrasound, etc.).
According to SARMC, any magnetic resonance imaging services provided at IMI would be
through either a lease relationship between IMI and MRIA or through an arrangement whereby
SARG/GSR would become a partner in MRIA.
30.

In approximately October of 1998, Giles was voted out of his position as President

of SARG/GSR, and in early 2000, Giles was asked to leave SARG/GSR for the reason that Giles'
ownership interests in MRIA were in conflict with the interests of SARG/GSR. As a result of his
removal from leadership at SARG/GSR and ultimate departure from that group, Giles was
unaware of the SARG/GSR negotiations with SARMC regarding a deal that would involve
purchase of IMI' s magnetic resonance imaging business by SARMC, or delivery of magnetic
resonance imaging services by SARMC and IMI.
31.

Bruce and SARMC were well aware that supporting IMI would result in business

losses to MRIA. As early as 1999, SARMC had constructed pro formas that identified substantial
business losses that would be sustained by the hospital's radiology department (all non-magnetic
resonance imaging modalities) if a freestanding imaging center like IMI was established. This
same sort of business loss could be forecasted for MRI Center/MRI Limited. While SARMC
could choose to rob business from its own radiology department to support IMI's business, it
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could not do so with respect to MRIA without breaching its fiduciary obligations to its partners
and partnership. These projected losses for MRI Center/MRI Limited were not communicated to
the MRIA partnership.
32.

On July 1, 2001, SARMC formalized its support for IMI by executing the

Operating Agreement of Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC ("Operating Agreement"),
attached hereto as Exhibit A. The significant terms of the Operating Agreement include, but are
not limited to, the following:
•

SARMC agreed to contribute at least $500,000 as an initial capital contribution to
IMI;

•

SARMC accepted 50% management responsibility for the operation of IMI;

•

SARMC appointed three SARMC representatives to IMI's management
committee of six;

•

SARMC agreed to participate in subsidizing Gem State Radiology's
administrative expenses;

•

SARMC agreed to participate in funding a medical director position, which would
have oversight of all IMI modalities;

•

SARMC and IMI agreed to work together (to the exclusion ofMRIA) to
implement a digital network and data storage system (P ACS/RIS), which would
elevate IMI's visibility and accessibility to the referring physician community,
over MRI Center; and

•

SARMC bargained away much of the leverage it possessed to control
SARG/GSR's competitive activities vis-a-vis MRIA. Before the execution of the
Operating Agreement, SARMC had the discretion to determine whether
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SARG/GSR would receive the exclusive contract to interpret the radiological
images generated on the SARMC campus. SARMC agreed to limit this discretion
by agreeing that SARMC would forfeit, at a loss, its share in IMI if SARMC did
not renew SARG/GSR' s exclusive hospital contract.
33.

The only purported benefit received by SARMC under the Operating Agreement

was the opportunity to participate in the profits or losses received from the "non-MRI" modalities
at IMI. On information and belief, the "non-MRI" modalities at IMI have been, at best,
marginally profitable.
34.

Although the Operating Agreement pays lip service to the notion that SARMC

would only be involved in owning, operating, and managing the "non-MRI" portion ofiMI's
business, SARMC's actual involvement in IMI has not been so limited. In fact, SARMC lent
substantial financial, marketing and human resources to the whole of IMI, which included its
magnetic resonance imaging modality. Further, SARMC's general support ofiMI enabled IMI to
more effectively compete with MRIA for magnetic resonance imaging business.
35.

In addition to the provisions stated above, the Operating Agreement contained

terms relating to SARMC's "buy in" to IMI's magnetic resonance imaging business: SARMC
would be allowed to participate in IMI' s magnetic resonance imaging profits by purchasing 50%
ofiCR's magnetic resonance imaging business. This would occur ifSARMC could purchase the
MRI Center and make a 50% ownership interest in the Center available to ICR (the "exchange
sale"). In that event, each party could purchase 50% of the other's magnetic resonance imaging
business at the fair market value of the magnetic resonance imaging assets. exclusive of goodwill
or other intangibles, less any liabilities.
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36.

This "exchange sale", based upon asset rather than going concern value, created a

significant problem for SARMC as an MRIA partner: any purchase ofMRI Center/MRI Limited
from MRIA would have to be at fair market value as a going concern, which was considerably
higher than the value of the Center's assets (i.e. equipment, etc.). Were SARMC to purchase MRI
Center as a going concern, it would lose money upon resale of 50% to ICR.
37.

Because SARMC's investment in IMI would only make a reasonable return once

SARMC was able to participate in IMI's magnetic resonance imaging business, SARMC was
motivated to find ways to induce its MRIA partners to sell MRI Center to SARMC at less than its
going concern value. For this reason, SARMC (and SARG/GSR) took steps to discourage the
Center's then-robust growth and/or diminish its then-thriving business.
38.

SARMC, IMI, GSR, and ICR conspired to discourage MRIA's growth and

diminish its business while giving IMI a competitive advantage over MRIA. These acts include,
but are not limited to, the following acts of SARG/GSR/ICR/IMI, which SARMC condoned,
encouraged, and supported:
•

SARG/GSR reduced hours of its availability to MRIA operations for the first time
in the history of the hospital while maintaining longer hours of service to IMI;

•

SARG/GSR refused to personally attend to patients being imaged in MRIA's
mobile unit stationed in the SARMC parking lot only yards away from MRI
Center (a service provided willingly by the group since 1988);

•

SARG/GSR radiologists provided faster response on image interpretation for
images taken at IMI than at MRIA operations;

•

SARG/GSR radiologists wrongfully disparaged MRIA by asserting that images
produced at MRI Center were inferior to IMI magnetic resonance images;
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•

SARG/GSR physician support was reduced from that which had been historically
provided in addressing routine quality and service issues, including patient care
issues, within the lab, despite charging for professional service; and

•

SARG/GSR reduced responsiveness from what had been historically provided to
the needs of lab personnel for physician input in clinical operations.

39.

MRIA informed SARMC that SARG/GSR, IMI, and ICR had engaged in the

tactics and behaviors listed above. SARMC did nothing to abate or prevent such behavior.
40.

While SARG/GSR, IMI, and ICR were engaging in these acts (with the

knowledge and consent of SARMC), SARMC (while still a partner at MRIA) was also
compromising the efforts of MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile to grow their business and/or
compete with IMI by, among other things:
•

Giving IMI advantages with respect to the rollout and implementation of
SARMC's IT system which linked referring physicians to MRIA's and IMI's data
and images;

•

Disparaging MRIA's services;

•

Promoting IMI's services over MRIA's; and

•

Voting against growth initiatives at the MRIA board level.

41.

In addition to these acts, SARMC appointed as IMI Management Committee

Members those same SARMC employees who were involved in regular communications with
MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile management regarding business plans, strategic initiatives
and IT planning for those businesses. The net effect of this arrangement is that, unbeknownst to
MRIA, IMI managers received confidential business information from MRIA, MRI Center and
MRI Mobile, which could be used to IMI' s competitive advantage.
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42.

The conduct of SARMC described above violated SARMC's non-compete

obligations contained in the Articles of Partnership, as subsequently amended.
SARMC'S "EFFORTS" TO PURCHASE MRI CENTER

43.

While SARMC, IMI, SARG/GSR, and ICR undertook these concerted efforts to

damage and/or reduce the value of the business ofMRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile,
SARMC initiated efforts to buy (on its own behalf, or on behalf of SARG/GSR/IMI or ICR) MRI
Center. Despite participating in talks on several occasions, and despite great commitment of time
and money in exploring a buy-sell resolution, SARMC never actually made an offer and rejected
all financial offers by MRIA. In every case, SARMC never demonstrated any sincere interest in
purchasing MRI Center at fair market value of the business as a going concern.
SARMC WRONGFULLY DISSOCIATES FROM MRIA

44.

After officially joining IMI in 2001, SARMC sustained more than two consecutive

years oflosses from its participation in the non-MRI portion of that business (while IMI's MRI
portion was extremely profitable). Consequently, Bruce became frustrated with the Hospital's
position in IMI. At about this same time, SARG/GSR became frustrated with the hospital's
continued participation in MRIA, and threatened that SARG/GSR would stop providing
professional services to MRI Center unless the Hospital resolved its conflict.
45.

When last ditch efforts made to purchase MRI Center failed, SARMC wrongfully

dissociated from MRIA by withdrawing in breach of the conditions for withdrawal stated in
Section 6.1 ofthe Partnership Agreement. At the time SARMC gave notice of its intent to
withdraw, SARMC also threatened to violate the terms of its "non-compete" clause with MRIA.
46.

As stated above, one of the benefits brought to the partnership by SARMC was the

exclusive arrangement that allowed MRI Center to operate the magnetic resonance imaging
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facility on the SARMC campus. This exclusive on-campus-arrangement was intended by
SARMC and MRIA to last for the duration of the partnership (at least 2023). Since withdrawing
as a partner, SARMC, through IMI, has installed a mobile magnetic resonance imaging unit on
the SARMC campus and has made clear its intention to build a magnetic resonance scanning
facility on the SARMC campus. On information and belief, SARMC intends to operate this
facility in partnership with IMI. Such competing magnetic resonance imaging facilities have, and
will continue to, deprive MRIA and MRI Limited of the exclusive arrangement for magnetic
resonance scanning services to which it was entitled under the partnership agreement.
SARMCIIMI CONDUCT SINCE DISSOCIATION

47.

Since SARMC's wrongful dissociation from MRIA, SARMC, IMI, SARG/GSR,

and ICR have become even bolder in their tactics undertaken to drive MRI Center out of
business. These tactics include, but are not limited to:
•

Bringing an IMI mobile magnet on campus to compete with the Center, and using
confusing and misleading business names and contact telephone numbers in an
effort to wrongfully divert business away from MRI Center to IMI's mobile
magnet;

•

Directing SARMC physicians to refer magnetic resonance imaging patients to
IMI, to the exclusion of MRI Center;

•

Creating uncertainty among referring physicians and MRI Center employees by
spreading rumors that MRI Center would close in the near future;

•

Telling SARMC employees that SARMC's insurance would not cover magnetic
resonance scans done at the MRI Center, when such was patently untrue; and
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•

Threatening to terminate MRI Center's access to SARMC's PACS/RIS, thereby
forcing MRI Center to invest in its own PACSIRIS system. Once this investment
was made, SARMC inhibited MRI Center's efforts to install software on referring
physician computers (provided by SARMC), which would give referring
physicians access to MRI Centers' PACSIRIS system.

48.

In early December, 2004, MRI Center notified SARG/GSR that, effective January

3, 2005, MRI Center would no longer use the services of SARG/GSR to interpret magnetic
resonance images generated at the Center. Instead, MRI would use Boise Advanced Radiology as
the professional component services provider.
49.

In reaction to its termination, SARG/GSR sent a letter to hundreds of SARMC

referring physicians informing them that images taken at the MRI Center would no longer be
accessible to the referring physician community on SARMC's electronic data system (PACSIRIS
system). This system provides many SARMC referring physicians with the only means of access
to radiological images taken on SARMC in-patients and outpatients.
50.

This statement was false, and was either known by SARG/GSR to be false or was

recklessly made by SARG/GSR. SARMC was aware of the SARG/GSR correspondence and its
falsity.
51.

Although MRIA took immediate steps to have SARG/GSR correct its false

statements (and requested SARMC's assistance in this regard) neither SARMC nor SARG/GSR
retracted the statement in a timely or effective manner. A weakly worded retraction came some
four weeks later, after numerous physicians believing the SARG/GSR correspondence to be true,
began referring to IMI.
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52.

SARMC has informed MRIA of its plans to terminate any and all access MRI

Center has to SARMC's PACS/RIS system, even though MRIA, through payments made to the
various vendors who developed and implemented the technology, has part ownership in such
system.
SARMC SPOLIATES ELECTRONIC INFORMATION

53.

By no later than 2003, SARMC anticipated litigation with MRIA relative to its

involvement with IMI, its conduct as an MRIA partner, and its dissociation from the MRIA
partnership.
54.

SARMC had an obligation to preserve any and all documents that might be

relevant to the dispute between SARMC and MRIA as soon as litigation was anticipated.
SARMC was aware ofthis obligation.
55.

SARMC knowingly allowed its electronic information (e.g. e-mails) relative to the

SARMCIIMI and MRIA activities and its subsequent dissociation from MRIA to be deleted from
SARMC's electronic information storage system, after SARMC anticipated litigation, and even
after litigation in this matter was filed. SARMC has intentionally spoliated virtually all emails
once stored on its electronic information storage system which relate to communications among
SARMC employees concerning MRIA, IMI, SARG/GSR and ICR. Likewise, SARMC has
intentionally spoliated virtually all emails transmitted between SARMC representatives and
representatives of IMI, SARG/GSR, and ICR. Such spoliation unreasonably interferes with the
prosecution of this action and serves to conceal evidence of the activities of SARMC on its own
and in conjunction with IMI, SARG/GSR, and ICR, which caused damage to MRIA.
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SARMC AND IMI'S CONSPIRACY AGAINST MRIA, MRI LIMITED,
AND MRI MOBILE

56.

SARMC, SARG/GSR, IMI, and ICR have engaged in a conspiracy for the purpose

of running MRI Center out of business or diminishing its value so substantially that MRIA would
have to sell the severely damaged Center to SARMC, at which point SARMC and GSR could
easily reestablish its value simply by once again supporting it as they had in the past.
57.

Such acts in furtherance of this conspiracy include, but are not limited to, the

following acts:
•

SARG/GSR, with the knowledge and support of SARMC, reduced hours of its
availability to MRIA operations for the first time in the history of the hospital
while maintaining longer hours of service to IMI;

•

SARG/GSR, with the knowledge and support of SARMC, refused to personally
attend to patients being imaged in MRIA's mobile unit stationed in the SARMC
parking lot only yards away from MRI Center (a service provided willingly by the
group since 1988);

•

SARG/GSR radiologists, with the knowledge and support of SARMC, provided
faster response on image interpretation for images taken at IMI than at MRIA
operations;

•

SARG/GSR radiologists, with the knowledge and support of SARMC, wrongfully
asserted that images produced at MRI Center were inferior to IMI magnetic
resonance images;

•

SARG/GSR, with the knowledge and support of SARMC, reduced physician
support from that which had been historically provided in addressing routine
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quality and service issues, including patient care issues, within the lab, despite
charging for professional service; and
•

SARG/GSR, with the knowledge and support of SARMC, reduced responsiveness
from what had been historically provided to the needs of lab personnel for
physician input in clinical operations.
Likewise, prior to dissociation, SARMC wrongfully engaged in conduct which

58.

breached its partnership obligations and harmed MRIA, MRI Center/MRI Limited, and MRI
Mobile by:
•

Giving IMI advantages with respect to the rollout and implementation of
SARMC's IT system which linked referring physicians to MRIA's and IMI's
businesses;

•

Promoting IMI' s services over MRI Center; and

•

Voting against growth initiatives at the MRIA board level.

59.

Moreover, after dissociation, SARMC, IMI, SARG/GSR, and ICR continued this

conspiracy by:
•

Bringing an IMI mobile magnet on campus to compete with the Center, and using
confusing and misleading business names and contact telephone numbers in an
effort to wrongfully divert business away from MRI Center to IMI's mobile
magnet;

•

Directing SARMC physicians to refer magnetic resonance imaging patients to
IMI, to the exclusion of MRI Center;

•

Creating uncertainty among referring physicians and MRI Center employees by
spreading rumors that MRI Center would close in the near future;
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•

Telling SARMC employees that SARMC's insurance would not cover magnetic
resonance scans done at the MRI Center, when such was patently untrue;

•

Threatening to terminate MRI Center's access to SARMC's PACSIRIS, thereby
forcing MRI Center to invest in its own PACS/RIS system. Once this investment
was made, SARMC refused to allow MRI Center to install software on referring
physician computers (provided by SARMC), which would give referring
physicians access to MRI Centers' PACS/RIS. SARMC presently plans to
terminate any and all access MRIA may have to SARMC's PACS/RIS system;
and

•

Disparaging MRI Center's services.

60.

The combined acts of SARMC, SARG/GSR, IMI, and ICR have damaged the

reputation ofMRI Center/MRI Limited, MRI Mobile, and MRIA's, limited referring physician
access to MRI Center's magnetic resonance images, and interfered with, or diverted, MRI
Center's existing and prospective customers.
61.

Before SARMC, SARG/GSR, IMI, and ICR undertook this conspiracy, MRI

Center had enjoyed an eighteen-year record of increased scan volume and profitability.

As a

result of the conspiracy described above, MRI Center's volume has dwindled from a high of
approximately 8,000 out-patient scans in 2003 to roughly 3,000 out-patient scans in 2005.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Contract and Wrongful Dissociation)

62.

The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by

reference and made a part hereof.
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63.

SARMC's withdrawal from MRIA was a breach of an express provision of the

Partnership Agreement (that specifically listed the instances in which a partner could rightfully
withdraw).
64.

Also, the MRIA partnership was formed for a definite term, in that the partners

agreed to operate the partnership until at least 2015 (which date was later extended to 2023).
SARMC withdrew from MRIA before the expiration of the term.
65.

Defendants have waived or are estopped from claiming that the partnership was

not extended to 2023 by their ratification of the extension.
66.

SARMC's withdrawal was wrongful, and amounts to wrongful dissociation under

I.C. §§ 53-3-602 (b)(l) and (2).
67.

SARMC competed with MRIA before it withdrew from the partnership by

supporting IMI' s magnetic resonance imaging scanning business. Such conduct violated
SARMC's non-compete obligation in the Partnership Agreement.
68.

SARMC's withdrawal and competition with MRIA's operational units in violation

of the Partnership Agreement has caused damages to MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile.
69.

MRI Limited and MRI Mobile are third party beneficiaries of the Partnership

Agreement.
70.

MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile have sustained, and are entitled to recover,

the damages caused by SARMC's wrongful dissociation and breach of its non-compete
obligations in an amount to be proved at trial.
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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Relief)

71.

The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by

reference and made a part hereof.
72.

MRIA seeks an order declaring that SARMC's withdrawal from the MRIA

partnership amounted to a wrongful dissociation under I.C. §§ 53-3-602(b) (1) and (2), and that
MRIA is entitled to obtain damages for such wrongful dissociation as are causally related to such
act.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Fiduciary Duties to MRIA)

73.

The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by

reference and made a part hereof.
74.

Before dissociation, SARMC owed MRIA certain fiduciary duties ofloyalty and

care as a result of the Partnership Agreement, and as restated in I.C. § 53-3-404. SARMC
breached said fiduciary duties by competing with MRIA, by co-opting partnership opportunities,
by dealing with MRIA on its own behalf and on behalf of SARG/GSR/ICR and IMI when such
entities had interests adverse to MRIA, and by failing to exercise the requisite care owed by a
partner pursuant to I.C. § 53-3-404(c).
75.

As a result of these breaches of fiduciary duties, MRIA has been damaged in an

amount to be proved at trial.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Fiduciary Duties to MRI Limited and MRI Mobile )

76.

The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by

reference and made a part hereof.

THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM- PAGE 23

000107

.

'

'

\

I

77.

Before dissociation, SARMC owed MRIA certain fiduciary duties ofloyalty and

care pursuant to I.C. § 53-3-404.
78.

As a general partner, MRIA owes (and at all relevant times owed) MRI Limited

and MRI Mobile certain fiduciary duties of loyalty and care pursuant to I. C. § 53-2-408.
79.

As a partner in the MRIA general partnership, SARMC therefore owed MRI

Limited and MRI Mobile certain fiduciary duties of loyalty and care and is jointly and severally
liable for the general partnership's obligations pursuant to I.C. § 53-3-306.
80.

On information and belief, SARMC breached its fiduciary duties owed to MRI

Limited and MRI Mobile by, inter alia, competing with MRI Limited and MRI Mobile Limited
by co-opting partnership opportunities;

d~~ling

with MRI Limited and/or MRI Mobile on its/their

own behalf and on behalf of SARG/GSRICR and IMI when such entities had interests adverse to
MRI Limited, and/or MRI Mobile; while on the MRIA Board, voting in opposition to MRI
Mobile growth initiatives; conspiring to harm the business ofMRI Limited and MRI Mobile, and
wrongfully dissociating from the general partnership.
81.

As a result of these breaches of fiduciary duties MRI Limited and MRI Mobile,

have been damaged in an amount to be proved at trial.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)

82.

The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by

reference and made a part hereof.
83.

Idaho law and I.C. § 53-404(d) in particular, imposed upon SARMC a duty to

discharge its duties as a partner in good faith. As indicated in the foregoing paragraphs, SARMC
breached the Partnership Agreement with MRIA and deprived MRIA of the benefits of the
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partnership by engaging in various acts, including failing to discharge its responsibilities as an
MRIA board member, competing with and advancing interests adverse to, MRIA, and condoning
unfair business conduct on the part of its business partner and radiology group, resulting in
damage to MRIA and its operational units, MRI Limited and MRI Mobile.
84.

MRI Limited and MRI Mobile are beneficiaries of the Partnership Agreement.

85.

As a result of the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, MRIA,

MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile have been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations or Business
Expectations of MRI Limited)

86.

The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by

reference and made a part hereof.
87.

MRI Limited had a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy

with patients referred to, or who would otherwise obtain services from, MRI Center.
88.

SARMC knew, or should have known, of prospective contractual relations, or a

business expectancy, between MRI Limited and patients referred to, or who would otherwise
obtain services from, MRI Center.
89.

SARMC intentionally and wrongfully interfered with, terminated, and/or induced

a breach ofMRI Limited's prospective contractual relations and business expectations by
supporting and condoning the anti competitive and unfair acts of its business partners,
SARG/GSR, IMI and ICR, as enumerated herein.
90.

SARMC, on its own, also intentionally and wrongfully interfered with, terminated,

and/or induced a breach ofMRI Limited's prospective contractual relations and business
expectations by engaging in the anticompetitive and unfair acts described herein.
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91.

Because of this wrongful interference, MRI Limited has been damaged in an

amount to be proved at trial.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations or Business
Expectations of MRI Mobile)

92.

The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by

reference and made a part hereof.
93.

MRI Mobile had a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy

with patients referred to, or who would otherwise obtain services from its mobile imaging center.
94.

SARMC knew, or should have known, of prospective contractual relations, or a

business expectancy, between MRI Mobile and patients referred to, or who would otherwise
obtain services from, the mobile imaging center.
95.

SARMC intentionally and wrongfully interfered with, terminated, and/or induced

a breach ofMRI Mobile's prospective contractual relations and business expectations by
supporting and condoning the anticompetitive and unfair acts of its business partners,
SARG/GSR, IMI and ICR, as enumerated herein.
96.

SARMC, on its own, also intentionally and wrongfully interfered with, terminated,

and/or induced a breach ofMRI Mobile's prospective contractual relations and business
expectations by engaging in the anticompetitive and unfair acts described herein.
97.

Because of this wrongful interference, MRI Mobile has been damaged in an

amount to be proved at trial.
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EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Civil Conspiracy)
98.

The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by

reference and made a part hereof.
99.

SARMC conspired with SARG/GSR/IMIIICR to harm MRIA, MRI Limited, and

MRI Mobile through the commission of acts, which are themselves actionable, including, but not
limited to:
•

Defamation of MRI Center/MRI Limited;

•

Interfering with prospective business opportunities of MRIA, MRI Limited, and
MRI Mobile;

•

Misappropriation of trade secret or confidential information, as alleged herein; and

•

Co-opting a partnership opportunity that should have been offered to MRIA.

•

Wrongfully withdrawing from MRIA

100.

The commission ofthese acts by SARMC and SARG/GSR/IMIIICR in

combination and conspiracy caused MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile damages in an
amount to be proved at trial.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
101.

Counter-Claimants have been required to obtain the assistance of counsel to aid in

the prosecution of this matter and has retained the law firm of Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
and have agreed to pay said attorneys a reasonable fee. Counter-Claimants are entitled to recover
their reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred in the prosecution of this matter pursuant to Rule
54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 121, or other applicable
law.
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PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Counter-Claimants MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile pray for
judgment against Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center as follows:
1.

That per Counter-Claimants' First Claim for Relief (Breach of Contract and

Wrongful Dissociation), they are entitled to recover damages related to SARMC's dissociation
in an amount to be proved at trial.
2.

That per Counter-Claimants' Second Claim for Relief (Declaratory Relief), it be

granted an order declaring that SARMC's withdrawal from the MRIA partnership was a
wrongful dissociation under Idaho Code§§ 53-3-602(b) (1) and (2), and that such wrongful
dissociation entitles Counter-Claimants to damages.
3.

That per Counter-Claimants' Third Claim for Relief (Breaches of Fiduciary Duties

to MRIA), MRIA be awarded damages in an amount to be proved at trial.
4.

That per Counter-Claimants' Fourth Claim for Relief (Breaches of Fiduciary

Duties to MRI Limited and MRI Mobile), to MRI Limited and MRI Mobile be awarded damages
in an amount to be proved at trial
5.

That per Counter-Claimants' Fifth Claim for Relief (Breach of Covenant of Good

Faith and Fair Dealing) they be awarded damages in an amount to be proved at trial.
6.

That per Counter-Claimants' Sixth and Seventh Claim for Relief (Interference

with Prospective Contractual Relations or Business Expectations) they be awarded damages in an
amount to be proved at trial.
15.

That per Counter-Claimants' Eighth Claim for Relief(Civil Conspiracy) they be

awarded damages in an amount to be proved at trial.
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16.

That Counter-Claimants' be awarded their cost and attorneys fees for defending

and prosecuting this action, pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121 and I.R.C.P. Rule 54.
17.

For such other and further relief as may be just and proper under the

circumstances.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Counter-Claimants hereby demand a jury trial pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 38(b).
DATED this 22"d day of March, 2010.

DaraLab~
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
Attorney for Counter-Claimants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of March, 201 0, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following counsel for Plaintiff in the manner set forth below:
Donald B. Ayer (VIA FAX)
Christian G. Vergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113

JackS. Gjording (VIA HAND-DELIVERY)
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701

Patrick J. Miller (FAX)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 601 W. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720

- ~:>"'~
~L
araLabrum
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OPERATING AGREEMENT
OF
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC

This OPERATING AGREEMENT is made and entered into effective as ofthe lst day
of July, 2001, by and between Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., an Idaho nonprofit
corporation ("Diversified Care"), and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP (OICR"), an Idaho
limited liability partnership, as Members.

ARTICLE 1 FORMATION
1.1. Background. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("Saint
Alphonsus") is an Internal Revenue Code Section 50l(c)(3) corporation which owns and
operates a regional medical center (the "Medical Center"), licensed under laws in the State of
Idaho and accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations.
The Medical Center is located in Boise, Idaho. Saint Alphonsus provides patient care
services consistent with the moral principles and philosophies of the Roman Catholic Church
as expressed in the ethical and religious directives for Catholic Health Care Services
promulgated by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Diversified Care is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Saint Alphonsus. ICR is an Idaho professional association consisting
entirely of physicians licensed to practice medicine in the State of Idaho.
Diversified Care and ICR are entering·into this Operating Agreement to make certain
medical imaging services more available to the community and to increase the costeffectiveness, efficiency and quality of medical imaging services available in the community.
The primary purpose of Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC (the "Company"), shall be to
own and operate free standing medical imaging centers in and around Boise, Idaho.
The Company own and operates both the :MRI and non-rvtRI Medical Imaging business
at. 927 Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho, and receives the technical component from the Medical
Imaging. The physicians ofiCR provide the medical services for the Company's operations
and receive the professional component from the Medical Imaging. The Company maintains
separate financial statements for each operation. Certain administrative, lease and other
expenses are allocated between the two operations as provided in Section 12.8, 13.3 and 13.4.
Diversified Care is acquiring a 50% interest in the non-MRI operation of the Company under
this Agreement. This Agreement, which sets forth the terms and conditions of the ownership,
operation and management ofthe non-MRI portion ofthe Company's operations, does not
apply to ICR's ownership, operation and management of the MRJ operation. Profits, losses
and distributions for the non-MRJ operation are allocated equally between ICR and
Diversified Care, and for the MRI operation entirely to ICR. ICR will continue to own a
100% interest in the MRI operation of the Company until Diversified Care acquires a 50%
OPERATING AGREEMENT- I
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interest in the MRI operation as provided in Section 7.3 .2. If and when Diversified Care
acquires a 50% interest in the MRI operation, this Agreement will apply to the ownership,
operation and management of both the MRJ and non-MRI operations of the Company.

1.2. Formation. ICR formed the Company pursu;mt to the Act by filing Articles of
Organization on July 23, 1999. By execution ofthis Agreement, Diversified Care is admitted
as a Member ofthe Company effective as of the date ofthis Agreement. Upon the request
of the Managing Committee or B:S required by law, the parties shall promptly execute all
amendments of the Articles of Organization and all other documents that are needed to enable
the Managing Committee to accomplish all filing, recording, publishing and other acts
necessary or appropriate to comply with all requirements for the operation of the Company
under the Act.
1.3. Intent. It is the intent of the Members that the Company be operated in a
manner consistent with its treatment as a "partnership" for federal and state income tax
purposes. It is also the intent of the Members that the Company not be operated or treated as
a "partnership" for purposes of Section 303 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. No Member
shall take any action inconsistent with the express intent of the parties hereto as set forth
herein.
1.4.

Definitions. Capitalized terms used in this Agreement are defined in Article 2.
ARTICLE 2 DEFINITIONS

The following terms used in this Agreement shall have the meanings described below:
2.1. "Act" shall mean the Idaho Limited Liability Company Act, Idaho Code, Title
53, Chapter 6, as may be amended from time to time.

2.2.
the Code.

"Adjusted Basis" shall have the meaning given such term in Section lOll of

2.3. "Adjusted Capital Account Deficit" means with respect to any Member, the
deficit balance, if any, in that Member's Capital Account as of the end ofthe relevant Fiscal
Year, after giving effect to the following adjustments: (i) credit to that Capital Account the
amount by which that Member is obligated to restore or is deemed to be obligated to restore
pursuant to the penultimate sentences of Treasury Regulation Sections I. 704-2(g)(l) and
(i)(5); and (ii) debit to that Capital Account the items described in paragraphs (4), (5) and (6)
in Section 1. 704-1 (b )(2)(ii)( d) of the Treasury Regulations. This definition of Adjusted
Capital Account Deficit is intended to comply with the provisions of Section
1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d) of the Treasury Regulations and shall be interpreted and applied
consistently therewith.
OPERA TTNG AGREEMENT- 2
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2.4. "Affiliate" means a Person who, with respect to any other Person: (a) directly
or indirectly controls, is controlled by or is under common control with such other Person; (b)
owns or controls fifty percent(50%) or more of the outstanding voting securities of such other
Person; (c) is an officer, director, partner or member of such other Person; or (d) if such other
Person is an officer, director, partner or member of any Person for which such other Person
acts in any such capacity.
2.5. "Agreement" means this Operating Agreement, as it may be amended from
time to time, complete with all exhibits and schedules hereto.
2.6. "Articles of Organization" means the Company's Articles of Organization
filed with the Secretary of State of Idaho, as amended or restated from time to time.
2.7.
following:

"Bankruptcy" means, with respect to a Person, the happening of any of the

2.7 .1. the making of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors;
2. 7.2. the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy or the filing of a pleading
in any court of record admitting in writing an inability to pay debts as they become due;
2. 7.3. the entry of an order, judgment or decree by any court of competent
jurisdiction adjudicating the Person to be bankrupt or insolvent;
2.7 .4. the filing of a petition or answer seeking any reorganization,
arrangement, composition, readjustment, liquidation, dissolution or similar relief under any
statute, law or regulation;
2.7.5. the filing of an answer or other pleading admitting the material
allegations of, or consenting to, or defaulting in answering, a bankruptcy petition filed against
the Person in any bankruptcy proceeding;
2.7.6. the filing of an application or other pleading or any action otherwise
seeking, consenting to or acquiescing in the appointment of a liquidating trustee, receiver or
other liquidator of all or any substantial part of the Person's properties;
2.7.7. the commencement of any proceeding seeking reorganization,
arrangement, composition, readjustment, liquidation, dissolution or similar relief under any
statute, law or regulation which has not been quashed or dismissed within one hundred eighty
(180) days; or
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2. 7 .8. the appointment without consent of such Person or acquiescence of a
liquidating trustee, receiver or other liquidator of all or any substantial part of such Person's
properties without such appointment being vacated o.r stayed within ninety (90) days and, if
stayed, without such appointment being vacated within ninety (90) days after the expiration
of any such stay.
2.8. "Capital Account" shall mean the accounting record of each Member's interest
in the Company created and maintained in accordance with this Section 2.8. There shall be
credited to each Member's Capital Account (i) the amount of any contribution of cash by that
Member, (ii) the Gross Asset Value of property contributed by that Member, (iii) that
Member's allocable share of Profits and any items in the nature of income allocated to that
Member hereunder, and (iv) the amount of any Company liabilities that the Member assumes
or takes subject to Code Section 752. There shall be debited against each Member's Capital
Account the amount of all distributions of cash to that Member unless a distribution to the
Member is a loan or is deemed a payment tinder Code Section 707(a) or 707(c), the Gross
Asset Value of property distributed to that Member by the Company, that Member's allocable
share of Losses and any items in the nature of expenses or losses which are specifically
allocated to that Member hereunder, and the amount of any liabilities of that Member that the
Company assumes or takes subject to Code Section 752. This definition of Capital Account
and the other provisions herein relating to the maintenance of Capital Accounts are intended
to comply with Treasury Regulation Sections 1.704-l(b) and 1.704-2 and shall be interpreted
and applied consistently therewith. In the event the Managing Committee determines that it
is in the best interests of both Members to modify the manner in which the Capital Accounts,
or any debits or credits thereto (including, without limitation, debits or· credits relating to
liabilities that are secured by contributed or distributed property or which are assumed by the
Company or the Members), are computed in order to comply with such Treasury Regulations,
the Managing Committee may make such modification provided that it is not likely to have
a material effect on the amounts distributed to any Member pursuant to Section 5.2. The
Managing Committee ·shall also make any appropriate modifications in the event
unanticipated events might otherwise cause this Agreement not to comply with Treasury
Regulation Sections 1.704-l(b) and 1.704-2.

2.9. "Capital Contribution" means, with respect to any Member, the amount of
money contributed by that Member to the Company and, if property other than money is
contributed, the initial Gross Asset Value of such property. The principal amount of a
promissory note which is not readily traded on an established securities market and which is
contributed to the Company by the maker of the note (or a person related to the maker of the
note within the meaning of Treasury Regulations Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(c)) shall not be
included in the Capital Account of any Member until the Company makes a taxable
disposition of the note or until (and to the extent) principal payments are made on the note,
all in accordance with Treasury Regulations Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(d)(2).
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2.10. "Code" shall mean the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (or successor thereto),
as amended from time to time.
2.11. "Company" means the limited liability company formed pursuant to this
Agreement, as such limited liability company may from time to time be constituted.

2.12. "Contribution Percentage" means: (i) with respect to ICR, fifty percent (50%)
and (ii) with respect to Diversified Care, fifty percent (50%). The Contribution Percentage
shall not be changed except as provided in Section 7 .6.3 .5 hereof.
2.13. "Defaulting Member" means a Member that has committed an event of
default as described in Section 9.1 hereof.
2.14. "Depreciation" shall mean, for each Fiscal Year or portion thereof, an amount
equal to the depreciation, amortization or other cost recovery deduction allowable with respect
to an asset for that Fiscal Year or portion thereof, except that if the Gross Asset Value of an
asset differs from its Adjusted Basis at the beginning of the Fiscal Year or portion thereof,
Depreciation shall be an amount which bears the same ratio to that different Gross Asset
Value (as originally computed) as the federal income tax depreciation, amortization, or other
cost recovery deduction for that Fiscal Year or portion thereof bears to the Adjusted Tax Basis
(as originally computed); provided, however, that if the federal income tax depreciation,
amortization or other cost recovery deduction for the applicable year or period is zero,
Depreciation shall be determined with reference to the Gross Asset Value (as originally
computed) using any reasonable method selected by the Managing Committee.
2.15. "Fiscal Year" means the year on which the accounting and federal income tax
records of the Company are kept as set forth in Section 12.2 hereof.
2.16. "Gross Asset Value" shall mean with respect to any Company asset, the asset's
Adjusted Basis, except as follows:
2.16.l.the initial Gross Asset Value of any asset contributed by a Member to
the Company shall be the gross fair market value of that asset, as determined by the
contributing Member and the non-contributing Member. In the event the Members cannot
agree on the gross fair market value of the asset, the value of the asset shall be determined by
an independent appraisal conducted by an appraiser selected by the Members in good faith.
Such appraiser shall be experienced in making appraisals and the appraiser's decision shall
be final and binding upon the Company and the Members;
2.16.2.the Gross Asset Value of all Company assets shall be adjusted to equal
their respective gross fair market values, as determined by the Managing Committee, as of the
date upon which any of the following occurs: (i) the acquisition of an additional Interest in
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the Company after the date hereof by any new or existing Member, in exchange for more than
a de minimis Capital Contribution or the distribution by the Company to a Member of more
than a de minimis amount of Company property as consideration for an Interest in the
Company, if the Managing Committee determines that such adjustment is necessary or
appropriate to reflect the relative economic interest of the Members ofthe Company; and (ii)
the liquidation of the Company within the meaning of Treasury Regulation Section I. 7041(b )(2)(ii)(g);
2.16.3.the Gross Asset Value of any Company asset distributed to any Member
shall be the gross fair market value of that asset on the date of distribution, as determined by
the Member receiving that distribution and the other Member; and
2.16.4.if an election under Section 754 of the Code has been made, the Gross
Asset Value of Company assets shall be increased (or decreased) to reflect any adjustments
to the adjusted basis ofthe assets pursuant to Code Section 734(b) or Code Section 743(b),
but only to the extent that those adjustments are taken into account in determining Capital
Accounts pursuant to Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(m) and Section 6.2
hereof; provided, however, that Gross Asset Value shall not be adjusted pursuant to this
subsection (d) to the extent that the Managing Committee determines that an adjustment
pursuant to subsection (b) hereof is necessary or appropriate in connection with a transaction
that would otherwise result in an adjustment pursuant to this subsection (d).
If the Gross Asset Value of an asset has been determined or adjusted thereby, that
Gross Asset Value shall thereafter be further adjusted by the Depreciation, if any, taken into
account with respect to that asset for purposes of computing Profits and Losses.

2.17. "Interest" means the interest of a Member in the Company as a Member
representing such Member's rights, powers and privileges as specified in this Agreement.
2.18. "Major Decisions" shall have the meaning set forth in Section 8.5 hereof.
2.19. "Managing Committee" means that committee designated as such pursuant
to Section 8.1 ofthis Agreement.
2.20. "Medical Imaging" means the physician/professional component of the full
range of those Medical services and/or procedures, whether invasive or non-invasive that
involve the use of imaging equipment and/or any technique or modality related to imaging of
the body, all related supervision, interpretations, consultations and imaging gu~ded
interventional services and/or procedures typically and customarily performed by radiologists
as listed in the Radiology (including Nuclear Medicine and Diagnostic Ultrasound) and the
Adjunctive Surgical Procedures Sections of the American Medical Association Physician's
Current Procedural Terminology (0CPT Codes") as amended or supplemented.
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2.21. "Member" means any Person that executed this Agreement as a Member, and
any other Person admitted to the Company as an additional or substituted Member, that has
not made a disposition of such Person's entire Interest.
2.22. "Net Cash From Operations" means the gross cash proceeds from Company
operations (including sales and dispositions of Company property in the ordinary course of
business) less the portion thereof used to pay or establish reserves for all Company expenses,
debt payments, capital improvements, replacements, and contingencies, all as reasonably
determined by the Managing Committee. "Net Cash From Operations" shall not be reduced
by depreciation, amortization, cost recovery deductions, or similar allowances, but shall be
increased by any reductions of reserves previously established pursuant to the first sentence
ofthis Section 2.22 and Section 2.23 hereof.
2.23. "Net Cash From Sales or Refinancings" means the net cash proceeds from
all sales and other dispositions (other than in the ordinary course of business) and all
refinancing of Company property, less any portion thereof used to establish reserves, all as
reasonably determined by the Managing Committee. ·"Net Cash From Sales or Refinancings"
shall include all principal and interest payments with ,respect to any note or other obligation
received by the Company in connection with sales or other dispositions (other than in the
ordinary course ofbusiness) of Company property.
2.24. "Person" means an individual, firm, corporation, partnership, limited
partnership, limited liability company, association, estate, trust, pension or profit-sharing plan,
or any other entity.
2.25. "Principal Office" means the registered Idaho office of the Company at which
the records ofthe Company are kept as required under the Act.
2.26. "Profits" and "Losses" shall mean for each Fiscal Year or portion thereof, an
amount equal to the Company's taxable income or loss for that year or period, determined in
accordance with Code Section 703(a) (for this purpose, all items of income, gain, loss or
deduction required to be stated separately pursuant to Code Section 703(a)(l) shall be
included in taxable income or loss), with the following adjustments:
2.26.l.any income of the Company exempt from federal income tax not
otherwise taken into account in computing Profits or Losses shall be added to that taxable
income or loss;
2.26.2.any expenditures of the Company described in Code Section
705(a)(2)(B) or treated as Code Section 705(a)(2)(B) expenditures pursuant to Treasury

OPERATING AGREEMENT- 7

doc 33235

IMI/0018

114-012
000127

. ..
~

Regulation Section I. 704-1 (b)(2 )(iv)(i), and not otherwise taken into account in computing
Profits and Losses shall be subtracted from that taxable income or loss;
2.26.3.in the event the Gross Asset Value of any Company asset is adjusted as
required by subsections (b) or (c) of the definition of Gross Asset Value, the amount of that
adjustment shall be taken into account as gain or loss from the disposition of that asset for
purposes of computing Profits or Losses in the Fiscal Year of adjustment;
2.26.4.gain or loss resulting from any disposition of Company property with
respect to which gain or loss is recognized for federal income tax purposes shall be computed
by reference to the Gross Asset Value of the property disposed of, notwithstanding that the
Adjusted Basis of that property may differ from its Gross Asset Value;
2.26.5 .in lieu of the depreciation, amortization and other cost recovery
deductions taken into account in computing the taxable income or loss, there shall be taken
into account the Depreciation for the Fiscal Year or portion thereof;
2.26.6.the extent an adjustment to the adjusted tax basis of any Company asset
pursuant to Code Section 734(b) or Code Section 743(b) is required pursuant to Regulations
Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(m)(4) to be taken into account in determining Capital Accounts as
a result of a distribution other than in complete liquidation of a Member's Interest, the amount
of such adjustment shall be treated as an item of gain (if the adjustment increases the basis of
the asset) or loss (if the adjustment decreases the basis of the asset) from the disposition of
the asset and shall be taken into account for purposes of computing Profits or Losses; and
2.26. 7.any items of income, gain, loss or deduction that are specially allocated
pursuant to Sections 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 or 6.5 hereof shall not be taken into account in computing
Profits or Losses.
2.27. "Tax Matters Member" means the "tax matters partner" as defined in Section
623 I(a)(7) of the Code.
2.28. "Transfer" means to sell, assign, transfer, give, donate, pledge, deposit,
alienate, bequeath, devise or otherwise dispose of or encumber to any Person other than the
Company.
2.29. ''Transferee" means a Person to whom a Transfer is made.

2.30. "Treasury Regulations'' shall mean pronouncements, as amended from time
to time, or their successor pronouncements, which clarifY, interpret and apply the provisions
of the Code, and which are designated as "Treasury Regulations" by the United States
Department of the Treasury.
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Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to
such terms in this Agreement.
ARTICLE 3 GENERAL PROVISIONS
3.1. Name. The name of the Company shall be Intermountain Medical Imaging,
LLC, or such other name as the Managing Committee from time to time shall select.
3.2. Principal Office and Place of Business. The principal office and place of
business of the Company shall be located at 927 Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho 83702,
Att;ention: Timothy Hall, M.D., or such other place as the Managing Committee from time to
time shall determine.
3.3. Company ?urposes. The initial purpose of the Company shall be to engage
in the ownership and operation of free standi[lg medical imaging centers and such other
lawful activities as may be approved by the Members.
3.3.1. Prohibited Purposes, Relationships and Understandings. It is
expressly understood by the parties hereto that the Company's operations are subject to
various state and federal laws regulating permissible relationships between the Members and
entities such as the Company, including 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (the "Fraud and Abuse
Statute"), and 42 U .S.C. § 1395nn (the "Stark Act"). It is the intent of the parties that the
Company operate in a manner consistent with the foregoing statutes. Accordingly,
notwithstanding anything else contained in this Agreement to the contrary,
I

.

3.3.1.1. No contract or other agreement may be entered into by the Company
with any Member or Affiliate or any other third party, unless such contract
or agreement is at arms-length and for fair value and is approved in
accordance with Section 8.6 ofthis Agreement;
3 .3 .1.2. Both Members represent and warrant that there is no intent to induce the
referral of patients to the Company by any person or entity in connection
with the formation and operation of the Company and it is expressly
understood between the parties that each Member, its Affiliates and its
employees are not precluded or discouraged from referring patients to any
alternate provider of services other than the Company;
3.3.1.3. The Company shall not loan funds to or guarantee a· loan for any
Member to enable such Member to make a Capital Contribution;
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3.3 .1.4. Any distributions to Members shall be dir.ectly proportional to such
Members' Contribution Percentage; and
3.3 .1.5. The Company shall not furnish or provide services to patients who are
referred by Members, their Affiliates or employees, on terms different from
those offered to patients referred by any other person, after taking into
account any difference in provision of services due to the terms and
conditions of a patient's health care coverage.
3.3 .2. ICR Responsibilities. It is expressly understood by the parties that the
Company shall not be operated in a manner which would violate the professional
responsibilities or jeopardize the professional licenses of the physician members of ICR.
Nothing contained in this Section shall be interpreted to authorize or require the Company or
the Members to exercise any specific control over the physician members ofiCR's exercise
of their professional medical judgment in the care and treatment of patients.
3.3.3. Community Benefit.
The Company and its Members shall not
discriminate in patient selection based upon a patients' race, sex, creed, national origin,
religion. The Company and its Members wil1 not discriminate against Medicare or Medicaid
patients. Further, the Management Committee shall address community health needs,
including delivering health-care services to under-served populations and providing
educational opportunities to the community. The amount spent on these activities shall be
documented at each year end.
3.3.4. Information Resources. The Members acknowledge'and agree that the
computer information resources and capabilities thereof of the Company shall be developed,
implemented and maintained, subject to budgetary constraints in a commercially reasonable
manner such that they will be interactive and communicate with the computer software,
programs and systems utilized by Diversified Care and Saint Alphonsus in the Medical
Center. Without limiting the foregoing and subject to budgetary constraints, the Company
agr~es to integrate the computer, image viewing, and Picture Archiving and Communications
System (PACS) at the Center with Diversified Care's information system. The Company
agrees to acquire the requisite hardware and software in order to accomplish such integration
and to update such hardware and software as may be reasonably necessary to maintain
connectivity. To the extent the Company acquires any such hardware or software from
Diversified Care, it shall be required to pay fair market value for such hardware and software.
The Company shall further pay Diversified Care the fair market value of any support services
rendered by Diversified Care to the Company in connection with the PACS.
3.4. Term. The tenn of the Company shall commence on the filing of the Articles
of Organization and shall continue perpetually until dissolved in accordance with Section 11.1
of this Agreement.
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3.5. Agent for Service of Process. The name and business address of the Agent for
Service of Process for the Company is Timothy Hall, M.D., or such other person as the
Managing Committee shall appoint from time to time.

ARTICLE 4 CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS
4.1. Initial Capital Contributions by the Members. As of the date of this
Agreement, Diversified Care and ICR shaH each have contributed cash and assumed liabilities
of the Company in the amounts reflected on Exhibit 4.1, attached hereto and incorporated
herein by this reference. Exhibit 4.1 shall be amended from time to time to reflect the
admission ofnew Members, if any, and the relative Contribution Percentages thereafter. No
Member can be assessed additional capital unless unanimously agreed by all Members.
4.2. Member Loans. If Capital Contributions or revenues of the Company are
insufficient to satisfy all financial requirements of the Company, or ifbridge funds are needed
by the Company on an interim basis, the Managing Committee may in accordance with
Section 8.5.4 of this Agreement request a loan to the Company in such amount as it
reasonably determines is needed by the Company. In the event the Managing Committee
determines the need for such a loan, the Managing Committee shall immediately notify the
Members in writing of the amount and the terms thereof and the Members, at any time
thereafter and in their sole discretion, may agree (in writing by notice given to the Managing
Committee) to share as participant lenders in such loan in a percentage amount specified by
the Member's Contribution Percentage. Members may not loan funds to the Company in
proportions which differ from their Contribution Percentage.
4.3. Operating and Capital Budgets. The Company shall annually adopt capital
and an operating budget as provided in 8.5.2. The amount of the operating and capital
budgets and the specific budget items shall be identified based upon criteria which include
community need. Adjustments to the capital or operating budgets or approval of capital or
operating expenses not provided for in the budget may be approved at any time by the
Management Committee in accordance with Section 8.5.2 and subject to limitations on debt
provided in Section 8.5.1 and the limitation on additional capital contributions as stated in
Section 4.1. The parties agree to set their initial capital contribution and the Company initial
borrowing limitations in amounts reasonably believed to be sufficient to fund the capital needs
ofthe Company. It is the parties intent that the long term capital needs of the Company be
met either by retained earnings of the Company or by borrowings using the assets of the
Company as collateral. The parties shall exercise their best efforts to have the next year's
operating and capital budgets approved by November 30 of each year.
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ARTICLE 5 DISTRIBUTIONS
5.1. Amount and Time of Distributions. The Management Committee will retain
sufficient cash within the Company to fund current operations and debt service. However,
absent a seventy-five percent (75%) vote of the Management Committee, at least sixty percent
(60%) ofNet Cash from Operations will be distributed to the Members on the 15th day ofthe
month following the end of each operating quarter.
5.2. Distributions to Members. All distributions to the Members shall be made
based on their Contribution Percentage.

5.3.

Distribution Upon Withdrawal. No withdrawing Member shall be entitled
to receive any distribution or the value of such Member's Interest in the Company as a result
of withdrawal from the Company prior to the liquidation of the Company, except as
specifically provided in this Agreement.
5.4. Return of Capital. No Member shall be entitled to the return of, or interest on,
that Member's Capital Contributions except as provided herein. Under such circumstances
requiring a return of any Capital Contributions, no Member shall have the right to receive
property other than cash.
ARTICLE 6 PROFITS AND LOSSES

6.1.

Profits and Losses. Profits and Losses for any Fiscal Year shall be allocated
· to each Member in accordance with their Contribution Percentage.
6.2. Allocation In the Event of Section 754 Election. To the extent an adjustment
to the Adjusted Basis of any Company asset pursuant to Code Section 734(b) or Code Section
743(b) is required to be taken into account in determining Capital Accounts, pursuant to
Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(m), the amount of that adjustment to the
Capital Accounts shall be treated as an item of gain (if the adjustment increases the basis of
the asset), then that gain or loss shall be specially allocated to the Members in the manner
consistent with the manner in which their Capital Accounts are required to be adjusted
pursuant to that Treasury Regulation.

6.3. Capital Account Allocations. At all times, the Capital Accounts of the
Company shall be maintained in accordance with Code Section 704 and all related Treasury
Regulations thereunder.
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6.4.

Special Tax Allocations.

6.4.1. Contributed Property. In accordance with Code Section 704(c) and
the Treasury Regulations thereunder, income, gain, loss and deduction with respect to any
property contributed to the Company shall be allocated among the Members so that a
contributing member, to the maximum extent possible, recognizes the variation, if any,
between the Adjusted Basis and the initial Gross Asset Value of the property contributed by
that Member.
6.4.2. Adjusted Property. In the event the Gross Asset Value of any
Company asset is adjusted pursuant to subsection (b) ofthe definition of Gross Asset Value,
subsequent allocations of income, gain, Joss and deduction with respect to that asset shall take
into account any variation between the Gross Asset Value of that asset before such adjustment
and its Gross Asset Value after such adjustment in the same manner as the variation between
Adjusted Basis and Gross Asset Value is taken into account under Section 6.5.1 hereofwith
respect to contributed property, and such variation shall be allocated in accordance with the
principles of Treasury Regulation Section I. 704-1 (b)(2)(iv )(f).
6.4.3. Recapture of Deductions a.nd Credits. If any "recapture" of
deductions or credits previously claimed by the Company is required under the Code upon the
sale or other taxable disposition of any Company property, those recaptured deductions or
credits shall, to the extent possible, be allocated to the Members pro rata in the same manner
that the deductions and credits giving rise to the recapture items were originally allocated
using the "first-in, first-out" method of accounting; provided, however, that this Section 6.4.3
shall only affect the characterization of income allocated among the Members for tax
purposes.
6.4.4. Discretion of the Managing Committee. Any elections or other
decisions relating to the allocations under this Section 6.4 shall be made by the Managing
Committee in any manner that reasonably reflects the purpose and intention of this
Agreement. Allocations pursuant to this Section 6.4 are solely for purposes of federal, state
and local taxes and shall not affect or in any way be taken into account in computing any
Member's Capital Account or share of Profits, Losses, other items or distributions pursuant
to any provision of this Agreement.

6.5.

Regulatory and Curative Allocations.

6.5.1. Qualified Income Offse~.. In the event any member unexpectedly
receives any adjustment, allocation or distribution described in Treasury Regulation paragraph
(4 ), (5) or (6) of Section 1. 704-1 (b)(2)(ii)( d), items of Company income and gain shall be
specially allocated to the Members in an amount and manner sufficient to eliminate, to the
extent required by the Treasury Regulations, the Adjusted Capital Account Deficit of that
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Member as quickly as possible, provided that an allocation pursuant to, this Section 6.5.1 shall
be made only if and to the extent that such Member would have an Adjusted Capital Account
Deficit after all other allocations provided for in this Article 6 have been tentatively made as
if this Section 6.5 .1 were not in the Agreement.
6.5.2. Gross Income Allocation. In the event that any Member has a deficit
Capital Account at the end of any Company Fiscal Year that is in excess of the sum of (i) the
amount that such Member is obligated to restore and (ii) the amount that the Member is
deemed to be obligated to restore pursuant to the penultimate sentence ofTreasury Regulation
Sections 1.704-2(g)(l) and (i)(5), that Member shall be specially allocated items of Company
income and gain in the amount of such excess as quickly as possible, provided that an
allocation pursuant to this Section 6.5.2 shall be made only if, and to the extent that, such
Member would have a deficit Capital Account in excess of such sum after all other allocations
provided for in this Article 6 have been made as if Section 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 were not in the
Agreement.
6.5.3. Curative Allocation. The allocations set forth in Sections 6.5.1 and
6.5.2 (the "Regulatory Allocations") are intended to comply with certain requirements of
Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-l(b) and 1.704-2. Notwithstanding any other provision
of this Article 6 (other than the Regulatory Allocations), the Regulatory Allocations shall be
taken into account in allocating other items of income, gain, loss, and deduction among the
Members so that, to the extent possible, the net amount of such allocation of other items and
the Regulatory Allocations to each Member should be equal to the net amount that would
have been allocated to each such Member if the Regulatory Allocations had not occurred.
6.5.4. Nonrecourse Deductions. The allocations set forth iri Section 6.1 are
intended· generally to comply with requirements of Regulations Sections I. 704-1 (b) and
1.704-2. If the Company incurs "nonrecourse deductions or partner nonrecourse deductions"
or if there is any change in the Company's "minimum gain," as those terms are defmed in such
Regulations, the allocation of Profits, Losses and items thereof to the Members shall be
modified as deemed reasonably necessary or advisable by the Managing Committee to comply
with such Regulations.

ARTICLE 7 THE MEMBERS
7.1. Meetings of the Members. Written notice ofthe time, place and purpose of
a meeting of the Members shall be given no less than ten (10) nor more than sixty (60) days
before the date of the meeting, either personally or by mail, to each Member. Notices of
special meetings shall state the purpose or purposes of the meeting, and no business may be
conducted at a special meeting, except for the business specified in the notice of the meeting;
provided, however, ifboth Members waive their right to notice of the purposes of the meeting,
any business may be transacted at such special meeting. If a meeting is adjourned to another
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time or place, it is not necessary to give notice of the adjourned meeting if the time and place
to which the meeting is adjourned are announced at the meeting at which the adjournment is
taken and at the adjourned meeting, only such business may be transacted as might have been
transacted at the original meeting. A waiver of any required notice shall be equivalent to the
giving of such notice if such waiver is in writing and signed by the Person entitled to such
notice, whether before, at or after the time stated therein. The Members may make use of
telephones and other electronic devices to hold meetings, provided that each Member may
simultaneously participate with the other Members with respect to all discussions and votes
ofthe Member. The Members may act without a meeting, if the action taken is reduced to
writing (either prior to or thereafter) and approved and signed by the vote of the Members in
accordance with the other voting provisions of this Agreement. Written minutes shall be
taken at each meeting of the Members; however, any action taken or matter agreed upon by
the Members shaH be deemed final, whether or not written minutes are prepared or finalized.
7.2. Other Business Interests of the Members. Except as specifically provided
in Section 7.3 this Agreement-shall not be construed to grant any right, privilege or option to
a Member to participate in any manner in any other business,. corporation, joint venture,
limited partnership, general partnership, limited liability company, limited liability partnership
or investment in which the other Members may participate, including those which may be the
same as or similar to the Company's business. Except as provided in Section 7.3 hereof, each
Member expressly waives the doctrine of corporate opportunity (or any analogous doctrine)
with respect to any other such business, corporation, partnership or investment of any other
Member or Affiliate.
7 .3.

c

Participation in Additional Operations.

7.3 .1. Right of First Refusal. I.n order to protect the goodwill and business
and professional relationship of the Company and the Members, each party agrees that neither
it nor its Affiliates will build, establish, or acquire in whole or in part any new medical
imaging service ("New Venture") within two (2) mile radius of the Saint Alphonsus campus
located at l 055 N. Curtis Road, Boise, Idaho without the other party's consent. In addition,
each party agrees that neither it nor its Affiliates will build, establish or acquire in whole or
in part a New Venture outside the two (2) mile radius but within Ada or Canyon Counties
without first offering to the other party the right to participate in the ownership and control
of the New Venture on the same terms, conditions and relative percentage of ownership as set
forth in this Agreement; provided, however, that ICR's right of first refusal shall not apply to
Diversified Care's or its Affiliates' building, establishing or acquiring any hospital which
provides medical imaging services or building, establishing or acquiring any ambulatory care
center wherein the only medical imaging services provided are of a type usually and
customarily provided, supervised and interpreted by non-radiologists and are in fact provided,
supervised and interpreted by non-radiologists. If either Member accepts the offer to
participate in the New Venture, then the Company shall have the first right of refusal to be the
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sole entity through which the Members own an interest in such service. Acceptance of the
right of first refusal must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt ofthe offer. In the event
a party fails to accept the right of first refusal, the other party may proceed to build, establish,
acquire or operate the New Venture for its own benefit notwithstanding any noncompete
agreement otherwise existing between the parties or their Affiliates. If Diversified Care
acquires a hospital or other facility in which medical imaging services are provided as of the
time of acquisition, Diversified Care will grant to ICR the first right of refusal to be the
exclusive provider of the professional services at such facility except where an acquired
facility already has in place a contract for professional radiology services. ICR shall have the
right to make an offer to become the provider of professional radiology services at the
expiration of any existing relationship or contract with an existing provider at such facility.
The individual members or partners of ICR agree to execute an agreement to these terms in
the form provided as Exhibit 7.3.1
·
7.3.2. MRI Participation. At which time Diversified Care or an Affiliate
thereof is able to make available to ICR a fifty percent (50%) interest in the MRl services
servicing the Medical Center ("Diversified Care's :tv1RI") and Diversified Care or an Affiliate
thereof is contractually able to purchase a 50% interest in all ofiCR's (or its Affiliate's) MR1
services ("ICR MRl"), (i) ICR will purchase a 50% interest in Diversified Care's MRJ, and
(ii) Diversified Care or its Affiliate will purchase a 50% interest in ICR's MRI. The price
for the respective interests shall be paid in cash and will be equal to fifty percent (50%) of the
fair market value of each entities' assets (exclusive of good
or other intangibles) less any
liabilities of such entity. Fair market value of the physical assets shall be by appraisal
assuming the existence of a willing buyer and a willing seller in an orderly sale. Closing on
the purchase and sale of such interest shall occur within one hundred twenty (120) days ofthe
date notice is given of intent to exercise the above rights. The parties shall negotiate in good
faith commercially reasonable ancillary terms and must agree to acceptable commercially
reasonable terms and conditions for each party's purchase of an interest in the other party's
MRI service.

will

7.3.3. Agreement to Pursue Meridian Facility. Notwithstanding Section
7.3 .I, the Members agree in good faith to pursue the development of a medical imaging center
within a one (l) mile radius of the St. Luke's Meridian Medical Center located at 520 South
Eagle Road, in Meridian, Idaho. The Members will either consent to the Company
establishing the center or that the other Member may pursue the establishment of such center
notwithstanding Section 7.3 above. In the event Diversified Care elects not to participate in
the establishment of such a center in Meridian, Idaho, ICR or its Affiliates may build,
establish or acquire the center and provide professional services at such site and receive the
technical component for such site, notwithstanding any noncompete agreement otherwise
existing between the parties or their Affiliates.
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7.4. Participation in Managed Care Programs. Diversified Care and ICR agree
to use their best efforts to include the Company as a participating provider in all managed care
programs in which Diversified Care or its Affiliates are involved which include physician
services as a service covered under the program. However, the final decision ~ncerning the
Company's participation in any managed care program shall be subject to the discretion of the
Managing Committee.
7.5. Transaction With Members or Affiliates. Except as otherwise provided in
this Agreement, no Member or its Affiliate may, directly or indirectly, deal with the Company
in connection with carrying out the business of the Company without the express approval of
the other Member(s).
7.6.

Rights and Obligations of Members

7.6.1. Limitation of Liability. Each Member's liability for the debts and
obligations of the Company shall be limited as set forth in the Act and other applicable law.
In this regard, no Member shall have liability in excess of its Capital Contribution unless it
expressly agrees in writing to assume such liability.
7.6.2. Company Records. Upon written request, each Member shall have the
right, during ordinary business hours, to inspect and copy the Company records required to
be maintained by the Managing Committee at the Company's registered office as set forth in
Section 12.1 hereof.
7.6.3. Responsibilities of the Members. The Members shall have the
following rights and responsibilities which shall require the unanimous consent of all of the
Members, in each Member's sole discretion, to undertake:
7.6.3.1. Approval of the merger of the Company with another company or to
participate as a shareholder, partner, member or joint venturer or in any
corporation, partnership, limited liability company or joint venture,
respectively;
7.6.3.2. Approval of any transaction between the Company and any Member,
Management Committee member or Affiliate;
7.6.3.3. Approval of any amendment to the Articles of Organization or this
Operating Agreement;
7.6.3.4.

Approval of admitting a new Member;

7 .6.3 .5.

Approval of any change in the Contribution Percentage;
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7.6.3.6.

Changing the Company's purposes;

7.6.3.7. Approval of any contract that would remove operational control from the
Management Committee and vest operational control in any other entity or
person;
7.6.3.8.

Declaration of bankruptcy or similar action;

7.6.3.9. Approval of any changes to the distribution requirements of Section 5.1
hereof;
7.6.3 .1 0. Approval of any change to the prohibition against Members making a
loan to the Company in a percentage different from their capital contribution
percentage as provided in Section 4.2 .
7.7. Additional Members. Additional Members may be admitted to the Company
only with the prior unanimous written consent of the Members in accordance with Section
7.6.3.4. Admission of a new Member shall occur upon execution.and delivery by such
Member of a counterpart of this Agreement in the forQ:l attached hereto as Exhibit 7.7,
delivery ofthe required Capital Contribution, if any, and execution and delivery of such other
documents, instruments and items as the Managing Committee may require.
7.8. ·Exercise of Rights by Diversified Care. The Members' exercise of their
authority and rights hereunder shall not be limited by any duty to the Company or to any other
Member. Each Member expressly understands that the Company's profitability is an
appropriate goal, but Diversified Care will necessarily be guided by Saint Alphonsus'
charitable mission.
ARTICLE 8 MANAGEMENT
8.1. Managing Committee. The Members agree that the management of the
Company shall be vested in the Members, and that the Members shall appoint a Managing
Committee. The number of Members of the Managing Committee shall be determined from
time to time by the Members; provided, at all times the number of Managing Committee
members will be divided equally between Diversified Care and ICR. Upon the execution of
this Agreement the Members agree that the initial Managing Committee shall be composed
of six (6) members, with Diversified Care being entitled to appoint three (3) such members,
and ICR being entitled to appoint three (3) such members. Each Member shall have the right
to appoint and remove its representatives to the Managing Committee at any time subject
solely to its discretion. No Member shall have any authority to enter into contracts on behalf
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of the Company or to otherwise bind or obligate the Company without a vote or the consent
of the Members as provided under this Agreement.
8.2.

Rights and Powers of Managing Committee.

8.2.1. Exclusive Rights of Managing Committee. Except for powers or
duties expressly reserved or assigned to the Members under the Articles of Organization, this
Agreement or applicable law, the Managing Committee shall have full, exclusive and
complete power to manage and control the business and affairs of the Company. A majority
ofthe Managing Committee shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business at any
regular or special meeting of the Managing Committee. Decisions of the Managing
Committee shall require the affirmative vote of at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the
members of the Managing Committee. In the event of a deadlock or tie in the voting by the
Members of the Managing Committee, the decision ofiCR shall control.
8.2.2. Reliance by Third Parties. Any third party not affiliated with either
Member shall be entitled to rely on all actions of the Managing Committee and shall be
entitled to deal with the Managing Committee as if it was the sole party in interest therein,
both legally and beneficially. A third party not affiliated with either Member shall not be
required to verify whether any consents required herein have been obtained by the Managing
Committee.
8.3. Duties and Responsibilities of the Managing Committee. Subject to the
provisions of Section 7.6.3 and Section 8.5 here9f, the Managing Committee shall have the
full, exclusive and compl~te power to manage and control the affairs of the Company. The
Managing Committee shall be responsible for conducting the daily business affairs of the
Company and for making the day-to-day operating decisions in carrying out the purposes,
objectives and policies established by this Agreement and the Members, including but not
limited to the following:
8.3.1. Expend its best efforts with respect to the operations of the Company,
taking it:J,to account the best interests of the Members in carrying out such duties and
responsibilities;
8.3.2. Operate and administer the Center in conformity with prudent servicing
standards customary in the industry among prudent providers of similar services, and exercise
the same judgment as if the action or failure to act were entirely for its own account;
8.3.3. Cause all books of account and other records ofthe Company to be kept
in accordance with the terms of this Agreement;
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8.3.4. Prepare and deliver to each Member all reports required by the terms of
this Agreement;
8.3.5. To the extent that funds ofthe Company are available, pay all debts and
other obligations of the Company as they come due;
8.3.6. Maintain all funds ofthe Company in a Company account in a bank or
banks located in Boise, Idaho, and designate the signatories to such accounts;
8.3. 7. Make distributions periodically to the Members in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement;
8.3.8. Undertake such actions as are necessary or desirable in order that the
Company, within reason, promptly complies with all material present and future laws,
ordinances, orders, rules, regulations and requirements of all governmental authorities having
jurisdiction which may be applicable to the Company, its property, and the operations and
management of the Company;
8.3.9. Approval ofthe annual operating and capital expenditure budgets of the
Company or material modifications to such budgets once approved;
8.3.10.Perform all other duties required by law or this Agreement to be
performed by the Managing Committee; and
8.3.ll.The entering into, modification of, or termination of any non-risk
bearing agreement with third party payers.
8.3 .12. Setting of compensation of the Center Manager or Chief Executive
Officer for the Company.
8.3.13.Managing Committee may delegate one or more of the duties provided
for in this Section 8.3 to an individual who will act as the general manager ("Center
Manager") of the Center which Center Manager will report directly to the Managing
Committee. The Center Manager, in consultation with the Managing Committee, shall be
responsible for those duties delegated to it by the Managing Committee which may include
the day to day management of the Company, and, in consultation with ICR, oversee the
hiring, discipline, development, counseling and retention of all employees, daily operations
of the Company, development of clinical protocols, procedures and standards, and the
development, implementation and maintenance of ongoing quality assurance, quality control
and group compliance programs. The Center Manager's duties shall not include, however,
approval of payer or managed care contracts; the approval of which is reserved to the
Managing Committee.
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8.4. Action by Managing Committee. Any action required or permitted to be
taken at a meeting of the Managing Committee may be taken without a meeting, without prior
notice, and without a vote, if all of the members shall severally or collectively consent in
writing to any action to be taken by the Company. Such action shall be as valid a Company
action as though it had been authorized at a meeting of the Managing Committee. Members
of the Managing Committee may participate in and act at any meeting of the Managing
Committee by means of conference telephone or similar communications equipment if all
persons participating in the meeting can hear each other simultaneously.
8.5. Actions Requiring Super Majority Vote. The following actions shall be
considered "Major Decisions," which the Managing Committee shall not undertake without
the consent of at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the members of the Managing
Committee:
8.5.1. Except as provided in Section 8.3.9, approval of the purchase, sale,
lease, mortgage, encumbrance or disposal of any single item of real or personal property
which involves a value in excess of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000).
8.5.2. Changing the criteria by which to approve capital expenditures;
8.5.3. Making loans on behalf of the Company, requesting a loan from the
Members or causing the Company to guarantee the obligations of others;
8.5.4. Approval of the incurrence by the Company of any indebtedness or any
contract (including a lease) which would require the guarantee of any Member;
8.5.5. Using the Company's funds or capital in any way other than for the
business purposes of the Company;
8.5.6. Appointment, removal, identification of duties and authority of the
Center Manager or chief executive office for the Company;
8.5.7. Pledging or encumbering any Company asset as security for an
obligation of a Member or any Affiliate of a Member;
8.5.8. Co-mingling any Company funds or capital with the funds of any other
Person;
8.5.9. Determining the amount of reserves required by the Company; and
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8.5.1 O.The entering into, modification of, or termination of any risk bearing
agreement with third party payers.
8.6. Actions Regarding Member Transactions. Any decision regarding any
contract or other arrangement between the Company and a Member may only be approved
by the Members pursuant to Section 7.6.3.2. The Managing Committee shall make a
recommendation to the Members regarding such contract or other arrangement. In all events,
Diversified Care's members on the Managing Committee shall vote in accordance and
consistent with its Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) status.

8. 7,

Filing of Documents. The Managing Committee shall file or cause to be filed
all certificates or documents as may be determined by the Managing Committee to be
necessary or appropriate for the formation, continuation, qualification and operation of a
limited liability company in the State of Idaho and any other state in which the Company may
elect to do business .. To the extent that the Managing Committee determines the action to be
necessary or appropriate, the Managing Committee shall do all things to maintain the
Company as a limited liability company under the laws of the State of Idaho and any other
state in which the Company may elect to do business.

8.8.

Meetings of the Managing Committee. The Managing Committee shall hold
regular meetings on a quarterly basis at such place and time as shall be fixed by the chair of
the Managing Committee, or as may be determined or approved by a majority of the members
of the Managing Committee. Special meetings of the committee may be called by the chair
of the Managing Committee or upon the written request of one-third (1/3) of the members of
such committee. At least ten (I 0) days' written notice shall be given before the date of the
meeting for all meetings. Notice of a special meeting shall specify the topics to be addressed
at such special meeting and only such matters as have been identified in such notices shall be
voted upon or have other action taken with respect to such matters.

8.9. Managing Committee Chair. The Managing Committee shall have a chair
and a vice-chair. The chair ofthe Managing Committee shall preside at all meetings of the
Managing Committee and shall be entitled to vote on all matters presented to the Managing
Committee. In the absence of the chair, the vice-chair shall preside at all such meetings. The
chair and vice-chair shall serve one year terms. The chair shall be appointed by ICR.
Diversified Care shall have the right to appoint the vice-chair.
8.10. Quorum and Proxy. No action shall be taken at any meeting of the Managing
Committee unless a quorum is present. A quorum of the Managing Committee shall consist
of fifty-one percent (51%) ofthe members of the Managing Committee who are present either
personally or by proxy, provided, however, that once a quorum is present the withdrawal of
one or more members shall not destroy the quorum. A member of the Managing Committee
may give his or her proxy to another rpember of the Managing Committee so long as such
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proxy is in writing and is signed by the member giving the proxy. The person holding the
proxy shall be entitled to exercise all rights of the member of the Managing Committee who
gave the proxy.
8.11. Indemnification of the Managing Committee.
8.ll.l.lndemnification. The Company, its receiver or trustee shall, to the
maximum extent provided by law, indemnify, defend and hold harmless the Managing
Committee and its Affiliates (each, an "Actor"), to the extent of the Company's assets, for,
from and against any liability, damage, cost, expense, loss, claim or judgment incurred by the
.Actor arising out of any claim based upon acts performed or omitted to be performed by the
Actor in connection with the business ofthe Company, including without limitation, attorneys'
fees and costs incurred by the Actor in settlement or defense of such claims. Amounts
incurred by an Actor in connection with Company affairs shall be reimbursed by the
Company. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no Actor shall be sci indemnified, defended or held
harmless for (I) cJaims based upon its acts or omissions in the breach of this Agreement or
which constitute, fraud, negligence, misconduct, or breach of fiduciary duty to the Company
or to the Members or (2) for acts or omissions for which the Company is prohibited from
indemnifying under Section 53-624 of the Act.
8.11.2.Liability. Actor (as defined in Section 8.11.1 hereof) shall not be
personally liable for the failure of the Company to make distributions as set forth in this
Agreement or otherwise to the Company or the Members for any act or omission performed
or omitted by such Actor in connection with the Company or its business. Notwithstanding
the foregoing, an Actor shall in all instances be liable for acts or omissions in breach ofthis
Agreement or which constitute fraud, gross negligence, or breach of fiduciary duty.
8.12. Compensation of Managing Committee.
8.12 .l.Fees. The Company will not pay the Managing Committee any fees or
other compensation for its services except as set forth in this Agreement.
8.12.2.Reimbursable Expenses. Subject to restrictions for payment to
Members and Affiliates under this Agreement, the Company will reimburse the Managing
Committee for all actual out-of-pocket third-party expenses reasonably incurred in connection
with the carrying out of the duties set forth in this Agreement. The Company will pay all
expenses of the Company, including without limitation (i) all costs of borrowed money, taxes,
insurance and assessment with respect to the assets and operation of the Company; (ii) legal
and accounting fees; and (iii) expenses for the acquisition, financing, operation, construction
and disposition of the assets of the Company.
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ARTICLE 9 MEMBER DEFAULTS
9.1. Events of Default. The occurrence of any of the following events shall
constitute an event of default and the Member so defaulting (herein referred to as the
Defaulting Member) shall (except as otherwise provided herein) thereafter be deemed to be
in default without any further action whatsoever on the part of the Company or the other
·
Member:

9 .1.1. attempted dissolution of the Company by any Member other than
pursuant to the provisions contained elsewhere in this Agreement;

9.1.2. a Bankruptcy occurs as to a Member;
9.1.3. failure of any Member to make required additional capital contributions;
or
9 .1.4. failure of any Member to perform any obligation, act or acts required of··
that Member by the provisions of this Agreement, which shall be necessary for or in
connection with the fulfilling of the purposes of the Company (other than the making of
additional capital contributions), or the Member violates or breaches any of the other terms
or provisions ofthis Agreement.
· A Member shall not be deemed to be in default ofthis Section 9.1 until after sixty (60)
days' written notice thereof and if such default is a nonmonetary default and cannot
reasonably and with due diligence and in good faith be cured within said sixty (60) day
period, and if the Defaulting Member immediately commences and proceeds to complete the
cure of such default with due diligence and in good faith, the sixty (60) day period with
respect to such default shall be extended to include such additional period of time as may be
reasonably necessary to cure such default.
9.2. Dispute Resolution. If the Members are in dispute regarding a substantive
matter underlying an occurrence of default or a question exists regarding facts surrounding
an occurrence of default, the parties shall first attempt to resolve the matter through mediation
as provided in Section 14.8 hereof.

ARTICLE 10 TRANSFERS, WITHDRAWALS
10.1. Transfers.
10 .l.l.Restriction. Except as expressly provided below, a Member shall not
make any direct or indirect Transfer of all or any portion of its Interest; provided, however,
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a Member may Transfer rights to Profits, Losses or distributions to a Transferee who does not
become a substituted Member of the Company.
10.1.2.Requirements for Transferee Becoming a Substituted Member. No
Person shall become a substituted Member in the Company, unl~ss the following conditions
precedent are satisfied: (a) the other Member(s), in their sole discretion, shall have consented
in writing to the Transferee becoming a Member; (b). the Transferee shall have assumed any
and all of the obligations under this Agreement with respect to the Interest to which the
Transfer relates; (c) all reasonable expenses required in connection with the Transfer shall
have been paid by or for the account of the Transferee; and (d) all agreements, articles,
. minl,ltes, written consent.s and all other necessary documents and instruments shall have been
executed and filed and all other acts shall have been performed which the Managing
Committee deems necessary to make the Transferee a substitute Member of the Company and
to preserve the status of the Company as a limited liability company.
10.2. Termination. A Member's membership in the Company shall continue until
it is terminated as follows:

10.2.l.upon the Member's withdrawal, effectuated by providing the other
Member(s) with ninety (90) days prior written notice;

10.2.2.upon the Member's bankruptcy;
I 0.2.3.upon the Member's dissolution;

10.2.4.Diversified Care's membership interest in the Company shall terminate
·
upon the sale of a controlling interest in Saint Alphonsus to a non-50 l(c)(3) entity.
10.2.5.1CR's membership interest in the Company shall terminate upon the sale
of all or substantially all ofiCR's assets, or in the event that during any twelve (12) month
period more than fifty percent (50%) of the individual owners ofiCR sell their interest in ICR
or otherwise terminate their affiliation with ICR;
10.2.6.Diversified Care's membership interest in the Company shall terminate
upon thirty (30) days notice by ICR, in the event Saint Alphonsus does not offer to extend the
Professional Services Agreement between Gem State Radiology, LLP and Saint Alphonsus
dated Jut~ l. d()O I
, in which Gem State Radiology, LLP is granted the
exclusive rig to' provide professional Medical Imaging Services at Saint Alphonsus as
provided in Section 7.1 ofthe Professional Services Agreement. ICR must exercise this right
within ninety (90) days of the termination the Professional Services Agreement.
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10 .2. 7. If Saint Alphonsus offers to extend the Professional Services Agreement
as provided in Section 10.2.6 and Gem State Radiology, LLP does not agree to extend the
Professional Services Agreement, ICR's membership in the Company shall terminate upon
thirty (30) days notice by Diversified Care. Diversified Care must exercise this.right within
ninety (90) days of the termination of the Professional Services Agreement.
I 0.2.8.a Member's membership interest in the Company shall terminate upon
that Member's breach of a material term of the Operating Agreement, of which breach the
breaching Member has been notified in writing by the non-breaching Member, and the
breaching Member has had ninety (90) days to correct the breach and has failed to do so; or
10.2.9.in the event legislation or administrative interpretation of such
legislation renders continued participation in the Company by either party illegal or
significantly jeopardizes the nonprofit or tax exempt status of Saint Alphonsus and pursuant
to Section 11.2 the parties have in good faith failed to negotiate changes to this Agreement
necessary to bring the Company into compliance with all applicable state and/or federal laws,
then Diversified Care's membership interest shall terminate at the election of the party whose
continued participation would be adversely affected, , which election shall be made within
ninety (90) days of which such negotiations fail.
10.2.10.
Notwithstanding Section 10.2.3 and 10.2.5, ifiCR or an Affiliate
ofiCR combines or merges an Affiliate, such combination or merger will not trigger Sections
10.2.3 and/or 10.2.5.
10.3. Purchase of Withdrawing Member's Membership Interest. In the event the
termination of a Member's membership interest under Section 10.2, the remaining Members
shall have the following rights:
10.3 .Lin the event the termination of a Members' interest in the Company is
made pursuant to Sections 10.2.1 through 10.2.3, the remaining Member (or Members) may
continue the business of the Company by providing notice to the terminating Member of such
intent within ninety (90) days of discovery of such termination or notice of intent to withdraw,
otherwise the Company shall be dissolved as provided in Article 11 of this Agreement. If the
remaining Member (or Members) elects to continue the business of the Company, such
continuing Member (or Members) shall pay the terminated Member an amount equal to the
lesser of the fair market value of such Member's membership interest in the Company (as
agreed upon by the Members or as determined by an appraiser mutually selected by the parties
hereto) or its Capital Account, as of the date oftermination. Such amount shall be paid by the
remaining Member (or Members) over a three (3) year period. Such payments shall be
amortized over the three (3) year period as ofthe date the remaining Member (or Members)
gives notice of its intent to continue the business ofthe Company with the first payment on
such date and annually thereafter. The rate of interest shall be fixed at the "prime rate" plus
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one as such "prime rate" is publicly announced by the Wall Street Journal on the date of the
first payment. The terminated Member also agrees to cooperate with the other Member (or
Members) in taking the necessary steps to restructure the Company to conform with law;
provided, however, that such cooperation will not require any additional expenditures by the
tenninated Member. Such cooperation may include the creation of an interim management
agreement to facilitate the "transfer of the applicable provider numbers.
10.3.2.In the event the termination of the Member's interest in the Company is
made pursuant to Section 10.2.4 or 10.2.5, the remaining Member (or Members) shall pay to
the terminated Member an amount equal to the fair market value ofthe Company at the time
ofthe termination of such Member's interest multiplied by the Member's existing percentage
membership interest in the Company immediately prior to termination. The purchase price
shall be paid in cash.
I 0.3 .3 .In the event the termination of a Member's membership interest in the
Company is made pursuant to Sections 10.2.6 and 10.2.7, the remaining Member (or
Members) shall purchase the other Member's membership interest at a price equal to the fair
market value of the Company at the time of termination of the Professional Services
Agreement multiplied by the terminating Member's then percentage interest in the Company.
The purchase price shall be paid in cash.
I 0.3 .4 .In the event the termination of the Member's interest in the Company is
made pursuant to Section I0.2.8, the non-breaching Member (or Members) shall purchase the·
breaching Member's membership interest at a price equal to the fair market value of the
Company at the time of the breach multiplied by the terminating Member's then percentage
interest in the Company. The purchase price shall be amortized over three (3) years at a rate
of interest which shall be fixed at the then existing U.S. prime rate plus one (I) percentage
point.
10.3.5.In the event Diversified Care's membership interest in the Company is
terminated pursuant to Section 10.2.9, the remaining Member (or Members) shall purchase
Diversified Care's membership interest at a price equal to the fair market value of the
Company at the time of the termination multiplied by Diversified Care's then existing
percentage interest in the Company. The purchase price shall be paid in cash.

1.0.4. Transfer. If a Member purports to transfer its Interest in breach of Section I0.1
of this Agreement, that purported Transfer shall be void and of no effect.

ARTICLE 11 LIQUIDATION AND WINDING UP
11.1. Dissolution. The Company shall dissolve upon the earliest to occur of the
following events:
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11.1.1. the unanimous vote of the Members;
11.1.2.upon termination of a Member's membership interest, unless the
business ofthe Company is continued by the remaining Member as provided in Section 10.3;
11.1.3.the occurrence of any event which makes it unlawful for the business of
the Company to be carried on after the Members have complied with the provisions of Section
11.2 hereof;
11.1.4. the sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of the Company's
assets and properties and the collection of all notes received in connection with such sale or
other disposition;
11.1.5. the loss of any provider number or license after all appropriate appeals
and other actions have been taken which substantially restricts the Company's ability to
participate in a reimbursement or medical insurance program which is material to the overall
operations of the Company;
ll.l.6.a final determination after all reasonable rights of appeal have been
exhausted, finding or ruling (e.g., Revenue Ruling, General Counsel Memorandum, Private
Letter Ruling) by the Internal Revenue Service or any authoritative extension thereof that the
Company's operations cause the net earnings of any Member or Affiliate of a Member, which
is exempt from taxation under Section 501.(c)(3) of the Code, to inure to the benefit of a
private individual or entity, or that the formation or operation of the Company provides more
than an incidental private benefit to any individual.

11.2. Renegotiation in Lieu of Dissolution. In the event dissolution is triggered by
the occurrence of an event described in Section 11.1.6, prior to dissolution as provided for in
this Article 11, the Members shall negotiate in good faith for a period not to exceed one
hundred eighty (180) days the necessary amendments or revisions to this Agreement so that
an event of dissolution no longer exists; provided, however, if an agreement cannot be reached
which maintains the economic benefit to the Company and each Member as contemplated
hereby, then dissolution will be commenced in accordance with this Article 11.
11.3. Filing Upon Dissolution. As soon as possible following the dissolution of the
Company, the liquidating trustee of the Company shall execute and file a certificate of
dissolution with the Secretary of State of Idaho as required by Section 53-647 of the Act.
Upon the dissolution of the Company, the Company shall cease to carry on its business,
except insofar as may be necessary for the winding up of its business.
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11.4. Liquidation. Upon dissolution of the Company, the business and affairs of the
Company shall be wound up and liquidated as rapidly as business circumstances permit, the
Managing Committee shall act as the liquidating trustee, and the assets of the Company shall
be liquidated and the proceeds thereof shall be paid (to the extent permitted by applicable law)
in the following order:

_

.
11.4.l.First, to creditors, including Members that are creditors, in the order of
priority as required by applicable law;
11.4.2.Second, to a reserve for contingent liabilities that are not liquidated, but
will not be barred, to be distributed at the time and in the manner as the liquidating trustee
determines in its reasonable discretion;
11.4.3. Third, to Members, pro rata, in satisfaction of their Capital Accounts;
and
ll.4.4.Thereafter, to the Members as set forth in Section 5.2.
The Managing Committee shall accomplish such liquidation with the purpose of
maximizing the economic value to be provided to the Members of the Comp~any. If the
Managing Committee determines that an immediate sale of the Company's assets and
liquidation of the Company would cause undue losses to the Members, it may defer
liquidation of any assets, other than those assets necessary to satisfy current obligations, for
a reasonable time, or may distribute such assets in kind according to the order and priority set
forth in this section. Any asset distributed in kind shall be valued and treated as though the
assets were sold and the cash proceeds were distributed.
11.5. Reasonable Time for Winding Up. A reasonable time shall be allowed for the
orderly winding up of the business and affairs ofthe Company and the liquidation of its assets
pursuant to Section 11.4 in order to minimize any losses otheiWise related to that winding up.
11.6. Deficit Capital Account. Upon liquidation, each Member shall' look solely to
the assets of the Company for the return of that Member's Capital Contribution. No Member
shall be personally liable for a deficit Capital Account balance of that Member, it being
expressly understood that the distribution of liquidation proceeds shall be made solely from
existing Company assets.
ARTICLE 12 BOOKS, RECORDS, REPORTS AND ACCOUNTING
12.1. Records. The Managing Committee shall keep or cause to be kept at the
Principal Office of the Company the following: (a) a current list of the full name and last
known business, residence or mailing address of each Member; (b) a copy of the initial
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articles of organization and all amendments thereto; (c) copies of all written operating
agreements and all attachments to the agreements, including any prior written operating
agreements no longer in effect; (d) copies of any written and signed promises by Member to
make Capital Contributions to the Company; (e) copies of the Company's federal, state and
local income tax returns and reports, if any, with the three (3) most recent years; (f) copies of
any prepared financial statements of the Company for the three (3) most recent years; and (g)
minutes of every meeting of the Members as well as any written consents of Members or
actions taken by Members without a meeting. Any such records maintained by the Company
may be kept on or be in the form of any information storage device, provided that the records
so kept are convertible into legible written form within a reasonable period of time. The
foregoing records shall be kept off site at ICR's business office at 877 W. Main Street, Suite
603, Boise, Idaho.

12.2. Fiscal Year and Accounting. The Fiscal Year of the Company shall be
comprised of twelve (12) months, commencing on the 1st day of January and ending on or
about the thirty-first (31st) day of December of each year. All amounts computed for the
purposes ofthis Agreement and all applicable questions concerning the rights of Members
shall be determined using the accrual method of accounting. All decisions as to other
accounting matters, except as specifically provided to the contrary herein, shall be made by
the Managing Committee.
12.3. Annual Reports. As soon as practicable, but in no event later than three (3)
months after the close of each Fiscal Year, the Managing Committee shall cause to be
that Fiscal Year, reports containing such
furnished to the Members, as of the last day
financial statements of the Company for the Fiscal Year, presented in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles, including a balance sheet, a statement of income,
a statement of Members' equity and a statement of changes in financial position, which
statements shall be reviewed at the expense of the Company by an independent public
accountant selected by the Managing Committee. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any
Member can request audited financial statements at the expense of the Company if an audited
financial statement has not been prepared for the Company within the three (3) prior years.
Otherwise, the cost of the audited financial statement will be borne by the Member requesting
the audit. · ·.

of

12.4. Interim Reports. The Managing Committee shall provide the Members with
interim written reports in such detail as the Members may reasonably require setting out the
progress and status ofthe business of the Company. In addition, as soon as practicable, but
in no event later than one (1) month after the close of each calendar quarter, the Managing
Committee shall cause to be furnished to the Members as of the last day of that calendar
quarter reports containing such financial statements of the Company for that calendar quarter,
including balance sheet and statement of income.
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12.5. Preparation of Tax Returns. The Managing Committee shall arrange for the
preparation and timely filing of all returns of Company income, gains, deductions, losses and
other items necessary for federal and state income tax purposes and shall cause to be furnished
to the Members the tax information reasonably required for federal and state income tax
reporting purposes. The classification, realization and recognition of income, gain, losses and
deductions and other items, for federal income tax purposes, shall be based on that method
of accounting as the Managing Committee shall determine in its reasonable discretion.
12.6. Tax Elections. The Managing Committee, in its reasonable discretion, may
determine and in the best interests of all Members whether to make any available elections
pursuant to the Code.
12. 7. Tax Controversies. Subject to the provisions hereof, Diversified Care and ICR
shall be Co-Tax Matters Members, and is authorized and required to represent the Company
in connection with all examinations of the Company's affairs by tax authorities, including
resulting administrative and judicial proceedings, and to expend Company funds for
professional services and costs associated therewith as approved by the Members. The
Members agree to cooperate with the Tax Matters Members and to do or refrain from doing
any or all things reasonably required by the Tax Matters Members to conduct those
proceedings. The Tax Matters Members agree to promptly notify the Members upon the
receipt of any correspondence fTom any federal, state or local tax authorities relating to the
examination of the Company's affairs. The Tax Matters Members shall not enter into a
financial arrangement, agreement, or settlement of any kind related to the Company's tax
matters without the Managing Committee's express authorization unless such arrangement or
agreement is expressly budgeted for the Management Committee (e.g., engagement of an
accounting firm to prepare the Company's tax filings).
12.8 Tax Controversies. Except as provided in Section 13.4, ongoing expenses of
the Company shall be allocated between the MRJ and non-MRI operations ofthe Company
based upon the current cost accounting methodology utilized by the Company. Diversified
Care may periodically review said allocation.

ARTICLE 13 OTHER AGREEMENTS
Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, the party shall also enter into the
agreements set forth below.
13.1. Administrative Services. The Company may purchase certain administrative
services necessary to the operation of the Center, including, without limitation, cleaning,
linen, medical record retention, accounting and billing, maintenance and repair, and hazardous
waste disposal, from Diversified Care or an Affiliate thereof attached hereto as Exhibit 13 .1.
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13.2. Information Services. The Company shall purchase its information system
support from Diversified Care or an affiliate of Diversified Care in order to ensure the
integrity and compatibility ofthe Center's information system with the information systems
utilized by Saint Alphonsus. The agreement shall be in substantially the form attached hereto
as Exhibit 13 .2.
13.3. Medical Director/Administrative Services. The Company shall enter into a
medical director agreement with ICR for the provision of medical director services to the
Company. An ICR Member will serve as Medical Director of the Company. The fee paid to
ICR for services rendered by the Medical Director shall equal $60,000 per year, payable
monthly. The agreement shall be substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit 13.3. In
addition, the Company shall reimburse Gem State Radiology, LLP for 50% of Gem State
Radiology, LLP's administrative office expense, including, but not limited to wages and
benefits paid to the staff accountant, customer service representative, administrative assistant,
executive director, and expense of office rent, supplies, and equipment. The amount
reimbursed by the Company shall be allocated equally between the MRI and non-MRI
components of the operation.
13.4. Lease of Space. The Company has entered into a lease agreement with ICR
with respect to the lease of the non-MR.l portion of the building and land for the operation of
the Center. The monthly rent is $22,269.35, with a term of twenty (20) years, with three (3)
five-year renewal options. A CPI adjustment will begin in year 10 and every five (5) years
thereafter. ICR will have the option to terminate the lease ifiCR is no longer a Member of
the Company. The effective date ofthe lease is August 15, 1999. Common area and triple
net expenses are allocated eighty-two percent (82%) to the lease, and eighteen percent (18%)
to the MRI portion. Utilities are prorated based upon the percentage use of the premises based
upon the MRI and non-MR1 patient volume. The lease is attached hereto as Exhibit 13.4.
ARTICLE 14 MISCELLANEOUS
14.1. Governing Laws. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho.
14.2. Notices. Notices may be delivered either by hand or by mail. Any notice or
document required or permitted hereunder to a Member shall be in writing and shall be
deemed to be given on the date received by the Member; provided, however, that all notices
and documents mailed to a Member in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, certified mail,
return receipt requested, addressed to the Member at its respective address as shown in the
records of the Company, shall be deemed to have been received five (5) days after mailing.
The address of each of the Members shall for all purposes be as set forth on the signature page
hereto, unless otherwise changed by the applicable Member by notice to the other as provided
herein.
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14.3. Severability. If any provision of this Agreement shall be conclusively
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable to any extent,
the remainder of this Agreement shall not be affected thereby.
14.4. Binding Effect. Except as otherwise provided herein, this Agreement shall
inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the Members and their respective successors and,
where permitted, assigns.
14.5. Titles and Captions. All article, section and paragraph titles and captions
contained in this Agreement are for convenience only and are not a part of the context hereof.
14.6. Pronouns and Plurals. All pronouns and any variations thereof are deemed
to refer to the masculine, feminine, neuter, singular or plural as the identity of the appropriate
Person(s) may require.
14.7. No Third Party Rights. This Agreement is intended to create enforceable
rights between the parties hereto only, and creates no rights in:, or obligations to, any other
Persons whatsoever.
14.8. Mediation. Prior to resorting to litigation or other legal recourse concerning a
dispute or disagreement arising hereunder or otherwise between the Members in any way
concerning the Company or its operations, the parties shall first in good faith attempt to settle
the matter without resort to litigation. Upon the request of either Member, in writing, the
dispute shall be submitted to mediation for resolution, with a mediator to be chosen by
agreement of the parties. Within thirty (30) days of the part of the party's written request for
mediation, mediation shall be scheduled for a mutually agreeable date in Boise, Ada County,
Idaho. Each party shall bear its own attorneys' fees for the mediation and shall split equally
any other costs and expenses of the mediation in accordance with their ownership percentage
in the Company. The Members shall work together in good faith to agree upon the selection
of a mediator within thirty (30 days and to have the matter mediated within sixty (60) days
of the selection of the mediator. If mediation does not resolve the dispute, then either party
may go forward with litigation.
14.9. Time is of the Essence. Time is of the essence in the performance of each and
every obligation herein imposed .

. _ l4._1Q. }?inders. The parties hereto each represent and warrant that they have not
employed or utilized the services of any broker, finder or agent in connection with this
Agreement, incurred any liability to any broker, finder or agent, and that there are no claims
for any brokerage fees, finder's fees or commissions in connection with the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement.
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14.11. Further Assurances. The parties hereto shall execute all further instruments
and perform all acts which are or may become necessary to effectuate and to carry on the
business contemplated by this Agreement.
14.12. Estoppel Certificates. The Members hereby agree that, at the request of any
Member, they will each execute and deliver an estoppel certificate stating that this Agreement
is in full force and effect and that to the best of such Member's knowledge and belief there are
no defaults by any Member (or that certain defaults exist), as the case may be, under this
Agreement.
14.13. Schedules Included in Exhibits; Incorporation by Reference. Any reference
to an Exhibit to this Agreement contained herein shall be deemed to include any Schedules
to such Exhibit. Each of the Exhibits referred to in this Agreement, and each Schedule to such
Exhibits, is hereby incorporated by reference in this Agreement as if such Schedules and
Exhibits were set out in full in the text of this Agreement.
14.14. Amendments. This Agreement may not be amended except by unanimous
written agreement of all of the Members.
14.15. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts.
14.16. Creditors. None of the provisions of this Agreement shall be for the benefit
of or enforceable by any creditors of the Company.
[End ofText]
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed th1s Agreement effective as of
the day and year first above written.
MEMBERS:

Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
an Idaho limited liability partnership

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care,
Inc., an Idaho nonprofit corporation

By:

By:

N·

By:

By:

By:

By:

By:

By:

OPERATING AGREEMENT- 35

doc 33235

IMI/0046

000155

114-040

By:

By:

By:

By:
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EXHIBIT 4.1
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Member

Capital
Contribution

50%

Diversified Care
Cash

Contribution
Percentage

$546,347

ICR

50%
Cash

$546,347
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EXHIBIT 7.3.1
CONSENT OF PHYSICIAN TO TERMS OF OEPRATING AGREEMENT
The undersigned, a physician owner and/or employee oflmaging Center Radiologists,
LLP, hereby acknowledges and agrees that such person has received a substantial benefit as
a consequence ofiCR's being a member of the Company. In order to protect the goodwill and
business and professional relationships of the Company and Members, the undersigned
acknowledges that the undersigned has reviewed Section 7 .3.1 of the Operating Agreement
and agrees to be individually bound by such section paragraph and further agrees that ~he
undersigned will not directly or indirectly, build, establish, acquire in whole or in part, directly
or indirectly, any new medical imaging service within Ada or Canyon County except as
permitted or allowed pursuant to section 7.3 .1 The undersigned authorizes this Signature
Page to be attached to the Operating Agreement.
Date:

7/1~/
}

;

Printed Name of Pliysician Owner

Signature of Physician Owner
Address of Physician Owner
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EXHIBIT 7.3.1
CONSENT OF PHYSICIAN TO TERMS OF OEPRATING AGREEMENT
The undersigned, a physician owner and/or employee oflmaging Center Radiologists,
LLP, hereby acknowledges and agrees that such person has received a substantial benefit as
a consequence ofiCR's being a member of the Company. In order to protect the goodwill and
business and professional relationships of the Company and Members, the undersigned
acknowledges that the undersigned has reviewed Section 7.3 .1 of the Operating Agreement
and agrees to be individually bound by such section paragraph and further agrees that ~e
undersigned will not directly or indirectly, build, establish, acquire in whole or in part, directly
or indirectly, any new medical imaging service within Ada or Canyon County except as
permitted or allowed pursuant to section 7.3.1 The undersigned authorizes this Signature
Page to be attached to the Operating Agreement.
Date:

OG

/2-7/~(

~I

Address ofPhysician Owner
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EXHIBIT 7.3.1
CONSENT OF PHYSICIAN TO TERMS OF OEPRATING AGREEMENT
The undersigned, a physician owner and/or employee of Imaging Center Radiologists,
LLP, hereby acknowledges and agrees that such person has received a substantial benefit as
a consequence ofiCR's being a member ofthe Company. In order to protect the goodwill and
business and professional relationships of the Company and Members, the undersigned
acknowledges that the undersigned has reviewed Section 7.3.1 ofthe Operating Agreement
and agrees to be individually bound by such section paragraph and further agrees that ~e
undersigned will not directly or indirectly, build, establish, acquire in whole or in part, directly
or indirectly, any new medical imaging service within Ada or Canyon County except as
permitted or allowed pursuant to section 7.3 .1 The undersigned authorizes this Signature
Page to be attached to the Operating Agreement.
Date:

]

/1/

I

D{

Printed Name of Physician Owner

Signature of Physician Owner
Address of Physician Owner
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EXHIBIT 7.3.1
CONSENT OF PHYSICIAN TO TERMS OF OEPRATING AGREEMENT
The undersigned, a physician owner and/or employee oflmaging Center Radiologists,
LLP, hereby acknowledges and agrees that such person has received a substantial benefit as
a consequence ofiCR's being a member of the Company. In order to protect the goodwill and
business and professional relationships of the Company and Members, the undersigned
acknowledges that the undersigned has reviewed Section 7.3 .1 of the Operating Agreement
and agrees to be individually bound by such section paragraph and further agrees that ~he
undersigned will not directly or indirectly, build, establish, acquire in whole or in part, directly
or indirectly, any new medical imaging service within Ada or Canyon County except as
permitted or allowed pursuant to section 7.3.1 The undersigned authorizes this Signature
Page to be attached to the Operating Agreement.
Date:

&-- '-:2 ~~v l
Printed Name ofPhysician Owner

Address of Physician Owner
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EXHIBIT 7.3.1
CONSENT OF PHYSICIAN TO TERMS OF OEPRATING AGREEMENT
The undersigned, a physician owner and/or employee oflmaging Center Radiologists,
LLP, hereby acknowledges and agrees that such person has received a substantial benefit as
a consequence ofiCR's being a member of the Company. In order to protect the goodwill and
business and professional relationships of the Company and Members, the undersigned
acknowledges that the undersigned has reviewed Section 7.3.1 ofthe Operating Agreement
and agrees to be individually bound by such section paragraph and further agrees that ~he
undersigned will not directly or indirectly, build, establish, acquire in whole orin part, directly
or indirectly, any new medical imaging service within Ada or Canyon County except as
permitted or allowed pursuant to section 7.3.1 The undersigned authorizes this Signature
Page to be attached to the Operating Agreement.
Date:
Printed ·'ameofPh)TSiCia11 Owner

Signature ofPhysician Owner
Address of Physician Owner
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EXHIBIT 7.3.1
CONSENT OF PHYSICIAN TO TERMS OF OEPRATING AGREEMENT
.
The undersigned, a physician owner and/or employee oflmaging Center Radiologists,
LLP, hereby acknowledges and agrees that such person has received a substantial benefit as
a consequence ofiCR's being a member of the Company. In order.to protect the goodwill and
business and professional relationships of the Company and Members, the undersigned
acknowledges that the undersigned has reviewed Section 7.3 .1 of the Operating Agreement '
and agrees to be individually bound by such section paragraph and further agrees that ~e
undersigned will not directly or indirectly, build, establish, acquire in whole or in part, directly
or indirectly, any new medical imaging service within Ada or Canyon County except as
permitted or allowed pursuant to section 7.3.1 The undersigned authorizes this Signature
Page to be attached to the Operating Agreement.
Date:

'1

/.1 ItJ/

Printed Name of Physician Owner

Address of Physician Owner
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EXHIBIT 7.3.1
CONSENT OF PHYSICIAN TO TERMS OF OEPRATING AGREEMENT
The undersigned, a physician owner and/or employee oflmaging Center Radiologists,
LLP, hereby acknowledges and agrees that such person has received a substantial benefit as
a consequence ofiCR's being a member of the Company. In order to protect the goodwill and
business and professional relationships of the Company and Members, the undersigned
acknowledges that the undersigned has reviewed Section 7.3 .1 of the Operating Agreement
and agrees to be individually bound.by such section paragraph and further agrees that ~e
undersigned will not directly or indirectly, build, establish, acquire in whole or in part, directly
or indirectly, any new medical imaging service within Ada or Canyon County except as
permitted or allowed pursuant to section 7.3 .1 The undersigned authorizes this Signature
Page to be atta~hed to the Operating Agreement.
Date:

zi/Z---1--?/
I
/
1-(.'/L'.L./'.~ / . /Jt/ffi-'(~1~4

y; / t··t.:_~ . .

Printed Name ofPhysician Owner

Address of Physician Owner
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EXHIBIT 7.3.1
CONSENT OF PHYSICIAN TO TERMS OF OEPRATING AGREEMENT
The undersigned, a physician owner and/or emp.Ioyee oflmaging Center Radiologists,
LLP, hereby acknowledges and agrees that such person has received a substantial benefit as
a consequence ofiCR's being a member of the Company. In order to protect the goodwill and
business and professional relationships of the Company and Members, the undersigned
acknowledges that the undersigned has reviewed Section 7.3.1 of the Operating Agreement
and agrees to be individually bound by such section paragraph and further agrees that ~he
undersigned will not directly .or .indirectly, build, establish, acquire in whole or in part, directly
or indirectly, any new medical imaging service within Ada or Canyon County except as·
pennitted or allowed pursuant to section 7.3 .1 The undersigned authorizes this Signature
Page to be attached to the Operating Agreement.
Date:

4(l?S\ o<
Printed Name of Physician Owner

~c--Q_,~~Signature of Physician Owner

Address ofPhysician Owner
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EXHIBIT 7.3.1
CONSENT OF PHYSICIAN TO TERMS OF OEPRATING AGREEMENT
The undersigned, a physician owner and/or employee oflmaging Center Radiologists,
LLP, hereby acknowledges and agrees that such person has received a substantial benefit as
a consequence ofiCR's being a member of the Company. In order to protect the goodwill and
business and professional relationships of the Company and Members, the undersigned
acknowledges that the undersigned has reviewed Section 7.3 .1 of the Operating Agreement
and agrees to be individually bound by such section paragraph and further agrees that ~he
undersigned will not directly or indirectly, build, establish, acquire in whole or in part, directly
or indirectly, any new medical imaging service within Ada or Canyon County except as
permitted or allowed pursuant to section 7.3 .I The undersigned authorizes this Signature
Page to be attached to the Operating Agreement.
Date:

~~~

Printed 7me of Physiciap... Owner

·- l

,?~_

Address of Physician Owner

11~ tl)~C¥W.iY1
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EXHIBIT 7.3.1
CONSENT OF PHYSICIAN TO TERMS OF OEPRATING AGREEMENT
The undersigned, a physician owner and/or employee of Imaging Center Radiologists,
LLP, hereby acknowledges and agrees that such person has received a substantial benefit as
a consequence ofiCR's being a member of the Company. In order to protect the goodwill and
business and professional relationships of the Company and Members, the undersigned
acknowledges that the undersigned has reviewed Section 7.3. 1 of the Operating Agreement
and agrees to be individually bound by such section paragraph and further agrees that the
undersigned will not direc~ly or indirectly, build, establish, acquire in whole or in part, directly
or indirectly, any new medical imaging service within Ada or Canyon County except as
permitted or allowed pursuant to section 7.3.1 The undersigned authorizes this Signature
Page to be attached to the Operating Agreement.
Date:

eo[ vtLo1
Pnnted Name ofPhysictan Owner

Address of Physician Owner
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EXHIBIT 7.3.1
CONSENT OF PHYSICIAN TO TERMS OF OEPRATING AGREEMENT
The undersigned, a physician owner and/or employee oflmaging Center Radiologists,
LLP, hereby acknowledges and agrees that such person has received a substantial benefit as
a consequence ofiCR's being a member ofthe Company. In order to protect the goodwill and
business and professional relationships of the Company and Members, the undersigned
acknowledges that the undersigned has reviewed Section 7.3.1 ofthe Operating Agreement
and agrees to be individually bound by such section paragraph and further agrees that ~e
undersigned will not directly or indirectly, build, establish, acquire in whole or in part, directly
or indirectly, any new medical imaging service within Ada or Canyon County except as
permitted or allowed pursuant to section 7.3 .1 The undersigned authorizes this Signature
Page to be attached to the Operating Agreement.
Date:

7~
I

Printed Name of Phys:fian Owner

Address of Physician Owner
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EXHIBIT 7.7
MEMBERSHIP AGREEMENT FOR _ _ __
The undersigned, desiring to become a Member in
, an Idaho limited
liability company (the "Company"), and further desiring to· enter into the Operating
Agreement between the Company and all of its Members, dated as of _ _ _ _ _ __
199_ (the "Operating Agreement"), hereby joins in and executes the Operating Agreement,
agrees to all of the terms and conditions of the Operating Agreement and agrees to be bound
thereby. The undersigned authorizes this Signature Page to be attached to the Operating
Agreement.

Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Capital Contribution:
Printed Name of Member
$___________________

Signature ofMember
Contribution Percentage:
Address ofMember:
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EXHIBIT 13.2
INFORMATION SERVICES AGREEMENT

[·TO BE AGREED UPON AND A ITACHED LATER ]
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Exhibit 13.2
IT Service Agreement

Scope and Purpose.
Saint Alphonsus and the Company mutually operate and benefit from an Information
Technology Picture Archive Communic;ation System relationship. This relationship will
be hereto referred to as "ITPACS". All costs associated with ITPACS are actual vendor
charges or calculated using industry-standard rates.
This document details and defines Information Technology (IT) service provision for the
Company's sites, including both Basic Service and ITP ACS related services.
For Basic Service: the agreement defines and describes appropriate service levels;
covered services; communication; notification processes; calculation of costs; and agreed
upon installation/system security processes associated with the Saint Alphonsus support
of the computer system network, desktop computers, printers and other noted hardware
and software at the Company's locations. It also identifies key staff and management as
well as decision making/authorization channels for purchases, analysis requests and
installation of new equipment.
The Company's ITPACS relationship provides business and clinical system support for
applications including Patient Scheduling, Picture Archive Communication System
(P ACS), Charge Capture and electronic document and image review for referring
physicians and others via Saint Alphonsus hosted and managed software, and includes
technical support staff for both the core systems and for participating referring physician
offices and encourage/support use of electronic review mechanisms.
The Agreement is reviewed, updated and signed annually or as required by regulatory or
other changes.

Definition of Terms
New Capital (Shared)- this is defined as newly purchased computer hardware or
software that is determined to have equal or shared benefit to all members involved in the
ITP ACS. Examples include DR software, fileservers, storage mechanisms, and other
equipment integral to the proper operation of the ITP ACS system.
New Capital (Non-shared)- this is defined as newly purchased computer hardware or
software that is determined to have benefit mainly for one member in the ITP ACS.
Examples include computer workstations, printers, image capture devices, and other
equipment installed at a location that is not integral to the proper operation of the
ITP ACS system.
Installation - this is defined as the labor and other Saint Alphonsus IT resources required
to properly configure and install new capital, either shared or non-shared.
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DR Maintenance Fees- this is defined as the amount DR Systems charges annually for
support and maintenance of all software and hardware acquired through them.
Saint Alphonsus Basic IT Support- this is a percentage-based support agreement that
provides basic Help Desk and other support services for the Company's local and widearea data and voice network infrastructure, computer workstations, printers, and related
office-automation and email software. This support does not include the software and
systems covered under ITP ACS ..
ITPACS Support- this is defined as the additional IT labor necessary to support
ITPACS, including the various technical staff roles detailed in the Cost Summary. These
staff members perform system maintenance, upgrade and problem resolution for
ITPACS.
Fiber Backbone Network Connectivity - this is defined as the recurring costs from the
service provider for fiber optic data network connectivity to the various locations
throughout the ITPACS.
Physician Office Network Connectivity- this is defined as the recurring costs from the
service provider for wireless data network connectivity installed in various physician
offices to enable broadband access to the ITPACS.
Utilization Rate -this is defined as the percentage of exams stored on the ITP ACS for
each member, using a rolling three-month average. The percentage, calculated at the end
of each month, is determined by dividing the total number of exams stored on the system
for the month from each member location by the total number of exams stored for the
month. The utilization rate is then calculated by averaging the last three monthly
percentages for each member. The utilization rate changes from month to month and is
used to allocate the costs of supporting and maintaining the ITP ACS amongst the
members.

DR Utilization Report- this is defined as the monthly report showing the on-going
utilization rate for each member. This report is distributed to all members that share in
the ITPACS.

Cost Allocation Summary
The costs of supporting and maintaining the ITPACS, including new shared capital
expenditures, are allocated to each member based on the utilization rate of each member
at the time of the expenditure as defined below:

utilization rate
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Installation of New Capital (Non-shared)
DR Maintenance Fees
Saint Alphonsus Basic IT Support
- network, workstations, printers, telecom

ITP ACS System Support
- .8 FTE Software Engineer
- 2.5 FTE Application Specialist
- .3 FTE System Engineer
- .2 FTE Network Engineer
- .2 FTE Project Manager
Mileage/Travel Expenses
Fiber Backbone Network Connectivity
Physician Office Network Connectivity

Total cost ofNew Capital* 10%
Total annual software support cost per DR
Systems invoice * current utilization rate
annually
Total initial capital cost * 1

q%

Note: amount will be adjusted annually for ·
changes in inventory at each site
Total cost of ITPACS support staff* current
utilization rate
Note: Staff costs are calculated using
current hourly rates multiplied by % of time
spent on ITPACS support. These hourly
rates will change over time.
Charged as incurred on behalf of the
Company at the published IRS rate.
Total cost* 100% to benefitting member
Total cost *current utilization rate

Saint Alphonsus will be responsible for tracking and calculating all costs related to the
support and maintenance of ITP ACS. Saint Alphonsus will invoice each member
annually (or at agreed upon intervals) for the total amount of that member's cost
allocation based on the formulas outlined above.

Basic Service Terms and Conditions
The Company purchases from Saint Alphonsus IT Basic Service and Support. The
services provided are the Information Technology (IT) Help Desk support of desktop
computers to include standard software, printers, network accounts, email accounts and
network equipment support. This level of support provides maintenance of the
computers, printers and network equipment installed at the site. Maintenance includes:
small part replacement; no-cost standard software and operating system upgrades;
return/replacement of any waranteed equipment that fails; supported server operating
system maintenance; software upgrades as undertaken by Saint Alphonsus for networkwide use, resolution of problems and training on new releases of software (either
classroom or via electronic media as appropriate). Maintenance does not include:
upgrades of hardware; upgrades of software except as adopted by Saint Alphonsus IT as a
new standard; new/additional software; repair of equipment damaged through neglect or
environmental conditions; repair of equipment not recommended for a given use because
of capacity or functionality limitations; replacement of consumable printer parts; or major
repairs. The Company will be charged actual mileage and travel expenses (at the
published IRS rate) incurred by technicians who travel to Company sites in support of the
Basic Service agreement.
Additionally, Basic Service includes delivery of monthly (12 times per year) service
usage reports to the Company's Operating Committee. These reports summarize Help
Desk and other service utilization; describe unplanned downtime events; provide high-
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impact problem summaries and provide request status and are deE vered and reviewed
with site management by a Saint Alphonsus IT management team member.
Basic Service is calculated as 10% of the initial capital cost of all equipment and software
on the Saint Alphonsus network at the supported site. The Company's inventory as of
June 16, 2003 is attached.
Conditions associated with Basic Service:
Help Desk Service
All IT service provision is coordinated through the Saint Alphonsus IT Help Desk. This
group provides 7 X 24 X 365 service, problem resolution and notification. to all Saint
Alphonsus Network customers. Whenever possible, problems and requests are resolved,
or managed through resolution, by the staff member who takes the initial request or
report of a problem. Help Desk requests may be made via telephone at (208) 367-3100
or via Saint Alphonsus email userid "Help Desk" or from the internet
"helpdesk@sarrnc.org".

1.

2.
Notification
Saint Alphonsus strives to have secure and highly available systems and networks for the
use of our customers. Planned, scheduled downtime and maintenance is coordinated
through contact via email to all computer network users and individual site contact via
telephone as appropriate to the impact on the site's operations.
Unscheduled downtime or failures, when they occur, are communicated to the
Company's representatives via email (if appropriate), pager and the IT Help Desk status
greeting, which is updated within 5 minutes of any system or network failure. In
addition, the site contact list will be utilized for emergent high-impact notifications.

3.

Contacts

For purposes of communication and notification as well as high-quality service provision, Saint
Alphonsus IT and the Company agree to provide one another appropriate contact information for
service provision, site management, facilities management, billing information, etc.
The initial point of contact is the Help Desk. Service issues or urgent matters should be escalated
as follows:
208-367-7225
1. Help Desk Specialist
208-367-6683
2. Help Desk Manager
208-367-3779
3. Director Technical Services

4.

System and User Security and Authentication

All users of computers on the Saint Alphonsus network must authenticate to the network using
authentication credentials consisting of a unique security login and password (userid and
password). Authentication credentials are provided to each user after a completed Login Request
form and signed Saint Alphonsus Confidentiality Agreement is received. In signing the
agreement, users agree to honor the conditions of the agreement. Saint Alphonsus Confidentiality
agreements are reviewed and signed annually. Login request forms and confidentiality
agreements can be obtained by contacting the Saint Alphonsus Help Desk.
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ITPACS Terms and Conditions
An ITPACS committee is formed that consists of representatives of Saint Alphonsus IT
management, Saint Alphonsus Radiology Department management, the Company's
management and ICR physicians and management. This committee meets frequently to
make recommendations and set priorities and timelines related to ITPACS system
upgrades, adoption and purchase of software modules, development of new tools,
adoption of new processes impacing IT systems and other such matters. Minutes of the
ITP ACS committee are published and distributed to all committee members after each
meeting.

1.

Vendor Contract and Maintenan~e

.

In support of the ITP ACS relationship, the contracts .and service agreements with
DR Systems, the primary system used by the ITP ACS members, will be
consolidated into one agreement administered by Saint Alphonsus. Costs will be
allocated as described above in the "Cost Allocation Summary" section.
.

2.

.

.

.

Referring Physician and other ITPACS Customer Support
ITPACS will staff and support a field-based customer service team to ensure
utilization ofthe ITPACS technology is optimized and service to customers is
timely. Costs of this support will be allocated as described above in "Cost
Allocation Summary" section.

3.

Adoption of New Processes
ITPACS agrees to stand.ardize work processes affecting the capture and
distribution of images and other data that impacts ITP ACS members. Changes to
these processes will be managed through the ITP ACS committee.

4.

Purchase/Adoption of new Software/Systems
ITP ACS agrees to review at the ITP ACS Committee meeting the potential
purchase or adoption of new software, systems or technology that may impact
other members. Research and analysis may be assigned to staff members and led
by ITP ACS Committee members. Recommendations will be made by the
committee to senior leadership and governance.

5.

Addition of Company Sites
ITP ACS members agree to undertake new sites in partnership. PlaiUling for
technology adoption, system capacity and network LANIWAN connectivity will
be undertaken by the ITP ACS team or a subgroup.

Attachments:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Sample Equipment and Inventory Listing
Sample IMI Operating Committee Information Technology Report
Sample ITPACS Utilization Report
Sample Invoice
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EXHIBIT 13.3
MEDICAL DIRECTOR AGREEMENT

[TO BE AGREED UPON AND ATTACHED LATER ]
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MEDICAL DIRECTOR AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT is made effective the Lday of July 2001, by and between
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company (the
"Company") and IMAGING CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, L.L.P., an Idaho limited liability
partnership ('!lCR").
RECITALS
A
Company currently owns and operates a freestanding Independent Diagnostic
Testing Facility for medical imaging with locations in Ada County, Idaho ("Center"). The Center is
in need of a Medical Director.

B.
ICR is an Idaho limited liability partnership consisting entirely of physicians duly
licensed to practice medicine in the state of Idaho, and who are qualified to provide high quality
medical imaging services and are either board certified or board eligible in radiology.
C.
The Company desires to obtain the services of a Medical Director for the Center and
ICR is desirous of providing such services.
D.
The parties desire to enter into this agreement to identify the duties of the Medical
Director and to identify the terms upon which ICR will agree to serve as Medical Director. It is
intended that this agreement provide a full statement of the parties' agreement concerning the
provision of Medical Director Services.
AGREEMENT
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants set forth herein, ICR agrees
to perform the duties of the Medical Director on the terms described as follows:
l.

Medical Director Duties and Responsibilities.

1.1
Appoint Lead Medical Director. ICR agrees to appoint one of its
physicians, who from time-to-tim~ will serve as the lead Medical Director. The duties of
Medical Director herein described wifl be ·performed by different physician members of ICR;
however, the single individual physician appointed as the lead Medical Director shaH be
responsible for assuring that all duties of Medical Director are performed, and that a responsible
director is appropriately identified and available.
1.2
Policies and Procedures Development. The Medical Director shall have
the overall responsibility for assuring proper medical policies and procedures are developed,
implemented and established within the Center and that such policies and procedures are
committed to writing and that such policies and procedures are reviewed on at least an annual
basis in cooperation with the Management Committee of the Center and other appropriate
personnel of the facility.

MEDICAL DIRECTOR AGREEMENT- I
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Quality Assurance.

1.3.1 Medical Director shall work cooperatively with the Center staff
and with the managers of the Center and the other physicians and providers who may be
involved in or impact patient care to identify methods for enhancing the quality and efficiency
with which patient care is provided in the Center.
1.3.2 Medical Director shall assist Center staff in ·the development,
implementation, evaluation, and follow-up of criteria for quality improvement processes related
to the delivery of medical imaging services.
1.3.3 Medical Director shall be available for comment and shall assist in
resolving all conflicts related to patient care in the Center.
1.3.4 Medical Director shail assure adequate monitoring of patient care
and periodic review and assessment of the delivery of patient care and medical imaging services
delivered in the Center

1.3.5 Medical Director shall provide the overall professional expertise
necessary to meet Federal, State, Local and Center requirements, including providing
professional guidance, monitoring evaluations of all medical imaging equipment of the Center.
1.4
Educational Responsibilities. Medical Director shall ensure that all
Center staff receive adequate training and education, both through the Medical Director's
presence and availability to answer questions regarding patient care, and through the Medical
Director's identification of specific educational needs and coordinating both informal and formal
educational opportunities.
1.5
Organizational Integrity. Abide by and assist the Center as necessary
and as reasonably requested in implementing a corporate Compliance Program, inclusive of a
HIP AA privacy compliance program.
1.6
Cost Containment. Work cooperatively with Center staff and the
Managing Committee in establishing appropriate Cost Containment and Quality Improvement
Programs.
1.7
Center Reputation. The Medical Director shall assist in, cooperate with
and participate in the development of programs and opportunities that will enhance the quality of
the care and its reputation as a Center of excellence and high quality, cost-efficient and serviceoriented organization.
2.

Medical Director Qualifications.

Medical Director shall meet the qualifications set forth below:
2.1
Be a member in good standing of the ICR or such other group as may have
the contractual right and obligation to provide professional medical services ("Professional
Service Providers") to the Center and be qualified and competent to provide the treatment and
MEDICAL DIRECTOR AGREEMENT - 2
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fulfill the responsibilities contemplated by this Agreement. Medica.! Director shall diligently
fulfill all obligations, duties, and requirements associated with the obligations of the Professional
Service Provider. Nothing in. this Agreement, however, is intended to establish or evidence a
standard of care for physicians, the Center, or the Medical Director and Center employees
beyond the applicable local community standard of care pursuant to I. C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013.
2.2

Be Board Certified in.Radiology.

2.3
Be fully licensed and otherwise qualified to practice medicine in the State
of Idaho without any limitations or qualifications whatsoever.
2.4
Comply with all of the policies, ethics, moral principles, rules, regulations,
and other rules promulgated by the Center, the Professional Service Provider and other
auth-oritative bodies and comply with all of the requirements of regulatory bodies and
accreditation organizations having oversight of the Center.
2.5
Comply with and conform to all Federal and State laws, rules and
regulations relative to the practice of medicine, and the performance of duties hereunder; except,
however, with the limitation regarding the establishment and evidence of the applicable standard
of care as articulated in paragraph 2.1.
2.6
Practice medicine in a legitimate and proper manner and to provide and
maintain high quality patient care and treatment and exercise good faith and reasoned
professional and medical judgment in the performance of the duties and services pursuant to this
Agreement.
2.7
Notwithstanding anything expressed or implied in this Agreement to the
contrary, the Center shall have and retain exclusive control and authority over its employees and
agents and the management and operation of the Center. All supervision, hiring and discharge of
employees of the Center shall be the right and responsibility of the company; however, the
Medical Director shall be consulted whenever possible and his input and advice considered in
good faith.
·
2.8
Medical Director shall not have been excluded from the Medicare
Program or any other governmental payer program and shall not be listed as disbarred.

3.

Compensation.
3.1

Payment for Medical Director Services.

3 .1.1 Amount. The Company shall pay to ICR the sum of Five
Thousand Dollars ($5,000) per month, for all services and duties as set forth in this Agreement.
This payment is based upon the projection that the Medical Director will spend 37 hours per
month performing the duties set forth in this Agreement, multiplied by One Hundred Thirty-Five
Dollars ($135) per hour, which amount is believed to be within fair market value for such
Medical Director services. Payment shall be made in monthly payments in the amount of $5,000
on or before the 1Oth of the month following each month's services.
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3.1 .2 Report of Services Provided. Medical Director shall provide a
quarterly written report to the Managing Committee of the Center containing a description of the
status of administrative issues and significant developments, accomplishments, issues. and tasks
undertaken pursuant to this Medical Director Agreement as may be requested by the managing
committee from time to time. The report shall outline generally the time devoted to the functions
and duties of the Medical Director. The Medical Director shall maintain such written records of
the performance of Medical Director activities on a monthly basis in order to document what
services have been performed and an estimation of the time required to perform such services
and shall provide the same to the Management Committee upon its reasonable request.
3.1.3 Annual Review. On an annual basis, the Management Committee
will review all reports submitted by the Medical Director. Annual Compensation for the issuing
year shall be based upon the number of hours anticipated to be devoted during the next year
multiplied by the hourly rate of $135, or such greater rate as may be mutually agreed to and as
supported by fair market value. Anticipated number of hours shall be estimated based upon the
prior year's number of hours and any anticipated reductions or increases in the final report
requiring the Medical Director's attention. If the parties are unable to agree upon the next year's
compensation, the parties shall submit the issue of compensation to an arbitrator mutually
agreeable to the parties. The arbitrator shall be instructed to determine a reasonable
compensation based upon the reasonably predictable number of hours necessary to complete the
Medical Director's services in the next year. If the parties are unable to agree on a single
arbitrator, each party may select an arbitrator who is not an employee or agent of any of the
members of the Center and those two arbitrators shall select a third arbitrator.
4.

Relationship of the Parties.

4.1
The parties intend that an independent contractor relationship will be
created between the Company and Medical Director by this Agreement. The Company is
interested only in the results to be achieved. The control and performance of the services will be
solely at the discretion of the Medical Director.
· 4.2
Medical Director and the individual physician members thereof shall not
be considered agents or employees of the Company for any purpose. Neither the Medical
Director or his agents or employees shall be entitled to any of the benefits that the Company
provides for its employees.
4.3
Medical Director shall not, during the term of this Agreement, assume or
incur any liability or obligations of any kind on behalf of the Company without the written
consent of the Company.
4.4
It is understood that Medical Director does not agree to limit the practice
of medicine to the provision of services pursuant to this Agreement but shall be free to pursue
the practice of medicine in any other lawful manner so long as such practice does not
unreasonably interfere with the performance of the duties hereunder or is not restricted by other
agreements to which Medical Director or an affiliate thereof is a party.
4.5
The Medical Director shall not divulge proprietary information, materials,
or documents of the Company to any person or entity not having a right to such information.
MEDICAL DIRECTOR AGREEMENT- 4
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5.

Records

It is specifically agreed by and between the contracting parties that if it is determined by
regulation that Section 952 of PL 96-499, as it may be amended from time to time, applies to the
Company, upon written r-equest of the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the
Comptroller General or any of their duly authorized agents or representatives, the Company and
the Medical Director will make available this Agreement and such other contracts, books,
documents and records as may be necessary to verify the nature and extent of the costs of
providing services under this Agreement. The parties agree that such records shall be maintained
for at least a period of four (4) years after services are furnished hereunder. No attorney-client,
accountant-client, or other legal privilege will be deemed to have been waived by the Company
or the Medical Director by virtue of this Agreement. All parties agree to notify the other in the
event one party is notified of a request for inspection and, further, agrees to consult with the
other regarding the response.

6.

Liability and Insurance

6.1
To the extent required to be cov.ered by insurance as set forth in paragraph
6.2, the Company agrees to indemnify and hold the Medical Director and ICR and its successors
or assignees harmless for any and all liability or loss arising in any way out of the Medical
Director's professional services in performance of this Agreement. In addition, the Company
agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Medical Director and ICR and its owners, employees,
successors, or assignees for any and all liability or loss which the Medical Director incurs as a
direct and proximate result of the tortious or illegal conduct of the Company or its agents. The
Company shall provide appropriate professional liability coverage for administrative decisions
made by the Company and the Medical Director pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.
6.2
The Company shall procure and maintain a policy of comprehensive
professional liability insurance, insuring the Medical Director, ICR and all of its members,
employees, officers and agents, in an amount not less than One Million Dollars ($1 ,000,000) for
any injury or death or any other liability per occurrence, and Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000)
in the aggregate insuring the Medical Director for occurrences related to, or allegedly related to,
the Medical Director's duties herein. The Company shall obtain a tail policy providing coverage
for any claims made following the termination of this agreement, which claims arise out of acts
which occur during the term of the agreement and would otherwise be covered by the insurance
required by this paragraph 6.7, in the event the insurance procured hereunder is "claims made"
and not "occurrence" coverage. This provision shall survive the termination of this agreement.
6.3
The Company agrees to procure and maintain a policy of comprehensive
professional and general liability insurance, insuring the Center and all of the Company's
members, employees, officers and agents, in an amount not less than One Million Dollars
($1 ,000,000) per occurrence and Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000) in the aggregate. The
Company shall obtain a tail policy providing coverage for any claims made following the
tem1ination of this agreement, which claims arise out of acts which occur during the term of the
agreement and would otherwise be covered by the insurance required by this paragraph 6.3. This
provision shall survive the termination of this agreement.
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7.

Entire Agreement.

This Agreement embodies the entire agreement between the parties· relevant to this
subject matter hereof. There are no oral. or other agreements existing between the parties re·lative
to the subject matter hereof which are not expressly set forth herein.

8.

Governing Law.

This Agreement shall be governed by the laws, of the State of Idaho, notwithstanding
Idaho's or any other state's laws or rules regarding conflicts of law.

9.

Severability.

In case any one or more of the provisions contained in this Agreement shall for any reason
be held to be invalid, illegal, unconscionable or unenforceable in any respect, this Agreement shall
be construed as if such provision had never been contained herein and all other terms and provisions
hereof will remain in force to the fullest extent permitted by law.

10.

Assignment.

The obligations of the Medical Director are personal and may not be assigned either
voluntarily ·or by operation of law.

11.

Term and Termination.

This agreement shall be for a period commencing on July l, 2001, and ending on June 30,
2004 but shall be renewed for additional one-year periods if either party fails to provide notice or
intent to not renew this Agreement at least sixty days prior to the termination date of the Agreement.
Unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties, this Agreement shall termination immediately
upon the occunence of any of the following events:
11.1

At any time by mutual agreement in writing between the parties; or

11.2 As to any party, the failure to abide by and perform fully and faithfully the
terms of this-· Agreement and the non-breaching party gives notice of such breach, and the
breaching party fails to cure said breach within thirty days of the date of such notice;
. 11.3 If Medical Director fails to meet the qualification identified in paragraph 2
hereof and ICR fails to appoint a substitute director within ten days of the date of notice of the
Director's failure to meet requirements required herein; or
11.4 Pursuant to paragraph 16, the Agreement is found to violate any applicable
laws and regulations.
The termination of this Agreement shall not limit any parties' rights for damages resulting
from a default hereunder or limit any parties' rights for reimbursement.
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12.

Time of Essence.

All times provided for in this Agreement, for the perfonnance of any act will be strictly
construed, time being of the essence.

13.

Modification.

The parties hereto may at .any time hereafter modify or amend this Agreement only by a
subsequent written agreement executed by all parties. This Agreement may not, however, be
changed orally, nor shall it be deemed modified in any way by any act of any of the parties
hereto.

14.

Damages Upon Breach.

Each party shall be entitled to all rights and remedies provided at law or equity for the
breach of the terms of this Agreernent. It is hereby agreed between the parties hereto that in the
event of any claim, controversy or action that is filed or instituted between the parties to this
Agreement to enforce the terms and conditions of this Agreement or arising from the breach of
any provision, the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from the other party all costs,
damages and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by the prevailing
party whether or not such controversy, claim or action is litigated or prosecuted to judgment.

15.

Obligation of Good Faith.

Each party is obligated in all respects to act in good faith under the terms and provisions of
this Agreement.

16.

Changes in Law.

It is the intent of the parties that the tem1s of this Agreement be in strict compliance with
applicable law, statutes, rules and regulations including, but not limited to, Stark, Medicare fraud
and abuse and relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended. If in the
opinion of either party's legal counsel, laws, regulations, interpretations qr rulings are propounded
subsequent to the date of this Agreement which may adversely affect such strict compliance; and the
other party agrees; or if the other party is not in agreement, then the matter shall be submitted to
health care counsel mutually agreeable to the pruties, and said attorney concludes that the
Agreement is in violation of law (in which case the cost of counsel shall be equally divided by the
parties, but if no violation is found, then the party first claiming a violation shall be entirely
responsible for the counsel's fees); of if any authority commences regulatory or enforcement action,
the parties shall renegotiate any terms of this Agreement to secure such strict compliance .. Only in
the event the parties, after exercising the utmost good faith, have been unable to renegotiate the
terms of this Agreement, shall either party be entitled to tennination of this Agreement pursuant to
Paragraph 11.4 hereof.
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17.

Non-Assignment.

The duties or benefits of this Agreement may not be assigned by either party without the
written consent of the other party, e.xcept that this contract may be assigned by ICR to Gem State
Radiology, LLP, so long as at least 50 percent (50%) of the owners of ICR are also owners of
Gem State Radiology at the time of the assignment.
·
··
· ··
18.

No Third-Party Beneficiaries.

No person or entity not a party to this Agreement is intended to be a third-party
beneficiary and no such person shall have any rights hereunder.
19.

No Referral Requirement.

The terms of this Agreement are believed by the parties to reflect their market value
regardless of the value or volume of any referrals generated by and between the parties, and no
party hereunder is required in any way to make or influence the making of referrals to the other
party or their affiliates.

:ld;ti#,

INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC,

Its:

~

IMAGING RADIOLOGISTS, P.L.L.C.
an Idaho limited liability pattnership

MEDICAL DIRECTOR AGREEMENT- 8
S:ICLIENTS\646511\Medical Director Agreement- final. DOC

IMI/00075

000184
114-069

ASSIGNMENT OF MEDICAL DIRECTOR AGREEMENT
This Assigment of Medical Director Agreement ("Assignment") is made effective the
I I th day of April, 2003, by Imaging Center Radiologists LLP ("ICR") and Gem State Radiology
LLP ("Gem State").

RECITALS
A.

ICR entered into that Medical Director Agreement effective the I st day of July,

2001 with Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC ("IMI"), wherein ICR agreed to provide medical
director services ("Medical Director Agreement") for IMI.
B.

The Medical Director Agreement allows for the assignment of the Medical

Director Agreement by ICR to Gem State.
C.

Subsequent to the Effective Date of the Medical Director Agreement, ICR ceased

being the professional entity providing medical services and medical director services for IMI,
and Gem State began to and currently does provide such services to IMI.
D.

ICR desires to assign and delegate to Gem State all of its rights, duties,

obligations, and all the benefits and burdens of the Medical Director Agreement to Gem State,
and Gem State wishes to accept such assignment and delegation, and provide the medical
director services pursuant to the Agreement, and receive payments for those services provided
and for any payments due and owing to ICR under the contract for services already provided
prior to this assignment.
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY AGREED that for value received, the sufficiency
and receipt of which are hereby acknowledged, ICR hereby assigns and delegates all of its rights,
obligations, duties, and benefits under the Medical Director Agreement to Gem State.

Assigment of Medical Director Agreement- I
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, ICR makes this assignment as of the date first written above.

IMAGING CENTER RADIOLOGISTS LLP

OEM STATE RADIOLOGY LLP

:: =~=;./,=~=~-~:··(=L-=Z=
APPROVED BY:
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC

By:
Its:

~
·~1-rh-z..LLJ.L.~""""""L.v
________
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LEASE AGREEMENT

THIS LEASE AGREEMENT is made and entered into effective the 15th day of
August, 1999, by and between IMAGING CENTER 'RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership (hereinafter "Lessor"), and INTERMOUNTA1N :MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC,

an Idaho limited liability corporation (hereinafter "Lessee").
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the parties hereto have negotiated and agreed to the tenns for this Lease

Agreement;
NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the parties do hereby
agree as follows:
ARTICLE I

l ,EASED PREMISES
Lessor, in consideration of the rents hereinafter reserved and of the covenants and
agreements on the part of Lessee hereinafter set forth and contained, by these presents, does demise
and lease unto Lessee, and said Lessee does hereby take and hire from Lessor, the non-:MR.I portion of
the real property and improvements located 927. W. Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho (hereinafter the
"premises"), together with all the easements, rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging
or in any way appertaining. · The parties ·agree that the MRI portion of the real estate and
improvements located at 927..\}{. Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho utilize approXimately 18~ of the space,.
and Lessee's use ofthe premises utilizes approximately 82% of the space. Lessee's share ofth.e costs
and expenses set forth in Articles ill, IVB and VI shall equal 82% of the ·total cost, and Lessor shall
pay the remaining 18%. Lessee's use of the premises is non-exclusive with Lessor's use of the MRI
portion of the real estate and improvements located at 927 W. Myrtle Street, ~oise, Idaho.

at

ARTICLE IT
TERM, RENT AND SEOTRITV DEPOSIT

The terrtn:)f this lease shall be for a period of twenty (20) years and shall commence on
August 15, 1999, and shall expire August 14, 2019; provided, however, Lessee is given the option to
extend~ the term on all the provisions contained in this lease, for three (3) additional five (5) year
periods ("extended terms") following expiration of the initial term, by giving notice of exercise of the
option ("option notice") to Lessor at least six (6) months but not more than one (1) year before the
expiration of the current term.· Provided that, if Lessee is in default on the date of giving the option
notice, the option notice shall be totally .ineffective, or if~essee is in default on the date the extended
term is to commence, the extended term shall not commence and this lease shall expire at the end 'Of the·
current term.

LEASE AGREEMENT· I
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Notwithstanding the above, the Lessor shall have the option to tenninate this lease with
at least six (6) months prior written notice if the Lessor at any tirhe ceases to be a member of
Intermountain Medical Ima~ng, LLC.
The monthly rent is $22,269.35, and the payments shall begin on August 1, 1999, and
shall be payable on the 1st day of each and every month thereafter for the tenn of this Agreement. The
monthly rent shall be adjusted in the following manner:
The Conswner Price Index for all Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W):
U.S. Average for the United States, published by the United States Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics .('Index"), which is published for the month nearest the date of the
commencement of the Tenth (lOih) year, and every five (5) years thereafter ("Adjusted Index"),
shall be compared with the Index publishe'd-for the month immediately preceding the month in
which the initial tenn commences ("Beginning Index"}
If the Adjusted Index has increase over the Beginning Index, the minimum monthly
rent payable during the following five (5) years· term shall be set by multiplying the monthly
rent set forth above by a fraction, the numerator of which is the Adjusted Index and the
denominator of which is the Beginning Index. AB soon as the monthly rent of the following
five (5) years is set Lessor shall give Lessee notice of the amount of monthly rent for the
following five (5) years.
If the Index is changed so that the base year differs from that used as of the month
inunediately preceding the month in which the term commences, the Index shall be converted
in accordance with the conversion factor published by the United States Department ofLabor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics. If the Index is discontinued or revised during the term, such other
goveinment index or compu~tion with ~hich it is replaced shall be used in order to obtai~
substantially the same result as would be obtained in the Index had not be discontinued or
revised.

All rental payments are to be paid in advance for the ensuiflg month. All amounts
payable as rental shall be paid to Lessor at Lessors address as set forth herein or to such other person
or persons and at such other places and in such proportions as Lessor shall from time to time designate
by written notice to Le8see.
ARTICLE ill
PAYMENT OF EXPENSES
In addition to the rent specified in Article IT, Lessee agrees to pay at its own cost and
expense during the term ofthis lease 82% of all real property taxes and assessments, inswance and any
other charges of every kind whatsoever pertaining to the real estate and improvements located at 927
W. Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho. Utilities (including, but not limited to, gas, water, heating, cooling,
electricity, sewer, and power) shall be prorated between the parties based upon the percentage use of
the premises by MRI patients and non-MRI patients. This percentage use will be determined monthly,
and will be based upon the actual MRI and non-MRI patient volume at the premises as shown on
.Lessee's books and records.
LEASE AGREEMENT- 2
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ARTICLE IV
COVENANTS TO BE PERFORMED BY LESSEE

Lessee covenants as follows:
A.

Payment ofRent:

To pay the rent punctually when due hereunder;

B.
Maintenance and Repairs:· At Lessee's cost and expense, to keep the real
estate and improvements located at 927 W. Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho in good condition, in safe and
proper repair, to make all repairs, both inside and outside, ordinary and extraordinary, whether or not
such repairs are of structural nature, including but not limited to the HVAC system, roo( parking,
doors, windows and signage; for purposes of·,this subdivision the term "repairs" shall include
replacement and renewals when necessary, and all such repairs shall be of good workmanlike character. .
Lessee's share of such costs shall be 82%.
C.
J.aws, Ordinance and Regulations: At Lessee's cost, promptly to comply
with all laws, zoning regulations and ordinances, and every notice; requirement, order or regulation
(whatever the nature thereof may be), now or hereafter enacted, of the United States, State of Idaho,
and of any authority, department or bureau thereo~ and of the Board ofFice Underwriters or any other
body having similar functions or of any insurance company insuring Lessor on policies secured by
Lessee, affecting the premises or with respect to anyvautt, sidewalk or other space or encroachment in,
under or over any street or avenue adjoining the demised premises, including any existing at or before
the commencement of the demised tenn, and also all reasonable requirements of the holder of the first
mortgage in coJUlection with the maintenance of the. property, whether or not any of the foregoing be
within the contemplation of the parties hereto;
D.
lise ofPremises:
Lessee may use the· premises to carry on a medical
practice with a specialty in radiology, and medical imaging and all other activities related to Lessee's
medical practice. However, Lessee shall not use. or occupy the premises, or any part thereof, nor to
permit the same to be used or occupied, for any unlawful purpose, or in any way which would make
void and voidable any insurance then in force at the demised premises;
E.
F,xaminatjon ofPremises:
To permit Lessor, or their agents, and the first
mortgagee, its agents or representatives, to enter and examine the premises, at such reasonable times,
and under such reasonable conditions as may be requested by Lessor;
F.
Outlay by I .essor:
Not to call upon Lessor for any disbursement or outlay
during the term, unless in this instrument specifically provided for;
.G.
Return nfPremises: . At the expiration or termination ofthe demised term,
peaceably surrender the premises, with all improvements and additions thereto, clean and in good
condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted, without notice of any kind, all notice to quit or vacate
hereby being expressly waived, any law, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding;
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H.
fudemnjficatinn ofT ,essor: Lessor shall not be responsible_ for any defect,
latent or otherwise; in the premises, or change of conditions in the prerhises, or for any damage to the
same or to any person, or to goods or things contained therein, by reason of any matter or thing
whatsoever, Lessee assuming all the risk and responsibility with reference to the present or future
condition, tenantability, management, operation or control of premises, and Lessee will promptly
indemnifY and save and hold Lessor hannless of and from all fines, suits, proceedings, claims, demands
and actions, of any kind or nature whatsoever, brought by anyone whomsoever, arising or growing out
of, or in any way connected with the occupation, maintenance, control or use of the premises or the
streets or sidewalks adjoining the same, or by reason of any breach, violation or non-performance of
·any covenant, condition or agreement hereof on the part of Lessee;
I.
Removal ofT,jens:
Within thirty (30) days after notice of the filing thereof,
to discharge any mechanics' lien or liens, which 1nay be· filed against the premises by reason of work,
labor, services or materials performed for, or furnished to Lessee or its representatives, or anyone
holding or claiming the demised premises or any part thereof through or under Lessee;

J.
· Remedies:
In respect of the ·non-payment of rent or any item anywhere in
this lease provided for, Lessor shall have all the rights and remedies (including any summary or other
remedy now or hereafter eJ_cisting), as Lessor has, or may have in respect of the non-payment of the
·rent;
K.
Acceptance ofPremises:
Lessee accepts the premises subject to the
present or future physical condition and location of any party thereof, and to any state of facts which
either an accurate survey or· personal inspection might reveal;

L. .
.Iifk: ·Lessee shall have no power, and nothing herein contained shall. be
construed as giving Lessee power, to do any act or make any contract which may create or be the
foundation of any lien upon the estate, reversion or other interest of Lessor, or of the present or any
future owner of the premises;

M.
I.e:ssor's Remedies: Any right or remedy of Lessor hereunder, or law, in
equity or otherwise,. upon any breach by Lessee, shall be distinct, separate and cumulative, and no one
of them, whether exercised by Lessor or not, shall be deemed to be in exclusion of any other;
N.
Enrther Assurances: Except as hereinafter provided, neither the destruction
of, nor injury or damage to, improvements at any time on the premises, whatever the cause, shall
terminate or invalidate this lease, and the rent and additional rent shall be paid by Lessee to Lessor
without any claim for any reduction or diminution of rent or other expense whatsoever except as is
otherwise provided for herein;
0.

T.essnr Payment of Lessee's Ob!jgations:

. If Lessee shall fail to make any

of the payments required of Lessee, or shall fail to perform or to com pry with any of the provisions, on
Lessee's part to be complied with and performed, Lessor, at its option, but without obligation so to do,
may make such payments, or any of them, or may comply with such provisions or any of them, and any
and all sums expended by Lessor, with interest thereon from the date of such expenditure at the highest
rate allowed by law, shall be additional rent and, at Lessor's option, may be immediately, or at any time
LEASE AGREEMENT· 4
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thereafter, due and payable or added to the rent due, at the time such e:JgJenditures are made, or to any
installment of rent thereafter becoming due. But any such payment by Lessor shall not be deemed a
waiver of Lessee's default or shall affect any remedy by Lessor hereunder, by reason of such default;
P.
No Waiver of Remedies:
Acceptance of Lessor of any sums, either for
rent or for use or occupancy of the Whole or any part of the premises; from anyone other than the
specifically named Lessee herein, shall not be, nor shall it deemed to be a waiver of any ofthe Lessors
rights and remedies hereunder.
Failure of Lessor to insist, in any instance, upon performances of any provisions of this
lease, or to exercise any option herein, shall not be construed as waiving for the future, any such
provision or option; and the receipt of any monies or rent, of whatsoever nature, whether the rent be
that specifically reserve, or that which may become' payable under any provision herein, or whether the
same be received from Lessee or from anyone claiining under or through Lessee, or otherwise, shall
not be deemed to operate as a waiver of Lessor to enforce the payment of rent or charges, of any kind,
previously due, or thereafter becoming due, or the right to terminate this lease and to recover
possession of the premises, by stinnnary proceedings or· otherwise, or to exercise any of the rights or
remedies reserved to Lessor, or which Lessor may have at law, in equity or otherwise.

ARTICLEV
ASSIGNMENT AND Slffil,ETIJNG

Lessee shall not assign or sublet the lease, or any interest therein, without the written
consent ofLessor having been first obtained.
ARTICLE VI
INSURANCE

During the term of this lease, Lessee shall maintain insurance with respect to the real
estate and improvements located at 927 Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho, and pay 82% of the cost thereof;
·of the following type and in the following amounts:
(a)
Public liability insurance, protecting Lessor against all claims for personal
mJury, death, and property damage occurring. upon, in, or about the demised premises and the
adjoining sidewalks, streets, roads and passageways, with limits ofat least $1,000,000 for injury to
persons in any one accident, and $5,300,000 for damage to property;

(b)
Lessee shall also provide and maintain in effect for the term of this lease, and
any extensions thereof, a policy, or policies of insurance covering the premises providing protection
against any peril included in the classification "Fire and Extended Coverage," with code upgrade
protection, in an amount not less than $2,400,000 or 100% ofthe full replacement value ofthe building
and all improvements thereon, whichever is the greater, as the same is determined at not less than
three-year intervals by a responsible appraiser or contractor paid for by Lessee, together with insurance
against vandalism and malicious mischief to the extent of the full replacement costs thereof;
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(c)
Such other insurance as is customarily maintained by owners of similar
property in the locality, or as may be reasonably required by the first mottgage_
All such insurance carrier by Lessee as required under the provisions of subdivisions
(a), (b) and (c) shall be carried in favor of the Lessor and Lessee as their respective interests may
appear (including naming Lessor as co-insured) and shall, if required by Lessor, include the interest of
the holder of any mortgage of the fee and shall expressly provide that any loss is to be payable to
Lessor and Lessee, and, if requested ·by Lessor, the holder of any mortgage of the fee, and in such
event, shall contain standard mortgagee clauses. Lessee shall delive;r to Lessor (or if requested by
Lessor, to the holder of any mortgage of the fee) all policies of insurance with evidence by stamping or
otherwise of the payment ofthe premiums thereon and shall deliver to IJessor (and to su<;h mortgagee
if requested by Lessor) renewals thereof from time to time at least ten (1 0) days prior to the expiration ·
of any similar policy then expiring_ All policies shall provide that the same cannot be cancelled by
Lessee without the written consent of Lessor and the first mortgagee, if an institution, first obtained.
Lessee shall neither knowingly do nor suffer anything to be done whereby any of the insurance required
by the provisions thereof shall or may be invalidated in whole or in party. Lessee agrees not to
maintain any insurance· policies required by_ the provisions thereof which do not include Lessor and any
first mortgagee (except public liability insurance and except as hereinafter provided) as their interests
may appear. All insurance policies required under the provisions thereof shall be valid and enforceable
policies and shall be written in companies licensed to write insurance in the State of Idaho and
reasonably satisfactory to the first mortgagee, if an institution.
All insurance carried by Lessee as required under the provisions of this article shall, if
required by Lessor, include the interest of any over-landlord or the. owner of any over-lease covering
· the demised premises, provided, and on the condition that said over-landlord or such owner shall agree
in writing that the proceeds of any insurance shall be used in accordance with the terms of this lease,
and provided further that if this provision shall result in any additional premium, Lessor shall pay such
additional cost.
ARTICLEVIT
DAMAGE OR DESTRTTCITQN OF PREMISES

Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, in the event that the premises or any
improvement at any time upon the premises is. destroyed by catastrophe, including war, insurrection or
earthquake, then, and in such event, Lessee shall.not be-required to rebuild the premises nor restore the
same to its previous condition, but such destruction shall not relieve Lessee from its obligation to pay
rent hereunder. However, Lessee may, at its option, rebuild the same. If the premises or any
improvements at any time upon the premises shall be otherwise damaged or destroyed, and as often as
the same shall occur, Lessee shall promptly notify Lessor thereo~ and the same shall be promptly
replaced, repaired and rebuilt by Lessee at its own cost and expense, in such manner as to restore the
improvement as near as reasona~ly possible to the condition prior to such damage and without any
outlay whatsoever from Lessor. Subject to the consent and approval of the holder of any first
mortgage on the premises and the terms and conditions of said mortgage, any insurance money, if
available, shall be used ~connection with such restoration as hereinbelow provided.
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ARTICLEVIll
FIRE OR OTHER DAMAGE TO PREMiSES

In the event that the premises or any part thereof are made untenantable as a result of
any fire or other damage or destructionto the premises, the provisions of this lease shall be unaffected,
and Lessee shall remain and continue liable for the payment of the rent and all other charges by Lessee
payable under any of the provisions hereof as though no d~age had occurred to the premises, except
the rent shall abate only to·the ex.tent of the proceeds of rent insurance received by Lessor under rent
insurance policies furnished by Lessee under the provisions hereof.

ARTICLE IX
DEFAULT
If at any time (i) the rent reserved herein shall become in arrears and be unpaid for a
period of fifteen ( 15) days after the earlier of its due date or the date for which written demand was ·
made for the payment thereof, (ii) Lessee shall default in the performance of any of the other terms,
covenants and provisions of this lease on its part to be performed within thirty (30) days after written
demand for the performance thereof, or (Iii) the demised premises become vacant or deserted while no
rent is being paid, then in such· event, Lessor shall have the right to tenninate this lease and the term
hereof, as well as all of the "right, title and interest of Lessee hereunder, by giving Lessee not less than
twenty (20) days notice in writing of such intention and upon the expiration of the time fixed in such
latter notice (if such default shall not have been cured) this lease and the term thereof, as· well as all the
right, title and interest of Lessee· hereunder, shall wholly terminate in the same manner and with the
same force and effect (except as to Lessee's liability) as if the date fixed by siJch latter notice were the
expiration of the term herein originally granted, and Lessor may enter into or repossess said premises,
either by legal force or summary proceedings, or otherwise, and Lessee hereby expressly waives.
service of notice of intention to re-enter to that end.

In the eve~J,t of cancellation or termination hereof by either the issuance of a
dispossessory warrant or the service' of a notice of termination as hereinabove provided, or otherwise,
Lessee shall, nevertheless, remain and continue liable to Lessor in a sum equal to all rent and all charges
for the balance of the tenn; and Lessor may re-enter said premises, using such legal force as that
purpose as may be necessary without being liable to any prosecution for said re-entry or for the use of
such legal force, and Lessor may repair or alter said premises in such manner as to Lessor may seem
necessary or advisable, and/or let or relet said premises or any or all. parts thereof for the whole or any
part of the remainder of the original term hereof or for a longer or shorter period, in Lessor's name or
otherwise, and, out of any rent so collected or received, Lessor shall first pay to them8elves the expense
and cost of retaking, repossessing, repairing and/or altering the same premises and the expenses of
removing all persons and property therefrom, second, pay to themselves any cost or expense sustained
in securing any new tenant or tenants, 1!-nd third, pay to themselves any balance remaining. and apply
the whole thereof or so much thereof as may be required toward payment of the liability of Lessee to
Lessor, for the sum equal to the rents reserved herein and then unpaid by Lessee for the remainder of
the term. Any entry or re-entry by Lessor, whether had or taken under summary proceedings or
otherwise, shall not absolve or discharge Lessee from liability hereunder. The words "re-enter" and
"re-entry" as used in this lease are not restricted to their technical legal meaning. The failure ofLessor
to relet the premises or any part or parts thereof shall not release or affect Lessee's liability for damages
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or otherwise, however, either Lessor or Lessee shall and may seek to relet said premises to mitigate the
·
damages to Lessee.
Should any rent so collected by Lessor after the payments aforesaid be insufficient fully
to pay to Lessor a sum equal to all rent and additional charges herein reserved, the balance or
deficiency shall be paid by Lessee following receipt of notice from Lessor of such balance or deficiency,
that is, upon each of the rent days above specified, Lessee shall pay to Lessor the amount of said
deficiency then existing, and shall remain liability for any portion thereof not so paid; and the right of
Lessor to recover from Lessee the amount of such deficiency, or a sum 'equal to the amount of all rent
and additional charges herein reserved ifthere shall be no reletting by Lessor, shall survive the issuance
of any dispossessory warrant or other termination of the term hereof
Suit or suits for the recovery of any. such deficiency or damages, or for a sum equal to
any instalhnent or installments of rent or additional charges payable hereunder, may be brought by
Lessor from time to time at Lessor's election and nothing herein contained shall be deemed to require
Lessor to await the date whereon this lease, or the term hereof; would have expired by limitation had
there been no such default by Lessee or no such termination.
Lessee hereby expressly waives any and all rights of redemption granted by or under
any present or future laws iii the event of Lessee being evicted or dispossessed for any cause, or in the
event of Lessor obtaining possession of demised premises, by reason of the violation of Lessee of any
of the covenants and conditions of this lease, or otherwise, provided, however, that should the
premises be not relet then Lessee may, by payment of all charges, costs and rents due, redeem said
prenuses.

ARTICLE X
REPRESENTATION

Lessee acknowledges that Lessor has made no representations that the demised
premises are, or will be suitable for use by Lessee or suitable for any use or purpose whatsoever.
ARTICLE XI
AI ,TEBATIONS

Lessee shall not, without the prior ,vri.tten consent of Lessor, make any changes or
alterations, structural or otherwise, to the premises.
ARTICLE XU
I JCENSES, PERMITS, ETC.

Lessee agrees at its own cost and expense to procure and maintain any and all
necessary pennits, licenses or other authorizations required for the use of the demised premises and for
the lawful and proper installation and maintenance upon the demised premises of wires, pipe, conduits,
tubes and other equipment and appliances for the use in its operations at the demised premises.
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ARTICLE XIII
COVENANTS

AND CONDmDNS'

All of the provisions ofthis lease shall be deemed and construed to be "conditions 11 as
well as "covenants" as though the word specifically expressing or importing covenants and conditions
be used in each separate provision hereof
ARTICLE XIV
MODIFICATIONS, TEBMJNATIQN

_
This lease contains all the tenns and agreements between the parties and may not in any
respect be modified or terminated except by written instrument signed and delivered by both parties.
ARTICLE XV
DEFINITIONS

Subject to the provisions of Article XIX, the respective words "Lessor" and "Lessee",
shall include the original Lessor and Lessee herein named and their respective successors, legal
representatives or assigns, .and the covenants and provisions herein contained shall run with this lease
and be binding upon and inure to the benefit of not only such original Lessor and Lessee, but also their
respective successors, legal representatives or assigns; and unless shown otherwise by the context, any
provision respecting such original Lessor and Lessee shall be deemed specifically to include such
successors, legal representatives or assigns.
ARTICLE XVI
NOTICES

All notices required to be given hereunder shall be given in writing and sent by United
States certified 1mill, addressed as follows:
To Lessor:

Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
·

929 W. Myrtle
Boise, Idaho 83702

To Lessee:

Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC
929 W. Myrtle
Boise, Idaho 83702

Either party may change the address to which notices shall be sent hereunder by written
notice of such address such to the other party hereto in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
Any time required hereunder for any notice to be given hereunder shall be determined from the actual
mailing of such notice .and such determination shall not depend in anyway upon whether or not such
notice has been received, but the sender of such notice may require the usual certified return receipt.
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ARTICLEXVU
-ffiNDEMNATION

Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding,- in the event said entire demised
premises shall be taken under any condemnation or eminent domain proceedings during the term
hereof, or any renewal tenn pursuant hereto, or in the· event any portion of said demised premises
untaken or uncondemned after any such proceeding shall not be suitable or adequate for the uses and
purposes for which said entire demised premises then are being utilized by Lessee, then, and in any
such event, this lease and the term hereof shall tenninate on the date of vesting title.or the date upon
which Lessee shall be required to surrender possession of the demised premises, or portion thereof,
pursuant to the judgment or decree in such condemnation or eminent domrun proceedings, which ever
shall first occur, and Lessee shall be liable for the payment of rent and other charges hereunder only to
such date.
··..
In the event that a portion of sai!l demised premises shall be taken under any

condemnation or eminent domain proceedings, during the tenn hereof, or said tenn as extended
pursuant hereto, and the remaining portion of srud demised premises not taken or condemned, shall be
suitable and adequate for the use and purposes for which said entire demised premises then are being
used by Lessee, then, and in any such event, this lease shall remain in full force and effect, as to such
remaining portion, except· that, from and after the date upon which Lessee shall be required to ·
surrender possession of the portion of said demised pr~ses so taken or condemned, Lessee shall be
entitled to a pro rata equitable reduction in the annual rent to be paid hereunder (due consideration
being given to the respective rental values to the space taken and the space not taken) the amount
thereof to be agreed on by the Lessor and Lessee. IfLessor and Lessee cannot mutually agree on the
amount of such reduced rent, the same shall be detennined by arbitration as herein provided.
In the event Lessor and Lessee cannot agree within ninety (90) days after such taking
as to whether the uncondenmed portion of the demised premises shall not be suitable or adequate for
the uses or purposes for which the entire demised premises then· are being utilized by Lessee, said
dispute shall be settled by arbitration:

In the event of any such taking or condenmation of said entire demised premises, or
any portion thereof: owned by Lessor, and regardless of whether this lease survives, the entire amount
awarded for the demised premises in any such proceeding shall belong to and be paid to the Lessor and
Lessee agrees to execute and deliver any assignment or other document necessary to permit Lessor to
recover any such award. The entire amount awarded for any fixtures or equipment owned by Lessee in
said premises, so taken or condemned, and for damages to any fixtures or equipment owned by Lessee
in the demised premises, shall belong to and be paid to Lessee.
ARTICLEXVDI
FIXTURES AND PERSONAL PROPERTY

All fixtures and articles of personal property attached or appurtenant to, or used in
connection with the buildings on the demised premises, including all plumbing and heating fixtures and
lighting fixrures attached to ceilings and walls, the sprinkler system, furnaces, water pipes, pennanent
air condition units, and appurtenances, and electric wires installed for the purpose of lighting and
LEASE AGREEMENT- I 0
=I property lease

IMI/00088

114-082
000197

.,

~

'!"-

•

~

~-~

I

..-,.

~

~·

equipment operation, and any additions thereto, shall belong to Lessor and are leased hereby as part of
the demised premises and wherever in this lease the tenn "premises" or 11 demised premises" are used,
the same shall be deemed to include all of the foregoing items. All goods, chattels, machinery,
equipment, parts, other personal property of various kinds and description used in connection with the
operation of the business being conducted on the premises, and all equipment pertaining thereto, of
whatever kind and nature, now or hereafter installed or placed on the premises by the Lessee, or any
user, sublessee or occupant ofthe premises, shall be the sole and absolute property of said Lessee, user,
sublessee or occupant, at the expiration or other termination of this lease or at any time prior thereto,
upon the condition that the Lessee shall, except in the event of the expiration of the tenn by reason· of
conderrmation, make good at Lessee's own cost and expense any and aU damages caused to the
premises by any removal thereof
ARTICLE XIX
QTUET POSSESSION

Lessor covenants that Lessee, upon duly performing all of its obligations hereunder,
shall and may peaceably and quietly have, hold and enjoy the premises for the original term of this lease
and any renewal term, subject, however, to all of the provisions of this lease. The term "Lessor" as
used in this lease means only the ovmer, or the mortgagee in possession for the time being, of the
demised premises so that in the event of any sale or sales of said· premises, the said Lessor shall be and
hereby is entirely freed and relieved of all covenants and obligations of the Lessor hereunder (except
for any breach occurring before such sale) and it shall be deemed and construed without further
agreement between the parties or their successors in interest, or between the parties and the purchaser
at any such sale, that the purchaser has assumed and agreed to carry out any· and all covenants and
obligations cifLessor hereunder.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, This Lease Agreement has been duly executed by the
respective parties hereto effective as of the day and year first above written.·.
Lessor:

Lessee:
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701- _
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 33{)-9177
Patrick J. Miller, ISB No. 3221
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No CV OC 0408219D

ANSWER TO THIRD AMENDED
COUNTERCLAIM

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("Diversified Care")
and Counter-Defendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("Saint Alphonsus"),
through their counsel, and in answer to the Third Amended Complaint filed by MRI Associates
LLP ("MRIA"), MRI Limited Partnership ("MRI Center" or "MRI Limited") and MRI Mobile
Limited ("MRI Mobile"), hereby admit, deny, and affirmatively allege as follows:
1.

Paragraph 1 is admitted.

2.

In answer to paragraph 2 ofthe Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care state that Diversified Care is an Idaho non-profit corporation, of which
Saint Alphonsus is the sole member. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder
of the allegations of paragraph 2.
3.

In answer to paragraph 3 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that MRI Limited Partnership is an Idaho limited partnership but are
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without sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations contained therein
and, therefore, deny the same.
4.

In answer to paragraph 4 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that MRI Mobile Limited Partnership is an Idaho limited partnership
but are without sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations contained
therein and, therefore, deny the same.
5.

In answer to paragraph 5 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that MRI Associates LLP is now an Idaho limited liability
partnership, and that it is the general partner of MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile
Limited Partnership. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care are without sufficient information to
admit or deny the remainder of the allegations contained therein and, therefore, deny the same.
6.

In answer to paragraph 6 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that their goal, in the interest of patient care, has been to integrate the
provision of the technical and professional components of MRI technology to advance the
quality of patient care.
In further answer to paragraph 6 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus
and Diversified Care state that Saint Alphonsus became interested in MRI technology as early as
1982. In the Spring of 1984, Saint Alphonsus unquestionably wanted MRI technology on its
campus. At the time, the principal proven application of MRI technology related to
neurosciences. Saint Alphonsus's goal in bring the technology to Boise was to maintain Saint
Alphonsus's role as the regional diagnostic center of choice, to maintain its leadership position in
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neurosciences and to meet the needs of the community for high quality state of the art care. In
1984, Saint Alphonsus worked to find the best model for making the technology available to its
patients. Options included owning the technology outright without partners, having only hospital
partners, having outside investors who were not physicians and having outside investors who
were physicians. Saint Alphonsus had little doubt that the technology was going to be successful.
At the same time that Saint Alphonsus was investigating becoming involved in the technology,
St. Luke's Regional Medical Center was also actively trying to bring the technology to Boise.
For-profit investors were also considering establishing freestanding centers. Saint Alphonsus
discussed jointly bringing the technology to Boise with St. Luke's. St. Luke's, however, would
not agree to participate on terms proposed and chose to establish its own MRI services. Early
indications at Saint Alphonsus suggested that the MRI technology would be quite profitable.
There was, in 1984, a high level of interest among members of the Saint Alphonsus medical
community regarding participation in such a venture. Saint Alphonsus ultimately decided to
introduce the technology in a joint venture with practicing neuroscience physicians (who had
specific knowledge regarding the applications of the technology, would be using the technology
for their patients and would be consulting with other physicians providing care in the community)
and with other hospitals. The involvement of practicing physicians was essential to the
fundamental purpose of MRIA. Except as stated herein, Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care
deny the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 6 of the Third Amended
Counterclaim.
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7.

In answer to paragraph 7 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care incorporate their response to paragraph 6 above and except as specifically
admitted therein, deny the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 7.
8.

In answer to paragraph 8 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that the Articles of Partnership were signed effective April 26, 1985.
Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny that the only purpose ofMRIA was to operate a
magnetic resonance scanning facility on Saint Alphonsus's campus. Saint Alphonsus, in fact,
wanted to limit the purpose of the partnership to form a single limited partnership to operate an
MRI service and proposed language to this effect. Attorneys representing the physicians rejected
this request and insisted on having a broader statement of purposes. The result was that the
purpose of the partnership remained broad and included being able to own and operate any kind
of diagnostic device (not just MRI) and own and operate any kind of therapeutic device. Saint
Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny that the purpose or term of MRIA can be inferred from
language in a separate building lease agreement. The building lease agreement was between
Saint Alphonsus Building Company, Inc., and MRI Limited Partnership. Saint Alphonsus
Building Company is not a party to this litigation and is not a party to the MRIA Articles of
Partnership. The lease related to only one of a broad range of permitted activities. In all events,
the unambiguous language of the MRIA Partnership Agreement creates a partnership that will
continue indefinitely, without a maximum or minimum duration, and the terms of that integrated
agreement may not be contradicted by extrinsic evidence. The fact that MRIA had a broad
purpose is evidenced by MRIA's creation ofMRI Mobile and expansion to multiple hospitals
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throughout the Intermountain West and its subsequent creation of Isoscan LLC, which expanded
MRIA's operations into the PET/CT business line. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny
the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
9.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care admit the language of the ground lease but

deny the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the Third Amended
Counterclaim.
10.

In answer to paragraph 10 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that the term ofthe ground lease ran from October 1, 1985, to
December 31,2015. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny that the operation ofMRI
Center was the only operational project contemplated by the original partners ofMRIA, as Saint
Alphonsus attempted to specifically limit the purpose of MRIA to such purpose and the
physicians who made up DMR rejected Saint Alphonsus's request. Saint Alphonsus and
Diversified Care specifically deny that the lease term for the MRI Center and the term of MRI
Limited were extended by Saint Alphonsus and the MRIA Board to December 31,2023. To the
contrary, the Idaho Supreme Court expressly addressed this alleged extension in its October 2009
decision, and held that "[t]he limited partnership agreement for MRI Center provides that it can
only be amended through a properly executed written instrument," but that "[t]here was no
properly executed written instrument extending the term of the MRI Center limited partnership
beyond December 31, 2015." Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP,
148 Idaho 479,---,224 P.3d 1068, 1086 (2009).
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11.

In answer to paragraph 11 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit the terms of Article 6.1 of the Articles of Partnership ofMRIA.
Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny that Article 6.1 acted as a limitation of Diversified
Care's statutory right to cause a liquidation or to dissociate from the partnership, and further state
that any suggestion to the contrary is inconsistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's October 2009
decision, which held that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from the MRIA Partnership did not
violate Section 6.1 ofthe MRIA Partnership Agreement. See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care,

Inc., 148 Idaho at ---, 224 P .3d at 1073-78. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care further deny
the remainder of the allegations of paragraph 11.
12.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

12 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
13.

In answer to paragraph 13 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that the two limited partnerships of which MRIA was general partner
flourished financially from 1985 to the late 1990s. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny
the remainder of the allegations of paragraph 13.
14.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

14 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
15.

In answer to paragraph 15 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that SARG/GSR provided the "professional component" of the
medical imaging services provided by MRI Center until MRI Center terminated its relationship
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with SARG/GSR in December 2004. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified care deny the remainder
of the allegations contained in paragraph 15 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
16.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

16 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
17.

In answer to paragraph 17 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that SARG/GSR earned fees for the professional services for reading
MRI scans obtained at MRI Center. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care further admit that
SARG/GSR established its own independent medical imaging center and that center began
operations in 1999. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations
of paragraph 17.
18.

In answer to paragraph 18 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that Sandra Bruce became the CEO of Saint Alphonsus in January
1997. Sandra Bruce and Sister Patricia Vandenberg shared the view that it was vitally important
to involve practicing physicians in the ownership and operation of MRI Center in order to
advance high-quality patient care. As DMR physicians retired from the practice of medicine,
they failed to bring practicing radiologists into an ownership position in DMR or MRIA, and
thus failed to continue the alignment of competencies envisioned both by Sister Patricia
Vandenberg and Sandra Bruce. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the
allegations contained in paragraph 18.
19.

In answer to paragraph 19 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that in the summer of 1998, Dave Giles and one or more other
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representatives of SARG/GSR visited Sandra Bruce's office and told her that SARG/GSR was
going to build an independent freestanding medical imaging center in downtown Boise and had
already acquired the real estate to do so. Saint Alphonsus thereafter requested that if
SARG/GSR was going to go ahead with the downtown center, that Saint Alphonsus be allowed
to be a participant in that center. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care also admit that, during
this time frame, the formation of "Integrated Delivery Networks" was a frequent topic of
discussion both at Saint Alphonsus and in the health care industry as a whole. Saint Alphonsus
denies, however, that the motivation for the creation of the downtown imaging center was related
to Saint Alphonsus's desire to be a part of Integrated Delivery Networks. Saint Alphonsus and
Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 19.
20.

In answer to paragraph 20 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that Dr. David Giles was an owner ofDMR and a member of the
Board of Partners ofMRIA. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care further admit that at the same
time Dr. Giles was an owner ofDMR and a member of the Board of Partners ofMRIA, he was
also serving as president of SARG/GSR and he was participating in SARG/GSR' s planning of
the downtown imaging center. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care were not involved in the
planning of the downtown center. Dr. Giles failed to disclose important information to MRIA
and to Saint Alphonsus concerning his involvement in the downtown center. Dr. Giles later told
Saint Alphonsus that he did not want his participation in planning the downtown imaging center
known to MRIA. After being told by Dr. Giles in August of 1998 that SARG/GSR had already
planned to open the downtown imaging center, Saint Alphonsus indicated that it would like to
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participate with SARG/GSR in the downtown imaging center. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified
Care deny the remainder of the allegations of paragraph 20 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
21.

In answer to paragraph 21 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that at the meeting of the Board of Partners of MRIA on October 22,
1998, representatives of SARG/GSR were present and announced that SARG/GSR planned to
open a downtown imaging center. At that board meeting, Sandra Bruce disclosed that Saint
Alphonsus planned to negotiate with SARG/GSR to allow Saint Alphonsus to be a part of that
center. Sandra Bruce also stated that Saint Alphonsus supported MRIA negotiating with
SARG/GSR to allow MRI Center to provide magnetic resonance imaging coverage for the
downtown imaging center. A motion was made and approved to establish a committee to
conduct MRIA's negotiations. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the
allegations contained in paragraph 21.
22.

In answer to paragraph 22 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care deny the implication that Saint Alphonsus or Sandra Bruce "combined with
SARG/GSR through IMI to compete with MRIA in the provision of magnetic resonance imaging
services." Further, paragraph 22 asserts a legal conclusion to which no response is required; to
the extent a response is required, Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations of
paragraph 22.
23.

In answer to paragraph 23 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that Saint Alphonsus actively and in good faith supported
SARG/GSR and MRIA in reaching an agreement as to how MRI services would be provided by
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the two entities. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of allegations of
paragraph 23.
24.

In answer to paragraph 24 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care deny the allegations, and incorporate the response provided in answer to
Paragraph 23.
25.

In answer to paragraph 25 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that in late 1999, MRIA asked Sandra Bruce to meet with
SARG/GSR as MRIA had not been able to reach an agreement with SARG/GSR regarding the
provision of MRI services at the downtown site. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care admit
that MRIA wanted Saint Alphonsus to threaten SARG/GSR over its contract with Saint
Alphonsus in order to force SARG/GSR to agree to MRIA's demands. Saint Alphonsus and
Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 25 of the Third Amended
Counterclaim.
26.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

26 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
27.

In answer to paragraph 27 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that as of July 1, 2001, Diversified Care became a member ofiMI's
non-MRI operations. As of this time, IMI had been operating since late 1999. As a part of the
IMI Operating Agreement by which Diversified Care became a member of the non-MRI portion
ofiMI's outpatient imaging business, Diversified Care and ICR agreed on a method by which
Diversified Care could also participate in IMI's MRI operations in the event Saint Alphonsus
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was able to be a participant in an MRI business. At the time, Saint Alphonsus and Diversified
Care were in on-going and longstanding discussions with MRIA to allow Saint Alphonsus to be
involved in MRI operations. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of
allegations of paragraph 27.
28.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in

paragraph 28 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
29.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in

paragraph 29 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
30.

In answer to paragraph 30 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations
contained therein and, therefore, deny the same.
31.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

31 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
32.

In answer to paragraph 32 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that Diversified Care executed an Operating Agreement effective
July 1, 2001, by which Diversified Care became a member ofiMI's non-MRI operations. Saint
Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 32.
33.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

33 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
34.

In answer to paragraph 34 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care state that Saint Alphonsus entered into a relationship with IMI in July 2001
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for non-MRI portions ofiMI's business. At that time, Saint Alphonsus still had the expectation
that the ongoing discussions between and amongst SARG/GSR/ICR, MRIA, and Saint
Alphonsus would result in an amicable solution for all parties regarding the provision of MRI
services. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations contained
in paragraph 34.
35.

In answer to paragraph 35 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care deny the allegations, and incorporate the response provided in answer to
Paragraph 34.
36.

In answer to paragraph 36 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care deny the allegations, and incorporate the response provided in answer to
Paragraph 34.
37.

In answer to paragraph 37 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care deny the allegations, and incorporate the response provided in answer to
Paragraph 34.
38.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

38 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
39.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

39 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
40.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

40 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
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41.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

41 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
42.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

42 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
43.

In answer to paragraph 43 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that they made good-faith efforts to purchase the assets ofMRI
Center. Discussions were not successful due to no fault of Saint Alphonsus and Diversified
Care. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations contained in
paragraph 43.
44.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

44 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
45.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

45 of the Third Amended Counterclaim. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care also specifically
note that MRIA's allegation that "SARMC wrongfully dissociated from MRIA by withdrawing
in breach of the conditions for withdrawal stated in Section 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement"
was expressly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in its October 2009 decision. In that
decision, the Supreme Court held that Section 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement is "not an
express provision limiting the right to dissociate rightfully," and that Saint Alphonsus had not
wrongfully dissociated in violation of an express provision of the Partnership Agreement. Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1077-78.
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46.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

46 of the Third Amended Counterclaim. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care also specifically
note that MRIA's claim that the "duration of the [MRI Center] partnership" was until "at least
2023" was specifically rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in its October 2009 decision. In that
decision, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he limited partnership agreement for MRI Center
provides that it can only be amended through a properly executed written instrument," and that
"[t]here was no properly executed written instrument extending the term of the MRI Center
limited partnership beyond December 31, 2015." Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.,
148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1086.
4 7.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

4 7 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
48.

In answer to paragraph 48 of the Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus

and Diversified Care admit that MRI Center terminated SARG/GSR as the physicians
interpreting magnetic resonance images generated at Center. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified
Care further admit that MRIA stated that it would use Boise Advanced Radiology. Saint
Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations ofpanrgraph 48.
49.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

49 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
50.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

50 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
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51.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

51 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
52.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

52 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
53.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

53 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
54.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

54 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
55.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

55 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
56.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

56 of the Third Amended Counterclaim. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care also note that the
allegations of Paragraph 56 are taken nearly verbatim from the antitrust allegations of paragraph
67 ofMRIA's Second Amended Counterclaim, with the only change being that references to
"antitrust" have been changed to references to a "conspiracy." The Idaho Supreme Court,
however, has already affirmed the dismissal ofMRIA's antitrust claims, see Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care, Inc., 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1089, and to the extent MRIA is attempting

to recast its antitrust allegations under the guise of"conspiracy," the allegations of paragraph 56
are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision.
57.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

57 of the Third Amended Counterclaim. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care also note that the
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allegations of Paragraph 57 are taken nearly verbatim from the antitrust allegations of paragraph
68 ofMRIA's Second Amended Counterclaim, with the only change being that the reference to
"unfair business tactics and anticompetitive conduct" has been changed to "acts in furtherance of
this conspiracy." The Idaho Supreme Court, however, has already affirmed the dismissal of
MRIA's antitrust claims, see Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at
1089, and to the extent MRIA is attempting to recast its antitrust allegations under the guise of
"conspiracy," the allegations of paragraph 57 are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision.
58.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

57 of the Third Amended Counterclaim. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care also note that the
allegations of Paragraph 58 are taken verbatim from the antitrust allegations of paragraph 69 of
MRIA's Second Amended Counterclaim. The Idaho Supreme Court, however, has already
affirmed the dismissal ofMRIA's antitrust claims, see Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.,
148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1089, and to the extent MRIA is attempting to recast its antitrust
allegations under the guise of"conspiracy," the allegations of paragraph 58 are inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's decision.
59.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

59 of the Third Amended Counterclaim. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care also note that the
allegations of Paragraph 59 are taken nearly verbatim from the antitrust allegations of paragraph
70 ofMRIA's Second Amended Counterclaim, with the only change being that the reference to a
"pattern of anticompetitive tactics and unfair business conduct" has been changed to
"conspiracy." The Idaho Supreme Court, however, has already affirmed the dismissal of
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MRIA's antitrust claims, see Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at
1089, and to the extent MRIA is attempting to recast its antitrust allegations under the guise of
"conspiracy," the allegations of paragraph 59 are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision.
60.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

60 of the Third Amended Counterclaim. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care also note that the
allegations ofParagraph 60 are taken nearly verbatim from the antitrust allegations of paragraph
71 ofMRIA's Second Amended Counterclaim, with the only change being the claim that MRI
Center and MRI Mobile were allegedly damaged, in addition to MRIA. The Idaho Supreme
Court, however, has already affirmed the dismissal ofMRIA's antitrust claims, see Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1089, and to the extent MRIA is
attempting to recast its antitrust allegations under the guise of"conspiracy," the allegations of
paragraph 60 are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision.
61.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care admit that MRI Center enjoyed high profits

for certain years, but otherwise deny the allegations contained in paragraph 61 of the Third
Amended Counterclaim. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care also note that the allegations of
Paragraph 61 are taken nearly verbatim from the antitrust allegations of paragraph 72 ofMRIA's
Second Amended Counterclaim, with the only change being that references to "unfair business
tactics and anticompetitive behavior" have been changed to "conspiracy." The Idaho Supreme
Court, however, has already affirmed the dismissal ofMRIA's antitrust claims, see Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1089, and to the extent MRIA is
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attempting to recast its antitrust allegations under the guise of"conspiracy," the allegations of
paragraph 61 are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision.
62.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

62 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
63.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

63 of the Third Amended Counterclaim. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care also specifically
note that MRIA's allegation that "SARMC's withdrawal from MRIA was a breach of an express
provision of the Partnership Agreement (that specifically listed the instances in which a partner
could rightfully withdraw)" was expressly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in its October
2009 decision. In that decision, the Supreme Court held that Section 6.1 of the Partnership
Agreement was "not an express provision limiting the right to dissociate rightfully," and that
Saint Alphonsus had not wrongfully dissociated in violation of an express provision of the
Partnership Agreement. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., 148 Idaho at ---, 224 P .3d at
1077-78.
64.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

64 of the Third Amended Counterclaim. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care specifically deny
that the MRIA partnership had a definite term, or that the term was "later extended to 2023."
The allegation of a term extension is premised on the allegation that the MRIA general
partnership has a term defined by reference to the separate term of the MRI Center limited
partnership, which was allegedly extended from 2015 to 2023. See 3d Am. Countercl.

~

8.

However, the allegation that the term ofMRI Center was extended to 2023 was expressly
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rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in its October 2009 decision. In that decision, the Supreme
Court held that "[t]he limited partnership agreement for MRI Center provides that it can only be
amended through a properly executed written instrument," and that "[t]here was no properly
executed written instrument extending the term of the MRI Center limited partnership beyond
December 31, 2015." Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., 148 Idaho at ---, 224 P .3d at 1086.
65.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

65 of the Third Amended Counterclaim. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care further note that
MRIA argued in its brief to the Idaho Supreme Court that Saint Alphonsus had waived the
argument, and was estopped from arguing, that the partnership was not extended to 2023, see
Respondent's Br. at 55 n.41, available at 2008 WL 5328238, yet the Supreme Court necessarily
rejected MRIA's argument by ruling on the merits that "[t]he limited partnership agreement for
MRI Center provides that it can only be amended through a properly executed written
instrument," and that "[t]here was no properly executed written instrument extending the term of
the MRI Center limited partnership beyond December 31, 2015." Saint Alphonsus Diversified

Care, Inc., 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1086.
66.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

66 of the Third Amended Counterclaim. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care also specifically
note that MRIA's allegation that "SARMC's withdrawal was wrongful, and amounts to wrongful
dissociation under I.C. [§] 53-3-602(b)(l)" was expressly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court
in its October 2009 decision, which held that Saint Alphonsus had not wrongfully dissociated
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from MRIA in violation ofldaho Code§ 53-3-602(b)(1). Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.,
148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1077-78.
67.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

67 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
68.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

68 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
69.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

69 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
70.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

70 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
71.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

71 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
72.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

72 of the Third Amended Counterclaim. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care also specifically
note that MRIA's request for an "order declaring that SARMC's withdrawal from the MRIA
partnership amounted to a wrongful dissociation I.C. [§] 53-3-602(b)(1)" is directly contrary to
the Idaho Supreme Court's October 2009 decision, which held that Saint Alphonsus had not
wrongfully dissociated from MRIA in violation of Idaho Code § 53-3-602(b)(1 ). Saint

Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1077-78.
73.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

73 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
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74.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

74 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
75.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

75 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
76.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

76 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
77.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

77 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
78.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

78 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
79.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

79 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
80.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

80 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
81.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

81 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
82.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

82 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
83.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

83 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
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84.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

84 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
85.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

85 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
86.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

86 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
87.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

87 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
88.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

88 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
89.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

89 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
90.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

90 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
91.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

91 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
92.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

92 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
93.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

93 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
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94.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

94 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
95.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

95 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
96.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

96 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
97.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

97 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
98.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

98 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
99.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

99 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
100.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

100 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
101.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph

101 of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

102.

To the extent that allegations and claims asserted in the Third Amended

Counterclaim have already been expressly or implicitly rejected or denied by the Idaho Supreme
Court or by the district court, those allegations and claims are barred by res judicata, collateral
estoppel, stare decisis, law-of-the-case, and other similar doctrines.
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SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

103.

MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile have entered into a settlement agreement

with third-party defendants Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, Gem State Radiology, LLP,
and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP, each of which was and is alleged to be a co-conspirator
and/or a joint tortfeasor with respect to the claims for relief set forth in the Third Amended
Complaint. This settlement agreement provides that "[a]ny damages recovered or recoverable"
against Saint Alphonsus "shall be reduced in amount by the ratio, portion, pro rata share, or
percentage of causal negligence, contractual liability, any claims arising from joint activities, or
in any form for fault for which [the third-party defendants] are found liable as may be
determined in a future trial or other disposition of these matters." Pursuant to this settlement
agreement and Idaho Code§§ 6-802 to 6-806, any claims and/or damages awarded against Saint
Alphonsus and/or Diversified Care must be reduced by the third-party defendants' pro rata share
of liability or otherwise reduced in accordance with Idaho law.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

104.

The claims asserted in the Third Amended Counterclaim, including in particular,

but not limited to, the claims asserted by MRI Limited and MRI Mobile, are barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

105.

The claims asserted in the Third Amended Counterclaim, including in particular,

but not limited to, the claims asserted by MRI Limited and MRI Mobile, are barred by the
doctrine of laches.
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FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

106.

MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile, by their own actions and statements,

including but not limited to their breach of fiduciary obligations to Saint Alphonsus and/or
Diversified Care, are estopped from seeking the relief claimed in the Third Amended
Counterclaim.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

107.

MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile, by their own actions and statements, have

waived any right they had to seek the relief claimed in the Third Amended Counterclaim.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

108.

MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile are barred by the doctrine ofunclean

hands from seeking the relief claimed in the Third Amended Counterclaim.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

109.

MRIA breached duties owed to the partnership and otherwise violated the MRIA

Articles of the Partnership. MRIA's breaches excuse any alleged breach by Saint Alphonsus
and/or Diversified Care of the Articles of Partnership. In asserting this defense, any alleged
breach of the Articles of Partnership by Saint Alphonsus and/or Diversified Care is specifically
denied.
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

110.

MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile lack standing to bring or maintain this

action for reasons including, but not limited to, the fact that the alleged injuries are not the type
addressed by the laws under which MRIA attempts to state their claims.
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TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
111.

MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile are barred from recovering damages

because all alleged damages are speculative or otherwise legally insufficient, and because of the
impossibility of ascertaining and allocating those alleged damages. This is not an admission that
MRIA, MRI Limited, or MRI Mobile have any damages.
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

112.

MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile are barred in whole or in part from

recovering damages because of their failure to mitigate their alleged damages. This is not an
admission that MRIA, MRI Limited, or MRI Mobile have any damages.
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

113.

The claims ofMRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile are barred because there is

no causal relationship between the alleged injuries and damages of MRIA, MRI Limited, and
MRI Mobile and the alleged acts or omissions of Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care.
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
114.

To the extent that any of the claims ofMRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile rest

on alleged defamation, those allegations of defamation are barred by the qualified privilege for
communication among parties with a common interest.
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

115.

To the extent that any of the claims ofMRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile rest

on alleged defamation, those allegations of defamation are barred because all statements
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attributed to Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care were made in good faith and reasonable belief
of the truth of such statements.
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

116.

MRIA induced any alleged breach by Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care of

MRIA's Articles of Partnership, and MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile are thereby barred
and estopped from asserting such alleged breach.
SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

117.

MRIA's Articles ofPartnership are unlawful and are void because of public

policy and, therefore, are not enforceable.
SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

118.

MRIA's Articles of Partnership failed in their essential purpose, and, therefore,

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care are excused from performing any obligations under the
Articles of Partnership.
EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

119.

Numerous claims and/or allegations assert the existence of agreements which, in

order to be enforceable, must be in writing under the Idaho Statute of Frauds.
NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

120.

MRIA's Articles of Partnership unambiguously created a partnership without a

fixed duration or term of years, and to the extent that MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile
seek to rely on evidence outside the four comers of that agreement to argue that the MRIA

ANSWER TO THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM- 28

000226

~

'

...

·.

•

,.

partnership was created for a fixed durational term, such evidence is barred by the Parol
Evidence rule.
TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

121.

MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile are not the real parties in interest to assert

one or more of the causes of action alleged in the Third Amended Counterclaim.
TWENTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

122.

Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care did not owe fiduciary duties to MRI

Limited or MRI Mobile as a matter of law, either prior to, or after, dissociation from the MRIA
partnership, and therefore Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care cannot be liable for breach of
fiduciary duty to those limited partnerships.
TWENTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

123.

The Third Amended Counterclaim fails to state claims upon which relief may be

granted and should be dismissed, in whole or in part.
ATTORNEYS' FEES

In order to defend the counterclaims brought in this case, Saint Alphonsus and
Diversified Care have been required to obtain the services of attorneys to represent them and in
connection therewith and have agreed to pay such attorneys costs and attorneys' fees in
defending this action. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care are entitled to attorneys' fees
pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120 & 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Therefore, Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care pray for judgment on the Third
Amended Counterclaim against MRIA as follows:
1.

That the Third Amended Counterclaim be dismissed with prejudice and that

MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile take nothing thereby.
2.

That Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care be dismissed from the Third Amended

Counterclaim with prejudice and that Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care be awarded their
costs and attorneys' fees incurred in defending this action as plead above.
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper in the

premises.

DATED this 16th day of April, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 161h day of April, 201 0, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

~
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D
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Patrick J. Miller, ISB No. 3221
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION
TO STRIKE IMMATERIAL MATTER
FROM THE THIRD AMENDED
COUNTERCLAIM

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,
Inc. (collectively "Saint Alphonsus"), through their counsel, hereby move pursuant to Rule 12(f)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to strike those portions of the Third Amended
Counterclaim alleging that (i) Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated from the MRIA
partnership in violation of Section 6.1 of the partnership agreement, and (ii) the term of the MRI
Center limited partnership was extended to December 2023. In its decision in this case, the
Supreme Court unequivocally rejected both of these allegations on the merits. MRIA therefore
may not reassert them on remand.

BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court made two holdings relevant to this motion in its October 21, 2009,
decision in this case. First, it reversed the district court's ruling on summary judgment that Saint
Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated from MRIA "in breach of an express provision of the
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO STRIKE IMMATERIAL MATTER FROM THE
THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM- 2
000231

partnership agreement" (specifically, Section 6.1 ofthat agreement) within the meaning ofldaho
Code§ 53-3-602(b)(l). See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP,
148 Idaho 479,---,224 P.3d 1068, 1077-78 (2009). In reaching this determination, the Supreme
Court carefully parsed the language of Section 6.1 and concluded as a matter of law that this
provision "is not an express provision limiting the right to dissociate rightfully," and that Saint
Alphonsus therefore had not dissociated wrongfully pursuant to Idaho Code § 53-3-602(b)(1 ).
148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1078-80.
Second, the Supreme Court held that the district court had erred in permitting MRIA to

recover damages for projected lost profits at MRI Center after December 31, 2015, the date
stated in the MRI Center limited partnership agreement for the expiration of MRI Center's term.
148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1086. Necessarily rejecting MRIA's argument that Saint Alphonsus
was estopped from denying that the term had been extended and had waived any argument to the
contrary, see Respondent's Appellate Br. at 55 & n.41, available at 2008 WL 5328238, the
Supreme Court held that "[t]he limited partnership agreement for MRI Center provides that it can
only be amended through a properly executed written instrument," and that "[t]here was no
properly executed written instrument extending the term of the MRI Center limited partnership
beyond December 31, 2015." 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1086. 1

1

The Supreme Court did not pass upon MRIA's alternative allegation that Saint
Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated before the expiration of a definite durational term pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 53-3-602(b)(2), or decide whether MRIA may rely on the term of the MRI Center
limited partnership to prove that the MRIA general partnership has an equivalent term. These
allegations are not at issue in this motion. At an appropriate time, Saint Alphonsus will
demonstrate that the MRIA general partnership contains no durational term as a matter of law.
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO STRIKE IMMATERIAL MATTER FROM THE
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Notwithstanding these unequivocal rulings of the Supreme Court, MRIA has now alleged
in its Third Amended Counterclaim:
•

that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from MRIA breached an express provision of
the MRIA partnership agreement, namely Section 6.1, and was therefore wrongful
under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602(b)(l). 3d Am. Countercl. ~~ 45, 63, 66, 72.

•

that the MRI Center limited partnership was extended from 2015 to 2023; that
Saint Alphonsus is estopped from arguing that the partnership was not extended to
2023; and that, because the durational term of the MRI Center limited partnership
agreement fixes the durational term of the MRIA general partnership, the latter
was also extended to 2023. Id ~~ 10, 46, 64-65.

ARGUMENT
Rule 12(f) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a district "court may order
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter."2 This Rule permits a court to strike, as "immaterial ... matter," any
"allegations which have previously been eliminated by" a prior judicial determination. Stewart v.

Arrington Constr. Co., 92 Idaho 526,530 & n.2, 446 P.2d 895, 899 & n.2 (1968) (noting
propriety of striking allegations contradicted by prior ruling on summary judgment).

2

Although Rule 12(f) indicates that a motion to strike should be filed "before" the
answer, a party may file such a motion together with an answer to prevent delay. See Xerox
Corp. v. ImaTek, Inc., 220 F.R.D. 244, 245 (D. Md. 2004) (interpreting identical federal rule).
In any event, the rule also permits the court to strike immaterial evidence "upon [its] own
initiative at any time." I.R.C.P. 12(f); see also Xerox Corp., 220 F.R.D. at 245.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO STRIKE IMMATERIAL MATTER FROM THE
THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM- 4
000233

Federal courts interpreting the substantively identical federal rule 3 have similarly granted
motions to strike under Rule 12(f) where, as here, a party attempts to re-plead allegations that
have already been rejected on the merits at an earlier stage of the case. See, e.g., Allapattah

Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1361-63, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (striking
allegations that had "been finally litigated and resolved against" pleading party during earlier
appeal and noting that pleading party cannot "advocate[] as ifthere has never been ... appellate
review" and "is not entitled to a 'do over"'); Day v. Moscow, 769 F. Supp. 472, 47576 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (striking allegations in amended complaint that had been rejected by
appellate court at earlier stage of the proceedings); Watkins & Son Pet Supplies v. Jams Co.,
107 F. Supp. 2d 883, 888, 891 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (striking amended complaint's references to
plaintiff as a "franchisee" where the "[c]ourt ha[ d] previously dismissed [p]laintiffs [claim]"
that it was a franchisee); cf United States v. Green, 33 F. Supp. 2d 203, 214-16 (W.D.N.Y.
1998) (striking allegations that were "precluded by collateral estoppel").
Two sets of allegations must be stricken from the Third Amended Counterclaim pursuant
to this standard. First, as it did in its original counterclaim, MRIA alleges (and bases its first and
second claims for relief in part on the allegation) that Saint Alphonsus "wrongfully dissociated

3

Idaho rules should be "interpret[ed] ... in conformance with the interpretation placed
upon the same language in the federal rules." Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., 145 Idaho 892,
897, 188 P.3d 834, 839 (2008). Here, Idaho Rule 12(f) and Federal Rule 12(f) were word-forword identical until December 12, 2007, when Federal Rule 12(f) was re-worded as "part of the
general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12
advisory committee's note to 2007 amend; see also id. (change "intended to be stylistic only").
The federal cases cited herein all interpret the pre-amended version of Rule 12(f).
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from MRIA by withdrawing in breach of the conditions for withdrawal stated in Section 6.1 of
the Partnership Agreement." 3d Am. Countercl. ~ 45; see also id. ~ 63 ("SARMC's withdrawal
from MRIA was a breach of an express provision ofthe Partnership Agreement (that specifically
listed the instances in which a partner could rightfully withdraw)"); id.

~

66 ("SARMC's

withdrawal ... amounts to wrongful dissociation under I.C. [§] 53-3-602(b)(l)"); id.

~

72

("SARMC's withdrawal from the MRIA partnership amounted to a wrongful dissociation under
I.C. [§] 53-3-602(b)(l)"). But whether Saint Alphonsus may be held liable for wrongful
dissociation under I.C. § 53-3-602(b)(1) based on Section 6.1 of the partnership agreement was
the principal issue before the Supreme Court, and the Court definitively and unequivocally held
that Saint Alphonsus could not be so liable because Section 6.1 "is not an express provision
limiting the right to dissociate rightfully." 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1077-78; see also supra
pp. 2-3.

Second, as it did in its original counterclaim, MRIA alleges that the "lease term for the
MRI Center [was] extended by SARMC and the MRIA board to December 31, 2023." 3d Am.
Countercl.

~

10; see also id.

~

2023"); id.

~

64 (alleging that the partnership has a definite term "which was later extended to

46 (alleging that the "duration of the partnership" was "at least

2023"). MRIA relatedly alleges that "Defendants have waived or are estopped from claiming
that the partnership was not extended to 2023 by their ratification of the extension." Id.

~

65.

These allegations, too, were resolved against MRIA by the Supreme Court, which necessarily
rejected MRIA's waiver and estoppel argument and ruled on the merits that "[t]here was no
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properly executed written instrument extending the term of the MRI Center limited partnership
beyond December 31, 2015." 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1086; see also supra p. 3.
Thus, like the losing party inAllapattah, MRIA seeks to treat the Supreme Court's
unequivocal rejection ofMRIA's allegations concerning Section 6.1 ofthe partnership
agreement and the purported extension of the term of the MRI Center limited partnership as if
they were mere suggestions to the trial court with no binding force. They obviously were not.

See, e.g., Ernst v. Hemenway & Moser Co., 126 Idaho 980, 984, 895 P.2d 581, 585 (Ct. App.
1995) ("[i]ssues [that] were raised and disposed of in [an] earlier appeal ... , under the 'law of
the case' principle, [a]re not subject to reconsideration by the district court on the remand for a
new trial"). To the contrary, the Supreme Court definitively ruled on these issues, and remanded
the case for "further proceedings that are consistent with [its] opinion." 148 Idaho at---, 224
P.3d at 1090 (emphasis added). MRIA "is not entitled to a 'do over,"' Allapattah, 372 F. Supp.
2d at 1363, and the Court should therefore strike those allegation in the Third Amended
Complaint that are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in this case.
CONCLUSION

The Court should strike, as contradicted by the decision of the Supreme Court in this case
and thus immaterial, (i) those portions of paragraphs 45, 63, 66 and 72 of the Third Amended
Counterclaim alleging that Section 6.1 of the MRIA partnership agreement is an express
provision making dissociation wrongful and/or that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from MRIA
was wrongful under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602(b)(1); and (ii) those portions of paragraphs 10, 46,
64 and 65 of the Third Amended Complaint alleging that the term of the MRI Center limited
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO STRIKE IMMATERIAL MATTER FROM THE
THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM- 7
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partnership and/or the alleged term ofthe MRIA partnership were extended to 2023 and/or that
Saint Alphonsus waived or is estopped from arguing that the alleged terms of those partnerships
were not extended to 2023. A proposed order striking the immaterial allegations is attached.

DATED this 16th day of April, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
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V.

Case No. CV OC 408219D
OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MOTION TO STRIKE IMMATERIAL
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COUNTERCLAIM

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.
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MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), MRI Limited Partnership, LP ("MRI Center"), and
MRI Mobile Limited, LP (collectively, "the MRI Entities") oppose the motion of Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively St.
Alphonsus) to strike portions of the MRI Entities' Third Amended Counterclaim
("Counterclaim").

I.

BACKGROUND

On October 21, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an opinion in the appeal from a
jury verdict on seven counts in favor of MRIA, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI
Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 224 P.3d 1068 (2009) ("Supreme Court Opinion"), in which the
Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. Contrary to St. Alphonsus's
assertion otherwise, the opinion of the Idaho Supreme Court did not eliminate the ability of the
MRI Entities to argue on remand that St. Alphonsus breached an express provision of the MRIA
partnership agreement or to argue that St. Alphonsus can be estopped from denying that the term
ofMRI Center was extended to December 2023.

II.

ARGUMENT

A Motion to Strike brought under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(t) "can be used, with
respect to a complaint, only to eliminate unnecessary or objectionable verbage." Stewart v.
Arrington Canst. Co. 92 Idaho 526, 530, 446 P.2d 895, 899 (1968). As federal courts have said
with respect to a substantially similar federal rule, "[b ]ecause striking a portion of a pleading is a
drastic remedy, such motions are generally viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted."
Watkins & Son Pet Supplies v. lams Co., 107 F.Supp.2d 883, 887 (S.D. Ohio 1999). The rule
"should be resorted to only where the pleading contains such allegations that are obviously false
and clearly injurious to a party to the action because of the kind of language used or the
OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS 'S MOTION TO STRIKE IMMATERIAL MATTER
FROM THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM- PAGE 2
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allegations are unmistakably unrelated to the subject matter." Pessin v. Keene/and Ass'n, 45
F.R.D. 10, 13 (E.D. Ky. 1968). No such extreme circumstances exist in this case.

A.

Allegations Concerning Dissociation
1.

Wrongful Dissociation in Violation of an Express Contractual
Provision

The MRIA Entities maintain in their Counterclaim that St. Alphonsus wrongfully
dissociated from MRIA in violation of an "express provision of the partnership agreement,"
Idaho Code § 53-3-602(b)(I), by withdrawing in breach of the conditions of withdrawal stated in
Section 6.1 of the Partnership Agieement. Section 6.1 outlines the "Conditions for withdrawal"
and states that: "Any Hospital partner may withdraw from the Partnership at any time if, in a
Hospital Partner's reasonable judgment, continued participation in this Partnership [affects four
specifically delineated circumstances.]" In its summary judgment decision, the district court
examined Section 6.1, and found that this was an express provision limiting the circumstances in
which St. Alphonsus could rightfully withdraw. As none of the four circumstances applied, the
district court found as a matter oflaw that St. Alphonsus's dissociation had been wrongful. The
Supreme Court held, however that this provision might have a different meaning, such as simply
outlining those circumstances in which withdrawal would avoid dissolution under the Uniform
Partnership Act. (Supreme Court Option at p. 1077.) As the Court explained:
The district court picked one definition of the word "if' ("on condition that") ...
The sentence could [also] be read to state that the hospital partner may withdraw
in the event that one of the listed events occurs ... With "if' and "conditions"
given these alternative meanings, the section is not an express provision limiting
the circumstances under which St. Alphonsus could withdraw without breaching
the partnership agreement.
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(Supreme Court Opinion at p. 1075-76) (emphasis in original).) This decision came in
the much broader context of deciding that the repeated statements at trial that dissociation
had been "wrongful" prejudiced the jury.
It is difficult to tell from the Supreme Court's decision exactly what the parties are to do

with this claim on remand. However, some instruction can be gleaned by the Supreme Court's
silence on St. Alphonsus assertion on appeal that, not only should the summary judgment ruling
in favor of MRIA have been reversed, summary judgment should have been ordered in favor of
St. Alphonsus on its cross-motion for summary judgment on this same claim. (Appellant's Brief
p. 25.) The Supreme Court did not so hold. It merely reversed the grant of summary judgment
in favor of MRIA. As summary judgment removes issues from the purview of a jury, the
reversal of summary judgment without a corresponding finding that summary judgment should
have been given to St. Alphonsus suggests that the Supreme Court believes that issues of
material fact exist on this claim which should be presented to the jury.

2.

Breach of Contract

Even if this Court is persuaded that the Supreme Court functionally granted summary
judgment in favor of St. Alphonsus on the statutory wrongful dissociation claim--even though
the Supreme Court did not so state--St. Alphonsus is overreaching by suggesting that there is no
legal theory by which the MRIA Entities could recover, as these allegations also support a
common law breach of contract claim. Unlike the statutory claim, a common law breach of
contract claim does not hinge on the violation of an "express" provision of a contract, but simply
a breach of a contractual provision. See, e.g., Ervin Canst. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695,
700, 874 P.2d 506, 511 (1993). Indeed, as the Supreme Court itself noted, its decision was
directed only at the statutory wrongful dissociation claim, which, unlike a common law breach of
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contract claim, "does not simply provide that dissociation is wrongful if it is in breach of the
partnership agreement, or if it is in breach of a provision in the partnership agreement. It is
wrongful only it ifbreaches an express provision of the partnership agreement." As such, by its
explicit terms, the Supreme Court's decision does not affect any common law breach of contract
claim, which has been pleaded in the Counterclaim.
Thus, to the extent that this Court finds that any part of the Counterclaim must be struck
in light of the Supreme Court's decision, only the word "express" and references to Idaho Code
53-3-602(b) may be struck from the Counterclaim. The underlying factual allegations that St.
Alphonsus breached Section 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement cannot be struck because it also
supports the MRI Entities' claim for breach of contract. The interpretation of the meaning of the
word "if' and the other provisions of Section 6.1, and whether St. Alphonsus' s withdrawal was a
breach of contract is a question of fact for the jury. Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 79, 205
P.3d 1209, 1215 (2009); Clarkv. St. Pau/Property and Liability Ins. Companies, 102 Idaho 756,
757, 639 P.2d 454, 455 (1981). There has been and will be ample evidence presented that St.
Alphonsus's actions constituted a breach of contract, and that St. Alphonsus knew that this was
so:
•

•

•

Exhibit 4239 (Affidavit of Thomas A. Banducci,~ 3, Ex. A), which was admitted
at trial, in which a memorandum submitted to St. Alphonsus noted that St.
Alphonsus had referred to withdrawal from MRIA as their "scorched earth
scenario" and that in withdrawing, "there may be a risk of St. Alphonsus
breaching its fiduciary responsibility to the LPs."
Exhibit 4138 (Affidavit of Thomas A. Banducci,~ 4, Ex. B), which was admitted
at trial, in which a scenario was emailed at the request of the Chief Operations
Officer and Chief Financial Officer of St. Alphonsus which stated that "The
Partnership Agreement restrict the ability of Hospital Partners to withdraw from
MRI Associates."
Exhibit 4147 (Affidavit ofThomas A. Banducci,~ 5, Ex. C), which was admitted
at trial, which was a presentation by the St. Alphonsus Chief Executive Officer
which stated that "A waiver for SARMC to participate in the imaging business of
IMI requires a unanimous favorable vote (10) from all General Partners."
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The factual allegations about St. Alphonsus's withdrawal from MRIA present genuine
questions of fact related to the breach of contract claim that have not been resolved by the Idaho
Supreme Court, and therefore cannot be struck. See Rosenberg v. Toetly, 94 Idaho 413, 417 489
P.2d 446, 450 (1971) (motions to strike under Rule 12(f) will not be granted where the matter
pleaded raised on its face genuine questions oflaw or fact). As the Supreme Court has said,
"[a]llegations in a complaint which allege one ground of relief will not be stricken upon a [Rule
12(f)] motion to strike if the ground is sufficient to claim relief on any other ground." Stewart, 92
Idaho at 530,446 P.2d at 899. 1

B.

Definite Term

The MRI Entities maintain that St. Alphonsus is estopped from denying that the lease
term for MRI Center was extended to December 31, 2023, has waived the necessity for a written
instrument, or has ratified the same. Contrary to St. Alphonsus's argument that the Supreme
Court must have "necessarily rejected MRIA's waiver and estoppel argument," (Motion to
Strike, p. 6), the Supreme Court did not reject, or even mention, any waiver, estoppel, or
ratification argument. Indeed, it was not presented to the Supreme Court as an issue on appeal in
the briefing of the parties. In its opinion the Supreme Court merely noted that no written
instrument extended the MRI Center Limited Partnership beyond December 31,2015.
The doctrines of estoppel, waiver, and ratification are not dependent on contractual
provisions. Estoppel is an equitable remedy by which a party is precluded from denying a fact in
consequence of its own previous action which has led another party to conduct himself in such a

1

The MRIA Entities also maintain that the dissociation was wrongful because it occurred prior
to the expiration of a definite term of partnership. I. C. 53-3-602(b)(2).
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way that the other party would suffer. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Lee, 95 Idaho 134, 135-36,
504 P.2d 807, 808-809 (1972). For example, the doctrine of quasi-estoppel "precludes a party
from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by
[them]. The doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a
position inconsistent with one in which [they] acquiesced, or of which [they] accepted a benefit."

Schiewe v. Farwell, 125 Idaho 46, 49, 867 P.2d 920, 923 (1993); see also Terrazas v. Blaine
County ex ref. Bd. ofCom'rs 147 Idaho 193, 200 n.3, 207 P.3d 169, 176 n. 3 (2009). Estoppel is
applicable in situations when a contract may require one result, but a party has behaved in such a
way that he is estopped from asserted that result. See e.g., Grover v. Wadsworth, 14 7 Idaho 60,
205 P.3d 1196 (2009) (although greater amount was due under the terms of a note, lender was
estopped from asserting a greater amount when inconsistent with the lender's previous position.)
Similarly, the doctrines of waiver and ratification prevent St. Alphonsus from contending
that MRI Center's term expired in 2015. See Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138
Idaho 200, 61 P.3d 557 (2002) (party waived and ratified procedural defects with respect to
contractual performance by accepting benefit from the allegedly invalid procedure); Primary

Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept. ofAdmin., 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307 (2002) (ratification of
contract by accepting party as a member despite the party's late enrollment by extending
enrollment benefits to the party). As such, the court must not strike the allegation that the term
of MRI Center was extended to 2023 because a jury could find that St. Alphonsus is prevented
from asserting otherwise.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, the Court should deny St. Alphonsus's motion to strike
portions of the MRI Entities Counterclaim.
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STATE ofiDAHO
County of Ada

)
)ss.
)

I, Thomas A. Banducci, being first duly sworn under oath, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am an attorney for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI

Mobile Limited in the above titled action.
2.

I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge.

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Exhibit 4239, which

was admitted at the trial of this matter.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of Exhibit 4138, which

was admitted at the trial of this matter.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Cis a true and correct copy of Exhibit 4147, which

was admitted at the trial of this matter.
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2010.
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Memorandum
To:
From:
Date:
Re:

Grant Chamberlain and Michael Hammond
Mike Finnerty and Bill Appleyard
September 25, 2001
St. Alphonsus / MRI Associates Overview

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a concise overview of
the dynamics surrounding the St. Alphonsus/MRI Associates
engagement and is organized into the following sections:
•

Overview of the Engagemenc

•

Ownership and Operations of MRI Associates GP and Affiliates
Ownership Structure
MRI Associates GP ( "MRIA• )
MRI Center of Id aho LP ("MRICI•)
MRI Mobile LP ( "MRIM")

•

Overview of the Stakeholders
St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("SARMC")
•

Gem State Radiology ( "GSR")
Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc.

("DMR")

Other Hospital Investors in MRIA
Jack Floyd
Others
•

Governance of MRIA

•

Financial Performance

•

Alternatives Considered by St . Alphonsus

•

Current Status

This memorandum is designed to be a working document and provides
our understanding of the current and historical relationship and
motivations of and between the stakeholders as well as the
alternatives currently under consideration by st·. Alphonsus.

SH 0763

Overview of the Engagemen i·:

St . Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("SARMc•) entered into a
general partnership, MRI Associates, GP ("MRIA"), in the early
1980's. MRIA is currently comprised of 4 hospital gener al partners
and 5 physicians who have formed a separate corporation that holds
their interests. While the physicians own only 45% of MRIA, they
have 5 of 10 board votes and the swing vote in the event of a tie
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vote. MRIA provides MRI services through two limited partnerships,
MRI Center of Idaho LP ("MRICI") whose primary operations are the
provision of MRI services on the campus of SARMC and MRI Mobile LP
("MRIM") which provides mobile MRI imaging on routes throughout
Idaho and into Oregon, Washington and Nevada.
The radiology group associated with St. Alphonsus, Gem State
Radiology ("GSR"), does the reads for the magnets on the SARMC
campus but does not share in the profitability of the facility,
which is a source of significant aggravation to GSR. This
situation may be further exacerbated by the fact that two of the
physician general partners were founding members of GSR. SARMC
would like t.o sha.re ownership of the magnets on its campus with GSR
and enter into additional joint ventures in adjoining communities
with the practice. Unfortunately, the non-compete agreement
contained in General Partnership Agreement for MRIA precludes SARMC
from doing so.
SARMC has been exploring ways to exit MRIA but has met resistance
from the other general partners, particularly the physicians, and
from Jack Floyd, the recently appointed CEO of MRIA. (Reasons for
this resistance are discussed later in the memorandum.) From the
correspondence provided, SARMC is frustrated with the situation and
is strongly considering simply withdrawing from MRIA and competing
with the exiting MRI facilities on its. own campus after the end of I
the one-year non-compete agreement. SARMC has been advised by
counsel that this option would likely engender litigation with
MRIA.
SHP has been engaged by SARMC to prepare a Strategic Options
Assessment ("SOA") regarding the options available for achieving
their objectives of owning the facilities on their campus and being
permitted to enter into additional joint venture MRI facilities
with GSR. Further, SARMC has made it clear that they cannot use
any funds of St. Alphonsus, nor can they incur debt, to achieve
these objectives. As per the engagement agreement, SHP must
deliver the SOA by October 21, 2001. Following the completion of
the SOA, SHP will advise SARMC on a potential transaction involving
that ownership stake.
Ownership and Operations of MRI Associates GP and Affiliates

Ownership Structure
SH 0764
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MRI Associates GP is the parent company that delivers fixed and
mobile MRI services through two limited partnerships, MRI Center of
Idaho LP ( "MRICI") and MRI Mobile LP ( "MRIM") .
MRIA owns 30% of MRICI and MRIM. The other general partners of
MRIA also own shares of MRICI and MRIM directly. Additionally,
MRICI owns a 40% stake of MRIM. Distributions to partners are
determined by ultimate ownership in each limited partnership and
are outlined in Attachment 1 to this memorandum. The ownership
structures of MRIA and its affiliates are as follows:
Ownership ot' MRIA

IIIDMR

IISARMC
DMedNow

DHRMC
II Health Trust

25%

Ownership for MRICI

Ownership for MRIM

liliDMR

II%

liSARJVIC

IIISARMC

·'_;~

DMedNow

DMedNow

40%a.;;.'·
. .·
15%
.
3%

DHRMC
II HealthTrust
li1l Others

.

1%

30"!.·

IIIIMRJA

liHealthTrust
Ell Others

IIIMRIA
GIMRICI
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MRI Associates GP

MRIA exists on paper only and no assets and or services are
associated directly with the entity. However, MRIA does collect a
"Management fee" from both MRICI and MRIM of 7.5% of revenue. This
money is a preferred return to the general partners which is paid
to compensate the general partners for their higher level of risk
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incurred. In the event of any liquidation, the limited partners
will be paid off prior to the general partners.

SH 0766
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MRI Center of Idaho LP
MRICI's operations are primarily the provision of MRI services on
the SARMC campus, where it owns two magnets. MRI Mobile LP
{discussed below) leases its employees from MRICI. As mentioned
previously, MRICI owns a 40% interest in MRIM.
For the year ended
December 31, 2000, MRICI had $3.7 million of EBITDA on $7.0 million
in revenue.

MRI Mobi 1 e LP
MRIM began by offering mobile MR services to the other hospitals
within the general partnership. These magnets have since been
replaced with fixed magnets but the relationship remains with MRIM.
In addition, MRIM runs routes throughout Idaho and into Oregon,
Washington, Nevada and will soon enter Montana. We are awaiting
information regarding the number of magnets used by MRIM.
For the
year ended December 31, 2000, MRIM had $4.4 million of EBITDA on
$11.6 million in revenue.
Overview of the Stakeholders
•

St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center:
SARMC is a 281 bed
facility in Boise, ID with $211.7 million in net patient
revenue and $29.7 million in EBITDA for the thirteen months
ended June 30, 2000.
It is a member of Trinity Health
{formerly a member of Holy Cross Health System prior to its
merger with Mercy) and is the designated trauma center in the
Boise region.
As discussed above, SARMC's objective is to allow their
radiology group to acquire a 50% equity position in the magnets
on the SARMC campus and enter into additional joint ventures in
surrounding markets with GSR.
SARMC has made it clear that
they cannot use any funds of St. Alphonsus, nor can they incur
debt, to achieve these objectives.
SARMC is the second largest
investor in MRIA with 25% of the equity and 2 of 10 board
seats.

•

Gem State Radiology: GSR is the existing group of radiologists
affiliated with SARMC. They feel the current ownership of the
MRis on the SARMC campus is not equitable.
Further, these
radiologists believe their reputation and expertise are
paramount to the success of the MRICI facilities on the SARMC
campus.

SH 0767
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GSR and SARMC explored the possibility of GSR purchasing shares
in Doctor's Magnetic Resonance, Inc. ("DMR") but ultimately
declined as they were unwilling to be bound by the non-compete
agreement that all general partners are subject to (a clash of
ego's was also sited as a reason for GSR's refusal to join
DMR).
Instead, GSR and SARMC have opened a new, independent radiology
center in Boise, known as Inter-Mountain Imaging ("IMI"), which
offers general x-ray, CT and MRI services in partnership with
SARMC. To avoid violating their non-compete, the joint venture
was structured such that SARMC only owns a portion of the nonMRI portion of the partnership, which is significantly less
profitable than the MRI business. While this is a creative
"work around" it does not satisfy the long-term strategic
objectives of SARMC. GSR, through Jeff Cliff, mentioned below,
has indicated that they are not interested in entering into the
mobile imaging business..
Jeff Cliff, the Executive Director of GSR, manages all of the
business operations of the entity and acts as a CFO and COO.
He does not currently own an equity stake in GSR, but implied
in our discussions of September 19th that it was being
negotiated. He was the principal owner of Practice Management
Incorporated ("PMI"), a firm that provides billing, financial
and other administrative services to MRIA, GSR and other
medical organizations in Boise. PMI is now run by Paul DeWitt
and Jeff Cliff owns a minority stake.
•

Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc.: DMR is a corporation formed
by the five physician general partners for purposes of
investing in MRIA, in which they are the largest shareholders.
DMR controls half of the board of MRIA and owns 45% of the
equity. An overview of the physicians and their motivations
(as described by SARMC) follows.
• Dr. Prochaska: Retired at a young age. He and Dr. Giles are
seen by SARMC as key to swaying the other doctors in key
votes.
•

Dr. Giles:

Former head of GSR until he was forced out

because of a perceived conflict of interest between his role
at GSR and his investment in MRIA. Upon leaving GSR, he
joined Mercy Medical Center, a competitor of SARMC. As
mentioned above, Dr. Giles is seen as being key in swaying
the other doctors.
Dr. Henson: Retired young and believed to be seeking a
liquidity event.
SR 0768
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•

•

Dr. Curran: Retired, but very active. He was the acting CEO
of MRIA prior to the appointment of Jack Floyd and was
involved in the creation of DMR and MRIA. His son is
currently on the SARMC medical staff.
Dr. Havilina: Retired, and holds bitterness toward GSR. His
son is currently on the SARMC staff.

•

Other Hospital Investors in MRIA: There are currently three
other hospital general partners in MRIA, on which we have
limited information. We do know that two of the hospital
general partners voted against SARMC with regard to exploring
putting a magnet on the campus of a competitor to SARMC. The
following is what we currently know about the hospital general
partners.
• MedNow: A CHI facility and wholly owned subsidiary of Mercy
Medical Center, Nampa. MedNow owns 16% of MRIA and has one
board seat.
• Holy Rosary Medical Center ("HRMC"): HRMC is also a CHI
facility and is located in Ontario, OR, they invested in MRIA
in the mid-1990s. HRMC owns 10% of MRIA and has one board
seat.
• Healthtrust: A Columbia/HCA facility in Caldwell, formerly
West Valley Medical Center. Healthtrust owns 5% of MRIA and
has one board seat.

•

Jack Floyd: Recently named CEO of MRIA, but has no equity in
MRIA or DMR. He believes there is significant growth potential
in the mobile side of the business (and a possible IPO) but
believes he needs the SARMC name and access to SARMC trained
technicians to bring credibility to the mobile business.
Earlier this year SARMC voted against the purchase of two new
magnets favored by Jack Floyd. Following that incident, Floyd
brought a motion before the board to put an MRI at a hospital
competitor to SARMC. It is not clear whether this was done in
retaliation for SARMC's vote.
Moving forward, Floyd strongly believes that cardiac MRI
imaging could contribute to explosive growth for MRIA. He also
stated that he thought MRICI and MRIM could not be separated as
there were many synergies (primarily the training of
technicians) and MRIM does not yet have the critical mass to
support the necessary fixed costs of the operation. He is
confident that MRIM will continue to win contracts from
hospitals over larger competitors since MRIM offers more
personalized service and shorter contacts.
(MRIM is offering
contacts with duration of as little as one year, compared with
SH 0769
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the industry standard of three years. Being forced to
renegotiate these short contracts annually could severely hurt
MRIM going forward.)
These were voiced in the September 18th
meeting in Boise.
•

Others: Other investors, identified in SARMC material only as
"Others," own minority stakes in MRICI and MRIM (14% and 1%
respectively) . They do not have any voting rights pertaining
to the MRIA board. The "Others" primarily consist of other
doctors in the Boise area, some affiliated with SARMC, who
purchased limited partnership stakes when the entities were
formed in the 1980s.

Governance of MRIA
All of the significant decisions of MRIA must be approved by the
board. Board representation is only roughly correlated with
ownership.
In general, the DMR physicians have significant control
over the direction of the company and the ability of St. Alphonsus
to affect a transaction.
The number of votes by shareholder is provided below.
SARMC
2 votes
MedNow
1 vote
HRMC
1 vote
Healthtrust
1 vote
DMR
5 votes (1 vote per doctor)
Total
10
•

Matters subject to a simple majority are detailed below.
However, the physicians maintain the swing vote on tie votes.
Routine matters
Capital calls
• Capital reductions

•

Eight votes are required for:
Purchase or lease of real estate
• Admission of new partners

• Transfer of partnership interests
• Dissolution and liquidation (requires 8/10 or more of
"eligible" votes, however it is not clear what governs
eligibility)

•

All ten votes are required for:

SB 0770
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• Borrowing, if aggregate debt is in excess of $5 million
• Engaging in a new venture outside of imaging

• Formation of LP agreements
•
•

Waiver of non-compete agreement
Matters outside the ordinary course of business (such as sale
of business)

There is no mention of MRICI and MRIM having their own governing
boards, so it is assumed that the MRIA board controls all decisions
affecting the subsidiaries. MRIA may not transfer its general
partner ownership interest in either LP.

SII 07'11
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Financial Performance of MRIA and Affiliates
MRI Centers of Idaho, LP & MRl Mobile, LP
Financial Statements
(Dollars in thousands)
Year Ended
Dec. 31, 2000
MRICI
MRIM

Five Months Ended
May 31, 2001
MRlCI
MRlM

Income Statement
Revenue
Operating Expenses
EBITDA
Depreciation and Amortization
Interest
Other Income I (Expenses)
Net Income

$

$

7,018
3,303
3,714
574
148
1,000
3,993

$ 11,629
7,207
4,422
1,643
486
14
$ 2,307

$

1,932

$

1,523

2,030
3,102
2,479
7,612

$

$

$

2,497
6,825

13,114

2,421
2,062
l ,510
5,993

872
1,042
1,915
5,697
7,612

2,992
5,340
8,332
4,782
$ 13,114

28
1,247
1,275
4,718
$ 5,993

$

2,840
850
1,989

$ 4,633
2,847
1,786

57

264

Balance Sheet
Current Assets
PPE (net of depreciation)
Other Assets
Total Assets

$

Current Liabilities
Long Term Debt
Capital
Total Liabilities and Capital

$

3,991
9,123

9,322
26
6,372
6,397
2,924
$ 9,322

SH 0772
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Alternatives Considered by St. Alphonsus

Presently SARMC is considering a number of alternatives for
achieving their goal of ending the non-compete associated with
their ownership in MRIA so that they can partner with GSR to
provide MRI services on the St. Alphonsus campus and in the
surrounding community.
As mentioned previously, under the terms
of the non-compete, SARMC must wait one year after exiting the
general partnership before competing in magnetic resonance imaging
within 100 miles of Boise. In addition, there are "wrongful"
termination provisions entitling the MRIA to damages in the event
that SARMC exits the partnership for the purposes of competing with
MRIA after the end of the non-compete. We are awaiting the actual
partnership agreement to analyze the wrongful termination
provisions in more detail.
The following is an overview of the options under consideration by
SARMC with regard to negating its non-compete. These options have
been reviewed with Givens Pursley, counsel to SARMC, and we have
included their thoughts on the potential litigation involved with
each alternative.
Option A: Withdrawal from MRIA

If SARMC's withdrawal from MRIA is not deemed wrongful, SARMC would
be entitled to the liquidation value of their portion of the
investment and, after a period of one year, would be able to
compete in the Boise market. (It has been reported that DMR
offered to accept $2.5 million to vote to waive the non-compete
agreement and allow SARMC to open other centers.) SARMC has
referred to this as their "scorched earth scenario.• Givens
Pursley believes that there would likely be litigation as to
whether the termination was wrongful and that there may be a risk
of St. Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary responsibility to the LPs.
Under this scenario SHP would not receive a success fee.
Option B: Sell to a Hospital Partner

Under this scenario, SARMC would sell its interests in MRIA and the
LPs to a current hospital owner (i.e. MedNow, HRMC or Healthtrust).
This would allow SARMC to compete with MRIA after a period of one
year, but it is thought that they would not receive fair market
value for their stake in such a transaction.
Option C: Transfer MRIA ownership to an "Affiliate"

11
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SARMC has considered the sale of their ownership in MRIA to an
affiliate that it would subsequently sever ties (either through
sale, divesture, etc.) with the affiliate. Under this option SARMC
would be allowed to compete after a period of one year, but SARMC
would not receive fair market value for its interests. Givens
Pursley believes there is significant litigation risk with this
approach.

Option D: Negotiated transaction with DMR
Under this scenario SARMC would transfer its ownership in MRIA and
MRIM in exchange for 100% ownership of MRICI. SARMC could then
allow its radiologists to invest in the fixed MRI site on its
campus, which would satisfy the strategic interests of both SARMC
and GSR. This is the ideal situation for SARMC as it will virtually
negate litigation risk and would immediately allow SARMC to enter
surrounding markets with GSR. Although previous attempts to affect
such a transaction have been dismissed by DMR, SARMC reports that
at a board retreat in the first quarter of 2001, one of the
physician owners of DMR said it would consider such a transaction
if the price was right.

Option E: Allow GSR to put one or more MR sites on the SARMC campus
SARMC has considered allowing GSR to put magnets on its campus
without partnering with SARMC. This approach would placate GSR,
but it would have an adverse financial impact on SARMC.

I

Other Options Previously Considered
Other scenarios that were previously considered included SARMC
buying out DMR (a move which would require the unanimous approval
of all five doctors) or buying out all other members of MRIA.
These have been dismissed as unfeasible because of SARMC's capital
constraints and because it is contrary to SARMC's present goals of
divesting of the mobile business in favor of partnering with GSR in
its local markets.

SH 0774

Current Status

It is our understanding that St Alphonsus would prefer Option D
(Negotiated transaction with DMR) . However, management has become
quite weary from years of debate on this matter and is leaning
toward terminating its interests in MRIA, receiving the liquidation
value for its shares and competing in one year. SARMC has informed
other members of MRIA that they will not support future growth of

12
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MRIA as long as there are no plans to deal with SARMC's strategic
goals of partnering with GSR.

Current.ly aaved loeally by Bill Appleyard duo to NY oerver canveru¢n.
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From :
To:
Date:
Subject:

<all en.hahn@us.pwcglobal.com>
SARMC .PO-SARMC(SARABRAT)
Wed, Jan 5, 2000 2:40 PM
Engagement Documents

Attached are the documen ts requested by Cindy and Ken. The report on the IMI
joint venture is draft; please have Cindy/Helen review and call w/any comments .
We will send a final copy after suggested edits are incorporated. Also Is
"Scenario 5" which Ken requested based on our reading of the relevant
partnership documents . A FED EX will arrive tomorrow with draft copies of both
documents. Please call if either Ken or Cindy would li ke to discuss.
regards
(See attached file : Report_IM I_9_ 1_99_final.doc)(See attached file : Scenario
5.doc)
The information transmitted is intended only fo r th e person or entity to which
it is add ressed and may contain confiden tial and/or privileged material. Any
review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action
in reliance upon, th is information by persons or entities other than the
intended recipient is prohibited . If you received this In error, please
con tact the sender and delete the material from any computer.

P-1029
SARMC08047
Office of the CFO

1

000266

Confidential Draft for Discussion
Restructuring of MRI Associates General Partnership
Scenario 5
SARMC withdraws from MRI Associates to provide flexibility to form potentially
competing ventures
Considerations
1)

The Partnership Agreement restricts the ability of Hospital Partners to
withdraw from MRI Associates. A Hospital Partner may withdraw at any
time if, in the Hospital Partner's reasonable judgement, continued
participation in MRI Associates:

2)

•

jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of the Hospital Partner;

•

jeopardizes medicare/medicaid
participations;

•

if the business activities of MRI Associates are contrary to the ethical
principles of the Roman Catholic Church; or

•

is or may be in violation of any local, state or federal laws, rules or
regulations (Articles of Partnership, Section 6.1)

or

insurance

reimbursements

or

SARMC would be restricted for a period of one year after becoming a
Terminated Partner from engaging in any Competitive Activity (Third
Amendment to Articles ofPartnership, Section 8.1)

3)

A favorable vote of all current members of the Board of Partners can waive
the Partnership's rights with respect to any particular activity and Restricted
Party (Articles ofPartnership, Section 9.4)

4)

The appearance of shifting referrals may potentially result in legal
challenges from GP and LP interest holders, and investigations from State
and Federal authorities

5)

Unless otherwise agreed, SARMC would receive the balance of its .
Partner's capital account at the time of withdrawal (Articles. of Partnership,
Section 6.1)

6)

Withdrawal would not relieve SARMC from any contingent liability in
existence at the time of withdrawal (Articles of Partnership, Section 6.3)

7)

SARMC would retain limited partnership interests in Idaho and Mobile
SARMC08062
Office of the CFO
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From:
To:

Data:
Subject:

<allen.hahn@us.pwcglobel.com>
Sarah Bratley <SARABRAT@mailstn.sarrnc.org>
Mon. Jan 31, 2000 12:47 PM
SARMC Draft Presentation

Attached is the draft of Cindy's presentation for the SMC meeting tomorrow.
Given !he complexity of the subject matter, we shoul\1 discuss these slides with
Cindy and Ken this afternoon. She may then need some changes to these slides.
Please have her look at these slides ASAP. I will be leaving the office at 5:30
EST today.
(See attached file: slldesflnal.ppt)

The Information transmitted Is Intended only for the person or entity to which
it Is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. Any
review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action
In reliance upon, this Information by persons or entities other than the
intended recipient Is prohibited. If you received this in error, please
contact the sender and delete the material fro.m any computer.

CC:

SARMC.GWIA{"kevln.c.sands@us.pwcglobal.com")
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~Saint Alphonsus
" " ' Regional Medical Center

An Introduction to MRI Associates Legal Ownership of the Partnerships
MRI Associates GP
HRMC
10.00%

~~d

DMR
45.00%
lnrerest in Distribution•
DMR
31.06%
SARMC
26.56%

Inrerest In Distributions
DMR
43.95%
SARMC
2!.60%
Mednow
11.20%
HRMC
6.38%
Healthtrust
2.87%
Others
14.00%

Mednow

HRMC
Healthtrust

Others

9.35%

5.55%
2.53%
24.95%

0"--MRIA
30.00%

Healthttutt

Mednow
6.48%

14.18%

0.04%

MRI Center of Idaho LP

Others
19.35%

MRI Mobile LP
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~Saint Alphonsus

" ' - " Regional Medical Center

Restrictive Partnership Agreements Limit
the Potential Restructuring Options for MRI Associates
•

Buy-out of DMR' s interest in MRI Associates requires a unanimous
favorable vote from DMR shareholders

•

MRI Associates may not sell nor transfer its General Partner
ownership interest in either Limited Partnership

•

Sale or dissolution of the operations of either Limited Partnership
requires 8 favorable votes

•

Numerous Limited Partnership holders create the potential for a legal
challenge without a buy -out of LP interests

•

A waiver for SARMC to participate in the imaging business of IMI
requires a unanimous favorable vote (10) from all General Partners
SARMC01268

I OFFICE OF THE,CFO
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~Saint Alphonsus

"tJ' Regional Medit:al Center
GoaJs/Constraints of a Potential Restructuring of :MRl Associates
• SARMC
-

secure long-term strategy for imaging services with radiologists

-

availability of capital

-

timing of Holy Cross merger

• Other Hospital Partners
-

secure control over local imaging services/revenues

-

maintain network connection to trauma center

-

availability of capital/potential reduc~on in future income

• DMR Physicians
-

divergent shareholder objectives

• Radiologists
- partner with SARMC
-

availability of capital for buy-in to existing MRI business

- no exposure to mobile MRI services

SARMC01269
I OFFICE OF THE CFO
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~Saint Alphonsus

~ Regional Medical Center

Scenario 1
SARMC Buys MRIA & Fixed and DMR & Hospitals Buy Mobile

MRIA/
SARMC

\1obile

SARMCbuys
Hospital's Interest
inMRJA

MRIA borro"':s
to repurchase

M<>bDe LP interest-s

MobUe borrows
to repurchase
\lobile LP interests

MRIA repurchases
FixedLI'
Interests

Mobile repurchases
LP Interests

Fixed

UMR!
H<,spitals

fl;.:diologib~l
i buy into I

Radiologist~

1

Fixed

!
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~Saint Alphonsus

'tJ' Re9ional Medical Center
Scenario 1
Ownership of the Partnerships after Transactions
MRI Associates GP

Radiologists
20.00%

DMR
50.00%

Hospitals
50.00%

80.00%

NewCo-MobRe 1

MRI Center of Idaho LP

I
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~Saint Alphonsus
't)' Regional Medical Center
Scenario 1
Schedule of Expected Net Cash Flows

[F;;h;;;~b:e;;;~.-~!b2_·_~-::-:·:.::·:·.-.~···.:i~::~oj~--~;n·:-~:~·3;;_;:·-._·_~--i--·-~-~- -UOO-~

··-M·--···-··-•

oo00,0 000 · - · - -

o•

00

o

~---······-- ............. ······--··

~~~~~~~J!i!Mt;~~!..t.

,oM.-,,,,,

,,,,

,,,,,,

oO'OoOO

o000~...

--······

O

• .....

'oOOOo

OO

'OOO-O

.........................................

,,,,,,_.,_,

O'o,

••

.,,

.

-~"'

8

-············--

______________ . . _ _ .....__________ . .

,,,,,

1
: .. M.~~..!-~"~~~pb_~_l:,s_~-~ by ~~-~~-ijo~~r-·-.jt"·:·

. ----·· ---- · · -···

000

··-··-·

SARMC01272
OFFICE OF THE CFO

000276

'

~Saint Alphonsus

'tY Regional Medical Center
Scenario 2
SARMC Buys DMR Interest in MRIA and DMR & Hospitals Own Mobile
Step l
MIHAl

SAR:--1<.:

Mobile

Step 2
MRIA borrows
to repurchase

Mobile LP interests

Mobile borroD
to repw·chase
'v!obile LP interests
1

Step 4

Step 3

Step 5

MlUA repurchases
Fli<edLP
Iutercsts

L:

repurchas~

Interest~

l

ll'IH{!
Howltals

Radiologists
bay Into
Fixed

Radlok>glsts
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~Saint Alphonsus

'tJ' Regional Medical Center

Scenario2
Ownership of the Partnerships after Transactions
MRI Associates GP

Hospu~~~

--L--J

DMR
50.00%

Hospitals
50.00%

SARMC

32.2:7%

NewCo-Mobile

MRI Center of Idaho LP
SARMC01274
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'

~Saint Alphonsus

'tJ' Regional Medical Center
Scenario 2
Schedule of Expected Net Cash Flows
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~Saint Alphonsus
't)' Regional Medical Center
Expected Benefits of a Potential Restructuring of MRI Associates

• SARMC
- Aligns strategic/financial interests of Hospital and radiologists
- Participate in proceeds if NewCo-Mobile sold in future
- IRR expected to exceed 25 percent on capital employed

•

Other Hospital Partners
- "One-time" inflow of capital/maintain some level current income
- Increased flexibility/control to pursue local imaging strategy
• DMR Physicians
- Provides liquidity for GP and LP partnership interests
- Opportunity to participate in NewCo-Mobile
• Radiologists
- Reduce uncertainty through partnerships with SARMC
- Attractive investment opportunity in SARMC' s MRI business
SARMC01276
1.
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. RANDALL
DEPUTY

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION
TO STRIKE IMMATERIAL MATTER
FROM THE THIRD AMENDED
COUNTERCLAIM

Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO STRIKE IMMATERIAL
MATTER FROM THE THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM - 1
000281

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

In its decision remanding this case, the Supreme Court made two unambiguous holdings
that conflict with allegations contained in the Third Amended Counterclaim: (i) "[w ]e hold that
[Section 6.1] is not an express provision limiting the right to dissociate rightfully," and (ii) "[t]he
limited partnership agreement for MRI Center provides that it can only be amended through a
properly executed written instrument," but "[t]here was no properly executed written instrument
extending the term of the MRI Center limited partnership beyond December 31, 2015." Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, ---, 224 P.3d 1068, 107778, 1086 (2009). Contending that these straightforward rulings do not finally resolve two key
issues in this case, Counter-Claimants (collectively "MRIA") continue a fight against the
Supreme Court's decision that began when, in an unsuccessful petition for rehearing on appellate
costs, MRIA asserted that Saint Alphonsus was not the prevailing party on appeal. Id at---,

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO STRIKE IMMATERIAL
MATTER FROM THE THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM- 2
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224 P .3d at 1091. 1 Because the Supreme Court's opinion resolves these two issues, this Court
should grant the motion to strike and put an end to MRIA's stubborn insistence that the Supreme
Court's decision does not mean what it says.

ARGUMENT
MRIA does not contest either Saint Alphonsus's authority to seek, or this Court's power
to grant, a motion to strike the challenged allegations here. It offers no authority contradicting
the long line of cases (Mot. to Strike. at 4-5) holding that "allegations which have previously
been eliminated by" a prior judicial determination are "immaterial ... matter" subject to strike.
Stewart v. Arrington Constr. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 530 & n.2, 446 P.2d 895, 899 & n.2 (1968). 2
And its contention that the challenged portions of its Counterclaim were not "previously
eliminated" is wrong.
First, MRIA's argument that, in reversing a grant of summary judgment in favor of
MRIA, the Supreme Court's decision left open the possibility that MRIA could prevail before a
1

This contention was so baseless that the Supreme Court rejected MRIA's petition
unanimously, without even directing Saint Alphonsus to file a response. See id. ("St. Alphonsus
appealed the judgment against it for $33,872,677.63 (after offsets and an award of costs and
attorney fees) and obtained a ruling vacating that judgment. MRIA cross-appealed and lost on
all issues raised by its cross-appeal. St. Alphonsus was the prevailing party on this appeal.").
2

Of the cases that MRIA cites regarding Rule 12(t) (see Opp'n at 2-3), the ones that are
on point ruled contrary to MRIA's position here. See Stewart v. Arrington Constr. Co., 92 Idaho
526, 530 & n.2, 446 P .2d 895, 899 & n.2 (noting the propriety of striking allegations that had
previously been decided on summary judgment); Watkins & Son Pet Supplies v. lams Co.,
107 F. Supp. 2d 883, 888, 891 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (striking claim that plaintiff was a "franchisee"
when claim had been previously dismissed). The third case it cites, Pessin v. Keeneland Ass 'n,
45 F.R.D. 10, 13 (E. D. Ky. 1968), did not involve the propriety of a motion to strike alreadydecided claims. Yet even in the words ofthat case, MRIA's re-allegation of already-decided
issues is plainly "false" and "clearly injurious," not only to Saint Alphonsus, but also to this
Court's judicial resources. !d.
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO STRIKE IMMATERIAL
MATTER FROM THE THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM- 3
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jury on its "express provision" wrongful dissociation claim (Opp'n at 3-4) ignores both settled
law-of-the-case principles and the unambiguous words of the Supreme Court's holding. When,
"upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle
or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and
must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon
subsequent appeal." Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000). Here,
the Supreme Court did just that by "hold[ing]" that Section 6.1 "is not an express provision
limiting the right to dissociate rightfully." Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 107778. It is not "difficult to tell" (Opp'n at 4) what this holding means. It means that MRIA can no
longer assert, and no jury may find, that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated from MRIA in
violation of an express provision of the partnership agreement.
The meaning of the Supreme Court's holding is especially clear from the language of the
decision that MRIA does selectively quote. See Opp'n at 3. In that paragraph, the Supreme
Court explained that the district court was able to find "wrongful withdrawal" only by
"infer[ring]" that the reasons for withdrawal listed in Section 6.1 were exclusive. Saint

Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1076. But the very fact that Section 6.1 required an
inference of exclusivity means, the Court explained, that Section 6.1 by definition is not an

"express provision limiting the circumstances under which St. Alphonsus could withdraw." !d.
It certainly does not mean, as MRIA contends, that a jury is now free to conclude that the

provision is express.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO STRIKE IMMATERIAL
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Undaunted, MRIA asserts that it is free to assert a "common law" claim for breach of
Section 6.1 that is somehow separate and distinct from its "statutory wrongful dissociation
claim." Opp'n at 4-5. This argument makes no sense. First, MRIA's counterclaim does not
allege any such separate claim. It alleges only that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal "amounts to
wrongful dissociation under I.C. §§ 53-3-602(b)(1) and (2)." 3d Am. Countercl. ~ 66. 3
More importantly, any such separate claim would be meaningless in this context. As the
Supreme Court held, a partner has a statutory right under RUP A to dissociate from a partnership,
and that right can be revoked only by an express provision of the partnership agreement. Saint
Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1074-75. Saint Alphonsus exercised this statutory right
to dissociate, and the Court held that Section 6.1 did not prevent it from doing so:
Because the provision limiting the right to withdraw rightfully
must be an express provision, any doubt as to the meaning of the
provision at issue must be resolved in favor of not limiting the right
to withdraw. The provision of the partnership agreement at issue
does not contain any prohibitive language. For example, it does
not state that a hospital partner shall not withdraw from the
partnership except under the specified circumstances. Likewise, it
does not state that a hospital partner may only withdraw from the
partnership under the specified circumstances.

!d. at---, 224 P.3d at 1077 (emphasis added). The Court thus concluded that Section 6.1 "is not
an express provision limiting the right to dissociate rightfully." !d. at---, 224 P.3d at 1078.
Plainly, the Supreme Court examined Section 6.1 ofthe partnership agreement and held
that it did not take away Saint Alphonsus's statutory right to dissociate. It follows that Saint

3

By contrast, MRIA does allege a separate "breach" of the partnership agreement's noncompete obligation. !d. ~~ 67, 70. Saint Alphonsus does not seek to strike that allegation.
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO STRIKE IMMATERIAL
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Alphonsus cannot be held liable for exercising this statutory right. The Court's holding is clear
and unmistakable, and it may not be evaded by MRIA conjuring up a new "common law" theory
of violation of Section 6.1.

Second, MRIA's attempt to resurrect its claim that the MRI Center limited partnership
term was extended to 2023 likewise runs headlong into the Supreme Court's straightforward
rejection of this claim as a matter oflaw. In a section of its decision captioned "Must the Award
of Damages Be Vacated because It Includes Lost Profits beyond the Term of the Partnership?,"
the Supreme Court expressly decided the limited-partnership term extension issue "because it
may arise again on retrial." Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1086. Framing the
issue as whether "the district judge erred by permitting MRIA to recover damages based upon
MRI scans that MRI Center would have lost after December 31, 2015, the date stated in the
limited partnership agreement for the expiration of its term," the Supreme Court held that "[t]he
limited partnership agreement for MRI Center provides that it can only be amended through a
properly executed written instrument," and that "(t]here was no properly executed written
instrument extending the term of the MRI Center limited partnership beyond December 31,
2015." /d. This unambiguous holding means that MRIA may not assert, and a jury may not
find, that the limited partnership term was extended beyond 2015, and that MRIA may not
recover, and a jury may not award, damages for profits allegedly lost after 2015.
This ruling is law of the case, and MRIA cannot strip it of its binding force by claiming
that there are alternative grounds-i.e., an alleged waiver and estoppel by Saint Alphonsus-for
giving effect to the purported contract extension and allowing damages beyond 2015. In any
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO STRIKE IMMATERIAL
MATTER FROM THE THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM- 6
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event, MRIA's waiver and estoppel allegations were also resolved against MRIA by the Supreme
Court's holding. Contrary to MRIA's assertion that its waiver/estoppel argument "was not
presented to the Supreme Court as an issue on appeal in the briefing of the parties" (Opp'n at 6),
MRIA's appellate brief argued, in support ofMRIA's extension theory, that:
SARMC waived any right to claim the partnership terms were not
extended by voluntarily relinquishing that claim through ratifying
the vote to extend the term. Frontier Fed Sav. & Loan v.
Douglass, 123 Idaho 808, 812, 853 P.2d 553, 557 (1993). Thus,
SARMC is stopped [sic]. KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279,
282, 486 P .2d 992, 995 (1971) (applying the doctrine of quasiestoppel to similar facts).
Mot. to Strike at 3 (quoting MRIA's Appellate Br. at 55 n.41, available at 2008 WL 5328238).
Saint Alphonsus responded to this argument in its appellate reply brief, noting that MRIA's
theory was both legally and factually incorrect (as MRIA had filed, long after the supposedly
"ratifying vote," an Amended Certificate of Limited Partnership with the Idaho Secretary of
State confirming a 2015 limited-partnership term). See Saint Alphonsus's Combined Reply and
Resp. to Cross-Appeal at 37-38 & n.23, available at 2008 WL 5507132. The Supreme Court
thus made its ruling in full awareness of, and following briefing on, MRIA's waiver/estoppel
argument, and therefore necessarily rejected that argument.

CONCLUSION
The Court should strike the portions of the Third Amended Counterclaim that are
contradicted by the decision of the Supreme Court in this case, as set forth in Saint Alphonsus's
Motion to Strike and the proposed order attached thereto.
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DATED this 6th day of July, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 6th day of July, 2010, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

D
D
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho non profit corporation,
Case No. CV OC 2004 08219
Plaintiff,
ORDER RE: SCHEDULING
PRELIMINARY MOTIONS FROM THE
PARTIES AND BRIEFING SCHEDULE

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership;
and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
Vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho non profit corporation,
Counter-defendant.

The Court being advised at a hearing conducted on the morning of July 9, 2010, that the
parties have been unable to agree among themselves as to scheduling of certain motions for
hearing and a briefing schedule, the Court hereby issues its own schedule with which the parties
shall comply.

ORDER RE: SCHEDULING PRELIMINARY MOTIONS FROM THE PARTIES AND
BRIEFING-PAGE 1
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The following motions, if filed by the parties, will be set for hearing at 9:00 a.m. on
October 1, 2010. Such motions and supporting briefing maybe filed by either party no later than
5:00p.m. on August 6, 2010.
1) Motions relating to the issue of claims of wrongful dissociation based upon a definite
term.
2) Motions relating to claims of a stature of limitation defense or defenses relating to
any newly named party or parties.
3) Motions relating to so called Pope issues concerning damages for lost profits and
adequacy of proof.
Each side shall have one hour to argue its position or positions in oral argument unless
good cause is shown by a formal motion filed no later than August 16, 2010, for additional time.
Any responsive briefing shall be filed no later than 5:00p.m. on August 30, 2010.
Any reply briefing shall be filed no later than September 13, 2010 at 5:00p.m.
No brief on any motion shall exceed 30 pages in length including attachments and
exhibits.
Nothing contained herein is intended to limit the right of the parties to file additional
motions of a similar nature for hearing on October 1, 2010, so long as the scheduling time lines
set forth above are adhered to as to all motions filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 9th day of July, 2010.
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Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
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Case No. CV OC 2004-H-98g

MOTION TO AMEND ORDER: RE
SCHEDULING PRELIMINARY
MOTIONS

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counterclaimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counterdefendant.
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Defendant/Counterclaimants MRI Associates, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile
Limited ("the MRI Entities") respectfully ask for a minor modification to the July 9, 2010, Order
of the Court Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions from the Parties and Briefing Schedule ("July
9 Order"). Specifically, the MRI Entities ask that the Court remove the page limitation to
attachments and exhibits to the briefing with respect to any motion on Pope-related issues.
In the Court's July 9 Order, the Court directs that "No brief on any motion shall exceed
30 pages in length including attachments and exhibits." (Emphasis added.) However, the Court
has also directed that Motions be filed "relating to so called Pope issues concerning damages for
lost profits and adequacy of proof." (Emphasis added.) If the adequacy of proof is at issue, as
the Court has indicated it may be, then at least for the purpose of the Pope motion(s), the parties
should not be limited to 30 pages including attachments and exhibits. On the issue of damages,
the MRI Entities previously hired two experts through whom the MRI Entities have generated
extensive proof of their damages, including: 213 pages of expert reports and exhibits thereto;
372 pages of deposition testimony; and 222 pages of trial testimony. If the MRI Entities are
limited in their proof when the very adequacy of that proof is at issue, there is a risk that a
finding of inadequate proof could be made based on a page limitation, rather than the true nature
and extent of the proof. The MRI Entities emphasize that they are not requesting additional
pages of briefing or argument, but merely the opportunity to present all of their proof on
damages to demonstrate the adequacy thereof. The MRI Entities therefore respectfully ask that,
with respect to any motion on Pope issues, the Court remove the page limit on attachments and
exhibits currently outlined in the July 9 Order.

MOTION TO AMEND ORDER: RESCHEDULING PRELIMINARY MOTIONS- 2

000293

,,

DATED this .2f_ day of July, 2010.

BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the~ day of July 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following counsel for Plaintiff in the manner set forth below:
Donald B. Ayer (VIA FAX)
Christian G. V ergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113

JackS. Gjording (VIA FAX)
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701

Patrick J. Miller (FAX)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 601 W. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
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Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE
TO MRIA'S MOTION TO AMEND
ORDER: RE SCHEDULING
PRELIMINARY MOTIONS

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

MRIA has moved for an order removing the Court's 30-page limit for attachments and
exhibits to the parties' briefing on Saint Alphonsus's forthcoming motion for summary judgment
on Pope-related issues. Saint Alphonsus agrees that the parties' ability to rely on record
evidence in support of, or in opposition to, any motions for summary judgment should not be
restrained by page limits. 1 At the same time, virtually all of the evidentiary material relevant to
the motions is already on file with the court as exhibits and testimony from the first trial and/or
attachments to previously filed affidavits. Accordingly, Saint Alphonsus respectfully requests
that the Court either remove its 30-page limit insofar as that page limit applies to attachments
and exhibits to supporting affidavits filed in connection with any forthcoming motion for

1

For instance, the Court may wish to review the 20-page MRIA partnership agreement in
connection with Saint Alphonsus's argument, in its forthcoming motion for summary judgment
on wrongful dissociation, that the agreement lacks a definite term as a matter of law.
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE TO MRIA'S MOTION TO AMEND ORDER: RE
SCHEDULING PRELIMINARY MOTIONS- 2
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summary judgment (while retaining the page limit for the briefs), or, in the alternative, clarify
that the parties should offer evidence in support of, or in opposition to, the motions for summary
judgment by citation to record evidence on file with the court.

DATED this 29th day of July, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
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Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
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51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON
THE LEGAL INSUFFICIENCY OF
MRIA'S EVIDENCE OF LOST
PROFITS

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), and move this
Court pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for an order holding that
Counter-Claimants have failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the question of the
quantum oflost profits, if any, caused by Saint Alphonsus's alleged wrongful conduct and, on
that ground, further granting summary judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus on CounterClaimants' Third through Eighth Claims for Relief, as to which lost profits is the only damages
theory MRIA has offered, and on Counter-Claimants' First Claim for Relief to the extent that it
claims damages for lost profits.
This motion is supported by the Court's records and files in this matter and by the
Memorandum in Support filed contemporaneously herewith.
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Oral argument is requested in accordance with the Court's scheduling order dated July 9,
2010.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 6th day of August, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
Counter-Claimants (collectively, "MRIA") seek to recover "lost profits" based on the
contention that Saint Alphonsus's pre-dissociation conduct caused the diversion of business from
MRI Center and MRI Mobile to their competitor Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC ("IMI").
See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assoc., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, ---, 224 P.3d
1068, 1086-87 (2009). In support of this claim for lost profits, MRIA relies on expert testimony
that "assume[s]" without any evidence that Saint Alphonsus's alleged misconduct caused all of
the cited business migration. Id at---, 224 P.3d at 1087. The Supreme Court instructed this
Court to consider on remand whether this assumption is sufficient under Pope v. Intermountain
Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P .2d 988 (1982), which held that a plaintiff must present evidence
distinguishing between the portion of business lost as a result of the defendant's misconduct and
the portion lost as a result of other factors, such as a competitor's proper entry into the

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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competitive marketplace. 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1087. Because MRIA's evidence here
fails to create a genuine issue for trial under Pope, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to summary
judgment on the legal inadequacy of this evidence, and, therefore, on all ofMRIA's claims for
which it seeks to recover lost profits.

BACKGROUND
The background and procedural history of this case is set forth in Saint Alphonsus' s
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment on MRIA's claim for wrongful
dissociation, filed concurrently herewith. As described therein, MRIA advances two separate
theories of damages, including a "purchase price" theory relating to the claim for wrongful
dissociation, and a "lost scans" or "lost profits" theory that purports to measure the damages
caused in connection with all non-dissociation causes of action-i.e., the claims for breach of the
partnership agreement's non-compete clause, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, interference with prospective contractual relations, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil
conspiracy. See Opp. to Mot. for J.N.O.V. and Mot. for New Trial, at 1-3 (Oct. 24, 2007).
MRIA's "lost profits" measure of damages is based on the theory that, by allegedly
providing assistance to IMI, a competitor of MRI Center and MRI Mobile, Saint Alphonsus
helped IMI win scan business that otherwise would have gone to MRI Center or MRI Mobile.
MRIA's expert, Bruce Budge, identified three categories of scans (and profits) that allegedly
migrated from MRI Center and/or MRI Mobile to IMI: (i) scans performed by IMI at its
downtown Boise location, (ii) scans performed by IMI at its Meridian location, and (iii) scans
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performed by IMI at Saint Alphonsus' s Boise campus. Trial Ex. 4417 (Tab 8) at 11; see also
Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2738. 1
With respect to IMI' s downtown Boise and Meridian locations, Budge determined the
number of scans performed by IMI for patients referred to those locations by physicians who
either were exclusively affiliated with Saint Alphonsus or had referred patients to MRI Center
before IMI opened. See Trial Ex. 4417 (Tab 8) at 13-14 & n.5; Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2738-39,
2741-46. This was, according to Budge, MRIA's "historical[]" "customer base." Trial Tr. (Tab
10) at 2739. Budge then "assumed" that all of these scans would have been performed by MRI
Center but for Saint Alphonsus's alleged misconduct. See Trial Ex. 4417 (Tab 8) at 13-14 & n.5;
Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2741-47, 2756-59. This assumption accounted for approximately $13.9
million in alleged historical lost scan profits ($9.4 million from IMI downtown and $4.5 million
from IMI Meridian). See Trial Ex. 4417 (Tab 8) at 13-14 & n.5; Trial Ex. 4520 (Tab 11)?
Budge similarly assumed that that MRI Center would have performed all of the scans that IMI
performed at its facility on the Saint Alphonsus campus, amounting to another $1.4 million in
alleged historical lost profits. See Trial Ex. 4417 (Tab 8) at 12; Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2747; Trial
Ex. 4520 (Tab 11).

1

"Tab" numbers refer to the binder of Record Documents in Support of Saint Alphonsus' s
Motions for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings, submitted herewith.
2

Budge's expert report alternatively calculated lost scan profits based on "the
assumption" that MRIA would have won all of the scans performed at IMI' s Meridian facility,
see Trial Ex. 4417 (Tab 8) at 13-14, but Budge did not present, or rely upon, this alternative
calculation at trial, see Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2810-11.
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MRIA's other expert, Charles Wilhoite, extrapolated Budge's data for the year 2006 in
order to determine MRI Center's and MRI Mobile's projected future lost profits through 2015
and 2023. See Trial Ex. 4522 (Tab 9) at 13-15. 3 As Budge did for past scans, Wilhoite for future
scans "assum[ed]" that all ofiMI' s scans referred by the identified physicians "would have been
realized by MRIA" but for Saint Alphonsus's alleged assistance to IMI. Id. at 14. This resulted
in present-value estimates of future lost profits of$14.9 million (through 2015) and $20.9 million
(through 2023). !d. at 15. 4
On appeal, Saint Alphonsus challenged, among other things, the legal and factual
sufficiency ofMRIA's proof of past and future lost scan profits. Though the Supreme Court's
decision to order a new trial made it unnecessary to decide the adequacy ofMRIA's "lost
profits" evidence, the Court elected to "briefly address this issue" and, in doing so, raised
substantial doubt about the sufficiency ofMRIA's evidence. 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1087.
The Court began by emphasizing that MRIA' s expert, Budge, had "assumed" without
evidence that, for two categories of physicians, Saint Alphonsus' s alleged misconduct caused the
entirety of the business migration that had occurred from MRI Center to IMI's downtown Boise
location. !d. at---, 224 P.3d at 1086-87. The Court noted Saint Alphonsus's "argu[ment] that
MRIA could not simply assume" without evidence that "none of those physicians would have
3

The Supreme Court subsequently held that MRIA cannot recover damages beyond
2015. See Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1086.
4

Like Budge's report, Wilhoite's report alternatively calculated lost scan profits based on
"the assumption" that MRIA would have won all of the scans performed at IMI' s Meridian
facility, see Trial Ex. 4522 (Tab 9) at 14-15, but Wilhoite did not present this alternative
calculation at trial, see Trial Tr. (Tab 12) at 2860-61.
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referred patients to Intermountain Imaging for MRI scans but for St. Alphonsus's wrongful
conduct." Id at---, 224 P.3d at 1087. And, in response to this argument, the Court quoted
extensively from its previous decision in Pope, 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988, which rejected, as
inadequate proof of a plaintiffs lost profits, an approach that "'assumes, without any support in
the record, that [a competitor] would not have won any portion of the ... market absent [the
defendant's alleged wrongdoing]."' Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1087. The
Court held that the "concerns expressed in Pope should be considered" on remand. Id
ARGUMENT

MRIA's "lost profits" theory of damages, and the claims that depend upon it, fail as a
matter of law because MRIA cannot point to record evidence showing what portion (if any) of
the scans that MRI Center and MRI Mobile allegedly lost to IMI were caused by Saint
Alphonsus's alleged misconduct, rather than by other factors such as IMI's presence in the
competitive marketplace. The only evidence in the record on this point is the unsupported
"assumption" ofMRIA's experts that Saint Alphonsus's alleged assistance to IMI was
responsible for 100% of the alleged business migration from MRIA's "historical[]" "customer
base" (Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2739) to IMI. Such an assumption is insufficient to create a genuine
issue for trial, as the Supreme Court made clear in the very case (Pope) that it instructed this
Court to apply to MRIA's damages theory on remand.
As to MRIA's proof relating to its "lost profits" theory of damages, the Supreme Court
stated:
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The lost profits evidence offered by MRIA was based upon "lost
scans." MRIA's expert determined which physicians referred
patients to MRI Center and/or MRI Mobile prior to Intermountain
Imaging opening. He assumed that all MRI scans later performed
at Intermountain Imaging for patients of those physicians would
have been done at MRI Center and/or MRI Mobile but for St.
Alphonsus's wrongful conduct.
He also assumed that all
physicians who were admitted to St. Alphonsus only and who had
not previously referred patients to MRIA prior to Intermountain
Imaging opening would have referred all of their patients needing
MRI scans to MRI Center and/or MRI Mobile but for St.
Alphonsus's wrongful conduct. This assumption as to MRIA's
lost scans was the basis for the past and future lost profits allegedly
suffered by MRI Center and MRI Mobile.
148 Idaho at ---, 224 P .3d at 1087.
In Pope the trial court had awarded lost-profit damages for antitrust violations based on
the defendant's total revenues during the period that the violations occurred. 103 Idaho at 222,
646 P .2d at 993. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning-in language that it quoted in
reviewing this case-that "[s]uch a method of figuring damages assumes, without any support in
the record, that the [defendant's] operation would not have won any portion of the ... market
absent" the defendant's misconduct. 103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005, quoted in Saint
Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1087. In the context of claims for lost business or lost

profits, in other words, a plaintiff may not simply presume that its loss is equivalent to its
competitor's gain. Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 847, 172 P.3d 1119,
1122 (2007).
Pope and Trilogy Network are specific applications of the principle that "[t]he burden is

upon the plaintiff to prove not only that it was injured, but that its injury was the result of the
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defendant's breach; both amount and causation must be proven with reasonable certainty."
Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604, 611 (2007). Moreover,
"the trier of fact must be able to find, reasonably, that the inference linking the defendant's
conduct to the damage is more probable than an inference connecting the loss to other causes."
Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 919, 684 P.2d 314, 321 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Nw. Bee-Corp v.
Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 840, 41 P.3d 263, 268 (2002) (affirming district court's grant
of summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had failed as a matter of law to establish
damage causation). Thus, damages may not be awarded for business losses where "the evidence
does not support a finding that all ofth[ose] losses ... were the result of the [defendants']
breaches." Twin Falls Farm & City Distrib., Inc. v. D & B Supply Co., 96 Idaho 351, 360, 528
P.2d 1286, 1295 (1974) (emphasis added); see also Synthes Spine Co. v. Walden, No. 04-CV4140, 2006 WL 3053317, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2006) (improper to assume "that 100% of [a
company's] business losses" are attributable to a competitor's misconduct where the plaintiff
"never attempted to isolate the effect of other causes on the volume of sales," including, for
example, "the entry of [the competitor] into the competitive marketplace"). 5
There is no doubt that MRIA' s "lost scan" damages proof is deficient under these
decisions. In its argument to the Supreme Court, MRIA conceded that its experts, Budge and

5

As one court has explained, to accept a damages award based on the difference between
the plaintiffs revenues before and after the defendant's misconduct would "make a joke of the
concept of expert knowledge" where the plaintiffs expert "ascribe[s] the entire difference
between these revenue streams ... to [the defendant's] misconduct, and none to ... lawful
competition." Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Wilhoite, had recognized "the fact that IMI would have taken scans away from MRIA even if
[Saint Alphonsus] had not supported IMI." See MRIA's Appellate Br. at 52, available at 2008
WL 5328238. Nevertheless, in calculating how many scans MRIA "lost" to IMI's downtown
Boise and Meridian locations as a result of the assistance allegedly provided to IMI by Saint
Alphonsus, Budge included every scan from every doctor who had previously referred scans to
Center but then switched to IMI, as well as every scan from every doctor affiliated only with
Saint Alphonsus. See Trial Ex. 4417 (Tab 8) at 14; Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2738-39, 2741-46. In
other words, Budge's damages estimates are based on the assumption that, but for Saint
Alphonsus's alleged assistance, IMI would not have won any business-not a single scan-from
the physicians constituting what he contends was MRI Center's "historical[]" "customer base."
Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2739.
Budge does not explain how or why all these changes in referrals were caused by Saint
Alphonsus's alleged misconduct, but rather "assum[es]" it, as though some other evidence will
establish causation:
A. [Budge:] I'm assuming that without that course of conduct,
that migration would not have occurred.

Q. And you're not here to say that the bad acts caused it; you're
assuming that they caused it?
A. I'm not offering testimony on that. Logically, I need to
understand the causation, and it seems reasonable. But I'm not
weighing in on that.
Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2785-86, see also id. at 2792 ("Q. Yes or no, Mr. Budge: Doesn't logic
dictate that ifiMI ran into a very formidable competitor, IMI, in 1999, logic certainly follows as
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to why IMI' s business would flourish and MRI' s business would begin to tail off? A. It could
explain it."); id. at 2801-02 ("Q. But for the purpose of your analysis, you were asked to assume
that these bad acts caused this picture, true? [Objection overruled.] A. Yes.") And in
extrapolating for future lost profits from 2006 to 2023, Wilhoite, simply "started ... where Mr.
Budge left off," adopting Budge's "assumption" that all IMI business from the identified
physicians constituting MRIA's historical customer base "would have been realized by MRIA."
Trial Ex. 4522 (Tab 9) at 13-14; Trial Tr. (Tab 12) at 2860-61.
This approach plainly fails to establish that Saint Alphonsus actually caused all of the
changed referrals or to show what portion of those changed referrals were caused by Saint
Alphonsus' s conduct. Budge does not dispute that IMI would have existed regardless of Saint
Alphonsus's actions, as MRIA conceded before the Supreme Court. See supra pp. 8-9. But he
nevertheless completely ignores the effects of "the entry of [IMI] into the competitive
marketplace," Synthes Spine Co., 2006 WL 3053317, at *16, and simply "assumes ... that [IMI]
would not have won any portion of [this business] absent [Saint Alphonsus's conduct]," Pope,
103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005.
Nor is there any other evidence in the record to fill the evidentiary gap. Indeed, there is
no evidence that even one single physician-let alone all of those in the two categories of
physicians at issue-actually changed his referring practices as a result of Saint Alphonsus's
actions. Budge candidly admitted that he did not seek such evidence. Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at
2801-02 ("I didn't interview any doctors."); accord id. at 2818-19. But contrary to Budge's bare
assumption, several physicians gave unrebutted trial testimony that they began referring to IMI
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because of the identity and reputation of the IMI radiologists reading the scans, not because of
any conduct by Saint Alphonsus. See Trial Tr. of Mary River, M.D. (Tab 13) at 3889-91, 3901
("I knew nothing about the politics that were involved. I only knew the radiologists. And I
knew if I sent my patients over there, they would read them, and I would get great results.");
Trial Tr. of Bruce Anderson, M.D. (Tab 14) at 3977-80 ("Q. What role does the fact that Saint
Alphonsus owns a portion of Intermountain Medical Imaging play in your decision to refer or
not refer patients to Intermountain Medical Imaging? A. Zero."); Trial Tr. of David Reedy,
M.D. (Tab 15) at 4130-34 ("[Q.] What role, if any, does it play in your decision to send a patient
to IMI that Saint Alphonsus is or is not a participant[?] A. It has nothing to do with it.").
Indeed, the idea that Saint Alphonsus's conduct, including assistance it allegedly gave to
IMI, could have caused all of the identified IMI referrals defies common sense. Budge admits
that MRIA "had a monopoly" before IMI opened, "[a]nd when IMI came in, all of the sudden
that referral base was diverted." See Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2790. When a monopolist faces a new
competitor, some of its business is going to shift to the competitor, as Budge also concedes. See
id. at 2792 ("Doesn't logic dictate that ifMRI ran into a very formidable competitor, IMI, in

1999, logic certainly follows as to why IMI's business would flourish and MRI's business would
begin to tail off? [Budge:] It could explain it."); see also id. at 2822 ("Q. Isn't it true, Mr.
Budge, that if this jury determines that this curve and that curve were not caused by these bad
acts but, rather, were caused by good, stiff competition from IMI, then your damage figure is
zero, true? A. If none ofthem were proved, I would think so."). More specifically, IMI was
owned and operated by the group of radiologists who had, for many years, been serving the
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needs of patients at Saint Alphonsus and reading the scans generated at Center, and thus had
long-standing consulting relationships with the treating physicians who worked at Saint
Alphonsus. See Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1072-73. It is absurd to suggestand thus improper to allow the jury to infer-that none of the doctors that previously referred to
Center would have sent any referrals-not one-to the people they trusted at IMI, if only Saint
Alphonsus had refrained from providing some technical support to IMI. Indeed, as noted above,
the only evidence on this issue actually presented at trial showed that the identity of the
radiologists and their established relationships and reputations were the main reasons that IMI
took business away from Center. See supra p. 11. 6
In sum, to recover for lost profits, it is incumbent upon MRIA "to isolate the effect of
other causes" for its lost scans, including "the entry of [IMI] into the competitive marketplace."
Synthes Spine Co., 2006 WL 3053317, at *16; see also Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224
P.3d at 1087 (quoting Pope's holding that an "assum[ption] that ... jobs done by [a competitor
of the plaintiffs] would have all have been done by [the plaintiffs] but for the [defendant's]
violations" is "not a proper manner to measure the [plaintiffs'] lost profits"). Because MRIA's
damages experts have made no effort to conduct this analysis, and there is no record evidence
allowing MRIA to do so, MRIA's proof oflost profits damages is legally insufficient as a matter
oflaw.

6

This case is thus unlike Griffith, in which there was no evidence of alternative causation
and every lost opportunity was "more likely than not attributable to" the defendant's conduct.
143 Idaho at 741, 152 P.3d at 612.
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The absence of"a reasonable foundation for calculating [the plaintiffs] lost profits" is a
"failure in proof of damages" requiring "judgment [to] be[] entered in favor of the [defendant]."

Pope, 103 Idaho at 237, 646 P.2d at 1008. Because each one ofMRIA's non-dissociation claims
is premised upon MRIA' s legally and factually insufficient claim for lost profits, Saint
Alphonsus is entitled to summary judgment on those claims.
CONCLUSION

Because MRIA has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the question of the
quantum of lost profits, if any, caused by Saint Alphonsus's alleged pre-dissociation conduct,
Saint Alphonsus is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of lost profit damages, and
therefore on each ofMRIA's causes of action that relies on lost profits as a measure of damages.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 6th day of August, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

ter-Defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
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Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), and move this
Court pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for a judgment dismissing, as
barred by the applicable statutes oflimitations, I.C. §§ 5-216 & 5-224, all claims of CounterClaimants MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited sounding in contract based on
conduct occurring prior to March 22, 2005, and all other claims ofMRI Limited Partnership and
MRI Mobile Limited based on conduct occurring prior to March 22, 2006.
This motion is supported by the Court's records and files in this matter and by the
Memorandum in Support filed contemporaneously herewith.
Oral argument is requested in accordance with the Court's scheduling order dated July 9,
2010.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

When MRIA filed its counterclaim in 2005 and twice amended that counterclaim before
trial, it declined to join as parties the two limited partnerships (MRI Center and MRI Mobile)
that provide MRI services under MRIA's management. Instead, beginning with its second
amended counterclaim in December 2006, MRIA contended that, as the general partner of these
two limited partnerships, it was entitled to recover damages "on [their] behalf." MRIA
subsequently resisted Saint Alphonsus's January 2007 objection that only parties to the case
could collect damages. After discussing this issue at some length, the Supreme Court agreed
with Saint Alphonsus and held that the "[t]he limited partnerships were not parties to this action"
and "therefore could not recover a judgment." Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI
Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, ---, 224 P.3d 1068, 1086 (2009).
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Now, years after its tactical decision not to join the limited partnerships, MRIA has filed
an amended counterclaim naming MRI Center and MRI Mobile as additional parties with
separate claims of their own. This amendment comes too late. The relevant statutes of
limitations have run on the claims now asserted by Center and Mobile, and no rule of civil
procedure permits those claims under the circumstances of this case to "relate back" to the filing
date ofMRIA's original counterclaim or any prior amendment thereof. For this reason, Saint
Alphonsus is entitled to judgment on the claims asserted by Center and Mobile.

BACKGROUND
The background and procedural history of this case is set forth in Saint Alphonsus's
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment on MRIA's claim for wrongful
dissociation, filed concurrently herewith. As described therein, MRIA served as the general
partner of two limited partnerships: MRI Limited Partnership, doing business as MRI Center of
Idaho ("Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership ("Mobile"). Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho
at--, 224 P.3d at 1072. MRIA provided no imaging services directly, but rather derived all of its
revenues from the distribution of profits based on its 30% ownership interests in Center and
Mobile and from a "management fee" equal to 7.5% of their cash receipts from operations. Id at
--, 224 P.3d at 1072, 1085.
Center and Mobile were not named as parties in Saint Alphonsus's complaint (filed
October 18, 2004), in MRIA's counterclaim (filed May 20, 2005), or in MRIA's first amended
counterclaim (filed January 31, 2006). On December 20, 2006, MRIA moved to amend its
counterclaim a second time, this time "to assert claims on behalf of Center and Mobile without
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making them parties to this lawsuit." Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at--, 224 P.3d at 1084; see
also 2d Am. Countercl. ~ 7. Saint Alphonsus objected to this amendment on the ground that
MRIA could not recover damages on behalf of MRI Center and MRI Mobile, which are distinct
legal entities with the power to sue in their own names. Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at--, 224
P.3d at 1084. MRIA refused to correct its proposed pleading, and on February 6, 2007, the court
allowed MRIA's new counterclaim, reasoning that MRIA had the authority to bring claims on
behalf of the limited partnerships pursuant to the limited partnership agreements. Id. at--, 224
P.3d at 1085. The jury ultimately awarded damages to MRIA based on a theory of profits
allegedly lost by Center and Mobile, even though MRIA had much less than a one-half
ownership interest in each of those limited partnerships. !d.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that although MRIA, as the general
partner of Center and Mobile, controlled them and could have joined them in the lawsuit, "there
is a difference between having the power to have the limited partnerships join in this lawsuit and
actually doing so." !d. at---, 224 P.3d at 1086. Here, the Court concluded, "the limited
partnerships [had] not [been made] parties to the this action." !d. Thus, the damages award
"must be vacated" because it included amounts allegedly suffered by Center and Mobile and
"MRIA could not recover damages on behalf of nonparties." !d.
On remand, this Court granted MRIA permission to amend its pleading in light of the
Supreme Court's decision, and on March 22, 2010, MRIA filed its Third Amended
Counterclaim. In this new pleading, MRIA for the first time actually joined Center and Mobile
as additional counterclaimants, with these two limited partnerships asserting claims for breach of
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the MRIA partnership agreement (as alleged third-party beneficiaries), breach of fiduciary duty,
interference with prospective business relations, and "civil conspiracy." See 3d Am. Countercl.
,-r,-r 68-70,79-81, 84-97, 99.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE CLAIMS OF CENTER AND MOBILE ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS
The events giving rise to the claims of MRlA, Center, and Mobile began more a decade

ago and culminated in Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from the MRlA partnership effective April
1, 2004, over six years ago. See Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1073. Yet it was
not until the filing of the Third Amended Counterclaim on March 22, 201 0 that the limited
partnerships were joined as parties to this lawsuit. See id. at---, 224 P.2d at 1086 ("[t]he limited
partnerships were not parties to this action"). Their claims are therefore barred by the applicable
four-year and five-year statutes of limitations unless those claims "relate back" to an earlier
filing in this case. Under the applicable rules of civil procedure, however, the claims do not
relate back. Accordingly, those claims must be dismissed.

A.

The Statute of Limitations Has Run on Each of Center's and Mobile's
Claims

The allegations in the Third Amended Counterclaim establish that each of the claims of
Center and Mobile was filed outside the applicable limitations period. Specifically:
•

Center and Mobile, as alleged third-party beneficiaries of the MRlA partnership
agreement, assert wrongful dissociation and breach of contract claims (including a
claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing) based on Saint
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Alphonsus's dissociation from the MRIA partnership on April1, 2004, see 3d
Am. Countercl. ,-r,-r 63-64, and its alleged breach of the contract "before it
withdrew from the partnership," id. ,-r,-r 67; see also id. ,-r 83. But the statute of
limitations for contract claims is five years. See I.C. § 5-216. Thus, the statutory
period for Center and Mobile to file contract claims ran out no later than April1,
2009, nearly a year before Center and Mobile were joined as parties in this case
on March 22,2010.
•

Center and Mobile assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on duties that
Saint Alphonsus allegedly owed them "[b]efore [Saint Alphonsus' s] dissociation"
on April1, 2004. 3d Am. Countercl. ,-r 77; see also id. ,-r,-r 78-79. But the statute
of limitations for fiduciary duty claims is four years. See I. C. § 5-224; Jones v.
Kootenai County Title Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 607, 614, 873 P.2d 861, 868 (1994).
Thus, the statutory period for Center and Mobile to file fiduciary duty claims ran
out no later than April 1, 2008, nearly two years before Center and Mobile were
joined as parties in this case.

•

Based on the same alleged conduct occurring prior to Saint Alphonsus's
dissociation on April 1, 2004, both limited partnerships assert claims for
interference with prospective business relations. See 3d Am. Countercl. ,-r,-r 89-90,
95-96, 99. But the statute oflimitations for such clams is also four years, see I.C.
§ 5-224, and the statutory period for Center and Mobile to file claims for
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interference with prospective business relations thus also expired no later than
April 1, 2008. 1
Thus, the claims of Center and Mobile are time barred unless those claims somehow
"relate back" to the date of an earlier pleading in this case.

B.

The Claims of Center and Mobile Do Not Relate Back to Any Prior Pleading

Relation back is governed by Rule 15(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which
establishes three different standards for relation back depending upon the nature of the amended
pleading. The rule provides in relevant part:
[ 1] Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
[2] An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is
asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and
[certain other conditions relating to notice are satisfied]. [3] The
relation back of an amendment joining or substituting a real party
in interest shall be as provided in Rule 17(a).
I.R.C.P. 15(c) (numbering added).
Idaho rules should be "interpret[ed] ... in conformance with the interpretation placed
upon the same language in the federal rules," Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., 145 Idaho 892,
Center and Mobile also assert a claim for "civil conspiracy." See 3d Am. Compl. ~~ 98100. However, as explained in Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for
Judgment on the Conspiracy Claim, filed contemporaneously herewith, "[c]ivil conspiracy is not,
by itself, a claim for relief," but rather is derivative of some other underlying cause of action.
McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003); see also Wesco Autobody
Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, No. 35732, --- Idaho ---, --- P .3d ---, 2010 WL 2927078, at *17 (July 28,
2010); Dahlquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 386-87, 233 P. 883, 887 (1925). Thus, any "civil
conspiracy" claim necessarily has the same limitations period as the underlying causes of action
pleaded in the other counts of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
1
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897, 188 P.3d 834, 839 (2008), but federal interpretations are not followed when the "relevant
wording of ... the Idaho Rules ... differs from that of the corresponding federal rule," Wait v.

Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 796, 41 P.3d 220, 224 (2001). In the case ofldaho Rule
15(c), which was adopted in its current form in 1975, the first sentence is identical to the
language ofthe original federal rule adopted in 1937; the second sentence tracks language added
to the federal rule in 1966; and the third sentence was "added" by Idaho and is "not contained in
the federal rule." Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 272-73 & n.1, 723 P .2d 814, 816-17
& n.1 (1986)_2

While this piecemeal development of Rule 15(c) renders it somewhat confusing at first
glance, careful review of the language and history of the rule leads unmistakably to the following
interpretation: The first sentence of Rule 15(c) governs amendments asserting additional claims
between the original parties to the original pleading. 3 The second sentence governs amendments
changing the party "against whom" an existing claim is being asserted, i.e. , amendments adding
2

The federal rule was amended in 1991 and since then has differed from the Idaho rule.
See Wait, 136 Idaho at 796, 41 P.3d at 224; Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
3

Before 1966, it was well settled that the federal rule, which then included only the
current first sentence of the Idaho rule, applied only to amendments by or against the original
parties to the case, such that amendments joining additional claimants or defendants "did not
relate back to the time ofthe original filing ... for statute oflimitations purposes." Chacon,
111 Idaho at 272, 723 P.2d at 816 (citing Athas v. Day, 161 F. Supp. 916, 919 (D. Colo. 1958)
(claims of newly joined plaintiffs did not relate back) and Robbins v. Esso Shipping Co., 190 F.
Supp. 880, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (claims against newly joined defendants did not relate back));
see also, e.g., Murjkan v. Kahn, 11 F.R.D. 520, 522 (S.D. Fla. 1951) ("[e]ven though the rights
of the original plaintiff and the plaintiff sought to be added arose out of the same transaction ... ,
an amendment will not be allowed to permit the addition of a party plaintiff after the expiration
of the time allowed by statute in which to institute suit").
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a new defendant. 4 And the third sentence-which appears in the Idaho rule but not in the
corresponding federal rule-governs amendments adding or substituting a real party in interest
"as provided in Rule 17(a)," i.e., amendments adding a new claimant (such as a plaintiff or a
counterclaimant). 5
The Supreme Court's decision in Chacon explains the history and purpose ofthe rule's
three sentences, as well as the rule's application to the addition of a party plaintiff or
counterclaimant, as on the facts of this case. The Court there explained that the 1966 version of
the federal rule, on which the Idaho Rule is based, lacked the third sentence and thus, as to
joinder of new parties, '"only deal[t] with an amendment ... changing the party defendant."' Jd.
at 273 n.1, 723 P.2d at 817 n.1 (quoting comments to 1975 amendments to the Idaho rules). For
that reason, the third sentence of the Idaho Rule was added for the "purpose" of providing for the
'"relation back effect"' of joining or substituting additional plaintiffs or other claimants. ld.
(quoting comments to 1975 amendments to the Idaho rules).

4

After the addition of the second sentence in 1966, the language of the federal rule
provided for relation back of claims "against" newly joined parties-but not for claims by newly
joined claimants. See, e.g., Newell v. Harrison, 779 F. Supp. 388, 391-92 (E.D. La. 1991)
("[federal] Rule 15(c) was not intended for a party to amend its pleadings to add or change party
plaintiffs"); Utah v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 50 F.R.D. 99, 109 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (under federal
Rule 15(c), "[a] new party-plaintiff cannot be added by amendment after the statute [of
limitations] has run"), aff'd in part and rev 'din part on other grounds, 473 F.2d 580 (9th Cir.
1973), aff'd, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
5

"Rule 17(a) applies only to those who are asserting a claim." 6A Charles Alan Wright
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1543, at 339 (2d ed. 1990); see also Damian v. Estate of
Pina, 132 Idaho 447, 450, 974 P.2d 93, 96 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Rule 17(a) addresses the
substitution of parties plaintiff' (emphasis in original)).
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As a result, in order to add a new plaintiff or counterclaimant outside the limitations
period pursuant to the relation-back provisions of Rule 15(c), as MRIA seeks to do here, the new
party's pleading must constitute "an amendment joining or substituting a real party in interest ...
as provided in Rule 17(a)." I.R.C.P. 15(c); accord Chacon, 111 Idaho at 273 n.l, 723 P.2d at
817 n.l. Rule 17(a) provides:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest. ... No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is
not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a
reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of
commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the
real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution
shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in
the name of the real party in interest.
I.R.C.P. 17(a).
The Supreme Court has provided clear guideposts limiting application of the relationback doctrine to claims by a party newly added to a case. First, the new party must be the real
party in interest, i.e., the entity "who will be entitled to the benefits of the action if successful."

St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. ofComm 'rs, 146 Idaho 753, 757, 203 P.3d 683, 687
(2009). Rule 17(a) and the third sentence of Rule 15(c) thus permit relation back only where
someone other than the original party is entitled to the benefits of the causes of action asserted-

i.e., '"if [the] suit was originally brought in the name of the wrong party, and later the proper
party plaintiff was substituted in the action.'" Chacon, 111 Idaho at 2 73 n.1, 723 P .2d at 81 7 n.1
(quoting comments to the 1975 amendments); see also Freiberger v. Am. Triticale, Inc.,
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12q Idaho 239, 241, 815 P.2d 437, 439 (1991) ("Rule 15(c) does not allow one party's pleading
i

to ~late back to a different party's pleadings").
Second, the Supreme Court's decision in Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 867 P.2d
96q (1994), makes clear that Rule 17(a) permits relation back for real parties in interest only

wh~re there was an "inadvertent" and "understandable" "factual mistake" in identifying the
proper party in the original pleading because the identification of that proper party was
I
i

"difficult," and even then the rule only "affords a reasonable amount of time to correct" the error.

Id. ~t 92, 867 P.2d at 966.
i

Under these principles, the claims of Center and Mobile do not qualify for relation back

I

to ~RIA's original counterclaim or to either ofthe two previously filed amended counterclaims.
'

First, as to MRIA's original counterclaim, which was filed on May 20, 2005, Center and
I
I

Mo~ile plainly are not real parties in interest with respect to any of the claims. A real party in
I

i

int9rest is the party who should have been named originally because it, rather than the party
I

n~ed, is the one "entitled to the benefit of the action if successful." St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr.,
I

14~ Idaho at 757, 203 P.3d at 687. But with regard to the claims asserted in the original
I
I

co'fterclaim-for breach of the MRIA partnership agreement and for breach of duties that Saint

Al~honsus allegedly owed to MRIA as a result of the partnership, see Answer & Countercl.
~~ h-31-no one is being substituted for MRIA, and MRIA was not the "wrong party" to bring
an~ of the claims advanced therein. Indeed, all of the causes of action asserted in the original
i

co*terclaim plainly belong to MRIA exclusively and are still being asserted by MRIA in its
i
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o~ name today. There is therefore no basis for concluding that the claims now brought by

Ce*ter and Mobile relate back to the May 20, 2005 filing of the original counterclaim.
Second, MRIA was similarly the real party in interest with respect to the claims asserted

in t~e First Amended Counterclaim filed on January 31,2006. Like the original counterclaim,
the !First Amended Counterclaim made no mention at all of any claims of Center and Mobile.
i

An~ all of the claims newly added there-for breach of the non-compete clause of the MRIA
!

partnership agreement, interference with prospective contractual relations, and conspiracy-were
bropght in MRIA's own name on behalf ofMRIA itself, and (unless otherwise dismissed) are
still being asserted by MRIA in its own name today. Thus, the recent addition of Center and
Mo~ile as parties, far from substituting them in place of the "wrong party" to bring those claims,

siniply seeks to bring additional claims-for different harms but using the same legal theorieson pehalf of the newly added entities. Here, too, therefore, Center and Mobile may not take
i

ad~antage of the Rule 17(a) mechanism for substituting a real party in interest-the one who
I

act~ally

possesses the claim-for one who was mistakenly said to possess that claim in the

earlier pleading.
Third, it was in the Second Amended Counterclaim, filed December 20, 2006, that MRIA

for jthe first time purported to bring claims "on behalf of MRI Center and MRI Mobile without
m4ing them parties to this lawsuit." Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1084; see
als(J 2d Am. Countercl.
res~ect

~

7. Center and Mobile arguably are the real parties in interest with

to those claims asserted in the Second Amended Counterclaim on their behalf, but, if so,

rel*tion back is nevertheless improper under the Supreme Court's holding in Tingley that Rule

SA~T ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
JUpGMENT ON THE CLAIMS OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS- 12
'

000332

17~a) applies only to reasonable, inadvertent errors that are corrected relatively promptly.
!

In~eed, as explained below, denial of relation back to the Second Amended Counterclaim
foltows a fortiori from the Tingley decision.
I

In Tingley, an individual in bankruptcy filed a malpractice claim against his former
I

att~meys during 1987, prior to the expiration of the statute oflimitations on April18, 1988. Id.
at ~1, 867 P.2d at 965. The defendants' answer, filed on August 10, 1987, properly objected that
the! bankruptcy trustee, not Tingley, was the owner of the malpractice claim and thus the real
I
I

I

p~y

in interest. !d. A year later, in August 1988-four months after the expiration of the

li~itations period-the bankruptcy trustee "enter[ed] the scene," joined in Tingley's complaint,
anq sought to rely on Rule 17(a) to have its untimely claim "relate back" to Tingley's original

ti~ely filing.

Id.

The Supreme Court held Rule 17(a) inapplicable for reasons that are dispositive here.
Th+ Court reasoned that "the purpose of [Rule 17(a)] is to prevent forfeiture of an action when
detfrmination of the right party to sue is difficult or when an understandable mistake has been

ma~e," and that Rule 17(a) therefore applies "only" where there was an "inadvertent error" or
I

"h1nest mistake" in naming the original party. !d. at 91-92, 867 P.2d at 965-66. The Court thus
rul¢d that, because Tingley's decision to bring the claims in his own name, rather than in the
i

na$e of the bankruptcy trustee, was calculated and strategic, rather than inadvertent, Rule 17(a)
I

didj not apply. !d. (noting "no evidence of a factual mistake in naming plaintiff Tingley"). The
I

Co~rt further held that Rule 17(a) only "affords a 'reasonable' amount of time to correct" the

I

!
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"error in naming the party plaintiff," and that delaying for a full year after the defendants'
objections before joining the trustee "was not 'reasonable."' !d.
This case presents a stronger case than Tingley for rejecting relation back to MRIA's
Second Amended Counterclaim, which purported to bring claims on behalf of Center and Mobile
but refused to name them as parties. First, like the defendants in Tingley, Saint Alphonsus filed a
timely objection to MRIA's failure to join the parties on whose behalfthe claims were being
asserted. See Saint Alphonsus Mem. Opp'n to MRIA's Mot. for Leave to File 2d Am.
Countercl. at 4, Jan. 4, 2007. That objection fully explained what the Supreme Court later
confirmed-that to pursue claims and collect damages that belong to a legal entity, that entity
must be a party-and MRIA' s decision to resist that requirement was not an "understandable
mistake."
Second, where Tingley found a delay of one year in joining the correct party to be
"unreasonable" and a reason for denial of relation back, MRIA here waited more than three years
from the time Saint Alphonsus pointed out its error on January 4, 2007.
Third, as with the plaintiff in Tingley, MRIA's decision was not an "inadvertent" "honest
mistake" resulting from reasonable confusion about who should be named. Instead, it was a
tactical choice, explainable by the substantial benefits that would accrue to MRIA as a result. In
particular, pursuing claims belonging to Center and Mobile without actually joining them as
parties offered MRIA distinct litigation advantages: (a) doing so would finesse the problem of
the statute of limitations that would be squarely presented if the limited partnerships were added
as parties in 2006, after the statute on many of their claims had run; (b) MRIA would then be
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able to control100% of any recovery, most ofwhich would derive from alleged lost income of
the Center and Mobile, even though MRIA owns only 30% of the limited partnerships; (c) the
substantial income streams and assets of Center and Mobile would be shielded from liability for
substantial attorney's fees and costs should the claims asserted by MRIA on their behalf prove
unsuccessful; 6 and (d) it would greatly simplify the presentation ofMRIA's case-as in fact it
did at the first trial-by yielding a verdict as to MRIA only, and allowing it to avoid the complex
but critical distinctions as to the duties owing to and the damages recoverable by each of three
distinct entities. It was MRIA's tactical choice to follow the path it did. Having done so, it
would be an abuse of Rule 17(a) as defined by the Supreme Court in Tingley to allow a do-over
by permitting Center and Mobile to join as parties long after numerous statutes of limitations
have expired.
CONCLUSION
Center and Mobile have been joined as new parties in this case. Rules 15(c) and 17(a)
are inapplicable here, however, and the claims of Center and Mobile therefore do not relate back
to any earlier pleading. As a result, all contract claims of Center and Mobile based on conduct

6

Indeed, Saint Alphonsus has obtained a final judgment against MRIA for over $425,000
in costs as a result of prevailing in the appeal of that case. See Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at--,
224 P.3d at 1091. Because Center and Mobile were non-parties to the case, that judgment may
not currently be enforceable against them. But if Center and Mobile are permitted to enter this
case as the "real parties in interest" with respect to the claims asserted in the first trial, then
Center and Mobile would be liable on the existing judgment arising out of the successful appeal
of those claims. See Explosives Corp. ofAm. v. Gar/am Enters. Corp., 817 F .2d 894, 907 (1st
Cir. 1987) (holding that "[l]itigation is a two-way street" and, as a result, substituted real party in
interest was bound by judgment entered against original party).
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occurring prior to March 22, 2005, and all other claims based on conduct occurring prior to
March 22, 2006, are barred by the statutes of limitations. Judgment as thus defined against
Center and Mobile should be entered in favor of Saint Alphonsus.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 6th day of August, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS- 16

000336

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of August, 2010, a true and correct copy ofthe
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

~

D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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J. DAVIC NAVAHHO, Clerk
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE CIVIL
CONSPIRACY CLAIM

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.
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CLAIM -1
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·

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), and move this
Court pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for a judgment dismissing
Counter-Claimants' Eighth Claim for Relief (for civil conspiracy).
This motion is supported by the Court's records and files in this matter and by the
Memorandum in Support filed contemporaneously herewith.
Oral argument is requested in accordance with the Court's scheduling order dated July 9,
2010.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 6th day of August, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 6th day of August, 201 0, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

~

D

D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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THE CIVIL CONSPIRACY CLAIM

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

Counter-Claimants (collectively "MRIA") allege as their Eighth Claim for Relief a
purported cause of action for civil conspiracy between Saint Alphonsus and the former thirdparty defendants. Under well-settled law, however, a civil conspiracy claim is not a stand-alone
cause of action, but rather is simply a means of establishing a particular party's liability for the
underlying substantive wrong that is the object of the alleged conspiracy. McPheters v. Maile,
138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003). As a result, proof of a conspiracy gives rise to no
liability absent proof of the substantive wrong that is its objective, and if the substantive claim is
determined against the plaintiff, the conspiracy claim also fails. By the same logic, separate
claims of tortious conduct and of conspiracy to commit the same tortious conduct, within a single
complaint, are alternative ways of alleging the same substantive cause of action; in such
circumstances, the conspiracy claim is entirely redundant and therefore subject to dismissal.
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Here, each of the five underlying substantive claims on which the alleged civil conspiracy
rests-misappropriation, defamation, wrongful dissociation, interference with prospective
business opportunities, and co-opting a partnership opportunity, see 3d Am. Countercl. ~~ 98100-either already has been adjudicated to be without merit or is repetitive of another cause of
action alleged in MRIA's counterclaim. As a result, the conspiracy claim fails as a matter or law
and must be dismissed.

BACKGROUND
MRIA' s now-superseded Second Amended Counterclaim contained a total of twenty
claims asserted against both Saint Alphonsus and the former third-party defendants-Saint
Alphonsus Radiology Group/Gem State Radiology ("GSR"), Intermountain Imaging ("IMI"),
and Imaging Center Radiologists ("ICR"). 2d Am. Countercl.

~~

1-6. These included claims for

"Misappropriation of Trade Secret," "Common Law Misappropriation," and "Procuring
Information By Improper Means" brought against both Saint Alphonsus and IMI, and a single
defamation claim (libel per se) against GSR.

!d.~~

133-36, 150-162. In April and May 2007,

Saint Alphonsus and the third-party defendants filed motions for summary judgment on all of
these claims. Instead of responding to those motions, MRIA "voluntarily dismiss[ ed]" these
claims "with prejudice." Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41(A)(1) at 2-3
(May 22, 2007). 1

1

This voluntary dismissal occurred while GSR, IMI, and ICR were still parties to the
litigation. MRIA settled its remaining claims against the third-party defendants on July 20,
2007. See Stip. for Dismissal of 3d Party Defs. With Prejudice (July 20, 2007).
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MRIA filed its Third Amended Counterclaim on March 22, 2010. This new counterclaim
excludes the misappropriation and defamation causes of action that MRIA previously dismissed
with prejudice, but asserts, as part of a purported cause of action for "Civil Conspiracy," that
Saint Alphonsus "conspired with" the former third-party defendants "to harm" MRIA by means
of "defamation" and "misappropriation of trade secret or confidential information." 3d Am.
Countercl.

~

99. MRIA also alleges that the civil conspiracy involved "interfering with

prospective business opportunities," "co-opting a partnership opportunity that should have been
offered to MRIA," and "wrongfully withdrawing from MRIA." !d.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE ALLEGATIONS OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MISAPPROPRIATION
AND DEFAMATION FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE CIVIL
CONSPIRACY DEPENDS ON A VIABLE UNDERLYING SUBSTANTIVE
CLAIM, AND MRIA'S MISAPPROPRIATION AND DEFAMATION CLAIMS
HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
It has long been recognized that a "conspiracy does not of itself create or give rise to a

cause of action." Dahlquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 386-87, 233 P. 883, 887 (1925). Rather,
"[t]he essence of a cause of action for civil conspiracy is the civil wrong committed as the
objective of the conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself." McPheters, 138 Idaho at 395, 64 P.3d at
321. Thus, because it is entirely derivative of some other, underlying actionable wrong, "[c]ivil
conspiracy is not an independent claim for relief." Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest,
No. 35732, ---Idaho---,--- P.3d ---, 2010 WL 2927078, at* 17 (July 28, 2010).
As a consequence of the fact that a "conspiracy" claim is only a means of assigning
liability for a party's involvement in some underlying substantive wrongdoing, courts have
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dismissed civil conspiracy claims when the underlying wrongdoing that is the object of the
conspiracy cannot be established. In McPheters, for example, the Supreme Court held that the
plaintiffs claim of"[c]ivil conspiracy is not actionable because the proper cause of action in
[the] case is negligence," and the Court found that the plaintiff had not established the elements
of a negligence claim. 138 Idaho at 395-96, 64 P.3d at 321-22. Likewise, in Fibertection v.
Jensen, the federal district court cited McPheters and "summarily dismiss[ed]" Idaho state-law
claims of conspiracy to interfere with contractual relations and conspiracy to interfere with
prospective economic advantage, in light of "the Court's decision to grant summary judgment
... on the underlying interference claims." No. CV 07-245, 2008 WL 5384552, at *5 (D. Idaho
Dec. 22, 2008). Numerous other cases are in accord. See, e.g., Wisdom v. Centerville Fire Dist.,
Inc., No. CV 07-95, 2008 WL 4372009, at *18 (D. Idaho Sept. 22, 2008) (citing McPheters and
holding that when "there is no legal basis for" plaintiffs underlying Idaho state-law claims,
"[p]laintiffs claim for civil conspiracy with respect to these underlying unlawful objections must
also fail"); Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927,934-35, 155 P.3d 1166, 1173-74 (2007) (affirming,
on alternate grounds, district court ruling that, after "dismissing the [underlying] fraud claim as a
preliminary matter," the "conspiracy claim failed because Idaho does not allow an independent
cause of action for civil conspiracy"); MA. Deately Constr. v. City of Lewiston, No. CV 04-598,
2006 WL 980730, at *1 (D. Idaho Apr. 11, 2006) (holding that, "like [in] McPheters," a "claim
for civil conspiracy must be dismissed" where plaintiff lacks "sufficient allegations of acts
committed as the objective of the conspiracy," noting that "civil conspiracy is a redundant tort
identical to the alleged violation under Idaho's [substantive] law"); Mertens v. Shensky,
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No. CV 05-147-N, 2006 WL 173651, at *4 (D. Idaho Jan. 23, 2006) (dismissing state-law "civil
conspiracy" claim where plaintiffs complaint did not identify any alleged underlying substantive
wrong under state law).
A.

The Claim for Conspiracy to Misappropriate Fails As a Matter of Law

MRIA's Second Amended Counterclaim contained causes of action against Saint
Alphonsus and IMI for "Misappropriation of Trade Secret," "Common Law Misappropriation,"
and "Procuring Information By Improper Means" (collectively, "the misappropriation claims").
2d Am. Countercl.

~~

150-162. Following discovery, Saint Alphonsus and IMI filed summary

judgment motions as to the misappropriation claims. Instead of responding, MRIA voluntarily
dismissed those claims with prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41(A)(1) at 2-3, May 22,
2007. Notwithstanding its voluntary dismissal, MRIA now attempts to allege a conspiracy to
commit misappropriation. MRIA may not do so.
The Supreme Court has held that "the effect of a Rule 41 stipulation of dismissal with
prejudice" is to invoke the "doctrine of res judicata ... as if the parties had proceeded to trial"
and the dismissing party had lost on the merits. Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610,
614,826 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1992); see also Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 73, 175 P.3d 754,
762 (2007) (Eismann, J., concurring) ("dismissal of an action 'with prejudice' is simply an
adjudication on the merits of the plaintiffs claim" (citing authorities)); Kugler v. Bohus,
No. CV 08-151, 2009 WL 2986748, at *4 (D. Idaho Sept. 15, 2009) ("[w]hen an action is
dismissed 'with prejudice,' there is an adjudication on the merits of the plaintiffs claim, and the
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right to bring or maintain an action on the same claim or cause is extinguished"). As a result,
when a party voluntarily dismisses a claim with prejudice, that "adjudication concludes parties
and privies ... as to [the] matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim." Kawai
Farms, 121 Idaho at 614, 826 P.2d at 1326 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, then, the fact that MRIA voluntarily dismissed its misappropriation claims with
prejudice bars it from reasserting those claims on retrial. Indeed, Counter-Claimants' counsel
effectively acknowledged as much in the parties' first appearance before this Court. 2 Further,
Center and Mobile are equally bound by this voluntary dismissal because they were in privity
with MRIA and because the dismissal was expressly made by MRIA on their "behalf. " 3 And

2

During the status conference held before this Court on February 17, 201 0, counsel for
MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile represented that he did not intend to re-assert any of the
previously withdrawn claims. See Feb. 17, 2010 Hr'g Tr. at 24 ("[T]he other claims that we
submitted to the jury, there were certainly claims that we withdrew. I think it's a 14-, 16-claim
complaint. We withdrew a significant number of those claims before it was submitted to the
jury. We wouldn't go back to them.") (attached as Tab 16 in the binder of Record Documents in
Support of Saint Alphonsus's Motions for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings,
submitted herewith).
3

Res judicata applies not only to parties, but also to their privies. Kawai Farms, 121
Idaho at 614, 826 P.2d at 1326. Privies include a "person who is not a party to an action but who
is represented by a party," and thus is "bound by ... a judgment as though he were a party."
Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 41(1)(b). A party "represents" a non-party if it is
"[i]nvested by the [non-party] with authority to represent him in an action," such as through a
"transaction antedating the litigation" which "confer[s] on the representative the requisite
authority, and generally the exclusive authority, to participate as a party on behalf of the
represented person." Id. § 41 cmt. a. Thus, courts have barred limited partnerships from
relitigating issues already litigated by general partnerships. See, e.g., United States v.
Geophysical Corp., 732 F.2d 693, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that where general partnership
had earlier filed suit on its own behalf and to "protect[] the interests of' its limited partnership,
limited partnership bound by outcome of earlier suit); Smith v. Jenkins, 562 A.2d 610, 616 (D.C.
1989) (applying claim preclusion in suit by limited partners where same claims previously
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because Counter-Claimants thus cannot assert any substantive misappropriation claims, the
derivative conspiracy claim based on misappropriation also fails as a matter of law. See Wesco

Autobody Supply, 2010 WL 2927078, at *17; McPheters, 138 Idaho at 395-96, 64 P.3d at 321-22;
Fibertection, 2008 WL 5384552, at *5; Wisdom, 2008 WL 4372009, at *18.
Finally, if there were any doubt that the claim for conspiracy to misappropriate is barred
by the prior dismissal with prejudice, then the Court should grant summary judgment on the
claim in favor of Saint Alphonsus for the reasons stated in the memorandum in support of Saint
Alphonsus's unanswered and unresolved 2006 motion for summary judgment on the
misappropriation claims, which Saint Alphonsus incorporates herein by reference. See Saint
Alphonsus's Mot. for Summ. J. on Misappropriation Cause of Action, May 18, 2007; Mem.
Supp. 3d Party Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. on Misappropriation of Trade Secret Cause of Action, May
9, 2009.
(continued ... )

litigated on behalfofpartnership by a general partner); Sports Factory, Inc. v. Chanoff, 586 F.
Supp. 342, 346-48 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (barring relitigation of claims first raised against a limited
partnership in a subsequent suit against the general partner who "had the right to and did in fact
control the [prior] litigation"); cf Farmers Nat'/ Bankv. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68,878 P.2d 762,
767 (1994) (non-parties were "privities to [an earlier] bankruptcy action as registered creditors
represented by the trustee, a party" in that action).
Here, MRIA concedes that it has the sole authority to manage MRI Center and MRI
Mobile and to bring lawsuits on their behalf, due to the limited partnership agreements giving
MRIA "all authority and responsibility necessary" to conduct their "business and affairs," which
"necessarily includes lawsuits." MRIA's Appellate Br. at 34, available at 2008 WL 5328238;
see also 3d Am. Countercl. ~ 5 (noting MRIA's "management responsibilities" for MRI Center
and MRI Mobile). Although it did not add them as parties, MRIA asserted that it was speaking
"on behalf of' MRI Center and MRI Mobile when it dismissed the claims, as the caption of the
notice of voluntary dismissal notice clearly states. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal at 1.
MRIA thus bound Center and Mobile, as privies, to its dismissal with prejudice.
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B.

The Claim for Conspiracy to Commit Defamation Fails As a Matter of Law

MRIA's conspiracy claim also fails as a matter oflaw to the extent it is based on an
underlying cause of action for defamation, because MRIA also dismissed with prejudice that
underlying claim for defamation. MRIA's Second Amended Counterclaim asserted a claim for
libel against SARG/GSR based on the allegation that "SARG/GSR sent a letter to hundreds of
[Saint Alphonsus] referring physicians informing them that images taken at the MRI Center
would no longer be accessible to the referring physician community on [Saint Alphonsus's]
electronic data system." 2d Am. Countercl. ~~50-53, 133-36. Following discovery, SARG/GSR
filed a motion for summary judgment as to the libel claim. See 3d Party Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot.
Partial Summ. J. on Defamation Cause of Action (Apr. 26, 2007). In response to that motion,
MRIA voluntarily dismissed the libel claim with prejudice. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41(A)(l) at 2-3 (May 22, 2007).
Notwithstanding this voluntary dismissal, MRIA once again asserts-in the very same
words-that SARG/GSR sent the same allegedly libelous "letter to hundreds of referring
physicians," and further alleges that Saint Alphonsus conspired with SARG/GSR to commit that
same libel. See 3d Am. Countercl.

~~

49-51, 98-99. But MRIA's voluntary dismissal with

prejudice of this libel claim resolved that claim against MRIA on the merits and is thus res
judicata as to MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile. See supra pp. 6-8 & notes 2-3. And

because Counter-Claimants' underlying libel claim is invalid, the allegation that Saint Alphonsus
conspired with GSR to commit that libel fails to state a claim as a matter oflaw. See Wesco
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Autobody Supply, 2010 WL 2927078, at *17; McPheters, 138 Idaho at 395-96,64 P.3d at 321-22;
Fibertection, 2008 WL 5384552, at *5; Wisdom, 2008 WL 4372009, at *18.
As with the claim for misappropriation, if there were any doubt about the res judicata
effect of the prior dismissal with prejudice on the claim for conspiracy to defame, then the Court
should grant summary judgment on that claim in favor of Saint Alphonsus for the reasons stated
in the memorandum in support ofGSR's unanswered and unresolved motion for summary
judgment, which Saint Alphonsus incorporates herein by reference. See 3d Party Defs.' Mem.
Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. on Defamation Cause of Action (Apr. 26, 2007).

II.

MRIA'S CONSPIRACY CLAIMS FOR "INTERFERENCE WITH
PROSPECTIVE BUSINESS RELATIONS" AND "CO-OPTING A
PARTNERSHIP OPPORTUNITY" ARE DUPLICATIVE AND SHOULD BE
DISMISSED AND/OR STRICKEN
Because a civil conspiracy claim is simply a means for establishing liability for "the civil

wrong committed as the objective of the conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself," McPheters,
138 Idaho at 395, 64 P.3d at 321, courts have ruled such conspiracy claims duplicative and
redundant when the complaint separately sets forth a cause of action for the underlying cause of
action. For instance, in Transport Truck & Trailer, Inc. v. Freightliner LLC, the plaintiffs
complaint set forth three state-law causes of action for intentional interference with prospective
economic gain, and a fourth count which alleged a conspiracy to commit these underlying
substantive acts of intentional interference. No. CV 06-282, 2007 WL 294280, at *2 (D. Idaho
Jan. 29, 2007). The district court held that "[u]nder the holding of McPheters, [the plaintiff] has
no separate conspiracy claim growing out of the civil wrongs recited in earlier Counts of the
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amended complaint," and thus dismissed the conspiracy count because it merely "allege[d] that
[defendants] conspired to commit the acts complained of in the earlier counts." Id at *8; see
also, e.g., Buck v. City of Sandpoint, No. CV 07-76,2008 WL 4498806, at *17 (D. Idaho Oct. 1,

2008) (dismissing conspiracy claim as "superfluous" when "Plaintiff allege[d] a civil wrong
already recited" as a cause of action earlier in its complaint).
This, of course, is consistent with the unambiguous power of "the court [to] order
stricken from any pleading any ... redundant ... matter," I.R.C.P. 12(f), and to dismiss such
duplicative, redundant claims as a matter of law. See, e.g., Lewis v. First Am. Title Ins. Co.,
No. CV 06-478, 2007 WL 2815041, at *5 (D. Idaho Sept. 25, 2007) (dismissing plaintiffs claim
for money had and received as 'just another name for" its claim of unjust enrichment, and
therefore redundant); Davis v. Keybank Nat 'lAss 'n, No. CV 05-198, 2007 WL 1189368, at *5
(D. Idaho Apr. 20, 2007) (dismissing plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage as "identical" to the slander of title claim, "and hence ... redundant");
Beringer v. Std Parking O'HARE Joint Venture, No. CV 07-5027,2008 WL 4890501, at *4

(N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2008) ("[c]ourts have the authority to dismiss duplicative claims if they allege
the same facts and the same injury").
Here, the Sixth and Seventh Claims for Relief directly allege prospective interference
with business relations, 3d Am. Countercl. ~~ 86-97, and the Third and Fourth Claims for Relief
directly allege breach of fiduciary duty, including specifically "co-opting partnership
opportunities," id.

~~

74, 80; see also MRIA's Opp'n to Mot. for Partial Summ. J. on Civil

Conspiracy Cause of Action 11-13 (Jun. 5, 2007) (argument by MRIA that "Opening the
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Meridian Facility Violated SARMC's Fiduciary Duty to MRIA because SARMC Co-Opted a
Partnership Opportunity from MRIA."). Thus, the portions of the conspiracy claim relating to
prospective interference with business relations and "co-opting a partnership opportunity" are
duplicative of these substantive causes of action. MRIA is not permitted to assert identical
claims twice. See, e.g., Transport Truck & Trailer, 2007 WL 294280, at *8; Buck, 2008 WL
4498806, at *17; I.R.C.P. 12(f). Accordingly, the conspiracy claim fails as a matter oflaw to the
extent it is premised on substantive claims of prospective interference and "co-opting a
partnership opportunity."

III.

MRIA MAY NOT ALLEGE CONSPIRACY TO WRONGFULLY
"WITHDRAW," BECAUSE SAINT ALPHONSUS DID NOT WRONGFULLY
DISSOCIATE FROM MRIA, AND BECAUSE THE CONSPIRACY CLAIM IS
DUPLICATIVE
Finally, MRIA attempts to premise its conspiracy claim on Saint Alphonsus's alleged

wrongful "withdrawal" from the MRIA partnership. This claim, however, should be dismissed
for both of the reasons discussed above.
First, as discussed in the contemporaneously filed memorandum in support of Saint
Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment on the claim for wrongful dissociation, MRIA's
wrongful dissociation claim fails as a matter oflaw. Because MRIA's underlying substantive
claim for wrongful dissociation is invalid, the allegation of conspiracy to wrongfully dissociate is
likewise without merit. See supra pp. 4-6; Wesco Autobody Supply, 2010 WL 2927078, at *17;
McPheters, 138 Idaho at 395-96, 64 P.3d at 321-22; Fibertection, 2008 WL 5384552, at *5;
Wisdom, 2008 WL 4372009, at *18.
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Second, even before the Court rules on Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment
on wrongful dissociation, the allegation of conspiracy to wrongfully withdraw is improper and
should be stricken because it is redundant and duplicative of the substantive allegations of
wrongful dissociation contained in MRIA's First Claim for Relief. See 3d Am. Countercl. ,-r,-r 6370. The conspiracy claim therefore fails as a matter of law to the extent it is based on a
substantive claim of"wrongful withdrawal." See supra pp. 10-11; Transport Truck, 2007 WL
294280, at *8; Buck, 2008 WL 4498806, at* 17; I.R.C.P. 12(f).
CONCLUSION
A cause of action for civil conspiracy is derivative of other underlying claims for relief.
Here, the civil conspiracy claim relies on underlying substantive claims for relief that all either
fail as a matter of law or are duplicative of claims already pled elsewhere in the complaint, or
both. The conspiracy claim should therefore be dismissed in its entirety.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 6th day of August, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
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802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

~

D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE CIVIL CONSPIRACY CLAIM- 14

000354

•

...

..

N0.----~7tFsiiOLgon~~---fi07:l"j~bJ-...__....--::::::-:

\o'

A.M.-~.~

AUG 0 6 2010
J.

DAVIu

;,.nv,...nHO, Clerk

Syi..AMES
Dllilii'V

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S
CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL
DISSOCIATION

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), and move this
Court pursuant to Rule 56 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for an order granting summary
judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus on Counter-Claimants' First Claim for Relief to the extent
that it claims that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from the MRIA partnership was wrongful
and/or breached the MRIA partnership agreement, and on Counter-Claimants' Second Claim for
Relief in its entirety.
This motion is supported by the Court's records and files in this matter and by the
Memorandum in Support filed contemporaneously herewith.
Oral argument is requested in accordance with the Court's scheduling order dated July 9,
2010.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 6th day of August, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S CLAIM
FOR WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court held that MRIA cannot prevail on its claim that Saint Alphonsus
wrongfully dissociated from the MRIA partnership in violation of an express provision of the
partnership agreement. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assoc., LLP, 148 Idaho
479,---,224 P.3d 1068, 1075-79 (2009); see also July 9, 2010 Hr'g Tr. (Tab 1) at 37. 1 At the
same time, the Supreme Court left for this Court to determine on remand the validity ofMRIA's
alternative theory that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was wrongful because the partnership
agreement had a definite term that had not expired at the time Saint Alphonsus dissociated. See
Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1080-81. Saint Alphonsus is entitled to summary
judgment on this claim on two distinct grounds.
1

"Tab" numbers refer to the binder of Record Documents in Support of Saint Alphonsus' s
Motions for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings, submitted herewith.
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First, the MRIA partnership agreement is an integrated contract with a provision
expressly addressing the durational term of the MRIA partnership. That provision
unambiguously provides that the partnership has an indefinite term. Parol evidence may not be
used to vary or contradict this contractual language, and, in any event, the evidence upon which
MRIA would rely-the fact that the separate MRI Center limited partnership had a fixed termis wholly consistent with the MRIA partnership's indefinite term? Since the MRIA partnership
agreement expressly established an indefinite term, Saint Alphonsus cannot be liable for
dissociating prior to the expiration of a definite term.

Second, summary judgment on this same theory of wrongful dissociation in violation of a
definite term should be entered for Saint Alphonsus on the separate and independent ground that
MRIA's evidence fails to establish any damages caused by the dissociation. MRIA's only
evidence and claimed measure of damages arising out of the dissociation is the purported
purchase value ofMRI Center, and the Supreme Court categorically ruled that this is not a
proper "measure of damages ... on any ofthe alleged causes of action." !d. at---, 224 P.3d at
1087.

2

To be clear, MRIA's claim for wrongful dissociation relates to the durational term of
the MRIA general partnership. This partnership is distinct from the MRI Center limited
partnership, which was created later and does have a fixed term that extends, as the Supreme
Court held and this Court confirmed, to 2015. See Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at
1086; July 9, 2010 Hr'g Tr. (Tab 1) at 38. As explained herein, the fixed term ofthe MRI Center
limited partnership cannot alter the indefinite term of the MRIA general partnership.
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BACKGROUND
A.

Statement of Undisputed Facts

MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA") is an Idaho general partnership created pursuant to a
written partnership agreement on April26, 1985, by Doctors of Magnetic Resonance, Inc., a
corporation established by five specialist physicians for the purpose of holding a partnership
interest in MRIA, and by Saint Alphonsus and certain other hospitals. Saint Alphonsus,
148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1072. The purpose ofMRIA was to acquire and operate medical
diagnostic equipment, specifically magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") equipment, to acquire
facilities to support those activities, and to provide MRI imaging services to the Boise
community. !d. To this end, MRIA created, and served as the general partner of, two limited
partnerships: MRI Limited Partnership, also known as MRI Center of Idaho ("Center"), which
owned and operated an MRI scanner located on the St. Alphonsus hospital campus, and MRI
Mobile Limited Partnership ("Mobile"), which owned and operated mobile MRI scanners
throughout the region. !d.
From the time that Center opened for business in 1985, the scans taken there were
interpreted by radiologists resident at Saint Alphonsus. !d. Those radiologists were affiliated
with the Saint Alphonsus Radiology Group, also known as Gem State Radiology ("GSR"),
which had long had an exclusive contract with Saint Alphonsus to provide radiological services
to the hospital's patients. !d. In August 1998, the GSR radiologists advised Saint Alphonsus
that they had acquired land in downtown Boise for the purpose of opening an outpatient imaging
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facility that would provide a full range of medical imaging services, including both MRI and a
variety of other imaging services (e.g., CT scan) not provided by Center. !d.
In response, Saint Alphonsus attempted to secure an agreement among all parties to
merge Center and GSR's new facility. !d. at---, 224 P.3d at 1072-73. Along the way, on
September 1, 1999, GSR opened its imaging center under the name of Intermountain Medical
Imaging, LLC ("IMI"), and on July 1, 2001, Saint Alphonsus became a partner in the non-MRI
part of the business of IMI. !d. at ---, 224 P .3d at 1073. Treating physicians at Saint Alphonsus
and elsewhere-many of whom had previously worked with or consulted the GSR radiologists
operating IMI-began referring some patients needing MRI scans to IMI instead of Center. !d.
at---, 224 P.3d at 1087. Ultimately, negotiations reached an impasse and Saint Alphonsus
dissociated from the MRIA partnership effective April1, 2004. !d. at---, 224 P.3d at 1073.

B.

Procedural History

On October 18, 2004, Saint Alphonsus brought this lawsuit to recover the value of its
partnership interest in MRIA pursuant to Idaho Code§ 53-3-701. See Saint Alphonsus,
148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1073. MRIA responded by filing counterclaims alleging that the
2004 dissociation was "wrongful" under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602 both because it was in breach of
an express provision of the partnership agreement and because it occurred prior to the expiration
of a definite term. Answer & Countercl.

~~

23-25; 2d Am. Countercl. ~~ 74-76; see also Saint

Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at--, 224 P.3d at 1073 ("MRIA included in its counterclaim a cause of
action for wrongful dissociation alleged under two theories"). MRIA also alleged that, prior to
dissociation, Saint Alphonsus had breached various duties to the partnership by allegedly
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assisting IMI and thereby causing Center and Mobile to lose business to IMI. Answer &
Countercl. ,-r,-r 28, 30; 2d Am. Countercl. ,-r,-r 77, 82, 96, 101-02.
A year before trial began, the district court ruled on summary judgment that Saint
Alphonsus' s dissociation was wrongful because, according to the court, an "express provision"
of the partnership agreement, Section 6.1, prohibited dissociation except under limited
circumstances concededly inapplicable here. See Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at
1073. The district court did not, however, pass on Saint Alphonsus's argument that MRIA's
alternative theory of wrongful dissociation failed as a matter of law because the partnership
agreement lacked a definite durational term. As the Supreme Court noted, "[h]aving granted
summary judgment to MRIA on one theory, the court apparently did not see any need to address
the alternate theory." Id at---, 224 P.3d at 1080.
The case proceeded to trial for a determination of damages for the wrongful dissociation
and liability on the remaining claims. Id at ---, 224 P .3d at 1073. The jury returned a verdict in
favor ofMRIA, and awarded damages of$63.5 million. Id The district court reduced the
verdict to $36.3 million after determining that the jury had added together MRIA's two
alternative damages models: one which measured the alleged injury due to wrongful
dissociation by reference to the price that Saint Alphonsus would have had to pay to purchase
MRI Center, and a "lost profits" theory of damages for the non-dissociation claims. Id The
district court, sitting in equity, then determined that Saint Alphonsus's interest in the partnership
was $4.6 million, and ordered that amount offset from the award. Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Judgment at 6, Sept. 21, 2007.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for a new trial. The Court first
concluded that Saint Alphonsus had not wrongfully dissociated in violation of an express
provision of the partnership agreement, because the provision at issue, Section 6.1, "is not an
express provision limiting [Saint Alphonsus's] right to dissociate rightfully." Saint Alphonsus,
148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1077-78. Moreover, the Court held, the communication to the jury
on the district court's erroneous ruling on this issue "could have affected the jury's determination
ofMRIA's other causes of action," thus requiring a retrial on all ofMRIA's remaining claims.

!d. at 1078. With respect to MRIA's alternative theory of wrongful dissociation, the Supreme
Court held that "the issue of whether the partnership was for a definite term and, if so, whether
St. Alphonsus dissociated prior to the expiration of that term will have to be determined in
further proceedings" on remand. !d. at---, 224 P.3d at 1081.
The Supreme Court decision also addressed the legal and factual sufficiency of both of
MRIA's two alternative damages theories. With respect to the "purchase price" theory advanced
by MRIA as the sole measure of damages resulting from Saint Alphonsus's allegedly wrongful
dissociation, the Court found the theory categorically inapplicable to any claim in the case. The
Court explained:
The advice St. Alphonsus received from its consultants [about the
price Saint Alphonsus would have to pay to purchase Center from
MRIA] does not determine the measure of damages. This is not an
action for breach of a contract to purchase MRI Center. The cost
to purchase MRI Center is not the measure of damages suffered by
MRIA on any of the alleged causes of action. Thus, the jury's
alternative award of damages [based on the "purchase price"
theory] cannot be reinstated.
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On remand, MRIA filed a Third Amended Counterclaim, re-alleging both theories of
wrongful dissociation. See 3d Am. Countercl.

~~

62-72. On Saint Alphonsus's motion, this

Court held that the allegations that the dissociation violated an express provision were precluded
by the Supreme Court's decision and ordered those allegations stricken from the Third Amended
Counterclaim. July 9, 2010 Hr'g Tr. (Tab 1) at 37-38. Saint Alphonsus now seeks summary
judgment on MRIA's remaining "definite term" theory of wrongful dissociation.
ARGUMENT

The Revised Uniform Partnership Act gives a partner a statutory right to dissociate
without liability from a partnership except where the dissociation (i) breaches an express
provision of the partnership agreement, (ii) occurs before the expiration of a definite term set
forth in the agreement, or (iii) occurs before the completion of a particular undertaking set forth
in the agreement. I.C. § 53-3-602. The Supreme Court rejected MRIA's "express provision"
theory of wrongful dissociation, and MRIA does not allege that Saint Alphonsus dissociated
prior to the completion of a particular undertaking. Thus, the only remaining basis for liability
arising out of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from MRIA is MRIA's claim that the MRIA

3

The Supreme Court also instructed this Court to consider on remand the legal
sufficiency, under Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988 (1982), ofthe
evidence offered by MRIA in support of its "lost profits" theory, which purports to measure the
damages allegedly arising out of Saint Alphonsus's pre-dissociation conduct. Saint Alphonsus,
148 Idaho at ---, 224 P .3d at 1086-87. MRIA' s "lost profits" theory is the subject of a separate
motion and memorandum filed concurrently herewith.
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partnership agreement had a definite term and the dissociation occurred prior to the expiration of
that term. For the reasons explained below, that claim clearly fails as a matter oflaw. 4

I.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE MRIA PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
CREATES AN INDEFINITE-TERM PARTNERSHIP AS A MATTER OF LAW
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act renders a partner's dissociation from a partnership

"wrongful" when the partnership is "for a definite term," and the dissociation occurs "before the
expiration of the term." I.C. § 53-3-602(b)(2). "To find that [a] partnership is formed for a
definite term ... there must be clear evidence of an agreement among the partners that the
partnership ... has a minimum or maximum duration .... " !d. § 53-3-101 cmt. By contrast, if
the parties agree that the partnership "may last indefinitely," until some uncertain future date,
then they "have not agreed to remain partners until the expiration of a definite term." !d. § 53-3101(10) & cmt. Here, the MRIA partnership agreement is an integrated contract that
unambiguously provides that the partnership will continue indefinitely, until the partners agree to
dissolve it. As a result, the MRIA partnership, as a matter oflaw, was not formed for a definite
term, and no act of dissociation could violate the agreement on the ground that it preceded the
expiration of such a definite term.

4

In opposing Saint Alphonsus's motion to strike, MRIA contended that there might be a
"common law" basis for limiting Saint Alphonsus's statutory right to dissociate. No such theory
of liability is alleged in the Third Amended Counterclaim. In any event, if the partnership
agreement does not, in any of the three statutorily permissible ways, limit Saint Alphonsus's
statutory right to dissociate, then it necessarily follows that Saint Alphonsus cannot be liable for
exercising that statutory right to dissociate.
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A.

The MRIA Partnership Agreement Is an Integrated Contract That Expressly
and Unambiguously Establishes a Partnership That Will Continue
lndefmitely, Without a Minimum or Maximum Duration

The first step in construing a given contract's legal effect with regard to a particular
subject is to determine whether the subject is addressed by the contract. "Whether a particular
subject of negotiations is embodied in the writing depends on the intent of the parties, revealed
by their conduct and language, and by the surrounding circumstances." Valley Bank v.
Christensen, 119 Idaho 496, 498, 808 P.2d 415, 417 (1991). Where the contract represents the
complete and integrated agreement of the parties, and sets forth the parties' agreement on a
particular subject in "plain and unambiguous language," then the language of the contract will
govern and "the intention of the parties must be determined from the contract itself." Rowan v.
Riley, 139 Idaho 49, 54, 72 P.3d 889, 894 (2003). "When the language of a contract is clear and
unambiguous," moreover, "its interpretation and legal effect are questions of law" amenable to
resolution on a motion for summary judgment. Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 18586, 75 P.3d 743, 746-47 (2003). These principles compel a finding that, as a matter oflaw, the
MRIA partnership agreement was formed for an indefinite duration, not a definite term.
First, from both the "comprehensive nature" of the MRIA partnership agreement, see
Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 603, 150 P.3d 288, 296 (2006), and the
agreement's specific language, there can be no dispute that the agreement was intended to be a
complete and integrated contract that would govern the parties' interactions in connection with
the partnership. Passing review of the twenty-page document demonstrates its thorough
character, addressing not merely the many routine issues of partnership organization and
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governance, see, e.g., Trial Ex. 4023 (Tab 2) §§ 2.1, 5.1-5.5, but a range of possible
contingencies as well, see id. §§ 6.1-6.3, 7.1-7.5. Such thoroughness of an agreement that is "not
ambiguous, nor ... missing terms" demonstrates its integrated character. Tolley v. THI Co.,
140 Idaho 253, 260, 92 P.3d 503, 510 (2004).
The agreement also states explicitly that the "parties agree that the conduct of the
Partnership shall be in accordance with the terms and provisions herein set forth," Trial Ex. 4023
(Tab 2) at 1 (emphasis added), and that "[t]hese Articles of Partnership may be amended only
through written instrument executed by all of the Partners," id. § 12.1. As the Supreme Court in
this case noted, such a "'provision of the agreement prohibiting oral modifications is
enforceable, despite any common law antagonism to "no oral modification" provisions."' Saint
Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1086 (quoting I.C. § 53-2-110, official cmt.). And a
"provision in a contract to the effect that the written terms may not be varied by prior or oral
agreements because all such agreements have been merged into the written document" is "one
means of proving that the writing was intended as a complete statement of the parties
agreement." Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 44 & n.3, 740 P.2d 1022, 1029 & n.3 (1987).
Second, this integrated agreement addresses explicitly the issue of the partnership's term
of duration in a separate Section 1.1 of the MRIA partnership agreement devoted to the
"Effective Date and Term" of the contract. Trial Ex. 4023 (Tab 2) § 1.1 (emphasis added).
Section 1.1.1 provides that the MRIA partnership would end on December 31, 1985, if certain
formative steps were not completed by that date, id. §§ 1.1, 1.1.1., and Section 1.1.2 provides
that if those specified formative steps were timely completed (as undisputedly occurred here),
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"then the term of this Partnership shall end on the date which is within a reasonable time after the
business of the Partnership is wound up and dissolved," id. § 1.1.2. The parties thus plainly
considered the question of the partnership's duration, and expressly agreed that either the
partnership would end on December 31, 1985, or else it would last indefinitely, until the partners
dissolved it.
The language used in Section 1.1.2 unambiguously establishes a contract with an
indefinite duration. To create a contract for a definite term, the agreed language must "clear[ly]
evidence" that the parties reached agreement on a specific "minimum or maximum duration."
I.C. § 53-3-101 cmt. If the parties agree that the partnership "may last indefinitely," until some
uncertain future date, then they "have not agreed to remain partners until the expiration of a
definite term." !d. § 53-3-101(10) & cmt. Thus, courts have repeatedly and consistently held
that contractual language tying an agreement's duration to a contingent event does not suffice to
create a definite term.
For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has held (in determining the applicability of the
statute of frauds) that a contract is not for a "definite term of duration" where it provides for
contractual obligations to continue "as long as" certain specified circumstances exist. Gen. Auto
Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 856-57, 979 P.2d 1207, 1214-15 (1999).

Likewise, the California Court of Appeals held that where there is "plain, unambiguous language
that the contract 'shall continue' until grounds arise for termination," that contract contained a
"valid, express contractual term of duration ... for [an] indefinite period[] oftime." Zee Med.
Distrib. Ass 'n, Inc. v. Zee Me d., Inc., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1, 10 (2000). Numerous other cases are in
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accord. See, e.g., Bergley v. Cmty. Child Care Ctr., 104 Wash. App. 1022,2001 WL 61084, at
*6 (2001) (holding that contracts were not for a "definite time period" where the "contracts were
automatically renewed annually unless the employee received notice before the renewal date"
and thus "the clear intent of the parties was to continue employment indefinitely"); Fremont
Lumber Co. v. Starrell Petrol. Co., 364 P.2d 773, 776 (Or. 1961) (holding that lease provision
stating that it "shall be for a term of five (5) years from this date ... and as long thereafter as oil,
gas or other mineral is produced from said land" created a divided-duration lease, with the fiveyear clause creating a "definite fixed term" and the "thereafter" clause creating an "indefinite
term"). It thus follows that where a partnership agreement states "that it would continue 'until
said partnership is dissolved mutually or by law,"' such a "partnership agreement specifie[ s] no
definite term." Osborne v. Workman, 621 S.W. 2d 478, 479 (Ark. 1981); see also Courdy v.
Paycom Billing Servs., Inc., No. B162421, 2006 WL 847212, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2006)
(partnership has indefinite duration as a matter of law when agreement provides that partnership
"shall continue until dissolved either by mutual agreement or by operation of law").
The contract provision at issue here, stating that the contract term shall end when "the
business of the Partnership is wound up and dissolved," similarly establishes a contract with an
indefinite duration. Far from creating any specific minimum or maximum duration, the language
provides that the partnership shall last indefinitely, i.e., until and unless the partners choose to
end it. Like the "as long as" language of General Auto Parts, the "shall continue until" language
of Zee and Courdy, and the "until dissolved mutually or by law" language of Osborne, therefore,
the "shall end [when] ... wound up and dissolved" language of Section 1.1.2 unambiguously
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embodies an agreement to create a partnership with an indefinite duration, and not a partnership
for a "definite term."
Moreover, the use of words establishing an indefinite term does not suggest that the
contract provision is in any sense ambiguous. The parties did not forget to address the
partnership's durational term; they specifically addressed it, and used language expressing their
desire to allow the partnership to continue so long as the partners did not choose to dissolve it.
As discussed below, this intent to form an open-ended term is thus no more subject to
modification by parol evidence than would be a provision specifying a particular term of years.

B.

The Agreement's Express and Unambiguous Provision Establishing a
Partnership of Indefinite Duration Cannot Be Varied by Parol Evidence,
Including by the Evidence Offered by MRIA

MRIA has argued-and will presumably argue again-that summary judgment on its
cause of action for wrongful dissociation is improper because the partnership agreement's
language is capable of being supplemented by extrinsic evidence purporting to show that the
parties intended MRIA's partnership duration to be defined by reference to the allegedly fixed
terms of the Center and Mobile limited partnership agreements and Center's building lease, and
that this fact renders the issue of the duration of the MRIA partnership a question of fact for the
jury. But the MRIA agreement unambiguously makes the partnership one for an indefinite term,
and nothing in the limited partnership and lease agreements cited by MRIA in any way amends
the original agreement.

First, as already noted, it is black-letter law that when a "written agreement is complete
on its face and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence ... is not admissible to contradict, vary, alter,
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add to or detract from the terms ofthe written contract." Rowan, 139 Idaho at 54, 72 P.3d at
894. The MRIA partnership agreement expressly provides for an indefinite term of duration, and
MRIA's efforts to vary the legal consequences of the agreement are barred by the agreement
itself, which specifically provides that it "may be amended only through written instrument
executed by all ofthe Partners." Trial Ex. 4023 (Tab 2) §12.1. Parol evidence therefore cannot
create any genuine issues for trial.
MRIA's purported authority for the propriety of considering such evidence consists
entirely of out-of-state cases that do not involve any integrated "written contract" of the sort that
"the parties [would have] intend[ed] to be a final statement of their agreement." Simons v.
Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 828, 11 P.3d 20, 24 (2000). Instead, the cases relied on by MRIA
involve either contracts that are entirely oral or written contracts that are incomplete in failing to
address at all the point in issue. 5 The bar on parol evidence has no application in such cases

5

Most of the cases cited by MRIA in prior briefing involved agreements that were
entirely oral. See Owen v. Cohen, 119 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1941); Zeibak v. Nasser, 82 P.2d 375, 381
(Cal. 1938); Meherin v. Meherin, 209 P.2d 36, 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); Zimmerman v. Harding,
227 U.S. 489, 490 (1913); 68th St. Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78, 80 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1976). The others involved written agreements that were completely silent on the issue of
the partnership's durational term, thus leaving wholly unaddressed the parties' intentions on that
essential point. See Vangel v. Vangel, 254 P.2d 919, 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (noting that "the
agreement does not mention the term ofthe partnership"); Shannon v. Hudson, 325 P.2d 1022,
1023 & n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (informal written agreement with no specific mention of a
term); Drashner v. Sorenson, 63 N.W.2d 255, 257-58 (S.D. 1954) (no specific mention of term);
Pemberton v. Ladue Realty & Constr. Co., 180 S.W.2d 766, 771 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944) ("no
express stipulation as to the duration of the partnership agreement"). These cases thus stand only
for the unexceptional proposition that extrinsic evidence of parties' contractual intentions is
admissible where the predicate for the parol evidence rule-an integrated writing intended as a
final statement of the agreement and addressing the subject at issue-is missing.
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where there is no integrated contract and the parties have entirely failed to address the disputed
issue in writing. Where that is true, the only evidence available as to the parties' intent is from
sources outside of any written agreement. Contrary to MRIA' s assertions, there is no precedent
at all for allowing extrinsic proof concerning the parties' intent where a comprehensive,
integrated agreement expressly addresses the contract's duration in words that make it indefinite,
and allows for modification only by written amendment.

Second, even if it were proper to consider evidence extrinsic to the contract, none of
MRIA's evidence demonstrates a contractual intent to modify the partnership agreement's
indefinite term. MRIA's contention rests primarily on the fact that other later-executed
agreements between different entities-i.e., MRI Center's and MRI Mobile's limited partnership
agreements, and a September 1985 ground lease between Saint Alphonsus and its subsidiary
(related to building the space to be occupied by MRI Center)-had fixed terms. Mem. in Opp. to
Saint Alphonsus's Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 14-15 (May 23, 2006); Opp. to Mot. for J.N.O.V.
and Mot. for New Trial, at 41-42 (Oct. 24, 2007). None of these other agreements even

reference Section 1.1 of the MRIA general partnership agreement or its term, let alone state any
intention-or support any inference of a shared desire-to amend the MRIA partnership
agreement to include a fixed term. 6 See Miami Subs Corp. v. Murray Family Trust, 703 A.2d

6

See generally Trial Ex. 4024 (Tab 3) (MRI Center limited partnership agreement); Trial
Ex. 4025 (Tab 4) (MRI Center ground lease); Trial Ex. 4028 (Tab 5) (MRI Mobile limited
partnership agreement).
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1366, 13 71 (N.H. 1997) (provisions of a separate contract "executed after the partnership was
formed[] cannot be read to inform the [durational] term[] of the earlier partnership agreement")
In any event, the limited partnership agreements plainly foreclose any inference that
MRIA's own longevity thereby was extended to 2015. While both the MRI Center and MRI
Mobile limited partnerships themselves have fixed terms, the agreements expressly provide that
the limited partnerships will automatically end before the expiration of their fixed terms if MRIA
dissolves itself, and can also be ended prior to 2015 in the "sole discretion" of MRIA for "any
reason whatsoever." Trial Ex. 4023 (Tab 3) § 6.1, Trial Ex. 4028 (Tab 5) § 6.1. Obviously, the
fixed terms of the limited partnerships cannot define MRIA's term when those limited
partnerships exist only at MRIA's discretion and dissolve whenever MRIA dissolves.
Further, none of the extrinsic agreements are "executed by all the [MRIA] partners," as
Section 12.1 expressly requires for any amendment ofthe MRIA partnership agreement. See
Walter E. Wilhite Revocable Living Trust v. Nw. Yearly Meeting Pension Fund, 128 Idaho 539,

548, 916 P.2d 1264, 1273 (1996) (party's "contractual rights ... [may] not be taken away by a
contract between [different parties]"). The MRI Center and MRI Mobile limited partnership
agreements are signed by MRIA in its own name, but not by each of the MRIA partners
individually. Trial Ex. 4023 (Tab 3), at 13; Trial Ex. 4028 (Tab 5), at 15. The ground lease is
signed only by Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. and the Saint Alphonsus Building
Company, Inc. Trial Ex. 4025 (Tab 4), at 6.
Finally, of course, a partnership whose term of duration is expressly defined in a way that
leaves it indefinite does not acquire a definite term simply because "there [is] an obligation of the
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partnership, such as a mortgage, which must be repaid by a certain date, absent a specific
agreement that no partner can rightfully withdraw until the obligation is repaid." I.C. § 53-3-101
cmt. For this reason, too, the terms of the limited partnerships, and the ground lease signed only
by Saint Alphonsus and its own subsidiary, do not abrogate the agreed-upon indefinite term of
the MRIA general partnership.
In sum, the MRIA partnership agreement is an integrated contract with unambiguous
language establishing an indefinite term of duration, there is no indication that the parties desired
to amend it, and certainly no contractually required amending agreement was ever "executed by
all the partners." Accordingly, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to summary judgment on MRIA's
claim that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated before the expiration of a definite term.

II.

MRIA'S WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION CLAIM FAILS FOR THE DISTINCT
REASON THAT THE SUPREME COURT REJECTED THE ONLY DAMAGES
EVIDENCE OFFERED IN SUPPORT OF THE CLAIM
MRIA' s wrongful dissociation claim fails for the separate and distinct reason that

MRIA's only evidence of damages for wrongful dissociation has been definitively rejected by
the Supreme Court. Throughout these proceedings, MRIA has asserted only one damages theory
in connection with the alleged wrongful dissociation: the so-called "purchase price" damages
theory, based on a consultant's estimate of the purchase price ofMRI Center. See Mem.
Decision at 10 (Nov. 19, 2007), Trial Tr., Vol. I (Tab 6) at 574-84; Trial Tr., Vol. III (Tab 7) at
4382-85. Under this theory, MRIA claimed that the measure of damages for wrongful
dissociation was the amount that Saint Alphonsus would have had to pay to purchase MRI
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Center, rather than any measure of resulting harm that was shown to be suffered. The Supreme
Court categorically rejected the factual and legal sufficiency of this measure of damages:
This is not an action for breach of a contract to purchase MRI
Center. The cost to purchase MRI Center is not the measure of
damages suffered by MRIA on any of the alleged causes of action.
Thus, the jury's alternative award of damages [on the "purchase
price" theory] cannot be reinstated.
Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1087.

Without any proper evidence of damages shown to result from Saint Alphonsus
dissociation, MRIA's wrongful dissociation claim fails as a matter of law. See, e.g., McKinley v.
Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co., 144 Idaho 247,252, 159 P.3d 884, 890 (2007) (holding that a party's

"contract cause of action cannot survive summary judgment because no genuine issue of material
fact exists that he is not entitled to contract damages."); Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co.,
103 Idaho 217, 237, 646 P.2d 988, 1008 (1982) ("[b]ecause ofth[e] failure in proof of damages,
judgment should have been entered in favor of the appellant"); Molyneux v. Twin Falls Canal
Co., 54 Idaho 619, 35 P.2d 651, 659 (1934) ("[t]he law places upon respondent the burden of

proving the extent of his damages and he should properly be required to prove all elements
reasonably necessary to establish the amount of his ... damages"). For this reason, too, Saint
Alphonsus is entitled to summary judgment on MRIA's claim for wrongful dissociation.
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CONCLUSION
Saint Alphonsus is entitled to summary judgment on MRIA's claims that Saint
Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated prior to the expiration of a definite term both because the
MRIA partnership agreement expressly provides that the partnership shall be for an indefinite
duration, and because MRIA has come forward with no evidence that it suffered any damages as
a result of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 6th day of August, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION- 000378
20

-.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 6th day of August, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

v

D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
21
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION- 000379

NO·-------==~--~-~

A.M _ _ _ _
FIL~~

!\

AUG 0 6 2010
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISJY~~V~
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

DEPUTY

Case No. CVOC-0408219
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO AMEND ORDER RE:
SCHEDULING PRELIMINARY
MOTIONS

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership,
Defendant.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited
partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED,
an Idaho limited partnership,

Counter-claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit
corporation,
Counter-defendant.

This matter came before the Court on Defendant/Counter-claimant's Motion to Amend
Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions. The Court heard oral argument on August 4, 2010.
Dara Labrum appeared for the Defendant/Counter-claimant MRI Associates, LLP (MRIA). Jack
Gjording appeared for the Plaintiff/Counter-defendant the Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.
(Saint Alphonsus). The Court announced its ruling from the bench denying the motion.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND ORDER RE: SCHEDULING PRELIMINARY MOTIONS -Page
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On October 21, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court
in this matter and remanded the case for further proceedings. The parties were unable to stipulate
to a schedule for the first set of motions and on July 9, 2010 the Court entered an order imposing
a schedule. Under the Court's Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions from the Parties and
Briefing Schedule, the parties are limited to thirty pages on any brief on any motion, including
attachments and exhibits.
Defendant/Counterclaimant MRIA brought the instant motion seeking a "minor
modification" of the order: that the Court remove the page limit for attachments and exhibits.
MRIA argues that because the adequacy of the proof is at issue, there is a risk that the Court may
find inadequate proof if it is not permitted to submit all of its expert reports and exhibits,
deposition testimony, and trial testimony. Plaintiff/Counter-defendant Saint Alphonsus agrees
that the parties should not be constrained by a thirty page limit for exhibits and attachments, yet
also asserts that virtually all of the relevant evidentiary material is already in the record. Saint
Alphonsus requested that the Court clarify that the parties should offer evidence by citation to
the existing record.
At the hearing on this matter, the Court expressed its concern that the repetitive filing of
lengthy exhibits will unnecessarily complicate an already voluminous record and increase the
difficulty of finding individual documents. It is also worth noting that neither party was able to
provide a concrete example of an exhibit not currently in the record but which is crucial to the
upcoming motions. Accordingly, Defendant/Counter-claimant's Motion to Amend Order Re:
Scheduling is DENIED.
However, the Court recognizes that due to the length of the record, the parties wish to
draw particular attention to specific portions of certain documents. Therefore, the Court will
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND ORDER RE: SCHEDULING PRELIMINARY MOTIONS -Page
2
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allow each party to submit, along with its memorandum, a single three ring binder containing
copies of the relevant excerpts of documents already in the record. The Court cautions that each
document in the binder must be cited in the memorandum and that only the relevant portion of
each document should be submitted, rather than the entire document.
If either party seeks to submit attachments and exhibits which are not currently in the
record, the party seeking to introduce the material is to bring a separate motion seeking leave of
the Court to submit such material.
SO ORDERED AND DATED THIS

~""day of August 2010.
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.
MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited (the "MRI
Entities") submit this Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on
MRIA's Claim for Wrongful Dissociation (the "Motion").

I.

INTRODUCTION

Though wholly unwarranted, Saint Alphonsus's insistence that this Court consider one
provision of the MRIA Partnership Agreement (the "MRIA Partnership Agreement") in a
vacuum-without reference to the remainder of that Agreement or to any extrinsic evidence-is
understandable. Saint Alphonsus knows that if the entire contract and other relevant extrinsic
evidence are considered by a jury, Saint Alphonsus cannot hope to prevail on this matter, a fact
which it learned the hard way at the last trial. But unfortunately for Saint Alphonsus, its
construction of the Partnership Agreement is fundamentally flawed, since in order to find as
Saint Alphonsus suggests, this Court must impermissibly ignore two elementary canons of
contract interpretation: (1) that a court must construe the Agreement as a whole; and (2) that a
court must examine extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguities in the Agreement. See, e.g.,
Kessler v. Tortoise Development, Inc., 130 Idaho 105, 107, 937 P.2d 417,419 (1997); Campagna
v. Parker, 116 Idaho 734, 737, 779 P.2d 409, 412 (1989). And perhaps most tellingly, even if
the Court were to ignore these black-letter rules, Saint Alphonsus's interpretation of the isolated
provision is still decidedly tenuous.
Moreover, Saint Alphonsus's argument that it should prevail on this issue because the
Supreme Court eliminated one type of damages is nothing more than wishful thinking. While
the MRIA Entities did rely on a certain damages theory in the first trial, it does not follow that
there is only one damages theory upon which the MRIA Entities can prevail as it relates to
wrongful dissociation. Put more simply, summary judgment is not allowable under these facts.
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II.

STANDARD

While this Court is undoubtedly already familiar with the standards for summary
judgment, it is worth noting here that:
When interpretation of the terms of a contract is called into question, as it is here,
summary judgment is appropriate only when the court finds the contract language
to be unambiguous as a matter of law. If relevant terms are ambiguous, the
resolution of the meaning of those ambiguous terms becomes one for
determination by the finder of fact, and summary judgment must be denied if there
are disputed issues of fact regarding the meaning of the ambiguous contract
language.

Campagna, 116 Idaho at 737. Put succinctly, then, this Court can only render summary
judgment for the moving party if it first finds that the contractual interpretation advanced by the
non-moving party is completely unreasonable. See, e.g., Chittenden & Eastman Co. v. Leasure,
116 Idaho 981,982, 783 P.2d 320, 321 (Ct. App. 1989).
In addition, though not the case here, it bears mentioning that even when a contract is
facially "unambiguous," this Court can still consider extrinsic evidence at summary judgment to
determine its meaning. That is, while extrinsic evidence cannot supplement an unambiguous
contract, the Court can still consider such evidence in order to determine whether an ambiguity
exists in the first place. Storrer v. Russo, 123 Idaho 442, 444, 849 P.2d 115, 117 (Ct. App.
1991 ); City ofSanta Clara v. Watkins, 984 F .2d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir .1993) (in order to determine
whether a contract term is ambiguous, "[e]ven if the written agreement is clear and unambiguous
on its face, the trial judge must receive relevant extrinsic evidence that can prove a meaning to
which the language of the contract is 'reasonably susceptible."').

III.

UNDISPUTED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The MRIA Entities do not agree with many of the facts and characterizations contained in
Saint Alphonsus's "Undisputed Facts" and "Procedural History" sections ofthe Motion (p. 4-8).
That said, much of the recitation there is superfluous to the salient topics of disagreement
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL
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between the parties in the Motion. As such, the MRIA Entities will not burden this Court with a
sentence-by-sentence analysis of the inaccuracies in those sections, but will only contradict those
statements which have a direct effect on the issues before this Court as they progress through this
Opposition.

IV.

BOTH THE INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE ARE CLEAR THAT
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S SELF-SERVING INTERPRETATION OF
THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT IS FLAWED.
A.

The plain reading of the entire contract is that the Partnership has a definite
date of termination.

Saint Alphonsus spends the bulk of its Motion trying to convince the Court that § 1.1.2 of
the Partnership Agreement should be read to create an at-will partnership. Saint Alphonsus is
careful not to engage in full survey of that contract, however, choosing instead to read§ 1.1.2 in
isolation from the remainder of the relevant terms in the Agreement. An excellent synopsis of
Saint Alphonsus's faulty approach is found in pp. 11-12 of its Motion. There, Saint Alphonsus
quotes § 1.1.2 of the Partnership Agreement, which states that "the term of this Partnership shall
end on the date which is within a reasonable time after the business of the Partnership is wound
up and dissolved." Then, in a complete non sequitur, Saint Alphonsus cursorily concludes in the
very next sentence that as a result, "the parties ... expressly agreed that either the
partnership ... would last indefinitely, until the partners dissolved it."
Yet this is not at all what the provision quoted says-a fact which becomes abundantly
clear when the entire contract is examined, as is required by Idaho law. See Kessler, 130 Idaho
at 107. Rather than the MRIA Partnership continuing "indefinitely," the Agreement plainly
bases its duration on the "business ofthe Partnership." Trial Ex. 4023 at§ 1.1.2 (Binder Tab 11).
Logically, then, if the business of the Partnership has a fixed duration or constitutes a specific

1

"Binder Tab 1" refers to MRIA's Binder of Exhibit Excerpts at its Tab 1.
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undertaking, the life of the Partnership will also be limited. As such, the critical question
becomes whether the "business of the Partnership" has a fixed duration or is for a specific
undertaking, since there is no way to know whether the Partnership is for a term without first
answering those questions.
While this question alone should be more than enough to create an ambiguity as to the
intent of the parties regarding the "business of the Partnership," the good news is that the
Partnership Agreement actually provides a clear explanation of what the "business of the
Partnership" was to be. In particular, the Partnership Agreement expressly states that the
purpose of the MRIA Partnership was to "organize and promote an Idaho limited partnership"
and to operate and manage medical diagnostic devices, including a magnetic resonance imaging
device. Trial Ex. 4023 at § 1.6 (Binder Tab 1). The Partnership Agreement further provides that
when formed, these limited partnership(s) shall have the same purpose as MRIA. Id
Moreover-and possibly most importantly-the only manner which the Partnership Agreement
anticipates making any money is through the management of the limited partnerships. Jd at§ 2.
Critically, even the Supreme Court recognized has already recognized as much. Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 224 P.3d 1068, 1085 (2009) ("MRIA did not
provide any services. Its income came from management fees [for running the limited
partnerships]."). It is undoubtedly for this reason that the parties agreed in§ 1.1.1 that unless
MRIA could get a limited partnership up and running by end of year 1985, the general
Partnership would automatically dissolve. As such, the MRIA Partnership Agreement makes
clear the intent of the parties was that MRIA's sole purpose would be to manage the business
affairs of the limited partnerships.
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It is resultantly clear that the "business of Partnership" could only continue-and indeed
was expressly only meant to continue-so long as MRIA was operating an "Idaho limited
partnership." More to the point, if the "Idaho limited partnership(s)" that the MRIA Partnership
operated had a definite term, so too will the MRIA Partnership. It is for this reason that the
drafter of this Agreement specifically stated to all parties immediately before the time of
formation that "the life of this partnership will undoubtedly be determined by the terms of the
lease and the limited partnership." Trial Ex. 12 (Binder Tab 21) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the Court is not left guessing at what the duration of these agreements are; the
limited partnerships which MRIA "organized and promoted"2-MRI, LP and MRI Mobile, LPexpired by their terms in December of2015 and December of2018, respectively. Motion, p. 3,
n.2; Trial Ex. 4024, § 1.1 (Binder Tab 3); Trial Ex. 24, § 1.1 (Binder Tab 4). Thus, because the
"business of the Partnership" was defined to be coterminous with these limited partnerships and
because these partnerships had specific dates of termination, the Partnership both had a term
itself and was for a specific undertaking.
This is analysis is clearly consistent with Idaho law, which specifically allows a
partnership for a term to be established by proof that the "partnership will continue for a definite
term or until a particular undertaking is completed." I.C. § 53-3-101, cmt. Indeed, in this regard,
the RUP A commentators have specifically recognized that "[w ]hether there exists an agreed term
or undertaking for a given partnership cannot always be resolved by reference to the written
partnership agreement." RUPA, § 602, Authors' Comments 5.a (emphasis added). That is, the

existence of a "term" partnership or partnership for a specific undertaking can be implied and,
therefore, requires consideration of documents, conduct, and statements outside the formal
partnership agreement. !d.; see also 68th Street Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546,
2

Trial Ex. 4023, § 1.1.2 (Binder Tab 1).
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561, 362 A.2d 78, 87 (1976) (holding an agreement as to term may be express or implied);
Fischer v. Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Ky. 2006).
In fact, contrary to Saint Alphonsus's arguments in the Motion,3 it has been recognized
that even when there is a written partnership agreement, "oftentimes the parties do not state their
intentions explicitly. In such an event, the term of the partnership is a matter of inference from
the contract provisions and surrounding circumstances." Mervyn Investment Co. v. Biber, 184
Cal. 637,641-642, 194 P. 1037 (1921) (emphasis added); see also RUPA, § 602, Authors'
Comments 5.a (even with written language, parties intent cannot always be determined). Indeed,
it is black-letter law that "[w]here the time for a contract's duration is not specified, or where the
language in regard thereto lacks precision, the court may inquire into the intent of the parties
and supply the missing term, if duration may be fairly and reasonably fixed by the surrounding
circumstances and the parties' intent." AMJUR CONTRACTS§ 530 (emphasis added); see also
Mervyn Investment, 184 Cal. at 641-642 ("if the partnership has for its object ... the conduct of a
business which obviously continues through a particular season, it will be presumed that the
parties intended the relationship should continue until the object had been accomplished.");
Haines v. City of New York, 396 N.Y.S.2d 155, 157 (N.Y. 1977) (holding when there is no
express term, "the courts may inquire into the intent of the parties and supply the missing term if
a duration may be fairly and reasonably fixed by the surrounding circumstances and the parties'
intent."); Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 456
N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (N.Y.A.D. 1982) (same). Put simply, then, a contract-including a written
contract--can be for a term or specific undertaking, even where it lacks specific language to that
effect, so long as the "surrounding circumstances" suggest as much. This is unquestionably the
case under the facts at hand.
3

See Motion, p. 15.
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B.

Because SaintAlphonsus chose to ignore the relevant language of the entire
Agreement, the remainder of its arguments become easy to discard.

Saint Alphonsus's curious choice to simply ignore the other relevant provisions of the
Partnership Agreement which run contrary to its strained interpretation of § 1.1.2 renders the
remainder of its arguments easily dismissible, since they are all premised on a the same faulty
reading of the Agreement.

1.

The Agreement was not fully integrated nor is it unambiguous such
that parol evidence is inadmissible.

Though separated by several pages, Saint Alphonsus's arguments as to integration and
parol evidence both advance the same erroneous position: that the Agreement is clear on its face
and therefore it is unnecessary to consider extrinsic evidence. Motion, p. 10 (integration) and pp.
14-15 (parol evidence). Saint Alphonsus is flatly incorrect as to both arguments.
As to integration, Saint Alphonsus's arguments are, ironically, fully undermined by the
language it chose to quote as support. According to Saint Alphonsus, the only time relevant
extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent should be excluded is if the contract is fully "integrated."
Motion, p. 10. Saint Alphonsus defines the term "integrated" to be when a contract "sets forth
the parties' agreement on a particular subject in 'plain and unambiguous language."' !d. But
again, there is an obvious ambiguity in the Agreement as to the length of the "business of the
Partnership" here. At the risk of repetition, the unmistakable result of the previous section is that
the MRIA Partnership would only continue as long as the "business of the Partnership" and the
"business of the Partnership" was unquestionably running limited partnerships. See Saint

Alphonsus Diversified Care, 224 P.3d at 1085. As such, the Partnership Agreement specifically
creates an ambiguity as to term which can only be clarified by consulting other documents and
testimony, such as the limited partnership agreements. More to the point, by Saint Alphonsus's
own definition, this Agreement cannot be considered "integrated" as to duration, since its
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL
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language mandates that the Court consult outside sources to determine how long the "business of
the Partnership" was to last.
Similarly, as to parol evidence, Saint Alphonsus argues that extrinsic evidence is
unallowable because, according to Saint Alphonsus's circular logic, "the MRIA agreement
unambiguously makes the partnership one for an indefinite term." Motion, pp. 14-15. But again,
the "business of the Partnership" is-at best for Saint Alphonsus-an ambiguous term. 4 See
Chittenden & Eastman, 116 Idaho at 982 (an ambiguous term is one capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation). And critically, as this court knows, such an ambiguity requires a
dismissal of Saint Alphonsus's Motion. See Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 428, 196
P.3d 341, 346 (2008) ("[i]t is clear that [an] ambiguity creates an issue of fact precluding
summary judgment and that parol evidence is admissible to clarify an ambiguous contract.").
2.

The cases cited by Saint Alphonsus in support of its position that the
term is indefinite are inapposite.

Saint Alphonsus also maintains that § 1.1.2 of the Partnership Agreement is similar to
cases in which a few courts have found that agreements did not have a specific duration. Yet
Saint Alphonsus once again makes this argument without even considering the effect of§§ 1.1.1,
1.6, and 2 of the Partnership Agreement, all of which clearly have a direct and contrary effect on
the position Saint Alphonsus takes in this matter. For example, Saint Alphonsus quotes from
General Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 979 P.2d 1207 (1999), as alleged
proof that contracts that continue "as long as certain specified circumstances exist" are for an
indefinite term. Motion, p. 12. However, Saint Alphonsus's synopsis of General Auto is
extraordinarily misleading. The language the Court was construing there concerned a putative
durational term based off of an event inherently incapable of any meaningful measurement: the

4

Indeed, if anything, the Agreement is unambiguous that it will only continue as long as the limited partnerships.
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moving party there "would have the exclusive right to operate NAPA stores in Boise 'as long as
there was a Workland [family member] 5 running General Auto."' !d. at 851. That is not the case
here. In this case, the parties agreed that the MRIA Partnership would continue for the duration
of the limited partnership(s) that the MRIA Partnership might run, and each of those limited
partnerships had an explicit date of termination. As such, unlike in General Auto, there is a
definite and ascertainable date of termination.
Zee Me d. Distrib. Ass 'n, Inc. v. Zee Me d., Inc., 80 Cal. App. 1 (2000), is similar. See

Motion, pp. 12-13. There, the contract would cease only in the case of one of the parties filing
bankruptcy or becoming insolvent. Unlike the facts at hand, then, Zee had no fixed date of
duration since its termination was based solely off of events of termination which might never
occur, and which, in fact, were hopeful never to occur. Again, that is not the case with the
MRIA Partnership, which would terminate at a date certain based off the express term of the
limited partnership agreements.
Indeed, it is telling that after litigating this exact issue literally for several years now,
Saint Alphonsus cannot point this Court to even one case in which a court found that a contract
was not for a term when there was evidence of its duration being based of an "ascertainable"
event, which is the exact situation before the Court in this matter. This failure is critical, given
that black-letter law is directly contrary to the position Saint Alphonsus takes in its Motion:
"[w]ords which fix an ascertainable fact or event, by which the term of a contract's duration can
be determined, make the contract definite and certain." AMJUR CONTRACTS § 193
(emphasis added); see also, e.g., HL. Miller Mach. Tools, Inc. v. Acroloc Inc., 679 F. Supp. 823,
825 (C.D. Ill. 1988) ("A duration term need not specify a date or period of time; it can identify

5

The Worklands were a family who owned one of the parties in that case.
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some event which will signal termination, even if it is not clear, ex ante, when that event will
take place.")

C. The fact that the limited partnership agreements were executed later is irrelevant.
Saint Alphonsus next advances the erroneous argument that even if this Court considered
extrinsic evidence, "none of these other agreements .. .amend the MRIA partnership agreement to
include a fixed term." Motion, p. 16 (emphasis added). 6 This is a fundamental misstatement of
the MRIA Entities' argument. Their position is not that the limited partnership agreements
somehow "amended" the MRIA Partnership Agreement. To the contrary, the MRIA Entities'
position is that the MRIA Partnership Agreement's language concerning its duration has always
been that it will be determined by the "business of the Partnership." As such, no "amendment"

has occurred vis-a-vis this provision-either by the limited partnerships or by some other
document-and none is anticipated. Instead, the MRIA Entities' argument is that determining
what the "business of the Partnership" is and how long it may last can only be accomplished by
reference to the limited partnership agreements, which do have fixed terms. Stated another way,
the MRIA Partnership Agreement needs no "amendment" in order to last only as long as the
limited partnerships, since it already does that with its original language.
It is for this reason that the case cited by Saint Alphonsus as support for its position in
this regard is wholly irrelevant to the analysis. Motion, pp. 16-17. That case, Miami Subs Corp.
v. Murray Family Trust, 703 A.2d 1366 (N.H. 1997), involved an agreement that by its very

nature implicated partnership business that could and, under more favorable circumstances,
would have continued indefinitely. As the Court there noted, "[a]lthough the purpose of entering
into the joint venture might have been accomplished at a particular time, the purposes of
development and operation would have been ongoing and could conceivably have continued
6

Saint Alphonsus largely repeats this exact argument on p. 17 as well.
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indefinitely." Id at 1371 (emphasis added). As such, the Court found that the fact that a
subsequent agreement was entered into after the original joint venture agreement was executed
was irrelevant to the analysis, since with or without that agreement, the business of the joint
venture in question had the potential of"continu[ing] indefinitely."
That is not the case here. Unlike Miami Subs, the subsequent agreements entered into
here were explicitly anticipated by the MRIA Partnership Agreement, had definite terms, and, in
fact, were specifically intended to limit the life of the MRIA Partnership. See Trial Ex. 4023, §§
1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.6, and 2 (Binder Tab 1). Miami Subs accordingly provides this Court with no help
at all in construing the Partnership Agreement.
D.

The fact that the limited partnerships could be terminated prior to their stated
terms has no effect on whether the MRIA Partnership is for a term.

Saint Alphonsus next asserts that because the limited partnerships have the possibility of
being dissolved on the occurrence of either (1) MRIA dissolving or (2) MRIA choosing to
dissolve the limited partnerships, the MRIA Partnership cannot be considered to be for a fixed
duration. Motion, p. 17. This argument makes no logical sense.
The fundamental point Saint Alphonsus ignores in this argument is that any partnership
for a fixed term can be ended before that term with a vote from the partnership. See I.C. § 53-3801(2)(ii) and cmt. 5(ii). That is, the contractual ability to vote to end a partnership earlier than
its fixed duration does not magically transform a partnership for a fixed duration into an at-will
partnership. See id In this case, the MRIA Partnership could only dissolve prior to its fixed
term by a 7/9ths vote ofthe partnership. See the Partnership Agreement,§ 10.1. (The default
provision in I.C. § 53-3-801(2)(ii) required unanimity, but pursuant to their rights under I.C. §
53-3-103, the parties contracted around that provision for a 7/9ths majority. 7)

7

The parties agreed later to change this to 8/lOths. Trial Ex. 199 (Binder Tab 2), p. 10.
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With that in mind, Saint Alphonsus's argument that the limited partnerships would end
when the MRIA Partnership does clearly puts the cart before the horse, and does so in a
tautological and convoluted manner. Specifically, there is no need to examine the effect of the
dissolution of the MRIA Partnership on the limited partnerships so as to examine, in tum, the
effect of the limited partnerships' dissolution on the MRIA Partnership, because the analysis
begins with MRIA dissolving in the first place. And again, MRIA dissolving by vote of the
partners prior to its fixed term has no effect on whether it is, in fact, a partnership for a definite
duration. See I.C. § 53-3-801(2)(ii) and cmt. 5(ii).
Moreover, the fact that the MRIA Partnership had the capability to end the limited
partnerships prior to their terms has no effect on whether the MRIA Partnership was for a fixed
duration. If the MRIA Partnership were ever to end the limited partnerships, the MRIA
Partnership would effectively be ending the "business of the Partnership," since, as established
above, the "business of the Partnership" is solely running the limited partnerships. See Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, 224 P.3d at 1085. As such, if the partners of the MRIA Partnership
voted to discontinue the limited partnerships, they would effectively be voting to end the MRIA
Partnership. And again, such an action is fully allowable, even in the cases of a partnership for a
fixed duration.

E.

The extrinsic evidence demonstrates that Saint Alphonsus has repeatedly
represented that the MRIA Partnership was for a fiXed term.

Saint Alphonsus intimates in its Motion that the only extrinsic evidence that suggests that
the parties intended to make the MRIA Partnership coterminous with the limited partnership
agreements is the partnership agreements themselves. Motion, p. 16. This is false. While those
agreements are obviously important pieces of evidence in this regard, there are several other
pieces of very clear evidence which unambiguously show that a fixed-term partnership was the
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL
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intent of all the parties from the beginning, including-and especially-Saint Alphonsus. Two
bear mentioning here.
1.

The Ed Miller letter.

As noted above, the drafter of the Partnership Agreement-Ed Miller from the firm of
Givens Pursley-wrote a memorandum slightly before the time of formation which each
signatory received. Trial Ex. 12 (Binder Tab 21). In it, he specifically stated that with or
without a formal termination clause, "the life of this partnership will undoubtedly be determined
by the terms of the lease and the limited partnership." Id, p. 2 (emphasis added). The context of
this statement makes clear that it was intended to set everyone's mind at ease for not including a
more specific "sunset clause"-i.e., that a sunset clause was unnecessary given that the
Partnership Agreement would automatically terminate with the expiration of the limited
partnerships anyway. Id Given the timing of this letter and the fact that it was authored by the
person drafting the Partnership Agreement, it is difficult to imagine a more compelling piece of
evidence to indicate that the "business of the Partnership" has always been intended to be
coterminous with the limited partnerships.
More damning still is the fact that Ed Miller was not some impartial third party, but was
actually Saint Alphonsus's own counsel in this transaction. See Saint Alphonsus's Response to
MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Term ofthe MRIA Partnership (R-01848- R-01860), p. 4 (Saint
Alphonsus states that Ed Miller was its attorney at the time of the letter). He sent the letter to his
client, Saint Alphonsus, and then purposefully copied the remainder of the soon-to-be partners so
that they too would be fully apprised of the intent of the agreement. As such, Saint Alphonsus
itself represented from the beginning of the relationship to the rest of the Partnership that its
intent-and indeed the intent of the Partnership Agreement itself--was for the MRIA
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Partnership's life to end with the lives of the limited partnerships. To argue conversely now-at
a time when Saint Alphonsus is trying to avoid millions in damages for breach of this fixed-term
agreement-suggests strongly that Saint Alphonsus cannot be trusted to tell the truth here.
Moreover, Miller's letter creates an inherent fact issue, since Saint Alphonsus's
inconsistent positions give rise to the equitable theory of quasi-estoppel (and possibly estoppel as
well). See Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d 663, 668 (2008) (quasi-estoppel
involves questions of fact and law). In particular, "[t]he doctrine of quasi-estoppel 'prevents a
party from asserting a right, to the detriment of another party, which is inconsistent with a
position previously taken."' !d. It applies when "(I) the offending party took a different position
than his or her original position, and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or
caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change positions; or
(c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position
from one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in." !d.
Applying those elements here, it is obvious from the letter that Saint Alphonsus is taking
a different position as to the verbiage of the Partnership Agreement than it took at the time the
contract was executed. Moreover, by doing so: (1) Saint Alphonsus is now attempting to gain an
advantage over the MRIA Partnership and other partners to the Partnership Agreement; (2) Saint
Alphonsus induced the other partners in the MRIA Partnership to enter into the MRIA
Partnership with this representation, an implication which arises given the timing of the letter;
and (3) it would be unconscionable to allow Saint Alphonsus to take this inconsistent position
now, given that all parties operated pursuant to this understanding for years. In sum, then, the
Miller letter presents a series of fact issues which prevent this Court from granting summary
judgment.
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2.

The minutes from Saint Alpbonsus's Board of Directors' October 11,
1999 annual meeting.

On October 11, 1999, Saint Alphonsus's board of directors met and discussed the MRIA
Partnership. The minutes from that meeting are recorded in Trial Ex. 4109. Those minutes
indicate that the board agreed to "[e]xtend[] the term of the MRI partnership agreement to
12/31/23." Trial Ex. 4109, p. 1 (Binder Tab 22) (emphasis added). Critically, this statement
does not refer to one of the limited partnerships, but to the "MRI partnership" itself. Id. Thus,
while these minutes might not have been enough of a "writing" to amend the limited
partnerships' terms, 8 there is no question that they stands as remarkably clear proof that Saint
Alphonsus considered the MRIA Partnership to have a "term" that needed to be "extended."
Accordingly, these minutes-like the Miller letter-are in stark contrast to the position Saint
Alphonsus takes now, since there would be no need to discuss "extending the term of the MRI
partnership" if that Partnership was already intended to "continue indefinitely," as Saint
Alphonsus self-servingly argues in its Motion. Motion, p. 9. And though this document does not
state the date from which the extension was to be made, the fact remains that Saint Alphonsus
clearly believed that the Agreement was for a term-i.e., that there was a date the Agreement
would expire-and that that date needed to be extended so that that expiration would not occur.
Once again, then, Saint Alphonsus's current arguments catch it speaking out both sides of its
mouth in hopes of avoiding liability.
Moreover, as with the Miller letter, these minutes create a fact issue rendering summary
judgment impossible. Since the minutes are essentially a ratification of Miller's interpretation of
the Partnership Agreement, they at least create the factual and legal questions as to whether Saint
Alphonsus should be bound to its stated position that the Partnership Agreement was for a term.

8

See Saint Alphonsus Diversified, 224 P.3d at 1086.
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See, e.g., Maui Jim Northeast, Inc. v. Maui Jim, Inc., 2002 WL 31682160, **4-5 (D. Mass. Nov.
26, 2002) (dispute whether one party ratified the other party's interpretation of their joint
agreement created a question of fact precluding summary judgment); Manning v. Twin Falls
Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 122 Idaho 47, 54, 830 P.2d 1185 (1992) (" ... the effect of a ratified act is
essentially the same as an act that was authorized ... ").

V.

THE "PURCHASE PRICE" DAMAGES THEORY IS NOT THE
EXCLUSIVE MANNER OF PROVING UP DAMAGES
FOR WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION.

Saint Alphonsus's argument concerning the MRIA Entities' damages theory is very
limited. Saint Alphonsus argues simplistically that "MRIA has asserted only one damages
theory in connection with the alleged wrongful dissociation: the so-called 'purchase price'
damages theory." Motion, p. 18. Saint Alphonsus then points out that the "purchase price
damages theory" has been eliminated by the Supreme Court, and suggests that summary
judgment should be granted as a result. !d.
This argument is false. The MRIA Entities have at their disposal other provable damages
theories that measure damages for wrongful dissociation. For example, a lost-profits damages
theory is a perfectly allowable manner in which to prove up damages for wrongful dissociation.
As the comments to I.C. § 53-3-602 make clear, a "wrongfully dissociating partner is liable to
the partnership and to the other partners for any damages caused by the wrongful nature of the
dissociation,"9 and these "damages" unquestionably would include lost profits: "[u]nder RUPA,
it is clear that wrongful dissociation triggers liability for lost future profits." Horizon/CMS
Healthcare Corp. v. Southern Oaks Health Care, Inc., 732 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Fla. App. 5
Dist.1999) (emphasis removed).

9

I.C. § 53-3-602, cmt. 3.
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Moreover, there is significant evidence already in the record to support such a lost-profits
theory. The MRIA Entities are briefing their lost-profits damages theory in detail in another
Opposition, but it is worth noting in summary here that the expert report of Bruce Budge is
replete with lost-profits analysis up to 2006, and the expert report of Charles Wilhoite continues
that analysis through 2023. See Expert Reports of Budge at pp. 1-20 and Wilhoite at pp. 1-16
(R., Ex. 139, Exhibits Q and R thereto) (Binder Tabs 13 and 14).
For example, Budge calculates his lost-profits analysis based on the assumption that Saint
Alphonsus is "found liable for the allegations made by MRIA," which includes the wrongful
dissociation cause of action. R., Ex. 139, Exhibit Q thereto (Binder Tab 13) at pp. 5 and 10.
Budge then calculates the damages for each year based off of Saint Alphonsus's wrongful
behavior, including the years since the wrongful dissociation. /d. at pp. 5-20. Notably, Budge
includes a chart on p. 11 wherein he shows lost profits based off of certain chronological events,
including the wrongful dissociation. As such, Budge provides a bevy of evidence of damages
associated with wrongful dissociation.
Wilhoite's report is similar. It too assumes that the MRIA Entities' counterclaims are
valid as a whole, including their claim for wrongful dissociation, and then calculates future lost
profits up to 2023. R., Ex. 139, Exhibit R thereto (Binder Tab 14) at pp. 1 and 14. Critically,
most-if not all--of his damages models are calculated as "lost profits" models based off of
Saint Alphonsus bad "Acts," including wrongful dissociation. See id. at, e.g., p. 3, Table 1. As
such, to argue that there is no evidence in the record showing damages for wrongful dissociation
is wholly unfounded. 10

10

By so arguing, the MRIA Entities do not necessarily commit themselves solely to this damages theory. They
reserve the right to present any theory the evidence will support to the jury.
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Given this abundance of evidence-evidence which one jury has already found to be
more than sufficient to find against Saint Alphonsus-it is important to point out the grounds
upon which Saint Alphonsus is not moving for summary judgment. In particular, Saint
Alphonsus does not argue that there is no other viable theory available to the MRIA Entities to
prove up damages from wrongful dissociation. See Motion, pp. 18-19. Moreover, it does not
contend that defending itself from such a theory would somehow be unfair or prejudicial to it
now. /d. Nor could it do so, given that this exact lost-profits damages theory and evidence in
support of it was presented in the previous trial. As such, this Court is limited to considering the
very narrow issue upon which Saint Alphonsus actually moved: whether there is "any proper
evidence of damages shown to result from Saint Alphonsus dissociation." Motion, p. 19. As
noted above, there is not just a scintilla of evidence-which is all the MRIA Entities need to
avoid summary judgment-but two convincing expert reports in the record teeming with
"evidence of damages shown to result from dissociation." As such, summary judgment is
manifestly inappropriate here.

VI.

CONCLUSION

In the end, both of Saint Alphonsus's arguments in its Motion depend on this Court
ignoring whole swaths of evidence currently in its possession. In the case of the Partnership
Agreement, Saint Alphonsus asks this Court to ignore the language of the entire agreement and
other documents wherein Saint Alphonsus says the exact opposite of what it is saying now. In
the case of damages, Saint Alphonsus asks this Court to ignore extant expert reports which are
directly on point. In both arguments, then, Saint Alphonsus asks this Court to suspend the
standard for summary judgment, which requires that this Court consider all the relevant evidence
before it. See, e.g., Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 44, 122 P.3d 300,

OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL
DISSOCIATION- 18

000402

303 (2005) ("In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact the court reviews
all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.") (emphasis added). This the
Court cannot do. The Motion must be dismissed.
DATED this 30th day of August 2010.

Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
Attorneys for Defendants
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Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), MRI Limited Partnership ("MRI
Center") 1, and MRI Mobile Limited ("MRI Mobile") (MRI Center and MRI Mobile,
collectively, the "Limited Partnerships") submit this Opposition to the Motion of CounterDefendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care and Saint Alphonsus Region Medical Center
(collectively "Saint Alphonsus") for Judgment on the Claims of the Limited Partnerships.

I.

BACKGROUND

MRIA first brought causes of action against Saint Alphonsus by filing a Counterclaim in
this action on May 20, 2005. With leave of the Court, it filed a First Amended Counterclaim on
March 7, 2006. In December 2006, MRIA sought leave of the Court to file a Second Amended
Counterclaim, in which it asserted causes of action on behalf of the Limited Partnerships. (R.,
Ex. 66 at p. 6-9 (Tab 262).) In addition, in its briefing and at the hearing on this Motion to
Amend, MRIA noted that, if the Court found that MRIA could not pursue claims on their behalf,
the Limited Partnerships should instead be joined to the action as real parties in interest. (Id. p.
10-11; Tr., Vol. I, p. 275 (Tab 25).) The district court held that MRIA could pursue claims on
the behalf of the Limited Partnerships. (R., 00870 (Tab 15)). MRIA therefore filed a Second
Amended Counterclaim consistent with this holding on March 2, 2007, 3 well before the running

1

MRI Center was also referred to as MRI Center ofldaho or MRICI in the previous proceedings.
It has also been referred to as MRI Limited in later pleadings, to reflect the difference between
the entity and the location on the Saint Alphonsus campus where its business operated.
2
"Tab" refers to the tab number ofMRIA's Binder of Exhibit Excerpts, filed
contemporaneously with its briefing.
3
In its briefing, Saint Alphonsus states that the Second Amended Counterclaim was filed on
December 20, 2006. This is the date upon which the Motion for Leave to file the Second
Amended Counterclaim was filed, along with a proposed draft of the Second Amended
Counterclaim. This is not a dispositive point, but for the sake of accuracy, this Second Amended
Counterclaim was not filed until March 2, 2007, after leave to amend was granted.
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4

of any applicable statute of limitation. Based on the district court's ruling, MRIA did not seek
to join the Limited Partnerships to the action, but proceeded to trial on its own claims and the
claims that it had asserted on behalf of the Limited Partnerships. After a trial, the jury rendered a
verdict which included damages suffered by the Limited Partnerships. On appeal, the Idaho
Supreme Court vacated this damages award, holding that the district court had erred, that MRIA
could not bring an action on behalf of the Limited Partnerships, and that because the Limited
Partnerships were not parties to the action, they could not recover a judgment. Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associations, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, _ , 224 P.3d 1068, 1086
(2010).
On remand, with the permission of this Court, MRIA filed a Third Amended
Counterclaim which joined the Limited Partnerships as real parties in interest. Contrary to Saint
Alphonsus's assertion otherwise, the Limited Partnerships have been appropriately joined, and
under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 15(c) and 17(a), their claims relate back to the filing date
ofMRIA's original counterclaim such that their claims fall within the applicable statutes of
limitation.
II.

A.

THE CLAIMS OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
RELATE BACK TO PRIOR PLEADINGS

Rule 15(c) and 17(a)
The claims ofthe Limited Partnerships are not barred by any statute of limitation because

they relate back to prior pleadings, which were timely filed. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)
provides that when a real party in interest joins or is substituted in an action under Rule 17(a),
the claims of the real party in interest relate back to the original pleading. This provision makes
it clear that the principle of relation back applies regardless of whether the joined or substituted
4

As Saint Alphonsus points out in its own briefing, the applicable statutes of limitation ran in
either April2008 or April2009, well after the Second Amended Counterclaim was filed.
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party is a defendant or a plaintiff. Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 273 n. 1, 723 P.2d
814, 817 n. 1 (1986). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provides for the ratification by,
joinder, or substitution of a real party in interest:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest ... No action
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of
commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest;
and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action
had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.

!d. (emphasis added). See Haywardv. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342,348,33 P.3d
816, 822 (2001) (discussing the combined effect of Rules 15(c) and 17(a)). The plain language
of these rules resolves any statute of limitations issue, as the joinder of the Limited Partnerships
as real parties in interest has the "same effect" as if the action had been commenced in their
name.

B.

The Limited Partnerships are Real Parties in Interest
As to the claims asserted by the Limited Partnerships in the Third Amended

Counterclaim, the Limited Partnerships are clearly real parties in interest. 5 A real

5

Saint Alphonsus spends several pages arguing that the Limited Partnerships are not "real parties
in interest" to the claims alleged in the Original or First Amended Counterclaim, but only to
those claims brought "on their behalf' in the Second Amended Counterclaim filed on
March 2, 2007. This is an incorrect and immaterial argument. First, as stated beginning in the
Original Counterclaim, "[u]nless otherwise reference, the designation "MRIA" shall refer to all
three entities: MRIA, MRICI, and MRI Mobile [the Limited Partnership.]" (R., 00068 (Tab.
27).) This was carried through in the First and Second Amended Counterclaims. (R., 141 and
905) Thus, the Limited Partnerships were pleaded as a part of every claim alleged. Second,
under Idaho. R. Civ. P. 15(c), whenever a "claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading." As the
claims of the Original, First Amended, and Second Amended Counterclaims all arise out of the
same occurrences, they all related back to the filing of the original counterclaim, without
reference to the real party in interest. Finally, even if the claims of the Limited Partnerships in
the Third Amended Counterclaim relate back only as far as the filing of the Second Amended
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS OF THE LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS - 4

000408

party in interest "is the person who will be entitled to the benefits of the action if successful, one
who is actually and substantially interested in the subject matter." Carrington v. Crandall, 63
Idaho 651,658, 124 P.2d 914, 917 (1942) (decision under statutory precursor to I.R.C.P. 17(a));
see Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 870, 993 P.2d 1197, 1201
(Ct. App. 1999). On the claims ofBreach of Contract/Wrongful Dissociation and Breach ofthe
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, the Limited Partnerships have alleged that they are
third party beneficiaries of the Partnership Agreement. Third party beneficiaries are entitled to
have the contract enforced and to sue for any damages that result from a breach of the contract.
Braun v. Ada County, 102 Idaho 901, 905,643 P.2d 1071, 1075 (1982). The Limited
Partnerships have made direct claims that Saint Alphonsus has breached its fiduciary duties to
the Limited Partnerships; interfered with their prospective contractual relations or business
expectations; and committed acts of civil conspiracy. Under each of these causes of action, the
Limited Partnerships are entitled to recover if the claim is successful, and are actually and
substantially interested in the subject matter because they have been damaged by Saint
Alphonsus's actions. Moreover, the Supreme Court's reversal ofthe damages award was
premised on the finding that much of damages award belonged to non-parties: the Limited
Partnerships. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., 148 Idaho at_, 224 P .3d at 1086. As
such, they are clearly real parties in interest.

C.

Policy Considerations Support the Joinder of the Limited Partners as Real Parties
in Interest
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the joinder rules, 6 when read in conjunction with

Rule 17, not only allow but in fact require a court to grant a motion to substitute or join a real

Counterclaim on March 2, 2007, this is still well before the running of the applicable statutes of
limitation, all of which ran either in 2008 or 2009.
6
The Limited Partnerships qualify for joinder Idaho R. Civ. P. 19(a)(l), Rule 20, and Rule 21.
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party in interest when to do so secures the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the
action. Holmes v. Henderson Oil Co., 102 Idaho 214, 216, 628 P.2d 1048, 1050 (1981). The rule
authorizing the joinder of real parties in interest is to be liberally construed in order to '"further
the policy favoring the just resolution of actions--providing litigants their day in
court."' Haywardv. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342,348,33 P.3d 816, 822 (2001)
(citing Holmes, 102 Idaho 214, 628 P .2d 1048). The policy behind applying the relation back
doctrine to the substitution or joinder of a real party in interest is to '"permit[] that bona fide
complaints be carried to an adjudication on the merits. Hayward, 136 Idaho at 348, 33 P.3d
816,at 822 (quoting Crowder v. Gordons Transports, Inc., 387 F.2d 413 (8th Cir.1967)). In
determining whether the substitution or joinder of a real party in interest is proper, "the good
faith of the plaintiff and the prejudice experienced by the defendant are factors to consider."

Hayward, 136 Idaho at 348, 33 P.3d at 822.
1.

Joinder is in Good Faith

The joinder of the Limited Partnerships here is in good faith. This is not a case where a
baseless place-holder claim was filed before the expiration of the statute of limitations, with the
hope that the proper party would eventually materialize. Hayward, 136 Idaho at 348, 33 P.3d at
822. The Limited Partnerships were known to all the parties at the time the lawsuit was filed,
and indeed, were specifically referenced in the original Counterclaim. (R., 00068 (Tab 27).) The
Limited Partnerships were not previously added simply because of the district court's ruling that
MRIA, the general partner, could bring the claims in their behalf without joining them to the
action. At the time, the district court's decision seemed reasonable and based on sound law, as
Idaho R. Civ. P. 17(a) provides that "a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been
made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute, may sue in this capacity without
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joining the party for whose benefit the action was brought." The court and MRIA believed that
this provision was applicable because the partnership agreements of each of the Limited
Partnerships provided that MRIA, as the general partner, was vested with all the authority and
responsibility necessary for the managements of the Partnership and its business. Had the
district court found that MRIA could not bring claims on behalf of the Limited Partnerships, it is
notable that in early 2007, MRIA had sought in the alternative an opportunity to join the Limited
Partnerships as real parties in interest, as is requested here. (R., Ex. 139 at p. 10-11 (Tab 14);
Tr., Vol. I, p.275 (Tab 25).) This reliance upon the district court's decision is clearly a good
faith reason for not joining the Limited Partnerships at an earlier time. The Supreme Court's
recent decision otherwise now provides a good faith reason for the present joinder of the Limited
Partnerships.

2.

There is no Prejudice from the Joinder

As significantly, there is no prejudice to Saint Alphonsus. Indeed, Saint Alphonsus does
not even argue that it would suffer any prejudice. As the Supreme Court has noted, '"A Rule
17(a) substitution of plaintiffs should be liberally allowed when the change is merely formal and
in no way alters the original complaint's factual allegations as to the events or participants."'
Hayward, 136 Idaho at 348, 33 P.3d at 822 quoting Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront
Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11, 20 (2nd Cir.1997). A case that illustrates this point is American
Pension Services, Inc. v. Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC, 147 Idaho 638, 642, 213 P.3d 1038,

1042 (2009). In that case, a business called APS administered the retirement accounts of various
individuals. APS sued a defendant with whom those funds had been invested. The retirement
account holders whose funds had been invested were joined to the action under Rule 17. The
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Court approved this joinder, noting that their joiner did not "alter the original complaint or
factual allegations in this case." /d. Such is the case here.
Similarly, the circumstances in the present case are strongly akin to those in the case
Conda Partnership, Inc. v. MD. Canst. Co., Inc., 115 Idaho 902, 771 P.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1989).

In that case, a mining operation called Conda Partnership was comprised of two entities: the
managing partner, Beker; and the limited partner, Western. Beker solicited and hired the
defendant to build a storage bin for the Conda Partnership mining operation. The defendant was
apparently unaware of the existence of Conda Partnership. Several years later, Conda
Partnership sued the defendant when the storage bin collapsed. In its answer, the defendant
denied that it had a contractual relationship with Conda Partnership. Two years later, it brought
a motion for summary judgment on the same grounds. Thereafter, Conda Partnership sought to
have Beker and Western joined or substituted as real parties in interest. The Court of Appeals
found that Beker and Western should have been permitted to be joined. The Court said:
Here, Conda gave an understandable explanation of why it was named as plaintiff
instead of Beker, based upon the relationship between a managing partner and the
partnership. Extensive discovery has been conducted by both sides. Conda has
provided all requested documents to [defendant]; most, if not all, of the
documents have been in Beker's possession. [Defendant] has deposed several
Beker employees. The underlying facts giving rise to this action are understood
by both parties. [Defendant] has not indicated it was unsure about the events at
issue. From our review of the record, Conda appears to have acted in good faith.
There is no indication that [defendant] has experienced any real prejudice because
of the time span involved. A great injustice would result if the legitimate claims
were defeated by the simple error of form when the mistake is so easily corrected.

!d. at 904. As outlined above, the joiner of the Limited Partnerships is in good faith and based
on the district court's conclusion that, as the general partner, MRIA could bring claims on behalf
of the Limited Partnerships .
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More significantly, Saint Alphonsus cannot claim to be in any way surprised about the
Limited Partnerships or prejudiced by their joinder. This case was tried as if the Limited
Partnerships were present. The Limited Partnerships have been referenced, and in fact included
in each of the claims, since the filing of the original Counterclaim, wherein it was said of them:
MRI Associates, LLP is an Idaho limited liability partnership ("MRIA") which
has acted as a general partner with management responsibilities for two
operational entities, MRI Limited Partnerships known as MRI Center of Idaho
("MRICI") and MIR Mobile Limited Partnership known as MRI Mobile. Unless
otherwise referenced, the designation "MRIA" shall refer to all three entities:
MRIA, MRICI and MRI Mobile.
(R., 00068 ~ 3) (Tab 27) (emphasis added). Discovery and depositions included extensive
information about the Limited Partnerships. For example, the entities and the role of the Limited
Partnerships was referenced at length during the deposition of James Prochaska, M.D.
(Deposition ofProchaska, 15:3-8; 80:12-16; 90:8-93:14; 285:17-23 (Tab 24).) The operating
agreements, financial statements, and minutes of the Limited Partnerships were provided during
discovery and used by Saint Alphonsus at trial. (See, e.g,. the following illustrative examples:
Trial Ex. No. 24 (Tab 4); Trial Ex. No. 376 (Tab 17); Trial Ex. No. 377 (Tab. 18); Trial Ex. No.
342 (Tab 19); Trial Ex. No. 335(Tab 20).) Saint Alphonsus conducted the deposition of Jack
Floyd, the CEO ofboth Limited Partnerships (Deposition of Jack Floyd, Volume I, p. 9:1410: 17; 11:4-9 (Tab 23).) It also deposed Robin Cioffi, the Director of Human Resources and
Administration for both Limited Partnerships (Deposition of Cioffi, p. 6:25-7:4; 7:19-8:20 (Tab
28).) The damages calculations were based on extensive information regarding the Limited
Partnerships. (R., Ex. 139, Exhibit Q thereto.) Indeed, one of the damages theories advanced by
MRIA, the so-called "Purchase Price Damage Theory" was based on the premise that Saint
Alphonsus should have purchased MRI Center. (See e.g., R. Ex. 147 (Tab 16).) As pointed out
by the Supreme Court, the damages calculation ultimately reached by the jury included damages
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR WDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS OF THE LIMITED
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to the Limited Partnerships. That all the parties were treating trial as if the Limited Partnerships
were present was succinctly summarized by the trial court during one of the jury instruction
conferences:
And when I say "these folks," I'm talking about, really, MRI Mobile/MRI Center
were interwoven with MRIA, though there were distinctions and they may have
been for tax purposes or other health-law purposes, the overwhelming evidence is
that they were all bundled together and decisions were made.
(TR Vol. III at 4202:24-4203:4 (Tab 29).) In short, information about the Limited Partnerships
has permeated this litigation; all that has been missing is a formal appearance by the Limited
Partnerships themselves. Thus, Saint Alphonsus will not be prejudiced by the joinder of the
Limited Partnerships. Rather, it would be a great injustice if the Limited Partnerships' legitimate
claims were defeated by a simple and easily correctable error of form.
D.

Tingley v. Harrison and Saint Alphonsus's Arguments

Saint Alphonsus rests the bulk of its arguments against the joiner of the Limited
Partnerships on the 1994 case Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 867 P.2d 960 (1994), and
concomitant arguments that the joiner was not timely and that the omission of the Limited
Partnerships was a tactical decision rather than an "inadvertent" or "understandable" mistake.
First, Tingley is readily distinguishable. In Tingley, a debtor in bankruptcy filed a cause
of action against his former attorneys for malpractice. The debtor filed this action after the time
in which the statute of limitation had run for professional malpractice actions. The debtor argued
that because his malpractice claim was the property of the bankruptcy estate, it qualified for an
extended period under the bankruptcy statute. While the debtor filed the lawsuit within this
extended period, the trustee of the bankruptcy estate made no attempt to ratify this cause of
action under Rule 17 until four months after the expiration of the extended period. The debtor
argued that, by virtue of the ratification, the trustee was the real party in interest and thus that
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS OF THE LIMITED
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under the "relation back" doctrine, the extended statute of limitation had been satisfied. Id at 91,
867 P.2d at 966. The Court disagreed for three reasons, noting that the attempt to join the trustee
was not timely; that the debtor did not show that he was mistakenly named a party in lieu of the
trustee or that he was invoking the application of rule 17 for any other reason that the escape the
limitations period; and that Rule 17 applies only when the original complaint is not time barred.
In the present case, unlike Tingley, the original case was not time barred; the Counter-plaintiffs
are not making complicated contortions to change the applicable statutes of limitation, but rather
are seeking relation back to the ordinarily applicable statutes of limitation; and Counter-plaintiffs
are seeking a joiner that they did timely seek in the past, but ultimately did not pursue in reliance
upon the district court's decision that it was not necessary.
On the question of timeliness, in determining whether the time is reasonable, the Court
should consider "the good faith of the plaintiff and the prejudice, if any, experienced by the
defendant." Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 257 n.l, 127 P.3d 156, 160 n. 1 (2005). Both of
these factors have been discussed at length in the section above. Although over three years have
passed since the initial (and initially rejected) objection of Saint Alphonsus, this is because
MRIA and Limited Partnerships relied in good faith upon the district court's ultimately
erroneous ruling for the bulk of that time. MRIA has always moved with alacrity, both in
addressing the initial objection by Saint Alphonsus, and in responding to the Supreme Court's
decision upon remand. Moreover, as outlined in detail above, there is no prejudice to Saint
Alphonsus. Under these circumstances, the timing for joining the Limited Partnerships is
reasonable.
The district court's erroneous ruling that the Limited Partnerships did not have to be
joined provides ample and understandable justification for their previous omission. Saint
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Alphonsus nevertheless insinuates the omission was a "tactical decision" made to finesse
supposed statute of limitations problems, allow MRIA to control recovery, shield the Limited
Partnerships from liability, and simplify the case. (Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support
of its Motion for Judgment on the Claims of the Limited Partnerships, p. 15.) This argument is
utterly undermined by the fact as MRIA had been prepared to timely join as real parties in
interest the Limited Partnerships prior to the running of any applicable statute of limitation. In
short, at the time of the district court's ruling, MRIA was not engaged in tactical maneuvering,
but was simply seeking guidance from the district court about the best method for presenting the
claims of the Limited Partnerships, whether in bringing claims on their behalf or in joining them
to the action. That the district court turned out to be wrong does not equate to a tactical ploy on
the part ofMRIA.
Moreover, despite Alphonsus's fixation otherwise in its briefing, the reason that the real
party in interest was initially omitted is less important than the practical results. For example, in
the Hayward case, decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to Tingley, the Court favorably
cited the case Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11 (2nd Cir. 1997).
In Advanced Magnetics, it had been argued (as Saint Alphonsus argues in its motion,) that a real
party in interest should not be substituted because there was no evidence that it had been omitted
because of a "mistake," rather than a "tactical" decision. Hayward, 136 Idaho at 348-49 33 P.3d
at 823-24. The Idaho Supreme Court noted with favor the Second Circuit's decision that, despite
that assertion, the "substitution of plaintiffs should be liberally allowed when the change is
merely formal and in no way alters the original complaint's factual allegations as to the events or
participants." Id., 136 Idaho at 349 33 P.3d at 824 (citing Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20.
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As discussed at length in the section on prejudice above, the addition of the Limited Partnerships
does not change the basic factual allegations or prejudice Saint Alphonsus.
Several of Saint Alphonsus's other arguments against the joinder of the Limited
Partnerships as real parties in interest are simply not supported by the law. At one point in its
brief, Saint Alphonsus argues that relation back is permitted "only where someone other than the
original parties is entitled to the benefits of the causes of action asserted." (Saint Alphonsus's
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Judgment on the Claims of the Limited Partnerships,
p. 10.) That is, it appears to argue that the doctrine can only be used to substitute the later-found
"proper party" for the "wrong party," and that the Limited Partnerships therefore cannot be
added because "no one is being substituted for MRIA, and MRIA was not the 'wrong party' to
bring any of the claims." (Id at p. 10 and 11.) This is a very narrow interpretation of a Rule that
is to be liberally construed, Hayward, 136 Idaho at 348, 33 P.3d at 822, and indeed, is contrary to
the very language of the rule, which provides for relation back when a real party in interest
ratifies, is joined, or is substituted into the action. Idaho R. Civ. P. 17(a). This argument is also
contrary to the case Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. One 1990 Geo Metro, Etc., 126 Idaho
675, 889 P.2d 109 (Ct. App. 1995), where it was held that upon remand, a real party in interest
could be joined to the action as a party plaintiff.
In addition, Saint Alphonsus cites the case Freiberger v. Am Tritcale, Inc., 120 Idaho
239, 815 P.2d 437, 439 (1991)for the principle that "Rule 15(c) does not allow one party's
pleading to relate back to a different party's pleading." (Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in
Support of its Motion for Judgment on the Claims of the Limited Partnerships, p. 10-11 ). This
case is simply irrelevant, as it discusses whether a party's new claim can relate back to the
original answer of the opposing party. In this context, when the court said "different" party, it
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clearly meant "opposing" party. Further, the case does not discuss Rule 15(c), which authorizes
relation back in joining or substituting a real party in interest, or Rule 17(a), which explicitly
provides that the ratification, joinder, or substitution of a real party in interest "shall have the
same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest."
Indeed, the Court had no need to discuss Rule 17(a), because Freiberger simply did not involve
the question before this Court--the addition of and relation back of claims of a real party in
interest.

III.

CONCLUSION

The Limited Partnerships may maintain their causes of action as pleaded in the latest
iteration of the Counterclaim because they are properly joined real parties in interest whose
claims relate back to the filing of the earlier pleadings in this case. As such, Saint Alphonsus's
Motion for Judgment on the Claims of the Limited Partnerships must be denied.
DATED this 30th day of August 2010.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

WadeL. Wood
Dara Labrum
Attorneys MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), MRI Limited Partnership ("MRI Center") and MRI
Mobile Limited Partnership ("Mobile"), 1 submit this opposition to Saint Alphonsus Diversified
Care, Inc.'s and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's (collectively "St. Als") motion for
summary judgment based on MRIA's civil conspiracy claim.

I. INTRODUCTION
St. Als' motion for summary judgment on MRIA's civil conspiracy claim should be
denied as it is not authorized. St. Als filed a motion for summary judgment on MRIA's civil
conspiracy claim before the first trial. R., 1243. That motion was denied by Judge McLaughlin.
R., 2069. St. Als did not appeal that denial. St. Als is now barred from filing another motion for
summary judgment on the same issue that it failed to appeal. Furthermore, even if the Court
were to consider St. Als' improper motion, it should be denied because MRIA's conspiracy
claim is supported by underlying claims for relief and because a conspiracy claim cannot be
duplicative of other claims because it is not an independent claim for relief, and therefore is
dependent on other claims for relief.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS
The facts below demonstrate that St. Als conspired and agreed with its in-house
radiologists, St. Alphonsus Radiology Group (nlk/a Gem State Radiology and hereinafter "GSR"
or the "rads") to open up a business that would compete with St. Als' existing partnership,
MRIA.

A.

St. Als' Interest in MRI as a New Technology

In 1980, the neuroscience physicians at St. Als began investigating magnetic resonance
imaging ("MRI") technology as the next state-of-the-art imaging modality. (Trial Ex. 4022.)
They determined that MRI technology was essential for St. Als to remain the preeminent
1

References to MRJA include not only MRl Associates, but also MRJ Center and Mobile.
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neuroscience center in Idaho. By 1984, St. Als formed a general partnership (MRIA) with five
physicians (later known as "DMR"), Mercy Medical Center in Nampa and Caldwell Memorial
Hospital (nlk/a West Valley Regional Medical Center) to develop a jointly owned and operated
MRI center located on St. Als' campus. (!d) The result was the first multi-institutional
cooperative effort of its kind in Idaho whereby the partners subordinated traditional institutional
interests to introduce MRI to the Treasure Valley. (Trial Exs. 4022 & 4023; TR Vol. 2 II at 1101.)

B.

MRIA's Formation, Fundraising and Governance.

To initially fund MRIA's business and purchase the necessary equipment, the partners
created MRI Center which offered physicians limited partnership interests in the business.
MRIA, the general partner ofMRI Center, had overall responsibility for running the business,
MRI Center. (Trial Ex. 4024 at § 4.1; TR Vol. II at 1109 ("The business and affairs of [MRI
Center] shall be conducted by [MRIA], which is vested with all authority and responsibility for
the management of [MRI Center] and its business.")) MRI Center then acquired a MRI scanner
which was placed on St. Als' campus. (TR Vol. II at 1325:21-1326:11.)
MRIA created a Board of Partners which ran MRI Center. (TR Vol. II at 1315-16.) Each
hospital partner, including St. Als, and each partner physician in DMR was a voting member of
the board. Board meetings were held monthly and were typically chaired by St. Als' CEO. (Id at
1122:21-1123:25;1345:19-23.) Board meetings regularly covered sensitive and confidential
business information relative to the operation of MRI Center. (Trial Ex. 432 - Tab 19; Trial Exs.
433-445).
MRI Center was viewed by the medical community, and treated by St. Als, as part of
St. Als' radiology department. (Id at 1418, 2420.) MRI Center's business benefitted from this
association. (Id at 2420 ("It's always good to be ... part of a flagship like St. Al's. We were
2

"TR Vol." refers to the official trial transcript from the first trial.
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known as the MRI at St. Al' s. Being backed by some huge corporation was extremely valuable
[for marketing] ... in the field and with the referring physicians.")) In fact, St. Als-employed
physicians and physicians with privileges at St. Als referred patients to MRI Center because of
its affiliation with St. Als. (ld at 1517: 12-19.)

C.

The Delivery of MRI Services

MRI services involve two components:
•

The "technical component," which includes the MRI scanning equipment, the
technicians who run the equipment, and the creation of the images. MRI
CENTER provided the technical component of the service; and,

•

The "professional component," which involves setting the "protocols" for the
scan and reading of the image. This component is provided by physician
radiologists who diagnose disease through interpretation of the MRI image.

(TR Vol. II at 1128-36.) A separate fee is charged for each ofthese components. (ld at 1128.)
In practice, physicians with patients requiring radiologic evaluation contact a radiologist
to determine whether MRI or some other radiologic "modality" (e.g. CT, x-ray etc.) will assist in
diagnosing a disease. (TR Vol. II at 1128-29.) If an MRI is needed, the physician "refers" the
patient to an MRI center for imaging. After the images are created, the radiologist reads the
image and reports back to the referring physician. 3 Thus, the referring physician's point of
contact at the beginning and end ofthe process is the radiologist. (TR Vol. III at 3618-3619.)
From MRIA's formation, St. Als designated its in-house radiologists, GSR, as the
exclusive reader of radiologic images on St. Als' campus, including at MRIA. (TR Vol. II at
1146, 2309.) From 1985 to 1998, the working relationship between GSR and MRIA was
collegial and cooperative. (TR Vol. II at 1110:23-1111:12; 2383:16-25; TR Vol. III at 3165:143

Proper scanning requires significant teamwork between the radiologists and technicians. (TR Vol. II at 1135.) The
radiologists must know the type of disease being examined to provide the technician with the proper "protocols"
(image settings). (Id. at1129.) The radiologist must be available during the examination to adjust protocols and assist
if the patient has an allergic reaction to the image enhancing dye ("contrast"). (Jd. at 1130-1131.) The technician is
responsible for operating the scanning equipment. (!d. at 2457: 14-23.) Thus, collaboration between the radiologist
and technician is imperative. (!d. at 2461-2462).
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24.) However, in 1998, GSR began developing a plan to build its own imaging center in Boise
(known as Intermountain Medical Imaging ("IMI")), which would compete with MRIA. The
present dispute arises out of St. Als' decision to conspire with, advance, support and eventually
partner with GSR in IMI to compete against St. Als' existing partners in MRIA.

D.

The Beginning of the Conspiracy: GSR Plans to Build IMI and Invites St. Als
to be a Partner.

In 1998, GSR became concerned that most of its income was derived from its services
contract with St. Als. (!d. at 1445-1447; Trial Ex. 4047.) GSR feared (as had happened with
another physician group) that St. Als might terminate GSR's services contract. (TR Vol. II at
1447-8.) Consequently, GSR desired autonomy from St. Als, and concluded that owning an
imaging center would provide that autonomy. (!d. at 1446-1448; Trial Ex. 4052.)
GSR, however, was concerned that if it opened an imaging center that competed with
St. Als, St. Als' CEO, Sandra Bruce, would react negatively and refuse to renew GSR's services
contract. (TR Vol. II at 1455-56.) GSR's solution was to invite St. Als to participate in the new
imaging center, IMI. (/d.) Although Bruce's initial reaction was negative, she warmed to the
idea, ultimately seeking 50% of the new business. (!d. at 1456-57; Trial Ex. 4057.)
When St. Als and GSR announced their intention to partner in a new imaging center,
St. Als understood that to avoid violating the noncompete clause in the MRIA partnership
agreement, MRIA needed to participate in the new imaging center. (Trial Ex. 4062; TR Vol. II at
1741-1742.) For that reason, St. Als requested MRIA to pursue a partnership with the GSR to
eliminate this conflict. (TR vol. II at 1152-53, 1748-50.) MRIA pursued discussions with GSR,
offering GSR Dr. Thomas Henson's (ofDMR) one-eleventh ownership interest in MRIA (which
included a seat on the Board of Partners), so that IMI and MRI Center could be joined to
eliminate the conflict. (Id.at1152-1155; 1788:19-1790:15.) This approach also created a business
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opportunity for MRIA to participate in IMI profits. (!d. at 1153-1154.) Thereafter, a deal for
purchase of Dr. Henson's interest was, according to GSR and MRIA, "very close to being
finalized." (TR Vol. II at 1157; Trial Ex. 4079).

E.

St. Als Sabotages MRIA's Negotiations and Conspires with GSR to Compete
Against MRIA.

In June 1999, MRIA asked its partner, St. Als through its CEO, Sandra Bruce, to help
MRIA close the deal with GSR. (TR Vol. II at 1164-1165, 1759-1760.) Although Bruce agreed
to help and although Bruce knew St. Als could not participate in a new imaging center without
MRIA, Bruce shockingly told GSR to backbumer its negotiations with MRIA and complete a
deal with St. Als. (!d. at at1166, 1760-61, 1769:7-10;Trial Ex. 4101.) St. Als then offered GSR a
better deal: a 50% interest in an MR imaging business rather than the 9% (one-eleventh) interest
offered by MRIA. 4 (!d. at 1788:19-1790: 15; 1786: 15-19; 2043:24-2044:5; 2371 :4-10; 3702:911; 4171:13-21; Trial Ex. 4191 at 3 .) As a result, GSR predictably chose to partner with St. Als.
(Trial Ex. 4226.)
"[A]t least as far back as 1999" and before IMI opened, Bruce and her COO, Cindy
Schamp, pursued a relationship between St. Als and GSR whereby they would establish imaging
centers (with MRI) "throughout the region." (TR vol. II at 1791, 2270-2271.) Such a strategy
clearly violated the MRIA non-compete provision. (Trial Ex. 4023 at§ 9.) ) This strategy also
included the concept that St. Als would buy MRI Center from MRIA and sell 50% of that
operation to GSR. (TR Vol. II at 1795-1798.)
By mid-1999, St. Als retained consultants to explore options to exit or "restructure"
MRIA so St. Als could partner in IMI. Alan Hahn ofPriceWaterhouseCoopers, was hired to
explore four "scenarios" whereby St. Als would take control of the MRIA board so that St. Als
4

This was a better deal for both St. Als and GSR because St. Als was also able to gain a 50% interest rather than the
27.5% interest it owned in MRIA. (Trial Ex. 4023 at§ 3.1.1.)
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•
could either liquidate MRIA or offer GSR an equity position in a restructured partnership that
excluded the DMR physicians. (Trial Ex. 4118.) After reviewing these scenarios, St. Als
requested Hahn to evaluate the consequences of St. Als simply withdrawing from MRIA and
competing with its partners. Hahn's evaluation ("Scenario 5") informed St. Als that withdrawal
would be a breach of the MRIA partnership agreement and could lead to litigation due to
"shifting referrals." (Trial Ex. 4138 at 16.) This report was not disclosed to MRIA. (TR. Vol. II
at 1199:5-23.)
In fa111999, St. Als began to exchange with GSR confidential draft operating agreements
for IMI. (Trial Exs. 4115 &4125). Those drafts describe a relationship where:
•

Neither St. Als nor St. Als' "Affiliate" (which would include MRIA) could
expand in Ada or Canyon counties without GSR's permission. (Ex. 4115 §7.3.1)

•

St. Als and GSR agreed to pursue development of an imaging center in Meridian
(a location which MRIA had picked to establish an imaging center. (Ex. 4115
§7.3.3)

•

St. Als would receive an option to purchase 50% of any IMI imaging facility in
Ada and Canyon counties.

In essence, St. Als' separate, confidential negotiations assured that GSR would partner
with St. Als in IMI, to the exclusion of MRIA. When representatives of MRIA finally met with
the rads on December 16, 1999, to finalize the sale of Dr. Henson's interest, the rads predictably
rejected the offer (even though this was the same deal that had been "very close to ...
finaliz[ation]" before St. Als' interference.) (Trial Ex. 4079.) Not only was MRIA prevented
from partnering with GSR in IMI, it was left with the prospect of competing with the same rads
who were reading MRIA's images and interfacing with MRIA's referring physician community.
(Trial Ex. 4104, 4137; TR Vol. II at 1488.) St. Als exacerbated the problem when it ignored
MRIA's requests to permit MRIA to "contract directly with radiologists" who were not MRIA's
competitors. (Trial Ex. 4137; TR Vol. II at 1182.)
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F.

Although St. Als Knew it Must Buy its Way Out ofMRIA to Join IMI,
St. Als Stalled Negotiations While MRIA's Value Diminished.

By the time IMI opened, St. Als clearly understood that it could neither withdraw from
the partnership nor participate in IMI without violating the MRIA partnership agreement . (Trial
Exs. 4137, 4138 at 16, 4149, 4150; TR Vol. II at 1690:21-1697.) Documents generated by
SAMRC and its consultants in late 1999/early 2000, acknowledge that "A waiver for St.
Alphonsus to participate in the imaging business of IMI requires a unanimous favorable vote
from all general partners." (Trial Exs. 4137,4149,4150,4118, & 4147). 5 St. Als also knew that
IMI would take business away from MRIA. (TR Vol. II at 1740:25-1741 :5.) Despite this
knowledge, St. Als helped IMI become a formidable competitor.
Recognizing that there was no easy "way around" the non-compete provisions to achieve
its objective of partnering with GSR, St. Als shifted focus in early 2000 to buying its way out of
MRIA by purchasing MRI Center, and sharing that operation with GSR. (TR Vol. II at 1197,
1520-21, 1812, 2057). St. Als requested its consultant, Hahn, to determine a fair market value
buyout price for MRI Center. (!d.) The figure was in excess of $22 million. (!d. at 1519-25, Ex.
4144.)
5

At trial St. Als attempted to argue that it had the right under the partnership agreement to participate in IMI as
long as it only participated in the "non MRI modalities." This transparently ridiculous position was properly rejected
by the trial court and the jury because the clear weight of the evidence demonstrated there was no separate and
distinct non-MRI side ofthe business. It was all one business, and St. Als participated in all facets of the business.
The evidence demonstrated there was only one IMI Management Committee which managed the operations of the
entire business and on which St. Als had equal participation. (TR Vol. III at 3714:1-5; 3716:7-3717:7; 3719:73720: 1; 3721: 18-3722:3.) There was no way to split the management up between MRI and non-MRI. (!d. at
3722:19-25.) After St. Als officially joined IMI, IMI covered non-MRI losses with MRI profits. (TR Vol. II at
1630:24-1631 :4.) IMI had only one reception area, one receptionist, one entrance, one director of operations, one
secretarial staff, one executive director, one medical director, and as far as customers were concerned it was just
"one big imaging center." (Jd. at 1601:4-1602:8; 1603:11-19; 4167:19-21.) IMI marketed itself as one business
including all modalities. (Jd. at 1602:9-1603:5; 4168:4-6.) Additionally, IT was not split between modalities. (TR
Vol. III at 4167:24-4168:2.)
Additionally, the MRIA partnership agreement prohibited hospital partners from competition, including
competition accomplished by means of an affiliate. (Trial Ex. 4023 at§§ 8 & 9.) The agreement defined an affiliate
as an entity under common control with a partner. !d. The unrebutted testimony of Budge was that IMI was under
the common control of St. Als even if St. Als only participated in the mythical non-MRI side of the business. (TR
Vol. II at 2780:3-12.) Thus, as Judge McLaughlin recognized, the MRI/non-MRI distinction raised by St. Als was a
myth. (TR Vol. III at4471:9-17.)
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Hahn never made an offer to MRIA because St. Als was unwilling to pay such an
amount. (TR Vol. II at 1525; TR Vol. III at 3567.) 6 Instead, St. Als dragged its feet and withheld
its consultants' fair market value determination ofMRI Center. There was method in this. St. Als
understood that after IMI entered the market and started to take MRIA' s customer base, "the
cheapest thing to do [would be] nothing." (Trial Ex. 4154; TR Vol. II at 2662-65.) In other
words, rather than negotiate a deal, St. Als would stand by and watch MRIA's patient volumes
"dwindle away." (Id. at 2664-5). This would severely impact MRI Center's profitability, and
drive down the value of the operation allowing St. Als to purchase MRI Center for a reduced
price. (!d.) St. Als pursued this strategy even though it knew such a strategy was unethical. (!d. at
1870.)

G.

While St. Als Still an MRIA Partner, St. Als Conspires to Establish IMI
overMRIA
1.

IMI was Established with St. Als' Support

Although St. Als understood it could not participate in IMI without breaching its
obligations to MRIA, it did so anyway. As early as October 1998, St. Als expressed its intention
to become a 50 percent owner in IMI. (Trial Ex. 4061 at 2.) With that intention in mind, St. Als
began preparations for that eventuality, including supporting the establishment ofiMI.
[St. Als] has already made a number of tangible investments into IMI, including
the following: providing [St. Als'] case volume, database, technical component
charges, staffing costs, and other operational data for IMI's use in its business
plan; linking IMI to its intranet between the hospital and its physician network;
supporting Karen Noyes, assistant director of the [St. Als] radiology department,
in joining IMI as executive director; converting [St. Als] to the same digital
radiography system as IMI.

6

When St. Als later hired Shattuck Hammond ("SH"), St. Als told SH it was only interested in a buyout strategy
that would not require any St. Als funds because "capital was tight." (TR Vol. II at 2090; Trial Ex. 4247 at 5.) In
2003, it again was noted that "money was a big issue" for St. Als; it was "tight on cash." As a result, St. Als never
made an offer to buy out MRICI. (TR Vol. II at 1201-02, 1212-13, 1841-2, 1845, 1919, 2330.)
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(Trial Ex. 4095; see also Trial Ex. 4074 (showing in February 1999, St. Als was working on
funding for IMI)). GSR meeting minutes further reflect that "financing [for IMI] was contingent
on a partnership with the hospital." (Trial Ex. 545 (emphasis added).)

2.

St. Als' IT Support Gives IMI a Competitive Edge Over MRIA.

From IMI' s inception, St. Als provided substantial technical and professional assistance
to IMI allowing IMI to aggressively compete against MRIA. St. Als helped bring "the digital
revolution to IMI" by investing several hundred thousand dollars in IMI' s IT system. (TR Vol. II
at 1505:10-1507:10; Trial Ex. 4095.) The investment by St. Als in "dark fiber" connectivity to
IMI, alone, was $780,000. (Trial Ex. 4231at 3; TR Vol. II at 1509:6-13.) As part of the IT
support, St. Als and IMI had direct contact with MRIA's customers, the referring physicians. (ld.
at 1621:7-20; 1639:18-24.) St. Als provided laptops that allowed referring physicians to view
IMI reports and images, but not MRIA reports and images. (!d. at 2432:10-2435:1; 2436:212437:6; 2439:10-17; 2453:6-24543:9.) St. Als and GSR also formed an "ITPACS" committee
staffed by knowledgeable St. Als IT which planned the future of the "entire digital paradigm
shift for [St. Als], the radiologists and IMI." (ld. at 1619:12-1621 :20.) MRIA was not allowed
to attend ITPACS meetings. (!d. at 2437:18-2439:9.)
The IT support provided by St. Als, while still a partner in MRIA, gave IMI "competitive
advantages" over MRIA. (!d. at 1618:22-1619:3, 2434:16-22.) For example, Mary Rivers, a
referring physician, testified that this new technology was extremely beneficial to her practice
because she needed the results of the scans immediately while her patient was in her office and
this new technology, which St. Als gave to IMI two years before MRIA received it, allowed
referring physicians to receive the images and reports immediately. (TR Vol. III at 3902:73903:16; TR Vol. II at 2420:11-16; 2428:21-2429:6; 2439:7-2440:7.) In sum, St. Als "was there
with [IMI] making that investment in getting doctors over the technology hump" and helping
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bring the "digital revolution" to IMI while MRIA was left in the cold. (!d. at 1505:10-15;
1634:12-15; 2433:22-2440:7.)

3.

Financial Support Before St. Als Withdrew From MRIA

In addition to the financial investment in IT set forth above, St. Als gave IMI $546,146
and assumed almost $1.5 million ofiMI's debt. (Id. at 1557:4-1558:2; 1622:22-1623:8.)

4.

St. Als Conspires with GSR to Shift Referrals from MRIA to IMI by
Jointly Marketing IMI with GSR to Referring Physicians.

While still a partner in MRIA, St. Als worked with IMI to obtain a combined market
share for MRI, in direct competition with MRIA. (Trial Ex. 4248; TR Vol. II at 1643:7-13; TR
Vol. III at 4169:10-17.) St. Als and IMijointly marketed by television, radio, newspapers,
letters to referring physicians and physician-to-physician to office visits. (Trial Exs. 4248 &
4107; TR Vol. II 1643:23-1644:22.) This marketing effort included marketing for MRI in direct
competition with MRIA. I d. This pervasive marketing effort had the goal of promoting both
St. Als and IMI to referring physicians. (TR Vol. II at 1646: 1-7.) Because affiliation with St. Als
was a strong marketing tool, marketing for MRIA became difficult by early 2000 when IMI was
being marketed jointly by IMI and St. Als as St. Als' MRI imaging center. (!d. at 2420:11-16.)
This joint marketing by IMI and St. Als caused confusion among the referring doctors as to
which imaging center was affiliated with St. Als. (ld. at 2428:21-2429:6.)

5.

In Furtherance of the Conspiracy, St. Als Visibly Shifts its Name
Association to IMI by Making IMI a St. Als "Outpatient Facility"

While still a partner in MRIA, St. Als made IMI an outpatient facility for St. Als. (!d. at
1582:10-1583:24.) This development was communicated to the referring doctor community (the
source of MRIA' s business) which caused MRIA to lose scans because doctors became "used to
sending patients to IMI, not just for CT, but for MRI as well." (!d. at 1583:17-24.) St. Als' own
expert agreed that this act alone caused MRIA to lose scans because these referrals followed
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St. Als. (TR Vol. III at 3206:16-3207:13.) That it was the intent of co-conspirators, St. Als and
GSR, to shift business from MRIA to IMI by shifting St. Als' affiliation to IMI is demonstrated
by the following statement from one of the GSR radiologists to St. Als: "any docs who are
willingly sending cases to [MRIA] and[sic] not what I would call loyal to St. Als." (Trial Ex.
4359 (emphasis added.))

6.

St. Als' and GSR's Usurpation of MRIA's Meridian Opportunity

While still a partner in MRIA, St. Als and GSR agreed to pursue and establish IMI
Meridian (aka IMI West), which would include MRIA. (Trial Exs. 4115,4211 & 4275; TR Vol.
II at 1590:11-23; 1613:5-12; 1615:20-23.) St. Als provided this support even though it knew that
at this time, MRIA was planning to expand operations into Meridian. (Trial Ex. 4156.) As a
result of St. Als usurping this MRIA partnership opportunity, MRIA lost scans to IMI Meridian.
(Trial Exs. 4425, 4515, 4516, & 4517.)

H.

In furtherance of the Conspiracy to Shift Business From MRIA to IMI,
St. Als Condones or Turns a Blind Eye to Conduct by the Rads Intended to
Shift Referrals from MRIA to IMI

Shortly after IMI opened in fall1999, MRIA began to notice a "shift in attitude" in the
rads relative to the performance oftheir responsibilities at MRI Center. (TR Vol. II at 1176:191177:3.) Initially, this shift in attitude was demonstrated by reduced time and attention in MRI
Center's "lab" as well as inadequate support of MRI Center's technicians. (/d. at 1176:191177:3; 2385:2-2387:1; 2511 :3-24.) MRIA requested Bruce to intervene and return radiologist
service to its previous, professional level:
The time has come for SARMC to insist [that its rads] provide full, supportive
radiologic coverage of the lab at historical levels of professionalism and service ..
. . [Such coverage] cannot be allowed to be withdrawn simply because the
radiologists of the lab are now also its competitors. We now view as a necessity
SARMC's providing the lab with full, supportive, traditional radiologist coverage
or permitting the MRI Center of Idaho to contract directly with radiologists as a
fiduciary responsibility of SARMC to its other general and limited partners.
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(Trial Ex. 4137 at 2.) Bruce never responded to MRIA's request. (TR Vol. II at 1182:9-14.)
As time progressed, and SARMC's relationship with IMI deepened, the rads became
bolder in their unfair tactics. For example, (1) the rads unilaterally reduced their weekday hours
at MRI Center, while IMI increased its hours of service for its MRI modality; and (2) the rads
completely cancelled weekend support to MRI Center, except for emergency cases. (See, Trial
Ex. 4277 &4309; TR Vol. II at 1653:23-1655:25; 2195:2-17; 2392:5-24.) The result to MRI
Center was increased cost and a substantial loss of scan volume. (Trial Ex. 4292, 4519; TR Vol.
II 2494:7-2499:18, 2507:9-2508:10; 2509:14-2510:15.)
Before IMI's opening, the rads had provided 24 hour a day, seven day a week coverage
(24/7) to SARMC's radiology department and MRI Center. (TR Vol. II at 2496:8-12.) After IMI
opened, the only modality not receiving 24/7 coverage at SARMC was MRI Center. (!d. at
2195:2-2197:4.) Although SARMC understood that this change in hours of coverage had a "huge
impact" on MRIA's ability to do business, SARMC did nothing to change the situation. (!d.)

I.

In June 2001, St. Als, while still a MRIA partner, St. Als Formalized its
Partnership with IMI by Executing an Operating Agreement.

In June, 2001, St. Als formalized its relationship with GSR and IMI through execution of
the Operating Agreement of Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC. (Trial Ex. 4226). 7 In salient
part, the agreement provided:
•

St. Als would contribute over $500,000 to IMI. (Trial Ex. 4226 at§ 4.1.)

•

St. Als would not establish an imaging center in Ada or Canyon County without
offering the rads the right to participate in such venture. (!d. at §7.3 .1.)

7

To avoid the perception of blatantly breaching the non-compete provisions of the MRIA partnership agreement,
St. Als included in the final draft of the Operating Agreement language that purportedly limited the agreement to
the alleged "non-MRI" operation of the company. Testimony at trial, however, from IMI's own executive director
demonstrated that this Operating Agreement related to IMI's entire business, including its magnetic resonance
imaging operation (TR. Vol. II at 1600-1604, 1613, 1616-1621, 1630-1; see also note4, supra.)
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•

St. Als and the rads would pursue the development of a medical imaging center in
Meridian, Idaho (a location MRIA was interested in developing). (!d. at§ 7.3.3;
TR Vol. II at 1613.)

•

IMI's Management Committee (that had oversight for the entire business ofiMI,
including MRI operations would consist of 3 representatives from St. Als and 3
radiologist representatives. (TR Vol. III at 3721-3723.)

•

St. Als and the rads would enter into an IT services agreement and create an
ITP ACS committee which was the vehicle by which IMI obtained technological
opportunities and competitive advantages over MRIA (Trial Ex. 4226 at§ 13.2
and Exhibit 13.2 thereto; TR Vol. II at 1618-19.)

The Operating Agreement also described a process whereby St. Als would "make
available" to the rads a 50% interest in MRI Center. (Trial Ex. 4226 at § 7.3.2.) The terms of
this Operating Agreement were never revealed to St. Als' partners. In fact, Bruce warned GSR
not to disclose the terms of any proposed deal to MRIA, for fear that it might make the buyout of
MRI Center more difficult. (Trial Ex. 4199; TR Vol. II at 1575-6).
J.

After Signing the IMI Operating Agreement, St. Als Hired Shattuck
Hammond to Evaluate Options for Achieving St. Als' Goals of Owning MRI
Center and Joint Venturing with GSR in other MRI Facilities.

St. Als' COO, Cindy Schamp, hired Grant Chamberlain of Shattuck Hammond ("SH"), a
"health care focused investment bank" to perform a Strategic Options Assessment ("SOA'')
evaluating the options available to St. Als for meeting its objectives of owning MRI Center and
joint venturing with GSR in other MRI facilities. (Trial Ex. 4239; TR Vol. II at 2547-48.) In the
course of its work, SH employees discussed various strategic options with St. Als
representatives. (Trial Ex. 4239). The results of these discussions were included in an
"Overview" document describing alternatives then being considered by St. Als. (!d.; TR Vol. II
at 2562.). The document reveals that, as of October 2001:
•

St. Als anticipated litigation if it withdrew from MRIA.

•

St. Als understood that it owed a fiduciary duty to the Limited Partnerships and
risked breaching that duty, if it withdrew.
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•

St. Als understood that if its termination was "wrongful," MRIA would be entitled
to damages arising from subsequent competition with MRIA.

•

St. Als would not support the future growth of MRIA as long as there was no plan
to deal with St. Als' strategic goals ofpartnering with SARG/GSR.

•

St. Als could not use any St. Als funds, nor incur debt to achieve its objectives.

The Overview report evaluated 5 different options for St. Als' consideration, ranging
from withdrawal to various other strategies. The report also indicated that withdrawal (referred to
by St. Als as their "scorched earth scenario") was the direction St. Als was "leaning."
In November 2001, SH delivered to St. Als its final SOA (Trial Ex. 4247) and Valuation
Analysis ofMRI Associates. (Trial Ex. 4246). The first page of the SOA discusses St. Als'
objectives relative to partnering with GSR. It provides that St. Als considered it a "strategic
imperative" to partner with GSR to pursue "outpatient diagnostic imaging opportunities in
St. Als' service area." (Trial Ex. 4247). Because this was prohibited by the MRIA Partnership
Agreement, St. Als wanted control ofMRI Center to relieve itself of that obligation.
The SOA evaluated 5 different "structural alternatives" (including withdrawal) which
would attain St. Als' stated objectives. 8 Given the business and litigation risks associated with
these alternatives, SH recommended that St. Als acquire all general and limited partner interests
in MRI Center, leaving MRIA with only its mobile operation (Option 1). Upon acquiring MRI
Center, St. Als could then merge that operation into IMI. According to the SOA the net cost to
St. Als for executing this strategy was $27.3 million.
Ken Fry, St. Als' CPO was involved in review of SH's valuation report. (TR Vol. II at
2078-9.) He believed that SH's purchase price of MRI Center was "fair" and that the

8

The SOA warns St. Als (as did Alan Hahn) that "[a] waiver for St. Als to participate in the imaging business of
IMI requires a unanimous favorable vote from all general partners ofMRJA." (Trial Exs. 4137,4149,4150,4118,
& 4147)
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recommendation to purchase MRI Center (Option 1) was a good approach (!d. at 2085-87). 9
St. Als never communicated the results of the valuation to MRIA, and never made an offer to
buy MRI Center. (TR Vol. II at 2088-9, 2092-2094). Fry did not know why an offer was not
made, but was aware that "capital was pretty tight" at St. Als during that timeframe. (!d. at 2090,
2094.) Copies ofSH's reports were never provided to MRIA. (!d. at 2098). 10
In fall2003, after MRI Center scan volumes had dropped precipitously, 11 Bruce requested
a meeting of the MRIA Board of Partners where she presented a three month time line for the
buyout ofMRI Center. (TR Vol. II at 1217:1-12, 1920:4-9; 1931 :10-18.) She stated that if the
transaction did not occur timely, SARMC would consider withdrawal from the partnership.
(Trial Ex. 4309, TR Vol. II at 1920:14-1922:1.) Given that SARMC had been dragging its feet
on a buyout since 2000, MRIA questioned Bruce's motives. (TR Vol. II at 1222:12-1223:7.)
SARMC's proposal was made more difficult by two other demands: (1) that GSR
participate in the negotiations to buyout MRI Center, thereby requiring MRIA to disclose
confidential information to its competitor, and (2) that Grant Chamberlain, SARMC's consultant,
be used to facilitate the negotiations. (TR Vol. II at 1224:16-1231:7.)
In a meeting on December 17, 2003, MRIA proposed that it be given 120 days to prepare
a fair market value for SARMC's purchase ofMRI Center. (TR Vol. II at 1231 :9-1232:17.)
SARMC never responded to this request. (TR Vol. II at 1232:12-17.) Instead, on February 24,
SARMC notified MRIA that SARMC was withdrawing from MRIA in 30 days and threatened
that, only ifMRIA paid SARMC its departing partner share, would SARMC delay competition
9

Fry also testified repeatedly that Bruce and Schamp were involved in the process of reviewing the SH report and
attended a presentation of the report by Chamberlain. (TR Vol. II at 2079, 2082, 2084, 2088). Amazingly, both
Bruce and Schamp claimed ignorance as to the contents ofthe SH report. (!d. at 1886, 2376-2377.)
10
Although MRIA partners had been interviewed by Grant Chamberlain in 200 I, and had been promised a "fair
market buyout" number as a result of his work, Chamberlain was not heard from after "a couple of meetings" and
MRIA was never provided with an explanation (1213-1215).
11
The evidence at trial showed that IMI enjoyed a corresponding jump in its scan volumes at this same time. (Trial
Ex. 4518; TR Vol. II at2796:15-2797:1.)
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with MRIA for one year. (Trial Ex. 4329; TR Vol. II at 1952:22-25.) Bruce admitted that
SARMC withdrew from MRIA to partner with the rads and that she understood SARMC might
be liable for wrongful dissociation damages. (TR Vol. II at 1943:15-24, 1950:9-15.)
Upon receipt ofSARMC's notice ofwithdrawal, MRIA's other hospital partners
approached SARMC with the fair market value buyout that MRIA had been working on since its
December meeting with SARMC. (Trial Ex. 4322.) Although the proposal from MRIA was the
deal SARMC had requested in September of2003, SARMC rejected the offer solely because it
was "too late." (TR Vol. II at 1954:4-8; 1954:15-1955:2.)
After withdrawal SARMC and GSR moved a mobile MRI scanner onto SARMC's
campus for IMI, within 100 feet ofMRI Center's operation. (TR Vol. II at 2173:21-24.) In mid
December 2005, SARMC notified its medical and nursing staff of the transition of all SARMC
MRI imaging business to the IMI mobile scanner:
"As you may be aware, St. Alphonsus and Gem State Radiology are currently in
the process of transitioning MRI Services at St. Alphonsus. We are excited about
our plans to bring MRI imaging into our hospital in partnership with these
exceptional rads .... " (Trial Ex. 4316.)
"As of [December 19, 2005], St. Alphonsus MRI [IMI's mobile unit at SARMC]
will be the sole provider of MRI services for all Saint Alphonsus inpatient,
outpatient and ED [emergency department] patients .... MRI of Idaho [MRICI]
will no longer provide services to St. Alphonsus connected patients ..... " (Trial
Ex. 4377.)
By the end of2005, SARMC had accomplished the objectives it had articulated and
pursued since 1999: SARMC had partnered with GSR in IMI on its campus, in downtown Boise
and in Meridian. As a result ofSARMC's efforts and the combined conduct ofSARMC and
GSR in IMI, virtually all of MRI Center's business had been diverted to IMI. (Trial Ex. 4519;
TR Vol. II at 2767:25-2768:6.) SARMC had effectively exited the MRIA partnership and
accomplished its objectives without paying anything to MRIA, leaving MRIA struggling to stay
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in business (1301 :7-1302:1). St. Al's CEO summed up St. Als' strategy nicely when she
testified as to her reasons for supporting IMI: "I was a partner with a competitor [IMI]. I was
supporting myself." (Jd at 1871 :8-9.)

III. ARGUMENT
St. Als' motion is improper. Before the first trial, St. Als filed a motion for summary
judgment on MRIA's conspiracy claims. R., 1243. Judge McLaughlin denied that motion. R.,
2069. Consequently, MRIA's civil conspiracy claims were given to the jury in the first trial.
St. Als did not argue on appeal that it was improper to let the civil conspiracy go to the jury. It is
now too late for St. Als to raise arguments it failed to raise on appeal. Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho
705, 709 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009) (The law ofthe case doctrine prevents consideration "of
alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal.") Therefore,
because St. Als failed to raise these alleged errors in the first appeal it is barred from raising
them now.
However, even if the Court were to consider St. Als' motion, it should be denied.
St. Als makes two arguments in its motion. First, St. Als argues that parts ofMRIA's civil
conspiracy count should be dismissed because civil conspiracy is dependent on underlying
claims and certain allegedly underlying claims were dismissed. Second, St. Als argues that parts
ofMRIA's civil conspiracy count should be dismissed because those parts are duplicative of
underlying claims. St. Al's arguments, however, are completely contradictory as St. Als argues
in the first instance that MRIA's civil conspiracy count is dependent on underlying claims and in
the second instance that the civil conspiracy count is duplicative of underlying claims. St. Als
contradictory arguments stem from an apparent misunderstanding of Idaho law concerning
conspiracy. As is set forth below, civil conspiracy is not an independent claim, but rather is a
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means of assigning joint liability to co-conspirators for conduct that states a claim for relief.
Accordingly, civil conspiracy is dependent on underlying claims for relief, and therefore cannot
be duplicative of such claims. 12

A.

The Nature of Civil Conspiracy

"A civil conspiracy that gives rise to legal remedies exists only ifthere is an agreement
between two or more to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in
an unlawful manner." McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003). "The
gist of a civil action for conspiracy is the act or acts committed in pursuance thereof, the damage,
not the conspiracy or the combination." Argonaut Ins. Co. v. White, 86 Idaho 374, 379, 386 P.2d
964, 966 (1963). Thus, the "[t]he essence of a cause of action for civil conspiracy is the civil
wrong committed as the objective of the conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself." McPheters, 138
Idaho at 395, 64 P.3d at 321 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, St. Als is correct that conspiracy is not an independent claim for relief.
Argonaut Ins., 86 Idaho at 379, 386 P.2d at 966. It is a means of assigning joint and several
liability among the co-conspirators for acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Lorang
v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 449, 209 P.2d 733, 737 (1949); Dahlquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 233
P. 883, 885-86 (1925) Thus, there must be separate "wrongful acts" apart from the conspiracy,
such as breach of fiduciary duty, wrongful dissociation, interference with prospective business
relations and breach of contract, "committed by the conspirators" which cause the plaintiff
injury. Argonaut Ins., 86 Idaho at 379, 386 P.2d at 966.

12

The incompatibility of St. Als' arguments is demonstrated from the following quotes from its brief. In part I of its
brief the heading states "the allegations of conspiracy to commit misappropriation and defamation fail as a matter of
law because civil conspiracy depends on a viable underlying substantive claim" whereas in Part II it argues the exact
opposite, that "the conspiracy claim fails as a matter oflaw to the extent it is premised on substantive claims."
(Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Claim at 4, 12.)
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B.

MRIA's Conspiracy Claim

MRIA's civil conspiracy count and the underlying conspiracy allegations in the Third
Amended Counterclaim are not alleged as an independent claim for relief. Instead, the count is
in the counterclaim for purposes of holding St. Als liable for the acts of the rads and IMI in
furtherance ofthe conspiracy. Indeed, the allegations ofMRIA's Third Amended Counterclaim
make clear that it is MRIA's position that St. Als is jointly and severally liable for the wrongful
acts that both St. Aland its radiologist partners in IMI, GSR, committed in furtherance of their
conspiracy to compete against MRIA in violation of St. Als' fiduciary, contractual and tort
duties. In that regard, MRIA alleges as follows in their Third Amended Counterclaim:
38.
SARMC, IMI, GSR, and ICR conspired to discourage MRIA's
growth and diminish its business while giving IMI a competitive advantage over
MRIA. These acts include, but are not limited to, the following acts of
SARG/GSR/ICR/IMI, which SARMC condoned, encouraged, and supported:
•

SARG/GSR reduced hours of its availability to MRIA operations for the
first time in the history of the hospital while maintaining longer hours of
service to IMI;

•

SARG/GSR refused to personally attend to patients being imaged in
MRIA's mobile unit stationed in the SARMC parking lot only yards away
from MRI Center (a service provided willingly by the group since 1988);

•

SARG/GSR radiologists provided faster response on image interpretation
for images taken at IMI than at MRIA operations;

•

SARG/GSR radiologists wrongfully disparaged MRIA by asserting that
images produced at MRI Center were inferior to IMI magnetic resonance
images;

•

SARG/GSR physician support was reduced from that which had been
historically provided in addressing routine quality and service issues,
including patient care issues, within the lab, despite charging for
professional service; and

•

SARG/GSR reduced responsiveness from what had been historically
provided to the needs of lab personnel for physician input in clinical
operations.
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39.
MRIA informed SARMC that SARG/GSR, IMI, and ICR had
engaged in the tactics and behaviors listed above. SARMC did nothing to abate or
prevent such behavior.
40.
While SARG/GSR, IMI, and ICR were engaging in these acts
(with the knowledge and consent of SARMC), SARMC (while still a partner at
MRIA) was also compromising the efforts ofMRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI
Mobile to grow their business and/or compete with IMI by, among other things:
•

Giving IMI advantages with respect to the rollout and implementation of
SARMC's IT system which linked referring physicians to MRIA's and
IMI' s data and images;

•

Disparaging MRIA' s services;

•

Promoting IMI's services over MRIA's; and

•

Voting against growth initiatives at the MRIA board level.

41.
In addition to these acts, SARMC appointed as IMI Management
Committee Members those same SARMC employees who were involved in
regular communications with MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile management
regarding business plans, strategic initiatives and IT planning for those
businesses. The net effect of this arrangement is that, unbeknownst to MRIA, IMI
managers received confidential business information from MRIA, MRI Center
and MRI Mobile, which could be used to IMI' s competitive advantage.

****
SARMC AND IMI'S CONSPIRACY AGAINST MRIA, MRI LIMITED,
AND MRI MOBILE

56.
SARMC, SARG/GSR, IMI, and ICR have engaged in a conspiracy
for the purpose of running MRI Center out of business or diminishing its value so
substantially that MRIA would have to sell the severely damaged Center to
SARMC, at which point SARMC and GSR could easily reestablish its value
simply by once again supporting it as they had in the past.
57.
Such acts in furtherance of this conspiracy include, but are not
limited to, the following acts:
•

SARG/GSR, with the knowledge and support of SARMC, reduced hours
of its availability to MRIA operations for the first time in the history of the
hospital while maintaining longer hours of service to IMI;

•

SARG/GSR, with the knowledge and support of SARMC, refused to
personally attend to patients being imaged in MRIA's mobile unit
stationed in the SARMC parking lot only yards away from MRI Center (a
service provided willingly by the group since 1988);
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•

SARG/GSR radiologists, with the knowledge and·support of SARMC,
provided faster response on image interpretation for images taken at IMI
than at MRIA operations;

•

SARG/GSR radiologists, with the knowledge and support of SARMC,
wrongfully asserted that images produced at MRI Center were inferior to
IMI magnetic resonance images;

•

SARG/GSR, with the knowledge and support of SARMC, reduced
physician support from that which had been historically provided in
addressing routine quality and service issues, including patient care issues,
within the lab, despite charging for professional service; and

•

SARG/GSR, with the knowledge and support of SARMC, reduced
responsiveness from what had been historically provided to the needs of
lab personnel for physician input in clinical operations.

58.
Likewise, prior to dissociation, SARMC wrongfully engaged in
conduct which breached its partnership obligations and harmed MRIA, MRI
Center/MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile by:
•

Giving IMI advantages with respect to the rollout and implementation of
SARMC's IT system which linked referring physicians to MRIA's and
IMI' s businesses;

•

Promoting IMI' s services over MRI Center; and

•

Voting against growth initiatives at the MRIA board level.

59.
Moreover, after dissociation, SARMC, IMI, SARG/GSR, and ICR
continued this conspiracy by:
•

Bringing an IMI mobile magnet on campus to compete with the Center,
and using confusing and misleading business names and contact telephone
numbers in an effort to wrongfully divert business away from MRI Center
to IMI' s mobile magnet;

•

Directing SARMC physicians to refer magnetic resonance imaging
patients to IMI, to the exclusion of MRI Center;

•

Creating uncertainty among referring physicians and MRI Center
employees by spreading rumors that MRI Center would close in the near
future;

•

Telling SARMC employees that SARMC's insurance would not cover
magnetic resonance scans done at the MRI Center, when such was
patently untrue;
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•

Threatening to terminate MRI Center's access to SARMC's PACS/RIS,
thereby forcing MRI Center to invest in its own PACS/RIS system. Once
this investment was made, SARMC refused to allow MRI Center to install
software on referring physician computers (provided by SARMC), which
would give referring physicians access to MRI Centers' PACS/RIS.
SARMC presently plans to terminate any and all access MRIA may have
to SARMC's PACS/RIS system; and

•

Disparaging MRI Center's services.

60.
The combined acts of SARMC, SARG/GSR, IMI, and ICR have
damaged the reputation ofMRI Center/MRI Limited, MRI Mobile, and MRIA's,
limited referring physician access to MRI Center's magnetic resonance images,
and interfered with, or diverted, MRI Center's existing and prospective
customers.
61.
Before SARMC, SARG/GSR, IMI, and ICR undertook this
conspiracy, MRI Center had enjoyed an eighteen-year record of increased scan
volume and profitability. As a result of the conspiracy described above, MRI
Center's volume has dwindled from a high of approximately 8,000 out-patient
scans in 2003 to roughly 3,000 out-patient scans in 2005.
(MRIA's Third Amended Counterclaim at~~ 38-41, 56-61, filed on March 22, 2010 (emphasis
added).) MRIA's Third Amended Counterclaim then contains claims for (1) breach of contract
for competing against and then deserting the partnership in breach of the partnership agreement;
(2) wrongful dissociation; (3) declaratory relief; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (6) interference with prospective contractual
relations or business expectations. Because, MRIA's count for civil conspiracy is a recognized
"cause of action", but is not an independent claim for relief, MRIA must succeed on one of the
above claims in order to hold St. Als liable for acts committed in furtherance of its conspiracy to
harm MRIA. McPheters, 138 Idaho at 395, 64 P.3d at 321.

C.

The Withdrawal of MRIA's Misappropriation and Defamation Claims Did
Not Affect MRIA's Conspiracy Claim.

St. Al's argues that MRIA's claim for conspiracy to misappropriate and conspiracy to
defame fail as a matter of law because MRIA voluntarily dismissed the underlying claims. It is
true that MRIA has voluntarily dismissed its claim for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets and its
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claim for Defamation. Thus, those claims cannot be the independent claims for relief that
supports MRIA's civil conspiracy count. Argonaut Ins., 86 Idaho at 379, 386 P.2d at 966. MRIA
does not dispute as much. The dismissal of those two claims, however, does not call for
dismissal of any part of MRIA' s civil conspiracy count.
As set forth in the above excerpt from MRIA' s Third Amended Counterclaim, MRIA
alleges that St. Als and the rads engaged in a conspiracy to compete with, and take business
from, MRIA. (MRIA's Third Amended Counterclaim at~~ 38-41, 56-61, 98-100.) St. Als and
the rads did so by forming IMI and directly competing with MRIA in violation of St. Al' s
contractual, tort, statutory and fiduciary duties to its partners in MRIA. Id As part of their
scheme to shift referrals from MRIA to IMI, St. Als and the rads misappropriated MRIA's
business plans and used them for purposes of helping IMI to obtain referrals from MRIA and
defamed MRIA's business units, including the quality of their equipment. Id Such actions by
St. Als were in violation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty that St. Als owed to MRIA and its
limited partners, the contractual duty not to compete, and the tort duty not to interfere with
MRIA's relationships with its customers. Thus, even though MRIA no longer has claims for
relief specifically for misappropriation or defamation, that does not mean that misappropriation
and defamation is not part of the wrongful conduct that makes up MRIA's breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of contract and tort claims. Accordingly, there is no need to dismiss any part of
MRIA' s conspiracy claim if MRIA prevails on any one of its fiduciary duty, contract or tort
claims. (Third Amended Counterclaim at ~~ 3 8-41.)

D.

MRIA's Conspiracy Claim Need Not Be Dismissed as Duplicative

As set forth above, St. Als first argued in its brief that MRIA's civil conspiracy claim is
not an independent claim for relief, and therefore because it is dependent on an underlying claim
for relief, the claim should be dismissed as to misappropriation and defamation as a result of
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those underlying claims being dismissed. St. Als, however, next argues that MRIA's civil
conspiracy claim should be dismissed because it is duplicative ofMRIA's other "independent
claims for relief." These arguments are completely inconsistent. Under St. Als' view of civil
conspiracy, a plaintiff could never make a claim for joint liability of co-conspirators because if
the claim is not supported by an underlying claim for relief, it should be dismissed, but if it is
supported by an underlying claim for relief it also should be dismissed because it duplicative.
Idaho law, however, has not created such a conundrum. As set forth in Part III.A above,
because civil conspiracy is a means of assigning joint and several liability among the coconspirators and is not an independent claim for relief, it is dependent on wrongful acts (i.e.,
independent claims for relief) apart from the conspiracy. Argonaut Ins., 86 Idaho at 379, 386
P.2d at 966; Dahlquist, 40 Idaho 378, 233 P. at 885-86. Consequently, it makes no sense to
dismiss a conspiracy claim as being duplicative of claims for relief which allege the wrongful
acts upon which the conspiracy claim is dependent.
In the Idaho Supreme Court's 2003 McPheters decision, the Supreme Court cited to its
prior case of Dahlquist which provides a thorough explanation of how a conspiracy claim works
and why it cannot be duplicative of other claims. McPheters,138 Idaho at 395, 64 P.3d at 321.
The issue in Dahlquist was whether a claim for conspiracy constitutes a separate cause of action.
40 Idaho 378, 233 P. at 885-86. The Supreme Court held that it does not, but that it is a remedy
for independent causes of action. !d. In so holding, the court recognized that "[a] civil
conspiracy itself is not a tort, and, until some act is done by the conspirators, there arises no
cause of action, and when an act is done which amounts to an actionable tort, then that is the gist
of the action." !d. at 885. In other words, "there is no such thing as a civil action for conspiracy.
The better view is that the damage sustained, and not the conspiracy is the gist of the action." !d.
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at 885-86 (citations omitted) Thus, it is the "[w]rongful acts committed by conspirators resulting
in injury alone give rise to a cause of action. If there are several separate and distinct torts
perpetrated by the conspirators, each tortious act resulting in damages creates an independent,
separate cause of action against one or more ofthe conspirators." !d. at 886. "In the same way,
where two or more actionable wrongs are perpetrated upon one by two or more joint tort-feasors,
separate causes of action against the latter may be brought. The gravamen of the action is not the
conspiracy, but the injurious, wrongful acts committed by those who are charged with the
conspiracy." !d. (citations omitted.) Thus, a civil conspiracy is not a claim for relief, but rather is
a means of assigning joint and several liability to co-conspirators for the wrong committed. !d.,

see also Argonaut Ins. Co, 86 Idaho at 379, 386 P.2d at 966; Lorang, 69 Idaho at 449, 209 P.2d
at 737. It is the wrongs, not the conspiracy, that constitute the claims for relief. !d.
Consequently, because conspiracy is a means of assigning joint and several liability to
co-conspirators and not a separate claim for relief, under Idaho law it cannot be duplicative of
other cause actions. !d. In that regard, it must be noted that St. Als does not cite to a single Idaho
appellate decision for its illogical argument. Instead it relies upon the unreported federal district
court decisions of Transport Truck & Trailer v. Freightliner, LLC, 2007 WL 294280 (D. Idaho
Jan. 29, 2007) and Buck v. City ofSandpoint, 2008 WL 4498806 (D. Idaho Oct. 1, 2008).
Neither decision is particularly clear as to reasoning behind its dismissal of the conspiracy claim
in those cases. However, ifthese decisions are read to support St. Als' argument, they are
contrary to the Idaho law.
In Transport Truck & Trailer v. Freightliner, LLC, 2007 WL 294280 (D. Idaho Jan. 29,
2007), the court held that "TTT has no separate conspiracy claim growing out of the civil wrongs
recited in earlier Counts of the amended complaint", and thus dismissed the conspiracy claim.
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Id at *8. The decision is not a model of clarity as to why it dismissed the claim; it appears that
the court did so because it dismissed underlying claims. Id Likewise, the Buck decision also is
not a model of clarity. It simply held that the claim was "superfluous." 2008 WL 4498806 at
*17.
Both Transport Truck and Buck rely solely on Idaho Supreme Court's decision in
McPheters to make their rulings. The Idaho Supreme Court in McPheters, however, did not hold
that a civil conspiracy claim should be dismissed as duplicative of other claims. It held the exact
opposite--that a civil conspiracy is not an independent claim for relief, and is therefore dependent
on a separate claim for relief. 138 Idaho at 395, 64 P.3d at 321. Indeed, the McPheters decision
relies upon the Argonaut Insurance and Dahlquist decisions cited above. Thus, if the federal
district courts in Transport Truck and Buck did dismiss the conspiracy claims in those cases as
duplicative, as St. Als argues, the courts in those cases misapplied Idaho law as the Dahlquist
decision and its progeny, Argonaut Insurance and McPheters clearly recognize that civil
conspiracy is dependent on underlying claims for relief, and therefore cannot be duplicative of
those claims. It is a means of holding a party jointly liable for wrongs outlined in other claims.
Therefore, MRIA's civil conspiracy claim should not be dismissed as duplicative.

E.

MRIA Can Allege a Claim for Conspiracy to Wrongfully Withdraw.

As it does in its other arguments, St. Als contradictorily argues that MRIA's civil
conspiracy claim, to the extent based on wrongful dissociation should be dismissed both because
St. Als believes the underlying wrongful dissociation claim should be dismissed and because if
the wrongful dissociation claim is not dismissed, the civil conspiracy should be dismissed as
duplicative. Again, as set forth above, a conspiracy claim cannot be both dependent on an
underlying claim and duplicative of an underlying claim. Thus, MRIA's civil conspiracy claim
should not be dismissed as duplicative of the wrongful dissociation claim.
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Moreover, MRIA's wrongful dissociation claim has not been dismissed and therefore,
that underlying claim for relief still supports MRIA's civil conspiracy claim. However, even if
that claim were dismissed, MRIA still has fiduciary duty, contract and tort claims which provide
the underlying wrongful acts and damage to support MRIA's conspiracy claim. Therefore,
MRIA civil conspiracy claim should not be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, MRIA respectfully requests the Court to deny St. Als' motion
for summary judgment regarding MRIA's conspiracy claims.
DATED this }01'-day of August 2010.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Wade L. Woodard
Attorneys for Defendants
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MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), MRI Limited Partnership ("MRI Center") and MRI
Mobile Limited Partnership ("Mobile") 1 submit this opposition to Saint Alphonsus Diversified
Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's (collectively "St. Als") motion for
summary judgment based on the alleged legal insufficiency of MRIA's evidence of lost profits.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case is about St. Als' breach of its fiduciary and contractual duties to its partners in
MRIA by competing against MRIA's businesses through a joint venture/partnership in
Intermountain Medical Imaging ("IMI"). While still a partner in MRIA, St. Als surreptitiously
joined IMI to compete against MRIA because it wanted a larger share of the magnetic resonance
imaging business in the Treasure Valley, including profits. St. Als' behavior in competing
against MRIA was so egregious that it destroyed MRIA's business unit, MRI Center, and caused
the jury to award MRIA $63.5 million. It is for this reason that St. Als seeks so desperately to
eliminate MRIA's lost profit claims based on its erroneous argument of lack of evidence. The
current motion, however, was not authorized by the Supreme Court's opinion and should be
denied out of hand as the arguments raised in St. Als' motion are the same arguments that were
rejected by the Supreme Court as well as Judge McLaughlin on more than one occasion.
A.

St. Als' Motion is Barred by the Supreme Court's Decision
A plain reading of St. Als' motion makes clear that it is asking this Court to do what the

Supreme Court refused to do--dismiss MRIA's lost profits claims for lack of proof. On appeal
St. Als argued that MRIA's "damages claim also fails as a matter of law because MRIA produced
no evidence to connect its alleged $36.3 million in lost-scan damages, or any specific portion
thereof, to Saint Alphonsus's alleged misconduct" and that "MRIA's proof of lost scan profits
was fatally deficient because it relied on the unsupported assumption that [St. Als] caused every
1

References to MRIA include not only MRI Associates, but also MRI Center and MRI Mobile.
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single change in referrals from [MRIA] to IMI." (Appellant's Brief at 50 (emphasis added).)
Those are the exact same arguments that St. Als makes in its present motion. The Idaho
Supreme Court, however, refused to find as a matter of law that MRIA's damage proof was
inadequate. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 500,
224 P.3d 1068, 1087 (2009). Had it agreed with St. Als, it would have dismissed MRIA's claims
for lack of proof of damages. But instead of dismissing MRIA's claims, Justice Jones
commented that "[n]othing this Court has said indicates that [St. Als] may not have engaged in
actionable conduct. ... [B]ased on the evidence in the record it may well be that [St. Als] is
ultimately called upon to compensate MRIA in some significant amount." Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 503,224 P.3d 1068, 1092 (2009).
In sum, St. Als is asking this Court to accept an argument that has already been rejected by the
Supreme Court and is essentially seeking a reversal of the Supreme Court's decision. 2
Consequently, St. Als' motion should be denied because the law of the case doctrine bars the
reopening by this Court of the Supreme Court's rejection of St. Als' request to dismiss MRIA's
claims. Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 Idaho P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009).

B.

St. Als' Motion Fails to Satisfy its Burden of Proving that No Reasonable Juror
Could Determine that St. Als Caused MRIA to Lose Profits.
If, however, this Court does entertain St. Als' request to reverse the Supreme Court, this

Court must decide that a "reasonable juror" could not determine that St. Als caused MRIA to
lose some referrals (profits). Thomas Helicopters, Inc. v. San Tan Ranches, 102 Idaho 567, 571,

2

For certain, St. Als reads much into the Supreme Court's statement concerning Pope that is simply not there. The
Supreme Court did not say that MRIA's damage theories should be dismissed as a matter of law. Likewise, the
Supreme Court did not invite St. Als to file yet another motion for summary judgment on the issue, let alone
authorize, any type of pretrial motion on this issue as its refusal to find MRIA's evidence deficient as a matter oflaw
is now the law of the case. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not raise doubt as to the sufficiency ofMRIA's proof.
Instead, the Supreme Court simply stated that at retrial (not during any pretrial proceedings) the requirements of
Pope should be taken into account. The most reasonable inference from that statement is that the Court's jury
instructions should take into account the requirements of Pope.
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633 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Idaho 1981) ("[I]t is ... the rule that 'the possibility, or even probability of
another cause for damages than that alleged does not defeat recovery where plaintiff presents
sufficient facts to justify a reasonable juror in concluding that the thing charged was the prime
and moving cause.'") That is all that needs to be determined because the amount of damages
(i.e., whether MRIA suffered all of the lost profits it is requesting) is a fact question for the jury.
Vancil v. Anderson, 71 Idaho 95, 105, 227 P.2d 74 (1951)

The five justices of the Supreme Court and Judge McLaughlin all determined that a
reasonable juror could find that St. Als caused MRIA to lose some profits. In fact, this is the
fifth time that St. Als has raised the same old tired arguments (three times before Judge
McLaughlin and once before the Supreme Court). (Memorandum Decision, July 13, 2007, at 69; TR Vol. III 3 at 2925:9-11,2927:14-16, 2936:1-2937:2; Memorandum Decision, November 19,
2007 at 5-6.) The record before this Court is the same as the record before the jury, Judge
McLaughlin and the Supreme Court. That record, as Judge McLaughlin found sitting as the
thirteenth juror on St. Als' motion for new trial, contains not only "overwhelming" but also
"clear and convincing" evidence as to liability, causation and damages. (TR Vol. III at 44 71 :924). Consequently, even if the Court were to entertain St. Als' improper motion, the motion
should be denied.
II. MRIA'S DAMAGE CAUSATION PROOF/BACKGROUND
As this Court is aware, there is already extensive evidence in the record both from pretrial proceedings and the trial. All of that evidence is before this Court. Below is a summary of
some of the facts concerning MRIA's causation proof that are in the record.

3

"TR Vol." refers to the official trial transcript from the first trial. Relevant portions of the transcript are contained
in MRlA's Binder of Exhibit Excerpts ("Binder") at Tab 5.
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MRIA was founded by St. Als and a group of St. Als affiliated physicians in 1984 to
bring magnetic resonance imaging ("mri") technology to Idaho. The provision ofmri services
involves two components: (1) the "technical component," which includes mri scanning
equipment, technicians who run the equipment, and the creation of the images; and (2) the
"professional component," which involves programming the equipment for the scans and reading
the image. MRIA, through MRI Center and Mobile, provides the technical component whereas
the professional component is provided by radiologists. (TR Vol. II at 1128:7-1136:9.) MRIA's
business came almost exclusively from referrals from St. Als affiliated physicians.
From MRIA's formation, it was the sole provider of the technical component ofmri
services for St. Als. Indeed, St. Als' former COO testified that MRIA, after its formation, was
considered one and the same as St. Als' radiology department. (TR Vol. II at 1418:7-11.) St. Als
designated St. Alphonsus Radiology Group (nlk/a Gem State Radiology and hereinafter "GSR"
or the "rads") as the exclusive reader of radiologic images on its campus, including at MRI
Center. (TR Vol. II, at 2308:14-2309:7.)
The present dispute arises out of St. Als' decision to breach its fiduciary duties to its
partners in MRIA by joint venturing with its radiologists, GSR, in IMI to open mri facilities in
the Treasure Valley in direct competition with MRIA. (Trial Ex. 4239; TR Vol. II at 2564:22565:19.). The facts demonstrate that St. Als pursued this plan, while still a partner in MRIA, by
first sabotaging and then usurping MRIA's opportunity to join with GSR to establish IMI.
(Respondent's Brief at 4-6.) St. Als then supported and eventually joined IMI to compete against
MRIA because of greed-St. Als owned 27.5% ofMRIA as one of many hospital partners in
MRIA whereas it was the only hospital partner in IMI and it increased its ownership to 50% of
IMI. (Trial Ex. 4023 at 4 (Binder at Tab 1); TR Vol. II at 1661 :9-12.)
4

References to MRIA's Respondent's Brief on Appeal include the record evidence cited therein.
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Once St. Als determined to leave MRIA for IMI in 1999, it purposely began efforts to
shift support and referrals from MRIA to IMI. (Respondent's Brief at 4-17.) In fact, St. Als
provided the financial and logistical support necessary for IMI to begin business.
St. Als has already made a number of tangible investments into IMI, including the
following: providing St. Als' case volume, database, technical component
charges, staffing costs, and other operational data for IMI' s use in its business
plan; linking IMI to its intranet between the hospital and its physician network;
supporting Karen Noyes, assistant director of the St. Als radiology department, in
joining IMI as executive director; converting St. Als to the same digital
radiography system as IMI.
(Trial Ex. 4095 (Binder at Tab 10); see also Trial Ex. 4074.) GSR meeting minutes further
reflect that "financing [for IMI] was contingent on a partnership with the hospital." (Trial Ex.
545 (emphasis added).) St. Als gave IMI a competitive edge over MRIA by furnishing IMI with
the revolutionary ability to send its reports and images digitally to referring physicians, which
was highly important to referring physicians. (Respondent's Brief at 9; infra note 5.) St. Als did
not provide MRIA with this technology until two years later, after IMI had used the technology
to shift St. Als referring physicians from MRIA to IMI. (TR Vol. II at 2432:20-2440:7.)
Basically, St. Als "was there with [IMI] making that investment in getting doctors over the
technology hump" and helping bring the "digital revolution" to IMI while MRIA was left in the
cold. (Respondent's Brief at 9.) This exclusive IT assistance to IMI gave IMI a huge marketing
advantage over MRIA because referring physicians could read IMI's images and reports online.
(TR Vol. II at 2434:16-22; TR Vol. III at 3896:1-10, 3902:7-3903:16.) 5
In addition to supplying IMI with IT support, St. Als, while still a partner in MRIA,
invested $546,146 in IMI and assumed almost $1.5 million ofiMI's debt. (Respondent's Brief at
10.) St. Als also jointly marketed IMI through television, radio, newspapers, letters to referring
5

An inference from Mary Rivers' testimony, one of the three St. Als affiliated doctors who testified at trial, is that
she went with IMI because she needed the results of the scans immediately while her patient was in her office, as
St. Als helped IMI to do. (TR Vol. III at 3902:7-3903:16.)
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physicians and physician-to-physician office visits. (Id) These efforts were in direct
competition with St. Als' partners in MRIA. In addition to marketing on IMI's behalf, St. Als
further visibly shifted its name association from MRIA to IMI by making IMI St. Als' outpatient
facility. (/d) This development was communicated to the referring doctor community (MRIA's
source of business) causing MRIA to lose scans as doctors became "used to sending patients to
IMI ... for MRI." (/d) Then while still a partner in MRIA, St. Als and GSR agreed to pursue
and establish IMI Meridian (aka IMI West) even though St. Als knew as a partner in MRIA that
MRIA was planning to expand operations into Meridian. St. Als thereby usurped MRIA's
opportunity to establish an mri scanner in Meridian. (Id at 10-11.)
This shift of St. Als' name association from MRIA to IMI was very damaging to MRIA.
As a marketer for MRIA testified: "[i]t's always good to be a part of a flagship like Saint Al's.
We were known as the MRI at Saint Al's. Being backed by some a huge corporation was
extremely valuable ... with the referring physicians." (TR Vol. II at 2419.) St. Als purposely
caused its partners in MRIA to lose that valuable marketing tool. As one of the IMI rads told
St. Als: "any docs who are willingly sending cases to [MRIAJ are not what I would call loyal to
St. Als." (Trial Ex. 4359 (emphasis added) (Binder at Tab 6).) Thus, it was intended by St. Als
and its partners in IMI that IMI's association with St. Als would cause IMI to obtain all of the
business from referring physicians with privileges at St. Als.
St. Als further supported the establishment of IMI over MRIA by condoning conduct by
St. Als' rads intended to shift referrals from MRIA to IMI. (Respondent's Brief at 11-12.) After
IMI opened, the rads curtailed their professional services to MRIA. Consequently, MRIA
requested St. Als to intervene and return radiologist service to its previous, professional level:
The time has come for [St. Als] to insist [that its rads] provide full, supportive
radiologic coverage of the lab at historical levels of professionalism and service ..
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. . [Such coverage] cannot be allowed to be withdrawn simply because the
radiologists of the lab are now also its competitors. We now view as a necessity
[St. Als]' providing the lab with full, supportive, traditional radiologist coverage
or permitting the MRI Center of Idaho to contract directly with radiologists as a
fiduciary responsibility of [St. Als] to its other general and limited partners.
(Trial Ex. 4137 at 2 (Binder at Tab 9.) St. Als never responded to MRIA's request. (TR Vol. II at
1182:9-14.)
As time progressed, and St. Als' relationship with IMI deepened, St. Als and the rads
became bolder in their unfair tactics. For example, the rads: (1) unilaterally reduced their
weekday hours at MRIA while IMI increased its hours of service; and (2) completely cancelled
weekend support to MRIA, except for emergency cases. (Respondent's Brief at 11-12.)
Additionally, before IMI's opening, the rads had provided 24 hour a day, seven day a week
coverage (24/7) to St. Als' radiology department which then included MRIA. (!d.) After IMI
opened, the only unit not receiving 24/7 coverage at St. Als was MRIA. (!d.) Although St. Als
understood that this change in hours of coverage had a "huge impact" on MRIA' s ability to do
business, St. Als did nothing to change the situation. (!d.) The result to MRIA was increased cost
and a substantial loss of scan volume. (!d.)
St. Als then delivered the coup de grace in 2005 by allowing IMI to set up an mri scanner
on the St. Als campus next to MRIA's scanner and by issuing a written mandate to all of its
employees, including referring physicians, directing that all patients be sent to the IMI magnet
rather than to MRIA. (!d. at 16-17.) In sum, St. Als breached its contractual and fiduciary duties
of loyalty to MRIA by competing with MRIA. The end result of St. Als' conduct is that referring
physicians switched from MRIA to St. Als' new imaging center, IMI, thereby reducing MRIA
from a once highly profitable business to an almost bankrupt company.
St. Als brazenly embarked on this strategy of competing against MRIA with full
knowledge that it was violating the partnership agreement and its fiduciary duties. (Trial Exs.
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4239 at 11,4137,4138 at 16,4149, 4150; TR Vol. II at 1690:21-1697:14.) According to St. Als'
own documents, any participation in IMI was a breach of the agreement's non-compete clause:
"A waiver for St. Alphonsus to participate in the imaging business of IMI requires a unanimous
favorable vote from all general partners." (Trial Exs. 4137 (Binder Tab 9), 4149,4150,4118, &
4147). Consequently, St. Als hired consultants to help it determine how it could join with GSR
in IMI without violating its contractual and fiduciary obligations. (Trial Ex. 4239 at 2; Trial Ex.
4247 at 5.) Those consultants told St. Als that to do so, it would need to buy MRI Center from
MRIA (Trial Ex. 4247 at 37-39). St. Als, however, did not want to spend any money to buy MRI
Center from MRIA, so it decided to follow what it referred to as the "scorched earth" approach
by simply ignoring its obligations and competing against MRIA. (R., Conf. Ex. 2, Exhibit GG
thereto at 2, 11, Binder Tab 11.) St. Al's understood that after IMI entered the market and started
to take MRIA's customer base: "the cheapest thing to do [would be] nothing." (!d. at 2662:172665: 10; Trial Ex. 4154 at 1.) In other words, rather than negotiate a deal, St. Als would stand by
and watch MRIA's patient volumes "dwindle away." (!d. at 2664:3-2665:10.) St. Als' CEO
summed up St. Als' strategy nicely when she testified as to her reasons for supporting IMI: "I
was a partner with a competitor [IMI]. I was supporting myself." (!d. at 1871:8-9.)

III. ARGUMENT
A.

MRIA's Proof Satisfies Pope
At the outset, it should be noted that Pope and the other decisions cited by St. Als

(Synthes and Twin Falls) were not summary judgment decisions. They all concerned the
adequacy of the evidence at trial. Here, St. Als must prove that there are no issues of fact that
MRIA suffered damages because the amount of damages (i.e., MRIA 's alleged assumptions

about how many referrals IMJ took as a result ofSt. Als' conduct) is a fact question for the jury.
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Vancil v. Anderson, 71 Idaho 95, 105,227 P.2d 74 (1951). The evidence clearly shows that
St. Als caused MRIA to lose some scans. That said, a reading of St. A1s' motion demonstrates
that St. A1s is not arguing that it did not cause MRIA to lose some scans, but rather is arguing the
it did not cause MRIA to lose all of the scans it claims, which is a jury question.
Additionally, Pope is an antitrust case and the cases cited therein concerning causation
are all federal antitrust cases. The instant case, however, is not an antitrust case. It is a case of a
partner breaching its fiduciary duties by competing with its partners. Such a case is the polar
opposite of an antitrust case. In an antitrust case, one must show that the damages were caused
by an antitrust violation, not by other factors such as competition; 6 whereas in a breach of a duty
not to compete case, one shows the damages were caused by the unlawful competition. Vancil,
71 Idaho at 105, 227 P.2d at 79; Todd v. Sullivan Constr. LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 122, 191 P.3d
196, 200 (2008). Thus, in an antitrust case, a plaintiff must show why it is losing customers
because it must show the damages came from an antitrust injury rather than competition
whereas, in a non-compete case, a plaintiff need not show why it is losing customers to a
competitor, but rather need only show it is losing customers to the competitor. Vancil, 71 Idaho
at 105, 227 P.2d at. 79.
Also, although St. Als asserts that its motion is based on Pope, the argument that St. Als
relies upon-that MRIA must show why each referring physician switched from MRIA to IMIis not articulated in Pope and was not espoused by the Supreme Court in its opinion in this case.
St. Als' argument simply ignores the facts of this case and Idaho law. But even ifMRIA's proof
were to be judged under the antitrust standards in Pope, the proof satisfies those standards.

6

Pope, 103 Idaho at 233-34; Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116, 107 S. Ct. 484,
492 (1986) ("[T]he antitrust laws do not require the courts to protect [] businesses from the loss of profits due to
continued competition, but only against the loss of profits from practices forbidden by the antitrust laws.")
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In Pope, the plaintiffs, a group of insulators, sued Intermountain Gas Co. and its
subsidiary, HomeGuard on various antitrust claims essentially alleging the defendants were
selling insulation at a loss in an attempt to monopolize the market. 103 Idaho at 220, 646 P .2d at
991. According to the Court in Pope, the trial court calculated the damages as follows:
The gross sales from the insulation business operated both by [defendants]
beginning in August, 1976, and ending in March, 1978, were found to be
$1 ,333,316.69. Since the trial court found that the insulation business had been
operated at an overall loss of 5.33% totaling $75,137.43 during the entire period,
the gross sales figure was increased by that sum to yield what the court apparently
concluded should have been a break-even gross sales figure--$1,408,454.12, and
that figure in tum was increased by 15%, apparently to obtain a gross sales figure
which the insulation business would have achieved had it operated at a profit level
which the court felt was reasonable.
/d. at 222, 646 P.2d at 993. The trial court concluded that the above 11 represented the amount of

business which the other insulators had been deprived due to the activities of Intermountain
Gas. 11 /d. The trial court 11 then proceeded to allocate that $1,619,722.24 among the other
insulators, apparently on the theory that by violating the antitrust laws the defendant had either
forfeited its right to be in the insulation business, or that but for the antitrust violations the
defendant would not have obtained any business. 11 /d.
The Supreme Court found, however, as quoted in its opinion in this case, that
[t]here was no justification in the present case for the trial court's determination
that the gross revenues of the defendants ... provide a reasonable foundation for
calculating the lost profits of plaintiffs. Such a method of figuring damages
assumes, without any support in the record, that the HomeGuard operation would
not have won any portion of the insulation market absent antitrust violations.
Furthermore, it assumes that the plaintiffs had the capacity to assimilate all of the
business which HomeGuard performed, and that plaintiffs would have won that
business over other insulators who chose not to participate in this action. There is
simply no evidence in the record to demonstrate a relationship between
HomeGuard's sales figures and plaintiffs' damages so as to support a conclusion
that HomeGuard's income was the equivalent of plaintiffs' lost profits.
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!d. at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005. In sum, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he record reflects" that
"none of the plaintiffs so much as made an estimate, reasoned or unreasoned, as to how much
money they lost due to the alleged antitrust violations by the defendant." !d. 7

1.

MRIA's Damage Causation Evidence Does Not Suffer from the Problems
Highlighted in Pope

Whereas in Pope the Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs' damage proof
assumed without any evidentiary support that the defendant would not have won some portion of
the market absent antitrust violations, MRIA's proof makes no such assumptions. MRIA's proof
takes into account that had IMI opened independent of St. Als, it would have obtained some
portion of the market. MRIA adjusted its damage analysis for that possibility as well as for other
market factors, including competition from other sources.
MRIA has two experts, Bruce Budge and Charles Wilhoite. 8 At the first trial, Budge
testified he obtained information from both MRIA and IMI showing the doctors that referred to
those imaging centers and the number of referrals from each of those doctors. (TR Vol. II at
2730:3-2731 :7; 2735:13-21; 2737:9-18; 2738:25-2739:7; Trial Exs. 4425, 4515, 4516, and 4517;
and R., Ex. 139, Ex. Q thereto.) Budge used a conservative analysis to calculate MRIA's
damages; he included only doctors who previously referred to MRIA and then switched to IMI
and new doctors who gained privileges at St. Als after IMI opened and were referring to IMI.
(!d. at 2741 :7-2743:6; 2765:4-2766:7.) If a referring doctor did not have privileges at St. Als or

had privileges at more than one hospital, Budge did not include that doctor in his analysis of
MRIA's lost scans. (!d.) Because MRIA was, before St. Als switched allegiance to IMI, the
7

It should be noted that the so-called Pope issues raised by St. Als rely on double dicta. First the Supreme Court's
decision in Pope concerning damages was dicta. As the Supreme Court indicated, it did not need to address the
issue of damages in Pope because the evidence in Pope did not support the trial court's findings as to liability. 103
Idaho at 223, 646 P.2d at 994. Second, the Supreme Court's reference to Pope in its decision in the instant case was
dicta as the reference had no relevance to any of the holdings in the Supreme Court's decision.
8
Both are very experienced experts in the realm of estimating lost profits. (R., Ex. 139, Exhibit Q thereto at
schedule A.)
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exclusive supplier of scans on St. Als' campus, Budge included all of those scans. (!d. at
2747:9-24; Trial Ex. 4023,

~

9.2.) Also, Budge did not include referrals that were lost to

competitors other than IMI. (!d.) Hence, 46 percent of IMI's total scans were not included in
Budge's damages calculations. (ld. at 2743:7-2745:21.) Thus, unlike in Pope, MRIA's proof
does take into account that IMI would have obtained some scans for reasons other than
association with St. Als.
Based on this information, Budge demonstrated that revenues were diverted from MRIA
to IMI. (ld. at 2733:5-9). Essentially, he tracked the "migration of referrals" from MRIA to IMI.

(ld. at 2764:5-17; 2767:25-2768:6.) His analysis was consistent with the testimony at trial that
MRIA lost scans to IMI. (TR Vol. II at 1301:24-1302:1; 1365; 1536:13-19.) Budge's analysis,
contrary to St. Als' assertion, accounted for other factors such as competition. He testified that:
What this red line shows [referring to trial Exhibit 4519] is the actual
scans that were done by [MRIA] plus the ones that I'm saying it would have
performed but for the action of Saint Alphonsus in supporting this competitor of
MRIA.

And so this is what I call the but-for line. But for the actions of Saint
Alphonsus, this is what the scan volumes would have looked like for [MRIA).
You can see that they go down. And we're basically saying in this alternative
world that was really never allowed to happen, it's probably reasonable to
assume that the scan volume would have gone down for [MRIAJ because
there would have been other entries in the market. This allows for the
existence of IMI for those scans that were kind of outside of this Saint
Alphonsus stable of referring physicians.
(ld. at 2769:13-2770:19 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2756:21-2757:3 Trial Exhibit 4519l
Thus, Trial Ex. 4519 graphically demonstrates the actual scans performed by MRIA and the
scans MRIA would have performed but for St. Als' association with IMI. (!d.; TR Vol. II. at

9

MRIA expert, Charles Wilhoite also took into account competition and based his damages solely on the bad acts of
St. Als. (TR Vol. III at 2864-2874, 2897-98, 2901:13-16, 2903:1 0-18; 2907:23-2908:3.)
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2769:13-2770:19.) 10 His "but for" analysis takes into account that MRIA would have lost scans
to IMI and other competitors contrary to St. Als' assertion. Furthermore, unlike in Pope, MRIA's
experts did not assume that MRIA's lost profits were equivalent to IMI's income. As set forth
above, MRIA's damage proof only refers to scans it lost to IMI as a result of St. Als' conduct.
MRIA, unlike the plaintiffs in Pope, does not claim as damages all of the scans performed by
IMI nor does it rely solely on IMI's income. Instead, MRIA's proof, unlike the unsupported
assumption in Pope, takes the lost scans and then applies MRIA's cost and profit structure to
determine the amount of profits MRIA lost. (R., Ex. 139, Exhibit Qat 12-17 and schedule 7; TR
Vol. II at 2753:15-2754:16.) Finally, unlike in Pope, Budge showed that MRIA had the capacity
to assimilate all ofthe scans included in the damages analysis. (R., Ex. 139, Exhibit Qat 14.)
While Budge analyzed historical lost profits, MRIA's expert Charles Wilhoite analyzed
future lost profits. He did so by modeling what the profits would have been but for St. Als'
wrongful conduct as compared to what the profits had been before St. Als' wrongful conduct. 11
(TR Vol. III at 2864:19-2874:24; 2901:13-16.) Wilhoite, like Budge, accounted for competition
from sources other than St. Als and based his damages solely on the migration of scans from
MRIA to IMI. (TR Vol. III at 2864:19-2874:24,2897:17-2898:22,2901:13-16, 2903:10-18;
2907:23-2908:3.) Wilhoite also used a very conservative discount factor and growth rate. (Jd. at
2864:25-2869:13.) In sum, MRIA, unlike the plaintiffs in Pope is not seeking all ofiMI's scans,
let alone profits, as damages, but rather is only seeking those scans from historical MRIA
customers (who were mostly St. Als physicians), scans for the usurped Meridian opportunity and

10

Further detail of the analysis ofMRIA's experts is set forth in TR Vol. II at 2746-2759 and TR Vol. III at 28532874.
11
Such an analysis has been approved by the Supreme Court even though other causes "may have rendered the
historical averages questionable for determining future [profits]." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho
733, 152 P.3d 604 (Idaho 2007).
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the scans from IMI's mri machine that was placed on St. Als' campus, next to MRIA's in
violation of the MRIA partnership agreement. 12
Also in Pope, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's "use of a 15% profit factor to
establish sub-market lost net profits was pure speculation. Few ofthe plaintiff insulators testified
in any respect as to what their net profit margin was or should have been." 103 Idaho at 234, 646
P .2d at 1005. That is not the case here. There is no speculation as to profit margin because
MRIA's historical profit margins were applied to the lost scans. R., Ex. 139, Ex. Q, P. 12 &
Schedule 7. Another difference is that in Pope the plaintiffs did not show their claimed sales
were being lost to the defendants rather than other competitors, whereas in the present case, as
set forth above, MRIA's evidence showed that its losses went directly to IMI. 103 Idaho at 23436, 646 P.2d at 1005-07. In fact, MRIA is only seeking damages for scans that went directly to
IMI and that accounts for competition from others, unlike in Pope. (See Supra pp. 11-13.)
Thus, even if the Pope dicta were applicable, MRIA's damage proof satisfies Pope.
Unlike the proof in Pope, MRIA's proof: (1) takes into account that IMI would have won a
portion of the market absent St. Als' involvement; (2) demonstrates that MRIA had the ability to
assimilate the scans it proved it lost; (3) takes into account other competitors (4) does not assume
that IMI's income was equivalent to MRIA's lost profits, and (5) only seeks damages for scans
that were lost directly to IMI. Accordingly, the proof deficiencies in Pope are not present in this
case. Whereas in Pope there was "no evidence in the record to demonstrate a relationship
between HomeGuard's sales figures and plaintiffs' damages so as to support a conclusion that
HomeGuard's income was the equivalent of plaintiffs' lost profits," here MRIA has presented

12

In addition to presenting evidence of lost profits, MRIA presented that the value of MRIA diminished as a result
of St. Als' competition with MRIA through IMI. (TR Vol. II at 2873:25-2874:4.)
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significant evidence that it lost scans directly to IMI because of St. Als' partnership in IMI and
what profits those scans would have produced.
2.

Cherokee and Household Goods

The decision in Pope relies heavily on the 5th Circuit antitrust cases of Cherokee
Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Services, Inc., 383 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1967) and Household
Goods Carriers Bureau v. Terrell, 417 F.2d 47,53 (5th Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court adopted

the two Fifth Circuit cases as instances where in an antitrust case, the plaintiffs damages can be
calculated by reference to the defendant's revenues. Pope, 103 Idaho at 234-236, 646 P.2d at
1005-07. MRIA's proof satisfies the standards set forth in Cherokee and Household Goods.
In Cherokee, the plaintiffs projection of lost profits was based on the assumption that
Cherokee would have remained the sole seller of the product at issue instead of being unlawfully
replaced by the defendants. 383 F.2d at 106. Cherokee used the defendant's sales figures to
project its lost profits. !d. The Fifth Circuit held that "[s]ince Cherokee was excluded from the
market, those were the only available figures from which the jury could infer what Cherokee's
loss as a competitor would have been. Such deduction of inference was, of course, necessary."

!d. The court explained "[i]fthe defendants are guilty of excluding Cherokee from the market as
a competitor, they cannot complain of the lack of evidence for which they are responsible. Once
the fact of injury is established, the jury has considerable leeway in assessing the amount of
damages." !d. In response to the defendant's objection that Cherokee did not rule out other
causes for the losses, the Fifth Circuit held that "[w]hether Cherokee suffered losses attributable
to antitrust violations or to other economic factors were matters for the jury's consideration and
determination." !d. In the Household Goods case, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in
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Cherokee, but emphasized that Cherokee did not "authorize a plaintiff to assume defendant's
sales figures without other evidentiary support." 417 F.2d at 53.
Here, the facts are similar to, but more compelling than Cherokee, because MRIA is not
seeking all of IMI's scans. MRIA, prior to St. Als' and GSR's formation of IMI was virtually the
sole supplier of scans to St. Als affiliated physicians as a result of it being St. Als' affiliated
imaging center. (TR Vol. II at 1418:7-11 (MRIA was considered one and the same as St. Als'
radiology department), 1517: 12-19; 2790; St. Als' Brief at 11.) Upon St. Als' and GSR's
formation ofiMI and joint marketing ofiMI as the new St. Als affiliated imaging center, MRIA
was displaced as supplier of scans for St. Als affiliated physicians. (TR Vol. II at 1517: 12-19;
1536:13-19; 2790:4-14.) The migration of referrals analyzed by Budge and shown in his report
clearly demonstrates that the referrals of St. Als' affiliated physicians went from MRIA to IMI.
(TR Vol. II at 2767:25-2768:6.) 13
Moreover, as set forth above, MRIA's proof does not suffer from the problem noted in
Household Goods and reiterated in Pope of lack of evidentiary support. Judge McLaughlin found
MRIA has "overwhelming" and "clear and convincing" evidence that St. Als "blatantly ignored
the partnership rights of a partner" by competing "directly/indirectly with [the] partner." (TR
Vol. III at 44 71 :9-17.) MRIA demonstrated because of this competition, doctors who had
historically referred scans to MRIA switched to IMI. (TR Vol. II at 2767:25-2768:6.) That same
record is before this court and is certainly sufficient under Cherokee and Pope.

13

St. Als trumpets testimony from Budge that ifMRIA ran into a formidable competitor in IMI, "logic dictates" that
IMI would flourish while MRIA would languish. That testimony does not help St. Als because it ignores that IMI
became a formidable competitor only as a result of St. Als switching its loyalty and affiliation from MRIA to IMI.
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3.

In Pope the Supreme Court Recognized that Lost Profits Could be Shown by
Comparing MRIA's Performance Before and After the Wrongful Conduct

The Supreme Court in Pope also recognized that another viable method of proving
causation and damages is a "comparison of plaintiffs performance before and after the wrongful
conduct under otherwise similar conditions." 103 Idaho at 236, 646 P.2d at 1007; see also Ryska
v. Anderson, 70 Idaho 207,215,214 P.2d 874, 878 (1950). The Supreme Court noted that the

plaintiff in Pope "failed to provide an evidentiary foundation to enable a reasonable
determination of damages under [that theory]." In the instant case, MRIA's evidence provides
such a foundation. At trial, MRIA's experts graphically demonstrated based on the data they
analyzed that MRIA began losing revenues soon after IMI came into existence and began
marketing with St. Als. (See Trial Ex. 4518 reproduced below.)
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The above graph demonstrates that as IMI became entrenched as the St. Als affiliated imaging
center, its scan volume increased while MRIA's scan volume decreased in an almost reciprocal
manner. This evidence satisfies Pope .14

14

Furthermore, St. Als' argument that affiliation with St. Als did not cause the shift in referrals is belied by the
evidence that IMI agreed to share 50 percent ofthe profits ofiMI with St. Als. (TR Vol. II at 1661:9-12.) The jury
can infer from all of the evidence that GSR agreed to share its profits with St. Als because it was extremely valuable
to have St. Als as a partner.
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B.

MRIA's Proof of Causation Satisfies Idaho Law
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho

733, 740, 152 P.3d 604, 611 (Idaho 2007), held that a plaintiff has three hurdles to clear in its
proof of causation and damages: (1) injury, (2) proximate cause, and (3) the amount of damage.
Here, there are genuine issues of fact as to each hurdle thereby precluding summary judgment.
Indeed, St. Als really is not making causation argument, but instead is arguing about the proof of
the amount of damages (i.e., MRIA's assumptions about how many referrals MRIA lost due to
St. Als rather than the fact that MRIA lost referrals). Such an argument is a fact question for the
jury. Vancil v. Anderson, 71 Idaho 95, 105,227 P.2d 74 (1951).

1.

MRIA's Evidence of Injury is Sufficient to go to a Jury.

St. Als does not dispute that MRIA lost scan volumes after IMI opened and that the scans
lost by MRIA went directly to IMI. As set forth above, Trial exhibits 4518 and 4519 graphically
show that MRIA lost scan volumes while IMI enjoyed a corresponding increase in scans. In his
analysis, Budge painstakingly identified approximately 1900 doctors who had historically used
MRIA, but had shifted their business to IMI. (TR Vol. II at 2745:23-2746:7.) Moreover a jury
could draw reasonable inferences from the conduct set forth in Part III.B.2.a below to find that
St. Als did, in fact, cause MRIA injury. Griffith, 143 Idaho at 740, 152 P.3d at 611. Even St. Als'
expert admitted that MRIA would lose scans as a result of St. Als shifting its affiliation from
MRIA to IMI. (!d. at 1301:24-1302:1; TR Vol. III at 3206:11-3207:13.) Thus, there is sufficient
evidence in the record to create a triable issue of fact as to injury.

2.

MRIA's Evidence of Proximate Cause is Sufficient to go to a Jury

Proximate cause is a cause that, in natural or probable sequence produced the claimed
damage. IDJI 2.30.2. It need not be the only cause; it is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in
bringing about the loss. !d. "Reasonable certainty requires neither absolute assurance nor
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE ALLEGED
LEGAL INSUFFICIENCY OF MRIA'S EVIDENCE OF LOST PROFITS- 18

000467

mathematical exactitude; rather, the evidence need only be sufficient to remove the existence of
damages from the realm of speculation." !d.

a.

The Evidence Shows that St. Als' Conduct Shifted Scans from MRIA
to IMI's Joint Venture and Later Partnership with GSR, IMI

The evidence is overwhelming that IMI would never have been the competitor it became
without St. Als' support and assistance. In fact, the evidence demonstrates IMI might not have
come into existence without St. Als' assistance. (See supra Part II & Respondent's Brief at 8-17.)
In sum, St. Als', while still a partner in MRIA, made IMI a devastating competitor to MRIA by
providing, among other assistance, the following: (1) assistance in securing loans, including
IMI' s initial financing which was contingent on St. Als' involvement; (2) records of its case
volume to IMI to help IMI develop a business plan; (3) knowledgeable staff members who began
working for GSR in order to establish a functioning business at IMI; (4) significant financial
support, including $546,146 in cash and assumption of $1.5 million ofiMI' s debt; ( 5) the
exclusive ability to transmit images and reports to referring physicians digitally and other
exclusive IT support; (6) marketing ofiMI by St. Als directly to referring physicians;
(7) assistance in the management, planning and establishment ofiMI Meridian (aka "IMI West")
which competed with MRIA; (8) condoning GSR's reduction in effort, services hours and
technician support at MRIA's lab; (9) making IMI its "outpatient facility;" (10) pulling all
affiliation with MRIA; and (11) directing its medical staff to refer patients solely to IMI.
(Respondent's Brief at 8-17, 44-48.) The reasonable inference is that the natural and probable
consequence of this conduct was the loss of scan volume at MRIA. Indeed, IMI' s business
manager testified that MRIA lost scans due to St. Als' affiliation with IMI, and St. Als' Chief
Nursing Officer testified she was "sure" the rads' curtailment of hours at MRIA had a "huge
impact" on MRIA's capability to do business. (TR Vol. II at 1517:12-19; 1536:13-19,2195:14-
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17.)

15

Accordingly, the evidence, as Judge McLaughlin found, overwhelmingly demonstrates

that St. Als took deliberate steps to shift scan volumes away from MRIA to IMI. Thus, there is
no question that there is at least a genuine issue of fact as to whether St. Als was a substantial
factor in causing referrals to switch from MRIA to IMI. 16

b.

MRIA Was Not Required to Disprove Other Causes

In summary, St. Als' argument, as it was before Judge McLaughlin and the Supreme
Court, is that MRIA had to disprove that referring physicians switched from MRIA to IMI for
reasons other than the assistance of St. Als. Idaho law, however, does not require MRIA to
disprove other causes. Griffith, 143 Idaho at 740-41, 152 P.3d at 611-12; Thomas Helicopters,

Inc. v. San Tan Ranches, 102 Idaho 567, 571,633 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Idaho 1981); Adams v.
Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining Co., 12 Idaho 637, 643, 89 P. 624 (1906). It was sufficient for
MRIA to show that St. Als was a substantial factor in causing the migration of scans from MRIA
to IMI. /d.; see also IDJI 2.30.2.
In Griffith, the Supreme Court rejected defendant Clear Lakes' argument that there was
insufficient evidence of causation to support the damages award and concluded that the district
court wrongfully failed to award damages during the remaining years of the contract on the
grounds that those damages were too speculative. Id at 736-37. In concluding the evidence of
causation was sufficient, the Court noted that although causation must be proven with reasonable
certainty, reasonable certainty "requires neither absolute assurance nor mathematical exactitude;
rather, the evidence need only be sufficient to remove the existence of damages from the realm
of speculation." /d, citing Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 422, 807 P.2d 633, 640 (1991).

15

Jack Floyd, CEO ofMRI Center, presented St. Als with a monthly report showing the lost scans caused by
St. Als' failure to require the rads to maintain a 24/7 schedule at MRIA (!d. at 2509: 14-2510: 19; Trial Ex. 4292.)
16
An analysis of the overwhelming evidence supporting causation in with St. Als' sole fact in defense of causation is
attached at Binder Tab 31.
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The Court then analyzed the assertion by Clear Lakes that Griffith's damages expert "never
performed an analysis to tie the increased costs to any specific cause and that he failed to analyze
a number of other variables that might contribute to variations in the costs, including changes in
the number of employees or in their salary levels; changes in insurance rates; changes in the
price of feed and fuel; specific items of repair and maintenance; and so forth." !d. at 740. The
Court also acknowledged the argument by Clear Lakes that, "[i]n the absence of any breach the
cost increased by 6 cents between years two and three, but [Griffith's damages expert] was
unable to determine precisely why the cost went up during that period" and that, "[a]ccording to
Clear Lakes, such unexplained variations cast doubt on the assumption that the increased costs
during years four and five were caused by the breach." !d. at 740-41.
The Court rejected this argument stating the "fact that [Griffith's damages expert] did not
analyze every potential alternative cause is not fatal to Griffith's claim." !d. at 741 (emphasis
added). The Court then ruled the "district court was entitled to draw reasonable inferences from
the evidence. It determined that any increase in costs over the base years was more likely than
not attributable to Clear Lakes' delays in taking delivery." !d. The Court also emphasized that
Griffith's damages expert analysis "was the only analysis that could be done under the
circumstances." !d. This fact dovetailed with the well-established law in Idaho that: (1) "[t]he
mere fact that it is difficult to arrive at the exact amount of damages, where it is shown that
damages resulted, does not mean that damages may not be awarded .... " Sells v. Robinson, 141
Idaho 767, 774, 118 P.3d 99,106 (2005); and (2) "Compensatory damages ... have to be proved
with whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts permit, but no more." I. C. § 28-1-106 cmt. 1.
See also Griffith, 143 Idaho at 741. Thus, the Court concluded Griffith's causation evidence was
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•
sufficient even though "it did not take account of every factor that might influence costs." !d.
(emphasis added).
Although the Court upheld the district court's finding of causation on the damages
claimed by Griffith before the final two years of the Agreement, the Court rejected the district
court's finding that "any determination of how many fish would have been grown during the
final two years of the contract was too speculative to support an award of damages." !d. at 613.
In vacating the district court's decision that damages calculations for the final two years of the
Agreement were too speculative, the Supreme Court noted that Griffith's damages expert had
produced an "estimate of future profits based on the assumption that future volume would accord
with the historical average" and that such analysis was permissible despite the fact that the
"decline in the market, among other factors, may have rendered the historical averages
questionable for determining future quantities." !d.
The analysis applied by the Supreme Court in Clear Lakes was applied by that court to
reverse a directed verdict based on lack of causation evidence. Thomas Helicopters, 102 Idaho
at 571, 633 P.2d at 1149. In Thomas, the Court held that the possibility, "or even probability" of
other causes for the damages does not preclude recovery: "[I]t is ... the rule that 'the
possibility, or even probability of another cause for damages than that alleged does not defeat
recovery where plaintiff presents sufficient facts to justify a reasonable juror in concluding that
the thing charged was the prime and moving cause."' !d. at 570-71.
The Thomas Court based its conclusion on its prior holding in Adams v. Bunker Hill. In
Adams, the Supreme Court held that, in Idaho, "the jury would be justified in returning a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff, although it be possible that the injury may have resulted from some other
cause." 12 Idaho at 643 (emphasis added). This conclusion was necessitated by the Idaho
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•
Supreme Court's acknowledgement that "[t]here are very few things in human affairs, especially
in litigation involving damages, that can be established to such an absolute certainty as to
exclude the possibility or even some probability that another cause or reason may have been the
true cause or reason for the damage rather than the one urged by plaintiff." /d. This inability to
ever achieve "absolute certainty" regarding causation, the court held, should not "be allowed to
defeat the right of recovery where the plaintiff has presented to the jury sufficient facts and
circumstances surrounding the occurrence as to justify a reasonable juror in concluding that the
thing charged was the prime and moving cause," even when a "probability" of another cause
exists. Id.
Based on its prior analysis in Adams, the Thomas court concluded that, although it was
disputed whether other causes existed for the damage alleged by the plaintiff, "all conflicts in the
evidence at this point must be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff' and that it
therefore "must be concluded that a reasonable juror could determine that it is the greater
probability that respondent's negligence was the prime and moving cause of the [alleged harm].
Consequently, the question of proximate cause should have been given to the jury." Thomas,
102 Idaho at 571; see also Cherokee, 383 F.2d at 106 ("Whether Cherokee suffered losses
attributable to antitrust violations or to other economic factors were matters for the jury's
consideration and determination.")
Thus, MRIA did not need to disprove all other possible causes of its lost scans as argued
by St. Als nor did it need to show why each referring physician switched from MRIA to IMI as
argued by St. Als. 17 St. Als' erroneous argument would require the "absolute certainty" and

17

St. Als cites Twin Falls Farm & City Distrb., Inc. v. D&B Supply Co., 96 Idaho 351, 528 P.2d 1286 (1974) and
also Synthes Spines Co. v. Walden, 2006 WL 3053317 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2006) for the erroneous proposition that
damages may not be awarded "where the evidence does not support a finding that all of the losses were the result of
the defendants breaches. (St. Als' Brief at 8.) As set forth above that is not the law in Idaho and in Twin Falls, the
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"mathematical exactitude" rejected by Griffiths, Thomas, and Adams. Moreover, the sheer
number of referring physicians made it impracticable to show why each referring physician
switched from MRIA to IMI. (TR Vol. II at 2766:8-2768:6.) Performing such an analysis is also
impracticable because it is difficult to (1) get a representative sample, (2) get doctors to
participate against the hospital with which they are affiliated, and (3) get an unbiased sample
because ofthe doctors' affiliation with St. Als. (!d.) St. Als' expert likewise did not do such an
analysis. (TR Vol. III at 3235:15-3236:8.) As in Griffith, MRIA's analysis "was the only
analysis that could be done under the circumstances" and proved the amount of damage with
reasonable certainty. 143 Idaho at 740-41, 152 P.3d at 611-12. St. Als as the wrongdoer cannot
complain about any uncertainty. ld.
Furthermore, St. Als' argument simply ignores the fact that MRIA's experts analyzed
whether the damages would have occurred but for St. Als' association with IMI, and determined
the damages would not have occurred. (TR Vol. II at 2769:13-2770:21, Trial Ex. 4519.) In fact,
as set forth above, Budge and Wilhoite specifically compensated for what would have happened
had IMI competed without St. Als' affiliation. (!d.; TR Vol. III at 2864-2874,2897-98,2901:13Supreme Court did not hold that damages may not be awarded where "the evidence does not support a finding that
all of the losses were the result of [defendant's] breaches" as St. Als attempts to make it appear by its partial, out-ofcontext quote. Rather, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of which losses were caused by the
defendant's anticompetitive conduct. The entire quote, bears this out:
Certain business losses, such as loss of customers, etc., may flow from the violations by the respondents as
found here, and while the evidence does not support a finding that all of the losses of profits, depreciation of
assets and expenses incurred, which the appellant's testimony clearly established, were the result of the
breaches of the respondents herein, the evidence likewise does not warrant a conclusion that none of them
were caused by the conduct of the respondents. On remand, the trial court shall enter new findings regarding
the causation of losses suffered by the appellant which were proximately caused by respondents' acts.

!d. at 360, 528 P.2d at 1295. Synthes, also cited by St. Als, is irrelevant. First it is a foreign, unreported decision
that sets forth a different standard from the standard set by the Idaho Supreme Court. Furthermore, in Synthes, an
employee bound by a non-compete joined a competitor that was already in existence. 2006 WL 3053317 at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 23, 2006). Here, the evidence shows that the competitor, IMI, came into existence as a result of St. Als
assistance. Moreover, in our case, St. Als is a partner in IMI thereby making it liable for IMI's conduct unlike in
Synthes. (R. Vol. XII at 2296.) Finally, unlike in Synthes, MRIA's experts did take into account other factors such
as competition. 2006 WL 3053317 at * 16. How many of the lost scans were due to St. Als as opposed to other
causes is a question for the jury. Cherokee, 3 83 F .2d at 106.
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16, 2903:10-18; 2907:23-2908:3 Trial Ex. 5419.) 18 However, what St. Als argues is required is
virtually impossible because St. Als is requiring MRIA to prove something that did not occuri.e., IMI's entry into the Market without St. Als' involvement.

c.

There is no Evidence that MRIA's Proof is not Reliable or Doesn't
Meet Generally Accepted Accounting Practices.

St. Als has produced no evidence that MRIA's expert analysis is not reliable or doesn't
meet generally accepted accounting principles or the American Institute of CPAs standards.
Indeed, St. Als' expert testified that he "didn't do anything that would support the conclusion that
Mr. Budge's assumption is wrong." (TR Vol. III at 3236:5-8, 3235:16-3236:8.)

d.

MRIA Does Not Need to Show Why the Referring Physicians
Switched

As set forth above, this not an antitrust case. This is a case of St. Als wrongfully
competing against its partners in breach of its fiduciary and contractual duties. In such a case, a
plaintiff does not need to show why it is losing customers to a competitor; it need only show it is
losing customers to the competitor. Vancil v. Anderson, 71 Idaho 95, 105, 227 P.2d 74 (1951). In
Vancil, which is much more factually analogous than Pope, the plaintiff Vancil bought a store
from the defendant Anderson called the Cherry Blossom. Id at 100, 227 P.2d at 76. The
contract of sale contained a non-compete provision prohibiting Anderson from competing in a
similar business. Id Anderson quickly opened a competing business, Anderson's Fine Foods,
across the street from the Cherry Blossom. Vancil sued and won. Anderson appealed on several
grounds including the adequacy of the proof of causation and damages.
Vancil's proof consisted of evidence that before Anderson opened the competing
business, Vancil averaged over $100 a day in sales and that after the defendant opened the

18

Even St. Als' expert could not rule out St. Als' bad acts as a cause for the switch in referrals. (TR Vol. III at
3234: 17-3235:6.)
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competing business, Vancil averaged $75 a day in sales. !d. at 103, 227 P.2d at 78. Evidence
was also introduced that customers ofVancil also did business with Anderson. !d. Additionally,
Vancil introduced evidence of his overhead and profit structure as well as evidence showing the
historical increase in sales from month to month prior to the competition. !d.
The Supreme Court found this evidence to be sufficient holding that:
It is impossible to determine damages in such cases with exactitude and precision,
and at most it is difficult to approximate such damages including the value of the
good will which is impaired, but, where a foundation has been laid with facts as
hereinabove detailed, it would afford a basis for the witness to express an opinion
and would also enable the jury to draw its own conclusion and make a rational
estimate as to the aggregate damages, if any, suffered, and the opinion of such
witness, in the light of such other evidence, is admissible for what it is worth.

!d. at 104, 227 P.2d at 79. In so holding, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "[a]fter all,
[damages] is a question for the jury, taking all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including
the opinion of respondent, into consideration." !d. Therefore, "[t]he court did not err in
overruling the objection to the introduction ofthe opinion evidence of respondent as to the
percentage his business would have increased had his customers not divided their patronage
between appellant and respondent." The Supreme Court further recognized that in cases
involving lost profits due to breach of a non-compete, damages "are seldom susceptible of
accurate proof with any degree of mathematical certainty, and the law does not require such
proof." !d. at 105, 227 P.2d at 105.
The Supreme Court also addressed Anderson's argument, similar to St. Als' current
argument, that Vancil was required to prove that (1) "the customers of Anderson's Fine Foods
were, or would have been, customers of the Cherry Blossom, and that such customers would
have patronized the Cherry Blossom had it not been for the operation of Anderson's Fine Foods,"
and (2) "the actual amount of net profits that plaintiff lost as a result of defendant taking his
customers." !d. at 105-06, 227 P.2d at 80. The Supreme Court rejected the argument holding:
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it was not necessary, in order to establish the breach or prove the damages arising
therefrom, that plaintiff prove that all the customers of defendant were or would
have been customers of defendant were or would have patronized the place of
business of plaintiff if defendant had not entered into business in competition with
him, or that plaintiff adduce proof that defendant sold all the articles which
plaintiff sold, or that defendant engaged in every phase of the business of
plaintiff. It was only necessary that plaintiff show that defendant competed in a
material and substantial way.

!d. (emphasis added). Thus, MRIA need not to show why the referring physicians switched to
IMI because why they switched is irrelevant in a non-compete case. What MRIA needs to show
is that St. Als "competed in a material and substantial way." ld.
Here the evidence demonstrates that St. Als competed in a substantial and material way
with MRIA through its involvement in IMI. (TR Vol. III at 44 71 :9-17.) The fact that St. Als
joined with a partner, GSR, does not shield St. Als from liability for scans MRIA lost to St. Als'
new competing partnership. St. Als as a partner in IMI is jointly and severally liable for the rads'
acts in the IMI partnership. I. C. § 53-3-306. St. Als is even liable for the acts ofiMI before it
formally joined IMI because it supported and joint ventured with IMI from the beginning. 19

Costa v. Borges, 145 Idaho 353, 356, 179 P.3d 316, 319 (2008) (recognizing a joint venture "is
an association of two or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise" and that
"partnership law generally governs joint ventures.") Accordingly, MRIA did not need to
"isolate" the effect of IMI' s entry into competitive market or show why referring physicians
went to IMI instead of St. Als because it was the very fact ofiMI's entry into the market with
St. Als' support that caused MRIA damages. 20 As summarized by MRIA's expert, Bruce Budge,
St. Als' course of conduct "handicapped MRIA to the advantage of one of its partners [St. Als]
19

St. Als announced in 1998, before it formally joined IMI, that it would be joint venturing with the rads in IMI.
(Trial Ex. 4062 at 2.) It later affirmed to its parent company that it had successfully joint ventured with the rads in
IMI. (TR Vol. II at 1658:22-24.)
20
Another, although not essential reason, it is the competition and conduct ofiMI that is at issue, is because there is
evidence that St. Als conspired with its rads to compete with MRIA through IMI, a ruling that St. Als has not
appealed. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. White, 86 Idaho 374, 379, 386 P.2d 964,966 (1963) (Recognizing co-conspirators
are liable for the "[w]rongful acts committed by conspirators resulting in injury").
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and caused this migration of referrals .... Those scans [upon which Budge based his
calculations] ... they're not going out in the community to some other competitor. They're
going to IMI. You can see that from the data. And it's not necessary to go and ask the
physicians for their detailed information. We can observe what that migration is." (TR Vol. II at
2767:25-2768:6.) Therefore, as there is no dispute the scans were lost to IMI, the following
equation summarizes causation: SAMRC + GSR = IMI. 21

3.

MRIA's Evidence of the Amount of Damages is Sufficient to go to a Jury

A "less rigid standard of proof is imposed with respect to amount of damage" because
economic harm is "difficult to quantify." Pope, 103 Idaho at 233, 646 P.2d at 1004. Therefore,
because MRIA proved some damage occurred (i.e., some portion of scans went from MRIA to
IMI as a result of St. Als' conduct) it only needed to prove the amount of damages "with
whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts permit[ed]" because any uncertainty is borne by
St. Als as the wrongdoer. Griffith, 143 Idaho at 741, 152 P.3d at 612. Moreover, the amount of
damages is a jury question. Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 774, 118 P.3d 99,106 (2005).
As set forth above, MRIA's evidence of the amount of damages meets this standard as its
experts tracked the "migration of referrals" from MRIA to IMI on a historical basis and then
used the detailed information they had from both MRIA and IMI concerning their revenues and
costs per scan to determine how much profit MRIA lost as a result of the migration of referrals
from MRIA to IMI. (Jd. at 2730:3-2731 :7; 2753:17-2754:16.) For future lost profits, MRIA's

21

MRIA is also entitled to damages because St. Als usurped a partnership opportunity. St. Als owed a fiduciary
duty to MRIA not to usurp a partnership opportunity. I.C. § 53-3-404(b)(l). Under this rule. the misappropriation of
a partnership opportunity is considered a usurpation of partnership property and a breach of a fiduciary duty and the
partnership is entitled to any profits realized from such usurpation. See id. (official comment). Here, as set forth in
Part II supra., St. Als usurped MRIA's opportunity to partner with the rads, GSR, in an imaging center (Meridian
campus etc.) and took that opportunity for itself by partnering with the rads in IMI. As discussed above, MRIA took
a more conservative approach than what would be allowed under a theory of usurpation. If the Court, however,
believes MRIA's damages proof fails under this theory, MRIA requests leave to conduct discovery concerning the
profits St. Als reaped from usurpation of this opportunity.
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experts also met this standard22 by modeling what the profits would have been but for St. Als'
competition as compared to what the profits had been before St. Als' competition. (TR Vol. III at
2864:19-2874:24; 2901:13-16.)

C.

There are Genuine Issues of Fact Concerning Why Referring Physicians Switched
from MRIA to IMI.
As set forth above, MRIA is not required to prove why the referring physicians switched

to IMI; it only is required to show that they switched. That said, St. Als' argument, based on the
testimony of three referring physicians, that the referring physicians switched because of the
reputation of the rads readings the scans at IMI is a red herring for several other reasons. First,
St. Als was a co-conspirator, joint venturer and partner with the rads in IMI, and therefore is
liable for referrals that IMI took from MRIA based on the reputation of St. Als' co-conspirator
and partner. Next, even if St. Als' argument that the referring physicians switched from MRIA to
IMI because of the quality of the rads was relevant, it is not supported by the evidence. From
1999 to 2005, the same St. Als affiliated rads, GSR, read images for both MRIA and IMI. (Id at
2460:20-2461 :7.) It was not until2005 that GSR quit reading for MRIA to read exclusively for
IMI and by that time, as Trial Exhibit 4519 demonstrates, MRIA had been losing scans to IMI
for several years. Thus, there is evidence that the lost scans were not caused by radiologist
preference as argued by St. Als because the same rads were reading for both MRIA and IMI.
The argument is made more meaningless by the fact that it is not statistically significant (St. Als
had only 3 of 1,900 referring doctors testify concerning their preference). (TR Vol. II at
2745:23-2746:7.)
Additionally, the testimony of the three witnesses is only one data point from which a
jury could decide the matter. There is other evidence from which the jury could infer that the

22

Ryska v. Anderson, 70 Idaho 207,215,214 P.2d 874, 878 (1950).
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referring physicians left due to St. Als' influence and prodding, including, among all of the
conduct set forth above and in MRIA's appeal brief, that the referring physicians were affiliated
with St. Als. (TR Vol. III 3329:10-20; 3892:20-3893:10; 3981:14-20.) Even St. Als' own expert
testified that MRIA lost scans to IMI as a result of St. Als' support of IMI instead of MRIA. (TR
Vol. II, 1301:24-1302:1; TR Vol. III, 3206:11-3207:13.) He also testified, "we don't know what
the reason is" that referring physicians switched, but admitted that affiliation with St. Als might
be a reason. (TR Vol. III at 3232:17-22.) For that same reason, the credibility ofthe three
testifying referring physicians is suspect as they all are on St. Als' staff. (TR Vol. III 3329:1020; 3892:20-3893:10; 3981: 14-20.) Thus, even if the reason the referring physicians quit was
relevant, there are genuine issues of fact concerning why they switched. Finally, even if St. Als'
assertion were true, it supports MRIA's claim, not St. Als' defense, because it demonstrates why
it was so egregious for St. Als to join the rads in competing against MRIA.

IV. CONCLUSION
St. Als has failed to show that no reasonable juror could find for MRIA on the record
before the Court. As Judge McLaughlin found, sitting as the thirteenth juror on St. Als' motion
for new trial, MRIA's evidence of damages to be sufficient and the Supreme Court refused to
overrule that finding. Therefore, St. Als' motion should be denied.
DATED this

~"day of August 2010.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Wade L. Woodard
Attorneys for Defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS OF
THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE
000481
CLAIMS OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS- 1

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

Saint Alphonsus's opening memorandum demonstrated that (i) the claims asserted by
Center and Mobile in the Third Amended Counterclaim are time barred unless those claims
relate back to a prior proceeding in this case, see Mem. at 5-7, (ii) under Rule 15(c), those claims
can relate back to a prior pleading only if Center and Mobile were real parties in interest as to a
claim in that prior pleading and otherwise satisfy the requirements of Rule 17(a), see Mem. at 711, (iii) Center and Mobile plainly were not real parties in interest with respect to any claims in
the original counterclaim or the first amended counterclaim, see Mem. at 11-12, and
(iv) although Center and Mobile may have been real parties in interest with respect to the second
amended counterclaim-when MRIA first attempted to assert claims "on [their] behalf'relation back is nevertheless inappropriate under Rule 17(a) as interpreted by the Supreme Court
in Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 867 P.2d 960 (1994), see Mem. at 12-15.
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MRIA concedes that all claims of Center and Mobile are time-barred absent relation back
to an earlier pleading. Opp'n at 3 n.4. MRIA also concedes that those claims will relate back to
an earlier pleading only if Center and Mobile were the real parties in interest with respect to
claims asserted in that earlier pleading, and, further, the other requirements of Rule 17(a) are
satisfied. See Opp'n at 3-4. Saint Alphonsus's motion for judgment on the claims of Center and
Mobile therefore turns on (1) whether Center and Mobile can satisfy Rule 17(a) and, if so, (2) in
which of the earlier pleadings Center and Mobile were real parties in interest and thus eligible for
relation back.
1.

As demonstrated in Saint Alphonsus' s opening memorandum, even assuming

Center and Mobile were the real parties in interest with respect to the claims previously asserted
"on [their] behalf' in the second amended counterclaim, Center and Mobile simply cannot satisfy
Rule 17(a) as that rule was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Tingley. Indeed, in all relevant
respects, this case is either identical to Tingley or presents a stronger case than Tingley for
rejecting relation back.
The plaintiff in Tingley originally asserted in his own name a claim belonging to someone
else (the bankruptcy trustee) without joining that entity as a party in the case. See 125 Idaho at
91, 867 P.2d at 965. Here, in the second amended counterclaim, MRIA likewise asserted in its
own name claims belonging to someone else (Center and Mobile) without joining those entities
as parties in the case. In Tingley, there was no "difficult[y]" in "determin[ing ]the right party to
sue" or any "understandable mistake" concerning identity. !d. at 92, 867 P.2d 966. Here,
likewise, there is no case of mistaken identity, given that MRIA obviously knew that Center and
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Mobile were the entities that possessed the claims that MRIA was asserting "on [their] behalf."

See Wells v. HBO & Co., 813 F. Supp. 1561, 1567 (N.D. Ga. 1992) ("even the most liberal
interpretation of 'mistake' cannot include a deliberate decision not to [name] a party whose
identity plaintiffknew from the outset"). In Tingley, the defendants "objected" to Tingley's
assertion of the trustee's claim "on the grounds that he was not the real party in interest."
125 Idaho at 91, 867 P.2d at 965. Here, likewise, Saint Alphonsus objected to MRIA's assertion
of claims "on behalf of' Center and Mobile on the grounds that MRIA was not the real party in
interest. In Tingley, the plaintiff waited for one year from the time ofthe defendants' objection
before attempting to join the bankruptcy trustee-an amount of time the Supreme Court held
"not 'reasonable"'-with the statute oflimitations expiring in the meantime. /d. at 91-92, 867
P .2d at 965-66. Here, likewise, MRIA waited three years from the time of Saint Alphonsus' s
objection before joining Center and Mobile, with the statute of limitations concededly expiring in
the meantime. Finally, in Tingley, the Supreme Court held that, under these facts, Rule 17(a)
does not permit relation back. /d. at 92, 867 P.2d at 966. Here, likewise, this Court should hold
that, under these facts, Rule 17(a) does not permit relation back.
MRIA contends that Tingley is distinguishable because the plaintiff there was attempting
to avoid the statute of limitations, see Opp'n at 10, but MRIA's conduct is actually substantially
more egregious in this regard. The plaintiff in Tingley, from the beginning, asserted a
malpractice claim that in fact belonged to the trustee. 125 Idaho at 91, 867 P.2d at 965. Claims
by trustees received a longer statutory limitations period than an action by Tingley himself on his
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own behalf would have received, had he been the proper party to bring one. /d. When Tingley
first filed, however, it was still "well within the [trustee's] extended ... limitation period." /d.
By contrast, when MRIA for the first time (in March 2007) introduced into this case
claims belonging to Center and Mobile-by referring to those entities in the caption of the
pleading and asserting that specific claims were being brought "on [their] behalf," see 2d Am.
Countercl. ~ 7-the limitations period had already run on large portions of those claims, since
much of Saint Alphonsus's alleged misconduct had occurred more than four years earlier. By
claiming at that time simply to act "on behalf of' the limited partnerships, rather than joining
them as actual parties, MRIA hoped to benefit from the rule that new claims asserted by an
original party to the case relate back to the original pleading, see Mem. at 8 & n.3, while new
claims asserted by newly joined parties do not, see id. at 8-10. In other words, attempting to join
Center and Mobile as new parties in 2007 would likely have rendered at least part of their claims
barred by the limitations period, while having the original party, MRIA, assert claims on their
behalf, if allowed, would circumvent that outcome. This critical tactical advantage-and several
other important advantages, see Mem. at 14-15, that MRIA does not dispute it obtained through
its pleading stratagem--explains why MRIA argued vigorously to avoid actually joining Center
and Mobile, see Reply Mem. Supp. MRIA's Mot. for Leave to File 2d Am. Countercl. (MRIA
App'x Tab 26) at 6-10, and undermines any claim of a reasonable, good-faith mistake that would
distinguish this case from Tingley.
It is no answer for MRIA to say (Opp'n at 12) that it was prepared to join Center and

Mobile as parties if only the district court had not erroneously endorsed MRIA's artful pleading
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maneuver. That MRIA had a Plan B is beside the point. "It has long been the law in Idaho that
one may not successfully complain of errors one has acquiesced in or invited." Taylor v.
McNichols, No. 36130, ---Idaho---,--- P.3d ----, 2010 WL 3448851, at *5 (Sept. 3, 2010)
(internal quotation omitted). MRIA invited and persuaded the court to adopt MRIA's erroneous
legal position, and MRIA must therefore bear the consequences of its deliberate decision to
proceed without joining Center and Mobile within the limitations period. 1
MRIA also complains that Saint Alphonsus will not suffer prejudice if Center and Mobile
are added to this case because Saint Alphonsus already defended against claims asserted on
behalf of Center and Mobile at the first trial. But Tingley does not require a party to demonstrate
prejudice when, as here, the other factors-unreasonable delay and lack of mistake as to party
identity-are present. See Tingley, 125 Idaho at 92, 867 P.2d at 966 (Johnson, J., concurring and
dissenting) ("[i]n this case, the Court makes no reference to prejudice to [the defendant], nor is
there any evidence of prejudice"). In any event, Saint Alphonsus will be prejudiced by the
joinder of Center and Mobile in several respects. First, only a single claim (for breach of
fiduciary duty) was tried to the jury on behalf of Center and Mobile at the first trial. See Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, ---, 224 P.3d 1068, 1085
1

See, e.g., Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950) ("[litigant] cannot be
relieved of' "calculated and deliberate" "[procedural] choice because hindsight seems to indicate
to him that his decision ... was probably wrong"); Adams v. AlliedSignal Gen. Aviation
Avionics, 74 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[a]t some point, a litigant must bear the
consequences of conscious strategic or tactical decisions of this kind"); Myelle v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 57 F.3d 411, 414 n.5 (4th Cir. 1995) ("strategic decisions have consequences, and we
simply are not ... willing ... to relieve [litigant] of the consequences ofthis particular
decision").
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n.1 0 (2009). In the Third Amended Counterclaim, by contrast, Center and Mobile are asserting
several new claims, including for the first time in this litigation claims as alleged third-party
beneficiaries of the MRIA partnership agreement. See 3d Am. Countercl. ~~ 69, 84. New fact
discovery may be required to defend against these new claims, with the adequacy of such
discovery impacted by factors such as the fading memories of witnesses. See, e.g., Weitz v.

Green, 148 Idaho 851, ---, 230 P.3d 743, 750 (2010) (district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding prejudice where amendment "would require additional evidence and witness gathering").
Second, after incurring time and costs in preparing for a first trial without Center and Mobile as
parties, Saint Alphonsus will now have to shoulder the added costs of preparing to defend against
the claims of Center and Mobile in their own names, including the need to allocate damages
among the three counterclaimants, which will be particularly complex given that the applicable
four- and five-year statutes of limitations will bar Center and Mobile from claiming damages for
large portions of Saint Alphonsus' s alleged misconduct.
Finally, MRIA's cited authorities are not to the contrary. Conda Partnership, a court of
appeals decision that pre-dated Tingley, reversed a district court's decision to deny as untimely a
plaintiffs motion to amend its pleading to add or substitute a real party in interest. See Conda

P 'ship, Inc. v. MD. Constr. Co., 115 Idaho 902, 904, 771 P.2d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 1989) (per
curiam). While the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Tingley would obviously control in
the event of any tension with Conda, the two cases are in fact fully consistent. Critically, in

Conda, the attempted joinder of the real party in interest appears to have occurred within the
relevant limitations period, since the court of appeals emphasized that "[t]he district court did not
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rely on any statute oflimitation in granting summary judgment." Id at 903, 771 P.2d at 921.
Conda Partnership thus has little bearing in cases like Tingley and this one in which a party is
seeking to rely on the doctrine of relation back in order to assert claims that would otherwise be
barred by the statute of limitations.
MRIA also relies on the Supreme Court's post-Tingley ruling in Hayward v. Valley Vista
Care Corp., but that case is plainly distinguishable because, unlike this one, it did not involve the
joinder of any new parties. Specifically, in Hayward, the son of a deceased individual brought a
survival action in his capacity as the personal representative of his father's estate, and later
sought to add a claim for wrongful death after the statute of limitations on that claim had run.
See 136 Idaho 342, 344-45, 33 P.3d 816, 818-19 (2001). The district court held that the son
would have to allege the wrongful-death claim not as personal representative, but in his capacity
as an heir, and for that reason refused to allow relation back to the original complaint. !d. The
Supreme Court reversed because the son was not joining any additional parties but was "merely
... changing the representative capacity in which the suit is being brought" by the same
individual, a scenario that the Court thought called for "a more lenient standard" of relation back.
136 Idaho at 349, 33 P.3d at 823. In a separate opinion, Justice Eismann emphasized that "[t]he
facts in this case do not raise any issue regarding substitution of the real party in interest"
because "[t]he proposed second amended complaint would not have changed the named plaintiff,
nor is there any need to do so." Id at 353, 33 P.3d at 827 (Eismann, J., specially concurring).
Here, by contrast, Justice Eismann's opinion for the Supreme Court made clear that
MRIA may not assert Center's and Mobile's claims in a representative capacity, but rather must

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE
000488
CLAIMS OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS- 8

join Center and Mobile as additional parties. See Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at
1086. This case is therefore controlled by Tingley, involving the joinder of new claimants, and
not by Hayward, involving a change in the capacity of the original claimant. And, for the
reasons stated above and in Saint Alphonsus's opening memorandum, Center and Mobile are not
entitled to relation back.
2.

If this Court concludes that relation back is improper under Rule 17(a) and

Tingley, then (as MRIA concedes) the Court must dismiss Center's and Mobile's claims as
barred by the statute of limitations. On the other hand, if the Court determines that Center and
Mobile do satisfy Rule 17(a) and Tingley, then it should make clear in its ruling that their claims
relate back no further than to the second amended counterclaim, in which MRIA first attempted
to assert claims "on behalf of' Center and Mobile.
MRIA asserts that it does not matter to which of the prior pleadings Center's and
Mobile's claims relate back, because those claims are timely even if they relate back only as far
as the second amended counterclaim. See Opp'n at 4-5 n.5. That is wrong. As noted above,
though Center's and Mobile's claims will not be time barred in their entirety if the claims relate
back to the second amended counterclaim, those claims will be time barred to the extent they
seek to recover for conduct occurring outside the relevant limitations periods, which includes
much but not all of the alleged misconduct in this case. Accordingly, if Center and Mobile are
permitted to remain in this case, it is critical to know the date on which those claims are deemed
to have been filed.
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MRIA misleadingly asserts that "when a real party in interest joins or is substituted in an
action under Rule 17(a), the claims of the real party in interest relate back to the original
pleading." Opp'n at 3; see also id. at 4 n.5. But the claims only relate back to the first pleading
in which the new party was, in fact, a real party in interest. In other words, under the first
sentence of Rule 15(c), a plaintiff who was in the case at the start gets the benefit of relation back
on new claims (arising out of the same transaction or occurrence) against existing parties. See
Mem. at 8 & n.3; Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 272, 723 P .2d 814, 816 (1986). By
contrast, claims by new entities-such as Center and Mobile here-will only relate back to a
prior complaint in which they were the real parties in interest, and no further. See Mem. at 8-10.
With the correct standard in mind, it is clear that while Center and Mobile may have been
the real parties in interest with respect to the claims that MRIA attempted to assert "on [their]
behalf' in the second amended counterclaim, they plainly were not real parties in interest to the
original or first amended counterclaim. As explained in the opening memorandum, a real party
in interest is one on whose behalf a claim is asserted and who is "entitled to the benefit of the
action if successful." Mem. at 11 (quoting St. Luke's Reg 'I Me d. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs,
146 Idaho 753, 757, 203 P.3d 683, 687 (2009)). MRIA's first two counterclaims, however, did
not assert any claim for the benefit of Center and Mobile. Rather, those pleadings asserted only
claims belonging to MRIA--claims that MRIA continues to assert in its own name today.
As the Supreme Court held, it was not until "MRIA filed a motion seeking permission to
file a second amended counterclaim" that MRIA for the first time "sought to amend its pleading
in order to assert claims on behalf of MRI Center and MRI Mobile without making them parties
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to this lawsuit." Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1086. It did this by inserting the
names of the limited partnerships in the caption of the case as entities "on behalf of' whom
MRIA was bringing claims, see 2d Am. Countercl. at 1, and alleging for the first time that
"MRIA brings this action on its own behalf, and as general partner for these operational entities;
MRIA is entitled to and does hereby bring this action on behalf of these two limited
partnerships," id.

~

7. Without question therefore, if relation back is permitted at all-and it

should not be-then it is permitted no further back than to MRIA's second amended
counterclaim. Thus, Center and Mobile would be barred from asserting claims for conduct
occurring outside the applicable four- or five-year limitations period (depending on the claim),
measured from the second amended counterclaim's filing date ofMarch 2, 2007.
CONCLUSION
MRIA concedes that, absent relation back, the claims of Center and Mobile are time
barred. The Supreme Court's decision in Tingley precludes relation back of those claims.
Accordingly, the court should enter judgment dismissing the claims of Center and Mobile as
barred by their respective statutes of limitations.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this

13th

day of September, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

As set forth in Saint Alphonsus's opening brief, the comprehensive and integrated MRIA
partnership agreement addresses its own "Effective Date and Term," and unambiguously
provides that the partnership does not have a defined minimum or maximum duration, but rather
will last indefinitely, until the partners agree to dissolve it. Mem. at 10-12. As a result, the
partnership is not one for a "definite term," and MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully
dissociated before the term's end fails as a matter oflaw. !d. at 12-14.
In response, MRIA attempts to blend its allegation of wrongful dissociation before the
end of a "definite term" issue with a new theory of liability-dissociation before the end of a
particular undertaking-which theory is not alleged in the complaint and thus is not a subject of
the summary judgment motion. MRIA uses that new theory of liability to offer an elaborate but
unsupportable "plain language" argument that the general partnership was created solely to
manage the limited partnerships and therefore ends automatically at the end of the limited
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partnerships' fixed terms. This argument rests on selective editing of the key agreement
language and willful blindness to other express contractual provisions. And, even then, the
resulting construction yields an MRIA partnership agreement with no fixed durational term.
MRIA alternatively suggests that its "plain language" argument creates an ambiguity that
requires resort to extrinsic evidence, Opp'n at 7, but Idaho law is plain that a contractual term is
ambiguous only if an alternative reading is "reasonable," and MRIA's proffered interpretation is
plainly unreasonable. Moreover, MRIA's extrinsic evidence, even if consulted, would not
change the fact that the partnership has no definite term as a matter of law. MRIA's attempt to
rewrite the contract's plain language should be rejected, and Saint Alphonsus should be granted
summary judgment on the wrongful dissociation claim.
ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE MRIA HAS NOT PLED A CLAIM OF WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION
ON THE GROUND THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS FOR AN UNCOMPLETED
"PARTICULAR UNDERTAKING," IT CANNOT NOW RELY ON THAT
THEORY OF LIABILITY
MRIA attempts to confuse the issue before the Court by injecting into the case a new,

unpleaded theory of liability-that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was wrongful because it
occurred prior to the completion of a specific undertaking that was the stated purpose of the
contract. See, e.g., Opp'n at 4 ("the critical question becomes whether the 'business of the
Partnership' has a fixed duration or is for a specific undertaking"); id. at 5 ("the Partnership both
had a term itself and was for a specific undertaking"). This theory is not before the Court and in
any event lacks merit.
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Dissociation prior to the completion of a particular undertaking is a separate ground for
wrongful dissociation under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"). See I. C. § 53-3602(b)(2). This theory of liability was not in the case at the first trial, as the Supreme Court
made clear. See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., 148 Idaho 479, ---,
224 P .3d 1068, 1073 (2009) ("MRIA included in its counterclaim a cause of action for wrongful
dissociation alleged under two theories: (a) the dissociation breached an express provision of the
partnership agreement and (b) the partnership agreement had a definite term and the dissociation
occurred prior to the expiration of that term"). Nor has MRIA included this theory of liability in
the Third Amended Counterclaim, which simply reasserts that Saint Alphonsus dissociated in
violation of an express provision (an allegation that this Court has stricken) and before the
expiration of a definite term. 3d Am. Countercl. ~~ 63-64.
Because it is not alleged in MRIA's counterclaim, the "particular undertaking" theory of
liability is not before the Court. Obviously, Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment
did not address the issue of "particular undertaking" because that claim has never been advanced.
MRIA cannot oppose a motion directed at one type of liability by arguing that dissociation was
actually improper on a distinct legal theory that it has not even alleged. Nor should MRIA be
allowed to muddle the question before this Court by blurring these two distinct statutory bases
for liability. 1

1

In any event, the MRIA partnership was plainly not created for a "particular
undertaking" within the meaning ofl.C. § 53-3-602(b)(2). The statute's official comments
explain that partnerships for particular undertakings are partnerships that end after discrete onetime events, and give examples like "market[ing] an art book" and "construct[ing] an apartment
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II.

THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT UNAMBIGUOUSLY ESTABLISHES AN
INDEFINITE TERM AS A MATTER OF LAW
Section 1.1 of the MRIA general partnership agreement, entitled "Effective Date and

Term," unambiguously provides that, upon the completion of formative steps (that undisputedly
occurred here), the partnership shall last until the partners elect to dissolve it. Mem. at 11-12.
And, under RUP A, because the agreement does not "clear[ly] evidence" that the parties agreed
on a specific "minimum or maximum duration," I. C. § 53-3-101 cmt., but rather shows that they
agreed that the partnership could "last indefinitely," the partnership is not one for a definite term.
Mem. at 12-14. MRIA's wrongful dissociation claim therefore fails as a matter oflaw.
MRIA does not dispute that a provision stating that the partnership ends when the
partners choose to dissolve it establishes a partnership for an indefinite term as a matter of law.
But MRIA denies that this is what Section 1.1.2 of the MRIA partnership agreement
unambiguously provides. Opp'n at 3. According to MRIA, Section 1.1.2 ties the end of the term
of the partnership to the winding up and dissolution of the "business of the Partnership," and this
phrase must be read to refer to the termination of the limited partnerships (Center and Mobile)
that, according to MRIA, constitute the sole "business of' MRIA. Id. at 3-5. 2

(continued ... )

building." I.C. § 53-3-101 official cmt. By contrast, ongoing operations, such as a partnership to
"operate a linen supply business" or "to contract and operate a bowling alley"--or to operate an
MRI business-are not particular undertakings. /d. (emphasis added).
2

Citing no Supreme Court authority, MRIA contends that summary judgment is only
appropriate if its reading of this provision is "completely unreasonable." Opp'n at 2. That is not
the law. See McKay v. Boise Project Bd. ofControl, 141 Idaho 463,469-70, 111 P.3d 148, 15455 (2005) ("ambiguity is not established merely because different possible interpretations are
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
000497
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION- 5

This is clearly wrong, for the reasons set forth below.
A.

MRIA's Claim that the General Partnership Automatically Dissolves Upon
the Expiration of the Limited Partnerships Is Directly Contradicted by the
Very Sentence on Which MRIA Relies

Though MRIA asserts that its reading comports with the language of the "entire contract"
(Opp'n at 3), it is not even consistent with the language of the entire sentence from which MRIA
lifted the phrase "business of the Partnership." When read in full, that sentence plainly does not
provide that the term of MRIA automatically ends upon the termination of some other entity or
entities that somehow constitute the "business ofthe Partnership." Rather, it provides that the
term ends "within a reasonable time after the business of the Partnership is wound up and
dissolved under Article 10." Trial Ex. 4023, § 1.1.2 (MRIA App'x Tab 1) (emphasis added).
Article 10, in turn, unambiguously sets out the procedures for the dissolution, liquidation, and
winding up of the MRIA partnership itself, and includes a requirement of an "affirmative vote of
seven-ninths (7/9) or more of the eligible votes of the [MRIA] Board of Partners." Trial Ex.
4023, § 10.1 (MRIA App'x Tab 1). Thus, the phrase "the business ofthe Partnership" is
unambiguously being used in Section 1.1.2 to refer not to some other business entity managed or
controlled by the MRIA partnership, but to the MRIA partnership itself.
Moreover, by requiring an affirmative vote of seven-ninths (later amended to eighttenths, see Trial Ex. 4032, § 9.1 (MRIA App'x Tab 2)) ofthe Board before the MRIA

(continued ... )

presented to a court"); Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185-86, 75 P.3d 743, 746-47
(2003) ("[w]hen the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and legal
effect are questions of law").
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partnership can be wound up and dissolved, Article 10 ensures that MRIA will continue--even
after the end of the fixed terms of Center and Mobile-until the partners vote to dissolve MRIA.
Thus, when read in the context of its cross-reference to Article 10, Section 1.1.2 unambiguously
provides that the MRIA partnership shall end only when the partners choose to wind up and
dissolve the MRIA partnership-language that MRIA does not dispute is the hallmark of an
indefinite-term partnership. See Mem. at 12-14.

B.

The Plain Language of the Contract Also Contradicts MRIA's Claim that its
"Business" Is Necessarily Limited to Managing Center and Mobile

MRIA' s proffered interpretation of Section 1.1.2 is also incorrect as a matter of law for
the separate reason that the partnership agreement contradicts MRIA's contention that "MRIA's
sole purpose would be to manage the business affairs of the limited partnerships," such that

MRIA's term is necessarily defined by the purportedly "fixed duration" of the Center and
Mobile limited partnerships. Opp'n at 4 (emphasis added). Instead, Section 1.6 of the
partnership agreement unambiguously allows the "Partnership" (i.e., MRIA) itself to engage in
"any and all business" related to medical equipment, including but not limited to "manag[ing]"
other entities:
The purpose of this Partnership is to purchase, lease or otherwise acquire,
finance, manage, operate, use, control, hold, sell and otherwise transfer
medical diagnostic devices, equipment and accessories and therapeutic
devices, equipment and accessories related to such diagnostic devices and
equipment, together with buildings and other facilities associated
therewith, and to transact any and all business matters incident thereto.
The initial diagnostic equipment to be acquired shall be a magnetic
resonance imaging device.

000499
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This Partnership intends to promote and organize an Idaho limited
partnership (the "Limited Partnership") .... When formed, the Limited
Partnership shall have the same purpose as this Partnership.
This Partnership and any entity in which it has an ownership interest shall
not engage in any other business activity except those set forth above
without the approval of the Board ofPartners required by Section 5.4.4.
Trial Ex. 4023, § 1.6 (MRIA App'x Tab 1) (emphasis added). This language states an initial
plan to acquire and operate MRI equipment, and to organize a limited partnership with the same
purpose. But no language forecloses expansion into other types of equipment or addition of
other partnerships. And this provision shows that the partners contemplated the possibility of
future expansion, as the final sentence unambiguously indicates, both "[t]his Partnership" and

"any entity in which it has ownership" (i.e., not just the contemplated limited partnership) may
engage in the "business activity ... set forth above." !d. (emphasis added).
Indeed, the very existence of MRI Mobile demonstrates the point: Section 1.6
contemplates "an Idaho Limited Partnership"-singular, not plural. As MRIA has repeatedly
noted, MRI Center was that limited partnership, yet some three years later, MRIA created an
entity "other" than "the Limited Partnership"-namely, MRI Mobile-and engaged in operating
that business as well. In fact, MRIA's "business" does not even end with Center and Mobile. In
2004, MRIA created a limited liability company called IsoScan, LLC, of which MRIA is the
only listed member and also the entity in which "management" of IsoScan is vested. See
http://www.accessidaho.org/public/sos/corp/W31830.html (last visited Sept. 10, 201 0) (Articles
of Organization filed by MRIA with Secretary of State) (attached hereto as Exhibit A). IsoScan
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operates mobile PET/CT scanners. See http://www.isoscanllc.com/aboutus.asp (last visited Sept.
10, 2010).
By contrast, MRIA's interpretation that§ 1.6limits the business ofthe MRIA general
partnership to "sole[ly]" managing "the Limited Partnership," and nothing else, renders almost
every word of Section 1.6 and the related provisions superfluous, and also means that the
creation of both MRI Mobile and IsoScan was ultra vires. Such an interpretation is unreasonable
as a matter oflaw. See Point of Rocks Ranch, L.L.C. v. Sun Valley Title Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 411,
413, 146 P.3d 677, 679 (2006) (finding interpretation "not reasonable because it would result
in [a contractual] provision becoming meaningless); City of Chubbuck v. City ofPocatello,
127 Idaho 198, 201, 899 P .2d 411, 414 ( 1995) ("[c]ourt must determine whether the terms of
that contract are reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations").
For this reason, too, Section 1.1.2. cannot bear the meaning that MRIA wishes to ascribe
to it. No one limited partnership was regarded as the only proper "business" of the MRIA
partnership, and the term of the MRIA partnership therefore cannot be read as tied to the term of
Center or Mobile--or ofMRIA's corporation, IsoScan.

C.

Even Under MRIA's Convoluted Reading, The MRIA General Partnership
Would Still Not Have a Defined Minimum or Maximum Duration, And
Therefore is Not For a "Definite Term" under RUPA

For the reasons set forth above, the term of the MRIA general partnership is not tied to
the operation of the limited partnerships. But even if it were, MRIA would still be a partnership
with an indefinite term. MRIA reads Section 1.1.2 as providing that the MRIA general
partnership shall last "so long as MRIA was operating an 'Idaho limited partnership."' Opp'n at

000501
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5 (emphasis added). As the case law shows, however, an agreement that a partnership will last
"so long as" some other condition persists is necessarily an agreement for an indefinite term,
even if the condition is continuing to operate businesses that happen to take the form of limited
partnerships. See Mem. at 12-14. 3
MRIA tries to distinguish these cases by arguing that the two limited partnerships (Center
and Mobile) have fixed terms. Opp'n at 8-11. But this purported distinction fails for several
reasons. First, while MRIA chose to create Center with a fixed term unti12015, nothing in the
general partnership agreement required that Center have a fixed term until 2015, or even a fixed
term at all. Indeed, the general partnership agreement contains no durational requirements at all
for the business activities of the partnership. Thus, at the time the partners signed the MRIA
partnership agreement, MRIA's anticipated operation of the limited partnerships had no firm end
date or fixed durational term. It follows that MRIA too had no firm end date or fixed durational
term. 4
Second, even today, nothing prevents MRIA from creating and managing additional
limited partnerships or other business entities with longer (or unlimited) durational terms, thus
3

See also, e.g., Gen. Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 856-57, 979
P.2d 1207, 1214-15 (1999) (no definite duration where contract continued "as long as"
circumstances existed); Zee Med. Distrib. Ass 'n v. Zee Med., Inc., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1, 10 (2000)
("language that the contract 'shall continue' until grounds arise for termination" creates "a valid,
express contractual term of duration ... for [an] indefinite period[] of time"); Fremont Lumber
Co. v. Starrell Petrol. Co., 364 P.2d 773, 776 (Or. 1961) (indefinite term created by provision
setting term for "as long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced from said land").
4

MRIA now concedes that it is "not [claiming] that the limited partnership agreements
somehow 'amended' the MRIA Partnership Agreement," Opp'n at 10, nor could it so claim
given the absence of the requisite formal written amendment, see Mem. at 16-17. Accordingly,
what matters is whether MRIA had a definite term when it was created.
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
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allowing the business activities of the MRIA partnership to continue indefinitely. See supra Part
II.B. MRIA demonstrates this point by suggesting that its term was extended from 2015 to 2018
by the creation ofMRI Mobile three years after the creation ofMRI Center. Opp'n at 5. By this
logic, MRIA's still-later creation ofisoScan, LLC would have further altered the term ofMRIA,
and if IsoScan follows the presumptive rule of Idaho law related to limited liability companies,
IsoScan (and, in turn, MRIA) would have "perpetual duration." See I.C. § 30-6-104(3). Thus,
even under MRIA's own argument, the MRIA partnership term is not fixed-its end date
fluctuates depending on the lifespan of any existing limited partnerships or other business
entities whose affairs are managed by MRIA. MRIA could continue to operate its "business"
indefinitely by creating and managing limited partnerships or other business entities until such
time as the partners choose to create no additional limited partnerships or other business entities,
cease and wind up the ones in place, and then dissolve. That is not a partnership with a
"definite" term.

III.

MRIA'S RESORT TO EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS IMPERMISSIBLE

MRIA points to two pieces of extrinsic evidence-a letter from Saint Alphonsus's
outside counsel, Ed Miller, to Saint Alphonsus's then-CEO, Sister Pat Vandenberg, regarding an
earlier draft of the general partnership agreement, and minutes of an October 11, 1999 Saint
Alphonsus board meeting regarding a vote for a never-culminated extension of the Center and
Mobile terms to 2023-that MRIA claims supports its interpretation of the contract. For several
reasons, these documents do not and cannot alter the conclusion that the MRIA partnership lacks
a definite term.
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First, there is no merit to MRIA's assertion that extrinsic evidence should be consulted

even if the partnership agreement is "facially 'unambiguous."' Opp'n at 2. MRIA cites only a
Ninth Circuit case applying California law and a 1991 court of appeals decision citing (but not
endorsing) California law on this point. !d. While MRIA' s assertion may be an accurate
statement of California law, it is not the law of Idaho, which expressly forbids the use of
extrinsic evidence in interpreting facially unambiguous contracts. See Ward v. Puregro Co.,
128 Idaho 366,369,913 P.2d 582,585 (1996) (distinguishing California law from Idaho law on
this point and stating that "Idaho courts look solely to the face of a written agreement to
determine whether it is ambiguous"); accord, e.g., Bauchman-Kingston P 'ship, LP v. Haroldsen,
149 Idaho 87, --- , 233 P .3d 18, 21 (2008) ("The interpretation of a contract begins with the
language of the contract itself. If the language of the contract is unambiguous, then its meaning
and legal effect must be determined from its words.") (citation omitted); Bilow v. Preco, Inc.,
132 Idaho 23, 28,966 P.2d 23,28 (1998) ("[i]fthe language of a contract is plain and
unambiguous the intention of the parties must be determined from the contract itself').
Second, MRIA argues more narrowly that determining whether a "definite term"

partnership exists always "requires consideration of documents, conduct, and statements outside
the formal partnership agreement." Opp'n at 5. This, too, is incorrect. Whether a partnership is
for a "definite term" is no different than any other question of contract interpretation-parol
evidence is considered only if the language of the agreement is ambiguous. Otherwise, the
unambiguous language of the contract is controlling as a matter of law. Mem. at 10, 14-16.
Indeed, this is shown in the unofficial author's comment to the model RUPA quoted in MRIA's

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
000504
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION- 12

opposition, which states that "[w]hether there exists an agreed term ... cannot always be
resolved by reference to the written partnership agreement." Opp'n at 5 (emphasis added). The
phrase "cannot always" means that in many (or most) situations, whether a definite term exists
can be resolved by reference to the written partnership agreement. Such is the case here, where
the written agreement is unambiguous. 5
Third, MRIA suggests that the contract is not "integrated" and that it is ambiguous,
requiring the use of extrinsic evidence. Opp'n at 7-8. Notably, MRIA does not cite a single case
discussing "integrated" contracts, let alone authority contradicting Saint Alphonsus's showing
that the MRIA general partnership agreement is integrated under Idaho law, as it comprehensive
and expressly provides that "the conduct of the Partnership shall be in accordance with the terms
and provisions herein set forth." Trial Ex. 4023 at 1 (Saint Alphonsus App'x Tab 2) (emphasis
added); see also Mem. at 10-11. Moreover, as already discussed, the partnership agreement is

5

MRIA's cited authorities (Opp'n at 5-6) are not to the contrary. The only one involving
RUPA-Fischer v. Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98 (Ky. 2006}-did not involve the question of a
partnership term, but rather the question whether the defendant had dissociated before the
completion of a particular undertaking. Even then, the court found that the agreement at issue
should be interpreted as a matter oflaw and did not need to be decided by a jury. !d. at 104-06.
68th St. Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78, 80 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976),
involved an oral agreement and is thus irrelevant. The New York cases are irrelevant, as they
were decided well before RUP A was even conceived of, in a jurisdiction that has yet to adopt
RUPA. See Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About the Uniform
Partnership Act, http://www .nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fsupa9497.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). And Mervyn Investment Co. v. Biber, 184 Cal. 637
(1921 ), likewise predates RUPA; in any event, the resort to extrinsic evidence in that case
occurred because there was "no express agreement under the contract" regarding duration, unlike
here where the MRIA agreement does explicitly address its term. See id. at 641.
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not at all ambiguous as to term-it unambiguously provides for an indefinite term. See supra
Part II.

Fourth, for the reasons set forth in the preceding section, even ifMRIA's extrinsic
evidence were properly before the Court, that evidence would not raise a material issue of fact.
Even accepting MRIA's spin that these documents show that '"the business of the Partnership'
has always been intended to be coterminous with the limited partnerships," Opp'n at 13, the
MRIA partnership still has no "definite" term because it lasts "as long as" the partners choose to
manage limited partnerships, which per the terms of the partnership agreement could continue
indefinitely. See supra Part II.C.

IV.

MRIA'S UNPLED, UNDEVELOPED "QUASI-ESTOPPEL" ARGUMENT
SHOULD BE REJECTED

MRIA alternatively argues that its extrinsic evidence gives rise to a "quasi-estoppel"
claim. This claim, too, should be rejected for several reasons. First, MRIA cites no authority to
support its claim that "quasi-estoppel" is a means of circumventing the parol evidence rule.
Indeed, Idaho law rejects the notion that a party's subjective opinion is relevant to the
interpretation of the objective words of the agreement itself. See, e.g., Chambers v. Thomas,
123 Idaho 69, 72, 844 P.2d 698, 701 (1992) (party's "understanding was ofhis obligations under
the contract [ ] cannot be used to defeat the integrated and unambiguous agreement").

Second, even if such a claim had viable legal support, MRIA's Third Amended
Counterclaim nowhere alleges that quasi-estoppel requires that MRIA be deemed to have a
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definite term. 6 As the Supreme Court recently held, the failure to plead both "quasi-estoppel"
and its elements in a complaint precludes a court from applying the doctrine on summary
judgment. Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, ---, 235 P.3d 387, 393 (2010)
(holding district court erred in applying quasi-estoppel where "no quasi-estoppel claim appears
in the body of the complaint or the prayer for relief' and its elements were not pled).

Third, even had it been pled, there is no quasi-estoppel here as a matter oflaw. MRIA's
suggestion that Ed Miller's letter somehow lulled the other partners into accepting the contract
without a definite term is quite misleading. What MRIA omits is that, seven days earlier, on
February 26, 1985, Saint Alphonsus proposed both the inclusion of a fixed end date, and express
language that the general partnership would terminate when the limited partnership did: "the
term of this Agreement shall end on the date which is within a reasonable time after the business
of the limited partnership is wound up and/or all obligations of this Partnership are terminated,
but in any and all events on or before the day of_, 1997." Trial Ex. 9 & Trial Ex. 10, art. I,

§ 7.2 (attached hereto as Exhibits Band C). The underscored language was rejected, thus
prompting the March 5 letter from Mr. Miller to Saint Alphonsus's CEO. Trial Ex. 12 (MRIA
App'x Tab 21). MRIA cannot credibly argue that Saint Alphonsus "asserted a right" detrimental
to MRIA, thus gaining an advantage over MRIA or inducing it to change positions, when MRIA

rejected the explicit language that would have supported the very position it seeks to take now.

6

MRIA alleged only that Saint Alphonsus should be estopped from denying that the
terms of the limited partnerships were extended to 2023, not that the general partnership itself
should be deemed to have a definite term due to the Miller letter or for any other reason. See 3rd
Am. Countercl. ~ 65. This Court ordered that paragraph stricken on July 9, 2010.
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C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Hwy. Dist. No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 144-45,75 P.3d 194, 198-99 (2003)
(stating elements of quasi-estoppel).

Fourth, the alleged "ratification" ofthe Ed Miller letter as evidenced by the October 11,
1999 meeting minutes, Opp'n at 15-16, does not support MRIA's quasi-estoppel argument. Not
only did MRIA fail to plead such a theory, it does not offer any evidence that it received these
minutes, or learned of the purported "ratification" allegedly contained therein, at any time prior
to this litigation. As such, MRIA cannot establish that, with these minutes, Saint Alphonsus
"asserted a right" that was detrimental to MRIA or caused it to change positions. See C & G,

Inc., 139 Idaho at 144-45, 75 P.3d at 198-99. Moreover, MRIA's argument that, in these
minutes, Saint Alphonsus was voting to extend the MRIA general partnership itself(Opp'n at
15) is directly at odds with the statement MRIA made in its brief to the Idaho Supreme Court, in
which MRIA asserted that these October 1999 minutes referred to a purported extension of the

MRI Center limited partnership. See MRIA's Appellate Br. at 53-55 & n.40, available at
2008 WL 5328238. MRIA's last-ditch, unpled "quasi-estoppel" argument cannot defeat
summary judgment on grounds that the MRIA general partnership agreement lacks a definite
term.

V.

MRIA HAS NOVALID DAMAGES THEORY FOR DISSOCIATION
As Saint Alphonsus showed, MRIA' s dissociation claim also fails as a matter of law

because the only damages theory in support of this claim has been definitively rejected by the
Supreme Court. Mem. at 18-19. MRIA now claims for the first time that it can advance a "lost
profits" theory of dissociation damages. Opp'n at 16-18. But a partner who wrongfully
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dissociates is liable only for "damages caused by the dissociation," I.C. § 53-3-602(c), such as
"replacing the partner's expertise or obtaining new financing," id. § 53-3-602 cmt. 3. MRIA
cites no evidence of any such damages and has never sought them. Nor is there any evidence in
the record explaining how Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation (as opposed to its alleged assistance to
IMI) caused any of the alleged lost profits. Finally, of course, even ifMRIA could rely on the
"lost profits" expert reports of Budge and Wilhoite (who were prepared to prove damages on the
non-dissociation claims), those lost-profits reports fail for the reasons set forth in Saint
Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment based on the legal insufficiency ofMRIA's evidence
of lost profits.
CONCLUSION

The Court should grant Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment on MRIA's
wrongful-dissociation claim.

DATED this 13th day of September, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

D

if"
D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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ARTICLESOFORGAMZATION
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

•

.II. 12 p II: '~

•

S~il#iMJY OF STATE
(~l~tin6f1~

(Instructions on back of application)

1. The name of the limited liability company is:
ISOSCAN LLC

2. The street address of the initial registered office is:
949 N Curtis Road, Boise, ID 83706
and the name of the initial registered agent at the above address is:
Jack Floyd
3. The mailing address forfuture correspondence is:
949 N Curtis Road, Boise, ID 83706
4. Management of the limited liability company will be vested in:
Manager(s)

D

0

or Member(s)

(please check the appropriate box)

5. If management is to be vested in one or more manager(s), list the name(s) and
address( es) or at least one initial manager. If management is to be vested in the
member(s),listthe name(s)and address(es) of at least one initial member.
Name

Address

MRI Associates LLP

949 N Curtis Road, Boise, ID 83706

6. Signature of at least one person responsible for forming the limited liability company:

-?:3.- ~~....:..
Signature:
Typed Name: Mark A. Ellison
Capacity:

Organizer

··----····---~-·-

i

I

f!
l.b--~~~:~P:~~~~~~~m;;;;e;;;;:;;;;;~~~~;;;;;;;;~;;;..d• P. ,.
Signature-----------

_·---:___--:::_-:::.·.._ _ _.

. ---·-·==--------·····- -· . ·-·

~--··

-----,-

Secretary of State use only

IMIJ SECIIETARY IF STATE

87/12/2884 8~188
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• • 1••• u.c 12

UJ~ ~~~
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RECEIVED.
. ct:l :~ 5 1985

LAW OF"F"ICES

GIVENs, McDEviTT, PURSLEY, WEBB & BusER

OFFICE O~~:l~~.foi!,~SJ DENT.

SUITE 200, PARK Pl.ACE

RA.YMONO D. GIVENS
CHAS. f". MC:OEVITT

12081 3«2-8571

277 NO. E!TH STREET

KENNETH 1.. PURSLEY

POST OF"F"ICE BOX 2720

.,JAY L. WEBB
PAUL ..J. BUSER

BOISE, IDA.KO 83701

LI!:O EDWARD MILLER
KENNETH Lo MALLEA
CHRISTOFI'HER .J. SEE.SON
CELESTE KIM V'ERN£TTI

T£Lt:COI>IER
(20111 3<43•11ooOII2

TERRY L. MYERS

KENNETH A. MCCLURE

February 26, 1985

Neal M. Newhouse, Esq.
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley
One Capital Center
999 Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Re:

MRI Associates

Dear Neal:
Further to our telephone conversation today, I am
enclosing herein our proposed changes to the third draft of
the MRI Associates General Partnership Agreement. In preparation of the enclosed, I have attempted to address only those
issues under which we have specific concerns and have not
attempted to request changes which we do not feel are
absolutely necessary.

LEH:rmg
Enclosure
cc: Patricia Van~nberg, C.S.C.
w/enclosure
ChrisAnton w/enclosure
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PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
TO PRELIMINARY DRAFT No. 3
OF ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP OF MRI ASSOCIATES
.,.

,\ tJ ~
'

1

•

/

INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,
Inc., should be eliminated and Saint Alphonsus Magnetic
Resonance, Inc., an Idaho non-profit corporation should be
substituted. This appears in the introductory paragraph, as well
as Article 1, Section 3.3.
Article I, Section 2, Page 1. The office of the partnership may
only be located in Boi~e, Idaho.
~

Article I, Section 3.3, Paqe 2. Eliminate Saint Alphonsus
-r
Regional Medical Center, Inc., and substitute Saint Alphonsus
~ Magnetic Resonance, Inc.

l~"ry

li
l

Article I, Section 6, Page 3. The existing paragraph should be
deleted and the following substituted:
The Partnership intends to promote and organize an
Idaho limited partnership in which this Partnership or a
similar partnership owned by the partners of this
Partnership will be the sole general partner. When organized, the purpose of the limited partnership shall be as
described on Exhibit A attached hereto. Any material
deviation from the organization or purposes set forth on
Exhibit A attached hereto shall be a change of purpose for
the purposes of Article IV, Section 4 (g), hereof. Prior
to the organization of the limited partnership, this
Partnership may enter into contracts and agreements as
nominee for the to-be-formed limited partnership, provided
that all such contracts and agreements are within the scope
and th~es of the limited partnership as described on
Exhib1~ched hereto.
Article I, Section 7, Page 3.
be added:

The following new section should

Section 7. ~· The term of this partnership shall
commence on the date hereof and shall terminate as follows:
7.1 If the limited partnership contemplated pursuant
to Section 6 and Exhibit A attached hereto is not formed or
fully funded or this Partnership does not otherwise acquire
financing acceptable to all of the Partners to replace the
funds which were to be raised by the li~d partnership
offering, on or before the ~ day of ~ .
,
1985, then the term of this partnership shall end on the
31 day of '1¥<.
, 1985.

7.2 If the limited partnership is formed and fully
funded and/or other financing mutually acceptable to all Partners
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS - 1
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J
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to replace the limited partnership funding is acquired on or
before the
day of
, 1985, then the term of
.__ ~~ this Agreement shall end on the date which is within a reasonable
time after the business of the limited partnership i-s wound up
:);"'.
and/or all obligations of this Partnership are terminated, but in
~
any and all events on or before the
day of

J ~-

)5.

•• ~

~/

;2-o

(/<>os-)

Article II, Section 1, Page 4. Saint Alphonsus Magnetic
Resonance, Inc.'s, capital ratio is thirty percent (30%) and
Mercy Medical Center's ratio is twenty percent (20%}.
A{ticle II, Section 2, Page s. Borrowed CaPital - Partnership
Obligations. The following should be added as a new Section 2.3.

J

2.3 Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event that
any instrument of Partnership indebtedness (or other document or instrument (directly or indirectly) which imposes
an obligation on the Partnership in excess of $25,000)
fails to limit the liability of any Partner to such
Partners proportionate share (that is capital ratio) in the
event the Partnership fails to pay the debt/obligation or
any partion thereof in full, then such financing obligation
must be approved by all Partners.
Article III, Section 2, Pages 8 and 9.
should be added:

The following language

No Partner shall be entitled to any cash flow distributions if such Partner is in material default of the terms
of this Agreement. Material default shall include, without
limitation, the failure to make a capital contribution.
Article IV, Section 1.2, Page 9.
at the end:

The following should be added

Notwithstanding the foregoing, no Partner or member of
the Board of Partners shall be entitled to vote if such
Partner is in material default of the terms of this
Agreement.
Neal, the The votes in this paragraph should be changed to
show that Saint Alpnonsus Magnetic Resonance, Inc., and~~~
*
ppl Medical Center, Inc., both have two votes
~
each. The last sentence of this paragraph should read as~~-~
follows:
.
~ r~
Assuming no terminations or transfers, if a newApartner
/ were admitted by unanimous agreement of all Partners, it
would be anticipated that the capital ratio (that is 50%)
'\
and the vote (that is four votes) of the Hospital Partners
would be reallocated as agreed between the Hospital
\ Partners.
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Article IV., Section 1.3, Pages 10 and 11. Appropriate changes
regarding votes should be made to this paragraph:

Article IV. Section 1.6, pages 11 and 12. The next to the last
sentence of this section should read as follows:
/

/

If mailed within Ada or Canyon County, Idaho, by certified mail, return receipt requested, such notice shall be
deemed to be delivered when deposited in the u.s. Mail, so
addressed with postage pre-paid thereon.

The following paragraph should also be added to this
Section 1. 6.
·,
\

*'

\~-~)
/

'\

\
'

Notwithstanding the foregoing, any annual meeting of
the partnership or special meeting, or other meeting otherwise called for the purposes of considering and acting upon
a matter requiring a vote of more than five m(jb~s of the
Board of Partners, shall require at least ten (10 days
written notice to each member of the Board of Partners and
must specify the matters to be considered , which notice
must be personally delivered or mailed by certified mail as
provided in Section 1.6 above.

Article IV., Section 4, page 14. Introductory Paragraph of
Section 4, should read as follows:
Subject to the limitations set forth on Exhibit A attached
hereto regarding the purpose of this Partnership and the purpose
of the limited partnership, the following Partnership management
decisions shall require the following vote of the Board of
Partners for determination.
The following should be added:
(g) The change of purpose of the Partnership (a
favorable vote of nine).
{h) The form and content of the limited partnership
agreement for the limited partnership which is to be formed
by this Partnership and the offering and the private placement memorandum associated with the sale of limited partnership interests in the limited partnership. (a favorable
vote of ntne).
Article V, Section 4, Page 18.
a new Section 4 on page 18.

The following should be added as

PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS - 3
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Section 4. Withdrawal of Hospital Partner. Any
Hospital Partner may withdraw from the Partnership at any
time if, in a Hospital Partner's reasonable judgment continued participation in this Partnership jeopardizes tax
exempt shares of such Hospital Partner or its parent or
jeopardizes medicare/ medicaid or insurance reimbursements
or participation. In the event that a.Hospital Partner
withdraws, such Hospital Partner's interest in the
Partnership shall terminate on the date of withdrawal and
the Hospital Partner's membership on the Board of Partners
and vote shall terminate on such date, and shall be reallocated among the remaining Partners. Unless otherwise
agreed, the withdrawing Hospital Partner's capital account
shall be frozen and shall only be entitled to receive the
balance due in such Partner's capital account in the same
manner and to the same extent as if the Bospi tal Partner
had continued as a Partner of the Partnership.

Article rv. Section 3. Transfers to Others, Page 21. The
following should be added as a new Section 3.4 on Page 21.
3.4 Notwithstanding the foregoing, Saint Alphonsus
Magnetic Resonance, Inc., may transfer its partnership
interest to Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.,
its parent or subsidiary, or any other 50lc3 organization
without the consent of any other Partners.

/

Additionally, Mercy Medical Center may also transfer
its partnership interest to any subisidary of~---------
--------------- or any other 501c3 organization.
SIGNATURE LINES

J

In addition to the doctors, there should be consents by the
wives to the terms of this agreement.
EXHIBIT A should read as follows:
The purpose of this Partnership shall be to form and
create an Idaho limited partnership consisting of this
Partnership or an affiliate of this Partnership as the sole
general partner. The limited partnership shall have
approximately ____ limited partners. It is anticipated
that
AND N0/100THS
DOLLARS shall be raised through the offering and sale of
limited partnership interest. The limited partnership
interest shall be off~ ~xclusively to physicians
licensed to practice
ffi~he State of Idaho and licensed
State of Idaho hospitals pursuant to a private placement
security offering. The opera~al term of the limited
partnership shall not exceed · years and all financial
forecasts and the business an
perations of the limited
partnership shall be conducted in accordance with the said

;do
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ten-year operational life. An additional period to wind-up
and liquidate the Partnership shall be permitted.
The purpose of the limited partnership shall be as follows:

.r
~ ·~
~ aJ ~~ a
.

If{"

.7

·

A. To lease from Saint Alpnnsus Building Co., Inc.,
pursuant to a building lease and ground sublease, a
~h~
building adjacent to the Saint Alpnonsus Regional Medical~ 7
Center, Inc. This building shall be used for the purposes
,.. }
of housing the magnetic resonance imaging magnet and
~~
related equipment and for the purpose~ of conducting the
( ~
business of the limited partnership. The limited part1 t;
nership shall not acquire any other i terest in real prol
perty.;
~ ·J-.t
B. The limited partnership also intends to acquire,~~
through a lease or purchase arrangement, a magnetic resonance imaging magnet and related equipment and accessories
and thereafter operate the same to provide diagnostic ser. vices. The total liability to the limited partnership
under such lease or purcha~l not exceed in t~e
aggregate the sum of :3
~
cis U:~.._
AND N0/100THS DOLLARS. The int1. tal debt instrument/lease
instrument shall specify that each of the Partners of this
Partnership shall only be responsible for its proportionate
share (that is capital ratio percentage) of any deficiency
resulting from the failure to pay the debt/lease associated
with the acquisition of the magnet or the related equipment ·
and accesso~ies.
~

antic~ t~oJc

part-~

C. The Partners do not
the limited
nership will acquire any othe ~anc~and that all funds
of the limited partnership shall e a1.sed through the
limited partnership offering and thereafter from operations. Notwithstanding that, the limited partnership
shall be authorized to acquire additional financing for the~
purposes of operations or asset acquisitions, in an~t
not to exceed
;;@..........:.t...""'
< r:-r
AND N0/100THS DOLLARS.
.

7

D. The limited partnership shall also be authorized to
enter into such other and further agreements as is
necessary to conduct the business of the limited partnership; provided however, that no such agreement shall
obligate the limited partnership to liability in excess of
~~~~-----------------------------AND N0/100THS
DOLLARS.

~.

'(~ -Jj1!! ~' r .,~4.c.A.uL
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. RANDALL
DEPUTY

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment on MRIA's Civil Conspiracy Claim rests on two
simple propositions of law that prohibit a party from pleading allegations that have been
determined against it, and from alleging, for rhetorical effect, the exact same basis for legal
liability in multiple claims. MRIA offers no reason to doubt these propositions-indeed, it
concedes them-but instead engages in misdirection.

ARGUMENT
I.

SAINT ALPHONSUS IS NOT BARRED FROM BRINGING THIS MOTION
MRIA contends that Saint Alphonsus is barred from bringing this motion because Saint

Alphonsus did not specifically appeal the district court's denial, prior to the first trial, of a
motion for summary judgment involving the conspiracy count. Opp'n at 17. But the current
motion raises issues entirely different than those raised in the referenced motion (filed by the
third-party defendants on May 11, 2007, and adopted by Saint Alphonsus on May 18, 2007),
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which was premised on the sufficiency ofMRIA's conspiracy evidence. See Mem. Supp. Mot.
Partial Summ. J. on Civil Conspiracy, at 5. In any event, Saint Alphonsus appealed liability on
all claims, and the Supreme Court vacated the entire judgment and verdict against Saint
Alphonsus, including the finding of liability on the conspiracy count. See Saint Alphonsus

Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., 148 Idaho 479, ---, 224 P.3d 1068, 1072, 1090. After such
a general reversal, this Court is free to examine the legal validity of the conspiracy count. See

Hutchins v. State, 100 Idaho 661, 666, 603 P .2d 995, 1000 (1979). This is especially so where,
as here, the present conspiracy count differs in material respects from the previously asserted
conspiracy claim, compare 3d Am. Countercl. ~ 99 with 2d Am Countercl. ~ 148, is asserted by
two new parties (in addition to MRIA), and is premised in part on claims that were voluntarily
dismissed after the prior motion was filed.

II.

1

MRIA'S LENGTHY RECITATION OF FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IS
COMPLETELY BESIDE THE POINT OF THIS MOTION
MRIA argues this motion as if it somehow requires the Court to consider and rule upon

the facts of this case. Thus, MRIA styles its brief as an "Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment," and spends the bulk of it describing in detail the allegations that Saint Alphonsus
conspired with Gem State Radiology. See Opp'n at 1-17. But Saint Alphonsus has not moved
for summary judgment and is not seeking a ruling on the factual sufficiency of the conspiracy
allegations. Rather, Saint Alphonsus has moved for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to

1

MRIA's misappropriation and defamation claims were not dismissed until May 22,
2007, after Saint Alphonsus joined the prior summary judgment motion, so Saint Alphonsus
could not have raised the current arguments (relying on those dismissals) in that brief.
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Rule 12(c) because the conspiracy count fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Saint Alphonsus's motion thus has nothing to do with the sufficiency of the evidence, but only
with the impropriety of pleading the same legal wrong twice, and of pleading conspiracy to
commit a wrong where that wrong has been determined not to have occurred. Thus, the factual
allegations about which MRIA spends the bulk of its brief arguing are completely beside the
point.

III.

MRIA'S CONCESSION THAT CONSPIRACY STATES NO SEPARATE CLAIM
APART FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE WRONG RESOLVES THIS MOTION

Amidst its pages of irrelevant factual argument, MRIA concedes repeatedly that
conspiracy is "not an independent claim" for relief, and thus provides no basis for liability
distinct from the substantive wrong that is its claimed objective. Opp'n at 17, 18, 22, 24, 25.
Thus, MRIA acknowledges, "[i]t is the wrongs, not the conspiracy, that constitute the claims for
relief," and "a civil conspiracy is" just "a means of assigning joint and several liability to coconspirators for the wrong committed." Opp'n at 25 (citing Dahlquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378,
233 P. 883, 885-86 (1925)). Indeed, quite correctly, MRIA references the Supreme Court's clear
holding that "there is no such thing as a civil action for conspiracy." Opp'n at 24 (citing
Dahlquist, 40 Idaho 378, 233 P. at 885-86).
In view of these concessions, MRIA cannot avoid the two propositions on which this
motion rests. First, because ultimate liability for conspiracy rests on proving liability for the
substantive wrong to which the conspiracy is directed, there can be no claim of conspiracy if that
substantive wrong has been finally resolved against the plaintiff. Second, allegations of a
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substantive wrong and a conspiracy to commit that wrong state the same legal claim and are
entirely redundant.
MRIA attempts to avoid these necessary conclusions by asserting that Saint Alphonsus's
two arguments are "completely inconsistent." Opp'n at 23-24. But there is no inconsistency.
Conspiracy constitutes no wrong where the claimed tortious act that is its alleged objective has
been determined against the plaintiff. And any complaint including claims of liability for a
tortious act and for conspiracy to commit that act simply pleads the same legal wrong twice.
As a result, MRIA's claim of civil conspiracy to commit the substantive torts of
misappropriation and defamation is improper. These claims do not appear elsewhere in the
Third Amended Counterclaim because, as MRIA admits, it earlier dismissed them with
prejudice. Opp'n at 22. Further, MRIA neither addresses (nor contradicts) Idaho case law
holding that this voluntary dismissal rendered those substantive claims res judicata. See Mem. at
6-8. "Thus," as MRIA concedes, "those claims cannot be the independent claims for relief that
supports MRIA's civil conspiracy count." Opp'n at 22-23. It follows that MRIA may notreplead such claims under the guise of civil conspiracy because doing so seeks to establish liability
for claimed substantive wrongs have been finally determined against MRIA.
With regard to the alleged conspiracy to commit substantive wrongs that are as yet
unresolved-wrongful dissociation, interference with business opportunities, and co-opting a
partnership opportunity-it is wholly inappropriate for MRIA to repeat the same assertion of
substantive liability twice, once focusing on the substantive claim itself and once by asserting
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that Saint Alphonsus is liable for that very wrong because it conspired to achieve it. Such claims
are redundant, and one or the other must be dismissed. See Mem. at 10-11.2
MRIA's insistence that it be allowed to plead a redundant conspiracy count appears
premised on the misapprehension that it needs to plead conspiracy as a cause ofaction in order
to seek to hold Saint Alphonsus jointly and severally liable for the allegedly wrongful conduct of
the former third-party defendants. See Opp'n at 25. But that is not correct. MRIA can allege
each substantive legal claim only once, in what words it chooses, referencing conspiracy or not
as it sees fit. And it may make general allegations of conspiratorial conduct-as it has done, see
3d Am. Countercl. ~~ 56-61-and introduce otherwise relevant and admissible evidence of such
conduct in support of its claims. But it may not, for dramatic effect and emphasis-and to
potentially confuse the jury if and when its claims are eventually submitted-plead the same
legal wrong twice in two distinct claims as if they were separate grounds of possible liability.

2

The cases MRIA cites (Opp'n at 26) are not to the contrary. In Argonaut Insurance Co.
v. White, the Court held that the factual allegations of conspiracy were not surplusage because
they supported the complaint's single cause of action for misrepresentation; the Court did not
hold that a party may allege two separate causes of action for both misrepresentation and
conspiracy to commit misrepresentation. 86 Idaho 374, 379, 386 P.2d 964, 966 (1963). And in
McPheters v. Maile, the Court upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff's conspiracy claim precisely
because it was redundant of a separately pleaded negligence claim. See 138 Idaho 391,395,64
P.3d 317, 321 (2003) ("Civil Conspiracy Is Not Actionable Because The Proper Cause of Action
In This Case Is Negligence"). Thus, it is MRIA who misreads McPheters, not the federal district
courts that have, in straightforward reliance on McPheters, dismissed conspiracy counts as
repetitive. See Buck v. City ofSandpoint, No. CV07 -76-N-EJL, 2008 WL 4498806, at * 17 (D.
Idaho Oct. 1, 2008); Transport Truck & Trailer v. Freightliner, LLC, No. CV-06-282-5-BLW,
2007 WL 294280, at *8 (D. Idaho Jan. 29, 2007).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Count Eight of the Third Amended Counterclaim should be
dismissed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this

13th

day of September, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Saint Alphonsus filed the present motion in light of the Supreme Court's substantial
discussion of the legal adequacy ofMRIA's lost-profit damages evidence, and its instruction to
this Court to consider this issue on remand. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI
Assoc., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, ---, 224 P.3d 1068, 1087 (2009). Portions ofMRIA's thirty-page

opposition brief claiming the motion is somehow barred by the Supreme Court decision that
directed consideration of the issue, Opp'n at 1-2, and reciting at length MRIA's claimed facts
demonstrating liability, Opp'n at 3-8, 19-20, are simply distractions from the issue at hand. The
arguments and distinctions advanced by MRIA in the remainder of its opposition raise no serious
question about the legal inadequacy ofMRIA's evidence oflost-profit damages, for the reasons
discussed in the Supreme Court opinion and Saint Alphonsus's opening memorandum.
Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THIS MOTION RAISES A QUESTION OF LAW, WHICH SHOULD BE
DECIDED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
The Supreme Court decision makes clear that this Court should consider on remand the

adequacy ofMRIA's evidence offered at trial to support its lost profit damages theory. And
because this motion concerns the deficiency of evidence as a matter of law, it is appropriately
decided on summary judgment. MRIA's arguments to the contrary rely on an unsupportable
misreading ofthe Supreme Court opinion and Saint Alphonsus's motion. 1
First, MRIA claims that Saint Alphonsus's motion is somehow barred by the Supreme

Court decision even though that decision instructed this Court to reconsider the issue on remand.
See Opp'n at 1-2. According to MRIA, the argument for legal insufficiency ofthe lost profits

evidence "has already been rejected by the Supreme Court" and that rejection is "law of the
case." !d. at 2. MRIA's contention, however, relies on a gross misunderstanding of the Supreme
Court opinion. The Supreme Court explained that it did not have to decide the lost-profits
damages issue because "we will be remanding this case for a new trial," but the Court
nonetheless went out of its way to "briefly address this issue because it may arise again on
retrial." Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1087. And in addressing the issue, the
1

This motion is made necessary because, though offered the opportunity to do so in open
court on more than one occasion, see July 9, 2010 Hr'g Tr. at 46-51; May 7, 2010 Hr'g Tr. at 45; Feb. 17, 2010 Hr'g Tr. at 12, 17-18, MRIA has declined to state that it will offer any different
damages evidence or theory, thus leaving its case to tum on the legal adequacy under Pope of the
proof discussed by the Supreme Court. See May 7, 2010 Hr'g Tr. at 6-7 (statement by MRIA's
counsel that "we need some time still to decide to work with our experts to decide whether we
want to revise their opinions based on what the Supreme Court said in Pope").
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Supreme Court explained the reasoning in its opinion in Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co.,
103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988 (1982), and held that "[t]he concerns expressed in Pope should be
considered on any retrial." 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1087. Thus, far from "reject[ing]" Saint
Alphonsus's argument, the Supreme Court not only recognized that this Court should consider it
on remand, but sought to direct this Court's attention to what the Supreme Court obviously
believed was the key precedent on point. MRIA's suggestion-without citation-that the
Supreme Court "determined that a reasonable juror could find that St. Als caused MRIA to lose
some profits," Opp'n at 3, is therefore directly at odds with what the Supreme Court actually
stated in its opinion?
In addition, MRIA argues that this issue was already decided by Judge McLaughlin
before the appeal, but those decisions-which plainly are not binding here in light of the
Supreme Court's general reversal--did not perform the correct analysis under Pope, see
Memorandum Decision, July 13,2007, at 6-9; Memorandum Decision, Nov. 19,2007, at 10-11,
which is why the Supreme Court instructed this Court to reconsider the issue with Pope's
reasoning in mind. MRIA also contends that "the Supreme Court did not invite St. Als to file yet
another motion for summary judgment on the issue." Opp'n at 2 n.2. Of course, the Supreme
Court did not invite or disinvite such a motion, as there was no reason for the Supreme Court to

2

MRIA also claims that the Supreme Court's reference to Pope was "double dicta,"
Opp'n at 11 n.7, but it is absurd to suggest this Court should ignore the Supreme Court's clear
instruction on this point. In any event, for the reasons explained herein and in Saint Alphonsus' s
opening memorandum, the Supreme Court was correct to focus on Pope.
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anticipate this Court's procedures on remand, particularly on an issue where there could have
been new evidence (which MRIA has declined to introduce).
Second, MRIA contends that this issue cannot be decided on summary judgment because
Pope and other similar cases were not summary judgment decisions. See Opp'n at 8. However,
Pope decided the damages issue as a matter of law under a post-trial standard that is essentially

the same as the summary judgment standard. Pope, 103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005; see
also, e.g., Dunn v. Ward, 105 Idaho 354, 356, 670 P.2d 59, 61 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that

evidence of lost profits damages for violation of anti-competition clause failed as a matter of
law). And there is no reason why this issue should go to trial if the evidence upon which MRIA
proposes to rely is insufficient as a matter of law.
Further, decisions of the Supreme Court make clear that resolution of this issue by a
motion for summary judgment is proper. That Court has upheld a pretrial decision--{)n
summary judgment-rejecting lost-profit damages, holding that "we agree with the district court
that the requisite reasonable certainty was not shown and that any conceivable jury verdict would
have been based solely upon impermissible conjecture." Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA.,
110 Idaho 15, 18,713 P.2d 1374, 1377 (1985). "Accordingly," the Supreme Court "affirm[ed]
the district court's award of summary judgment on the issue oflost profits." /d.; see also Nw.
Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 840, 41 P.3d 263, 268 (2002) (affirming district

court's grant of summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had failed as a matter oflaw to
establish damage causation).
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MRIA' s argument against summary judgment also rests on the mistaken premise that
"the amount of damages ... is a fact question for the jury," Opp'n at 3, 8, and that ifMRIA
offers proof that Saint Alphonsus "cause[d] MRIA to lose some scans," Opp'n at 9, there can be
no legal claim that the evidence fails as a matter of law. 3
Of course, the Supreme Court's decision in this case, calling for consideration of the
damages proof in light of Pope, flatly contradicts this contention. It does so because, as a matter
ofldaho law, evidence that some indeterminate damages exist is, without more, insufficient to
allow the jury to decide the amount of damages as it sees fit. Rather, "the factfinder may not
determine damages by mere speculation and guesswork, and there must be a reasonable
foundation established by the evidence from which the factfinder can calculate the amount of
damages." Pope, 103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005. In particular, "[t]he burden is upon the
plaintiff to prove not only that it was injured, but that its injury was the result of the defendant's
breach; both amount and causation must be proven with reasonable certainty." Griffith v. Clear
Lakes Trout Co., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604, 611 (2007).

Thus, beginning with the assumption of Saint Alphonsus's motion that MRIA's evidence
can establish liability and some indeterminate amount ofinjury,4 that fact does not remotely

3

See also Opp'n at 2 (to grant summary judgment, "this Court must decide that a
'reasonable juror' could not determine that St. Als caused MRIA to lose some referrals
(profits)"); id. at 18 ("St. Als really is not making [a] causation argument, but instead is arguing
about the proof of the amount of damages . . . . Such an argument is a fact question for the
jury.").
4

The issue of the legal adequacy of damages proof arises only where the other elements
of liability have been shown, and this assumption is therefore the necessary hypothetical premise
of the motion before this Court. MRIA's extensive discussion of its version of the facts, to paint
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE LEGAL INSUFFICIENCY OF MRIA'S 000534
EVIDENCE OF LOST PROFITS - 6

support submission to the jury of the unsupported theory ofMRIA's experts that all of the scans
from MRIA's "historical[]" "customer base," Trial Tr. at 2739 (Saint Alphonsus App'x Tab 10),
would have gone to MRIA but for Saint Alphonsus's alleged misconduct. Because, as set forth
below and in the opening memorandum, that evidence fails under Pope, the claim for lost-profit
damages should be dismissed.

II.

MRIA'S LOST PROFITS THEORY FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW UNDER
THE POPE STANDARD
MRIA's "lost profits" theory of damages, and the claims that depend upon it, fail as a

matter of law because there is no evidence plausibly showing what portion of the scans allegedly
lost to IMI were caused by Saint Alphonsus's alleged misconduct. As the Supreme Court
explained, MRIA's experts "assumed that all MRI scans later performed at [IMI] for patients of
those physicians [who previously referred patients to MRIA] would have been done at MRI
Center and/or MRI Mobile but for St. Alphonsus's wrongful conduct." 148 Idaho at---,
224 P .2d at 1087. They "also assumed that all physicians who were admitted to St. Alphonsus
only and who had not previously referred patients to MRIA prior to [IMI] opening would have
referred all of their patients needing MRI scans to MRI Center and/or MRI Mobile but for St.
Alphonsus's wrongful conduct." !d. Under Pope, these assumptions are insufficient to create a
genuine issue for trial. Just as in Pope, "[s]uch a method of figuring damages assumes, without
any support in the record, that the [competitor's] operation would not have won any portion of

(continued ... )

a picture of misconduct alleged to give rise to liability and some indeterminate quantum of
injury, is thus wholly beside the point, and will not be discussed here.
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the ... market absent" the defendant's misconduct. 103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005, quoted

in Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1087.
MRIA attempts to distinguish Pope, but it does so based on irrelevant facts that fail to
undermine the applicability of Pope's reasoning to this case.

First, MRIA argues that "Pope is an antitrust case," and is therefore inapposite here.
Opp'n at 9. However, the Supreme Court plainly thinks Pope is applicable in this case, as
explained in its opinion. That is because Pope does not purport to apply a rule unique to antitrust
cases. Rather, Pope makes clear that where, as here, the allegation is that wrongful conduct by
or in aid of a competitor caused business to migrate from the plaintiff to the competitor, damages
evidence may not proceed on the unexamined and wholly implausible assumption that the
alleged misconduct is legally responsible for 100% of identified adverse business consequences.

Second, MRIA argues that "unlike in Pope, MRIA's proof does take into account that
IMI would have obtained some scans for reasons other than association with St. Als," Opp'n at
12, and "MRIA's experts did not assume that MRIA's lost profits were equivalent to IMI's
income," Opp'n at 13. To be sure, MRIA's experts excluded from their lost-profits measure the
IMI scans referred by doctors who both did not previously refer to MRIA and who were not
admitted to practice only at Saint Alphonsus-and thus were not part of the "historical[]"
"customer base" that MRIA once had. Trial Tr. at 2739 (Saint Alphonsus App'x Tab 10). But
as to that historical customer base-made up of doctors who previously referred patients to
MRIA or were admitted to practice only at Saint Alphonsus-MRIA' s experts assumed that all
of the scans won by IMI would have gone to MRIA but for Saint Alphonsus' s alleged
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misconduct. The experts assumed, in other words, that IMI would not have taken away from
MRIA even a single scan referred by these doctors. This is fundamentally the same as the
assumption in Pope that the competitor "would not have won any portion of the ... market
absent" the defendant's misconduct. 103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005, quoted in Saint
Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1087; see also Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224

P .3d at 1087 (quoting Pope's holding that an "assum[ption] that ... jobs done by [a competitor
of the plaintiffs] would all have been done by [the plaintiffs] but for the [defendant's] violations"
is "not a proper manner to measure the [plaintiffs'] lost profits"). A determination of damages
cannot be based on such a wholly unsupported assumption.
Third, MRIA argues that here, unlike in Pope, "[t]here is no speculation as to profit

margin." Opp'n at 14. However, in Pope, the profit margin issue was simply an alternate basis
for decision, not a necessary part of the Court's holding on the lack of evidence to support lostprofit damages. See Pope, 103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005 ("[E]ven first assuming such a
method of proving damages is permissible in this case, still there were fundamental errors in its
application.... [T]he court's use of a 15% profit factor to establish sub-market lost net profits
was pure speculation.").
Apart from the specific applicability of Pope, the evidence here fails the more general
test that damages must be proven with "reasonable certainty." Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v.
Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P.3d 1119, 1121 (2007). In particular, damages may not be

awarded for business losses where "the evidence does not support a finding that all of th[ ose]
losses ... were the result of the [defendants'] breaches." Twin Falls Farm & City Distrib., Inc.
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v. D & B Supply Co., 96 Idaho 351, 360,528 P.2d 1286, 1295 (1974) (emphasis added). 5 Yet

that is exactly what MRIA seeks here, without any evidentiary basis. Indeed, MRIA does not
contest several basic facts that demonstrate the lack of sufficient evidence here: (1) There is no
evidence that any physician-let alone all of those in the two categories of physicians at issueactually changed his referring practices as a result of Saint Alphonsus's actions. See Mem. at 10.
(2) There is no evidence to suggest, contrary to common sense, that none of the doctors that
previously referred to Center would have sent any referrals-not one-to the people they trusted
at IMI, if only Saint Alphonsus had refrained from providing some technical support to IMI. /d.
at 11. (3) The only physicians who testified on the issue stated that they began referring to IMI
because of the identity and reputation of the IMI radiologists reading the scans, not because of
any conduct by Saint Alphonsus. /d. at 10-11. 6

5

MRIA attempts to distinguish Twin Fails on the ground that the court remanded the case
to determine which damages were caused by the defendants' anticompetitive conduct. Opp'n at
23-24 n.1 7. However, a remand does not change the fact that a plaintiff may not assume that all
of the damage was caused by the misconduct, and, here, MRIA has not produced any basis to
distinguish which damages were caused by the misconduct and which were not.
6

MRIA claims that Saint Alphonsus is liable for changed referrals based on the
reputation of physicians because Saint Alphonsus was a co-conspirator with the radiologists in
IMI. See Opp'n at 29. This argument is incoherent. "A civil conspiracy itself is not a tort, and,
until some act is done by the conspirators, there arises no cause of action, and when an act is
done which amounts to an actionable tort, then that is the gist of the action." Dahlquist v.
Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 386, 233 P. 883, 885 (1925). MRIA does not allege, and certainly cannot
prove, that the radiologists had an independent legal duty not to compete with Center, and
therefore MRIA cannot seek to hold Saint Alphonsus liable for the competition that IMI
introduced into the marketplace. Rather, the "actionable" wrong alleged here is Saint
Alphonsus's allegedly improper assistance to IMI's MRI business, and, again, it was incumbent
upon MRIA to prove in some rational way what profits were lost as a result of that assistance.
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE LEGAL INSUFFICIENCY OF MRIA'S 000538
EVIDENCE OF LOST PROFITS - 10

In the face of this lack of evidence to show damages caused by Saint Alphonsus, MRIA
ignores the element of causation and argues simply that it provided an evidentiary foundation to
show the decline in its own revenues soon after IMI came into existence. See Opp'n at 17.
However, that supposed foundation only demonstrates damages if Saint Alphonsus were liable
for the very existence of IMI. And MRIA has not argued or produced evidence to show that IMI
would not have existed but for Saint Alphonsus's supposed misconduct. 7 MRIA fails to separate
out the effect ofiMI' s existence and the effect of any improper conduct by Saint Alphonsus in
support ofiMI. And it is well established that "the trier of fact must be able to find, reasonably,
that the inference linking the defendant's conduct to the damage is more probable than an
inference connecting the loss to other causes." Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 919, 684 P.2d 314,
321 (Ct. App. 1984).
MRIA relies on Griffith for the idea that it need not disprove other causes, see Opp'n at
20-22, but in that case there was no evidence of alternative causation and every lost opportunity
7

MRIA makes a token effort in this regard by asserting that "IMI might not have come
into existence without St. Als' assistance," Opp'n at 19, but this newfound speculation of
"might" is insufficient to support a claim. MRIA has already conceded in the Supreme Court
that its experts do not dispute that IMI would have existed regardless of Saint Alphonsus' s
actions, see Mem. at 8-9, and it concedes here that "had IMI opened independent of St. Als, it
would have obtained some portion of the market," Opp'n at 11. These concessions are necessary
because, as the Supreme Court noted, the undisputed evidence establishes that the GSR
radiologists formulated their plans and acquired land in downtown Boise for IMI before
disclosing their plans to Saint Alphonsus and encouraging it to become involved in the project.
Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1072. Thus, David Giles, an MRIA radiologist
involved in the creation of IMI, testified at trial that the GSR physicians had a "contingency
plan" to the effect that if Saint Alphonsus "refuses to partner with the group on [the IMI] project
and severs all ties, the new center will continue with a second center being built as close to Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center as possible to compete with them." Trial Tr. at 2981-83
(attached hereto as Ex. A).
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was "more likely than not attributable to" the defendant's conduct. 143 Idaho at 741, 152 P.3d at
612. Moreover, Griffith dealt with a very different kind of injury than the one at issue here, and
thus one that could be proven in a different way. In Griffith, the plaintiff, a fish hatchery, was
injured when the defendant customer cancelled a purchase contract, and the question was
whether the cancellation caused lost profit damages from the increased cost of raising the fish for
an extended period. /d. at 739-40, 152 P.2d at 610-11. Thus, Griffith deals with multiple causes
of a single, undifferentiated injury, and not (as here) thousands of independent business
transactions, some unproven proportion of which allegedly resulted from the acts of the
defendant and some other proportion of which were undeniably caused by other factors such as
the presence of a new competitor in the marketplace.
In addition, MRIA complains that "the sheer number of referring physicians made it
impracticable to show why each referring physician switched from MRIA to IMI." Opp'n at 24.
This supposed difficulty does not relieve MRIA of its burden and thereby allow it to claim and
collect compensation for all business lost to IMI, whether or not caused by Saint Alphonsus. See
Pope, 103 Idaho at 222, 646 P.2d at 993; Twin Falls, 96 Idaho at 360, 528 P.2d at 1295.

Moreover, it is not impracticable to make a reasonable effort to assess what "portion of the ...
market" IMI would "have won" absent Saint Alphonsus's alleged assistance to IMI. Pope,
103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005. No perfect precision is required. MRIA did not need to
interview all1,900 referring physicians to show damages with reasonable certainty. Its experts
could have interviewed a sample of those physicians and extrapolated from the results. Or its
experts could have created an economic model that estimated how much business IMI would
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have taken from Center absent the competitive advantages allegedly given to it by Saint
Alphonsus. Instead, MRIA just rested on gross assumptions that are contrary to common sense
and unsupported by any evidence.
Finally, MRIA rests on the idea that MRIA need not show why the referring physicians
switched to MRIA because it is irrelevant in a non-compete case. See Opp'n at 25-27. 8 This
theory directly contradicts the basic requirement of causation: if the referring physicians
switched to IMI for reasons other than those caused by Saint Alphonsus's alleged misconduct,
then Saint Alphonsus cannot be liable for them. Indeed, in Trilogy, a non-compete case, the
Supreme Court held that "[t]he measure of damages for the breach of an anti-competition clause
is the amount that the plaintiff lost by reason of the breach," and damages cannot be sustained in
the absence of evidence that the amount lost was caused by the breach. 144 Idaho at 846, 172
P.2d at 1121; see also, e.g., Dunn, 105 Idaho at 356, 670 P.2d at 61 ("[t]he measure of damage
for the breach of an anti-competition clause is the amount that the plaintiff lost by reason of the
breach"). MRIA relies on Vancil v. Anderson, 71 Idaho 95,227 P.2d 74 (1951), but in that case
the very existence of the competitor was the actionable wrong because the competitor had
violated a non-compete clause by opening up its store. Here, in contrast, the alleged wrong is
Saint Alphonsus's assistance to a competitor (IMI) that would have existed in any event. See
8

MRIA also mentions, in a footnote, that it is entitled to damages because Saint
Alphonsus "usurped" a partnership "opportunity to partner with the rad[iologists], GSR, in an
imaging center [at the] Meridian campus." Opp'n at 28 n.21. However, MRIA's lost-profits
evidence bears no relationship to the value of this supposedly usurped opportunity, which would
depend on such facts as the structure of the hypothetical partnership, the capital contributions
made to it by MRIA, and the share of IMI profits that MRIA would have received from the
enterprise.
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supra p. 11 & note 7. By claiming as damages all of the scans referred to IMI by MRIA's

historic customer base, MRIA ignores the requirement to link damages to the wrong alleged.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in Saint Alphonsus' s opening memorandum of law and this reply
memorandum, MRIA has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the question of the
quantum of lost profits, if any, caused by Saint Alphonsus's alleged pre-dissociation conduct.
Accordingly, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of lost profit
damages. Since MRIA has declined to take the hint offered by the Supreme Court and produce a
new damages expert report and theory, this Court should therefore grant summary judgment on
each ofMRIA's causes of action that relies on lost profits as a measure of damages.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 13th day of September, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

~JAt,~
JCK S. GJ~RDING 5

(}.ttomeys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
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group, I had contacts with other hospital members in the
pathology department and in the emergency room departmen
who were also negotiating contracts with the hospital,
and it was through those contacts that I became aware
that the noncompete clause was coming up at the time that
we were going to be negotiating our next contract. So,
as I said before, this was a window that was closing.
Q Okay. And then, it says, "It was unanimously
agreed upon by the group that control of their future was
the most important, therefore, now was the time to open
an imaging center." I assume that means that, "We're
going to be independent and we're going to -- we're going
to control our future and we're going to open this
center"?
A Inasmuch as that was possible.
THE COURT: With that, we'll take our lunch
break.
(Recess.)
(Jury present.)
THE COURT: All of our jurors are present.
Counsel are here.
Mr. Gjording, you may continue with your direct
examination.
MR. GJORDING: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
BY MR. GJORDING:
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of opinion. So, generally, that was true, but there were
those who didn't want to partner with the hospital.
Q Okay. But whoever is doing the minutes here is
using the phrase "the group would like to partner with
the hospital"?
A Correct.
Q Okay. And you were thinking that maybe one of
the ways you would partner with them is to lease
equipment to them?
A Yes.
Q Or from them?
A Sure.
Q Okay. And then, it says, "If the hospital
refuses to partner with the group on this project and
severs all ties"-- does that mean doesn't let you have a
contract to read?
A Correct.
Q Okay. "Ifthe" --"If the hospital refuses to
partner with the group on this project and severs all
ties, the new center will continue with a second center
being built as close to Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center as possible to compete with them." Pretty strong
statement?
A There were those who felt that was the way to
go.
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Q Let's look at that paragraph on page 2 just for
a moment longer, Dr. Giles. So, to kind of sum that up,
you felt that there was -- there was an urgency regarding
getting this center going; true?
A A sense of urgency, yes.
Q A sense of urgency. And certainly, it was
expressed unanimously by the group that, "We're going to
control our own future"; right?
A We'll try.
Q And, "We're going to open this center"?
A We're going to investigate it.
Q Okay. "There is an urgency, and we want to
control our own future, so we're going to open it"?
A We would like to see if it's feasible, yes.
Q Okay. Page 2. Let's go to the first paragraph
on page 2. Well, it's actually the continuation from a
paragraph before, but let's go to that first fractional
paragraph on the top of page 2. And it says, "Ideally,
the group would like to partner with the hospital on this
project perhaps by leasing equipment from them." So, it
still was -- this is a group meeting; right?
A Correct.
Q So, the group is still in favor of partnering
with the hospital; true?
A Whenever you have a group, you have a spectrum
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Q Okay. And these are the group minutes. So, you
had a contingency plan, did you not, or at least this
suggests that you did?
A This would suggest that.
Q Okay. So, you want to partner with the
hospital, but if they won't partner with you, then what
you will do is you will open a second center. This one
is down at Ninth and Myrtle; right?
A Contemplated -- well, no.
Q The first one is.
A I don't believe that site had been yet selected
for the center.
Q Okay. But, well, then, where was this?
A It eventually-- eventually, it was developed at
Ninth and Myrtle, but I don't believe at this time we had
land and all necessary to develop it.
Q Okay. So, at this point in time-- and this is
what? Where are we? We're in April of-- May of 1998.
At this time, we really don't know where the radiologists
are going to put that first center, but they're saying
here fairly clearly, are they not, Dr. Giles, that if the
hospital refuses to partner, they're going to take -they're going to make a second center and they're going
to build it right next to Saint Alphonsus and they're
going to compete with them?
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A Some wanted to do that, yes.
Q Okay. All right. That's what the minutes say?
A That's what the minutes say.
Q Next paragraph. "Doctors Traughber and Knochel"
-- am I saying that right?
A Yes.
Q Okay. --"agreed than an MRI unit is essential
to making the center successful. Dr. Giles feels that
the MRI Board will be favorable to this."
Let's take the first sentence, first. Do you
recall some ofthe physicians at the radiology group
believing that, indeed, MRI was a modality that was
essential to have in the new center?
A Yes.
Q Okay. Now, you didn't always agree with that;
right?
A That's correct.
Q Okay. But, ultimately, it was opened with an
MRI?
A It was.
Q Okay. Did some of those radiologists-- I
notice they use the word "essential." Did some of those
radiologists feel pretty strongly about including MRI in
the center?
A Yes.
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that you probably indicated that the "Board probably
would be favorable"?
A Yes. I couldn't obviously speak for the Board,
but I must have said something to the effect that it
wouldn't be -- there was a way to work this out with
MRIA.
Q Is it your recollection, Dr. Giles, that at
least at this point in time, May of 1998, you had not
breathed a word of this to MRIA?
A As far as I know.
Q Okay. And what about your DMR partners?
A As far as I know, I hadn't told them.
Q Okay. And do you think that -- do you think
they would have been interested -- do you think the MRIA
people would have been interested in these plans?
A I have no idea.
Q There is going to be a competitor?
A Maybe. It's-Q But I take it that it was your position that
regardless of whether they liked it or not, you weren't
going to tell them about it?
A I couldn't.
Q Okay. And I think you've already looked to see
if you reviewed those minutes. Yes, you did. Okay.
Let's go to -- let's go to Exhibit 570. Are you there?
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Q Then, the second sentence says, "Dr. Giles feels
that the MRI Board will be favorable to this." Did you
tell the radiologists that you thought the Board would be
favorable?
A I don't think so. Again, these are Kathy
Sharp's minutes, and I think that I -- my sentiments were
probably that there would be a way to work this out with
MRIA.
Q Okay. Because at this time, are you even
mentioning anything to MRIA about -A No.
Q --about these plans?
A No.
Q So, do you feel that this really is one of those
minutes where she didn't quite get it right?
A Correct.
Q Okay. Do you remember reviewing these notes -A No.
Q Did you sign these?
A I signed them all. Yes.
Q Okay. Do you remember seeing when you reviewed
them that she didn't quite have it right?
A I don't remember that; otherwise, I would have
changed it.
Q Okay. But you think it's correct in the sense
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And I see you were in attendance?
A Correct.
Q Let's go down to paragraph B under the "Imaging
Center" topic. I'll read. "Due to Sandra Bruce's
position on the hospital staff as well as her position on
the MRI Board, this could potentially be problematic for
obtaining an MRI unit." It's true, is it not, Dr. Giles,
your group recognized that Sandra Bruce may have a
problem with radiologists opening a center that competed
withMRIA?
A Yes.
Q You recognized that?
A Yes.
Q So, were you trying to make sure that this
information wasn't expressed through the community? Did
you want to keep it confidential?
A Wedid.
Q Okay. And did you even talk about -- talk about
the idea that no one should talk about this?
A I'm sure we did.
Q Okay. "Dr. Hall feels that the group needs to
be independent from the MRIA Board to maintain the
ability to upgrade equipment and have complete control."
Do you know what he means by that?
A Well, I think it's self-evident.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
STRIKE IMMATERIAL MATTER
FROM THE THIRD AMENDED
COUNTERCLAIM

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
This matter having come before the Court on July 9, 2010, on Saint Alphonsus's Motion
to Strike Immaterial Matter From the Third Amended Counterclaim, and good cause appearing
therefore:
For the reasons stated by the Court at the hearing on July 9, 2010, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter From the Third Amended Counterclaim
is GRANTED. The following portions of the Third Amended Counterclaim are stricken as
immaterial allegations, as they directly conflict with, and thus are inconsistent with, the Idaho
Supreme Court's October 21, 2009 decision in this matter:
•

In paragraph 10, the word "originally" and the sentence "This lease term for the
MRI Center, as well as the term ofMRI Limited, were both later extended by
SARMC and the MRIA board to December 21, 2023" are hereby stricken.

•

In paragraph 45, the word "wrongfully" and the phrase "by withdrawing in breach
of the conditions for withdrawal stated in Section 6.1 of the Partnership
Agreement" are hereby stricken.
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•

In paragraph 46, the phrase "(at least 2023)" is hereby stricken.

•

Paragraph 63 is hereby stricken in its entirety.

•

In paragraph 64, the phrase "(which date was later extended to 2023)" is hereby
stricken.

•

Paragraph 65 is hereby stricken in its entirety.

•

In paragraph 66, the reference to Idaho Code § 53-3-602(b)(1) is hereby stricken.

•

In paragraph 72, the reference to Idaho Code § 53-3-602(b)(1) is hereby stricken.

~

DATED this

.l7 day of$rfJ._ , 2010.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL Dl~'f~i8~~erk
DEPUTY

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership,

Case No. CVOC-0408219
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited
partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED,
an Idaho limited partnership,
Counter-claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit
corporation,
Counter-defendant.

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on
Claim of Wrongful Dissociation, Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Civil Conspiracy Claim,
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on the Legal Insufficiency ofEvidence of Lost Profits,
and Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Claims of Limited Partnerships. The Court heard oral
argument on October 1, 2010. Donald Ayer appeared for the Plaintiff/Counter-defendant the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS AND
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Page I
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Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. (Saint Alphonsus). Thomas Banducci appeared for the
Defendant/Counter-claimant MRI Associates, LLP (MRIA). The Court took all four motions
fully under advisement at that time.
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

In 1985, Plaintiff Saint Alphonsus and several other parties formed a partnership called
MRI Associates (MRIA) to acquire and operate diagnostic and therapeutic devices, equipment,
and accessories, specifically magnetic resonance imaging devices. In 2004, Saint Alphonsus
sought to withdraw from the partnership and brought this suit for a judicial determination of the
amount it was entitled to for its share of the partnership. MRIA counterclaimed for wrongful
dissociation. MRIA alleged that Saint Alphonsus significantly and materially assisted a direct
competitor, Intermountain Imaging (IMI), in establishing an MRI facility on Saint Alphonsus'
campus in Boise and in usurping MRIA's opportunity to expand to the Meridian market.
The trial court held on summary judgment that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully
dissociated as a matter of law. The case proceeded to trial and the Court instructed the jury that
Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated. On October 21, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of the district court in this matter and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Subsequently, this Court granted the Defendants leave to file the Third Amended
Counterclaim, which was filed on March 22, 2010. This pleading added two counterclaimants:
MRI Limited Partnership (Center) and MRI Mobile Limited (Mobile), the limited partnerships
formed by MRIA. Saint Alphonsus moved to strike immaterial matter from the Third Amended
Counterclaim and the Court granted that motion on September 27, 2010, eliminating language
from the counterclaim that contradicts the Supreme Court's holdings.
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The parties were unable to stipulate to a schedule for pre-trial motions and the Court
entered an order imposing a schedule on July 9, 2010. The parties moved to amend that
scheduling order, seeking to remove the page limits on the briefings. The Court denied the
motion to lift the page limit and on August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus filed two motions for
judgment on the pleadings and two motions for summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) governs motions for judgment on the pleadings. It
provides:
After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any
party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If on a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Because Rule 12(c) treats motions for judgment on the pleadings similarly to motions for
summary judgment, "the standard of review applicable to lower courts' rulings on motions for
summary judgment also applies to motions for judgment on the pleadings." Trimble v.
Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 302, 939 P.2d 1379, 1381 (1997) (citing Orthman v. Idaho Power
Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561, 563 (1995)).

"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents
on file with the court . . . demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd. Partnership,
145 Idaho 735, 738, 184 P.3d 860, 863 (2008) (quoting Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765
P.2d 126, 127 (1988) (citing I.R.C.P. 56(c)). The burden of proof is on the moving party to
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Rouse v. Household Finance Corp.,
144 Idaho 68, 70, 156 P.3d 569, 571 (2007) (citing Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935
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P.2d 165, 168 (1997)). In construing the facts, the court must draw all reasonable factual
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408,
410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008).
Moreover, "[s]ummary judgment proceedings are generally decided on the basis of
admissible evidence." Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 236, 178 P.3d 597, 601 (2008) (citing
I.R.C.P. 56(e)). Idaho Rule ofProcedure 56(e) provides as follows:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to
be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits.
!d.
"Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the
burden shifts to the non-moving party," to provide specific facts showing there is a genuine issue
for trial. Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 228, 159 P.3d 862, 864 (2007) (citing Hei v. Holzer,
139 Idaho 81, 85, 73 P.3d 94, 98 (2003)); Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134
Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000). The non-moving party's case must be anchored in
something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine
issue. Zimmerman v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69 (1996).
The non-moving party may not simply rely upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set
forth in affidavits specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e); see
Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). If the non-moving party

does not provide such a response, "summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
the party." I.R.C.P. 56(±).
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S CLAIM OF WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION
Before the first trial in this matter, the trial court granted MRIA's motion for summary
judgment on wrongful dissociation, holding that Saint Alphonsus' dissociation was wrongful
because it breached an express provision of the Partnership Agreement. Saint Alphonsus

Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, _, 224 P.3d 1068, 1073 (2009).
In that same motion, MRIA also argued an alternative theory that the dissociation was wrongful
because it occurred prior to the expiration of the definite term of the Partnership. !d. The trial
court did not address the alternate theory in the summary judgment order. !d. at 1080. Holding
that the provisions of the contract must be construed in light of the Uniform Partnership Law
(UPL), which was the law at the time the parties entered into the Partnership Agreement, the
Idaho Supreme Court overturned the trial court's ruling that the dissociation was in breach of an
express provision ofthe Partnership Agreement. !d. at 1077-78. The Idaho Supreme Court held
that the four provisions were not the only ways a partner could rightfully withdraw from the
Partnership and thus Saint Alphonsus' withdrawal was not in breach of an express provision. !d.
Because the trial court did not rule on the issue of whether the Partnership was for a definite term
and because Saint Alphonsus did not timely object to the submission of the issue to the jury, the
Supreme Court did not consider the issue on appeal. !d. at 1081. The Supreme Court stated:
Because we remand this case for a new trial, the issue of whether the partnership
was for a definite term and, if so, whether Saint Alphonsus dissociated prior to the
expiration of that term will have to be determined in further proceedings.

!d.
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The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUP A) 1 gives a partner a statutory right to
dissociate without liability from a partnership except where the dissociation 1) breaches an
express provision of the partnership agreement; 2) occurs before the expiration of a definite term
set forth in the agreement; or 3) occurs before the completion of a particular undertaking set forth
in the agreement. I.C. § 53-3-602. The Supreme Court has specifically held that Saint Alphonsus
did not breach an express provision of the agreement by its withdrawal from MRIA and MRIA
does not assert that Saint Alphonsus withdrew prior to the completion of a particular
undertaking.
Saint

Alphonsus

seeks

summary judgment

unambiguously provides that the Partnership has an

that

indefin~te

the

Partnership

Agreement

term. Saint Alphonsus argues that

the Partnership Agreement is an integrated contract with clear language establishing an indefinite
term and therefore Saint Alphonsus merely exercised its statutory right to dissociate. MRIA
argues that when considered as a whole, the provision of the Partnership Agreement setting forth
the term of the Partnership clearly sets forth a definite term for the duration of "the business of
the Partnership." It is MRIA's position that the business ofthe Partnership is the management of
the business affairs of the limited partnerships and because these limited partnerships have
express terms, the life of the MRIA Partnership is necessarily limited by those contracts. Finally,

1

Although the Idaho Supreme Court spent several paragraphs reviewing the history of the UPL and held that the
partnership agreement at issue must be construed in the context of the UPL, the Supreme Court then employed the
RUPA in making its decision. I.C. § 53-3-1204 governs applicability of the RUPA to Idaho partnerships formed
before and after the enactment of the RUP A. The Official Comment to this section states:
This section provides for a transition period in the applicability of the Act to existing
partnerships, similar to that provided in the revised Texas partnership act. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 6132b-10.03 (Vernon Supp. 1994). Subsection (a) makes application of the Act
mandatory for all partnerships formed after the effective date of the Act and permissive, by
election, for existing partnerships. That affords existing partnerships and partners an
opportunity to consider the changes effected by RUP A and to amend their partnership
agreements, if appropriate.
Under subsection (b), application of the Act becomes mandatory for all partnerships,
including existing partnerships that did not previously elect to be governed by it, upon a
future date to be established by the adopting State.
I.C. § 53-3-1204 Official Comment (emphasis added).
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MRIA asserts that the only way to determine the life of the MRIA Partnership is to examine the
relevant extrinsic evidence, including but not limited to the limited partnership agreements.
Article 1, Section 1.1 of the Articles of Partnership of MRI Associates (the Partnership
Agreement) governs the effective date and term of the agreement. It states in full:
Section 1.1 Effective Date and Term The effective date of these Articles of
Partnership is the twenty-sixth day of April, 1985, and shall terminate as follows:
1.1.1 If the Limited Partnership contemplated pursuant to Section 1.6 is not
formed and the limited partnership interests sold in accordance with the Private
Placement Memorandum, or this Partnership does not otherwise acquire financing
acceptable to all Partners to replace the funds which were to be acquired by the
limited partnership offering, on or before December 31, 1985, then the term of
this Partnership shall end on December 31, 1985.
1.1.2 If the Limited Partnership contemplated by Section 1.6 is formed and the
limited partnership interests sold, and/or other financing mutually acceptable to
all Partners to replace all or a portion of the funds which were to be acquired by
the limited partnership offering is acquired on or before December 31, 1985, then
the term of this Partnership shall end on the date which is within a reasonable
time after the business of the Partnership is wound up and dissolved under Article
10.
Article 10, Section 10.1 governs dissolution. It states:
Section 10.1 Dissolution At a meeting of the Board of Partners held in Boise,
Idaho, pursuant to due notice, the Partnership may be dissolved through the
affirmative vote of seven-ninths (7/9) or more of the eligible votes of the Board of
Partners. 2
Saint Alphonsus contends that the plain language of Section 1.1.2 stating "the term of this
Partnership shall end on the date which is within a reasonable time after the business of the
Partnership is wound up and dissolved under Article 10" means the Partnership has an indefinite
term and can be dissolved at any time pursuant to Article 10. MRIA argues with equal vigor that
the reference to the "business of the Partnership" in the term provision must be construed in
reference to Section 1.6, which states the purpose of the partnership and that the purpose would
be accomplished via the limited partnerships. MRIA asserts that because the limited partnerships
2

Section 10.1 was amended to eight tenths by the Third Amendment dated April21, 1985.
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formed pursuant to the MRIA Partnership Agreement have definite terms, the business of the
Partnership to conduct the limited partnerships is necessarily for the term of the limited
partnerships.
A contract is ambiguous, as a matter of law, if it is reasonably susceptible to conflicting
interpretations. Hoffman v. United Silver Mines, Inc., 116 Idaho 240, 246, 775 P.2d 132, 138
(Ct.App.1989). In construing the parties' agreement, the court looks first to the instrument itself.

Storrer v. Russo, 123 Idaho 442, 444, 849 P.2d 115, 117 (Ct. App. 1991). If Section 1.1.2 read
only " ... then the term of this Partnership shall end on the date which is within a reasonable
time after the business of the Partnership is wound up and dissolved," then MRIA's argument
that there is a built in ambiguity based on the phrase 'business of the Partnership' would be a
viable argument. But this construction reads out the last words "under Article 10." Article 10,
provides for ending the Partnership with a 7/9ths (amended to 8/10ths) vote.
In its Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim for Wrongful Dissociation,
MRIA suggests that even when a contract is facially unambiguous, the Court may look to
extrinsic evidence to determine whether an ambiguity exists. Storrer v. Russo, 123 Idaho 442,
444, 849 P.2d 115, 117 (Ct. App. 1991). MRIA also argues that the RUPA commentators
acknowledge that the agreed upon term cannot always be determined from the four comers ofthe
document and may require consideration of documents, conduct, and statements outside the
agreement, citing RUPA, § 602, Authors' Comments 5.a. The Court notes that these comments
were not adopted by the Idaho Legislature and are not listed in the Official Comment in the
Idaho Code.
The Court finds the Partnership Agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. The
Court finds that the agreement is not reasonably susceptible to two meanings. The Court finds
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS AND
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that the clear language of the Agreement, when reading the contract as a whole and giving
meaning to all the words and phrases, is that it was a partnership meant to end when 7/9ths (now
8/10ths) ofthe partners voted to dissolve the partnership. The Court finds this an indefinite term.
Saint Alphonsus' motion for partial summary judgment that as a matter of law the contract was
for an indefinite term is GRANTED.
MRIA next argues that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel prevents Saint Alphonsus from
asserting that the Agreement was for a definite term. MRIA has placed into the record two
instances when Saint Alphonsus has made statements which MRIA alleges indicate Saint
Alphonsus' intent and understanding that the Partnership was for a definite term. The doctrine of
quasi-estoppel "prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment of another party, which
is inconsistent with a position previously taken." Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 138 P.3d
310, 314 (2006) (quoting C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 144, 75
P.3d 194, 198 (2003)). The elements of quasi-estoppel are:
(1) the offending party took a different position than his or her original position,
and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change
positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to
maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit
or acquiesced in.
Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d 663, 668 (2008). MRIA argues that Saint
Alphonsus is clearly taking a different position than one earlier taken, in an attempt to gain an
advantage over MRIA, where it previously sought to induce the other partners to enter the
agreement, and it would be unconscionable to allow them to take a position contrary to the one
under which all of the parties previously operated.
The first piece of extrinsic evidence that MRIA asks the Court to consider is a letter
written by counsel for Saint Alphonsus approximately six weeks prior to the execution of the
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Agreement attached to a revised draft. MRIA asserts that this letter makes clear that Saint
Alphonsus informed the other partners that a definite term "was unnecessary given that the
Partnership Agreement would automatically terminate with the expiration of the limited
partnerships anyway." (Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim for Wrongful
Disscoiation, 13.) The relevant paragraph ofthe letter states in full:
The enclosed draft does not address termination and/or a buy-out clause. As you
and I discussed, a "sunset" clause would be preferable, but it is not critical.
Additionally, the life of this partnership will undoubtedly be determined by the
terms of the lease and the limited partnership.
The language of this paragraph established that Saint Alphonsus would have preferred to
have a "sunset" clause but that one had not been agreed upon. Saint Alphonsus' use of the term
"life of the partnership" rather than "term of the partnership", where it uses term of the lease and
term of the limited partnership in the same sentence, does not indicate that Saint Alphonsus
believed this Partnership to have a definite term. Finally, that the executed version does include a
buy-out clause, which Saint Alphonsus sought to enforce in this suit, reinforces that at the time
this letter was sent, negotiations were not yet complete. The Court does not find this letter
evidences a belief that the contract was for a definite term such that Saint Alphonsus is changing
its position in an attempt to gain an advantage over MRIA, that Saint Alphonsus induced MRIA
to change positions, or that Saint Alphonsus benefitted from this position and that it would be
unconscionable to allow it to now assert that the contract is for an indefinite term.
The second document MRIA asks the Court to consider is the minutes of a Saint
Alphonsus Board of Directors meeting on October 11, 1999 at which the board ratified
"extending the term of the MRI partnership agreement to 12/31/23." MRIA contends that this
statement "stands as remarkably clear proof that Saint Alphonsus considered the MRIA
Partnership to have a 'term' that needed to be 'extended.'" (Opposition to Motion for Summary
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Judgment on Claim for Wrongful Disscoiation, 15.) The Court notes that the minutes approved
extension of the "MRI partnership agreement" but not the MRIA or MRI Associates partnership
agreement. The Court does not find this document evidences a clear belief that the contract at
issue was for a definite term such that Saint Alphonsus is changing its position in an attempt to
gain an advantage over MRIA, that Saint Alphonsus induced MRIA to change positions, or that
Saint Alphonsus benefitted from this position and that it would be unconscionable to allow it to
now assert that the contract is for an indefinite term.
Saint Alphonsus also seeks summary judgment dismissing MRIA's claim for wrongful
dissociation becuase MRIA's evidence fails to establish any damages caused by the dissociation,
arguing that the Idaho Supreme Court held that the only measure of damages put forth by MRIA
is not valid. MRIA counters that the purchase price damages are not the only damages in the
record, but instead there are two expert reports which contain significant support for a lostprofits theory. Although the Court has granted Saint Alphonsus' motion for summary judgment
dismissing the wrongful dissociation claim, the Court will nonetheless address the second
portion of the motion. The Supreme Court held that "MRIA's alternative measure of damages,"
the sum Saint Alphonsus would have had to pay to purchase MRI Center, was not an allowable
measure of damages on any of the alleged causes of action because this contract was not a
contract to purchase MRI Center. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP,
148 Idaho 479, _, 224 P.3d 1068, 1087 (2009). The Supreme Court also held that evidence of
MRI Center's lost profits beyond December 31, 2015 was not admissible because the term of
that limited partnership had not been extended beyond that date, but the Supreme Court stated it
addressed the issue because MRIA's damages could include its portion of the lost income of
MRI Center before that expiration. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc at 1086. In light of the
Supreme Court's holding that the alternative measure of damages was not appropriate but that
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the lost profits measure of damages could not extend beyond the terms of the limited partnership,
the Court does not find that the Supreme Court held there was no measure of damages available
to MRIA. Saint Alphonsus' motion for summary judgment on the insufficiency of evidence of
damages supporting the wrongful dissociation in a contract for a definite term is DENIED.
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE CIVIL CONSPIRACY CLAIM

Saint Alphonsus seeks an order dismissing MRIA's cause of action for civil conspiracy.
Saint Alphonsus raises three arguments in support of its motion for judgment on the pleadings on
this cause of action. First, Saint Alphonsus contends that the allegations of conspiracy to commit
misappropriation and defamation fail as a matter of law because MRIA's misappropriation and
defamation claims have been dismissed with prejudice. Second, Saint Alphonsus asserts that
where a complaint separately sets out a cause of action, a claim for civil conspiracy is redundant
and duplicative. Finally, Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA may not allege conspiracy to
wrongfully withdraw because the Idaho Supreme Court held that Saint Aphonsus did not
wrongfully dissociate.
MRIA contends that this motion for judgment on the civil conspiracy claim is precluded
because it was made by Saint Alphonsus, prior to the first trial, denied by the trial court, and then
not appealed by Saint Alphonsus. It is accurate that Saint Alphonsus previously moved for
judgment on the civil conspiracy claim and that Saint Alphonsus did not appeal that denial. In its
prior motion, Saint Alphonsus argued that the civil conspiracy claim should be dismissed
because it was barred by the four year statute of limitations, because there was no evidence in the
record to support such a claim, because there was no evidence of any damages caused by the
alleged conspiracy, and because it was redundant in the face of the third party defendants having
been dismissed. Saint Alphonsus' current motion argues redundancy by duplication and that the
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claims should be dismissed because some of the underlying claims have been dismissed with
prejudice. The Court does not find the two motions for judgment to be the same motion,
therefore Saint Alphonsus' motion for judgment on the civil conspiracy claim is not precluded.
MRIA's misappropriation and defamation claims were dismissed with prejudice. Because
under Idaho law no conspiracy claim can exist where the underlying claim does not exist or
cannot be shown, Saint Alphonsus contends that no civil conspiracy claim can stand where the
underlying substantive claims have been dismissed. Saint Alphonsus also argues Center and
Mobile are equally bound by this voluntary dismissal because they were in privity with MRIA
and because the dismissal was expressly made by MRIA on their behalf. MRIA contends that
although it dismissed its claims for misappropriation and defamation, no part of its civil
conspiracy claim needs to be dismissed because this behavior is only part of the wrongful
conduct that makes up MRIA's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and its
other tort claims. Whether a civil conspiracy claim fails where some but not all of the underlying
tort claims have been dismissed appears to be a matter of first impression in Idaho.
"A civil conspiracy that gives rise to legal remedies exists only if there is an agreement
between two or more to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in
an unlawful manner." McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003). There
must be specific evidence of a plan or agreement to demonstrate the existence of the conspiracy
at the time the allegedly unlawful objective was accomplished. Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927,
935, 155 P.3d 1166, l174 (2007). It has been held that where liability for the underlying tort has
been dismissed, there can be no claim for civil conspiracy. See Rogers v. Dallas Morning News,
Inc., 889 S.W.2d 467 (Rex. App. Dallas 1994) (holding that a civil conspiracy to commit libel

claim was properly dismissed on summary judgment where the underlying libel claim was
dismissed on summary judgment for truth); Kelly v. Diocese of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 88
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(Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1992) (holding that a civil conspiracy to commit slander was properly
dismissed where a directed verdict was granted to the opposing party on the underlying slander
claim. It has also been held that civil conspiracy is not an independent, stand alone cause of
action but is only a derivative claim. McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P .3d 317, 321
(2003) ("Civil conspiracy is not, by itself, a claim for relief.") (citing Argonaut Insurance Co. v.
White, 86 Idaho 374, 379, 386 P.2d 964, 966 (1963)).
In support of its contention that the civil conspiracy claim as to misappropriation and

defamation must be dismissed because the underlying tort claims were dismissed, Saint
Alphonsus cites McPheters v. Maile, Mannos v. Moss, and several umeported Federal District
Court of Idaho opinions. In McPheters, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
dismissal of a claim for civil conspiracy because the underlying tort claim was negligence,
holding that there must be an agreement between two or more people to "accomplish an unlawful
objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in an unlawful manner." 138 Idaho at 395, 64 P.3d
at 321. Negligence "denotes culpable carelessness." Black's Law Dictionary 1061 (8th ed. 2004).
Inherent in the Court's decision to dismiss the civil conspiracy claim in McPheters is a finding
that one cannot agree to be careless. Such an advance intention to be careless would be indicative
of an intentional tort. That the Idaho Supreme Court held that the elements of negligence were
not met and as a result the civil conspiracy claim was properly dismissed does not require a
dismissal of the civil conspiracy claim in the case at hand where negligence is not a cause of
action.
In Mannos v Moss, the plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim was based on the defendants'
purported attempts to defraud him. Mannos, 143 Idaho at 934, 155 P.3d at 1173. The district
court then dismissed the civil conspiracy claim after it dismissed the fraud claim, holding that
"Idaho does not allow an independent cause of action for civil conspiracy." !d. at 934-35, 155
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS AND
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Page 14

000564

. ,..

',..

P.3d at 1173-74. Although the Idaho Supreme Court noted the trial court's reasoning for the
dismissal of the civil conspiracy claim, the Supreme Court did not affirm the dismissal based on
that reasoning. Instead, the Supreme Court held that because "an agreement is the foundation of
a conspiracy charge and there must be some showing of specific evidence of a plan or agreement
to defraud to demonstrate the pendency of the conspiracy at the time the alleged fraud occurred,"
the plaintiffs failure to offer any specific evidence regarding an alleged agreement or plan was
fatal to his civil conspiracy claim. Id. at 935, 155 P.3d at 1174. The Supreme Court stated, "As a
result, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on this charge." Id. The
argument that the record does not contain evidence of such an agreement has previously been
rejected by the trial court in this matter on Saint Alphonsus' earlier motion for judgment on the
civil conspiracy claim. The holding in Mannos does not require dismissal of the civil conspiracy
claim in the instant case.
In the unreported case MA. Deately Construction v. City of Lewiston, the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho dismissed a state civil conspiracy claim for failure to
plead the cause of action with particularity and alternatively because the relief available for a
civil conspiracy claim was identical to the relief available under the statutory claim. 2006 WL
980730 (D.Idaho *1) ("When relief is provided pursuant to a statute, there is no reason to allow
an additional tort that offers the same remedy."). Deately Construction is distinguishable from
the case at hand in that Saint Alphonsus has not claimed the civil conspiracy claim was not pled
with particularity and in that MRIA is not making any claims under Idaho's competitive bidding
statutes.
In the unreported federal case Fibertection v. Jensen, the plaintiffs brought two categories
of claims: the interference claims of interference with contractual relationship and interference
with prospective economic advantage and claims based on the Code of Federal Regulations.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS AND
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Page 15

000565

-' ··.·
2008 WL 5384552 (D. Idaho *3-*5). The Court dismissed the interference claims holding that
the plaintiff had failed to meet its burden on summary judgment "by offering nothing more than
speculation and unreasonable inferences." Id. at *4. Next, the Court held that no private right of
action to enforce the particular regulations had been established by Congress and therefore no
cause of action based on those regulations was available to the plaintiff. Id. at *5. Having held
that there was no basis for any of the underlying claims brought by the plaintiff, the Court
dismissed the plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim. !d.
MRIA does not bring a mirror civil conspiracy claim for each underlying tort cause of
action, but brings one blanket civil conspiracy claim alleging multiple behaviors as part of an
overall scheme. Although MRIA has dismissed two of its tort claims, there are remaining tort
claims on which the civil conspiracy claim is based. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, there are allegations of behaviors from which a reasonable
jury could find the existence of a civil conspiracy. Saint Alphonsus' motion to dismiss the civil
conspiracy claim because two tort claims have been dismissed with prejudice is DENIED.
Saint Alphonsus argues that the claim for civil conspiracy is duplicative of the underlying
tort claims and must be dismissed as redundant because a party is not permitted to assert
identical claims twice. MRIA responds that Saint Alphonsus misconstrues the law of conspiracy
because first it argues that the claim must be dismissed if there is no underlying cause of action
and then argues that the claim must be dismissed if there is an underlying cause of action. The
Court agrees with MRIA that such an interpretation would mean no claimant could ever bring a
civil conspiracy claim in Idaho. Saint Alphonsus fails to cite and the Court has not found a single
Idaho case holding that civil conspiracy is not a cause of action in Idaho. If the Idaho Appellate
Courts had intended to eliminate the civil conspiracy cause of action, they could have done so in

Argonaut Insurance Co. v. White, 86 Idaho 374, 386 P.2d 964 (1963); McPheters v. Maile, 138
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Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003) ("Civil conspiracy is not, by itself, a claim for relief.")
(emphasis added); Cunningham v. Jensen, 2004 WL 2034988 (Ct. App. 2004) ( "Civil
conspiracy is not an independent tort but rather is a derivative tort that relies on an underlying
actionable wrong.") (opinion withdrawn on granting of motion to dismiss appeal); Mannos v.
Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 935, 155 P.3d 1166, 1174 (2007); or Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v
Ernest, No. 35732, _Idaho_,_ P.3d _, 2010 WL 2927078 (July 28, 2010). While each of

those cases admittedly dismisses the civil conspiracy cause of action, the Idaho Supreme Court
has not gone so far as to hold that no such cause of action exists nor that it cannot be asserted
where an underlying claim has been asserted. Saint Alphonsus' motion to dismiss the civil
conspiracy claim as redundant is DENIED.
Finally, Saint Alphonsus contends that the civil conspiracy claim must be dismissed
because the Supreme Court held that Saint Alphonsus did not wrongfully dissociate. The
Supreme Court held that Saint Alphonsus did not withdraw in breach of an express provision of
the partnership agreement. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148
Idaho 479, _, 224 P.3d 1068, 1077-78 (2009). However, the Supreme Court did not consider
the issue of whether the dissociation was wrongful because it occurred prior to the expiration of a
definite term. Above, the Court found that the Partnership Agreement did not have a definite
term. MRIA does not bring a mirror civil conspiracy claim for each underlying tort cause of
action, but brings one blanket civil conspiracy claim alleging multiple behaviors as part of an
overall scheme. Although the Court has dismissed the wrongful dissociation claim, there are
remaining tort claims on which the civil conspiracy claim is based. Therefore, the Court will not
dismiss MRIA's civil conspiracy claim. However, MRIA may not base its claim for civil
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conspiracy on the wrongful dissociation claim. 3 Saint Alphonsus' motion to dismiss the civil
conspiracy claim because the Supreme Court held that Saint Alphonsus did not wrongfully
dissociate is DENIED.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LEGAL INSUFFICIENCY OF
MRIA's EVIDENCE OF LOST PROFITS
On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, Saint Alphonsus argued that the damage award
must be vacated because there was insufficient evidence to support the award of lost profits.
Rather than vacating the damage award, the Idaho Supreme Court instructed this Court to
consider the concerns expressed in Pope v. Intermountain Gas, 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988
(1982).
Saint Alphonsus contends that Pope stands for the proposition that a claimant must
present evidence distinguishing between the portion of business lost as a result of a competitor's
misconduct and the portion lost as a result of other factors. Saint Alphonsus further contends that
the Supreme Court held that MRIA relies on expert testimony which "assumes" without any
evidence that Saint Alphonsus' alleged misconduct caused all of the cited business migration.
Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA's damage experts have made no effort to conduct an analysis
as to what percentage of the lost scans would have been lost solely due to IMI's entry into the
market and that there is no evidence in the record from which MRIA could conduct such an
analysis. Therefore Saint Alphonsus claims the evidence that MRIA has put forth in its claim for
lost profits is legally insufficient and all claims for lost profits must be dismissed.
MRIA's asserts that its damage calculation does not suffer from the problems in Pope.
MRIA argues that its damage calculation takes into account that had IMI opened without Saint

3

Recognizing that three of the claims underlying the single civil conspiracy claim have been dismissed, the Court
anticipates the filing of motions in limine to determine evidentiary issues.
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Alphonsus' assistance it would have won some of the market. MRIA contends that its damage
analysis also accounts for other market factors, including competition from other sources. MRIA
argues that it does not seek all of IMI's profits, but only the scans which migrated to IMI from
physicians who had historically been MRIA's customers, scans for the usurped Meridian
opportunity, and scans from the IMI machine placed on Saint Alphonsus' campus. MRIA states
that doctors who did not have privileges at Saint Alphonsus or who had privileges at more than
one facility were not included in the damage calculation and that scans lost to competitors other
than IMI were not included in the damage calculation. Because MRIA was the sole supplier of
MRis on the Saint Alphonsus campus prior to Saint Alphonsus' assistance to IMI, MRIA
contends that all of the IMI scans on Saint Alphonsus' campus were properly included. Finally,
MRIA argues that unlike the claimant in Pope, it did not attempt to calculate its losses as IMI's
gams.
In Pope, the Idaho Supreme Court was concerned that there was no evidence in the

record to support the fact finder's findings and that the award of damages was the result of mere
speculation and guesswork. Pope, 103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005. The Court held "there
must be a reasonable foundation established by the evidence from which the fact finder can
calculate the amount of damages." ld.
It is MRIA's position that without the actions of Saint Alphonsus, IMI would not have

gotten these specific referrals, would not have gotten funding, would not have had a scanner at
Saint Alphonsus' campus, and would not have been in a position to open the IMI Meridian
facility. The inclusion of scans which migrated to IMI from physicians who had historically been
MRIA's customers, scans for the usurped Meridian opportunity, and scans from the IMI machine
placed on Saint Alphonsus' campus is consistent with its claims. In the instant case, the Court
finds the expert evidence takes into account other competitors and provides a historical view.
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Further, the Court finds that the damage estimate does not merely presume that its damage due to
lost profits is equivalent to IMI's profits, but instead distinguishes scans which may have been
lost for other reasons. All experts make some assumptions. Saint Alphonsus had the opportunity
and took the opportunity to cross examine regarding those assumptions. The Court finds the
damage calculation of lost profits is supported by a reasonable foundation from which a
reasonable jury could calculate the amount of damages. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, the Court finds the evidence satisfies the Pope concerns.
Saint Alphonsus' motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss each of MRIA's causes of
action that relies on lost profits as a measure of damages is DENIED.
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS

The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the damage award holding that a limited partnership is
an entity distinct from its partners and although MRIA has the general power to join the limited
partnerships in the suit, MRIA had not actually done so. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.
v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,

, 224 P.3d 1068, 1086 (2009). At the oral argument on

MRIA's motion to file a second amended counterclaim, MRIA argued in the alternative to add
Center and Mobile as claimants pursuant to Rule 17(a) if the Court found that MRIA was not
able to bring the claims on their behalf. (Tr., Vol. I, p.275). The trial court specifically found that
MRIA could pursue claims on behalf of the limited partnerships under the limited partnership
agreements.
[T[he Court will find that MRIA is able to assert claims on behalf of MRICI and
MRIM. Generally, general partners may have the authority to bind a limited
partnership for actions taken within the ordinary course of business. The
partnership agreements of MRICI and MRIM adopt this rationale and state the
general partner [MRIA] "is vested with all authority and responsibility necessary
for the management of the Partnership and its business."
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(Memorandum Decision on MRI Associates' Motion to Amend the Counterclaim and Third
Party Complaint to Seek Punitive Damages and to File a Second Amended Counterclaim and
First Amended Third-Party Complaint; Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike References to
Privileged Documents and Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Professor Douglas M.
Branson, 28-29.)
In seeking judgment on the pleadings dismissing the claims of the limited partnerships,

Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA should have joined the two limited partnerships before the
trial of this matter rather than waiting until after the appeal. Saint Alphonsus contends that all of
the applicable statutes of limitations have passed and that there is no rule of civil procedure
which allows these claims to relate back. MRIA argues that it would have joined the limited
partnerships but for the ruling of the trial court which made joinder of the limited partnerships
unnecessary. MRIA also contends that the limited partnerships are real parties in interest, that the
limited partnerships are third party beneficiaries of the Partnership Agreement, and that policy
considerations require the joinder of the limited partnerships.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) controls relation back of amendments to pleadings. It
states:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back
if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for
commencing the action against the party, the party to be brought in by amendment
(1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not
be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the
action would have been brought against the party. The relation back of an
amendment joining or substituting a real party in interest shall be as provided in
Rule 17(a). The delivery or mailing of process to the Idaho attorney general or
designee of the attorney general, or an agency or officer who would have been a
proper defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof
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with respect to the state of Idaho or any agency or officer thereof to be brought
into the action as a defendant.
The parties agree that pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 17(a) controls the relation back ofthe claims of the Second Amended Counterclaim. It
provides:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An
executor, administrator, personal representative, guardian, conservator, bailee,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has
been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in
this capacity without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought; and
when a statute of the state of Idaho so provides, an action for the use or benefit of
another shall be brought in the name of the state of Idaho. No action shall be
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of
commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in
interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as
if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
Saint Alphonsus asserts that Rule 17(a) permits relation back for real parties in interest
only where there was an inadvertent and understandable factual mistake in identifying the proper
claimant because the identification of that claimant was difficult and that even under those
circumstances, Rule 17(a) only allows such relation back where the time between the original
pleading and the amendment was "reasonable." It is Saint Alphonsus position that since this case
was filed in 2004, has proceeded to trial and has been appealed, the delay in seeking this
amendment can in no way be considered reasonable, particularly in light of the fact that the
parties have previously argued whether the limited partnerships should be joined as parties to the
litigation.
Saint Alphonsus contends that the Idaho Supreme Court "has provided clear guideposts
limiting application of the relation-back doctrine to claims by a party newly added to a case."
(Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Judgment on the Claims of the
Limited Partnerships, 10.) First, the new party must be a real party in interest, i.e. the entity "who
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will be entitled to the benefits of the action if successful." St. Luke's Regional Medical Center,
Ltd. v. Board of Commissioners, 146 Idaho 753, 757, 203 P.3d 683, 687 (2009). Second, citing
Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 272-73 n.1, 723 P.2d 814, 816-17 n.1 (1986), Saint

Alphonsus argues that Rule 17(a) and Rule 15(c) "permit relation back only where someone
other than the original party is entitled to the benefits of the causes of action asserted-i.e., 'if
[the] suit was originally brought in the name of the wrong party, and later the proper party
plaintiff was substituted in the action."' In Chacon, a plaintiff used fictitious names for certain
defendants pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a)(4), intending to amend his complaint
when the true identities ofthose defendants became known. Chacon at 271, 723 P.2d at 815. The
injury occurred on August 1, 1981 and the complaint was filed on July 28, 1983, near the end of
the applicable statute of limitations. Id. The plaintiff determined the true identity of the
defendants in April of 1984, amended his complaint on June 4, 1984, and served the new
defendants on June 14, 1984. Id. The defendants sought to dismiss the amended complaint,
arguing that the statute of limitations had passed. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether the notice requirement of
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) permitted relation back of the claim in the absence of notice
to those defendants within the applicable statute oflimitation. Id. at 272-74, 723 P.2d at 816-18.
The Court notes that Chacon did not involve a ruling on relation back of amendments to
pleadings involving additional claimants, but rather the language quoted by Saint Alphonsus
comes from an example in a parenthetical in a comment to the 1975 amendments to the Idaho
rules quoted in a footnote to show that the Idaho Supreme Court was aware "[t]he scope and
conditions of the relations back of amendments has always been one of considerable difficulty,
particularly where it involves the statutes of limitation" as shown by the language the Idaho
Supreme Court chose to emphasize. The Court does not find that the use of this parenthetical
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example in a footnote is a "clear guidepost limiting application of the relation-back doctrine"
only where someone other than the original party is entitled to the benefits of the causes of action
asserted, but instead the Court finds that the language is an example of one such time that an
amendment may relate back.
"Liberal construction should be given to [Rule 17(a)] and courts should 'further the
policy favoring the just resolution of actions-providing litigants their day in court."' Hayward
v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 33 P.3d 816 (2001) (quoting Conda Partnership, Inc.
v. MD. Construction Co., Inc., 115 Idaho 902, 904, 771 P.2d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 1989). The

Idaho Supreme Court has also adopted the considerations regarding Rule 17(a) joinders
established by the Court of Appeals in Conda consisting of the good faith of the claimant and the
prejudice to the defendant. Hayward at 348-49, 33 P.3d at 822-23. Thus, in order for a claim to
relate back under Rule 17(a), the claimant must be a real party in interest, the claimant must have
proceeded in good faith, and any prejudice to the defendant must be considered.
"A real party in interest 'is the person who will be entitled to the benefits of the action if
successful, one who is actually and substantially interested in the subject matter."' St. Luke's
Regional Medical Center, Ltd. v. Board of Commissioners, 146 Idaho 753, 757, 203 P.3d 683,

687 (2009) (quoting Carrington v. Crandall, 63 Idaho 651, 658, 124 P.2d 914, 917 (1942)). Saint
Alphonsus argues that the limited partnerships could not have been real parties in interest to the
original counterclaim or the amended counterclaim as all of the causes of action in those
counterclaims were brought solely in the name of MRIA for breaches of duties owed to MRIA.
Saint Alphonsus concedes that the limited partnerships are arguably real parties in interest to the
Second Amended Counterclaim because that was the first time that MRIA attempted to seek
damages "on behalf of' the limited partnerships. MRIA contends that the limited partnerships are
clearly real parties in interest to the Third Amended Counterclaim, in which they seek damages
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as third party beneficiaries of the Partnership Agreement and for direct damages for duties owed
to them by Saint Alphonsus. MRIA further asserts that the limited partnerships have been present
in this litigation since the filing of the original Counterclaim which stated:
MRI Associates, LLP is an Idaho limited liability partnership ("MRIA") which
has acted as a general partner with management responsibilities for two
operational entities, MRI Limited Partnerships known as MRI Center of Idaho
("MRICI") and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership known as MRI Mobile. Unless
otherwise referenced, the designation "MRIA" shall refer to all three entities"
MRIA, MRICI and MRI Mobile.
The Court finds that it has been clear since early in this litigation that MRIA has
attempted to act in accordance with the limited partnership agreements by bringing a claim as the
general partner and by seeking damages experienced by the limited partnerships. As the entities
in direct competition with IMI, whose business was affected by the alleged actions of Saint
Alphonsus, and whose existence is the very purpose of the MRIA Partnership Agreement, the
Court finds that the limited partnerships are real parties in interest to this action and have been
contemplated by this litigation since its inception.
MRIA argues that it acted in good faith when it filed its Second Amended Counterclaim
on behalf of the limited partnerships rather than joining the limited partnerships as parties
because it believed it had the power to manage the limited partnerships and bind them to actions
pursuant to the limited partnership agreements. Further, MRIA contends that it relied on the
holding of the trial court that MRIA had the authority to bring this suit on behalf of the limited
partnerships and that such reliance on the order of the trial court was reasonable given the
language of Rule 17(a) and the language of the limited partnership agreements. "[A] party with
whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party
authorized by statute may sue in this capacity without joining the party for whose benefit the
action is brought." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)( emphasis added). This was not a claim
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where the complaint was filed and then a suitable plaintiff was found. Based upon the language
of Rule 17(a), the language of the limited partnership agreements, and MRIA's motion in the
alternative to join the limited partnerships, the Court finds that MRIA's reliance on the trial
court's order granting the motion for leave to file the Second Amended Counterclaim holding
that MRIA had the authority to bring these claims on behalf of the limited partnerships was
reasonable and that MRIA was acting in good faith.
Saint Alphonsus argues that it would be prejudiced by the joinder of the limited
partnerships in that new fact discovery "may" have to be completed to address the claims of the
limited partnerships as third party beneficiaries of the MRIA Partnership Agreement and by the
cost of a new increasingly complex trial. Saint Alphonsus has not established that discovery will
have to be reopened or even given the Court an estimate of what sort of discovery would be
required at what costs and what length. Instead it relies on the vague assertion that it would be
prejudiced because discovery "may" have to be reopened. The Court does not find this
ambiguous assertion of potential discovery to be prejudicial to Saint Alphonsus. Additionally,
the Court finds that the cost of a new trial is a calculation that a party makes when it decides
whether to file an appeal. Here, Saint Alphonsus argued in its appeal that the damages to MRIA
could not include the damages to the limited partnerships. Therefore, Saint Alphonsus must have
had some idea what the damages MRIA alone must have sustained. The Court does not find
Saint Alphonsus' argument that it will be prejudiced by the cost of breaking down damages by
party based upon its own argument for the new trial it sought is sufficient prejudice to overcome
the policy of resolving disputes on the merits.
However, Saint Alphonsus cites Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 867 P.2d 960 (1994),
in support of its contentions that 1) there is no relation back in the absence of "an 'inadvertent'
and 'understandable' 'factual mistake"' and 2) the joinder of a claimant after an appeal and after
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the statute of limitations has run is "unreasonable." (Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support
of Its Motion for Judgment on the Claims of the Limited Partnerships, 11.) Mr. Tingley was
injured fighting a fire and filed a personal injury suit against the mill where the fire had occurred.
Tingley at 88, 867 P.2d at 962. Tingley hired attorneys Harrison and Herndon to represent him in

personal injury suit. !d. Two years into that litigation, the claim was dismissed pursuant to Rule
41 for failure to prosecute. !d. Tingley learned his claim had been dismissed two years after it
was dismissed. !d. Then Tingley filed for bankruptcy protection and listed the possible
malpractice claim against the attorneys as an asset. !d. After filing bankruptcy, Tingley filed a
malpractice claim, four years after the dismissal of the personal injury claim, which was outside
of the extended discovery statute of limitations for fraudulent concealment, but within the
applicable statute of limitations if the federal law applicable to Bankruptcy trustees had applied.
!d. at 91, 867 P.2d at 965. More than a year after the malpractice suit was filed, the Bankruptcy
Trustee filed a ratification agreement allowing Tingley to file the suit in his name, but stating
that the claim belonged to the estate. !d. The attorneys, Harrison and Herndon, sought to dismiss
the malpractice suit as barred by the statute of limitations, but Tingley and the Trustee argued
that federal law allowed the case to be filed past the statute of limitations and that the attorneys
fraudulently concealed the dismissal. !d. Also relevant is that in their answer, Harrison and
Herndon raised the defense that Tingley was not the real party in interest. !d. The Idaho Supreme
Court held that Rule 17(a) did not allow relation back in that case because 1) Tingley had been
made aware he was not the real party in interest on August 10, 1987 but no effort was made to
join the proper party for a full year; 2) Rule 17(a) only allows retroactive ratification where there
was a mistake in naming the original party; and 3) Rule 17(a) only applies when the original
complaint is not time barred. !d. at 91-92, 867 P .2d at 965-66.
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In the case at hand, Saint Alphonsus argues that there was no mistake in MRIA's failure
to join the limited partnerships because Saint Alphonsus argued that the limited partnerships
needed to be joined in late 2006 and early 2007. Saint Alphonsus alleges that MRIA made a
calculated decision not to join the limited partnerships in order to protect the assets of the limited
partnerships in the event that Saint Alphonsus were to prevail. Saint Alphonsus further contends
that the three years between that argument and the motion for leave to file the Third Amended
Counterclaim is patently unreasonable, given MRIA's notice that the limited partnerships should
be joined as parties.
As the Court found above, MRIA's reliance on the ruling of the trial court in not joining
the limited partnerships as parties was reasonable. When MRIA argued its motion to file its
Second Amended Counterclaim, it sought in the alternative to add Center and Mobile as
claimants if the Court found that MRIA was not able to bring the claims on their behalf. The trial
court specifically found that MRIA could pursue claims on behalf of the limited partnerships
under the limited partnership agreements. The Second Amended Counterclaim was filed in
accordance with the trial court's findings and before the applicable statutes of limitations ran.
Under the UPL which was in effect at the time the parties entered into the Partnership
Agreement, "a partnership was not a legal entity distinct from its partners." St. Alphonsus v.
MRIA, 148 Idaho 479, _, 224 P.3d 1068, 1074 (2010) (citing Swope v. Swope, 112 Idaho 974,
739 P.2d 273 (1987)). Also, Rule 17(a) itself allows contract claims of"a party with whom or in
whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another" to be brought without joining
that party. Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that it was a reasonable mistake (if it can
truly be called a "mistake" given the trial court's order) not to join the limited partnerships prior
to this point in the litigation.
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Finally, Saint Alphonsus argues that the time delay between the filing of the motion for
leave to file the Second Amended Counterclaim and the filing of the Third Amended
Counterclaim finally adding the limited partnerships as parties is patently unreasonable. In light
of the trial court's ruling that MRIA could bring the claims on behalf of the limited partnerships,
the length of the trial, and the length of the appellate process, the Court does not find that the
amount of time to correct the mistake is unreasonable.
The Court finds that the limited partnerships are real parties in interest; that MRIA acted
in good faith when it filed the Second Amended Complaint instead of joining the limited
partnerships as counterclaimants; and that Saint Alphonsus is not prejudiced by the relation back
of these counterclaims. Further, the Court finds that MRIA's failure to join the limited
partnerships at the time of filing the Second Amended Counterclaim was a reasonable mistake
and that the time to correct the mistake was not unreasonable given the length of the trial and
appellate process. Saint Alphonsus' motion for judgment on the pleadings dismissing the claims
of the limited partnerships is DENIED.
CONCLUSION

Saint Alphonsus' motion for judgment on the pleadings dismissing the claims of the
limited partnerships is DENIED. Saint Alphonsus' motion for partial summary judgment that as
a matter of law the contract was for an indefinite term is GRANTED. Saint Alphonsus' motion
for summary judgment on the insufficiency of evidence of damages supporting the wrongful
dissociation in a contract for a definite term is DENIED. Saint Alphonsus' motion to dismiss the
civil conspiracy claim because two tort claims have been dismissed with prejudice is DENIED.
Saint Alphonsus' motion to dismiss the civil conspiracy claim as redundant is DENIED. Saint
Alphonsus' motion to dismiss the civil conspiracy claim because the Supreme Court held that
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Saint Alphonsus did not wrongfully dissociate is DENIED. Saint Alphonsus' motion for
summary judgment seeking to dismiss each ofMRIA's causes of action that relies on lost profits
as a measure of damages is DENIED. Saint Alphonsus' motion for judgment on the pleadings
dismissing the claims of the limited partnerships is DENIED.

SO ORDERED AND DATED THIS 16"ta;,ofNovember2010.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRl LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
COME NOW, Plaintiff/Counter-defendants, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively "Saint Alphonsus"), by and through their
attorneys of record, Gjording & Fouser, PLLC and Jones Day, and submit this Motion to Reopen
Fact and Expert Discovery Regarding Damages and Set a Discovery Schedule pursuant to Rule
16 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
On May 7, 2010, at a status conference before this Court, the parties agreed to postpone
the entry of a scheduling order, including dates for additional discovery, pending the Court's
disposition of various motions to be filed regarding the issues left undecided by the Supreme
Court's October 21, 2009 decision remanding this case for retrial. See 517110 Tr., p. 14-15. On
November 17, 2010, this Court resolved those motions.
On November 30, 2010, undersigned counsel sent a letter to counsel for MRIA,
proposing a schedule for fact and expert discovery regarding damages, in light of the Court's
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resolution of the motions. MRIA's counsel responded by voicemail that, due to an intervening
trial, he would not be available to discuss the matter until January 2011. On December 21, 2010,
undersigned counsel received a further voicemail from MRIA's counsel stating that his trial had
been concluded, and that MRIA will oppose any reopening of expert discovery or submission of
new expert reports. Being unable to reach counsel for MRIA on the telephone, undersigned
counsel left a voice mail with counsel on December 23, 2010, advising this motion would be
filed.
Damages discovery should be reopened because the Supreme Court's decision and this
Court's recent rulings on motions have, in several significant respects, significantly altered the
circumstances relevant to any assessment of damages. New expert reports and depositions of the
parties' expert witnesses are needed to evaluate the effect of these changed circumstances on
MRIA's damages claims. Additional fact discovery limited to damages might also become
necessary in connection therewith. In view of the September 5, 2011 trial date, there is a need to
resolve this disputed matter promptly.
First, this Court's resolution of the motion for summary judgment as to wrongful
dissociation undercuts a key premise of MRIA's claim for lost profits. Specifically, both of
MRIA's expert witnesses, Bruce Budge and Charles Wilhoite, expressly premised their estimates
of lost profits on Judge McLaughlin's opinion that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated
from MRIA in 2004. See Budge Rep. at 10 (Ex. A); Wilhoite Rep. at 2 (Ex. B). Since that time,
however, the Supreme Court reversed Judge McLaughlin's ruling that Saint Alphonsus
wrongfully dissociated in breach of an express term of the partnership agreement, see Saint
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Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., 148 Idaho 479, 488-89 (2009), and this Court
held that Saint Alphonsus did not dissociate in breach of a definite term in the partnership
agreement, see Nov. 17, 2010 Op. at 6-11. Saint Alphonsus therefore had "a statutory right to
dissociate without liability from" MRIA. Nov. 17,2010 Op. at 6.
Given this fundamental change to one of the foundations of MRIA' s claim for damages,
Saint Alphonsus needs to depose Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite regarding their no-longer-valid
assumption that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated from the MRIA partnership. Likewise,
Saint Alphonsus intends to designate its own expert witness to address how Saint Alphonsus's
lawful dissociation from MRIA in 2004 limits the damages allegedly suffered by MRIA.
Second, modification of the parties' damages analyses is also necessitated by the
Supreme Court's ruling that MRIA cannot recover damages "on behalf of'' Center and Mobile,
MRIA's subsequent joinder of Center and Mobile as named counter-claimants, and this Court's
ruling that Center and Mobile may assert claims on their own behalf. In connection with the first
trial, MRIA and its experts did not distinguish between these three entities in calculating
damages. Now that each entity is a separate party asserting claims in its own right, however, it is
incumbent upon MRIA to do so. Saint Alphonsus therefore needs to depose Mr. Budge and Mr.
Wilhoite to determine how the claimed damages are allocated among MRIA, Center, and
Mobile.

Saint Alphonsus likewise intends to designate an expert witness to opine on the

apportionment of damages among these three entities.
In sum, the changed landscape of this case on remand requires that damages discovery be
reopened and, in particular, that the parties be given the opportunity to serve new expert
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disclosures and depose each other's designated experts. In light of the September 5, 2011 trial
date, Saint Alphonsus proposes the following schedule for such discovery:
•

MRIA shall serve its expert reports on damages by April 1, 2011.

•

Saint Alphonsus shall serve its expert reports on damages by May 15, 2011.

•

Both parties shall depose the designated expert witnesses by June 15, 2011.

•

Both parties may serve additional fact discovery limited to the subject of
damages. All such discovery must be completed by July 15, 2011.

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
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Christian G. Vergonis
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51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
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MOTION TO SET A SCHEDULING
ORDER

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
COME NOW, Plaintiff/Counter-defendants, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively "Saint Alphonsus"), by and through their
attorneys of record, Gjording & Fouser, PLLC and Jones Day, and submit this Proposed
Scheduling Order, which Saint Alphonsus proposes be entered in conjunction with the Court's
resolution of Saint Alphonsus's December 23,2010 Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert
Discovery Regarding Damages and Set a Discovery Schedule.
The proposed scheduling order recognizes this Court's earlier setting of a trial date
commencing September 6, 2011, and ending October 14, 2011. In addition to those trial dates,
Saint Alphonsus proposes the following:
DISCOVERY

•

MRIA shall serve its expert reports on damages by April 1, 2011.

•

Saint Alphonsus shall serve its expert reports on damages by May 15,2011.

MOTION TO SET A SCHEDULING ORDER, P. 2

000588

.

'

•

Both parties shall depose the designated expert witnesses by June 15, 2011.

•

Both parties may serve additional fact discovery limited to the subject of
damages. All such discovery must be completed by June 15, 2011. 1

MOTIONS
•

All Motions for Summary Judgment shall be heard by August 1, 2011. Notice
and briefing shall comply with Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

•

All other pre-trial motions, including Motions in Limine, shall be heard by August
8, 2011. Notice and briefing shall comply with Rule 7(b)(3) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure and Local Rule 8.1. Provided, however, that Motions in Limine
may be filed up to and during the trial as appropriate.

PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
•

Counsel for the parties shall appear before the Court on August_, 2011 [2 weeks
before trial] for a final pre-trial conference, including discussion of settlement and
all items set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16.

•

At the pre-trial conference, in addition to the requirements ofl.R.C.P. 16(c), each
party shall be required to serve on the other party and file with the court a
complete list of exhibits and witnesses in accordance with I.R.C.P. 16(h).

•

The parties shall each submit to the Court at the Pre-Trial Conference a pre-trial
memorandum which will include the following:
a. Elements and/or Defenses of the party's case;
b. Contested facts;
c. Contested issues of law;
d. Evidentiary issues;
e. Agreed or stipulated facts; and
f. Memorandum of Points and Authorities on issues of law.

1

Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery Regarding Damages
and Set a Discovery Schedule indicated a July 15,2011 deadline for completion of fact discovery
related to damages; however, this was in error. Saint Alphonsus instead proposes a June 15
deadline for such discovery.
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•

The parties shall submit pre-marked exhibits to the Judge's clerk on the first day
of trial.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
•

Both parties shall submit all requested jury instructions and proposed juror
questionnaires to the Court at the pre-trial conference.

DATED this lOth day of January, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
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Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. CV OC 04082 19D
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO REOPEN
FACT AND EXPERT DISCOVERY
REGARDING DAMAGES

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.
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Defendants/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership ("MRI
Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited ("MRIA Mobile") 1 submit this Opposition to the Motion of
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery
Regarding Damages. This opposition is supported by the Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to
Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery Regarding Damages, and in Opposition to Motion
to Set Scheduling Order (hereinafter "Parker Aff."), filed contemporaneously herewith.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Saint Alphonsus, by its motion, seeks to obtain a new expert and conduct new discovery,
even though the deadlines for disclosing experts and conducting discovery have long since
expired. Saint Alphonsus attempts to justify its request by erroneously claiming that
circumstances have changed since those deadlines expired. The fact, however, is that nothing
has changed justifying new discovery or new experts. Saint Alphonsus simply is seeking an
impermissible mulligan.
As this court is aware, in the previous trial of this matter, the jury awarded a verdict in
favor of MRIA in the amount of $63.5 million? Simply put, one jury has already rejected Saint
Alphonsus's damages analysis and fully adopted the damages analyses presented by MRIA. It is
for this reason that Saint Alphonsus so strenuously seeks new damages discovery and a new
damages expert. As noted above, however, discovery in this matter is long past as it closed on
December 29,2006. 3 MRIA has not changed its experts or the opinions of its experts, who were

1

All Defendants/Counter-claimants will be referred to collectively as "MRIA." MRI Center and
MRI Mobile will be referred to collectively as "the Limited Partnerships."
2
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 484, 224 P.3d
1068, 1073 (2009). The district court reduced the verdict to $36.3 million. !d.
3
Parker Aff., Ex. A (hereinafter "Amended Scheduling Order,"), at p. 4.
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fully deposed and subject to cross-examination at the previous trial of this matter. As such, Saint
Alphonsus has already had ample opportunity to conduct discovery regarding the damages
analysis which will be presented by MRIA. Likewise, Saint Alphonsus already had the
opportunity to retain and disclose a well-qualified damages expert, and indeed, Saint Alphonsus
did disclose such an expert who had (and will have) the opportunity to critique MRIA's damage
theory as well as present Saint Alphonsus's theory of damages. Moreover, as described more
fully below, the posture of this case after remand from the Supreme Court and this Court's
decision on summary judgment have not caused any alteration to the facts or circumstances of
MRIA's damages analysis so as to justify new discovery and experts. Therefore, for these
reasons, which are more fully developed below, there is no basis to reopen discovery.
Consequently, Saint Alphonsus's Motion should be denied.

II.
A.

OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO REOPEN DAMAGES DISCOVERY

The Remand of this Case does Not Necessitate the Reopening of Discovery
Saint Alphonsus seeks to reopen fact and expert discovery regarding damages. The

parties had discussed the possibility of reopening discovery when Saint Alphonsus filed its
recent Motion for Summary Judgment on the sufficiency ofMRIA's evidence oflost profits.
MRIA considered submitting updated expert reports in response to that Motion, but after
consideration, determined that the remand of this case for retrial did not authorize reopening
discovery on damages and that there was no need to change the expert reports. MRIA
determined that its prior damages proof was the proof with which it could and would go to trial,
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and this Court agreed. In short, MRIA has not changed its experts or the opinions of its experts,
who were fully deposed and subject to cross-examination at the previous trial of this matter.
There is nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion that authorizes reopening the case, and
the case was not remanded for the purpose of conducting more discovery. When a case is
reversed and remanded, the case then stands as it did before the erroneous decision, order, or
judgment was entered. Hutchins v. State, 100 Idaho 661, 665, 603 P.2d 995, 999 (1979). As the
Supreme Court reversed the jury's verdict, the present case therefore stands as it did immediately
prior to trial-past the deadlines for discovery, which closed on December 29, 2006. 5 Thus, the
decision to reopen discovery is within the Court's discretion.
The purpose of the discovery rules is to facilitate fair and expedient pretrial fact
gathering. Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873,136 P.3d 338, 344 (2006). The procedures
and techniques of discovery provide means by which litigants may enter upon the trial of a cause
reasonably assured against surprise of unknown or undisclosed facts. R. E. W. Const. Co. v.
District Court ofThird Judicial District, 88 Idaho 426, 442, 400 P.2d 390, 400 (1965). Trial
courts are expected to effectively and actively manage discovery to achieve the purposes of
the discovery rules and to reach a "just, speedy, and inexpensive" determination of the issues.
Edmunds, 142 Idaho at 878, 136 P.3d at 349. In the present case, there is no need to reopen
discovery on the issue of damages because the facts have already been fully developed in

4

As this Court recognized, rather than vacating the damages award, the Idaho Supreme Court
instructed the Court to consider the concerns express in Pope v. Intermountain Gas, 103 Idaho
217, 646 P .2d 988 (1982). (Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for
Judgment on Pleadings and Motions for Summary Judgment, filed Nov. 16, 2010, at p. 18). This
Court agreed that the damage calculation of lost profits was supported by a reasonable
foundation from which a reasonable jury could calculate the amount of damages. (Jd at p. 20).
5
Amended Scheduling Order at p. 4.
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discovery and at the prior trial. To reopen discovery now will needlessly increase the expense of
this matter. 6

B.

The Opinions of MRIA's Damages Experts are Not Premised Upon Dismissed
Claims
1.

The Decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court have Not Changed the
Damages Analysis

Saint Alphonsus first contends that discovery should be reopened because the opinions of
MRIA's expert witnesses, Bruce Budge and Charles Wilhoite, are "expressly premised" on a
finding that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated from MRIA in 2004. 7 As this Court
knows, among MRIA's claims for relief in this case, MRIA brought statutory claims for
wrongful dissociation for (1) breach of an express provision of the Partnership Agreement, Idaho
Code§ 53-3-602(b)(1); and/or (2) withdrawing prior to the expiration of the definite term, I.C. §
52-3-602(b)(2). 8 The Supreme Court found that Saint Alphonsus could not have wrongfully
dissociated by breaching an express provision of the Partnership Agreement. Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care, Inc., 148 Idaho at 488-89,224 P.3d at 1077-78. On Summary Judgment, this

Court held that there was not a definite term to the partnership, and thus that Saint Alphonsus

6

It is notable that this request to reopen discovery and Saint Alphonsus's concomitant motion to
reopen briefing come at the same time Saint Alphonsus also seeks to enforce the award of costs
on appeal, despite Justice Jones's advice that "rather than ... pursing hardball tactics against
MRIA on collection of any cost award that may result from the appeal, S.t. Alphonsus might be
advised to consider withholding collection proceedings pending the ultimate outcome of the
litigation." Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care., Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 224
P.3d 1068, 1092 (Jones, J., specially concurring). The convergence ofthese motions and the
attempt to collect this debt from MRIA, which is already on the verge of insolvency, suggests the
possibility that Saint Alphonsus is attempting to avoid a retrial of this matter by making it too
cost-prohibitive for MRIA to retry.
7
Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery Regarding Damages and Set a Discovery
Schedule, filed Dec. 23, 2010 (hereinafter "Saint Alphonsus Discovery Motion") p. 3).
8
Second Amended Counterclaim, filed March 2, 2007.
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could not have wrongfully dissociated in violation ofldaho Code§ 53-3-602(b)(2), by
withdrawing prior to the end of a definite term. 9
The dismissal of MRIA' s claims for statutory wrongful dissociation has no bearing on the
remaining damage theory in this case. In the first trial, MRIA had two alternative theories of
damages. The first was what Saint Alphonsus called the "purchase price damage theory;" or
what it would have cost Saint Alphonsus to buy out MRIA. 10 That damage theory related solely
to the statutory wrongful dissociation claims. 11 However, because the Supreme Court rejected
that theory of damages, it is no longer at issue in this case. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care,
Inc., 148 Idaho at 498,224 P.3d at 1087.

The second theory of damages, which is the damage theory MRIA will pursue at the
retrial of this matter, and is the theory that this Court has already found legally sufficient, is lost
profits, otherwise known as "lost scan volumes," or the calculation of MRI scans lost to the
competitor which Saint Alphonsus supported, called Intermountain Medical Imaging or "IMI."
The measure of "lost scan volumes" was used at the first trial for all of MRIA' s causes of actions
including the causes of action still remaining at retrial: breach of contract, breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, interference with prospective
contractual relations or business expectations, and civil conspiracy. 12
As Mr. Wilhoite explained:
A: ... [The purchase price damages theory] relates to the notion that
SARMC could have purchased the other party's interest and we would not find
9

Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Motions for Summary Judgment on Pleadings
and Motions for Summary Judgment filed Nov. 16, 2010, at p. 6-11.
10
Parker Aff. at Ex. D (hereinafter "Budge Trial Testimony), at p. p. 2679:22-2682:10; 2724:212725:15.
11
Budge Trial Testimony at p. 2679:14-2680:21; 2727:10-15; Parker Aff. at Ex. G (hereinafter
"Wilhoite Trial Testimony"), at p. 2875:1-4,2891:7-13.
12
Third Amended Counterclaim, filed March 22,2010.
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ourselves sitting here today had they paid what Shattuck Hammond estimated as
the fair market value of all the other partners' interests as of 2001.
So that is separate from forward-looking lost profits that relates, as I
testified to earlier, to historical profit.
Q. Earlier I asked you if you had broken down the damage analysis by
claim, and I believe you responded that you had not; is that correct?
A. Not by specific claim; however, dissociation, as I referenced in the
footnote, could be viewed as a manner of buying your way out of a partnership. 13
Indeed, in its own briefing to this Court in its Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment relating to the evidence of lost profits, Saint Alphonsus itself states that:
MRIA advances two separate theories of damages, including a "purchase price"
theory relating to the claim for wrongful dissociation, and a "lost scans" or
"lost profits" theory that purports to measure the damages caused in
connection will all non-dissociation causes of action - i.e., the claims for breach
of the partnership agreement's non-compete clause, breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, interference with prospective contractual relations,
breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. 14
The now-dismissed wrongful dissociation claims were the only cause of action with a specific
damages theory attached. The damage theory that remains in this case, lost scans, is viable on
any ofMRIA's currently-existing claims. Thus, it is not a new damage theory and the decisions
of the Supreme Court and this Court on the statutory wrongful dissociation claims have not
altered the lost scan volume damages analysis in any way.

2.

Mr. Budge's Opinion is Not Expressly Premised on a Wrongful Dissociation
Claim

Mr. Budge was an expert hired by MRIA to opine about historical damages. This
opinion was based upon a calculation of the number of scans lost to IMI. 15 Saint Alphonsus cites
only to page 10 of Mr. Budge's report in support of its proposition that Mr. Budge "expressly
13

Parker Aff., Ex. F (hereinafter" Wilhoite Depo.") at p. 153:19-154:10.
Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment Based on
the Legal Insufficiency of MRIA's Evidence of Lost Profits, filed August 6, 2010 (hereinafter
"Saint Alphonsus's Lost Profits MSJ"), at p. 3 (emphasis added).
15
Parker Aff., Ex. B (hereinafter "Budge Report") at p. 6; Budge Trial Testimony at p.
2733:5-9.
14
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premised" his estimate of lost profits upon wrongful dissociation. 16 This page is a part of Mr.
Budge's recitation of the "Case Background," in which Mr. Budge merely notes as a part of the
timeline of the case that it was found by the trial court that on April4, 2004, SARMC wrongfully
dissociated from MRIA. 17
Mr. Budge's Opinion regarding historical lost scan volume damages is not at all
dependent upon the statutory wrongful dissociation claims, but rather all the "bad acts" generally
alleged by MRIA. 18 As Mr. Budge explained his role, "[i]n this litigation there's an alleged
course of conduct by the hospital which had the result of diverting business from MRIA to IMI.
And my assignment was basically to calculate the profits that were lost in connection with this
loss of business." 19 He continued:
Q: ... to an extent you have referred to these bad acts in your report, my
question is: For the purpose of your analysis, do you really need to know what
those were or are?
A. Well, I think it's definitely useful to be informed about them, but I
don't know ifl need to have a detailed understanding of those.
Q. Does it make any difference to you --you have explained to us a
couple oftimes that you're not here to opine about the bad acts. You're here to
opine about the impact of the bad acts; correct?
A. I think that's generally right, yes.
Q. Does your analysis depend on all of those bad acts being true?
A. No.
Q. One of them being true?

16

Saint Alphonsus Discovery Motion at p. 3.
Budge Report at p. 10.
18
Budge Trial Testimony at pp. 2732:21-2733:9,2785:17-2586:17,2788:1-5,2800:4-8, and
2809:4-5; Budge Report at p. 8-10.
19
Budge Trial Testimony at p. 2726:11-16 (emphasis added).
17
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A. I think that what it depends upon is a finding that St. Al' s breached its
fiduciary duties or that it unlawfully competed against MRIA or that it wrongfully
dissociated. I view, using your term "bad acts," things which basically put the
legs under those three stools. So what combinations of those is necessary to
establish one of those three things is not that important to me. 20
In other words, while his necessary underlying assumption as a damages expert is that
Saint Alphonsus will be held liable for these losses on some legal theory for its "bad acts"
(otherwise there would obviously be no damages) 21 , the precise nature of the legal theory
has no bearing on his opinion. As he explained:

Q: Did you do an evaluation ofthe allegations of breach of fiduciary duty
or wrongful withdrawal or violation on the noncompete on your own?
A: No. That's really not my view or my role as a damages expert. I
basically am taking those conditions, which I think basically you will have to
decide whether they're factual enough. And if they occurred, then what I've
calculated is what the financial implication are of those actions. 22
His analysis was not directed at any specific cause of action, but was informed by the entire
course of conduct. As the Court found in its ruling on Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary
Judgment, MRIA's damage analysis is appropriate for calculating damages for past lost scan
profits from Saint Alphonsus's general course ofconduct under the liability theories remaining
in the case. In short, the fact that the statutory wrongful dissociation claims have been dismissed
does not affect Mr. Budge's expert opinion in any way.

3.

Mr. Wilhoite's Opinion is Not Premised on a Wrongful Dissociation Claim

Likewise, Mr. Wilhoite's opinion as to lost scans/profits is not premised on the wrongful
dissociation claims. Mr. Wilhoite was an expert hired to opine about future damages? 3 His
work projected forward from Mr. Budge's opinion in order to arrive at the present value of the

20

Parker Aff., Ex. C (hereinafter "Budge Depo.") at p. 63:16-64:15.

21

Budge Trial Testimony at p. 2820:22-2821 :21.
Budge Trial Testimony at p. 2764:18-2765:3.
Wilhoite Trial Testimony a p. 2848:17-20.

22
23
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cash flow from lost scans that would have been received in the future? 4 As with Mr. Budge, Mr.
Wilhoite's opinion regarding damages is not at all dependent upon the dismissed statutory
wrongful dissociation claims, but rather all the "bad acts" generally alleged by MRIA. As Mr.
Wilhoite explained:
[We started with the amount that Mr. Budge] said that MRIA lost because
of the acts of Saint Alphonsus ... and we grow it over this period because if Saint
Alphonsus had not committed those acts, set up with IMI, taken that business, that
$3.7 million would have remained inside the operations of MRIA. So that's our
starting point. We grow it out through the end of the partnership? 5
As Mr. Wilhoite stated in his expert report, "the Acts of the part of the Counterdefendants ...
generally are summarized as (1) unfair business practices, (2) business interference, (3) violation
ofthe noncompete agreement, and (4) wrongful dissociation." 26 Wrongful dissociation was only
one ofthe "bad acts" which Mr. Wilhoite noted might provide the basis for finding liability.
As a damages expert, Mr. Wilhoite necessarily assumed that Saint Alphonsus would be
held liable for these losses on some legal theory for its "bad acts." 27 As he testified, "[w]hat I'm
assuming is the referrals, the relationships that left MRIA as a result of Saint Alphonsus leaving
and these other acts, that's what caused the loss in profits and the loss in value." 28 The precise
nature of the theory ofliability is unimportant to Mr. Wilhoite's lost future profits analysis. As
Mr. Wilhoite testified during his deposition:
Q: Where in your Expert Opinion do you break out the amount of
economic loss caused by each individual act?
A: We don't break them out that way, and we weren't asked to. We look
at the collective acts. That's why we refer to them as "the acts." 29
24
25

26
27
28
29

!d. at p. 2851 :18-2852:16; Wilhoite Depo. p. 79:4-19.
Wilhoite Trial Testimony at p. 2863:5-12 (emphasis added).
Parker Aff., Ex. E (hereinafter "Wilhoite Report") at p. 2.
Wilhoite Depo. at p. 96:7-11.
Wilhoite Trial Testimony at p. 2897:23-2898:1 (emphasis added).
Wilhoite Depo. at p. 67:15-20.
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His damage analysis is appropriate for calculating damages for future damages from Saint
Alphonsus's general course of conduct, regardless ofthe precise theory of liability under which
such conduct is found to be improper.
The opinions of these experts, which are premised on a general course of "bad acts" and
not dependant on the wrongful dissociation claims, are unchanged by the posture of this lawsuit
upon remand and this Court's recent decisions on summary judgment. As such, there is no need
to reopen discovery with regard to their opinions.
C.

The Addition of the Limited Partnerships Does not Alter the Damages Landscape
Saint Alphonsus next asserts that the joinder of the Limited Partnerships, MRI Center and

MRI Mobile, necessitate the reopening of damages discovery. This is an untenable position, as
Saint Alphonsus has previously argued on appeal that the damages were those exclusively of the
(then) absent parties, MRI Center and MRI Mobile. In Saint Alphonsus's own appeal brief to the
Idaho Supreme Court, Saint Alphonsus recognized, and specifically argued, that the damages
figures presented by MRIA's experts were in fact the damages of the Limited Partnerships:
the award of $36.3 million in damages represents profits allegedly lost by one
or both of the limited partnerships, Center and Mobile. MRIA, which owns
just a fraction of Center and Mobile, therefore did not suffer these
damages ....
Center and Mobile are the two limited partnerships established by MRIA
for the purpose of engaging in the business of providing MRI services ... MRIA
"provides no services directly" ... but rather receives a management fee of 7.5%
of Center and Mobiles annual cash receipts for overseeing their operations. . ..
ln presenting evidence of lost profits, MRIA's two damages experts
relied exclusively on allegations of injury to Center and Mobile's business.
Specifically, Bruce Budge estimated the number of scans diverted from the
limited partnerships to IMI and applied their revenue and cost figures in order to
calculate the profits that were thus lost. MRIA's other expert, Charles Wilhoite,
used Budge's calculation to predict diverted lost future scans and resulting lost
profits ....
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The $36.3 million in damages thus represents profits allegedly lost by
Center and/or Mobile-the entities actually proving MRI scanning servicesrather than any conceivable injury to MRIA itself. 30
The Idaho Supreme Court likewise recognized that the lost profits sought by MRIA in the first
trial were the damages to the Limited Partnerships:
[t)he lost profits included profits lost by both MRI Center and MRI Mobile
for past and future MRI scans diverted to Intermountain Imaging. MRIA did
not provide any services. Its income came from management fees. MRI Center
agreed to pay MRIA a management fee of $90,000 or 7.5% of its cash receipts
from operations, whichever was greater. MRI Mobile agreed to pay MRIA a
management fee of7.5% of its cash receipts from operations. In addition, MRIA
would receive its share of the net cash flow from the limited partnerships.
MRIA's lost profits would be the management fees and its share of the net cash
flow from the limited partnerships. 31
Saint Alphonsus prevailed in its argument on appeal that the damages awarded by the jury were
the damages of MRI Center and MRI Mobile. As such, it is now judicially estopped from taking
a contrary position. See Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC; 147 Idaho 737,
748,215 P.3d 457,468 (2009) ("[t]he doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits 'a party from
assuming a position in one proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a subsequent
proceeding.'"); Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 240, 178 P.3d 597, 605 (2008) ("Judicial
estoppel is applied when a litigant obtains a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one
party ... and subsequently adopts inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony to obtain a
recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject matter").
Indeed, the parties have always known that the lost scan damages opined to by Mr.
Budge and Mr. Wilhoite were the damages of the Limited Partnerships. This case was originally
tried as if the Limited Partnerships were present. The Limited Partnerships have been
referenced, and in fact included in each of the claims, since the filing of the original
30
31

Parker Aff. Ex. H at p. 43-44 (emphasis added).
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc, 148 Idaho at 496, 224 P.3d at 1085 (emphasis added).
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Counterclaim. 32 In the Second Amended Counterclaim, MRIA explicitly sought damages "on
behalf of' the Limited Partnerships. 33 That all the parties were treating trial as if the Limited
Partnerships were present was succinctly summarized by the trial court during one of the jury
instruction conferences:
And when I say "these folks," I'm talking about, really, MRI Mobile/MRI Center
were interwoven with MRIA, though there were distinctions and they may have
been for tax purposes or other health-law purposes, the overwhelming evidence is
that they were all bundled together and decisions were made. 34
In sum, the damages belonging to the Limited Partnerships has permeated this litigation.
The parties all know that the Limited Partnerships were the only entities who had scans to
lose. In its own briefing to this Court in is Memorandum in Support oflts Motion For Summary
Judgment Based on the Legal Insufficiently ofMRIA's Evidence of Lost Profits, Saint
Alphonsus states that "MRIA's 'lost profits' measure of damages is based on the theory that by
allegedly providing assistance to IMI ... Saint Alphonsus helped IMI win scan business that
otherwise would have gone to MRI Center or MRI Mobile." 35 The formal joinder of the Limited
Partnerships as parties to this action has not changed the damages analysis, which has always
been premised on damages to the Limited Partnerships. Because the parties have always known
that the lost scan damages have always been the damages of the Limited Partnerships and not
MRIA, there is no need to "parse out" the lost scan damages as between MRIA and the Limited
Partnerships.
Furthermore, there is no need to conduct further discovery in order to parse out the lost
scan damages as between the Limited Partnerships, MRI Center and MRI Mobile, because such

32
33
34

35

Counterclaim, filed May 20, 2005.
Second Amended Counterclaim, filed March 2, 2007.
Parker Aff., Ex. I at p. 4202:24-4203:4.
Saint Alphonsus's Lost Profits MSJ at p. 3.
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parsing has already been done. Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite calculated the scans lost to IMI
from three locations? 6 The first was on the campus at Saint Alphonsus, where the MRI Center
facilities were located. 37 The second was scans lost by MRI Center to IMI' s downtown Boise
office. 38 The third was scans lost to IMI' s Meridian, Idaho, office. 39 The scans lost to IMI' s
downtown Boise office and on the Saint Alphonsus campus were considered the lost scans of
MRI Center. The Meridian, Idaho, lost scans were also generally considered the lost scans of
MRI Center, with the possibility that the scans from Meridian would have been the lost scans of
MRI Mobile. As Mr. Budge testified:

Q: I want to make sure, Mr. Budge, that what we're talking a out here- what
you're talking about here is the loss of profits to MRI Center of Idaho, true?
A: I have to make a qualification with respect to Meridian because I haven't
made an assumption about what unit that would be in.
Q: But insofar as any income that would flow from the mobile side, say, from the
Pacific Northwest operations, you're not talking about that.
A: I'm not talking about any diversion of MRIM revenues.
Q: Right. In fact, you're not talking about any loss of revenue from the mobile
side, are you?
A: I'm not, unless MRIA had chosen to service Meridian out of that location.

40

As Mr. Wilhoite explained:
Q: ... For the lost scans that you have attributed to the Meridian site or
the prior affiliated physician referrals, what MRI entity did those -- the damages
associated with those lost scans affect?

36

37
38
39
40

Parker Aff. at Ex. J; Budge Report at p. 51.
Parker Aff. at Ex. J.
/d.
!d.; Budge Report at p. 56.
Budge Trial Testimony at p. 2783:21-2784:13.
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A. Let's assume that, but for the acts of your clients, the revenues of
MRIC and MRIM would have been at a higher level, which would have generated
higher management fees.
Q. So the lost scan volume, if you will, is damage that you have attributed
-- or the damage attributed to lost scans is damage to either MRI Center or MRI
Mobile; is that correct?
A. Based on the fact that they would have assumed to have performed the
41
scans and generated the related profits.
As Saint Alphonsus had itself stated to this Court:
With respect to IMI' s downtown Boise and Meridian locations, Budge
determined the number of scans performed by IMI for patients referred to those
locations who either were exclusively affiliated with Saint Alphonsus or had
referred patients to MRI Center ... would 1\ave been performed by MRI Center
but for Saint Alphonsus's alleged miscondutt ... Budge similarly assumed that
MRI Center would have performed all of the scans that IMI performed at its
42
facility on the Saint Alphonsus campus.
In short, the damages landscape, upon which extensive discovery was held and evidence actually
presented at trial, has not been altered at all by the addition of the Limited Partnerships, because
the damages sought have always been the damages incurred by the Limited Partnerships.

D.

Saint Alphonsus is Not Entitled to a New Expert
Saint Alphonsus asserts that it "intends to designate its own expert witness to address

how Saint Alphonsus's lawful 43 dissociation from MRIA in 2004 limits the damages allegedly

41

WilhoiteDepoatp.175:19to 176:9.
Saint Alphonsus's Lost Profits MSJ at p. 4.
43
The assertion that its dissociation from MRIA in 2004 is "lawful" is disingenuous. The
finding of the Supreme Court and this Court are simply that Saint Alphonsus did not violate any
statute by dissociating in 2004 because an express term of the Partnership Agreement was not
violated. Unlike the statutory claim, a breach of contract claim does not hinge on the violation of
an "express" provision of a contract, but simply a breach of a contractual provision. See, e.g.,
Ervin Canst. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 700, 874 P.2d 506, 511 (1993). Whether
St. Alphonsus's withdrawal was a breach of contract is a question of fact for the jury. Borah v.
McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 79, 205 P.3d 1209, 1215 (2009); Clark v. St. Paul Property and
Liability Ins. Companies, 102 Idaho 756, 757, 639 P.2d 454,455 (1981). A question of fact
42
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suffered by MRIA" and "to opine on the apportionment of damages among these three entities
[MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile]."44 The time for expert designation expired over four
years ago. 45 A court may properly exclude an expert witness who is disclosed after the deadline
to do so. Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873, 136 P.3d 338, 344 (2006) City ofMcCall v.

Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 586, 130 P.3d 1118, 1124 (2006). Moreover, as outlined above, the
damages landscape on the remaining damages theory of lost scan/profits has not changed at all
since that time, nor been impacted by the pruning of the claims or formal addition of the Limited
Partnerships. As such, there is no need for a new expert to analyze damages.
In addition, MRIA has not changed its experts or the content of its expert's reports or
testimony. Saint Alphonsus already has a well-qualified expert, Manfred Steiner, who is highly
experienced in financial valuation ofhealthcare organizations. 46 He was hired by Saint
Alphonsus to analyze the opinions of Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite:
Q: ... Mr. Steiner, did I ask you to do any other analysis or work in this
case?
A: You asked us to review the Budge and Wilhoite reports.
Q: And what did you do in that regard?
A: We reviewed the reasonableness of the assumptions that were
underlying the damage calculations.
Q: And, again, when-- what damage calculations are we talking-- are you
talking about when you say looking at the underlying assumptions?
A: The but-for analysis. But for the bad acts- but for the bad acts, the
damages, the result in damages.

remains as to whether by dissociating in 2004, Saint Alphonsus committed the other acts (breach
of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, etc.) outlined in MRIA's Third Amended Complaint.
44
Saint Alphonsus Discovery Motion at p. 4.
45
Amended Scheduling Order at p. 4.
46
Parker Aff. at Ex. K (hereinafter" Steiner Trial Testimony"), at p. 3187:8-3189:9.
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Q: And when-- to your understanding, when Mr. Wilhoite and Mr. Budge
looked at the damage calculation, were they looking at -- well, what were they
looking at? Were they looking at the value of the companies or were they looking
at the value of potentially lost scans?
A: They were looking at the value of potentially lost scans.
Q: Okay. And you, as I understand, looked at the assumptions behind
some of those calculations?
A: Yes, we did.
Q: And based on your experience, Mr. Steiner, in the healthcare field and
in valuation, did you have any criticisms of those assumptions?

A: I think we questioned the reasonableness of the assumptions that the
scans that were lost at Center would have been able to be kept at Center given
47
some of the deficiencies that we saw in the business model at Center.
Notably, Mr. Steiner's analysis recognized that the opinions of Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite
were based on the "bad acts," rather than a particular cause of action, and that the lost profits
were primarily those ofMRI Center. As the opinions ofMr. Budge and Wilhoite have not
changed, there is no need for Saint Alphonsus to secure a different expert to analyze their
reports.
Significantly, Saint Alphonsus elected to instruct Mr. Steiner not to conduct his own
48
damages analysis, but simply to critique the analysis of Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite. As such,

Saint Alphonsus did not have an alternative sum of damages to present to the jury, which fully
accepted the damages numbers presented by MRIA's experts. Although the opportunity to
designate experts is long past, and MRIA's damages analysis remains unchanged, Saint

47
48

Steiner Trial Testimony at p. 3213:11- 3217:10; see, also, Parker Aff. Ex. L, at p. 14-16.
Steiner Trial Testimony at p. 3226:11-18.
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.

Alphonsus is seeking a do-over. Saint Alphonsus wants a chance to correct any weaknesses in
the opinion of its expert-which is perhaps unsurprising, since a jury has previously rejected this
expert's opinion. Unfortunately for Saint Alphonsus, the time for designating experts and
conducting discovery is long past and, as demonstrated above, there is no reason to reopen these
issues.

III.

CONCLUSION

Because the decisions of this Supreme Court and this court have not altered the damages
analysis, and because Saint Alphonsus had already had ample opportunity to conduct discovery
and designate its own experts, the Motion to Reopen Discovery should be denied. For these
reasons, and those stated above, MRIA respectfully requests that Saint Alphonsus's Motion to
Reopen Discovery be denied.
DATED this

2~ day ofFebruary 2011.
Thomas A. B ducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 04082 19D

OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SET
SCHEDULING ORDER

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.
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Defendants/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership ("MRI
Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited ("MRIA Mobile") 1 submit this Opposition to the Motion of
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") to Set a Scheduling Order. This
opposition is supported by the Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Motion to Reopen Fact and
Expert Discovery Regarding Damages, and in Opposition to Motion to Set Scheduling Order
(hereinafter "Parker Aff."), filed contemporaneously herewith.

I.

INTRODUCTION

With this Motion, Saint Alphonsus is seeking to reopen motion practice on issues that
have already been thoroughly litigated in the course of this trial. In particular, Saint Alphonsus
seeks a briefing order allowing for pretrial Motions for Summary Judgment and Motions in
Limine. The deadline for motions in this case, January 16, 2007, is long past? During the
motions practice portion of this case, the parties filed sixty-three (63) legally substantive
motions. Likewise, this Court's recent order allowing the filing of motions expired on August 6,
201 o? In short, many (if not all) of the issues that might come up in the trial of this case have
been briefed andre-briefed ad nauseam. More significantly, as will be discussed in further detail
below, the Court's jurisdiction to entertain new matters after remand is severely limited. As
Saint Alphonsus has not sufficiently stated the nature of the motions it intends to file, the Court
cannot determine if it has jurisdiction to hear such Motions. As such, Saint Alphonsus' s Motion
to set a scheduling order should be denied.

1

All Defendants/Counter-claimants will be referred to as "MRIA." MRI Center and MRI
Mobile will be referred to collectively as "the Limited Partnerships."
2
Parker Aff., Ex. A (hereinafter "Amended Scheduling Order,"), at p. 3.
3
Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions from the Parties and Briefing Schedule, filed July
9, 2010.
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II.

OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SET SCHEDULING ORDER

Saint Alphonsus has proposed that this Court set a scheduling order which sets deadlines
for reopened discovery, summary judgment, and pre-trial motions. 4 As noted in MRIA's
Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Reopen Discovery, filed contemporaneously
herewith, there is no reason to reopen discovery, and thus MRIA objects to setting such a
schedule. With respect to submitting further legal briefs in this matter, because Saint Alphonsus
had not indicated what legal issues require briefing, it has not demonstrated that such matters are
within the Court's jurisdiction on remand. As such, its Motion should be denied.
Upon remand, a trial court has jurisdiction only over matters subsidiary to the directions
of the appellate court. "The general rule is that, on remand, a trial court has authority to take
actions it is specifically directed to take, or those which are subsidiary to the actions directed by
the appellate court." 5 Mountainview Landowners Co-op. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 866,
136 P.3d 332, 337 (2006). See, Rockefeller v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 82 P.3d 450 (2003); State
v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886, 11 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000). As Saint Alphonsus has not identified
with specificity any Motions it wishes to file, this Court cannot determine whether such issues
4

The Motion also requests that court to set a date for a pre-trial conference, service of exhibit
and witness lists, pretrial memoranda, and jury instructions. MRIA has no objection to the
scheduling of these matters.
5
If a case is generally reversed, a court may also "correct an error in its original findings as to a
matter not passed on by the appellate court." Blinzler v. Andrews, 95 Idaho 769, 519 P.2d 438
(1973) (emphasis added). That is, the Court may modify any prior orders or partial judgments
that have been previously entered, assuming non-application of the doctrine of law of the case.
Hutchins v. State, 100 Idaho 661,666, 603 P.2d 995, 1000 (1979) (emphasis added). However,
those issues must still be subsidiary to the appellate court's ruling. For example, in JR. Simplot
Co. v. Chemetics Int'l, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 939 P.2d 574 (1997), the Supreme Court reversed a
jury's verdict because two of three counts brought by a plaintiff were barred by the statute of
limitations. On remand, the defendant therefore argued that it was the prevailing party entitled to
attorney fees. While noting that the trial court was free to determine if there had been an error in
its previous determination of which party was prevailing, id at 257-58, 939 P.3d at 576-77, the
Supreme Court also found it critical that this issue was "subsidiary" to the Court's reversal of
the jury's verdict
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are within its jurisdiction. The Court should therefore deny this Motion, which broadly seeks an
open briefing schedule. If Saint Alphonsus (or MRIA) desires to file a motion, it should
specifically seek leave from the Court to do so, stating the reasons why the Court has authority to
hear the motion so that the Court can determine whether the matter is within its jurisdiction on
remand.
MRIA also notes that because the legal issues in this case have already been thoroughly
litigated in the prior trial of this matter, an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
opportunity given by this Court to brief issues following the appeal, there is no need to schedule
yet another round of legal briefing. When a case is reversed and remanded, the case then stands
as it did before the erroneous decision, order, or judgment was entered. Hutchins v. State, 100
Idaho 661, 665, 603 P.2d 995, 999 (1979). As the Supreme Court reversed the jury's verdict, the
present case therefore stands as it did immediately prior to trial-past the deadlines for briefing,
motions in limine, and motions for summary judgment, which were due in this case on January
16,2007. 6 Likewise, this Court's recent order allowing the filing of motions expired on August
6, 2010. 7
Prior to the original trial of this case, the parties filed sixty-three (63) legally substantive 8
motions. 9 The parties have filed (or joined with the filing) of ten Motions for Summary
Judgment or Motions to Reconsider the same (one filed by MRIA, nine filed or joined by Saint
Alphonsus); twenty-nine (29) Motions in Limine (twenty one (21) filed by MRIA, eight filed or

6

Amended Scheduling Order at p. 3.
Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions from the Parties and Briefing Schedule, filed July
9, 2010.
8
This is not including motions relating to discovery, amendments to pleadings, extending
deadlines, scheduling, attorney's fees, etc.
9
These sixty three (63) motions constitute the motions themselves. The briefing in support and
opposition obviously multiplies the sheer volume of the filings by at least three times.
7
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joined by Saint Alphonsus); two Motions to Dismiss filed by Saint Alphonsus; three objections
or Motions to Dismiss concerning expert witnesses filed or joined by Saint Alphonsus; nine
Motions to Strike (five filed by MRIA, four filed or joined by Saint Alphonsus); one Request for
Clarification filed by MRIA; and one Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict filed by
Saint Alphonsus. 10 In addition, pursuant to the Court's recent briefing schedule, Saint Alphonsus
filed an additional four Motions for Summary Judgment. 11 In short, many (if not all) of the issues
that might come up in the trial of this case have been briefed and re-briefed. At some point, this
multiplicity of pleadings-particularly on matters that have already been passed upon during the
course of this litigation-becomes unduly burdensome. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(l)
requires that motions be signed, which signature constitutes a certification that the motion is
"well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation." MRIA does not accuse Saint Alphonsus of stepping over this line, but merely notes

10

Parker Aff. at Ex. M. It is notable that Judge McLaughlin ably ruled on these sixty-three
motions prior to the trial of this matter, and was reversed by the Supreme Court on a very limited
set of matters. Had Judge McLaughlin still been presiding over this case, he likely would not
have been amenable to hearing these matters yet again. It is perhaps out of the hope that another
court might be willing to entertain re-litigation of all of these matters that Saint Alphonsus
disqualified Judge McLaughlin for the retrial of this matter.
11
Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment Based on the Legal Insufficiency of
MRIA's Lost Profits, filed Aug. 6, 2010; Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment on the Claims
of the Limited Partnerships, filed Aug. 6, 2010; Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment on the
Civil Conspiracy Claim, filed Aug. 6, 2010; Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment
on MRIA's Claim for Wrongful Dissociation, filed Aug. 6, 2010.
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that there is a danger of doing so if this Court permits yet another round of unrestrained
briefing. 12 Consequently, Saint Alphonsus's motion should be denied.

III.

CONCLUSION

Saint Alphonsus's motion should be denied because this case was remanded for a retrial
and not for a "do-over" of pretrial motions. Indeed, Saint Alphonus has had ample opportunity
to file pretrial motions. Moreover, the motion should be denied because this Court's jurisdiction
on remand is limited and Saint Alphonsus has made no showing that the motions it seeks to file
are within the Court's limited jurisdiction to hear.
DATED this 2nd day of February 2010.

Thomas A. Ban\lcci
Wade L. Woodard
Dara L. Parker
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

12

As noted in MRIA's Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert
Discovery Regarding Damages, these Motions coincide with an attempt by Saint Alphonsus to
enforce the award of costs on appeal. This convergence suggests the possibility that Saint
Alphonsus may attempt to avoid retrial of this matter by making it too cost-prohibitive for MRIA
to continue the litigation.
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Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

Case No. CV OC 04082 19D
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
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Idaho Limited Partnership,
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v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.
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County of Ada
State of Idaho

)
): ss
)

Dara L. Parker, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI

Mobile Limited Partnership in the above captioned case.
2.

I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge.

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Amended

Scheduling Order, entered by District Judge Michael McLaughlin prior to the original trial of
this case on March 20, 2006. This document is referred to in the associated briefing as
"Amended Scheduling Order."
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the relevant portion of

the Expert Report of Bruce Budge, dated March 12, 2007. This document is referred to in the
associated briefing as "Budge Report."
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Cis a true and correct copy of the relevant portion of

the Deposition Testimony of Bruce Budge, conducted on April4, 2007. This document is
referred to in the associated briefing as "Budge Depo."
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Dis a true and correct copy of the relevant portion of

the Trial Testimony of Bruce Budge conducted on August 20, 2007. This document is referred
to in the associated briefing as "Budge Trial Testimony."
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of the relevant portion of

the Expert Report of Charles Wilhoite, dated March 12, 2007. This document is referred to in
the associated briefing as "Wilhoite Report."
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8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of the relevant portion of

the Deposition Testimony of Charles Wilhoite conducted on April2, 2007. This document is
referred to in the associated briefing as "Wilhoite Depo."
9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of the relevant portion of

the Trial Testimony of Charles Wilhoite conducted on August 21,2007. This document is
referred to in the associated briefing as "Wilhoite Trial Testimony."
10.

Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy ofthe relevant portion of

Saint Alphonsus's Appellant's Brief to the Idaho Supreme Court, dated Sept. 12, 2008.
11.

Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of the relevant portion of

the Trial Transcript of August 30, 2007.
12.

Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of Trial Exhibit 4520.

13.

Attached hereto as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of the relevant portion of

the trial testimony of Manfred Steiner, conducted on August 23, 2007. This document is referred
to in the associated briefing as "Steiner Trial Testimony."
14.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Lis a true and correct copy of the relevant portion of

Saint Alphonsus' Third Supplemental Answer to Defendant/Counterclaimant's First Set of
Interrogatories served on April 23, 2007.
15.

Attached hereto as Exhibit M is a true and correct copy ofthe alphabetical Clerk

Record Index Table of Contents.
DATED this 2nd day of February 2011.

-

\~q, 4~~~

Dara L. Parker
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 2nd day of February, 2011
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _1_ day of ]!.b. 2011, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintifflCounterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
ru.-¥(and Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintifflCounterdefendant

CYtf.'S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

D Facsimile

l
a Parker /
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RECEIVED

APR 0 4"2006
GREENER, BANDUCCI,
SHOEMAKER, P.A.

MAR 2 0 2006

~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit
corporation,

Case No. CVOC 0408219

Plaintiff,
vs.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership,

AMENDED
SCHEDULING ORDER

Defendant.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership,
CounterCiaimant,
vs.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit
corporation; SAINT ALPHONSUS
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
CounterDefendants.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL
IMAGING, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; GEM STATE
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; and IMAGING
CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an
Idaho limited liability partnership.

This matter came before the Court in as a scheduling conference on March 16,
2006, at 11:00 o'clock a.m. with both parties appearing by and through Jack Gjording
for the Plaintiff; Thomas Banducci, Richard H. Greener and G. Rey Reinhardt for the
Defendant MRI Associates, LLP and Third-Party Plaintiffs; Warren Jones for Third
Party Defendants, Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, Gem State Radiology, LLP and
Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP.
ACCORDINGLY, THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULING ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:
1)

DESIGNATED TRIAL COUNSEL:
Plaintiff: Jack S. Gjording, Trudy Hanson Fauser and Bobbi K.
Dominick of Gjording & Fauser
Defendant MRI Associates, LLP: Thomas A. Banducci, G. Rey
Reinhardt, IV, and Richard H. Greener of Greener Banducci
Shoemaker
Third Party Plaintiffs: Warren Jones of Eberle Berlin

Each party to the action shall be represented at all pre-trial hearings by the
attorney or party who is to conduct the trial or by co-counsel with full knowledge of the
case and with authority to bind the party by stipulation. If any attorney has not been
given such authority to bind the party by stipulation, the party shall be present or
available at the pre-trial conference.
2)
TRIAL DATE: The twenty l20) day jury trial of this action shall commence
before this Court on February 261h, 2ifi, 28th, 29tH March 5th, 6th, 7th, 81h, 121h, 13th,
14th, 15th, 19th, 201\ 21 5 \ 22"et, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 2007, at 9:00 o'clock a.m. The
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parties and their attorneys shall be present in the courtroom on the first day of trial at
8:30a.m.
Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d){1 )(G),
that an alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case. The
following is a list of potential alternate judges:
Hon. Phillip M. Becker
Hon. G.D. Carey
Hon. Dennis Goff
Hon. Nathan Higer
Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt, Jr.
Any sitting 4 lh District Judge

Hon. James Judd
Hon. Duff McKee
Han. Daniel Meehl
Hon. George R. Reinhart, Ill
Han. Ronald Schilling
Hon. W. H. Woodland

Unless a party has previously exercised their right to disqualification without
cause under Rule 40(d)(1), each party shall have the right to file one (1) motion for
disqualification without cause as to any alternate judge not later than ten (1 0) days after
service of this notice.
3)
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE: Counsel for the parties shall appear before
this Court on February 12, 2007, at 1:30 o'clock p.m. for a final pre-trial conference.
Counsel shall be prepared to discuss settlement possibilities, and all items set forth in
Rules 16(a) through 0), I.R.C.P.
4)
MOTIONS: All motions, including Motions in Limine and Motions for
Summary Judgment, shall be filed and argued on or before January 16, 2007. Any
party who does not intend to oppose the motion shall immediately notify opposing
counsel and the court by filing a pleading titled "Non-Opposition to Motion." The moving
party shall serve and file with the motion affidavits or other documentary evidence,
which the moving party Intends to rely upon. Each motion, other than routine or
uncontested matters, shall be accompanied by a separate brief containing all the points
and authorities relied upon by the moving party. In summary judgment motions, the
moving party will also file a separate statement of material facts upon which the moving
party intends to rely. Responding parties may file a statement of facts, which are in
dispute, and any briefs shall contain all the reasons, points and authorities relied upon
by the responding party. All parties shall supply two (2) additional courtesy copies of all
motions and supporting memoranda to chambers.
5)
MOTIONS TO AMEND PLEADINGS: All motions to amend pleadings,
except punitive damages shall be filed and argued on or before August 21, 2006.
6)
MOTIONS TO AMEND COMPLAINT FOR CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: All motions to amend the Complaint for a claim for Punitive Damages shall
be filed no later than November 13, 2006.
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7)
DISCOVERY CUT-OFF: All discovery and supplemental responses
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(a), except trial depositions, shall be completed by December
29, 2006. Trial depositions shall be completed one week prior to the first day of trial
unless agreed upon by the parties.
8)
TELEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCES:
On August 21, 2006 at
4:00 o'clock p.m. and October 30, 2006 at 4:00 p.m., there will be convened
status/settlement conferences telephonically to review settlement and case progress.
The Court will initiate the call.
9)
DISCLOSURE OF EXPERTS:
All Plaintiffs expert witnesses shall be
disclosed by August 14, 2006. Defendant MRI's expert witnesses shall be disclosed by
September 18, 2006. Plaintiffs reply/rebuttal experts and Third Party Defendants
experts shall be disclosed by October 23, 2006. The Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs
shall be allowed to submit rebuttal experts to the experts disclosed by the Third Party
Defendants in the event the parties cannot agree to a deadline for the disclosure of the
Defendantsffhird Party Plaintiffs expert witness disclosure, the parties shall notice the
matter up for hearing before the Court. All parties' disclosure as to experts, shall be in
compliance with Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i). An expert is defined under Rule 702 of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence. Counsel ·may extend the expert witness disclosure dates by
stipulation, or if the expert witness disclosure dates are not able to be agreed upon by
stipulation, the Court will set the matter for hearing. The Court will extend these
deadlines for the disclosure of experts in the event there are unforeseen discovery
delays or conflicts that occur prior to trial.
10)
ATTORNEYS CONFERENCE: Counsel for Plaintiff shall convene an
attorneys conference two weeks prior to final pre-trial conference for the purposes of
exchange and marking of all exhibits, exchange of all witness lists, the noting of any
foundational objections to exhibits or witnesses, stipulate to uncontested facts, explore
all settlement possibilities, and prepare a pre-trial stipulation pursuant to Rule 16(e),
I.R.C.P., which stipulation will be presented to this Court at the final pre-trial
conference.
11)
PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDA AND TRIAL EXHIBITS: Parties shall submit
to the Court, no later than five (5) days before the final pre-trial conference, a pre-trial
memoranda which will include the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Elements of Plaintiffs case (Plaintiff);
Defenses of Defendant's case (Defendant)
Contested facts;
Contested issues of law;
Evidentiary issues
Agreed or stipulated facts; and
Memorandum of Points and Authorities on issues of law.
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. ...
The parties shall submit to the Judge's clerk pre-marked exhibits for trial
five days before the commencement of the trial. Plaintiff shall use numbers 1
through 2000 to mark their exhibits and defendants shall use the numbers 3000 through
5000 to mark their exhibits.
12) JURY INSTRUCTIONS: Each party shall submit all proposed jury
instructions ·on or before February 12, 2007, at 1 :30 o'clock p.m.
13) SANCTIONS~ Failure to comply with this Order shall subject a party or its
attorney to appropriate sanctions, including, but not limited to, costs and reasonable
attorney fees, the dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs claim, or the striking of a
Defendant's defenses. A party may be excused from strict complian.ce with any
provisions of this Order only upon motion showing extraordinary circumstances. ·
14) CONTINUANCES: If all parties request a continuance of the trial date,
this Court will only consider a Motion to Continue if the motion is signed by all parties
personally and their counsel.
15) STIPULATION: Any changes agreed upon by counsel to this scheduling
order must be submitted in writing to the Court with a proposed order.
16)
Present at the Scheduling Conference was Patrick Miller from the firm of
Givens Pursley. The Court instructed counsel for the Plaintiff that in the event that
Givens Pursley is going to appear in this case, they shall file a Notice of Appearance on
or before Wednesday, March 22, 2006 at 5:00 p.m.
Dated this

'/- e
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CERTIFI~E

OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this~ day of March, 2006, I mailed (served) a true
and correct copy of the within instrument to:
Thomas Banducci
Attorney at Law
815 West Washington Street
Boise, ID 83702
JackS. Gjording
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 83701
Boise, ID 83701
Warran Jones
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701
Patrick J. Miller
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court....-------·--····-···-·-·-··--·
----~
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Expert Report of Bruce P. Budge
Saittt AlphmtS1tS Diversified Cm·a, Iuc., Plaiutiff
v.
MRJ Associrdes, LLP, Defclldtmt

MRI Associates, LLP, Conntercln.imn.ut

v.
Sai11t Alplxonsus Diversified Cm·e, 11tc. et al., Cormterdefendau.ts
MJU Associates, I..LP, T1tird Party Plaintiff
v.
Illtel'momttailt Medlca.lltnagiltg, LLC et n.l.. Third Pm-tt; Defimdn1tts

District Coutt of the Fourth Judicial Distilct of the State of Idaho, In and For the County of ADA
No. CV OC 04082190

March 12, 2007
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1

19?9·2006 MIUA • Afftl!~!ccl Downtown Referrals Ph.>.• All Meridian Referrals

$

21,370,854

2

July 1, 2001 • 2006 MRIA ·Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus AU Meridian Referrals

$

18,924,186

Calculation Method 1: 1999- 2006 MRIA-Affiliated Downtow11 Referrals Plus All Meridian Referrals
Under this calculation, I have calculated MRIA's damages from the inception of IMI in 1999
through 2006 to be composed of three components:
1.

Damages From Intermountain Medical Imaging LLP's ("IMI's") MRI operations
on the Saint Alphonsus ("SARMC") campus in Boise, ID;

2.

Damages From IMI's MRI operations at the Magicview Location in Meridian, ID;
and

3.

Damages From IMI's MRI operations at its Downtown location in Boise, ID.

Calculation Method 2: July 1, 2001 - 2006 MRIA-Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridia11
Referrals

The components of Calculation Method 2 are the same as Method 1, but the damage period has
been changed to begin on July 1, 2001. I understand July 1, 2001 to be on or about the date
when SARMC made its initial investment in IMI which, according to MFJA, breached the

non~

competition clause within the MRIA Partnership Agreement.

lam prepared to calculate prejudgment interest on these or other amounts upon request.

In addition to the above calculations of damages, I have read the Operating Agreement of
Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC to evaluate the degree of control by SARMC over the
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On July 1, 2001, SARMC and IMI executed an Operating Agreement. The Operating Agreement
had various terms including:
•

SARMC would contribute at least $500,000 in capital to lMl;

•

SARMC accepted 50% management responsibility for the operations of IMI;

•

SARMC would appoint three SARMC representatives to IMI's management committee
of six;

•

SARMC would participate in subsidizing GSR's administrative expenses;

•

SARMC agreed to participate in funding a medical director position, which would have
oversight of all IMI modalities;

•

SARMC and IMI formalized this agreement to work together to implement a digital
network and data storage system (PACS(RIS) which would elevate IMI's visibility and
accessibility to the referring physician community (this cooperative arrangement had
already been commenced by late 1999/early 2000);

•

SARMC agreed to forfeit its share in IMI if SARMC did not renew SARG/GSR's
exclusive contract to read MRI scans on the SARMC campus;

•

SARMC would participate in the profits and losses received from the non-MRI
modalities of IMl; and

•

SARMC could purchase a direct financial interest in IMI's MRl business under certain
terms.

As will be discussed later in this report, the Operating Agreement of IMI put IMI under the
control of SARMC and a group of radiologists doing business as Imaging Center Radiologists,
LLP ("ICR").

In its counterclaim, MRIA alleges that SARMC condoned and supported a variety of unfair
business tactics by SARG/GSR that not only interfered with SARMC's obligations as a partner in
MRIA and as a party to the MRIA Partnership Agreement, but were designed to increase IMI's
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growth at the expense of MRIA including:
SARG/GSR reduced hours of its availability to MRIA operations for the first time in the
history of the hospital while maintaining longer hours of service to IMI;
•

SARG/GSR refused to personally attend to patients being imaged in MRIA's mobile unit
stationed in the SARMC parking lot just yards away from MRI Center (a service that had
previously been willingly provided);

•

SARG/GSR radiologists provided faster response on image interpretation for images
taken at lMI than at MRIA operations;

•

SARG/GSR radiologists wrongfully disparaged MRIA by asserting that images produces
at MRI Center were inferior to IMI MRI scans;

•

SARG/GSR physician support was reduced from that which had been historically
provided in addressing routine quality and service issues, including patient care issues
within the lab, despite charging for professional services;

•

SARG/GSR reduced responsiveness from what had been historically provided to the
needs of lab personnel for physician input in clinical operations; and

•

SARG/GSR radiologists leveraged their relationship with SARMC, prompting SARMC's
wrongful dissociation from the MRIA Partnership.

MRIA also alleges that SARMC compromised MRIA' s efforts to grow and/or compete with IMI
by, among other things:

•

Giving IMI advantages with respect to the rollout and implementation of SARMC's
information technology system that linked referring physicians to MRIA's and IMI's
data and images;

•

Disparaging MRIA' s service;

•

Promoting IMI's services over MRIA's;

•

Voting against growth initiatives at the MRIA board level;

•

Working with IMI rather than MRIA to expand into Meridian; and
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Appointing SARMC employees as IMI Management Committee Members who were
involved in regular communications with MRIA regarding confidential business plans,
strategic initiatives and IT planning.

Then, on or about April 4, 2004, SARMC wrongfully dissociated from the MRIA partnership, in
violation of Section 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement2• Since dissociation, MRIA alleges that
SARMC, IMI and SARG/GSR have continued uniair business practices including:
•

Putting an IMI mobile MRI unit on the SARMC campus on or about December 2005;

•

Using confusing and misleading business names and contact telephone numbers to
divert business from MRI Center to IMI;

•

Directing SARMC physicians to refer MRI patients to IMI instead of MRIA;

•

Creating uncertainty among referring physicians and MRI Center employees by
spreading rumors that MRI Center would dose in the near future;

•

Falsely telling SARMC employees that SARMC's insurance would not cover MRl scans
done at MRI Center; and

•

Interfering with MRI Center's electronic information technology system.

MRIA further alleges that it was forced to locate and utilize an alternate radiology group to read
MRICI images as a result of the radiologists' conduct referred to above, coupled with the fear
that the radiologists would cease reading MRICI images without adequate notice.

Below is a timeline of certain of the alleged events, combined with the MRI scan volume of both
MRI Center and IMI.

2

Memorandum Decision On Plaintifrs Motions To Strike, Cross-Motions For Summary Judgment, And
Plaintiff(fhird Party Defendant's Molion To Dismiss, Honorable Michael McLaughlin, District Judge, Idaho 4'h
Judicial District, July 24, 2006.
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Schedule ll

Scan Volume Data

1955

108

108

1986

2.677

2.671

1987

4,165

4,165

19$3

~.810

4.810

1989
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1990

~.739

4.739

1991
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5,825

1992

6.222

6.222

1993
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tm
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1995

6.625

6.340
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1996
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1997
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1999
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2000
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2001

3.011
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2002
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2003
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2004
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7,369
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7.836
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9,319
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2005
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1,667

5,886
6,966

62

8,695

1,607

14.346

7,380
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2006

14.188

2,953 Pl

1,548
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2.922
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Saint Alphcnsus R.egionoal Medical Cenler v. MRI Assodalu,_ d nl.

Schedule
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Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center vs. MRI Associates, et al.

16

MRIM Meridian Imputed Interest Calculation

2002 Borrowing
Estimated 2002 Capital Expenditures 111
Estimated Amount Financed
Estimated Financing
Annual Interest Rate121
Annual Interest for Six Years

$2.227,440
80%
$1,781,952

c~axb

6.56%
$116,896

r=c:rd

a

d

2004 Borrowing

Estimated 2004 Capital Expenditures 111
Estimated Amount Financed
Estimated Financing
Annual Interest Ratel3l

$1,565,280
80%
$1,252.224
4.85%
$60,733
$177,629

Incremental Annual Interest for Five Years
Annual Interest Beginning in 2004

f
b

g=[xb
h

i-gxh
i+r

Notes
(1) See Schedule 15
[2}!MI Revkwed financlill Sl•temenl (IMIRP/003244)
[3) !Ml Reviewed Financial Statement (IMIRP/001797}
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, )
INC., an Idaho nonprofit
)
corporation,
Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.
) Case No.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership, )
Defendant.

1

2
3
4
5
6
7

THE DEPOSITION OF BRUCE P. BUDGE was taken
on behalf of the Plaintif£'CounterDefendants at the
offices of Givens Pursley, LLP, 601 West Bannock,
Boise, Idaho, 83701, commencing at 9:00a.m. on April
4, 2007, before Diana L. Durland, Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State
ofldaho, in the above-entitled matter.

8
) CV OC 0408219D

9
0
1
2
3

)

(Caption Continued)

4
DEPOSITION OF BRUCE P. BUDGE
April 4, 2007

5
6
7

t~

t~

REPORTED BY:
DIANA L. DURLAND, CSR No. 637
Notary Public

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff/ Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
CounterDefendants: By: JACK S. GJORDING
509 West Hays Street
Post Office Box 2837
Boise, Idaho, 83701-2837
-andGivens Pursley, LLP
By: PATRICKJ. MILLER
60 1 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho, 83701-2720

2

3
4
5
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9
0
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7
8
9
0
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2
3
4
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho
)
limited liability partnership, )
Counterclaimant,
)
VS.
)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, )
)
INC., an Idaho nonprofit
corporation; SAINT ALPHONSUS
)
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
)
Counterdefendants.
)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

)

0
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0
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3
4
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For the Defendant/ Greener, Banducci, Shoemaker, PA
CounterClaimant: By: THOMAS A. BANDUCCI
950 West Bannock Street
Suite 900
Boise, Idaho, 83702

9

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho
)
limited liability partnership, )
Third-Party Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability )
company; GEM STATE RADIOLOGY,
)
LLP, an Idaho limited liability )
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER )
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho
)
limited liability partnership, )
Third-Party Defendants. )
)

)

A P P E A R A N C E S (Continued)

For the Third-Party Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow
Defendants, GSR, By: WARREN E. JONES
IMI, ICR:
300 North Sixth Street
Second Floor
Post Office Box 1368
Boise, Idaho, 83701-1368
-andSaetrum Law Offices
By: DAVID W. LLOYD
101 South Capitol Boulevard
Suite 1800
Post Office Box 7425
Boise, Idaho, 83707-7425
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1
A. I would think a hard copy.
2
MR. GJORDING: Tom, if you know the Bates
3 number of that.
4
MR. BANDUCCI: Off the top of my head?
5
MR. GJORDING: Yeah.
6
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, I do.
7
MR. GJORDING: All right. Recite it.
8
MR. BANDUCCI: I'm not telling you. I
9 really don't, Jack. I don't know what that is.
10
MR. GJORDING: We'd like to have that as
11 well.
12
MR. BANDUCCI: Okay. Well I think maybe
13 what we could do here -- the same thing that we did
14 with Wilhoite, and that is give you Bates stamps for
15 all of this. I'm assuming that's because we got
16 them.
17
MR. MILLER: It doesn't have a date on it,
18 so there's no way to search by date.
19
MR. BANDUCCI: It says they're IMI financial
20 documents. I assume I got them from IMI. And I also
21 assume that they have Bates numbers on them.
22
MR. MILLER: I think most of them we can
23 figure out, but there's a few with the lack of Bates
24 numbers we couldn't figure out what they were.
25
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) Mr. Budge, do you happen
Page 61

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

The other term that I wanted to have you
define for me is "lost scans." You use that in some
of your schedules. Maybe that will change as we go
through this inquiry. But what do you mean when you
say "lost scans"?
A. I mean that basically but for the actions of
the counterdefendants, those scans, in all
reasonableness, would have been made by MRIA but were
not because of a complicated course of events which
is described in the pleadings.
Q. Speaking of the pleadings-- and I know you
addressed some of these matters in your report. But
there is set out in the pleadings -- I'm going to
refer to these as bad acts; okay?
A. Okay.
16
Q. They're set out in the pleadings. And to an
17 extent you have referred to these bad acts in your
18 report, my question is: For the purpose of your
19 analysis, do you really need to know what those were
20 or are?
21
A. Well, I think it's definitely useful to be
22 informed about them, but I don't know ifl need to
23 have a detailed understanding of those.
24
Q. Does it make any difference to you -- you
25 have explained to us a couple of times that you're
Page 63
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to remember what that letter said?
A. I do not.
Q. I need to do a few more kind of preliminary
things here before we start looking at your opinion,
Mr. Budge.
In your opinion in your report and in some
of the schedules, you use the phrase SARMC -- which
stands for St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center.
SARMC affiliated physicians. I need to know what you
mean by that.
A. It depends on how I'm using it. In one
sense I mean people with admitting privileges at
SARMC. But in terms of my analysis, I often mean
those physicians which were affiliated with SARMC's
MRIA provider for many years, meaning MRIA. So it
means, oftentimes, MRIA affiliated, at least through
a certain date in time when IMI came on the scene.
Q. You know it occurred to me that maybe one of
the ways you were using that phrase is that that
refers to physicians who, prior to 1999, used to
refer to MRIA or to Center and thereafter began to
refer to IMI.
A. I do use it in that sense at times, yes.
Q. We'll try to remember to refine that as we
go along.
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not here to opine about the bad acts. You're here to
opine about the impact of the bad acts; correct?
A. I think that's generally right, yes.
Q. Does your analysis depend on all of those
bad acts being true?
A. No.
Q. One of them being true?
A. I think that what it depends upon is a
finding that St. Al's breached its fiduciary duties
or that it unlawfully competed against IMI or that it
wrongfully dissociated. I view, using your term "bad
acts," things which basically put the legs under
those three stools. So what combinations of those is
necessary to establish one of those three things is
not that important to me.
Q. Okay.
A. I might make one qualification. That I
understand that the issue of whether IMI was under
the control of SARMC is something that might be
important in making that determination too. So that
is probably the one exception to that rule, and I am
testifying about that.
Q. So using your stool analogy here, you
haven't made any attempt to assess what adverse
financial consequences might have flowed from two
Page 64
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legs of the stool being proven or one?
MR. BANDUCCI: Objection. I think using his
analogy in your question renders the question
ambiguous. I don't know what you mean.
WITNESS: In the way I view it, I don't care
how many legs the stool has.
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) Because you don't care
how many legs the stool has, you haven't made any
attempt to try to determine whether or not the
damages would change based upon whether one or two or
three of the legs were proven?
MR. BANDUCCI: Again, ambiguous.
WITNESS: No. We're not quite connecting.
I'm assuming that the overall breach of the
noncompete provisions were the duties, in a fiduciary
nature or of a withdrawal or found by somebody else
during trial, to have occurred. And if they occur,
then my measurements would apply to those three
scenarios. So then what happened to MRIA as a result
of one of those three things.
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) Let's go to your report
here.
(Exhibit 7 marked.)
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) Handing you what has been
marked Deposition Exhibit 7, Mr. Budge, is that a
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1 copy of your report? Although you'll see that it's
2 just the first 20 pages of your report. It does not
3 include the schedules.
4
A. Okay.
5
Q. When you go through the first pages, like
6 pages three and four of the report, you see that
7 there's calculation method number one, calculation
8 method number two, three and number four; right?
9
A. Correct.
10
Q. So that I can make sure I understand what
11 differences there are in those calculation methods
12 one through four, would you explain those to me?
13
A. Calculation method number -- it would be
14 helpful ifl can look at them.
15
Q. What do you need?
16
A. The schedules.
17
Q. So here is the schedules or calculation
18 method one, and we'll mark that as 8.
19
(Exhibit 8 marked.)
20
MR. BANDUCCI: Is this marked as 7?
21
MR. GJORDING: 7 is the body ofthe report.
2 2 8 is calculation number one.
23
WITNESS: Calculation method number one
2 4 basically kind of derives from what I understand the
2 5 legal theory to be. That the defendant's actions,
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had they not occurred, probably would have caused IMI
to either delay or probably not come in existence at
all.
In other words, these predate the actual
entering of the operating agreement by SARMC with IMI
and relate to things like IT support and all of the
negotiations and all of these other allegations made.
They measure diverted scans starting from
the very opening of IMI's doors through sometime -through 2006. Although 2006 is based on partial
incomplete data.
Calculation number two -Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) I want to ask you another
question about calculation one. So calculation
method number one, as I understand, embraces the idea
of damage resulting from scans that were diverted
from '99 through '06; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And for the purpose of this calculation, are
you assuming that IMI would not have come into
business?
A. No.
Q. What are you assuming in that regard?
A. I'm assuming that, to the extent that scans
were starting to occur there that were from
Page 67

traditional historical referring physicians at MRIA,
that if the allegations are proved, that they should
be encompassed in the damage calculation. That's
4 when they started.
5
Q. You are assuming that, for the purpose of
6 calculation number one, the scans would not have been
7 diverted between '99 and 2006, those scans that you
8 reflect in your report?
9
A. They would not have been?
10
Q. But for the actions of the
11 counterdefendants?
12
A. Yeah. That's the purpose of the
13 calculation.
14
Q. I wanted to make sure that you're not saying
15 in calculation number one that but for the actions of
the counterdefendants, IMI would never have existed.
1 16
17 You're not saying that?
18
A. I don't believe that, no. I think actually
1 9 that may be possible, but I have not assumed that to
2 0 be a fact.
21
Q. And you're not opining as to that?
22
A. I am not.
23
Q. So calculation method number two -- let's
2 4 get these marked.
25
MR. BANDUCCI: Jack, for purposes of
Page 68
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1 just for a second?
2
THE COURT: Can this witness step down?
3
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes.
4
THE COURT: You may step down, Mr. Dalley.
5
(Bench conference not reported.)
6
THE COURT: We're ahead of schedule. We
7 have a little break here, Gil. It will take a few
8 minutes, I think, for the next witness to arrive.
9 So we'll take a short recess.
0
(Jury absent.)
1
THE COURT: We've taken a short break.
2 And, Mr. Banducci, did you wish to address this
3 issue of your expert's testimony and your offer of
4 proof?
5
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, I did, Your Honor.
6
THE COURT: All right. You can go ahead.
7 Proceed.
8
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
9
THE COURT: First of all, any objection?
0
MR. GJORDING: Yes, sir.
1
THE COURT: Well, you're objecting to it,
2 but to bringing it up now?
3
MR. GJORDING: No, no.
4
THE COURT: Proceed, Mr. Banducci.
5
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
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Before I call Bruce Budge to the
stand, Your Honor, I'd like to draw the court's
attention to the testimony of Grant Chamberlain
that was read this morning. And specifically,
reference was made at page 105 to the objectives
that are stated at the beginning of the strategic
options assessment of Shattuck Hammond.
And at line 20, I'm talking with
Mr. Chamberlain, and I say the first one, in
reference to these objectives, reads specifically:
"SARMC would like to exchange its ownership
interests in MRIA and MRI and for controlling
interest in MRICI, the business, the primary
business of which is an operation of an MRI
facility on the campus of Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center."
And the second one is: "In
addition, Saint Alphonsus would like to be
released from its noncompete with MRIA which
precludes the hospital from opening additional
imaging centers in partnership with Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's primary
radiology group, Gem State Radiology.
"Are those the two primary
objectives that you believe were attained by Saint
Page 2677
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Alphonsus following recommended option 1?"
And the answer was: "Yes, two of
the primary objectives."
And I think I've referred to that as
the strategic options assessment. That's
Exhibit 4246, whether that's -- 4246 I think is
the valuation, isn't it?
I miss poke, Your Honor. That's the
introduction of the valuation performed by
Shattuck Hammond as opposed to the strategic
options assessment.
For the remainder of this offer of
proof, I'd call Bruce Budge to the stand, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Budge, just
come forward. The gentleman in the gray coat will
give you some instructions.

1

you want me to qualify this witness or whether or
not the court has already considered that in the
context of the various motions.
MR. GJORDING: No problem, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Proceed. He's qualified.
MR. GJORDING: For this purpose.
THE COURT: For purposes of this offer of
proof.
MR. BANDUCCI: That's fine. Thank you
verymuch.
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BRUCE POWELL BUDGE,
having been first duly sworn to tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, was examined and testified as follows:
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, in the interest
of brevity, I'd ask the court to tell me whether
Page 2678
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VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q. Mr. Budge, what I'd like to talk to
you about from the standpoint of your expert
perspective is the appropriate measure of damages
for wrongful disassociation. And perhaps what you
could do is tell the court what you consider to be
the appropriate way to measure damages for
wrongful disassociation given the circumstances
and facts that have arisen in this case.
A. Sure. When I originally evaluated
this issue in terms of the most direct approach,
it seemed to me that the value of basically the
partnership rights which MRI would give up as a
Page 2679
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result of the disassociation is the most direct
measure of what it would take to compensate them
for the loss of those rights.
And specifically, when we looked at
the objectives from the Shattuck Hammond analysis,
which was to partner with the hospital's
radiologists in operating-- in the magnetic
resonance services and be able to compete in that
area, those analyses focused on what it would take
to basically buy out MRIA in order to be relieved
of the noncompete and be able to basically have
the hospital in an ownership and control position
over the MRI services.
So that is the value in their
analysis which they would have to pay in order to
execute their plan. And by the same means, it
represents the value that MRIA would have been
entitled to in giving up its status as the, you
know, official provider of these services for the
Saint Al's network, and it's the most direct way
of measuring what it takes to make them whole.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I know that the
court had reserved its perspective on whether or
not this is an appropriate measure of damages.
It's not our intent at this time through this
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witness to put a particular number in that
represents that.
However, I felt that since Mr. Budge
was going to be here today and is testifying as an
expert in the area of commercial damages, that he
could give the court his perspective on the
appropriate methodology that would isolate these
wrongful disassociation damages in the context of
the Shattuck Hammond analysis and actually in the
context of other valuations or measures of value
that were provided to the hospital in March of
2004.
So our view is that although lost
profits is a way to measure the damages in this
case, including wrongful disassociation, that does
not prohibit this court and certainly the
witnesses from testifying, ifthey believe that it
is an appropriate measure, that this approach -which is, in effect, compensating MRIA for the
benefit of its contractual rights that it has lost
as a result of the wrongful disassociation-- is
also an appropriate way to measure this.
In effect, Shattuck Hammond provided
the hospital with what it would cost to rightfully
accomplish their game plan, their objectives.

1
Q. Can I see it?
2
A. Yes. Shall I come to you or -THE COURT: No. Gil will carry that.
3
4
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) So are these notes
5 that you made?
6
A. Yes.
7
Q. When did you make these?
8
A. Last night.
9
Q. Okay. And what prompted you to make
10 the notes?
11
A. In my testimony, I'm going to parse
12 out my damages according to these periods between
13 the inception ofiMI and its entering into the
14 operating agreement with Saint Al's -- between
15 that period and the date of its disassociation and
16 for the period after its disassociation.
17
Q. Well, I guess I should have asked,
18 did counsel talk to you and prompt you to do these
19 notes?
20
A. Yes. Basically in discussing my
21 direct testimony, he asked me to offer -- to parse
22 out the damages, and I intend to do that.
23
Q. Okay. Mr. Budge, as I recall, you
24 provided -- or your report in this case was dated
25 March 12 of this year; is that correct?

Today, the hospital is on the campus, partnered
with its rads, and it is competing in the service
area that it was not entitled to compete in under
the MRIA partnership agreement, and it hasn't paid
anything for that.
And so we consider that to be the
most direct way of measuring the losses that we
sustained because the hospital wrongfully withdrew
instead of paying us for the right to do those
things.
11
So that is the offer of proof, Your
12 Honor.
13
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Gjording, did
14 you wish to examine the witness?
15
MR. GJORDING: I do. I have a couple of
16 questions for Mr. Budge.
17
18
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
19 BY MR. GJORDING:
20
Q. Good morning, Mr. Budge.
21
A. Good morning.
22
Q. We met at your deposition, correct?
23
A. Yes, sir.
24
Q. Do you have some notes here?
25
A. I have one note here.
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the rights to all the profits that are going to
come in the future. And there's calculations that
we do where we can take a projected stream of
profits in the future and calculate how much
somebody would pay to own that.
And if the business was destroyed,
for example, and you know what that value is, then
that is a good proxy for all those future earnings
that never occurred. Or if a business was
impaired in some way where it was permanently
crippled, you can take what that valuation would
have been had it not been injured, what it is in
its present state; and the difference in that
valuation can represent the damage. And that's
fairly commonly used, too.
Q. Now, in this case, Mr. Budge, we
have a number of valuations ofMRIA or MRI Center
during the time of the facts in this case. And
those valuations were suggested to the hospital as
a way of valuing a buyout.
Can that approach or those facts be
used to measure damages in this case in connection
specifically with a wrongful withdrawal by a
partner?
A. If you're going to determine the
Page 2724
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amount that IMI would have to pay in order to
accomplish what it wanted to accomplish -Q. IMI or the hospital?
A. The hospital; I'm sorry. Which I
understand at some point in time they had the
objective of owning with their radiologists the
MRI or magnetic resonance imaging equipment and to
be able to compete within this 100-mile service
area from the hospital. If a calculation was done
as to what they would have to do to buy out MRIA
in order to allow them to execute that strategy,
that would represent the amount that MRIA would
have to receive to be fairly compensated for
giving up their rights in the partnership, and it
could be a measure of damages.
Q. Thank you. Why don't you go ahead
and take a seat.
We touched on this a few minutes
ago, but when it comes to measuring damages in
these sorts of commercial contexts, can you
measure damage to the penny?
A. No. And I hope I indicated, you
know, to the maximum extent possible, you try to
base it on verifiable objective data, but they
still are assumptions.
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You know, the world is a complicated
place. And so sometimes you have to make
assumptions that generalize factors, and so it's
not a calculation that's done to the penny. But
it still needs to be neutral in its approach, not
have inherent bias and be fairly even-handed in
the assumptions that it makes.
Q. Now, would you tell the jury what
you were asked to do in connection with this
litigation.
A. In this litigation there's an
alleged course of conduct by the hospital which
had the result of diverting business from MRIA to
IMI. And my assignment was to basically calculate
the profits that were lost in connection with this
loss ofbusiness.
Q. Okay. Now, with respect to your
assignment, are you the only expert involved in
measuring this loss?
A. In this case, I'm not, no.
Q. And who is the other gentleman
involved in measuring the loss in this case for
MRI Associates?
A. There's an appraiser by the name of
Charles Wilhoite. And kind of our division of
Page 2726
duties is that I calculate the historical damages,
the ones that are in the past; and I do that
through December 31st, 2006. Then Mr. Wilhoite
basically projects the future stream of profits
that was lost and converts it into a valuation
which -- so I've got the past, and he's got the
future.
Q. You've got the past. All right.
Good. So given that assignment, what did you do?
A. I mentioned to you three or four
possible ways of approaching damages. And I
actually used a fifth one, which is a direct
measurement of what the migration of business was
from MRIA to IMI as a result of this course of
conduct. And I quantified it.
Q. Okay. Well, let's start with what
you had to start with. And can the -- let me hand
you Exhibit 4417.
THE COURT: Has it been stipulated to?
MR. BANDUCCI: I think it's only been
stipulated as to authenticity, Your Honor. I'll
lay foundation.
THE COURT: Okay. 4417 will be presented
to the witness.
THE BAILIFF: It has not been admitted.
Page 2727
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1
And it is the first thing I
2 typically look at in an assignment is both sides'
3 pleadings or arguments so I can understand what's
4 the case about and what is the actual damage
5 measurement that I'm being asked to make.
Q. Okay. So how -- I noticed, for
6
7 example, one ofthe things that's in here
8 references the counterclaim, which is the first
9 one at the top. How did you familiarize yourself
10 with the facts of this case initially so that you
11 could understand what your assignment looked like?
12
A. I basically read all of these
13 documents, which describe in the counterclaim -1 4 which would be the position of MRIA -- what it
15 thought its injuries were, what its allegation
16 were against the hospital and that sort of thing.
17
Q. Now, is there anything that you
18 observed in the allegations that directed you to
19 consider what methodology to use to measure the
2 0 lost profits?
21
A. Yeah. It was basically that
2 2 background work which caused me to basically adopt
2 3 a particular analytical approach to what the
2 4 damages would be.
25
Basically, the pleadings described

Page 2732

1 advantages were given to IMI that were withheld
2 from Saint Al's partner, MRIA.
3
And then there was basically a
4 finding by the court which I also read.
5
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, I'll object to
6 his interpretation of your work.
7
THE COURT: He's objecting to the-- well,
8 I'm going to overrule at this point. You may
9 answer the question, Mr. Budge.
10
THE WITNESS: Among other things I read
11 was an order by the court where there was a
12 finding that when Saint Alphonsus withdrew from
13 the MRIA partnership, that that was wrongful.
14
So those would all be examples of
15 this course of conduct which would suggest that
1 6 basically loss of business from MRIA would
1 7 naturally result to the benefit of IMI.
18
MR. BANDUCCI: Can the witness be
1 9 presented Exhibit 4490. And this has not been
2 0 admitted.
21
THE COURT: 4490 is being presented to the
22 witness.
23
Q. (BY MR. BANDUCCI) Now, you've been
2 4 handed a memorandum decision. Is this memorandum
2 5 decision something that you reviewed and relied

~----+-

1 allegations about a course of conduct that
2 resulted in patient services and, therefore,
3 revenues and profits being diverted away from MRIA
4 to IMI.
5
So I developed an approach that
6 would basically try to directly look at what were
7 those revenues that were being taken from one
8 business and moved to another because of these
9 alleged acts.
10
Q. We talk about these alleged acts.
11 Give the jury just an example of what your
12 understanding ofthe alleged acts are.
13
A. Well, there's a number, but I could
14 probably think of some examples. There's an
15 allegation that service levels were reduced at
1 6 MRIA by physicians which affected their patient
1 7 care and their ability to do business.
18
There's an allegation that when
1 9 Saint Alphonsus entered into the operating
2 0 agreement with IMI in 2001, that that -- going
2 1 into business with a competitor violated their
2 2 noncompete. That would be an example.
23
There's an allegation that -- I
2 4 don't know if you've heard of this DR system, but
2 5 it was more broadly technological support and

Page 2733
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1 upon in developing your work in this case?
A. Yeah. I believe this was a part of
2
3 those documents.
4
MR. BANDUCCI: We'd move its admission,
5 Your Honor.
6
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, I understand
7 this is what you will be instructing the jury on.
8 I don't have any problem with him relying on the
9 concept.
10
THE COURT: I'll sustain. They're going
11 to get a specific instruction.
12
MR. BANDUCCI: Very well.
13
Q. (BY MR. BANDUCCI) All right.
14 Mr. Budge, did you also review-- we talked about
15 this, the financial data. Did you review
1 6 operational data which reflected the identity of
1 7 the doctors who were referring to IMI?
18
A. Yes. I think I indicated that, that
19 I actually-- starting in 2001 through the middle
2 0 of 2006, I had the detail of every referral and
2 1 examination that was given to IMI.
22
MR. BANDUCCI: All right. Can the witness
2 3 be presented 4425.
24
THE COURT: Has that been stipulated to?
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, I need to look
25
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1 It appeared to me that this case and the
2 allegations of this case is about a diversion of a
3 customer base from MRIA to a competitor of it,
4 IMI, by one of its partners.
5
And the best way to measure what
6 that migration of its business or the diversion of
7 its business is is to directly measure. It's to
8 basically look at the scans that were actually
9 done by IMI and to try to develop criteria which
1 0 is even-handed which would help us identify which
11 one ofthose, in all probability, would have been
12 done by MRIA had these various allegations not
13 occurred.
14
So, again, I'm looking at it as a
15 universe of referrals that come kind of out of the
1 6 Saint Alphonsus family, and I'm actually tracking
1 7 them as they move from MRIA to IMI.
18
Q. Now, you mentioned allegations. Did
19 you do an evaluation ofthe allegations ofbreach
2 0 of fiduciary duty or wrongful withdrawal or
21 violation of the noncompete on your own?
A. No. That's really not my view or my
22
2 3 role as a damages expert. I basically am taking
2 4 those conditions, which I think basically you will
2 5 have to decide whether they're factual enough.

1 magnetic resonance imaging. And I took none of
2 those.
3
So there are other questions that
4 may arise. But this is an example of are you
5 talking about even-handedness. This is something
6 that's conservative, and I think it makes the
7 calculation more reliable.
Q. Is there any reason why you didn't
8
9 go and interview all of these physicians to ask
1 0 them why they changed from or had previously
11 referred from MRIA but are now referring to IMI?
12
A. There's a couple of reasons I didn't
13 do that. And one ofthem or several ofthem
14 revolved around the practicality of doing that.
15 And the other one is I don't really think it's
1 6 necessary to do that.
17
But in terms of practicality, I've
18 had a number of cases where we do surveys on like
19 customer perceptions and that type of thing. But
2 0 the difficulty that you have on surveys is, one,
21 getting a representative sample. You need to get
2 2 enough of them so that it's meaningful and you
2 3 know it represents the population.
24
The second one is interpreting the
2 5 results. In a case-- ifl was able to, and I'm
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And if they occurred, then what I've calculated is
what the financial implications are of those
actions.
Q. Do you believe that this approach is
conservative?
A. Well, I think it is conservative in
a couple of senses. One is that it didn't involve
me trying to go out and trying to reconstruct what
MRIA would look like based upon its past trends
extrapolated into the future and analysis of the
market as a whole. It allowed me to directly look
at scans that were being done, who they were being
referred by, and whether they were part of the
historical referral base.
Secondly, the one thing I think is
quite conservative is the way I treated physicians
who had not previously referred to MRIA. Because
there was a majority ofthem who had admitting
privileges at either St. Luke's or St. Luke's and
Saint Al's.
It's logical to me that some of
those were certainly ones where the physician had
admitting privileges at both hospitals would find
their way to MRIA in a world where MRIA was in the
sole partnering relationship with the hospital for

1 not even sure practically that you could get busy
2 doctors to stop and get themselves involved in
3 this lawsuit to answer questions like that.
4
But if you did, they might come up
5 with a lot of reasons why they're now referring to
6 IMI. And those could be colored by friendships
7 and loyalties they had. They could tell you
8 that -- you know, you would have to sit and look
9 at the reason and say: Now, does that relate to
10 one of the underlying allegations? You know, if
11 they said "because the radiologist told me to use
12 IMI," that's an answer, but how does that relate
13 to the allegations in this case? It gets very,
14 very complicated.
15
So I'm concerned that you would have
16 to find an unbiased sample, people that are not
17 partisans and enough of them that you would get
1 8 answers that you knew what they meant.
19
Finally, I don't think it's needed.
2 0 Because this case is about this course of conduct
2 1 which, a step at a time, basically handicapped
2 2 MRIA to the advantage of one of its partners and
2 3 caused this migration of referrals, which you can
2 4 clearly see in that graph of the scans.
25
Those scans -- when MRI goes down,
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read back, please.
(Question read by the reporter.)
THE WITNESS: Basically what I'm trying to
look at is the substance of where IMI's governance
comes from. And because ofthe composition of the
board and the requirements for making decisions at
IMI, which requires certain percentage votes for
things, IMI cannot be governed without Saint
Alphonsus participation.
And in that sense, it's -- it's
controlled by the radiologists and Saint Alphonsus
jointly in every substantive sense of the word.
MR. BANDUCCI: All right. Thank you.
That's all the questions I have, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Gjording, you may
cross-examine.
MR. GJORDING: Thank you very much, Your
Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. GJORDING:
Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Budge.
A. Good afternoon.
Q. I know I don't have to ask you to
watch my questions carefully, because I know

1 that?
2
MR. BANDUCCI: Objection. Misstates the
3 evidence, and there's no evidence in the record to
4 support Mr. Gjording's question.
5
THE COURT: Response? Just a moment.
6 Response?
7
MR. GJORDING: Let me rephrase the
8 question.
9
THE COURT: Rephrase it. Sustained.
10
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) Let me pose a
11 hypothetical question to you, Mr. Budge. If later
12 in this case this jury should be advised that
13 there is, indeed, another management committee
14 that has no Saint Alphonsus membership on it, and
15 it manages the MRI aspect of the business, would
1 6 you then agree that Saint Alphonsus does not
17 control the entirety of the IMI business?
18
A. If that evidence was introduced -- I
1 9 mean, you really would have to look at what both
2 0 governing boards did to see that that separation
2 1 was really carefully observed, but it could be
2 2 applicable.
23
Q. Yes. But what -- I guess my real
2 4 question is that if, indeed, there is another
2 5 management committee at IMI that deals with the
Page 2782
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you've been through this process before, true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. On this last issue, Mr. Budge, were
you aware that IMI had two managing committees?
MR. BANDUCCI: Objection.
MR. GJORDING: I just asked him if he was
aware.
MR. BANDUCCI: Facts not in evidence, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) Were you aware
that they had two operating committees?
A. I'm not sure. Maybe ifyou can tell
me their name, I can tell you ifl was aware of
them both. This is -- the one that I just
referred to is the one in front of my mind.
Q. I realize the one you're talking
about there -- there is a management committee at
IMI that has Saint Alphonsus members and IMI
members. But if you read that document, you'd see
that it applies only to the non-MRI aspect of the
business.
So my question is: Were you aware
that they also had a management committee at IMI
that dealt with the MRI issues? Did you know
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MRI issues, you're not aware of it; is that true?
MR. BANDUCCI: Objection. States facts
not in evidence, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I'm not familiar with it.
MR. GJORDING: Okay. Fine.
Gil, could you get me that -whatever the number of that one is. I believe
it's been admitted. Can you see a number on it?
566, I hope. The smaller version has been
admitted as 566.
THE COURT: Proceed.
MR. GJORDING: Could you put that in front
of the podium here right here, just so both the
jury and Mr. Budge can see that.
Mr. Budge, can you see that?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, may I step
around it?
THECOURT: Youmay.
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) I want to make
sure, Mr. Budge, that what we're talking about
here -- what you're talking about here is the loss
of profits ofMRI Center ofldaho, true?
A. I have to make a qualification with
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1 respect to Meridian because I haven't made an
2 assumption about what unit that would be in.
Q. But insofar as any income that would
3
4 flow from the mobile side, say, from the Pacific
5 Northwest operations, you're not talking about
6 that?
7
A. I'm not talking about any diversion
8 ofMRIM revenues.
9
Q. Right. In fact, you're not talking
10 about any loss of revenue from the mobile side,
11 are you?
12
A. I'm not, unless MRIA had chosen to
13 service Meridian out of that location. But
14 otherwise, no.
15
Q. So far -- it's true, is it not, that
1 6 so far as the income flow from the mobile side is
1 7 still flowing to MRIA and DMR, you have no reason
18 to believe that that flow isn't just as vigorous
19 as it always has been?
A. That's true.
20
21
Q. So I want to kind of start kind of
2 2 back where Mr. Banducci started with you on some
2 3 very basic, very basic assumptions upon which your
2 4 opinions are based. Okay?
25
And I understand that what you're

course of conduct, that migration would not have
occurred.
Q. And you're not here to say that the
4 bad acts caused it; you're assuming that they
5 caused it?
6
A. I'm not offering testimony on that.
7 Logically, I need to understand the causation, and
8 it seems reasonable. But I'm not weighing in on
9 that.
10
Q. And I follow the logic. But also
11 you were told, were you not, when you were given
12 this assignment, that you were to read the
13 counterclaim and to understand that, in the
14 counterclaim, MRIA alleged that there were all of
15 these bad acts, and they also alleged that all of
1 6 these bad acts caused the very damage that you're
1 7 testifying to, true?
18
A. I think that that is true. The
19 counterclaim does that. And I did read it, yes.
Q. And we're going to go back to that
20
21 a little later, Mr. Budge. But I wanted to make
2 2 sure that you and I are connecting here in terms
2 3 of me understanding what you assume to be true
2 4 and, therefore, based on those assumptions, that
2 5 you could basically calculate the numbers, right?
1
2
3

Page 2786

Page 2784

1
2
3
4

5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

doing here is you're making a lost scans/lost
profits analysis?
A. Fair enough.
Q. Okay. And so what you do is you
find out how many scans were lost, true?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And you multiply that times
the price per scan?
A. Correct.
Q. And you get the gross profits?
A. I get the incremental profits,
right.
Q. And from that analysis, that simple
analysis, you can give us the opinions that you've
given here today?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. The other thing that you have
assumed, ifl followed Mr. Banducci's questions,
is that the -- what you call the diversion or
sometimes call the migration of these lost scans
was caused by -- you're assuming that it was
caused by these various things that I'm going to
call bad acts?
A. Yeah. They need to be connected
with them. And I'm assuming that without that
Page 2785

1
A. Okay.
2
Q. Okay. And I think you said that
3 these numbers that you've talked about here today
4 would not have occurred -- and you used the phrase
5 "but for." In other words, this migration would
6 not have occurred but for these bad acts?
A. That's right.
7
8
MR. GJORDING: Let's take a look -9 Mr. Bailiff, if we could put up on an easel4519,
10 please. Should be one of those graphs. That one,
11 yes, sir.
12
Mr. Bailiff, if you could position
13 that so I can see -- yes. That would be good.
14 Thank you. Put that right over here.
15
And, Judge, if you don't mind, I'll
1 6 step around and point.
THE COURT: You may.
'1 7
18
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, may I step
19 around there?
20
THE COURT: You may.
21
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) So you're saying,
2 2 are you not, Mr. Budge, that this area right here,
2 3 the "but for" line is the pink line, and the other
2 4 line is the IMI line, correct?
25
A. Right.
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Q. But for the bad acts, MRlA would
still be enjoying this profit that represents the
difference between the pink line and the blue
line?
A. Exactly right.
Q. True?
A. Yeah.
Q. And we know, do we not, that IMI
opened their center downtown in 1999?
A. Correct.
Q. True? And almost precisely at the
same time, that's when MRI's profits began to fall
off, true?
A. Within a year, yes.
Q. Yes. Well, it looks like they're
exactly the same. Is that -- is that drawing,
correct?
A. Well, this shows scans. And the
scans declined between '99 and 2000.
Q. Okay. But let's look at what
happens with MRlA between 1985 and 1999. Steady
growth, right?
A. Generally.
Q. How many real competitors did they
have in those years?
Page 2788

1
Q. And I'm sure if something was in
2 your mind, you'd tell me about it, wouldn't you?
A. You bet.
3
4
Q. Okay. Isn't it true, Mr. Budge,
5 that the only formidable competitor that MRlA had
6 ever encountered before 19 -- or by 1999 was IMI?
A. Well, ifyou're looking in the
7
8 context of all providers, I would think St. Luke's
9 would be a formidable competitor. But certainly
10 within the family of referring physicians
11 affiliated with Saint Al's, that's absolutely
12 right. They had a monopoly. And when IMI came
13 in, all of the sudden that referral base was
1 4 diverted.
15
Q. And if you want to talk about logic,
16 if you've got a product that can generate the kind
, 1 7 of revenues that you've been talking about here
!18 today, and you've got a monopoly, doesn't logic
19 tell you that, of course, you're going to have a
2 0 line like that? Of course, they're going to grow
21 rapidly, true?
A. Well, it may be true if the market
22
2 3 is growing, yeah.
24
Q. Okay. So using your logic, do you
2 5 have any reason to disagree that, of course, they
Page 2790

A. Well, in the sense of being the sole
magnetic resonance imaging provider of Saint Al's,
they did not have competition. There were
certainly other magnets in the Treasure Valley
during that period.
Q. How many were in the Treasure
Valley?
A. I don't remember. We had tried to
survey that. I'm not sure ifl ever knew exactly.
Q. Well, I want to ask you to assume
that, for these early years, certainly from 1985
until, oh, say 1995, the only other magnet in this
area was one owned by St. Luke's Regional Medical
Center. Ask you to assume that.
A. Okay.
Q. So, if you assume that, would you
agree with me that for these years that this curve
was really looking very good, they had only one
competitor?
A. Well, you asked me to assume that.
Q. I know. So, therefore, you have to.
But you don't have any reason to believe that that
hypothetical isn't true, do you?
A. I can't actually recall. Nothing
that's in my mind right now.
Page 2789

1 would have a very positive growth rate during
2 those years if they had no competitor?
3
A. That may explain one of the factors
4 that caused their growth rate. Population would
5 be another. Probably the frequency that doctors
6 were using MRI would explain some of it.
7
Q. Now, I want you to assume another
8 hypothetical. I want you to assume that IMI, when
9 it opened in 1999, was owned by what was perceived
1 0 by the referring physicians in this valley as
11 truly excellent radiologists. I want you to
12 assume that.
13
A. Okay.
14
Q. Okay. If you assume that, and you
15 assume that IMI was therefore a formidable
16 competitor, does logic explain why IMI went up and
1 7 MRI went down?
18
A. I think that the allegations in the
1 9 case explain why that happened.
20
The hospital has a group of
2 1 radiologists that are under its contract. I
2 2 assume it has -23
Q. Mr. Budge, that wasn't my question.
2 4 Let me rephrase the question, and let me help you
25 here.
Page 2791
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Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) Now, I want to
show you this. And I'm going to kind of hold it
here, Judge, ifthat's okay.
Now, you're assuming, are you not,
Mr. Budge, that the reason that MRIA went down and
IMI went up is because of all of these bad acts?
A. Basically, yeah, the allegations are
what caused the migration.
Q. Right. And you've been asked to
assume that that is true, have you not?
A. That's my assignment.
Q. Yeah. That's your assignment from
MRIA's attorney, correct?
A. Well-Q. They asked you --just a second.
It's true, is it not -- yes or no -- that those
people asked you to assume that the reason that
these market dynamics occurred was because of all
of these bad acts; isn't that true?
A. That's the only way it can be.
That's true.
Q. Right. Well, it's the only way it
can be for you because you were asked to assume
that as being true; isn't that true?
A. No. I think that misstates the
Page 2800
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situation. It's true because I'm not the trier of
fact.
Q. Okay.
A. I don't make the determinations
about whether these allegations of giving
advantages or breaching contracts are true.
What I do do is give accounting
effect to the theories that either side -- I could
have done it for you -Q. I understand that.
A. -- in this case. You give me yours,
and I can do the calculations. And that's what
I've done.
Q. What I'm saying is -- and you're
saying this -- is the folks that are going to
decide whether or not these bad acts caused this
picture to result are those folks?
A. Absolutely.
Q. But for the purpose of your
analysis, you were asked to assume that these bad
acts caused this picture, true?
MR. BANDUCCI: Asked and answered.
THE COURT: Well, I'll allow him to
answer.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Page 2801
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Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) Right. Otherwise,
you wouldn't be able to say that the bad acts
caused the diversion or the migration or whatever
it is you want to call it, true?
A. No. I can observe -- well, that the
bad acts caused them?
Q. Yes.
A. I think the data corroborates that
they did, but I'm not opining on it.
Q. And you were candid enough to tell
us that you didn't run out and interview every
doctor that refers patients to these two
13 facilities, did you?
14
A. I didn't interview any doctors.
15
Q. Okay. Well, let me ask you this:
16 Did you have the occasion to investigate as to
17 whether or not these radiologists have really
18 excellent reputations in this valley?
19
A. I think I assumed that they did.
20
Q. You assumed that they did?
21
A. Yes.
22
Q. Okay. All right. Let's talk
23 about -- let's talk about the bad acts for a
24 while. Mr. Bailiff, can you take that down for a
25 second?
Page 2802
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, let me advise
you what I want to do -- you and counsel. As
counsel did, he provided Mr. Budge with portions
of the report in order to illustrate a point. I
certainly am not wanting to introduce this exhibit
into evidence, but I do want to ask Mr. Budge to
refer to portions of his report and answer some
questions. Is that okay?
MR. BANDUCCI: I can't answer that, Your
Honor, without looking at what it is -11
THE COURT: I'm going to allow him to
12 proceed. Proceed.
13
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) I'm going to hand
14 you, Mr. Budge, what I'm sure you will immediately
15 recognize as your report.
16
A. I do.
17
Q. And turn to page 8, if you will.
18 And read to yourself, because I'm going to ask
19 you -- as you have already testified, you read the
20 counterclaim in this case, correct?
21
A. Yes.
22
Q. Okay. And from reading the
23 counterclaim, you were able to discern what these
24 various bad acts are?
25
A. Right. There may have been other
Page 2803
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client or IMI is likewise for these folks, true?
A. Your client is half ofiMI. You
mean your client or the radiologists?
Q. No. My client is the hospital.
A. Okay.
Q. The hospital that's involved in a
non-MRijoint venture with the radiologists.
MR. BANDUCCI: Objection, Your Honor.
Argumentative.
THE COURT: Well, overruled.
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) True?
A. I'm afraid I've forgotten the
question.
MR. GJORDING: Can you read it back?
THE REPORTER: Do you want me to start
back? Because it's a little disjointed.
MR. GJORDING: Let's skip it.
THE COURT: Let's skip it.
MR. GJORDING: Mr. Bailiff, I need you to
put up the easel, please. And put up 451 -- 4519.
I hope I'm guessing right. Yes.
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) What I want to do
here, Mr. Budge, is I want to call your attention
to this area. This is what I'm going to call the
"but for" area.
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MR. BANDUCCI: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Your objection is?
MR. BANDUCCI: It's not a question. He's
testifYing.
THE COURT: I'll overrule.
THE WITNESS: By my standards, it's a
lucrative business.
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) Me too. Me too.
Of course, as we discussed, this "but for" area is
comprised of the scans that you believe MRI would
have gotten at three locations: IMI's downtown
location, true?
A. True.
Q. IMI's Meridian location, true?
A. True.
Q. And the mobile magnet or magnet that
was ultimately put on Saint Alphonsus' campus in
2005, true?
A. True.
Q. Is it your assumption, Mr. Budge,
that IMI wouldn't have gone to Meridian ifMRIA
had gone to Meridian?
A. I didn't make an explicit assumption
about that, so I would say no.
Q. Now, IMI went out there in 2002,
Page 2810
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A. It's what I call the damages area.
Q. Yeah. The damages that would not
have occurred but for the bad acts?
A. Damages that did occur because of
the bad acts.
Q. Right. I want to understand that -am I correct, yes or no, that this area of damage
that is defined by the blue and pink lines is
$15 million?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And does that give you or
does it give the jury some idea of the magnitude
13 of the dollars that these businesses generate?
14
A. Yeah, I think generally.
15
Q. And the reason I want you to call
16 that to their attention is because I want them to
17 have an understanding of why these numbers are so
18 huge.
19
And you're saying, are you not, that
20 this portion right here, this "but for" portion,
21 represents $15 million?
22
A. Right, over the course of, what is
23 it, seven years.
24
Q. Right. Pretty lucrative business,
25 true?
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right?
A. Yes.
Q. And MRI never did go out there,
right -- MRIA?
A. Right.
Q. But you're saying that because of
these bad acts, all of the business that IMI has
enjoyed out at Meridian should have gone to MRIA?
A. No. I'm saying that in this
calculation, that they would have preserved their
referral base by virtue of their exclusive
affiliation with Saint Alphonsus.
Q. Oh, so you're not saying IMI would
not have gone to Meridian?
A. No.
Q. What you're saying is that even if
they went to Meridian, all of those scans that
they got in Meridian would have gone down to MRIA?
A. Well, I'm actually saying that had
Saint Alphonsus had the fidelity towards MRIA and
the partnership, that they would have supported it
as opposed to IMI in going to -- in going to
Meridian.
Q. So the -- it's really Saint
Alphonsus' fault that IMI has done so well in
Page 2811
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you're asking me. I'm not expressing an opinion
about what IMI did in 1999.
Q. Okay. No. What I meant was -- and
that's a fair comment, Mr. Budge. What I was
referring to, on page 8, 9, and 10 of your report,
ifyou've still got itthere, you've got, as I
mentioned, 12 or 15 bad acts. That's what I'm
referring to as "bad acts."
A. Okay.
Q. And many of them were IMI, the
radiologists, true?
A. Yeah. I call them GSR, the rads,
because IMI is a partnership between the rads and
Saint Al's. But yes.
MR. GJORDING: Thank you.
THE COURT: Redirect?
MR. BANDUCCI: Just a couple questions,
Your Honor.
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A. See, that's really a prerequisite
for me to do any assignment. Because I'm not a
judge and a jury. I'm not on a mission. I'm not
deciding this case.
What I am is an accountant. And I
need an assignment that says: I want you to
assume that, during the course of a trial, we're
going to prove these facts. Now, if that's true,
we need an accountant present to tell us what that
means in terms of money damages. And that's what
I do.
So I'm not presumptuous enough so I
can go in and I can evaluate my client is right or
my client is wrong. You know, I don't try to do
that. I can't possibly do that. I'm not hearing
all the evidence that you're hearing.
I do accounting calculations which
flow from these assumptions, and that's what every
damages expert does. He can't or she can't do
their work unless they're given the assumptions
that they're supposed to calculate.
MR. BANDUCCI: That's all.
MR. GJORDING: I have one last question,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: One last question. Well, what
Page 2821

1 is it before I let you ask it? What -2
MR. GJORDING: I'm going to ask him about
3 a-- relating to what Mr. Banducci said.
4
THE COURT: I know that's a requirement.
5
MR. GJORDING: Oh, the question. The
6 question is going to be, Your Honor, ifl may,
7 that is it true -8
9
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
10 BY MR. GJORDING:
11
Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Budge, that if
12 this jury determines that this curve and that
13 curve were not caused by these bad acts but,
14 rather, were caused by good, stiff competition
15 from IMI, then your damage figure is zero, true?
16
A. If none of them were proved, I would
17 think so.
18
MR. GJORDING: That's all.
19
THE COURT: Any additional?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
MR. BANDUCCI: Nothing further, Your
20
21 Honor.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
22
THE COURT: Mr. Budge, thank you. Have a
Q. This point about assumptions, that
2 3 good trip back to Seattle.
we asked you to assume certain -- to assume the
THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.
24
allegations, can you tell the jury how that fits
25
THE COURT: You may call your next
into the work of a damages expert?
Page 28.22
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witness.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, the next
witness is flying into the Boise airport hopefully
as we speak.
THE COURT: Can you reach him by phone?
MR. BANDUCCI: We can put him on by phone
if you'd like, Your Honor. But this is what I
forewarned the court about this morning, that it
was a possibility we would complete Mr. Budge.
and-THE COURT: So you just have the one
witness tomorrow?
MR. BANDUCCI: That's it.
THE COURT: Well, you get to go home
early. I can see the disappointment. All right.
We'll see you tomorrow morning. Be in recess.
(Jury absent.)
THE COURT: So Mr. Wilhoite, and did you
have any other -- I know you're going to admit
possibly some documents through Mr. Wilhoite. But
did you have any other documentary evidence that
you were intending to introduce other than through
Mr. Wilhoite?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, the only thing
I'm going to check this evening is to see whether
Page 2823
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INTRODUCTION

My name is Charles A. Wilhoite. Currently, I maintain professional designations as a Certified Public
Accountant/Accredited in Business Valuation, and an Accredited Senior Appraiser in business valuation.
These designations, among others, are described in my detailed curriculum vitae, attached to this opinion as
Appendix A.
Based on my professional training and experience with regard to business valuation and related financial and
economic analysis, I have been retained by MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA LLP") to provide an independent
estimate of the economic damages MRIA LLP and its operating entities, MRI Center ("MRIC") and MRI
Mobile ("MRIM") (hereafter collectively referred to as "MRIA") experienced as a result of the alleged
wrongful acts (the "Acts") committed by the Counterdefendants and Third Party Defendants named in this
matter.
For the purpose of completing this analysis and developing my opinons, I have reviewed various financial,
corporate and related documents and information provided to me relating to MRIA and this litigation, and
conducted independent research and analysis with regard to relevant industry (i.e., medical imaging
services), economic, and investment considerations. The documents and information considered by me are
listed in Appendix B, and/or are referenced in this opinion letter and attached exhibits.

A. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE

The objective of this analysis is to estimate the economic damages incurred by MRIA as a result of the
Acts of the Counterdefendants and Third Party Defendants. The purpose of this analysis is to provide an
independent opinion regarding the estimated economic damages. No other purpose is intended or should
be inferred.

B. PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
I have developed my opinions based on consideration of (1) the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice ("USPAP"), as promulgated by The Appraisal Foundation, (2) the Principles of
Appraisal Practice and Code of Ethics and Business Valuation Standards of the American Society of
Appraisers, and (3) generally accepted valuation, economic and financial theory.

C. WILLAMETTE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES
Founded in the 1960s, Willamette Management Associates is one of the nation's leading independent
valuation consulting, economic analysis, and financial advisory firms. Our principal business is the valuation
of businesses and business interests-including both privately held and publicly traded companies-for all
purposes, including mergers and acquisitions, divestitures, public offerings, gift and estate taxes, employee
stock ownership plans, corporate and partnership recapitalizations, dissolutions and other objectives.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP
ESTIMATED ECONOMIC DAMAGES ANALYSIS
CONFIDENTIAL-PAGE 2
D. PREMISE OF ECONOMIC DAMAGES

While discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections of this opinion letter, the Acts on the part of the
Counterdefendants and Third Party Defendants generally are summarized as (1) unfair business practices,
(2) business interference, (3) violation of noncompete agreement, and (4) wrongful dissociation. I
understand that a July 24, 2006, ruling by the Honorable Michael McLaughlin, District Judge, Idaho 4th
Judicial District held that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care ("SADC"), successor entity to Saint
Alphonsus Magnetic Resonance, Inc., and a wholly owned subsidiary of Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center (collectively referred to hereafter as "SARMC"), wrongfully dissociated from MRIA on
or about April 4, 2004. 1
Based on consideration of the July 24, 2006, ruling, and assuming the remaining allegations presented by
MRIA are proven, I have estimated the economic damages incurred by MRIA based on the premise that
the Acts resulted in (1) the loss of historical relationships and (2) the diversion of future business
opportunities with regard to the operations of MRIA. The loss of historical relationships and diversion of
business opportunities can be equated to lost revenues and economic returns, which exert a detrimental
impact on the current fair market value ofMRIA.
It is my understanding that Bruce P. Budge of FTI Consulting, Inc., will provide expert opinions regarding
the estimated economic damages, represented by historical lost profits, incurred by MRIA as a result of the
Acts. I have been asked to provide an independent estimate of the future lost profits, as represented by the
decline in business value, incurred by MRIA as a result of the Acts. To develop an estimate of the future lost
profits, I have analyzed the following:
1. The estimated decline in the fair market value of MRIA between the initiation of the Acts and the
current date, based on comparison of the fair market value of MRIA at the time the Acts commenced
with the current fair market value ofMRIA.
2.

The incremental fair market value that MRIA would reflect currently but-for the loss of historical
relationships and diverted business opportunity caused by the Acts.

Standard of Value and Premise of Value
In performing my analysis and forming my opinions, I have applied the fair market value standard (or
definition) of value. Fair market value is the amount at which property would change hands between a
willing seller and a willing buyer when neither is acting under compulsion and when both have
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. Among other factors, this appraisal takes into consideration all
elements of appraisal listed in Internal Revenue Service Revenue Ruling 59-60, which generally outlines the
valuation of closely held companies.
MRIA was appraised under the appraisal premise of value in continued use, as a going concern business
enterprise. This premise of value represents the highest and best use of the assets controlled by MRIA.

1
See July 24, 2006, Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's Motions to Strike, Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment, and Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, entered in the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of ADA, Case No. CVOC 048219D.
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IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED)
CARE, INC., an Idaho
nonprofit corporation,

)
)

Plaintiff, )
vs.

)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

THE DEPOSITION OF CHARLES A. WILHOITE,
CPA, CMA, ASA, was taken on behalf of the
Plaintiff/Counterdefendants at the offices of
Givens Pursley, LLP, 601 West Bannock, Boise, Idaho,
83701, commencing at 9:00a.m., on April2, 2007,
before Barbara Burke, Certified Shorthand Reporter
and Notary Public within and for the State of
Idaho in the above-entitled matter.

9
Case No. CV OC 0408219D

REPORTED BY:

0
APPEARANCES
1
2 For the Plaintiff/ Givens Pursley, LLP
3 Counterdefendants: By PATRICK J. MILLER
4
601 West Bannock Street
5
Post Office Box 2720
6
Boise, ID 83701-2720
7
-and8
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
9
By JACKS. GJORDING
0
509 West Hays Street
1
Post Office Box 2837
2
Boise, ID 83701-2837
3

BARBARA BURKE, CSR No. 463

4

Notary Public

5

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an )
Idaho limited liability )
partnership,
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)

(caption continued)
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CHARLES A WILHOITE, CPA, CMA, ASA
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1 MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho )
2 limited liability partnership, )
3
Counterclaimant, )
4 vs.
)
5 SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED )
6 CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit )
7 corporation; SAINT ALPHONSUS )
8 REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
)
9
Counterdefendants. )
)
0
1 MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho )
2 limited liability partnership, )
3
Third-Party Plaintiff, )
4 vs.
)
5 INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, )
6 LLC, an Idaho limited liability )
7 company; GEM STATE RADIOLOGY, )
8 LLP, an Idaho limited liability )
9 partnership; and IMAGING CENTER )
< 0
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho )
~ 1
limited liability partnership, )
< 2
Third-Party Defendants. )
' 3
)
< 4
' 5
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McKlveen & Jones
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3
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5
P.O. Box 1368
6
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A. Maybe just a brief conversation here
and there for scheduling or status updates,
things of that nature.
Q. What about Mr. Banducci; did you have
conversations with Mr. Banducci in connection
with preparation of your Expert Opinion?
A. Most of my contact was with Mr. Gordon,
and I didn't speak with Mr. Banducci until roughly
towards the end, prior to delivering our opinion.
Q. One of the analyses-- and I don't mean
to say this exactly correctly, but generally-is you have looked at the loss -- at the present
value of the lost future scans. Is that an
accurate statement of one of the things you have
done in your Expert Opinion?
A. Yes, that approximates what we've done.
Q. Who asked you to look at the economic
damages, the alleged economic damages as a result
of the acts, in that fashion?
A. Well, it was discussed how to approach
damages. As I mentioned or testified earlier,
Mr. Budge and FTI were engaged prior to my firm
becoming engaged, and as is typically the case in
litigation there's various discussion and strategy
among counsel regarding how to approach the damages.
Page 65
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That was one of the concepts that developed over
time, looking at future lost profits.
Q. When you were engaged, it sounds like
Mr. Budge ofFTI had already been engaged; is
that correct?
A. That's my understanding.
Q. And was at that point the -- well,
strike that.
You mentioned that in litigation
engagements the manner in which to approach
estimating an economic loss might change over
time or there will be discussions around that.
Do you recall specific discussions with
Mr. Gordon regarding how to approach the analysis
of economic damages in this case?
A. Just generally intimated that I had
completed damage analyses in the past, there are
different ways to look at damages, and that's one
of the approaches that evolved from our brief
discussions.
Q. Have you used this particular method of
evaluating economic loss in any of your prior
engagements?
A. Not that I recall specifically, but
it's comparable to a straight business valuation
Page 66
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in the sense that we have a finite period of time
that the partnership was expected to run, so it
was logical to look at the losses that we would
likely incur through that finite period of time
and look at those as a reasonable estimate of
lost future profits.
7
Q. And that estimate again assumes that
8 all of the scans that are identified on Exhibits
9 3 or 4, the lost -- on Exhibit 4, actually --the
10 lost scans, would have otherwise been realized by
11 MRI Center?
12
A. Yes. There are some variations, but
13 that's generally the concept; we lost historical
1 4 relationships, we lost prospective opportunities.
15
Q. Where in your Expert Opinion do you
1 6 break out the amount of economic loss caused by
1 7 each individual act?
18
A. We don't break them out in that way,
19 and we weren't asked to. We look at the collective
2 0 acts. That's why we refer to them as "the acts."
21
Q. Let's-- I'm sorry to jump around on
2 2 you so much here, but let's go to Exhibit 4.
2 3 What does Exhibit 4 show us?
24
A. Well, I will say this is indicated in
2 5 the lower left comer "Draft," so probably the
Page 67
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most accurate place to look ultimately is
Mr. Budge's final opinion, but this Exhibit 4
that I'm looking at is described as Scenario A
and assumes all Meridian scans were lost to MRIA.
It is my understanding that Mr. Budge
and FTI analyzed historical referral patterns
between physicians that either previously referred
to MRIA or were affiliated in some manner with
SARMC, and those were the relationships that were
assumed lost going forward.
This particular Scenario A also assumes
that all Meridian scans would have been completed
by MRIA, but for the fact that Saint Alphonsus
breached its fiduciary responsibilities, wrongfully
dissociated, and gave up business opportunity to
IMI that should have belonged to MRIA.
Q. So that's the assumption; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And have you independently assessed
Mr. Budge's work to evaluate the reasonableness
of his work as represented here on Exhibit 4?
A. Well, I discussed the process with
Mr. Budge. His report identifies those referring
physicians that he's relating to -- and I'm sure
he will have the opportunity to defend it -- but
Page 68
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Q. So the current value is -- your testimony
is the current value -- strike that.
Let's just jump ahead here a little bit
to Table 6.
MR. BANDUCCI: What page is that, Pat?
MR. MILLER: Page 12.
Q. (BY MR. MILLER) On Table 6 there's a
column entitled, "Current Equity Value"?
A. Yes.
Q. What is the effective date, in your
Expert Opinion, for the current equity value?
A. Of-Q. As stated in this column, the third
column from the left on Table 6, what is the
effective date for purposes of your opinion as to
the current equity value of MRI Associates and
its related entities?
A. Well, the effective date is today's
date. Until we receive additional information
and we are asked to update that, that would be -the effective date would be today.
Q. Today.
A. Once again, we have not seen financial
results for the entities since July of '06.
Q. So you have the Shattuck Hammond
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read that correctly?
A. Yes.
Q. Explain to me what that analysis is.
A. Well, once again, we valued the entities
as of the current date, based on their historical
information through the current date.
Now, if your clients had not committed
the alleged acts, MRIA would have reflected a
different history; and that history would have
shown higher service delivery, higher revenue,
and likely higher profits.
So once again relying on Mr. Budge's
analysis, we looked at the 2006 referrals, revenue,
and profits that were lost and carried those forward
through the end of the term ofthe agreement.
Q. And then present value of those back-A. That's correct.
Q. --to arrive on a current number?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it your opinion that the economic
loss to MRI Associates is additive of paragraphs 1
and 2, or are those alternative methods of
calculating the economic loss?
A. No. 1 has nothing to do with our
assessment of economic damages. Once again, we
Page 79
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valuation from November of'01, and your valuation,

Mr. Wilhoite's/Willamette Management's as of the
current date.
You also mentioned that there was
additional consideration to be given to the
period from '99 to 2001?
A. That's correct.
Q. So in your Expert Opinion that we have
here as Exhibit 2, have you attached a separate
number to the '99 to 2000 time frame?
A. Yes, I believe that's in a footnote in
our report, and that number was $8.5 million.
Q. Do you know what footnote that is,
offhand?
A. I believe it was Footnote 5.
Q. Okay.
MR. BANDUCCI: I think that's on page 11,
Pat.
MR. MILLER: Yes, it is. Thank you.
We'll come back to that.
Q. (BY MR. MILLER) Now, Paragraph 2 states
that you have analyzed "The incremental fair market
value that MRIA would reflect currently but-for
the loss of historical relationships and diverted
business opportunity caused by the acts." Did I
Page 78

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

just looked at the change in value between the
two dates based on our current valuation and
Shattuck Hammond's valuation as of 2001.
Our damages are based on Item No.2.
Q. You say your damages are based on No. 2.
Does that mean MRIA's damages are -A. No. I am Willamette. (Laughter).
Q. So Willamette is estimating the damages
or the economic loss -A. That's correct. We were retained to
estimate forward looking losses.
Q. So what does paragraph 1 --is there a
number -- there is a number or a range of numbers
associated with paragraph No. 1?
A. As I testified earlier, the difference
in value between the two dates is, roughly,
$32.5 million.
Now, since there are two experts,
from my perspective having been involved in other
damages cases, I said, "If you can look at the
change in value, you have to determine how much
of it is attributable to acts," and one thing
that does provide is a ceiling, basically, on the
damages with regard to historical performance.
Because Mr. Budge's damages are lower

!
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and you reviewed it?
A. Staff wrote parts of it, and I came in
and edited it.
Q. When you say you "came in and edited it,"
what do you mean?
A. I reviewed what had been written, I
edited it, made changes to it, and added things
that I thought needed to be incorporated.
Q. Where are those edits now?
A. They are in the document you have.
Q. No, but there was something somebody
wrote, and you made edits to it.
A. Once again, we don't retain drafts.
So if I'm editing a document, I would have been
writing over it on a computer.
Q. Do you recall when those edits were made?
A. Within a week of delivering our final
opinion.
Q. So sometime in late February or early
March?
A. Yes, I would say so.
Q. Did counsel for MRI Associates have any
participation in that editing process?
A. They reviewed the draft.
Q. And "the draft" is the one you previously
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ASSOCIATES

the management staff from the MRI Center. Did
they participate in the drafting of the first
draft of this document?
A. No.
Q. In paragraph F on page 4, who-where did you obtain this information?
A. Considering its representation and/or
factual, staff would have obtained the information
from the files, the records that were provided to
us.
Q. I notice, like, in the fourth paragraph
you stated, "It is my understanding that the
Partnership Agreement provided for the creation
of a single limited partnership." Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So when you say it's your understanding,
where did that understanding come from?
A. Just review of the documents and
discussion with staff.
Q. Did that include, for example, the
Counterclaim filed by MRI Associates in this case?
A. That would have included one of the
documents reviewed, yes.
Q. Is it fair to say that a lot of the
allegations of MRI Associates came to your
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submitted to me today?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. They didn't review any of the
sections that were -- strike that.
You testified your staff wrote some
portions of this report. You came in, edited it,
and you saved over their draft so that there was
no notes-retained document of what your staff
drafted; correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Did that same process happen with
counsel involvement? Were there portions of this
document that were written with counsel or
counsel present and changes made and just saved
over the existing document, as opposed to a draft
being presented?
A. No. The editing process probably occurred
within a span of 24 to 48 hours.
Q. And was counsel involved in that
process at all?
A. Only to the extent that we issued a
draft, they read it, we talked about it, and I
would have made whatever changes that I felt
were appropriate.
Q. And the same question with respect to
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attention through review of the Counterclaim?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have assumed all of the facts
in the Counterclaim to be true as a part of your
Expert Opinion?
A. Or subject to being disproved, yes.
Q. But for purposes of the economic
analysis that you've done, you've assumed the
accuracy and truth of the allegations made in the
Counterclaim?
A. Yes.
Q. The last sentence on page 4 states,
"For a period of two years after lawfully terminating
membership in the partnership, neither DMR, SADC,
nor their affiliates can engage in any competing
activity." Do you see that, the last sentence on
page 4?
A. Yes.
Q. Where did you come to the understanding
of that statement?
A. It's in at least one version of the
Partnership Agreement, is my understanding.
Q. Okay. Do the words, "lawfully terminate"
appear in the Partnership Agreement, to your
recollection?
I
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have to consider -(Discussion off the record with Counsel).
Q. (BY MR. MILLER) Let's go to the -A. Should I finish my answer?
Q. I thought you were done. I know
Mr. Banducci had something to add, but I think
you answered the question.
A. Well, did I finish in the middle of a
sentence or did I finish a sentence?
(Record read by the Reporter).
Q. (BY MR. MILLER) So you have now
considered Mr. Banducci's thoughts. Does that
add to your answer?
A. Well, for clarification purposes, once
again, these are future losses relating to the
acts -- and I think it's important to clarify the
acts with regard to dissociation that was
referenced specifically in my report.
The footnote we just discussed prior to
leaving the room relates to the notion that SARMC
could have purchased the other party's interest
and we would not find ourselves sitting here
today had they paid what Shattuck Hammond
estimated as the fair market value of all the
other partners' interests as of 2001.
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Q. Okay. The entirety of that now adopted
opinion -- which is adopted as of today?
MR. BANDUCCI: Counsel, you're getting
argumentative.
MR. MILLER: I'll withdraw the question.
MR. BANDUCCI: We really don't need to -you don't need to be that way. Just ask him
questions.
Q. (BY MR. MILLER) Is that opinion
adopted today? Are you adopting that as your
opinion today?
A. That opinion is basically a stated item
in my opinion presented that we're talking about.
Q. But you first said it was a fact, and
now you've said you'll adopt it as your opinion;
is that correct?
A. I'll adopt it, just to make it simple.
Q. And you are adopting it as of today,
April 2nd, 2007?
A. I will say it was adopted as of the
time I issued this report, and I will read the
footnote as a statement. It says, "It represents
a reasonable estimate of the then value of what
SARMC would have to pay to avoid its obligations,"
meaning that that's how they could have avoided
Page 155

Page 153
··-·······

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

So that is separate from forward-looking
lost profits that relates, as I testified to
earlier, to historical profit.
Q. Earlier I asked you if you had broken
down the damage analysis by claim, and I believe
you responded that you had not; is that correct?
A. Not by specific claim; however,
dissociation, as I referenced in the footnote,
could be viewed as a manner of buying your way
out of a partnership.
Q. So, from your perspective, any opinions
you have regarding damages related to dissociation
are contained in Footnote 5?
A. And it's not even my calculation; it's
basically a fact that comes out of Shattuck
Hammond's analysis.
Q. So you are testifying to a fact that's
not an opinion of yours?
A. Well, I'll adopt it as an opinion that
a reasonable representation of the cost that
SARMC could have incurred to get out of the
partnership is represented by the fair market
value opiniori presented by Shattuck Hammond with
regard to the other partners' interests as of the
end of'Ol.
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breaching or committing these alleged acts that
are being presented.
Q. Prior to putting Footnote 5 in this
document, did you have a discussion regarding
Footnote 5 with anyone?
A. I had a discussion regarding the concept.
Q. And who was that discussion with?
A. Either Mr. Gordon and/or Mr. Banducci,
and Mr. Budge.
Q. Let's go to the schedules.
A. You're saying, "Schedules." I'm
assuming you're referring to the exhibits?
Q. The exhibits. Thank you. Exhibit 1-1,
the first item, is "Lost revenues." You have
assumed on this chart lost revenues up through
the year of2015; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And what entered into your analysis
of-- and that growth is simply represented on
the next line down; is that correct? You have
simply assumed a percentage growth rate per year?
A. Starting in 2007, that's correct.
Q. So in 2007 you assumed a 10 percent
growth rate; 2008, an 8 percent growth rate;
2009, 5 percent; and from there on out 3 percent.

!
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and manages outpatient medical diagnostic imaging
centers that use PET scanning equipment."
Q. (BY MR. MILLER) Are you aware of the
reimbursement changes that have occurred in PET
imaging over the last three years?
A. Generally, yes.
Q. What has happened for the reimbursement
for PET imaging over the past 3 years?
A. It's gone down.
Q. Would that be a causative factor in the
profit margins for a PET imaging business to
decline from 2003 to 2004?
A. I don't see that in the tables, so I
don't know how to answer your question.
Q. Well, the Sagemark Companies on
Exhibit 1-6 went from 59 percent to 29 percent.
A. You said from '03 to '04.
Q. Excuse me. '04 to '05.
A. Yes, that could explain it. Alliance
also has PET services MRI, CT, so that's why you
look at as much information as you can.
Q. But you didn't look at the PET/CT
business that MRI Associates owns, did you?
MR. BANDUCCI: What do you mean by
"look at"?
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1
Q. (BY MR. MILLER) You didn't provide a
2 Valuation Summary with respect to IsoScan?
3
A. We looked at all the financial results
4 that were reported within their financial
5 information, so if it was not reported, it was
6 not covered by us.
7
Q. Okay. The line reference "Discount
8 factor E" refers to Exhibit 1-5; is that correct?
9
A. That's correct.
10
Q. Let's turn to Exhibit 1-5. Tell me,
11 generally, what does this Exhibit 1-5 show?
12
A. As the title indicates, it's a weighted
13 average cost of capital.
14
Q. What is the purpose of developing the
15 weighted average of capital?
16
A. You develop a discount rate that you
17 then apply to the projected lost profits to bring
18 them to a present value.
19
Q. Is your opinion that the appropriate
20 discount rate is 13 percent to apply to MRI
21 Associates?
22
A. That's correct.
23
Q. And the discount rate that you're
24 applying here is not to the company as a whole;
25 it's just to the lost scan?
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A. Which is assumed to relate to the
company as a whole.
Q. So you discounted by 13 percent as your
discount factor the future revenues less costs
associated with the loss of scans?
A. Generally, yes.
Q. You state in here on the first box on
Exhibit 1-5 that you have applied an industry
adjusted equity risk premium of2.8 percent;
is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And then a small -- what does that say?
I can't even read it. "Small--"
A. Stock.
Q. "Small stock/circumstance/company
specific risk premium," and you state that that's
the "Willamette Management Associates' estimate,
considering MRIC/MRIM's declining revenue and
profitability"; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Is the 6.4 the small stock or-- well,
if you were just to take the small stock risk
premium, what would that be?
A. It depends on how you define it, but I
don't -- well, go ahead.
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Q. The 6.4, do you know what component of
the 6.4 is the small stock risk premium?
A. I don't recall, as I sit here, and I
don't know that I broke it out specifically in
that way.
Q. Would somebody on your staff have been
the one that came up with that number and would
have more information about that?
A. No. It would just require me to look
at the file to determine exactly how we came up
with that particular number.
Q. Okay. Would that-A. The WACC summary, the Weighted Average
Cost of Capital, is 13 percent, which is 300 basis
points higher than the median industry lacked for
this particular type of business, which is
10 percent if you look at the box in the lower
left-hand comer.
Q. And the industry reflects all of the
companies that you have looked at radiologic -A. Plus the size premium, yes, so we're at
30 percent above that.
Q. Again, does your risk premium reflect
whether these other companies that you looked at
were multimodality versus single modality?
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1 accounting firm known as KPMG Peat Marwick.
2
Q And where was that office?
3
A That was the Phoenix, Arizona, office.
Q Actually, Bruce Budge testified that he worked
4
5 with -- for KPMG for a while. Have you -- did you work
6 with Mr. Budge at KPMG?
7
A No, I did not.
8
Q And how long were you at KPMG in Phoenix?
9
A For three years.
0
Q And then after that, where did you go?
1
A I joined my current firm, Willamette Management.
2
Q Now, when you took a position with Willamette
3 Management, what position did you take?
CHARLES A. WILHOITE,
4
A I came in to Willamette Management as a senior
5 associate analyst.
having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole
6
Q All right. Can you give the jury just a sense
truth, and nothing but the truth, was examined and
for the business ofWillamette Management-- what they do
testified as follows:
and the extent of their reach as far as a business?
9
A Sure. Willamette has six offices throughout the
THE COURT: Mr. Banducci, you may proceed.
0 country. I'm based in our Portland, Oregon, office. We
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
1 have an office in Chicago. We have an office in Atlanta.
2 We have an office in the Washington area. We have an
DIRECT EXAMINATION
3 office in Manhattan in New York, and we have an office in
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
4 Connecticut.
Q Good morning, Mr. Wilhoite. How are you?
5
And our firm specializes in business valuation,
A Doing well.
Page 2839
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1
THE BAILIFF: They're all here, sir.
2
(Recess.)
3
(Jury present.)
4
THE COURT: All of our jurors are present in
5 their proper places. Good morning. Counsel are here.
6 Parties are here.
Mr. Banducci, you may call your next witness.
7
8
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor. Call
9 Charles Wilhoite.
0
THE COURT: Charles Wilhoite. Mr. Wilhoite,
1 just come up to the gentleman in the gray coat. He will
2 give you some instructions, sir.
3
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Q Good. Can you introduce yourself to the jury
and tell them a little bit about yourself?
A Yes. My name is Charles A. Wilhoite. I reside
in Portland, Oregon. I am employed by a financial
consulting and business valuation firm known as
Willamette Management Associates, and I've been employed
there going on 18 years.
Q Okay. So, you live in Portland?
A That's correct.
Q Family?
A Three kids. Yes.
Q How old are they?
A 18, 9, and 7.
Q All right.
A Not good planning.
Q You said that. Not me. Can you tell the jury a
little bit about your education, please?
A Yes. I have a degree in accounting and a degree
in finance from Arizona State University.
Q All right. And when you did you graduate from
Arizona State?
A 1987.
Q And after graduating from Arizona State, what
did you do?
A I went to work for a, at the time, "Big Eight"
Page 2840

1 financial consulting, and economic analysis. And,
2 primarily, we focus on the valuation of companies to
3 assist with the transfer of the companies when people buy
4 or -- when people buy or sell companies.
5
Or we perform valuation work for gift and estate
6 tax purposes. If someone owns a company and they die,
7

8
9

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9

0
1
2
3
4
5

you have to file a tax return with the Internal Revenue
Service. We will perform valuation work to assist them
with the filing of that return to know how much estate
tax they have to pay.
We also perform a number of valuations for
employee stock ownership plan companies, and this is a
company that the employees get together, form an employee
stock ownership trust, and they buy an ownership interest
in the company. We do a fair amount of work in that
area, as well.
And for this purpose, I perform a number of
valuations and a lot of analysis for litigation support
purposes.
Q Okay. How many -- how many employees at
Willamette?
A Oh, it varies, but approximately between 80 and
100 employees.
Q Okay. That's in all of the offices?
A Yes.
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1 The Schlumberger case was actually based in Abu Dhabi.
2 So, we have actually done work on foreign soil, as well.
3
Q Okay. Have you been involved in disputes
4 relating to valuation of imaging centers?
5
A Yes, very -6
Q Other than this one.
7
A Yes. I was going to say similar to this
8 particular matter. I live in Portland, the Northwest,
9 and I was actually retained to facilitate the buyout of a
10 hospital's interest in an imaging center when the
11 hospital made it clear to their other partners that they
12 wanted to develop their own imaging capacity. So, very
13 similar circumstances, similarly sized operation, as
14 well.
15
Q Okay. Good. Thank you.
16
Now, yesterday, the jury heard the testimony of
17 Bruce Budge, and Mr. Budge testified that you were one of
18 the other persons involved in analyzing the damages. Can
19 you tell the jury how you and Mr. Budge split the labor
20 between each other and why?
21
A Sure. And you heard Mr. Budge's testimony
22 yesterday. Mr. Budge looked at the historical lost
23 profits that were estimated for MRIA. And Mr. Budge, I
24 believe, in his testimony and in his report indicated
25 that his historical experience relates primarily to
Page 2847
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1
A That's correct.
2
Q All right. Now, does your approach when you're
3 valuing a business -- is it significantly different if
4 you're valuing a business or if you're looking at lost
5 value due to lost profits?
6
A No. The approach is basically the same because,
7 once again, it's forward-looking. When I value a
8 business, I determine what that business is likely to
9 generate in the future from its operations, and I bring
10 that all to one number, a value for all of those future
11 returns. When you're looking at lost profits forward12 looking, it's the same type of analysis. So, it would be
13 exactly the same in this case, particularly because the
14 partnership has a definite period where it's set to end,
15 2023. So, we can look at all of the profits and cash
16 flows that we think the company will generate through
17 2023 and bring those to a present value because a dollar
18 out in the future is worth less today. We can't spend it
19 today. We have to wait until we get it so we discount it
20 back to a present value.
21
MR. BANDUCCI: Okay. Now, if it's all right
22 with the court, if the bailiff could bring just the flip
23 chart down here. There are just a few questions that I
24 think Mr. Wilhoite would be better explaining through the
25 use of an easel.
Page 2849

analysis of lost profits, historical lost profits. He
is a CPA.
Well, I'm a CPA, as well. I'm also a certified
management accountant, certified in fmancial management.
I'm an accredited business valuation expert by the AICPA,
and I'm an accredited senior appraiser as designated by
the American Society of Appraisers.
And I tell you all of that just to get to this
point of I look forward more times than not because I
value the companies. To value a company, you have to
understand its historical performance, but we're more
concerned with what the company is going to do in the
future because that's what a buyer is paying for. You
want to know the expected earnings, expected cash flow
rather than the historical because that's what value
relates to.
So, we divided the engagement -- Mr. Budge
looking historically. I was looking forward because my
background and my professional expertise relates more to
forward-looking analyses.
Q Okay. Just so it's clear for the jury, then,
Mr. Budge looked at the period from 1999 to 2006?
A Yes.
Q And you looked from 2007 to the end of the
partnership in 2023?

1 BY MR. BANDUCCI:
2
Q Mr. Wilhoite, if you could, I know that there
3 are various approaches that are typically used by you and
4 by business valuation experts when you're valuing a
5 business or when you're valuing lost profits. Could you
6 come down here. I think the pens are behind you. Or
7 you've got one in your hand. Okay. If you could come
8 down to the easel and explain to the jury the different
9 approaches that are used in valuating either a business
10 or lost profits.
11
THE COURT: Mr. Wilhoite, you can go down into
12 the jury well.
13
A Basically, in a valuation, you look at three
14 standard approaches. It's not really rocket science. I
15 don't want to say it's easy because people don't want to
16 pay me to do it ifl say it's easy.
17
But there are only three approaches to any
18 business valuation. You have what we call an income
19 approach, an asset approach, or a market-based approach,
20 and I'll do them in reverse.
21
The market approach for valuing a business would
22 be the same as buying a home. If you are out in the
23 market looking for a home and you're in a three-block
24 radius and you know that there are three homes in that
25 same area that have sold for a certain price and all
Page 2848
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those three homes are identical to the home you're
looking at buying, it's pretty easy to determine the
price of your home what you're willing to pay.
So, if all ofthose homes sold for $100 per
square foot -- we'll just call this the "market
approach." We have three "comparables." This is what we
call the other homes that were sold. And they each sold
at a price of $100 per square foot and you had a home
you're looking at that was 2,000 square feet, the value
of that home reasonably could be priced at $200,000.
It's the same for valuing a business. We look
to the public markets to identify similar companies to
the company that we're trying to value. We decide how
the market is pricing those companies, and then we price
our company accordingly.
So, that's basically the market approach in the
nutshell.
The income approach. Basically, you look at
what income or cash flow you expect the business to
generate and then you bring that to a present value and
you sum that up and that's the value based on the income
approach.
And the best example I could use there would be
a bond. If you had a United States government bond and
it's going to pay you $100 in interest for 10 years and
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computers -- and add all of those up, but that's not
going to give you a good indication of the value they
provide.
So, when you're looking at service industries,
you typically don't focus on an asset approach, and we
did not look at the asset approach on this case. Any
relevant or authoritative value-issued textbook you would
look at will tell you service industries are typically
not valued using an asset approach. So, we typically
exclude it.
Q Before you go away, I have another exhibit for
you to show the jury.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, we have marked this
as Exhibit 4525, and we have shown it to counsel. .
THE COURT: 4525 can be displayed.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q Now, what I'd like you to take the jury through
--you have explained the different approaches. What I'd
like you to do now is explain how you implement the
process, how you follow the steps necessary to create the
valuation?
A Sure. Excuse me. And there is a lot of detail,
obviously, that goes into a valuation analysis, but I
have summarized it in five primary steps.
The first step, we gather and analyze company's
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you paid $70 for that bond today, you look at those
ten-year payments of interest. And let's say it's 10
percent. So, you're going to get $7 every year for ten
years, and you know you've paid $70, you're going to get
that $70 back at the end of the ten years and those ten
payments of $7 or another 70, add that up and that's your
value based on the income approach. So, it's
forward-looking.
That's what we have done here looking at the
losses that MRI experienced. What did they lose out into
the future? Let's bring that back to a present value.
That's the income approach. That, in a nutshell, is a
discounted cash flow analysis. Looking out into the
future of the return to expect to realize coming back,
and you discount those to a present value. So, that's
the income approach.
In the asset approach, basically, you look at
the tangible assets, things you can touch and feel, in a
company and you add up the value of all those values and
that will give you the total asset value of that company.
The asset approach isn't really relevant when you're
valuing a service company, and an imaging center is a
service business. All healthcare entities, basically,
are service entities. We can look at the assets they
have -- the furniture, the fixtures, the equipment, the
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specific information. And I'm sure you've heard more
than you ever wanted to about imaging and healthcare and
a lot of other things. But we focus on the companies
themselves. In this instance, we're looking at MRIA, and
we're looking at the Center itself, the Mobile business,
and that management agreement. So, we gathered all of
that information -- historical financial statements,
minutes from meetings of the Board of Directors,
operating information, projections, other plans -- and we
analyzed all of that information to make sure we're
comfortable and familiar with the company that we're
trying to value. That's our first step.
The second step, we look at industry economic
and market information. And the industry -- once again,
healthcare is a large industry. It's the largest
industry in the country, service industry. It's growing
at a phenomenal rate because -- I hate to admit it, but
we're all getting older every day. We all have issues.
We all have to utilize healthcare services. So, it's a
high-growth industry.
Well, in this case, we're focusing,
specifically, on the imaging industry. And I think,
later, I'll have the opportunity to look at that
particular segment of the healthcare industry and show
that imaging services have been growing at double-digit
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reflect the 2006 amount that Mr. Budge says that Saint
Alphonsus [sic] lost because of those acts.
We started with -Q You mean, "MRIA lost"?
A I'm sorry. That MRIA lost because of the acts
of Saint Alphonsus. We start with the 3. 7 million
dollars, and we grow it over this period because if Saint
Alphonsus had not committed those acts, set up with IMI,
and taken that business, that $3.7 million would have
remained inside of the operations of MRIA. So, that's
our starting point. We grow it out through the end of
the partnership in 2023. And just for reference, the
average growth rate over this period was approximately
3 percent.
MR. BANDUCCI: Okay. Let's show the Exhibit
4526 which is another poster board. This has been shown
to counsel, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Has this been stipulated to its
admission?
MR. GJORDING: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. It may be displayed to
the jury.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q So, what does Exhibit 4526 show?
A Exhibit 4526 reflects the trend line after we
Page 2863
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start with $3.7 million of lost profits and grow it over
the remaining term of the partnership through 2023. And
it's important to note the $3.7 million that we started
with had not been adjusted for taxes. So, we deducted
40 percent for taxes. That's why we end up at about
$2.2 million, and then we grow it from that point out.
And as you can see, we start at about $2.2 million in
2007, and we grow it out to about $3.5 million by 2023.
And once again, that translates into an average growth
rate over that period of about 3 percent.
Q Okay. And ifyou were to take the annual losses
from 2007 to 2023 and just add them up, did you-- did
you do that computation?
A The average loss over that period after taxes is
about 2 and a half million dollars. Excuse me. And
that's a 17-year period. So, that translates into total
losses, before you do any discounting, of about 42, $43
million.
Q Okay. But you're saying that the amount of lost
profits is 20.9 million. Why didn't you just take the
42 million?
A Well, once again, a dollar out here in 2023 is
not worth a dollar today. So, as I testified earlier, a
government return rate is about 5 percent. We discounted
those at a rate almost three times that much or about
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13 percent. And if you discount these returns back, that
42, $43 million translates down to about $20.9 million in
present value lost profits after taxes.
Q Okay. Now, how did you come up with this
decision that you made to increase the lost chunk of
business, if you will, the lost profits by a rate of
3 percent -- or average rate of 3 percent between 2007
and 2023?
A Well, as I testified earlier, we did a lot of
industry research, market research. We looked at
publicly traded companies that are operating in the
imaging segment of the industry. Their growth rates
average between 12 and 14 percent. We looked at IMI's
performance. We looked at MRIA's performance. We looked
at just general industry information. And as I testified
to, the imaging services is growing at 15-plus percent a
year. Well, we know we're projecting this over a long
term so we start with growth of 10 percent in the first
year. We go down to 8 percent, 5 percent. By the time
we get to year four of this projection, we're only
growing at 3 percent to reflect the fact that there are
things going on in the marketplace. We want to take that
into consideration. And, basically, we say from the
fourth year on out, we're only going to grow at an
inflationary rate, 2-1/2 to 3 percent. In our opinion,
Page 2865
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that's very conservative and reasonable given what's gone
on historically with the imaging industry.
MR. BANDUCCI: Now, can the witness be shown
4257, please?
THE COURT: It's been admitted. It may be
disp~ayed.

BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q Mr. Wilhoite, you testified about industry
dynamics and information and growth rates, and so forth.
Can you explain what's shown on 4527 and tell them how
you gathered this information?
A First, I'll start with how we gathered it. We
have a full-time research department in our firm. And
any time I get retained in a valuation engagement, I send
out a request to that research department to give me any
and every bit of information that's relevant that they
can get their hands on with regard to the industry we're
looking at over the relevant.time period.
So, we put in a request for information on the
imaging-services industry over this '99 through 2007 time
period. And these are some of the key factors that came
out of that research, more detailed than my report.
But, basically, 10 to 15 percent of all
diagnostic images in the U.S. are provided by outpatient
diagnostic imaging centers similar to MRIC. More than
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1 specifically, about damages regarding wrongful
2 dissociation. And yesterday, Mr. Budge testified about
3 an approach using valuation of a business as a way to
4 measure wrongful dissociation losses. Are you aware that
5 the court has entered an order finding that Saint
6 Alphonsus wrongfully withdrew or wrongfully dissociated
7 from MRI Associates?
8
A Yes. And I cite that July 24th, 2006, ruling by
9 Judge McLaughlin in my report.
10
Q Now, I think we talked about this a little bit
11
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previously, but you reviewed the Shattuck Hammond report
in connection with your work; correct?
A That's correct.
Q And I think you were telling the jury all that
you did in connection with your evaluation of Shattuck
Hammond and to verify its reliability and reasonableness,
but I'd ask that you take them through the steps that you
actually performed in order to make that -- to reach that
conclusion.
A Basically, once again, as a member of the
American Society of Appraisers, I look to the Uniform
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice because
those are the most relied upon and considered to be the
most relevant standards for the purpose of conducting a
business valuation. And those standards, 9 and 10, are
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their discounted cash flow?
A As I testified, Shattuck Hammond's report is
dated November 6, 2001. Part of their analysis inCluded
a discounted cash flow analysis similar to the
forward-looking or expected returns that I testified to
bringing them back to a present value.
And if you look at this line, you can see that
revenue realized, 1999 was about 6.9 million. 2000 was
6.6. When you get to 2001, we're back up to $6.9
million. This is for MRJ Center. This is the net
revenue that they collected.
Shattuck Hammond projects that this will grow to
about $10.6 million by 2006. And that implied growth
rate over that period of time is about 9 percent.
So, in their analysis as of'01, they're
projecting that MRJ Center is going to grow about
9 percent a year through 2006. And this played a big
role with regard to their overall valuation conclusion.
MR. BANDUCCI: Okay. Now, can the witness be
shown Exhibit 4247 which is the Strategic Options
Assessment already in evidence. And let's show, I
believe, it's page 13, Lauren. Can you enlarge that
yellow section for us? Thank you.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q All right. Now, the first highlighted section
Page 2877

Page 2875
1 very specific with regard to the approaches, the
2 methodology, the documentation of the analysis that you
3 have to complete in order to arrive at a conclusion or
4 opinion that can be deemed reasonable.
5
So, I compared Shattuck Hammond's report and
6 their analysis with those standards and determined that
7 they had adhered in all respects -- excuse me -- with
8 those standards; therefore, I could conclude that their
9 conclusion was reasonable and could be relied upon.
10
MR. BANDUCCI: Okay. Now, can the witness be
11
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shown Exhibit 4246, please, which is the valuation report
of Shattuck Hammond? Lauren, ifyou would-- I think
it's page 28. And this is in real small print, so,
Lauren, actually, I think you only need to take the top
third. Well-- there we go. Perfect. All right.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q Now, Mr. Wilhoite, I'm not sure I've got the
right page. Can you confirm that for me? Is that the
right page of the valuation report with the discounted
cash flow analysis?
A Yes, it is.
Q Okay. Can you explain to the jury what you have
there enlarged on the screen -- and you may need to use
the pointer here -- so that they can understand what
Shattuck Hammond did in 2001 when they were performing
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says, "MRI Center experienced increasing scan volume and
operating revenue until 2000 when IMI opened a competing
imaging center in MRI Center's service area. Operating
revenue is projected to increasein 2001 due to volume
increases recorded through August of this year."
Is it your understanding, Mr. Wilhoite, that
when Shattuck Hammond performed its analysis -- and by
that I mean its valuation, its discounted cash flow
analysis, and its work in general -- that it understood
that IMI was already in the market?
A That's what's implied by this first bullet
point. Shattuck Hammond is looking at the fact that IMI
is already in the marketplace exerting a negative impact
on the performance ofMRIC; so, yes.
Q All right. And I think there is actually a
reference in the second bullet point to a "softenip.g in
the economy." Do you see that?
A Yes. The second line.
Q Can you read that because I'm having a heck of a
time today?
A The second bullet reads: "Net revenue per scan
has displayed a consistently positive trend over the past
five years but is projected to decline significantly in
2001 due to a softening in the local economy."
Q Okay. So, is it your understanding, then, that
Page 2878

Page 2876

13 (Pages 2875 to 2878)
Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704
www.etucker.net

000668

St. Alphonsus v. MRI Associates

8/21/2007

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Shattuck Hammond not only considered competition from IMI
but also softening economy that was occurring in the
local market while it was performing its valuation and
making its options assessment?
A Yes. And that's what is implied in this bullet,
and that's what would be reflected in that revenue growth
line that we talked about previously. And they projected
revenue growth at 9 percent per year, even in light of
these factors.
Q All right. Let's now go to, if you could,
Lauren, the -- we're in the options assessment. Is that
right?
Now, you did review the options assessment;
correct?
A Yes.
Q And did you review all five of the options
offered by Shattuck Hammond in connection with that
Assessment?
A Yes.
Q Okay. Let's go through these options. And the
jury has already heard that Option 1 was recommended.
Let's go to Option 2, which I believe is at page 33.
All right. Here we have Option 2. You know,
I'm just going to need a copy of this. And if you could,
enlarge the last bullet point at the bottom of the page.
Page 2879
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has the "Risks and Impediments of Option 2," but let's go
to "Financial Implications," the first bullet point. And
that says it has the "Financial implications - same as
Option 2." Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q What would that lead you to believe?
A Once again, it could cost more than Option I.
Q Okay. Let's go to Option 4. And Option 4 is,
"Pay DMR 2.5 million for limited noncompete release."
And let's light up the "Issues, Risks and Impediments"
section. And, specifically, the bottom bullet point
says, quote, "Ultimately more costly and riskier than
Options I, 2, or 3." Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q All right. Let's go to the last option, the
next page. That is the option to withdraw, and we don't
see anything more than just "Review Givens Pursley
assessment"; is that right?
A Yes.
Q Now, is it -- is it correct to say that Option I
was the option recommended by Shattuck Hammond?
A Yes.
Q All right. Let's go to Option I. I believe
that's on page 3I. And if you would, could you take the
jury just through the Option 1 advantages -Page 2881
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All right. Good.
Now, Option 2 refers to an "acquisition of the
non-DMR interests in MRI Center" and then later an
"acquisition ofDMR interests over three to five years."
Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q All right. Now, with reference to the third
bullet point, it says, "Conversely, if SARMC is
successful in merging MRI Center into IMI, Saint
Alphonsus will ultimately pay more to acquire the DMR
units as significant synergies should be realized."
Is it your understanding, Mr. Wilhoite, that
Option 2, one of the options not recommended by Shattuck
Hammond, had the potential of Saint Alphonsus actually
paying more than in other options?
A That's what's implied, and that's my
understanding with regard to this bullet point, yes.
Q Okay. If we pull that back down, that is under
the "Issues, Risks and Impediments" section of the
document. Correct?
A Correct.
Q Let's go to Option 3. And if you could, Lauren,
could you enlarge "Structure" and the "Financial
Implications" section. 34. Okay. And under
"Structure," it says, "Execute Option 2," which so then
Page 2880
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MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, I have an objection.
The line of testimony here is going to a place outside
the disclosure of this witness as we have discussed
before. It's gone quite a ways past the purchase price
theory.
THE COURT: Response?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, this is in evidence,
and I want to lay the foundation for the analysis of the
Strategic Options Assessment before we put in testimony
regarding wrongful dissociation damages. He has
reviewed -- Your Honor, in his -- in his report, he
testified that he reviewed both the Strategic Options
Assessment and the valuation. That's what he is doing
here in front of the jury.
THE COURT: Response to that?
MR. GJORDING: Well, Your Honor, I feel a little
bit restrained about arguing this because -THE COURT: Well, was it disclosed?
MR. GJORDING: No.
THE COURT: Well, then, we'll take something up
outside the presence of the jury.
(Jury absent.)
THE COURT: All right. Was it disclosed,
Mr. Banducci?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I refer the court to
Page 2882
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the second page of "Appendix B, Information Considered,"
No. 26. Right there. Black and white.
MR. MILLER: He says he considered it, but he
didn't say he valuated it.
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, the point here -- and
we have really been arguing this point for months. Where
we start with this is in the footnote 5 to Mr. Wilhoite's
report which allowed them to get to the purchase price
theory. Now, we're going-- I think it all stems out of
footnote 5. There is no -- I invite you, Your Honor, to
review the report, to review the disclosures, and in
particular, review footnote 5.
There is nothing in any of those documents that
tells us that Mr. Wilhoite is going to express opinions
about where he is going here and, for that matter, where
he went with Options 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
And so, I think what has happened is, as you
know, we have resisted the purchase price theory all
along. We've had rulings about that all along, and now
because purchase price apparently is back in, now we're
going to bootstrap and spring into these other opinions
without being disclosed.
THE COURT: Could I have a copy of Mr.
Wilhoite's report, please? Just go ahead and give it
to the bailiff. I'll -Page 2883
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1
Response, then, Mr. Banducci?
2
MR. BANDUCCI: The Strategic Options Assessment
3 is referred to both in footnote 5 and the Information
4 Considered. And, Your Honor, he is not giving opinions
5 about anything other than what is in evidence. The
6 Strategic Options Assessment has been entered into
7 evidence, and I'm taking him through this and showing
8 what's in writing to the jury.
9
THE COURT: All right.
10
MR. GJORDING: Which, of course, Your Honor, is
11 nothing more than saying "yes" to Mr. Banducci's
12 testimony.
13
THE COURT: Well, if you want to object to
14 leading, I'll let you.
15
MR. GJORDING: Okay.
16
THE COURT: Well, as I have gone through this
17 report, he references very significantly that -- and
18 points out the appraisal standards. To me, it's covered
19 in his opinion so the objection is overruled from my
20 review of the report.
21
Bring in the jury.
22
(Jury present.)
23
THE COURT: All of our jurors are present in
24 their proper places. Based upon the court's ruling,
25 proceed.
Page 2884

MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q All right. We were just about to talk about
Option 1, Mr. Wilhoite. And I'd like you to focus the
jury's attention on the advantages of Option 1 as
illuminated in the first three bullet points.
A Well, under "Advantages" as indicated on the
screen, Option 1 is described by Shattuck Hammond, which
is the expert that Saint Alphonsus retained to advise
them, that this is the: "cleanest structural alternative.
It would offer SARMC: No. 1, complete freedom from DMR
physicians to pursue its strategy and avoid political
issues; No. 2, the opportunity for SARMC and GSR to
realize all synergy growth ofiMI and MRICI; and,
thirdly, the lowest likelihood of any ongoing
litigation."
MR. BANDUCCI: All right. Now, can the witness
be shown the "Objectives" page, which I think, Lauren, is
page 5. Now, these are identified by Saint Alphonsus
at -- excuse me, by Shattuck Hammond as Saint Alphonsus's
objectives. And, Lauren, if you would be so kind as to
illuminate the top three bullet points. There we go.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q Now, these three bullet points say:
"Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
Page 2885
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believes it is a strategic imperative to partner with its
affiliated radiology group, Gem State Radiology, in
pursuing outpatient diagnostic imaging opportunities in
Saint Alphonsus service area.
"The Partnership Agreement governing MRI
Associates prohibits Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center from having any investments in any competitive MRI
facilities.
"Saint Alphonsus desires to obtain control of
the two magnets on its campus which are operated by an
11 affiliate of MRI Associates, MRI Center of Idaho."
12
Are the objectives stated on this page met by
13 Option 1?
14
A Yes.
15
Q Mr. Wilhoite, do the valuation report and the
16 Strategic Options Assessment prepared by Shattuck Hammond
17 provide a means of establishing the amount that Saint
18 Alphonsus would have to pay to rightfully attain those
19 objectives?
20
MR. GJORDING: Objection, leading.
21
THE COURT: It's preliminary. I'll overrule.
22 You may answer.
23
A Yes, it does.
24
Q All right. How does it do that?
25
A Well, if you tum to page 25 of the Strategic
Page 2886
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Options Assessment -Q All right. Let's get that up on the board.
A Shattuck Hammond develops an overall opinion of
value for MRICI, and that would be $34.7 million. If you
can't see that, I can write this on a -Q You know, maybe it's better if you do just
because that's a pretty fuzzy -- may he approach the
easel, Your Honor?
THE COURT: He may.
A Shattuck Hammond's conclusion is that the total
value ofMRICI is $34.7 million. Now, because Saint
Alphonsus owns part of that value, if you subtract out
SARMC's value of$7.4 million, you come to the conclusion
that SARMC or Saint Alphonsus could have paid all of the
other owners $27.3 million, basically, to accomplish
their objectives of being able to control the magnets on
campus and to compete with MRIA in the service area. So,
that, basically, is the conclusion of the fmancial
expert that Saint Alphonsus hired to advise them.
Q All right. Now, I think we can probably put you
back in the witness seat. Now, that's the valuation of
MRI Center as of2001; correct?
A That's correct.
Q Can you use the information contained in the
valuation report to estimate the value ofMRI Center in
Page 28
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2004?
A Yes. And once again, valuation is
forward-looking. If we look at 2001 -MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, I hate to interrupt,
but the question called for a "yes" or "no."
THE COURT: It did.
A Yes, sir.
Q Yes. How would you do that?
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, I'll just put my
objection in as noted earlier.
THE COURT: Continuing objection noted for the
record.
MR. GJORDING: Thank you.
THE COURT: Proceed. You can answer the
question.
A Forward-looking valuation. When the valuation
was completed by Shattuck Hammond as of 200 I, their
concluded value for this operation could be translated
into a multiple. I talked about valuing a house and
looking at what comparable houses have been bought and
sold for. Well, same thing with regard to 2001.
Shattuck Hammond's multiple of cash flow was about 5.8
times. If you take that 5.8 times cash flow and you look
at the cash flow that was diverted, i.e., the cash flow
that IMI generated ranging from 5 to $6 million, if you
Page 2888

1 estimating what it would have cost Saint Alphonsus to
2 rightfully withdraw in 2004?
3
MR. GJORDING: Objection. Leading.
4
THE COURT: Sustained.
5
MR. GJORDING: Foundation.
6
THE COURT: It's leading.
7 BY MR. BANDUCCI:
8
Q Can you tell the jury whether or not the
9 information in the Shattuck Hammond report gives them a
10 number that they can look at that would estimate the cost
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

apply that $5.8 million to $5 million, you get a
conclusion that's in excess of $27 million.
Q Okay.
A Which, coincidentally, is very close to the
amount that they would have had to pay to buy out the
other non-SARMC owners at the time.
Q Okay. Are there other instances or is there
other information in the record that uses a similar
multiple that would get you to the same value or roughly
the same estimate of value in 2004?
A Yes. As indicated in my report or information
provided to us, included the valuation completed by
Mr. Steiner for Saint Alphonsus as of April of 2004. And
once again, looking at the conclusion that Mr. Steiner
arrives at -- and, once again, this is an expert retained
by Saint Alphonsus -- his multiple of cash flow based on
his conclusion is about 4.5 times. And, once again,
applying that to the cash flow that IMI is generating
that is diverted from MRIA to IMI as a result of the
dissociation and other acts of Saint Alphonsus, you apply
a 4-112 multiple to a 5 to $6 million cash flow, you end
up right around the same $27 million conclusion.
Q All right. So, using that information to derive
a 2004 valuation, is it your opinion that the information
in Shattuck Hammond provides the jury with a way of
Page 2889

to Saint Alphonsus to rightfully withdraw?
MR. GJORDING: Objection. A legal conclusion.
Relevance. Estimates?
MR. BANDUCCI: May I respond, Your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, the court made it
clear that I needed to establish a relationship between
2001 and 2004. I think I've done that. And I'm simply
asking the next question which relates to 2004.
THE COURT: Well, the way it's worded I agree
with the objection.
MR. BANDUCCI: All right. Let me try again.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q Does the Shattuck Hammond report provide you
with information that gives you an estimate for the value
Page 2890
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1 ofMRI Center in 2004?
2
MR. GJORDING: Objection; relevance. Estimates.
3
THE COURT: I'll overrule that. The way that's
4 phrased, I'll overrule it.
5
A Yes.
6
Q What is that estimate?
7
A Well, once again, $27.3 million represents the
8 amount that Saint Alphonsus could have paid to accomplish
9 its objectives of controlling the magnets on their campus
10 and competing in the service area. That would have taken
11 all of the other partners out of the equation, and, as
12 their own financial advisor advised them, that would have
13 helped to avoid the litigation that brings us here today.
14
Q Is the 27.3 relatable to 2004?
15
A Yes.
16
Q Thank you. Have you, as a business valuation
17 expert, seen situations where a partner in a partnership
18 decides to change strategic direction, and that strategic
19 direction is different than the old partnership's
20 strategies?
21
A Yes, and that happens all the time.
22
Q And what is your experience with respect to how
23 that change in strategic direction is resolved?
24
A Well, as I testified to earlier, I had that very
25 instance with regard to an imaging center in Portland,
Page 2891
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and the hospital partner stated their intentions to do
something differently and their way to accomplish that
was that they hired our finn. We valued the company, and
they bought out the partner interests.
MR. BANDUCCI: That's all the questions I have.
Thankyou.
THE COURT: Mr. Gjording, you may cross-examine.
MR. GJORDING: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
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CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. GJORDING:
Q Good morning, Mr. Wilhoite.
A Good morning.
Q How are you?
A Doing well.
Q You know, I want to talk to you mostly about the
opinion of the damages that you have computed from 2007
forward. But a question or two about what you just were
talking about. I think you said that Saint Alphonsus
could have bought this business back in 2001 for 27.3
million; right?
A That's what's indicated in the Shattuck Hammond
report, yes.
Q Okay. And I think you've said that you have
projected the loss of profits out into the future of
Page 2892
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20.9; true?
A That's correct.
Q Yesterday, Mr. Budge told us that in his opinion
that the profits that were lost by MRIA from a point to
where you took over was 15 something. So, you add the 15
and the 20 together, and you come up with 35.
My question is: Isn't it true, Mr. Wilhoite,
that if Saint A1phonsus had bought the business back in
2001 for 27 million, they would have -- they would have
gained all that profit?
A Which profit are you referring to?
Q Your 20.9 and Mr. Budge's 15.
A No. Mr. Budge looks at historical losses that
actually occurred. I look at the value that was lost as
a result of that loss.
Q But, of course, if Saint Alphonsus had bought
this business back in 2001, then they would have owned
it, and they would have gathered all of that income.
True?
A If they had bought it in 2001, the recipients of
that cash could have invested it, and they would have
realized some return through the current date, as well.
Q Thankyou.
MR. GJORDING: Mr. Bailiff, could I have 4519,
please?
Page 2893
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THE COURT: 4519 has been admitted; correct?
MR. GJORDING: Yes, sir. That is one of
those -- it's one of the boards.
THE COURT: You can go ahead and display it.
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, may I just kind of
hold it right here? I'm only going to use it for a
second.
THE COURT: Yes, of course.
MR. GJORDING: Then, I won't have to bother
Mr. Bailiff. It should be-- it's one of the graphs,
Gil.
THE BAILIFF: Do you wish it put up on the -MR. GJORDING: No. If it's okay with the judge,
I'm just going to put it right here so that you don't
have to jump up and down all the time.
BY MR. GJORDING:
Q Mr. Wilhoite, yesterday-- you see this area
right here (indicating)?
A Yes.
Q Mr. Budge-- are you familiar with this diagram?
A I've seen this, yes.
Q Okay. Mr. Budge testified that but for the bad
acts of these parties coming forward, that MRIA would
have enjoyed this kind of performance, this kind of scan
volume, and, therefore, that the damage was in this area
Page 2894
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here. And he was talking about the historical past?
A That's my understanding, yes.
Q Okay. And, sir, is it-- the opinions that
you're giving going forward is, basically, just a
projection of this difference right here?
A It picks up in 2006, and as I testified -Q Right.
A -- we, as MRIA, lost a certain amount of
referrals and cash flow that isn't reflected in the
valuation currently because it's gone. It's over on
IMI's side.
Q So -- but have I got this straight that,
basically, what he said the lost -- the loss that was
computed in his opinion from the past is this piece right
here, and what you're saying is, "I'm projecting that out
into the future to show these folks what the -- what the
damage would be going forward"?
A The future value loss, yes.
Q Okay. Thank you. I wanted to make sure that I
understood that before we start.
Okay. Mr. Wilhoite, I was listening to your
experience. And having used experts myself and
cross-examined experts in the past, it occurs to me that
the jury might be interested in how you're paid. And you
said that about 60 percent of your work is in litigation
Page 2895
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Q Okay. But you-- you believe that you have
about how many hours in it?
3
A I would estimate 60 to 70 hours of my time.
4
Q Okay. And is that to this point?
5
A Yes.
6
Q Okay. All right. In order to shortcut this a
7 little bit, can I assume that you are, basically,
I 8 adopting a great deal of Mr. Budge's work?
9
A Yes. I believe I testified to that.
10
Q In other words, you are -- you are assuming
11 here-- basically, you're assuming the validity of his
12 report; true?
13
A Yes.
14
Q Okay. So, you are assuming that this experience
15 of lost referrals will continue on until2023?
16
A Yes.
17
Q Okay. So, would it be correct, sir, that you
1 8 are assuming that even from this point forward, 2007 to
r 19
2023, the reason that the physicians, who perhaps haven't
12 0 even come to this town yet -- the reason that they're not
21 going to refer to MRIA is because of these bad acts that
2 2 occurred back in 1999 forward?
23
A No. Really; what I'm assuming is the referrals,
2 4 the relationships that left MRIA as a result of Saint
2 5 Alphonsus leaving and these other acts, that's what's
Page 2897
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support?
A No. I believe I testified 30 to 40.
Q Oh, 30 to 40. The other way around. How much
4 do you get paid per hour?
5
A My hourly rate is $425.
6
Q Okay. And do you know how many hours you've got
7 in this case?
8
A I'd estimate somewhere between 60 and 70.
Q In your report, it shows that through February,
9
1 0 you were paid 95,000.
11
A In my report?
12
Q I thought so.
13
A I don't believe that's listed in my report.
14
Q Perhaps in the deposition, an exhibit to your
15 deposition.
16
MR. GJORDING: Could we publish the deposition
1 7 of Mr. Wilhoite, please?
18
THE COURT: You may. It will be published.
1 9 BY MR. GJORDING:
20
Q You know, while they're getting that,
21 Mr. Wilhoite, maybe it was the charges from your firm.
22
A That's correct.
23
Q Okay.
24
A I would like to say they paid all that to me,
2 5 but that's not true.
Page 2896
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caused the loss in profits and the loss in value.
Q And these folks will never come back?
A Which folks are you referring to?
Q These referrals. Like the ones that are going
to refer next year in 2008 won't refer to MRIA because of
the bad acts that occurred back in the '90s?
A Well, the assumption is we lost the referral
8 relationships.
9
Q And that's my point. That is an assumption,
10 isn't it?
11
A Yes.
12
Q Okay. And so, if that assumption doesn't come
13 true, if some doctor who has yet to come to this valley
14 comes here and refers to MRIA, it won't be because of
15 anything that's happened in the past, perhaps?
16
A No. We're not really looking at doctors that
1 7 we're not aware of or that aren't here. Mr. Budge's
18 analysis -- and I believe he presented a fairly hefty
1 9 amount of detail -- his analysis is looking at historical
2 0 relationships; people that have been referring to MRIA
2 1 and failed to refer after Saint Alphonsus left and formed
2 2 IMI with GSR.
23
Q That's true. He is looking at what has happened
2 4 in the past, but he is projecting that out into the
2 5 future, as are you?
Page 2898
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introduce evidence of lost profits beyond December 31,2015, the date on which the Center
partnership was set to expire. See infra Part III.D.
Finally, if the award of$36.3 million for '"lost profits" is set aside, it would be error to
substitute in its place the jury's alternative award of"purchase price" damages of$27.3 million.
This theory of damages for breach of contract finds no basis in the law and is unsupported by the
evidence. See infi·a Part III.E.

A.

The Award Of Lost Scan Profits To MRIA Cannot Stand Because MRIA
Had No Such Profits To Lose

It is indisputable that the award of $36.3 million in damages represents profits allegedly

lost by one or both of the limited partnerships, Center and Mobile. MRIA, which mvns just a
fraction of Center and Mobile, therefore did not suffer these damages, and the jury award to
MRIA in its

0\\<11

name and on its own behalf was improper.

Center and Mobile are the two limited partnerships established by MRIA for the purpose
of engaging in the business of providing MRI services. See supra pp. 3-4. MRIA "provides no
services directly" (App. 37 (Trial Ex. 4247, p. 5)), but rather receives a management fee of7.5%
of Center's and Mobile's annual cash receipts for overseeing their operations (App. 11 (Trial Ex.
4024 § 4.2)). MRIA owns just 30% of Center and Mobile; Saint Alphonsus and other investors
own the remaining interests. (App. 37-40 (Trial Ex. 4247, pp. 5-8).)
In presenting evidence oflost profits, MRIA's two damages experts relied exclusively on
allegations of injury to Center and Mobile's business. Specifically, Bruce Budge estimated the
number of scans diverted from the limited partnerships to IMI and applied their revenue and cost
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figures in order to calculate the profits that were thus lost. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2732, L. 6 top. 2754,

L. 16.) MRIA's other expert, Charles Wilhoite, used Budge's calculations to predict diverted
lost future scans and resulting lost profits. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 2861, L. 6 to p. 2870, L. 21.)
The $36.3 million in damages thus represents profits allegedly lost by Center and/or
Mobile-the entities actually providing MRI scanning services-rather than any conceivable
injury to MRIA itself. And because MRIA owns just 30% of the limited partnerships, the
separate legal identity of these entities obviously cannot be ignored. Accordingly, this jury
award to "MRIA" cannot be affirmed on the theory that MRIA actually suffered such damages.
B.

The Award Of Lost Scan Profits Cannot Be Sustained On The Theory That
It Should Be Regarded As An Award To Center And/Or Mobile

Since MRIA did not suffer the lost profits damages that constitute the present award, the
award could only be sustained if this Court were to regard it as an award to one or both of the
limited partnerships, Center and/or Mobile. However, the only claims submitted to the jury on
behalf of Center and Mobile were causes of action for breach of the fiduciary duty allegedly
owed to those entities. (R., Vol. XII, pp. 2193-96.) For two separate and independent reasons,
this Court cannot reasonably regard the damage award as one made to the limited partnerships on
that cause of action. First, because the claims of the limited partnerships were improperly
combined in a single, disjunctive special-verdict question with MRIA's own claim for breach of
fiduciary duty, there is no basis for concluding that the jury found Saint Alphonsus liable to
either Center or Mobile. Second, Center's and Mobile's claims fail as a matter oflaw because
Saint Alphonsus owed no fiduciary duties to them.
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quote, "the second and third elements," breach of
damages, are specifically asked in the special verdict
form. And so, I don't believe there is going to be any
risk of jury confusion on that.
The, quote, "act primarily" language was left in
as a description of fiduciaries and is not inconsistent
with the case law describing fiduciary duty. This
language is separate from the descriptions of the duty of
loyalty and duty of care which follow in Instructions 33
and 34. So, the court will not amend Instruction 32
other than the sentence that the court indicated.
In this case, I don't see from the totality of
the evidence that was presented in this case -- when I
was addressing the summary judgment motion by Saint
Alphonsus regarding the fiduciary duty to MRI Center/
MRI Mobile as limited partnerships, the court concluded
that that was an issue of fact that should go to the
jury. The court had, from the significant number of
minute meetings and -- or minutes from meetings and the
substantial role, I believe, Saint Alphonsus played in
their partnership with MRIA, that realistic- -- the
evidence -- and I haven't really heard any evidence to
the contrary -- that there was a confidence placed by
these folks. And when I say "these folks," I'm talking
about, really, MRI Mobile/MRI Center were interwoven with
Page 4202

1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4

5

that's really the only amendment to the instructions that
will be going to the jury today.
The court will, as far as Instruction 40 -- the
reason that 40 and 41 remain separate rather than
combining them is because the concepts of proximate cause
and natural and proximate result separate the tort claims
and the contract claims, and so, 40 deals with the
contract claims. Forty-one deals with the tort claims.
The reason that the court is not instructing on a, quote,
"reasonably certain" standard is because I believe those
have been adequately covered throughout the instructions.
The special verdict form -- I'm not going to
amend that. There will be -- when the jury goes through
this, they're going to check off what they believe to be
the claims of MRIA that were established. I know that in
your closing remarks you will be able to give them your
theories on damages.
I realize that MRIA has this concern that if or
when this is appealed that they're concerned about
what -- whether or not the breach of the Partnership
Agreement for the wrongful dissociation will stand. But
the jury is going to go through and indicate which
theories that they believe were proven or not proven and
the amount. Obviously, that they-- in the event they
fmd damages, I think by requiring them to differentiate
Page 4204
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MRIA, though there were distinctions and they may have
been for tax purposes or other health-law purposes, the
overwhelming evidence is that they were all bundled
together and decisions were made.
I realize Saint Alphonsus was not -- and the
evidence has come in that, certainly, they were not as
interested in MRI Mobile in terms of trying to resolve
some of these disputes. But, still, they were there.
They were voting. They were acting as a fiduciary. And
certainly, there is, I believe, clear evidence and,
really, no contradictory evidence to that effect.
So, the facts and circumstances really fall into
that-- as I cited in Bliss Valley Foods at 121 Idaho 226
[sic], that, clearly, in this case, I think MRIA had a
very, very reasonable reliance on the trust and belief
that Saint Alphonsus was acting in a fiduciary capacity
towards both MRIA, MRI Mobile/MRI Center in their limited
partnership capacities. And so, the court will decline
to differentiate between or give separate instructions as
to MRIA and then MRI Mobile and MRI Center, the limited
liability partnerships.
But as I said, I did strike the language that,
"The court has already ruled that Saint Alphonsus owed
fiduciary duties to MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile." I
hadn't made that ruling because -- and I think that's -Page 4203
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between profits and loss ofthe benefit of the bargain,
my review of the case law in this area is that that's
certainly not a requirement, and I believe that they can
grasp these issues that are going to be presented to them
throughout this trial, as well as through the closing
remarks. So, the special verdict form will remain as
presented earlier.
So, those are the court's rulings. I know that
you have all set forth your objections, corrections. I
will make sure the record reflects all of these various
drafts of these instructions, whether they were given,
whether they were covered. I'll make sure that the
packet that goes up in the event that this is appealed
will reflect both the instructions that you proposed and
what was covered, what was not covered.
As far as an owner's right to testify as to the
value of property, that -- I don't disagree that that's
certainly allowed.
In this case, I -- my ruling is is that these
experts have come in. They have done a thorough and
complete evaluation of this process, and that that is the
level of evidence that I think the jury should consider.
Though, I think one witness did testify as to he
thought that was the value of the MRIA Center, he was
really keying off of documentation that had been
Page 4205
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MRIA Damages- From IMI Downtown

Lost Scans

434

2,033

1

3,011

1

2,6oo

1

2,180

1

1,950

1,667

1,548

15,423

Lost Profits

$252,749

$ 1,254,972

1

$ 1,927,852

1

$ 1,566,169

1

$ 1,375,115

1

$ 1,274,214

$963,754

$805,507

$9,420,332

MRIA Damages - From IMI Meridian

Lost Scans

I

1,184

Lost Profits I ($1,542,722)

I

2,340

I

2,832

I

2,989

I

3,069

I

I $ 1,249,386 I $ 1,608,108 I $ 1,711,793 I $ 1,523,221 I

MRIA Damages- From IMI SARMC

Lost Scans

62

2,922

2,984

Lost Profits

$29,420

$ 1,383,649

$ 1,413,069

12,414
$4,549,786
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MR. GJORDING: Oh. I'm sony. 459, excuse me.
BY MR. GJORDING:
Q I'm sony to you too, as well, Dr. Giles. This
is the meeting before 461. It was in April that they
said they didn't want to be bothered with it?
A Words to that effect.
Q Okay. Take a look at the 459 which is the
meeting exactly one month before. You'll see that you're
there. Sandra Bruce is there. Cindy Schamp is there.
And Mike Czech is there. Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q Who is Mike Czech?
A Mike Czech was the technical director of the MRI
Center of Idaho at the time.
Q Okay. Go to the second page, please, and
enlarge the first "- the second full paragraph where it
says "The possibility." I think it's the next one.
First full paragraph. I'm sony. Go to the third
paragraph. "The possibility of placing an MRI system in
Meridian was discussed." Do you see that?
A I do.
Q I'm going to read this. "The possibility of
placing an MRI system in Meridian was discussed. Mike
Czech reported potential of space available at the comer
of Eagle Road and Franklin in the Parkway Plaza
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go talk to her person, Janelle, and they should get
together about perhaps using the Saint Alphonsus property
as a location for MRIA's Meridian site?
A I don't think so. I think what it says is that
that the other Meridian property was going to be
considered. I don't think this says "Cheny Lane."
Q Okay. Well, do you get the impression that
Sandra is making a suggestion to the group that the -that Mike should go talk to Janelle and talk about
whether or not MRI could -- MRIA could locate their new
site, if possible, on a Saint Alphonsus property?
A Possibly.
MR. GJORDING: Okay. Thank you.
THE COURT: All right. Dr. Giles, you may step
down.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Let's take our break for the
morning.
(Recess.)
(Jury present.)
THE COURT: All of our jurors are present in
their proper places. Mr. Miller, you may call your next
witness.
MR. MILLER: Thank you, Your Honor. Saint
Alphonsus calls Manfred Steiner.
Page 3184
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building." Mike Czech is a Center or Mobile employee?
A He was the director.
Q Okay. He is the director. And it looks like he
reported that there was some space at the comer of Eagle
Road and Franklin; correct?
A Correct.
Q That's not the Cheny Lane, not the Saint
Alphonsus property; correct?
A That's correct.
Q Okay. Then, it goes on to say, "It was agreed
that we should pursue other location options to include
the property being developed directly across from
St. Luke's Meridian, as well as 9 acres of property that
Saint Alphonsus has committed to purchasing." Is that
the Cheny Lane?
A I think so.
Q Okay. Then, Sandra said -- "Sandra requested
that Mike"-- Mike Czech-- "contact Jonell Reilly at
Saint Alphonsus to determine the location of the Meridian
property and investigate that site as a potential for
magnet placement."
Did I read that correctly?
A Youdid.
Q Okay. Did you -- did you understand that Sandra
Bruce was suggesting to -- that your fellow, Mike, should
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THE COURT: Mr. Steiner, come forward to the
gentlemen in the gray coat. He will give you some
instructions, sir.

MANFRED R. STEINER,
having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, was examined and
8 testified as follows:
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DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. MILLER:
Q Good morning, Mr. Steiner.
A Good morning.
Q Would you please state your full name for the
record, please?
A Manfred R. Steiner.
Q Mr. Steiner, how are you employed or otherwise
professionally engaged?
A I'm a managing director at Wellspring Partners
which is a Huron division company.
Q What does Wellspring Partners do?
A Wellspring Partners is an operational
improvement and financial consulting firm, specifically
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targeting the healthcare industry. I head up the
financial advisory group within Wellspring Partners.
Q Okay. Why don't you tell me a little bit more
what that means?
A Basically, I am responsible for all of the
fairness opinions and valuation opinions and financial
advisory opinions that Wellspring Partners performs for
its healthcare clients.
Q So, what-- okay. I'll keep asking these
questions as you throw out new terms on us. What is a
"fairness opinion"?
A A fairness opinion is an opinion as to whether a
transaction is fair from a financial standpoint.
Q And how does that differ from a valuation?
A A valuation opinion is an opinion from the
valuation professional's perspective as to what the value
is of an entity on a-- typically, on a fair market value
basis.
Q You mentioned that Wellspring does work in the
healthcare area. And I didn't hear -- perhaps you said
it, but how much of Wellspring's work is devoted to the
healthcare industry versus other fields?
A We are 100 percent focused on the healthcare
industry. We have always been focused on the healthcare
industry.
Page 3186
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Q Before we go further into Wellspring,
Mr. Steiner, why don't you give us a little history of
your educational background following high school?
A High school. I got an undergraduate degree at
Babson College in Massachusetts. Worked thereafter doing
real estate development and in the property casualty
insurance industry and then went to graduate school at
University of Chicago. Got out of University of Chicago
and went to work for Price Waterhouse, worked there, and
then went to Valuation Counselors before coming to
Wellspring Partners.
Q Okay. And what did you do while you were at -you said you went to University of Chicago. Did you
obtain a degree there?
A Yes.
Q And what kind of degree did you obtain?
A MBA in finance.
Q And then, you said you went to work for
PriceWaterhouse?
A Correct.
Q And what did you do while at PriceWaterhouse?
A I worked in the financial advisory and valuation
group within PriceWaterhouse.
Q Okay. While you were at PriceWaterhouse, did
you have any particular specialty or area of emphasis in
Page 3187
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your practice there?
A I had a -- I was an associate there so I had a
focus -- driven into a focus towards healthcare, which is
principally where I got my experience in healthcare.
Q You said you went to a company called Valuation
Counselors?
A Yes.
Q What did that firm do?
A That was a valuation fmancial advisory firm.
In addition to healthcare, it did a number of other
industries, but I tended to focus on the healthcare
industry.
Q Now, how long have you been with Wellspring?
A Wellspring -- I've been with Wellspring for
about five years.
Q And within-- you mentioned that Wellspring is
l 00 percent focused in healthcare. You mentioned you're
on the -- well, tell me again. I forgot. What side of
the Wellspring business are you on?
A On the fmancial advisory end and valuation
group.
Q What is it about the healthcare area that causes
somebody like a Wellspring company to focus in that area?
Is there a lot of work in the area or why is it that you
focus just on healthcare?
Page 3188
--·--...............- ..........---·--·-----------·---- ·····-- . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·. ···-········A Well, healthcare is really a different animal.
It's different from a lot of industries. It's governed
by a reimbursement system which is dictated by the
government which can change on a whim. It has a whole
level of fraud and abuse and Stark Laws which impact the
industry. And, really, in order to understand the
financial mechanics and the valuation ofhealthcare
entities, you have to be absorbed in it almost 100
percent.
Q Now, you mentioned something called "Stark" and
anti-kickback statute. To your understanding, what are
those statutes with respect to what -- how they impact
what you do?
A Well, they impact what I do from the standpoint
that our opinions have to withstand third-party
scrutinies. Whenever there is a physician involvement or
there is a deal with a physician, there has to be a fair
market value or a fairness opinion. We provide that
assistance, and we do it all under the -- in the context
that our opinions will withstand any sort of third-party
scrutiny.
Q Okay. And what is your understanding of what
the scrutiny is about? What is the source and the reason
for the scrutiny?
A It principally involves Medicare referrals and
Page 3189
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1
2
performed by Shattuck Hammond. Did you review the
3
Shattuck Hammond reports?
4
A Yes, we did.
i 5
Q And Shattuck Hammond, I believe -- and I'll
6
represent to you -- is engaged in a process of taking the
7
MRIA and pushing down the value of that entity into the
8
other two. Are you familiar with that?
9
A Yes.
10
Q Okay. So, is this a little different than what
11
Shattuck did?
12
A Well, it's a little different in that we have-13
we have our summary, basically-- our value summary
14
broken out. We have each one of the entities, and then
15
we have the respective ownership that each has in each
16
other.
17
Q Okay.
18
A Ultimately, we're getting down to a total
19
interest that Saint Alphonsus has in MRIA, the 24.75
20
percent at 3.6 million to 4.6 million.
21
Q Okay. And is this chart an apples-to-apples
22
comparison to what Shattuck did?
23
A I don't know.
24
Q Okay.
25
A I don't know if it's apples to apples because it
Page 3210

Q Now, the jury has seen some prior valuations

Q Did we correctly identify those on the screen?
A Yes.
MR. MILLER: Okay. Are those big enough on the
screens that you can see those? Thank you.
Mr. Steiner, you can sit down.
I think we can take this one down, Gil.
BY MR. MILLER:
Q Again, Mr. Steiner, other than taking out the
Saint Alphonsus volume out of this number, if you had
been asked to value Saint Alphonsus's interest in this
company, what differently would you have done if this
were a transaction versus what you did here?
A If this were a transaction, I wouldn't change
any of the processes and methodologies that we employed.
We may not adjust out for the-- for the volumes with
Saint Alphonsus.
Q Okay. Now, just so I'm clear, the-- when we
talk about what Saint Alphonsus's interest is in MRIA,
does that represent what other interests Saint Alphonsus
or the other parties may have in MRI Center or MRI
Mobile?
A That is -- that is Saint Alphonsus's interest in
MRIA which has tl1e relationship with all of the other
entities.
Q So, parties -Page 3212

············- ·····- ·-···

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

was, I think, for a different purpose.
Q Okay. And, again, what -- with reference to
what you refer to as the Saint Al's scans, the inpatients
and ED patients, what, if any, portion ofthose scans is
included in the number for MRIA Center?
A None.
Q You took those out?
A Those were all taken out.
Q Okay. And, again, why did you do that?
A Because we wanted to value Center under the
assumption that Saint Alphonsus was not party to it at
all.
Q Okay. So, then, when we get down to what Saint
Alphonsus's interest -- that 25 percent interest and the
pie at the top that we talked about, did you come to a
conclusion of what that value was? And this is yes or
no.
A Yes.
Q Okay. And what is the value that you came to
for the value of Saint Alphonsus's interest in MRIA?
A The value-- the opinion of value that we have
for the 24.75 percent interest in MRIA is the 3.6 million
to the 4.6 million.
Q So, the very bottom numbers there?
A The very bottom numbers.
Page 3211

1
2
3
I 4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

-··-·······-··--·-··--··--··--·····--·-·-··--·--·-···----······-····-----------·-·-------·----

A Direct and indirect.
Q And parties may have other ownership interests
in other pieces of the puzzle?
A Correct.
Q Okay. And you didn't attempt to individually
value those pieces?
A No, we didn't value them individually. They
would be the result of doing the calculations from the
individual business operations.
Q Okay. Actually, I'll leave this here for a
moment. Other than your valuation work, Mr. Steiner, did
I ask you to do any other analysis or work in this case?
A You asked us to review the Budge and Wilhoite
reports.
Q And what did you do in that regard?
A We reviewed the reasonableness of the
assumptions that were underlying the damage calculations.
Q And, again, when -- what damage calculations are
we talking -- are you talking about when you say looking
at the underlying assumptions?
A The but-for analysis. But for the bad acts-but for the bad acts, the damages, the result in damages.
Q Okay. Just quickly, can you compare what-what those analyses are to your understanding versus what
the analysis you were doing was?
Page 3213
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A I think they are very different. There is the
damage calculation versus a business enterprise value
calculation that was done for -- in conformity with
appraisal standards.
Q And when -- to your understanding, when
Mr. Wilhoite and Mr. Budge looked at the damage
calculation, were they looking at -- well, what were they
looking at? Were they looking at the value of the
companies or were they looking at the value of
potentially lost scans?
A They were looking at the value of potentially
lost scans.
Q Okay. And you, as I understand, looked at the
assumptions behind some of those calculations?
A Yes, we did.
Q And based on your experience, Mr. Steiner, in
the healthcare field and in valuation, did you have any
criticisms of those assumptions?
A Well, I think my question-Q I'm asking for yes or no. It's foundational.
MR. BANDUCCI: I'll wait.
A I think we questioned the reasonableness -MR. BANDUCCI: Excuse me. This is a yes or no.
THE COURT: It just calls for a yes or no
answer, sir.
Page 3214
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different area at this point. And I would object on that
basis.
THE COURT: It goes to the weight. I'll
overrule.
MR. MILLER: Thank you, Your Honor.
BY MR. MILLER:
Q Mr. Steiner, could you describe -MR. MILLER: Actually, would it be convenient
for you, Tammy, to go back and look at my last question
so we can not have an objection to it again?
THE COURT: We'll do that for you.
(Court reporter read back the last question.)
BY MR. MILLER:
A Did you hear the question?
Q Yes. Okay. Go ahead.
A I think we questioned the reasonableness of the
assumptions that the scans that were lost at Center would
have been able to be kept at Center given some of the
deficiencies that we saw in the business model at Center.
Q Okay. Would you describe what deficiencies you
saw -- again, I'm asking for based on your expertise and
your experience what you see as the business model
problems at MRl Center?
A Well, first of all, the -- the general market,
as demonstrated through Center, was very favorable in
Page 3216
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you have, and then we'll ask you for the basis for those
criticisms?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, ifl may voir dire
the witness in aid of objection?
THE COURT: Proceed.
MR. BANDUCCI: Mr. Steiner, I think you
testified at the beginning of your examination that
you've only been involved in the litigation context a
couple of times. Is that true?
THE WiTNESS: Yes.
MR. BANDUCCI: And I take it, then, that you
have not prepared a damages analysis, per se, in the
context of litigation more than a couple times in your
career?
THE WiTNESS: That's correct.
MR. BANDUCCI: And you did not prepare a damages
analysis in this case?
THE WiTNESS: No, we did not.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I don't think that
this witness is qualified to evaluate the work of damages
experts because I don't think he is qualified as an
expert in the area of damages. I'm not asserting that he
isn't a valuation expert, but we're getting into a very
Page 3215
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Boise. It was a favorable demographic market. It was a
favorable reimbursement market from the standpoint that
Center was enjoying very high profit margins relative to
the industry. There was also no certificate of need,
meaning that there could be new entrants coming into the
market.
That said, Center was a single-modality
operation with no involvement in the radiologists. And
it's our view that over time, the more sustainable models
are the multi-modality, radiologist-affiliated models.
Ultimately, the scans in that volume would all
have been at risk, whether it was from IMI or any other
new entrant coming into the market.
Q Now, you mentioned "high profit margins."
What -- describe for the jury what you mean and what you
saw as "high profit margins" here based on your
experience in other areas of the country.
A Well, Center had-- historically had very, very
strong profit margins to the point where they were
considerably above the other transaction -- transacted
companies and, also, the publicly traded companies.
Q In your experience, what happens when a company
has higher profit margins than you see other places?
A It's been our experience that usually when there
are profit margins that are above or abnormal, it usually
Page 3217
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reports of Budge and Wilhoite?
A Yes, I did.
Q And I assume that in -- when you reviewed the
Wilhoite deposition -- excuse me -- the Wilhoite report,
you saw his statement that $27.3 million represents the
wrongful dissociation damage figure?
A I believe I saw that, yes.
Q Okay. And you were also provided a copy of
testimony of Mr. Wilhoite in that regard?
A Yes.
Q And you do not have an opinion, do you, that
that is an inappropriate measure of damages?
A We didn't look at the damage. We did not look
at the damage aspect of it.
Q My question to you is: You don't have an
opinion criticizing that approach to the damages?
A We don't have an opinion because we didn't look
at it.
Q Well, you were not asked to look at it?
A We were not asked to look at the damage aspect.
We were asked to look at the reasonableness of the
assumptions.
Q Okay. So, you talked with the lawyers. They
gave you the reports of Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite, and
that was a part of the Wilhoite report; correct?
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THE CLERK: There is two. So, which one?
THE COURT: The second volume. We have one
that's referenced as a videotape and the other that is -MR. BANDUCCI: Telephonic. It's the second one,
Your Honor. I can give you the date. It is -THECOURT: May17th?
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes.
THE COURT: The May 17th deposition of
Mr. Steiner will be presented to him. It's been
published. Proceed.
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q Mr. Steiner, if you would please go to page 25
of your deposition. And starting at line 5, you say,
"Yes, we also received copies oftheir depositions."
Actually, Mr. Gordon's question: "Did you
review those?
"Answer: Not really.
"Question: Kind of?
"Answer: A couple pages, maybe.
"Question: So, it was even less than leafing
through it?
"Answer: Yes.
"Did you look at particular excerpts?
"Answer: No, I did not.

Page 3226
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1
A Let-2
Q That was a part of the Wilhoite report, this
3 $27.3 million?
4
A Yes, it was.
5
Q And you were aware of that?
6
A Yes.
7
Q And you don't have -- you're not telling this
8 jury here today the $27.3 million is not an appropriate
9 number for wrongful dissociation; correct?
10
A We don't have a comment on that damage aspect.
11
Q Okay. Thank you. Now, when you reviewed the
12 Budge analysis, I assume that you read the Budge
13 deposition?
14
A Yes.
15
Q Really? Are you testifying today that you
16 actually took the time to read the Budge deposition?
17
A I may -- if it was provided to us, I may have
18 scanned it. Yes.
19
MR. BANDUCCI: Let's have the deposition of
20 Mr. Steiner published. This would be the second
21 deposition.
22
THE COURT: Mr. Steiner?
23
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes.
24
THE COURT: Okay. The Steiner deposition will
25 be published, the. second volume.
Page 3227

1
"Question: How did you decide what to read and
2 what not to read?"
3
"I think I was just trying to glean from the
4 very beginning what the nature of the questions were.
5
"Question: You were just kind of curious, more
6 or less, how long it was and in a brief moment to see
7 what sort of questions were asked?
8
"Answer: Just gleaning from the first couple of
9 pages."
10
Was that your testimony?
11
A Yes.
12
Q Are you criticizing Mr. Budge's analysis of
13 damages without even looking at his deposition?
14
A I'm critiquing the assumptions that Mr. Budge
15 made in his schedules -16
Q Well-17
A -- and the reasonableness of those assumptions.
18
Q Now, do you think it would be giving Mr. Budge a
19 fair shake to read what he testified to under oath?
20
A Well, we reviewed the -21
Q That's the question.
22
MR. MILLER: I'll object. It's argumentative.
23
THE COURT: Just a moment. Your objection?
24
MR. MILLER: It's argumentative, Your Honor.
25
THE COURT: The way it's phrased, I'll sustain.
Page 3229
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iii. Second Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRI Associates;
iv. '11tird Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRI Associates;
v. Fourth Amendment to Atiicles of Partnership ofMRI Associates;
vi. Limited Partnership Agreement of MRI Mobile Limited Partnership;
vii. MRI Limited Partnership, dba MRI Center ofldaho;
viii. Lease Information;

ix. Operating Agreement of Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC;
x. Professional Services Agreement by and between Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center and Gem State Radiology;

..

xi. Amendment to the Limited Partnership Agreement ofMRI Mobile
Limited Patincrship.
Supplemental disclosure regarding previously disclosed expert Manfi·cd Steiner is as
follows:

(

In addition to those opinions previously disclosed on March 6, 2006, and January 16,
2007, Mr. Steiner will offer the opinions identified below.
Mr. Steiner has reviewed the report of Charles Wilhoite dated March 12, 2007, and the
report of Bruce Budge of the same date. He has also reviewed the depositions of these two
individuals.

Mr. Steiner will opine that Mr. Budge's assumption (an assumption upon which
Mr. Wilhoite's analysis is also based) that physicians who referred thcil· patients to MRICI prior
to 1999 would have continued to refer their patients to MRICI but f{n· the alleged conduct of
Saint Alphonsus, Gem State, ICR and IMI is not a reasonable assumption, and any projection of

business loss based on such assumption is speculative. This opinion is based on the fact that in
1999, the MRI market in Boise and Meridian, Idaho, was ripe for competition. If Gem State/ICR

..
had not established a free standing imaging center, one or more other providers would have
SAINT ALPHONSUS' THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S
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entered into competition. The facts supporting this conclusion arc disclosed in the report of
January 16, 2007. These facts include the high reimbursement for MRis in Idaho, MRICPs high
profit margins and the fact that MRICI was a single modality facility and did not have radiologist
affiliation. The combination of high reimbursement, high profit margin and MRICI's single
modality business model was an invitation for competition.
This opinion is further supported by the fact that in the first three months of IMJ's
operation in 1999, IMI received referrals ft·om physicians to perform scans on 632 patients.
According to Mr. Budge's report, 434 of those patient referrals cmne from physicians who
previously had referred to MRICI.

(See Budge report, Exh. 11.)

If accurate, this fact

demonstrates that IMPs business model was being quickly adopted by referring physicians. In
addition) in the first full year of operation) IMI received referrals to perform MRI scans on 3)000

(

patients. Again, this shows quick adoption of the IMI business model over that offered by
MRICI. Likewise, IMI had MRI patient gmwth of' approximately 50% from 2000 to 2001,
approximately 35% from 2001 to 2002, 32% from 2002 to 2003, 16% from 2003 to 2004 and
8% growth from 2004 to 2005. These growth rates and their timing reflects that IMI's growth is
consistent with the fact they had the preferred business model and docs not support the
conclusion that MRI suffered damage as a result of Saint Alphonsus' dissociation.
The fact thut MRICI's MRI patient volume peaked in 2001 and declined steadily
thereafter (see pnge.J9 _gf January 16, 2007, report) also reflects that MRICI's loss is due to
factors other than Suint Alphonsus' dissociation. MRICI's diminishing scan volume in a growth
market at a time when IMI was experiencing high growth demonstrates that MRICPs alleged
damage was attributable to forces that existed before Saint Alphonsus dissociated. Mr. Steiner

will testify that based upon his professional oxpertiso in the economics of medical imaging and
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based on tho facts disclosed in the January t 6, 2007, report, tho primary rcasott for such dynam:]
was IMI's superior business model.
M1".

Steine1· will also opine that Shattuck Hammond, as an investment banking firm,

approaches valuation from lhe standpoint of facilituting a transaction in which it ha.<l an economic
interest. An independent valuation consultant firm has greater independence in its assessment of
value.
Moreover, an assessment of value in 2001 is not relevant to value at other time periods.

Any assessment of value is based upon the facts as they exist at the time of the valuation.
Industry dynamics, local market dynamics and provider specific dynamics all must he considered
at the time ofthe valuation. Valuation projections based on a companis current positive growth
(which MRICI showed for 2000 and 2001) will change significantly when changes in industry,
loc!tl market conditions or provider specific conditions change. In April 2004, MRICI was
experiencing declining volumes. MRICI's scan volumes in fact peaked in 200 l. Shattuck
Hammond had predicted they would conlinuo to rise significantly when they in fact declined.
The difference between the scan volume and the direction of scan volume between 2001 and
2004 is a highly significant depressor on the value ofMRICI.

As noted above, the rate ofiMI's growth from 1999 through 2003 suggest it was because
ofiMI's superior business model. Tho fact that IMI was radiologist affiliated is a very important
fact. Physicians in the community who have patients in need of medical imaging services know
and work with the radiologists. The radiologist-affiliated center has advantages in having cunent
relationships with practicing physicians and being on the forefront of emerging teclmology.
Likewise, IMI's multi-modality "one stop shopping" approach was a positive facto!' for IMI ovc1·
MRICI.
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Mr. Steiner will te.CJtify that the overriding factor in MRICI's diminution in value was
MRICI's business model.

In 1999, the medical imaging market in Boise was ripe for

competition. Favorable reimbursement and good patient demographics allowed MRlCl to have
unusually high profit margins. For example, in 2001, MRICI's profit margins were 56% versus
38% nationally.

These facts are disclosed in the Januaty 16, 2007, l'Cport. This would have

likely attracted competition even if Gem Stutc/lCR had not established the downtown imaging
cenler. In fact, competition in addition to IMI came to

t~c

market. As Mr. Wilhoite points out in

his report, low barriers to entry have drawn competitors into an inct·casingly crowded field.
Idaho has no certificate of need law. Financing for equipment was readily available. IMI
approached the favorable market with a superior business model that likely contributed to theit·
success over and above many competitors.
In asse.qsing current value, one must ulso lake into account the effects of the Deficit

Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005. The DRA has had the resutt of significantly reducing the
profitabHity and therefore the value of medical imaging companies.

Mr. Steiner will testify that Saint Alphonsus' dissociation is not u substantial factor in
MRIA's overall loss in volume. The primat·y effect of SADC dissociating on MRICl was the
loss of hospital inpatients and emergency department patients. As previously stated, the primary
cause of loss to MRICI was market competition.
Saint Alphonsus may also call any of the experts identified by the Third Party
Defendants.

\
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.

Case No CV OC 0408219D
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SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO
REOPEN FACT AND EXPERT
DISCOVERY REGARDING
DAMAGES AND SET A DISCOVERY
SCHEDULE, AND ITS MOTION TO
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EXPERT DISCOVERY REGARDING DAMAGES AND SET A DISCOVERY SCHEDULE,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

MRIA opposes the entry of a scheduling order setting forth deadlines for dispositive
motions and motions in limine, as well as the limited reopening of expert discovery related to
damages. But any case going to trial needs such a schedule, and MRIA offers no coherent
reasons justifying its view that no motions in limine can be filed, that no proper dispositive
motions can be brought, and that Saint Alphonsus should be deni~d all right to expert testimony
with regard to the changed factual premises on which the upcoming trial will proceed.
Specifically, the Supreme Court's October 2009 ruling in this matter held, among other
things, that (1) Saint Alphonsus did not wrongfully dissociate in breach of Section 6.1 of the
partnership agreement, and (2) that the initial, erroneous wrongful dissociation ruling, when
"considered with other evidence such as ... [statements] from the Shattuck memoranda, the
erroneous instructions could have affected the jury's determination of other causes of action."
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 491, 224 P.3d 1068,
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO REOPEN FACT AND
EXPERT DISCOVERY REGARDING DAMAGES AND SET A DISCOVERY SCHEDULE,
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1080 (2009) ("SADC"). The Court thus held that "[w ]e vacate the judgment and verdict and
remand this case for further proceedings that are consistent with this opinion." Id at 501, 224
P.3d at 1090. Further, in November 2010, this Court ruled that MRIA's only other theory of
wrongful dissociation lacked merit, and thus under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, Saint
Alphonsus had a "statutory right to dissociate without liability from [the] partnership." Nov. 17,
2010 Op. at 6-9; see also id at 17-18. Saint Alphonsus's dissociation in 2004 was therefore
legally proper as a matter of law. As a result, Saint Alphonsus should be entitled to argue-in
sharp distinction from the premises of the 2007 trial-that its lawful dissociation ended any
fiduciary duty to its former partner, and that, once its contractual non-compete obligation ended
in 2005, Saint Alphonsus likewise no longer had statutory obligations to MRIA. Saint
Alphonsus should also be entitled to discover whether and how these changed circumstances
affect the damages analysis ofMRIA's experts, and to offer its own expert testimony taking
these changed circumstances into account.

I.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER A SCHEDULING ORDER ADDRESSING
DEADLINES FOR DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS AND MOTIONS IN LIMINE
This Court should enter the scheduling order as proposed in Saint Alphonsus's opening

motion, as that schedule provides reasonable, orderly deadlines for the myriad pre-trial activities
that must be accomplished before the September 6, 2011 trial is to begin. See Mot. at 2-4.
MRIA notably does not object to the time-frame set forth in that proposed schedule. Counsel for
the parties stipulated at an earlier status conference that the parties would first address several
preliminary issues expressly left open by the Supreme Court's decision, and afterwards, a
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scheduling order would be entered for further proceedings. See May 7, 2010 Tr., p. 14-15. This
Court then did, indeed, order a briefing schedule on these "preliminary" motions. See July 9,
2010 Order re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions from the Parties and Briefing Schedule. The
previously contemplated scheduling order should now be entered.
MRIA's opposition to the scheduling order appears to rest on the notion that the Supreme
Court's remand was very narrow, even though it plainly contemplated a complete retrial of the
entire case on substantially changed legal premises. Indeed, MRIA attempts to artificially limit
the scope of this case on remand by citing cases where the Supreme Court's order was for a
limited remand, to address a specified issue. See, e.g., Mountainview Landowners Co-op Ass 'n
v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 866, 136 P.3d 332, 337 (2006) (remand for limited purpose of having the

district court determine the meaning of the term "swimming" in a contract); Rockefeller v.
Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 543, 82 P.3d 450, 455 (2003) (remanded only limited issue of'"whether

Rockefeller should forfeit all, or just a portion, of his commission."').
But this case was a "general reversal," and not such a narrow, issue-specific reversal. See
Hutchins v. State, 100 Idaho 661, 666, 603 P.2d 995, 1000 (1979); J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics
Int'l, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 257, 939 P.2d 574, 576 (1997) (distinguishing "general reversal" from

remands that "limited the district court" in the question to be considered.). It is well-settled that
"[a]fter a general reversal," "all issues not passed upon by th[e Supreme] Court were open to [the
district court] at the second trial," the district court may take "additional evidence ... presented
in further proceedings on remand," and the district court may enter "conclusions of law, with
respect to the issues not dealt with in our opinion, [in] ... such further proceedings as may be
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO REOPEN FACT AND
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had." Hutchins, 100 Idaho at 666, 603 P.2d at 1000; see also, e.g., 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error

§ 1106 ("The effect of a general and unqualified reversal of a judgment, order, or decree is to
nullify it completely and to leave the case standing as if such judgment, order, or decree had
never been rendered, except as restricted by the opinion of the appellate court.").
The Supreme Court's remand order was a general reversal-it did not just reverse some
portion of the prior judgment for some specific legal determination, but rather "vacate[d] the
judgment and verdict" in its entirety---on all the merits, claims and the damages award-and
"remand[ed] this case for further proceedings that are consistent with this opinion." SADC,
148 Idaho at 501, 224 P.3d at 1090 (emphasis added). By the very terms ofthe remand order,
this Court has the broad authority to conduct further proceedings as appropriate, including issues
not passed upon by the Supreme Court, and issues raised in the newly amended pleadings
(which, obviously, could not have been passed upon before). Thus, quite properly, this Court's
recent ruling specifically anticipated motions in limine on several evidentiary issues related to
the dissociation rulings, as well as on claims that MRIA had voluntarily dismissed with prejudice
prior to the first trial. See Nov. 17, 2010 Op. at p. 18, n.3.
Obviously, numerous motions-both dispositive and evidentiary-arise out of the
Supreme Court's opinion and are fairly intertwined with that decision. For one, MRIA is
suggesting (yet again) that it wishes to argue that despite this Court's ruling that the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act gave Saint Alphonsus a "statutory right to dissociate without liability
from" MRIA (Nov. 17, 2010 Op. at 16) (emphasis added), Saint Alphonsus's dissociation
somehow still breached the partnership agreement. See Opp. to Mot. to Reopen Discovery at 15
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO REOPEN FACT AND
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n.43. Both a motion for summary judgment and motion in limine regarding this repeatedly
discredited theory would be appropriate. Likewise, MRIA's recent amendment of its
counterclaims added an entirely new legal theory never before present in this case-that MRI
Center and Mobile are third-party beneficiaries of the MRIA general partnership agreement 3d
Am. Compl.

~

84. Motions practice related to that new legal theory is plainly appropriate.

As a similar example, the Supreme Court's opinion expressly noted that the original,
incorrect wrongful dissociation ruling, combined with MRIA's use of certain evidence ("such
as", but not exclusively, the Shattuck Hammond memorandum), prejudiced Saint Alphonsus as
to the other non-dissociation causes of action. SADC, 148 Idaho at 491, 224 P .3d at 1080.
Motions in limine pertaining to any such purported evidence are plainly appropriate. 1
Thus, for many reasons, this case requires a scheduling order, consistent with normal
practice, that includes the proposed dates for filing dispositive motions and motions in limine.

II.

THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND THIS COURT
SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECT MRIA'S PRIOR EXPERT REPORTS REGARDING
DAMAGES, SO THAT FURTHER EXPERT DAMAGES DISCOVERY IS
JUSTIFIED
The Supreme Court's general reversal permits the Court to reopen discovery. See

Hutchins, 100 Idaho at 666, 603 P.2d at 1000. Further, the fact that MRIA's wrongful
dissociation claim has now been rejected significantly alters the factual premises supporting
MRIA's remaining lost-profits damages theory. Although MRIA now strains mightily to

1

There is no basis for MRIA's unsupported speculation that Saint Alphonsus is likely to
file numerous improper motions. The solution to abusive motion practice is not to limit motion
practice at the outset, but to seek appropriate relief should such abuses occur.
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suggest that its experts' reliance on the "wrongful dissociation" was limited to the purchase-price
damages theory, this is flatly contradicted by the face of the reports, both of which cite the
wrongful dissociation in support of their opinions on lost-profits damages, not "purchase price"
damages. See Mot. to Reopen, Ex. A (Budge Report) at 11-17; Ex. B (Wilhoite Report) at 3.
Saint Alphonsus should be entitled to explore how the new legal rulings affect those opinions; to
the extent that MRIA believes that the dissociation rulings do not affect its experts' opinions, that
should come from the experts' mouths, not counsel's, and should be subject to cross-examination
and a competing expert report.
The dissociation ruling also plainly affects the lost-profits damages calculations in other
germane ways. For example, a significant portion of the lost-profits that MRIA asserts relies on
the fact that, a year after dissociation, Intermountain Medical Imaging ("IMI") opened a location
on Saint Alphonsus's campus. See Mot. to Reopen, Ex. A (Budge Report) at 11-12; Ex. B
(Wilhoite Report) at 13. MRIA claims that by allowing this to happen, Saint Alphonsus
breached fiduciary and contractual duties, among other things, see, e.g., 3d Am. Compl. ~59,
and MRIA's experts calculated their lost-profits damages assuming that IMI's campus magnet
was improper. But given that the Court has now held that Saint Alphonsus lawfully dissociated,
Saint Alphonsus had no fiduciary or contractual duties to MRIA at the time IMI opened on
campus, and thus MRIA cannot claim "damages" from that lawful competition. In other words,
Saint Alphonsus is entitled to test the experts' assessment of damages in light of the fact that
their assumptions have been held to be false.
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More generally, in the prior trial, MRIA's experts claimed that the damages accruing to
MRIA increased for some nineteen years after the dissociation-from 2004 to 2023. This
dubious contention was at least theoretically supportable on the theory that, dissociation being
wrongful, Saint Alphonsus continued to breach fiduciary and contractual duties until2023.
Now, however, not only has the Supreme Court definitively held that damages can, in no event,
run past 2015, but also the dissociation rulings should mean that Saint Alphonsus's fiduciary
duties ended in 2004 and its one-year contractual non-compete duty ended in 2005. Saint
Alphonsus has need of an expert to analyze these new factual premises that substantially reduce
the prospective damages, as well as an opportunity to cross-examine MRIA's experts as to the
effect of these rulings on their now-implausible damages theories. 2
Finally, MRIA's position that this case must "stand as it did immediately prior to trial,"
Opp. to Mot. to Reopen Discovery at 4, is contradicted by the way this case has proceeded on
remand. The Supreme Court held that "[t]he limited partnerships [MRI Center and MRI Mobile]

2

Notably, MRIA's attempt to freeze the case at the point "immediately prior to trial" is
inconsistent with the very quotation MRIA cites in support of its theory: that "the case stands as
it did before the erroneous decision, order, or judgment was entered." Hutchins, 100 Idaho at
665, 603 P.2d at 999. Here, the critical "erroneous decision" overruled by the Supreme Court
was Judge McLaughlin's grant to MRIA of summary judgment on its claim for "wrongful
dissociation." See SADC, 148 Idaho at 484-89,224 P.3d at 1073-78. That decision was entered
on July 24, 2006, more than .five months before the close of discovery and nearly six months
before the motions deadlines. And that erroneous decision not only affected the trial, but
permeated the entire pretrial proceedings, impacting everything from the testimony of Saint
Alphonsus's witnesses to Saint Alphonsus's strategic decisions about the type of expert
testimony to present in the case. Even under MRIA's improperly narrow view of the scope of
remand, therefore, Saint Alphonsus would have a right to file motions and prepare new expert
reports in light of the changed circumstances flowing from the reversal of the wrongful
dissociation decision.
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were not parties to this action." SADC, 148 Idaho at 497, 224 P.3d at 1086. MRIA nevertheless
requested-and this Court nevertheless granted-leave to amend to the pleadings to add MRI
Center and MRI Mobile as new parties, thus dramatically expanding Saint Alphonsus's potential
liability. MRIA cannot have it both ways. Either the matter stands as it did before trial-in
which case Center and Mobile should not have been allowed to join as claimants--or it does not,
in which Saint Alphonsus should be granted a similar opportunity to revise its defense in light of
the changed circumstances resulting from the Supreme Court's decision.
CONCLUSION

The Court should grant Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Set a Scheduling Order, including
dates for motions practice, as there are numerous motions that can and should be filed consistent
with the Supreme Court's opinion. Likewise, consistent with its prior ruling allowing MRIA to
amend its complaint to add new parties and claims, the Court should grant the Motion to Reopen
Fact and Expert Discovery Regarding Damages and allow Saint Alphonsus to conduct expert
discovery and offer new expert reports in light of the case's changed legal and factual
circumstances.
DATED this 4th day of February, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

~-f~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FEB 15 2011

OHR1STOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED, CARE )
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
)
liability partnership,
)
Defendant.
)

By DIA=ATMAN

Case No. CV-OC-2004-008219
ORDER REOPENING DISCOVERY
AND SETTING SCHEDULE

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership, on its own behalf, and on
behalf ofMRI Limited, and Idaho limited
partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited, an Idaho
limited partnership,

)
)
)
)
)
)
CounterClaimant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED, CARE )
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)
CounterDefendants.
)

Presently before the Court is a motion by Saint Alphonsus to reopen discovery and issue
a scheduling order. St. Alphonsus is seeking to have expert and fact discovery reopened due to
the "changed landscape" caused by the Idaho Supreme Court's decision reversing decisions

~ OrderReopeningDiscoveryAndSettingSchedule 1
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made by the original trial court. 1 MRI Associates opposes St. Alphonsus's motion, arguing that
discovery covering the new legal issues had already been conducted.

BACKGROUND
This action arises from a partnership, MRI Associates (MRIA), formed in 1985 between
St. Alphonsus and several other parties. In 2004, St. Alphonsus dissociated from MRIA and
sought a judicial determination of its share of MRIA.

MRIA counterclaimed for wrongful

dissociation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
interference with prospective contractual relations, and civil conspiracy.

At trial, the

counterclaimant, MRIA, presented two theories of damages: one based on the buyout value of
MRIA, and one based on the lost profits of MRIA caused by St. Alphonsus's bad acts.
Ultimately MRIA was awarded $63.5 million by the jury, which was reduced to $36.3 million by
the trial court on the finding that the jury had aggregated the two alternate theories of damages.
St. Alphonsus appealed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed several decisions of the trial court. Among other
things, it reversed the trial court's determination that St. Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated
as a matter of law. It further held that the buyout theory of damages is not a proper measure of
damages given the nature of the contract between the parties. It also held that the damage award
could not be based on the purportedly extended end date of the partnership because the
partnership term had not been properly extended.

On remand, this Court found that St.

Alphonsus had a statutory right to dissociate, and thus did not wrongfully dissociate as a matter
oflaw.

1

The issue of whether further dispositive motions could be filed was raised, but at hearing both parties agreed that
more motions could be filed, so that issue will not be addressed.
OrderReopeningDiscoveryAndSettingSchedule 2
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DISCUSSION

St. Alphonsus argues that discovery should be reopened because the circumstances
surrounding the upcoming trial have changed materially. It argues that this Court's ruling that
St. Alphonsus did not wrongfully dissociate and the joinder of MRI Center and MRI Mobile
require further fact discovery and new expert testimony.
St. Alphonsus first argues that MRIA's experts expressly premised their lost-profit
damage calculations on the court's decision that St. Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated. To
support their contention, St. Alphonsus notes that both experts cited to the wrongful dissociation
in their lost-profits damages calculations. However, St. Alphonsus's position is rebutted by the
experts' trial and deposition testimony. One expert, Mr. Budge, explicitly states that what theory
St. Alphonsus might be found liable on is irrelevant to his analysis of MRIA' s lost profits. The
other expert for MRIA, Mr. Wilhoite, based his analysis on Mr. Budge's analysis, and also
explained at trial that his analysis was based generally on "the acts of St. Alphonsus" including
dissociation and other acts.

Since both of MRIA's experts looked to numerous theories of

liability, and apparently weren't relying on any particular one for their analyses, this Court finds
St. Alphonsus's argument unpersuasive.
St. Alphonsus's second argument, that the damage models of MRIA's fails to parse out
the injury to each of the now joined parties, is also unpersuasive. The examination of MRIA's
experts makes clear that the experts had already made conclusions about the damages to each of
the entities. In fact, Mr. Budge specifically spells out his assumptions about which conduct
damaged each particular entity in his trial testimony. Thus, there is no need for additional
discovery to determine the proportions of damages to which each entity is entitled.
However, the record is unclear as to the timelines for the damage calculations.
Specifically, it is unclear whether the damage calculations used at the first trial were broken out
OrderReopeningDiscoveryAndSettingSchedule 3
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into timeframes that could be permissibly used under the Supreme Court's and this Court's
rulings. Due to the lack of clarity on that point, discovery will be reopened for the limited
purpose of determining what damages would have been given different beginning and end dates
for the lost profit calculations. Furthermore, St. Alphonsus will be allowed to bring in a new
expert for the trial on remand with the caveat that should it use a completely new theory of
damages, MRIA may use St. Alphonsus's previous expert's testimony to cross examine its new
expert.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, St. Alponsus's motion to reopen discovery is hereby
GRANTED subject to the limitations discussed above. Furthermore, the parties will be bound

by the following schedule:
1. MRIA shall serve its expert reports on damages, if any new reports are done, by
April1, 2011.
2. Saint Alphonsus shall serve its expert reports on damages no later than May 15,
2011.
3. Both Parties shall depose the designated expert witnesses by June 15, 2011.
4. Both parties may serve additional fact discovery limited to the subject of damages.
All such discovery must be completed by July 15, 2011.
5. Both parties have until April 11, 2011 to file motions in limine or motions for
summary judgment together with supporting briefs. Responsive briefs shall be filed
by April 25, 2011, and rebuttal briefs by May 2, 2011. Motions will be set for
hearing to be heard no later than May 18, 2011.
6. Proposed jury instructions shall be provided to the Court by July 15, 2011.
7. The Court will not be available between the dates of June 24 and July 19, 2011.
8. A Pretrial Conference will be on August 5, 2011 at 1:30PM.

OrderReopeningDiscoveryAndSettingSchedule 4
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SO ORDERED AND DATED this ./S_ day ofFebruary, 2011.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

,_-

I hereby certify that on this

~

day of February, 2011,

I mailed(served) a true and correct copy of the within
instrument to:
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODWARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST., STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
CHRISTIAN VERGONIS
JONES DAY
51 LOUISIANA AVE, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
PO BOX 2837
BOISE, ID 83701

Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court

By

Ot~~ CJut;;-

Deputy Court Clerk
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dpark2r@bwslawgroup.com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

CHRISTOPHER D. RlCH, Clerk
By ELYSHIA 1-IOLMES
DEPUTY

Attorneys MRI Associat2s, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRJ Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219

JOINT MOTION TO AMEND
DISCOVERY SCHEDULE

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,

v.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.
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MAR-02-2011 14:51 From:Gjording & Fauser

2083369177

To:3424455

COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively "Saint Alphonsus''), and

Defendant/Counter-Claimants MRI Assocjates, LLP; MRl Limited Partnership; and MR1 Mobile
Limited (collectively "MRIA''), by and through their respective counsel, and hereby move this
Court to amend the Discovery Schedule issued on February 15, 2011.

The parties agree that (i) early resolution ofMRIA's conteJ}tion that Saint Alphonsus's
dissociation breached the partnership agreement would be beneficial to the progress of this case,
and (ii) more time is needed to conduct additional fact discovery on the subject of damages prior
to the service of expert reports. In addition, MRlA has requested, and Saint Alphonsus does not
oppose, the opportunity to file rebuttal expert reports. The parties therefore met in a telephone
conference on February 25, 2010, and agreed to the following amended discovery and motion
schedule and hereby request the Court enter the following order:
1. MRIA shall serve its expert reports on damages, if any new reports are done, by May

1, 2011.
2. Saint Alphonsus shall serve its expert reports on damages, if any, no later than June 15,
2011.
3. MRIA shall file its rebuttal expert reports, if any, no later than July 15,2011.
4. Both parties shall depose the designated expert witnesses by July 30, 2011.
5. Without prejudice to either party's right to file additional motions consistent with the
Court's Order ofFebruary 15, 2011, to be heard no later than May 18,2011, Saint Alphonsus
shall file on March 7, 2011, a motion for summary judgment, along with supporting briefs, on

MRIA's contention that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation breached the partnership agreement.
MRIA's responsive brief shall be filed on March 28, 2011. Saint Alphonsus's rebuttal brief shall
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MAR-02-2011 14:52 From:Gjordin9 & Fauser

2083369177

To:3424455

be filed on April 11, 2011. The motion shall be and hereby is set for hearing at 9:00 a.m. on

April 22, 2011.
6. The remainder of the dates set in the Order Reopening discovery and Setting Schedule
shall remain unchanged.
DATED this

Z.~ day ofMarch 2011
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

DATED this
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMAN

WADEL. WOODARD
Attorneys for Defendants/Counter-Claimants
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By EMILY CHilO
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219

ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION TO
AMEND DISCOVERY SCHEDULE

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.

The parties' Joint Motion to Amend Discovery Schedule having come before this Court
and good cause appearing therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Order Reopening
Discovery and Setting Schedule, issued on February 15, 2011, shall be amended as follows:
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1.

MRIA shall serve its expert reports on damages, if any new reports are done, by

May 1, 2011.
2.

Saint Alphonsus shall serve its expert reports on damages, if any, no later than

June 15, 2011.
3.

MRIA shall file its rebuttal expert reports, if any, no later than July 15, 2011.

4.

Both parties shall depose the designated expert witnesses by July 30, 2011.

5.

Without prejudice to either party's right to file additional motions consistent with

the Court's Order of February 15,2011, to be heard no later than May 18,2011, Saint Alphonsus
shall file on March 7, 2011, a motion for summary judgment, along with supporting briefs, on
MRIA's contention that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation breached the partnership agreement.
MRIA's responsive brief shall be filed on March 28, 2011. Saint Alphonsus's rebuttal brief shall
be filed on April 11, 2011. The motion shall be and hereby is set for hearing at 9:00 a.m. on
April 22, 2011.
6.

The remainder of the dates set in the Order Reopening Discovery and Setting

Schedule shall remain unchanged.
DATED

this~ay of March 201t.
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509 West Hays Street
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Boise, ID 83701
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Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
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0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
0 Facsimile: 202-626-1700

Thomas A. Banducci
Wade L. Woodard
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 West Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702-5842
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimants

C!1J. S. Mail

2011, a true

0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
0 Facsimile: 336-9177

0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELYSHIA HOLMES
DEPIJTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRl ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S
UNPLED "BREACH OF
CONTRACT" THEORY OF
WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION

Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRlA'S UNPLED
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), and move this
Court pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for an order granting summary
judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus on MRIA's unpled "breach of contract" theory of
wrongful dissociation, by which MRIA claims it will assert that Saint Alphonsus's lawful
dissociation from the MRIA partnership nonetheless gives rise to liability for breach of contract
and other counts in its counterclaims. This motion is supported by the Court's records and files
in this matter and by the Memorandum in Support filed contemporaneously herewith.
Oral argument is requested for April22, 2011 in accordance with the parties' joint
motion filed on March 2, 2011.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S UNPLED
"BREACH OF CONTRACT" THEORY OF WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION- 2
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 7th day of March, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

ter-Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of March, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

~

0
0
0

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.

Case No CV OC 0408219D
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ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S UNPLED
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THEORY OF WRONGFUL
DISSOCIATION

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

Notwithstanding prior rulings ofthe Supreme Court and of this Court that together
establish as a matter of law that Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation from MRIA in April 2004 was
legally proper under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, MRIA has indicated its intention to
assert at trial that the dissociation was nonetheless improper and a basis for liability on several
theories. Saint Alphonsus brings this motion for summary judgment foreclosing MRIA from
pursuing these unpled and wholly improper contentions at trial.

BACKGROUND
On October 18, 2004, Saint Alphonsus brought this lawsuit to recover the value of its
partnership interest in MRIA pursuant to Idaho Code§ 53-3-701. See Saint Alphonsus

Diversified Care v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 484, 224 P.3d 1068, 1073 (2009)
("SADC'). MRIA responded by filing counterclaims alleging, inter alia, that the 2004
dissociation was "wrongful" under Idaho Code § 53-3-602 both because it was in breach of an
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S UNPLED "BREACH OF CONTRACT" THEORY OF
WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION - 2
000743

express provision of the partnership agreement and because it occurred prior to the expiration of
a definite term. Answer & Countercl. ~~ 23-25; 2d Am. Countercl.

~~

74-76.

A year before trial began, the district court ruled on summary judgment that Saint
Alphonsus's dissociation was wrongful because, according to the court, an "express provision"
of the partnership agreement, Section 6.1, prohibited dissociation except under limited
circumstances concededly inapplicable here. See SADC, 148 Idaho at 484, 224 P.3d at 1073.
The district court did not, however, pass on Saint Alphonsus's argument that MRIA's alternative
theory of wrongful dissociation failed as a matter of law because the partnership agreement
lacked a definite durational term. As the Supreme Court noted, "[h]aving granted summary
judgment to MRIA on one theory, the court apparently did not see any need to address the
alternate theory." Id at 491, 224 P.3d at 1080.
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for a new trial. Among other
things, the Court concluded that Saint Alphonsus had not wrongfully dissociated in violation of
an express provision of the partnership agreement, because the provision at issue, Section 6.1, "is
not an express provision limiting [Saint Alphonsus's] right to dissociate rightfully." SADC, 148
Idaho at 488-89,224 P.3d at 1077-78. With respect to MRIA's alternative theory ofwrongful
dissociation, the Supreme Court held that "the issue of whether the partnership was for a definite
term and, if so, whether St. Alphonsus dissociated prior to the expiration of that term will have to
be determined in further proceedings" on remand. Id at 492, 224 P.3d at 1081.
On remand, MRIA filed a Third Amended Counterclaim, re-alleging both theories of
wrongful dissociation. See 3d Am. Countercl. ~~ 62-72. On Saint Alphonsus's motion, this
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Court held that the allegations that the dissociation violated an express provision were precluded
by the Supreme Court's decision and ordered those allegations stricken from the Third Amended
Counterclaim, issuing a preliminary ruling from the bench. July 9, 2010 Hr'g Tr. at 36-39.
On September 27, 2010, this Court issued its final order striking material from the Third
Amended Counterclaim, leaving MRIA with arguing, with respect to withdrawal, only that Saint
Alphonsus's withdrawal was wrongful dissociation in breach of a term of years. See Sept. 27,
2010 Order at 2-3; Ex. C (Third Amended Counterclaim with stricken material stricken through).
It did not allege that a rightful dissociation breached the partnership agreement.

Saint Alphonsus then moved for summary judgment on MRIA's alternative theory of
wrongful dissociation, arguing that the partnership agreement did not contain a definite term, and
thus Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was not in breach of that definite term. On November 17,
2010, this Court granted Saint Alphonsus's motion. The Court stated that the "Revised Uniform
Partnership Act (RUPA) gives a partner a statutory right to dissociate without liability from a
partnership except where the dissociation 1) breaches an express provision ofthe partnership
agreement; 2) occurs before the expiration of a definite term set forth in the agreement; or 3)
occurs before the completion of a particular undertaking set forth in the agreement." Nov. 17
Op. at 6 (citing Idaho Code§ 53-3-602) (emphasis added). Noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has
specifically held that Saint Alphonsus did not breach an express provision of the agreement by
its withdrawal from MRIA and MRIA does not assert that Saint Alphonsus withdrew prior to the
completion of a particular undertaking," id. at 6, the Court held that the third exception to a
partner's statutory right to dissociate without liability-breach of a definite term-was also not
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present in this case because "as a matter oflaw the contract was for an indefinite term." Id at 89; see also SADC, 148 Idaho at 488-89,224 P.3d at 1077-78.
On December 23, 2010, Saint Alphonsus filed a motion asking to reopen expert
discovery, noting that the Court's dissociation rulings-among them, the fact that Saint
Alphonsus had now been determined by the Court to have had a statutory right to "dissociate
without liability"-had a significant impact on MRIA's legal theories of damages; for instance,
given that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was proper, MRIA's liability and damages theories for
acts subsequent to the dissociation and the end of the partnership's non-compete clause would be
called into question. See Mot. at 3-4.
In its opposition to Saint Alphonsus's motion, MRIA included a footnote arguing that
Saint Alphonsus's statement that it had "lawfully dissociated" was "disingenuous." MRIA Opp.
to Mot. to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery at 15-16 n.43. Specifically, it claimed that the
Supreme Court's wrongful dissociation ruling merely meant that Saint Alphonsus had not
breached an "express" provision of the partnership agreement, but that the "withdrawal" from
MRIA was still a breach of the partnership agreement. Id At the hearing before this Court on
February 9, 2011, MRIA repeated the same unpled theory ofliability:
The Court found that although one could infer from the partnership
agreement withdrawal was prohibited, that wasn't enough. It had
to be express; since it wasn't express, it was not a wrongful
dissociation. So our position is there are inferred terms. There are
implied terms in this contract, in the partnership agreement, that
were breached when they withdrew.
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February 9, 2011 Hr'g Tr. at 32. The parties agreed to file this motion in advance ofthe courtordered deadline for all pre-trial motions and to notice it for hearing on April22, 2010.

ARGUMENT
As a result of this Court's decision ofNovember 17, 2010, it has now been determined as
a matter oflaw that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from MRIA effective April1, 2004 was
legally proper, under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602. As this Court observed, that section "gives a
partner a statutory right to dissociate without liability" unless one of three conditions is met, and
it has now been finally resolved that none of those conditions existed in this case. Nov. 17, 2010
Op. at 6, 9.
Notwithstanding this clear ruling, MRIA continues to contend that Saint Alphonsus's act
of dissociating, pursuant to the "statutory right" to do so without liability, may nonetheless be
actionable as violating inferred terms of the contract and other duties. This assertion flies in the
face of the statute and prior rulings in this case.

I.

THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT NECESSARILY PRECLUDES
MRIA'S SO-CALLED "CONTRACTUAL" THEORY OF LIABILITY BASED ON
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S LAWFUL DISSOCIATION.
By its plain terms, Idaho's version of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA")

"dramatically change[d] the law governing partnership breakups," by creating an "entirely new
concept, 'dissociation' ... to denote the change in the.relationship caused by a partner's ceasing
to be associated in the carrying on of the business." Idaho Code§ 53-3-601 official cmt. 1. As
relevant here, RUP A:

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S UNPLED "BREACH OF CONTRACT" THEORY OF
WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION- 6
000747

•

Specifies that "[a] partner has the power to dissociate at any time, rightfully or
wrongfully, by express will," id. § 53-3-602(a), and that a "partnership agreement
may not . . . [v]ary the power to dissociate as a partner ... except to require the
notice under section 53-3-601(1), Idaho Code, to be in writing." !d. § 53-3103(b)(6).

•

Provides that "[a] partner's dissociation is wrongful only if any ofthe following
apply: ( 1) it is in breach of an express provision of the partnership agreement; or (2)
in the case of a partnership for a definite term or particular undertaking, before the
expiration of the term or the completion of the undertaking .... " !d. § 53-3602(b)(1 )-(2) (emphasis added);

•

States that RUP A applies retroactively so as to "govern all partnerships" as of July 1,
2001, meaning that "application of the Act becomes mandatory for all partnerships,
including existing partnerships that did not previously elect to be governed by it."
Idaho Code§ 53-3-1204(b) & official cmt.

Further, the act specifies that common law and equitable principles do not apply if they
are "displaced by particular provisions of this act." !d. § 53-3-104(a). Here, by its terms,
RUPA's creation of a new right of dissociation necessarily precludes any "common law"
contractual liability for leaving a partnership. Thus, even putting aside the fact that MRIA has
never actually pled such a theory, 1 MRIA's so-called "contract" theory of wrongful dissociation
(or wrongful "withdrawal") fails as a matter of law.
MRIA's purported claim that a partner can rightfully dissociate due to the lack of an
express term, but still be liable because the dissociation breached an implied contractual
1

The Court certainly could hold that MRIA's "contract" based theory should be barred
from retrial precisely because it was not pled, and thus has no place in any retrial. See
Vanvooren v. Astin, 141 Idaho 440, 443, Ill P.3d 125, 128 (2005) ("issues considered on
summary judgment are those raised by the pleadings" and court thus "declines to review" issues
not raised in the pleadings). As described herein, however, even had it been pled, summary
judgment is plainly appropriate.
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restriction on withdrawal, is a non sequitur. Indeed, it is simply a contradiction of the statute's
provision that only an "express" term renders a dissociation as wrongful. MRIA cannot avoid
this fact by simply dropping the statutory term "dissociation" from its argument and substituting
the word "withdrawal." The legislature used those words interchangeably, and thus made clear
that the act of dissociation is the act of withdrawing from a partnership. 2 And RUPA further
provides that after dissociation/withdrawal, the former partner is free to act adversely to the
former partnership with respect to future business. 3 It has now been determined that Saint
Alphonsus properly dissociated in April2004, and that fact cannot be altered by MRIA's efforts
to find further restrictions implicit in the agreement.
2

See, e.g., Idaho Code§ 53-3-103 official cmt: 8 ("Section 602(a) continues the
traditional UP A Section 31 (2) rule that every partner has the power to withdraw from the
partnership at any time, which power can not be bargained away," "except to require that the
notice ofwithdrawal under Section 601(1) be in writing."); id. § 53-3-501 official cmt. 2
("Section 602(a) provides that a partner has the power to withdraw at anytime. The power to
withdraw is immutable under Section 103(b)(6), with the exception that the partners may agree
the notice must be in writing."); id. § 53-3-602 official cmt. 1 ("Subsection (a) states explicitly
... that a partner has the power to dissociate at any time by expressing a will to withdraw, even
in contravention of the partnership agreement.") (all emphasis added).
3

See Idaho Code§ 53-3-404 official cmt. 2 ("Upon a partner's dissociation, Section
603(b)(3) limits the application of the duty to account for personal profits to those derived from
matters arising or events occurring before the dissociation .... Thus, after withdrawal, a partner
is free to appropriate to his own benefit any new business opportunity thereafter coming to his
attention, even if the partnership continues."); see also id. ("Upon a partner's dissociation;
Section 603(b)(3) limits the application of the duty to refrain from representing interests adverse
to the partnership to the same extent as the duty to account. Thus, after withdrawal, a partner
may deal with the partnership as an adversary with respect to new matters or events."); id. § 533-603 ("Upon a partner's dissociation, all of the following apply: .... (b) The partner's duty of
loyalty under section 53-3-404(b)(3), Idaho Code, terminates. (c) The partner's duty ofloyalty
under section 53-3-404(b)(1) and (2), Idaho Code, anci duty of care under section 53-3-404(c),
Idaho Code, continue only with regard to matters arising and events occurring before the
partner's dissociation.")
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It is axiomatic that, in this state, "[ e]xisting law becomes part of a contract, just as though

the contract contains an express provision to that effect, unless a contrary intent is disclosed."

Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dep 't ofAdmin., 137 Idaho 663, 666, 52 P.3d 307, 310
(2002); Robinson v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 150, 100 Idaho 263, 265-66, 596 P.2d 436, 438-39
(1979) (holding that contract had to be construed to include statutory rights). Here, as described
above, RUP A expressly created an "entirely new" right to dissociate, and then made that right
applicable to pre-existing partnership agreements. See supra pp. 6-8. And, as the Supreme
Court held, this new right applies to existing partnership agreements unless the partnership
agreement expressly precludes its application-which this agreement did not. SADC, 148 Idaho
at 488-89,224 P.3d at 1077-78. Saint Alphonsus thus had a statutory-and contractual-right to
dissociate from the partnership without liability. 4

II.

MRIA'S COUNTERCLAIM LIKEWISE STATES NO OTHER THEORY OF
WRONGDOING BY LAWFUL DISSOCIATION, NOR WOULD SUCH A CLAIM
BE TENABLE.
MRIA also noted its intention to argue that Saint Alphonsus's lawful dissociation was a

breach of fiduciary duty and otherwise tortious under the theories set forth in MRIA's
counterclaim. MRIA Opp. to Mot. to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery at 15-16 n.43. This
further effort to repackage its contentions to render the dissociation wrongful, even though the
statute affirmatively authorized it, is likewise without merit.
4

This was understood to be a consequence ofRUPA's retroactive application; i.e., that a
party could be "left with a set of termination provisions far different from those upon which he
counted at the inception of the partnership," including a right to "dissociate from the
partnership." Allan W. Vestal, "Wide Open": Nevada's Innovative Market in Partnership Law,
35 Hofstra L. Rev. 275, 278 (2007).
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The mere statement ofMRIA's contention that the lawful dissociation somehow
breached a fiduciary duty, is a contradiction in terms. Since the dissociation was legally proper
and authorized under the statute, it cannot have breached a fiduciary duty. It is notable also that
even before the rulings of this Court and the Supreme Court established the legal propriety of
Saint Alphonsus's dissociation, MRIA never even pled the dissociation as a breach of fiduciary
duty. Indeed, MRIA's counts alleging that Saint Alphonsus breached fiduciary duties to MRIA
and the limited partnerships state to the contrary: that Saint Alphonsus only owed fiduciary
duties to MRIA "[b]efore dissociation." 3d Am. Countercl. ~~ 74, 77. This allegation that the
dissociation ended any fiduciary duties is consistent with the express language of RUP A. The
statute provides that a party's fiduciary duties end at the time of dissociation, Idaho Code§ 533-603(a)-(c), and that as a consequence, "upon dissociation ... the dissociated partner is free
immediately to engage in a competitive business, without any further consent." Jd § 53-3-603
official cmt. 2. 5 Nor has MRIA ever asserted-at the first trial or otherwise-its novel theory
that the lawful exercise of the dissociation right breaches fiduciary duties. Nor could it. 6

5

The right to compete after dissociation may, of course, be limited by a contractual noncompete clause, see Idaho Code § 53-3-404 official cmt. 2, but as Saint Alphonsus will show in
a forthcoming motion for summary judgment, Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal triggered a one-year
non-competition clause, thus allowing lawful competition one year from the dissociation date.
Among other things, the opening of the IMI location on the Saint Alphonsus campus (which
accounts for a large portion ofMRIA's purported lost-profits damages) occurred more than a
year after the dissociation, and thus was lawful under RUP A and the terms of the non-compete.
6

See, e.g., Pearce Bros. Ready Mix Concrete & Supply Co. v. Wausau Signature Agency,
Inc., No. 3:06-CV-548-S, 2008 WL 474414, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 19, 2008) ("a party's reliance
on its contractual rights does not constitute a violation of any fiduciary duty"); Soomekh Oriental
Rugs v. Target Corp., No. 00-2570,2001 WL 1619453, at *4 (D. Minn. Apr. 27, 2001)
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Similarly, any suggestion by MRIA that Saint Alphonsus's lawful dissociation somehow
was either a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or tortious interferencewhich has never been pled, see Third Amd. Countercl.

~~

82-97-is without merit for the same

reasons. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot override express contractual
terms. See Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 115 Idaho 298,300-301,766 P.2d 768, 770-71
(1988) (rejecting argument that the "implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing so requires
the invalidating of an express termination provision of a written contract" and holding that the
"exercise of the right to terminate the contractual relationship pursuant to the express terms of
the written contract did not constitute a breach of the contractual relationship"); see also, e.g.,
Fifth Third Bank v. Waxman, 726 F. Supp. 2d 742, 749 (E.D. Ky. 2010) ("while each contract
implicitly contains a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, this covenant does not prevent
contracting parties from exercising their contractual rights"). And "[i]t is well established law in
Idaho that a party cannot tortiously interfere with its own contract." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade
Corp., 141 Idaho 223,243, 108 P.3d 380,390 (2005).

(continued ... )

(rejecting, as a matter of law, claim that party breached fiduciary duty by "exercis[ing] its
contractual right to terminate the business relationship," finding that a party "cannot impose
additional contract terms simply by asserting a fiduciary duty"), aff'd 38 F. App'x 351 (8th Cir.
2002); AON Properties, Inc. v. Riveraine Corp., No. 14-96-00229-CV, 1999 WL 12739, at* 10
(Tex. App. Jan. 14, 1999) ("Clearly, AON's lawful exercise of its contractual right to terminate
the joint venture is not a breach of fiduciary duty.").
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*

*

*

In sum, the prior rulings by this Court and the Supreme Court establish as a matter of law
that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from the MRIA partnership was legally proper and
affirmatively authorized by RUPA. In light of that fact, MRIA's intimations of an intention to
prove that the dissociation was nonetheless actionable as a breach of an implied contract term, as
a violation of fiduciary duty or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or as some sort of
tortious interference, flies in the face of common sense and the prior rulings in this case.
CONCLUSION

The Court should grant Saint Alphonsus's motion and preclude MRIA from arguing or
asserting that Saint Alphonsus's lawful dissociation was a breach of the contract or otherwise is a
basis for liability or damages in this case.
DATED this 7th day of March, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
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)
liability partnership,
)
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
)
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER,

)
)
)
)
)

Counter-Defendants. )
On March 7, 2011, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center, Inc. (collectively referred to herein as "Saint Alphonsus") filed their

Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA 's Unpled "Breach of
Contract" Theory of Wrongful Dissociation ("Memorandum"). This notice shall serve to correct
a typographical error in the Memorandum.
1.

Page 4,, 2- Fourth Sentence. The reference to Ex. C should say "Exhibit A,,,
62-72 (Third Amended Counterclaim with stricken material stricken through)."

The corrected Page~and Ex. A are attached hereto.
DATED this

2

day of March, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
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Court held that the allegations that the dissociation violated an express provision were precluded
by the Supreme Court's decision and ordered those allegations stricken from the Third Amended
Counterclaim, issuing a preliminary ruling from the bench. July 9, 2010 Hr'g Tr. at 36-39.
On September 27, 2010, this Court issued its final order striking material from the Third
Amended Counterclaim, leaving MRIA with arguing, with respect to withdrawal, only that Saint
Alphonsus's withdrawal was wrongful dissociation in breach of a term ofyears. See Sept. 27,
2010 Order at 2-3; Ex. A, ~~62-72 (Third Amended Counterclaim with stricken material stricken
through). It did not allege that a rightful dissociation breached the partnership agreement.
Saint Alphonsus then moved for summary judgment on MRIA's alternative theory of
wrongful dissociation, arguing that the partnership agreement did not contain a definite term, and
thus Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was not in breach of that definite term. On November 17,
2010, this Court granted Saint Alphonsus's motion. The Court stated that the "Revised Uniform
Partnership Act (RUPA) gives a partner a statutory right to dissociate without liability from a
partnership except where the dissociation 1) breaches an express provision of the partnership
agreement; 2) occurs before the expiration of a definite term set forth in the agreement; or 3)
occurs before the completion of a particular undertaking set forth in the agreement." Nov. 17
Op. at 6 (citing Idaho Code§ 53-3-602) (emphasis added). Noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has
specifically held that Saint Alphonsus did not breach an express provision of the agreement by
its withdrawal from MRIA and MRIA does not assert that Saint Alphonsus withdrew prior to the
completion of a particular undertaking," id. at 6, the Court held that the third exception to a
partner's statutory right to dissociate without liability-breach of a definite term-was also not
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•

Telling SARMC employees that SARMC's insurance would not cover magnetic
resonance scans done at the MRl Center, when such was patently untrue;

•

Threatening to terminate MRI Center's access to SARMC's PACS/RIS, thereby
forcing MRI Center to invest in its own P ACS/RIS system. Once this investment
was made, SARMC refused to allow MRI Center to install software on referring
physician computers (provided by SARMC), which would give refetTing
physicians access to MRI Centers' PACS/RIS. SARMC presently plans to
terminate any and all access MRIA may have to SARMC's PACS/RIS system;
and

•

Disparaging MRI Center's services.

60.

The combined acts of SARMC, SARG/GSR, IMI, and ICR have damaged the

reputation ofMRI Center/MRI Limited, MRI Mobile, and MRIA's, limited referring physician
access to MRI Center's magnetic resonance images, and interfered with, or diverted, MRI
Center's existing and prospective customers.
61.

Before SARMC, SARG/GSR, IMI, and ICR undertook this conspiracy, MRI

Center had enjoyed an eighteen-year record of increased scan volume and profitability.

As a

result of the conspiracy described above, MRI Center's volume has dwindled fTom a high of
approximately 8,000 out-patient scans in 2003 to roughly 3,000 out-patient scans in 2005.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Contract and Wrongful Dissociation)

62.

The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by

reference and made a part hereof.
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SARMC's •wr.ithafB:v,!Ql from MRIA was a breaefl: efaa eJ{press f'Fevisiea of the

PattfleFSb.if' AgFeemetlt: (that SJ3eeifieally listea the instances ia whiel1 a par..ner eel:lla rightfHlly

64.

Also, the MRIA partnership was formed for a definite term, in that the partners

agreed to operate the partnership until at least 2015 (vlhieh dale was later eKteaded to 2023).
SARMC withdrew from MRIA before the expiration of the term.
~

Defeadaats ha•te weivea or are esteppea from slaiiRiag that the par..nership vt'-as

aot eKteaaea to 2023 by their ratifieatioa of the eKteasioa.

66.

SARMC's withdrawal was wrongful, and amounts to wrongful dissociation under

l.C. §§ 53-3-602 (b)(lj-aaa (2).
67.

SARMC competed with MRIA before it withdrew from the partnership by

supporting IMI's magnetic resonance imaging scanning business. Such conduct violated
SARMC's non-compete obligation in the Partnership Agreement.
68.

SARMC's withdrawal and competition with MRIA's operational units in violation

of the Partnership Agreement has caused damages to MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile.
69.

MRI Limited and MRI Mobile are third party beneficiaries of the Partnership

Agreement.
70.

MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile have sustained, and are entitled to recover,

the damages caused by SARMC's wrongful dissociation and breach of its non-compete
obligations in an amount to be proved at trial.
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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Relict)
71.

The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by

reference and made a part hereof.
72.

MRIA seeks an order declaring that SAR1v1C's withdrawal from the MIUA

partnership amounted to a wrongful dissociation under I.C. §§ 53-3-602(b) (1) ana (2), and that
MRIA is entitled to obtain damages for such wrongful dissociation as are causally related to such
act.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Fiduciary Duties to MRIA)
73.

The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by

reference and made a part hereof.
74.

Before dissociation, SARMC owed MRIA certain fiduciary duties of loyalty and

care as a result of the Partnership Agreement, and as restated in I.C. § 53-3-404. SARMC
breached said fiduciary duties by competing with MRIA, by co-opting partnership opportunities,
by dealing with MRIA on its own behalf and on behalf of SARG/GSRIICR and IMI when such
entities had interests adverse to MRIA, and by failing to exercise the requisite care owed by a
partner pursuant to l.C. § 53-3-404(c).
75.

As a result of these breaches of fiduciary duties, MRIA has been damaged in an

amount to be proved at trial.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Fiduciary Duties to MRI Limited and MRI Mobile )
76.

The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by

reference and made a part hereof
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

DEPUTY

509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 70 I
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

Patrick J. Miller, ISB No. 3221
Thomas E. Dvorak, ISB No. 5043
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
60 I W. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300

Donald B. Ayer, D.C. Bar No. 962332
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
David M. Cooper
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. CV OC 0408219D

STIPULATION AND
COVENANT NOT TO
EXECUTE

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant-Respondent.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership, on its own behalf, and on
behalf of MRI Limited, an Idaho limited
partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited, an Idaho
limited partnership,
CounterClaimant-Respondent,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
CounterDefendants-Appellants.

COME NOW Plaintiff Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Counterdefendant
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively hereinafter "SARMC"), by and through
their counsel of record, Givens Pursley LLP, and Defendant/Counterclaimant MRI Associates,
LLP ("MRIA"), by and through its counsel of record, Banducci Woodard Schwartzman, PLLC,
and stipulate and agree as follows:
1.

On March 16, 2010, a Judgment for costs on appeal in this matter was entered in

this matter in favor of SARMC and against Defendant/Counterclaimant MRIA in the amount of
$420,103.75 (the "Judgment");
2.

In accordance with Idaho law, interest began to accrue upon the entry of

Judgment on March 16,2010, at the rate of5.265% per annum, or $64.75 per day;
3.

No payment has been made on the Judgment;

STIPULATION AND COVENANT NOT TO EXECUTE- 2
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4.

As of March 25, 2011, there will be a total of $444,345.82 owing upon the

Judgment;
5.

MRIA concedes and agrees that it has no defense to the immediate enforcement

of the Judgment, and that the factual recitations contained within this Stipulation are true and
correct;
6.

MRIA has engaged in efforts to attempt to obtain a bond so that SARMC would

not have to enforce the Judgment;
7.

Because MRIA is having some difficulty obtaining the bond, MRIA has now

asked that it be allowed to make installment payments upon the Judgment in exchange for
SARMC agreeing not to execute if said payments are timely made;
8.

Accordingly, it is hereby agreed that payments will be made by MRIA to SARMC

as follows:

9.

a.

An initial payment of$150,000 will be paid on March 25, 2011;

b.

A first installment payment of$98,105.66 will be paid on April25, 2011;

c.

A second installment payment of $98,105.66 will be paid on May 25,
2011;and

d.

The third and final installment payment will be paid on June 25, 2011, in
the remaining amount due (estimated to be $99,972.09).

These payments shall be made in the form of good and sufficient funds delivered

to Stephanie Westermeier, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Office of General
Counsel, Hartman Building, Ste. 101, 1055 N. Curtis Road, Boise, ID 83706, prior to the end of
the business day on the date required for said payment.
10.

Time is of the essence of this Stipulation. In the event any payment is not timely

made, SARMC may, without further notice to MRIA, immediately seek enforcement of the
STIPULATION AND COVENANT NOT TO EXECUTE- 3
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DATED this 21-P-day ofMarch, 2011.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Thomas E. Dvorak
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendants
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN,
PLLC
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Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant
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OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the22 day of March, 2011~ a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC
802 West Bannock, Suite 700
Boise, ID 83702
Facsilnile (208) 342~4455
Cbdstian G. Vergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Facsimile (202) 626-1700
JackS, Gjo1·ding
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile: (208) 336-9777

D U.S. mail, postage prepaid

D express 1nail
D lw1d delivery

~acsilnile

D

U.S. mail, postage prepaid

D express mail

~ hand delivery
~facsimile

0
D

U.S. mail, postage prepaid
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_Q'hand delivery
~facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

J-

Case No. CV OC 0408219D
~
liED ORDER RE
STIPULATION AND
COVENANT NOT TO
EXECUTE

Defendant-Respondent.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership, on its own behalf, and on
behalf of MRI Limited, an Idaho limited
partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited, an Idaho
limited partnership,
CounterClaimant-Respondent,

vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
CounterDefendants-Appellants.

BASED ON the Stipulation of the parties, which is hereby incorporated by this reference
i.,

and restated as if set forth in full as the Order of this Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

)
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Defendant/Counterclaimant MRI Associates, LLP shall make payments at the time and as set
forth in the referenced stipulation.
DATED

this,.t~J day of__._M...L-'~q._...L..~=-r......:;fA~----' 2011.
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Thomas E. Dvorak
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC
802 West Bannock, Suite 700
Boise, ID 83 702
Facsimile (208) 342-4455
Christian G. Vergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Facsimile (202) 626-1700
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile: (208) 336-9777

,d U.S. mail, postage prepaid
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0
D
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hand delivery
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U.S. mail, postage prepaid
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facsimile
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D
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Q
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hand delivery
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
Wade L. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
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By ELYSHIA HOLMES
DEPUTY

Attorneys MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219

MRI ASSOCIATES' OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON "BREACH OF CONTRACT"
THEORY OF WRONGFUL
WITHDRAWAL

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership;
and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho
Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.

MRI ASSOCIATES' OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON "BREACH
CONTRACT' THEORY OF WRONGFUL WITHDRAWAL- I

00 RIGI NAL
000770

Counterclaimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile
Limited (collectively "MRIA") submit this Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment of
Counter-Defendant Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care ("Saint Alphonsus") on MRIA's Breach of
Contract Theory of Wrongful Withdrawal. While the Supreme Court and this Court have held
that SaintAlphonsus did not commit a statutory violation of the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act in dissociating from MRIA in April2004, neither court has passed on the question of
whether other theories of liability remain for Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal from the MRIA
Partnership.

I.

BACKGROUND

In the initial trial ofthis matter, MRIAasserted that SaintAlphonsus' withdrawal from the
MRIA Partnership was a violation ofldaho Code § 53-3-602 because it was in breach of an
"express" provision of the Partnership Agreement, I.C. § 53-3-602(b)(1 ), and because it was
prior to the expiration of a definite term, I.C. § 53-3-602(b)(2). On appeal, the Supreme Court
rejected the first of these theories. The Court examined Article 6 of the Partnership Agreement,
which addresses the withdrawal of hospital partner from the MRIA Partnership. In particular, the
Court examined Section 6.1, which provides that:
Any Hospital Partner may withdraw from the Partnership at any time if, in a
Hospital Partner's reasonable judgment, continued participation in this
Partnership: (i) jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of such Hospital Partner or its
parent or their subsidiaries; or (ii) jeopardizes medicare/medicaid or insurance
reimbursements or participations; (iii) if the business activities of the Partnership
are contrary to the ethical principles of the Roman Catholic Church as designated
from time to time; or (iv) is or may be in violation of any local, state or federal
laws, rules or regulations.
See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,486, 224 P.3d

1068, 1075 (2009). The Supreme Court determined that this provision could be interpreted in a
number of ways, and thus that ''the section is not an express provision limiting the circumstances
MRI ASSOCIATES' OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON "BREACH OF
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under which St. Alphonsus could withdraw without breaching the partnership agreement." !d.,
148 Idaho at 487, 224 P.3d at 1076 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court did not hold that
Saint Alphonsus had withdrawn in conformance with the contract, but merely that it could not
have violated I. C.§ 53-3-602(b)(l) because the Partnership Agreement did not contain an
"express" provision limiting the right to dissociate. !d.
On remand, this Court examined the second statutory theory of withdrawal before the
expiration of a definite term, I. C. § 53-3-602(b)(2). The Court determined that the Partnership
Agreement set out indefinite term for the existence of the Partnership, rather than a definite term,
and therefore dismissed this claim on summary judgment. (Memorandum Decision and Order on
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on Pleadings and Motion for Summary Judgment, November 16,
2010, p. 5-12). The Court also examined the Third Amended Counterclaim, and struck a number
of portions from it that were inconsistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's decision. From
Paragraph 45, the Court struck the word "wrongfully" and the phrase "by withdrawing in breach
of the conditions for withdrawal stated in Section 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement." (Order
Granting Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter from Third Amended Counterclaim, September 27,
2010.) Thus, Paragraph 45 now reads:
45.
When last ditch efforts made to purchase MRI Center failed,
SARMC v;Feagfully dissociated from MRIA by withdfa'tvffig in breaeh of tile
coflditions for ·ffl.tftdrav;aJ stated in SectioB 6.1 of tile PartBership AgFeemeBt. At
the time SARMC gave notice of its intent to withdraw, SARMC also threatened to
violate the terms of its "non-compete" clause with MRIA."
From the First Claim for Relief, the Court stuck Paragraphs 63 and 65 in their entirety, the phrase
"which date was later extended to 2023" from Paragraph 64, and reference to Idaho Code§ 53-3602(b)(l) from Paragraphs 55 and 72. (Order Granting Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter from
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Third Amended Counterclaim, September 27, 2010.) Thus, the First Claim for Relief reads as
follows:

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Contract and Wrongful Dissociation)
62.
The allegations included in all the foregoing paragraphs are
incorporated by reference and made a part hereof.
63.
SARMC's vfithdm\Yal from MRIA: was a breaeh of an eKpress
pro:visioa of the Partaership AgFeemeat (that speeifieally listed the iastanees ia
whieh a partaer eottld rightfally vlithdrav;.)
64.
Also, the MRIA partnership was formed for a definite term, in that
the partners agreed to operate the partnership until at least 2015 (whieh date was
later exteadea to 2023). SARMC withdrew from MRIA before expiration of the
term. 1
65.
Defeaaants have 'Nahred or are estopped from elaimiag that the
partaership was aot exteadea to 2023 by their ratifieatioa of the exteasioa.
66.
SARMC's withdrawal was wrongful, and amounts to wrongful
dissociation under I. C.§§ 53-3-602~ and (2). 2
67.
SARMC competed with MRlA before it withdrew from the
partnership by supporting IMI's magnetic resonance imaging business. Such
conduct violated SARMC's non-compete obligation in the Partnership
Agreement.
68.
SARMC's withdrawal and competition with MRIA's operational
units in violation of the Partnership Agreement has cause damages to MRIA, MRI
Limited, and MRI Mobile.
69.
MRI Limited and MRI Mobile are third party beneficiaries of the
Partnership Agreement.
70.
MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile have sustained, and are
entitled to recover, the damages caused by SARMC's wrongful dissociation and
breach of its non-compete obligations in an amount to be proved at trial.
1

To the extent that this paragraph alleges that Saint Alphonsus violated I.C. § 53-3-602(b)(2) by withdrawing
before the expiration of a definite term, this claim is obviously precluded by the Court's Order of November 16,
2010.
2
To the extent that this paragraph alleges that Saint Alphonsus violated I. C. § 53-3-602(b)(2) by withdrawing
before the expiration of a definite term, this claim is obviously precluded by the Court's Order of November 16,
2010.
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Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's assertion otherwise, Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal from the MRIA
Partnership is actionable under other theories of liability.

D.

ARGUMENT

In order for Saint Alphonsus to obtain the relief it requests, it must show either that its
withdrawal from the partnership was not a breach of the partnership agreement or the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, or that the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA") has
abrogated common law claims such as breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Saint Alphonsus, however, cannot show that its conduct was not a breach
of the Partnership Agreement because there is an issue of fact as to the interpretation of the
agreement. Furthermore, the law does not support SaintAlphonsus's erroneous argument that
RUPA abrogated common law claims.

A.

The Idaho Supreme Court Determined that There is an Issue of Fact as to the
Interpretation of the Withdrawal Provision of the Partnership Agreement
Saint Alphonsus misunderstands MRIA's breach of contract claims. Those claims are

two-fold: (1) that SaintAlphonsus's withdrawal was a breach of the partnership agreement and
(2) that Saint Alphonsus 's withdrawal was a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. See Third Amended Counterclaim at~~ 68 & 83. Despite the first fold of the claim
being a straight breach of contract claim, Saint Alphonsus appears to believe that the claim is
dependent on an implied term because of the Supreme Court's holding that Section 6.1 of the
partnership agreement is not an "express term" limiting the right to withdraw. SaintAlphonsus's
belief is inaccurate.
The first fold ofMRIA's claim is that SARMC breached Section 6.1 of the partnership
agreement when it withdrew from the partnership. The Supreme Court's decision that the
limitation on withdrawal was not "express" as required for wrongful dissociation under RUPA,
MRI ASSOCIATES' OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY ruDGMENT ON "BREACH OF
CONTRACT'' THEORY OF WRONGFUL WITHDRAWAL- 5
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did not preclude a claim that withdrawal was a breach of the partnership agreement. The
Supreme Court held that "the statute does not simply provide that dissociation is wrongful if it is
in breach of the partnership agreement, or if it is in breach of a provision in the partnership
agreement. It is only wrongful if it breaches an express provision ofthe partnership agreement."
Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at 488, 224 P.3d at 1077. Accordingly, the Court's holding was
limited to the determination that Section 6.1 of the partnership agreement was not an express
limitation on the right to dissociate and that the dissociation, therefore, was not wrongful under
the statute. /d.
However, in concluding that Section 6.1 was not a "express" provision limiting the right
to dissociate, the Court found that the section was ambiguous because it was subject to two
competing interpretations, one of which limited the right to withdraw. /d. at 487, 224 P.3d at
1076. Consequently, no terms need to be implied into the agreement, but rather the term that is
in the agreement needs to be interpreted. Indeed, by determining that the provision was
ambiguous, the Court left for the jury to decide the issue of whether the withdrawal was a breach
of the partnership agreement. Moreover, the evidence is clear that all parties interpreted the
section as restrictive. 3 Therefore, because the Court found that the Section 6.1 of the partnership
agreement was ambiguous, it would be improper to grant summary judgment on MRIA's breach
of contract claim as it is for the jury to decide whether Saint Alphonsus 's withdrawal breached
the partnership agreement.

3

SARMC's conduct also demonstrates that SARMC did not believe it could withdraw without incurring liability.
SARMC behaved in a manner consistent with the perspective that it could not simply withdraw in order to rightfully
exit the partnership. {Trial Ex. 4138 at 16.) Indeed, SARMC witnesses uniformly testified that Section 6.1 was
restrictive. SARMC's CEO, Sandra Bruce, testified she understood that Section 6.1 of the MRIA partnership
agreement operated as a restriction on the ability of the hospital partners to withdraw from the partnership. {TR Vol.
II at 1828:9-19, 1950:9-15.) SARMC's former COO, Cindy Schamp, testified that it would be a breach of the
agreement to withdraw other than for the four listed reasons. (!d. at 2295:20-2297:4.) Additionally, SARMC's hired
consultant, Alan Hahn, interpreted Section 6.1 to be a restriction on SARMC's right to withdraw. (Exhibit 4138 at
16.)
MRI ASSOCIATES' OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON "BREACH OF
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B.

The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Does Not Preclude other Theories of Liability
for Saint Alphonsus's Withdrawal from the MRIA Partnership
Perhaps recognizing that the Supreme Court's determination that Section 6.1 is

ambiguous does not preclude a breach of contract claim, Saint Alphonsus argues that because the
withdrawal was not a breach of the RUPA, it cannot be a breach of contract. Contrary to Saint
Alphonsus's assertion, RUPA does not preclude other theories ofliability for Saint Alphonsus's
withdrawal from the MRIA Partnership.
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act enacted in Idaho provides that "[u ]nless displaced
by particular provisions of this act, the principles of law and equity supplement this act." I.C. §
53-3-104 (emphasis added). In Idaho, a clear and specific legislative intent is required to
override the common law. As the Supreme Court has said, "statutory enactment is essential to
repeal, abrogate or change the rules or doctrine of the common law." Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho
594, 607, 151 P.2d 765, 771 (1944) superseded on other grounds by statute, I.C. § 5-327, as

recognized in Doggett v. Boiler Eng'g & Supply Co., 93 Idaho 888,890,477 P.2d 511, 513
(1970). See Statewide Const., Inc. v. Pietri, --- P.3d ----, 2011 WL 350501 (2011); Baker v. Ore-

Ida Foods, Inc.,95 Idaho 575, 583, 513 P.2d 627, 635 (1973). The Supreme Court has explained
that the legislative intent to abrogate the common law must be expressly declared in a statute by
clear and unambiguous language:
It is not to be presumed that the Legislature intended to abrogate or modify a rule
of the common law by the enactment of a statute upon the same subject; it is
rather to be presumed that no change in the common law was intended, unless the
language employed clearly indicates such an intention. It has been said that
statutes are not presumed to make any alterations in the common law further than
is expressly declared, and that a statute, made in the affirmative without any
negative expressed or implied, does not take away the common law. The rules of
the common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication, nor overturned,
except by clear and unambiguous language

Cox v. St. Anthony Bank & Trust Co., 242 P. 785, 786 (1925).
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The case Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 115 Idaho 281, 766 P.2d 751 (1988) is illustrative
of this point. In that case, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the adoption by Idaho of
the doctrine of comparative negligence, Idaho Code § 6-801, abrogated the common law theory
of equitable indemnity. The Court noted that "[e ]quitable indemnity is founded on common law
notions of justice, and unless explicit statutory language abrogates such common law concepts,
they remain viable. We see no language in I.C.§ 6-801requiring the abrogation of the common
law remedy of equitable indemnity." Chenery, 115 Idaho at 285, 766 P.2d at 755 (emphasis
added). Many statutes contain explicit language abrogating the common law. See I. C. § 6803(3) ("The common law doctrine of joint and several liability is hereby limited to causes of
action [among tortfeasors]"); I. C. § 54-2094 ("this act is intended to abrogate the common law of
agency as it applies to regulated real estate transactions"). I.C. § 53-3-602 contains no such
explicit statutory language abrogating other theories of liability upon which withdrawal might be
found improper. Thus, it should not be presumed, as Saint Alphonsus argues, that this statute
supplants a contractual theory of liability for Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal.
Indeed, intent to supplant the common law cannot even be inferred from this statute. The
purpose of the wrongful dissociation section ofRUPA contained in I. C. § 53-3-602 was to
change the operation of the previous statutory scheme, the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"), by
permitting the continued operation of the business of the partnership even if one of the partners
withdrew from the partnership. I.C. § 53-3-601, official cmt. 1. While the statute creates an
immutable power to withdraw, it also creates a category whereby that withdrawal is classified as
"wrongful" under a specific set of circumstances, as discussed above: the violation of an
"express" provision of the partnership agreement or withdrawal prior to the termination of a
definite term. I.C. § 53-3-602(b)(l) and (2).
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Under RUPA, when a partner's dissociation is classified as ''wrongful," there are a
number of statutory consequences. First, Section 602(c) renders the wrongfully dissociating
partner liable for damages. Second, Section 803(a) limits the right to participate in the winding
up of the partnership to partners who have not wrongfully dissociated. Third, Section
602(b)(2)(i), applicable to term partnerships, enables other partners to withdraw (free of the taint
of a wrongful dissociation) within ninety days after another partner's wrongful dissociation.
Fourth, Section 802(2)(i), also applicable to term partnerships, provides that a wrongful
dissociation launches the dissolution and winding up of a partnership unless within ninety days a
majority in interest of the partners agree to continue the partnership. Finally, a wrongfully
dissociated partner is not allowed to file a Statement of Dissolution under Section 805(a). A
decision that there was no ''wrongful dissociation" under Section 53-3-602 does not mean that
the partnership agreement has not been breached. It merely means that the statutory
consequences related to a statutory wrongful dissociation cannot be imposed. In fact, Section
53-3-602(c) explicitly recognizes that wrongful dissociation and the consequences thereto are "in
addition to any other obligations of the partner to the partnership or to the other partners."
Just because the act of withdrawal is found not to be statutorily "wrongful" does not
mean that such withdrawal was in accordance with the contract. Notably, the Supreme Court
interpreted the word "express" under Section 53-3-602 to mean "unambiguous." As the Court
said:
The statute does not simply provide that dissociation is wrongful if it is in breach
of the partnership agreement, or if it is in breach of a provision in the partnership
agreement. It is only wrongful if it breaches an express provision of the
partnership agreement. We have defined the word "express" as follows: "Black's
Law Dictionary defmes 'express' as, '[c]lear; definite; explicit; plain; direct;
unmistakable; not dubious or ambiguous.
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Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at 489, 224 P.3d at 1078 (emphasis in original). A contract is
ambiguous if it is reasonable subject to conflicting interpretation. Page v. Pasquali, 244 P.3d
1236, 1238 (2010). As the Court said of Section 6.1 :
The district court picked one definition of the word "if' ("on condition that") and
concluded that section 6.1 established the conditions that must exist before a
hospital partner could withdraw from the partnership without breaching the
agreement. Another definition rejected by the court would also be consistent with
the context. The sentence could be read to state that the hospital partner may
withdraw in the event that one of the listed events occurs.
Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at 487, 224 P.3d at 1076 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court
made no holding about the actual meaning of the provision, and nor could it, as the interpretation
of an ambiguous provision is left to the trier of fact. !d. at 487 -88; Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout
Co., Inc. 143 Idaho 733, 737, 152 P.3d 604, 608 (2007); Clark v. Prudential Property and Cas.
Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d 242, 245 (2003). The Court merely held that the multiple
reasonable interpretations of Section 6.1 prevented the provision from being "express" in a
manner to implicate Section 53-3-602. Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at 488, 224 P.3d at 1077.
As set forth above, the Court did not preclude the possibility that SaintAlphonsus's
withdrawal may have breached the contract by breaching this ambiguous term of the Partnership
Agreement. Likewise the Supreme Court did not preclude the possibility that Saint Alphonsus's
withdrawal may have breached an implied term of the Partnership Agreement, such as the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is implied by law into every contract.
Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex. M & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 217, 177 P.3d
955, 964 (2008). Neither did the Supreme Court hold that such a withdrawal could not be in
violation ofSaintAlphonsus's fiduciary duties. In short, all that has occurred by the decision of
the Supreme Court and this Court are holdings that Saint Alphonsus did not violate Section 53-3602, which statute does not purport in any way to displace contractual or fiduciary theories of
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liability. As such, RUPA does not and cannot preclude MRIA's other theories of liability for
Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal.
Indeed, there is no indication that the legislature intended to immunize a dissociating
partner from bad faith conduct in the manner and method of its dissociation, which in turn
terminally injures the partnership. That, however, is exactly what Saint Alphonsus did in this
case. It specifically conducted itself in such a way as to insure that its nest would be feathered
upon departure while at the same time its soon to be competitor, rather than partner, MRIA
would be destroyed and unable to compete. As set forth in detail in Memorandum in Opposition
to Motion for Summary Judgment Based on MRIA's Civil Conspiracy Claim, pages 1-17, Saint
Alphonsus began competing against MRIA and marketing its competing venture so that referring
doctors switched from MRIA to SaintAlphonsus's competing venture and took other steps to
ensure that MRIA's ability to compete would permanently crippled. !d. Neither the Supreme
Court's decision nor RUPA was designed to insulate Saint Alphonsus from damages caused by
this conduct. On the other hand, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and common law
fiduciary duties were designed to prevent that type of conduct.

C.

MRIA's Counterclaim Sufficiently Pleads Multiple Theories of Liability Based on
Withdrawal
Saint Alphonsus next argues that its withdrawal cannot serve as the basis for any of the

causes of action pleaded by MRIA because such claims are not pleaded and could not be tenable.
In so doing, SaintAlphonsus is attacking an argument made in a footnote ofMRIA's Opposition
to Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery, in which MRIA said:
The assertion that its dissociation from MRIA in 2004 is "lawful" is disingenuous.
The finding of the Supreme Court and this Court are simply that Saint Alphonsus
did not violate any statute by dissociating in 2004 because an express term of the
Partnership Agreement was no violated. Unlike the statutory claim, a breach of
contract claim does not hinge on the violation of an "express" provision of a
contract, but simply a breach of contractual provisions ... whether St.
MRI ASSOCIATES' OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON "BREACH OF
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Alphonsus's withdrawal was a breach of contract is a question of fact for the jury .
. . A question of fact remains as to whether by dissociating in 2004, Saint
Alphonsus committed the other acts (breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
etc.) outlined in MRIA's Third Amended Complaint
(Opposition to Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery, filed February 2, 2001, p. 15-16,
para. 43l However, contrary to Saint Alphonsus's assertion, MRIA clearly pleaded claims for
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of fiduciary
duty related to Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal.

1.

Breach of Contract/Good Faith and Fair Dealing

As explained above, MRIA asserts that SaintAlphonsus's withdrawal could be found to
be in violation of the ambiguous provisions of Section 6.1 or the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Contrary to SaintAlphonsus's assertion otherwise, such claims are pled in the
Third Amended Counterclaim. In the body of the Third Amended Counterclaim, which is
incorporated into the claim for relief for Breach of Contract, (Third Amended Counterclaim,
filed March 22, 2010, ~ 62) and the claim for the Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (id.

at~

82), MRIA alleged that Saint Alphonsus "dissociated from MRIA by withdrawing in breach of
the condition of withdrawal stated in Section 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement." (Id

at~

45, as

amended by Order Granting Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter from Third Amended
Counterclaim). In MRIA breach of contract count (Count One), MRIA alleges that Saint
Alphonsus's withdrawal was a breach of the partnership agreement. (Id.

at~

68.) In MRIA's

claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count 5), MRIA also specifically
asserts that this covenant was breached because Saint Alphonsus "breached the Partnership
Agreement." (Third Amended Counterclaim, at~ 83).

4 MRIA does not intend to assert that Saint Alphonsus 's withdrawal directly supports its claims for tortious
interference with prospective relations or business expectations, although its withdrawal obviously provides the
backdrop for these claims.
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Saint Alphonsus also appears to argue that in advancing a good faith a fair dealing
argument related to its withdrawal, MRIA is asking the Court to override express contractual
terms. However, as held by the Supreme Court, the provision of the Partnership Agreement
dealing with dissociation is not an express term. Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at 487, 224 P.3d at
1076. To the extent that SaintAlphonsus argues that a good faith and fair dealing claim
contradicts the wrongful dissociation provision ofRUPA, this is merely a repackaging of Saint
Alphonsus's conclusory argument that its dissociation was "lawful" and thus cannot form the
basis for any other theories of liability. A case from the Federal District of Idaho is instructive on
this point. In Henley v. Rif/dnd, 2009 WL 1676072 (Idaho Dist. 2009) (unpublished), the court
determined that the Defendant had not breached certain express terms of a contract. The Court
found, however, that ''the contract ... is still there even though the express terms of that contract
were not breached as found by this Court. However, the contract remains, and to the extent there
are implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing under that contract, those implied covenants
remain." (Id at *5). As SaintAlphonsus's withdrawal could be found to be in violation of the
ambiguous provisions of Section 6.1 or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
summary judgment should not be granted in favor of Saint Alphonsus.

2.

The Assertion that Saint Alphonsus's Withdrawal was "Lawful" is
Conclusory

Throughout this portion ofSaintAlphonsus's brief, SaintAlphonsus argues that because
its dissociation was "lawful," it withdrawal from the partnership cannot form the basis for any
other theories of liability. This is a conclusory assertion that highlights the very point of
argument between the parties in this motion. As explained in detail above, the Supreme Court
and this Court have determined only that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was not a statutory

MRI ASSOCIATES' OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON "BREACH OF
CONTRACT" THEORY OF WRONGFUL WITHDRAWAL- 13

000782

violation. It remains to be seen whether Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal was in fact "lawfully"
under all theories.

3.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

MRIA has also asserted that Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary duties in withdrawing
from the Partnership. Contrary to SaintAlphonsus's assertion otherwise, this is pleaded in
MRIA's Third Amended Counterclaim, specifically Paragraph 80, which provides that "SARMC
breached its fiduciary duties owned to MRI Limited and MRI Mobile by ... wrongfully
dissociating from the general partnership." (Third Amended Counterclaim, at, 80.)
Saint Alphonsus also argues that withdrawal cannot be a breach of fiduciary duties
because fiduciary duties end upon dissociation per Idaho Code§ 53-3-603. Contrary to this
argument, however, other courts have held that breaches of fiduciary duty can stem from the
manner of withdrawal. See Meyer v. Christie, --- F. 3d ----, 2011 WL 87343 7 (1Oth Cir. 2011)
(wrongful dissociation also supported verdict for breach of fiduciary duty); Federalpha Steel

LLC Creditors' Trust v. Fed Pipe & Steel Corp., 368 B.R. 679, 695 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (fmding that
claim for wrongful withdrawal also supported claim for breach of fiduciary duty). As Saint
Alphonsus's withdrawal, even though not a statutory violation, could be found to be in violation
of its fiduciary duties, summary judgment should not be granted in favor of Saint Alphonsus. 5

III.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to SaintAlphonsus's argument otherwise, the decisions of the Idaho Supreme
Court and this Court do not preclude MRIA's argument that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal may
have constituted a breach of the ambiguous provisions of the Partnership Agreement, the implied
5

In footnote 5 of its brief: Saint Alphonsus discloses an intention to file yet another motion for summary judgment
on the contention that Saint Alphonsus 's withdrawal triggered a one-year non-competition clause, and thus that
damages after that point are unavailable. MRIA again asks how many "bites at the apple" Saint Alphonsus is to get.
It filed nine motions for summary judgment before the first trial and, including the present motion, has filed five
motions for summary judgment since remand. As previously noted in MRIA's Opposition to Motion to Set
Scheduling Order, such a multiplicity of motions begins to implicate questions of unnecessary delay and cost.
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained therein, and/or Saint Alphonsus's fiduciary
duties. Such causes of action were pleaded, and should be permitted to be presented to the jury.
As such, MRIA respectfully asks the Court to deny this Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this 28th day of March 2011.
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMANPLLC

~. t:?~ /~"-

Dara L. Parker {
Attorneys MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") bring this Motion requesting clarification regarding the
departing partner's share. A previous decision made by Judge McLaughlin regarding the
amount Saint Alphonsus is entitled to receive as its departing partner share is subsidiary to and
overturned by the decision of the Supreme Court on appeal. MRIA asks the Court for
clarification on whether the previous decision of the district court regarding the applicable
buyout provision is subsidiary to the decision of the Supreme Court. Second, MRIA asks the
Court to hold that the gapfiller RUPA provision ofldaho Code§ 53-3-70l(b) governs buyouts if
the jury determines that a hospital partner's ability to withdraw is limited by the Partnership
Agreement to the four medical/theological circumstances listed in Section 6.1.
This Motion is supported by the Affidavit of Counsel and a Memorandum in Support,
filed contemporaneously herewith.
DATED this 11th day of April, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~.
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Memorandum in Support of their Motion for
Clarification Regarding Departing Partner's Share.

I. INTRODUCTION
MRIA seeks clarification of the status of the decision made by Judge McLaughlin
regarding the amount Saint Alphonsus is entitled to receive as its departing partner share. When
the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the judgment in this matter, it vacated the award for Saint
Alphonsus's departing partner's share which was included within the judgment. In addition to
vacating the judgment, the Supreme Court's decision also nullified the basis for Judge
McLaughlin's decision regarding the formula for determining Saint Alphonsus's departing
partner share.
Judge McLauglin's decision that the departing partner share is governed by the gapfilling provisions of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act instead of the Partnership Agreement
was based on his determination that the Partnership Agreement expressly limited the
circumstances under which a partner could withdraw, and therefore the buyout provision
contained in the Partnership Agreement, which he determined was tied to the withdrawal
provision (they are both inSection 6.1 of the partnership Agreement), likewise applied only to
withdrawals for one of the approved circumstances. As this Court is aware, the Supreme Court
rejected Judge McLaughlin's finding that the withdrawal provision expressly limited the right to
withdraw and held that the provision was ambiguous. Because Judge McLaughlin tied his
decision concerning the buyout provision to his finding that the withdrawal provision expressly
limited Saint Alphonsus's right to withdraw, and because his interpretation of the provisions was
rejected by the Supreme Court, the underpinnings of his decision regarding the measure of Saint
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION REGARDING WITHDRAWING
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Alphonsus' s departing partner share have been overturned. MRIA therefore seeks clarification
from the Court that this matter will be re-addressed following the interpretation of the
Partnership Agreement by the jury.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Parties Argued that Different Provisions Governed a Buyout
One of the issues in the previous trial of this matter was the amount of compensation to
which Saint Alphonsus was entitled as a departing partner of MRIA. The parties differed about
whether Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of the Partnership Agreement governed the calculation, or whether
the issue was governed by Idaho Code § 53-3-701 (b), the gap-filler provision regarding buyouts
contained in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUP A").
MRIA argued that Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of the Partnership Agreement provided the
correct measure. Those provisions provide as follows:
6.1
Conditions of Withdrawal. Any Hospital Partner may withdraw from the
Partnership at any time if, in a Hospital Partner's reasonable judgment, continued
participation in this Partnership: (i) jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of such
Hospital Partner of its parent of their subsidiaries; or (ii) jeopardized
medicare/Medicaid or insurance reimbursement or participations; (iii) if the
business activities of the Partnership are contrary to the ethical principles of the
Roman Catholic Church as designated from time to time; or (iv) is or may be in
violation of any local, state or federal laws, rules or regulations .... Unless
otherwise agreed, the withdrawing Hospital Partner shall only be entitled to
receive its interest in the Partnership an amount which is equal to the balance of
such Hospital Partner's capital account at the time of withdrawal.
6.2
Payment for Interest. The price for the withdrawing Hospital Partner's
interest in the Partnership shall be paid to such Hospital Partner by the Partners to
which its interest in the Partnership has been allocated, without interest, in
installments equal to, and due at the same time as, distributions of the Net Cash
Flow which the Hospital Partner would have received had it remained a Partner in
the Partnership.
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(Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMotions Filed April11, 2011, Ex. A, §§6.1 and 6.2
(emphasis added) (hereinafter "the Buyout Provision.")) MRIA argued that the terms of the
withdrawing partner's buy-out were to be determined by these sections, regardless of whether the
withdrawal was made for one of the enumerated "medical/theological" reasons stated in the first
part of paragraph 6.1.
Saint Alphonsus argued that the Buyout Provision contained in the Partnership
Agreement only applied if the Hospital Partner opted to withdraw under one of the.
medical/theological circumstances listed in section 6.1. Because Saint Alphonsus did not
dissociate from MRIA due to one of these four enumerated circumstances, Saint Alphonsus
argued that its share should be determined under the more expansive default provision of RUP A,
Idaho Code§ 53-3-701(b), which provides that:
The buyout price of a dissociated partner's interest is the amount that would have
been distributable to the dissociating partner under section 53-3-807(b), Idaho
Code, if, on the date of dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a
price equal to the greater of the liquidation value or the value based on a sale of
the entire business as a going concern without the dissociated partner and the
partnership was wound up as of that date. Interest shall be paid from the date of
dissociation to the date of payment.
I.C. § 53-3-701(b).

B. The Trial Court's Decision
This issue arose in the context of cross-motions for summary judgment asking the district
court to interpret Section 6.1. The questions included in those Motions for Summary Judgment
included the question of whether Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated, as well as the question
of whether Section 6.1 governed the terms of the buyout. The district court issued a
Memorandum Decision on these issues on July 24, 2006. As this Court knows, the district court
first made a fateful determination, overturned by the Supreme Court on appeal, that the four
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION REGARDING WITHDRAWING
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medical/theological reasons for withdrawal outlined in Section 6.1 were "express" contractual
provisions limiting the circumstances of withdrawal, and thus that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal
for other reasons was a wrongful withdrawal under Idaho Code§ 53-3-103(b)(l). (Affidavit of
Counsel in Support of Motions Filed Aprilll, 2011, Ex. B (hereinafter "Decision and Order of
July 24, 2006") at p. 7-13.)
The district court then turned its attention to the Buyout Provision, where MRIA was
requesting a summary determination that Sections 6.1 and 6.2 governed the terms of the buyout.
The district court declined to enter summary judgment, finding that the Buyout Provision was
ambiguous:
On the one hand, the paragraph discussing the withdrawing partner's share is
included under the heading "Conditions for Withdrawal" and follows a list of
reasons for a Hospital Partner's rightful withdrawal. This could indicate that the
buy-out provision at the end of section 6.1 applies only when a partner withdraws
for one of those four (4) reasons. However, the paragraph in section 6.1 and 6.2
are the only provision in the partnership agreement defining the terms for
compensating a withdrawing partner. The absence of any language specifically
discussing wrongful dissociation would either indicate the parties' intent to rely
on the default dissolution provisions of the UP A, and later the payment provision
ofthe RUPA, or show that the parties intended any distribution to a withdrawing
partner to be handled under sections 6.1 and 6.2.

(Id. at p. 14-15.) The district court therefore left the interpretation of the Buyout Provision to a
trier of fact. (!d.) During the trial, the district court determined that the interpretation of the
Buyout Provision was an issue based in equity, and thus within its purview. (Affidavit of
Counsel in Support ofMotions Filed Aprilll, 2011, Ex. C (hereinafter "Decision of September
21, 2007"), at p. 2).
The Court ultimately held that the more limited Buyout Provision outlined in Sections 6.1
and 6.2 applied only when a withdrawing hospital partner withdrew under one of the four
circumstances enumerated in Section 6.1. (!d. at p. 6.) The district court said:
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The Court has further examined the type of circumstances outlined in Article 6.1
as permitted reasons for dissociation. Each of these circumstances were subject to
changes in law or medical-theological circumstances beyond the control of the
Hospital partners that could require that hospital partner to dissociate quickly in
order to avoid substantial financial harm to the entire hospital organization based
upon this partnership agreement. Because a quick dissociation might have
significant financial consequences for the partnership due to the debt associated
with this new technology at the time of formation of the partnership, a reduced
"buyout" based upon the four (4) enumerated reasons for dissociation would
allow MRIA to continue without the hospital partner's participation and
significant debt load issues for the partnership. The delay in payment set forth for
payment in Article 6.2 is consistent with the intent of Article 6.1 as outlined
above and further demonstrates that all of these provisions were based upon the
four enumerated reasons for withdrawal as outlined in Article 6.1
(!d. at p. 5.) As Saint Alphonsus had not withdrawn for one of these enumerated reasons, the
Court applied the more expansive buyout language in Idaho Code§ 53-3-70l(b). (Id. at p. 5-6.)

III. ARGUMENT
A. The Underpinnings of the District Court's Decision Concerning the Buyout Were
Overturned by the Supreme Court's Decision

Notably, the district court decision that the Buyout Provision of Section 6.1 and 6.2 did
not extend to other un-enumerated circumstances of withdrawal comported with the district
court's previous ruling that these four circumstances expressly limited the circumstances in
which a hospital partner might contractually dissociate. (Decision and Order of July 24, 2006, at
p. 7-13.) The Court had found that Saint Alphonsus could not lawfully dissociate for reasons
other than those stated. Reasoning from this position, it held that Section 6.1 created a lawful
dissociation for one of the four enumerated circumstances, but that in exchange for allowing
such a withdrawal, the other partners should be protected by a limited buy-out position. (!d.) In
other words, the district court came to two consistent conclusions: that dissociation was limited
to the four enumerated reasons of Section 6.1, and that the Buyout Provision's applicability was
likewise limited to those four enumerated reasons.
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This reasoning regarding the Buyout Provision cannot stand in light of the Supreme
Court's decision on appeal. As this Court knows, the Supreme Court held that Section 6.1 might
be read as a provision that, depending on the interpretation of ambiguous language, either does
or does not outline the exclusive circumstances in which a partner might withdraw. Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 487, 224 P.3d 1068,
1076 (2009). If the district court's previous interpretation is allowed to stand, there is a risk that,
if the jury determines that Section 6.1 is not a restrictive provision, the provision will have been
interpreted in two diametrically opposing ways. Saint Alphonsus cannot argue that four
enumerated medical/theological circumstances of withdrawal listed in Section 6.1 do not limit
the reasons for which it might withdraw, but then argue that the Buyout Provision contained in
the same section applies only under one of those four circumstances. This would result in a .
nonsensical interpretation that Section 6.1 is umestrictive for purposes of withdrawal, but
restrictive for purposes of the Buyout Provision.
While the Supreme Court did not address this issue during the appeal, it is subsidiary to
and impacted by the Supreme Court's decision. On remand, a trial court has authority to take
actions which are subsidiary to the actions directed by the appellate court, even though that issue
is not expressly included in the issues to be address on remand. Mountainview Landowners Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 866, 136 P.3d 332, 337 (2006). See, Rockefeller v.
Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 545,82 P.3d 450,457 (2003) (question of attorney fees subsidiary to
reversal of summary judgment); State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886, 11 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000)
(withdrawal of guilty plea subsidiary to question of whether evidence should have been
admitted); Trimble v. Engelking, 134 Idaho 195,197, 998 P.2d 502, 504 (2000) (Court erred in
failing to consider applicability of statute of limitations when directed by Supreme Court to
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION REGARDING WITHDRAWING
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consider all applicable laws relating to the issue of timeliness ); Walters v. Industrial Indem.
Co., 130 Idaho 836, 838, 949 P.2d 223, 225 (1997) (motion to amended to add claims not
subsidiary in appellate determination that Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction); JR.
Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Int'l, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 258, 939 P.2d 574, 577 (1997) (when
Supreme Court reversedjury verdict as to two counts in commercial dispute, relieving party of
liability, question of attorney fees was subsidiary issue); Industrial Inv. Corp. v. Rocca, 102
Idaho 920, 923, 643 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Ct. App. 1982) (attorney fees were subsidiary to issue of
liability on a guaranty). A court may also "correct an error in its original findings as to a matter
not passed on by the appellate court." Blinzler v. Andrews, 95 Idaho 769, 519 P.2d 438 (1973)
(emphasis added). See, also, Hutchins v. State, 100 Idaho 661, 666, 603 P.2d 995, 1000 (1979).
As the Supreme Court overturned the district court's interpretation of Section 6.1 as to
the circumstances of withdrawal, its interpretation of the provisions of Section 6.1 related to the
Buyout Provision is a subsidiary issue. A contract should be interpreted as a whole to give effect
to every part of a contract. George v. University ofIdaho, 121 Idaho 30, 36, 822 P.2d 549,
555 (Ct. App. 1991). There is a risk that if the issue is not reopened, the end result may be
contradictory and nonsensical interpretations of Section 6.1

B. Request for Clarification
Given the above, MRIA asks the Court for clarification on the following. First, MRIA
asks the Court to find that the previous decision of the district court regarding the applicable
buyout provision is subsidiary to the decision of the Supreme Court. Second, MRIA asks the
Court to find that Judge McLaughlin's ruling regarding the formula for determining the amount
of Saint Alphonsus' s departing partner's share is no longer valid as a result of the Supreme
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Court's decision. Finally, MRIA asks the Court defer any decision regarding the amount of the
departing partner share until after the jury construes Section 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Court should clarify and find that the previous decision of the district court regarding
the applicable buyout provision was abrogated by the decision of the Supreme Court, and that the
gapfiller RUPA provision ofidaho Code§ 53-3-70l(b) governs buyouts only if the jury
determines that a hospital partner may contractually withdraw only under the four
medical/theological circumstances listed in Section 6.1.
DATED this 11th day of April, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Dara L. Park r
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") move the Court for a ruling in Limine to prevent Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("Saint Alphonsus") from arguing to the jury or presenting
evidence that, as a matter oflaw, it lawfully or rightfully dissociated from the MRI Associates
Partnership. Such argument or evidence is not relevant to any issue of consequence in this
action. Idaho R. Evid. 401, 402, and if permitted, there is a substantial risk that any such
assertions will cause unfair prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. Idaho R. Evid.
403. This motion is supported by the Affidavit of Counsel and a Memorandum in Support, filed
contemporaneously herewith
DATED this 11th day of April, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

bara L. Park
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Memorandum in Support of their Motion in
Limine to Prevent Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("Saint Alphonsus") from arguing that
as a matter oflaw, it lawfully or rightfully dissociated from the MRI Associates Partnership.
There has been no such finding as a matter of law; rather, this is a question of fact for the jury. 1

I.

BACKGROUND

As this Court knows, the initial trial of this matter, MRIA asserted that Saint Alphonsus's
withdrawal from the MRIA Partnership was in violation ofldaho Code§ 53-3-602 because it
was in breach of an "express" provision ofthe Partnership Agreement, I.C. § 53-3-602(b)(l), and
because it was prior to the expiration of a definite term, I. C. § 53-3-602(b )(2). On appeal, the
the
Supreme Court rejected the first of these theories. The Court examined Article 6 of•I..
Partnership Agreement, which addresses the withdrawal of hospital partner from the MRIA
Partnership. In particular, the Court examined Section 6.1, which provides that:
Any Hospital Partner may withdraw from the Partnership at any time if, in a
Hospital Partner's reasonable judgment, continued participation in this
Partnership: (i) jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of such Hospital Partner or its
parent or their subsidiaries; or (ii) jeopardizes medicare/medicaid or insurance
reimbursements or participations; (iii) if the business activities of the Partnership
are contrary to the ethical principles of the Roman Catholic Church as designated
from time to time; or (iv) is or may be in violation of any local, state or federal
laws, rules or regulations.
(Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motions Filed Aprilll, 2011, Ex. A (hereinafter
"Partnership Agreement") at§ 6.1.) The Supreme Court determined that this provision could be
interpreted in a number of ways, and thus that "the section is not an express provision limiting
the circumstances under which St. Alphonsus could withdraw without breaching the partnership

1

Saint Alphonsus may, of course, argue its case to the jury that its withdrawal was in compliance with the contract.
However, it should be prevented from assertion in any manner that such a ruling has been made by a Court as a
matter oflaw or referencing the statutory analysis contained in I. C. § 53-3-602.
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agreement." See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,
487, 224 P.3d 1068, 1076 (2009) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court did not hold that·
Saint Alphonsus had withdrawn in conformance with the contract, but merely that it could not
have violated I.C. § 53-3-602(b)(l) because the Partnership Agreement did not contain an
"express" provision limiting the right to dissociate. !d.
On remand, this Court examined the second statutory theory of withdrawal before the
expiration of a definite term, I.C. § 53-3-602(b)(2). The Court determined that the Partnership
Agreement set out indefinite term for the existence of the Partnership, rather than a definite term,
and therefore dismissed this claim on summary judgment. (Memorandum Decision and Order on
Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on Pleadings and Motion for Summary Judgment, November 16,
2010, p. 5-12). Given the decisions ofthis Court and the Supreme Court, the statutory theories
ofliability under Idaho Code § 53-3-602(b) no longer exist in this case. However, it is a
question of fact for the jury whether Saint Alphonsus dissociated in conformance with the
Partnership Agreement. As such, it has yet to be determined whether Saint Alphonsus' s
dissociation was "lawful."

II.

ARGUMENT

Following the remand of this case, Saint Alphonsus has argued at various times that its
dissociation had been found to be "lawful" because of the decisions of the Supreme Court and
this Court on MRIA's statutory wrongful dissociation claims. (See, e.g., Saint Alponsus's
Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Unpled "Breach of Contract" Theory of Wrongful
Dissociation, filed March 7, 2011.) MRIA's disagreement with this position has already been
extensively briefed in MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on "Breach of
Contract" Theory ofWrongful Liability, filed March 28, 2011, which is incorporated herein by
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reference. As the Court is already well-apprised ofMRIA's arguments, they will not be repeated
here. ,To simply summarize those arguments:
(1)

The holding of the Idaho Supreme Court was that there was no statutory
"wrongful dissociation" because there was not an "express" (i.e., unambiguous)
provision in the Partnership Agreement limiting dissociation. As these
contractual provisions are ambiguous, their meaning (and the possibility that Saint
Alphonsus breached them) is a question for the finder of fact.

(2)

Withdrawal may also have constituted a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing and/or Saint Alphonsus's fiduciary duties.

(3)

The Revised Uniform Partnership Act does not preclude these theories ofliability
for Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal from the MRIA Partnership.

If the Court agrees with MRIA's position, as stated above and more fully in its Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment on "Breach of Contract" Theory ofWrongful Liability, then
Saint Alphonsus should be prevented from arguing or asserting that its dissociation was "lawful"
under Idaho Code § 53-3-602 or that any court has found that such dissociation was "lawful."
Such assertions are not relevant to any issue of the case, and any potential relevancy is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury.
The contention that that Saint Alphonsus 's dissociation was not a "wrongful dissociation"
as defined by Idaho Code § 53-3-602 is not relevant to any issue of consequence in this action.
Idaho R. Evid. 401, 402. These statutory causes of action no longer exist in this case, and
therefore reference to the elements of such claims or findings of law regarding them are simply
irrelevant to any fact of consequence to the determination of the action.
Perhaps more significantly, ifthe Court agrees that common law causes of action for
breach of contract remain in this case, there is a substantial risk that any such assertions will
cause unfair prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. Idaho R. Evid. 403. The jury
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may believe that because courts found that Saint Alphonsus did not "wrongfully dissociate"
under I. C. § 53-3-602, that this precludes the jury from finding that Saint Alphonsus's
dissociation nevertheless violated the terms of the Partnership Agreement. The jury may also
confuse the statutory elements of "wrongful dissociation" with the common law elements of
''breach of contract." Notably, when the shoe was on the other foot, the Supreme Court held that
an incorrect instruction that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated was prejudicial because
could have seriously affected the jury's decision making process. Saint Alphonsus Diversified

Care, Inc., 148 Idaho at 489-91, 224 P.3d at 1078-80. Likewise, allowing Saint Alphonsus to
assert that its dissociation was lawful would be irrelevant and prejudicial, and should not be
allowed in the re-trial of this matter.

III.

CONCLUSION

If the Court agrees with MRIA's position as stated in MRIA's Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment on "Breach of Contract" Theory ofWrongful Liability, filed March 28,
2011, then the Court should also grant this Motion in Limine preventing Saint Alphonsus from
arguing or asserting to the jury that its dissociation was lawful.
DATED this 11th day of April, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

/Rk.,.

~ Di'i-a
I :::2...
L. Park

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") move the Court for a Ruling in limine to prevent Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("Saint Alphonsus") from arguing to the jury or presenting
evidence of any findings or statements made by the Idaho Supreme Court in the appeal from the
first trial ofthis matter. Such information is not relevant to any issue of the case, and any
potential relevancy is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury. Idaho R. Evid. 401-403. This motion is supported by a
Memorandum in Support, filed contemporaneously herewith.
DATED this 11th day of April, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MIU Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Memorandum in Support of their Motion in
Limine to prevent Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("Saint Alphonsus") from arguing to
the jury or presenting evidence of any findings or statements made by the Idaho Supreme Court
in the appeal from the first trial of this matter. Such information is not relevant to any issue of
the case, and any potential relevancy is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Idaho R. Evid. 401-403.
As this Court is well aware, on October 21, 2009, the Supreme Court issued Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 224 P.3d 1068, (2009),
a lengthy opinion addressing many points of law, vacating the previous judgment, and
remanding for the present proceedings. Saint Alphonsus should be prevented from reading from
or referring to this opinion in front of the jury 1 in any way. The assertion or implication that any
issue, fact, or even a particular point of law upon which the jury is instructed has already been
specifically endorsed or considered by the Idaho Supreme Court in the context of the case may
give that information undue weight in the minds of the jury. 2 The Court will ensure that the
opinion of the Supreme Court on remand is followed during retrial. There is no reason for the
jury to be told about any aspects of the Supreme Court's opinion, including the reversal of the
first verdict.

1

0bviously, iflegal issues are taken up outside the presence of the jury, this opinion does provide the law of the case
and other guiding law, and is entirely appropriate to cite to the Court.
2
MRIA does not seek to preclude evidence or argument on the simple fact that the case is on retrial after remand
from the Supreme Court. This information may help give the jury context about the timeline of events, and MRIA
does not consider such information to be prejudicial.
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County of Ada
State of Idaho
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Dara L. Parker, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI

Mobile Limited Partnership in the above captioned case.
2.

I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge.

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Articles of

Partnership of MRI Associates. This is referred to in the briefing as the "Partnership
Agreement."
Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a tru~ and correct copy of the district court's

4.

Memorandum Decision and Order, filed July 24, 2006. This is referred to in the briefing as the
"Decision and Order of July 24, 2006."
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Cis a true and correct copy of the district court's

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment Regarding
Partner's Interest in the Partnership, filed September 21, 2007. This is referred to in the briefing
as the "Decision of September 21, 2007."
DATED this 11th day of April, 2011.
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ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP
OF
MRI ASSOCIATES
THESE ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP have been entered into
effective this .26th day of April, 1985, by and among DOCTORS
MAGNETIC RESONANCE, INC., an Idaho corporation ("DMR"), SAINT
ALPHONSUS MAGNETIC RESONANCE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit
corporation ("SAMR"), MEDNOW, INC., an Idaho corporation ("MN"),
and HCA OF IDAHO, INC., an Idaho corporation ("HCA"}.
Except as modified hereunder, the parties hereto hereby
form a general partnership pursuant to the Uniform Partnership
Law of the State of Idaho. The parties agree that the conduct of
the Partnership shall be in accordance with the terms and
provisions herein set forth.
ARTICLE 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1.1 Effective Date and Term. The effective
date of these Articles of·?artnership is the twenty-sixth day of
April, 1985, and shall terminate as follows:
1.1.1 If the Limited Partnership contemplated pursuant
to Section 1.6 is not formed and the limited partnership
interests sold in accordance with the Private Placement
Memorandum, or this Partnership .does not otherwise acquire
financing acceptable to all Partners to replace the funds
which were to be acquired by the limited partnership
offering, on or before December 31, 1985, then the term ~f
this Partnership shall end on December 31, 1985.
1.1.2 If the Limited Partnership contemplated by
Section 1.6 is formed and the limited partnership interests
sold, and/or other financing mutually acceptable to all
Partners to replace all or a portion of the funds which were
to be acquired by the limited partnership offering is
acquired on or before December 31, 1985, then the term of
this Partnership shall end on the date which is within a
reasonable time after the business of the Partnership is
wound up and dissolved under Article 10.
In the event the Partnership terminates due to a failure
of the conditions set forth in Section 1.1.1, all debts and
obligations incurred by or on behalf of the Partnership shall be
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shared by the Partners in accordance with Capital Ratios set
forth in Section 3 .l.l.
Section 1.2 Location of Offices. The office(s) of the
Partnership shall be maintalned ln Ada and/or Canyon County,
Idaho.
Section 1.3

Partners.

1.3.1 The term "Partners" shall refer, collectively and
individually, to those entities who are parties to these
Articles of Partnership and those persons and entities
hereafter admitted to Partner status, excluding those whose
status as a Partner has been terminated as provided in
Articles 6, 7 and 8. The initial Partners are DMR, SAMR, MN
and HCA.
1.3.2 The term "Doctor Shareholders" shall refer,
collectively and individually, to J. Roger curran, M.D.,
David J. Giles, M.D., John M. Havlina, Jr., M.D., Thomas E.
Henson, M.D., and James M. Prochaska, M.D., who are the
holders of all of the issued and outstanding capital stock of
DMR and join in these Articles for purposes of their
agreements and covenants set forth in Artjcle 8, and those
persons and entities that hereafter become shareholders of
DMR.
1.3.3 The term "Hospital Partners" shall refer,
collectively and individually, to SAMR, MN, HCA and any other
State of Idaho licensed hospital or affiliate thereof
hereafter admitted to Partner status, excluding any hospital
whose status as a Partner has been terminated as provided in
Articles 6, 7 and 8.
1.3.4 The term "Partnership" shall refer to the
association existing among the Partners pursuant and sub~ect
to the terms of these Articles of Partnership.
1.3.5 With the approval required by Section 5.4.3, a
new Partner may be admitted to Partner status in the
Partnership by appropriate amendment of these Articles of
Partnership and the agreement of the new Partner to be bound
by the terms and provisions of these Articles of Partnership.
Section 1.4 Partnership Name.
Partnership shall be: f-tRI ASSOCIATES.

The name of the

Section 1.5 Certificate of Assumed Business Name.
Concurrently with the execution of these Articles, the Partners
shall execute a Certificate of Assumed Business Name pursuant to
applicable Idaho law. The Partnership shalt cause the
Certificate to be promptly filed in accordance with such law.
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Section 1.6 Purpose. The purpose of this Partnership
is to purchase, lease or otherwise acquire, finance, manage
operate, use, control, hold, sell and otherwise transfer medical
diagnostic devices, equipment and accessories and therapeutic
devices, equipment and accessories related to such diagnostic
devices and equipment, together with buildings and other
facilities associated therewith, and to transact any and all
business matte~s incident thereto. The initial diagnostic
equipment to be acquired shall be a magnetic resonance imaging
device.
This Partnership intends to promote and organize an
Idaho limited partnership (the •Limited Partnership•). Limited
partnership interests in the Limited Partnership shall be offered
for sale pursuant to a Private Placement Memorandum approved by
the Board of Partners as provided in Section 5.4.5 and prepared
and presented in accordance with applicable federal and state
securities laws and exemptions. When formed, the Limited
Partnership shall have the same purpose as this Partnership.
This Partnership and any entity in which it has an
ownership interest shall not engage in any other business
activity except those set forth above without the approval of the
Board of Partners required by Section 5.4.4.
ARTICLE 2
MANAGEMENT F.'SE
Section 2.1 Management Fee. When the Limited
Partnership is formed, the Limited Partnership Agreement will
provide for an annual management fee payable by the Limited
Partnership to the Partnership of $90,000 or 7.5% of the Limited
Partnership's annual cash receipts from operations, whicheve~ is
greater. The management fee will be paid to the Partnership in
monthly installments of $7,500 each, with an annual adjustment to
be made at the time the annual audit of the Limited Partnership
is completed, if such audit shows that annual cash receipts from
operations exceed $1,200,000.
2.1.1 Unless and until a Partner's interest in this
Partnership is terminated or transferred as authorized in
Articles 6, 7 and 8, or a new Partner is admitted, when
received by the Partnership, the management fee will be
forthwith allocated among and paid to the Partners, as
follows:
5/9

DMR

SAMR
MN
FICA

2/9

1/9
1/9
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Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Section
2.1.1, the portion of the management fee that would be
allocated and paid to HCA for 1985 instead shall be allocated
and pa id to MN.
2.1.2 In the event a Partner's interest in the
Partnership is terminated or transferred, that Partner's
interest i~ the management fee as described in Section 2.1.1
shall be allocated among the Partners (existing or new) who
have acquired that interest. The interest of a new Partner
in the management fee shall be determined at the time of
admission. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Section 6.1 shall
control the reallocation of the management fee upon the
withdrawal by a Hospital Partner under the terms of Section
6.1, and Section 7.4 shall control the forfeiture and
reallocation of the management fee for violation of Sections
7. 3 and 8. 2.
For purposes of these Articles, the management fee shall
be a guaranteed payment, shall be treated as a current operating
expense to both the Partnership and the Limited Partnership, and
shall be in addition to any distribution of Net Cash Flow that
the Partners receive, based on their Capital Ratios.
In addition to the
Partnership shall reimburse
costs and expenses incurred
assisting in the management
Partnership.

annual management fee, the
the Partners for all their reasonable
in connection with their services in
of the Partnership and the Limited

ARTICLE 3
CAPITAL
Section 3.1

Capital Ratios.

3.1.1 Unless and unti.l a Partner's interest in the
Partnership is terminated or transferred as authorized in
Articles 6, 7 and 8, or a new Partner is admitted, the
capital accounts of the Partners in the Partnership and the
interests of each Partner in profits and losses of the
Partnership shall be maintained in the following relationship
(hereinafter referred to as "Capital Ratios"):

Capital Ratio

Partner Name

501
27.5%

DMR
SAMR
MN
HCA

17.5\
5\
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3.1.2 In the event a Partner's interest in the
Partnership is terminated or transferred, that Partner's
interest in profits and losses of the Partnership and its
capital account shall be allocated among the Partners
(existing or new) who have acquired that interest. The
Capital Ratios and capital accounts of the Partners upon the
admission of a new Partner shall be determined at the time of
admission. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Section 6.1 shall
control the adjustment of Capital Ratios upon the withdrawal
by a Hospital Partner under the terms of Section 6.1.
Section 3.2

Borrowed Capital.

3.2.1 To provide for the capital requirements of the
Partnership, from time to time funds may be borrowed from
financial institutions or other lenders. The amount
borrowed, the rate of interest, the terms of paymen~ and the
security therefor shall be approved by the vote of the Board
of Partners as required by Section 5.4. Subject to the
requirements of Sections 5.4 and 5.5, any instrument of
indebtedness or related security document for approved
financing may be executed on behalf of the Partnership by any
Partner.
3.2.2 Partnership borrowings and all other·Partnership
obligations shall be paid from funds of the Partnership
available for and subject to distribution to the Partners.
By payment in that manner, each Partner will have contributed
toward payment of such obligation in the proportion that such
Partner is entitled to share in profits of the Partnership
(its Capital Ratio). If such Partnership funds are
insufficient, each Partner shall make a contribution to the
Partnership capital of that proportion of the deficiency
which is equal to its Capital Ratio.
By reason of the joint nature of Partnership obligations, should one Partner be required to pay a sum in excess
of the proportion equal to its Capital Ratio, such Partner
may require reimbursement from the remaining Partner(s) of
that excess amount to the extent that any such remaining
Partner(s) has not paid a s~ in proportion (based on Capital
Ratios of such Partners) to the amount paid by the Partner
seeking reimbursement.
Should any shareholder of any Partner be required to
guarantee any portion of a Partnership obligation, all other
Shareholders of Partners shall provide their several
guaranties of their proportionate amounts of such Partnership
obligation. With due regard to their status as nonprofit
corporations, the provisions of this paragraph shall apply to
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. as if it were
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the shareholder of SAMR. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center, Inc., Mercy Medical Center, Nampa, Idaho, Hospital
Corporation of America and the Doctor Shareholders join in
the execution of these Articles to' effect the purposes of
this paragraph.
Section 3.3

Capital Accounts/Capital Contributions.

3.3.1 A separate capital account shall be established
on the books and records of the Partnership for each Partner.
3.3.2 To provide required capital for the conduct of
the Partnership and to maintain the capital accounts of all
Partners in the proper Capital Ratio, each Partner may be
required to make capital contributions to the Partnership.
Capital contributions shall be made at such time and in such
amounts as determined by five (5) votes on the Board of
Partners. If a call for a capital contribution is made, each
Partner shall have at least ninety ( 90) days to meet that
call. The amounts from time to time contributed by each
Partner to the capital of the Partnership shall be shown as a
credit to such Partner's separate capital account. A Partner
shall be in default hereunder if such Partner fails to make a
capital contribution at the time and place required by the
Board of Partners.
3.3.3 To the extent that funds in the Partnership
evidenced by capital contributions of Partners, or procP.eds
from borrowings, exceed those reasonably required for the
future conduct of the business of the Partnership, by the
favorable vote of at least five (5) on the Board of Partners,
those excess funds may be withdrawn by the Partners, each
Partner withdrawing that proportion.of the amount available
for withdrawal in proportion to that Partner's Capital Ratio.
During the existence of the Partnership, no Partner shall
withdraw its capital in any other manner except as otherwise
provided herein.
3.3.4 The provisions of this Section 3.3 shall be
strictly followed in establishing and maintaining the capital
account of each Partner in the Partnership, and there shall
be no occasion for any Partner to co~tribute to the capital
of the Partnership in excess of that Partner's proper Capital
Ratio share. Should additional operating capital be obtained
by the Partnership from any Partner on a temporary basis,
such shall be deemed a loan by that Partner to the
Partnership, payable on demand and bearing interest until
paid at the rate at which the Partnership is paying (or would
be required to p~y) to the lending institution which has
provided the Partnership with its regular operating line of
credit. If no demand is made, in any event such a loan shall
be repaid before any distributions of Net Cash Flow are made
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to any other Partners under Article 4, and before any further
distributions under Section 3.3.3.
3.3.5 If a Partner must file a suit to effect its right
to reimbursement under Section 3.2.2 or payment under Section
3.3.4, or the Partnership must file suit to require a Partner
to meet a Partnership call for a capital contribution under
Section 3.3.2, it shall be entitled to also recover
. reasonable attorneys fees and costs of suit incurred in any
such action, together with interest from the date the amount
was due, annualized at a eloating rate equal to two (2)
points over the prime rate of The Idaho First National Bank;
interest rate adjustments will be made each time said Bank
announces changes in its prime rate.
I

ARTICLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF NET CASH FLOW AND
ALLOCATION OF PROFIT AND LOSS
Section 4.1 Net Cash Flow Defined. As used in this
Article, the term "Net Cash Flow• shall be determined for each
fiscal year and shall mean the cash on hand at the beginning of a
fiscal year plus total cash receipts of the Partnership for such
fiscal year (excluding ca~;tal contributions for such fiscal
year) from which there shall be deducted: (i) the management fee
and all other current operating expenses of the Partnership
(excluding any expense not involving a cash expenditure, such as
any amount charged for depreciation); (ii) all payments made on
Partnership obligations during such fiscal year; (iii) any
amounts spent by the Partnership for capital expenditures during
such fiscal year; {iv) the amounts due during such fiscal year to
Partners (principal and interest) on any loans made to the
Partnership as contemplated by Section 3.3.4; and (v) a reserve
for working capital, the amount of which shall be determined· by
the decision of the Board of Partners in the manner provided in
Section 5.4.
Section 4.2 Distribution of Excess Net Cash Flow. Not
less than once each fiscal year, the Partnership shall distribute
Net Cash Flow among the Partners in proportion to their Capital
Ratios. Anything to the contrary herein notwithstanding, no
distributions of Net Cash Flow shall be made at any time that
payments on any Partnership obligation shall be delinquent. No
Partner shall be entitled to any Net Cash Flow distributions or
any other distributions if such Partner is in default of the
terms of these Articles.
Section 4.3 Allocation of Income and Losses. For
federal income tax and financial reporting purposes in each year
(a) net income shall be allocated among Partners to the extent
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Net Cash Flow is allocated to a Partner's capital account to
maintain the proper Capital Ratio among the Partners and,
secondly, among the Partners in the proportion of their Capital
Ratios; (b) net loss of the Partnership shall be allocated among
the Partners in the proportion of their Capital Ratios, (c) any
gain realized on a sale of property shall be allocate1 among the
Partners in the proportion of their Capital Ratios. Notwithstanding the foregoing, generally accepted accounting principles,
consistently applied, shall control all Partnership financial
reporting.
ART!CLE 5
MANAGEMENT
Section 5.1

Board of Partners.

5.1.1 Powers. The business and affairs of the
Partnership shall be conducted by the Partners through a
Board of Pa~tners, which Board is vested with all authority
and responsibility necessary for the management of the
Partnership and its business.

5.1.2 Votes. Unless and until there is a termination
under Articles 6, 7 or. 8, or unless and unt i1 a new Partner
is admitted to the Partnership, OMR shall have five (5)
votes, SAMR shall have two (2) votes, MN shall have one (1)
vote and HCA shall have one (1) vote on the Board of
Partners. Except for any transfers between DMR and a
Hospital Partner pursuant to section 7.2, the provisions of
Articles 6, 7 and 8 are to be construed to continue this 5:4
ratio of votes on the Board of Partners between DMR and the
Hospital Partners. (For example, assuming no terminations or
transfers, if a new Hospital Partner were admitted, it would
be anticipated that the Capital Ratio (that is 50%) and the
vote (that is four votes) of the Hospital Partners would be
allocated among the Hospital Partners as agreed among the
Hospital Partners.)
5.1.3 Members. The initial Board of Partners shall be
comprised of five (5) members (with one (l) vote each)
designated by DMR, two (2) members (with one (1) vote each)
designated by SAMR, one (1) member (with one (l) vote)
designated by HN and one (l) member (with one (1) vote)
designated by HCA. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no
Partner's representative on the Board of Partners shall be
entitled to vote if such Partner is in default of the terms
of these Articles.
5.1.4 Meetings. The time and place for the holding of
all meetings of the Board of Partners may be called by or at
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the request of any two members or the Chairman of the Board
of Partners and shall be held in Ada or Canyon County, Idaho,
or such other place as the Board of Partners determines.
5.1.5 Conference Telephone Meetings. Meetings of the
Board of Partners may be held by conference telephone or
similar communications equipment by means of which all
persons participating in the meeting can hear each other at
the same time. ·If any member of the Board of Partners is
unable to attend a meeting of the Board of Partners and makes
a request in advance of the meeting of the Chairman or
Secretary that he be included in such meeting by conference
telephone or similar equipment, he shall be so included if
such contact can be made.
'

5.1.6 Notice of Meeting. Except as otherwise provided
in this Section, notice of any meeting shall be provided to
the members as set forth in Section 11.4 at least three (3)
days prior to the meeting. For any meeting held by
conference telephone or similar communications equipment,
notice of the meeting shall be given at least twenty-four
(24) hours prior thereto by telephone and, notwithstanding
Section 11.4, shall be effective notice when the board member
receives actual notice of the telephone meeting.
Whenever any notic~ is required to be given to any
member under the provisions of this Section, a waiver thereof
in writing signed by the member, whether before or after the
time stated therein, shall be deemed equivalent to the giving
of such notice.
Neither the business to be transacted at, nor the
purpose of, any meeting of the Board of Partners need be
.
specified in the notice or waiver of notice of such meeting.
5.1.7 Quorum. The presence (including presence by'
conference telephone or similar communications equipment) of
members of the Board of Partners having at least 2/3 of the
eligible votes shall constitute a quorum for the transaction
of business at any meeting of the Board of Partners, but if
less than such number of votes are present at a meeting, a
majority of the votes present may adjourn the meeting from
time to time without further notice. Any new meeting
scheduled shall be subject to the notice requirements of
Section 5.1.6. If all of the members of the Board of
Partners shall approve the proceedings of a meeting of the
Board of Partners by execution of that approval on the
minutes of the meeting, any actions taken at the meeting
shall be legal and binding regardless of the manner in which
it was called or the number of votes present.
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5.1.8 Action Without a Meeting. Any action required or
permitted to be taken by the Board of Partners at a meeting
may be taken without a meeting if a consent in writing
setting forth the action so taken shall be signed by all of
the members of the· Board of Partners.
5.1.9 Records. Records of the meetings and proceedings
of the Board of Partners shall be kept at the principal
office of the Partnership.
Section 5.2 Chairman of the Board of Partners.
Annually, the Board of Partners shall elect a Chairman of the
Board of Partners who shall be presiding officer of.all meetings
of the Board of Partners and shall have such other duties as the
Board of Partners shall'prescribe.
Section 5.3 Secretary of the Partnership. Annually,
the Board of Partners shall elect a Secretary of the Partnership
who shall be responsible for the giving of notice of meetings of
the Board of Partners and of the Partners, the preparation of
agendas for meetings and minutes of meetings and such other
duties as the Board of Partners shall prescribe.
Section 5.4 Minimum Vote for Certain Partnership
Actions. Except as specified below, all management and business
decisions of the Partnership shall require at least five (5)
favorable votes on the Boa"rd of Partners. The following
Partnership management and business decisions shall require the
following votes of the Board of Partners for determination:
5.4.1 The purchase, lease or other acquisition of any
interest, directly or indirectly through the Limited
Partnership or other entity, or the granting of any security
interest, in real property shall require a favorable vote of
at least seven (7) on the Board of Partners.
5.4.2 Subject to the limitations set forth in Section
5.5, the borrowing of funds for capital acquisitions,
operational needs and otherwise, leasings, contracts and
agreements of any kind or nature, or other activities or
arrangements which cause the total Partnership debt/
obligations, in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, to
exceed FIVE MILLION DOLLARS ( $5,000,000) (based on 19·~5
dollars) at any time shall require a favorable vote of all
members of the Board of Partners. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the initial Partnership debt/obligation created in
connection with the acquisition of the magnetic resonance
imaging equipment and related equipment and accessories shall
not exceed the sum of THREE MILLION DOLL.ARS ($3, 000,000)
without a favorable vote of all of the members of the Board
of Partners.
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5.4.3 The admission of a new Partner shall require a
favorable vote of at least seven (7) on the Soard of
Partners, except as provided in se.ction 7.4.
5.4.4 Engaging directly, or indirectly through other
entities, including the Limited Partnership, in any business
activity other than that described in Section 1.6 shall
require a favorable vote of all of the members of the Soard
of Partners.
5.4.5 The form and content of the Limited Partnership
Agreement for the Limited Partnership and the Private
Placement Memorandum associated with the sale of limited
partnership interests in the Limited Partnership and the form
and content of any other partnership agreement or other
entity documents in which this Partnership has an interest
shall require a favorable vote of all of the members of the
Board of Partners.
The FIVE MILLION DOLLAR ($5,000,000) limit for
Partnership debts/obligations set forth in Section 5.4.2 shall be
adjusted annually in accordance with changes in the Consumer
Price Index for all items for All Urban Consumers for the u.s.
City Average as published by the United States Department of
Labor. The index in effect in April 1985 shall be used as the
base index from which changes in the Partnership debt/obligation
dollar ceiling are computed.
Section 5.5 Limitation on Joint Liability.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 5.4, in the event that
any instrument of Partnership indebtedness or other document,
agreement or instrument which imposes an obligation on the
Partnership and/or the Partners, directly or indirectly, in
excess of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000) fails to limit
the liability of a Partner to such Partner's proportionate share
(that is Capital Ratio) of the Partnership debt/obligation, then
such Partnership debt/obligation must be approved by all Partners
whose liability is not so limited.
ARTICLE 6
WITHDRAWAL OF HOSPITAL PARTNER
6.1 Conditions for Withdrawal. Any Hospital Partner
may withdraw from the Partnership at any time if, in a Hospital
Partner's reasonable judgment, continued participation in this
Partnership: (i) jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of such
Hospital Partner or its parent or their subsidiaries, or (ii)
jeopardizes medicare/medicaid or insurance reimbursements or
participations; (iii) if the business activities of the
Partnership are contrary to the ethical principles of the Roman
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Catholic Church as designated from time to timer or (iv) is or
may be in violation of any local, state or federal laws, rules or
regulations. tn the event that a Hospital Partner withdraws,
such Hospital Partner's interest in the Partnership shall
terminate on the date of withdrawal, and that interest,
including, without limitation, the Hospital Partner's vote on the
Board of Partners and its interest in the Partnership management
fee, shall be reallocated among the remaining Hospital Partners.
(If there are no remaining Hospital Partners, the reallocation
shall be among the remaining Partners). Unless otherwise agreed,
the withdrawing Hospital Partner shall only be entitled to
receive for its interest in the Partnership an amount which is
equal to the balance in such Hospital Partner's capital account
at the time of withdrawal.
'

6.2 Pa~ent for Interest. The price for the
withdrawing Hosp~al Partner 1 s interest in the Partnership shall
be paid to such Hospital Partner by the Partners to which its
interest in the Partnership has been allocated, without interest,
in installments equal to, and due at the same time as,
distributions of the Net Cash Flow which the Hospital Partner
would have received had it remained a Partner in the Partnership.
6.3 ~oans and Other Liabil1ties. Loans payable to the
withdrawing Hospital Partner shall be paid as provided herein.
Withdrawal shall not relieve the Hospital Partner from its
contingent liability for its Capital Ratio share of Partnership
liabilities in existence on the date of withdrawal.
ARTICLE 7
TRANSFERS OF PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
Section 7.1 Restrictions. No Partner shall sell,
assign, transfer, pledge or hypothecate its interest in the
Partnership, including all of its property and assets, or agree
to do the same, except in accordance with the provisions of this
Article.
Section 7.2 Transfers Between Partners. A Partner may
sell, assign and transfer its interest in the Partnership to the
Partnership or to another Partner for such price and on such
terms and conditions as they may agree subject to the following
rights of refusal. In the event that any Hospital Partner
receives an offer to purchase its interest in the Partnership and
desires to accept such offer, that Hospital Partner first shall
give written notice of such offer to all the other Partners. The
notice shall set forth all the terms of such offer, including the
name and address of the proposed purchaser. The Hospital
Partners receiving such notice shall have forty-five (45) days
after they have received notice to elect to purchase such

- 12 020002

12

000829

partnership interest on the terms set forth in the notice, in
proportion to the Capital Ratios of those Hospital Partners so
electing to purchase. In the event that none of the Hospital
Partners elect to purchase the offered partnership interest
within the allowed time, DMR shall have an a-:!ditional ten {10)
days in which to elect to purchase the partnership inte.r'!st on
the terms set forth in the noti~e. In the event that no Partner
elects to purchase such partnership interest, the Hospital
Partner may transfer it to the Partnership on the same terms, if
the Partnership so agrees, or to another party on the same terms,
subject to the provisions of Section 7.3. Upon completion of a
transfer by a Partner of all of its interest in the Partnership
to another Partner, the transferor Partner's interest in the
Partnership shall be terminated and the transferee Partner shall
have all the rights attributable to the transferred interest,
including without limitation the right to votes on the Board of
Partners and to participate in the management fee.
Section 7.3 Transfers to Others. Except for those
transfers between Partners which are authorized by Section 7.2,
and transfers to affiliates of Hospital Partners which are
autho~ized by Section 7.5, all transfers of Partnership interests
or agreements to do the same shall require the prior approval of
the Board of Partners by the favorable vote set forth in Section
5.4.3.
Section 7.4 Effect of Violation; Option to Purchase.
In the event a Partner shall violate the restriction on transfers
of Partnership interests set forth in Section 7.3,· voluntarily or
involuntarily (as a result of execution sale, proceedings in
bankruptcy, assignment for benefit of creditors, or other similar
action or inaction), as agreed liquidated damages neither the
assignee nor the breaching Partner, if it retained any
Partnership interest, shall be entitled to receive any portion of
the management fee described in Article 2 (the same to be
proportionately reallocated among the remaining Partners), unless
the Board of Partners agrees to the admission of the assignee as
a new Partner by the favorable vot• of 7/9 of the eligible votes
and the admission agreement allocates a portion of the fee to the
new Partner.
If the Board of Partners does not agree to the admission
of the assignee as a· new Partner, in addition to the agreed
liquidated damages, the Partnership shall have all rights and
remedies given by the Uniform Partnership Law of the State of
Idaho for conveyance of a Partnership interest in violation of
the Partnership Agreement, including, without limitation, that
the transfer does not of itself dissolve the Partnership, nor
entitle the assignee to interfere in the management or
administration of the Partnership business or affairs, or allow
the assignee to require any information or account of Partnership
transactions or to inspect Partnership books, but the assignee is
only entitled to receive the profits of the Partnership which the
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breaching Partner would otherwise be entitled to receive. In
addition the Partnership and/or the remaining Partners shall have
the right to cause a dissolution of the Partnership by the
affirmative vote of the Board of Partners required by Section
10.1, the right to enjoin the transfer,. the right to recover its
reasonable attorneys fees and costs of suit should legal action
be necessary, and the right to purchase the Partnership interest
held by the assignee and the Partnership interest held by the
breaching Partner, if it has reta.ined any, tor the lesser of:
the purchase price paid by the assignee for its interest in the
Partnership or the breaching Partner's capital account
immediately prior to the transfer. (If the breaching Partner has
retained an interest in this Partnership, the purchase price for
the breaching Partner's ,interest shall be the breaching Partner's
capital account less the purchase price paid by the assignee).
The Partnership, by the favorable vote of a majority of the
eligible votes, may elect to purchase at any time within
forty-five (45} days after it has received notice of an
unauthorized transfer by written notice delivered to the
breaching Partner and its assignee.
7.4.~
The purchase price shall be paid by the
Partnership, without interest, in installments equal to, and
due at the same time as, distributions of the Net Cash Flow
which the breaching Partner would have received had it
remained a Partner in the Partnership.

7. 4. 2 Loans payable to the breaching Partner shall be
paid as provided herein. Termination shall not relieve the
breaching Partner from its contingent liability for its
Capital Ratio share of Partnership liabilities in existence
on the date of termination.
7.5 Transfers to Affiliates. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, without requiring the consent and approval of an~
other Partner, any Hospital Partner may transfer partnership
interests to persons and entities that directly, or indirectly
through one or more intermediaries, control, are controlled by,
or are under common control with, such Hospital Partner.
ARTJ:CLE:

8

AGREEMENTS AND COVENANTS OF
DMR AND DOCTOR SHAREHOLDERS
6.1 Recognitions. Doctor Shareholders are the holders
of all of the issued and outstanding capital stock of the O~R,
and they are all physicians licensed to practice medicine in the
State of Idaho. Doctor Shareholders have agreed to vote their
shares so that each is a member of the five-member Board of
Directors of CMR and each is a member of the Soard of Partners of
this Partnership. Recognizing that DMP and the Board of Partners
of this Partnership require the active interest, support and

_________________________________
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personal attention of all Doctor Shareholders, they and DMR have
entered into a Shareholders Agreement providing for the
acquisition by the DMR or remaining Doctor Shareholders of all
stock owned by a Doctor Shareholder in the event of his death or
permanent mental disability and restricting the ability of any
Doctor Shareholder to transfer his stock in DMR to any one other
than the other Doctor Shareholders or DMR.
8. 2 Covenants and Agreements Relating to Change in
Control. DMR and Doctor Shareholders acknowledge and agree that
a change in the control of DMR by Doctor Shareholders could have
an adverse effect on the management of this Partnership unless
such a change is accomplished with the consent and concurrence of
at least half of the members of the Board of Partners who are
designated by Hospital Partners. Accordingly, Doctor
Shareholders and DMR hereby covenant and agree with Hospital
Partners that at all times during the existence of this
Partnership: (1) they will notify Hospital Partners in writini
of any change in the shareholders of DMR, which notification w 11
include a request for the approval by the Hospital Partners of
the new shareholder and (2) ownership of at least fifty-one
percent (51%) of the issued and outstanding capital stock of DMR
will be in either some or all of the Doctor Shareholders, or
Doctor Shareholders and others who have been approved as
successor shareholders of.OMR by at least two (2) favorable votes
by the persons designated by the Hospital Partners as members of
the Board of Partners.
8.3 Notation on Stock Certificates. The existence of
the covenants and agreements of DMR and the Doctor Shareholders
set forth in Section 8.2 shall be noted on the certificates
evidencing shares of capital stock of OM.R,

8.4 Effect of Violation. !n the event OMR and/or
Doctor Shareholders shall violate their covenants and agreements
set forth in Section 8.2, it shall have the same effect as a
violation of the restrictions on transfer of Partnership
interests as set forth in Section 7.4.
ARTICLE 9
RESTRICTIONS ON COMPETITION

Section 9.1 Restricted Party. For the purposes of this
Article 9, the term "Restricted Party" shall refer to (1) the
Partners, (2) any Partner whose status as a Partner has been
terminated as provided in Articles 6, 7 and 8 ("Terminated
Partner"), (3) the shareholders of the Partners and any
Terminated Partners, including the persons and entities that are
shareholders on the date of these Articles and those persons and
entities that hereafter become shareholders ("Shareholders"), and
(4) the persons and entities that directly, or indirectly through
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one or more intermediaries, control, are controlled by, or are
under common control with, a Partner, Terminated Partner or
Shareholder ("Affiliates"}. With due regard to their status as
nonprofit corporations, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,
Inc. shall be deemed to be the shareholder of SAMR for the
purposes of this Article 9.
Section 9.2

Competitive Activity.

9.2.1 For the purposes of this Article 9, the term
"Competitive Activity• shall refer to (l) those business
activities in which the Partnership is engaged and (2) those
prospective business activities whose development has
received at least five ,(5) favorable votes on the Board of
Partners.
9.2.2 Competitive Activity shall not include (1) any
business activities conducted more than 100 miles from the
location of the first magnetic resonance imaging device .
installed by the Limited PartnershipJ (2) the professional
activity of a physician, including without limitation, the
reading and analysis of diagnostic images, materials or
information, (3) for each Restricted Party (i) those
activities in which such Restricted Party is engaged on the
date of these Articles, (ii) those activities in which such
Restricted Party is engaged prior to such activities becoming
Competitive Activity, or (iii) any activity toward the
development of which such Restricted Party has incurred
obligations in the aggregate amount of at least $25,000 prior
to such activity becoming Competitive Activity; or (4) for
each Restricted Party the acquisition, maintenance, repair,
replacement or expansion, utilizing the same or substantially
similar technology, of medical devices, equipment and
accessories ("Equipment•) that such Restricted Party (i}
utilizes on the date of these Articles, (ii) utilizes prio~
to the utilization of such Equipment becoming Competitive
Activity, or (iii) has incurred obligations for the
utilization of such Equipment in the aggregate amount of at
least $25,000 prior to the utilization of such Equipment
becoming Competitive Activity.
Section 9.3

Noncompetition.

9.3.1 No Restricted Party sh~ll engage in any
Competitive Activity while such Restricted Party is a
Partner, a Shareholder of a Partner, or an Affiliate of a
Partner.
9.3.2 For a period of two (2) years after becoming a
Terminated Partner neither DMR nor SAMR shall engage in any
Competitive Activity that has attained that status prior to
such Partner becoming a Terminated Partner. Any Shareholder
or Affiliate of DMR or SAM also shall not engage in any
- 16 -
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Competitive Activity that has attained that status prior to
such Shareholder or Affiliate terminating its relationship
with the applicable corporation for a period of two (2) years
from the earlier of {1) the termination of such relationship
or (2) the applicable corporation's becoming a Terminated
Partner.
9.3.3 For a period of one (1) year after becoming a
Terminated Partner neither MN nor HCA shall engage in any
Competitive Activity that has attained that status prior to
such Partner becoming a Terminated Partner. Any Shareholder
or Affiliate of MN or HCA also shall not engage in any
Competitive Activity that has attained that status prior to
such Shareholder or Affiliate terminating its relationship
with the applicable corporation for a period of one (1) year
from the earlier of (1) the termination of such relationship
or (2) the applicable corporation's becoming a Terminated
Partner.
9.3.4 In the event that MN or HCA shall become a
Terminated Partner, the Partnership shall not operate a
facility including a magnetic resonance imaging device in
Canyon County for a period of one (1) year after such
termination, unless the Partnership already is operating such
facility or has incurred obligations in the aggregate amount
of at least $25,000 for such facility prior to such Partner
becoming a Terminated Partner.
9.3.5 Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.,
Mercy Medical Center, Nampa, Idaho, Hospital Corporation of
America and the Doctor Shareholders join in the execution of
these Articles to effect the purposes of this Article 9.
Section 9.4 Waiver. By a favorable vote of all members
of the Board of Partners, the Partnership can waive its righ~s
under this Article 9 with respect to any particular activity of
any Restricted Party.
ARTICLE 10
DISSOLUTION AND LIOOIDATION
Section 10.1 Dissolution. At a meeting of the Board of
Partners heln in Boise, tdaho, pursuant to due notice, the
Partnership may be dissolved through the affirmative vote of
seven-ninths (7/9) or more of the eligible votes of the Board oF.
Partners.
Section 10.2 Pending Matters. In the event of the
dissolution of the Partnership, no further transactions or
services shall be entered into, performed or ·rendered in the
Partnership name and no further business shall be transacte~ for
the Partnership, excepting such as is necessary for winding up
- 17 020007
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the affairs of the Partnership, liquidation of assets and
distribution of the proceeds of the liquidation. Maintenance of
offices to facilitate winding up the Partnership affairs shall
not be construed to involve a continuation of the Partnership.
Section 10.3 Liquidation of Assets. Promptly following
the effective date of dissolution of the Partnership, the Board
of Partners sh~ll be empowered to liquidate and wind up the
affairs and all business transactions of the Partnership.
Section 10.4 Distribution of Proceeds. Following
liquidation of the assets of the Partnership and after payment of
expenses incurred in connection with such liquidation, the
proceeds remaining shall be applied in the following order:
10.4.1 Tb the payment of the debts and liabilities of
the Partnership owing to the cre~itors other than Partners of
the Partnership;
10.4.2 To the payment of debts and liabilities owing to
Partners ot-her than for ( i) capital or, ( i i) share of net
profits;
10.4.3 To the repayment to each Partner of the credit
balance in its capital account in the Partnership,

10.4.4 Any funds, proceeds or assets thereafter
remaining shall be distributed to the Partners in the same
proportion as the Capital Ratio of each Partner;
10.4.5 If the assets and proceeds of the liquidation
are insufficient to pay all of the items referred to in
Sections 10.4.1 and 10.4.2, exclusive of those identified in
(i) and (ii) in Section 10.4.2, tl-len an assessment shall be
levied against the Partners to cover net losses of the
Partnership, each Partner to be assessed in the same
proportion as the Capital Ratio of each Partner.
ARTICLE 11
MISCELLANEOUS
Section 11.1 Bank Accounts. The Partnership shall
maintain one or more bank accounts for Partnership purposes.
Funds may be withdrawn from a Partnership account throu9h bank
check or draft executed by any person or persons who have been
designated by the Board of Partners to have that authority.
Section 11.2 Accounting Policy. The accountin9 period
for the Partnership shall 6e the year commencing January l an~
terminating December 31. Financial statements in reasonable
detail shall be prepared monthly by such person as desi9nated by
the Board of Partners, and shall be distributed to all Partners
- 18 020008
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before the fifteenth day of the subsequent month. Annually, the
financial statements of the Partnership shall be audited at the
expense of the Partnership by a firm of independent certified
public accountants selected by the Board of Partners. Copies of
such annual financial statements shall be distributed promptly
upon receipt by the Secretary of the Partnership to all Partners.
All financial statements shall be accurate in all material
respects and shall present fairly the financial position and
results of the operations of the Partnership.
Section 11.3 Other Restrictions. No Partner shall
become a surety, guarantor or accommodation party as a Partner or
in such manner as would impose an obligation thereunder upon the
Partnership or the remaining Partners.
Section 11.4 Notice. Any notice required or permitted
to be delivered hereunder shall be ~eemed received when
personally delivered or when deposited in the United States mail,
postage prepaid, registered or certified with return receipt
requested, or sent by telegram or mailgram, or by recognized
courier delivery (i.e., Federal Express, Airborne, Burlington,
etc.), addressed to the Partners as the case may be, at the
address set forth below, or at such other addresses as a Partner
subsequently designates by written notice given in the manner
provided in this Section. _ Any notice to a member of- the Board of
Partners shall be deemed glven if-notice is given to the Partner
represented by such member.
The addresses for notices to the Partners and their
representatives on the Board of Partners are as follows:
To Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc. and to Doctor Shareholders:
J. Roger Curran, M.D.

423 East Elm
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

David J. Giles, M.D.

999 North Curtis Road
Boise, Idaho 83706

John M. Havlina, Jr., M.D.

999 North Curtis Road
Boise, Idaho 83796

Thomas E. Henson, M.D.

999 North Curtis Road
Boise, Idaho 83706

James M. Prochaska, M.D.

999 North Curtis Road
Boise, Idaho 83706

To Saint Alphonsus Magnetic
Resonance, Inc.:

1055 North Curtis Road
Boise, Idaho 83706

To MedNow, Inc.:

c/o Mercy Medical Center
1512 - 12th Avenue Road
Nampa, Idaho 83651
- 19 020009
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To SCA of Idaho, Inc.:

c/o Caldwell Memorial
Hospital
1717 Arlington
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

Notices delivered personally will be effective upon delivery to
an authorized representative of the Partner at the designated
address; notices sent by mail or courier in accordance with the
aboye will be effective three (3) days following deposit in the
u.s. Mails in accordance with the above; notices sent by telegram
or mailgram will be effective twenty-four (24) hours following
transmission.
ARTICLE 12
AMENDMENT--SEVERABILITY
Section 12.1 Amendments. These Articles of Partnership
may be amended only through written inst~ument executed by all of
the Partners.
Section 12.2 Severability. It is agreed that the
invalidity or unenforceability of any Article, Section, paragraph
or provision of these Articles of Partnership shall not affect
the validity or enforceability of any one or more of the other
Articles, Sections, paragraphs or provisions thereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, these Articles of Partnership have
been executed the day and year herein first above written.
DOCTORS MAGNETIC RESONANCE, INC.

SAINT ALPHONSUS MAGNETIC
RESONANCE, INC.
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MEDNOW, INC.

HCA OF IDAHO, INC.

J

I,
\.•

~~~~~~-;,
Thomas E. Henson, M.D.

SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC.

- 21 020011
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MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, NAMPA,
IDAHO

HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA
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JOINDER OF SPOUSES OF DOCTOR SHAREHOLDERS
The undersigned, being the respective spouses of the
Doctor Shareholders, hereby state that they have read the
foregoing Articles of Partnership of MRI Associates, understand
the provisions thereof and, in consideration of the terms and
provisions of these Articles, hereby agree that their community
property intere.sts, if any, in the Partnership of MRI Associates
shall be boun.d and controlled by the terms of these Articles and
further agree to execute any and all documents necessary to carry
out the terms and provisions of these Articles.
Dated effective this 26th day of April, 1985.

~J\..(. I?. 0 . (. ·t? cc.

t. '--

Anne R. Curran

Randa L. Giles

~CYQ~
Patricia o. Prochaska
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

4

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

5

6

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CVOC 04082190

7

8

Plaintiff,

9

vs.

10

11

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.

12
13

14

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

16

CounterCiaimant,

16

vs.

17
1S
19

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE,
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, AND PlAINTIFFfrHIRD
PARlY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation;
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER,

20

CounterDefendants,

21

22

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

23
24

Third Party Plaintiff,

vs.

25

INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING
26
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LLC, and Idaho limited liability company;
GEM STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; and IMAGING
CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho
limited Uablllty partnership,
Third Party Defendants.

4

5

APPEARANCES

6

7

Plaintiffs:

Jack S. Gjordlng of Gjording & Fauser, PLLC for Plaintiff/
Counterdefendant Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.;
Patrick J. Miller of Givens Pursley, LLP for
Counterdefendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center, Inc.

Defendants:

Thomas A. Banducci, G. Rey Reinhardt IV, and Dan Gordon
of Greener, Banducci, Shoemaker, P.A. for
Defendant/Counterclaimant MRI Associates, LLP

Third-Party Defendants:

Warren E. Jones of Eberte, Bertin, Kading, Turnbow,
McKJveen & Jones Chtd. and Rodney R. Saetrum of
Saetrum Law Offices for Intermountain Medical Imaging,
LLC, Gem State Radiology, LLP, and Imaging Center
Radiologists, LLP

8
9

10

11
12
13
14

15

16

BACKGROUND

17

This

litigation

stems from

Saint Alphonsus

Diversified

Care's

(SADC)

18

dissociation from an Idaho limited liability partnership, MRI Associates, l.LP (MRIA).
19

SADC filed an action against MRIA to determine the buyout terms of this dissociation
20
21
22

under Idaho law. In

tum, MRIA filed a counterclaim against SADC. Saint Alphonsus

Regional Medical Center (SARMC) 1 (collectively "Safnt Alphonsus") alleging breach of

23

contract and wrongful dissociation. breach of fiduciary duty, and bi'Etach of the implied

24

covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Both the Plaintiffs Complaint and the

25
26

1

SADC Is an Idaho nonprofit corporation whose sole voting member Is SARMC
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Defendant's Counterclaim sought declaratory relief and damages. The Defendant filed
the First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint on March 7, 2006, addfng

3

fifteen (15) new claims against SARMC and three (3) third parties, Intermountain

4

Medical Imaging, LLC (IMI), Gem State Radiology, LLP (GSR). and Imaging Center

5

Radiologists, LLP (ICR).

6
1
8

Presently, MRIA and Saint Alphonsus have filed cross-motions for partial
summary judgment centering on the issue of whether SADC's dissociation from MRIA
was "'wrongful• under the MRIA Partnership Agreement and Idaho's partnership

9

statutes. Saint Alphonsus has filed two (2) motions to strike relating

to the pending

10

summary judgment motions.

Also, both Saint Alphonsus and the Third-Party

11
12

Defendants {IMI, GSR, and ICR) have filed motions to dismiss claims from MRIA's First

13

Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

14

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. These motions

15

came before the Court for oral argument on Tuesday, June 6, 2006.

16

17
18

19

DISCUSSION

I.

Saint Alphonsus Motions to Strike2
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) requires that all supporting and opposing

affidavits "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be

20

admissible In evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
21
22

23

testify to the matters stated therein,"

Any document evidence offered in support of a

motion must be properly authenticated and attached to such an affidavit. Importantly,

24
25

~hese motions were filed on May 5 and May 30, 2006. The Court signed an order to shorten time on the
second motion on Monday, June 5, 2006.

26
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the facts asserted In an affidavit submitted In support or opposition to a motion for
summary judgment must have a proper evidentiary foundation. See I.R.C.P. 56(e) If

3

the statements in or exhibits to an affidavit would not be admissible, they should not be

4

considered when deciding the motion for summary judgment. Cates v. Alberl$on's Inc.,

5

126 Idaho 1030, 1034, 895 P.2d 1223, 1227 (1995).

6
7
8

Saint Alphonsus

first motion to strike seeks to strike: 1) paragraph 6 of the

Affidavit of Thomas E. Henson, M.D. In Support of MRI Associates' Motion for
Summary Judgment; 2) all portions of MRI Associate's memorandum supporting their

9

motion for partJal summary judgment that refer to "internal· documents of Saint
10

Alphonsus 3; and 3) paragraph 4 and Exhibit C of the Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in

11

12
13

Support of MRI Associates' Motion for summary Judgment (the referenced "Internal"
document). These affidavfts were filed on March 21, 2006.

14

Saint AJphonsus contends that the challenged statements and documents are

15

inadmissible pursuant to the parol evidence rule. This rule holds that where a contract

16

is complete, clear, and unambiguous on its face, "extrinsic evidence of prior or

17

contemporaneous negotiations or conversations Is not admissible to contradict. vary,

18

aJter, add to, or detract from the terms of the contract." Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho

19

139, 141-42. 106 P.3d 465, 467-68 (2005). Saint Alphonsus further contends that
20

even ff admissible under the parol evidence rule, the statements and exhibfts are
21

23

24

25
26

:r Although the memorandum cited to "Exhibit C" of Mr. Reinhardt's affidavit for the ·internal" document,

Exhibit C was actually a copy of the minutes of an SARMC meeting presented at the deposition of Ms.
Sandra Bruce and the document referred to in MRIA's memorandum in support of it.s motion was
inadvertenUy omitted. The document referred to In MRIA's memorandum was later attached as Exhibit A
to the Supplemental Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt In Support of MRI Associates' Motion for SUmmary
Judgment, filed on May 26. 2006. 'These discrepancies were ramedled by Saint AJphonsus' second
motion to strike, which specifically addresses ethlbit A to the supplemental affidavit.
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extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent regarding an unambiguous partnership
agreement, and are therefore Inadmissible. See Lewis v. CEDU Educ. Servs., Inc., 135
Idaho 139,144, 15 P.3d 1147,1152 (2000).

4

At oral argument on these motions. the parties essentially agreed that the Court

5

should strike the challenged affidavits and/or exhibits. The parties both urged the Court

6

to determine the motions for summary judgment on basic principles of contract

7
8

Interpretation, eschewing reference to facts and circumstances beyond the partnership
agreement. Because the Court does find the partnership language unambiguous with

9

regard to SAOC's right to dissociate from MRIA, the Court will not consider the
10

challenged evidence. See id. Therefore, the Court will grant both of Saint Aiphonsus
11
12

13

motions to strike. 4

II.

Motions for Partial Summary Judgment

14

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) states that summary judgment shall be

15

rendered 4'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the

16

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

17

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment may be

18

rendered upon an entire case, or discrete claims or issues. See I.R.C.P. 56{d). To

19

defeat a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party may not simply rely upon
20

mere allegations In the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts In an affidavit
21

22
23

presenting a genuine issue of fact for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Rhodehouse v. stutts. 125
Idaho 208, 211. 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 {1994}.

on a motion tor summary judgment, all

24

25
26

4

In the event the stricken documents or statements are later found relevant to remaining claims, the Court
may consider the proffered evidence on Issues other than those addressed in this motion, so long as a
proper foundation Is demonstrated.
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facts and Inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderaon v.
Hollingsworth} M.D. eta/., 1361daho BOO, 41 P.3d 228 (2001).
The parties' motions for summary judgment overlap to a substantial extent.

3
4

Although each party's motion must be evaluated on its own merits, Intermountain Eye &

5

Laser Centers PLLC v. Miller, 142 Idaho 218, 222, 127 P.3d 121, 125 (2005), where

6

both parties have filed motions for summary judgment on the same evidentiary facts,

7
8

issues, and theories, the parties have effectively stipulated that there Is no issue of
material fact. See Komrel v. Aid Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 549, 716 P.2d 1321 (1986). Here,

9

both motions center on whether SADC's dissociation from MRIA was "wrongful" under
10
11
12

the MRIA Partnership Agreement and Idaho law. MRIA's motion additionally requests
summary judgment to determine the formula for computing the partnership share

13

calculation for SADC because of SADC's disassociation from the partnership. The

14

Court agrees with the parties that these motions present a pure issue of law for the

15

Court.

16

17
18

19

The partnership agreement at Issue was entered into and made effective on April

1, 1985. At that time, Idaho had enacted a version of the Uniform Partnership Act.
Under that Act,

a partner could rightfully leave a partnership and cause dissolution by

express will at any time unless the partnership was for a specific term or undertaking, or

20

otherwise restricted In the partnership agreement. See Idaho Code § 53-331 (repealed
21

22

effective July 1, 2001 }. After passing the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA}, the

.

23

Idaho legislature allowed a period of time for existing partnership agreements to be

24

modffied in light of the changes In the existing law. As of July 1, 2005, the RUPA

25

applied retroactively to govern all Idaho partnerships. Idaho Code § 53-3--1204.

26
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Therefore, the provisions of the RUPA govern the MRIA partnership agreement. even if
2

entered into In 1985.

3

Idaho's version of the RUPA states that, except in enumerated circumstances,

4

"relations among the partners and between the partners and the partnership are

5

governed by the partnership agreement. To the extent the partnership agreement does

6

not otherwise provide, [the RUPA] governs relations among the partners and between

7

the partners and the partnership: Idaho Code § 53.3-103.

8

5

Generally, where an

express provision of the partnership agreement applies to a given situation, the parties

9

are bound to the terms of the partnership agreement. If there is no provision of the
10

partnership agreement that applies to a given situation, the RUPA provisions act as
11
12

default rules, filling in the gaps left by the lack of agreed upon provisions,

13

A.

14

Atthough a partner always has the power to withdraw. a partner's dissociation will

15

be deemed wrongful If: 1) the dissociation breaches an express term of the partnership

16

agreement: 2) the partnership was to last for a specific, Identified term and a partner

17

dissociated before the end of the term: or 3) the partnership was for a particular

18
19

SADC's Dissociation from MRIA

undertaking, and ·a partner dissociated before the end of the undertaking. Idaho Code

§§ 53-3-103(b) (6), -602. Thus. THE RUPA acknowledges the parties' rights to restrict,

20

enlarge, or entirely eliminate the circumstances upon which a partner may rightfully
21

22

23

dissociate from the partnership. See Idaho Code §§ 53-3-103(a), .602(b) (1). The
primary disagreement here is whether an express tenn of the MRIA partnership

24
25

26

s Although subsection (b) lists certain un-alterable provisions, these exceptions to the general rule are not
applicable to this dispute. Sr~e Idaho Code§ 53-3-103(b).
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agreement restricted SADC's right to dissociate for any reason.
MRIA is an Idaho limited liability partnership that currently has fJVe (5) corporate

3

partners: Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc., SADC, MedNow, Inc.; West Valley

4

Medical Center; and Holy Rosary Medical Center. SADC was included as one of the

s

"Hospital Partners" of MRIA under the MRJA Partnership Agreement. The only section

6

of that partnership agreement discussing dissociation provides:

7
8

9

10
11

12
13
14

ARTICLES

WITHDRAWAL OF A HOSPITAL PARTNER
6.1
Conditions for Withdrawal. Any Hospital Partner may
withdraw from the Partnership at any time if, in a Hospital Partner's
reasonable judgment, continued participation in this partnership: (i)
jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of such Hospital Partner or its parent or
its subsidiaries; or (ii) jeopardizes Medicare/Medicaid or insurance
reimbursements or participations; (Ill) if the business activities of the
Partnership are contrary to the ethical principles of the Roman Catholic
Church as designated from time to time; or (iv) is or may be In violation of
an local, state or federal laws, rules or regulations ....
Affidavit of Thomas E. Henson, M.D. in Support MRI Associates' Motion for Summary

15

Judgment (nHenson Aff...), Exhibit A. The above section Is the only provision of the
16
17

MRIA Partnership Agreement discussing withdrawal of a Hospital Partner. Neither

18

party disputes the fact that SADC did not dissociate or intend to dissociate from MRIA

19

under any of the four (4) listed provisions In section 6.1 of the MRIA Partnership

20

Agreement. The first question for the Court ls whether the only reason a Hospital

21

Partner could rightfUlly withdraw is for one of the circumstances listed in paragraph 6.1.

22
23

24

MRIA asserts that the use of "if' in section 6.1 before the list of circumstances
limits a Hospital Partner's ability to dissociate under the MRIA Partnership Agreement.
Because SADC admittedly did not withdraw due to the presence of one or more of the

25

stated circumstances, MRIA contends SADC's dissociation was ''wrongful." As MRIA
26
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correctly points out the specified circumstances set forth in this paragraph are of great
significance to the hospital partners. These enumerated circumstances could each

3

cause significant ramifications to the hospital partners from the standpoint of economic,

4

legal and religious support.

5

On the other hand. Saint Alphonsus contends that while SADC could dissociate
under those four (4) provisions, these were not an exclusive list of circumstances upon

7
8

which a Hospital Partner could rightfully withdraw from MRIA. Thus, Saint Alphonsus
claims that their dissociation was not in violation of an express provisions of the

9

partnership agreement and therefore not wrongful under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602(b).
10

Contract language Is ambiguous if the language is "reasonably subject to
11
12

conflicting interpretations." Maroun v.

Wyreles~

Systems. Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 114

13

P.3d 974, 984 (2005) (quoting Terteling v. Payne, 131 Idaho 389, 392. 957 P.2d 1387,

14

1390 (1998)). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that when opposing parties submit

1:s

"equally plausible readlng[st of a contract provision, the provision is. by definition,

16

ambiguous. Intermountain Eye, 142 Idaho at 223, 127 P.3d at 126. If the withdrawal

17

provision Is found to be ambiguous, the interpretation of that provision presents a

18

question of fact that precludes summary judgment ld. In this case, however. the Court

19

finds that the contract provision at Issue is not ambiguous because the language in
20

question is not reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations or two (2) "equally
21

22

plausible" readings.

23

The Court agrees with MRIA's interpretation of section 6.1. The critical phrase

24

reads: "Any Hospital Partner may withdraw from the Partnership at any time ff...." The

25

use of n;r at the end of that clause is expJ/cJtly conditional and clearly Indicates that the

26
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1
2
3

I

Hospital partners oan withdraw rightfully for the four (4) reasons listed. Saint Alphonsus

l

argues that. In order to read the Jist in section

eJ1 as exclusive, the Court would have to
I

Imply "only" before the word "if." Saint Alphohsus
concludes that because "only" is
I
I

I

4

implied and the language is not expressly :restrictive, SADC was not limited to
I

5

I

withdrawing for one ( 1) of those tour (4) reasons~

i

6

When reading contract tenns, the Cot must apply the ordinary and plain

7

meaning to the words used. The word 11ir Is corpmonly defined as "a: in the event that,

a

b: allowing that,

I

c: on the assumption that, d: on condition that.• See http://www.m-

9

w.com/dictlonaryfrf. Substituting one of these 9eflnHions Into the contract language,
10
11

section 6.1 allows the Hospital Partners

to

wit~draw
on the condition that one of the
I
1

13

listed events occurs. In the reverse, if one oft the four reasons is not present, the
!
Hospital Partners may not withdraw from the pa,;tnershlp rightfully. In the Court's view,

14

the use of "only" before "Jf' would be redundant ln this context. The title of the section,

15

"Conditions for Withdrawal" lends further suppJrt

12

16

expressly conditional language. 6

I
i

6.1 was not intended to restrict the Hospital Partners' ability to withdraw at any time.
1

19
20

the Courfs finding that "If' was

II
Saint Alphonsus also argues that the use ~f the word 11 may" indicates that section

17
18

to

I

1

The Court disagrees. The use of the word "may"1I does not contradict the restrictive "If."

I

As MRIA points out, the use of the permissive "may" merely entitles the Hospital

I

21

Partners to dissociate for the four (4) reasons in $ection 6.1, but does not require those
i

I

23

24
~

I

6

26

While the court recognizes that the title of section 6.1 does! not itself decide the Issue, It Is within the four
comers of the contract and is Instructive as to the Interpretation of the terms following lt.
I

I
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partners to dissociate upon the happening of the listed events,

7

Thus, the Court cannot

find that the word "may" In any way changes the Interpretation of the subsequent "if" as
used In section 6.1.

4

Saint Alphonsus urges the Court took look at the legal backdrop at the time the

5

partnership was entered Into. As Saint Alphonsus points out, the terms "'withdrawal"

6

and "dissociate" were not used in the UPA; rather, a partner's expression of intent to

7

leave the partnership triggered dissolution of the partnership.

a
9

Saint Alphonsus

concludes that, in the context of the UPA, section 6.1 is more properly read as an
additional grant of rights, not a restriction on the partners' ability to "withdraw'" because

10

the UPA didn't recognize a right of -withdrawal• without dissolving the partnership,
11

The Court will find that this argument Is without merit First, assuming for the

12

13

purposes of this argument that this section was an addition of rights under the UPA,

14

section 6.1 is clearly restrictive viewed In the context of the RUPA, which applies

1S

retroactively to all Idaho partnership agreements. Idaho Code § 53·3-1204. Second,

16

even viewed In the context of the UPA, this section did not grant any rights to the

17

Hospital Partners that were not already available under the UPA. Under the UPA (like

18

19
20

the RUPA), the Hospital Partners had the power to leave the partnership at any time,
but the partnership agreement could ·still limit the partners' ability to leave and dissolve

the partnership rightfulfy. 6 The RUPA merely changed the rights of the partnership

21
22

23
24

25
26

7

The Court witl also note that a partnership agreement cannot, a$ a matter of Jaw, restrict a partn..,r's

power to dissociate from a partnership. Idaho COde§ 53-3--103(b)(6). Thus, the partnership agreement
could not uie th'e alternative "can· in place of "may" in section 6.1 because the agreament could not
restrict that the Hospital Partners ability to dissociate for one of the four (4) reasons listed In section 6.1.
1
Even If the UPA didn't use the term "withdrawal" or recognize *dissociation" as the RUPA does. the
various partner'$ still had the ability to leave the partnership and the UPA still allowed the partnership
agreement to determine Whether when such a departure was wrongful. Therefore, the Hospital Partners

did not gain any rights by the Inclusion of section 6.1 that they did not already have under the UPA.
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3

section 6.1 clearly acts as a restriction on the way the Hospital Partners could rightfully

4

extricate themselves from the partnership.

5

The Court recognizes that one of the fundamental policies underiying partnership

6

law alms to allow partners to free themselves from business arrangements that they

7

oome to find Intolerable without exposing themselves to JiabJJity. Prudential Ins. Co. of

8

9

Am. v. Hilton Hotels Corp •• 1996 WL 340002 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), Given this policy, courts

regularly require restrictions on a partner's ability to rightfully withdraw to be explicit and

10

unequivocal.
11

12

/d.; Cooper v. Isaacs, 448 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

Partnership law also generally supports the partners' ability to vary statutory

13

construction and formulate contract that accurately reflects the intent of the parties.

14

See Idaho Code § 53-3-1 03(a). Thus, restrictions In a partnership agreement on a

15

partner's ability to withdraw from a partnership are regularly upheld when clearly

16

expressed. See Prudential. at *4: see a/so Cooper, 448 F .2d 1202.

17
18

In this case. the Court finde that such a restriction was clearly and unequivocally
expressed. Section 6.1 of the MRIA partnership agreement allowed SADC to rightfully

19

withdraw from the partnership upon the occurrence of one (1) of four (4) llsted events.
20
Saint AJphonsus has repeatedly conceded that they did not dissociate from MRIA due
21

22

to any of the four (4) enumerated circumstances In section 6.1 and has not introduced

23
9

24
25

PoE, Saint Alphonsus describes, the RUPA Introduced a philosophical shift frOm the UPA's "aggregate•
theory, where the partnership is viewed as a group of indMduals, to the "entity" theory, where the
partnership maintains Its own identity separate from its various partners and therefore continues on as a
business even as partners withdraw.

26
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any evidence to the contrary. Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRI
2
3

4

s

Associate' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibits A & B. Therefore, the Court will find
that SADC's dissociation from MRIA was wrongful as a matter of law.

B.

Buy-Out Calculation

MRIA also seeks summary judgment on the appropriate buyout calculation.

6

MRIA contends that, regardless of whether SADC's dissociation was wrongful, any

7

payment owed to SADC upon dissociation should be determined based upon the

8

formula in section 6.2 of the MRIA Partnership Agreement. A partnership agreement

9

may also spell out the manner in which a partner's share Is to be determined upon
10

withdrawal from the partnership. Idaho Code § 53-3-103. If an applicable buy-out
11

12

13

provision is not set out In a partnership agreement. Idaho Code § 53-3-701 provides the
appropriate method to calculate the amount due to the dissociating partner.

14

After the language restricting the Hospital Partners' right to wttndraw, but under

15

the same section number and heading (•6.1 Conditions for Withdrawal''). the

16

partnership agreement states:

17

19

"Unless otherwise agreed. the withdrawing Hospital Partner shall
only be entitled to receive for its interest Jn the Partnership an amount which
is equal to the balance in such Hospital Partner's capital account at the time
of withdrawal." Henson Aff., Exhibit A.

20

Next, section 6.2 sets out the timing for making the aforementioned payment,

21

stating that amount owing Is to be paid 'Without Interest, in installments equal to, and

22

due at the same time as, distributions of the Net Cash Flow which the Hospital Partner

18

23
24

would have received had ft remained a Partner In the Partnership. n let.

MRIA malntaine that the terms of the withdrawing partner's buy-out are

25

determined by sections 6.1 and 6.2 of the MRIA partnership agreement. regardless of
26
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whether the withdrawal was made for one of the enumerated reasons in the first

2

paragraph of paragraph 6.1. Saint Alphonsus argues that the formula in paragraph 6.2

3

only applies where the Hospital Partner opts to withdraw under one of the

4

circumstances listed in section 6.1. Because SADC did not dissociate from MRIA due

5

to one of the four (4) enumerated circumstances, Saint Alphonsus concludes that 6.2

6

does not apply. Rather, Saint Alphonsus argues that their share should be detennlnecl

7

under the default provisions of the RUPA. specifically Idaho Code § 53~3-701.

8

When interpreting specific terms in a contract. "the contract must be viewed as a

9

whole and in its entirety." Sea Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc. v. Clear Springs Foods, Inc.,
10

141 Idaho 117. 120, 106 P.3d 443,446 (2005). Thus, a specific provision in a contract
11

12

may not be viewed In isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the surrounding

13

tenns and the entire framework of the contract as a whole. If these buy-out provisions

14

are read in Isolation, they appear to apply to any withdrawing Hospital Partner,

15

regardless of whether the withdrawal was rightful or wrongful. However, reading the

16

buy-out provisions in 6.1 and 6.2 in the larger context of the partnership agreement, the

17

Court finds the aforementioned language ambiguous.

18

On one hand, the paragraph discussing the withdrawing partner's share is

19

included under the heading "Conditions for Withdrawaj" and follows a list of reasons for
20

a Hospital Partner's rightfUl withdrawal. This could indicate that the buy-out provision at
21
22

the end of section 6.1 applies only when a partner withdraws for one of those four (4)

23

reasons. However, the paragraph in section 6.1 and section 6.2 are the only provisions

24

in the partnership agreement defining the terms for compensating a withdrawing

25

partner. The absence of any language specifically discussing wrongful dissolution

26
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·could either indicate the parties' intent to rely on the default dissolution provisions of the
UPA, and later the payment provisions of the RUPA, or show that the parties Intended
any distribution to a wtthdrawing partner to be handled under sections 6.1 and 6.2.

4

Because either reading of these provisions, In light of the contract as a whole. is

5

equally plausible, this Court must tlnd that terms of the payment owed to SADC are

6

ambiguous as a matter of law. Intermountain Eye, 142 Idaho at 223, 127 P.3d at 126.

7

8

Ambiguities in contract terms are a question of fact for the trier of fact.

Shawver v.

Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354,361, 93 P.3d 685, 692 (2004). Therefore,

9

MRIA's motion for summary judgment regarding the terms of payment to a dissociating
10

Hospital Partner Is denied.
11

12
13

Ill.

Saint Alphonsus I.R.C.P. 12(b) (6) Motion to Dismiss Counts VIII, IV, X and
XI of the MRIA's First Amended Counterclaim and Third..Party Complafnt
The Defendanfs motion to dismiss Is brought pursuant

to

I.R.C.P. 12(b) (6) for

14

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court may only grant a
15

16
17

motion

to dismiss under 12(b) (6) '\vhen it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle [the pfalntiffj to relief."

18

Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 405, 353 P.2d 782, 787 (1960). Wfth few

19

exceptions, Idaho is a notice pleading state. Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33,

20

13 P.3d 857, 869 (2000). Notice pleading only requires that the Plaintiff's complaint

21

contain a simple, concise, and direct statement fairly apprising the Defendant of claims

22

23

and grounds upon which the claims rest. Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc.,
1141daho432, 439, 757 P.2d 696,702 (ct. App, 1988).

24

The only facts a court may consider on a Rule 12(b) (6) motion are those
25

26

appearing In the complaint, supplemented by those facts of which the court may
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properly take judicial notice. See Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796 P.2d 150

(Ct. App. 1990). The nonmoving party, here MRIA, Is entitled to have all inferences

3

from the records and pleadings viewed in his or her favor. See Idaho Schs. for Equal

4

Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P .2d 7.24 (1993). The Court must

5

make every reasonable Intendment to sustain a complaint against an I.R.C.P. 12(b) (6)

6

motion to dismiss. Idaho Comm'n on Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215, 217,

7

606 P.2d 112, 114 {1973).

8

This standard applies equally to antitrust claims given the antitrust cases require

9

no special deference to defendants. Hospital Building Co. v. TRS. of Rex Hosp. Co.
10
11

12

425

u.s.

738.

There is no heightened pleading requirement in antitrust cases.

Towmbly v. Bell At/. Corp., 425 F.3d 99.

13

SARMC and Third Party Defendants have joined in filing a Motion to Dismiss

14

MRIA's Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). MRIA

15

alleges that as a result of SARMC and Third-Party Defendants' illegal attempt to

16

monopolize the relevant market that, competition has been damaged, consumers will

17

18

suffer and MRIA has been damaged spectflcally in an amount to be proven at trlal.1f
116 of the Counterclaim. Jn addition MRIA has alleged that in furtherance of SARMC

19

and the Third Party Defendant's willful attention to acquire and maintain market and

20
21

22

23

ultimately monopoly power, SARMC and Third-Party Defendants have acted in concert

with the intent of suppressing, inhibiting and destroying competition in the relevant
market.

24

SAMRC and Third-Party Defendants assert that what MRIA has asserted is

25

simply a reshuffling of competitors although the vast majority of the allegations set forth

26
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in the Counterclaim and this dispute between competing businesses does not rise to
the level of a monopolistic practice.

3

The Court will flnd that the allegations of MRIA's foreclosure from market forces,

4

referral of consumers to purchase magnetJo imaging seiVIceS from IMI when they would

5

potentially prefer to purchase from some other providers including MRIA, and finally

6

allegations that SARMC's antlcompetitive conduct that has resulted in unspecified

7
8

9

injuries to competition including Increases in price, lower quality and lower output of the
provision of magnetic imaging services, are sufficiently pled to withstand a 12(b)(6)
motion. The Court is satisfied from the MRIA's pleadings that they have sufficiently

10

alleged that MRIA was damaged by SARMC's and Third Party Defendants alleged
11

12

13

anticompetitlve conduct.
The next issue raised by SARMC and Third-Party Defendants is that MRIA does

14

not have standing to pursue this antitrust claim. The focus of the standing argument

16

relates to whether or not MRIA qualifies as an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws.

16

Essentially SAMRC and Third-Party Defendants assert that MRIA's interest In obtaining

17

benefits of an exclusive practice do not coincide with the best interests of patients and

18

that as a result, individuals such as patients. referring physicians or insurers are more

19

efficient enforcers of MRIA's antitrust claims. These contentions by SAMRC and Third20

Party Defendants could be determined after discovery and upon a motion for summary
21
22

2

s

24
2S

judgment.

However, this Court is constrained by the provisions of I.R.C.P 12(b)(6).

This Court cannot adopt a per se rule denying standing to allege exclusionary practices
based on the face of the pleadings.
The next assertion by SARMC and Third-Party Defendants Is that Count VIII, the

26
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exclusive dealing claim. Is deficient as a matter of law. The basis for this assertion is
that Count VIII has failed to allege the existence of an exclusive agreement between

3

Saint Alphonsus and IMI because no such agreement exists. SARMC and Third-Party

4

Defendants focus on the language contained in the Counterclaim and those terms are

5

"urge" and "referral."

6

language illustrates that there Is not an exclusive dealings agreement between Saint

7
8

SARMC and Third-Party Defendants assert that that very

Alphonsus and IMI and therefore MRIA has failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.

9

SARMC and Third-Party Defendants focus that first an exclusive dealing contract
10

Involves a commitment by a buyer to deal only with a particular seller. Western Parcel
11
12

Express v. United Parcel Setvlce of North America, Inc., 190 F.3d 974. To rise to a

13

level warranting antitrust scrutiny, a contract must foreclose competition in a substantial

14

share of the line of commerce affected. Omega Environ., Inc. v. Gllbarco1 Inc., 127

1s

F.3d 1157. SARMC and Third-Party Defendants go on to assert that the agreement

16

between Saint Alphonsus and IMI does not foreclose competition because the

17

agreement does not prevent doctors at Saint Alphonsus from referring patients to MRJ

18

technicians other than IMI.

19

The First Amended Counterclaim asserts that physicians were urging referrals to
20

IMI but not compelling or foreclosing referrals to MRI, thus SARMC and Third..Party
21
22

23

Defendants allege that where a contract has the ability to deal wHh other parties in that
contract, the contract Is not an exclusive dealings contract

24

MRIA correctly points out that courts analyze exclusive dealing agreements

26

under the rule of reason rather than treating such agreements as per se unlawful.

26
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Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal CO., 365 U.S. 320. The traditional framework for
analysis of a rule of reason claim Involves three steps.

First, the plaintiff bears the

3

initial burden of showing that the challenged action has had an actual adverse affect on

4

competition in the relevant product and geographic markets.

5

succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the pro-competitive effects of

6

the restrained on commerce. Thirdly, if the defendant satisfies this shifted burden. the

7
8

Second, if the plaintiff

plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant could have achieved such legitimate
objectives by means of less restrictive alternatives.

9

This Court is again constrained by the parameters of I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) to only
10

examine this case from the face of the pleadings. The Court Is satisfied that MRIA has
11
12

proper1y pleaded the existence of an exclusive dealing agreement. As the Court noted

13

above, through discovery and motions for summary judgment, this issue may be

14

resolved depending upon what facts are discovered as to the allegation of "an exclusive

15

dealing agreement.• If through the enlightenment of discovery SARMC and Third-Party

16

Defendants establish that doctors were potentially urged to refer patients to IMI and that

17

there was still an abJJity by those physicians to deal with other parties, then obviously

18
19

the contract is not an exdusive dealings contract and this claim for relief may be
dismissed as a matter of law.

20

SARMC and Third-Party Defendants argue that Count IX of the First Amended
21

22
23

Counterclaim fails to state a claim for relief on the allegation of attempted
monopolization on the part of Saint Alphonsus, IMI and Gem State Radiology.

24

SARMC and Third-Party Defendants argue that the federal antitrust provisions

25

set forth in Section II of the Sherman Act. is contrary to the Section I focus on illegal

26

MEMORANDUM DECISION· CASE

NO. CVOC040B219D ·PAGE 19

07/24/2008 MON 11:41

[TX/RX NO 8033]
Iii 019
000860

..

~7/24/2006

1
2

10:54 FAX 2082877529

DISTRICT COURT

[aJ 020/024

contracts, combination or conspiracies and is generally directed at a single firm
conduct,

SARMC and Third-Party Defendants go on to set forth that an attempted

3

monopolization claim requires pmof of the following elements: (1) that the Defendant

4

has engaged In predatory or anti-competitive conduct with; (2) a specific Intent to

s

monopolize; and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.

6

7
8

In summary, SARMC and Third-Party Defendants assert the attempted
monopolization claim by MRIA fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cognizable claim
for relief. SARMC and Third-Party Defendants set forth the reason that there is not a

9

cognizable claim for relief is because It Is unclear what specific entity MRJA alleges has
10

committed the offense of attempted monopolization. Secondly, they assert that MRIA
11

12

13
14

has not alleged facts demonstrating that Saint Alphonsus engaged In a conduct which
can fairly be characterized as predatory or exclusionary, such that It might support an
attempted monopolization claim.

15

MRIA asserts ln their Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint they

16

have set forth with sufficient specificity, conduct which can be characterized as

17

predatory or exclusionary.

18

19

The Court concurs with MRIA that these arguments look past MRIA"s
Cot.mterclaim and Third-Party Complaint and border on a motion for summary

20

judgment. For this Court to dismiss the claim pursuant to 12(b)(6) would require the
21
22
23

Court to look beyond the face of the pleadings and consider extrinsic evidence that has

not been presented to the Court in the form of a summary judgment proceeding.

24

Therefore the Court will deny the 12(b)(6) relief requested by SARMC and Third-Party

25

Defendants.

26
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SARMC and Third-Party Defendants assert that Count XII, the claim for relief
focusing on "the essential facility", should be dismissed.

SARMC and Third-Party

3

Defendants assert that as a matter of law, any cause of action based upon the

4

essential facilities doctrine must allege that Saint Alphonsus possesses monopoly

5

power. From the facts alleged in the Counterclaim MRIA is asserting this is an actual

6

monopolization case and not an attempted monopolization issue.

7

8

MRIA alleges that IMI, through their relationship with Saint Alphonsus, holds
45% of the alleged relevant market for outpatient TCMRI services. This allegation Is set

9

forth in ' 60 of the First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint.

The

10
11
12

Counterclaimant!Third-Party Plaintiff goes on to assert at

secure monopoly power for more than 50% market share

14

TCMRJ market."

in the relevant Boise-Meridian

MRIA asserts tl)at this is not a proper motion to dismiss, that these arguments

can

16

are fact dependant, and

17

to conduct the necessary discovery.

18

63 that "there is a

substantial likelihood that IMI with the assistance of SARMC, SARG/GSR and ICR will

13

15

'tf

only be resolved after the parties have had an opportunity

The Court, In reviewing the case authority regarding this judicial doctrine of

19

essential facilities, will find that based upon Rebel Oil Company, Inc. v. Atlantic
20

Richfield, 51 F.3d 1428, that on the face of the pleadings. Counterclalmant/Third-Party
21

22

Plaintiff has not demonstrated the threshold percentage amount required to sustain a

23

claim for actual monopolization in Count XII of their claim for relief. The Ninth Circuit

24

has addressed this Issue and held that in actual monopolization cases that a market

25

share of less than 50% is presumptively Insufficient to establish such a claim for relief.

26
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The 45o/o of market share set forth in MRIA's Counterclaim is insufficient as a matter of
law to establish that IMI is a monopolist and therefore insufficient to sustain the
allegation of liability under the essential facilities doctrine.

4

The Court then will dismiss the Count XII claim for relief wrthout prejudice. The

5

Court in so ruling need not address whether or not the PACS/RIS System meets the

6

criteria of an essential facility.

7
8

The Court concurs with the MRIA that these are issues

of fact outside the scope of the pleadings and are not appropriate for a 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss.

9

The Court will further note that with the remaining counts in the antitrust
10
11
12

allegations, that the Court has not dismissed, MRIA Is still in a position to discover
Information that may in fact demonstrate a greater percentage than alleged In the First

13

Amended Counterclaim thus allowing them the opportunrty to potentially amend the

14

Counterclaim to assert a higher percentage if the facts so demonstrate.

15
16

17

18

CONCLUSION
The Court will GRANT MRIA's motion for summary judgment and find that
termination of the Partnership Agreement was wrongful. The Court will decline to grant
MRIA's Motion for Summary Judgment as to that portion of

1J 6.1

of the Partnership

19

Agreement that pertains to damages and will find that this paragraph Is ambiguous.
20
21
22

23

The Court will decline to grant the 12(b)(6) motions filed by SARMC and Third Party
Defendant wrth the exception of the Count XII claim for relief and the Court will dismiss
that claim without prejudice.

24

25
26
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The Court will set a Telephonic Status Conference for August 21, 2006 at 3;45
p.m. to address the issue of the current trial date as requested by the parties.

DATED this~ day of July 2006.

4

5
6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13

14
15

16

17
16
19
20

21
22
23

24

25
26
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2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
J. D

3

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADABy_..;;;,~~~~~

COP

4

5
6

7
8
9

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, Case No. CVOC-0408219
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
ONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
UDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

10

Defendant.
12
13

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
·

14

CounterCiaimant •.

15

vs.

16
17

18
19

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation;
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER,
·CounterDefendants,

20
21
22

APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff: Jack S. Gjording of Gjording & Fouser and Patrick Miller of Givens
Pursley, LLP for Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.

23
24

For Defendant: Thomas Banducci of Greener Banducci Shoemaker P.A. for MRI
Associates, LLP

25

PROCEEDINGS

26
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This litigation stems from Saint A!phonsus Diversfied Care's (SADC) dissociation
2

3

from an Idaho limited liability partnership, MRI Associates, LLP {MRIA.) SADC filed an
action against MRIA to determine the buyout terms of this dissociation under Idaho law.

4

In turn, MRIA filed a counterclaim against SADC, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
5

Center {SARMC) (collectively "Saint Alphonsus") alleging breach of contract and
6
7
8

wrongful dissociation, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.

9

This matter came before the court for a jury trial on the issue of damages

10

asserted by MRIA and before the Court on the issue of the value of SADC's partnership

11

share based upon their dissociation. Prior to trial, the Court decided in a Memorandum

12

Decision issued July 24, 2006 that SADC dissociation in 2004 was wrongful. In that

13

decision, the Court also held that the contractual language regarding the appropriate

14

buyout calculation was ambiguous and to be decided as a matter of law. During the
15

trial, the Court determined that the issue of SADC partnership share was an issue
16
17

18

19

based in equity and more appropriately within the purview of a trial court judge. The
jury ultimately returned a verdict on MAlA's counterclaims in the amount of $63,500,000
and ruled against SADC on their affirmative defenses.
Being fully advised of the facts and the law, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil

20
21

Procedure 52(a), the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

22

Law:

23
24

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

SADC and other partners entered into the Articles of Partnership of MRI

25

Associates (the "Partnership Agreemenf') dated effective April 26, 1985, creating the
26
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M RIA partnership.
2

2.

Article 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement provides that a Hospital Partner

3

(SADC and others) may withdraw at any time if continued participation in the

4

partnership:

5
6

7
8
9

"(i) jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of such Hospital Partner or its parent or
their subsidiaries; or (ii) jeopardizes medicare/medicaid or insurance
reimbursements or participations; (iii) if the business activities of the Partnership
are contrary to the ethical principles of the Roman Catholic Church as
designated from time to time; or (iv) is or may be in violation of any local, state or
federal laws, rules or regulations."

3.

Article 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement further provides that the

10

withdrawing partner "shall only be entitled to receive for its interest in the Partnership an
11

amount which is equal to the balance in such Hospital Partner's capital account at the
12

13
14

time of withdrawal.

4.

II

Article 6.2 of the Partnership Agreement provides that the partnership

15

shall pay a withdrawing partner the amount due under Article 6.1 "in installments equal

16

to, and due at the same time as, distributions of the Net Cash Flow which the Hospital

17

Partner would have received had it remained a Partner in the Partnership."

18

19

5.

SADC did not withdraw under any of the four (4) circumstances outlined in

Article 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement, but rather withdrew from the partnership

20

under Idaho Code section 53-3-601.
21

6.

SADC made a timely demand to MAlA to purchase SADC's partnership

22

23
24

interest when SADC notified MAlA of its dissociation, and thereafter filed this lawsuit.
7.

Manfred Steiner of Wellspring Valuation Ltd. Testified at trial that he used

25

standard valuation procedures approved by the Internal Revenue Service, specifically

26

IRS Revenue Ruling 59-60, for valuing closely-held corporations. Mr. Steiner testified
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1

2

that the value of SADC's partnership interest in MRIA, pursuant to Idaho Code section
53-3-701, was between $3,600,000 and $4,600,000. Using Mr. Steiner's methodology,

3

the Court finds that SADC's partnership interest under Idaho Code section 53-3-701 (b)

4

is $4,600,000.

5

8.

Dr. James Prochaska, chairman of the MRIA Board of Partners and a

6

signatory to the Partnership Agreement, testified as to his understanding of the

7

meaning of Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the Partnership Agreement and as to the amount of

8

SADC's capital account at the time of its withdrawal.

9

9.

Additionally, the Court heard testimony from multiple witnesses regarding

10

the overall purposes, risks, and concerns that existed at the time the Partnership
11
12

Agreement was entered into, and the business purpose of the partnership agreement.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

13
14

The Partnership Agreement sets forth in Articles 6.1 and 6.2 a calculation of the

15

amount due to a dissociating partner. MRIA contends this is the correct calculation

16

regardless of the circumstances of SADC's dissociation. SADC asserts that these

17

provisions are inapplicable and that Idaho Code section 53-3-701 provides for the

18

correct buyout calculation.

19

At the time the Court issued the Memorandum Decision on July 24, 2006, the
20

Court was not able to determine which method of calculating the buyout amount owed
21

22
23

to SADC was correct. Dr. Prochaska testified at trial that his understanding of the
Partnership Agreement was that a partner would leave with the amount in that partner's

24

capital account and that the only capital account figures that were kept were the same

25

figures reported for tax purposes each year. Also during trial, considerable evidence

26
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was presented regarding the context of the formation of the Partnership Agreement, the
2
3
4

gravity of the risks involved in the partnership's intended business, and the partners'
serious concern over the amount of partnership debt each partner would be liable for.
The Court has further examined the type of circumstances outlined in Article 6.1

s

as permitted reasons for dissociation. Each of these circumstances were subject to

6

changes in law or medical-theological circumstances beyond the control of the Hospital

7

partners that could require that hospital partner to dissociate quickly in order to avoid

8

substantial financial harm to the entire hospital organization based upon this

9

partnership agreement. Because a quick dissociation might have significant financial
10

consequences for the partnership due to the debt associated with this new technology
11
12

at the time of formation of the partnership, a reduced "buyout" based upon the four (4)

13

enumerated reasons for dissociation would allow MRIA to continue without the hospital

14

partner's participation and significant debt load issues for the partnership. The delay in

15

payment set forth for payment in Article 6.2 is consistent with the intent of Article 6.1 as

16

outlined above and further demonstrates that all of these provisions were based upon

17

the four enumerated reasons for withdrawal as outlined in Article 6.1.

18
19

While the Court has no reason to doubt the credibility of Dr. Prochaska's
testimony as to his understanding of the amount of money in SADC's capital account,

20

the Court does not find Dr. Prochaska's testimony to be well founded as to the parties'
21
22
23

intent as to Section 6.1 and 6.2 of the Partnership Agreement. Dr. Prochaska's
testimony cannot hold more weight and counter the totality of the evidence regarding

24

the Partnership Agreement that was produced at trial. Very little foundation was laid as

2s

to the basis of Dr. Prochaska's testimony on this point and from what source his

26
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understanding of the Partnership Agreement as to this specific issue is based upon.
2

The Court finds that considering the other evidence presented at trial along in

3

conjunction with the language of the Partnership Agreement itself, the applicability of

4

the buyout calculation in Article 6.1 is limited to those enumerated four (4) reasons for

5

dissociation, which did not occur in this case.

6
7

8

For these reasons, and taking into account the entirety of evidence presented at
trial, this Court concludes that the buyout calculation provision contained in Article 6.1
and the payment timing provision contained in Article 6.2 were only applicable if the

9

partner withdrew under the circumstances outlined in Article 6.1. Thus, there being no
10

general buyout calculation for other partnership withdrawals, the default provision
11
12
13

contained in Idaho Code section 53-3-701 controls.
The Court finds that Mr. Steiner is well qualified, reliable, and that his testimony

14

regarding valuation was an accurate measurement of the partnership interest that

15

SADC is entitled to receive upon its withdrawal as of April2004. This amount,

16

$4,600,000, will be applied to offset the jury verdict in favor of MRIA on its counterclaim

17

in the amount of $63,500,000. Accordingly, the judgment for MRIA will be offset and

18

reduced to $58,900,000.

19

JUDGMENT
20

The Court finds that upon withdrawal, MRIA owed SADC for their interest in the
21
22

partnership as of April2004, which was $4,600,000 pursuant to Idaho Code section 53-

23

3-701. The Court will award Saint Alphonsus their share of the partnership in this

24

amount and offset this award against the judgment against Saint Alphonsus on MAlA's

2s

counterclaim. Pursuant to IRCP Rule 52 the Court hereby awards Judgment in favor of

26
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MRIA and against SADC and SARMC in the amount of $58,900,000.
2

3

DATED this 21 day of September, 2007.

4

5
6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22

23
24

25
26
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3
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4

5

s JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
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9
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12

13
14

15
16
11
18
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S UNPLED
"BREACH OF CONTRACT"
THEORY OF WRONGFUL
DISSOCIATION

Defendant.

ORIGINAL
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S
1
UNPLED "BREACH OF CONTRACT" THEORY OF WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION- 000875

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
As set forth in Saint Alphonsus' s opening brief, multiple rulings of this Court and the
Supreme Court have established that Saint Alphonsus "rightfully" dissociated from the MRIA
partnership, thus foreclosing any contention that Saint Alphonsus breached any contractual or
fiduciary duties to MRIA through the act of leaving the partnership on April!, 2004.
Desperately clinging to the very same erroneous legal theory that necessitated reversal of the first
trial, MRIA trots out yet another version of its now-discredited claim that Saint Alphonsus' s
dissociation was wrongful. 1 MRIA's attempt to reargue issues that it lost in the Supreme Court
should be rejected, and the Court should make clear once and for all that Saint Alphonsus's
lawful dissociation is neither a breach of the contract nor otherwise a basis for liability or
damages in this case.

1

Though MRIA's opposition brief asserts without basis that Saint Alphonsus is engaging
in duplicative motion practice, it is actually MRIA' s repeated attempts to reassert its claim of
wrongful dissociation that constitute multiple "bites at the apple." Opp. at 14 n.5.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S
UNPLED "BREACH OF CONTRACT" THEORY OF WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION-000876
2

ARGUMENT
I.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RIGHTFUL DISSOCIATION CANNOT BE A BASIS
FOR "BREACH OF CONTRACT" OR OTHER THEORIES OF LIABILITY
A.

Saint Alphonsus's Dissociation Was Affirmatively Authorized By The
Provisions Of RUP A, And Thus Cannot Be A Basis Of Liability

MRIA' s opposition raises yet another version of MRIA' s "breach of contract" theory that
by dissociating, Saint Alphonsus breached Section 6.1 of the partnership agreement, which,
according to MRIA, "limited the right to withdraw." Opp'n at 5-6. But, however Section 6.1
might have been construed in 1985, that construction has been rendered irrelevant by the
intervening rulings of the Supreme Court and this Court that Saint Alphonsus withdrew properly
pursuant to a new statutory right made effective as to all partnerships on July 1, 2001.
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act created the "power to dissociate" as an "entirely
new concept," providing that "[a] partner has the power to dissociate at any time, rightfully or
wrongfully," by giving "notice of[his] express will to withdraw." Idaho Code§ 53-3-601(1) &
official cmt. 1, § 53-3-602(a); see also Opening Memorandum ("Mem.") at 5-7. A dissociation
or withdrawal is, under RUPA, "wrongful only if' one ofthree conditions is met. Idaho Code
§ 53-3-602 (b) (emphasis added). The condition relevant here is that it must breach an express
provision ofthe contract. !d. § 53-3-602(b)(1). The Supreme Court has held that the provision
on which MRIA relies-Section 6.1-is not such an "express" provision. Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,487,224 P.3d 1068, 1076 (2009)
("SADC'). Because Saint Alphonsus thus did not dissociate "wrongfully," according to the

terms of the statute, its dissociation was necessarily done "rightfully." Idaho Code § 53-3-602(a).

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S
000877
UNPLED "BREACH OF CONTRACT" THEORY OF WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION- 3

This point is dispositive. A statutorily "rightful" dissociation cannot be a breach of
contract. MRIA does not dispute that, in Idaho, "[ e]xisting law becomes part of a contract, just
as though the contract contains an express provision to that effect, unless a contrary intent is
disclosed." Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, 137 Idaho 663,666,52 P.3d 307,310 (2002).
Here, RUP A explicitly created a new power to dissociate by express will, and applied that law
retroactively to existing partnership agreements. See Mem. at 7. The MRIA partnership
agreement must, therefore, be construed to include the new RUP A right. See Robinson v. Joint
Sch. Dist. No. 150, 100 Idaho 263,265-66,596 P.2d 436,438-39 (1979) (holding that contract

had to be construed to include statutory rights). Even if it were true that Section 6.1 set forth
certain "limited" conditions for withdrawal when written, those limitations, as the Supreme
Court held, were not "express" and thus were countermanded by the clear language of RUP A
defining the only ways that a dissociation can be wrongful. Saint Alphonsus's notice of
withdrawal explicitly relied upon RUPA's statutory right of dissociation (Trial Ex. 4329)-a
right that bound the parties as though it were set forth in the contract itself. See Primary Health,
13 7 Idaho at 666, 52 P .3d at 310 (2002)_2 It is thus the exercise of the RUP A right to
withdraw-not any such right based on Section 6.1-that is relevant, and its exercise has already

2

MRIA's claim in a footnote that "SARMC did not believe it could withdraw without
incurring liability" (Opp'n at 6 n.3) is both irrelevant and entirely incorrect. Sandra Bruce
testified unequivocally that she believed at the time of withdrawal that Saint Alphonsus had a
right to dissociate pursuant to RUP A. Trial Tr. at 1949. And the trial exhibit MRIA cites (Ex.
4138) is dated January 2000, eighteen months before RUPA's effective date. The cited Cindy
Schamp testimony was explicitly "based upon only the language" in that pre-RUPA exhibit.
Trial Tr. at 2295-97. And Sandra Bruce likewise stated that Ex. 4138, and Section 6.1, were
inapplicable in light ofRUPA. !d. at 1828-29, 1949-50.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S
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been held to be not wrongful. That should be the end ofMRIA's newly restated "breach of
contract" theory.
B.

MRIA Cannot Escape The Plain Meaning Of RUPA By Claiming That
Dissociation Violates Implied Contract Provisions Or Other Supposed Duties

Although MRIA expressly represented to the Court that "our position is there ... there
are implied terms in this contract, in the partnership agreement, that were breached when they
withdrew," see Feb. 9, 2011 Hr'g Tr. at 32, MRIA now says that Saint Alphonsus's "belie[f] that
[MRIA's] claim is dependent on an implied term ... is inaccurate." Opp'n at 5. This disclaimer
notwithstanding, MRIA goes on to argue that a partner's dissociation can be rightful and
authorized under RUP A, because there is no express term limiting dissociation, yet still provide a
basis for liability for common-law breach of contract, because it breached an implied term
limiting the right to dissociation. !d. at 7-11. MRIA purports to defend this non-sequitur based
on Idaho Code§ 53-3-104(a), which states that "[u]nless displaced by particular provisions of
this act, the principles of law and equity supplement this act." MRIA's argument fails.
MRIA appears to confuse "principles of law and equity" with the availability of certain
"common law" causes of action. The comment to Idaho Code § 53-4-1 04( a) clearly indicates
that the statute merely provides that "supplemental" principles of law such as "agency,"
"estoppel," the "capacity to contract, fraud, [and] misrepresentation" apply under RUPA. !d.
§ 53-3-104 official cmt. But it does not remotely suggest that this language is intended to
countermand RUPA's express language defining when a partner's dissociation or withdrawal is
"rightful" or "wrongful." !d. § 53-3-602(a), (b). Here, none ofthe statutory grounds for a
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"wrongful" dissociation-including the one that requires an "express" restriction on
withdrawal-are present, and thus Saint Alphonusus's withdrawal was "rightful." Mem. at 4-5.
Since RUP A defines when a party may be held liable for the act of withdrawing from a
partnership, and liability requires an express contractual provision limiting that right, MRIA's
"implied terms" breach-of-contract liability theory is inconsistent with RUPA and should be
rejected.
Likewise, since Saint Alphonsus was affirmatively authorized by RUP A to dissociate,
MRIA may not attempt to end-run that right by claiming that the act of rightful withdrawal
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breached fiduciary duties, or constituted
tortious interference.
First, the Supreme Court has held in the context of the dissociation provisions of an
operating agreement that "contract terms are not overridden by the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing." Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 768, 203 P.3d 694,
698 (2009) (emphasis in original); Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 115 Idaho 298,300-301, 766
P.2d 768, 770-71 (1988). Since the RUPA right is applicable just as if it were expressly set forth
in the MRIA contract, Primary Health, 137 Idaho at 666, 52 P.3d at 310, the exercise ofthe
RUP A right cannot breach any implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Second, MRIA offers no response to the legal authority showing that a rightful
dissociation, by definition, does not breach any fiduciary duties. See Mem. at 10 & n.6 (citing
RUPA and case authorities). The two cases MRIA cites (Opp. at 14) both deal with wrongful
dissociation, and there was no wrongful dissociation here.
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Third, MRIA concedes that it cannot assert tortious interference claims based on the act
of dissociation. Opp. at 12.

C.

MRIA Effectively Concedes That Its "Common Law" Theory Is Not Pled,
And The Court Could Reject It For That Reason Alone

Finally, it is noteworthy that, even after being given leave to amend its counterclaim on
remand, MRIA has never before pled a "common law" theory of wrongful withdrawal, and is
only inventing this theory at the eleventh hour after its statutory wrongful dissociation claim was
rejected by the Supreme Court and then stricken from the Third Amended Counterclaim by this
Court.
Specifically, in its opposition brief, MRIA concedes that "[i]n the initial trial of this
matter, MRIA asserted that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal from [MRIA] was a violation of'
Idaho Code§§ 53-3-601(b)(1) and (2). Opp. at 2. It further notes that its "breach of contract"
theory of wrongful dissociation does not appear in the text of its enumerated causes of action, but
rather are found in the "body" of the Third Amended Counterclaim, which was "incorporated"
by reference into Count One. !d. at 12. But this is plainly wrong, since only Counts One and
Two make any allegations of wrongful withdrawal, and both expressly assert wrongful
dissociation only under Idaho Code§ 53-3-601(b). Thus, even ifMRIA's legal theory were
viable, which it is not, the theory has not been pled, and should be rejected for that reason alone.

See Mem. at 7 n.1.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should grant Saint Alphonsus's motion and hold that Saint Alphonsus's
rightful dissociation, as a matter of law, is neither a breach of the partnership agreement nor
otherwise a basis for liability or damages in this case.

DATED this 11th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., and move this Court for a motion in limine
precluding MRIA from contending or offering evidence at trial that Saint Alphonsus' s mere act
of competing with MRIA after April 1, 2005, gives rise to liability or damages, and excluding
specific liability and damages evidence, described in the Memorandum in Support filed herewith,
which relates to lawful, post-April1, 2005 competition. This motion is supported by the Court's
records and files in this matter and by the aforementioned Memorandum in Support.
Argument on this motion is requested on or before May 18,2011, in accordance with this
Court's February 15, 2011 scheduling order.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRl LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
VS.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

The decision ofthe Supreme Court and this Court's order dated November 17, 2010,
establish as a matter oflaw that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from MRIA effective April I,
2004, was "rightful[]" under Section 602(b) ofldaho's Revised Uniform Partnership Act. MRIA
is thereby foreclosed from arguing that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal from the partnership was a
wrongful act on which liability can be predicated. Beyond that fact, Saint Alphonsus's lawful
dissociation from MRIA also defined the end point of various duties that Saint Alphonsus owed
as a result of being a partner in MRIA.
Specifically, the lawful dissociation terminated Saint Alphonsus's fiduciary duty not to
compete with the partnership and therefore authorized such competition absent some other
identifiable duty foreclosing Saint Alphonsus from competing. One such specific duty was the
non-competition clause found in the MRIA partnership agreement, which prohibited competition
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for one year following termination as a partner. Under this clause, Saint Alphonsus was free to
compete with MRIA as of April 1, 2005, one year after it rightfully withdrew from the MRIA
partnership.
Because Saint Alphonsus's right to compete head-to-head against MRIA after the
expiration ofthe non-compete clause on April 1, 2005, was not constrained by any other duty,
MRIA should be foreclosed at trial from contending or offering evidence that Saint Alphonsus's
mere act of competing with MRIA after April 1, 2005, gives rise to liability or damages.
ARGUMENT
A central allegation of MRIA in this case has been that, by allegedly assisting IMI' s MRI
business, Saint Alphonsus improperly competed with MRIA in violation of various duties not to
do so. However, because Saint Alphonsus rightfully dissociated from the MRIA partnership on
Aprill, 2004, any such duty not to compete ended no later than April1, 2005, the expiration
date of the partnership agreement's one-year non-compete clause. As a result, MRIA should be
precluded from contending or premising liability or damages upon the allegation that Saint
Alphonsus had no right to compete with MRIA after Aprill, 2005.
I.

BECAUSE SAINT ALPHONSUS PROPERLY DISSOCIATED FROM MRIA ON
APRIL 1, 2004, SAINT ALPHONSUS WAS FREE TO COMPETE WITH MRIA
FOR THE PROVISION OF MRI SERVICES FOLLOWING THE EXPIRATION
OF THE NON-COMPETITION CLAUSE ON APRIL 1, 2005

A.

The Non-Competition Clause Expired One Year After the Date of Saint
Alphonsus's Dissociation

Saint Alphonsus's contractual duty not to compete with MRIA terminated one year after
Saint Alphonsus's lawful dissociation from the partnership. Specifically, Section 9.3.3 of the
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MRIA Partnership Agreement, as amended by the July 1998 Fourth Amendment to Articles of
Partnership, provides that "[f]or a period of one (1) year after becoming a Terminated Partner, no
Partner shall engage in any Competitive Activity that has attained that status prior to such partner
becoming a Terminated Partner." Trial Ex. 4050. Because Saint Alphonsus rightfully
dissociated on April 1, 2004, this contractual duty not to compete by its own terms ended on
April 1, 2005, as MRIA has repeatedly conceded. See Trial Ex. 157 at 2-3 (letter from MRIA
expressly "acknowledg[ing] SADC's withdrawal from the Partnership effective April 1, 2004,
and[] treat[ing] SADC as a dissociated partner from and after that date," and stating that the
agreement's non-compete clause would prevent competition "for a period of one ( 1) year
following SADC's withdrawal"); MRIA Trial Br. (filed July 18, 2007) at 8 ("acknowledg[ing]
that MRIA cannot preclude SARMC from competing with MRIA now that SARMC is no longer
a partner and SARMC has fulfilled its [one-year non-compete] obligation under section 9.3.3").
This Court should therefore hold, as a matter of law, that Saint Alphonsus's contractual duty not
to compete with MRIA ended on April1, 2005, and that Saint Alphonsus was free to compete
with MRIA after that date.

B.

Any Restriction on Competition That Might Arise from the Fiduciary Duty
of Loyalty Terminated Upon Saint Alphonsus's Dissociation From the
Partnership

Similarly, to the extent that Saint Alphonsus owed MRIA a fiduciary duty not to
compete, see I.C. § 53-3-404(b)(3) (describing partner's duty "[t]o refrain from competing with
the partnership in the conduct of the partnership business"), such duty arose as a result of Saint
Alphonsus's status as a partner in MRIA, and ended when Saint Alphonsus dissociated from the
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partnership. Specifically, Idaho law provides categorically that "[u]pon a partner's dissociation
... (b) [t]he partner's duty ofloyalty under section 53-3-404(b)(3), Idaho Code, terminates." !d.

§ 53-3-603(b). Thus, the "Section 404(b)(3) duty not to compete terminates upon dissociation,
and the dissociated partner is free immediately to engage in a competitive business, without any
further consent." !d. § 53-3-603 official cmt. 2 (emphasis added). Indeed, MRIA's own
counterclaims appear to concede the point by alleging that Saint Alphonsus only owed fiduciary
duties "[b]efore dissociation"-i.e., before April1, 2004. See 3d Am. Countercl.

~~

74, 77.

Thus, as a matter of law, because Saint Alphonsus properly dissociated from MRIA on
April 1, 2004, the fact that Saint Alphonsus engaged in competition for MRI services after the
agreement's non-compete obligation lapsed on April1, 2005, does not and cannot constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty.

C.

The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Did Not Restrict Saint
Alphonsus's Right To Engage in Competition with MRIA After the NonCompetition Clause Expired on Aprill, 2005

Likewise, MRIA cannot allege that Saint Alphonsus breached the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing by competing after the expiration of the contract's non-compete clause on April
1, 2005. Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a breach-of-contract
theory, and "[n]o covenant will be implied which is contrary to the terms of the contract
negotiated and executed by the parties." Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121
Idaho 266, 288, 824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991); see also Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho
764, 768, 203 P.3d 694, 698 (2009) ("contract terms [regarding right to dissociate member of an
LLC] are not overridden by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" (emphasis in
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original)); Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 115 Idaho 298,300-301,766 P.2d 768,770-71 (1988)
(rejecting argument that the "implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing ... requires the
invalidating of an express termination provision of a written contract"). The express terms of the
MRIA partnership agreement, as set forth in section 9.3.3, unambiguously preclude competition
for only one year after withdrawal. Thus, MRIA cannot argue that the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing overrides this express provision of the contract so as to extend the period of
the non-compete clause beyond the one-year period defined in the Agreement.

D.

Saint Alphonsus's Competition with MRIA After Aprill, 2005, Standing
Alone, Did Not Constitute Interference with Prospective Contractual
Relations

Nor could the mere act of lawfully competing with MRIA constitute the tort of
interference with prospective contractual or economic relations. In order to establish that tort, a
party must prove (among other elements) that "the interference was wrongful by some measure
beyond the fact of the interference itself." Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho
881, _, 243 P.3d 1069, 1081 (2010). Whether a purported interference was "wrongful" is a
question oflaw for the Court to consider, Carter v. Carter, 146 P.3d 639, 648 (2006), and "[t]o
be actionable, the means used to cause injury must be wrongful by reason of a statute, regulation,
recognized common law rule, or an established standard of a trade or profession." Yoakum v.

Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 178, 923 P.2d 416, 423 (1996). Thus, while the act of
competing in violation of a fiduciary duty or contractual obligation might satisfy the
"wrongfulness" element of an interference claim, see Wesco Autobody Supply, 149 Idaho at_,
243 P.3d at 1083, by the same token, competition alone cannot satisfy the element of
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wrongfulness if it did not violate some independent duty not to compete. See Frantz v. Parke,
111 Idaho 1005, 1012, 729 P.2d 1068, 1075 (Ct. App. 1986) (noting existence of"qualified
privilege allowing competitors to interfere with prospective contracts" absent "wrongful" means)
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 768). Because, as explained above, Saint Alphonsus had
every right to compete with MRIA after April 1, 2005, Saint Alphonsus could not have acted
"wrongfully" for purposes of the interference tort when, in cooperation with IMI, it competed
with MRIA for the provision of MRI services after that date. 1

II.

THE COURT SHOULD FORECLOSE MRIA FROM CONTENDING THAT
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S COMPETITION AFTER APRIL 1, 2005, WAS
WRONGFUL OR GIVES RISE TO INJURY OR DAMAGES
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should hold that Saint Alphonsus had a right to

compete with MRIA in the marketing and provision of MRI services beginning on April 1, 2005,
when the MRIA partnership agreement's non-compete obligation expired. In addition, the Court
should bar MRIA from asserting to the contrary, and require it to predicate any allegation of
misconduct by Saint Alphonsus after April 1, 2005, on evidence of actions inconsistent with an
identifiable legal duty, and not merely on the basis that Saint Alphonsus had a continuing duty to
refrain from competing.
In addition, the Court's order should address specific items of evidence that MRIA put
before the jury at the first trial, the admissibility of which was effectively determined by Judge
McLaughlin's erroneous summary judgment ruling that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully
1

As this Court has held, MRIA's separately pleaded conspiracy claim is entirely
dependent on its substantive causes of action. Nov. 17, 2010 Op. at 13. As a result, engaging in
competition after April 1, 2005, similarly cannot give rise to liability on the conspiracy claim.
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•
dissociated. MRIA argued at the first trial that "any damages sustained by MRIA as a result of
[Saint Alphonsus's] competition, therefore, are recoverable as damages directly caused by the
wrongful withdrawal of SARMC from MRIA," because, absent wrongful dissociation, Saint

Alphonsus "would not [have been] able to compete lawfully against MRIA." See MRIA Trial Br.
at 2-3 (emphasis added); see also id. at 8-9 (arguing that "SARMC's ability to compete [a year
after ceasing to be a partner] would not exist but for SARMC's wrongful withdrawal") (emphasis
in original). Whatever the merit of this contention under the circumstances at the time, it plainly
has no merit now that the Supreme Court and this Court have held that Saint Alphonsus lawfully
dissociated pursuant to Idaho Code § 53-3-601.
To the contrary, since it is now established that Saint Alphonsus properly dissociated and
therefore had the right to compete with MRIA beginning on April 1, 2005, any evidence of Saint
Alphonsus's competition after that date is now irrelevant to any fact "of consequence to the
determination ofthe action." Idaho R. Evid. 401. On that basis, it should be excluded. Idaho R.
Evid. 402. Likewise, given that the primary issue to be decided at retrial is whether Saint
Alphonsus wrongfully competed with MRIAprior to April1, 2005, any attempt by MRIA to
introduce evidence of entirely lawful, post-April 1, 2005 competitive activity would be highly
and unfairly prejudicial, and could only serve to mislead or confuse the jury. Such evidence is
thus also inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. The excludable evidence includes:
•

Evidence about the IMI magnets being brought onto the Saint Alphonsus campus.
See 3d Am. Countercl. ~ 47, bullet 1. In December 2005, IMI placed a temporary
mobile magnet on the Saint Alphonsus campus, and in 2006 a permanent IMI magnet
was installed. See Trial Ex. 4376. These events occurred after the non-compete
ended, when Saint Alphonsus had no obligation to use MRIA' s services, but rather
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could use a competing service to do MRI scans of hospital patients. These events are
therefore irrelevant to MRIA's claims, and allowing them into evidence would
grossly and unfairly prejudice Saint Alphonsus and confuse and mislead the jury.
•

Evidence or arguments related to Saint Alphonsus patients having to go outside to use
the temporary IMI magnet or problems with the mobile unit. Relatedly, MRIA
argued to the jury that the temporary IMI on-campus magnet had problems, and that
patients had to walk in the cold and/or rain to reach it, in contrast to the "fullyenclosed, warm MRI Center of Idaho that could have handled those patients." See,
e.g., Trial Tr. at 2173-75. This evidence, too, is entirely irrelevant, prejudicial, and
misleading to the jury. Even assuming the truth ofMRIA's allegation, the IMI oncampus mobile magnet was not in place until late 2005, after Saint Alphonsus's noncompete obligations had ended. Saint Alphonsus thus had every right at that time to
send its patients to IMI rather than to MRI Center.

•

Directing Saint Alphonsus physicians to refer MRI patients to IMI. See 3d Am.
Countercl. ~ 47, bullet 2. At the first trial, MRIA offered into evidence a December
11, 2005 letter to Saint Alphonsus' s nursing staff informing the staff about the IMI
magnet coming to campus and stating that "MRI of Idaho will remain on campus as
they have a long term lease on their current space. They will continue to serve non
Alphonsus outpatients, but as of December 19th, they will no longer provide services
to Saint Alphonsus connected patients." Trial Ex. 4377. Like the other evidence
relating to IMI's on-campus magnet, this letter is irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and
would confuse to the jury since it was sent after the non-compete ended, when Saint
Alphonsus had no obligation to have MRI Center perform services for hospital
patients.

•

Evidence of damages from the IMI on-campus magnet. At the first trial, MRIA
claimed damages based on all scans done at the IMI on-campus location because
"under the partnership agreement, MRIA had the right to perform all magnetic
resonance images on the Saint Alphonsus campus," which continued indefinitely after
Saint Alphonsus's wrongful dissociation. Trial Tr. at 2747; Ex. 4377. Since we now
know that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was proper, and its non-compete obligation
ended April1, 2005, the opening ofthe IMI on-campus location late in 2005 was
likewise completely proper. Saint Alphonsus was under no continuing legal
obligation to send its hospital patients to MRIA, and MRIA should be precluded from
introducing any evidence of "damages" resulting from the decision to send them to
IMI' s on-campus magnet. 2

2

The lawfulness of Saint Alphonsus's competition after April 1, 2005, will also greatly
limit the damages that MRIA can claim for scans it lost to IMI's downtown and Meridian
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•

Evidence relating to IMI's Eagle facility. MRIA has recently, for the first time,
propounded discovery requests relating to a new IMI facility at Saint Alphonsus
Eagle Health Plaza in Eagle, Idaho, which began operations in October 2007, two and
a half years after Saint Alphonsus's non-compete obligations ended. By that time,
Saint Alphonsus had every right, in association with IMI, to open an MRI facility to
serve its hospital patients at Eagle Health Plaza. Any evidence relating to the Eagle
facility should thus similarly be excluded as irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and
confusing to the jury.

Finally, in accordance with the principal requested ruling that Saint Alphonsus was
allowed to compete after April1, 2005, MRIA should be directed to identify, out ofthe presence
of the jury, any conduct by Saint Alphonsus after that date which it intends to introduce to the
jury as a basis for liability. The first three bullet points above include the primary post-April
2005 evidence that MRIA has advanced to date in support of its liability claims. To the extent
MRIA may now intend to expand its assertions to include other post-April 1, 2005 acts, beyond
these irrelevant and prejudicial allegations of competitive behavior, the Court should protect the
trial record by assessing the relevance and likely prejudice of any such evidence before it is put
before the jury.
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant Saint Alphonsus's motion in limine and preclude MRIA from
introducing evidence of liability and damages, and from making false and misleading arguments
related to that evidence, as described above.

(continued ... )

locations after that date. Because expert discovery will not close until after the hearing on this
motion, however, Saint Alphonsus does not address those damages at this time.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), and move this
Court pursuant to Rule 56 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for an order granting summary
judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus on the Second Affirmative Defense of its Answer to the
Third Amended Counterclaim and holding that Saint Alphonsus may not be held liable for more
than its pro rata share of 50% of any damages MRIA might prove at trial. This motion is
supported by the Court's records and files in this matter and by the Memorandum in Support
filed contemporaneously herewith.
Argument on this motion is requested on or before May 18, 2011, in accordance with this
Court's February 15, 2011 scheduling order.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

MRIA has consistently alleged that its injuries were caused by the concerted actions of
Saint Alphonsus, Gem State Radiology LLP ("GSR"), Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
("ICR"), and Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC ("IMI"), and that each of these entities is
therefore jointly and severally liable for all ofthe damages suffered by MRIA. Under Idaho's
version ofthe Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, any one of multiple jointly and
severally liable tortfeasors may ordinarily be held liable for the entirety of a plaintiffs injuries,
with a joint tortfeasor that pays more than its share of the joint liability relegated to suing its
fellow joint tortfeasors in an action for contribution. At the same time, in order to facilitate
settlements with fewer than all of the joint tortfeasors, the Idaho Act makes it possible to cut off
a non-settling defendant's right to seek contribution against the settling defendants. That is
accomplished by the plaintiffs agreement in the settlement to reduce any subsequent award that
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the plaintiff might obtain against the non-settling defendant by the amount of the settling
defendants' pro rata share ofliability. Idaho Code § 6-806. MRIA entered into just such an
agreement when it settled its claims against GSR, ICR, and IMI (collectively, the "settling
defendants"). As a result, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a holding that it may be held liable for
no more than its own pro rata share of whatever amount of damages MRIA proves at trial.

BACKGROUND
The gravamen ofMRIA's counterclaim is that Saint Alphonsus, GSR, ICR, and IMI
"engaged in a conspiracy for the purpose of running MRI Center out of business or diminishing
its value ... substantially." 3d Am. Compl. ~ 56. 1 Specifically, MRIA contends that the entirety
of Saint Alphonsus' s alleged wrongful conduct was taken in concert with the settling defendants
as part of a "conspiracy to compete against MRIA in violation of Saint Al[phonsus' s] fiduciary,
contractual and tort duties." MRIA Mem. Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. on Civil Conspiracy
Claim at 19; see also id. at 1-17 (describing conspiratorial conduct). "MRIA's position is that St.
Al[phonsus] is [therefore] jointly and severally liable for the wrongful acts" allegedly committed
in concert by Saint Alphonsus and the settling defendants. Id. at 19; see also id. ("the
[conspiracy] count is in [MRIA's] counterclaim for purposes ofholding St. Al[phonsus] liable
for the acts ofthe [GSR] rads and IMI in furtherance ofthe conspiracy"); id. at 18 (conspiracy
claim asserted "as a means of assigning joint and several liability"); id. at 24-25 (same).
1

These allegations of concerted activity have persisted through various incarnations of
MRIA's pleadings, including the most recent. See 1st Am. Countcl. ~~ 45, 48, 57, 66, 70-71,
141-43; 2d Am. Countercl. ~~ 45, 49, 58, 67, 71-72,147-49; 3d Am. Countercl. ~~ 43, 47, 56-61,
98-100.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
000902
JUDGMENT ON ITS SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE - 3

Perhaps most importantly, as MRIA tells the story and frames its claim for damages,
MRIA was injured because the competitive MRI imaging business, begun and primarily operated
by the settling defendants, allegedly with Saint Alphonsus's support, took business away from
MRIA. See 3d Am. Countercl.

~

61 ("MRI Center's volume has dwindled from a high of

approximately 8,000 outpatient scans in 2003 to roughly 3,000 outpatient scans in 2005.") Thus,
the settling defendants, by allegedly engaging in improper competition that won business from
MRIA, were the direct cause of the damages MRIA seeks to recover.
Notwithstanding these allegations, MRIA settled its claims against GSR, ICR, and IMI
shortly before the first trial, releasing all claims against them in exchange for payment of
$825,000. See Affidavit of JackS. Gjording, Ex. D (Settlement Agreement) at 2. To induce that
settlement and in accordance with conventional practice in cases of joint-and-several liability,
MRIA immunized the third-party defendants from any contribution claim that Saint Alphonsus
might thereafter have against them. To accomplish this, MRIA expressly agreed that "[a]ny
damages recovered or recoverable by [MRIA

f

against ... [Saint Alphonsus] shall be reduced in

amount by the ratio, portion, pro rata share, or percentage of causal negligence, contractual
liability, any claims arising from joint activities, or in any form for fault for which [the settling
defendants] are found liable as may be determined in a ... disposition of these matters." !d. at 4.
2

The settlement agreement applies to claims by all three counter-claimants here-MRIA
Associates LLP, MRI Limited Partnership ("MRI Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited ("MRI
Mobile")-as well as to claims by any ofMRIA's general partners and other affiliated persons
and entities. See Affidavit of Counsel Jack Gjording, Ex. D at 1. For purposes of this
memorandum, the term "MRIA" refers collectively to MRIA Associates, MRI Center, and MRI
Mobile.
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Following remand from the Supreme Court, MRIA's new amended counterclaim
continued to allege that it was harmed by the concerted acts of Saint Alphonsus and the settling
defendants. See 3d Am. Countercl.

~~

43, 47, 56-61, 98-100. Saint Alphonsus's answer

included a Second Affirmative Defense that, "[p ]ursuant to th[ e] settlement agreement and Idaho
Code§§ 6-802 to 6-806, any claims and/or damages awarded against Saint Alphonsus and/or
Diversified Care must be reduced by the [settling] defendants' pro rata share of liability or
otherwise reduced in accordance with Idaho law." Answer to 3d Am. Countercl.

~

103. Saint

Alphonsus now moves for summary judgment establishing and specifically defining its right to a
reduction in any damages award in accordance with the settlement agreement and Idaho law.

ARGUMENT
I.

MRIA'S SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH GSR, ICR, AND IMI INVOKES
THE PROVISIONS OF IDAHO LAW THAT PROTECT THE SETTLING
DEFENDANTS AGAINST A CONTRIBUTION ACTION
In 1971, the Idaho Legislature adopted the 1939 version ofthe Uniform Contribution

Among Tortfeasors Act to govern the liabilities among multiple tortfeasors where joint-andseveral liability makes each of the tortfeasors responsible to the injured party for the entirety of
the injury sustained. See Idaho Code § 6-803 et seq.; Halve v. Draper, 95 Idaho 193, 194-95,
505 P.2d 1265, 1266-67 (1973). The statute defines a "joint tortfeasor" as "one oftwo or more
persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property," id § 6803(4), and creates a "right of contribution ... among joint tortfeasors" that accrues after one
joint tortfeasor "has paid more than his pro rata share" of the common liability. Idaho Code § 6803(1).
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The Act recognizes, however, that the existence of a right to contribution among joint
tortfeasors has a substantial impact on partial settlements in multi-party cases because any one
alleged joint tortfeasor will be unlikely to settle with a plaintiff if the settling tortfeasor continues
to be exposed to a contribution claim by the non-settling tortfeasor. To address this concern, the
Act allows a plaintiff to extinguish the non-settling tortfeasor's right to contribution by making a
legally binding commitment, enforceable by any non-settling defendants, to reduce the amount
of any subsequent award against them and in favor of the plaintiff by the amount for which the
settling tortfeasor would be liable in a suit for contribution. Specifically, a settling defendant
will be "relieve[d] ... from liability to make contribution" only if the release by the plaintiff
"provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor, of the
injured person's damages recoverable against all the other tortfeasors." Idaho Code § 6-806. In
that event, the "claim against the other tortfeasors" is "reduce[d]" "in the amount of the
consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides
that the total claim shall be reduced, if such amount or proportion is greater than the
consideration paid." Idaho Code§ 6-805(1).
MRIA's agreement with the settling defendants, on its face, plainly invokes these
provisions of the Act, with the intention to protect the settling defendants against a right of
contribution. After alleging claims giving rise to joint and several liability, MRIA induced GSR,
ICR, and IMI to settle with MRIA in exchange for a release that protects them against
contribution claims by Saint Alphonsus. Specifically, that agreement was made "before the right
of [Saint Alphonsus] to secure a money judgment for contribution has accrued," Idaho Code § 6-
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806, and releases the settling defendants from liability to MRIA. Further, it states that "[a]ny
damages recovered or recoverable by [MRIA] against any other joint tortfeasor [e. g., Saint
Alphonsus] shall be reduced in amount by," among other things, the "pro rata share ... for
which [the settling defendants] are found liable as may be determined in a future trial or other
disposition of these matters." Affidavit of JackS. Gjording, Ex. D at 4. The agreement thus
"provides for a reduction, to the extent ofthe pro rata share of the [settling defendants], of
[MRIA's] damages recoverable against [Saint Alphonsus]." Idaho Code§ 6-806. As a result,
the settlement agreement extinguishes Saint Alphonsus's right under Idaho Code§ 6-803(1) to
seek contribution from the settling defendants for their "pro rata share" of the judgment, and
replaces it with a right to a comparable reduction in the amount of damages recoverable here by
MRIA. See Idaho Code§ 6-805(1).
It is also entirely clear that this case involves allegations of the sort of joint-and-several

liability to which these contribution-foreclosing provisions of Idaho law can apply. The
Supreme Court has held that, for purposes of applying Idaho Code§ 6-805(1), the
"determination whether a settling party is a joint tortfeasor must be based on the pleadings and
not the jury's apportionment of fault." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 783, 727 P.2d 1187, 1211
(1986). In so holding, the Supreme Court explained:
"Even though the ·plaintiff now contends that he, in fact, had no
cause of action in tort against one of the [settling] defendants, the
court will consider the issues as framed by the pleadings. Where
the plaintiff charges several defendants with tort, and one of the
defendants buys its way out of the suit and is given a release ... ,
the court will not go into the question of liability of such
defendant. The test in such case is: was the defendant sued as a
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tort-feasor? If so, any liability of the remaining defendants to the
plaintiff must be reduced . . . . The question of actual liability in
tort of any of the defendants so discharged by release and covenant
not to sue is wholly immaterial .... "

!d. (quoting Levi v. Montgomery, 120 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1963)); see also Restatement (Second)
ofTorts § 885(3) (1977) (settlement payment reduces claim against non-settling tortfeasors
"whether or not the person making the payment is liable to the injured person"). 3
MRIA's pleadings unambiguously establish that Saint Alphonsus and the settling thirdparty defendants were "sued as" joint tortfeasors for purposes ofldaho Code § 6-805(1 ). Under
current law, entities are jointly and severally liabile where the parties were "acting in concert,"
which is defined as "pursuing a common plan or design which results in the commission of an
intentional or reckless tortious act." Idaho Code § 6-803(5); see also Halve, 95 Idaho at 195, 505
P.2d at 1267 (noting that the statute applies to intentional tortfeasors). MRIA alleges precisely
such concerted activity in this case: it asserts that Saint Alphonsus and the third-party
defendants "conspire[ed] to compete against MRIA in violation of Saint Al[phonsus' s] fiduciary,
contractual and tort duties." MRIA Mem. Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. on Civil Conspiracy

3

In Quick, the defendants were attempting to reduce the award by the amount of the
settlement payments because that amount was greater than the settling defendants' pro rata share
of responsibility. However, I.C. § 6-805(1) reduces the plaintiffs claim by the greater of the
settlement amount or the proportion of the settling party's liability, and nothing in Quick
suggests that its pleadings-based approach does not fully apply in both situations. Additionally,
though Quick was an automobile negligence case decided prior to the Legislature's 1987
decision to replace joint-and-severalliability with comparative fault in run-of-the-mill
negligence cases, see I.C. § 6-803(3); Tuttle v. Wayment Farms, Inc., 131 Idaho 105, 108,952
P.2d 1241, 1244 (1998), nothing in the legislative revisions can be read to alter the rule of Quick
where, as here, joint-and-severalliability continues to apply.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
000907
JUDGMENT ON ITS SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE - 8

Claim at 19; see also 3d Am. Countercl. ~~ 43, 47, 56-61,98-100. Indeed, MRIA recently
conceded that "MRIA's position is that" Saint Alphonsus and the third-party defendants are
"jointly and severally liable for the wrongful acts" set forth in MRIA's counterclaims. MRIA
Mem. Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. on Civil Conspiracy Claim at 19; see also id. at 18,24-25. As
a result, pursuant to Quick's instruction that "the trial court's determination whether [the] settling
part[ies are] joint tortfeasor[s] must be based on the pleadings," Ill Idaho at 783, 727 P.2d at
1211, Saint Alphonsus and the settling defendants meet the statutory definition of joint
tortfeasors for purposes of applying the set-off rules of Idaho Code §§ 6-805(1) & 6-806.

II.

UNDER IDAHO LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT, SAINT ALPHONSUS MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR NO MORE
THAN ITS OWN PRO RATA SHARE OF MRIA'S TOTAL DAMAGES
The statute entitles Saint Alphonsus to a "pro rata" reduction in damages, Idaho Code

§ 6-806, which means that the size of the reduction is to be determined by this Court as a matter
of simple arithmetic, rather than submitted to the jury as a question of proportionate fault. A
"pro rata" share is an equal share, i.e., the whole award divided according to the number of
alleged tortfeasors. See W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law ofTorts § 50, at 340
(5th ed. 1984) ("a pro rata share (is] arrived at by dividing the damages by the number of
tortfeasors"); Fowler V. Harper et al., Harper, James and Gray on Torts§ 10.2 at 62 n.33 (3d ed.
2007) ("[w]ith one exception (discussed below], the term 'pro rata' shares has usually been
thought to mean equal shares, divided according to the number of defendants"); id. at 62
("[t]raditionally, the damages have been shared equally among the tortfeasors rather than being
apportioned on the basis of their comparative negligence").
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Thus, for example, in a two-defendant case, each joint tortfeasor' s pro rata share of the
injured party's damages would be 50%, without regard to that tortfeasor's relative culpability; in
a three-defendant case, each share would be one third, and so forth. See, e.g., In re Masters
Mates & Pilots Pension Plan & IRAP Litig., 957 F .2d 1020, 1028 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The pro rata
rule apportions an equal share of the liability to each defendant in a lawsuit. Relative culpability
is irrelevant under this approach. When, for example, a plaintiff settles with one defendant in a
two defendant case, a judgment against the nonsettling defendant is reduced by one-half,
regardless of whether the settling defendant was primarily or only minimally culpable."); In re
Jiffy Lube Sees. Litig., 927 F.2d 155, 160 n.3 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[under the] Pro rata [method], ...
the judgment amount is simply divided by the number of defendants, settling and non-settling,
that are found liable. Relative culpability is not an issue").
Though the Idaho Code does not expressly define the term "pro rata share," the 1939
uniform act from which the Code provisions are derived, see Halve, 95 Idaho at 194, 505 P.2d at
1266, adopts this traditional understanding. The official comments to the uniform act state that,
"[w]ithout [an optional] Subsection" providing for equitable readjustment of the joint tortfeasors'
relative shares according to fault, "the ordinary rule of apportionment of the common liability
among the tortfeasors in accordance with the number of them commonly liable obtains. Thus, if
P is hurt by A, B and C, who were concurrently negligent, and he recovers his damages from A
alone, A may shift one-third ofthe burden to Band one-third to C. Ordinarily no inquiry is
made into the respective degrees offault ofthe tort-feasors as amongst themselves." 1939
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Uniform Act § 2 cmt on Subsection 4 (emphasis added). The optional subsection that would
alter this default rule is not currently part of the Idaho Code. 4
The Legislature's decision to require a "pro rata" or equal-shares approach to
apportioning liability in the context of alleged joint tortfeasors acting in concert to commit
intentional torts makes sense. In the negligence context, where a plaintiffs injury is often the
result of several independent causes (as in a multi-car accident), a rule of proportionate fault
based on relative levels of culpability both does justice and is readily comprehended by lay
jurors. This is presumably why, in the negligence context, the Legislature (like the legislatures
of most other states) has replacedjoint-and-severalliability with comparative fault. See Idaho
Code § 6-803(3). By contrast, where joint tortfeasors are alleged to have purposefully acted in
concert to intentionally commit a tortious act desired by all, questions like which tortfeasor is
more at fault defy answer. Moreover, the non-settling defendant would be severely prejudiced if
it had to assert to a jury simultaneously that there was no conspiracy and that the other

4

An earlier version of I. C. § 6-803(3) did include the referenced optional subsection,
providing that "[w ]hen there is such a disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors as to render
inequitable an equal distribution among them of the common liability by contribution, the
relative degrees of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their pro rata
share solely for the purpose of determining their rights and contribution among themselves, each
remaining severally liable to the injured person for the whole injury as at common law." Tucker
v. Union Oil Co., 100 Idaho 590, 598-99,603 P.2d 156, 164-65 (1979) (quoting earlier version
ofi.C. § 6-803(3)). This provision was deleted as part ofthe 1987 amendments abolishingjointand-severalliability in negligence cases, see Idaho 1987 Session Laws ch. 278, § 4, thereby
demonstrating that the Legislature intended, in those narrow circumstances in which joint-andseveral liability has been retained, to follow the "ordinary rule" of apportioning liability among
the tortfeasors "in accordance with the number ofthem commonly liable." 1939 Uniform Act
§ 2 cmt on Subsection 4 (emphasis added).
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conspirators were more culpable. A rule that liability is to be apportioned equally among the
alleged tortfeasors avoids these problems and complements the holding in Quick that the
existence of joint-and-severalliability is to be determined from the pleadings as a matter of law.
Together, these two principles obviate the need in cases such as this to submit to the jury any
question about the relative fault of the settling tortfeasors, thereby simplifying the trial and
providing a straightforward method for the court to determine whether and to what extent the
settlement reduces the award against the remaining defendants.
Thus, rather than submit the question of relative fault to the jury, the Court should follow
the language of the statute and the "traditional" and "ordinary" understanding of the term "pro
rata share," and hold that Saint Alphonsus's liability must be reduced as a matter of law by the
settling defendants' equal share ofliability. 5
The only remaining question is the number of entities among which equal shares of
liability must be allocated. Technically, there are five alleged joint tortfeasors here: the three
settling defendants (GSR, ICR, and IMI) and two Saint Alphonsus entities (Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center). While a simple headcount
would therefore entitle Saint Alphonsus to a three-fifths reduction in damages, the "one
exception" to a completely equal division of shares is that entities with vicarious relationshipslike a corporate parent and its wholly owned subsidiary-are treated as a single entity. Harper,
supra,§ 10.2, at 62 n.33. Applying this exception here would mean that Saint Alphonsus
5

Of course, if the Court disagrees, then the question of apportionment of damages among
Saint Alphonsus and the settling defendants will need to be put to the jury.
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Regional Medical Center and its wholly owned subsidiary, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care,
must be treated as a single entity. Similarly, MRIA could reasonably contend that IMI, ICR, and
GSR, three separate legal entities controlled in whole or in part by the same group of
radiologists, are sufficiently related that they should constitute a single entity for purposes of
Idaho Code§ 6-805(1). Thus, the simplest and most equitable approach under the circumstances
would be to treat these two sets of entities (i.e., the two Saint Alphonsus entities and the three
settling defendants) as each responsible for a single pro rata share ofliability. Under this
approach, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to have any award against it reduced by one-half, thus
making Saint Alphonsus liable for no more than 50% of whatever overall damages MRIA might
prove at trial.
CONCLUSION

MRIA could have chosen not to settle with GSR, ICR, and IMI, and instead sought to
hold Saint Alphonsus liable for 100% of any judgment awarded to MRIA in this case. In that
case, Saint Alphonsus would have been entitled to recover contribution from GSR, ICR, and IMI
for their pro rata share of the judgment. Idaho Code § 6-803(1 ). In its settlement with GSR,
ICR, and IMI, however, MRIA extinguished Saint Alphonsus's right to seek contribution from
the settling defendants for their share of any judgment and provided instead for an automatic
reduction by that same share of the amount of total damages that MRIA may recover against
Saint Alphonsus. Affidavit of JackS. Gjording, Ex. D at 4. Idaho Code§ 6-805(1) makes this
provision of the settlement enforceable here as a matter oflaw. Saint Alphonsus therefore can be
liable for no more than its own pro rata share of any damages that MRIA proves at trial. Because
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Saint Alphonsus constitutes one of two groups of alleged joint tortfeasors, that pro rata share is
one half.
The Court should therefore grant summary judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus on its
Second Affirmative Defense, and hold that Saint Alphonsus may not be liable for more than 50%
of any damages MRIA might prove at trial.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 11th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), and move this
Court a motion in limine (1) excluding language from the Shattuck Hammond and PWC
Memorandums (Trial Exs. 4138, 4234, and 4239) which raise questions as to the legal propriety
of Saint Alphonsus's April2004 dissociation, as specifically described in the Memorandum in
Support filed contemporaneously herewith; and (2) directing counsel to refrain from submitting
evidence or making statements before the jury with the intent, or whose likely effect will be, to
suggest to the jury that Saint Alphonsus acted improperly or in violation of a legal duty when it
withdrew from MRIA in 2004. This motion is supported by the Court's records and files in this
matter and by the Memorandum in Support filed contemporaneously herewith.
Argument on this motion is requested on or before May 18,2011, in accordance with this
Court's February 15, 2011 scheduling order.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 11th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

In the initial trial of this matter, MRIA introduced several documents and questioned
several witnesses with respect to Saint Alphonsus's allegedly wrongful act of leaving the MRIA
partnership, based on the now-overturned decision ofthe former trial judge that Saint Alphonsus
had wrongfully dissociated from MRIA as a matter of law. These documents, including a
memorandum prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PWC") (Trial Ex. 4138), and two versions
of a memorandum prepared by Shattuck Hammond Partners (Trial Exs. 4234, 4239), set forth
options to be considered by Saint Alphonsus concerning its relationship with MRIA. Each of the
documents contains language suggesting that a decision by Saint Alphonsus to withdraw from
MRIA could expose it to litigation and/or risk oflegalliability, and MRIA heavily relied upon
this language at the first trial to both show liability and argue that Saint Alphonsus acted in bad
faith. It has now been determined as a matter of law that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from
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MRIA was affirmatively authorized by the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUP A").
Accordingly, Saint Alphonsus moves the Court for an order: (1) that certain language in these
three exhibits should be excluded as both irrelevant and prejudicial; and (2) that MRIA should be
foreclosed from advancing any contention or evidence suggesting that Saint Alphonsus acted
improperly or was not in full compliance with the law by withdrawing from MRIA.

ARGUMENT
A.

Language In The PWC And Shattuck Hammond Memoranda Raising
Questions About The Legal Propriety Of Saint Alphonsus's April2004
Dissociation Should Be Excluded As Irrelevant and Prejudicial

This motion seeks to exclude portions of three exhibits admitted at the first trial which
call into question the legal propriety of Saint Alphonsus's April 2004 dissociation from MRIA.
These exhibits were used at trial to suggest that Saint Alphonsus was warned in advance that
dissociation would be improper and thus that it also acted in bad faith. Because the Supreme
Court and this Court have now determined as a matter of law that Saint Alphonsus acted properly
in withdrawing from MRIA, this evidence must be excluded.
First, MRIA introduced a PWC document dated January 5, 2000, discussing a "Scenario
5," under which Saint Alphonsus would hypothetically "withdraw[] from MRI Associates," and
stating that "[t]he Partnership Agreement restrict[s] the ability of Hospital Partners to withdraw
from MRI Associates." Trial Ex. 4138 at 16. MRIA extensively relied upon this document to
support its claim that Saint Alphonsus knew in advance that its dissociation from MRIA in 2004
would be a breach of contract. In particular, the document was used repeatedly during the
examinations of Saint Alphonsus's former CEO Sandra Bruce and former COO Cindy Schamp
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to attack their statements that they believed Saint Alphonsus had a right to dissociate. See, e.g.,
Trial Tr. pp. 1819-30, 1863-66, 2295-98, 3563-64.
Second, MRIA also introduced two drafts of a memorandum by Shattuck Hammond
Partners-an investment banking and consulting firm retained by Saint Alphonsus' s attorneys at
Givens Pursley LLP. See Trial Ex. 4234 (dated August 30, 2001) and Trial Ex. 4239 (dated
September 25, 2001). The documents analyzed "options" for Saint Alphonsus to extricate itself
from the developing difficulties with MRIA, including the possibility of withdrawal-a scenario
the memoranda referred to as a "scorched-earth scenario." Trial Ex. 4234 at 8; Trial Ex. 4239 at
11. It also contained comments attributed in the memo to Givens Pursley that "there would
likely be litigation as to whether the termination was wrongful and that there may be a risk of St.
Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary responsibilities to the LPs." Trial Ex. 4234 at 8; Trial Ex.
4239 at 11; see also Trial Ex. 4234 at 2, Trial Ex. 4239 at 2 (similar). While the memoranda's
references to "scorched earth scenario" were held inadmissible at the first trial, the remainder of
the memoranda, including the references to the legal advice by Givens Pursley, was admitted.
Indeed, MRIA characterized the Shattuck Hammond memoranda as among the "most critical
documents in the case" because they purportedly showed that Saint Alphonsus had acted in bad
faith and with indifference to its lawyers' advice about Saint Alphonsus's legal obligations to
MRIA. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 1861-66. 1874-78,3593-96,4302,4317,4321.
In light of the subsequent rulings regarding the lawfulness of Saint Alphonsus' s
dissociation, each ofthese memoranda is both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Rule 401 of
the Idaho Rules of Evidence defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to
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make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Rule 402, in tum, provides
that "(e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Finally, Rule 403 states that even if
relevant, "evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
ofundue delay, waste oftime, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
The subsequent rulings by the Supreme Court and this Court that Saint Alphonsus' s
dissociation violated neither an "express provision," Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v.
MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,488-89,224 P.3d 1068, 1077-78 (2009) ("SADC'), nor any
"definite term" contained in the agreement, Nov. 17 Op. at 9, mean that Saint Alphonsus had "a
statutory right to dissociate without liability from [the] partnership" pursuant to the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act. Id. at 6.
Thus, the portions of the PWC memorandum and the Shattuck Hammond memoranda
discussing the likelihood of litigation over "withdrawal" and the possibility of wrongful
withdrawal are not relevant to any facts left to be decided in this case. It has been decided
already that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was proper and authorized under the provisions of
RUP A. The purported restrictions in Section 6.1 of the partnership agreement are simply
irrelevant, because Saint Alphonsus dissociated pursuant to the statutory RUPA right.
Nor can MRIA use this evidence on the pretense that it proves the mundane point that
Saint Alphonsus understood that, if it withdrew, it could face litigation. See MRIA Appellate Br.
at 62-63, available at 2008 WL 5328238. Again, this point is simply not relevant. The
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withdrawal was lawful, and the fact that Saint Alphonsus's attorneys anticipated MRIA's
unsuccessful attempt to prove otherwise has no bearing on any aspect of the merits of this case.
Further, even ifthere were any possible relevant grounds for admitting the portions of the
memoranda discussing the possibility of litigation if Saint Alphonsus withdrew, that relevance
would be far outweighed by the evidence's unfairly prejudicial effect, and would likely engender
juror confusion. During the first trial, MRIA used the PWC and Shattuck Hammond
memorandums as evidence that (1) Saint Alphonsus could not lawfully withdraw from MRIA;
(2) that Saint Alphonsus knew it could not withdraw from MRIA, yet did so anyway; (3) that
because Saint Alphonsus knew it could not withdraw, yet did so anyway, it acted in bad faith;
and (4) Saint Alphonsus's officers-who testified that they believed dissociation was
permitted-were not credible witnesses. See supra pp. 3-4. Obviously, permitting MRIA to
raise such inferences in the minds of the jurors now would be grossly inappropriate and unfairly
prejudicial, as the Supreme Court's opinion demonstrates. See SADC, 148 Idaho at 489-91,224
P.3d at 1078-80. Indeed, while MRIA painted Saint Alphonsus's CEO as a liar at the first trial
because she expressed her belief that dissociation was lawful, the rulings of the Supreme Court
and this Court have vindicated that belief. See id.
Given the determination as a matter of law that Saint A1phonsus rightfully dissociated,
the fact that its lawyers advised of a risk of resulting litigation is especially misleading and likely
to cause confusion. Any corporation planning a course of action may face litigation risks, a fact
that non-lawyer jurors are unlikely to appreciate. A lawyer's advice of a risk oflitigation tells
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precious little about the propriety of the underlying conduct. Where, as here, the conduct was
legally proper, evidence of advice about a litigation risk can serve only to confuse and mislead.
Accordingly, this Court should exclude from evidence all language in the PWC and
Shattuck Hammond memoranda raising questions about the legal propriety of Saint Alphonsus' s
April 2004 dissociation from the MRIA partnership. 1

B.

For The Same Reasons, The Court Should Enter An Order Foreclosing
Evidence Or Argument Offered To Show That Saint Alphonsus's
Withdrawal From MRIA In April2004 Was In Any Sense Legally Improper

The decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court have definitively resolved that
Saint Alphonsus acted properly and within its statutory right to dissociate when it withdrew from
the MRIA partnership in April 2004. Accordingly, there is no room or possibility for the jury to
reach any different conclusion, and any evidence or argument contrary to this established law of
the case would serve only to misdirect and confuse the jury.
Accordingly, the Court should further direct counsel for MRIA to refrain from submitting
evidence or making statements before the jury with the intent, or whose likely effect will be, to
suggest to the jury that Saint Alphonsus acted improperly or in violation of a legal duty when it
withdrew from MRIA in 2004. Such an order, directed at ensuring that the case before the Court
is resolved on the basis of issues properly in dispute and not by re-litigating issues that have
already been finally resolved, is well within the powers of the Court to supervise the trial

1

In addition, MRIA may not introduce the Shattuck Hammond memoranda's "scorched
earth" language, which was held inadmissible at the first trial. MRIA did not appeal that
evidentiary ruling and therefore may not seek to revisit it now. See Swanson v. Swanson, 134
Idaho 512,517,5 P.3d 973,978 (2000).
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proceedings before it. See, e.g., Idaho R. Evid. 403 (permitting exclusion of evidence that risks
"misleading the jury"); Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 168, 158 P.3d 937, 9443 (2007)
(affirming court-ordered limitation on counsel's conduct to prevent "conflicts with its motion in
limine"); D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook§ 3.2 (2d ed.) (motion in limine is a
"recognized means for obtaining ... an order regulating the manner in which evidence may be
called to the jury's attention during the course of trial").
CONCLUSION

The Court should grant Saint Alphonsus's motion in limine and exclude from evidence,
and redact from the exhibits if they are placed before the jury, the following portions of the PWC
and Shattuck Hammond memoranda that raise questions about the propriety of Saint
Alphonsus's withdrawal from MRIA and suggest that it had advance notice of such impropriety
(the relevant pages, with proposed redactions highlighted, are attached as Exhibits A-Cto the
Affidavit of JackS. Gjording filed herewith):
•

Trial Exhibit 4138, p. 16 ("Scenario 5" Memo): under the caption
"Considerations," the entirety of paragraph 1, pertaining to alleged restrictions on
withdrawal under Section 6.1;

•

Trial Exhibit 4234 (August 30, 2001 draft of Shattuck Hammond memo):
o

p. 2: The sentence "SARMC has been advised by counsel that this option
would likely engender litigation with MRIA."

o

p. 8: under the caption "Alternatives Considered by Saint Alphonsus," the
entirety of the sentences beginning with "In addition, there are 'wrongful'
termination provisions ... "and "We are awaiting the actual partnership
agreement .... "
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o

•

p. 8: under the caption "Option A: Withdrawal from MRIA": the phrase "If
SARMC's withdrawal from MRIA is not deemed wrongful," the entire
sentence containing the phrase "scorched earth scenario," and the entire
sentence beginning with "Givens Pursley believes that there would likely
be litigation .... "

Trial Exhibit 4239 (September 25,2001 draft of Shattuck Hammond memo):
o

p. 2: The sentence "SARMC has been advised by counsel that this option
would likely engender litigation with MRIA."

o

p. 11: under the caption "Alternatives Considered by Saint Alphonsus,"
the entirety of the sentences beginning with "In addition, there are
'wrongful' termination provisions ... "and "We are awaiting the actual
partnership agreement .... "

o

p. 11: under the caption "Option A: Withdrawal from MRIA": the phrase
"IfSARMC's withdrawal from MRIA is not deemed wrongful," the entire
sentence containing the phrase "scorched earth scenario," and the entire
sentence beginning with "Givens Pursley believes that there would likely
be litigation .... "

The Court should further direct counsel for MRIA to refrain from presenting evidence or
arguing to the jury that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal from MRIA on April I, 2004, was in any
respect improper.

DATED this 11th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

ounter-Defendants
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I hereby certify that on the 11th day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), and move this
Court a motion in limine reinstating certain evidentiary rulings from the first trial of this matter
that were not affected by subsequent rulings of the Supreme Court and this Court, and declining
to reinstate others that were so affected, as specified in the accompanying Memorandum in
Support. This motion is supported by the Court's records and files in this matter and by the
Memorandum in Support filed contemporaneously herewith.
Argument on this motion is requested on or before May 18, 2011, in accordance with this
Court's February 15, 2011 scheduling order.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Under Idaho law, a party is "preclude[d) [from] reopening [an] issue[]" in subsequent
proceedings when it failed to appeal the trial court's ruling on that issue during its initial appeal.
See Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 517, 5 P.3d 973, 978 (2000). Further, even in
circumstances where the district court can reconsider a previously-made decision on remand
from an appellate court, such prior rulings should be treated as law-of-the-case where there are
no new circumstances "bearing on the correctness" of the prior order. See Devil Creek Ranch,
Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 126 Idaho 202,205, 879 P.2d 1135, 1138 (1994).
Indeed, this Court recently recognized these principles when it stated, during the February 9,
2011, hearing, that "if something has already been decided which the Supreme Court has not
reversed on appeal, I'm not going to reverse it in the trial court." Feb. 9, 2011 Hr'g Tr. at 40-41.
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At the prior trial, there were several significant evidentiary rulings that were not appealed
to the Supreme Court, and for which the legal and factual basis underlying the trial court's
original decision has not changed. This Court should enter an order re-instating those
substantive evidentiary rulings that were not affected by the Supreme Court's decision. To the
extent that a later decision of the trial or appellate court moots or undermines a prior ruling, the
prior ruling should be disregarded. In addition, in this case, the Supreme Court decision has
provided new, distinct grounds for excluding evidence that was the subject of prior motions, and
these new grounds for relief should be addressed on their merits.
I.

EVIDENTIARY RULINGS

Among the substantive evidentiary rulings which should be re-instated for retrial are the
following:
1.

May 7, 2007 Order Excluding Expert Report of Douglas M. Branson. Prior to

the first trial, MRIA proposed to have law professor Douglas M. Branson testify as to the
meaning of the legal term "fiduciary duty" and then opine that Saint Alphonsus's actions
violated those legal duties. In a May 7, 2007 ruling from the bench and a follow-up decision
dated May 21, 2007, the Court found Branson's report was inadmissible as it would not assist the
trier of fact and would improperly allow a witness to testify about the applicable law in the case.

See Trial Tr. at 454-58; Memo. Dec. on Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Douglas M.
Branson at 5-6. MRIA did not appeal this ruling, and Branson's report and testimony should
again be excluded.
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2.

August 6, 2007 Order Excluding Carl Harder Letter (Trial Ex. 4140). On

August 6, 2007, MRIA attempted to introduce into evidence a letter from deceased attorney Carl
Harder, which MRIA claimed had been delivered to Saint Alphonsus CEO Sandra Bruce. Saint
Alphonsus objected on the grounds that there was no foundation to show that the letter had, in
fact, been delivered. Trial Tr. at 1189-90. The Court excluded the evidence, ruling that "[t]here
has not been a showing made that it was delivered." !d. at 1196. The Court reiterated its ruling
the next day, finding a jury could only speculate on whether the letter was delivered. Id. at 1272.
MRIA then attempted to indirectly introduce the letter as "impeachment" of Saint
Alphonsus witness Cindy Schamp, who at a deposition initially stated that she had seen the
letter-a misstatement that she later corrected. See id. at 2312-24. The Court again denied the
letter's admissibility, finding that Ms. Schamp's misstatement was not "relevant impeachment on
this issue regarding the Carl Harder letter." Id. at 2324-25. MRIA then filed an unsolicited brief
on the admissibility of the letter, which the Court treated as a motion for reconsideration. The
Court again ruled that the letter was inadmissible. !d. at 2922-25. MRIA did not appeal any of
these rulings, and the letter should again be held inadmissible on retrial.

3.

August 27, 2007 Order Admitting Statements of Dr. Roger Curran. During

the trial, Saint Alphonsus examined witness Cindy Schamp regarding conversations she had with
Dr. Roger Curran, one of the five doctors who together controlled MRIA. MRIA objected on the
basis that Dr. Curran, who died before trial, could not be examined about his statements and that
his statements were hearsay. Trial Tr. 3423-3425, 3479-80. Saint Alphonsus responded that Dr.
Curran's statements were admissions of a party opponent, that they therefore are not hearsay
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under Rule 80l(d) ofthe Idaho Rules of Evidence, and were admissible. !d. at 3425-26, 3480.
The Court held that Dr. Curran's statements were admissible under Rules 801(d)(1) and
804(b)(3). !d. at 3426-27, 3480. MRIA did not appeal these rulings, and Dr. Curran's
statements should again be held admissible.

II.

JULY 30, 2007 DECISION ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

On July 30, 2007, the trial court issued a decision addressing some eighteen motions in
limine and two motions to strike that had previously been filed. See July 30, 2007 Mem.
Decision at 3 (numbering the motions). Several of these motions remain relevant and trial
court's prior rulings should be applied; others are now moot or have otherwise been affected by
subsequent rulings of the Supreme Court and this Court. The Court should deal with these prior
rulings as follows:

a.

Rulings Which Should Be Re-Instated. The following rulings in the Court's

decision of July 30, 2007, were neither appealed by MRIA nor affected by subsequent rulings of
the Supreme Court or this Court, and thus must be re-instated:
•

Motion 7: MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Communications Between SARMC
and MRIA About the Purchase ofMRIA and/or MRICI. See id. at 15-17. The
Court denied MRIA's motion, related to a discovery dispute, that sought to limit
factual testimony of certain witnesses.

•

Motion 8: MRIA's Motion in Limine re: Justification for Withdrawal. !d. at 1718. The Court denied MRIA's request that Saint Alphonsus's witnesses be
precluded from stating their belief that dissociation was lawful. Given that
dissociation has now been held as lawful, this ruling should stand.

•

Motion 10: MRIA's Motion in Limine re: SARMC Promotion of its Own Best
Interest. !d. at 18-20. The Court denied MRIA's motion in part and granted it in
part, granting the motion insofar as it held that Saint Alphonsus could not make
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the legal argument that it "was permitted to breach the fiduciary duties owed to
MRIA so long as Saint Alphonsus was promoting its own best interest"-a legal
position which the Court itself acknowledged that Saint Alphonsus had not
attempted to make.
•

Motion 11: MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Purported Breaches by MRIA of
Fiduciary Duties. !d. at 20. The Court held that Saint Alphonsus could introduce
evidence supporting affirmative defenses, including estoppel and waiver, but held
that "absent an offer of proof to the contrary by Saint Alphonsus, the Court will
preclude Saint Alphonsus from asserting that MRIA has breached a fiduciary duty
allegedly owed to Saint Alphonsus." To the extent Saint Alphonsus seeks to
introduce such an assertion, it will make an offer of proof as the Court ordered.

•

Motion 12: MRIA's Motion in Limine re: Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's
Status as a Former Catholic Nun. !d. at 21. The Court denied MRIA's request to
preclude Saint Alphonsus from mentioning that former CEO Patricia Vandenberg
was a Catholic nun, finding that the probative value was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading
the jury.

•

Motion 13: MRIA's Motion in Limine re: SARMC's Beliefs About Legality of
Withdrawal from MRIA. !d. at 21-22. The Court denied MRIA's request to
preclude testimony about the legality of Saint Alphonsus' s withdrawal from
MIRA, holding that witnesses' beliefs that withdrawal was lawful is relevant to
MRIA's claims. The Court's subsequent decision that dissociation was lawful
bolsters this ruling, and the same should apply on retrial.

•

Motion 15: MRIA's Motion in Limine re: Referring Physicians Designated by
SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses. !d. at 23-24. The Court denied MRIA's
motion, and held that Doctors Mary River, Bruce Anderson, Peter Reedy, Samuel
Gibson, and Marc Meier would be accepted as expert witnesses, so long as Saint
Alphonsus lays a sufficient foundation to qualify them as experts on the topics for
which they will give expert testimony.

•

Motion 16: MRIA's Motion in Limine re: SARMC's Reliance on Advice of
Counsel. !d. at 24-25. MRIA sought to preclude Saint Alphonsus from
introducing evidence related to its reliance on the advice of counsel as a defense
or justification to claims by MRIA. The Court noted that Saint Alphonsus did not
intend to present such a defense, but would be able to introduce Sandra Bruce's
statement that she believed she had the right to withdraw from MRIA-a
statement which the Court earlier held admissible. !d. at 22.
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•

Motion 17: MRIA's Motion in Limine re: Inadvertently Disclosed Privileged
Documents. !d. at 25-26. The Court denied MRIA's motion to exclude from
evidence "handwritten notes, apparently taken by Dr. Prochaska during a meeting
in either late 1999 or early 2000" which MRIA claimed were inadvertently
produced, finding that it could not rule that the notes were confidential
communications under Rule 502 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence.

•

Motion 18: MRIA's Motion in Limine re: Investments by Members ofDMR. !d.
at 27. The Court granted this motion in part and denied it in part, holding that the
"financial status of individual members ofDMR [is] irrelevant to this litigation,"
but that "Saint Alphonsus is permitted to inquire into a witness's particular
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation in order to potentially show
bias," and that "individual investments by members ofDMR outside ofMRIA are
potentially relevant depending on the evidence proffered by MRIA."
Prior Rulings on Motions in Limine Undermined or Mooted by Subsequent

b.

Decisions. The following motions decided as part of the Court's July 30, 2007 decision have

been undermined or mooted outright by subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court or this
Court, and therefore should not be re-instated for purposes of the retrial.
•

Motion 2: Saint Alphonsus's Renewed Motion in Limine re: Lease and
Partnership Term. !d. at 8-10. This motion asked the Court to find that the terms
ofMRI Center and MRI Mobile extended only until2015. The Supreme Court's
decision in this case so held. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI
Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 497, 224 P.3d 1068, 1086 (2009) ("SADC').

•

Motion 3: Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine re: Purchase Price Damages
Theory. July 30, 2007 Op. at 10-12. Saint Alphonsus sought to preclude MRIA
from presenting the "purchase price" damage theory to the jury. The Supreme
Court held that the theory is invalid as a matter of law. SADC, 148 Idaho at 498,
224 P.3d at 1087.

•

Motion 4: Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine re: Dissociation. July 30, 2007
Op. at 12-13. The Court held that MRIA was precluded from arguing that
dissociation was "unlawful, illegal, or a violation of the law," but MRIA could
argue that the dissociation was "wrongful" and a "breach of the MRIA partnership
agreement." Given that the Supreme Court and this Court have found that
dissociation was not wrongful, MRIA should obviously be precluded from
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arguing, in any fashion, that dissociation was wrongful or a breach of the
partnership agreement.

c.

•

Motion 5: MRIA's Motion in Limine Prohibiting SARMC from Introducing
Evidence of its Intent re: Term of the MRIA Partnership. July 30,2007 Op. at 14.
The Court denied MRIA's request to preclude evidence about Saint Alphonsus's
intent with respect to the partnership term of MRIA. Given that this Court has
since held that the MRIA partnership has no definite term, the issue is now moot.
See Nov. 17, 2010 Op. at 9.

•

Motion 14: MRIA's Motion to Strike Gregory S. Vistness. July 30, 2007 Op. at
22-23. This motion related to an expert report discussing MRIA's dismissed
antitrust claims. The Court found the issue was moot given that the antitrust
claims had been dismissed, and the dismissal of those claims was affirmed by the
Supreme Court. SADC, 148 Idaho at 499-501,224 P.3d at 1088-90.

•

Motion 19: Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Charles Wilhoite
in Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine re: Purchase Price Damages
Theory. July 30, 2007 Op. at 27-28. Like Motion 3, this motion addressed the
purchase-price damages theory, which the Supreme Court later found invalid.
SADC, 148 Idaho at 498, 224 P .3d at 1087.

•

Motion 20: MRIA's Motion to Strike Supplemental Affidavit of Gregory S.
Vistnes, Ph.D. July 30, 2007 Op. at 28. Like Motion 14, this motion involved
the now-dismissed antitrust claims and is moot.

Motions in Limine For Which There are Now New Grounds for Relief.

Finally, there are two motions in limine that were previously decided, partially in Saint
Alphonsus's favor and partially in MRIA's. Although the prior rulings should not be revisited,
subsequent Supreme Court and trial court rulings that Saint Alphonsus did not wrongfully
dissociate give rise to new grounds, previously unavailable, for a motion in limine, as discussed
in Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and
Argument that Saint Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew from MRIA (filed April11, 2011). These
motions are as follows:
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•

Motion 1: Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine re: Shattuck Hammond
Memorandum. July 30, 2007 Op. at 6-8. The Court held, in response to this
motion, that (1) language calling dissociation the "scorched earth scenario" as
inadmissible, and that (2) portions of the memorandum regarding legal ad vic
from Givens Pursley was not inadmissible on grounds of attorney-client priv'lege.

•

Motion 9: MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Admissibilit of Shattuck Hammo d
Memorandum. !d. at 18. The Court's opinion merely referred to its ruling o
Motion 1, excluding the "scorched earth" language and declining to exclude ther
portions of the memorandum on attorney-client privilege grounds. See id. at -8.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant Saint Alphonsus's motion in limine and reinstate or decline t
reinstate the evidentiary rulings as described above.

DATED this 11th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04082190
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS
CLAIM FOR ITS PARTNERSHIP
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Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRl LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

COMES NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and
moves this Court pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for an order granting
summary judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care on its claim, as set forth in its
Complaint, for the buy-out price to which it is entitled under Idaho Code § 53-3-701, which
totals $4,600,000 plus 12% statutory interest running from the date of dissociation (April 1,
2004) until the date of payment. This motion is supported by the Court's records and files in this
matter and by the Memorandum in Support filed contemporaneously herewith.
Argument on this motion is requested on or before May 18, 2011, in accordance with this
Court's February 15, 2011 scheduling order.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of April, 2011.

GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 11th day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
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802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON ITS CLAIM FOR
ITS PARTNERSHIP INTEREST

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

This lawsuit began with the filing of an equitable claim by Plaintiff Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care, Inc. seeking recovery of its interest in the MRIA partnership following Saint
Alphonsus's dissociation from the partnership. In findings of fact and conclusions of law issued
after the jury trial, this Court held that the measurement of Saint Alphonsus' s interest in MRIA is
controlled by Idaho Code§ 53-3-701, and that, pursuant to this section, the correct measurement
of that interest, known as the statutory "buyout price," is $4,600,000.
MRIA did not appeal these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and they are therefore
the law of the case. In addition, Idaho Code§ 53-3-701(b) makes clear that Saint Alphonsus is
also entitled to accrued prejudgment interest, at the statutory rate of 12%, "from the date of
dissociation to the date of payment." Accordingly, the Court should enter summary judgment in
favor of Saint Alphonsus on its claim for its partnership share in the amount of $4,600,000 plus
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interest accruing at a rate of 12% per year from the date of dissociation (April 1, 2004) until the
date of satisfaction of the judgment.

BACKGROUND
Saint Alphonsus dissociated from the MRIA partnership effective April 1, 2004.
Approximately one year later, it filed this lawsuit seeking recovery of its financial interest in the
partnership. Concluding that the issue of Saint Alphonsus' s partnership share was based in
equity and therefore within the purview of the Court, rather than the jury, this Court issued
findings of fact and conclusions of law on September 21, 2007.
On the law, this Court rejected MRIA's argument that Article 6 of the partnership
agreement provided the method of calculating the amount due to a dissociating partner. See
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007, at 6. "[T]he buyout
calculation provision contained in Article 6.1 and the payment timing provision contained in
Article 6.2," the Court held, "were only applicable if the partner withdrew under the
circumstances outlined in Article 6.1." ld. Thus, because all agreed that Saint Alphonsus did not
withdraw under the outlined circumstances, "the default provision contained in Idaho Code
section 53-3-701 controls." Id. 1

1

Section 53-3-701(a) states that, following a partner's dissociation, "the partnership shall
cause the dissociated partner's interest in the partnership to be purchased for a buyout price
determined pursuant to subsection (b) of this section." Subsection (b) in turn provides that "[t]he
buyout price of a dissociated partner's interest is the amount that would have been distributable
to the dissociating partner under section 53-3-807(b), Idaho Code, if, on the date of
dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a price equal to the greater of the
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On the facts, the Court credited the testimony of Saint Alphonsus' s valuation expert,
Manfred Steiner, and held that the statutory buyout price amounted to $4,600,000. See Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007, at 4. Because the judgment in favor
of MRIA was greater than the statutory buyout price, the Court offset the buyout price against
the judgment in favor of MIRA. See id. at 6; I.C. § 53-3-701(c) ("[d]amages for wrongful
dissociation ... shall be offset against the buyout price").

ARGUMENT
When a party fails to appeal an adverse ruling, that ruling becomes the law of the case
and cannot be challenged in subsequent proceedings. Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201
P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009). Despite their significant financial consequences, MRIA chose not to
appeal this Court's explicit holdings that (i) the partnership agreement's buyout provisions apply
"only ... if the partner withdrew under the circumstances outlined in Article 6.1 ," (ii) because
Saint Alphonsus did not dissociate under those circumstances, Idaho Code § 53-3-701 governs
the amount due to Saint Alphonsus, and (iii) pursuant to § 53-3-701, the "buyout price" of Saint
Alphonsus's interest in MRIA is $4,600,000. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007, at 4, 6. As a result, MRIA is prohibited by law of the case from
attempting to relitigate any of these holdings on remand.

(continued ... )

liquidation value or the value based on a sale of the entire business as a going concern without
the dissociated partner and the partnership was wound up as ofthat date." I.C. § 53-3-70l(b).
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In addition, Idaho Code§ 53-3-701(b) makes clear that Saint Alphonsus is entitled to
prejudgment interest on the value of its partnership share. That provision, after setting forth the
methodology for determining the dissociated partner's "buyout price," states simply and clearly
that "[i]nterest shall be paid from the date of dissociation to the date of payment." I.C. § 53-3701(b) (emphasis added); see also I.C. § 53-3-701 official cmt. 3 ("[s]ince the buyout price is
based on the value of the business at the time of dissociation, the partnership must pay interest
on the amount due from the date of dissociation until payment to compensate the dissociating

partner for the use of his interest in the firm" (emphasis added)).
This interest accrues at the rate of 12% per year. Specifically, a separate provision of the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act provides that "[i]f an obligation to pay interest arises under this
act and the rate is not specified, the rate is that specified in subsection (1) of section 28-22-104,
Idaho Code." Idaho Code§ 53-3-104(b); see also I.C. § 53-3-701 official cmt. 3 ("Section
104(b) provides that interest shall be at the legal rate unless otherwise provided in the partnership
agreement"). The referenced subsection, which is entitled "LEGAL RATE OF INTEREST," in
turn provides that "interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on the hundred by the
year." Idaho Code§ 28-22-104(1). Here, no provision of the partnership agreement specifies a
different interest rate to be applied when a partner is entitled to a post-dissociation buyout
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 53-3-701, so the "legal rate" of 12% applies.
Accordingly, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to summary judgment on its claim for its
partnership share in an amount of $4,600,000, plus interest accruing at an annual rate of 12%
"from the date of dissociation"-April 1, 2004-until the date of payment.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should grant summary judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus on its claim for
its partnership share in the amount of $4,600,000, plus accrued interest at the statutory rate of
12% per year from April 1, 2004, through the date of satisfaction of the judgment.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 11th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

nter-Defendants
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Donald B. Ayer
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388
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CENTER AND MRI MOBILE'S
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
CLAIMS

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), and move this
Court pursuant to Rule 56 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for an order granting summary
judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus on MRI Center and MRI Mobile's claims for reliefunder
Claim One (entitled "Breach of Contract and Wrongful Dissociation") and Claim Five (entitled
"Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing"), which are premised on MRI Center and
MRI Mobile's alleged status as third-party beneficiaries of the MRI Associates general
partnership agreement. This motion is supported by the Court's records and files in this matter
and by the Memorandum in Support filed contemporaneously herewith.
Argument on this motion is requested on or before May 18, 2011, in accordance with this
Court's February 15, 2011 scheduling order.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRl LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
INTRODUCTION

When MRlA amended its counterclaim following remand from the Supreme Court, it
alleged-for the first time in this litigation-that MRI Center and MRI Mobile, the two limited
partnerships that provide MRI services under MRlA's management, are third-party beneficiaries
of the MRIA general partnership agreement. Under Idaho law, however, an entity is a thirdparty beneficiary of a contract only if that contract is made primarily for its benefit. Here, the
MRIA partnership agreement, by its terms, is a formative agreement defining the duties and
obligations that the MRIA general partners owe amongst themselves. The agreement was thus
made primarily for the general partners' benefit, not the benefit of Center and Mobile. Indeed, if
anything, the contract establishes that Center and Mobile were created to benefit MRIA, and not
the other way around.
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BACKGROUND
A.

Statement of Undisputed Facts

MRIA is an Idaho general partnership created on April 26, 1985, by Saint Alphonsus,
certain other hospitals and a consortium of physicians known as Doctors Magnetic Resonance,
Inc. ("DMR"), pursuant to a written partnership agreement whose purpose was to "form [the]
general partnership." Trial Ex. 4023, preamble; see also Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.
v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479,483,224 P.3d 1068, 1072 (2009).

Consistent with its formative nature, the MRIA partnership agreement sets forth the
structure and operation of the partnership, and the rights and obligations of the partners to one
another. Thus, Article 1 establishes MRIA's effective date and term, the location of its offices,
the identities of its partners, the name of the partnership, and its business purpose. Trial Ex.
4023. Article 2 establishes a management fee that will be paid to MRIA by the limited
partnership it intends to create, and describes how that fee will be allocated among the MRIA
partners. !d. Article 3 describes the MRIA partners' capital contributions. !d. Article 4 defines
how the partnership's cash flow is to be distributed. !d. Article 5 details how the partners shall
manage MRIA. !d. Article 6 relates to withdrawals from the partnership. !d. Article 7 sets
forth conditions for the transfer of general partnership interests. !d. Article 8 defines certain
special duties owed to the partnership by DMR, one of the general partners. !d. Article 9
imposes certain obligations on the general partners not to compete with partnership. !d. Finally,
Article 10 sets forth provisions governing the dissolution of the general partnership. !d.
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MRIA and others subsequently created the limited partnerships MRI Center and MRI
Mobile. SADC, 148 Idaho at 483, 224 P.3d at 1072. Center and Mobile each has its own
limited partnership agreement setting forth the rights and duties owed to one another by the
parties to those agreements. See Trial Exs. 4024 & 4028.
B.

Procedural History

Prior to the first trial, MRIA asserted a series of claims against Saint Alphonsus,
including several breach-of-contract claims. It also purported to assert a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty on behalf of Center and Mobile. Nowhere in any ofMRIA's pleadings did MRIA
allege that Center and Mobile were intended third-party beneficiaries of the MRIA partnership
agreement.
On remand from the Supreme Court, this Court permitted MRIA to amend its pleading in
light ofthe Supreme Court's decision, and on March 22, 2010, MRIA filed its Third Amended
Counterclaim. In this new pleading, MRIA formally joined Center and Mobile as additional
counterclaimants. In addition to reasserting the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim that MRIA had
unsuccessfully tried to bring on Center's and Mobile's behalf in the first trial, the new
counterclaim alleged for the first time that Center and Mobile are third-party beneficiaries of the
MRIA partnership agreement, and asserted claims by Center and Mobile for breach of that
agreement. See 3d Am. Countercl.

~

69 (asserting third-party-beneficiary claim for wrongful

dissociation and breach ofthe MRIA partnership agreement's non-compete clause); id.

~

84

(asserting third-party-beneficiary claim for breach of the MRIA partnership agreement's
covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
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ARGUMENT

While MRIA expressly asserted claims "on behalf of' Center and Mobile prior to and
during the first trial, see 2d Am. Countercl., it never once-until the filing of its Third Amended
Counterclaim last year-mentioned Center's and Mobile's alleged status as third-party
beneficiaries ofthe MRIA partnership agreement. Yet now, although MRI Center and MRI
Mobile are distinct entities organized and operated pursuant to their own partnership agreements,
MRIA purports to have belatedly realized that these entities are in fact intended beneficiaries of
the MRIA general partnership agreement made between DMR and the hospital partners. The
limited partnerships' newly minted claims for breach of contract fail as a matter of law, however,
because the written MRIA partnership agreement unambiguously forecloses the possibility that
the parties to that agreement intended to confer third-party beneficiary status upon the limited
partnerships.
"The test for determining a party's status as a third-party beneficiary is whether the
agreement reflects an intent to benefit the third party." Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 687,
183 P.3d 771, 775 (2008) (internal citation omitted); see also Idaho Code§ 29-102 (allowing a
third party to enforce "a contract[] made expressly for the [third party's] benefit"). "The third
party must show the contract was made primarily for his benefit; it is not sufficient that the third
party is a mere incidental beneficiary to the contract." Partout, 145 Idaho at 687, 183 P.3d at
775 (emphasis added). "The intent to benefit the third party must be expressed in the contract
itself," and "circumstances surrounding the contract's formation are only considered when the
contract is ambiguous as to the intent to benefit a third party." !d. at 687 & n.3, 183 P.3d at 775
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& n.3; see also Fenwick v. Idaho Dep 't ofLands, 144 Idaho 318, 323-24, 160 P.3d 757, 762-63

(2007); Idaho Power Co. v. Hulet, 140 Idaho 110, 112-13,90 P.3d 335, 337-38 (2004). An oftcited example of third-party-beneficiary status is found in Just's Inc. v. Arrington Construction
Co., 99 Idaho 462,463, 583 P.2d 997, 998 (1978), in which a contract between the city ... and a

construction company contained a provision that "specifically" conferred a benefit on a class of
area businesses by "requir[ing] the construction company to take precautions to limit the
disruption to th[ose] businesses." Idaho Power Co., 140 Idaho at 113, 90 P.3d at 338 (discussing
Just's).

Here, several factors, taken together, demonstrate as a matter of law that "the contract
itself' (the MRIA partnership agreement) does not reflect the requisite "intent to benefit" Center
and Mobile. First, the very nature of the MRIA partnership agreement undermines any
suggestion that Center and Mobile-two entities that did not yet even exist when the agreement
was executed-are third-party beneficiaries. The contract at issue comprises articles of
partnership creating the MRIA partnership and setting forth the rights and duties of the MRIA
partners to one another. It would be extremely unusual for such a formative document,
governing the internal relations of a new business entity, to be made primarily for the benefit of
other entities. See, e.g., Laclede Inv. Corp. v. Kaiser, 596 S.W.2d 36,43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that partnership agreement identifying a company as the source of a loan to the
partnership did not confer third-party-beneficiary status on that company because "[t]he entire
partnership agreement dealt with the interrelationship between the partnership and its members").
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Second, the MRIA partnership agreement neither states an intent to benefit Center and
Mobile nor contains any promise to confer a benefit upon them. To be sure, the MRIA
partnership agreement contemplates the formation of a limited partnership by providing that
"[t]his Partnership intends to promote and organize an Idaho limited partnership," which,
"[w]hen formed, ... shall have the same purpose as this Partnership," Partnership Agreement

§ 1.6, and further stating that the limited partnership agreement will provide for the payment of a
management fee to MRIA, see id. § 2.1. But neither the mere recognition of a transaction
involving a third party, nor the fact that a third party might incidentally benefit from a contract
between others, suffices to confer third-party beneficiary status. See, e.g., Partout, 145 Idaho at
687, 183 P.3d at 775; Blickenstaffv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 579, 97 P.3d 439, 446 (2004);

Laclede Inv. Corp., 596 S.W.2d at 43. If it did, enforceable contract rights would arise by
accident, simply through contractual references to third parties having some connection to the
subject of the contract.

Just's v. Annington is instructive insofar as the Supreme Court's discussion of the
language ofthe contract there demonstrates the sort of specificity-completely absent here-that
is needed to confer third-party-beneficiary status on a non-signatory. In particular, the contract
in Just's quite explicitly spelled out certain duties that the contractor owed to the area businesses
held to be third-party beneficiaries: the contract required the contractor, for example, to "keep
the businesses within the project area advised of his proposed schedule," to "continuously and
courteously provide[]" "[a]ccess to and from the various businesses," and to "protect the
adjacent businesses" from harm. Just's, 99 Idaho at 465-66, 583 P.2d at 1000-01 (quoting
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contractual language, emphasis added by Just's). And the contract emphasized that the parties to
the contract "intended that ... the amount of disruption to the downtown businesses be as
minimal as possible." !d. (quoting contractual language, emphasis added by Just's). While the
MRIA partnership agreement does note the partners' intent to create Center, see Trial Ex. 4023

§ 1.6, the agreement is devoid of any language requiring the partners "to take specific steps"
(Just's, 99 Idaho at 466, 583 P.2d at 1001) to benefit Center and Mobile in any way.
In contrast, contracts with language similar to the MRIA partnership agreement have
been held not to confer third-party beneficiary status. In Laclede Investment, for example,
various entities had executed an agreement to form a limited partnership for the purpose of
completing construction of an apartment project. 596 S.W.2d at 38-39. The partnership
agreement contemplated that the project would be funded by a loan from an affiliate of one of
the partners, and even incorporated by reference the applicable loan agreement. !d. at 39. When
the partnership abandoned the project and defaulted on the loan, the lender sued as an alleged
third-party beneficiary of the partnership agreement's term calling for completion of the project.

!d. at 40. The court held that this claim failed as a matter oflaw, even though the lender would
obviously have benefited by performance of the contract. The court ruled that "[t]here [wa]s
nothing in ... the limited partnership agreement which require[ d the] defendants to perform any
promise to [the lender]," and it was not enough that the parties to the contract had "a generalized
intention to advance [the lender's] interest or to promote its welfare." !d. at 43-44. They must
manifest an intention to give the third party enforceable rights under the contract.
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Similarly, the court found no third-party beneficiary status as a matter of law in Russell v.
Birmingham Oxygen Service, Inc., 408 So. 2d 90 (Ala. 1981 ). There, in connection with their

sale of an oxygen business, the defendants had executed a non-competition agreement in which
they promised not to compete with the purchaser for a period of ten years. !d. at 92. The
purchaser thereafter operated the acquired oxygen business through a wholly owned subsidiary.

!d. After the defendants set up a competing oxygen business during the non-compete period, the
subsidiary-i.e., the company engaging in the business purchased from the defendants-sued as
a third-party beneficiary of the non-competition agreement. !d. at 92-93. The claim failed as a
matter oflaw, the court held, because the agreement's promise not to compete had been given to
the contracting parent, not to its non-party subsidiary. !d. at 93.
In this case, too, none of the handful of provisions referencing a limited partnership
constitutes a promise to confer a benefit on that limited partnership. In other words, unlike the
paradigmatic example of the construction company in Just's, but like the partnership agreement
in Laclede Investment and the non-competition agreement in Birmingham Oxygen, the MRIA
partnership agreement provides no indication that the parties were intending through the MRIA
partnership agreement to confer enforceable rights on the limited partnership entities that they
planned to create in the future. Indeed, if anything, the MRIA partnership agreement expressly
contemplates that the limited partnerships would be created solely to benefit MRIA, and not the
other way around.
Third, the parties' failure to give the limited partnerships enforceable rights under the

MRIA partnership agreement is quite sensible, since Center and Mobile have their own limited
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t

partnership agreements which define the rights and duties between all parties concerned,
including those between the limited partnerships and their general partner, MRIA. See Trial Exs.
4024 & 4028. Those agreements, and not the MRIA partnership agreement, define the rights of
the limited partnerships in relation to MRIA and its partners. By trying to claim third-partybeneficiary status under the MRIA partnership agreement, the limited partnerships are simply
attempting to make an end run around the more limited rights conferred by their own limited
partnership agreements.
For these reasons, the MRIA partnership agreement as a matter oflaw fails to "express[]"
an "intent to benefit" Center and Mobile, and was not "made primarily for [their] benefit." As a
result, these limited partnerships have no rights under that agreement, and their claims for breach
of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION

Because the MRIA Partnership Agreement was not, as a matter of law, made primarily
for the benefit of either MRI Center or MRI Mobile, neither Center nor Mobile may claim to be
third-party beneficiaries of that agreement. As a result, the Court should grant summary
judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus on Center and Mobile's third-party beneficiary claims.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 11th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), and move this
Court for a motion in limine prohibiting MRIA from arguing or presenting evidence in support
of claims of misappropriation, libel, or wrongful dissociation-either as independent claims, or
in support of the conspiracy claim set forth in MRIA's Third Amended Counterclaim, as
specified in the Memorandum in Support filed contemporaneously herewith. This motion is
supported by the Court's records and files in this matter and by the Memorandum in Support
filed contemporaneously herewith.
Argument on this motion is requested on or before May 18,2011, in accordance with this
Court's February 15, 2011 scheduling order.
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
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ISTARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE
CLAIMS OF MISAPPROPRIATION,
DEFAMATION OR WRONGFUL
DISSOCIATION

Defendant.

ORIG\NA 1
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO
EXCLUDE CLAIMS OF MISAPPROPRIATION, DEFAMATION OR WRONGFUL
DISSOCIATION - 1
000966

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
As this Court recognized, three of the claims underlying MRIA's conspiracy claim have
been dismissed, and a motion in limine is necessary to determine evidentiary issues related to
those claims. See Nov. 17, 2010 Order at 18 n.3. Specifically, MRIA voluntarily dismissed its
misappropriation and defamation claims with prejudice prior to the first trial, and this Court
subsequently dismissed MRIA's wrongful dissociation claim. !d. at 13, 17. Because MRIA
therefore cannot base its claim for civil conspiracy on these acts, see id. at 17-18, the Court
should preclude MRIA from arguing or presenting evidence in support of these claims.

BACKGROUND
MRIA's now-superseded Second Amended Counterclaim asserted twenty claims against
both Saint Alphonsus and the former third-party defendants-Gem State Radiology ("GSR"),
Intermountain Imaging ("IMI"), and Imaging Center Radiologists ("ICR"). 2d Am. Countercl.
~~

1-6. These included claims for "Misappropriation of Trade Secret," "Common Law

Misappropriation," and "Procuring Information By Improper Means" (collectively, the
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"misappropriation claims"), asserted against Saint Alphonsus and IMI, and a single defamation
claim (libel per se) asserted against GSR. !d.

~~

133-36, 150-162. In 2007, Saint Alphonsus and

the third-party defendants filed motions for summary judgment on all of these claims. Instead of
responding to those motions, MRIA "voluntarily dismiss[ed]" these claims "with prejudice."
Notice ofVoluntary Dismissal Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41(A)(1) at 2-3 (May 22, 2007). 1
MRIA's Third Amended Counterclaim omits the dismissed misappropriation and
defamation causes of action but continues to assert the underlying conduct as part of a purported
cause of action for "Civil Conspiracy." See 3d Am. Countercl.

~

99 (alleging that Saint

Alphonsus "conspired with" the former third-party defendants "to harm" MRIA by means of
"defamation" and "misappropriation of trade secret or confidential information."). MRIA also
alleges that the civil conspiracy involved "wrongfully withdrawing from MRIA." !d. On Saint
Alphonsus's motion, this Court on November 19, 2010, held that MRIA cannot premise its civil
conspiracy claim on evidence ofthese acts. See Nov. 17,2010 Order at 17-18.
ARGUMENT
I.

MRIA SHOULD BE PROHIBITED FROM PRESENTING ARGUMENT OR
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DISMISSED CLAIMS AT TRIAL
Because MRIA and this Court dismissed with prejudice MRIA's claims of

misappropriation, defamation, and wrongful dissociation, this Court properly held that MRIA
may not in effect reinstate these claims through a cause of action for conspiracy. And because

1

This voluntary dismissal occurred while GSR, IMI, and ICR were still parties to the
litigation. MRIA settled its remaining claims against the third-party defendants on July 20,
2007. See Stip. for Dismissal of 3d Party Defs. With Prejudice (July 20, 2007).
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MRIA may not do that, any evidence directed solely to that conduct has no place at trial. It will
serve no probative purpose, and is very likely to unfairly prejudice Saint Alphonsus.
As this Court previously noted, where liability for the underlying tort has been dismissed,
there can be no claim for civil conspiracy. Nov. 19,2010 Order at 13-14 (citing Rogers v. Dallas
Morning News, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a civil conspiracy to

commit libel claim was properly dismissed on summary judgment where the underlying libel
claim was dismissed on summary judgment for truth); and Kelly v. Diocese of Corpus Christi,
832 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a civil conspiracy to commit slander was
properly dismissed where a directed verdict was granted to the opposing party on the underlying
slander claim)). This is true even with respect to MRIA's voluntary dismissal ofthe
misappropriation and defamation claims with prejudice, since "the effect of a Rule 41 stipulation
of dismissal with prejudice" is to invoke the "doctrine of res judicata ... as if the parties had
proceeded to trial" and the dismissing party had lost on the merits. Kawai Farms, Inc. v.
Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 614, 826 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1992); see also Saint Alphonsus's Aug. 6,

2010 Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Judgment on the Civil Conspiracy Claim at 6-7.
"Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Idaho R. Evid. 402. Here, evidence
of these previously dismissed torts--claims no longer in the case-is completely irrelevant and
should be excluded on that basis alone. Accordingly, any evidence-whether documents or
testimony-offered in an effort to show that Saint Alphonsus engaged in acts of defamation,
misappropriation, or wrongful dissociation is irrelevant to any unresolved disputed issue.
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In addition, the presentation of argument or evidence in support of these claims would be
highly prejudicial to Saint Alphonsus and would confuse the jury. Even relevant evidence can be
excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." Idaho R. Evid. 403. Here, irrelevant allegations
or evidence of Saint Alphonsus' s supposed misappropriation of trade secrets, defamation, and
alleged wrongful dissociation would be both irrelevant and highly prejudicial, and on that
account should be foreclosed by an order of the Court?

II.

THESE ISSUES CAN BE ADDRESSED BY A SIMPLE ORDER FORECLOSING
CERTAIN SPECIFIC CONTENTIONS AT ODDS WITH PRIOR
DETERMINATIONS IN THIS CASE
The Court should issue an order precluding MRIA from contending that any alleged acts

of defamation, misappropriation, or wrongful dissociation are a basis for liability, or are
themselves improper acts evidencing or giving support to MRIA' s conspiracy claim.
Specifically, this Court should order that MRIA may not:
•

state or imply that Saint Alphonsus, GSR, IMI, or ICR libeled MRIA (i.e., that
these entities made false, damaging statements about MRIA), or that Saint
Alphonsus participated in a conspiracy to libel MRIA; or

•

contend that Saint Alphonsus misappropriated trade secret or confidential
information from MRIA, improperly conveyed such information to another,

2

MRIA also dismissed four other claims with prejudice, in addition to those mentioned
in its conspiracy claim. See Notice ofVoluntary Dismissal Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4l(A)(l) at 2-3
(May 22, 2007) (dismissing conversion, Idaho Consumer Protection Act, and Restraint of Trade
under Idaho Code§ 48-606 claims); Trial Tr. at 2824 (dismissing spoliation claim). Unlike the
conspiracy-related claims, MRIA did not reassert these dismissed causes of action in its Third
Amended Counterclaim, but should MRIA attempt to argue or introduce trial evidence arising
out of these dismissed claims, Saint Alphonsus will raise objections as appropriate.
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procured information from MRIA using improper means, or participated in a
conspiracy to do any of those things; or
•

contend that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully withdrew from the MRIA partnership;
or

•

make any other allegation of impropriety relating to acts of misappropriation,
defamation, or dissociation from MRIA.

A number of exhibits and assertions relating to these resolved issues can reasonably be
anticipated, because they were presented at the first trial. The Court's order should therefore
foreclose several specific violations of the foregoing principles. Specifically, this Court should
order that MRIA may not:
•

contend that Ex. 4533, a January 4, 2005 letter signed by Jeffrey Seaboum, was a
libelous letter, that SARG/GSR sent the same allegedly libelous "letter to
hundreds of referring physicians," that by not timely retracting the letter Saint
Alphonsus committed libel, that Saint Alphonsus conspired with SARG/GSR to
commit that same libel, or any similar allegation, see 3d Am. Countercl. ~~ 49-51,
98-99; Trial Tr. at 3727-31;

•

characterize any disparaging comments or references to "technical limitations" of
MRIA's equipment by the radiologists as libelous, see, e.g., Trial Tr. at 2388-89
(Hopkins);

•

refer to the portions of Trial Exhibit 4138 (January 5, 2005 document discussing a
"Scenario 5") or Trial Exhibits 4234 or 4239 (August 31, 2001 and October 1,
2004 Shattuck Hammond memoranda) discussed in Saint Alphonsus's
Memorandum in Support of its Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and
argument that Saint Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew From MRIA, or similar
documents; or

•

introduce testimony from witnesses to argue that withdrawal was wrongful or to
suggest that Saint Alphonsus knew it was not allowed to withdraw, see, e.g., Trial
Tr. at 1819-30, 1863-66 (Bruce); Trial Tr. at 2295-98, 3563-64 (Schamp).
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CONCLUSION
This Court should grant Saint Alphonsus's motion and prohibit MRIA from submitting
evidence of, or contending that Saint Alphonsus engaged in misappropriation, libel, or wrongful
dissociation as either independent claims for relief or in support ofMRIA's civil conspiracy
claim.

DATED this 11th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

0

~
0

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION IN
LIMINE RE: REFERENCES TO THE
JURY'S FINDING OF LIABILITY IN
THE FIRST TRIAL

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), and move this
Court for a motion in limine precluding any reference to the jury's findings or verdict from the
first trial of this matter. This motion is supported by the Court's records and files in this matter
and by the Memorandum in Support filed contemporaneously herewith.
Argument on this motion is requested on or before May 18, 2011, in accordance with this
Court's February 15, 2011 scheduling order.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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000974

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

JackS. (;jording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
VS.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
ITS MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
REFERENCES TO THE JURY'S
FINDING OF LIABILITY IN THE
FIRST TRIAL

Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

A year before the previous trial in this matter began, the district court ruled on summary
judgment that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was wrongful because, according to the Court, an
"express provision" of the partnership agreement, Section 6.1, prohibited dissociation except
under limited circumstances concededly inapplicable here. See Saint Alphonsus Diversified
Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, 148 Idaho 479,484,224 P.3d 1068, 1073 (2009) ("SADC').
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Saint Alphonsus had not wrongfully dissociated
in violation of an express provision of the partnership agreement, and further held that the district
court's decision to the contrary, which had been repeatedly placed before the jury, "could have
affected the jury's determination of other causes of action" and thus prejudiced Saint Alphonsus
with respect to all remaining claims. !d. 148 Idaho at 491,224 P.3d at 1080. In light ofthe
erroneous ruling, and the prejudicial effect on Saint Alphonsus, MRIA should be precluded from

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
000977
REFERENCES TO THE JURY'S FINDING OF LIABILITY IN THE FIRST TRIAL - 2

.

'

directly or indirectly informing the jury or making any mention of the finding of liability or
award of damages at the first trial.
ARGUMENT

The fact that the first jury-which had been repeatedly exposed to false statements that
Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated as a matter of law-found Saint Alphonsus liable
for wrongdoing is plainly irrelevant to prove any issue upon retrial, see Idaho R. Evid. 401, and
should be excluded from evidence, see Idaho R. Evid. 402. See also Yeager v. United States,
129 S. Ct. 2360, 2367-68 (2009) (holding that a "mistried count ... hardly makes the existence
of any fact more probable or less probable" (internal punctuation marks omitted)). Moreover,
the primary, if not the only, consequence of placing such information before the new jury would
be to influence that jury to reach a similar result-which would obviously be grossly prejudicial
to Saint Alphonsus given the Supreme Court's express ruling that the first jury's verdict was
prejudicially tainted by legal error. SADC, 148 Idaho at 491, 224 P.3d at 1080. Even if there
were any conceivable relevance of the prior verdict and award in the context of the present
proceeding, such references would have to be excluded because that relevance would be far
outweighed by the prejudicial effect. Idaho R. Evid. 403; see also United States v. Wilkerson,
361 F.3d 717, 734 (2d Cir. 2004) ("it is well within the discretion of the trial judge to disallow
any testimony as to the outcome of the prior trial, where that information would be prejudicial").

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
000978
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CONCLUSION

The Court should preclude MRIA from referring to the jury's findings of liability or
award of damages at the first trial.
DATED this 11th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

(

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 11th day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

DEPUTY

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
("DECLARATORY RELIEF")

Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S SECOND
CLAIM FOR RELIEF ("DECLARATORY RELIEF") - 1
000980

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), and move this
Court pursuant to Rule 56 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for an order granting summary
judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus on MRIA' s second claim for relief (entitled "Declaratory
Relief'). This motion is supported by the Court's records and files in this matter and by the
Memorandum in Support filed contemporaneously herewith.
Argument on this motion is requested on or before May 18, 2011, in accordance with this
Court's February 15, 2011 scheduling order.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 11th day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208)336-9777
Facsimile: (208)336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No CV OC 0408219D
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388
AFFIDAVIT OF JACK S. GJORDING

VS.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada
)
JACKS. GJORDING, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that he is one
of the attorneys for Plaintiff/CounterDefendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("Saint Alphonsus") in the above-entitled matter and makes
this affidavit having personal knowledge of the facts contained herein.
1.

This affidavit is filed in support of (1) Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine To

Exclude Evidence And Argument That Saint Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew From MRIA; and
(2) Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Second Affirmative Defense.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of pages 1 and 16 of Trial Exhibit 4138,

indicating the language that should be excluded from evidence and redacted from the document
if it is presented to the jury, as discussed in Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine To Exclude
Evidence And Argument That Saint Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew From MRIA.

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING, P. 2
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3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a copy of pages 1, 2, and 8 of Trial Exhibit 4234,

indicating the language that should be excluded from evidence and redacted from the document
if it is presented to the jury, as discussed in Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine To Exclude
Evidence And Argument That Saint Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew From MRIA.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a copy of pages 1, 2, and 11 of Trial Exhibit 4239,

indicating the language that should be excluded from evidence and redacted from the document
if it is presented to the jury, as discussed in Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine To Exclude
Evidence And Argument That Saint Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew From MRIA.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a copy of the agreement between MRIA and

former third-party defendants GSR, ICR, and IMI settling MRIA's claims against these entities
in the present matter, as discussed in Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion
for Summary Judgment on its Second Affirmative Defense.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

fore me, a Notary Public, this 11+- day of April,
2011.

Residing at Meridian, Idaho
My Commission Expires: to -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

1/ fttday

of April, 2011, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702
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:::

I~arah !ratley - Engagemen! ~ocumenls
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:

::

Page

<allen.hahn@us.pwcglobal.com>
SARMC .PO-SARMC(SARABRAT)
Wed, Jan 5, 2000 2:40 PM
Engagement Documents

Attached are the documents requested by Cindy and Ken. The report on the IMI
joint venture Is draft; please have Cindy/Helen review and call w/any comments.
We will send a final copy after suggested edits are Incorporated. Also Is
"Scenario 5" which Ken requested based on our reading of the relevant
partnership documents. A FED EX will arrive tomorrow with draft copies of both
documents. Please call if either Ken or Cindy would like to discuss.
regards
(See attached file: Report_IM1_9_1_99_final.doc)(See attached file: Scenario
5.doc)
The Information transmitted is Intended only for the person or entity to which
It Is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. Any
review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action
in reliance upon, this information by persons or entitles other than the
intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this In error, please
contact the sender and delete the material from any computer.

P-1029

EXHIBIT_A_
1
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Confidential Draft for Discussion
Restructuring of MRI Associates General Partnership
Scenario 5
SARMC withdraws from MRI Associates to provide flexibility to form potentially
competing ventures
Considerations

11
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2)

SARMC would be restricted for a period of one year after becoming a
Terminated Partner from engaging in any Competitive Activity (Third
Amendment to Articles ofPartnership, Section 8.1)

3)

A favorable vote of all current members of the Board of Partners can waive
the Partnership's rights with respect to any particular activity and Restricted
Party (Articles ofPartnership, Section 9.4)

4)

The appearance of shifting referrals may potentially result in legal
challenges from GP and LP interest holders, and investigations from State
and Federal authorities

5)

Unless otherwise agreed, SARMC would receive the balance of its .
Partner's capital account at the time of withdrawal (Articles. of Partnership,
Section 6.1)

6)

Withdrawal would not relieve SARMC from any contingent liability in
existence at the time of withdrawal (Articles ofPartnership, Section 6.3)

7)

SARMC would retain limited partnership interests in Idaho and Mobile
SARMC08062.
Office of the CFO
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Memorandum
To:
From:
Date:
Re:

Grant Chamberlain and Michael Hammond
Mike Finnerty and Bill Appleyard
August 30, 2001
St. Alphonsus I MRI Associates Overview

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a concise overview of the dynamics
surrounding the St. Alphonsus/MRI Associates engagement and is organized into the
following sections:
•

Overview of the Engagement

•

Ownership and Operations ofMRl Associates GP and Mfiliates

•

•
•

Ownership Structure
MRl Associates GP ("MRIA")
MRI Center of Idaho LP ("MRICI")

•

MRI Mobile LP ("MRIM")
Overview of the Stakeholders

• St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("SARMC")

•
•

St. Alphonsus Radiology Group ("SARG")
Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc. ("DMR")

•

Other Hospital Investors in MRIA

•
•

Jack Floyd
Others

•

Governance of MRIA

•

Financial Performance

•

Alternatives Considered by St. Alphonsus

•

Current Status

This memorandum is designed to be a working document and provides our understanding
of the current and historical relationship and motivations of and between the stakeholders
as well as the alternatives currently under consideration by St. Alphonsus.

sa 1886 ·

Overview of the Engagement

St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("SARMC") entered into a general partnership,
MRI Associates, GP ("MRIA"), in the early 1980's. MRIA is currently comprised of 4.
hospital general partners and 5 physicians who have formed a separate corporation that

1

EXHIBIT

B

000989

St. Alphonsus Overview
August 22, 2001
Page 2

holds their interests. While the physicians own only 45% ofMRIA, they have 5 of 10 board
votes and the swing vote in the event of a tie vote. MRIA provides MRI services through two
limited partnerships, MRI Center of Idaho LP ("MRICI") whose primary operations are the
provision of MRI services on the campus of SARMC and MRI Mobile LP ("MRIM") which
provides mobile MRI imaging on routes throughout Idaho and into Oregon, Washington
and Nevada.
The radiology group associated with St. Alphonsus, St. Alphonsus Radiology Group
("SARG"), does the reads for the magnet~ on the SARMC campus but does not share in the
profitability of the facility, which is a source of significant aggravation to SARG. This
situation may be further exacerbated by the fact that two of the physician general partners
were founding members of SARG. SARMC would like to share ownership of the magnets
on its campus with SARG and enter into additional joint ventures in adjoining communities
with the practice. Unfortunately, the non-compete agreement contained in General
Partnership Agreement for MRIA precludes SARMC from doing so.
SARMC has been exploring ways to exit MRIA but has met resistance from the other
general partners, particularly the physicians, and from jack Floyd, the recently appointed
CEO ofMRIA. (Reasons for this resistance are discussed later in the memorandum.) From
the correspondence provided, SARMC is frustrated with the situation and is strongly
considering simply withdrawing from MRIA and competing with the exiting MRI facilities
on its own campus after the end of the one-year non-compete agreement. Sld\MC hae heett
Mrlieeti "' eett:Mellhet eWe eptien weald Ukely ett~Jf!BEieP liligtttiea lAth MRV...
SHP has been engaged by SARMC to prepare a Strategic Options Assessment ("SOA")
regarding the options available for achieving their objectives of owning the facilities on
their campus and being permitted to enter into additional joint venture MRI facilities with
SARG. Further, SARMC has made it clear that they cannot use any funds of St. Alphonsus,
nor can they incur debt, to achieve these objectives. As per the engagement agreement,
SHP must deliver the SOA by October 21, 2001. Following the completion of the SOA, SHP
will advise SARMC on a potential transaction involving that ownership stake.
Ownership and Operations of MRI Associates GP and Affiliates

SH 1887

Ownership Structure

MRI Associates GP is the parent company that delivers fixed and mobile MRI services
through two limited· partnerships, MRI Center of idaho LP ("MRICI") and MRI Mobile LP
("MRIM").

2
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Alternatives Considered by St. Alphonsus
Presently SARMC is considering a number of alternatives for achieving their goal of ending
the non-compete associated with their ownership in MRIA so that they can partner with
SARG to provide MRI services on the St. Alphonsus campus and in the surrounding
community. As mentioned previously, under the terms of the non-compete, SARMC must
wait one year after exiting the general partnership before competing in magnetic resonance
imaging within 100 miles of Boise. Ia aaeliaea, there ape "wfeBINl.. te•hltltiell ~eM
eRiidbtg t:he MSV.. M ....... iB U,e eveRt .nat 8P&MC ellitrl the pertaei!IH'lip fer t:he

ei eempefllllg wirh MN!.. aAer the ee el tile IUJtl eempete. 'fJJe Me a'fi'lltliBg tl:te
aetaN Jilllllteleftlhip a,peeme&t te an.e the ,11'81'1~ MI'Rli_.a preWeieMta mee detail.

P'li:f'P881!18

The following is an overview of the options under consideration by SARMC with regard to
negating its non-compete. These options have been reviewed with Givens Pursley, counsel
to SARMC, and we have included their thoughts on the potential litigation involved with
each alternative.
option A: Withdrawal from MRIA

IfM&MC'a wisheliWaal hm :hUUI.. is set deemed Vll'etlsfal, SARMC would be entitled to
the liquidation value of their portion of the investment and, after a period of one year,
would be able to compete in the Boise market. (It has been reported that DMR offered to
accept $2.5 million to vote to waive the non-compete agreement and allow SARMC to open
other centers.) iANAC hae FefefNa te dHs ae their "eeerefi.ed eafthaeeftttl'ie." Ghet~~~
Pweley eelievee ti.lat theFe weuhllikety he Hti~eft .. t:e wfteeher tlte tel"ftriflatl&fl wae
WFB&gful llRS that teeFe may 'he 8 Fiek • s~. J'dpheBBU8 &reaefitl'lg he SEhtd:ery respeftlrihHity
te the bP&. Under this scenario SHP would not receive a success fee.
option B: Sell to a HosfJital Partner

Under this scenario, SARMC would sell its interests in MRIA and the LPs to a current
hospital owner (i.e. MedNow, HRMC or Healthtrust). This would allow SARMC to compete
with MRIA after a period of one year, but it is thought that they would not receive fair
market value for their stake in such a transaction.

Option C: Transfer MRIA ownership to an "Affiliate"
SARMC ha~ considered the sale of their ownership in MRIA to an affiliate that it would
subsequently sever ties (either through sale, divesture, etc.) with the affiliate. Under this
option SARMC would be allowed to compete after a period of one year, but SARMC would

SH 1893
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Memorandum

To:
From:
Date:
Re:

Grant Chamberlain and Michael Hammond
Mike Finnerty and Bill Appleyard
September 25, 2001
St. Alphonsus I MRI Associates Overview

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a concise overview of
the dynamics surrounding the St. Alphonsus/MRI Associates
engagement and is organized into the following sections:
•

Overview of the Engagement

•

ownership and Operations of MRI Associates GP and Affiliates
Ownership Structure
MRI Associates GP ("MRIA")
• MRI Center of Idaho LP ("MRICI")
• MRI Mobile LP ( "MRIM")

•

Overview of the Stakeholders
• St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ( "SARMC")
• Gem State Radiology ( "GSR")
• Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc. ( "DMR")
• Other Hospital Investors in MRIA
Jack Floyd
• Others

•

Governance of MRIA

•

Financial Performance

•

Alternatives Considered by St. Alphonsus

•

CUrrent Status

This memorandum is designed to be a working document and provides
our understanding of the current and historical relationship and
motivations of and between the stakeholders as well as the
alternatives currently under consideration by st·. Alphonsus.
Overview of the Engagemen1":
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St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("SARMC") entered into a
general partnership, MRI Associates, GP ["MRIA"), in the early
1980's. MRIA is currently comprised of 4 hospital general partners
and 5 physicians who have formed a separate corporation that holds
their interests. While the physicians own only 45% of MRIA, they
have 5 of 10 board votes and the swing vote in the event of a tie
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vote. MRIA provides MRI services through two limited partnerships,
MRI Center of Idaho LP ("MRICI") whose primary operations are the
provision of MRI services on the campus of SARMC and MRI Mobile LP
("MRIM") which provides mobile MRI imaging on routes throughout
Idaho and into Oregon, Washington and Nevada.
The radiology group associated with St. Alphonsus, Gem State
Radiology ("GSR"), does the reads for the magnets on the SARMC
campus but does not share in the profitability of the facility,
which is a source of significant aggravation to GSR. This
situation may be further exacerbated by the fact that two of the
physician general partners were founding members of GSR. SARMC
would like to share ownership of the magnets on its campus with GSR
and enter into additional joint ventures in adjoining communities
with the practice. Unfortunately, the non-compete agreement
contained in General Partnership Agreement for MRIA precludes SARMC
from doing so.
SARMC has been exploring ways to exit MRIA but has met resistance
from the other general partners, particularly the physicians, and
from Jack Floyd, the recently appointed CEO of MRIA. (Reasons for
this resistance are discussed later in the memorandum.) From the
correspondence provided, SARMC is frustrated with the situation and
is strongly considering simply withdrawing from MRIA and competing
with the exiting MRI facilities on its own campus after the end of 1
the one-year no~-com?ete agreement.
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SHP has been engaged by SARMC to prepare a Strategic Options
Assessment ("SOA") regarding the options available for achieving
their objectives of owning the facilities on their campus and being
permitted to enter into additional joint venture MRI facilities
with GSR. Further, SARMC has made it clear that they cannot use
any funds of St. Alphonsus, nor can they incur debt, to achieve
these objectives. As per the engagement agreement, SHP must
deliver the SOA by October 21, 2001. Following the completion of
the SOA, SHP will advise SARMC on a potential transaction involving
that ownership stake.
Ownership and Operations of MRI Associates GP and Affiliates

Ownership Structure
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Alternatives Considered by St. Alphonsus

Presently SARMC is considering a number of alternatives for
achieving their goal of ending the non-compete associated with
their ownership in MRIA so that they can partner with GSR to
provide MRI services on the St. Alphonsus campus and in the
surrounding community.
As mentioned previously, under the terms
of the non-compete, SARMC must wait one year after exiting the
general partnership before competing in magnetic resonance imaging
within 100 miles of Boise.
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The following is an overview of the options under consideration by
SARMC with regard to negating its non-compete. These options have
been reviewed with Givens Pursley, counsel to SARMC, and we have
included their thoughts on the potential litigation involved with
each alternative.
Option A: Withdrawal from MRIA
tf HaUtE!' s ·,..'i'tftd!!'&\1'&~ frEMII MR:IA is aee tieemee 'Jlf&B!Jf'dl, SARMC would
be entitled to the liquidation value of their portion of the
investment and, after a period of one year, would be able to
compete in the Boise market. (It has been reported that DMR
offered to accept $2.5 million to vote to waive the non-compete
agreement and allow SARMC to open other centers.) Sk~!G see
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Under this scenario SHP would not receive a success fee.
Option B: Sell to a Hospital Partner

Under this scenario, SARMC would sell its interests in MRIA and the
LPs to a current hospital owner (i.e. MedNow, HRMC or Healthtrust).
This would allow SARMC to compete with MRIA after a period of one
year, but it is thought that they would not receive fair market
value for their stake in such a transaction.
Option C: Transfer MRIA ownership to an "Affiliate"
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS

Recitals
MRI Associates, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, MRI Limited
Partnership, an Idaho Limited Partnership, doing business as MRI Center of Idaho, MRI Mobile
Limited Partnership, an Idaho Limited Partnership, ISOSCAN LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability
Company, Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Andrew R. Curran, M.D.,
David J. Giles, M.D., John M. Havlina, M.D., Thomas E. Henson, M.D., James M. Prochaska,
M.D., Mednow, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Dominican Sisters of Ontario, Inc., an Oregon
corporation, and West Valley Medical Center, Inc., an Idaho corporation (collectively ''Third
Party Plaintiff"), filed a Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third Party
Complaint on or about March 7, 2006 ("Third Party Complaint"), against Intermountain Medical
Imaging, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company; Gem State Radiology LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership;
Defendants").

and

Imaging

Center Radiologist,

LLP (collectively "Third

Party

A copy of the Third Party Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" for

reference and incorporated herein.
Third Party Plaintiff, and their successors, representatives, assigns, agents,
officers,

directors,

partners,

shareholders

members,

servants,

employees,

attorneys,

indemnitors, and insurers, subsidiaries, and affiliated business enterprises, and their heirs,
estates, representatives, and any and all persons acting for, by, through, or in any way on
behalf of said persons and entities, are hereby collectively referred to as Releasor.
3.
officers,

Third Party Defendants, and their successors, representatives, assigns, agents,
directors,

partners,

shareholders,

members,

servants,

employees,

attorneys,

indemnitors, and insurers, subsidiaries, and their heirs, estates, representatives, and any and
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all persons acting for, by, through, or in any way on behalf of said released persons (except
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, its affiliates (other than Third Party Defendants),
parent companies, or subsidiaries, hereinafter "St. Alphonsus"), are hereby collectively referred
to as Releasees.
4.

The Parties desire to resolve their disputes through this Settlement Agreement

and Release of All Claims herein.
Be it known that Releasor for the following consideration:

(1) The sum of EIGHT

HUNDRED AND TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND AND 00/100 DOLLARS ($825,000.00) payable to
Releasor within fourteen (14) days of the signing of this release and dismissal of all claims
against Releasees With Prejudice; and, (2) That the Physicians identified as medical doctors
employed by Third Party Defendants will refrain from discussing the substance of this case or
their testimony prior to completion of the trial with representatives, including counsel for either
Saint Alphonsus or MRI Associates LLP, unless they have been properly served with and are
responding to a subpoena (It is understood by the parties that St. Alphonsus representatives,
including counsel, may confer with Jeff Cliff, Executive Director of IMI, relative to this litigation.
It is agreed that such communications between Mr. Cliff and St. Alphonsus' representatives
related to the substance of Jeffrey Cliff and the Physicians' testimony shall not be passed on by
Mr. Cliff to the Physicians.), does acknowledge and hereby releases, acquits, and forever
discharges Releasees of and from all claims of every kind and demands of every and whatever
kind, name or nature, known or unknown, contingent or mature, in tort, contract, based in
statute, based in common law, any claim involving extra contractual claims, conspiracy,
monopoly, having to do with, arising, arisen, to arise, or in any way which may arise out of or by
reason of or related to the allegations and events contained in the Third Party Complaint and as
set forth in Exhibit "A" to this Release of all Claims.
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It is understood and agreed that this settlement is a compromise of a doubtful and
disputed claim, that the payment made is voluntary and is not to be construed as an admission
of liability on the part of Releasees, and that said Releasees deny liability therefor and intend
merely to avoid further litigation and buy their peace. This Settlement Agreement and Release
of All Claims is made and entered into as a free and voluntary act of Releasor in the exercise of
Releasor's own judgment, belief, and knowledge of the nature, extent, and duration of said
claims and damages and is not made or entered into under the influence of Releasees, or any
of them, or any attorney, representative, agent, or any other person acting for, through, or on
behalf of any of Releasees, and no Releasee or any other person has induced or influenced
Releasor to make this settlement or execute this Settlement Agreement and Release of All
Claims.
Releasor and Releasee agree that the release provided for herein does not extend to
nor discharge any liability of any other tortfeasor, co-conspirator, or co-actor, including
specifically St. Alphonsus.
If Releasees are joint tortfeasors, are joint signatories to any contract, are co-owners of
any entity, have acted in concert, have acted in a conspiracy with any person, firm, corporation,
partnership, not for profit entity, charitable entity, or any other entity, in such an event Releasor
releases that portion or share of the cause of action which Releasor has against Releasees and
discharges any and all damages attributable to Releasees in any such cause of action, without
in any way discharging or releasing that portion of the cause of action attributable to any portion
of the cause of action attributable to any party other than Releasees who have caused injury as
a result of the allegations in the Third Party Compliant as set forth in Exhibit "A".
Releasor does hereby credit and satisfy that portion of the total amount of damages of
Releasor that may have been caused by the negligence, actions, fault, or activities, if any, of
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Releasees as hereinafter may be determined in a future trial or other disposition of these
matters, and Releasor does hereby release and discharge that fraction, portion, pro rata share,
and percentage of the total causes of action and claims of Releasor for damages against
Releasees which shall hereinafter by further trial, settlement, or other disposition of these
matters, be determined to be the sum of the portion, fraction, pro rata share, or percentage of
causal negligence, breach of contract or extra contractual claims, any joint and several liability
as it applies to Releasees, and/or any other form of fault for which Releasees are found,
determined, or by way of stipulation or agreement may be liable.
Any damages recovered or recoverable by Releasor against any other joint tortfeasor
shall be reduced in amount by the ratio, portion, pro rata share, or percentage of causal
negligence, contractual liability, any claims arising from joint activities, or in any form for fault for
which Releasees are found liable as may be determined in a future trial or other disposition of
these matters including agreement or settlement by other parties.
Releasor further agrees to have executed on Releasor's behalf a Stipulation for
Dismissal with Prejudice, or agree to a Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice at Releasees
request, with each party to bear its own attorney fees and costs, in that action filed in the
District Court for the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada,
captioned:
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 04082190

Plaintiff,

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership, on its own behalf, and on behalf of
MRI Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership, and
MRI Mobile Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counterclaimant,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC, an Idaho nonprofit corporation;
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER,
Counterdefendants.

MRl ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,
Third Party Plaintiff,

v.
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,
Third Party Defendants.

Releasor further declares and represents that no promise, inducement, or agreement
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not herein expressed has been made to Releasor, that this Settlement Agreement and Release
of All Claims contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto, and that the terms of
this release are contractual and not a mere recital.
If any action or proceeding is instituted to enforce or construe any provision of this
Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims, the prevailing party in such action or
proceeding shall be entitled to recover from any party or parties against whom a judgment is
entered, all reasonable attorney fees, paralegal fees and costs incurred by the prevailing party
in connection with such action or proceeding in addition to such other relief to which such
prevailing party is entitled.
Releasor has read the foregoing Release and Indemnity Agreement and fully
understands it.
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DATED this _ _ day of June, 2007.

RELEASORS:
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
company

By:
Title:

MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited
partnership, d/b/a MRI Center of Idaho

By:
Title:

MRI MOBILE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho
limited partnership

By:
Title:

ISOSCAN LLC, an Idaho limited liability company

By:
Title:

-------------~--·-

DOCTORS MAGNETIC RESONANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation

By:
Title:

ANDREW R. CURRAN, M.D.
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DAVID J. GILES, M.D.

JOHN M. HAVLINA, M.D.

THOMAS E. HENSON, M.D.

JAMES M. PROCHASKA, M.D.

MEDNOW, INC., an Idaho corporation

By:
Title:

DOMINICAN SISTERS OF ONTARIO, INC., an
Oregon corporation

By:
Title:

WEST VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, INC., an
Idaho corporation

By:
Title:
APPROVED:
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A.

By
Thomas A. Banducci
Attorneys for Releasor
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

On this ___ day of June, 2007, before me, a notary public in and for said state,
personally appeared
, known or identified to me to be the
of MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership, and the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument on behalf of
said company, and acknowledged to me that
executed the same on behalf of said
company.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate last above written.

Name:
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
My commission expires

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

On this ___ day of June, 2007, before me, a notary public in and for said state,
personally appeared
, known or identified to me to be the
of MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited
partnership, d/b/a MRI Center of Idaho, and the person whose name is subscribed to the within
instrument on behalf of said company, and acknowledged to me that
executed the
same on behalf of said company.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate last above written.

Name:
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
My commission expires
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
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County of Ada
On this
day of June, 2007, before me, a notary public in and for said state,
personally appeared
, known or identified to me to be the
- - - - - - - - - - - of MRI MOBILE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited
partnership, and the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument on behalf of
executed the same on behalf of said
said company, and acknowledged to me that
company.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate last above written.

Name:
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
My commission expires

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

On this ___ day of June, 2007, before me, a notary public in and for said state,
personally appeared
, known or identified to me to be the
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ of ISOSCAN LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, and the
person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument on behalf of said company, and
acknowledged to me that
executed the same on behalf of said company.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate last above written.

Name:
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
My commission expires

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
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County of Ada
On this
day of June, 2007, before me, a notary public in and for said state,
personally appeared
, known or identified to me to be the
- - - - - - - - - - - of DOCTORS MAGNETIC RESONANCE, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument on behalf of
said company, and acknowledged to me that
executed the same on behalf of said
corporation.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate last above written.

Name:
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
My commission expires

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

On this
day of June, 2007, before me, a notary public in and for said state,
personally appeared ANDREW R. CURRAN, M.D., known or identified to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate last above written.

Name:
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
My commission expires

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.

County of Ada

)

On this ___ day of June, 2007, before me, a notary public in and for said state,
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personally appeared DAVID J. GILES, M.D.,known or identified to me to be the person whose
name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate last above written.

Name:
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
My commission expires

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

On this
day of June, 2007, before me, a notary public in and for said state,
personally appeared JOHN M. HAVLINA, M.D., known or identified to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate last above written.

Name:
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
My commission expires

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

On this
day of June, 2007, before me, a notary public in and for said state,
personally appeared THOMAS E. HENSON, M.D., known or identified to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate last above written.

Name:
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
My commission expires

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

On this
day of June, 2007, before me, a notary public in and for said state,
personally appeared JAMES M. PROCHASKA, M.D., known or identified to me to be the
person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate last above written.

Name:
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
My commission expires

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

On this ___ day of June, 2007, before me, a notary public in and for said state,
personally appeared
, known or identified to me to be the
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ of MEDNOW, INC., an Idaho corporation, and the person
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument on behalf of said company, and
acknowledged to me that
executed the same on behalf of said corporation.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate last above written.
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Name:
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
My commission expires

STATE OF OREGON
County of

)
) ss.
)

On this ___ day of June, 2007, before me, a notary public in and for said state,
personally appeared
, known or identified to me to be the
----:-----:------:--of DOMINICAN SISTERS OF ONTARIO, INC., an Oregon
corporation, and the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument on behalf of
said company, and acknowledged to me that
executed the same on behalf of said
corporation.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate last above written.

Name:
Notary Public for Oregon
Residing at
My commission expires

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

On this ___ day of June, 2007, before me, a notary public in and for said state,
personally appeared
, known or identified to me to be the
---.---:---:-:----~:-- of WEST VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument on behalf of
said company, and acknowledged to me that
executed the same on behalf of said
corporation.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate last above written.
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Name:
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
My commission expires
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S SECOND
CLAIM FOR RELIEF
("DECLARATORY RELIEF")

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
VS.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

MRIA's second claim for relief in its Third Amended Counterclaim, entitled
"Declaratory Relief," states that "MRIA seeks an order declaring that SARMC's withdrawal
from the MRIA partnership amounted to a wrongful dissociation under I.C. §§ 53-3-602(b)flj
aml--(2), 1 and that MRIA is entitled to obtain damages for such wrongful dissociation as are
causally related to such act." 3d Am. Countercl. ~ 72.
On November 17, 2010, this Court held that, as a matter of law, Saint Alphonsus did not
wrongfully dissociate pursuant to Idaho Code§ 53-3-602(b)(2). See Nov. 17,2010 Order at 6-9.
MRIA's request for a declaratory order that Saint Alphonsus did wrongfully dissociate under that
provision must necessarily fail as a matter of law, and summary judgment should therefore be
granted as to MRIA's Claim Two, which seeks only that relief.

1

The strike-through is added to indicate that portion ofMRIA's counterclaim that was
ordered stricken by this Court's order dated September 27, 2010.
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DATED this 11th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 11th day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

D

tQ
D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
001012
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ORIGINAL

APR 25 2011

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup. com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup. com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
fJVCARLY LATIMORE
DI!PUTY

Attorneys MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
MRIA'S NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION
TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA'S
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
("DE CLARATORY RELIEF")

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.
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("Declaratory Relief'). MRIA has no objection to this Motion for Summary Judgment. 1
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Summary Judgment on its Claim for its Partnership Interest. This Motion is essentially the
inverse of MRIA' s Motion for Clarification Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share, filed April
11, 2011. MRIA therefore incorporates that briefing herein as if set forth in full.

I. INTRODUCTION
As outlined in MRIA's Motion for Clarification Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share,
it is MRIA's position that when the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the judgment in this matter, it
nullified the basis for Judge McLaughlin's decision regarding the formula for determining Saint
A1phonsus's departing partner share. Judge McLauglin's decision that the departing partner
share was governed by the gap-filling provisions of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act instead
of the Partnership Agreement was based on his determination that the Partnership Agreement
expressly limited the circumstances under which a partner could withdraw. Therefore the buyout
provision contained in the Partnership Agreement, which he determined was tied to the
withdrawal provision (as they are both in Section 6.1 ofthe partnership Agreement), likewise
applied only to withdrawals for one of the approved circumstances.
As this Court is aware, the Supreme Court rejected Judge McLaughlin's finding that the
withdrawal provision expressly limited the right to withdraw and held that the provision was
ambiguous. As the Supreme Court said,
The district court picked one definition of the word "if' ("on condition that") and
concluded that section 6.1 established the conditions that must exist before a
hospital partner could withdraw from the partnership without breaching the
agreement. Another definition rejected by the court would also be consistent with
the context. The sentence could be read to state that the hospital partner may
withdraw in the event that one of the listed events occurs. For example, the
second sentence of the section begins, "In the event that a Hospital Partner
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS CLAIM
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withdraws .... " It would not change the meaning to substitute "If' for "In the event
that." The district court found some support for its interpretation by the section
title, "Conditions for Withdrawal." However, the word "conditions" is
synonymous with "circumstances." Roget's II: The New Thesaurus164 (Houghton
Mifflin Co.1988). With "if' and "conditions" given these alternative meanings,
the section is not an express provision limiting the circumstances under which St.
Alphonsus could withdraw without breaching the partnership agreement.
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 487, 224

P.3d 1068, 1076 (2009).
Because Judge McLaughlin tied his decision concerning the buyout provision to his
finding that the withdrawal provision expressly limited Saint Alphonsus's right to withdraw, and
because his interpretation of the provisions was rejected by the Supreme Court, the
underpinnings of his decision regarding the measure of Saint Alphonsus' s departing partner
share have been overturned. As such, resolution of the issue must await the interpretation of the
Partnership Agreement by the jury.

II. BACKGROUND
In the previous trial of this matter, the parties disagreed about what provision governed
the buyout of Saint Alphonsus's partnership share following its dissociation. MRIA argued that
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of the Partnership Agreement provided the correct measure. Those
provisions provide as follows:
6.1
Conditions of Withdrawal. Any Hospital Partner may withdraw from the
Partnership at any time if, in a Hospital Partner's reasonable judgment, continued
participation in this Partnership: (i) jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of such
Hospital Partner of its parent of their subsidiaries; or (ii) jeopardized
medicare/Medicaid or insurance reimbursement or participations; (iii) if the
business activities of the Partnership are contrary to the ethical principles of the
Roman Catholic Church as designated from time to time; or (iv) is or may be in
violation of any local, state or federal laws, rules or regulations .... Unless
otherwise agreed, the withdrawing Hospital Partner shall only be entitled to
receive its interest in the Partnership an amount which is equal to the balance of
such Hospital Partner's capital account at the time of withdrawal.
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS CLAIM
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6.2
Payment for Interest. The price for the withdrawing Hospital Partner's
interest in the Partnership shall be paid to such Hospital Partner by the Partners to
which its interest in the Partnership has been allocated, without interest, in
installments equal to, and due at the same time as, distributions of the Net Cash
Flow which the Hospital Partner would have received had it remained a Partner in
the Partnership.
(Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motions Filed April 11, 2011, Ex. A, §§6.1 and 6.2
(emphasis added) (hereinafter "the Buyout Provision.")) MRIA argued that the terms ofthe
withdrawing partner's buy-out were to be determined by these sections, regardless of whether the
withdrawal was made for one of the enumerated "medical/theological" reasons stated in the first
part of paragraph 6.1.
Saint Alphonsus argued that the Buyout Provision contained in the Partnership
Agreement only applied if the Hospital Partner opted to withdraw under one of the
medical/theological circumstances listed in section 6.1. Because Saint Alphonsus did not
dissociate from MRIA due to one of these four enumerated circumstances, Saint Alphonsus
argued that its share should be determined under the more expansive default provision of the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"), Idaho Code § 53-3-701 (b), which provides that:
The buyout price of a dissociated partner's interest is the amount that would have
been distributable to the dissociating partner under section 53-3-807(b), Idaho
Code, if, on the date of dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a
price equal to the greater of the liquidation value or the value based on a sale of
the entire business as a going concern without the dissociated partner and the
partnership was wound up as of that date. Interest shall be paid from the date of
dissociation to the date of payment.
I.C. § 53-3-701(b).
Judge McLauglin decided that the gap-filling provision of RUP A was controlling, and
entered judgment awarding Saint Alphonsus $4,600,000 for its partnership share. (Affidavit of
Counsel in Support of Motions Filed April 11, 2011, Ex. C (hereinafter "Decision of September
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS CLAIM
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21, 2007"), at p. 2). However, this decision was based on the Court's previous determination
that the Partnership Agreement expressly limited the circumstances under which a partner could
withdraw. As this Court knows, the district court made a determination, overturned by the
Supreme Court on appeal, that the four medical/theological reasons for withdrawal outlined in
Section 6.1 were "express" contractual provisions limiting the circumstances of withdrawal, and
thus that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal for other reasons was a wrongful withdrawal under Idaho
Code§ 53-3-103(b)(l). (Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMotions Filed April11, 2011, Ex. B
(hereinafter "Decision and Order of July 24, 2006") at p. 7-13.) The district court later held that
the Buyout Provision outlined in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 likewise applied only when a withdrawing
hospital partner withdrew under one of the four circumstances enumerated in Section 6.1. (!d. at
Ex. C (hereinafter "Decision of September 21, 2007"), at p. 6.) The district court said:
The Court has further examined the type of circumstances outlined in
Article 6.1 as permitted reasons for dissociation. Each of these circumstances
were subject to changes in law or medical-theological circumstances beyond the
control of the Hospital partners that could require that hospital partner to
dissociate quickly in order to avoid substantial financial harm to the entire
hospital organization based upon this partnership agreement. Because a quick
dissociation might have significant financial consequences for the partnership due
to the debt associated with this new technology at the time of formation of the
partnership, a reduced "buyout" based upon the four (4) enumerated reasons for
dissociation would allow MRIA to continue without the hospital partner's
participation and significant debt load issues for the partnership. The delay in
payment set forth for payment in Article 6.2 is consistent with the intent of Article
6.1 as outlined above and further demonstrates that all of these provisions were
based upon the four enumerated reasons for withdrawal as outlined in Article 6.1

(Id. at p. 5.) As Saint Alphonsus had not withdrawn for one of these enumerated reasons, the
Court applied the more expansive buyout language in Idaho Code § 53-3-701 (b). (!d. at p. 5-6.)
As this Court is aware, the Supreme Court rejected Judge McLaughlin's finding that the
withdrawal provision expressly limited the right to withdraw and held that the provision was
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ambiguous. Because Judge McLaughlin tied his decision concerning the buyout provision to his
finding that the withdrawal provision expressly limited Saint Alphonsus's right to withdraw, and
because his interpretation of the provisions was rejected by the Supreme Court, the
underpinnings ofhis decision regarding the measure of Saint Alphonsus's departing partner
share have been overturned. ·

III. ARGUMENT
A.

MRIA's Decision Not to Appeal the Matter Does not Preclude Revisiting it on
Remand
Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's assertion otherwise, the Court may consider this issue,

despite the fact that MRIA did not appeal it. In fact, MRIA could not have appealed this, because
it would have been contrary to the district court's finding, on which MRIA had built much of its
case, that Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation was wrongful as a matter of law. Saint Alphonsus
cites to Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009), for the proposition that
if a party "fails to appeal" an adverse ruling, because of the law of the case that ruling cannot be
challenged in subsequent proceedings. Taylor does not stand for this proposition. Rather, it
states that:
the "law of the case" doctrine provides that when "the Supreme Court, in deciding
a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule oflaw necessary to the
decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered
to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent
appeal." ... The "law of the case" doctrine also prevents consideration on a
subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in
the earlier appeal

I d. The case does not stand at all for the proposition that a district court on remand may not
consider issues that were not appealed.
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Moreover, in Saint Alphonsus's briefing on another Motion it submitted
contemporaneously with the present Motion, Saint Alphonsus had argued the exact opposite of
its position that a Court cannot reconsider matters if such matters were not appealed. In Saint
Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine re: Prior Evidentiary Rulings from
the First Trial, filed Aprilll, 2011, Saint Alphonsus states that "to the extent that a later decision
of the trial or appellate court moots or undermines a prior ruling, the prior ruling should be
disregarded. (Id. at p. 3.) It also argues that "[a]lthough the prior rulings should not be revisited,
subsequent Supreme Court and trial court rulings that Saint Alphonsus did not wrongfully
dissociate give rise to new grounds, previous unavailable, for a motion in limine. (Id. at p. 8).
MRIA likewise argues, and outlined more fully below, that because of the decision of the
Supreme Court, the prior ruling of the district court regarding the partnership interest have been
"undermined" and there are new grounds for reconsidering the issue. Based on Saint
Alphonsus's own contrary reasoning, the Court should disregard its claim here that the Court
cannot revisit this matter.
More importantly, Saint Alphonsus's present assertion that this matter should have been
appealed runs afoul of the principle that on remand, "a court may 'correct an error in its original
findings as to a matter not passed on by the appellate court,"' Blinzler v. Andrews, 95 Idaho 769,
519 P.2d 438 (1973), or those matters ''which are subsidiary to the actions directed by the
appellate court," even though that issue is not expressly included in the issues to be address on
remand. Mountainview Landowners Co-op. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 866, 136 P.3d
332, 337 (2006). See, Rockefeller v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 545, 82 P.3d 450, 457 (2003)
(question of attorney fees subsidiary to reversal of summary judgment); State v. Hosey, 134
Idaho 883, 886, 11 P .3d 1101, 1104 (2000) (withdrawal of guilty plea subsidiary to question of
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY nJDGMENT ON ITS CLAIM
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whether evidence should have been admitted); Trimble v. Engelking, 134 Idaho 195,197, 998
P .2d 502, 504 (2000) (Court erred in failing to consider applicability of statute of limitations
when directed by Supreme Court to consider all applicable laws relating to the issue of
timeliness); Walters v. Industrial Indem. Co., 130 Idaho 836, 838, 949 P.2d 223, 225 (1997)
(motion to amended to add claims not subsidiary in appellate determination that Court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction); JR. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Int'l, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 258,
939 P.2d 574, 577 (1997) (when Supreme Court reversed jury verdict as to two counts in
commercial dispute, relieving party of liability, question of attorney fees was subsidiary issue);

Industrial Inv. Corp. v. Rocca, 102 Idaho 920, 923, 643 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Ct. App. 1982)
(attorney fees were subsidiary to issue ofliability on a guaranty).
The error of Saint Alphonsus' s argument is clearly demonstrated by the case Hutchins v.

State, 100 Idaho 661, 603 P .2d 995 (1979). In that case, Plaintiffs and Defendant both prevailed
in part on summary judgment. Defendant received partial summary judgment holding that
Plaintiff was not entitled to damages. While the Defendant appealed those portions of the
summary judgment which had gone against it, Plaintiffs did not file a cross-appeal on damages.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, but the trial court's summary
disposition of the damages issue was not discussed. On remand, the Defendant argued that only
that portion of the summary judgment which it had appealed had been reversed. The trial court
disagreed, noting that the case was generally reversed, and that as the Supreme Court's opinion
did not pass upon damages at all, law of the case did not come into play. !d., 100 Idaho at 665,
603 P.2d at 999. The trial court ultimately determined that the Defendant was liable for
damages, despite the fact that the Plaintiff had not challenged on appeal the earlier decision
otherwise.
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS CLAIM
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On a second appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's reasoning.
The Court said:
We agree with [the district court] that all issues not passed upon by this
Court were open to him at the second trial. After a general reversal, a trial court is
free to correct any error in its original findings and conclusions as to matters not
passed on by the appellate court. Blinzler v. Andrews, 95 Idaho 769, 519 P.2d 438
(1973).
"The findings of the trial court to which we have referred were not before
us and received no consideration on this appeal. Upon remand, whether or not any
mention of these findings had appeared in our opinion, they would be subject to
review and revision by the trial court .. 'A trial court may, after a remand for
further proceedings, correct an error in its original findings as to a matter not
passed on by the appellate court.' Blinzler v. Andrews, 95 Idaho 769,519 P.2d
438 (1973) ....
"Upon remand of this case the trial court should determine its findings of
fact and conclusions oflaw, with respect to the issues not dealt with in our
opinion, on the basis of the record in the prior proceedings and such further
proceedings as may be had, without being bound in any way by its prior findings
and conclusions on such issues." Hulihee v. Heirs ofHueu, 556 P.2d 920, 921
(Hawaii 1976) ....
Irrespective of such general rule, where a part of a final nonseverable
judgment is reversed, a final judgment is thereafter not present, leaving a trial
judge positioned so that he can modify any prior orders or partial judgments that
have been previously entered, assuming non-application of the doctrine oflaw of
the case .... Thus, after the reversal in [the first appeal] this case was back to
where it was when the original improvident summary judgment was granted, and
[the district court] was free to follow any procedure and retry any issues upon
which this Court had not specifically passed.

Hutchins, 100 Idaho at 666, 603 P.2d at 1000 (emphasis added). This case clearly demonstrates
that, contrary to Saint Alphonsus's assertion otherwise, the "law of the case" doctrine does not
come into play, and that the district court is free to consider this issue on remand. As Saint
Alphonsus itself admits, and as Hutchins demonstrates, the Court clearly can reexamine the
matter.
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B.

The Underpinnings of the District Court's Decision Concerning the Buyout Were
Overturned by the Supreme Court's Decision, and the Issue is Therefore Subsidiary
to the Supreme Court's Decision
Not only does the Court have the authority to consider this issue, the Court should

consider this issue because the underpinnings of the district court's earlier decision concerning
the buyout have been undermined by the Supreme Court's decision. The district court decision
that the Buyout Provision of Section 6.1 and 6.2 did not extend to other un-enumerated
circumstances of withdrawal comported with the district court's previous ruling that these four
circumstances expressly limited the circumstances in which a hospital partner might
contractually dissociate. (Decision and Order of July 24, 2006, at p. 7-13.) The Court had found
that Saint Alphonsus could not lawfully dissociate for reasons other than those stated. Reasoning
from this position, it held that Section 6.1 created a lawful dissociation for one of the four
enumerated circumstances, but that in exchange for allowing such a withdrawal, the other
partners should be protected by a limited buy-out position. (!d.) In other words, the district
court came to two consistent conclusions: that dissociation was limited to the four enumerated
reasons of Section 6.1, and that the Buyout Provision's applicability was likewise limited to
those four enumerated reasons.
This reasoning regarding the Buyout Provision cannot stand in light of the Supreme
Court's decision on appeal. As this Court knows, the Supreme Court held that Section 6.1 might
be read as a provision that, depending on the interpretation of ambiguous language, either does
or does not outline the exclusive circumstances in which a partner might withdraw. Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 487, 224 P.3d 1068,
1076 (2009). If the district court's previous interpretation is allowed to stand, there is a risk that,
if the jury determines that Section 6.1 is not a restrictive provision, the provision will have been
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS CLAIM
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interpreted in two diametrically opposing ways. Saint Alphonsus cannot argue that four
enumerated medical/theological circumstances of withdrawal listed in Section 6.1 do not limit
the reasons for which it might withdraw, but then argue that the Buyout Provision contained in
the same section applies only under one of those four circumstances. This would result in a
nonsensical interpretation that Section 6.1 is unrestrictive for purposes of withdrawal, but
restrictive for purposes of the Buyout Provision.
As the Supreme Court overturned the district court's interpretation of Section 6.1 as to
the circumstances of withdrawal, its interpretation of the provisions of Section 6.1 related to the
Buyout Provision is a subsidiary issue. A contract should be interpreted as a whole to give effect
to every part of a contract. George v. University ofIdaho, 121 Idaho 30, 36, 822 P .2d 549,
555 (Ct. App. 1991). Given the Supreme Court's ruling, the determination of whether the
Partnership Agreement or RUPA governs the buyout provision must await the jury's
interpretation of the Partnership Agreement. There is a risk that if the issue is not reopened, the
end result may be contradictory and nonsensical interpretations of Section 6.1 by the jury and by
the district court.

C.

Prejudgment Interest
Saint Alphonsus argues for an award of prejudgment interest at the default interest rate of

twelve percent (12%) from the date of dissociation. Obviously, such an award is premature ifthe
Court declines to grant summary judgment on this issue. Moreover, also central to this issue is
the resolution of whether Section 6.2 of the Partnership Agreement applies, or the default
provisions ofRUPA. Saint Alphonsus argues that Idaho's default prejudgment interest statute
applies because, under RUPA, "[i]f and obligation to pay interest arising under this act and the
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rate is not specified, the rate is that specified in subsection (1) of section 28-22-104, Idaho Code.
However, Section 6.2 of the Partnership Agreement provides that:
6.2 Payment for Interest. The price for the withdrawing Hospital
Partner's Interest in the Partnership shall be paid to such Hospital Partners by the
Partners to which its interest in the Partnership has been allocated, without
interest, in installments equal to, and due at the same time as, distribution of the
Net Cash Flow which the Hospital Partner would have received had it remained a
Partner in the Partnership.
(Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motions Filed April 11, 2011, Ex. A,§ 6.2 (emphasis
added).) The Partnership Agreement specifically states that interest is not to be awarded to a
withdrawing hospital partner. For the same reasons discussed above, the applicability of the
Partnership Agreement or RUPA to any aspect ofthe buyout of Saint Alphonsus's partnership
interest must await the jury's interpretation of the Partnership Agreement.

IV. CONCLUSION
The district court may take up the question of whether the Partnership Agreement or
RUPA applies in dictating the terms ofthe buyout of Saint Alphonsus's partnership share. Saint
Alphonsus is not entitled to summary judgment on this issue because the jury must first interpret
Section 6.1 and 6.2 to determine whether the provisions therein are restrictive or unrestrictive.
After it does so, the Court will then be able to apply the terms of the Buyout Provision
consistently with the jury's determination.
DATED this 25th day of April, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

ara L. Parl{er
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Opposition to Saint Alphonsus Diversified
Care, Inc.'s ("Saint Alphonsus") Motion for Summary Judgment on its Second Affirmative
Defense (the "Motion").

I.

INTRODUCTION

Saint Alphonsus's Motion is the latest in a long line of failed attempts at dismissing
MRIA's claims. What sets the current Motion apart from the perhaps eighteen or so other
summary judgment motions filed by Saint Alphonsus in this matter is the absolute incredibility
of the argument. In particular, Saint Alphonsus advances the improbable theory that according
to I. C. § 6-806, even if the parties who have already settled in this matter were only responsible
for 1% ofMRIA's total damages, there was no effective way for MRIA to have settled with them
without giving up at least 50% of the damages to which MRIA would otherwise be entitled from
Saint Alphonsus. But, as might be expected, in order to make this facially tenuous argument,
Saint Alphonsus has been forced to ignore the plain language of the statute itself and the law
from Idaho courts interpreting it, both of which make clear that Saint Alphonsus's position is
wholly unsupportable. Tellingly, Saint Alphonsus fails to cite even one case from any
jurisdiction whatsoever-let alone from Idaho--that has limited a plaintiffs damages based on
Saint Alphonsus's rationale. Indeed, to the contrary, those courts that have considered Saint
Alphonsus's arguments have concluded that they are "patently absurd" and "irrational." See,

e.g., Hindy v. Bousquet, 1975 WL 169940, **3-4 (R.I. Super. 1975); National Union Fire Ins.
Co. v. A.A.R. Western Skyways, Inc., 784 P.2d 52, 55-57 (Okla. 1989).
Moreover, even if this Court were to accept the incongruous logic of this initial position,
Saint Alphonsus has failed to bring forth any evidence to support it. That is, in order to prevail
on its already shaky argument, Saint Alphonsus needs this Court to believe that the settlement
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agreement it attached to its Motion indicates that the parties to it actually intended for MRIA to
cut off at least half of its damages by settling with comparatively minor co-defendants. Yet the
agreement is unsigned, unauthenticated, and inadmissible. Moreover, it contains unambiguous
and repeated language entirely contrary to Saint Alphonsus's fanciful interpretation.
In short, Saint Alphonsus's argument relies on a facially untenable legal position and an
unsubstantiated factual position. Plainly, these are not the building blocks of a competent
summary judgment motion. Saint Alphonsus's Motion must accordingly be denied.

II.

STANDARD

This Court is undoubtedly very familiar with the summary judgment standard. In this
case, it requires the court to liberally construe the facts in the existing record in favor of MRIA,
and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor ofMRIA. Boots v. Winters, 145
Idaho 389, 392, 179 P.3d 352, 355 (2008). Moreover, the burden at all times is upon Saint
Alphonsus to prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. G & M Farms v. Funk
Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991). Thus, Saint Alphonsus's case

must be anchored in something more than speculation or assumption. Mackay v. Four Rivers
Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410-11, 179 P .3d 1064, 1066-67 (2008).

III.

SUMMARY OF SAINT ALPHONSUS'S ARGUMENTS

Perhaps because Saint Alphonsus' s argument does not appear to have ever been advanced
in Idaho before, deciphering what it is truly saying is somewhat difficult. For that reason, it
makes sense to re-state it here succinctly. Saint Alphonsus starts its Motion by stating that the
"gravamen ofMRIA's counterclaim" is a conspiracy between Saint Alphonsus, on the one hand,
and Gem State Radiology, Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Imaging Center Radiologist, on
the other (collectively, the "Rads"). Motion, p. 3. Saint Alphonsus then alleges that the Rads
and MRIA entered into a settlement agreement prior to the previous trial. !d., p. 4. According to
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Saint Alphonsus, under I. C.§ 6-806, this settlement agreement can only inoculate the Rads from
having to contribute to Saint Alphonsus's ultimate liability in this matter if it meets certain
criteria. Id., pp. 5-7. In particular, Saint Alphonsus argues that§ 6-806 requires that the
settlement agreement must "provide for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of the
released tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable against all other tortfeasors."
!d., p. 6 (emphasis added).

I. C. § 6-806, however, only deals with contribution, rather than a reduction of the
ultimate amount of damages due to MRIA. As a result, Saint Alphonsus tries to piggy-back this
settlement agreement provision from § 6-806 onto § 6-805 by reasoning that if the parties agree
to the reduction referenced in § 6-806, then § 6-805 requires that the plaintiffs ultimate damages
must be diminished by the amount of the settlement or by the "proportion" by which the
agreement says the says the claim should be reduced, whichever is greater. Id. Saint Alphonsus
concludes that the settlement agreement here does, in fact, release by a "proportion"; the Rad's
"pro rata" share of the damages. !d., p. 7. Then, most critically, Saint Alphonsus argues that the
term "pro rata" has just one meaning-both in § 6-806 and in the settlement agreement: an
"equal share of liability" per defendant, regardless of fault. Id., p. 12.
Put another way, Saint Alphonsus argues that by settling with the Rads, MRIA gave up
between 50%-60% of its claim, based on the fact that each Rad held a 20% share of the total
amount of damages, as calculated under Saint Alphonsus's understanding of the term "pro rata."
To put this percentage into perspective, consider that Saint Alphonsus alleges that the Rads
settled for $825,000, and the ultimate award of damages in the previous trial was a little less than
$40,000,000. Id. at p. 4. Thus, according to Saint Alphonsus's understanding of the term "pro
rata," MRIA purposefully gave up at least $20,000,000 in exchange for the Rads' comparatively
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small settlement amount of $825,000. As might be expected, however, this theory has multiple
logical and legal holes.

IV.

A.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

According to Saint Alphonsus 's arguments in other summary judgment motions, the
current Motion must be dismissed.
Saint Alphonsus has struggled to make up its mind as to what can and cannot be

considered by this Court on remand, and has often changed its position 180 degrees based on
which argument best fits its purposes at the time. Sadly, in its latest set of summary judgment
motions, Saint Alphonsus makes yet another round of conflicting arguments. In particular, on
p. 4 of Motion for Summary Judgment on Its Claim for Its Partnership Interest, 1 Saint Alphonsus
stridently asserts that "[w ]hen a party fails to appeal an adverse. ruling, that ruling becomes the
law of the case and cannot be challenged in subsequent proceedings," citing Taylor v. Maile, 146
Idaho 705, 709,201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009). Yet in the Motion at hand, Saint Alphonsus takes
the exact opposite position by asking this Court to consider an issue which Saint Alphonsus
clearly "fail[ed] to appeal," even though all the facts which support it all took place not just
before the appeal, but even before the first trial. (As Saint Alphonsus itself notes in this Motion,
"MRIA settled its claims .. .shortly before the first trial." Motion, p. 4 (emphasis added).) As
such, Saint Alphonsus again seems to be speaking out both sides of its mouth.
MRIA has made clear its Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary
Judgment on Its Claim for Its Partnership Interest that the law is not as simplistic as Saint
Alphonsus has argued. That said, to the extent the Court finds any credence in Saint
Alphonsus's arguments there, then this Motion must be dismissed. To hold otherwise would be
to allow Saint Alphonsus to profit by making knowingly conflicting arguments to this Court.

1

This motion was filed with this Court on April 11, 2011.
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B.

The entirety of Saint Alphonsus 's arguments in the Motion are based on obviously
incompetent evidence.
As is clear from the recitation of Saint Alphonsus' s argument above, central to all of its

arguments is the alleged settlement agreement between MRIA and the Rads; without it,
I. C. §§ 6-805 and 6-806 do not even apply since both require the existence of a valid settlement
agreement. ·In its Motion, however, Saint Alphonsus relies on an alleged agreement that is
unsigned by any of the parties listed thereto and otherwise appears to be in draft form. See

generally, the Affidavit of Jack Gjording at its Exhibit D. Moreover, Saint Alphonsus has
curiously attempted to "authenticate" the agreement through its own counsel, Jack Gjording. Id
at~

5. Yet Mr. Gjording does not state that he was counsel for any of the parties listed in this

unsigned contract, and does not otherwise choose to tell the Court how he might know that it is
what it purports to be. Indeed, Mr. Gjording does not even perfunctorily state that he knows the
unsigned agreement to have actually been entered into by the parties.
Such failures render the agreement inadmissible. "Under I.R.E. 901, authentication is a
prerequisite to the admission of evidence." Herman v. Herman, 136 Idaho 781, 785, 41 P.3d
209, 213 (2002). As such, at a bare minimum, Saint Alphonsus needed someone with personal
knowledge of the alleged formation and/or contents of this agreement to testify as to its
authenticity-to demonstrate to the Court that the document "is what it is claimed to be." See
I.R.E. 901(b)(1); Herman, 41 P.3d at 213. Clearly, as counsel to a non-party to this agreement,
Mr. Gjording is not the man for that job. As such, the unexecuted contract attached to his
affidavit is inadmissible. See, e.g., Herman, 41 P.3d at 213 (unsigned letter inadmissible because
"[t]here was no testimony by a witness with knowledge regarding the letter, and the record is
void of any other evidence to provide foundation to show that the writing was" as represented);

LC Associates v. Pensignorkay, Inc., 1996 WL 165510, *2 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("the unsigned draft
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of the 'Agreement,' being neither properly identified nor authenticated, is inadmissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 901"). This inadmissibility is fatal to Saint Alphonsus's claims.
C.

Saint Alphonsus 's arguments are only relevant to one of MRIA 's seven claims.

Saint Alphonsus's inability to authenticate the only piece of evidence at issue in this
matter is just the beginning of its problems. Indeed, even putting these evidentiary problems to
the side, Saint Alphonsus's substantive argument is over almost before it begins. In particular,
Saint Alphonsus begins its Motion with the unfounded proposition that conspiracy forms the
"gravamen ofMRIA's counterclaim." Motion, pp. 3-4. Much depends on this Court agreeing
with this characterization, since Saint Alphonsus is attempting to limit all ofMRIA's damages
from all ofMRIA's causes of action based on its reading of§§ 6-805 and 6-806-even those
causes of action to which §§ 6-805 and 6-806 do not apply. !d. at pp. 12-13.
Yet Saint Alphonsus's description ofMRIA's counterclaim as chiefly being about a
conspiracy is demonstrably false. In fact, ofMRIA's seven claims, only one, speaks to
conspiracy. See MRIA's Third Amended Counter Claim (the "TACC") at pp. 21-27. 2 The other
six are specifically only about Saint Alphonsus-and Saint Alphonsus alone-venally engaging
in knowingly unlawful acts. !d. For example, MRIA alleges in its first claim that Saint
Alphonsus-rather than any of the Rads-had the relevant partnership agreement with MRIA,
and that it breached that partnership agreement in flagrant violation of both the contract and
Idaho law surrounding partnerships. !d. at pp. 21-23. Similarly, MRIA alleges in its third and
fourth claims that Saint Alphonsus-not the Rads--owed fiduciary duties to MRIA but that
Saint Alphonsus breached those duties. !d. at pp. 23-24. Next, MRIA alleges that Saint
Alphonsus alone, not the Rads, covenanted to deal with it in good faith, but that Saint Alphonsus
violated that covenant. !d. at pp. 24-25. Finally, MRIA alleges that Saint Alphonsus interfered
2

There are actually eight claims listed in the TACC, but the declaratory judgment action has been dropped.
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with MRIA's current or prospective business opportunities. Id at pp. 25-26. In short, by any
objective standard, the "gravamen" ofMRIA's claim is that Saint Alphonsus took upon itself the
responsibility to act with utmost fidelity towards MRIA, but knowingly violated those duties so
that it could enrich itself at MRIA's expense.
In so arguing, MRIA wants to make clear that it is not selling its conspiracy claim short.
The conspiracy in this matter was real and deleterious to MRIA, a fact which MRIA has already
demonstrated at trial once. But to contend that the "gravamen" ofMRIA's TACC is about this.
conspiracy ignores the reality that the chief obligation to avoid harming MRIA in all ofMRIA's
causes of action started first and foremost with Saint Alphonsus. Indeed, Saint Alphonsus is the
only defendant who had a partnership agreement with MRIA; the only defendant to owe MRIA
fiduciary duties; and the only defendant to covenant with MRIA to act in good faith. Id at
pp. 21-26.
It is for this reason that Saint Alphonsus's insistence that the Court look only to the

pleadings to determine the "gravamen" ofMRIA's claims is so ironic. Motion at pp. 7-8. In
particular, the statutes under which Saint Alphonsus is trying to diminish its monetary liability
are clear that they only apply to "joint tortfeasors." See I.C. §§ 6-805 and 6-806. "Joint
tortfeasors" are defined as two or more "persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same
injury to person or property .... " I.C. § 6-803(4) (emphasis added). Thus, in order for these
statutes to apply, the cause of action at issue must make the defendant (1) jointly and severally
liable as to (2) a tort action. Id Yet, as pled, six ofMRIA's seven claims have Saint Alphonsus
as solely liable-rather than jointly or severally liable-and of those six claims, three sound in
something other than tort (breach of contract, breach of good faith, fiduciary duty). As a result,
even if this Court were to believe Saint Alphonsus's far-fetched theory that when MRIA settled
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with the Rads it purposefully gave up 50-60% of its damages, that reduction would only apply to.
a recovery directly attributable to MRIA's one conspiracy cause of action; none of the other six
fit the statutory definition.

D.

SaintAlphonsus's insistence that the term "pro rata" must mean an equal division of
liability regardless offault has been described as both "irrational" and "absurd."
Saint Alphonsus spends much of its Motion trying to convince the Court that "pro rata"

means equal shares of liability, regardless of fault. As noted above, however, Saint Alphonsus
must prove two things in this regard in order to prevail. First, it must prove that when the Idaho
Legislature used the term in§ 6-806, it meant an equal division of the liability among all cotortfeasors, regardless of the individual fault. Second, Saint Alphonsus must prove that when the
parties to the settlement agreement used the term, they also intended this meaning. 3
Unfortunately for Saint Alphonsus, the evidence is clear that the term "pro rata" in both the
statute and the settlement agreement does not have the improbable meaning which Saint
Alphonsus ascribes to it.

1.

The evidence is uncontroverted that the term "pro rata" in I.C. § 6-806 does
not mean what Saint Alphonsus needs it to mean.

Though Saint Alphonsus pins the entirety of its Motion on the idea that the undefined
term "pro rata" only means equal liability, this definition is just one among many possibilities.

See, e.g., National Union Fire, 784 P.2d at 55-57 (Okla. 1989) (concluding that left undefined,
the use ofthe term "pro rata" was inherently ambiguous); Hindy, 1975 WL 169940 at **2-4
(examining the several possible meanings of the term); McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S.
202, 211, n.9, 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1466 (1994) (Court "deliberately" avoided using the term because
3

Obviously, the inquiry as to what the parties meant when they entered into the alleged settlement agreement is
moot here, because Plaintiff has failed to produce any admissible evidence that the parties actually came to an
agreement in the first place. That said, as demonstrated herein, even if the evidence was valid, Saint Alphonsus still
could not prevail. As such, MRIA will assume only for the purposes of argument that the settlement is valid. In no
way by so doing, however, does MRIA waive or alter its arguments above concerning the alleged agreement's
authenticity or admissibility.
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it has too many competing meanings). Indeed, several courts have pointed out that the term has
the capability to mean what Saint Alphonsus suggests, but is just as likely to mean an "equation
of liability with fault," or that each defendant pays or contributes in proportion to the amount of
culpability found by a jury or court. National Union, 784 P.2d at 55-57; Hindy, 1975 WL
169940 at **2-4.
As such, the question becomes what the Idaho Legislature meant when it used the term
"pro rata" in the context of§ 6-806. Fortunately, this question is easily answered because the
statute itself, the context in which it is found, and the case law all uniformly indicate that the
only reasonable interpretation is that the term "pro rata" in this statute means in proportion to the
relative fault of the individual defendants.

a.

The statute itself does not allow for Saint Alphonsus 's interpretation.

Perhaps the most telling piece of evidence against Saint Alphonsus's self-interested
interpretation of§ 6-806 is the fact that if Saint Alphonsus' s definition of "pro rata" is accepted,
the last sentence of that statute will be rendered either an absurdity or nullity. In specific,
§ 6-806 reads as follows:
A release by the injured person of one (1) joint tortfeasor does not relieve him
from liability to make contribution to another joint tortfeasor unless the release is
given before the right of the other tortfeasor to secure a money judgment for
contribution has accrued, and provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro
rata share of the released tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable
against all the other tortfeasors. This section shall apply only if the issue of
proportionate fault is litigated between joint tortfeasors in the same action.
I.C. § 6-806 (emphasis added).
The last sentence-which unambiguously states that the statute will only apply if the
issue of proportionate fault has first been litigated between tortfeasors-is directly contrary to
Saint Alphonsus's interpretation of"pro rata." Again, Saint Alphonsus argues that "pro rata"
means nothing more than "simple arithmetic"; that the Court must simply perform a head count
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"without regard to [the individual] tortfeasor's relative culpability." Motion, pp. 9-11. Yet
according to the last sentence of§ 6-806, the very statute which speaks to the "pro rata share" of
liability will only apply if and after these joint tortfeasors litigate the "proportionate fault"
between them. Obviously these two concepts are mutually exclusive: either the judge is to
simply perform Saint Alphonsus's "head count," or the jury is to apportion liability according to
fault, as § 6-806 specifically requires. It cannot be both, unless Saint Alphonsus is seriously
urging that the Idaho Legislature meant for Idaho juries to engage in the laborious exercise of
determining the relative culpability of the parties, only to immediately have that finding
completely discarded in favor of a judge's simple head count. Clearly, this would be a patently
ridiculous outcome, which would be the death knell for Saint Alphonsus's argument since
"[ c]onstructions of a statute that would lead to an absurd result are disfavored." State v. Gill, 244
P.3d 1269, 1271 (Idaho App. 2010).
The only other possible solution for Saint Alphonsus, then, is to ignore this last sentence
altogether, which is essentially what Saint Alphonsus has done in its Motion (this thorny issue is
never even mentioned, let alone discussed). Yet unlike Saint Alphonsus, this Court lacks the
discretion to simply ignore the portions of statutes it does not like. Instead, the "Court must give
every word, clause and sentence [of a statute] effect." Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 525, 148
P.3d 1267, 1271 (2006). As such, the only reasonable explanation left is that the term "pro rata"
means just what the last sentence of§ 6-806 would suggest it does: a determination by the jury
of the relative culpability of the parties. Saint Alphonsus's arguments to the contrary must
accordingly be rejected.
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b.

The cases defining § 6-806 do not allow [or Saint Alphonsus 's
interpretation.

Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's intimations, the Supreme Court has at least twice opined
· on what the term "pro rata" in § 6-806 means, and both of these decisions stand in direct
opposition to Saint Alphonsus's construction. In specific, in Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727
P.2d 1187 (1986}-a case cited at length by Saint Alphonsus in its Motion-the Court dealt with
a certain type of release known as a "Pierringer release." According to the Court, Pierringer
releases "entail an agreement whereby the plaintiff releases one co-defendant but reserves the
right to proceed against the remaining defendants." !d. at 1207. As a result, said the Court,
"[u]nder the terms of this type of release, the nonsettling defendants will not be required to pay
more than their fair share as determined by the jury's finding of comparative negligence." !d.
(emphasis added). Critically, the Court then found that these types of releases-releases which
specifically require a finding of the relative culpability of the non-settling parties-" are generally
approved by the courts and are consistent with I C. §§ 6-805 and -806." !d. (emphasis added).
Stated more simply, the Court found that a release in which the parties agree to be bound by the
jury's "finding of comparative negligence" was entirely "consistent with" § 6-806.
Such a holding is obviously antithetical to Saint Alphonsus's interpretation of the statute.
Specifically, if the term "pro rata" exclusively meant to simply conduct a perfunctory head
count, as Saint Alphonsus argues, then the Supreme Court could not logically have found that a
release which envisioned a "finding of comparative negligence" later could be "consistent with"
§ 6-806. Id. Saint Alphonsus's interpretation has accordingly been flatly rejected by the
Supreme Court.
A similar holding is found in Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd., 119 Idaho 299,
805 P.2d 1223 (1991). That case expounded on I.C. § 6-803(1), which contains the exact same
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"pro rata share" language as found in§ 6-806. 4 Specifically, one of the parties there suggested
that it paid niore than its "pro rata share" of damages, and wanted to seek contribution. Id at
1233. The Court, which was already remanding on a separate ground, stated that."[c]ontribution
is available only when a party has paid more than its pro rata share of a judgment." Id
(emphasis added). Then, in the very next sentence, the Court then found that "[b]ecause we
remand for a new trial, it will be up to the trier of fact to determine the relative negligence, if
any, among the parties." Id (emphasis added). At the risk of stating the obvious, then, the
Supreme Court stated that the determination of a "pro rata share of a judgment" depended first
on the Court ascertaining "the relative negligence ... among the parties." Id Again, then, Saint
Alphonsus's odd interpretation is clearly rejected by the Supreme Court, since if"pro rata" were
to simply mean a head count, there would obviously be no need to "determine the relative
negligence" of the parties.

c.

The statutory scheme surrounding § 6-806 makes clear Saint Alphonsus 's
interpretation is false.

Other rules of statutory construction are relevant here as well. In specific, when "an
ambiguous statute is part of a larger statutory scheme, [the court must] not only focus upon the
language ofthe ambiguous statute, but also look at other statutes relating to the same subject
matter and consider them together in order to discern legislative intent." State v. McNair, 141
Idaho 263,265-66, 108 P.3d 410,412-13 (Idaho App. 2005). In this regard, it is critical that the
term "pro rata share" in§ 6-806 (and§ 6-803(1)) is found in the "larger statutory scheme" of
Idaho's comparative negligence and contribution statutes. See I.C. § 6-801 et seq. "The
rationale" for these statutes is to have "a comparison of all legal causes of the plaintiffs injuries

4

Unless there is very specific evidence to the contrary, terms used more than once in the same act or section are
presumed to have the same meaning. St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, Ltd. v. Board of County
Com'rs of Gooding County, 149 Idaho 584,237 P.3d 1210, 1215 (2010).
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and results in a sensible and fair method ofloss allocation." Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. AvcoLycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D. Idaho 1976).
While joint-and-severalliability is obviously a distinct concept from comparative
negligence, it makes sense for the Legislature to have included it within the "larger statutory
scheme" of comparative negligence, since many of the rationales found in the proportionate
liability context have also been found to apply in the joint-and-several liability context. For
example, Idaho law is very clear that while two defendants who have acted in "concert" may
each be jointly-and-severally liable to a plaintiff-meaning that they are each responsible for
100% ofthe damages to the plaintiff-that 100% is only as to making the plaintiff whole. As
between the two jointly-and-severally liable tortfeasors, a right of proportionate contribution still
exists if one ends up paying more than his fair share in relation to his fault. I. C. § 6-803; Rausch
v. Pocatello Lumber Company, Inc., 135 Idaho 80, 88, 14 P.3d 1074, 1082 (Idaho App. 2000).
In the Motion, however, Saint Alphonsus appears to argue to the contrary. In particular,
it states that, unlike simple negligence, in the context of intentional torts and joint-and-several
liability, Idaho does not and should not recognize this proportioning of liability based on fault:
This is presumably why, in the negligence context, the Legislature ... has replaced
joint-and-several liability with comparative fault. See Idaho Code § 6-803(3). By
contrast, where joint tortfeasors are alleged to have purposefully acted in concert to
intentionally commit a tortious act desired by all, questions like which tortfeasor is
more at fault defy answer.
Motion, p. 11. Essentially, then, Saint Alphonsus argues that there are two different standards.
For those who are simply negligent, there is§ 6-803(3)'s requirement that a court evaluate the
"comparative responsibility" of the individual tortfeasors. !d. But, according to Saint
Alphonsus, for those who act intentionally or in concert, there is only the head count "pro rata"
model. !d.

001042
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Unfortunately for Saint Alphonsus, the Court of Appeals has specifically rejected this exact
approach. In Rausch, cited above, the Court spoke pointedly to this argument and stated that the
relative degree of fault of co-defendants should still be considered even if the tort was intentional
and even where the parties were jointly and severally liable:
Rausch contends, however, that the § 6-803(3) provision for apportionment is
inapplicable because Sargeant's act was an intentional tort, a battery, rather than
an act of negligence. According to Rausch, the comparative responsibility
provisions of § 6-803 do not apply to intentional torts and do not allow an
allocation offault ... In our view, this argument is unsupported by the language
of the statute. Subsection (3) requires the comparison of not only parties'
negligence but of their "negligence or comparative responsibility," thus allowing
for apportionment offault other than that arising from negligence. In addition,
subsection (4) defines "joint tortfeasor" as "one (1) of two (2) or more persons
jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether
or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them." This definition
is not limited to persons who are liable in negligence; it refers to anyone who is
liable "in tort." ... Therefore, even if Sargeant's conduct can be properly
characterized as intentional rather than negligent, his name may be included on
the special verdict form for purposes of apportionment of responsibility.
Rausch, 14 P.3d at 1082 (emphasis added).

In short, § 6-806's "pro rata" language exists in the context of a statutory scheme whose
aim is to apportion responsibility based on relative degrees of fault, even in the context of
intentional torts and joint-and-several liability. !d. It would be anomalous indeed for the

Legislature to suddenly and inexplicably abandon that purpose when it drafted § 6-806. More to
the point, Saint Alphonsus's interpretation is directly contrary to the rules of statutory
construction, and should be rejected. McNair, 108 P.3d at 412-13.
d.

Cases from other jurisdictions.

There are several cases on point from other jurisdictions which have determined that
when a statute similar to Idaho's was found among the respective state's comparative negligence
and contribution statutes-just as they are in Idaho-the legislature there was clearly indicating
that "pro rata" was to be defined in relation to the parties' respective fault. For example, in
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National Union Fire, cited above, the Oklahoma Supreme Court was faced with the definition of
"pro rata share" in a statute very similar to I. C. § 6-803(1) (which, again, contains the exact same
language as§ 6-806). 784 P.2d at 55-56. As here, one defendant in that case urged the
Oklahoma Supreme Court to significantly decrease its damages by construing the "pro rata"
language in that statute as meaning that "each tortfeasor' s share would be equal regardless of

their degree offault." Id (emphasis in original).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to do so, finding that the only reasonable
interpretation of the term "pro rata share" was in proportion to comparative fault. Jd It found
instrumental in its construction of the statute the fact that the Oklahoma statute-like Idaho' swas found among others dealing with contribution:
The Oklahoma Legislature decided that justice was better served by allowing for
contribution among tortfeasors and hence, adopted the contribution statute. . ..
Therefore, in liberally construing this statute according to legislative intent, it
seems only logical that the lawmaking body expected contribution to be
apportioned according to each tortfeasor's degree of fault. To have one tortfeasor
1% at fault and another 99% at fault and yet, make them split equally their
liability in a contribution action seems as harsh and irrational as not having
contribution at all. We find that a more equitable result is the equation of liability
with fault. Surely, the Legislature would intend no less.

Id at 57 (emphasis added).
National Union is not alone in this holding. In Hindy v. Bousquet, cited above, a Rhode
Island court was faced with virtually an identical issue to the one here. 1975 WL 169940.
Again, just as in this case, one of two tortfeasors argued that when a statute very similar to
Idaho's § 6-803(1) used the term "pro rata," that meant it could only be liable for 50% of the
damages, even though the jury's determination was that it was 80% liable, because, according to
the tortfeasor, "pro rata" meant an equal division, regardless of fault. Id at *1. The Court
rejected this argument. It found that because Rhode Island had adopted comparative negligence
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and contribution, the idea that the Rhode Island Legislature meant for "pro rata" to be defined
without regard to fault was "absurd";
[I]f the jury in the instant case had determined that defendant driver Bousquet was
99% guilty of the causal negligence for the accident and defendant driver Hindy
only guilty of 1% of the causal negligence, it would appear to be absurd to permit
the fact that each driver is a joint tortfeasor to rearrange the jury's verdict and call
upon the 1% negligent driver to pay 50% of the judgment. Likewise, absurdity
follows by permitting the 99% negligent driver to be rewarded by virtue of his
joint tortfeasor status and have his payment reduced from 99% to 50% of the
judgment.

!d. at *3. Given this "absurdity," the Court found that the term "pro rata" was to be defined in
relation to respective fault. !d. at **3-4.
This Court is faced with almost the identical situation to those in National Union and
Hindy: Saint Alphonsus, the main tortfeasor here, is proposing an "irrational" and "absurd"

interpretation of§ 6-806 at issue in order to avoid liability itself. Moreover, it urges its strained
interpretation in spite of the fact that, like Rhode Island and Oklahoma, the Idaho Legislature
adopted the contribution and comparative fault system found I.C. § 6-801 et seq. so as to develop
a "sensible and fair method ofloss." Sun Valley Airlines, 411 F. Supp. at 603. Thus, like these
courts, this Court must reject Saint Alphonsus's self-serving interpretation as needlessly
incongruous with the statutory scheme.

2.

There is no evidence that the parties to the settlement agreement intended
the term "pro rata" to mean equal shares.

As noted above, it is not enough for Saint Alphonsus to persuade the Court that when the
Idaho Legislature used the term "pro rata" it meant equal shares. Even if accepted, that argument
only gets Saint Alphonsus past § 6-806, which solely deals with contribution between
tortfeasors, not their liability to a plaintiff. Instead, Saint Alphonsus must also deal with the
requirements of§ 6-805, which, unlike § 6-806, does talk to the possibility of a settlement
agreement decreasing the amount of liability of a non-settling defendant. In that regard, Saint
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Alphonsus cites § 6-805(1) and argues that because the alleged settlement agreement at issue in
this case contains the term "pro rata," MRIA has agreed to reduce its claim against Saint
Alphonsus by an equal-shares "proportion" ofbetween 50%-60%. Motion, pp. 6-7.
The problems with this argunient are numerous. First, and most fundamentally, the
argument depends entirely on the existence of a valid settlement agreement; without one, § 6-805
never comes into play to begin with. But again, there is no evidence of a valid and enforceable
settlement agreement before the Court since Saint Alphonsus has altogether failed to meet its
burden to bring forth an admissible and authenticated agreement between MRIA and the Rads.
Secondly, even assuming that agreement attached to Mr. Gjording's affidavit was
somehow admissible evidence of the parties' intent, the simple fact that it uses the term "pro
rata" is not particularly relevant to the analysis. This is because, as noted repeatedly in this
Opposition, "pro rata" is an inherently ambiguous term reasonably capable of several competing
definitions. See, e.g., National Union, 784 P.2d at 55-57; Hindy, 1975 WL 169940 at **2-4;
McDermott, 511 U.S. at n.9. As such, in order to prevail on summary judgment, Saint
Alphonsus needed to have brought forth more than just an agreement using the term "pro rata
reduction," but also evidence making clear that when the parties used that term, they specifically
meant equal shares rather than, say, a reduction commensurate with fault.
Yet Saint Alphonsus produced no such evidence. Indeed, it does not even attempt to
make such a showing. For example, Saint Alphonsus submits no affidavit from any party to this
alleged agreement stating what was meant by use ofthe term "pro rata." Similarly, there is no
correspondence attached to any affidavit demonstrating negotiations between the parties to the
alleged settlement agreement such that intent might be gleaned. Instead, Saint Alphonsus asks
this Court to simply take its word for it that when the parties to this agreement-none of whom
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are Saint Alphonsus-used the inherently ambiguous term "pro rata," they were foolishly but
purposefully using the meaning which would result in MRIA needlessly forfeiting over half of its
remaining damages-or about $20,000,000-in exchange for a comparative pittance. In sum,
Saint Alphonsus, as the moving party, asks this Court not just to make impermissible inferences
on its behalf in order to grant summary judgment, but also to suspend reason altogether and
recklessly assume that MRIA knowingly acted against its own interests. Obviously, such
ridiculous assumptions have no place in a summary judgment motion, at least not in favor of the
moving party. See Mackay, 179 P.3d at 1066-67.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even ifthis Court were to overlook the manifold
evidentiary problems with the alleged agreement, its verbiage makes clear that the parties to it, if
any, only intended for "pro rata" to mean that each party should pay commensurate with fault.
This becomes painfully obvious once all the relevant language from that agreement is examined:
If Releasees are joint tortfeasors, ... have acted in concert, have acted in a
conspiracy with any person, ... in such an event Releasor releases that portion or
share of the cause of action which Releasor has against Releasees and discharges
any and all damages attributable to Releasees in any such cause of action, without
in any way discharging or releasing that portion of the cause of action attributable
to any portion of the cause of action attributable to any party other than Releasees
who have caused injury as a result of the allegations in the Third Party Compliant.
Releasor does hereby credit and satisfy that portion of the total amount of
damages ... that may have been caused by ... Releasees as hereinafter may be
determined in a future trial . . . and Releasor does hereby release and discharge
that fraction, portion, pro rata share, and percentage of the total causes of action
and claims of Releasor for damages against Releasees which shall hereinafter by
further trial ... be determined to be the sum of the portion, fraction, pro rata share,
or percentage of causal negligence, breach of contract or extra contractual claims,
any joint and several liability as it applies to Releasees, and/or any other form of
fault for which Releasees are found, determined, or by way of stipulation or
agreement may be liable.
Any damages recovered or recoverable by Releasor against any other joint
tortfeasor shall be reduced in amount by the ratio, portion, pro rata share, or
percentage of causal negligence, contractual liability, any claims arising from
joint activities, or in any form for fault for which Releasees are found liable as
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may be determined in a future trial or other disposition of these matters including
agreement or settlement by other parties.
See the Affidavit of Jack Gjording, pp. 3-4 (emphasis added).
It is clear that the parties here only released the Rads from their relative fault in this

matter, with that fault to be determined at trial. Specifically, the reduction referred to in this
agreement was expressly in an amount equal to the "causal negligence" or whatever "other form
of fault" that "may be determined in a future trial." Id This is dispositive, because each party
paying in proportion to the amount of "fault" that a judge or jury determines "at a future trial" is
a result of that party's negligence is the very epitome of the proportionate fault system.
Moreover, to remove any confusion, the parties to this alleged agreement stated this
intent not just once, but no less than three different times: (1) "Releasor releases that portion or

share of the cause of action which Releasor has against Releasees and discharges any and all
damages attributable to Releasees"; (2) "Releasor does hereby credit and satisfy that portion of

the total amount of damages ... that may have been caused by ... Releasees as hereinafter may be
determined in a future trial ... "; (3) "Any damages recovered or recoverable by Releasor against
any other joint tortfeasor shall be reduced [by the] fault for which Releasees are found liable as

may be determined in a future trial ...." Id There can thus be no question but that the parties to
this agreement, if any, intended to release the Rads-and thus credit Saint Alphonsus--only
from that amount which the Rads' "fault" caused MRIA's damages. Obviously, this clear and
oft repeated intent is entirely incompatible with the idea that the parties meant to decrease
MRIA's future damages against Saint Alphonsus by a "per head" basis.
In response to this language, Saint Alphonsus focuses myopically on the term "pro rata,"
arguing that by merely invoking it, the parties must have intended something diametrically
opposed to what they state repeatedly throughout the agreement. Motion, pp. 9-11. But again,
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this position depends solely on Saint Alphonsus's erroneous belief that the term "pro rata" has
only one meaning. Given that the case law cited above makes clear that one of the term's many
definitions is completely congruent with comparative negligence, there is no reason to believe
that the parties to this agreement, if any, intended anything other than what is written: that the
Rads were only being released in relation to their relative fault. Indeed, any other construction of
the term "pro rata" would ignore and invalidate the repeated language in the agreement requiring
the relative degree of fault to be determined at a future trial. This, of course, is not acceptable,
since "the entire contract is to be construed together for the purpose of giving force and effect to
each clause." Maxwell v. Cumberland Life Ins., 113 Idaho 808, 813,748 P.2d 392,397 (1987).
And perhaps just as importantly, Saint Alphonsus has failed to present evidence suggesting the
parties intended something different than what is unmistakably stated. As such, Saint
Alphonsus' s Motion must be denied.

V.

CONCLUSION

The result of the foregoing is clear. Saint Alphonsus has advanced an argument that
depends entirely on faulty "evidence," requires the Court to ignore Idaho statutes and case law,
and only works if this Court makes illogical assumptions about what the parties to an unsigned
contract meant. And, tellingly, even if all these problems were impermissibly ignored, Saint
Alphonsus's arguments could, at best, only affect one ofMRIA's seven causes of action. Saint
Alphonsus's Motion must be rejected.
DATED this 25th day of April2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

-·2···-l''R. ~~

DaraL. Pker
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Christian G. Vergonis
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Attorneys MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219

OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON MRI CENTER AND MRI MOBILE'S
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY CLAIMS

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
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Idaho Limited Partnership,
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INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
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OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRI
CENTER AND MRI MOBILE'S THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY CLAIMS -1
001051

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), MRI Limited Partnership
("MRI Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited ("Mobile") submit this Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRI Center and MRI Mobile's Third Party
Beneficiary Claims.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Saint Alphonsus seeks the dismissal ofMRI Center and Mobile's third party beneficiary
claims on the grounds that MRI Center and Mobile are not express beneficiaries. Saint
Alphonsus appears to base its motion on the fact that MRI Center and Mobile had not been
formed when the MRIA Partnership Agreement was executed and on its erroneous belief that the
MRIA Partnership Agreement does not state an intent to confer a benefit on MRI Center and
Mobile. Saint Alphonsus's motion, however, must be denied because the MRIA Partnership
Agreement expressly confers benefits upon the yet to be organized limited partnerships that
MRIA was formed to manage, including the benefit of a covenant by the partners of MRIA not
to compete against the businesses of the limited partnerships and a limitation on the hospital
partners' ability to withdraw.

II.
A.

DISPUTED FACTS

MRIA was Formed to Manage the Limited Partnerships
In 1980, the neuroscience physicians at SARMC began investigating magnetic resonance

imaging ("MRI") technology as the next state-of-the-art imaging modality. (Trial Ex. 4022.)
They determined that MRI technology was essential for SARMC to remain the preeminent
neuroscience center in Idaho. By 1985, SARMC formed a general partnership (MRIA) with five
physicians (later known as "DMR"), Mercy Medical Center in Nampa and Caldwell Memorial
Hospital (nlk/a West Valley Regional Medical Center) to develop a jointly owned and operated
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MRI center located on SARMC's campus. (/d.) (Trial Exs. 4022 & 4023; TR Vol. II at 1101:191105:10.)
The sole purpose of MRIA as expressly stated in the MRIA Partnership Agreement was
"to promote and organize" and "manage" limited partnerships that would provide magnetic
resonance imaging services. (Trial Ex. 4023 at§§ 1.6, 2.1; Affidavit of Dr. James Prochaska in
Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRI Center and MRI
Mobile's Third Party Beneficiary Claims ("Prochaska Aff.")

at~~

4-5, filed concurrently

herewith.) Indeed, when the MRIA Partnership Agreement was being negotiated, it was agreed
that MRIA would form a limited partnership, later named MRI Limited Partnership d/b/a MRI
Center of Idaho, for the purpose of running an MRI business on Saint Alphonsus's campus.
(Prochaska Aff.

at~

5.) Had the limited partnership not attracted sufficient limited partner

investors to fund the limited partnership, the MRIA partners agreed, as reflected in the
Partnership Agreement, that MRIA itself would dissolve. (Trial Ex. 4023 at § 1.1.1; Prochaska
Aff.

At~

4.) It was also agreed to leave open the possibility of forming other business units and

later MRIA formed MRI Mobile Limited Partnership to provide MRI services on the campuses
of West Valley Medical Center in Caldwell, Idaho ("West Valley") and Mercy Medical Center in
Nampa, Idaho ("Mercy"). (Prochaska Aff.

at~~

5-6.)

As contemplated by the Partnership Agreement, MRIA had no business other than the
management of the limited partnerships. (TR Vol. II at 1326:12-1328:3; 1335:11-13; 1336:191337:1.) In that regard, as expressed in the Partnership Agreement, MRIA promoted and
organized MRI Center and Mobile. It then managed the business affairs of MRI Center and later
Mobile as their general partner. (/d. at 1316:5-16; Trial Exs. 4024 at§ 4.1, 4028 at§ 4.1.)
Furthermore, as contemplated by the Partnership Agreement, MRIA, through MRI Center,
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acquired an MRI scanner which was placed on SARMC's campus and which began providing
MRI services. (TR Vol. II at 1325:21-1326:11.)

B.

The Limited Partnerships are Expressly Named, Direct Beneficiaries of the MRIA
Partnership Agreement's Non-Compete Provision.
Consistent with the purpose expressed in Sections 1.6 and 2.1 of the Partnership

Agreement to manage the limited partnerships' magnetic resonance imaging businesses, the
Partnership Agreement contains covenants that restricted the partners of MRIA from competing
with the magnetic resonance imaging businesses of the limited partnerships. (Trial Ex. 4023 at
§§ 9.2 & 9.3.) Section 9.3 provides that no "Restricted Party" 1 shall engage in a "Competitive
Activity." (Id at§ 9.3.) Section 9.2.1 defines "Competitive Activity" to include "business
activities in which the partnership is engaged." (Id at § 9.2.1.)
As set forth above, the business of MRIA was to manage the magnetic resonance imaging
businesses of the limited partnerships, MRI Center and Mobile. Especially important to the
partners was that the partners be restricted from opening businesses that would compete with the
magnetic resonance imaging businesses of the limited partnerships and consequently, Section
9 .2.2 of the agreement provides that the partners are prohibited from engaging in any business
activities within "1 00 miles from the location of the first magnetic resonance imaging device
installed by the Limited Partnership." (Trial Ex. 4023 at§ 9.2.2; Prochaska Aff.

at~

9.) The

partners inserted these provisions primarily for the benefit of the business units because they
were the ones providing MRI services, not MRIA. (Prochaska Aff. At ~ 9.) Thus, for the benefit
of the limited partnerships as well as MRIA, the MRIA Partnership Agreement expressly

1

The term "Restricted Party," as defined by the MRIA Partnership Agreement, includes the
partners of MRIA and terminated partners. (Trial Ex. 4023 at § 9.1)
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prohibits partners from competing with the magnetic resonance imaging businesses of the limited
partnerships.

C.

The Limited Partnerships are Direct Beneficiaries of the MRIA Partnership
Agreement's Withdrawal Provisions.
The parties recognized that because the initial MRI scanner and business, MRI Center,

would be based on Saint Alphonsus's campus and because the support of Saint Alphonsus was
critical to the success ofMRI Center, it would be necessary to insert provisions into the
Partnership Agreement limiting the circumstances under which the hospital partners could
withdraw. (/d. at~~ 7-8.) Those provisions are contained Article 6 of the Partnership Agreement
and were for the benefit of the business units of MRIA, which are MRI Center and Mobile. (!d.;
Trial Ex. 4023 at § 6.1.) The provisions apply to all hospital partners because the support of
West Valley and Mercy was critical to the success of Mobile just as the support of Saint
Alphonsus was critical to the success ofMRI Center and Mobile. (Prochaska Aff.

III.

at~~

7-8.)

ARGUMENT

Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's assertion, the MRIA partnership agreement specifically
contemplates that the MRIA would form and manage limited partnerships through which it
would engage in the business of providing magnetic resonance imaging services. By the terms
of the Partnership Agreement, the business of MRIA was inextricably intertwined with the
limitedpartnerships and, consequently, many of the covenants in the Partnership Agreement
expressly benefit the limited partnerships formed by MRIA-MRI Center and Mobile. Indeed,
the non-compete and withdrawal provisions were for the direct and primary benefit of the limited
partnerships. Thus, as a matter of law, MRI Center and Mobile are third party beneficiaries of
the MRIA Partnership Agreement.
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A.

Direct Beneficiaries of a Contract Provision May Enforce that Provision.
For a third party beneficiary to recover on a breach of contract claim, the third party must

show that the contract was made for her direct benefit and that she is more than a mere incidental
beneficiary. Dawson v. Eldredge, 84 Idaho 331, 337, 372 P.2d 414, 418 (1962). The contract
itself must express an intent to benefit the third party. Stewart v. Arrington Constr. Co., 92 Idaho
526, 532, 446 P.2d 895, 901 (1968). The intent "must be gleaned from the contract itselfunless
that document is ambiguous, whereupon the circumstances surrounding its formation may be
considered.'' Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg., Co., 107 Idaho 406, 409, 690 P.2d 341, 344
(1984).

1.

A Third-Party Beneficiary Does Not Need to be Identified by Name

The Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized that a party does not need to be named and
identified as an individual to recover on a third party beneficiary claim. Stewart, 92 Idaho at
532, 446 P .2d at 901. Instead, the party need only show that it "is a member of a limited class
for whose benefit [the contract provision] was made." Id This principle was exemplified in

Just's Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co. Inc., 99 Idaho 462, 463, 583 P.2d 997, 998 (1978). In that
case, a contract between the City of Idaho Falls and Arrington Construction Company for the
renovation of a part of the city contained a provision that specifically required the construction
company to take precautions to limit the disruption to the businesses within the area to be
renovated. The plaintiff, Just's Inc., was a not a party to the contract, but was a retailer within
the renovation area. Indeed, Just's Inc. was not mentioned by name anywhere in the contract. Id
at 465-66, 583 P .2d at 1000-1001. Even though Just's Inc. was not mentioned by name in the
contract, Just's Inc. sued when Arrington failed to provide continuous access to Just's Inc. Id at
463, 583 P.2d at 583. The Idaho Supreme Court held that Just's Inc. was a third party beneficiary
to the contract between Idaho Falls and Arrington reasoning that:
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It is apparent from the language 'Of these provisions that the parties intended to
keep to a minimum the disruption to the downtown businesses within the project
area and that these provisions, which require the contractor to take specific steps
in order to avoid undue disruption to these businesses, were for their benefit. It is
for the alleged breach of these provisions that the plaintiff has brought this suit.

These provisions impose a contractual obligation on the defendant to take specific
steps to prevent undue injury to a well defined and limited class of third parties.
Being the beneficiaries of those provisions, members of that class are entitled to
sue for enforcement or breach of those provisions under the principles of contract
law specifically recognized in the Idaho statutes and cases. I. C. § 29-102.

Id at 466, 583 P.2d at 1001.
2.

A Third Party Beneficiary Only Needs to be a Beneficiary of the Provision It
Seeks to Enforce, Not the Entire Contract.

The Idaho Supreme Court has also held that a third party beneficiary does not need to be
a beneficiary of the entire contract; it only needs to be a beneficiary of the provision it seeks to
enforce. Id at 467, 583 P .2d at 1002. In Just's Inc., as set forth above, the contract mainly
concerned the renovation of downtown Idaho Falls. !d. at 463, 583 P.2d at 998. It specified the
work to be done, the price for the work and other terms ordinarily found in a construction
contract. Id Just's Inc. did not claim that it was a beneficiary of all of those contract provisions.
Instead it only claimed third party beneficiary status under certain provisions that required the
construction company to take measures to prevent unnecessary interruption to businesses in the
downtown area during construction. Idat 463-67, 583 P.2d at 998-1002. The Idaho Supreme
Court held that "the contract itself indicates that the provisions which the plaintiff claims the
defendant breached were intended for the benefit of the businesses operating within the LID, not
merely owners of the fee. We conclude therefore that this plaintiff is a member of the class of
third persons intended to be benefited by this contract and is entitled to sue for its breach." Id at
467, 583 P.2d at 1002. Thus, a party need not be a beneficiary of the entire contract; it only
needs to be a beneficiary of the provisions it seeks to enforce.
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B.

The Limited Partnerships Are Direct Beneficiaries of the Non-Compete and
Withdrawal Provisions of the MRIA Partnership Agreement.
Here, the connection between the limited partnerships' beneficiary status is more direct

than that of Just's Inc. The limited partnerships are expressly mentioned in the MRIA
Partnership Agreement. Indeed, as set forth above, the sole purpose of forming MRIA was to
manage the limited partnerships. While it is true that MRI Center and Mobile are not mentioned
by name in the MRIA Partnership Agreement, that fact is of no consequence because the MRIA
Partnership Agreement expressly references this limited class of beneficiaries. Stewart, 92 Idaho
at 532, 446 P.2d at 901; Just's Inc., at 467, 583 P.2d at 1002. Likewise, because the MRIA
Partnership Agreement expressly contemplated that MRIA would form MRI Center and Mobile,
it is also of no consequence that MRI Center and Mobile were not yet formed when the MRIA
Partnership Agreement was executed.
1.

(Trial Ex. 4023 at§§ 1.1, 1.6, 2.1 & 9.2.2.)

The Non-Compete Provisions

As set forth above, MRIA itself conducted no business other than the management of the
limited partnerships. (TR Vol. II at 1326: 12-1328:3.) As contemplated by the MRIA
Partnership Agreement, the vehicles through which MRIA intended to pursue the business of
providing magnetic resonance imaging services was the limited partnerships. (Trial Ex. 4023 at
§ 1.6.) Consequently, the non-compete provisions expressly prohibit competition within "100
miles from the location of the first magnetic resonance imaging device installed by the Limited
Partnership." (Trial Ex. 4023 at§ 9.2.2.i These provisions directly benefit the limited
partnerships, MRI Center and Mobile, which are the entities that provided magnetic resonance
imaging services, not MRIA. (TR Vol. II at 1335:11-13; 1336:19-1337:1.) For that reason, the

2

The CEO of Saint Alphonsus who participated in the negotiation of the MRIA Partnership Agreement testified that
it was the intention of the partners that no partner ofMRIA compete in the provision of magnetic resonance
services. (TR Vol. II at 1417:15-23.)
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contemplated limited partnership is expressly mentioned in the non-compete provision of the
Partnership Agreement. (Trial Ex. 4023 at§ 9.2.2.) Indeed, at the time the Partnership
Agreement was negotiated, it was understood by all that the limited partnership, not MRIA,
would operate the mri scanner that would be located on Saint Alphonsus's campus and
consequently, the parties to the Partnership Agreement inserted the non-compete clause into the
Partnership Agreement primarily for the benefit of the limited partnerships because they were the
ones that would be providing mri services. (Prochaska Aff.

At~

9.) Thus, because the limited

partnerships MRI Center and Mobile were the entities that provided the magnetic resonance
imaging services, they are the direct beneficiaries of the non-compete provision in the MRIA
Partnership Agreement.
SARMC's interpretation renders the non-compete clause meaningless. Because the
limited partnerships, as contemplated by the Partnership Agreement, were the entities that
conducted the business of providing magnetic resonance imaging services, it would not make
any sense to have a non-compete provision that prevented MRIA partners from competing in the
business of providing magnetic resonance imaging services if the provision did not benefit the
limited partnerships. As in Just's Inc., it is apparent from the lariguage of the non-compete
provisions that the parties intended to prevent the partners from competing with the limited
partnerships, and therefore that the provisions were for the direct benefit of the limited
partnerships. Accordingly, the Court should find that MRI Center and Mobile are authorized to
enforce the non-compete provisions of the Partnership Agreement as third party beneficiaries.

2.

The Withdrawal Provisions.

Again, as set forth above, MRIA' s existence and business was, pursuant to the terms of
the MRIA Partnership Agreement, inextricably intertwined with the limited partnerships it would
form and then manage. (Trial Ex. 4023 at §§ 1.1, 1.6, 2.1 & 9 .2.) MRIA was formed for the
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purpose of managing limited partnerships that would provide mri services. (Jd; Prochaska Aff.
at~

4.) Saint Alphonsus's participation in MRIA was key to the success of the limited

partnership, MRI Center, because MRI Center was based on Saint Alphonsus's campus and was
considered to be part of the Saint Alphonsus's radiology department. (TR Vol. II at 1397:11-17;
1125:9-22; 1418:7-16; Prochaska Aff.

At~~

5-8.) In fact, the partners understood that

withdrawal and competition by Saint Alphonsus would be devastating to the limited partnerships
that operated the business contemplated by the MRIA Partnership Agreement. (Prochaska Aff.
at~~

6-9.) It was for these reasons that the non-hospital partners ofMRIA insisted that Article 6

be placed in the MRIA Partnership so as to limit the circumstances under which the hospital
partners could withdraw and compete. (/d) Accordingly, those provisions were primarily for
the benefit of the business units ofMRIA, MRI Center and Mobile. (/d) Consequently, MRI
Center and Mobile are third party beneficiaries of the withdrawal limitations in Article 6 of the
Partnership Agreement.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary
Judgment on MRI Center and MRI Mobile's Third Party Beneficiary Claims.
DATED this 25th day of April2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively "MRIA") submit this Response to Saint Alphonsus's Motion in
Limine Re: Prior Evidentiary Rulings From the First Trial.
I.

INTRODUCTION

For the most part, Saint Alphonsus, through its motion, seeks the reinstatement of prior
evidentiary rulings. MRIA does not dispute that prior evidentiary rulings that were not disturbed
by the Supreme Court's decision should apply in the retrial of this matter. In fact, had Saint
Alphonsus asked, MRIA would have stipulated to most of the relief sought by this motion.

II.

ARGUMENT

MRIA does not dispute that the rulings listed in Section I of Saint Alphonsus's Brief,
entitled Evidentiary Rulings are still in effect, but it does not necessarily agree with SARMC's
description or interpretation of those rulings. Likewise, MRIA does not dispute that the rulings
listed in Section II( a) of Saint Alphonsus's Brief, entitled July 30, 2007 Decision on Motions in
Limine, Rulings Which Should be Re-Instated are still in effect, but it does not necessarily agree
with SARMC's description or interpretation of those rulings. As to the rulings listed in Section
II(b) of Saint Alphonsus' s Brief, entitled July 30, 2007 Decision on Motions in Limine, Prior
Rulings on Motions in Limine Undermined or Mooted by Subsequent Decisions, the trial court's
order on Motion 4, the Supreme Court's decision and the orders of this Court do not preclude
MRIA from arguing that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal from MRIA was a breach of the
partnership agreement. As this issue is the subject of two other recently filed motions, MRIA
hereby incorporates the arguments it made in support of the motion it filed on the issue and the
arguments it made in support of its opposition to the motion Saint Alphonsus filed on the issue.
Finally, as to the rulings listed in Section II( c) of Saint Alphonsus's Brief, entitled July 30,2007
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Decision on Motions in Limine, Motions in Limine for Which There are Now New Grounds for
Relief, Saint Alphonsus claims that the Supreme Court's decision provides a basis for Saint
Alphonsus to seek reconsideration of the ruling in Motions 1 and 9 via its recently filed Motion
in Limine to Exclude Evidence and Argument that Saint Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew from
MRIA. MRIA disagrees for the reasons set forth in its opposition to that motion.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Saint Alphonsus's Motion to the extent
MRIA does not oppose the relief requested therein and, for the reasons set forth above, deny the
motion to the extent MRIA opposes the relief requested therein.
DATED this

'Z'S"'- day of April 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") respond to the Motion in Limine of Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care ("Saint Alphonsus") to preclude reference to the jury's finding of liability in the
first trial. MRIA has no objection to this Motion in Limine. In fact, had Saint Alphonsus asked,
MRIA would have stipulated to this motion. However, Saint Alphonsus should likewise be
precluded from referencing the reversal of that verdict by the Supreme Court on appeal, as
outlined in greater detail in MRIA's Motion in Limine to Preclude Saint Alphonsus from
Referencing the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Regarding the Appeal of this Case, filed April 11,
2011.
DATED this 25th day of April, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Opposition to the Motion in Limine of Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("Saint Alphonsus") regarding evidence of competition
following its dissociation. Saint Alphonsus argues that because it "lawfully" dissociated on
April 1, 2004, the non-compete clause of the Partnership Agreement terminated on Aprill, 2005,
and that MRIA should therefore be "precluded from contending or premising liability or
damages upon the aU~g-i!ion that Saint Alphonsus had no right to compete with MRIA after
Aprill, 2005. (Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in Limine re:
Evidence of Competition Following Lawful Dissociation., p. 3.) Whether Saint Alphonsus
"lawfully" dissociated remains to be seen. More significantly, the activities undertaken by Saint
Alphonsus after Aprill, 2005, and damages occurring after that date, flow from the entire
spectrum of Saint Alphonsus's unlawful conduct which occurred well before that date. By Saint
Alphonsus's competition with its partner, breach of its fiduciary duties and the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and usurpation of partnership opportunities, the damage to MRIA was
done long before Aprill, 2005. Saint Alphonsus cannot escape liability for the damages that its
unlawful actions caused. As such, this Motion in Limine should be denied.

BACKGROUND
A.

MRIA has Claims Against Saint Alphonsus for Conduct Dating to 1999
As this Court is aware, this case is aboutSaint Alphonsus's breach of its fiduciary and

contractual duties to its partners in MRIA by competing against MRIA's businesses through a
joint venture/partnership in Intermountain Medical Imaging ("IMI"). While still a partner in
MRIA, Saint Alphonsus surreptitiously joined IMI and St. Alphonsus Radiology Group (n/k/a
Gem State Radiology and hereinafter "GSR" or the "rads") to open up a business that would
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compete with Saint Alphonsus's existing partnership, MRIA. Saint Alphonsus's behavior was so
egregious that it destroyed MRIA's business unit, MRI Center. The facts below provide the
basis for MRIA' s causes of action in this case, including breach of the Partnership Agreement,
Breach of Fiduciary Duties, Breach ofthe Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Interference
with Prospective Contractual Relations, and Civil Conspiracy.
1.

The Formation of the MRIA Partnership

The MRIA Partnership was formed in 1984 among Saint Alphonsus, five physicians
(later known as "DMR"), Mercy Medical Center in Nampa and Caldwell Memorial Hospital
(nlk/a West Valley Regional Medical Center), for the purpose of to developing a jointly owned
and operated investigating magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") scanner located on Saint
Alphonsus's campus. (Trial Ex. 4022 and 4023.) A Partnership Agreement was drafted to
govern the relationship among the parties. (/d.) Among other things, Partnership Agreement
contains a noncompete clause, which is located in Section 9.3.3 of the MRIA Partnership
Agreement as amended by the July 1998 Fourth Amendment to Articles of Partnership. (Trial
Ex 4050.) That provision provides that "[ f]or a period of one (1) year after becoming a
Terminated Partner, no Partner shall engage in any Competitive Activity that has attained that
status prior to such Partner becoming a Terminated Partner." 1
After the formation of the MRIA Partnership, the partners created MRI Center which
offered physicians limited partnership interests in the business. MRIA, the general partner of
MRI Center, had overall responsibility for running the business, MRI Center. (Trial Ex. 4024 at

This provision therefore supersedes the default rule stated in the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act that the duty not to compete exists only so long as the party is a partner. I. C. §
53-3-404(b )(3); I. C. § 53-3-603(b)
OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: EVIDENCE OF COMPETITION
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§ 4.1; TR Vol. 2 II at 1109.) MRI Center then acquired a MRI scanner which was placed on Saint
Alphonsus's campus. (TR Vol. II at 1325:21-1326:11.) MRIA created a Board ofPartners which
ran MRI Center. (TR Vol. II at 1315-16.) Each hospital partner, including Saint Alphonsus, and
each partner physician in DMR was a voting member of the board. Board meetings were held
monthly and were typically chaired by Saint Alphonsus's CEO. ( TR Vol. II at 1122:21-1123:25;
1345:19-23.) Board meetings regularly covered sensitive and confidential business information
relative to the operation ofMRI Center. (Trial Ex. 432; Trial Exs. 433-445).
MRI Center was viewed by the medical community, and treated by Saint Alphonsus, as
part of Saint Alphonsus's radiology department. (TR Vol. II. at 1418, 2420.) MRI Center's
business benefitted from this association. (Id. at 2420 ("It's always good to be ... part of a
flagship like St. Al's. We were known as the MRI at St. Al's. Being backed by some huge
corporation was extremely valuable [for marketing] ... in the field and with the referring
physicians.")) In fact, Saint Alphonsus-employed physicians and physicians with privileges at
Saint Alphonsus referred patients to MRI Center because of its affiliation with Saint Alphonsus.

(Id. at 1517:12-19.)
From MRIA's formation, Saint Alphonsus designated its in-house radiologists, GSR, as
the exclusive reader of radiologic images on Saint Alphonsus's campus, including at MRIA. (TR
Vol. II at 1146, 2309.) From 1985 to 1998, the working relationship between GSR and MRIA
was collegial and cooperative. (TR Vol. II at 1110:23-1111:12; 2383:16-25; TR Vol. III at
3165:14-24.) However, in 1998, GSR began developing a plan to build its own imaging center
in Boise (known as Intermountain Medical Imaging ("IMI")), which would compete with MRIA.
The present dispute arises out of Saint Alphonsus' s decision to conspire with, advance, support

2

"TR Vol." refers to the official trial transcript from the first trial.

OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS 'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: EVIDENCE OF COMPETITION
FOLLOWING DISSOCIATION- 4

001072

and eventually partner with GSR in IMI to compete against Saint Alphonsus's existing partners
inMRIA.

2.

GSR Plans to Build IMI and Invites Saint Alphonsus to be a Partner

In 1998, GSR became concerned that most of its income was derived from its services
contract with Saint Alphonsus. (Jd. at 1445-1447; Trial Ex. 4047.) GSR feared (as had happened
with another physician group) that Saint Alphonsus might terminate GSR' s services contract.
(TR Vol. II at 1447-8.)Consequently, GSR desired autonomy from Saint Alphonsus, and
concluded that owning an imaging center would provide that autonomy. (!d. at 1446-1448; Trial
Ex. 4052.) GSR, however, was concerned that if it opened an imaging center that competed with
Saint Alphonsus, Saint Alphonsus would react negatively and refuse to renew GSR's services
contract. (TR Vol. II at 1455-56.) GSR's solution was to invite Saint Alphonsus to participate in
the new imaging center, IMI. (Id.) Although Saint Alphonsus's initial reaction was negative, it
warmed to the idea, ultimately seeking 50% of the new business. (Id. at 1456-57; Trial Ex.
4057.)
When Saint Alphonsus and GSR announced their intention to partner in a new imaging
center, Saint Alphonsus understood that to avoid violating the noncompete clause in the MRIA
partnership agreement, MRIA needed to participate in the new imaging center. (Trial Ex. 4062;
TR Vol. II at 1741-1742.) For that reason, Saint Alphonsus requested MRIA to pursue a
partnership with the GSR to eliminate this conflict. (TR vol. II at 1152-53, 1748-50.) MRIA
pursued discussions with GSR and the business opportunity to participate in IMI's profits
(Jd.at1152-1155; 1788:19-1790:15.) In fact, a deal between GSR and MRIA was "very close to
being finalized." (TR Vol. II at 1157; Trial Ex. 4079).
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3.

Saint Alphonsus Sabotages MRIA's Negotiations and Conspires with GSR to
Compete Against MRIA

In June 1999, MRIA asked its partner, Saint Alphonsus through its CEO, Sandra Bruce,
to help MRIA close the deal with GSR. (TR Vol. II at 1164-1165, 1759-1760.) Although Bruce
agreed to help and although Bruce knew Saint Alphonsus could not participate in a new imaging
center without MRIA, Bruce shockingly told GSR to backburner its negotiations with MRlA and
complete a deal with Saint Alphonsus. (!d. at at1166, 1760-61, 1769:7-10; Trial Ex. 4101.) Saint
Alphonsus then offered GSR a better deal: a 50% interest in an MRI business rather than the 9%
(one-eleventh) interest offered by MRIA. 3 (!d. at 1788:19-1790:15; 1786:15-19; 2043:242044:5; 2371:4-10; 3702:9-11; 4171 :13-21; Trial Ex. 4191 at 3.) As a result, GSR predictably
chose to partner with Saint Alphonsus. (Trial Ex. 4226.) Saint Alphonsus pursued a relationship
with GSR whereby they would establish imaging centers (with MRI) "throughout the region."
(TR vol. II at 1791, 2270-2271.) Such a strategy clearly violated the MRIA non-compete
provision. (Trial Ex. 4023 at§ 9.) This strategy also included the concept that Saint Alphonsus
would buy MRI Center from MRIA and sell 50% of that operation to GSR. (TR Vol. II at 17951798.)
By mid-1999, Saint Alphonsus retained consultants to explore options to exit or
"restructure" MRIA so Saint Alphonsus could partner in IMI. Alan Hahn of
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, was hired to explore four "scenarios" whereby Saint Alphonsus would
take control of the MRIA board so that Saint Alphonsus could either liquidate MRIA or offer
GSR an equity position in a restructured partnership that excluded the DMR physicians. (Trial
Ex. 4118.) After reviewing these scenarios, Saint Alphonsus requested Hahn to evaluate the
3

This was a better deal for both Saint Alphonsus and GSR because Saint Alphonsus was also
able to gain a 50% interest rather than the 27.5% interest it owned in MRIA. (Trial Ex. 4023 at §
3.1.1.)
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consequences of Saint Alphonsus simply withdrawing from MRIA and competing with its
partners. Hahn's evaluation ("Scenario 5") suggested that withdrawal might be a breach of the
MRIA partnership agreement and could lead to litigation due to "shifting referrals." (Trial Ex.
4138 at 16.) This report was not disclosed to MRIA. (TR. Vol. II at 1199:5-23.)
In fall1999, Saint Alphonsus began to exchange with GSR confidential draft operating
agreements for IMI. (Trial Exs. 4115 &4125). Those drafts describe a relationship where:
•

•

•

Neither Saint Alphonsus nor Saint Alphonsus's "Affiliate" (which would
include MRIA) could expand in Ada or Canyon counties without GSR's
permission. (Ex. 4115 §7.3.1)
Saint Alphonsus and GSR agreed to pursue development of an imaging
center in Meridian (a location which MRIA had picked to establish an
imaging center. (Ex. 4115 §7.3.3)
Saint Alphonsus would receive an option to purchase 50% of any IMI
imaging facility in Ada and Canyon counties.

In essence, Saint Alphonsus's separate, confidential negotiations assured that GSR would
partner with Saint Alphonsus in IMI, to the exclusion ofMRIA. When representatives ofMRIA
finally met with the rads on December 16, 1999, to finalize the deal between GSR and MRIA,
which had been previously very close to finalization before Saint Alphonsus's interference, GSR
predictably rejected the offer (Trial Ex. 4079.) Not only was MRIA prevented from partnering
with GSR in IMI, it was left with the prospect of competing with the same rads who were
reading MRIA's images and interfacing with MRIA's referring physician community. (Trial Ex.
4104, 4137; TR Vol. II at 1488.) Saint Alphonsus exacerbated the problem when it ignored
MRIA's requests to permit MRIA to "contract directly with radiologists" who were not MRIA's
competitors. (Trial Ex. 4137; TR Vol. II at 1182.)
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4.

Saint Alphonsus Decides it is in its Interest to Destroy the Business of MRI
Center

Recognizing that there was no easy "way around" the non-compete provisions to achieve
its objective ofpartnering with GSR, Saint Alphonsus shifted focus in early 2000 to buying its
way out ofMRIA by purchasing MRI Center, and sharing that operation with GSR. (TR Vol. II
at 1197, 1520-21, 1812, 2057). Saint Alphonsus requested its consultant, Hahn, to determine a
fair market value buyout price for MRI Center. (!d.) The figure was in excess of $22 million. (!d.
at 1519-25, Ex. 4144.) Hahn never made an offer to MRIA because Saint Alphonsus was
unwilling to pay such an amount. (TR Vol. II at 1525; TR Vol. III at 3567.) Instead, Saint
Alphonsus dragged its feet and withheld its consultants' fair market value determination of MRI
Center. There was method in this. Saint Alphonsus understood that after IMI entered the market
and started to take MRIA' s customer base, "the cheapest thing to do [would be] nothing." (Trial
Ex. 4154; TR Vol. II at 2662-65.) In other words, rather than negotiate a deal, Saint Alphonsus
would stand by and watch MRIA's patient volumes "dwindle away." (Id. at 2664-5). This would
severely impact MRI Center's profitability, and drive down the value of the operation allowing
Saint Alphonsus to purchase MRI Center for a reduced price. (!d.) Saint Alphonsus pursued this
strategy even though it knew such a strategy was unethical. (Id. at 1870.)

7.

While Saint Alphonsus Still an MRIA Partner, Saint Alphonsus Establishes
IMI over MRIA
a.

IMI was Established with Saint Alphonsus's Support

Although Saint Alphonsus understood it could not participate in IMI without breaching
its obligations to MRIA, it did so anyway. As early as October 1998, Saint Alphonsus expressed
its intention to become a 50 percent owner in IMI. (Trial Ex. 4061 at 2.) With that intention in
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mind, Saint Alphonsus began preparations for that eventuality, including supporting the
establishinent of IMI.
[Saint Alphonsus] has already made a number of tangible investments into
IMI, including the following: providing [Saint Alphonsus '] case volume,
database, technical component charges, staffmg costs, and other operational data
for IMI's use in its business plan; linking IMI to its intranet between the hospital
and its physician network; supporting Karen Noyes, assistant director of the [Saint
Alphonsus] radiology department, in joining IMI as executive director; converting
[Saint Alphonsus] to the same digital radiography system as IMI.
(Trial Ex. 4095; see also Trial Ex. 4074 (showing in February 1999, Saint Alphonsus was
working on funding for IMI)). GSR me~ting minutes further reflect that "financing [for IMI] was
contingent on a partnership with the hospital." (Trial Ex. 545 (emphasis added).)

b.

Saint Alphonsus's IT Support Gives IMI a Competitive Edge Over
MRIA

From IMI's inception, Saint Alphonsus provided substantial technical and professional
assistance to IMI allowing IMI to aggressively compete against MRIA. Saint Alphonsus helped
bring "the digital revolution to IMI" by investing several hundred thousand dollars in IMI's IT
system. (TR Vol. II at 1505:10-1507:10; Trial Ex. 4095.) The investment by Saint Alphonsus in
"dark fiber" connectivity to IMI, alone, was $780,000. (Trial Ex. 4231at 3; TR Vol. II at 1509:613.) As part of the IT support, Saint Alphonsus and IMI had direct contact with MRIA' s
customers, the referring physicians. (!d. at 1621 :7 -20; 1639: 18-24.) Saint Alphonsus provided
laptops that allowed referring physicians to view IMI reports and images, but not MRIA reports
and images. (!d. at 2432:10-2435:1; 2436:21-2437:6; 2439:10-17; 2453:6-24543:9.) Saint
Alphonsus and GSR also formed an "ITPACS" committee staffed by knowledgeable Saint
Alphonsus IT which planned the future of the "entire digital paradigm shift for [Saint
Alphonsus], the radiologists and IMI." (!d. at 1619:12-1621:20.) MRIA was not allowed to
attend ITPACS meetings. (!d. at 2437:18-2439:9.)
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The IT support provided by Saint Alphonsus, while still a partner in MRIA, gave IMI
"competitive advantages" over MRIA. (!d. at 1618:22-1619:3, 2434:16-22.) For example, Mary
Rivers, a referring physician, testified that this new technology was extremely beneficial to her
practice because she needed the results of the scans immediately while her patient was in her
office and this new technology, which Saint Alphonsus gave to IMI two years before MRIA
received it, allowed referring physicians to receive the images and reports immediately. (TR Vol.
III at 3902:7-3903:16; TR Vol. II at 2420:11-16; 2428:21-2429:6; 2439:7-2440:7.) In sum, Saint
Alphonsus "was there with [IMI] making that investment in getting doctors over the technology
hump" and helping bring the "digital revolution" to IMI while MRIA was left in the cold. (!d. at
1505:10-15; 1634:12-15; 2433:22-2440:7.)

c.

Financial Support Before Saint Alphonsus Withdrew From MRIA

In addition to the financial investment in IT set forth above, Saint Alphonsus gave IMI
$546,146 and assumed almost $1.5 million ofiMI's debt. (!d. at 1557:4-1558:2; 1622:221623:8.)

d.

Saint Alphonsus Conspires with GSR to Shift Referrals from MRIA
to IMI by Jointly Marketing IMI with GSR to Referring Physicians

While still a partner in MRIA, Saint Alphonsus worked with IMI to obtain a combined
market share for MRI, in direct competition with MRIA. (Trial Ex. 4248; TR Vol. II at 1643:713; TR Vol. III at 4169: 10-1 7.) Saint Alphonsus and IMI jointly marketed by television, radio,
newspapers, letters to referring physicians and physician-to-physician to office visits. (Trial Exs.
4248 & 4107; TR Vol. II 1643:23-1644:22.) This marketing effort included marketing for MRI
in direct competition with MRIA. !d. This pervasive marketing effort had the goal of promoting
both Saint Alphonsus and IMI to referring physicians. (TR Vol. II at 1646: 1-7.) Because
affiliation with Saint Alphonsus was a strong marketing tool, marketing for MRIA became
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difficult by early 2000 when IMI was being marketed jointly by IMI and Saint Alphonsus as
Saint Alphonsus's MRI imaging center. (!d. at 2420:11-16.) This joint marketing by IMI and
Saint Alphonsus caused confusion among the referring doctors as to which imaging center was
affiliated with Saint Alphonsus. (!d. at 2428:2'1-2429:6.)

e.

Saint Alphonsus Visibly Shifts its Name Association to IMI by
Making IMI a Saint Alphonsus "Outpatient Facility"

While still a partner in MRIA, Saint Alphonsus made IMI an outpatient facility for Saint
Alphonsus. (!d. at 1582:10-1583:24.) This development was communicated to the referring
doctor community (the source ofMRIA's business) which caused MRIA to lose scans because
doctors became "used to sending patients to IMI, not just for CT, but for MRI as well." (!d. at
1583:17-24.) Saint Alphonsus's own expert agreed that this act alone caused MRIA to lose
scans because these referrals followed Saint Alphonsus. (TR Vol. III at 3206:16-3207:13.) That
it was the intent of co-conspirators, Saint Alphonsus and GSR, to shift business from MRIA to
IMI by shifting Saint Alphonsus's affiliation to IMI is demonstrated by the following statement
from one of the GSR radiologists to Saint Alphonsus: "any docs who are willingly sending cases
to [MRIAJ and[sicl not what I would call loyal to Saint Alphonsus." (Trial Ex. 4359 (emphasis
added.))

f.

Saint Alphonsus's and GSR's Usurpation ofMRIA's Meridian
Opportunity

While still a partner in MRIA, Saint Alphonsus and GSR agreed to pursue and establish
IMI Meridian (aka IMI West), which would include MRIA. (Trial Exs. 4115,4211 & 4275; TR
Vol. II at 1590:11-23; 1613:5-12; 1615:20-23.) Saint Alphonsus provided this support even
though it knew that at this time, MRIA was planning to expand operations into Meridian. (Trial
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Ex. 4156.) As a result of Saint Alphonsus usurping this MRIA partnership opportunity, MRIA
lost scans to IMI Meridian. (Trial Exs. 4425,4515,4516, & 4517.)

8.

Saint Alphonsus Condones or Turns a Blind Eye to Conduct by the Rads
Intended to Shift Referrals from MRIA to IMI

Shortly after IMI opened in fall1999, MRIA began to notice a "shift in attitude" in the
rads relative to the performance of their responsibilities at MRI Center. (TR Vol. II at 1176:191177:3.) Initially, this shift in attitude was demonstrated by reduced time and attention in MRI
Center's "lab" as well as inadequate support ofMRI Center's technicians. (!d. at 1176:191177:3; 2385:2-2387:1; 2511 :3-24.) MRIA requested Bruce to intervene and return radiologist
service to its previous, professional level:
The time has come for Saint Alphonsus to insist [that its rads] provide full,
supportive radiologic coverage of the lab at historical levels of professionalism
and service .... [Such coverage] cannot be allowed to be withdrawn simply
because the radiologists of the lab are now also its competitors. We now view as a
necessity SAINT ALPHONSUS's providing the lab with full, supportive,
traditional radiologist coverage or permitting the MRI Center of Idaho to contract
directly with radiologists as a fiduciary responsibility of SAINT ALPHONSUS to
its other general and limited partners.
(Trial Ex. 4137 at 2.) Bruce never responded to MRIA's request. (TR Vol. II at 1182:9-14.)
As time progressed, and Saint Alphonsus's relationship with IMI deepened, the rads
became bolder in their unfair tactics. For example, (1) the rads unilaterally redueed their
weekday hours at MRI Center, while IMI increased its hours of service for its MRI modality; and
(2) the rads completely cancelled weekend support to MRI Center, except for emergency cases.
(See, Trial Ex. 4277 &4309; TR Vol. II at 1653:23-1655:25; 2195:2-17; 2392:5-24.) The result

to MRI Center was increased cost and a substantial loss of scan volume. (Trial Ex. 4292, 4519;
TR Vol. II 2494:7-2499:18, 2507:9-2508:10; 2509:14-2510:15.)
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Before IMI's opening, the rads had provided 24 hour a day, seven day a week coverage
(24/7) to Saint Alphonsus's radiology department and MRI Center. (TR Vol. II at 2496:8-12.)
After IMI opened, the only modality not receiving 24/7 coverage at Saint Alphonsus was MRI
Center. (ld. at 2195:2-2197:4.) Although Saint Alphonsus understood that this change in hours of
coverage had a "huge impact" on MRIA's ability to do business, Saint Alphonsus did nothing to
change the situation. (Id.)

9.

In June 2001, Saint Alphonsus, while still a MRIA partner, Formalized its
Partnership with IMI by Executing an Operating Agreement

In June, 2001, Saint Alphonsus formalized its relationship with GSR and IMI through
execution of the Operating Agreement of Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC. (Trial Ex.
4226). In salient part, the agreement provided:
•
•
•

•

•

Saint Alphonsus would contribute over $500,000 to IMI. (Trial Ex. 4226 at § 4.1.)
Saint Alphonsus would not establish an imaging center in Ada or Canyon County
without offering the rads the right to participate in such venture. (ld. at §7.3.1.)
Saint Alphonsus and the rads would pursue the development of a medical imaging
center in Meridian, Idaho (a location MRIA was interested in developing). (Id. at
§ 7.3.3; TR Vol. II at 1613.)
IMI's Management Committee (that had oversight for the entire business,ofiMI,
including MRI operations would consist of 3 representatives from Saint
Alphonsus and 3 radiologist representatives. (TR Vol. III at 3721-3723.)
Saint Alphonsus and the rads would enter into an IT services agreement and
create an ITP ACS committee which was the vehicle by which IMI obtained
technological opportunities and competitive advantages over MRIA (Trial Ex.
4226 at§ 13.2 and Exhibit 13.2 thereto; TR Vol. II at 1618-19.)

The Operating Agreement also described a process whereby Saint Alphonsus would
"make available" to the rads a 50% interest in MRI Center. (Trial Ex. 4226 at§ 7.3.2.) The
terms of this Operating Agreement were never revealed to Saint Alphonsus's partners. In fact,
Bruce warned GSR not to disclose the terms of any proposed deal to MRIA, for fear that it might
make the buyout ofMRI Center more difficult. (Trial Ex. 4199; TR Vol. II at 1575-6).
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10.

After Signing the IMI Operating Agreement, Saint Alphonsus Hired
Shattuck Hammond to Evaluate Options for Achieving Saint Alphonsus's
Goals of Owning MRI Center and Joint Venturing with GSR in other MRI
Facilities

Saint Alphonsus's COO, Cindy Schamp, hired Grant Chamberlain of Shattuck Hammond
("SH"), a "health care focused investment bank" to perform a Strategic Options Assessment
("SOA'') evaluating the options available to Saint Alphonsus for meeting its objectives of
owning MRI Center and joint venturing with GSR in other MRI facilities. (Trial Ex. 4239; TR
Vol. II at 2547-48.) In the course of its work, SH employees discussed various strategic options
with Saint Alphonsus representatives. (Trial Ex. 4239). The results of these discussions were
included in an "Overview" document describing alternatives then being considered by Saint
Alphonsus. (!d.; TR Vol. II at 2562. ). The document reveals that, as of October 2001:
•
•
•

•

•

Saint Alphonsus anticipated litigation if it withdrew from MRIA.
Saint Alphonsus understood that it owed a fiduciary duty to the Limited
Partnerships and risked breaching that duty, if it withdrew.
Saint Alphonsus understood that if its termination was "wrongful," MRIA
would be entitled to damages arising from subsequent competition with
MRIA.
Saint Alphonsus would not support the future growth of MRIA as long as
there was no plan to deal with Saint Alphonsus's strategic goals of
partnering with SARG/GSR.
Saint Alphonsus could not use any Saint Alphonsus funds, nor incur debt
to achieve its objectives.

The Overview report evaluated 5 different options for Saint Alphonsus 's consideration,
ranging from withdrawal to various other strategies. The report also indicated that withdrawal
(referred to by Saint Alphonsus as their "scorched earth scenario") was the direction Saint
Alphonsus was "leaning."
In November 2001, SH delivered to Saint Alphonsus its final SOA (Trial Ex. 4247) and
Valuation Analysis ofMRI Associates. (Trial Ex. 4246). The first page of the SOA discusses
Saint Alphonsus's objectives relative to partnering with GSR. It provides that Saint Alphonsus
OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: EVIDENCE OF COMPETITION
FOLLOWING DISSOCIATION- 14
001082

considered it a "strategic imperative" to partner with GSR to pursue "outpatient diagnostic
imaging opportunities in Saint Alphonsus's service area." (Trial Ex. 4247). Because this was
prohibited by the MRIA Partnership Agreement, Saint Alphonsus wanted control of MRI Center
to relieve itself of that obligation.
The SOA evaluated 5 different "structural alternatives" (including withdrawal) which
would attain Saint Alphonsus's stated objectives. 4 Given the business and litigation risks
associated with these alternatives, SH recommended that Saint Alphonsus acquire all general and
limited partner interests in MRI Center, leaving MRIA with only its mobile operation (Option 1).
Upon acquiring MRI Center, Saint Alphonsus could then merge that operation into IMI.
According to the SOA the net cost to Saint Alphonsus for executing this strategy was $27.3
million.
Ken Fry, Saint Alphonsus's CFO was involved in review ofSH's valuation report. (TR
Vol. II at 2078-9.) He believed that SH's purchase price ofMRI Center was "fair" and that the
recommendation to purchase MRI Center (Option 1) was a good approach (!d. at 2085-87).
Saint Alphonsus never communicated the results of the valuation to MRIA, and never made an
offer to buy MRI Center. (TR Vol. II at 2088-9, 2092-2094). Fry did not know why an offer was
not made, but was aware that "capital was pretty tight" at Saint Alphonsus during that timeframe.
(Id. at 2090, 2094.) Copies of SH's reports were never provided to MRIA. (Id. at 2098).

In fall2003, after MRI Center scan volumes had dropped precipitously, Bruce requested
a meeting of the MRIA Board of Partners where she presented a three month timeline for the
buyout ofMRI Center. (TR Vol. II at 1217:1-12, 1920:4-9; 1931 :10-18.) She stated that if the

4

The SOA warns Saint Alphonsus (as did Alan Hahn) that "[a] waiver for Saint Alphonsus to
participate in the imaging business of IMI requires a unanimous favorable vote from all general
partners ofMRIA." (Trial Exs. 4137,4149,4150,4118, & 4147)
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transaction did not occur timely, Saint Alphonsus would consider withdrawal from the
partnership. (Trial Ex. 4309, TR Vol. II at 1920:14-1922:1.) Given that Saint Alphonsus had
been dragging its feet on a buyout since 2000, MRIA questioned Bruce's motives. (TR Vol. II at
1222:12-1223:7.)
Saint Alphonsus's proposal was made more difficult by two other demands: (I) that
GSR participate in the negotiations to buyout MRI Center, thereby requiring MRIA to disclose
confidential information to its competitor, and (2) that Grant Chamberlain, Saint Alphonsus's
consultant, be used to facilitate the negotiations. (TR Vol. II at 1224:16-1231 :7.)
In a meeting on December 17, 2003, MRIA proposed that it be given 120 days to
prepare a fair market value for Saint Alphonsus's purchase ofMRI Center. (TR Vol. II at
1231:9-1232: 17.) Saint Alphonsus never responded to this request. (TR Vol. II at 1232: 12-17.)
Instead, on February 24, Saint Alphonsus notified MRIA that Saint Alphonsus was withdrawing
from MRIA in 30 days and threatened that, only ifMRIA paid Saint Alphonsus its departing
partner share, would Saint Alphonsus delay competition with MRIA for one year. (Trial Ex.
4329; TR Vol. II at 1952:22-25.) Bruce admitted that Saint Alphonsus withdrew from MRIA to
partner with the rads. (TR Vol. II at 1943:15-24, 1950:9-15.)
Upon receipt of Saint Alphonsus's notice of withdrawal, MRIA's other hospital
partners approached Saint Alphonsus with the fair market value buyout that MRIA had been
working on since its December meeting with Saint Alphonsus. (Trial Ex. 4322.) Although the
proposal from MRIA was the deal Saint Alphonsus had requested in September of2003, Saint
Alphonsus rejected the offer solely because it was "too late." (TR Vol. II at 1954:4-8; 1954:151955:2.)
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After withdrawal Saint Alphonsus and GSR moved a mobile MRI scanner onto Saint
Alphonsus's campus for IMI, within 100 feet ofMRI Center's operation. (TR Vol. II at 2173:2124.) In mid December 2005, Saint Alphonsus notified its medical and nursing staff of the
transition of all Saint Alphonsus MRI imaging business to the IMI mobile scanner: "As you may
be aware, St. Alphonsus and Gem State Radiology are currently in the process oftransitioning
MRI Services at St. Alphonsus. We are excited about our plans to bring MRI imaging into our
hospital in partnership with these exceptional rads .... " (Trial Ex. 4316.) "As of [December 19,
2005], St. Alphonsus MRI [IMI's mobile unit at SAINT ALPHONSUS] will be the sole provider
ofMRI services for all Saint Alphonsus inpatient, outpatient and ED [emergency department]
patients .... MRI of Idaho [MRICI] will no longer provide services to St. Alphonsus connected
patients ..... " (Trial Ex. 4377.)
By the end of2005, Saint Alphonsus had accomplished the objectives it had articulated
and pursued since 1999: Saint Alphonsus had partnered with GSR in IMI on its campus, in
downtown Boise and in Meridian. As a result of Saint Alphonsus's efforts and the combined
conduct of Saint Alphonsus and GSR in IMI, virtually all ofMRI Center's business had been
diverted to IMI. (Trial Ex. 4519; TR Vol. II at 2767:25-2768:6.) Saint Alphonsus had effectively
exited the MRIA partnership and accomplished its objectives without paying anything to MRIA,
leaving MRIA struggling to stay in business (1301:7-1302:1). St. Al's CEO summed up Saint
Alphonsus's strategy nicely when she testified as to her reasons for supporting IMI: "I was a
partner with a competitor [IMI]. I was supporting myself." (!d. at 1871:8-9.)
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ARGUMENT

A.

It Remains to be seen Whether Saint Alphonsus's Dissociation was Lawful

Saint Alphonsus premises its entire argument on the conclusory assertion that because
Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation was not a statutory ''wrongful dissociation" under Section 602(b)
of Idaho's Revised Uniform Partnership Act, it had no partnership or contractual duties to MRIA
after the non-compete provision expired on April1, 2005. In particular, it seeks to preclude
evidence that IMI installed a magnet on the Saint Alphonsus campus beginning in December
2005, that patients were inconvenienced by having to go outside to use the temporary IMI
magnet installed in December 2005, that in December 2005 Saint Alphonsus directed its staff
that MRI Center would no longer provide services for Saint Alphonsus patients, evidence of
damages resulting from this decision to no longer use MRI Center's services, and evidence of
IMI's Eagle facility which was constructed in October 2007.
As MRIA has repeatedly argued, it remains to be seen whether Saint Alphonsus' s
withdrawal was "lawful" because a jury must determine whether Saint Alphonsus committed a
common-law breach of the Partnership Agreement by withdrawing from the MRIA partnership
on April 1, 2004. This argument has already been submitted in many other places, including
MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on "Breach of Contract" Theory of
Wrongful Withdrawal (filed March 28, 2011), MRIA's Motion in Limine to Preclude Saint
Alphonsus from Arguing that its Dissociation was Lawful under Idaho eode § 53-3-602 (filed
April11, 2011), and MRIA's Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to Exclude
Evidence and Argument that Saint Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew from MRIA, filed
contemporaneously herewith. Those arguments are incorporated herein by reference as if set
forth in full, and thus will not be repeated here. If Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal is found to be a
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breach of contract, Saint Alphonsus's ability to compete a year after ceasing to be a partner
would not exist but for Saint Alphonsus's wrongful withdrawal. As such, if the Court finds that
contractual theories of liability still exist for Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal, then the Court may
simply deny this Motion in Limine on that basis.

B.

The Evidence and Argument that Saint Alphonsus Seeks to Preclude is Relevant
and Admissible of MRIA's Damages Flowing From Saint Alphonsus's Wrongful
Conduct
Perhaps more significantly, the evidence and argument that Saint Alphonsus seeks to

preclude is relevant and admissible ofMRIA's damages flowing from all of Saint Alphonsus's
wrongful conduct under all ofMRIA's various causes of action. As outlined above, MRIA was
on the brink of reaching a deal to partner with IMI when Saint Alphonsus interfered with and
ultimately usurped that opportunity. Had this not occurred, MRIA would have received the
benefits of partnering with IMI, including participating in the profits from any additional
magnets placed on the Saint Alphonsus campus, the IMI Downtown facility, the IMI Meridian
facility, and the IMI Eagle facility. Nor would MRIA's business have been destroyed by this
competitor, but rather enhanced by a new partner. The date of Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation
and the running of the non-compete agreement is utterly irrelevant to the damages which flow
from Saint Alphonsus's usurpation of this opportunity, and certainly does not provide a "cutoff'
point for them.
Because of Saint Alphonsus' s conduct prior to the expiration of the non-compete
agreement, MRIA lost its referral base. MRIA measures its damages by "lost scans," i.e., those
MRI scans referred to IMI by area physicians who had formally referred scans to MRIA. By the
time the non-compete agreement expired on April I, 2005, because of Saint Alphonsus's many
unlawful actions, as described in detail above, that referral base had already been lost. Rather
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than referring their scans to MRIA, as they had previously done, those physicians then went on
to refer their scans to IMI' s various facilities, including the facility on the Saint Alphonsus
campus, the downtown facility, the Meridian facility, and the Eagle facility. Those losses to
MRIA flow from unlawful activities that Saint Alphonsus undertook while it was still a partner
of MRIA, and prior to the expiration of the non-compete agreement. As such, the evidence
about the Saint Alphonsus's actions after the expiration of the non-compete agreement is
relevant to show damages flowing from Saint Alphonsus's course of unlawful conduct before the
non-compete agreement expired.
In addition, but for Saint Alphonsus's acts of unlawful competition prior to April1,
2005, its breaches of its fiduciary duties and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing until its
dissociation, and interference with MRIA's prospective contractual or economic relations, which
are extensively outlined above, IMI would not have been in the position to place a magnet on the
Saint Alphonsus campus in 2005 or construct IMI Eagle facility in 2007. In addition Saint
Alphonsus would not have been able to give its inpatient MRI serves to IMI. For a period of six
years, from 1999 until April1, 2005, Saint Alphonsus unlawfully supported IMI to the detriment
of its own partners in MRIA. As IMI was built up during this time, MRI Center was destroyed.
The effects of six years of Saint Alphonsus's illegal activity, and the damages which flow
therefrom, do not end as of April 1, 2005.
Under the Partnership Agreement, MRIA had the right to perform all magnetic resonance
images on the Saint Alphonsus campus (TR p. 2747:15-2747:24). In December 2005, everything
that was done at IMI' s campus location would have been done by MRIA if it had continued to be
the MRI provider in the Saint Alphonsus's healthcare system. (Id.) MRIA would still have been
such, absent six years of illegal activity by Saint Alphonsus. Thus, the evidence that in
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December 2005 Saint Alphonsus and IMI placed a magnet on the Saint Alphonsus campus and
terminated MRI Center as its inpatient imaging facility is not presented as evidence unlawful
competition. Rather, it is demonstrative ofMRIA's damages--the culmination of Saint
Alphonsus' s breaches of contract and duty in the previous six years. These damages were
sustained by MRIA as a direct result of Saint Alphonsus' s previous unlawful competition, breach
of contract, contractual interference, and breach of fiduciary duties.
Essentially, Saint Alphonsus is asking the Court to overlook its six years of outrageous
behavior. It asks the Court to cut off damages as of April 1, 2005, simply because that was the
date upon which it could lawfully compete. The injury to MRIA was done well before that date,
and the damages from Saint Alphonsus' s actions continue forward until today and beyond. Saint
Alphonsus destroyed MRIA's physician referral base, and thus those scans which went to IMI
which would have and should have gone to MRIA - even those after the non-compete expiredare proper evidence of its damages from Saint Alphonsus' s extensive course of conduct. Saint
Alphonsus took MRIA's opportunity to partner with IMI, and thus all that Saint Alphonsus and
IMI have done since that time are opportunities which should have belonged to MRIA. The noncompete agreement does not change this in any respect. In addition, Saint Alphonsus could have
waited until April 1, 2005, to start partnering with IMI. Instead, it feathered its nest beginning in
1999 so that by 2005, the business ofMRIA was destroyed and IMI was primed and ready to
supplant it. The events which occurred after April 1, 2005, including the establishment ofiMI's
campus magnet, downtown facility, Meridian facility, and Eagle facility, are evidence of
damages and lost profits which occurred only because of Saint Alphonsus' s prior illegal actions.
As such, Saint Alphonsus's motion to exclude such evidence must be denied.
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•

CONCLUSION
The Court can simply deny this motion because Saint Alphonsus's underlying premise
that its dissociation was "lawful" is still a matter which must be decided by the jury. More
significantly, the evidence that Saint Alphonsus seeks to preclude includes evidence of damages
which flow from its destruction ofMRIA's referral base and the usurpation ofMRIA's
opportunity to partner with IMI. The running of Saint Alphonsus' s noncompete is irrelevant to
these damages. Moreover, the damages flow from many other unlawful actions that Saint
Alphonsus undertook prior to the expiration of the non-compete agreement (and indeed, many of
which occurred while Saint Alphonsus was still a partner of MRIA.) As such, this evidence is
highly probative and should not be excluded. For these reasons, and those stated above, MRIA
asks that the Court deny this Motion in Limine.
DATED this 25th day of April, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~o<
... ~ [::?.,...__
:DaraL. Paer
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Attorneys MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
V.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219

OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE
EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT THAT
SAINT ALPHONSUS IMPROPERLY
WITHDREW FROM MRIA

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Opposition to the Motion in Limine of Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("Saint Alphonsus") to exclude evidence and argument that
Saint Alphonsus improperly withdrew from MRIA. Saint Alphonsus argues, as it has at various
points in this litigation, that because of the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court and this Court
dismissing MRIA's statutory theories ofliability for withdrawal, that its withdrawal was lawful.
This is an extension of Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Breach of
Contract Theory of Wrongful Dissociation, filed March 7, 2011. MRIA already addressed these
arguments extensively in is Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on "Breach of
Contract" Theory ofWrongful Dissociation, filed March 28, 2011, as well as MRIA's Motion in
Limine to Preclude Saint Alphonsus from Arguing that its Dissociation was Lawful Under Idaho
Code § 53-3-602, filed April 11, 2011. That briefing is therefore incorporated herein by
reference as if reproduced in full. More significantly, the evidence that Saint Alphonsus seeks to
preclude is relevant to MRIA's other claims and thus should not be excluded.

I.

BACKGROUND

As this Court knows, during the initial trial of this matter, MRIA asserted that Saint
Alphonsus's withdrawal from the MRIA Partnership was in violation ofldaho Code§ 53-3-602
because it was in breach of an "express" provision of the Partnership Agreement, I. C. § 53-3602(b )(1 ), and because it was prior to the expiration of a definite term, I. C. § 53-3-602(b )(2). On
appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the first of these theories. The Court examined Article 6 of
the Partnership Agreement, which addresses the withdrawal of hospital partner from the MRIA
Partnership. In particular, the Court examined Section 6.1, which provides that:
Any Hospital Partner may withdraw from the Partnership at any time if, in a
Hospital Partner's reasonable judgment, continued participation in this
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Partnership: (i) jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of such Hospital Partner or its
parent or their subsidiaries; or (ii) jeopardizes medicare/medicaid or insurance
reimbursements or participations; (iii) if the business activities of the Partnership
are contrary to the ethical principles of the Roman Catholic Church as designated
from time to time; or (iv) is or may be in violation of any local, state or federal
laws, rules or regulations.
(Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motions Filed April11, 2011, Ex. A (hereinafter
"Partnership Agreement") at § 6.1.) The Supreme Court determined that this provision could be
interpreted in a number of ways, and thus that "the section is not an express provision limiting
the circumstances under which St. Alphonsus could withdraw without breaching the partnership
agreement." See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,
487, 224 P.3d 1068, 1076 (2009) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court did not hold that
Saint Alphonsus had withdrawn in conformance with the contract, but merely that it could not
have violated I.C. § 53-3-602(b)(l) because the Partnership Agreement did not contain an
"express" provision limiting the right to dissociate. !d.
On remand, this Court examined the second statutory theory of withdrawal before the
expiration of a definite term, I.C. § 53-3-602(b)(2). The Court determined that the Partnership
Agreement set out indefinite term for the existence of the Partnership, rather than a definite term,
and therefore dismissed this claim on summary judgment. (Memorandum Decision and Order on
Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on Pleadings and Motion for Summary Judgment, November 16,
2010, p. 5-12). Given the decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court, the statutory theories
of liability under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602(b) no longer exist in this case. However, it is a
question of fact for the jury whether Saint Alphonsus withdrew in conformance with the
Partnership Agreement. Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's arguments otherwise, it has yet to be
determined whether Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation was "lawful."
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II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Valid Claims Remain that Saint Alphonsus's Withdrawal was Improper
Saint Alphonsus argues that evidence and argument that Saint Alphonsus improperly

withdrew from the MRIA partnership must be precluded because the Supreme Court and this
Court found its dissociation to be "lawful." As noted above, MRIA's disagreement with this
position has already been extensively briefed. Because the Court is already well-apprised of
MRIA's arguments, MRIA will endeavor to give the matter shorter treatment here.
Entirely apart from MRIA's now-dismissed statutory claims from wrongful dissociation
under I.C. § 53-3-602, Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal was a breach of the partnership agreement,
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fiduciary duties. The ruling of the
Supreme Court does not change this. The Supreme Court was simply concerned with whether
the limitation on withdrawal contained in the Partnership was "express" as required for wrongful
dissociation under RUP A. The Supreme Court held that the withdrawal provision was subject to
several different interpretations, and that this ambiguity meant that it was not "express." 1 Saint
Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at 487, 224 P.3d at 1076 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court's
holding was limited to the determination that Section 6.1 of the partnership agreement was not an
express limitation on the right to dissociate and that the dissociation, therefore, was not wrongful
under the statute. !d. By determining that the provision was ambiguous, the Court left for the
jury to decide the issue of whether the withdrawal was a breach of the partnership agreement.
Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc. 143 Idaho 733, 737, 152 P.3d 604, 608 (2007); Clark v.
Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d 242, 245 (2003). The Court

Notably, the Supreme Court interpreted the word "express" to mean "not subject to
multiple reasonable interpretations," i.e., "unambiguous." Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at 489,
224 P.3d at 1078. The Supreme Court's opinion therefore does not have any impact on the
jury's ability to interpret an ambiguous contractual provision such as Section 6.1 ·
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merely held that the multiple reasonable interpretations of Section 6.1 prevented the provision
from being "express" in a manner to implicate Section 53-3-602. Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at
488, 224 P.3d at·1077. Just because the act of withdrawal cannot be statutorily "wrongful" does
not mean that such withdrawal was in accordance with the contract.
Moreover, the existence of the "wrongful dissociation" provision under RUPA, I. C. § 533-602, does not preclude a common-law claim for breach of contract or breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act enacted in Idaho provides that
"[u ]nless displaced by particular provisions of this act, the principles of law and equity
supplement this act." I. C. § 53-3-104 (emphasis added). In Idaho, a clear and specific
legislative intent is required to override the common law. As the Supreme Court has said,
"statutory enactment is essential to repeal, abrogate or change the rules or doctrine of the
common law." Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 607, 151 P.2d 765, 771 (1944) superseded on
other grounds by statute, I.C. § 5-327, as recognized in Doggett v. Boiler Eng'g & Supply
Co., 93 Idaho 888, 890,477 P.2d 511, 613 (1970). The legislative intent to abrogate the

common law must be expressly declared in a statute by clear and unambiguous language.
Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 115 Idaho 281, 766 P.2d 751 (1988); Cox v. St. Anthony Bank &
Trust Co., 242 P. 785, 786 (1925). Idaho Code§ 53-3-602 contains no explicit statutory

language abrogating other theories ofliability upon which withdrawal might be found improper.
Thus, it cannot be presumed that this statute supplants a contractual theory of liability for Saint
Alphonsus's withdrawal. In short, valid claims remain in this case that Saint Alphonsus's
withdrawal was improper, and MRIA should not be precluded from presenting evidence and
argument to establish these claims.
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B.

Exclusion of Trial Exhibits 4138, 4234, and 4239

With this Motion, Saint Alphonsus is also attempting to prevent MRIA from presenting
evidence and argument on claims that it has brought and is justified in bringing. It seeks to
redact portions of three specific exhibits discussing Saint Alphonsus's dissociation: the
"Scenario 5" document, (Trial Ex. 4138), and two copies of the "Shattuck Hammond
Memoranda," (Trial Ex. 4234 and 4239). In particular:
• · From the "Scenario 5" document, (Trial Ex. 4138), Saint Alphonsus seeks to
redact a paragraph that summarizes Paragraph 6.1 of the partnership agreement.
(Affidavit of JackS. Gjording, Ex. A).
• From both copies of the "Shattuck Hammond Memorandum", (Trial Ex. 4234 and
4239) Saint Alphonsus seeks to remove any paragraph or sentence referring to
engendering litigation by withdrawing, Section 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement,
and all advice that Saint Alphonsus had been given about the possible
consequences of its withdrawal. (Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording, Ex. B and C).
Saint Alphonsus argues only that such evidence would be irrelevant and prejudicial. As noted
above, since claims relating to Saint Alphonsus' s withdrawal and the interpretation of Section
6.1 of the Partnership Agreement remain in this case, this evidence, and argument related to it, is
obviously highly relevant and should not be excluded. More importantly, even ifthe Court were
to hold that claims relating to Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal do not exist in this case, such
evidence is still highly relevant in connection with MRIA's claims, and is therefore admissible.
1.

The Creation and Purpose of the Scenario 5 Document and Shattuck
Hammond Memoranda

First, a brief summary of the creation and purpose of these documents is instructive. The
Scenario 5 Document was created in 1999, when Saint Alphonsus retained consultants to explore
options to exit or "restructure" MRIA so Saint Alphonsus could partner with MRIA's
competitor, Intermountain Medical Imaging ("IMI"). The consultant was hired to explore four
"scenarios" whereby Saint Alphonsus would take control of the MRIA board so that Saint
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Alphonsus could either liquidate MRIA or offer the· owners of IMI an equity position in a
restructured MRIA partnership. (Trial Ex. 4118.) After reviewing these scenarios, Saint
Alphonsus requested its consultant to evaluate the consequences of Saint Alphonsus simply
withdrawing from MRIA and competing with its partners. This evaluation, contained in
Scenario 5, suggested that withdrawal might be a breach of the MRIA partnership agreement and
could lead to litigation due to "shifting referrals." (Trial Ex. 4138 at 16.) This report was not
disclosed to MRIA. (TR. Vol. II at 1199:5-23.)
In 2001, Saint Alphonsus hired a "health care focused investment bank" called Shattuck
Hammond ("SH"), perform a Strategic Options Assessment ("SOA'') evaluating the options
available to Saint Alphonsus for meeting its objectives of owning MRI Center and joint
venturing with IMI. (Trial Ex. 4239; TR Vol. II at 2547-48.) In the course of its work, SH
employees discussed various strategic options with Saint Alphonsus representatives. (Trial Ex.
4239). The results of these discussions were included in an "Overview" document describing
alternatives then being considered by Saint Alphonsus. (!d.; TR Vol. II at 2562. ). The document
reveals that, as of October 2001:
•
•
•
•
•

Saint Alphonsus anticipated litigation if it withdrew from MRIA.
Saint Alphonsus understood that it owed a fiduciary duty to the Limited Partnerships and
risked breaching that duty, if it withdrew.
Saint Alphonsus understood that if its termination was "wrongful," MRIA would be
entitled to damages arising from subsequent competition with MRIA.
Saint Alphonsus would not support the future growth of MRIA as long as there was no
plan to deal with Saint Alphonsus's strategic goals ofpartnering with SARG/GSR.
Saint Alphonsus could not use any Saint Alphonsus funds, nor incur debt to achieve its
objectives.

The Overview report evaluated five different options for Saint Alphonsus's consideration,
ranging from withdrawal to various other strategies. The report also indicated that withdrawal
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(referred to by Saint Alphonsus as their "scorched earth scenario") was the direction Saint
Alphonsus was "leaning."
In November 2001, SH delivered to Saint Alphonsus its final SOA(Trial Ex. 4247) and

Valuation Analysis ofMRI Associates. (Trial Ex. 4246). The first page of the SOA discusses
Saint Alphonsus's objectives relative to partnering with IMI. It provides that Saint Alphonsus
considered it a "strategic imperative" to partner with IMI to pursue "outpatient diagnostic
imaging opportunities in Saint Alphonsus's service area." (Trial Ex. 4247). Because this was
prohibited by the MRIA Partnership Agreement, Saint Alphonsus wanted control of MRI Center
to relieve itself of that obligation.
The SOA evaluated five different "structural alternatives" (including withdrawal) which
would attain Saint Alphonsus's stated objectives. 2 Given the business and litigation risks
associated with these alternatives, SH recommended that Saint Alphonsus acquire all general and
limited partner interests in MRI Center, leaving MRIA with only its mobile operation (Option 1).
Upon acquiring MRI Center, Saint Alphonsus could then merge that operation into IMI.
According to the SOA the net cost to Saint Alphonsus for executing this strategy was $27.3
million. Saint Alphonsus never communicated the results of the valuation to MRIA, and never
made an offer to buy MRI Center. (TR Vol. II at 2088-9, 2092-2094). Copies of SH's reports
were never provided to MRIA. (!d. at 2098).

2.

The Scenario 5 Document and Shattuck Hammond Memoranda are Relevant
to MRIA's Other Claims

The Scenario 5 Document and Shattuck Hammond Memoranda are highly relevant to
MRIA's other claims, including its claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
2

The SOA warns Saint Alphonsus that "[a] waiver for Saint Alphonsus to participate in the
imaging business of IMI requires a unanimous favorable vote from all general partners of
MRIA." (Trial Exs. 4137,4149,4150,4118, & 4147)
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dealing and breach of fiduciary duties. For example, the Scenario 5 Document suggests that
withdrawal might be in breach of the MRIA partnership agreement and could lead to litigation
due to shifting referrals. (Trial. Ex. 4138 at 16.) A reasonable jury could infer from this
information that Saint Alphonsus decided to begin shifting referrals to IMI from MRIA prior to
its dissociation. A jury could infer that Saint Alphonsus believed that a slower siphoning of
MRIA's referral base, although the breach of fiduciary duties to its partner, would draw less
attention than the abrupt impact due to "shifting referrals" from its withdrawal. The Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum also reveals that in October 2001, three years before Saint Alphonsus's
withdrawal, Saint Alphonsus had been advised about its fiduciary duties. A reasonable jury
could infer that Saint Alphonsus understood that in order to fulfill its fiduciary duties, it had a
duty to explore a buyout plan with its partners, but failed to do so.
In short, these documents are evidence of Saint Alphonsus 's perspective prior to the time
it withdrew. It is demonstrative of the advice that Saint Alphonsus was getting about its
contractual and fiduciary duties to MRIA at the time at Saint Alphonsus was still a partner in
MRIA, particularly that the only way to exit the MRIA partnership was through a buyout. That
the Supreme Court later determined that the some of the advice that Saint Alphonsus may have
been getting vis-a-vis statutory wrongful dissociation was incorrect does not change the fact that
this evidence shows what Saint Alphonsus was thinking at the time. The documents show that
Saint Alphonsus was actively seeking ways in which to leave the MRIA partnership in order to
justify the fact that it was already supporting MRIA's competitor, Intermountain Medical
Imaging ("IMI"), in violation of its fiduciary duties. See I. C. § 53-3-404(b )(3). These
documents demonstrate that, rather than proceeding conservatively, Saint Alphonsus consistently
took the riskiest and most extreme path with respect to its relationship with its partners in MRIA
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in order to more quickly legitimize its relationship with IMI. Indeed, this evidence shows that
Saint Alphonsus was acting in callous disregard for MRIA, and was breaching its fiduciary
duties by placing its own interests and the interests ofiMI over MRIA. See I.C. § 53-3404(b)(2). As this evidence is relevant to these matters, it should not be precluded.

3.

Saint Alphonsus is Attempting to Bootstrap Evidentiary Rulings to the
Supreme Court Opinion

Saint Alphonsus is attempting to bootstrap evidentiary rulings into the Supreme Court's
decision. The Supreme Court actually addressed the Shattuck Hammond Memorandum on
appeal, noting that Saint Alphonsus's arguments concerning the admissibility of the
Memorandum had been waived. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP,
148 Idaho 479, 492-94, 224 P.3d 1068, 1081-83 (2009). Notably, although the Supreme Court
was fully apprised about the Shattuck Hammond Memorandum and had not hesitated to address
other matters that it believed might be important for retrial, id., 148 Idaho at p. 497, 224 P.3d at
1087, the Court did not hold that this document would be rendered irrelevant by its opinion
regarding wrongful dissociation. Having received a disappointing ruling from the Supreme
Court on appeal regarding the Shattuck Hammond Memorandum, Saint Alphonsus now seeks to
exclude this highly probative evidence (as explained more extensively above) by bootstrapping it
to a portion of the Supreme Court's opinion that is irrelevant to the admissibility of these
documents.
The Court may wish to note that the admissibility of the Shattuck Hammond
Memorandum has already been exhaustively litigated, and Saint Alphonsus had consistently lost
its attempts to exclude this evidence. The district court rejected a motion to strike the Shattuck
Hammond memorandum in February 6, 2007. On July 30,2007, the district court granted only a
small portion of a motion in limine seeking to redact the memorandum in much the same matter
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now requested. Saint Alphonsus filed another motion in limine in August 2007, seeking an order
to prevent the use of these documents. It then failed to object when this evidence was presented
at trial, thus waiving its objections. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates,
LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 494, 224 P.3d 1068, 1083 (2009). As noted above, this evidence is highly
relevant to MRIA's other claims, and the opinion of the Supreme Court does not alter these prior
rulings. As such, this latest attempt to exclude this highly relevant evidence should likewise be
denied.

III.

CONCLUSION

Valid claims remain that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was improper as a common law
breach of the Partnership Agreement. MRIA should therefore not be precluded from presenting
evidence and argument relevant to this claim. Furthermore, even if such claims were found not
to exist in this case, the evidence that Saint Alphonsus seeks to preclude is relevant to MRIA's
other causes of action in this case. MRIA therefore respectfully asks that this Motion be denied.
DATED this 25th day of April, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~lTh...-

Dara L. Pafker
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Idaho Limited Partnership,
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v.
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INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion in
Limine to Exclude Claims of Misappropriation, Defamation or Wrongful Dissociation.

BACKGROUND
Prior to the first trial of this matter, MRIA voluntarily withdrew several claims which it
had brought for "Misappropriation of Trade Secret," "Common Law Misappropriation,"
"Procuring Information by Improper Means" (the "misappropriation claims"), and defamation.
(Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, filed May 22, 2007.) In its Third Amended Counterclaim
following the remand of this matter, MRIA did not assert these claims. It did reiterate its factual
allegations that Saint Alphonsus and its partner Intermountain Medical Imaging ("IMI") falsely
disparaged MRIA's facilities and technology, stated that images produced at MRI Center were
inferior to IMI magnetic resonance images, spread rumors that MRI Center would close, stated
that certain insurance would not cover magnetic resonance scans done at MRI Center, sent a
letter informing area physicians that MRI Center images would no longer be accessible to the
referring physician community a commonly used data system, and otherwise disparaged MRI
Center's services. (3d Am. Countercl.

~~

47-52, 56-59). It also asserted that Saint Alphonsus

employees who sat on IMI's Management Committee had access to MRIA's business plans, and
passed that information on to IMI so that IMI would have a competitive advantage over MRIA.

(Id.

at~

41.)

Based on these and other facts, MRIA pleaded a number of causes of action, including
Breach of Fiduciary Duty to MRIA (id.
and MRI Mobile (id.
(id.

at~~

at~~

at1~

73-74), Breach of Fiduciary Duties to MRI Limited

76-81), and Breach ofthe Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

82-85). These claims read as follows:
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Fiduciary Duties to MRIA)

73.
The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are
incorporated by reference and made a part hereof.
74.
Before dissociation, SARMC owed MRIA certain fiduciary duties
ofloyalty and care as a result of the Partnership Agreement, and as restated in I.C.
§ 53-3-404. SARMC breached said fiduciary duties by competing with MRIA, by
co-opting partnership opportunities, by dealing with MRIA on its own behalf and
on behalf of SARG/GSR/ICR and IMI when such entities had interests adverse to
MRIA, and by failing to exercise the requisite care owed by a partner pursuant to
I. C. § 53-3-404( c).
75.
As a result of these breaches of fiduciary duties, MRIA has been
damaged in an amount to be proved at trial.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Fiduciary Duties to MRI Limited and MRI Mobile )

76.
The allegations included in all ofthe foregoing paragraphs are
incorporated by reference and made a part hereof.
77.
Before dissociation, SARMC owed MRIA certain fiduciary duties
ofloyalty and care pursuant to I.C. § 53-3-404.
78.
As a general partner, MRIA owes (and at all relevant times owed)
MRI Limited and MRI Mobile certain fiduciary duties of loyalty and care
pursuant to I.C. § 53-2-408.
79.
As a partner in the MRIA general partnership, SARMC therefore
owed MRI Limited and MRI Mobile certain fiduciary duties ofloyalty and care
and is jointly and severally liable for the general partnership's obligations
pursuant to I.C. § 53-3-306.
80.
On information and belief, SARMC breached its fiduciary duties
owed to MRI Limited and MRI Mobile by, inter alia, competing with MRI
Limited and MRI Mobile Limited by co-opting partnership opportunities; dealing
with MRI Limited and/or MRI Mobile on its/their own behalf and on behalf of
SARG/GSRICR and IMI when such entities had interests adverse to MRI
Limited, and/or MRI Mobile; while on the MRIA Board, voting in opposition to
MRI Mobile growth initiatives; conspiring to harm the business ofMRI Limited
and MRI Mobile, and wrongfully dissociating from the general partnership;
81.
As a result of these breaches of fiduciary duties MRI Limited and
MRI Mobile, have been damaged in an amount to be proved at trial.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)

82.
The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are
incorporated by reference and made a part hereof.
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83.
Idaho law and I.C. § 53-404(d) in particular, imposed upon
SARMC a duty to discharge its duties as a partner in good faith. As indicated in
the foregoing paragraphs, SARMC breached the Partnership Agreement with
MRIA and deprived MRIA ofthe benefits of the partnership by engaging in
various acts, including failing to discharge its responsibilities as an MRIA board
member, competing with and advancing interests adverse to, MRIA, and
condoning unfair business conduct on the part of its business partner and
radiology group, resulting in damage to MRIA and its operational units, MRI
Limited and MRI Mobile.
84.
MRI Limited and MRI Mobile are beneficiaries of the Partnership
Agreement.
85.
As a result of the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile have been damaged in an amount
to be proven at trial.
MRIA also brought a civil conspiracy claim which reads as follows:
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Civil Conspiracy)

98.
The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are
incorporated by reference and made a part hereof.
99.
SARMC conspired with SARG/GSR/IMI/ICR to harm MRIA,
MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile through the commission of acts, which are
themselves actionable, including, but not limited to:
• Defamation of MRI Center/MRI Limited;
• Interfering with prospective business opportunities ofMRIA, MRI
Limited, and MRI Mobile;
• Misappropriation of trade secret or confidential information, as
alleged herein; and
• Co-opting a partnership opportunity that should have been offered
toMRIA.
• Wrongfully withdrawing from MRIA
100. The commission of these acts by SARMC and
SARG/GSR/IMI/ICR in combination and conspiracy caused MRIA, MRI
Limited, and MRI Mobile damages in an amount to be proved at trial.
This Court determined that the voluntarily dismissal of the misappropriation and
defamation claims, as well as the statutory wrongful dissociation claim dismissed by the orders
of the Supreme Court and district court, could not serve as a basis for a Civil Conspiracy claim
because the underlying causes of action no longer existed. (Memorandum Decision and Order on
Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motions for Summary Judgment, p. 12-18,
OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE CLAIMS OF
MISAPPROPRIATION, DEFAMATION OR WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION- 4

001107

filed Nov. 16, 2010). The Court held that the Civil Conspiracy claim remained, however,
because it was still based on other active claims. !d.
Saint Alphonsus now brings this Motion in Limine, apparently seeking to enforce the
order of the Court with respect to the dismissed claims. MRIA has no objection, to the extent
that such an order is limited to preventing the assertion of misappropriation, defamation, and
statutory wrongful dissociation claims as the basis for a civil conspiracy claim. MRIA has no
intention of arguing such dismissed claims to the jury, or asserting that such dismissed claims
serve as the basis of a conspiracy claim. However, to the extent that Saint Alphonsus seeks to
preclude evidence that is relevant to MRIA's other claims, particularly the claims of breach of
fiduciary duty and good faith and fair dealing, or preclude an argument that the civil conspiracy
claim may be supported by evidence that Saint Alphonsus committed a common law breach of
the Partnership Agreement by dissociating from the MRIA Partnership, MRIA objects.
ARGUMENT
A. Misappropriation and Defamation Claims
It is somewhat unclear precisely what Saint Alphonsus is seeking with this Motion. It

appears that it framed its Motion to prevent MRIA from arguing to the jury that Saint Alphonsus
committed the torts of misappropriation or defamation, which claims MRIA voluntarily
dismissed prior to the first trial of this matter, or from arguing that these claims form the basis of
a civil conspiracy claim. MRIA has no intention of arguing to the jury that Saint Alphonsus
committed the torts of misappropriation or defamation, or that the torts of misappropriation or
defamation support the claim for civil conspiracy. These matters have already been decided by
this Court.
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However, to the extent that Saint Alphonsus argues that any evidence which might have
been used to support a claim for tortious misappropriation or defamation is inadmissible, MRIA
objects. Such evidence is relevant and probative ofMRIA's other claims which still exist in this
action, and thus is admissible. Idaho R. Ev. 401, 402. As noted above, MRIA intends to present
evidence that Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary duties. The scope of such duties are stated
in Idaho Code§ 53-3-104:
(b) A partner's duty ofloyalty to the partnership and the other partners includes the
following:
(1) To account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any ... information
including the appropriation of a partnership opportunity;

(2) To refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct ... as or on behalf
of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership; and
(3) To refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the
partnership business before the dissolution of the partnership.
(c) A partner's duty of care to the partnership and the other partners in the conduct and
winding up of the partnership business is limited to refraining from engaging in
grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation
of law.

Id. See, also, I.C. § 53-2-404 (general partner's responsibility to limited partnerships). MRIA
also intends to show that Saint Alphonsus violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Idaho Code 53-3-404( d) provides that "A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and
the other partners ... and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing." A party breaches the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is violated when one
party takes an action that violates, qualifies or significantly impairs any benefit or right of the
other party. Independent School Dist. ofBoise City v. Harris Family Ltd. Partnership, 2011 WL
924039, 5 (2011).
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In its Third Amended Complaint, MRIA pled that Saint Alphonsus's actions of making
false statements about MRIA and passing MRIA's business plans to IMI constituted breaches of
Saint Alphonsus's fiduciary duties and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. To use the
examples cited by Saint Alphonsus in its brief, MRIA will prove these causes of action, in part,
by presenting evidence that Saint Alphonsus and its partner IMI/GSR/SARG disparaged MRIA's
facilities and technology, stated that images produced at MRI Center were inferior to IMI
magnetic resonance images; spread rumors that MRI Center would close, stated that certain
insurance would not cover magnetic resonance scans done at MRI Center, sent a letter informing
area physicians that MRI Center images would no longer be accessible to the referring physician
community a commonly used data system, and otherwise disparaged MRI Center's services.
(Trial Exhibit 4533; Trial Tr. 2388-89; Trial Tr. 3727-31; 3d Am. Countercl.

~~

49-51, 98-99).

Evidence will also be solicited that such disparaging remarks were untrue, and that Saint
Alphonsus refused to take steps to correct these untrue statements. MRIA likewise intends to
produce evidence that Saint Alphonsus employees who sat ori IMI's Management Committee
also had access to MRIA's business plans, and passed that information on to IMI so that IMI
would have a competitive advantage over MRIA. (Id. at ~ 41.) MRIA will present this evidence,
not to show that Saint Alphonsus committed the torts of misappropriation or defamation, but
rather to demonstrate that Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary duties and the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
There is a difference between a legal claim, and evidence. MRIA has legal claims for
breach of fiduciary duty and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Just because the
evidence described above might also have been probative of other claims, now dismissed, does
not make such evidence any less relevant to the claims that still exist in this case. And, as MRIA
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does not intend to argue to the jury that these actions might constitute misappropriate or
defamation, there is no danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. As such, to the
extent that Saint Alphonsus seeks to preclude the evidence that it (or its partner) made untrue
remarks about MRIA, or communicated information belonging to MRIA to a competitor (as
opposed to legal claims of defamation and misappropriation), the Motion must be denied because
this evidence is probative of claims that remain in this case.

B. Wrongfully Withdrawing from MRIA
Saint Alphonsus asserts that MRIA cannot argue, as a part of its civil conspiracy case,
Saint Alphonsus conspired with IMI by wrongfully withdrawing from MRIA. This Court held
that a civil conspiracy claim may only stand when an underlying cause of action exists.
(Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and
Motions for Summary Judgment, p. 12-18, filed Nov. 16, 201 0). Based on the dismissal by the
Supreme Court and this Court ofMRIA's claim for statutory wrongful dissociation under Idaho
Code§ 53-3-602, this Court held that MRIA could not base its claim for civil conspiracy on the
statutory wrongful dissociation claim. (!d. at p. 17-18.) MRIA therefore has no intention of
arguing that Saint Alphonsus committed civil conspiracy by "wrongfully dissociating" from the
MRIA partnership in breach of I. C. § 53-3-602. However, MRIA maintains that it may assert a
claim for civil conspiracy based on contract-based theories ofliability.
MRIA' s assertion that Saint Alphonsus breached the Partnership Agreement by
withdrawing from the MRIA partnership has already been well briefed in many other places,
including its Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on "Breach of Contract" Theory of
Wrongful Withdrawal (filed March 28, 2011), MRIA's Motion in Limine to Preclude Saint
Alphonsus from Arguing that its Dissociation was Lawful under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602 (filed
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April11, 2011), and MRIA's Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to Exclude
Evidence and Argument that Saint Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew from MRIA, filed
contemporaneously herewith. Those arguments are incorporated herein by reference as if set
forth in full, and thus will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that if the Court finds that
contractual theories of liability still exist for Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal, then this is an
underlying cause of action sufficient to support a civil conspiracy claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, to the extent ~hat Saint Alphonsus seeks to preclude
evidence that is relevant to MRIA's claims ofbreach of fiduciary duty and good faith and fair
dealing, or preclude an argument that the civil conspiracy claim may be supported by evidence
that Saint Alphonsus committed a common law breach of the Partnership Agreement by
dissociating from the MRIA Partnership, this MRIA respectfully asks the Court to deny the
Motion.
DATED this 25th day of April, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

. .,\~" i?L

Dara L. Pa er
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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liability partnership,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
MRIA has moved to bar Saint Alphonsus "from arguing to the jury or presenting
evidence of any findings or statements made by the Idaho Supreme Court in the appeal from the
first trial of this matter." Mem. at 2. At the same time, MRIA "does not seek to preclude
evidence or argument on the simple fact that the case is on retrial after remand from the Supreme
Court." Id at 2 & n.2.
MRIA's motion has it backwards. There is no reason to tell the jury of a prior trial or
appeal in this case, and doing so can be prejudicial in a variety of ways. At the same time, the
rulings of the Supreme Court are themselves highly relevant and a proper subject for argument.
The rulings of the Supreme Court and of this Court-including the critical ruling that Saint
Alphonsus was legally authorized to withdraw from the partnership in 2004-must be conveyed
to the jury by the Court as governing legal principles, and may be asserted and argued by both
parties. But this governing law should be stated simply as legal propositions without attribution
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to a particular court. Indeed, Saint Alphonsus urges the Court to enter an order barring both
parties from advising the jury that there was a prior trial and appeal in this case.
The jury can learn nothing relevant from the fact that the case was previously tried and
reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court. Such information can only invite speculation about
what the prior jury found and how the Supreme Court dealt with that verdict. Telling the jury
about the prior award and reversal would be plainly improper under established law. United
States v. Werner, No. 93-1738, 1994 WL 507461, at *3 (4th Cir. Sept. 19, 1994) (per curiam)
("general rule that it is improper and prejudicial to inform a jury in a civil action of a prior award
in an earlier adjudication ofthe same case"); Olitsky v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 964 F.2d 1471, 147576 (5th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that disclosure of the result of the first trial to the jury could be
grounds for reversal); Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1351 (3d Cir. 1975)
("[t]he admission of a prior verdict creates the possibility that the jury will defer to the earlier
result and thus will, effectively, decide a case on evidence not before it"); see also Saint
Alphonsus's Motion in Limine re: References to the Jury's Finding of Liability in the First Trial
(filed April11, 2011).
But withholding information about the verdict and simply advising that there was a prior
trial and appeal is also improper. In that event, the jury would be invited to speculate about who
won at the first trial, an utterly pointless and distracting enterprise, which could well lead the jury
to focus on and give weight to their perception of what the first jury probably found. Nor does
such information serve any affirmative purpose. While testimony from the first trial may be
usable at trial for impeachment or other reasons, such use requires no acknowledgement of a
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previous trial. In that event, the Court could simply note the party's "prior sworn testimony"
without more detail. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, No. H-03-221-5, 2006 WL 2850063, at

* 2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2006) ("Counsel need not refer to the prior trial in confronting a witness
with prior testimony. Rather, counsel may simply ask if the witness previously gave sworn
testimony and then confront the witness with that testimony.").
At the same time, the legal rulings and principles enunciated by the Supreme Court and
by this Court on numerous issues are obviously central to the case and will be a primary focus of
the parties' presentations to the jury. Cases are not tried in a vacuum in which parties simply
sling factual allegations at each other, but rather within a framework of legal rules that the Court
communicates to the jury. Weinstein v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,
313,233 P.3d 1221, 1235 (2010) ("[a] trial court has the duty to properly instruct the jury on the
law applicable to the case before it" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Obviously,
discussion of those legal principles and their relationship to the facts of the case-without any
attribution to the decision or court that first enunciated them-is the essence of a lawyer's job at
trial. Thus both parties have every right to reference and argue the holdings of the Supreme
Court in this case, simply as legal principles which this Court tells the jury will govern, and
without any mention of a specific ruling, court, or proceeding from which they have come.
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Court should allow discussion of the applicable legal and factual rulings of the Supreme Court to
the extent they bear on the issues to be resolved at trial.

DATED this 25th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 25th day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

D

B1
D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE TO MRIA'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE
001118
REFERENCE TO THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT OPINION IN THIS CASE- 5

NO·-----;;:~--:-~-
FILEi?
.I 1)1 I /1
A.M. _ _ _ _
p,_w_~

.,.

APR 2 5 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JERI HEATON
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION
TO MRIA'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO
PRECLUDE ARGUMENT THAT
DISSOCIATION WAS LAWFUL
UNDER IDAHO CODE § 53-3-602

Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE
001119
ARGUMENT THAT DISSOCIATION WAS LAWFUL UNDER IDAHO CODE§ 53-3-602- 1

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
On February 24, 2004, Sandra Bruce, President and CEO of Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center, Inc., sent MRI Associates a letter stating why Saint Alphonsus felt "compelled
to withdraw from the MRI Associates" and asking MRIA to "consider [the] letter as notice,
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 53-3-601 as Saint Alphonsus' express will to withdraw effective
as of Aprill, 2004." Trial Ex. 4329. That statutory provision, enacted by the Idaho Legislature
in 1998, and made applicable to all existing partnerships as of July 1, 2001, provided that "[a]
partner is dissociated from a partnership upon the occurrence of ... (1) [t]he partnership's
having notice ofthe partner's express will to withdraw as a partner or on a later date specified by
the partner."
Ms. Bruce's letter and notice of dissociation pursuant to§ 53-3-601 gave rise to the most
critical issue in this case: whether Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was a "wrongful" dissociation
or a "rightful" dissociation under the statute. See Idaho Code § 53-3-602 ("[a] partner has the
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power to dissociate at any time, rightfully or wrongfully"). MRIA, of course, argued the former
position, while Saint Alphonsus argued the latter. After nearly five years of litigation,
culminating in decisions by the Supreme Court and this Court on remand, it has finally been
determined that Saint Alphonsus's position was correct, and that its dissociation under Idaho
Code § 53-3-602 was not done "wrongfully." Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI
Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,487,224 P.3d 1068, 1076 (2009) ("SADC"). Because Saint
Alphonsus thus did not dissociate "wrongfully," according to the terms of the statute, its
dissociation was necessarily done "rightfully." Idaho Code § 53-3-602(a).
Having lost the legal dispute over the centerpiece issue in this case, MRIA now claims, in
its motion in limine, that Saint Alphonsus's rightful dissociation is "irrelevant to any fact of
consequence to the determination of the action," and that Saint Alphonsus's rightful dissociation
should be hidden from the jury. MRIA Mem. at 4. This is nonsense. Saint Alphonsus's rightful
exercise of its statutory power to dissociate under Idaho Code§§ 53-3-601 and 53-3-602 is a key
part of the story of this case, and telling the jury about it is necessary to a fair defense of MRIA' s
claims.
ARGUMENT

MRIA's purported legal basis for excluding evidence that Saint Alphonsus had a right to
dissociate under RUP A is that, while Saint Alphonsus dissociated rightfully pursuant to the
Idaho Code, the dissociation was still wrongful because it breached implied terms of the MRIA
partnership agreement. MRIA Mem. at 3-4. Saint Alphonsus has filed a motion for summary
judgment on this unpled theory of "common law" breach of contract, which was argued on April
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22,2011. It is obvious, and MRIA concedes (Mem. at 5), that if Saint Alphonsus's motion is
granted, MRIA's present motion in limine fails.
But even if Saint Alphonsus's summary judgment motion on "breach of contract"
dissociation were somehow to be denied, the fact that Saint Alphonsus dissociated rightfully
under Idaho Code § 53-3-602 would still be highly relevant. In that event, MRIA would argue to
the jury that Saint Alphonsus breached an implied term of the partnership agreement because
none of the conditions for withdrawal in Section 6.1 of that agreement were satisfied. In
response, Saint Alphonsus will explain that it never claimed to withdraw under Section 6.1.
Rather, as Sandra Bruce's February 2004 notice expressly stated, Saint Alphonsus withdrew
under a statutory provision that gave it the power to dissociate "rightfully." This statutory right,
no less than the Section 6.1 rights, was "part of [the] contract, just as though the contract
contain[ed] an express provision to that effect," Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, 137 Idaho
663,666,52 P.3d 307,310 (2002), and its existence therefore rebuts any contention by MRIA
that the contract contained an implied term prohibiting Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal.
In the context of such arguments, the fact that Saint Alphonsus dissociated rightfully
under § 53-3-602 is highly probative and not the least bit misleading. Saint Alphonsus must be
able to tell the jury about the existence of the RUP A statutory right that Sandra Bruce invoked,
and also that if the jury finds that Saint Alphonsus withdrew under that provision, as opposed to
Section 6.1, its withdrawal was done "rightfully." The only resulting "confusion" arises from the
fact that MRIA's eleventh-hour "common law breach of contract" theory is inconsistent with the
existence of an affirmative statutory right to dissociate. Saint Alphonsus cannot be denied its
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defense because MRIA has now chosen to advance a facially absurd theory.
In addition, Saint Alphonsus needs to tell the jury that it was acting pursuant to a
statutory power to dissociate rightfully in order to rebut MRIA's accusations that Saint
Alphonsus witnesses are not to be believed when testifying that Saint Alphonsus had dealt with
MRIA in good faith when it worked for years to find a mutually satisfactory resolution of the
parties' respective interests. As the Supreme Court noted, one ofMRIA's tactics at the first trial
was to mock Saint Alphonsus witness Sandra Bruce for stating that Idaho Code§ 53-3-602
allowed Saint Alphonsus to withdraw. SADC, 148 Idaho at 490-91,224 P.3d at 1079-80; see
also, e.g., Trial Tr. at 1959-63, 4223-28, 4317. Although that belief has now been vindicated by
the Supreme Court's decision, MRIA's motion in limine would serve to gag Ms. Bruce and other
Saint Alphonsus witnesses from giving any justification for withdrawing.
Finally, MRIA is in no position to argue-and, indeed, should be estopped from
arguing-that Saint Alphonsus' s use of the precise statutory term "rightfully" to describe
dissociation is prejudicial, misleading, or confusing. Prior to the first trial of this matter, MRIA
sought and received permission to use the phrases "wrongful withdrawal" and "wrongful
dissociation" because:
The phrase "wrongful withdrawal" is not an inflammatory term
coined by MRIA for purposes of inciting the jury. The phrase
"wrongful withdrawal" has been used by the Idaho Legislature, the
Idaho Supreme Court, Idaho district courts in general, this Court in
particular and in model jury instructions when describing a
withdrawal from a partnership that breaches the partnership
agreement.
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The jury is tasked with awarding damages to MRIA caused by the
wrongful withdrawal of SARMC. The relevant statute requiring
the jury to calculate damages states that "[a] partner who
wrongfully dissociates is liable to the partnership and to the other
partners for damages caused by the dissociation."
MRIA's Opp. to SARMC's Mot. in Limine Re: Dissociation (June 12, 2007) at 2-3. The Court
agreed that MRIA could use those terms because:
The term 'wrongful' arises from the RUPA as adopted in Idaho.
Moreover, the term 'wrongful' is technically and legally accurate.
The Court will not preclude MRIA from stating that Saint
Alphonsus 'wrongfully' dissociated from MRIA. The Court is
unable to conclude that the technical and correct legal description
is prejudicial or potentially misleading.
July 30, 2007 Mem. Decision at 12-13.
That reasoning does not change simply because the shoe is now on the other foot. The
Idaho Code specifically states that "[a] partner has the power to dissociate at any time, rightfully

or wrongfully, by express will," Idaho Code§ 53-3-602(a) (emphasis added), and that "[a]
partner's dissociation is wrongful only if ( 1) it is in breach of an express provision of the
partnership agreement; or (2) in the case of a partnership for a definite term or particular
undertaking, before the expiration of the term or the completion of the undertaking," id. § 53-3602(b). The conditions for a "wrongful" dissociation being absent, Nov. 17,2010 Op. at 6, 9,
Saint Alphonsus dissociated "rightfully," and the use of this technical and correct statutory term
is not misleading or prejudicial.
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CONCLUSION

Because Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was "rightful," and thus affirmatively authorized
by Idaho law, MRIA's Motion in Limine to Preclude Argument that Dissociation Was Lawful
Under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602 should be denied.

DATED this 25th day of April, 2011.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

Saint Alphonsus has moved for summary judgment on its claim for its partnership share
based in part on the binding, law-of-the-case status of this Court's prior unappealed ruling that
the measurement of Saint Alphonsus's interest in MRIA is controlled by the valuation provision
ofthe Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"), Idaho Code§ 53-3-701. MRIA
simultaneously filed a motion seeking the opposite relief, i.e., "clarification" that this Court's
prior ruling "was abrogated" by the Supreme Court's decision. Specifically, MRIA contends
that the previous trial court's rulings that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated and that§ 533-701 applies were inextricably linked, so that the Supreme Court's reversal ofthe first ruling
necessarily requires reversal ofthe second. In so arguing, MRIA grossly misstates the basis of
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the previous trial court's ruling valuing Saint Alphonsus's buyout share. Its motion for
clarification should therefore be denied. 1
Nothing in Judge McLaughlin's post-trial decision determining the value of the "buyout
share" by reference to§ 53-3-701 depended on his prior and now-reversed "wrongful
dissociation" summary judgment holding. The Court's written ruling on "buyout share"
explained that "the buyout calculation provision contained in Article 6.1 [of the partnership
agreement] and the payment timing provision contained in Article 6.2 were only applicable if the
partner withdrew under the circumstances outlined in Article 6.1." Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007, at 6. The trial court said that "the
applicability of the buyout calculation in Article 6.1 is limited to those enumerated four (4)
reasons for dissociation, which did not occur in this case." !d. Since the partnership agreement
contained "no general buyout calculation for other partnership withdrawals, the default provision
contained in Idaho Code section 53-3-701 controls." !d. Far from suggesting that the RUPA
provision applies when, or because, a dissociation is wrongful, the trial court expressly held that
it applies to all dissociations for reasons "other" than those listed in Section 6.1 of the
partnership agreement. And no one has ever suggested-least of all the Supreme Court in its

1

MRIA's memorandum also continues to misstate the Supreme Court's decision in this
case. The Court did not hold, as MRIA contends, that a jury must determine whether or not
Section 6.1 limits Saint Alphonsus's right to dissociate. Rather, the Supreme Court held as a
matter of law that Section 6.1 does not limit Saint Alphonsus' s statutorily conferred right to
dissociate without liability. See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assoc., LLP,
148 Idaho 479,488-89,224 P.3d 1068, 1077-78 (2009).
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decision in this case-that the dissociation here fell within one of the four reasons set out in
Section 6.1.
This reasoning is compelling given the language of the partnership agreement. The
clause in that agreement providing a different "buyout price" methodology is the last sentence of
a lengthy paragraph setting forth the four legal and ethical grounds for a hospital partner's
invocation of its pre-RUP A contractual right to withdraw. See Trial Ex. 4023 § 6.1. It thus
appears on its face to be a formula to be "limited to those enumerated four (4) reasons for
dissociation." Findings ofFact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Sept. 21,2007, at 6.
The court specifically noted that the four enumerated conditions in Section 6.1 involved
circumstances "beyond the control ofthe Hospital partners that could require [them] to dissociate
quickly," and the "reduced" buyout provisions in the agreement would ameliorate otherwise
resulting "significant financial consequences for the partnership" of such a sudden and
unforeseen withdrawal. Id at 5. Accordingly, it made good sense to conclude that the
agreement's limitations on the size and terms of the departing partner's share recovery did not
apply where a partner did not rely on these emergency provisions but instead invoked the
"entirely new" general power to dissociate created by RUPA. Idaho Code§ 53-3-601(1), official
cmt. 1.
At the same time, the trial court said nothing to suggest it was reaching this result based
on its mistaken beliefthat Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal was wrongful under Idaho Code§ 53-3602(b). That is hardly surprising, since it is utterly illogical to suppose that the statutory RUP A
"buyout" formula should apply when a partner dissociates wrongfully under the Act, but not
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when that action is taken, as here, properly and "rightfully," in exercise of the broad statutory
power to dissociate under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602(a).
MRIA's argument to the contrary is gibberish. Indeed, MRIA offers no coherent
reasoning to support its contention that the trial court's post-trial ruling calculating partnership
share is "subsidiary to the decision of the Supreme Court" reversing the finding of wrongful
dissociation, and thus "is no longer valid." MRIA Mem. at 8. MRIA first quotes from the
pretrial decision that discusses the "buyout share" issue after entering summary judgment on the

claim for wrongful dissociation. !d. at 5. However, the trial court's discussion of the buyout
share issue in that decision did not endorse application of the RUP A formula, but instead held
that the jury would decide whether Article 6 of the partnership agreement or section 701 of
RUP A would be applied in determining buyout share. See Decision and Order of July 24, 2006,
at 14-15. This decision thus demonstrates the trial court's view that the determination of buyout
share was not at all governed by the trial court's erroneous finding of wrongful dissociation.
As MRIA acknowledges, near the end of trial, the trial court reversed itself and ruled that
the buyout share issue was equitable in nature and should be resolved by the Court. See MRIA
Mem. at 5. In deciding that section 701 ofRUPA governs the determination for the reasons set
forth above, the trial court again said nothing to suggest that this result was dependent at all on
its prior wrongful dissociation ruling. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment,
Sept. 21, 2007, at 2-6.
Moreover, MRIA offers no rationale for a logical connection between the two rulings.
All it can say is that "the district court came to two consistent conclusions: that dissociation was
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limited to the four enumerated reasons of Section 6.1, and that the Buyout Provision's
applicability was likewise limited to those four enumerated reasons." MRIA Mem. at 6. But the
fact that two rulings "are consistent"-i. e., do not logically conflict with each other-in no way
suggests that one depended logically on the other. That conclusion is equally true when, as here,
the two rulings are logically distinct and not dependent on each other in any way.
The previous trial judge was correct in concluding that§ 53-3-701 governs the
determination of "buyout share" recoverable by a partner who dissociates pursuant to the power
granted by Idaho Code§ 53-3-602, and MRIA has offered no basis whatsoever to suppose that
the Supreme Court decision in any way undermined that ruling. But even apart from that,
MRIA's collateral attack on the four-year-old buyout-share decision would have to rejected.
That decision calculated a recoverable principal amount owed by MRIA to Saint Alphonsus, and
MRIA had a right in 2007 to appeal that ruling. Such an appeal could have contended, albeit
without merit, that Section 6.1 of the partnership agreement, and not Idaho Code § 53-3-701,
should have been employed to make that calculation. But MRIA chose not to do so. As a
result, the trial court's ruling on this issue is res judicata and law of the case, and it binds the
parties and the Court here on remand. See Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282,
1286 (2009) (unappealed ruling becomes the law of the case and cannot be challenged in
subsequent proceedings); Idaho First Nat 'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 29192, 824 P .2d 841, 866-67 ( 1991) (unappealed issues are "laid to rest" and "will not be issues on
retrial").
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CONCLUSION

MRIA is bound by the Court's prior, unappealed ruling that Idaho Code§ 53-3-701
controls the measurement of Saint Alphonsus' s interest in MRIA. Further, that ruling is correct
and is in no respect undermined by any reasoning of the Supreme Court. MRIA's motion for
"clarification" must therefore be denied.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 25th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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County of Ada

)
): ss
)

State of Idaho

Dr. James Prochaska, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows:
1.

I am president of the board of partners of MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA") and I

have been a member of the board from the time that MRIA was formed.
2.

I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge.

3.

I participated in the negotiations over the terms of the Articles of Partnership of

MRI Associates (the "MRIA Partnership Agreement").
4.

MRIA was formed to plan for, create, develop and manage a limited partnership

that would provide magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) services to the Treasure Valley. Had the
limited partnership not attracted sufficient limited partner investors to fund the limited
partnership, the MRIA partners agreed, as reflected in the Partnership Agreement, that MRIA
itself would dissolve.
5.

When the MRIA Partnership Agreement was being negotiated in 1985, it was

agreed that MRIA would form the limited partnership named MRI Limited Partnership that
would do business as MRI Center of Idaho ("MRI Center") for the purpose of running an MRI
Imaging business on the campus of Saint Alphonsus Hospital, Boise, Idaho. St. Alphonsus
Hospital agreed to provide whatever MRI services it needed solely and exclusively through MRI
Center. St. Alphonsus Hospital subsequently became known as Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center ("SARMC"). Also at the time the MRIA Partnership Agreement was negotiated,
the partners wanted to leave open the possibility of forming other limited partnerships to operate
additional businesses.

AFFIDAVIT OF DR. JAMES PROCHASKA IN OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRI CENTER AND MRI MOBILE'S THIRD
PARTY BENEFICIARY CLAIMS- 2
001134

6.

A couple of years after the formation ofMRI Center, MRIA elected to form and

operate a second limited partnership, MRI Mobile Limited Partnership ("Mobile"), to provide
MRI services on the campuses of our partner hospitals: Mercy Medical Center in Nampa, Idaho
("Mercy") and West Valley Medical Center in Caldwell, Idaho ("West Valley"). MRIA would
be the General Partner of both limited partnerships.
7.

Because of the very large capital expenditure required to purchase, install and

operate MRI equipment on the campus of SARMC and because of the considerable business risk
of the new modality ofMRI in 1985, participation by other hospitals in the venture of was
desired. Consequently, the partnership ultimately included four hospitals.
8.

SARMC, the five physicians it chose to become general partners in MRIA, Mercy

and West Valley Hospitals all agreed that the hospitals were critical to the success of the
partnership and therefore should be bound to the partnership except for under a few carefully
defined circumstances. Provisions were therefore placed in the MRIA Partnership Agreement
severely limiting the circumstances under which the hospital partners could withdraw. Those
provisions were placed in the Partnership Agreement initially for the benefit of MRIA and its
business unit, MRI Center, but were subsequently essential to the formation of Mobile.
9.

During the negotiations over the terms of the Partnership Agreement, it was

agreed that because the business unit, MRI Center, would be located on Saint Alphonsus's
campus and would represent a considerable financial risk and expenditure for the general
partners and limited partners, withdrawal and competition by Saint Alphonsus would be
particularly devastating to MRI Center. It was for this reason that the parties to the Partnership
Agreement included the non-compete clause into the Partnership Agreement. Indeed, it was
considered absolutely essential to attracting limited partner investors to the project that the
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general partners be prohibited from competing with the businesses of the limited partnerships.
Accordingly, the MRIA partners agreed to insert a non-compete clause into the Partnership
Agreement prohibiting the partners from competing with the business units of MRIA, MRI
Center and later Mobile. Additionally, the partner hospitals' agreement to provide their MRI
services exclusively through the two limited partnerships allowed the businesses to successfully
expand, attract new investors, purchase mobile equipment, and provide MRI services on the
campuses of Mercy Hospital, West Valley Hospital, and subsequently Holy Rosary Hospital
(which later joined the partnership). The non-compete provision was inserted for the benefit of
the limited partnership businesses because they, not MRIA, were the ones that would be taking
the risks, making the financial expenditures, and providing the MRI services.
DATED this.:2.\~ay of April 2011.

~~
Dr.Ja~
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this.,2\~ day of April2011

~~.§~
Notary Public for Idaho
My commission expires: \0 Jib /:J.O\. \
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Reply in Support of their Motion for
Clarification Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share.

I.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Underpinnings of the District Court's Decision Concerning the Buyout Were
Overturned by the Supreme Court's Decision
As MRIA demonstrated in its earlier briefing on this Motion, and in its Opposition to

Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Claim for Partnership Interest, filed
April25, 2011, incorporated herein by reference, the Supreme Court's decision that the
withdrawal provision of Section 6.1 does not contain an "express" (i.e., unambiguous) provision
limiting withdrawal undermines the district court's decision concerning the buyout.
The provision at issue in this motion is Section 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement, which
contains two parts: the enunciation of the "medical/theological" reasons for a Hospital Partner's
withdrawal, and the buyout provision. Section 6.1 states in pertinent part:
Conditions of Withdrawal. Any Hospital Partner may withdraw from the
Partnership at any time if, in a Hospital Partner's reasonable judgment, continued
participation in this Partnership: (i) jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of such
Hospital Partner of its parent of their subsidiaries; or (ii) jeopardized
medicare/Medicaid or insurance reimbursement or participations; (iii) if the
business activities of the Partnership are contrary to the ethical principles of the
Roman Catholic Church as designated from time to time; or (iv) is or may be in
violation of any local, state or federal laws, rules or regulations .... Unless
otherwise agreed, the withdrawing Hospital Partner shall only be entitled to
receive its interest in the Partnership an amount which is equal to the balance of
such Hospital Partner's capital account at the time of withdrawal.
(Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motions Filed April11, 2011, Ex. A, §6.1.) It is a matter of
hornbook law that, where possible, the provisions of a contract must be construed as a whole to
give effect to every part of the contract. Daugharty v. Post Fails Highway Dist., 134 Idaho 731,
735, 9 P.3d 534, 538 (2000) (emphasis added). If, as Saint Alphonsus argues, the Supreme Court
MRIA'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION REGARDING WITHDRAWING
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has held 1 (or the jury finds) that Saint Alphonsus may lawfully withdraw for reasons beyond the
medical/theological reasons stated in Section 6.1 then, if Section 6.1 is to be read consistently,
the buyout provision of Section 6.1 likewise must apply when withdrawal occurs for reasons
other than the medical/theological reasons stated. If not, the district court's determination that
"the buyout calculation in Article 6.1 is limited to those enumerated four (4) reasons for
dissociation" (Finds of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007, at p. 6
(emphasis added),) results in diametrically opposing interpretations of provisions contained in
the very same section.
Saint Alphonsus argues that there is no connection between Judge McLaughlin's ruling
(ultimately overturned) that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated by withdrawing for reasons
other than those stated in Section 6.1, and its ruling that the buyout provision of Section 6.1 did
not apply because Saint Alphonsus withdrew for reasons other than those stated in Section 6.1.
To the contrary, these decisions are deeply intertwined. Prior to its decision regarding the
buyout, Judge McLaughlin made the fateful ruling that Saint Alphonsus could lawfully
dissociate from MRIA only if it withdrew for one of the four medical/theological reasons
outlined in Section 6.1. In his later decision regarding the buyout provision of Section 6.1, Judge
McLaughlin expressly connected the withdrawal provision with the buyout provision, noting that
each of the four circumstances outlined in Section 6.1 gave Saint Alphonsus the ability to
quickly withdraw, and that "[b]ecause a quick dissociation might have significant financial
consequences for the partnership ... a reduced "buyout" based upon the four (4) enumerated
reasons for dissociation would allow MRIA to continue without the hospital partner's

MRIA contends that all that the Supreme Court decided is that the provisions of Section
6.1 were ambiguous, and thus did not qualify as a withdrawal in violation of an "express"
provision under RUP A, and that the meaning of Section 6.1 still awaits a determination by a
JUry.
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participation and significant debt load issue for the partnership." (Finds of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007, at p. 5.)
In reversing Judge McLaughlin's decision that Section 6.1 was an express limitation on
Saint Alphonsus's right to dissociate, the Supreme Court vacated the underpinnings upon which
Judge McLaughlin's interpretation of the buyout provision had rested. Judge McLaughlin had
reasoned that when dissociation was done in accordance with the four express reasons stated in
Section 6.1, it was necessary to protect the MRIA partnership from the significant debt load
caused by an expansive buyout. In reversing Judge McLaughlin's decision and holding that
Section 6.1 did not expressly limit the circumstances of withdrawal to the four expressed
situation, the Supreme Court opened the door to the possibility that Section 6.1 likewise does not
limit the application of the buyout provision to the four expressed stated reasons. Presuming that
this Court or a jury holds that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal was not in violation of Section 6.1,
Judge McLaughlin's discussion about the purpose of the buyout provision- that MRIA requires
protection from the quick dissociations that flow from a lawful withdrawal - is implicated
despite the fact that Saint Alphonsus lawfully dissociated for reasons other than stated in Section
6.1. Saint Alphonsus cannot have it both ways. Either Section 6.1 is restrictive, or it is not. If
withdrawal can lawfully be accomplished for reasons other than the four medical/theological
reasons stated, then the buyout provision likewise applies in circumstances other than withdrawal
for one of those four reasons.

B.

MRIA's Decision Not to Appeal the Matter Does not Preclude Revisiting it on
Remand
Saint Alphonsus also argues that MRIA's

~ecision

not to appeal the matter precludes the

Court from revisiting it on remand. MRIA addressed this extensively in its Opposition to Saint
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Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Claim for Partnership Interest, filed April25,
2011, and incorporated herein by reference.
Saint Alphonsus cites to Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286
(2009), for the proposition that if a party "fails to appeal" an adverse ruling, because of the law
of the case that ruling cannot be challenged in subsequent proceedings. Taylor does not stand for
this proposition. Rather, it states that when the Supreme Court states an opinion, "such
pronouncement becomes the law of the case." !d. It also cites to Idaho First Nat'/ Bank v. Bliss
Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 291-92, 824 P.2d 841, 866-67 (1991) for the proposition that
un-appealed issues are "laid to rest." However, this case stands for the proposition that the trial
court should not "re-examine issued already laid to rest by the appellate court." (!d., emphasis
added.) These cases simply prevent a district court from reexamining questions already
explicitly passed upon by the appellate court.
In fact, Saint Alphonsus' s assertion in fact runs afoul of the principle that on remand, "a
court may 'correct an error in its original findings as to a matter not passed on by the appellate
court,"' Blinzler v. Andrews, 95 Idaho 769, 519 P.2d 438 (1973), or those matters "which are
subsidiary to the actions directed by the appellate court," Mountainview Landowners Co-op.
Ass 'n, Inc. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 866, 136 P.3d 332, 337 (2006), even though that issue is not
expressly included in the issues to be address on remand. Hutchins v. State, 100 Idaho 661, 603
P .2d 995 (1979) is on point. In that case, Plaintiffs and Defendant both prevailed in part on
summary judgment. Defendant received partial summary judgment holding that Plaintiff was
not entitled to damages. While the Defendant appealed those portions of the summary judgment
which had gone against it, Plaintiffs did not file a cross-appeal on damages. On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, but the trial court's summary disposition of the
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damages issue was not discussed. On remand, the Defendant argued that only that portion of the
summary judgment which it had appealed had been reversed. The trial court disagreed, noting
that the case was generally reversed, and that as the Supreme Court's opinion did not pass upon
damages at all, law of the case did not come into play. Id., 100 Idaho at 665, 603 P.2d at 999.
The trial court ultimately determined that the Defendant was liable for damages, despite the fact
that the Plaintiff had not challenged on appeal the earlier decision otherwise.
On a second appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's reasoning.
The Court noted that the finding on liability for damages "were not before us and received no
consideration on this appeal. Upon remand, whether or not any mention of these findings had
appeared in our opinion, they would be subject to review and revision by the trial court." I d.,
100 Idaho at 666, 603 P.2d at 1000. The Supreme Court further noted that "Opon remand of this
case the trial court should determine its findings of fact and conclusions of law, with respect to
the issues not dealt with in our opinion, on the basis of the record in the prior proceedings and
such further proceedings as may be had, without being bound in any way by its prior findings
and conclusions on such issues." Id., citing Hulihee v. Heirs ofHueu, 556 P.2d 920,921 (Hawaii
1976).
This case clearly demonstrates that, contrary to Saint Alphonsus's assertion otherwise,
the "law of the case" doctrine does not come into play, and that the district court is free to
consider this issue on remand. As outlined above, the Supreme Court's opinion vacates the
underpinnings of Judge McLaughlin's analysis, and thus this issue is "subsidiary to the actions
directed by the appellate court," Mountainview Landowners Co-op. Ass 'n, Inc., 142 Idaho at 866,
136 P.3d at 337 (2006), and thus maybe taken up on remand. Indeed, in Saint Alphons_us's
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine re: Prior Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial,
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filed April 11, 2011, Saint Alphonsus recognizes this rule, stating that "to the extent that a later
decision of the trial or appellate court moots or undermines a prior ruling, the prior ruling should
be disregarded. (!d. at p. 3.) It is also notable that MRIA couldnot have appealed this issue
because, until the Supreme Court reversed the district court, the argument that the buyout
provision is broadly applicable would have been contrary to the district court's finding that the
circumstances of withdrawal are limited to the four enumerated circumstances. As Saint
Alphonsus itself admits, and as Hutchins demonstrates, the Court clearly can reexamine the
matter.

II.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and in its previous briefing, MRIA respectfully asks the
Court to find that the previous decision of the district court regarding the applicable buyout
provision is subsidiaryto the decision of the Supreme Court and that Judge McLaughlin's ruling
regarding the formula for determining the amount of Saint Alphonsus' s departing partner's share
is no longer valid as a result of the Supreme Court's decision.
DATED this 2nct day of May, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~~1;2~~

afaCPar7r
Attorneys MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Reply in Support of their Motion in Limine
to Preclude Argument that Dissociation was Lawful Under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602.
I.

ARGUMENT

This Court is already well-apprised ofMRIA's argument that, while Saint Alphonsus's
dissociation from the MRIA partnership was not in violation ofl.C. § 53-3-602, such withdrawal
was nevertheless unlawful because it violated the Partnership Agreement. This matter has
already been submitted to the Court in the context of Saint Alphonsus' s Motion for Summary
Judgment on this "Breach of Contract" Theory, heard by the Court on April22, 2011. MRIA's
argument has been briefed in the context of many motions and argued to the Court, and thus will
not be repeated here. Rather, in this Reply, MRIA will demonstrate that evidence and argument
that Saint Alphonsus "lawful dissociated" is irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, regardless of
which way the Court decides.
A.

If the Court finds that Common Law Breach of Contract Theories of Liability for
Withdrawal Remain, Argument that Saint Alphonsus Did Not Breach RUPA is
Unduly Prejudicial

The Supreme Court and this Court have dismissed MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus
breached the withdrawal provision in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUP A"), I. C. § 533-602, by withdrawing from the MRIA partnership. If the Court agrees with MRIA's position
that common law breach of contract theories of liability for Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal
remain in the case, then argument and evidence that Saint Alphonsus did not breach I.C. § 53-3602 is unduly prejudicial.
There is a substantial risk that any such assertions will cause unfair prejudice, confuse the
issues, or mislead the jury. Idaho R. Evid. 403. The jury may believe that because Saint
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Alphonsus did not "wrongfully dissociate" under I. C. § 53-3-602, that this. precludes the jury
from finding that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation nevertheless violated the terms of the
Partnership Agreement. The jury may also confuse the statutory elements of"wrongful
dissociation" with the common law elements of"breach of contract."
Saint Alphonsus argues that if the Court finds that breach of contract claims remain in
this case, the fact the Saint Alphonsus did not breach RUP A in withdrawing would be relevant
because Saint Alphonsus would explain to the jury that it "never claimed to withdraw" under
Section 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement, but was relying instead on the withdrawal provisions
ofRUPA. (Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion in Limine to Preclude Argument
that Dissociation was Lawful Under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602, p. 4). It argues that "if the jury
finds that Saint Alphonsus withdrew under that provision [RUPA], as opposed to Section 6.1, its
withdrawal was done 'rightfully."' (Id. (emphasis in original).) With this argument, Saint
Alphonsus proves that there is a ygy high likelihood of confusion of the issues and misleading
the jury, because it has itself confused the issues and indicated its intent to mislead the jury.
One cannot "choose to withdraw" under the provisions of RUP A instead of the
provisions of the contract. The assertion that Saint Alphonsus can somehow opt out of the terms
ofthe Partnership Agreement by "invoking" RUPA is preposterous. The Partnership Agreement
has a broader sweep of liability for violation of any of its terms, express or implied, rather than
violation of only "express" (i.e., unambiguous) terms under RUP A. Put another way, withdrawal
maybe consistent with the provisions ofRUPA, but if contractual theories ofliabilityremain,
such withdrawal may nevertheless be in violation of the Partnership Agreement. If this Court
finds that such common law contract causes of action still remain in this case, it is immaterial

MRIA'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE ARGUMENT THAT
DISSOCIATION WAS LAWFUL UNDER IDAHO CODE§ 53-3-602-3

001148

whether Saint Alphonsus "invoked" RUP A in its withdrawal. This does not shield Saint
Alphonsus from the operation of contract.
From Saint Alphonsus's own argument otherwise, it appears that Saint Alphonsus intends
to and in fact will actively seek to confuse the jury by arguing that RUP A can "trump" the
contract. If the Court finds that a common law breach-of-contract claim remains in this case, the
Court will have necessarily rejected Saint Alphonsus's argument that, with respect to
withdrawal, RUP A displaces the contract. Saint Alphonsus should not be permitted to make a
contrary argument to the jury, as the jury might believe (as Saint Alphonsus apparently intends it
to believe), that because it "chose" to withdraw ''under" RUPA, it cannot ever be held liable for a
common law breach of the Partnership Agreement. As this confuses the issues and will mislead
the jury, the Court should grant the Motion in Limine to prevent Saint Alphonsus from arguing
that it "lawfully dissociated" under RUP A.

B.

If the Court holds that MRIA cannot Maintain a Common Law Breach of Contract

Claim for Saint Alphonsus's Withdrawal, Argument that Saint Alphonsus
"Lawfully Dissociated" is Irrelevant and Unduly Prejudicial
If the Court rejects MRIA's position that common law breach of contract theories of
liability for this withdrawal remain in the case, then argument and evidence that Saint Alphonsus
"lawfully dissociated" is irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. If the Court so finds, then evidence
of the fact that Saint Alphonsus withdrew from the MRIA partnership is merely part ofthe
timeline of events, and cannot serve as the basis ofliability for any claim advanced by MRIA.
Under these circumstances, the affirmative representation that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal was
"lawful" under RUP A is irrelevant to any issue of consequence in this action. Idaho R. Evid.
401, 402. There is no claim, and will be no argument, that withdrawal was improper or
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unlawful. As such, argument and evidence about RUPA and the fact that Saint Alphonsus's
withdrawal was lawful has no significance in the case.
More importantly, such evidence and argument will cause unfair prejudice, confuse the
issues, or mislead the jury. Idaho R. Evid. 403. Saint Alphonsus has said that even if the Court
finds that there is no wrongful dissociation or withdrawal claim in this case, it intends to
emphasize to the jury that its withdrawal from the partnership was lawful. MRIA will obviously
be unable to take a contrary position. There is a risk that by allowing Saint Alphonsus to
emphasize its lawful withdrawal in this manner, particularly when the issue is oflimited
relevancy, this might confuse the jury about the remaining causes of action in this case. For
example, the jury might believe that a proper withdrawal sanitizes previous breaches of fiduciary
duty, interference with prospective contractual relations, and the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. It might incorrectly assume that because wit9drawal was proper, the non-compete
agreement and Saint Alphonsus's improper competitivje activities and contractual interference
during that time cannot be implicated. It short, if such irrelevant evidence is presented to the
jury, it might reason that the evidence has to be releva111t of something, and give it weight on the
remaining issues, which have nothing to do with witho/awal. Under these circumstances, the
very limited probative value of this evidence is substarl.tially outweighed by the danger of
confusing the issues or misleading the jury, LR.E. 403j and the evidence should therefore be
excluded.

II.

CONCLUSION

Regardless of whether the Court determines th<:~.t a common law claim ofbreach of
contract remains for Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal rerljl.ains in this case, argument that evidence
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that Saint Alphonsus did not violate RUP A by its with awal is both irrelevant and unduly
prejudiciaL As such, MRIA asks the Court to grant th s Motion in Limine.
DATED this 2nd day of May, 2011.
BANDUCCI W ODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Attorneys MRI Afsociates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
imd MRI Mobile !Limited Partnership
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Reply in Support oftheir Motion in Limine
to Preclude Reference to the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in this Case.

I.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Parties are in Agreement that the Jury Should Not be Told that the Supreme
Court Endorsed any Particular Principal in the Appeal
Saint Alphonsus and MRIA are largely in accord with respect to this motion. MRIA

seeks to prevent Saint Alphonsus from arguing to the jury or presenting evidence of any findings
or statements made by the Idaho Supreme Court in the appeal from the first trial of this matter.
Saint Alphonsus apparently believes that MRIA is trying to preclude the jury from being
instructed on relevant matters of law, and therefore spends part of its response arguing that the
rulings of the Supreme Court are relevant as the governing legal principles of the case, although
it acknowledges that any such rulings "should be stated simply as legal proposition without
attribution to any particular court." (Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine
to Preclude Reference to the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in this Case, p. 2-3.)
With this Motion, MRIA is seeking a ruling the Saint Alphonsus will not refer to or read
from the Supreme Court opinion in any way in front of the jury. MRIA would not and does not
seek to preclude the jury from being instructed on any relevant point of law, even if enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v MRI Associates, LLP, 148
Idaho 4 79, 224 P .3d 1068 (2009). Indeed, as MRIA noted, this opinion provides the law of the
case. (Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine to Preclude Saint Alphonsus from
Referencing the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Regarding the Appeal of this Case, p. 2 n. 1.)
MRIA simply seeks to preclude Saint Alphonsus from arguing that any particular point of law
has already been specifically endorsed by the Supreme Court in this very case. Saint Alphonsus
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seems to be in agreement, as it has stated that reference to applicable legal principles should be
made ''without any mention of a specific rulin~, court, or proceeding from which they have
come." (Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine to Preclude Reference to the
Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in this Case, p. 4.) The parties seem to be fully in accord on this
ISSUe.

B.

Telling the Jury that this Case is on Retrial May Help Orient the Jury
The principal point of disagreement among the parties seems to be an extremely minor

point, mentioned by MRIA in a footnote, that it sees no harm in letting the jury know that this
case in on retrial, so long as no other details (such as the first verdict, the amount of the award,
the result of the appeal, etc.) are communicated to the jury. In fact, Saint Alphonsus cites a
number of cases in which disclosure of the result of the first trial is inappropriate. MRIA agrees.
The jury should not be told that the prior jury reached a verdict in favor of MRIA; it should not
be told the damages that jury awarded, or the amount ultimately awarded by remittitur; and it
should not be told that the Supreme Court reversed the verdict or the reasons for doing so.
However, MRIA reiterates that it sees no harm in informing simply (and only) that the
case is on retrial. The information is necessary for the jury to determine the credibility of
witnesses. If witnesses are presented with their prior trial testimony or if former testimony of
unavailable witnesses is presented at trial, the fact that such former testimony was given in the
prior trial of the matter will assist the jury assess whether biases or self-serving statements were
being made in that testimony, as opposed to presenting it as testimony in a vacuum. In addition,
this information may help orient the jury about the timeline of events and explain why there is a
"gap" in the facts from 2006 to the present. For example, MRIA's experts have two damages
calculations, the first measuring damages from 1999 until the first trial in 2006, and then a new
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set of calculations from 2006 until the present. MRIA 's experts will need to explain that there
are two calculations because the first was done prior to the first trial, and the second was done to
measure damages since the first trial. Rather than leaving the jury to speculate about the reason
for this and other "gaps" or "breaks" in the facts, this mystery can be dispelled without any
prejudice to either party by noting to the jury that the case is on retrial.

C.

The Supposed "Ruling" that Saint Alphonsus was Legally Authorized to Withdraw
from MRIA Should not be Conveyed to the Jury as a "Governing Legal Principle"
Saint Alphonsus also argues that "[t]he ruling ofthe Supreme Court and this Court-

including the critical ruling that Saint Alphonsus was legally authorized to withdraw from the
partnership in 2004---must be conveyed to the jury by the Court as governing legal principles,
and may be asserted and argued by both parties."

(Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's

Motion in Limine to Preclude Reference to the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in this Case, p. 1
(emphasis added).) As MRIA has argued extensively in other places, it remains to be seen
whether Saint Alphonsus was legally authorized to withdraw from the partnership in 2004. As
such, this is not a "governing legal principle."
Moreover, if the Court finds that Saint Alphonsus was "legally authorized to withdraw,"
then this legal finding is irrelevant and risks confusing the issues, and should not be conveyed to
the jury. MRIA made this argument in its Reply in Support of its Motion in Limine to Preclude
Argument that Dissociation was Lawful Under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602, filed contemporaneously
herewith and incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full. To summarize that
argument, if the Court finds that SaintAlphonsus's withdrawal was "lawful," there is no claim,
and will be no argument, that withdrawal was improper. As such, argument and evidence about
RUPA and the fact that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal was lawful has no significance in the case.
More importantly, there is a risk that by allowing Saint Alphonsus to emphasize its lawful
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withdrawal in this manner, particularly when the issue is otherwise irrelevant, might confuse the
jury about the remaining causes of action in this case.

II.

CONCLUSION

As the parties appear to be in accord, the Court should enter a Motion in Limine
preventing the parties from presenting evidence or argument to the jury that the Supreme Court
made any specific finding, ruling, or statements in the context of the appeal of this case. The
Court should also reject Saint Alphonsus's contentions that the jury should be informed that
Saint Alphonsus was "legally authorized to withdraw," or that it would be prejudicial to tell the
jury that this case in on retrial.
DATED this 2nd day ofMay, 2011.

Dara L. Parker/
Attorneys MRfAssociates, LLP, MRJ Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

MRIA concedes in its opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on
Its Claim for its Partnership Interest that, ifldaho Code § 53-3-701 governs the measurement of
Saint Alphonsus's interest in MRIA, then Saint Alphonsus is entitled to judgment for $4,600,000
plus prejudgment interest at the statutory legal rate of twelve percent per year from the date of
dissociation. Opp'n at 11-12. But even though this Court previously ruled that§ 53-3-701 does
govern here, and even though MRIA failed to appeal that ruling, MRIA nonetheless contends
that the matter is still open to debate because the Supreme Court reversed this Court's separate
ruling on wrongful dissociation. MRIA is wrong.

First, as explained in detail in Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion for
Clarification Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share, the Court's two rulings-the one finding
wrongful dissociation and the one holding§ 53-3-701 applicable-simply had nothing to do with
one another. Specifically, Judge McLaughlin ruled that "the buyout calculation provision
contained in Article 6.1 [of the partnership agreement] and the payment timing provision
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contained in Article 6.2 were only applicable if the partner withdrew under the circumstances
outlined in Article 6.1." Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007, at
6 (emphasis added). He thus held that§ 53-3-701 applies to all dissociations "other" than those
for the reasons enumerated in Article 6, and in no way suggested that this result depends on
whether those "other" dissociations were wrongful or rightful. !d.; see also Opp'n to MRIA's
Mot. for Clarification at 3-6. Thus, the Supreme Court's reversal of the wrongful dissociation
ruling in no way undermines or calls into question the ruling that§ 53-3-701 governs here. 1
Second, because MRIA did not appeal that ruling, it is res judicata and law of the case,

and cannot be re-litigated here. See, e.g., Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282,
1286 (2009) ("alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in [an] earlier appeal" are
"law of the case," which means they "must be adhered to throughout [the case's] subsequent
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal"). In response, MRIA cites Hutchins
v. State, 100 Idaho 661,603 P.2d 995 (1979) (per curiam), and the rule that, on a general

reversal, issues not passed upon by the Supreme Court are open on remand. See Opp'n at 8-9.
But Hutchins merely held that a prior ruling concerning the damages for a claim was open to

1

MRIA ignores these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and instead cites the
Court's decision and order of July 24, 2006. See Opp'n at 10. But that decision, in which the
Court held (incorrectly) that Saint Alphonsus wrongly dissociated, further rebuts MRIA's
argument. If, as MRIA now contends, the Court thought that applicability of§ 53-3-701 turned
on whether the dissociation was wrongful, then it would have followed from the Court's finding
of wrongfulness that § 53-3-701 applies. But the Court did not draw that conclusion at that time,
and instead deferred resolution ofthe matter. See Decision and Order of July 24,2006, at 14-15.
This decision thus demonstrates the Court's view that the applicability of§ 53-3-701 was an
independent question not at all dictated by the erroneous finding of wrongful dissociation.
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reconsideration on remand where the Supreme Court had overruled a ruling on the merits of the
claim because "the issue of damages was so interwoven with the [merits] that a consideration of
the former ... necessarily involved a consideration of the latter." Hutchins, 100 Idaho at 665-66,
603 P.2d at 999-1000. As explained above, however, this Court's ruling as to the applicability of

§ 53-3-701 was in no way "interwoven with" or dependent upon any of the rulings overturned by
the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the rule that a "general reversal" opens up to reconsideration issues not passed
upon by the Supreme Court applies only to the retrial of those claims that were the subject of the
general reversal. Specifically, in Bliss Valley Foods, the Supreme Court ordered a retrial of
numerous claims but emphasized that the jury's verdict on two claims (for fraud and RICO
violations) would not be part of the retrial because the verdict on those two claims had not been
challenged on appeal. Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 291-92,
824 P.2d 841, 866-67 (1991). In so holding, the Supreme Court explained that where a party has
"had one trial" on a particular set of claims and did "not raise[] any issue concerning any error
relating to the trial of those claims," then "those issues are laid to rest" and "will not be issues on
retrial" insofar as they are "not so intertwined, or so interdependent with the ... other claims
which must be retried, that the trial of [those] other issues on remand would be prejudiced by not
being allowed to have a retrial on what was an otherwise error-free trial as far as the
[unappealed] issues are concerned." /d.; see also Triton Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 846 P.2d 664,
667-69 (Wyo. 1993) (discussing Hutchins and the "general reversal rule" and holding that where
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on five claims, and defendant
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successfully appealed the ruling as to four of those claims, the "failure to appeal [the fifth claim]
foreclosed a trial on that issue upon remand").
Thus, the Supreme Court's general reversal of the jury verdict in favor ofMRIA on
MRIA's counterclaims opened up for reconsideration only those issues relating to the retrial of
those counterclaims. Specifically, at the first trial, Saint Alphonsus asserted a claim for relief
(for its partnership share), while MRIA asserted numerous counterclaims. Each party's claims
were tried, with Saint Alphonsus prevailing on its claim and MRIA prevailing on its claims.
Saint Alphonsus appealed and obtained a general reversal of the jury's verdict as to each of
MRIA's counterclaims. MRIA did not appeal, and alleged no errors, with respect to this Court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law on Saint Alphonsus's claim. It follows that MRIA's
counterclaims are to be retried, while Saint Alphonsus's claim has been "laid to rest" and "will
not be [an] issue[] on retrial." Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho at 291-92, 824 P.2d at 866-67.
In any event, whether or not the "general reversal" rule gives this Court the power to
reconsider the prior ruling that§ 53-3-701 governs, the Court has already stated that it is "not
going to revisit" and "not going to reverse" any of the "numerous decisions made in the original
trial by Judge McLaughlin that the Supreme Court did not find in error." Feb. 9, 2011 Hr'g Tr.
at 40-41. For this reason, too, the Court should decline MRIA's request to revisit the issue.
Third, and finally, even if the issue were somehow open to reconsideration-which it is
not-this Court should still grant summary judgment for Saint Alphonsus because Judge
McLaughlin's conclusion that§ 53-3-701 controls here was indisputably correct. The clauses in
the partnership agreement providing a different "buyout price" methodology and limiting
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recoverable interest are incorporated into the lengthy provisions setting forth the four legal and
ethical grounds for a hospital partner's invocation of its pre-RUPA contractual right to
"withdraw." Trial Ex. 4023 §§ 6.1 & 6.2. The clauses thus unambiguously provide a formula
"limited to those enumerated four (4) reasons for dissociation," Findings ofFact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007, at 6, and cannot reasonably be read as applying to the
"entirely new" general power to dissociate created by the Revised Uniform Partnership Act.
Idaho Code § 53-3-601 (1 ), official cmt. 1. Rather, where, as here, a party exercises its RUP A
right to dissociate, the RUPA provisions, including Idaho Code§ 53-3-701, control.
CONCLUSION
As this Court held in connection with the first trial-in a ruling that MRIA did not appeal
and which was in no way undermined by the subsequent determination that Saint Alphonsus
dissociated rightfully-Idaho Code § 53-3-701 controls the amount due to Saint Alphonsus for
its share in MRIA. That provision provides for a statutory buyout price (determined at the first
trial to be $4,600,000) plus prejudgment interest at the legal rate of 12% from the date of
dissociation to the date of payment. The Court should therefore grant summary judgment in
favor of Saint Alphonsus on its claim for its partnership share in the amount of $4,600,000 plus
accrued interest at the statutory rate of 12% per year from April1, 2004, through the date of
satisfaction of the judgment.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

In its opening memorandum, Saint Alphonsus demonstrated that MRIA' s settlement with
the third-party defendants, together with MRIA's allegations that it was injured by concerted
action of Saint Alphonsus and the third-party defendants, entitles Saint Alphonsus to a reduction
in any damages by the greater of the amount of the settlement or the "pro rata share" of the
settling defendants' liability. Also, the phrase "pro rata share," though undefined in the statute,
is best read as referring to equal shares divided according to the number of defendants (or groups
of related defendants) rather than to percentages of proportionate fault as determined by the jury.
Under this interpretation of"pro rata share," Saint Alphonsus is entitled as a matter oflaw to a
holding that it can be liable for no more than 50% of whatever damages MRIA might prove.
In an overwrought response directed at evading the consequences of its voluntary
settlement of its claims against Saint Alphonsus's alleged co-conspirators, MRIA takes issue
with Saint Alphonsus's interpretation of the phrase "pro rata share." MRIA repeatedly insists
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that applying the traditional understanding of that term-as numerous legislatures, courts, model
codes, and treatise writers have done for decades-would be "patently absurd" and "irrational."
To the contrary, for reasons explained in Saint Alphonsus's opening memorandum and discussed
further below, the "equal shares" approach is superior to a proportionate fault submission to the
jury both as a reading of the statutory language and as a matter of fairness and judicial efficiency.
Just as importantly, MRIA's exaggerated arguments about the meaning of"pro rata
share" should not obscure the fact that MRIA takes serious issue only with the manner of
determining the respective liability shares of Saint Alphonsus and the third-party defendants.
Assuming the settlement agreement is genuine-and it is-MRIA does not dispute that Idaho
Code § 6-805 entitles Saint Alphonsus to have any damages awarded at trial reduced by some
percentage of liability attributable to the third-party defendants. The only open question,
therefore, is whether that percentage should be determined through application of the "equal
shares" rule or by the jury as a matter of fact.

A.

MRIA's "Authenticity" Argument Is Frivolous

It is undisputed and a matter of record in this case that MRIA settled its claims against

the third-party defendants. See Stipulation for Dismissal of Third Party Defendants With
Prejudice (filed July 31, 2007) (noting that MRIA and the third-party defendants "have mutually
resolved and settled their dispute"); July 2, 2007 Hr'g Tr. at 5 ("We have entered into ... a
release/settlement agreement."). Because that settlement has undeniable legal effect on the
remainder ofMRIA's case, Saint Alphonsus's counsel submitted by affidavit a copy of the
settlement agreement previously provided to him by the third-party defendants.
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MRIA's purported questions about the authenticity of the agreement are a sham. MRIA
is a party to the settlement agreement and its counsel, Mr. Banducci, personally signed it. Thus,
MRIA knows what the settlement agreement says. If the document provided to Saint Alphonsus
did not accurately reflect the terms of that agreement, then MRIA should have said so. See
I.R.C.P. 56(e) ("adverse party may not rest upon ... mere allegations or denials ... , but the
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."); Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 814, 907 P.2d
783, 791 (1995) (noting rule that "adverse inferences" may be drawn against party that fails "to
produce evidence within its control").
Instead MRIA just played cat and mouse, invoking the technicality that the document
submitted was not a signed copy, even as MRIA's counsel knew full well that the submitted
copy is verbatim identical to the slightly reformatted final executed version. To confirm that
fact, Saint Alphonsus is filing with this reply brief a supplemental affidavit attaching the
executed settlement agreement.

B.

Saint Alphonsus Is Entitled To Have Any Damages Reduced by the Settling
Defendants' "Pro Rata Share"

MRIA does not dispute (i) that the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act requires an
equivalent reduction in the non-settling defendant's liability when a joint tortfeasor settles and
invokes the Act's provisions, see Idaho Code§§ 6-805 & 6-806; (ii) that the "determination
whether a settling party is a joint tortfeasor [for purposes of applying the statute] must be based
on the pleadings and not the jury's apportionment of liability," Quickv. Crane, 111 Idaho 759,
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783, 727 P.2d 1187, 1211 (1986); or (iii) that MRIA's conspiracy allegations, embodying all of
the claimed substantive wrongs, make Saint Alphonsus and the third-party defendants joint
tortfeasors for purposes of the statute because joint-and-severalliability arises where parties were
"acting in concert" by "pursuing a common plan or design which results in the commission of an
intentional or reckless tortious act," Idaho Code§ 6-803(5). Plainly, the language ofMRIA's
settlement agreement with the third-party defendants falls within the statute-as MRIA also does
not dispute-and thus triggers the right to a reduction in Saint Alphonsus's damages. 1
MRIA contends, however, that the statute requires a reduction in damages only for
MRIA's conspiracy claim, and does not apply to any ofMRIA's substantive counterclaims (for
tortious interference with contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract) because
those claims "are specifically only about Saint Alphonsus" and "only one" claim, for civil
conspiracy, "speaks to conspiracy." Opp'n at 7. This baldly misrepresents MRIA's
counterclaims and is otherwise incorrect for several reasons.
First, "[c]ivil conspiracy is not an independent tort but rather is a derivative tort that relies
on an underlying actionable wrong." Mem. Decision and Order dated Nov. 17, 2010, at 17. In
this case, those other "underlying actionable wrong[s]" always have been the other counts of
MRIA's counterclaim, and the conspiracy has always been one to commit the other substantive
1

Though MRIA does not actually contend that Saint Alphonsus is barred from raising its
properly pleaded§ 6-805 defense, it argues that doing so is inconsistent with Saint Alphonsus's
separate motion seeking to apply the Court's prior ruling on partnership share. Opp'n at 5.
There is no inconsistency. The § 6-805 issue is properly before the Court because the parties are
still litigating MRIA's counterclaims, and there is no prior ruling on the§ 6-805 issue, and hence
neither a failure to appeal a ruling nor any attempt tore-litigate a ruling.
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wrongs. See MRIA Mem. Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. on Civil Conspiracy Claim at 18
(explaining that MRIA's civil conspiracy claim "is not an independent claim for relief' but rather
rests on allegations of "breach of fiduciary duty, wrongful dissociation, interference with
prospective business relations and breach of contract"); id. at 22 (conceding that "MRIA must
succeed on one of the above claims in order to hold St. Als liable for acts committed in
furtherance of its conspiracy to harm MRIA").
Thus, MRIA's claims for tortious interference, fiduciary duty, and breach of contract
have never been about "Saint Alphonsus alone." By MRIA's own description, MRIA's entire
case amounts to the allegation that "St. Als and the [GSR] rads engaged in a conspiracy to
compete with, and take business away from, MRIA. [They] did so by forming IMI and directly
competing with MRIA in violation of St. Al's contractual, tort, statutory and fiduciary duties to
its partners in MRIA. . . . Such actions ... were in violation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty that
St. Als owned to MRIA and its limited partners, the contractual duty not to compete, and the tort
duty not to interfere with MRIA's relationships with its customers." MRIA Mem. Opp'n to Mot.
for Summ. J. on Civil Conspiracy Claim at 23? MRIA thus has repeatedly alleged that Saint
Alphonsus and the third-party defendants are "jointly and severally liable for the wrongful acts

2

MRIA's counterclaim similarly states that Saint Alphonsus "conspired with" the thirdparty defendants by, among other things, "interfering with prospective business opportunities,"
"[ c]o-opting a partnership opportunity that should have been offered to MRIA" in violation of
Saint Alphonsus's fiduciary duties, and "[w]rongfully withdrawing from MRIA" in violation of
Saint Alphonsus's contractual duties, 3d Am. Countercl. ~ 99, and emphasizes that the "acts in
furtherance ofth[e] conspiracy" "[l]ikewise" include that Saint Alphonsus "wrongfully engaged
in conduct which breached its partnership obligations," id. ~~57-58.
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that [they] committed in furtherance of their conspiracy to compete against MRIA in violation of
Saint Al[phonsus's] fiduciary, contractual and tort duties." MRIA Mem. Opp'n to Mot. for
Summ. J. on Civil Conspiracy Claim at 19.
Thus, every act of alleged wrongdoing set forth in the counterclaim-every last one-is
alleged to have been part of a conspiracy and taken in concert by Saint Alphonsus and the GSR
radiologists. Under Quick v. Crane, these allegations control for purposes of determining
whether§ 6-805 applies. 3

3

MRIA also makes the more limited argument that § 6-805 does not apply to its claims
for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract because those claims do not sound in tort.
Opp'n at 8; see also Idaho Code § 6-803(4) (defining "joint tortfeasors" as entities "jointly or
severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property"). This, too, is wrong.
As to breach of fiduciary duty, MRIA's premise is mistaken; that claim does, in fact,
sound in tort. See Hoyle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 373, 48 P.3d 1256, 1262 (2002)
("the breach of a fiduciary duty sounds in tort"); Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 644, 39
P.3d 577, 584 (2001) (same); Prop. Mgmt. W, Inc. v. Hunt, 126 Idaho 897, 900, 894 P.2d 130,
133 (1995) (same). Moreover, by alleging that Saint Alphonsus and the third-party defendants
conspired to breach the contract, MRIA has alleged joint-and-severalliability "in tort," because a
conspiracy claim "sounds in tort, and not in contract" even where the acts constituting the wrong
are a breach of contract, 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy§ 24, and a "party to a contract ... who breaches
it on the inducement of another is ... a joint tortfeasor," 44B Am. Jur. 2d Interference§ 55.
In any event, MRIA's counterclaim cannot be divided into tort and contract actions for
purposes of applying the pro rata reduction because MRIA does not allege a contract claim with
discrete and separate damages. Rather, it alleges a single injury resulting from the business it
allegedly lost to IMI as a result of the supposedly improper concerted acts of Saint Alphonsus
and the settling defendants, thus making Saint Alphonsus and the settling defendants "joint
tortfeasors" for purposes of that injury within the meaning of§ 6-803(4 ). See Joe & Dan Int 'I
Corp. v. US. Fid. & Guar. Co., 533 N.E.2d 912,918 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988) (plaintiff's assertion of
contract claim does not remove parties from coverage ofthe uniform act where underlying joint
conduct was tortious and parties were therefore joint tortfeasors).
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C.

The "Pro Rata Share" Reduction to Which Saint Alphonsus Is Entitled
Should Be Determined by the Number of Defendants (or Groups of
Associated Defendants) Rather Than by a Jury Determination of
Comparative Fault

Saint Alphonsus is thus entitled to have its liability reduced by the "pro rata share" of the
third-party defendants' liability, whatever that means. The statute does not define this term.
MRIA says it must mean the percentage of proportionate fault as determined by the jury in this
case, and also argues that Saint Alphonsus cannot show that the settling parties intended
otherwise.
Taking the latter objection first, MRIA misses the point in trying to divine what the
settling parties intended "pro rata" to mean. The statute applies if and only if the settlement, by
its terms, "provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor,
of the injured person's damages recoverable against all the other tortfeasors." Idaho Code § 6806 (emphasis added). The settlement agreement here includes the required statutory language,
providing that "[a]ny damages ... recoverable" by MRIA against Saint Alphonsus "shall be
reduced" by the "pro rata share" of the third-party defendants, among other phrases the
agreement uses to describe that share. Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel Jack Gjording, Ex. C
at 4. 4 In using the term "pro rata share," the settlement agreement thus, on its face, invokes the

4

To be sure, the settlement agreement includes additional language directed at other
contingencies. But that does not change the fact that the agreement unambiguously triggers the
statue by providing for a "pro rata share" reduction in damages.
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application of the statute, protecting the settling defendants against a contribution action by
allowing the remaining defendant, Saint Alphonsus, to reduce any later award "pro rata. " 5
While MRIA is right that the phrase "pro rata share" does not necessarily mean equal
shares, as evidenced by the cases it cites from two other jurisdictions (Rhode Island and
Oklahoma) that have interpreted the phrase to refer to proportionate fault as determined by a fact
finder, this is neither the only reasonable interpretation of the phrase, nor the better one. To the
contrary, the two leading torts treatises explain that "a pro rata share [is] arrived at by dividing
the damages by the number oftortfeasors," W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts § 50, at 340 (5th ed. 1984), and that "the term 'pro rata' shares has usually been thought to
mean equal shares, divided according to the number of defendants," Fowler V. Harper et a!.,
Harper, James and Gray on Torts § 10.2 at 62 n.33 (3d ed. 2007). See also Mem. at 10 (citing
additional authorities). Courts in numerous states have adopted this definition of"pro rata share"
in construing their own versions of the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. 6 Indeed, when
Idaho adopted its statute, the rule that "the tortfeasors who are liable will end by paying equal
5

Having signed the agreement including the statute's "pro rata" reduction language,
surely MRIA cannot now mean to suggest that the language is legally ineffective and the settling
defendants may be sued by Saint Alphonsus for contribution notwithstanding their settlement
payment.
6

See, e.g., Zeller v. Cantu, 478 N.E.2d 930, 933 (Mass. 1985) (act "bars any
consideration of the relative fault of a codefendant in assessing his or her pro rata share of the
damages); Great W Cas. Co. v. Fletcher, 287 S.E.2d 429, 431 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) ("the pro
rata share of each defendant is determined by dividing the amount of the judgment by the
number of persons against whom it has been obtained"); Lincenberg v. lssen, 318 So.2d 386,393
(Fla. 1975) ("contribution [is] on a pro rata basis [and] the relative degrees of fault [are] not to be
considered").
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shares"-known as "pro-rata contribution"-was "still followed by a majority of the courts."

Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 886A cmt. h (1979). 7
Moreover, "the Idaho Legislature saw fit to adopt the 1939 version ofthe Uniform
[Contribution Among Tortfeasors] Act." Halve v. Draper, 95 Idaho 193, 194, 505 P.2d 1265,
1266 (1973). The official comments to that uniform act make clear that, absent a specific
optional provision to the contrary, "the ordinary rule of apportionment of the common liability
among the tortfeasors [is] in accordance with the number of them commonly liable," and that "no
inquiry is made into the respective degrees of fault ofthe tort-feasors as amongst themselves."
1939 Uniform Act§ 2 cmt on Subsection 4 (emphasis added); see also Mem. at 10-11. 8
Critically, in 1987, at the same time it replaced joint-and-severalliability with
comparative fault in most actions, the Idaho Legislature deleted a subsection of the uniform act
that had required consideration, in some cases, of "the relative degrees of fault of the joint
tortfeasors." Mem. at 11 n.4 (quoting earlier version of§ 6-803(3)). This action shows that the
Legislature intended the default "equal shares" rule to apply in the few remaining instances of
joint-and-several liability, ofwhich this case is plainly one. See Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho

7

According to the Restatement, the approach advocated here by MRIA is "called
comparative contribution." !d.
8

The 1955 version of the uniform act is even more explicit, providing that "[i]n
determining the pro rata shares oftortfeasors in the entire liability (a) their relative degrees of
fault shall not be considered." Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act 1955 Revised Act
§ 2 (emphasis added). While this version ofthe uniform act (which differs from the 1939
version in many respects) is not in effect in Idaho, it further demonstrates that there is nothing
unusual about interpreting the phrase "pro rata share" to mean "equal share."
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239, 242, 953 P.2d 989, 992 (1998) (legislative "deletion" of statutory provision demonstrated
that "the legislature intended to eliminate" effects of provision); Hendrix v. Gold Ridge Mines,
56 Idaho 326,337-38,54 P.2d 254,258 (1936) ("fact that ... provision was omitted from our
statute leads to the conclusion that it was not intended that such practice should prevail here").
This history ofthe Idaho statute rebuts MRIA's argument (Opp'n at 13-15) that the
parties' relative degrees of fault should be tried to the jury here simply because that is the
practice in cases of comparative fault. The Court should reject MRIA's attempt to resurrect by
judicial decision a rule that the Legislature deliberately chose not to make applicable to the few
situations in which joint-and-several liability is still applicable. 9

9

MRIA cites two Supreme Court cases in which the Court made statements appearing to
assume that the statute would require jury determinations of relative fault. Opp'n at 11-12. Both
statements were plainly dicta that was not relevant to any of the disputed issues in those cases;
"[s]uch dicta cannot be relied upon as binding precedent." St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg 'l Med.
Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. ofCnty. Comm 'rs, 149 Idaho 584, 595,237 P.3d 1210, 1221 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Moreover, one of the cases, Quick v. Crane, was decided in 1986, a
year before the Legislature deleted the provision of the statute providing for relative degrees of
fault to be considered. The other, Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 119 Idaho 299, 805 P.2d
1223 (1991), also appears to have involved the pre-1987 version ofthe statute, since the Court
referred to contribution for "relative negligence," Opp'n at 13 (quoting Burgess), a cause of
action that no longer existed after the Legislature's 1987 abolition of joint-and-several liability in
negligence actions. In any event, neither of these cases involved conspiracy allegations, for
which (as discussed further below) an equal shares approach is particularly appropriate. These
cases thus do not help MRIA here.
MRIA also relies on the last sentence of§ 6-806, which provides that a settling joint
tortfeasor is relieved from liability for contribution "only if the issue of proportionate fault is
litigated between joint tortfeasors in the same action." MRIA cites no authority interpreting this
provision, and Saint Alphonsus is aware of none. This provision appears to mean only that the
joint tortfeasors must be sued together in the same lawsuit and/or that the matter of the release
must be placed at issue in the litigation. These conditions are obviously satisfied here.
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Far from being an "odd interpretation" or a "patently ridiculous outcome" (Opp'n at II,
13), defining "pro rata share" to mean an equal share without regard to relative fault would thus
conform with the "usual[]" and "ordinar[y]" meaning of the term as understood by "a majority of
the courts" at the time the Legislature adopted the statute at issue.
It also is a sensible and fair interpretation. For one thing, it is widely recognized that the
"equal shares" rule "is simpler to administer," Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A cmt. h,
especially in the limited context in which contribution and set off are still relevant, i.e., to alleged
conspirators acting in concert. The concept of comparative fault is ill-suited to conspiracies,
where multiple parties work together for the same result, and each co-conspirator is fully
responsible for the acts and conduct of the others. In both the criminal and civil contexts, the law
thus treats co-conspirators as equally at fault for the harms brought about. See, e.g., United

States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095, 1102 (4th Cir. 1983) ("all co-conspirators are equally
responsible for the acts of others done in furtherance of the conspiracy"). By the intentional and
cooperative nature of conspiracy, the co-conspirators are always each fully and equally liable for
the harm done, which is probably why the Legislature chose to retain joint-and-several liability
in cases of alleged conspiracies. Thus, while it will not be impossible for a jury to allocate
percentages of fault if this Court decides to go that route, the result will necessarily be somewhat
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arbitrary and less accurate than an "equal shares" allocation that reflects the co-conspirators
"equal responsibility" for the conduct alleged. 10
CONCLUSION

Idaho's Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act entitles Saint Alphonsus to a reduction in
any damages against it by the "pro rata share" of the settling third-party defendants. The only
question is whether this reduction requires a jury allocation of"fault," or whether each defendant
(or each group of related defendants) should share equally. For the reasons set forth herein and
in Saint Alphonsus's opening memorandum, the Court should adopt the "equal shares" approach
and hold that Saint Alphonsus may not be liable for more than 50% of any damages MRIA might
prove at trial. If the Court rejects that conclusion, it should submit the issue of comparative
responsibility to the jury.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 2nd day ofMay, 2011.

10

Similar considerations exist in the only other context where the act still applies, i.e.,
where parties are principal and agent or master and servant. Who is more "at fault"-the
principal who orders the act or the agent who carries it out? Philosophers may debate the "just
following orders" defense; jurors should not need to.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No CV OC 04-0829D
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRI
CENTER'S AND MRI MOBILE'S
THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY
CLAIMS

ORIGINAL
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
001180
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
As Saint Alphonsus's opening brief shows, the controlling principle for when a thirdparty beneficiary status exists "is whether the agreement reflects an intent to benefit the third
party," in the sense that it is "made primarily for his benefit; it is not sufficient that the third
party is a mere incidental beneficiary to the contract." Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 687,
183 P .3d 771, 77 5 (2008) (internal citation omitted). MRIA does not dispute this. Further,
MRIA agrees that Just's Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462,463, 583 P.2d 997,
998 ( 1978), is relevant Idaho authority with respect to the level of specificity a contract must
contain before it can be determined as "primarily" for the benefit of a third-party. Opp'n at 7-8
(quoting Just's at length). The provisions of the MRIA general partnership agreement identified
in MRIA's opposition brief, however, fall far short of Just's requirements.
MRIA does not contest that the MRIA agreement defines the interrelationships between
the MRIA general partners, or that the relationships between the MRIA general partnership and
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the later-created limited partnerships are defined in separate agreements. See Mem. at 3-4. This
fact is critical, because such a formative document creating a new legal entity necessarily focuses
almost exclusively on the respective rights and powers associated with that entity, and thus is
unlikely to satisfy the third-party beneficiary test. See, e.g., Laclede Inv. Corp. v. Kaiser,
596 S.W.2d 36, 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that partnership agreement identifying a
company as the source of a loan to the partnership did not confer third-party-beneficiary status
on that company because "[t]he entire partnership agreement dealt with the interrelationship
between the partnership and its members"). MRIA's contention that the "entire contract" need
not benefit MRI Center or MRI Mobile, Opp'n at 7, just underlines the fact that the MRIA
partnership agreement was drafted primarily to benefit its partners, not the Center or Mobile
limited partnership.
MRIA identifies portions of specific contractual provisions that it says were made
primarily to benefit MRI Center and MRI Mobile. Opp'n at 8-10. But each of these provisions,
on their face, 1 define general partner rights and obligations, and are thus primarily intended for
the benefit of the general partners and general partnership. Unlike the provisions in Just's,
which required specific acts for the sole benefit of the area businesses held to be third-party
beneficiaries, none of these provisions in the MRIA agreement are direct statements of an intent
to benefit a third-party, divorced from the benefits and duties owed between the actual

1

As MRIA itself concedes, the intent of the parties to confer a third-party benefit "must
be gleaned from the contract itself unless that document is ambiguous." Opp'n at 6. Because the
language of the agreement is not ambiguous, the affidavit of Dr. James Prochaska, attached to
MRIA's opposition, should be disregarded.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
001182
JUDGMENT ON CENTER'S AND MOBILE'S THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY CLAIMS- 3

contractual signatories. Thus, any benefit that the limited partners received as a result of these
general-partner agreements are merely incidental, and do not give the limited partnerships
standing to sue for their alleged breaches. Mem. at 5, 9.
First, MRIA argues that § 9.2.2 was written primarily for the benefit of MRI Center and
MRI Mobile by expressly prohibiting competition with those entities. Opp'n at 8. This is wrong.
The language MRIA quotes is misleadingly edited and taken out of context. Section§ 9.2.2 is
not a provision (as in Just's) stating that the general partners must provide some benefit to the
limited partnerships. To the contrary, it is part of a broader definition of the limits on the
activities of the general partners, and explains what prohibited "Competitive Activity" shall not
include:
§ 9.2.1 For the purposes ofthis Article 9, the term 'Competitive
Activity' shall refer to (1) those business activities in which the
Partnership is engaged and (2) those prospective business activities
whose development has received at least five (5) favorable votes
on the Board of Partners.
§ 9.2.2 Competitive Activity shall not include (1) any Business
activities conducted more than 100 miles from the Location of the
first magnetic resonance imaging device installed by the Limited
Partnership; (2) the professional activity of a physician, including
without limitation, the reading and analysis of diagnostic images,
materials or information; ....
§ 9.3.1 No Restricted Party shall engage in any Competitive
Activity while such Restricted Party is a Partner, a Shareholder of
a Partner, or an Affiliate of a Partner.
Trial Ex. 4023. MRIA itself concedes that the "Restricted Parties" in § 9.3 .1 refer to the current
and former general partners ofMRIA, Opp'n at 4 & n.l, and thus in context, all§ 9.2.2 says is
that, as between the general partners, activities more than 100 miles from what would eventually
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become MRI Center are not "competition." Thus, like the rest ofthe agreement, § 9.2.2 is a
provision defining the rights and obligations the general partners owe to each other, and exists
for each general partner's benefit. Any benefit accruing to the later-created MRI Center is thus
plainly incidental to the primary purpose of defining the general partners' mutual obligations to
each other?
Second, MRIA claims that the withdrawal provisions of§ 6.1 were written primarily for

the benefit ofMRI Center and Mobile. Opp'n at 9. This argument is moot, as§ 6.1 is irrelevant.
Saint Alphonsus rightfully dissociated under the statutory power provided by RUP A, and MRIA
has no claim for wrongful withdrawal. See Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on
MRIA's Unpled "Breach of Contract" Theory of Wrongful Dissociation.
MRIA's theory is also absurd. Section 6.1 and its corresponding provisions discuss
withdrawal by a "Hospital partner" from the general partnership. Trial Ex. 4024 § 6.1. Even
assuming, as MRIA argues, that MRI Center would have been benefitted by having no hospitals
withdraw (Opp'n at 10), that is merely an incidental benefit of a contractual clause discussing the
general partners' mutual agreements. MRI Center and MRI Mobile are not third-party
beneficiaries of Section 6.1.

2

In all events, MRI Mobile's third-party beneficiary count fails even under MRIA's own
reasoning, as this clause refers only to the "Limited Partnership" that became MRI Center. At a
minimum, then, summary judgment should be granted on MRI Mobile's breach of contract
claims.
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CONCLUSION

Because the MRIA partnership agreement is the formative document that defines the
rights and obligations of its signatories, the MRIA general partners, its references-and arguable
benefits-to a limited partnership to be created in the future are at most incidental. The
agreement thus was not executed primarily for the benefit of either MRI Center or MRI Mobile,
and neither Center nor Mobile may claim to be third-party beneficiaries of that agreement. As a
result, the Court should grant summary judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus on Center's and
Mobile's third-party beneficiary claims.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 2nd day ofMay, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

/Counter-Defendants
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

On April 11, Saint Alphonsus filed five motions in limine with this Court, seeking to
exclude certain irrelevant, prejudicial evidence and arguments and to otherwise reinstate prior
orders that were not affected by the Supreme Court's rulings. MRIA has now responded, and a
common thread running through many of these responses rests on the single contention that Saint
Alphonsus's motions should be denied in whole or in part because, despite this Court's ruling
that Saint Alphonsus properly exercised its statutory right to "dissociate without liability" from
MRIA, Saint Alphonsus still faces liability for wrongful withdrawal under its unpled "breach of
contract" theory of wrongful dissociation. But, as Saint Alphonsus recently argued to this Court,
this newly concocted theory of wrongful dissociation is wholly without merit. See Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Unpled "Breach of Contract" Theory of
Wrongful Dissociation.
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In light of the common theme running through MRIA's responses, and generally to
streamline the Court's consideration of these motions, Saint Alphonsus offers the following
consolidated reply in support of all its motions in limine.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE MOTION IN LIMINE RE: POST-APRIL 1, 2005 COMPETITION SHOULD
BE GRANTED, AS MRIA DOES NOT CONTEST THE RELEVANT LEGAL
PRINCIPLES FLOWING FROM RIGHTFUL DISSOCIATION

As Saint Alphonsus showed, its rightful dissociation from the MRIA partnership on April
1, 2004, significantly impacts MRIA's claims for liability and the damages theory it presented at
the first trial. Mem. at 3-10. Due to that rightful dissociation, Saint Alphonsus's fiduciary duty
to refrain from competition ended immediately, and any restrictions on competition arising out of
the MRIA agreement's non-compete clause, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or the
tort of interference with contract ended one year later, on April I, 2005. !d. Thus, MRIA's
evidence of Saint Alphonsus' s competitive activities after that date-including IMI' s placement
of a magnet on Saint Alphonsus' s campus and Saint Alphonsus' s decision to send its own
patients to IMI-is not relevant to MRIA's claims ofliability.
The vast majority ofMRIA's opposition memorandum consists of supposed "facts"
culled nearly verbatim from its Supreme Court brief, all but one page of which deals with
activities occurring prior to April 1, 2005. Opp'n at 3-17; compare MRIA Appellate Br. at 4-17,
available at 2008 WL 5328238. Such pre-2005 evidence is irrelevant to this motion. If MRIA

wishes to claim that the events from 1999 to April1, 2005, caused it harm, it can certainly try to
do that. But with respect to the actual subject of Saint Alphonsus's motion, whether MRIA may

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S CONSOLIDATED REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS
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allege liability and damages arising out ofpost-April1, 2005 competitive activities, MRIA's
only response is to deny that Saint Alphonsus rightfully dissociated, relying on its unsound
"breach of contract" theory of wrongful dissociation. See Opp'n at 18-19.
By contrast, MRIA does not make any effort to contest the legal consequences that
follow if one assumes-in accordance with reality-that Saint Alphonsus rightfully dissociated.
Thus, because Saint Alphonsus exercised its statutory power under RUP A to "dissociate without
liability," Nov. 17, 2010 Op. at 6, 8-9, the Court should hold that the following are true as a
matter of law:
•

Any restriction on Saint Alphonsus's competition arising out of alleged fiduciary
duties of loyalty ended, as a matter of law, on April 1, 2004. Thus, but for any
contractual obligation to the contrary, Saint Alphonsus was "free immediately to
engage in a competitive business." Mem. at 4-5;

•

The non-compete provision in the MRIA Partnership Agreement expired on April 1,
2005, and as a matter oflaw, Saint Alphonsus was allowed to compete with MRIA as
of that date. Mem. at 3-4;

•

Any alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising out of the
MRIA Partnership Agreement ended, as a matter of law, when the non-compete
lapsed on April1, 2005. Mem. at 5-6; and finally

•

Saint Alphonsus's post-April1, 2005 competition with MRIA, standing alone, did not
constitute interference with contractual relations, as a matter oflaw. Mem. at 6-7.

Apparently recognizing that it cannot assert liability based on competition after April 1,
2005, MRIA shifts its theory (see Mem. at 7-8), and claims that Saint Alphonsus's post-April1,
2005 activity "is not presented as evidence [of] unlawful competition" but "[r]ather is
demonstrative ofMRIA's damages" frompre-2005 activities. Opp'n at 21. But details about
the entirely lawful post-April 2005 competitive activity that IMI or Saint Alphonsus engaged in
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is wholly irrelevant to proving damages caused by lingering effects from allegedly improper
behavior before April 1, 2005. MRIA has the data on who did what scans in the post-April I,
2005 period, and can try as it will to show that actions before that date caused damages later.
But it must not be allowed to present evidence of post-non-compete conduct simply to show
competition that was, by then, wholly proper. The only conceivable purposes in providing those
details would be to bolster its case by misleading the jury into believing that the post-dissociation
competition was part of the wrongful conduct with which Saint Alphonsus is now charged, or
that Saint Alphonsus did not, then, have the right to send its own patients to anyone other than
MRIA.
II.

MRIA SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE OR
ARGUMENT IMPLYING THAT SAINT ALPHONSUS WRONGFULLY
DISSOCIATED OR WITHDREW
Saint Alphonsus also filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and Argument that

Saint Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew From MRIA. As shown in Saint Alphonsus's supporting
memorandum, MRIA sought to use portions of three documents during the first trial to suggest
that Saint Alphonsus knew in advance that withdrawal would be improper, and that its
dissociation was therefore in bad faith. Mem. at 3-4. Given that it has since been determined, by
the Supreme Court and this Court, that Saint Alphonsus did not wrongfully dissociate, such
evidence--or any similar evidence or argument intended to imply that Saint Alphonsus
wrongfully dissociated-is irrelevant and prejudicial. !d. at 5-8. Saint Alphonsus thus seeks to
exclude a few, limited prejudicial excerpts of these memos.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S CONSOLIDATED REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS
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MRIA's primary response is to argue that, despite this Court's ruling that Saint
Alphonsus had a right under RUPA to "dissociate without liability," Nov. 17, 2010 Op. at 6, 8-9,
Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated under MRIA's unpled "common law" breach of contract
theory of wrongful dissociation. Opp'n at 4-5. As discussed above, this is baseless.
MRIA' s alternative response 1 is that, even if Saint Alphonsus rightfully dissociated, the
"documents" are probative evidence and should not be excluded. Opp'n at 8-10. But MRIA
protests too much. Saint Alphonsus did not move to exclude the entirety of the documents, but
only to strike small portions of the memoranda that specifically refer to Section 6.1 and the
possibility of liability for wrongful dissociation-issues that are no longer in the case and are not
relevant. See Mem. at 8-9; Affidavit of JackS. Gjording Exs. A-C. MRIA makes no effort to
explain why the actual portions of the memoranda that Saint Alphonsus seeks to exclude should
be admissible. Indeed, the only specific citation to language it wishes to discuss, regarding

1

MRIA also argues that Saint Alphonsus is precluded from filing its motion because the
Supreme Court found Saint Alphonsus had not preserved other grounds for excluding portions of
the Shattuck Hammond memorandum. Opp'n at 10-11. This is nonsense. Saint Alphonsus is
not asking for a reconsideration of these old rulings. It is asking for a new ruling, on new
grounds not previously available. Here, the question whether portions of the PWC and Shattuck
Hammond memoranda should be excluded as irrelevant and prejudicial because Saint Alphonsus
rightfully dissociated was not-and could not have been-raised previously, and was not decided
by the trial court or the Supreme Court.
Specifically, prior to the first trial, Judge McLaughlin held that Saint Alphonsus had
wrongfully dissociated, and so Saint Alphonsus could not have argued for exclusion based on
rightful dissociation. While the Supreme Court held that Saint Alphonsus did not wrongfully
dissociate on grounds of an "express term" in the partnership agreement, it left for this Court to
determine whether Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated before the end of a definite term.
Saint Alphonsus was not determined to have rightfully dissociated until this Court's ruling of
November 17, 2010. Thus, Saint Alphonsus is raising this ground for exclusion at the first
practical opportunity.
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litigation over "shifting referrals" (Opp'n at 9, citing Trial Ex. 4138, p. 16) is not even something
Saint Alphonsus moved to exclude. See Gjording Aff. Ex. A, p. 16 (seeking to exclude only~ 1,
not~

5, regarding "shifting referrals"). The specific portions of the memoranda that Saint

Alphonsus identified should be excluded as prejudicial and irrelevant, and the Court should grant
Saint Alphonsus's motion in limine, in full.
III.

THE ONLY DISPUTED POINT IN THE MOTION IN LIMINE RE: PRIOR
TRIAL COURT RULINGS IS RESOLVED UPON A FINDING THAT SAINT
ALPHONSUS RIGHTFULLY DISSOCIATED.
MRIA largely concedes Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine re: Prior Trial Court

rulings, with two exceptions. First, it argues that it is not precluded from arguing that Saint
Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated. Opp'n at 2. This argument rests on MRIA's flawed "breach
of contract" theory of wrongful dissociation, and is baseless.
Second, MRIA argues that Saint Alphonsus may not ask for a "reconsideration" of the

rulings on Motions 1 and 9, relating to the Shattuck Hammond memorandum. Opp'n at 3. But
MRIA proceeds from a false premise. Saint Alphonsus's motion explicitly states that the rulings
on Motions 1 and 9 "should not be revisited." Mem. at 8. Those rulings held only that (1) the
"scorched earth" language in the Shattuck Hammond memorandum must be excluded, and (2)
that portions would not be excluded based on attorney-client privilege. Saint Alphonsus's
current motion argues different grounds, previously unavailable to it, for excluding portions of
the Shattuck Hammond and PWC memoranda as irrelevant and prejudicial because Saint
Alphonsus rightfully dissociated, a contention not available to Saint Alphonsus before this
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Court's November 17, 2010 Order. !d. at 8-9. That issue is properly before this Court. See
supra Part II & p. 6 n.1.

IV.

MRIA CANNOT ASSERT CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WRONGFUL
DISSOCIATION, NOR CAN IT ASSERT EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORTS ITS
OTHER VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED CLAIMS
Saint Alphonsus also moved to exclude MRIA from introducing evidence in support of

"conspiracy" to commit wrongful withdrawal, or evidence of claims it had voluntarily dismissed
prior to the first trial, including libel and misappropriation. As the opening brief explained,
MRIA may not assert a conspiracy claim when the underlying predicate claim is itself invalid.
Mem. at 4. Moreover, MRIA's voluntary dismissal of certain claims had "the effect of a Rule
41 stipulation of dismissal with prejudice," and invokes the "doctrine of res judicata ... as if the
parties had proceeded to trial" and the dismissing party had lost on the merits. Kawai Farms, Inc.
v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610,614, 826 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1992) (cited in Mem. at 4.)
In response, MRIA asserts that it can argue for a conspiracy to "wrongfully withdraw"
because it has a valid claim for wrongful dissociation on its "breach of contract" theory. Opp'n
at 8-9. As discussed above, that is incorrect.
MRIA goes on to argue that even though it voluntarily dismissed its libel and
misappropriation claims, it can still effectively argue the same wrongdoing simply by avoiding
the terms "libel" and "misappropriation" and instead presenting them as breaches of fiduciary
duty instead. Opp'n at 7-8. MRIA's response misconstrues the scope of res judicata. That
doctrine does not simply bar a "cause of action" but rather bars the "claim," i.e., the actual
allegations of wrongdoing encompassed therein. See Watkins v. Peacock, 145 Idaho 704, 707,
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184 P.3d 210,213 (2008) ("Idaho uses a transactional approach to claim preclusion"); Houser v.

S. Idaho Pipe & Steel, Inc., 103 Idaho 441,446,649 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1982) ("[t]he 'sameness'
of a cause of action for purposes of application of the doctrine of res judicata is determined by
examining the operative facts underlying the two lawsuits"). Thus, simply changing the label
attached to the same claim of wrongdoing does not defeat the bar. See, e.g., Andrus v. Nicholson,
145 Idaho 774, 777, 186 P.3d 630,633 (2008) (res judicata "'extinguishes all claims arising out
of the same transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose' ... even
though the theory of liability ... differ[ s] from the cause of action actually litigated in the prior
lawsuit" (quoting Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 150, 804 P.2d 319, 323
(1990))); Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 259, 668 P.2d 130, 135 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
claim for the same result but "adducing a different substantive law premise ... does not
constitute the presentation of a new claim when the new premise or ground is related to the same
transaction" (quoting Restatement (Second) ofJudgments§ 25 cmt. d)).
The transactions underlying MRIA's dismissed claims are thus barred. For example,
MRIA's claim oflibel was that GSR published "an untrue statement concerning MRI Center's
ability to deliver its images to the referring physician community, with the intent of steering
business away from MRI Center"-i.e., the January 4, 2005 Seaboum letter alleged in the
counterclaim to have been sent "in reaction to" actions taken by MRIA. See 2d Am. Countercl.
~~

49-53, 134; Trial Ex. 4533. MRIA voluntarily dismissed this claim with prejudice, and thus it

has lost that claim on the merits. Kawai Farms, 121 Idaho at 614, 826 P.2d at 1326. MRIA
nonetheless wishes to argue the very transaction underlying that dismissed libel claim-that
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I

Seabourn's letter was false and injurious to MRIA. Opp'n at 7. That claim is barred, whether
MRIA calls it "libel" or "breach of fiduciary duty. " 2
V.

THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE MOTION TO PRECLUDE REFERENCE
TO THE FIRST VERDICT, AS WELL AS REFERENCE TO THE FACT THE
SUPREME COURT DECIDED AN APPEAL OF THAT VERDICT
Finally, MRIA has filed a non-opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Preclude

Reference to the Jury's Finding of Liability in the First Trial. Non-Opp'n at 2. MRIA argues,
however, that Saint Alphonsus should be "precluded from referencing the reversal of that verdict
by the Supreme Court on appeal." Id Saint Alphonsus agrees that no party should be able to
mention the Supreme Court's involvement in this matter. But the key legal rules governing the
case-including those embedded in the Supreme Court's decision-should be made known to
the jury by the Court. And as such, they are entirely proper subjects for discussion by the parties
before the jury. See Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine to Preclude
Reference to the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in this Case at 2-5 (filed April25, 2011.)

2

Contrary to MRIA's argument, Opp'n at 7, Saint Alphonsus is not arguing that all
evidence which might have supported a dismissed claim is excludable for all purposes. If, for
instance, the letter were relevant for some purpose other than attempting to show that it was a
false, injurious statement, then it might be admissible for that other purpose, subject to a Rule
403 analysis. But MRIA admits that it wishes to use that letter to prove the very same
allegation-that the letter was false and injurious-that MRIA dismissed in its libel count. Such
evidence and argument is irrelevant and prejudicial, given that any such claim is now barred.
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CONCLUSION

The Court should grant each of Saint Alphonsus's motions in limine.
DATED this 2nd day of May, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702
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INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No CV OC 04-08219D
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada
)
JACKS. GJORDING, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that he is one
of the attorneys for Plaintiff/CounterDefendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("Saint Alphonsus") in the above-entitled matter and makes
this affidavit having personal knowledge of the facts contained herein.
1.

On July 2, 2007, MRIA and the third-party defendants informed the Court and

Saint Alphonsus that they had entered into a settlement and release ofMRIA's claims against the
third-party defendants.
2.

At 1:55 p.m. that day, J. Norris Morceaux, a Paralegal at the law firm of Eberle

Berlin, Kading, Turnbow, McKlveen & Jones, Chartered, as it was then named, counsel for the
third-party defendants, sent an unsigned version of the final settlement agreement to Saint
Alphonsus's counsel. I attached this agreement as Exhibit D to my affidavit dated April 11,
2011. A copy of the transmittal e-mail is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
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3.

On July 9, 2007, Joseph H. Uberuaga, II, of the Eberle, Berlin firm, forwarded to

Saint Alphonsus an executed copy of the settlement agreement, which except for some changes
in formatting was identical to the earlier version. A copy of the transmittal e-mail is attached
hereto as Exhibit B.
4.

A copy of the executed settlement agreement forwarded by Mr. Uberuaga is

attached hereto as Exhibit C.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NOT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before

e, a Notary Public, this

'Z."'d day of May,

2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 2nd day ofMay, 2011, a true and correct copy ofthe
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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From:
To:
Date:
Subject:

"J Morceaux" <jmorceaux@eberle.com>
<jgjording@g-g.com>, <pjm@givenspursley.com>, <general@saetrumlaw.com>
Mon, Jul 2, 2007 1:55 PM
FW: Settlement Agreement and Release of all Claims - GSR I SARMC I MRIA

Gentlemen:

I am forwarding to you the final draft of GSR's Settlement Agreement at Neil McFeeley's request. Please
feel free to call if you have any questions.

J Norris Marceaux
Paralegal
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow, McKiveen & Jones, Chtd.
Boise Plaza
1111 West Jefferson, Suite 530
Post Office Box 1368
Boise, Idaho 83701
Phone: (208) 947-3249 (direct)
Fax: (208) 344-8542

Information contained in this electronic message and in any attachments hereto may contain information
that is confidential, protected by the attorney/client privilege and/or attorney work product doctrine. This
email is intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above. Inadvertent disclosure of the
contents of this email or its attachments to unintended recipients is not intended to and does not constitute
a waiver of the attorney/client privilege and/or attorney work product doctrine. This transmission is further
covered by the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, 18 U.S. C.§§ 2510-2521. If you have received this
email in error, immediately notify the sender of the erroneous receipt and destroy this email and any
attachments of the same either electronic or printed. Any disclosure, dissemination, distribution, copying
or use of the contents or information received in error is strictly prohibited. Internal Revenue Service Rules
of Practice require us to notify you that any tax advice in this electronic message was not intended or
written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue
Code, nor for promoting, marketing or recommending any transaction on matters addressed herein. Any
party privy to or any way using or disclosing protected health information in conjunction with this email
shall comply with federal and state laws including HIPAA regulations, with regard to the confidentiality,
handling, and use of such protected health information.

CC:

"Neil McFeeley" <nmcfeeley@eberle.com>
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Filters Used:
1 Tagged

Record

Date Printed: 4/28/2011

Email Report

Time Printed: 10:21AM
Printed By: PJM

Form Format

0.01 (hours)
10:21AM 10:21AM Duration
Date
4/28/20111lme
Subject
FW: Signed Settlement Agreement
MatRef
MRI Joint Venture
St. Al's Reg Med Ctr- 337,
Client
From
PJM
To
CCTo
Bee To
(days before) Follow N Done N Notify N Hide
Reminders
Email Topic
User2

Code
Staff

Stacy Rodriguez
MatNo 337-1765

N Trigger N Private N Status

User3
User4

-- Original Message--To: Patrick J Miller
Cc: Warren Jones; Neil McFeeley; Melanie Pinney; J Morceaux
From: juberuaga@eberle.com
Sent: 7/09/2007 11 :OOAM
Subject: Signed Settlement Agreement
>>Pat,
>>
» Here is a copy of the signed settlement agreement. Please provide a copy to
»Jack and Stephanie. Thanks.
>>
» Joseph H. Uberuaga II
>>
» Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow, McKiveen & Jones, Chtd.
>>
»Boise Plaza, 1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
>>
» Post Office Box 1368
>>
» Boise, Idaho 83701
>>
» 208.344.8535 (phone)
>>
» 208.344.8542 (fax)
>>
» juberuaga@eberle.com
>>
» Information contained in this electronic message and in any attachments hereto
» may contain information that is confidential, protected by the attorney/client
» privilege and/or attorney work product doctrine. This email Is intended only for the
» use of the Individual or entity named above. Inadvertent disclosure of the
» contents of this email or its attachments to unintended recipients is not Intended
» to and does not constitute a waiver of the attorney/client privilege and/or attorney
» work product doctrine. This transmission is further covered by the Electronic
» Communication Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 251 0·2521. If you have received this
» email in error, Immediately notify the sender of the erroneous receipt and destroy
» this email and any attachments of the same either electronic or printed. Any
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Filters Used:
1 Tagged

Record

Email Report
Form Format

Date Printed: 4/28/2011
Time Printed: 10:21AM
Printed By: PJM

>>disclosure, dissemination, distribution, copying or use of the contents or
>> Information received in error Is strictly prohibited. Internal Revenue Service Rules
>> of Practice require us to notify you that any tax advice in this electronic message
>> was not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of
>>avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor for promoting,
>> marketing or recommending any transaction on matters addressed herein. Any
» party privy to or any way using or disclosing protected health information in
» conjunction with this email shall comply with federal and state laws including
» HIPAA regulations, with regard to the confidentiality, handling, and use of such
>> protected health information.
>>
>>
>>
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS

Recitals
1.

MRI Associates, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, MRI Limited

Partnership, an Idaho Limited Partnership, doing business as MRI Center of Idaho, MRI Mobile
Limited Partnership, an Idaho Limited Partnership, ISOSCAN LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability
Company, Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Andrew R. Curran, M.D., David
J. Giles, M.D., John M. Havlina, M.D., Thomas E. Henson, M.D., James M. Prochaska, M.D.,
Mednow, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Dominican Sisters of Ontario, Inc., an Oregon corporation, and
West Valley Medical Center, Inc., an Idaho corporation (collectively "Third Party Plaintiff"), filed a
Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third Party Complaint on or about March 7,
2006 ("Third Party Complaint"), against Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company; Gem State Radiology LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership; and Imaging
Center Radiologist, LLP (collectively "Third Party Defendants").

A copy of the Third Party

Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" for reference and incorporated herein.
2.

Third Party Plaintiff, and their successors, representatives, assigns, agents, officers,

directors, partners, shareholders members, servants, employees, attorneys, indemnitors, and
insurers, subsidiaries, and affiliated business enterprises, and their heirs, estates, representatives,
and any and all persons acting for, by, through, or in any way on behalf of said persons and
entities, are hereby collectively referred to as Releasor.
3.

Third Party Defendants, and their successors, representatives, assigns, agents,

officers, directors, partners, shareholders, members, servants, employees, attorneys, indemnitors,
and insurers, subsidiaries, and their heirs, estates, representatives, and any and all persons acting
for, by, through, or in any way on behalf of said released persons (except SaintAiphonsus Regional

SETILEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS -1
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Medical Center, its affiliates (other than Third Party Defendants), parent companies, or
subsidiaries, hereinafter "St. Alphonsus"), are hereby collectively referred to as Releasees.
4.

The Parties desire to resolve their disputes through this Settlement Agreement and

Release of All Claims herein.
Be it known that Releasor for the following consideration:

(1) The sum of EIGHT

HUNDRED AND TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND AND 00/100 DOLLARS ($825,000.00) payable to
Releasor within fourteen ( 14) days of the signing of this release and dismissal of all claims against
Releasees With Prejudice; and, (2) That the Physicians identified as medical doctors employed by
Third Party Defendants will refrain from discussing the substance of this case or their testimony
prior to completion of the trial with representatives, including counsel for either Saint Alphonsus or
MRI Associates LLP, unless they have been properly served with and are responding to a
subpoena (It is understood by the parties that St. Alphonsus representatives, including counsel,
may confer with Jeff Cliff, Executive Director of IMI, relative to this litigation. It is agreed that such
communications between Mr. Cliff and St. Alphonsus' representatives related to the substance of
Jeffrey Cliff and the Physicians' testimony shall not be passed on by Mr. Cliff to the Physicians.),
does acknowledge and hereby releases, acquits, and forever discharges Releasees of and from all
claims of every kind and demands of every and whatever kind, name or nature, known or unknown,
contingent or mature, in tort, contract, based in statute, based in common law, any claim involving
extra contractual claims, conspiracy, monopoly, having to do with, arising, arisen, to arise, or in any
way which may arise out of or by reason of or related to the allegations and events contained in the
Third Party Complaint and as set forth in Exhibit "A" to this Release of all Claims.
It is understood and agreed that this settlement is a compromise of a doubtful and disputed
claim, that the payment made is voluntary and is not to be construed as an admission of liability on
the part of Releasees, and that said Releasees deny liability therefor and intend merely to avoid
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further litigation and buy their peace. This Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims is
made and entered into as a free and voluntary act of Releasor in the exercise of Releasor's own
judgment, belief, and knowledge of the nature, extent, and duration of said claims and damages
and is not made or entered into under the influence of Releasees, or any of them, or any attorney,
representative, agent, or any other person acting for, through, or on behalf of any of Releasees,
and no Releasee or any other person has induced or influenced Releasor to make this settlement
or execute this Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims.
Releasor and Releasee agree that the release provided for herein does not extend to nor
discharge any liability of any other tortfeasor, co-conspirator, or co-actor, including specifically St.
Alphonsus.
If Releasees are joint tortfeasors, are joint signatories to any contract, are co-owners of any
entity, have acted in concert, have acted in a conspiracy with any person, firm, corporation,
partnership, not for profit entity, charitable entity, or any other entity, in such an event Releasor
releases that portion or share of the cause of action which Releasor has against Releasees and
discharges any and all damages attributable to Releasees in any such cause of action, without in
any way discharging or releasing that portion of the cause of action attributable to any portion of the
cause of action attributable to any party other than Releasees who have caused injury as a result of
the allegations in the Third Party Compliant as set forth in Exhibit "A".
Releasor does hereby credit and satisfy that portion of the total amount of damages of
Releasor that may have been caused by the negligence, actions, fault, or activities, if any, of
Releasees as hereinafter may be determined in a future trial or other disposition of these matters,
and Releasor does hereby release and discharge that fraction, portion, pro rata share, and
percentage of the total causes of action and claims of Releasor for damages against Releasees
which shall hereinafter by further trial, settlement, or other disposition of these matters, be
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determined to be the sum of the portion, fraction, pro rata share, or percentage of causal
negligence, breach of contract or extra contractual claims, any joint and several liability as it applies
to Releasees, and/or any other form of fault for which Releasees are found, determined, or by way
of stipulation or agreement may be liable.
Any damages recovered or recoverable by Releasor against any other joint tortfeasor shall
be reduced in amount by the ratio, portion, pro rata share, or percentage of causal negligence,
contractual liability, any claims arising from joint activities, or in any form for fault for which
Releasees are found liable as may be determined in a future trial or other disposition of these
matters including agreement or settlement by other parties.
Releasor further agrees to have executed on Releasor's behalf a Stipulation for Dismissal
with Prejudice, or agree to a Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice at Releasees request, with each
party to bear its own attorney fees and costs, in that action filed in the District Court for the Fourth
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, captioned:

----·--·--------------.--------------SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 0408219D

Plaintiff,

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership, on its own behalf, and on behalf of
MRI Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership, and
MRI Mobile Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counterclaimant,

v.
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC, an Idaho nonprofit corporation;
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER,
Counterdefendants.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,
Third Party Plaintiff,

v.
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,
Third Party Defendants.

- - - - - - - · · - - - - - - - - - - - l - . . - - - - - - - - - - - - -..-·-Releasor further declares and represents that no promise, inducement, or agreement not
herein expressed has been made to Releasor, that this Settlement Agreement and Release of All
Claims contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto, and that the terms of this release
are contractual and not a mere recital.
If any action or proceeding is instituted to enforce or construe any provision of this
Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims, the prevailing party in such action or proceeding
shall be entitled to recover from any party or parties against whom a judgment is entered, all
reasonable attorney fees, paralegal fees and costs incurred by the prevailing party in connection
with such action or proceeding in addition to such other relief to which such prevailing party is
entitled.
Releasor has read the foregoing Release and Indemnity Agreement and fully understands it.
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This Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims may be executed in one or more

counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, but all of which together shall
constitute one and the same Instrument.

DATED this

.L.

day ot

~

, 2007.

RELEASORS:
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liabiUty
company

By:~~
~
~ri:

Title:

MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ~,, Idaho limited
partnership, d/b/a MRI Center ~f Idaho

MRI MOBILE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho
limited partnership

ISOSCAN LLC, an Idaho limited liability company

By:
Title:
DOCTORS MAGNETIC RESONANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation

By:

Title:
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS - 6
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DOCTORS MAGNETIC RESONANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation

By:
litle:

~lLn=~
~

ANDREW R. CURRAN, M.D.

DAVID J. GILES, M.D.

JOHN M. HAVLINA, M.D.

'~fv,D~
THOMAS E. HENSON, M.D.

JAMES M. PROCHASKA, M.D.
MEDNOW, INC., an Idaho corporation

By;
Title:

DOMINICAN SISTERS OF ONTARIO, INC., an
Oregon corporation

By;
Title:

WEST VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, INC., an
Idaho corporation

By:

litle:
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ANDR W R. CURRAN, M.D.

DAVID J. GILES, M.D.

JOHN M. HAVLINA, M.D.

THOMAS E. HENSON, M.D.

JAMES M. PROCHASKA, M.D.
MEDNOW, INC., an Idaho corporation

By:
Title:
DOMINICAN SISTERS OF ONTARIO, INC., an
Oregon corporation

By:
Title:
WEST VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, INC., an
Idaho corporation

By:
Title:
APPROVED:
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A.

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS· 7
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JOHN M. HAVLINA, M.D.

THOMAS E. HENSON, M.D.

JAMES M. PROCHASKA, M.D.
MEDNOW, INC., an Idaho corporation
By:
Title:
DOMINICAN SISTERS OF ONTARIO, INC., an
Oregon corporation
By:
Title:
WEST VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER. INC., an
Idaho corporation
By:
Title:
APPROVED:
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A.

By _________________________
Thomas A. Banducci
Attorneys for Releasor

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS· 7
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ANDREW R. CURRAN, M.D.

THOMAS E. HENSON, M.D.

ESM:PffoCHASKA. M.D.

~

MEDNOW, INC., an Idaho corporation

By:
Title:

DOMINICAN SISTERS OF ONTARIO, INC., an
Oregon corporation

By:
Title:
WEST VAI..L~Y MEDICAl. CENTER, INC., an

Idaho corporation

By:
Title:

APPROVED:
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A.

By
Thom~s A. Banducci
Attorneys for Releasor

SETTLEMENT AGRE~MENT AND RELEASa OF ALL CLAIMS • 7
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ANDREW R. CURRAN. M.D.

DAVID J. GILES, M.D.

JOHN M. HAVLINA, M.D.

THOMAS E. HENSON, M.D.

JAMES M. PROCHASKA, M.D.
MEDNOW, INC., an Idaho corporation

By:
Title:

I

~- q'.

"""..,~~· fh,~, 'wl

'1/W-.-<·-y

.~·2·

DOMINICAN SISTERS OF ONTARIO, INC., an
Oregon corporation

By:
Title:
WEST VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, INC., an
Idaho corporation

By:
Title:
APPROVED:
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A.

By ___________________________
Thomas A. Banducci
Attorneys for Releasor
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Jul. '· :lOUt

Y::loAM

Holy Kosary Med ~tr ~41-~tl1-/1~4

No.

1/~U

~.

'1.

ANDREW R. CURRAN, M.D.

DAVID J. GILES, M.D.

JOHN M. HAVUNA, M.D.

THOMAS E. HENSON, M.D.

JAMES M. PROCHASKA, M.D.

MEDNOW, INC.,

an Idaho corporation

By:
Title:
DOMINICAN SISTERS OF ONTARIO, INC., an
Oregon corporation

~:

1/::d-J c~~
WEST VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, INC., an
Idaho corporation

By:
Title:
APPROVED:
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A.

BY----------------------Thomas A Banducci
Attorneys for Releasor
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08:26:43 p.m.

W. Valley Med Ctr Admin.

2084553717

07·02·2007

2/2

ANDREW R. CURRAN, M.D.

DAVID J. GILES, M.D.

JOHN M. HAVLINA, M.D.

THOMAS E. HENSON, M.D.

JAMES M. PROCHASKA, M.D.
MEDNOW, INC., an Idaho corporation
By:

litle:
DOMINICAN SISTERS OF ONTARIO, INC., an
Oregon corporation

By:
Title:
WEST VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, INC., an
Idaho corporation

APPROVED:
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A.

BY-------------------------Thomas A. Banducci
Attorneys for Releasor

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS· 7
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup. com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup. com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

NO.
A.M._ _____.f_F_r~.~

}J.,Jf
'7/
,

=

MAY 0 3 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JAMIE RANDALL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. CV OC 2004-,0'08219

MOTION TO STRIKE THE SECOND
AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.

MOTION TO STRIKE THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JACK S. GJORDING AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT- 1
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") move the Court to strike the second Affidavit of JackS.
Gjording, filed by Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care ("Saint Alphonsus") on May 2, 2011 (the
"Second Affidavit"). This Motion is brought pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 7(b)(3), Idaho R. Civ.
P. 56(c), and Idaho R. Evid. 801(c). This Affidavit must be struck in its entirety because it is
untimely. Further, statements attributed to a third party in an attempt to authenticate the
settlement agreement must be struck as inadmissible hearsay. A brief summary of the facts and
legal authority follow below.

BACKGROUND
The Second Affidavit was submitted on May 2, 2011, contemporaneously with Saint
Alphonsus's Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on its Second Affirmative
Defense. Saint Alphonsus's initial Motion, briefing, and a first affidavit in support were filed on
April11, 2011. The matter is set for hearing on May 18, 2011. The primary argument of this
Motion was that because of an alleged settlement agreement entered into between MRIA and
certain former third party defendants 1, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a reduction of any damages
by the amount of 50 percent. The First Affidavit that Saint Alphonsus filed contemporaneously
with its Motion simply stated that Mr. Gjording was attaching as an exhibit "a copy of the
agreement between MRIA and former third-party defendants GSR, ICR, and IMI setting MRIA's
claims against these entities in the present matter." (Affidavit of JackS. Gjording, filed April11,
2011, ~ 5 and Ex. D (the "First Affidavit").) In MRIA's response to this Motion, MRIA noted
that the supposed settlement agreement submitted by Saint Alphonsus was inadmissible because

1

These third party defendants were Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC ("IMI"), Gem State
Radiology, LLP ("GSR"), and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP ("ICR").
MOTION TO STRIKE THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JACK S. GJORDING AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT- 2
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it was unsigned and unauthenticated. (MRIA's Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Summary Judgment on its Second Affirmative Defense, filed April25, 2011, at p. 6-7.)
In response, contemporaneously with its Reply, Saint Alphonsus has submitted a new
Affidavit with new evidence. In this Second Affidavit, Mr. Gjording describes how he received
the unsigned version of the "final" settlement agreement from counsel for former third-party
defendants GSR, ICR, and IMI, which was the version of the settlement agreement he submitted
with his First Affidavit. (Affidavit of JackS. Gjording, filed May 2, 2011, ~ 2 and Ex. A.)
Mr. Gjording also attaches an email that he received from counsel for former third-party
defendants, in which counsel explains that an executed version of the agreement was being
forwarded. (/d.,

at~

3 and Ex. B.) Mr. Gjording then attaches a copy of this purported executed

settlement agreement allegedly received from counsel for former third-party defendants, which is
purportedly signed by some, although not all, of the parties, and is not notarized. (/d.

at~

4 and

Ex. C.)
The Second Affidavit must be struck in its entirely because it is untimely. Further,
statements and emails attributed to counsel for former third party defendants, which Saint
Alphonsus presents in an attempt to authenticate the various versions of the settlement agreement
presented in Mr. Gjording's two affidavits, must be struck as inadmissible hearsay.

ARGUMENT
A.

The Second Affidavit is Untimely
Saint Alphonsus filed the Second Affidavit of Mr. Gjording contemporaneously with its

Reply to its Motion for Summary Judgment. This is an untimely filing, and an attempt to
introduce new evidence under circumstances where MRIA has no opportunity to respond to it.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3) provides that when a motion is "supported by affidavit(s),

MOTION TO STRIKE THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JACK S. GJORDING AND
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the affidavit(s) shall be served with the motion." /d. (emphasis added.) Rule 56(c) likewise
provides that, specific to motions for summary judgment, "[t]he motion, affidavits and
supporting brief shall be served at least twenty eight (28) days before the time fixed for the
hearing." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added.) The purpose ofthis rule is to give the
opposing party an adequate and fair opportunity to support its case. Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v.
Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1, 5, 981 P.2d 236, 240 (1999). Affidavits submitted

with a reply, after the opposing party's opportunity to respond, do not comport with this rule, and
in fact constitute trial by ambush. As the Court in Sun Valley Potatoes noted when an affidavit
in support of a motion for summary judgment was untimely filed:
The problem here is that the ... affidavit was not a supplement to the earlier
factual showing made in support of its motion, but rather presented new and
different factual information.... Moreover, while the ... affidavit was also filed
to oppose information submitted by [the opposing party], the information
contained in [the] affidavit was clearly known and available to [the party] prior to
filing its motion and the record reflects no reason why the affidavit could not have
been timely filed.
/d. at 6, 981 P .2d at 241. Such is the case here. Saint Alphonsus has presented an affidavit with

new and different factual information, including an entirely different copy of the purported
settlement agreement upon which it bases its entire Motion. The information contained in the
affidavit was known and available to Saint Alphonsus at the time it filed its Motion, and there is
no reason why an affidavit with such information could not have been timely filed. As such, the
Court should not allow or consider this untimely evidence.

B.

The Affidavit and Exhibits Contain Inadmissible Hearsay, and thus do not
Authenticate the Alleged Settlement Agreements
Even if the Court is inclined to consider the untimely Second Affidavit, the Affidavit

does not correct the fact that neither version of the purported settlement agreement is
authenticated. As the Court well knows, an affidavit submitted in support of a motion for
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summary judgment must be made with personal knowledge and set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e). Under Idaho Rule ofEvidence 901,
authentication is a prerequisite to the admission of evidence. Herman v. Herman, 136 Idaho 781,
785, 41 P.3d 209, 213 (2002). In its briefing responsive to Mr. Gjording's First Affidavit, MRIA
noted that as a stranger to the settlement agreement, Mr. Gjording was not qualified to
authenticate it, particularly the unsigned version presented in Mr. Gjording's First Affidavit. 2
(MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on Second Affirmative Defense, filed
April25, 2011, at p. 6).
In an apparent response to this argument, Saint Alphonsus now attempts to authenticate
both the unsigned version of the purported settlement agreement attached to Mr. Gjording's First
Affidavit, and the entirely new partially executed and un-notarized version attached to the
Second Affidavit. In order to properly authenticate these documents, Saint Alphonsus should
have submitted an affidavit from a witness with personal knowledge that the document is what
Saint Alphonsus claims it to be, Idaho R. Evid. 901(a)(2), such as the person who drafted the
alleged settlement agreement and/or person who received MRIA's alleged signatures. 3 Saint
Alphonsus did not do so, but simply attached two emails purportedly received from counsel for

2

In its reply brief, Saint Alphonsus accuses MRIA of playing "cat and mouse" by requiring Saint
Alphonsus to properly authenticate this document. (Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in
Suppport of its Motion for Summary Judgment on its Second Affirmative Defense, filed May 2,
2011, at p. 4) Saint Alphonsus also accuses MRIA of making a "sham" argument, contending
that MRIA knows full well the contents of this agreement and pointing to the (newly submitted)
version of the document that purportedly contains the signature of MRIA and counsel for MRIA.
Saint Alphonsus apparently expects the Court to take its word that the signatures on this
unnotarized document are those of counsel and MRIA. Saint Alphonsus also apparently expects
MRIA to simply stipulate to its authenticity. However, it is not MRIA's responsibility to provide
admissible evidence in support of Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment. MRIA is
not playing "cat and mouse" by requiring Saint Alphonsus to provide an admissible, properly
authenticated document, as the Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence require.
3
And, as discussed above, it should have submitted this affidavit with its initial motion.
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former third party defendants, in which counsel for the former third party defendants allegedly
represented that final or signed copies of the settlement agreement were attached. However,
these emails are out-of-court statements made by third parties, offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted-i.e., that the attached settlement agreement is authentic and final. As this is
hearsay, Idaho R. Evid. 801(c), such statements are inadmissible. 4 The Court must therefore
strike Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, and Exhibits A and B of Mr. Gjording's Second Affidavit. As
such, even if the Court were inclined to consider this untimely Second Affidavit, Saint
Alphonsus's attempt to authenticate both versions of the settlement agreement fails for the same
reasons stated in MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on Second Affirmative
Defense, filed April 25, 2011, at p. 6-7.
CONCLUSION

As the Second Affidavit is untimely, it should be struck it its entirety. Moreover, the
statements by third parties which Saint Alphonsus attempts to use to authenticate the various
versions of the settlement agreement are hearsay, and must also be struck.
DATED this .3_ day of May 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

6ara L. Per
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

4

Further, no hearsay exception applies. For example, this is not a statement of a party
opponent as described in Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2) because the statements of the third
party attorneys are not the statements of MRIA, against whom these statements are being
offered. Nor does any other hearsay exception outlined in Rule 803 or 804 apply.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .3_ day of May 2011, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
~acsimile

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
,;&Facsimile
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR
RECUSAL BY THE COURT BASED
ON RELATIONSHIP WITH DR.
HENSON

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

During the April22, 2011 hearing on Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment
on MRIA' s "breach of contract" theory of wrongful dissociation, the Court informed Saint
Alphonsus of its prior relationship with Dr. Thomas Henson, one of the five physicians who
formed Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc. ("DMR"), the controlling member of the defendant
and counterclaimant MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"). 1 Specifically, the Court noted that
Dr. Henson had been the Court's personal neurologist for fifteen years, until Dr. Henson's
retirement from active practice approximately fifteen years ago. Apr. 22, 2011 Hr'g Tr. at 21-22
(Ex. A). The Court also stated that it had recognized this coincidence some time ago, but had
then believed that Dr. Henson's involvement would not interfere with the Court's ability to hear
this case fairly. !d.

1

Saint Alphonsus did not know previously of this relationship, either from any interested
party in this case or from any other source.
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Saint Alphonsus appreciates the Court's time and efforts in presiding over this complex
matter, and also the Court's view that it may continue despite Dr. Henson's involvement in this
case. However, after careful consideration of the issue, Saint Alphonsus is bringing this motion
asking the Court to recuse itself from further participation in this case. The proceedings before
this Court to date have not yet provided to the Court all the information relevant to its
consideration of the recusal issue. Specifically, the Court may not know the prominent role Dr.
Henson has in this matter, the full extent of Dr. Henson's personal involvement in the events at
issue, or his financial stake in this case. Although Dr. Henson was not called as a witness at the
prior trial, he attended the entire trial. Because of his important personal role in the disputed
events, upon retrial Saint Alphonsus expects to call Dr. Henson for live testimony, where his
personal credibility, bias, and financial stake in the outcome will be sharply in issue. According
to MRIA's expert reports served May 2, 2011, MRIA now claims total damages of$70 million,
of which Dr. Henson's ownership interest would give him a recovery of over $5 million.
As the Court is aware, MRIA asserts that Saint Alphonsus and Intermountain Medical
Imaging ("IMI"), a competing imaging center, were engaged in a conspiracy to destroy MRIA's
business, a claim which Saint Alphonsus believes is without factual basis. In fact, Gem State
Radiology ("GSR")-the radiologists who read scans for both Saint Alphonsus's hospital
patients and MRI Center's non-hospital outpatients-decided to create the multi-modality
imaging center that would become IMI, and purchased the land before telling Saint Alphonsus
about it. See, e.g., Trial Exs. 516, 517, 522,4055. Remarkably, a moving force behind this plan

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR RECUSAL BY THE COURT BASED ON
RELATIONSHIP WITH DR. HENSON - 3

001226

was Dr. David Giles, who was at the time a member ofGSR as well as Dr. Henson's partner in
DMR. See, e.g., Trial Ex. 516 p. 1, Trial Ex. 517 p. 2.
In October 1998, representatives of MRIA, GSR, and Saint Alphonsus met and agreed on
a plan to create a single common enterprise in which all would participate. Specifically, the
parties agreed that Saint Alphonsus would negotiate with GSR to join its non-MRI imaging
modality business, and MRIA would do the same with respect to GSR's planned MRI modality
business. But MRIA and GSR could not reach agreement, due to the intransigence ofDMRDr. Henson and his four physician partners-which controls MRIA? DMR refused to allow
GSR a fair share of the profits and control of the new center that GSR had proposed. Dr. Henson
had a unique interest in the negotiations because, in view of his retirement, he wished to sell his
share in DMR (worth 9% ofthe profits ofMRIA), which he offered to GSR to be split among
over a dozen radiologists. Dr. Henson's four DMR partners would continue to share 36% of the
profits of MRIA. At the same time, DMR was asking for MRIA-which it controlled-to have
full ownership and control ofGSR's new MRI magnet, and this demand was viewed as
unreasonable and unacceptable to GSR. See Trial Ex. 4101.
After this impasse, Saint Alphonsus, acting in good faith and without a legal duty to do
so, labored for several more years to reconcile the unreasonable demands of the DMR physicians
with the interests of the GSR radiologists, by identifying a range of possible business

2

Per the MRIA partnership agreement, in addition to their 45% financial interest, the five
DMR physicians controlled five of the nine MRIA votes, when only five votes were needed for
most partnership activities. When a fifth hospital vote was later added, DMR was given the tiebreaking vote in case of a 5-5 deadlock. (Trial Ex. 4023 § 5.1.2; Trial Ex. 4032 § 6.2-6.3).)
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combinations and transactions. Again, Dr. Henson's role in these matters was prominent and
unique, given his intense interest in monetizing his investment share and maximizing his
personal return. For example, one witness has testified that DMR had sought $6 million in cash
as part of one possible transaction, but when it was reported that such a deal might come to
fruition, Dr. Henson upped the ante by stating that "if they [Saint Alphonsus] will pay that, they
will pay more." Trial Ex. 96; Trial Tr. at 4024.
At the time that this Court alerted the parties to its prior doctor-patient relationship with
Dr. Henson, it may well have presumed that Dr. Henson was a passive investor akin to a
corporate shareholder, simply one of many who have a modest financial stake and no substantial
part in the control of the enterprise. But the facts here are very far from that situation and,
without further information from the parties, the Court certainly had no way to know of
Dr. Henson's active participation in the events in issue, or the very substantial extent of his
claimed financial stake and the importance of these issues in the upcoming trial.
By this motion, Saint Alphonsus does not question the Court's prior judgment that it
could be impartial in this case, for that is not the test. Idaho law and judicial canons provide that,
apart from any question of actual bias, "[a] judge shall disqualify himself ... in a proceeding in
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 3E(l) & commentary. The Idaho Supreme Court has found "instructive" former Chief
Justice of the United States William Rehnquist's interpretation of the similar federal rule: what
is relevant "is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance," and the "inquiry is an
objective one, made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR RECUSAL BY THE COURT BASED ON
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surrounding facts and circumstances." Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 114,
233 P.3d 38,45 (2009) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)
(statement ofRehnquist, C.J.)).
From this perspective, a reasonable, objective observer could well have serious questions
about the appearance created by a judge presiding over a trial in which a physician specialist who
treated the judge for fifteen years is an intensely engaged, partisan litigant. Further, it is quite
unfair for a judge to be asked to play such a role. The judge in this case must preside over a
contentious proceeding in which Dr. Henson will seek to collect millions of dollars from Saint
Alphonsus, and Saint Alphonsus will challenge Dr. Henson's personal credibility as clouded by
myopic self-interest, at the expense of patient care and fairness to all concerned, as demonstrated
by his own conduct and statements. It would be reasonable for anyone learning of Dr. Henson's
fifteen-year relationship with the Court to assume that the Court and Dr. Henson had a close
physician-patient relationship and mutual respect growing out of the relationship. These facts
are compelling for a recusal to avoid an appearance of possible bias.
CONCLUSION
In light of the role that Dr. Henson has played in the controversy underlying this case,
and the nature of his likely participation in the trial-none of which the Court has had reason
previously to anticipate-the Court should exercise its sound discretion to recuse itself from
further participation in this case, to avoid any reasonable appearance of bias arising from fifteen
years of an ongoing physician-patient relationship with Dr. Henson.
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DATED this 5th day of May, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of May, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

k
D
D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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other hospitals,

2

physicians,

3

order to have the community appeal,

4

support that was needed here.

5

a lot of questions about MRI technology.

6

bring in a practicing group of

neuroradiologists and neurologists in
community

Because there were

So the parties gather together and they

7

enter into an agreement.

8

by Saint Alphonsus's attorneys.

9

actually an affidavit of Thomas Henson that we

10

The agreement is drafted
And there is

supplied in support of our motion.
THE COURT:

11
12

Dr. Henson's name.

13

the record,

14

Counsel,

I'm so glad you raised

I have to make a disclosure on

and I've almost forgotten to.
Dr.

Henson was my treating neurologist

15

for a period of about 15 years.

16

longer.

17

that that will not in any way affect any decision

18

that I enter into in this case because he hasn't

19

been my treating neurologist for at least the last

20

15 because he has been retired that long.

21

Maybe even

I made a determination in my own mind

However,

when I started going through

22

the original pleadings in the matter,

23

Dr.

24

make that disclosure that he had been my treating

25

neurologist at one time,

Henson's name.

And I

EXHIBIT.

I noted

felt it was important to

a very long time ago,

A

to
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1

all the parties for whatever they chose to do with

2

it.
But I

3

can assure you that this Court's

4

decision legally with regard to this case is

5

certainly not going to be influenced by the fact

6

that Dr.

7

15 years ago.

8

aware of that.

Henson was my treating neurologist some

MR.

9

But I wanted the parties to be

BANDUCCI:

Thank you,

Your Honor.

That

10

affidavit of Mister -- of Dr.

11

just said.

12

the hospitals in the partnership and that's why

13

these four restrictions were put in.

14

Henson says what I

And that is it was critical to keep

Now,

what happens?

Saint Alphonsus's

15

attorneys draft this agreement.

And they use

16

"if";

not only if,

Some,

17

know,

22 years later that language is determined

18

to be ambiguous.

19

not express.

20

because it is not express,

21

violation of the intent of the parties with no

22

consequence.

23

they use if.

I don't

And because it's ambiguous,

it's

And what Saint Al's is now saying is

THE COURT:

Well,

they can withdraw in

you can't -- and I

just

24

want to give you an opportunity to address this.

25

You can't accuse Saint Al's attorneys of putting
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

MAY 0 6 2011

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

OHIW'IOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
lriWMOATMAN

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, INC., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

.....

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219
ORDERRE: SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON CONTRACT THEORY OF
WRONGFUL WITHDRAWAL

-------------------------- )
Presently before the Court is Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment against
the MRI Associates. Hearing was held on April 22, 2011, and the matter was taken under
advisement as of noon that day. The Court now issues the following opinion.

BACKGROUND
In 1985, Saint Alphonsus and several other parties formed a partnership called MRI

Associates (MRIA) for the purpose of acquiring and operating magnetic resonance imaging
devices. In 2004, St. Alphonsus withdrew from MRIA and brought suit for the share of the
partnership to which it was entitled under Idaho Code Section 53-3-701. MRIA counterclaimed
against St. Alphonsus on several theories, including wrongful dissociation.
The trial court held on summary judgment that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully
dissociated as a matter of law. At trial, the court instructed the jury that it had determined that
Saint Alphonsus had dissociated wrongfully and counsel argued to the jury that damage had
resulted from that dissociation. On October 21, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the trial
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court's decision that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was wrongful and remanded the case for
further proceedings.
On remand, this Court granted MRIA leave to amend its counterclaim, and MRIA filed
its Third Amended Counterclaim on March 22, 2010. The Court subsequently struck material
from MRIA's amended counterclaim that the Court found to be inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's decision. The Court later held, acting on a motion for summary judgment, that St.
Alphonsus' s dissociation, as a matter of law, was not wrongful. The Court then held a hearing to
set the trial schedule and to decide whether discovery should be reopened. At hearing, counsel
for MRIA indicated that it would be pursuing a common law contract theory of wrongful
withdrawal at trial. Saint Alphonsus then filed this motion for summary judgment seeking to
preclude MRIA from asserting a contract theory of wrongful withdrawal at trial.
DISCUSSION

Summary judgment may be entered when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c); see also
Kelso v. Lance, 134 Idaho 373, 375, 3 P.3d 51, 53 (2000). In a summary judgment context, the
moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. BMC
West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 893, 174 P.3d 399, 402 (2007). However, the nonmoving party "cannot rest on mere speculation because a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough
to create a genuine issue of fact." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991).
Furthermore, the non-moving party may not rest on bare allegations or denials; it must set forth
specific facts that show a genuine issue. Vebillis v. Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335,
689 P.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1984). However, the disputed facts are construed liberally in favor of the
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non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are drawn in favor of the
non-moving party. BMC West, 144 Idaho at 893, 174 P.3d at 402.
Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA is precluded from advancing a contract theory of
wrongful withdrawal because it failed to adequately plead the theory. It also argues that MRIA's
contract theory of wrongful withdrawal is precluded by the Supreme Court's decision and that
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUP A) displaced the common law of contract as to
withdrawal from partnerships.
I. Adequacy of Pleading

The first issue is whether MRIA has properly pled its contract theory of wrongful
withdrawal. Saint Alphonsus argues in a footnote, without substantial discussion, that MRIA has
not adequately pled its contract theory of wrongful withdrawal. The Court is not persuaded by
Saint Alphonsus's argument. A complaint must merely state facts and theories sufficient to put
the opposing party on notice of what the claims against it are. Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148
Idaho 802, 810, 229 P.3d 1164, 1172. The liberal notice pleading standard is designed to prevent
the dismissal of otherwise valid claims due to technical defects. /d. Thus, so long as a pleading
puts a party on notice ofthe claim against it, the pleading is sufficient.
Here, MRIA' s Third Amended Counterclaim is adequate to put Saint Alphonsus on
notice that it would be defending a breach of contract claim based on its withdrawal. Its first
claim for relief is labeled "Breach of Contract and Wrongful Dissociation." Within that claim for
relief, MRIA states that Saint Alphonsus's "withdrawal and competition with MRIA ... has
caused damages to MRIA . . . ." The Third Amended Counterclaim also alleges that Saint
Alphonsus "withd[rew] in breach of the conditions for withdrawal stated in ... the partnership
agreement." The Court finds that these statements are sufficient to put Saint Alphonsus on notice
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that it would be defending a breach of contract claim for its withdrawal. Consequently, the
contract theory of wrongful withdrawal was adequately pled.
II. Validity of Theories of Wrongful Withdrawal
In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court and this Court have ruled as a matter of law that

Saint Alphonsus did not wrongfully dissociate within the meaning of the RUP A. The Supreme
Court ruled that Saint Alphonsus did not dissociate in breach of an express term of the
partnership agreement because the term of the partnership agreement governing withdrawal in
this case was ambiguous, and therefore not express. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v.

MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, _ , 224 P.3d 1068, 1077-78 (2009).

This Court

addressed the other potential theory of wrongful dissociation in its November 16, 2010 grant of
summary judgment, determining that the partnership was not for a definite term as a matter of
law. Although Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from MRIA has been adjudicated as not wrongful
as a matter of law, MRIA argues that Saint Alphonsus is potentially liable for its withdrawal
based on common law contract theories.
The Court is essentially being called upon to decide whether the RUP A displaced the
common law as to the act of dissociating from a partnership. When examining whether a statute
displaces the common law, courts are to "liberally construe[ statutes] with a view to effect their
objects and to promote justice." I.C. § 73-102(1). Furthermore, "the rule ... that statutes in
derogation [of the common law] are to be strictly construed has no application . . . ." !d.
However, courts do not presume that a statute changes the common law unless it appears that the
legislature intended to change the common law. Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622, 630, 269 P.
993, 995-96 (1928). Furthermore, when interpreting a statute, courts should not adopt an
interpretation that will render provisions of the statute surplusage. Schweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho
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568, 572, 798 P.2d 27, 31 (1990). Thus the Court must look to whether the legislature intended
to displace the common law and whether continued adherence to an asserted doctrine of the
common law would tend to hinder or totally frustrate the objectives of the statute as enacted by
the Idaho Legislature.
MRIA argues that the common law rules applying to withdrawal of a partner from a
partnership have not been displaced because the applicable section of the RUP A does not
explicitly state that it replaces the common law. However, the Court believes that the legislature
intended to displace the common law of contracts it might otherwise apply in cases involving the
new concept of dissociation from partnerships provided for in the RUPA. The RUPA provides
that "[ u]nless displaced by particular provisions of [the RUPA], the principles of law and equity
supplement this act." I.C. § 53-3-104(a). That statement clearly indicates that parts of the RUPA
are intended to displace the common law. Furthermore, this Court has found no provision in the
RUPA containing language explicitly stating that it is displacing the common law. In fact, the
Court has only found language apparently designed to preserve the common law. See I.C. § 533-404 cmt. 2, cmt. 3 (referencing several Restatements). Because the RUPA indicates that some
of its provisions will displace the common law yet does not use explicit language to that effect in
any particular section, the Court must liberally construe the statute to displace the common law
where it is duplicative of, or conflicts with, the common law. Any other interpretation would
render the language of Section 104(a) surplusage.
The RUPA displaces the common law of contracts as applied to withdrawal from
partnerships with the totally new concept of dissociation. The RUP A provides that "a partner has
the power to dissociate at any time, rightfully or wrongfully .... " I.C. § 53-3-602(a). The
statute goes on to define dissociations as "wrongful" where the dissociation "is in breach of an
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express provision of the partnership agreement." I. C. § 53-3-602(b )(1 ). Furthermore, the statute
implies that if a partner's dissociation does not fit within the statutory definition of "wrongful,"
the partner has the right to dissociate. See I.C. § 53-3-602 cmt. 1 {"The phrase 'rightfully or
wrongfully' reflects the distinction between a partner's power to withdraw in contravention of
the partnership agreement and a partner's right to do so."). The RUPA defines by exclusion
"rightful" withdrawal, and it specifically lays out the consequences for a partner's wrongful
dissociation, including liability "to the partnership and to the other partners for damages caused
by the dissociation." I.C. § 53-3-602(c). Furthermore, the RUPA does not clearly define the
forms of damages available for wrongful dissociation, clearly relying on the damages as
prescribed by the common law. /d.; see also I.C. § 73-116. Because wrongful dissociation under
the RUP A and breach of contract by wrongfully withdrawing under the common law both
provide for the same damages as prescribed by the common law, and because the RUP A provides
that partners have the right to dissociate where the dissociation is not wrongful, it is apparent that
the RUP A was intended to replace the law of contract as applied to partnership dissociation.
Consequently, there is no liability simply for the act of dissociating from a partnership except as
provided for in the RUP A; the common law concepts of liability for the simple act of
withdrawing from a partnership no longer exist.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, St. Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment is hereby
GRANTED. St. Alphonsus's simple act of leaving the partnership, standing alone, cannot form

a basis for liability for either wrongful withdrawal or wrongful dissociation. This opinion does
not address any other bases of liability.
At argument, the parties agreed that regardless of which party prevailed, a Rule 54(b)
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certification being granted for the non-prevailing party would be appropriate. The Court agrees
with the parties and, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court will grant a Rule 54(b)
certification on this issue.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this

b /f. day of May 2011.

Dis ·ct Judge
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE

With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment order, it is hereby
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that there is
no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the Court has and does hereby
direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue
and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.
DATED this £dayofMay2011.

D trict Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this tf;ay of May 2011, I mailed (served) a true and correct
copy of the within instrument to:
JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
PO BOX 2837
BOISE, ID 83701
DONALDAYER
JONES DAY
51 LOUSIANA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODWARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST. STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court
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By
Deputy Court Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MAY 06 2011

at=tiSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DIANe OATMAN

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

Oepuly

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219

)
)

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, INC., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Defendant.

--------------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)

JUDGMENT

)

For the reasons set forth in this Court's order issued on May 6, 2011, partial summary
judgment is issued in favor of Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care on the issue of whether a cause
of action for wrongful withdrawal exists under the common law of contract. Consequently, MRI
Associates is precluded from arguing or seeking damages based on that theory.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment, it is hereby CERTIFIED, in
accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that there is no just reason
for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the Court has and does hereby direct that the
above judgment shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be
taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.
DATED this

6_. day ofMay 2011.

~
~····
WETHELL
Dis rict Judge
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WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODWARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST. STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court
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Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
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Christian G. Vergonis
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
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OF JACKS. GJORDING

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

With its motion to strike, MRIA has doubled down on its frivolous effort to prevent the
Court from taking notice of the terms ofMRIA's settlement with the third-party defendants in
this case. MRIA is playing games and wasting the Court's time and the parties' money. Despite
several opportunities to do so, MRIA has not suggested, let alone submitted evidence showing,
that the two identically worded versions of the settlement agreement submitted by Saint
Alphonsus are anything other than what they purport to be: an accurate reflection of the terms of
the parties' settlement, as signed by MRIA and Mr. Banducci himself.
MRIA attempts to obscure this point by citing to the rules concerning authentication and
hearsay, but these "evidentiary" objections are misplaced because the rules of evidence do not
apply here. The content of the settlement agreement is not a disputed fact for the jury to resolve;
it is a fact preliminary to a question of law for this Court to decide, i.e., whether the settlement
entitles Saint Alphonsus to a reduction in damages. "In taking evidence for the purpose of
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[making a legal determination], the court is not trying an issue in the case, but is seeking for
information as the basis of its order, and is not bound by the rules of evidence applicable to
contesting litigants." Smiley v. Smiley, 46 Idaho 588,269 P. 589, 590 (1928); cf I.R.E. 104
(court "not bound by the rules of evidence" when addressing certain "[p]reliminary questions").
Indeed, since the terms of the settlement are "capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned," the Court may take judicial
notice ofthem. I.R.E. 201(b); see also Hernandez ex rei. Gonzalez v. Tapia, No. 10-cv-4124,
2010 WL 5232942, at *4 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2010) (citing analogous federal rule and
numerous cases in support of power to "take[] judicial notice of the text of [a] release agreement
... submitted as an exhibit to [a] motion"). 1
Because MRIA does not contest the terms of the settlement, that should be the end of the
matter. But if MRIA persists in this gamesmanship, then, at the hearing on Saint Alphonsus' s
motion, the Court should just ask Mr. Banducci if this agreement is the one that he and his clients
executed.

1

MRIA's complaints about the timeliness of the supplemental affidavit are misplaced for
the same reasons. MRIA's timeliness argument is also rebutted by the very case MRIA cites in
support. That case takes issue only with an affidavit that "was not a supplement to the earlier
factual showing made in support of the motion, but rather presented new and different factual
information." Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1,6, 981 P.2d
236, 241 (1999). Here, the second affidavit and its attachments plainly "supplement" the first by
providing information that does nothing more than confirm the accuracy of the original
submission.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 6th day of May, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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A.M.

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup. com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup. com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
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Plaintiff,
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Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
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Counter-defendant.

J

~

OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOUON FOR RECUSAL- 1

ORIGINAL
001247

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") Oppose Saint Alphonsus's Motion· for Recusal ofthe
Court.
INTRODUCTION
At the hearing conducted on April22, 2011, the Court informed the parties that he had
previously been treated by Dr. Thomas Henson, one of the five physicians who formed Doctors
Magnetic Resonance, Inc. ("DMR"), which is one the partners ofMRI Associates, LLP. (Tr.,
April22, 2011, p. 1:11-2:8. 1) The Court noted that Dr. Henson had been the Court's neurologist
for a period of fifteen years, but that relationship had ended fifteen years ago. 2 (Id. at p. 14-20).
The Court stated that Dr. Henson's involvement would not interfere with the Court's ability to
hear the case fairly. (!d.) At that time, Saint Alphonsus had no objection. (Id.)
Now, with just four months until the trial of this matter is scheduled to commence, Saint
Alphonsus seeks for the Court to recuse itself. This Court was assigned to this case over sixteen
months ago, on January 28, 2010, after Saint Alphonsus exercised a not-for-cause recusal of
Judge McLaughlin. (Notice of Reassignment, Jan. 28, 2010). The Court has spent significant
time becoming familiar with this case, and has already ruled upon many critical motions. (See,
e.g, Order Re: Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on Contract Theory of
Wrongful Withdrawal, filed May 6, 2011; Memorandum Decisions and Order on Plaintiffs
Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motions for Summary Judgment, filed Nov. 16,
2010; Order Reopening Discovery and Setting Schedule, filed Feb. 15, 2011.) Other motions,
including those brought by Saint Alphonsus, have already been submitted to the Court and await
The relevant portion ofthis transcript is attached to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Recusal as Ex. A. The
pages are not numbered, and so they are referred to sequentially.
2

In fact, Dr. Henson retired on August 5, 1994, almost seventeen years ago. (Affidavit of Counsel in
Opposition to Motion to Recuse, Ex. A.)
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hearing. Notably, Saint Alphonsus does not assert that the Court is burdened by any actual bias
that would prejudice Saint Alphonsus, but simply asserts that there is a possibility that the
Court's impartiality might be questioned by outside parties. (Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Recusal, filed May 5, 2011, at p. 5.) At this late stage, this is insufficient.
The Court should recognize this Motion for what it really is. It is extremely unlikely that
another court will have availability for a six week trial within the next four months, much less be
able to become sufficiently apprised of the facts and legal issues of this very large and
complicated case in that short amount of time. Thus, if the Court recuses itself, there will almost
certainly be a significant delay in the trial of this matter. Saint Alphonsus knows this .. Saint
Alphonsus also knows that, as has been stated on the record in open court, MRIA is on the verge
of financial ruin. 3 If Saint Alphonsus can delay the trial of this matter, MRIA may become
unable to prosecute this case, enabling Saint Alphonsus to simply walk away from its liability or
put unfair pressure on MRIA to settle for a significantly reduced sum. Notably, as Saint
Alphonsus does not contend that the Court is actually biased, Saint Alphonsus cannot and does
not assert that it would suffer any prejudice if the Court declines to recuse itself. But a
significant delay in the trial of this matter, which would almost certainly occur if this Motion is
granted, could destroy MRIA. As the Court knows, under Canon 3(B)(8), it has a responsibility
to ensure that all matters are disposed of promptly, efficiently, and fairly. The Court should not
permit Saint Alphonsus to manipulate the Canons of Judicial Ethics to do such injustice,
particularly because the Court's impartiality in this matter cannot be reasonably questioned.

Indeed, MRIA is in such dire straits because ofbecause of the actions that Saint Alphonsus took, which are
the basis of this lawsuit.
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ARGUMENT
A.

Saint Alphonsus is Attempting to Exercise a Second Disqualification Without Cause
First, Saint Alphonsus has not established the necessary elements for a "for cause"

disqualification under the Rules of Civil Procedure. Notably, Saint Alphonsus had already
exercised its right to disqualify Judge McLaughlin without cause. (Motion to Disqualify Judge
Without Cause, filed Jan. 15, 2010.) However, as Saint Alphonsus does not assert that this Court
is actually biased or otherwise subject to disqualification under Idaho R. Civ. P. 40(d)(2), Saint
Alphonsus is essentially seeking to exercise a second "without cause" disqualification in
violation ofldaho R. Civ. P. 40(d)(l). It should not be permitted to do so.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40( d)(2)(A) outlines the procedure for disqualification for
cause. Saint Alphonsus does not even cite this rule, much less attempt to comply with it. The
Rule provides:
(A)

Grounds. Any party to an action may disqualify a judge or magistrate for
cause from presiding in any action upon any of the following grounds:
1.

That the judge or magistrate is a party, or is interested, in the
action or proceeding.

2.

That the judge or magistrate is related to either party by
consanguinity or affinity within the third degree, computed
according to the rules oflaw.

3.

That the judge or magistrate has been attorney or counsel for any
party in the action or proceeding.

4.

That the judge or magistrate is biased or prejudiced for or against
any party or the case in the action.
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!d. 4 The Court of Appeals has explained that when the bias or prejudice of a Court is asserted as
grounds for disqualification, "it must be 'so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair
judgment,"' and that "'unless there is a demonstration of "pervasive bias" derived either from an
extrajudicial source or facts and events occurring at trial, there is no basis for judicial recusal. "'

In re Doe,--- P.3d ----, 2011 WL 768401 (Ct. App. March 3, 2011) citing Bach v. Bagley, 148
Idaho 784, 229 P.3d 1146 (2010). As Saint Alphonsus does not even contend that the Court is
actually biased or prejudiced from its relationship with Dr. Henson more than fifteen years ago,
Saint Alphonsus cannot establish the grounds for disqualification of the Court for cause. Rather,
it is seeking to exercise a second "without cause" disqualification for the purpose of delaying the
trial of this matter and thereby gaining an advantage over MRIA. As Saint Alphonsus has not
established any basis for a "for cause" disqualification, the Court may simply deny this Motion.

B.

The Court's Impartiality Cannot Reasonably Be Questioned
Of far more importance, the Court's impartiality in this matter cannot reasonably be

questioned. As Saint Alphonsus has no grounds for recusal of the Court under the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, it is apparently asking the Court to recuse itself sua sponte under the Canons
of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3(E)(l) of the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a]
judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might

4

The Rule also continues that:
Any such disqualification for cause shall be made by a motion to disqualify accompanied by an affidavit of
the party or the party's attorney stating distinctly the grounds upon which disqualification is based and the
facts relied upon in support of the motion.... The presiding judge or magistrate sought to be disqualified
shall grant or deny the motion for disqualification upon notice and hearing in the manner prescribed by
these rules for motions.

40( d)(2)(B). Saint Alphonsus had not submitted an affidavit, as required by the Rule. Furthermore, it did not even
seek a hearing in the matter, although MRIA has now done so.
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reasonably be questioned" (emphasis added). 5 Whether it is necessary for a judicial officer to _
disqualify himself in a given case is left to the sound discretion of the judicial officer himself.
Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 206, 731 P.2d 192, 201 (1986). Under the Canon, it is not the

reality of bias or prejudice, but its appearance. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548, 114
S.Ct. 1147 [1154] 127 L.Ed.2d 474 [486] (1994). However, "[t]his inquiry is an objective one,
_made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts
and circumstances." Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302, 121 S.Ct. 25, 26
(2000); (emphasis added); Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 114, 233 P.3d 39,
45 (2009).
Under the facts and circumstances that exist here, the Court's impartiality cannot
reasonably be questioned. In fact, the Court, which was well aware of the facts and the
circumstances about its long-past relationship with Dr. Henson, had already engaged in the
necessary analysis. At the time when the Court disclosed its past relationship with Dr. Henson to
the parties, the Court had already carefully considered this relationship and the Court's ethical
duties, and determined both that it would not labor under any actual bias, and that its impartiality
could not reasonably be questioned. The Court's reasoned analysis was absolutely correct.
The Court's previous determination that it did not need to recuse itself is supported by the
Idaho case State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 (1998). In that case, a criminal defendant
asserted that the presiding judge should have recused himselfbecause the judge attended church
with and personally knew the investigating police officer, the victim, and the victim's family. 6

The rule provides several illustrative circumstance, such as when the judge is burdened by a personal bias
or prejudice, knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, circumstances in which the judge was an attorney or witness,
an economic interest in the subject matter, a family member who is a party or lawyer in the proceeding, an interest
that could be affected by the proceeding, or the judge is likely to be a material witness. None of these
circumstances exist in the present case.
6
The judge also went to church with the attorneys for the defendant, whose conduct was later asserted to be
ineffective assistance of counsel.
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!d. at 94, 967 P.3d 708. In fact, the judge saw the victim's father on a regular basis. The
defendant asserted that the judge's impartiality was in question because he would be required to
assess the credibility of these church associates during the course of trial, and well as make
.;

decisions about matters of great personal interest to them. !d. Noting that it was inevitable that
many judges will have church affiliations and that there will be occasions in which they are
called upon to decide matters related to members of the same church, the Court examined Canon
3(E)(l) and held that the presiding judge did not abuse his discretion in hearing the case. !d. at
95,967 P.3d 709.
Like the defendant in Wood, Saint Alphonsus argues that this Court's impartiality could
be questioned because the Court may be called upon to assess Dr. Henson's credibility and make
decisions about issues in which Dr. Henson has a financial stake. (Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Recusal, filed May 6, 2011, at p. 6.) However, as in Wood, it is inevitable that many judges will
be treated by physicians that that there will be occasions in which they are called upon to decide
matters related to those physicians. Significantly, in the present case, the connection is even
more tenuous than in Wood. In Wood, the judge had an active church relationship with parties
who had a very significant personal interest in the case, most notably the victim and her family.
Nevertheless, when the Canons of Judicial ethics were examined, the Idaho Supreme Court
determined that this relationship did not place the trial judge in a position in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In the present case, the relationship between the
Court and Dr. Henson ceased more than fifteen years ago. Thus, the impact of this long-past
relationship upon any determination that Court might make about Dr. Henson's credibility or
decisions that the Court might make on issues of purely pecuniary importance to Dr. Henson are
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far more attenuated than in Wood. As such, as in Wood, the Court's impartiality cannot
reasonably be questioned.
If Saint Alphonsus' s assertion that a judge's impartiality could be questioned because of
his past treatment by a physician, then no judge who has ever been treated or had a family
member treated at Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center or its affiliated hospitals could ever
hear a case involving Saint Alphonsus. In the same manner that "[a] judge does not have an
affirmative duty to withdraw from cases which merely tangentially relate to the judge's
participation in an organization or committee," State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 920, 854 P.2d
259,263 (1993) abrogated on other grounds by State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961
(2010), a judge should not have an affirmative duty to withdraw from cases which are merely
tangentially related to a judge's past medical care. If a judge's impartially could reasonably be
questioned under such circumstances, it might become impossible to find a judge in a particular
venue who could hear a case.
Moreover, contrary to Saint Alphonsus's assertion otherwise, Dr. Henson's role in this
litigation is minor. As Saint Alphonsus notes, Dr. Henson was not even called as a witness in the
initial trial of this matter. It now asserts that it intends to call him as a witness at trial, but
overstates his involvement in the pertinent events. Dr. Henson one of the five physicians who
formed DMR, one the partners ofMRI Associates, LLP. He had a mere one-eleventh interest (or
9%) in MRIA, which he hoped to sell to the radiology group that "read" the MRIA scans, Gem
State Radiology ("GSR"). (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1155:5-25.)
As the Court knows, in 1998, GSR began exploring the construction of its own MRI
facility, which would ultimately become Intermountain Medical Imaging ("IMI"). GSR was
concerned that if it opened an imaging center that competed with Saint Alphonsus, Saint
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Alphonsus would react negatively and refuse to renew GSR's services contract. (TR Vol. II at
1455-56.) GSR's solution was to invite Saint Alphonsus to participate in the new imaging
center, IMI. (!d.) When Saint Alphonsus and GSR announced their intention to partner in a new
imaging center, Saint Alphonsus understood that to avoid violating the noncompete clause in the
MRIA partnership agreement, MRIA needed to participate in the new imaging center. (Trial Ex.
4062; TR Vol. II at 1741-1742.) For that reason, Saint Alphonsus requested MRIA to pursue a
partnership with the GSR to eliminate this conflict. (TR vol. II at 1152-53, 1748-50.) MRIA
pursued discussions with GSR and the business opportunity to participate in IMI's profits
(Id.at1152-1155; 1788:19-1790:15.) In fact, an agreement between GSR and MRIA to purchase
Dr. Henson's interest was "very close to being finalized" in 1999. (TR Vol. II at 1157; Trial Ex.
4079).
In June 1999, MRIA asked its partner, Saint Alphonsus through its CEO, Sandra Bruce,
to help MRIA close the deal with GSR. (TR Vol. II at 1164-1165, 1759-1760.) Although Bruce
agreed to help and although Bruce knew Saint Alphonsus could not participate in a new imaging
center without MRIA, Bruce shockingly told GSR to backburner its negotiations with MRIA and
complete a deal with Saint Alphonsus. (!d. at atl166, 1760-61, 1769:7-10; Trial Ex. 4101.) Saint
Alphonsus then offered GSR a better deal: a 50 percent interest in an MRI business rather than
the nine percent (one-eleventh) interest offered by MRIA. (!d. at 1788:19-1790:15; 1786:15-19;
2043:24-2044:5; 2371 :4-10; 3702:9-11; 4171 :13-21; Trial Ex. 4191 at 3.) As a result, GSR
predictably chose to partner with Saint Alphonsus. (Trial Ex. 4226.)
Beyond being an owner of nine percent ofMRIA, Dr. Henson's only real involvement in
the case is with respect to this aborted sale of his interest. Certainly, Dr. Henson's involvement
with the facts of the case is far less than the investigating police officer or victim with whom the
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judge attended church in Wood. A reasonable observer, informed of the Court's long-past
patient/physician relationship with Dr. Henson, could not reasonably question the Court's
impartiality.

C.

The Court has a Duty to Ensure Prompt Disposition of the Matter
Not only does Saint Alphonsus unreasonably question the Court's impartiality, Saint

Alphonsus asks the Court to violate Canon 3(B)(8). Under that Canon, a court has a
responsibility to ensure that all matters are disposed of promptly, efficiently, and fairly. As
discussed above, a significant delay of this trial is likely to cause MRIA such financial hardship
that it may be unable to continue to prosecute this matter. This significant and actual prejudice
significantly outweighs Saint Alphonsus's insinuations of perceived bias. In weighing its many
responsibilities to the parties and to the integrity of the judicial system, it is clear that it would in
fact be improper for the Court to recuse itself under these circumstances.

CONCLUSION
As the Court has already properly concluded, contrary to Saint Alphonsus's assertion
otherwise, the Court's impartiality and compliance with the Canons of judicial ethics cannot
reasonably be questioned. Given this, the fact that Saint Alphonsus has not and cannot assert
that the Court is actually biased, and the severe prejudice to MRIA that would flow from the
Court's withdrawal at this late stage of the litigation, the Court should deny this spurious Motion
for Recusal, the real intent of which is to delay the trial of this matter.
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DATED this lith day ofMay, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~~@k-

ara L. P rker
Attorneys for MRJ Associates, LLP, MRJ Limited
Partnership, and MRJ Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day ofMay, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
~acsimile

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery

D Overnight Delivery
)'1 Facsimile

~-til;~
Dara L. arker
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup. com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup. com
Dara Parker {ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

MAY 11 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELYSHIA HOLMES
DEPUTY

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MOTION FOR RECUSAL

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.
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County of Ada
, State of Idaho

)
): ss
)

Dara L. Parker, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI

Mobile Limited Partnership in the above captioned case.
2.

I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge.

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of the Notice of Retirement of Dr. Thomas

E. Henson, printed in the Idaho Statesman. This notice was provided to my office by Dr.
Henson.
DATED this 11th day of May, 2011.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 11 1h day of May, 2011.

Notary Public for Idaho
My commission expires: 10/03/2011
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day ofMay, 2011, a true and correct copy ofthe
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintifflCounterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintifflCounterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

I)Uacsimile

~Facsimile

.?lR~~
ara L. P ker
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The Idaho Statesman

. Thomas E.. Henson, M.D!!P.A.

f.A.A.N., F.A.C.P., DIPLOMATE A.Jj.P.N.
ANNOUNCES HIS RETIREMENT FROM THE

PRIVATE PRACflCE OP NEUROLOGY
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 1994

Subsequent consultations will be limited to p~el,
disability, and independent medical evaluations.
Patient records remain at
Boise Neurological Offices
999 N. Curtis Rd. Suite 5lJ6 • Boise, Idaho 83706
(208) 378-2800
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MAY 13 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELYSHIA HOLMES
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECUSAL BY THE COURT BASED
ON RELATIONSHIP WITH DR.
HENSON

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

At the hearing held on April 22, 2011, this Court disclosed that it had a fifteen-year
physician-patient relationship with Dr. Henson, one of the primary litigants in this case. The
Court stated that "it was important to make that disclosure ... to all the parties for whatever they
choose to do with it." See Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Recusal, Ex. A. After careful
consideration, and mindful of the effort the Court has put into the case to date, Saint Alphonsus
filed a motion providing the Court with a more complete picture of Dr. Henson's involvement in
the upcoming retrial, and asking the Court to recuse itself based on the standard set forth in the
Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct.
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In response, MRIA argues that Saint Alphonsus's motion is somehow an improper, lastminute attempt to delay the trial until MRIA goes out of business. Opp'n at 3. 1 This
unsupported allegation is baseless and absurd. If Saint Alphonsus had wished to delay the trial,
it could have done so on February 9, 2011, when this Court expressly offered both parties that
opportunity due to earlier delays in certain rulings. Feb. 9, 2011 Hr'g Tr. at 35-36 (Affidavit of
JackS. Gjording in Support of Reply in Support of Motion for Recusal, Ex. A). Saint Alphonsus
declined the opportunity, and instead asked the Court to keep the September 5, 2011 trial date.
/d. at 36.

Saint Alphonsus is, in fact, filing this motion for the reasons it set forth in its motion. It
first learned of the Court's physician-patient relationship with Dr. Henson at the April22, 2011
hearing, when the Court disclosed the relationship in the middle ofMRIA's oral argument. Saint
Alphonsus filed its recusal motion on May 5, 2011, as soon as practicable given the seriousness
of the subject matter. After due consideration, Saint Alphonsus concluded that the Court may

1

MRIA has been asserting financial hardship repeatedly since November 2009 as an
excuse for avoiding procedural issues. It incorrectly claimed that such hardship would prevent it
from paying the appellate cost judgment entered against it by the Supreme Court. See Resp 't
Mem. Supp. Pet. Reh'g (Nov. 17, 2009) at 2 (Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Reply
in Support of Motion for Recusal, Ex. B). It has also claimed such hardship should prevent it
from having to answer new pretrial motions following remand (Opp'n Mot. to Set Scheduling
Order (Feb. 2, 2011) at 5-6 n.12), or from having to engage in new expert discovery based on the
changed circumstances arising out ofthe Supreme Court's ruling (Feb. 9, 2011 Hr'g Tr. at 29).
It has, of course, since done both. Moreover, given the possibility that this case would be
reassigned to a "Plan B" judge, it is far from certain that the granting of Saint Alphonsus's
motion would result in a change in the trial date. In any event, MRIA's assertions have no
relevance to the pending recusal motion, which should be decided based on the standard set forth
in Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3E.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECUSAL BY THE
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not have been aware of the full picture of Henson's involvement in this matter, and sought the
Court's recusal not based on bias but-as the relevant canon provides-its appearance, arising
from the Court being asked to preside over a matter where its long-time, personal physician is
one of the most partisan, interested litigants in the case. See Mot. at 3-6.

CONCLUSION
The Court should exercise its sound discretion to recuse itself from further participation
in this case, to avoid any reasonable appearance of bias arising from fifteen years of an ongoing
physician-patient relationship with Dr. Henson.
DATED this 13th day of May, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of May, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

D
D
D

~

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Vi
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MAY 13 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELYSHIA HOLMES
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No CV OC 04-08219D
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING IN
SUPPORT OF REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECUSAL

Defendant.

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING IN SUPPORT OF REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FORRECUSAL, P. 1
001269

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada
)
JACK S. GJORDING, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that he is one
of the attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("Saint Alphonsus") in the above-entitled matter and
makes this affidavit having personal knowledge of the facts contained herein.
1.

This affidavit is made in support of Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of

Motion for Recusal by the Court Based on Relationship with Dr. Henson filed concurrently
herewith.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is an excerpt of the February 9, 2011 hearing

transcript ofthis matter, at pp. 35-36.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is an excerpt of Respondent's Memorandum in

Support of its Petition for Rehearing Pursuant to I.A.R. 42 dated November 17, 2009, at p. 2.
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FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

ic, this /3-4C-day of May,

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before
2011.

Residing at Meridian, Idaho
My Commission Expires: I 0 - I q
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the I 3 '-day of May, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

0
0
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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that sort of-- he referred to it as parity. I
don't see it as such, Your Honor. And I want to
point out a couple more things and then I will be
done.
Third-party beneficiary. If they want
to move for summary judgment on third-party
beneficiary, Your Honor, I don't have a problem
with that. That clears up the issue.
There is definitely a debate. We think
that the Supreme Court's ruling on wrongful
dissociation is this: that the Court erred when
it found that Saint Alphonsus had breached express
terms of the partnership agreement. That word
"express" is in the dissociation statute as I'm
sure you know.
THE COURT: I know now.
MR. BANDUCCI: Well, and we all have looked
a lot more closely at that statute. What that
leaves to be debated and thought over and we're
happy to fight over this in a motion for summary
judgment, Your Honor, is because RUPA is additive
to the common name, the question remains was this
a breach of contract of something other than the
express terms. As the Court knows there are
implied terms. And as this Court knows that
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Supreme Court decision defined express in a way
that was not the counter proposed -- counterpart
to implied, but was expressed as meaning
articulately expressly stated.
The Court found that although one could
infer from the partnership agreement withdrawal
was prohibited, that wasn't enough. It had to be
express; since it wasn't express, it was not a
wrongful dissociation.
So our position is there are inferred
terms. There are implied terms in this contract,
in the partnership agreement, that were breached
when they withdrew.
THE COURT: Well, I think we all learned
that about the first year of law school.
MR. BANDUCCI: And, you know, if they want
to move for summary -THE COURT: There are implied terms in every
contract of good faith and fair dealings.
MR. BANDUCCI: Sure. So if they want to
move for summary judgment saying there is no
breach of contract for withdrawing from the
partnership, fine. I think it would make sense
frankly for both sides to understand the Court's
perspective of this issue going in. And I'm happy

Page 35
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

to do that. I think that that's efficient.
But the rest of this, Your Honor, is
just an effort to change horses and change
direction and change strategy as was admitted by
Mr. Vergonis. They're going to change their trial
strategy. That's not what is supposed to happen
here. Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
Mr. Vergonis.
MR. VERGONIS: Just a couple of words, Your
Honor. I think Mr. Banducci conceded that summary
judgment motions are appropriate. Your Honor said
motions in limine are appropriate. So I think the
motions part of the proposed order, everybody is
on the same page.
On this issue of the experts -THE COURT: Motions help to reduce the cost
oflitigation generally.
MR. VERGONIS: I think so. I think so.
And, Your Honor, we're not going to be abusive of
the motion practice as was speculated in some of
the briefing.
You know this -- Mr. Banducci accuses
us of wanting a Mulligan, a redo, a do-over. And
Your Honor gave them, and we're not asking you to
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reconsider your ruling, you gave them a Mulligan
to add these parties that were not added in the
case, were not in the case when it came back down
from the Supreme Court and increases their ability
to recover damages fivefold.
And I think you did that because you
realized it's not a game of gotcha where you're
trying to trap the parties into positions they
took under different circumstances with different
rulings by the trial court in the first trial.
The Supreme Court has cleared up a lot
of things. Your Honor has cleared up a lot things
with your ruling. And now we have a changed case.
And the parties want to try the case, you know,
fairly by presenting the evidence to the jury.
And we ought to be allowed, just as they were
allowed to add parties, we ought to be allowed to
sort of react to the changed posture of the case
and litigate this case. Not the last case. This
case, with all its new rulings, in a way that we
think is appropriate.
' reports
I don't think having new exp,¢1
on our side will be a tremendous amount of time
and expense to MRIA. There will be cost involved.
I want to depose our witnesses, but we're the ones
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--------·--------IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
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Respondent/Cross-Appellant MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA") files this Memorandum in
Support of its Petition for Rehearing Pursuant to I.A.R. 42.

I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 21, 2009, this Court remanded the above-captioned case back to the district
court after clarifying ce1tain points of Idaho law. Soon after that decision, Appellants filed their
Memorandum of Costs (the "Memorandum") in which they seek no less than $426,944.75 in
costs alone. This amount is potentially crippling to MRIA--the party which won below--and
will likely cause MRIA to be unable to continue this litigation. Moreover, the award seems
extraordinarily incongruent given that this Court stated in its Opinion that "there is not yet a
prevailing party" in this matter. As such, MRIA respectfully requests that this Court clarify its
opinion so as to disallow costs in this matter as premature.

II.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

This Court should amend its October 22, 2009 opinion (the "Opinion") to deny costs to
either party for four interrelated reasons. First, I.A.R. 40 only allows costs to the prevailing
pmty, and this Court specifically held in its Opinion that there is not yet a prevailing party in this
matter. Secondly, even if the Comt had not so held, there is significant authority suggesting that
when a matter is being remanded, an award of costs should wait until the ultimate disposition of
the case. Next, and perhaps most importantly, awarding costs in the nature of $426,000 will
almost certainly destroy MRIA's ability to retry this matter. Finally, the Opinion made rulings
on various issues that benefitted both sides, meaning that neither party should receive costs.

Ill
Ill
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Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219

MRIA'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION TO STRIKE THE SECOND
AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.

MRIA'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO STRIKE THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS.
GJORDING -1

001276

ORIGINAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Reply in support of its Motion to Strike the
Second Affidavit of JackS. Gjording.

A.

The Second Affidavit is Untimely
As described in detail in MRIA's initial briefing, Mr. Gjording's Second Affidavit, which

was submitted contemporaneously with Saint Alphonsus's Reply in support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment on its Second Affirmative Defense, is untimely under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c). Saint Alphonsus makes no attempt to contest this. Therefore, on these grounds
alone, the Court should strike this Second Affidavit, and disregard the information therein and
attachments thereto.

B.

The Two Versions of the Alleged Settlement Agreement Attached to Mr. Gjording's
First and Second Affidavits are Not Properly Authenticated
Saint Alphonsus asserts that at the hearing of this matter, MRIA's counsel should be

asked whether the alleged settlement agreement is authentic. MRIA has no duty to stipulate to
the submission of any document that Saint Alphonsus desires to submit as evidence in support of
its Motion for Summary Judgment. Rather, Saint Alphonsus has the duty to ensure that
evidence submitted in support of its own Motion is made with personal knowledge and set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56( e). As explained in detail in
MRIA's earlier briefing, Mr. Gjording's affidavit is insufficient to authenticate these documents.
Notably, Saint Alphonsus does not contend otherwise, but asserts that it does not need to comply
with the Rules of Evidence because Saint Alphonsus is seeking a "legal determination" about
whether the settlement agreement entitles Saint Alphonsus to a reduction in damages.
This argument flies squarely in the face of Rule 56( e). Saint Alphonsus is seeking
summary judgment on half of the damages in this case. Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's argument
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otherwise, this is not a "preliminary question" to which the rules of evidence do not apply. Idaho
R. Ev. 104(a). That rule is limited to questions about the qualification of a witness, the existence

of privilege, or the admissibility of a piece of evidence. !d. Nor is this simply a "legal
determination." Rather, it is a motion for summary judgment requesting a ruling that, because of
the terms of a settlement agreement - which Saint Alphonsus has presented only in the form of
an unauthenticated document - Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a significant reduction in its
liability. As such, the only Idaho case that Saint Alphonsus cites, Smiley v. Smiley, 269 P. 589,
590 (1928), undermines its own argument. In that case, the trial court allowed a sum of$250 in
attorney fees, despite the fact that there had been uncontested testimony that $500 was a
reasonable sum. It was therefore asserted that the court did not have discretion to enter less than
$500. The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that "[i]n taking evidence for the purpose of fixing
the amount of an allowance for attorney's fees, the court is not trving an issue in the case, but is
seeking for information as the basis of its order, and is not bound by the rules of evidence
applicable to contesting litigants." Here, on this Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court is in
fact trying a critical issue in the case. As such, Saint Alphonsus cannot escape its duty under
Rule 56(e) to provide admissible evidence to support its Motion for Summary Judgment.
In addition, Saint Alphonsus asks, for the very first time, for the Court to take judicial

notice of the purported settlement agreements attached to Mr. Gjording's two affidavits. Idaho
Rule of Evidence 201(b) provides that "[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Saint Alphonsus asserts, in a circular manner, that
the accuracy of these unauthenticated settlement documents cannot reasonably be questioned.
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Of course, if there were the case, it would render the rules requiring evidence to be authenticated
mere surplusage and of no effect.

C.

Conclusion
As noted above and in MRIA's prior briefing, because this new evidence was not

submitted in a timely manner, and because Saint Alphonsus has failed to authenticate this
evidence such that it would be admissible, the Court should grant MRIA's Motion to Strike Mr.
Gjording's Second Affidavit.
DATED this 13th day of May 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Dara L. Par7r
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day ofMay, 2011, a true and correct copy ofthe
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

%-facsimile

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
~Facsimile

~~~"Rk~
ara L. Pa ker
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MAY 1 6 2011
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS~T

TOPtfal D.~ Qedc

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA... ~Oil'IIMH

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, INC., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Defendant.

----------------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219

ORDER~THDRA~GRULE

54(b) CERTIFICATION

)

On May 6, 2011, the Court issued an Order Regarding Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Summary Judgment along with an accompanying Judgment. At the request of the parties and for
good cause, the Court certified the judgment for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b). The defendant, MRI Associates, the only party with standing to appeal
the Court's ruling, has now requested that this Court withdraw its certification. Because the
certification was made for the benefit of the non-prevailing party, MRI Associates, and MRI
Associates no longer wishes to have the Order and Judgment certified for interlocutory appeal,
the Court hereby withdraws its Certification of its May 6, 2011 Order and Judgment.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this/b1ay of May 2011.

-

.

/'2_

~~
Dis rict Judge
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CERTIFICJ\TE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
copy of the within instrument to:

1l..vday of! May 2011, I mailed (served) a true and correct

JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
POBOX2837
BOISE, ID 83701
DONALDAYER
JONES DAY
51 LOUSIANA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODWARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST. STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court

Byu~{)Jc;;
Deputy Court Clerk
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802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, 10 83702
Tel (208) 342-4411
Fax (208) 342-4455
www.bwslawgroup.com

May 10,2011

Honorable Michael E. Wetherell
District Judge
Ada County Courthouse
2002 W. Front St., Rm 5124
Boise, ID 83 702

Re:

Saint Alphonsus v. MRI Associates
Case No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Dear Judge Wetherell:
I noted that your recent decision and order on SARMC's Motion for Summary
Judgment on Contract Theory of Wrongful Withdrawal includes a Rule 54(b) Certificate. At
the hearing, I indicated to the court that my client would want to seek an interlocutory appeal
of an order granting SARMC's motion. It now appears that I jumped the gun. Given that an
interlocutory appeal would likely jeopardize the trial date, my client is not willing to seek an
interlocutory appeal but is, instead, willing to proceed to trial.
Given that MRIA is the only party with standing to pursue an appeal of this order, we
would ask that the court decertify the order so that there is no question that an appeal of this
order may be taken after trial, if necessary.

TAB:jkr
cc:

JackS. Gjording (via fax: 336-9177)
Donald B. Ayer/Christian G. Vergonis (via fax: 202-626-1700)

BANDUCCI

WOODARD
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SCHWARTZMAN
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup. com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup. com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
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Clerk

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219

MOTION AND MEMORANDUM FOR
ORDERS CONCERNING POTENTIAL
WITNESSES SANDRA BRUCE AND
CINDY SCHAMP

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.
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ORIGINAL

MOTION
Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") move the court for one of two alternative orders: (1) an
order that if Saint Alphonsus intends to call former Saint Alphonsus Chief Executive Officer
("CEO") Sandra Bruce and former Saint Alphonsus Chief Operations Officer ("COO") Cindy
Schamp in its case-in-chief, that it will make these witnesses available to MRIA in its case-inchief; or (2) that if Ms. Bruce and/or Ms. Schamp are not going to be present for trial, the Court
will enter an order allowing the preservation depositions of Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp and hold
that their depositions may be read into evidence pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a).
A short Memorandum in Support follows below. This Motion is also supported by the Affidavit
of Counsel, submitted contemporaneously herewith.

MEMORANDUM
Sandra Bruce was the CEO of Saint Alphonsus from January 2007 (Tr. p. 1669:6-13) to
the fall of 2008, the most critical time frame of this lawsuit during which Saint Alphonsus
partnered with Intermountain Medical Imaging and dissociated from MRI Associates. She is
now believed to be the CEO of Resurrection Health Care in Chicago, Illinois. (Affidavit of
Counsel in Support of Motion for Orders Concerning Potential Witnesses Sandra Bruce and
Cindy Schamp, (hereinafter "Affidavit of Counsel),~ 3 at Ex. A.) Ms. Bruce gave extensive
testimony in the prior trial of this matter, (Tr. p. 1669:1 et seq.) From 1998 to 2002, Cindy
Schamp served as the chief operating officer of Saint Alphonsus. (Tr. p. 2251 :5~ 10.) At the time
of trial, Ms. Schamp was living in Pennsylvania. (Tr. p. 2250:10-13.) She is now believed to be
the President of Baylor Medical Center at Irving in Irving, Texas. (Affidavit of Counsel,~ 4, at
Ex. B.) Ms. Schamp gave testimony in MRIA's case-in-chiefby deposition in the previous trial
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of this matter. (Tr. p. 2249:22 et seq.) She was then called as a live witness in Saint
Alphonsus's case-in-chief(Tr. p. 5579:14 et seq.) MRIA has designated both Ms. Bruce and Ms.
Schamp as witnesses in its case-in-chief. (Affidavit of Counsel,~ 5, at Ex. C and D.)
Because Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp are currently beyond MRIA's power to subpoena
for trial, on April27, 2011, counsel for MRIA sent a letter to counsel for Saint Alphonsus,
asking Saint Alphonsus to confirm "that SARMC will make available for the MRIA parties'
case-in-chief witnesses Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp." (Affidavit of Counsel,~ 6, Ex. E.)
On May 5, 2011, counsel for Saint Alphonsus sent a reply which merely stated that "As for the
availability of specific witnesses, Saint Alphonsus is prepared to discuss that issue as a part of a
comprehensive trial plan for both parties closer to trial." (Affidavit of Counsel,~ 7, Ex. F.)
Saint Alphonsus apparently intends to leave the availability of these crucial witnesses unsettled
until the eve of trial, perhaps beyond the time when MRIA could take their depositions to
preserve their testimony.
MRIA therefore asks one of two alternative orders from the Court. The first is an order
that, if Saint Alphonsus uses Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp as witnesses in its case in chief that it
will make these witnesses available to MRIA during MRIA's case in chief. It would be
prejudicial to MRIA and confusing for the jury for these witnesses to be produced only by
deposition by MRIA, but testify live for Saint Alphonsus.
Alternatively, MRIA asks for an order permitting 1 the preservation depositions 2 of these
witnesses and a determination from the Court that these depositions may be used in lieu of trial

While leave of the Court does not ordinarily need to be sought in order to take a
deposition, Idaho R. Civ. P. 30(a), MRIA is requesting leave because such depositions appear to
be beyond the discovery order now in place.
2
These witnesses can be deposed in their state of residence. Idaho R. Civ. P. 45(f)(2).
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testimony if Saint Alphonsus does not call these witnesses and does not make them available as
witnesses to MRIA. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(3), the deposition of any witness
may be used at trial for any purpose (including being read into evidence in lieu of live testimony)
if, among other things, the witness lives 100 miles from the place or trial or outside the state of
Idaho, or the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the
witness by subpoena. Both of these circumstances exist there, as Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp
both live outside the state of Idaho, and unless they happen to be found in Idaho, it will be
impossible to serve them with subpoenas to attend trial. Idaho. R. Civ. P. 45(g) (providing that
subpoenas for a hearing or trial in a may be served at any place within the state.)
For the reasons stated above, MRIA respectfully asks the Court to order that if Saint
Alphonsus intends to call Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp in its case-in-chief, that it will make these
witnesses available to MRIA in its case-in-chief, and allow the preservation depositions of these
witnesses.
DATED this

ih day of June 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

-~~
}R~~aL.

Park!
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ih day of June 2011, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
p(facsimile

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
~Facsimile
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A.M. _ _ _ _ ,p.M.

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup. com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup. com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELYSHIA HOLMES
DEPUTY

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.
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County of Ada

)
): ss
)

State of Idaho

Dara L. Parker, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,

and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership in the above captioned case.
2.

I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge.

3.

Former Saint Alphonsus Chief Executive Officer Sandra Bruce is now believed to

be the CEO of Resurrection Health Care in Chicago, Illinois. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a
true and correct copy of a news release, accessed from the Resurrection Health Care website on
May 18, 2011, identifying Sandra Bruce as the Resurrection Health Care Center CEO.
4.

Former Saint Alphonsus Chief Operations Officer ("COO") Cindy Schamp is now

believed to be the President of Baylor Medical Center at Irving in Irving, Texas. Attached hereto
as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of a profile, accessed from the Baylor Medical Center at
Irving website on May 18, 2011, identifying, Ms. Schamp as the president.
5.

MRIA has designated both Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp as witnesses in its case-in-

chief. Saint Alphonsus designated these witnesses in its Disclosure of Lay Witnesses on
December 18, 2006, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C. In MRIA's
Supplemental Disclosure of Witnesses of May 22, 2007, a true and correct copy ofwhich is
attached hereto as Exhibit D, MRIA reserved the right to call at trial all witnesses identified by
Saint Alphonsus.
6.

On April 27, 2011, my firm sent a letter to counsel for Saint Alphonsus, asking

Saint Alphonsus to confirm "that SARMC will make available for the MRIA parties' case-in-
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chief witnesses Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp." A true and correct copy of this letter is
attached hereto as Exhibit E.
7.

On May 5, 2011, counsel for Saint Alphonsus sent a reply which merely stated

that "As for the availability of specific witnesses, Saint Alphonsus is prepared to discuss that
issue as a part of a comprehensive trial plan for both parties closer to trial." A true and correct
copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
DATED this

ih day of June, 2011.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this

ih day of June, 2011.

No ary Pubhc for Idaho
My commission expires: \Oj-:o(~\
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7th day of June 2011, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintijjlCounterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintijjlCounterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery

D Overnight Delivery

~acsimile

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
~Facsimile
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Resurrection Health care CEO Sandra B...

5/18/2011

. • Resurre.ction
- Health care•
Home

About

Newsroom

News Releases

Release

News Releases
CONTACT:
Susan E. White
Resurrection Health Care
773-792-6316
Susan. White2@reshealthcare.org
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Resurrection Health Care CEO Sandra Bruce Named One of the Top 25 Women in
Health care
Chicago, Ill. (April 18, 2011) - Sandra Bruce has been named one of the nation's Top 25
Women in Healthcare by Modern Healthcare magazine.
The recognition program honors those female healthcare executives who are making a positive
difference in the industry.
Modern Healthcare accepted nominees from all sectors of the industry, including hospitals,
health systems, physician organizations, insurance, government, vendors and suppliers, trade
and professional organizations, and patients' rights groups.
Nominees were judged on the following five criteria:
•
•
•
•
•

Successfully served as a leader or managed an organization or company
Shown the ability or power to effect change in the healthcare industry
Demonstrated a willingness to share expertise with others in the field
Served as a role model or mentor to other female healthcare executives
Assumed a leadership position in the industry outside of the candidates' own organization
or company

Bruce is president and CEO of Resurrection Health Care in Chicago, the largest Catholic
healthcare system in Illinois.
• Read the full article
• Read Sandra's profile
###

About Resurrection Health Care:
Resurrection Health Care is a nationally ranked leader in quality care. Our family of health care
services provides advanced medical care and exceptional customer service with compassion and
hope. Our hospitals, nursing homes, retirement communities, home health services, behavioral
health programs and numerous outpatient services are conveniently located in many
001294
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Resurrection Health Care CEO Sandra B...

Chicagoland neighborhoods.
###
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Ctndy Schamp
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Register 1Sign In
Careers Log In

Cindy Schamp
President
Baylor Medical Center at Irving
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
Trudy Hanson Fouser, ISB No. 2794
Bobbi K. Dominick, ISB No. 2895
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208)336-9777
Facsimile: (208)336-9177
. Patrick J. Miller, ISB No. 3221
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300
Attorneys for Plaintiff/CounterDefendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA .

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No. CV OC 0408219D
PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANT
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC. AND SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER'S
DISCLOSURE OF LAY WITNESSES

Defendant.

_

PlAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANfS SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC. AND SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENrER'S DISCLOSURE OF LAY WITNESSES - 1
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counterdefendants.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an
liability partnership,

~daho

limited

Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership;
and
IMAGING
CENTER
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liabj}ity
partnership,
Third-Party Defendants.

COME NOW, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center, through counsel and pursuant to the agreement reached at the December 4, 2006 meet
and confer conference attended by counsel for the parties related to the disclosure of witnesses
and documents states as follows:
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A.

Potential Lay Witnesses.
Sandra Bruce. The subject mattet of her testimony will include her involvement on the

MRIA board of partners, her interactions with members of the MRIA board of partners, her
involvement in working with radiologists affiliated with Gem State and their representatives, her
involvement in Saint Alphonsus becoming affiliated with th~ non-MRI division of Intermountain
Medical Imaging and subsequently the MRI division of IMI, her involvement in Saint
Alphnonsus' dissociation from MRIA, her involvement in Saint Alphonsus' efforts to avoid
dissociating and her knowledge of the importance of quality medical imaging to the delivery of
quality health care. The subject matter of her testimony will include any of the subject matters
on which she has been deposed.
Ken Frv. The subject matter of his testimony will include his involvement on the MRI
board of partners, his interactions with representatives of MRIA on operational issues affecting
MRICI and Saint Alphonsus, his involvement in working with radiologists affiliated with Gem
State and their representatives becoming affiliated with the non-MRI division of Intermountain
Medical Imaging and his subsequent involvement in Saint Alphonsus becoming involved in the
MRI division of IMI after Saint Alphonsus dissociated from MRIA and efforts made by Saint
Alphnonsus to avoid dissociation from MRIA. The subject matter of his testimony may also
include any of the subject matters on which he has been deposed.
Cindy Schamp.

The subject matter of Ms. Schamp's testimony will relate to her

involvement on the MRIA board of partners, her involvement with MRICI on operational issues
affecting MRICI and Saint Alphonsus, Saint Alphonsus' discussions with MRIA relating to
Pl.AINTJFF/COUNTER.DEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC. AND SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
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restructuring its relationship with MRIA, her discussions with DMR members, her involvement
with Saint Alphonsus becoming affiliated with the non-MRI division of Intermountain Medical
Imaging and her discussions with members and representatives of Gem State Radiology
regarding operational issues affecting Saint Alphonsus' imaging operations. The subject matter
ofher testimony will include any of the subject matters on which she has been deposed.
Carolyn Corbett.

The subject matter of Ms. Corbett's testimony will be her

involvement in patient care and·other operational issues as they related to the delivery of MRI
services to Saint Alphonsus patients before and after Saint Alphonsus' dissociation from MRIA.
This will include discussion of her involvement in resolving issues between MRICI and Gem
State.

The subject matter of her testimony will also include her discussions with MRICI

personnel regarding services provided by Saint Alphonsus to MRICI. The subject matter of her
testimony may also relate to any of the subject matters on which she is deposed.
Leslie Kelly Hall. The subject matter of her testimony will be on Saint Alphonsus'

delivery of IT services to MRICI and IMI. This will include a discussion of Saint Alphonsus'
broader goals for IT in the delivery of health care. She will testify about her interactions with
MRICI employees. The subject matter of her testimony will include any of the subject matters
on which she has been deposed
Ben Murray.- The subject matter of Mr. Murray's testimony will be his involvement in

patient care issues as they related to the delivery of MRI services to Saint Alphonsus patients
before and after Saint Alphonsus' dissociation from MRIA. This will include discussion of his
involvement in resolving issues between MRICI and Gem State. The subject matter of his

P!AlNTIFF/CoUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC. AND SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
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testimony will also include his discussions with MRICI personnel regarding services provided by
'Saint Alphonsus to MRICI. The subject matter of his testimony may also relate to any of the
subject matters on which he has been deposed.

Robert George, System Engineer, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. The
subject matter of Mr. George's testimony will be the structure of Saint Alphonsus' e-mail
system.

Grant Chamberlain. The subject matter of Mr. Chamberlain's testimony will be efforts
Saint Alphonsus made to effectuate a transaction between and among IMI, Saint Alphonus and
MRIA to merge the MRI operations ofMRICI and IMI. The subject matter of his testimony may
also include any of the subject matters on which he has been deposed.

Terry Krogstad. The subject matter of Mr. Krogstad's testimony will be nature of Saint
Alphonsus' working relationship with MRICI in the delivery of MRI services and the services
provide by Saint Alphonsus to MRICI.

Patricia Vandenberg. The subject matter ofher testimony will relate to the formation of
MRIA and the importance of integrating practicing physicians into the delivery of care. The
subject matter of her testimony will include any of the subject matters on which she has been
deposed.
In addition to the foregoing witness, Saint Alphonsus may call any of the members of
DMR, Jack Floyd, Robin Cioffi, Julli Hopkins and any of the current or former non-Saint
Alphonsus members of the MRIA Board of Partners. The subject matter will include any matters
on which such individuals have been or will be deposed, but will likely include their knowledge
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of the formation of MRIA, MRICI and MRIM, relationships and discussions between
MRIAIMRICI and GSR/ICR/IMI.
Saint Alphonsus may also call any witness identified by MRIA as a potential witness and
may call any witness identified by third-party defendants GSRIICRIIMI.
Saint Alphonsus is not in a position to identify its potential witnesses in defense of
MRIA's counterclaim until seeing MRIA's evidence. For example, Saint Alphonsus may call
providers of the technical component of MRI services or third party payors for such services.
All such entities currently known have been identified in prior discovery requests.
Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, this list may be supplemented as additional
names become known. Further, Saint Alphonsus understands the parties agreement re disclosure
of witnesses relates only to lay witnesses and expert witnesses disclosures will be made in
accordance with the Court's Third Amended Scheduling Order dated November 22, 2006.
This list is also based on the claims currently before the Court and may be amended if
additional claims are to be presented to the jury.

B.

Potential Documents.
Saint Alphonsus currently knows of no document not produced in discovery that Saint

Alphonsus intends to introduce at trial.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the J

~~ay of December 2006, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P .A.
950 West Bannock, Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702

0
D

Warren E. Jones
Joseph H. Uberuaga
EBERLE BERLIN KADING TURNBOW
McKLVEEN & JONES
300 N. 6th Street, 2nd Floor
Boise, ID 83702

kJ

Rodney R. Saetrum
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1800
Boise, Idaho 83702

~ U.S. mail, postage prepaid
D express mail
hand delivery
D facsimile

Patrick J. Miller
GNENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701

gj

0

0
D
0

U.S. mail, postage prepaid
express mail
hand delivery
facsimile
U.S. mail, postage prepaid
express mail
hand delivery
facsimile

0

~ U.S. mail, postage prepaid
express mail
hand delivery
facsimile

0
0
0

GJORDING & FOUSER,

PILC
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@greenerlaw. com
G. Rey Reinhardt, IV (ISB No. 6209)
greinhardt@greenerlaw.com
Daniel J. Gordon (ISH No. 6051)
dgordon@greenerlaw.com
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P .A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third
Party Plaintiff MRI Associates, LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. CV OC 0408219D

MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE
OF WITNESSES PURSUANT TO
AGREEMENT OF PARTIES

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
CounterClaimant,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER,
CounterDefendants.
MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT OF
PARTIES - Page 1
(186156) .
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; GEM
STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; and IMAGING CENTER
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Third-Party Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendant/CounterClaimant/Third Party Plaintiff, MRI Associates LLP
(hereinafter "MRIA") through its counsel, and hereby supplements its original list of those
witnesses which it currently anticipates that it may call at trial in this matter, dated
Based upon agreement of the parties MRIA identifies the following witnesses which
were not included on its original witness designation which it may cal at trial. As indicated in
the original disclosure reserves the right to call any witness listed on this disclosure, as well as
any witness deposed. MRIA also reserves the right to call any witnesses identified on Plaintiffs'
and Third Party Defendants' witness lists.

1. Dr. Michael McMartin
In Care of Greener, Banducci, Shoemaker
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702
Dr. McMartin will testify to statements made to him and/or his office by
representatives of Gem State Radiology regarding the quality of services at MRI Center
of Idaho.

MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT OF
PARTIES - Page 2
(186156)
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2. Patti Harneck
In Care of Greener, Banducci, Shoemaker
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702
Patti Harneck will testify regarding IT services provided by SARMC to IMI and
MRICI during the time SARMC was a partner in MRIA.

3. Kevin West
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton, P A
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 700
Boise, ID 83701
Mr. West will testify to the negotiations to have Shattuck Hammond act as
facilitator/negotiator for a transaction between SARMC, MRIA and IMI in late 2003.

4. Walt Fennel
In Care of Greener, Banducci, Shoemaker
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise; ID 83 702
The programmer which MRI hired to write the program for the patient reports. He
is the sole programmer that wrote 4D for MRI which was the system that MRI used prior
to the DR and current PACSIRIS.

DA1ED this

Q-.-'2.- j

day of May, 2007.
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A .

. on
Attorneys for Defendant

MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT OF
PARTIES- Page 3
(186156)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .,.._.1..--- day of May, 2007, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
Warren E. Jones
EBERLE BERLIN
300 N. 6th Street, 2nd Floor
Post Office Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701
[Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants]
Rodney R. Saetrum
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
101 South Capitol Boulevard
Suite 1800
Boise, ID 83702
[Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants]
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER
509 West Hayes
Post Office Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
[Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants]
Patrick J. Miller
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
[Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants]

~S. Mail

0' Facsimile (208) 344-8542
0
0

Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

~u.s. Mail

~

0
0

Facsimile (208) 336-0448
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

2!)J.s. Mail
~ Facsimile (208) 336-9177
0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery

e:('~~Mail

[21"Facsimile (208) 388-1300
0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery

MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT OF
PARTIES - Page 4
(186156)
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802W.Bannock,Su1te 500
Boise, 10 83702
Tel (208} 342-4411
Fax (208) 342-4455
www.bwslawgroup.com

Apri127, 2011

Donald B. Ayer
JONESDAY .
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 WHays St
PO Box2837
Boise, ID 83701-2837

Re: St. Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, Inc.
Dear Don and Jack,
As we approach trial, I believe it is important to confirm certain understandings reached
by trial counsel in connection with this litigation.
First, we would like to confirm that the parties do not intend to call any witnesses at trial
other than those persons identified on their fmal witness lists. In the case of SARMC, we
understand that it may be designating a new expert on the issue of damages, as allowed by the
court. Please let me know by close ofbusiness May 4, 2011, whether SARMC intends to call
witnesses other than those identified on its final witness list (attached), with the addition of a
new damages expert.
Also, please confirm by close of business on May 4, 2011, that SARMC will make
available for the MRIA parties' case-in-chief witnesses Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp.

TAB:jkr

BANDUCCI

WOODARD

SCHWARfZMAN
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From: ---1369177

Page: 217

Date: 5/5/2011 3:43:"' • ..,M

Law Offices

GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
JackS. Gjording
Trudy Hanson Fouser
Julianne S. Hall

509 W. Hays Street
P.O. "Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 336-9777 telephone
(208) 336-9177 facsimile

EbineR Lee
Bobbi K. Dominick
OfColmsel

May 5, 2011

Via Facsimile
Thomas A. Banducci

BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
Re:

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care vs. MRI Associates, LLP
Ada Co. Case No. CV OC 0408219D
File No. 15051.001

Dear Tom:
Your letter of April 27 requests certain witness infonnation related to the upcoming trial.
Regarding witness lists, Saint Alphonsus confirms that it will call at trial only those
witnesses identified on its final witness list (as well as its new damages expert) provided that
MRIA agrees to do the same. Please conflrm that MRIA does not intend to call any witnesses at
trial other than those persons identified on its final witness list (attached).
As for the availability of specific witnesses, Saint Alphonsus is prepared to discuss that
issue as part of a comprehensive trial plan for both parties closer to trial.
Very truly yours,

GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

~Ojording
JSG/fe
Attachment
cc:
Donald B. Ayer
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JUN 1 0 2011
CHRJSTOPHEA D. RICH, Clerk
By JERI HEATON
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE
TO MRIA'S MOTION CONCERNING
POTENTIAL WITNESSES SANDRA
BRUCE AND CINDY SCHAMP

Defendant.
Defendant/counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited Partnership (collectively "MRIA") have moved the Court for an order ( 1) that
Saint Alphonsus be compelled to produce for testimony on MRIA's direct case two former Saint

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR ORDERS CONCERNING
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Alphonsus executives (Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp) who live out of state and are not
subject to subpoena by any party, if those witnesses have agreed to appear voluntarily on Saint
Alphonsus's defense case, (2) or in the alternative, that the Court order yet another deposition for
these witnesses whom MRIA has already deposed for three days (in the case of Ms. Schamp) or
four days (in the case of Ms. Bruce), and examined at the previous trial.
There is no basis in the rules for either ofMRIA's proposed orders. Nevertheless, Saint
Alphonsus is willing to seek the appearance of Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp for testimony on
MRIA's direct case, provided it is pursuant to an order that assures that these witnesses need
appear only once, and provided that MRIA produces Dr. Thomas Henson, who likewise lives out
of state, for live testimony on the same terms. Whether or not an order is entered to provide that
Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp appear for testimony on MRIA's case, MRIA's request for further
depositions is abusive and should be denied, but if granted, it should be on terms that preclude
the use of previous depositions of these witnesses.
FACTS
Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp left the employ of Saint Alphonsus in 2008 and 2003,
respectively. Ms. Bruce is now the Chief Executive Officer of a major health care system
headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. Ms. Schamp holds the same position at a major medical
center in Irving, Texas. Each has a demanding job that makes it extremely inconvenient to travel
to Boise to testify in this case. They are beyond the subpoena power of this Court, and Saint
Alphonsus has no more power than MRIA to compel their appearance. Nevertheless, they have
agreed to appear for live testimony when called by Saint Alphonsus on the defense case. Saint
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR ORDERS CONCERNING
POTENTIAL WITNESSES SANDRA BRUCE AND CINDY SCHAMP - 2
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Alphonsus is willing to ask instead, and we believe the witnesses would likewise agree, to appear
for live testimony during MRIA's case, on two conditions:
1. That each of Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp be called to testify on a date certain, to be
specified no later than three weeks in advance. With the permission of the Court, other witness
testimony would be interrupted to allow Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp to commence testimony as
the first order of business on the scheduled date, with their testimony to proceed continuously
with full examination by all parties until it is concluded and they are excused. In this regard, if
these witnesses are called on MRIA's case, after examination by MRIA, counsel for Saint
Alphonsus would question each witness not only on the matters addressed in MRIA's direct
examination, but on all issues relevant to the Saint Alphonsus case-in-chief. MRIA would then
cross-examine as to new matters introduced on Saint Alphonsus's examination, and so on,
should further rounds of re-direct and re-cross be deemed appropriate by the Court. In this
manner, these witnesses will be asked to travel to Boise in order to testify at trial only once.
2. Dr. Thomas Henson, one ofthe true parties-in-interest on the MRIA side of this case,
now lives in the State of Washington. He did not testify but nevertheless travelled to Boise to
attend the first trial of this matter. Saint Alphonsus will ask Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp to
appear on the terms described in paragraph 1 above, provided that MRIA agrees to produce
Dr. Henson for testimony at trial on the same terms, on either the plaintiff or defense case.
ARGUMENT
Such an arrangement is explicitly entrusted to the Court's broad discretion under the
Idaho Rules, which provide that "[t]he court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR ORDERS CONCERNING
POTENTIAL WITNESSES SANDRA BRUCE AND CINDY SCHAMP - 3
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order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence" and that, on cross-examination, the
"court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct
examination." Idaho Rule ofEvidence 611(a), (b). The rules thus expressly contemplate, and
authorize the Court to allow, the taking of Ms. Bruce's, Ms. Schamp's, and Dr. Henson's
testimony in the sequence that Saint Alphonsus has offered.
Moreover, even ifMRIA refuses to accept this accommodation, and Ms. Bruce and
Ms. Schamp do not appear live during MRIA's case-in-chief, MRIA's procedural rights are
nevertheless fully protected by its right to a live cross-examination of Ms. Bruce and
Ms. Schamp during the defense case. There is no provision of law that affords any further
relief, and MRIA has cited none. Surely the Court cannot "order" Saint Alphonsus to do what
MRIA, Saint Alphonsus-and even the Court itself-are powerless to do, by "compelling" these
out-of-state witnesses to appear for the convenience of MRIA.
Whether or not an arrangement is struck to provide for Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp to
testify live during MRIA's case, further depositions for use at trial would be singularly
inappropriate in this case. Ms. Bruce testified about the same matters for four days in a
discovery deposition (March 7 and 8, 2006, August 22, 2006, and July 12, 2007). Ms. Schamp
testified for two days in a discovery deposition (October 19 and 20, 2006), and for one day in a
trial deposition (June 22, 2007). MRIA's counsel then examined Ms. Bruce twice at trial, when
she was called to testify both on MRIA's case and on Saint Alphonsus's case, and Ms. Schamp
when she testified on Saint Alphonsus's case. Neither the fact of a retrial, nor the fact that these
witnesses will appear again on Saint Alphonsus's case, justifies any claim of surprise or change
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR ORDERS CONCERNING
POTENTIAL WITNESSES SANDRA BRUCE AND CINDY SCHAMP - 4
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in circumstance, and no provision of the rules supports this unprecedented request for yet another
deposition of these witnesses.
Above all, MRIA counsel should not be permitted to use a further deposition to add to the
multiple accounts of the same facts that he has already collected from these witnesses, in order to
mine his repetitive questioning for inconsistencies with which to attempt unfairly to attack these
witnesses' credibility. If new depositions are permitted over our strenuous objection, they
should be pursuant to a protective order that precludes MRIA's counsel from using previous
testimony at the retrial.

CONCLUSION
The Court should issue an order providing that:
(1) Saint Alphonsus will arrange for its former employees, Sandra Bruce and Cindy
Schamp, to be available to appear as witnesses in MRIA's case-in-chief, during the
weeks of September 6-16, 2011; on dates to be specified no less than three weeks in
advance;
(2) The examination of these witnesses will continue on all subjects relevant to trial until
their testimony is concluded and the witnesses are excused; and
(3) MRIA will make out-of-state witness Dr. Thomas Henson available for testimony on
corresponding terms.
DATED this 1Oth day of June, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

PROPOSED ORDER RE
AVAILABILITY AT TRIAL OF
WITNESSES SANDRA BRUCE,
CINDY SCHAMP, AND DR.
THOMAS HENSON

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

The Court being advised by the Parties concerning their mutual desires to present
testimony by witnesses who reside outside of the State of Idaho, does hereby ORDER that:
1) Saint Alphonsus will arrange for its former employees, Sandra Bruce and Cindy
Schamp, to be available to appear as witnesses in MRIA's case-in-chief, at times to be
defined more precisely when possible, during the weeks of September 6-16, 2011;

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR ORDERS CONCERNING
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2) Saint Alphonsus will be allowed, immediately following MRIA's direct examination,
to present its full examination of those witnesses for all purposes and not limited to crossexamination defined by MRIA's direct testimony; and
3) MRIA will make out-of-state witness Dr. Thomas Henson available to appear as a
witness, either during the presentation ofMRIA's case, or during the presentation of
Saint Alphonsus case.

IT IS SO ORDERED
DATED this_ day of June, 2011.

Mike Wetherell
District Judge

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR ORDERS CONCERNING
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 1Oth day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

~

D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

JackS. Gjording

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR ORDERS CONCERNING
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----P.M
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AM.

JUN J 0 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH C
By JERI HEATON ' /erk
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO
COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH
STATUTORY RIGHTS TO INSPECT
PARTNERSHIP BOOKS AND
RECORDS

Defendant.

ORIGINAL
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY
001323
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
COME NOW, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("Saint Alphonsus"), and move this Court for a
motion compelling MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), MRI Limited Partnership ("Center") and
MRI Mobile Limited Partnership ("Mobile") to allow Saint Alphonsus to access, inspect, and
copy the following partnership and limited partnership documents:
1. Annual financial statements for the years 1985 through 2004.
2. Records sufficient to show all partnership distributions in cash or in kind, and all
management fees and other monies paid on account of each general and limited partner's
interest in the partnerships for the years 1985 through 2004.
3. Records sufficient to show all accounting activity in the capital accounts of each
general and limited partner for the years 1985 through 2004, in order to show
contributions in, distributions out, and income retained.
4. Documentation for any loans to the partnership by any partner, and any borrowings or
financings by the partnership from third parties in amounts in excess of $50,000, during
the years 1985 through 2004.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY
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As described in the accompanying Memorandum in Support, Saint Alphonsus is
statutorily and/or contractually entitled to such information in its capacities as former general
partner in MRIA, and as a current limited partner in Center and Mobile. See Idaho Code§§ 532-304, 53-3-403. This motion is supported by the Court's records and files in this matter and by
the aforementioned Memorandum in Support and Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support.
Argument on this motion is requested on June 20, 2011 at 10:00 a.m.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this lOth day of June, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the lOth day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

..... ~

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

~

D
D

GsuJ.\.Q~
§~jording
Jack
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JUN f 0 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JERI HEATON
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No CV OC 04-08219D
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
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OR\G\NAL

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada
)
JACK S. GJORDING, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that he is one
of the attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("Saint Alphonsus") in the above-entitled matter and
makes this affidavit having personal knowledge of the facts contained herein.
1.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of a letter from Kenneth W. Fry to the

MRI Partnerships dated June 2, 2011.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a copy of a letter from Thomas A. Banducci to

Kenneth W. Fry dated June 7, 2011.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Cis a copy of page 60 ofthe MRI Limited Partnership

Private Placement Memorandum dated May 24, 1985.
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4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a copy of page 80 of the MRI Mobile Limited

Partnership Private Placement Memorandum dated September 6, 1988.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before
2011.

Residing at Meridian, Idaho
My Commission Expires: lo- I 't -1 I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the IO""ctay of June, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:

0
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN ~
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
0
Boise, ID 83702
0

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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@ Saint Alphonsus
June 2, 2011

VIA E-MAIL and U.S. MAIL
MRI Associates, LLP
MRI Limited Partnership
MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
c/o Thomas A. Banducci
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock Street
Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

Re:

Demand for Partnership and Limited Partnership Records and Information
Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 53-3-403 and 53-2-304

Dear Sirs:
In its capacity as a former general partner in MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA") and as a
current limited partner in MRI Limited Partnership ("Center") and MRI Mobile Limited
Partnership ("Mobile"), Saint Alphonsus hereby requests that MRIA, Center, and Mobile provide
access to certain partnership materials as authorized by Idaho statute.

Former partners of a general partnership have a right to "access to books and records
pertaining to the period during which they were partners," including "the opportunity to inspect
and copy records during ordinary business hours." Idaho Code§ 53-3-403(b). This right
extends, without a demand by the partner, to "any information concerning the partnership's
business and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties
under the partnership agreement," and, upon demand, to "any other information concerning the
partnership's business and affairs," with narrow exceptions not applicable here. Id. § 53-3403(c)(l) and (2).
Limited partners have a right to ''inspect and copy true and full information regarding the
state of the activities and fmancial condition of the limited partnership and other information
regarding the activities of the limited partnership as is just and reasonable," for any purpose
reasonably related to the partner's interest as a limited partner. Id. § 53-2-304(2). In addition, a
limited partner has a right to inspect and copy certain "required information," for which the
limited partner "need not have any particular purpose for seeking the information," including
without limitation as to time, "the amount of cash, and a description and statement of the agreed
value of the other benefits, contributed and agreed to be contributed by each partner." I d. § 53-2304(1) and § 53-2-111 (9)(a).
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MRI Associates, LLP
MRI Limited Partnership
MRl Mobile Limited Partnership
June 2, 2011
Page 2
In accordance with these statutory rights, as both a former general partner in MRIA and
as a current limited partner in the Center and Mobile limited partnerships, Saint Alphonsus
requests to inspect and copy the following materials from MRl Associates LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership, on or before Monday, June 13, 2011:
1. Annual financial statements for the years 1985 through 2004.
2. Records sufficient to show all partnership distributions in cash or in kind, and all
management fees and other monies paid on account of each general and limited partner's
interest in the partnerships for the years 1985 through 2004. We note that such
information as to partnership distributions is typically contained in the required annual
federal tax Form 1065 U.S. Return of Partnership Income, in Idaho state tax Form 65,
and in "Cost Reports" filed with the federal Medicare and state Medicaid agencies.
Information as to management fees and other monies paid may be stated separately.
3. Records sufficient to show all accounting activity in the capital accounts of each general
and limited partner for the years 1985 through 2004, in order to show contributions in,
distributions out, and income retained.
4. Documentation for any loans to the partnership by any partner, and any borrowings or
financings by the partnership from third parties in amounts in excess of $50,000, during
the years 1985 through 2004.
Saint Alphonsus requests this information for the purpose of responding to charges by
you that St. Alphonsus acted wrongfully in its conduct as a partner/limited partner in MRIA,
Center and Mobile. To the extent that a "demand" is required by Idaho partnership law for
access to this information, please consider this letter to be the demand. Thank you in advance
for your cooperation.

z:·

Kenneth . Fry
Vice President ofF
ce
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.
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MRI Associates, LLP
MRI Limited Partnership
MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
June 2, 2011
Page3

bee:

Jack Gjording
Donald B. Ayer
Stephanie C. Westermeier
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A E C E I V EsDw. Bannock. Suite 500
Boise,ID 83702

J!JN 0 D 2011'rel

(208) 342-4411

G. lOADING & FOUSi:!f-1x (208) 342-4455
DLJ..C
www.bwslawgroup.com

June 7, 2011

Kenneth W. Fry
Vice President of Finance
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.
c/o JackS. Gjording
Gjording & Fauser, PLLC
POBox2837
Boise, ID R3701-2KH
Dear Mr. Fry:
We are in receipt of your letter of June 2, 2011, demanding access to the partnership
and limited partnership records ofMRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited Partnership. As you well know, Saint Alphonsus is currently in litigation
with the parties from whom you have demanded records on the very subjects for which you
have requested records. In fact, as you explicitly state in your letter, "Saint Alphonsus
requests this information for the purpose of responding to charges by you that St. Alphonsus
acted wrongfully in its conduct as a partner/limited partner in MRIA, Center, and Mobile."
During the course of litigation, the discovery of infom1ation must be pursued through
the orderly process outlined in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Your request is outside the
bounds of those rules. Your request is also outside the very limited order of the district court
allowing further discovery in this litigation. As such, under Idaho Code§ 53-3-403(c)(2), we
deny your request, which is "unreasonable or otherwise improper under the circumstances."
If you have further questions, please have your attorney contact us. We will not
correspond directly with you or any member of your organization in the future.

TAB:DLP:jkr
cc:

Jack Gjording
.Donald Ayer

A

EXHIBIT

BANDUCCI

WOODARD

SCHWARTZMAN
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MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
Private Placement Memorandum

Offeree Name

Memorandum No. • • • • •
MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
An Idaho Limited Partnership
General Partner:
MRI ASSOCIATES
an Idaho General Partnership
c/o Mr. c. Anton
lOSS N. Curtis Road
Boise, Idaho 83706
(208) 378-2000

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
Units
Offer red
Minimum
80
Max1mum
120

Unit
Size
$10,000*
$10 000*

*payable $2,500 upon subscription and
$7,500 on August 15, 1985
THESE SECURITIES INVOLVE A HIGH DECREE OF RISK.
PROSPECTIVE INVESTORS SHOULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY
THE MATTERS SET FORTH UNDER "R.ISI< FACTORS."
UNITS WILL BE SOLD ONLY TO "ACCREDITED INVESTORS" AND NO MORE
THAN 35 OTHER PERSONS WHO MEET THE SUITABILITY STAND~RDS
SET FORTH HEREIN. SEE "TEPMS OF THE OFFERING."
THE SECURITIES OFFERED HEREBY HAVE NOT BEEN REGISTERED UNDER
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED.
THE SECURITIES OFFERED HEREBY H.AVE NOT BEEN 'REGISTERED
UNDER THE IDAHO SECURITIES ACT IN RELIANCE UPON EXEMPTION
FROM REGISTRATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 30-1435(1) THEREOF.
THEY MAY NOT BE SOLD, TRANSFERRED, PLEDGED OR HYPOTHECATED
EXCEPT IN A TRANSACTION l'lHICH IS EXEMPT UNDER SAID ~CT
OR PURSUANT TO AN EFFECTIVE REGISTRATION UNDER SAID ACT.
The date of this Memorandum is May 24, 1985.
- i -

EXHIBIT

C.
012779
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General Partner
Limited Partners

30%
70%

At all times, Partnership income, gain, loss, deduction or credit
to be allocated to the Limited Partners collectively shall be
allocated among the various Limited Partners in the same
relationship of the amounts of their respective capital
contributions.
Net Cash Flow of the Partnership shall be distributed
among the Partners in the same manner that Partnership income,
ga1n, loss, deduction or credit shall be allocated. The Net Cash
Flow distributed to the General Partner shall be in addition to
the management fee ·paid to the General Partner.
Restrictions on Transfers
Except for transfer by gift, will or intestate
succession, no Limited Partner shall sell or transfer an interest
in the Limited Partnership without the written consent of the
General Partner, which consent may be withheld in the General
Partner's absolute discretion.
The General Partner shall not consent to any such sale
or transfer if it would cause the termination of the Partnership
for federal income tax purposes. The General Partner also shall
not consent to any such sale or transfer unless it has received
an opinion of counsel, satisfactory to it, that such proposed
transfer may be effected without registration of the Units under
federal or state securities laws.
Any person to whom a sale or transfer of all or any part
of a Unit has been made will be admitted as a Limited Partner
only if the General Partner has consented to such transfer or
such consent is unnecessary, and the transferee agrees in writing
to be bound by the terms and provisions of the Limited
Partnership Agreement.
Accounting and Reports
The fiscal year of the Partnership will be the calendar
year and the books and records of the Partnership will be kept on
the cash basis in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles. Each Limited Partner will receive, within 75 days
after the close of each fiscal year of the Partnership, all
information necessary for the preparation of his tax returns and,
within 90 days of the close of each such year, an annual report
containing, among other materials, audited financial statements
of the Partnership prepared by a firm of independent certified
public accountants selected by the General Partner. Limited
Partners may inspect the books and records of the Partnership at
any time during normal business hours. The books and records of
the Partnership will be maintained at its principal office.
-60-

---·---012841
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MRI MOBILE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
Private Placement Memorandum
Memorandum No.
Offeree Name and Signature
See "Confidentiality Agreement"
on Page iii herein

MRI MOBILE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
An Idaho Limited Partnership
General Partner:
MRI ASSOCIATES
an Idaho General Partnership
c;o MRI Center of Idaho
949 N. Curtis Road
Boise, Idaho 83706
( 208) 378-3340

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
Units
Offered
Minimum 384

Aggregate
Offering Size
$1,584,000

$

Maximum 480

$1,980,000

Minimum Investment: One (1) Unit
THESE SECURITIES INVOLVE A HIGH DEGREE OF RISK.
PROSPECTIVE INVESTORS SHOULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY
THE MATTERS SET FORTH UNDER "RISK FAC'fORS."
UNITS WILL BE SOLO ONLY TO "ACCREDITED INVESTORS" AND NO MORE
THAN 35 OTHER PERSONS WHO MEET THE SUITABILITY STANDARDS
SET FORTH HEREIN. SEE "TERMS OF THE OFFERING."
THE SECURITIES OFFEREO HEREBY HAVE NOT BF.EN REGISTERED UNDER
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED.
THE SECURITIES OFFERED HEREBY HAV~ NOT BEEN REGISTERED
UNDER THE IDAHO SECURITIES ACT IN RELIANCE UPON EXEMPTION
FROM REGISTRATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 30-1435(1) THEREOF.
THEY MAY NOT BE SOLD, TRANSFERRED, PLEDGED OR HYPOTHECATED
EXCEPT IN A TRANSACTION WHICH IS EXEMPT UNDER SAID ACT
OR PURSUANT TO AN EFFECTIVE REGISTRATION UNDER SAID ACT.
The date of this Memorandum is September 6, 1988.
-

i

-

. EXHIBIT_j;L_ -----

020349

001335

an op1n1on of counsel, satisfactory to it, that such proposed
transfer may be effected without registration of the Units under
federal or state securities laws.
In addition to the other·restrictions upon the transfer
of Units, no Limited Partner may transfer any Units to any third
party without first giying the General Partner the opportunity to
exercise a first right of refusal to purchase such interest on
the same terms and conditions as the proposed sal~ to a third
party. Such first right of refusal could delay any proposed
transfer of Units at least thirty (30) days because of the
necessary notice to be given to and the time for response by the
General Par~ner.
Any person to whom a sale or transfer of all or any part
of a Unit has been made will be admitted as a Limited Partner
only if the General Partner has consented to such transfer or
such consent is unnecessary, and the transferee agrees in writing
to be bound by the terms and provisions of the Limited
Partnership Agreement.
Accounting and Reports
The fiscal year of th .' ·. tnership will be the calendar
year and the books and records .
he Partnership will be kept Oft
the accrual basis in accorda
·
generally accepted
accounting principles. Ea
d Partner will receive, within
75 days after the close of
. al year of the Partnership,
all information nP.cessa ry f..
eparation of the Limited
Partner's tax returns and, w
days of the close of each
such year, an annual report con
ing, among other materials,
audited financial statements of the Partnership prepared by a
firm of independent certified public accountants selected by the
General Partner. Limited Partners may inspect the books and
records of the Partnership at any time during normal business
hours. The books and records of the Partnership will be
maintained at its principal office.
=·

LEGAL MATTERS
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, One Capital Center, 999
Main Street, Boise, Idaho, has been retained to act as counsel to
the General Partner.

- 80 -
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DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO COMPEL
COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY
RIGHTS TO INSPECT
PARTNERSHIP BOOKS AND
RECORDS

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY RIGHTS TO INSPECT PARTNERSHIP BOOKS AND
RECORDS- 1
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
On June 2, 2011, Saint Alphonsus's Chief Financial Officer Kenneth Fry sent a letter
(Exhibit A attached to the Affidavit of JackS. Gjording filed in support herewith) to MRI
Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), MRI Limited Partnership ("Center") and MRI Mobile Limited
Partnership ("Mobile") (collectively, the "Partnerships"), requesting the recipients to provide
access to certain fundamental partnership and limited partnership financial records, based on
Saint Alphonsus's statutory rights under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA") and the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act ("RULPA"). Idaho Code§ 53-3-101 et seq. and§ 532-101 et seq., respectively. As a former partner in MRIA and as a current limited partner in
Center and Mobile, Saint Alphonsus requested from each of the entities:
1. Annual financial statements for the years 1985 through 2004.
2. Records sufficient to show all partnership distributions in cash or in kind, and all
management fees and other monies paid on account of each general and limited partner's
interest in the partnerships for the years 1985 through 2004.
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY RIGHTS TO INSPECT PARTNERSHIP BOOKS AND
RECORDS -2
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3. Records sufficient to show all accounting activity in the capital accounts of each general
and limited partner for the years 1985 through 2004, in order to show contributions in,
distributions out, and income retained.
4. Documentation for any loans to the partnership by any partner, and any borrowings or
financings by the partnership from third parties in amounts in excess of $50,000, during
the years 1985 through 2004.

See Exhibit A.
On June 7, 2011, counsel for MRIA, Center, and Mobile sent a letter refusing Saint
Alphonsus's request, without disputing that Saint Alphonsus in fact had these rights of access
under RUPA and RULPA. The Partnerships' sole basis for refusing to comply with the statutes
was that "[d]uring the course of litigation, the discovery of information must be pursued through
the orderly process outlined in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure," and that discovery
limitations made the requests "unreasonable or otherwise improper under the circumstances"
under RUP A. (Gjording Aff., Ex. B).
That response is beside the point: a party's discovery rights in litigation have nothing to
do with a partner's unconditional statutory right to inspect and copy partnership records. The
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not cancel the Revised Uniform Partnership Act and the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, or the rights created by contract when the
partnerships were formed. Because Saint Alphonsus has rights under RUP A and RULP A as well
as by contract to inspect and copy these materials-rights which the Partnerships have not
disputed-and because the materials are relevant to the current lawsuit challenging Saint
Alphonsus's "proper exercise of [a] partner's rights and duties," Idaho Code § 53-3-403(c)(l ),

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY RIGHTS TO INSPECT PARTNERSHIP BOOKS AND
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the court should order MRIA, Center, and Mobile to comply with the statutes and provide Saint
Alphonsus access to the books and records listed in its June 2, 2011 letter.

I.

AS A FORMER GENERAL PARTNER OF MRIA, AND A CURRENT LIMITED
PARTNER OF CENTER AND MOBILE, SAINT ALPHONSUS HAS BROAD
RIGHTS OF ACCESS UNDER RUPA AND RULPA AND BY CONTRACT TO
THE PARTNERSHIPS' RECORDS.
Saint Alphonsus was a founding general partner in 1985 of MRIA, an Idaho general

partnership, and remained a general partner until2004. MRIA was itself the sole general partner,
30% owner, and in full operating control, oftwo Idaho limited partnerships, Center (organized
simultaneously with MRIA in 1985, to acquire and operate the magnetic resonance imaging
device at Saint Alphonsus Hospital) and Mobile (established in 1988 to operate mobile MRI
devices). Saint Alphonsus was also a limited partner of Center and Mobile from the time they
were organized, and remains a limited partner in both to this day.
A series of overlapping provisions of RUP A and RULP A provide to all partners - both
general and limited, both current and former-various rights of access to inspect and copy
partnership records. These provisions considered one by one are decisive in favor of Saint
Alphonsus·s rights to the records that have been requested. Considered together, they are an
emphatic statement of the legislature's intent that partners should have such access. And if the
statutes were not enough, the private placement memoranda that were the basis upon which
Center and Mobile sold the limited partnership interests to Saint Alphonsus and others,
guaranteed similar rights by contract.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY RIGHTS TO INSPECT PARTNERSHIP BOOKS AND
RECORDS -4
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A.

As a former general partner of MRIA, Saint Alphonsus has an unqualified
right to the Partnerships' "books and records" and "any other information
concerning the partnership's business affairs" for 1985-2004

The Idaho Revised Uniform Partnership Act§ 53-3-403, titled "Partner's rights and
duties with respect to information," defines the right of a general partner and former general
partner to certain general partnership material. Per the statutory text, there are two types of
relevant data: "books and records," and "information" which "concem[s] the partnership's
business and affairs" apart from books and records. See id. § 53-3-403(b) (describing access to
"books and records"); id. § 53-3-403(c) (discussing other information); accord id. § 53-3-403
official cmt. 2 & 3 (noting these separate rights as to "books and records" and "partnership
information other than books and records").
The books-and-records provision provides an absolute right of access, stating that "[a]
partnership ... shall provide former partners and their agents and attorneys access to books and
records pertaining to the period during which they were partners." Id. § 53-3-403(b) (emphasis
added). It contains no exception; indeed, the official comment expressly notes that "[a] partner's
right to inspect and copy the partnership's books and records is not conditioned on the partner's
purpose or motive," but instead partners have "an unqualified right of access to the partnership
books and records." Id. § 53-3-403(b) official cmt. 2.
Books and records include "financial records," id. § 53-3-403 official cmt 1, and thus
include the basic financial records that Saint Alphonsus has requested here: (1) the annual
financial statements, (2) records of distributions to partners, (3) records of partners' capital to

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY RIGHTS TO INSPECT PARTNERSHIP BOOKS AND
RECORDS- 5
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include their contributions to the Partnerships, and (4) loans by partners (in any amount) and by
third parties (in amounts over $50,000) to the Partnerships, during the period 1985 to 2004 when
Saint Alphonsus was a general partner in MRIA.
Were that unqualified right not sufficient, there is also a right of access, "without
demand," to information, apart from books and records, "concerning the partnership's business
and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the
partnership agreement or this act." !d. § 53-3-403(c)(l). Finally, after defining these broad
rights that guarantee Saint Alphonsus access to all the materials demanded here, the statute
provides a right to "any other information concerning the partnership's business and affairs."
Only in this final, catch-all category may the Partnerships object that a request for access "is
unreasonable or otherwise improper under the circumstances," id. § 53-3-403(c)(2), and "[t]he
burden is on the partnership or partner from whom the information is requested to show that the
demand is unreasonable or improper," id. § 53-3-403 official cmt. 3.
But even under this "reasonable and proper" test-which, again, has no application to the
unconditional rights discussed above-Saint Alphonsus is entitled to the records that it has
demanded. It is precisely Saint Alphonsus's "proper exercise of [a] partner's rights and duties"
that the Partnerships have attacked in this lawsuit. Saint Alphonsus' s need to defend a lawsuit
over its "proper exercise of [a] partner's rights and duties" is a reason- if such a showing were
necessary- for the Court to enforce Saint Alphonsus's unconditional rights under RUPA to the

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY RIGHTS TO INSPECT PARTNERSHIP BOOKS AND
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Partnership materials. The Partnerships' attempt to impose discovery limitations in this lawsuit
as a reason to cancel these statutory rights, stands Idaho law on its head.
The "business and affairs" of MRIA was the operation of Center and Mobile. MRIA has
served as the sole general partner, exercising complete control over the operation and affairs of
Center and Mobile since their inception. MRIA also has long owned a 30% interest in each of
those two limited partnerships. Saint Alphonsus's rights of access as a general partner in MRIA
to the "books and records" ofMRIA, and to "information concerning the partnership's business
and affairs," includes the requested records relating to Center and Mobile, since MRIA's
business includes managing and profiting from ownership in those limited partnerships. This
statutory right of a partner "to inspect and copy the partnership's books and records is not
conditioned on the partner's purpose or motive," but instead is "an unqualified right of access to
the partnership books and records." ld. § 53-3-403(b) official cmt. 2.

B.

As a limited partner of Center and Mobile, Saint Alphonsus has an
unconditional right to records showing all contributions by partners under
RULPA §§53-2-304(1) and 53-2-111(9)(a)

The Idaho Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, Idaho Code§ 53-2-304(1),
provides that "a limited partner may inspect and copy required information during regular
business hours in the limited partnership's principal office" and that "[t]he limited partner need
not have any particular purpose for seeking the information." Such "required information" is
defined in RULPA § 53-2-111, and includes information describing "[t]he amount of cash, and a
description and statement of the agreed value of the other benefits, contributed and agreed to be

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
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contributed by each partner," and the "the times at which, or events on the happening of which,

any additional contributions agreed to be made by each partner are to be made." ld. § 53-2111(9)(a) and (b) (emphasis added). One ofthe items requested by Saint Alphonsus is precisely
this information: "Records sufficient to show all accounting activity in the capital accounts of
each general and limited partner for the years 1985 through 2004, in order to show contributions
in, distributions out, and income retained." Ex. A, item #3. Saint Alphonsus is entitled to such
information, and "need not have any particular purpose for seeking the information." RULPA

§ 53-2-304(1 ).

C.

As a limited partner of Center and Mobile, Saint Alphonsus has further
rights to "true and full information regarding the state of activities and
financial condition of the limited partnership and other information
regarding the activities of the limited partnership as is just and reasonable,"
under RULPA §§53-2-304(2)

RULPA § 53-2-304(2) further provides that "a limited partner may obtain from the
limited partnership and inspect and copy true and full information regarding the state of the
activities and financial condition ofthe limited partnership and other information regarding the
activities of the limited partnership as is just and reasonable if:
(a) The limited partner seeks the information for a purpose
reasonably related to the partner's interest as a limited partner;
(b) The limited partner makes a demand in a record received by the
limited partnership, describing with reasonable particularity the
information sought and the purpose for seeking the information;
and
(c) The information sought is directly connected to the limited
partner's purpose.ld.
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Once again, this litigation by the Partnerships is a basis to enforce, not to deny, Saint
Alphonsus access to this information that the Partnerships seek to conceal. "True and full
information regarding the state of the activities and financial condition of the limited partnership
and other information regarding the activities of the limited partnership" are central- not merely
"reasonably related"- to Saint Alphonsus's need to defend its performance of its responsibilities
as a partner.

D.

As a limited partner of Center and Mobile, Saint Alphonsus has an
unconditional contract right to "inspect the books and records of the
Partnership at any time during normal business hours."

Limited partnership interests were sold to Saint Alphonsus and others on the basis of a
"private placement memorandum" that guaranteed without qualification that "Limited Partners
may inspect the books and records of the Partnership at any time during normal business hours."
Gjording Aff., Ex. Cat 60 (Center) and Ex. D. at 80 (Mobile). Such rights are enforceable
independent of any statutory right. See Bond Purchase, L.L. C. v. Patriot Tax Credit Properties,
L.P., 746 A.2d 842, 850 (Del. Ch. 1999) (enforcing limited partner's contractual right to certain

information independent from rights granted by limited partnership statute). For this fourth
reason, the Court should order access to the books and records of Center and Mobile.
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CONCLUSION

The Court should compel MRIA, Center, and Mobile to allow Saint Alphonsus to access,
inspect, and copy the limited financial records it seeks, as provided by statute and by contract.
DATED this 9th day of June, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

CERTIFICA'IE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on thelth day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

D
~
D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DIANE OATMAN
Deputy

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219
MEMORANDUM OF ACTIONS
TAKEN AT MAY 18,2011 HEARING

Presently before the Court are thirteen motions filed by MRIA and Saint Alphonsus.
Hearing was held on May 18, 2011, where the Court issued several rulings from the bench, and
took all other motions under advisement. The Court now issues this memorandum of the actions
taken at that hearing.
Decisions Made from the Bench

L Motion for Recusal
Saint Alphonsus sought to have Judge Wetherell recuse himself due to his relationship
with one of the partners ofMRI Associates. After hearing argument, the Court found that Judge
Wetherell's doctor-patient relationship that ended seventeen years ago with one of the partners
does not give rise to an appearance of impropriety. The Court further noted that it had contacted
counsel for the Judicial Council and that counsel shared the opinion of the Court that Judge
Wetherell's relationship with Dr. Henson did not give rise to an appearance of impropriety based
on the facts in this case. Thus, the Court DENIED Saint Alphonsus's motion for recusal.

~andumOfActionsTaken I
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2. Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Claim for Declaratory Relief
Saint Alphonsus moved for summary judgment on the MRIA's claim for declaratory
relief that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal was wrongful under the RUPA. Because this matter
was unopposed, the Court GRANTED Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment on
MRIA's claim for declaratory relief.
3. Motion in Limine Re: References to the Prior Jury's Finding of Liability
Because the parties were in agreement that there should be no references to the prior
jury's findings, the Court GRANTED Saint Alphonsus' s motion in limine. The Court further
ruled that the parties must reference the prior trial as a "prior proceeding" without indicating to
the jury the nature of the proceeding.
4. Motion in Limine Re: References to Supreme Court Opinion
Because the parties were in agreement that there should be no references to the fact that
the Supreme Court heard this case, the Court GRANTED MRIA' s motion in limine. The Court
further ruled that any reference to the appellate proceedings must refer to a "prior proceeding"
without indicating the nature of the proceeding.
5. Motion in Limine Re: Voluntarily Dismissed Claims
Because the parties were in substantial agreement, the Court GRANTED Saint
Alphonsus' s motion in limine seeking declaration that MRIA had dismissed its libel and
misappropriation of trade secrets claims. The Court RESERVED ruling on the impact of the
ruling on the admissibility of evidence until trial.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DIANE OATMAN
Deputy

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219
CONSOLIDATED ORDER RE: MOTIONS
IN LIMINE HEARD MAY 18,2011

---------------------------- )
Presently before the Court are a number of motions in limine filed by both parties.
Hearing was held on May 18, 2011, and the matter was taken under advisement that day. The
Court now issues the following order.
DISCUSSION
I. Motions in Limine Re: Argument and Evidence of the Lawfulness or Impropriety of Saint
Alphonsus' s Dissociation from MRIA

Both MRIA and Saint Alphonsus argue that the opposing party should not be allowed to
argue or otherwise comment on the propriety or lawfulness of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation
from MRIA.

The issue of whether Saint Alphonsus was allowed to dissociate was wholly

disposed of in this Court's May 6, 2011, decision in which it decided that Saint Alphonsus could
not be held liable for the bare act of dissociating.
Alphonsus' s dissociation from MRIA is not at issue.

Consequently, the propriety of Saint
Thus, evidence, argument, or other

comment regarding the propriety of MRIA's dissociation is irrelevant, and potentially unfairly
prejudicial. Thus, such evidence, argument, or comment is precluded as to both parties under

~
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Idaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403.
Saint Alphonsus specifically seeks to have portions of three trial exhibits (Trial Exhibits
4138, 4234, and 4239) excluded. As to Trial Exhibit 4138, "Scenario 5," section one (1) ofthe
portion entitled "Considerations" is irrelevant to the matters remaining in this litigation. That
portion of Trial Exhibit 4138 deals purely with dissociation from MRIA.

Because Saint

Alphonsus's dissociation is not at issue, the highlighted portion of Exhibit A of the Affidavit of
Jack Gjording is excluded.
As to Trial Exhibits 4234 and 4239 1, the sentence "SARMC has been advised by counsel
that this option would likely engender litigation with MRIA" is potentially relevant to MRIA's
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Consequently, the Court will not exclude that sentence at this time. The sentences regarding
Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal or termination must be redacted because Saint Alphonsus's
dissociation is no longer at issue. The "scorched earth" language must be redacted for the
reasons set forth in J. McLaughlin's July 30, 2007 order. However, the language regarding the
"risk of St. Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary duty to the LPs" is potentially relevant to the
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of good faith a fair dealing and the
Court will not exclude that language at this time.
II. Motion in Limine Re: J. McLaughlin's Prior Rulings
Saint Alphonsus seeks to have J. McLaughlin's May 7, 2007 Order Excluding Expert
Report of Douglas M. Branson, August 6, 2007 Order Excluding Carl Harder Letter, August 27,
2007 Order Admitting Statements of Dr. Roger Curran, and portions of the July 30, 2007
Memorandum Decision on various motions in limine reinstated as law of the case.

Saint

1

These trial exhibits are the subject of another motion in limine filed by Saint Alphonsus discussed below in Section
II of this decision.
OrderRe:MotionForSummaryJudgment 2
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Alphonsus also wishes to have other portions of J. McLaughlin's July 30, 2007 Decision
declared invalid.

Saint Alphonsus also wishes for this Court to revisit two portions of J.

McLaughlin's July 30, 2007 Decision.
The parties are entirely in agreement as to the portions of the July 30, 2007 Decision that
should be reinstated except for Decisions 1 and 9. Consequently, the May 7, 2007, Order;
August 6, 2007, Order; August 27, 2007, Order; and the July 30, 2007, rulings on Motions 7, 8,
10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, and 18 are hereby reinstated as law of the case. The July 30, 2007,
rulings on Motions 2, 3, 4, 5, 14, 19, and 20 are not reinstated. Because the Supreme Court did
not reverse J. McLaughlin's July 30, 2007, Decision as to the admissibility of the statements
regarding counsel's advice, the July 30, 2007, rulings are reinstated insofar as those decisions are
consistent with this Court's ruling in Section I of this Order.
III. Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of Subsequent Competition
Saint Alphonsus seeks to have evidence of its competition with MRIA following the
expiration of its noncompetition agreement excluded. Specifically, Saint Alphonsus seeks to
have evidence relating to the installation of the IMI magnets on the Saint Alphonsus campus,
relating to patients having to walk outside to reach the temporary IMI magnets, relating to Saint
Alphonsus directing its doctors to refer patients to IMI, relating to damages from the IMI magnet
on the Saint Alphonsus campus, and relating to IMI' s Eagle facility.
The parties and this Court agree in principle that MRIA should not be allowed to
introduce evidence of competition that is not somehow related to a wrongful conduct on the part
of Saint Alphonsus. Saint Alphonsus had no duty not to compete after the expiration of the
noncompetition agreement. However, with the exception of the evidence that Saint Alphonsus's
patients had to walk outside in the cold to reach the IMI magnet, the Court believes that MRIA

OrderRe:MotionForSummaryJudgment 3
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could potentially show that the specific pieces of evidence Saint Alphonsus is seeking to exclude
are related to damages and to wrongful conduct on the part of Saint Alphonsus. Thus, the
evidence that patients had to walk outside to reach the IMI magnet is excluded because it has
little or no probative value, and carries with it substantial risk of unfair prejudice. The Court
reserves ruling on whether the remaining evidence should be excluded until the case is further
developed. However, the Court will again note that the Supreme Court ruling in this case creates
an extremely strong presumption that damages argued to have been incurred after December 31,
2015, do not establish a proper basis for an award of damages against Saint Alphonsus.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Saint Alphonsus's motion in limine regarding argument that its
withdrawal was improper is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Saint Alphonsus's motion
in limine regarding J. McLaughlin's rulings is hereby GRANTED as to Parts I, II(a) and II(b).
Saint Alphonsus's motion in limine regarding evidence of competition is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part, with ruling on most of the evidence sought to be excluded reserved. The

parties are advised that this Court's rulings on these motions in limine are subject to revision as
the case develops before or during trial. If the parties feel the Court has failed to address any of
the motions filed or issues raised, they are both free to advise the Court to that fact so the Court
may, if necessary, make additional findings, or, if deemed appropriate, hold additional hearing on
the previously-raised issues.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this

OrderRe:MotionForSummaryJudgment 4
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Opposition to Saint Alphonsus Diversified
Care, Inc.'s ("Saint Alphonsus") Motion to Compel Compliance with Statutory Rights to Inspect
Partnership Books and Records (the "Motion to Compel").

I.

INTRODUCTION

Saint Alphonsus's chief argument in its Motion to Compel is that because there is a right
to inspect books as between partners, Saint Alphonsus is immune from having to comply with
this Court's discovery orders or even the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This argument is
nothing short of reckless, since, taken to its logical conclusion, it posits that if a lawsuit exists as
between parties with a right of inspection of corporate books and records, discovery quite
literally can never end-in this or in any other case-because these parties will always have the
right to obtain documents from one another, even in the middle of trial and even when there are
specific orders otherwise prohibiting such discovery. Put another way, Saint Alphonsus reads
the rights of inspection ofpartnership and corporate books found in various Idaho statutes to be a
license to ignore direct court orders. Unsurprisingly, Saint Alphonsus has cited no cases from
any jurisdiction which support this novel argument, and there is substantial case law to the
contrary. Indeed, its position here would do palpable harm to the "long recognized [Idaho rule]
that courts have broad, inherent powers to control discovery." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho
867, 878, 136 P.3d 338, 349 (2006). Saint Alphonsus's Motion must be dismissed.

II.

FACTS

As this Court already knows, this case has been pending in earnest since April2005.
There have been two protracted discovery periods during that time, one of which is still open.
However, as the Court noted in its February 15, 2011 Order (the "Order"), because this case is on
remand, the scope of the discovery that can currently be sought is very limited. In spite of these
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years of litigation and discovery, Saint Alphonsus has suddenly decided, on the eve of trial, that
it made errors in its original discovery efforts and accordingly still does not have all the
documents it wants. Unfortunately for Saint Alphonsus, the documents it desires clearly fall
outside the exception found in the Court's Order and therefore cannot be sought now. Clearly
cognizant of that prohibition, Saint Alphonsus, in a rather desperate move, chose to submit its
requests by letter from an officer of the corporation, rather than at its attorneys' hand, thus
pretending that they are not seeking these documents as "discovery," but instead pursuant to
statutes which allow partners to see the partnership's books and records. See Ex. A. to the
Affidavit of J. Gjording in Support of Motion to Compel (hereinafter "Gjording Aff.").
MRIA immediately saw this ruse for what it was: a naked attempt to circumvent this
Court's February 15 Scheduling Order and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, MRIA
responded that if Saint Alphonsus wants documents related to this litigation-as Saint Alphonsus
has repeatedly admitted is the purpose of its request 1-then the manner to go about obtaining
them would be through the normal channels of discovery. See id. at Ex. B.
Instead, Saint Alphonsus chose to file this Motion to Compel-without having conducted
a meet-and-confer conference-in which it essentially asks the Court to sanction its unfair
backdoor methods of discovery. As noted in that Motion, Saint Alphonsus argues that because
partners can seek documents from the partnership, Saint Alphonsus is essentially free to ignore
the Rules of Civil Procedure and court orders governing scheduling and discovery. See Motion
to Compel, p. 3. Saint Alphonsus does not develop this facially-untenable contention in any
meaningful way; its total argument in this regard is a little less than a paragraph. /d. The
remainder of its Motion to Compel-about seven pages or so-is taken up with a largely
irrelevant discussion of how it would have a right to these documents if no suit had been
1

See Ex. A. to the Gjording Aff., p. 2; Motion to Compel, pp. 6-7.
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commenced. See generally, id. Given that a suit has been pending for years, most of Saint
Alphonsus's Motion to Compel is beside the point.
Again, Saint Alphonsus's argument has far-reaching and troubling implications, both in
this case and others. By its logic, this Court is powerless to stop Saint Alphonsus from seeking
discovery "related to the partnership" not just now, but even after discovery closes and even
while trial is pending, because its rights to documents exist independent of this lawsuit.
Moreover, its argument goes well beyond just this lawsuit, since all partners/limited partners
would have these same rights, as would almost any owner of a business entity, such as corporate
shareholders and LLC members. See, e.g., I.C. § 30-1-1602 (shareholder's right to inspect
corporation's books),§ 30-3-131 (non-profits),§ 30-6-410 (LLCs). As such, Saint Alphonsus is
essentially arguing that no Idaho court can ever effectively limit discovery in any case between a
partner and a partnership, a member and an LLC, a corporation and shareholder, and a whole
slew of other similar relationships, because the parties in those suits will always have the right to
obtain documents, even when the Court specifically tells them they cannot. This argument is
disquieting, to say the least.

III.
A.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

The fact that a party once had the statutory right to obtain documents becomes
irrelevant once a suit is commenced.
Saint Alphonsus's principal argument-that it is free to ignore court orders limiting

discovery so long as it has a preexisting right to conduct an inspection-is false. As might be
expected, Saint Alphonsus has cited no authority for this extraordinary proposition, and there is
considerable case law to the contrary.
While it appears that no party in Idaho has attempted to seriously assert this flawed
argument, there are several cases from federal courts which are on point. For example, in Smith
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v. Union Pacific R. Co., 878 F. Supp. 171 (D. Colo. 1995), the Court was faced with similar
arguments to those presented here. In that case, Union Pacific had a pre-existing right to conduct
a physical examination of a man named Smith. !d. at 172. However, Smith and Union Pacific
had since commenced suit, and the results of the physical evaluation would be arguably relevant
to the issues in that suit. !d. Just like Saint Alphonsus here, Union Pacific argued that because
its right to conduct an examination existed independent of, and prior to, the suit between the
parties, Union Pacific had the right to conduct its physical evaluation of Smith regardless of a
discovery order prohibiting medical examinations. !d.
The Smith Court balked at Union Pacific's argument, holding that once a suit is
commenced, the "orders of the court shall govern the relationship ofthe parties," regardless of
any preexisting rights:
UP counters the "back to work" physical at issue predates Magistrate-Judge
Schlatter's Order. .. I find UP's argument facile and unpersuasive. Clearly the
"back-to-work" physical at issue bears directly on the issues pending in this case.
. . . To the extent the "back-to-work" physical and ensuing disciplinary
proceedings bear on issues relevant to this FELA action and generate facts or
medical opinions that could be used as evidence against Smith, it constitutes
"discovery" within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) and is subject to this
court's authority under Rule 26(c) ... to manage and control "as justice requires."
. . . As long as this case is pending, the parties shall regulate their conduct
regarding all matters relevant to this case in accordance with the letter and spirit
of the orders issued by this court.

!d. at 172-73 (emphasis added).
Put more simply, then, the Smith Court found that any outside right to conduct
"discovery" was suspended while the court had jurisdiction, if the results of that discovery
"could be used as evidence" in the case at hand. !d. Critically, the Court unambiguously stated
that once a suit is commenced, such alternative methods were considered to be "discovery"
under the Federal Rules and thus subject to the Court's control, regardless of any previous rights.

!d. Notably, the Smith Court was frank that it considered Union Pacific's choice to ignore the
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 5
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discovery order at issue in that case in favor of its putative independent right to examine Smith to
be very close to sanctionable. !d.
Several other cases are in agreement. See, e.g., Partida v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 221
F.R.D. 623, 629-30 (C.D. Cal. 2004) ("Since it appears that Union Pacific is indirectly obtaining
these medical examinations to assist them in resisting Plaintiffs claim, these actions constitute
discovery subject to the Court's authority"); Vicary v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 942 F. Supp.
1146, 1148-50 (N.D. Ohio 1996) ("Conrail's effort to circumvent the rules [by exercising a preexisting right to inspection] threatens the integrity of the judicial process ... and endangers the
right to ... a fair trial").
In this case, Saint Alphonsus makes all the same arguments as Union Pacific did in

Smith. Like Union Pacific, it argues that it has a pre-existing and independent right to obtain
certain information from MRIA. And like Union Pacific, it argues that even though the Court
here has issued orders which would otherwise govern the requests for documents found in its
letter, Saint Alphonsus can ignore those orders because of its pre-existing right to inspection.
Indeed, Saint Alphonsus goes a step further than Union Pacific, in that it outright admits that its
requests are not just possibly relevant to the issue of this case, but that they are specifically being
sought for use in this case. See Ex. A. to the Gjording Aff., p. 2; Motion to Compel, pp. 6-7. As
such, as in Smith, Saint Alphonsus's letter is intended to "generate [documents] that could be
used as evidence" in this matter and therefore unmistakably "constitutes discovery" which is
"subject to this Court's authority." Smith, 878 F. Supp. at 173.
Put more simply, because Saint Alphonsus is seeking documents for use in this case from
MRIA, it is unquestionably seeking "discovery," regardless of its own characterization of its
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requests. Id; Partida, 221 F.R.D. at 629-30. As such, it was obligated to follow the
requirements ofRules 16 and 34 and the Court's orders. It has obviously failed to do so.
B.

Saint Alphonsus's requests violate both the letter and the spirit of this Court's
February 15 Order.
Even if Saint Alphonsus was not required by the law to obey the rules of discovery as it

relates to the requests, there is no doubt that it is required to do so by this Court's Order. Again,
on February 15, 2011, this Court issued an Order in which it specifically stated that there was no
reason to allow the parties to seek documents from each other for use in this case, except as to
one very limited subject. Order, pp. 2-4. Moreover, this Court very pointedly informed the
parties that they were "bound" to only seek documents in the manner prescribed by the Court.

Id Clearly, Saint Alphonsus requests are in violation of that Order, since they do not relate to
the exception stated by the Court therein (see below) and therefore do nothing less than seek to
fully re-open discovery.
Obviously, in hopes of avoiding the ire of this Court, Saint Alphonsus has argued that it
is not seeking the "discovery" unambiguously prohibited by the Court; it is simply making a
request under certain partnership acts. This argument is severely flawed. First, as noted above,
if Saint Alphonsus is seeking documents from a litigant for use in this case, it is seeking
"discovery" as a matter oflaw. See Smith at 878 F. Supp. at 172-73; Partida, 221 F.R.D. at 62930. But more fundamentally, this argument puts the cart before the horse. Because the Order
specifically spells out how and when documents for use in this case can be obtained, the
unavoidable truth is that Saint Alphonsus cannot exercise whatever other rights it might have
under these books-and-records statutes without first violating the Order.
Given this backdrop, what is perhaps most ironic about Saint Alphonsus' s Motion to
Compel is not just that it is seeking to violate the letter and spirit of this Court's February 15
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Order and re-open discovery, but that it is unabashedly seeking aid from the Court to help it do
so. However, all the reasons this Court chose to enter its February 15 Order still apply, and there
is no justification for this Court to consider this de facto motion to re-open discovery now, with
mere months to go before trial. Indeed, the rationales for leaving discovery mostly closed cited
by the Court in its Order seem even more important now, given that trial is mere months away
and the parties should be preparing for it rather than re-opening discovery in earnest. Indeed, as
one federal case has noted, re-opening
discovery now at the 11th hour is problematic both for not only all counsel who
should be gearing up for a complex jury trial. .. but for ... the trial judge as well. To
force counsel to take their limited time and resources away from their trial
preparation now to engage in even limited discovery is unreasonable. . . . A
primary purpose of the Rule 16, RCvP, scheduling order, which sets, among
others, a discovery deadline, is to avoid just this kind of last minute rush.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Pointe Tapatio Resort, 206 F.R.D. 495, 498 (D. Ariz. 2002).

Notably, Saint Alphonsus goes even beyond the denied request made in Mutual Life, in
that the party seeking to re-open discovery there was seeking to re-open it for all parties. Id.
Here, because the statutes Saint Alphonsus refers to only allow a partner to seek documents from
the partnership--and not the other way around-Saint Alphonsus is essentially seeking only to
only re-open discovery for its benefit, i.e., where only it gets to ask for documents and MRIA
only gets to produce. Thus, under Saint Alphonsus's plan, even though it was Saint Alphonsus
that made the mistakes in its original document gathering that has led it here, it is MRIA that will
pay the price for those mistakes by having to produce new documents for Saint Alphonsus's
benefit on the eve of trial. This would be an absurd result.

C.

MRIA has already complied with I. C. §§ 53-2-304 and 53-3-403 and the private
placement memoranda.

Saint Alphonsus also errs when it contends that MRIA has failed to make the requested
records available to it. That is, even if Saint Alphonsus had the right to blithely ignore this
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Court's discovery orders and seek the documents in its letter through I. C. §§ 53-2-304 and
53-3-403 and the referenced private placement memoranda, MRIA has long since fulfilled its
obligations under those statutes and contracts. As Saint Alphonsus admits, I.C. § 53-3-403's
only requirement is that a partnership provide partners and former partners "access to its books
and records," and I.C. § 53-2-304 only requires it to provide the opportunity to "inspect and copy
true and full information regarding ... the partnership." Similarly, the private placement
memoranda require only that the partnership provide an opportunity to "inspect the books and
records of the Partnership." See Exs. C and D to the Gjording Aff.
In this case, MRIA has indisputably provided that access and opportunity to inspect. In
specific, the parties began litigating this case in earnest in April 2005. Discovery in this matter
continued well past May 2007. See the Notice of Service for MRIA's Responses to SARMC's
Fifth Set of Interrogatories and Eighth Set of Requests for Production, filed on May 31, 2007.
During that lengthy amount of time-over two years of very active discovery-Saint Alphonsus
had every opportunity in the world to inspect the books and records of the partnerships in regard
to the subject matter found in its recent requests. Indeed, given that the bounds of relevance in
this case are arguably more expansive than the documents allowed to be sought in I.C. §§ 53-2304 and 53-3-403, Saint Alphonsus had largely unfettered access not just to the records it seeks
now, but much, much more as well. And it had that access for years.
Critically, Saint Alphonsus took full advantage of that opportunity to inspect and
examine MRIA's books and records. Saint Alphonsus made at least eight sets of requests for
documents from MRIA, with at least 80 separate requests. See id. Indeed, MRIA's records
indicate that as many as 200,000 pages of documents were exchanged as a result.
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Consequently, Saint Alphonsus's argument that it has been denied access to documents it
is entitled to by statute or contract is absolutely false. For almost two years, Saint Alphonsus had
almost unrestricted access to virtually any partnership record it wanted. Indeed, MRIA went to
great lengths and efforts to provide every document reasonably requested by Saint Alphonsus
which was relevant to the partnerships. As such, there can be no dispute that MRIA has more
than complied with whatever independent duty it had, if any, to "provide former partners and the
agents and attorneys access to books and records pertaining to the period during which they were
partners." I.C. § 53-3-403. Indeed, providing that access was the entire point of discovery.
As a result, what Saint Alphonsus seems to be arguing is not that it has not had an
opportunity to examine the records it wants-because it clearly has-but that it has just realized
that it made critical mistakes over the course of the two years it had complete access and now
wants to see them again at the eve of trial. In this regard, Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P. v.
Motient Corp., 906 A.2d 156, 165-66 (Del.Ch. 2006), a case out of Delaware, is very instructive.

In that case, a stockholder filed at least two lawsuits alleging mismanagement of a corporation.
Id Like Saint Alphonsus, the stockholder in Highland Select had an opportunity to obtain

information related to its claims from the corporation in the discovery phases of those cases. Id
Nonetheless, the stockholder, through no fault of the corporation, failed to obtain the records it
wanted in discovery (the stockholder eventually stayed discovery). However, realizing its
mistake, the stockholder then turned around and sought the exact same information it previously
had access to in discovery in the form of a books-and-records request similar to the ones at issue
in this case. The Court denied the request, stating that the stockholder had already had the ability
to obtain the records he sought in discovery, and that as a result, for him to now seek those same
kinds of documents in a books-and-records request was patently unfair:
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[The stockholder] filed that Section 220 demand [for access to books and records]
despite the fact that it (or its affiliates) could have conducted full discovery into
the very same questions of mismanagement in various other cases filed in Texas
federal and state court, but chose to foreclose that possibility by [staying the
case]. Of course, there is nothing objectionable about availing oneself of federal
rights to stay discovery. But that action should not then be followed by a Section
220 demand that seeks what amounts to one-way discovery into the same matters.

Id
Here, Saint Alphonsus is doing much as the same thing as the stockholder in Highland
Select. Despite having had a nearly two-year window in which to "conduct[] full discovery into
the very same" matters as are delineated in its recent document requests, it nonetheless has filed
a books-and-records "demand that seeks what amounts to one-way discovery into the same
matters." Jd Like the Court in Highland Select, this Court should deny that request as unfair.
D.

Saint Alphonsus's requests fall outside of this Court's February 15, 2011, discovery
exception.
As discussed above, Saint Alphonsus has been careful to not call its recent requests for

documents "discovery requests"-even though that is precisely what they are as a matter of law.
See Smith, 878 F. Supp. at 172-73; Partida, 221 F.R.D. at 629-30. As such, it has not delved into
a discussion of whether they fall into the exception to this Court's February 15, 2011, Order.
Indeed, the fact that Saint Alphonsus tried this "unorthodox" route to obtain its discoveryrather than a Rule 34 request-suggests that it concedes that the exception does not apply to its
request. Nonetheless, given that the window is still open for seeking documents pursuant to the
exception, it seems likely that if Saint Alphonsus loses here, it may make a misguided attempt to
pigeonhole its requests into it. In an effort to avoid having to argue another motion to compel
later, MRIA briefly addresses this issue.
As this Court knows, it allowed discovery solely on the limited issue of "determining
what damages would have been given different beginning and end dates for the lost profit
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calculations." Order, p. 4. None of Saint Alphonsus's new requests fit into that category. In
specific, none of the requests deal in any meaningful way with the timing of damages. Instead,
they are simply requests for documents related to financial statements, partnership distributions,
accounting activity, and partnership loans for the time Saint Alphonsus was a partner. As such,
they do not relate to any discovery concerning "different beginning and end dates" for lost
profits.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Saint Alphonsus's June 2, 2011, letter is an obvious and unfortunate attempt to
circumvent the Rules and this Court's Order. If Saint Alphonsus's Motion were granted, it
would essentially re-open discovery solely for Saint Alphonsus's benefit-and at MRIA's
detriment-at the eleventh hour. It should be denied.
DATED this 15th day of June 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

-W~.~<~

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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ORIG!~JAL

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
MRIA's overwrought Opposition dismisses Saint Alphonsus's request for enforcement of
its statutory rights of access to partnership records as "nothing short of reckless" (page 2) "a
rather desperate move," a "ruse" and "a naked attempt" (page 3) "on the eve of trial" (page 3;
repeated on page 8) based on arguments that are "absolutely false" (page 10), "to circumvent this
Court's February 15 Scheduling Order and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure" (page 3).
Saint Alphonsus's motion is nothing of the kind. Nor is it an extravagant claim that
"discovery quite literally can never end" (Opp. at 3; emphasis in original), or that "no Idaho
court can ever effectively limit discovery in any case" (Opp. at 4; emphasis in original), or that a
party may demand records "even in the middle of trial" and "even when there are specific orders
otherwise prohibiting such discovery" (Opp. at 3).
MRIA identifies the issue exactly-but gets the answer 180 degrees wrong-when it
argues that "[t]he fact that a party once had the statutory right to obtain documents becomes
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irrelevant once a suit is commenced." Opp. at 4 (emphasis added). Saint Alphonsus was a
general partner of MRIA from 1985 until 2004, and remains a limited partner of Center and
Mobile to this day, but MRIA asserts that its express statutory rights of access to examine
partnership and limited partnership records were suspended because its dispute with MRIA went
to court. In this case, in MRIA's view, these statutory rights were suspended for the duration of
the litigation, presumably when suit was filed in 2005, but certainly no later than the close of
discovery in 2007. Further, they remain suspended now, given the narrow limits on this Court's
February 15, 2011 Order reopening discovery.
MRIA thus asserts that a partner's statutory rights of access to basic financial information
about the partnership are categorically unavailable precisely when they are most relevant: during
a serious dispute concerning the partnership. But nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure, and
certainly nothing in RUPA or RULPA, "turns off' the partnership laws in that way.
The records access provisions of RUP A and RULP A are a form of "sunshine" law aimed
at improving business conduct by allowing general access by defined interested persons to
critical categories of basic documents. This access is not "discovery," but rather a statutory right
held by particular persons to investigate specified categories ofdocuments central to the proper
operation and management of the business. 1 The statutory right is thus markedly less
burdensome for all parties than conventional discovery in a litigation, since it involves no series

1

See, e.g., Am. Bank v. City of Menasha, 627 F .3d 261, 265 (7th Cir. 201 0) (Posner, J.)
(noting that "[t]he word 'discovery' is not a synonym for investigation" and that "requests made
under [a statutory] provision" that "entitles shareholders to inspect corporate books and records
for 'any proper purpose' ... are not discovery demands" (citations omitted)).
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of requests and responses, but simply the allowance of access to, and copying of, the covered
documents. The fact that these partnership records are relevant to litigation about a dispute
among partners concerning partnership affairs is all the more reason to enforce, not to frustrate,
these basic partnership rights.
As one court has held in rejecting the very line of cases cited by MRIA, "nothing in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the Rules are the only way that parties can obtain
information from each other" and nothing in the Federal Rules "preclude[s] either party from
asserting rights [to information] independent of this action." Purscell v. So. Pac. Trans. Co.,
No. 99-2282, 2000 WL 33117432, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2000) (enforcing rights to
information under collective bargaining agreement and criticizing Smith v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
878 F. Supp. 171 (D. Colo. 1995), and its progeny).
Other courts have held in related contexts that "there is no rule that the parties to a
lawsuit may only gather evidence through the formal discovery devices created by the federal
rules of civil procedure," Jackson v. First Federal Sav. ofArkansas, 709 F. Supp. 887,889 (E.D.
Ark. 1989), and that use of alternative statutory means of obtaining documents that "may be
exempt from discovery does not mean that it will be exempt from demand" made on another
legal basis, Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dep't ofJustice, 677 F.2d 931,936 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(demand under FOIA). 2 Indeed, some courts have viewed the availability of statutory access to

2

See also Am. Bank, 627 F.3d at 265 ("[t]he case law uniformly refuses to define
requests for access to federal or state public records under public-records laws ... as discovery
demands, even when ... the request is made for the purpose of obtaining information to aid in a
litigation" (citing numerous authorities)).
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books and records as a basis to decline to initiate sometimes cumbersome discovery under the
Rules of Civil Procedure. See In re MIPS Techs., Inc. Derivative Litig., 542 F. Supp. 2d 968,
979-80 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 3 In sum, a partner's clear rights of access to business books and
records remain available to parties in disputes, notwithstanding assertions that they are a way to
secure "back door" discovery in a lawsuit. Henshaw v. Am. Cement Corp., 252 A.2d 125, 129
(Del. Ch. 1969). 4
Finally, MRIA's purported authorities to the contrary have been criticized even in the
narrow factual setting in which they were decided, which itself has no application to this case.
MRIA cites only three cases-the latter two merely citing the first-in which railroad defendants
sought intrusive physical examinations or medical histories from employee plaintiffs, invoking
rights created not by statute but by collective bargaining contracts, Smith v. Union Pac. R. Co.,
878 F. Supp. 171, 172 (D. Colo. 1995); Partida v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 221 F.R.D. 623,627,
629-30 (C.D Cal. 2004) (citing Smith), or "with no showing of need or legal justification"
3

In MIPS, the court rejected a shareholder's request to lift a discovery stay because "as a
shareholder" he had the "ability to inspect corporate books and records" granted by statute, and
"[t]he court fails to comprehend what 'limited' discovery could be conducted [under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure] for the purpose of amending [his] complaint that cannot be done
through a books-and-records request." 542 F. Supp. at 979-80; see also Sanchez v. Saylor,
13 P.3d 960, 973 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting sanctions for alleged discovery misconduct,
among other reasons, because movant could have obtained the same information by invoking his
judicially enforceable "right to inspect partnership books and records").
4

See, e.g., Wolffv. Arctic Bowl, Inc., 560 P.2d 758,770-771 & n.14 (Alaska 1977)
(holding that although party was not entitled to additional discovery for certain corporate
records, he was nonetheless still "entitled under [state statute] to inspect the [opponent's] booksand-records"); cf Durham v. Durham, 871 A.2d 41, 47 (N.H. 2005) ("[t]he plaintiffs right as a
shareholder to inspect corporate records differs from his right to production of documents
through discovery as a litigant in this matter").
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whatsoever, Vicary v. Consol. Rail Corp., 942 F. Supp. 1146, 1148-50 (N.D. Ohio 1996). Even
in that wildly different factual context, the Smith decision and its progeny have been questioned
as "ill-conceived."5 Those cases do not remotely undermine Saint Alphonsus's statutory rights
of access to partnership records under RUP A and RULP A. 6
As even MRIA is forced to concede, Saint Alphonsus's requests "are simply requests for
documents related to financial statements, partnership distributions, accounting activity, and
partnership loans for the time Saint Alphonsus was a partner." Opp. at 12. These requests were
made June 1, 2011, three months ahead oftrial. They are not disruptive, and they are squarely
within Saint Alphonsus's rights under RUPA and RULPA. MRIA could have complied with
these simple requests with far less effort than was spent on its fulminations in opposition. The
Court should direct that it do so.
CONCLUSION
The Court should compel MRIA, Center, and Mobile to allow Saint Alphonsus to access,
inspect, and copy the limited financial records it seeks, as provided by statute and by contract.

5

Schnelle v. Soo LineR. Co., 976 F. Supp. 849, 853 (D. Minn. 1997) ("[t]o intrude upon
a grievance procedure, which was congressionally designed to be exclusive, under the guise of
case management, seems short-sighted, at best"); see also Purcell, 2000 WL 33117432, at *2-3.
6

Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P. v. Motient Corp., 906 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 2006)
(cited in Opp. at 10), is equally unavailing; there, the requesting party's extensive, discovery-like
requests were "broadly inconsistent with that statutory scheme," which envisioned "a narrow
request calling for the production of only a small number of categories of particular documents."
Id. at 164-65, 168.
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DATED this 17th day of June, 2011.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTJ

UN 1 7 2011
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk
By DIANE OATMAN '
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, INC., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Defendant.
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Case No. CV -OC-2004-08219
CONSOLIDATED ORDER RE:
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT HEARD MAY 18, 2011

Presently before the Court are several motions for summary judgment filed by Saint
Alphonsus and a related Motion for Clarification filed by MRI Associates. Hearing was held on
May 18, 2011, and the matter was taken under advisement. The Court now issues the following
opm10n.

BACKGROUND
In 1985, Saint Alphonsus and several other parties formed a partnership called MRI
Associates (MRIA) for the purpose of acquiring and operating magnetic resonance imaging
devices.

MRIA formed two limited partnerships through which it conducted its business of

operating the MRI machines. St. Alphonsus ultimately dissociated from MRIA and entered into
another partnership that operated MRI machines and began competing with MRIA. Afterward,
Saint Alphonsus brought suit for the share of the partnership to which it was entitled under Idaho
Code Section 53-3-701. MRIA counterclaimed against Saint Alphonsus on several theories.
At trial, the court, with Judge McLaughlin presiding, determined the share of MRIA to

/
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which Saint Alphonsus was entitled upon dissociation from MRIA, determining that the RUP A,
not the partnership agreement, governed the calculation. In the same opinion, it also addressed
whether the partnership agreement expressly limited Saint Alphonsus's right to dissociate from
MRIA. The trial court also determined that it was appropriate for MRIA to seek damages from
Saint Alphonsus on behalf of its limited partnerships. After trial, both sides appealed numerous
issues, including the issue of whether MRIA could collect damages on behalf of the limited
partnerships it had organized.
The Supreme Court reversed several decisions of the trial court, including its decision that
Saint Alphonsus could collect damages on behalf of the limited partnerships. The Supreme Court
remanded this cause for new trial, and now both parties move for partial summary judgment on
several issues.

DISCUSSION
Summary judgment may be entered when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c); see also

Kelso v. Lance, 134 Idaho 373, 375, 3 P.3d 51, 53 (2000). In a summary judgment context, the
moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. BMC West

Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 893, 174 P.3d 399, 402 (2007). However, the non-moving party
"cannot rest on mere speculation because a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a
genuine issue of fact." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991). Furthermore,
the non-moving party may not rest on bare allegations or denials; it must set forth specific facts
that show a genuine issue. Vebillis v. Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335, 689 P.2d 227
(Ct. App. 1984). However, the disputed facts are construed liberally in favor of the non-moving
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. party, and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are drawn in favor of the non-moving
party. BMC West, 144 Idaho at 893, 174 P.3d at 402.
I. Motion for Clarification and Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Saint Alphonsus's
Partnership Share

MRI Associates filed a motion for clarification on whether this Court will revisit Judge
McLaughlin's decision as to the share to which Saint Alphonsus was entitled upon dissociation
from MRIA.

MRIA argues that Judge McLaughlin's decision was inextricably linked to his

decision that the partnership agreement expressly limited Saint Alphonsus' s right to dissociate
from MRIA, and thus the ruling on the partnership share was affected by the Supreme Court's
decision in this case. Saint Alphonsus contemporaneously filed a motion for summary judgment
asking this Court to reinstate Judge McLaughlin's decision on the ground that Judge McLaughlin's
decision was not affected by the Supreme Court's decision in this case.
The Court does not believe that Judge McLaughlin's decision as to Saint Alphonsus's share
upon dissociation from MRIA was affected by the Supreme Court's decision regarding the
propriety of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation. The Supreme Court's decision was limited to whether
the Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from MRIA was in contravention of an express term of the
partnership agreement. It concluded that Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation was not in contravention
of an express term of the partnership agreement. In doing so, it determined that Section 6.1 of the
partnership agreement, delineating circumstances in which partners could rightfully dissociate, did
not expressly limit the right to dissociate. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed Judge
McLaughlin's decision that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated in contravention of an
express term of the partnership agreement as a matter of law.
In the same opinion reversed by the Supreme Court, Judge McLaughlin determined that the
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contractual buyout provisions only applied in the circumstances enumerated in Section 6.1. Noting
that all of the reasons for dissociation listed in Section 6.1 would require Saint Alphonsus to
dissociate on short notice, the Court reasoned that the buyout provision was designed to protect
MRIA from a liquidity shortage in the event Saint Alphonsus had to dissociate from the
partnership. Judge McLaughlin ultimately ruled that because Saint Alphonsus had not dissociated
for one of the reasons listed in Section 6.1, the buyout provision of the contract did not apply, and
the RUP A provision applied.
The Supreme Court reversed Judge McLaughlin based upon his interpretation of RUP A
provisions that are irrelevant to Judge McLaughlin's analysis of the buyout provisions.
Conspicuously absent from Judge McLaughlin's opinion regarding the buyout provision is any
reference to the rightfulness of wrongfulness of dissociations. Consequently, the Court cannot find
that the Supreme Court's opinion affects Judge McLaughlin's opinion regarding the buyout
provisions of the partnership agreement. Judge McLaughlin's decision regarding the share of the
partnership to which Saint Alphonsus is entitled stands and remains the law of the case.
II. Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Saint Alphonsus's Second Affirmative Defense and
MRIA's Motion to Strike.
Saint Alphonsus moves for summary judgment seeking to have any damages ultimately
awarded against it reduced by approximately half. Saint Alphonsus argues that Idaho law provides
for a reduction of damages awarded at trial where a jointly and severally liable codefendant settles
before trial. It argues that the amount of the reduction is calculated by determining the number of
defendants, dividing by that number to determine each defendant's pro rata share, then subtracting
from the total damage award the pro rata share of each settling defendant.

Finally, Saint

Alphonsus argues that its former codefendants-Intermountain Medical Imaging, Gem State
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Radiology, and Imaging Center Radiologists (collectively "the Rads")-were jointly and severally
liable for all of the claims MRIA has leveled against Saint Alphonsus because the gravamen of
MRIA's theory is that Saint Alphonsus conspired with the Rads to destroy MRIA's business.
MRIA also moves to strike the copy of the settlement agreement reached between the Rads
and MRIA, provided in the Affidavit of Jack Gjording, because it is untimely and improperly
authenticated. The Court will note that this is a preliminary matter and the rules of evidence are
not in full force. The Court will also note that MRIA has never contested the authenticity of the
settlement agreement provided by Saint Alphonsus.

Furthermore, the only use that the Court

makes of this settlement agreement is to note that an agreement in fact exists. The Court will
therefore deny MRIA's motion to strike the Affidavit of Jack Gjording, but will note that any
copies presented at trial must be properly authenticated and otherwise comply with the rules of
evidence.
Idaho code provides for a reduction in the amount awarded to a joint tortfeasor in the
amount of any settling defendant's pro rata shares or in the amount for which the joint tortfeasors
settled, whichever is greater. I. C. § 6-806. A joint tortfeasor is "one (1) of two (2) or more persons
jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property ...." I.C. § 6-803(4).
To be jointly and severally liable for an injury, the tortfeasors must have been acting in concert to
commit a tort. I.C. § 6-803(5). In other words, the tortfeasors must be "pursuing a common plan
or design which results in the commission of an intentional or reckless tortuous act.

!d.

Furthermore, the designation of parties as ')oint tortfeasors" within the meaning of the statute is a
question for the court based upon the pleadings. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 783, 727 P.2d
1187, 1211 (1986). Thus, to receive a pro rata reduction to a damage award, it must be evident
from the pleadings that the settling party was pursuing a common plan along with the non-settling
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tortfeasor.
Once the court finds that a settling defendant is a joint tortfeasor and that a non-settling
party is entitled to a reduction in the damages awarded, the next issue is determining the amount.
Idaho law provides that damages recoverable against the non settling joint tortfeasor are to be
reduced by either the pro rata share of the settling joint tortfeasor's liability or the amount paid for
the settlement, whichever is greater. I. C. § 6-805(1).
While pro rata is not a defined term within the statute, the Court finds that it refers to a joint
tortfeasor's share based on his fault apportioned by the finder of fact. The Idaho Code seems to
assume that pro rata has some relationship with apportionment of fault. For example, one Section
provides for "reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor, of the injured
person's damages recoverable against all the other tortfeasors," but makes the reduction available
"only if the issue of proportionate fault is litigated between the joint tortfeasors ...." I. C. § 6-806.
In another Section, the Code allows for a reduction of damage awards against tortfeasors who are

not jointly and severally liable, and thus by pro rata share, ''whether or not the finder of fact
apportions responsibility to the tortfeasor receiving the release." I. C. § 6-805(2). Both of these
Sections of the Idaho Code suggest that apportionment of fault is necessary where a joint tortfeasor
is released. It is also noteworthy that the Supreme Court has upheld a damages award reduced
based on the apportionment of fault among joint tortfeasors, though the definition of"pro rata" was
not specifically at issue there. See Quick, 111 Idaho at 782-84, 727 P.2d at 1210-1212. Thus the
Court finds that defining "pro rata share" as one's share of a damages award based on
apportionment of fault is more just-the defendants who are more at fault should be required to
pay more of the damages-and has more support in the Idaho law than the definition proposed by
Saint Alphonsus. This is one of those occasions where the law and common sense appear to be in
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accord.
Based on the pleadings of MRIA, Saint Alphonsus and the Rads are joint tortfeasors. Half
of the claims leveled against Saint Alphonsus are allegations of tortuous conduct engaged in by
Saint Alphonsus along with the Rads. Consequently, the Court finds that based on MRIA's Third
Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and the Rads were acting in concert, and are joint
tortfeasors within the meaning of Section 6-805, Idaho Code. Consequently, Saint Alphonsus is
entitled to a reduction in any damages awarded against it in an amount based on apportionment of
fault to be determined at trial.
III. Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Third-Party Beneficiary Claims.
Saint Alphonsus moves for summary judgment on the basis that two of the parties, MRI
Center and MRI Mobile (collectively the "Limited Partnerships"), do not have enforceable rights
under the MRIA partnership agreement.

The basis of their argument is that the partnership

agreement was not intended for the benefit of the Limited Partnerships, and thus the Limited
Partners do not have third-party beneficiary status under the partnership agreement.
For a party to be a third-party beneficiary, and thus have rights in a contract between others,
the contract must have been intended to benefit the third party. Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683,
687, 183 P.3d 771, 775 (2008). Furthermore, the intent to benefit the third party must be expressed
within the contract. /d. And it is not sufficient that the purported third-party beneficiary receive
an incidental benefit from the contract; the contract must be made primarily for the benefit of the
third party. /d. In other words, "a party must show that the contract was made for its direct benefit,
and that it is not merely an indirect beneficiary." Idaho Power v. Hulet, 140 Idaho 110, 113, 90
P.3d 335-338 (2004).
To establish third-party beneficiary status, it is not necessary to show the entire contract
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was designed for the benefit of the third party. Rather, there must simply be direct benefits
conferred upon the third party beneficiary.

For example, in one case, the Supreme Court

recognized a business entity as a third-party beneficiary to a contract between a city and a
construction company. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 467, 583 P.2d
997, 1002 (1978). There, the plaintiff, a local business, sued a construction company that was
performing construction work near the plaintiffs place of business because it was not adhering to
contractual terms designed to minimize disruption to the businesses in the area. !d. at 465--466,
583 P.2d at 1000-01. The construction being performed under the contract was designed to
improve the retail atmosphere of the downtown area. Id at 467, 583 P .2d at 1002. The court
reasoned that since the provisions of the contract being enforced were designed for the benefit of
the businesses in the area, the businesses in the downtown area could enforce the provisions of the
construction contract. !d.
Here, the partnership agreement was intended to benefit the Limited Partnerships. MRIA
was formed for the express purpose of purchasing and operating imaging equipment. The way
MRIA intended to do so was "to promote and organize an Idaho limited partnership . . ." that
would "have the same purpose as [MRIA]." Essentially, MRIA intended to conduct its business
through the Limited Partnerships. Furthermore, the partnership agreement proscribed competition
with the partnership. Since the limited partnerships were the vehicles by which MRIA conducted
its business, the prohibition on competition would be meaningless if it did not extend to the limited
partners. Consequently, the Court finds that the noncompetition provisions were made for the
benefit of the Limited Partners, and thus, the limited partners have enforcement rights as thirdparty beneficiaries. Furthermore, the Court finds that the partnership agreement's statement of
purpose indicating that MRIA would dissolve if it could not secure financing to form the Limited
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. Partnerships indicates a general intent to benefit the Limited Partnerships.
Saint Alphonsus argues that the partnership agreement was designed to dictate relations
among the MRIA partners, and the benefits flowed from the Limited Partnerships to MRIA, and
thus the partnership agreement was designed to benefit MRIA, not the Limited Partnerships. The
Court does not find this argument persuasive. The Court is convinced that the city in Just's
received benefits in the form of attracting business or stimulating the local economy, not to
mention new streets, sidewalks, and other infrastructure. However, the fact that the city received
benefits did not preclude the businesses from enforcing their rights. Consequently, the Court finds
that the Limited Partners are third-party beneficiaries under the partnership agreement.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment regarding its
share of MRIA to which it is entitled is hereby GRANTED, with a consistent disposition for
MRIA's motion for clarification. Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment regarding its
second affirmative defense is hereby GRANTED in part. Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary
judgment regarding the third-party beneficiary claims of MRI Center and MRI Mobile is hereby
DENIED. At the time of hearing, the parties agreed on many issues and reserved argument on

others. The Court believes that it has addressed all the issues which were argued and which it was
asked to address. If, however, the parties feel that the Court has not addressed an issue raised at in
the motions heard May 18, 2011, they are free to call such lapses to the Court's attention.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") moved the Court for an order (1) that Saint Alphonsus
produce two former Saint Alphonsus executives if they agreed to appear in Saint Alphonsus's
case in chief; or (2) order depositions for the preservation of trial testimony of these witnesses.
In response, Saint Alphonsus had proposed a resolution to which MRIA is agreeable. MRIA
therefore asks the Court to enter the order as proposed in Saint Alphonsus's responsive briefing
of June 10, 2011.
DATED this 21st day of June 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~j;RL

ara L. P ker
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

The Court being advised by the Parties concerning their mutual desires to present
testimony by witnesses who reside outside of the State of Idaho, does hereby ORDER that:
1.

Saint Alphonsus will arrange for its former employees, Sandra Bruce and Cindy

Schamp, to be available to appear as witnesses in MRIA's case-in-chief, at times to be defined
more precisely when possible, Miring the vreeks sf gef'tetBeer 9 1e, ~Q 11 ~
2.

Saint Alphonsus will be allowed, immediately following MRIA's direct

examination, to present its full examination of those witnesses for all purposes and not limited to
cross-examination defined by MRIA's direct testimony; and
3.

MRIA will make out-of-state witness Dr. Thomas Henson available to appear as a

witness, either during the presentation ofMRIA's case, or during the presentation of Saint
Alphonsus case.

ORDER RE: AVAILABILITY AT TRIAL OF WITNESSES SANDRA BRUCE, CINDY
SCHAMP, AND DR. THOMAS HENSON, P. 2
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IT IS SO ORDE!fD·
DATED thisZZ. day of June, 2011.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
VS.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
During the June 22, 2011 hearing before this Court on Saint Alphonsus's Motion to
Compel Access to Inspect and Copy Partnership Books and Records, counsel for MRIA
referenced the case of Gilbert v. Summit County, 821 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio 2004) (attached as
Ex. A). Counsel offered this previously uncited authority in support of an argument first
advanced by MRIA at the hearing, that in any event the Court could exclude from evidence any
documents produced by the books and records inspection.
The issue before the Court is whether Saint Alphonsus may, as a former partner in MRIA
and a current Limited Partner in Center and Mobile, utilize Idaho's various books and records
statutes notwithstanding the pendency of litigation giving rise to separate rights to take discovery
as directed by the Court. Gilbert's unanimous ruling that a litigant "may use the Public Records
Act to request public records related to a pending civil lawsuit after the expiration of the
discovery deadline in that lawsuit," 821 N.E.2d at 566 (internal punctuation marks and citations
omitted), strongly counsels that Saint Alphonsus's motion should be granted. The separate
SAINT ALPHONSUS 'S BRIEF RE: RELEVANCE OF GILBERT V SUMMIT COUNTY,
821 N.E.2d 564 (OHIO 2004), TO MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH
STATUTORY RIGHTS TO INSPECT PARTNERSHIP BOOKS AND RECORDS- 2 001392

question of the admissibility of particular evidence at trial, which was mentioned briefly only in
a concurring opinion, is for another day, when the character of the evidence will show that it
should be received in evidence.
ARGUMENT

The facts of Gilbert closely mirror this case. Gilbert was the attorney for a party with a
lawsuit against Summit County. Gilbert, 821 N.E.2d at 565. After "the discovery period in that
case closed," Gilbert "filed a public records request for the documents" from Summit County,
but Summit County "withh[e]ld the documents on the grounds that the public records request
was an attempt to circumvent civil discovery rules" in the pending litigation. Id Ultimately, the
Ohio Supreme Court heard the matter, to decide whether a litigant can use the Public Records
Act to secure public records related to a pending civil lawsuit, even though the discovery
deadline in the litigation had passed. All seven members of the Ohio Supreme Court agreed that
a litigant may do so. Id at 566. The Court specifically relied on authority providing that a
"person may inspect and copy a 'public record,' as defined in [the statute], irrespective of his or
her purpose for doing so." Id at 567. It concluded that the fact that "the public records Gilbert
seeks are potentially useful to him in a lawsuit is fortuitous, not illegal." Id
That exact reasoning applies here. As in Gilbert, Saint Alphonsus is seeking access to
records from its party-opponent, MRIA, under a separate statutory authority-here, allowing
routine access by partners and limited partners to defined categories of partnership financial
records. And, as in Gilbert, MRIA is refusing the request on grounds that it is inconsistent with
the Court's discovery orders. As in Gilbert, the relevant statutes provide that Saint Alphonsus's
SAINT ALPHONSUS 'S BRIEF RE: RELEVANCE OF GILBERT V SUMMIT COUNTY,
821 N.E.2d 564 (OHIO 2004), TO MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH
STATUTORY RIGHTS TO INSPECT PARTNERSHIP BOOKS AND RECORDS- 3 001393

"right to inspect and copy the partnership's books and records is not conditioned on the partner's
purpose or motive." 1 MRIA has not disputed that the financial records that Saint Alphonsus
seeks are "books and records" as defined in the statute, and thus under the Gilbert precedent, that
Saint Alphonsus should be provided with the records it seeks.
To be sure, a minority of three justices, while agreeing with the majority that Gilbert had
a right to inspect and copy the disputed documents under the public records laws, stated in a
concurrence that the trial court might nonetheless exclude the public records at trial because they
were not secured in a manner consistent with the discovery orders, and "to prevent undue
prejudice." Gilbert, 821 N.E.2d at 567-68 (Stratton, J., concurring). But a majority-the four
other Justices-did not qualify the right of access in that way, but instead stated expressly that
the fact that Gilbert's client could use the requested documents in the litigation was "fortuitous,
not illegal." Id. at 567.
When the MRIA documents are before the Court and the question of admissibility arises
in this case, the Court will recognize that Saint Alphonsus has sought merely to obtain
authoritative and complete copies of the most elementary partnership records, which are not
voluminous and are to be produced for inspection and copying at Saint Alphonsus's expense. At
that time it will be plain that these documents do not present the sort of "undue prejudice" that

1

Idaho Code § 53-3-403(b) official cmt. 2 (describing "an unqualified right of access");
accord Idaho Code§ 53-2-304(1) (providing that a limited partner may inspect and copy
"required information" and "need not have any particular purpose for seeking the information").
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S BRIEF RE: RELEVANCE OF GILBERT V. SUMMIT COUNTY,
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the Gilbert concurrence thought might justify excluding records gained by the exercise of
statutory rights of access. Id at 568.
In summary, rather than support MRIA's view on the records access issue before this
Court, the decision in Gilbert confirms the well-established view, expressed in numerous cases
cited in the Reply Brief, that discovery limitations under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do
not curtail other statutory rights of access to public, corporate or partnership records. 2
CONCLUSION

The Gilbert decision strongly supports Saint Alphonsus's right to inspect and copy the
limited financial records it seeks, pursuant to Idaho's partnership books-and-records laws giving
unqualified rights of access. Saint Alphonsus's motion for access should be granted.
DATED this 29th day of June, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

2

See, e.g., Am. Bank v. City of Menasha, 627 F.3d 261, 265 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.)
(noting that "[t]he word 'discovery' is not a synonym for investigation" that "[t]he case law
uniformly refuses to define requests for access to federal or state public records under publicrecords laws ... as discovery demands, even when ... the request is made for the purpose of
obtaining information to aid in a litigation"); Jackson v. First Fed Sav. ofArk., FA., 709
F. Supp. 887, 889 (E.D. Ark. 1989) ("there is no rule that the parties to a lawsuit may only gather
evidence through the formal discovery devices created by the federal rules of civil procedure").
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Saint Alphonsus's brief(the "Brief') concerning Gilbert v. Summit County, 821 N.E.2d
564 (Ohio 2004), misses the point completely. As this Court knows, MRIA cited that case only

after this Court, sua sponte, made specific statements at the hearing in which it suggested that
even if the Court was inclined to grant Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Compel, it did not believe
that it had any obligation to allow the documents obtained as a result to be used in the trial of this
matter. The concurrence in Gilbert addresses this Court's concerns in that regard exactly.
Unfortunately, rather than discussing this issue, Saint Alphonsus has inexplicably chosen to
advance the exact same erroneous FOIA-related arguments it did in its Reply. 1 As a result, Saint
Alphonsus' s Brief is needless surplusage.
As noted at the hearing, the relevant quote from Gilbert's concurrence states that even if
"a litigant may use the Public Records Act to request public records related to a pending civil
lawsuit after the expiration of the discovery deadline in that lawsuit ... it is still the trial court
that determines the admissibility of any records so acquired." !d. at 567-68. This is because
"[t]rial courts have discretion to admit or exclude evidence," and therefore "have long had
authority on an evidentiary basis to exclude otherwise relevant evidence to prevent undue
prejudice." !d. It is for this reason that "even though a party may effectively circumvent a
discovery deadline by acquiring a document through a public records request, it is the trial court
that ultimately determines whether those records will be admitted in the pending litigation." !d.
Stated another way, even if a court felt that it had to allow a party to gather documents
outside of a discovery order, that fact did not divest the court from keeping those documents out
of the trial, since judges have such wide discretion as to what evidence to admit. Unsurprisingly,
1

As it did at the hearing, Saint Alphonsus feigns surprise in its Brief with the fact that MRIA made its FOIA-related
arguments, such as the one from Gilbert, for the first time at the hearing. Brief, p. I. In truth, it was Saint
Alphonsus who chose to spring its misguided FOIA analogy for the first time in its Reply, rather than in its Motion,
in spite of the fact that Saint Alphonsus admits that it knew ofMRIA's relevant arguments prior to filing its Motion.
See Motion, p. 3.
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just as in Ohio, judges in Idaho have this exact same expansive discretion as to whether to admit
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Birkla, 126 Idaho 498, 500, 887 P.2d 43,45 (Ct. App. 1994).
Regrettably, rather than address this highly germane concurrence, Saint Alphonsus has
decided to simply avoid it completely, stating that it hopes to save discussion about it for another
time. Brief, p. 4. Yet this is the only issue for which MRIA cited Gilbert. As a result, Saint
Alphonsus's apparent inability to distinguish its concurrence from the facts at hand is telling.
In short, Saint Alphonsus's Brief has failed to provide this Court with any reason toreopen discovery in this remanded matter at the eleventh hour. As such, MRIA asks that Saint
Alphonsus' s Motion to Compel be denied.
DATED this 5th day of July 2011.
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~Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
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,l ~ \\ tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
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WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup. com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELYSHIA HOLMES
DEPUTY

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
MOTION TO RELEASE ORIGINAL
EXHIBITS

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.

MOTION TO RELEASE ORIGINAL EXHIBITS - 1
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP; MRI Limited Partnership; and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRI"), move the Court for an Order releasing the original
admitted trial exhibits from the trial held in this matter in August of 2007 currently stored by the
Clerk's office.
MRI requests that the original exhibits be returned to either counsel or the Court for use
in the trial now scheduled to commence on September 6, 2011.
DATED this 13th day of July 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

MOTION TO RELEASE ORIGINAL EXHIBITS - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of July 2011, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
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Christian G. V ergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
ORDER RELEASING EXHIBITS

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.

Defendants/Counterclaimants' Motion to Release Original Exhibits having come before
this Court and good cause appearing therefore;

y

ORDER RELEASING EXHIBITS- 1
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER that the Clerk shall release the
original exhibits used in this matter for the trial held in August of 2007 to the parties for use at
the trial scheduled to commence on September 6, 2011.

DATEDthis

/~fJayof :JP/17

ORDER RELEASING EXHIBITS - 2
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~~ day~~#~~r------2011, a true

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
and correct copy of the within and foregoing instrument
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Attorneys for Plainti.ff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Attorneys for P lainti.ff/Counterdefendant
Thomas A. Banducci
Wade L. Woodard
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 West Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702-5842
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimants
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RECEIPT OF EXHIBIT(S)

CVOC0408219

CASE NUMBER#

Received from the clerk, Plaintiff's exhibit(s).
dated this _ ____;_\_day of

Av~vs+

S

---

, 20_lL.

~J=~
ature
C.hc ,'5 rou--.se..r-

Print Name

Received from the clerk, Defendant's exhibit(s).
dated this

.~/

day of

/A,/

,20JL.

Certificate of Release

...........lj'•,,,

certify that I released Exhibits to the above named party to the,~eMJ 1
authorized representative.
..•."\:)~~•••••••••_'J;C'. ''· ..
~c.;.•
··'1-~
I
.•
•. ~ •
1 of THE S7'.-tr ~ 0 ':·.
~: • c;; ":.
: ell:: :
- OF J. David Navarro
:f-•
.. r.n •
•:-..,
>::J
Clerk of the District Court
~ -;::., •.
IDAHO
I;::::
1 hereby

: t:;
·-·
.-:. .......
/

"" -t·

.

...

.

••

•• '

.... ·141 (_ ••••••••

.-<"

.

;

~

.
'

.·

',,, ;.,!£oR JUtc!:)·zou

ate···

Order to Release/Receipt/Certificate of Release

001407

NO.

FILED

~~
IV

A.M·----~P.M.,...-..-_.__-4-_

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup. com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup. com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com

JUL 1~ 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELYSHIA HOLMES
DEPUTY

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - I

ORlG\NAL
001408

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit the following Jury Instructions to the Court
pursuant to the Court's Order Reopening Discovery and Setting Schedule of February 15, 2011.
The majority of the jury instructions proposed below were given by Judge McLaughlin in
the previous trial of this matter, in the Instructions to the Jury of August 3, 2007. In the proposed
jury instructions which follow, MRIA has indicated whether such instruction was previously
given. MRIA has removed, added, or modified a limited number of the jury instructions in
conformity with the Supreme Court opinion on appeal and rulings of this Court on remand. Any
changes to the previous instructions given by the Court are indicated through redline annotation.
As the Court has previously indicated, any rulings of Judge McLaughlin not overturned by the
Supreme Court are the law of the case and will not be revisited by this Court. (See Consolidated
Order Re: Motions in Limine Heart May 18, 2011, filed June 13, 2011; Consolidated Order Re:
Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May 18, 2011, filed June 17, 2011.) If the instruction
was not affected by the Supreme Court's opinion, then it is the law of the case and may presume
to be correct, and should be given again. 1 The Court should also give the limited number of
slightly modified and new instructions proposed by MRIA below.

Inthe proposed jury instructions below, MRIA has omitted some instructions from the
original Instructions to the Jury of August 3, 2007:
• MRIA has omitted Instruction Nos. 1, 2, 3, 8, 12, and 15 because such instructions
are advisory instructions typically crafted differently by individual judges. MRIA has
no particular objection to such instructions.
• MRIA has omitted Instruction Nos. 7 and 13 because it is not clear that such
instructions are needed.
• Instructions Nos. 14, 16, 21, 23, 24, and 39 of the original Instructions to the Jury of
August 3, 2007 should not be given because they conflict with the ruling ofthe
Supreme Court or this Court since remand.
• Instruction Nos. 40 and 41 involved damages. As the posture of damages has
changed somewhat on remand, MRIA has submitted new versions.

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 2
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DATED this 141h day of July, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

.--0·

j 7,..~>~

Dara L. Park r
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

0
0
0
X

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Facsimile

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

0
0
0
X

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Facsimile

Dara L. Pa er
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INDEX OF INSTRUCTIONS

1.00
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.05
1.07
1.20.1
1.28
1.22
1.24.2
2.30.1
1.41.1
6.10.1
6.22.2
6.24.1
6.08.2

"

9.00

9.14
1.09
1.11
1.13
1.15.2
1.43.1
1.17

Introductory Instruction to Jury
Deliberation Procedures
The parties
Corporate parties
Admonition of Jury
Statement of Claims
Statement of Claims Not Evidence
Facts Not in Dispute
Burden ofProof- Preponderance of Evidence
Evidence admitted for limited purpose
Prior Sworn Testimony
Circumstantial Evidence with Definition
Proximate Cause
General format, verdict on special interrogatories
Breach of Bilateral Contract-General Case
MRI Center and MRI Mobile are Beneficiaries of the Partnership Agreement.
Waiver by Estoppel
Waiver
Interpretation of contract - witness's testimony, ambiguity of contract
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim
Duty of Loyalty
Partnership Opportunity - Defined
Duty of Care
Fiduciary duties require good faith and fair dealing
Actions Must Conflict with Partnership's Interest
Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Elements of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations of Business Expectation ofMRI
Center and MRI Mobile
Claim of civil conspiracy
Civil con~iracy - Damages
Cautionary instruction on damages
Damages instruction
No double recovery
Mitigation of damages
Quotient Verdicts
Communications with Court
Concluding Remarks
Completion of Verdict Form on Special Interro_g_atories
Instruction on special verdict form
Post Verdict Jury Instruction
Special Verdict Form

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 5

001412

IDJI 1.00- Introductory instruction to jury (modified)
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. No alterations have been made
from the original version. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3, 2007, Instruction No.4.)

INSTRUCTION NO.
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this case.

It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those facts,
and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and objective
assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice.

It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is your
duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not picking
out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the manner in
which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If you do not
understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or
explain the point further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an attorney's
argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, I
sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered
exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my
responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 6
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ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or
speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not
evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.
There will be occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark be
stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In
your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as though you
had never heard it.
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience and
background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday
affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight
you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more important decisions
in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in your deliberations in this
case.
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion on that
matter. In determining the weight to be given to such an opinion, you should consider the
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for the opinion. You are not
bound by the opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled~

Given - - - - - Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 7
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IDJI 1.01 -Deliberation procedures
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. No alterations have been made
from the original version. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3, 2007, Instruction No. 5.)

INSTRUCTION NO.
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions concerning
the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence and any notes
taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby diverted from
the witness or his testimony, and you must keep your notes to yourself and not show them to other
persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial.
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said and not be
overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot assign to one person the duty
of taking notes for all of you.
I advised you that we have a court reporter that also keep a verbatim record of these
proceedings. However, no written transcript will be made of these proceedings for review by the
Jury.

Given - - - - - Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 8
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The parties
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 17.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.
When I use the term "MRIA" I am referring to MRI Associates, LLP. When I use the
term "Saint Alphonsus," I am referring to Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. aad Saint
AlphoflStls RegiOfl&l Medieal Ceflter, Ine. When I use the term "MRI Center'' I am referring to
MRI Limited Partnership, which is also called MRI Center of Idaho. MRI Center of Idaho, of
v;hieh MRIA is a geaeral partE:er. When I use the term "MRI Mobile" I am referring to MRI
Mobile Limited Partnership, of vihieh MRIA is a geaeral partE:er. When I use the term "GSR" I
am referring to Gem State Radiology, LLP.

I

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 9
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IDJI 1.02 - Corporate parties, amended.
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 11.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. (also called "Saint Alphonsus"), MRI Associates,
LLP, (also called "MRIA"), MRI Limited Partnership (also called "MRI Center"), and MRI
Mobile Limited (also called "MRI Mobile") Sai:at A:lphoRsus RegioRal Medieal Ce:ater are
corporations or limited liability business organizations and are entitled to the same fair and
unprejudiced treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances.
You should decide this case with the same impartiality that you would use in deciding a
case between individuals.

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 10
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IDJI 1.03 -Admonition to jury
The subject matter contained in this instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter.
(Instructions to the Jury, August 3, 2007, Instruction No.6.) MRIA has substituted the pattern
jury instruction approved by the Supreme Court rather than the version used by the Court in the
prior trial ofthi.s matter.

INSTRUCTION NO.

There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.

You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their

employees, or any of the witnesses.
2

You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case

with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the case,
you must report it to me promptly.
3.

You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury room to

deliberate at the close of the entire case.
4.

You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony and have

received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case.
5.

You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater understanding

ofthe case.
6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred.

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other - - - - -

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 11
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Statement of claims
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 20.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case, MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile have has made the following claims:
A. Contract Claims
1.

Breaeh ofthe PartnersffijJ Agreemeflt:
a.

Wrongful dissoeiation from the MRIA PartnersffijJ

b.

Dissoeiation before the end of the partnership term

e.

Breaeh ofthe non eompete elat1se

1. Breach of the Partnership Agreement by breaching the Non-Compete Clause
2. Breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing

B. Tort Claims
1. Intentional interference with prospective contractual relations or business
expectations. (This claim brought only by MRI Center and MRI Mobile.)
2. Breach of fiduciary duty.
C. Civil Conspiracy
In this case, Saint Alphonsus has asserted estoppel and waiver as defenses to MRIA.'s these
claims. Saint Alphonsus also asserts that other factors caused the MRIA's claimed damages.

Given - - - - - Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 12
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IDJI 1.05 - Statement of claims not evidence

INSTRUCTION NO.
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I have
advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be decided.

Given - - - - - Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ _ __
Covered - - - - Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 13
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IDJI 1.07 -Facts not in dispute
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 18.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.
The following facts are not in dispute:
Saint Alphonsus and MRIA were partners and entered into a partnership agreement in
1985 (the MRIA Partnership Agreement).
Saint Alphonsus dissociated from the MRIA partnership in April 2004 and this
dissociation has been determined by the Cotl:rt to be a 'mongful disassociation.
MRIA is the general partner with the management responsibilities of two limited
Partnerships, MRI Center and MRI Mobile. MRIA is currently the general partner of those two
entities, and was also the general partner during the time that Saint Alphonsus was a part of
MRIA.
During the time that it was a partner in the MRIA partnership, Saint Alphonsus owed
fiduciary duties, including duties of care and duties ofloyalty, to MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI
Mobile.
MRI Center and MRI Mobile are beneficiaries of the MRIA Partnership Agreement.

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 14
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IDJI 1.20.1 -Burden of proof- preponderance of evidence
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 19.) No alterations have been made from the original version.

INSTRUCTION NO.
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably
true than not true.

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 15
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IDJI 1.28 - Evidence admitted for limited purpose
This instruction was contained within an instruction given in the previous trial of this matter.
(Instructions to the Jury, August 3, 2007, Instruction No. 10, third paragraph.) The deleted
paragraphs of the original version are contained in the instruction labeled" IDJI 1.24.2 Circumstantial evidence with definition," below.

INSTRUCTION NO.
E:vidence may ae either direct or circamstantia:l. Direct evidence is evidence that directly
proves a fact. Gircl:lll'lstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, hy pro:ving one or
more facts from which the fact at issue may ae inferred.
The la->.v makes no distinction aetv1eea direct and circl:lll'lstantial e•lideace as to the degree of
proofrequired; eaeh is aeeepted as a reasonaale method ofproofand eaeh is respected for such
conviaciag force as it may carry.

In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. I called your attention to
this when the evidence was admitted. I remind you that whenever evidence was admitted for a
limited purpose, you must not consider such evidence for any purpose other than the limited
purpose for which it was admitted.

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 16
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IDJI 1.22 - Prior Sworn testimony
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 9.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by prior sworn testimony or deposition.
This was A. depositioH is testimony taken under oath before the trial_and preserved in writing and/or
upon video tape. This evidence is entitled to the same consideration you would give had the witness
testified from the witness stand.
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of the
testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be available to you during your deliberations.

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused - - - - Modified _ _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 17
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IDJI 1.24.2 - Circumstantial evidence with definition
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 10.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline. The
deleted paragraph made a part of the Instruction labeled "IDJI 1.28 - Evidence admitted for
limited purpose," above.

INSTRUCTION NO
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly
proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one or
more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree of
proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such
convincing force as it may carry.

In this ease, eertain evidenee may be admitted for a limited pwpose. I ·.vill eall ~ur
attention to this 'Nhen this evidenee is admitted. I remind yol:l that wfl:ene•1er evidenee is admitted
for a limited pl:lFpose, yol:l ffil:lst not eonsider Sl:leh evidenee for any pl:llpose other than the limited
plifPose for vihieh it is admitted.

Given - - - - - Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 18
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IDJI 2.30.1 -Proximate cause (modified)
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 31.) No alterations have been made from the original version.

INSTRUCTION NO
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in natural or probable
sequence, produced the injury, the loss, or the damage complained of and but for that cause the
damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial
factor in bringing about the injury, loss, or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss, or
damages likely would have occurred anyway.

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 19
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IDJI 1.41.1 - General format, verdict on special interrogatories
INSTRUCTION NO.
With respect to the claims by MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile against Saint
Alphonsus, MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile have the burden of proof.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Did Saint Alphonsus breach the noncompete agreement m the MRIA
Partnership Agreement?
Did Saint Alphonsus breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing to MRIA,
MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile?
Did Saint Alphonsus breach its fiduciary duties to MRIA MRI Center,
and/or MRI Mobile?
Did Saint Alphonsus interfere with MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile
prospective contractual relations?
Did Saint Alphonsus engage in a civil conspiracy?
If you answered "yes" to any of the questions above; did MRIA, MRI
Center, and/or MRI Mobile sustain damages?
If MRIA, MRI Center, and or/MRI Mobile suffered damages, what
percentage is attributable to Saint Alphonsus's acts?
What is the dollar amount of damages suffered by MRIA, MRI Center,
and/or MRI Mobile attributable to Saint Alphonsus's acts?

Given - - - - - Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 20

001427

IDJI 6.1 0.1 -Breach of bilateral contract- general case
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 25.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.
MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile claims that Saint Alphonsus breached the express
terms of the MRIA Partnership Agreement by violating the terms of the non-competition provisions
within the MRIA Partnership Agreement. MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile have has the
burden of proving each of the following propositions:
1. A contract existed between MRIA and Saint Alphonsus.
2. The contract contained a non-competition provision
2. Saint Alphonsus breached the contract by competing with MRIA;
3. MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile has have been damaged on account of the breach
of contract; and
4. The amount of the damages.
This Court has already ruled that MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile has have met #s
their burden of proving the first proposition. Specifically, this Court has already ruled that a
contract existed, the MRIA Partnership Agreement. You, therefore, need only determine whether
MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile has have met their burden of proving the second, third,
fourth, and fifth propositions~above.
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that Numbers 2, 3, 4, and 5 of these
proposition s have been proved by MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile, then you must consider
the affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver raised by Saint Alphonsus as set forth in

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 21

001428

InstmetioHs No. 28 and 29. If you find after considering all the evidence that either the second,
third, fourth, or fifth propositions have not been proved, you verdict should be for Saint Alphonsus.

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered - - - - Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 22

001429

MRI Center and MRI Mobile are Beneficiaries of the Partnership Agreement.
This instruction is based on the Court's Consolidated Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment
heard May 18, 2001, filed Jun3 17,2011, at p. 7-9.

INSTRUCTION NO.
I have already determined that the two limited partnerships, MRI Center and MRI Mobile,
are beneficiaries of the MRIA Partnership Agreement, meaning that MRI Center and MRI Mobile
are entitled to enforce and recover damages (if proven), for breaches of the MRIA Partnership
Agreement.

I.C. 29-201

Given - - - - - Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 23

001430

IDJI 6.22.2- Waiver by estoppel
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 28.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Saint Alphonsus has raised the affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel. This is a legal
term which means that a party is deemed to have waived a claimed breach of contract by reason of
the party's own conduct. To establish the defense of waiver by estoppel, Saint Alphonsus has the
burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

MRIA represented to Saint Alphonsus by words or conduct that MRlA was waiving,

excusing or forgiving Saint Alphonsus breach of contract; and
2.

Saint Alphonsus relied upon this representation and materially changed position in

reliance thereon; and
3.

The reliance was reasonable in light of all of the circumstances; and

4.

The change of position was to Saint Alphonsus's detriment.

If you find that each of these propositions has been proved, you should find that Saint
Alphonsus is not liable to MRlA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile for the claimed breach of contract 5et:
forth ffi mstmetions Nos. 24, 25, 26 and 27. If Saint Alphonsus fails to prove all of the propositions,
Saint Alphonsus has not established the affirmative defense of estoppel.

Given - - - - - Refused _ _ _ __
Modified - - - - Covered _ _ _ __
Other - - - - - -

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 24

001431

IDJI 6.24.1 - Waiver
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 29.) No alterations have been made from the original version.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be evidenced by conduct, by
words, or by acquiescence.

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 25

001432

IDJI 6.08.2 -Interpretation of contract - witness's testimony, ambiguity of contract
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 22.) No alterations have been made from the original version.

INSTRUCTION NO.
You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by any
witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the written agreement,
which is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement. While you may
consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider such
testimony to completely change the agreement, or to construe a term ofthe agreement in such a
fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or parts.

Given - - - - - Refused _ _ _ __
Modified - - - - Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 26

001433

Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 32.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.
MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile claim claims that Saint Alphonsus breached its
fiduciary duties to MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile. A partner owes fiduciary duties to
the partnership. A fiduciary is a person or entity with a duty to act primarily for the benefit of
another. These fiduciary duties include both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. You must
determine whether Saint Alphonsus breached the duties owed to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI
Mobile.

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ _ __
Covered - - - - Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 27

001434

Duty of Loyalty
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 33.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.
A partner's duty ofloyalty includes the following:

1. The partner must refrain from taking advantage of a partnership opportunity for the
partner's own individual benefit. The partner should not act adversely to the
partnership, either for itself or others. As such, the partner should not support the
competitor of the partnership.
2. The partner must refrain from competing with the partnership at any time before
disassociating or as set forth in the partnership agreement.
If you fmd that Saint Alphonsus has breached any of the above elements of the duty of
loyalty in regards to the duty Saint Alphonsus owes to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile, then
your verdict should be for MRIA, MRI Center and/or MRI Mobile. If you find that Saint
Alphonsus has not breached any of the above elements of the duty of loyalty, you should
consider whether Saint Alphonsus has breached any of the elements of the duty of care,
described below. If you find that Saint Alphonsus has not breached any of the elements of the
duty of loyalty or the duty of care, in regards to the duty Saint Alphonsus owes to MRIA, MRI
Center or MRI Mobile, then your verdict should be for Saint Alphonsus.

Rest.

2nd

Torts§ 874, cmt. a (1979)

I.C. § 53-3-404, cmt. 2
Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 28

001435

Partnership Opportunity - Defined
INSTRUCTION NO.

A partner's duty ofloyalty includes refraining from taking advantage of a partnership
opportunity for the partner's own individual benefit. If a partner takes a partnership opportunity,
it has a duty to hold in trust any profit or benefit it received from the opportunity for the benefit
of its partners, rather than keeping that benefit for itself. The other partners can recover any
money or property in the breaching partner's hands than can be traced to this lost partnership
opportunity.

I.C. § 53-2-408(2)(a), I.C. § 53-3-404(b)(l); I.C. § 53-3-404 official cmt. 2

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered - - - Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 29

001436

Duty of Care
A similar instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury,
August 3, 2007, Instruction No. 34.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in
redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.
A partner's duty of care requires the partner to conduct partnership business in a manner
that is not grossly negligent, reckless, intentional misconduct, or knowing violation of the law.
If you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached any of the above elements of the duty of
care in regards to the duty Saint Alphonsus owes to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile, then
your verdict should be for MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile. If you find that Saint Alphonsus
has not breached the duty of loyalty or the duty of care in regards to the duty Saint Alphonsus
owes to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile, then your verdict should be for Saint Alphonsus.

I. C. § 53-3-403( c)

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 30

001437

Fiduciary duties require good faith and fair dealing

INSTRUCTION NO.

A partner must discharge the duties to the partnership and other partners and exercise any
rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. The obligation of good
faith and fair dealing requires that a partner cannot take an unfair advantage or enjoy greater
rights than are provided by the terms of the partnership agreement, and prohibits a partner from
obtaining a secret profit or obtaining an undue benefit.

I.C. § 53-3-404(d)
I.C. § 53-3-404, cmt. 4

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ _ __
Covered - - - - Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 31

001438

Actions Must Conflict with Partnership's Interest
This instruction was given in the previous trial ofthis matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 35.) No alterations have been made from the original version.

INSTRUCTION NO.

A partner does not violate the duty of loyalty or duty of care merely by acting in the
partner's individual interest. Those actions must be in conflict with the partnership's interest in
order for the duty of loyalty or the duty of care to be at issue.

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused - - - - Modified _ _ __
Covered - - - - Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 32

001439

Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 26.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.

MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile claim that Saint Alphonsus breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an
implied obligation of every contract, including the MRIA Partnership Agreement. The covenant
requires that the parties perform in good faith the obligations contained in their agreement, and a
violation of the covenant occurs when either party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any
benefit of the contract. The covenant does not inject new material terms into the contract, but it
does require the parties to perform in good faith those terms agreed upon by the parties.

Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 750, 9 P.3d 1204, 1216 (2000); Idaho
First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 289, 824 P.2d 841, 864 (1991)

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused - - - - Modified _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 33

001440

Elements ofthe Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 27.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.
In order for MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile to recover on its their claims that Saint
Alphonsus breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI
Mobile has have the burden of proving each of the following:
1. There was a contract between MRIA and Saint Alphonsus in the form of a partnership
agreement.
2. Action by Saint Alphonsus violated, nullified, or significantly impair the benefit of the
contract; and
3. MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile suffered damages that were a natural and
proximate result of Saint Alphonsus 's actions.
The first of these propositions, that a contract existing in the form of a partnership
agreement, is not a disputed fact. I have also already found that MRI Center and MRI Mobile are
beneficiaries of the MRIA Partnership Agreement who may enforce its terms. Therefore, you must
only consider whether the second and third of these propositions has been proved. If you find from
you consideration of all the evidence that the second and third propositions have been proved, then
you must consider the issue of the affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver raised by Saint
Alphonsus. If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions
has not been proven, then your verdict should be for Saint Alphonsus.

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 34

001441

Given - - - - - Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered - - - - Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 35

001442

Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations of Business Expectation ofMRI Center and
MRI Mobile
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 30.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.
·

INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case, MRIA MRI Center and MRI Mobile claims that Saint Alphonsus interfered
with #s their prospective contractual relations or business expectations. To recover on this
claim, MRIA MRI Center and MRI Mobile must prove the following elements:
1. The existence of a prospective economic advantage;
2. Knowledge of the prospective economic advantage on the part of Saint Alphonsus;
3. Intentional interference by Saint Alphonsus that induced termination of the
prospective economic advantage of MRI Mobile and MRI Center
4. That interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference
(in other words, that Saint Alphonsus interfered for an improper purpose or through
improper means); and
5. Damages proximately caused by the interference.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that these propositions required of

MRlt\ MRI Center and MRI Mobile have been proved, then your verdict should be for MRIA
MRI Center and MRI Mobile. If you find from your consideration of all of evidence that any of
these propositions has not been proven, then your verdict should be for Saint Alphonsus.

Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 285-86, 824 P.2d 841, 86061 (1991).
Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused - - - - Modified _ _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 36

001443

Claim of civil conspiracy
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 36.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.
MRIA, MRI Center. and MRI Mobile claim elaffi:ts that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil
conspiracy with GSR to harm MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile. To recover on this claim,
MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile must prove the following elements to establish that(. a
conspiracy existed.:
1. Saint Alphonsus had an express agreement with GSR;
2. To accomplish an unlawful objective or accomplish a lawful objective through unlawful
means.
The essence of a cause of action for civil conspiracy is the civil wrong committed as the
objective of the conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself
If you find from you consideration of all the evidence that these propositions required of
MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile have been proved, then you must consider the issue of the
affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver raised by Saint Alphonsus. If you find from your
consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proven, then your
verdict should be for Saint Alphonsus.

Given - - - - - Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 37

001444

Civil conspiracy - Damages
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 37.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.

If you determine that a conspiracy existed, consider which acts caused damage to MRIA,
MRI Center, and MRI Mobile. Saint Alphonsus will be liable for an act that proxiffiately causes
MRIA damages if the act was both:
1. Perpetrated by Saint Alphonsus or perpetrated by GSR m furtherance of the
conspiracy; and
2. The act was a natural and probably consequence of the agreed upon objective of the
conspiracy.
If you find that both of these elements were proven with regard to an act, then you should
find that Saint Alphonsus is liable for the damages proximately caused by that act. If you find
that either of these elements was not proven with regard to an act, then you should not find that
Saint Alphonsus is liable for the damages proximately caused by that act.

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 38

001445

IDJI 9.00- Cautionary instruction on damages
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 38.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.-·-""

By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to
whether MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile is entitled to damages.

Given - - - - - Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 39

001446

Damages instruction
INSTRUCTION NO.

If the jury decides MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile is entitled to recover from Saint
Alphonsus, the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly
compensate MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile for any damages proved to be caused by Saint
Alphonsus. The elements of damage the jury may consider are the amount of money necessary to
compensate MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile for the injuries resulting from Saint
Alphonsus 's conduct even though such injuries may not have been contemplated as a probable
result of Saint Alphonsus's conduct. The losses ofMRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile may be
measured by reference to:
(1) The value of the profits lost by MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile because of the
unlawful actions of Saint Alphonsus. This has been measured by MRIA, MRI Center,
and MRI Mobile as the scans/referrals that MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile lost
because of the unlawful actions of Saint Alphonsus;
(2) The value of the lost opportunity of MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile to join with
Intermountain Medical Imaging. This has been measured by MRIA, MRI Center, and
MRI Mobile as the profits and Saint Alphonsus received from its partnership with
Intermountain Medical Imaging; and
(3) Any other reasonable measure of damages.

White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 97-98, 730 P.2d 1014, 1017-18 (1986); LC. § 53-3-

404(b)(l) and official comment; Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 42 P.3d
672 (2002); Brown v. Yacht Club oJCoeur d'Alene, Ltd., 111 Idaho 195, 198, 722 P.2d 1062, 1065

•

(Idaho App. 1986)
MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 40
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Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 41

001448

No Double Recovery
INSTRUCTION NO.
In determining what, if any, damages to which MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile are

entitled, the jury should refrain from giving "double recovery" to

MRIA, MRI Center, and/or

MRI Mobile. The law does not permit double satisfaction for a single injury. In other words,
MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile cannot recover multiple damages for the same injury even
though they have advanced multiple legal theories or reasons for relief.

McCandless v. Kramer, 76 Idaho 516,518-19,286 P.2d 334 (1955).

Given - - - - - Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 42

001449

IDJI 9.14 - Mitigation of damages
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 42.) No alterations have been made from the original version.

INSTRUCTION NO.
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage
and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be
recovered.

Given----'---Refused - - - - Modified _ _ __
Covered - - - - Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 43

001450

IDJI 1.09- Quotient verdicts
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 43.) No alterations have been made from the original version.

INSTRUCTION NO.
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide
any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are
to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to
average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of
the damage award.
Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 44

001451

IDJI 1.11 - Communications with court
Thi"s instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 45.) No alterations have been made from the original version.

INSTRUCTION NO.
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send a
note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me by
any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of the
questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me.

Given - - - - - Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other - - - - - -

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 45

001452

IDJI 1.13 - Concluding remarks
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 46.) No alterations have been made from the original version.

INSTRUCTION NO.
I have given you the rules oflaw that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes
.counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for your
deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the attitude
and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense of
pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is
wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me,
there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you
must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and consideration of
the case with your fellow jurors.

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered - - - - Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 46

001453

IDJI 1.15 .2 - Completion of verdict form on special interrogatories
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 47.) No alterations have been made from the original version.

INSTRUCTION NO.
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside over

your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the

directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions on
the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as nine
or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you should fill
it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on each question.
If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the
entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, who will
then return you into open court.

Given - - - - - Refused _ _ _ __
Modified - - - - Covered _ _ _ __
Other - - - - - -

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 47

001454

IDJI 1.43.1 -Instruction on special verdict form.
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 44.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.

INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. This
form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to you
now.
[Previous special verdict form omitted]
[Read the verdict form in its entirety, including all instructions, and explain the signature block
for the foreperson and the signature lines for the individual jurors.]

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 48

001455

IDJI 1.17 - Post verdict jury instruction
This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2007, Instruction No. 48.) No alterations have been made from the original version.

INSTRUCTION NO.
You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged with the
sincere thanks of this Court. You may now discuss this case with the attorneys or with anyone else.
For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to anyone else, is entirely
your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you want to, but you are not required
to do so, and you may choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you choose to talk to
someone about this case, you may tell them as much or as little as you like about your deliberations
or the facts that influenced your decisions. If anyone persists in discussing the case over your
objection, or becomes critical of your service, either before or after any discussion has begun, you
may report it to me.

Given _ _ _ _ __
Refused _ _ _ __
Modified _ _ __
Covered _ _ _ __
Other _ _ _ _ __

MRIA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 49
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•
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.
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We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:

Question No. 1: Did Saint Alphonsus breach the noncompete clause in the MRIA
Partnership Agreement?
Answer to Question No.1:

Yes[___]

No[___].

Question No. 2: Did Saint Alphonsus breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing to
MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile?
Answer to Question No. 2:

Yes [___]

No[___]

Question No.3: Did Saint Alphonsus breach its fiduciary duties to MRIA, MRI Center,
and/or MRI Mobile?
Answer to Question No.3:

Yes[___]

No[___]

Question No.4: Did Saint Alphonsus interfere with MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile's
prospective contractual relations?
Answer to Question No.4:

Yes [___]

No[___]

Question No. 5: Did Saint Alphonsus engage in a civil conspiracy?
Answer to Question No.5:

Yes[___]

No[___]

Question No.6: If you answered "yes" to any of the questions above, did MRIA, MRI
Center, and/or MRI Mobile sustain damages?
Answer to Question No. 6:

Yes [___]

No[___]

Question No.7: IfMRIA, MRI Center, and or/MRI Mobile suffered damages, what
percentage is attributable to Saint Alphonsus's acts?
Answer to Question No.7: _ _ _ _ _ _%
Question No. 8: What is the dollar amount of damages suffered by MRIA, MRI Center,
and/or MRI Mobile attributable to Saint Alphonsus's acts?
Answer to Question No. 8:
MRIA:$_________________________________
MRl C e n t e r : $ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - MRl Mobile:$ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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DATED this _ _ day of _ _ _ _, 2011.
Jury Foreperson: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Member of the Jury Agreeing with the Verdict (if verdict is not unanimous):
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

~~·----F-IL~.~qqq
JUL 19 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELYSHIA HOLMES
DEPUTY

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
Thomas A. Banducci, ISB No. 2435
WadeL. Woodard, ISB No. 6312
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83701-2720
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV OC 0408219D
STIPULATION TO AMEND
DISCOVERY SCHEDULE

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership, MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership, and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
VS.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively "Saint Alphonsus"), and Defendant/CounterClaimants MRI Associates, LLP; MRI Limited Partnership; and MRI Mobile Limited
(collectively "MRIA"), by and through their respective counsel, stipulate and agree as follows.
On February 15, 2011, the Court issued an Order Reopening Discovery and Setting
Schedule on February 15, 2011. On March 4, 2011, the Court issued an Order Granting Joint
Motion to Amend Discovery Schedule. Pursuant to those orders, MRIA shall file rebuttal expert
reports, if any, no later than July 15, 2011, and both parties shall depose the designated expert
witnesses by July 30, 2011. To accommodate the schedules of counsel and the expert witnesses,
the parties have agreed to the following amended discovery schedule and request the Court enter
the following order:
1.

MRIA shall file its rebuttal expert reports, if any, no later than July 29, 2011.

2.

Both parties shall depose the designated expert witnesses by August 12, 2011.
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FB.cci Woodard & Schwartzman
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..
DATED this

/It "d:;ofJuly, 201f.
OJORDJNO & FOUSER, PLLC

BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

JUL 2 0 2011

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
~
CMMJTOPHE..R D. RICH.~

ay [)~ANt: OATMAN
Oepilr

SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, INC., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219
ORDER DENYING SAINT
ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO
COMPELCOMPLIANCEvnTH
STATUTORY RIGHT TO INSPECT
MRIA'S BOOKS AND RECORDS

---------------------------- )
Presently before the Court is Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Compel Compliance with
Statutory Rights to Inspect Partnership Books and Records. Hearing was held on this matter on
June 22, 2011. At hearing, case law that was not cited in the parties' briefs was discussed, and the
parties were given an opportunity for further briefing. All the supplemental briefing was submitted
by July 5, 2011. The Court now issues the following opinion.
DISCUSSION
The sole issue before the Court is whether this Court should enforce the statutory right of
Saint Alphonsus to inspect the books and records of MRIA. On June 2, 2011, Saint Alphonsus
requested access to some of MRIA's, MRI Mobile's, and MRI Center's books and records
pursuant to the RUPA. On June 7, 2011, counsel for MRIA, MRI Mobile, and MRI Center refused
access to the requested records on the basis that the request came outside the scope of discovery in
the pending litigation. Saint Alphonsus argues that regardless of the rules of discovery, it has the
right to inspect the books and records, and therefore this Court should compel compliance with the
statutory rights found in the RUP A.

/
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Saint Alphonsus argues that the statutory right of a partner to examine partnership records
is nearly absolute, while MRIA argues that the right is suspended during the pendency of litigation.
The Court is inclined to agree with Saint Alphonsus that the right to examine partnership books
and records is nearly absolute, but the Court does not believe the scope of the right is at issue here.
The issue here is whether this Court should enforce the statutory right in the context of this
litigation. The Court believes that on the facts before it, it would be inappropriate to do so.
The rules governing discovery exist to define the scope of proceedings well in advance so
that both parties may develop their trial strategies and not be surprised at trial. See Edmunds v.
Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 878, 136 P.3d 338, 349 (2006). Allowing a party to use information

obtained outside the discovery process so long after the discovery deadlines have passed would
frustrate the purpose of the discovery rules and allow for the trials by surprise sought to be avoided
by the rules. While cases have been cited that allow this practice even though it was conceded to
be "backdoor discovery," none of these cases involved, as this case does, a second trial after
appeal.
Here, this Court reopened discovery in this casefor the very limited purpose of determining
whether expert testimony relating to damages or the lack thereof would change as a result of the
Supreme Court's opinion in this case. Discovery for other purposes was not reopened. Thus, this
is not simple backdoor discovery, which might otherwise be allowed-it is an effort specifically
designed to avoid this Court's order limiting further discovery. That was made clear when the
Court asked whether any materials found would be used in this case, and plaintiffs counsel, to his
credit, honestly told the Court that the materials would potentially be used at trial. As the Court
indicated at the time, it might well be willing to require the inspection so long as nothing reviewed
would be used in the trial. But the Court does not believe it is required to compel the inspection in
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light of its previous discovery ruling and the fact that the sole reason for the request is to see
whether there is any further information that might be used at trial. fu this context, the plaintiffs
purpose is not transparency-it is discovery. Consequently, it is subject to this Court's discovery
ruling and the Court will not compel MRIA to comply with Saint Alphonsus' s statutory right to
inspect partnership books of this purpose.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Compel Compliance with the
Statutory Right to fuspect Partnership Books and Records is DENIED. The Court expresses no
opinion on whether the statutory right is suspended during the pendency of litigation. The Court
finds that it would be inappropriate to enforce those statutory rights in the context of this litigation,
or to admit evidence obtained outside of discovery as ordered by the Court by use of what in
another context might be permissible "backdoor discovery."

.
~
SO ORDERED AND DATED thts~ day of July 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

.......

I hereby certify that on thi~ day of July 2011, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy
of the within instrument to:
JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
POBOX2837
BOISE, ID 83701
DONALDAYER
JONES DAY
51 LOUSIANA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST. STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court

By,~~ Gb•--:;•
Deputy Court Clerk
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DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC'
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D
IS TARS No. CV -OC-2004-11388
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION IN
LIMINE TO EXCLUDE "HEARSAY
WITHIN HEARSAY" IN BUSINESS
RECORDS

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), and move this
Court pursuant to Rule 805 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, for an order in limine excluding the
use of double hearsay statements contained within exhibits that may be offered at the trial of this
matter. This motion is supported by the Court's records and files in this matter and by the
Memorandum and Affidavit in Support filed contemporaneously herewith.
Oral argument is requested on this motion.
DATED this 25th day of July, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

ounter-Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

0

.~

0
0

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IN PART OF
JUNE 13,2011 CONSOLIDATED
ORDER RE: MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Defendant.

ORIG!~·JAL
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
On June 13, 2011, this Court issued its Consolidated Order re: Motions in Limine Heard
May 18, 2011. Saint Alphonsus moves for reconsideration, in part, of that order.

I.

THE COURT SHOULD PERMIT SAINT ALPHONSUS TO ARGUE THAT ITS
DISSOCIATION FROM MRIA WAS LAWFUL
In its order, the Court ruled as follows:
The issue of whether Saint Alphonsus was allowed to dissociate was
wholly disposed of in this Court's May 6, 2011, decision in which it
decided that Saint Alphonsus could not be held liable for the bare act of
dissociating. Consequently the propriety of Saint Alphonsus's
dissociation from MRIA is not in issue. Thus, evidence, argument, or
other comment regarding the propriety of [Saint Alphonsus' s] dissociation
is irrelevant, and potentially unfairly prejudicial. Thus, such evidence,
argument, or comment is precluded as to both parties under Idaho Rules of
Evidence 401 and 403. 1
Saint Alphonsus respectfully requests that the Court permit Saint Alphonsus to reference,

and indeed to argue, what the Court recognizes is a true fact that is central to the dispute between

1

Consolidated Order Re: Motions in Limine Heard May 18,2011 at 1-2.
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the parties-the fact that Saint Alphonsus had a legal right to dissociate when it did, and cannot
be found liable on any theory on the basis of that conduct. 2
Saint Alphonsus's dissociation is the key event in the story that the jury will hear, and it
cannot properly evaluate the evidence without being clear beyond doubt that Saint Alphonsus
had the right to leave when it did. There is no question that the jury will be informed, repeatedly,
that Saint Alphonsus withdrew as a partner in 2004. Simultaneously, MRIA's relentless theme at
the first trial was the "abandonment" and "betrayal" by Saint Alphonsus of MRIA. The jury will
necessarily have to confront the question whether the 2004 withdrawal was proper or improper,
and it is essential that there be no ambiguity that withdrawal was proper.
Thus, the notion that the undisputed legal correctness of Saint Alphonsus' s action could
not even be mentioned by Saint Alphonsus, while all manner of allegations of impropriety that
are an object of intense dispute are vigorously argued by the parties, would be a source of very
great confusion and prejudice. Indeed, it would create a great risk that the jury would assume
that the withdrawal was somehow improper, or a basis for liability-a proposition that this Court
has categorically rejected.
The central dispute in this case is whether Saint Alphonsus breached legal duties to the
MRIA entities, that arose from its longtime relationship as a partner in MRIA. The duties that
MRIA, Center and Mobile allege were breached arose out of the partnership contract itself, and
include the fiduciary duties owed by partners to each other, the implied covenant of good faith

2

Order Re: Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on Contract Theory of Wrongful Withdrawal at 4, 6
(May 6, 2011) (holding that "Saint Alphonsus did not wrongfully dissociate within the meaning of the RUPA" and
that "there is no liability simply for the act of dissociating from a partnership except as provided for in the RUPA;
the common law concepts of liability for the simple act of withdrawing from a partnership no longer exist.")
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and fair dealing, and the non-compete clause. As we have amply demonstrated elsewhere, 3 the
proper termination of the partnership agreement, as occurred here on April 1, 2004, ended all but
one of these duties immediately, and the covenant not to compete expired at the end of one year.
It is thus unthinkable that Saint Alphonsus would be able to effectively argue its case, either

relating to its conduct in dissociating after five years of effort to work out a deal, or with regard
to the scope and character of its other legal duties, without relying centrally on the fact that it had
a right to leave the partnership when it did. Foreclosing Saint Alphonsus from expressly relying
upon the legal fact that it properly left the partnership would excise the heart from the center of
its case.
Indeed, MRIA itself conceded that Saint Alphonsus should be able to inform the jury
about its lawful withdrawal in its memorandum supporting its motion in limine, arguing only that
"[i]fthe Court agrees with MRIA's position as stated in MRIA's Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment on 'Breach of Contract' Theory of Wrongful Liability ... then the Court
should also grant its Motion in Limine preventing Saint Alphonsus from arguing or asserting to
the jury that its dissociation was lawful."4 The Court later denied MRIA's common-law

3

See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus's Mem. in Support of its Motion for Summ. J. on MRIA's Unpled "Breach of Contract"
Theory of Wrongful Dissociation (Mar. 7, 2011).

4

MRIA's Mem. in Support of Mot. In Limine to Preclude Saint Alphonsus from Arguing that its Dissociation was
Lawful, at 5 (emphasis added). To be sure, MRIA reversed course in its reply brief, by purporting to withdraw its
concession and thus denying Saint Alphonsus an opportunity to brief the apparently undisputed fact that, if
dissociation was not wrongful under either of MRIA' s theories, that the jury should be aware of that fact. See Opp.
to MRIA's Motion in Limine at 4 (accepting MRIA's concession and arguing why evidence of lawful dissociation
was relevant "even if Saint Alphonsus's summary judgment motion on 'breach of contract' dissociation were
somehow to be denied"); MRIA's Reply in Support at 2 (claiming, for the first time, that lawful dissociation is
irrelevant "regardless of which way the Court decides" the "common law" dissociation theory").

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN PART OF JUNE 13, 2011
001473
CONSOLIDATED ORDER RE: MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 4

dissociation theory on May 6, 2011, so the basis for MRIA's request to exclude any reference to
"lawful dissociation" has collapsed.
Saint Alphonsus thus respectfully requests that the Court permit Saint Alphonsus to
inform the jury that its withdrawal was rightful under Idaho law.
II.

THE COURT SHOULD ORDER REDACTED ALL PORTIONS OF THE
SHATTUCK HAMMOND MEMORANDUM WHICH DIRECTLY SUGGEST
THAT DISSOCIATION OR POST -APRIL 1, 2005 COMPETITION IS
WRONGFUL
In its June 13 decision, consistent with its earlier rulings that dissociation was rightful,

the Court excluded references in the Shattuck Hammond and PriceWaterhouseCoopers
memoranda that indicated the possibility that dissociation was wrongful. The Court declined,
however, to strike two additional sentences from the Shattuck Hammond memoranda (TX 4234
and 4239) which, when read in context, also suggest that the dissociation by Saint Alphonsus
could give rise to liability. Because these sentences are highly prejudicial in suggesting what the
Court has ruled to be legally incorrect-that Saint Alphonsus dissociation may itself give rise to
liability-Saint Alphonsus seeks reconsideration of these rulings as well.

First, the Court held that "the sentence 'SARMC has been advised by counsel that this
option would likely engender litigation with MRIA' is potentially relevant to MRIA' s claims for
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Consequently,
the Court will not exclude that sentence at this time." 5 Viewed in context, however, this
sentence is quite prejudicial because it expressly suggests that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal,
and competition following the expiration of the one-year non-compete, is wrongful:
5

Consolidated Order Re: Motions in Limine Heard May 18,2011 at 2.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN PART OF JUNE 13,2011
001474
CONSOLIDATED ORDER RE: MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 5

J

•

•

•

From the correspondence provided, SARMC ... is strongly considering
simply withdrawing from MRIA and competing with the exiting MRI
facilities on its own campus after the end of the one-year non-compete
agreement. SARMC has been advised by counsel that this option would
likely engender litigation with MRIA.
Trial Ex. 4234 at 2 (emphasis added); accord Trial Ex. 4234 at 3. The implication of this last
sentence is directly contrary to this Court's unambiguous rulings that the withdrawal was not
wrongful and that Saint Alphonsus could compete with MRIA after the expiration of the noncompete clause. 6 By contrast, nothing in this paragraph relates at all to the notion that Saint
Alphonsus was wrongfully competing or breaching fiduciary duties before dissociation, which is
the relevant issue to be tried.
Should the Court allow MRIA to place this language before the jury, the jury will be
misled to believe that dissociation and post-April 1, 2005 competition was questionable in some
legal sense, a suggestion that we now know to be flatly incorrect. Moreover, the challenged
language has no relevance to the breaches of fiduciary duties that remain to be tried in this case.

Second, the Court further ruled that the memoranda's "language regarding the 'risk of St.
Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary duty to the LPs' is potentially relevant to the claims for breach
of fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of good faith a fair dealing and ... [declined to]
exclude that language at this time."7 But, as above, the quotation at issue makes unmistakably

6

See Order re: Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on Contract Theory of Wrongful Withdrawal, at 2,
6 (May 6, 20II) ("The Court [has] held ... that St. Alphonsus's dissociation, as a matter oflaw, was not
wrongful."); id. at 6 ("St. Alphonsus's simple act ofleaving the partnership, standing alone, cannot form a basis for
liability for either wrongful withdrawal or wrongful dissociation."); Consolidated Order re: Motions in Limine
Heard May I8, 20II at 3 ("Saint Alphonsus had no duty not to compete after the expiration of the noncompetition
agreement.")
7

Consolidated Order Re: Motions in Limine Heard May I8, 20 II at 2.
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clear that it is the act of withdrawal from the partnership that would here be the supposed source
of a breach of fiduciary duty. The language at issue appears on page 11 of Ex. 4239, in a
consideration of various options that Saint Alphonsus might pursue, and under the heading
"Option A: Withdrawal from MRIA::"
Givens Pursley believes that there would likely be litigation as to whether
the termination was wrongful and that there may be a risk of St.
Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary responsibility to the LPs.
As this Court has held, "there is no liability simply for the act of dissociating from a
partnership except as provided for in the RUPA," and Saint Alphonsus is not liable under
RUP A. 8 And, as before, nothing in this paragraph relates at all to the relevant issues that are still
present: the claim that Saint Alphonsus was wrongfully competing or breaching fiduciary duties
before dissociation.

Accordingly, the Court should reconsider its ruling declining to exclude both of these
highly misleading statements, even as it ordered exclusion of other statements from these same
exhibits, on precisely the grounds that require exclusion of these statements as well.
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant Saint Alphonsus's motion to reconsider and order that (a) Saint
Alphonsus be permitted to argue that its dissociation from MRIA in 2004 was lawful, and that
(b) the language in the Shattuck Hammond memoranda stating that "SARMC has been advised
by counsel that this option would likely engender litigation with MRIA" and "Givens Pursley

8

Order Re: Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on Contract Theory of Wrongful Withdrawal at 6
(May 6, 2011)
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believes that ... there may be a risk of St. Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary responsibility" by
withdrawing, be held inadmissible at trial.
DATED this 25th day of July, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

D
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
)
liability partnership,
)
)
Defendant.
)
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
)
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
)
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and )
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
)
partnership,
)
)
Counter-Claimants, )
vs.
)

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING, P. 1
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)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
)
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)
Counter-Defendants. )
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
)
County of Ada

JACK S. GJORDING, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that he is one
of the attorneys for Plaintiff/CounterDefendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("Saint Alphonsus") in the above-entitled matter and makes
this affidavit having personal knowledge of the facts contained herein.
1.

This affidavit is filed in support of Saint Alphonus's Motion in Limine to Exclude

"Hearsay Within Hearsay" in Business Records and the supporting Memorandum.
2.

That attached hereto are copies of Trial Exhibit Nos. 4047,4057, 4101,4219 and

4154 referenced in Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETHNOT.

~

e me, a Notary Public, this 2::>~ day of July,
2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

2b-..day of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
,
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING, P. 3
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~
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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MINUTES
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEEUNG
MAY 11,1998

In attendance: David Giles, Tim Hall, Paul Traughber, Jeff Cliff, and Kathy Sharpe, Secretary.
I

IMAGING CENTER.

A.

Dr. Giles expressed his feelings that the hospital will issue a "non-compete" clause within
the next six months. It was agreed that this is not a direction in which the Group would
benefit from. An independent Imaging Center would be beneficial and would help to
maintain a professional image as well as autonomy. Dr. Giles stated that if the Imaging
Center is not built now, it is most likely that it wilt not happen after the contract with the
hospital is renegotiated.

B.

The question was raised as to how important the relationships are with the physicians at the
hospital. BoaJPoa ._ atatt4 tW _,.. wddlt a. .._._llel~Ui..t. TVH. is

'NGiddlle ,._._ ........,_. .......,. .,,.,...,..,_....,., PtdtlfJI by.wayof
aoJIIiMofCIII!IIdiiCCwlaSiiltA)III&IIII rlflliwJI:a..lfi.ac.t.. Dr. Hall will speak

with him in a more social setting to hopefully gain some insight into this matter. Dr. Giles

feels that a separate Imaging Center will cause some real problems with the current hospital
staff and the ideal situation would be to someh9w partner with the hospital.

II

III

C.

Dr. Hall stated that he believes that the Group is in control now, but that they are in jeopardy
of losing that control with each passing year. Jeff agrees that now is the time to open a
center and feels confident that the Group's income will significantly increase and the
younger partners will be happy with the risk in a few short years. It was :agreed that
expansion to the east toward Saint Luke's Regional Medical Center would be the best option.

D.

Dr. Giles felt it was not necessary for a consultant to be brought in, as there are many
contacts within the Group. Jeff will gather some demographics to present.

MANPOWER.

A.

Neil Davey was very weli received on his visit to the department. It was felt that if both Ian
and Neil join the Group, a clause in their contract will need to be drawn to exclude the
brothers from monopolizing votes on certain issues i.e. votes that pertain to each other. A
letter of intent will be sent to Ian.

B.

Lisa Scales will be out for her interview this month.

SCHEDULE.

A.

Dr. Gobel has brought up some ideas on scheduling and will present them at the Group
Meeting. Dr. Hall would like someone rather than himself to take over the schedule, Dr.
Giles volunteered to take on scheduling.

GSREX/0036
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IV

INVESTIGATION PROTOCOL.
A.

Dr. Traughber presented an article by ACR regarding Investigation Protocol. Dr. Traughber
would like to set up a protocol for WBR that will help employees know how to handle any
agency that may visit WBR and ask to see files etc. Drs. Giles and Hall agreed that this was
a good idea. Jeff aiso suggested a Compliance protocol that would protect the office and
employees. Dr. Traughber will work on an outline for the protocol and get back to the
Executive Committee.

STARKU.

V

A.

Dr. Traughber questioned how the Stark II Self-Referral law would effect WBR. (See
attachment). It was felt that it is ok to bill for films if the bill is to go the patient and not the
referring agency. The biggest problem could be with Bedside. Jeff and Dr. Traughber will
look into this article and work up a written agreement for the offices that will be most
effected by this.

VENCOR.

VI

A.

VII

Dr. Hall met with the Cooperate Head of the Vericor. Dr. Hall was asked if the Group
would be interested in doing business with Vencor. Vencor is currently in the process of
seeking HealthSouth. Dr. Hall told him that he would be interested in talking to them.
More on this issue to come.

WEST BOISE NUMBERS.

A..

Jeff presented profit information to the committee on WBR. Dr. Giles has requested these
numbers to determine if the profits can be utilized in the financing of the new Imaging
Center.

CAROLYN COFFMAN.

VIII

A.

Dr. Coffinan talked to Jeff regarding her malpractice insurance, which is approximately
$6,000 per year. She is the only Radiologist who pays this herself. Dr. Giles feels that the
Group should pay a percentage (perhaps two-thirds). Jeff will talk to Dr. Coffman about her
premium.

IX

DIANE NEWTON.

A.
X

Dr. Newton recently went to San Francisco as a consultant. A motion was made and carried
to reimburse her for her expenses.

MOUNTAIN HOME REPORTS.

A.

The reports from Mountain Home continue to be problematic due to the lack of history. Dr.
Hall will talk to them about this problem.

DG/kas
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MINUTES
GROUP. MEETING
SEPTEMBER 9, 1998
In attendance: Jeff Seabourn, Ricardo Abello, Tim Hall, Neil Davey, Vicken Garabedian, Diane Newton,
John Knochel, Joe Gobel, David Giles, Paul Traughber; Jeff Cliff and Kathy S~arpe, Secretary.

I

MCCALL
A.

II

MANPOWER
A.

III

The question was raised as to whether the digitalized system at McCall will meet with ACR
standards. Dr. Knochel has been told that it will not be a problem. Due to the backlog from
the US West strike, it will be a while before the T1 line is installed and the system is fully
running. Dr. Abello suggested that perhaps a test period could be done with the digitalized
films versus the hard copies to compare the quality and detennine if they are up to the
standards that the Group is willing to accept. This issue has been tabled until the Tl line has
been installed.

Dr. Gobel has spoken with Lisa Scales and stated that she is still very interested in relocating
to Boise but that she is currently looking elsewhere and may not be available in the future.
With the opening of the Imaging Center, and TVH continuing to grow, there will be a
shortage of Radiologists for adequate coverage. This would be a good time to talk to Lisa
again. Dr. Abello motioned that Lisa be brought back out to meet with the Radiologists that
she did not have the opportunity to meet on a previous visit to Boise. Dr. Traughber
seconded the motion. Dr. Giles stated that it would be Wifair to bring her out if the Group is
not going to offer her a job. Dr. Knochel motioned to hire "Dr. Somebody", Dr. Abello
seconded. The motion carried. Dr. Giles stated that there are some new CVs in the file and
a committee should be put together to sort through them for potential candidates for
interviews. Dr. Hall stated that a Pediatric Radiologist from Arkansas has contacted him.
She is moving to Boise and is looking for a job. Although there is not a need for a Pediatric
Radiologist, it was decided that she should be invited to the department to meet with her.
Drs. Traughber, Abello and Knochel felt that the areas for concern for backup would be
women's studies, cardiac and musculoskeletal.. Dr. Davey stated that there are three
Radiologists from Denver that would be interested in relocating to Boise. He will contact
them to send their CV s.

HAITI
A.

The hospital in Haiti does not have a trained ultrasound tech at this time. It will cost
$6,000.00 to send a tech to the states to be trained. The hospital has agreed to match the
$3,000.00 from the Radiology Group. Dr. Giles stated that contributions should be
voluntary and Group members should pledge only what they are comfortable with.

GSR/0638
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IV

MAMMOGRAPHY CERTIFICATION
A.

V

BILLING FOR OUTSIDE CONSULTATION
· A.

VI

VII

A.

Jeff asked for clarification as to whether a bill should be sent on a professional courtesy. Dr.
Giies felt that ifthe patient is not being billed due to a professional courtesy, than nothing
should be sent to the patient.

B.

Jeff will look at the data on the exact number of professional courtesies and who is getting
them. Currently, professional courtesies are being extended to physicians and their
immediate family unless the Radiologist pays for a specific professional courtesy. More on
this issue later.

STAFF ISSUES FOR WBR AND THE IMAGING CENTER
Dr. Abello stated that the staff at WBR has some concerns regarding the future of WBR and
the Imaging Center. Dr. Giles will talk to the staff of WBR.

RETREAT
A.

IX

Jeff has looked at the billing problem and has stated that if a report has not been read, a
consultation fee only can be billed. It was stressed that the Radiologists must be careful
with "curbside" consults if there is not a report read, as there will not be a paper trail and the
possibility for misinterpretation is high. Dr. Seabourn also stated that the number of films
looked at should be documented.

PROFESSIONAL COURTESIES

A.

VIII

Dr. Traughber stated that some members of the Group will fail to be recertified due to their
low numbers of mammography studies. Drs. Seaboum and Garabedian will probably need
to be dropped from the study due to their numbers. Dr. Traughber stated that more of the
Junior Partners need to be qualified and that mammography should be assigned to more
members. Drs. Traughber and Knochel will look at the schedule and work out a system to
help the mammography numbers. More on this issue to come.

Dr. Abello would like to discuss subspecialty and the call schedule at the retreat on
November 14, 1998.

TRAUMA ULTRASOUND
A.

Bob Korn has talked to Dr. Giles about the use of ultrasound in the trauma departments as
an extension of the stethoscope. Dr. Giles expressed the Group's opposition to this, as this
raises a potential problem in that the trauma physicians may not be trained enough to fully
evaluate an ultrasound. Dr. Traughber would like to write a position paper to give to the
trauma physicians. Dr. Hall felt that before a letter is sent, a few Radiologists should
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infonnally get together with some of the trauma physicians to discuss thcir willingness to
work with the trauma department and their availability. Dr. Traughber felt a protocol should
be established to follow the use of ultrasound in the trauma department. The Executive
Committee with work out a meeting with the trauma surgeons. More to come on this issue.
X

IMA DELEGATES

A.

XI

TVH

A.
XII

The Executive Collllt1ittee will put together a list of infonnation that will go on the plaques
below the photos. If anyone has any ideas of what should be on the list, please let Drs.
Traughber, Knochel or Garabedian know. Those that have not had their picture done yet are
strongly encouraged to do so.
·

INCREASED FEES

A.

XIV

Dr. Knochel felt that perhaps the Group should infonn TVH about the Imaging Center. Dr.
Giles felt that it would be better to wait until after the MRI Board has been told.

PHOTOS
A.

XIII

Dr. Giles stated that the IMA needs delegates if anyone is interested. There has been a poor
representation in the past and Dr. Hall would like to encourage attendance. Dr. Hall will
attend if he is not on call.

Jeff stated that Blue Cross has cut fees down by 9%. To offset this, the Executive
Corn.inittee has asked Jeffto look for codes that will allow fees to be increased around 5% to
10%. There has been an overall net of3.3% so far. Jeff will continue to monito( procedures
. that Blue Cross is not cutting and steadily increase those until they hit a ceiling.

IMAGING CENTER
A.

Drs.OU.. TIIJ.tlbitrudHtllmotwitlts..IAJJntcetod""-4W~CM*r. As
~SOd, htr il*ial ~ wu not ia tb.o ~·•.tav•• the felt thtRtdiolety <?mvp.

to._

had violated tblir ,.lllk•ldp d tho hotpilal. the:offerwt~·IUlto
tho equtpment
from dlo hoapital but s.lrl lelttbat UUa WO\Jkt. IM)t\)e ~ The helpi~'s position is
t.bll the Jmaaiea c.nter will like.,.... • tlley·wat aa • • of «be ceatir • pt~sible.
SIDCira ID4. CHMJy ScUmp we.~ to 4ct~~~Jiac how ..-.or .a~ dlir; w!U have on
the boapitN
bow . .b of a pmA• ta.Y.· u,a. aotll't.tm tbt ceater. Dr. Giles feels that this
will allow the center to market on the hospital campus. Or. Traughber stated that Cindy
talked of obtaining a global fee (technical and profession fees) of 50%. Dr. Traughber
questioned if the Group will allow the Executive Committee to barter with the hospital. It
was unanimously felt that the Group must maintain complete control over the center at all
cost. It was also felt that the center must not be tied to the hospital for new projects. The
issues that were definitely off the table for discussion included: professional fees, control
over new projects and management. Those issues up for discussion with the hospital would

a
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be: a percentage of involvement, options for new projects and a new contract for the
hospital. A possible discussion for a nocompete clause and TVH was also raised. Jeff
stressed that the Group must protect the center and not give control to the hospitaL Jeff also
questioned how successful the center would be if the hospital becomes too involved. Is the
Group willing to give up a higher percentage of technical fee to maintain total control? Dr.
Giles suggested telling Sandra that the hospital can have 30% if.they stay out ofTVH and
the Group maintains complete control of the center. The hospital will present their case
based on 50% control tomorrow. Jeff will get back to the Group with this information.
B.

Carl has drawn up a new contract for the partnership with the Imaging Center. He has taken
the SARG contract as a base and modified it for review. Dr. Hall questioned if there could
be a main contract that would state that splinter groups could be spun off and each of these
entities would have its own contract. The main contract would also state that none of the
separate entities could supersede the main contract in any way. Jeff felt that this would not
be a problem and should be discussed with Carl.
1.

2.

The profits and losses wili be shared equally among the patiners and vesting will be
immediate for those partners that established the center. Anyone coming into the
Group after the center is open will have to have a buy in/buy out contract similar to
the SARG and WBR contracts. Senior partners will guarantee the salaries for the
junior partners if the hospital contract is lost. Each partner has equal equity so each
partner could ask for a guaranteed salary, but it was thought that some partners
would not have to do so. Dr. Gobel felt that there should be a cap or a percentage of
what can. be requested. It was felt that all partners should have the opportunity to
request a guarantee salary and those who do not need to use this option can choose
not to. Dr. Hall suggested that Jeff meet with each partner individually to discuss
their position and report back to the Group. This issue will be tabled until further
discussed.
Jeff also expressed his concerns over how to account for losses at the hospital if the
center is extremely successful. He questioned if there should be compensation to the
Saint Alphonsus Radiology Group to cover the center's profits and what to pay for
that coverage. Perhaps the pay should be based on market value per hour such as
$150.00 per hour, which will help offset operating costs if the center struggles in the
beginning. This will help to keep a Senior partner from making less than a Junior
partner. This issue will be tabled until members have a chance to look at the
contracts.

C.

Dr. Giles told Mike Falash that two vendors have been selected.' MRJ: Philips & Siemens,
Specials Room: Philips & Siemens and CT: GE & Siemens. Dr. Hall spoke with someone
who will give the Group a Panorex machine for a fee per examination.

D.

Jeff spoke with someone concerning the success of having an MRI in an Imaging Center.
The spokesperson stated that in a town similar in size to Boise that out of five Imaging
Centers, three do not have MRl. They are very successful but not as profitable as those with
MRl.

GSR/0641
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VX

MRIBOARD
A.

Jeff stated that he feels that Tom Hensen is strongly considering the offer of$1.8 million for
all his shares. Hensen will wait until after the MRl Board meeting to get back to Jeff with
his decision.· Dr. Giles questioned when the Group should approach the MRI Board
regarding leasing a magnet for the center. It was felt that this should wait until after Hensen
has made his decision.
·

EXECUTIVE SESSION:
I

COMMISSION
A.

II

GILES REPORT
A.

III

Jeff presented the amendment for WBR with the new name of Southwest Idaho Imaing dba
West Boise Radiology. This has been signed by all six ofthe original partners with the
exception of Dr. Murray. It was also noted that the revenue source for WBR is brittle.

PARTY FOR NEW PARTNERS
A.

VI

The issue was again raised to remove Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center name from
the TVH billing. Jeff suggested coming up with a new name for billing purposes.

WBR
A.

V

A report on the sources of revenue will be presented at each Executive Session. The current
breakdown is 21.6% for in-patients, 60.8% for out-patients and 17.6% for ER.

BILLING FOR TVH
A

IV

Dr. Giles presented a letter from Arthur Berry (see attachment) regarding the commission on
the building. Dr. Hall stated that the Group should probably pay the rest of the commission
$23,750.00 but it certainly leaves a "bad taste". Dr. Traughber seconded and the motion was
carried. Dr. Hall would like Arthur Berry to know that the Group would like to be able to
trust his integrity and would like help with the future purchase of the adjacent Jot. Dr. Giies
will take the check to Arthur Berry on Friday. Due to the commission issue, Dr. Knochel
would like to use another agency for any future real estate purchases,

It was agreed that a party to introduce the newer partners to the Group should be given. Drs.
Knochel and Traughber will help Dr. Garabedian with this project.

SACC
A.

As of November 1, 1998 Owyhee and State SACC facilities will have WBR bill their
patients directly.

GSR/0642
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VII

IC RECRUlTING
A.

Recruiting for the Imaging Center will have to be done soon. More on this issue later.

DG!kas
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ARTHUR BERRY
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& COMPANY

uslnass Brokorago ProrossiMIIls
Commercial 1'1e111 Estale

September 9; 1998

960 Broa<!Wlly Avonue. !>ulto ~50
Bolso. Idaho 83706
(208) 33G-6000

f.AX (200) 345·0609
arthurbeny C arthwbarry.com

Dr. Pave Giles
410 S. Orcllard
Boise, 10 83705

PERSONAL & CQNFII)BNTJAL
Fax Transmission: 367-2824

Dear Dave:

r und.ersttmd that you arc going to be having a partnership meeting in the next day or so and,
therefore,. I wanted t.o set out our position why we are hop.eful that the remainder of the
commission for the l Olh and Myrtle propertY will be paid by YOl!f medical group.
. .When we originally met in the St. A!phonsus conference room to oonfldenti~tl!y discuss your
potential real estate needs, l outlined a program that involved our perfom1i11g specific and
unlimited search for the potential office site you described. Due to your need for anonymity, this
was to be done without disclosing your identity. J indic~t~d to you that we had two or 'three ·
''listed properties which probably would not meet your needs, and that. we were aware of five or
six tlther properties listed by other agencies which may have ~n interest level." I thought it was
acceptable to your group that the "best site'' w~tich we probably would find for you wo\,!ld be
properties somewhere along the Myrtle connector that presently were not. listed for sale. I
indicated that in the event we found such propctty, and the seller was willing to sell but
unwilling to pay us our commission; that you would "protec:t us on ovr fcc." I think at this
original meeting l even mentioned Ms. J.ec.ccsc's 1011' & Myr:tle property since l knew she was
considcring.selling and felt it was an ideal site for you.
·

a

In Rny c;vent, Ms. Lecesse agreed to accept your last proposal of $950,000 provided she would
only have to pay us a fee of three percent. I regret that 1 was not able to "control her" in paying
the stanQard fee we previously discussed, but this often happens' in circumstances where we
show unlisted property which the seller is unwilling to initially execuie a written listing
agreement on.' Therefore, I am asking that your group pay th'e $23,750 remainder of eommission
to ul>, which we think is on.ly fair:.
·
·
·
Very truly yours,

Arthur J. Berry
ArthL1rBcny & Company

AJB:sg
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Confidential
MINUTES
IMAGING CENTERMEETING
AUGUST 24, 1999

In atten®nce: David GileiJ, Joe Gobel, Li~Ja Scales, John Knoebel, Ian Davey, Paul Traughber,
Bill Murray, Jeff Seabo~ Karen Noyes and Kathy Sharpe, Secretary.
I

IMAGING CENTER UPDATE
A.

Karen stated that approximately six trial patients were scanned on the MRI Unit at
the center today with approximately six scheduled for tomorrow.

B.

Transcription has developed a problem due to the computer interface not being
up. Reports will need to be printed on hardcopy until this can be resolved.

C.

DR wyl be on site next week. Karen stated that for DR to run, other systems,
such as Radiology Infonnation, needs to be on line.

D.

The Med.Rad power injectors are not compatible with the angio system. Karen
has spoken to someone regarding this problem and is waiting to hear back from
them as to how they will make this work at no charge to the center.

E.

The temporary license for mammography has been obtained with a 45-day
timeftame to tum in sample images.

F.

Business cards are in.

G.

The Lmnysis system is in but needs AGFA cassettes to work. Karen and Dr.
Seaboum will work on this issue.
·

H.

Dr. Newton stated that the signs should be ready for the October4, 1999 deadline
for the video shoot at the center. They will de:filiitely been fiilished by the
openhig patty. A signed contract should be ready by the end of the week. Also,
two temporary signs will be done ~y the ertd of the week.

I.

Nothing new on dark fiber. Carl is working on a contract that will state that the
Group's lease tate will decrease when someone else comes onto the existing

cable.
II

MRI NEGOTIATIONS
A.

s.n... 'Welikl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~~.

............... thCI NlU..s.l is ........... This could cause a problem witb
financing due to the bank grouping the loan to MlU and the hospital as potential
partnet$. It was felt that perhaps this was part of the reason US Bank has not
closed the deal as of yet. The MRI Board would like to own the MIU portion of

- - - - -...._.... ~.•..o;;;;···==;;;,;,;,;;;;'""'"'----------~--·~-----M--·-----~-··
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Confidential
the center with the Group being only a 1/11 owner. This would make the center
an extension ofMRI Center ofldaho. The GrOup feels strongly that this is not an
acceptable option.

m

INTERMOUNTAIN ORTHOPEDICS
A

IV

TREASURE VALLEY HOSPITAL
A.

V

Dr. Traughber drafted a letter of intent (see attachment) to send to Buzz
Showalter, which would give the Group 30 days to continue working on this and
to notify the MRI Board of this venture. Dr. Knochel raised the question of
whether the MRI Board will stall in a decision using the 30-day grace period from
the letter of intent: The Board will have to be notified that there is a time limit
and they will have to respond quickly. If the MRI Board is not interested, then
the money already set aside for the MRI deal could be used to finance buying the
magnet at the Elks annex. If the MRI Board is interested, then this could be done
jointly. It was felt that the bank would be favorable to this, as the orthopedics
profonna is very strong and this is a win-win situation. Dr. Gobel will look into
the Elks site for potential growth. as a second imaging center. Dr. NeWton
motioned that Dr. Traughber go forward with the letter of intent to Dr. Showalter.
Dr. Gobel seconded and the motion passed.

Brian Deever would like to talk to the Group regarding Blue Cross. There is
ariother Radiologist interested in doing the imaging under the Blue Cross
restiictions and discount services. Dr. Knochel wilJ gather more information on
this issue.

SCHEDULE ROTATION
A.

Dr. Knochel stated that the winter quarter including spring break needs to be
picked. Dr. Knochel suggested that this needs to rotate in the same way the
rotation works for RSNA This will be discussed further at the next meeting.

DG/kas
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FINANCE AND FEES COMMITTEE
APRIL 18, 2001

MINUTES

In attendance: Joe Gobel, MD; John Knochel, MD; Tim Hall, MD; Jeff Cliff, and Nicole
Lindauer (secretary)

0
I.

g.

BlJUGF.T

"<

a. Jeff Cliff will get a disk to all group members with the 2002 - 2006 IMI
budget figures.

II.

COMMITTEES /ISSUES
a. Discussed how much committees can spend without rad exec or group
approval. The marketing committee has received the marketing report from
Canie Strader. The committee requested a proposal from SMCS to
implement the strategy for 2001. The total proposal cost is around $180,000
for 2001 including sub-contractors. Dr. Gobel will poll the group for
approval.
Rad exec will define what guidelines will be used for committee spending.

III.

MRICI

a. Diaeuaion: Hospitalleokiag strolilgly into avesta to get O\Lt ofMIUCl. Jeff
Cliff to set up-.~ with Cindy 9ehamp to disows peasible solutiens.
IV.

li'INANCIALS
a. Jeff Cliff presented a first quarter financial summary for GSR. The physician

productivity numbers will be distributed by the end of this month.
V.

SURVEY
a. Jeff Cliff has e-mailed a copy of the survey done previously to group

members. Each committee will begin addressing issues/concerns raised by
group members over the next few meetings.

Approvod By:

~~~

:;;re

ApprovedBy: __

~_JRC 4.7S/O I
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IMI WEST EQUIPMENT BIDS
CT SCANNER
l. Seimens CT Zoom( current platform) $993,293
Fluoro(28,800) and cardiac( 46,800+ 39,600) as options
Doesn't include I 6 channel upgrade
Care bolus(25,200) option
No injector( 15,000) total-$1, !48,693
Maintainence (see attached) 129-141 K/ycar

0

a
'-<

2. Toshiba Aquilion( advanced platform) $1,160,588
Includes 64 row O.Smm detector- ?deliver as 8 or 16 channel
Fluoro(65,000)
Bonus( vitrea upgrade or CT flu oro) bu 3-31-01
Maintainence -$175K after wmnenly/year minus 5% on
Both scanners
,

MRI SCANNER
!. Philips $1,662,168
2. Seimens
Quantum $1 ,668,580
Ultra $1,495,780

MULTIPURPOSE ROOM
1. Polystar $659,978
1024 X 1024, 40 em
80 kW generator
up to 8 fr/scc
96 image RAM

GSRRP/000509
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Confidential
? number of monitors

2. GE Advantx Tilt-C $576,158
I 024 X 1024, 40cm
I 00 kW generator
6-8 fr/sec
>1000 image RAM
dual monitors
$9420 ceiling mount

Radiography and Fluoroscopy room
I. Siemens Sireskop $410,205
2. GE$323,012
Angio $141<.
lntcrventional $1 0.51<.
Vertical Bucky $91<.

Mobile C-arn1
I. Siemens $173,836
2. OS I table $49,000
Radiography
I. GE Proleus with vertical bucky $97,432
Tomo $16K

2. Siemens Multix with vert bucky ~$ 130K
Torno $~12K
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CHAJSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JERI HEATON
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04082190

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
ITS MOTION IN LIMINE TO
EXCLUDE "HEARSAY WITHIN
HEARSAY" IN BUSINESS RECORDS

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
At the first trial, Saint Alphonsus stipulated liberally to the admission of numerous
business records, including the minutes of meetings of several organizations, as a matter of
judicial economy and professional courtesy. MRIA counsel made aggressive use of this
stipulation, to argue the truth of individual hearsay statements contained within the minutes. The
result was the improper use of"hearsay within hearsay". I.R.E. 805. To illustrate this problem
and to preclude several specific examples, Saint Alphonsus hereby moves pre-trial for an order
excluding the double hearsay included in five exhibits discussed herein, and will make similar
objections as further inadmissible hearsay may be offered at trial by MRIA.

II. ARGUMENT
A.

Statements included in a business record memorializing the out-of-court statements
of others are inadmissible hearsay.
A document, such as the minutes describing a meeting of an organization, is classic

hearsay, because it is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION IN LIMINE TO
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trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.R.E. 801(c), 802;
State v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375, 378, 924 P.2d 637, 640 (Idaho App. 1996). Once properly
authenticated, however, meeting minutes are often readily admissible under the "business
records" exception to the hearsay rule, to prove the details of the meeting, such as who attended,
the agenda, and the discussions had at the meeting. 1
But when such minutes include statements by a meeting participant that describe his
earlier activities, outside of the meeting, they introduce a second level of hearsay. And when the
meeting participant describes what a third party purportedly said to the meeting participant at
some earlier time, the minutes add a third level of hearsay.
To be sure, "[h]earsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule

if

each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule ... "
I.R.E. 805 ("Hearsay within hearsay"; emphasis added). But the converse is also true: when "a
written report, itselfhearsay, . . relate[s] the statements of third persons," then "[i]n such a
situation each level of hearsay is subject to a separate hearsay objection." Idaho Trial Handbook

§ 19.9. Thus, while a police officer's report may be admissible under the "business records
exception, I.R.E. 803(6)," the statement of an individual incorporated into that report is itself
"hearsay and not admissible unless it [meets] a separate hearsay exception." State v. Vivian, 129

1

I.R.E. 803(6) "Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in
any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it
was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation ...
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness."
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Idaho at 378, 924 P.2d at 640. Above all, as to meeting minutes, when "the statements recorded
in the minutes could not be attributed to any particular person," no exception to the hearsay rule
can be established. 2
There were offered in evidence at the first trial numerous minutes of meetings of a group
of radiologists, who were led during a portion of the events in controversy by Dr. David Giles,
who is a principal antagonist of Saint Alphonsus in this litigation. In many cases, Dr. Giles
himself initialed and apparently drafted these minutes. 3 We accept for the sake of this motion,
and expect to stipulate at trial, that such minutes qualify as business records. However, the
minutes frequently include statements, sometimes attributed by name to Dr. Giles or another
meeting participant, and sometimes not attributed to anyone by name, that describe the
declarant's activities prior to coming to the meeting. Those statements, when offered by MRIA
to prove that those activities occurred, are hearsay that is subject to no exception, and therefore
must be excluded.

2

See Estate ofBurton v. Trover Clinic Found. Inc.,--- S.W.3d ---,2010 WL 6816338, at *5 (Ky. App. 2010) ("most
importantly, the statements recorded in the minutes could not be attributed to any particular person. In reviewing
KRE 803(6), one of the requirements of the exception requires the statements in the business records to have been
made by a person with knowledge. The exception does not allow the admission of anonymous statements into
evidence ... "); accord Walton v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., No. 05-3027,2009 WL 2778441, at *6 (D. Ariz.
2009) (holding that statements in meeting minutes "do not satisfy the ... knowledge requirement" when "the
original declarants are unidentified," because despite fact that one could infer that speakers were employees, the
Court could only speculate that these "employees had personal knowledge of the testing and other facts mentioned
in the document, including [a second-level] hearsay [statement]" found therein).
3

The "Giles minutes" that are the subject of this motion uniformly include the notation at the end "DG/kas",
indicating that they were typed by "kas" for "DG" (David Giles), and bear the handwritten initials "DG." See Trial
Exhibit Nos. 4047,4057 and 4101, attached to the Affidavit of JackS. Gjording filed concurrently herewith.
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At a third level, the hearsay declarant in these meeting minutes sometimes describes prior
meetings with Saint Alphonsus, and attributes inflammatory statements to certain Saint
Alphonsus officials. We acknowledge that

if the hearsay declarant were to appear at trial and

testify to the Saint Alphonsus statements, then the Saint Alphonsus statements would be nonhearsay as an admission of a party opponent. I.R.E. 801 (d)(2)(A). But when the Saint
Alphonsus statement is included in a hearsay statement by a meeting participant that is included
in hearsay meeting minutes, "each level of hearsay is subject to a separate hearsay objection,"
Idaho Trial Handbook§ 19.9, and the Saint Alphonsus statement is admissible only "if each part
of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule." I.R.E. 805.
Because the Saint Alphonsus statement is included in inadmissible hearsay by the meeting
participant, both must be excluded.

B.

The Court should exclude the following hearsay-within-hearsay statements and
order their redaction if the documents are introduced for other purposes. 4
The following exhibits admitted at the last trial, among others, contain hearsay statements

which should themselves be excluded from evidence, even assuming the underlying document
itself is admissible as a business record under I.R.E. 803(6):
1.

May 11, 1998 GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes (Tr. Exh. 404 7).

Dr. Giles's minutes of this meeting of the radiologists ("GSR") state that "the question
was raised as to how important the relationships are with the physicians at the hospital." The

4

Submitted herewith are copies of the five exhibits that are the subject of this motion, highlighted to indicate the
portions that should be excluded. See, Gjording Aff., Trial Exhibit Nos. 404 7, 4057, 4101, 4219 and 4154.
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"questioner" is not identified, but the minutes continue with this anonymous attribution of a
purported prior conversation with J. Robert Polk, M.D., who was then Vice President of Medical
Affairs at Saint Alphonsus:
"Bob Polk has stated that anyone [i.e., any physician] working for other
institutions i.e. TVH [Treasure Valley Hospital], is working for the
competition and should therefore be 'punished.' Perhaps by way of
exclusion of contract with Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center."
The statement at the meeting by an unidentified declarant to describe a purported
conversation with Dr. Polk is itself hearsay, subject to no exception, and should be excluded,
along with the purported Polk statement included within the inadmissible hearsay. See Estate of
Burton, 2010 WL 6816338, at *5; Walton, 2009 WL 2778441, at *6.
2.

September 9. 1998 GSR Group Minutes (Tr. Exh. 4057).

Dr. Giles's minutes of this meeting include the following description (attributed to no
particular declarant by name) of a meeting by Giles and two other members of the group, with
Sandra Bruce, the CEO, and Cindy Schamp, COO, of Saint Alphonsus:
"Drs. Giles, Traughber and Hall met with Sandra Bruce to discuss the
Imaging Center. As expected, her initial response was not in the Group's
favor as she felt the Radiology Group had violated their relationship with
the hospital. The offer was made to lease the equipment from the hospital
but Sandra felt that this would not be enough. The hospital's position is
that the Imaging Center will take business so they want as much of the
center as possible. Sandra and Cindy Schamp are trying to determine how
much of an impact this will have on the hospital and how much of a profit
they can get from the center. .. Dr. Traughber stated that Cindy talked of
obtaining a global fee (technical and profession fees) of 50% ... "
IfMRIA calls any of Drs. Giles, Traughber or Hall at trial to testify subject to cross
examination about this meeting with Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp, that witness testimony in court
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION IN LIMINE TO
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would not be hearsay, and the statements that they would attribute to Bruce and Schamp would
be admissible as admissions by Saint Alphonsus representatives. I.R.E. 801(d)(2)(a). But MRIA
may not "mail in" this testimony in hearsay form, just because the hearsay is included in a
business record.
3.

August 24, 1999 Imaging Center minutes (Tr. Exh. 4101).

Dr. Giles's minutes of this meeting include the following views attributed to Sandra
Bruce, who of course was not present at the meeting:
"Sandra Bruce would like to have the hospital and Imaging Center
contracts finished before the MRI deal is completed."
The minutes do not even indicate whether this statement is merely the opinion of the anonymous
declarant, in which case it is irrelevant to any issue in this case, or the declarant's assertion of a
prior conversation with Ms. Bruce, which would be hearsay, and equally as inadmissible as the
previous examples.
4.

April19, 2001 IMI Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (Tr. Exh. 4219).

By this date the radiologists had expelled Dr. Giles from their group, and the minutes are
drafted by others, but the hearsay objection is the same. The minutes include the following
sentence fragment, not identified to any speaker in attendance at the meeting, that contains a
statement purporting to express the views of Saint Alphonsus:
"Discussion: Hospital looking strongly into avenues to get out of MRICI
[i.e. one of the claimants against Saint Alphonsus at this trial}. Jeff Cliff
to set up a meeting with Cindy Schamp to discuss possible solutions."
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Once again, the assertion of this fact, apparently by an unidentified participant in the
meeting, is itselfhearsay that can only be admitted if it independently satisfies an exception to
the hearsay rule. While the minutes are themselves a business record of what transpired at the
meeting, no hearsay exception supports the admission of this anonymous statement as proof that
Saint Alphonsus was in fact at this time looking "into avenues to get out ofMRICI."
5.

Dr. Giles Notes "Docs Corp 2/14/00" (Tr. Exh. 4154).

Apart from these examples from meeting minutes, one further serious instance of
multiple hearsay deserves attention pre-trial. MRIA offered at trial a random page of Dr. Giles's
personal notes, which by no means qualify as business records. This note, which is itself
inadmissible hearsay, attributes remarks to Jeff Cliff, which are similarly hearsay, that purport to
quote Cindy Schamp, COO of Saint Alphonsus, speaking of the underlying dispute with MRIA
that is the subject of this litigation:
"Cindy told Jeff that soon the ctr magnet 'will be only an inpt [perhaps
"inpatient"] magnet'- threat to induce a sale. 'Cheapest thing to me to
do is nothing.'
Tax consequences would be huge - must investigate. Must do
reneg. of agreement to make it an exchange."
Unlike the instances of hearsay within meeting minutes, here neither the document itself,
nor the Cliff hearsay contained within, have any basis for admission under the hearsay rule.
When the time comes, if necessary Saint Alphonsus will press additional objections to the
foundation for this document. But the hearsay objection is a sufficient basis to exclude it now.
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II. CONCLUSION
The Court should hold that the hearsay statements in Trial Exhibit Nos. 4047, 4057,
4101,4219, and 4154 cited above are excluded from evidence, and likewise, if it becomes
necessary, exclude other such statements upon objection made during trial.
DATED this 25th day of July, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

ounter-Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

D

~
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRic'JlUL

2 6 Z011

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO ' IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OJC~lilaTOPHE::R
D. RICH, Clerk
' .......,, ~y DIANE OATMAN
Depulv

SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, INC., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Defendant.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219

ORDER SETTING DEADLINE FOR
NON-DISPOSITNE MOTIONS

The time for dispositive motions having passed, the attorneys for Saint Alphonsus
contacted chambers asking for a deadline for non-dispositive motions in limine. Consequently,
the Court is setting a deadline of August 5, 2011, for all motions in limine to be argued; the
Court must have adequate time to issue the rulings, if any are requested, and prepare for trial just
as the parties must.

-A

SO ORDERED AND DATED this 1:£_ day of July 2011.

J

OrderSettingDeadline
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
~

I hereby certify that on thi~ day of July, 2011, I mailed (served) a true and correct
copy of the within instrument to:
JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
POBOX2837
BOISE, ID 83701
DONALDAYER
JONES DAY
51 LOUSIANA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODWARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST. STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court

ByQ~&;;?
Deputy Court Clerk
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NO._
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JUL 2 8 2011

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup. com

WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)

CHRISTOPHER 0

wwoodard@bwslawgroup. com

By JERI HeAT~~H, Clerk

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)

DEPUTY

dparker@bwslawgroup. com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup. com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho.83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO HAVE DEEMED
ADMITTED THE EXHIBITS ADMITTED
IN THE PREVIOUS TRIAL

V.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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COME NOW Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") and move this Court to deem
admitted the Exhibits admitted in the previous trial.
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum and Affidavit in Support of Motion, both
filed concurrently herewith.
DATED this& day of July 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thiJJ__ day of July 2011, a true and correct copy ofthe
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D~Mail

)'(Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile

~ail

D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile
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JUL 2 8 2011

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JERI HEATON

tbanducci@bwslawgroup. com

DEPUTY

WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup. com

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup. com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. CV OC 04082 19D

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO HAVE DEEMED
ADMITTED THE EXHIBITS ADMITTED
IN THE PREVIOUS TRIAL

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO HAVE DEEMED ADMITTED THE EXHIBITS
ADMITTED IN THE PREVIOUS TRIAL - I
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County of Ada
State of Idaho

)
): ss
)

Thomas A. Banducci, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI

Mobile Limited Partnership in the above captioned case.
2.

I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge.

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the July 7, 2011, letter

from Thomas A. Banducci to Jack Gjording.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the July 8, 2011

responsive letter from Jack Gjording to Thomas A. Banducci.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Cis a true and correct copy of the July 11, 2011 reply

letter from Thomas A. Banducci to counsel for Saint Alphonsus, with attached Exhibit Index.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the July 14, 2011, letter

from Jack Gjording to Thomas A. Banducci in response to the July 11, 2011, letter.
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of the July 19, 2011, letter

from Thomas A. Banducci to Jack Gjording.
8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of the July 22, 2011, letter

(incorrectly dated July 15, 2011) from Jack Gjording to Thomas A. Banducci.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 28th day of July 2011, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D~ail
~and ~elivery
D Overnight Delivery

D Facsimile

~~ail

/[]

H~~d Delivery

D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile
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802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
Tel (208) 342·4411
Fax (208) 342-4455
www.bwslawgroup.com

July 7, 2011

Via Facsimile 336-9177
Jack Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 West Hays St.
Boise, ID 83701
Re:

St. Alphonsus v. MRIA

Dear Jack:
Based on your position for the motions in limine and the Court's position on the
sanctity of Judge McLaughlin's rulings on evidence, I assume that all exhibits admitted or
stipulated to at the first trial will be deemed admitted, except for those that directly relate to
the Supreme Court's ruling. Please advise me if this is not your understanding.
Additionally, I also assume that the jury instructions previously issued by Judge
McLaughlin at the first trial will be used with the exception of those instructions affected by
the Supreme Comt's ruling.
Very truly yours,
DARD SCHWARTZMAN

:kas

BANDUCCI

WOODARD

SCHWARTZMAN
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Law Offices

GJORDING & FOUSER/

PLLC

J;;u:k S. G;ordiltg

509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701

Trudy Han$on Fouser

Ju.lia.nne 5. Hall
Bobbi K. Dominick, Of Counsel

(208) 336-9777 telephone
(208) 336·9177 facsimile

July 8, 2011

Via Facsimile
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
802 W. Barmock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

Re:

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care vs. MRI Associates, LLP
Ada Co. Case No. CV OC 04082190
File No. 15051.001

Dear Tom:

Thank you for your letter of July 7 concerning stipulations, admission.ofexhibits.at.the ...
last trial, and jury instructions. We look forward to cooperating with you on a reciprocal basis to
achieve all appropriate stipulations. However, since this is a new trial, we cannot agree in the
abstract that the stipulations and admissibility detenninations for the hundreds of exhibits
marked in the 2007 trial automatically apply, with the limited exceptions that you describe.
Likewise, we will be submitting on the schedule ordered by Judge Wetherell our requested jury
instructions.

To get the ball rolling as to stipulations, as a starting point and to make sure we are on the
same page, I suggest that we each dig out and exchange what we believe to be the final
stipulations entered into for the 2007 trial, so that we may reconsider and supplement them as
necessary. I am scheduled for trial commencing Monday, but will endeavor to get this to you as
soon as possible, and I look forward to receiving the same from your side at your earliest
convemence.
Very truly yours,
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

~Gjording
JSG/fe
Jones Day
cc:
001517

.

-·

EXHIBIT C
001518

802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, 10 83702

Tel (208) 342-4411
Fax (208) 342-4455
IIJWW.bwslawgroup.com

July 11, 2011

Via Facsimile
JackS. Gjording
Gjording & Fouser
PO Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Donald Ayers
Christian Vergonis
Jones Day
51 Louisiana Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20001
Re: Saint Alphonsus v. MRI Associates
Gentlemen:
I am add1·essing this response to Jack's letter of July 8, 2011, to all of you because Jack is
in trial and I believe an immediate response is required.
It seems that we are working on different wavelengths. I was surprised to learn froin
Jack's letter that SARMC is unwilling to stipulate to the admission of the same exhibits that they
stipulated to in the first case.

Attached to this letter is the official trial record showing all of the exhibits admitted in
the first trial. As you can see, more than 90% of the trial exhibits were admitted by stipulation.
IF SARMC is withdrawing its agreement to any of these stipulated exhibits, please let us know
by the end of the week the exhibits to which you are withdrawing your stipulation and the
reasons for the withdrawal. I plan to raise this issue with the Court for guidance.
On this same attachment, there are various exhibits which were admitted during trial, to
which SARMC did not object. Are you now assetiing objections to these exhibits? If so, please
let me know by the end of the week the exhibits admitted at trial, to which SARMC is now
objecting.

BANDUCCI

WOODARD

SCHWARTZMAN

001519

PLLC

II.
l
i

WITNESS INDEX
Date Volume

Saint Al's Witnesses
STEINER, Manfred R.

Direct Examination by Mr. Miller
Cross~Examination by Mr. Banducci
Redirect Examination by Mr. Miller
Recross~Examination by Mr. Banducci

3
3

3185
3225
3269
3273

8/23/07
8/23/07
8/23/07
8/23/07

Page

Date Volume

4230

8/30/07

3
3

I

I.
MRIA Rebuttal Witness
PROCHASKA, James, M.D.
Direct Examination by Mr. Banducci

3

l·
EXHBIT INDEX
MRIA Exhibits

. I'

Admitted

Date

12

Letter from L. Ed Miller to Sr. Pat Vandenberg~ 3/5/1985

**

8/7/07

13

Signed Art. Of Partnership of.MRIA ~ 31711985

**

8/7/07

20

Building Lease Agreement- 9/19/1985

**

8/7/07

21

Ground Lease b/t SARMC and SABC- 9/19/1985

**

8/'J/07

24

Limited Partnership Agreement of MRI Mobile Limited
10117/1988

**

817/07

30

SAR.J.\1C/SARG Medical Services -5/1/1997

**

8/7/07

31

ICR Partnership Agreement- 8/10/1998

**

817/07

32

SBB Notes- 8/20/1998

**

817/07

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record

TAMARA L HOHENLEITNER, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
LESLIE ANDERSO~ OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
XIII

001520

J
I
EXHBIT INDEX
MRlA Exhibits

Admitted

Date

40

Kurtz Letter to A. Hahn- 2/511999

**

8/7/07

42

PWC Letter to C. Schamp- 2/16/1999

**

8/7/07

45

PWC FMV Assessment of20% Partnership Interest
(Draft)- 7/31/1999

**

8/7/07

I

61

Operating Agreement of Intermountain Medical
Imaging LLC -8/20/1999

**

8/7/07

l

62'

Dr. Giles!IMI Letter toR. Denning -8/2411999

**

8/7/07

63

PWC Valuation of 50 Percent Interest in Intermountain Medical
Imaging LLC -9/1/1999

**

817/07

64

Lettei· re: opening ofiMI -10/4/1999

**

8/7/07

65

PWC letter to C. Schamp re: financial advisory services -10/25/1999

**

817/07

66

Memo to SBB and C. Schamp from R. Curran -10/27/1999

**

8/7/07

67

Memo re: Joint Venture Imaging Center -11111/1999

**

817/07

68

Power Point Pres. Re: .l.L\11 Joint Venture -1111111999

**

8/7/07

69

Restructuring of lv1RIA General -11/2911999

**

817/07

70

Dr. Henson Memo to SBB-12/6/1999

**

8/7/07

71

Email from R. Abello to SBB.: 12114/1999

**

8/7/07

72

SBB Notes -12/1611999

**

8/7/07

73

Email from D. Giles to J. Prochaska et al-12/18/1999

**

8/7/07

74

Email from D. Giles to J. Pochaska -12/19/1999

**

817/07

75

Doctors Corp. letter to Sandra Bruce dated 1/4/2000 -1/4/2000

**

8/7/07

91

Agenda for meeting with J. Cliff -1/26/2000

**

817/07

93

Email to D. Giles fi·om R. Curran , 1/31/2000

3149

8/23/07

** &hibit admitted by stipulation of! the record
TAMARA L HOHENLEITNER, OFFICIAL COU~T REPORTER
LESLIE ANDERSON, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
XIV

001521

EXHBIT INDEX
MRIA Exhibits

Admitted

Date

95

Email from K. Sands to S. Bratley, 2/8/2000

**

8/7/07

96

Memo from K. Sands to C. Schamp , 2/18/2000

**

8/7/07

101

Letter to C. Schamp from PWC re: Assessment of
. Flv!V ofMRIM, 5/16/2000

**

8/7/07

102

J. Cliff letter toR. Cunan, 7/17/2000

**

8/7/07

103

Letter from J. Cliff toR. Curran, 7/17/2000

**

8/7/07

104

Idaho Sec. Of State receipt w/ attachments , 8/18/2000

3523

8/27/07

105

Amendment to Loan Agreement between ICR et al &
USB , 8/20/2000

**

8/7/07

109

Release and Reaffirmation Agreement between MulTay et al
and USB , 10/18/2000

**

8/7/07

114

IMI Operating Agreement, 7/1/2001

**

817/07

115

Professional Services Agreement (Radiology Services), 7/1/2001

**

817/07

116

Letter from J. Floyd to K. Fry -8/1/2001

**

8/7/07

118

Notes re: meetings with MRIA stake holders -9/18/2001

**

8/7/07

119

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation off the record
G Chamberlain handwritten option 1 -11/1/2001

**

817/07

120

Shattuck Hammond Presentation of Strategic Options -1116/2001

**

8/7/07

121

Shattuck Hammond Presentation ofValuation ofMRIA -1116/2001

**

817/07

122

request for Financing Proposals prepared by Shattuck Hammond
12/11/2001

**

817/07

123 .

Memo to Leslie Kelly Hall from Patti Hameck -1/23/2002

**

817/07

124

Memo to K. Fry from G. Chamberlain -2/12/2002

**

817/07

. **Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record

TAMARA I. HOHENLEITNER, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
LESLIE ANDERSO~ OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
XV

001522

EXHBIT INDEX

I

MRIA Exhibits

Admitted

Date

125

Email from G. Chamberlain toP. Miller and Ken Fry -4/9/2002

**

817/07

126

G. Chamberlain discussion outline with Dr. CuiTan
w/ GC handwritten note -4/9/2002

**

817/07

127

Letter from T. Hall to MRICI Scheduling Dept. -817/2002

**

8/7/07

129

Email from Mark Lawrence to David Giles et al -8/19/2002

**

8/7/07

131

USB Standard Credit Display Exec. Summary -1/13/2003

**

8/7/07

137

Memo from Dr. Havlina to Dr. Curran et al-5/5/2003

3298

8/23/07

141

IT Service Level Agreement -7/112003

**

817101

145

CEO Report -9/30/2003

**

817/07

148

Shattuck Hammond Power Point re: Overview of Restructuring of
MRIA and Simultaneous Merger ofMRICI and IMI -10/30/2003

**

817/07

151

Letter from P. Miller toT. Banducci -12/22/2003

**

817/07

154

Letter from J. Curran to C. Corbett -2/10/2004

"'*

817/07

155

SBB letter to Dr. Curran -2/24/2004

**

817/07

157

Dr. Curran letter to SBB -3/23/2004

**

8/7/07

161

Meeting notes -11115/2004

**

817/07

162

Letter from MRl Center to S. Bruce -12/3/2004

**

8/7/07

163

Letter J. Seaborn to J. Floyd -12/8/2004

**

8/7/07

164

Letter from C. Corbett to J. Gobel-12/8/2004

**

817/07

165

Memo re: MRI from SBB -12/20/2004

**

8/7/07

167

Email from D. Seaborn to C. Corbet el at -Ill 0/2005

**

8/7/07

169

First Amendment to Operating Agreement of Intermountain Medical
Imaging -12/9/2005

**

817/07

**Exhibit admitted by lstipulation offthe record

TAMARA I. HOHENLEITNER, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
LESLIE ANDERSON, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
XVI

001523

.,

I

EXHBIT INDEX
MRlA Exhibits

Admitted

Date

185

Memo re: issues imaging center joint venture -unknown date

**

817/07

186

SARGIMRIA Joint Venture Proposals Nos. 6&7 -unknown date

**

8/7/07

195

Letter from J. Hall to SBB-unknown date

**

817/07

197

First Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRIA -8/25/1988

**

8/7/07

198

Second Amendment to Articles ofPartnership ofMRIA -5/1/1991

**

8/7/07

199

Third Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofNIRIA -4/21/1995

**

8/7/07

200

Fourth Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRIA -7/15/1998

**

8/7/07

201

Fifth Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRIA -8/1/2002

**

817/07

202

Sixth Amendment to Articles of Partnership of MRIA -4/15/2003

**

8/7/07

207

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes -3/22/1984

**

8/7/07

217

SAfuviC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes -8/18/1999

**

8/7/07

219

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes -9/30/2003

**

8/7/07

220

SARNIC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes -3/15/2004

**

8/7/07

221

SARNIC Board ofTrustees/Subcommittee Minutes -11/18/2003

**

8/7/07

222

SARJ.VfC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes -3/15/2004

**

8/7/07

223

DR Rollout Minutes -3/6/2001

**

817/07

224

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -2/20/2001

**

8/7/07

225

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -3/21/2001

**

817/07

226

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -4/18/2002

**

817/07

227

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -5/3/2001

**

8/7/07

228

-Finance & Fees Conunittee Minutes -5/15/2001

**

8/7/07

229

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -6/6/2001

**

8/7/07

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record

TAMARA L HOHENLEITNER, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
LESLIE ANDERSON, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
XVII

001524

..
EXHBIT INDEX
MRIA Exhibits

Admitted

Date

230

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes ~6/26/2001

**

8/7/07

231

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -7/31/2001

**

8/7/07

232

-Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -8/3112001

**

8/7/07

233

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -9/13/2001

**

817/07

234

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -10/5/2001

**

8/7/07

235

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -10/17/2001

**

8/7/07

236

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -11/7/2001

**

817/07

237

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -11/19/2001

**

8/7/07

238

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -12/17/2001

**

817/07

239

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -112/2002

**

817/07

240

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -2/4/2002

**

817/07

241

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes ~2/20/2002

**

8/7/07

242

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -3/5/2002

**

8/7/07

243

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes ~4112/2002

**

8/7/07

244

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -4/30/2002

**

817/07

245

-Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -5113/2002

**

817/07

246

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -5/29/2002

**

8/7/07

247

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -6/10/2002

**

8/7/07

248

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -7/29/2002

**

817/07

249

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes~9/25/2002

**

8/7/07

250

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -9/10/2002

**

817/07

251

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -11/20/2002

**

817/07

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe re~ord

TAMARA I HOHENLEITNER, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
LESLIE ANDERSON, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
XVIII

001525

1
EXHBIT INDEX
MRIA Exhibits

Admitted

Date

252

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes ~ 1/30/2002

**

. 817/07

253

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes ~2/19/2002

**

8/7/07

254

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes ~3/6/2002

**

8/7/07

255

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -1/16/2003

**

817/07

256

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -4/8/2003

**

817/07

257

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -5/13/2003

**

817/07

258

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -6/4/2003

**

8/7/07

259

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -8112/2003

**

8/7/07

260

finance & Fees Committee Minutes -7/15/2003

**

817/07

261

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -9/2/2003

**

817/07

262

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -10/1/2003

**

817/07

263

finance & Fees Committee Minutes -10/27/2003

**

817/07

264

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -11114/2003

**

817/07

265

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -12/1/2003

**

8/7/07

266

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -1112/2004

**

817/07

267

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -4/5/2004

**

817/07

268

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes-6/3/2004

**

817/07

269

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes-7/14/2004

**

8/7/07

270

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -8/24/2004

**

8/7/07

271

Finan.ce & Fees Committee Minutes -9/14/2004

**

8/7/07

272

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -10/21/2004

**

8/1/07

273

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -I 1/8/2004

**

8/7/07

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation of! the record

TAMARA I. HOHENLEITNER, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
LESLIE ANDERSON, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
XIX

001526

EXHBIT INDEX
Admitted

MRIA Exhibits

Date

274

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -11/29/2004

**

8/7/07

275

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -1/31/2005

**

8/7/07

276

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -2/14/2005

**

817/07

277

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes-3/2112005

**

8/7/07

278

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -4/4/2005

**

8/7/07

279

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -6/13/2005

**

817/07

280

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -7/5/2005

**

817/07

281

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes -8/12/2005

**

8/7/07

282

Operations Committee Minutes -3/23/2001

**

817/07

283

Operations Committee Minutes -4/2/200 l

**

817107

284

Operations Committee Minutes -1/16/2001

**

8/7/07

285

Operations Committee Minutes -2/8/2001

**

8/7/07

286

Operations Committee Minutes -4/16/2001

**

8/7/07

287

Operations Committee Minutes -5/4/2001

**

8/7/07

288

Operations Committee Minutes -5/17/2001

**

8/7/07

289

Operations Committee .tvfinutes -7/20/2001

**

817/07

290

Operations Committee Minutes -I 0/2/2001

**

8/7/07

291

Operations Committee Minutes -11/5/2001

**

·8/7/07

292

Operations Committee Minutes -4/2/2002

**

8/7/07

293

Operations Committee Minutes -4116/2002

**

8/7/07

294

Operations Committee Minutes -8/20/2002

**

8/7/07

295

Operations Committee Minutes -9/25/2002

**

8/7/07

,

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record

TAMARA I. HOHENLEITNER, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
LESLIE ANDERSON, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
XX

001527

EXHBIT INDEX
MRIA Exhibits

Admitted

Date

296

Operations Committee Minutes - 11/12/2002

**

8/7/07

297

Operations Committe~ Minutes - 1115/2003

**

817/07

298

Operations Committee Minutes - 2/25/2003

**

8/7/07

299

Operations Committee Minutes - 3/13/2003

**

817/07

300

Operations Committee Minutes - 4/30/2003

**

817/07

301

Operations Committee Minutes - 5/12/2003

**

8/7/07

302

Operations Committee Minutes - 6/2/2003

**

817/07

303

Opemtions Committee Minutes - 6/20/2003

**

817/07

304

Operations Committee Minutes -7/2/2003

**

817/07

305

Operations Committee Minutes -7/16/2003

**

8/7/07

306

Operations Committee Minutes- 7/30/2003

**

8/7/07

307

Operations Committee Minutes - 9/5/2003

**

8/7/07

308

Operations Committee Minutes- 9/30/2003

**

8/7/07

309

Operations Committee Minutes - 10/28/2003

**

8/7/07

310

Operations Committee Minutes - 12/10/2003

**

8/7/07

311

Operations Committee Minutes -12/24/2003

**

8/7/07

312

Operations Committee Minutes -1/10/2005

**

8/7/07

313

Operations Committee Minutes -9/7/2004

**

817/07

314

Operations Committee Minutes -9/29/2004

**

817/07

315

Operations Committee Minutes -11/3/2004

**

817/07

316

Operations Committee Minutes -11/30/2004

**

817/07

317

Operations Committee Minutes -1/13/2004

**

8/7/07

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation of!the record

TAMARA L HOHENLEITNER, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
LESLIE ANDERSO~ OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
XXI

001528

'l
EXHBIT INDEX
Admitted

MRIA Exhibits

Date

318

Operations Committee Minutes -2/6/2004

**

8/7/07

319

Operations Committee Minutes -3/3/2004

**

8/7/07

320

Operations Committee Minutes -3/29/2004

**

8/7/07

321

Operations Committee Minutes -5/19/2004

**

817/07

322

Operations Committee Minutes -6/16/2004

**

8/7/07

323

Operations Committee Minutes -7/12/2004

**

8/7/07

324

Operations Committee Minutes -8/3/2004

**

817/07

325

Operations Committee Minutes -1110/2005

**

8/7/07

326

Operations Committee Minutes -2/22/2005

**

8/7/07

327

Operations Committee Minutes -3/15/2005

**

8/7/07

328

Operations Committee Minutes -3/29/2005

**

817/07

329

Operations Committee Minutes -4/5/20Q5

**

8/7/07

330

Operations Technical Committee Minutes -4/25/2005

**

8/7/07

331

Operations Technical Committee Minutes -5/17/2005

**

8/7/07

332

Operations Technical Committee Minutes -6/10/2005

**

8/7/07

333

Operations Committee Minutes -6/14/2005

**

817/07

334

Operations Committee Minutes -7/6/2005

**

817/07

335

Operations Teclmical Committee Minutes -7/11/2005

**

817/07

336

Operations Committee Minutes -8/1/2005

**

817/07

337

Operations Technical Minutes -8/2/2005

**

8/7/07

338

Operations Committee Minutes -9/26/2005

**

817/07

339

perations Teclmical Committee Minutes -10/6/2005

**

8/7/07

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation

off the record

~

TAMARA I. HOHENLEITNER1 OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
LESLIE ANDERSON, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
XXII
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EXHBIT INDEX

I

Admitted

MRIA Exhibits

Date

340

Operations Committee Minutes -10/10/2005

**

817/07

I

348

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 16

**

817/07

j·

349

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 7

**

817/07

350

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 8

817/07

351

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 9

**
**

8/7/07

352

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 10

**

8/7/07

353

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 11

**

8/7/07

354

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 13

**

8/7/07

355

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 14

**

8/7/07

356

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 15

**

8/7/07

357

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 18

**

8/7/07

358

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 19

**

8/7/07

359

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 21

**

817/07

360

S. Berger Deposition Exhibit 7

**

8/7/07

361

S. Berger Deposition Exhibit 9

**

8/7/07

362

R. Cioffi Deposition Exhibit 2

**

8/7/07

363

R. Cioffi Deposition Exhibit 6

**

8/7/07

364

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 3

**

8/7/07

366

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 7

**

817/07

367

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 9

**

8/7/07

376

MRI Mobile Financial Statements -12/1990-1991

**

817/07

377

MRI Limited Financial Statements -12/1990-1991

**

8/7/07

l

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation of!the· record

i

i

TAMARA I. HOHENLEITNER) OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
LESLIE ANDERSON, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

XXIII

001530

EXHBIT INDEX
MRIA Exhibits

Admitted

Date

378

l'vfRI Mobile Financial Statements -12/1996-1997

**

817/07

379

MRI Limited Financial Statements -12/1996-1997

**

817/07

380

MRI Mobile Financial Statements -12/1997-1998

**

8/7/07

381

MRI Limited Financial Statements -12/1997-1998

**

8/7/07

382

l'vfRI Mobile Financial Statements-12/1998-1999

**

8/7/07

\ 383

.MRI Limited Financial Statements-12/1998-1999

**

817/07

384

MRI Mobile Financial Statements -12/1999-2000

**

8/7/07

385

l'vlRILimited Financial Statements -12/1999-2000

**

8/7/07

386

MRI Mobile Financial Statements -12/2000-2001

**

8/7/07

387

1'1RI Limited Financial Statements -12/2000-2001

**

8/7/07

388

MRI Limited Financial Statements -12/2001-2002

**

8/7/07

389

MRI Mobile Financial Statements -12/2001-2002

**

8/7/07

390

l'vfRI Limited Financial Statements-12/2002-2003

**

8/7/07

391

lVlRI Mobile Financial Statements -12/2002-2003

**

817/07

392

MRI Limited Financial Statements -12/2003-2004

**

817/07

393

MRI Mobile Financial Statements -12/2003-2004

**

8/7/07

394

MRI Limited Financial Statements (-12/2004-2005

**

8/7/07

395

MRI Mobile Financial Statements-12/2004-2005

**

8/7/07

396

R. Curran email to D. Giles re: PAC with SARlviC -9/10/1999

**

8/7/07

397

Leslie Kelly Hall email re: MRI Connectivity -9/13/1999

**

8/7/07

**

817/07

398

· Sarah Bratley email toR. Curran re Update -9/8/1999

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation off the record
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MRIA Exhibits

l
I
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Admitted

Date

399

OLeslie Kelly Hall memo to Lyndee Chatte1ton re: SARMC!MRICI
Networking Interface -6/4/1999

"'*

817/07

410

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRWSARG -unknown date

**

817/07

411

Draft ofJoint Operations Proposal for .rv.IRWSARG -unknown date

**

817/07

412

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRWSARG -unknown date

**

8/7/07

413

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for iVlRWSARG -unknown date

**

817/07

414

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRINSARG -4/13/1999

**

8/7/07

415

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG -5/3/1999

**

817/07

416

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG -5/18/1999

**

817/07

417

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRWSARG -unknown date

**

8/7/07

418

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for .rv.IRWSARG -9/15/1999

**

817/07

419

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRWSARG -9/17/1999

**

8/7/07

420

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG -9/17/1999

**

817/07

421

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRWSARG -9/30/1999

**

817/07

422

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG -9/3 0/1999

**

817/07

423

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRWSARG -10/27/1999

**

817/07

424

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG -10/18/1999

**

817/07

425

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI-112/1985

**

8/21/07

426

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI-118/1985

**

8/21107

427

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI -2/21/1985

**

8/21/07

428

Pre-organization meeting minutes oflVlRl-2/28/1985

**

8/21/07

429

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI-3/7/1985

**

8/21/07

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation of! the record
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Admitted

Date

430

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI -3/27/1985

**

8/21/07

431

Pre-organization meeting minutes of :NIRI -6/5/1985

**

8/21/07

432

MRICI Board meeting minutes -4/25/1988

**

8/21107

433

MRICI Board meeting minutes -7/25/1988

. **

8/21/07

434

MRICI Board meeting minutes -5115/1991

**

8/21/07

435

:NIRI Mobile meeting minutes -5/15/1991

**

8/21107

436

MRICI Board meeting minutes -8/12/1991

**

8/21/07

437

MRI Mobile meeting minutes -11/18/1991

**

8121107

438

MRIA meeting minutes -10/13/1994

**

8/21/07

439

MRICI Board meeting minutes -11121/1994

**

8/21107

440

MRIA meeting minutes -11/22/1994

**

8/21/07

441

MRICI Board meeting minutes -8/9/1995

**

8/21/07

442

MRI Mobile meeting minutes -8/9/1995

"'*

8/21/07

443

.MRIA meeting minutes -11/16/1995

**

8121107

444

MRICI Board meeting minutes -11/1611995

**

8/21/07

445

lVlRICI meeting minutes -11125/1996

**

8/21/07

446

:NlRI Mobile meeting minutes -11/2511996

**

8/21/07

447

Any response to Requests for Admission or Intenogatories-val'ious

**

8121/07

448

Pre-organization meeting minutes of:NllU-6/19/1985

**

8/21107

449

:NlRI Board meeting minutes -4/25/1988

**

8/21/07

450

MRI Board meeting minutes -5/25/1988

**

8/21/07

451

MRI Board meeting minutes-7116/1998

**

8/21/07

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record
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Admitted

MRIA Exhibits

Date

452

MRI Board meeting minutes-10/22/1998

**

8/21/07

453

IvlRI Board meeting minutes -12/15/i999

**

8/21/07

454

MRl Mobile meeting minutes-12/15/1999

**

8/21/07

455

MRI Mobile meeting minutes -1/19/2000

**

8/21/07

456

MRI Board meeting minutes -1119/2000

**

8/21/07

457

MRI Board meeting minutes -2/16/2000

**

8/21/07

458

MRI Mobile meeting minutes -2/16/2000

**

8/21/07

459

MRI Board meeting minutes -3/15/2000

**

8/21/07

460

MRI Mobile meeting minutes -3/15/2000

**

8/21107

461

MRI Mobile meeting minutes -4/21/2000

**

8/21/07

462

MRI Board meeting minutes - executive session -4/21/2000

**

8/21107

463

MRl Board meeting minutes -6/21/2000

**

8/21/07

464

MR1 Board meeting minutes -7/19/2000

**

8/21/07

465

IvlRI Mobile meeting minutes -7/19/2000

**

8/21/07

466

IvlRI Board meeting minutes -8/16/2000

**

8/21107

467

MR1 Mobile meeting minutes -8/16/2000

**

8/21/07

468

lVlRI Board meeting minutes -9/20/2000

**

8/21/07

469

MRI Mobile meeting minutes -9/20/2000

**

8/21/07

470

MRI Mobile meeting minutes -10/18/2000

**

8/21/07

471

MRl Board meeting minutes -10/18/2000

**

8/21/07

472

MR1 Board meeting minutes -11115/2000

**

8/21/07

473

MRI Mobile meeting minutes -1117/2001

**

8/21/07

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record
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Admitted

Date

474

MRI Board meeting minutes -2/16/2001

*"'

8/21107

475

1v1RICI and Mobile Strategic Planning Meeting -2/1612001

**

8/21/07

476

1vfRI Mobile meeting minutes -4/18/2001

**

8/21/07

477

MRl Mobile meeting minutes -5/16/2001

**

8/21/07

478

MRl Mobile meeting minutes-?/18/2001

**

8/21/07

479

MRI Board meeting minutes -9/19/2001

**

8/21/07

480

MRI Board meeting minutes -10/17/2001

**

8/21/07

481

MRI Mobile meeting minutes -12119/2001

**

8/21/07

482

MRI Board meeting minutes -2/20/2002

**

8/21/07

483

MRI Mobile meeting minutes -3/20/2002

**

8/21/07

484

MRI Board meeting minutes -4/17/2002

**

8/21/07

485

MRI Board meeting minutes -5/21/2002

**

8/21107

486

1v1RI Board meeting minutes -6/18/2002

**

8/21/07

487

MRI Board meeting minutes -7/16/2002

**

8/21107

488

MRl Board and Executive Session meeting minutes -8/1/2002

**

8/21/07

489

MRI Mobile meeting minutes-9/i 7/2002

**

8/21/07

490

MRI Board meeting minutes -9/17/2002

**

8/21/07

491

MRI Boa1:d meeting minutes -11/19/2002

**

8/21/07

492

l\tlRI Mobile meeting minutes -12/17/2002

**

8/21/07

493

MRI Board meeting minutes -1/21/2003

**

8/21107

494

MRI Board meeting minutes with Summary Forecast -2/18/2003

**

8/21/07

495

MRI Board meeting minutes -3/18/2003

**

8/21107

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record
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MRIA Exhibits

Date

496

MRi Board meeting minutes -4/15/2003

**

8/21/07

497

MR1 Board meeting minutes -5/20/2003

**

8/21/07

498

IMI Group meeting minutes -5/29/1997

2954

8/21/07

499

IMI Executive meeting minutes -5/16/1997

**

8(21/07

500

IMI Group meeting minutes -6/1/1998 ·

**

8/21/07

501

IMI Group meeting minutes -1/19/1999

**

"8/21/07

502

llvfl Group meeting minutes-717/1999

**

8/21/07

503

IMI Group meeting minutes -8/4/1999

**

8/21/07

504

IMI Group meeting minutes-8/24/1999

**

8/21/07

505

IMI Group meeting minutes -9/22/1999

**

8/21/07

506

IMI Group meeting minutes -8/14/2001

**

8/21/07

507

I.tvH Group meeting minutes -9/26/2001

**

8/21/07

508

IMI Group meeting minutes-11128/200 1

**

8/21/07

509

IMI Group meeting minutes -4/30/2002

**

8/21107

510

IMI Group meeting minutes -5/19/2003

**

8121/07

511

GSR Group meeting minutes -1/14/1998

**

8/21/07

512

GSR"Executive meeting minutes-2/211998

**

8/21/07

513

GSR Executive meeting minutes -2/16/1998

**

8/21107

514

GSR Group meeting minutes -3/11/1998

**

8/21/07

515

GSR Group meeting minutes -4/8/1998

**

8/21/07

516

GSR Executive meeting minutes -5/11/1998

**

8/21/07

517

GSR Group meetiQg minutes -5/13/1998

**

8/21/07

~
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MRIA Exhibits

Admitted

Date

518

GSR Group meeting minutes -6/1611998

**

8/21107

519

GSR Group meeting minutes -6/29/1998

**

8/21/07

520

GSR Executive meeting minutes -7/6/1998

**

8/21/07

521

GSR Group meeting minutes-7/7/1998

**

8/21/07

522

GSR Executive meeting minutes -7/20/1998

**

8/21/07

523

GSR Group meeting minutes-7/2711998

**

8/21107

524

GSR Group meeting minutes -7/30/1998

**

8/21/07

525

GSR Group meeting minutes-8/5/1998

**

8/21/07

526

GSR Executive meeting minutes -8/31/1998

**

8/21/07

527

GSR Group meeting minutes -9/9/1998

**

8/21/07

528

GSR Executive meeting minutes -9/14/1998

**

8/21/07

529

GSR Executive meeting minutes -9/21/1998

**

8/21/07

530

GSR Executive meeting minutes -10/8/1998

**

8/21/07

531

GSR Equipment meeting minutes -10/5/1998

**

8/21/07

532

GSR Executive meeting minutes -10/12/1998

**

8/21/07

533

GSR Group meeting minutes -10/14/1998

**

8/21107

534

Radiology Department meeting minutes -10/21/1998

**

8/21/07

535

GSR Group meeting minutes -10/28/1998

**

8/21/07

536

GSR Group meeting minutes-11/3/1998

**

8/21107

537

GSR Group meeting minutes -1119/1998

**

8/2.1107

538

GSR Group meeting minutes-11111/1998

**

8/21/07
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Admitted

Date

539

GSR Group meeting minutes -12/9/1998

**

8/21107

540

GSR Executive meeting minutes -2/8/1999

**

8/21/07

541

GSR Group meeting minutes -2/10/1999

**

8/21107

542

GSR Executive meeting minutes -6/21/1999

**

8/21107

543

GSR Executive meeting minutes -6/28/1999

**

8/21/07

544

GSR Executive meeting minutes -8/23/1999

**

8/21/07

545

GSR Group meeting minutes -9/8/1999

**

8/21/07

546

GSR Executive meeting minutes -10/25/1999

**

8/21/07

547

GSR Group meeting minutes-11/10/1999

**

8/21/07

548

GSR Executive meeting minutes -11/22/1999

**

8/21/07

549

GSR Executive meeting minutes -12/20/1999

**

8/21/07

550

GSR Executive meeting minutes -12/27/1999

**

8/21/07

551

GSR Group meeting minutes -1112/2000

**

8/21/07

552

GSR Group meeting minutes -1126/2000

**

8/21/07

553

GSR Executive meeting minutes -3/13/2000

**

8/21/07

554

GSR Group meeting minutes -8/8/2000

**

8/21/07

555

GSR Group meeting minutes -8/30/2000

**

8/21/07

556

GSR Executive meeting minutes -9/6/2000

**

8/21/07

557

GSR Executive meeting minutes -9/19/2000

**

8/21107

558

GSR Group meeting minutes -2/22/2001

**

8/21/07

559

GSR Group meeting minutes -5/9/2001

**

8/21/07

560

GSR Group meeting minutes -12/18/2001

**

8/21/07

~

** Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record
TAMARA I. HOHENLEITNER} OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
LESLIE ANDERSON} OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
XXXI

001538

EXHBIT INDEX
MRIA Exhibits

Admitted

Date

561

Marketing Committee·Meeting -3/10/2004

**

8/21/07

565

D. Giles email toR. Curran re: PAC with SARMC -9/10/1999

3083

8/22/07

566

Pie Graph Used. Large -various

1304

8/8/07

567

Counter Designation

**

8/21/0

568

Executive Committee Meeting - 3/2/98

**

8/21/07

569

Executive Committee Meeting - 3/9/98

**

8/21/07

570

GSR Meeting Minute - 5/29/98

**

8/21/07

571

Executive Committee Meeting- 7/13/98

**

8/21/07

572

Executive Committee Meeting 8/17/98

**

8/21/07

573

Executive Committee Meeting 8/19/98

**

8/21107

574

Executive Committee Meeting 2/15/99

**

8/21/07

575

Executive Committee Meeting 3/8/99

**

8/21/07

576

Executive Committee Meeting 3/15/99

**

8/21/07

578

Executive Committee Meeting 3/22/99

**

8/21/07

579

Executive Committee Meeting 3/29/99

**

8/21107

580

Executive Committee Meeting 4112/99

**

8/21/07

581

Executive Committee Meeting4/26/07

**

8/21/07

582

Executive Committee Meeting 5/3/99

**

8/21107

583

Executive Committee Meeting 5/24/99

**

8/21/07

584

Executive Committee Meeting 6/7/99

**

8/21/07

585

Executive Committee Meeting 9/13/99

**

8/21107

586

Executive Committee Meeting 10113/99

**

8/21/07

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record
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MRIA Exhibits

Admitted

Date
8/21/07

Executive Committee Meeting 11/1/99

**
** .

589

Long Graph used in Giles testimony

2940

8/21/07

590

Demonstrative re: Acronyms

**

8/21107

591

Charles Wilhoite hand written notes

2908

8/21/07

592

Demonstrative re: Giles roles 1985-2000

**

8/21/07

593

Demonstrative by Gjording re: Business Transactions

3180

8/23/07

594

Large Graph Correlation of Value and Other Considerations

3208

8/23/07

595

Timeline -colored indicators drawn by Gjording

3320

8/23/07

596

Demonstrative drawing by Gjording re: relationship of entities

3333

8/23/07

597

Letter from Seaboum, retraction letter of 1/26/05

3766

8/28/07

598

Demonstrative TimeJine used with Chamberlin

3823

8/28/07

599

2 page drawing Gjording used with Cliff

3925

8/28/07

600

Drawing - Pie GrapWfimeline used with Cliff

**

8/28/07

587

Executive Committee Meeting 10/18/99

588

8/21/07

I
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Saint Alphonsus Exhibits

Admitted

Date

4011

Health Planning Committee SAR.l\1:C Board of Trustees Meeting
Minutes; March 22, 1984

**

8/7/07

4012

Executive Committee SARMC Board of Trustees Meeting Minutes;
March 26, 1984

**

8/7/07

4013

Executive Committee SARMC; October 1, 1984

**

817/07

4014

Executive Committee SARMC Board of Trustees; December 20, 1984

**

8/7/07

4015

Letter to Chris Antonfrom J. Roger Curran; November 21, 1984

**

817/07

4016

Letter to J. Roger Curran from Sister Patricia Vandenberg;
December 27, 1984

**

8/7/07

4017

Health Planning Committee SAR.l\1:C Board of Trustees Meeting
Minutes; December 28, 1984

**

8/7/07

4018

Board of Trustees SARMC Executive Committee Report Minutes;
January 11, 1985

**

8/7/07

4021

MRI, Ltd. Meeting Minutes; March 27, 1985

**

8/7/07

4022

1122 Application; AprilS, 1985

1101

8/7/07

4023

Articles ofPartnership of~lRIA; April26, 1985

**

8/7/07

4024

Limited Partnership Agreement of:rviRI Limited Partnership;
August 2, 1985

**

8/7/07

4025

SAR.l\1C and Saint Alphonsus Building Company, Inc. Ground Lease;
September 19, 1985

**

817/07

4026

First Amendment to Articles of Partnership of~IRI Associates;
May25, 1988

**

8/7/07

4027

Agreement for Provision of Medical Services; August 1, 1988

**

8/7/07

4028

Limited Pat1nership Agreement of~IRI Mobile Limited Partnership;
October 17, 1988

**

817/07

4029

Second Amendment to At1icles ofPat1nership ofMRI Associates;
May 16, 1991

**

817/07

)
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Saint Alphonsus Exhibits

"I
!

Admitted

Date

4030

1\.tiRICI Minutes; April27, 1992

**

8/7/07

4032

Third Amendment to Articles of Partnership of :MRI Associates;
January 1, 1995

1340

8/8/07

4033

SARMC Medical Services Agreement- Radiology; May 1, 1997

**

8/7/07

4034

IMI Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; June 16, 1997

**

8/7/07

4035

MR1CI Minutes; October 21, 1997
Bruce; October 31, 1997

**

8/7/07

4037

Letter to MRIA Boardmembers from Mike Czech; November 10, 1997

**

8/7/07

4038

IMI Group Meeting Minutes; November 12, 1997

**

8/7/07

4039

Letter to Sandra Bruce from IMI; November 13, 1997

**

8/7/07

4040

Letter to Paul Traughber, William Murray, Jeffrey Seaboum, and
Joseph Gobel from Sandra Bruce; November 13, 1997

"'*

8/7/07

4041

:MRICI Minutes; December 17; 1997

**

8/7/07

4045

MRICI Minutes; February 18, 1998

**

8/7/07

4047

GSR Executive Committee Minutes; May 11, 1998

**

8/7/07

4048

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; May 13, 1998

**

8/7/07

4050

Fourth Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRl Associates;
July 15, 1998

**

8/7/07

4051

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; July 27, 1998

**

8/7/07

4052· GSR Group Meeting Minutes; Jtdy 30, 1998

**

8/7/07

4053

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; August I 0, 1998

**

8/7/07

4054

MR1CI and MRIM Meeting Minutes; August 19, 1998

**

8/7/07

4055

Handwritten notes and news clipping; August 20, 1998

**

8/7/07

4056

l\tfRI Center ofldaho Newsletter; September 1998

1144

8/7/07

~
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.I

Admitted

Date

4057

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; September 9, 1998

**

8/7/07

4061

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; October 14, 1998

**

8/7/07

4062

MRICI Minutes; October 22, 1998

**

817/07

4063

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; October 28, 1998

**

817/07

4064

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; November 3, 1998

**

817/07

4065

GSR Group Meeting Minutes, November 9, 1998

**

8/7/07

4066

GSR Group Meeting Minutes, attached draft outline of letter;

**

817/07

4068

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; December 9, 1998

**

817/07

4072

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; January 13, 1999

**

817/07

4073

GSR Group Meeting Minutes, attached DR Systems Presentation of
PACS System; February 3, 1999

**

817/07

4074

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; February 10, 1999

**

817/07

4075

Imaging Center Meeting Minutes; March 3, 1999

**

8/7/07

4076

iYIRI Executive Meeting Minutes; March 17, 1999

**

817/07

4077

Imaging Center Meeting Minutes; March 31, 1999

**

817/07

4078

Imaging Center Meeting Minutes; April 7, 1999

**

817/07

4079

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; April 14, 1999

**

817/07

4080

MRI Executive Meeting Minutes; April21, 1999

**

8/7/07

4081

Imaging Center Meeting Minutes; May 5, 1999

**

8/7/07

4084

GSR Group Meeting Minutes, attached Term Sheet; June I 0, 1999

**

817/07

4085

MRI Executive Meeting Minutes; June 16, 1999

**

817/07

4086

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; July 26, 1999

**

817/07

c\

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record
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!

Admitted

Date

4087

Imaging Center Meeting Minutes; July 7, 1999

**

8/7/07

4088

Imaging Center Meeting Minutes; July 22, 1999

**

8/7/07

4090

Imaging Center Meeting Minutes; July 27, 1999

**

8/7/07

4093

Draft PWC Fair Market Value of a 20 Percent Partnership Interest
DMR's 45 Percent Interest in :tv1RIA; July 31, 1999

**

8/7/07

4095

Fax to Carl Harder from Jeff Cliff; August 10, 1999

1483

8/8/07

4096

List ofRefen-ing Physicians; August 12, 1999

. 1434

8/8/07

4097

Imaging Center Meeting Minutes; August 18, 1999

**

8/7/07

4098

SAR.J.\1C Board ofTrustees Board Meeting; August 18, 1999

**

8/7/07

4099

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; August 23, 1999

**

8/7/07

4100

Notes re: history and structure of MRICI and MRI Mobile and how
they relate to SARMC; August 1999

**

8/7/07

I

4101

Imaging Center Meeting Minutes; August 24, 1999

**

817/07

4102

Letter to Ridgley Denning from David Giles; August 24, 1999
September 1999

4079

8/29/07

I

4104

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; September 8, 1999

**

817/07

4105

MRICI and l\tfR.IM Minutes; September 15, 1999

**

8/7/07

4107

Letter to Vicken Garabedian from IMI; October 4, 1999

1497

8/9/07

4108

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; October 4, 1999

**

817/07

4109

Board of Directors Annual Meeting Minutes; October 11, 1999

**

8/7/07

4111

MRICI Meeting Minutes and attachment; October 20, 1999

**

817/07

4113

IMI Balance Sheets As of October 31, 1999

**

8/7/07

in

~

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation of!the record
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Admitted

Date

4115

Draft of.IMI Operating Agreement; November 3, 1999

1431

8/8/07

4118

Restructuring of MRlA General Partnership Confidential Draft for

1709

8/13/07

4122

Letter to Sandra Bruce from Thomas Henson; December 6, 1999

**

8/7/07

4123

Handwritten Notes re: 12/16/99 Meeting; December 16, 1999

1793

8/13/07

4125

Draft ofThfl Operating Agreement; December 17, 1999

1431

8/8/07

4126

Email to Jim Prochaska and Roger Curran from David Giles;
December 18, 1999

**

8/7/07

4127

IMI Referrals by Procedures PowerPoint by D. Benion;
December 21, 1999

1434

8/8/07 >

4128

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; December 22, 1999

**

8/7/07

4137

Letter to Sandra Bruce from James Prochaska; January 4, 2000

**

8/7/07

4138

Email t9 Sarach Bratley from Allen Hahn re: Engagement Documents,
PWC Valuation of 50 Percent Interest in IMI Draft; January 5, 2000

1709

8/13/07

4141

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; January 12,2000

**

817/07

4142

MRICI Minutes; January 19, 2000

**

817/07

4143

GSR Executive Committee Minutes; January 24, 2000

**

817/07

4144

Meeting with JeffCliffPurchase/Restructuring Options for NfRIA;
January 26, 2000

**

8/7/07

4145

GSR Group Meeting Minute; Jamtaty 26, 2000

**

817/07

4146

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; January 31, 2000

**

8/7/07

4147

Email to Sarah Bratley from Allen Hahn re; SARN!C Draft
Presentation, Presentation: An Introduction to wlRI Associates Legal
Ownership of the Partnerships; Janurary 31, 2000

1709

8/13/07

4148

Outline for Discussion Presentation by Cindy Schamp Purchase/
Restructuring Options for MRIA; February 1,2000

**

8/7/07

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record
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l
I

Admitted

Date

4149

SARNlC Senior Management Team Agenda and PowerPoint slides;
February 1, 2000

**

8/7/07

4150

An Introduction to MRIA Legal Ownership of the Pat1nerships;
February 11,2000

**

817/07

4152

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; February 9, 2000

**

8/7/07

4153

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; February 14, 2000

**

8/7/07

4154

Handwritten notes; February 14, 2000

2662

8/20/07

4155

MRICI Minutes; February 16, 2000

**

8/7/07

4156

MRIM Minutes; February 16,2000

**

8/7/07

4159

PACS/DR Expenses -- March 2000 to July 2001

**

8/7/07

4160

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; March 8, 2000

**

8/7/07

4161

SAR.i\1C Planning/Finance Committee Minutes; March 10,2000

**

8/7/07

4162

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; March 13, 2000

**

8/7/07

4163

Handwritten notes MRI Restructuring Meeting; March 15, 2000

**

817/07

4164

SAR.i\IIC Planning/Finance Committee Minutes; March 16, 2000

**

8/7/07

4165

IMI: A Joint Venture Pat1nership between SARG and SARMC;

**

8/7/07

March 16, 2000
4166

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; March 20, 2000

**

817/07

4167

Handwritten letter to Carl Harder from Roger Curran; March 22, 2000

**

8/7/07

4168

GSR Group Meeting l\llinutes; April4, 2000

**

8/7/07

4169

SARMC Board of Trustees Minutes; April11, 2000

**

8/7/07

4170

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; April 17, 2000

**

817/07

4171

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; May 10, 2000

**

817/07

I

** Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record
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EXHBIT INDEX
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Admitted

Date

4172

Secretary of State Annual Report form for IMI; May 23, 2000

*"'

8/7/07

4173

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; May 30, 2000

**

8/7/07

4174

Email to Roger Curran from Henson; June 5, 2000

**

8/7/07

4176

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; June 12, 2000

"'*

8/7/07

4177

Draft of llVfl Operating Agreement; June 28, 2000

1431

8/8/07

4178

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; June 29, 2000

**

8/7/07

4179

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; July 12, 2000

**

817/07

4180

Letter to Roger CmTan from Jeff Cliff; July 17, 2000

**

817/07

4182

Dmft ofiMI Operating Agreement; August 4, 2000

1431

8/8/07

4183

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; August 8, 2000

**

8/7/07

4184

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; August 21, 2000

**

8/7/07

4186

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; August 30, 2000

**

8/7/07

4187

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; August 31, 2000

"'*

8/7/07

4188

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; September 6, 2000

"'*

8/7/07

4189

GSR Group Meeting Minutes, September 8, 1999

**

817/07

4190

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; September 8, 2000

**

8/7/07

4191

GSR Group Meeting Agenda and Minutes; September 13, 2000

**

817/07

4192

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; September 19, 2000

**

8/7/07

4193

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes with handwritten notes;
September 19, 2000

**

8/7/07

4194

GSR Group Meeting Agenda; October 11, 2000

**

8/7/07

4195

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; October 11,2000

**

8/7/07

,---,

*"'Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record··
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Admitted

Date

4196

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; October 16, 2000

**

8/7/07

4197

Release and Reaffirmation Agreement; October 18, 2000

**

8/7/07

4198

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; November 15,2000

**

8/7/07

4199

GSR Executive Committee Minutes; November 19,2000

**

8/7/07

4203

SARMC Board & Committee Structure 2001

**

8/7/07

4207

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; January 8, 2001

**

8/7/07

4208

GSR Operations Committee Meeting Minutes; February 8, 2001

**

8/7/07

4209

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; February 12,2001

**

817/07

4210

GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes; Februaty 13, 2001

**

8/7/07

4211

Radiology Strategy Meeting Record; February 13,2001

**

8/7/07

4212

MRIC.WV1RIM Strategic Planning Meeting Notes; Februaty 16,2001

**

8/7/07

4213

GSR Marketing Committee Meeting Minutes; February 22, 2001

**

8/7/07

4214

GSR Group Meeting Agenda; March 14, 2001

**

8/7/07

4215

MRI Mobile Board Meeting Minutes; March 21, 2001

**

8/7/07

4216

GSR/IJ\IH Operations/Finance & Fees Committee Minutes;
March 23, 2001

**

817/07

4218

Memo to DMR from Thomas Henson; AprilS, 2001

**

817/07

4219

lt"vll Finance & Fees Committee Meeting Minutes; April 18, 2001

**

8/7/07

4220

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; May 9, 2001

**

817/07

4221

wlRI Mobile Board Meeting Minutes; May 16, 2001

**

8/7/07

4222

Email to Cindy Schamp and Sandra Bruce from Ken Fry re: IMI
agreement/Radiology Contract/MRI; May 30,2001

**

8/7/07

., **Exhibit admitted by stipulation off the record
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Admitted

Date

4223

Letter to Michael Hammond from Pat Miller re: Retention Letter;
June 14, 2001

**

8/7/07

4224

Email to James Prochaska from Roger Curran and attachment;
June 26,2001

**

817/07

4225

Shattuck Hammond Engagement Letter; June 26, 2001

**

8/7/07

4226

Operating Agreement ofiMI; July 1, 2001

**

8/7/07

4227

Operating Agreement oflntermountain Medical Imaging, LLC,
July 1, 2001

**

817/07

4228

Operating Agreement o'f Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC;
July 1, 2001

**

8/7/07

4229

Professional Services Agreement for Radiology Services between
SARiV!C and GSR/SARG; July 1, 2001

**

8/7/07

4230

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; July 11, 2001

**

8/7/07

4231

IMI Management Committee Minutes; August 14,2001

**

8/7/07

4232

MRICI Board Meeting Minutes; August 15, 2001

**

817/07

4233

Letter to Ken Fry from Jack Floyd following meeting of August 15, 01

**

817/07

4234

Memorandum to Grant Chamberlain and Michael Hammond :fi·om
Michael Finnerty and Bill Appleyard re:St. Alphonsus and rviRIA
Overview; August 30, 2001

**

8/17/07

4235

Radiology Group Meeting Minutes; September 12,2001

**

8/7/07

4236

GSR Fees & Finance Committee Meeting Minutes; September 13, 2001 **

817/07

4238

SARiviC IT System Support for llvll Meeting Minutes;
September 24,2001

**

8/7/07

4239

Memorandum to Grant Chamberlain and Michael Hammond from
Mike Finnerty and Bill Appleyard; September 25,2001

1853

8/13/07

4240

IMI Management Committee Meeting Minutes; September 26, 2001

**

817/07

-·1
I
'
'

\

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation of!the record
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Admitted

Date

4242

IMI Fees & Finance Committee Meeting Minutes; October 5, 2001

**

817/07

4243

IMI Management Meeting Minutes; October 31,2001

**

8/7/07

4244

St. Alphonsus' Request for Financing ProposallvfRI Limited
Partnership; November 2001

**

8/7/07

4245

IMI Operations Committee Meeting Minutes; November 5, 2001

**

817/07

4246

Valuation Analysis ofMRIA, GP and Affiliates for SARlv!C by
Shattuck Hammond Partners; November 6, 2001

1837

8/13/07

4247

Shattuck Hammond Partners Presentation of Strategic Options of
MRIA Ownership Interest for SARlvlC; November 6, 2001

1837

8/13/07

4248

IMI Marketing Committee Meeting Minutes; November 28, 2001

**

817/07

4249

MRICI Financial Statement Budge vs. Actual; December 2001

**

8/7/07

4250

Email to Cindy Schamp and Ken Fry from Grant Chamberlain
re: Financing Proposals; December 10, 2001

**

8/7/07

4251

Memorandum to Ken Fry and Cindy Schamp from Grant Chamberlain, **
Mike Finnerty and Bill Appleyard re: Debt and Distribution Analyses;
December 12, 2001

817/07

4252

Email to Cindy Schmap and Ken Fry from Bill Appleyard re: SAR.iv!C
debt and distribution analysis; December 13, 2001

**

817/07

4253

L.Vll/SAR.MC IT Meeting Minutes; December 18, 2001

**

817/07

4260

Handwritten notes re: MRI Restructure; January 2002

**

8/7/07

4261

IMI Marketing Committee Report; January 2002,

**

8/7/07

4262

PACS Meeting Minutes; Janua1y 4, 2002

**

8/7/07

4263

Email to Grant Chamberlain and William Appleyard from Michael
Finnerty re: Distributions; Jam1ary 14, 2002

**

8/7/07

4265

Email to Cindy Schamp from Ken Fry re: MRIA; January 29,2002

**

8/7/07

4267

IMI Management Committee Meeting Minutes; January 31, 2002

**

8/7/07

~

** Exhibit admitted by stipulation off the record
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Admitted

Date

4268

Fax to Gwen Moore (Trinity Health) from Tiffany Albanese
(Administrative Assistant, Finance) re: Shattuck Hammond Memo;
February 6, 2002

**

8/7/07

4269

Memorandum to Ken Fry from Grant Chamberlain re: Work Plan/Next **
Steps; February 12, 2002

817/07

4270

Email To Grant Chamberlain from Michael Finnerty re: St. Alphonsus; **
February 13,2002

8/7/07

4271

Email to Ken Fry and Cindy Schamp from Grant Chamberlain re:
Work Plan Timeline; February 15,2002

**

8/7/07

4272

St. Alphonsus - NIRIA Restructure Proposal Discussion Outline
w/Dr. Curran; April 9, 2002

**

8/7/07

4273

GSR Fees & Finance Committee Meeting Minutes; April 12, 2002

**

8/7/07

4274

Email to Grant Chamberlain from Roger CutTan re: Update;
April29, 2002

**

817/07

4275

IMI Management Committee Meeting Agenda; May 30, 2002

**

817/07

4276

Fifth Amendment to Articles ofPartnership ofMRI Associates;
August _ 2002

**

817/07

4277

Letter to MRICI Scheduling Department, Radiology Scheduling
Department from Radiologists!rim Hall; August 7, 2002

**

8/7/07

4278

Email to Dave Giles, Roger Curran and Jack Floyd from Mark
Lawrence re: Gem Radiology; August 19,2002

**

817/07

4279

Email to Ken Fry from Mark Lawrence re: Weekend Issues;
August 26, 2002

**

817/07

4280

Radiology-MRI Meeting Record; August 30, 2002

**

817/07

4281

MRI Center of Idaho Board Meeting Minutes; September 17, 2002

**

8/7/07

4282

Email to Carolyn Corbett from Terry Krogstad Re: Radiology/MRI
Meeting; September 24, 2002

**

8/7/07

4285

Handwritten Notes re: Ben Murray l 0/18/02; October 18, 2002

**

8/7/07

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record
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Admitted

Date

4289

DR Usage Percentage by Location; November 1, 2002

**

8/7/07

4292

November .MRI Board Topics for Discussion and Follow Up;
November 1, 2002

**

817/07

4296

ll\11 Marketing Committee Meeting Minutes;· April 2, 2003

**

8/7/07

4297

Sixth Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofl\IIRI Associates;
Aprill5, 2003

**

817/07

4298

Memorandum to Grant Chamberlain from Ken Fry re: MRI
Discussions; April 18, 2003

**

817/07

4300

Email to Roger Curran, James Prochaska, and David Giles from
Jack Havlina re: DMR Agreement and Rads; May 5, 2003

**

817/07

4302

Letter to Sandra Bruce from Roger Curran; June 3, 2003

**

817/07

4303

IMI Operations Committee Meeting Minutes; June 20, 2003

**

8/7/07

4304

MFP Management Steering Committee Meeting Summary;
June 24, 2003

**

817/07

4305

DR Systems Invoice to SARMC; June 24, 2003

**

817/07

4306

IMI Operations Committee Meeting Minutes; July 16,2003

**

8/7/07

4307

Email to Jack Floyd from Thomas Henson re: Agreement for MRI
Services; July 18, 2003

**

817/07

4309

MRl of Idaho Special Meeting Minutes and Agenda;
September 8, 2003

**

8/7/07

4310

Negotiating Timeline; September 8, 2003

1223

817/07

4311

MRI Center of Idaho Board Meeting Minutes; September 8, 2003

**

817/07

4313

CEO Report; September 30, 2003

**

8/7/07

4314

IMI Management Committee Meeting Minutes; October 28, 2003

**

817/07

** Exhibft admitted by stipulation offthe record
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Admitted

Date

4315

Presentation to Trinity Health: Overview of the Restructuring of the
1-!RIA Limited Partnership & the Simultaneous Merger ofMRICI
and llvll; October 30, 2003

**

817/07

4316

IMI Fees & Finance Committee Meeting Minutes; December I, 2003

1938

8/14/07

4318

Letter to Tom Banducci from Pat Mi1ler and follow-up correspondence; **
December 22, 2003, February 20, 2004, and February 24, 2004

8/7/07

4319

NlRICI Income Statement; December 31,2003

**

8/7/07

4322

Resume of Patricia Vandenberg; 2004

**'

8/7/07

4325

Email to David Giles, Roger Curran, and James Prochaska from
Jack Havlina re: MRI; January 12, 2004

**

8/7/07

4326 · Email to Carolyn Corbett, Julli Hopkins, and Robin Cioffi from Ben
Murray re: JCAHO; Januaty 14,2004

**

8/7/07

4327

SARMC Monthly Imaging Strategy Meeting; January 20, 2004

**

8/7/07

4328

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; January 20, 2004

**

8/7/07

4329

Letter to Roger Curran from Sandra Bruce re: Notice of Withdrawal;
February 24, 2004

**

8/7/07

4330

Letter to Patrick Miller from Tom Banducci re: MRI Associates;
February 25, 2004

**

817/07

4331

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; February 25, 2004

**

8/7/07

4332

Letter to Sandra Bruce from Mark Adams, Mark Dalley, and Joseph
Messmer re: officer to sell MRICI and buy SARMC's share in MRIM;
March 5, 2004

1246

817/07

4333

Letter to Mark Adams, Mark Dalley, and Joe Messmer from Sandra
Bruce re: Saint Alphonsus Withdrawal; March 10, 2004

1252

817/07

4334

PACS Team Meeting Minutes; March 12, 2004 and various dates

**

817/07

4335

IMI Marketing Committee Minutes; March 10, 2004

**

817/07

4336

ltvH Strategy Session Minutes; March 16, 2004

**

817/07

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record
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Admitted

Date

4339

Handwritten notes; March 22, 2004

**

8/7/07

4340

SAR.i\1C Senior Leadership Team Meeting Summary; March 23, 2004

**

8/7/07

4341

Letter to Sandra Bruce from Roger Curran re: response to withdraw!;
March 23,2004

**

8/7/07

4342

Email to Sandra Bruce from Carolyn Corbett re: MRI conversation;
March 26, 2004

**

8/7/07

4343

Radiology Marketing Committee Meeting Minutes; March 30, 2004

**

8/7/07

4344

GSR Group Meeting Minutes; April 20, 2004

**

8/7/07

4345

SARMC Senior Leadership Team Meeting Summary; April 27, 2004

**

8/7/07

4346

Radiology Group Meeting Minutes; June 2, 2004

**

8/7/07

4347

Letter to Jack Floyd from Bill Radaj; August 6, 2004

**

8/7/07

4348

Letter to Joseph Gobel from Carolyn Corbett re: Medical Director;
August 10,2004

**

8/7/07

4349

Email to Julli Hopkins from Joseph Gobel re: Exam Protocol and
various;August 28, 2004 and various

**

8/7/07

4350

Imaging Strategic Plan Environmental Assessment, Imaging Planning
Team; August 31, 2004

**

8/7/07

4351

Letter to Pat Miller from Mark Ellison and attachments;
September 3, 2004

1289

8/8/07

I

4352

Seventh Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofwiRI Associates
LLP; November 10, 2004

**

8/7/07

I

4353

Letter to Sandra Bruce from MRICI Board of Directors;
December 3, 2004

**

8/7/07

4354

SAR1\t1C Senior Leadership Team Meeting Summary;

**

8/7/07

4357

Memo to Saint Alponsus Medical Staff from Sandra B1uce;
December 20, 2004

**

8/7/07

- '

I

**Exhibit admitte.d by stipulation off the record
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Admitted

Date

4359

Email to Carolyn Corbett, Jeff Cliff and Tim Hall from Jeffrey
Seaboum re: MRICI patients on DR; January 10, 2005

**

8/7/07

4362

SARMC MRI Operations Team Meeting Minutes; March 21, 2005

**

8/7/07

4363

Letter to ICR from Sandra Bruce; March 22, 2005

**

8/7/07

4366

SAIUvfC Board of Trustees Meeting Minutes; September 20,2005

**

8/14/07

4367

Email to Ben Murray, Carolyn Corbett, Robert Polk, Janelle Reilly,
Jean Basom, and Sandra Bruce fi·om Ken Fty re: Mobile MRI at
SAIUvfC; October 6, 2005

**

8/7/07

4373

Agreement for MRI Services between SARI\1C and IMI;
December 9, 2005

**

817/07

4374

First Amendment to Operating Agreement oflntermountain Medical
Imaging, LLC; December 9, 2005

**

8/7/07

4375

Option and Purchase Agreement between ICR and SADC;
December 9, 2005

**

8/7/07

4376

Email to Carolyn Corbett fi·om Ben Murray re: MRI Letter;
December 11, 2005

**

8/15/07

4377

Email to BCC, Front Office, Gen Rad Techs, Nuc Med Group,
Nurses, Rad Admin, Rad Assistants, Specials, Ultrasound from Scott
Christensen re: New MRI Services; December 12, 2005

**

8115/07

4379

Email to Ben Murray, Carolyn Corbett, Dennis Adams, Joseph 9obel,
Kevin Dwello, Karen Noyes, and Sandra Bruce from Neil Hamilton
re: ~lRI Issues; December 15, 2005

**

8/15/07

4381

Email to Adam Feider, Connie Stern, Dennis Adams, Garna Barker,
et al. fi·om Ben Murray re: MRI Agenda and Minutes;
December 19, 2005

**

8/15/07

4387

MRI Center ofldaho Business I Income Statement;
December 31,2005

**

8/7/07

4390

New Saint Alphonsus MRI Launches; January 9, 2006

**

8/7/07

*'i<
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EXHBIT INDEX
Saint Alphonsus Exhibits

Admitted

Date

4403

Assignment of Membership Interest between ICR and SADC;
April1, 2006

**

8/7/07

4409

Curriculum Vitae of Jeffrey Todd Seaboum, M.D.; 2006

**

817/07

4412

Resume of Joseph A. Messmer; 2007

**

817/07

4413

Cuniculum Vitae ofPaul D. Traughber, M.D.; 2007

**

817/07

2728

8/20/07

4417A Expert Report ofBruce Budge; March 12,2007
4425

PI\tll Data - JMI MRI Exams 2001- current spreadsheet

2736

8/20/07

4428

MRICI Charges by Refening Physician; 1998- March 31, 2001

**

817/07

4429

MRI LP Financial Statements; December 31, 1991 and 1990

**

8/7/07

4430

MRIMobile LP Financial Statements; December 31, 1991 and 1990

**

817/07

4431

MRI LP Financial Statements; December 31, 1997 and 1996

**

817/07

4432

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements; December 31, 1997 and 1996

**

817/07

4433

MRI LP Financial Statements; December 31, 1998 and 1997

**

817/07

4434

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements; December 31, 1998 and 1997

**

817/07

4435

MRI LP Financial Statements; December 31, 1999 and 1998

**

817/07

4436

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements; December 31, 1999 and 1998

**

817/07

4437

MRI LP Financial Statements; December 31,2000 and 1999

**

8/7/07

4438

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements; December 31, 2000 and 1999

**

817/07

4439

MRI LP Financial Statements; December 31, 2001 and 2000

**

8/7/07

4440

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements; December 31, 2001 and 2000

**

817/07

4441

MRI LP Financial Statements; December 31, 2002 and 2001

**

817/07

4442

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements; December 31,2002 and 2001

**

817/07

~
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EXHBIT INDEX
Saint Alphonsus Exhibits

l
i

I

Admitted

Date

4443

.tvfRl LP Financial Statements; December 31, 2003 and 2002

**

817/07

4444

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements; December 31, 2003 and 2002

**

817/07

4445

1vlRI LP Financial Statements; December 31, 2004 and 2003

**

817/07

4446

MIU Mobile LP; December 31, 2004 and 2003

**

8/7/07

4447

MRI LP Financial Statements; December 31, 2005 and 2004

**

817/07

4448

.MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements; December 31, 2005 and 2004

**

817/07

4449

.MRICI Business I Balance Sheet; July 31, 2006

**

817/07

4450

.tvlRICI Business I Income Statement; July 31, 2006

**

817/07

4451

MRIM Business II Balance Sheets; July 21, 2006

**

817/07

4452

MRJMBusiness II Income Statement; July 31,2006

**

8/7/07

4470

CV of Bob Bell

2482

8/16/07

4489

Cettified copies ofldaho Secretary of State Annual Report Forms
-livH; 2002; 2002 REINSTATE:tvJENT; 2003 and 2004

4094

8/29/07

4499

Large Poster Board - DMR Doctor Partners

1117

8/7/07

4500

Large Poster Board -Hospital Partners

1117

8/7/07

4501

Circle Diagram drawn by Jeffrey Cliff

1473

8/8/07

4502

Trinity Health Integrity Program

1726

8/13/07

4503

Timeline 5/88-5/99

1754

8/13/07

4505

Letter of3/24/0S to Bruce from Seabourn!ICR

1974

8/14/07

4506

Diagram/Timetable -Banducci

(marked)

8/14/07

4507

Diagram/Timetable -Banducci

(marked)

8114/07

4508

Diagram/Timetable - Banducci

(marked)

8/14/07
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EXHBIT INDEX
Saint Alphonsus Exhibits

Admitted

Date

4509

Diagramffimetable -Banducci

(marked)

8/14/07

4510

Graph drawn by Dr. Bell

2602

8/16/07

4511

Memo to Ken Fry and Cindy Schamp from Grant Chamberlain;
December 11, 2001

**

8/20/07

4512

CD of Cindy Schamp deposition video clips

**

8/15/07

4513

Cindy Schamp video deposition designations

**

8/15/07

4515

Pie chart- Bruce Budge

2740

8/20/07

4516

Pie chart - Bruce Budge

2740

8/20/07

4517

Pie chart - Bruce Budge

2740

8/20/07

4520

Poster board - Annual lost profit

2755

8/20/07

4521

Poster board

2755

8/20/07

4524

Appendix B to the report of Charles Wilhoite

**

8/21/07

4525

Demonstrative exhibit "Standard Steops in Valuation"

**

8/21/07

4526

Demonstrative exhibit "lVIRIA Projected Lost Profits"

**

8/21107

4527

Demonstrative exhibit "Industry Dynamics"

**

8/21/07

4528

Drawings by Mr. Wi1hoitte re: lost profit

2922

8/21/07

4529

Drawings by Mr. Wilhoitte re: lost profit

2922

8/21/07

4530

Drawings

3971

8/29/07

4531

Drawings

3971

8/29/07

4533

Letter to doctors from Dr. Seabourn re: lV1RI refenals

3727

8/27/07

4534

Drawings

3971

8/29/07

4535

Letter to Dr. Garabedian at IMI from ACR

4160

8/29/07

**Exhibit admitted by stipulation offthe record
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From: 2083369177

Page: 2/3

Date: 7/14/2011 3:04:17 PM

Law Offices

GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
JackS. Gjording
Tllldy Hanson :Fou!;l!:r
JuliaMe S. Hall
Bobbi K. Dominick, OfCQrmset

509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, 10 83701
(203} 336-9777telephone

(208) 336-917'7 ~csimile

July 14, 2011

Via Facsimile
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMANPLLC
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702
Re:

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care vs. MRI Associates, LLP
Ada Co. Case No. CV OC 04082190
File No. 15051.001

Dear Tom:
Thank you for your letter of July 11 concerning stipulations.
As I wrote to you on July 8, we look forward to cooperating with you on a reciprocal
basis to achieve all appropriate stipulations. However since this is a new trial, we cannot agree
in the abstract that the stipulations for the hundreds of exhibits marked in the 2007 trial
automatically apply.
For example, the Exhibit Index on appeal that you forwarded with your July llletter
shows that MRIA marked 535 exhibits in connection with the last trial. Our review indicates
that fully 70% of those exhibits were never mentioned on the record of the trial. Saint Alphonsus
likewise marked many exhibits that were never used at trial. We see no reason to burden the
record by stipulation to admissibility of hundreds of exhibits that neither party uses. On the
other band, there will likely be some additional exhibits that each side will want to add and use at
the trial, and that will be appropriate subjects for stipulation.
In general, we expect to be able to stipulate (a) to the authenticity of nearly every
document; (b) the business records foundation for almost as many documents; and (c) the
admissibility without further follildation to a major portion of the documents.

If you would like to give us a preliminary list of the documents that you plan to introduce
at the new trial, whether marked previously in 2007 or in addition to those, and the stipulations
that you would request for each, we will be happy to consider them promptly. We will do the
same, and expect that both sides will supplement those lists on a reasonable schedule as our
preparation progresses.
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From: 2083369177

Page: 3/3

Date: 7/14/2011 3:04:17 PM

Thomas A. Banducci
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care v. MRI Associates, LLP
July 14, 2011
Page2

Very truly yours,
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

JSG/fe

cc:

Jones Day
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802 W. Bannock, Suite SOO
Bolse,IO 83702
Tel (208) 342·4411
Fax (208) 342·4455

www.bwslawgroup.com

July 19, 20 ll

Via Facsimile 336-9177
Jack Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 West Hays St.
Boise, ID 83701
Re:

St. Alphonsus v. MRJA

Dear Jack:
I am in receipt of your letter dated July 14, 2011 regarding acceptance of service of the
subpoenas for the Saint Alphonsus' witnesses we intend to call in our Case in Chief. At this
time, we expect to call Ken Fry, Ben Murray, and Sally Jeffcoat. We will give you at least 24
hours notice prior to calling these individuals. We will, of course, accept service for the
MRIA witness under the same conditions.
Also, in response to your request regarding the release of the original trial exhibits, it
is my understanding that the Clerk will notify each party and advise them when their exhibits
will be available for pick up. We intend to take possession of the exhibits which were
submitted at trial. If you object, please let me know.
As I previously wrote you, we intend to hold SARMC to its stipulations entered into
in the first trial relative to exhibits. To the extent there are any exhibits which SARMC has
stipulated into evidence which are no longer relevant by virtue of the Supreme Court's ruling,
we will provide you a list of these and agree to their withdrawal from evidence.
Please advise me how you wish to exchange exhibits either electronically, in hard
copy or both.
Very truly yours,

:kas

BANDUCCI

WOODARD

SCHWARTZMAN

001563
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From: 2083369177

. .

Page: 2/3

Date: 7/22/2011 2:59:52 PM

...

Law Offices

GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
JackS. Gjo~;d.i.ng
Trudy Hanson Fouser
Julianne S. Hall
Bobbi K. Dominick, Of Counsel

509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Bo1C :2837
Boise, JD 8370l
(208) 336-9777 telephone
(208) 336-9177 fa~m.He

July 15, 2011

Via Facsimile
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702
Re:

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care vs. MRI Associates, LLP
Ada Co. Case No. CV OC 04082190
File No. 15051.001

Dear Tom:
I have in hand your letter of July 19, 2011, relating to Saint Alphonsus witnesses you
wish to call, the release of exhibits being held by the Clerk from the last trial, the issue of
stipulations, and the exchange of exhibits.
As to the witnesses~ we are inquiring to determine the availability of Ken Fry, Ben
Murray, and Sally Jeffcoat on the days during which the trial is expected to be conducted. We
will get back to you concerning that information as soon as we have it. Once we have that
information, we can consider with you whether there are any scheduling conflicts that are
relevant to your plans to call these witnesses.
As to the release of exhibits, I understand that your intention is to secure from the Clerk
those exhibits that that were marked in the 4000 series as exhibits for MRIA, and that you
envision that we would pick up the marked exhibits running between 0 and 999 as exhibits for
Saint Alphonsus. If that is correct, we have no objection to that plan.
As to the issue of stipulations, for the reasons set forth in my letter of July 14, we do not
agree that the parties' stipulations from the first trial are binding in this new trial. Accordingly,
we intend to proceed as outlined in my July 14 letter.

Finally, if you agree, let's exchange exhibits electronically only, with each side reserving
the right to inspect the other side's best uoriginal', exhibit~ whether it is a paper or electronic
document.
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From: 2083369177
~

Page: 3/3

Date: 7/22/2011 2:59.:52 PM

..
Thomas A. Banducci
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care v, MRI Associates, LLP
July 22, 2011
Page 2

Very truly yours,

GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

JSG/fe
cc;
Jones Day
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
Dara L. Parker (ISB No. 7177)
BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk
By JERI HEATON

'

DEPUTY

Attorneys MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. CV OC 408219D
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MRIA'S MOTION TO HAVE DEEMED
ADMITTED THE EXHIBITS ADMITTED
IN THE PREVIOUS TRIAL

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited (collectively,
"MRIA") submit this Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Have Deemed Admitted the
Exhibits Admitted in the Previous Trial.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Saint Alphonsus has apparently decided that it does not like the rulings concerning the
documents admitted by Judge McLaughlin at the previous trial. It has therefore effectively
informed MRIA that it wants a "do-over"; that it now wants to have each of the hundreds of
exhibits previously admitted-most of them by Saint Alphonsus's own stipulation-to be
laboriously scrutinized by this Court prior to a duplicative re-admission. Boiled to its essence,
then, Saint Alphonsus's argument is that it should not have to be bound by its own stipulations or
even the representations it has made both to Judge McLaughlin and this Court. Saint
Alphonsus's contradictory position, however, violates both Idaho law and the law of this case.
MRIA accordingly respectfully requests that this Court simply hold Saint Alphonsus to its word
and deem admitted those documents previously admitted in the previous trial.

II.

FACTUALBACKGROUND

On July 7, 2011, MRIA contacted Saint Alphonsus concerning the exhibits previously
admitted in the first trial of this matter. MRIA's counsel stated:
Based on your position for the motions in limine and the Court's position on the
sanctity of Judge McLaughlin's rulings on evidence, I assume that all exhibits
admitted or stipulated to at the first trial will be deemed admitted, except for those
that directly relate to the Supreme Court's ruling. Please advise me if this is not
your understanding. 1
MRIA believed that this was an eminently reasonable request-perfunctory even. This belief
was based on the fact that: (1) Saint Alphonsus itself had already specifically taken the position

1

See the Affidavit of Thomas A. Banducci (the "Banducci Aff.") at Ex. A.
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that the prior evidentiary rulings by Judge McLaughlin were not to be disturbed at this trial; 2 and
(2) this Court had repeatedly stated that "if something has already been decided which the
Supreme Court has not reversed on appeal, I'm not going to reverse it in the trial court." 3
Moreover, the vast majority of the documents admitted at the previous trial were admitted by
stipulation of the parties. 4
Saint Alphonsus, however, declined MRIA's request. Its rationale for not agreeing was
that "since this is a new trial, we cannot agree in the abstract that the stipulations and
admissibility determinations ... automatically apply .... " 5 Thus, even though Saint Alphonsus had
previously stipulated on the record to admissibility of most of the relevant exhibits, those
representations were now to be considered worthless. More surprising still, Saint Alphonsus was
taking the position that these evidentiary determinations by Judge McLaughlin-all but a few of
which were not affected by the Supreme Court decision-were also now meaningless.
MRIA immediately recognized that this position was 180 degrees from the one Saint
Alphonsus took in its Motion in Limine Re: Prior Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial, filed
April 11, 2011, in which it argued that prior evidentiary rulings should not be disturbed. MRIA
accordingly replied on July 11, expressing surprise at this inexplicable change of position and
attaching the official reporters' list of admitted exhibits from the first trial. 6 This list made clear
that Saint Alphonsus had specifically stipulated to an estimated 90% of the exhibits admitted. 7

2

See generally, e.g., Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Prior Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial, filed
April11, 2011.
3
Feb. 9, 2011 Hearing Transcript, pp. 40-41.
4
See the Banducci Aff. at Ex. C, which contains the Exhibit Index created by Tamara I. Hohenleitner and Leslie
Anderson, Official Court Reporters, and which notes that most exhibits admitted in the previous trial were done by
"stipulation off the record."
5
Banducci Aff. at Ex. B.
6
Banducci Aff. at Ex. C.
7 /d.
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MRIA accordingly asked Saint Alphonsus to reconsider its contradictory position. 8 But Saint
Alphonsus again declined, this time with the confusing excuse that it should not be held to its
word because its prior stipulations might somehow be a "burden on the record," in spite of the
fact that the exhibits were already on the record and would remain on the record, regardless of
the parties' agreement here. 9
Hoping that the problem had to do with a misunderstanding about the exclusion of
documents that were directly affected by the Supreme Court's decision in this matter, MRIA
wrote again:
As I previously wrote to you, we intend to hold SARMC to its stipulations entered
into in the first trial relative to exhibits. To the extent there are any exhibits
which SARMC has stipulated into evidence which are no longer relevant by
virtue ofthe Supreme Court's rulin~, we will provide you a list of these and agree
to their withdrawal from evidence. 1
Apparently, however, worries about the effect of the Supreme Court's ruling on these exhibits
were not the reason Saint Alphonsus was declining to honor its stipulations; even with MRIA's
offer to remove these documents, Saint Alphonsus still refused to agree. 11 MRIA accordingly
found itself with no other choice but to file this motion.

III.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

This Court has consistently taken the position that it will not disturb the previous rulings
made by Judge McLaughlin unless such a ruling was directly affected by the Supreme Court's
decision. In particular-and again-this Court stated that "if something has already been
decided which the Supreme Court has not reversed on appeal, I'm not going to reverse it in the

8

Id

9

Banducci Aff. at Ex. D
Banducci Aff. at Ex. E.
11
Banducci Aff. at Ex. F. The date on that document appears to be a mistake. It was received by MRIA on July 22.

10
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trial court." 12 This has specifically included decisions about admissibility of evidence made by
Judge McLaughlin. For example, this Court held in its Consolidated Order Re: Motions in
Limine Heard May 18, 2011 (filed on June 13, 2011 ), that the admission of certain documents
and testimony by Judge McLaughlin which were not affected by the Supreme Court's decision
was the "law of the case" and would not be modified or revisited. 13
Saint Alphonsus has expressly agreed with this rationale when it has worked in Saint
Alphonsus's favor. For example, it specifically argued in its Motion in Limine Re: Prior
Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial, filed April11, 2011, the polar opposite of what it is
now stating in its current letters:
Under Idaho law, a party is "preclude[d] [from] reopening [an] issue[]" in
subsequent proceedings when it failed to appeal the trial court's ruling on that
issue during its initial appeal. See Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 517, 5
P.3d 973, 978 (2000). Further, even in circumstances where the district court can
reconsider a previously-made decision on remand from an appellate court, such
prior rulings should be treated as law-of-the-case where there are no new
circumstances "bearing on the correctness" of the prior order. See Devil Creek
Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 126 Idaho 202, 205, 879 P.2d
1135,1138 (1994). Indeed, this Court recently recognized these principles when it
stated, during the February 9, 2011, hearing, that "if something has already been
decided which the Supreme Court has not reversed on appeal, I'm not going to
reverse it in the trial court." Feb. 9, 2011 Hr'g Tr. at 40-41.

At the prior trial, there were several significant evidentiary rulings that were not
appealed to the Supreme Court, and for which the legal and factual basis
underlying the trial court's original decision has not changed This Court should
enter an order re-instating those substantive evidentiary rulings that were not
affected by the Supreme Court's decision. 14
Put more simply, Saint Alphonsus argued to the Court just a few months ago that ifthe
"legal and factual basis underlying the trial court's original decision has not changed," then unappealed "evidentiary rulings" must be upheld. This is precisely what MRIA sought from Saint

12

Feb. 9, 2011 Hearing Transcript, pp. 40-41.
Consolidated Order Re: Motions in Limine Heard May 18,2011 (filed on June 13, 2011), pp. 1-3.
14
Saint Alphonsus Motion in Limine Re: Prior Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial, pp. 2-3 (emphasis added).
13
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Alphonsus in the letters attached to this Motion: an agreement that the un-appealed evidentiary
rulings of Judge McLaughlin be ratified and the documents he admitted in the previous trial be
admitted here as well. 15
Yet now, when this rationale will apparently work against it, Saint Alphonsus has
changed its mind. That is, it is suddenly unwilling to follow the very statements it made to this
Court just a few months ago and agree to Judge McLaughlin's previous admission of documents
in the prior trial. Such self-contradiction, apparently made for the purpose of situational
expediency, is unfortunate.
It should also be noted that the fact that the parties stipulated to most of these exhibits is
especially relevant to the analysis here, for two reasons. First, as noted in the official court
reporters' index, Judge McLaughlin specifically admitted these documents because the parties
made a "stipulation off the record." 16 Thus, Judge McLaughlin made an evidentiary ruling based
on representations from Saint Alphonsus that it agreed that the documents should be admitted.

17

Secondly, such stipulations estop Saint Alphonsus from contesting the admission of these
documents now. Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 241, 178 P.3d 597, 605-06 (2008), is
instructive in this regard. There, a litigant made a stipulation with the other side-both on the
record and in front of the Court-just as Saint Alphonsus did here. The litigant thereafter
changed his mind about that stipulation, and sought to take a new position in a subsequent
proceeding. The Court, however, found that this was fundamentally unfair and estopped the
litigant from taking a contrary position. Such is the case here as well. Saint Alphonsus took a

15

See the Banducci Aff. at Exs. A, C, and E.
See Ex. C at the bottom of every page of the Index.
17
MRIA assumes that the official reporters' index is sufficient proof of this fact, especially given that Saint
Alphonsus never objected to it on appeal. To the extent Saint Alphonsus disagrees that it did, in fact, enter into
these stipulations, MRIA is willing to call Saint Alphonsus's attorney, Mr. Gjording, at the hearing of this matter to
inquire as to whether he did enter into these stipulations.
16
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position on the record and now wants to be allowed to renege for no apparent reason other than
that it now does not like the deal it struck. It similarly should be disallowed from doing so.
Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 81, 205 P.3d 1209, 1217 (2009), is also informative.
There, McCandless, like Saint Alphonsus, "stipulated to all of Borah's exhibits being admitted
into evidence." Thereafter, he changed his mind and complained that some of those exhibits
should not have been admitted. The Supreme Court held that he could not complain on appeal
that the trial court used the very documents he had stipulated to. While the present procedural
circumstances are slightly different than those in Borah (Borah did not involve a remand) the
idea is the same: a party cannot be heard to complain that the documents it stipulates to are
actually used in trial. Saint Alphonsus is accordingly estopped from similar complaints here.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, MRIA respectfully asks this Court to deem admitted all
documents which were previously admitted in the prior trial, with the exception of the limited
few which have been entirely obviated by the Supreme Court's decision.
DATED this 28th day of July 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
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.,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 28th day of July 2011, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D ~·Mail
~Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile

~Mail

D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile
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ORlG\NAL
Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
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.

;

COME NOW Defendant/Counterclaimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") and hereby move this Court for an
Order Excluding Mention of Saint Alphonsus's Status as a Non-Profit Entity.
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum filed concurrently herewith.
DATED this 28th day of July 2011.

BrentS. Bastian
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
Attorneys for Defendants
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MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited (collectively,
"MRIA") submit this Memorandum in Support of their Motion in Limine to Exclude Mention of
Saint Alphonsus's Status as a Non-Profit Entity.
I.

ARGUMENT

Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, MRIA moves this Court to exclude
mention of Saint Alphonsus's status as a non-profit entity. MRIA makes this Motion on two
grounds. First, Saint Alphonsus's non-profit status is not even tangentially relevant to any
defense or other argument it has in this matter. That is, no fact in this case will be made any
more or less probable by its presentation to the jury. As such, exclusion is warranted under
Rules 401 and 402. See Loza v. Arroyo Dairy, 137 Idaho 764,768, 53 P.3d 347, 351 (Ct. App.,
2002) ("The testimony in question is inadmissible because it is irrelevant.").
Secondly-and probably more importantly- the mention of Saint Alphonsus's nonprofit status should be excluded because of the "danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues,
or misleading the jury." Idaho R. Evid. 403. As this Court knows, one ofMRIA's main theories
in this matter is that Saint Alphonsus was so driven by the bottom line that it knowingly
breached its contractual and fiduciary duties with MRIA so that it could make more money by
working with a competing entity. MRIA accordingly worries that the term "non-profit" might
somehow be read by some jurors as undermining that assertion. In particular, to the
unsophisticated eye, the term "non-profit" might seem to indicate that Saint Alphonsus lacks the
capability to make money and therefore would also lack the motive to maximize profits. This
belief, of course, would be erroneous, but perhaps understandable given the confusing nature of
the term "non-profit." As one court put it "[n]onprofit corporations are probably misunderstood
and perhaps misnamed. They make profits and, though they don't have owners or stockholders,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE MENTION OF SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
STATUS AS A NON-PROFIT ENTITY- 2

001578

an establishment exists to run them." Arkansas Hasp. Ass'n v. Arkansas State Bd of Pharmacy,
297 Ark. 454, 459, 763 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Ark. 1989) (concurrence; emphasis added). See also,
Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of US. ofAmerica, Inc., 549 F .3d 1079,
1094 (7th Cir. 2008) ("The term 'nonprofit organization' does not mean (as is most often
incorrectly assumed) an organization that cannot enjoy a profit") (emphasis added, quoting
approvingly from third-party source).
In sum, the possibility of confusion to the jury by use of the term "non-profit" is very
real, while the probative value of the mention of Saint Alphonsus's status as a non-profit entity is
nugatory. Rule 403 is accordingly clear that its mention should be excluded. See Loza, 768, 53
P .3d at 3 51 (" ... even if the statements bore some marginal probative value, ... [the] probative
value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, making the evidence
inadmissible under Rule 403.")

II.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, MRIA respectfully asks this Court to exclude mention of
Saint Alphonsus's status as a non-profit entity.
DATED this 28th day of July 2011.

BrentS. Bastian
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
Attorneys for Defendants
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Opposition to Saint Alphonsus Diversified
Care, Inc.'s ("Saint Alphonsus") Motion in Limine to Exclude "Hearsay Within Hearsay" in
Business Records (the "Motion").
The Motion is ill-conceived for two independent reasons. First and foremost, Saint
Alphonsus freely admits that it previously stipulated to the admissibility of all but one of these
documents, meaning that Judge McLaughlin admitted them into evidence of the first trial as a
result ofthe agreement ofthe parties. 1 As to the remaining document (Doc. 4154), Judge
McLaughlin specifically overruled the exact hearsay objection being made in the Motion? As
such, and as stated by Saint Alphonsus itself, the documents' prior admissions obviously
constitute "evidentiary rulings that were not appealed to the Supreme Court, and for which the
legal and factual basis underlying the trial court's original decision has not changed." 3 Thus, just
as Saint Alphonsus recently argued to this Court, it "should enter an order re-instating those
substantive evidentiary rulings that were not affected by the Supreme Court's decision. " 4
MRIA has argued this exact issue at some length in its concomitantly-filed Motion to
Have Deemed Admitted the Exhibits Admitted in the Previous Trial. Rather than repeat the
substance ofthat argument verbatim, MRIA simply re-incorporates it, and the evidence cited in
support of it, herein. That said, MRIA additionally notes that there is a case directly on point

1

Motion, p. 2. See also the Affidavit of Thomas A. Banducci in Support ofMRIA's Motion to
Have Deemed Admitted the Exhibits Admitted in the Previous Trial ("Deemed Admitted Aff.")
at Ex. C, demonstrating that all but Doc. 4154 were admitted by Judge McLaughlin at the first
trial due to stipulation of the parties.
2
See the Trial Transcript from the first trial ofthis matter, 8/20/07, p. 2662; see the Deemed
Admitted Aff. at Ex. C.
3
Saint Alphonsus Motion in Limine Re: Prior Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial, pp. 2-3
(emphasis added).
4 !d.
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from the Idaho Supreme Court. Just as Saint Alphonsus is doing now, a party in Colpaert v.
Larson's Inc., 115 Idaho 825, 828, 771 P.2d 46, 49 (1989), argued that a stipulated exhibit

contained hearsay and that therefore it should not have been used against him. The Court flatly
disagreed:
ISIF asserts that the report is hearsay and inadmissible. However, the record
contains a stipulation entered into by the attorneys for Colpaert, the employer and
surety, and ISIF that agreed that this report should be admitted into evidence.
Thus, through this stipulation, ISIF has waived any hearsay objection.

!d. (some emphasis added). Such is the exact case here as well.
Secondly, even if Saint Alphonsus had not already indisputably waived this argumentboth by stipulation at the previous trial and by its own recent statements to this Court about the
"non-disturbability" of Judge McLaughlin's evidentiary rulings-the Motion would still be
faulty. This is because the Motion is clearly premature. In particular, whether a document
constitutes hearsay cannot be determined in the abstract, as Saint Alphonsus seems to suggest in
its Motion. Instead, at a minimum, the court must know why it is being introduced because the
hearsay rule will only apply if the document is being "offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted." Idaho R. Evid. 801(c). As it stands now, this Court does not know what the
context for the introduction will be such that it could determine that they will be introduced "to
prove the truth ofthe matter asserted." !d.; see also State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651,657, 862
P.2d 343, 349 (Ct. App. 1993) (statement which might otherwise be hearsay held to be
unobjectionable because it was not being admitted to prove the matter asserted). As such, even
assuming the statements in the referenced documents would otherwise qualify as hearsay, any
request to have the documents adjudged as violating the rule at this point is premature.
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Moreover, as Saint Alphonsus seems to recognize, the statements in each of the
referenced documents clearly meet the party-opponent exception to the hearsay rule. 5 In
specific, the speaker in each of the documents is a Saint Alphonsus (Polk, Schamp, Bruce) or
IMI (Cliff) representative. Obviously, these would easily fit into the exceptions found in Idaho

R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) and (D), which deal with statements made by party-opponents and their
representatives. Moreover, depending on the evidence before the court prior to the admission,
they could very conceivably fit into Idaho R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B), (C), and (E) as well (providing
another reason Saint Alphonsus's Motion is premature).
As to what Saint Alphonsus describes as the "second level ofhearsay"-that a few notes
might be unclear on who the speaker at the meeting was-what it seems to be describing is less
about hearsay and more about foundation. Yet, even ifthat objection had not already been
waived, it could easily be remedied at trial with a small amount of testimony and background.
Of course, the Court will not know whether that testimony and background will exist until trial,
which is yet another reason the Motion is premature.
In sum, Saint Alphonsus has made a number of mistakes relative to this Motion. It
waived its objections to all of these documents some time ago and thereby induced Judge
McLaughlin to make evidentiary rulings allowing them into evidence. It then argued stridently
before this Court that Judge McLaughlin's prior evidentiary rulings were, in all but a few
inapposite cases, sacrosanct and should therefore not be disturbed by this Court. Finding that its
own arguments are now working against it, Saint Alphonsus has now changed its tune, but
nonetheless submits a Motion which is premature and legally unsupportable. The Motion must
be denied.

5

Motion, p. 5.
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DATED this 28th day of July 2011.
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v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile
Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Exclude
the Expert Testimony of Thomas R. McCarthy, Ph.D.
INTRODUCTION
In a report dated June 15, 2011, Saint Alphonsus disclosed a new expert, an economist
named Thomas R. McCarthy, Ph.D. (Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMotion to Exclude the
Expert Testimony ofThomas R. McCarthy, Ph.D ("Affidavit of Counsel"),~ 3, Ex. A, Expert
Report of Thomas R. McCarthy, Ph.D (hereinafter "Report").) McCarthy's opinions are beyond
the limited issues on remand upon which this Court has indicated it will allow expert testimony.
In addition, much of the proposed testimony invades the province of the jury by weighing and
applying the evidence to reach conclusions on the ultimate issue of causation. Furthermore,
McCarthy is not qualified to render some of his opinions, and most of his opinions are not
supported by any scientific or technical methodology. For these reasons, the Court should strike
Sections IV(A), IV(B), V and the related portions of Sections II, III, and VI 1 from McCarthy's
expert report, and McCarthy should be prohibited from testifying about those issues at trial.

Section II is a Summary of Opinions; Section III is a description ofthe damages
advanced by MRIA's experts; Section VI is the Appendix.
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ARGUMENT
A.

Saint Alphonsus's Expert Opines Beyond the Limited Issues for Which Saint
Alphonsus was Permitted to Retain a New Expert
Saint Alphonsus approached the Court late last year and asked that discovery be reopened

and that it be permitted to secure a new expert. (Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery
Regarding Damages and Set Discovery Schedule, filed Dec. 23, 2010). In response, the Court
held that:
discovery will be opened for the limited purpose of determining what damages
would have been given different beginning and end dates for the lost profit
calculations. Furthermore, St. Alphonsus will be allowed to bring in a new expert
for the trial on remand with the caveat that should it use a completely new theory
of damages, MRIA may use St. Alphonsus's previous expert's testimony to cross
examine its new expert.
(Order Reopening Discovery and Setting Schedule, filed Feb. 15, 2011, p. 4.) The Court later
clarified that:
We had a lengthy discussion about the issue of whether or not damages
discovery should be reopened. Any my initial feeling on that was I can
understand the argument that that issue shouldn't be reopened either because have
you already done discovery on damages; however, the Supreme Court decision
changes the context of the damages. And so I said given that, the parties have a
right to go back to their experts and they have the right to provide this new
information provided by the Supreme Court decision. They have a right to revise
what they have to say with regard to damages ... But I'm not going to open it up
beyond that.
(Affidavit of Counsel,~ 5, Ex. C, Tr. Hearing June 22,2011, p. 23 1. 9- 24.)
The Court held that the parties could retain new experts and expert testimony on the issue
of damages. Despite the fact that McCarthy purports to be a damages expert, in fact, by in large,
McCarthy is not advanced as an expert on damages, but an expert on causation. (See Affidavit
of Counsel,~ 4, Ex. B, McCarthy Depo. ("McCarthy Depo") p. 112:19 -110:15; 115:15-
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116:1 0). As McCarthy himself admits, once of the chief purposes of his report is to use
causation to reduce the damages figures ofMRIA's experts. (McCarthy Depo. p. 115:2-6; see,

also, p. 53:20-54:1.) ("As you know from my report . . . There's nothing in the record that
suggests that's the causation mechanism. Worse than that, there's nothing in there that says
whatever loss in value or loss in scans that MRIA suffered can be tracked to simply IMI's
activities or Saint Alphonsus activity")). He admits that his damage analysis inquires primarily
about the "fact of damages," which he himself identifies as causation. (McCarthy Depo. p.
198:9-18.) In Sections IV(A), IV(B), V, and the related portions of Sections II, III and

ve ofhis

expert report, McCarthy's expert testimony does not address damages, but is strictly concerned
with causation. McCarthy opines that even if Saint Alphonsus committed the bad acts, those bad
acts did not cause damage to MRIA, (Report ,-r,-r10 (first two and last two bullet points), 13, 2023; 80-83; Exhibits 5-8, ); that the opening of IMI facilities did not cause MRIA to lose scans,
(Report ,-r,-r 14, 15, 16, 24-28; 54-57, Exhibit 11-13; 23-26A); that the IMI facilities would have
existed regardless of the bad acts committed by Saint Alphonsus (Report ,-r,-r 17, 29-34; 58-61;
70-71; 74-79; Exhibit 14-15); that GSR/IMI would never have partnered with MRIA (Report ,-r
35-38; 72-74); and that ifGSR/IMI would have partnered with MRIA, MRIA would have
received less than half of the benefit (Report ,-r,-r 39-40). As this is not damages testimony, which
is the only subject on which the Court permitted Saint Alphonsus to obtain a new expert,
McCarthy should be prohibited from testifying at trial.

B.

McCarthy's Testimony is Inadmissible

2

Sections I is a preliminary background statement that does not encompass substantive
opinion testimony. In Sections IV(C) and IV(D) and the portions of Section VI related thereto
(Exhibits 16-17, 20, 22), McCarthy criticizes the calculation done by MRIA's experts, Bruce
Budge and Charles Wilhoite, in their expert reports. This is damages testimony.
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In order for expert opinion testimony to be admissible, the party offering the evidence
must show that the expert is a qualified expert in the field, the evidence will be of assistance to
the trier of fact, experts in the particular field would reasonably rely upon the same type of facts
relied upon by the expert in forming his opinion, and the probative value of the opinion
testimony is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho
42, 47, 844 P.2d 24, 29 (Ct. App. 1992); I.R.E. 702, 703, and 403. Sections IV(A), IV(B), V,
and the related portions of Sections II, III, and VI of McCarthy's proffered expert testimony does
not meet these standards of admissibility. 3

1.

McCarthy's Causation Opinions Invade the Province of the Jury

Much of McCarthy's opinion is an attack on causation. McCarthy first opines that Saint
Alphonsus' s wrongful conduct cannot have caused the damages from lost scans as alleged by
MRIA. (Report ,-r,-r10 (first two and last two bullet points), 13, 16, 20). He presents as reasons for
this conclusion that doctors would have referred patients to other competitors anyway, (Report ,-r
21, 80-83; Exhibit 6); that they would refer patients to facilities closer to home, (Report ,-r 22;
Exhibit 7); that they routinely refer their patients to various facilities, (Report ,-r 23, Exhibit 5;
Exhibit 8); that opening IMI did not cause any loss in scans, (Report ,-r,-r24-28, 54-57; Exhibit 1213, Exhibit 23-26A); and that the IMI facilities would have existed regardless of Saint
Alphonsus's bad acts (Report ,-r,-r14, 15, 14, 29-34; 58-61,75-76, 78-79; Exhibit 9, Exhibit 14-15.)

3

MRIA's quarrel is primarily with Sections IV(A), IV(B), V and the related portions of
Section II, III, and VI of McCarthy's report. Sections I is a preliminary background statement
that does no encompass substantive opinion testimony. In Sections IV(C) and IV(D),
McCarthy's criticisms are primarily about certain other discrete factors related to the calculation
done by MRIA's experts, Bruce Budge and Charles Wilhoite. While MRIA believes these
criticisms are not well founded, these are matters that will be addressed in rebuttal reports. Other
than two paragraphs (,-r,-r47 and 53), Sections IV(C) and IV(D) do not appear to suffer from the
same deficiencies that make Sections IV(A), IV(B) and V inadmissible as expert testimony.
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McCarthy also opines that these there is no causal link between Saint Alphonsus's behavior and
the usurpation ofMRIA's opportunity to partner with GSRIIMI because such a partnership never
could have happened or that MRIA's share in it would have been small. (Report ~~35-40, 74, 77.)
McCarthy's opinions regarding causation are not admissible because it is an attempt to present as
"expert" testimony conclusions that the average juror would be qualified to draw from the facts
utilizing the juror's common sense and normal experience.
The admissibility of expert testimony on the subject of causation is question for the trial
court to decide. Earl v. Cryovac, A Div. ofWR. Grace Co., 115 Idaho 1087, 1090, 72 P.2d 725,
728 (Ct. App. 1989). Under Idaho Rule ofEvidence 702, the threshold question for the
admission of expert testimony is if it will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue." I.R.E. 702; Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 647, 39 P.3d 577,
587 (2001). The function of the expert is to provide testimony on subjects that are beyond the
common sense, experience and education of the average juror. Rockefeller, 136 Idaho at 647, 39
P.3d at 587. An expert is not permitted to testify about a legal standard. Kuhn v. Coldwell
Banker Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240,245 P.3d 992, 1005 (2010). Nor is an expert allowed to

weigh evidence, which is in essence evaluating the circumstances and rendering the same
conclusion which the jury is asked to render by its verdict. Fowler v. Kootenai County, 128
Idaho 740, 746,918 P.2d 1185, 1191 (1996). As a court has noted in interpreting a similar
federal rule, "testimony which articulates and applies the relevant law ... circumvents the jury's
decision-making function by telling it how to decide the case." Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805,
808 (1Oth Cir.l988).
As this principle has been articulated by Idaho courts, an expert's opinion is inadmissible
"if it concerns conclusions or opinions that the average juror would be qualified to draw from the
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facts utilizing the juror's common sense and normal experience." Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho
360, 367, 128 P .3d 897, 904 (2005). If a jury can readily apply the facts to the appropriate legal
standard without the assistance of expert testimony, then expert testimony on the subject does
not assist the trier of fact and should be disallowed. Rockefeller, 136 Idaho at 647, 39 P.3d at
587. In fact, such testimony invades the province of the jury. !d. 4
Rockefeller is illustrative of this principle. In that case, a party proffered an expert to

testify regarding the fiduciary duties owed by a realtor. The court held that such expert
testimony was not needed because, once instructed on the legal standard of care (which was
already well established), the jury could readily apply the facts to this legal standard without the
assistance of expert testimony. Rockefeller, 136 Idaho at 647, 39 P.3d at 587. See State v.
Ellington,--- Idaho---, 253 P.3d 727 (2011) (whether party acted intentionally was an inference

that could be drawn by jurors, and thus expert testimony was inappropriate); Chapman v.
Chapman, 147 Idaho 756, 760, 215 P.3d 476, 480 (2009) (whether design of bathroom presented

a hazard was within the competence of the average juror and therefore expert opinion would not
assist the trier of fact); Warren v. Sharp 139 Idaho 599, 606, 83 P.3d 773, 780 (2003) Gurors do
not need an expert to determine whether party could have avoided accident); Sheridan v. St.
Luke's Regional Medical Center, 135 Idaho 775, 786, 25 P.3d 88, 99 (2001) (expert testimony

on causation unnecessary when jury "could reasonably and naturally infer from the chain of

4

While Rule 704 provides that "[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact," Rule 704 must be read in the light of Rule 702, in that expert testimony is only
admissible when the expert's specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence and determine a fact in issue. Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 314, 17 P.3d 247, 258
(2000).
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circumstances that a breach ofthe standard of care ... proximately caused [the] injuries."). 5
Such is the case here.
The issue of causation is a question of fact for the jury. Walker v. American Cyanamid
Co., 130 Idaho 824, 948 P.2d 1123 (1997). The legal standard for causation is so well
established that it is contained in the Idaho Pattern Civil Jury Instructions. Proximate cause is
cause which, in natural or probable sequence, produced the complained injury,
loss or damage, and but for that cause the damage would not have occurred. It
need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing
about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or
damage likely would have occurred anyway.
IDJI 2.20.2. With the exception of McCarthy's "regression analysis," which is inadmissible for
other reasons discussed below, all McCarthy has done is apply the legal standard of proximate
cause to the facts to reach a conclusion that MRIA's injuries were not caused by Saint
Alphonsus's actions. In fact, as discussed in more detail below, most of McCarthy's conclusions
do not involve any technical or scientific analysis, but simply interpret the facts. The jury can
readily apply the facts to the legal standard without the assistance of expert testimony. This
testimony is inadmissible because it crosses the line into "weigh[ing] the evidence, in essence
evaluating the circumstances and rendering the same conclusion which the jury is asked to render
by its verdict." Fowler, 128 Idaho at 746,918 P.2d at 1191. In so doing, McCarthy has usurped
the jury's function. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 696, 760 P.2d 27, 35 (1988).

2.

McCarthy is not Qualified to Opine about Causation

5

This can be contrasted to cases where the question of causation is outside the experience
of a lay jury, such as whether a certain drug caused a heart attack. Swallow v. Emergency
Medicine of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 598, 67 P.3d 68, 77 (2003). See Flowerdew v. Warner,
90 Idaho 164, 170, 409 P.2d 110, 114 (1965) (expert testimony on causation appropriate in
medical malpractice because such causative factors are not ordinarily within the knowledge or
experience of laymen composing the jury).
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Even if the Court is inclined to find that the causation opinion offered by McCarthy does
not invade the province of the jury, McCarthy is not qualified to opine on many of the issues he
advances. A qualified expert is one who possesses "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education" on the subject upon which he offers opinions. I.R.E. 702. Formal training is not
necessary, but practical experience or special knowledge must be shown to bring a witness
within the category of an expert. Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 837,
153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007). The proponent of the testimony must lay foundational evidence
showing that the individual is qualified as an expert on the topic of his or her testimony. State v.
Burrow, 142 Idaho 328, 330, 127 P.3d 231, 233 (Ct.App.2005) (citing State v. Winn, 121 Idaho

850, 855, 828 P.2d 879, 884 (1992)).
McCarthy is an economist whose expertise is in "antitrust, intellectual property, and
commercial damages matters in the health care marketplace." (Report p. 1.) Yet in his report, he
testifies about causation, the manner in which doctors refer their patients to imaging facilities,
the factors which inform such medical referrals, factors which inform the construction of medical
imaging facilities, and the form that partnership agreement take between partners of medical
imaging facilities. (Sections IV(A) and IV(B).) Saint Alphonsus has not demonstrated how
McCarthy, an economist, is qualified to testify about these matters. As he is not qualified to
opine on these topics, he cannot offer expert testimony regarding them.

3.

There is No Scientific or Technical Basis For McCarthy's Speculative and
Conclusory Opinions

When an expert's opinion is based upon scientific knowledge, there must be a scientific
basis for that opinion, because if the reasoning or methodology underlying the opinion is not
scientifically sound, then the opinions would not assist a trier of fact. Weeks, 143 Idaho at 838,
153 P.3d at 1184; Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d 68
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(2003). Idaho has not adopted the standards of admissibility of an expert's testimony contained
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993), but has
used some of Daubert's standards, including whether a theory can be tested and whether it has
been subjected to peer review and publication, in assessing whether the basis of an expert's
opinion is scientifically valid. Weeks, 143 Idaho at 838, 153 P.3d at 1184. The question is
whether the expert's knowledge will assist the trier of fact, with the focus of the court's inquiry
upon the principles and methodology employed by the expert. !d. This entails a preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 81 P.3d 1230 (2003).
Importantly, "expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts
in the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible."
Ryan, 123 Idaho at 46, 844 P.2d at 28. Expert opinion that merely suggests possibilities would
only invite conjecture and may be properly excluded. Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 97 P.3d
428 (2004). Speculative or conclusory testimony also has little or no probative value, and
therefore may be excluded because its probative value is "substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury," I.R.E. 403. Ryan, 123 Idaho
at 46-47, 844 P.2d at 28-29.

a.

Most of McCarthy's Testimony is Conclusory and Not Based on Any
Methodology Whatsoever
i.

McCarthy's Attacks on the "Lost Scans" Measure of Damages

As noted above, McCarthy challenges MRIA's "lost scans" damages calculation by
contending that Saint Alphonsus's bad acts did not cause this migration of scans. (See Report
~~10

(first two and last two bullet points), 13, 16, 20). He first contends that it is "highly likely"
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that, even if IMI did not exist and Saint Alphonsus had committed no wrongful acts, MRIA
would have lost its scans to other competing imagining facilities, such as St. Luke's or other
competitors who opened in the area between 1999-2011.

(Report~

21, 80-83; Exhibit 6). This

is entirely speculative and conclusory. He admits that he does not know the details of the MRI
services or equipment of these competitors. (McCarthy Depo. p. 96:20-98:21.) He admits that
he has not investigated any of the factors which might impact the migration of scans (McCarthy
Depo. p. 133:4-8.) He has done no study that traces scans from doctors who had historically
referred to MRIA to any of the other competitors he has identified, much less conducted a study
to determine whether these competitors could have enticed away MRIA's business in a world
where IMI did not exist and Saint Alphonsus had committed no bad acts. He admits that IMI's
financial condition is very healthy, despite the fact that the same competitors exist. (McCarthy
Depo. p. 99:5-9.) He has merely opined, without any basis in fact, that since competitors exist,
the same scans that MRIA lost to IMI would have been lost to these other imaging facilities.
This opinion is not based on any facts or methodology; it simply invites conjecture.
He next examines the zip codes of patients that MRI Center served and the zip codes of
patients served by IMI, and finds that the service area for the IMI facilities covers different
geographical areas than the service area for IMI Center.

(Report~

22; Exhibit 7). From this, he

extrapolates that even in a world where IMI did not exist, MRI Center would have lost scans
because referring physicians would have sent their patients to other competing facilities closer to
home. (Id) Again, this is entirely speculative. First, he has not included any data point about
MRI Mobile, which serves a broad geographical area. In addition, he does not bother to explain
how he arrived at his underlying premise - that IMI and MRI Center do not share the same
geographical area. He simply presents the data and declares it so. He admits that he has not
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even spoken with IMI about how it determines which is its facility patients will be seen at.
(McCarthy Depo. p. 141 :20-143:2.) Even accepting the underlying premise, he does not explain
his leap from that premise to his opinion that affiliated physicians "almost certainly" would have
started to refer their patients to other competitors. He has done no analysis about the zip code
service areas of these other competing facilities. He has not engaged in any study about the
geographical referral patterns of area physicians and their patients, much less conducted a study
to determine whether the geographical location of these competitors would have siphoned
business away from MRIA's facilities in a world where IMI did not exist and Saint Alphonsus
had committed no bad acts. He has not interviewed any physicians in the market relative to
referral patterns. (McCarthy Depo., p. 51 :9-12.) In short, McCarthy's assertion about where
doctors would have "almost certainly" started to refer their patients away from MRI Center is not
based on any methodology or fact.
He next notes that 35% of physicians who referred scans to MRIA split their referrals
between IMI and MRI Center.

(Report~

23, Exhibit 5; Exhibit 8.) From this, he extrapolates

that it is likely that physicians who referred scans to MRIA would have split their referrals
between MRIA and other competitors, even if IMI did not exist and Saint Alphonsus had
committed no bad acts. He admits that he has no data to support this position (Report~ 23), and
indeed he does not. He has not presented data that any physicians split their referrals between
MRIA and other competitors, much less quantified the rate at which this occurs. He has not
interviewed any physicians in the market relative to referral patterns. (McCarthy Depo., p. 18:912.) He simply asks the jury to follow him in an unsubstantiated leap that physicians would split
their referrals between MRIA and other competitors, and that this splitting of referrals would
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cause MRIA losses equivalent to that which MRIA loses to IMI. This testimony is not based on
any fact, much less methodology or analysis.
Finally, he argues that the IMI facilities would have existed, and thus would have
siphoned away MRIA's scans, regardless of Saint Alphonsus's bad acts. (Report ~~14, 15, 14,
29-34; 58-61,75-76, 78-79; Exhibit 9, Exhibit 14-15). In particular, he notes that the IMI Saint
Alphonsus facility and the IMI Eagle facility opened after the period of Saint Alphonsus's
noncompete ended,

(Report~

30); that GSR/IMI was moving forward in its plans to build the

IMI Downtown and Meridian facilities even before Saint Alphonsus became involved in the
project (Report~ 33, 59); and that GSR would have been capable of building the Downtown and
Meridian facilities without Saint Alphonsus's help,

(Report~

33, 59, 65-78). He therefore

argues that it is "implausible" to believe that these facilities would not have been built. (Report ~
30.) In essence, he asserts the construction of the various IMI facilities would have proceeded in
exactly the same fashion even if Saint Alphonsus had done nothing at all with respect to IMI
before the end of its noncompete. However, he conducted no analysis or study to "back out" the
investments and support of Saint Alphonsus in these facilities or otherwise determine how these
facilities would have been constructed and operated without Saint Alphonsus. Instead, his
testimony appears to be a repackaging of fact testimony (i.e., assertions that IMI would have
moved forward regardless of Saint Alphonsus's participation.) This is not expert testimony, but
is instead an attempt to vouch for the credibility of fact testimony, which is not permitted. State
v. Norton, 254 P.3d 77 (Ct. App.2011).
ii.

McCarthy's Attacks on the "Usurpation" Measure of Damages

McCarthy also attempts to challenge MRIA's damage theory which is based on the
premise that Saint Alphonsus usurped MRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR/IMI. He opines
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that there was no lost opportunity because a partnership between GSR/IMI and MRIA could
never have happened, or would never have happened in the form that MRIA envisioned. (Report
~~35-40,

74, 77.) He contends that MRIA's proposals to GSR were "consistently inadequate"

and "never addressed" issues that were key to GSR. (Report ~ 36).

He also speculates that

MRIA's damage analysis fails to take into account how any agreement with GSR would "likely"
have been structured had an agreement been reached (Report~ 37-40). This is another attempt to
cast fact testimony as expert testimony. McCarthy has no basis at all for an expert opinion about
what GSR would or would not have accepted, much less the form of the agreement that may
have been reached among the parties. He simply speculates that MRIA and GSR would not have
reached the agreement and that MRIA therefore had no opportunity to lose.
None of these opinions offered by McCarthy are supported by facts, methodology, or
analysis. The opinions are not even offered as scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge.
Rather, they are speculative and conclusory conjecture unsubstantiated by facts in the record.
Such testimony cannot assist the jury, and in fact will cause unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury. As such, McCarthy must be precluded from testifying as to these
opinions.

b. Regression Analysis
The only point in which McCarthy even attempts to offer scientific, technical, or
specialized knowledge is with respect to his assertion that opening IMI did not cause any lost
scans to MRIA. (Report ~~24-28, 54-57; Exhibit 12-13, Exhibit 23-26A). He calls this a
"regression analysis," which purportedly analyzes whether the opening of the various IMI
facilities impacted MRIA's scans, or whether MRIA's scans were instead impacted by the
"firing" of the GSR radiologists. McCarthy used the annual data in Exhibit 10, which reflects
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MRIA's actual scan volumes between 1985 and 2010. From this, he conducted an analysis to
determine whether various variables - that is, the opening of IMI Downtown, IMI Meridian, and
the firing of the GSR radiologists from reading MRIA scans- "negatively impacted the trend
line." (Report ,-r 25 and Ex. 12.) In his analysis, he determines that the opening of IMI
Downtown had a positive effect, and that MRI Center did not start to lose scans until IMI opened
its Meridian facility. (Report ,-r 26, 56). From this, he concludes that "there is no empirical
support for the assertion that the IMI downtown facility caused MRI Center to lose scans."
(Report ,-r 27, 55, 56). He conducts a similar regression analysis regarding MRIA's "decision" to
fire the GSR radiologists, and opines that that event had a "much greater negative impact on
MRI Center's scan volume than the opening of the IMI Meridian facility." (Report ,-r 28, 56). His
ultimate conclusion is that "there should be no damages associated with the opening ofiMI' s
downtown facility since it did not cause MRI Center to lose scans." (Report ,-r 57.) 6
As McCarthy himself admits, however, a regression analysis is not an appropriate
measure of causation. Of regression analyses, he says "[i]n statistical analysis, regression
analysis, what you show is correlation. You don't really show causation." (McCarthy Depo. p.
113: 16-18.) McCarthy also admits that he is not willing to assign correlation to causation,
(McCarty Depo. 153:15-154:11), despite the fact that that is precisely what he does in his report.
He also admits that his regression analysis does not even attempt to measure other bad acts of
Saint Alphonsus that might have affected scans (McCarthy Depo p. 163:25-166:12.) As he

6

As a part of his analysis, he also opines that "To the extent that the IMI facilities that were opened after
Saint Alphonsus's legal dissociation cannot be counted as causes of damages, their possible effect on MRI Center
scans cannot be called lost sales that caused damages. Like losses to the St. Luke's and other rivals, scans done by
these IMI imaging facilities are merely competitive losses that the MRI Center suffered when a new, legitimate
entrant came into the market" (Report 't[ 55.) This is a legal conclusion, not an expert opinion, and thus cannot be
allowed.
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admits that his analysis cannot help the jury decide the issue of causation, it is of no assistance
and should not be permitted.

4.

Offset for Saint Alphonsus's Interest in MRI Associates, LLP

At several places in McCarthy's report, he contends that damages must be reduced by the
proportion of Saint Alphonsus's partnership ownership in MRI Associates, LLP. (Report ,-r,-r 47,
53, Exhibits 18-18D, 19-19A.) MRI Associates, LLP, receives 7.5 percent ofthe revenues
generated by MRI Center and MRI Mobile as an administrative fee for managing those entities.
When MRI Center and MRI Mobile lost scans, they lost revenues and the management fee was
obviously impacted. In paragraphs 47 and 53 of his Report, McCarthy asserts because Saint
Alphonsus owned a 24.75 percent share ofMRIA from September 1999 through March 2004,
any damages to MRI Associates, LLP, must be offset to reflect Saint Alphonsus's share in those
management fees. (See McCarthy Depo. p. 40:4-22.)
First, this attempt to offset the damages award in this fashion was not pleaded in Saint
Alphonsus's Answer, and thus cannot be allowed. (See Answer to Third Amended Counterclaim
filed April16, 2010.) Furthermore, it is an attempt to receive more money for the buyout of its
partnership share, I.C. § 53-3-701, which amount has already been determined. (Consolidated
Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May 18,2011, filed June 17,2011, p. 3-4.) In
addition, If this testimony is allowed, it runs a significant risk of resulting in a double reduction.
The jury is being asked to reduce the 7.5 percent management fee of MRI Associates, LLP,
between September 1999 through March 2004, to reflect Saint Alphonsus's 24.75 percent share
in those revenues. It may be difficult to tell whether the jury engaged in this complicated math.
Assuming that MRI Associates, LLP, is awarded damages, as a former partner Saint Alphonsus
will presumably make a demand upon MRI Associates, LLP for its share of the damages award.
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If this is permitted (notwithstanding that the buyout share has already been determined,) this
would result in a double recovery.
CONCLUSION

The portions of McCarthy's testimony and report identified above that are beyond the
limited issues on remand, invade the province of the jury, outside his qualifications, and not
supported by facts or methodology must be disallowed.
DATED this 29th day of July, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

12-

tP--~

Dara L. Parker
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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I.

Introduction
A. Qualifications
I.

I am an economist and senior vice president employed by NERA Economic

Consulting (NERA), an international economic consulting firm with 24 offices around the wol'ld.
I am the head ofNERA's health care practice. I hold a B.A. degree in economics fi·om
Assumption College in Worcester, Massachusetts, and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in economics
fi·om the University ofMat·yland. For more than twenty"five years, I have specialized in the
study of industrial organization and health economics, focusing principally on antitrust,
intellectual property, and commercial damage matters in the health care marketplace. I have
testified in a variety of state and federal cases relating to liability and damage issues associated
with physicians, hospitals, health insurers, fi·eestanding outpatient centers, and medical
device/equipment manufacturers. I have also made presentations to state and federal antitrust
agencies on the likely competitive effects of a wide range ofhealth plan, hospital, and other
mergers in the health care industry (including the merger of companies that manufacture MRI
scanners). During 2003, I was invited by the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S.
Department of Justice to testify at three sessions of their joint hearings on Health Care and
Competition Law and Policy. Prior to joining NERA, I worked as a Staff Economist for the
Federal Trade Commission in Washington, D.C., and as an Assistant Professor of Economics at
the School ofEconomics and Management of Oakland University in Michigan, where 1 taught,
among other courses, health economics. A more complete listing of my qualifications,
publications, and prior testimony is provided in my cul'l'iculum vitae found in Exhibit 1.
B. Understanding of Case
2.

Plaintiff and counter"defendant is Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.

(hereafter "Saint Alphonsus"), which was a general partner in MRI Associates and is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. 1 Defendant and counter"
claimant MRl Associates (hereafter "MRIA") is a general partnership that formed in 1985 to
provide MRI imaging services in the Boise, Idaho area? The original partners in MRIA
1

Third Amended Counterclaim,~~ 1-2.

2

Third Amended Counterclaim, ~1!5 and 8.
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consisted ofDoctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc., Saint Alphonsus, Mednow, Inc., and HCA of
Idaho, Inc. 3 Finally, counter"claimants MRI Limited Pattnership and MRI Mobile Limited are
the operational entities ofMRIA that provide the MRI services.4 MRI Limited Partnership
(hereafter uMRI Limited") operates a fixed MRI imaging facility on the Saint Alphonsus campus
(hereafter "MRI Center"), while MRI Mobile Limited (hereafter "MRI Mobile") operates MRI
mobile units that have provided set·vices to Mercy Hospital in Nampa, Idaho, and Holy Rosary
Hospital in Ontario, Oregon.5 Prior to early 2005, Gem State Radiology (hereafter "GSR")
provided the radiologists who read the scans fot· MRI Limited.6 The GSR radiologists also have
had for several decades the exclusive contract for reading scans fot· Saint Alphonsus hospital
patients. 7
3.

Saint Alphonsus dissociated from the MRIA partnership on April I, 2004. 8 It

filed the original complaint to be compensated for its share ofthe MRIA partnership. MRIA
counter-sued claiming, in part, that Saint Alphonsus had conspired with GSR to harm MRIA by
helping GSR statt a competing MRI imaging facility (Intermountain Medical Imaging) and that
Saint Alphonsus had wt·ongfully dissociated fi·om the MRIA partnership, which led to Saint
Alphonsus entering into a partnership with Tntet·mountain Medical Imaging (hereafter "IMI'') for
its MRI business. 9
4.

I am advised that on the basis of various prior court rulings (1) the counter-

claimants' damages should not extend beyond 20 15-when the pattnet·ship agreement was
scheduled to expire; and (2) Saint Alphonsus legally withdrew from MRIA on April 1, 2004 and
could start to compete in the MRI business in the Boise area beginning April I, 2005-the one
year period specified in the non"compete clause in the MRIA partnership agreement.

3

Third Amended Counterclaim,~ 8.

4

Third Amended Counterclaim, rt~ 3-4.

s Third Amended Counterclaim,~~ 3-4.
6

Third Amended Counterclaim,~~ 14-15.

7

Third Amended Counterclaim, ~ 14.

8

Prior court opinion, p. 9. Although Saint Alphonsus dissociated from MRIA, it is my understanding that Saint
Alphonsus is still a limited partner in both MRI Limited and MRI Mobile.

9

Prior court opinion, p. 9. GSR was previously called Saint Alphonsus Radiology Group. [Third Amended
Counterclaim, fl~ 14.]
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5.

The Third Amended Counterclaim contains eight claims for relief. 10 The fit·st and

second claims are for breach of contract and wrongful dissociation; the third and fourth claims
are for breach of fiduciary duties; the fifth claim is for breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; the sixth and seventh claims are for interference with prospective contractual relations;
and the eighth claim is for civil conspiracy.

C. Assignment
6.

I have been asked by counsel for Saint Alphonsus to review and comment on the

damage estimates in the repmts of the countet·-claimants' damage expet·ts, Mr. Budge and Mr.
Wilhoite. Mr. Budge has estimated the counter-claimants' past alleged lost profits, while Mr.
Wilhoite has estimated theh· future alleged damages. For purposes ofthis report, I assume that
Saint Alphonsus is found liable of violating one ofthe claims in the Third Amended
Counterclaim, other than the wrongful dissociation claims. Of course, if Saint Alphonsus is not
found liable of violating any ofthe claims, then the alleged damages to the countet·-claimants
would equal zet·o.

D. Materials Reviewed
7.

In performing my work for this repot1, I have reviewed a variety of materials.

These include the Thil'd Amended Counterclaim, various prior court decisions, the supplemental
and initial expert reports of Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite (including back-up materials), and
various fact witness and expert testimony. The materials also include a number of documents
produced by the various parties and information obtained from third parties, including the MRl
scan data compiled by Practice Management, Inc (hereafter "PMI"). Finally, the materials
include infot·mation obtained fi·om publicly available sources, such as medical stafft·osters for
Boise area hospitals. In addition, my staff and I conducted several interviews with Mr.

JeffClif~

who is the Executive Director oflMI. A complete list of the information sources that I have
considered in reaching my opinions in this repmt is found in Exhibit 2.
8.

NERA's compensation for my time is $675 pet· hour, which is the standard hourly

rate that NERA charges for my time. Similal'ly, NERA's compensation for my staff's time is at

10

Third Amended Counterclaim,~~ 62-100.
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standard hourly rates. No payments to NERA are contingent upon the outcome of this case or
upon the nature of my opinions.

II.

Summary of Opinions
9.

My opinions in this matter are based on my training and experience as a health

economist and on my review of the available record. The Background Appendix at the end of
this rep01t summarizes my understanding of many ofthe relevant facts in this matter. Since the
counter-claimants' damage experts have not yet been deposed and since they will be given an
opportunity to file rebuttal reports, I reserve the right to supplement my opinions if new relevant
information becomes available. However, based on what I have seen to date, I do not expect my
opinions to change matel'ially.
10.

In the remainder ofthis report, I will explain in detail the basis fot· each ofthe

opinions summarized below:
• The counter-claimants' damage experts fail to address how Saint Alphonsus' alleged
bad acts may have caused the damages asset1ed by counter-claimants. Instead, they
have just assumed the source and, thus, the quantity ofthese damages. Ignol'ing
causation results in their estimates of alleged damages being inaccut·ate and
unreliable.
• The counter-claimants' damage expetts fail to specify what the world would have
looked like "but for" the alleged bad acts of the counter-defendant. As a result, it is
impossible for them to know whether their estimates are reliable and make the
counter-claimants whole.
• The counter-claimants' damage calculations suffer from a number of other problems
that cause these estimates to be overstated. These include a failure to include all
relevant costs in the lost profit calculations; a failure to offset damage estimates to
account fot· Saint Alphonsus' share ofMRIA; and a failure to take pt·actical capacity
constraints into account.
• Mr. Wilhoite's future damage calculations also suffer fi•om a number of
methodological problems that cause these estimates to be overstated. These include:
a double count of lost management fees; the inclusion of damages beyond 2015;
CONFIDENTIAL
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umealistic growth rates; and reliance on Mr. Budge's 2010 lost revenue projections,
which are clearly overstated.
• In contrast, I have examined the available record to determine what would have
happened but-for Saint Alphonsus' alleged bad acts and analyzed the empirical
evidence to determine whethet· there is any evidence to support the asset1ion that
these alleged bad acts caused the MRI Center to Jose scans. I find that there is no
suppot1 for this assertion.
•

Based on my analysis, I find that the counter-claimants' alleged damages should
equal zero. In the altemative, if the finder of fact should determine that the IMI
Meridian center was built earlier than was appropriate to Saint Alphonsus' MRIA
obligations, damages would be $2.1 million at most.

III.

Description of Counter-Claimants' Damage Calculations

A. Past Alleged Damages
11.

Mr. Budge has estimated past alleged lost profits for the counter-claimants

through 2010.

11

In his supplemental report, he presents five alternative damage calculations,

each of which depends upon a slightly different damage scenario. 12 His Calculation Methods# I,
#3 and #5 at·e based on the assumption that the alleged bad acts began in September 1999, with
the stm1-up of IMI. 13 His Calculation Methods #2 and #4 are based on the assumption that the
alleged bad acts did not begin until July 1, 2001, with Saint Alphonsus' investment in the nonMRI portion ofiMI. 14 Damages under Mr. Budge's five alternative damage calculations range
fi·om $29.2 million (Calculation Method #4) to $52.6 million (Calculation Method #5).
12.

15

For Calculation Methods #I through #4, Mr. Budge assumes that either MRI

Mobile or MRI Limited would have opened facilities in Mel'idian and Eagle absent the alleged
11

Supplemental Expert Report of Bruce P. Budge dated May 2, 2011 (hereafter "Budge Supplemental Report").

12

Budge Supplemental Report, p. 6.

13

Budge Supplemental Report, pp. 6-8.

14

Mr. Budge understands "July 1, 2001 to be on or about the date when SARMC made its initial investment in IMI

which, according to MRIA, breached the non-competition clause within the MRIA Partnership Agreement."
[Budge Supplemental Report, pp. 7-8]
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bad acts. 16 He also assumes that any MRI scans lost to IMI's downtown or Saint Alphonsus
campus locations would have been performed at the existing MRI Centet· in the but-for world.
Calculation Method #5 also includes the assumption that counter-claimants would have opened
and operated the IMI downtown facility. 17 {See Exhibit 3, which illustrates how Mr. Budge
expects but-for volumes to be redirected to each of these facilities.]
13.

All ofMr. Budge's damage calculations assume that, at a minimum, the counter-

claimants would have performed all of the MRI scans actually referred to IMI by the "affiliated
referring physicians." 18 Mr. Budge defines "affiliated referring physicians" as (1) all physicians
that referred patients to MRI Center prior to IMI opening its downtown facility in 1999 plus (2)
all new (post-1999) t•efet·ring physicians who have admitting privileges solely with Saint
Alphonsus. 19 Even when Mr. Budge limits his measure of lost scans to all scans associated with
so-called affiliated physicians, these scans account for a large share of the IMI facilities' actual
scan volume and, thus, produce large damage estimates. [See Exhibit 4.]
14.

As I discuss below, Mr. Budge does not clearly define in his damage scenarios

when or whethet· the IMI downtown, Meridian or Eagle facilities would have opened absent the
alleged bad acts. Mr. Budge is explicit only with regard to the IMI facility on the Saint
Alphonsus campus, which he assumes in all his damage calculations would not have opened
absent the alleged bad acts. 20
15.

In addition, Mt·. Budge does not explain why the opening of the JMI downtown

facility caused the counter-claimants to lose scans or how this might have been caused by Saint
Alphonsus' alleged bad acts. He does state that the opening of the IMI Meridian facility caused

15

Budge Supplemental Report, Figures I and 10.

16

Budge Supplemental Report, p. 15 and Figures 3-6, I0.

17

Budge Supplemental Report, Figures 7-9.

18

Budge Supplemental Report, Figure I. In addition, Calculation Methods #1, #2 and #5 assume that counterclaimants would have performed all of the other scans that IMI actually performed at its Meridian and Eagle
facilities. [Budge Supplemental Report, Figures I, 3, a11d 5 and Schedule 12] Calculation Method #5 also
assumes that the counter-claimants would have performed all ofthe other scans that IMl actually performed at its
downtown facility. [Budge Supplemental Report, Figure 9 and Schedule 12]

19

Budge Supplemental Report, p. II and Schedule 18; Budge Dep., 4-4-07, p. 62.

20

Budge Supplemental Report, p. 9; Budge, 8-20-07, pp. 2747-2748.
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them to lose scans because the July 1, 2001 partnership with Saint Alphonsus (1) allowed IMI to
beat them to Meridian and (2) caused historical referral pattems to change. 21
16.

Mr. Budge has made two additions to the scope of his supplemental repott that go

beyond the topics covered in his initial report. First, he has added a new damage calculation
(i.e., Calculation Method #5) based on the assumptions (I) that Saint Alphonsus caused the
counter-claimants to lose a business opportunity to partner with GSR at the time IMI was formed
and (2) that none of the IMI facilities would have existed absent the alleged bad acts.22 Unlike
his other damage calculations, this scenario is explicitly based on the assumption that the IMI
facilities located in downtown Boise, Meridian and Eagle would not have opened absent the
alleged bad acts.
17.

Second, in his supplemental report, Mr. Budge has apportioned his lost profit

estimates among the three counter-claimants (i.e., MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile). Yet
Mr. Budge testified previously that he had seen no evidence of lost income to MRI Mobile.23
Also, in his supplemental repm1, he has been "instructed to assume that all SARMC campus and
Downtown scans would have been perfot·med by MRIC, and that all Meridian and Eagle scans
would have been provided by MRIM. From these scan revenues, MRIA would have received a
7.5% administrative fee. Calculation Methods 3& 4 assume that all scans would have been
performed by MRIC less the MRIA fee." 24 Therefore, Mr. Budge's assumptions about which
facilities would exist in the but-for world were given to him by counsel with no independent
analysis on his part. Further, his apportionment of the lost profits to MRI Mobile is appat·ently
arbitrary.

B. Future Alleged Damages
18.

Mr. Wilhoite has estimated the fllture alleged damages for the counter-claimants

through 2015.25 In his supplementalt-eport, he relies on two alternative methodologies to
calculate the future damage estimates that correspond to each ofMr. Budge's five Calculation
21

Budge, 8-20-07, pp. 2758-2760.

22

Budge Supplemental Report, p. 5.

23

Budge, 8-20-07, p. 2784.

24

Budge Supplemental Report, p. 15.

25

Expert Opinion of Charles A. Wilhoite dated May 2, 2011 (hereafter "Wilhoite Supplemental Report").
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Methods.26 For his Alternative A, Mr. Wilhoite applies a range ofpl'icing multiples (entet·prise
value /revenue) fi·om two publicly-traded companies to Mr. Budge's 2010 aggregated lost
revenue amount. Mr. Wilhoite repm1s the resulting valuation ranges as MRIA's lost business
value. Mr. Wilhoite also capitalizes the MRIA management fee income implied by Mr. Budge's
2010 aggt·egated lost revenue amount to arrive at an additional lost management fee value. 27
Damages under Mr. Wilhoite's Alternative A range :fi·om $13.9 million (Calculations #3 and #4)
to $20.4 million (Calculations #I and #2) to $23.2 million (Calculation #5). 28
19.

For his Alternative B, Mr. Wilhoite estimates MRINs alleged lost future profits

based on a discounted cash flow methodology. To do so, he uses Mr. Budge's 2010 aggregated
lost a·evenues as the starting point to forecast MRIA's revenues through 2015 using a 2 percent
annual growth rate. He applies a 55 percent profit margin for all facilities and then discounts the
resulting cash flow to arrive at the pt·esent value of his forecasted future lost profits. 29 Using
essentially the same methodology, he also forecasts and then discounts to its present value
additional MRIA management fee income implied by Mr. Budge's 2010 aggregated lost revenue
through 2015. 30 Damages under Mr. Wilhoite's Alternative B range fi·om $10.6 million
(Calculation #2) to $15.6 million (Calculation# I) to $17.7 million (Calculation #3).31

IV.

Problems with Counter-Claimants' Damage Calculations

A. Damage Calculations Have Not Examined Causation
20.

Both Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite have acknowledged that they did not examine

whether the alleged bad acts caused the countet·-claimants to lose any scans. 32 Instead, they just
assumed that they did. Of course, by not having examined causation, there is no basis for
knowing what kind of damages might have occul'red, when they may have statted and stopped,
26

For Mr. Wilhoite's DCF Method, see his schedules 1-l through 1~7. For his Capitalization Method, see his
schedules 2 and 3. [Wilhoite Supplemental Report, pp. 8~ 17]

27

Wilhoite Supplemental Report, Exhibits 2 and 3.

28

Wilhoite Supplemental Report, Exhibit l.

29

Wilhoite Supplemental Report, Exhibits 1~1, 1-2 and 1-3.

30

Wilhoite Supplemental Report, Exhibits 1~5, 1~6 and 1~7.

31

Wilhoite Supplemental Report, Exhibit I.

32

Budge, 8~20-07, p. 2786; Wilhoite Dep., 4-2-07, p. 54.
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or whethet· damages occurred at all. Ignoring causation results in damage estimates that are
inaccurate and unreliable.
1. Mr. Budge's Methodology for Determining Lost Scans Is Ad Hoc

21.

As mentioned above, all of Mr. Budge's damage calculations assume that, at a

minimum, the counter-claimants would have pet·formed all of the scans actually refert·ed to IMI
by the "affiliated referring physicians."33 However, there is no basis offered for this J'igid and
simplistic assumption and no causal link established that these physicians would be the source of
the scans and the volume of scans that likely would have been referred to MRIA in the but-for
world. At best, it is a convenient assumption with no basis. In fact, there are several reasons to
think that the assumption is unrealistic and that this but-for referral pattern would not have
happened. First, the so-called affiliated referring physicians are not affiliated with MRIA. Many
were included on this list simply because they referred some MRI scans to the MRI Center prior
to September 1999. This does not mean there would be an ongoing or consistent referral
relationship, especially once other imaging locations opened, many with a broader range of
services and greater convenience to the referring physicians' patients.34 An examination ofthese
"affiliated referring physicians" shows that many of them have privileges at other hospitals (such
as St. Luke's). [See Exhibit 5.] Given that the MRI scanning capacity has increased at many of
these other facilities, it is highly likely that these physicians might have referred some oftheir
33

Budge Supplemental Report, Figure I. Note that the different Calculation Methods also include some scans
performed by non-affiliated referring physicians. [See Exhibit 4.]
Mr. Budge testified in deposition on this point:
Q.
A.

34

"A couple of times you've used the term ... 'reasonably referred' or something. How are you using

reasonable in there?"
"Obviously no one can do the calculation with total precision. It needs to be done with reasonable
certainty, is what my thinking is.
The best calculation that can be done, I think, is based on these referral patterns, For example, there's a
whole category ofiMI scans which, if we go back and none of these allegations actually occurred and step
in the looking glass, you're going to see how the world unfolded, which might have gone to MRIA but
never did. I can't measure them. I don't know in terms of this other group of physicians that had
previously referred to MRTA, which of those, in fact, might have been their business. So they're out of my
damage calculation.
In that sense it's not precise, but I think it's reasonable. It could be that there might be a few physicians
that would use IMT and MRI Associates. There's no way for me to separate those, so I have included all of
those as being lost scans. But then there's a big group of them which I also know that I'm omitting."
[Budge Dep., 4-4-07, pp. 85-86.]

Mr. Budge refers to a "family of referring physicians affiliated with Saint Al's" ove1· which MRIA "had a
monopoly. And when 1M I came in, all of the sudden that referral base was diverted." [Budge, 8-20-07, p. 2790.]
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MRI patients to these other MRI facilities, even if the IMI facilities had not existed in the

but~for

wol'id. Fot· instance, St. Luke's also opened MRI facilities in Meridian, downtown Boise, and
Eagle between September 1999 and June 20 II. [See Exhibit 6, which shows the number of MRI
competitors in the Boise area over time.] Dt·. Curran acknowledged in June of2000 (in his final
repott as CEO to MRI Center and MRT Mobile board members) that new competition fi·om
several som·ces in the local area had had a negative impact on their operations.35
22.

Second, and closely related to the previous point, an examination of the PMI scan

data shows that the service at·eas for the IMI facilities cover different geographic at·eas than the
service area for MRI Center.36 For example, a comparison ofthe service areas based on the rank
of the zip codes for each service area shows that the IMI facilities generally draw patients from a
different set ofzip codes than MRI Center. [See Exhibit 7.] 37 This is especially true for IMI's
Meridian and Eagle facilities. Given that these imaging facilities are drawing their MRI patients
fi·om different areas and given that MRI scanning capacity has increased in many of these other
areas, then the "affiliated physicians" would almost certainly have referred some or many or all
of their patients needing an MRI scan to imaging facilities closer to them in these other areas,
even if the IMI facilities had not existed in the but~fut· world.
23.

Third, an examination ofthe PMI scan data shows that the "affiliated physicians"

split the it' referrals between IMI and MRI Center. For example, Exhibit 8 shows that, during the
January 2006 to March 20 II period, 35 percent of the affiliated physicians refet·red at least one
patient to both IMI facilities and MRI Center. 38 These splits occurred even though these
physicians could have referred all theil' MRI scans to the JMI facilities, because IMI's Saint
35

Dr. Curran wrote: "During this period, we survived the negative impact of numerous changes in our local market
including new competition from the St. Alphonsus radiologists as the Intermountain Imaging Center, Nydec as
Open MRI, Healtbsouth and a large physician group as Treasure Valley Hospital, Mid Atlantic MRI Center in
Nampa, and the institution of an MRl Center at Elks Hospital owned and operated by Elks and the Boise
Orthopedic Clinic- formerly one of our best referring groups of physicians." [032615]

36

The analysis focuses on the January 2007 to March 2011 period since this is the only period that we have zip
code information for all of the facilities. Also, I identified the service areas by determining the smallest set of
zip codes from which each MRl facility drew 90 percent of its patients from.
Practice Management, Inc. has provided accounting and billing services to both MRIA and IMI during the period
1990 to the present. [Cliff, 8-8-07, pp. 1436-1440.]

37

The top zip code for the IMI Saint Alphonsus facility represents the P.O. Box for the hospital. This indicates
that the patients associated with this zip code represent inpatients.

38

A total of269 physicians on Mr. Budge's list referred patients to either IMI facilities or MRI Center during this
time period. Of these physicians, 95 referred patients to both IMI facilities and MRI Center.
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Alphonsus campus location was open during this entire period. [See Exhibit 9, which is a
timeline of key events.] I do not have data to determine how often these same physicians already
split their referrals with other imaging facilities, such as St. Luke's, but given that the affiliated
physicians have a history of splitting their referrals, then it is likely that these affiliated
physicians would have also split their refenals with other facilities even ifthe IMT facilities did
not exist in the but-for world. Finally, Mt·. Budge's list of affiliated physicians includes over 50
doctors who have staff privileges at St. Luke's hospitals. [See again Exhibit 5.] Clearly, these
physicians would likely have split their t•efet·rals and theh· time with St. Luke's, if they are not
already doing so. There is no basis for assuming that all scans of the "affiliated referring
physicians" would have gone to a single supplier. This fundamental assumption to Mr. Budge's
calculations is made without any empirical support that it is a reliable measUl'e of lost scans.
2. The Empirical Evidence Indicates that the IMI Downtown Facility Did Not
Cause Counter-Claimants to Lose Scans

24.

Neither Mr. Budge nor Mr. Wilhoite has established that IMI's downtown facility

was the cause of any damages. Even if we assume that Saint Alphonsus was critical to the
opening ofthis facility, it must still be demonstrated that the IMI downtown facility had a
material effect on the number of scans perfot·med at MRI Center. Before assigning damages for
the IMI downtown facility, the counter-claimants' experts should have examined whether there
was any empirical evidence that the opening ofthis facility actually caused the counter-claimants
to lose scans. Instead, such losses are simply assumed to have occurt·ed based on an ad hoc
assumption about the so-called affiliated referring physicians. Exhibit 10 is a copy of Chart 2
from Mr. Budge's supplemental report, which shows the annual actual scans for MRI Center
from 1985 to 2010. As the chart shows, MRI Center generally experienced a steady increase in
the annual number of scans from t 995 through 2002-although there were a few years where the
annual number of scans actually decreased (such as 1989, 1993, and 2000)-and then there was,
generally, a drop-off.
25.

Using the annual data reflected in Exhibit 10, I conducted a regression analysis to

test whether the opening ofthe IMI downtown facility impacted the MRI Center trend line and,
. if so, by how much. In general, regression analysis is a long-established and widely-accepted
statistical technique that allows a researcher to determine the best fit of a regression line through
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the data to better identify the correlation between two variables, often while holding other
possible variables constant in their effect. [See Exhibit 11.] The dependant variable for my
regression analysis was the annual number of scans performed by MRI Center and the
'

explanatory variables consisted of an intercept, a trend line, an IMI downtown facility intemction
term, an IMI Mel'idian facility interaction term, and a GSR interaction term. 39 [See Exhibit 12.]
The purpose ofthis analysis was to determine whether the opening of the IMI downtown facility
negatively impacted the trend line, holding val'ious other factors constant (i.e., the opening of the
IMI Meridian facility and MRIA's decision to fire the GSR radiologists). Ifthe opening ofthe
lMl downtown facility did negatively impact the trend line, this would tend to support the
counter-claimants' assumption that the IMI downtown facility's opening caused them to lose
scans.
26.

Exhibit 13 presents the results ofmy MRI Center regression analysis using annual

data and Newey-West standard errors.40 The results show that the regression explains almost 90
percent of the total variation in the MRI Center annual scans (i.e., the R-squat·e = 0.88). This
indicates that the model fits the data very well. Likewise, the results show that the estimated
coefficient of the trend variable is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This suppotts
the conclusion that the annual scans for MRI Center generally increased during the 1985 to 1998
pel'iod. The results further show that the estimated coefficient for the IMI downtown facility
interaction variable is also positive and significant at about the 1 percent level, not negative as
Mr. Budge assumes. This supports the conclusion that the opening of the IMI downtown facility
did not cause MRI Centet· to lose scans. This finding is consistent with Dr. Giles• asse11ion that

39

Tite interaction terms just represent the trend variable multiplied by dummy variables, where the dummy
variables are indicator variables that signal whether the events have occurred. In the case of the IMl downtown
interaction term, the interaction term would equal 0 for all years prior to 1999 and the value of the trend variable
for all years after 1999. For the year 1999, the interaction term would equal the value of the trend variable
multiplied by 0.25 to reflect that the IMI downtown facility did not open until September 1999. It should be
noted, however, that the results remain the same even ifthe interaction term for 1999 is set to just equal the value
of the trend variable. Also, I have specified the trend variable as a natural logarithm to account for the volume of
scans performed at MRI Center eventually leveling off. Finally, the GSR interaction term controls for the date
when MRIA fired the GSR radiologists, since those physicians likely had an effect on referral patterns.

40

Tite Newey· West standard errors are used to make sure that serial correlation has not biased the t-va lues, which
are used as a measure of the statistical significance of each variable. Serial correlation is a common problem
when analyzing time series data. It means that the disturbance of the current observation is correlated with the
disturbances ofthe past observations. For the t-values to be unbiased, the disturbances are supposed to be
uncorrelated with each other. The Newey-West standard errors correct this problem.
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j

the IMI downtown facility would primarily attl"act patients from St. Luke's. 41 GSR intentionally
located its downtown facility to the east by St. Luke's Regional Medical Center rather than being
closer to the Saint Alphonsus campus. 42 In addition, the results show that the estimated
coefficient for the IMI Meridian facility interaction variable is negative and significant at the 1
percent level. This supports the conclusion that MRI Center did not statt to lose scans until IMI
opened its Meridian facility.
27.

Hence, these regression results demonstrate that there is no empirical support for

the assertion that the IMI downtown facility caused MRI Center to lose scans.43 As such, these
results also illustrate that the methodology that Mr. Budge used to determine lost scans is ad hoc,
based only on an assumption, and leads to a substantial overstatement of the alleged damages.
3. The Empirical Evidence Also Indicates that MRIA's Decision to Fire the GSR
Radiologists Caused the Counter-Claimants to Lose Scans

28.

The regression results in Exhibit 13 also demonstrate that Mr. Budge has failed to

control for other factors that could have caused MRI Center to lose scans besides the alleged bad
acts. In particular, the estimated regression coefficient for the GSR interaction variable is
negative and significant at the I percent level. Its magnitude (i.e., -2066) is more than four times
as large as the magnitude of the IMI Meridian facility interaction (i.e., -504).44 This suggests
that MRIA's decision to fire the GSR radiologists in January of2005 had a much greater
negative impact on MRI Center's scan volume than the opening ofthe IMI Meridian facility.
This finding is consistent with the previous testimony of referring physicians, who said they are
genet·ally loyal to cet1ain •·adiologists and try to refer their patients to the MRI facilities where
those radiologists read scans.45 Of course, the ad hoc methodology that Mr. Budge used to
determine the lost scans cannot control for this factor. In fact, to the extent that some physicians
41

Giles, 8-21-07, pp. 2991, 3024-3025, and 3031.

42

Exh. 0517. GSR/0593-600 at GSR/0594-595. ("The current administrative staff at the hospital is very negative
with regards to expansion and competition. For this reason, [it] was felt that the Center should be located east by
St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, which may be seen as less of a threat to Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center.").

43

As I will discuss below in Section V.A., a regression analysis of the MRI Center monthly scan volumes confirms
these results.

44

4.1 =(-2066/ -504).

45

Anderson, 8-29-07, pp. 3986-87; Gibson, 8-23-07, pp. 3324-25, 3331; Reedy, 8-29-07, p. 4133, 4138; River, 828-07, pp. 3890-91, 3904-06.
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referred to the MRI Center only because theit· prefet·red GSR radiologists practiced there, then
MRIA's fil'ing of these physicians fi:om MRI Center would naturally have led to a changing
referml pattern and lost scans fot· MRIA.

B. But-For World Assumptions Are Vague and Implausible
29.

In general, the goal of a damage expert is to make the plaintiffwhole-that is, to

restore the profits that would have been earned if the alleged bad acts had not occurred. This
requires specifying what the world would have looked like "but for" the alleged bad acts ofthe
defendant. Without properly specifying the but-for world, it is impossible to know whether the
damage estimates are reliable and make the counter-claimants whole.
1. IMI Facilities at the Saint Alphonsus Campus and Eagle Would Have Existed
Anyway in the But-For World

30.

For their first four damage scenarios, the damage experts for the counter-

claimants have assumed that the IMI facility located on the Saint Alphonsus campus would not
have existed in the but-for world. 46 They have also assumed that the IMI facility located at Eagle
Plaza either would not have existed in the but-for world (Budge Calculation Methods #1 and
#2)47 or, if it did exist, would have had only a partial impact on the counter-claimants' scan
volume (Budge Calculation Methods #3 and #4). 48 However, these assumptions make no sense
given that Saint Alphonsus legally withdrew fi:om MRIA as of April I, 2004 and could enter as a
competitor a year later.49 Thus, it is implausible to believe that the IMI Saint Alphonsus facility
(which opened in December 2005) and the JMJ Eagle facility (which opened in November 2007)
would not have existed anyway in the but-for wol'ld since the Saint Alphonsus/IMJ partnership
could legally open them. As such, it is also implausible to believe that these two facilities would
not have had the same impact on the counter-claimants' scan volume in the but-for world that

46

Budge Supplemental Report, p. 9; Budge, 8-20-07, pp. 2747-2748.

47

For these scenarios, Mr. Budge assumes all scans for all referring physicians would be performed by a MRI
Mobile facility in Eagle. [See Exhibit 4.]

48

For these scenarios, Mr. Budge assumes all scans for only the affiliated referring physicians would be performed
by a MRI Limited facility in Eagle. [See Exhibit 4.]

49

Neither Mr. Budge nor Mr. Wilhoite mentions these rulings in their supplemental reports.
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they had in the actual world. This means that there should be no damages associated with the
opening and opet·ation ofthe IMT Saint Alphonsus and Eagle facilities. 5°
31.

Exhibit 14 shows the impact on Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite 1s damage

calculations of assuming that the IMI Saint Alphonsus facility and IMl Eagle facility would have
existed anyway in the but" for world. 51 The only change I show here to their damage calculations
is the elimination of any damages associated with those two facilities. As can be seen, Mr.
Budge's past lost profits should be reduced by between $11.2 million (Calculation Methods #3
and #4) and $15.0 million (Calculation Methods #l and #2). Mr. Wilhoite's future lost profits
should be reduced by between $6.6 million (Alternative B Calculation #2) and $8.8 million
(Alternative B Calculation #1). 52
2. The IMI Facility in Downtown Boise Would Have Existed Anyway in the ButFor World

32.

Mr. Budge has been very vague about what his but-for world would look like for

most of his damage scenarios. In particular, for Calculation Methods #1 through #4, Mr. Budge
has been either unwilling ot· unable to state in any definitive way whether IMI would have
opened its downtown facility absent the alleged bad acts. 53 However, this information is crucial
for assessing whethet· there should be any damages associated with the IMI downtown facility.
If this facility would have existed anyway in the but-for world, then it is unclear how there could
be any damages associated with it. Both Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite seem to believe that the
50

In a separate section below, I discuss the but-for world assumptions underlying Mr. Budge's Calculation Method
#5.

51

This exhibit shows the impact of this change for the first four damage scenarios. I discuss Mr. Budge's
Calculation Method #5 separately below.

52

These reductions do not consider Mr. Wilhoite's estimate of lost management fees, since (as I discuss below) he
has double counted these amounts and they are therefore irrelevant. I also do not specifically address estimates
under his Alternative A methodology here, since these estimates are clearly faulty in that they include damages
beyond 2015.

53

For example,
"Calculation method number one basically kind of derives from what I understand the legal theory to be. That
the defendant's actions, had they not occurred, probably would have caused IMI to either delay or probably not
come in existence at all." [Budge Dep., 4-4-07, pp. 66-67.]
and
Q. "I wanted to make sure that you're not saying in calculation number one that but for the actions of the
counterdefendants, IMI would never have existed. You're not saying that?"
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damages for these calculation methods arise due to a change in referral patterns caused by the
Saint Alphonsus partnership with TMJ. 54 However, that pattnership did not exist when the IMT
downtown facility opened and it opened a few months before discussions between IMI and
MRIA had stopped progressing. Thus, if the IMI downtown facility would have existed anyway
in the but-for world, then whatever change in referral patterns occurred in the actual world would
have also occurred in the but-for world, and no damage award would be justified to make the
counter-claimants whole on this issue.
33.

Based on my review of the record, the IMI downtown facility would have existed

in the but-for world. As noted in my Background Appendix, GSR had acquired the land and the
building for the IMI downtown facility even before notifYing Saint Alphonsus that it planned to
open an imaging facility there. 55 The U.S. Bank officer who made the loans to GSR fol'the
purchase of the equipment and the improvements to the building testified that she approved the
loans based on the collateral ofthe t·adiologists and the favot·able prospects ofthe imaging
facility, as well as the expectation ofiMI receiving a loan from a competing bank. 56 Finally,
even though Dr. Giles sent a lettet·Iisting some "tangible investments" that Saint Alphonsus had
made with respect to the IMI downtown facility, it is my understanding that the chal'acterization
ofthese "tangible assets" as investments in IMI is inaccurate-in fact, IMI paid Saint Alphonsus
for all ofthose alleged "investments."57
34.

Exhibit 15 shows the impact on Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite's damage

calculations of assuming that the IMT downtown facility would have existed anyway in the butfor world. 58 The only changes that I show here to their damage calculations are the elimination
of any damages associated with this facility, as well as those associated with the IMI Saint
Alphonsus and Eagle facilities (as discussed above). As can be seen, Mr. Budge's past lost
profits should be reduced further by between $9.9 million (Calculation Methods #2 and #4) and
A.

"I don't believe that, no. I think actually that may be possible, but r have not assumed that to be a fact."
[Budge Dep., 4-4-07, p. 68.)

54

Budge Supplemental Report, p. 11 and Schedule 18; Budge Dep., 4-4-07, p. 62; and Wilhoite, 8-21-07, p. 2898.

55

Giles, 8-22-07, pp. 3005-3008

56

Denning Dep., 6-29-07, pp. 67-68 and 85-86 and 7-27-07, pp. 183-184 and 189; Cliff, 8-28-07, p. 3999.

57

Cliff, 8-8-07, pp. 1504-1506; interview with Mr. Cliff.

58

This exhibit shows the impact of this change for the first four damage scenarios. I discuss Mr. Budge's
Calculation Method #5 separately below.
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$12.3 million (Calculation Methods# I and #3). M1·. Wilhoite's fhture lost profits should be
reduced further by $1.3 million (Alternative B Calculations # 1 and #2). 59
3. Mr. Budge's Calculation Method #5 Is Based on an Implausible and Unspecified
But~For Partnership with IMI
35.

Mr. Budge's Calculation Method #5 appears to represent damages that resulted

fi•om MRIA's alleged usurped opp01tunity to pattner with GSR radiologists and IMI at the time

°

IMI was fot·med. 6 For this Calculation Method, Mr. Budge was asked to calculate lost profits
on the assumption that all ofiMI's MRI scans were diverted fi·om MRIA, since "MRIA contends
that but for the encouragement, direct suppott and affiliation ofSARMC, IMI would never have
provided MRT services at any of its locations."61
36.

Mr. Budge does not specify the nature ofMRIA's assumed 1999 but~for

pat1nership with GSR and IMI. As I discuss in my Background Appendix, the MRIA
partnership pt·oposals were consistently inadequate to meet the needs of the GSR radiologists and
likely became less relevant as the success of the IMI downtown facility became apparent. One
ofthe pl'imary reasons GSR formed IMI in 1999 was to protect itself from being left without a
facility in the event Saint Alphonsus ever chose to shift its exclusive contract to another
radiology group. Ownership of an independent outpatient imaging facility appears to have been
a key requirement for GSR. 1 am aware of no evidence that MRIA ever addressed this concern.
Moreovet·, there is no evidence that the parties ever reached an agreement in principle, much less
drafted a proposed agreement.
37.

Mr. Budge's damage analysis implies that the MRIA entities would have owned

all oflMI's MRl operations without any initial payment for this ownership interest and without
sharing any of the profits generated by these facilities with GSR ot· IMI.62 This is a highly
implausible but-for scenario, particularly when one considers that MRIA had already offered an
59

These reductions do not consider Mr. Wilhoite's estimate of lost management fees, since (as I discuss below) he
has double counted these amounts and they are therefore irrelevant. I also do not specifically address estimates
under his Alternative A methodology here, since these estimates are clearly faulty in that they include damages
beyond 2015.

60

Budge Supplemental Report, p. 5.

61

Budge Supplemental Report, p. 5.

62

Mr. Budge also does not specify the possibility ofGSR or IMI accepting an ownership share ofMRl Center in
exchange for agreeing to a partnership with MRIA.
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1/11 th share and was apparently willing to go to a 3/11 th share. [See Section D in the Background
Appendix.] Moreover, this is implausible in that it ignores one ofthe radiologists' primary
economic concerns, which was to have control of an independent imaging facility. There is no
evidence that any agreement would have been reached in the but-for world yet, on this basis, Mr.
Budge estimates past damages of over $52 million and Mr. Wilhoite projects futut·e damages of
$23 million.
38.

Mr. Budge offers no basis (other than instruction fi·om counsel) for an MRlA

partnership with GSR in the but-for wol'ld. In his earlier testimony, Mr. Budge said that he had
no opinion and no independent evidence about whether IMI would have opened facilities in
downtown Boise or Meridian absent the alleged bad acts.63 However, now counsel has
instructed Mr. Budge to assume IMI would never have offered MRI services at any of its
facilities. Counsel further instructed Mr. Budge to assume that MRTA and GSR would have
reached an agreement that would have led to all IMI MRI scans being performed by MRlA
entities. Mr. Budge has apparently also taken this instruction to mean that MRTA would also
collect all the profits fi·om these IMI MRI scans. There is no basis or evidence provided in
defense ofthese extreme assumptions.
39.

In addition, the implicit structure ofthe hypothesized MRTA-GSR pattnership in

his damage analysis appears to be entirely speculative. Mr. Budge does not identify the form of
the pattnet·ship, the partnet·s' ownership shat·es, the investments t·equired (e.g., land and building
purchases and othet· initial investments), where the but-for pat1nership would have opened MRl
facilities, whether they would have agreed on these investments, when these facilities would
have opened, and whether such a partnership would have even lasted. For example, MRlA has
been far slower to develop imaging facilities than TMI has. Finally, Mt·. Budge does not consider
Saint Alphonsus' role in such a pattnership and whether it would also have been entitled to a
pottion ofthe profits undet· his damage scenarios (eitherthrough a direct ownership interest in
the but-fot· pattnership ot· through its but-for ownership interests in various MRlA entities). It is
implausible that a but-for MRIA-GSR partnership would have resulted in events and investments
unfolding in just the same way as IMI's business actually developed on its own.
63

Budge Dep., 4-4-07, p. 68; Budge, 8-20-07, p. 2811. Note that a discussion of the IMI Eagle facility did not
come up during his earlier testimony since that facility did not open until later.
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40.

IfGSR would have agreed to partner with MRIA in the but-for world (contrary to

my understanding of the evidence), then it is more likely to have struck a deal similar to the 50
percent ownership deal it eventually reached with Saint Alphonsus rather than any l/11 1h or even
3/11 1h deal that MRIA may have proposed in the 1999 and 2000 time frame. Even if somehow
this but-for partnership developed new MRI facilities in just the same way as JMI's business
actually developed, J would expect MRIA's share ofthese profits to be no more than halfofMr.
Budge's forecasted amounts. 64 Under this still unlikely scenario, damages under Mr. Budge's
Calculation Method #5 would fall by half or $26.3 million. 65 Mr. Wilhoite's measures of future
lost profits under this scenal'io would also be cut in half or drop by $7.8 million undet·
Altemative B Calculation #3. 66 These reductions do not take into account other necessat·y
corrections, which would reduce the estimates further.

C. Damage Calculations Do Not Include All Costs that Counter-Claimants
Would Have Incurred
41.

Mr. Budge's calculations of past lost profits do not include all relevant costs.

There are two categories of costs that are understated in Mr. Budge's damage calculations. The
first category represents the costs that counter-claimants would have incurred if they had opened
and operated their own facilities in downtown Boise, Meridian, and Eagle and/or performed
some or all of the allegedly lost scans at MRl Center. The second category represents the
partnering costs the counter-claimants would have incurred based on Saint Alphonsus'
ownership share of MRIA.
1. Additional Operating Costs

42.

All ofMr. Budge's damage calculations assume that counter-claimants would

have opened and operated their own MRI facilities in Meridian and Eagle. In addition, his
64

This assumes MRTA would not have paid any consideration for its share ofthe partnership and would simply
have shouldered half the necessary MRI-related capital expenditures (excluding land and building costs) in
exchange for receiving half of the profits from the operation of the MRI imaging at the new facilities.

65

There is also no reason to assume that GSR would have been willing to pay MRIA 7.5 percent of its revenues in
the form of a management fee, so this expense is excluded from this calculation. The cost structure for each of
the actual IMT facilities already reflects the cost of managing these facilities.

66

These reductions do not consider Mr. Wilhoite's estimate oflost management fees, since (as I discuss below) he
has double counted these amounts and they are therefore irrelevant. I also do not specifically address estimates
under his Alternative A methodology here, since these estimates are clearly faulty in that they include damages
beyond 2015.
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Calculation Method #5 assumes that counter-claimants would have opened and operated their
own MRI facility in downtown Boise. First, he offers little basis for assuming that these clinics
would have been opened. But, even if we assume they would have been opened, it is important
to understand the costs that would have been involved in their opening.
43.

For these new but-for MRI facilities located in Meridian, Eagle and downtown

Boise, Mr. Budge has applied a fully-allocated profit margin to his estimated lost revenues. He
determined the fully-allocated profit mat·gin using the MRI-only financial statements produced
by IMI for each of its actual imaging facilities located in downtown Boise, Meridian and Eagle.
The problem with this approach is that IMI operates facilities that are substantially different than
Mr. Budge's new but-for facilities. IMI offers a range of imaging services at its facilities. IMPs
MRI-only financial statements understate most ofthe fixed and step operating costs that would
be incurred to open and operate imaging facilities offering only MRI services. This is because
many of these costs are actually shat-ed with the non-MRI side ofiMI's business, so Mr. Budge
is not counting the true costs of an MRI-only facility. Through an interview with Mr. Cliff, I
learned that, ifthese facilities had offered only MRI set·vices, some of the shared costs that were
allocated to the non-MRI financial statements would have had to be incUl'red anyway. For
example, the site administrator expense represents the salary of the site administrator at each
facility. Mr. Budge's new but-for facilities would still have had to employ these managers at
each facility even if they offered only MRT services. Thus, the operating costs for a fucility
offering only MRI services should include the total site administrator salary taken fi:om both the
MRI and non-MRI financial statements for IMI, and not just the portion ofsalary reflected on the
MRI-only financial statements. There are a number of other operating expenses for which the
entire expense amount (including portions allocated to non-MRI operations) would have been
incurred, even if the facility offered just MRI imaging.67
44.

Similarly, through an interview with Mr. Cliff, I learned that Mr. Budge likely

understated the variable operating costs that MRT Center would have had to incur to perform
additional scans. In particulat·, a review of Mr. Budge's exhibits shows that he did not consider
"patient billings" to represent a vat·iable cost. Howevet·, fi·om his expel'ience, Mr. Cliff believes
67

These shared expense categories include Management fee, PAC system related expenses, Site administrator,
Courier service, and Telephone. [Interview with Mr. Jeff Cliff.]
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that this expense category should have been designated as a variable operating cost since it
represents the cost of billing the patients and most billing services (such as PMl) charge a
separate fee per patient to provide this service.
45.

Based this information, I revised the fully-allocated profit margins that Mr. Budge

used in his damage calculations for the Meridian facility, Eagle facility, and downtown facility
(for Calculation Method #5 only). I also revised the variable margin that Mr. Budge used for the
Saint Alphonsus facility and the downtown facility (for Calculation Methods #1- #4 only). 68
Exhibit 16 presents these results. It shows that the additional costs should reduce the fullyallocated profit margins at new but-for facilities by a minimum of 1.5 to 3.7 percentage points. 69
It also shows that the additional patient billing cost should reduce the val'iable margin on

allegedly lost scans at the MRI Center by 1.1 pet·centage points. 70
46.

I calculated the impact of these added costs on the counter-claimants' past

damage calculations by applying these revised profit margins to Mr. Budge's calculation
methods, but accepting all of his other damage assumptions (many of which I do not agree with
and have akeady discussed). This adjustment should reduce the alleged past damages by $0.8
million (Calculation Method #4) to $2.7 million (Calculation Method #5). [See Exhibit 17 .]
2. Additional Partnering Costs

47.

Mr. Budge's Calculation Methods #I through #4 are based on the assumptions

that (1) MRl Center would have performed the lost scans associated with the IMl Saint
Alphonsus and IMI downtown facilities, (2) MRI Mobile or MRI Limited would have performed
the lost scans associated with the IMI Meridian and IMI Eagle facilities, and (3) MRTA would
have received a 7.5 percent administrative fee for the revenues generated by the lost scans. 71
Given that Saint Alphonsus owned a 24.75 percent share ofMRIA fi·om September 1999 through
68

These profit margins are still understated, because I was not able to correct for all cost understatements.
Specifically, I was not able to isolate the PAC system related expenses in IMI's Non·MRI financial statements.

69

For instance, in Mr. Budge's Methods 1 and 2, the additional costs at the Meridian facility lower the average
profit margin over the 2002 to 20 I0 period fi·om 58.8% to 56.2%. For the Eagle facility the average pl'ofit
margin for 2007 to 2010 decreases from 60.9% to 59.4%. Finally, for the downtown facility the average profit
margin for 1999 to 2010 decreases 59.00/o to 55.4% in Method 5.

70

The additional costs at the MRI Center lower the average variable profit margin over the 1999 to 2010 period
from 66.7% to 65.5%.

71

Budge Supplemental Report, p. 15.
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March 2004, Mr. Budge should have offset the countet·-claimants' alleged damages to account
for Saint Alphonsus' MRTA shares during this time period. Saint Alphonsus' share ofMRIA
would have entitled it to a 7.43 percent share ofMRI Center's profits and a 10.39 percent share
ofMRT Mobile's profits. 72 Saint Alphonsus would also have been entitled to 20 percent of the
management fees paid by these two entities. 73 Adjusting for this ownership position. Mr.
Budge's past damages should be reduced by between $0.4 million (Calculation Method #4) and
$0.8 million (Calculation Method #l). [See Exhibit 18.]
48.

For Calculation Method #5, both Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite should have offset

their estimates of alleged damages to account for Saint Alphonsus' MRIA shares during the
entire damage period, since this damage scenario imagines a but-for world in which Saint
Alphonsus would not have dissociated from MRIA. Alleged past damages should be reduced by
$5.4 million for Mt·. Budge's Calculation Method #5. Mr. Wilhoite's estimation of future
damages under this same scenario should also be reduced by $1 .6 million (Alternative B
Calculation #3).74 [See Exhibit 19.]
3. Costs Associated with Practical Capacity Constraints

49.

Through an interview with Mr. Cliff, I also learned that MRI capacity can be

evaluated on two different bases: (I) assuming extended business hours with patients scheduled
to have scans performed at inconvenient times or (2) assuming standard imaging facility business
hours limited to approximately 74 hom·s per week (e.g., 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. on weekdays and 10
a.m. to 5 p.m. on weekends). Mr. Budge's Calculation Methods# I through #4 result in some
but-for scan volumes at the MRI Center that are at or above 160 percent of this standard-hour
measure of capacity. [See Exhibit 20.] It is unrealistic to assume that patients would have been
willing to schedule their outpatient MRT scans at inconvenient times, since thet·e were a number
72

Leaving aside Saint Alphonsus' separate directly-owned limited partnership interests,
Saint Alphonsus' share ofMRI Center's profits (owned through MRIA): 7.43% = 24.75% (Saint Alphonsus
share ofMRIA) x 30.00% (MRIA's share ofMRI Center).
Saint Alphonsus' share ofMRI Mobile's profits (owned through MRTA): 10.39% = [24.75% (Saint Alphonsus
share ofMRIA) x 30.00% (MRIA's share ofMRI Mobile)]+ [24.75% (Saint Alphonsus share ofMRlA) x
30.00% (MRIA's share ofMRI Center) x 39.96% (MRI Center's share ofMRT Mobile)].
[Exh. 4148 at SARMC00964.]

73

Exh. 4148 at SARMCOl242.
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of other MR1 facilities open by this time that would compete for these patients by offering more
accommodating appointment times. Therefore, either MR1 Center would have lost some amount
of scans to competitors or would have had to add capacity, perhaps even another magnet, to
accommodate these added patients during standard imaging facility business hom·s. Based on
Mr. Budge's calculations of the cost to install another MRI scanner at an existing facility, his
Calculation Methods #1 through #4 should be reduced by approximately $1.6 million. 75

D. Future Damage Calculations Include a Double Count, Damages Beyond 2015,
and Suffer from Many of the Same Problems as the Past Damage
Calculations
1. Future Lost Management Fee Income Is Double Counted

50.

Mr. Wilhoite does not seem to realize that Mr. Budge calculated the past lost

profits by first calculating the total past lost profits and then reducing this by the amount of the
past lost management fees. 76 By using this methodology, Mr. Budge avoided a double count. In
contrast, Mr. Wilhoite uses the same future lost revenues to calculate both the future lost profits
and additional future lost management fees. Importantly, Mr. Wilhoite does not reduce the
future lost profits by the amount of the future lost management fees. As such, his future lost
profits are overstated by the amount of the future lost management fees. As Exhibit 1 to his
repott shows, his estimate of future lost profits should be reduced by between $1.3 million
(Alternative B Calculation #2) and $2.1 million (Alternative B Calculation #3).77. 78
2. Alternative A Damage Calculations Include Future Damages Beyond 2015

51.

Mr. Wilhoite relies on the enterprise value I revenue multiples fi:om two publicly-

traded companies to value MRIA's lost revenue on a going forwat·d basis. This is a common
74

I do not specifically address estimates under his Alternative A methodology here, since these estimates are
clearly faulty in that they include damages beyond 2015.

75

See Budge Supplemental Report, Schedule 4. He lists the cost of adding a second MRI magnet at IMI's
Meridian facility in 2004 as $1,565,280.

76

See Budge Supplemental Report, Schedules 2, I, and lb. Mr. Budge explained in deposition that "Well,
management fee is kind of an in and out. So since it's paid to MRIA from itself, I would not have considered it a
variable cost." (Budge Dep., 4-4-07, pp. 128-29.]

17

Wilhoite Supplemental Report, Exhibit 1.

78

I do not specifically address estimates under his Alternative A methodology here, since these estimates are
clearly faulty in that they include damages beyond 2015.
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method fot· valuing companies that are going concems, but is a dangerous approach when only
two "comparable)~ companies are used. Whether well implemented or not, valuing a company as
a going concern assumes the company will be producing for many years in the future. In
contrast, MRIA's future lost profits should terminate at the end of20 15 since I understand that
on the basis of prior court rulings damages cannot extend beyond 2015. 79 The magnitude of the
benchmark publicly-traded firms' multiples includes the expectation that these firms will
continue to generate revenues and profits beyond 20 15-in fact, in perpetuity. If instead these
fit·ms were expected to cease operation at the end of2015, their multiples would be lower. By
relying on these multiples, Mr. Wilhoite has implicitly assumed that MRlA's damages will
extend beyond 2015 and has included these post-2015 damages in his estimate. As a result, these
estimates are unreliable.
3. Alternative B Damage Calculations Are Based on an Unrealistic Growth Rate

52.

Mr. Wilhoite's Alternative B measures of future damages (i.e., discounted cash

flow methodology) include a 2 percent revenue gl'Owth rate. This growth rate follows his
previous damage analyses in which he relied on a 2 percent growth rate to forecast revenues
forward from 2010. Mr. Wilhoite testified that he intended this growth rate to take inflation into
account without any scan volume growth to be sure that MRI Center had sufficient capacity fm·
these revenues. 80 This growth rate is unrealistic because reimbursement for MRI scans has been
decreasing, not increasing. Between 2001 and 2010, IMI has experienced a 2.5 percent average
annual decrease in the average amount paid per MRI scan at its facilities. In 2010, the most
t•ecent year for which data at·e available, these reimbursement levels fell by over 8 percent. [See
Exhibit 21] Thus, it is unrealistic to assume a positive inflation rate in the but-for world. Even
at a 0 percent gl'Owth rate, Mr. Wilhoite's future damage estimates should be reduced by between
$0.5 million and $0.9 million. [See Exhibit 22.] A more realistic but-for world with declining
MRI reimbursement levels would produce a negative revenue growth rate and even lower future
damages.
79

If the partnership agreement terminated in 2015, any scans associated with that partnership may have ended
abruptly in 2015. Instead, lost sales may be expected to shrink year by year until they tapered down to zero lost
sales by 2015. In either case, Mr. Wilhoite can only properly estimate a change in enterprise value by first
identifying the likely pattern oflost sales and then performing a discounted cash flow analysis on the but-for
pattern of lost profits on those lost sales.
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4. Lost Scans Overstated and Additional Partnering Costs Understated

53.

Mt•, Wilhoite uses Mr. Budge's lost revenues projection for 2010 as the statting

point for both his Alternative A and Alternative B future damage calculations. Since Mr.
Budge's lost revenues projection fot· 20 I0 is based on his estimate of the lost scans for 2010 and
since Mr. Budge's estimate of the lost scans for 2010 is clearly overstated for all the reasons
stated above, all ofMt·. Wilhoite's damage calculations are overstated. In addition, as discussed
above, Mr. Wilhoite should have offset his estimates of alleged future damages to account for
Saint Alphonsus' ongoing ownership ofMRIA shares in the but-for world in his Alternative A
Calculation #5 and Alternative B Calculation #3.

V.

NERA's Damage Analysis
A. Fact of Damages
54.

In contrast to Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite's damage analyses, I have examined

the available record to determine what would have happened but-for Saint Alphonsus' alleged
bad acts and analyzed the empil'ical evidence to determine whether there is any evidence to
support the assertion that these alleged bad acts caused the MRI Center to lose scans.
55.

As discussed above, my regression analysis of the annual scan data for MRI

Center indicated that the opening ofthe IMI downtown facility did not cause the counterclaimants to lose scans. 81 I also conducted a second regt·ession analysis with monthly data to
confn·m that those results still hold when I control for the opening of each ofthe IMI facilities. 82
This regression analysis relies on the same approach as the one discussed above except (I) the
dependent variable now t·epresents the monthly number of scans performed by MRI Center rathet·
than the annual scans and (2) the explanatory variables include two new interaction terms, one
fot· the opening of the IMI Saint Alphonsus facility and one for the opening of the IMI Eagle
80

Wilhoite Dep., 4-2-07, pp. 159 and 197.

81

However, this regression analysis did not allow me to control for the opening of all of the IMl facilities since I
only had a limited number of observations when using annual data.

82

I re-ran my regression analysis using monthly scan data for the period January 1997 through December 2010. I
obtained the monthly scan data for MRI Center from two sources: (1) Budge Supplemental Report, Schedule 11
and 14, and {2) MRI Center Accounts Receivable Transaction Reports [0 12279, 040055 and 042207]. Since the
sum of the monthly totals in these documents for 1997,2001, and 2002 did not match the annual totals for those
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facility. As before, I specified the tt·end variable as a natural logarithm and I included interaction
terms for the IMI downtown facility, the IMI Meridian facility, and MRIA's decision to fire
GSR. [See Exhibit 23.] Once again, the purpose ofthe regression analysis was to examine
whether the opening ofthe different TMT facilities or the fil'ing ofGSR significantly impacted the
number of monthly scans that MRI Center performed. To the extent that the IMI facilities that
were opened after Saint Alphonsus' legal dissociation cannot be counted as causes of damages,
their possible effect on MRI Center scans cannot be called lost sales that caused damages. Like
losses to the St. Luke's and other rival facilities, scans done by these TMT imaging facilities are
merely competitive losses that the MRI Center suffered when a new, legitimate entrant came into
the market.
56.

Exhibit 24 presents the results of my regression analysis using monthly data and

Newey-West standat·d errors. The results show that the regression explains 95 percent of the
total variation in the MRI Center monthly scans (i.e., the R-square = 0.95). Again, this indicates
that the model fits the data vet·y well. Likewise, the results show that the estimated coefficient of
the trend variable is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This supports the conclusion
that the monthly scans for MRI Center generally increased each month during the January 1997
to December 2010 period. 83 The results further show that the estimated coefficient for the IMT
downtown facility interaction term is positive but insignificant. Again, like my findings using
annual data, this result suppmts the conclusion that the opening of the IMI downtown facility did
not cause MRI Center to lose scans. In addition, the results show that the estimated coefficients
for all of the other interaction tetms are negative and significant at the 1 percent level. This
supports the conclusion that MRI Center did not start to lose scans untillMl opened its Meridian
facility. Finally, a comparison of the magnitude ofthe estimated coefficients for the other
interaction terms shows that the opening of the IMI Saint Alphonsus facility in 2007 had the
largest negative impact on the MRI Center monthly scans but that the firing ofGSR in 2005 had
almost as big of an impact (-54.2 compared to -49.7).

years in Schedule II of the Budge Supplemental Report, I adjusted the monthly totals for each ofthose years
proportionately so that their sums would match the annual totals in Schedule II.
83

I examined whether monthly or quarterly dummy variables should be included to control for seasonality and
found that they should not. The adjusted R-square in all cases remained equal to 0.95.
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57.

In summary, my regression results demonstmte that there should be no damages

associated with the opening ofiMl's downtown facility since it did not cause MRI Center to lose
scans. The regression results also demonstrate that the opening of the other IMI facilities as well
as the firing ofGSR are cot·related with the MRT Center losing scans. Howevet·, whether the lost
scans associated with these other events represent damages depends on whether these other
events would have occurred anyway in the but-for world. In my opinion, they would have.
B. Quantum ofDamages

58.

As discussed above, the IMI downtown facility, the IMI Saint Alphonsus facility,

and the IMI Eagle facility would have existed anyway in the but-for world. Since these IMI
facilities would have existed in the but-for world, MRIA would have just as likely have fired
GSR in the but-for world. Thus, any lost scans that MRI Center experienced as a result of these
events do not represent damages since these lost scans would have occurred anyway in the butfot·world.
59.

Similarly, in my opinion, the available record suggests that the IMI Meridian

facility would have opened anyway in the but-for world in May 2002. Accot·ding to Dr. Giles,
IMI had the idea of expanding into Meridian during the early planning stages of its first imaging
facility. 84 Likewise, according to Mr. Cliff, IMI had already acquired the land for its Meridian
facility befot·e entel'ing into the 200 I partnership agreement with Saint Alphonsus. 85 Finally, the
U.S. Bank officer who had made the loan to IMI announced at a May 10, 2000 GSR board
meeting that an independent auditor had found IMI's credit rating to be outstanding. 86 Hence,
the record indicates that IMI could have readily obtained the funding to build its IMJ Mel'idian
facility without Saint Alphonsus' help.
60.

Assuming that the IMI Meridian facility would have opened anyway in the but-for

world in May 2002, there would be no alleged damages to the counter-claimants. Any scans that
MRI Center lost as a result ofiMI opening its Meridian facility at that time would have been lost
anyway. However, it is my understanding that countet·-claimants are specifically arguing that

84

Giles, 8-22-07, p. 3127.

ss Cliff, 8-8-07, pp. 1594-1595 and 8-28-07, p. 3912.
86

Exh. 4171.
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IMI could not have opened its Meridian facility in May 2002 without the financial and other
suppoti that it received as a result of entering into the July 2001 agreement with Saint Alphonsus
for the non-MRI business. 87 Therefot·e, in the alternative to my first opinion that there are no lost
scan damages owing to MRIA, I have also calculated damages under the assumptions (I) that
Saint Alphonsus should not have entered into an agreement with IMT until it had withdrawn fi·om
MRTA on April I, 2004 and (2) that the partnership should not have opened a facility in Meridian
until Apr ill, 2005-after the one year period specified in the non-compete clause in the MRIA
partnership agreement. Of cout·se, there is also a very strong possibility that IMI would have
only delayed a short time, if at all, in the but-for world before entering Meridian without the help
of Saint Alphonsus-not the full tht·ee-year delay I am assuming here in this alternative damage
calculation.
6l.

Given these assumptions, I used the regression results in Exhibit 24 to calculate

the alleged damages. Specifically, I used the regt·ession results to calculate MRI Center's but-for
scans for the period May 2002 through March 2005 by setting the negative interaction term for
the IMI Meridian facility equal to zero for this period but allowing all of the other explanatory
variables to remain at their actual levels. I then subtracted MRI Center's actual scans for this
period from its but-fot· scans to determine the number oflost scans. [See Exhibit 25.] Since ther·e
were a few early months where the actual scans exceed my estimate ofthe but-for scans (due to
the IMI Mel'idian facility just stmting up), I set the number of lost scans for those instances equal
to zel'O, rather than using them as an offset to later lost scans. 88 Using this method, I calculated
that the opening ofthe IMI Meridian facility in May 2002 instead of Aprill, 2005 caused the
counter-claimants to lose 3,340 scans. Once I determined the number of lost scans, I then used
the revised variable margin for MRI Centet· reflected in Exhibit 16 to calculate the alleged
damages. I also offset the alleged damage estimate to account fur Saint Alphonsus' share of
MRIA profits and management fees fi·om September 1999 through March 2004. In the
alternative to my basic opinion of no damages due to lost scans, these results show that the
alleged damages would equal $2. t million if the finders of fact were to determine that IMI's
87

MRIA also appears to assert that Saint Alphonsus improperly denied MRIA the opportunity to expand into
Meridian. My alternative damage analysis is consistent with this theory as well. [Budge Initial Report, p. 13]

88

If I had not set these lost scans equal to zero but instead kept the negative lost scans amounts, this would have
lowered the total lost scans by 416.
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opening ofits Meridian facility was materially sped up by its allegedly premature partnership
with Saint Alphonsus. [See Exhibit 26.]

Thomas R. McCarthy
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VI.

BACKGROUND APPENDIX

A. MRIA Partnership
62.

The MRIA general partnet·ship was formed in 1985 to provide MRI imaging

services in the Boise, Idaho area. 89 [See Exhibit 9, which is a timeline of key events.] The
original partners in MRIA consisted of Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc., Saint Alphonsus,
Mednow, Inc., and HCA ofldaho, Inc. 90 MRTA along with various other pat1ners then formed
two other partnerships: MRl Limited and MRl Mobile. MRl Limited is the operating entity that
opened the MRI Center on the Saint Alphonsus campus. It opened with one fixed MRI magnet
in 1985 and then added a second fixed MRI magnet in the late 1990s. MRI Mobile is the
operating entity that provides mobile MRI units to other patts ofldaho and Oregon. It also fot· a
time provided overflow coverage on the Saint Alphonsus campus prior to MRI Center adding a
second fixed magnet.91
63.

MRIA is the general partner ofMRI Limited and MRI Mobile and is paid

management fees equal to approximately 7.5 percent of the revenues generated by the two
entities. 92 It also owns a 30 percent share ofMRI Limited and a 30 percent share ofMRI Mobile
and is paid a share of the profits that the two entities earn. In addition, MRl Limited owns a
39.96 percent share ofMRI Mobile and is paid a share ofthe profits earned by that entity.93
Thus, MRIA's profit stream from MRI Limited and MRI Mobile consists of (I) management
fees fi'Om the two entities, (2) profit distributions from MRI Limited, and (3) profit distributions
fi·om MRJ Mobile.
B. Saint Alphonsus
64.

Saint Alphonsus operates a 381-bed acute care hospital in Boise, Idaho. It offers

primary, secondat·y, and tertiat·y acute care inpatient services. It also operates a Level III

89

Tilird Amended Counterclaim, ~~ 5 and 8.

90

Third Amended Counterclaim,~ 8.

91

Third Amended Counterclaim,,;~ 8 and 13. Prochaska, 8-7-07, pp. 1156-1157.

92

Shattuck Hammond Partners LLC Report titled "Strategic Options Assessment ofMRIA Ownership Interests,
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, November 6, 2001," p. 10. [SARMC06453]

93

Exh. 4148 at SARMC00964.
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neonatal intensive care unit and a trauma centet'. It serves as a regional refenal center for
southwest Idaho, eastern Oregon, and northem Nevada. 94
65.

.I

The hospital has had an exclusive contract with the GSR for several decades. 95

This contract specifies that the GSR is the only radiologist group allowed to read imaging scans
for the hospital's patients.96
66.

As a general partner, Saint Alphonsus owned a 24.75 percent share ofMRIA. It

also received 20 percent of the management fees paid to MRIA. 97 Saint Alphonsus also owns a
14.18 percent share ofMRI Limited and a 10.50 percent share ofMRI Mobile. 98 It is my

understanding that, even though Saint Alphonsus withdrew fi·om MRIA in 2004, it continues to
own its shares in MRI Limited and MRI Mobile.

C. GSR, Imaging Center Radiologists and IMI
67.

The GSR group is the largest radiology group in the Boise, Idaho area. It has

twenty-two members, with subspecialties in neuroradiology, interventional radiology,
musculoskeletal radiology, and women's imaging. 99 As mentioned, it currently holds an
exclusive contract with Saint Alphonsus to read scans at its hospital. Until the beginning of
2005, GSR also read the MRT scans at MRI Cente1·. 100 On January 3, 2005, MRIA replaced GSR
with other radiologists. 101 However, I understand that the GSR radiologists continued to read
any scans fur Saint Alphonsus hospital patients that were referred to MRI Center.
68.

Imaging Center Radiologists and IMI m·e closely related entities. Imaging Cente1·

Radiologists is the entity responsible for providing the professional services at the IMI outpatient

94

httg://www.saintalphonsus.org/.

95

Giles, 8-21-07, p. 2972.

96

Titird Amended Counterclaim,~ 14.

91

Exb. 4148 at SARMC00964 and SARMC01242.

98

Exit. 4148 at SARMC00964.

99

http://www,aboutimi.com/providerslour-radiologists/.

100

Third Amended Counterclaim,~ 14.

101

Exh. 4357.
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imaging facilities. Likewise, IMI is the entity responsible for leasing and operating the
outpatient imaging facilities. Both entities are owned by the GSR radiologists. 102
69.

IMI operates five outpatient imaging facilities: (1) downtown Boise, (2) Meridian,

(3) Saint Alphonsus campus, (4) Eagle Plaza, and (5) Parkcenter. 103 The Saint Alphonsus
campus location is an MRI-only facility. The other sites, which are all stand-alone off-campus
facilities, are multi-modality imaging facilities. These facilities offer CT, DEXA,
mammography, MRI, PET, ultrasound, and x-ray imaging services, with more limited modalities
(not including MRI) offered at Parkcenter. 104 IMI opened the downtown Boise facility on
September 7, 1999, the Meridian facility on May 23, 2002, the Saint Alphonsus facility on
December 21, 2005, and the Eagle facility on October 1, 2007. 105
D. Negotiations among GSR, MRIA and Saint Alphonsus

70.

One of the reasons that GSR formed Imaging Center Radiologists and IMI in 1999

was to protect itself from being left without a facility in the event Saint Alphonsus ever chose to
shift its exclusive contract to another radiology group. Radiologists, like othet· traditionally
hospital-based physicians, can be vulnerable to this kind of contract change. Around this time,
the hospital had replaced the pathology group with which it had an exclusive contract with
another pathology group. This essentially left the original pathology group without a facility at
which to practice. One reason GSR decided to open its own independent outpatient imaging
facility was to protect itself from such a possibility. 106 In May of 1998, the GSR radiologists
unanimously agreed on a plan to open their own imaging facility. 107 They further agt·eed that

102

Denning Dep. 07-27-07 Exh. # 10. [USB00829].

103

http://www.aboutimi.com/ .

104

Imaging modalities performed at the Parkcenter location are limited to mammography and DEXA (dual energy
x-ray absorptiometry) imaging. [http://www.aboutimi.comL].

105

PMI scan data for IntermOLmtain Medical Imaging.

106

Cliff, 8-8-07, p. 1447 and 8-29-07, pp. 4006-4007. See also Exh. 0517.

107

Exh. 0517 at GSR/0594. ("It was unanimously agreed upon by the Group that control of their future was most
important m1d therefore now was the time to open an Imaging Center.")
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they would move forward with the downtown Boise facility and other imaging locations, with or
without the cooperation of Saint Alphonsus. 108
71.

On August 20, 1998, several of the GSR radiologists met with the CEO of Saint

Alphonsus, Ms. Sandra Bruce, and announced their plans to open an outpatient imaging
facility. 109 GSR had purchased the land and the building for its outpatient imaging facility before
meeting with Ms. Bruce. 110 I undet·stand that by October· 1998 all parties had agreed to pursue
two tracks of negotiation: (1) MRIA and GSR negotiating to partner on the MRI portion ofthe
new imaging facility and (2) Saint Alphonsus and GSR negotiating to partner on the non"MRI
portion of the new facility. 111 At the time, Dr. Giles was chairman ofMRIA and president of
GSR and he participated in the negotiations on behalf of both GSR and MRIA. 112
72.

On the cusp of opening the IMI downtown facility GSR found MRIA's proposed

partnership deal unacceptable. GSR opened the IMI downtown imaging facility on September 7,
1999, both before any agreement in principle was reached and before negotiations stopped
progressing. 113 Just 14 days earliet·, the GSR board had met and discussed its partnership
negotiations with MRIA and Saint Alphonsus. MRIA's proposal at that time appeat·s to have
anticipated GSR receiving a 1/11 111 ownership share ofMRT Center in exchange for MRI Center
owning the MRI portion of the new downtown imaging facility. This pt•oposal offered the
radiologists only a limited ownership interest in the MRI facility and was found unacceptable. 114
73.

On October 27, 1999, about six weeks after the opening ofthe IMI downtown

facility, Dr. Roger Curran (apparently on behalfofMRIA) wrote to the CEO and COO of Saint
Alphonsus suggesting that they use their "big stick" to pressure GSR to accept the MRIA
108

Exh. 0517 at GSR/0595. ("Ideally, the Group would like to partner with the hospital on this project perhaps by
leasing equipment from them. If the hospital refuses to partner with the Group on this project and severs all ties,
the new Center will continue with a second Center being built as close to Saint Alphonsus Medical Center as
possible to compete with them.")

109 Cliff, 8-8-07, pp. 1456-1457; Giles, 8-22-07, pp. 3055-3057.
110

Giles, 8-22-07, pp. 3005-3008.

111

See for example Exh. 4062; Bruce, 8-13-07, pp. 1739-1740; Cliff, 8"8-07, pp. 1456-1457.

112

Giles, 8-20-07, pp. 2654-2655 and 2950; Denning Dep., 6-29-07, p. 69 and 7-27-07, pp. 158-159.

113

Cliff, 8-8-07, p. 1488 and PMI scan data.
114 Exh. 4101 ("The MRI Board would like to own the MRI portion of the cente1· with the Group being only a Ill!
owner. This would make the center an extension ofMRI Center ofldaho. The Group feels strongly that this is
not an acceptable option.")
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partnership proposal: "Ifwe are to get what we want, I think you need to swing it a little., 115
The proposed deal discussed in this letter appears to mirt·or the I/11 1h deal ah'eady rejected by
GSR prior to opening the downtown facility. 116 It appears that MRIA may also have eventually
considered offering a deal with the potential fot· a 3/11 th MRI Center ownership share, but I am
aware of no evidence that MRIA ever addressed the radiologists' concem of having direct
ownership of an independent imaging facility. 117
74.

By early 2000, the IMI imaging business was already considered financially sound.

The U.S. Bank officer who had made the initial loan for the downtown facility announced at a
May I0, 2000 GSR board meeting that an independent auditor had found IMI's credit rating to
be outstanding. 118 Thus MRIA partnership proposals (which were inadequate to meet the needs
ofGSR prior to the opening ofthe IMI downtown facility) likely became less relevant as the
success of the ah·eady-opened IMI downtown facility became apparent.

E. Saint Alphonsus' Assistance to IMI
75.

IMI needed a loan to open its downtown facility in September 1999. During the

loan negotiations, Dr. Giles told U.S. Bank that MRTA, IMJ, and Saint Alphonsus were close to
reaching a pat1nership agt·eement. Although the bank officer who made the loan indicated that
this information was a plus factor in the decision to grant the loan, she also said that it was not
the deciding factor. 119 Instead, she granted the loan based on IMI's prospects as well as the
collateral of the radiologists. 120 She also mentioned that there was another bank ready to grant
the loan which influenced U.S. Bank's decision. 121
76.

The lMl downtown location was the first imaging facility in Boise, Idaho to use the

PACS digital technology. 122 Although Saint Alphonsus paid for a fiber optic line to be installed
m SARMC07417.
116
117

SARMC07417.
Exh. 4137 (SARMC00640).

tts Exh. 4171.
tt 9 Denning Dep., 6-29-07, pp. 67-70 and 7-27-07, pp. 156-157.
120

Denning Dep., 6-29-07, pp. 67-68 and 85-86 and 7-27-07, pp. 183-184 and 189; Cliff, 8-29-07, p. 3999.

121

Denning Dep., 7-27-07, pp. 167-168 and 213; Cliff, 8-8-07, p. 1479 and 8-29-07, p. 3999.

122

Giles, 8-22-07, pp. 3074-3077; Cliff, 8-8-07, pp. 1504-1505 and 1632-1634.
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I

between the downtown facility and Saint Alphonsus, Mr. Cliff, who is the Executive Director of
IMI, testified that the company repaid Saint Alphonsus for those services. 123 He also testified
that Saint Alphonsus paid for the "dark" line since it was asking for similar lines to be laid to
other locations. 124 It is my understanding that Saint Alphonsus also offered MRIA the
opportunity to adopt the PACS techno logy in 1999, but MRIA chose to wait until the following
year to implement the system. 125 Finally, Dr. Giles testified that, even though IMI was the first
entity in the Boise area to otTer the PACS technology, he did not think it gave IMI much of an
advantage over MRIA since the referring physicians were not equipped initially to utilize the
technology. 126
77.

When it became clear in late 1999 or early 2000 that the negotiations with regard to

the MRI portion of the business between MRIA and GSR were not progressing, Saint Alphonsus
began to look for other alternatives. 127 One ofthe alternatives, which it ultimately did not
pursue, was to buy the other partners out ofthe MRIA partner·ship. 128 To determine how much
this would cost, Saint Alphonsus commissioned Shattuck Hammond to conduct a valuation. 129
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP and Shattuck Hammond also helped Saint Alphonsus evaluate
other options. 130
78.

Eventually, over a yeat·~and~a-halfaftel' IMI's downtown facility opened and after

the IMI imaging business was already considered fmancially sound, Saint Alphonsus decided to
enter into a partnership with JMI for its non-MRI business. This partnership agreement was
signed on July I, 2001. 131 It involved Saint Alphonsus paying IMI almost $550,000 in return for
owning half of the non~MRI business. 132 As a result of the agreement, IMI set up separate
123 Cliff, 8-8-07, pp. 1504-1505.
124 Cliff, 8-8-07, pp. 1635-1636.
125 Hall Dep., 9-20-06, pp. 84-89; Exhs. 405-409, 466, and 564.
126

Giles, 8-22-07, p. 3088.

127

Prochaska, 8-7-07, pp. 1168 and 1197.
128 P1·ochaska, 8-7-07, pp. I 168 and 1197.
129 Chamberlain Dep., 9-27-06, pp. 87-88; Shattuck Hammond Valuation ofMRlA dated 11-6-01 [Steiner Dep. 309-07, Exh. #8].
13 Chamberlain Dep., 6-27-07, p. 95; SARMC00671-681.

°

131

Cliff, 8-28-07, pp. 3914-3915 and 3918. Prior court opinion, p. 9.
132 Cliff, 8-8-07, pp. 1623-1624; Cliff, 8-28-07, p. 3918.
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management committees for its two businesses. 133 Saint Alphonsus only held seats on the nonMRl management committee. Also, according to Mr. Cliff, the radiologists had already acquired
the land for IMI's Meridian facility before entering into the 2001 partnership agreement with
Saint Alphonsus. 134
79.

After its dissociation fi·om MRIA on April 1, 2004, Saint Alphonsus entered into

negotiations with IMI to acquire 50 percent of its MRI business. Saint Alphonsus completed this
transaction in March or· April2006. 135 The parent of Saint Alphonsus paid IMI $11 million for
its share ofthe MRI business. 136

F. Other MRI Facility Competitors
80.

When TMI opened its downtown facility in September 1999, it became the first

entity to open a fi·ee-standing imaging facility in the Boise area. 137 In contrast to the MRIA
facility, which offered only MRis, IMI offered multiple imaging modalities including CT,
mammography, MRI, ultrasound, and x-ray. At the time, IMT anticipated that it would attract its
business equally from Saint Alphonsus/MRIA and St. Luke's-the other major hospital system
in the area. 138 However, Dt·. Giles advocated that it would primarily attract business from St.
Luke's. 139
81.

By the end of2000, there were at least seven competitors in the Boise area that

offered MRI services. These included IMI, MRIA, St. Luke's, Nydic, Treasure Valley Imaging,
Intermountain Otthopedics, and the Boise Orthopedic Clinic. [See Exhibit 6, which shows the
number ofMRI competitors in the Boise area over time.] St. Luke's operated a single fixed
magnet at its main campus. Nydic is a national company that operates imaging facilities
throughout the U.S. 140 It opened its facility about the same time as IMI did. Finally, even
m Cliff, 8-28-07, pp. 3934-36.
134

Cliff, 8-8-07, pp. 1594-1595 and 8-28-07, p. 3912.

135

Cliff, 8-29-07, pp. 4039-4040.

136

Cliff, 8-8-07, p. 1662 and 8-29-07, pp. 4039-4040.

137

Cliff, 8-28-07, p. 3880; Denning Dep., 6-29-07 Exh. #1.

138

Denning Dep. 6-29-07, Exh. #1.

139

Giles, 8-22-07, pp. 3024-3025, and 3031.

° Cliff, 8-28-07, p. 3882.

14
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though the Boise Orthopedic Clinic offered MRI services, it did so only for its orthopedic
patients. It did not offet· the set·vices to patients referred from other physicians. 141
82.

By August 2007, there were at least ten competitors in the Boise area that offered

MRI services. These consisted ofiMI, MRIA, St. Luke's, Treasure Valley Imaging,
Intermountain Ot1hopedics, Boise Orthopedic Clinic, Pinnacle Imaging Center, Advanced Open
Imaging, Saltzer Imaging, and West Idaho Orthopedics & Spotts Medicine. In addition, lMI and
St. Luke's now each offered MRI services at three locations. Howevet·, Nydic had exited the
Boise area by 2007. [See again Exhibit 6.]
83.

As of June 2011, there were at least nine entities in the Boise area that offer MRI

services. These consist oflMI, MRIA, St. Luke's, Treasure Valley Imaging, Pinnacle Imaging
Center, Advanced Open Imaging, Saltzer Imaging, West Idaho Orthopedics & Spotts Medicine,
and Sage Diagnostics & Imaging. IMI and St. Luke's have both expanded and now each offers
MRI services at four locations. [See again Exhibit 6.]

G. Practice Management, Inc.
84.

PMI has provided accounting and billing services to both MRIA and IMI during

the pet·iod 1990 to the present! 42 Mr. Cliff, who is the Executive Director oflMI, was one of the
principals ofPMl. 143 He resigned his position with PMI when he joined IMI in 2000. 144

141

Cliff, 8-28-07, p. 3880.

142

Cliff, 8-8-07, pp. 1436-1440.

143

Cliff, 8-8-07, p. 1435.

144

Cliff, 8-8-07, pp. 1537-1538.
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EXHIBIT 1

NERA
Economic Consulting

National Economic Research Associates, Inc.
Suite 1950
777 South Figueroa Street
Los Angeles, California 90017
+1 213 346 3000 Fax +1 213 346 3030
Direct dial: +1 213 346 3005
thomas.mccarthy®neca,com
www.nera.com

THOMAS R. MCCARTHY
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
Dr. McCarthy received a B.A. in Economics from Assumption College in Worcester,
Massachusetts and Master's and Ph.D. degrees in Economics from the University of Maryland
under a National Defense Education Act Fellowship. Aftet· teaching microeconomic theory and
urban economics at the Univet·sity ofMat·yland, Dr. McCat1hy joined the faculty of the School
ofEconomics and Management of Oakland University in Michigan. There he taught graduate
and undergraduate mict·oeconomics as well as health economics, his area of special interest.
Dr. McCarthy joined NERA in 1983 and now directs NERA's health care practice, a practice
that specializes in the economic analysis of t·egulatory, public policy, and litigation matters in
health care markets. His own projects include analyzing the competitive effects of many health
care industry mergers, including evaluating the horizontal and vertical issues created by
mergers of hospitals, hospital systems, health insurers, physician groups, physician practice
management companies, imaging and other medical device manufacturers, and home health
care companies. In a variety of health care antitrust liability and damages cases, he has
analyzed exclusive contracts, physician staff privileges issues, exclusions from managed care
panels, GPO contracting, alleged foreclosures due to shifting refetTal patterns and exclusive
contracting (e.g., the PeaceHealth case), bundling, joint ventures, hospital and physician
monopolization cases, monopsony, and state action immunity issues involving cet1ificates of
public advantage covering hospital mergers in Montana and South Carolina. He has also
analyzed class certification and liability issues in health care class action cases, including
serving as a liability expet1 in the Miami MDL brought by physicians against ten national
HMOs. In the pharmaceuticals at·ea, he recently served as the liability witness on behalf of
Lund beck in the FTC v. Lundbeck (Ovation) case. As part of his policy work, Dr. McCarthy
has analyzed the competitive effects of a "Blues'' conversion to for-profit status and Medicat·e
prescl'iption drug proposals. He is also co-editor and a principal author of a year-long, twovolume study of health care reform in 12 industrialized countries, published by Kluwer.
Another area of specialization for Dr. McCarthy has been the economics of intellectual
property protection, including the estimation of contract, tmde dress, trade secret and patent
damages, often for medical equipment and devices but also including computer hardwat·e, CDRs, supermarket equipment, satellites, and agricultural products. He has also worked on
antitrust damages or class cet1ification matters involving the pharmaceutical, medical devices,
soft drink, agriculture, candy, ice ct·eam, auto parts, oil, video distribution, and newspapet·
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industries. Other major projects include the competitive analysis of revenue shal'ing
agreements used by supet·markets during a recent labor strike, the development of affirmative
action plans, and the estimation of damages resulting from a major oil spill.
Prior to joining NERA, Dr. McCarthy was a staff economist with the Federal Trade
Commission conducting studies of regulation and competition in health care markets. One
such study examined the competitive effects of certificate-of-need regulation in the hospital
market.
Dr. McCa1thy has written several papers analyzing competition and antitrust damages in health
care. These include an article in the Journal of Health Economics on competition in the
physician services market and atticles in ABA monographs on hospital merger efficiencies,
monopoly and monopsony issues between payers and providers, antitrust damages, and
defining geographic markets in hospital merget·s. Other research activities include
presentations at professional meetings and his set·ving as an invited panelist or moderator for
various ABA and health care policy conferences. He was also invited by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Antitrust Division ofthe Department of Justice to testifY at three different
sessions about monopoly and monopsony issues in health care at their joint hearings on Health
Care and Competition Law and Policy. He has testified as an economic expert in federal and
state court, as well as before arbitration panels, state insurance agencies, and the International
Trade Commission.
Dr. McCatthy is a member of the American Economic Association and an associate membet· of
both the Amel'ican Health Lawyers Association and the American Bar Association's Section of
Antitrust Law, including membet·ship with the Section,s Health Cat·e Committee. He also
served on the American Bar Association's Task Force on Hospital Mergers.

Education
University of Maryland
Ph.D., Economics, 1980
M.A., Economics, 1973
Assumption College
B.A., Economics, 1971
Canisius College
1967-1969
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Professional Experience
1996-

NERA Economic Consulting
Senior Vice President

1989-1996

Vice President

1986-1989

Senior Consultant and Project Director

1983-1986

Senior Analyst

1982-1983

Federal Trade Commission
StaffEconomist, Division ofRegulatory Analysis, Bureau ofEconomics

1978-1983

Oakland University
Assistant Professor, School of Economics and Management

1980-1982

Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan
Consultant

1978-1980

Department of Health, Education and Welfare
Sole-source Contractor, Health Care Financing Administration

1975-1978

General Electric Tempo
Consultant, Center for Advanced Studies

1975-1978

University of Maryland
Instructor, Department of Economics

1975

Teaching Assistant, Depat1ment of Economics

1971-1973

National Defense Education Act Teaching Fellow

Honors and Professional Activities
Wall Street Joumal Award for Outstanding Achievement in Economics,
Assumption College, 1971
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Graduate Assistantship, University of Maryland, 1974" 1975
National Defense Education Act Fellowship, University of Maryland, 1971"
1974
Outstanding Faculty Award, Oakland University Chapter ofthe Golden Key
National Honor Society, 1981
Member, American Economic Association
Member, American Health Lawyers Association
Associate Member, American Bat· Association, including membership in Section
of Antitrust Law and Health Care Committee
Member, ABA Task Force on Hospital Mergers

Publications
"Contt·acting Practices by Hospitals," Chapter 11, Economics ofAntitrust: New Issues,
Questions, and Insights, NERA Economic Consulting, 2004.
"Geographic Market Issues in Hospital Mergers," Chapter 3 (with Scott Thomas) in Douglas C.
Ross and Mark J. Horoschak, Health Care Mergers and Acquisitions Handbook, Chicago:
American Bar Association, 2003.
"Antitrust Issues Between Payet·s and Provider," (with Scott Thomas), prepared for the ABAAHLA Health Care Antitrust Meetings, Washington DC, May 17-18, 2001. (Reprinted in two
parts in Antitrust Health Care Chronicle, Chicago: American Bar Association, Spring 2002 and
Summer 2002.)
"Efficiencies Analysis in Hospital Mergers" (with Scott Thomas and Lawrence Wu), Antitrust
Health Care Chronicle, Volume 13, No. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 2-11. (Revised version of article
found in Howard Feller, Antitrust and Healthcare Insights into Analysis and Enforcement,
Chicago: American Bat· Association, Spring 1999.)
"Analyzing Damages in Health Care Antitrust Cases" (with Scott Thomas), Antitrust
Developments in Evolving Health Care Markets, American Bat· Association, 1996, pp. 67-96.
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"Health Care Reforms - Are They Answedng the Right Questions?'' Adapting a Global
Industry to the New Health Care Environment, Proceedings ofthe Financial Times World
Pharmaceuticals Conference, March 23 and 24, 1994.

Financing Health Care, co-editor (with Ullrich Hoffmeyer), Kluwer Academic Press, 1994.
Co-author, Chapter 2; "The Prototype" (with Ullrich Hoffmeyer). Co-author, Chapter 14; "The
Health Care System of the United States" (with Julie Minnis).
"Health Care Funding and Its Impact on the Balance of Supply, Demand and the Meeting of
Needs," A New Socio-Economic Order in Twenty-First Century Europe, Conference
Proceedings of the General Assembly of the European Fede1·ation ofPharmaceuticallndustries'
Associations, 1993, pp. 47-54.
"U.S. Health Care Reform: NERA Offers a Number of Recommendations" (with Julie Minnis),
Viewpoint, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 15-21.
"The Effect of City Size on Journey to Work Behavior: Some Empirical Evidence" (with Oded
lzraeli), Perspectives in Urban Geography, Volume V (Concept Publishing Company, New
Delhi, India, 1987).
"The Competitive Nature ofthe Primary Care Physician Services Mat·ket," Journal ofHealth
Economics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June 1985).
"Variations in Travel Distance, Travel Times and Modal Choice Among SMSAs" (with Oded
Izraeli), Journal a/Transport Economics and Policy, May 1985.
"Beyond Goldfarb: Applying Traditional Antitt·ust Analysis to Changing Health Markets" (with
Geraldine Alpert), The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 24, No.2 (Summer 1984), pp. 165-204.
"Commentary," in A New Approach to the Economics of Health Care, Mancur Olson, ed.,
Amel'ican Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC (December 1981). A review of four papers on
Hospital Regulation presented at AEI conference on "Health Care-Professional Ethics,
Govemment Regulation, or Mat·kets," September 25-26, 1980.

Deposition Testimony
The Foundation for Seacoast Health v. Hospital C01poration ofAmerica, eta/., Apl'il 6, 20 II.
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In Re Aetna UCR Litigation, Decembet· 21,2010.
Diane Hillman, Mona Rupe, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, and on
behalf of the general public v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, An Inter-Insurance Exclumge,
eta!., October 30, 2009.
Federal Trade Commission v. Lundbeck, Inc., State ofMinnesota v. Lundbeck, Inc., Septembet·
10, 2009.
Kelli Miller, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated vs. Farmers Insurance
Company, Inc., eta/., September 2, 2009.
George S. Cohlmia, Jr., MD and Cardiovascular Surgical Specialists, Corp. v. Ardent Health
Services, LLC, et al., April2, 2009.
Carolinas HealthCare System, et al. v. South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control, et a!., February 24, 2009.
Paul Schwam v. Farmers Insurance Company ofArizona, eta/., February 19, 2008.
Carolina Care Plan, Inc. v. United HealthCare Services, Inc. eta/., Janual'y 29, 2008.
State of California v. Safeway, eta!., January 18, 2008.
State of California v. Safeway, eta/., August 7, 2006.
Kaswan v. A/lergan, May 4, 2006.
Edward Collins, MD., eta!., v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., February I, 2006 and November
14, 2003.
Saint Agnes Medical Center, eta!. v. PacifiCare of California, et al., March 8, 2005 and
October 28,2005.
In Re: Managed Care Litigation, Provider Track Case relating to Shane I, MDL 1334,
February 2, 2005.
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U.S. PhiUps C01poration v. Princo Cmporation and Princo America C01poration and
Gigastorage C01poration and Gigastorage USA v. U.S. Philips Corporation and Konink/igke
Philips Electronics, NV, October 12,2004.
In the Matter of the Proposed Conversion of Premera Blue Cross to a For-Profit Corporation,
Washington State Insurance Commission, December 3-4, 2003.
Rocky Mountain Medical Center, Inc. v. Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation, d/b/a St.
Mark's Hospital, eta/., Octobet· 16, 2003.
Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Company, et al., August 25, 2003.
In the Matter of Certain Recordable Compact Discs and Rewritable Compact Discs (United
States International Trade Commission Investigation), May 23, 2003.
McKenzie-Willamette Hospital v. PeaceHealth, Aprill7, 2003.
Del Monte Fresh Produce Company and Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. v. Dole Food
Company, Inc. and Dole Fresh Fruit Company, Januat·y 21, 2002.
Yvonne Green, on her behalfand on behalfofall others similarly situated, v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., et al., October 26, 2001.
In Re: Aetna, Inc. Securities Litigation, June 21, 2000 and July 19, 2000.
Boston Scientific Corporation v. Mentor Medical, Inc., August 21, 1998.
The County of Tuolumne and Eric Runte v. Sonora Community Hospital, et al., October 2-3,
1997.
St. MmyMedical Group, Inc. v. M & C ProActive Management, Ltd, et al., April18, 1997.
COBE Laboratories, Inc. v. AVECOR Cardiovasculm~ Inc., June 5, 1996.
Al/ergan Medical Optics and Microtech, Inc. v. Staar Surgical Co., Inc., May 28, 1996.
American Council ofCertified Podiatric Physicians and Surgeons v. American Board of
Podiatric Surgery and American Podiatric Medical Association, March 14, 1996.
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Retina Associates, P.A. v. Southern Baptist Hospital of Florida, Inc., Januat·y 18- t 9, 1996.
Santa Cntz Medical Clinic and Derjjan Associates, Inc. v. Dominican Santa Cruz Hospital,
September 5-6, t 995, October 3-4, 1995 and February 2, 1996.
T1ylon Corporation v. Metwest, Inc. and Uniktb Corporation, April 7, 1995.
Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc., et al., March 8, 1994 and June
8, 1994.

American Health Advisors and William Phillips v. The University of Texas System, eta/.,
Novembet· 9, 1993.

John A. Bakos, MD. v. Roseville Community Hospital, eta/. and John A. Bakos, MD. v.
Donald Franks, MD., et al., October 8, 1993.
Diasonics, Inc. v. Acuson Cmporation, December 8-9, 1992, March 15 and March 24, 1993.
David B. Kaye, MD., et al. v. California Eye Institute, eta/., December 28-29, 1992.
Gerhard Flegel, D.O. an(/ Richard Still, D.O. v. Christian Hospital Northeast-Northwest, eta!.,
August 28, 1992.

Lawrence Leyba, D. 0. v. Hartmut Renger, MD., Anesthesia Specialists ofAlbuquerque and St.
Joseph's Health Care Corporation, August 22, 199 I.
Dan A. Morgenstern, MD. v. Charles S. Wilson, MD., eta/., July 18-19, 1991.
Colorado Orthopedic Dance and Athletic Rehabilitation, P.C. and Linda Perkin v. Preferred
Independent Physical Therapy Organization, Inc., October 4, 1990.
Jeanne Call, et al. v. Prudential Insurance Company ofAmerica, et al., September 5, 1990.
Weldotron Corporation v. Hobart Cmporation and Waldyssa, S.A., March 6-9, 1990, April30,
1990 and May 1-4, 1990.
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AB Food Products, Inc. v. Fabrica de Chocolates La Azteca, The Quaker Oats Company and
Gabriel Tello, January 3, 1990.
Thomas Andrew Cherewick and Therapeutic Radiology, P.S.C v. Northern Rockies Regional
Cancel' Treatment Center, eta/., February 9, 1989.
Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. Popsic/e Industries, Inc., Sara Lee Cmporation, and DOES
1-100, December 9 and December 12, 1988.
Michigan State Podiatry Association, et al. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield ofMichigan and
Eugene Harpel~ D.P.M., et al. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield ofMichigan, July 20 and July 21,
1987.
Sun Drop Bottling Company, Inc., eta/. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consolidated and PepsiCola Bottling Company of Charlotte, Inc., January 30 and January 31, 1986.
Wordsman v. Xerox Corporation, October 9, I985.

Trial Testimony
The Foundation for Seacoast Health v. Hospital Corporation ofAmerica, et al., (Superior
Court, Rockingham County, State ofNew Hampshire), May 19,2011.
Federal Trade Commission v. Lundbeck, Inc., State ofMinnesota v. Lundbeck, Inc., (Federal
Couat, gth Circuit, District ofMinnesota), December 15, 2009.
Komeshak v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Company, eta/., (Circuit Court, Twentieth Judicial
District, St. Clail' County, Illinois), Class Certification Hearing, September 30, 2009.
R.J. McCauley and Roxanne Rogers, eta/. v. Farmers Insurance Company, et al., (District
Court of Canadian County, State ofOklahoma), Class Certification Heal'ing, April22, 2009.
McKenzie- Willamette Hospital v. PeaceHea/th (U.S. District Cout1 for the Distl'ict of Oregon,
Pottland Division), October 22-23, 2003.
David M. Odom v. Fairbanks Memorial Hospital, et al., (Superior Couat ofthe State of Alaska,
Fourth Judicial District ofFairbanks), March 14, 2002.
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St. MGiy Medical Group, Inc. v. M & C ProActive Management, Ltd, et al., June 9, 1997.
Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc., et al., (U.S. District Court,
Central District of California), June 28, 1994.
American Health Advisors and William Phillips v. The University of Texas System, et al.,
(District Court ofTravis County, Texas, 26lst Judicial District), November 23, 1993.
Gil N. Mileikowsky, MD. v. Sheldon L. Schein, M.D., et al., (Supel'ior Court of the State of
California, County of Los Angeles), October 25, 1993.
Dan A. Morgenstern, MD. v. Charles S. Wilson, MD., et al., (U.S. District Court, District of
Nebraska), December 9-10, 1991 and September 8-10, 1992.
Sun Drop Bottling Company, Inc., eta!. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consolidated and Pepsi
Cola Bottling Company of Charlotte, Inc., (U.S. DistJ·ict Court, Westem District ofNorth
Carolina), May 29-30, 1986.

Other Testimony
Arbitration Testimony

Saint Agnes Medical Center, et al. v. PacifiCare of California, eta!., November 16,2005 and
November 17, 2005.
T1ylon C01poration v. Metwest, Inc. and Unilab Cmporation (binding arbitration before Judge
Weil); April19, April21, May 29, 1995 and July 10, 1995.
Testimony Provided to the International Trade Commission

In the Matter of Certain Recordable Compact Discs and Rewritable Compact Discs (US lTC
Inv. No. 337-TA-474), Washington, DC, June 19,2003.
Testimony Provided to State Agencies

Colorado Division oflnsurance, Testimony in support ofCIGNA's acquisition of Great West
Healthcare, Denver, CO, March 11, 2008.
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Alaska Division oflnsurance, Testimony in support ofPremera Blue Cross' proposed
conversion to fo1·-profit status, June 9, 2004.
Washington State Office ofthe Insurance Commissioner, Testimony in support ofPremera
Blue Cross' proposed conversion to for-profit status, May 5, 2004.
New Mexico Division oflnsurance, Testimony in supp011 ofCiman-on Health Plan's
acquisition ofQua!Med Plans for Health, Santa Fe, New Mexico, August 30, 1999.
Florida State Department oflnsurance, (written) Testimony in supp01t of Aetna, Inc.'s
acquisition of Prudential Health Care's Florida Division, Tallahassee, Florida, March 2, 1999
and March 11, 1999.
New Mexico Division oflnsurance, Testimony in suppmt of Presbyterian Health Plan's
acquisition ofFHP ofNew Mexico, Inc., Santa Fe, New Mexico, Octobe1· 23, 1997.
Testimony Provided to Fedet·al Agencies

"Health lnsul'ance Monopsony- Competitive Effects," testimony and presentation to The
Fede1·al Trade Commission and The Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Hearings on
Health Care and Competition Law and Policy, Washington, DC, Apl'il25, 2003.
"Health Insurance Monopsony- Market Definition," testimony and presentation to The Federal
Trade Commission and The Depa11ment of Justice Antitrust Division, Hearings on Health Care
and Competition Law and Policy, Washington, DC, Apri124, 2003.
"Contracting Practices," testimony and presentation to The Federal Trade Commission and The
Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Hearings on Health Care and Competition Law and
Policy, Washington, DC, March 27, 2003.
Certificate of Need Hearing Testimony

Fact-finding hearing before Virginia State Department ofHealth on behalfofBrandermill
Active Retirement Village~ Inc.- Evaluation ofthe Virginia State Department of Health
nursing home bed need methodology~ October 9, 1986.
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Conference Papers and Presentations
"FTC v. Lundbeck (Ovation): A Retmspective Merger Review," invited speech to the
Antitrust Committee ofthe New York City Bar Association, New York, NY, October 21,2010.
"Unmasking the Wolf: The Universal Applicability of Antitrust Law and Economics?," NERA
Seminar on Antitrust and Trade Regulation, Santa Fe, NM, July 11, 2009.
"Bundling: Does PeaceHealth Tie It All Together?," Moderator, NERA Seminar on Antitrust
and Trade Regulation, Santa Fe, NM, July 3, 2008.
"When Does the Flow of Competitively Sensitive Information Create Antitrust Concerns?,"
pt·esentation to American Health Lawyers Association's Antitrust in Healthcare conference,
Washington, DC, September 17, 2007.
"How Buying at Low Prices Can Violate the Antitrust Laws: Monopsony Lessons fi·om
Healthcare Antitrust Cases," presentation to the American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust
Law Meetings, Washington, DC, Aprill9, 2007.
"HeaJth Care Quality and the Measurement of Market Power," invited panelist at Antitrust and
Health Care: Assessing Issues in California and the United States, a UC-Berkeley conference
sponsored by the Nicholas C. Petris Center on Health Care Markets and Consumer Welfare,
April30- May 1, 2004.
"Economics v. Daubert: Roundtable and Moot Hearing,'' Moderator, NERA Seminar on
Antitrust and Trade Regulation, Santa Fe, NM, July 6, 2002.
"Leadership in Challenging Times," Directors' Roundtable speech and discussion with the
Honorable Timothy Muris, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, Los Angeles, CA,
April 18, 2002.
"Antitrust Issues Affecting Payors," presentation and paper to conference on "Antitrust in
Healthcare," sponsored by the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, the ABA Health Law Section,
and the American Health Lawyet·s Association, Washington, DC, May 17-18, 2001.
"Why Tobacco II: What Changes Do Plaintiffs Want in the Use of Financial Incentives in the
Managed Care Industry?" Moderator and panelist at Marsh Health Spectrum Forum on
Managed Care Organization Enterprise Risk, New Orleans, LA, July 13,2000.
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"Use of Economists- Help m· Hindt·ance?" Workshop presentation at American Health
Lawyers' Association conference on "Antitrust in the Healthcare Field," Arlington, VA,
February 17, 2000.
"Aetna's Acquisition ofPrudential Health Care," presentation at DC Bar Association luncheon,
Washington, DC, December 14, 1999.
"Restructuring and Competition in the Health Insurance Industry," presented at NERA Seminar
on Antitrust and Trade Regulation, Santa Fe, NM, July 10, 1999.
"Efficiencies Analysis in Hospital Mergers," speech at the ABA Conference on Antitrust L~sues
in Health Care, sponsored by the ABA Section of Antitrust Law and the Section of Health
Law, in New Orleans, LA, October 16, 1998.
"Restructuring and Competition in the Health Care Industry," presented at NERA Seminar on
Antitrust and Trade Regulation, Santa Fe, NM, July 11, 1998.
"Overview oflntemational Health Care Systems," presentation to the Eli Lilly and UCLA
Anderson School ofBusiness' 1998 Global Health Care Conference on "Managing Evolving
Health Care," Los Angeles, CA, June 26, I 998.
"Current Antitt·ust Issues for Health Plans," presented to the American Association ofHealth
Plans' 8th Annual Managed Care Law Conference, San Diego, CA, Apri127-29, 1997.
"Certificates of Public Advantage: The Example of a Great Falls Hospital Merger," presented
at NERA Seminar on Antitrust and Trade Regulation, Santa Fe, NM, July 4, 1996.
"Hospital Met·gers and State Action Immunity," speech before the State Action/Noerr Doctrine
Committee at the American Bar Association meetings of the Section of Antitrust Law,
Washington, DC, March 27, 1996.
"The Economics ofVertical Mergers," presented to Preston, Gates & Ellis Conference on
"Antitrust: Does the Tiger Again Have Teeth?" Seattle, WA, May 5, 1995.
"Analyzing Damages in a Health Care Antitrust Case," presented at American Bar Association
Conference on Antitrust and Health Care, co-sponsored by the Section of Antitrust Law and
the American Bar Association Forum on Health Care, New Ol'leans, LA, Octobet· 7, 1994.
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"Health Care Reforms Worldwide," presented at William M Mercer International Conference,
New York, NY, September 29, 1994.
"Employer Mandates in Health Care Reform," pt·esented at NERA Seminar on Antitrust and
Trade Regulation, Santa Fe, NM, July 7, 1994.
"Health Care Reforms - Are They Answering the Right Questions?" Speech to the Financial
Times World Pharmaceuticals Conference, Adapting a Global Industry to the New Health Care
Environment, London, U.K., March 23, 1994.
"Establishing the Relevant Market in Health Cat·e Cases," presented at the National Health
Lawyers Association meetings on Antitt·ust in the Health Care Field, Washington, DC,
February 18, 1994.
"Cost Crisis in Health Care: A Global Conve!'gence Towat·d Mat·ket~Based Solutions,"
sponsored by The Center for Strategic and International Studies. The results ofNERA's 16volume study ofhealth care reform in 12 industrialized countl'ies were presented to
Congressional staffs on Septembet· 15, 1993 in the Senate's Hart Building, Washington, DC
(with U. Hoffmeyer and R. Rapp).
"The Implications ofHealth Care Reform fot· Antitt·ust Litigation," presented at NERA Seminar
on Antilntst and Trade Regulation, Santa Fe, NM, July 10, 1993.
"Health Care Funding: It's Impact on the Balance of Supply, Demand and the Meeting of
Needs," presented at the Annual Conference ofthe European Federation of Pharmaceutical
Industries' Associations, Salzburg, Austria, May 25, 1993.
"Health Care Reform and the European Economic Community," presentation to t•epresentatives
of various Directorates General of the European Commission, including Mr. Fernand Saur, in
charge of pharmaceutical policy for the EC, Brussels, Belgium, May 13, 1993.
"Financing Health Care, with Particular Reference to Medicines," presentation ofyeat·Iong
study to CEOs of35 R&D based pharmaceutical companies, Washington, DC, April I, 1993.
Discussant, "The Proposed Dutch Health Care System: Moving Away from Employer Based
Health Insurance," by Warren Greenberg, Amel'ican Economic Association Meetings,
Anaheim, CA, January 7, 1993.
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"Effective Use of Economists in Health Care Litigation," presented at the National Health
Lawyers Association meetings on Antitt·ust in the Health Cat·e Field, Washington, DC, January
29-31, 1992.
"Calculating Damages For Lost Earnings," presented at NERA Seminar on Calculating
Economic Damages in Employment Cases, Los Angeles, CA, Mat·ch 26, 1991.
"Valuing Intangibles in Transfer Pricing Cases," presented at NERA Seminar on Antitrust and
Trade Regulation, Santa Fe, NM, July 7, 1990.
"Estimating Patent lnfi"ingement Damages," NERA Seminar on New Developments in the
Economics ofPatent Infringement Litigation, San Francisco, CA, and Los Angeles, CA,
December 5 and 6, 1989.
"Competition and Cooperation in the Provision of Health Care," presented at NERA Seminar on
Contracting in the NHS, London, UK, September 11, 1989.
"A Comparison ofthe Cluster of Services Approach with the Product Line Approach in
Analyzing Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions," presented at NERA Seminar on Antitrust and
Trade Regulation, Santa Fe, NM, July 1987 and Young Pat1ners Luncheon Sel'ies, New York,
NY, October 5, 1987.
"The Application ofFranchising Concepts in the Health Care Industry," workshop pt·esented to
the Ninth Annual American Bar Association's Forum Commiltee on Franchising, San Antonio,
TX, October 23-24, 1986.
"Misuse and Confiscation oflntellectual Property," presented at a NERA Seminar on Patents:
The New Economics (Infringement, Misuse and Damages), New York, NY, April 17, 1986.
"Calculating Economic Damages in Wrongful Termination Cases," presented at the First
Annual Employment Litigation Workshop, sponsored by the Employee Relations Law Journal,
Williamsburg, VA, September 18-20, 1985.
"An Economic Analysis of Certificate ofNeed Laws" (with David Kass), presented at the
American Economic Association Meetings, San Francisco, CA, December 1983.
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"Medical, Legal, and Economic Ramifications of Changes in the Health Cat·e System," panelist
at the American Entet·prise Institute Confet·ence on "Restmcturing the Health Care Financing
System: Policies and Programs" Washington, DC, January 26-27, 1983.
"A Reexamination of Medical Society Control of Blue Shield Plans," discussant of Arnould
and Debmck paper at the Eastem Economic Association Meetings, Washington, DC, April29,
1982.
"Public Policy Toward the Health Care Sector," presented to the Detroit Chapter of the
National Association ofHealth Services Executives, Pontiac, MI, June 15, 1982.
Reviewer of four papers on "Regulation- Can It Improve Incentives?" at the American
Enterprise Institute Conference on "Health Care- Professional Ethics, Government Regulation,
or Markets?" Washington, DC, September 25-26, 1980.
"A Model of the Primary Care Physician Firm," presented at the Eastern Economic Association
Meetings, Montreal, Canada, May 8-10, 1980.
Moderator, Conference on Physician Manpower Issues- Health Economists' Views (Reinhardt,
Sloan), Oakland University Health Education Program, Rochester, MI, October 16, 1979.

May 2011
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Document Name

Bates Range

Court Fil111gs
• Third Amended Counterclaim
• First Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint
• Memo in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Lost
Profits
• Memo in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on i\1RIA's Lost
Profits
• SADC Reply Memo in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of
MRIA's Lost Profits
• SA's Second Supplemental Answer to Defendant/Counterclaimant's
First Set oflnterrogatories
• Idaho Supreme Court Opinion
• Court Order Re SA's Motion for Summary Judgment on Contract
Theory of Wrongful Withdrawal
• Judgment on Contract Theory of Wrongful Withdrawal
Da/(1

• BC - Revised MRI Facility Report.xls (years 200 1-2006)
• Blue Shield Ada County MRI claims 1-25-2007.xls (claims between
2001-2006)
• IMI Data with Affiliations and Prior MRIA Referral.xls
• IMI MRI Exams 2001 - Current.xls (years 2001-2006)
• MRI Center Exams 2001- Current.xls (years 2001-2006)
• IMI DOWNTOWN 2007-Present.xls
• IMI DOWNTOWN PRE-2007.xls
• IMI EHP 2007-Present.xls
• IMI MERIDIAN 2007-Present.xls
• IMI MERrDIAN PRE-2007.xls
• IMI Non-MRI Exams by Referring Physician January 2001 Current. xis (years 200 1-2006)
• IMI SARMC 2007-Present.xls
• IMI SARMC PRE-2007.xls
• Budget 20 II MRICI by Quarter with comparison to 20 I 0 audited
FSs.xls
• MRI 2007-PresentSARMCvsMRIA.xls
• MRI Center Analysis REFRESHED 091509.xls
• MRl Center Analysis.xls
• IMI.OINONMRIBUD.xls (IMI non MRl financials 2001)
• IMI.02NONMRI BUD.xls (IMI non MRI financials 2002)
• IMI.03NONMRI BUD.xls (IMI non MRI financials 2003)
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EXHIBIT2

Materials Considered

Document Name
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Bates Range

IMI.04NONMRffiUD.xls {IMI non MRI financials 2004)
IMI.OSNONMRIBUD.xls (IMI non MRI financials 2005)
IMI.06MRIBUD.xls (IMI tvtRI financials 2006)
IMI.06NONMRJBUD.xls (IMI non-MRI financials 2006)
IMI.07MRIBUD.xls (IMI MRI tinancials 2007)
IMI.07NONMRffiUD.xls (IMI non-MRI financials 2007)
IMI.08BUDGET.xls (IMI MRJ ftnancials 2008)
IMI.09BUDGET.xls (IMJ MRI financials 2009)
IMI.lOBUDGET.xls (IMI MRI financials 2010)
IMI.IIBUDGET.xls (IMI MRT financials 2011)
IMI AR SUMMARY.xls
MRI000053.xls (Business I 20 II Budget)
MRIOOOI55.xls
MR100039I.xls (MRI Limited Partnership financials)
MRI000404.xls (MRI Limited Partnership financials)

Depositions & Deposition E:.;ltiblts
• Deposition ofBruce P. Budge. April4, 2007.
• Deposition ofGrant Chamberlain and Exhibits. September 27, 2006.
• Deposition of Grant Chamberlain and Exhibits. June 27, 2007.
• Deposition ofRidgely L. Denning and Exhibits. June 29, 2007.
• Deposition of Ridgely L. Denning. July 27, 2007.
• Deposition Exhibit 7 ofHahn. January 9, 2007.
• Deposition of Leslie Kelly Hall and Exhibits. September 20, 2006.
• Deposition ofYvonne Ketchum and Exhibits. March 5, 2007
• Deposition of Dennis R. Reinstein and Exhibits. June 4, 2007.
• Deposition ofManfted R. Steiner and Exhibits. March 9, 2007.
• Deposition ofManfred R. Steiner and Exhibits. May 17,2007.
• Deposition of Paul Traughber. May 3, 2007.
• Deposition of Charles A. Wilhoite and Exhibits. April2, 2007.

Gem State Radiologyllntermomrtaln Metllcallmaglng
• IMI Financial Statements. Year ended December 31, 1999.
• IMI Redacted budget 2008
• IMI Redacted budget 2009
• IMI Redacted budget 20 10
• TMI Redacted budget 20 11

Page2 of7
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EXHIBIT2
Materials Considered

Document Name

Bates Range

• IMI Budget 2007
• IMI SARMC MRI budget 2007
• IMI Reviewed Financial statements. Years ended December 31, 2003
and 2004.
• IMI Reviewed Financial statements. Years ended December 31,2001
and 2002.
• IMI MRI operations monthly income statements Aprit2005- August
2005
• IMI MRI operations monthly income statements August 2005 November, 2005
• IMI MRI operations monthly income statements and balance sheets
December 2002- May 2003
• IMI MRI operations monthly income statements and balance sheets
February 2004 - June 2004
• IMI MRI operations monthly income statements and balance sheets July
2002 - December 2002
• IMI MRl operations monthly income statements and balance sheets July
2004 - November 2004
• IMI MRI operations monthly income statements and balance sheets
March 2001 - November 200 I
• lMI MRI operations monthly income statements and balance sheets
May 2003 - September 2003
• IMI MRI operations monthly income statements and balance sheets
November 2001 -July 2002
• lMI MRI operations monthly income statements and balance sheets
November 2004 - April 2005
• lMI MRI operations monthly income statements and balance sheets
October 1999- March 2001
• IMI MRI operations monthly income statements and balance sheets
September 2003 -February 2004
• IMI MRl financials 2006

IMIRP/001787-797
IMIRP/003235-244
IMIRP/000601-650
IMIRP/000651-700
IMIRP/000301-350
IMIRP/000451-500
IMIRP/000251-300
IMIRP/000501-550
JMIRP/000151-200
IMIRP/000351-400
IMIRP/00020 1-250
IMIRP/000551-600
IMIRP/000101-150
IMIRP/000401-450

• PMI scan data

Expert Materials
• Expert Report of Bruce P. Budge. March 12,2007.
• Supplemental Expert Report ofBruce P. Budge. May2, 2011.
• Amendment to the Supplemental Expert Report ofBruce P. Budge.
May 19, 2011.
• Expert Opinion of Charles A. Wilhoite. March 12, 2007.
• Supplemental Expert Opinion of Charles A. Wilhoite. May 2, 20 ll.
• Expert Report ofDennis R. Reinstein. April23, 2007.
• Expert Report of Gregory S. Vistnes. April30, 2007.
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EXHIBIT2

Matel'ials Considered

Document Name

Bates Range

• Well fare Spring Valuation titled, "Fair Market Value Analysis of the
business Enterprise and Stockholders' Equity of: MRI Associates, LLP
as of Aprill, 2004".

Miscellaneous
• Blue Shield MRI Insurance payment information
• AR Transaction Summary January 200 l - November 200 l
• AR Transaction Summary January 2006- July 2006
• Business ll Financial Information. Month ended July 31, 2006
• Business I and II Financial Information August 2006 -November 2006

MRIAIMRI Center Materials
• AR Transaction Summary 1998-2000
• AR Transaction Summary 2003-2005
• AR Transaction Summary January 2006- July 2006
• MRI Mobile Operations Assessment. June, 1998.
• MRIA scan data 1998-2005
• Articles of Partnership ofMRI Associates
• MRIA Volumes 1997-2003
• MRI Limited Partnership Financial Statements. Years ended December
31, 1999 and 1998.
• MRI Limited Partnership Financial Statements. Years ended December
31, 200 I and 2000.
• MRI Limited Partnership Financial Statements. Years ended
December 31, 2003 and 2002.
• MRI Limited Partnership Financial Statements. Years ended
December 31, 2005 and 2004.
• MRI Limited Partnership, MRT Mobile, and MRTC ofldaho Financial
Statements. Years ended December 31, 2004 and 2003.
• MRI Limited Partnership, MRI Mobile, MRIA, and Tsoscan Financial
Statements. Years Ended December 31,2005 and 2004.
• MRIC Financial Information. Year ended December 31, 2000.
• MRIC Financial Information. Year ended December 31, 2005.
• MRIC Financial Information. Month ended July 31, 2006.
• MRIA Financial Information August 2006 - November 2006

Page4 of7
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012364-373
042315-324
042325-332
056850-863, 040055-060,
056820-898, 042315-320,
SARMCOI545

012275-284
042202-211
042325-332
000608-614
040055-060
SARt\1C01032-080,
SARt\1C05354-359,
039108-129
035763-768
012052-061
013100-109
015673-682
042191-200
040197-218,040061-064,
002986-994,015038-039
042181-200,
InternalGPOOO 1-037
012275-284
042202-042211
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EXHIBIT2

Materials Considered

Bates Range

Document Name
• June 2000 Letter from J. Roger Curran to MRICIIMRIM Board of
Directors
• PMI scan data
• Shattuck Hammond Parners, Strategic Options Assessment ofMRIA
Ownership Interests, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,
November 16, 2001.
• Letter from J. Roger Curran Re: Negotiating with the Radiologists
• MRI Limited Partnership Financial Statements. Years ended December
31, 2007 and 2006.
• MRI Limited Partnership Financial Statements. Years ended December
31, 2009 and 2008.
• MRI Limited Partnership Financial Statements. Years ended December
31, 2010 and 2009.
• Accounts Receivable Transaction Summary. 2006.
• AR Analysis for I. 2008-2010.
• MRI Limited Partnership Financial Statements. Years ended December
31, 2006 and 2005.
• Accounts Receivable Transaction Summary. 2008.

032615-18

SARI\107417

Public/)' Available Materials
• http://www.aboutimi.com
• www.saintalphonsus.org
• www.saintlukesonline.org
Saint Alpllonsus Materials
• Saint Alphonsus Imaging Strategic Plan. August 31, 2004.
• Saint A1phonsus MRl Update Trinity Review

SARMC00299-334

Tl'ial Ktlliblts
• MRT Exhibit 4092
• MRl Exhibit 4094
• MRI Exhibit 4095
• MRIExhibit 4102
• MRl Exhibit 4145
• MRI Exhibit 4146
• MRI Exhibit 4171
• MRI Exhibit 4173
• MRI Exhibit 4181
• MRl Exhibit 4183
• MRT Exhibit 4210

USB00979
033755
GSRRP001595
GSRRP/000288
GSRRP/000434
GSRRP/000302 R
GSRRP/000378
USB00821
GSRRP/000336
GSRRP/000722
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EXHIBIT2
Materials Considered

BAtes Range

Document Name
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

012456
SARMC02163-238
SH2436
SARMC06442-480
GSRRP/000884
SARMC00125
021742-743
SARMC00758
SARMC00385
GSRRP/000999
IMIRP/001166-001282
SARMC00175
SARMC01472

MRI Exhibit 4212
MRT Exhibit 4226
MRl Exhibit 4246
MRl Exhibit 4247
MRT Exhibit 43 I6
MRI Exhibit 4327
MRI Exhibit 4332
MRl Exhibit 4337
MRI Exhibit 4338
MRI Exhibit 4344
MRl Exhibit 4350
MRI Exhibit 4357
MRI Exhibit 4377
MRI Exhibit 4417
MRI Exhibit 4518
MRI Exhibit 4519
MRI Exhibit 4521
MRl Exhibit 4522
MRI Exhibit 4524
MRT Exhibit 4525
MRI Exhibit 4526
SARMC Exhibit 0051
SARMC Exhibit 0052
SARMC Exhibit 0053
SARMC Exhibit 0054
SARt\1C Exhibit 0055
SARMC Exhibit 0056
SAR1\1C Exhibit 0057
SARMC Exhibit 0058
SAR1\1C Exhibit 0059
SARMC Exhibit 0060
SARMC Exhibit 0066
SARMC Exhibit 0405
SARMC Exhibit 0406
SARMC Exhibit 0407
SARMC Exhibit 0408
SARMC Exhibit 0409

USB01019
USBOOI63
USB00177
USB00179
USB00210
USB00378
USB00183
USB00191
USB00369
USB00357
SARMC07417
033708
033711
033712
033724
033729
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EXHIBIT2

Materials Considered

Bates Range

Document Name
• SARMC Exhibit 0466

001692

• SARMC Exhibit 0517
• SARMC Exhibit 0564

GSR/0593
024023

• SARi\1C Exhibit 0566
• SARMC Exhibit 0591
• SARMC Exhibit 0594
•
•
•
•

Trial Exhibit 4062
Trial Exhibit 4101
Trial Exhibit 4122
Trial Exhibit 4137

IMIRP/000811
032441
SARMC00640-641
SARMC01240-242, 00635·
639,00964-973

• Trial Exhibit 4148

Trial Transcripts
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Official Transcript
Testimony Transcript of Jeff Cliff. August 8, 28 and 29, 2007.
Testimony Transcript of Cindy Schamp. August 15 and 27, 2007.
Testimony Transcript of Manfred R. Steiner. August 23, 2007.
Testimony Transcript of Samuel Gibson. August 23, 2007.
Testimony Transcript of Mary Elizabeth River. August 28, 2007.
Testimony Transcript of Bruce Anderson. August 29, 2007.
Testimony Transcript of David Peter Reedy. August 29, 2007.
Testimony Transcript of Banducci. August 20, 2007.
Testimony Transcript of Charles A. Wilhoite. August 21, 2007.
Testimony Transcript of Bruce Budge. August 20, 2007.
Testimony Transcript of David James Giles. August 20, 21 and 22,
2007.
• Testimony Transcript of Sandra Bruce. August 13, 2007.
• Testimony Transcript of James Prochaska. August 7, 2007.
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EXHIBITJ

Mr. Budge's But-For MRI Center and MRI Mobile Facilitiell
Assumed Annual Scan Volumes

Calf!!!.adon M!lhod # l:

MRI Center actual scans
IMI Downtown actual scans
IMI Saint Alpbonsus actual scans
MRI Center but-for scaDS

....l22L

~

2001

.2!llL

~

...1!!!L

9,418
434

8,371
2,033

9,548
3,011

9,737
2,600

8,794
2,180

7;J69
1,950

9,852

10,404

12,559

12,337

10,974

2.060
2,060

4J:67
4,267

IMI Meridian actual scans
MRI Mobile Meridiau but-for scans

~

....l!!!L ..1!!!L

~ ~ ~

9,319

5,651
1,667
62
7,380

2,850
1,548
2,922
7,320

2.139
1,713
4,478
8,330

1,608
1,589
4,768
7,965

7,772

1,258
1,615
6,123
8,996

5,886
5,886

6.966
6,966

7,680
7,680

7,085
7,085

4,649
4,649

4,687
4,687

4,567
4,567

973
973

3,865
3,865

3,923
3,923

4,>74

IMI Eagle actual scans
MRI Mobile Eagle but-for scaas

877
1,520
5~75

4~74

Cofa.fi!Jii!!J Mf!!Jg,d #1;

MRI Center actual scans
IMI Downtown actual scans
IMI Saint Alpbonsus actual scans
MRI Ceoter bot-for sc:aas

9,418

9,418

8)71

8.J71

9,548
1,540

9,737
2,600

8,794

11,088

12.337

10,974

2,060
2,060

4J:67
4,267

IMI Meridian actual scans
MRI Mobile Meridiau bot-for scaas

2,180

7;J69
1,950

1,258
1,615
6,123
8,996

2,850
1,548
2922
7,320

2,139
1,713
4478
8,330

1,608
1,589
4,768
7,965

877
1,520
5)75

9.319

5,651
1,667
62
7,380

5,886
5,886

6,966
6,966

7,680
7,680

7,085
7,085

4,649
4,649

4,687
4,687

4,567
4,567

973

973

3 865
3,865

3923
3,923

4374
4,374

877
1,520

IMI Eagle actual scans
MRI Mobile Ea:Je but·for scaDS

7.m

CgJ,cllf.iJ.I!J.n Mdh2ri.I!J.;

MRI Center actual scans
IMI Downtown actual scans
lM1 Saint Alpbonslls actual scans
MRI Ceoter bot-for scaas
lM1 Meridian actual scans
MRI Limited MeridiaD but-for seaos

9,418
434

8,371
2.033

9,548
3,011

9,737
2,600

8,794
2,180

7,369
1,950

9,852

10,404

12,559

12.337

10,974

1,184
1,184

2~40

2,340

1M! Eagle actual scans
MRI Limited Eacle but-for SC:IIIIS

Page lof2

9,319

5,651
1,667
62
7,380

2,850
1,548
2,922
7,320

2,139
1,713
4,478
8,330

1,608
1,589
4,768
7,965

1,m

1,258
1,615
6,123
8,996

2,832
1,831

2,989
2,989

3,069
3,069

2,930
2,930

1,887
1,887

1,897
1,897

1,815
1,815

374
374

1420
1,420

1489
1,489

1,621
1,621

5~75
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EXHIBIT3

Mr. Budge's But-For MRI Center and MRI Mobile Facilities
Assumed Annual Scan Volumes

__!!22_
QdsJt.lation Methb« #4:
MRI Center acQlal scans
IMI Downtown acQlal scans
1MI Saint Alpbonsus acQlal scans
MRI CtDttr but·for scaDS

9,418

9,418

...2!!!!L
8,371

8,371

__!2!!.!_

.22!!L. ....1!!2L

~ _2!!2L

....l!!!!L _2!!2L.

9,548

9,737

8,794

7,369

5,651

2,850

2,139

1,608

877

1,258

1,540

2,600

2,180

1,950

1,667

1,548

1,589

1,520

62

~922

1,713
4,478

4,768

51315
7,m

1,615
6,123

11,088

1MI Meridian acQlal scans
MRl Limited Meridian but-for seaas

12,337

10,971

9,319

7,380

7,320

8,330

7,965

I 184

2,340

2832

2.989

3069

2930

I 887

1,184

2,340

2,832

2,989

3,069

2,930

1,887

374

i/74

1MI Eagle actual scans
MRI Limited Eagle but-for SC8DS

C!lcu.lllll<m M•tlu>dtiS:
MRI Center acQlal scans
IMI Saint Alpbonsus acQlal scans
MRl Ceattr but-ror SC3II5

IMI Downtown acQlal scans
MRI Limited Do..,to"" but-ror sans

9,418

8,371

__l!!!!L ~ _l!!!L

9,548

9,737

8,794

7,369

8,996

1.897
1,897

I 815
1,815

1420

1489

1621

1,420

1,489

1,611

1.258
6,123

5.651

2,850

2,139

1,608

877

62

2 922

4478

4,768

5,375

9,418

8,371

9,S48

9,737

8,794

7,369

5,713

5,m

6,617

6,376

6,252

7,381

651

3,048

4,486

4,126

3,916

3,664

3,274

3,586

4,057

4,110

3,928

3,917

651

3,018

4,486

4,126

3,916

3,661

3.•274

3,586

4,057

4,110

3,928

3,917

2 060

4,267

5,886

7680

7 085

4,649

4,687

4567

2,060

4,267

5,886

6966
6,966

7,680

7,085

4,619

4,687

4,567

1MI Meridian actual scans
MRI Mobile Meridian but-for scoas
IMI Eagle actual scans
MRI Mobile Eat:Ie but·for scans

973

3 865

3.923

4,374

973

3,865

3,923

4,374

Sourees:
Budge Supplemental Report. Schodules II, 11.2, I 1.3, 11.4, 11.5 and 12.
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EXHIBJT4

Mr. Budge's But-For MRl Center and MRI Mobile Facilities
Assumed Sbare ofJMI's Actual Scau Volumes

Csl--lntimt Mft.&eJ!.#I:

JMI Downtown
JMIMeridian
JMI Saint Alphomus Campus
lMI EasJe
Tob11

...!222....

.2!!!!!L

~

..1m..

69 %

69 %

67 %

69

69

67

63 %
100

_1Q!L
56 %
100

..1.!!2i..
53 %
100

..1IJ!!L
51 %
100
100

_l!!!!L
43 %
100
100

75

79

82

84

86

63
100

56
100

53
100

51
100
100

43
100
100

67

75

79

82

84

86

67

63
51

56

53

ss

48

51
43
100

43
40
100

67

61

55

50

46

5]

67

63
51

56
55

53
48

51
43
100

43
40
100

67

61

55

so

46

5]

~

..1!!!...

~

..ill.!!...

42 %
100
100
100
86

39 %
100
100
100
16

39 %
100
100
100
87

41 %
100
100
100
88

42
100
100
100
86

39
100
100
100
86

39
100
100
100
87

41
100
100
100
88

42
41
100
38
57

39
41
100
37
56

39
40
100
38
57

41
40
100
37
59

42
41
100
38
57

39
41
100
37
56

39
40
100
38
57

41
40
100
37
59

Calet:€a!i£.. M.fi!Hll. 11a:
lMI Downtown
lMI Meridian
lMI Saint Alphonous Campus
lMI EasJe
Total

67

'

CBltrils M.'!J.hoti~J:
1M! Downtown
lMI Meridian1
lMI Saint Alphonous CamptlS
JMI Eagle
Tobit

69

69

69

69

Caletlllie.t! Mgjyzsi f:!.:
JMI Downtown
JMI Meridian'
1M1 Saint Alphonsus Campus
IMIEagle
Total

Ca!CM/Ie!en Method liS:
1M1 Downtown
IMI Meridian
1M! Saint Alphonous Campus
IMIEagle
Tobit

103

103

100

100
100

100
100

100
100

100
100
100

100
100
100

100
100
100
100

100
100
100
100

100
100
100
100

100
100
100
100

103

103

100

/00

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100
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EXH1BIT4

Mr. Budge's But-For MRI Center and MRI Mobile Facilities
Assumed Share ofiMI's Actual Sua Volumes

1

Mr. Budge's Schedules 10.3 and 10.4 report total IMI Meridian scans of4,265. I 11SC4,267 scans here to be consistent with Mr. Budge's Schedules 10, 10.2 and 10.5.
Mr. Budgc'sCaloulation Methods #2 and #4 include lost scans os ofJuly 1, 2001, so 2001 pcrcc:rllageS arc: ealculatod os a percentage of total July I, 2001 • December 31,2001 scans.
' Due to a difference in his methodologies. Mr. Budge's Method #5 "'ports total actual IMI sesns in 1999 and 2000 as 651 and 3,048, respectively, compared wilh the 632 and 2,959 scans in 1999
and 2000 reported in Methods #I through #4. I rely on the 632 and 2,959 totals.

1

Soarces:
Budge Supplemental Report. Schedules II, 11.2, I 1.3, 11.4, 11.5 and 12.
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EXHIBITS

Physicians Included on Mr. Budge's List of Affiliated Referring Physicians
Who Have Staff Privileges at St. Luke's Medical Centers
1.

2.
3.
4.

s.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.

II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

ANDERSEN, BRUCE J
BEASLEY, DONALD J
BISHOP, JOHN E
BORUP, MARK D
BOSTICK, MARC W
CARE, STEVEN B
CHANDLER, JEFFREY L
COLLINS, PAUL C
DAINES JR, JOSEPH G
DOERR, TIMOTHY E
EAST, N. JOHN
FENDER, FRED W
GAMBOA, JOHN E
GILBREATH, ERIC C
GREENWALD, NANCY E
GROSS, DOMINIC L
HENBEST, MICHAEL L
HERROLD, JAMES M
JOHANS, TIMOTHY J
JOHNSON, MARK
JOHNSTON, JAMES M
JONES, MARGARET M
JUTZY, RONALD E
KLOSS, JOHN G
KRISTENSEN, RONALD M
LAWLER, CHRISTOPHER
LEWER, GREGORY S

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

LUQUE, MARION
MAIER, ERIC
MAIER, MICHAEL K
MAUGHAN, DELRAY R
MCGEE, DENNIS R
MENZNER, JEFFRY P
MILLER, MARK R
MOCK,DALEL
MOORE, MONTE H
MOORE, RICHARD E
NEGRON, ROBERTO A
NEWCOMBE, EDWARD H
NOVAK, CHARLES C
PALMER, KYLE L
POGUE, BRYAN C
POOLE, COLIN E
SCH\V ARZ, MATTHEW B
SCHWEIGER, GREGORY P
SERIO, CATHERINE D
SMITH, DOUGLAS E
STUBBS, LESLIE J
THOMPSON, E GREG
UNDESSER, KARL P
WADE, GEORGE A
WALKER, ROBERT N
WATERS, STANLEY J
ZIMMERMAN, CHRISTIAN

Note:
Physicians listed in Mr. Budge's Schedule 18 were compared with j>hysicians appearing on the St. Luke's medical
staff directories at St. Luke's Boise Medical Center and St. Luke's Meridian Medical Center. Physicians were
matched on a first and last name basis.

Sou•·ces:
Budge Supplemental Report. Schedule 18.
St. Luke's Meridian and St. Luke's Boise Medical Centers. (www.stlukesonline.org)
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EXHIBIT6

MRI Facilities in the Boise Area
Coml!an~

Location

Imaging Services

MRI Center of ldnho/MRI Mobile
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
i 11 MRl Magnet
2nd MRI Magnet
West Valley Medical Center
Mercy Medical Center
II Mobile Units

Caldwell
Nampa
Multiple locations

MRl only
MRlonly
MRI only

1985
approx. 1998
1988
before 1999
n.a.

St. L11ke's Health System
St. Luke's Boise Medical Center
St. Luke's Meridian Medical Center
Downtown Boise
Eagle

Boise
Meridian
Boise
Eagle

Multi-modal
Multi-modal
Multi-modal
Multi-modal

1986
2001
approx. 2003
2008

Boise
Meridian

Multi-modal
Multi-modal

1999

lntermormta/11 Medical lmagl11g
Downtown Boise
Meridian
I" MIU Magnet
2nd MIU Magnet 2
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
Eagle 2

Boise

Closing Year

Ol!enlng Year

MR!only

Boise
Eagle

MRionly
Multi-modal

2002
2004
2005
2007

Treas11re Jlal/ey Imaging

Boise

Multi-modal

approx. 1995

Intemromrtain Orthopedics

Boise

MRlonly
3

1

2007

between 1996 & 1998

2011

1999

approx. 2007
2010

N)'dic Open MRI ofAmerica

Boise

MRlonly

Boise Orthopedic Clinic

Boise

n.a.

2000

West ldal1o Orthopedics & Sports llletllclne

Caldwell

MRI only 4

2001

Adl'allced Open Imaging

Meridian

MRionly

before 2005
4

Pimtacle Imaging Center

Meridian

MRI only

Salfzer Imaging

Nampa

Multi-modal

Sage Diagnosdcs & Imaging

Meridian

MRI only

before 2005
approx. 2006
after 2006

1

The St. Luke's Eagle Medical Plaza opened in 2008. MRI services were offered at this location on or soon after the Plaza's opening date.
IMI Meridian's second MRI magnet was moved from the Meridian facility to the Eagle facility in 2007.
3 lnfonnation is not available on whether this facility offered imaging services other than MRI while it was in operation.
4
These locations also offer x-ray imaging services.
2

Note: n.a. denotes infonnation not available.
Sour(es: Internet searches, telephone interviews with MRI facilities, newspaper articles, Blue Cross and Blue Shield data sets, PMI scan data,
and interviews with Jeff Cliff.
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EXHIBIT7

Comparison of Service Areas Based on Rank of Patient Zip Codes
January 2007- March 2011
Rank
City

Zip Code

State

MRICenter

L\11

L'HI

L\11

L\11

Downtown

Meridian

Saint Alphonsus

Eagle

I

83709
83704
83705

Boise
Boise
Boise

ID
JD
ID

2

2

3
6

3

4

15

83642

Meridian

JD

4

It

83686

Natnpa
Mountain Home

JD
JD
ID
ID

s

15

6
7
8
9

12

I
4
21

83647
83617
83714
83646
83651
83605
83706
83301
83702
83607
83687
83703
83713
83634
83616
83716
83661
97814
97914
83669
83672
83338
83712
83644
83638
83611
83619
83318
83676
83660
97913
83622
83655
83629
83639
83316
83641
83707
83628
97918

Emmell
Garden City
Meridian
Nampa
Caldwell
Boise
Twin Falls
Boise
Caldwell
Nampa
Boise
Boise
Kuna
Eagle

1

20

II

16

s

19
12

20

II

ID

12

1

lD
ID

13
14

TO

15

ID

7
20

ID

16
17
18
19

22
5
21
16
7
9
17
14
8

ID

ID

20

ID
ID
OR

21
22

McCall
Cascade
Fruitland
Burley
Wilder

ID

Horseshoe Bend
Marsing
Buhl

ID

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

ID

40

ID

Melba
Boise
Homedale

ID
ID
ID

41
42
43
44

Vale

OR

45

OR
ID
ID
ID

ID
ID

lD
ID

!D
ID

Parma

ID

Nym

OR
ID
ID

Page I of2

"9

9

10

lD

I

24
8

ID
ID

I

21'

II

t4
t8
13
10

8
10

12

22

14

21
27

24

28

s

23
17
26

13
24
28

6
2
17
19
12

18
8
6
16

24

27
26

3
4
II
7

13

14
13
2
9

6

3

15
21
7
10
19
17

10
18
19

ID

Boise
Payellc
Baker City
Ontario
Star
Weiser
Jerome
Boise
Middleton

Garden Valley
New Plymouth

3

18

s
IS

tl

16

22

23

23

20
26

27

25
22
25

29
25

28
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EXHIBIT7

Comparison of Service Areas Based on Rank of Patient Zip Codes
January 2007 -March 2011
Rank
Zip Code

97720
83612
83330
83631
83350
83336
83355
83467
83719
1

Cit;r
Burns
Council
Gooding
Idaho City
Rupert
Heyburn
Wendell
Salmon
Boise

State

MRICcntcr

OR

46

ID
ID
ID
ID
ID
ID
ID
ID

47
48
49

IMI
Domttown

L\11

1\11

Meridian

Saint Alphonsus

L\11
Eagle

23

50
51

52

53

The top zip code for the IMl Saint Alphonsus center represents the P.O. Box for the hospital. This indicates that the patients associated
with this zip code represent inpatients. In tho case of the IMI Saint Alpbonsus facility, zip code with rank of2 has also been boxed.

Source:
PMl scan data.

Page2 of2
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EXHIBITS

Physicians Included on Mr. Budge's List of Atliliated Referring Physicians
Who Split Their Referrals Between IMI Facilities and MRl Center
January 2006 to March 2011
January 2006 to
Marc:b2011

I.

Number of physicians on Mr. B11dge's list of affiliated physicians

269

I

who referred patients to either IMI facilities or MRI Center

II. Nwnber of physicians on Mr. Budge's list of affiliated physicians
who referred patients to both IMI facilities and MRI Center

III. Percentage of physicians on Mr. Budge's list of affiliated physicians
who referred patients to both IMI facilities and MRI Center

1

Mr. Budge's list of affiliated referring physicians incl11ded 290 names. Of this total, 269 referred
any scans to either the MRI Center or IMI during the relevant time period. Mr. Budge's list
included seven instances of duplicate names and one instance in which the physician's name
was listed as "Other." These were not included in the analysis above.

2

IMl facilities include those located at downtown Boise, Meridian, Saint Alphonsus and Eagle.

35%

Note: The matching of physicians between Mr. Budge's list of affiliated physicians, the PM! data for
MRI Center and the PMI data for IMl was based on physicians' first, middle. and last names.
Sources: Budge Supplemental Report. Schedule 18.
PMI scan data.
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EXHIBIT9

Time Line of Key Events
Date

Event

5/13/98

GSR radiologists agreed to open theh' own outpatient imaging facility. 1

7/20/98

GSR bought the land and building for its IMI downtown Boise facility. 2

8/20/98

GSR radiologists met with Saint Alphonsus CEO, Ms. Sandra Bruce,
and announced their plans to open an outpatient imaging facility. 3

9/07/99

IMI opened its downtown Boise facility. 4

Aug. 2000

Dr. Giles left GSR. 5

Early 2001

Land purchased for IMI's Meridian facility. 6

7/01/01

Saint Alphonsus bought a 50 percent interest in IMI's non-MRI
business. 7

5/23/02

IMI opened its Meridian facility. 8

4/01/04

Saint Alphonsus dissociated fi·om MRIA.9

1/03/05

MRI Center and MRI Mobile terminated GSR as a reader. 10

4/01/05

Saint Alphonsus' non-compete restriction with MRIA expired. 11

12/21/05
Apr. 2006
10/01107

IMI opened its facility on the Saint Alphonsus campus. 12
Saint Alphonsus bought a 50 percent interest in IMI's MRI business. 13
IMI opened its Eagle facility. 14

1

Exhibit 0517.
Giles, 8-21-07, pp. 3005-3008.
3
Giles, 8-21-07, pp. 3055-3057.
4
PMI scan data; Cliff, 8-8-07, p. 1488.
s Exhibit 4183.
6
Cliff, 8-28-07, p. 3912.
7
Prior court opinion, p. 9; Cliff, 8-28-07, p. 3918.
8
PMI scan data; Cliff, 8-28-07, p. 3878.
9
Prior court opinion, p. 9.
10
Exhibit 4357.
11
Saint Alphonsus Magnetic Resonance Imaging Update Trinity Review. August 25, 2005. [SARMC00302]
12
PMI scan data.
13
Cliff, 8-29-07, p. 4096.
14
PMI scan data.
2
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EXHIBIT 12

List of Variables Used for Regression Analysis
Based on Annual Data
Dependant Variable

MRI Center Scans

Description

Annual number ofMRI Center scans

Explanatot·y Variables

Trend
IMI Downtown Interaction
IMI Meridian Interaction
GSR Interaction

Natural logarithm of time trend
IMI downtown Boise facility interaction term
IMI Meridian facility interaction term
GSR interaction term
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EXHIBIT 13

Regression Analysis ofMRI Center Scan Volume
Based on Annual Data and Newey-West Standard Errors
1985-2010
Explanatoa:y Variable

Estimate

Intercept
Trend
IMI Downtown Interaction
IMI Meridian Interaction
GSR Interaction

487.98
2,175.43
445.85
(503.55)
(2,065.80)

t-ratio
1.39
14.86
2.68
(2.52)
(6.18)

*
*
*
*

Observations= 26
R-Square = 0.88

* Significant at the 1% leveL
Source:
Budge Supplemental Report, Schedule 11.
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EXHIBJT14

Impact oo Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite's Damage Estimates
IMI Saint Alphonsos and Eagle Facilities Woald Have Existed Anyway in The But-For World

Method#!

Mr. Badge's PIISI Lost Pro.fi/8 EstimBU!s

!MI Saint Alpbonsus facility
!MI Eagle facility

Metllodll4

46,321,0$7

4!,874,369

!/,6!9,415

29,192,747

10,724.466

10,724,466
4,237 522

10,724,466

10,724,466

516~63

516 363

14,961,988

11,240.829

11,240,829

4.237.S22

Amount Ptut DimuJgl!:l Should Be Redua:d

Mctbod#3

Metbod#l

14,961,988

Altei'Dativo B
Method#!

Mr. W/llroW!'s FUIJU'e LosJ Proflls Estimlltl!:l

1

!MI Saint Alpbonsus facility
IMI Eagle facility
Amount FIIJIVe /Jdmagl!:l Shotdd Be kduced

1

s

Melllod#l

Melbod#l

Method Ill

1!,731,020

1!,7!1,020

9,321,872

9,321,872

5,234,791
3 576,397

5,234,791

5,234,791

5,234,791

3.$76(197

1,328(161

1,328(161

8,8Il,188

8,811,188

6,56!,152

6,56!,152

These reductions do not consider Mr. Wilhoite's additional estimate of!ost management fees, !Iince he has double counted these omounts.

Sources:
Budge Supplem<nlal Report. Schedules 2, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.
Wilhoite Supplemental Report. Exhibits 1·1 and 1-2.
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EXHffiiTlS

Impact on Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite's Damage Estimates
IMI Saint Alphonsus, Eagle and Downtown Boise Facilities Would Have Existed Anyway in The But-For World

Method #1

Mr. Budge's Past Lost Profits Estimates

1M! Saint Alphonsus facility
lMI Eagle facility
Amount Past Damages ShOilld Be Redllced
IMI downtown Boise facility
Amount Past Damages Should Be Further Reduced

s

46,321,037

Method #2

s

43,874,369

Metbod#4

Method #3

$

31,639,415

$

29,192,747

10,724,466
4,237,522

10.724.466
4.237.522

10,724.466
516 363

10.724,466
516 363

14,961,988

14,961,988

Il,240,829

11,240,829

12,297,432

9.850,764

12.297.432

9,850,764

12,297,432

9,850,764

12,297,432

9,850,764

AltemativeB
Method #1
Mr. W'dhoite's Future Lost ProfitS Estimates J
IMI Saint Alphonsus
IM!Eagle
Amount Future Damages Should Be Reduced

1M! downtown Boise facility
Amount Future Damages Should Be Further Redllced

13,731,020

13,731,020

Method Ill

Method #2

Method#!

$

9,321,872

$

9,321,872
5,234,791
1.328,361

5,234,791
3,576,397

5,234,791
3.576,397

5,234,791
1,32!_,361

8,811,188

8,811,188

6,563,152

6,563,152

1.309,887

1.309,887

1,309.887

1.309,887

1,309,887

1,309,887

1,309,887

1,309,887

' These reductions do not consider Mr. Wilhoite's additional estimate oflost management fees, since he has double counted these amounts.
Soon:es:
Budge Supplemental Report. Schedules 2, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.

Wilhoite Supplemental Report. Exhibits 1-1 and 1-2.
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EXHIBrri6

Impact ou Mr. Budge's Estimated FuDy-AIIoeated aDd Variable Profit Margins'
Correction for Understated Costs
~
I\IRICentcr bdJl1y

__!222._ __l!!!!!L_ ~ ~ ___J!!!L_ ~

Gross Roccipts/Net R.eveoue
Variobl< Mafsio'

7,263,744

Variobl< Expenses
1
1- Paricnt aill~
T01ol Varillblo Expoasos
AdjUSI<d Varioblo MorgU>

2,311,806
94,204
2,406,010

li\IIM<ridbafaoml)'

68.2%

7,017,658
72.3%

8,305,515

1,946,071
113,903
2,059.974
70.6%

2,081,780

74.9%

127,7()1

2,209,481

1,913,913
66.0%

1.219,782
66.0%

826,152
57.6%

397,764

2,505,729
98,175
2,603,904

2,246,160
79,656
2,325,816
69.0%

1,536,528
63,402

1,510,909
46,176
1,557,085

1,128,017
20,963

955,528
12,890
9611,418

720.1~5

657,299
4,386
661,685

~

~

___!!!!.._ ~ ~ ~ ___!!!L_ ~ ~

TOIIIE>q>e11ies
+ Ma1::iagemcDt Ferl'
+Supplies DR1
+DR-Cont'
+SitcAdtniDisb'ator'
+Telepbooc1
+Courier scmc:e~
A<ljuslod Totol E>pcnsos

Net lncome Before Dcproeiolioo oncll.....,.

AdjQStod% of Amow>1s Paid

4,437,490
66.0%

64.9%

%of AmouDts Pak1

-!-Expense

_!\!!!Z._

6.015,825
74.5%

64.9%

73.4%

7

Nctlnc:omc

_!!!!L_

7,500,357
70.1%

64.9%

66.9%

Total~

+ Dcprcciatioa oo MRI Ikviccs

-2!!2L.

7,936,914
68.4%

67.2%

8.190
728,355

~

~

3,943,194
59.4%

5.255,624
62.7%

5,601,108
63.9%

6,072.202
61.9%

5,751,832
59.9%

D.&

703,499
19,318

1,708,597
80,258
89
10,219
25,180
183

2.083,581
63,978

2,193,465
79,841

2.347,865
56.758

2,476,0:;4
58,618

D.L

53.029
25,232
1,903

64,195
28,051
1,591

20,213
28.339

94,044
30,051
7,368

_,WL ~

1.892
~

~

~

--1!!.'!!..

750,297

1,831,574

2.230.172

2,369,479

2.456,735

2,668,084

1,164.798

2.111.620

3,025,452

3,231,629

3,615,468

3.083,748

129,933
116.896

223,167
116.896

30t.m
177,629

347,943
177,629

351,815
177,629

345,703
177.629

1,177,835

2,218,591

3,149,595

3,401,943

3,789,653

3,251,822

61.5%

56.3%

59.9"-'

Page I ofS

60.7%

62.4%

56.5%

~

~

559,379

5~.7%

59~~

66.7%

344,750
3,639
348,389

.---s6.N' .--- .

1,915,095
63.9".

151
14,791
290

--------

73.4%

.2!!!L -2!!!!-

.2!!!L
52.3%

86,531

55.9%

S8.3%

~

~

..
.

~

S1.S%
~

0,&

53.8%

....

98,940

91.884

67,883
8,878

159.430
169,180
62,767

17~.857

~

~

--l.2dlL

146,439

....
....
....
.....

49.4%

....
....
.......
....

48.6%

65.5%

58.8%

84,802
66,386

....

.

~

...
0.&

...

SO.&%

56.2%
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EXHmD'l6

Impact oo Mr. Budge's Estimated Folly-ADocated aod Variable Profit Margios1
Correetioa for Understated Costs

__!.!!!_~-2!!1!.___1!!!L_~__!!!L___!!!!L_~~

T0131R.eveDUC'
%of Amouats Paid1u

998,417

TOI>IE><pe+ MIDipmcat Fce 11
.. Supplies DR11

354,020
9,715

67.1'~

+DR Maimcaacc Coct11

750
5,'12S
313

+Site Administrat~ 1

+Tcl~ 11
11
+CcuricrSmi~:~:
AqjvatedTOO>IExpmiCS

_.1!L
370.909
627.508

Net locomc BcfOR Doprooia!ica ODd IDI=st

·~415

16,069

~

....
....

58.6%

2I:2L .2!!!....

....

57.7%

....

60.9'.4

60.3%

....

86,S3l

83,886

78,757

138.189
61.883
l,151

10~485

145,011
53,785

72.126
151.592
S6.ll02

-1:2!!..

~

__.WL

....
....
....
....

..•..•

~

....

D.L

6Sl,854

NctiDCOme

65.4%

Plot;!:2of8

57.1%

S6.3% '

51.8".4'

59.4%
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EXHIBif16

lmpaet on Mr. Badge's Estimated FaDy-AIIocated and Variable Profit Margins'
Correction for Understated Costs
M'thmf.~

Jd 4

MRI c..tcrf..Wty

em.. R<c<ipts/NetRcvawc
Variabh: M:qin

12

Variable~

•PlllicclBillioa>'
Tota!Variobl<:Expeoses
Adji.Ad Variable Mar;in
IM1 Mcricliaa r.dlity

_!!!L_ __!!!!L_ ~ ~ ~ ~ __l!!!!.L_
7.lQ,744
68.2%
2,)11,806
94,204
2.406 OlO
66.9%

--l..W._

7,017,6~8

72.3%

~,SIS

74.9%

1,946,071
ll3,903

2,081,780
127,701

2 059974

~

70.6%

73.4%

...2!!!!2.- -2!!2!.-

Tota!Revccuc
%of AmouDls Paid 13

Total El<poascs
+ Managcmc;m Pte•
+Supplies DRM
+OR Mom......., CorJ'
+SitcAdmini_.
+TdQPb.ooc"
+ Courier SGI'Yicc11
Adj""'ed TOOl! El<poascs
Not Income: BefOre DcprcQacioo lllld IDtcRst
+ OcpecialioD oa MIU o.Mccs

·lntcrostExpenso:
Nethlcnmc
AdjD$1Cd% of-"'-" !':lid

7,936.914
68.4%

7,500,357
70.1%

6,015,825
74.5%

4,437,490
66.0%

2,505,?29
98,17S
2,603,904

2,246,160
79,6l<l

1,536,528

1,510,909
46,176

2,32S,816

1,599,930
73.4%

67.2"'.

~

64.9%

~ ~ ~ __l!!!!.L_

~

..1!!L.

1126,152
51,6%

397,764
56.7%

559,)79

651,299
4,)86
661,685
~ ~ ~
64.9% •
64.9'.4 •
SS.9%
S6,7% '

344,750
3,639

~

1.913,913
66.0%

1,219,'1$2
66.0%

1,128,017
20,963

955,52&
12.890

-l!!!L-

~

3,943,194
59.4%

5.255,624
63.9%

5,601,108
65.0%

6.072.202
62.9%

~.7Sl,832

703,499
19,318

1,7011.~97

80,258

2.083,S81
63,978

2,193,465
79,841

2,347.86S
56,758

2,476,034
511.618

89
10,219
25,180

53,029

lS.232

64,195
28,051
1,591

20,213
28,339
1,892

94,044
30,051
7.368

lSI

290

183

1,903

~

~

3,231,629

3.615,468

3,083,748

347,943

116,896

351.815
116.896

345,703
116,896

3,462,676

3,850,386

3,312,555

~ ~ ~~
750,297

l,83l,S74

2,230,1?2

2,369,479

1,164,798

2.111,620

3,025,452

129,933
116,896

223,867
116.896

30t,m
116,896

1,177,835

2.218,591

3,210,328

61.5%

56.3%

61.1%

PIIIF3 ofS

60.9%

61.8%

2.456.735

63.4%

2.6611.084

51.6%

~

....
....

53.2%

4

~

66.7%

~

511.3% •

65.5%

..1!!L.

a.a
52,4%

59.6%

54.8%

....

86,:531

98,940

91.884

146,439
67,883
8,878

159,430
169,180
62,767
12,990
a. a

84,802
176,857
66,386
10,410

~

~

~9.3%

?20,165
11.190

•

1,915,095
63.9%

14,791

--------

69.0%

63.402

..2!!!!!...

-l!!!L-

u

........
$0.3%

.......

...

49.6% ~

....

...
SU%"

57.0%
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EXHIBIT16

Impact oa Mr. Budge's Estimated Fully-Alloeared and Variable Profit MargiDs 1
Corrcetioa for Understated Costs
Mrdwd.~14

4
Eacltfacility

%of AtnwDts Paid "

998.417
67.1%

Toml Expense•
11
+~Fce

3$4,020
9,715

Tomll!ewoue
1

+Supplies OR 11
+DR. Maio.tctlanCC Cont 11
+Site Adminislntor11
+Tolcpbooe11
+Courier Scrvioe11
A<!jutcd Tolol....,._

75G
S,72S
313

-------

------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ----

~
370,909

....
....

S8.6%

41,415
16,069

.. tn~~

60.3%

86,531

83.886

138,139
67.883
:!,lSI

lG~485

'12.126

l45,0ll
53,785

1Sl,S92

~

~

......!.m..

....

627,508

+ Depredation oa MRl Devices

S7.7%

....
....

....

78,757

56,902

....

....
....

652,854

NcilDCOme

65.4%

A<!jliSicd%ofAmow>IIPaid

P'8'4of8

57.1%

60.9%

....

56.3%

SS.S%

.

59.4%
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EXHIBIT16

Impad on Mr. Budge's Estimated Fully-Allocated and Variable Profit MargiDs1
Correction for Understated Costs
~

IMJDowa-.BoaefaciHty

--..illL

Total Revalue
%of AIDOWJts Paid.u

553.352
56.0%

Toaoll!xpenscs
+~tF"k>
+Supplies DR"

270.237

........
....
....

TOR~Coct"
+Site A.dmi.nisrnlor16

+Telcpbonc:tri

+ Cooricr Servicek>

n.A

...!l:!o-

Adjllstcd Total ExpcJoscs

270.237

+ Dcpn;ciation on MRl Ocviocs

-~-~
NctlDComc

Adj111<Cd% o f - Paid

__.1!!!._

~

3,Sl1,68:l
60.3%

··~S2.1%

1,398,227
56,158

1,53$,946

u
86,531

19.963
28,339
2,464

94,044

....1!!!!L-

3,827.2.0
61.2%

3,400,969
60.4%

2,798,342
60.0%

>.IJ93.67S

1,597,720
75,654
183
43,183
25,1'19
3.284

1,642,895
63,978

1,344,001
79.841

54.295

60.22S
28.051
2,007

2.591,834

62.8%

......
.......

1,050.2.0

_....___
1,050.2.0

3,930,832

64.5%
1,491,918

lll,618
2.193
38.099
65.161
8,68:1

3,715,869
63,6%

1,464.251
41;J.n
714
42.521
44,971

5,281

~ ~
1,732,003
1,619,824

---1m...
1,753,059

ln:rcrcsttncomc
Net Jacome Before Dcproc:iation t

~

~ ___1!!!!!.._ __.!!!.!!._ ~ ~

25.232
2.713

~ ~
I,S!S,433
1.m.m

60.1%

~
1,507,418

58.618

30.051
2.260

--12a..

83.279

119,894

74.205

12.918

1.541.594

2,191,829

2,096,045

2,074,181

1.693.475

1,.02,803

1.660.462

1.811,712

66).58
39,331

204.871
117,992

212,515
117,992

229,026
117,992

230,929
117,992

329,141
117,992

221,619
117,992

222.935

243,228
117,992

310,042

1,628.473

2.293.412

2.207,079

2,187,118

1.904.~4

1,506,430

1.m.397

1,936.948

62.83%

58.34%

59.-

57,IS%

S6.00%

53.113%

60.88%

~

1,722,888

283,m

56.03%

146,439
67,ll!3
2,493

55.00',0

.2!l!!L 2.!L

.

S1.9%

....

65,631

98,553
120.843
44,821
9.279

200.973

u

59.0%

S4.8%

....

68.833

....

~

~

126,327
47,418

__1.ill_
LL
II.L

....
....
....
48.1%

....
....
47.3%

....
ILL

49.4%

55.4%
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EXB1Blfl6

lmp.oet on Mr. Budge's Estimated Fully-ADocatcd and Variable Profit Margins'

Correction for Understated Costs
!!l.t!!u!il.
IMI McridioD l'acW<y

.....!!!!.....

___2!!!!...._ _2!!.!._ __1!!!!._ ~ ~ ___1!!!!_

Total R.cvcmc 11
%ofAmouo1>Paid

1,91S,09S

TocaiExp=cs
+ Manascmeat Fee'
+Supplies DR'

703,499

1,708,597

19,318

80,2S8
89
10,219
25,180
183

63,9%

.-DR Maim"'""" Co.!'

lSI

TSit<Admlni...,...

14,791

+ Tclcpboac1
+Courier Sen<iee1

290

--------

AdjuotcHOIII Exp=cs

Net 1acomc Ber... Dcprcciatioa one! In""""

+ ~ C11 MRI Deviocs
-1•-l!xpco:o:
Ncrlncomc

AdjU&tc<l%ofAmo<mtsPaid

3,943,194

59.4%

~

___1!!!_

6,072,202
61.9%

5,751,832
59.9%

79,841

2,347,865
56,758

2.476,034
58.618

64,19S
:ZS.OSI
1,591

20.213
:ZS.339
1,892

94,044
30,051
7,368

5,255,624
62.7%

S,60J,l08

2.083,581
63,978

2,193,465

53,029
25,232

1,903

63.9'.0

~ ~ ~ ~
750,297
1,831,574
2.230,172
2.369,479

~
2.456,735

~
2.668,084

1,164,798

2.1ll,620

3,025,452

3,231,629

:3.615,468

3,083,748

1:!9,933
116,896

223,867
116,896

301,m
177,629

347,943
177,629

351.815
177,629

345,703

1,177,835

2,218.591

3,149,595

3,401,943

3.789,653

3.2SI,822

61.5%

56.3%

..2!!!-

~

59.!1%

60.7%

~

.....!!!!!....

....
....

51.5%

86,531

98,940

146,439
67,883
&,873

159,430
169,180
62.767

~

...B2!1J!...

....

53.8%

84.10l
176,857
66,386
10,410

D.L

....

..

....
....

....

....

....

...

62.4%

56.5%

49,4%

48.6%

50.8%

~

~

~

.....!!!!!....

_.!!!!!_

......!!!!L

4,437,490

1,913,913

1.219,782

66.0%

66.0%

66.0%

826,152
57.6%

397,764
56.7%

559,379
59.3%

VariablcE"''''""'
..-Patient Billin,;
Total Variable Exp=cs

1,510,!109
46,176
l,SS7,085
64.9%

1,128.017
20,963

955,528
12,890
968.418
64.9%

720,165
8,190

657.299
4,386

344,750
3,639

A4i-.! Variable-~

--122L.

___2!!!!...._ _2!!.!._

--22!L-

------ ---- ----- ---- ---- -------

Pooc6of8

~
64.9%

.

.

.E£!.L .Jill!.L
S6.7'.4

58.8%

91.884

Oross Rct:cipl'!l!NC1 R.evcnuc
VarillbleM:.rt;in 1'

MRJC...ter

~

o.a

52.3%

177,629

......!!!!L

4

55.9%

.

348,389
SB.:J-M

.

56.2%

61.9%

.

60.9%
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EXHmrrJ6

Impact on Mr. Badge's Estimated FaDy-ADocatcd aad Variable Profit Margills1
Correction for Uaderstated Casts
tJ!t;t/JJJJU

IMJ Eo,:le fadllty

.-l.!!L-

~ ~ ~ __2.!!L_ ~ ~

~

__.!!!!!!_

TObiiRcvcnuc
19
%of Amounts hid

998,417

ToO>IExpcases

354,020
9,7lS

+M~Fc:c

"

750
S,72S
313

+Sitc~ 11
11

------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -------

~
370,909
627,508

Net Jacome Before DcprcciaDoD .aad lotcrcst

41,41!

+ Dcprceiation on MRI Devices
~ lmcrclt Ex:peDse
Not .......
Adjostod%ofAmouotsPoid

PI(I07of8

ft.L

_ill!_ ~

S7.7%

33,856

71,7S7

138.189
67,853
2,1SI

101,41!l
145,011
S3,71S

ISI.$92

~

...

~

....

....

6S2.8S4

D.&

S7.1%

60.9%

60.3%

D.L

86,S31

16.069

6S.4%

~

$8.6'.0

67,1%

+Supplies DR11
+OR Main'!lcoaac:c CQ.rll 11
+Tclcphc:mt;
+CouricJScrvice 1'
AdjostodTOiliiE><pcaKs

~

72.1:16
S6.'l02

...!1.!.!!.. _!.5L

.

u

~

aL

.

56.3%

....
.....
.....

...
SB.I%

.

$9,4%
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EXHIBIT 16

Impael on Mr. Badge's Esliulated FuDy-Ailoc:ated and Variable Profit Margins'
Corre<tion Cor Understated Costs
Notes aDd Sol:nus:

I lludJICSupplcmeolol Report. S<bc<lol.. 7. 8, 9, 7.2, 8.2. 9.2. 7.3, 8.3, 9.3. 7.4, 8.4, 9.4, 7.5,8.5 &:9,S, unlo#-do<h.rwi...
Buds< Suppl..,..tal Report. S<bc<lolc 3.
' MRl CCIIIcrVIIrioble "'JJCD'CS adjuolcdiO meiode "po!iCDI billizqp'" <epcrtetUnMRl Limited PartDcrsiHp 1~10 ..mt.d fiftaocial- (Jn~D<fuos buuct 1imitodtc: 012056, 013104, 015677, 042195).

1

2005 Vlriablc ...... isbdd-ttluo..... 2007, aod20()8.2010 isrcduo:cdooa- ba<is ca 1M1 SARMC localiootreod IO.....U."""""""with Mt. BwJac~ mctbodalcgy.
'Parli.olyoor.l""""l'•Novcmber.
' Parli.olyoor. i""""l' ·November. 20061MI MR!..,.....cos ftom 20061MI MRl inc:omc '""""""' rccdvcd ftom ...-!.
7
Budsc Suppi.....W Report. S<hcduk 4.
4

• Total_....., bocoadjUSicdto iooludc.....WU ...,....,,.,.acaa~tyi""f!iog....,r. Noo-MJU""""""' i"""'oObillediomiMI -.MRl fiDancialsrec:eivedftomi!OODS<I.
(Including, but DC! limited 10: IMTRI'/000306, 433, 563, 684)
'2008-2010 ro:du1!olloo a-bai.o on the IMI SARMC lacolion treod 10.....U. oonsi,_,with Mt. BadJIC~ methodology.
1

~ Budp Su.pp10CDCII1UII R.cpott. Sdscdulc 4b.

'' Totalo;xpcosos...., bocoadj\J$1Cdlo iooludc ..,...MR!

_.,.rea... asiDglc.modollty imatPI:eontcr. Ne>ooMJU- il<ml oObilledliomiMIIICOoMRl fiDancialsrec:eived liomOCIIIlO<I.

" B..... Svpplcmcot>l Report. Sdlcdule 5.3.
"BWQeSU])Ili-Rcport. Sdlcdulc4.3.
w BucJsc SuJll)l- Report. Sdlcdulc 4.3b.
" Buell!' SuJll)l=-t>l Report. S<bc<lole S.5.
16 Total cxpc:ase~ have bccD alljustcd to iacludc aM-MRl ecpcDSCs to n:flcct a siagle-modaliJ:y £mociag cc11tct. Noo-MRI CXJICilSC ilemS obbiDcd &om IMl Dlm-MRl fisumcials. aacl docamcDts n:x:civcd &om CO'IUlliCI. (lDclod:UI&
but nor limited to: IMIRP/000305. 433, 434, 435. S62, 683)
"J!udiooS<hcduk4.S.
" BadJIC Sdtcdale 3.5.

" BucJsc Schodulc 4.Sb.
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EXIDBIT 17

Impact on Mr. Budge's Past Damage Estimates
Correction for Understated Costs

Mr. Budge's Past Lost Profits Estimtlles
Correction for Understated Costs
AlfUJilllt Past Damages Should Be Rei/Meed

$

46,321,037

$

43,874,369

$

31,639,415

Method#S

Method #4

Method #3

Method#2

Method #1

$

29,192,747

s

52,619,388

1,487,508

1,435,248

868,129

815,869

2,666,575

1,487,508

1,435,248

868,129

815,869

2,666,575

Notes and Sources:

Methodology is consistent with Method# I through #S in the Budge Supplemental Report.
IMI expenses have been adjusted to include "management fee", "supplies DR", "DR maintenance cont", "site administrator", ·~elephone" and "courier service".
MRI Limited Partnership variable expenses have been adjusted to include "patient billings".
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EXHIBIT IS

Impact on Mr. Budge's Past Damage Estimates
Saint Alphonsus' Share ofMRIA from September 1999 to Man:h 2004 in The Bnt-ForWorld

Method#l

Metbod#4

Metbod#3

46,321,037

43,874,369

31,639,415

29,192,747

MR1 Center

445,013

282,061

431,899

268,947

MRIMobile
MRIA management fees

128,190

128,190

no

no

247.976

197.571

197.455

147,051

821,179

607,822

629,354

415,998

Mr. Budge's Past Lost Profits Estinwtes

$

Saint Alphonsus' Share (September 1999- March 2004)

1

Amount Past DatrUlges Should Be Reduced

1

Metbod#l

Saint Alphonsus' share of Mr. Budge's past lost profit estimates is based on (1) the lost profit apportionment listed in Mr. Budge's
Figure 10 and (2) Saint Alphonsus' MRIA ownership percentages as defined in Exhibit 4148.

Sources:

Budge Supplemental Report. Schedules 2, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.
Exhibit 4148 at SARMC00964 and SARMC01242.
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EXHIBIT18A
Saint Alphonsus' Share of Past Lost Profits and Management Fees
Based on Its Ownership Share ofMRIA through March 2004 in The But-For World
Mr. Budge's Calculation Method #1

MRI Center
Mr. Budge's Apportionment of Past Lost Profits Estimates

$ 5,993,447

1

$ 1,233,542

7.43%

Saint Alphonsus' Ownership Shares via MRIA:

Saint Alphonsus' Share of Past Lost Profits

Lost Profits Allocated to 1
MRI Mobile
MRI Associates

$

445,013

$ 1,239,878

128,!90

$ 8,466,867

20.00%

10.39"10

$

Total

$

247,976

$

821,179

Saint Alphonsus' share ofMr. Budge's past lost profit estimates is based on (1) the lost profit apportionment listed in Mr. Budge's
Figure I 0 and (2) Saint Alphonsus' MR1A ownership percentages as defined in Exhibit 4148.

Sources:
Budge Supplemental Report.
Exhibit 4148 at SARMC00964 and SARMC01242.
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EXlllBIT 18B

Saint Alphonsus' Share of Past Lost Profits and Management Fees
Based on Its Ownership Share ofMRIA through March 2004 in The But-For World
Mr. Budge's Calculation Method #2

MRICenter
Mr. Budge's Apportionment of Past Lost ProfitS Estimates

$ 3,798,801

1

$ 1,233,542

7.43%

Saint Alphonsus' Ownership Shares via MRL4:

Saint Alphonsus' Share of Past Lost ProfitS

Lost Profits Allocated to 1
MRI Associates
MRIMobile

$

282,061

$

128,190

$ 6,020,199

20.00%

10.39%

$

987,856

Total

$

197,571

$

607,822

Saint Alphonsus' share of Mr. Budge's past lost profit estimates is based on (I) the lost profit apportionment listed in Mr. Budge's
Figure 10 and (2) Saint Alphonsus' MRIA ownership percentages as defined in Exhibit 4148.

Sounes:
Budge Supplemental Report.
Exhibit 4148 at SARMC00964 and SARMCOI242.
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EXHIBIT18C
Saint Alphonsus' Share of Past Lost Profits and Management Fees
Based on Its Ownership Share ofMRIA through March 2004 in The But-For World
Mr. Budge's Calculation Method #3

MRICenter
Mr. Budge's Apportionment of PllSt Lost Profits Estinuztes

$ 5,816,825

1

$

431,899

$

na

na

987,276

Total
$ 6,804,101

20.00%

10.39%

7.43%

Saint Alphonsus' Ownership Shares via MRIA:

Saint Alphonsus' Share of PllSt Lost Profus

Lost Profits Allocated to'
MRI Associates
MRIMobile

$

197,455

$

629,354

Saint Alphonsus' share ofMr. Budge's past lost profit estimates is based on (I) the lost profit apportionment listed in Mr. Budge's
Figure 10 and (2) Saint Alphonsus' MlUA ownership percentages as defined in Exhibit 4148.

Sources:
Budge Supplemental Report.
Exhibit 4148 at SARMC00964 and SARMC01242.
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EXHffiiT18D

Saint Alphonsus' Share of Past Lost Profits and Management Fees
Based on Its Ownership Share ofMRIA through March 2004 in The But-For World
Mr. Budge's Calculation Method #4
Lost Profits Allocated to

Mr. Budge's Apporlionment of Past Lost ProfitS Estimates

MRICenter

MRIMobile

$ 3,622,179

na

Saint A/phonsus' Share ofPast Lost Profits

1

$

268,947

$

na

Total

MRI Associates
735,255

$ 4,357,433

20.00%

10.39"/o

7.43%

Saint Alphonsus' Ownership Shares via MRIA:

1

$

147,051

$

415,998

Saint Alphonsus' share ofMr. Budge's past lost profit estimates is based on (I) the lost profit apportionment listed in Mr. Budge's
Figure 10 and (2) Saint Alphonsus' MRIA ownership percentages as defined in Exhibit 4148.

Sources:
Budge Supplemental Report.
Exhibit 4148 at SARMC00964 and SARMC01242.
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EXIUBIT 19

Impact on Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite's Damage Estimates
Saint Alphonsus' Share ofMRIA for Entire Damage Period in The But-For World

Metbod#S

Mr. &tdge's PIISI Lo$1 ProfllS Estimate
SaiJIJ Alplu>rrsiUI' Share (Sqtember 1999 - Decembu 201 OJ

$

52,619,388

1

1,885.659
2,044,484
1,509 947

MRl Center
MRJMobile
MRIA management fees

5,440,089

AmolUII Pttst Dtumtges Should Be Ret/Meed

Alttroative B
Metbod#3

Mr. Wlllroite's Future Lost ProfitS Estimole 1' 1

$

15,613,572

SaiJIJ A/phorrsiUI' Share (201 1- 2015) 1• 1

MRJCenter
MRJMobile
MRIA management fees

545,286
646,656
409,408
1,601,350

1

Saint Alphonsus' share of lost profit estimates is based on ( 1) the lost profit apportionment methodology shown in Mr. Budge's
Figure 10 and (2) Saint Alphonsus' MRIA ownership percentages as defined in Exhibit4148.
' These reductions do not consider Mr. Wilhoite's additional estimate of lost management fees, since he has double counted these amounts.
3
I rely on Mr. Budge's estimated 2010 lost profits to determine the allocation percentages for MRl Center, MRl Mobile and MRIA management
fees. I apply those percentages (47.04%, 39.85% and 13.11% to MRI Center, MRI Mobile. and MRl Associates, respeetivcly) to Mr. Wilhoite's
Ahcrnative B Method #3 calculation of future lost profits to determine each entity's allocation of future lost profits. I then calculate Saint
Alpbonsus' share of those future lost profits.

Sonrees:
Wilhoite Supplemental Report. Schedules 2, 2.2. 2.3 and 2.4; Exhibit 4148 at SARMC00964 and SARMC01242.
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EXHIBIT19A
Saint Alphonsus' Share of Past Lost Profits and Management Fees
Based on Its Ownership Share ofMRIA through December 2010 in The But-For World
Mr. Budge's Calculation Method #5
1

MRI Center

Mr. Budge's Apportionmelfl of Past Lost ProfitS Estimates

Saint Alphonsus' Ownership Shares vilz MRIA:

Saint Alphonsus' Share of Past Lost Profits

1

$ 25,396,080

7.43%

$ 1,885,659

Lost Profits Allocated to
MRI Mobile
MRI Associates

$ 19,673,576

10.39"A>

$ 2,044,484

$ 7,549,733

Total

$ 52,619,389

20.00%

$ 1,509,947

$ 5,440,089

Saint Alphonsus' share of Mr. Budge's past lost profit estimates is based on (I) the lost profit apportionment listed in Mr. Budge's
Figure 10 and (2) Saint Alphonsus' MRlA ownership percentages as defined in Exhibit 4148.

Sources:
Budge Supplemental Report.
Exhibit 4148 at SARMC00964 and SARMCOJ242.
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EXHmiT20

Mr. Budge's But-For M1U Cuter Assumed Scan Volume
Comparison with Capacity Measures

....!!2!... ...2!!!l!L
MRJ C,e~~ter Actual Vnlume

Scans Relative to Standard-Hour Capacity'
Scans Rclalive to 24-Hour per Day Capacity
C,glS!!J!.Ii£n M.fl!!e!J. #I: 11H!=For Yol!eflr

Scans Relalive to Standard-H<>ur Capacity'
Scans Relative to 24-Hour per Day Capacity
(;alcullllio!! /!lft!!.od #~:

/Jw::I:ta. v~

Scans Relative to Standard-Hour Capacity'

Scans Relalivc to 24-Hour per Day Capacity

f:t!l£Hlfl!i!!.n M<ihod 1!.1,: llllt-For Volu!!!!
Scans Relative to Standard·H<>ur Capacil)l'
Scans Relative to 24-Hour per O.y Capacity

r;:elfB!e.lirl!.l (!!ft!!.od 114: B14J::.Fer V!l[f!!!!£
Scans Relative to Standard-Hour Capacity'
Scans Relative to 24-Hour per Day Capacity
(;alfi!!!.atibn Mr!lY!!l.l§.: !JeJ:.For Volf!!!!•

Scans Rdative to Standard-Hour Capacity'
Scans Rdative to 24-Hour per O.y Capacity
1

9,418
122%
54%
9,852

8,371
109%
48%
10,404

128%
56%

135%
60%

9,411

8,371

122%

109%

54%

48%

9,852
128%

56%
9,418
122%
54%
9,418
122%

54%

/0,404
135%
60%
8,371

~ ~ ~
9,548
124%
55%
12,559

9,737
127%
56%
12,337

163%
72%

160%
71%

11,088

12,337

144%
63%

160'A.
71%

12,559

12,337

163%
72%
JJ,088

160'Ao
71%
12,337

8,794
114%
50%

10,974
143%1
63%
10,974
143%1
63%
10,974
143%1
63%
10,974

-2!!!!L ..1!!!L
7,369
96%
42%
9,319
121%
53%
9,319
121%
53%
9,319
121%
53%
9,319

109%
48%

144%
63%

160%
71%

143%1
63%

121%
53%

8,371

9,548

9,737

8,794

7,369

127%

114%
50%

109%
48%

124%
55%

56%

96%
42%

5,651
73%
32%

7,380

~ ~ ~ ~ 2!!!_
2,850
37%
16%

7,320

42%

95%
42%

7,380

7,320

96%

96%
42%

7,380
96%
42%

7,380
96%
42%
5,713
74%
33%

95%
42%
7,320
95%
42%
7,310
95%
42%

5,772
75%
33%

2,139
28%
12%

1,608
21%
9%

177
11%
5%

1,258
16%
7%

8,330

7,965

7,772

8,996

108%
48%

103%
46%

101%
44%

117%
51%

8,330

7,965

7,772

8,996

108%
48o/o

103%
46%

101%
44%

117%
Sl%

8,330

8,996

7,965

7,772

108%
48%

103%
46%

101%
44%

8,330

117%
51%

7,965

7,772

108%
48%

103%
46%

101%
44%

117%
51%

6,617

6,376

6,152

7,381

86%
38%

83%
36%

81%
36%

8,996

96%
42%

Standard-hour capacity detennined on the basis of a 52-week year with 74 standard operating hours available each .,..ek and each MRI scan requiring 1 hour on average. Standard hours total
74 hours per week based on a schodu1e of7 a.m. to 7 p.m. on weekdays and 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. on weekOillls

Sources:
Bud&eSupplementa!Repon. Schedules 11, 11.2, 11.3. 1l.4and 11.5.
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EXHIBIT21

Average Amount Paid Per MRI Scan at IMI Facilities
2001-2010

Year
(1)

Amount Paid

Scan Volume
(2)

Ave•·age Amount
Paid Per Scan
(4)

(3)

(3)/(2)

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

4,486
6,186
8,183
9,550
10,302
14,188
16,593
17,392
17,913
18,981

$

3,814,865
5,572,456
7,417,137
8,429,203
8,897,062
10,445,086
13,648,533
13,361,021
13,135,327
12,797,228

$

850
901
906
883
864
736
823
768
733
674

9-Year (2001-2010) CAGR:

(2.5)%

5-1'ear (2005-2010) CAGR:

(4.8)%

1-Year (2009-2010) CAGR:

(8.1)%

Sources:
Budge Supplemental Report. Schedule 12.5.
Amendment to Budge Supplemental Report. Schedule 17.5.
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EXHIBIT22

Impact on Mr. Wilhoite's Alternative B Future Damage Estimates
Zero Percent Future Annual Growth Rate for Revenue

Alternative B
Method#l

Method#l

Mr. Wilhoite's Future Lost Proflls Estimates 1

$

Mr. Wilhoite's Damage Calculations Reevaluated
with a 0% Revenue Growth Rate
Amount Future Damages Should Be Reduced

1

13,731,020

$

9,321,872

Method#3

$

15,613,572

12,957,610

8,796,811

14,734,126

773,410

525,061

879,446

These reductions do not consider Mr. Wilhoite's additional estimate of lost management fees, since he has double counted

these amounts.
Sources:
Wilhoite Supplemental Report. Exhibits 1·1, 1·2 and 1-3.
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EXHIBIT23

List of Variables Used for Regression Analysis
Based on Monthly Data
Dependant Variable

MRl Center Scans

Desct·iption
Monthly number ofMRI Center scans

Explanatory Variables

Trend
IMI Downtown Interaction
IMI Meridian Interaction
GSR Interaction
IMI Saint Alphonsus Interaction
IMI Eagle Interaction

Natural logarithm oftime trend
IMI downtown Boise facility interaction term
IMI Meridian facility interaction term
GSR interaction term
IMI Saint Alphonsus facility interaction term
Eagle facility interaction term
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EXHIBIT24

Regression Analysis ofMRI Center Scan Volume
Based on Monthly Data and Newey-West Standard Errors
January 1997 - December 2011
ExplAnatory VAriable
Intercept
Trend
IMJ Downtown Interaction
IMJ Meridian Interaction
GSR Interaction
IMI Saint Alphonsus Interaction
IMJ Eagle Interaction

Estimate
563.51
51.09
1.04
(21.10)
(49.65)
(54.18)
(18.43)

t~rAtio

•

20.73
3.62 •
0.11
(2.74) •

(6.87) *
(18.36) •
(6.18) •

Observations= 168
R-Square = 0.95

• Significant at the 1% level.
Sources:
AR Transaction Summaries [012279, 040055 & 042207]
Budge Supplemental Report, Schedules II and 14.
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EXIUBITlS

NERA's Estimate of MRI Ceater's Alleged Lost Scus
Based oa Moatllly Scaa RegressioD Resulls a:nd Assumptioa that tbe IMI Meridian Facility Would Not Have Opened UntU April I, 2005 in tbe But-For World

2002

But-For Scans
A<:lual Scans
Diffcreucc in Scan VohJmc

-

827
827

~ ~ ~ __M!L_
740
740

852
ID

846
846

--l!!!L..

781
934
(153).

782
803
(21) •

--l!!!!:_ ~
783
791
(8).

784
843
(59).

Esllmatcd Lost Scaas

September

784
727

57

~ ~ ~ __!!!L
785
851
(66).

786
738
48

786
782

109 •

43

57

2003
But~For

Scans

A<:~ua~s.....

Oitren:ncc in Scan Volome

787

788

844

659

789

790
770

791
731

792
748

793
757

793

784

20

60

7

44

36

20

60

44

797

798

798

646

686

799
578

789
S40

841

129

249

(52).

129

249

796
519

796

666

699

(S7) '

Estimated Loat Scaas

791

79S

59

794
629
16S

36

59

165

38

799

800

800

801

580

557

641

sso

801
597

734

757

38
807 •

2004

Bld·ForScons
A<:lua!S_,
Oift'c:te~~ce in Scan Volume

79S
129

277

97

lSI

650
148

112

221

219

243

IS9

251

204

Estimated Lost g.,...

129

277

97

151

148

Ill

221

219

243

159

251

204

468
468

506
506

428
428

433
433

526

448
448

458
458

483

526

483

374
374

2005
Bid-For Scans
AetuaiS~s

Oiffc:ra:JCC in SCIP Volume
Esllm2tcdLostScaas

S90

515

575

517
73

523

487

52

88

73

52

88

2,211

213

&timlzllofMRICmt8:rTtlbllAfk::<t~/..o$tSetUU:G
• For moaths in which actual scans cxc:cod estima1ed but--for scaos.. the number of lost scacs is set equal to ZICtQ,
NotuPdSo\ftCS:
BuHor saul estimates based on regression results shown ia Exlu'bh 24.
AR Transaction Swnmaries [012279, 040055 & 042207]
Budge Supplcmem.l Report. Schedules II and 14.
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EXBIBIT26

NERA's Estimate ofMRI Center's Alleged Lost Profits
Assuming the lMI Meridian Facility Would Not Have Opened Until April!, 2005 in the But-For World

Estimated Lost Profits

$

Lon Profits Estimllte
Saint Alphonsus' Share (September 1999- March 2004)
MRI Center

62,692

MRIA management fees

20,110

Saint Alphonsus' Share of Estimated Lost Profds
Counter-Clainlllllts' Share of Estimated Lost Profds
1

2,151,190

1

82,802
2,068,389

Saint Alphonsus' share of estimated lost profits is based on Saint Alphonsus' MRIA ownership percentages as defined in Exhibit 4148.

Sources:
Supplemental Expert Report of Bruce P. Budge, May 2, 2011. Schedules 2, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.
Exhibit 4148 at SARMC00964 and SARMCOI242.
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EXHIBITUA

NERA's Estimate of MRI Center's ADoged Last Profits
Assuming the IMI Meridian FacDity Would Not Have Opened Until Aprill, 2005 in the But-For World

~ ~
l!stimalcl MRI CCIIW t.ost Sc:ans
A""3!1C Amount Paid Pot Scon1
Amolltlt:s Paid

coa'b

MJnat=ment Fee
MRI Ccn>::r Variable Margjo1
Lolll'rojl/$/lldMdJ"f: Ml1H1111<- Fee

t"'<'d

109
930
101,370

807
924
745.668

7.603

SS.92S

~ ~

s __!!d..!.L

~

l004
2,211
893
1.974.423
148,082
73.40%
l,449,JII

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _lli!!,_
213
863
183,819

n.a.
n.a.

~

..

..•.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

...

3,340

n.a.
n.a.

3,005,280

___ ---·-··-·
___. _.._
___,._. _---·-··-· ---·-··-·

....._..._
___
__i!!,!!!_ ___,._. _
13.786

....
....
._......._

___!!:!._

___!!:!._

Total

225.396
1,151,19()

Notes and So1lltCS:
1

2

AV«8BCIIIIIOIIDt paid is from Budge Supplemental Report, Sobedulc 6.
MRl Center variable mar,in bu been c:alculaNd as :ahown il1 Exhibit 16.
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup. com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup. com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
, 802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

JUL 2 9 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
ByLARAAMES
DEPUTY

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE EXPERT
TESTIMONY OF THOMAS R.
MCCARTHY, PH.D

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

MOTION TO EXCLUDE lf~E EXPERT TESTIMONY OF THOMAS R. MCCARTHY, PH.D- 1

0001711
RIGlNAL

COME NOW Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") and move this Court to Exclude
the Expert Testimony of Thomas R. McCarthy, Ph.D.
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Exclude and the
Affidavit in Support of Motion to Exclude, both filed concurrently herewith.
DATED this ?f'aay of July 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~ ~~P-~--

T omas A. anducc1
WadeL. Woodard
Dara L. Parker
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

27

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of July 2011, a true and correct copy ofthe
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

~acsimile

MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF THOMAS R. MCCARTHY, PH.D- 2

001712

.
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

~Facsimile

MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF THOMAS R. MCCARTHY, PH.D- 3
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: ._____

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)

4:tt

AUG 0 1 2011

tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802. W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208)342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for MRJ Associates, LLP, MRJ Limited Partnership,
and MRJ Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT TO PRECLUDE
REFERENCE TO SAINT
ALPHONSUS'S DEPARTING
PARTNER'S SHARE

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

~~p~~~,::i~~~RE!N ~UPPORT TO PRECLUDE REFERENCE TO

SAINT AORIGI
NAL
001714

MOTION
Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Motion in Limine to prevent Saint
Alphonsus from referring to, presenting to the jury, or making argument about its partnership
share. Such evidence is irrelevant and runs a substantial risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury. I.R.E. 402, 403. A brief Memorandum in Support follows
below.
MEMORANDUM
In its Order of June 17, 2011, this Court upheld Judge McLaughlin's September 21, 2007,
decision that Saint Alphonsus was entitled to its partnership share upon departing the partnership
in the amount of$4.6 million. Nothing about Saint Alphonsus's partnership share is relevant to
any issue on the retrial of this matter, and thus should be precluded under I.R.E. 402. It is not a
defense to any claim, and is not anything that the jury needs to be informed about or needs to
consider. The Court can easily offset this payment from any verdict. Indeed, if the jury is
informed about Saint Alphonsus's entitlement to this money, it runs the risk of confusing the
jury, I.R.E. 403, which may believe that the fact that Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a payment as
a departing partner may in some way suggest that none of its conduct was wrongful. MRIA
therefore requests that Saint Alphonsus should be precluded from referencing or arguing to the
jury in any way the fact that it has been found to be entitled to this money from the MRIA
Partnership.

MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT TO PRECLUDE REFERENCE TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
DEPARTING PARTNER'S SHARE- 2

001715

DATED this 1st day of August, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

r~ 112..¥.~rkfr

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of August, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery

D Overnight Delivery
~Facsimile

D U.S. Mail

D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
¢-facsimile

MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT TO PRECLUDE REFERENCE TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
DEPARTING PARTNER'S SHARE- 3
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup. com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com
BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup. com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 VI. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boisf, Idaho 83 702
Te:tfphone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
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AUG 0 f 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VJOAK
DEPtnv

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
ISTARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership,

MOTION AND MEMORANDUM FOR
CLARIFICATION THAT SAINT
ALPHONSUS MAY NOT CONTEND
THAT MRIA BREACHED FIDUCIARY
DUTIES

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership; MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho
Limited Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT ALPHONSUS
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,

Counter-defendants.

MOTION AND MEMORANDUM FOR CLARIFICATION THAT SAINT ALPHONSUS MAY NOT CONTEND
THAT MRIA BREACHED FIDUCIARY DUTIES- 1

ORIGINAL
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Memorandum in support of their Motion
clarifying tharSaint Almphrh•.,...,.,._.••-•tt.w
...........'iltJ!I!'IitdMMAIM!P!·Mflltf·~eaedfted' any ffifuciary duties.
In the June 22, 2011, hearing on Saint Alphonsus's motion to compel the production of
MRIA's business records, Saint Alphonsus made reference to the fact that these records are
"highly relevant to the question of whether or not their [MRIA's] fiduciary duties have been
breached" (Tr. p. 35 1. 12-17.) 1 However, this matter has already been decided. In Judge
McLaughlin's Order of July 30, 2007, the Court held that there is no authority suggesting that a
partnership owes fiduciary duties to the individual partners, and thus that "Saint Alphonsus may
not assert MRIA breached an alleged fiduciary duty owed to Saint Alphonsus. (Order of July 30,
2007, at p. 20.) This was "Motion 11" in that July 30th Order. Saint Alphonsus itself expressly
asked that Judge McLaughlin's order on this issue be reinstated, saying:
• Motion 11: MRlA's Motion in Limine Re: Purported Breaches by MRIA of
Fiduciary Duties. !d. at 20. The Court held that Saint Alphonsus could introduce
evidence supporting affirmative defenses, including estoppel and waiver, but held
that "absent an offer of proof to the contrary by Saint Alphonsus, the Court will
preclude Saint Alphonsus from asserting that MRlA has breached a fiduciary duty
allegedly owed to Saint Alphonsus." To the extent Saint Alphonsus seeks to
introduce such an assertion, it will make an offer of proof as the Court ordered.
(Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine re: Prior Evidentiary Rulings
from the First Trial, filed April11, 2011, at p. 6.) Indeed, this Court, in its Consolidated Order
Re: Motion in Limine Heard May 18, 2011, reinstated many of Judge McLaughlin's prior
rulings, including its ruling on Motion 11. (Consolidated Order Re: Motion in Limine Heard
May 18,2011, filed on June 13,2011, p. 3.) As such, this matter is res judicata. Saint

The relevant page of this transcript is attached hereto.
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM FOR CLARIFICATION THAT SAINT ALPHONSUS MAY NOT CONTEND
THAT MRIA BREACHED FIDUCIARY DUTIES- 2
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Alphonsus cannot argue to the jury in any manner that MRIA breached any fiduciary duties to
Saint Alphonsus?
In light of Saint Alphonsus' s more recent comments that it was seeking evidence that
MRIA breached its fiduciary duties, MRIA seeks clarification that, prior to the offering of any
evidence by Saint Alphonsus that could be construed by the jury to be proof of a breach of
fiduciary duty by the MRIA or the limited partners, the parties should first confer with the court
outside the presence of the jury.
DATED this 1st day of August, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~~
Dara L. P
Attorneys or MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

2

Saint Alphonsus has not brought a claim against MRIA for breach of fiduciary duty, and
the statute oflimitations for the same has long since run. Saint Alphonsus does raise the
affirmative defense that the MRIA entities "by their own actions and statements, including but
not limited to their breach of fiduciary obligations to Saint Alphonsus and/or Diversified Care,
are estopped from seeking the relief claimed in the Third Amended Counterclaim." (Answer to
Third Amended Counterclaim, filed, April16, 2010, p. 26.) However, as noted above, Judge
McLaughlin has already held that there is no such fiduciary obligation, an issue that Saint
Alphonsus did not raise on appeal, and which this Court has specifically reinstated. Thus, the
matter is the law of the case which Saint Alphonsus should not attempt to argue again.
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM FOR CLARIFICATION THAT SAINT ALPHONSUS MAY NOT CONTEND
THAT MRIA BREACHED FIDUCIARY DUTIES - 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of August, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
wacsimile

Attorneys for PlaintifJ!Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1 700

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
pacsimile

Attorneys for PlaintifJ!Counterdefendant

riara L. Per
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Saint Alphonsus v. MRI Associates

6/22/2011
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I wrote this as a quote -- that Saint Alphonsus
believes that it was treated wrongly by another
limited pat1ner. There is no claim in this case
filed by Saint Alphonsus that it was treated
wrongly in its status as a limited partner and
that therefore they are entitled to this
information in this case.
If they've got that, let them file it.
Let them file their lawsuit, let them file their
information request; we will fight about it. But
I would actually say, Your Honor, that since this
isn't before you as a lawsuit and since it is not
properly before you in discovery, I am not exactly
sure why they believe they can walk into this
courtroom and move to compel responses to
something that they claim is no big deal, but is
statutorily required.
The Com1 has properly identified that
there is in these statutes ameliorating language
that says that it has got to be for a proper
purpose; it can't be unreasonable, those sods of
terms. And that's exactly what we have got going
on here. This is a backdoor discovery request.
There's that old saying, I was born
at night, but it wasn't last night. I think
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everybody here knows what a backdoor discovety
request is. And, in fact, they admit it in their
letter; they are going to use it in this
litigation. That is inappropriate and we ask that
whatever this is -- a motion to compel pursuant to
a statute in an action that was not filed pursuant
to claims that are not asserted, be denied. Thank
you.
THE COURT: Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Ayers, response.
MR. AYERS: Thank you, Your Honor. Just a
few points, Your Honor. One is that I just want
to stress that as to a couple of the statutes we
are relying on which, as I say, I think covered
pretty much all the material that we want, it is a
completely unqualified statutmy right. There is
no contingency based on reasonableness or anything
else as to the certain categories of records. That
would be 53-3-403(b), partnership must provide
former partners and their agents with access to
books and records not conditioned on purpose or
motive at all. Unqualified is our right to that
access. And the provision under the Limited
Partnership Act, 53-2-304(1), inspecting and
copying required information during business hours
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and required information, most significantly for
our purposes, covers the contributions made by the
limited partnerships. The law makes very clear
that you're supposed to be able to know, if you
are a limited partner, what other limited partners
put into the enterprise.
That information is very relevant to
this case. We would use it if we get it, you can
be sure. Because it is highly relevant to know
how much money some of our opponents put into this
limited partnership as compared with how much
money they got out. And that is highly relevant
to the question of whether or not their fiduciary
duties have been breached. And you can be sure
that if we get access to this information, either
in this way or in another way, it will come in if
we possibly are allowed to do it.
Now, I want to emphasize that the scope
of what we are asking for is very narrow and very
specific and very defined. There is no need for
us to rummage through anything.
We want the financial statements of
these businesses. That's a certified accountant's
document of a certain number, ten or twelve pages,
usually, that every enterprise oflegitimacy
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generates. And we want it for the years between
1985 and 2004 when we were a general partner.
That's a very simple thing. That's probably a
stack of paper about three inches high. We want
records sufficient to show all partnership
distributions in cash or in kind and management
fees. How much money did this organization
distribute and to who? Not a hard thing to come
up with. Most limited pat1nerships generate a
sheet of paper every year that describes the
distributions, however many checks went out to
however many different people and who the limited
pattnership is. That is probably 20 pieces of
paper would provide us with that information.
Records sufficient to show all
accounting activity and capital accounts of each
general and limited partner. In other words, what
did people put in, what is their capital invested
whether it be the general partner or a limited
partner, and what did they take out that
diminished their capital account. Again, not a
complicated or a difficult thing to do show. A
kind of a traditional record that enterprises
keep.
And finally a record ofloans. Who
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") oppose the motion of Saint Alphonsus for
reconsideration in part of the Court's June 13, 2011 Consolidated Order Re: Motions in Limine.
Specifically, Saint Alphonsus asks the Court to reconsider its ruling that Saint Alphonsus will
not be allowed to argue that its dissociation was lawful, and seeks further redaction of certain
exhibits.
Saint Alphonsus has not presented any new facts to support its motion for
reconsideration, but has simply repackaged its previous arguments. As the Supreme Court has
noted, "Ea] rclwaing m tCCOiiSidaabellittthe biatWtllt.&Mdfy itHtJives new or additionat facts,
and a more comprehensive presentation of both law and fact" Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v.

First Nat. Bank ofNorth Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990) (citing J.l
Case Company v. McDonald, 76 Idaho 223,229,280 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1955)). Saint Alphonsus
seeks reconsideration of this order, despite the fact that nothing at all has changed since that time
which would provide grounds for reconsideration. It simply asserts that the Court's ruling was
incorrect. These issues have already been briefed and decided; it is a waste of MRIA' s resources
and the Court time to address these issues again. Nevertheless, despite Saint Alphonsus's
assertion otherwise, the Court's original order was correct.

A.

The Court Correctly Held that Argument that Saint Alphonsus's Withdrawal was
"Rightful" or "Lawful" is Not Admissible
Saint Alphonsus first seeks permission to argue to the jury that its dissociation from the

MRIA partnership was lawful. In the Court's order of June 13,2011, the Court correctly held
that the propriety of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation is not in issue in the case, and thus that
evidence, argument, or other comment on this subject is irrelevant and potentially unfairly
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prejudicial under I.R.E. 401 and 403. (Consolidated Order Re: Motions in Limine Heart May 18,
2011 ("Order") at 1-2.) Despite the Court's well-reasoned ruling, Saint Alphonsus asks the
Court to reconsider, and presents a number of reasons why it should be allowed to reference the
lawfulness of its dissociation. None of these reasons affect the Court's previous ruling that the
evidence is irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.
Saint Alphonsus first contends that the lawfulness of its dissociation is "central" to the
dispute among the parties. (Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Reconsider in Part of June 13, 2011
Consolidated Order Re: Motions in Limine ("Motion") p. 2). It claims that the centrality of this
issue is demonstrated by the fact that the Court found that it cannot be found liable on any theory
on the basis of dissociation. (Motion, p. 3.) To the contrary, the fact that the Court has held that
MRIA cannot advance any wrongful dissociation claim simply illustrates the irrelevance of
evidence that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was lawful. The fact that Saint Alphonsus
dissociated from the MRIA partnership is an uncontested, neutral part of the timeline. But as
Saint Alphonsus is so eager to tout, no claim exists, and MRIA cannot assert, that Saint
Alphonsus' s dissociation was in any way wrongful. If MR:lA: cannot assert that the dissociation
was wrongful, there is no need to Saint Alphonsus to argue to the jury that it was rightful. The
fact that Saint Alphonsus lawfully dissociated is not central, and indeed, is not even relevant, to
any point of dispute among the parties.
Saint Alphonsus next asserts that the jury will "necessarily have to confront the question
whether the 2004 withdrawal was proper," (Motion, p. 3). This is absurd. Whether Saint
Alphonsus' s 2004 withdrawal was proper is not the element of any claim or defense in this case.
The jury will not "necessarily" have to confront this question. It will not be asked to address this
issue at all, for whether Saint Alphonsus properly withdrew it is not a question of fact that the
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jury must answer. Indeed, it is not even tangentially relevant to any question of fact that the jury
will need to answer. As MRIA cannot argue that this withdrawal was wrongful, the jury will
have no reason to give the issue any particularly consideration at all. It is simply an uncontested
part of the timeline, no different from the fact that Saint Alphonsus entered the MRIA
partnership.
Saint Alphonsus argues that it should be allowed to argue that its dissociation was
lawful to combat the allegations of impropriety that MRIA will level at it during trial. (Motion
p. 3). This merely bolsters the Court's Rule 403 analysis. 'F:he"thct that Saint Alpf:tonsus
properly withdrew is not a defense to the claims that it breached the non-compete agreement,
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breached its fiduciary duties, committed
tartious interference with prospective contradual relations, and committed civil conspiracy.
That Saint Alphonsus wants to argue that is lawful dissociation somehow sanitizes its bad acts,
which are not even remotely related to its dissociation, simply demonstrates why this evidence
runs a significant risk of confusing the issues or misleading the jury, I.R.E. 403. Saint
Alphonsus all but admits that it is its intent to mislead the jury with this argument.
Saint Alphonsus asserts that it must be allowed to argue that it properly dissociated
because its proper dissociation ended the fiduciary duties and the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. (Motion, p. 3-4). The jury can be instructed about the consequences of a lawful
dissociation without needing to be told that the dissociation was lawful. For example, the jury
can simply be told that "upon a partner's dissociation, a party's duty ofloyalty terminates, and
continues only with regard to matters arising and events occurring before dissociation." I.C. §
53-3-603. Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's assertion otherwise, it is unnecessary for the jury to
hear that dissociation was lawful in order to apply this instruction.
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Finally, Saint Alphonsus does contortions to argue that MRIA has somehow conceded
that Saint Alphonsus should be allowed to reference its lawful dissociation. As the Court knows,
during this litigation, MRIA asked the Court to hold that Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation could be
wrongful, not under RUP A, but as a simple common law breach of contract. (Memorandum in
Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine to Preclude Argument that Dissociation was Lawful Under
Idaho Code§ 53-3-602, filed April11, 2011.) MRIA therefore asked that Saint Alphonsus be
prevented from arguing that its dissociation was rightful under RUP A. (!d.) The Court
determined that RUP A replaced the common law, and thus that no wrongful dissociation claim
could be brought. Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA conceded that Saint Alphonsus could
reference lawful dissociation if the Court rejected the common-law wrongful dissociation claim.
This argument misrepresents MRIA's position, and conveniently overlooks its assertion in its
reply brief that even if the Court held that MRIA could not maintain a common law breach of
contract claim for withdrawal, argument that Saint Alphonsus lawfully dissociated is irrelevant
and unfairly prejudicial (MRIA's Reply In Support oflts Motion in Limine to Preclude
Argument that Dissociation was Lawful Under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602, filed May 2, 2011, p. 45). Regardless, the fact that there is not a common-law wrongful dissociation claim does not
change the fact that reference to lawful dissociation is irrelevant and unduly prejudicial with
respect to all the existing claims and defenses in the case, as outlined above, in MRIA' s previous
briefing, and in the Court's Order.
This case does not concern, in any respect, the lawfulness of Saint Alphonsus' s
dissociation. As such, the Court should decline to reconsider its prior well-reasoned finding that
any reference to lawful dissociation is irrelevant and potentially unfairly prejudicial.
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B.

Nothing Further Needs to Be Redacted from the Shattuck Hammond Memorandum
In the Court's June 13 Order, the Court redacted Exhibits 4234 and 4329 in the manner

that Saint Alphonsus requested, save for two clauses. Saint Alphonsus now contends that those
clauses should have been redacted as well. In particular, a paragraph contained in both exhibits,
with the redactions requested by Saint Alphonsus, reads as follows:
SARMC has been exploring ways to exit MRIA but has met resistance from the other
general partners, particularly the physicians, and from jack Floyd, the recently appointed
CEO ofMRIA. (Reasons for this resistance are discussed later in the memorandum.) From
the correspondence provided, SARMC is frustr"oe1led with the situation and is strongly
considering simply withdrawing from MRIA and competing with the exiting MRI facililies
on its own campus after the end of the one-year non-com pete agreement. {~(fh!M~be:~i)
·fidYis¢'fiJWee\lit$ei.~tmi.lilii$"Qpli$·a.:w.~·~t~·•~·~lf·~ejige.ill:l.~fJitiKtili$a'\~t-a'Mw2

A paragraph contained in Exhibit 4329, with the redactions requested by Saint Alphonsus reads
as follows:

ffSARttde ';.fithdlia~tal from !.RIA ie.:not 'deemed wfiea!)f\ll, SARMC would
be entitled to the liquidation value of their portion of the
investment and, after a period of one year, would be able to
compete in the Boise market. (It has been reported that DMR
offered to accept $2.5 million to vote to waive the non-compete
agreement and . allow. SARMC to open other . centers.) •$ARJ•¢ )~:~f;l

~Ui~$~ii~~i~!l!~~~~~~t~ii~~~if!~i~f.~!~~~~~:·:. ~

Under this scenario SHP would not receive a success fee.

The Court declined to redact the statements that "SARMC has been advised by counsel that this
option would likely engender litigation with MRIA" and "risk of St. Alphonsus breaching its
fiduciary duty to the LPs" because these statements were potentially relevant to MRIA's claims
for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Order, p.
2.)
Saint Alphonsus argues that the Court should have granted these proposed redactions. It
contends that when read in context, the section that "SARMC has been advised by counsel that
this option would likely engender litigation with MRIA" implies that Saint Alphonsus's
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withdrawal and competition after the running of the noncompete was wrongful. However, the
statement does not expressly articulate why litigation might ensue; concerns about breach of
fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing are equally plausible
explanations for concern about litigation. Furthermore, these statements do not suggest that
withdrawal or competition are in fact wrongful. Rather, it is evidence that Saint Alphonsus was
being advised that it might want to reconsider these options, but engaged in them all the same.
Saint Alphonsus also argues that when taken in context, the statement that there could be
a "risk of St. Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary duty to the LPs" implies that the breach of duty is
from the withdrawal. Saint Alphonsus claims that the paragraph will read:
Givens Pursley believes that there would likely be litigation as to whether the
termination was wrongful and that there may be a risk of St. Alphonsus breaching
its fiduciary responsibilities to the LP's.
However, the Court has already ordered the redaction of the supposed "context" that makes the
clause objectionable. The full redaction requested by Saint Alphonsus was:
Giveas Pmsley believes that there would likely be litigation as to whether the
termination v.r.as vffongful and that there may be a risk of 8t. Alphonsus breaehing
its fidueiary responsibilities to the LP's.
The redaction ordered by the Court was:
Givens Pmsley beliey;es that there vlould likely be litigation as to 'Nhether the
termination v.r.as wrongful and that there may be a risk of St. Alphonsus breaching
its fiduciary responsibilities to the LP's-;(Order, p. 2) As such, the supposed "context" that runs the risk of the jury thinking that the
breach was from wrongful termination does not exist.
There is no reason to strike these provisions from the Shattuck Hammond Memorandum.
As the Court correctly found in its initial order, these clauses are potentially relevant to MRIA's
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
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CONCLUSION
As the Court's initial rulings on these matters were correct, the Court should deny Saint
Alphonsus's Motion to Reconsider.
DATED this 1st day of August, 2011
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~2-/.'P----

ara L. Par er
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
MRIA has moved for an order deeming admitted the exhibits that were admitted at the
previous trial. It makes this argument by analogizing the parties' private array of stipulations,
most concerning documents that were never even used at trial, to written legal rulings by the trial
court on a series of disputed legal motions. MRIA's analogy is a poor one. Saint Alphonsus
should not be bound by stipulations concerning the use of over 1,100 exhibits, which were
entered into four years ago before a trial conducted on very different legal premises.
A retrial is not, and is not intended to be, a carbon copy of the first trial where the events
and sequence of the first trial are slavishly replayed for the jury, without alteration. Rather, the
parties are entitled to make a new record, based on a fresh presentation of evidence through
documents and testimony. See Flitton v. Primary Residential Mortg., Inc., 238 F. App'x 410,
420 (lOth Cir. 2007) ("Because we reverse and remand the district court's ruling ... retrial of
these issues will necessarily involve a new record. The district court will need to reconsider this
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evidence in the context of that new record.") Moreover, upon remand, the "trial court is free to
correct any error in its original findings and conclusions as to matters not passed on by the
appellate court." Hutchins v. State, 100 Idaho 661,666 603 P.2d 995, 1000 (1979). Thus, there
is "substantial authority [that] permits parties on retrial to make new motions, raise new
objections, and present additional evidence." Jimenez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 79 P.3d 673,676
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing cases). By contrast, "there is no
merit to the suggestion ... that [a] defendant enjoy[s] a vested right to introduce inadmissible
evidence at his retrial merely because that evidence was erroneously admitted without objection
at [the] first trial." People v. Seit, 204 A.D.2d 363, 365 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); State v. Darwin,
288 A.2d 422,426 (Conn. 1971) ("evidence which was not objected to at the first trial may be
contested at the second").
MRIA's motion asserts just that-an unfettered right to use every document from the last
trial, without objection, due to stipulations entered into on radically different premises. At the
last trial, the main issue was what Saint Alphonsus should pay for its wrongful dissociation. But
now, it is established as a matter of law that the dissociation was legally proper, new parties have
been added to the case, new defenses have been raised, and MRIA has advanced a new damages
theory, totaling nearly $70 million, that it could have, but failed, to raise before. These
fundamental changes, including MRIA's deliberate choice to alter the case that it is putting
forward, means that both parties must be allowed to make new decisions about the use of
evidence, including what stipulations to enter into.
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MRIA's argument for introducing the prior exhibits, free from any challenge through
evidentiary objections, is done primarily through sophistry. It claims that because the admission
of certain evidence was not objected to last time, Judge McLaughlin's admission of such
evidence was a "ruling" that has "law of the case" effect, and thus Saint Alphonsus's position is
contrary to its prior argument that the "Court should enter an order re-instating those substantive
evidentiary rulings that were not affected by the Supreme Court's decision." Mem. at 5 (quoting
Saint Alphonsus's Mot. in Limine re: Prior Evidentiary Rulings).'
Plainly, though, a judge's admission, without any legal ruling or analysis, of documents
that neither party objected to is not a "substantive evidentiary ruling" by the judge. See Jimenez,
79 P.3d at 676 ("In the first trial, ... the photographs were offered and admitted without
objection. Such a 'ruling' does not amount to an actual decision on the merits; no objection,
argument, or substantive ruling was made."). Under MRIA's logic, unless someone objected
previously, no evidence at the retrial, including any question asked by counsel, could be
challenged for any reason at the new trial. Indeed, any such deviation from the "script" of the
first trial would presumably run afoul of law-of-the-case and thus potentially be reversible error.
But that is not how law-of-the-case works. See id. (court's exclusion of photographs at retrial,
where photographs were admitted at first trial without objection or any substantive ruling "did
not violate law of the case principles"). Instead, it would handcuff this Court's expressly

1

Saint Alphonsus previously filed a motion, which the Court granted, concerning twentytwo rulings made by the Court at or prior to the first trial. See Saint Alphonsus's Mot. in Limine
re: Prior Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial (Apr. 11, 2011); Consolidated Order re:
Motions in Limine Heard May 18, 2011 (Jun. 6, 2011).
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recognized power to control the trial and address all issues not decided by the Supreme Court.
Hutchins, 100 Idaho at 666, 603 P.2d at 1000?

Moreover, MRIA's suggested approach to wholesale enforcement of stipulations from
the 2007 trial would also burden the record in this new trial with hundreds of irrelevant and
unnecessary documents. MRIA marked 534 exhibits in the 2007 trial, the vast majority of
which, according to the "Exhibit Index" relied upon by MRIA, were received in evidence by
stipulation. But Saint Alphonsus's review of the transcript of the 2007 trial shows that only 151
of those exhibits-fewer than 30o/o-were even mentioned during the course of those
proceedings. Thus more than 380 irrelevant MRIA documents cluttered the record of that case,
despite the fact that no one found them worth mentioning. To be fair, Saint Alphonsus did the
same, introducing hundreds of documents that were never mentioned at the trial.
To avoid going down this unproductive road, by narrowing the evidence at issue and
seeking reasonable stipulations with regard to it, Saint Alphonsus suggested to MRIA several
weeks ago that the parties exchange exhibit lists and proposals for stipulations for this new trial.

2

MRIA's two cited cases are both inapposite. Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232 (2008),
ruled that a client was judicially estopped from claiming his attorney committed malpractice by
recommending a divorce settlement, when the client agreed to the settlement in court. MRIA
makes no argument as to how the elements of judicial estoppel-the obtaining of"ajudgment,
advantage, or consideration from one party through means of sworn statements" coupled with
"contrary allegations or testimony to obtain a recovery or a right against another party"-are met
here. !d. at 240. This is not a judicial estoppel case.
In Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 43 (2009), a party stipulated to evidence at trial, and
then challenged the introduction of the evidence during a direct appeal of the same trial. The
case says nothing at all to question a party's ability at a retrial-which did not occur in this
case-to raise new objections not raised at the first trial. Indeed, MRIA concedes this case is
inapposite. Mot. at 7.
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When MRIA declined to do so, Saint Alphonsus nevertheless reviewed all of the MRIA exhibits
that were mentioned on the record 2007 trial, plus many others, and prepared a proposal for
stipulations.
Saint Alphonsus's first proposal for stipulations to MRIA exhibits was delivered to
MRIA on July 29, and included an offer to stipulate in full (i.e., to admit into evidence for the
retrial) for 121 exhibits and partial stipulations to about 20 more exhibits (usually with
suggestions for redactions to allow full stipulation into evidence). Saint Alphonsus also alerted
MRIA to Saint Alphonsus's objections to about a dozen exhibits, and invited MRIA to identify
additional exhibits, whether marked previously or not, that MRIA proposes to use, and for which
Saint Alphonsus would consider stipulations. Further, Saint Alphonsus also submitted for
MRIA's consideration its first list of2007 exhibits for which Saint Alphonsus seeks stipulations,
and reserved the right for both parties to revise and supplement these proposed stipulations as
trial preparation proceeds, until an agreement on stipulations is completed.
In this way, Saint Alphonsus has addressed five weeks before trial all of the exhibits that
MRIA actually used at the last trial (with the exception of demonstratives) and numerous others
that were marked but not used, has offered stipulations to about 140 exhibits, and stated
objections to about a dozen others. The parties should be ordered to pursue this process of
negotiating for stipulations so as to create an orderly record for this new trial.
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CONCLUSION
MRIA's Motion to Have Deemed Admitted Exhibits from First Trial should be denied.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

On April 11, 2011, Saint Alphonsus filed a motion for summary judgment for "the buyout price to which it is entitled under Idaho Code § 53-3-701, which totals $4,600,000 plus 12%
statutory interest running from the date of dissociation (April 1, 2004) until the date of
payment." 1 On June 17, 2011, this Court held that "Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary
judgment regarding its share ofMRIA to which it is entitled is hereby GRANTED." MRIA now
claims that Saint Alphonsus should be barred from mentioning the "fact that it has been found to
be entitled to this money from the MRIA partnership." This motion should be denied.
ARGUMENT
During the first trial, the jury was informed that Saint Alphonsus sought a buy-out of its
partnership share in MRIA, and the Court told the jury that Saint Alphonsus was entitled to such
a buyout, all without objection from MRIA. See Trial Tr. at 619 ("Saint Alphonsus left this
1

Mot. for Summ. J. on Claim for Partnership Interest at 2.
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partnership on April 1, 2004. And in order for us to recoup our investment from the partnership,
which we were entitled to do, it became necessary for us to sue MRI to get that money back.");
id. at 4270 ("Instruction 16. You have heard evidence in this case as to the amount of money

that Saint Alphonsus is entitled to receive for their share of the MRIA partnership. The Court
will decide the amount of money that Saint Alphonsus is entitled to receive for their share of the
partnership."). MRIA now moves to preclude reference to the "fact that [Saint Alphonsus] has
been found to be entitled to this money," Mot. at 2, but notably, not the fact that it sought a
buyout. This request can do nothing but inject unnecessary confusion into this case.
As MRIA apparently concedes, the fact that Saint Alphonsus sought a buy-out share is
properly part of evidence. Not only do many of the documents in this case discuss the fact of a
buyout (see, e.g., Trial Ex. 4329), it is necessary to avoid jury confusion, since Saint Alphonsus
is the plaintiff, yet it is proceeding second. The jury should be informed, as it was before, that
Saint Alphonsus brought this lawsuit to recover its buyout, that issue has been decided, and now
MRIA's counterclaims are being heard. If the jury is told of the buyout, but not told that the
issue was decided, it is likely that the jury will believe the issue is live. As Judge McLaughlin's
admonition to the jury last time made clear, such incomplete information to the jury might lead it
to improperly consider the buy-out value as part of its "deliberations or [its] determination of
damages." Trial Tr. at 4270. MRIA's suggestion to allow the jury to hear about a buyout, but be
deprived of knowledge that the claim has been decided, is unworkable.
By contrast, MRIA's newfound claim, that "the jury ... may believe that the fact that
[Saint Alphonsus] is entitled to a payment as a departing partner may in some way suggest that

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S MOTION TO PRECLUDE REFERENCE
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none of its conduct was wrongful" is unpersuasive. Such an inference is not logical, and is
unlikely to occur to a reasonable juror. Further, Saint Alphonsus did not argue that before, and
will not argue it now. In fact, Saint Alphonsus's very first proposed jury instruction states "I
have also determined that Saint Alphonsus is entitled to the return of its equity in the MRIA
general partnership. Thus, those claims will not concern you." Saint Alphonsus's Requested
Jury Instructions and Special Verdict Form (July 15, 2011). Saint Alphonsus would not object to
a similar post-trial instruction instructing the jury not to consider the buyout in its deliberations.
MRIA did not previously object before to the jury knowing this information, and it has no basis
to object now.
CONCLUSION
MRIA's Motion to Preclude Reference to Saint Alphonsus's Departing Partner Share
should be denied.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

ter-Defendants
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
VS.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
During the first trial of this matter, the fact that Saint Alphonsus is a non-profit
corporation was relayed to the jury by the judge, 1 and at various times by MRIA' s own counsel. 2
The jury awarded MRIA over $30 million. Yet MRIA now claims that mention of Saint
Alphonsus's non-profit status is irrelevant and prejudicial, and should be excluded. Its motion
should be denied.
ARGUMENT
MRIA raises two arguments for exclusion. First, it asserts that "Saint Alphonsus' s nonprofit status is not even tangentially relevant to any defense or other argument it has in this
matter." Mem. at 2. That is plainly wrong. Saint Alphonsus's status as a non-profit Catholic
hospital is integral to understanding its nature and directly relevant to several issues in this case.

1

"THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. This is the case of Saint Alphonsus Diversified
Care, Incorporated, an Idaho nonprofit corporation .... " Trial Tr. at 611.
2

See Trial Tr. at 932, 1294-95, 4080, 4900.
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Most basically, Saint Alphonsus's status as a non-profit Catholic hospital, subject to both Church
governance principles and various tax rules, including limits on the disposition of any assets left
over at the end of the year as a surplus of revenues over expenses, is a fundamental part of who
Saint Alphonsus is. That status also has a direct bearing on the nature of Saint Alphonsus' s
mission to provide the highest quality patient care to its community.
In addition, that non-profit status has a direct bearing on certain specific issues in the
case, relating to why certain transactions that were contemplated or explored by the parties
necessarily had to be pursued in certain ways. In particular, Saint Alphonsus's non-profit status
meant that its purchase or sale of assets, or its payment of money for other purposes, is only
proper when done on the basis of fair market value, to avoid improper private inurement.

Second, MRIA claims that it would be prejudiced because "one of its main theories is that
Saint Alphonsus was so driven by the bottom line that it knowingly breached its contractual and
fiduciary duties with MRIA so that it could make more money," and that an "unsophisticated"
juror might think Saint Alphonsus cannot make money. Mem. at 2. The proposed solution to
this highly speculative and unlikely "prejudice"-to ban Saint Alphonsus from telling the jury
who it is-is unfair and should be rejected. While this point is fair game for MRIA and Saint
Alphonsus to argue to the jury, it is certainly not a proper object of censorship to keep the jury
ignorant of this integral fact.
Saint Alphonsus intends to show, among other things, that as a non-profit Catholic
hospital, its motivation was not to maximize its profits but rather to serve patients in the Boise
area. It has consistently sought to align with excellent doctors and radiologists in furtherance of
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE MENTION OF
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S STATUS AS A NON-PROFIT ENTITY- 3
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its mission, and tried to bring all of the parties here together for many years. MRIA wants to
argue, to the contrary, that Saint Alphonsus was focused on "profit maximization," without
letting the jury know that, as a non-profit Catholic hospital, Saint Alphonsus was in fact
motivated by considerations somewhat different from those that would influence a for-profit
entity like MRIA. Thus, it is MRIA's request that is prejudicial, because by keeping from the
jury the fact of Saint Alphonsus's nonprofit status, the jury would be misled to believe that Saint
Alphonsus had profit motives indistinguishable from those of MRIA. MRIA wishes to enhance
its story by crippling Saint Alphonsus's ability to tell its own.
MRIA offers no legal authority for its request, and there is none. The case of Barclay v.
Mercy Health Services-Iowa Corp., No. C 07-4074,2009 WL 939846 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 6, 2009)

is directly on point and to the contrary. There, the court found that Mercy Health's status as a
Catholic non-profit was relevant under the facts of that case because, among other things, the
hospital's "Catholic identity and not-for-profit status are integral facts" with respect to the
"relationships among the defendants." /d. at *3. The Court held that this evidence was not more
prejudicial than probative under Rule 403 because although there might have been "perhaps even
some sympathy or antipathy to their non-profit status, the court finds that an adequate limiting
instruction is sufficient to protect both the plaintiffs' and the defendants' interests." /d. at *4
(citation omitted). 3 Thus, even if there were potential prejudice here-and there is not-then

3

The Court held that "[s]uch an instruction would advise the jurors that they must consider and decide the
case ... without regard to the defendants' corporate status, non-profit status, or religious affiliation, and that the
jurors must give the same fair consideration to all parties," and further held that "[p]otential religious or other biases
may also be probed by the court and the parties during jury selection." Barclay, 2009 WL 939846 at *4.
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voir dire or an instruction would cure it.

CONCLUSION
MRIA's Motion to Exclude Mention of Saint Alphonsus's Status as a Non-Profit Entity
should be denied.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2011.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
ARGUMENT
MRIA's motion purports to seek "clarification" of whether Saint Alphonsus may contend
that MRIA breached fiduciary duties "[i]n light of Saint Alphonsus's more recent comments that
it was seeking evidence that MRIA breached its fiduciary duties." Mot. at 3. In fact, MRIA
claims that there should be a blanket prohibition on such argument. /d. at 2-3 ("This matter is res
judicata. Saint Alphonsus cannot argue to the jury in any manner that MRIA breached any
fiduciary duties to Saint Alphonsus."). Putting aside the fact that the "comments" in question
referred to the alleged breaches by Saint Alphonsus and not by MRIA, MRIA's motion should be
denied because this Court has ordered no such blanket prohibition.
MRIA's own motion makes this clear. As it notes, Saint Alphonsus previously moved to
have reinstated the prior order that "Saint Alphonsus could introduce evidence suggesting
affirmative defenses, including estoppel and waiver, but [which] held that 'absent an offer of

proof to the contrary' by Saint Alphonsus, the Court will preclude Saint Alphonsus from
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asserting that MRIA breached a fiduciary duty." Mot. at 2 (emphasis added). Saint Alphonsus's
motion stated that "[t]o the extent Saint Alphonsus seeks to introduce such an assertion, it will
make an offer of proof as the Court ordered." ld This Court then granted the motion.
Therefore, contrary to MRIA's claim, this Court's order does not categorically prohibit Saint
Alphonsus from making such argument; instead, it must make an offer of proof to the Court first.
If Saint Alphonsus decides to make such an argument, it will follow the procedure set forth in the
Court's order.
CONCLUSION
MRIA's Motion and Memorandum for Clarification re: Contentions that MRIA Breached
Fiduciary Duties should be denied.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

ter-Defendants
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

ARGUMENT
Saint Alphonsus's July 25, 2011 motion catalogued several documents containing
hearsay upon hearsay which should be excluded from evidence, even assuming the underlying
document itself is admissible as a business record, and asked the Court to exclude these hearsay
statements. In response, MRIA primarily asserts its fundamentally flawed argument that any
new objections to documents used at the first trial are improper, simply because they were
admitted without objection the first time. As described in detail in Saint Alphonsus' s
contemporaneously filed Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Have Deemed Admitted Exhibits
from the First Trial, MRIA's argument is incorrect and contrary to substantial authority
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1

permitting new objections. MRIA's claim that it is allowed to introduce the double-hearsay
from Exhibits 404 7, 4057, 4101, and 4219 simply because no objection was made at the first trial
should be rejected. 2
MRIA implicitly concedes that all of these exhibits include inadmissible double hearsay,
because it makes no attempt to rebut that fact. Rather, MRIA's primary substantive response is
that the hearsay statements should not be excluded because MRIA might later attempt to
introduce them for non-hearsay purposes. Opp. at 3. Yet here again, MRIA describes no "non-

1

See, e.g., Jimenez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 79 P.3d 673, 676 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) ("substantial
authority permits parties on retrial to make new motions, raise new objections, and present additional
evidence"); Hutchins v. State, 100 Idaho 661,666 603 P.2d 995, 1000 (1979) (upon remand, "trial court is
free to correct any error in its original findings and conclusions as to matters not passed on by the
appellate court"); People v. Seit, 204 A.D.2d 363, 365 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) ("there is no merit to the
suggestion ... that [a] defendant enjoy[s] a vested right to introduce inadmissible evidence at his retrial
merely because that evidence was erroneously admitted without objection at [the] first trial"); State v.
Darwin, 288 A.2d 422, 426 (Conn. 1971) ("evidence which was not objected to at the first trial may be
contested at the second").
2

MRIA also argues that Judge McLaughlin "overruled the exact hearsay objection being made in
the motion" with respect to Exhibit 4154. Mem. at 2. That is not so. The present motion argues that
Exhibit 4154 is barred for the truth of the matter asserted because it is hearsay upon hearsay upon
hearsay: Dr. Giles' notes (the first level of hearsay) contain non-party Cliffs purported statement (the
second level), recounting what Cindy Schamp purportedly said. See Trial Tr. at 2661-62 ("Q .... Does
that document contain your notes taken at the time that Mr. Cliff recounted his conversation with Ms.
Schamp to you? A. It does.").
However, Judge McLaughlin decided that this evidence was admissible as a present sense
impression based on an incorrect factual premise: that Dr. Giles was actually listening to Schamp say this
to Cliff, and wrote it down contemporaneously. See Nov. 17, 2007 Mem. Decision at 16 (stating,
incorrectly, that notes were made at the time of Schamp's statement, "and so is not a case of multiple
levels of hearsay as would be the case of a statement made to Jeff Cliff, then made to Dr. Giles, and then
recorded') (emphasis added). Having misunderstood the nature of the document, the Judge never ruled
on the actual merits of the challenge. Law-of-the-case does not apply in such a circumstance. See State v.
Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 736 n.5, 240 P.3d 575, 582 n.5 (2010) ("the law ofthe case doctrine is purely
discretionary and a court is within its power to change a pretrial ruling at any time prior to issuing a final
judgment in the case, and is especially warranted when the change is needed to correct a clear error")
(emphasis added). Moreover, there are substantial objections to the foundation for any use of this
document.
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hearsay" use for any of these documents. MRIA's hypothetical argument that it might one day
make is no reason to delay a ruling on evidence that is inadmissible on its face. If MRIA later
conjures up some "non-hearsay" basis for offering any of the statements, it should first raise the
issue with Saint Alphonsus and the Court out of the hearing of the jury, so that all may consider
whether there is a genuine "non-hearsay" purpose, whether that purpose is relevant, and whether
its relevance outweighs the risk of prejudice that the jury may improperly consider the statement
"for the truth of the matter asserted."
Finally, MRIA makes the conclusory assertion that the statements in each document
"clearly meet the party-opponent exception to the hearsay rules." Opp. at 4. That is a
satisfactory basis for excusing only the last of the three levels of hearsay presented by these
exhibits: (1) the document itself; (2) the statement by a meeting attendee (sometimes identified,
sometimes not) about a prior meeting or conversation; and (3) sometimes reporting remarks
attributed to a Saint Alphonsus representative. When "a written report, itself hearsay, ...
relate[s] the statements of third persons," then [i]n such a situation each level of hearsay is
subject to a separate hearsay objection." Idaho Trial Handbook§ 19.9 (emphasis added).
Although step (1), the document itself, may be a business record admissible under I.R.E. 803(6),
and step (3), the statement attributed to a Saint Alphonsus representative, may be admissible as
an admission of a party opponent under I.R.E. 801 (d)(2), there is no basis for admission of the
hearsay statement in step (2), the description by the meeting participant of purported prior
meetings and conversations. The unfairness of such hearsay is only magnified when the
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declarant is anonymous, leaving no basis whatever to assess the reliability of the statement. 3 But
the hearsay rule does not turn simply on this "lack of foundation," as MRIA argues. Whether the
step (2) declarant is identified or not, these out-of-court statements, which are subject to no
exception to the rule, present inadmissible hearsay and should be excluded.
CONCLUSION
Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to Exclude Hearsay within Hearsay From Business
Records should be granted.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2011.

GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

er-Defendants

3

See Estate of Burton v. Trover Clinic Found. Inc.,--- S.W.3d ---,2010 WL 6816338, at
*5 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010) ("[M]ost importantly, the statements recorded in the minutes could not
be attributed to any particular person. In reviewing KRE 803(6), one of the requirements of the
exception requires the statements in the business records to have been made by a person with
knowledge. The exception does not allow the admission of anonymous statements into evidence
... .");Walton v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., No. 05-3027,2009 WL 2778441, at *6 (D. Ariz.
2009) (holding that statements in meeting minutes "do not satisfy the ... knowledge
requirement" when "the original declarants are unidentified," because despite the fact that one
could infer that speakers were employees, the Court could only speculate that these "employees
had personal knowledge ofthe testing and other facts mentioned in the document, including [a
second-level] hearsay [statement]" found therein).
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

ARGUMENT
In its motion to reconsider, Saint Alphonsus requested that the Court (1) hold that Saint
Alphonsus may mention that its withdrawal from MRIA was lawful-a critical and highly
relevant point that MRIA originally conceded, and then only contested in its reply brief-and (2)
order redactions to two misleading portions of the Shattuck Hammond memoranda, in order to
conform those documents to the Court's legal rulings. MRIA's response to the first point
requests this Court to keep the jury ignorant of its critical legal ruling. Its response to the second
point fails to address the actual, prejudicial context of the challenged Shattuck Hammond
language.
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I.

The Court Should Permit Mention of Lawful Dissociation as it is Relevant and
Necessary to Avoid Unfair Prejudice to Saint Alphonsus
As Saint Alphonsus showed, the fact that Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation was lawful is

highly relevant both factually and legally. 1 Mot. at 3-4. The act of dissociating cut off any
fiduciary duty claims and started the one-year clock on the non-compete. It brought a lawful end
to the partnership, and was an action taken by Saint Alphonsus only after years of attempting to
make a deal with MRIA.
MRIA does not deny that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal is an important part of the story
of this case, Opp. at 4, and it does not even deny that it will again argue that Saint Alphonsus's
attempts to resolve the MRIA-IMI dispute and its leaving the partnership were "abandonments"
and "betrayals." !d. Yet MRIA believes the jury should be completely ignorant of whether
dissociation was lawful, going so far as to argue that the Court should not even mention it by
way ofjury instructions. !d. But that would obviously allow the jury to wrongfully infer that the
dissociation was one of these improper "abandonments" or "betrayals." Juror ignorance on this
point does nothing except unfairly benefit MRIA, and risks a recurrence ofthe very same jury
misconceptions that necessitated a retrial in the first place.
It is no less important that Saint Alphonsus be allowed to tell the jury about the true state

of affairs-that it legally dissociated from MRIA in 2004. MRIA's claim that "Saint Alphonsus

1

MRIA argues that Saint Alphonsus should not be allowed to seek reconsideration, but
MRIA concedes that it did not assert until "its reply brief that ... argument [by Saint
Alphonsus] that [it] lawfully dissociated is irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial." Opp. at 5. Thus
this motion for reconsideration is Saint Alphonsus's first opportunity to address the issue.
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wants to argue that its lawful dissociation somehow sanitizes its bad acts," Opp. at 4, is
demonstrably false. Saint Alphonsus's own proposed pre-trial jury instruction make this clear:
I have already determined that Saint Alphonsus had a legal right to
withdraw, or "dissociate," from the MRIA partnership when it did so, on
Aprill, 2004. You need not concern yourselfwith the legality ofthat
action.
On the other hand, the fact that Saint Alphonsus had the legal right to
withdraw from MRIA on April 1, 2004, does not prevent the MRI
entities from arguing that Saint Alphonsus breached its contractual
obligations or fiduciary duties before it withdrew from the MRIA
partnership, or that Saint Alphonsus breached contractual non-compete
obligations that did not expire until April 1, 2005.
Saint Alphonsus's Requested Jury Instructions and Special Verdict Form, Instr. 8 (July 15,
2011 ). If the jury is so instructed by the Court prior to trial, there is no risk the jury will think
that Saint Alphonsus's lawful dissociation means that it could not have breached duties before
dissociation or the end of the non-compete, and Saint Alphonsus would not argue this. There
will be no prejudice to MRIA's actual claims. By contrast, MRIA wants the jury to be
completely ignorant of this critical fact and to speculate that the dissociation may have been
wrongful.

II.

The Language in the Shattuck Hammond Memoranda Improperly Suggest to the
Jury That the Lawful Withdrawal was Wrongful
The Court's June 13 decision excluded references in the Shattuck Hammond and

PriceWaterhouseCoopers memoranda that suggested that dissociation was wrongful. Saint
Alphonsus's motion to reconsider showed that two additional sentences in the Shattuck
Hammond memoranda, in context, likewise improperly suggested that dissociation was
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wrongful. Mot. at 5-7. In response, MRIA suggests that it wants the jury to draw improper
inferences, and ignores the very context which creates the prejudice.
The first sentence at issue states that Saint Alphonsus was considering "simply
withdrawing from MRIA," and that "this option would likely engender litigation with MRIA."
Trial Ex. 4234 at 2 (emphasis added); accord Trial Ex. 4239 at 3. MRIA does not dispute that a
jury would infer from this that withdrawal was wrongful; it suggests, however, that the language
should be allowed because the jury might believe that the risk of litigation was not due to
withdrawal but rather to breaches of fiduciary duty. Opp. at 7. The passage in question says
nothing about fiduciary duty or other breaches, but rather claims that withdrawal might cause
litigation, and thus that withdrawal might be wrongful. The jury should not be presented with
that improper inference. Alternatively, MRIA claims that this is admissible evidence that Saint
Alphonsus was advised that dissociation might lead to litigation with MRIA, yet dissociated "all
the same." /d. That Saint Alphonsus was advised oflegal risks is completely irrelevant, and in
any event, any possible relevance is outweighed by the prejudice of suggesting to the jury that
dissociation was wrongful.
The second sentence contains, under the heading "Option A: Withdrawal from MRIA,"
the words: "Givens Pursley believes that ... there may be a risk of St. Alphonsus breaching its
fiduciary responsibility to the LPs." See Trial Ex. 4234 at 8, Ex. 4239 at 11. MRIA claims that
this sentence does not, in context, imply that withdrawal is wrongful. It makes that conclusion,
however, only by completely ignoring the heading of the section in which the quoted language
appears. See Opp. at 7 (making no mention of the language "Option A: Withdrawal from
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RECONSIDERATION IN PART OF JUNE
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MRIA," let alone argument as to why it is not prejudicial in context). With that context, this
sentence prejudicially implies that Saint Alphonsus might have breached its fiduciary duties by
withdrawing. Mot. at 7. MRIA has done nothing to rebut this contention.
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant Saint Alphonsus's motion to reconsider and order that (a) Saint
Alphonsus be permitted to argue that its dissociation from MRIA in 2004 was lawful, and that
(b) the language in the Shattuck Hammond memoranda stating that "SARMC has been advised
by counsel that this option would likely engender litigation with MRIA" and "Givens Pursley
believes that ... there may be a risk of St. Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary duties" by
withdrawing, be held inadmissible at trial.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2011.

r-Defendants
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Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219
MEMORANDUM ADDRESSING SAINT
ALPHONSUS 'S OPPOSITION TO
MRIA'S MOTION TO SHORTEN

Presently before the Court are seven substantive motions filed at the last minute by both
parties that are currently slated to be heard on August 5, 2011. Saint Alphonsus is objecting to
the Court hearing one of MRIA's motions on that date because it cannot adequately prepare for
hearing in the short amount of time left before hearing and because expert discovery has not yet
been completed.
At the scheduling conference held on February 9, 2011, the Court set a deadline for
hearing motions of May 18, 2011, and reiterated that "Motions will be set for hearing ... no later
than May 18, 2011" in its February 15, 2011, Order Reopening Discovery and Setting Schedule.
However, the Court stated on the record that it could not prevent the parties from filing motions
in limine after that deadline. The Court subsequently issued another order setting a deadline of
August 5, 2011, for motions in limine, indicating that the Court must prepare for trial.
Regardless of the stipulation extending the discovery deadlines, the Court literally does not have
any available hearing dates prior to trial aside from August 5, 2011. Consequently, this Court
cannot and will not adopt Saint Alphonsus' s proposed schedule for motions regarding expert

~emorandurnRe:MotionToShorten
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witnesses, and it will sign the order shortening time.
Deadlines are set for a reason, and the Court wishes to be absolutely clear on this point:
the Court will not accept any further late motions from either party. The Court too must have
time to prepare for trial and suggests that the parties do the same.
SO ORDERED AND DATED

this3 1 ~dayof August, 2011.

~

~
Dist

t Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
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:

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
According to MRIA's damages expert Bruce Budge, MRIA's competitor IMI performed
approximately 127,000 MRI scans between 1999 and 2010. See Budge Report Sch. 12. The
premise ofMRIA's clam for lost profits is that, but for improper assistance allegedly given to
IMI by Saint Alphonsus, MRIA would have performed some portion of these 127,000 scans.
MRIA does not, however, offer evidence that any specific physicians diverted any specific scans
from MRIA to IMI or that any such diversions (if they occurred) resulted from Saint
Alphonsus's alleged misconduct rather than other factors. Instead, MRIA offers Budge's
opinion that it is reasonable to assume that absent the alleged bad acts, MRIA would have
performed a certain number of those 127,000 scans-either 67,000 or 71,000 or 103,000 or
107,000 or al1127,000, depending on which of Budge's models is applied, see Budge Schs. 6,
6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5. To arrive at his opinion about the number of scans that MRIA would have
performed, and hence the damages that MRIA is entitled to recover, Budge looks at the hospital
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE EXPERT
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affiliations and referring practices of the physicians that ordered the scans, and draws inferences
about which physicians would have sent patients to IMI in any event and which physicians sent
patients to IMI as a result of Saint Alphonsus' s alleged misconduct. 1
After holding that Budge's opinions about which scans were lost as a result of the alleged
bad acts creates a question of fact for the jury, see Nov. 16, 2010, Mem. Decision at 18-20, this
Court gave Saint Alphonsus the opportunity to "bring in a new expert" and offer "new" expert
testimony responding to Budge's methodology and offering an alternative method for estimating
damages. Saint Alphonsus's expert, Dr. Thomas McCarthy, has done precisely that: using a
variety of well-recognized economics methodologies from the empirical toolkit ofthe social
sciences, Dr. McCarthy offers his opinion that Budge's opinion about which ofiMI's 127,000
scans would have gone to MRIA but for the alleged bad acts fails to account for, among other
things, the impact of other competitors that entered the market during the relevant time period,
statistical data showing that physician referral patterns are based in large part on where the
patient lives, and statistical data showing that physicians typically split their referrals among
providers. Dr. McCarthy also applies a well-established and judicially accepted statistical
methodology known as a regression analysis to show that the declines in MRIA's scan volumes,
which Budge attributes to the alleged bad acts, are not correlated at all with the asserted acts, but
rather are closely correlated with other events, including specific business decisions made by
MRIA. Dr. McCarthy also calculates how Budge's and Wilhoite's aggregate damages figures

1

MRIA's other expert, Charles Wilhoite, relies on Budge's opinion to project future lost profits for the
same proportion of scans selected by Budge.
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must be adjusted if one varies certain assumptions. All of these opinions result from the
application of well-established areas of expertise applied every day in courts in Idaho and
throughout the country. There is no basis for excluding Dr. McCarthy's testimony.

ARGUMENT
I.

Dr. McCarthy's Testimony Is Within the Scope of the Court's Order Reopening
Expert Discovery
As part of his analysis, Dr. McCarthy employs a variety of well-accepted methodological

approaches (described in detail in Part II below) to show that MRIA's experts, Budge and
Wilhoite, have failed to support their opinion that Saint Alphonsus' s alleged bad acts caused a
certain volume of scan business to migrate from MRIA to IMI. According to Dr. McCarthy, an
analysis of the competitive market for MRI scanning services, statistical data showing where
physicians refer patients for scans, and a sophisticated regression analysis all demonstrate that
Budge is incorrect when he opines that between 67,000 and 127,000 scans (depending on the
model employed) should be counted as "lost" as a result of the assistance allegedly given to IMI
by Saint Alphonsus.
MRIA is wrong in arguing that, by opining on "causation" in this manner, Dr.
McCarthy's opinion goes beyond what the Court allowed in permitting Saint Alphonsus to
develop new expert opinion on damages. The Court permitted Saint Alphonsus to develop
expert testimony in response to the opinions offered by MRIA's damages experts. See Feb. 15,
2011 Order Reopening Discovery at 4. And as MRIA has conceded, and this Court has
recognized, MRIA's damages experts opine about causation and the "scans [MRIA allegedly]
lost to IMI as a result ofSt. Als' conduct." MRIA Mem. Opp'n Mot. Summ. J. on Lost Profits
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE EXPERT
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(Aug. 30, 2010), at 13 (emphasis added); see also id. at 11-15 (devoting entire section ofbriefto
discussing the "Causation Evidence" offered by Budge and Wilhoite); Nov. 16, 2011 Mem.
Decision at 20 (holding that MRIA's experts' "damages estimate ... distinguishes" between
those scans lost as a result of Saint Alphonsus' s alleged misconduct and those "scans which may
have been lost for other reasons"). Expert opinion like Dr. McCarthy's that directly addresses
and rebuts these assumptions and conclusions ofMRIA's damages experts is plainly within the
scope of the permitted testimony.
Even apart from the fact that they are directly responsive to Budge's and Wilhoite's
opinions about which scans were diverted, Dr. McCarthy's opinions about causation plainly fall
within the scope of expert opinion on "damages." It is well settled that to prove "lost profit
damages," a plaintiff must establish "both amount and causation." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout
Co., 143 Idaho 733, 739-40, 152 P.3d 604, 610-11 (2007); see also, e.g., Trilogy Network Sys.,
Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P .3d 1119, 1121 (2007) ("[t ]he measure of damages for

the breach of an anti-competition clause is the amount that the plaintiff lost by reason of the
breach, not the amount of profits made by the defendant" (emphasis added)); Wing v. Hulet,
106 Idaho 912,919,684 P.2d 314,321 (Ct. App. 1984) (discussing the "general rule on
damages" and emphasizing that "[i]n order to establish recoverable damages ... , the evidence
must show that the loss was produced by a defendant's conduct rather than by ... other
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variables" and that "the measure of damage -

as well as the fact of damage -

must be proven

beyond speculation"). 2
That is why, as the Supreme Court admonished, a critical aspect ofMRIA's proof of
damages is to show that scans went to IMI as a result of misconduct by Saint Alphonsus and not
for other, unrelated reasons. Specifically, in a section of its opinion addressing the adequacy of
MRIA's proof of"damages," the Court instructed that MRIA must supply "'a method of figuring
damages'" that distinguishes between the business lost as a result of the alleged bad acts and the
business that would have been lost absent those bad acts. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care v.
MRI Assocs., 148 Idaho 479, 498, 224 P.3d 1068, 1087 (2010) (quoting Pope v. Intermountain
Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988 (1982)). In addressing this issue of causation as part of

his damages analysis, Dr. McCarthy is doing exactly what the Supreme Court instructed the
parties to do on remand-and, it bears repeated emphasis, exactly what MRIA's experts purport
to be doing, see MRIA Mem. Opp'n Mot. Summ. J. on Lost Profits at 11-15.
That Dr. McCarthy's discussion of causation is appropriately part of an expert opinion on
damages is confirmed by the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, a leading resource "used
in a variety of educational programs for federal and state judges" to "assist judges in identifying
the issues most commonly in dispute in ... selected areas [of expert testimony] and in reaching
an informed and reasoned assessment concerning the basis of expert evidence." Federal Judicial
Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, at v-vi (2d ed. 2000), available at
2

Because Idaho courts view both "the measure of damage" and "the fact of damages" as part of a proper
damages analysis, Wing, 106 Idaho at 919,684 P.2d at 321, MRIA's criticism of Dr. McCarthy for discussing "'the
fact of damages"' (MRIA Mem. at 4 (quoting McCarthy Dep. at 198)) is perplexing.
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http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/pages/610 (excerpts attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of
Counsel filed herewith). 3 In a section entitled "Reference Guide on Estimation of Economic
Losses in Damages Awards," the manual explains that the very "first step" in a proper "damages
study" is the "but-for analysis" in which the expert compares the plaintiffs actual economic
position to "the plaintiffs economic position if the harmful event had not occurred." Id. at 284.
This analysis "must ... include ... a characterization of the causal link between the wrongdoing
and the harm the plaintiff suffered." Id. at 286. A key question in the damages analysis will be,
"[i]s there disagreement about the causal effect of the injury?" ld. at 289. The defendant's
damages expert "may agree that [the plaintiffs] earnings have been dramatically reduced but
argue that the reduction in earnings is the result of other causes .... Frequently, the defendant
will calculate damages on the premise that the harmful act had little, if any, causal relationship to
the plaintiffs losses." Id. at 289-90. Critically, if a plaintiffs expert's "damages analysis
includes the effects not caused by the defendant, it is a defective analysis. It has not followed the
standard format for damages, which, by its nature, isolates the effects of the harmful act on the
plaintiff. The proper response is ... to carry out a valid damages analysis that includes only
damages, and not the effects of other events." Id. at 307.
As these authorities demonstrate, Dr. McCarthy's testimony about causation is damages
testimony. Not only that, but MRIA has it entirely backwards: an expert damages analysis that
fails to adequately isolate those losses caused by the defendant's misconduct from those not so

3

According to a search on Westlaw, since its original publication in 1995, the Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence has been cited in over 500 state and federal judicial decisions.
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caused "is a defective analysis." !d.; see also Pope, 103 Idaho at 234,646 P.2d at 1005. Dr.
McCarthy's testimony is thus plainly within the scope of the Court's order permitting Saint
Alphonsus to offer new expert opinion on damages. 4

II.

Dr. McCarthy's Testimony Is Admissible As Proper Expert Testimony
MRIA's argument that Dr. McCarthy's damages testimony is inadmissible rests largely

on MRIA's incorrect assertion that expert testimony on causation should not be a part of a
damages analysis. See, e.g., Mem. at 5, 9, 11-13. To the contrary, as established in the
preceding section, it is a necessary component to a proper damages study. In those sections of
his report challenged by MRIA-which discuss both the fact of damages and the quantum of
damages-Dr. McCarthy's analysis adheres to well settled methodologies-much more so, in
fact, than the conclusory analyses and speculative conclusions offered by MRIA's own experts.
Dr. McCarthy's opinions all derive from his specialized knowledge and will assist the jury in
understanding the evidence, and he is eminently qualified to give them.

A.

Dr. McCarthy's Methodologies Are Scientifically and Technically Sound

Expert witnesses routinely rely on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge to
testify whether certain facts have caused a particular harm for which a plaintiff seeks to recover.
Such knowledge is no less relevant, helpful to a jury, and admissible in the field of economics
4

MRIA's interpretation of this Court's ruling also makes no sense because Saint Alphonsus offered, and
the Court admitted, similar expert testimony about damages in the first trial. Saint Alphonsus's damages expert in
the first trial, Manfred Steiner, provided the very sort of testimony and opinion about causation that MRIA now
seeks to prevent Dr. McCarthy from giving. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 3220 ("we question the assumption that Center
would have been able to retain those scans but for the bad acts"); id at 3222 (rejecting the premise "that it was some
bad act that caused th[ e] shift" of referrals from Center to IMI). MRIA recognized then that this causation analysis
was part of a damages opinion when it objected (unsuccessfully) that Mr. Steiner was not "qualified as an expert in
theareaofdamages." Jd at3215.
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than it is in the biological sciences. See Mem. at 8 n.5. In Rockefeller v. Grabow, the very case
on which MRIA principally relies, the Supreme Court upheld the admission of expert testimony
opining that the defendant's acts caused the claimants lost sales because the "expert was an
economics professor who had talked with several people involved in the [market]; reviewed
[relevant documents]; and then applied common economic principles to the fact." 136 Idaho
637, 646, 39 P.3d 577, 586 (2001). 5
It is thus highly appropriate for an economist like Dr. McCarthy, who is expert in the

workings of competitive markets generally and health-care markets in particular, to assist the
jury in understanding the effects and interactions of competitive forces and customer choice in
the marketplace for MRI scans. Indeed, as noted above, the section on expert damages testimony
in the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence stresses that an expert's damages opinion "must"
include "a characterization of the causal link between the wrongdoing and the harm the plaintiff
suffered," and emphasizes that a defendant's damages expert will often opine that "the reduction
in [the plaintiffs] earnings is the result of other causes." Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence, supra, at 286, 289. To the extent "a damages analysis includes the effects not caused
by the defendant"-as Dr. McCarthy will testify is the case with Budge's and Wilhoite's
analyses-"it is a defective analysis" and "[t]he proper response" is "to carry out a valid

5

MRIA cites Rockefeller for its separate holding that expert testimony is not appropriate for determining
whether a defendant's conduct complied with a specified standard of care. !d. at 647,39 P.3d at 587. No such
testimony is at issue here; Dr. McCarthy assumes that Saint Alphonsus is found liable for violating its alleged duties
to MRIA. McCarthy Report~ 6.
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damages analysis that includes only damages, and not the effects of other events." !d. at 307.
This is exactly what Dr. McCarthy has done in his report.

1.

Dr. McCarthy's Rebuttal of Budge's and Wilhoite's "Lost Scan"
Opinions

The first section of Dr. McCarthy's report that MRIA seeks to exclude is Section IV.A.1,
which examines Budge's opinion that certain IMI scans would have been performed by MRIA if
Saint Alphonsus had not assisted IMI. Budge reasons that these scans would have been
performed by MRIA because the physicians referring those scans either previously sent at least
one patient to MRIA or else are affiliated only with Saint Alphonsus. See Trial Tr. at 2741-43.
Applying his economic expertise to analyze the structure of the market and the same reams of
quantitative scan data relied upon by Budge, Dr. McCarthy concludes that Budge failed to
properly assess causation and that his assumptions about physician referring practices are "rigid
and simplistic." McCarthy Report~ 21. Dr. McCarthy offers "several reasons to think that
[Budge's] assumption is unrealistic and that th[e] but-for referral pattern [Budge envisions]
would not have happened." !d.
First, Dr. McCarthy criticizes Budge for failing to take into account the fact that MRIA

had been a monopoly provider until numerous new MRI competitors entered into the Boise area
during the time in question, and that this new competition would have had an impact on MRIA's
business. McCarthy Report~ 21. This is a valid criticism; indeed, lost-profit analyses, like
Budge's, that fail to take into account the effects of competitors have been held inadmissible.
See, e.g., BioCore, Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 183 F.R.D. 695,697 (D. Kan. 1998) (holding that

multi-year lost-profits analysis was inadmissible where it assumed all lost profits would flow to
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plaintiff as the only competitor, because contrary to expert report, "plaintiffs now have 25
competitors").
Second, examining the same decade's worth of scan data relied upon by Budge, Dr.

McCarthy criticizes Budge for failing to consider patient ZIP code information in conjunction
with the service areas for the different MRI facilities. McCarthy

Report~

22. Analyzing patient

ZIP code data reveals that patient convenience is a consideration in where physicians send
patients for scans, and that the IMI facilities draw a high proportion of patients from a different
geographic area than do MRIA's facilities. See id. This strongly indicates that MRI Center
would not have serviced all of the Budge-identified scans in the but-for world. Id

6

Third, again analyzing the same scan data relied upon by Budge, Dr. McCarthy concludes
that the data establishes that physicians regularly split their referrals between MRIA and IMI and
do not-as Budge mistakenly sets forth as a basis for his opinion-send all of their patient to one
MRIA provider or the other. See McCarthy

Report~

23. The data thus undermines Budge's

opinion that any physician who sent even one patient to MRIA in the past would have sent all of
his patients to MRIA in the but-for world. Id
MRIA's criticism that Dr. McCarthy's analysis is speculative (Mem. at 10-13)
completely misses the point. Dr. McCarthy is critiquing Budge's analysis for its own
fundamental failure to properly "characterize[e] ... the causal link between the wrongdoing and

6

MRIA criticizes Dr. McCarthy for not looking at MRI Mobile's service area. Mem. at 11. This criticism
goes to weight not admissibility and is in any event flawed because (with the exception of certain ofMRIA's
separate "usurpation" theories) Budge's analysis looks to scans allegedly lost by MRI Center, not MRI Mobile. See
Supplemental Expert Report of Bruce P. Budge (May 2, 2011), at 15 figure 10, calculation methods 3 and 4.
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the harm [MRIA] suffered." Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra, at 286. It is
MRIA 's burden, not Saint Alphonsus's, to prove through expert testimony that any business lost
to IMI by MRIA resulted from Saint Alphonsus's misconduct and not from other factors, such as
an altered competitive landscape, the location of the patients, or the practice of physicians to split
scans among providers. See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, 148 Idaho at 498, 224 P.3d at
1087. By pointing to innocent factors that likely caused MRI to lose some of the scans that
Budge claims as damages, and thereby demonstrating that Budge likely overstates MRIA's
damages, Dr. McCarthy provides crucial information to a jury that might otherwise place blind
trust in Budge's own speculative conclusions.
In sum, MRIA's experts are offering the opinion that it is reasonable to conclude (based
on affiliations and historic referring practices analyzed by those experts) that a certain set of
physicians would have consistently sent their patients to MRIA but for misconduct by Saint
Alphonsus. Using accepted economics methodologies, Dr. McCarthy is analyzing the same (and
some additional data) and opining that the data demonstrates that it is not reasonable to conclude
that this certain set of physicians would have sent all of their patients to MRIA. Any criticisms
that MRIA might have are properly directed to the weight the jury should give Dr. McCarthy's
opinions, not to their admissibility.

2.

Dr. McCarthy's Regression Analyses

MRIA also seeks to exclude the opinions expressed in Part IV.A.2, IV.A.3, and V.A of
Dr. McCarthy's report. Two of these sections set forth Dr. McCarthy's discussion of the results
of two regression analyses (one using monthly data and one using annual data) that Dr.
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McCarthy conducted and which demonstrate that there is no empirical support for Budge's
conclusion that the existence of the downtown IMI imaging center caused MRIA to lose scans.

See McCarthy Report Part IV.A.2

(~~

24-27) & Part V.A (~~54-57). The third challenged

section discusses Dr. McCarthy's use of regression analysis to demonstrate that a different
variable unrelated to Saint Alphonsus's bad acts (namely, MRIA's independent business decision
to fire the radiologists that read its scans) correlates strongly to MRIA's loss of scans. See
McCarthy Report Part IV .A.3

(~

28).

Multiple regression "is a statistical tool for understanding the relationship between two
or more variables" and involves "a variable to be explained-called the dependent variable-and
additional explanatory variables that are thought to produce or be associated with changes in the
dependent variable." DanielL. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in

Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra, at 184-85. It is a well-established
methodological approach that "is used extensively by all social sciences." Zenith Elecs. Corp. v.

WHTV Broadcasting, 395 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2005). As such, expert testimony relying on
regression analysis is generally admissible, as the United States Supreme Court and numerous
other courts have held. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385,400 (1986), Zenith Elecs.,
395 F.3d at 419 ("[r]egression analysis is common enough in litigation to earn extended
treatment in the Federal Judicial Center's Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence"). Indeed,
since regression is such a core part of the "empirical toolkit of the social sciences," courts have
criticized experts who (like Budge here)fail to use regression analysis as part of their damages
studies. See Zenith Elecs., 395 F.3d at 419.
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In his report, Dr. McCarthy used MRI Center's scan volume as the dependent variable to
be explained, and analyzed various explanatory variables that might explain why the scan
volumes changed. McCarthy Report~~ 25, 55. His analysis showed that the opening of IMI's
downtown facility in September 1999 did not correlate with any lost scans by MRI Center. !d.
~~

25-27, 56. His analysis also showed that the variables that correlated the most with lost scans

were MRI Center's firing of the GSR radiologists and the opening ofiMI on Saint Alphonsus's
campus in December 2005, after Saint Alphonsus had rightfully dissociated and the period of
non-compete had ended. !d.~~ 28, 56.

7

Despite its well-established use in litigation, MRIA argues, without a single citation to
authority, that "regression analysis" is improper "with respect to [Dr. McCarthy's] assertion that
opening IMI did not cause any lost scans to MRIA" because "a regression analysis is not an
appropriate measure of causation" but rather shows only correlation. Mem. at 15. This
argument-which would contradict the authorities by never allowing the expert use of regression
analysis-misunderstands the point of regression analysis. While it is true that "[ c]ausality

7

MRIA is wrong in claiming, in a footnote, that Dr. McCarthy made improper legal conclusions in his
statement that "[t]o the extent that IMI facilities were opened after Saint Alphonsus's legal dissociation cannot be
counted as causes of damages, their possible effect on MRI Center scans cannot be called lost sales" because "scans
done by these IMI imaging facilities are merely competitive losses that the MRI Center suffered when a new,
legitimate entrant came into the market." Mem. at 15 n.6 (emphasis added). The Court has already recognized (as
has MRIA) that "Saint Alphonsus had no duty not to compete after the expiration of the noncompetition agreement"
on April1, 2005. Consolidated Order reMotions in Limine, June 9, 2011, at 3. It has also recognized (as has
MRIA) that MRIA can only recover damages after April1, 2005, if it proves the post-April1, 2005 damages were
caused by "breach[es] of [an] obligation not to compete prior to that date." Hr'g Tr. of May 18, 2011, at 66-69
(emphasis added). As the words "to the extent that" make clear, Dr. McCarthy is merely assuming the Court's
conclusion: ifthe post-April1, 2005 opening ofiMI's on-campus facility was not improper, then losses caused by
that lawful opening (as opposed to losses caused by conduct occurring before April1, 2005) are not losses caused by
the alleged bad acts.
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cannot be inferred by data analysis alone," Rubinfeld, supra, at 184-85, a regression analysis
showing such a correlation lends support to an "infer[ ence] that a causal relationship exists on
the basis of an underlying causal theory that explains the relationship between the two
variables," and offers independent "empirical evidence that there is a causal relationship." !d.
Here, the regression analysis showing no correlation between the number of scans
performed by MRIA and the opening ofiMI's downtown facility is in harmony with other facts
suggesting the absence of such causation. This other evidence includes, among other things, that
IMI's downtown facility was located near Saint Luke's in order to avoid or minimize
competition with outpatient scans done at Saint Alphonsus (including Saint Alphonsus's nonMRI modalities and MRI Center's MRI modality), and that MRI Center's scans increased after
IMI opened in 1999, giving rise to a permissible inference that the opening of IMI' s downtown
facility did not financially harm Center. Further, Saint Alphonsus will introduce evidence that
MRI Center's firing of its well-respected reading radiologists was a self-inflicted cause of many
of their lost scans, as there is abundant evidence (including from MRIA principals themselves)
that the identity of the reading radiologists is a key factor influencing physician referral decisions
for MRI scans. Dr. McCarthy's regression analysis is statistical evidence supporting this
inference, which Saint Alphonsus will urge the fact finder to make. That is precisely what a
regression analysis should do. See, e.g., Schumacher v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., No. CIV 021027, 2006 WL 47504, at *7 (D.S.D. Jan. 5, 2006) ("Even the best regression equation cannot
prove causation. The most it can show is a correlation that can give rise to an inference that
causation exists.").
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MRIA next argues that Dr. McCarthy's regression analysis is invalid because it "does not
even attempt to measure other bad acts of Saint Alphonsus that might have affected scans."
Mem. at 15 (emphasis added). But, of course, applying the regression analysis to some of the
alleged bad acts serves the purpose of negating the likely role of those acts as a cause of harmwhich is all that Dr. McCarthy is claiming and which alone is sufficient reason to admit the
regression analysis.
In any event, as the U.S. Supreme Court has held, "the question of what explanatory
variables should be included in a particular regression normally 'affect[s] the analysis'
probativeness, not its admissibility."' Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. ofAm., Inc., 380 F.3d 459,
468 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 400). Thus, "a regression analysis does not
become inadmissible as evidence simply because it does not include every variable that is
quantifiable and may be relevant to the question presented . . . . [I]t is for the finder of fact to
consider the variables that have been left out of an analysis, and the reasons given for the
omissions, and then to determine the weight to accord the study's results." Maitland v. Univ. of
Minn., 155 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 1998). MRIA's alleged criticisms of the structure of the

regression analysis is an issue for MRIA's experts, or for MRIA's cross examination of Dr.
McCarthy.

3.

Dr. McCarthy's Criticism of Budge's and Wilhoite's But-For World
and His Adjustments to Damages For Changes in the Assumptions

MRIA also challenges Part IV.B of Dr. McCarthy's report. In this section of the report,
Dr. McCarthy criticizes Budge and Wilhoite for their failure to articulate with specificity what
the "but-for world" would have looked like. See McCarthy Report, 29 ("[w]ithout properly
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specifying the but-for world, it is impossible to know whether [Budge's and Wilhoite's] damages
estimates are reliable"). The cases and other authorities recognize that this is an appropriate
response to the failure of a plaintiffs expert to hypothesize a "but for" world in which the
wrongdoing did not occur: "In the standard format [of an expert damages analysis], the but-for
analysis differs from the actual environment only by hypothesizing the absence of the harmful
act committed by the defendant. The comparison of but-for to actual automatically isolates the
causal effects of the harmful act on the plaintiff." Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence,

supra, at 307; id at 284; see also, e.g., Energy Northwest v. United States, 641 F.3d 1300, 1305
(Fed. Cir. 2011) ("[A] plaintiff seeking damages must submit a hypothetical model establishing
what its costs would have been in the absence of breach. It is only by comparing this
hypothetical 'but-for' scenario with the parties' actual conduct that a court can determine what
costs were actually caused by the breach, as opposed to costs that would have been incurred
anyway." (internal citation omitted)); Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 569 (8th Cir. 2005)
(an expert is "required to construct a hypothetical market, a but-for market, free of the restraints
and conduct alleged to be anticompetitive" to show impact of alleged wrongdoing (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Thus, in Part IV .B.l of his report, Dr. McCarthy criticizes Budge and Wilhoite for
including in their calculations damages for scans purportedly lost to IMI after Saint Alphonsus
was free to compete with MRIA. McCarthy Report~ 30. Using his skills as an economist, Dr.
McCarthy then performs the calculations needed to reduce Budge's and Wilhoite's aggregate
damages calculations by the amount attributable to those scans. Id

~

31. These calculations will
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plainly assist the jury in segregating out amounts that Budge and Wilhoite improperly included
in their damages calculations. 8
Similarly, in Part IV.B.2 of his report, Dr. McCarthy explains how Budge's and
Wilhoite's overall calculations would need to be reduced if the jury finds (as Dr. McCarthy
assumes for purpose of this portion of his testimony) that IMI would have existed anyway.
McCarthy Report~ 34. In this section, Dr. McCarthy also criticizes Budge for failing "to state
9

in any definitive way"-as a proper damages analysis requires-whether or not IMI would have
existed anyway in the "but for" world. !d.

~

32.

8

To the extent MRIA is criticizing Dr. McCarthy's assumption that MRIA cannot recover damages
traceable to conduct occurring after April 1, 2005, that is no reason to exclude Dr. McCarthy's opinion.
"[O]pposing experts may have been given different legal guidance and therefore made different economic
assumptions, resulting in major differences in their damages estimates." Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence,
supra, at 291. MRIA is free to ask Dr. McCarthy on cross examination how his damages calculations would change
if the assumptions are varied.
9

Part VI of Dr. McCarthy's report, which MRIA does not challenge, sets forth the facts upon which Dr.
McCarthy bases his damages opinion. As permitted by Rule 703, these facts are "those perceived by" Dr. McCarthy
based on his review of the record evidence that Saint Alphonsus will present at trial. See, e.g., Karlson v. Harris,
140 Idaho 561, 566-67, 97 P.3d 428, 433-34 (2004) (holding that as Rule 703 expressly permits an expert to "base
an opinion or inference upon facts or data 'perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing,"'
expert opinion is admissible when based on "facts . . . supported in the evidence in the record"); Cummings v. Sea
Lion Corp., 924 P.2d 1011, 1018 (Alaska 1996) (noting, under Rule 703, that expert could, "[i]n formulating his
opinion ... review[] the depositions of all the major witnesses, [and] all relevant documents including the limited
partnership documents").
Dr. McCarthy does not purport to offer, and will not in fact offer, opinion testimony as to the existence of
these background facts. They are rather the factual premises, which must still be established by the evidence, on
which his expert conclusions rest. This is entirely proper. See, e.g., Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 525 F.
Supp. 2d 558,677-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding expert damages report that was "intertwined with over fifty
footnotes carefully marshalling selected references to deposition and hearing transcripts, news articles and other
materials," was permissible "'context' for his expert opinion," so long as expert did not testify as to the truth of the
background facts). Saint Alphonsus is free to introduce a damages estimate based on one permissible view of the
evidence, and MRIA is free to cross examine Dr. McCarthy about how his calculations would change if the factual
assumptions were different.
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Finally, in Part IV.B.3 of his report, Dr. McCarthy criticizes Budge's new methodology,
which seeks to estimate the amount of profits that MRI would have made had it partnered with
IMI. MRIA contends that Dr. McCarthy is improperly speculating about how such a
hypothetical partnership would have been structured, Mem. at 14, but Dr. McCarthy is simply
criticizing as speculative and unreasonable Budge 's own assumptions about that hypothetical
deal. Specifically, Budge has offered no factual basis to support his premise that MRIA
somehow would have ended up with all the profits ever earned by IMI' s MRI business-a claim
that MRIA did not even assert at the prior trial. Dr. McCarthy is well justified in explaining how
these damages numbers change when one makes different (and more reasonable) assumptions
about any such hypothetical deal.

4.

Dr. McCarthy's Testimony About the Offset for Saint Alphonsus's
Interest in MRIA

MRIA next seeks to exclude Dr. McCarthy's calculations reducing the lost profits
claimed by MRIA's experts for the years 1999 to 2004 by the share of those profits that belong
to Saint Alphonsus based on its ownership of a portion of MRIA during those years. The point
of this exercise is to avoid overcompensating MRIA by ensuring that it does not recover for its
current partners those profits that, if earned in 1999 to 2004, would have been distributed to Saint
Alphonsus. In this part of his testimony, Dr. McCarthy uses his skills as an economist to
perform the mathematical calculations necessary to determine Saint Alphonsus's ownership
percentage and offset the amounts attributable thereto. MRIA concedes that this is "complicated
math," which alone establishes that Dr. McCarthy's testimony on this matter will be helpful to
the jury.
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MRIA also appears to concede that its experts overstate MRIA' s damages by not making
an adjustment for Saint Alphonsus's ownership share, but suggests with some equivocation that
this amount can be determined as a matter of law and added to the sum due to Saint Alphonsus
as a departing partner. Mem. at 16. But there is obviously no authority for the proposition that a
claimant may recover more than its actual damages if it also suggests the expedient of allowing
the defendant to sue to get back the excess. MRIA's purported concerns about a "risk" of double
recovery are without merit. If the damages awarded by the jury properly account for the required
offset, Saint Alphonsus will not be permitted to recover that same amount by other means.

B.

Dr. McCarthy Is Qualified

MRIA's argument that Dr. McCarthy is not qualified to offer his opinions (MRIA Mem.
at 8-9) is premised entirely on MRIA's argument that "causation" is not an appropriate subject of
expert damages analysis. Since that premise is incorrect, see supra pp. 4-5, the argument that
Dr. McCarthy is unqualified is also incorrect. As an economist with M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in
economics, and twenty-five years of experience studying and modeling competitive markets
generally and the health-care market in particular, see McCarthy Report~ 1, Dr. McCarthy is
eminently qualified to apply the economic methodologies discussed above to evaluate and
critique the damages models put forth by Budge and Wilhoite.

C.

Dr. McCarthy's Opinion Does Not Invade the Province of the Jury

Finally, there is no merit to MRIA's argument (MRIA Mem. at 5-8) that Dr. McCarthy's
testimony improperly invades the province of the jury because "[t]he issue of causation is a
question of fact for the jury." MRIA Mem. at 8. But "[t]he amount of damages is a question of
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fact which is for the jury" as well. Bratton v. Slininger, 93 Idaho 248, 253, 460 P.2d 383, 388
(1969). Indeed, expert testimony is only of value if it illuminates issues to be decided by the fact
finder in the case. And, under the rules of evidence, expert testimony does not become
objectionable even if"it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Idaho R.
Evid. 704. Rather, it is admissible if it will assist the jury in understanding the issues.
Here, the jury has no way of knowing, without expert assistance, how many ofiMI's
127,000 scans were won from MRIA or, if won, were won as the result of Saint Alphonsus's
alleged assistance to IMI, rather than IMI' s independent performance in the market. This is a
complex question that requires expert analysis of patterns, since neither party intends to go
through the 127,000 scans one by one to demonstrate whether each individual migration was
caused by the bad acts. MRIA has offered expert opinion on this precise question, and Saint
Alphonsus is entitled to do the same. By employing tools like regression analysis and (as Budge
purports to do) sorting through a decade's worth of scan data to look for statistically significant
patterns, Dr. McCarthy is plainly assisting the jury in determining the extent to which certain
acts (if proven) took scans away from MRIA.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny MRIA's motion to exclude portions of
Dr. McCarthy's testimony.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 4th day of August, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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Preface
Thomas Henry Huxley observed that "science is simply common sense at its
best; that is, rigidly accurate in observation and merciless to a fallacy in logic." 1
This second edition of the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence furthers the goal
of assisting federal judges in recognizing the characteristics and reasoning of
"science" as it is relevant in litigation. The Reference Manual is but one part of a
series of education and research initiatives undertaken by the Center, in collaboration with other professional organizations, and with support by a grant
from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, to aid judges in dealing with
these issues. The Reference Manual itself responds to a recommendation of the
Federal Courts Study Committee that the Federal Judicial Center prepare a
manual to assist judges in managing cases involving complex scientific and technical evidence. 2
The first edition of the Reference Manual was published in 1994, at a time of
heightened need for judicial awareness of scientific methods and reasoning created by the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. 3 Daubert assigned the trial judge a "gatekeeping responsibility" to make "a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. " 4 The first edition of the Reference Manual has been republished by numerous private publishers and used in a
variety of educational programs for federal and state judges, attorneys, and law
students. The Center estimates that approximately 100,000 copies have been
distributed since its initial publication.
This second edition comes after recent decisions that expand the duties and
responsibility of trial courts in cases involving scientific and technical evidence.
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 5 the Supreme Court strengthened the role of the
trial courts by deciding that abuse of discretion is the correct standard for an
appellate court to apply in reviewing a district court's evidentiary ruling. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Breyer urged judges to avail themselves of techniques, such as the use of court-appointed experts, that would assist them in

1. T.H. Huxley, The Crayfish: An Introduction to the Study of Zoology 2 (1880), qrJoted in Stephen
Jay Gould, Full House: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin 8 (1996).
2. Federal Courts Study Comm., Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 97 (1990). See
also Carnegie Comm'n on Science, Tech., & Gov't, Science and Technology in Judicial Decision
Making: Creating Opportunities and Meeting Challenges 11 (1993) (noting concern over the ability of
courts to manage and adjudicate scientific and technical issues).
3. 509 u.s. 579 (1993).
4. ld. at 589 n.7, 592-93.
5. 522 u.s. 136, 141-43 (1997).
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making determinations about the admissibility of complex scientific or technical
evidence. 6 Last year, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court determined that the trial judge's gatekeeping obligation under Daubert not only applies to scientific evidence but also extends to proffers of"'technical' and 'other
specialized' knowledge," the other categories of expertise specified in Federal
Rule ofEvidence 702. 7 Also, the Supreme Court recently forwarded to Congress proposed amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence 701, 702, and 703
that are intended to codify case law that is based on Daubert and its progeny.
This second edition includes new chapters that respond to issues that have
emerged since the initial publication. The Introduction by Justice Breyer reviews the role of scientific evidence in litigation and the challenges that trial
courts face in considering such evidence. Supreme Court cases subsequent to
Daubert are summarized in a chapter by Margaret Berger. The philosophy and
practice of science are described in a chapter by David Goodstein. New reference guides on medical testimony and engineering will aid judges with the
broader scope of review for cases involving nonscientific expert testimony following Kumho. Reference guides from the first edition have been updated with
new cases and additional material. The Reference Guide on DNA Evidence has
been completely revised to take account of the rapidly evolving science in this
area. To make room for the new material, essential information from the chapters on court-appointed experts and special masters was condensed and included
in the chapter on management of expert evidence. 8
We continue to caution judges regarding the proper use of the reference
guides. They are not intended to instruct judges concerning what evidence
should be admissible or to establish minimum standards for acceptable scientific
testimony. Rather, the guides can assist judges in identifying the issues most
commonly in dispute in these selected areas and in reaching an informed and
reasoned assessment concerning the basis of expert evidence. They are designed
to facilitate the process of identifying and narrowing issues concerning scientific
evidence by outlining for judges the pivotal issues in the areas of science that are
often subject to dispute. Citations in the reference guides identify cases in which
specific issues were raised; they are examples of other instances in which judges
were faced with similar problems. By identifYing scientific areas commonly in
dispute, the guides should improve the quality of the dialogue between the
judges and the parties concerning the basis of expert evidence.

6. ld. at 147-50.
7. 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1171 (1999) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702).
8. Much of the information in those two chapters is available in joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging,
Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43
Emory L.J. 995 (1994), and Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special Masters,
43 Emory L.J. 927 (1994).
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I. Introduction
Multiple regression analysis is a statistical tool for understanding the relationship
between two or more variables. 1 Multiple regression involves a variable to be
explained-called the dependent variable-and additional explanatory variables
that are thought to produce or be associated with changes in the dependent
variable. 2 For example, a multiple regression analysis might estimate the effect of
the number of years of work on salary. Salary would be the dependent variable
to be explained; years of experience would be the explanatory variable.
Multiple regression analysis is sometimes well suited to the analysis of data
about competing theories in which there are several possible explanations for
the relationship among a number of explanatory variables. 3 Multiple regression
typically uses a single dependent variable and several explanatory variables to
assess the statistical data pertinent to these theories. In a case alleging sex discrimination in salaries, for example, a multiple regression analysis would examine not only sex, but also other explanatory variables of interest, such as education and experience. 4 The employer-defendant might use multiple regression to
argue that salary is a function of the employee's education and experience, and
the employee-plaintiff might argue that salary is also a function of the individual's
sex.
Multiple regression also may be useful (1) in determining whether a particular effect is present; (2) in measuring the magnitude of a particular effect; and (3)
in forecasting what a particular effect would be, but for an intervening event. In
a patent infringement case, for example, a multiple regression analysis could be
1. A variable is anything that can take on two or more values (for example, the daily temperature in
Chicago or the salaries of workers at a factory).
2. Explanatory variables in the context of a statistical study are also called independent variables. See
David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, § II .A.1, in this manual. That
guide also offers a brief discussion of multiple regression analysis. /d. § V.
3. Multiple regression is one type of statistical analysis involving several variables. Other types
include matching analysis, stratification, analysis of variance, pro bit analysis, logic analysis, discriminant
analysis, and factor analysis.
4. Thus, in Ottaviani v. State University of New York, 875 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1989) (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990), the court stated;
In disparate treannent cases involving claims of gender discrimination, plaintiff• typically use multiple regression analysis to isolate the influence of gender on employment decisions relating to a particular job or job
benefit, such as salary.
The first step in such a regression analysis is to specify all of the possible "legitimate" (i.e., nondiscriminatory) factors that are likely to significantly affect the dependent variable and which could account for disparities in the treannent of male and female employees. By identifying those legitimate criteria that affect the
decision-making process, individual plaintiffi can make predictions about what job or job benefit• similarly
situated employees should ideally receive, and then can measure the difference between the predicted treatment and the actual treannent of those employees. If there is a disparity between the predicted and actual
outcomes for female employees, plaintiffi in a disparate treannent case can argue that the net "residual"
difference represents the unlawful effect of discriminatory animus on the allocation of jobs or job benefits.
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used to determine (1) whether the behavior of the alleged infringer affected the
price of the patented product; (2) the size of the effect; and (3) what the price of
the product would have been had the alleged infringement not occurred.
Over the past several decades the use of multiple regression analysis in court
has grown widely. Although regression analysis has been used most frequently
in cases of sex and race discrimination5 and antitrust violation, 6 other applications include census undercounts,7 voting rights, 8 the study of the deterrent
5. Discrimination cases using multiple regression analysis are legion. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday,
478 U.S. 385 (1986), on remand, 848 F.2d 476 {4th Cir. 1988); King v. General Elec. Co., 960 F.2d 617
{7th Cir. 1992); Diehl v. Xerox Corp., 933 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (age and sex discrimination); Csicseri v. Bowsher, 862 F. Supp. 547 (D.D.C. 1994) (age discrimination), alfd, 67 F.3d 972
(D.C. Cir. 1995); Tennes v. Massachusetts Dep't of Revenue, No. 88-C3304, 1989 WL 157477 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 20, 1989) (age discrimination); EEOC v. General Tel. Co. ofN.W., 885 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 (1990); Churchill v. IBM, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1089 (D.NJ. 1991);
Denny v. Westfield State College, 880 F.2d 1465 (1st Cir. 1989) (sex discrimination); Black Law
Enforcement Officers Ass'n v. City of Akron, 920 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1990); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc.
v. City of Bridgeport, 735 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Conn. 1990), alfd, 933 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 924 (1991); Dicker v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4982, 1993 WL 62385 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
5, 1993) (race discrimination). See also Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination:
Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 Geo. LJ. 237,238 (1996)
("regression analysis is probably the best empirical tool for uncovering discrimination").
6. E.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (price-fixing of college
scholarships), rev'd, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993); Petruzzi IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware
Co., 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 994 (1993); Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc .. 925
F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Ohio 1996); In re Chicken Antitrust Litig .. 560 F. Supp. 963,993 (N.D. Ga. 19HO):
New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). See also jerry Hausman et al.,
Competitive Analysis with Differenciated Products, 34 Annales D'Economie et de Statistique 159 (1994);
Gregory J. Werden, Simrliating the Effects if Differentiated Products Mergers: A Practical Alternative to Stmctural Merger Policy, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 363 (1997).
7. See, e.g., City ofNew York v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 822 F. Supp. 906 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (decision of Secretary of Commerce not to adjust the 1990 census was not arbitrary and capricious), vacated, 34 F.3d 1114 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying heightened scrutiny), rev'd sub nom. Wisconsin v.
City of New York, 517 U.S. 565 (1996); Cuomo v. Baldrige, 674 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Carey v. Klutznick, 508 F. Supp. 420, 432-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (use of reasonable and scientifically
valid statistical survey or sampling procedures to adjust census figures for the differential undercount is
constirutionally permissible), stay granted, 449 U.S. 1068 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 653 F.2d 732 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 999 (1982); Youngv. Klutznick, 497 F. Supp. 1318,1331 (E.D. Mich.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 652 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982).
8. Multiple regression analysis was used in suits charging that at-large area-wide voting was instituted to neutralize black voting strength, in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (1988). Multiple regression demonstrated that the race of the candidates and that of the electorate were determinants of voting. See, e.g., Williams v. Brown, 446 U.S. 236 (1980); Bolden v. City of
Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384,388 (S.D. Ala. 1976), qff'd, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), stay denied, 436
U.S. 902 (1978), rev'd, 446 U.S. 55 (1980);Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196,208-09 (E.D. Ark.
1989), qff'd, 498 U.S. 1019 (1991); League ofUnited Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements,
986 F.2d 728, 774-87 (5th Cir.), reh'g en bane, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1060
(1994). For commentary on statistical issues in voting rights cases, see, e.g., Symposium, Statistical and
Demographic Issues Underlying Voting Rights Cases, 15 Evaluation Rev. 659 (1991); Stephen P. Klein et
a!., Ecological Regression versus the Secret Ballot, 31 JurimetricsJ. 393 (1991);James W. Loewen & Bernard
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effect of the death penalty,9 rate regulation, 10 and intellectual property .11
Multiple regression analysis can be a source of valuable scientific testimony in
litigation. However, when inappropriately used, regression analysis can confuse
important issues while having little, if any, probative value. In EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 12 in which Sears was charged with discrimination against women
in hiring practices, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that "[m]ultiple regression analyses, designed to determine the effect of several independent variables
on a dependent variable, which in this case is hiring, are an accepted and common method of proving disparate treatment claims. " 13 However, the court
affirmed the district court's findings that the "E.E.O.C's regression analyses did
not 'accurately reflect Sears' complex, nondiscriminatory decision-making processes'" and that the "'E.E.O.C.'s statistical analyses [were] so flawed that they
lack[ed] any persuasive value.'" 14 Serious questions also have been raised about
the use of multiple regression analysis in census undercount cases and in death
penalty cases. 15
Moreover, in interpreting the results of a multiple regression analysis, it is
important to distinguish between correlation and causality. Two variables are
correlated when the events associated with the variables occur more frequently
Grofinan, Recent Developments in Methods Used in Vote Dilution Litigation, 21 Urb. Law. 589 (1989);
Arthur Lupia & Kenneth McCue, VVhy the 1980s Measures of Racially Polarized Voting Are Inadequate for
the 1990s, 12 Law & Pol'y 353 (1990).
9. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184--86 (1976). For critiques of the validity of the
deterrence analysis, see National Research Council, Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the
Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978); Edward Leamer,
Let's Take the Con Out of Econometrics, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 31 (1983); Richard 0. Lempert, Desert and
Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Ptmishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1177
(1981); Hans Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts v. Faith, 1976 Sup. Ct. Rev. 317.
10. See, e.g., Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (challenge to
FCC's application of multiple regression analysis to set cable rates), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1112 (1996).
11. See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 76-1634-MA, 1990 WL 324105, at *29, *62*63 (D. Mass. Oct. 12, 1990) (damages awarded because of patent infringement), amended by No. 761634-MA, 1991 WL 4087 (D. Mass. Jan. 11, 1991); Estate ofVane v. The Fair, Inc., 849 F.2d 186, 188
(5th Cir. 1988) (lost profits were due to copyright infringement), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989).
The use of multiple regression analysis to estimate damages has been contemplated in a wide variety of
contexts. See, e.g., David Baldus eta!., Improving]udicial Oversight ofjury Damages Assessments: A Proposal
for the Comparative Additllr!Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpeamiary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80
Iowa L. Rev. 1109 (1995); Talcott J. Franklin, CalCIIlating Damages for Loss of Parental NurMe Through
Mtlltiple Regression Analysis, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 271 (1997); Roger D. Blair & Amanda Kay
Esquibel, Yardstick Damages in Lost Profit Cases: An Econometric Approach, 72 Denv. U. L. Rev. 113
(1994).
12. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
13. Id. at 324 n.22.
14. Id. at 348, 351 (quoting EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1342, 1352
(N.D. Ill. 1986)). The district court commented specifically on the "severe limits of regression analysis
in evaluating complex decision-making processes." 628 F. Supp. at 1350.
15. See David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics,§ II.A.e, B.1, in this
manual.
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together than one would expect by chance. For example, if higher salaries are
associated with a greater number of years of work experience, and lower salaries
are associated with fewer years of experience, there is a positive correlation
between salary and number of years of work experience. However, if higher
salaries are associated with less experience, and lower salaries are associated with
more experience, there is a negative correlation between the two variables.
A correlation between two variables does not imply that one event causes the
second. Therefore, in making causal inferences, it is important to avoid spurious
correlation. 16 Spurious correlation arises when two variables are closely related
but bear no causal relationship because they are both caused by a third,
unexamined variable. For example, there might be a negative correlation between the age of certain skilled employees of a computer company and their
salaries. One should not conclude from this correlation that the employer has
necessarily discriminated against the employees on the basis of their age. A third,
unexamined variable, such as the level of the employees' technological skills,
could explain differences in productivity and, consequendy, differences in salary.17 Or, consider a patent infringement case in which increased sales of an
allegedly infringing product are associated with a lower price of the patented
product. This correlation would be spurious if the two products have their own
noncompetitive market niches and the lower price is due to a decline in the
production costs of the patented product.
Pointing to the possibility of a spurious correlation should not be enough to
dispose of a statistical argument, however. It may be appropriate to give litde
weight to such an argument absent a showing that the alleged spurious correlation is either qualitatively or quantitatively substantial. For example, a statistical
showing of a relationship between technological skills and worker productivity
might be required in the age discrimination example above. 18
Causality cannot be inferred by data analysis alone; rather, one must infer that
a causal relationship exists on the basis of an underlying causal theory that explains the relationship between the two variables. Even when an appropriate
16. See David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, § V.B.3, in this
manual.
17. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir.) (rejecting plaintiff's
age discrimination claim because statistical study showing correlation between age and retention ignored the "more than remote possibility that age was correlated with a legitimate job-related
qualification"), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1104 (1997).
18. See, e.g., Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1989) Qudicial skepticism was raised when
the defendant did not submit a logistic regression incorporating an omitted variable--the possession of
a higher degree or special education; defendant's attack on statistical comparisons must also include an
analysis that demonstrates that comparisons are flawed.). The appropriate requirements for the defendant's
showing of spurious correlation could, in general, depend on the discovery process. See, e.g., Boykin v.
Georgia Pac. Co., 706 F.2d 1384 (1983) (criticism of a plaintiff's analysis for not including omitted
factors, when plaintiff considered all information on an application form, was inadequate).
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theory has been identified, causality can never be inferred directly. One must
also look for empirical evidence that there is a causal relationship. Conversely,
the fact that two variables are correlated does not guarantee the existence of a
relationship; it could be that the model-a characterization of the underlying
causal theory-does not reflect the correct interplay among the explanatory
variables. In fact, the absence of correlation does not guarantee that a causal
relationship does not exist. Lack of correlation could occur if (1) there are
insufficient data; (2) the data are measured inaccurately; (3) the data do not
allow multiple causal relationships to be sorted out; or (4) the model is specified
wrongly because of the omission of a variable or variables that are related to the
variable of interest.
There is a tension between any attempt to reach conclusions with near certainty and the inherently probabilistic nature of multiple regression analysis. In
general, statistical analysis involves the formal expression of uncertainty in terms
of probabilities. The reality that statistical analysis generates probabilities that
there are relationships should not be seen in itself as an argument against the use
of statistical evidence. The only alternative might be to use less reliable anecdotal evidence.
This reference guide addresses a number of procedural and methodological
issues that are relevant in considering the admissibility of, and weight to be
accorded to, the findings of multiple regression analyses. It also suggests some
standards of reporting and analysis that an expert presenting multiple regression
analyses might be expected to meet. Section II discusses research design-how
the multiple regression framework can be used to sort out alternative theories
about a case. Section III concentrates on the interpretation of the multiple regression results, from both a statistical and practical point of view. Section IV
briefly discusses the qualifications of experts. Section V emphasizes procedural
aspects associated with use of the data underlying regression analyses. Finally,
the Appendix delves into the multiple regression framework in further detail; it
also contains a number of specific examples that illustrate the application of the
technique.

II. Research Design: Model Specification
Multiple regression allows the testifying economist or other expert to choose
among alternative theories or hypotheses and assists the expert in distinguishing
correlations between variables that are plainly spurious from those that may
reflect valid relationships.
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I. Introduction
This reference guide identifies areas of dispute that will likely arise when economic losses are at issue. Although this material differs from other topics presented in this manual, it is included because expert testimony is commonly
offered on these matters. This reference guide discusses the application of economic analysis within the established legal framework for damages. It is not a
commentary on the legal framework. It does not lay out a comprehensive theory
of damages measurement, nor does it describe the applicable law. We provide
citations to cases to illustrate the principles and techniques discussed in the text.
This reference guide has three major sections. Section II discusses the qualifications required of experts who quantify damages. Section III considers issues
common to most studies of economic damages (the harmful event, pretrial earnings and mitigation, prejudgment interest, future earnings and losses, subsequent
events, consideration of taxes, and apportionment). Section IV considers the
major subject areas of economic loss measurement (personal lost earnings, intellectual property losses, antitrust losses, securities losses, and liquidated damages).
Our discussion follows the structure of the standard damages study, as shown
in Figure 1. We assume that the defendant has been found liable for damages for
a harmful event committed sometime in the past. The plaintiff is entitled to
recover monetary damages for losses occurring before and possibly after the
time of the trial. The top line of Figure 1 measures the losses before trial; the
bottom line measures the losses after trial. 1
The defendant's harmful act has reduced the plaintiff's earnings, or stream of
economic value. The stream of economic value may take the form of compensation received by a worker, the profit earned by a business, or one-time receipts, such as the proceeds from the sale of property. They are measured net of
any associated costs.
The essential features of a study oflosses are the quantification of the reduction in earnings, the calculation of interest on past losses, and the application of
financial discounting to future losses. The losses are measured as the difference
between the earnings the plaintiff would have received if the harmful event had
not occurred and the earnings the plaintiff has or will receive, given the harmful
event. The plaintiff may be entitled to interest for losses occurring before the
trial. Losses occurring after trial will normally be discounted. The majority of
damages studies fit this format, so we have used such a format as the basic model
for this reference guide. 2
1. Our scope here is limited to losses of actual dollar income. However, economists sometimes
have a role in the measurement of nondollar damages, including pain and suffering and the hedonic
value oflife. See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability (1991 ).
2. In the Appendix, we give an example of a complete damages study in the spreadsheet format
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We use numerous brief examples to explain the disputes that can arise. These
examples are not full case descriptions; they are deliberately stylized. They attempt to capture the types of disagreements about damages that arise in practical
experience, though they are purely hypothetical. In many examples, the dispute
involves factual as well as legal issues. We do not try to resolve the disputes in
these examples. We hope that the examples will help clarify the legal and factual
disputes that need to be resolved before or at trial.
Each area of potential dispute is introduced with a question. It is our hope
that the majority of disputes over economic damages can be identified by asking
each of these questions to the parties. Of course, some questions, especially in
section IV, are only relevant in their specific subject areas. Most of the questions
in section III, however, should help sort out areas of contention that may well
arise in any dispute involving economic losses.
Figure 1. Standard Format for a Damages Study

Earnings
before trial,
had the
harmful event
not occurred

Actual
earrungs
before trial

+

Prejudgment
interest

=

Damages
before
trial

+
Projected
earnings after
trial, had the
harmful event
not occurred

Projected
earnings
after trial

Discounting

=

Damages
after trial

Total
Damages

often presented by damages experts. Readers who prefer learning from an example may want to read
the Appendix before the body of this reference guide.

281

001810

Riference Manual on Sdentific Evidence

II. Experts' Qualifications
Experts who quantify damages come from a variety of backgrounds. Whatever
his or her background, however, a damages expert should be trained and experienced in quantitative analysis. For economists, the standard qualification is the
Ph.D. Damages experts with business or accounting backgrounds often have
MBA degrees or CPA credentials, or both. The specific areas of specialization
needed by the expert are dictated by the method used and the substance of the
damages claim. In some cases, participation in original research and the authorship of professional publications may add to the qualifications of an expert. The
relevant research and publications are less likely to be in damages measurement
per se than in topics and methods encountered in damages analysis. For example, a damages expert may need to restate prices and quantities in a market
with more sellers than are actually present. Direct participation in research on
the relation between market structure and performance would be helpful for an
expert undertaking that task.
Statistical regression analysis is sometimes used to make inferences in damages
studies. 3 Specific training is required to apply regression analysis. As another
example, damages studies may involve statistical surveys of customers. 4 In this
case, the damages expert should be trained in survey methods or should work in
collaboration with a qualified survey statistician. Because damages estimation
often makes use of accounting records, most damages experts need to be able to
interpret materials prepared by professional accountants. Some damages issues
may require assistance from a professional accountant.
Experts benefit from professional training and experience in areas relevant to
the substance of the damages claim. For example, in the case oflost earnings, an
expert will benefit from training in labor economics; in intellectual property
and antitrust, a background in industrial organization will be helpful; and in
securities damages, a background in finance will assist the expert.
It is not uncommon for an analysis by even the most qualified expert to face
a challenge under the criteria associated with the Daubert case. 5 These criteria are
intended to prevent testimony based on untested and unreliable theories. On
the one hand, it would appear that an economist serving as a damages expert is
unlikely to succumb to a Daubert challenge because most damages analyses oper-

3. For a discussion of regression analysis, see generally Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on
Multiple Regression, in this manual.
4. For a discussion of survey methods, see generally Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on
Survey Research, in this manual.
5. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). For a discussion of emerging
standards of scientific evidence, see Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court's Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony,§ IV, in this manual.
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ate in the familiar territory of restating economic flows using a combination of
professional judgment and standard tools. The parts of economics that might be
accused of verging on junk science are rarely used in damages work. But the
circumstances of each damages analysis are unique, and a party may raise a Daubert
challenge based on the proposition that the tools have never before been applied
to these circumstances. Even if a Daubert challenge fails, it is an effective way for
the opposing party to probe the damages analysis prior to trial. Using a Daubert
challenge to try to disable a damages analysis is relatively new, and it remains to
be seen if it is a successful way to disqualify an expert.

III. Issues Common to Most Damages Studies
Throughout our discussion, we assume that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for losses sustained from a harmful act of the defendant. The harmful act
may be an act whose occurrence itself is wrongful, as in a tort, or it may be a
failure to fulfill a promise, as in a breach of contract. In the first instance, damages have traditionally been calculated under the principle that compensation
should place the plaintiff in a position economically equivalent to the plaintiff's
position absent the harmful event. In applications of this principle, either restitution damages or reliance damages are calculated. These two terms are essentially synonyms with respect to their economic content. The term restitution is
used when the harmful act is an injury or theft and the defendant is unjustly
enriched at the expense of the plaintiff, and reliance is used when the harmful
act is fraud and the intent of damages is to place the plaintiff in as good a position
as if no promises had been made. In the second instance, breach of contract,
damages are generally calculated under the expectation principle, where the
compensation is intended to replace what the plaintiff would have received if
the promise or bargain had been fulftlled. These types of damages are called
expectation damages.
In this section, we review the elements of the standard loss measurement in
the format of Figure 1. For each element, there are several areas of potential
dispute. The sequence of questions posed in section III should identify most if
not all of the areas of disagreement between the damages analyses of opposing
parties.
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A. Characterization of the Harmful Event
1. How was the plaintiff harmed and what legal principles govern compensation for the harm?
The first step in a damages study is the translation of the legal theory of the
harmful event into an analysis of the economic impact of that event. In most
cases, the analysis considers the difference between the plaintiffs economic position if the harmful event had not occurred and the plaintiffs actual economic
position. The damages study restates the plaintiffs position "but for" the harmful event; this part is often called the but-for analysis. Damages are the difference
between the but-for value and the actual value.
In cases where damages are calculated under the restitution-reliance principle, the but-for analysis6 posits that the harmful event did not occur. In many
cases-such as injuries resulting from accidents-the but-for analysis presumes
no contact at all between the parties. Damages are the difference between the
value the plaintiff would have received had there been no contact with the
defendant and the value actually received.
Expectation damages7 generally arise from the breach ofa contract. The harmful
event is the defendant's failure to perform. Damages are the difference between
the value the plaintiff would have received had the defendant performed its
obligations and the value the plaintiff actually obtained. However, when one
party has only pardy performed under the contract, then damages may be calculated under the reliance-restitution principle.

Example:

Agent contracts with Owner for Agent to sell Owner's farm. The
asking price is $1,000,000 and the agreed fee is 6%. Agent incurs
costs of$1,000 in listing the property. A potential buyer offers the
asking price, but Owner withdraws the listing. Plaintiff calculates
damages as $60,000, the agreed fee for selling the property. The
defendant calculates damages as $1,000, the amount that Agent spent
to advertise the property.

6. See, e.g., May v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., No. 91-1057V, 1997 WL 402412, at *2
(Fed. Cl. June 27, 1997) (holding correct analysis for plaintiffs personal injury claim is the but-for test
where the appropriate question is but for the injury, would the expenditure have been made); RiteHite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that under patent statute but-for
analysis is not the sole test for damages since judicial relief cannot redress all conceivable harm that can
be traced to the but-for cause; thus, the but-for analysis may be coupled with the question of whether
the alleged injury may be compensated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995).
7. See John R. Trentacosta, Damages in Breach cifContract Cases, 76 Mich. B.J. 1068, 1068 (1997)
(describing expectation damages as damages that place the injured party in the same position as if the
breaching party completely performed the contract}; Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Bressler, 977 F.2d 720,
728-29 (2d Cir. 1992) (defining expectation damages as damages that put the injured party in the same
economic position the party would have enjoyed if the contract had been performed).
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Under the expectation remedy, Agent is entitled to $60,000, the
fee for selling the property. However, the Agent has only partly
performed under the contract, thus it may be appropriate to limit
damages to $1,000. Some states limit recovery in this situation by
law to the $1,000, the reliance measure of damages, unless the property is actually sold.
When the harmful event is misrepresentation by the defendant, resulting in
an economically detrimental relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff, the but-for analysis may consider the value the plaintiff would have received
in the absence of that relationship. In this case, the but-for analysis for fraud will
adopt the premise that the plaintiff would have entered into a valuable relationship with an entity other than the defendant. For example, if the defendant's
misrepresentations have caused the plaintiff to purchase property unsuited to the
plaintiff's planned use, the but-for analysis might consider the value that the
plaintiff would have received by purchasing a suitable property from another
seller.
Even though cases of intentional misrepresentation or fraud are torts, courts
today more commonly award expectation damages. In cases where the court
interprets the fraudulent statement as an actual warranty, then the appropriate
remedy is expectation damages. Courts, though, have awarded expectation damages even when the fraudulent statement is not interpreted as an actual warranty. Some of these cases may be situations where a contract exists but is legally
unenforceable for technical reasons. Nonetheless, in the majority of jurisdictions, courts award expectation damages for fraud, but there appears to be no
consistent explanation as to why some courts award expectation damages and
others, reliance damages. 8
Plaintiffs cannot normally seek punitive damages under an expectation remedy for breach, but may seek them under a reliance-restitution theory.
In other situations, the plaintiff may have a choice of remedies under different legal theories. For example, fraud, where there is a contract, may be considered under tort law for deceit or under contract law for breach in determining
compensatory damages.
Comment:

Example:

Buyer purchases a condominium from Owner for $90,000. However, the condominium is known by the Owner to be worth only
$80,000 at the time of sale because of defects. Buyer chooses to
compute damages under the expectation measure of damages as
$10,000 and to retain the condominium. Owner computes dam-

8. Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts§ 110, at 767-69 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
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ages under the reliance measure as $90,000 together with the return of the condominium, which is now worth $120,000.

Comment:

Defendant's application of the reliance remedy is incomplete. Absent the fraud, Buyer would have purchased another condominium
and enjoyed the general appreciation in the market. Thus, correctly
applied, the two measures may be similar.
The characterization of the harmful event begins with a clear statement of
what it entailed. It must also include:
• a statement about the economic situation absent the wrongdoing;
• a characterization of the causal link between the wrongdoing and the harm
the plaintiff suffered; and
• a description of the defendant's proper behavior.
In addition, the characterization will resolve such questions as whether to measure damages before or after taxes and the appropriate measure of costs. Many
conflicts between the damages experts for the plaintiff and the defendant arise
from different characterizations of the harmful event and its effects.
A comparison of the parties' statements about the harmful event and what
would have happened in its absence will likely reveal differences in legal theories that can result in large differences in damages claims.

Example:

Client is the victim of unsuitable investment advice by Broker (all
of Client's investments made by Broker are the result of Broker's
negligence). Client's damages study measures the sum of the losses
of the investments made by Broker, including only the investments
that incurred losses. Broker's damages study measures the net loss
by including an offset for those investments that achieved gains.

Comment:

Client is considering the harmful event to be the recommendation
of investments that resulted in losses, whereas Broker is considering
the harmful event to be the entire body of investment advice. Under Client's theory, Client would not have made the unsuccessful
investments but would have made the successful ones, absent the
unsuitable advice. Under Broker's theory, Client would not have
made any investments based on Broker's advice.
A clear statement about the plaintiff's situation but for the harmful event is
also helpful in avoiding double counting that can arise if a damages study confuses or combines reliance9 and expectation damages.
9. See Trentacosta, s~<pra note 7, at 1068. Reliance damages are distinguished from expectation
damages. Reliance damages are defined as damages that do not place the injured party in as good a
position as if the contract had been fully performed (expectation damages) but in the same position as if
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Example:

Marketer is the victim of defective products made by Manufacturer; Marketer's business fails as a result. Marketer's damages study
adds together the out-of-pocket costs of creating the business in the
first place and the projected profits of the business had there been
no defects. Manufacturer's damages study measures the difference
between the profit margin Marketer would have made absent the
defects and the profit margin he actually made.

Comment:

Marketer has mistakenly added together damages from the reliance
principle and the expectation principle. 10 Under the reliance principle, Marketer is entitled to be put back to where he would have
been had he not started the business in the first place. Damages are
his total outlays less the revenue he actually received. Under the
expectation principle, applied in Manufacturer's damages study,
Marketer is entitled to the profit on the extra sales he would have
received had there been no product defects. Out-of-pocket expenses of starting the business would have no effect on expectation
damages because they would be present in both the actual and the
but-for cases, and would offSet each other in the comparison of
actual and but-for value.

2. Are the parties disputing differences in the plaintiffs economic environment
absent the harmful event?
The analysis of some types of harmful events requires consideration of effects,
such as price erosion, 11 that involve changes in the economic environment caused
by the harmful event. For a business, the main elements of the economic environment that may be affected by the harmful event are the prices charged by
rivals, the demand facing the seller, and the prices of inputs. Misappropriation of
intellectual property can cause lower prices because products produced with the
misappropriated intellectual property compete with products sold by the owner
of the intellectual property. In contrast, some harmful events do not change the
promises were never made. Reliance damages reimburse the injured party for expenses incurred in
reliance of promises made. See, e.g., Satellite Broad. Cable, Inc. v. Telefonica de Espana, S.A., 807 F.
Supp. 218 (D.P.R. 1992) (holding that under Puerto Rican law an injured party is entitled to reliance
but not expectation damages due to the wrongdoer's willful and malicious termination or withdrawal
from precontractual negotiations).
10. See Trentacosta, supra note 7, at 1068. The injured party cannot recover both reliance and
expectation damages.
11. See, e.g., General Am. Transp. Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1121, 1123-24 (N.D.
Ill. 1995), modified, 93 F.3d 766 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Rawlplug Co., Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works Inc., No.
91 Civ. 1781, 1994 WL 202600, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1994); Micro Motion, Inc. v. Exac Corp.,
761 F. Supp. 1420, 1430-31 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding in all three cases that patentee is entitled to
recover lost profits due to past price erosion caused by the wrongdoer's infringement).
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plaintiff's economic environment. For example, the theft of some of the plaintiff's
products would not change the market price of those products, nor would an
injury to a worker change the general level of wages in the labor market. A
damages study need not analyze changes in broader markets when the harmful
act plainly has minuscule effects in those markets.
For example, the plaintiff may assert that, absent the defendant's wrongdoing, a higher price could have been charged; the defendant's harmful act has
eroded the market price. The defendant may reply that the higher price would
lower the quantity sold. The parties may then dispute by how much the quantity would fall as a result of higher prices.
Example:

Valve Maker infringes patent of Rival. Rival calculates lost profits
as the profits actually made by Valve Maker plus a price-erosion
effect. The amount of price erosion is the difference between the
higher price that Rival would have been able to charge absent Valve
Maker's presence in the market and the actual price. The priceerosion effect is the price difference multiplied by the combined
sales volume of the Valve Maker and Rival. Defendant Valve Maker
counters that the volume would have been lower had the price
been higher. Defendant measures damages taking account oflower
volume.

Wrongful competition is likely to cause some price erosion 12 and,
correspondingly, some enlargement of the total market because of
the lower price. The more elastic the demand the lower the volume would have been with a higher price. The actual magnitude of
the price-erosion effect could be determined by economic analysis.
We consider price erosion in more detail in section IV.B, in connection with
intellectual property damages. However, price erosion may be an issue in many
other commercial disputes. For example, a plaintiff may argue that the disparagement of its product in false advertising has eroded its price. 13
In more complicated situations, the damages analysis may need to focus on
how an entire industry would be affected by the defendant's wrongdoing. For
Comment:

12. See, e.g., Micro Motion, 761 F. Supp. at 1430 (citing Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S.
536, 553 (1886), the court stated that "in most price erosion cases, a patent owner has reduced the
actual price of its patented product in response to an infringer's competition").
13. See, e.g., BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., Inc., Nos. 92-3928,92-3645,92-3486,923471, 1994 WL 617918 (7th Cir. Nov. 9, 1994) (finding that the plaintiff's damages only consisted of
lost profits before consideration of price erosion, prejudgment interest, and costs despite plaintiff's
argument that it was entitled to price erosion damages as a result of the defendant's false advertisingthe court determined there were other competitors who would keep prices low).
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example, one federal appeals court held that a damages analysis for exclusionary
conduct must consider that other firms beside the plaintiff would have enjoyed
the benefits of the absence of that conduct, so prices would have been lower and
the plaintiffs profits correspondingly less than those posited in the plaintiffs
damages analysis. 14

Example:

Photographic Film Maker has used unlawful means to exclude rival
film manufacturers. Rival calculates damages on the assumption that
it would have been the only additional seller in the market absent
the exclusionary conduct, and that Rival would have been able to
sell its film at the same price actually charged by Film Maker. Film
Maker counters that other sellers would have entered the market
and driven the price down, so Rival has overstated damages.

Comment:

Increased competition lowers price in all but the most unusual situation. Again, determination of the number of entrants attracted by
the elimination of exclusionary conduct and their effect on the price
probably requires a full economic analysis.

3. Is there disagreement about the causal effect of the injury?
The plaintiff might argue that the injury has dramatically reduced earnings for
many years. The defendant might reply that most of the reduction in earnings
that occurred up to the time of trial is the result of influences other than the
injury and that the effects of the injury will disappear completely soon after the
trial. Alternatively, the defendant may agree that earnings have been dramatically reduced but argue that the reduction in earnings is the result of other
causes.

Example:

Worker is the victim of a disease caused either by exposure to
xerxium or by smoking. Worker makes leather jackets tanned with
xerxium. The Worker sues the producer of the xerxium, Xerxium
Mine, and calculates damages as all lost wages. Defendant Xerxium
Mine, in contrast, attributes most of the losses to smoking and calculates damages as only a fraction oflost wages.

Comment:

The resolution of this dispute will tum on the legal question of
comparative or contributory fault. If the law permits the division of
damages into parts attributable to exposure to xerxium and smoking, then medical evidence on the likelihood of cause may be needed
to make that division.

14. See Dolphin Tours, Inc. v. Pacifico Creative Servs., Inc., 773 F.2d 1506, 1512 (9th Cir. 1985).
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Example:

Real Estate Agent is wrongfully denied affiliation with Broker. Plaintiff Agent's damages study projects past earnings into the future at
the rate of growth of the previous three years. Broker's study projects
that earnings would have declined even without the breach because the real estate market has turned downward.

Comment:

The difference between a damages study based on extrapolation
from the past, here used by Agent, and a study based on actual data
after the harmful act, here used by Broker, is one of the most common sources of disagreement in damages. This is a factual dispute
that hinges on the relationship between real estate market conditions and the earnings of agents.
Frequently, the defendant will calculate damages on the premise that the
harmful act had little, if any, causal relationship to the plaintiffs losses.

Example:

Defendants conspired to rig bids in a construction deal. Plaintiff
seeks damages for subsequent higher prices. Defendants' damages
calculation is zero because they assert that the only effect of the bid
rigging was to determine the winner of the contract and that prices
were not affected.

Comment:

This is a factual dispute about how much effect bid rigging has on
the ultimate price. The analysis must go beyond the mechanics of
the bid-rigging system to consider how the bids would be different
had there been no collaboration among the bidders.
The defendant may also argue that the plaintiffhas overstated the scope of the
injury. Here the legal character of the harmful act may be critical; the law may
limit the scope to proximate effects if the harmful act was negligence, but require a broader scope if the harmful act was intentional. 15

Example:

Plaintiff Drugstore Network experiences losses because defendant
Superstore priced its products predatorily. Drugstore Network reduced prices in all its stores because it has a policy of uniform national pricing. Drugstore Network's damages study considers the
entire effect of national price cuts on profits. Defendant Superstore
argues that Network should have lowered prices only on the West
Coast and its price reductions elsewhere should not be included in
damages.

15. See generally Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, mpra note 8, § 65, at 462. Dean Prosser
stated that simple negligence and intentional wrongdoing differ "not merely in degree but in the kind
of fault ... and in the social condemnation attached to it." ld.
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Comment:

It is a factual question whether adherence to a policy of national
pricing is the reasonable response to predatory pricing in only part
of the market.

4. Is there disagreement about how the nonharmful conduct of the defendant
should be defined in projecting the plaintiffs earnings but for the harmful
event?
One party's damages analysis may hypothesize the absence of any act of the
defendant that influenced the plaintiff, whereas the other's damages analysis may
hypothesize an alternative, legal act. This type of disagreement is particularly
common in antitrust and intellectual property disputes. Although, generally,
disagreement over the alternative scenario in a damages study is a legal question,
opposing experts may have been given different legal guidance and therefore
made different economic assumptions, resulting in major differences in their
damages estimates.

Example:

Defendant Copier Service's long-term contracts with customers are
found to be unlawful because they create a barrier to entry that
maintains Copier Service's monopoly power. Rival's damages study
hypothesizes no contracts between Copier Service and its customers, so Rival would face no contractual barrier to bidding those
customers away from Copier Service. Copier Service's damages study
hypothesizes medium-term contracts with its customers and argues
that these would not have been found to be unlawful. Under Copier
Service's assumption, Rival would have been much less successful
in bidding away Copier Service's customers, and damages are correspondingly lower.

Comment:

Assessment of damages will depend greatly on the substantive law
governing the injury. The proper characterization of Copier Service's
permissible conduct usually is an economic issue. However, sometimes the expert must also have legal guidance as to the proper legal
framework for damages. Counsel for plaintiff may prescribe a different legal framework from that of counsel for the defendant.

5. Are losses measured before or after the plaintiffs income taxes?
A damages award compensates the plaintiff for lost economic value. In principle, the calculation of compensation should measure the plaintiffs loss after
taxes and then calculate the magnitude of the pretax award needed to compensate the plaintiff fully, once taxation of the award is considered. In practice, the
tax rates applied to the original loss and to the compensation are frequently the
same. When the rates are the same, the two tax adjustments are a wash. In that
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case, the appropriate pretax compensation is simply the pretax loss, and the
damages calculation may be simplified by the omission of tax considerations. 16
In some damages analyses, explicit consideration of taxes is essential, and
disagreements between the parties may arise about these tax issues. If the plaintiffs
lost income would have been taxed as a capital gain (at a preferential rate), but
the damages award will be taxed as ordinary income, the plaintiff can be expected to include an explicit calculation of the extra compensation needed to
make up for the loss of the tax advantage. Sometimes tax considerations are
paramount in damages calculations. 17
Example:

Trustee wrongfully sells Beneficiary's property, at full market value.
Beneficiary would have owned the property until death and avoided
all capital gains tax.

Damages are the amount of the capital gains tax, even though the
property fetched its full value upon sale.
In some cases, the law requires different tax treatment ofloss and compensatory award. Again, the tax adjustments do not offset each other, and consideration of taxes may be a source of dispute.
Comment:

Example:

Driver injures Victim in a truck accident. A state law provides that
awards for personal injury are not taxable, even though the income
lost as a result of the injury is taxable. Victim calculates damages as
lost pretax earnings, but Driver calculates damages as lost earnings
after tax. 18 Driver argues that the nontaxable award would exceed
actual economic loss if it were not adjusted for the taxation of the
lost income.

Comment:

Under the principle that damages are to restore the plaintiff to the
economic equivalent of the plaintiffs position absent the harmful
act, it may be recognized that the income to be replaced by the
award would have been taxed. However, case law in a particular

16. There is a separate issue about the effect of taxes on the interest rate for prejudgment interest
and discounting. See discussion infra §§ III.C, II I.E.
17. See generally John H. Derrick, Annotation, Damages for Breach if Contract as Affected by Income
Tax Considerations, 50 A.L.R. 4th 452 (1987) (discussing a variety of state and federal cases in which
courts ruled on the propriety of tax considerations in damage calculations; courts have often been
reluctant to award difference in taxes as damages because it is calling for too much speculation).
18. See generally Brian C. Brush & Charles H. Breedon, A Taxonomy for the Treatment if Taxes in
Cases Involving Lost Earnings, 6 J. Legal Econ. 1 (1996) (discussing four general approaches for treating
tax consequences in cases involving lost future earnings or earning capacity based on the economic
objective and the tax treatment of the lump sum award). See, e.g., Myers v. Griffin-Alexander Drilling
Co., 910 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding loss of past earnings between the time of the accident and
the trial could not be based on pretax earnings).
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jurisdiction may not allow a jury instruction on the taxability of an
award. 19

Example:

Worker is wrongfully deprived of tax-free fringe benefits by Employer. Under applicable law, the award is taxable. Worker's damages estimate includes a factor so that the amount of the award, after
tax, is sufficient to replace the lost tax-free value.

Comment:

Again, to achieve the goal of restoring plaintiff to a position economically equivalent absent the harmful act, an adjustment of this
type is appropriate. The adjustment is often called "grossing up"
damages. 20 To accomplish grossing up, divide the lost tax-free value
by one minus the tax rate. For example, if the loss is $100,000 of
tax-free income, and the income tax rate is 25%, the award should
be $100,000 divided by 0.75, or $133,333.

6. Is there disagreement about the costs that the plaintiff would have incurred
but for the harmful event?
Where the injury takes the form oflost volume of sales, the plaintiffs lost value
is the lost present value of profit. Lost profit is lost revenue less the costs avoided
by selling a lower volume. Calculation of these costs is a common area of disagreement about damages.
Conceptually, avoided cost is the difference between the cost that would
have been incurred at the higher volume of sales but for the harmful event and
the cost actually incurred at the lower volume of sales achieved. In the format of
Figure 1, the avoided-cost calculation is done each year. The following are
some of the issues that arise in calculating avoided cost:
• For a firm operating at capacity, expansion of sales is cheaper in the longer
run than in the short run; whereas, if there is unused capacity, expansion
may be cheaper in the short run.
• The costs that can be avoided if sales fall abruptly are smaller in the short
run than in the longer run.
19. See generally John E. Theuman, Annotation, Propriety cif Taking Income Tax into Consideration in
Fixing Damages in Personal Inj11ry or Death Action, 16 A.L.R. 4th 589 (1981) (discussing a variety of state
and federal cases in which the propriety ofjury instructions regarding tax consequences is at issue). See,
e.g., Bussell v. DeWalt Prods. Corp., 519 A.2d 1379 (N.J. 1987) (holding that trial court hearing a
personal injury case must instruct jury, upon request, that personal injury damages are not subject to
state and federal income taxes); Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 271 A.2d 94 (Conn. 1970)
(holding court did not err in refusing to instruct jury that personal injury damages were tax-free).
20. See Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Income, Cash, and Lost Profits Damages Awards in Patent Infringement
Cases, 2 Fed. Circuit BJ. 201, 207 (1992) (discussing the importance of taking tax consequences and
cash flows into account when estimating damages).
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• Avoided costs may include marketing, selling, and administrative costs as
well as the cost of manufacturing.
• Some costs are fixed, at least in the shorter run, and are not avoided as a
result of the reduced volume of sales caused by the harmful act.
Sometimes it is useful to put cost into just two categories, that which varies in
proportion to sales (variable cost) and that which does not vary with sales (fixed
cost). This breakdown is rough, however, and does not do justice to important
aspects of avoided costs. In particular, costs that are fixed in the short run may be
variable in the longer run. Disputes frequently arise over whether particular
costs are fixed or variable. One side may argue that most costs are fixed and
were not avoided by losing sales volume, while the other side will argue that
many costs are variable.
Certain accounting concepts are related to the calculation of avoided cost.
Profit and loss statements frequently report the "cost of goods sold. " 21 Costs in
this category are frequently, but not uniformly, avoided when sales volume is
lower. But costs in other categories, called "operating costs" or "overhead costs,"
also may be avoided, especially in the longer run. One approach to the measurement of avoided cost is based on an examination of all of a firm's cost categories.
The expert determines how much of each category of cost was avoided.
An alternative approach uses regression analysis or some other statistical method
to determine how costs vary with sales as a general matter within the firm or
across similar firms. The results of such an analysis can be used to measure the
costs avoided by the decline in sales volume caused by the harmful act.

7. Is there a dispute about the costs of stock options?
In some firms, employee stock options are a significant part of total compensation. The parties may dispute whether the value of options should be included
in the costs avoided by the plaintiff as a result oflost sales volume. The defendant might argue that stock options should be included, because their issuance is
costly to the existing shareholders. The defendant might place a value on newly
issued options and amortize this value over the period from issuance to vesting.
The plaintiff, in contrast, might exclude options costs on the grounds that the
options cost the firm nothing, even though they impose costs on the firm's
shareholders.

21. See, e.g., United States v. Arnous, 122 F.3d 321, 323 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that district court
erred when it relied on government's theory ofloss because the theory ignored the cost of goods sold).

294

001823

Riference Guide on Damages

B. Mitigation and Earnings Bifore Trial
We use the term earnings for almost any dollar receipts that a plaintiff should
have received. Earnings could include:
• wages, salary, commissions, bonuses, or other compensation;
• profits of a business;
• cash flow;
• royalties;
• proceeds from sales of property; and
• purchases and sales of securities.
Note that earnings in some of these categories, such as cash flow or purchases of
securities, could be negative in some years.

1. Is there a dispute about mitigation?
Normally, the actual earnings of the plaintiff before trial are not an important
source of disagreement. Sometimes, however, the defendant will argue that the
plaintiffhas failed to meet its duty to mitigate. 22 In a factual dispute about mitigation, the burden of proof rests with the defendant to show that the plaintiff
failed to make a reasonable effort to mitigate or failed to mitigate in good faith.
The defendant will propose that the proper offset is the earnings the plaintiff
should have achieved, under proper mitigation, rather than actual earnings. In
some cases the defendant may presume the ability of the plaintiff to mitigate in
certain ways unless the defendant has specific knowledge otherwise at the time
of a breach. For example, unless the defendant could reasonably foresee otherwise, the defendant may presume that the plaintiff could mitigate by locating
another source of supply in the event of a breach of a supply agreement. Damages are limited to the difference between the contract price and the current
market price in that situation.
For personal injuries, the issue of mitigation often arises because the defendant believes that the plaintiff's failure to work after the injury is a withdrawal
from the labor force or retirement rather than the result of the injury. For commercial torts, mitigation issues can be more subtle. Where the plaintiffbelieves
that the harmful act destroyed a company, the defendant may argue that the
company could have been put back together and earned profit, possibly in a
different line of business. The defendant will then treat the hypothetical profits
as an offiet to damages.
Alternatively, where the plaintiff continues to operate the business after the
harmful act, and includes subsequent losses in damages, the defendant may argue
that the proper mitigation was to shut down after the harmful act.
22. See, e.g., Thibodaux v. Guilbeau Marine, Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-3389, 1998 WL 66130, at *8
(E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1998) (addressing defendant's claim that plaintiff failed in his duty to mitigate damages).

295

001824

Riference Manual on Scientific Evidence

Example:

Franchisee Soil Tester starts up a business based on Franchiser's
proprietary technology, which Franchiser represents as meeting government standards. During the start-up phase, Franchiser notifies
Soil Tester that the technology has failed. Soil Tester continues to
develop the business but sues Franchiser for profits it would have
made from successful technology. Franchiser calculates much lower
damages on the theory that Soil Tester should have mitigated by
terminating start-up.

This is primarily a factual dispute about mitigation. Presumably Soil
Tester believes it has a good case, that it was appropriate to continue to develop the business despite notification of the failure of
the technology.
Disagreements about mitigation may be hidden within the frameworks of the
plaintiffs and the defendant's damages studies.
Comment:

Example:

Defendant Board Maker has been found to have breached an agreement to supply circuit boards. Plaintiff Computer Maker's damages
study is based on the loss of profits on the computers to be made
from the circuit boards. Board Maker's damages study is based on
the difference between the contract price for the boards and the
market price at the time of the breach.

Comment:

There is an implicit disagreement about Computer Maker's duty to
mitigate by locating alternative sources for the boards not supplied
by the defendant. The Uniform Commercial Code spells out the
principles for resolving these legal issues under the contracts it governsY

23. See, e.g., Aircraft Guaranty Corp. v. Strata-Lift, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 735,738-39 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(mem.) (Both defendant-seller and plaintiff-buyer turned to the Uniform Commercial Code to support
their respective positions that the plaintiff-buyer had a duty to mitigate damages when the defendantseller breached its contract and that the plaintiff-buyer did not have a duty to mitigate when the defendant-seller breached its contract. Court held that according to the UCC, plaintiff-buyer did have a duty
to mitigate if the duty was reasonable in light of all the facts and circumstances; however, failure to
mitigate does not preclude recovery.); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524 (3d Cir.
1978) (holding that the duty to mitigate is a tool to lessen plaintiff's recovery and is a question of fact);
Thomas Creek Lumber & Log Co. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 220 (1996) (holding that U.S. government has a duty to mitigate in breach of contract cases but it is not required to make an extraordinary
effort; however, federal common law rather than vee applies in cases involving nationwide federal
programs).
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C. Prejudgment Interest
1. Do the parties agree about how to calculate prejudgment interest? 24
The law may specify how to calculate interest for past losses (prejudgment interest). State law may exclude prejudgment interest, limit prejudgment interest to
a statutory rate, or exclude compounding. Table 1 illustrates these alternatives.
With simple uncompounded interest, losses from five years before trial earn five
times the specified interest, so compensation for a $100 loss from five years ago
is exactly $135 at 7% interest. With compound interest, the plaintiff earns interest on past interest. Compensation is about $140 for a loss of $100 five years
before trial. The difference between simple and compound interest becomes
much larger if the time from loss to trial is greater or if the interest rate is higher.
Because, in practice, interest receipts do earn further interest, economic analysis
would generally support the use of compound interest.
Table 1. Calculation ofPrejudgment Interest (in Dollars)
Years Before
Trial

Loss Without
Interest

Loss with
Compound
Interest at 7%

Loss with Simple
Uncompounded
Interest at 7%

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Total

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
1,100

197
184
172
161
150
140
131
123
114
107
100
1,579

170
163
156
149
142
135
128
121
114
107
100
1,485

24. See generally MichaelS. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 293 (1996)
(discussing prejudgment interest extensively). See, e.g., Ford v. Rigidply Rafters, Inc., 984 F. Supp.
386, 391-92 (D. Md. 1997) (deciding appropriate method of calculating prejudgment interest in an
employment discrimination case to ensure plaintiff is fairly compensated rather than given a windfall);
Acron/Pacific Ltd. v. Coit, No. C-81-4264-VRW, 1997 WL 578673, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 1997)
(reviewing supplemental interest calculations and applying California state law to determine the appropriate amount of prejudgment interest to be awarded); Prestige Cas. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co.,
969 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (analyzing Michigan state law to determine the appropriate
prejudgment interest award).
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Where the law does not prescribe the form of interest for past losses, the
experts will normally apply a reasonable interest rate to bring those losses forward. The parties may disagree on whether the interest rate should be measured
before or after tax. The before-tax interest rate is the normally quoted rate. To
calculate the corresponding after-tax rate, one subtracts the amount of income
tax the recipient would have to pay on the interest. Thus, the after-tax rate
depends on the tax situation of the plaintiff. The format for calculation of the
after-tax interest rate is shown in the following example:
(1) Interest rate before tax: 9%
(2) Tax rate: 30%
(3) Tax on interest (line (1) times line (2)): 2.7%
(4) Mter-tax interest rate (line (1) less line (3)): 6.3%
Even where damages are calculated on a pretax basis, economic considerations suggest that the prejudgment interest rate should be on an after-tax basis:
Had the plaintiff actually received the lost earnings in the past and invested the
earnings at the assumed rate, income tax would have been due on the interest.
The plaintiffs accumulated value would be the amount calculated by compounding past losses at the after-tax interest rate.
Where there is economic disparity between the parties, there may be a disagreement about whose interest rate should be used-the borrowing rate of the
defendant or the lending rate of the plaintiff, or some other rate. There may also
be disagreements about adjustment for risk. 25

Example:

Insurance company disputes payment of insurance to Farmer. Farmer
calculates damages as payment due plus the large amount of interest
charged by a personal finance company; no bank was willing to
lend to him, given his precarious financial condition. Crop Insurer
calculates damages as a lower payment plus the interest on the late
payment at the normal bank loan rate.

Comment:

The law may limit claims for prejudgment interest to a specified
interest rate, and a court may hold that this situation falls within the
limit. Economic analysis does support the idea that delays in payments are more costly to people with higher borrowing rates and
that the actual rate incurred may be considered damages.

25. See generally James M. Patell et al., Accumulating Damages in Litigation: The Roles of Uncertainty and
Interest Rates, 11 J. Legal Stud. 341 (1982) (extensive discussion of interest rates in damages calculations).
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D. Projections

of Future Earnings

1. Is there disagreement about the projection
event?

of prc!fitability but for the harmful

A common source of disagreement about the likely profitability of a business is
the absence of a track record of earlier profitability. Whenever the plaintiff is a
start-up business, the issue will arise of reconstructing the value of a business
with no historical benchmark.
Example:

Plaintiff Xterm is a failed start-up. Defendant VenFund has been
found to have breached a venture-capital financing agreement.
Xterm's damages study projects the profits it would have made under its business plan. VenFund's damages estimate, which is much
lower, is based on the value of the start-up revealed by sales of
Xterm equity made just before the breach.

Comment:

Both sides confront factual issues to validate their damages estimates. Xterm needs to show that its business plan was still a reasonable forecast as of the time of the breach. V enFund needs to show
that the sale of equity places a reasonable value on the firm; that is,
that the equity sale was at arm's length and was not subject to discounts. This dispute can also be characterized as whether the plaintiff is entitled to expectation damages or must settle for reliance
damages. The specific jurisdiction may specify damages for firms
with no track record.

2. Is there disagreement about the plaintiffs actual earnings after the harmful
event?
When the plaintiff has mitigated the adverse effects of the harmful act by making
an investment that has not yet paid off at the time of trial, disagreement may
arise about the value that the plaintiffhas actually achieved.
Example:

Manufacturer breaches agreement with Distributor. Distributor starts
a new business that shows no accounting profit as of the time of
trial. Distributor's damages study makes no deduction for actual
earnings during the period from breach to trial. Manufacturer's damages study places a value on the new business as of the time of trial
and deducts that value from damages.

Comment:

Some offset for economic value created by Distributor's mitigation
efforts may be appropriate. Note that if Distributor made a goodfaith effort to create a new business, but was unsuccessful because of
adverse events outside its control, the issue of the treatment of unexpected subsequent events will arise. (See section III.G.l.)
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3. Do the parties use constant dollars 26 for future losses, or is there escalation
for inflation?
Persistent inflation in the U.S. economy complicates projections of future losses.
Although inflation rates in the 1990s have been only in the range of3% per year,
the cumulative effect of inflation has a pronounced effect on future dollar quantities. At 3% annual inflation, a dollar today buys what $4.38 will buy 50 years
from now. Under inflation, the unit of measurement of economic values becomes smaller each year, and this shrinkage must be considered if future losses
are measured in the smaller dollars of the future. We refer to the calculations of
this process as embodying escalation. Dollar losses grow into the future because
of the use of the shrinking unit of measurement. For example, an expert might
project that revenues will rise at 5% per year for the next 10 years-3% because
of general inflation and 2% more because of the growth of a firm.
Alternatively, the expert may project future losses in constant dollars without
escalation for future inflationY The use of constant dollars avoids the problems
of dealing with a shrinking unit of measurement and often results in more intuitive damages calculations. In the example just given, the expert might project
that revenues will rise at 2% per year in constant dollars. Constant dollars must
be stated with respect to a base year. Thus a calculation in constant 1999 dollars
means that the unit for future measurement is the purchasing power of the
dollar in 1999.

E. Discounting Future Losses
For future losses, a damages study calculates the amount of compensation needed
at the time of trial to replace expected future lost income. The result is discounted future losses; 28 it is also sometimes referred to as the present discounted
value of the future losses. 29 Discounting is conceptually separate from the adjustment for inflation considered in the previous section. Discounting is typically
carried out in the format shown in Table 2.

26. See, e.g., Eastern Minerals Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 621,627 n.5 (1997) (stating
both expert witnesses used constant dollars for damage analysis); In re California Micro Devices Sec.
Litig., 965 F. Supp. 1327, 1333-37 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (discussing whether constant-dollar method
should be used in the proposed plan of damage allocation).
27. See, e.g., Willamette Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 202 (1992) (holding
expert witness erred in failing to take inflation escalation into account).
28. See generally Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Effect of Anticipated Itiflation on Damages for
Future Losses-Modern Cases, 21 A.L.R. 4th 21 (1981) (discussing discounted future losses extensively).
29. See generally George A. Schieren, Is There an Advantage in Using Time-Series to Forecast Lost
Earnings?, 4 J. Legal Econ. 43 (1994) (discussing effects of different forecasting methods on present
discounted value offuture losses). See, e.g., Wingad v. John Deere & Co., 523 N.W.2d 274, 277-79
(Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (calculating present discounted value offuture losses).
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Table 2. Calculation ofDiscounted Loss at 5% Interest
Years in
Future

0
1
2
Total

Loss

Discount
Factor

$100.0 0
125.00
130.00

1.000
0.952
0.907

Discounted Loss*

$100.00
119.00
118.00
$337.00

*"Discounted Loss" equals "Loss" times "Discount Factor."

"Loss" is the estimated future loss, in either escalated or constant-dollar form.
"Discount Factor" is a factor that calculates the number of dollars needed at the
time of trial to compensate for a lost dollar in the future year. The discount
factor is calculated by applying compound interest forward from the base year to
the future year, and then taking the reciprocal. For example, in Table 2, the
interest rate is 5%. The discount factor for the next year is calculated as the
reciprocal of 1.05. The discount factor for two years in the future is calculated as
the reciprocal of 1.05 times 1.05. Future discounts would be obtained by multiplying by 1.05 a suitably larger number of times and then taking the reciprocal.
The discounted loss is the loss multiplied by the discount factor for that year.
The number of dollars at time of trial that compensates for the loss is the sum of
the discounted losses, $337 in this example.
The interest rate used in discounting future losses is often called the discount
rate.

1. Are the parties using a discount rate properly matched to the projection in
constant dollars or escalated terms?
To discount a future loss projected in escalated terms, one should use an ordinary interest rate. For example, in Table 2, if the losses of$125 and $130 are in
dollars of those years, and not in constant dollars of the initial year, then the use
of a 5% discount rate is appropriate if 5% represents an accurate measure of the
time value of money.
To discount a future loss projected in constant dollars, one should use a real
interest rate as the discount rate. A real interest rate is an ordinary interest rate
less an assumed rate of future inflation. The deduction of the inflation rate from
the discount rate is the counterpart of the omission of escalation for inflation
from the projection offuture losses. In Table 2, the use of a 5% discount rate for
discounting constant-dollar losses would be appropriate if the ordinary interest
rate was 8% and the rate of inflation was 3%. Then the real interest rate would
be 8% minus 3%, or 5%.
The ordinary interest rate is often called the nominal interest rate to distinguish it from the real interest rate.
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2. Is one cif the parties assuming that discounting and earnings growth cffset
each other?
An expert might make the assumption that future growth oflosses will occur at
the same rate as the appropriate discount rate. Table 3 illustrates the standard
format for this method of calculating discounted loss.

Table 3. Calculation of Discounted Loss when Growth and Discounting
Offset Each Other
Years in
Future

0
1
2
Total

Loss

Discount
Factor

$100.00
105.00
110.30

1.000
0.952
0.907

Discounted Loss*

$100.00
100.00
100.00
$300.00

*"Discounted Loss" equals "Loss" times "Discount Factor."

When growth and discounting exactly offset each other, the present discounted value is the number of years of lost future earnings multiplied by the
current amount oflost earnings. 30 In Table 3, the loss of $300 is exactly three
times the base year's loss of$100. Thus the discounted value of future losses can
be calculated by a shortcut in this special case. The explicit projection of future
losses and the discounting back to the time of trial are unnecessary. However,
the parties may dispute whether the assumption that growth and discounting are
exactly offsetting is realistic in view of projected rates of growth of losses and
market interest rates at the time of trial.
In jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. J.Yeifer, 31 the Supreme Court considered the
issue of escalated dollars with nominal discounting against constant dollars with
real discounting. It found both acceptable, though the Court seemed to express
a preference for the second format. In general, the Court appeared to favor
discount rates in the range of 1% to 3% per year in excess of the growth of
earmngs.

30. Certain state courts have, in the past, required that the offset rule be used so as to avoid speculation about future earnings growth. In Bearllieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 671-72 (Alaska 1967), the
court ruled that discounting was exactly offset by wage growth. In Kaczkowki v. Bolubasz, 421 A.2d
1027, 1036-38 (Pa. 1980), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that no evidence on price inflation
was to be introduced and deemed that inflation was exactly offset by discounting.
31. 462 u.s. 523 (1983).
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3. Is there disagreement about the interest rate used to discount future lost
value?
Discount calculations should use a reasonable interest rate drawn from current
data at the time of trial. The interest rate might be obtained from the rates that
could be earned in the bond market from a bond of maturity comparable to the
lost stream of receipts. As in the case of prejudgment interest, there is an issue as
to whether the interest rate should be on a before- or after-tax basis. The parties
may also disagree about adjusting the interest rate for risk. A common approach
for determining lost business profit is to use the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM) 32 to calculate the risk-adjusted discount rate. The CAPM is the standard method in financial economics to analyze the relation between risk and
discounting. In the CAPM method, the expert first measures the firm's "beta"the amount of variation in one firm's value per percentage point of variation in
the value of all businesses. Then the risk-adjusted discount rate is the risk-free
rate from a U.S. Treasury security plus the beta multiplied by the historical
average risk premium for the stock market. 33 For example, the calculation may
be presented in the following format:
(1) Risk-free interest rate: 4.0%
(2) Beta for this firm: 1.2%
(3) Market equity premium: 8.0%
(4) Equity premium for this firm [(2) times (3)]: 9.6%
(5) Discount rate for this firm [(1) plus (4)]: 13.6%

4. Is one of the parties using a capitalization factor?
Another approach to discounting a stream oflosses uses a market capitalization
factor. A capitalization factor 4 is the ratio of the value of a future stream of
income to the current amount of the stream; for example, if a firm is worth $1
million and its current earnings are $100,000, its capitalization factor is ten.
The capitalization factor is generally obtained from the market values of comparable assets or businesses. For example, the expert might locate a comparable

32. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 WL 161084 (Del. Ch. Oct.
19, 1990) (mem.) (explaining CAPM and propriety of using CAPM to determine the discount rate);
Gilbert v. MPM Enters., Inc., No. 14416, 1997 WL 633298, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 1997) (holding
that petitioner's expert witnesses' use ofCAPM is appropriate).
33. Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 141-228 (5th ed.
1996).
34. See, e.g., United States v. 22.80 Acres of Land, 839 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
landowners' market data were not fatally flawed because of failure to use a capitalization factor); Maureen
S. Duggan, Annotation, Proper Measure and Elements of Recovery for Insider Short-Swing Transaction, 86
A.L.R. Fed. 16 (1988) (mentioning use of capitalization factor to derive price of purchased stock).
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business traded in the stock market and compute the capitalization factor as the
ratio of stock market value to operating income. In addition to capitalization
factors derived from markets, experts sometimes use rule-of-thumb capitalization factors. For example, the value of a dental practice might be taken as one
year's gross revenue (the capitalization factor for revenue is one). Often the
parties dispute whether there is reliable evidence that the capitalization factor
accurately measures value for the specific asset or business.
Once the capitalization factor is determined, the calculation of the discounted
value of the loss is straightforward: It is the current annual loss in operating
profit multiplied by the capitalization factor. A capitalization-factor approach to
valuing future losses may be formatted in the following way:
(1) Ratio of market value to current annual earnings in comparable publicly
traded firms: 13
(2) Plaintiffs lost earnings over past year: $200
(3) Value of future lost earnings [(1) times (2)]: $2,600
The capitalization-factor approach might also be applied to revenue, cash flow,
accounting profit, or other measures. The expert might adjust market values for
any differences between the valuation principles relevant for damages and those
that the market applies. For example, the value in the stock market may be
considered the value placed on a business for a minority interest, whereas the
plaintiffs loss relates to a controlling interest. The parties may dispute almost
every element of the capitalization calculation.
Example:

Lender is responsible for failure of Auto Dealer. Plaintiff Auto
Dealer's damages study projects rapid growth offuture profits based
on current year's profit but for Lender's misconduct. The study
uses a discount rate calculated as the after-tax interest rate on Treasury bills. The application of the discount rate to the future stream
of earnings implies a capitalization rate of12 times the current pretax
profit. The resulting estimate of lost value is $10 million. Defendant Lender's damages study uses data on the actual sale prices of
similar dealerships in various parts of the country. The data show
that the typical sales price of a dealership is six times its five-year
average annual pretax profit. Lender's damages study multiplies the
capitalization factor of six by the five-year average annual pretax
profit of Auto Dealer of $500,000 to estimate lost value as $3 million.

Comment:

Part of the difference comes from the higher implied capitalization
factor used by Auto Dealer. Another reason may be that the fiveyear average pretax profit is less than the current year profit.
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5. Is one party using the appraisal approach to valuation and the other, the
discounted-income approach?
The appraisal approach places a value on a stream of earnings by determining
the value of a similar stream in a similar market. For example, to place a value on
the stream of earnings from a rental property, the appraisal approach would look
at the market values of similar properties. The appraisal approach is suitable for
many kinds of real property and some kinds of businesses.
Example:

Oil Company deprives Gas Station Operator of the benefits of
Operator's business. Operator's damages study projects future profits
and discounts them to the time of trial, to place a value of $5 million on the lost business. Oil Company's damages study takes the
average market prices of five nearby gas station businesses with comparable gasoline volume, to place a value of $500,000 on the lost
business.

Comment:

This large a difference probably results from a fundamental difference in assumptions. Operator's damages study is probably assuming that profits are likely to grow, while Oil Company's damages
study may be assuming that there is a high risk that the neighborhood will deteriorate and the business will shrink.

F. Damages with Multiple Challenged Acts: Disaggregation
It is common for a plaintiff to challenge a number of the defendant's acts and to
offer an estimate of the combined effect of those acts. If the fact finder determines that only some of the challenged acts are illegal, the damages analysis
needs to be adjusted to consider only those acts. This issue seems to arise most
often in antitrust cases, but can arise in any type of case. Ideally the damages
testimony would equip the fact finder to determine damages for any combination of the challenged acts, but that may be tedious. If there are, say, 10 challenged acts, it would take 1,023 separate studies to determine damages for every
possible combination of findings about illegality of the acts.
There have been several cases where the jury has found partially for the plaintiff but the jury lacked assistance from the damages experts on how the damages
should be calculated for the combination of acts the jury found to be illegal.
Even though the jury has attempted to resolve the issue, damages have been
remanded upon appeal. 35

35. See Litton Sys. Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14662 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 1996)
(order granting new trial on damages only-"Because there is no rational basis on which the jury could
have reduced Litton's 'lump sum' damage estimate to account for Litton's losses attributable to conduct
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One solution to this problem is to make the determination of the illegal acts
before damages testimony is heard. The damages experts can adjust their testimony to consider only the acts found to be illegal.
In some situations, damages are the sum of separate damages for the various
illegal acts. For example, there may be one injury in New York and another in
Oregon. Then the damages testimony may consider the acts separately.
When the challenged acts have effects that interact, it is not possible to consider damages separately and add up their effects. This is an area of great confusion. When the harmful acts substitute for each other, the damages attributable
to each separately sum to less than their combined effect. As an example, suppose that the defendant has used exclusionary contracts and illegal acquisitions
to ruin the plaintiffs business. Either one would have ruined the business. Damages for the combination of acts are the value of the business, which would have
thrived absent both the contracts and the acquisitions. Now consider damages if
only the contracts but not the acquisitions are illegal. In the but-for analysis, the
acquisitions are hypothesized to occur, because they are not illegal. But plaintiffs
business cannot function in that but-for situation, because of the acquisitions.
Hence damages-the difference in value of the plaintiffs business in the but-for
and actual situations-are zero. The same would be true for a separate damages
measurement for the acquisitions, with the contracts taken to be legal.
When the effects of the challenged conduct are complementary, the damages
estimates for separate types of conduct will add to more than the combined damages. For example, suppose there is a challenge to the penalty provisions and to
the duration of contracts for their combined exclusionary effect. The actual
amount of the penalty would cause little exclusion if the duration were briefbut
substantial exclusion were the duration long. Similarly, the actual duration of
the contracts would cause little exclusion if the penalty were small but substantial exclusion were the penalty large. A damages analysis for the penalty provision in isolation compares but-for-without the penalty provision but with long
duration-to actual, where both provisions are in effect. Damages are large.
Similarly, a damages estimate for the duration in isolation gives large damages.
The sum of the two estimates is nearly double the damages from the combined
use ofboth provisions.

excluded from the jury's consideration, the conclusion is inescapable that the jury's verdict was based
on speculation. For these reasons, the Court orders a new trial limited to the issue of the amount of
damages sustained by Litton that is attributable to unlawful Honeywell conduct."); Image Technical
Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1224 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1560
(1998) (plaintiffs "must segregate damages attributable to lawful competition from damages attributable
to Kodak's monopolizing conduct").
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Thus, a request that the damages expert disaggregate damages across the challenged acts is far more than a request that the total damages estimate be broken
down into components that add up to the damages attributable to the combination of all the challenged acts. In principle, a separate damages analysis-with its
own carefully specified but-for scenario and analysis-needs to be done for every possible combination of illegal acts.

Example:

Hospital challenges Glove Maker for illegally obtaining market power
through the use of long-term contracts and the use of a discount
program that gives discounts to consortiums ofhospitals if they purchase exclusively from Glove Maker. The jury finds that Defendant
has attempted to monopolize the market with its discount programs, but that the long-term contracts were legal because of efficiencies. Hospital argues that damages are unchanged because either act was sufficient to achieve the observed level of market power.
Defendant argues that damages are zero because the long-term contracts would have been enough to allow it to dominate the market.

Comment:

The appropriate damages analysis is based on a careful new comparison of the market with and without the discount program. The
but-for analysis should include the presence of the long-term contracts since they were found to be legal.
Apportionment or disaggregation sometimes arises in a different setting. A
damages measure may be challenged as encompassing more than the harm caused
by the defendant's harmful act. The expert may be asked to disaggregate damages between those caused by the defendant and those caused by other factors
not caused by the defendant. We believe that this use of terms is confusing and
should be avoided. If a damages analysis includes the effects not caused by the
defendant, it is a defective analysis. It has not followed the standard format for
damages, which, by its nature, isolates the effects of the harmful act on the
plaintiff. The proper response is not to tell the expert to disaggregate, but rather
to carry out a valid damages analysis that includes only damages, and not the
effects of other events.
In the standard format, the but-for analysis differs from the actual environment only by hypothesizing the absence of the harmful act committed by the
defendant. The comparison ofbut-for to actual automatically isolates the causal
effects of the harmful act on the plaintiff. No disaggregation of damages caused
by the harmful act is needed once the standard format is applied.

307

001836

/_
NO.
FILEOW._
A.M. _ _ _ _ _P.M.~_....c;..-.---

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup. com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup. com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com
BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

AUG 0 4 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELYSHIA HOLMES
DEPUTY

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
V.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership,

OBJECTIONS TO SAINT
ALPHONSUS'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL
VERDICT FORM

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership; MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho
Limited Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT ALPHONSUS
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

OBJECTIONS TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL VERDICT
FORM -1

001837

ORIGINAL

MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), MRI Limited Partnership ("MRI Center") and MRI
Mobile Limited ("MRI Mobile") (collectively, the "MRI Entities") object to Saint Alphonsus's
requested Jury Instructions and Special Verdict form. Each of the instructions proposed by Saint
Alphonsus is discussed below.

A.

Instructions to Which the MRI Entities no Not Object
The MRI Entities do not object to the following instructions proposed by Saint Alphonsus:

•

•
•
•
•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
B.

Instruction No.
Instruction No.
Instruction No.
Instruction No.
Instruction No.
Instruction No.
Instruction No.
Instruction No.
Instruction No.
Instruction No.
Instruction No.
Instruction No.
Instruction No.

5
10
13
14
15
18
20
21
28
31
39
40
43

Instructions to Which the MRI Entities Suggest that Their Proposed Instruction Be
Given Instead
The MRI Entities object to the following instructions to the extent that they are different

from the instructions proposed by the MRI Entities. The majority of these instructions, as
proposed by the MRI Entities, were given by Judge McLaughlin in the previous trial of this
matter, in the Instructions to the Jury of August 3, 2007. As this Court has previously indicated,
any rulings of Judge McLaughlin not overturned by the Supreme Court are the law of the case
and will not be revisited by this Court. (See Consolidated Order Re: Motions in Limine Heart
May 18,2011, filed June 13, 2011; Consolidated Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment
Heard May 18, 2011, filed June 17, 2011.) As these instructions were riot affected by the
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Supreme Court's opinion, then they are the law of the case and may be presumed to be correct,
and should be given again.
1. Instruction No.3

In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes an instruction on deliberation procedures.
The MRI Entities proposed an instruction on the same topic on Page 8 of their proposed
instructions (MRIA's Proposed Jury Instructions, filed July 14, 2011 (hereinafter "MRI Entity
In~tructions"),

p. 8.) While the instruction proposed by Saint Alphonsus is the unmodified Idaho

Pattern Instruction, the instruction proposed by the MRI Entities is the instruction actually given
by the district court in the previous trial of this matter. The instruction given at the last trial
expands upon "note taking" and clarifies the role of the court reporter. As this instruction was
not altered by the Supreme Court's decision or any decisions of this Court, the instruction given
in the previous trial of this matter is the law of the case and should be given again.

2. Instruction No.4
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes a modified version ofiDJI 1.03. The MRI
Entities Instructions, Page 11, contains the unmodified version ofiDJI 1.03. While the MRI
Entities have no legal quarrel with the addition suggested by Saint Alphonsus, the pattern jury
instructions approved by the Idaho Supreme Court are presumptively correct, and trial courts
should follow them as closely as possible to avoid creating unnecessary grounds for appeal.
McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 n. 2, 225 P.3d 700, 704 n. 2 (2010). As such, they suggest
that their proposed instruction be given instead.

3. Instruction No. 11
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposed an unmodified version of IDJI 1.22,
discussing deposition testimony. The M!p: Entities Instructions, Page 17, contains a slightly
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modified version that discusses not only deposition testimony, but also prior sworn testimony.
(MRI Entity Instructions, p. 17.) Because this case in on retrial, and some ofthe testimony used
may come from the previous trial and depositions, the Instruction proposed by the MRI Entities
is more accurate.

4. Instruction No. 12
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes an introductory instruction to the jury. The
MRI Entities proposed an instruction on the same topic on Page 6 of the MRI Entity Instructions.
While the instruction proposed by Saint Alphonsus is the unmodified Idaho Pattern Instruction,
the instruction proposed by the MRI Entities is the instruction actually given by the district court
in the previous trial of this matter. The instruction proposed by the MRI Entities and used at the
prior trial contains a paragraph at the end discussing opinion testimony. 1 As this instruction was
not altered by the Supreme Court's decision or any decisions of this Court, the instruction given
in the previous trial of this matter is the law of the case and should be given again.

5. Instruction No. 16
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes an instruction on corporate parties. The
MRI Entities have proposed an instruction on the same topic at Page 10 that also identifies the
shortened names used for each entity.

6. Instruction No. 23
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes a non-IDJI instruction regarding the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On pages 33 and 34 of their proposed instructions, the
MRI Entities proposed instructions on the same topic. The instructions proposed by the MRI

If, however, the Court gives a separate instruction on opinion testimony, then the MRI
Entities agree that the version of the introductory instruction suggested by Saint Alphonsus
should be given.
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Entities are the instructions actually given by the district court in the previous trial of this matter,
with only minor modifications. As these instructions were not altered by the Supreme Court's
decision or any decisions of this Court, the instructions given in the previous trial of this matter
are the law of the case and should be given again.

7. Instruction No. 36
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes a modified version of IDJI 9.14 regarding
mitigation of damages. On page 43 of their proposed instructions, the MRI Entities proposed an
instruction on the same topic. The instruction proposed by the MRI Entities is the instruction
actually given by the district court in the previous trial of this matter. As this instruction was not
altered by the Supreme Court's decision or any decisions of this Court, the instruction given in
the previous trial of this matter is the law of the case and should be given again.

8. Instruction No. 38
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes an unmodified version ofiDJI 1.09
regarding quotient verdicts. On page 42 of their proposed instructions, the MRI Entities
proposed an instruction on the same topic. The MRI Entities' instruction removes the last clause
on "percentage of negligence," as negligence is not alleged in the case and is therefore irrelevant.
The instruction proposed by the MRI Entities is the instruction actually given by the district
court in the previous trial of this matter. As this instruction was not altered by the Supreme
Court's decision or any decisions of this Court, the instruction given in the previous trial of this
.matter is the law of the case and should be given again.

9. Instruction No. 41
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes an instruction on completing the verdict
form. The MRI Entities propose<;! an instruction on the same topic on Page 4 7 of the MRI Entity
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Instructions. The instruction proposed by the MRI Entities is the unmodified Idaho Pattern
Instruction, which is presumptively correct. It is also the instruction actually given by the district
court in the previous trial of this matter. As this instruction was not altered by the Supreme
Court's decision or any decisions of this Court, the instruction given in the previous trial of this
matter is the law of the case and should be given again.

C.

Instructions to Which the MRI Entities Object
The MRI Entities object to all other instructions proposed by Saint Alphonsus.

Requested jury instructions must fairly and accurately reflect applicable law. State v. Butcher,
137 Idaho 125, 133, 44 P.3d 1180, 1188 (Ct. App. 2002). Instructions should not be given if
they include irrelevant information, State v. Folk,--- P.3d ----, 2011 WL 2568011 (2011); are apt
to confuse or mislead the jury, require an involved explanation, are ambiguous and uncertain,
erroneously state the law, or are confusing and misleading, State v. Wheeler, 70 Idaho 455, 460,
220 P.2d 687, 690 (1950); if they are adequately covered by the other instructions given by the
trial court or not supported by the facts of the case, State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 285, 647 P.2d
734, 741 (1982); ifthey summarize testimony, State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 51, 454 P.2d 945,
948 (1969); or ifthey comment on the evidence, State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 71, 951 P.2d
1288, 1298 (Ct. App. 1998). The instructions discussed below suffer from one or more of these
deficiencies.

10. Instruction No. 1.
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus has proposed a non-IDJI voir dire instruction. As
noted above, the Court should have care in giving non-IDJI instructions, lest it create
unnecessary grounds for appeal. McKay, 148 Idaho at 571 n. 2, 225 P.3d at 704 n. 2. The MRI
Entities' specific quarrel with this instruction begins in paragraph 4. Paragraph 4 is .
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argumentative, and also includes the irrelevant fact that Saint Alphonsus brought a lawsuit to
recover its equity in the partnership. As noted in the MRI Entities Motion to Preclude Reference
to Saint Alphonsus's Departing Partner's Share, filed August 1, 2011, this information is
irrelevant and risks confusing the jury. I.R.E. 402, 403.
In paragraph 5, Saint Alphonsus requests that the Court instruct the jury that it has
already determined that Saint Alphonsus had a right to withdraw from the MRIA partnership.
This is in contravention of the court's order of July 13, 2011, wherein the Court found that Saint
Alphonsus's dissociation is not at issue in the case, that evidence and argument on the subject is
irrelevant and potentially unfairly prejudicial, and that Saint Alphonsus cannot reference this fact
at trial. Essentially, Saint Alphonsus is trying to do what the Supreme Court found objectionable
in the first trial when the tables were turned - have the Court tell the jury about the results of a
Motion for Summary Judgment that went in their favor. This is an irrelevant and preJudicial fact
about which that the Court has already held the jury should not be informed. This argumentative,
non-IDJI instruction attempts to introduce irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, and thus should
not be given.
To the extent that the Court is inclined to give this instruction or any portion of it, the
MRI Entities suggest that in paragraph 3, the MRI Entities and their lawyers be listed first (i.e.,
as the "Plaintiff.") Also, Brent Bastian is going to be the third attorney for the MRI Entities at
trial, rather than Dara Parker.

11. Instruction No.2
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus has proposed a non-IDJI "introductory remarks"
instruction. As noted above, the Court should have care in giving non-IDJI instructions, lest it
create unnecessary groun,ds for appeal. McKay, 148 Idaho at 571 n. 2, 225 P.3d at 704 n. 2.
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Furthermore, Paragraph 3 hints at the fact that Saint Alphonsus received payment for its
partnership share by instructing the jury that "I have already decided the issues raised by Plaintiff
Saint Alphonsus." As these issues have already been fully decided, it is irrelevant and
unnecessary to tell the jury that these issues ever existed. As noted in the MRI Entities Motion
to Preclude Reference to Saint Alphonsus's Departing Partner's Share, filed August 1, 2011, this
information is irrelevant and risks confusing the issues. I.R.E. 402, 403.

12. Instruction No.6
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus has proposed a non-IDJI instruction regarding the
nature of the case. As noted above, the Court should have care in giving any non-IDJI
instructions, lest it create unnecessary grounds for appeal. McKay, 148 Idaho at 571 n. 2, 225
P.3d at 704 n. 2. Furthermore, this instruction is rife with argumentative and irrelevant issues.
In Paragraph 1, Saint Alphonsus asks the Court to instruct the jury that "Saint Alphonsus is a
major hospital in Boise." There is no need for the Court to so instruct the jury. If Saint
Alphonsus believes that this is in any way relevant, it can present this evidence through
testimony. For the Court to give this as an instruction inappropriately highlights Saint
Alphonsus's community status. In Paragraph 3, Saint Alphonsus again asks the Court to instruct
the jury that Saint Alphonsus had a lawful right to withdraw from the partnership. This is
irrelevant and prejudicial information in contravention of the court's order of July 13, 2011. In
Paragraph 4, Saint Alphonsus asks the Court to instruct the jury that the non-compete clause of
the Partnership Agreement applied until April1, 2005. This is evidence that it is more
appropriate to put in through a witness. For the Court to give this as an instruction
inappropriately highlights this fact. In Paragraph 5, Saint Alphonsus asks the Court to instruct
the jury that "MRIA contends that Saint Alphonsus acted wrongfully with re,spect to the MRIA
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partnership while Saint Alphonsus was a member, and during the year after." This grossly
oversimplifies the position of the MRfEntities. There is no need to give the jury an instruction
on the nature of the case, much less an instruction, as proposed by Saint Alphonsus, which is
argumentative and irrelevant.

13. Instruction No.7
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus has proposed a non-IDJI preliminary fiduciary duty

instruction. The MRI Entities have proposed an alternative instruction in their First
Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, filed contemporaneously herewith. This is the
instruction which should be given.
The MRI Entities object to a number of specific features in Saint Alphonsus's proposed
instruction. In the first paragraph, Saint Alphonsus gives the jury examples of fiduciary duties
(attorney/client, executor/beneficiary) that are not relevant to the case. The jury can simply be
instructed on the meaning of fiduciary duties without needing examples, which may confuse the
jury into thinkingthat these are the only situations in which fiduciary duties arise.
The second paragraph of this instruction states that Saint Alphonsus 's fiduciary duties to
MRI Associates, LLP, ended on April 1, 2004. This is not an accurate or complete statement of
the law. The party's duty ofloyalty under I. C. § 53-3-404(b )(3) (competition), terminates upon
dissociation. However, a partner's duty ofloyalty under I.C. § 53-3-404(b)(l) (holding benefit
as trustee) and I. C. § 53-3-404(b)(2) (refrain from dealing adversely), and duty of care ~nder
I.C. § 53-3-404(c) continue with respect to matters arising and events occurring before the
partner's dissociation. I. C. § 53-3-603. The instruction requested by Saint Alphonsus is an
inaccurate statement of the law, and should not be given.

OBJECTIONS TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL VERDICT
FORM-9

001845

14. Instruction No.8
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus asks the Court, yet again, to instruct the jury that
Saint Alphonsus had a legal right to withdraw from the MRIA partnership. As the MRI Entities
have repeatedly noted, this is in contravention of the court's order of July 13, 2011. As the Court
htes alreadyfmmd, and as MRIA has been forced to argue, yet again, in its Objection to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Reconsideration in Part of June 13, 2011, Consolidated Order Re:
Motions in Limine (filed Aug. 1, 2011 ), this is an irrelevant and prejudicial fact that the jury
should not be informed about, much less specifically instructed about by the Court itself.

15. Instruction No.9
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus has proposed a non-IDJI instruction regarding the
nature ofthe case. As noted above, the Court should have care in giving any non-IDJI
instructions, lest it create unnecessary grounds for appeal. McKay, 148 Idaho at 571 n. 2, 225
P.3d at 704 n. 2. The MRI Entities' specific objection to this instruction is to the last sentence of
the first paragraph. In that sentence, Saint Alphonsus asks the Court to instruct the jury that
"Any evidence of Saint Alphonsus 's competition with the MRI entities after that date [April 1,
2005,] is irrelevant to the question ofliability and may not be considered for the purposes of
determining whether Saint Alphonsus committed any wrongdoing." Whether evidence is
relevant or irrelevant is question of law for the Court. The evidence either comes in as relevant
evidence, or it does not. The jury should not be instructed on the relevance or irrelevance of
evidence.

16. Instruction No. 17
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes a Ninth Circuit pattern jury instruction,

seeking to instruct the jury on factors it should consider when evalu~ting witness credibility.
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This instruction has not been approved in Idaho, and is not based on any Idaho law. A jury is
equipped to evaluate the credibility of witnesses without being instructed about how to do so. As
such, the Court should decline to give this instruction, lest it create unnecessary grounds for
appeal. McKay, 148 Idaho at 571 n. 2, 225 P.3d at 704 n. 2.

17. Instruction No. 19
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes a "facts not in dispute" instruction. This
instruction is argumentative, contains facts which are irrelevant, and contains facts which are in
dispute.
First, in bullet point number two, Saint Alphonsus again asks the Court to instruct the
jury that it had a legal right to withdraw. Not only is this in direct contravention ofthe court's
order of July 13, 2011, even if the Court were inclined to so instruct the jury, it is becoming
repetitive to the point of being prejudicial and giving undue emphasis to this fact.
In bullet point three, Saint Alphonsus asks for an instruction about the scope of the noncompete, saying "Saint Alphonsus contractually agreed not to compete with MRIA with respect
to the business of operating MRI equipment." This is an oversimplification of the noncompetition clause, which prohibits "competitive activity," defined as "(1) those business
activities in which the Partnership is engaged and (2) those prospective business activities whose
development had received at least five (5) favorable votes on the Board of Partners" (Former
Trial Ex. 4023, Section 9.2.) It would be better to leave reference to the non-competition clause,
which is directly at issue in this case, to the presentation of facts, rather than including it in a list
of"facts not in dispute." If, however, the Court is inclined to reference the non-competition
agreement, its scope cannot be the cherry-picked version suggested by Saint Alphonsus, but
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should instead be the full contractual language. Anything less is not an accurate statement of the
facts.
The MRI Entities suggested a "Facts not in Dispute" instruction on page 14 of their
proposed instructions. Given the deficiencies in Saint Alphonsus's proposed instruction, the
Court should instead use this instruction proposed by the MRI Entities.

18. Instruction No. 22
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes a modified version of IDJI 6.1 0.1. The MRI
Entities proposed an instruction on the same topic on Page 21 of the MRI Entity Instructions.
The instruction proposed by the MRI Entities is the instruction actually given by the district
court in the previous trial of this matter, with only minor modifications inserting the names of the
limited partnerships. As this instruction was not altered by the Supreme Court's decision or any
decisions of this Court, the instruction given in the previous trial ofthis matter is the law of the
case and should be given again.
MRIA also has concerns with the paragraph following the numbered elements in Saint
Alphonsus' s proposed instruction. In that paragraph, Saint Alphonsus refers to whether Saint
Alphonsus "materially" breached the non-competition provision. It is unclear how there could
be a breach that is not material. Either the non-competition provision was complied with, or it
was not. There is no need for the jury to decide whether the breach was material; any breach was
material.
In addition, in the final paragraph of this instruction, Saint Alphonsus asks the Court to
instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of laches. As discussed in more detail below with
respect to Saint Alphonsus's proposed Instruction No. 30, no instruction on the affirmative
defense of laches should be given because it lacks support iJ;I the facts of the case.
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19. Instruction No. 24
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes a non-IDJI instruction regarding the breach
of fiduciary duties to MRIA. The MRI Entities proposed a number of instructions on the same
topic on Pages 27 through 32 of the MRI Entity Instructions. The instructions proposed by the
MRI Entities (save Pages 29 and 31) are the instructions actually given by the district court in the
previous trial of this matter, with only minor modifications. As these instructions were not
altered by the Supreme Court's decision or any decisions of this Court, the instructions given in
the previous trial of this matter are the law of the case and should be given again.
The MRI Entities also have specific objection to the fifth paragraph of Saint Alphonsus' s
proposed instruction, which reads:
A partner does not violate a duty or obligation, however, merely because the
partner's conduct furthers the partner's own interest. For example, a partner is free
to engage in business activities that are outside the scope of the partnership
business, and does not have to share its profits from that activity with the
partnership. A partnership, moreover, can authorize a specific act or transaction
by a partner that otherwise would violate the duty ofloyalty. It may also ratify,
after-the-fact, a specific act or transaction that would otherwise have been a
breach of the duty of loyalty after full disclosure of all material facts. If an action
has been authorized or ratified, then the partner taking that action is not in breach
of its fiduciary duties. As I have mentioned earlier, once again in this context,
neither Saint Alphonsus's act of withdrawing from MRIA, nor any acts of
competition by Saint Alphonsus occurring after April 1, 2005 constitute a breach
of Saint Alphonsus's fiduciary duty to MRIA.
The first and second sentence, which give examples about what is not a breach of fiduciary duty,
are argumentative and inappropriately comment on the evidence. The second, third, and fourth
sentences are regarding ratification. Saint Alphonsus did not plead ratification as an affirmative
defense, and the time for amending the pleadings has long since passed. Saint Alphonsus has not
alleged at any time that the MRI Entities ratified its breaches of fiduciary duty. As such,
instruction on the same is not supported by the facts, is irrelevant to any of the issues, and runs

OBJECTIONS TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL VERDICT
FORM -13

001849

the risk of confusing the jury. The final sentence again asks the Court to instruct the jury that
Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal was lawful, in contravention of the Court's Order of July 13,
2011.
The final paragraph of this instruction instructs the jury to consider the affirmative
defense ofwaiver and laches to excuse any breach of fiduciary duty. As discussed in more detail
below with respect to Saint Alphonsus's proposed Instruction No. 29, waiver is not a valid
defense to the claim of breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, as discussed in more detail below
with respect to Saint Alphonsus's proposed Instruction No. 30, no instruction on the affirmative
defense of laches should be given because it lacks support in the facts of the case.

20. Instruction No. 25
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes an instruction on the fiduciary duties owed
by Saint Alphonsus to MRI Center and MRI Mobile. This is an argumentative instruction. Saint
Alphonsus begins the instruction in paragraph 1 as follows:
MRI Center and MRI Mobile have also asserted that Saint Alphonsus
breached fiduciary duties it owed to them. While there is no statute that imposes a
fiduciary duty on Saint Alphonsus with respect to MRI Center or MRI Mobile,
MRI Center and MRI Mobile may still be able to prove that SaintAlphonsus
owed them fiduciary duties based on the specific nature of their relationship.
There is no need for the jury to know that no statutory fiduciary duty exists as to MRI Center and
MRI Mobile. The Court can simply instruct the jury on what is necessary to find a common law
statutory duty without interjecting this irrelevant fact.
Saint Alphonsus then gives examples of when fiduciary duties may and may not be
found. It contends that Saini Alphonsus has to have been superior to MRI Center and MRI
Mobile, and that they occupy a "position of dependence on Saint Alphonsus." This entire
instruction is convoluted, ambiguous, confusing, argumentative, and inaccurate. The cleanest
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statement of common law fiduciary duty is contained in the case Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho
276, 288, 240 P.2d 833, 840-41 (1952), where the Court simply states:
A fiduciary relationship does not depend upon some technical relation created by
or defined in law, but it exists in cases where there has been a special confidence
imposed in another who, in equity and good conscience, is bound to act in good
faith and with due regard to the interest of one reposing the confidence.
Id. There is no need to go beyond this simple statement. A fiduciary relationship exists under

such circumstances. The caveats, examples, and hedging that Saint Alphonsus has inserted
simply confuses the issue. Indeed, Saint Alphonsus has cited no law for the proposition that the
MRIA entities much show that MRI Center and MRI Mobile "occupied a position of dependence
on Saint Alphonsus so that it was reasonable to conclude that Saint Alphonsus owed them a duty
to act primarily for their benefit." The MRI Entities have proposed an alternative instruction in
their First Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, filed contemporaneously herewith, which is
based on the simple test outlined in Stearns. This is the instruction which should be given.
In addition, the final paragraph of this instruction instructs the jury to consider the
affirmative defense of waiver and laches to excuse any breach of fiduciary duty. As discussed in
more detail below with respect to Saint Alphonsus's proposed Instruction No. 29, waiver is not a
valid defense to the claim of breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, as discussed in more detail
below with respect to Saint Alphonsus's proposed Instruction No. 30, no instruction on the
affirmative defense oflaches should be given because it lacks support in the facts of the case.
21. Instruction No. 26
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes a non-IDJI instruction regarding
interference with prospective contractual relationship. The MRI Entities proposed an instruction
on the same topic on Page 36 of the MRI Entity Instructions. This instruction proposed by the
MRI Entities is the instructions actually given by the district court in the previous trial of this
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matter, with only minor modifications. As this instruction was not altered by the Supreme
Court's decision or any decisions of this Court, the instructions given in the previous trial of this
matter are the law of the case and should be given again.
Furthermore, the instruction proposed by Saint Alphonsus has a number of problems.
First, it asserts that MRI Associates, LLP, brought this claim. In fact, this claim was brought
only by the limited partnerships, MRI Center and MRI Mobile. In element number 2 and several
other related sections throughout the proposed instruction, Saint Alphonsus refers to whether
"valid economic expectancy" exists. The test is more appropriately phrased "prospective
economic advantage." Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 285-8,
824 P.2d 841, 860-61 (1991).
To establish a claim oftortious interference with prospective economic advantage, a
party must show that the interference was "wrongful." !d., 121 Idaho at 287, 824 P.2d at 862. In
the third paragraph of its instruction, Saint Alphonsus attempts to illustrate that such wrongful
interference occurs when motivated by "hatred or revenge." This will mislead the jury, as these
kinds of vitriolic emotions are not required. All that is required is that the interference be for an
improper means or purpose. !d., 121 Idaho at 285, 824 P .2d at 860. The Court should refrain
from providing these kinds of limited illustrative examples, as the jury might believe that these
are the only circumstances (or kinds of circumstances) under which it can find wrongful
interference.
In the final sentence of the third paragraph, Saint Alphonsus also argues that "Parties,
however, have a privilege to engage in competition, unless they have agreed by contract not to
do so. If a party does not use improper means, and if a party's purpose, even just in part, is to
engage in competition, its competition is pr,ivileged and not wrongful." This is an extremely
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confusing sentence. It is also argumentative, and comments on the evidence by suggesting to the
jury that competition cannot be the basis for this claim. Further, it is not supported by the facts
in this case and is not relevant, as the parties did in fact have a contract not to compete.
Finally, the second to last paragraph of this instruction instructs the jury to consider the
affirmative defense of waiver and laches to excuse the claim of interference with prospective
contractual relations. As discussed in more detail below with respect to Saint Alphonsus's
proposed Instruction No. 29, waiver is not a valid defense to the claim of interference with
prospective contractual relations. In addition, as discussed in more detail below with respect to
Saint Alphonsus's proposed Instruction No. 30, no instruction on the affirmative defense of
laches should be given because it lacks support in the facts ofthe case.
22. Instruction No. 27
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes a non-IDJI instruction for civil conspiracy.
The MRI Entities proposed an instruction on the same topic on Page 37 ofthe MRI Entity
Instructions. The instruction proposed by the MRI Entities is the instruction actually given by
the district court in the previous trial of this matter, with only minor modifications inserting the
names of the limited partnerships. As this instruction was not altered by the Supreme Court's
decision or any decisions of this Court, the instruction given in the previous trial of this matter is
the law ofthe case and should be given again.
In addition, the second to last paragraph of Saint Alphonsus' s proposed instruction
instructs the jury to consider the affirmative defense of waiver and laches to excuse the claim of
civil conspiracy. As discussed in more detail below with respect to Saint Alphonsus's proposed
Instruction No. 29, waiver is not a valid defense to the claim of civil conspiracy. In addition, as
discussed in more detail below with respect to Saint Alphonsus's proposed Instruction No. 30, ,no
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instruction on the affirmative defense of laches should be given because it lacks support in the
facts of the case.
23. Instruction No. 29
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes a modified version ofiDJI 6.22.2. The MRI
Entities proposed an instruction on the same topic on Page 24 of the MRI Entity Instructions.
The instruction proposed by the MRI Entities is the instruction actually given by the district
court in the previous trial of this matter, with only minor modifications inserting the names of the
limited partnerships and removing reference to specific instruction numbers. As this instruction
was not altered by the Supreme Court's decision or any decisions of this Court, the instruction
given in the previous trial of this matter is the law of the case and should be given again.
Furthermore, the instruction proposed by the MRI Entities is the same as the IDJI
instruction 6.22.2, other than substituting the name of parties for generic terms. Saint
Alphonsus, on the other hands, makes significant changes to the IDJI instruction. The Court
should have care in giving non-IDJI instructions, lest it create unnecessary grounds for appeal.

McKay, 148 Idaho at 571 n. 2, 225 P.3d at 704 n. 2. In fact, Saint Alphonsus's changes in this
case alter the instruction so that it is not supported by Idaho law. First, Saint Alphonsus removes
the portion of the instruction that refer to the defense as "waiver by estoppel," and simply refers
to it as ''waiver." Saint Alphonsus also adds a definition of the term "waiver" as follows:
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, and implies election
by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some right or
advantage which the party might have demanded and insisted upon.
This definition is itself inconsistent with IDJI, which simply defines waiver as follows: "Waiver
is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be evidenced by conduct, by words, or
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by acquiescence." IDJI 6.24.1. There is no need for the Court to go outside IDJI on these
instructions.
More significantly, Saint Alphonsus seeks a radical change in IDJI 6.22.2 by seeking to
instruct the jury that the doctrine of waiver by estoppel excuses not merely breaches of contract,
but tortious conduct as well. IDJI 6.22.2 states that the first element of waiver by estoppel is a
representation "that the plaintiff was waiving, excusing or forgiving the defendant's breach of
contract" and, that if the defense is proved "you should find that the defendant is not liable to the
plaintiff for the claimed breached of contact." Saint Alphonsus make a significant change,
asserting that the first element is that "MRIA was waiving, excusing, or forgiving Saint
Alphonsus's conduct," and that if the defense is proved, "you should find that Saint Alphonsus is
not liable ... for its conduct." In short, Saint Alphonsus argues that the doctrine of waiver by
estoppel is a defense not merely to breach of contract, as specifically provided by IDJI 6.22.2,
but to the other claims ofbreach of fiduciary duty, interference with prospective contractual
relationship, and civil conspiracy. Each of these claims are torts. Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc.
v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 893 n. 9, 243 P.3d 1069, 1081 n. 9 (2010) (intention interference with
contract is a tort); Property Management West, Inc. v. Hunt, 126 Idaho 897, 899, 894 P.2d 130,
132 (1995) (breach of fiduciary duty is a cause of action are grounded in tort, not in contract);
Dahlquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 233 P. 883, 886 (1925) (civil conspiracy to commit a tort is
a tort). By its express terms, IDJI 6.22.2 relates only to the waiver of breaches of contract.
The MRI Entities have not found any Idaho case law in which this doctrine was used to
excuse violations of fiduciary duty, interference with prospective contractual relationships, or
civil conspiracy, and Saint Alphonsus has pointed to none. Saint Alphonsus has not cited any
Idaho case law for the proposition that a party may "waive, excuse, or forgive"

tortiou~

conduct,
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much less that a party may reasonably rely on such a waiver. The only Idaho law that Saint
Alphonsus cites is I. C. § 53-3-103, which permits a partnership to "ratify, after full disclosure of
all material facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty."
Ratification after full disclosure is a much different test than waiver by estoppel, 2 and Saint
Alphonsus did not plead as an affirmative defense that its breaches are excused by ratification.
The Court should not give this proposed instruction, or instruct the jury that it is a defense to the
MRI Entities claims of fiduciary duty, interference with prospective contractual relationships,
and civil conspiracy. Such an instruction is not consistent with the pattern instruction or Idaho
law.

24. Instruction No. 30
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes an instruction on laches. As elements, it
proposes the following:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile delayed in asserting their legal
rights against Saint Alphonsus;
MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile had notice of any alleged violation
of their legal rights by Saint Alphonsus and had an opportunity to institute
suit;
Saint Alphonsus lacked knowledge that MRI Associates would assert
their legal rights;
Saint Alphonsus would suffer injury or prejudice in the event MRIA, MRI
Center, and MRI Mobile are allowed to recover.

First, this affirmative defense should not be addressed at all, because it lacks support in the facts
of the case. Laches is a type of equitable estoppel based on a plaintiff's undue delay in asserting
its rights. Callenders, Inc. v. Beckman, 120 Idaho 169, 175,814 P.2d 429,435 (Ct. App.1991).

2

Saint Alphonsus also cites to case law which provides that in the criminal law context,
constitutional and statutory rights may be waived, such as the jury trial, the privilege against self
incrimination, and right to appeal. This case law, which has nothing to do with the civil
affirmative defense ofwai~er by estoppel of tortious claims, is inapposite.
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Saint Alphonsus's wrongful conduct was alleged to have started in 1999, and continued through
a pattern of wrongful conduct up until the time its non-competition agreement expired in April
2005. MRIA filed its counterclaim in May 2005. The MRI Entities have not delayed in the least
in assertingtheir rights against Saint Alphonsus. Moreover, Saint Alphonsus certainly did not
lack knowledge that MRI Associates would assert their legal rights; in fact, they were
specifically told by their own attorneys that this was a strong possibility. As stated in exhibit
4234 from the previous trial, "SARMC has been advised by counsel that this option would likely
engender litigation with MRIA." (See Affidavit of JackS. Gjording, April 11, 2011, Ex. R) 3
Moreover, Saint Alphonsus can point to no prejudice from any alleged delay. As such, the Court
should decline to give this instruction or permit Saint Alphonsus to maintain this defense to any
of the claims asserted by the MRI Entities.
If the Court does intend to allow Saint Alphonsus to present a laches defense, Saint
Alphonsus's proposed instruction does not adequately state the elements of the defense, upon
which it bears the burden of proof. The elements are as follows: (1) defendant's invasion of
plaintiffs rights; (2) delay in asserting plaintiffs rights, the plaintiff having had notice and an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge by the defendant that plaintiff would assert
his rights; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to plaintiff
or the suit is not held to be barred. Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359, 48
P.3d 1241, 1248 (2002). Saint Alphonsus's proposed instruction entirely leaves out the first
element. Saint Alphonsus also misstates the last element. It says that this element is that Saint

3

Saint Alphonsus has recently moved to redact this language. This language should not be
redacted because it is relevant to the claims of the MRI Entities. However, to the extent that the
Court permits a laches defense to stand, this language must not be redacted, because it would
also be relevant to this affirmative defense.
,
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Alphonsus would "suffer injury or prejudice in the event MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile
are allowed to recover." The element reads that injury or prejudice to the defendant would occur
"in the event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit is not held to be barred."
Furthermore, to the extent that this instruction is given, it should also note that the lapse
of time alone is not controlling on whether laches applies; silence alone on the part of the
plaintiff was not sufficient to lead the defendant to the conclusion that the plaintiff would not
assert his rights; and prejudice cannot occur in situations where the defendant was deprived of a
benefit to which he was not entitled. Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359-60,
48 P .3d 1241, 1248-49 (2002). The jury should be instructed about when MRIA filed its claims.
In addition, there is a serious risk that the jury might be confused by the fact that over six years
have passed since this lawsuit was filed, and believe that this somehow implicates a laches
defense. If the Court allows a laches defense, the jury should be instructed that the time which
has passed since the lawsuit was filed is not relevant to the request, and that the jury should not
concern itself with such a passage of time.
25. Instruction No. 32
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes a modified version of IDJI 2.30.1 regarding
proximate cause. The MRI Entities proposed an instruction on the same topic on Page 19 of the
MRI Entity Instructions. The instruction proposed by the MRI Entities is the instruction actually
given by the district court in the previous trial of this matter. It is also identical to the IDJI
instruction. As this instruction was not altered by the Supreme Court's decision or any decisions
of this Court, the instruction given in the previous trial of this matter is the law of the case and
should be given again.
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Furthermore, there is no need for the court to modify the IDJI instruction in the manner
that Saint Alphonsus has requested. Saint Alphonsus adds a paragraph at the beginning, talking
about whether it has been proved that the wrongful act was the proximate cause of damages.
This is repetitive, as proximate cause is an element of each of the causes of action. Saint
Alphonsus also adds the word "but," which muddles the instruction from the version approved
by the Supreme Court.
26. Instruction No. 33
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes a non-IDJI instruction on damages that is

argumentative, convoluted, and contains misstatements of the law.
First, it instructs the jury that it must inquire about whether damages were proximately
caused. This is duplicative of other instructions, which already contain as elements that damages
must be proximately caused by Saint Alphonsus's acts. If the jury is to the point of considering
damages, it will have already found proximate cause. There is no need to instruct the jury on
proximate cause yet again.
Saint Alphonsus seeks to instruct the jury that if the MRI Entities "cannot prove both the
amount and the proximate cause of the damages with reasonable certainty, then you may award
them only a symbolic, nominal sum such as $1." First, this is a misstatement of the law.
Nominal damages have been approved to "demonstrate, symbolically, that the plaintiffs person
or property have been violated." Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 679, 39 P.3d 612,
619 (200 1). It does not stand for the proposition that nominal damages should be awarded for a
failure to prove the cause and amount of damages. More importantly, it is a comment on the
evidence, as it might be seen as the Court's belief about the amount of damages that should be
awarded in the case.
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In the final paragraph, Saint Alphonsus asks that the jury be instructed that Saint

Alphonsus had a right to compete with the MRI Entities after April 1, 2005. This is repetitive of
other instructions, and begins to give undue emphasis to this fact.
The most egregious part of this instruction is contained in the third and fourth paragraphs.
In the third paragraph, Saint Alphonsus contends that with regard to the contract claims, "you

may award ... only those damages that you find were incurred after May 20, 2000. In this case,
the law does not permit recovery of contract damages that were incurred before May 20, 2000."
In the fourth paragraph, Saint Alphonsus similarly contends that damages for the other claims
. begin on May 20, 2001. This is preposterous. As the Court knows, the MRI Entities contend
that Saint Alphonsus's bad acts began in 1999. The Court has not found, in any way, that there
is a date after that time when damages begin to run. This jury instruction is apparently a
backdoor attempt to receive summary judgment on an issue that has never been briefed to the
Court. The Court should decline to decide such a significant issue in the context of proposed
jury instruction. Moreover, this proposition is not a correct statement of the law
While the argument is somewhat unclear, it appears that Saint Alphonsus argues that the
statute of limitations, rather than cutting off the date upon which an action may be filed on a
particular claim, cuts of damages for any time beyond that period before the filing of the claim.
Saint Alphonsus takes the date upon which MRIA filed its counterclaim, May 20, 2005. It then
subtracts the five year statute of limitations for contract claims to calculate that the MRI Entities
cannot receive damages for any time before May 20, 2000. It then uses the four year statutes of
limitation for other claims to calculate that the MRI Entities cannot receive damages for any time
before May 20, 2001. As Saint Alphonsus terms this bizarre procedure, "damages may only be
awarded quring the statutory period, even if the violation is deemed to be 'continuing.'
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It appears that Saint Alphonsus contends that this is a procedure that exists pursuant to

the "continuing tort doctrine." In Idaho, a continuing tort is "one inflicted over a period of time;
it involves a wrongful conduct that is repeated until desisted, and each day creates a separate
cause of action ... When the tortious conduct ends, the limitations period begins." Glaze v.

Deffenbaugh, 144 Idaho 829, 172 P.3d 1104 (2007). In support of its instruction, Saint
Alphonsus cites a treatise, which states that "[ u ]nder the continuing tort doctrine, while the
statute of limitations is tolled by a continuing tortious act, recovery may be had for all damages
accruing within the statutory period before the action, but not for damages accrued prior to that
period." 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitations ofActions, § 168 (2006). This treatise has never been cited
in Idaho. Saint Alphonsus also cites an Idaho case called Woodland v. Lyon, 78 Idaho 79, 298
P.2d 380 (1956), which states that "[t]he tort herein alleged is not a single wrong, but a
continuing one, and appellant may, if the evidence supports his claim, recover for all injuries
occurring within the statutory period, even though the obstruction occurred more than four years
before the complaint was filed." However, this is dicta, as the question in that case was whether
the cause of action was barred, not a certain portion of damages.
Furthermore, even if the doctrine is arguably applicable in Idaho, the case John McShain,

Inc. v. L'Enfant Plaza Properties, Inc. 402 A.2d 1222, 1231 n. 29 (D.C. 1979) illustrates that it
is not applicable in this case. That court noted that
If the continuing tort has a cumulative effect, such that the injury might not have
come about but for the Entire course of conduct (E. g., a physical condition
brought about by long-term medical treatment), then all damages caused by the
tortious conduct are recoverable even though some of the conduct occurred
outside the limitations period. . .. If, on the other hand, the continuing tort is of
the type that causes a series of separate or recurrent injuries, then only those
damages stemming from conduct occurring within the limitations period are
recoverable.
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In this case, the MRI Entities have not alleged that they were damaged by a series of discrete
injuries, but rather that they were injured through the cumulative effect of Saint Alphonsus
course of conduct beginning in 1999 and continuing forward from that date. As such, all
damages are recoverable, even if they occurred before the limitations period. Finally, to the
extent that such a doctrine exists with respect to "continuing torts," Saint Alphonsus has cited no
case law whatsoever suggesting that this doctrine applies to claims for breach of contract. For all
of these reasons, the Court should decline to give this instruction.
27. Instruction No. 34
This is a non-IDJI instruction on damages. It is duplicative of other instructions on
damages, particularly the proximate cause instruction. It is argumentative, as it attempts to point
the blame at other parties or encourage the jury to give only nominal damages to the MRI
Entities. It requires MRIA to provide a "means of filtering out the damages attributable to other
factors," which suggests to the jury that the Court believes that other parties were at least
partially at fault. The jury could find that no other party was at fault, but be confused by this
instruction into believing that it could award no damages. Moreover, MRIA is not required to
provide such a means for "filtering out the damages," and Saint Alphonsus has cited no case law
for this proposition. MRIA is only required meet its burden to show that its damages were
proximately caused by Saint Alphonsus's wrongful conduct. This proposed instruction attempts
to impose additional burdens that are not supported by Idaho law. In short, this entire instruction
is argumentative and a misstatement of the law, and should not be given
28. Instruction No. 35
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus requests an instruction on avoiding multiple
re,covenes. The MRI Entities have proposed an instruction on the same topic at Page 42, which
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they believe more cleanly states the legal standard. In addition, in the final paragraph of Saint
Alphonsus' s proposed instruction, Saint Alphonsus states that
if you find that MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile have proven that Saint
Alphonsus committed wrongful acts as I have defined them, and MRIA, MRI
Center, and MRI Mobile have proven that there were proximately damages as a
result, you may only award them a single award of damages for all of the proven
acts of wrongdoing.
This misstates the law or, at least, may confuse the jury into misunderstanding the law. As
separate plaintiffs, MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile are each entitled to their own award of
damages. The way the Saint Alphonsus's instruction is written, the jury may believe that it can
only award damages to one of these parties on each of the causes of action, or that their
individual damage awards must somehow be aggregated into a single award. As this instruction
is convoluted, and contains ambiguity and uncertainty about the way that the jury might interpret
it, this instruction should not be given. The instruction proposed by the MRI Entities should be
given instead.
29. Instruction No. 37
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus seeks to instruct the jury that third parties "were

jointly responsible for any harm" and that the jury "must determine that percentage of damages
are attributable" to these other actors. With this, Saint Alphonsus is attempting to instruct the
jury that these third parties were in fact responsible, in some portion, for the harm caused to the
MRI Entities. However, these other actors have not been found in any way to be responsible for
any harm. That is a determination that the jury must make first; that is, it must decide whether
any party other than Saint Alphonsus is responsible for the harm to the MRI Entities. As the
Court has said, "Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a reduction in any damages awarded against it in
an amount based on apportionment of fault to be determined at trial." (Consolidated Order Re:
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Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May 18, 2011, filed June J 7, 2011, at p. 7.) The jury
could, of course, determine that Saint Alphonsus is 100% at fault and that these other parties are
0% at fault. Saint Alphonsus's instruction does not allow for this possibility, but instructs the
jury that these third parties were in fact jointly responsible for the harm in some degree. As such,
this highly misleading instruction, which incorrectly states the facts and appears to be an attempt
by Saint Alphonsus to receive a summary decision by the Court that third parties were in fact
partially responsible for harming the MRI Entities, is inappropriate and cannot be given.

D.

Special Verdict Form (Instruction No. 42)
In this instruction, Saint Alphonsus proposes a special verdict form. The MRI Entities

appended a special verdict form to their proposed instructions, and encourage the Court to use
that form instead. In addition, the MRIA Entities have a number of specific objections to this
special verdict form.
First, it is extremely complicated, and requires the jury to answer twenty-nine (29)
special interrogatories. Those interrogatories specifically ask about proximate cause and Saint
A1phonsus's affirmative defenses. The jury has already been instructed on proximate cause and
the affirmative defenses in the context of the specific instructions on those issues and with
respect to those claims. The jury has also been instructed about which party it must find for,
depending on its findings of fact as to those elements and defenses. This proposed special
verdict form is repetitive of those instructions. Also, as noted at various places above, Saint
Alphonsus's affirmative defense oflaches is inapplicable and should not be given in any event,
and its defense of waiver does not apply to the non-contract claims. As such, even if the Court
were inclined to ask about the affirmative defenses in the special verdict form, these defenses
cannot be included.
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In Question No. 26, Saint Alphonsus has a number of"bullet" points, reinstructing the
jury on various issues. In the first bullet point, Saint Alphonsus requests a special interrogatory
about the beginning date of damages. As noted in the MRI Entities' objection to Instruction No.
23, above, this is not the law in Idaho, or, at the very least, is inapplicable and irrelevant to this
case. As such, this should not be given. Furthermore, even if the Court found that this doctrine
was applicable, the jury will already have been instructed on the point. It should not be
instructed on the point a second time as an aside in the special verdict. form.
In the second bullet point, Saint Alphonsus instructs the jury that if it has found the
affirmative defenses oflaches and waiver, the jury cannot award damages. First, the doctrine of
laches is not applicable at all, and the doctrine of estoppel is applicable only to the contract
claims. In addition, the jury has already been instructed on these points. It should not be
instructed on the issues yet again as an aside in the special verdict form.
In the third bullet point asks that the jury be instructed that, if the MRI Entities have not
proved the cause of amount of damages, they can be awarded only $1. As noted above, this is a
misstatement of the law. Nominal damages have been approved to "demonstrate, symbolically,
that the plaintiff's person or property have been violated." Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672,
679, 39 P.3d 612, 619 (2001). It does not stand for the proposition that nominal damages should
be awarded for a failure to prove the cause and amount of damages. More importantly, it is a
comment on the evidence, as it might be seen as the Court's belief about the amount of damages
that should be awarded in the case. Finally, the jury has already been instructed on proximate
cause. It should not be instructed on the issue yet again as an aside in the special verdict form.
In question 28 and 29, Saint Alphonsus proposed interrogatories for the jury to indicate
the amount of damages that should be subtrayted if the jury finds a failure to mitigate. The jury

OBJECTIONS TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL VERDICT

FORM-29

001865

has already been instructed on the doctrine of mitigation as a part of its instructions on damages.
There is no reason to ask the jury a special interrogatory on the issue, as it will simply be
expected to take that doctrine into consideration in awarding damages, if any.
The Court should decline to give most of Saint Alphonsus's proposed instructions. It
must not give those instruction to which the MRI Entities have objected. Furthermore, the Court
should give the instructions requested by the MRI Entities, as these are accurate reflections of the
law and facts and are, by in large, the instructions actually given at the previous trial of this
matter.
DATED this

4th

day of August, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Dara L. Par r
Attorneys fo MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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ORIGINAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA"), propose the following jury instructions, to supplement
those instructions already submitted.
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IDJI 1.02 - Corporate parties, amended.

This instruction was given in the previous trial of this matter. (Instructions to the Jury, August 3,
2'007, Instruction No. 11.) An alteration from the original version is indicated in redline.
This instruction was proposed on Page 10 ofMRIA's original Proposed Jury Instructions; it has
been slightly amended to include Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, which was
inadvertent! y omitted.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
(also called "Saint Alphonsus"), MRI Associates, LLP, (also called "MRIA"), MRI Limited
Partnership (also called "MRI Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited (also called "MRI Mobile")
are corporations or limited liability business organizations and are entitled to the same fair and
unprejudiced treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances.
You should decide this case with the same impartiality that you would use in deciding a
case between individuals.
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Whether the Acts of SADC are the Acts of SARMC
As an alternative to this instruction, MRIA requests an instruction, as outlined below that it is
stipulated that the conduct of Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. can be attributed to Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, if Saint Alphonsus would be willing to so stipulate

INSTRUCTION NO.
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center are
separate parties in this case. It is uncontested that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. is a
wholly owned subsidiary of Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. One ofthe issues you
must decide is whether all conduct of Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. can be attributed to
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. The mere fact that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care,
Inc. owns all the stock Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center is not enough. Instead, you
must decide whether two factors exist:
1. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center and Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care,
Inc., have a unity of interest and ownership; and
2. ifthe acts are treated only as those of Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., an
inequitable result will follow, or it would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.
If you decide that both of these factors exist, than the conduct of Saint Alphonsus Diversified
Care, Inc. can be attributed to Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center.

Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 114 Idaho 817, 831, 761 P.2d 1169, 1183 (1988)

.

Whether the Acts of SADC are the Acts of SARMC
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001871

Whether the Acts of SADC are the Acts of SARMC -- Alternative Instruction
INSTRUCTION NO.
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center are
separate parties in this case. It is uncontested that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. is a
wholly owned subsidiary of Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. The parties have
stipulated that the conduct of Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. can be attributed to Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center.
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Corrective Instruction on Inadvertent Reference to "Prior Trial"

As per the Court's order, the parties and their witnesses will endeavor to refer to the prior trial of
this matter as the "prior proceeding." In the unlikely event that a party or witness does refer to
the prior proceedings as the "prior trial," the "first trial," or some similar designation that
discloses the existence of a previous trial, the following corrective instruction should be given.
If no inadvertent mention is made of the prior trial, this instruction should not be given.
INSTRUCTION NO.
You have just heard reference to a "prior trial." For various reasons, this case is on
retrial. You should not speculate about the results of that first trial, nor the reason that this case
is being tried again. As I previously instructed you, you must not conduct any research at all
about this case. I now especially caution you that you must not conduct and research into the
results of this first trial or the reasons this case is on retrial. I instruct you to put this entirely out
of your mind, and treat this proceeding as if it was the first trial.

MRIA'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 6
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Duties Continuing After Dissociation
INSTRUCTION NO.

A partner's duty of care, as well as its duty ofloyalty to refrain from taking advantage of
a partnership opportunity for the partner's own individual benefit and not act adversely to the
partnership, continues after dissociation with regard to matters arising and events occurring
before the partner's dissociation.

For the proposition that a party's duty of care and loyalty continue with regarding to
matters arising and events occurring before dissociation: I. C. § 53-3-603 (c) "The partner's
duty ofloyalty under section 53-3-404(b )(1) and (2), Idaho Code, and duty of care under section
53-3-404(c), Idaho Code, continue only with regard to matters arising and events occurring
before the partner's dissociation."

For the proposition that a party's duty of loyalty to refrain from taking advantage of a
partnership opportunity for the partner's own individual benefit continues with regarding
to matters arising and events occurring before dissociation: I.C. § 53-3-603(c) and I.C. §
53-3-404(b)(1) "(b) A partner's duty ofloyalty to the partnership and the other partners includes
the following: (1) To account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or
benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business or
derived from a use by the partner of partnership property, or information including the
appropriation of a partnership opportunity"

For the proposition that a party's duty of loyalty not act adversely !o the partnership,
continues with regarding to matters arising and events occurring before dissociation: I.C. §
53-3-603(3) and I.C. § 53-3-404(b)(2) "(b) A partner's duty ofloyalty to the partnership and the
other partners includes the following ... (2) To refrain from dealing with the partnership in the
conduct or winding up of the partnership business as or on behalf of a party having an interest
adverse to the partnership"

MRIA'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -7
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Disgorgement for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
INSTRUCTION NO.
Under the duty of loyalty, a partner has a fiduciary duty to share with the partnership
those business opportunities clearly related to the subject of its operations. A partnership may
recover any money or property in the partner's hands which can be traced to the taking of an
opportunity of the partnership. Thus, the partnership is entitled to recover from the partner any
gain it received from the breach of its fiduciary duty.

I. C. § 53-3-404(b )(2) and official comment. See also Unzipped Apparel, LLC v. Sweet
Sportswear, LLC, 2010 WL 2677441 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.,2010) (unreported) ("Disgorgement of
the defendant's unjust enrichment or wrongful gain is a proper remedy for breach of fiduciary
duty"); Harestad v. Weitzel, 242 Or. 199, 536 P.2d 522 (1975) (partnership entitled to share in
profits from venture that partner engaged in under own name that was related to the subject of
the partnership's operations); Fortugno v. Hudson Manure Co. 51 N.J.Super. 482, 499, 144
A.2d 207, 216 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1958) ("Co-partners must deal with each other with trust,
confidence and good faith; there can be no secret advantages or benefits. A partner has a
fiduciary duty to share with the partnership those business opportunities clearly related to the
subject of its operations.")

MRIA'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 8
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Preliminary Instruction Regarding Fiduciary Duty
INSTRUCTION NO.
During this case, you will likely hear references to "fiduciary duties." Under Idaho law, a
partner has a duty to its partnership and its partners to act in good faith and in the partnership's
best interests during the period of the partnership. These obligations include the duty of loyalty
and the duty of care to both the partnership and partners. This obligation runs to the partnership
and to the other partners in all matters related to the conduct of the partnership business. These
fiduciary duties require that a partner cannot take an opportunity that rightfully belongs to the
partnership, behave in a way that is adverse to a partnership, act on behalf of anyone who has
interests adverse to the partnership, or compete with the partnership. A partner may not further
its own interest to the extent doing so would violate the duty ofloyalty and/or duty of care.
Combined, these obligations represent a partner's fiduciary duties to the partnership and its
partners.
After hearing all the evidence, you will be asked to determine whether Saint Alphonsus,
as a partner in MRIA, breached its fiduciary duties to MRIA and/or MRI Center and/or MRI
Mobile. To establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, MRIA must establish that SARMC
owed MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile a fiduciary duty and that the fiduciary duty was
breached causing damage to MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile.
This Court has already conciuded that SARMC, as a former general partner in MRIA,
owed MRIA fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, and the duty to act
in good faith towards MRIA. You must only determine, therefore, whether SARMC breached
any of the fiduciary duties it owed to MRIA and, if so, the amount of damages flowing from
SARMC breach.
You must also determine whether SARMC owed MRI Center and/or MRI Mobile a
fiduciary duty and, if so, whether SARMC breached its fiduciary duty to MRI Center and/or
MRI Mobile and, if so, the amount of damages, if any, flowing from SARMC's breach.

I.C. § 53-3-404

MRIA'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 9

001876

Fiduciary Duties to MRI Center and MRI Mobile
INSTRUCTION NO.

MRI Center and MRI Mobile have asserted that Saint Alphonsus breached fiduciary
duties owed to them. You must first decide whether Saint Alphonsus owed any fiduciary duties
to MRI Center and MRI Mobile. A fiduciary relationship does not depend upon some technical
relation, but it exists in cases where there has been a special confidence imposed in another who,
in equity and good conscience, is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interest of
one the other. You must therefore decide whether MRI Center and MRI Mobile have met their
burden of proof to demonstrate:
( 1) that they placed special confidence in Saint Alphonsus, and
(2) that in equity and good conscience, Saint Alphonsus was bound to act and good faith
and due regard for their interests.
If you so find, you must determine whether Saint Alphonsus breached this duty to MRI Center
and MRI Mobile, as described in Instruction No.

Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 288, 240 P.2d 833, 840-41 (1952): "A fiduciary relationship
does not depend upon some technical relation, but it exists in cases where there has been a
special confidence imposed in another who, in equity and good conscience, is bound to act in
good faith and with due regard to the interest [of the other]."

MRIA'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 10
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Passage of Time Since Lawsuit was Filed
INSTRUCTION NO.

You will hear evidence that this lawsuit was first brought by MRIA in May 2005. For
various reasons that need not concern you, the case is being tried now. You should not be
concerned by this passage of time since the lawsuit was filed, or hold it against either party.

MRIA'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 11
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Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
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MRI Associates, LLP, MRl Limited Partnership, and MRI

Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this reply in support of their Motion to have
deemed admitted exhibits from first trial.
In the previous trial of this matte1:, Saint Alphonsus stipulated to the admission of many
exhibits. On the retrial of this matter, it has indicated its intent to challenge the admissibility of
many of the documents to which it previously stipulated. As Saint Alphonsus itself has argued,
and this court has agreed, Judge McLaugblin~s prior evidentiary rulings should not be disturbed
in the retrial of this matter, unless affected by the Supreme Court's opinion. Saint· Alphonsus is
now taking a contrary opinion.
Saint Alphonsus's main argument appears to be that Judge McLaughlin's acceptance of
the stipulation concerning these documents and admission of these documents into the record
was somehow not an "actual" decision of the Court. It argues that because Judge Mclaughlin
did not make any specific findings over objections made by Saint Alphonsus, that the admission
into evidence of these documents was not an evidentimy ruling. To the contrary, as noted in
MRIA's initial briefing, Judge McLaughlin admitted these documents on the basis ofthe
stipulation. It is unclear how Saint Alphonsus's affirmative stipulation is functionally any
different from the overruling of an objection. Had Saint Alphonsus objected at trial, been
overruled, and then failed to appeal this to the Supreme Court, of course Judge McLaughlin's
previous ruling would still stand, That Judge Mclaughlin's ruling on this evidence came by
virtue of the stipulation of the parties does not change the fact that it is a ruling on the evidence.
Saint Alphonsus's citation to cases allowing a party to object on remand to evidence which was
not objected to in the first trial is inapposite. Saint Alphonsus did not merely fail to make an
objection at the previous trial, but affinnatively stipulated to the admissibility of these exhibits.
,

I
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It caiUlot now claim that its own affirmative stipulation was an error it should be allowed to
"redo" on retrial.
Saint Alphonsus argues that the retrial of this case is so fundamentally different from the
previous trial so as to justify undoing its prior stipulation. First, it contends that because one
claim at the previous trial - wrongful dissociation- is no longer applicable, that this changes the
case. It is unclear how removing a claim affects Saint Alphonsus's prior stipulations. Saint
Alphonsus asserting that adding the limited partnerships changes the posture of the case, which
is patently absurd, as the previous case was tried "on their behalf' as if they were present in the
case. Saint Alphonsus also contends that a "new" damages theory justifies is withdrawal of its
stipulation has to all of the evidence, including evidence which has nothing to do with damages.
The only fundamental difference in this case on retrial is that the Supreme Court has taken
claims and evidence away from MRIA. On evidence that the Supreme Court's ruling did not
touch, Saint Alphonsus cannot run away from its own stipulation that this evidence is admissible.
Finally, Saint Alphonsus argues that the enforcement of the stipulation would "burden the
record," asserting that the limited number of documents ''mentioned" in the previous trial
somehow suggests that the documents "mentioned" during these proceedings will be similarly
limited. This is, ofcourse, rank speculation by Saint Alphonsus about MRIA's trial strategy on
retrial.
For the reasons stated above and in MRIA's initial briefing, the Court should grant
:MR.IA 's motion to deem admitted evidence untouched by the Supreme Court to which Saint

Alphonsus stipulated in the first trial.
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ORIGINAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this reply in support of their Motion in Limine to
Exclude Mention of Saint Alphonsus's Status as a Non-Profit Entity.
Saint Alphonsus asserts that its status as a non-profit hospital demonstrates its mission to
provide high quality health care. It contends that it will argue to the jury that, "as a non-profit
Catholic hospital, its motivation was not to maximize its profits but rather to serve patients."
(Saint Alphonsus Opposition, p. 3.) It wants to use this to argue that Saint Alphonsus was not
motivated by profits, unlike "for-profit" entities such as MRIA. (!d.) This simply proves
MRIA's point that such evidence is irrelevant and runs a significant danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of issues, and misleading the jury. I.R.E. 401, 403.
As noted in MRIA' s initial briefing, there is not any matter at issue in the case which will
be made more or less probable by presentation to the jury of this evidence. Rather, it is simply
an attempt to sway the jury's emotions and confuse them about the motivations of a "non-profit"
organizations. Significantly, the underlying premise that "non-profit" organizations are not
motivated by profits is simply untrue. Saint Alphonsus is a 501 (c)(3) organization, which makes
Saint Alphonsus exempt from some federal income taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 50L It does not mean
that Saint Alphonsus is motivated by a desire to serve, rather than profits. It simply means that
Saint Alphonsus does not have to pay taxes on its profits, and must use those profits in a certain
manner, because of its status as an organization operated "exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes." 26 U.S.C. § 50l(c)(3).
Saint Alphonsus has expressly admitted its intent to argue that it is a "non-profit"
organization to sway the emotions of a jury. It has also expressly admitted its intent to confuse
)

the jury about the ramifications of 50l(c)(3) status to suggest that it is not at all concerned about
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profits. As such, the Court should grant MRIA's Motion to exclude any mention of Saint
Alphonsus's status as a non-profit entity.
DATED this

4th

day of August, 2011.
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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Defendants/Counter-Claimants, MRI Associates, LLP; MRI Limited Partnership and
MRI Mobile Limited Partnership, may call the following witnesses at the trial in this matter:
1. James Prochaska, M.D.
2 David Giles, M.D.
3. Tom Henson, M.D.
4. Jack Havlina, M.D.
5. Sandra Bruce (Bennett)
6. Ken Fry
7. Julli Hopkins
8. Vicken Garabedian, M.D.
9. Leslie Kelly Hall
10. Ben Murray
11. Bruce Budge
12. Charles Wilhoite
13. Joe Messmer, M.D.
14. Cindy Schamp
15. Jack Floyd
16. Lani O'Malley
17. Holly Wallace
18. Patti (Hameck) Sulc
19. Mark Dalley
20. Robin Matzek (f.k.a. Robin Cioffi)
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21. Chris Anton
22. Carolyn Corbett
23. Bob Bell
24. JeffSeaboum, M.D.
25. Tim Hall, M.D.
26. Jeff Cliff
27. Sally Jeffcoat
28. Mark Lawrence
29. MarkAdams
30. Ed McEachern, MD
31. Mary River, MD
32. Jennifer Mann
33. Stephanie Westermeier
34. Manfred Steiner, via prior proceeding testimony
35. Paul Traughber, MD
36. Lisa Scales
37. Allen Hahn, via deposition testimony
38. Scott Berger
39. Any witness called by the Plaintiff/Counter-defendant in this matter.
40. Any witness necessary for rebuttal or impeachment purposes.
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DATED this 5th day of August, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Attorneys r MRI ssociates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership,
'RJ Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of August 2011, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintifJ!Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintifJ!Counterdefendant

D y,&Mail
ft1-Iand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery

D 9Yernight Delivery
_;?'Facsimile
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AUG 0 5 2011
Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No.
wwoodard@bwslawgroup. com

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
ByLARAAMES

6312)

DEPUTY

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

--1

DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' PROPOSED EXHIBIT
LIST

V.
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-

-
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0

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,

v.
SAINTALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit the attached list of exhibits which are anticipated
for MRIA's case in chief. In addition to the exhibits identified on the attached list, MRIA
reserves the right to utilize any exhibit, document or other thing identified by any party in this
case as an exhibit; any exhibit necessary for impeachment of any witness; any exhibit, document
or other thing identified or produced during the discovery in this case by any party or other
person or entity; and demonstrative and illustrative exhibits to otherwise explain or highlight any
other evidence or facts presented in this case.
MRIA reserves the right to add to, subtract from, or otherwise amend, supplement or
withdraw exhibits identified in this list.

DATED this 5th day of August, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

At orneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of August 2011, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintijjlCounterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintijjlCounterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
)6fland Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery

D Overnight Delivery
p.csimile
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IN THE DISTR1CT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTR1CT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
~

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Idaho nonprofit corporation,

DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S EXHIBIT LIST

-

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 0408219D

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,
Defendant.
Presiding Judge:

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Honorable Michael Wetherell

JackS.
Gjording
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G.
Vergonis

Trial Date:
PI f.

No.

September 6, 2011

De f. Date
No.
Offered
4000

4001

4002
4003

4004

4005

4006

Marked

Stipulation

Court Reporter:
Admitted
Authenticity

Foundation

Admitted

Description
SARMC
Planning/Finance
Charter and
Objectives; not dated
Vision PowerPoint
slide; not dated
Radiology Imaging
Center; not dated
SARG/MRlA JV
Proposals #6 & 7; not
dated
Issues Imaging Center
Joint Venture; not
dated
SARMC IT System
Support for IMI; not
dated
DR Investment List,
MRICI AP Ledger;
various dates

Defendant's
Attorney:

Thomas A.
Banducci
WadeL.
Woodard
BrentS.
Bastian
Courtroom Deputy:
Diane Oatman
Bates No.
Office of the CFO
SARMC08896;
Reilly Ex 41
Office of the CFO
SARMC08719;
Reilly Ex 29
014512; Giles Ex
18
000931; Giles Ex
17
001142-4; Giles Ex
16
IMIRP/000892;
Kelly Hall Ex 13
040220-8; Berger
Ex 9; Floyd Ex 23
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,
4007

4008

4009

4010

4011

4012

4013

4014

4015

4016

4017

4018

4019

Radiologist Schedules
Produced at
Deposition of Jeffrey
Seabourn (280 pages),
various dates
Radiologist/Hospital
Imaging Center Joint
Venture; not dated
Handwritten notes re:
DR Investment; not
dated
Handwritten notes and
charts re: analysis
given to Ken Fry on
negative movement of
patients from
MRI/SARMC to IMI;
not dated
Health Planning
Committee SARMC
Board of Trustees
Meeting Minutes;
March 22, 1984
Executive Committee
SARMC Board of
Trustees Meeting
Minutes; March 26,
1984
Executive Committee
SARMC; October 1,
1984
Executive Committee
SARMC Board of
Trustees; December
20, 1984
Letter to Chris Anton
from J. Roger Curran;
November 21, 1984
Letter to J. Roger
Curran from Sister
Patricia Vandenberg;
December 27, 1984
Health Planning
Committee SARMC
Board of Trustees
Meeting Minutes;
December 28, 1984
Board ofTrustees
SARMC Executive
Committee Report
Minutes; January 11,
1985
Letter to Jon Miller
and E.E. Gilbertson
from Sister Patricia
Vandenberg and James
E. Bruce; January 14,
1985

Seabourn Ex. No.
21

GSR/0091- 0093,
Seabourn Ex. No.
10
0898?; Cioffi Ex 9

034104-7,034109,
034112

Office of the
President
SARMC06928-39;
Vandenberg Ex 2
Office of the CFO
SARMC02719-20;
Vandenberg Ex 3

Givens Pursley
SARMCOO 169-72;
Vandenberg Ex 5
Office of the
President
SARMC08146-55;
Vandenberg Ex 4
Giles Ex 5

Office of the
President
SARMC09462;
Vandenberg Ex 6
Givens Pursley
SARMC00146-8;
Vanden berg Ex 7

Givens Pursley
SARMC00139-43;
Vandenberg Ex 8

Office of the
President
SARMC09403-4;
Vandenberg Ex 9

001896

;

4020

4021

4022
4023

4024

4025

4026

4027

4028

4029

4030

4031

4032

4033

-

Letter to Sister Patricia
Vandenberg from Leo
Edward Miller; March
5, 1985
MRI, Ltd. Meeting
Minutes; March 27,
1985
1122 Application;
AprilS, 1985
Articles of Partnership
ofMRIA; April26,
1985
Limited Partnership
Agreement of MRl
Limited Partnership;
August 2, 1985
SARMC and Saint
Alphonsus Building
Company, Inc. Ground
Lease; September 19,
1985
First Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
ofMRI Associates;
May25, 1988
Agreement for
Provision of Medical
Services; August 1,
1988
Limited Partnership
Agreement ofMRI
Mobile Limited
Partnership; October
17, 1988
Second Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
of MRl Associates;
May 16, 1991
MRICI Minutes; April
27, 1992

Letter to DMR from
SADC, MedNow, and
West Valley Medical
Center; August 24,
1992
Third Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
ofMRI Associates;
January 1, 1995
SARMC Medical
Services Agreement Radiology; May 1,
1997

039488-90;
Vandenberg Ex 10

011244-6; Giles Ex
9
004139-42
019991-20013;
Bruce Ex 1; Fisher
Ex5
009940-52; Bruce
Ex2

028914-20

01402-8

Givens Pursley
SARMC01917-39;
Anton Ex 2
026877-91

029706-11

Office of the
President
SARMC05851-3;
Anton Ex 1
011486

024996-25008

Office of the CFO
SARMC025972614; Bruce Ex 6;
Seaboum Ex4
(same as Giles
00002- 19; I.
Davey Ex. No. 3,
N. Davey Ex 2,
Traughber Ex 3)'
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4034

IMI Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; June 16,
1997
MRICI Minutes;
October 21, 1997
Letter to SARG from
Sandra Bruce, Fax
from Mike Czech to
Sandra Bruce; October
31, 1997
Letter to MRIA
Boardmembers from
Mike Czech;
November 10, 1997
IMI Group Meeting
Minutes; November
12, 1997
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from IMI; November
13, 1997
Letter to Paul
Traughber, William
Murray, Jeffrey
Seaboum, and Joseph
Gobel from Sandra
Bruce; November 13,
1997
MRICI Minutes;
December 17; 1997
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Paul Traughber;
January 5, 1998

4035
4036

4037

4038

4039

4040

4041
4042

4043

4044

4045

4046

4047

4048

'

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; January 14,
1998
Letter to MRlA
Boardmembers from
Mike Czech; February
13, 1998
MRICI Minutes;
February 18, 1998
Capital Expenditure
Third CT Scanner
System Executive
Summary, SARMC
Planning/Finance
Committee; April 1,
1998
GSR Executive
Committee Minutes;
May 11, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; May 13,
1998

IMIRP/004438-40

000413-20; Bruce
Ex 32
Office of the
President
SARMC10170-2;
Bruce Ex 33
000388; Bruce Ex
34

IMIRP/004401-3

Office of the CFO
SARMC06142-3;
Bruce Ex 36
Office of President
SARMC10169;
Bruce Ex 37

021306-8; Bruce
Ex38
Office of the CFO
SARMC06066;
Bruce Ex 39 (same
as Office of the
President
SARMC10168,;
Traughber Ex 4)
GSREX/0265-8;
Garabedian Ex 6
000509; Gobel Ex
4

021269-71; Bruce
40
Office of the CFO
SARMC08627-43;
Reilly Ex 42

GSREX/0036-9;
Krogstad Ex 2
GSR/0593-600;
Newton Depo Ex.
No. 2,Traughber Ex
5

001898

4049

SARMC Leadership
hierarchy charts; June
1, 1998 and various

4050

Fourth Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
ofMRI Associates;
July 15, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; July 27, 1998

4051

4052
4053

4054

4055

4056

4057

4058

4059

4060

4061

4062
4063

4064

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; July 30, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; August 10,
1998
MRICI andMRIM
Meeting Minutes;
August 19, 1998
Handwritten notes and
news clipping; August
20, 1998
MRl Center ofldaho
Newsletter; September
1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; September 9,
1998
Memo to Cindy
Schamp from Sandy
Cruise; September 16,
1998
Email to Cindy
Schamp from Sandra
Bruce re: RadiologyReply; September 21,
1998
Holy Cross Health
System Corporation
Capital Project
Summary, SARMC
Budget Year Ended
May 31, 2000;
September 24, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; October 14,
1998
MRICI Minutes;
October 22, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; October 28,
1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; November 3,
1998

Office of the
President
SARMC11855,
10721, 10719,
10718, 10717,
10715; Kelly Hall
Ex2
016029-33; Bruce
Ex 15

GSRJ0612- 614;
Newton Ex 3,
Traughber Ex 6
GSRJ0616-8;
Newton Ex 4
GSRJ0633-5

021068-73; Bruce
Ex3
Office of the
President
SARMCO 10620-1;
Bruce Ex4
021042-7

GSRJ0638-44;
Knochel Ex 5,
Traughber Depo
Ex. No.7
Office of the CFO
SARMC02657;
HensonEx3
Office of the CFO
SARMC02649;
Schamp Ex 1

Office of the CFO
SARMC08616-26;
Reilly Ex 45

GSRJ0647-53;
Knochel Ex6
020943-5; Bruce
Ex5
GSRJ0656-7

GSRJ0663-4;
Knochel Ex 7,
Traughber Depo
Ex. No. 14
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4065

4066

4067

4068

4069

4070

4071

4072

4073

4074

4075

4076

4077

4078

4079

4080
\

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, November 9,
1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, attached draft
outline of letter;
November 11, 1998
Letter to Cindy
Schamp from David
Giles re: November
13, 1998 meeting; not
dated (fax date May 6,
1999)
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; December 9,
1998
MRlCI Financial
Statement 1998
Budget vs. Actual;
December 1998
Radiology Department
Possible Effect of
Losing Volume to
Freestanding Center
based on FY 98Financials; not dated
Freestanding Imaging
Center List of Key
Assumptions to
Anticipate Profit; not
dated, prob. early 1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; January 13,
1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, attached DR
Systems Presentation
ofPACS System;
February 3, 1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; February 10,
1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
March 3, 1999
MR1 Executive
Meeting Minutes;
March 17, 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
March 31, 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
April 7, 1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; April 14,
1999
MR1 Executive
Meeting Minutes;
April21, 1999

GSR/0665-6

GSR/0667-72

GSRRPOO 1865-7;
Traughber Ex 15

GSR/0673-81

031792

Office of the CFO
SARMC02650;Fry
Ex2

Office of the CFO
SARMC02018-32;
Fry Ex 3

GSR/0682-6

GSR/0687 -99

GSR/0700-2;
Newton Ex 5
IMIRP/004757-62;
Noyes Ex 4
001064; Henson Ex
4
IMIRP/004775-86

IMIRP/004787804; Noyes Ex 8
GSR/0725-9

001093-4; CliffEx
11
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4081

4082

4083

4084

4085

4086

4087

4088

4089

4090

4091

4092

4093

4094

Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes; May
5, 1999
SARMC Holy Cross
Health System
Corporation
Preliminary Budgeted
Consolidated Financial
Statements and
Strategic and Routine
Capital Expenditure
Summary for Year
Ended May 31, 1999
Memo to Giles,
Knochel, Traughber,
Seaboum, from Sarah
Bratley; June 4, 1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, attached
Term Sheet; June 10,
1999
MRI Executive
Meeting Minutes; June
16, 1999
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; July 26, 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes; July
7, 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes; July
22, 1999
Articles of
Organization Limited
Liability Company;
July 23, 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes; July
27, 1999
IMI Center Meeting
Notes; July 28, 1999
US Bank Loan:
Facility Page: Imaging
Center Radiologists
and Uniform Credit
Analysis Borrower
Profile; July 28, 1999
Draft PWC Fair
Market Value of a 20
Percent Partnership
Interest in DMR's 45
Percent Interest in
MRIA; July 31, 1999
USB Business Loan
Transmittal; August 5,
1999

IMIRP/004927-8

Offi"ce of the CFO
SARMC08685-8;
Reilly Ex 44

GSRRP0018511856; Traughber
Ex 17
GSR/0730-7

025322-4; CliffEx
12
GSRRP/000174175; I. Davey Ex 2
IMIRP/004956-8;
Noyes Ex 9
IMIRP/004959-61

IMI/0336-7; Cliff
Ex 13

IMIRP/000784786; I. Davey Ex.
11
IMIRP/004664-70;
Noyes Ex 11
Denning Ex 1

023949-99; Fisher
Ex 11

USB00979"96, 5053; Noyes Ex 3,
Traughber Ex. 11,
N. Davey Ex. I 0

001901

4095

Fax to Carl Harder
from Jeff Cliff; August
10, 1999

4096

List of Referring
Physicians; August 12,
1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
August 18, 1999
SARMC Board of
Trustees Board
Meeting; August 18,
1999

4097

4098

4099

4100

4101

4102

4103

4104

4105

4106

4107

4108

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; August 23,
1999
Notes re: history and
structure ofMRICI
and MRI Mobile and
how they relate to
SARMC; August 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
August 24, 1999

Letter to Ridgley
Denning from David
Giles; August 24, 1999
IMI Financial
Statement Budget vs.
Actual Income - MRI;
September 1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; September 8,
1999

MRICI and MRIM
Minutes; September
15, 1999
IMI Financial
Statement- MRI
Budget vs. Actual
Income/(Loss);
October 1999
Letter to Vicken
Garabedian from IMI;
October 4, 1999
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October 4,
1999

033755-6; Knochel
Ex 9, Traughber
Ex. 10, Newton Ex.
7
IMIRP/004458501; Scales Ex 4
IMIRP/000804-6

Office of the
President
SARMC07067-76;
Reilly Ex 12;
Fisher Ex 4
GSRRP/000184-90
(same as
GSR/0056;
Traughber Ex 8)
032259-61; Bruce
Ex 16

IMIRP/000811-2;
Gobel Ex 5, Scales
Ex 8 (same as
IMI/0699;
Traughber Ex. 13)
GSRRPOO 1595-8;
Denning Ex 2
GSRRP/000149

GSRRP/000122-6;
Gobel Ex 6, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 12, N. Davey
Depo Ex. No. 7,
Newton Depo Ex.
No.6
001260-1;
Garabedian Ex 13
GSRRP/000160

GSRRP/000218-9;
Hall Ex 7, I. Davey
Depo. Ex. No. 13,
GSRRP/000212 R27; Noyes Ex 21,,
I. Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 28

001902

4109

4110

4lll

4112

4113
4114

4115

4116

Board of Directors
Annual Meeting
Minutes; October 11,
1999
Letter to MRIA
Boardmembers from
Mike Czech; October
16, 1999
MRICI Meeting
Minutes and
attachment; October
20, 1999
Letter to Cindy
Schamp from Allen
Hahn/PWC re:
qualifications; October
25, 1999
IMI Balance Sheets As
of October 31, 1999
IMI Financial
Statement- MRl
Budget vs. Actual
Income/(Loss );
November 1999
Draft ofiMI Operating
Agreement; November
3, 1999
Joint Venture Imaging
Center SARG and
SARMC; November
11,1999

4117

IMI: A JV Partnership
between SARG and
SARMC PowerPoint
Presentation;
November 11, 1999

4118

Restructuring of
MRIA General
Partnership
Confidential Draft for
Discussion; November
29, 1999
MRICI Financial
Statement Budget vs.
Actual; December
1999
IMI Financial
Statement- MRl
Budget vs. Actual
lncome/(Loss );
December 1999
IMI Financial
Statement - MRl
Budget vs. Actual
lncome/(Loss);
December 1999
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Thorhas Henson;
December 6, 1999

4119

4120

4121

4122

Office of the
President
SARMC12746-9;
Fugate Ex 2
001258;
Garabedian Ex 14

023416-8, 001305

Office of the CFO
SARMCO 1822-36

GSRRP/00015866; Cliff Ex 22
IMIRP/000104

GSR/0380-431;
Bruce Ex 10,
Schamp Ex 3
Office of the
President
SARMC06847-81;
CliffEx 23; Fisher
Ex6
Office of the
President
SARMC06849-66;
Bruce Ex 20,
Schamp Ex2;
Fisher Ex 7
Office of the CFO
SARMC06358-67;
Bruce Ex 11,
Schamp Ex 4

012278

IMIRP/000108

GSRRP/000283

032441; Henson Ex
6

001903

4123

Handwritten Notes re:
12/16/99 Meeting;
December 16, 1999

4124

Handwritten Notes by
Jim Prochaska re:
December 12, 1999
meeting
Draft of IMI Operating
J\greement; December
17, 1999
Email to Jim
Prochaska and Roger
Curran from David
Giles; December 18,
1999
IMI Referrals by
Procedures
PowerPoint by D.
Benion; December 21,
1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; December
22, 1999

4125

4126

4127

4128

4129

4130

4131

4132

4133

4134

4135

4136
4137

IMI Financial
Statements; December
31, 1999
SARMCBoard
Committee Structure
for 2000
SARMC IDN FY 0002 Strategic Plan
Presentation; not dated
Capital Budget
J\nalysis - FY 2000,
not dated
Consolidated
Operations Capital
Budget J\nalysis - FY
2DOO, not dated
Capital Plan FYOOFY02; not dated
Consolidated
Operations Capital
Budget J\nalysis, not
dated
IMI MRI 2000 Income
Budget
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from James Prochaska;
January 4, 2000

Office of the
President
SARMC09913-5;
Bruce Ex 6
001366-7;
Prochaska Ex 21

IMI/0528-81; Cliff
Ex7
001364; Giles Ex
19

IMIRP/004805-10

GSRRP/000167-9;
Cliff Ex 6, I. Davey
Depo. Ex. No. 16,
N. Davey Depo Ex.
No.l3
IMIRP/003204-13

Office of the
President
SARMC12798;
Fisher Ex 2
Office of the CFO
SARMC08700-1;
Reilly Ex 46
Office of the CFO
SARMC08695;
Reilly Ex 25
Office of the CFO
SARMC08699;
Reilly Ex 26
Office of the CFO
SARMC08701;
ReillyEx27
Office of the CFO
SARMC08704;
Reilly Ex 28
GSRRP/000284
Office of the CFO
SARMC00640-1;
Bruce Ex28,
Schamp Ex 7

001904

4138

4139

4140

4141

4142
4143

4144

4145

4146

4147

4148

4149

4150

Email to Sarach
Office of the CFO
SARMC08047-62;
Bratley from Allen
Mahn're:Engagemeflt
'Fry Ex 6, Schamp
Ex 6; Fisher Ex 14
Documents, PWC
Valuation of 50
Percent Interest in IMI
Draft;January5,2000
Email to James
038786
Prochaksa, Roger
Curran, and David
Giles from Carl
Harder; January 6,
2000
032442-4; Bruce
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Carl Harder;
Ex 29. Schamp Ex
January 6, 2000
8
GSR Group Meeting
GSRRP/000273-7;
Minutes; January 12,
Scales Ex 7
2000
MRICI Minutes;
001492-3; Bruce 43
January 19, 2000
GSR Executive
GSRRP/000424Committee Minutes;
33; Hall Ex 8
January 24, 2000
Meeting with Jeff Cliff Office of the CFO
Purchase/Restructuring SARMC01239; Fry
Options for MRIA;
Ex 19
January 26, 2000
GSR Group Meeting
GSRRP/000288Minute; January 26,
291; I. Davey Ex
2000
15
GSR Executive
GSRRP/000434;
CliffEx 8
Committee Meeting
Minutes; January 31,
2000
Email to Sarah Bratley Office of the CFO
from Allen Hahn re;
SARMC08029-39;
SARMC Draft
Schamp Ex 9 (same
Presentation,
as Office of the
Presentation: An
CFO
Introduction to MRI
SARMC01265-76)
Associates Legal
Ownership of the
Partnerships; Janurary
31,2000
Outline for Discussion
Office of the CFO
Presentation by Cindy
SARMCO 1240-2,
Schamp
635-9, 964-73; Fry
Purchase/Restructuring Ex 11
Options for MRIA;
February 1, 2000
SARMC Senior
· Office of the
Management Team
President
Agenda and
SARMC11927-32;
PowerPoint slides;
Reilly Ex 7
February 1, 2000
An Introduction to
Office of the
MRIALegal
President
SARMC09891-8;
, Ownership of the
·Partnerships; February Bruce Ex 13
11,2000

001905

4151

4152

4153

4154
4155
4156
4157

4158

4159

4160

4161

4162

4163

4164

SARMC
Planning/Finance
Committee Minutes;
March 10, 2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; March 13,
2000
Handwritten notes
MRl Restructuring
Meeting; March 15,
2000
SARMC
Planning/Finance
Committee Minutes;
March 16, 2000

4165

IMI: A Joint Venture
Partnership between
SARG and SARMC;
March 16, 2000

4166

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; March 20,
2000
Handwritten letter to
Carl Harder from
Roger Curran; March
22,2000

4167
\

Email to Janelle Reilly
from Sarah Bratley;
February 7, 2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; February 9,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 14,
2000
Handwritten notes;
February 14, 2000
MRlCI Minutes;
February 16, 2000
MRlM Minutes;
February 16, 2000
SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Minutes; February 22,
2000
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Thomas Henson;
February 23, 2000
PACS/DR Expenses -March 2000 to July
2001
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; March 8,
2000

Office of the CFO
SARMC07994;
ReillyEx 14
GSRRP/000292 R4 R; Gobel Ex 7
GSRRP/000435

014066-7
001472-3; Bruce
Ex44
001474-6; CliffEx
9
Office of the
President
SARMC11866-8;
Reilly Ex 15
032432; Henson Ex
8
Office of the CIO
SARMC01910,
L.K. Hall Ex 28
GSRRP/000295-7
R; CliffEx 10,, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No.l4
Office of the
President
SARMC06835-40;
FryEx22
GSRRP/000441

Office of the CFO
SARMC01202; Fry
Ex20
Office of the
President
SARMC12852-5;
Fisher Ex 9, Fry Ex
27
Office of the
President
SARMC12887-92;
Reilly Ex 18;
Fisher Ex 8
GSRRP/000455-6

Office of the CFO
SARMC06768-9;
Fry Ex 18

001906

4168

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; April 4, 2000
SARMC Board of
Trustees Minutes;
April 11, 2000

4169

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; April 17,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; May 10,
2000

4170

4171

4172

4173

4174

4175
4176

4177

4178

4179
4180

4181

4182

4183

4184

j

Secretary of State
Annual Report form
for IMI; May 23, 2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; May 30,
2000
Email to Roger Curran
from Henson; June 5,
2000
Notes "Next IMI
Meet"; June 6, 2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; June 12,
2000
Draft of IMI Operating
Agreement; June 28,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; June 29,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; July 12, 2000
Letter to Roger Curran
from Jeff Cliff; July
17,2000
US Bank Commercial
Loan Credit DisplayExecutive Summary,
Highlights of Key
Findings; July 20,
2000
Draft of IMI Operating
Agreement; August 4,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; August 8,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; August 21,
2000

GSRRP/000298301; Hall Ex 11
Office of the
President
SARMC12800,
12804-5; Reilly Ex
17; Fisher Ex 10
GSRRP/000458 R9

GSRRP/000302 R307; Hall Ex 10, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 19
Knochel Ex 13

GSRRP/000378-9;
Hall Ex 13

031411; Henson Ex
10
IMIRP/00473345R; Scales Ex 6
GSRRP/000380-2

IMI/00225-69;
Cliff Ex 34
GSRRP/000383-6;
Hall Ex 15

GSRRP/000314-6;
Hall Ex 18
022512-3; Bruce
Ex47
USB00821-40

IMI/00090-139;
Hall Ex 23,
Schamp Ex 17
GSRRP/000336340; I. Davey Ex.
18
GSR/0103-5; Bruce
Ex 49 (same as
GSRRP/000387000389, Seabourn
Depo Ex. 7, I.
Davey Ex. 17)

001907

4185

4186

4187

4188

4189

4190

4191

Memo to Mike Czech
from Bob Bell; August
25,2000
.GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; August 30,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; August 31,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September 6,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, September 8,
1999
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September 8,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Agenda and Minutes;
September 13, 2000

4192

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September
19,2000

4193

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes with
handwritten notes;
September 19, 2000
GSR Group Meeting
Agenda; October 11,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; October 11,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October 16,
2000
Release and
Reaffirmation
Agreement; October
18,2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; November
15,2000

4194

4195

4196

4197

4198

014891-5

GSR/0080-1; Hall
Ex 16

GSRRP/000390 R4

GSRRP /00046971; Hall Ex 17

GSR/0052;
Traughber Ex. 12
GSRRP/000395 R9 (same as
GSR/0 111-4;
Schamp Ex 18)
GSRRP/000345350; Gobel Ex 9.,
I. Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 8, N. Davey
Depo Ex. No. 5
GSR/0 115-6; Bruce
Ex 52, Seabourn
Depo Ex. No. 8, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 4, N. Davey
Depo Ex. No. 3,
Newton Depo Ex.
No.9
GSRRP/000400-3;
Lindauer Ex 4,
Schamp Ex 10

GSRRP/000367377; I. Davey Ex. 5
GSRRP/000368-77

GSR/0 117 -8; Bruce
Ex 54, Newton
Depo Ex. No. 10
GILESE00283-287

GSRRP/00031827; Gobel Ex 10

001908

4199

GSR Executive
Committee Minutes;
November 19, 2000

4200

MRICI Financial
Statement Budget vs.
Actual; December
2000
Letter to Vicken
Garabedian from
Committee on MR1
Accreditation;
December 18, 2000
IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2000
SARMC Board &
Committee Structure
2001

4201

4202

4203

FY 0 1 Capital Budget
Analysis; not dated
FY 0 1 Capital
Strategic Requests, not
dated
FY 01 Capital Budget,
not dated

4204
4205

4206

GSR Executive
Committee. Meeting
Minutes; January 8,
2001
GSR Operations
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 8,
2001
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 12,
2001
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 13,
2001

4207

4208

4209

4210

4211

4212

4213

'

Radiology Strategy
Meeting Record;
February 13, 2001
MRICIIMRIM
Strategic Planning
Meeting Notes;
February 16, 2001
GSR Marketing
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 22,
2001

GSRRP/000413415; Newton Ex
11, Schamp Ex 5
(same as
GSR/0119-121;
Bruce Ex 55,
Seaboum Depo Ex.
No. 9)
012278

IMIRP/003982-3;
Garabedian Ex 4

IMIRP/003215-24

Office of the
President
SARMC12961-3;
Fisher Ex 3
Office of the CFO
SARMC08734
Office of the CFO
SARMC08725;
Reilly Ex 31
Office of the CFO
SARMC08724;
Reilly Ex 30
GSRRP/000688-9;
I. Davey Ex 23 and
N. Davey Ex 17
GSRRP/000668-9;
Noyes Ex 16

GSRRP/000690-3
(same as
GSR/0130; Schamp
Ex 13)
GSRRP/000722-4;
I. Davey Ex. 20, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No. 15, Schamp Ex
12, Reilly Ex 20
Office of the CFO
SARMCO 1945-6;
Kelly Hall Ex 12
012456-60; Bruce
Ex 56

GSRRP/00645;
Noyes Ex 17

001909

4214

4215

4216

4217

4218

4219

4220

4221

4222

4223

4224

4225

4226

4227

4228

GSR Group Meeting
Agenda; March 14,
2001
MR1 Mobile Board
Meeting Minutes;
March 21, 2001
GSRIIMI
Operations/Finance &
Fees Committee
Minutes; March 23,
2001
Fax to Patty Harn,eck
from Jeff Cliff; April
4,2001
Memo to DMR from
Thomas Henson; April
5,2001
IMI Finance & Fees
Committee Meeting
Minutes; April 18,
2001
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; May 9, 2001

MR1 Mobile Board
Meeting Minutes; May
16,2001
Email to Cindy
Schamp and Sandra
Bruce from Ken Fry
re: IMI
agreement/Radiology
Contract/MRl; May
30,2001
Letter to Michael
Hammond from Pat
Miller re: Retention
Letter; June 14, 2001
Email to James
Prochaska from Roger
Curran and
attachment; June 26,
2001
Shattuck Hammond
Engagement Letter;
June 26, 2001
Operating Agreement
ofiMI; July 1, 2001
Operating Agreement
of Intermountain
Medical Imaging,
LLC, July I, 2001
Operating Agreement
of Intermountain
Medical Imaging,
LLC; July 1, 2001

GSRRP/000541

002014-7; Bruce
Ex 57
GSRRP/000506;
L.K. Hall Ex 19

Office of the CIO
SARMC00337-40;
Kelly Hall Ex 6
033023-5; Henson
Ex 9 and Messmer
Ex3
GSRRP/00050810; Schamp Ex 11;
Fisher Ex 12
GSRRP/00056873; Kelly Hall Ex
21, I. Davey Depo.
Ex. No. 30
002092-6; Bruce
Ex 58, Schamp Ex
15
Office of the CFO
SARMC01886;
Bruce Ex 18

Office of the CFO
SARMC08171-2;
Chamberlain Ex 17
036811-4, 036802

Office of the CFO
SARMC06602-10;
Schamp Ex20
Office of the CFO
SARMC021632238; Bruce Ex 8
IMI/0007 - 00089;
L.K. Hall Ex. No.
3, Schamp Ex 16
Corporate
Development
SARMC00379436; Traughber Ex.
No. 16

001910

4229

4230
4231

4232

4233

4234

4235

4236

4237

4238

4239

4240

Professional Services
Agreement for
Radiology Services
between SARMC and
GSR/SARG; July 1,
2001
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; July 11, 2001
IMI Management
Committee Minutes;
August 14, 2001

MRICI Board Meeting
Minutes; August 15,
2001
Letter to Ken Fry from
Jack Floyd following
meeting of August 15,
2001
Memorandum to Grant
Chamberlain and
Michael Hammond
from Michael Finnerty
and Bill Appleyard re:
St. Alphonsus and
MRIA Overview;
August 30, 2001
Radiology Group
Meeting Minutes;
September 12, 2001
GSR Fees & Finance
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September
13, 2001
Finnerty Interview
Notes- Meetings with
MRIA Stakeholders;
September 18-20,
2001
SARMC IT System
Support for IMI
Meeting Minutes;
September 24, 2001
Memorandum to Grant
Chamberlain and
Michael Hammond
from Mike Finnerty
and Bill Appleyard;
September 25, 2001
IMI Management
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September
26,2001

GSR/0168- 0216,
Seabourn Ex. No.
5, Schamp Ex 19

GSRRP/000583 90; N. Davey Ex 9
IMIRP/000886-9;
Fry Ex 12,
Seabourn Depo Ex.
No. 17, L.K. Hall
Depo Ex. No. 5, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No. 12, I. Davey
Depo. Ex. No. 14
002145-8 (same as
019350- 019353;
L.K. Hall Ex 24)
Office of the CFO
SARMCOO 182-6;
Fry Ex 32, L.K.
Hall Depo Ex. No.
23
SH1886-1894;
Schamp Ex 14
(same as SH077686; Newton Ex 12,
Traughber Ex 9)

GSRRP/000602611; I. Davey Ex
27
GSRRP/000522-3

SH0089-90,
Schamp Ex22

IMIRP/000890-7;
Kelly Hall Ex 18

SH 0763 - 0775; N.
Davey Ex 4, I.
Davey Ex 7,
Schamp Ex21

IMIRP/000898000922; Seaboum
Ex 18, L.K. Hall Ex
14, N. Davey Ex 19

001911

4241

IMI IT Reports;
various dates
beginning October 1,
2001

4242

IMI Fees & Finance
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October 5,
2001
IMI Management
Meeting Minutes;
October 31, 2001

4243

4244

St. Alphonsus'
Request for Financing
Proposal MRI Limited
Partnership; November
2001

4245

IMI Operations
Committee Meeting
Minutes; November 5,
2001

4246

Valuation Analysis of
MRIA, GP and
Affiliates for SARMC
by Shattuck Hammond
Partners; November 6,
2001
Shattuck Hammond
Partners Presentation
of Strategic Options of
MRIA Ownership
Interest for SARMC;
November 6, 2001
IMI Marketing
Committee Meeting
Minutes; November
28,2001

4247

4248

4249

MRICI Financial
Statement Budge vs.
Actual; December
2001

Office of the CIO
SARMC01865-74,
01861-3, 01667-8,
IMIRP/001030,
IMIRP/001040-1,
IMIRP/001051-2,
IMIRP/001068-91,
IMIRP/001110-2,
IMIRP/001122,
IMIRP/001134,
IMIRP/001144;
Kelly Hall Ex 8 and
Sulc (Hameck) Ex
5
GSRRP/000524525; I. Davey Ex 9

IMIRP/000923-4;
Seaboum Depo Ex.
No. 19, L.K. Hall
Depo Ex. No. 27
Office of the CFO
SARMC006591-5;
Bruce Ex 61 (same
as Office of the
CFO
SARMC07681-5;
Fisher Ex 15)
GSRRP/000681-3;
Scales Ex 5, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
10 (same as
GSR/0128;
Seaboum. Ex 11)
SH2436-86

Office of the CFO
SARMC06442-80;
Fry Ex 36 (same as
SH0224-270
Schamp Ex 23);
Fisher Ex 13
GSRRP/000661-4;
Kelly Hall Ex 20,
L.K. Hall Depo Ex.
No. 20, I. Davey
Depo. Ex. No. 25,
N. Davey Depo Ex.
No. 18
031021

001912

4250

4251

4252

4253

4254

4255

4256

4257

4258

4259

4260

4261

4262

Email to Cindy
Schamp and Ken Fry
from Grant
Chamberlain re:
Financing Proposals;
December I 0, 200 I
Memorandum to Ken
Fry and Cindy Schamp
from Grant
Chamberlain, Mike
Finnerty and Bill
Appleyard re: Debt
and Distribution
Analyses; December
12, 2001
Email to Cindy
Schmap and Ken Fry
from Bill Appleyard
re: SARMC debt and
distribution analysis;
December 13, 2001
IMIISARMC IT
Meeting Minutes;
December 18, 200 I

IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2001
2002 vs. 2001
Comparison Center
Income; not dated
FY 02 Capital
Analysis Budget
(tentative) vs. Actual;
not dated
FY 02 Capital
Analysis Budget vs.
Actual; not dated
FY 02 Capital
Analysis Budget vs.
Actual; not dated
Local Pool Capital FY
02; not dated
Handwritten notes re:
MRI Restructure;
January 2002
IMI Marketing
Committee Report;
January 2002,
PACS Meeting
Minutes; January 4,
2002

Office of the CFO
SARMC07665; Fry
Ex38

SH1178-9; Finnerty
Ex8

Office of the CFO
SARMC06596-8;
Fry Ex 41

GSRRP/00686-7;
Kelly Hall Ex 22, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 29, N. Davey
Depo Ex. No. 20,
Sulc (Hameck)
DepoEx. 4,
Seabourn Depo Ex.
No. 20
IMIRP/003225-34

Office of the CFO
SARMC00177-8;
Fry Ex 15
Office of the CFO
SARMC08838;
Reilly Ex 33
Office ofthe CFO
SARMC08867;
Reilly Ex 35
Office of the CFO
SARMC08878;
Reilly Ex 36
Office of the CFO
SARMC08924;
Reilly Ex 38
Office of the CFO
SARMC07696; Fry
Ex39
IMIRP/000973; I.
Davey Ex. 26
Office of the CIO
SARMCOI841-4;
Kelly Hall Ex 15

001913

4263

4264

4265

4266

4267

4268

4269

4270

4271

4272

4273

Email to Grant
Chamberlain and
William Appleyard
from Michael Finnerty
re: Distributions;
January 14, 2002
Memo to Leslie Kelly
Hall from Patti
Harneck re: DR
Systems Status Report;
January 23, 2002
Email to Cindy
Schamp from Ken Fry
re: MRIA; January 29,
2002
Memo to Leslie Kelly
Hall from Patti
Harneck re:
Comparison of options
IMI West DR
Acquisition Server;
January 31, 2002
IMI Management
Committee Meeting
Minutes; January 31;
2002
Fax to Gwen Moore
(Trinity Health) from
Tiffany Albanese
(Administrative
Assistant, Finance) re:
Shattuck Hammond
Memo; February 6,
2002
Memorandum to Ken
Fry from Grant
Chamberlain re: Work
Plan/Next Steps;
February 12, 2002
Email To Grant
Chamberlain from
Michael Finnerty re:
St. Alphonsus;
February 13, 2002
Email to Ken Fry and
Cindy Schamp from
Grant Chamberlain re:
Work Plan Timeline;
Februaryl5, 2002
St. Alphonsus- MRIA
Restructure Proposal
Disc1,1ssion Outline
w/Dr. Curran; April 9,
2002
GSR Fees & Finance
Committee Meeting
Minutes; April12,
2002

SH1795-7; Finnerty
Ex 10

Office of the CIO
SARMC01847-9;
Kelly Hall9

SH1804;
Chamberlain Ex 9

GSRRP /00082830; Sulc(Harneck)
Ex6

IMIRP/000976981; I. Davey Ex.
24
Office of the CFO
SARMC06571-3;
Fry Ex 42

SH0001-2, 134-6;
Chamberlain Ex 10

SH1805-8; Finnerty
Ex 14

Office of the CFO
SARMC07553;Fry
Ex43

SH1200-1;
Chamberlain Ex 12

GSRRP/000730-3

001914

4274

4275

4276

4277

4278

4279

4280

4281

4282

4283

4284

4285

4286.

4287
I

Email to Grant
Chamberlain from
Roger Curran re:
Update; Apri129, 2002
IMI Management
Committee Meeting
Agenda;May30,2002
Fifth Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
ofMRI Associates;
August
2002
Letter to MRI CI
Scheduling
Department,
Radiology Scheduling
Department from
Radiologists/Tim Hall;
August 7, 2002
Email to Dave Giles,
Roger Curran and Jack
Floyd from Mark
Lawrence re: Gem
Radiology; August 19,
2002
Email to Ken Fry from
Mark Lawrence re:
Weekend Issues;
August 26, 2002
Radiology-MRI
Meeting Record;
August 30, 2002
MRI Center of Idaho
Board Meeting
Minutes; September
17,2002
Email to Carolyn
Corbett from Terry
Krogstad Re:
Radiology/MRI
Meeting; September
24,2002
MRI Center ofldaho
Exam Report, Dr.
Garabedian;
September 25, 2002
Email to Jack Floyd
from Debra Scott re:
Personal Service;
September 27, 2002
Handwritten Notes re:
Ben Murray 10/18/02;
October 18, 2002
Email to Ken Fry from
Richard Presnell re:
MRI Distributions;
October 22, 2002
Email to Ken Fry from
Jack Floyd re: New
Pad Site Approval;
October 22, 2002

SH1809;
Chamberlain Ex 13

IMIRP/001004,
IMIRP/001015; Fry
Ex26
025015-21

016331

000061

Office of the CFO
SARMC07362; Fry
Ex28
Office of the CFO
SARMC07228-9;
Krogstad Ex 5
014111-4;
Garabedian Ex 8

Patient Care
Services
SARMC00565;
Corbett Ex 3

163311-2

033607;
Garabedian Ex 19

033597; Murray Ex
8
SH1443-l449;
Chamberlain Ex 14

Office of the .CFO
SARMC06776;Fry
Ex29

001915

4288

4289

4290

429I

4292

4293

4294

4295

4296

4297

4298

4299

4300

4301

4302

4303

Email to Ken Fry and
Stephanie Westermeir
from Patrick Miller re:
Partnership Duties MRI; October 25,
2002
DR Usage Percentage
by Location;
November I, 2002
IMI Financial
Statements December
3I,2002
MRICI Income
Statement; December
31,2002
November MRl Board
Topics for Discussion
and Follow Up;
November I, 2002
FY 03 Capital Budget
Local Pool; not dated
FY 03 Capital
Analysis Budget vs.
Actual; not dated
FY 03 Capital Budget
Status; not dated
IMI Marketing
Committee Meeting
Minutes; April 2, 2003
Sixth Amendment to
Articles ofPartnership
ofMRl Associates;
~ril I5, 2003
Memorandum to Grant
Chamberlain from Ken
Fryre: MRl
Discussions; April I8,
2003
Draft Letter to Sandra
Bruce from Roger
Curran; May I, 2003
Email to Roger
Curran, James
Prochaska, and David
Giles from Jack
Havlina re: DMR
Agreement and Rads;
May 5, 2003
Email to Rick Presnell
from Jack Floyd re: redirected Patient; June
3,2003
Letter to Sandra Bruce
. from Roger Curran;
June 3, 2003
IMI Operations
Committee Meeting
Minutes; Ju~e 20,
2003

SHI434,
Chamberalain Ex
16

033627, 040250,
034II6, OI4825;
Fry Ex 33
IMIRP/003235-44
Office of the CFO
030946

SARMC07382-7;
Bruce Ex 62

Office of the CFO
SARMC08864;
Reilly Ex 34
Office of the CFO
SARMC0890I;
Reilly Ex 37
Office of the CFO
SARMC08925;
Reilly Ex 39
GSRRP/000896-9;
N. DaveyEx6
025022-35

SHI435-42;
Chamberlain Ex I5

OI4879-80

037250; Havlina
Ex2

034325, Hopkins
Ex I6

OI4I9I-2

GSRRP/000940-5;
Garabedian Ex 22

001916

4304

4305

4306

4307

4308

4309

4310

4311

4312

4313

4314

4315

4316

4317

MFP Management
Steering Committee
Meeting Summary;
June 24, 2003
DR Systems Invoice to
SARMC; June 24,
2003
IMI Operations
Committee Meeting
Minutes; July 16, 2003
Email to Jack Floyd
from Thomas Henson
re: Agreement for MR1
Services; July 18, 2003
Email to Jack Floyd
from Julli Hopkins re:
list; September 4, 2003
MR1 ofldaho Special
Meeting Minutes and
Agenda; September 8,
2003
Negotiating Timeline;
September 8, 2003

MR1 Center of Idaho
Board Meeting
Minutes; September 8,
2003
Surgeries Within 8
Weeks that are Safe to
Scan; September 19,
2003
CEO Report;
September 30, 2003

IMI Management
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October 28,
2003
Presentation to Trinity
Health: Overview of
the Restructuring of
the MRIA Limited
Partnership & the
Simultaneous Merger
ofMRlCI and IMI;
October 30, 2003
IMI Fees & Finance
Committee Meeting
Minutes; December 1,
2003
Handwritten meeting
notes by Dr. Curran;
December 17, 2003

Office of the
President
SARMC12190-3;
Corbett Ex 4
Office of the CIO
SARMC01336-8;
Kelly Hall Ex 25
GSRRP/000947-8;
Corbett Ex 5
036222-38; Henson
Ex 11

034172; Hopkins
Ex3
028043-6; Corbett
Ex6

Office of the
President
SARMC010658;
Bruce Ex 65
014188-9

Garabedian Ex I 0

Office of the
President
SARMC07043-4;
Bruce Ex 22, Fisher
Ex 17
IMIRP/001062;
Sulc(Harneck) Ex 3

Office of the CFO
SARMC06777-86;
Bruce Ex 64,
Seaboum Depo Ex.
No. 12, I. Davey
Depo. Ex. No. 32,
N. Davey Depo Ex.
No. 21; Fisher Ex
16
GSRRP/000884-7;
Gobel Ex 14

024271--9

001917

4318

4319

4320

4321

4322
4323

4324

4325

4326

4327

Letter to Tom
Banducci from Pat
Miller and follow-up
correspondence;
December 22, 2003,
February 20, 2004, and
February 24, 2004
MRICI Income
Statement; December
31,2003
IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2003
FY 04 Capital Budget
Status; updated July
20,2004
Resume of Patricia
Vandenberg; 2004
GSR Charges by Year
and Amounts Applied
Charges Dated 20012004
GSR Fees & Finances
Committee Meeting
Minutes; January 12,
2004
Email to David Giles,
Roger Curran, and
James Prochaska from
Jack Havlina re: MRI;
January 12, 2004
Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Julli Hopkins,
and Robin Cioffi from
Ben Murray re:
JCAHO; January 14,
2004
SARMC Monthly
Imaging Strategy
Meeting; January 20,
2004

4328

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; January 20,
2004

4329

Letter to Roger Curran
from Sandra Bruce re:
Notice of Withdrawal;
February 24, 2004
Letter to Patrick Miller
from Tom Banducci
re: MRI Associates;
February 25, 2004
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; February 25,
2004

4330

4331

015659, 025573,
014547; Bruce Ex
68

015477

IMIRP/003245-57

Office of the CFO
SARMC08926;
Reilly Ex 40
Vandenberg Ex 1
Cliff30(b)(6) Ex 1

GSRRP/000970-1;
Gobel Ex 15

035919; Havlina
Ex 3 and Giles Ex
20

Patient Care
Services
SARMC00512;
MurrayEx37

Corporate
Development
SARMC00125-7; I.
Davey Ex. 22 and
N. Davey Ex. 16
GSRRP/000988 R92; Gobel Ex 12,
N. Davey Ex 11
(Redacted version
GSR/0138 used as
Bruce Ex 17)
021657-8; Bruce
Ex21

032376

GSRRP/000993 R5; Noyes Ex 32

001918

4332

4333

,,

4334

4335

4336

4337

4338

4339

4340

434I

4342

4343

i

4344

Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Mark Adams,
Mark Dalley, and
Joseph Messmer re:
officer to sell MRICI
and buy SARMC's
share in MRIM; March
5,2004
Letter to Mark Adams,
Mark Dalley, and Joe
Messmer from Sandra
Bruce re: Saint
Alphonsus
Withdrawal; March
I0,2004
P ACS Team Meeting
Minutes; March I2,
2004 and various dates
IMI Marketing
Committee Minutes;
March I 0, 2004
IMI Strategy Session
Minutes; March I6,
2004
Email to Janelle Reilly
and Ken Fry from
Carolyn Corbett re:
MRI; March I7, 2004
Email to Carolyn
Corbett from Mike
Boyd re: MRl
Contract, Agreement
for MRl Services
between SARMC and
BP Consulting; March
I8,2004
Handwritten notes;
March 22, 2004

SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Meeting Summary;
March 23, 2004
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Roger Curran re:
response to withdraw!;
March 23, 2004
Email to Sandra Bruce
from Carolyn Corbett
re: MRl conversation;
March 26, 2004
Radiology Marketing
Committee Meeting
Minutes; March 30,
2004
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; April 20,
2004

02I742-3

Office of the
President
SARMC010646-7;
Bruce Ex 23, Fisher
Ex I8

Office of the CIO
SARMCOI789838; Kelly Hall Ex
10
GSRRP/OOI040-2;
Noyes Ex 33
Patient Care
Services
SARMC00845-6;
Bruce Ex 25
Department of
Radiology
SARMC00758;
Krogstad Ex 8
Patient Care
Services
SARMC00385-95;
Bruce Ex26

Office of the
President
SARMCOI0645;
Seaboum Ex I6
Office of the
President
SARMCI2039-4I;
Corbett Ex I 0
003020-2

Office of the
President SARMC
0 I 0643; Hopkins
Ex6
GSRRP/OOI043-4;
N. DaveyEx8

GSRRP/000999I002; Gobel Ex 16

001919

4345

4346

4347

4348

4349

4350

4351

4352

4353

4354

4355

4356

4357

4358

SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Meeting Summary;
April27, 2004
Radiology Group
Meeting Minutes; June
2,2004
Letter to Jack Floyd
from Bill Radaj;
August 6, 2004
Letter to Joseph Gobel
from Carolyn Corbett
re: Medical Director;
August 10, 2004
Email to Julli Hopkins
from Joseph Gobel re:
Exam Protocol and
various; August 28,
2004 and various
Imaging Strategic Plan
Environmental
Assessment, Imaging
Planning Team;
August 31, 2004
Letter to Pat Miller
from Mark Ellison and
attachments;
September 3, 2004
Seventh Amendment
to Articles of
Partnership of MRI
Associates LLP;
November 10, 2004
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from MRICI Board of
Directors; December
3,2004
SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Meeting Summary;
December 7, 2004
Email to Julli Hopkins
from Tim Hall re: MRI
Scheduling; December
14,2004
MRICI Radiology
Report by Jeff
Seaboum "MRI of the
Liver with and without
Contrast"; December
17,2004
Memo to Saint
Alponsus Medical
Staff from Sandra
Bruce; December 20,
2004
IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2004

Office of the
President
SARMC12270;
Corbett Ex 11
GSRRP/001003-5;
Gobel Ex 11
034308

Patient Care
Services
SARMC00735;
Scales Ex
042584-90, 92-93,
96; Hopkins Ex 1

IMIRP/0011661282; Reilly Ex 21

039031-7

036987-92

025045; Berger Ex
6

Office of the
President
SARMC12081-3
034173; Hopkins
Ex8

042160- 042162,
Seaboum Depo Ex.
No. 6, I. Davey
Depo. Ex. No. 6

Patient Care
Services
SARMC00175

IMIRP/00 1787-97

001920

4359

4360

4361

4362

4363

4364

4365

4366

4367

4368

4369

Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Jeff Cliff and
Tim Hall from Jeffrey
Seabourn re: MRICI
patients on DR;
January 10, 2005
Email to Robin Cioffi
and Julli Hopkins from
Scott Berger re:
SARMC Issues;
January 27, 2005
SARMC"MRI
Meeting" Minutes;
February 21, 2005
SARMCMRI
Operations Team
Meeting Minutes;
March 21, 2005
Letter to ICR from
Sandra Bruce; March
22,2005
Defendant's First Set
of Interrogatories and
Requests for
Production; May 20,
2005
DR Invoices to MRICI
from Saint Alphonsus;
June 22, 2005 and
various
SARMC Board of
Trustees Meeting
Minutes; September
20,2005
Email to Ben Murray,
Carolyn Corbett,
Robert Polk, Janelle
Reilly, Jean Basom,
and Sandra Bruce from
Ken Fry re: Mobile
MRI at SARMC;
October 6, 2005
Letter to Jack Gjording
from G. Rey Reinhardt
re: production of
documents; October
19,2005
Email to Ben Murray,
Dennis Adams, Karen
Noyes, Kendall Miller,
Laurea Howell, Sarah
Berg; Scott
Chirstensen from
Terry Krogstad re:
MRI Communications
Plan & Physician
Letter; November 8,
2005

Patient Care
Services
SARMC01036;
Kelly Hall Ex 30

042153; Berger Ex
5

Patient Care
Services
SARMC00003-4;
Corbett Ex 12
Patient Care
Services
SARMC00002;
Corbett Ex 13
Bruce Ex 67

L.K. Hall
(30(b)(6)) Ex. No.
2

040229-41; Cioffi
Ex7

Office of the
President
SARMC11642-8
Director of Nursing
SARMCOOOll;
Murray Ex 12

Department of
Radiology
SARMC00924-5;
Murray Ex 14

001921

Clinical Operations
Team Meeting Agenda
(SARMCIIMI MRI);
November 22, 2005
Email to Ben Murray
from Sandra Bruce re:
MRI; December 5,
2005
Email to Ben Murray
from Sandra Bruce re:
MRIUpdate;
December 9, 2005
Agreement for MRI
Services between
SARMC and IMI;
December 9, 2005
First Amendment to
Operating Agreement
of Intermountain
Medical Imaging,
LLC; December 9,
2005
Option and Purchase
Agreement between
ICR and SADC;
December 9, 2005
Email to Carolyn
Corbett from Ben
Murray re: MRI
. Letter; December 11,
2005
Email to BCC, Front
Office, Gen Rad
Techs, Nuc Med
Group, Nurses, Rad
Admin, Rad
Assistants, Specials,
Ultrasound from Scott
Christensen re: New
MRI Services;
December 12, 2005
Email to Jack Gjording
from Manfred Steiner
re: MRI ; December
14,2005
Email to Ben Murray,
Carolyn Corbett,
Dennis Adams, Joseph
Gobel, Kevin Dwello,
Karen Noyes, and
Sandra Bruce from
Neil Hamilton re: MRI
Issues; December 15,
2005
Email to All nurse,
CNA's, et al from Ben
Murray re: MRI
Opening; December
16,2005

4370

4371

4372

4373

4374

4375

4376

4377

4378

4379

4380

Office of the
General Counsel
SARMC00295-6;
Murray Ex38
Director of Nursing
SARMC00013;
Murray Ex 16
Director ofNursing
SARMC00015;
Murray Ex 21
IMIRP/001719-36;
Kelly Hall Ex 4

IMIRP/001669-77;
Bruce Ex 66

Office of General
Counsel
SARMC00259-264
Director of Nursing
SARMC00093-4;
MurrayEx22

Department of
Radiology
SARMC01472-4;
Murray Ex 23

Steiner Ex 11

Director of Nursing
SARMC00017;
Murray Ex 17

Office of the CFO
SARMC08320;
Murray Ex 24

I

001922

4381

4382

4383

4384

4385

4386

4387

4388

4389

4390

4391

4392

Email to Adam Feider,
Connie Stern, Dennis
Adams, Garna Barker,
et al. from Ben Murray
re: MRl Agenda and
Minutes; December
19,2005
Email to Adam Feider,
Carolyn Corbett,
Connie Stern, et al.
from Ben Murray re:
MRl update;
December 20, 2005
Email to Ben Murray
from Robin Cioffi re:
Service; December 20,
2005
Email to Adam Feider,
Connie Stem, Dennis
Adams, et al. from Ben
Murray re: MRl
Launch - IMMED
ATfN; December 21,
2005
Email to Robin Cioffi
from Ben Murray re:
Undeliverable: MRl
Discussion; December
21,2005
Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Karen Noyes,
Adam Feider, Ben
Murray, Darrell
Fugate, Dennis Adams
from Joseph Gobel re:
MRl Concerns;
December 30, 2005
MRl Center ofldaho
Business I Income
Statement; December
31,2005
IMI Financial
Statements; December
31, 2005 and 2004
Email to Diana
Trujillo from Ben
Murray re: MRl
Transport; January 3,
2006
New Saint Alphonsus
MRl Launches;
January 9, 2006
MRl Associates'
Motion to Compel;
January 13, 2006
Memorandum in
Support ofMRI
·Associates' Motion to
Compel; January 13,
2006

Department of
Radiology
SARMC01495;
Murray Ex 19

Director of Nursing
SARMCOOllO;
MurrayEx26

Director ofNursing
SARMC00109;
MurrayEx25
Director of Nursing
SARMC00111;
Murray Ex 20

Director of Nursing
SARMC00117-8;
Murray Ex27

Department of
Radiology
SARMCO 1734-6;
Murray Ex 18

IMIRP/003258-70

Director of Nursing
SARMC00121;
Murray Ex 29

Cioffi Ex 3

001923

4393

Handwritten notes re:
GSR-Radiologists;
January 22, 2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Terry Krogstad;
January 25, 2006

4394

4395

4396

4397

4398

4399

4400

4401

4402

4403

4404

4405

4406

'

Email to Ben Murray
from Terry Krogstad
re: MRl Coverage
Thursday night;
January 26, 2006
Letter/Fax to Thomas
Banducci from Trudy
Hanson Fouser re:
Motion to Compel;
January 31,2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Robin Cioffi re:
Sedation Cases;
February 3, 2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Robin Cioffi re:
Sedation Cases;
February 6, 2006
List of Documents
Delivered to Manfred
Steiner; February 28,
2006
Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Directors,
MRlGroup from Ben
Murray re: MRl
Coverage on Wed
March 1st; February
28,2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Robin Cioffi; re:
recap; March 3, 2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Terry Krogstad
re: MRl Coverage
Wednesday; March 7,
2006
Assignment of
Membership Interest
between ICR and
SADC; April 1, 2006
Trinity Health
Consolidated Financial
Statements for the
Years Ended June 30,
2006 and 2005 and
Independent Auditors'
Report
DEPT#'s 89914 (MRl
Billable Cost) &
89915 (MRl Mobile
Unit); 2006
Hand-Drawn Sketch;
September 20, 2006

Reinstein Ex 5

Department of
Radiology
SARMC00985-6;
Murray Ex 30
Department of
Radiology
SARMC00993;
Murray Ex 31

042177; Murray Ex
32

042175-6; Murray
Ex33

Steiner Ex 6

Department of
Radiology
SARMC01248;
Murray Ex 34

042178; Murray Ex
35
Department of
Radiology
SARMC01021;
Murray Ex 36
Office of General
Counsel
SARMC00554-5

Wellspring
SARMC020; Stein
Ex 7
L.K. Hall Ex. No.
11

001924

4407

4408

4409

4410

4411

4412
4413

4414

4415

4416

4417

4418
4419

4420
4421
4422
4423

4424

Handwritten notes re:
St. Als; October 26,
2006
Preliminary Expert
Witness Report MSN
v. Compunet;
St:Q_tember 5, 2006
Curriculum Vitae of
Jeffrey Todd
Seabourn, M.D.; 2006
Internet Printout from
aboutimi.com Re:
Jeffrey T. Seaboum,
MD.; printed October
3,2006
Transcript of
Deposition of Dennis
Reinstein for MSN v.
Compunet; October 5,
2006
Resume of Joseph A.
Messmer; 2007
Curriculum Vitae of
Paul D. Traughber,
M.D.;2007
Invoices from Hooper
Cornell to Eberle
Berlin; January 31,
2007 and various
Letter to Daniel
Gordon from Jack
Gjording re: Saint
Alphonsus Capital
Budgets; February 23,
2007
Handwritten notes re:
Meeting with Jeff;
March 3, 2007
Expert Report of
Bruce Budge; March
12,2007
Timeline of Events;
2007
Regence website
"Facets Functional
Modifier Pricing
Updated October
2004"; printed from
website May 9, 2007
Vistnes Work Product;
2007
Vistnes Work Product;
2007
Vistnes Work Product;
2007
Handwritten notes re:
Call with data folks;
2007
Handwritten notes re:
St. Al's Tour; March
14 and 15, 2007

Steiner Ex 1

Reinstein Ex 8

Seabourn Ex. No.2

Seabourn Ex. No.3

Reinstein Ex 9

MessmerEx2
Traughber Ex. No.
2
Reinstein Ex 1

Reilly Ex 24

Reinstein Ex 10

Reinstein Ex 4
Vistenes Ex 10

VistnesEx 8
Vistnes Ex 9
Vistnes Ex 7
Vistnes Ex 5

Vistnes Ex; 2

001925

4425

4426
4427

PMI Data- IMI MRI
Exams 2001- current
spreadsheet
IMI Financial Data;
1999-2005
MRICI Accounts
Receivable
Transaction
Summaries; 19852006

4428

MRICI Charges by
Referring Physician;
1998- March 31,
2001

4429

MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 1991 and 1990
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 1991
and 1990
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 1997 and 1996
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 1997
and 1996
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 1998 and 1997
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 1998
and 1997
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 1999 and 1998
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 1999
and 1998
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31,2000 and 1999
MRI Mobile LP
Financ~al Statements;
December 31, 2000
and 1999

4430

4431

4432

4433

4434

4435

4436

4437

4438

PMI000288-1488

IMIRP/0001 04-681
Office of the
President
SARMC00654,
008141, Office the
President
SARMC05977,
018290, Office of
theCFO
SARMC03095,
031776,031809,
031537, 012279,,
031036, 042337-9,
042206-7, 0422656, 042319-20
031936, 031840,
031795,031539,
011880-1, 011919,
012280-1, 0123078
Office of the
President
SARMC00531-40
Office of the
President
SARMC00541-51
032188-99

032176-86

032152-62

032164-74

012052-61

032142-50

019776-85

019787-96

001926

4439

4440

4441

4442

4443

4444

4445

4446

4447

4448

4449

4450

4451

4452

4453

4454

4455
4456

MRl LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2001 and 2000
MRl Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2001
and 2000
MRl LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2002 and 2001
MRl Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2002
and 2001
MRl LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2003 and 2002
MRl Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2003
and 2002
MRl LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2004 and 2003
MRl Mobile LP;
December 31, 2004
and 2003
MRl LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2005 and 2004
MRl Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2005
and 2004
MRICI Business I
Balance Sheet; July
31,2006
MRICI Business I
Income Statement;
July 31, 2006
MRIM Business II
Balance Sheets; July
21, 2006
MRIM Business II
Income Statement;
July 3 1, 2006
Data Form for daily
MRl equipment QC;
not dated
Data Form for daily
MRl equipment QC;
not dated
Laser film printer
controlchart;notdated
ACRAnnual
Performance Analysis:
1.5 T Symphony
MRICI (with
handwritten notes);
October 18, 2004

013100-9

013090-9

032015-24

013845-54

015673-82

024250-9 (same as
021439-48)

040197-207

040208-18

042191-200

042181-90

042315

042317

042325

042327

043511-20

043521-31

043532-35
043536-49

)

001927

4457

4458

4459

4460

446I

4462

4463

4464

4465

4466

4467

4468
4469
4470
447I

4472
4473

ACRAnnual
Performance Analysis:
1.5 T GE Signa
MRICI; October I8,
2004
ACR Certificate for
MRI Center: GE
Twinspeed; March II,
2007
ACR Certificate for
MRI Center: Siemens
Symphony; March II,
2007
MRI Center ACR
accreditation
certificate for I998
Siemens System
MRI Scanner
Evaluation- GE I.5T:
November 8, 2006
MRI Scanner
Evaluation- GE I.5T:
November 8, 2006
MRI Scanner
Evaluation- Siemens
1.5T: November 8,
2006
MRI Scanner
Evaluation- Siemens
1.5T:
November 8, 2006
MRI Center ACR
accreditation:
December 8, 2000
Siemens Symphony
service records 20002006: not dated
ACRIMRI annual
performance review
verification:
November 2I, 2006
GE Service Records:
Various Dates
GE Service Records:
Various Dates
CV of Bob Bell
ACR Performance
Analysis of the 1.5 T
Symphony at MRICI;
October I8, 2004
Siemens Service
Records
ACR Performance
Review of Siemens I.5
T Symphony MRI at
the MRI Center of
Idaho; January 25,
2007

043550-65

043597

043598

056643

056658-63

056664-70

05667I-76

056677-83

056694-95

056899-057073

057074-75

057II5-406
057410-05843I
Bell Ex 2 (replace?)
043566-79

043580-2
Bell Ex 4

-

001928

4474

4475

4476
4477

4478

4479

4480

4481

4482

4483

4484

4485

4486
4487

ACR Performance
Review ofGE
Twinspeed 1.5 T
Excite; January 25,
2007
All ITPACS
Committee Meeting
Minutes; various dates
AllSARMC
Discovery Responses
Fax to Mark Adams,
Milt Kutsurelis, and
Marty Hutson from
Cindy Schamp re:
PWC estimates of fair
market value ofMRI
Mobie; June 8, 2000
Memo to Sandra Bruce
and Cindy Schamp
from Roger Curran
"Negotiating with the
Radiologists"; October
27, 1999
IMI's Supplemental
Responses to MRIA' s
First Requests for
Production of
Documents; November
16,2006
Saint Alphonsus
Building Company
Board ofDirectors
Annual Meeting;
October 11, 1999
Ed MacMullan's Notes
and Ed Whitelaw's
Maps from Site Visit,
Boise, July 7 -July 8,
2006
Handwritten Case
Notes, Marked
Collectively
ECONorthwest
"Geography" Binder
ECONorthwest
"Report and
Documents Cited"
Binder
ECONorthwest "Data"
Binder
ECONorthwest
"Geography Files
04/09/2007" CD
ECONorthwest CD,
Untitled

Bell Ex 5

Various

Various
Office of the CFO
SARMC07766-70;
Kutsurelis Ex 5

Office of the CFO
SARMC07417;
Kutsurelis Ex 6

Office of the
President
SARMC12750;
Fugate Ex 1
Whitelaw Ex 5

Whitelaw Ex 6

Whitelaw Ex 9
Whitelaw Ex 10

Whitelaw Ex 11
Whitelaw Ex 13

Whitelaw Ex 14

001929

4488

4489

4490

4491
4492
4493

4494

4495

4496

4497

4498

4499
4500
4501
4502
4503

Meeting with Jeff Cliff
and Outline for
Discussion
Presentation by Cindy
Schamp
Purchase/Restructuring
Options for MRI
Associates; January 26
and February 1, 2000
Certified copies of
Idaho Secretary of
State Annual Report
Forms- IMI; 2002;
2002
REINSTATEMENT;
2003 and 2004
Memorandum
Decision on Plaintiffs
Motions to Strike,
Cross-Motions for
Summary Judgement,
and Plaintif£'Third
Party Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss
CV Charles Wilhoite
Expert Opinion of
Charles Wilhoite
Expert Opinion of
Charles Wilhoite;
Rebuttal
Documents
Considered by C.
Wilhoite
Expert Opinion of
Bruce Budge
Supplemental
Expert Opinion of
Bruce Budge
Amended
MRI Limited
Financial Statement
2007
Email from Roger
Curran to MRIA
Board and attached
letter to Sandra Bruce
from Roger Curran;
May6, 2003
MRI Center Financials
2005
MRI Limited
Financials 2010
MRI Limited Financial
Statement 2009
Trinity Health
Integrity Program
9/1199 Statement for
Services from C.
Harder

Office of the CFO
SARMCO 1239-42

03692-4

Denning4;
GSRRP001594

001930

..
4504

4505

4506
4507
4508
4509
4510
4511

4512
4513
4514

4515

4516

4517

4518
'

4519
4520
4521
4522

4523
4524

4525
4526
4527
4528
4529
4530
4531

8/19/99 Letter toR.
Denning from Dr.
Giles
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Gem State
Radiology, 3/24/05
CV of Bruce Budge
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
Memo to Fry and
Schamp from
Chamberlin dated
12/11101
CD of Schamp Video
Clips
Cindy Schamp Video
Designations
GSR Charges by Year
and Amounts Applied
2001-2004
SARDC Answers and
Objections to MRIA's
First Set of
Interrogatories 3/24111
SARDC Answers and
Objections to MRIA's
Second Set of
Interrogatories and
Requests for
Production 4/15/11
SADC Answers and
Objections to MRIA's
Third Set of
Interrogatories and
Requests for
Production 4/27111
SADC Answers and
Objections to MRIA's
5th Set of
Interrogatories and
Requests for
Production 5/12/11
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
Expert Opinion of
Charles Wilhoite dated
3/12/07
RESERVED
Appendix B to Charles
Wilhoite Opinion
dated 3/12/07
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED

Denning 6;
GSRRPOO 1602-3

001931

..
4532
4533

4534
4535

RESERVED
1/4/05 Letter from
Seaboum to
Colleagues
RESERVED
12/18/00 Letter to Dr.
Garabedian at IMI
fromACR

001932

FILED
P.M._ _ __

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com
BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

AUG 0 9 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk
By JAMIE RANDALL '
DEPUTY

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Idaho nonprofit corporation,

~~Case 'NO.
T CV
~TT~~-oo·~~~-·~
UC L 4-UUlSLlY
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership,

MOTION FOR ORDER SETTING
DEADLINE FOR PRODUCTION OF
EXHIBIT LIST AND MOTION TO
SHORTEN TIME

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership; MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho
Limited Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT ALPHONSUS
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

MOTION FOR ORDER SETTING DEADLINE FOR PRODUCTION OF EXHIBIT LIST AND MOTION TO
SHORTEN TIME- 1

001933

ORIGINAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA"), move the Court for an order setting a deadline for the
production of final exhibit lists, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(h). MRIA also
moves for an order shortening time, so that this Motion may be heard at the continued pretrial
conference scheduled for this afternoon, August 9, 2011, at 1:30 p.m.
MRIA has produced its exhibit list to Saint Alphonsus pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(c)(5), which states that one of the matters for the pre-trial conference is the
"identification of witnesses and documents." Despite requests that Saint Alphonsus produce its
exhibit list so that its exhibits can be discussed at the continuing pretrial conference scheduled
for this afternoon, (including a letter yesterday requesting the same,) Saint Alphonsus has not
produced its exhibit list. MRIA therefore asks that, pursuant to Rule 16(h), the Court enter an
order directing the parties to file with the court and serve on all opposing counsel a list of all
exhibits to be offered at trial. As trial is fast approaching, the deadline for doing so should be as
soon as reasonably possible, but by no later than Thursday, August 11, 2011.
DATED this 9th day of August, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~I~ 1"2~.

15ara L. Piker
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

MOTION FOR ORDER SETTING DEADLINE FOR PRODUCTION OF EXHIBIT LIST AND MOTION TO
SHORTEN TIME- 2

001934

..
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9th day of August, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for P laintifjlCounterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for P laintifjlCounterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
~Facsimile

D U.S. Mail

0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
~Facsimile

MOTION FOR ORDER SETTING DEADLINE FOR PRODUCTION OF EXHIBIT LIST AND MOTION TO
SHORTEN TIME- 3
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NO.--~FILE-;:;:D----;Jg;j.-:::·3~~2
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC'i.M---_j).M. ~=---

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

AUG 1 6 2011

CHR\ST~6~:~:~~~A~Ierk
By L

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, INC., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Defendant-Counterclaimant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

[JEPUT'I

Case No. CV -OC-2004-08219

ORDER RESCHEDULING JURY
QUESTIONAIRE

Due to a scheduling conflict, the Court must reset the beginning of the jury questionnaire
currently scheduled for August 31, 2011.

Having contacted the parties, and both counsel

agreeing, the Court hereby resets the swearing of the jury for the questionnaire to August 30,
2011 at 9:00AM.

SO ORDERED AND DATED this /~'7'tday of August, 2011.

Order Resetting Questionaire l
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this /6'1:.y of August, 2011, I mailed (served) a true and correct
copy of the within instrument to:
JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
POBOX2837
BOISE, ID 83701
DONALDAYER
JONES DAY
51 LOUSIANA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST. STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court

By~
Deputy Court Clerk

Order Resetting Questionaire 2
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~

• .)•

' '"t

00·------~~~~---FIL~~ S\Sl a

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)

A.M.

tbanducci@bwslawgroup.corn
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.corn

AUG 17 2011

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

dparker@bwslawgroup.corn

By CHRISTINE SWEET

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)

DEPUTY

bbastian@bwslawgroup.corn

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
ISTARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' PROPOSED
AMENDED EXHIBIT LIST

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS PROPOSED AMENDED EXHIBIT LIST - 1

001938

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit the attached list of exhibits which are anticipated
for MRIA's case in chief. In addition to the exhibits identified on the attached list, MRIA
reserves the right to utilize any exhibit, document or other thing identified by any party in this
case as an exhibit; any exhibit necessary for impeachment of any witness; any exhibit, document
or other thing identified or produced during the discovery in this case by any party or other
person or entity; and demonstrative and illustrative exhibits to otherwise explain or highlight any
other evidence or facts presented in this case.
MRIA reserves the right to add to, subtract from, or otherwise amend, supplement or
withdraw exhibits identified in this list.

DATED this 17th day of August, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS PROPOSED AMENDED EXHIBIT LIST - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of August 2011, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D Up. Mail

.J11land Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
~~might Delivery

)6 .Facsimile

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS PROPOSED AMENDED EXHIBIT LIST - 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 0408219D
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S EXHIBIT
LIST

Plaintiff,

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,
Defendant.
Presiding Judge:

Plaintiffs Attorney:

Honorable Michael Wetherell

JackS.
Gjording
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G.
Vergonis

Trial Date:
PI f.
No.

Def.
No.

4000

4001

4002
4003

4004

4005

4006

September 6, 2011
Date

Offered

Marked

Stipulation

Admitted
Authenticity

Foundation

Admitted

Defendant's
Attorney:

ThomasA.
Banducci
WadeL.
Woodard
BrentS.
Bastian

Court Reporter:

Courtroom
Deputy: Diane
Oatman

Description

Bates No.

SARMC
Planning/Finance
Charter and
Objectives; not dated
Vision PowerPoint
slide; not dated

Office of the
,CFO
SARMC08896;
Reilly Ex 41
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08719;
Reilly Ex 29
014512; Giles Ex
18
000931; Giles Ex
17

Radiology Imaging
Center; not dated
SARG/MRlAN
Proposals #6 & 7; not
dated
Issues Imaging Center
Joint Venture; not
dated
SARMC IT System
Support for IMI; not
dated
DR Investment List,
MRlCI AP Ledger;
various dates

001142-4; Giles
Ex 16
IMIRP/000892;
Kelly Hall Ex 13
040220-8; Berger
Ex 9; Floyd Ex
23

001941

4007

4008

4009

4010

Radiologist Schedules
Produced at
Deposition of Jeffrey
Seabourn (280 pages),
various dates
Radiologist/Hospital
Imaging Center Joint
Venture; not dated
·Handwritten notes re:
DR Investment; not
dated
Handwritten notes and
charts re: analysis
given to Ken Fry on
negative movement of
patients from
MRI/SARMC to IMI;
not dated
Health Planning
Committee SARMC
Board of Trustees
Meeting Minutes;
March 22, 1984
Executive Committee
SARMC Board of
Trustees Meeting
Minutes; March 26,
1984
Executive Committee
SARMC; October 1,
1984

4011

Admit

4012

Admit

4013

Admit

4014

Admit

Executive Committee
SARMC Board of
Trustees; December
20, 1984

4015

Admit

4016

Admit

4017

Admit

4018

Admit

Letter to Chris Anton
from J. Roger Curran;
November 21, 1984
Letter to J. Roger
Curran from Sister
Patricia Vandenberg;
December 27, 1984
Health Planning
Committee SARMC
Board of Trustees
Meeting Minutes;
December 28, 1984
Board of Trustees
SARMC Executive
Committee Report
Minutes; January 11, ·
1985
Letter to Jon Miller
and E.E. Gilbertson
from Sister Patricia
Vandenberg and James
E. Bruce; January 14,
1985

4019

Seaboum Ex. No.
21

GSR/00910093, Seabourn
Ex. No. 10
0898?; Cioffi Ex
9
034104-7,
034109, 034112

Office of the
President
SARMC0692839; Vandenberg
Ex2
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0271920; Vandenberg
Ex 3
Givens Pursley
SARMC0016972; Vandenberg
Ex 5
Office of the
President
SARMC0814655; Vandenberg
Ex4
Giles Ex 5

Office of the
President
SARMC09462;
Vandenberg Ex 6
Givens Pursley
SARMC00146-8;
Vandenberg Ex 7

Givens Pursley
SARMC001394:3; Vandenberg
Ex8
Office of the
President
SARMC09403-4;
Vandenberg Ex 9

001942

4020

4021

Admit

4022

Admit

4023

Admit

4024

Admit

4025

Admit

4026

Admit

4027

Admit

4028

Admit

4029

Admit

4030

Admit

4031

4032

Admit

4033

Admit

Letter to Sister Patricia
Vandenberg from Leo
Edward Miller; March
5, 1985
MRI, Ltd. Meeting
Minutes; March 27,
1985
1122 Application;
April5, 1985
Articles of Partnership
ofMRIA; April26,
1985
Limited Partnership
Agreement of MRI
Limited Partnership;
August 2, 1985
SARMC and Saint
Alphonsus Building
Company, Inc. Ground
Lease; September 19,
1985
First Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
ofMRI Associates;
May 25, 1988
Agreement for
Provision of Medical
Services; August 1,
1988
Limited Partnership
Agreement of MRI
Mobile Limited
Partnership; October
17, 1988
Second Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
ofMRI Associates;
May 16, 1991
MRICI Minutes; April
27, 1992

Letter to DMR from
SADC, MedNow, and
West Valley Medical
Center; August 24,
1992
Third Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
of MRI Associates;
January 1, 1995
SARMC Medical
Services Agreement Radiology; May 1,
1997

039488-90;
Vandenberg Ex
10
011244-6; Giles
Ex9
004139-42
019991-20013;
Bruce Ex 1;
Fisher Ex 5
009940-52;
Bruce Ex2

028914-20

01402-8

Givens Pursley
SARMC0191739; Anton Ex 2
026877-91

029706-11

Office of the
President
SARMC05851-3;
Anton Ex 1
011486

024996-25008

Office of the
CFO
SARMC025972614; Bruce Ex
6; Seabourn Ex 4
(same as Giles
00002 - 19; I.
Davey Ex. No. 3,
N. Davey Ex 2,
Traughber Ex 3)

001943

4034

Admit

4035

Admit

4036

4037

Admit

4038

Admit

4039

Admit

4040

Admit

4041

Admit

4042

4043

4044

4045

Admit

4046

4047

Admit

IMI Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; June 16,
1997
MRICI Minutes;
October 21, 1997
Letter to SARG from
Sandra Bruce, Fax
from Mike Czech to
Sandra Bruce; October
31, 1997
Letter to MRIA
Boardmembers from
Mike Czech;
November 10, 1997
IMI Group Meeting
Minutes; November
12, 1997
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from IMI; November
13, 1997
Letter to Paul
Traughber, William
Murray, Jeffrey
Seabourn, and Joseph
Gobel from Sandra
Bruce; November 13,
1997
MRICI Minutes;
December 17; 1997
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Paul Traughber;
January 5, 1998

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; January 14,
1998
Letter to MRIA
Boardmembers from
Mike Czech; February
13, 1998
MRICI Minutes;
February 18, 1998
Capital Expenditure
Third CT Scanner
System Executive
Summary, SARMC
Planning/Finance
Committee; April 1,
1998
GSR Executive
Committee Minutes;
May 11, 1998

IMIRP/00443840

000413-20;
Bruce Ex 32
Office of the
President
SARMC10170-2;
Bruce Ex 33
000388; Bruce
Ex34

IMIRP/004401-3

Office of the
CFO
SARMC06142-3;
Bruce Ex 36
Office of
President
SARMC10169;
Bruce Ex 37

021306-8; Bruce
Ex38
Office of the
CFO
SARMC06066;
Bruce Ex 39
(same as Office
of the President
SARMC10168,;
Traughber Ex 4)
GSREX/0265-8;
Garabedian Ex 6
000509; Gobel
Ex4
'

021269-71;
Bruce 40
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0862743; Reilly Ex 42

GSREX/0036-9;
Krogstad Ex 2

001944

4048

Admit

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; May 13,
1998
SARMC Leadership
hierarchy charts; June
1, 1998 and various

4049

4050

Admit

4051

Admit

4052

Admit

4053

Admit

4054

Admit

4055

Admit

4056

Admit

4057

Admit

4058

4059

4060

4061

Admit

4062

Admit

4063

Admit

Fourth Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
of MRI Associates;
July 15, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; July 27, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; July 30, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; August 10,
1998
MRICI and MRIM
Meeting Minutes;
August 19, 1998
Handwritten notes and
news clipping; August
20, 1998
MRI Center ofldaho
Newsletter; September
1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; September 9,
1998
Memo to Cindy
Schamp from Sandy
Cruise; September 16,
1998
Email to Cindy
Schamp from Sandra
Bruce re: RadiologyReply; September 21,
1998
Holy Cross Health
System Corporation
Capital Project
Summary, SARMC
Budget Year Ended
May 31, 2000;
September 24, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; October 14,
1998
MRICI Minutes;
October 22, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; October 28,
1998

GSR/0593-600;
Newton Depo Ex.
No. 2,Traughber
Ex5
Office of the
President
SARMC11855,
10721, 10719,
10718, 10717,
10715; Kelly Hall
Ex2
016029-33;
Bruce Ex 15

GSR/0612- 614;
NewtonEx3,
Traughber Ex 6
GSR/0616-8;
NewtonEx4
GSR/0633-5

021068-73;
Bruce Ex 3
Office of the
President
SARMC0106201; Bruce Ex 4
021042-7

GSR/0638-44;
Knochel Ex 5,
Traughber Depo
Ex. No.7
Office of the
CFO
SARMC02657;
Henson Ex 3
Office of the
CFO
SARMC02649;
Schamp Ex 1
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0861626; Reilly Ex 45

GSR/0647-53;
Knochel Ex6
020943-5; Bruce
Ex5
GSR/0656-7

001945

4064

Admit

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; November 3,
1998

4065

Admit

4066

Admit

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, November 9,
1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, attached draft
outline ofletter;
November I I, I 998
Letter to Cindy
Schamp from David
Giles re: November
13, 1998 meeting; not
dated (fax date May 6,
1999)
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; December 9,
1998
MRICI Financial
Statement 1998
Budget vs. Actual;
December 1998
Radiology Department
Possible Effect of
Losing Volume to
Freestanding Center
based on FY 98
Financials; not dated
Freestanding Imaging
Center List of Key
Assumptions to
Anticipate Profit; not
dat~d, prob. early I 999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; January 13,
1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, attached DR
Systems Presentation
ofPACS System;
February 3, 1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; February 10,
1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
March 3, 1999
MRI Executive
Meeting Minutes;
March 17, 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
March 31, 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
April 7, 1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; April 14,
1999

4067

4068

Admit

4069

4070

4071

4072

Admit

4073

Admit

4074

Admit

4075

Admit

4076

Admit

4077

Admit

4078

Admit

4079

Admit

GSR/0663-4;
Knochel Ex 7,
Traughber Depo
Ex. No. 14
GSR/0665-6

GSR/0667-72

GSRRPOOI8657; Traughber Ex
15

GSR/0673-8 I

031792

Office of the
CFO
SARMC02650;
FryEx2

Office of the
CFO
SARMC0201832; Fry Ex 3
GSR/0682-6

GSR/0687-99

GSR/0700-2;
Newton Ex 5
IMIRP/00475762; Noyes Ex 4
001064; Henson
Ex4
IMIRP/00477586
IMIRP/004787804; Noyes Ex 8
GSR/0725-9

001946

4080

Admit

4081

Admit

4082

4083

4084

Admit

4085

Admit

4086

Admit

4087

Admit

4088

Admit

4089

4090

Admit

4091

4092

4093

Admit

MRI Executive
Meeting Minutes;
April21, 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes; May
5, 1999
SARMC Holy Cross
Health System
Corporation
Preliminary Budgeted
Consolidated Financial
Statements and
Strategic and Routine
Capital Expenditure
Summary for Year
Ended May 31, 1999
Memo to Giles,
Knochel, Traughber,
Seabourn, from Sarah
Bratley; June 4, 1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, attached
Term Sheet; June 10,
1999
MRI Executive
Meeting Minutes; June
16, 1999
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; July 26, 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes; July
7, 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes; July
22, 1999
Articles of
Organization Limited
Liability Company;
July 23, 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes; July
27, 1999
IMI Cent~r Meeting
Notes; July 28, 1999
US Bank Loan:
Facility Page: Imaging
Center Radiologists
and Uniform Credit
Analysis Borrower
Profile; July 28, 1999
Draft PWC Fair
Market Value of a 20
Percent Partnership
Interest in DMR's 45
Percent Interest in
MRIA; July 31, 1999

001093-4; Cliff
Ex 11
IMIRP/004927-8

Office of the
CFO
SARMC08685-8;
Reilly Ex. 44

GSRRP0018511856; Traughber
Ex 17
GSR/0730-7

025322-4; Cliff
Ex 12
GSRRP/000174175; I. Davey Ex
2
IMIRP/004956-8;
Noyes Ex 9
IMIRP/00495961
IMI/0336-7; Cliff
Ex 13

IMIRP/000784786; I. Davey Ex.
11
IMIRP /00466470; Noyes Ex 11
Denning Ex 1

023949-99;
Fisher Ex 11

001947

4094

USB Business Loan
Transmittal; August 5,
1999

4095

Admit

Fax to Carl Harder
from Jeff Cliff; August
10, 1999

4096

Admit

4097

Admit

4098

Admit

List of Referring
Physicians; August 12,
1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
August 18, 1999
SARMC Board of
Trustees Board
Meeting; August 18,
1999

4099

Admit

4100

Admit

4101

Admit

4102

Admit

4103

4104

Admit

4105

Admit

4106

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; August 23,
1999
Notes re: history and
structure ofMRICI
and MRI Mobile and
how they relate to
SARMC; August 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
August 24, 1999

Letter to Ridgley
Denning from David
Giles; August 24, 1999
IMI Financial
Statement Budget vs.
Actual Income - MRI;
September 1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; September 8,
1999

MRICI and MRIM
Minutes; September
15, 1999
IMI Financial
Statement- MRI
Budget vs. Actual
Income/(Loss );
October 1999

USB00979-96,
50-53; Noyes Ex
3, Traughber Ex.
11, N. Davey Ex.
10
033755-6;
Knochel Ex 9,
Traughber Ex.
10, Newton Ex. 7
IMIRP/004458501; Scales Ex 4
IMIRP/000804-6

Office of the
President
SARMC0706776; Reilly Ex 12;
Fisher Ex4
GSRRP/00018490 (same as
GSR/0056;
Traughber Ex 8)
032259-61;
Bruce Ex 16

IMIRP/000811-2;
Gobel Ex 5,
Scales Ex 8
(same as
IMI/0699;
Traughber Ex.
13)
GSRRP0015958; Denning Ex-2
GSRRP/000149

GSRRP/0001226; Gobel Ex 6, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 12, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No.7, Newton
Depo Ex. No. 6
001260-1;
Garabedian Ex 13
GSRRP/000160
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4107

Admit

Letter to Vicken
Garabedian from IMI;
October 4, 1999

4108

Admit

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October 4,
1999

4109

Admit

Board of Directors
Annual Meeting
Minutes; October 11,
1999
Letter to MRIA
Boardmembers from
Mike Czech; October
16, 1999
MRICI Meeting
Minutes and
attachment; October
20, 1999
Letter to Cindy
Schamp from Allen
Hahn/PWC re:
qualifications; October
25, 1999
IMI Balance Sheets As
of0ctober31, 1999
IMI Financial
Statement- MRI
Budget vs. Actual
Income/(Loss);
November 1999
Draft of IMI Operating
Agreement; November
3, 1999
Joint Venture Imaging
Center SARG and
SARMC; November
11, 1999

4110

41ll

Admit

4112

4113

Admit

4114

4115

Admit

4116

IMI: A N Partnership
between SARG and
SARMC PowerPoint
Presentation;
November 11, 1999

4117

4118

4119

Admit

Restructuring of
MRIA General
Partnership
Confidential Draft for
Discussion; November
29, 1999
MRICI Financial
Statement Budget vs.
Actual; December
1999

GSRRP/0002189; Hall Ex 7, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 13,
GSRRP/000212
R -27; Noyes Ex
21,, I. Davey
Depo. Ex. No.
28
Office of the
President
SARMC12746-9;
Fugate Ex 2
001258;
Garabedian Ex 14

023416-8,
001305

Office of the
CFO
SARMC0182236
GSRRP/00015866; Cliff Ex 22
IMIRP/000104

GSR/0380-431;
Bruce Ex 10,
Schamp Ex 3
Office of the
President
SARMC0684781; Cliff Ex 23;
Fisher Ex 6
Office of the
President
SARMC0684966; Bruce Ex 20,
Schamp Ex2;
Fisher Ex 7
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0635867; Bruce Ex 11,
Schamp Ex4
012278

001949

4120

4121

4122

Admit

4123

Admit

4124

4125

Admit

4126

Admit

4127

Admit

4128

Admit

4129

4130

IMI Financial
Statement- MRI
Budget vs. Actual
Income/(Loss);
December 1999
IMI Financial
Statement- MRI
Budget vs. Actual
Income/(Loss);
December 1999
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Thomas Henson;
December 6, 1999
Handwritten Notes re:
12/16/99 Meeting;
December 16, 1999
Handwritten Notes by
Jim Prochaska re:
December 12, 1999
meeting
Draft ofiMI Operating
Agreement; December
17, 1999
Email to Jim
Prochaska and Roger
Curran from David
Giles; December 18,
1999
IMI Referrals by
Procedures
PowerPoint by D.
Benion; December 21,
1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; December
22, 1999

IMI Financial
Statements; December
31, 1999
SARMC Board
Committee Structure
for 2000

4131

SARMC IDN FY 0002 Strategic Plan
Presentation; not dated

4132

Capital Budget
Analysis - FY 2000,
not dated

4133

Consolidated
Operations Capital
Budget Analysis - FY .
2000, not dated

IMIRP/000108

GSRRP/000283

032441; Henson
Ex6
Office of the
President
SARMC09913-5;
Bruce Ex 6
001366-7;
Prochaska Ex 21

IMI/0528-81;
CliffEx 7
001364; Giles Ex
19

IMIRP /00480510

GSRRP/0001679; Cliff Ex 6, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 16, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No.13
IMIRP/00320413
Office of the
President
SARMC12798;
Fisher Ex 2
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08700-1;
Reilly Ex 46
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08695;
Reilly Ex 25
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08699;
Reilly Ex 26

001950

4134

Capital Plan FYOOFY02; not dated

4135

Consolidated
Operations Capital
Budget Analysis, not
dated
IMI MRI 2000 Income
Budget
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from James Prochaska;
January 4, 2000

4136
4137

Admit

4138

Admit

4139

4140

4141

Admit

4142

Admit

4143

Admit

4144

Admit

4145

Admit

4146

Admit

4147

Admit

Office of the
CFO
SARMC08701;
Reilly Ex 27
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08704;
Reilly Ex 28
GSRRP/000284
Office of the
CFO
SARMC00640-l;
Bruce Ex28,
Schamp Ex 7
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0804762; Fry Ex 6,
Schamp Ex 6;
Fisher Ex 14

Email to Sarach
Bratley from Allen
Hahn re: Engagement
Documents, PWC
Valuation of 50
Percent Interest in IMI
Draft;January5,2000
Email to James
038786
Prochaksa, Roger
Curran, and David
Giles from Carl
Harder; January 6,
2000
Letter to Sandra Bruce
032442-4; Bruce
from Carl Harder;
Ex 29. Schamp
January 6, 2000
Ex8
GSRRP/000273GSR Group Meeting
7; Scales Ex 7
Minutes; January 12,
2000
MRICI Minutes;
001492-3; Bruce
January 19, 2000
43
GSR Executive
GSRRP/000424Committee Minutes;
33; Hall Ex 8
January 24, 2000
Meeting with Jeff Cliff Office of the
Purchase/Restructuring CFO
Options for MRIA;
SARMC01239;
January 26, 2000
Fry Ex 19
GSR Group Meeting
GSRRP/000288Minute; January 26,
291; I. Davey Ex
15
2000
GSRRP/000434;
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Cliff Ex 8
Minutes; January 31,
2000
Email to Sarah Bratley Office of the
from Allen Hahn re;
CFO
. SARMC08029SARMC Draft
Presentation,
39; Schamp Ex 9
Presentation: An
(same as Office
of the CFO
Introduction to MRI
Associates Legal
SARMC0126576)
Ownership of the
Partnerships; Janurary
31,2000

001951

4148

Admit

4149

Admit

4150

Admit

4151

4152

Admit

4153

Admit

4154

Pending

4155

Admit

4156

Admit

4157

4158

4159

Admit

4160

Admit

4161

Admit

4162

Admit

4163

Admit

Outline for Discussion
Presentation by Cindy
Schamp
Purchase/Restructuring
Options for MRIA;
February 1, 2000
SARMC Senior
Management Team
Agenda and
PowerPoint slides;
February I, 2000
An Introduction to
MRIALegal
Ownership of the
Partnerships; February
11, 2000
Email to Janelle Reilly
from Sarah Bratley;
February 7, 2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; February 9,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 14,
2000
Handwritten notes;
February 14, 2000
MRICI Minutes;
February 16, 2000
MRIM Minutes;
February 16, 2000
SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Minutes; February 22,
2000
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Thomas Henson;
February 23,2000
P ACS/DR Expenses -March 2000 to July
2001
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; March 8,
2000
SARMC
Planning/Finance
Committee Minutes;
March 10, 2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; March 13,
2000
Handwritten notes
MRI Restructuring
Meeting; March 15,
2000

Office of the
CFO
SARMCO 1240-2,
635-9, 964-73;
Fry Ex 11
Office of the
President
SARMC1192732; Reilly Ex 7
Office of the
President
SARMC09891-8;
Bruce Ex 13
Office of the
CFO
SARMC07994;
Reilly Ex 14
GSRRP/000292
R-4 R; Gobel Ex
7
GSRRP/000435

014066-7
001472-3; Bruce
Ex44
001474-6; Cliff
Ex9
Office of the
President
SARMC11866-8;
Reilly Ex 15
032432; Henson
Ex8
Office of the CIO
SARMC01910,
L.K. Hall Ex 28
GSRRP/0002957 R; CliffEx 10,,
N. Davey Depo
Ex. No.14
Office of the
President
SARMC0683540; F!Y_Ex 22
GSRRP/000441

Office of the
CFO
SARMC01202;
FryEx20

001952

4164

Admit

SARMC
Planning/Finance
Committee Minutes;
March 16, 2000

4165

Admit

IMI: A Joint Venture
Partnership between
SARG and SARMC;
March 16, 2000

4166

Admit

4167

Admit

4168

Admit

4169

Admit

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; March 20,
2000
Handwritten letter to
Carl Harder from
Roger Curran; March
22,2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; April 4, 2000
SARMC Board of
Trustees Minutes;
April 11, 2000

4170

Admit

4171

Admit

4172

Admit

4173

Admit

4174

Admit

4175
4176

Admit

4177

Admit

4178

Admit

4179

Admit

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; April 17,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; May 10,
2000

Secretary of State
Annual Report form
for IMI; May 23, 2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; May 30,
2000
Email to Roger Curran
from Henson; June 5,
2000
Notes "Next IMI
Meet"; June 6, 2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; June 12,
2000
Draft of IMI Operating
Agreement; June 28,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; June 29,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; July 12,2000

Office of the
President
SARMC12852-5;
Fisher Ex 9, Fry
Ex27
Office of the
President
SARMC1288792; Reilly Ex 18;
Fisher Ex 8
GSRRP/0004556

Office of the
CFO
SARMC06768-9;
Fry Ex 18
GSRRP/000298301; Hall Ex 11
Office of the
President
SARMC12800,
12804-5; Reilly
Ex 17; Fisher Ex
10
GSRRP/000458
R -9

GSRRP/000302
R-307; Hall Ex
10, I. Davey
Depo. Ex. No.
19
Knochel Ex 13

GSRRP /0003 789; Hall Ex 13

031411; Henson
Ex 10
IMIRP/00473345R; Scales Ex 6
GSRRP /0003 802

IMI/00225-69;
Cliff Ex 34
GSRRP/0003836; Hall Ex 15

GSRRP/0003146; Hall Ex 18

001953

4180

Admit

4181

4182

Admit

4183

Admit

4184

Admit

4185

4186

Admit

4187

Admit

4188

Admit

4189

Admit

4190

Admit

4191

Admit

4192

..

Admit

Letter to Roger Curran
from Jeff Cliff; July
17,2000
US Bank Commercial
Loan Credit DisplayExecutive Summary,
Highlights of Key
Findings; July 20,
2000
Draft of IMI Operating
Agreement; August 4,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; August 8,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; August 21,
2000

Memo to Mike Czech
from Bob Bell; August
25,2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; August 30,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; August 31,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September 6,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, September 8,
1999
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September 8,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Agenda and Minutes;
September 13, 2000

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September
19,2000

022512-3; Bruce
Ex47
USB00821-40

IMI/00090-139;
Hall Ex 23,
Schamp Ex 17
GSRRP/000336340; I. Davey Ex.
18
GSR/0103-5;
Bruce Ex49
(same as
GSRRP/000387000389,
Seabourn Depo
Ex. 7, I. Davey
Ex. 17)
014891-5

GSR/0080-1;
Hall Ex 16

GSRRP/000390
R-4

GSRRP/00046971; Hall Ex 17

GSR/0052;
Traughber Ex. 12
GSRRP/000395
R-9 (same as
GSR/0111-4;
Schamp Ex 18)
GSRRP/000345350; Gobel Ex 9.
, I. Davey Depo.
Ex. No. 8, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No.5
GSR/0115-6;
Bruce Ex 52,
Seabourn Depo
Ex. No.8, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 4, N. Davey
Depo Ex. No. 3,
Newton Depo Ex.
No.9

001954

4193

Admit

4194

Admit

4195

Admit

4196

Admit

4197

Admit

4198

Admit

4199

Admit

4200

4201

4202

4203

Admit

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes with
handwritten notes;
September 19,2000
GSR Group Meeting
Agenda; October 11,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; October 11,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October 16,
2000
Release and
Reaffirmation
Agreement; October
18,2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; November
15,2000
GSR Executive
Committee Minutes;
November 19, 2000

MRICI Financial
Statement Budget vs.
Actual; December
2000
Letter to Vicken
Garabedian from
Committee on MRI
Accreditation;
December 18, 2000
IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2000
SARMC Board &
Committee Structure
2001

4204

FY 0 1 Capital Budget
Analysis; not dated

4205

FY 01 Capital
Strategic Requests, not
dated

4206

FY 01 Capital Budget,
not dated

4207

Admit

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; January 8,
2001

GSRRP/0004003; Lindauer Ex 4,
Schamp Ex 10

GSRRP/000367377; I. Davey Ex.
5
GSRRP /00036877
GSR/0117-8;
Bruce Ex 54,
Newton Depo Ex.
No. 10
GILESE00283287

GSRRP/00031827; Gobel Ex 10
GSRRP/000413415; Newton Ex
11, Schamp Ex 5
(same as
GSR/0119-121;
Bruce Ex 55,
Seaboum Depo
Ex. No. 9)
012278

IMIRP/003982-3;
Garabedian Ex 4

IMIRP/00321524
Office of the
President
SARMC12961-3;
FiSher Ex 3
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08734
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08725;
Reilly Ex 31
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08724;
Reilly Ex 30
GSRRP /0006889; I. Davey Ex 23
and N. Davey Ex
17

001955

4208

Admit

4209

Admit

4210

Admit

4211

Admit

Radiology Strategy
Meeting Record;
February 13, 2001

4212

Admit

4213

Admit

4214

Admit

4215

Admit

4216

Admit

MRlCIIMRlM
Strategic Planning
Meeting Notes;
February 16, 2001
GSR Marketing
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 22,
2001
GSR Group Meeting
Agenda; March 14,
2001
MRl Mobile Board
Meeting Minutes;
March 21, 2001
GSR!lMI
Operations/Finance &
Fees Committee
Minutes; March 23,
2001
Fax to Patty Hameck
from Jeff Cliff; April
4,2001

4217

4218

Admit

4219

Admit

4220

Admit

4221

Admit

GSR Operations
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 8,
2001
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 12,
2001
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 13,
2001

Memo to DMR from
Thomas Henson; April
5,2001
IMI Finance & Fees
Committee Meeting
Minutes; April 18,
2001
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; May 9, 2001

MRl Mobile Board
Meeting Minutes; May
16,2001

GSRRP/0006689; Noyes Ex 16

GSRRP/0006903 (same as
GSR/0130;
Schamp Ex 13)
GSRRP /0007224; I. Davey Ex.
20, N. Davey
Depo Ex. No. 15,
Schamp Ex 12,
Reilly Ex 20
Office of the
CFO
SARMCO 1945-6;
Kelly Hall Ex 12
012456-60;
Bruce Ex 56

GSRRP/00645;
Noyes Ex 17

GSRRP/000541

002014-7; Bruce ·
Ex 57
GSRRP/000506;
L.K. Hall Ex 19

Office of the CIO
SARMC0033740; Kelly Hall Ex
6
033023-5;
Henson Ex 9 and
MessmerEx3
GSRRP/00050810; Schamp Ex
11; Fisher Ex 12
GSRRP /00056873; Kelly Hall Ex
21, I. Davey
Depo. Ex. No.
30
002092-6; Bruce
Ex 58, Schamp
Ex 15

001956

4222

Admit

4223

Admit

4224

Admit

4225

Admit

4226

Admit

Operating Agreement
ofiMI; July I, 2001

4227

Admit

4228

Admit

Operating Agreement
of Intermountain
Medical Imaging,
LLC, July I, 2001
Operating Agreement
of Intermountain
Medical Imaging,
LLC; July 1, 2001

4229

Admit

4230

Admit

4231

Admit

IMI Management
Committee Minutes;
August 14, 2001

4232

Admit

MRICI Board Meeting
Minutes; August 15,
2001

Email to Cindy
Schamp and Sandra
Bruce from Ken Fry
re: IMI
agreement/Radiology
Contract/MRI; May
30,2001
Letter to Michael
Hammond from Pat
Miller re: Retention
Letter; June 14,2001
Email to James
Prochaska from Roger
Curran and
attachment; June 26,
2001
Shattuck Hammond
Engagement Letter;
June 26, 2001

Professional Services
Agreement for
Radiology Services
between SARMC and
GSR/SARG; July I,
2001
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; July II, 2001

Office of the
CFO
SARMC01886;
Bruce Ex 18

Office of the
CFO
SARMC081712; Chamberlain
Ex 17
036811-4,
036802

Office of the
CFO
SARMC0660210; Schamp Ex
20
Office of the
CFO
SARMC021632238; Bruce Ex 8
IMI/000700089; L.K. Hall
Ex. No.3,
Schamp Ex 16
Corporate
Development
SARMC00379436; Traughber
Ex. No. 16
GSR/0168- 0216
, Seabourn Ex.
No. 5, Schamp
Ex 19

GSRRP/000583 90; N. Davey Ex
9
IMIRP/000886-9;
Fry Ex 12,
Seaboum Depo
Ex. No. 17, L.K.
Hall Depo Ex.
No. 5, N. Davey
Depo Ex. No. 12,
I. Davey Depo.
Ex. No. 14
002145-8 (same
as 019350019353; L.K.
Hall Ex 24)

001957

4233

Admit

Letter to Ken Fry from
Jack Floyd following
meeting of August 15,
2001

4234

Admit

4235

Admit

Memorandum to Grant
Chamberlain and
Michael Hammond
from Michael Finnerty
and Bill Appleyard re:
St. Alphonsus and
MRIA Overview;
August 30, 2001
Radiology Group
Meeting Minutes;
September 12, 2001
GSR Fees & Finance
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September
13,2001
Finnerty Interview
Notes- Meetings with
MRIA Stakeholders;
September 18-20,
2001
SARMC IT System
Support for IMI
Meeting Minutes;
September 24, 2001
Memorandum to Grant
Chamberlain and
Michael Hammond
from Mike Finnerty
and Bill Appleyard;
September 25, 2001
IMI Management
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September
26,2001

"

4236

Admit

4237

4238

Admit

4239

Admit

4240

Admit

4241

4242

IMI IT Reports;
various dates
beginning October 1,
2001

Admit

IMI Fees & Finance
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October 5,
2001

Office of the
CFO
SARMCOO 182-6;
Fry Ex 32, L.K.
Hall Depo Ex.
No. 23
SH1886-1894;
Schamp Ex 14
(same as
SH0776-86;
Newton Ex 12,
Traughber Ex 9)

GSRRP/000602 611; I. Davey Ex
27
GSRRP/0005223

SH0089-90,
Schamp Ex 22

IMIRP/000890-7;
Kelly Hall Ex 18

SH 0763 - 0775;
N. Davey Ex 4, I.
Davey Ex 7,
Schamp Ex 21

IMIRP/000898000922;
Seaboum Ex 18,
L.K. Hall Ex 14,
N. Davey Ex 19
Office of the CIO
SARMC0186574, 01861-3,
01667-8,
IMIRP/001030,
IMIRP /001 040-1,
IMIRP/001051-2,
IMIRP /00 106891,
IMIRP/001110-2,
IMIRP/001122,
IMIRP/001134,
IMIRP/001144;
Kelly Hall Ex 8
and Su1c
(Hameck) Ex 5
GSRRP/000524525; I. Davey Ex
9

001958

4243

Admit

IMI Management
Meeting Minutes;
October 31,2001

4244

Admit

St. Alphonsus'
Request for Financing
Proposal MRI Limited
Partnership; November
2001

4245

Admit

IMI Operations
Committee Meeting
Minutes; November 5,
2001

4246

Admit

4247

Admit

Valuation Analysis of
MRIA, GP and
Affiliates for SARMC
by Shattuck Hammond
Partners; November 6,
2001
Shattuck Hammond
Partners Presentation
of Strategic Options of
MRIA Ownership
Interest for SARMC;
November 6, 2001

4248

Admit

IMI Marketing
Committee Meeting
Minutes; November
28,2001

4249

Admit

4250

Admit

4251

Admit

MRICI Financial
Statement Budge vs.
Actual; December
2001
Email to Cindy
Schamp and Ken Fry
from Grant
Chamberlain re:
Financing Proposals;
December 10, 2001
Memorandum to Ken
Fry and Cindy Schamp
from Grant
Chamberlain, Mike
Finnerty and Bill
Appleyard re: Debt
and Distribution
Analyses; December
12,2001

IMIRP/000923-4;
Seaboum Depo
Ex. No. 19, L.K.
Hall Depo Ex.
No. 27
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0065915; Bruce Ex 61
(same as Office
of the CFO
SARMC07681-5;
Fisher Ex 15)
GSRRP/0006813; Scales Ex 5, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
10 (same as
GSR/0128;
Seaboum. Ex 11)
SH2436-86

Office of the
CFO
SARMC0644280; Fry Ex 36
(same as
SH0224-270
Schamp Ex 23 );
Fisher Ex 13
GSRRP/0006614; Kelly Hall Ex
20, L.K. Hall
Depo Ex. No. 20,
I. Davey Depo.
Ex. No. 25, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No. 18
031021

Office of the
CFO
SARMC07665;
Fry Ex 38

SH1178-9;
Finnerty Ex 8

001959

4252

Admit

4253

Admit

4254

Email to Cindy
Schmap and Ken Fry
from Bill Appleyard
re: SARMC debt and
distribution analysis;
December 13, 2001
IMIISARMC IT
Meeting Minutes;
December 18, 2001

IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2001
2002 vs. 2001
Comparison Center
Income; not dated

4255

4256

FY 02 Capital
Analysis Budget
(tentative) vs. Actual;
not dated
FY 02 Capital
Analysis Budget vs.
Actual; not dated

4257

4258

FY 02 Capital
Analysis Budget vs.
Actual; not dated

4259

Local Pool Capital FY
02; not dated

4260

Admit

Handwritten notes re:
MRI Restructure;
January 2002

4261

Admit

4262

Admit

4263

Admit

IMI Marketing
Committee Report;
January 2002,
PACS Meeting
Minutes; January 4,
2002
Email to Grant
Chamberlain and
William Appleyard
from Michael Finnerty
re: Distributions;
January 14, 2002
Memo to Leslie Kelly
Hall from Patti
Harneck re: DR
Systems Status Report;
January 23, 2002

4264

Office of the
CFO
SARMC06596-8;
Fry Ex 41

GSRRP/00686-7;
Kelly Hall Ex 22,
I. Davey Depo.
Ex. No. 29, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No. 20, Sulc
(Harneck) Depo
Ex. 4, Seabourn
Depo Ex. No. 20
IMIRP/00322534
Office of the
CFO
SARMC00177-8;
Fry Ex 15
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08838;
Reilly Ex 33
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08867;
Reilly Ex 35
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08878;
Reilly Ex 36
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08924;
Reilly Ex 38
Office of the
CFO
SARMC07696;
Fry Ex 39
IMIRP/000973; I.
Davey Ex. 26
Office of the CIO
SARMC01841-4;
Kelly Hall Ex 15
SH1795-7;
Finnerty Ex 10

Office of the CIO
SARMC01847-9;
Kelly Hall9

001960

4265

Admit

4266

Admit

4267

'

4268

Admit

4269

Admit

4270

Admit

4271

Admit

4272

Admit

4273

Admit

4274

Admit

4275

Admit

4276

Admit

Email to Cindy
Schamp from Ken Fry
re: MRIA; January 29,
2002
Memo to Leslie Kelly
Hall from Patti
Hameckre:
Comparison of options
IMIWestDR
Acquisition Server;
January 31, 2002
IMI Management
Committee Meeting
Minutes; January 31,
2002
Fax to Gwen Moore
(Trinity Health) from
Tiffany Albanese
(Administrative
Assistant, Finance) re:
Shattuck Hammond
Memo; February 6,
2002
Memorandum to Ken
Fry from Grant
Chamberlain re: Work
Plan/Next Steps;
February 12, 2002
Email To Grant
Chamberlain from
Michael Finnerty re:
St. Alphonsus;
February 13, 2002
Email to Ken Fry and
Cindy Schamp from
Grant Chamberlain re:
Work Plan Timeline;
February 15, 2002
St. Alphonsus- MRIA
Restructure Proposal
Discussion Outline
w/Dr. Curran; April 9,
2002
GSR Fees & Finance
Committee Meeting
Minutes; April 12,
2002
Email to Grant
Chamberlain from
Roger Curran re:
Update; April29, 2002
IMI Management
Committee Meeting
Agenda;May30,2002
Fifth Amendment to ·
Articles of Partnership
of MRI Associates;
Augu.st
2002

SH1804;
Chamberlain Ex
9
GSRRP/00082830;
Sulc(Harneck) Ex
6

IMIRP/000976981; I. Davey Ex.
24
Office of the
CFO
SARMC06571-3;
Fry Ex42

SH0001-2, 134-6;
Chamberlain Ex
10

SH1805-8;
Finnerty Ex 14

Office of the
CFO
SARMC07553;
FryEx43
SH1200-l;
Chamberlain Ex
12

GSRRP/0007303

SH1809;
Chamberlain Ex
13
IMIRP/001004,
IMIRP/001015;
FrvEx 26
025015-21

001961

4277

Admit

4278

Admit

4279

Admit

4280

Admit

4281

Admit

4282

Admit

4283

4284

4285

Admit

4286

4287

4288

4289

Admit

.

Letter to MRICI
Scheduling
Department,
Radiology Scheduling
Department from
Radiologistsffim Hall;
August 7, 2002
Email to Dave Giles,
Roger Curran and Jack
Floyd from Mark
Lawrence re: Gem
Radiology; August 19,
2002
Email to Ken Fry from
Mark Lawrence re:
Weekend Issues;
August 26, 2002
Radiology-MRI
Meeting Record;
August 30, 2002
MRI Center of Idaho
Board Meeting
Minutes; September
17,2002
Email to Carolyn
Corbett from Terry
Krogstad Re:
Radiology/MRI
Meeting; September
24,2002
MRI Center of Idaho
Exam Report, Dr.
Garabedian;
September 25, 2002
Email to Jack Floyd
from Debra Scott re:
Personal Service;
September 27, 2002
Handwritten Notes re:
Ben Murray 10/18/02;
October 18, 2002
Email to Ken Fry from
Richard Presnell re:
MRI Distributions;
October 22, 2002
Email to Ken Fry from
Jack Floyd re: New
Pad Site Approval;
October 22, 2002
Email to Ken Fry and
Stephanie Westermeir
from Patrick Miller re:
Partnership Duties MRI; October 25,
2002
DR Usage Percentage
by Location;
November 1, 2002

016331

000061

Office of the
CFO
SARMC07-362;
Fry Ex 28
Office of the
CFO
SARMC07228-9;
Krogstad Ex 5
014111-4;
Garabedian Ex 8

Patient Care
Services
SARMC00565;
Corbett Ex 3

163311-2

033607;
Garabedian Ex 19

033597; Murray
Ex8
SH1443-1449;
Chamberlain Ex
14
Office of the
CFO
SARMC06776;
FryEx29
SH1434,
Chamberalain Ex
16

033627, 040250,
034116, 014825;
Fry Ex 33

001962

4290

4291

4292

Admit

4293

IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2002
MRICI Income
Statement; December
31,2002
November MRI Board
Topics for Discussion
and Follow Up;
November 1, 2002
FY 03 Capital Budget
Local Pool; not dated

4294

FY 03 Capital
Analysis Budget vs.
Actual; not dated

4295

FY 03 Capital Budget
Status; not dated

4296

Admit

4297

Admit

4298

Admit

4299

4300

Admit

4301

4302

Admit

4303

Admit

4304

Admit

IMI Marketing
Committee Meeting
Minutes; April 2, 2003
Sixth Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
of MRI Associates;
April 15,2003
Memorandum to Grant
Chamberlain from Ken
Fryre: MRI
Discussions; April 18,
2003
Draft Letter to Sandra
Bruce from Roger
Curran; May I, 2003
Email to Roger
Curran, James
Prochaska, and David
Giles from Jack
Havlina re: DMR
Agreement and Rads;
May 5, 2003
Email to Rick Presnell
from Jack Floyd re: redirected Patient; June
3,2003
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Roger Curran;
June 3, 2003
IMI Operations
Committee Meeting
Minutes; June 20,
2003
MFP Management
Steering Committee
Meeting Summary;
June 24, 2003

IMIRP/00323544 Office of the
CFO
030946

SARMC07382-7;
Bruce Ex 62

Office of the
CFO
SARMC08864;
Reilly Ex 34
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08901;
Reilly Ex 37
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08925;
Reilly Ex 39
GSRRP/0008969; N. Davey Ex 6
025022-35

SH1435-42;
Chamberlain Ex
15

014879-80

037250; Havlina
Ex2

034325, Hopkins
Ex 16

014191-2

GSRRP/0009405; Garabedian Ex
22
Office of the
President
SARMC12190-3;
Corbett Ex4

001963

4305

Admit

4306

Admit

4307

Admit

4308

4309

Admit

4310

Admit

4311

Admit

4312

4313

Admit

4314

Admit

4315

Admit

4316

Admit

4317

DR Systems Invoice to
SARMC; June 24,
2003
IMI Operations
Committee Meeting
Minutes; July 16, 2003
Email to Jack Floyd
from Thomas Henson
re: Agreement for MRI
Services; July 18, 2003
Email to Jack Floyd
from Julli Hopkins re:
list; September 4, 2003
MRI ofldaho Special
Meeting Minutes and
Agenda; September 8,
2003
Negotiating Timeline;
September 8, 2003

MRI Center of Idaho
Board Meeting
Minutes; September 8,
2003
Surgeries Within 8
Weeks that are Safe to
Scan; September 19,
2003
CEO Report;
September 30, 2003

IMI Management
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October 28,
2003
Presentation to Trinity
Health: Overview of
the Restructuring of
the MRIA Limited
Partnership & the
Simultaneous Merger
ofMRICI and IMI;
October 30, 2003

IMI Fees & Finance
Committee Meeting
Minutes; December 1,
2003
Handwritten meeting
notes by Dr. Curran;
December 17, 2003

Office of the CIO
SARMC01336-8;
Kelly Hall Ex 25
GSRRP/0009478; Corbett Ex 5
036222-38;
Henson Ex 11

0341 72; Hopkins
Ex3
028043-6;
Corbett Ex 6

Office of the
President
SARMC010658;
Bruce Ex 65
014188-9

Garabedian Ex 10

Office of the
President.
SARMC07043-4;
Bruce Ex 22,
Fisher Ex 17
IMIRP /001 062;
Sulc(Harneck) Ex
3
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0677786; Bruce Ex 64,
Seabourn Depo
Ex. No. 12, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 32,N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No. 21; Fisher Ex
16
GSRRP /0008847; Gobel Ex 14

024271--9

001964

4318

Admit

4319

Admit

4320

4321

4322
4323

Letter to Tom
Banducci from Pat
Miller and follow-up
correspondence;
December 22,2003,
February 20, 2004, and
February 24, 2004
MRICI Income
Statement; December
31,2003
IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2003
FY 04 Capital Budget
Status; updated July
20,2004

015659, 025573,
014547; Bruce
Ex68

015477

IMIRP/00324557
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08926;
Reilly Ex 40

WITHDRAWN

4324

GSR Charges by Year
and Amounts Applied
Charges Dated 20012004
GSR Fees & Finances
Committee Meeting
Minutes; January 12,
2004
Email to David Giles,
Roger Curran, and
James Prochaska from
Jack Havlina re: MRI;
January 12, 2004
Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Julli Hopkins,
and Robin Cioffi from
Ben Murray re:
JCAHO; January 14,
2004
SARMC Monthly
Imaging Strategy
Meeting; January 20,
2004

4325

Admit

4326

Admit

4327

Admit

4328

Admit

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; January 20,
2004

4329

Admit

4330

Admit

4331

Admit

Letter to Roger Curran
from Sandra Bruce re:
Notice of Withdrawal;
February 24, 2004
Letter to Patrick Miller
from Tom Banducci
re: MRI Associates;
February 25,2004
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; February 25,
2004

Cliff30(b)(6) Ex
1

GSRRP/0009701; Gobel Ex 15

035919; Havlina
Ex 3 and Giles
Ex20

Patient Care
Services
SARMC00512;
MurrayEx37

Corporate
Development
SARMC00125-7;
I. Davey Ex. 22
and N. Davey Ex.
16
GSRRP/000988
R-92; Gobel Ex
12, N. Davey Ex
11 (Redacted
version
GSR/0138 used
as Bruce Ex 17)
021657-8; Bruce
Ex21

032376

GSRRP/000993
R-5; Noyes Ex 32

001965

4332

Admit

4333

Admit

4334

Admit

4335

Admit

4336

Admit

4337

4338

4339

Admit

4340

Admit

4341

Admit

4342

Admit

4343

Admit

4344

Admit

Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Mark Adams,
Mark Dalley, and
Joseph Messmer re:
officer to sell MRICI
and buy SARMC's
share in MRIM; March
5,2004
Letter to Mark Adams,
Mark Dalley, and Joe
Messmer from Sandra
Bruce re: Saint
Alphonsus
Withdrawal; March
10,2004
PACS Team Meeting
Minutes; March 12,
2004 and various dates
IMI Marketing
Committee Minutes;
March 10, 2004
IMI Strategy Session
Minutes; March 16,
2004
Email to Janelle Reilly
and Ken Fry from
Carolyn Corbett re:
MRI; March 17, 2004
Email to Carolyn
Corbett from Mike
Boydre: MRI
Contract, Agreement
for MRI Services
between SARMC and
BP Consulting; March
18,2004
Handwritten notes;
March 22, 2004

SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Meeting Summary;
March 23, 2004
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Roger Curran re:
response to withdraw!;
March 23,2004
Email to Sandra Bruce
from Carolyn Corbett
re: MRI conversation;
March 26, 2004
Radiology Marketing
Committee Meeting
Minutes; March 30,
2004
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; April 20,
2004

021742-3

Office ofthe
President
SARMC0106467; Bruce Ex 23,
Fisher Ex 18

Office of the CIO
SARMC01789838; Kelly Hall
Ex 10
GSRRP /00 10402; Noyes Ex 33
Patient Care
Services
SARMC00845-6;
Bruce Ex 25
Department of
Radiology
SARMC00758;
Krogstad Ex 8
Patient Care
Services
SARMC0038595; Bruce Ex 26

Office of the
President
SARMC010645;
Seabourn Ex 16
Office of the
President
SARMC1203941; Corbett Ex 10
003020-2

Office of the
President
SARMC 010643;
Hopkins Ex 6
GSRRP /0010434; N. Davey Ex 8

GSRRP/0009991002; Gobel Ex
16

001966

4345

Admit

4346

Admit

4347

Admit

4348

Admit

4349

Admit

4350

Admit

4351

Admit

4352

Admit

4353

Admit

4354

Admit

4355

4356

4357

4358

Admit

SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Meeting Summary;
April27, 2004
Radiology Group
Meeting Minutes; June
2,2004
Letter to Jack Floyd
from Bill Radaj;
August 6, 2004
Letter to Joseph Gobel
from Carolyn Corbett
re: Medical Director;
August 10, 2004
Email to Julli Hopkins
from Joseph Gobel re:
Exam Protocol and
various; August 28,
2004 and various
Imaging Strategic Plan
Environmental
Assessment, Imaging
Planning Team;
August 31, 2004
Letter to Pat Miller
from Mark Ellison and
attachments;
September 3, 2004
Seventh Amendment
to Articles of
Partnership of MRI
Associates LLP;
November 10, 2004
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from MRICI Board of
Directors; December
3,2004
SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Meeting Summary;
December 7, 2004
Email to Julli Hopkins
from Tim Hall re: MRI
Scheduling; December
14,2004
MRICI Radiology
Report by Jeff
Seabourn "MRI of the
Liver with and without
Contrast"; December
17,2004
Memo to Saint
Alponsus Medical
Staff from Sandra
Bruce; December 20,
2004
IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2004

Office of the
President
SARMC12270;
Corbett Ex 11
GSRRP /001 0035; Gobel Ex 11
034308

Patient Care
Services
SARMC00735;
Scales Ex
042584-90, 9293, 96; Hopkins
Ex 1

IMIRP/0011661282; Reilly Ex
21

039031-7

036987-92

025045; Berger
Ex6

Office of the
President
SARMC12081-3
034173; Hopkins
Ex8

042160-042162
, Seabourn Depo
Ex. No. 6, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No.6
Patient Care
Services
SARMC00175

IMIRP/00178797

001967

4359

Admit

4360

4361

4362

Admit

4363

Admit

4364

4365

4366

Admit

4367

Admit

4368
4369

4370

Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Jeff Cliff and
Tim Hall from Jeffrey
Seabou.m rc: MRICI
patients on DR;
January 10, 2005
Email to Robin Cioffi
and Julli Hopkins from
Scott Berger re:
SARMC Issues;
January 27, 2005
SARMC"MRI
Meeting" Minutes;
February 21, 2005
SARMCMRI
Operations Team
Meeting Minutes;
March 21, 2005
Letter to ICR from
Sandra Bruce; March
22,2005
Defendant's First Set
of Interrogatories and
Requests for
Production; May 20,
2005
DR Invoices to MRICI
from Saint Alphonsus;
June 22, 2005 and
various
SARMC Board of
Trustees Meeting
Minutes; September
20,2005
Email to Ben Murray,
Carolyn Corbett,
Robert Polk, Janelle
Reilly, Jean Basom,
and Sandra Bruce from
Ken Fry re: Mobile
MRI at SARMC;
October 6, 2005
WITHDRAWN
Email to Ben Murray,
Dennis Adams, Karen
Noyes, Kendall Miller,
Laurea Howell, Sarah
Berg; Scott
Chirstensen from
Terry Krogstad re:
MRI Communications
Plan & Physician
Letter; November 8,
2005
Clinical Operations
Team Meeting Agenda
(SARMCIIMI MRI);
November 22, 2005

Patient Care
Services
SARMCO 1036;
Kelly Hall Ex 30

042153; Berger
Ex5

Patient Care
Services
SARMC00003-4;
Corbett Ex 12
Patient Care
Services
SARMC00002;
Corbett Ex 13
Bruce Ex 67

L.K. Hall
(30(b)(6)) Ex.
No.2

040229-41;
Cioffi Ex 7

Office of the
President
SARMC11642-8
Director of
Nursing
SARMCOOOll;
Murray Ex 12

Department of
Radiology
SARMC00924-5;
Murray Ex 14

Office of the
General Counsel
SARMC00295-6;
MurrayEx38

001968

4371

4372

4373

Admit

4374

Admit

4375

Admit

4376

Admit

4377

Admit

4378

4379

4380

Admit

Email to Ben Murray
from Sandra Bruce re:
MRI; December 5,
2005
Email to Ben Murray
from Sandra Bruce re:
MRI Update;
December 9, 2005
Agreement for MRI
Services between
SARMC and IMI;
December 9, 2005
First Amendment to
Operating Agreement
of Intermountain
Medical Imaging,
LLC; December 9,
2005
Option and Purchase
Agreement between
ICR and SADC;
December 9, 2005
Email to Carolyn
Corbett from Ben
Murray re: MRI
Letter; December 11,
2005
Email to BCC, Front
Office, Gen Rad
Techs, Nuc Med
Group, Nurses, Rad
Admin, Rad
Assistants, Specials,
Ultrasound from Scott
Christensen re: New
MRI Services;
December 12, 2005
Email to Jack Gjording
from Manfred Steiner
re: MRI ; December
14,2005
Email to Ben Murray,
Carolyn Corbett,
Dennis Adams, Joseph
Gobel, Kevin Dwello,
Karen Noyes, and
Sandra Bruce from
Neil Hamilton re: MRI
Issues; December 15,
2005
Email to All nurse,
CNA's, et al from Ben
Murray re: MRI
Opening; December
16,2005

Director of
Nursing
SARMC00013;
Murray Ex 16
Director of
Nursing
SARMC00015;
MurrayEx21
IMIRP/00171936; Kelly Hall Ex
4
IMIRP/00 166977; Bruce Ex 66

Office of General
Counsel
SARMC00259264
Director of
Nursing
SARMC00093-4;
MurrayEx22
Department of
Radiology
SARMCO 1472-4;
Murray Ex 23

Steiner Ex 11

Director of
Nursing
SARMC00017;
Murray Ex 17

Office of the
CFO
SARMC08320;
Murray Ex 24

001969

4381

Admit

4382

4383

4384

4385

4386

4387

Admit

4388

4389

4390

4391

4392

Admit

Email to Adam Feider,
Connie Stern, Dennis
Adams, Garna Barker,
et al. from Ben Murray
re: MRI Agenda and
Minutes; December
19,2005
Email to Adam Feider,
Carolyn Corbett,
Connie Stern, et al.
from Ben Murray re:
MRI update;
December 20, 2005
Email to Ben Murray
from Robin Cioffi re:
Service; December 20,
2005
Email to Adam Feider,
Connie Stern, Dennis
Adams, et al. from Ben
Murray re: MRI
Launch - IMMED
ATTN; December 21,
2005
Email to Robin Cioffi
from Ben Murray re:
Undeliverable: MRI
Discussion; December
21,2005
Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Karen Noyes,
Adam Feider, Ben
Murray, Darrell
Fugate, Dennis Adams
from Joseph Gobel re:
MRI Concerns;
December 30, 2005
MRI Center of Idaho
Business I Income
Statement; December
31,2005
IMI Financial
Statements; December
31, 2005 and 2004
Email to Diana
Trujillo from Ben
Murray re: MRI
Transport; January 3,
2006
New Saint Alphonsus
MRI Launches;
January 9, 2006
MRI Associates'
Motion to Compel;
January 13, 2006
Memorandum in
Support ofMRl
Associates' Motion to
Compel; January 13,
2006

Department of
Radiology
SARMC01495;
Murray Ex 19

Director of
Nursing
SARMCOOllO;
Murray Ex 26

Director of
Nursing
SARMC00109;
MurrayEx25
Director of
Nursing
SARMCOOlll;
Murray Ex 20

Director of
Nursing
SARMC00117-8;
Murray Ex 27
Department of
Radiology
SARMC01734-6;
Murray Ex 18

IMIRP/00325870
Director of
Nursing
SARMC00121;
Murray Ex 29
Cioffi Ex 3

001970

4393

Handwritten notes re:
GSR-Radiologists;
January 22, 2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Terry Krogstad;
January 25, 2006

4394

4395

43%

4397

4398

4399

4400

4401

4402

4403

4404

4405

4406

Admit

Email to Ben Murray
from Terry Krogstad
re: MRI Coverage
Thursday night;
January 26, 2006
Letter/Fax to Thomas
Banducci from Trudy
Hanson Fouser re:
Motion to Compel;
January 31, 2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Robin Cioffi re:
Sedation Cases;
February 3, 2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Robin Cioffi re:
Sedation Cases;
February 6, 2006
List of Documents
Delivered to Manfred
Steiner; February 28,
2006
Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Directors,
MRIGroup from Ben
Murray re: MRI
Coverage on Wed
March 1st; February
28,2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Robin Cioffi; re:
recap; March 3, 2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Terry Krogstad
re: MRI Coverage
Wednesday; March 7,
2006
Assignment of
Membership Interest
between ICR and
SADC; April 1, 2006
Trinity Health
Consolidated Financial
Statements for the
Years Ended June 30,
2006 and 2005 and
Independent Auditors'
Report
DEPT#'s 89914 (MRI
Billable Cost) &
89915 (MRI Mobile
Unit); 2006
Hand-Drawn Sketch;
September 20, 2006

Reinstein Ex 5

Department of
Radiology
SARMC00985-6;
Murray Ex 30
Department of
Radiology
SARMC00993;
Murray Ex 31

042177; Murray
Ex32

042175-6;
Murray Ex 33

Steiner Ex 6

Department of
Radiology
SARMC01248;
Murray Ex 34

042178; Murray
Ex35
Department of
Radiology
SARMC01021;
Murray Ex 36
Office of General
Counsel
SARMC00554-5

Wellspring
SARMC020;
Stein Ex 7

L.K. Hall Ex. No.
11

001971

4407

-

4408

4409

Admit

4410

4411

4412

Admit

4413

Admit

4414

4415

4416

4417

4417(a)

Admit

4418
4419
4420
4421
4422
4423
4424
4425

4426

Admit

Handwritten notes re:
St. Als; October 26,
2006
Preliminary Expert
Witness Report MSN
v. Compunet;
September 5, 2006
Curriculum Vitae of
Jeffrey Todd
Seaboum, M.D.; 2006
Internet Printout from
aboutimi.com Re:
Jeffrey T. Seaboum,
M.D.; printed October
3,2006
Transcript of
Deposition of Dennis
Reinstein for MSN v.
Compunet; October 5,
2006
Resume of Joseph A.
Messmer; 2007
Curriculum Vitae of
Paul D. Traughber,
M.D.; 2007
Invoices from Hooper
Cornell to Eberle
Berlin; January 31,
2007 and various
Letter to Daniel
Gordon from Jack
Gjording re: Saint
Alphonsus Capital
Budgets; February 23,
2007
Handwritten notes re:
Meeting with Jeff;
March 3, 2007
Expert Report of
Bruce Budge; March
12,2007
Excerpt of Budge
Report - Schedule B
Timeline of Events;
2007
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
PMI Data- IMI MRI
Exams 2001- current
spreadsheet
IMI Financial Data;
1999-2005

Steiner Ex 1

Reinstein Ex 8

Seaboum Ex. No.
2
Seabourn Ex. No.
3

Reinstein Ex 9

Messmer Ex 2
Traughber Ex.
No.2
Reinstein Ex 1

Reilly Ex 24

Reinstein Ex 10

Reinstein Ex 4

PMI000288-1488

IMIRP/0001 04681

001972

4427

MRICI Accounts
Receivable
Transaction
Summaries; 19852006

4428

Admit

MRICI Charges by
Referring Physician;
1998 - March 31,
2001

4429

Admit

MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
3 1, 1991 and 1990

4430

Admit

4431

Admit

4432

Admit

4433

Admit

4434

Admit

4435

Admit

4436

Admit

4437

Admit

4438

Admit

4439

Admit

MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 1991
and 1990
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 1997 and 1996
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 1997
and 1996
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 1998 and 1997
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 1998
and 1997
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
3 1, 1999 and 1998
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 1999
and 1998
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31,2000 and 1999
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2000
and 1999
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2001 and 2000

Office of the
President
SARMC00654,
008141, Office
the President
SARMC05977,
018290, Office of
the CFO
SARMC03095,
031776,031809,
031537, 012279,
, 031036,
042337-9,
042206-7,
042265-6,
042319-20
031936, 031840,
031795,031539,
011880-1,
011919,0122801, 012307-8
Office of the
President
SARMC0053140
Office of the
President
SARMC0054151
032188-99

032176-86

032152-62

032164-74

012052-61

032142-50

019776-85

019787-96

013100-9

001973

4440

Admit

4441

Admit

4442

Admit

4443

Admit

4444

Admit

4445

Admit

4446

Admit

4447

Admit

4448

Admit

4449

Admit

4450

Admit

4451

Admit

4452

Admit

4453

4454

4455
4456

MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2001
and 2000
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2002 and 2001
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2002
and 2001
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2003 and 2002
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2003
and 2002
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2004 and 2003
MRI Mobile LP;
December 31, 2004
and 2003
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2005 and 2004
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2005
and 2004
MRICI Business I
Balance Sheet; July
31,2006
MRICI Business J
Income Statement;
July 31, 2006
MRIM Business II
Balance Sheets; July
21,2006
MRIM Business II
Income Statement;
July 31, 2006
Data Form for daily
MRI equipment QC;
not dated
Data Form for daily
MRI equipment QC;
not dated
Laser film printer
control chart; not dated
ACRAnnual
Performance Analysis:
1.5 T Symphony
MRICI (with
handwritten notes);
October 18, 2004

013090-9

032015-24

013845-54

015673-82

024250-9 (same
as 021439-48)

040197-207

040208-18

042191-200

042181-90

042315

042317

042325

042327

043511-20

043521-31

043532-35
043536-49

001974

4457

4458

4459

4460

4461

4462

4463

4464

4465

4466

4467

4468
4469
4470
4471

4472
4473

Admit

ACRAnnual
Performance Analysis:
1.5 T GE Signa
MRlCI; October 18,
2004
ACR Certificate for
MRl Center: GE
Twinspeed; March 11,
2007
ACR Certificate for
MRl Center: Siemens
Symphony; March 11,
2007
MRl Center ACR
accreditation
certificate for 1998
Siemens System
MRl Scanner
Evaluation- GE 1.5T:
November 8, 2006
MRl Scanner
Evaluation- GE 1.5T:
November 8, 2006
MRl Scanner
Evaluation- Siemens
1.5T: November 8,
2006
MRl Scanner
Evaluation- Siemens
1.5T:
November 8, 2006
MRl Center ACR
accreditation:
December 8, 2000
Siemens Symphony
service records 20002006: not dated
ACRIMRl annual
performance review
verification:
November 21,2006
GE Service Records:
Various Dates
GE Service Records:
Various Dates
CV of Bob Bell
ACR Performance
Analysis of the 1.5 T
Symphony at MRlCI;
October 18, 2004
Siemens Service
Records
ACR Performance
Review of Siemens 1.5
T Symphony MRl at
the MRl Center of
Idaho; January 25,
2007

043550-65

043597

043598

056643

056658-63

056664-70

056671-76

056677-83

056694-95

056899-057073

057074-75

057115-406
057410-058431
Bell Ex 2
(replace?)
043566-79

043580-2
Bell Ex 4

001975

4474

4475

4476
4477

4478

4479

4480

4481
4482
4483
4484
4485
4486
4487
4488

4489

Admit

ACR Performance
ReviewofGE
Twinspeed 1.5 T
Excite; January 25,
2007
AlliTPACS
Committee Meeting
Minutes; various dates
AllSARMC
Discovery Responses
Fax to Mark Adams,
Milt Kutsurelis, and
Marty Hutson from
Cindy Schamp re:
PWC estimates of fair
market value ofMRI
Mobie; June 8, 2000
Memo to Sandra Bruce
and Cindy Schamp
from Roger Curran
"Negotiating with the
Radiologists"; October
27, 1999
IMI's Supplemental
Responses to MRIA's
First Requests for
Production of
Documents; November
16,2006
Saint Alphonsus
Building Company
Board of Directors
Annual Meeting;
October 11, 1999
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
Meeting with Jeff Cliff
and Outline for
Discussion
Presentation by Cindy
Schamp
Purchase/Restructuring
Options for MRI
Associat!)s; January 26
and Febru~ 1, 2000
Certified copies of
Idaho Secretary of
State Annual Report
Forms- IMI; 2002;
2002
REINSTATEMENT;
2003 and 2004

Bell Ex 5

Various

Various
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0776670; Kutsurelis Ex
5

Office of the
CFO
SARMC07417;
Kutsurelis Ex 6

Office of the
President
SARMC12750;
Fugate Ex 1

001976

4490

4491
4492
4493

4494

4495

4496

4497

4498

4499
4500
4501
4502

Admit

4503

4504

4505

Admit

4506
4507
4508
4509
4510
4511

Admit

4512

Admit

Memorandum
Decision on Plaintiffs
Motions to Strike,
Cross-Motions for
Summary Judgement,
and Plaintiff/Third
Party Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss
CV Charles Wilhoite
Expert Opinion of
Charles Wilhoite
Expert Opinion of
Charles Wilhoite;
Rebuttal
Documents
Considered by C.
Wilhoite
Expert Opinion of
Bruce Budge
Supplemental
Expert Opinion of
Bruce Budge
Amended
MRI Limited
Financial Statement
2007
Email from Roger
Curran to MRIA
Board and attached
letter to Sandra Bruce
from Roger Curran;
May6, 2003
MRI Center Financials
2005
MRI Limited
Financials 2010
MRI Limited Financial
Statement 2009
Trinity Health
Integrity Program
9/1/99 Statement for
Services from C.
Harder
8/19/99 Letter to R.
Denning from Dr.
Giles
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Gem State
Radiology, 3/24/05
CV of Bruce Budge
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
Memo to Fry and
Schamp from
Chamberlin dated
12/11101
CD of Schamp Video
Clips

03692-4

Denning4;
GSRRP001594
Denning 6;
GSRRP001602-3

001977

Admit

4513
4514

4515

4516

4517

4518

--

4519
4520
4521
4522

4523
4524

Admit

4525
4526
4527
4528
4529
4530
4531
4532
4533

Admit

4534
4535

Admit

Cindy Schamp Video
Designations
GSR Charges by Year
and Amounts Applied
2001-2004
SARDC Answers and
Objections to MRlA's
First Set of
Interrogatories 3/24111
SARDC Answers and
Objections to MRlA's
Second Set of
Interrogatories and
Requests for
Production 4/15/11
SADC Answers and
Objections to MRlA's
Third Set of
Interrogatories and
Requests for
Production 4/27111
SADC Answers and
Objections to MRlA's
5th Set of
Interrogatories and
Requests for
Production 5/12/11
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
Expert Opinion of
Charles Wilhoite dated
3/12/07
RESERVED
Appendix B to Charles
Wilhoite Opinion
dated 3/12/07
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
114/05 Letter from
Seabourn to
Colleagues
RESERVED
12/18/00 Letter to Dr.
Garabedian at IMI
fromACR

001978

AUG 1 7 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By LARA AMES
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED
EXHIBIT LIST

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 1

001979

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership;
and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER,
CounterDefendants.
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") submit the following list
of exhibits which are anticipated for Saint Alphonsus's case in chief. In addition to the exhibits
identified on the following list, Saint Alphonsus reserves the right to utilize any exhibit,
document or other thing identified by any party in this case as an exhibit; any exhibit necessary
for impeachment of any witness; any exhibit, document or other thing identified or produced
during the discovery or in response to subpoena in this case by any party or other person or
entity; and demonstrative exhibits to otherwise explain or highlight any other evidence or facts
presented in this case.
Saint Alphonsus reserves the right to add to, subtract from, or otherwise amend,
supplement or withdraw exhibits identified in this list.

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST2
001980

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

1

Memo re: Buy-Sell DR's Corp from M. Lindstrom toR.
Curran (015496-98)

2001

2

R. Curran handwritten notes (024516-21)

2003

3

SARG 1983 Partnership Agreement (Giles 67-82)

10/1/1983

4

D. Giles handwritten notes (005921-23)

10/3111984

5

Letter to prospective general partners (SARMC681 - 700
Givens Pursley)

1118/1984

6

R. Curran letter to C. Anton (3357- 3358)

1112111984

7

Letter from A Kuykendall, M.D. to D. Giles, M.D. (004672)

12/13/1984

8

Memo to Dr. Giles from MTBR&F (16495 -16498)

2/8/1985

9

Letter from L. Ed Miller to Neal Newhouse (SARMC2489
Office of Pres.)

2/26/1985

10

Proposed Mod. To Draft No.3 of Art. OfMRIA (SARMC
2490 - 2494 Office of Pres.)

2/26/1985

11

Draft Articles of Partnership (6091-611 0)

3/5/1985

12

Letter from L. Ed Miller to Sr. Pat Vandenberg (SARMC568570 GP)

3/5/1985

13

Signed Art. Of Partnership ofMRIA (26799- 26821)

3/7/1985

14

Letter from R. Curran toN. Newhouse (016480-84)

3/25/1985

15

Articles of Partnership ofMRIA (SARMC01032-1054 Office
ofCFO)

4/26/1985

16

Draft Articles of Partnership ofMRIA (SARMC 467- 486
GP)

4/30/1985

17

Draft Articles of Partnership ofMRIA (SARMC450 -466 GP)

5/1/1985

18

Draft Articles of Partnership ofMRIA (11452- 11473)

5/16/1985

19

Limited Partnership Agreement ofMRI Limited (9940- 9952)

8/2/1985

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 3

001981

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

20

Building Lease Agreement (14604- 14638)

9/19/1985

21

Ground Lease b/t SARMC and SABC (16055- 16064)

9/19/1985

22

Tentative Plan Regarding Financing ofMRI Machine for MRI
Center ofldaho (CH001210-11)

12/10/1987

23

C. Harder Letter to MRI Limited Brd. Of Partners (010917010920)

5/9/1988

24

Limited Partnership Agreement ofMRI Mobile Limited
(26877 - 26891)

10/17/1988

25

West Boise Radiology Partnership Agreement (Giles 00307318)

31111990

26

Deloitte and Touche Fairmarket Value Assessment of 50%
Controlling interest in MRIA (SARMC5272 - 5296 CFO)

8/18/1992

27

Letter from SADC et alto R. Curran et al (011483)

8/24/1992

28

IMI Partnership Agreement (Giles 00084-109)

9/l/1992

29

MTBR&F Letter to Drs. Giles and Prochaska (65 - 66)

2/3/1997

30

SARMC/SARG Medical Services Agreement (Giles 0000219)

5/l/1997

31

ICR Partnership Agreement (Giles 00328-338)

8/10/1998

32

SBB Notes (SARMC 10620- 10621 Office of the Pres.)

8/20/1998

33

C. Harder invoice to MRIA (CH001835)

9/l/1998

34

Memo from S. Cruz to C. Schamp (SARMC 02657 Office of
CFO)

9/16/1998

35

Handwritten notes (023467)

11/12/1998

36

Draft outline ofletter of intent with 11/16 notes from D. Giles
to C. Harder- (GSRRP001502-04)

11/16/1998

37

Draft outline ofletter of intent with 11/16 notes from D. Giles
to C. Harder (GSR/671-672)

11/16/1998

38

Memo from T. Henson to SBB (033027 -31) (corrected to
include omitted pages)

1127/1999

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 4
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

39

Email from C. Harder to J. Prochaska (000920, 926-30)

2/2/1999

40

Kurtz Letter to A Hahn (SARMC 10596 - 10597 Office of
Pres.)

2/5/1999

41

Email re: MRIA-SARG Proposal from C. Harder to Dr.
Prochaska w/ attachments (898-903) (corrected- prior exhibit
contained wrong document)

2/15/1999

42

PWC Letter to C. Schamp (SARMC1745- 1752 CFO)

2/1611999

43

C. HarderlettertoJ. Cliff(CH001815)

4/22/1999

44

A Hahn visit agenda (SARMC 00934 Office ofCFO)

7/16/1999

45

PWC FMV Assessment of20% Partnership Interest
(Draft)(SARMC 07445-07494 Office ofCFO)

7/31/1999

46

A Hahn email to S. Bratley (SARMC 7429 - 7430 Office of
CFO)

8/4/1999

47

USB Business Loan Transmittal (USB00979 - 981)

8/5/1999

48

USB Application for Approval (USB00982)

8/5/1999

49

Fax to C. Harder from J. Cliff (33756)

8/10/1999

50

ICRIIMI Lease Agreement (Giles 00020-38)

8/16/1999

51

USBIICR Loan Agreement (USB1019- 1041)

8/18/1999

52

USBIIMIIICR Loan Agreement (USB 163 - 196)

8/18/1999

53

Promissory Note-ICR to USB ($908,000)(USB00177- 178)

8/18/1999

54

PromissoryNote-ICR to USB ($960,000)(USB00179-180)

8/18/1999

55

Commercial Security Agreement-USBIICR (USB21 0 - 213)

8/18/1999

56

Commercial Guarantee-USB/ICR-Wm. T. Murray, Guarantor
(USB00378 -380)

8/18/1999

57

USBIICR Deed ofTrust (USB183-188)

8/18/1999

58

Business Loan Agreement USB/Wm T. Murray et al (USB191
- 195)

8/18/1999

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST5
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

59

Construction Loan Agreement USBIICR (USB369- 375)

8/18/1999

60

Promissory Note USBIICR (3,600,000)(USB00357)

8/18/1999

61

Operating Agreement of Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC
(Giles 00351-54)

8/20/1999

62

Dr. Giles/IMI Letter toR. Denning (GSRRP1595- 1598),
with double hearsay redacted

8/24/1999

63

PWC Valuation of 50 Percent Interest in Intermountain
Medical Imaging LLC (SARMC01321-1336 Office of the
CFO)

9/1/1999

64

Letter re: opening of!MI (GSRRP/000218-219)

10/4/1999

65

PWC letter to C. Schamp re: financial advisory services
(SARMCI822- I836 CFO)

I0/25/I999

66

Memo to SBB and C. Schamp from R. Curran (SARMC
07417 Office ofCFO)

10/27/1999

67

Memo re: Joint Venture Imaging Center (SARMC 06847-48
Office of Pres.)

11/11/1999

68

Power Point Pres. Re: IMI Joint Venture (SARMC 068496866 Office of Pres.)

11111/1999

69

Restructuring ofMRIA General Partnership (SH1551- 1562)

11/29/1999

70

Dr. Henson Memo to SBB (032441)

12/6/1999

71

Email from R. Abello to SBB (SARMC 9200 Office of Pres.)

12/14/1999

72

SBB Notes (SARMC 09913-I5 Office of Pres.)

12116/1999

73

Email from D. Giles to J. Prochaska et at (001365)

12/18/1999

74

Email from D. Giles to J. Pochaska (001364)

I2119/1999

75

Doctors Corp. letter to Sandra Bruce dated 1/4/2000
(SARMC9910-9911 Office of Pres.)

1/4/2000

76

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (1431-1432)

77

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (1436)

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS 'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST - 6

001984

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

In
Evidence

78

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce ( 1444-1448)

79

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (1468)

80

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (14876)

81

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (24635)

82

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (24646)

83

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (35281-35282)

84

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (38758-38759)

85

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (38760-38761)

86

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (38762-38763)

87

Draft of Doctors Corp Jetter to Sandra Bruce (32367)

88

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (32445-32446)

89

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (SARMC99259926 Office of the Pres.)

90

Date

Reserved

91

Agenda for meeting with J. Cliff(SARMC 01239 Office of
CFO)

l/26/2000

92

Email from D. Giles toR. Curran (011962)

l/29/2000

93

Email to D. Giles from R. Curran (011963)

1/31/2000

94

Application of Retainer pd. By MRI Center ofldaho w/
attached invoices (CH001800, CH004687,004862,000600)

2/l/2000

95

Email from K. Sands to S. Bratley (SARMC 07991 Office of
CFO)

2/8/2000

96

Memo from K. Sands to C. Schamp (SARMC 07984-07986
Office ofCFO)

2/18/2000

97

Memo from T. Henson to SBB (032432)

2/23/2000

98

Draft Agenda for Discussion (SARMC 01211 Office ofCFO)

3/8/2000

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST001985
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

99

M. Czech letter toR. Curran (012421-28)

4/10/2000

100

Email from C. Schamp toT. Hall (GSR0357)

5/5/2000

101

Letter to C. Schamp from PWC re: Assessment ofFMV of
MRIM (SARMC 07766 -7775 Office ofCFO) (corrected to
include full copy of document)

5/16/2000

102

J. Cliff letter toR. Curran (014909-14910)

7/17/2000

103

Letter from J. Cliff toR. Curran (022512-13)

7/17/2000

104

Idaho Sec. Of State receipt w/ attachments (CH000008-12)

8/18/2000

105

Amendment to Loan Agreement between ICR et al & USB
(Giles 00285-86)

8/20/2000

106

Amend. And Restated Cert. Of Limited Partnership--MRI
Limited (24755)

8/22/2000

107

Amend. And Restated Cert. Of Limited Partnership--MRI
Mobile (24903)

8/22/2000

108

C. Harder invoice for professional services (CH00003)

9/1/2000

109

Release and Reaffirmation Agreement between Murray et al
and USB (Giles 00283-84)

10/18/2000

110

Notice of Offer to Purchase (027670)

ll/27/2000

111

Letter from A Curran to J. Curran (027660)

11/27/2000

112

C. Harder Letter to D. Giles (Giles 00276-277)

3/8/2001

113

Memo from T. Henson to DMR (033023-33025)

4/5/2001

114

IMI Operating Agreement (IMI0007-89)

7/1/2001

115

Professional Services Agreement (Radiology Services)
(SARMC 00591-00641 Corporate Development)

7/l/2001

116

Letter from J. Floyd to K. Fry (SARMC 00182-183 Office of
CFO)

8/1/2001

117

USB Credit Approval (USB00009-15)

8/6/2001

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 8

001986

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

118

Notes re: meetings with MRIA stake holders (SH0089 - 90)

9/18/2001

119

G. Chamberlain handwritten option 1 (SH1562)

111112001

120

Shattuck Hammond Presentation of Strategic Options
(SARMC10728-10766 Office of the Pres)

1116/2001

121

Shattuck Hammond Presentation of Valuation ofMRIA
(SARMC10767-108010ffice of the Pres)

1116/2001

122

Request for Financing Proposals prepared by Shattuck
Hammond (SARMC06752 -6756 Office ofCFO)

12/11/2001

123

Memo to Leslie Kelly Hall from Patti Hameck (SARMC1847
-1849CIO)

1123/2002

124

Memo to K. Fry from G. Chamberlain (SARMC 06764 Office
ofCFO)

2112/2002

125

Email from G. Chamberlain toP. Miller and Ken Fry
(SH1202)

4/9/2002

126

G. Chamberlain discussion outline with Dr. Curran w/ GC
handwritten note (SH1201)

4/9/2002

127

Letter from T. Hall to MRICI Scheduling Dept. (016331)

8/7/2002

128

Letter from T. Henson to M. Dalley (039265)

8/1112002

129

Email from Mark Lawrence to David Giles et al (000061)

8/19/2002

130

Dr. Curran Handwritten Notes (027235)

10/9/2002

131

USB Standard Credit Display Exec. Summary (USB00781792)

1/13/2003

132

Email from R. Curran to Henson, Prochaska, Giles, Havlina
(037453)

1113/2003

133

Curran Memo to Fellow Board Members ofMRIA (013864013866)

1114/2003

134

Email from R. Curran toM. Kutsurelis et al (037643)

2/19/2003

135

M. Panattoni letter toP. DeWitt (002747)

4/3/2003

136

Reserved

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 9

001987

SA No.

Date
Offered
Authenticity

137
138

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence
Email from Dr. Havlina to Dr. Curran et al (037250)

5/5/2003

Reserved

139

0. Karame letter to J. Floyd (034315)

5123/2003

140

Amend. To Limited Partnership Agreement ofMRI Mobile
(SARMC00601 -00605 Accounting)

6/17/2003

141

IT Service Level Agreement (015307-15312)

7/112003

142

Email from T. Henson to J. Floyd (036222)

7/18/2003

143

0. Karame letter to J. Floyd (034316)

8/19/2003

144

Agenda for MRICI and SARMC Meeting (014333)

9/23/2003

145

CEO Report (SARMC 07043-07044 Office of Pres.)

9/30/2003

146

D. Giles handwritten notes re: DMR meeting (014187)

10/14/2003

147

Email from J. Floyd to D. Giles et al re Meeting with D.
Carmona (036150)

10/27/2003

148

Shattuck Hammond Power Point re: Overview of
Restructuring ofMRIA and Simultaneous Merger ofMRICI
and IMI (SARMC 06777-06786 Office ofCFO)

10/30/2003

149

Memo from D. Giles to M. Brandt re: MRI reading
Opportunity (015159)

12/5/2003

150

Email from P. Harnick to J. Floyd (025617-25618)

12/8/2003

151

Letter from P. Miller toT. Banducci (025153)

12/22/2003

152

Agreement for MRI Services (SARMC 00241-256 Patient
Care Services)

1/112004

153

Email from Dr. Havlina to Dr. Giles eta! (035919)

1/12/2004

154

Letter from J. Curran to C. Corbett (SARMC00510 Patient
Care Services)

2/10/2004

155

SBB letter to Dr. Curran (003016-17)

2/24/2004

156

Memo from J. Floyd to D. Giles et al (014861)

3/4/2004

157

Reserved

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST -10

001988

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

158

Letter from S. Kim to C. Corbett (SARMC 00235-36 Patient
Care Services)

8/2/2004

159

Letter from S. Scales to J. Hopkins (SARMC 00237 Patient
Care Services)

8/3/2004

160

Handwritten notes (SARMC 00238 Patient Care Services)

8/9/2004

161

Meeting notes (SARMC 01940 Office ofCIO)

11/15/2004

162

Letter from MRI Center to S. Bruce (025045)

12/3/2004

163

Letter J. Seaborn to J. Floyd (SARMC00174 Patient Care
Services)

12/8/2004

164

Letter from C. Corbett to J. Gobel (SARMC 00180 Patient
Care Services)

12/8/2004

165

Memo re: MRI from SBB (SARMC 00175 Patient Care
Services)

12/20/2004

166

Agreement for MRI Services (SARMC 00158-00172 Patient
Care Services)

1/3/2005

167

Email from D. Seaborn to C. Corbet el al (SARMC 01036
Patient Care Services)

1110/2005

168

A Report to the Dept. of Radiology and Radiology
Administration on Strategic Conversations with Customers
(SARMC625- 635 Patient Care Services)

3/29/2005

169

First Amendment to Operating Agreement oflntermountain
Medical Imaging (SARMC244- 252 OGC)

12/9/2005

170

Agreement for MRI Services (IMIRP/001719-36)

12/9/2005

171

Curriculum Vitae of Dennis Reinstein

N/A

172

Opinions 1-4 of Budge's Report contained in Reinstein's
Expert Report

4/23/2007

173

Opinions 1-7 of Wilhoite Report contained in Reinstein's
Expert Report

4/23/2007

174

Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Mary River

175

Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Bruce Anderson

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST11
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

176

Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Peter Reedy

177

Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Samuel Gibson

178

Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Mark Maier

179

Curriculum Vitae of Manfred Steiner

180

Any chart or diagram in the Wellspring report dated as of
April!, 2004 from pp. 3-20,36-47, 53-57, 64-73, 77-79, 8291.

181

Tables I & 2, Fig. 1-3, App. 2 to Expert report of G. Vistnes
Ph.D

182

Curriculum Vitae of Greg Vistnes, Ph.D

183

Curriculum Vitae of all witnesses to be called by Saint
Alphonsus to the extent such CVs have been produced.

184

Proposal for obtaining mobile MRI (032280-32284)

unknown date

185

Memo re: issues imaging center joint venture (001142-44)

unknown date

186

SARG/MRIA Joint Venture Proposals Nos. 6&7 (000931)

unknown date

187

Memo re: Radiology Imaging Center (014512)

unknown date

187A

Memo re: Radiology Imaging Center (028432)

3/15/99

188

Memo entitled: "Some thoughts after talking to Roger"
(35394-35395)

unknown date

189

Memo re: Project to Maintain/Achieve Competitive Quality
(021621-23)

unknown date

190

Buy-Sell of DR's Corp (26614-26615)

unknown date

191

1. Floyd Volume projections (016230)

unknown date

192

Memo re: Advent of!MI (016323)

unknown date

193

Memo re: Thoughts on Radiology Issues at MRICI (01615216153)

unknown date

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 12
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

194

J. Curran Memo re: Considerations Regarding Purchase of
New MRI (023072-23073)

unknown date

195

Letter from J. Hall to SBB (IMI0521)

unknown date

196

Videotape ofMRIM mobile magnet

unknown date

197

First Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRIA
(SARMCOl055- 1061 Office ofCFO)

8/25/1988

198

Second Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRIA
(SARMC1062-1067 Office of the CFO)

5/1/1991

199

Third Amendment to Articles of Partnership of MRIA
(SARMC1068-1080 Office of the CFO)

4/21/1995

200

Fourth Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRIA
(SARMC5354-5359 Office of the CFO)

7/15/1998

201

Fifth Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRIA (3910839114)

8/l/2002

202

Sixth Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRIA (3911639129)

4/15/2003

203

Draft of Articles ofMRIA Partnership No. 1 (5977-5996)

unknown date

204

Draft of Articles ofMRIA Partnership No.2 (5814-5838)

1/30/1985

205

Draft of Articles ofMRIA Partnership No.3 (6430- 6455)

2/13/1985

206

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC08022-8032 Office of the Pres.)

12/16/1983

207

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC6928-6939 Office of the Pres.)

3/22/1984

208

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC8532-8538 Office of the Pres.)

3/30/1984

209

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7319-7329 & 7401 Office of the Pres.)

4/6/1984

210

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7144-7157& 7248-7255 Office ofthe Pres.)

7/13/1984

211

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7557-7566 Office of the Pres.)

10/l/1984

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST001991
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

212

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC07262 -7271 & SARMC7219-7232 Office ofthe
Pres.)

10/19/1984

213

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC9545-9547 Office of the Pres.)

11/2/1984

214

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC139-143 Office of the Pres.)

111111985

215

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee
Minutes(SARMC7094-7103 Office of the Pres.)

4/14/1989

216

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7090-7093 & 7077-7089 Office of the Pres.)

7/2111989

217

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7067- 7076 & 12722-12745 Office of the Pres.)

8/18/1999

217A

Map of Existing and Potential MRI Mobile Sites (Excerpted
from Saint Alphonsus Exhibit 217 (SARMC07073))

8/18/1999

2178

Map - 499 Mile Radius (Excerpted from Saint Alphonsus
Exhibit 217 (SARMC07074))

8/18/1999

218

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC6835-6840 Office of the CFO &SARMC1288712892 Office of the Pres.)

3/16/2000

219

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7043 -7044 Office of the Pres.)

9/30/2003

220

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7053 -7055 Office of the Pres.)

3/15/2004

221

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7038-7042 Office of the Pres.)

11/18/2003

222

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7049-7052 Office of the Pres.)

3/15/2004

223

DR Rollout Minutes (GSRRP670- 671)

3/6/2001

224

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP502- 503)

2/20/2001

225

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP504-505)

3/2112001

226

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP508-510)

4/18/2002

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST -14

001992

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

227

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP511-512)

5/3/2001

228

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP513-514)

5/15/2001

229

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP515)

6/6/2001

230

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP516-518)

6/26/2001

231

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP519-520)

7/31/2001

232

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP521)

8/31/2001

233

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP522-523)

9/13/2001

234

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP524-525)

10/512001

235

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP526-527)

10/17/2001

236

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP528-53IR)

11/7/2001

237

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP532-533)

11/19/2001

238

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP534-535R)

12/1712001

239

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP725)

112/2002

240

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP726)

2/4/2002

241

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP727-728)

2/20/2002

242

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP729)

3/5/2002

243

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP730 -733R)

4/1212002

244

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP734-735R)

4/30/2002

245

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP737-738R)

5/13/2002

246

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP739-740R)

5/29/2002

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST -15

001993

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

247

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP741-742R)

6/10/2002

248

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP743-744)

7/29/2002

249

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP745)

9/25/2002

250

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP746-747)

9/10/2002

251

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP748-749)

11/20/2002

252

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP795-796R)

1130/2002

253

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP797-798)

2/19/2002

254

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP799)

3/6/2002

255

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP860-861)

1116/2003

256

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP862-863)

4/8/2003

257

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP864-865R)

5/13/2003

258

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP866)

6/4/2003

259

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP867)

8/12/2003

260

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP873-874)

7/15/2003

261

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP875-876)

9/2/2003

262

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP877-879)

10/112003

263

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP880-881)

10/27/2003

264

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP882-883)

11114/2003

265

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP884-887)

12/112003

266

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP970-971)

1112/2004

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST -16

001994

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted
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Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

267

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP972-974)

4/5/2004

268

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP975)

6/3/2004

269

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP976)

7/14/2004

270

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP977-978)

8/24/2004

271

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP979-980)

9/14/2004

272

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP981-982)

10/2112004

273

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP983-984)

1118/2004

274

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP985)

11/29/2004

275

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP1157-1158)

1/3112005

276

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP1159-1160R)

2/14/2005

277

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP1161)

3/2112005

278

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP1162)

4/4/2005

279

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP1163)

6/13/2005

280

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP1164R)

7/5/2005

281

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP1165R)

8/12/2005

282

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP506)

3/23/2001

283

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP507)

4/2/2001

284

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP665-667)

1/16/2001

285

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP668-669)

2/8/2001

286

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP674)

4/16/2001

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 17

001995

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted
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Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
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287

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP675)

5/4/2001

288

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP676)

5/17/2001

289

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP677-678)

7/20/2001

290

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP679-680)

10/2/2001

291

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP681-683)

1115/2001

292

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP800-801R)

4/2/2002

293

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP802-803)

4/16/2002

294

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP804-805)

8/20/2002

295

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP806-807)

9/25/2002

296

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP808-809)

11/12/2002

297

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP914-915)

1/15/2003

298

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP916-918)

2/25/2003

299

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP919-920)

3/13/2003

300

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP928-931)

4/30/2003

301

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP934-935)

5/12/2003

302

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP938-939)

6/2/2003

303

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP940-941)

6/20/2003

304

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP946)

7/2/2003

305

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP947-948)

7/16/2003

306

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP949)

7/30/2003

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST18
001996

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted
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Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
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307

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP957-958)

9/5/2003

308

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP959-960)

9/30/2003

309

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP961-962R)

10/28/2003

310

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP963-964)

12110/2003

311

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP965-966)

12/24/2003

312

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI070-1072)

1/10/2005

313

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI084-1085)

9/7/2004

314

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI086-1087)

9/29/2004

315

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI091-1092)

11/3/2004

316

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI093)

11/30/2004

317

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPII 03)

1/13/2004

318

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI104-1105)

2/6/2004

319

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI106-1107)

3/3/2004

320

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPII08-IIIO)

3/29/2004

321

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1111-1112)

5/19/2004

322

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPIII3-1114)

6/16/2004

323

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPIII5-1116)

7/12/2004

324

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPIII9-1120)

8/3/2004

325

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI204-1206)

1/10/2005

326

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI207-1208)

2/22/2005

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST19
001997

SA No.
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Offered

Date
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Authenticity

Foundation
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Date
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327

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1209)

3/15/2005

328

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1210)

3/29/2005

329

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1211)

4/5/2005

330

Operations Technical Committee Minutes (GSRRP12281229)

4/25/2005

331

Operations Technical Committee Minutes (GSRRP1230)

5/17/2005

332

Operations Technical Committee Minutes (GSRRP12241225)

6/10/2005

333

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1212-1213)

6/14/2005

334

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1214-1215R)

7/6/2005

335

Operations Technical Committee Minutes (GSRRP1226)

7/1112005

336

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1216-1217R)

8/112005

337

Operations Technical Minutes (GSRRP1227)

8/2/2005

338

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1218-1221)

9/26/2005

339

Operations Technical Committee Minutes (GSRRP12311232)

10/6/2005

340

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1222-1223)

10/10/2005

341

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 1 (42584- 42596)

342

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 3 (34172)

343

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 4 (42139)

344

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 5 (33569)

345

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 6 (SARMC10643 Office of
Pres.)

346

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 7 (42146)

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 20

001998
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Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation
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Date

In
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347

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 8 (34173)

348

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 16 (34325)

349

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 7 (1468)

350

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 8 (1444)

351

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 9 (1436)

352

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 10 (1447)

353

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 11 (1446)

354

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 13 ( 1448)

355

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 14 (1440- 1442)

356

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit IS (1437-1439)
Exhibit Nos. 357-58 Reserved

359

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 21 (1366-1367)

360

S. Berger Deposition Exhibit 7(40229-40241)

361

S. Berger Deposition Exhibit 9(40220-40228)

362

R. Cioffi Deposition Exhibit 2

363

R. Cioffi Deposition Exhibit 6 (40220-40228)

364

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 3 (33603)

365

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 4 (36150)

366

1. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 7 (33607)

367

"MRI Volumes" for Center and Mobile; J. Floyd Deposition
Exhibit 9 (40055-40060)

368

1. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 13

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 21

001999
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Date
Offered

Date
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Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
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369

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 15 (SARMC3089 Office ofCFO)

370

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 17 (33329)

371

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 18 (34315)

372

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 19 (34316)

373

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 20 (34313- 34314)

374

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 21 (MT001275-1276)

375

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 22 (MT001018-1042)

376

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (10393-10402)

12/1990-1991

377

MRI Limited Financial Statements ( 10227-1 0236)

12/1990-1991

378

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (SARMC380-3910ffice of
the Pres.)

12/1996-1997

379

MRI Limited Financial Statements (32190-32199)

12/1996-1997

380

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (SARMC9942-9953 Office
of the Pres.)

12/1997-1998

381

MRI Limited Financial Statements (32154-32162)

12/1997-1998

382

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (12062-12071)

12/1998-1999

383

MRI Limited Financial Statements (12052-12061)

12/1998-1999

384

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (SARMC779-789 Office of
the CFO)

1211999-2000

385

MRI Limited Financial Statements (32113-32120)

12/1999-2000

386

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (13090-13099)

12/2000-2001

387

MRI Limited Financial Statements (SARMC137-142 Office
of the CFO)

12/2000-2001

388

MRI Limited Financial Statements (32017-32024)

12/2001-2002

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST22
002000
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Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation
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Date
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389

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (32028-32035)

12/2001-2002

390

MRI Limited Financial Statements (21428-21437)

12/2002-2003

391

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (21439-21448)

12/2002-2003

392

MRI Limited Financial Statements (40197-40207)

12/2003-2004

393

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (40208-40218)

12/2003-2004

394

MRI Limited Financial Statements (42191-42200)

12/2004-2005

395

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (42181-42190)

12/2004-2005

396

R. Curran email to D. Giles re: PAC with SARMC (3368633687)

9/10/1999

397

Leslie Kelly Hall email re: MRI Connectivity (33688)

9/13/1999

398

Sarah Bratley email to R. Curran re Update (33689)

9/8/1999

399

Leslie Kelly Hall memo to Lyndee Chatterton re:
SARMC/MRICI Networking Interface (33691)

6/4/1999

400

Lyndee Chatterton memo to Mike Czech re MRICVSARMC
Networking Link (33697)

12/2911998

401

Sandra Bruce email to Cindy Schamp re SARMC/MRICI
Phase II (33698)

1/6/1999

402

Review ofSARMC!MRI Meeting (33702-33704)

2/8/1999

403

Rachel Rorer memo to Lyndee Chatterton re Summer plan
(33705)

unknown date

404

Leslie Kelly Hall email to R. Curran re computer start date
(33706)

7/28/1999

405

Meeting notes re Interface (33708)

6/15/1999

406

Leslie Kelly Hall email to L. Chatterton re MRI (33711)

7/29/1999

407

Patti Hameck to C. Schamp re MRI Clinical Desktop (33712)

8/19/1999

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST23
002001

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

408

Lyndee Chatterton email to L. Kelly Hall re MRICI (33724)

7/29/1999

409

Leslie Kelly Hall email to L. Chatterton re MRICI
Connectivity (33729)

9/8/1999

410

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG ( 3401934023)

unknown date

411

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (3391033915)

unknown date

412

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG
(SARMC10824-10829 Office of the Pres.)

unknown date

413

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (10781083)

unknown date

414

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (3395633961)

4/13/1999

415

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (1450614511)

5/3/1999

416

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (3391833923)

5/18/1999

417

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (2405924064)

unknown date

418

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (3388733892)

9/15/1999

419

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (3386933875)

9/17/1999

420

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (3387933885)

9/17/1999

421

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (3386133865)

9/30/1999

422

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (3385433860)

9/30/1999

423

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG
(SARMC1379A-1379E Office of the CFO)

10/27/1999

424

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG
(SARMC6625-6629 Office of the Pres.)

10/18/1999

425

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11210-11212)

112/1985

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST24
002002

SA No.
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Date
Admitted
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Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
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426

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11213-11215)

118/1985

427

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11234-11235)

2/2111985

428

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11208-11209)

2/28/1985

429

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11236-11238)

3/7/1985

430

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11244-11246)

3/27/1985

431

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11300-11301)

6/5/1985

432

MRICI Board meeting minutes (4488-4490)

4/25/1988

433

MRICI Board meeting minutes (4481-4484)

7/25/1988

434

MR1C1 Board meeting minutes (SARMC4064-4067 Office of
the Pres.)

5/15/1991

435

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC4060-4063 Office of
the Pres.)

5/15/1991

436

MRICI Board meeting minutes (SARMC3993-3996 Office of
the Pres.)

8/12/1991

437

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC3881-3883 Office of
the Pres.)

11118/1991

438

MRIA meeting minutes (SARMC5094-5096 Office of the
Pres.)

10/1311994

439

MRICI Board meeting minutes (SARMC4998-5000 Office of
the Pres.)

11/2111994

440

MRIA meeting minutes (SARMC4993-4994 Office of the
Pres.)

11/22/1994

441

MRICI Board meeting minutes (SARMC4565-4566 Office of
the Pres.)

8/9/1995

442

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC4567-4568 Office of
the Pres.)

8/9/1995

443

MRIA meeting minutes (SARMC4508-4509 Office of the
Pres.)

11116/1995

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST25
002003

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

444

MRICI Board meeting minutes (SARMC4506-4507 Office of
the Pres.)

I I/I6/I995

445

MRICI meeting minutes (SARMC6339-6340 Office of the
CFO)

I I/25/1996

446

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC6341-6342 Office of
the CFO)

I I/25/1996

447

Any response to Requests for Admission or Interrogatories

various

448

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (I 1296-11297)

6/19/1985

449

MRI Board meeting minutes (4488-4490)

4125/1988

450

MRI Board meeting minutes (7214-7216)

5/25/1988

451

MRI Board meeting minutes (669-671)

7/16/1998

452

MRI Board meeting minutes (20943-20945)

10/22/1998

453

MRI Board meeting minutes (1412-1413)

12/I5/I999

454

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (1414-1415)

12/15/1999

455

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (1494-1495)

I/19/2000

456

MRI Board meeting minutes (28366-28367)

1/19/2000

457

MRI Board meeting minutes (1472-1473)

2/16/2000

458

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (1474-1476)

2/16/2000

459

MRI Board meeting minutes (1525-1527)

3/15/2000

460

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (1528-1530)

3/15/2000

461

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC9112-9113 Office of
the Pres.)

4/2I/2000

462

MRI Board meeting minutes- executive session (9116-9117)

4/2I/2000

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 26

002004

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

463

MRI Board meeting minutes (28344-28347)

6/21/2000

464

MRl Board meeting minutes (SARMC9053-9055 Office of
the Pres.)

7/19/2000

465

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC9056-9060 Office of
the Pres.)

7/19/2000

466

MRI Board meeting minutes (1692-1695)

8/16/2000

467

MRl Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC9023-9028 Office of
the Pres.)

8/16/2000

468

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC9011-9015 Office of
the Pres.)

9/20/2000

469

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC9004-9010 Office of
the Pres.)

9/20/2000

470

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC8980-8985 Office of
the Pres.)

10/18/2000

471

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC8986-8988 Office of
the Pres.)

10/18/2000

472

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC8967-8968 Office of
the Pres.)

11/15/2000

473

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC8545-8548 Office of
the Pres.)

l/17/2001

474

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC8560-8561 Office of
the Pres.)

2/16/2001

475

MRICI and Mobile Strategic Planning Meeting
(SARMC8562-8566 Office of the Pres.)

2/16/2001

476

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC8610-8614 Office of
the Pres.)

4/18/2001

477

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC8625-8629 Office of
the Pres.)

5/16/2001

478

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (12404-12407)

7/18/2001

479

MRI Board meeting minutes (2158-2159)

9/19/2001

480

MRI Board meeting minutes (2209-2210)

10/17/2001

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST27
002005

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

481

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (2271-2273)

12/19/2001

482

MRI Board meeting minutes (2343-2345)

2/20/2002

483

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (28183-28185)

3/20/2002

484

MRI Board meeting minutes (2419-2421)

4/17/2002

485

MRI Board meeting minutes (28169-28172)

5/2112002

486

MRI Board meeting minutes (2472-2474)

6/18/2002

487

MRI Board meeting minutes (2522-2524)

7/16/2002

488

MRI Board and Executive Session meeting minutes (25602563)

8/1/2002

489

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (14149-14151)

9/17/2002

490

MRI Board meeting minutes (14111-14113)

9/17/2002

491

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC004 71-4 72
Accounting)

11119/2002

492

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC00800-802
Accounting)

12/17/2002

493

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC00262-264
Accounting)

1/2112003

494

MRI Board meeting minutes with Summary Forecast (2810928111 & SARMC354 Hudspeth)

2/18/2003

495

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC00195-198
Accounting)

3/18/2003

496

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC00515-518
Accounting)

4/15/2003

497

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC00523-526
Accounting)

5/20/2003

498

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/4375-4382

5/29/1997

499

IMI Executive meeting minutes (IMIRP/4438-4440)

5/16/1997

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST28
002006

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

500

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/4817)

6/1/1998

501

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/4748-4750)

1119/1999

502

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/4956-4958)

7/7/1999

503

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/772-775)

8/4/1999

504

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/811-812}, as redacted to
remove double hearsay

8/24/1999

505

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/815-819)

9/22/1999

506

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/886-889)

8/14/2001

507

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/898-901)

9/26/2001

508

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP932 & 945)

11128/2001

509

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/993-994)

4/30/2002

510

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP1046)

5/19/2003

511

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSREX265-268)

1/14/1998

512

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX11-13)

2/2/1998

513

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX16-17)

2/16/1998

514

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR585-588)

3/1111998

515

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR589-592)

4/8/1998

516

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX36-39), as redacted
to remove double hearsay

5/1111998

517

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR593-600), as redacted to
remove double hearsay

5/13/1998

518

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR60 1-604)

6/16/1998

519

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR605-608)

6/29/1998

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST29
002007

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

520

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX44-52)

7/6/1998

521

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR609-611), as redacted to
remove double hearsay

7/7/1998

522

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX56-64)

7/20/1998

523

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR612-615)

7/27/1998

524

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR616-618)

7/30/1998

525

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR619-632)

8/5/1998

526

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX67-69)

8/31/1998

527

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR638-644), as redacted to
remove double hearsay

9/9/1998

528

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX70-71)

9/14/1998

529

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX72)

9/21/1998

530

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX73-74)

10/8/1998

531

GSR Equipment meeting minutes (GSREX75)

10/5/1998

532

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX76-78)

10/12/1998

533

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR647-653)

10/14/1998

534

Radiology Department meeting minutes (GSR654-655)

10/21/1998

535

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR656-662)

10/28/1998

536

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR663-664)

11/3/1998

537

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR665-666)

ll/9/1998

538

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR667-672)

11/ll/1998

539

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR673-681)

12/9/1998

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 30
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

540

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX136-138)

2/8/1999

541

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR700-706), as redacted to
remove double hearsay

2/10/1999

542

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX259-260)

6/21/1999

543

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX261-264)

6/28/1999

544

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP184-186)

8/23/1999

545

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP122-126)

9/8/1999

546

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSR59)

10/25/1999

547

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP153-156)

11/10/1999

548

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP262)

11122/1999

549

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP267-268)

12/20/1999

550

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP269-270R)

12/27/1999

551

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP273-277)

1112/2000

552

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP288-291)

1/26/2000

553

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP441)

3/13/2000

554

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP336-340R)

8/8/2000

555

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP465-468)

8/30/2000

556

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP469-471)

9/6/2000

557

GSR Executive meeting mintues (GSRRP400-403

9/19/2000

558

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP645)

2/22/2001

559

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP568-571)

5/9/2001

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 31
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

560

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR129)

12/18/2001

561

Marketing Committee Meeting (GSRRP1040-1041)

3/10/2004

562

Sandra Bruce letter toM. Adams, M. Dalley and J. Messmer
re Saint Alphonsus Withdrawal (SARMC I 0646-1064 7 Office
of the Pres)

3/10/2004

563

PACS presentation materials (SARMCO 1796-1818 Office of
the Pres.)

9/16/1999

564

D. Giles email toR. Curran re: PAC with SARMC (2402324024)

9/10/1999

565

D. Giles email toR. Curran re: PAC with SARMC (2843328434)

911011999

566

Pie chart re: Overview ofMRIA Ownership Interests

NA

567

Counter Designations from Ms. Schamps's Trial Deposition
Testimony Read into the Record by SADC

NA

568

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0020-0023)

3/2/1998

569

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0024- 0025)

3/9/1998

570

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0040-0041)

5/29/1998

571

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0053-0055)

7/13/1998

572

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0065-0066)

8/17/1998

573

GSR Limited Group Meeting Minutes (GSR0636-0637)

8/19/1998

574

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREXOI39-0142)

2/15/1999

575

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREXOI74- 0180)

3/811999

576

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0181-0182)

3/15/1999

577

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0181-0 182)

3/15/1999

578

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0183- 0185)

3/22/1999

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 32
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

579

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREXOI88-0199)

3/29/1999

580

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0203- 0204)

4/12/1999

581

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0215 -0217)

4/26/1999

582

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0221 - 0223)

5/3/1999

583

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0244- 0245)

5/24/1999

584

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0246- 0248)

6/7/1999

585

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSRRP195- 200)

9/13/1999

586

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSRRPI38 -140)

10113/1999

587

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSRRP251 - 253)

1011811999

588

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSRRP260)

111111999

Exhibit Nos. 589-90 Reserved

591

Handwritten Notes Prepared by Charles Wilhoite

4/2/07

Exhibit Nos. 592-93 Reserved

594

Demonstrative re: Correlation of Value & Other
Considerations (from Steiner's report)

NA

Exhibit Nos. 595-96 Reserved

597

Letter from Referring Physicians from Seaboum Correcting
the Issue of Availablilty ofMRI Scans on PACS System. GSR
151

1126/05

Exhibit Nos. 598-99 Reserved

600

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1985 (01002835)

12/31185

601

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1986 (01001622)

12/31186

602

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1987 (01000715)

12/31187

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 33
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Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

603

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1988 and 1987
(009994-10002)

12/31/88

604

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1989 and 1988
(009984-93)

12/31/89

605

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1990 and 1989
(0 10046-55)

12/31/90

606

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1991 and 1990
(010227-36)

12/31/91

607

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1992 and 1991
(010999-1008)

12/31/92

608

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1993 and 1992
(008853-62)

12/31/93

609

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1994 and 1993
(SARMC00477-87)

12/31/94

610

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1995 and 1994
(021809-19)

12/31/95

611

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1996 and 1995
(032200-12)

12/31/96

612

Reserved

613

Reserved

614

Reserved

615

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 616-624 Reserved

625

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1990
and 1989 (007647-55)

12/31/90

626

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1992
and 1991 011009-19)

12/31/92

627

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1993
and 1992 (008863-73)

12/31/93

628

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1994
and 1993 (021797 -808)

12/31194

629

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1995
and 1994 (SARMC00443-53)

12/31/95

630

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1996
and 1995 (020888-99)

12/31/96

631

Reserved

632

Reserved

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 34
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Offered

Date
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Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

633

Reserved

634

Reserved

635

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 636-649 Reserved

650

MRI Center, MRI Mobile, and MRIA Board minutes
(013916-18, 021235-37, 013933-34)

3/18/98

651

MRI Center and Mobile minutes (000572-73, 000589-90)

4/15/98

652

MRI Center, MRI Mobile, and MRIA Board minutes
(000599-606)

5/20/98

653

MRI Center, MRI Mobile, and MRIA Board minutes
(000625-631)

6/17/98

654

MRI Center, MRI Mobile, and MRIA Board minutes
(000767-772)

9/10/98

655

MRI Center/MRI Mobile Executive Meeting Minutes
(025396)

12/17/02

656

Reserved

657

Reserved

658

Reserved

659

Reserved

660

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 661-674 Reserved

675

GSR Executive Committee minutes (GSREX/0020-23)

3/2/98

676

GSR Executive Committee minutes (GSREX/0024-25)

3/9/98

677

GSR Executive Committee minutes (GSREX/0030-33)

4/6/98

678

GSR Executive Committee minutes (GSREX/0040-41)

5/29/98

679

GSR Imaging Center minutes (IMIRP/004817)

6/1/98

680

Reserved

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 35
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Offered
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Admitted
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Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

681

Reserved

682

Reserved

683

Reserved

684

Reserved

685

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 686-699 Reserved

700

SARMC Trustees Executive Committee minutes (Office of
President SARMC07953-91)

3/26/84

701

Giles Handwritten notes (Giles Dep. Ex. 4) (005917)

undated

702

Gill letter to Newhouse (005342)

12/12/84

703

Gill letter to Newhouse (CH000279-82)

l/14/85

704

Newhouse letter to Curran, Giles, Havlina, Henson, Prochaska
re: MRI Associates Limited Partnership (005975)

3/8/85

705

MRI limited schedule of investor payments (Office of CFO
SARMC03648-49)

7/23/85

706

Certificate of Limited Partnership ofMRI Limited Partnership
(024 740-48)

8/2/85

707

MRI limited schedule of investor payments (Office ofCFO
SARMC03650-51)

8/9/85

708

MRI Limited Partnership Private Placement Memorandum
(012779-890)

5/24/85

709

MRI Limited Partners (CH001075-76)

6/1/87

710

MRI Mobile Limited Partnership Private Placement
Memorandum (020349-506)

9/6/88

711

Certificate of Limited Partnership ofMRI Mobile- Limited
Partnership (024893-99)

10117/88

712

MRI Ltd, DBA MRI Center ofldaho Ownership and MRI
Mobile, L.P. Ownership Before Buyout and After Buyout
(SARMC04899-900)

Undated

713

MRICI- Limited Partnership Units I MRI Mobile Limited
Partnership Units (SARMC01019)

Undated

714

Reserved

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 36
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Authenticity

Foundation
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Date

In
Evidence

715

Reserved

716

Reserved

717

Reserved

718

Reserved

Exhibit Nos. 719-724 Reserved

725

DVI Financial letter to Chamberlain (SH 1513-16)

12/7/01

726

GE Financial Healthcare letter to Chamberlain (SH 1517-21)

12/7/01

727

DVI email to Chamberlain with proposal letter (SH 1782-85)

12/7/01

728

MRIA ownership structure percentages (SH 2021)

8/15/01

729

Volume and Revenue Summary MRICI (SH 0139)

2000

730

MRICI, MRI Mobile LP spreadsheets, Ownership Allocation
at July 31, 1999, and Cash Flow Analysis for Possible Trade
(SH 0141-47)

Undated

731

Floyd email to Giles et al., etc. re Confidentiality Agreement
and Engagement letter (032362-63)

10/10/03

732

Curran email to Prochaska et al. re Reminder (037607)

10113/03

733

Board Agenda (027980)

10/14/03

734

West email to Miller re Shattuck Hammond Ltr (NEW
REDLINE 10-14-03) (016406-13)

10/14/03

735

West email to Miller re Shattuck Hammond Ltr (NEW
REDLINE 10-14-03) with h/w note "Rec'd 10/14" (03234961)

10114/03

736

Voice Mail of J. Kevin West Transcribed on October 16,2003
(SARMC 01549 Givens Pursley)

10/16/03

737

Miller e-mail to Chamberlain et al. re FW: Shattuck
Hammond Ltr (NEW REDLINE 10-14-03) (SH 1699-1711)

1114/03

738

Miller e-mail to Chamberlain re 9-12-03 Confidentiality
Agreement (SH 1727-40)

11113/03

739

Miller e-mail to Chamberlain et al. re FW: Confidentiality
Agreement and Engagement Letter (SH 1741-50)

11113/03

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 37
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Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

740

Miller letter to VanValkenburg and Banducci re: MRI
Associates (SARMC 01526-34 Givens Pursley)

741

Reserved

742

Reserved

743

Reserved

744

Reserved

745

Reserved

12/5/03

Exhibit Nos. 746-749 Reserved
750

Employment Agreement- David Giles and DMR (03437476)

I2/17/2002

751

Employment Agreement- Jack Havlina and DMR (03437779)

12/17/2002

752

Employment Agreement- Thomas Henson and DMR
(034364-67)

12/17/2002

753

Employment Agreement- James Prochaska and DMR
(034371-73)

12/17/2002

754

Consent of Shareholders and Directors of DMR, Inc. in Lieu
of Meeting re: Annual Meetings 1986-2001 (034354-55)

12/17/2002

755

Consents of Shareholders/Directors of DMR in Lieu of
Meeting re: Annual Meeting 2002 (034357-62)

12/17/2002

756

Minutes of Annual Meeting of Shareholders/Directors of
DMR for 2003 (034432-36)

3/17/2003

757

Consent of Shareholders and Directors of DMR in Lieu of
Meeting re: Reverse Stock Split and Amended and Restated
Shareholders Agreement (034438-62)

5/20/2003

758

Doctors Magnetic Resonance Inc. (DMR) Cash receipts YTD
2003 (013406)

March2003

759

Doctors Magnetic Resonance Inc. (DMR) Schedule of
Compensation and Distributions to Shareholders 1" Quarter
2003 (002916-17)

3/31/03

760

Consent of Directors of DMR in Lieu of Meeting - Capital
Distribution for 1st Quarter

4/2/03

761

Doctors Magnetic Resonance Inc. (DMR) 1005- Cash in
General Checking (013404-05)

4/18/03

762

Doctors Magnetic Resonance Inc. (DMR) Schedule of
Compensation and Distributions to Shareholders 2nd Quarter
2003 (002918-19)

7/1103

763

MRI Mobile - Distribution of Earnings 2003 (032661)

8/23/03

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST38
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Date
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Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

764

Doctors Magnetic Resonance Inc. (DMR) Schedule of
Compensation and Distributions to Shareholders 3nd Quarter
2003 (002804)

10/1/03

765

MRI Associates Management Fees and Partner Distributions
From MRIC and MRIM, etc. (SARMC00111-13)

12/311/2003

766

MRI Limited Partnership List of Investorsffransfer Ledger
Commencing at January 1, 2003 (024886-88)

1/1103

767

Reserved

768

Reserved

769

Reserved

770

Reserved

Exhibit Nos. 771-774 Reserved

775

MRI Mobile Operations Assessment (000608-15)

6/98

776

Denning letter to Cliff and Giles (Denning Dep. Ex. 7)

7/28/99

777

Draft letter Sands to Schamp re PWC engagement (Office of
CFO SARMC01081-90) (Hahn Dep. Ex 7)

1119/99

778

Outline for Discussion Presentation by Cindy Schamp
February 1, 2000 Purchase/Restructuring Options for MRI
Associates (Office of the CFO SARMC01240-42)

2/1100

779

Bylaws of the Medical Staff of Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center

10/14/97

780

Top Referring Physician Group Analysis Y-T-D 2001
(002023-24)

2001

781

An Introduction to MRI Associates Legal Ownership of the
Partnerships (Office of the CFO SARMC00964-73)

undated

781R

Redacted version of An Introduction to MRl Associates
Legal Ownership of the Partnerships (Office of the CFO
SARMC00964-73).

undated

Redacted to remove irrelevant , prejudicial, and confusing
language stating an incorrect legal conclusion .

782

Reserved

783

Reserved

784

Reserved

785

Reserved

786

Reserved

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 39

002017

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations
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In
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Exhibit Nos. 787-799 Reserved

800

Curran email to Prochaska re Hitachi (037938)

6/17/99

801

Curran final report as CEO to MRICUMRIM Board (03261518)

6/2000

802

Curran Handwritten Notes re: PM! (042118-21)

7/12/00

803

Curran Handwritten Notes re: War? (042122-26)

undated

804

Matters for Thought and Discussion ( 027311-13)

undated

805

Curran Handwritten notes (025140)

undated

806

Reserved

807

Reserved

808

Reserved

809

Reserved

810

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 811-819 Reserved

820

Dr. Giles Funds received from DMR before DMR expenses,
etc. (014391-93)

2003

821

MRI Buyout (014409-10)

Undated

822

Giles fax to Harder, Draft Outline of Letter of Intent, etc.
(GSRRPOO 1505-07)

1l/1l/98

823

Giles letter to Ridgley Denning (GSRRP001602-04)

8/19/99

824

Reserved

825

Reserved

826

Reserved

827

Reserved

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST- 40

002018

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

828

Reserved

829

Reserved

830

Carl W. Harder invoice to Intermountain Medical Imaging,
LLP (GSRRP001501)

I 1/30/98

831

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (CH001823)

1/1/99

832

Letter from Carl W. Harder to David J. Giles, M.D.
(GSRRP002621)

1/21/99

833

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (033766)

2/1/99

834

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRP001524)

3/1/99

835

Letter from Carl W. Harder to Jeffrey R. Cliff re: February
MRI Statements (CHOOI816)

3/8/99

836

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (033763)

4/1/99

837

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRP001517)

4/1/99

838

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(re: Saint Alphonsus RMC) (GSRRP001736)

5/1/99

839

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(re: Partnership) (GSRRP001512)

5/1/99

840

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRP001734)

6/1/99

841

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (040458)

7/1/99

842

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRP001733)

7/1/99

843

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (CH003870)

8/1/99

844

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRP001732)

8/1/99

845

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (CH003869)

9/1/99

846

Carl W. Harder invoice to Intermountain Medical Imaging,
LLC (GSRRP001594)

9/1/99

847

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRP001509)

9/1/99

PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT LIST41
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Date
Offered

Date
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Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

848

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (033754)

10/1/99

849

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (040477)

1111199

850

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRP001731)

1211199

851

Letter from Carl W. Harder to Jeffrey R. Cliffre: July through
November Radiology Statements (GSRRP002741)

12/17/99

852

Letter from Carl W. Harder to J. Roger Curran re: Statements
for 1999 Legal Fees and Related Retainer (CH001801-02)

8/2/00

853

Reserved

854

Reserved

855

Reserved

856

Reserved

857

Reserved

858

Reserved

859

Reserved

860

"G.P. Dist" and "L.P. Dist" and "Dist per Unit" 1986-2001
(038606)

Undated

861

The Basics of the Deal (038790-92)

Undated

862

JP Notes Meeting with Sandra & her team. (000044-48)

Undated

863

Reserved

864

Reserved

865

Reserved

Exhibit Nos. 866-879 Reserved

880

Expert Report of Thomas R. McCarthy, Ph.D. with Exhibits

6/15/11
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

881

Curriculum Vitae of Thomas R. McCarthy (Expert Report
Ex. 1)

6/15/11

882

Materials Considered by Thomas R. McCarthy (Expert Report
Ex. 2)

6/15/11

883

Exhibits 3 to 26A of Expert Report ofThomas R. McCarthy,
Ph.D.

6/5/11

884

CD-ROM containing electronic files ofPMI-generated IMI
scan data and IMI financial statements relied upon by Thomas
R. McCarthy and produced by him at his deposition

undated

885

Electronic file produced by MRIA entitled IMI Data with
Affiliations and Prior MRIA Referral.xls

undated

886

Electronic file produced by MRIA entitled MRI Center Exams
2001 - Current.xls

undated

887

Electronic file produced by MRIA entitled MRI2007PresentSARMCvsMRIA.xls

undated

888

Electronic file produced by MRIA entitled IMI Scan Data
2006- 2010.xlsx

undated

889

Chart 2 (at page 13) of the Supplemental Expert Report of
Bruce P. Budge, as modified by Mr. Budge at his deposition
(Dep. Ex. 1)

8/11111

Redacted version of Exhibit 889

8/11/11

889R
890

Reserved

891

Reserved

892

Reserved

893

Reserved

894

Reserved

Exhibit Nos. 895-999 Reserved
Any Exhibit used at any deposition taken in this case.

Various

Any Exhibit identified by MRIA in this case.

Various

Any document disclosed in discovery for the purposes of
impeachment or rebuttal

Various

All Radiology Group & Executive Committee minutes
produced by GSR in discovery

Various
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence
AlllMI meeting minutes and subcommittees thereof produced
in discovery

various

All MRlA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile meeting minutes,
including MRIA executive meeting and executive session
minutes

various

Redacted Versions ofMRIA Exhibits Ordered I Proposed to Be Used in Lieu of Originals:
4138R

With redactions per Court's 6/9/11 order

4147R

Redacted to remove irrelevant , prejudicial, and confusing
language stating an incorrect legal conclusion .

4149R

Redacted to remove irrelevant , prejudicial, and confusing
language stating an incorrect legal conclusion .

4150R

Redacted to remove irrelevant , prejudicial, and confusing
language stating an incorrect legal conclusion .

4234R

Redacted per Court's 6/9/11 and 8/9/11 Orders

4239R

Redacted per Court's 6/9/11 and 8/9/11 Orders
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 17th day of August, 2011.

GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

Q~eo.a/~

JACK\s. GJORDING
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 17th day of August, 20 11, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

0
~

0
0

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

Ql!94'a~
Jack . Gjording
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By lARA AMES
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S WITNESS
DESIGNATIONS

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S WITNESS DESIGNATIONS- 1

ORIGINAL
002024

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("SADC"), and Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center, Inc. ("SARMC") (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), provide its intended list of
witnesses as follows:
1.

Chris Anton

2.

Sandra Bruce

3.

Cindy Schamp

4.

Ken Fry

5.

Janelle Reilly

6.

Carolyn Corbett

7.

Ben Murray

8.

Terry Krogstad

9.

Scott Christensen

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S WITNESS DESIGNATIONS- 2
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10.

Leslie Kelly Hall

11.

Edward McEachern, M.D.

12.

Jeff Cliff

13.

Jeffrey Seabourn, M.D.

14.

Tim Hall, M.D.

15.

David Giles, M.D.

16.

Tom Henson, M.D.

17.

John Havlina, M.D.

18.

James Prochaska, M.D.

19.

Jack Floyd, M.D.

20.

Scott Berger

21.

Robin Cioffi

22.

Mike Cacchillo

23.

Grant Chamberlain

24.

Mike Finnerty

25.

Alan Hahn

26.

Sally Jeffcoat

27.

Mike Czech

28.

Lyndee Chatterton

29.

Neil Davey, M.D.

30.

Ian Davey, M.D.
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002026

31.

Darrell Fugate

32.

Vicken Garabedian, M.D.

33.

Julli Hopkins

34.

Yvonne Ketchum

35.

John Knochel, M.D.

36.

Jennifer Mann

37.

Diane Newton, M.D.

38.

Karen Noyes

39.

Dennis Reinstein

40.

Lisa Scales, M.D.

41.

Thomas McCarthy

42.

Manfred Steiner

43.

Greg Vistnes

44.

Mary River, M.D.

45.

Bruce Anderson, M.D.

46.

Marc Meier, M.D.

47.

Sam Gibson, M.D.

48.

Peter Reedy, M.D.

49.

Patricia Vandenberg

50.

Patricia Harneck

51.

Ridgley Denning
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52.

Robert George

53.

Lynn Miller

54.

Paul DeWitt

55.

Milt Kutsurelis

56.

Lani O'Malley

57.

Joe Messmer

58.

Paul Traughber, M.D.

59.

Joe Gobel, M.D.
In addition, Saint Alphonsus reserves the right to call any witness identified by MRIA as

a potential witness, including its designated experts if MRIA is permitted by the Court over Saint
Alphonsus's objection to call Saint Alphonsus's expert witnesses during its own direct. Saint
Alphonsus also reserves the right to call any other witness not otherwise listed herein, including
attorney witnesses from either party, in the event that MRIA is permitted over Saint Alphonsus's
objection to call Saint Alphonsus's counsel Stephanie Westermeier as a witness. See Saint
Alphonsus's Objection to MRIA's Designations of Manfred Steiner, Alan Hahn, and Stephanie
Westermeier as Witnesses (Aug 17, 2011).
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 17th day of August, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

JACK S. GJORDING
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 17th day of August, 20 11, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

D

~
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By LARA AMES
DEPUTY

Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OBJECTION
TO MRIA'S DESIGNATIONS OF
MANFRED STEINER, ALAN HAHN
AND STEPHANIE WESTERMEIER
AS WITNESSES

Defendant.

ORfGf~L~L
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
On August 5, 2011, MRIA filed its Witness Designation for the upcoming trial. Saint
Alphonsus files the following objections to three of the witnesses on the list, and will renew
these objections should MRIA attempt to call them at trial.

1.

Manfred Steiner. MRIA proposes to call Manfred Steiner "via prior proceeding

testimony." See Defendant/Counter-Claimant' Witness Designation at 3 (Aug. 5, 2011). This is
plainly improper on several grounds.

First, MRIA's proposed use of Manfred Steiner's testimony violates the procedural rules
governing the one party's use of another party's expert witness. Steiner is not a percipient
witness and has no first-hand knowledge of the events at issue. While he was an expert witness
for Saint Alphonsus at the first trial, he is not Saint Alphonsus's expert witness at this trial, and
MRIA has neither designated Steiner as its own expert, nor sought the necessary permission to
even attempt to do so. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(iii) ("No party shall contact an expert
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witness of an opposing party without first obtaining the permission of the opposing party or the
court."). In any event, MRIA does not have the right to call its opponent's expert during its own
case. See, e.g., R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. CU Interface, LLC, 657 F. Supp. 2d 899,903 (N.D. Ohio
2009) (citing rule forbidding party from "calling the opposing party's expert as a witness at trial,
even if the opposing party does not intend to use that expert."); cf Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B)
("A party may not discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or
specially employed by another party in anticipation or litigation or preparation for trial and who
is not expected to be called as a witness at trial. .. ").

Second, MRIA's attempt to call Steiner during its direct case is also inconsistent with the
Court's February 15, 2011 order which provided that "St. Alphonsus will be allowed to bring in
a new expert for the trial on remand with the caveat that should it use a completely new theory of
damages, MRIA may use St. Alphonsus's previous expert's testimony to cross examine its new
expert." Order Reopening Discovery and Setting Schedule at 4 (Feb. 15, 2011) (emphasis
added). Putting aside the fact that Dr. McCarthy's expert opinion is not a "completely new"
theory of damages (thus precluding any use of Steiner, even on cross examination), MRIA
proposes to use Steiner on its own direct case, not McCarthy's cross.

Third, MRIA's proposal is also improper under Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(l), which
provides that prior trial testimony may only be used if, among other things, "the declarant is
unavailable" and "if the party against whom the testimony is now offered . . had an opportunity
and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination." MRIA
cannot meet either element of this rule.
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OBJECTION TO MRIA'S DESIGNATIONS OF MANFRED
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As to the unavailability requirement, MRIA has not established that it has "been unable
to procure (Steiner's] attendance ... by process or other reasonable means." I.R.E. 804(a)(5). It
has demonstrated no effort to obtain Steiner's testimony, whether voluntarily, by subpoena
within Idaho, or by procuring an out-of-state subpoena to depose Steiner for the preservation of
trial testimony in this case. Cf Idaho R. Civ. P. 45(i) (implementing Uniform Interstate
Depositions and Discovery Act). Moreover, MRIA seeks to use Steiner's old testimony in the
context of a retrial in which MRIA' s own expert testimony and purported damages theories have
changed, including its claim that it is entitled to $70 million on a new "usurpation" theory of
damages. Saint Alphonsus, by definition, had neither the motivation nor opportunity during the
prior proceedings to develop Steiner's testimony, as relevant to Dr. McCarthy's report or the
other changed premises, none of which had even occurred by that time.

2. Alan Hahn. MRIA also proposes to have Alan Hahn, a former Price Waterhouse
Coopers employee who did valuation work related to a potential MRIA deal in 1999, testify "via
deposition testimony." But as with prior trial testimony, deposition testimony may only be used
ifMRIA has "been unable to procure [Hahn's] attendance ... by process or other reasonable
means," I.R.E. 804(a)(5), and if Saint Alphonsus "had an opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination." I.R.E. 804(b)(1 ).
As with Steiner, MRIA has made no effort to show that it has been unable to procure
Hahn's attendance via subpoena or other means, and as with Steiner, has merely requested that
Saint Alphonsus "stipulate" to Hahn's unavailability. Saint Alphonsus cannot so stipulate-it
has made no inquiries and does not know whether Alan Hahn could possibly be available or not.
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OBJECTION TO MRIA'S DESIGNATIONS OF MANFRED
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Moreover, as with Steiner, the circumstances of this case have significantly changed since
Hahn's January 9, 2007 deposition, and Saint Alphonsus thus did not have the opportunity to
develop his testimony at that time. As MRIA cannot establish that Hahn's testimony is
admissible, he should be precluded as a witness "via deposition testimony."

3. Stephanie Westermeier. MRIA also lists as a possible trial witness Ms. Stephanie
Westermeier, Saint Alphonsus's current general counsel, who has provided legal counsel to Saint
Alphonsus in overseeing this litigation since before suit was filed in 2005. This is improper for
two reasons.

First, MRIA has never identified Ms. Westermeier as a potential witness, either during
discovery or prior to the first trial. See, e.g., Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 181, 219 P.3d
1192, 1197 (2009) ("the trial court may exclude the testimony of witnesses ... not disclosed by a
required supplementation of the responses of the party") (citing Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(e)(4)).

Second, Ms. Westermeier' s only knowledge of this case was as a result of her legal role
in representing Saint Alphonsus. In that context, the usual practice is to deny any right to call, as
a witness, counsel working on a case in court unless that testimony is essential due to the absence
of other witnesses to provide the evidence relating to a critical point at issue. 1 Thus, even though
MRIA's current trial counsel Tom Banducci was a percipient witness to events in dispute during
1

See Branam v. Smith Frozen Foods ofIdaho, Inc., 83 Idaho 502,512, 365 P.2d 958, 964 (1961) (holding
that an "attorney is justifiable in becoming a witness" when "matters important to the litigation are peculiarly within
the knowledge ofthe attorney" and there is otherwise a "want of such evidence" on point) (emphasis added); Carta
ex rei. Estate ofCarta v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 23,29-30 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that
opponent's attorneys could be called as witness only because the "attorneys are the only people who will be able to
testify on the plaintiffs behalf about the settlement negotiations with the defendants") (citing cases); cf State v.
Griffith, 94 Idaho 76, 83,481 P.2d 34,41 (1971) ("Only in a case in which his testimony is absolutely essential
should the prosecuting attorney be called to testify against the defendant.").
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the first trial (see, e.g., Trial Tr. at 1945-46, 4219-21 ), Saint Alphonsus never sought to call him,
because other non-attorney witnesses were available to be examined as to the same.
The facts in dispute in this case are over seven years old. In all that time, MRIA has
never before identified Ms. Westermeier as a potential witness, nor specified the topics on which
Ms. Westermeier might be examined, nor sought to depose her, nor made the showing necessary
to justify calling the opposing party's counsel as a trial witness. Saint Alphonsus objects to
MRIA's eleventh hour attempt to do so.
CONCLUSION
Saint Alphonus objects to Manfred Steiner, Alan Hahn, and Stephanie Westermeier being
called as potential MRIA trial witnesses, and MRIA should not be permitted to call them.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 17th day of August, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
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I hereby certify that on the 17th day of August, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
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51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04082 19D
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S MOTION
TO EXCLUDE EXPERT
TESTIMONY OF DR. THOMAS
MCCARTHY

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
In opposing MRIA' s motion to exclude portions of the expert testimony of Thomas
McCarthy, Saint Alphonsus argued in part that it would be premature for the Court to rule on the
motion prior to the completion of expert discovery on August 11, 2011. See Opp'n to MRIA's
Mot. Shorten Time, Aug. 1, 2011, at 3. Having now taken the deposition ofMRIA's expert
Bruce Budge on August 11, and based on an uncertified draft of the transcript received August
13, Saint Alphonsus respectfully submits this supplemental brief showing specifically how the
reactions of Mr. Budge to Dr. McCarthy's criticisms ofhis analysis demonstrate the relevance
and appropriateness of Dr. McCarthy's testimony. MRIA's motion should be denied for these
reasons in addition to those set forth in Saint Alphonsus' s opposition brief.

First, MRIA's primary argument for excluding portions of Dr. McCarthy's testimony is
that the testimony relates to causation, rather than damages. As shown in Saint Alphonsus's
opposition, this is a false dichotomy: when a damages expert seeks to measure business lost to a
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competitor, the expert typically must provide an opinion about the amount of lost business
caused by the defendant's alleged misconduct, as opposed to the amount lost because of other
factors. See Opp'n at 5-8. Mr. Budge's recent deposition testimony confirms that Mr. Budge is
attempting to do precisely that, making Dr. McCarthy's rebuttal testimony on this point entirely
appropriate.
Specifically, Mr. Budge confirmed at his deposition that he is offering expert opinion that
certain quantities of scans would have been performed by MRIA had IMI not existed, i.e., that
those scans would not have gone to other competitors in an increasingly crowded marketplace.
See Budge Dep. Tr., Aug. 11, 2011, at 73 (uncertified rough draft excerpts attached hereto as

Exhibit A) ("I do have an opinion about my - my -the methodology I selected. . . . And I
believe that it's accurate. And I - and the question of what were the diversions of scans from
MRIA to IMI ... is something I have a high degree of conviction is accurate."); id. ("Q. So you
have an opinion of whether MRIA lost business to IMI? A. Yes."); id. at 74 ("I have an- an
opinion under Methods 1 through 4 about what the quantification of diverted scans were."); id. at
80 ("The affiliates is something that is- is something that I just- I designed the methodology...
. I believe that it's going to result in responsive measurement. And I think it's accurate. And I
do think that it shows what the diversion was."); id. at 83 (Q. [You are opining] that MRIA
would have gotten this business ifiMI wasn't there? A .... yes .... "); id. at 109 ("opining"
that "physician's scan to IMI was diverted from MRIA").
Mr. Budge is opining, in other words, that the opening ofiMI-which Saint Alphonsus is
alleged to have facilitated-caused MRIA to lose certain quantities of scans. According to Mr.
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Budge, his opinion is justified by his "central hypothesis that the affiliations [among physicians,
hospitals, and scanning services] are very important in the hospital network and where the scans
go." !d. at 109-110.
Given this opinion by Mr. Budge that MRIA lost specifically identified scan volumes to
IMI as a result of the opening ofiMI, it is perfectly appropriate for Dr. McCarthy to opine, as he
does in Part IV.A ofhis report, that (i) to the contrary, the empirical evidence (in the form of a
regression analysis) 1 demonstrates that MRIA did not lose scans to IMI's downtown location, see
McCarthy Report~~ 24-28, and (ii) Mr. Budge's identification oflost scans fails to take into
account other factors (besides "affiliations") that impact scan referral patterns, including the
entry of other competitors, the location of patients and imaging centers, and the practice among
physicians to split referrals, see id

~~

21-23. While Dr. McCarthy and Mr. Budge can and do

disagree about the impact of each of these factors and over how much business IMI took away
from MRIA, those disagreements are for the jury to resolve. But it cannot be-as MRIA's
motion would have it-that Mr. Budge's opinion is proper damages testimony while Dr.
McCarthy's is not.

Second, Mr. Budge's testimony undermines any argument for excluding Part IV.B.1 of
Dr. McCarthy's report. In this section, Dr. McCarthy criticizes Mr. Budge and MRIA's other
damages expert, Charles Wilhoite, for failing to exclude damages relating to facilities opened by
IMI after April1, 2005 (when Saint Alphonsus's non-compete obligations expired), and

1

Mr. Budge testified that he himself had "probably" used regression analysis in offering expert testimony in other
matters and that such testimony had not been excluded. See Budge Dep. Tr. at 121-22.
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calculates what Mr. Budge's claimed damages would be on the assumption that such damages
are not recoverable. See McCarthy Report~~ 30-31.
At his deposition, Mr. Budge conceded that all of his damages calculations are premised
on the assumption that Saint Alphonsus never dissociated and never entered into postdissociation competition with MRlA. See Budge Dep. Tr. at 84--86. He further conceded that if
Saint Alphonsus were assumed to have rightfully dissociated-as this Court has ruled as a

matter of law that it did-then one should calculate damages suffered after April1, 2005, by
analyzing "the effects of the wrongful conduct ... through the tail period where that wrongful
behavior finishes manifesting itself." /d. at 86; see also id. at 88-93 (explaining how such
damages would rapidly tail off to zero); Budge Dep. Ex. 1, at 13 (Mr. Budge's handwritten
modifications to his expert report illustrating how damages should be calculated if rightful
dissociation is assumed) (attached hereto as Exhibit B). This is precisely the sort of analysis that
this Court suggested would be needed to justify recovery of damages for the period after April 1,
2005. See Hearing Tr., May 18, 2011, at 59 (stating that MRIA entities can recover damages
"that they can reasonably attribute to business lost even after that date arising out of the breach
of that obligation not to compete prior to that date"). Yet Mr. Budge admitted at his deposition
that the damages figures in his report do not reflect such an analysis and that he had "not"
performed such an analysis. Budge Dep. Tr. at 88. As a result, Dr. McCarthy's testimony
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recalculating Mr. Budge's damages to exclude those relating to facilities that opened after April
1, 2005, is unquestionably relevant and admissible?

Third, Mr. Budge's testimony also undermines MRIA's argument for exclusion of
testimony relating to Part IV.B.3 of Dr. McCarthy's report. As explained at pages 19 to 20 of
Saint Alphonsus's opposition to MRIA's motion, Dr. McCarthy in this section of his report
criticizes Mr. Budge's measure of damages for MRIA's new claim that Saint Alphonsus usurped
from MRIA an opportunity to form a joint venture with GSR. In his report, Dr. McCarthy
explains that a proper measure of MRIA 's damages should not include (as Mr. Budge's measure
does) GSR's interest in that hypothetical partnership, and calculates what Mr. Budge's claimed
damages would be on the assumption that MRIA and GSR agreed to share equally in the profits
of the hypothetical venture. See McCarthy Report~~ 35-40. At his deposition, Mr. Budge
endorsed this analysis, saying that, if one were to measure MRIA's and GSR's respective shares
of Mr. Budge's bottom-line damages figure, then Mr. Budge "conceptually agree[d] with [Dr.
McCarthy] for the need for a calculation" and that Dr. McCarthy made "a valid point that needs
to be pursued":
Dr. McCarthy, you know, proposes a calculation which I haven't- I'm not
endorsing his specific calculation, but if the question posed to me ... is
how do the - how under that scenario [where some portion of the business
interests are owned by MRIA and some portion of the business interests
are owned by GSR] would a particular stakeholder group come out, I
conceptually agree with him for the need for a calculation. He basically, I
2

Further, because MRIA's other expert, Charles Wilhoite, uses the 2010 numbers from Mr. Budge's report as his
starting point for estimating future damages, and because Mr. Budge's damages, properly calculated, would tail off
to zero by 2010, see Ex. B hereto, any adjustment to Mr. Budge's figures would also have an enormous impact on
Mr. Wilhoite's estimates.
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think, advocates that this number would be about half of what it is ....
And I'm not in a position to say that I agree completely with him or
disagree ... with the calculations, but I - if that's the purpose for which
Calculation Method 5 is used, then I think that there's a valid point that
needs to be pursued.
Budge Dep. Tr. at 65-66. Plainly, then, there is no basis for striking this portion of Dr.
McCarthy's testimony.
For these reasons as well as those set forth in Saint Alphonsus's opposition brief, the
Court should deny MRIA's motion to exclude portions of Dr. McCarthy's testimony.
DATED this 17th day of August, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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Civil Procedure, the deposition of BRUCE P. BUDGE was taken
before EVA P. JANKOVITS, a Certified Court Reporter, #1915, on
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in some sense so that it participated in -- in -- so that
these scans were basically performed under the MRIA
umbrella.
Q. Okay. Rather than under an IMI umbrella?
A. Yeah. Although by attribution it-- you know, it
could take the number of corporate forms. It doesn't really
matter to me, but...
Q. Okay. Does it matter to the amount of damages
that you're claiming?
A. Well, I guess it depends on what sense you're-what question you're trying to answer with my calculations.
If you want to know what is the total value of the
effect of these alleged wrongful acts and the usurpation-Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- then the amount that I've quantified will be a
good -- is a reliable indication to the jury of just how big
these -- this opportunities were. How much money we're
talking about.
If you're talking on the other hand, and this is
the amount that would have accrued under my understanding of
the MRI's theory to the MRI entity because it would have
been under that umbrella, if you're asking me was it a
proper measurement of damages with respect to the various
stakeholders' -Q. Mm-hm.
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A. -- allegation, I would probably have a different
answer.
Q. What's your -- what's your answer to that
question? Is that a proper measure of damages to the
various stakeholders in this litigation?
A. Then I think that there would be an additional
analysis that needs to look at their ownership interest and
percentages so that you could -- and those calculations
could be done with this as a starting point.
Q. Okay. The ownership in-- so this amount, 52
million and change, relates to a hypothetical partnership
between MRIA or one of its entities and GSR?
MR. WOODARD: Objection; misstates -CONTINUING BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Is that -- is that correct?
MR. WOODARD: --prior testimony.
THE COURT REPORTER: Misstates what?
MR. WOODARD: Priortestimony.
A. It basically -- I don't know the exact form that
MRIA's alleging, but, yes, it basically assumes that these
scans that occurred downtown would have been in a new MRIA
entity which including those locations.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. And includes GSR as a partner?
A. And it wouldn't -- it potentially and probably
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would have had different stakeholders than the ones that we
find today.
Q. Right. Including GSR -A. Yes.
Q. --as a stakeholder?
A. Yes.
Q. So what would we have to do when if you were
trying to find out how much of the $52 million would have
been owned by the stakeholders that are -- that currently
constitute MRIA?
A. If somebody -- I've looked at this in terms of
actually who the parties are in the litigation, but if
you-Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- wanted to go one step down and look at the
stakeholders, you would basically have to take the
respective ownership interest and, by attribution, basically
it step into down into how much they would end up with.
Q. Yeah. You know, I'm not-- I'm not so concerned
with the stakeholders -- with each limited partner. Let me
take a-- with each limited partner. I'm concerned with
trying to find out. I mean, you're envisioning a
hypothetical partnership between the MRIA entities and GSR.
A. Not -- yeah. I don't mean to say it would take a
legal form of a partnership --
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Q. Yeah.
A. -- as opposed to corporation, but some type of
joining of-- of business interests, yes.
Q. Some type of joining a business interests -A. Yes.
Q. --where some portion of the business interests
are owned by MRIA and some portion of the business interests
are own bid GSR?
A. Right.
Q. And if we're trying to deter--- I'm just trying
to figure out if we're trying to determine how much of the
business interests -- or if I'm trying to determine how much
of the total damages go to that part of the business
interest owned by MRIA, the plaintiff in this case, then how
much of that business interest-- how much of those damages
going to the business interest owned by GSR. I'm trying to
figure out how would we do that.
A. You basically would need to make assumptions as to
what their respective percentages were.
~ Okey.
_
A. And to basically then go ahead and do the
distribution of profits to the various entities.
Mr. McCarthy -- or perhaps it's Dr.?
Q. Dr. McCarthy.
A. Dr. McCarthy, you know, proposes a calculation
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which I haven't -- I'm not endorsing his specific
calculation, but if the question posed to me-Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- is how do the -- how under that scenario would
a particular stakeholder group come out, I conceptually
agree with him for the need for a calculation. He
basically, I think, advocates that this number would be
about half of what it is.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And I'm not in a position to say that I agree
completely with him or disagree -Q. Okay.
A. --with the calculations, but I-- if that's the
purpose for which Calculation Method 5 is used, then I think
that there's a valid point that needs to be pursued.
Q. Okay. Do you think it's reasonable to believe
that the hypothetical partnership would have been roughly
50150?
A. That's what I don't know. I would-Q. Okay.
A. -- need to be given that assumption in order to do
the calculation.
Q. Okay. Assuming the hypothetical partnership would
have been 50150, would Dr. McCarthy's approach be the
correct one to take?
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A. I haven't looked at it time closely, but this-so keeping in mind that I haven't done that, there are
issues about that MRIA only has 30 percent interest in the
operating entities, so I'm assuming GSR would have half of
30 percent of the interest in the operating entities. I
don't know whether this contemplated they would have an
interest in the operating entities directly -Q. Okay.
A. -- GSR. So all of those factors would have to be
specified to me before I could do that.
Q. Okay. Under your assumption, which entity would
have partnered with the GSR Radiologists?
A. I don't think that's important to my calculation.
I haven't made an assumption about that.
Q. Are you assuming that this hypothetical entity,
the joint -- I'll call it a joint venture because I -- and
by that I mean we're not -- we're not assuming any
particular corporate form but some sort of joint venture
between GSR and MRIA. Do you assume that this joint venture
would have expanded into Meridian and Eagle?
A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. And what's the basis for that assumption?
A. I don't know. Till you posed the question, I
hadn't thought about it explicitly. But I guess it isn't
actually a necessary assumption that -- that they would have
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included them all. They certainly could have. And that
would have to be specified to me before making the
calculations we referred to a minute ago -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- as to which entities actually GSR did have an
interest in.
Q. Okay.
A. I don't know why I assumed that would be the case.
That might be wrong on my part.
Q. Okay. If the joint venture did not go into Eagle
and Meridian, would we have to deduct the Eagle and Meridian
part of the damages?
A. Well, under the usurpation theory I would think
not. I think that the -- that the MRIA is advocating that
if St. Alphonsus had been a loyal partner and had acted
properly that those would have been in the MRIA umbrella.
And they may believe -- and this is where I don't want to
speak for MRIA -- that that could have occurred
independently of the GSR negotiations and whether or not
they were included in those entities.
Q. Okay.
A. I haven't made an assumption about it -- that
effects the calculations.
Q. Okay. Now, you said we could use Calculation
Method 5 to measure damages under the theory that, but for
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St. Alphonsus' alleged wrongdoing, IMI would never have
opened?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that mean you're assuming that if IMI had
never opened, MRIA or one of its operating entities would
have performed all the scans that IMI performed over the
years?
A. Well, that is the assumption that is made from a
calculation standpoint.
Q. For Method 5?
A. Yeah. I understand that the truth ofthat
assumption could be tested and argued about and everything,
but that is the assumption that is made by Method 5 that all
of the scans, even for non-affiliated services, that MRIA
would have filled that void -Q. Okay.
A. -- under that particular theory that it never
opened.
Q. Okay.
A. I understand that that's subject to examination,
but that's the assumption I made.
Q. Okay. Do you have an opinion on that assumption?
A. No. That gets into the causation and evidence -evidentiary matters I think that are going to be put for the
jury--
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Q.

Okay.
A. -- aren't properly put before me.
Q. What should the jury look for in trying to
determine whether all of the scans that IMI performed would
have been performed by MRIA if St. Alphonsus had prevented
IMI -- if St. -- if-- if St. Alphonsus caused IMI to open?
MR. WOODARD: I'm going object. He just testified
he's not providing expert testimony in that area. I'm not
instructing him not answer.
A. Yeah. I -- I just was going to say that I don't
really know how to answer the question. I would -- I would
encourage them to look at the evidence, but I -- I'm not a
position to be an advisor to them as to what they need to
look at.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Okay. Do you have any idea what sort of evidence
they would look at?
A. I'd just be guessing about something that's really
not my business, so, no.
Q. Okay. I know you're not offering an expert
opinion on it, but do you have -- you offered your personal
opinion earlier.
Do you have a personal opinion on whether MRIA
would have performed all of the scans that IMI performed if
IMI never existed including the scans of the nonaffiliated
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physicians?
A. I haven't gotten into the underlying evidence
enough to really have a sense either way on that question.
I feel pretty neutral about that.
Q. Your Methods 1 through 4 assume that would not be
the case; is that correct?
A. Yes. Not be the -- let's just make sure we're
talking about what I think we are. We're talking about the
scans that occurred at IMI that having nothing to do with
the affiliate -- the base of affiliated physicians.
Q. Correct.
A. Yeah.
Q. That's what I'm talking about.
A. Okay. Yeah. So I answered correctly.
Q. Okay. And the correct answer was Methods 1
through 4 assume that MRI would not have performed those
scans-A. Yes.
Q. -- the nonaffiliated scans?
A. That's correct.
Q. Putting aside some differences for Meridian and
Eagle?
A. Yeah, but we weren't talking about -Q. Yeah.
A. -- Meridian and Eagle. We were talking about

downtown.
Q. Okay. Yeah. That's-- that's really what I was
focusing on.
A. Yeah.
Q. Downtown. Okay. Do you have any opinion whether
the assumption made in Calculation Methods I through 4 about
the downtown scans is more or less reasonable than the
assumption made in Calculation Method 5 about the downtown
scans?
A. Well, I'm aware of the course of conduct that's
being alleged in the -Q. Mm-hm.
A. During the course of the prior proceeding and in
the last few months I've been exposed to some of the
evidence. And I suppose -- I think that MRIA's allegations
are plausible. And I think, just as a layperson, that -that many of them are persuasive-Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- but I don't view it as my job as to basically
weigh in on that. I'm an accountant. I'm supposed -- and
my job is -- you know, they -- they're going to advance
certain theorys and evidence, and they need somebody to
quantify the dollar impact of those if they prevail-Q. Okay.
A. -- and that's what I think my job is.
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Q. You're not offering any opinion on which scans
would have gone to MRIA but for the alleged bad acts?
A. Well, I'm not sure I like the way that question is
formed. I'm -- I am -- I do have an opinion about my -my -- the methodology I selected.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And I believe that it's accurate. And I -- and
the question of what were the diversions of scans from MRIA
to IMI -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- is something I have a high degree of conviction
is accurate. But whether those are the result of wrongful
acts is something that I'm not weighing in on.
Q. Okay. I think I understand you to be drawing a
distinction between the diversion of business and the cause
of the diversion?
A. That's correct.
Q. So you have an opinion of whether MRIA lost
business to IMI?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Is your opinion that MR- --is your opinion
that the lost business for the loss to the downtown location
of IMI includes every scan ever performed at the IMI
downtown location?
A. Depends under which of the five methods.

19 (Pages 70 to 73)

002047
095f3a21-5fab-4c49-9e9e-f8007860b5b0

Bruce Budge

UNCERTIFIED ROUGH DRAFT
Page 74

1
2

3
4

5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. Okay. I thought you said you had an opinion on
it.
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3
A. Oh, I have an -- an opinion under Methods I
4
through 4 about what the quantification of diverted scans
5
were.
6
Q. Okay.
7
A. And -- and to the extent that those are included
8
in five for the affiliated physician -9
Q. Mm-hm.
1O
A. -- group, I do have an affirmative opinion about
that, yes.
11
Q. What's that opinion?
12
A. It's reflected in the numbers that are in my
13
report.
14
Q. In other words, your-- your expert opinion is
15
that those scans were diverted from MRIA to IMI?
16
A. That's what I'm trying to measure -17
Q. Okay.
18
A. -- precisely.
19
MR. WOODARD: And, Chris, I mean, this truly is a 2 0
topic that was covered ad nauseam in the first trial and
21
22
in the-23
MR. VERGONIS: Yeah. I know, Wade. And-24
MR. WOODARD: --first deposition.
25
MR. VERGONIS: --what I'm trying --what I'm
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trying -- if you -- I -- what I'm trying to get at, though,
is this Calculation Method 5.
MR. WOODARD: Okay. Let's tie it in-MR. VERGONIS: Okay.
MR. WOODARD: -- otherwise I'm going to -- because
I-MR. VERGONIS: Okay.
MR. WOODARD: That foundation's already been
established. I know it's kind of odd in a new deposition,
but that foundation has been covered.
MR. VERGONIS: Right. Right. I just -- I just -I'm trying to make sure we're on the same page here before I
ask my questions about No. 5. I understand. I will -- as
we talked about the other day, I disagree with your premise,
by I'm going to try to stick to new material.
MR. WOODARD: Okay.
MR. VERGONIS: Can the --just to get my bearings,
can the reporter please read back the last question and
answer?
(The following encompasses the entire readback
portion.)
Q. 1\
(Whereupon the readback concluded.)
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Okay. And the "those scans" in that question were
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the affiliated physician scans, right?
A. That's my recollection-Q. Okay.
A. -- though I'm not really quite -Q. That's fine.
A. -- sure at this point.
Q. We might have to go back and read further.
Okay. So I'm trying to compare your opinion in
Calculation Methods I through 4 that the affiliated scans
were diverted from MRIA to IMI with the assumption in
Calculation Method No. 5 that all scans in Downtown IMI were
diverted from MRIA to IMI.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Do you see any inconsistency between your opinion
in Calculation Methods I through 4 and your assumption in
Calculation Method 5?
A. Well, they are not the same assumption.
Calculation Method 5 is based on usurpation argument and, in
which case, MRI would be a -- you know, a participant in the
downtown location. And I'm saying that MRIA may also have
theories that if IMI was never formed -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- that -- that this -- these market -- this
section of the market that IMI did is outside the affiliated
group might have accrued to MRIA.
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I'm not aware of that. I'm certainly not offering
an opinion of the reasonableness of that. If they have
such -- if they can demonstrate that through the evidence as
being a reasonable assumption, then this would be a useful
measurement for the jury. But I'm -- I don't know whether I
can do that or not. I don't know whether they are going to
try to advance that argument independently from the
usurpation. I just don't know -Q. Okay.
A. -- what their plan is.
Q. So you're-- okay. And you're not offering an
opinion on that?
A. On what their plan is?
Q. No. On the reasonableness -- or on the number
of-- you're not offering an opinion on the universe of
scans diverted from MRIA to IMI for Calculation Method 5?
A. I am offering an opinion with respect to the
affiliated ones. What -- what I'm aware of is that there is
another section of scans that don't relate to affiliated
ones. I believe that those rely on the usurpation -Q. Okay.
A. -- argument in order to prevail. I'm saying I
don't know, but there may be other arguments.
Q. Okay. And I'm-- and I'm trying here to focus on
other arguments because as we discussed, there seem to be
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two arguments -- two different assumptions built into your
model.
A. Right.
Q. We determined they're not mutually exclusive-A. Right.
Q. -- but they're different. And I understand how
the usurpation model, the theory is MRI should get
everything.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Or at least its portion of everything with -- with
the partner in this joint venture -A. Yeah.
Q. -- and it's portion pulled out, correct?
A. Right.
Q. But putting aside the usurpation model, the IMI
would never have opened -A. Mm-hm.
Q. -- model damages. I'm trying to --just trying
to -- and I think I got your answer. You're assuming that
ifiMI would never have opened, that MRI would have
performed all of the affiliated scans.
A. Yes.
Q. You're -- you're not only assuming that, you're
opining that that would have happened?
A. Yes.
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Q. But you're not opining that IMI would have
performed the nonaffiliated scans.
A. Well-Q. I'm sorry. That MRIA would not have performed the
nonaffiliated scans.
A. That MRIA would have or not have?
Q. I misspoke. Let me take the whole thing from the
top.
MR. WOODARD: You know, Chris, could we just go
off the record real quick.
MR. VERGONIS: Sure.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is approximately
10:50 a.m. We're off the record.
(Pause in the proceedings.)
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're back on the record. The
time is approximately 10:50 a.m.
Go ahead.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Okay. Let's --let me try to rephrase my question
better, Mr. Budge.
Am I correct in my understanding that you have an
opinion as to Calculation Method No. 5 that IMI -- that MRIA
would have performed the affiliated physician scans had IMI
never opened, but you do not have an opinion that MRIA would
have performed the nonaffiliated scans had IMI never opened?

A. That's not how I would articulate it. What I
would say is that I have done a calculation and I have an
opinion that is accurate that if there is a theory which
succeeds that there was -- we're not talking about
usurpation right now, right?
Q. Right.
A. -- that IMI never opened -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- that if MRIA and its counsel through the
evidence can give evidence that, had that not happened,
these other scans from nonaffiliated groups would have gone
to MRIA, my calculation measures that. I have no opinion on
whether that's a good assumption.
Q. Okay. But you do have an opinion as to the
affiliated's case?
A. Yeah. The affiliates is something that is -- is
something that I just-- I designed the methodology.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. I believe that it's going to result in responsive
measurement. And I think it's accurate. And I do think
that it shows what the diversion was.
Q. Okay.
A. For the affiliated.
Q. Right. Why don't you have an opinion as to the
other scans, the nonaffiliated scans?
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A. Well, I don't -- I haven't studied those scans in
the same -- with the same amount of data and the
completeness of data that was possible for the affiliateds,
and I don't feel comfortable extending my opinion to them.
Q. Okay.
A. My opin- -- not my opinion as to the
quantification but as to the causation of why they might
be -- have been performed by MRIA.
Q. But-- but isn't it also your opinion as to the
quantification of them?
A. That's what is included in my opinion, is if it is
true, that if IMI hadn't opened, MRIA would have done the
scans for nonaffiliated physicians, I have -- my opinion is
I've accurately quantified -Q. Okay.
A. -- what the economic effect of that is.
Q. Okay. But earlier we said as to the-- earlier we
broke out on Model l through 4, we said there was a question
about -- two separate questions. One about whether the
scans were diverted and a second question about whether the
diversions were caused by St. Al's. Do you recall -A. Sort of, yeah.
Q. --breaking that down?
A. Yeah.
Q. And you said-- you were offering your opinion
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that the scans were diverted from one business to another,
but you were not offering an opinion that the scans were
caused by-A. I know what the -Q. -- St. Al's conduct?
A. I know what the allegations were. I've been told
to assume that the allegations that the jury will find that
wrongful conduct by St. Al's caused a diversion of scans.
Q. Mm.
A. My assignment is to measure what that diversion
was.
Q. Right.
A. And my opinion extends only to that assignment
as-- as a-- you know, assuming that those things are in
evidence-Q. Right.
A. -- what's the measure of damages.
Q. Right. You're not -- you're not assuming -you're not opining that St. Alphonsus caused any of the-of the diversions, you're just assuming that St. Alphonsus
caused them, correct?
A. I'm instructed to assume that, yes.
Q. But you are opining that the diversions were
caused-A. That they occurred.
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A. Because it's my understanding that there's been
adjudication of that issue and that the dissociation was not
wrongful.
Q. Okay. Is it also your understanding that it
follows from the dissociation not being wrongful that St.
Alphonsus has a right to compete with MRIA after a certain
date?
A. Again, without trying to commit either parties to
their positions, that is my understanding, is that they
basically had to withhold participation for a year after
their dissociation.
Q. So all your opinions are based on the assumption
that St. At's could compete after that year expired?
A. Right. They in fact assume that, you know, had
this wrongful course of conduct not occurred -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- and that the corporate opportunities weren't
usurped and that there wasn't a deliberate attempt to divert
scans from MRIA to IMI, which is alleged -- I'm not saying
that to be the case -- that my model in the later years
presumes that everybody would have been a happy family and
that St. Alphonsus would not have a had a reason to
disassociate, but it doesn't assume that they couldn't have
disassociated at any time and honored that noncompete.
So, for example, if-- if you go through the
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Q. That the diversions occurred?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. In other words, that IMI --that MRIA would
have gotten this business if IMI wasn't there?
A. Under one of the-- I mean, there are other
wrongful acts which cause diversions besides -- doesn't rely
on IMI not being there, but, yes, if I -- if I understand
what you're asking me.
Q. I'm going to ask you about some changes in
assumptions between your 2007 and 20 11 report.
On Page 6 of your 2011 report, you write, under
"Summary of Updated Opinions," "For purposes of my analysis,
I have assumed that SARMC will be found liable for the
allegations made by MRIA.
"To the extend all or some of the allegations are
dismissed, my damages calculations may be revised."
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Do the wrongful acts that you're assuming SARMC
will be found liable for include wrongful dissociation?
A. No.
Q. Do they include an ongoing obligation not to
compete with MRIA extending through the present day?
A. No.
Q. Why don't they?
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allegations which MRI intends to offer so that they actually
become, you know, the first arrivers in Meridian, that
they're not undermined in the practice of their center so
that their scans are not diverted that there isn't
accommodation with GSR so that all of these things occur, I
don't see any reason to interpose an assumption at some
future date, in '07 or '8 or '9, that St. Alphonsus
withdraws, but if there was a reason that that might be the
case, I provided the details of my analysis so that you can
go in and say, okay, let's just assume that St. At's decides
to dissociate -- in '08?
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And I think you can use the data I have to kind
look at what the glide path is going to be in terms of the
decline in referrals from the -- because affiliation is
important in my opinion. And so that -- so my calculations
are all useful. So I don't want to be misunderstood that
I'm saying that St. At's couldn't have dissociated at any
time. I'm just saying that they assume that they wouldn't
have. And I think that that's a rebuttable assumption. And
if-- if it was rebutted, I could alter the calculations.
Q. And are we talk about Method 5 here?
A. All methods.
Q. Okay. So all five of your methods assume that St.
Alphonsus -- the bottom line numbers assume that St.
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Alphonsus would not have dissociated?
A. That in likelihood would not have dissociated.
But, you know, I'm open to evidence and that type of thing.
And if it were found by the jury or -- that dissociation was
likely at some particular -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- date, they could still use my calculations in
order to quantifY the wrongful behavior -- the effects of
the wrongful behavior through that date and kind of through
the tail period where that wrongful behavior finishes
manifesting itself.
Q. Okay. I want to-- I want to talk a little more
about that because I don't fully understand it, but I think
I -- I think I see what you're saying.
So you said the -- what -- what is the tail
period?
A. Well, I think that-- you know, if you look at the
actual data in terms of what happened to the MRIA
business -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- you know, basically it could be characterized
as a business that had been strongly growing, benefitting, I
believe, through -- by its status as a provider within the
St. Al's network. And when that disassociation occurs,
those affiliations don't -- you know, referral patterns
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don't just change immediately. It takes time for them to
do, but I don't know -- but you'll see that over a period of
one or two years basically the referrals dry up.
Q. Hm.
A. And I'm saying that if-- if you have wrongful
conduct through a certain date, and -- and then there's no
more conduct after that, you don't just truncate the damages
through the date that the conduct stopped. You basically
look at the impacts of the conduct.
Q. Okay.
A. And -- and so in the case where -- let's say for
some reason you're looking at my Method No. 1, and you
say-Q. Mm-hm.
A. --well, we have evidence that even if these
opportunities have not been usurped and all this occurred in
2008, St. Al's would have dissociated. Then what you could
do at that point of time is you could look at my but-for
line in terms ofwhat scans would-Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- have been -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- and then you would pause it in decline in those
scans as a result of dissociation, and damages then would be
the difference between that but-for line and the actual
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scans-Q. Okay.
A. -- instead of the original one.
Q. Okay. I understand. So that's an analysis that
could be done?
A. And I actually think that it could be done in an
approximate way, but-- by the jury looking at my data by
year. If you would give them a particular year to assume
dissociation, they can see that what the pattern of-and-- you know, and some way they could decide, well, maybe
we'll give them, you know, three-quarters of year one after
dissociation and one-quarter of year two, or something like
that.
Q. Okay. How's the jury to know what percentages to
use?
A. Well, they just look at, basically, the pattern of
how the -- what the attrition was in terms of referrals
after dissociation. We have hard data on that. We can show
them how the scans went down.
Q. Okay. So that's not-- this-- this tail analysis
is not something you've performed in your tables?
A. It's-- it's not in here. I really-- you know,
if somebody gave me assumptions, I could do an analysis
fairly readily, but I believe that MRIA's assumption is that
had these course of conduct not occurred that there would
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have been a state of affairs where St. Al's had -- had
little reason to want to dissociate. And so that -- and the
model assumes that they would have continued to be in
this -- in association. That certainly doesn't assume that
they had to legally.
Q. Right. What if we-- what if we change the
assumption and assume that even in the but-for world, St.
Alphonsus would have dissociated on April I st, 2004 and
would have been free to compete on April 1st, 2005? Can you
tell me, sitting here today, how your numbers would be
affected by the change in assumption?
A. Well, I would not truncate the damages at the date
that their noncompete expired.
Q. Okay.
A. I would basically -- you know, assuming that this
wrongful conduct-- you know, it affects MRIA's business
going on into the future. I would basically try to -- and
so under the wrongful conduct, I'm basically positing a
but-for line as to what would happen to their scans. Then
if you tell me that there was a-- a dissociation which was
proper-Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- I would basically look at what the attrition
period was that -- that -- that MRI would lose because of
lack of affiliation.
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Q.

Right.
A. Calculate a new but-for line, compare it to their
actuals, and compute the damages that way.
Q. Can you do that right now?
A. No. It's too-Q. Too complicated?
A. --complicated to do it right now.
Q. Okay. Would it-- you said before it would maybe
you three-quarters of the damages for the-A. Yeah. I didn't mean to actually hang a number on
any of those. That was for illustration purposes-Q. Okay.
A. -- only. Yeah.
Q. Is this something the jury could do?
A. Well, I-- I don't think that they could do it
with absolute precision. I think that the juries have the
ability in terms of assessing damages and testimony to try
to come at equitable result and they can kind of see how
much damages associated with those years. They can
understand that-- that some of those losses are now from
causes that aren't being accused.
Q. Right.
A. And they can make some decision as to how much o
them has to do with the bad conduct as to opposed to just
dissociation itself.
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this is the case -- but SARMC was under a duty not to
compete and to support a competitor. They did that. That
affected the amount of scans that occurred during that
period. But after that one year is completed -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- you can see what happens when there's no longer
an affiliation. They go from over 6,500 scans down a level,
you know, below 2,000 within one, two, three years.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And so that's the approximate pattern that I
would-- you know, the-- the referral pattern doesn't shift
instantly, but ultimately it does, like when there's not an
affiliation because the affiliations are very important in
the pattern of referrals in my opinion.
Q. Okay.
A. So I would probably take a line that starts where
this -- I'm looking at Chart 1.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. It starts with the end of the one-year period.
Q. Okay.
A. And then probably mimic a decline down after that.
Q. Okay.
A. Down on a similar pattern.
Q. Could you draw that?
A. It's going to be very approximate, but I could,
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Q. Can you give -- you said the numbers you gave
before were for illustrative purposes.
Can you -- can you give any assistance to the jury
as to how they ought -- as to how they ought to quantify
this tailing off of damages?
A. Well, I think I could tell-- basically I think
the biggest difference is that the but-for line would be the
same through the end of the date, and then that they would
need to lower that but-for line for the decline in scans
that happens after -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- dissociation, and then take that amount and
reduce my damages for it.
Q. How quickly would the line lower?
A. Well, it's-- I haven't studied that exactly. It
appears to me that, if you look at Page 8, for example-Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- and we have disassociation occurring in that
one vertical line in -Q. Yep.
A. -- in at about 12 months later appears to -- I
don't believe that it did, but it sort of seems to coincide
with IMI opening on SARMC campus -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- so -- and during that interim -- I don't think
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yeah.
Q. Okay. Here's a pen.
A. (Witness complies.) So you'd have something like
this, and it comes down, you know, within with a period of
two or three years.
Q. Okay. And what-A. And then -- and then the damages basically instead
of being this area, are this area (drawing).
Q. Can you shade that in?
A. (Witness complies.)
Q. Okay. And if you had time to look at the numbers
and examine everything, you could -- you could draw that
line -- you can estimate that line better?
A. More closely.
Q. Yeah.
A. But, you know, MRIA's belief is that if this
wrongful conduct occurred, then it's quite unlikely there
would have been a dissociation. But if I'm given an
instruction to assume there would have, I can do that
calculation.
Q. Okay. Get my pen back.
A. Oh.
Q. Thank you.
MR. WOODARD: Do you want to mark that?
MR. VERGONIS: Urn. Yeah, I think he drew it into
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Q. Mm-hm.
A. But it shows, in the combination between the two
of them, what actually occurs -Q. Right.
A. -- when in the course of events you described
happens. And so I think my -- my measurements are accurate
and useful for that, and they already encompass that
possibility.
Q. Okay. You testified earlier that you read
Dr. McCarthy's report, right?
A. Yes.
MR. VERGONIS: I'd like to mark that report as the
next exhibit.
(Whereupon a was marked Exhibit 5 for
identification.)
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Can I ask you to turn to Page 9 of that report.
A. Yes.
Q. In particular, Paragraph 21. Do you see the
sentence in Paragraph 21, two -- two lines from the bottom,
above the footnotes, "Given that the MRI scanning capacity
has increased at many of these other facilities"-- he's
referring to other MRI facilities that opened in the area -"it is highly likely that these physicians might have
referred some of their MRI patients to these other MRl
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what you're saying. If they use Boise Imaging instead of
IMI?
A. Then that is not in the population of scans that
I'm saying were diverted.
Q. Okay. But I think Dr. McCarthy is saying, in the
but-for world-- what was one of the imaging centers you
named?
A. I don't know. I think that-- I thought that the
Elks Rehabilitation Hospital. I just -- he said maybe they
have a scanner. You know, I don't care who it is.
Q. Okay. Why don't we use Boise Radiology then-A. Okay.
Q. --just for the --just for hypothetical
discussion.
A. Yeah.
Q. If Dr. McCarthy is saying in this sentence, I
believe, that it is highly likely that if these physicians
had not referred to -- let me strike that and let me start
over.
These are the -- these physicians that we're
referring to are the so-called affiliated referring
physicians, your universe of the physicians who you say any
scan they sent to IMI would have gone to the MRIA in the
but-for world?
A. Yes.
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facilities even if the IMI facility had not existed in the
but-for world."
MR. WOODARD: Did you have a question or did you
just ask him if he-MR. VERGONIS: Well, I just asked-MR. WOODARD: -- sees that?
MR. VERGONIS: --him if he sees that, I guess.
A. I'm trying to figure out who he means by "these
physicians." Are these people that did refer to IMI or...
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. These physicians I believe in the prior sentence
he's referring to the affiliated referring physicians by
which he means everyone in your two categories.
A. They may have and very well. And that would be
reflected in the data, and their scans wouldn't be included
in my definition of those that had been diverted if they had
done that.
Q. Well, around all of these physicians included in
your list of diverted scans?
A. Only ifiMI performed a scan for them. If they
were-- there was other competition in the valley. If they
used Elks Rehabilitation Scanner or the Boise Orthopedic
scanner, something like that, that's not in the population
of scans which I'm saying are diverted.
Q. What if they used both MRIA and -- or -- I see
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Q. Dr. McCarthy is saying that some of the scans that
went to the IMI in the real world would have gone not to
MRIA, but to facilities like Boise Radiology in the but-for
world.
A. Well, I'm assuming that that happened. And those
are not being measured by me as diversions from MRIA.
Q. But aren't they?
A. They aren't. It's only if IMI did -- did a scan
from the affiliated -Q. Right. But what Dr. McCarthy's talking about here
is the scan that IMI did in the real world -A. Mm-hm.
Q. -- from a physician who is in your group of
affiliated referring physicians because that physician, for
instance, had a prior referral pattern of sending scans to
MRI Center. You're assuming that that physician's scan to
IMI was diverted from MRIA?
A. Yes.
Q. And you're opining that that happened?
A. Right.
Q. Dr. McCarthy is saying, Well, isn't it possible
that that physician in the but-for world would have sent the
scan not to MRI Center or MRI Mobile, but to a third-party
provider like Boise Radiology?
A. That kind of runs to basically my central
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hypothesis that the affiliations are very important in the
hospital network and where the scans go.
Now, they -- there could be an isolated instance
where something like that happened, but I have a high degree
of conviction that the affiliations are very significant.
And being the official MRI center for St. Alphonsus is
valuable because of the referral network that it confers.
And I think there's, you know, a lot of evidence as to why
the affiliated patients' network is important in how it
generally functions in defining the market and the number of
scans that would have been.
Now, of course there are individual exceptions
that could have occurred. And there's referral patterns for
individuals that might be different. But what I've tried do
in the aggregate is to basically develop a method which
shows that had these accused acts of St. Alphonsus not
occurred, that the steady state is the situation that
happened before the bad acts occurred in which MRIA got most
of its business from referrals from the St. Al's network and
continued.
Once St. Al's tries to intentionally divert those
to another party and a competitor, that -- that's what I'm
measuring because prior to the wrongful acts, you can see
what the, basically, audience and the market was for-- for
the affiliated radiology center.
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So I agree with Dr. McCarthy that there could be
possible isolated instances. I don't agree in the aggregate
that you can't use hospital affiliation to put together a
reliable model as what would have happened had that not bee11
interrupted.
Q. What do you mean by hospital affiliation-A. I just mean -Q. --in this context?
A. I mean that, basically, physicians in different
areas of medicine that are affiliated with the same hospital
are encouraged to refer to each other. It makes the
organization stronger. It benefits them. It's important to
physicians in terms of what hospital groups they affiliate
with.
I know from my own personal experience, my own -I've had the same doctor for 30 years. He changed his
affiliation from Swedish Medical to the Poly Clinic and
suddenly, when I needed a cancer screening or a biopsy or
some other procedure, I got sent to the provider that was in
his network.
I've audited a number of hospitals. I have
friends that are -- were administrators and financial
officers of hospitals. I know what they're trying to do
when they create a network, affiliations, and that try to
support all ofthe branches of that because it brings the
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whole together. So I think affiliations are really
important. Some of Dr. McCarthy's own work, in my view,
supports the fact that the affiliations are quite important.
If you look at-- we were talking earlier about
the amount of money and returns that St. Alphonsus got for
its investment in IMI.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. Over that five or six-year period, they basically
had gained economic returns of over $18 million, according
to my calculation in the footnote.
Q. Okay.
A. They paid 11 for that -- 11 million for that.
That's a 33 percent return on their equity.
Why would IMI have sold -- and that's just for the
first five years.
Why would IMI have sold a cash flow stream that
lucrative for that cheap? What were they trying to get?
They were trying to get an affiliation with
St. Al's because they understood it was good referal source.
That's the only thing that occurs to me. They understood
that having the contract with St. Al's and being a part of
that referral network was highly valuable and they were -they -- they gave up a huge amount of money in order to
access that. And I think that goes to the issue of whether
the value of being in the network is real.
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Dr. McCarthy did an analysis where he showed that
30 -- on split referrals -Q. Mm-hm.
A. --he showed that 35 percent-- over a five-year
period, only 35 percent of the physicians made one or more
referrals to MRIA. That means that after the date of these
wrongful acts that 65 percent of all those referring
physicians in the affiliated base, in four or five years
didn't have the occasion to make one single referral to MRIA
who has a magnet on that campus in any circumstance.
That indicates to me the same thing: That once
St. Al's says IMI is our official provider, it causes a
diversion. Not that there weren't other bad acts that were
causing a diversion of referrals, but the best way to go in
the but-for world and look at what the scans that would have
been done by MRIA is, is to basically look at the universe
of referrals which accompanies St. Al's delivery system, and
that's what I've done.
MR. WOODARD: Chris, can we take a quick break?
MR. VERGONIS: Sure.
MR. WOODARD: He -- I just -MR. VERGONIS: Sure. We'll go offthe record.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 11 :53 a.m. We'rf
off the record.
(Recess taken.)
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to think that I ought to clarifY what I said earlier, is
that there isn't necessarily a connection between who they
designate as a provider and their membership in that. And
so that's the assumption that my model makes, is that they
continue to designate MRIA as their provider. And, really,
I think I made this statement before that had to do with
their actual association, and it's -- it's just a little bit
of a step away from that.
Q. Okay. Did you do your own analysis of the service
areas?
A. In terms of ZIP Codes?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. Or in terms of any sort to attempt to measure
where the scans came from geographically?
A. Geographically? I did -Q. Yeah.
A. I did not.
Q. Okay. Do you know what proportion of scans come
from-- do you know what proportion of the scans in your
affiliated referring physicians model come from doctors that
are actually affiliated with St. Alphonsus and what
proportion come from doctors affiliated with other hospitals
who at one time sent -- who at one time prior to 1999 sent a
scan to MRl Center?
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A. Not precisely. My understanding is-MR. WOODARD: Is that limited to time period or is
that just-MR. VERGONIS: It's meant to include all of his
scan counts. Maybe it would be better to limit it to a time
period.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Do you have a sense of how they're divided, either
overall or in time periods?
A. I don't know what they're talking about now.
What's divided?
Q. Okay. You-- you count up a total number of scans
that were diverted -A. Right.
Q. -- for each year.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And you have two -- and we're on Methods 1 through
4, not the usurpation theory. And -A. Well, they include a usurpation component-Q. Okay.
A. -- though -Q. Not-A. -- with Meridian and Eagle.
Q. Okay. So not the usurpation ofthe full
opportunity --

August 11, 2011

A. Of downtown?
Q. -- of downtown?
A. Yeah.
Q. And your scan universe consists of St.
Alphonsus affili- -- scans from St. Alphonsus facility -affiliated physicians, St. Alphonsus only affiliated
physicians and non-St. Alphonsus physicians who at one time
prior to 1999 sent at least one scan to MRI Center?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Do you have a sense of the relative proportions of
those two groups within any given year?
A. Not without looking at the data, no.
Q. Okay. Can we determine that from your data?
A. There -- basically there are lists, and the -- on
the CD that I gave you -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- you can tell by how I designated a physician as
to which of those groups he's-Q. Okay.
A. -- he or she is in.
Q. Okay. You commented already on Dr. McCarthy's
Paragraph 23 and the-- his observation that 35 percent of
the affiliated physicians referred at least one patient to
both -- both IMI and MRl Center during a period in question.
And you told me why you thought that was invalid.
Page 121

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Do you have any sense ofthe number of scans over
that period that -- strike -- strike that question. That
question does not make sense.
Are you familiar with regression analysis?
A. Somewhat, yes.
Q. Do you consider yourself an expert in regression
analysis?
A. I use some regression analysis in terms of
identifYing cost behavior and that type of thing, but I
don't -- I don't have any extensive econometrics training or
anything which would make me an expert. I think I have a
working knowledge of statistics that's adequate for my past
work as an auditor in terms of just having a general
understanding about what the implication of statistical
conclusions are.
Q. Have you ever used a regression analysis when
offering an opinion in connection with a litigation?
A. Probably, yes.
Q. Okay. And that would have been expert opinion?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you recall if the Court allowed-- allowed your
expert testimony in that case?
A. I don't recall -Q. Or in those cases?
A. -- my testimony every being excluded on any
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subject, so I assume so.
Q. Okay. Did you read the paragraphs in
Dr. McCarthy's report about the regression analysis he
employed?
A. I did.
Q. Do you have any criticisms of how Dr. McCarthy
constructed the regression analysis?
A. Yes.
Q. What are those criticisms?
A. Well, I think that his model is-- it basically
posits for a starting place an upwards-sloping, continuous
line as a time series. He uses a logarithmic function so it
has a curve to it.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. He's basically saying let's start with the
assumption that MRIA scans are going to increase at a steady
rate into -- and now I'm going try to identifY the variables
which will bend that line to match what actually happened
and try to make an assessment as to whether I found the
right variables.
The problem with that is, is that it's completely
dependent on choosing the right variables and not missing
important variables. That line, there is no reason to
accept the assumption that line would have been a steady
state growth into the future. There's all kinds of things
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in terms of the market, in terms of the competitive factors
that he talks about in terms of St. Al's conduct which bend
that line and cause changes in it.
The -- what the regression does is that he uses -and if I'm not mistaken, they're actually dummy variables,
which he basically takes events and he tries to measure
interaction with them.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And so the events that he chose are the opening of
IMI, the firing of GSR, the opening of Meridian, the three
most significant ones. And what the regression mathematics
do is they basically say I'm going to take these three -it's like a toggle switch. It's on or it's off.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. Is the condition present or is it not present?
And they basically have complete freedom to just more or
less experiment with themselves in assigning coefficients or
weights to the significance of each of these -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- in order to try to basically contort that line
to equal what actually happened.
The first thing I would say about it is that two
of those interaction events are actually allegations of MRI
in this case, that the Meridian, opening of Meridian was a
usurpation of a corporate opportunity. And so to the extent

August 11, 2011

that he shows that that is highly correlated with the
diversion of scans, he's basically proving the injury that
was caused to MRIA.
The second one is I believe that MRIA is going
to -- it believes and will introduce evidence that the
firing of the radiologist was something that they were
backed in the comer that they had to do and resulted from
St. Al's actions. If they-- I'm not weighing in on that
evidence. If they succeed in that, then what Dr. McCarthy
has done is to show that that was highly related to the
actual decline in scans which occurred, and, again, I think
he's proving damages.
I read his depression also. The other thing I
object to is that I don't think this is the only choice of
dummy variables that -- that you could use.
THE COURT REPORTER: Of dummy?
THE WITNESS: Dummy variables.
A. There's a number of discrete alleged bad acts
which St. Al's -- and they can be given time identification,
too, as to when they started and stopped, so he could
measure interaction variables with a number of-- of the
accused actions of-- of St. Alphonsus which MRIA is
alleging caused a diversion of scans, and he could find a
line that -- presumably that would somewhat closely
approximate what actually happened, and he would make a
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perfect allocation in terms of what all these alleged
wrongful acts contributed to, basically, MRIA's demise. So
I don't think it's particularly probative what he did. He's
just selecting three particular variables.
The second -- another thing that I think is very
hard to understand is that his regression shows that the
opening of IMI, which, incidentally, I don't see any reason
to associate that opening as being the only source of
injury. You know, as I read the course of conduct that's
being accused, it was over a long period of time and
preceded the opening of the MRI piece. And-- but he's
actually showing that the opening of the downtown location
conferred a benefit on MRIA --or MRIC on campus.
I can't -- I'm just not aware of any economic
theory which possibly would conclude that opening a
competitor within the service area of an existing business
is going to cause their service and revenue levels to go up.
That simply can't be the case. I think it impeaches his
methodology right out of the gate.
Let me think if I have any other criticisms of it.
So -- so, basically, I think, to recap, is that in
part, it largely confirms the allegations which are being
made with respect to Meridian and GSR if their established
that there were injury from that. And, secondly, the
results that it implies with respect to opening downtown
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MRIA's Ability to Perform Lost Scans
But for SARMC's wrongful acts, I have calculated that MRIA would have performed an
additional 45,588 MRI scans at its SARMC campus location (including Downtown), an
additional 47,847 MRI scans in Meridian, and an additional 13,135 MRI scans in Eagle through
2010. Based on my analysis and discussions with MRIA management, MRIA would have had
the capacity to perform these scans.

The chart below shows MRI Center's actual and but-for scan volume on the SARMC campus:

Chart 2

Actual and But-for MRIC Scan Volume
14,000

12,000

----- .. -----·--···- -------··--·-···- ................... ·---- _, ____ ·····---·--···------------1M! Opens

But-for Scan Volume
10,000
8,000

6,000
4,000

Actual MRIC Scan Volume

2,000

MRI Center has two magnets on the SARMC campus. But-for2 SARMC's wrongful acts, the
scan volume in 2001 of 12,559 represents an increase of 2,822 scans (29.0%) over MRI Center's
highest actual volume of 9,737.3 Based on my discussions with Jack Floyd, MRI Center has

2
3

But-for scan volume is equal to actual scan volume plus lost scan volume.
See Schedule 11.
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") move the Court to strike Saint Alphonsus's
Supplemental Brief in Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony ofDr.
Thomas McCarthy.
On July 29,2011, MRIA filed a Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Thomas R.
McCarthy, PhD. It did so in compliance with the Court's order that all Motions be submitted so
that they could be heard on August 5, 2011. Saint Alphonsus filed its opposition to this Motion
on August 4, 2011. The parties made oral argument to the Court regarding this Motion at the
August 5th hearing, at which time the Court indicated that it would prepare a decision.
Notwithstanding that the matter had been fully submitted to the Court for almost two weeks, on
August 17, 2011, Saint Alphonsus submitted a Supplemental Brief in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Dr. Thomas McCarthy. The purpose ofthis supplement
seems to be to argue that the August 11, 2011, deposition testimony ofMRIA's expert, Bruce
Bruce, somehow affect the admissibility of Dr. McCarthy's expert opinions. This position is not
well taken. The basis ofMRIA's Motion to Exclude Dr. McCarthy's testimony is that, under the
Rules of Evidence and other applicable law, Dr. McCarthy's opinions do not properly qualify as
expert testimony. What MRIA's experts have or have not said in their depositions does not
change the inquiry about whether Dr. McCarthy's own opinions are admissible as expert
testimony.
Saint Alphonsus did not seek leave from the court to file a supplemental response. As
this matter been fully submitted to the Court and Saint Alphonsus has already made its response,
MRIA moves the Court to strike Saint Alphonsus's untimely, duplicative, and irrelevant
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Supplemental Brief in Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony ofDr.
Thomas McCarthy.
DATED this 18th day of August, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~~H-~-

Dara L. P rker
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited
partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho limited partnership,
CounterClaimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER,
CounterDefendants.
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE

COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care,
Inc., and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., ("Saint Alphonsus") and
submits the following attached proposed juror questionnaire.

DATED this 19th day of August, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

~~~

JA K S. GJORDIN
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-De endants
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I hereby certify that on the 19th day of August, 20 11, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
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NAME______________________________________ SEAT#_______

JUROR NUMBER- - - - - - - JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE
Welcome and thank you for fulfilling one of the most important duties that American
citizens have: serving on a jury to resolve a dispute. Before the jury ins selected, the court must
learn a little about each potential juror to make sure that you are sitting only on a case that is
appropriate for you. The questions on this form are designed to help the court and the lawyers
learn something about your background and your views on issues that may be related to this
lawsuit. The questions are not asked to invade your privacy or to make you uncomfortable. This
is one way to make sure that jurors deciding a case are impartial about that case. Please answer
the questions carefully and completely. Remember that you are under oath to tell the
truth.
•

Do not leave any questions blank.

•

If a question does not apply to you, simply write N/A (for Not Applicable or No Answer)
in the space for the answer. If there is no response to a question, we will assume that
you mistakenly skipped it and may ask you about it in court.

•

Since we need to make copies, please DO NOT write on the back of any page. lfyou
need more room, continue at the bottom or side of the page. When you have completed
the questionnaire, please return it to the jury clerk.

There are no right or wrong answers! Just tell the court the truth. You may be asked
follow-up questions later about your answers.
If there are questions that you would feel more comfortable answering in private, simply
write "private" in the space for your answer and circle the question number. The follow-up
questions on that topic will be asked in a private setting, and not in front of other jurors.
Please understand that the answers you give on this form are under oath and under
penalty of perjury. You must tell the truth and only the truth.
If you have trouble reading, understanding, or filling out this form, please contact the
court clerk. Thank you very much for your jury service.
PLEASE REMEMBER THAT YOU ARE ANSWERING THESE QUESTIONS UNDER
PENALTY OF PERJURY. YOUR ANSWERS MUST BE TRUE AND COMPLETE.

I certify, under penalty of perjury, that the following answers are true and correct to the
best of my knowledge. Signed in the County of Ada on: August __ , 2011.
SIGNATURE_____________________________

DATE_________

-1-

002064

JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Full name

-------------------------------------------------

2. Date of Birth - - - - - - - 3. Are you a citizen ofthe United States? Yes(_) No(_)
4. List any other names you've ever been known by. ---------------------

5. Are you Male (_) or Female L_)?
6. In what city and county do you currently reside?_______________________

How long have you lived there? --------------------------------Where else have you lived in the past 10 years?

7. What is your current marital status? Single (_) Married (_)
Widowed L__) Divorced L__) Separated(_)
8. Do you have any children? Yes(_) No(_)
If yes, please list:
Gender

Age

Occupation

-2-
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9. If you are married or living with someone, what is his or her present occupation and
where does he or she work? ----------------------------------

10. Education:
Yes(_)

a. Did you complete high school?

No(_)

If not, what is the highest grade completed?
b. Did you attend any vocational or
technical schools?

Yes(_)

No(_)

Did you graduate?

Yes(_)

No(_)

Yes(_)

No(_)

Yes(_)

No(_)

Yes(_)

No(_)

Yes(_)

No(_)

Degree(s) attained:
c. Did you attend college?
Did you graduate?
How many years did you attend?
Degree(s) attained:
d. Did you attend graduate school?
Degree(s) attained:
e. Are you a student now?
Name of School:
Grade or Level:
11. What is your current employment status? Full-time (_) Part-time (_) Retired(_)
Disabled(_) Unemployed(_____) For how long? _____
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Present job position: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Employer: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Length of employment: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
12. If retired or unemployed, please list:
Most recent job p o s i t i o n : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Employer: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Length of employment: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
13. Briefly explain your duties at your current job (or your last job, if you are retired,
unemployed, or have been in your current job less than three years): _ _ _ __

14. Please list any organizations you belong to or participate in. This could include military
or veterans groups, volunteer work, church or religious organizations, neighborhood
groups, or political groups: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

15. a. Have you or a family member ever received treatment from Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center? Yes (_) No (_) If yes, please explain: _ _ __
-4-
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b. If your answer is "yes," is there anything about that experience that would make it
difficult for you to be affair and impartial juror? Yes (__) No (_) If yes, please
explain:. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

16. a. Have you or a family member ever received treatment from MRI Center of Idaho or
MRI Mobile? Yes (__) No (__) If yes, please explain: _ _ _ __

b. If your answer is "yes," is there anything about that experience that would make it
difficult for you to be affair and impartial juror? Yes (__) No (_) If yes, please
explain: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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17. a. Have you or a family member ever received treatment from Intermountain Medical
Imaging? Yes(_) No(_) If yes, please explain: _ _ _ _ __

b. If your answer is "yes," is there anything about that experience that would make it
difficult for you to be affair and impartial juror? Yes (_) No (_) If yes, please
explain: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

18. Have you or a family member ever received treatment from any of the following medical
doctors?:
a. Roger Curran
b. David Giles
c. John Havlina
d. Thomas Henson
e. James Prochaska
-6-
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Yes L_) No L_) If yes, please indicate which doctor(s) you have received treatment
from, and the nature of that treatment: -----------------------

19. Do you have any education, training, or work experience in the following areas?
a. Accounting, finance, or economics?

Yes L_) No L_)

b. Statistics or Mathematics?

Yes L_) No (_)

c. Law?

Yes(_) No (_)

d. Medicine or Medical Imaging?

Yes (_) No (_)

e. Computers or Information Technology (IT)?

Yes(_) No L_)

If yes to any of these, please explain:

20. Have you ever been a member of a partnership? Yes L__) No (_) If yes,
a. When did you become a partner? __________________

-7-
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b. Are you still a member of a partnership? Yes ( _ ) No (__) If not, when did
your membership in the partnership end, and how? _ _ _ __

c. What was the business purpose of the partnership? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

d. Have you had any negative experiences as a result of your membership in the
partnership? Yes

(~_

__,) No ( _ )

If yes, please explain: _ __

21. Have you ever had the responsibility for organizing a new business or negotiating
changes to an existing business? Yes(__) No(__) If yes, please describe:_

22. Have you, or anyone close to you, ever been involved in a lawsuit or other legal dispute
over a business matter? Yes(__) No(__) If yes, please explain, including the
outcome: __________________________

-8-
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23. Have you, or anyone close to you, ever lose a significant amount of money in a business
deal, or been prevented from participating in a successful business deal? Yes(__) No
(__)

If yes, please describe what happened, including what caused the loss or

prevented your participation, and the result:

24. Do you have any close friends or relatives who are medical doctors or physicians?
Yes(__) No(__) If yes, describe the relationship, and the type of medicine practiced
by the doctor or physician: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

25. Have you ever been a health care provider? Yes(__) No(__) If yes, describe the
health care position you held, the city and state where you worked, and the years you
worked as a health care provider: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

-9-
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26. Do you, or a member of your household, have any specialized training or work
experience in the following fields? (Please circle appropriate numbers)
a. Radiology
b. Magnetic Resonance Imaging (or "MRI")
c. Computed tomography imaging ("CT scans" or "CAT scans")
d. Ultrasound
e. X-ray imaging
27. Have you had any interactions with any of the following law firms:
Jones Day
Gjording & Fouser PLLC
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC
Greener Banducci Shoemaker, PA

Yes L_) No L_) lfyes, please explain: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

28. Do you have any vision problems, hearing problems, or any current health issues which
render you incapable of performing satisfactory jury service?
YesL_) NoL_)

-10-
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29. Are you able to read, speak, and understand English? Yes(__) No(__)
30. Have you ever served as a juror in the past? Yes(__) No(__)
a. If Yes, how many times: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
When:

------------------------

Type of case(s): - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Were you the foreperson for any ofthis cases? Yes(__) No(__) Which ones?

b. Did the case(s) reach a verdict? Yes(_) No(_)
If not, was that because the jury could not agree on a verdict or because of some
other reason?- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Please give that reason: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

c. How did you feel about your jury service? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

31. Other than as described in your previous answers, have you had any interaction with any
of the entities listed below? By "interactions," we mean have you or any member of your
immediate family ever been an investor in, employed by, or sought employment with or
done business with the following individuals or entities? If yes, please circle the
appropriate letter(s).

-11-
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a.

Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center

b.

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care

c.

MRI Associates, LLP

d.

MRI Limited, doing business as MRI Center of Idaho

e.

MRI Mobile Limited

f.

Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC

g.

Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP

h.

Gem State Radiologists, LLP

If you circled any of these entities, please describe the work sought, the work performed,
or the nature of the business conducted: --------------------

32. The principal owners ofMRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile Limited
are (a) Thomas Henson, (b) Jack Havlina, (c) David Giles, (d) James Prochaska, (e) the
estate ofRoger Curran, (f) West Valley Medical Center I HCA, and (g) CHI Catholic
Health Initiatives. There are also several limited partners in MRI Limited and MRI
Mobile Limited, who are listed on an attachment to this questionnaire. Do you know any
of these entities or individuals or entities?
Yes (_) No (_) If yes, please identify the entities or individuals and please describe
how you know them: -------------------------------12-
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33. This lawsuit involves a partnership dispute involving the entities listed in Question 31.
Have you read, heard, or seen anything on television about this lawsuit? Yes (__) No
(__) If yes, please identify the source of any information you have received and briefly
state what you recall about this lawsuit:

34. Do you owe money to any of these entities, or do any of these entities owe money to
you? Yes (__) No (__)
35. Are you interested in any manner in the outcome of this lawsuit or the principle question
involved in it? Yes (__) No (__)
36. Do you have any bias or prejudice, for or against, any of the entities listed above? Yes
(__) No(__) If yes, please state the name of the entity or entities and briefly explain
the reasons for your feelings:

-13-
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37. Are you acquainted with any of the people listed on the attached witness list? Please
circle the number in front of one or more names where appropriate. If you have circled
any numbers, please describe how you know that person and when you met him or her:

38. Do you have any ethical, religious, moral, philosophical, or other beliefs that prevent you
from serving as ajuror? Yes(_) No(_)
39. This trial may last four to six weeks. If asked to serve as a juror, will the length of this
trial or its location interfere with your ability to be a fair and impartial juror? Yes (_)
No(_) lfyes, please e x p l a i n : - - - - - - - - - - - - -

40. One of the Court's duties is to instruct the jury as to the law that applies to this lawsuit.
The role of the jury is to determine the facts and apply those facts to the law as instructed
by the Court. Will you follow the Court's instructions as to the law that must be applied
in deciding this lawsuit? Yes(_) No(_)
-14-
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lfno,whynot? _______________________________________________

41. Is there any matter not covered by this questionnaire that you think the attorneys or the
Court might want to know about you as a juror in this lawsuit?

Print your name: _________________________

Signature: ________________________________

-15-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRic,UG

2 4 2011

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY o~OPHER
D. RICH, Clerk
~
~ByDIANEOATMAN
'

L

..........

Deputy

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, INC., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Defendant-Counterclaimant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219
CONSOLIDATED ORDER RE:
MOTIONS HEARD AUGUST 5,
2011

)

Presently before the Court are MRIA' s Motion for Clarification, Motion to Preclude
Reference to Departing Partner's Share, Motion to Have Deemed Admitted Exhibits, Motion To
Exclude Mention of Saint Alphonsus's Non-Profit Status, and Motion to Exclude Testimony of
Thomas McCarthy. Also before the Court are Saint Alphonsus' s Motion to Reconsider, and
Motion to Exclude Hearsay within Hearsay.

Hearing was held on August 5, 2011, and the

matter was taken under advisement that day. The Court now issues the following opinion.

I.

MRIA'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
MRIA is not claimed to have breached any fiduciary duty to the partnership. Thus, to the

extent that any claim may legally exist, it has been waived. Furthermore, if argued, it would be
unduly prejudicial because it was not pled. Furthermore, Judge McLaughlin stated in his July 30,
2007 ruling that "Saint Alphonsus may not assert MRIA breached an alleged fiduciary duty owed
to Saint Alphonsus ...." That ruling was not appealed and is therefore the law of the case.
Consequently, Saint Alphonsus may not argue either directly or indirectly that MRIA breached
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any alleged fiduciary duty owed to Saint Alphonsus.
MRIA's Motion for Clarification is hereby GRANTED.

II.

MRIA'S MOTION TO PRECLUDE REFERENCE TO DEPARTING PARTNER'S
SHARE
Issues relating to Saint Alphonsus's departing partner's share were fully disposed of by

Judge McLaughlin in the first proceeding in this matter. That ruling was not reversed by the
Idaho Supreme Court.

Consequently, there is no remaining issue in this case as to Saint

Alphonsus' s departing partner's share and thus this Court finds there is no need, as the case
currently stands, for either party to refer to this issue.

Furthermore, the Court finds such

discussion and argument could both confuse and mislead the jury, and it could be unfairly
prejudicial. Consequently, given that the departing partner's share has little or no relevance to
the case, the Court finds that the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative
value. Accordingly, MRIA' s Motion in Limine as to the departing partner's share is hereby

GRANTED.
III.

MRIA'S MOTION TO HAVE EXHIBITS DEEMED ADMITTED AND SAINT
ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE "HEARSAY WITHIN HEARSAY"
FROM BUSINESS RECORDS.
Where a case is remanded to the District Court following appeal, the District Court is

bound by the law of the case. The extent to which law of the case binds a court depends on the
language used by the Supreme Court in remanding the case. Where the Supreme Court remands
a case "for new trial," the case comes for trial the same in all respects as though it had never been
tried, subject to the condition that it must be tried in light of rules of law announced by the
appellate court. Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 5 P.3d 973 (2000); Creem v. Nothwestern
Mutual Fire Association of Seattle, Wash., 58 Idaho 349, 352, 74 P.2d 762, 765 (1938). In
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Creem, the Supreme Court adopted the position that unless there was a specific mandate as to

what issues were to be corrected and retried, the District Court was to try the case de novo.
Creem, 58 Idaho at 352, 74 P.2d at 765. In determining that the case before it was to be retried
de novo, the Creem Court looked to the language of the remand and noted that it stated "for new

trial." Id. On the other hand, where a case is remanded "for further proceedings," a trial Court
has the power to correct any errors· in its original findings not passed upon on appeal. Hutchins v.
State, 100 Idaho 661, 603 P.2d 995 (1979); Blinzler v. Andrews, 95 Idaho 769, 519 P.2d 438

(1973).

With that exception, the District Court and the parties are bound by the previous

decisions in the case not reversed by the appellate court.
Here, the Court is bound by all of the pre-appeal decisions that were not reversed by the
Supreme Court.

The case presently before the Court is before it on remand "for further

proceedings that are consistent with this opinion." Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI
Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, _ , 224 P.3d 1068, 1090 (2009). The language used in this

case is far narrower that that used in Creem. Compare id. with Creem v. Northwestern Mutual
Fire Association, 56 Idaho 529, 537, 56 P.2d 762, 770 (1936). The Court believes the language

used by the Supreme Court in this case is clear and unambiguous. This matter needs to be retried
before a new jury with the errors found by the Supreme Court corrected, but otherwise the
previous proceedings stand.
It is inconceivable to this Court that the Supreme Court somehow was implying that every

issue and piece of evidence previously admitted and not found to have been admitted in error, or
admitted without objection, or admitted over an objection that was not appealed, should be
reexamined.

The Court does not believe that the Supreme Court intended that every piece of

evidence be revisited as to foundation, nor does it believe that the Supreme Court intended for
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the stipulations on admissibility to be redefined. Consequently, the Court will only correct errors
made by the previous court, and will not revisit every piece of evidence.
The way the Court sees the issues presented as to these previously admitted exhibits is
that there is no error as to their admission for this Court to correct at this time. The parties
stipulated to their admission in the first trial. As to all of the exhibits presented and admitted in
the first trial, whose admission was not appealed or found inappropriate, the Court can find no
error that it must correct on remand, with one exception. It appears from the record that the notes
of Dr. Giles, (Tr. Exh. 4154) may have been admitted in error and with the exception of that
exhibit, the Court will deem admitted in this trial all of the exhibits that were admitting by
stipulation in the first trial. No error was committed by the Court in admitted the exhibits
stipulated into evidence by both of the parties, and thus the Court will not set aside the
stipulation for the purposes of the second trial.
The Court will exercise its discretion and deem the exhibits admitted. The Court believes
that there is no unfair prejudice to Saint Alphonsus by doing so. Furthermore, the Court believes
that this ruling will advance the purpose of securing "fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay ... to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined." I.R.E. 102.
MRIA's motion to have the exhibits admitted in the first trial deemed admitted in this
trial is hereby GRANTED with respect to all exhibits except Trial Exhibit 4154. Ruling on Trial
Exhibit 4154 is hereby RESERVED.
IV.

MOTION TO EXCLUDE MENTION OF ST. ALPHONSUS'S NON-PROFIT
STATUS
The term "non-profit"

IS

a creation of the tax code not fully understood by most
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laypeople. Use of the term, though relevant and legal, could be unduly confusing and could
mislead the jury. The Court finds that it could also be unfairly prejudicial and the Court will
exclude the use of the term under Rule 403. Saint Alphonsus is clearly entitled to describe itself
as a charitable organization-that is what Saint Alphonsus is in fact. Whether it chooses to
describe itself as a Catholic charitable hospital seems to make little difference since that will
undoubtedly be known to most jurors in any event.
MRIA's Motion in Limine as to Saint Alphonsus's non-profit status under the tax and
corporate law is hereby GRANTED.
V.

MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF THOMAS McCARTHY
MRIA seeks to have several portions of Saint Alphonsus's expert's report stricken

and preclude him from testifying as to those stricken portions.

Generally, MRIA seeks to

preclude Dr. McCarthy from giving opinions as to causation.
Expert opinion testimony is admissible "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue ..
. ." I.R.E. 702. Such opinion testimony may only be offered by "a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education ...." /d. If the testimony and expert meet
these criteria, the testimony is competent and relevant, and may be admissible. State v. Hopkins,
113 Idaho 679, 680-81, 747 P.2d 88, 89-90 (Ct. App. 1987). Ultimately, the admissibility of
expert opinion is in the discretion ofthe trial court. /d. at 681, 747 P.2d at 90.
As to Sections IV(A) and V, the Court finds that Dr. McCarthy's testimony must be
limited. Specifically, Dr. McCarthy may not give an opinion as to causation based upon his
regression analysis because his own testimony is that causation may not be determined by
regression analysis. See Deposition of Thomas McCarthy, at p. 113. However, Dr. McCarthy
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may otherwise explain the regression analysis he performed, including the fact that an inference
may be drawn as to causation from the analysis. The Court finds that regression analysis could
aid the jury in determining causation, but given Dr. McCarthy's testimony that he cannot
determine causation from regression analysis, Dr. McCarthy may not testify as to his opinion on
causation.
Here, the Court finds that portions of Section IV(B) of Dr. McCarthy's report are not
admissible because they will not aid the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. The Court
understands Section IV.B.l-2 to attack the assumptions of Drs. Budge and Willhoite.
Specifically, Dr. McCarthy concludes that IMI's facilities in downtown Boise and in Eagle would
have existed anyway. Paragraphs 30, 32, 33, 36, and portions of 40 (as to the structure of a
partnership deal between GSR and MRIA) appear to be nothing more than argument and fact
testimony. There is nothing technical contained in those paragraphs. Of course the attorneys are
welcome to make the arguments Dr. McCarthy makes in those paragraphs, and elicit the fact
testimony from those with personal knowledge.

Furthermore, counsel may elicit testimony

related to paragraphs 31, 34, and portions of 40-the damages deductions based on these
differing assumptions-but counsel may not elicit non-technical argument from Dr. McCarthy.
It falls upon counsel to prove the facts underlying the case, and the jurors may then adopt

calculations provided by experts. However, counsel may not cloak their arguments as to the
existence of certain facts in the authority of an expert. Consequently, paragraph 30, 32, 33, 36,
and any paragraphs referencing them, are stricken. Dr. McCarthy may not testify in accordance
with the contents of those paragraphs.
The Court reserves ruling on whether Dr. McCarthy is qualified to testify as to the matters
in his expert report.
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VI.

MOTION TO RECONSIDER
A. Court's decision to preclude labeling Saint Alphonsus's dissociation "rightful"

This Court will not revisit its decision.

This Court will instruct the jury that Saint

Alphonsus's dissociation from the partnership, standing alone, is not a basis for an award of
damages to MRIA.

Saint Alphonsus prevailed on this issue on appeal, and this Court

subsequently ruled that Saint Alphonsus' s mere act of dissociation standing alone could not form
a basis of liability. Consequently, there is no issue of rightful or wrongful dissociation in this
case. The Court will not allow the reintroduction of the issue by allowing the use of these terms
by either counsel. The Court will follow the law of the case as spelled out by the Supreme Court
and this Court's order on the issue and not allow any comment on the propriety of Saint
Alphonsus' s dissociation from MRIA.
The motion to reconsider as to the use of the word "rightful" is hereby DENIED.
B. Redaction of the Shattuck Hammond Memo

As to the first paragraph, the Court erred. The words "there may be a" were inadvertently
stricken. They should not be stricken from the trial exhibit because the sentence makes no sense
without them and they could potentially confuse the jury.
The Court will only make one further redaction: the words "by counsel" will be removed
from the Shattuck Hammond memo. The Court believes the words indicate that attorneys for
Saint Alphonsus made a legal determination when in fact it may have been nothing more than a
practical "heads up," so to speak. Use of the term "by counsel," in this Court's view, unfairly
indicates that the attorneys told Saint Alphonsus that their actions were somehow illegal.
As to the further requested redactions, the Court believes there is nothing unfairly
prejudicial about the content of the Shattuck Hammond Memo as redacted. Consequently, the

Consolidated Order Re: Motions Heard August 5, 2011 7

002085

Court will not have anything further redacted from the Shattuck Hammond Memo.
SO ORDERED AND DATED

thisU~ay of August, 2011.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this QL'(t;of August, 2011, I mailed (served) a true and correct
copy of the within instrument to:
JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
POBOX2837
BOISE, ID 83701
DONALDAYER
JONES DAY
51 LOUSIANA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST. STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court

Byu_~
Deputy Court Clerk
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tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No.
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

AUG 2 5 2011

6312)

CHRISTOPHER D

By JAMtE RAN~CH,
DEPUTY
,LL

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com

Clerk

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' DEPOSITION
DESIGNATION

V.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

DEPOSITION DESIGNATION- 1
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") hereby makes it deposition designation for the trial in the
above-referenced matter, scheduled to begin on September 6, 2011, as follows:
Deposition of Grant Chamberlain, dated May 27,2007:
Page( s)/Line( s)
7:5-8:1
8:11-10:17
14:1-20:4
22:1
22:5-8
24:3-25:7
26:19-30:15
35:10-19
37:4-38:12
39:24-52:5
53:15-54:16
55:4-21
56:20-57:7
57:15-23
58:18-66:18
67:2-7
75:6-17
76:12-77:22

DEPOSITION DESIGNATION - 2
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.

'

81:2-86:15
87:4-99:18
104:5-12
105:4-106:22
107:5-108:16
109:2-110:9
Ill :3-11
111:23-112:13
115:19-118:24
119:18-122:21
123:8-128:19
129:23-134:2
137:9-11
137:23
138:2-139:12
DATED this 25th day of August 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

DEPOSITION DESIGNATION - 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25th day of August 2011, a true and correct copy ofthe
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

DEPOSITION DESIGNATION - 4

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)

1\\·l'l.t

tbandl.lcci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL Woodard (ISB No.
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

'fW\

e

' (flY
1.!

-

lf:o

F_.IL~~

.

: . __ _ _

AUG 2 6 2011
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)

. ByCHRISTINE.SWEET
DEPUTY

dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' PROPOSED
AMENDED EXHIBIT LIST

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Parti).ership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS PROPOSED AMENDED EXHIBIT LISJ - 1
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit the attached list of exhibits which are anticipated
for MRIA's case in chief. In' addition to the exhibits identified on the attached list, MRIA
reserves the right to utilize any exhibit, document or other thing identified by any party in this
case as an exhibit; any exhibit necessary for impeachment of any witness; any exhibit, document
or other thing identified or produced during the discovery in this case by any party or other
person or entity; and demonstrative and illustrative exhibits to otherwise explain or highlight any
other evidence or facts presented in this case.
MRIA reserves the right to add to, subtract from, or otherwise amend, supplement or
withdraw exhibits identified in this list.

DATED this 26th day of August, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

ucci
'RI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Attorn
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of August 2011, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID E3701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail

D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile

D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Facsimile

Thomas A. Banducci
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
.OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OFADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Waho nonprofit corpor~tion,

Case No. CV OC 0408219D

-DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S EXHIBIT
LIST

Plaintiff,

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,
Defendant.
Presiding Judge:

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Honorable Michael Wetherell

JackS.
Gjording
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G.
Vergonis

Trial Date:
Plf.
No.

Def.
No.

4000

4001

4002
4003

4004

4005

4006

September 6, 2011
Date
Offered

Marked

Stipulation

Admitted
Authenticity

Foundation

Admitted

Defendant's
Attorney:

ThomasA.
Banducci
WadeL.
Woodard
BrentS.
Bastian

Court Reporter:

Courtroom
Deputy: Diane
Oatman

Description

Bates No.

SARMC
Planning/Finance
Charter and
Objectives; not dated
Vision PowerPoint
slide; not dated

Office of the
CFO
SARMC08896;
Reilly Ex 41
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08719;
Reilly Ex 29
014512; Giles Ex
18
000931; Giles Ex
17

Radiology Imaging ·
Center; not dated
SARG/MRIAJV
Proposals #6 & 7; not
dated
Issues Imaging Center
Joint Venture; not
dated
SARMC IT System
Support for IMI; not
dated
DR Investment List,
MRICI AP Ledger;
various dates

001142-4; Giles
Ex 16
IMIRP/000892;
Kelly Hall Ex 13
040220-8; Berger
Ex 9; Floyd Ex
23
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4007

4008

4009

4010

Radiologist Schedules
Produced at
Deposition of Jeffrey
Seaboum
(280 pages), various
dates
Radiologist/Hospital
Imaging Center Joint
Venture; not dated
Handwritten notes re:
DR Investment; not
dated
Handwritten notes and
charts re: analysis
given to Ken Fry on
negative movement of
patients from
MRI/SARMC to IMI;
not dated
Health Planning
Committee SARMC
Board of Trustees
Meeting Minutes;
March 22, 1984
Executive Committee
SARMC Board of
Trustees Meeting
Minutes; March 26,
1984
Executive Committee
SARMC; October 1,
1984

4011

Admit

4012

Admit

4013

Admit

4014

Admit

Executive Committee
SARMC Board of
Trustees; December
20, 1984

4015

Admit

4016

Admit

4017

Admit

4018

Admit

Letter to Chris Anton
from J. Roger Curran;
November 21, 1984
Letter to J. Roger
Curran from Sister
Patricia Vandenberg;
December 27, 1984
Health Planning
Committee SARMC
Board of Trustees
Meeting Minutes;
December 28, 1984
Board of Trustees
SARMC Executive
Committee Report
Minutes; January 11,
1985
Letter to Jon Miller
and E.E. Gilbertson
from Sister Patricia
Vandenberg and James
E. Bruce; January-14,
1985

4019

2

Seaboum Ex. No.
21

GSR/00910093,Seaboum
Ex. No. 10
0898?; Cioffi Ex
9
034104-7,
034109, 034112
~

Office of the
President
SARMC0692839; Vandenberg
Ex2
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0271920; Vandenberg
Ex3
Givens Pursley
SARMC0016972; Vandenberg
Ex5
Office of the
President
SARMC0814655; Vandenberg
Ex4
Giles Ex 5

Office of the
President
SARMC09462;
Vandenberg Ex 6
Givens Pursley
SARMC00146-8;
Vandenberg Ex 7

Givens Pursley
SARMC0013943; Vandenberg
Ex8
Office of the
President
SARMC09403-4;
Vandenberg Ex 9

002095

4020 )

4021

.

4022.
4023

Admit

Admit

.

Admit

4024

Admit

4025

Admit

4026

Admit

4027

Admit

4028

Admit

4029

Admit

4030

Admit

4031

4032

Admit

4033

Admit

'

3

Letter to Sister Patricia
Vandenberg from Leo
Edward Milier; March
5, 1985
MRI, Ltd. Meeting
Minutes; March 27,
1985 .
1122 Application;
~ril5, 1985
Articles of Partnership
ofMRIA; April26,
1985
Limited Partnership
Agreement ofMRI
Limited Partnership;
August 2, 1985
SARMC and Saint
Alphonsus Building
Company, Inc. Ground
Lease; September 19,
1985
First Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
of MRI Associates;
M~25, 1988
Agreement for
Provision of Medical
Services; August 1,
1988
Limited Partnership
Agreement of MRI
Mobile Limited
Partnership; October
17, 1988
Second Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
ofMRI Associates;
May 16, 1991
MRICI Minutes; April
27, 1992

Letter to DMR from
SADC, MedNow, and
West Valley Medical
Center; August 24,
1992
Third Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
of MRI Associates;
Janua!Yl, 1995
SARMC Medical
Services Agreement Radiology; May 1,
1997

039488-90;
Vandenberg Ex
10
011244-6; Giles
Ex9
004139-42
019991-20013;
.Bruce Ex 1;
Fisher Ex 5
009940-52;
Bruce Ex 2

028914-20

01402-8

Givens Pursley
SARMC0191739; Anton Ex 2
026877-91

029706-11

Office of the
President
SARMC05851-3;
Anton Ex 1
011486

024996-25008

Office of the
CFO
SARMC025972614; Bruce Ex
6; Seaboum Ex 4
(same as Giles
00002 - 19; I.
Davey Ex. No. 3,
N. Davey Ex 2,
Traughber Ex 3)

002096

4034

Admit

4035

Admit

4036

4037

Admit

4038

Admit

4039

Admit

4040

Admit

4041

Admit

4042

4043

4044

4045

Admit

4046

4047

Admit

IMI Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; June 16,
1997
MRICI Minutes;
October 21, 1997
- Letter to SARG from
Sandra Bruce, Fax
from Mike Czech to
Sandra Bruce; October
31, 1997
Letter to MRIA
Boardmembers from
Mike Czech;
November 10, 1997
IMI Group Meeting
Minutes; November
12, 1997
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from IMI; November
13, 1997
Letter to Paul
Traughber, William
Murray, Jeffrey
Seabourn, and Joseph
Gobel from Sandra
Bruce; November 13,
1997
MRICI Minutes;
December 17; 1997
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Paul Traughber;
January 5, 1998

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; January 14,
1998
Letter to MRIA
Boardmembers from
Mike Czech; February
13, 1998
MRICI Minutes;
February 18, 1998
Capital Expenditure
Third CT Scanner
System Executive
Summary, SARMC
Planning/Finance
Committee; April 1,
1998
GSR Executive
Committee Minutes;
May 11, 1998

IMIRP/00443840

000413-20;
Bruce Ex 32
Office of the
President
SARMC10170-2;
Bruce Ex 33
000388; Bruce
Ex34

IMIRP/004401-3

Office of the
CFO
SARMC06142-3;
Bruce Ex36
Office of
President
SARMC10169;
Bruce Ex 37

021306-8; Bruce
Ex38
Office of the
CFO
SARMC06066;
Bruce Ex 39
(same as Office
of the President
SARMC10168,;
Traughber Ex 4)
GSREX/0265-8;
Garabedian Ex 6
000509; Gobel
Ex4

021269-71;
Bruce40
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0862743; Reilly Ex 42

GSREX/0036-9;
Krogstad Ex 2

4

002097

,,,

4048

Admit

4049.

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; May 13,
1998
SARMC Leadership
hierarchy charts; June
1, 1998 and various

4050

Admit

4051

Admit

4052

Admit

4053

Admit

4054

Admit

4055

Admit

4056

Admit

4057

Admit

4058

4059

4060

4061

Admit

4062

Admit

4063

Admit
"

Fourth Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
of MRl Associates;
July 15, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; July 27, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; July 30, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; August 10,
1998
MRlCI and MRlM
Meeting Minutes;
August 19, 1998
Handwritten notes and
news clipping; August
20, 1998
MRl Center ofldaho
Newsletter; September
1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; September 9,
1998
Memo to Cindy
Schamp from Sandy
Cruise; September 16,
1998
Email to Cindy
Schamp from Sandra
Bruce re: RadiologyReply; September 21,
1998
Holy Cross Health
System Corporation
Capital Project
Summary, SARMC
Budget Year Ended
May 31, 2000;
September 24, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; October 14,
1998
MRlCI Minutes;
October 22, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; October 28,
1998

GSR/0593-600;
Newton Depo Ex.
No. 2,Traughber
Ex 5
Office of the
President
SARMC11855,
10721, 10719,
10718, 10717,
10715; Kelly Hall
Ex2
016029-33;
Bruce Ex 15

GSR/0612- 614;
Newton Ex 3,
Traughber Ex 6
GSR/0616-8;
NewtonEx4
GSR/0633-5

021068-73;
Bruce Ex 3
Office of the
President
SARMC0106201; Bruce Ex 4
021042-7

GSR/0638-44;
Knochel Ex 5,
Traughber Depo
Ex. No.7
Office of the
CFO
SARMC02657;
Henson Ex3
Office of the
CFO
SARMC02649;
Schamp Ex 1
Offic,e of the
CFO
SARMC0861626; Reilly Ex 45

GSR/0647-53;
Knochel Ex6
020943-5; Bruce
Ex5
GSR/0656-7

5

002098

4064

Admit

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; November 3,
1998

4065

Admit

4066

Admit

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, November 9,
1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, attached draft
outline ofletter;
November 11, 1998
Letter to Cindy
Schamp from David
Giles re: November
13, 1998 meeting; not
dated (fax date May 6,
1999)
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; December 9,
1998
MRICI Financial
Statement 1998
Budget vs. Actual;
December 1998
Radiology Department
Possible Effect of
Losing Volume to
Freestanding Center
based on FY 98
Financials; not dated
Freestanding Imaging
Center List of Key
Assumptions to
Anticipate Profit; not
dated, prob. early 1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; January 13,
1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, attached DR
Systems Presentation
of PACS System;
February 3, 1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; February 10,
1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
March 3, 1999
MRI Executive
Meeting Minutes;
March 17, 1999 ·
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
March 31, 1999
Imaging Center .
Meeting Minutes;
April?, 1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; April14,
1999

4067

4068

Admit

4069

4070

4071

4072

Admit

4073

Admit

4074

Admit

4075

Admit

4076

Admit

4077

Admit·

4078

Admit

4079

Admit
"

6

GSR/0663-4;
Knochel Ex 1,
Traughber Depo
Ex. No. 14
GSR/0665-6

GSR/0667-72

GSRRP0018657; Traughber Ex
15

GSR/0673-81

031792.--'

Office of the
CFO
SARMC02650;
FryEx2

Office of the
CFO
SARMC0201832; Fry Ex 3
GSR/0682-6

GSR/0687-99

GSR/0700-2;
Newton Ex 5
IMIRP/00475762; Noyes Ex 4
0010~;

Henson

Ex4
IMIRP/00477586
IMIRP/004787804; Noyes Ex 8
GSR/0{25-9

002099

4080

Admit

4081

Admit

4082

4083

4084

Admit

4085

Admit

4086

Admit

4087

Admit

4088

Admit

4089

4090

Admit

4091
4092

-

4093

Admit

7

MRI Executive
Meeting Minutes;
April21, 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes; May
5, 1999
SARMC Holy Cross
Health System
Corporation
Preliminary Budgeted
Consolidated Financial
Statements and
Strategic and Routine
Capital Expenditure
Summary for Year
Ended May 31 , 1999
Memo to Giles,
Knochel, Traughber,
Seaboum, from Sarah
Bratley; June 4, 1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, attached
Term Sheet; June 10,
1999
MRI Executive
Meeting Minutes; June
16, 1999
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; July-26, 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes; July
7, 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes; July
22, 1999
Articles of
Organization Limited
Liability Company;
July 23, 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes; July
27, 1999
IMI Center Meeting
Notes; July 28, 1999
US Bank Loan:
Facility Page: Imaging
Center ~adiologists
and Uniform Credit
Analysis Borrower
Profile; July 28, 1999
Draft PWC Fair
Market Value of a 20
Percent Partnership
Interest in DMR's 45
Percent Interest in
MEJA; July 31, 1999

001093-4; Cliff
Ex 11
IMIRP/004927-8

Office of the
CFO
SARMC08685-8;
Reilly Ex44

GSRRPOO 1851 1856; Traughber
Ex17
GSR/0730-7

025322-4; Cliff
Ex 12
GSRRP/000174175; I. Davey Ex
2
IMIRP/004956-8;
Noyes Ex 9
IMIRP/00495961
IMV0336-7; Cliff
Ex 13

IMIRP/000784 786; I. Davey Ex.
11
IMIRP/00466470; Noyes Ex 11
Denning Ex 1

023949-99;
Fisher Ex 11

002100

4094

USB Business Loan
Transmittal; August 5,
1999

4095

Admit

Fax to Carl Harder
from Jeff Cliff; August
10, 1999
•'·

4096.

Admit

4097

Admit

4098

Admit

4099

Admit

4100

Admit

4101

Admit

4102

Admit

4103

4104

Admit

4105

Admit

4106

8

List of Referring
Physicians; August 12,
1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
August 18, 1999
SARMC Board of
Trustees Board
Meeting; August 18,
1999
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; August 23,
1999
Notes re: history and
structure of MRICI
and MRI Mobile and
how they relate to
SARMC; August 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
August 24, 1999

Letter to Ridgley
Denning from David
Giles; August 24, 1999
IMI Financial
Statement Budget vs.
Actual Income- MRI;
September 1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; September 8,
1999

MRICI and MRIM
Minutes; September
15, 1999
IMI Financial
Statement- MRI
Budget·vs. Actual
Income/ (Loss);
October 1999

USB00979-96,
50-53; Noyes Ex
3, Traughber Ex.
11, N. Davey Ex.
10
033755-6;
Knochel Ex 9,
Traughber Ex.
10, Newton Ex. 7
IMIRP/004458501; Scales Ex 4
IMIRP/000804-6

Office of the
President
SARMC0706776; Reilly Ex 12;
Fisher Ex 4
GSRRP/00018490 (same as
GSR/0056;
Traughber Ex 8)
032259-61;
Bruce Ex 16

IMIRP/000811-2;
Gobel Ex 5,
Scales Ex 8
(same as
IMI/0699;
Traughber Ex.
13)
GSRRP0015958; Denning Ex 2
GSRRP/000149

GSRRP/0001226; Gobel Ex 6, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 12, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No. 7, Newton
Depo Ex. No. 6
001260-1;
Garabedian Ex 13
GSRRP/000160

002101

4107

Admit

Letter to Vicken
Garabedian from IMl;
October 4, 1999

4108

Admit

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October 4,
1999

4109

Admit

Board of Directors
Annual Meeting
Minutes; October 11,
1999
Letter to MRIA
Boardmembers from
Mike Czech; October
16, 1999
MRICI Meeting
Minutes and
attachment; October
20, 1999
Letter to Cindy
Schamp from Allen
Hahn/PWC re:
qualifications; October
25, 1999
IMI Balance Sheets As
of October 31, 1999
IMI Financial
Statement- MRI
Budget vs. Actual
Income/(Loss);
November 1999
Draft of IMI Operating
Agreement; November
3-, 1999
Joint Venture Imaging
Center SARG and
SARMC; November11, 1999

4110

41ll

Admit

4112

4113

Admit

4114

4115

Admit

4116

IMI: A JV Partnership
between SARG and
SARMC PowerPoint
Presentation;
November 11, 1999

4117

~·-~·

4118

Admit

4119

9

Restructuring of
MRIA General
Partnership
Confidential Draft for
Discussion; November
29, 1999
MRICI Financial
Statement Budget vs.
Actual; December
1999

GSRRP /0002189; Hall Ex 7, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 13,
GSRRP/000212
R -27; Noyes Ex
21,, I. Davey
Depo. Ex. No.
28
Office of the
President
SARMC12746-9;
Fugate Ex 2
001258;
Garabedian Ex 14

023416-8,
001305

Office of the
CFO
SARMC0182236
GSRRP/00015866; Cliff Ex 22
IMIRP/000104

GSR/0380-431;
Bruce Ex 10,
Schamp Ex 3
Office of the
President
SARMC0684781; Cliff Ex 23;
Fisher Ex 6
Office of the
President
SARMC0684966; Bruce Ex 20,
Schamp Ex2;
Fisher Ex 7
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0635867; Bruce Ex 11,
Schamp Ex4
012278

002102

4120

4121

4122

Admit

4123

Admit

4124

4125

Admit

4126

Admit

4127

Admit

4128

Admit

4129

IMI Financial
Statement- MRI
Budget vs. Actual
Income/(Loss);
December 1999
IMI Financial
Statement- MRI
Budget vs. Actual
Income/(Loss);
December 1999
Letter to- Sandra Bruce
from Thomas Henson;
December 6, 1999
Handwritten Notes re:
12/16/99 Meeting;
December 16, 1999
Handwritten Notes by
Jim Prochaska re:
December 12, 1999
meeting
Draft of IMI Operating
Agreement; December
17,1999
Email to Jim
Prochaska and Roger
Curran from David
Giles; December 18,
1999
IMI Referrals by
Procedures
PowerPoint by D.
Benion; December 21,
1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; December
22, 1999

IMI Financial
Statements; December
31, 1999
SARMC Board
Committee Structure
for 2000

4130

4131.

SARMC IDN FY 0002 Strategic Plan
Presentation; not dated

4132

Capital Budget
Analysis- FY 2000,
not dated

4133

Consolidated
Operations Capital
Budget Analysis - FY
2000, not dated

IMIRP/000108

GSRRP/000283

032441; Henson
Ex6
Office of the
President
SARMC09913-5;
Bruce Ex 6
001366-7;
Prochaska Ex 21

IMV0528-81;
Cliff Ex 7
001364; Giles Ex
19

IMIRP/00480510

GSRRP/0001679; Cliff Ex 6, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 16,N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No.13
IMIRP/00320413
Office of the
President
SARMC12798;
Fisher Ex 2
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08700-l;
Reilly_Ex 46
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08695;
Reilly Ex25
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08699;
Reilly Ex 26

10

002103

4134

Capital Plan FYOOFY02; not dated

4135

Consolidated
Operations Capital
Budget Analysis, not
dated
IMI MRI 2000 Income
Budget
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from James Prochaska;
January 4, 2000

4136
4137

Admit

4138

Admit

4139

4140

4141

Admit

4142

Admit

4143

Admit

4144

Admit

4145

Admit

4146

Admit

4147

Admit

11

Email to Sarach
Bratley from Allen
Hahn re: Engagement
Documents, PWC
Valuation of 50
Percent Interest in IMI
Draft; January 5, 2000
Email to James
Prochaksa, Roger
Curran, and David
Giles from Carl
Harder; January 6,
2000
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Carl Harder;
January 6, 2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; January 12,
2000
MRICI Minutes;
January 19, 2000
GSR Executive
Committee Minutes;
January 24, 2000
Meeting with Jeff Cliff
Purchase/Restructuring
Options for MRIA;
January 26, 2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minute; January 26,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; January 31,
2000
Email to Sarah Bratley
from Allen Hahn re;
SARMC Draft
Presentation,
Presentation: An
Introduction to MRI
Associates Legal
Ownership of the
Partnerships; Janurary
31,2000

Office ofthe
CFO
SARMC08701;
Reilly Ex 27
Office ofthe
CFO
SARMC08704;
Reilly Ex 28
GSRRP/000284,
Office of the
CFO
SARMC00640-l;
Bruce Ex28,
Schamp Ex 7
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0804762; Fry Ex 6,
Schamp Ex 6;
Fisher Ex 14
038786

032442-4; Bruce
Ex 29, Schamp
Ex8
GSRRP/0002737; Scales Ex 7
001492-3; Bruce
43
GSRRP/00042433; Hall Ex 8
Office of the
CFO
SARMC01239;
Fry Ex 19
GSRRP/000288291; I. Davey Ex
15
GSRRP/000434;
Cliff Ex 8

Office of the
CFO
SARMC0802939; Schamp Ex 9
(same as Office
of the CFO
SARMC0126576)

002104

4148

Admit

4149

Admit

Outline for Discussion
Presentation by Cindy
Schamp
Purchase/Restructuring
Options for MRIA;
February 1, 2000
SARMC Senior
Management Team
Agenda and
PowerPoint slides;
February I, 2000
An Introduction to
MRIALegal
Ownership of the .
Partnerships; February
11,2000
Email to Janelle Reilly
from Sarah Bratley;
February 7, 2000

~

4150

Admit

4151

4152

Admit

4153

Admit

4154

Pending

4155

Admit

4156

Admit

4157

4158

4159

Admit

4160

Admit

4161

Admit

4162

Admit

4163

Admit
~

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; February 9,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 14,
2000
Handwritten notes;
February 14, 2000
MRICI Minutes;
February 16, 2000
MRIM Minutes;
February 16, 2000
SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Minutes; February 22,
2000
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Thomas Henson;
February 23, 2000
P ACS/DR Expenses -March 2000 to July
2001
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; March 8,
2000
SARMC
Planning/Finance
Committee Minutes;
March 10, 2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; March 13,
2000
Handwritten notes
MRI Restructuring
Meeting; March 15,
2000

Office of the
CFO
SARMC01240-2,
635-9, 964-73;
Fry Ex 11
Office of the
President
SARMC1192732; Reilly Ex 7
Office of the
President
SARMC09891-8;
Bruce Ex 13
Office of the
CFO
SARMC07994;
ReillyEx 14
GSRRP/000292
R-4 R; Gobel Ex
7
GSRRP/000435

014066-7
001472-3; Bruce
Ex44
001474-6; Cliff
Ex9
Office of the
President
SARMC11866-8;
Reilly Ex 15
032432; Henson
Ex8
Office of the CIO
SARMC01910,
L.K. Hall Ex 28
GSRRP/0002957 R; CliffEx 10,,
N. Davey Depo
Ex. No.l4
Office of the
President
SARMC0683540; FryEx22
GSRRP/000441

Office of the
CFO
SARMC01202;
FryEx20

12

002105

4164

Admit

SARMC
Planning/Finance
Committee Minutes;
March 16, 2000

4165

Admit

IMI: A Joint Venture
Partnership between
SARG and SARMC;
March 16, 2000

Admit

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; March 20,
2000
Handwritten letter to
Carl Harder from
Roger Curran; March
22,2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; April 4, 2000
SARMC Board of
Trustees Minutes;
Aprilll, 2000

4166

'

4167

Admit

4168

Admit

4169

Admit

4170

Admit

4171

Admit

4172

Admit

4173

Admit

4174

Admit

4175
4176

Admit

4177

Admit

.
4178

Admit

~179

Admit

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; April 17,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; May 10,.
2000

Secretary of State
Annual Report form
for IMI; May 23, 2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; May 30,
2000
Email to Roger Curran
from Henson; June 5,
2000
Notes "Next IMI
Meet"; June 6, 2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; June 12,
2000
Draft of IMI Operating
Agreement; June 28,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; June 29,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; July 12, 2000

Office of the
President
SARMC12852-5;
Fisher Ex 9, Fry
Ex27
Office of the
President
SARMC1288792; Reilly Ex 18;
Fisher Ex 8
GSRRP/0004556

Office of the
CFO
SARMC06768-9;
Fry Ex 18
GSRRP/000298301; Hall Ex 11
Office of the
President
SARMC12800,
12804-5; Reilly
Ex 17; Fisher Ex
10
GSRRP/000458
R-9

GSRRP/000302
R-307; Hall Ex
10, I. Davey
Depo. Ex. No.
19
Knochel Ex 13

GSRRP/0003789; Hall Ex 13

031411; Henson
ExlO
IMIRP/00473345R; Scales Ex 6
GSRRP/0003802

IMI/00225-69;
Cliff Ex 34
GSRRP/0003836; Hall Ex 15

GSRRP/0003146; Hall Ex 18

13

002106

4180

Admit

4181
'

4182'

Admit

4183

Admit

4184

Admit

4185

4186

Admit

4187

Admit

4188

Admit

4189

Admit

4190

Admit

4191

Admit

4192

Admit

I
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Letter to Roger Curran
from Jeff Cliff; July
17,2000
US Bank Commercial
Loan Credit DisplayExecutive Summary,
Highlights of Key
Findings; July 20,
2000
Draft of IMI Operating
Agreement; August 4,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; August 8,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; August 21,
2000

Memo to Mike Czech
from Bob Bell; August
25,2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; August 30,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; August 31,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September 6,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, September 8,
1999
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September 8,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Agenda and Minutes;
September 13,2000

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September
19,2000

022512-3; Bruce
Ex47
USB00821-40

IMI/00090-139;
Hall Ex 23,
Schamp Ex 17
GSRRP/000336340; I. Davey Ex.
18
GSR/0103-5;
Bruce Ex49
(same as
GSRRP/000387000389'
Seabourn Depo
Ex. 7, I. Davey
Ex. 17)
014891-5

GSR/0080-1;
Hall Ex 16

GSRRP/000390
R-4

GSRRP/00046971; Hall Ex 17

GSR/0052;
Traughber Ex. 12
GSRRP/000395
R-9 (same as
GSR/0111-4;
Schamp Ex 18)
GSRRP/000345350; Gobel Ex 9.
, L Davey Depo.
Ex. No. 8,N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No.5
GSR/0115-6;
Bruce Ex 52,
Seabourn Depo
Ex. No.8, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 4, N. Davey
Depo Ex. No. 3,
Newton Depo Ex.
No.9

002107

4193

Admit

4194

Admit

4195

Admit

4196

Admit

4197

Admit

4198

Admit

4199

Admit

4200

4201

4202

4203

Admit

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes with
handwritten notes;
September 19, 2000
GSR Group Meeting
Agenda; October 11,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; October 11,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October 16,
2000
Release and
Reaffirmation
Agreement; October
18,2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; November
15,2000
GSR Executive
Committee Minutes;
November 19, 2000

MRICI Financial
Statement Budget vs.
Actual; December
2000
Letter to Vicken
Garabedian from
Committee on MRI
Accreditation;
December 18, 2000
IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2000
SARMC Board &
Committee Structure
2001
FY 0 1·Capital Budget
Analysis; not dated

4204
'

4205

FY 01 Capital
Strategic Requests, not
dated

4206

FY 01 Capital Budget,
not dated

Admit

4207

·15

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; January 8,
2001

GSRRP/0004003; Lindauer Ex 4,
Schamp Ex 10

GSRRP/000367377; I. Davey Ex.
5
GSRRP/00036877
GSR/0117-8;
Bruce Ex 54,
Newton Depo Ex.
No. 10
GILESE00283287

GSRRP/00031827; Gobel Ex 10
GSRRP/000413415; Newton Ex
11, Schamp Ex 5
(same as
GSR/0119-121;
Bruce Ex 55,
Seaboum Depo
Ex. No. 9)
012278

IMIRP/003982-3;
Garabedian Ex 4

IMIRP/00321524
Office of the
President
SARMC12961-3;
Fisher Ex 3
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08734
Office ofthe
CFO
SARMC08725;
Reilly Ex 31
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08724;
Reilly Ex 30
GSRRP/0006889; I. Davey Ex 23
and N. Davey Ex
17

002108

GSR Operations
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 8,
2001
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 12,
2001
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 13,
2001

4208

Admit

4209

Admit

4210

Admit

4211

Admit

Radiology Strategy
Meeting Record;
February 13, 2001

4212

Admit

4213

Admit

4214

Admit

4215

Admit

4216

Admit

MRICI/MRIM
Strategic Planning
Meeting Notes;
Februarv 16,2001
GSR Marketing
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 22,
2001
GSR Group Meeting
Agenda; March 14,
2001
MRI Mobile Board
Meeting Minutes;
March 21,2001
GSRIIMI
Operations/Finance &
Fees Committee
Minutes; March 23,
2001
Fax to Patty Harneck
from Jeff Cliff; April
4,2001

4217

4218

Admit

4219

Admit

4220

Admit

4221

Admit

Memo to DMR from
Thomas Henson; April
5,2001
IMI Finance & Fees
Committee Meeting
Minutes; April 18,
2001
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; May 9, 2001

MRl Mobile Board
Meeting Minutes; May
16,2001

GSRRP /0006689; Noyes Ex 16

GSRRP/0006903 (same as
GSR/0130;
Schamp Ex 13)
GSRRP/0007224; I. Davey Ex.
20, N. DaV'ey
Depo Ex. No. 15,
Schamp Ex 12,
Reilly_ Ex 20
Office of the
CFO
SARMCO 1945-6;
Kelly Hall Ex 12
012456-60;
Bruce Ex 56

GSRRP/00645;
Noyes Ex 17

GSRRP/000541

002014-7; Bruce
Ex 57
GSRRP/000506;
L.K. Hall Ex 19

Office of the CIO
SARMC0033740; Kelly Hall Ex
6
033023-5;
Henson Ex 9 and
MessmerEx3
GSRRP/000508I 0; Schamp Ex
II; Fisher Ex 12
GSRRP/00056873; Kelly Hall Ex
21, I. Davey
Depo. Ex. No.
3"0
002092-6; Bruce
Ex 58, Schamp
Ex 1!5

16

002109

4222

Admit

.

Email to Cindy
Schamp and Sandra
Bruce from Ken Fry
re: IMI
agreement/Radiology
Contract/MRI; May
30,2001
Letter to Michael
Hammond from Pat
Miller re: Retention
Letter; June 14, 2001

4223

Admit

4224

Admit

4225

Admit

4226

Admit

Operating Agreement
ofiMI; July 1, 2001

4227

Admit

4228

Admit

Operating Agreement
of Intermountain
Medical Imaging,
LLC, July 1, 200 1
Operating Agreement
of Intermountain
Medical Imaging,
LLC; July 1, 2001

4229

Admit

4230

Admit

4231

Admit

Email to James
Prochaska from Roger
Curran and
attachment; June 26,
2001
Shattuck Hammond
Engagement Letter;
June 26, 2001

Professional Services
Agreement for
Radiology Services
between SARMC and
GSR/SARG; July 1,
2001
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; July 11, 2001
IMI Management
Committee Minutes;
August 14, 2001

..

4232

Admit

MRICI Board Meeting
Minutes; August 15,
2001

Office of the
CFO
SARMC01886;
Bruce Ex 18

Office of the
CFO
SARMC081712; Chamberlain
Ex 17
036811-4,
036802

Office of the
CFO
SARMC066021o; Schamp Ex
20
Office of the
CFO
SARMC021632238; Bruce Ex 8
IMI/000700089; L.K. Hall
Ex. No.3,
Schamp Ex 16
Corporate
Development
SARMC00379436; Traughber
Ex. No. 16
GSR/0168- 0216
, Seabourn Ex.
No. 5, Schamp
Ex 19

GSRRP/000583 90; N. Davey Ex
9
IMIRP/000886-9;
Fry Ex 12,
Seabourn Depo
Ex. No. 17, L.K.
Hall Depo Ex.
No. 5, N. Davey
Depo Ex. No. 12,
I. Davey Depo.
Ex. No. 14
002145-8 (same
as 019350019353; L.K.
Hall Ex 24)

17

002110

4233

Admit

Letter to Ken Fry from
Jack Floyd following
meeting of August 15,
2001

4234

Admit

4235

Admit

4236

Admit

Memorandum to Grant
Chamberlain and
Michael Hammond
from Michael Finnerty
and Bill Appleyard re:
St. Alphonsus and
MRIA Overview;
August 30, 2001
Radiology Group
Meeting Minutes;
September 12, 2001
GSR Fees & Finance
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September
13,2001
Finnerty Interview
Notes- Meetings with
MRIA Stakeholders;
September 18-20,
2001
SARMC IT System
Support for IMI
Meeting Minutes;
September 24, 2001
Memorandum to Grant
Chamberlain and
Michael Hammond
from Mike Finnerty
and Bill Appleyard;
September 25, 2001
IMI Management
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September
26,2001

4237

4238

Admit

4239

Admit

4240

Admit

4241

IMI IT Reports;
various dates
beginning October 1,
2001

4242

Admit

'

IMI Fees & Finance
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October 5,
2001

Office of the
CFO
SARMCOO 182-6;
Fry Ex 32, L.K.
Hall Depo Ex.
No. 23
SH1886·1894;
Schamp Ex 14
(same as
SH0776-86;
Newton Ex 12,
Traughber Ex 9)

GSRRP/000602611; I. Davey Ex
27
GSRRP/0005223

SH0089-90,
Schamp Ex 22

IMIRP/000890-7;
Kelly Hall Ex 18

SH 0763 - 0775;
N. Davey Ex 4, I.
Davey Ex 7,
Schamp Ex21

IMIRP/000898000922;
Seaboum Ex 18,
L.K. Hall Ex 14,
N. Davey Ex 19
Office of the CIO
SARMC0186574, 01861-3,
01667-8,
IMIRP/001030,
IMIRP/00 1040-1,
IMIRP/001051-2,
IMIRP /00 106891,
IMIRP/001110-2,
IMIRP/001122,
IMIRP/001134,
IMIRP/001144;
Kelly Hall Ex 8
and Sulc
(Hameck) Ex 5
GSRRP/000524525; I. Davey Ex
9

18

002111

4243

Admit

IMI Management
Meeting Minutes;
October 31, 2001

Admit

St. Alphonsus'
Request for Financing
Proposal MRI Limited
Partnership; November
2001

4245

Admit

IMI Operations
Committee Meeting
Minutes; November 5,
2001

4246

Admit

4247

Admit

Valuation Analysis of
MRIA, GPand
Affiliates for SARMC
by Shattuck Hammond
Partners; November 6,
2001
Shattuck Hammond
Partners Presentation
of Strategic Options of
MRIA Ownership
Interest for SARMC;
November 6, 2001

4248

Admit

IMI Marketing
Committee Meeting
Minutes; November
28,2001

4249

Admit

4250

Admit

4251

Admit

MRICI Financial
Statement Budge vs.
Actual; December
2001
Email to Cindy
Schamp and Ken Fry
from Grant
Chamberlain re:
Financing Proposals;
December 10, 2001
Memorandum to Ken
Fry and Cindy Schamp
from Grant
Chamberlain, Mike
Finnerty and Bill
Appleyard re: Debt
and Distribution
Analyses; December
12,2001

4244

-

19

IMIRP/000923-4;
Seabourn Depo
Ex. No. 19, L.K.
Hall Depo Ex.
No. 27
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0065915; Bruce Ex 61
(same as Office
of the CFO
SARMC07681-5;
Fisher Ex 15)
GSRRP/0006813; Scales Ex 5, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
10 (same as
GSR/0128;
Seabourn. Ex 11)
SH2436-86

Office of the
CFO
SARMC0644280; Fry Ex 36
(same as
SH0224-270
Schamp Ex 23);
Fisher Ex 13
GSRRP /0006614; Kelly Hall Ex
20, L.K. Hall
Depo Ex. No. 20,
I. Davey Depo.
Ex. No. 25, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No. 18
031021

Office of the
CFO
SARMC07665;
Fry Ex 38

SH1178-9;
Finnerty Ex 8

.
002112

4252

Admit

4253

Admit

Email to Cindy
Schmap and Ken Fry
from Bill Appleyard
re: SARMC debt and
distribution analysis;
December 13, 2001
IMI/SARMC IT
Meeting Minutes;
December 18, 2001

IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2001
2002 vs. 2001
Comparison Center
Income; not dated

4254

4255

FY 02 Capital
Analysis Budget ·
(tentative) vs. Actual;
not dated
FY 02 Capital
Analysis Budget vs.
Actual; not dated

4256

4257

4258

FY 02 Capital
Analysis Budget vs.
Actual; not dated

4259

Local Pool Capital FY
02; not dated

4260

Admit

Handwritten notes re:
MRI Restructure;
January 2002

4261

Admit

4262

Admit

4263

Admit

IMI Marketing
Committee Report;
January 2002,
P ACS Meeting
Minutes; January 4,
2002
Email to Grant
Chamberlain and
William Appleyard
from Michael Finnerty
re: Distributions;
January 14,2002
Memo to Leslie Kelly
Hall from Patti
Harneckre: DR
Systems Status Report;
January 23, 2002

4264

Office of the
CFO
SARMC06596-8;
Fry Ex 41

GSRRP/00686-7;
Kelly Hall Ex 22,
I. Davey Depo.
Ex. No. 29, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No. 20, Sulc
(Harneck) Depo
Ex. 4, Seaboum
Depo Ex. No. 20
IMIRP/00322534
Office of the
CFO
SARMC00177-8;
Fry Ex 15
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08838;
Reilly Ex 33
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08867;
Reilly Ex 35
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08878;
Reilly Ex 36
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08924;
Reilly Ex 38
Office of the
CFO
SARMC07696;
Fry Ex 39
IMIRP/000973; I.
Davey Ex. 26
Office of the CIO
SARMC01841-4;
Kelly Hall Ex 15
SH1795-7;
Finnerty Ex 10

Office of the CIO
SARMC01847-9;
KellyHaH 9

20

002113

Admit

4265

4266

4267

Admit

4268

Admit

4269

Admit

4270

Admit

4271

Admit

4272

Admit

4273

Admit

4274

Admit

4275

Admit

4276

Admit

Email to Cindy
Schamp from Ken Fry
re: MRIA; January 29,
2002
Memo to Leslie Kelly
Hall from Patti
Harneck re:
Comparison of options
IMIWestDR
Acquisition Server;
January 31; 2002
IMI Management
Committee Meeting
Minutes; January 31,
2002
Fax to Gwen Moore
(Trinity Health) from
Tiffany Albanese
(Administrative
Assistant, Finance) re:
Shattuck Hammond
Memo; February 6,
2002
Memorandum to Ken
Fry from Grant
Chamberlain re: Work
Plan/Next Steps;
February 12, 2002
Email To Grant
Chamberlain from
Michael Finnerty re:
St. Alphonsus;
February 13, 2002
Email to Ken Fry and
Cindy Schamp from
Grant Chamberlain re:
Work Plan Timeline;
February 15, 2002
St. Alphonsus- MRIA
Restructure Proposal
Discussion Outline
w/Dr. Curran; April9,
2002
GSR Fees & Finance
Committee Meeting
Minutes; April'l 2,
2002
Email to Grant
Chamberlain from
Roger Curran re:
Update; April29, 2002
IMI Management
Committee Meeting
Agenda;May30,2002
Fifth Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
of MRI Associates;
August
2002

SH1804;
Chamberlain Ex
9
GSRRP/00082830;
Sulc(Harneck) Ex
6

IMIRP/000976981; I. Davey Ex.
24
Office of the
CFO
SARMC06571-3;
Fry Ex42

SHOOOl-2, 134-6;
Chamberlain Ex
10

SH1805-8;
Finnerty Ex 14

Office of the
CFO
SARMC07553;
FryEx43
SH1200-1;
Chamberlain Ex
12

GSRRP/0007303

SH1809;
Chamberlain Ex
13
IMIRP/001004,
IMIRP/001015;
FryEx26
025015-21

21

002114

4277

Admit

4278

Admit

4279

Admit

4280

Admit

4281

Admit

4282

Admit

4283

4284

4285

Admit

4286

4287

4288

4289

Admit

Letter to MRICI
Scheduling
Department,
Radiology Scheduling
Department from
Radiologists/Tim Hall;
August 7, 2002
Email to Dave Giles,
Roger Curran and Jack
Floyd from Mark
Lawrence re: Gem
Radiology; August 19,
2002
Email to Ken Fry from
Mark Lawrence re:
Weekend Issues;
August 26, 2002
Radiology-MRI
Meeting Record;
August 30, 2002
MRI Center ofldaho
Board Meeting
Minutes; September
17,2002
Email to Carolyn
Corbett from Terry
Krogstad Re:
Radiology/MRI
Meeting; September
24,2002
MRI Center of Idaho
Exam Report, Dr.
Garabedian;
September 25, 2002
Email to Jack Floyd
from Debra Scott re:
Personal Service;
September 27, 2002
Handwritten Notes re:
Ben l\1urray 10/18/02;
October 18, 2002
Email to Ken Fry from
Richard Presnell re:
MRI Distributions;
October 22, 2002
Email to Ken Fry from
Jack Floyd re: New
Pad Site Approval;
October 22, 2002
Email to Ken Fry and
Stephanie Westermeir
from Patrick Miller re:
Partnership DutiesMRI; October 25,
2002
DR Usage Percentage
by Location;
November 1, 2002

016331

000061

Office of the
CFO
SARMC07362;
Fry Ex 28
Office of the
CFO
SARMC07228-9;
Krogstad Ex 5
014111-4;
Garabedian Ex 8

Patient Care
Services
SARMC00565;
Corbett Ex 3

163311-2

033607;
Garabedian Ex 19

033597; Murray
Ex8
SH1443-1449;
Chamberlain Ex
14
Office of the
CFO
SARMC06776;
Fry Ex 29
SH1434,
Chamberalain Ex
16

033627,040250,
034116, 014825;
Fry Ex 33

22

002115

'

4290

4291

4292

Admit

4293

..

IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2002
MRICI Income
Statement; December
31,2002
November MRI Board·
Topics for Discussion
and Follow Up;
Noveinber I, 2002
FY 03 Capital Budget
. Local Pool; not dated

4294

FY 03 Capital
Analysis Budget vs.
Actual; not dated

4295

FY 03 Capital Budget
Status; not dated

4296

Admit

4297

Admit

4298

Admit

4299

4300

Admit ·

4301

4302

Admit

4303

Admit

4304

Admit

IMI Marketing
Committee Meeting
Minutes; April 2, 2003
Sixth Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
of MRI Associates;
April15, 2003
Memorandum to Grant
Chamberlain from Ken
Fryre: MRI
Discussions; April18,
2003
Draft Letter to Sandra
Bruce from Roger
Curran; May 1, 2003
Email to Roger
Curran, James
Prochaska, and David
Giles from Jack
Havlina re: DMR
Agreement and Rads;
May 5, 2003
Email to Rick Presnell
from Jack Floyd re: redirected Patient; June
3,2003
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Roger Curran;
June 3, 2003
IMI Operations
Committet; Meeting
Minutes; June 20,
2003
MFP Management
Steering Committee
Meeting Summary;
June 24, 2003

IMIRP/00323544 Office of the
CFO
030946

SARMC07382-7;.
Bruce Ex 62

Office of the
CFO
SARMC08864;
Reilly Ex 34
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08901;
Reilly Ex 37
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08925;
Reilly Ex 39
GSRRP/0008969; N. Davey Ex 6
025022-35

SH1435-42;
Chamberlain Ex
15

014879-80

037250; Havlina
Ex2

034325, Hopkins
Ex 16

014191-2

GSRRP/0009405; Garabedian Ex
22
Office of the
President
SARMC12190-3;
Corbett Ex4

23

002116

4305

Admit

4306

Admit

4307

Admit

4308

4309

Admit

4310

Admit

4311

Admit

4312

4313

Admit

4314

Admit

4315

Admit

4316

Admit

4317

DR Systems Invoice to
SARMC; June 24,
2003
IMI Operations
Committee Meeting
Minutes; July 16, 2003
Email to Jack Floyd
from Thomas Henson
re: Agreement for MRI
Services; July 18, 2003
Email to Jack Floyd
from Julli Hopkins re:
list; September 4, 2003
MRI of Idaho Special
Meeting Minutes and
Agenda; September 8,
2003
Negotiating Timeline;
September 8, 2003

MRI Center of Idaho
Board Meeting
Minutes; September 8,
2003
Surgeries Within 8
Weeks that are Safe to
Scan; September 19,
2003
CEO Report;
September 30, 2003

IMI Management
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October 28,
2003
Presentation to Trinity
Health: Overview of
the Restructuring of
the MRIA Limited
Partnership & the
Simultaneous Merger
ofMRICI and IMI;
October 30, 2003

IMI Fees & Finance
Committee Meeting
Minutes; December 1,
2003
Handwritten meeting
notes by Dr. Curran;
December 17, 2003

Office of the CIO
SARMC01336-8;
Kelly Hall Ex 25
GSRRP/0009478; Corbett Ex 5
036222-38;
Henson Ex 11

034172; Hopkins
Ex 3
028043-6;
Corbett Ex 6

Office of the
President
SARMCO 10658;
Bruce Ex 65
014188-9

Garabedian Ex 10

Office of the
President
SARMC07043-4;
Bruce Ex 22,
Fisher Ex 17
IMIRP/00 1062;
Sulc(Harneck) Ex
3
Office ofthe
CFO
SARMC0677786; Bruce Ex 64,
Seaboum Depo
Ex. No. 12, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 32, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No. 21; Fisher Ex
16
GSRRP/0008847; Gobel Ex 14

024271--9

24

002117

4318

Admit

4319

Admit

4320

4321

Letter to Tom
Banducci from Pat
Miller and follow-up
correspondence;
December 22, 2003,
February 20, 2004, and
February 24, 2004
MRICI Incom~
Statement; December
31,2003
IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2003
FY 04 Capital Budget
Status; updated July
20,2004

015659, 025573,
014547; Bruce
Ex68

015477

IMIRP/00324557
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08926;
Reilly Ex40

WITHDRAWN

4322
4323

4324

GSR Charges by Year
and Amounts Applied
Charges Dated 20012004
GSR Fees & Finances
Committee Meeting
Minutes; January 12,
2004
Email to David Giles,
Roger Curran, and
James Prochaska from
Jack Havlina re: MRI;
January 12, 2004
Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Julli Hopkins,
and Robin Cioffi from
Ben Murray re:
JCAHO; January 14,
2004
SARMC Monthly
Imaging Strategy
Meeting; January 20,
2004

4325

Admit

4326

Admit

4327

Admit

4328

Admit

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; January 20,
2004

4329

Admit

4330

Admit

4331

Admit

Letter to Roger Curran
from Sandra Bruce re:
Notice of Withdrawal;
February 24, 2004
Letter to Patrick Miller
from Tom Banducci
re: MRI Associates;
February 25, 2004
G~R Group Meeting
Minutes; February 25,
2004

Cliff30(b)(6) Ex

1

GSRRP/0009701; Gobel Ex 15

035919; Havlina
Ex 3 and Giles
Ex20

Patient Care
Services
SARMC00512;
Murray Ex 37

Corporate
Development
SARMC00125-7;
I. Davey Ex. 22
and N. Davey Ex.
16
GSRRP/000988
R-92; Gobel Ex
12, N. Davey Ex
11 (Redacted
version
GSR/0138 used
as Bruce Ex 17)
021657-8; Bruce
Ex2l

032376

GSRRP/000993
R-5; Noyes Ex 32

25

002118

Admit

4332

-

4333

Admit

4334

Admit

4335

Admit

4336

Admit

4337

4338

4339

Admit

4340

Admit

4341

Admit

4342

Admit

4343

Admit

4344

Admit

I

Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Mark Adams,
Mark Dalley, and
Joseph Messmer re:
officer to sell MRICI
and buy SARMC's
share in MRIM; March
5,2004
Letter to Mark Adams,
Mark Dalley, and Joe
Messmer from Sandra
Bruce re: Saint
Alphonsus
Withdrawal; March
10,2004
PACS Team Meeting
Minutes; March 12,
2004 and various dates
IMI Marketing
Committee Minutes;
March 10, 2004
IMI Strategy Session
Minutes; March 16,
2004
Email to Janelle Reilly
and Ken Fry from
Carolyn Corbett re:
MRI; March 17, 2004
Email to Carolyn
Corbett from Mike
Boydre: MRI
Contract, Agreement
for MRI Services
between SARMC and
BP Consulting; March
18,2004
Handwritten notes;
March 22, 2004

SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Meeting Summary;
March 23,2004
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Roger Curran re:
response to withdraw!;
March 23, 2004
Email to Sandra Bruce
from Carolyn Corbett
re: MRI conversation;
March 26, 2004
Radiology Marketing
Committee Meeting
Minutes; March 30,
2004
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; April 20,
2004

021742-3

Office of the
President
SARMC0106467; Bruce Ex 23,
Fisher Ex 18

Office of the CIO
SARMC01789838; Kelly Hall
Ex 10
GSRRP/00 10402; Noyes Ex 33
Patient Care
Services
SARMC00845-6;
Bruce Ex 25
Department of
Radiology
SARMC00758;
Krogstad Ex 8
Patient Care
Services
SARMC0038595; Bruce Ex 26

Office ofthe
President
SARMC010645;
Seaboum Ex 16
Office of the
President
SARMC1203941; Corbett Ex 10
003020-2

Office of the
President
SARMC 010643;
Hopkins Ex 6
GSRRP/0010434; N. Davey Ex 8

GSRRP/0009991002; Gobel Ex
16

26

002119

4345

Admit

4346

Admit

4347

Admit

4348

Admit

4349

Admit

4350

Admit

4351

Admit

4352

Admit

4353

Admit

4354

Admit

4355

4356

4357

Admit

4358

SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Meeting Summary;
April 27, 2004
Radiology Group
Meeting Minutes; June
2, 2004
Letter to Jack Floyd
from Bill Radaj;
August 6, 2004
Letter to Joseph Gobel
from Carolyn Corbett
re: Medical Director;
A11gust 10, 2004
Email to Julli Hopkins
from Joseph Gobel re:
Exam Protocol and
various; August 28,
2004 and various
Imaging Strategic Plan
Enviromnental
Assessment, Imaging
Planning Team;
August 31, 2004
Letter to Pat Miller
from Mark Ellison and
attachments;
September 3, 2004
Seventh Amendment
to Articles of
Partnership ofMRI
Associates LLP;
November 10, 2004
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from MRICI Board of
Directors; December
3,2004
SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Meeting Summiuy;
December 7, 2004
Email to Julli Hopkins
from Tim Hall re: MRI
Scheduling; December
14,2004
MRICI Radiology
Report by Jeff
Seaboum ''MRI of the
Liver with and without
Contrast"; December
17,2004
Memo to Saint
Alponsus Medical
Staff from Sandra
Bruce; December 20,
2004
IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2004

Office of the
President
SARMC12270;
Corbett Ex 11
GSRRP/0010035; Gobel Ex 11
034308

Patient Care
Services
SARMC00735;
Scales Ex
042584-90, 9293, 96; Hopkins
Ex 1

IMIRP/0011661282; Reilly Ex
21

039031-7

036987-92

025045; Berger
Ex6

Office of the
President
SARMC12081-3
0341 73; Hopkins
Ex8

042160-042162
, Seabourn Depo
Ex. No. 6, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No.6
Patient Care
Services
SARMC00175

IMIRP/00178797

27

002120

4359

Admit

4360

4361

4362

Admit

4363

Admit

4364

4365

4366

Admit

4367

Admit

4368
4369
c

4370

Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Jeff Cliff and
Tim Hall from Jeffrey
Seaboum re: MRICI
patients on DR;
January 10, 2005
Email to Robin Cioffi
and Julli Hopkins from
Scott Berger re:
SARMC Issues;
January 27, 2005
SARMC"MRI
Meeting" Minutes;
February 21, 2005
SARMCMRI
Operations Team
Meeting Minutes;
March 21, 2005
Letter to ICR from
Sandra Bruce; March
22,2005
Defendant's First Set
oflnterrogatories and
Requests for
Production; May 20,
2005
DR Invoices to MRICI
from Saint Alphonsus;
June 22, 2005 and
various
SARMC Board of
Trustees Meeting
Minutes; September
20,2005
Email to Ben Murray,
Carolyn Corbett,
Robert Polk, Janelle
Reilly, Jean Basom,
and Sandra Bruce from
Ken Fry re: Mobile
MRI at SARMC;
October 6, 2005
WITHDRAWN
Email to Ben Murray,
Dennis Adams, Karen
Noyes, Kendall Miller,
Laurea Howell, Sarah
Berg; Scott
Chirstensen from
Terry Krogstad re:
MRI Communications
Plan & Physician
Letter; November 8,
2005
Clinical Operations
Team Meeting Agenda
(SARMC/IMI MRI);
November 22, 2005

Patient Care
Services
SARMC01036;
Kelly Hall Ex 30

042153; Berger
Ex5

Patient Care
Services
SARMC00003-4;
Corbett Ex 12
Patient Care
Services
SARMC00002;
Corbett Ex 13
BruceEx67

L.K. Hall
(30(b)(6)) Ex.
No.2

040229-41;
Cioffi Ex 7

Office of the
President
SARMC11642-8
Director of
Nursing
SARMCOOOll;
Murray Ex 12

Department of
Radiology
SARMC00924-5;
Murray Ex 14

Office of the
General Counsel
SARMC00295-6;
Murray_ Ex 38
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'

'

4371

4372

Admit

4373
','

4374

Admit

4375

Admit

4376

Admit

4377

Admit

4378

Admit

4379

4380

29

Director of
Email to Ben Murray
Nursing
from Sandra Bruce re:
SARMC00013;
MRI; December 5,
Murray Ex 16
2005
Email to Ben Murray
Director of
from Sandra Bruce re:
Nursing
MRI Update;
SARMC00015;
Murray Ex 21
December 9, 2005
IMIRP/001719Agreement for MRI
36; Kelly Hall Ex
Services between
4
SARMC and IMI;
December 9, 2005
. IMIRP/001669First Amendment to
77; Bruce Ex 66
Operating Agreement
of Intermountain
Medical Imaging,
LLC; December 9,
2005
Option and Purchase
Office of General
Agreement between
Counsel
SARMC00259ICR and SADC;
264
December 9, 2005
Email to Carolyn
Director of
Nursing
Corbett from Ben
SARMC00093-4;
Murray re: MRI
MurrayEx22
Letter; December 11,
2005
Email to BCC, Front
Department of
Radiology
Office, Gen Rad
SARMC01472-4;
Techs, Nuc Med
MurrayEx23
Group, Nurses, Rad
Admin, Rad
Assistants, Specials,
Ultrasound from Scott
Christensen re: New
MRI Services;
December 12, 2005
Email to Jack Gjording Steiner Ex 11
from Manfred Steiner
re: MRI ; December
14,2005
Director of
Email to Ben Murray,
Carolyn Corbett,
Nursing
Dennis Adams, Joseph SARMC00017;
Murray Ex 17
Gobel, Kevin Dwello,
Karen Noyes, and
Sandra Bruce from
Neil Hamilton re: MRI
Issues; December 15,
2005
Office of the
Email to All nurse,
CNA's, et al from Ben
CFO
SARMC08320;
· Murray re: MRI
Opening; December
Murray Ex 24
16,2005

002122

'

'

4381

Admit

4382

..
4383

4384

4385

4386

4387

Admit

4388

4389

4390

Admit

4391

4392

30

Email to Adam Feider,
Connie Stem, Dennis
Adams, Gama Barker,
et al. from Ben Murray
re: MRI Agenda and
Minutes; December
19,2005
Email to Adam Feider,
Carolyn Corbett,
Connie Stem, et al.
from Ben Murray re:
MRI update;
December 20, 2005
Email to Ben Murray
from Robin Cioffi re:
Service; December 20,
2005
Email to Adam Feider,
Connie Stem, Dennis
Adams, et al. from Ben
Murray re: MRI
Launch- IMMED
ATTN; December 21,
2005
Email to Robin Cioffi
from Ben Murray re:
Undeliverable: MRI
Discussion; December
21, 2005
Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Karen Noyes,
Adam Feider, Ben
Murray, Darrell
Fugate, Dennis Adams
from Joseph Gobel re:
MRI Concerns;
December 30, 2005
MRI Center of Idaho
Business I Income
Statement; December
31,2005
IMI Financial
Statements; December
31, 2005 and 2004
Email to Diana
Trujillo from Ben
Murray re: MRI
Transport; January 3,
2006
New Saint Alphonsus
MRI Launches;
January 9, 2006
MRI Associates'
Motion to Compel;
January 13, 2006
Memorandum in
Support ofMRI
Associates' Motion to
Compel; January 13,
2006

Department of
Radiology
SARMC01495;
Murray Ex 19

Director of
Nursing
SARMCOOllO;
Murray Ex 26

Director of
Nursing
SARMC00109;
MurrayEx25
Director of
Nursing
SARMCQOlll;
Murray Ex 20

Director of
Nursing
SARMC00117-8;
Murray Ex 27
Department of
Radiology
SARMC01734-6;
Murray Ex 18

IMIRP/00325870
Director of
Nursing
SARMC00121;
MurrayEx29
Cioffi Ex 3

002123

'

'

4393

Handwritten notes re:
GSR-Radiologists;
January 22, 2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Terry Krogstad;
January 25, 2006

4394

4395

4396

4397

4398

4399

4400

4401

4402

4403

Admit

4404

4405

4406

31

Email to Ben Murray
from Terry Krogstad
re: MRI Coverage
Thursday night;
January 26, 2006
Letter/Fax to Thomas
Banducci from Trudy
Hanson Fouser re:
Motion to Compel;
January 31, 2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Robin Cioffi re:
Sedation Cases;
February 3, 2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Robin Cioffi re:
Sedation Cases;
February 6, 2006
List of Documents
Delivered to Manfred
Steiner; February 28,
2006
Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Directors,
MRIGroup from Ben
Murray re: MRI
Coverage on Wed
March 1st; February
28,2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Robin Cioffi; re:
recap; March 3, 2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Terry Krogstad
re: MRI Coverage
Wednesday; March 7,
2006
Assignment of.
Membership Interest
between ICR and
SADC;April 1,2006
Trinity Health
Consolidated Financial
Statements for the
Years Ended June 30,
2006 and 2005 and
Independent Auditors'
Report
DEPT#'s 89914 (MRI
Billable Cost) &
89915 (MRI Mobile
Unit); 2006
Hand-Drawn Sketch;
September 20, 2006

Reinstein Ex 5

Department of
Radiology
SARMC009.85"6;
Murray Ex 30
Department of
Radiology
SARMC00993;
Murray Ex 31

042177; Murray
Ex32

042175-6;
Murray Ex 33

Steiner Ex 6

Department of
Radiology
SARMC01248;
Murray Ex 34

042178; Murray
Ex35
Department of
Radiology
SARMC01021;
Murray Ex 36
Office of General
Counsel
SARMC00554-5

Wellspring
SARMC020;
Stein Ex 7
L.K. Hall Ex. No.
11

002124

..
4407

4408

4409

Admit

4410

4411

4412

Admit

4413

Admit

4414

4415

4416

4417

4417(a)

Admit

4418
4419
4420
4421
4422
4423
4424
4425

Admit

4426

32

Handwritten notes re:
St. Als; October 26,
2006
Preliminary Expert
Witness Report MSN
v. Compunet;
September 5, 2006
Curriculum Vitae of
Jeffrey Todd
Seaboum, M.D.; 2006
Internet Printout from
aboutimi.com Re:
Jeffrey T. Seaboum,
M.D.; printed October
3,2006
Transcript of
Deposition of Dennis
Reinstein for MSN v.
Compunet; October 5,
2006
Resume of Joseph A.
Messmer; 2007
Curriculum Vitae of
Paul D. Traughber,
M.D.; 2007
Invoices from Hooper
Cornell to Eberle
Berlin; January 31,
2007 and various
Letter to Daniel
Gordon from Jack
Gjording re: Saint
Alphonsus Capital
Budgets; February 23,
2007
Handwritten notes re:
Meeting with Jeff;
March 3, 2007
Expert Report of
Bruce Budge; March
12,2007
Excerpt of Budge
Report - Schedule B
Timeline of Events;
2007
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
PMI Data- IMI MRI
Exams 2001- current
spreadsheet
IMI Financial Data;
1999-2005

Steiner Ex 1

Reinstein Ex 8

Seaboum Ex. No.
2
Seaboum Ex. No:
3

Reinstein Ex 9

MessmerEx2
Traughber Ex.
No.2
Reinstein Ex 1

Reilly Ex 24

Reinstein Ex 10

Reinstein Ex 4

PMI000288-1488

IMIRP/000104681

002125

'

'

4427

MRICI Accounts
Receivable
Transaction
Summaries; 19852006

:'

4428

Admit

MRICI Charges by
Referring Physician;
1998- March 31,
2001

4429

Admit

MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 1991 and 1990

4430

Admit

4431

Admit

4432

Admit

4433

Admit

4434

Admit

4435

Admit

4436

Admit

4437

Admit

4438

Admit

4439

·Admit

MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 1991
and 1990
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 1997 and 1996
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 1997
and 1996
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 1998 and 1997
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 1998
and 1997
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 1999 and 1998
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 1999
and 1998
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31,2000 and 1999
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2000
and 1999
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31,2001 and 2000

33

Office of the
President
SARMC00654,
008141, Office
the President
SARMC0.5977,
018290, Office-t~f
the CFO
SARMC03095,
031776, 031809,
031537, 012279,
, 031036,
042337-9,
042206-7,
042265-6,
042319-20
031936, 031840,
031795,031539,
011880-1,
011919, 0122801, 012307-8
Office of the
President
SARMC0053140
Office of the
President
SARMC0054151
032188-99

032176-86

032152-62

032164-74

012052-61

032142-50

019776-85

019787-96

013100-9'
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'

'

4440

4441

Admit

Admit

,.

4442

Admit

4443

Admit

4444

Admit

4445

Admit

4446

Admit

4447

Admit

4448

Admit

4449

Admit

4450

Admit

4451

Admit

4452

Admit

4453

4454

4455
4456

34

MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2001
and 2000
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2002 and 2001
MRI Mobile LP
. Financial Statements;
December 31, 2002
and 2001
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2003 and 2002
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2003
and 2002
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2004 and 2003
MRI Mobile LP;
December 31, 2004
and2003
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2005 and 2004
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2005
and2004
MRICI Business I
Balance Sheet; July
31,2006
MRICI Business I
Income Statement;
July 31, 2006
MRIM Business II
Balance Sheets; July
21, 2006
MRIM Business II
Income Statement;
July 31, 2006
Data Form for daily
MRI equipment QC;
not dated
Data Form for daily
MRI equipment QC;
not dated
Laser film printer
control chart; not dated
ACRAnnual
Performance Analysis:
1.5 T Symphony
MRICI (with
handwritten notes);
October 18, 2004

013090-9

032015-24

013845-54

~15673-82

024250-9 (same
as 021439-48)

040197-207

040208-18

042191-200

042181-90

042315

042317

042325

042327

043511-20

043521-31

043532-35
043536-49

002127

4457

4458

4459

4460

4461

4462

4463

4464

4465

4466
4467

4468
4469
4470

Admit

4471

ACRAnnual
Performance Analysis:
1.5 T GE Signa
MRICI; October 18,
2004
ACR Certificate ,for
MRI Center: GE
Twinspeed; March 11,
2007
ACR Certificate for
MRI Center: Siemens .
Symphony; March 11,
2007
MRI Center ACR
accreditation
certificate for 1998
Siemens System
MRI Scanner
Evaluation- GE 1.5T:
November 8, 2006
MRI Scanner
Evaluation- GE 1.5T:
November 8, 2006
MRI Scanner
Evaluation - Siemens
1.5T: November 8,
2006
MRI Scanner
Evaluation- Siemens
1.5T:
November 8, 2006
MRI Center ACR
accreditation:
December 8, 2000
Siemens Symphony
service records 20002006: not dated
ACR/MRI annual
performance review
verification:
November 21, 2006
GE Service Records:
Various Dates
GE Service Records:
Various Dates
CV of Bob Bell
ACR Performance
Analysis of the 1.5 T
Symphony at MRICI;
Octob~r 18, 2004
Siemens Service
Records
ACR Performance
Review of Siemens 1.5
T Symphony MRI at
the MRI Center of
Idaho; January 25,
2007

4472
4473

..

35

043550-65

043597

043598

056643

056658-63

056664-70

056671-76

056677-83

056694-95

056899-057073

057074-75

057115-406
057410-058431
Bell Ex 2
(replace?)
043566-79

043580-2
Bell Ex 4

002128

' '

4474

4475

4476
4477

4478

4479

4480

4481
4482
4483
4484
4485
4486
4487
4488

Admit

4489

ACR Performance
ReviewofGE
Twinspeed 1.5 T
Excite; January 25,
2007
AlliTPACS
Committee Meeting
Minutes; various dates
All SARMC
Discovery Responses
Fax to Mark Adams,
Milt Kutsurelis, and
Marty Hutson from
Cindy Schamp re:
PWC estimates of fair
market value of MRI
Mobie; June 8, 2000
Memo to Sandra Bruce
and Cindy Schamp
from Roger Curran
"Negotiating with the
Radiologists"; October
27, 1999
IMI's Supplemental
Responses to MRIA's
First Requests for
Production of
Documents; November
16,2006
Saint Alphonsus
Building Company
Board of Directors
Annual Meeting;
October 11, 1999
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
Meeting with Jeff Cliff
and Outline for
Discussion
Presentation by Cindy
Schamp
Purchase/Restructuring
Options for MRI
Associates; January 26
and February 1, 2000
Certified copies of
Idaho Secretary of
State Annual Report
Forms- IMI; 2002;
2002
REINSTATEMENT;
2003 and 2004

Bell Ex 5

Various

Various
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0776670; Kutsurelis Ex
5

Office of the
CFO
SARMC07417;
Kutsurelis Ex 6

Office of the
President
SARMC12750;
Fugate Ex 1

•·

36.
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1

J

~

4490

4491
4492
4493

4494

4495

4496

4497

4498

4499
4500
4501
4502

Admit

4503

4504

4505

Admit

4506
4507
4508
4509
4510
4511

Admit

4512

Admit
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Memorandum
Decision on Plaintiff's
Motions to Strike,
Cross-Motions for
Summary Judgement,
and Plaintiff/Third
Party Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss
CV Charles Wilhoite
Expert Opinion of
Charles Wilhoite
Expert Opinion of
Charles Wilhoite;
Rebuttal
Documents
Considered by C.
Wilhoite
Expert Opinion of
Bruce Budge
Supplemental
Expert Opinion of
Bruce Budge
Amended
MRI Limited
Financial Statement
2007
Email from Roger
Curran to MRIA
Board and attached
letter to Sandra Bruce
from Roger Curran;
May6, 2003
MRI Center Financials
2005
MRI Limited
Financials 2010
MRI Limited Financial
Statement 2009
Trinity Health
Integrity Program
9/1/99 Statement for
Services from C.
Harder
8/19/99 Letter toR.
Denning from Dr.
Giles
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Gem State
Radiology, 3/24/05
CV of Bruce Budge
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
Memo to Fry and
Schamp from
Chamberlin dated
12111101
CD of Schamp Video
Clips

03692-4

Denning4;
GSRRPOO 1594
Denning 6;
GSRRPOO 1602-3
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•

I

•

'

4513

Admit

4514

4515

4516
.-

-~

.

4517

4518

4519

4520
4521

4522

4523

4524

Admit

4525
4526
"

4527
4528
4529
4530
4531
'

4532

38

Cindy Schamp Video
Designations
GSR Charges by Year
and Amounts Applied
2001-2004
SARDC Answers and
Objections to MRIA's
First Set of
Interrogatories 3/24/11
SARDC Answers and
Objections to MRIA's
Second Set of
Interrogatories and
Requests for
Production 4/15/11
SADC Answers and
Objections to MRIA's
Third Set of
Interrogatories and
Requests for
Production 4/27111
SADC Answers and
Objections to MRIA's
5th Set of
Interrogatories and
Requests for
Production 5/12/11
2/20/2004 Email from
R. Hudspeth to C.
Corbett
8/25/2000 Memo to
M. Czech from B. Bell
113112002 Memo to
LK Hall from P.
Hameck
Expert Opinion of
Charles Wilhoite dated
3/12/07
MRI v. IMI Cash Flow
and Balance Sheets
Appendix B to Charles
Wilhoite Opinion
dated 3/12/07
12/17/2002 MRI
Mobile Board
6/24/2007 MRIC
Minutes
7/21/99 MRI Board
Minutes
12/16/200;l.A:1RIC
Board Minutes
1120/2004 MRI
Mobile Minutes
6/21/2000 MRI
Mobile Minutes
8/2002 Executive
Session Minutes MRI
11/13/2002 Letter to J.
Floyd from S. Bruce

SARMC00509

014891-95
SARMC00167169

SARMC0641730Office of CFO

016356-58
011568-70
023573-75
014181-84
002845-47
022518-21
002559

-

002595

002131
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4533

Admit

4534
4535

Admit

-.

4536
4537

4538

4539

4540
4541

4542

4543
4544

4545

4546
4547

4548

4549

4550

4551

4552
4553

39

1/4/05 Letter from
Seabourn to
Colleagues
IT Chart
12/18/00 Letter to Dr.
Garabedian at IMI
fromACR
Email from ~- Floyd to
K. Fry re Assistance
Email from J. Floyd to
K. Fry reNew Pad Site
Approval
10/14/2002 September
Monthly
MRICIIMIRM Results
Summary
8/12/2002 Letter to
Tim Hall from M.
Lawrence
2002 St. Al's
Investment Analysis
Scenario No. 1
Schedule of Expected
Net Cash Flows
Scenario No. 1
Schedule of Expected
Net CAsh Flows
112112004 Letter to J.
Cliff from R. Cioffi
116199 Email from S.
Bruce to L. Chatterton
re Phase II Reply
5/3/99 Memo to L.
Hall from L.
Chatterton re Interface
3/15/2000 Minutes of
MRI Center
1117/2000 Email from
L. Hall to L.
Chatterton re Update
to PACS
12/13/99 Email from
R. Rorer to L.
Chatterton re
Greetings
9/13/99 Email from L.
Hall to L. Chatterton
re MRI Connectivity
8/19/99 Email to C.
Schamp/L.Chatterton
from P. Hameck
8/19/99 Email from L.
Chatterton to P.
Hameck re Desktop
8/18/99 Minutes of
MRI Center
7128/99 Email from L.
Hall to R. Curran re
Computer Start Date

015306

03552
033551

019011-12

000060

002644
016446

014519

014778
033698

033734

001525-27
033727

033692

033688

033728

033694

001232-33
033671

002132

7/29/99 Email from L.
Chatterton to L. Hall
reMRI
7/29/99 Email from L.
Chatterton to
C. Schamp/S. Bruce re
MIRIC Database
Connectivity
9/10/99 Email from D.
Giles to R. Curran, etc.
re PAC with SARMC
12/14/98 Email from
L. Chatterton to L.
Hall MRI Phase II
9/12/01 Memo to L.
Hallf rom M. Glenn
1126/05 Letter to
Colleagues from
Seaboum
12/21/04 Letter to Our
Valued Referring
Physicians from J.
Floyd
SIGNA Upgrade
History_

4554

.4555
..,.

4556

4557

4558
4559

4560

4561

033695

033726

024023-24

033696

SARMC01892
Seabourn Depo.
Ex. 14
015440

000592

40
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS

P.M.-

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

UG 2 9 10'11
1\

-..-.:rroP. Ht:.R D. RICH, Clerk

urw-.:.::DiANE OATMAN
SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit
corporation,

)
)
)
vs.
)
)
MRI ASSOCIATES, INC., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
)
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited
)
partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, )
an Idaho limited partnership
)
)
Defendants)
Counterclaimants.
)
PlaintiffCounterdefendant,

IY

)
)
)
)

oeputY

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219

MEMORANDUM ADDRESSING
COMMUNICATION FROM COUNSEL

The Court has received letters from both counsel regarding what exhibits will be
permissible during opening statements. The Court has reviewed the recording of the pretrial
conference, and the Court notes that the letter from Mr. Gjording accurately reflects its pretrial
ruling on exhibits to be used during opening statements.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this

~ay of August 2011.
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CERTI~TE

I hereby certify that on this
copy of the within instrument to:

OF MAILING

~day of August 2011, I mailed (served) a true and correct

JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
POBOX2837
BOISE, ID 83701
DONALDAYER
JONES DAY
51 LOUSIANA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST. STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court

2
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~·\~)

't\r,
~
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~

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com
BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
IST ARS No. CV -OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership,

MOTION IN LIMINE TO PREVENT
SAINT ALPHONSUS FROM ARGUING
THAT DR. DAVID GILES OR
ATTORNEY CARL HARDER
ENGAGED IN INAPPROPRIATE
CONDUCT

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership; MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho
Limited Partnership,i and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT ALPHONSUS
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

MOTION IN LIMINE TO PREVENT SAINT ALPHONSUS FROM ARGUING THAT DR. DAVID GILES OR
ATTORNEY CARL HARDER ENGAGED IN INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT- 1

002136

ORIGINAL

.

MOTION
From the demonstrative exhibits recently disclosed by Saint Alphonsus, it is apparent that
Saint Alphonsus is going to attempt to argue in its opening statement that Dr. David Giles and
attorney Carl Harder engaged in inappropriate conduct, perhaps even amounting to a violation of
their fiduciary duties to MRIA or Gem State Radiology ("GSR"). As the Court ordered in a
pretrial conference, it will allow reference to evidence in opening statement only if there is a
good faith reason to believe that the evidence will be admitted at trial. Defendant/Counterclaimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited
(collectively, "MRIA") move the Court for an order in limine to prevent arguments or evidence
that Dr. Giles or Mr. Harder engaged in misconduct because it is irrelevant and runs a substantial
risk of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. I.R.E. 401, 402, and 403. In addition, much
of the evidence concerning Carl Harder is impermissible hearsay. I.R.E. 802. A Memorandum in
Support follows below. MRIA requests that this motion be heard prior to opening statements.

MEMORANDUM
In its recent disclosure of illustrative exhibits, Saint Alphonsus has produced a number of
exhibits which indicate its intent to argue in opening statement and present evidence throughout
trial that Dr. Giles and Mr. Harder engaged in inappropriate conduct. As the Court said at the
pretrial conference ofthis matter, it will allow reference to evidence in opening that has a goodfaith basis for admission at trial. Saint Alphonsus should not be permitted to argue these matters
in opening statements or present evidence on the same because they are irrelevant, confuse the
issues, or cannot be supported by admissible evidence.

MOTION IN LIMINE TO PREVENT SAINT ALPHONSUS FROM ARGUING THAT DR. DAVID GILES OR
ATTORNEY CARL HARDER ENGAGED IN INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT- 2

002137

•
A. Argument Concerning Dr. Giles
Dr. Giles is a radiologist who was a founding partner in MRIA, which formed in 1985.
He was a member of GSR until he was asked to leave GSR in mid-2000. From Saint
Alphonsus's illustrative exhibits, it is apparent that Saint Alphonsus is going to attempt to argue
that Dr. Giles engaged in inappropriate conduct by "playing both sides" and by failing to disclose
GSR's plans to MRIA relative to its competing imaging center. In Exhibit1 901B, Saint
Alphonsus argues that Dr. Giles was leading GSR's efforts to create a new independent imaging
center, starting in March 1998. In Exhibit 904A, 904B, and 904C, Saint Alphonsus presents a
number oftimelines showing Dr. Giles's participation at meetings with GSR and MRIA, with the
implication that Dr. Giles was inappropriately keeping the MRIA Board unaware of GSR's
plans. In Exhibit 906, Saint Alphonsus's presents a timeline in which Dr. Giles worked to secure
a loan for GSR's construction of the new imaging facility, with the implication that this was
inappropriate or in some manner misrepresented the circumstances to the bank. Saint Alphonsus
may also attempt to argue that Dr. Giles was using or acting in concert with attorney Carl Harder
to accomplish this misconduct. In Exhibit 904A, 904B, and 904C Saint Alphonsus presents
timelines showing both Dr. Giles and Mr. Harder attending MRIA meetings in which neither
disclosed GSR's intentions. In Exhibit 905 and 906, Saint Alphonsus presents timelines showing
discussions and meetings between Dr. Giles and Mr. Harder.
This is all highly irrelevant, inflammatory, and misleading. Whether Dr. Giles, a nonparty, engaged in misconduct is utterly irrelevant to any claim or defense in this case. Whether
Dr. Giles did or did not act in an appropriate matter with respect to either MRIA or GSR has no
impact on whether Saint Alphonsus breached its contracts, the covenant of good faith and fair

All of the referenced exhibits are attached hereto.
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dealing, fiduciary duties, interfered with contracts, or committed civil conspiracy. It likewise has
no impact on Saint Alphonsus's defenses of waiver and estoppel. It is not even Saint
Alphonsus's claim to make, as any such argument would rightfully belong to MRIA and/or GSR.
Rather, it is a red herring aimed at distracting the jury's attention from the issues ofthe case. As
such, any relevance at all is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion of the issues or
misleading the jury. I.R.E. 403. Saint Alphonsus should be prevented from presenting these
arguments and the related exhibits in opening statement, and should likewise be prevented from
presenting such evidence during trial.

B. Argument Concerning Mr. Harder
The late Mr. Harder was an attorney who represented both GSR and MRIA. From Saint
Alphonsus's illustrative exhibits, it appears that Saint Alphonsus is going to attempt to argue that
Mr. Harder had a conflict of interest. In Exhibit 902D, Saint Alphonsus presents a graph
showing Mr. Harder's representation of multiple parties, including MRIA and GSR. In Exhibits
904A, 904B, and 904C, Saint Alphonsus presents timelines showing Mr. Harder's participation
in GSR meetings and MRIA meetings, including reviewing agreements, proposals, and letters.
In Exhibit 905, Saint Alphonsus presents a timeline showing that Mr. Harder was advising both
GSR and MRIA concerning the joint venture that GSR and MRIA were considering entering
with one another. In Exhibit 906, Saint Alphonsus presents a timeline showing Mr. Harder's
participation in securing a loan for the new imaging facility that GSR intended to build.
This is all highly irrelevant, inflammatory, and misleading. It is utterly irrelevant to any
claim or defense in this case. Whether Mr. Harder did or did not have a conflict of interest with
respect to his representation of either MRIA or GSR has no impact on whether Saint Alphonsus
breached its contracts, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fiduciary duties, interfered

MOTION IN LIMINE TO PREVENT SAINT ALPHONSUS FROM ARGUING THAT DR. DAVID GILES OR
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with contracts, or committed civil conspiracy. It likewise has no impact on Saint Alphonsus's
defenses of waiver and estoppel. Notably, in the first trial of this matter, Saint Alphonsus did not
present any evidence or argument concerning Mr. Harder's alleged conflict of interest. Indeed, it
is not even Saint Alphonsus's claim to make, as any such argument would rightfully belong to
MRIA and/or GSR. Rather, it is intended to distract the jury's attention from the actual issues of
the case. I.R.E. 403. As such, Saint Alphonsus should be prevented from presenting these
arguments and the related exhibits in opening statement, and should likewise be prevented from
presenting such evidence at trial.
In addition, any statement attributed to Mr. Harder with respect to his representation GSR

is hearsay. Mr. Harder passed away in 2002, and thus the only evidence that Saint Alphonsus
could attempt to use would be notes he took or invoices he submitted to GSR or MRIA. As only
one illustrative example, it appears that much of Exhibit 905 was taken from invoices submitted
by Mr. Harder to GSR and MRIA, as contained in Exhibits 830-834 and 836-849. Statements
within those invoices that he "had a discussion" concerning a subject are clearly hearsay. I.R.E.
801. Nor does any exception apply. This evidence should be excluded at trial. Moreover,
because there is no good faith basis for believing that this evidence would be admissible, Saint
Alphonsus should be prevented from presenting argument on Mr. Harder's conversations during
opening statement.

MOTION IN LIMINE TO PREVENT SAINT ALPHONSUS FROM ARGUING THAT DR. DAVID GILES OR
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For the reasons stated above, Saint Alphonsus should be prevented from arguing in opening
statement or at trial that Dr. Giles or Mr. Harder engaged in misconduct.
DATED this 30th day of August 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~ ~~4·

/-p_r._

araL Par(ef
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of August 2011, a true and correct copy of the within
and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

)Kiracsimile

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

,1facsimile
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CONFIDENTIAL
...

CARL W. HARDER
Attorney and Counselor
P.O. Box 8974
Boise, ID 83707
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Tax ID #82-0502363

IMAGING CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP
POST OFFICE BOX 8359
BOISE, IDAHO 83707

PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
FILE: 0124-001
MAY 1,1999
BALANCE DUE: $0.00

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
04/29/99

Prepare final version of First Amendment to interim Partnership Agreement for
Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP fu admit Dr. Scales as a partner, based on
infonnation supplied by Dr. Giles and discussions with Jeff Cliff and Roger
Clubb regarding commencement date for partnership and choice of effective
date for Dr. Scales' admission.

TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $150.00
LESS RETAINER DISCOUNT: $15.00
NET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $135.00

INET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES PAID FROM RETAINER: $135.00

I

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
839

002142
GSRRP001512

CONFIDENTIAL

CARL W. HARDER
Attorney and Counselor
P.O. Box 8974
Boise, ID 83707
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Tax ID #82-0502363

IMAGING CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP
POST OFFICE BOX 8359
BOISE, IDAHO 83707

SAINT ALPHONSUS RMC
FILE: 0124-002
MAY 1,1999
BALANCE DUE: $0.00

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
04/30199

Review proposed terms of joint venture between radiologists and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for new imaging center, including
discussion with Dr. Giles and further consideration of issues in joint venture
following meeting with him.

TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $150.00
LESS RETAINER DISCOUNT: $15.00
NET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $135.00

INET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES PAID FROM RETAINER: $135.00

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

I ----838

GSRRP001736

002143

0838-0001

CARL W. HARDER
Attorney and Counselor
P.O. Box 8974
Boise, ID 83707
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Tax ID #82-0502363

MRI ASSOCIATES
POST OFFICE BOX 8359
BOISE, ID 83707

OPEN Mru: OF POCATELLO, LLC
FILE: 0005-035
SEPTEMBER 1, 1999
BALANCE DUE: $0.00

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
08/02/99

Draft portions of Operating Agreement for Open MRI ofldaho, LLC to
embody Joint Venture with Idaho Falls radiologists.

08/03/99

Complete client review draft of Op~ating Agreement.

08/05/99

Meet with Dr. Curran and Mike Czech to discuss refinements to proposed
Operating Agreement; revise Operating Agreement to incorporate comments
from Dr. Curran and Mike Czech; prepare letter from Dr. Curran and Mike
Czech to Drs. Strobel and Schmutz and dispatch to them in care of Dennis Earl.

TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $915.00
LESS RETAINER DISCOUNT: $97.50
NET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $877.50

INET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES PAID F~OM RETAINER: $877.50

l

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
845

~-CH003869

002144
0845-0001

CONFIDENTIAL

CARL W. HARDER
Attorney and Counselor
P.O. Box 8974
Boise, ID 83707
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Tax ID #82-0502363

INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL
IMAGING, LLP
POST OFFICE BOX 8359
BOISE, IDAHO 83707

ST. ALPHONSUS
mE: 0067-003

NOVEMBER 30, 1998
BALANCE DUE: $225.00

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
11/11/98

. Review message from Dr. Giles regarding draft outline of letter of intent for
downtown imaging center, review outline; discussion with him endorsing it as
drafted.
·

11/16/98

Review edited version of draft outline of letter of intent; discussion with Dr.
Giles regarding revision from first draft.

~

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

I _

___;;.a.;;;.3.;;;.o_ _

GSRRP001501

002145
0830-0001

CARL W. HARDER
Attorney and CoWlselor
P.O. Box 8974

Boise, ID 83 707
Telephone: (208} 331-9200
Tax ID #82-0502363

MR.l ASSOCIATES
POST OFFICE BOX 8359
BOISE, ID 83 707

SAINT ALPHONSUS RADIOLOGISTS
FILE: 0005-025
FEBRUARY 1, 1999
BALANCE DUE: $0.00

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
01/25/99 ·

Attend meeting of committee of Board of Partners ofMRI Associates to review
tenns by which Saint Alphonsus radiologists would become general partner in
MRl Associates and by which MRI Associates would acquire equity position in
MRl portion of radiologists' new imaging center.·

01/26/99

Discussions with Dr. Curran and Jeff Cliff to follow up details of January 25
meeting; draft portions of Joint Operations Proposal memorandum setting forth
tenns for Saint Alphonsus radiologists to become investor in MRl Associates
and for MRl Associates to become investor in MR.l portion of radiologists's
new imaging center.

01/27/99

Complete discussion draft of Joint Operation Proposal, including discussion
with Dr. Curran, for dispatch to members of committee of Board of Partners..

01/28/99

Attend meeting of committee of Board of Partners to review and further
develop tenns for transactions contemplated in Joint Operations Proposal.

01/29/99

Revise Joint Operations Proposal to reflect discussion at January 28 meeting, in
preparation for February 3 meeting.

TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $1,875.00
LESS RETAINER DISCOUNT: $187.50
NET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $1;687.50

I

NET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES PAID FROM RETAINER: $1,687.50

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

.I -----833

033766

002146

0833-0001

CARL W. HARDER
Attorney and Counselor
P.O. Box 8974
Boise, ID 83707
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Tax ID #82-0502363

MRI ASSOCIATES
POST OFFICE BOX 8359
BOISE, ID 83707

SAINT ALPHONSUS RADIOLOGISTS
FILE: 0005-025
NOVEMBER 1, 1999
BALANCE DUE: $0.00

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
10/07/99

Discussion with Dr. Curran regarding further refinements to Section 3.2 of
Joint Operations Proposal, regarding the buy-out agreement between MRI
Associates and SARG, to add triggering event if composition of SARG changes
significantly in any twelve-month period; further revise Section 3.2 to
incorporate Dr. Curran's final thoughts and dispatch to him and to Dr.
Prochaska for his review; further discussion with Dr. Curran to learn of further
revisions he and Dr. Prochaska desire to Section 3.2; make those revisions and
dispatch to Dr. Curran at the Center for their final review.

10/18/99

Draft further refinements to September 30 version of Joint Operations Proposal,
following discussion with Dr. CutTan, and incorporate all October revisions
into October 18 draft of Proposal.

10/21/99

Discussion with Dr. Prochaska regarding covenants against competition with
SARG internal agreements and how MRl Associates could be left with an
agreement with radiologists not of its choice, requiring further revisions to
recently proposed language for Joint Operations Proposal.

10/26/99

Draft further refinements to Section 3.2 of Proposal and new Section 3.6
overriding any covenant against competition contained with SARG internal
agreements.

10/27/99

Review with Dr. Curran the collective effect ofthe revisions this month to
Section 3 of Joint Oper!itions Proposal, prepare separate compilation of latest
language for Section 3, including Sections 3.1 through 3.6, and dispatch to Dr.
Curran.

TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $787.50

PLAINTIFF'S
•

EXHIBIT
849

~--

040477

002147

0849-0001

CARL W. HARDER
Attorney and Counselor
P.0. Box 8974
Boise, ID 83707
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Tax ID #82-0502363

MRl ASSOCIATES
POST OFFICE BOX 8359
BOISE, ID 83707

SAINT ALPHONSUS RADIOLOGISTS
FILE: 0005-025
OCTOBER 1, 1999
BALANCE DUE: $0.00

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
09/16/99

Discussion with Dr. Curran regarding further revisions to Joint Operations
Proposal regarding proposed Joint Venture for MRI services at Saint Alphonsus
radiologists' downtown Boise imaging center, review his revisions to June 16
draft of Proposal; revise Proposal for distribution to Drs. Curran and Prochaska
on Friday. [1.75]

09/17/99

Discussion with Dr. Curran regarding today's draft of Joint Operations
Proposal; prepare distribution draft of Proposal based upon Dr. Curran's
comments for full distribution to both parties, and dispatch to Drs. Curran and
Prochaska. [1.25]

09124199

Meet with committee ofMRI Board of Partners to review issues in proposed
Joint Venture. [2.00)

09/29/99

Prepare marked version of further draft of Joint Operations Proposal, based
upon our draft of September 17 and comments derived from September 24
meeting, and distribute to Dr. Curran for his preliminary review. [1.25)

09/30/99

Complete distribution draft of Joint Operations Proposal, after incorporating
Dr. Curran's comments on September 29 preliminary draft. (1.00]

TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $1,087.50
LESS RETAINER DISCOUNT: $108.75
NET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $978.75

I

NET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES PAID FROM RETAINER: $978.75

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

I ----848

033754

002148
0848-0001

CONFIDENTIAL

CARL W. HARDER
Attorney and Counselor
P.O. Box 8974
Boise, ID 83707
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Tax ID #82-0502363

IMAGING CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP
POST OFFICE BOX 8359
BOISE, IDAHO 83707

PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
FILE: 0124-001
APRIL 1) 1999
BALANCE DUE: $0.00

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
03/23/99.

Discussion with Dr. Abello about two revisions to proposed interim Partnership
Agreement for Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP, as set out in his March 12
Memorandum; prepare corresponding revisions.

03/31/99

Prepare First Amendment to interim Partnership Agreement to include addition
of Dr. Scales as partner, based upon tenns set out in Dr. Abello's March 25
Memorandum and subsequent discussions with him and Jeff Cliff about
specific terms.

TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $225.00
LESS RETAINER DISCOUNT: $25.00
NET PROFESSiONAL SERVICES: $200.00
CLIENT CHARGES:
03/11/99

Idaho Secretary of State-Filing fee for Application for Registration of Limited
Liability Partnership: $100.00

TOTAL CLIENT CHARGES: $100.00
NET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AND TOTAL CLIENT CHARGES PAlD FROM
RE.T AINER: $300.00

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
837
GSRRP001517

002149
0837-0001

CONFIDENTIAL

CARL W. HARDER
Attorney and Counselor
P.O. Box 8974
Boise, ID 83707
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Tax ID #82-0502363

INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC
POST OFFICE BOX 8359
BOISE, IDAHO 83707

US BANK FINANCING
FILE: 0160-003
SEPTEMBER 1, 1999
BALANCE DUE: $637.50

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
08/19/99

Prepare letter from LLC to Ridgley Denning of US Bank regarding the status of
negotiations by Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC with Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center, Inc. and MRI Associates to become members in LLC
for independent imaging center~ based upon form ofletter she has proposed;
discussion with Dr. Giles after his revieW' of proposed letter; make minor
revisions of letter before submitting it to him for signature; and dispatch of
letter to her.

08/23/99

Discussion with Ridgley Denning regarding the August 19letter and additional
statements she would like to have included.

08/24/99

Review Ridgley Denning's proposed revisions to August 19letter; discussion
with her about some of them and how those revisions can be stated for clarity
and accuracy; draft revisions to letter for review with Dr. Giles; dispatch
revised letter to her.

TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $637.50

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
846

GSRRP001594

002150

0846-0001

CONFIDENTIAL

CARL W. HARDER
Attorney and Counselor
P.O. Box 8974
Boise, ID 83707
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Tax ID #82..:0502363

IMAGING CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP
POST OFFICE BOX 8359
BOISE, IDAHO 83707

PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
FILE: 0124-001
MARCH 1, 1999
BALANCE DUE: $0.00

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
02/18/99

Discussion with Dr. Abello about preparing interim Partnership Agreement for
Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP, using originally proposed Partnership
Agreement for Intennountain Medical Imaging, LLP as a point of departure,
including specific discussion of no buy-out during first 12 months of
operations; review proposed Partnership Agreement to delete all but key
provisions.

02/23/99

Complete proposed interim Partnership Agreement materials for dispatch to Dr.
Abello on February 24.

02/25/99

Discussion with Dr. Abello and review fax from him about further
simplification ·of interim Partnership Agreement and further integration with
governing provisions of Saint Alphonsus Radiology Group, LLP.

02/27/99

Complete second distribution draft of interim Partnership Agreement, for
delivery to Dr. Abello on March 1.

T.OTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $450.00
LESS RETAINER DISCOUNT: $45.00
NET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $405.00

INET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES PAID FROM RETAINER: $405.00
PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

I ----834

GSRRP001524

002151
0834-0001

CONFIDENTIAL

CARL W. HARDER
Attorney and Counselor
P.O. Box 8974
Boise, ID 83707
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Tax ID #82-0502363

IMAGING CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP
POST OFFICE BOX 8359
BOISE, IDAHO 83707

·SAINT ALPHONSUS RMC
FILE: 0124-002
AUGUST 1, 1999
BALANCE DUE: $562.50

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
07/15/99

Meet with Dr. Giles to review various decisions to be made for imaging-center
limited liability company and varying majorities that would be required to
decide those issues, following review of fax from Dr. Giles regarding those
issues.

07119/99

Review two versions ofTenn Sheet prepared by Dr. Giles as revisions to Tenn
Sheet prepared by Pat Miller regarding proposed imaging center limited
liability company and related discussions with Dr. Giles.

TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $562.50

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
844

GSRRP001732

002152
0844-0001

CARL W. HARDER
Attorney and Counselor
P .0. Box 8974

Boise, ID 83707
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Tax ID #82-0502363

MRl ASSOCIATES
POST OFFICE BOX 8359
BOISE, ID 83707

SAINT ALPHONSUS RADIOLOGISTS
FILE: 0005-025
APRIL 1, 1999
BALANCE DUE: $525.00

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
03/15/99

Review version of Joint Operations Proposal as prepared by radiologists while
meeting with Dr. Curran; extended review of radiologists' proposal following
that meeting to prepare response based upon conunents received from Dr.
Curran. [1.0]

03/18/99

Prepare preliminary draft of marked version of Joint Operations Proposal,
responding to version presented by radiologists and marked against their
proposal, for review by Dr. Curran before submission to the radiologists. [1.5]

03/19/99

Complete distribution draft of Joint Operations Proposal for submission to
radiologists, marked against their proposal, after receiving Dr. Curran's
comments about draft submitted to him for review earlier today. [1.0)

TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $525.00

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
836
033763

002153

0836-0001

CARL W. HARDER
Attorney and Counselor
P.O. Box 8974
Boise, ID 83707
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Tax ID #82-0502363

MRI ASSOCIATES
POST OFFICE BOX 8359
BOISE, ID 83707

SAINT ALPHONSUS RADIOLOGISTS
FILE: 0005-025
JULY 1, 1999
BALANCE DUE: $0.00

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
06/08/99

regarding May 3 draft of Joint Operations
Discussion with Milt Kutsurelis
I
Proposal and provide him with copy of it.

06/15/99

Prepare marked version of preliminary draft of Joint Operations Proposal,
based upon our draft of May 3 and the radiologists' responses of May 3 and
May 18, based upon discussion with Dr. Curran.

06/16/99

Prepare Issues term sheet based upon information supplied by Dr. Curran;
discussions with him to review proposed Joint Operations Proposal and Issues
term sheet; revise Joint Operations Proposal and create second version oflssues
term sheet for distribution to MRJ Board and radiologists;

TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $525.00
LESS RETAINER DISCOUNT: $52.50
NET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $472.50

INET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES PAID FROM RETAINER: $472.50

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
841

040458

002154

0841-0001

CONFIDENTIAL

CARL W. HARDER
Attorney and Counselor
P.O. Box 8974
Boise, ID 83707
Telephone: (208) 331-9200
Tax ID #82-0502363

IMAGING CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP
POST OFFICE BOX 8359
BOISE, IDAHO 83707

SAINT ALPHONSUS RMC
FILE: 0124-002
JULY 1,1999
BALANCE DUE: $0.00

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
06/14/99

Meet with Executive Committee ofRadiologists and representatives of Saint
Alphonsus regarding tenns of proposed joint venture between radiologists and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for new imaging center. [4.00]

TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $600.00
LESS RETAINER DISCOUNT: $60.00
NET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $540.00

INET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES pAID FROM RETAINER: $540.00

•J

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

_
842_
GSRRP001733

002155
0842-0001

CONFIDENTIAL

CARL W. HARDER
Attorney and Counselor
P.O. Box 8974
Boise, ID 83707
Telephone: (208) 331·9200
Tax ID #82-0502363
i·

IMAGING CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP
POST OFFICE BOX 8359
BOISE, IDAHO 83707

SAINT ALPHONSUS RMC
FILE: 0124·002
1UNE 1,1999
BALANCE DUE: $0.00

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
05/06/99

05/11/99

Review proposed tenns ofjoint venture between radiologists and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for new imaging center to prepare for
meeting with Dr. Giles; meet with Dr. Giles to assist him in preparing
presentation about components of Operating Agreement for limited liability
company to implement joint venture, including matters that might require
more than a majority decision by the members.
_Review proposed Outline for imaging center limited liability company for
independent imaging center.

TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $300.00
LESS RETAINER DISCOUNT: $30.00
NET PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: $270.00
'-'NE_T_P_R_O_FE_S_S_IO_N_AL
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PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
840

GSRRP001734

002156
0840-0001
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Radiologists Creates IMI
Dr. Giles leads the Radiologists'. effort to create new independent imaging center
July-August 1998
Radiologists
purchase $950,000
building

August 20 1 1998
Drs. Giles, Traughber,
and Hall inform Saint Al's

March 1998
Radiologists begin
planning to create
a new imaging
center

October 22 1 1998
Radiologists/MRIA/Saint Al's
agree at MRIA Met tingto
pursue parallel ne! otiations

March 1998
Radiologists
begin planning
to create new
center
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August 19, 1998
MRIA votes to
extend to 2023

'

July2001

September 1999
IMI Opens

logists
on Nonon of IMI

Ezoo1

September 1999
IMI opens with no
agreement completed
. with either MRIA (MRI)
or Saint Al's (non-MRI)

I

.

l

I
April2004
SaintAI's
withdraws from
MRIA

~
~
Pia inti IT's
Exhibit
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MRIA and the Radiologists and Carl Harder
West Valley

5°/o

@ Saint Alphonsus
27.5%

Mercy
17.5%

Carl Harder,

CONTRACT
for
Radiology
Services

Attorney

Plain till's
Exhibit
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Giles Plans for a New Imaging Center
March -August 1998
Giles ~tjdthb_!{~diologists plan_a new imaging_ center
March 2
"a meeting Thursday...
an Independent
Imaging Center."
Signed:
"David Giles"
March 11
"a few possible
properties in the
downtown area ... "
Initialed: "DG"

August 17
"building purchase
closed at 1:00 PM
today. " "Dr. Giles ...
to discuss what is to
be said to Sandra ... "
Initialed: "DG"

July 20
"Dr. Giles would like to get
through the next MRI meeting
before Sandra Bruce has
knowledge ..." Initialed "DG"

May13
"Dr. Giles expressed his
feeling of urgency ... now
was the time to open an
Imaging Center."
Initialed: "DG"

July 6
"Dr. Giles again stressed ...
confidentiality." "Carl Harder feels
very comfortable representing the
group ... Dr. Giles feels ... a
confidential discussion with Dr.
Prochaska ..." Initialed "DG"

Mayll
"Dr. Giles stated that if
the imaging center is not
built now, it most likely
will not happen ... "
Initialed: "DG"

L

August20
Giles and
Radiologists
disclose plans for
imaging center to
Sandra Bruce.

August 5
"Dr. Giles
would like to
open as quickly
as possible ..."
Initialed "DG"

00

00

(j)

M

~

~

~

t

f;--------,
iMarch 18
f"No further
~business"
~Signed:

jDavid J. Giles

AprillS
MRIA retains Carl
Harder, Esq.
"No further
business."
Signed:
, David J. Giles

I
I

l

Ii
I

J

j

!

~

~

~!---------,
~May20

~"No further

Ibusiness"
~Signed:

IDavid J. Giles

June 17
Harder
attends.
I"No further
business."
Signed:
IDavid. J. Giles
~Carl

I

July 16
"Carl Harder
treviewed
!noncompete."
!"Discussion re
llRadiologists]
linterest... " "no
further business"
Signed:
David J. Giles

!

I

i---------,
\

l
l

I
!

j
1

!

!

¥August 19
!"Motion was... -~,
!approved to
1
iextend
term ... to!;
I
~December 31,
!
~2023 ..." "No
!
~further business."l
1
isigned:
jDavid J. Giles
t

'
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Giles Plans for a New Imaging Center
March -August 1998
plan a new imaging center

March 2
"a meeting Thursday ... an
Independent Imaging Center."
Signed:
"David Giles"

Mav11
"Dr. Giles stated that if the
imaging center is not built now,
it most likely will not happen ... "
Initialed: "DG"

March 11
"a few possible properties in
the downtown area ... "
Initialed: "DG"

May13
"Dr. Giles expressed his
feeling of urgency ...
now was the time to
open an Imaging
Center."
lntialled: "DG"

00
00

m

rl

I
i

~

i>
~

li------------------~

I

!

~·----------------------~
~April15

~March 18

~MRIA retains Carl Harder, Esq.

Signed:
!David
J. Giles
•J

I"No further business."
lsigned:
ioavid J. Giles

~~-"No further business"

~

tMay 20
rNo further business"
jSigned:
!David J. Giles
[
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Giles Plans for a New Imaging Center
March -August 1998
Giles and the Radiologists plan a new imaging center
July 6
"Dr. Giles again stressed ...
confidentiality ."
"Carl Harder feels very
comfortable representing
the group ... Dr. Giles
feels ... a confidential
discussion with Dr.
Prochaska ... "
Initialed "DG"
00
00

(j)
~

June

July 20
"Dr. Giles would like to
get through the next
MRI meeting before
Sandra Bruce has
knowledge ... "
Initialed "DG"

August 17
"building purchase closed at
1:00 PM today. u "Dr. Giles ...
to discuss what is to be said to
Sandra ... " Initialed: uDG"
August 5
"Dr. Giles would like to
open as quickly as
possible ..."
Initialed "DG"

August 20
Giles and
Radiologists
disclose plans for
imaging center to
Sandra Bruce.

;:'1111

f:

i

~

l

I

$"-------------:
~

!June 17
karl Harder attends.
I
f'No further business."
(Signed:
tDavid. J. Giles

I

t-------------------~

puly 16
~"Carl Harder reviewed
!noncompete." "Discussion ,
Ire [Radiologists] interest..."
rNo further business"
~
~Signed:
1
~David J. Giles
1

!

ij

!August 19
11
Motion was ... approved to
!extend term ... to December 31,
!2023 ... " "No further business."
!signed:
loavid
J. Giles
!

!

l'laintifr$
Exhibit
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Carl Harder's Dual Role in 1999 Negotiations
Advising Radiologists Concerning Joint Venture with Saint Al's
Novemberll
"Discussion with [Dr.
Giles] endorsing [letter
of Intent] as drafted"
"Dr. Giles will present
this outline to Cindy
s :hamp."

May6, 11
"Review ... terms of JV
between radiologists and
[St. Al's] for new imaging
center ... meet with Dr.
Giles.

I

November 16
"discussion with Dr. Giles
. . . revision from [Letter
of Intent]."

June 14
"Meet with Executive Committee
of Radiologists and [St. Al's]
regarding ... JV .. .for new
imaging center.''

April30
"Review ... terms of JV
between radiologists and [St.
Al's] for new imaging center .
.. discussion with Dr. Giles."

July 15
"Meet with Dr. Giles to review
various decisions ... for new
imaging center ... "

November 6. 8
"Comprehensive
review ... JV with
[St. Al's] .. .
Discussion with Dr.
Giles ... Saint
Alphonsus
component ..."

-i

January 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
"Attend meeting of
committee ... discussions
with Dr. Curran ...
complete discussion draft
of Joint Operations
Proposal."

~-,
~June 8, 15, 16

I~

~---------·----'
~March 15, 18. 19

'"Review version ...
~prepared by radiologists
~while meeting with Dr.
~Curran;" "Complete
~distribution draft of Joint ~
w
'·
• Operations Proposal.
.." '
....
~.

_,.

----..:}

:j "Discussion with Milt i
.
.
I
Kutsurehs ... Jomt
t i;
~Operations Proposal .. ·( ~
i! discussion with Dr.
i r,

,,
~

~Curran."

~-

.

...

~·~- ~·--·""}

SOctober 7, 18, Zl, 26, 27

~ .. Joint Operations Proposal. f
~ Discussion with Dr.
l
• Proc has ka... "
iI

I

..

:&.~.-..~...A<-=~-'~"""""""""""""'-J

I~~--··-·--~·

·--' :1September 16. 17, 24. 29,30
"Discussion with Dr. Curran . . .
proposed JV for MRI services at [Rads']
imaging center ... revise proposal for
.. Drs. Curran and Prochaska ... Meet
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~"Discussion with Dr. Curran .

~

July 28
Ridgley Denning
Letter: "Funding is
subject to
satisfactory
documentation ..."

August 19
August 19
Carl Harder prepares
Giles' first letter
letter "... based on form to Ridgley
of letter Ridgley Denning Denning
1----------'
has proposed ... discussion
with Dr. Giles after his
review ... submit it to him
for signature ... dispatch of
letter to her."

'

August 18
Loan Agreement: Requires
"documentation
satisfactory to lender. .."
Augu: t 10
Draft etter
faxed from Cliff
to Ha rder

August 23
Carl Harder:
uoiscussion
with Ridgley
Denning re: ...
additional
statements
she would
like ... "
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Giles Letters To Obtain Radiologists' Loan
August 1999
August 24
Radiologists meeting:
"MRIA Board would like to
own the MRI portion ...
group feels strongly this is
not an acceptable option"
Carl Harder: "Review
Ridgley Denning's
proposed revisions ... draft
revisions ... for review with
Dr. Giles; dispatch revised
letter to Her."
Giles second letter to
Ridgley Denning.

I

August 30
Loan funds releas ed
to Radiologists
-

-

--~---
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup. com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com
BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup. com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE
TO PREVENT SAINT ALPHONSUS
FROM ARGUING THAT ATTORNEY
CARL HARDER ENGAGED IN
INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT

v.
MRl ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership,
Defendant.
MRl ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership; MRl LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho
Limited Partnership; and MRl MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT ALPHONSUS
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

UPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE TO PREVENT SAINT ALPHONSUS FROM ARGUING THAT
TTORNEY CARL HARDER ENGAGED IN INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT- 1

.
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MOTION
On August 30, 2011, MRIA filed a Motion in Limine to Prevent Saint Alphonsus from
Arguing that Dr. David Giles or Attorney Carl Harder Engaged in Inappropriate Conduct. With
respect to Mr. Harder, MRIA argued that Saint Alphonsus should be prevented from arguing that
Mr. Harder had a conflict of interest because of his dual representation of GSR and MRIA. Saint
Alphonsus should be so prevented, as outlined in MRIA's original motion. However, in
addition, Saint Alphonsus should also be prevented from arguing that because of Mr. Harder's
joint representation of the parties, MRIA actually knew or should have known the actions,
opinions, and positions taken by GSR. Such an inference is not supported by the evidence and
runs a substantial risk of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. I.R.E. 401, 402, and 403.
A Memorandum in Support follows below. MRIA requests that this supplemental motion be
heard prior to opening statements.

MEMORANDUM
The late Mr. Harder was an attorney who represented both GSR and MRIA. It is
believed that Saint Alphonsus may attempt to argue in opening statement and at trial that because
the Mr. Harder represented both GSR and MRIA during the time when the parties were
investigating and negotiating a potential partnership with one another, MRIA actually knew or
should have known the actions and positions taken by GSR and Saint Alphonsus in their
negotiations with each other. As the Court said at the pretrial conference ofthis matter, it will
allow reference to evidence in opening that has a good-faith basis for admission at trial. Saint
Alphonsus should not be permitted to argue this position in opening statement or present
evidence on the same because it is not supported by the evidence and runs a substantial risk of
confusing the issues or misleading the jury.
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE TO PREVENT SAINT ALPHONSUS FROM ARGUING THAT
ATTORNEY CARL HARDER ENGAGED IN INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT- 2
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Mr. Harder passed away in 2002, and so we cannot ask him about his decision to
represent both GSR and MRIA. As noted in MRIA's original motion, the possibility that this
may have been a conflict of interest is irrelevant (and is not Saint Alphonsus's argument to
make.) Regardless, as this Court is well aware, the ethical rules would have prevented Mr.
Harder from communicating the information he knew related to his representation of GSR to
MRIA, regardless of the fact that he also represented MRIA. As Idaho Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.6 provides, subject to a few narrow exceptions, a lawyer shall not reveal information
related to the representation of a client. Saint Alphonsus has indicated its intent to argue that the
evidence raises the inference that Mr. Harder nevertheless informed MRIA about the thoughts,
positions, and actions taken by GSR because he represented both parties. There is no evidence
whatsoever that he actually did so. For the jury to infer otherwise would require Saint
Alphonsus to argue that Mr. Harder breached his ethical obligations to GSR by disclosing
information related to his representation of GSR to MRIA.
Saint Alphonsus' s argument is based entirely on impugning the ethical reputation of a
lawyer who is not able to defend himself because he is deceased. As such, it is of little, if any,
probative value. Furthermore, any such probative value is vastly outweighed by the Rule 403
dangers of confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. This argument would require
instructing the jury on the ethical responsibilities oflawyers, and would result in a mini-trial
about whether Mr. Harder did in fact breach those ethical responsibilities by communicating the
confidential information of GSR to MRIA. Or, if the jury was not instructed about the ethical
responsibilities oflawyers, the jury might incorrectly believe that nothing at all was stopping Mr.
Harder from disclosing GSR's secrets to MRIA, and that he likely did so. Either way, the

SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE TO PREVENT SAINT ALPHONSUS FROM ARGUING THAT
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argument is misleading, not supported by evidence, and has nothing do with the merits of the
case, but instead focuses the jury on an utterly tangential issue (and again, an issue that is not
Saint Alphonsus's to raise). It is also an attempt to paint MRIA in a poor light without any
evidentiary basis for doing so, by implying that MRIA was in possession of (or even had
solicited the disclosure of) information it ought not have. This argument runs a serious risk of
misleading the jury about the nature of attorney obligations and misdirecting its attention to
unsupported, inflammatory issues of dubious relevance. As such, Saint Alphonsus should be
prevented from presenting these arguments and the related exhibits in opening statement, and
should likewise be prevented from presenting such evidence at trial.
DATED this 31st day of August 2011.

BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

J::?~~~
Dara L. P rker
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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'
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of August 2011, a true and correct copy ofthe within
and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

}(!<"acsimile

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
~Facsimile

SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE TO PREVENT SAINT ALPHONSUS FROM ARGUING THAT
ATTORNEY CARL HARDER ENGAGED IN INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT- 5

002168

AUG 3 1 2011
JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH C/ k
By ELYSHIA HOLMES'
CEPUTY

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
VS.

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO
EXCLUDE ADDITIONAL MRIA
DEMONSTRATIVES

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE ADDITIONAL MRIA DEMONSTRATIVES- 1
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er

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
VS.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
Counsel for Saint Alphonsus learned late on Tuesday, August 30, 2011 that MRIA
counsel have not disclosed all of their proposed demonstrative exhibits as directed by the Court,
and plan not to do so. Rather, MRIA counsel's plan is to "build" visual displays oftimeline
exhibits spontaneously as the trial proceeds, long after this Court's August 26, 2011 deadline for
exchange of demonstrative exhibits between the parties, and without any disclosure to Saint
Alphonsus counsel prior to display in Court, perhaps as early as during opening statement but
certainly during examination of witnesses. This is contrary to this Court's order and should not
be permitted.
During the telephone pretrial conference held on August 9, 2011, the Court ordered that
the parties exchange demonstrative exhibits simultaneously on Friday, August 26. On that day,
Saint Alphonsus counsel received from MRIA some 40 pages of proposed demonstrative
exhibits. Certain of these demonstratives were puzzling for their content, or lack of same. To
take the extreme example, one of these demonstratives is simply a blank horizontal line. See

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE ADDITIONAL MRIA DEMONSTRATIVES- 2

002170

Exhibit A, attached hereto. Others have horizontal lines with a period of months called out, but
no other content. See Exhibit B. Still others have the horizontal line divided into a period of
months, plus a provocative banner headline, but no other content. See, e.g. Exhibit C "SARMC
Conduct 7/2/01-9/30/03" and Exhibit D "SARMC Conduct January 2000-July 1, 2001." A
single one of these demonstratives bears the headline "Exemplar" and cites a single document
along a horizontal timeline. Exhibit E.
Late on Tuesday, August 30, MRIA counsel explained to us that the "Exemplar"
represents a sample of the type of entries that MRIA plans to add to these demonstrative exhibits
only later, as the trial proceeds. Citing his right not to disclose his opening statement in advance,
MRIA counsel refused to identify for us which of his demonstratives, whether disclosed last
week or of this new "Exemplar" type, he planned to use in opening statement. 1 But counsel did
confirm his intention to construct such additional demonstrative exhibits as the trial proceeds,
including live during examination of witnesses, and thus without any advance disclosure to
opposing counsel, let alone disclosure by this Court's August 26 deadline.
Counsel's only justification for this approach was his assertion that these new time lines
would "merely" be non-argumentative representations of documents that are already admitted,
or are expected in good faith to be admitted, into evidence. Of course, that is the very definition
of the only legitimate purpose for demonstrative exhibits, and those were directed by the Court to

1

On August 3I, 20 II, MRIA provided a list of 7I trial exhibits it might use during its opening, and
repeated its intention to create a new, undisclosed timeline before the jury at that time.
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be exchanged last week, eleven days before trial. Counsel's attempt to ignore that deadline,
whether for his own convenience, or to achieve surprise at trial, should not be permitted.

CONCLUSION
MRIA's counsel should be limited to use of those demonstrative exhibits disclosed on
August 26, 2011, and only where such demonstratives are not further limited by Court order in
the event of further specific objections by Saint Alphonsus counsel.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 31st day of August, 2011.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 31st day of August, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

g/
D

D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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Exhibit A
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Exhibit B
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Exhibit C
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Exhibit D
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Exhibit E
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION
TO MRIA'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE
TOPREVENTARGUMENTTHAT
GILES AND HARDER ENGAGED IN
INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT

Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE TO PREVENT
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
On the incorrect premise that Saint Alphonsus intends to use certain timely disclosed
demonstrative exhibits in opening statement, 1 MRIA has elected to occupy the time of the Court
and of counsel in the last days before trial begins with a "Motion in Limine to Prevent Saint
Alphonsus from Arguing that Dr. David Giles or Attorney Carl Harder Engaged in Inappropriate
Conduct" (the "MRIA Motion") and a "Supplemental" motion covering the same ground. MRIA
says that it seeks to "prevent arguments or evidence that Dr. Giles or Mr. Harder engaged in
misconduct" on the grounds that such would be "irrelevant" and in the case of Mr. Harder,
inadmissible hearsay.
Contrary to MRIA's arguments, as explained below, the facts that are faithfully depicted
on the challenged exhibits are squarely relevant to the claims and disputes in this case.
1

The Court ordered the parties to disclose all demonstrative exhibits- not just those to be used in opening
statement- no later than August 26, 20 II, and Saint Alphonsus complied with that order. Saint Alphonsus plans to
use the demonstrative exhibits, Nos. 904A-C and 905, in the presentation of its evidence and in closing argument. It
has never intended to use these exhibits in opening statement.
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I.

Exhibits 904A-C: Dr. Giles' role in 1998 is integral to the facts ofthis case.
Exhibits 904A-C depict the following facts by strict reference to or quotation of the

minutes of meetings of the Radiologists and MRIA:
In 1998, Dr. David Giles was "a radiologist who was a founding partner in MRIA, which
was formed in 1985," as a for-profit business to operate the MRI scanner within Saint Alphonsus
Hospital. MRIA Motion at 3. In addition to being a partner in MRIA, and a leader among the
five physicians who controlled MRIA, Dr. Giles was also "a member," indeed the elected leader,
ofGSR, the radiologists' partnership, "until he was asked to leave GSR in mid-2000." MRIA
Motion at 3. GSR was the group of Radiologists (the "Radiologists"), who were under contract
with Saint Alphonsus, with the exclusive right and obligation to provide radiological services to
the hospital.
Minutes of meetings ofthe Radiologists' group-initialed by Dr. Giles as head of the
group-show that between March and August, 1998, Dr. Giles urged the Radiologists to launch
an independent, for-profit imaging center, which later came to be called "IMI," in which Giles
and his fellow Radiologists became investors? The minutes show that this was planned in
secret, and apparently undisclosed to most other partners in MRIA, but above all undisclosed to
Saint Alphonsus? This multi-modality facility had the potential to drain patients from both

2

See Saint Alphonsus Ex. 516 (GSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes) ("Dr. Giles stated that ifthe
Imaging Center is not built now, it is most likely that it will not happen ... ")
3

See Saint Alphonsus Ex. 520 (GSR Minutes) ("Dr. Giles again stressed the importance of confidentiality
regarding this matter ... Dr. Giles raised the question as to how news of the Center should be presented to the MRI
Board and Doctors Corp.")
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MRIA and from Saint Alphonsus's radiology department. The minutes show that Dr. Giles
delayed disclosure until after the Radiologists had purchased a building for $950,000, and
thereby passed the point of no return in their venture. 4
During the same period of time, minutes of meetings of the MRIA Board-also signed by
Giles as a board member of MRIA and as an officer of MRIA partner DMR-also confirm by
omission that Saint Alphonsus and other MRIA Board members were not informed of the
Radiologists' plans for a competing imaging center, neither by Dr. Giles himself, nor by Carl
Harder, a regular counsel to MRIA who was also hired by Giles and the Radiologists to represent
them in their new venture. This was true even at meetings that discussed in other respects the
Radiologists, and the non-compete obligations applicable to MRIA.
Eventually at a meeting of the Radiologists on July 20, 1998, Giles instructed his fellow
Radiologists that "Dr. Giles would like to get through the next MRI meeting before Sandra Bruce

[CEO of Saint Alphonsus] has knowledge of the center," i.e., the plans for IMI. That next MRIA
Board meeting would occur on August 19. Two days before that, on August 17, the Radiologists
closed on the purchase of their building. At their meeting on August 19, Giles and the rest of the
MRIA Board voted to extend the term of the MRIA partnerships to 2023 - without awareness, at
least on the part of Saint Alphonsus - that Giles and two other Radiologists would announce to
Sandra Bruce their plans for a competing imaging center on the very next day.

4

See Saint Alphonsus Ex. 572 (Radiologists Executive Committee Minutes) (stating that the "building
[purchase] closed at I :00 pm today ... Dr. Giles will meet with Jeffto discuss what is to be said to Sandra [Bruce,
CEO of Saint Alphonsus] and how to present it.")
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By prior appointment that they had sought days in advance for August 20, Giles and two
fellow Radiologists shocked Sandra Bruce with the news that they planned to go into business
ofiering imaging services already provided either by Saint Alphonsus directly or through MRIA.
Giles and the Radiologists sought Saint Alphonsus's financial backing and partnership in their
venture, but made plain that they had purchased a building and that there was no turning back.
Either Saint Alphonsus would find a way to partner with the Radiologists, or the Radiologists
would compete aggressively against the Hospital.
The entire remainder of this case - and MRIA' s claims against Saint Alphonsus - all
concern Saint Alphonsus's struggles after August 20, 1998 to fashion arrangements that would
somehow combine the efforts ofMRIA, the Radiologists' new imaging center IMI, and Saint
Alphonsus. The events of the case cannot be understood except in this context: Because
Dr. Giles-an MRIA partner-deliberately kept Saint Alphonsus in the dark until after positions
and financial commitments had hardened, the Hospital was denied the flexibility that would have
existed at the planning stages to reconcile the aspirations and financial interests of all of MRIA,
the Radiologists, and Saint Alphonsus. When asked to consider attacks on Saint Alphonsus's
"good faith" and "fair dealing" and "breach of fiduciary duty" in the manner that it performed its
responsibilities after August 20, the jury must understand these integral facts. That is especially
true when it considers that Dr. Giles now appears as a protagonist in this lawsuit, in his role as
MRIA partner, suing Saint Alphonsus for its responses to the dilemma created by Giles' six
months of secret planning and his August 20, 1998 disclosure. Dr. Giles was questioned about
these events extensively during the first trial, and they remain relevant now.
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II. Exhibit 905: Carl Harder's role in 1999 as attorney for two parties to negotiations negates any
non-disclosure by Saint Alphonsus
The August 20, 1998 disclosure led to a formal presentation, on October 22, 1998, to the
MRIA Board by the Radiologists about their plans for an independent imaging center. The
MRIA partners unanimously resolved to move forward with two parallel negotiations: one
between MRIA and the Radiologists to attempt to combine in some fashion with respect to
provision of MRI services at the new center, and a second negotiation between Saint Alphonsus
and the Radiologists to partner with respect to all other imaging modalities (the "Non-MRI"
portion) of the new center.
A central element ofMRIA's story is that Saint Alphonsus somehow exploited its
separate negotiation with the Radiologists to frustrate MRIA's opportunity to partner with the
Radiologists at the time that IMI was formed, and to secretly usurp that opportunity for itself.
Indeed, at this trial, this is not just a factual allegation on which MRIA centrally relies, but it is
also the basis of an entirely new damages theory offered by its experts based on alleged
"usurpation."
That contention secret plot between Saint Alphonsus and the Radiologists is squarely
rebutted by the fact that MRIA's counsel in its negotiations with the Radiologists, Carl Harder,
Esq., was also counsel to the Radiologists in their negotiations with Saint Alphonsus. MRIA's
legal counsel was thus known by all to be privy to every detail of the discussions that went on
between Saint Alphonsus and the Radiologists over a period of several years. Given that fact, it
is fanciful to claim that the Saint Alphonsus/Radiologists negotiations were plot to injure MRIA
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that was carefully kept secret from it. That this supposed secret was known in detail to MRIA's
lawyer is directly relevant to this case.
More specificaily, the evidence will show that Carl Harder had represented the five
doctor-partners (Drs. Curran, Giles, Havlina, Henson and Prochaska) all the way back at the
formation ofMRIA in 1985, which led to his role as a regular outside counsel to MRIA. By
early 1999, Harder was specifically assigned by MRIA to draft the proposals and to participate in
the negotiations on behalf of MRIA opposite the Radiologists, in the discussions to achieve a
combination between them for "MRI services." This will be established not only by testimony,
but by emails between Harder and the doctors negotiating for MRIA, and by Harder's own bills,
all of which should be routinely admissible under exceptions to the hearsay rule. 5
At the same time, Harder had been engaged in mid-1998 by the Radiologists to represent
them with respect to their new imaging center. This led to his specific assignment to represent
the Radiologists in their negotiations with Saint Alphonsus, hoping to achieve some sort of
combination for "Non-MRI" services at the new center. Those negotiations eventually
concluded in an agreement for Saint Alphonsus to partner in the "non-MRI" portion ofiMI,
beginning July 31, 2001. Harder's activities in this respect will be established through testimony
and through various documents, including his statements for services to the Radiologists, which
again are routine business records.

5

Mr. Harder's untimely death in January 2002 in no way impairs the admissibility and relevance of this

evidence.
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Thus throughout 1999 and beyond, Carl Harder was uniquely well informed about the
progress of both sets of negotiations, between the Radiologists and MRIA, and between the
Radiologists and Saint Alphonsus. Ali concerned were well aware, of course, of Harder's dual
role, and accepted this. Indeed, Mr. Harder's records reflect that at various times, he discussed
aspects of one set of negotiations or the other with Dr. Giles, Dr. Curran, or others. 6 The key fact
for present purposes is that Saint Alphonsus understood that when it spoke to Carl Harder as "the
Radiologists' lawyer" concerning a proposed partnership between the Radiologists and Saint
Alphonsus, it was also speaking to "MRIA's lawyer," as Harder was for many other purposes,
including for MRIA's negotiation with the Radiologists about their combination. The jury must
know this evidence in order to realize that it is far-fetched to contend that Saint Alphonsus was
acting "in secret" from MRIA, or to convert some opportunity that properly belonged to MRIA.
Whether Carl Harder did or did not pass along to other MRIA constituents particular facts about
the Saint Alphonsus negotiations is entirely beside the point, which is that Saint Alphonsus
would not try to "hide" something from MRIA by telling it directly to MRIA's lawyer.
It should be stressed that the relevance of this evidence has nothing to do with any claim
of "conflict of interest" on Harder's part. The fact that Harder represented the Radiologists in
some respects, but was opposite them on behalf of MRIA in this negotiation, is beside the point
described above. Saint Alphonsus does not, and does not need to, make any claim that Harder's
6

See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Exhibit 849 ("10/07/99 Discussion with Dr. Curran regarding further
refinements to Section 3.2 of Joint Operations Proposal, regarding the buy-out agreement between MRI Associates
and SARG"); Exhibit 850 ("11/08/99. Discussion with Dr. Giles regarding November 3 draft of Operating
Agreement for Saint Alphonsus component oflntermountain Medical Imaging, LLC.")
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relationships with MRIA and the Radiologists (and indeed, his personal representation of some
of the five doctors, as well as the corporation through which they owned their interest in MRIA),
was somehow "improper." It is the fact that Saint Alphonsus's conduct in its dealings with the
Radiologists were all an open book, fully transparent to MRIA's longtime attorney, that negates
any inference that Saint Alphonsus was somehow acting in secret to conceal conduct unfair to
MRIA.
CONCLUSION

MRIA's "Motion in Limine to Prevent Saint Alphonsus from Arguing that Dr. David
Giles or Attorney Carl Harder Engaged in Inappropriate Conduct" and the "Supplemental"
motion in limine regarding the same should be denied in all respects.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 31st day of August, 2011.

..

GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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ORIGINAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") oppose Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Exclude Additional
MRIA Demonstratives. On August 26,2011, in keeping with the Court's order, MRIA produced
to Saint Alphonsus the templates of illustrative exhibits it was going to create for use in opening
statement. (The letter forwarding these documents is attached hereto as Exhibit A; Saint
Alphonsus attached the templates as exhibits to its motion.) As indicated by the "exemplar"
which counsel forward to Saint Alphonsus, attached as Exhibit E to Saint Alphonsus's motion,
MRIA intends to create a demonstrative timeline. On that timeline, MRIA will insert a box
identifying the following non-argumentative information: (1) the exhibit number; (2) the date
upon which the exhibit was created; and (3) a basic description of the exhibit (such as "letter
from X toY"), consistent with how the document was identified on MRIA's exhibit list. The
box will then be placed at the appropriate point of the time line. MRIA described this process
and disclosed this information to Saint Alphonsus in the August 26th letter.
Saint Alphonsus objects, apparently believing that its needs to know which exhibits
would be included on the timelines.

1

In MRIA's view, this was unnecessary, since the purpose

of demonstrative exhibit exchange is to allow opposing counsel to object to argument aspects of
the demonstrative exhibits. 2 As outlined in the "exemplar," MRIA's demonstrative exhibits will
contain no argumentative content. However, when Saint Alphonsus took the position, at a
conference on August 30th, that MRIA must disclose the exhibits referenced in opening
1

Saint Alphonsus argues, in a misleading fashion, that it "learned late on Tuesday,
August 30, 2011 that MRIA counsel have not disclosed all oftheir proposed demonstrative
exhibits." However, MRIA forwarded the blank timeline templates and exemplar to Saint
Alphonsus on August 26, 2011. (Exhibit A).
2

Saint Alphonsus's counsel is more upset that they have not been able to gather
intelligence about MRIA's opening statements, which is not the purpose of demonstrative exhibit
exchange.
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statement, MRIA' s counsel complied, sending a letter on the morning of August 31st. (Exhibit B
hereto). 3 Saint Alphonsus has all of the information that might go into these timelines: the
templates with the headings, if any, and the exhibits which might be referenced in those
timelines. Counsel for MRIA could have produced a time line which inserted each of these
possible exhibits, in the same manner as the exemplar, but this would have been a useless
exercise. Saint Alphonsus already knows the full universe of what could appear on that time line.
An exhibit is properly admissible for demonstrative purposes when the exhibit

supplements the testimony of witnesses or assists the jury in obtaining a better understanding of
facts in issue. Masters v. Dewey, 109 Idaho 576, 579, 709 P.2d 149, 152 (Ct. App. 1985). The
appropriate test is an Idaho R. Evid. 403 balancing of probative value against the dangers of
unfair prejudice, distraction, confusion of issues, and waste oftime. !d. Saint Alphonsus has not
argued that the timelines will fail to assist the jury or otherwise be irrelevant or misleading. It is
also notable that Saint Alphonsus has not argued that it is in any way prejudiced by the creation
of these timelines, and nor could it be, as these will be utterly non-argumentative representations
of documents already admitted. MRIA therefore asks the Court to permit it to present a timeline
listing the basic information about the exhibits that counsel references during his opening
argument, as it will assist the jury in understanding the evidence.
DATED this 1st day of September, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

-~·L"2~~

Dara L. Pa er
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

3

That letter is dated August 16,2011. It was actually sent on August 31, 2011.
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M2 W:B'<Hinock. Suite 500 .
Boise, 10 83702
Tel (208}342-441 1
Fax (208) 342-4455

. www.bwslawgroup.com

August 26, 2011

Via Hand Delive1y
Jack Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 West Hays St.
Boise, ID 83701
Re:

St. Alphonsus v. MRIA

Dear Jack,
I have enclosed an amended Exhibit List, a disk containing additional exhibits and a
copy of our proposed demonstrative exhibits. The timelines referenced in our demonstratives
are going to refer to exhibit numbers, dates, author, recipient and type (e.g., email, letter, etc.).
The referenced exhibits will be any document that has already been admitted or those which I
believe in good faith wilt be allowed into evidence. I have attached an exemplar for your
reference.
In addition, I have noted on your exhibit list that you have redacted previously
admitted exhibits. Please confirm that those exhibits will remain unredacted pursuant to the
Comt's order. I have also noted that you have designated and redacted some of our exhibits.
Again, some of those exhibits have been redacted pursuant to the Court's order and we will
not modify them further.

Very truly yours,

TAB:kas
cc:

Jones Day (via facsimile w/o encs.)

BANDUCCI

WOODARD

SCHWARTZMAN
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802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
Tel (208)342-4411
Fax (208) 342-4455
www.bwslawgroup.com

August 16, 2011

Via Facsimile- 202-626-1700
Peter Romatowski
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113

Re: St. Alplwnsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, I11c.
Dear Pete,
Further to our discussion yesterday afternoon, I have reconsidered and am disclosing the
exhibits I may use in my opening statement. They are exhibits 4005, 4023, 4047, 4049, 4052,
4054,4057,4059,4061,4062,4064,4066,4077,4079,4095,4102,4104,4108,4115,4116,
4125,4127,4137,4140,4141,4144,4148,4150,4155,4170,4171,4173,4176,4177,4178,
4179,4180,4182,4187,4192,4199,4209,4210,4211,4212,4215,4219,4221,4226,4229,
4231,4232,4239,4243,4246,4247,4248,4253,4277,4302,4309,4329,4315,4318,4333,
4376, 4377,4498,416, 66, 358, as well as any illustrative exhibits we discussed yesterday. Any
"non-demonstrative" exhibits will be referenced on a timeline in the format given to you last
Friday.
With respect to the illustrative exhibits, I will withdraw the exhibit that paraphrases
certain provisions of the radiology contract. I will also change the reference on the timeline for
June '99 (relating to Bruce's involvement in the parallel negotiations), however, I will not delete
it. There is evidence in the record to this effect; therefore I may make reference to it in opening.
Also, I will not change the reference to SARMC's "desire" to partner with the radiologists. This
is also supported by the evidence. (Indeed, SARMC characterized its partnering as a "strategic
imperative.'')
I am also in the process of modifying the slides referencing SARMC's relationship with
the radiologists (for your reference, the exhibit that you said "sucked"), and the diagram
referencing the conflict created by GSR's position in reading for both MRlC and IML I will
bring the modified exhibits to court on Friday.
I believe this covers what may be referenced in opening. Obviously I may have to trim
my reference to exhibits to keep the opening within a reasonable time.

BANDUCCI

WOODARD

SCHWARTZMAN
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PLLC

Peter Romatowski
August 31, 2011
Page2

Upon ftn1her consideration I will also object to your timelines to the extent that they do
not accurately quote the documents referenced. I believe that the position you have taken with
MRIA should apply to SARMC as well. If you are going to refer to a document, you may display
it. Anything else is "argument" as you define it.
I anticipate the courtesy of knowing before Friday whether you intend to modify your
illustratives in conformance with my concerns expressed herein, and during our conference on
Tuesday.

TAB:jkr
cc:

Jack Gjording
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ORIGINAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Reply in Support of their Motions in Limine
to Prevent Argument that Giles and Harder Engaged in Inappropriate Conduct. MRIA asks that
the Court prevent Saint Alphonsus from arguing or presenting evidence that Dr. David Giles
should have disclosed GSR's plans to MRIA (or Saint Alphonsus as an MRIA partner) relative

MW"•.lbat MlUA must have-·known about the actions, intentions, and plans forGSR beea~
both enti!ies were· represented by the same attorney.

A.

David Giles
As noted in MRIA's initial briefing, Dr. David Giles was a member of both GSR and

MRIA until he was asked to leave GSR in 2000. In its responsive briefing, Saint Alphonsus
confirms its intention to argue that Dr. Giles did not communicate to Saint Alphonsus (as an
MRIA partner) GSR's initial plans to open a competing imaging center. See Saint Alphonsus's
Opposition to MRIA' s Motions in Limine to Prevent Argument that Giles and Harder Engaged
in Inappropriate Conduct, p. 4 ("Giles and the rest of the MRIA Board voted to extend the term
of the MRIA partnerships to 2023 - without awareness, at least on the part of Saint Alphonsus that Giles and two other Radiologists would announce to Sandra Bruce their plans for a
competing imaging center the next day). Saint Alphonsus further confirms its intention to argue
that "because Dr. Giles- an MRIA partner- deliberately kept Saint Alphonsus in the dark until
after positions and financial commitments had hardened, the Hospital was denied ... flexibility .
. . Dr. Giles, ... in his role as MRIA partner, [is] suing Saint Alphonsus for its responses to the
dilemma created by Giles." /d. at 5.
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Boiled down to is essence, it appears that Saint Alphonsus intends to argue that Saint
Alphonsus was faced with a dilemma when GSR decided to build an imaging facility, and that
because GSR (through Dr. Giles) did not tell Saint Alphonsus about the facility sooner, Saint
Alphonsus had already passed a "point of no return" and had no choice but to engage in the
actions that MRIA deems wrongful. Saint Alphonsus has simply confirmed its intention to
mislead the jury and confuse the issues in this case. First, there is no evidence that GSR have
any duty to disclose its intentions regarding the new imaging center. Second, Saint Alphonsus
has not asset a claim against GSR for such "'breach of duty" in this case or any other case. Third,
Saint Alphonsus seems to imply that MRIA, through Dr. Gilves, was holding back critical
information from the hospital. With respect to the GSR imaging center, Dr. Giles was not and
could not have been acting as an agent of MRIA, but was acting as an agent of GSR. The jury
may confuse Dr. Giles dual roles, and improperly infer that Dr. Giles behavior can be imputed to
MRIA in all circumstances.
Perhaps more significantly, this evidence simply is not relevant. 'Fhat Saint Alphonsus
may have been faced with a "dilemma" (i.e., being a partner of MRIA but wanting a relationship
with MRIA's competitor) is not a defense to and does not excuse breaches of fiduciary duty,
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or tortious interference.
There is no "intent" element to these causes of action. Further, what Dr. Giles did or did not do
as an agent of GSR does not constitute a waiver on the part of MRIA. In short, Saint Alphonsus
has simply expressed its intention to confuse the issues and mislead the jury. As such, under
Rule 401, 402, and 403, the Court should prevent such evidence and argument.
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B.

Carl Harder
In its responsive briefing, Saint Alphonsus confirms that it does indeed intend to ativaftCe

a new argument, not argued in the previous trial or in any prior proceedings, that because
information was known to Carl Harder in the context of his representati6ft.o-f ~ tftat·aBy such
information was also known to MRIA. See Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motions in
Limine to Prevent Argument that Giles and Harder Engaged in Inappropriate Conduct, p. 6;
("[the contention that there was a] secret plot between Saint Alphonsus and the Radiologists is
squarely rebutted by the fact that MRIA's counsel ... was also counsel to the Radiologists); id
at 8 ("Carl Harder was uniquely well informed about the progress ofboth sets of negotiations ...
[t]he jury must know this evidence in order to realize that it is far-fetched to contend that Saint
Alphonsus was acting "in secret" from MRIA."); id at p. 9 ("the fact that Saint Alphonsus's
conduct in its dealing with the Radiologists were all an open boo~ fully transparent to MRIA' s
longtime attorney, that negates any inference that Saint Alphonsus was somehow acting in secret
to conceal conduct unfair to MIRA.)
When distilled, Saint Alphonsus's argument appears to be that, whenever it had
communications with Mr. Harder concerning the negotiations between Saint Alphonsus and
GSR, it believed that Mr. Harder would have also given this information to MRIA. There is no
information as to who, within the Saint Alphonsus organization, formed such a belief, and
certainly not one of Saint Alphonsus' s witnesses has testified to this belief at the prior trial or
deposition. Also, there is no evidence that Mr. Harder was informed by anyone at GSR (his
client) that he should disclose to MRIA (GSR's competitor) the substance of separate
negotiations wherein Mr. Harder was representing GSR. Moreover, there is no evidence that
Harder actually did breach his ethical duties under Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 by
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passing on information to MRIA without authorization. 1 Indeed, had this occurred, it would
have taken place at an MRIA board meeting where Saint Alphonsus's representatives were
present. The only person who could testify that he communicated any information to MRIA,
much less the subject to that information, is Mr. Harder, who is dead.
Furthermor~ Saint

Alpbonsus has expressly admitted that it will not contend that Mr.

Harder engaged in wrongful conduct - meaning that it will not disclose to the jury that the only
way that Mr. Harder could have passed this information to MRIA was if he unethically breached
his duties to GSR. This is an attempt to seriously mislead the jury. Any limited probative value
from this evidence is strongly outweighed by the Rule 403 factors. Saint Alphonsus should
therefore be precluded from insinuating that because Mr. Harder was the attorney of both GSR
and MRIA, that MRIA necessarily knew any information concerning GSR's plans or GSR's
interactions with Saint Alphonsus.
In adaitioa~ Saint Alphonsus expresses its intention to use Mr: Harder's. bills to
demonstrate that he was having various conversations with GSR. It appears that Saint
Alphonsus will contend that these bills qualify for the business records hearsay exception. This
may or may not be true. However, Saint Alphonsus fails to recognize the "hearsay within
hearsay" problem. Even granting for the sake of argument that the bills are admissible, to the
extent that these bills reflect conversations between Mr. Harder and any nonparty (including Dr.
Giles when he was acting as an agent of GSR), these statements are inadmissible hearsay. This
further underscores the impropriety of any argument that Mr. Harder was passing on information

Saint Alpohonsus presents evidence that Mr. Harder spoke with Mr. Giles, but Mr. Giles
was a member ofGSR and MRIA; there is no evidence that Mr. Giles then gave that information
to MRIA.
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MRIA'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE TO PREVENT ARGUMENT THAT GILES AND
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from GSR to MRIA, because any oonversation that Mr. Haraer had with any member of GSR is
inadmissible.
For the reasons stated above and in MRIA's initial briefing, MRIA asks the Court to hold
that Saint Alphonsus cannot argue or present evidence that Dr. Giles withheld information from
MRIA or Saint Alphonsus, and that MRIA must have known about the actions, intentions, and
plans for GSR because both entities were represented by Carl Harder.
DATED this 1st day of September, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~- l-:2~~~

araL:Parket
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of September, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintifJ!Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for P laintifJ!Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

~acsimile

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
~vemight

lfl' acsimile

Delivery
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SEP 0 2 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JERI HEATON
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO
EXCLUDE MRIA'S NEW AND
IMPROPER DAMAGES THEORIES

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
VS.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

COME NOW, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), and move this
Court to preclude MRIA from presenting any claim for or expert damages testimony concerning
(i) usurpation ofMRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR in IMI at the time IMI was formed;
(ii) disgorgement of Saint Alphonsus's post-April!, 2005, MRI-related profits; and (iii) scans
and profits allegedly lost to IMI after April I, 2005.
This motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Exclude and
Affidavit in Support of Motion to Exclude filed concurrently herewith.
Saint Alphonsus respectfully requests that this motion be heard during trial prior to the
testimony ofMRIA's damages experts.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 2nd day of September, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of September, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

~D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S NEW AND IMPROPER
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SEP 0 2 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JERI HEATON
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 2000 1-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING
IN SUPPORT OF SAINT
ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO
EXCLUDE MRIA'S NEW AND
IMPROPER DAMAGES THEORIES

Defendant.

ORtG\NAL
AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING IN SUPPORT OF SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION
TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S NEW AND IMPROPER DAMAGES THEORIES, P. 1
002212

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada
)
JACKS. GJORDING, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that he is one
of the attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") in the above-entitled
matter and makes this affidavit having personal knowledge of the facts contained herein.
1.

This affidavit is filed in support of Saint Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude

MRIA'S New and Improper Damages Theories.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of the expert report of MRIA's damages

expert, Bruce P. Budge, dated March 12, 2007.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a copy of the expert report of MRIA's damages

expert, Charles A. Wilhoite, dated March 12, 2007.

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING IN SUPPORT OF SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION
TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S NEW AND IMPROPER DAMAGES THEORIES, P. 2
002213

4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C are excerpts from the transcript of the 2007 trial of

this matter.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D are excerpts from the transcript of the hearing held

in this matter on May 18, 2011.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a copy of the supplemental expert report of

MRIA's damages expert, Bruce P. Budge, dated May 2, 2011.
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a copy of the expert report of MRIA's damages

expert, Charles A. Wilhoite, dated May 2, 2011.
8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a copy of the rebuttal expert report of MRIA's

damages expert, Bruce P. Budge, dated July 29, 2011.
9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a copy of the rebuttal expert report of MRIA's

damages expert, Charles A. Wilhoite, dated July 29, 2011.
10.

Attached hereto as Exhibit I are excerpts from the transcript of the deposition of

MRIA' s damages expert, Charles A. Wilhoite, taken on August 9, 2011.
11.

Attached hereto as Exhibit J are excerpts from the transcript of the deposition of

MRIA's damages expert, Bruce P. Budge, taken on August 11, 2011.
12.

Attached hereto as Exhibit K is Trial Exhibit 4517 from the 2007 trial of this

13.

Attached hereto as Exhibit L is an excerpt from Exhibit 1 to the transcript of the

matter.

deposition ofMRIA's damages expert, Bruce P. Budge, taken on August 11,2011, constituting a

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING IN SUPPORT OF SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION
TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S NEW AND IMPROPER DAMAGES THEORIES, P. 3
002214

page of Mr. Budge's 2011 supplemental expert report as modified by Mr. Budge during his
deposition.
14.

Attached hereto as Exhibit M is Exhibit 4-to the transcript of the deposition of

MRIA's damages expert, Bruce P. Budge, taken on August 11, 2011, constituting schedules
disclosed for the first time at Mr. Budge's deposition in support of a disgorgement methodology.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETHNOT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO e re me, a Notary Public, this Z!!i day of
September, 2011.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

~day of September, 2011,

a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

D

Via U.S. Mail

Jtl)
D

D

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING IN SUPPORT
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION
TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S NEW AND IMPROPER DAMAGES THEORIES, P. 4

002215

mTIF TI

Expert Report of Bruce P. Budge
Saittt Alphottsus Diversified Care, Iuc., Plaintiff
v.
MR1 Associates, LLP, Defe11da11t

MR! Associates, LLP, Cotmterclai11umt

v.
Sai1tt Alpltonsus

Diversified Cm·e,

l1tc.

et al., C01mterdejettda1Lts

MRI Associates, L.LP, 1"/titd Patty Plai11tiff

v.
IntertltOtmtailt Medical Imagittg, l.LC et al., Third Patty De{-e11da1tts
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, In and For the County of ADA
No . CV OC 04082190

March 12, 2007
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Calculation Method 1
1.
2.
3.
4
5.
6.
7..
B.
9.
10.
1L
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17
18

Summary Matrix of Different Calculation Methods
MRIA Lost Profits Summary Through 2006
Location 1: SARMC Lost Profits
Location 2: Magicview- West (Meridian) Lost Profits
Location 3: Downtown Lost Profits
IMl Scan Volume Analysis
Income Statement- Variable Margin Presentation for MRl Center
IMI Income Statement for MRI Services
IMI Income Statement- Consolidated MRI
IMI MRI Scan Data
Scan Volume Data
Calculation of Total IMI Scans
IMI Annualization Calculations for 2006
MRI Center Annualization Calculation for 2006
IMI Meridian Capital Expenditure Requirements
MRIM Meridian Imputed Interest Calculation
1999-2000 Downtown Lost Scan Volume Estimate Worksheet
Physicians Referring to MRIC Prior to September of 1999 at the Meridian Location

Calculation Method 2
22
32
42
52
6.2
7.2
8.2
9..2
10.2
11.2
12.2
13.2
14 2
15.2
16.2

MRIA Lost Profits Summaty Through 2006
J..ocation 1: SARMC Lost Profits
Location 2: Magicview- West (Meridian) Lost Profits
Location 3: Downtown Lost Profits
IMI Scan Volume Analysis
Income Statement- Variable Margin Presentation for MRI Center
IMI Income Statement for MRI Services
IMI Income Statement-· Consolidated MRI
IMI MRI Scan Data
Scan Volume Data
Calculation of Total IMI Scans
IMI AnnuaHzation Calculations for 2006
MRI Center Annualizal'ion Calculation for 2006
IMI Meridian Capital Expenditure Requirements
MRIM Meridian Imputed Interest Calculation
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Calculation Method 3
2. 3

3. 3
43
53
6. 3

7.3
8.3
9.3

10.3
11.3
12 3
13 3
14.3
15.3
16 3

17.3

MRIA Lost Profits Summary Through 2006
Location 1: SARMC Lost Profits
Location 2: Magicview -West (Meridian) Lost Profits
Location 3: Downtown Lost Profits
IMI Scan Volume Analysis
Income Statement- Variable Margin Presentation fpr MRI Cente1
IMI Income Statement for MRI Services
IMI Income Statement- Consolidated MRI
IMI MRI Scan Data
Scan Volume Data
Calculation ofTotaliMI Scans
IMI Annualizalion Calculations for 2006
MRI Center Annualization Calctllation fol' 2006
IMI Meridian Capital Expenditure Requirements
MRIM Meridian Imputed Interest Calculation
1999-2000 Downtown Lost Scan Volume Estimate Worl<sheet

Calculation Method 4
2A

3.4
44
5.4
6.4

7.4
8.4

9.4
lOA

114
12 4
134
14.4
15.4
16.4

MRIA Lost Pmfits Summary Through 2006
Location 1: SARMC Lost Profits
Location 2: Magicview- West (Meridian) Lost Profits
Location 3: Downtown Lost Profits
IMI Sc;m Volume Analysis
Income Slutement- Variable Margin Presentation for MRI Center
IMI Income Statement for MRI Services
IMI Income Statement- Consolidated MRJ
IMI MRI Scan Data
Scan Volume Data
Calculation of TotallMI Scans
IMI Annualization Calculations for 2006
MRl Center Annualizalion Calculation for 2006
!Ml Meridian Capitnl Expenditure Requirem<mts
MRIM Meridian Imputed Interest Calculation
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Int1·oduction
My name is Bruce 1'. Budge, I am a Certified Public Accountant, and have devoted a substnntial
part of my career to the analysis and quantification of money damages asserted in commercial
disput·es

My curriculum vitae, including a listing of publicat-ions and prior testimony, is

attached to this report as Schedule A. I have been retained by MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA
LLP") to provide opinions on the measurement of damages to MRIA LLP and its operating
entities MRI Center and MRI Mobile (collectively "MRIA") arising from its allegations against
the Counterdefendants and Third Party Defendants in this matter

My conclusions, and the basis for them, are described throughout this report In preparing this
report I reviewed the documents including IMI financial records, MRIA financial records,
various agreements between the parties, IMI and MRIA board meeting minutes, valuations, and
numerous pleadings. I have also had discussions with Jack Floyd, CEO of MRI Center and MRI
Mobile, Robin Cioffi, Director of Human Resources and Administration for MRI Center and

MRl Mobile, and James Prochaska, M..D ., board member for MRIA, MRI Center and MRI
Mobile. The complete list of documents and other evidence I considered in reaching them are
attached as Schedule 13m are otherwise referenced herein.

SU1H11tary

of Opinions

For put poses of my analysis, I have assumed that the Counterdefendants and Third Party
Defendants are found liable for the allegations made by MRIA To the extent all or some of the
allegations are dismissed, my damages calculations may be revised. I may present schedules
showing other damages scenarios at trial, but those scenarios will be based on the schedules to
this repot t and any new data I may receive. As summarized in Schedule I attached to this
report, my opinions are as follows:
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·
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· 'fol~l

Pcscrlplion

1999·2006 MRJA • Alfilialcd Downtown R~lerrals l'lus All

M~ridian

t\cfermls

)ulj• 1, 2001 • 2006 MIUA • Arlilinlcd Downtown Referrals !'Ius All Mcrldlnn Relcrrnl~

$

21,370,854
18,924,186

Calculntioa Mc:tltod 1: 1999-2006 MRIA-Affilinted Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridian Referrals
Under this calculation, I have calculated MRIA's damages from the inception of IMI in 1999
through 2006 to be composed of three components:

1.

Damages From Intermountain Medical Imaging U.P's ("IMI's") MRl operations
on the Saint Alphonsus ("SARMC") campus in Boise, ID;

2.

Damages From IMI's MRI operations at the Magicview Location in Meddian, ID;

and
3.

Damages Prom IMI's MRI operations at its Downtown location in Boise, ID.

Calculation Method 2; July 1, 2001 - 2006 MRIA-Affilinted Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridian
Refen·nls

The components of Calculation Method 2 are the same as Method l, but the damage period has
been changed to begin on July 1, 2001. I understand July 1, 2001 to be on or about the date
when SARMC made its initial investment in IMI which, according to MRIA, breached the none
competition clause within the MRJA Partnership Agreement

I am p1 epa red to calculate prejudgment interest on these or other amounts upon 1equest.

In addition to the above calculations of damages, I have read the Operating Agreement of
Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC to evaluate the degree of control by SARMC over the
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I made this evaluation based upon the criteria used by

accountants in determining controlling interests for financial reporting purposes.

In my

opinion, from inception of the IMI Operating Agreement, SARMC was in joint control of IML

Case Background
MRIA was formed in 1985 as a partnership between a number of entities including Doctors
Magnetic Resonance, Inc. ("DMR"), St Alphonsus Magnetic Resonance Inc., Mednow, Inc,, and
1-ICA of Idaho, Inc. to operate a magnetic resonance scanning facility on the SARMC campus.

The minimum term of the partnership was through the year 2015, duting which time SARMC
could only rightfully withdraw if its continued participation in MRIA: (a) jeopardized the taxexempt status of the hospital partner; (b) jeopardized Medicare/Medicaid or insurance
reimbursementsj (c) was contrary to the ethical principles of the Catholic Church; or (d) would
be in violation of local, state or federallaws. 1 Operationally, MRIA employees would perform
the MRI scans, and the St. Alphonsus Radiology Group {later known as Gem State Radiology,
collectively "SARG/GSR") would evaluate the MRI scans performed on the SARMC campus
under exclusive contract with SARMC A SARG/GSR radiologist served as "Medical Director"
of MHJ Center, further evidencing the intended cooperative nature of the relationship among
the parties

In 1998, 17 years prior to the expiral'ion of the minimum MRIA partnership term, SARMC CEO
Sandra Bruce and rep1esentatives of SARG/GSH announced plans to form the IMJ joint venture
IMI would offer various imaging modalities, including MRI scans

By mid-1999, IMl had

opened its downtown Boise location and was competing directly with MRIA for MRI scans. On
or about June 2002, JMl opened its Magicview office in Meridian, Idaho

1

Article 61 of Ihe Articles of Parlnership
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On July 1, 2001, SARMC ond IMl executed an Operating Agreement The Opetating Agreement
had various terms including:
•

SAI~MC

•

SARMC accepted 50% management responsibility for the operations of IMI;

•

SARMC would appoint three SARMC representatives to IMI's management committee

would contribute at least $500,000 in capital to IMI;

of six;
•

SARMC would participate in subsidizing GSR's administrative expenses;

•

SARMC agreed to participate in funding a medical director position, which would have
oversight of all fMI modalities;

•

SARMC and IMI formalized this agreement to work together to implement a digital
network and data storage system (PACS/RIS) which would elevate IMI's visibility and
accessibility to the referring physician community (this cooperative arrangement had
alteady been commenced by late 1999/early 2000);

•

SARMC agreed to forfeit its share in IMI if SARMC did not renew SARG/GSR's
exclusive contract to read MRl scans on the SARMC campus;

•

SARMC would participote in the profits and losses received from the non-MRI
modalities of IMI; and
SARMC could purchase a direct financial interest in IMI's MRI business under certain
terms.

As will be discussed later in this report, the Operating Agreement of IMI put IMI under the
control of SARMC and a group of radiologists doing business as Imaging Center Radiologists,
LLP ("ICR")

In its counterclaim, MRIA alleges that SAHMC condoned and supported a variety of unfair
business tactics by SARG/GSR that not only interfered with SARMC's obligations as a partner in
MRIA and as a party to the MRIA Partnership Agreement, but were designed to increase IMI's
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growth at the expense of MRIA including:
•

SARG/GSR reduced hours of its availability to MRIA operations for the first time in the
history of the hospital while maintaining longer hours of service to IMI;
SARG/GSR refused to personally attend to patients being imaged in MRIA's mobile unit
stationed in the SARMC parking lot just yards away from MRI Center (a service that had
previously been willingly provided);
SARG/GSR radiologists provided faster response on image interpretation for images
taken at IMI than at MRIA operations;

•

SARG/GSR radiologists wrongfully disparaged MRIA by asserting that images produces
at MRI Center were inferior to IMI MRI scans;
SARG/GSR physician support was reduced from that which had been historically
provided in addressing routine quality and service issues, including patient care issues
within the Jab, despite charging for professional services;

•

SARG/GSR reduced responsiveness from what had been historically provided to the
needs of lab personnel for physician input in clinical operations; and

•

SARG/GSR radiologists leveraged their relationship with SARMC, prompting SARMC's
wrongful dissociation from the MRIA Partnership.

MRIA also alleges that SARMC compromised MRIA's efforts to grow and/or compete with IMI

by, among other things:
•

Giving IMI advantages with respect lo the rollout and implementation of SARMC's
information technoLogy system that linked referring physicians to MRJA's and IMI's
data and images;

•

Disparaging MRIA's service;
Promoting IMI's services over MRIA's;

•

Voting against growth initiatives at the MRIA board level;

•

Working with IMlrather than MRIA to expand into Meridian; and
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Appointing SARMC employees as TMI Management Committee Members who were
involved in regular communications with MRJA tegarding confidential business plans,
strategic Initiatives and IT planning .

Then, on or about April 4, 2004, SARMC wrongfully dissociated from the MRJA partnership, in
violation of Section 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement2 Since dissociation, MRIA alleges that
SARMC, IMI and SARG/GSR have continued unfair business practices including:
•

Putl"ing an IMI mobile MRI unit on the SARMC campus on or about December 2005;
Using confusing and misleading business names and contact telephone numbers to
divert business from MRI Center to IMI;

•

Directing SARMC physicians to refer MRI patients to IMI instead of MRIA;

•

Cteating uncertainty among referring physicians and MRI Center employees by
spreading rumots that MRI Center would dose in the near future;

•

Falsely telling SARMC employees that SARMC's insurance would not cover MRf scans
done at MRI Center; and

•

Interfering with MRI Center's electronic information technology system

MHIA further aUeges that it was forced to locate and utilize an alternate radiology group to read
MRICI images as a result of the radiologists' conducl referred to above, coupled with the fear
that the radiologists would cease reading MRICI images without adequate notice

Below is a timeline of certain of the alleged events, combined with the MRI scan volume of both

MRI Center and IMI.

2

Memorandum Decision On Plaintifl's Motions To Strike, Cross-Motions For Summary Judgment, And
Plainlifffrhird Party Defendant's Motion To Dismiss, Honorable Michael McLaughlin, Disll ict Judge, Idaho 4'h
Judicial District, July 24, 2006
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Damages Calculatio11s
1 CnlwlaliOII Method 1: 1999-2006 MRIA-Affiliatr!d DowniDWI1

n~jel'l'als

Plus All Mel'idimt Referrals

Under this calculation, I have calculated MRlA's damages from IMI's inception in September
1999 through 2006 in three components:

Damages Prom Inte1mountain Medical Imnging LLP's ("IMI's") MRI operntions
on the Saint Alphonsus ("SARMC") campus in Boise, ID;
2

Damages From IMI's MRI operations at the Magicvlew Location in Meridian, ID;
and

.3

Damages From IMI's MRI operations nt its Downtown location in Boise, ID
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This method will be applicable if the Trier-of-fact finds damages to MRIA began at IMI's
inception in September of 1999 based on the allegations in this matter.

IMJ's Operntirms orl the SARMC Cnmpus
MRIA alleges that, as a partner in MRIA and as a party to the MRIA Partnership Agreement,
SARMC was prohibited from competing with or supporting competition against MRIA in the
provision of MRI scans on the SARMC campus. Therefore IMI should not have performed any
MRI scans on the SARMC campus

MRIA has therefore lost scan volume on the SARMC

campus equal to the number of scans performed by IMI on the SARMC campus. I have
calculated the amount of MRIA's lost scans on the SARMC campus to be 2,984 through 2006-3
IMI collected over $2.1 million in revenue from performing these scans. Had MRIA performed
those scans and collected that 1evenue, MHIA would have ea1ned incremental profits of over
$L4 million as shown on Schedule 3 of my report as recapped below:

Hgnrr 2

Amounts Paid

$ 44,609

Vnriablc Ma1gin

65.951%

Lost Profits

$ 29,420

$ 2,097,996

$ 2,142,605

65951%
$ 1,383,649

$ 1,413,069

The above calculations include a quantification of lost revenue and profits incurred by MRIA
for years prior to the date of trial only I understand that Charles Wilhoite of Willametl'e
Management Associates will provide testimony quantifying future losses to MRJA, in the form
of its diminished (air market value at the end of this pel'iod

1

2006 datn has been annualized I will update with additional actual dnta upon receipt.
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IMI's Meridian Operntio11s
MRIA alleges that, as a partner in MRIA and as a party to the MRlA Partnership Agieement,
SARMC should not have facilitated or supported IMI's expansion into Meridian Rather, MRIA
contends that this partnership opportunity should have been presented to MRIA The IMJ
Operating Agreement as well as by board meeting minutes of the various parties show that
SARMC representatives knew and supported IMI's efforts to expand into Meridian while at the
same time were stalling MRIA's proposed expansion into Meridian.. Had SARMC instead
assisted MRIA in establishing the Meridian location, I performed calculations under the
assumption that MRIA would have performed the scans and generated the revenue that IMl
received.

Through 2006, IMI has performed over 26,000 scans and generated over $22.8 million at the
Meridian location.4 Had MRIA performed these scans and generated this revenue, I have
calculated that MRIA would have earned profits after fixed and variable costs of over $10.5
million5 as shown below and on Schedule 4 attached to this report:
flgrrtel

,---··--·--------------------------------------,
l.ocalion :U Magi<••low • Wesl (Meridian)
"' 5,886
" 7..680
2.0@
4.16?
6,966
Mogt<vlow- S<on
26,859
II

II

Vohtrl~

s 1.•91~.095

Anmu1l15 P.-id

t>roUf il$ ~

Pcrccnlt~yc

of Antounl

Pi~lcJ

Lost t•rolits IJI!rorl! CapU:~1 H)(pcnditur(!t:
tc:~.s:

(i'l,,it,'\1 Hl:pendihii'I:'S.

Losl rrotiu

63 9·16'Yo.

s 1,22~.627

$3,9-13.194
$2.311.547

62711%

$3,2%,1/0

s 6,015.066
63.879%

55,6?5~~20

s 2,3-11,5·17

S J,730,89U

s 22.8().1,199

63 819'::.

S3,812.364

S3,625,•16!j

s 11.330,1?3

5 3.812,364

$3,625,465

s 10,5:17,153

($ 1.565.280)

($2.:!27.HO)

(S 1,002,813)

s 5,255.611

59.182%

(SJ,:/92,720)

·• Ibid
5
As m1 alternative calculalion (prcsemed in schedules for Calculation Mathod 3), I nlso computed los! Meridian
revenue.~ and profits under the nssmnptionthnt only scans for patients referred from SARMC affiliuted physicians
and physicians who had previous relalionships and referralpallerns with MRI Center would have been pet formed
by MRIA at Meridian. Lost pro !its under this assumption amount to $4,549,786 for the Mngicview Location This
assumption reflecls lower revenues and costs, as the reduced number of scans would hnve required the usc of only
one MRI imaging device, as opposed to two ns in the cnse where all scans would have been performed Total lost
profits for all locations under this assumption would be $15,383,187
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IMI's Downtown Operations
If SARMC had honored its responsibilities as a partner in MRIA and as a party to the MRIA

Pat tnership Agreement, I <tSSLimed that

SAI~MC

affiliated physicians and physicians who had

previous relationships and refeual patterns with MRI Center prior to the opening of the IMI
downtown Boise location would have continued to refer patients to MRJ. Center rather than to
IMI downtown.

I have calculated the amount of MRIA's lost scans from the diversion of

referrals to IMI's downtown operations to be 15,423 through 2006 6 IMI collected over $13.0
million in revenue from performing these scans.

Had MRIA performed those scans and

collected that revenue, MRIA would have earned incremental profits of over $9.4 million as
shown on Schedule 5 of my report and shown below:

Hgurc4

r\nlOUnt

p,,ld

S .170,741o

Vot..,blr MMr,in
Lo~ll'roms:

6G 173'X.

S

173~-~~9

7U69%

S 25!,749 S 1,254,9n

S 1.572.Co99 S 2258,750

74 935')(.

68.4%!/':C.

$ J.9C•2.~64

70.05l'X.

$ 1.711.2% S 1.461J1B

7H59'l\

S 1.927,052 $ I,SG6,1W S 1.;175,115 $ 1,274,21~

S

12~1-JT.!

65.9SilG

65.951'f,

S 96),751

S 805.507

.$

9,120,331

MIUA's Ability to Pe~form L.osl Scrms
But for SARMCs failure in honoring its obligations as a partner in MRIA and as a party to the
MRIA Pa1tnership Agreement (or Third Party Defendants' interference with that relationship), I
have calculated that MRIA would have performed an additional18,407 MRI scans at its SARMC
camptls location and an additional 26,859 MRJ scans in Meridian through 2006 7 Based on my
analysis and discussions with MRIA management, MRIA would have had the capacity to
perform these scans.

~
1

Ibid See ligures 2,3 and 4
18,407 includes lost scans from both IMI 's Downtown and SAR.IviC locations. Sec Schedule II
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The chart below shows MIU Center's actual and but-for scan volume on the SARMC campus:

Clrnr12
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MRI Center has two magnets on the SARMC campus But-forB SARMCs failure in honoring its
obligations as a partner in MRIA and as a party to the MRIA Partnership Agreement (or Third
Patty Defendants' interference with that relationship), the scan volume in 2001 of 12,559
represents an increase of 3,011 scans (31.54%) over MRI Center's highest actual volume of

9,737 9 Based on my discussions with Jack Floyd, MRI Center has adequate capacity to perform
in excess of 12,000 scans per year based on scheduling considerations This capacity is adequate
to accommodate the number of lost scans I have calculated Calculation Methods 1 and 2

assume MRI Mobile would opel'ate 2 MRI fixed units in Meridian just as IMI has done

8

9

Bul·for scan volume is equal to actual scan volume plus lost scan volume
Sec Schedule II
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The chart below shows the bul-fm scan volume that MHI Mobile would have performed in
Meridian through 2006:

But-for MRIM Scan Volume
9.000
8.000 '
7,000
6.000 '

s.ooo

3,000
2.000

1.000'

-1---------.---------..20112

------~·-·-·-----.-----···--~

20113

200S

2006

IMl performed this scan volume with two magnets I have assumed thal MRI Mobile would
have had to incur similar costs for the purchase and operation of fixed magnets as those
it1curred by IMT in Meridian to perform these scans. These costs include cnpital expenditures
for magnets and medical equipment as well as all of IMI's operating costs, and have been
deducted from my calculations in the years they would have been incuned.
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H. Calculalion Method 2: July 1, 2001 - 2006 MRJA-Affi/iated Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridian

Referrals
The components of Calculation Method 2 are the same as Method 1, but the damage period has
been changed to begin on July 1, 2001 based on the assumption that the Trier-of.-fact finds
damages to MRlA began on or about this date' 0 I understand July 1, 2001 to be on or about the
date when
SARMC made its initial investment in IMI, which MRIA contends is in violation of Arlicle 9 of

the MRIA Articles of Partnership. Altering the damage period in this way results in damages of
$18.9 million through 2006 as shown below:

SARMC

$1,413,069

Magicview

$ 10,537,453

Downtown
Total

$6,973,664
$ 18,924,186

The above calculations include a quantification of lost revenue and pmfits incurred by MRIA
for years prior to the date of trial only. I understand that Charles Wilhoite of Willamette

Management Associates will provide testimony quantifying future losses the MRIA, in the form
of its diminished fair market value at the end of this period

10

Similar to Method I (presented in schedules for Cul(;ulatiun Method 4), J also computed lost Meridian revenues
and profits under the assumption that only scans for patients refcll'cd from SARMC nffilintcd physicians and
physicians who had previous relationships and rcf~rml patterns with MRI Center would have been performed by
MRIA at Meridian Lost profits under this assumption amount to $4,549,786 for lhc Magicvicw local ion This
assumption reflects lower revenues nnd costs, ns the J'cduccd number of scans would have required the usc o{ only
one MRl imaging device, os opposed to two as in the case where nH scans would have been performed. Total lost
profits for all locations under this assumption wollld be $12,936,519
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Control of IMI by SARMC aud ICR
As discussed under Method 2 above, MRIA contends that SARMC's entering into the IMI
Opetating Agreement in 2001 represented a breach of Article 9 of the MRIA Articles of
Pcntnership.

Article 9 prohibits "Restricted Parties" from competing with MRIA within 100

miles from the SARMC campus, among other restrictions.

Included in the definition of

Restricted Parties are "the persons and entities that directly, or indirectly through one or more
inte1:mediaries, control, are controlled by, or are under common control with, a Partnet~
Terminated Parmer or Shareholder ..."

Accountants must routinely evaluate the degree of

control by one entity over anothet, for purposes of detenninil1g which entities must be
consolidated

in financial statements where affiliated enterprises are involved.

The

determination of whether an investor enterprise must or must not consolidate an entity in
which it holds a financial interest, is determined by an evaluation of its degree of control ovet
the investee, and not merely its nominal ownership interest in the entity.

The IMI Operating Agreement grants SARMC significant p10tective and pm ticipatory rights
that give it significant control over IMI, to such an extent that ICR can implement virtually no
significant business or operating decisions without· the consent of SARMC, through its
subsidiary Diversified Care. The Operating Agreement gives SARMC 50% voting control in
IMI's Managing Committee 11 , and ~:equires a simple majotity for all routine decisions. Although
in the presumably unusual case of a deadlock on the Managing Committee, the decision of ICR
will be controlling, these situations are limited to those not requiring unanimous or supermajority (75%) votes on the committee, which cover a wide range of the Managing Committee's
prerogatives. For example, the following actions, among others, can

17CUCI'

occur without the

consent of SARMC, under Section 8.5 of the IMI Partnership Agreement:
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Purchase, sell, lease, mortgage, encumber or dispose of any single item of real or
personal properly in excess of $25,000;

2, Appoint, remove or define the duties and authority of the Center Manager or
CEO ofiMI;

3. Determine the amount of reserves to be maintained by the Company; and
4.

Enter, modify or terminate any risk bearing agreement with third party payors.

In addition, under the unanimous consent 1equirements of Section 7 6 3, changes in either the
ownership compositjon, Articles of Organization or the Operating Agreement cannot occur
without SARMC's approval. These pmvisions, together with the significance of the SARMC
campus operating location, the required use of SARMC's information systems, and SARMC's
general influence over health care delivery in the Treasure Valley, give SARMC effective joint
control over IMl with ICR. Control over a competing imaging business is prohibited under
Article 9 of the MRIA partnership agreement.

Docum.ents and Inform.atiOtt Considered
Documents and information I conside1ed in reaching my opinions are listed at Schedule B or are
referenced in this report.

Potential Additioual Analyses
I may perform additional work in this matter if new information becomes known or is provided
to me. I further anticipate responding to other expert reports thal may be p1epared al lhe
request of Counterdefendants.

11

Section 8 I, IMI Operating Agreement
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Compe1tsatio1t
My billing rate for the services in this matter is $495 per hour, and others performing work at

my direction are billing at rates fot services in this matter are $150 to $410 per hour.
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EXPERT OPINION OF CHARLES A. WILHOITE

in the Matter of

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., Plaintiff

v.
MRI Associates, LLP, Defendant

MRI Associates, LLP, Counterclaimant

v.
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., et al., Counterdefendants

MRI Associates, LLP, Third Party Plaintiff

v.
Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC et al., Third Party Defendants
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
In and for the County of ADA
No. CV OC 0408219D

March 12, 2007
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INTRODUCTION

My name is Charles A Wilhoite. Cunently, I maintain professional designations as a Certified Public
Accountant/Accredited in Business Valuation, and an Accredited Senior Appraiser in business valuation
These designations, among others, are described in my detailed curriculum vitae, attached to this opinion as
Appendix A
Based on my professional training and experience with regard to business valuation and related financial and
economic analysis, I have been retained by MRl Associates, LLP ("MRIA LLP") to provide an independent
estimate of the economic damages MRJA LLP and its operating entities, MRI Center ("MRJC") and MRJ
Mobile ("MRIM") (hereafter collectively referred to as "MRlA") experienced as a result of the alleged
wrongful acts (the "Acts") committed by the Counterdefendants and Third Party Defendants named in this
matter.
For the purpose of completing this analysis and developing my opinons, I have reviewed various financial,
corporate and telated documents and infonnation provided to me relating to MRJA and this litigation, and
conducted independent research and analysis with regard to relevant industry (i.e., medical imaging
services), economic, and investment considerations. The documents and information considered by me are
listed in Appendix B, and/or are referenced in this opinion letter and attached exhibits

A. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE

The objective of this analysis is to estimate the economic damages incurred by MRJA as a result of the
Acts of the Counterdefendants and Third Party Defendants. The purpose of this analysis is to provide an
independent opinion regarding the estimated economic damages. No other purpose is intended or should
be infened

B. PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
I have developed my opinions based on consideration of (I) the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appmisa/ Practice ("USPAP"), as promulgated by The Apptaisal Foundation, (2) the Principles of
Appraisal Practice and Code of Ethics and Busine.fs Valuation Standards of the American Society of
Appraisers, and (3) generally accepted valuation, economic and financial theory.

C. WILLAMETTE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES
Founded in the 1960s, Willamette Management Associates is one of the nation's leading independent
valuation consulting, economic analysis, and financial advisory firms Our principal business is the valuation
of businesses and business interests-including both privately held and publicly traded companies-for all
purposes, including mergers and acquisitions, divestitures, public offerings, gift and estate taxes, employee
stock ownership plans, corporate and patinership recapitalizations, dissolutions and other oqjectives.
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D. PREMISE OF ECONOMIC DAMAGES

While discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections of this opinion letter, the Acts on the part of the
Counterdefendants and Third Party Defendants generally are summarized as (I) unfair business practices,
(2) business interference, (.3) violation of noncompete agreement, and (4) wrongful dissociation. I
understand that a July 24, 2006, ruling by the Honorable Michael McLaughlin, District Judge, Idaho 4'11
Judicial District held that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care ("SADC"), successor entity to Saint
Alphonsus Magnetic Resonance, Inc , and a wholly owned subsidiary of Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center (collectively referred to hereafter as "SARMC"), wrongfully dissociated from MRIA on
or about April 4, 2004 1
Based on consideration of the July 24, 2006, ruling, and assuming the remaining allegations presented by
MRIA arc proven, 1 have estimated the economic damages incmred by MRIA based on the premise that
the Acts resulted in (I) the Joss of historical relationships and (2) the diversion of future business
opportunities with regard to the operations of MRIA The loss of historical relationships and diversion of
business opportunities can be equated to lost revenues and economic returns, which exert a detrimental
impact on the current fair madcet value of MRIA
It is my understanding that Bruce P Budge of FTI Consulting, Inc., will provide expert opinions regarding

the estimated economic damages, represented by historical lost profits, incuned by MRlA as a result of the
Acts. I have been asked to provide an independent estimate of the future lost profits, as represented by the
decline in business value, incurred by MRJA as a result of the Acts To develop an estimate of the future lost
profits, I have analyzed the following:
The estimated decline in the fair market value of MRIA between the initiation of the Acts and the
current date, based on comparison of the fair market value ofMRlA at the time the Acts c01m11enced
with the current fair market value of MRIA
2

The incremental fair market value that MRlA would reflect CUITently butior the loss of historical
relationships and diverted business opportunity caused by the Acts.

Standard of Value ami Premise of Value
In performing my analysis and fanning my opinions, I have applied the fair market value standard (or
definition) of value Fair market value is the amount at which property would change hands between a
willing seller and a willing buyer when neither is acting under compulsion and when both have
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. Among other factors, this appraisal takes into consideration all
elements of appraisal listed in Internal Revenue Service Revenue Ruling 59-60, which generally outlines the
valuation of closely held companies.

MRIA was appraised under the appraisal premise of value in continued use, as a going concern business
enterprise This premise of value represents the highest and best use of the assets controlled by MRIA.

1

See July 24, 2006, Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's Motions to Strike, Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment, and Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, entered in the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of ADA, Case No. CVOC 048219D
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Valuation Approaches
All relevant approaches and valuation methods were considered Within the market approach, I
considered the guideline publicly traded company method and the guideline merged and acquired
company method For the guideline publicly traded company method, I considered prices paid for
minority interests of guideline publicly traded companies within the same industry classification as MRIA
to estimate value. To anive at a controlling value for the equity of MRIA, I considered the addition of a
relevant level of control premium to the indicated value resulting from the guideline publicly traded
company method. For the merged and acquired company method, I considered prices paid for controlling
interests of guideline companies to estimate value
Within the income approach, I considered both the discounted cash flow (i.e., economic earnings)
analysis and the capitalization of cash flow method These methods develop value from the risk-return
perspective that is critical to investment decision making Based on this method, estimated cash flow
anticipated to be received in future operating periods is discounted to a present value at a rate reflecting
the risk inherent in the cash flows Alternatively, when a single-period approach is utilized (i.e.,
capitalization of cash flow method), a normalized, Iong-tenn estimate of expected cash flow is capitalized
by a risk-adjusted discount rate reduced by anticipated long·tenn growth.
Based on the nature of the operations of MRIA-a health care, service-oriented entity-the asset
approach to value was not deemed relevant

E. SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC DAMAGES

Table 1 presents a sununary of the economic damages incurred by MRIA, assuming that the Court holds that
the Counterdefendants and Third Party Defendants are liable for the Acts
c amaucs
T able 1: s ummaryo rE•conomID
Alternative
I

2
3
4

Basis
Decreased Business Value-{ Lost Profits) IMI-related· through 2015'
Decreased Business Value-(Lost Profits) Adjusted Meridian through 2015'
Decreased Business Value-_(Lost Profits)_lMI-relatedl through 2023'
Decreased Business Value-{ Lost Profits) Adjusted Meridian through 2023'

Economic Damages
$23,500 000
$14,900,000
$33,200,000
$20,900,000

While I have not been requested to perform additional analysis to date, I understand that I may be asked to
revise my analysis and update my opinions based on revised or updated infonnation received tluough the
date oftTial Additionally, !understand that I may be requested to review and address reports and/or opinions
submitted by experts retained on behalfof the Counterdefendants and Third Party Defendants

2

IMI-rela!ed lost business includes IMI scans performed on the SARMC campus, IMI scans performed at the
Magicview facility in Meridian, and IMI scans performed at the IMI downtown Boise location resulting from
referrals from SARMC-affiliated physicians and physicians who had previous relationships and referral patterns
with MRI Center
3
Includes impact of associated increase in management fee income and related value
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F. MRIA PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
MRIA was created through Articles of Partnership (the "Partnership Agreement"), effective April 26,
1985 MRIA was formed by:
I. Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc., an Idaho for profit corporation ("DMR"),
.2. MedNow, Inc., an Idaho for profit corporation wholly owned by Mercy Medical Center, Inc
("MedNow"),
.3. HCA of Idaho, Inc, an Idaho corporation ("HCA"), and
4 St Alphonsus Magnetic Resonance, Inc (As previously discussed Saint Alphonsus Diversified
Care is the successor entity to Saint Alphonsus Magnetic Resonance, Inc., and operates as a
wholly owned subsidiary ofSARMC)
At the time the Partnership was formed, the ownership structure of MRIA was as follows: DMR owned
50.0 percent; SADC 27 5 percent; MedNow 17 5 percent; and HCA 5.0 percent
According to the Partnership Agreement, MRIA was formed to purchase or lease and transfer medical
diagnostic devices, equipment and accessories The initial diagnostic equipment acquired was a magnetic
resonance imaging device
It is my understanding that the Partnership Agreement provided for the creation of a single limited

partnership, MRIC. MRIC was formed in August 1985. Further, I understand that the general purpose of
MRIC was to operate a magnetic resonance scanning facility on SARMC's main campus MRIC would
provide MRI services to SARMC, Mercy Medical Center, and Caldwell Memorial Hospital inpatients and
outpatients as well as other patients refened by physicians. MRIC would pay MRIA an annual
management fee of the greater $90,000 or 7.5 percent of MRIC's annual cash receipts from operations.
The Patinership Agreement provides that any Hospital Partner may withdraw from the partnership at any
time under certain conditions SADC, MedNow, HCA and any other State of Idaho licensed hospital or
affiliate are considered as Hospital Partners. A Hospital Partner may withdraw if continued participation
in the partnership (I) jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of the Hospital Partner or its parent or
subsidiaries, (2) jeopardizes Medicare/Medicaid or insurance reimbursements, (.3) was contrary to the
ethical principles of the Catholic Church, or (4) would violate local, state or federal laws.
Based on the Partnership Agreement, a partner may sell or transfer his/her interest in MRIA to the
Partnership or to another partner. If a partner receives an offer to sell its interest in MRIA, that partner
must first give the other partners an opportunity to purchase that partnership interest before accepting
such offer.

Non-compete Coveuant
Contained within the Partnership Agreement is a non-competition covenant prohibiting partners from
engaging in competitive activities, described as "(I) those business activities in which the partnership is
engaged and {2) those prospective business activities whose development has received at least five
favorable votes on the Board of Partners " No member of the partnership can engage in any competitive
activity while that member is a partner, a shareholder of a partner or an affiliate of a partner. For a period
of two years after lawfully terminating membership in the Partnership, neither DMR, SADC, nor their
affiliates can engage in any competing activity
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G. BACKGROUND
MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) was one of the most expensive medical technologies ever developed
when it first became commercially available in 1983 Despite its high cost, SARMC wanted to partner
with other health care providers in the region to deliver MRJ technology to the community_ Thus, the
MRIA partnership was established by DMR, MedNow, HCA, and SADC in 1985
The Partnership Agreement provided for the creation of MRJC. MRIC provided MRI services to SARMC
in-patients and out-patients, became a par1 of SARMC's facilities, and associated with SARMC's name
and reputation as the region's premier trauma center
Historically, MRJC provided the magnetic resonance images and the St. Alphonsus Radiology Group
("SARG") provided the interpretation of the images. SARG was a group of radiologists under exclusive
contract with SARMC to read all of the radiological images performed on the SADC campus. SARG later
became known as Gem State Radiology (hereafter referred to as "SARG/GSR")
From 1985 to the late 1990's, MRIA's business flourished. During this time, MRIM, a mobile MRI unit
that handled the coverage of overflow at the SARMC campus, was established MRIM expanded
markedly, providing MRJ services in mobile vans and fixed units at Mercy Medical Center, West Valley
Medical Center, Holy Rosary Medical Center and numerous other hospitals and clinics in the
northwestern United States
In the late 1990's, SARG/GSR began developing plans to establish an independent medical imaging
center that it would own and operate separate from the radiology practice at SARMC. I understand that in
October 1998, SARMC and SARG/GSR announced to MRIA plans to form a joint venture, which would
operate a freestanding medical imaging center called Intermountain Medical Imaging ("IMI") in
downtown Boise Since SARG/GSR was not a member of MRIA, SARMC could not participate in the
joint venture to form IMI, which would cause SARMC to violate its partnership obligations and the noncompete covenant contained within the Partnership Agreement It is my understanding that during 1998 to
mid 1999, MRIA and SARG/GSR held many discussions in an attempt to enable SARG/GSR to become
a member of MRIA
Further, 1 understand that when negotiations failed in late 1999, SARMC and SARG/GSR proceeded with
the establishment of IMI, which would operate an MRI scanner
On July 1, 2001, SARMC executed the Operating Agreement of Intermountain Medical Imaging, UC
(the "Operating Agreement") Based on my review of the Operating Agreement, I understand that
SARMC agreed to (I) contribute at least $500,000 as an initial capital contribution to IMI, (2) accept 50
percent management responsibility for the operation of IMI, (.3) appoint three Saint Alphonsus
representatives to IMI's management conm1ittee, (4) participate in subsidizing SARG/GSR administrative
expenses, (5) fund a medical director position, and (6) work with IMI to elevate IMI's visibility and
accessibility to the referring physician community While the Operating Agreement specified that
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SARMC would only be involved in the "non-MRI" portion ofiMl's business, documents and information
indicate that SARMC actually was involved with most significant aspects of IMI's operations. 4
Documents and information also indicate that SARMC would be allowed to participate in IMI's MRI
profits with the purchase of a 50-percent interest, if SARMC could purchase MRIC and make a 50percent ownership interest in MRIC available to IML The purchase price would be based on the fair
market value of MRIC assets, anticipated to be significantly lower than the fair market value of MRJC on
a going concern basis.
It is also my understanding that the non-competition covenant contained within the Partnership
Agreement motivated SARMC to attempt to acquire MRIC or sell its interest in MRIC. When those
efforts failed, SARMC provided written notification of its intention to dissociate from MRIA on February
24, 2004, effective April 1, 2004, pursuant to Idaho Code §5.3-3-60 I (I). This dissociation was later
determined to be wrongful by the Court on July 24, 2006

H. FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS
The historical financial statements of MRIA, specifically MRIC and MRIM, are presented in Exhibits 2-1
through 2-3, and Exhibits .3-1 through 3-3, respectively.

MRIC Historical Operating Results
From 1985 to the late 1990's, the business of MRIC flourished In calendar year ("CY") 1996, net
revenues were $53 million By CY 2000, net revenues had increased to $7.0 million, increasing at a
compound annual growth rate ("CAGR") of 7 .3 percent. In CY 2001, net revenues rose further to $8 3
million (an 18.4-percent annual growth rate).
After CY 2001, MRIC's net revenues began to decline. Table 2 presents MRIC's revenue and operating
income from CY 200 I to the latest twelve months ("LTM") ending July .31, 2006, and demonstrates that
MRIC's performance began to deteriorate significantly after the establishment of IMI in July 2001.
Deterioration in MRIC's operating performance occurred at an even faster rate aftet SARMC's
dissociation from MRIA in April 2004.
Table 2· MRIC Historicnl Financial Summary
MRI Center of Idaho
LTM

Net Revenues (Mil)

$3 0

An11ua/ Growth /late ("/a)

-32 3
-7
-22.2

Operating Income (Mil)
As a %ofNet Revenue

12/31/05
$4.4

12/31104

$6 0

12/31/03
$7 5

12/31/02
$7 9

12131/01
$8 3

-26 2

-19 8

-55

-4 4

18 4

7

20

26

28

4I

15.9

32.6

34.6

35.7

49.4

Figure I shows MRIC's monthly service volumes from 1997 to 2005. Volumes include services
perfonned by MRIC and Idaho Flex. As illustrated by the graph titled "MRI Volume," monthly service
procedures totaled 659 in January 1997 and reached a high of 920 monthly procedures in May 2002
4

While the Operating Agreement was formalized in July 2001, by mid-1999 !MI had opened its downtown Boise
location, competing directly with MRJA for MRJ scans By mid-2002, IMI was operating its Magicview facility in
Meridian, Idaho
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However, in June 2004, monthly procedures of 596 had dipped below the January 1997 volume. Monthly
volumes have been declining since May 2002 to December 2005 at a CAGR of 2.0 percent In December
2005, monthly volume was only 383.
Figure 1,: MRIC Monthly MRI Volume
MRIC- Monthly MRI Volume
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Similarly, Figure 2 presents annual MRI volume declining for MRIC since CY 2002. In CY 1997, MRIC
performed 7,903 pwcedures The number of annual procedures reached a high of 9,737 in CY 2002
Between CY 2001 and 2005, annual MRI volumes declined at a CAGR of 12.3 percent. Annual MRI
volume in CY 2005 was only 5,651
Figure 2: MRIC Annual MRI Volume
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MRIM Historical Operating Results
From 1998 through 2004, the business ofMRIM flourished. In CY 1998, net revenues were $6J million.
By CY 2004, net revenues had increased to $14.0 million, increasing at a compound annual growth rate
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("CAGR") of 14 2 percent. In CY 2005 (after the dissociation of SARMC), net revenues decreased 125
percent
Table .3 presents MRIM's reported revenue and operating income for CY 1998 through the LIM.
Table 3: MRIM Historical Financial Summary
MRI Mobile Limited Partnership of Idaho
LTM
12/31/05 12131/04 12/31103
$13 7
Net Revenues (Mil}
$1 I 6
$12 2
$14 0

12131/02

$!2 7
95
30
23.5

t1nn11af Growth Rate (%)

-4 8

-12 5

24

I 0

62

Operating Income (Mil)

I3

J.2

I8

23

24

/1.6

9.6

12.9

17.4

17.6

As a% ofNet Revenue (%)

12131101

$13 5

As indicated, revenue performance realized by MRIM has not experienced the same level of decline as
the historical performance reflected for MRIC However, as presented, profitability at mobile bas
declined significantly since 200 l.
Figure 3: MRIC Annual MRI Volume

MRI Mobile-· Annual Volume
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Figure 3 presents annual MRI volume for MRIM since 1997 As indicated, in 1997 MRIM performed
7,049 procedures. The number of annual procedures reached a high of 25,855 in CY 2004 . Between CY
200 I and 2005, annual MRI volumes increased at a CAGR of 4 4 percent However, between 2004 and
2005, MRI volumes decreased IL6 percent.

I. INDUSTRY DYNAMICS
Imaging centers use special equipment to visualize structUies and processes inside the human body,
including MRI, CT scanning (computed tomography), PET scanning (positron emission tomography),
and x-rays, mammography, ultrasound, fluoroscopy, and nuclear medicine MRI has become the preferred
method for imaging soft tissues
Traditionally, diagnostic imaging procedures were performed in acute care hospitals and in some cases,
physicians' offices However, advances in technology and the profit opportunity that diagnostic imaging
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services offer have driven a migration from in-hospital procedures to outpatient procedures performed in
freestanding imaging facilities and physician practices. This migration began with the emergence of
freestanding centers in the late 1980s, but a dramatic increase in imaging capacity over the last five years
has shifted more ofthe outpatient imaging procedures to non-hospital settings Currently, an estimated 10
percent to 15 percent of all diagnostic imaging services in the U.S are provided by outpatient diagnostic
imaging centers
According to Vcrispan, a hcalthcare information firm, there were approximately 4,800 freestanding
imaging centers in the United State in 2003, up from 2,200 ten years ago. Attractive financing by imaging
manufacturers, such as GE Healthcare and Siemens has made access to high-end scanners easier for
physicians and small-to-medium-sized hospitals. Low baniers to entry have also drawn a significant
amount of private equity-funded participants to an increasingly crowded field
The market for diagnostic imaging services is highly fragmented and has few national imaging service
providers The primary competition for the for-profit diagnostic imaging companies remains hospitals and
physician groups in local markets However, increased capacity across the industry has begun to put
pressures on margins, even in the high-end modalities such as MRI and CT
In 2005, U S customers spent $135 billion on new MRl scanners compared with $1.5 billion the year
before. These totals compare with $1 4 billion in 2003 and $1 .5 billion in 2002 In 2006, customers are
estimated to spend $14 billion in shipped scanners. MRI systems are priced in the 1ange of $1.0 million
to $2.0 million. According to a study released by Kalorama Information in September 2006, the
worldwide MRI equipment industry will top $4.0 billion by 2010.
The diagnostic imaging market in the United States continues to increase at staggering rates. The
American College of Radiology estimated that more than 543 million diagnostic imaging procedures were
performed in 2003, compared to 300 million procedures in 2000 (U S. Baocorp Piper Jaffray)
The MRI industry has experienced favorable growth as a result of:
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

the unique information that MRI scans provide;
recognition ofMRI as a cost-effective, noninvasive diagnostic tool;
superior soft-tissue image quality of MRI versus that of other diagnostic imaging technologies;
wider physician acceptance and availability of MRl technology;
growth in the number of MRI applications;
MRl's safety when compared to other diagnostic imaging technologies, because it does not use
potentially harmful radiation; and
increased overall demand for healthcare services, including diagnostic services, for the aging
population

Medicare volumes increased 45 percent between 1999 and 200.3, with higher-end modalities, such as MRI
increasing more than 80 percent over the same period, as shown in Figure I below
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Figure 4: Cumulative Growth in Imagining Volume per Beneficiary
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Between 1999 and 2004, based on the sum of all physician services paid under Medicare's physician fee
schedule, diagnostic imaging services increased by 62 percent; MRI of parts of the body other than the
brain increased by 140 percent. Spending for imaging services paid under the physician fee schedule
more than doubled between 2000 and 2005, from $6 . 6 billion to $13 7 billion.
PiperJaffray estimated that in 2004, $8.0 billion was spent on MRl imaging and that approximately 20
million scans were performed In 1999, the market for MRl services in the United States was estimated to
be $6.7 billion and approximately 14.6 million MRI scans were performed in 2000, according to Salomon
Smith Barney. The volume and complexity of imaging services increase 9.9 percent annually, on average,
between 1999 and 2003. The following table suggests that the number of MRl pwcedures increased
substantially in the period 1999 to 2004.
Table 4· Historical MRJ Procedure Growth
MRI GrO\vtli
Years
Sources
(%)
24
U.S. Bancorp
1999-2000
90+
MedPAC, Piper Jaffray
1999-2003
MedPAC
1999-2004
162
2004-2008
Washington G-2 Reports 2006 Diagnostic Imaging Industry
133
Strategic Outlook
Estimated

A Frost & Sullivan report on the industry projects an II percent CAGR for MRl procedures through
2009. Industry analysts suggest future growth in imaging services will even overshadow short-term
Medicare cuts under The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ("DRA"). Congress may reduce federal spending
on diagnostic imaging from 11 percent on average to 8 percent annually. DRA, which passed the House
of Representatives on February 1, 2006, will reduce reimbursement for imaging services by $2.8 billion
over five years, (Industry opposition is calling for a moratorium on the cuts. While open to debate, the
current level of planned cuts is now scheduled to be implemented over I0 years.)
According to the Washington G-2 Reports' 2006 Diagnostic Imaging Industry Strategic Outlook,
freestanding, independent imaging centers reported a much higher expected growth rate ( 16 3 percent)
than did hospital-based facilities (7.1 percent). Centers in the North Central states anticipate the highest
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overall growth (15.5 percent), while centers in other parts of the country say they expect growth of
anywhere from 7.8 percent to 9.0 percent.

J. SHATTUCK HAMMOND PARTNERS VALVA TION
For the purpose of developing my opinions, I reviewed a certain valuation analysis completed by Shattuck
Hammond Partners, LLC ("Shattuck Hammond") titled: Valuation Anai)'Sis of MIU Associates, GP and
Affiliates, November 6, 2001 ((the "Analysis"). The following table summarizes the conclusions presented
by Shattuck Hanunond in the Analysis.

.

Table 5· Shattuck Hammond Valuation of MRIA- November 6 2001
Shattuck Hammond's Equity Valuation of MRIA as of 11/06/2001
MRI Associates
MRI Center
MRI Mobile
Value
Weight
Value
Weight
Value
Weight
('000)
('000)
('000)
$9,754
100%
Discounted Cash Flow
$23,500
50%
$30,059
50%
Comparable Acquisitions
NA
NA
22,248
28,805
50%
50%
Publicly Traded Comparables
NA
NA
22,995
0%
29,772
0%
Preliminmy Business Enterprise Value
$9,754
$22,874
$29,432
(0)
(687)
Less: Est Debt@ 12/31/0 I
(4,868)
Equity Value
$9,754
$22,187
$24,564

It is my understanding that Shattuck Hammond was retained by SARMC to estimate the fair market value of
the equity of MRJA, MRIC and MRlM (collectively, the "Entities") to assist SARMC with its evaluation of
stmtegic options regarding its ownership interest in the Entities Specifically, SARMC was contemplating
the exchange of its ownership interest in MRIA and MRlM for a controlling interest in MRJC In addition,
SARMC sought to be released from its noncompetition restrictions with regard to MRIA 5

Based on my review of, and familiarity with, relevant valuation standards, including (I) the Principles oj
Appraisal Practice and Code of Ethics established by the American Society of Appraisers (the "ASA"), (2)
the Business Valuation Standards established by the ASA Business Valuation Committee, and (3) the
Uniform Standard5 of Professional Appraisal Practice established by the Appraisal Standards Board of the
Appraisal Foundation, the conclusions presented by Shattuck Hammond in the Analysis are relevant and
reliable based on compliance with existing standards

5

As presented on page 23 in the Shattuck Hammond Partners, LLC, Presentation of Strategic Options of MRIA
Ownenhip for St Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, dated November 6, 2001, the total value MRIC-$.34 7

million, less value attributable to SARMC's ownership interest of $7 4 million, or $27 3 million-represents a
reasonable estimate of the then-value of what SARMC would have to pay to avoid its obligations as a partner in
MRJA Additionally, based on infommtion provided by Bntce P Budge, estimated damages to the then-value of
MRIA total approximately $8 .5 mi !lion based on losses incurred during the J 999 through 200 I period
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Shattuck Hammoml's Conformity to Valuation Standards
The following requirements, satisfied by Shattuck Hammond with regard to the Analysis and related
opinions, serve as evidence of compliance with relevant valuation standards:
I. Shattuck Hammond identified and defined (1) the bu.siness, busines.s owne1:1·hip interest. or security
to be valued, (2) the effective date of the appraisal, (3) the standatd of value, and (4) the purpose
and intended use of the valuation.
2

Shattuck Hammond gathered, anal),zed, and adjusted the relevant information necessary to
pe1[onn the valuation approp1 iate to the ~cope of the engagement, including information
regarding the (1) nature, history and outlook of the Entities, (2) historical financial pe1[ormance
of the Entities, (3) the nature and conditions of the medical imaging industly, and (4) current
economic factoi~S affecting the Entities

3

Shattuck Hammond considered and applied appropriate valuation approaches, methods and
procedures

4.

Shattuck Hammond documented the Ana/ysi5 in a manner that satisfied the reporting
requirements of Standard I 0 of USAP

K. DAMAGES ANALYSIS
A summary of the estimated value of MRIA as of the cun·ent date, relative to the value of MRIA as
established in the Shattuck Hammond Analysis, is presented in Table 6, below
T a bl e 6 : Decrease .an E~QUI't:\• VaIue of MRJA from 2001 t 0 current Date
Shattuck
Hammond
Current
MRIA Value Component
EtiUity ValueEquity
2001
Value
MRIA Management Fee
9,754,000
6,000,000
22,187,000
4,600,000
MRIC
24,546,000
13,400,000
MRIM
Indicated Decrease in Historical Equity Value

Decrense in
Equity
Value
3,754,000
17,587,000
11,146,000
32,487,000

The indicated decrease in equity value of MRIA between 2001 and the current date presented in Table 6
above represents a decline in the value of MRIA attributable to historical lost profits.
As previously discussed, it is my understanding that Bmce P. Budge of FTI Consulting, Inc., will provide
expert opinions regarding the estimated economic damages incurred by MRIA relating to historical lost
profits resulting from the Acts of the Counterdefendants and Third Party Defendants
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Estimated Impact of the Acts on MRJA
Absent the Acts on the part of the Counter defendants and Third Party Defendants, the improved operating
performance and related financial results of MRIA at the end of 2006, relating to lost business
relationships and business opportunities, would result in a higher, current fair market valuation .
The analysis prepared by Bmce P Budge of FTl Consulting, Inc, indicates that the following refenal
relationships, business opportunities and related revenues and profits were lost to MRIA in 2006 as a
result of the Acts:
Table 7: 2006 Impact o f Lost Historical Referr·als and Business 0Jpportunities-AII Meridian
Mngicvie'lv
(Meridian)
Total
Fundamental
SARMC
Downtown 6
7
7,680
1,548
12,150
Scan Volume
2,922
$2,097,996
$5,675,520
$8,994,888
Net Revenue
$1,221,372
$3,625,465
Lost Profits
$1,383,649
$805,507
$5,814,621

The estimated impact on MRIA's 2006 performance noted in Table 7 above results from the loss of scan
volumes, net revenue and lost pwfits attributable to procedures perfonned at IMI facilities in the locations
identified that otherwise would have been performed by MRIA absent the Acts of the Counterdefendants
and Third Party Defendants The Magicview (Meridian) impact presented in Table 7 assumes all scans
conducted at IMI's Magicview facility would have been performed by MRJA. This assumption is based
on the premise that fiduciary obligations owed by SARMC to MRIA required that the business
opportunity represented by Meridian should have been developed with MRIA rather than IMI
Table 8: 2006 Impact of L ost H'1storica IR efcrrals and Busmess 0lpportunities-Affiliatcd Physicians
Magicview
Fundamental
(Meridian)
SAR!\fC
Downtown
Total
3,069
2,922 7
1,548
7,539
Scan Volume
$2,097,996
$2,344,716
Net Revenue
$1,221,372
$5,664,084
$1,523,221
Lost Profits
$1,.383,649
$805,507
$3,712,377

The estimated impact on MRIA's 2006 performance noted in Table 8 above results from the loss of scan
volumes, net revenue and lost profits attributable to procedures perfonned at IMI facilities in the locations
identified that otherwise would have been performed by MRJA absent the Acts of the Counterdefendants
and Third Party Defendants The Magicview (Meridian) impact presented in Table 8 assumes only those
scans conducted at IMI's Magicview facility on patients refened from SARMC-affiliated physicians and
physicians with prior relationships and referral patterns with MRIA would have been performed by
MRIA Once again, this assumption is based on the premise that fiduciary obligations owed by SARMC
to MRIA required that the business opportunity represented by Meridian should have been developed
with MRIA rather than IMI.

Decreased Current Business Value o[MRIA Attributable to tlze Acts
6

IMI scans performed at the TMI downtown Boise location resulting from referrals from SARMC-affiliated
physicians and physicians who had previous relationships and referral patterns with MRI Center
7
Level of scans reflects scans on the IMI mobile magnet on the SARMC campus, and does not include projected
scans on the fixed magnets scheduled to be installed in 2007
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But for the Acts on the part of the Counterdefendants and Third Party Defendants, MRJA would reflect
incremental operating statistics and financial results that would exert a positive impact on the current fair
market value of MRIA (as collectively representing the operating entities of MRIC and MRIM). The
improved operating statistics and related financial results that would have been realized but-for the Acts
of the Counter defendants and Third Party Defendants can be converted to incremental value for MRIA
Based on the estimated profits lost to MRIA as a result of the Acts of the Counterdefendants and Third
Party Defendants, the indicated decrease in the current fair market value ofMRIA is sununarized in Table
9. The summary presented in Table 9 is based on analysis detailed in Exhibits I through 1-10 as follows:
~

Alternative !-Decreased Business Value-All Meridian Business-through 2015, representing
trended lost profits through an assumed Partnership termination date of 2015, and assuming all
IMI business (i e., SARMC, Meridian, and Downtown) would have been realized by MRIA

~

Alternative 2-Decreased Business Value-Meridian Affiliated Physicians-through 2015,
representing trended lost profits through an assumed Partnership termination date of 2015, and
assuming IMI business (i.e , SARMC, Meridian, and Downtown) would have been realized by
MRlA, with the exception of non-SARMC affiliated physician referrals and prior relationships

~

Alternative 3- Decreased Business Value-All Meridian Business-through 202.3, representing
trended lost profits through an assumed Partnership termination date of .2023, and assuming all
IMI business (i.e., SARMC, Meridian, and Downtown) would have been realized by MRIA.

~

Alternative 4-Decreased Business Value-Meridian Affiliated Physicians-through 2023,
representing trended lost profits through an assumed Partnership termination date of 2023, and
assuming IMI business (i.e., SARMC, Meridian, and Downtown) would have been realized by
MRIA, with the exception of non-SARMC affiliated physician referrals and prior relationships
T II bl c 9: R ungc ofD ccrcasc dB us Iness VaIuc 8

Alternative
I-AII Meridian Business through 2015
2-Affiliated Physicians through 2015
3- All Meridian Business through 2023
4- Affiliated Physicians through 2023

Present Value
Future Lost Profits
$23,500,000
$14,900,000
$33,200,000
$20,900,000

8

The median, market-based revenue multiples resulting from our current analysis are 2 2 and l 5, based on
guideline publicly traded companies and guideline merged and acquired companies, respectively Based on
valuation conclusions presented in the Shattuck Hammond Analysis, the implied multiples of latest fiscal year
revenue for MRIC and MRJM were 3 Ax and 2 2x, respectively Based on assumed lost revenues ranging from $5 7
million to $9.0 million, and utilizing the current, market-based revenue multiples, the indicated reduction in the
current fair market value ofMRIA and the underlying operating entities ranges from $8 6 million to $19 8 million
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L. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Should the Court determine that the Counterdefendants and Third Party Defendants committed the Acts,
it is my opinion that the economic damages incurred by MRlA representing a decrease in current fair
market value are:

I am independent of MRlA and all parlies identified with regard to this litigation. I was compensated for
my services at my standard hourly rate of $425, and my firm was reimbursed for direct, out-of-pocket
costs. The hourly billing rates for other staff members who provided services relating to this matter
ranged from $70 to $225.
This memorandum is intended to provide an independent opinion(s) with regard to the litigation referenced
above. It does not include all of the analysis that was completed for this assignment, and I may update or
supplement tills analysis through the date of ttial based upon the receipt and consideration of additional
information. It is not intended to provide legal, accounting, or taxation advice:
~METTE MANAGEMENT ASSOClATES

~~J\-~~

Wilhoi;;~A. CMA, ASA, CFM, ABV

Charles A.
Managing Director

IMI-related lost business includes IMI scans performed on the SARMC campus, IMI scans performed at the
Magicview facility in Meridian, and IMI scans performed at the IMI downtown Boise location resulting from
referrals from SARMC-affiliated physicians and physicians who had previous relationships and referral patterns
with MRI Center.
10
Includes impact of associated increase in management fee income and related value.

9
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A I don't think I would have forwarded it on
without having some discussions with someone about it
since I didn't agree with half of it.
Q Who-- there is another number here, "Treasure
Valley Road," an earlier date.
A Yeah. I don't have any idea what that "Treasure
Valley Road" is.
Q So, you don't know who sent this?
A I would be speculating as to who sent it. No, I
don't know.
Q So, you don't know who sent it, and you don't
know -- you don't know whether you read it, and
apparently you forwarded it on to Carl Harder?
A I'm pretty confident I didn't read it, and, yes,
I forwarded it to Carl Harder.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, we're at about 2:20.
I'm about to change topics.
THE COURT: Change them. We have got three more
minutes.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q All right. Let's go to 4104. Now, this is a
set of group meeting minutes from September 8th, 1999.
And I'd like you to take a look at the third page. It
says "MRI Negotiations" at the bottom.
A Okay.

2
3
4

5
6
7

8
9

t1
!12

!13

114
!15
!16

17
'18
i19

A As of the date of this, I don't recall anything
-- any time where he was uncooperative as of the date of
this letter.
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you.
THE COURT: Now, we'll end the session.
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, folks. We'll see you
tomorrow morning. 8:45.
(Jury absent.)
THE COURT: Just briefly, then, who did you
intend to call tomorrow? Obviously, Mr. Cliff will
remain on the stand. And who else did you think -MR. BANDUCCI: We would call Joe Messmer,
Your Honor, and we would also commence the examination of
Sandra Bruce.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. We'll recess for
the day, then. See you at 8:15 tomorrow morning.
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Evening recess.)

i2o

'
!21
!22

23
24
25
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~2

123
~4

~5

1
Q Now, is September 8th, 1999, about the time that
2
the IMI imaging center opened?
3
A Yes. I think it opened just before that. I
4
think it was around -- my recollection is it was around
5
September 1st.
6
Q Okay. Late August, early September?
7
A Correct.
8
Q Okay. This paragraph says, "Without a contract
9
with MRI, the opening of the center puts MRI Center of
(!. 0
Idaho and the imaging center in competition with each
11
other." Agree or disagree?
b.2
A Agree.
(!. 3
Q Okay. "This also puts Dr. Giles in a difficult
h.4
position. Dr. Giles stated that this is not a problem
15
for him, and he will cooperate in any way that he can."
~6
Do you remember Dr. Giles saying that?
17
A I don't, but I don't dispute that he said it.
Q Okay. Did you find that once the imaging center (!. 8
h. 9
opened that Dr. Giles was being as cooperative as he
20
could be, given the fact that he had an ownership
interest in MRIA and was a radiologist in the group that ~ 1
2
was opening the imaging center?
23
A We're August about post-IMI opening?
~4
Specifically -25
Q As of the date of this.
Page 1488'

2

BOISE, IDAHO
AUGUST 9, 2007
(Jury absent.)
THE COURT: We're on record in Saint
Alphonsus/MRIA. This is day four of our trial. We have
Mr. Cliff\foming back today, and I think we announced
yesterday what other witnesses would be called today.
And so, are there any matters that counsel wish
to address with the court today, starting with MRIA?
MR. BANDUCCI: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Varin is here captaining the
ship for Saint Alphonsus.
MR. VARIN: Scary thought, Your Honor. Just one
issue, and this is more for the court's planning
purposes. We do have a motion in limine that we'll try
to get filed tomorrow concerning expert testimony on
damages, and we'd like to have that heard, obviously,
early next week so we can -- before the damage experts
come on.
THE COURT: Okay. When did you plan-- who is
the witness that you're seeking the in limine motion on,
the name?
MR. VARIN: It's not directed towards a specific
witness, Your Honor.
Page 1490
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not, and we're not -- you didn't include that in
i 1 the number of physicians, not the number of
your damage calculation?
i 2 referrals -- referred business to IMI is a quite
A. Yeah, I did not include them. I'm
! 3 large number; it's something around 18- or 1900
assuming that these are the historical and the new
I 4 doctors. Yet the ones that I am saying represent
referral base that's associated with being the MRI
5 the historical base for MRI's operation only
imaging center for Saint Al's; and that had all of
6 constitute seven percent of those doctors; and of
these things not occurred, that would have
7 the new physicians, nine percent of them.
8 continued to be the case all the way up until
8
So what this really tells me is that
9 today and into the future.
9 some of the physicians are doing a lot more
0
Q. Okay. Now, this is for the period,
0.. 0 referrals than others and do them more frequently.
11 It just gives a little better sense of really what
1 then, 2001 through 2006?
2
12 the composition of those referrals is.
A. Yeah. That's the only period that
13
Q. Now, you've been testifying that you
3 data was available for. And it's not all of 2006;
~ 4 were splitting up the referring docs between those
4 it's about half of it.
5
Q. And just for the jury's information,
!15 who have never referred to IMI and those who have
16 referred historically to MRI Center.
6 then, the data that you compiled reflects
h. 7
My question is: With reference to
7 something in the neighborhood of25,000 exams that
18
these
three
buckets, Meridian and the campus where
8 occurred over that period of time?
~
9
they
moved
a mobile on and now have a fixed unit
9
A. Right.
~ 0 and downtown, did you have to treat each of those
D. o
Q. All right. Can you take them to the
21 a little differently for various reasons?
D.1 next pie chart?
2
And you can take the stand back. I
D. 2
A. This should be a little quicker.
2 3 think the bailiff will take care of that.
t2 3 It's exactly the same analysis, but it includes
So I didn't ask the question very
~ 4 not just the downtown location; it includes
24
D. 5 referrals that were done -- there are basically
2 5 well. But we've been talking in generalities
Page 2746
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1 about your methodology for segregating out
three buckets to the IMI operation, three
2 referring docs that were either historically MRI
locations. It includes the exams that were done
at the Meridian location. And also eventually, in
i 3 Center versus other IMI doctors or referring
2005, IMI actually moved a mobile magnet onto the
I 4 doctors who ended up at IMI.
Saint Alphonsus campus; it includes those, too.
5
Can you tell the jury a little bit
So from three locations.
i 6 about how you looked at these three different
Q. Are you sure of that? Because this
i 7 locations slightly differently and the reasons
says downtown Meridian.
8 that you did?
A. You should have stopped me earlier.
i 9
A. Yeah. For the downtown operation
This is the chart I meant to put up.
10 and Meridian, I viewed them similarly in that I
And you can see that the percentages just change a
l1 relied on these historical referral patterns to
little bit. But basically when I put in Meridian
~ 2 determine whether or not those scans would have
and the Saint Alphonsus campus, that 52 percent
13 reasonably been done by MRIA in these years that
becomes 48 percent of those scans that IMI had
14 we've been talking about.
done I'm attributing to the historic customer base
h. 5
I took a different approach for on
of MRIA; 6 percent to the new physicians who only
h. 6 campus. Because under the partnership agreement,
had admitting privileges at Saint Al's. And 46
17 MRIA had the right to perform all magnetic
percent of IMI's scans I'm assuming that, you
18 resonance images on the Saint Alphonsus campus.
know, had the hospital's affiliation with MRIA not
19
So in 2005, when IMI moved its
changed, that these could have been done by IMI if
;2 0 mobile unit onto the campus, I assumed that
they had opened its doors.
21 everything that was done at that location would
Q. And then the third pie chart.
2 2 have been done by MRIA if it had continued to be
A. This just gives a little bit better
~ 3 the MRI provider in the Saint Al's healthcare
insight into this population of physicians.
24 system.
Because, in fact, the number of physicians that -;2 5
For the other two locations, I
Page 2747
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basically used this method that I described to you
in the last couple of minutes, which is based on
historical referral patterns, the way I treated
new doctors.
In the case of Meridian, I assumed
that MRIA would have to build a center in
Meridian, and I deducted the cost ofbuying a
magnet and that type of thing when I computed the
profits for them.
Q. And we'll talk about that a little
bit later. I'd like to show the witness another
exhibit, Your Honor, ifl may.
TilE COURT: 4518 will be admitted?
l\1R. GJORDING: I'm sorry?
TilE COURT: Do you stipulate to its
admission?
l\1R. GJORDING: Yes. Sorry, Judge.
TilE COURT: It's admitted.
(MRIA Exhibit 4518 admitted.)
Q. (BY l\1R. BANDUCCI) Mr. Budge, if you
want to approach that precariously balanced
poster, could you tell the jury what this shows.
A. This basically -Q. And excuse me, Mr. Budge. Before
you tell them what it shows, would you tell them
Page 2748

I11
12
13
14
J5
16

17

Is
19
!

t~
i

~2

tL3

~4
~5
~6

~~

~~
!

21

~2

F3
24
25

---------·---··----------------·---------------·--·------·--·--··-

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

0
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

2o
~1
~2
23
~4

~5

what information you used to construct this graph
first, so that they understand it.
A. This was prepared by me and my team.
And it basically is just a graph which shows the
actual number of scans by year right before IMI
opened until the end of my analysis in 2006.
Q. Okay. And there appear to be -there appears to be, you know, squares and then
there's some writing above those squares in
certain locations.
l\1R. BANDUCCI: May I ask, Your Honor -- I
don't know whether the jury can see those or not.
TilE COURT: Can you folks see them okay?
They're saying they're seeing them. If you want
to put it up in front of them, go ahead. You can
go back to the well. Go ahead. Proceed back into
the well. I want them to be able to see this.
Mr. Budge, you can follow him up
there. I'll let you use an easel to display that,
Gil. Proceed.
Q. (BY l\1R. BANDUCCI) So, now, having
explained what the source of information is, can
you take them through the graph and explain what's
on the graph, please.
A. This is from the detailed patient
Page

data that I have after looking through the number
of scans. And it shows the blue line being the
MRIC, Center, how many scans it did by year are
displayed along the bottom.
Q. Can you give them some examples of
that.
A. So, for example, in 1999, they did
approximately 10,000 scans. And in 2005, ifl
could eyeball that, it's like maybe 6500 or 7,000,
something like that.
Q. Okay.
A. Then it also shows some of the key
events which occurred over the course of the
period of this dispute. So you kind of see how
volumes changed because events unfolded.
Q. Would you take them through the
events, and let them know what's happening on both
of those curves on the graph.
A. Well, it starts out basically prior
to the opening ofiMI, the date that they had
announced that they were forming this joint
venture with the hospital. And at that point in
time, they didn't exist. But MRIA was doing about
8,000 scans.
Q. MRI Center?
Page 2750
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A. Yes. Thank you. A year later, IMI
opens its downtown location. MRI's business had
continued to grow, and they were up to maybe
10,000 scans.
In 2000, they were both in the
market. You can see that after the opening of
IMI, we had a downturn in the number of scans that
were done by MRIC. Then this had a period where
the number of scans starts to grow for IMI.
In 2001, Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center and the radiologists enter into
this operating agreement where they basically
become partners in IMI. And at that point in time
IMI had grown to this point, and things are pretty
flat with respect to MRIC.
In 2002, IMI opened the Meridian
location, which this includes all of their
location. So their business continued to grow.
And you start to see that MRIA is starting to
decline. Even though the Treasure Valley is
getting more population, their business is going
down.
And so continue on in 2004, Saint
Alphonsus formally withdraws from the partnership.
You see IMI's scans continue to increase. And at
Page 2751
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A. 4520.
Q. Does 4520 give an annual lost profit
loss for each of the three locations?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Okay. Can you take the jury through
that? And of course, this is lost profits only
through 2006. Because you're the historical guy,
and Mr. Wilhoite is the future lost profits; is
that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Would you take the jury through
first the lost profits from 1999 at IMI downtown,
and then take them through Meridian and the
campus, please.
A. Okay. The one that covers the most
number of periods is the Center. It's been there
since the mid 1980s. And basically I took this
data -- let me start with this period of 2001
through 2005.
I actually had these documents right
here, the detail of the exact exams and referring
physicians. If they met the criteria I described
to you earlier, I said those would have been MRI's
scans and would have continued basically to be in

1
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9
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b
i

23
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!25
Page 2756,

of 2006 -- this is, again, based on that actual
data of real scans, but I didn't have a full
year's worth of data. So I took the data I had,
and I just annualized it. I assumed that that
rate of scans would continue at the same rate and
the profit levels. So that is what is included in
2006.
Q. So for 2006, you didn't have a full
year. Do you remember when the data ended?
A. I'm sorry. I don't recall. It was
sometime in the middle of the year.
Q. And then you just projected that it
would be similar for the remainder of 2006?
A. If it was six months, I doubled it.
The calculation was not quite that way, but it
was -- that was what the original figure was.
Q. Okay.
A. For Meridian, from the documents I
reviewed, the minutes and everything, I understood
that MRIA had had an interest in Meridian. But
basically, IMI beat MRIA, through the partnership
that was formed between the radiologists and the
hospital. And so there started to be scans in
2002.
But if IMI had not come on the scene
Page 2758

i1 and MRIA [sic] had continued to partner
partnership with the hospital and be the only
'2
2 service provider. That was recognized by
exclusively with MRIA, I'm assuming that MRIA
13 would have opened a Meridian center and could have
3 Saint Al's.
!4 provided services to its referral base out of that
4
So this shows those lost profits for
5 location.
5 these years. I just took the scans times the
6
6 profit per scan and come up with these numbers.
You'll see something that's kind of
17 funny in 2002, a negative number, which shows they
7
1999 and 2000 are a little different
:8 would have lost money. And the reason is they
8 because I didn't have the data. I actually didn't
9 would have had to make substantial capital
9 have data of what the actual referring physicians
0 were and scans were.
lLo expenditures in that year to buy the magnet and
!u other equipment. I based that on the amount that
1
I knew from the financial
12 was actually expended by IMI.
2 information I got what the total revenues were and
13
3 how many scans, where they did it. So from this,
So I computed, basically, the
4 I made a couple of assumptions. One of them is
revenues
per scan. I used IMI -- because they
~4
15 were at that location and since they were a
5 that I could compute the average revenue by scan
6 by just dividing total revenues by number of
tl.6 comparable business in the one method I described
7 scans.
b to you -- for what the cost structure would be and
8
18 computed lost profits for that period from when
The second thing I did, absent any
19 Meridian opened to the end of2006. I made the
9 better information, is I used the mix of
20 same annualization calculation here because I only
~0 traditional MRIA customer base to total MRI scans
;n
had partial-year data.
~1 for computing lost profits for these two years.
Finally, in 2005, IMI actually moved
;22
So that concludes that assumption.
~2
t:u I don't know a better way to do that. That's the
!23 on to the Saint Alphonsus campus itself and
24 started to do scans there. For those, as I told
~4 way they got.
The other exception is that for half
l25 you earlier, I assumed that had the MRIA
~5
Page 2759
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partnership agreement continued uninterrupted,
that all of those scans would have had to have
been given to MRIA. They're done right there in
the hospital right next to its magnet.
So I think IMI moved on to the Saint
Alphonsus campus sometime in December. So there's
just a few scans in December 2005. And then here
are the 2006 scans. Again, I've annualized them
because I only had partial-year data.
Q. And could you show the second poster
there, which is I think a combination of all of
the three buckets that you've been talking about.
A. Is there a question?
Q. I'm sorry. Would you please explain
what's on that to the jury.
A. This is simply an arithmetic total
of what you saw in the previous year. So it adds
the downtown location, the Meridian location, and
Saint Alphonsus campus all together by year. So
you can see that the lost profits that I
calculated, they're scans diverted from the Saint
Alphonsus referral base to IMI. And the profits
from those total $15,383,187.
Now, that implies a degree of
precision that's not there, obviously, because I'm
Page 2760

11
12
!3
i
i4
js
·6
17

down the numbers that apply to each of these
periods over the last seven years.
From the period when IMI opened
until it entered into an operating agreement with
Saint Alphonsus hospital, basically profits on
diverted scans represented 2,446,000 --could I
round it to the thousands?
Ia
Q. Sure.
A. I'm just going to put "K" for
19
thousands there.
From the period then from when the
operating agreement starts to when Saint Alphonsus
officially withdraws from the MRIA partnership -!
0..4 maybe I'll put some arrows in here just so we
~5 don't forget where we start and stop.
P-6
So starting right here, the amount
b is $4,377,000. That goes through the date of
~8 disassociation. And then from that date to the
~9 end of my analysis, profits were $8,559,000. And
~0 that's accelerating basically as MRIA goes down
~1 and IMI goes up in terms of the number of scans
being done.
Q. Okay. Gil, I'm going to need that
p3
!24 easel maybe one or two more times, but we can have
Mr. Budge back in the witness stand.
fs
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using averages. But that's the best estimate I
1
could make of what that diversion of examinations
2
was.
3
Q. And that's through 2006?
I4
A. Through 2006, yes.
! 5
Q. Now, before I let you sit down,
6
7
could you pull up the graph there that we were
talking about, the color graph that shows the
! 8
chart. And this chart that you were just covering
9
up is an annualized measure of the lost profits,
: 0
correct?
b
A. Right, it is.
Q. And I know you're going to have to
refer to some notes on this, because -- would you
~4
identify for the jury losses not on an annualized
~5
. 6
basis but as between the different events that are
7
called out on this particular exhibit, which is
8
Exhibit No. -A. 4518.
~9
0
Q. Okay.
1
A. I'm going to run up here to get a
pen.
Mr. Banducci asked me to parse out
the $15 million according to different periods
5
along this. So I'm just going to basically write
Page 276li
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Now, was the information that you
developed in the course of your analysis shared
with Mr. Wilhoite?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And what was the purpose for sharing
that iAnformwationMr? W"lh . . d .
e11,
. I mte Is omg some
valuation calculations about what the value of the
future revenues that MRI would have done would be.
In other words, what their loss of future business
•

IS.

And to do that, he needed to see my
analysis as to how much revenue had been diverted
from IMI to MRI. So he basically doesn't want to
go and do a valuation ofMRIA in its injured
state. He wants to take the way it is today and
do a calculation to compare it to what it would
look like had basically Saint Alphonsus continued
to be affiliated with and fully support its
partner, MRIA.
Q. Now, with respect to the approach
that you've just shown the jury, why did you
choose that approach?
A. Well, as I indicated earlier, there
are choices depending upon the data and the facts.
Page 2763
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A Yeah.
1
Q Some of the things that are on this second half
2
of this document refer to -- let's take a look at this.
3
There is a "Summary Letter Report" at the very bottom
4
from PriceWaterhouseCoopers. No. 24 refers to a
5
"Valuation Analysis by Shattuck Hammond." No. 23 is a
6
"Fair Market Value Analysis," also by
7
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. So, you looked at work done by
8
other valuation experts. Is that true?
9
A Yes.
~0
Q Let's go to the next page, quickly.
l1
At the top of this page, there are a few other
1.2
things that are noteworthy. At the very top, No. 26,
h. 3
that's the "Strategic Options Assessment." Did you
i14
review that, as well?
!15
A Yes.
!16
Q Okay. And then, a little further down starting
In
!18
at-- oh, I guess, we should look at 29. That's the
"Shattuck Hammond Downtown Analysis and Equity Valuation 19
for MRIC." And then, we have got the "MRI Center of
;2 0
Idaho Monthly Internal Financial Statements," and so
21
forth.
22
Let's go to the bottom of the list, again, just
;2 3
for an illustrative purposes. Starting at 50 is -;2 4
25
excuse me -- starting at 51, is this some of the industry
Page 28591

information that you reviewed so that you could
1
understand both the national trends and industry
2
3
information relevant to your work?
4
A That's correct.
4
5
5
Q Okay. Very good. Thank you.
6
Well, I think from this point, Mr. Wilhoite, I'm
7
7 going to work backwards, in a sense. I'm going to ask
8
8 you, now, if you have reached an opinion as to value of
9
9 the lost profits, and then we're going to have you
~ o explain to the jury how you actually got to that number.
1
So, did you, Mr. Wilhoite, reach an opinion as
2 to lost profits based on diminished business value
3 between 2007 and 2023?
4
A Yes.
0.4
5
Q And what was that amount?
15
6
A That amount is $20.9 million.
16
7
Q All right. Now, can you explain to the jury how
17
18 you arrived at that number and what did you start with?
18
9
A Well, basically, I started with the analysis and
~9
2 0 conclusions where Mr. Budge left off. You heard
;2 0
2 1 Mr. Budge testifY yesterday that he performed a
;21
2 2 significant amount of analysis looking at lost referrals
2
23
which translates into lost revenue and lost profits for
23
2 4 MRIA. And he ended in 2006 with an estimate that MRIA
~4
2 5 lost approximately $3.7 million in profits as a result of
~5
Page 2860i
1

2
3

referrals that were diverted from MRIA when Saint
Alphonsus left and they went over to IMI.
So, from our perspective, that 3.7 million
dollars represents diverted or lost profits to MRIA that
would have been in our performance stream going forward.
So, we started at that point, and grew at 2023 when the
partnership was scheduled to end.
MR. BANDUCCI: Let me just show the jury what is
already in evidence as 4521. Actually, if you could just
put that up by Mr. Wilhoite just for a moment.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q Mr. Wilhoite, this is an exhibit that was shown
to the jury during the course of Mr. Budge's testimony.
Is the 3. 7 million on that exhibit?
A Yes.
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor? Objection,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Just a moment. Your objection is.
MR. GJORDING: I thought we started by
Mr. Wilhoite saying that he was going to justifY his
damage figure from 2007 forward. I think what he is
doing is just reiterating what we heard yesterday. I
think there is no foundation, and it's redundant.
THE COURT: Response?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, this is where he
Page 2861
started for his 2007 analysis. That's what he just
testified to.
THE COURT: Overruled. I'll allow it.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:

l3

2

Gil.
A (Witness complies.) What I have drawn here-if you look at 2006, the nonshaded block here represents
the actual profits that MRIA recognized in their
financial statements through 2006. And this, of course,
is after the acts of Saint Alphonsus and related parties.
The lost profits right here, $3.7 million,
Page 2862
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MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
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!1 1 partner, and you're not going to tell us what they are?
2

JAMES PROCHASKA, M.D.,
having been previously duly sworn to tell the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, was examined and
testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION ON REBUTTAL
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q Good morning, Dr. Prochaska.
A Good morning.
Q You thought you were done.
A Longago.
Q Doctor, you just passed me a note that says, "I
can demonstrate in quotes 'Tom's actions and statement'
at the December 17th meeting." And I know the jury is
dying to know what I must have done to cause Saint
Alphonsus to withdraw wrongfully. So, please
demonstrate -MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, I object to the
speech-MR. BANDUCCI: Well, Your Honor -MR. GJORDING: -- and the -- and the
mischaracterization -THE COURT: It is a mischaracterization.

3
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What if they affect the patient who is there right now?"
And I was feeling all alone, and I was getting worked up.
And Tom Banducci said, off to my right,
"Ms. Bruce, I'm going to have to ask you to put those in
writing for my client."
Q Do you have a recollection that I screamed?
A I just -- that was it.
Q Yesterday, Jeff Cliff testified, and you were
here to hear his testimony, were you not?
A Yes.
Q That he recalled a meeting with DMR regarding
the progress ofhis discussions with Alan Hahn at
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. Did his characterization of the
discussion with DMR comport with your recollection?
A Absolutely not.
Q Why not?
A Well, first of all, there were sort of two parts
of his story. And it's quite clear to me he was
confusing the conversations from '98 and '99 with the
conversations in 2000.
Q Why is that?
A Well, he said we were talking about
one-eleventh, the price of the one-eleventh, which, by
the way, was one-, two-, or three-elevenths, whichever

Page 4230

MR. BANDUCCI: Well, Your Honor, I'm sorry.
MR. GJORDING: Object to the speech.
MR. BANDUCCI: I'll withdraw the question.
THE COURT: Again, the comments will be
stricken, ladies and gentlemen. Get to your question.
MR. BANDUCCI: Fair enough.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q Now, I have no idea what you're going to do
here, Dr. Prochaska, so would you relate to the jury what
it is that occurred at this meeting on December 17th that
was referenced by Ms. Bruce?
A Can I say what happened the moment before you
did that?
Q Sure. Give context and give recollection.
A I had testified earlier that Sandra had claimed
that there were quality issues in our lab, and in the
process she had refused to tell us what they were. And I
had told her that we had reviewed the minutes, talked to
each other, talked to management, and we knew of no
report from Saint Al's that there had ever been a quality
ISSUe.

And she said, "We have said it over and over
again, and we're not going to do so again."
And I said, "Sandra, we're scanning patients
right now. If there are quality issues, you're a
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they chose. But-- and that Tom Henson had made some
comment, "If they would agree to that, they would agree
to more." We weren't talking about that anymore after my
letter in January.
Q Can we put the January letter up, please? That
would be -- I'm sure, Lauren, you have it memorized, but
I don't. Your Honor, that is Exhibit -- that would be
Exhibit-- I'm sorry. 4137.
THE COURT: 4137 has been admitted.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q This is the letter you're referring to?
A Yes, it is.
Q And you were referencing that letter in your
testimony?
A Yes.
Q How does that letter fit into what you were just
saying?
A Well, I think I testified earlier that after the
December-- what we have called the "ambush" meeting and
after this letter, there was no point discussing doing a
deal with the radiologists. Everything shifted to Saint
Al's buying us out, either by buying Center or by
splitting the two companies, and then doing whatever they
wanted to do with their radiologists. We were no longer
negotiating with the radiologists. We were no longer
Page 4233
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addressing that issue. It was history, and we knew it
after the December meeting and after I sent this letter.
Q Do you remember Jeff Cliff coming to you and
other members ofDMR saying he had a deal with Alan Hahn?
A No. And he wasn't negotiating for us.
Q When you say, "He wasn't negotiating for you,"
what do you mean?
A Well, first of all, the deal that we were
talking about -- MRI Center, a sale to Saint Al's, or
helping them finance it by letting them -- by us buying
them out of Mobile was not a DMR deal. It was the entire
rest of the MRI Board. We simply asked Jeff Cliff to get
involved, if he could, early in Alan Hahn's work -- when
you dropped the assumptions that ultimately generate the
fair market value because Alan Hahn had been part of the
PriceWaterhouse evaluation for the Henson unit which it
had been called a year earlier. And we thought the
assumptions and the history proved that assumptions in
that report were faulty.
So, we thought it would be best if we're going
to end up with a fair market value that someone from the
MRI Board get involved early on in developing the
assumptions. There were no negotiations. There was no
negotiating team from Saint Al's.
Q When you say, "There was no negotiating team,"
Page 4234
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1
what do you mean?
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, we have gone quite a
2
3
ways past the conversation. Object. Outside the scope.
MR. BANDUCCI: This is rebuttal, Your Honor.
4
MR. GJORDING: Defined rebuttal.
THE COURT: Well, I'll allow it. I'll allow a
little more latitude. Continue. Overruled.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q What do you mean by that?
A Well, there was no team to negotiate with from
Saint Al's. We were simply, with Alan Hahn, trying to
112
come up with the initial fair market number, and then,
both sides formed teams and started negotiating around
that number.
114
15
Q That didn't happen?
116
A Well, that didn't-- that wasn't where we were
117
at, and, in fact, the process just evaporated and it
never got there.
118
i19
Q What was DMR and MRIA's partnership perspective
on getting a deal done with the hospital relative to a
1
buyout in this January to June 2000 -- 2000 time frame?
2
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, I object. This is
3
beyond the -4
THE COURT: Well, I think it was covered in his
i2 5
direct examination, Mr. Banducci.
Page 4235!
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MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, this was actually
not. This is relative to the testimony of Jeff Cliff on
that issue.
THE COURT: All right. I'll overrule. I'll
give you a little more -MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I'm going to move to
the next topic after this.
THE COURT: Go ahead. You can ask the question.
THE WITNESS: Can you ask the question again?
MR. BANDUCCI: Sure.
THE WITNESS: Narrow it down a little more
clearly for me.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q What was DMR partners' and the MRIA hospital
partners' attitude toward getting a buyout done in the
January 2000 to June 2000 time frame?
MR. GJORDING: Objection. Foundation. Saint
Alphonsus's attitude?
THE COURT: Sustained. Rephrase.
MR. BANDUCCI: I don't think I talked about
Saint Alphonsus. I was talking about the perspective of
the DMR docs and the remaining MRIA hospital partners
relative to a buyout.
THE COURT: You mentioned "hospital partners."
What was-Page 4236
MR. BANDUCCI: As long as it's clear, I don't
know -- I'll rephrase the question so long as it's -THE COURT: Go ahead and rephrase it.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q Okay. I'm talking about members ofMRIA,
excluding Saint Alphonsus. That would be DMR and Holy
Rosary, Mercy, and West Valley Medical. What was the
perspective of those MRIA partners with respect to a
buyout in the January 2000 to June 2000 time frame?
A We were extremely interested in a resolution to
the problem that Saint Al's new vision presented us. And
we were very interested in -- for once, finding a fair
market number that Saint Al's would begin negotiating
with us around. We were hungry for that.
Q Okay. Let's go to a letter that was sent by
Dr. Seaboum to the referring community in January of
2005.
MR. BANDUCCI: Lauren, what number is that? I
believe that's January 5th, 2005.
MS. BLAESING: 4533.

~ ~~~~~~~ b~~~3~dmitted.

MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q Now, you were here -- do we have that on-Page 4237
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1

MRIA services after April 1,
THE COURT:

2

2005.

Don't they have a right though,

3

Mr. Ayer,

they are arguing that you began the

4

process of attempting to compete against them

5

during the period of noncompetition;

6

prior to the time that they even actually

7

withdrew,

8

want to be absolutely accurate,

9

right to argue in terms of their damages anything

in fact,

I guess I should say dissociated if we
don't they have a

10

that they can reasonably attribute to business

11

lost even after that date arising out of the

12

breach of that obligation not to compete prior to

13

that date?

14

So that my understanding of the Supreme

15

Court's decision was that they only drew one

16

absolute deadline on damages.

17

get any damages whatsoever after the 2015 date.

18

Period.

19

kind of profits out of this partnership after that

20

date,

21

date.

22

on the noncompete clause.

23

prove to the jury and the jury finds that there

24

was anti -- well,

25

action -- that there was action being taken to

That's it.

et cetera.

They said you can't

You had no expectation of any

They didn't draw an earlier

They didn't address an earlier date based
And if Mr. Banducci can

I shouldn't say anti-competitive

002262

1

compete or actual competition was taking place

2

during the period of the partnership then they can

3

argue those damages,

4

prove,

to that 2015 date.

5

that.

I'm concerned about saying,

6

get any damages for breach of the noncompetition

7

clause after 2005.

8

clause was breached prior to 2005.

9

advantage of any losses that they have up to 2015;

10
11

don't they?
MR.

such damages as they can

Well,

They can't go beyond
hey,

you don't

the noncompetition
They get the

Assuming they can prove --

AYER:

I

think,

Your Honor,

the way -- I

12

think Your Honor is basically correct.

13

think what it ends up meaning essentially is that

14

it is still true that we had a right to compete

15

after April 1,

16

they want to collect damages for things that

17

occurred after April 1,

18

caused by wrongful acts that we committed.

19

2005.

But I

What they need to prove if

2005 is that those are

Now most of the -- virtually all of the

20

basis for wrongful acts as this case is evolving

21

with knowing that we rightfully withdrew in 2004,

22

knowing that our fiduciary duty ended in 2004,

23

knowing that the covenant of good faith and fair

24

dealing ended in 2004 and knowing that the

25

noncompete ended in 2005 -- the question becomes,
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Introduction
My name is Bruce P. Budge. I am a Certified Public Accountant, and have devoted a substantial
part of my career to the analysis and quantification of money damages asserted in commercial
disputes. I have been retained by MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA LLP") to provide opinions on
the measurement of damages to MRIA LLP and its operating entities MRI Limited Partnership
("MRI Center") and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership ("MRI Mobile") (collectively "MRIA")
arising from its allegations against Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center (collectively "SARMC") in this matter. My curriculum vita, including a
listing of publications and prior testimony is attached as Schedule A. I submitted a previous
report dated March 12, 2007 in this matter ("Original Report") regarding my damages
conclusions through 2006.

I have been asked to update my Original Report based on the continued damages suffered by
MRIA in this matter since the date of my Original Report through 2010. This Supplemental
Report serves as the update to my Original Report and I incorporate all of my previous work
and opinions contained in my Original Report by reference.

MRIA alleges that SARMC, by its wrongful acts, usurped various partnership opportunities that
SARMC should have presented to its MRIA partners. One of the usurped opportunities was the
opportunity to partner with GSR radiologists and Intermountain Medical Imaging LLP ("IMI")
at the time IMI was formed. Further, MRIA contends that but for the encouragement, direct
support and affiliation of SARMC, IMI would never have provided MRI services at any of its
locations. As a result, I have been asked to calculate lost profits on the assumption that all of
IMI' s MRI scans were diverted from MRIA.

This calculation is referred to as Calculation

Method 5 in this report.

My method for calculating damages to MRIA has not changed, therefore I will discuss how my
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analysis of additional operating results from late 2006 through 2010 by the parties has led me to
update my damages figures which are presented in this Supplemental Report. The damages
figures included in this Supplemental Report supersede my earlier damages calculations.

Summary of Updated Opinions
For purposes of my analysis, I have assumed that SARMC will be found liable for the
allegations made by MRIA. To the extent all or some of the allegations are dismissed, my
damages calculations may be revised.

I may present schedules showing other damages

scenarios at trial, but those scenarios will be based on the schedules to this report and any new
data I may receive. As summarized in Schedule 1 attached to this report, my opinions are as
follows:

Figure 1
Ca/culaticm

Mt'llwd

Description
1999-2010 MRIA- Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All

Total

1

Meridian and Eagle Referrals
July 1, 2001- 2010 MRIA- Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus

$

46,321,037

2

All Meridian and Eagle Referrals
1999-2010 MRIA- Affiliated Downtown, Meridian and Eagle

$

43,874,369

3

Referrals
July 1, 2001 - 2010 MRIA- Affiliated Downtown, Meridian and

$

31,639,415

4

Eagle Referrals

$

29,192,747

5

1999-2010 MRIA- All IMI Scans

$

52,619,388

Calculation Method 1: 1999-2010: MRIA-Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridian and Eagle
Referrals
Under this calculation, I have calculated MRIA's damages from the inception of IMI in 1999
through 2010 to be composed of four components:
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1.

Damages From IMI's MRI operations on the Saint Alphonsus campus in Boise,
ID;

2.

Damages From IMI's MRI operations at the Magicview location in Meridian, ID;

3.

Damages From IMI's MRI operations at its Downtown location in Boise, ID; and

4.

Damages from IMI's MRI operations at its Eagle location in Eagle, ID.

Calculation Method 2: July 1, 2001-2010: MRIA-Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridian and
Eagle Referrals
The components of Calculation Method 2 are the same as Method 1, but the damage period has
been changed to begin on July 1, 2001. I understand July 1, 2001 to be on or about the date
when SARMC made its initial investment in IMI which, according to MRIA, breached the noncompetition clause within the MRIA Partnership Agreement.

Calculation Method 3: 1999-2010: MRIA-Affiliated Downtown, Meridian and Eagle Referrals
The components of Calculation Method 3 are the similar to Method 1, except that instead of
including all Meridian and Eagle physician referrals in the damages calculation, I have only
included referrals to Meridian and Eagle from physicians who had previously referred to MRIA
or who had a known exclusive affiliation with SARMC.

Calculation Method 4: July 1, 2001-2010: MRIA-Affiliated Downtown, Meridian and Eagle Referrals
The components of Calculation Method 4 are the same as Method 3, but the damage period has
been changed to begin on July 1, 2001. I understand July 1, 2001 to be on or about the date
when SARMC made its initial investment in IMI which, according to MRIA, breached the noncompetition clause within the MRIA Partnership Agreement.

Calculation Method 5: 1999-2010: All IMI Scans
The components of Calculation Method 5 are the same as Method 1, but all scans at IMI's
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Downtown location are treated as having been diverted from MRIA.l

I am prepared to calculate prejudgment interest on these or other amounts upon request.

Updated Damages Calculations
Below is an updated timeline of certain of the alleged events, combined with the MRI scan
volume of both MRI Center and IMI:

Chart 1
MRIC and IMI Scan Volume
20,000
18,000
16,000

SARMC
SARMC and IMI
Enter Operating
Agreement

Anruunces Plans
fortheiMIJoint
Venture

lMOpenson
H-eSARMC

Campus

14,000
IMIOpcns in
Meridian

IMIOpensin

12,000

lr-.11 Opens in
Eagle

SARMC
Dissociates

..._MRIC Scan Volume

fromf\.1RIA

Downtown

.,.IMI Scan Volume

10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

1

SARMC did not produce MRI financial results after 2007 for all MRI locations, however using the amounts used
to prepare Calculation 5 and estimating margins and capital expenditures for IMI based on the most current data
available, estimated net cash flow from operations for IMI from 1999 through 2010 was approximately $50.6
million of which 50% or $25.3 million would be allocated to SARMC.
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Lost Profits Calculations
I have calculated MRIA's damages from IMI's inception in September 1999 through 2010 in four
components:
1.

Damages From IMI's MRI operations on the SARMC campus in Boise, ID;

2.

Damages From IMI's MRI operations at the Magicview location in Meridian, ID;

3.

Damages from IMI's MRI operations at its Eagle location in Eagle, ID; and

4.

Damages From IMI's MRI operations at its Downtown location in Boise, ID.

This method will be applicable if the Trier-of-fact finds damages to MRIA began at IMI' s
inception in September of 1999 based on the allegations in this matter.

IMI's Operations on the SARMC Campus
Updating the same method discussed in my Original report through 2010, I have calculated the
amount of MRIA's lost scans and profits on the SARMC campus through 2010 resulting from
SARMC' s wrongful acts to be as follows:

Figure 2

2005
SARMC- Scan Volume

n

Amounts Paid

2,922

2007

Total

$44,609 $2,097,996 $3,662,979 $3,589,819 $4,023,799 $4,290,550

$ 17,709,752

d=b*c

$ 29,420 $ 1,383,649 $ 2,415,772 $ 2,069,080 $ 2,283,427 $ 2,543,119

65.951%

57.637%

5,375

2010

b

65.951%

4,768

2009

23,728

65.951%

4,478

2008

6,123

Variable Margin
Lost Profits

2006
62

56.748%

59.273%
$ 10,724,467

IMI' s Meridian Operations
Updating the same method discussed in my Original report through 2010, I have calculated the
amount of MRIA's lost scans and profits at the Meridian location through 2010 resulting from
SARMC' s wrongful acts to be as follows:
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Figure 3

Magicview- Scan Volume
Amounts Paid

Profit as a Percentage of Amount Paid

2,060

4,267

5,886

6,966

7,680

7,085

4,649

4,687

4,567

47,847

$ 1,915,095

$3,943,194

$ 5,255,624

$6,015,066

$ 5,675,520

$5,819,334

$3,495,323

$3,362,644

$2,958,791

$ 3M,440,592

Less: Capital Expenditures

59.382'){,

63.946'Y,,

Lost Profits before Capital Expenditures $ 1,224,627

$ 2,341,547

($ 2,227,440)

63.879'}(,

62.717%
$ 3,296,170

$3,842,364

61.877'){,

$3,511,842

52.326'}1,

59.874'){,

$ 3,484,268

$ 1,828,963

51.519'}{,
$ 1,732,400

($ 1,565,280)

53.811'}{,
$1,592,155

$ 22,854,336
($ 3,792,720)

Lost Profits

$19,061,616

IMI's Eagle Operations
MRIA alleges that SARMC usurped MRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR and IMI to open
additional facilities. Additionally, as a partner in MRIA and as a party to the MRIA Partnership
Agreement, SARMC should not have facilitated or supported IMI's expansion into Eagle, Idaho.
Had SARMC instead assisted MRIA in partnering with IMI and establishing the Eagle location,
I performed calculations under the assumption that MRIA would have performed the scans that
IMI received.

Updating the same method discussed for the Meridian location in my Original

Report, I have calculated the amount of MRIA' s lost scans and profits at the Eagle location from
2007, when it was opened, through 2010 to be as follows:

Figure 4

Eagle- Scan Volume
Amounts Paid
Profit as a Percentage of Amount Paid
Lost Profits before Capital Expenditures
Less: Capital Expenditures
Lost Profits

973

3,865

3,923

4,374

13,135

$807,499

$3,194,500

$2,966,943

$2,931,294

$9,900,235

67.080%
$541,670

58.624%

57.720%

60.287%

$ 1,872,744

$1,712,519

$ 1,767,189

$1,872,744

$1,712,519

$ 1,767,189

($ 1,656,600)
($1,114,930)

$5,894,122
($ 1,656,600)
$4,237,522
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Alternative Calculation for Meridian and Eagle
As an alternative calculation (presented in schedules for Calculation Methods 3 and 4), I also
computed lost Meridian and Eagle revenues and profits under the assumption that only scans
for patients referred from SARMC affiliated physicians and physicians who had previous
relationships and referral patterns with MRI Center would have been performed by MRIA at
Meridian and Eagle. This assumption reflects lower revenues and costs, as the reduced number
of scans would have required the use of only one MRI imaging device in Meridian, as opposed
to two as in the case where all scans would have been performed.

Lost profits for Meridian

and Eagle under these assumptions are computed for inclusion in Calculation Methods 3 and 4
as follows:

Figure 5
Location 2: Magicview- West (Meridian), Calculation Methods 3 & 4
2tHl2

Magicview- Scan Volume
Amounts Paid

Less: Capital Expenditures
Lost Profits

2\lO.t

2,340

200;

2,832

$ 1,070,775 $2,103,981 $2,517,665

Profit as a Percentage of Amotmt Paid
Lost Profits before Capital Expenditures

2003

1,184

63.946%

d=b""c

e

59.382<Y,,

20011

2,989

2007

2llOH

20,943

62.947%

60.930%

53.249%

1,897

Total

$17,068,818

$684,718 $1,249,386 $1,608,108 $1,711,793 $1,475,928 $1,473,999

1,887

2010

$2,634,987 $ 2,344,716 $2,419,168 $1,416,789 $1,373,241 $1,187,496
64.964%

2,930

2009

1,815

63.873%

3,069

52.428%

54.760%

$754,426

$719,963

$650,273

$754,426

$719,963

$650,273

($ 2,227,440)

$10,328,594
($ 2,227 ,440)

rd-e ($1,542,722) $1,249,386 $1,608,108 $1,711,793 $ 1,475,928 $1,473,999

$8,101,154

Figure 6
Location 3: Eagle Health Plaza, Calculation Methods 3 & 4
2007
Eagle Health Plaza - Scan Volume
Amounts Paid
Profit as a Percentage of Amount Paid
Lost Profits before Capital Expenditures

2009

2010

1,489

1,621

4,904

$ 301,233

$ 1,156,531

$ 1,102,761

$ 1,088,754

$3,649,279

$202,067

58.624%
$678,005

57.720%
$636,514

60.287%
$656,377

($ 1,656,600)

f=d-e

Total

1,420

67.080%
d~b'c

Less: Capital Expenditures
Lost Profits

2008
374

($ 1,454,533)

$ 2,172,963
($ 1,656,600)

$678,005

$636,514

$656,377

$ 516,363

IMI's Downtown Operations
Updating the same method discussed in my Original report through 2010, I have calculated the
amount of MRIA's lost scans and profits at the Downtown location from 1999 through 2010
resulting from SARMC' s wrongful acts to be as follows:
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Figure 7
199'1

211UH

!HU 1

20112

2HU1

!Uti-'

20(1.;;

!OU(o

2UU7

!UHS

2UU'J

!UW

434

2,033

3,011

2,600

2,180

~950

l667

1,548

1,713

1,589

1,520

1,615

21,860

$370,746

$ 1,736,529

$ 2,57:!,699

$2,288,750

$ 1,962,964

$ 1,71U96

$ 1,461,318

$ 1,221,372

H437,375

$ 1,193,635

$ 1,065,761

$ l073,6t!

$ 18,096,056

Dov.ntooo ·Scan Volume
Amount Paid

68.173%,

72 269%

74.935'%

$ 252,749

$ 1,254,972

$ 1,927,852

Variabk:Margm

Lost Pro fits

68.429'%
$

1,566,169

I n1 11

70 053%

74.459'%

65.95rYn

65.95rYu

65.95!"/.,

57.637'%

56.748%

59 273%

$ 1,375,115

$ 1,274,?14

$ 963,754

$ 805,507

$ 947,963

$ 687,981

$ 604,798

$ 636,357

$ 12,297,431

For purposes of Calculation Method 2 and 4, I have also calculated these amounts for IMI Downtown
scans diverted form MRIA for the period July 1, 2001 to 2010. These amounts are as follows:

Figure 8
Location 4: Downtown. Calculation Methods 2 & 4
2lltl1

2ll02

21Hl1

2\Hl-l

2ll();

2llllh

2007

2UWl

2llOY

2t!IO

lot.ll

2,600

2,180

1,950

1,667

1,548

1,713

1,589

1,520

1,615

17,922

$1.073.612

$14,735,767

$1,319,684 $2,288.750

Amount Paid

Variable Margin
Lost Profits

1

1,540

lliwntown- Scan Volume

d=b•c

74.935%

68.429%

$ 988,905

$1,566,169

$1.962.964 $1,711,296 $1,461,318 $1.221,372 $1,437,375 $1.193,635 $1,065,761
70.053%

74.459%

65.951%

$1,375,115 $1,274,214 $ 963,754

65.951%

65.951%

57.637%

56.748%

59.273%

$ 805,507

$ 947,963

$ 687,981

$ 604,799

$ 636,357

$ 9.850.764

In addition, if the trier-of-fact concludes that SARMC usurped MRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR
and IMI or that IMI would never have commenced operations as a provider of MRI services but for
SARMC's affiliation with it, the following calculation assumes for use in Calculation Method 5 that all of
IMI Downtown scans were diverted from MRIA:

Figure 9
Location4· Downtown, Calculation Method 5

Downtown- Scan Volume

651

Profit as a Pt'rcentag... of Amount Paid

56.030%

rf ...b•c

Less: Capital Expenditures
Lost Profits

4,126

$553,352 $2,591,834 $3,814,865 $3,657,361

AmountsPa1d

Lost Prof1ts bl'foreCapJtal b:pend1hues

3,048

4,486

62.831%

64.450'"·

63.583'!(,

3,916

3,664

3,274

3,586

4,057

$3,473,943 $3,173,579 $2,837,388 $2,671,570 $3,358,721
61.205'!(,

60.350%

59.959%

60.134'!(,

60.309%

$310,043 $1,628,475 $2,458,680 $2,325,460 $2,126,227 $ 1,915,255 $ 1,701,269 $ 1,606,522 $2,025,611

3,917

42,763

$3,081,378 $2,781,942 $2,616,593

$34,612,526

4,110

52.707%

3,928

51.893%

54.202%

$1,624,102 $ 1,443,633 $1,418,246

$20,583,523

$1,624,102 $1,443,633 $1,418,246

$18,595,783

($1,987,740)
f~rl-e

($1,987,740)

($1,677,697} $1,628,475 $2,458,680 $2,325,460 $2,126,227 $ 1,915,255 $ 1,701,269 $1,606,522 $2,025,611

Note that the variable margin in Calculation Method 5 differs from other methods in that other
methods assume lost scans would have been performed at MRIA' s campus location, while
Calculation Method 5 assumes that a separate facility with associated capital expenditures
equivalent to IMI' s expenditures would have been required due to increased volume.
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MRIA 's Ability to Perform Lost Scans

But for SARMC' s wrongful acts, I have calculated that MRIA would have performed an
additional 45,588 MRI scans at its SARMC campus location (including Downtown), an
additional 47,847 MRI scans in Meridian, and an additional 13,135 MRI scans in Eagle through
2010. Based on my analysis and discussions with MRIA management, MRIA would have had
the capacity to perform these scans.

The chart below shows MRI Center's actual and but-for scan volume on the SARMC campus:

Chart 2
Actual and But-for MRIC Scan Volume
14,000 ,................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... ,

12,000

IMI Opens
But-for Scan Volume

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

Actual MRIC Scan Volume

2,000

MRI Center has two magnets on the SARMC campus. But-for2 SARMC' s wrongful acts, the
scan volume in 2001 of 12,559 represents an increase of 2,822 scans (29.0%) over MRI Center's
highest actual volume of 9,737.3 Based on my discussions with Jack Floyd, MRI Center has

2
3

But-for scan volume is equal to actual scan volume plus lost scan volume.
See Schedule 11.
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adequate capacity to perform in excess of 12,000 scans per year based on scheduling
considerations. This capacity is adequate to accommodate the number of lost scans I have
calculated. Calculation Methods 1 and 2 assume MRI Mobile would operate 2 MRI fixed units in
Meridian and 1 MRI in Eagle just as IMI has done.

The chart below shows the but-for scan volume that MRI Mobile would have performed in
Meridian and Eagle through 2010:

Chart 3

But-for MRIM Scan Volume

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

IMI performed this scan volume with two magnets in Meridian and one magnet in Eagle. I
have assumed that MRI Mobile would have had to incur similar costs for the purchase and
operation of fixed magnets as those incurred by IMI in Meridian and Eagle to perform these
scans. These costs include capital expenditures for magnets and medical equipment as well as
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all of IMI' s operating costs, and have been deducted from my calculations in the years they
would have been incurred.

Summary of Lost Profits and Apportionment Among Injured MRIA Entities
The following table summarizes the Lost Profits computed by me under Calculation Methods 1
through 5. In addition, counsel requested that I apportion these lost profits among MRIA,
MRIA Center (MRIC) and MRIA Mobile (MRIM). For this purpose I was instructed to assume
that all SARMC campus and Downtown scans would have been performed by MRIC, and that
all Meridian and Eagle scans would have been provided by MRIM. From these scan revenues,
MRIA would have received a 7.5% administrative fee. Calculation Methods 3 & 4 assume that
all scans would have been performed by MRIC less the MRIA fee.

The following table

summarizes lost profits under the various Calculation Methods as follows:

Figure 10
Calmlalw11

a

b

c

a+b+c

r--IRIC

MRtr-.1

r--IRIA

Total Damages

Method

Description
1999-2010- Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All

1

Meridian and Eagle Referrals
July 1, 2001 - 2010- Affiliated Downtown Referrals

$

20,336,462

$

19,673,577

$

6,310,998

$

46,321,037

2

Plus All Meridian and Eagle Referrals
1999-2010- Affiliated Downtown, Meridian and

$

18,141,816

$

19,673,577

$

6,058,976

$

43,874,369

3

Eagle Referrals
July 1, 2001 - 2010- Affiliated Downtown, Meridian

$

27,400,122

$

-

$

4,239,293

$

31,639,415

4

and Eagle Referrals

$

25,205,476

$

-

$

3,987,271

$

29,192,747

5

1999-2010- All IMIScans

$

25,396,078

$

$

7,549,733

$

52,619,388

19,673,577

Control of IMI by SARMC and ICR
My opinions as discussed in my Original Report remain unchanged.
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Additional Documents and Information Considered
Additional documents and information I considered in reaching my opinions are listed at
Supplemental Schedule B or are referenced in this report.

Potential Additional Analyses
I understand that additional information is still being received from SARMC When I receive
that information, I may update this report if necessary.

I further anticipate responding to other

expert reports that may be prepared at the request of Counterdefendants.

Compensation
My billing rate for the services in this matter is $495 per hour, and others performing work at
my direction are billing at rates for services in this matter are $150 to $410 per hour.

Bruce P. Budge
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INTRODUCTION

My name is Charles A. Wilhoite. Currently, I maintain professional designations as a Certified Public
Accountant/Certified in Financial Forensics/Accredited in Business Valuation, and an Accredited Senior
Appraiser in business valuation. These designations, among others, are described in my detailed curriculum
vitae, attached to this opinion as Appendix B.
Based on my professional training and experience with regard to business valuation and related financial
and economic analysis, I have been retained by MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA LLP") to provide an
independent estimate of the economic damages MRIA LLP and its operating entities, MRI Limited
Partnership ("MRI Center") and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership ("MRI Mobile") (hereafter collectively
referred to as "MRIA") experienced as a result of the alleged wrongful acts (the "Acts") committed by
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively
"SARMC").
For the purpose of completing this analysis and developing my opinons, I have reviewed various financial,
corporate and related documents and information provided to me relating to MRIA and this litigation, and
conducted independent research and analysis with regard to relevant industry (i.e., medical imaging
services), economic, and investment considerations.
I previously submitted an opinion with regard to this matter dated March 12, 2007 (the "2007 Opinion"), the
relevant standards, premises, findings, key assumptions, and conclusions of which are incorporated herein
by reference.

A. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE
The objective of this analysis is to modify and supplement the 2007 Opinion by estimating the economic
damages incurred by MRIA as a result of the Acts of SARMC considering the Idaho Supreme Court
Ruling limiting the potential for future lost profits to those incurred through the year 2015. 1 The purpose
of this analysis is to provide an independent opinion regarding the estimated economic damages incurred
by MRIA. No other purpose is intended or should be inferred.

B. SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC DAMAGES
Table 1 presents a summary of the economic damages incurred by MRIA, assuming that the Court holds
that the Counterdefendants and Third Party Defendants are liable for the Acts.

1

See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 497, 224 P.3d 1068,

1086 (2009).
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'D ama!!es
T a bl e 1 : Summarvo fE COllOffilC

Alternative
I

2
3
4
5
1
2
3

Basis
Lost Business Value-Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridian & Eagle Referrals 2
Lost Business Value-Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridian & Eagle Referrals
Lost Business Value-Affiliated Downtown, Meridian & Eagle Referrals 3
Lost Business Value-Affiliated Downtown, Meridian & Eagle Referrals
Lost Business Value-All IMI Scans4

Economic
Dama2es
$20,400,000
$20,400,000
$13,900,000
$13,900,000
$23,200,000

Lost Future Profits-Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridian & Eagle Referrals
through 20 15 5
Lost Future Profits-Affiliated Downtown, Meridian & Eagle Referrals through 2015"
Lost Future Profits-All IMI Scans through 2015

$15,600,000
$10,600,000
$17,700,000

While I have not been requested to perform additional analysis to date, I understand that I may be asked to
revise my analysis and update my opinions based on revised or updated information received through the
date of trial. Additionally, I understand that I may be requested to review and address reports and/or
opinions submitted by experts retained on behalf of the Counterdefendants and Third Party Defendants.

2

Represents the estimated detrimental impact on the current value of MRIA as a result of lost revenues in calendar
2010 attributable to lost referral streams and related services that were performed by IMI as relating to Downtown
referrals plus all Meridian and Eagle Health Plaza referrals. Includes the economic impact of associated lost
management fee income and related value.
3
Represents the estimated detrimental impact on the current value of MRIA as a result of lost revenues in calendar
2010 attributable to lost referral streams and related services that were performed by IMI as relating to Downtown
referrals plus affiliated physician Meridian and Eagle Health Plaza referrals. Includes the economic impact of
associated lost management fee income and related value.
4
Represents the estimated detrimental impact on the current value of MRIA as a result of lost revenues in calendar
2010 attributable to lost referral streams and related services that were performed by IMI. Includes the economic
impact of associated lost management fee income and related value.
5
IMI-related lost business includes IMI scans performed on the SARMC campus, IMI scans pertormed at the
Magicview facility in Meridian, IMI scans performed at the IMI downtown Boise location and IMI scans performed
at Eagle Health Plaza resulting from referrals from SARMC-attiliated physicians and physicians who had previous
relationships and referral patterns with MRIA. Includes the economic impact of associated lost management fee
income and related value.
6
IMI-related lost business includes IMI scans performed on the SARMC campus, IMI scans performed at the
Magicview facility in Meridian, IMI scans performed at the IMI downtown Boise location and IMI scans performed
at Eagle Health Plaza resulting from referrals from SARMC-affiliated physicians who had previous relationships
and referral patterns with MRIA. Includes the economic impact of associated lost management fee income and
related value.
7
IMI-related lost business includes IMI scans (assuming all IMI business was inappropriately diverted from MRIA).
Includes the economic impact of associated lost management fee income and related value.
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C. DAMAGES ANALYSIS
As discussed in the 2007 Opinion, and assuming the Acts are proven, I have estimated the economic
damages incurred by MRIA based on the premise that the Acts resulted in (1) the loss of historical
relationships and (2) the diversion of future business opportunities with regard to the operations of MRIA.
The loss of historical relationships and the diversion of business opportunities can be equated to lost
revenues and economic returns, which exert a detrimental impact on the current fair market value of MRIA.
It is my understanding that Bruce P. Budge of FTI Consulting, Inc., will provide expert opinions regarding
the estimated economic damages, represented by historical lost profits, incurred by MRIA as a result of the
Acts (the "FTI Analysis"). I have been asked to provide an independent estimate of the future lost profits, as
represented primarily by the decline in business value, incurred by MRIA as a result of the Acts. To develop
an estimate of the future lost profits, I have analyzed the following:

1. The estimated loss of future profits that will be incurred by MRIA through 2015 as a result of the
Acts.
2.

The incremental fair market value that MRIA would reflect currently but-for the loss of historical
relationships and diverted business opportunity caused by the Acts.

Estimated Impact of the Acts on MRIA
Absent the Acts on the part of SARMC, the improved operating performance and related financial results
of MRIA at the end of 2010, relating to lost business relationships and business opportunities, would
result in a higher, current fair market valuation.
The FTI Analysis· indicates that the following referral relationships, business opportunities and related
revenues and profits were lost to MRIA in 2010 as a result of the Acts:
.
. I R ef erra sandB usmess
I
T a ble 2 : 2010 I mpact ofL OS t H"IS t onca
01pport um"f1es-DT/All M en"d"IanIE agJe
Magicview
Eagle
(Meridian)
Downtown
SARMC
Health
Total
Fundamental
1,615
4,567
6,123
4,374
16,679
Scan Volume
$1,073,612
$2,958,791
$4,290,550
$2,931,294
$11,254,24 7
Net Revenue
$636,357
$1,592,155
$2,543,119
$1,767,189
$6,538,820
Lost Profits

The estimated impact on MRIA's 2010 performance noted in Table 2 above results from the loss of scan
volumes, net revenue and lost profits attributable to procedures performed at IMI facilities in the locations
identified that otherwise would have been performed by MRIA absent the Acts of SARMC. The
Magicview (Meridian) impact and the Eagle Health impact presented in Table 2 assumes all scans
conducted at IMI's Magicview facility and Eagle Health facility would have been performed by MRIA.
This assumption is based on the premise that fiduciary obligations owed by SARMC to MRIA required
that the business opportunities represented by Meridian should have been developed with MRIA and that
but for the Acts of SAMRC those facilities would not have been built.
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.
. lRe£erra san dBusmess
..
T abl e 3 : 2010 I mpact ofL ost H"1stonca
01pportumt1es-Affil"
11ated PhlYSICians
Magicview
Eagle
Fundamental
Downtown
(Meridian)
SARMC
Health
Total

Scan Volume
Net Revenue
Lost Profits

1,615
$1,073,612
$636,357

1,815
$1,187,496
$650,273

6,123
$4,290,550
$2,543,119

1,621
$1,088,754
$656,377

11,174
$7,640,412
$4,486,126

The estimated impact on MRIA's 2010 performance noted in Table 3 above results from the loss of scan
volumes, net revenue and lost profits attributable to procedures performed at IMI facilities in the locations
identified that otherwise would have been performed by MRIA absent the Acts of SARMC. The
Magicview (Meridian) and Eagle Health impact presented in Table 3 assumes only those scans conducted
at IMI's Magicview facility and Eagle Health facility on patients referred from SARMC-affiliated
physicians and physicians with prior relationships and referral patterns with MRIA would have been
performed by MRIA. Once again, this assumption is based on the premise that fiduciary obligations owed
by SARMC to MRIA required that the business opportunities represented by Meridian and Eagle Health
should have been developed with MRIA rather than IMI and that but for the Acts of SAMRC those
facilities would not have been built.
.
. IR£
e erra san dBusmess
T a bl e 4 : 2010 I mpact ofL ost H"1stonca
0Jpportumtles-All IMI Scans
Magicview
Eagle
(Meridian)
SARMC
Health
Fundamental
Downtown
Total

Scan Volume
Net Revenue
Lost Profits

3,917
$2,616,593
$1,418,246

4,567
$2,958,791
$1,592,155

6,123
$4,290,550
$2,543,119

4,374
$2,931,294
$1,767,189

18,981
$12,797,228
$7,320,709

The estimated impact on MRIA's 2010 performance noted in Table 4 above results from the loss of scan
volumes, net revenue and lost profits attributable to procedures performed at IMI facilities in the locations
identified that otherwise would have been performed by MRIA absent the Acts of SARMC. The
estimated impact assumes that all scans conducted by IMI would have been performed by MRIA. Once
again, this assumption is based on the premise that fiduciary obligations owed by SARMC to MRIA
required that the business opportunity realized by IMI should have been developed with MRIA and that
but for the Acts of SAMRC those facilities would not have been built.

Decreased Current Business Value of MRIA Attributable to the Acts-Lost Revenue Basis
But for the Acts of SARMC, MRIA would reflect incremental operating statistics and financial results
that would exert a positive impact on the current fair market value of MRIA (as collectively representing
the operating entities of MRIC and MRIM). The improved operating statistics and related financial results
that would have been realized but-for the Acts of SARMC can be converted to incremental value for
MRIA.
First, and as a result of the Acts, MRIA has experienced a decrease in operating revenue attributable to
the lost scans. The analysis of publicly available information indicates that investments in imaging
businesses currently produce pricing indicators ranging from approximately 1.2 times to 1.7 times
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revenues. In other words, the prices that investors currently are paying to purchase interests in imaging
businesses translate into a multiple of 1.2 times to 1.7 times the revenues of the related businesses. 8
In essence, the decrease in the operating revenue level for MRIA as a result of the Acts has resulted in a
decrease in the current value of MRIA. Because the lost revenue would be continuing in nature, or
forward-looking, the conversion of the lost revenue to current value can be equated to the calculation of
lost business value (in essence capturing lost future profits).

Additionally, the loss of future scan revenues by MRIA as a result of the Acts triggers the loss of
management fees that MRIA would have earned.
Exhibits 2 and 3, and Table 5, summarize my analysis regarding (1) the estimated current value ofthe lost
management fees and (2) the decrease in the business value of MRIA as a result of the lost revenues
attributable to the Acts.

'D amaees Base d on L OS tRevenues
T a ble 5 : E sf 1mat edE COnOIDIC
Lost Business
Lost Management
Alternative
Value
Fee Value
!-Downtown/Meridian/Eagle Referrals (1999)
$16,200,000
$4,200,000
2-Downtown/Meridian/Eagle Referrals (200 I)
$16,200,000
$4,200,000
3-Affiliated Downtown/Meridian/Eagle (I 999)
$11,000,000
$2,900,000
4-Affiliated Downtown/Meridian/Eagle (200 I)
$11,000,000
$2,900,000
5- All IMI Scans ( 1999)
$18,400,000
$4,800,000

Total Damages
Future Lost Profits
$20,400,000
$20,400,000
$13,900,000
$13,900,000
$23,200,000

It is important to note that the assumed commencement period for the damages-i.e., either 1999 or

2001-exerts no impact on the estimated damages between Alternatives 1 and 2, or between Alternatives
3 and 4, based on the fact that the revenue loss by 2010 is consistent.

Decreased Current Business Value of MRIA Attributable to the Acts-Lost Future Profits
Based on the estimated profits lost to MRIA as a result of the Acts of SARMC, the indicated decrease in
the current fair market value of MRIA is summarized in Table 6. The summary presented in Table 6 is
based on analysis detailed in Exhibits 1-1 through 1-7 as follows:
);>

Alternative 1-Decreased Business Value-Mfiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridian
and Eagle Referrals-through 2015, representing trended lost profits through an assumed
Partnership termination date of 2015, and assuming the related IMI business (i.e., Downtown,
Meridian, SARMC and Eagle Health) would have been realized by MRIA.

);>

Alternative 2-Decreased Business Value-Affiliated Downtown, Meridian and Eagle
Referrals-through 2015, representing trended lost profits through an assumed Partnership
termination date of 2015, and assuming IMI business (i.e., Downtown, Meridian, SARMC and

8

It is worth noting that the Shattuck Hammond analysis ofMRIA in 2001, and the Wellspring Valuation analysis of
MRIA in 2004, resulted in average revenue pricing multiples or 2.1 and 1.5, respectively.

Willamette Management Associates
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Eagle Health) would have been realized by MRIA, with the exception of non-SARMC affiliated
physician referrals and prior relationships.

>-

Alternative 3- Decreased Business Value-All IMI Business-through 2015, representing
trended lost profits through an assumed Partnership termination date of 2015, and assuming all
IMI business (i.e., Downtown, Meridian, SARMC and Eagle Health) would have been realized by
MRIA.

. D a mages B ase d on L OS t F u t ure P ro fit
T a bl e 6 : E st"1mat edE conom1c
1s
Lost Future
Lost Management
Profits
Fee Value
Alternative

!-Affiliated Downtown, Plus All Meridian/Eagle
1-Lost Management Fee Value
-- --- OR---- 2-Affiliated Downtown/Meridian/Eagle
2-Lost Management Fee Value

Total Damages
Future Lost Profits

$13,700,000
$1,900,000

$15,600,000

$1,300,000

$10,600,000

$2,100,000

$17,700,000

$9,300,000

-- --- OR---- -

3- All IMI Scans
3-Lost Management Fee Value

$15,600,000

D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Should the trier of fact determine that SARMC committed the Acts, it is my opinion that the economic
damages incurred by MRIA, representing lost profits/a decrease in current fair market value ofMRIA, are
reasonable as stated in Table 5 and Table 6, above. It is important to note that each of the numbered
alternatives represents an independent estimation of damages based on a unique set of circumstances, and
that the alternatives are not intended to be additive.
I am independent of MRIA and all parties identified with regard to this litigation. I was compensated for
my services at my standard hourly rate of $450, and my firm was reimbursed for direct, out-of-pocket
costs. The hourly billing rates for other staff members who provided services relating to this matter
ranged from $70 to $250.
This memorandum is intended to provide an independent opinion(s) with regard to the litigation referenced
above. It does not include all of the analysis that was completed for this assignment, and I may update or
supplement this analysis through the date of trial based upon the receipt and consideration of additional
information which I understand that SARMC is still in the process of producing. It is not intended to provide
legal, accounting, or taxation advice.

WILLAMETIE MANAGEMENT AsSOCIATES

Charles A. Wilhoite, CPA/ABV/CFF, CMA, ASA, CFM
Managing Director

Willamette Management Associates
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Introduction
My name is Bruce P. Budge. I am a Certified Public Accountant, and have devoted a substantial
part of my career to the analysis and quantification of money damages asserted in commercial
disputes. I have been retained by MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA LLP") to provide opinions on
the measurement of damages arising from its allegations against the Counterdefendants and
Third Party Defendants in this matter. I have submitted previous reports in this matter (The
March 12, 2007 "Original Report", the May 2, 2011 "Supplemental Report", and the May 19,
2011 "Amendment to the Supplemental Report") regarding my damages conclusions through
2010.

Since the issuance of my previous reports, I have been provided with the June 15, 2011 Expert
Report of Thomas R. McCarthy, Ph.D. ("McCarthy" report). I have been asked to provide a
rebuttal to certain issues raised in the McCarthy report. I incorporate all of my previous work
and opinions contained in my previous reports by reference including my CV and documents
considered.

Rebuttal Opinions and Basis Thereon
In his report on page 23, Mr. McCarthy pointed out inconsistencies between my handling of
MRIA' s administrative fee and Mr. Wilhoite's handling of that fee, including the potential of a
double recovery. 1 Because MRIA's recovery of any lost administrative fees is contingent upon
(and calculated based upon) the recovery oflost profits by MRIC and MRIM, MRIA's recovery
would be taken from the limited partnerships' recovery, after an award by the jury. Therefore, in
order to avoid a double recovery, I have performed the following calculations which do not
separate out a lost management fee calculation for MRIA:

1

June 15, 2011 Expert Report of Thomas R. McCarthy, Ph.D.

Confidential - 3

002289

lmF

Rebuttal Expert Report of Bruce P. Budge

T

I

July 29, 2011

Rebuttal Figure 1
Calculatwn

a

b

a+b

MRIC

MRIM

Total Damages

Method

Description
1999-2010- Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All

1

Meridian and Eagle Referrals
July 1, 2001- 2010- Affiliated Downtown Referrals

$

23,021,898

$

23,299,139

$

46,321,037

2

Plus All Meridian and Eagle Referrals
1999- 2010- Affiliated Downtown, Meridian and

$

20,575,230

$

23,299,139

$

43,874,369

3

Eagle Referrals
July 1, 2001- 2010- Affiliated Downtown, Meridian

$

31,639,415

$

-

$

31,639,415

4

and Eagle Referrals

$

29,192,747

$

-

$

29,192,747

5

1999-2010- All IMl Scans

$

29,320,249

$

$

52,619,388

23,299,139

The total damages figures above are unchanged from my Supplemental Report.

I have also learned that Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("SARMC") did not begin
participating in the MRI profits of IMI until April1, 2005. Revising footnote 1 of my
Supplemental Report to reflect this fact shows that the estimated net cash flow from operations
for IMI from April1, 2005 through 2010 was approximately $37.4 million of which 50% or $18.7
million would be allocated to SARMC.

Additional Documents and Information Considered
Additional documents and information I considered in reaching my opinions not otherwise
listed in my previous reports are listed and referenced in this report.

Confidential - 4
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Potential Additional Analyses
I may perform additional analyses should additional information be produced in this matter
and provided to me.

Compensation
My billing rate for the services in this matter is $495 per hour, and others performing work at
my direction are billing at rates for services in this matter are $150 to $410 per hour.

Bruce P. Budge
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INTRODUCTION

My name is Charles A. Wilhoite. Currently, I maintain professional designations as a Certified Public
Accountant/Certified in Financial Forensics/Accredited in Business Valuation, and an Accredited Senior
Appraiser in business valuation. These designations, among others, are described in my detailed curriculum
vitae, attached to this opinion as Appendix B.
Based on my professional training and experience with regard to business valuation and related financial
and economic analysis, I have been retained by MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA LLP") to provide an
independent estimate of the economic damages MRIA LLP and its operating entities, MRI Limited
Partnership ("MRI Center") and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership ("MRI Mobile") (hereafter collectively
referred to as "MRIA") experienced as a result of the alleged wrongful acts (the "Acts") committed by
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively
"SARMC").
For the purpose of completing this analysis and developing my opinions, I have reviewed various financial,
corporate and related documents and information provided to me relating to MRIA and this litigation, and
conducted independent research and analysis with regard to relevant industry (i.e., medical imaging
services), economic, and investment considerations.
I previously submitted opinions with regard to this matter dated March 12, 2007 (the "2007 Opinion"), and
May 2, 2011 (the "Updated Opinion), the relevant standards, premises, findings, key assumptions, and
conclusions of which are incorporated herein by reference.'

A. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE
The objective of this analysis is to modify and supplement the 2007 Opinion by estimating the economic
damages incurred by MRIA as a result of the Acts of SARMC considering the Idaho Supreme Court
Ruling limiting the potential for future lost profits to those incurred through the year 2015. 2 The purpose
of this analysis is to provide an independent opinion regarding the estimated economic damages incurred
by MRIA. No other purpose is intended or should be inferred.

B. SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC DAMAGES
Table 1 presents a summary of the economic damages incurred by MRIA, assuming that the Court holds
that the Counterdefendants and Third Party Defendants are liable for the Acts.
1

This opinion is issued in response to the report issued by SARMC's expert, Thomas P. McCarthy, dated
June 15,2011.
2
See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 497, 224 P.3d 1068,
1086 (2009).
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'D ama2:es
Table 1: SummaryofE CODOIDIC

Economic
Alternative
I
2
3
4
5
I

2
3

Basis
Lost Business Value-Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridian & Eagle Referrals 3
Lost Business Value-Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridian & Eagle Referrals
Lost Business Value-Affiliated Downtown, Meridian & Eagle Referrals 4
Lost Business Value-Affiliated Downtown, Meridian & Eagle Referrals
Lost Business Value-All IMI Scans0

$16,200,000
$16,200,000
$11,000,000
$1!,000,000
$18,400,000

Lost Future Profits-Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridian & Eagle Referrals
through 20 !5 6
Lost Future Profits-Affiliated Downtown, Meridian & Eagle Referrals through 2015
Lost Future Profits-All IMI Scans through 20 15"

$13,800,000
$9,300,000
$15,600,000

Dama~es

I understand that I may be asked to revise my analysis and update my opinions based on revised or updated
information received through the date of trial. Additionally, I understand that I may be requested to review
and address reports and/or opinions submitted by experts retained on behalf of the Counterdefendants and
Third Party Defendants.

C. DAMAGES ANALYSIS
As discussed in the 2007 Opinion, and assuming the Acts are proven, I have estimated the economic
damages incurred by MRIA based on the premise that the Acts resulted in (1) the loss of historical
relationships and (2) the diversion of future business opportunities with regard to the operations of MRIA.
The loss of historical relationships and the diversion of business opportunities can be equated to lost
revenues and economic returns, which exert a detrimental impact on the current fair market value ofMRIA.
It is my understanding that Bruce P. Budge ofFTI Consulting, Inc., will provide expert opinions regarding
the estimated economic damages, represented by historical lost profits, incurred by MRIA as a result of the
Acts (the "FTI Analysis"). I have been asked to provide an independent estimate of the future lost profits, as

3

Represents the estimated detrimental impact on the current value of MRIA as a result of lost revenues in calendar
2010 attributable to lost referral streams and related services that were performed by IMI as relating to Downtown
referrals plus all Meridian and Eagle Health Plaza referrals.
4
Represents the estimated detrimental impact on the current value of MRIA as a result of lost revenues in calendar
2010 attributable to lost referral streams and related services that were performed by IMI as relating to Downtown
referrals plus affiliated physician Meridian and Eagle Health Plaza referrals.
5
Represents the estimated detrimental impact on the current value of MRIA as a result of lost revenues in calendar
2010 attributable to lost referral streams and related services that were performed by IMI.
6
IMI-related lost business includes IMI scans performed on the SARMC campus, IMI scans performed at the
Magicview facility in Meridian, IMI scans performed at the IMI downtown Boise location and IMI scans performed
at Eagle Health Plaza resulting from referrals from SARMC-affiliated physicians and physicians who had previous
relationships and referral patterns with MRIA.
7
IMI-related lost business includes IMI scans performed on the SARMC campus, IMI scans performed at the
Magicview facility in Meridian, IMI scans performed at the IMI downtown Boise location and IMI scans performed
at Eagle Health Plaza resulting from referrals from SARMC-affiliated physicians who had previous relationships
and referral patterns with MRIA.
8
IMI-related lost business includes IMI scans (assuming all IMI business was inappropriately diverted from MRIA).
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represented primarily by the decline in business value, incurred by MRIA as a result of the Acts. To develop
an estimate of the future lost profits, I have analyzed the following:
1.

The estimated loss of future profits that will be incurred by MRIA through 2015 as a result of the
Acts.

2.

The incremental fair market value that MRIA would reflect currently but for the loss of historical
relationships and diverted business opportunity caused by the Acts.

Estimated Impact of the Acts on MRIA
Absent the Acts on the part of SARMC, the improved operating performance and related financial results
of MRIA at the end of 201 0-relating to lost business relationships and business opportunities-would
result in a higher, current fair market valuation.
The FTI Analysis indicates that the following referral relationships, business opportunities and related
revenues and profits were lost to MRIA in 2010 as a result of the Acts:
T a ble 2 : 2010 I mpact of L OS t

Fundamental
Scan Volume
Net Revenue
Lost Profits

.
u·ISt onca
. I R efierra san dBusmess
I
0Jppo rt um"f1es-DT/AII Men"d"Ian/E a21e

Downtown
1,615
$1,073,612
$636,357

Magieview
(Meridian)
4,567
$2,958,791
$1,592,155

SARMC
6,123
$4,290,550
$2,543,119

Eagle
Health
4,374
$2,931,294
$1,767,189

Total
16,679
$11,254,247
$6,538,820

The estimated impact on MRIA's 2010 performance noted in Table 2 above results from the loss of scan
volumes, net revenue and lost profits attributable to procedures performed at IMI facilities in the locations
identified that otherwise would have been performed by MRIA absent the Acts of SARMC. The
Magicview (Meridian) impact and the Eagle Health impact presented in Table 2 assume all scans
conducted at IMI's Magicview facility and Eagle Health facility would have been performed by MRIA.
This assumption is based on the premise that fiduciary obligations owed by SARMC to MRIA required
that the business opportunities represented by Meridian should have been developed with MRIA and that
but for the Acts of SARMC those facilities would not have been built.
.
. IRefierra sandBusmess
T able 3 : 2010 I mpacto fL ost u·Istor1ca
11atedP hys1cians
0Jpportumt1es-Affil"
Magicview
Eagle
(Meridian)
Total
SARMC
Fundamental
Downtown
Health
1,815
6,123
1,621
Scan Volume
1,615
11 '174
$1,187,496
Net Revenue
$1,073,612
$4,290,550
$1,088,754
$7,640,412
$650,273
$2,543,119
$656,377
$4,486,126
Lost Profits
$636,357

The estimated impact on MRIA's 2010 performance noted in Table 3 above results from the loss of scan
volumes, net revenue and lost profits attributable to procedures performed at IMI facilities in the locations
identified that otherwise would have been performed by MRIA absent the Acts of SARMC. The
Magicview (Meridian) impact and the Eagle Health impact presented in Table 3 assume only those scans
conducted at IMI's Magicview facility and Eagle Health facility on patients referred from SARMCaffiliated physicians and physicians with prior relationships and referral patterns with MRIA would have
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been performed by MRIA. Once again, this assumption is based on the premise that fiduciary obligations
owed by SARMC to MRIA required that the business opportunities represented by Meridian and Eagle
Health should have been developed with MRIA rather than IMI and that but for the Acts of SAMRC
those facilities would not have been built.
'
' I Refierra sandBusmess
T able 4 : 2010 Impact ofL OSt H'IS tonca
01pportum'f1es---All IMI Scans
Eagle
Magieview
(Meridian)
Fundamental
Downtown
SARMC
Health
Total

Scan Volume
Net Revenue
Lost Profits

3,917
$2,616,593
$1,418,246

4,567
$2,958,791
$1,592,155

6,123
$4,290,550
$2,543,119

4,374
$2,931,294
$1,767,189

18,981
$12,797,228
$7,320,709

The estimated impact on MRIA's 2010 performance noted in Table 4 above results from the loss of scan
volumes, net revenue and lost profits attributable to procedures performed at IMI facilities in the locations
identified that otherwise would have been performed by MRIA absent the Acts of SARMC. The
estimated impact assumes that all scans conducted by IMI would have been performed by MRIA. Once
again, this assumption is based on the premise that fiduciary obligations owed by SARMC to MRIA
required that the business opportunity realized by IMI should have been developed with MRIA and that
but for the Acts of SARMC those facilities would not have been built.

Decreased Current Business Value of MRIA Attributable to the Acts-Lost Revenue Basis
But for the Acts of SARMC, MRIA would reflect incremental operating statistics and financial results
that would exert a positive impact on the current fair market value of MRIA (as collectively representing
the operating entities of MRIC and MRIM). The improved operating statistics and related financial results
that would have been realized but for the Acts of SARMC can be converted to incremental value for
MRIA.
First, and as a result of the Acts, MRIA has experienced a decrease in operating revenue attributable to
the lost scans. The analysis of publicly available information indicates that investments in imaging
businesses currently produce pricing indicators ranging from approximately 1.2 times to 1. 7 times
revenues. In other words, the prices that investors currently are paying to purchase interests in imaging
9
businesses translate into a multiple of 1.2 times to 1. 7 times the revenues of the related businesses.
In essence, the decrease in the operating revenue level for MRIA as a result of the Acts has resulted in a
decrease in the current value of MRIA. Because the lost revenue would be continuing in nature, or
forward-looking, the conversion of the lost revenue to current value can be equated to the calculation of
lost business value (in essence capturing lost future profits).
Exhibit 3 and Table 5 summarize my analysis regarding the decrease in the business value of MRIA as a
result of the lost revenues attributable to the Acts.

9

It is worth noting that the Shattuck Hammond analysis ofMRlA in 2001, and the Wellspring Valuation analysis of
MRlA in 2004, resulted in average revenue pricing multiples of 2.1 and 1.5, respectively.
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·namages Base d on L ost Revenues
T able 5: E sf tmat edEconomtc
Alternative
!-Downtown/Meridian/Eagle Referrals (1999)
2-Downtown/Meridian/Eagle Referrals (200 1)
3-Affiliated Downtown/Meridian/Eagle ( 1999)
4---Affiliated Downtown/Meridian/Eagle (200 1)
5-All IMI Scans (1999)

Lost Business
Value
$16,200,000
$16,200,000
$11,000,000
$11,000,000
$18,400,000

It is important to note that the assumed commencement period for the damages-i.e., either 1999 or
2001-exerts no impact on the estimated damages between Alternatives 1 and 2, or between Alternatives
3 and 4, based on the fact that the revenue loss by 2010 is consistent.

Decreased Current Business Value of MRIA Attributable to the Acts-Lost Future Profits
Based on the estimated profits lost to MRIA as a result of the Acts of SARMC, the indicated decrease in
the current fair market value of MRIA is summarized in Table 6. The summary presented in Table 6 is
based on analysis detailed in Exhibits 1-1 through 1-4 as follows:
);>

Alternative !-Decreased Business Value-Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridian
and Eagle Referrals-through 2015, representing trended lost profits through an assumed
Partnership termination date of 2015, and assuming the related IMI business (i.e., Downtown,
Meridian, SARMC and Eagle Health) would have been realized by MRIA.

);>

Alternative 2-Decreased Business Value-Affiliated Downtown, Meridian and Eagle
Referrals-through 2015, representing trended lost profits through an assumed Partnership
termination date of 2015, and assuming IMI business (i.e., Downtown, Meridian, SARMC and
Eagle Health) would have been realized by MRIA, with the exception of non-SARMC affiliated
physician referrals and prior relationships.

);>

Alternative 3-Decreased Business Value-All IMI Business-through 2015, representing
trended lost profits through an assumed Partnership termination date of 2015, and assuming all
IMI business (i.e., Downtown, Meridian, SARMC and Eagle Health) would have been realized by
MRIA.

·namages Base d on LOSt F ut ure P ro fit1 s
T a ble 6: E sf tmat edE conomtc
Alternative
!-Affiliated Downtown, Plus All Meridian/Eagle

Lost Future
Profits
$13,700,000

-- --- OR- - - - -

2-Affiliated Downtown/Meridian/Eagle

$9,300,000

-- --- OR---- -

3-All IMI Scans

$15,600,000
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D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Should the trier of fact determine that SARMC committed the Acts, it is my opinion that the economic
damages incurred by MRIA, representing lost profits/a decrease in current fair market value of MRIA, are
reasonable as stated in Table 5 and Table 6, above. It is important to note that each of the numbered
alternatives represents an independent estimation of damages based on a unique set of circumstances, and
that the alternatives are not intended to be additive.
With regard to Footnote 1 in the Supplemental Expert Report of Bruce P. Budge dated May 2, 2011, it is
important to note that the present value of estimated future profits that will be realized by IMI through
2015 is approximately $16.5 million-50% of which, or approximately $8.25 million, would accrue to
the benefit of SARMC. This compares with estimated historical profits realized by IMI from 1999
through 2010 of $50.6 million. As the historical period analyzed by Budge covers approximately 12
years, it is reasonable from an economic perspective that estimated future profits for the June 2011
through December 2015 period would represent approximately one-third of the historical loss (i.e., $16.5
million-;- $50.6 million= 32.6%). The present value of the estimated future profits ofiMI through 2015 is
based on (i) estimated 2010 profits of $7.4 million, (ii) increased annually through 2015 by a 2 percent
growth rate, (iii) decreased by an estimated tax rate of 40 percent, and (iv) discounted at a weightedaverage cost of capital discount rate of 14 percent.
On page 23, paragraph 50, in his opinion, Thomas R. McCarthy references a "double counting" in my
damages analysis relating to management fees. My opinion has been revised to remove the portion of
estimated economic damages relating to the management fees, treating the fees consistently with Mr.
Budge's analysis. Additionally, and based on analysis presented in Exhibit 2, attached, the allocation of
damages between MRIC and MRIM would be approximately evenly divided.
I am independent of MRIA and all parties identified with regard to this litigation. I was compensated for
my services at my standard hourly rate of $450, and my firm was reimbursed for direct, out-of-pocket
costs. The hourly billing rates for other staff members who provided services relating to this matter
ranged from $70 to $250.
This memorandum is intended to provide an independent opinion(s) with regard to the litigation referenced
above. It does not include all of the analysis that was completed for this assignment, and I may update or
supplement this analysis through the date of trial based upon the receipt and consideration of additional
information which I understand that SARMC is still in the process of producing. It is not intended to provide
legal, accounting, or taxation advice.

WILLAMETIE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES

Charles A. Wilhoite, CPA/ABV/CFF, CMA, ASA, CFM
Managing Director
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership,
Defendant.
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column where that number is coming from
Q. Right, 1-1 -A. Exhibit 1-1.
Q. -- 1-2 and 1-3. Okay. Maybe we can start
with 1-1, then. Can you just explain the basic
method -- methodological approach here and walk me
through what you're doing with this analysis.
A. Yes. A basic approach is calculation of
discounted future cash flow. And if you look at
Exhibit 1-1 on page 9 of my opinion, we look at
historical cash flow through 2006. We look at
historical cash flow as of 2010, and we carry that
forward or grow it at a two percent growth rate to
come to what we say is estimated lost cash flow to
MRIA based on the fact that related referral streams
and scans went to IMI. And basically, it's a
summation of those discounted future returns at a
discount rate of 14 percent.
Q. Okay. And is this -- this discounted cash
flow method, it this a valuation method?
A. It's a valuation method, yes.
Q. Okay.
A. It's also just a present value method.
Q. Okay.
A. That's really what we're doing.
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A. It's -- it is an estimate based on review
of historical referrals.
Q. Okay.
A. And scans.
Q. Okay. So are -- is -- are these numbers
taken from Mr. Budge's schedule?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. It's indicated on Footnote A on the bottom
ofthepage.
Q. Okay. Did you do any independent analysis
to determine whether these numbers are accurate?
A. Other than talking with Mr. Budge and
reviewing his analysis, no.
Q. Okay. What sort of talks did you have
with Mr. Budge about these numbers?
A. Just an understanding of how they were
developed.
Q. What's your understanding?
A. That he looked at historical referral
streams from SARMC physicians, or committed SARMC
physicians, to MRIA historically and assumed if
those continued forward, that's the result.
Q. Okay. I'm sorry. You -- I think you said
you did two things. You talked to Mr. Budge to

Q. Okay. And-- and why do you end at 2015?
A. That was the instruction provided by
Counsel.
Q. Okay. So there's -- this -- these values
do not include values for after -- for any cash
flows beyond 2015?
A. No, they do not.
Q. Okay. So on the loss revenues row, you
have actual2006 and actual2010. Where's --what's
was the source of those numbers?
A. Those would be the estimated lost revenues
based on Mr. Budge's analysis.
Q. Okay. So the word "actual" there doesn't
reflect anything that actually happened. It's what
Mr. Budge concludes would have -- would have
happened?
A. Well, it's-MR. WOODARD: Objection. Argumentative.
MR. WILHOITE: I'll leave it to Mr. Budge
to explain it, but it's based on his review of
actual experience.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Okay. But I -- but it's not an actual -okay. It doesn't reflect any actual number that
occurred? It's Budge's estimate?
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confirm these number -- or to get an understanding.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you say you did something else?
A. Well, I was provided with some of his
summary schedules.
Q. Okay. So you looked at his schedules?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And then I see you used annual
growth rate of two percent. What's the basis for
the two percent number that you use as your annual
growth rate for the years 2011 to 2015?
A. Well, it's a consideration of several
factors including the implied historical growth rate
for the lost revenues as indicated in Exhibit 1-1.
Also considered the CPI or Consumer Price Index over
the relevant period which indicated that average CPI
growth was about two and a half percent for the ten
years through 2011. Looked at industry data; at
least one publication, IBISWorld, suggesting that
laboratory and diagnostic imaging service increased
at a rate of about 2.3 percent in the five years
through 2011.
Also looked at their projected
growth for the five years through 20 16 which they
estimated at 4.3 percent. And I also looked at cost
with regard to medical services which in the ten
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Q. On page 6 of your report. Let me -- let
me just take a step back. I'm sorry. If we were to
hypothetically assume that Mr. Budge omitted certain
variable costs from his figures to arrive at these
numbers, would you still have confidence in those
numbers?
MR. WOODARD: Objection. Improper
hypothetical.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. I think you can still answer.
Hypothetically, if he omitted a significant variable
cost, would you have confidence in his numbers?
A. Well-MR. WOODARD: Objection. Vague and
ambiguous, as well.
THE WITNESS: I'll answer. Hypothetically,
if he omitted anything that had a material impact,
possibly. But once again, I've adjusted numbers
myself and I'm comfortable with the margin that I
arrive at. In that, you know, you have to have some
definition of materiality with regard to losing
confidence in numbers.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Would 7.5 percent in revenues be material?
A. Not according to Mr. McCarthy.
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A. Well, in clarifying the difference between
my management fee cash flow and the component value
relating to management fee, I had further
discussions with Mr. Budge and I understood that he
had considered an alternative theory relating to
lost profits based on a disgorgement concept. And
I'm not an attorney so I won't pretend to give you
all the legal definitions, but basically he
explained to me that he viewed the potential profits
that SARMC stood to gain in the future -- I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
He looked at the historical profits that
IMI realized and said if that had not happened, MRIA
would have realized those profits, meaning, ifiMI
hadn't gone into affiliation with SARMC. And in
talking about that I should -- well, the way I would
look at that going forward is I can look at the
expected future profits that IMI will realize, or is
expected to realize, and assume that the same -that half of that would have gone to MRIA, and
that's why this paragraph was included.
Q. Okay. Budge explained that to you
sometime between May and-- May 2nd and July 29th?
A. Yes. It was a brief conversation about
it. I believe he had a reference to it in his

Q. What do you mean by that?
A. Well, in his testimony, he said a
difference of 25 percent was no material change.
Q. Would 7.5 percent of revenues be material
to you?
A. Possibly.
Q. What would it depend on?
A. If it was factual and you're telling me to
hypothetically assume it.
Q. Yeah.
A. I think a better way to answer is it may
have some impact on his number, but it wouldn't have
any impact on my number.
Q. On page 6 of your report, you have a
paragraph with regard to Footnote 1 and Supplemental
Report ofBruce Budge. "It is important to note
that the present value of the estimated future
profits that will be realized by IMI through 2015 is
approximately 16.5 million," then the sentence
continues. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. This paragraph is not in your May report,
right?
A. No, it is not.
Q. Why did you add this paragraph?
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report. I can't recall as I sit here.
Q. Well, what -- how did that conversation
come about? Did he call you to tell you about this
new theory?
A. No. I believe we were talking about
capacity and the management fee and it came up
during the course of that conversation.
Q. Okay. So this paragraph isn't in response
to anything in Dr. McCarthy's report, right, this
paragraph?
A. I can't recall exactly if it related to
anything specifically in Dr. McCarthy's report.
Q. Okay. Why do you say, "It's important to
note," this point there, on the second line of
paragraph?
A. Because of the relationship implied, Mr.
Budge looked at the profits of IMI over roughly a
12-year period and based on the court ruling
instruction -- instructing us to look at damages
only through 2015, I said, "Well, if you look at the
profits that IMI is expected or projected to realize
from 2011 through 2015, it's roughly a four-year
period."
Q. Okay.
A. His analysis was 12 years. I said the
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1
A. No. I - I think that I had known it, and I think
2 that it- because of the passage of time, it escaped my

1 point out there's a CD in it which I brought just for you to
2 haveQ. Okay.
3
4
A. --which is the data that we used. And --and--

3 recollection.
Q. Okay. And how did you learn then-- how were you
4
5 reminded of this fact?
A. There's a footnote in my report which basically
6
7 shows the portion of cash flows which could be attributed to
8 St. Alphonsus Hospital and -

5 but otherwise, I certainly have no objection to that.

Q. Okay. But otherwise you would want it back? I
6
7 mean, if you -- if it's a copy already, they won't need to
8 make a copy. If it's your originals 9
A. It's my originals -Q. Okay.
10
11
A. - unfortunately.
Q. So they'll -- they'll make us a copy.
12
A. Yeah.
13
Q. We did that the other day.
14

Q. Mm-hm.
9
A. -- basically takes my damages calculations and
10
11 multiplies them by 50 percent which I understand to be their
12 ownership percentage.
Q. Okay.
13
14
A. It's- in reviewing that note, it was pointed out
15 to me that that was -- it's an improper calculation that

A. We're going to have to deal with my aged eyesight
15
16 here today -Q. Okay.
17

16 includes partnership distributions for a period prior to
17 when they had an interest that needed to be corrected.
18
19

24

Q. Okay. Who pointed that out to you?

A. - so give me a moment.
19
MR. WOODARD: I forgot to remind you. Glad you
20 remembered.
18

A. I don't - I can't remember for sure. I think
20 that the first time that I became aware of it may have been
21 in a discussion with Drew Voth who was my assistant on this
22 project.

21
MR. VERGONIS: Wade, since we only have one copy
22 of the book, would you mind if I walked over-

Q. Okay. So you say in this paragraph that for the
23
24 time period April --April 1st through - April 1st, 2005
25 through -I assume you say 2010. Is that the end of 2010?

23
MR. WOODARD: No.
24
MR. VERGONIS: --and sat in that chair to look
25 over Mr. Budge's shoulder?

23

25

A. Through all the data that we have forecasted, yes.
2

Q.

Okay. That the net cash flow from operations was

MR. WOODARD: No.
MR. VERGONIS: Okay.

2

3 approximately 37.4 million.

3

4

4 Schedule 2.6.
5 BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Oh.
6

First question: What do you mean by "net cash flow"?

5
A. It's basically the operating profit plus
6 depreciation minus the capital contributions that were
7 required in the years that they were required.
Q. Mm-hm. So profit-- the profit plus the
8

A.

It's -- actually, I can answer your question. It's

9 depreciation?
10
A. Right, minus capital investment.
11
Q. All right. Do you have -- maybe these - they're

7
A. 2.68
Q. I'll stay seated for now.
9
A. - in my report is what was -what the source of
10 that is.
11
MR. WOODARD: Pretty sure you're talking about

12 not certainly in the short rebuttal report.
13
Are there tables in your supplemental report of

12 your supplemental report.
13
THE WITNESS: Talking about my May 2nd

14 May 20, '11 where you can show me, even walk me through how

14 supplemental report.
15 BY MR. VERGONIS:

15 you get to the 37.4 million?
16
17

A. You said May 20.
Q. I might have misspoken. May-- May 2nd, 2011,

18 marked as Exhibit 1.
19
A. It's easier to find them if I use my file.
Q. Okay. That would be fine. Maybe you could ...
20
21
I think maybe before you start flipping through
22 it, can we mark the notebook as Exhibit 4?
A. Does that mean I have to give it to you or-23
24

Q.

It means they can photocopy it during a break.

25

A. That's-- that's certainly fine, but I would also

NaeGeLI RePORTinG
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16

Q.

17
18
19

A. Well, that's what it says here.
Q. I'm not sure I have a 2.6.
A. Let me go farther back. (Witness peruses

2.6 did you say?

20 document.)
21 I have a Schedule 2.5 -Q. Mm-hm.
22
23

A. - on the back, which these aren't Bates stamped

24 by page, but-25
Q. No, but I understand the order that everything's
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1 in, so I -- I've been able to flip to 2.5, so I have that in
2 front of me.
3
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28
1
2

A. Well, I'm somewhat mystified by this because I
think that there should be a 2.6 and a 3.6. Well, there's a
possibility this was not produced Q. Okay.
A. -- in the report.
Q. Do you have a 2.6 in your binder there?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Okay.
A. I have a 3.6, an 8.6, a 15.6. I see none of
those. You know, I didn't look through every page.
Q. No. I don't see them either. Before we look at
2.6, what's the schedule numbering convention that you use?
In other words, there's a lot of-A. Yeah.
Q. -- there are Schedules 1 through whatever number,
maybe 15 or 18. Then it starts over with Schedule 2 point
A. 1.
Q. -- 2 I think orA. 2 point - yeah.
THE COURT REPORTER: I need one at a time
speaking.
MR. VERGONIS: Yeah. I'm sorry.

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. -so-A. So-

Q. - in the absence of a dot A. That's right.

Q. - is Calculation Method 1?
A. Right.

Q. And the schedules that are numbered dot 2 are
related to Calculation Method 2?
A. Yes.
Q. And if there's not a schedule number dot 2, is it
okay to infer that the original schedule is also applicable
to this calculation method?
A. I would have to look at a specific -Q. Okay.
A. - instance where there's not a dot 2 in order to
see what the reason Q. Okay.
A. - for that is.
Q. But in other words, forTHE COURT REPORTER: In order to what?
THE WITNESS: See what the reason for that is.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. For example, there's no Schedule 1.2?
A. Right.
Q. So Schedule 1 --

27
1
2
3
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THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Yeah. So you know-- you know what I'm talking
about, Mr. Budge. Can you -A. Yeah.
Q. -- explain that convention to me?
A. The number after the decimal point is the method
number.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So when --when you have your summary, for
instance, Figure 10, and I know Figure 10 on Page 15 of your
May 2nd report, I know that figure's been revised by your
rebuttal report, so we'll get to that momentarily, but
Figure 10 lists five calculation methods.
A. Yes.
Q. So any schedule without a decimal point after it
relates to Calculation Method 1; is that correct?
A. I believe it is. I just want to make sure that I

20 21
Q. Sure. Take your time. As you're flipping pages,
22 I'll represent that there are no schedules A. That are point 1.
23
24
Q. -- numbered dot 1 A. Yeah.
25

29
1
A. So ...
Q. Schedule 1 is your overall -- is your list of five
2
3 damages scenario.
4
A. Right.
Q. So that one applies to all?
5
6
A. (Witness nods head.)
Q. Okay.
7
A. Yeah.
8
Q. And so forth probably?
9
10
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And then just for completeness, any
11
12 schedule that is labeled dot 3 applies to your third
13 calculation method?
14
A. Yes.
Q. Dot 4 to your fourth?
15
16
A. Yes.
Q. Dot 5 to your fifth?
17
18
A. Correct.
Q. What does dot 6 apply to?
19
A. This footnote.
20
Q. Okay. Is the footnote a damages calculation
21
22 method?
A. I think that that conceivably could be if there's
23
24 some kind of a disgorgement type of remedy that's advocated.
Q. Okay. Do you know if such a remedy is advocated?
25
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1

A. I think that there was a reason they asked me to

32
1 dates prior to 2005 --

2 do the calculation, so I assume there is, but I don't know.

2

3

3

4
5
6
7
8

Did they ask you to put it in a footnote?
A. Not specifically. I don't really recall how that
occurred.
Q. Do you know why you didn't put it in Figure 10 as
Calculation Method 6?
A.

Mm-hm.

Q.

A. - and I multiplied them by 50 percent. In doing
4 that I took the operating income and made some adjustments
5 for-- for depreciation and for capital investments I

Q.

6 described to you earlier. And those are reflected in there.
7
Q. Okay. What's capital investment?

Because it really isn't. The calculation is of a

8

A. It's primarily the purchase of magnets.

9 different nature. It basically has to do with a
10 disgorgement premise and the others don't. They're injury

9
10

11 to MRIA. And so that seems illogical to me.
Q. It seems illogical to put it in Figure 10?
12

11 machines.
12 BY MR. VERGONIS:

A. Yeah, because it's-- it really isn't comparable.
13
14 It has an entirely different premise, and it's an entirely
15 different measurement and an entirely different remedy.
16
Q. Do you think it was plain to someone reading your
17 report that that was a claimed measure of damages?

Q. Okay. And I would see that summarized here in
13
14 Schedule 15.6?
A. Yes, that's the one.
15
16
Q. Okay. Then you-- so you took the profits, plus
17 depreciation, minus capital investment and - for the years

18
19

18 in question, and divide it by two to reach SARMC's share of
19 18.7 million, right?

A. I don't know if it would be or not.
Q. Did you provide the dot 6 tables to the lawyers as

THE COURT REPORTER: It's primarily what?
THE WITNESS: For the purchase of magnets. MRI

20 part of your report?
21
A. Not that I recall.
Q. You think you failed to provide those?
22

20
21

A. Yeah, multiplied times 50 percent, same thing.
Q. Yeah. Okay. Multiply by 50 percent to reach 18.7

23
24

A. I think these are our work papers and -Q. Okay.

23
Does the 18.7 million take into account SARMC's
24 $11.6 million investment in IMI in--

25

A. -we - because they weren't part of the five

25

22 million.

A. No.

33

31
1 methods in chief, we didn't include them as an exhibit in

1

2 the report.
Q. Okay. All right. Going back then to the tables,
3

2
3

4 can you-5
A. To which tables?
Q. To the dot 6 tables-6

A. Those are the returns that they got in five years
4
5 before the $11 million investment, but I have not deducted

7
8

Q. Okay. I'm sorry. Let's break that down because
7
8 those are the returns that SARMC got, you said?

A. Yes.
Q. - that were never produced to us.

9
Can you walk me through how you calculated the
10 $37.4 million figure just by - maybe by showing me those
11 schedules?
A. Figure out the best way to do this.
12
Would you like to look at them first or-13
14

Q.

15
16

A. (Witness complies.)
Q. (Peruses document.)

Yeah. Why don't-- why don't you pass them over.

17 Okay.
A. So-18
19
Q. Do you need to look at them in order to 20
21

A. I might butQ. --talk to me? Okay.

Q. Whynot?
A. Those are the returns on - on that.
Q. What do you mean by that?

6 the $11 million investment.

9
A. They're the financial returns. I don't know - I
10 don't mean to say that they were necessarily distributed,
11 but they represent their proportionate interest in the cash
12 flows of IMI over the period after their ownership
13 commenced.
Q. Okay. And why don't those get deducted against-14
A. Well, it depends on what- for what purpose
15
16 you're looking at them. My purpose here is to show what
17 their investment returns had been during the period that
18 they were an owner in IMI. If you asked me what was their19 - you know, how much of their investment they'd recover,
20 that type of thing, that's a different question and I
21 probably would have answered- you know, I probably would

24 accruing to IMI were during these periods, and then I added

22 have taken the 11 million in the context of that question.
23
Q. I see. I understand. So we're talking about
24 SARMC's profits. We would --we would want to deduct the

25 them up originally for this period that included, you know,

25 11.6 million?

A. -- but basically the overall approach is to
22
23 basically-- if I made a calculation of what the profits
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34
1

36
1 any interest in IMI's net income prior to that date.

A. Not in the sense that accountants usually would

2

2 use the word "profit" because it's their investment, and
3 that usually isn't deducted from operating income. It's not
4 amortized. You basically have an interest in the business

Q. Okay. Let's move on to a different topic.

In your rebuttal report, on Page 4 in the Rebuttal
3
4 Figure No. 1, that's your-- am I right that that's your new

5 enterprise, and it continues on into perpetuity. It can
6 change in value, but it's not a deduction from the earnings
7 of it. So - so it would not be proper to deduct it to

5 bottom line for your five damages alternatives?
6
A. Well, what it does is it apportions them between
7 MRIC and MRIM instead of the way that I previously did which
8 was to apportion them between the three plaintiffs.
Q. Right.
9
10
A. And so that's how I would characterize it. I'm
11 not-- I don't believe that the total changed.

8 compute their profits.
If you wanted to deduct --you know, do some
9
10 calculation as to how they were --what type of return on
11 investment they were getting, or something like that, you
could -- I think that the average earnings in this period is
maybe around three and a half million a year that is
attributable to them. They- they invested 11 million.
That would say they're getting -- I don't know exactly, but
16 you know, 33 percent return on that investment.
Q. Okay.
17

Q. Right, the total did not change, but this is -12
13 this Rebuttal Figure 1 substitutes for any tables that came
14 before in terms of what your ultimate opinions on damages
15 are?
16
A. Yes. In terms of the apportionment between the

A. So you could use it, and it would be logical to
18
19 use it in that context, but it would not be logical to
20 deduct it to describe what their profits had been, because
21 at the end of that period, they still have that interest. It
22 still has a large value. There's been no diminution of the

Q. Okay. So- so Column A is what you claim MRI18
19 MRIC, which we sometimes refer to as "Center," suffered as
20 damages in this case?
21
A. Under these various methods.
Q. Yeah. Alternative methodologies.
22

23 value of it.

23

12
13
14
15

24

Q. Okay.

25

A. And, in fact, it may have become more valuable.

17 entities, yeah.

A. Right.
Q. And Column B is what MRIM, what we sometimes refer
24
25 to as "Mobile," suffered under each of the different

37

35

Q. But -- but what if you extend the calculations
1
2 into perpetuity to try to value SARMC's return in perpetuity
3 from its investment in this entity?
4
A. I don't understand the question, what ifQ. Well, you end in- you end in 2010, but I-- but
5
6 I think Mr. Wilhoite then extends the numbers into the
7 future.
8
A. Yeah. You'd have to ask him about that. But my
9 assignment was basically to calculate the economic benefit
10 that SARMC has received from their investment and
11 affiliation with IMI, and that's what I did.

Q. Okay. And the economic benefit that SARMC has
12
13 received are 18.7 million in cash flows during this time?
14
15

A. Yes.
Q. Okay. With no regard for the 11.6 million

16 investment?
17
A. Well, that would be improper. They still own it.
18 And I'm assuming it's still worth 11 million and probably
19 more than 11 million.
Q. Okay. Do you know why this disgorgement measure
20
21 begins after April 1st, 2005 when SARMC -22
A. Well, I'll let you finish the question.
Q. I'll finish the question there. Why does it begin
23
24 after April 1st, 2005?
25
A. Because of my understanding that they did not have

NaeGeLI RePORTinG
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1 alternatives?
2
A. Right. In preparing for the deposition, I was
3 informed by Mr. Woodard that we had a misunderstanding,
4 however, and that there may be additional supplementation
5 required. That is in 3 and 4.

Q. Mm-hm.
6
7
A. We understood our instruction to be that to assume
8 that if Meridian and Eagle were only damaged by the amount
9 of referrals that were diverted from affiliate -formerly
10 affiliate physicians 11

Q. Mm-hm.

12
A. - that those operations would have been housed
13 from a corporate standpoint within Center as opposed to
14 Mobile.
15
Q. Mm-hm.
16
A. Mr. Woodard informs me that we misunderstood that
17 and that it was his intention that all of Eagle and Meridian
18 would have been housed under Mobile even under Methods 3
and
19 4. And he proposed to me that we should correct that in
20 order to be responsive for what he thinks the facts are.
21
22

Q. Do you intend to correct that then?
A. Yeah. He asked me to and I will do that.

Q. When do you think you'll do that?
23
24
A. It's very easy to do. It could certainly be done
25 within the next week or something. I'm going on vacation
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82
1

Q.

Okay. But earlier we said as to the -- earlier we

84

1

Do you see that?

2 broke out on Model 1 through 4, we said there was a question

2

3 about - two separate questions. One about whether the

3
Q. Do the wrongful acts that you're assuming SARMC
4 will be found liable for include wrongful dissociation?
5
A. No.

4 scans were diverted and a second question about whether the
5 diversions were caused by St. Al's. Do you recall A. Sort of, yeah.
6
7
8

Q.

A. Yes.

Q. Do they include an ongoing obligation not to
6
7 compete with MRIA extending through the present day?
8
A. No.
Q. Why don't they?
9

-- breaking that down?

A. Yeah.

Q. And you said - you were offering your opinion
9
10 that the scans were diverted from one business to another,

10

11 but you were not offering an opinion that the scans were
12 caused by--

11 adjudication of that issue and that the dissociation was not
12 wrongful.

13
14
15
16 to

Q. Okay. Is it also your understanding that it
13
14 follows from the dissociation not being wrongful that St.
15 Alphonsus has a right to compete with MRIA after a certain
16 date?

A. I know what the -Q. --St. Al's conduct?
A. I know what the allegations were. I've been told
assume that the allegations that the jury will find that

17 wrongful conduct by St. Al's caused a diversion of scans.
Q. Mm.
18
A. My assignment is to measure what that diversion
19

A.

Because it's my understanding that there's been

17
18
19
20
21
22

A. Again, without trying to commit either parties to
their positions, that is my understanding, is that they
basically had to withhold participation for a year after
their dissociation.
Q. So all your opinions are based on the assumption
that St. Al's could compete after that year expired?

23 - as a -- you know, assuming that those things are in

23

A. Right. They in fact assume that, you know, had

24 evidence Q. Right.
25

24 this wrongful course of conduct not occurred -Q. Mm-hm.
25

20 was.
21
Q. Right.
22
A. And my opinion extends only to that assignment as

83
A. --what's the measure of damages.
Q. Right. You're not-- you're not assuming-3 you're not opining that St. Alphonsus caused any of the -4 of the diversions, you're just assuming that St. Alphonsus
5 caused them, correct?

85

1
2

1
A. - and that the corporate opportunities weren't
2 usurped and that there wasn't a deliberate attempt to divert

6
7

3 scans from MRIA to IMI, which is alleged-- I'm not saying
4 that to be the case -- that my model in the later years
5 presumes that everybody would have been a happy family and
6 that St. Alphonsus would not have had a reason to
7 disassociate, but it doesn't assume that they couldn't have

A. I'm instructed to assume that, yes.
Q. But you are opining that the diversions were

8 caused-A. That they occurred.
9
10

Q. That the diversions occurred?

11
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. In other words, that IMI --that MRIA would
12
13 have gotten this business if IMI wasn't there?
14
A. Under one of the - I mean, there are other
15 wrongful acts which cause diversions besides - doesn't rely
16 on IMI not being there, but, yes, if I --if I understand
17 what you're asking me.
Q. I'm going to ask you about some changes in
18
19 assumptions between your 2007 and 2011 report.
On Page 6 of your 2011 report, you write, under
20
21 "Summary of Updated Opinions," "For purposes of my analysis,
22 I have assumed that SARMC will be found liable for the
23 allegations made by MRIA. "To the extent all or some of the
24 allegations are dismissed, my damages calculations may be
25 revised."
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8 disassociated at any time and honored that noncompete.
9

So, for example, if-- if you go through the

10 allegations which MRI intends to offer so that they actually
11 become, you know, the first arrivers in Meridian, that
12 they're not undermined in the practice of their center so
13 that their scans are not diverted, that there isn't
14 accommodation with GSR so that all of these things occur, I
15 don't see any reason to interpose an assumption at some
16 future date, in '07 or '8 or '9, that St. Alphonsus
17 withdraws, but if there was a reason that that might be the
18 case, I provided the details of my analysis so that you can
19 go in and say, okay, let's just assume that St. Al's decides
20 to dissociate - in '08?
Q. Mm-hm.
21
A. And I think you can use the data I have to kind of
22
23 look at what the glide path is going to be in terms of the
24 decline in referrals from the - because affiliation is
25 important in my opinion. And so that -- so my calculations
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1 are all useful. So I don't want to be misunderstood that
2 I'm saying that St. Al's couldn't have dissociated at any

88
1 2008, St. Al's would have dissociated. Then what you could
2 do at that point of time is you could look at my but-for
3 line in terms of what scans would -Q. Mm-hm.
4

3 time. I'm just saying that they assume that they wouldn't
4 have. And I think that that's a rebuttable assumption. And
5 if-- if it was rebutted, I could alter the calculations.
Q. And are we talking about Method 5 here?

5
6
7

6
7

A. All methods.
Q. Okay. So all five of your methods assume that St.
8
9 Alphonsus - the bottom line numbers assume that St.
10 Alphonsus would not have dissociated?
11
A. That in likelihood would not have dissociated.
12 But, you know, I'm open to evidence and that type of thing.

A. -- have been -

Q. Mm-hm.

A. - and then you would pause it in decline in those
8 scans as a result of dissociation, and damages then would be
9 the difference between that but-for line and the actual
10 scans-Q. Okay.
11
12
A. - instead of the original one.
Q. Okay. I understand. So that's an analysis that
13
14 could be done?
15
A. And I actually think that it could be done in an

13 And if it were found by the jury or-- that dissociation was
14 likely at some particular-Q. Mm-hm.
15
16
A. --date, they could still use my calculations in
17 order to quantify the wrongful behavior- the effects of

16 approximate way, but -- by the jury looking at my data by
17 year. If you would give them a particular year to assume
18 dissociation, they can see that what the pattern of- and -

18 the wrongful behavior through that date and kind of through
19 the tail period where that wrongful behavior finishes
20 manifesting itself.

23 I - I think I see what you're saying.

19 -you know, and some way they could decide, well, maybe
20 we'll give them, you know, three-quarters of year one after
21 dissociation and one-quarter of year two, or something like
22 that.
Q. Okay. How's the jury to know what percentages to
23

So you said the --what- what is the tail
24
25 period?

24 use?
25
A. Well, they just look at, basically, the pattern of

Q. Okay. I want to- I want to talk a little more
21
22 about that because I don't fully understand it, but I think

87
1

A. Well, I think that --you know, if you look at the

2 actual data in terms of what happened to the MRIA business -

3 4

Q.

Mm-hm.

A. -- you know, basically it could be characterized
5
6 as a business that had been strongly growing, benefitting, I
7 believe, through - by its status as a provider within the
8 St. Al's network. And when that disassociation occurs,
9 those affiliations don't -you know, referral patterns
10 don't just change immediately. It takes time for them to
11 do, but I don't know-- but you'll see that over a period of
12 one or two years basically the referrals dry up.
Q. Hm.
13
14

A. And I'm saying that if-- if you have wrongful

15 conduct through a certain date, and - and then there's no
16 more conduct after that, you don't just truncate the damages
17 through the date that the conduct stopped. You basically
18 look at the impacts of the conduct.
Q. Okay.
19
A. And - and so in the case where - let's say for
20
21 some reason you're looking at my Method No. 1, and you say22 23

Q.

Mm-hm.

A. --well, we have evidence that even if these
24
25 opportunities have not been usurped and all this occurred in
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1 how the --what the attrition was in terms of referrals
2 after dissociation. We have hard data on that. We can show
3 them how the scans went down.

Q. Okay. So that's not- this-- this tail analysis
4
5 is not something you've performed in your tables?
6
7
8
9
10

A. It's -- it's not in here. I really- you know,
if somebody gave me assumptions, I could do an analysis
fairly readily, but I believe that MRIA's assumption is that
had these course of conducts not occurred that there would

have been a state of affairs where St. Al's had -- had
11 little reason to want to dissociate. And so that - and the
12 model assumes that they would have continued to be in this 13 - in association. That certainly doesn't assume that they
14 had to legally.

Q. Right. What if we -what if we change the
15
16 assumption and assume that even in the but-for world, St.
17 Alphonsus would have dissociated on April 1st, 2004 and
18 would have been free to compete on April 1st, 2005? Can you
19 tell me, sitting here today, how your numbers would be
20 affected by the change in assumption?
21
A. Well, I would not truncate the damages at the date
22 that their noncompete expired.
Q. Okay.
23

A. I would basically - you know, assuming that this
24
25 wrongful conduct -- you know, it affects MRIA's business
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92

1 going on into the future. I would basically try to -- and

1

Q. Mm-hm.

2 so under the wrongful conduct, I'm basically positing a but-

2

A. - and we have disassociation occurring in that

3 for line as to what would happen to their scans. Then if
4 you tell me that there was a - a dissociation which was
5 proper-

3 one vertical line in Q. Yep.
4

6
7

A. - in at about 12 months later appears to - I
5
6 don't believe that it did, but it sort of seems to coincide
7 with IMI opening on SARMC campus-Q. Mm-hm.
8

Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- I would basically look at what the attrition

8 period was that-- that-- that MRI would lose because of
9 lack of affiliation.
Q. Right.
10
11

A. - so -- and during that interim - I don't think
9
10 this is the case -- but SARMC was under a duty not to
11 compete and to support a competitor. They did that. That
12 affected the amount of scans that occurred during that
13 period. But after that one year is completed --

A. Calculate a new but-for line, compare it to their

12 actuals, and compute the damages that way.
Q. Can you do that right now?
13
14
15

A. No. It's too -

16
17

A. -- complicated to do it right now.

14
15

Q. Too complicated?

Q. Mm-hm.
A. - you can see what happens when there's no longer

16 an affiliation. They go from over 6,500 scans down a level,
17 you know, below 2,000 within one, two, three years.
Q. Mm-hm.
18

Q. Okay. Would it - you said before it would maybe

18 be three-quarters of the damages for the -19
A. Yeah. I didn't mean to actually hang a number on
20 any of those. That was for illustration purposes Q. Okay.
21
23

Q. Is this something the jury could do?

19
A. And so that's the approximate pattern that I would
20 --you know, the - the referral pattern doesn't shift
21 instantly, but ultimately it does, like when there's not an
22 affiliation because the affiliations are very important in
23 the pattern of referrals in my opinion.

24

A. Well, I -- I don't think that they could do it

24

25 with absolute precision. I think that the juries have the

25

22

A. --only. Yeah.

Q. Okay.
A. So I would probably take a line that starts where

91
1 ability in terms of assessing damages and testimony to try
2 to come at equitable result and they can kind of see how
3 much asso- -- damages associated with those years. They can
4 understand that -that some of those losses are now from
5 causes that aren't being accused.
Q. Right.
6
A. And they can make some decision as to how much of
7
8 them has to do with the bad conduct as opposed to just
9 dissociation itself.
Q. Can you give -- you said the numbers you gave
10
11 before were for illustrative purposes.
Can you - can you give any assistance to the jury
12
13 as to how they ought -- as to how they ought to quantify
14 this tailing off of damages?
A. Well, I think I could tell -- basically I think
15
16 the biggest difference is that the but-for line would be the
17 same through the end of the date, and then that they would
18 need to lower that but-for line for the decline in scans
19 that happens after Q. Mm-hm.
20
21
A. -- dissociation, and then take that amount and
22 reduce my damages for it.
23

Q. How quickly would the line lower?

A. Well, it's-- I haven't studied that exactly. It
25 appears to me that, if you look at Page 8, for example 24
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1 this -- I'm looking at Chart 1.

Q. Mm-hm.

2
3

A. It starts with the end of the one-year period.

4
5

A. And then probably mimic a decline down after that.

6
7

A. Down on a similar pattern.

8
9

A. It's going to be very approximate, but I could,

Q. Okay.
Q. Okay.
Q. Could you draw that?

10 yeah.
Q. Okay. Here's a pen.
11
12
A. (Witness complies.) So you'd have something like
13 this, and it comes down, you know, within a period of two or
14 three years.
Q. Okay. And what15
16
A. And then -- and then the damages basically instead
17 of being this area, are this area (drawing).
Q. Can you shade that in?
18
19
A. (Witness complies.)

Q. Okay. And if you had time to look at the numbers
20
21 and examine everything, you could --you could draw that
22 line --you can estimate that line better?
23
A. More closely.
24
25

Q. Yeah.
A. But, you know, MRIA's belief is that if this
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1 wrongful conduct occurred, then it's quite unlikely there

1 caused by loss of the referral network -

2 would have been a dissociation. But if I'm given an

2

Q.

3 instruction to assume there would have, I can do that

3

A. -that's not unlawful, comes down here, and the

4 calculation.

Mm-hm.

5

Q.

Okay. Get my pen back.

4 damages period is the area I shaded here.
5
Q. Okay.

6

A.

Oh.

6

7

Q.

Thank you.

7 you know, it might cut out here a little bit more than I

8
9

A. And I don't know what the pattern of that is, so

MR. WOODARD: Do you want to mark that?

8 drew, but there is some way that you divide this area

MR. VERGONIS: Um. Yeah, I think he drew it into

9 between declines in scans and just attrition of referrals

10 Exhibit 1.

10 from one that assumes continuing affiliation.

11

MR. WOODARD: Okay. So it is on the exhibit.

11

12

MR. VERGONIS: Is that okay, court reporter?

12 you.

13

THE COURT REPORTER: Yes.

13

14

MR. VERGONIS: Yes.

14 to change the tape.

Q.

Okay. I understand. That was very helpful. Thank
MR. VERGONIS: And, yeah, now would be a good time

MR. WOODARD: Okay. Okay. I just couldn't
15
16 remember if that was the actual exhibit -

16 Label No. 1 in the deposition of Bruce Budge.

17

MR. VERGONIS: Yeah.

17

18

MR. WOODARD: --or a copy.

18 the record.

19

MR. VERGONIS: Yeah. Good question.

19

20

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Mr. Vergonis, five- five

20 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the record. Here
marks the

21 minutes.

(Recess taken.)

22 Bruce Budge. The time is approximately 11 :27 a.m.

23 to change the tape.

23 EXAMINATION (Continuing)

THE WITNESS: Well, and I'm going to need to

24

The time is approximately 11:10 a.m. We're off

21 beginning of Videotape Label No.2 in the deposition of

MR. VERGONIS: Why don't we take a break now then

22

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Here marks the end of Videotape

15

24 BY MR. VERGONIS:

25 supplement my answer. It'll only take a minute.

25

Q.

Okay. Mr. Budge, you were saying before we broke

95

97

1

MR. VERGONIS: Okay.

1 that your assumption is that St. Alphonsus would have

2

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Yeah. No problem.

2 remained a partner in MRIA through the end of the --through

3 BY MR. VERGONIS:

3 the end of at least the damages period that you calculated?

4

Q.

4

5

A. I made the mistake in drawing this chart to assume

Go ahead.

A. I understand that to be the position which MRIA

5 believes that they can establish, is that had this wrongful

6 that this gray line was a but-for line. It's not. It's -

6 conduct not occurred, that there would have been a situation

7

Q.

7 where there would have been little reason for -- certainly

8

A. -- MRI's scan. And so assuming that this line was

Okay.

8 St. Alphonsus would not have been undertaking any conduct to

9 the but-for line, I would make this adjustment, okay?

9 undermine MRIA, and they would have resulted in a place

Okay. I see. Maybe we should have used a

10 where it was satisfactory to all parties and there would be

10

Q.

11 different chart.
12

A. Yeah. But I think the point is still

13 understandable.
14

Q.

It's actually Chart 2, right, that we've been

11 no reason for them to dissociate.
12

Q.

Okay. So then St. Alphonsus, under that

13 hypothetical but-for world, would have shared as an equity
14 shareholder and these profits that we're calculating under

15 working on --

15 Methods 1 through 4-

16

MR. WOODARD: Page 13.

16

17

CONTINUING BY MR. VERGONIS:

17

Q.

18

A. They would. And I believe with respect to their

--on Page 13?

18

Q.

19

A. And so in this case -

20

Q.

I'll give you the pen back if you can just do that

21 again. We have- we don't have the lines that show exactly
22 when the dissociation occurred, but we can23

A. Yeah.

A. Yes.
- is that correct?

19 limited partnership interest, I think they still do.
20

Q.

21
22

A. Yeah.

Okay.

Q. With respect to any interest they have in MRIA,

23 they don't, however, right?

24

Q.

-- pick a point in 2005 representing the -

24

A. That's my understanding.

25

A.

So somehow then you get a decline in scans that is

25

Q.

In order to accurately - in order not to
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Q. You write that "MRIA alleges that SARMC usurped
1
2 MRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR and IMI to open
3 additional facilities," one of which I assume is the Eagle
4 facility?

1 St. Luke's physician to fall within your category of
2 affiliated physicians, right?
A. That's true. And --but as I explained, I think
3
4 that I have observations that more than overcome any slight
5 tendency that might have to count a few scans that weren't
6 appropriately in there.
Q. Can you flip to Page 22, Paragraph 49 of Dr.
7
8 McCarthy's report?
9
10

132

A. I'm not sure that it's necessarily a precedent. It
5
6 would be in partnership with GSR. I don't have a complete
7 understanding of what MRI's allegations are except that it
8 had an interest in Eagle from a very early date, and that
9 because of SARMC's allegations, that opportunity was
10 suppressed and ultimately funneled to IMI. That's about
11 what I know.

A. Yes.

Q. And that paragraph -- and take as much time you

11 need to reread it-- but Dr. McCarthy criticizes your
12 Methods 1 through 4 for being above- being 160 percent of
13 the capacity that MRI Central would have had.

12

Q. What's the basis for your understanding that MRIA

13 had an interest in Eagle from a very early date?
14
A. Simply was told that by- that was told to me by
15 Counsel.
Q. Okay.
16
17
A. And I was asked to basically assume that Eagle was
18 usurping of a corporate opportunity, and that's- that's

14

Do you have any - do you think that's a valid
15 criticism?
16
A. I don't. I basically discussed this same issues
17 with Jack Floyd. I'm relying on Mr. Floyd. And we did have
18 a pretty grand discussion as to what the capacity was, what
19 our models showed in terms of scans.
20
I would point out that Dr. McCarthy's own table in
21 here shows that scans actually done at MRIC exceeded the

19 what I got.
Q. Okay. When did that usurping occur?
20
21
A. Well, I think-- this was a little bit of an
22 analytical issue because, as I understand it, this-- it

22 capacity limits that he's advocating before even getting
23 into the but-for period. So I believe that- well, what

23 occurred quite a number of periods prior to when Eagle was

24 Jack Floyd told me is that they have done, during peak
25 periods, scans of the- of the magnitude which are included

24 actually opened by IMI, but I've assumed that the
25 opportunity in terms of this diversion didn't happen until

133

131
1 in, you know, my total of diverted scans that they had
2 strategies to deal with peaks, that it certainly didn't
3 require people coming in in the middle of the night, and
4 that sort of thing. But I'm going to - I basically am
5 assuming that he is going to testify as to their capacities,
6 and I'm relying on what he told me that there was adequate
7 capacity.
Q. Okay.
8
A. The other thing that I point out is that I
9
10 actually have an extra magnet in my model because I didn't
11 understand, until I saw Dr. McCarthy's report, that the two
12 magnets that were originally put in to Meridian, one of them
13 had been moved to Eagle, so I actually have one more magnet
14 in my system than IMI actually has, which provides
15 additional capacity.
Q. Okay. We can jump back to Exhibit 1, which is
16
17 your supplemental report, on Page 10 in particular.
You have a paragraph there about damages to the
18
19 Eagle operations- or damages caused by IMI's Eagle
20 operations and St. Al's alleged conduct in relation thereto.
That's -- those are new damages that did not exist
21
22 in your 2007 report, right?
23
24

A. Yes.
Q. Because Eagle was not open at the time, right?

25

A. Correct.
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1 actually IMI opened its doors.
2
I think the record might show that had there not
3 been this usurpation by St. Al's that MRIA would have opened
4 it earlier, but I haven't tried to model damages for that
5 earlier period.

Q. Okay. If the usurpation occurred in 2007 when
6
7 Eagle opened, how could it- how- how would it be
8 included in the damages calculation based on bad acts
9 occurring before April 1st, 2005?
10
A. Well, the lawyers are going to have to establish
11 that, but I think that they believe that the usurpation and
12 the origins of it was during the period when MRIA was in
13 association with St. Alphonsus.
Q. Okay. And you're assuming that for purposes of
14
15 your opinion?
16
A. I'm not offering an opinion as to the correctness
17 of that. I'm making that assumption.
Q. Okay. You write in that paragraph, "Additionally,
18
19 as a partner in MRIA, and as a party to the MRIA partnership
20 agreement, SARMC should not have facilitated a supported IMI
21 expansion into Eagle."
I guess I have the same questions about that as I
22
23 had about the first sentence.
24
Is it - and you probably answered it already. Is
25 it your understanding then that the facilitation or- or
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MRIA's Ability to Perform Lost Scans
But for SARMC' s wrongful acts, I have calculated that MRIA would have performed an
additional 45,588 MRI scans at its SARMC campus location (including Downtown), an
additional 47,847 MRI scans in Meridian, and an additional 13,135 MRI scans in Eagle through
2010. Based on my analysis and discussions with MRIA management, MRIA would have had
the capacity to perform these scans.

The chart below shows MRI Center's actual and but-for scan volume on the SARMC campus:

Chart 2

Actual and But-for MRIC Scan Volume

12,000
But-for Scan Volume
10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

Actual MRIC Scan Volume

2,000

MRI Center has two magnets on the SARMC campus. But-for2 SARMC's wrongful acts, the
scan volume in 2001 of 12,559 represents an increase of 2,822 scans (29.0%) over MRI Center's
highest actual volume of 9,737. 3 Based on my discussions with Jack Floyd, MRI Center has

2
3

But-for scan volume is equal to actual scan volume plus lost scan volume.
See Schedule II.
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Eagle Ill
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$2,4Sl1,680
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$2,126,227
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$ U22.647
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s 1,229,340

S661.324

S 1,915,25S

$1.701.269
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$4,467,774
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$6,580,143
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Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center vs. MRI Associates, et al.

3.6

Schedule

Location 1: SARMC

Amounts Paid Ill

b

$44,609

Profit as a Percentage of Amount Paid 1'1

c

69.675%

Lost Profits before Capital Expenditures

d=b"c

Less: Capital Expenditures

141

Lost Profits

$31,081

e

$ (2,622,490)

J=d-e

($ 2,591,409)

$ 2,097, 996 141

$3,662,979

69.675%
$ 1,461,779

69.675%
$2,552_181

$3,589,819
61.683%
$2,214,308

$4,023,799
59.766%
$2,404,864

$17,709,752 •

$4,290,550
62.080%
$2,663,573

$ 11,327,786
$

$1,461,779

$2,552,181

$2,214,308

$2,404,864

$2,663,573

(2,622,490)
$8,705,296

Sources and Notes:
Ill IMI Sc.1n dat.a for MRI scrvi<cs. Sec Schedule 6.6
121 M.argin calrul.atcd from Income Statement Summary for IMI MRI.

2005~

ass_umcd
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2007. Sec
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Schedule 8.6

[31 Annualized scan volum~ for 2006. See schedule 13.6
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IMI Meridian Capital Expenditur. Requirements

2002

J..:;, ...-

Equipment Depreciation. June- December 2002111
Average Monthly Depreciation. June~ December 2002
121
Estimated 2002 Capital Expenditures

2004

$129,933
18,562

s

s 2.227,440

Stabilized Equipment Depreciation, May • December 2004PI
Less Previous Average Monthly Depreciation

h=ll/7

b ~ J2

$31.606
$ 18,562
$ 13,044

Incremental2004 Depreciation
Estim~ted 2004 Upital Expenditures121

s 1,565,280
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IMI SARMC Capital Expenditur. Requirements

2007

Equipment Depreciation, 2007''1
Average Monthly Depreciation

$262,249
$ 2!,854

Estimated 2007 and Prior Capital Expenditures

111

$2,622,490

b ~ 111l2
b

I 12111111

J0_1(r

IMl Downtown Capital Expenditure Requirements

1999

Equipment Depreciation, September- December 1999 1 ~ 1
A1.·erage Monthly Depreciation. September- December 1999

Estimated 1999 C~pital Expenditures

111

$66.258
$16,565
$1,987,740

b"'n/4
h•lZnloTlD_vr

IMI Eagle Capital Expenditure Requirements

2007

Equipment Depreciation, October- December 20071 4 1
Average Monthly Depreciation. October- December 2007

Estimated 2007 Capital Expenditures121

541.415
$ 13,805

$1,656,600
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's opinion, reversing a judgment for MRIA of$36.3 million,
significantly reduced the damages that MRIA might be entitled to recover in this case. Despite
this, MRIA has disclosed theories for the retrial that dramatically increase-to more than $75
million-the damages sought. MRIA accomplishes this more than doubling of its claimed
damages in two ways. First, MRIA improperly invokes two completely new legal theories"usurpation of the opportunity to partner with GSR and [IMI] at the time IMI was formed" and
"disgorgement" of IMI profits received by Saint Alphonsus between 2005 and 20 15-that were
not presented at the first trial, are in no way justified by any intervening ruling of the Supreme
Court or this Court, and (in the case of disgorgement) were belatedly disclosed months after the
deadline for expert disclosures. Second, MRIA ignores the limitations placed by the Supreme
Court and this Court on MRIA' s ability to recover for Saint Alphonsus' s rightful dissociation
and its lawful competition against MRIA after April I, 2005. For these reasons and others set
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forth below, the Court should preclude MRIA from asserting damages claims for disgorgement,
for the usurpation of the opportunity to partner with GSR and IMI "at the time IMI was formed,"
and for scans lost to IMI after April 1, 2005. 1

BACKGROUND
MRIA 's Original Damages Theories- Prior to the first trial, MRIA's expert Bruce
Budge disclosed four alternative estimates of the profits that MRIA allegedly lost through 2006
to three separate IMI facilities (downtown, Meridian, and on-campus). See 2007 Budge Report
(Gjording Aff. Ex. A) at 6 fig. 1 (Calculation Methods 1 and 2); id. at 13 n.5 (Calculation
Method 3); id. at 17 n.lO (Calculation Method 4). All four of Budge's models purported to
identify which subset of the scans performed at the IMI facilities would have instead been
performed by MRIA absent the alleged misconduct by Saint Alphonsus? The models differed
only in the date on which damages began (1999 vs. 2001) and the methodology by which Budge
measured the scans allegedly lost to IMI' s Meridian location ("all" Meridian scans vs.
"affiliated" Meridian scans). See id. at 6, 13 n.5, 17 n.10. Budge's lost profits estimates ranged
from approximately $13 million (damages from 2001 to 2006 using the "affiliated" scans model
1

Saint Alphonsus files this motion at this time because it depends substantially on material contained in
MRIA's rebuttal expert reports, submitted on July 29,2011, and on the recent deposition testimony ofMRIA's
expert witnesses, who were deposed on August 9 and 11 (i.e., after the August 5 motions hearing). Saint Alphonsus
respectfully requests that the motion be heard during trial prior to the testimony ofMRIA's damages experts.
2

Specifically, Budge counted as "lost" all of the scans performed by IMI at its on-campus facility, on the
theory that the partnership agreement prohibited Saint Alphonsus from competing against MRIA there and
"[t]herefore IMI should not have performed any scans on the SARMC campus." Id at 12. Budge also counted as
"lost" those scans sent to IMI's downtown facility by Saint Alphonsus-affiliated physicians and physicians who had
prior relationships with MRI Center, on the theory that those physicians "would have continued to refer patients to
MRI Center rather than to MRI downtown." Id at 14. For scans performed at IMI's Meridian facility, Budge
calculated damages under both an "all scans" and an "affiliated scans" approach, on the theory that Saint Alphonsus
should have "assisted MRIA [rather than IMI] in establishing [a] Meridian location." !d. at 13 & n.5, 17 & n.lO.
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for IMI Meridian) to approximately $21 million (damages from 1999 to 2006 using the "all"
scans model for IMI Meridian). See id.
MRIA's second expert, Charles Wilhoite, used Budge's 2006 figures as a starting point
for four alternative estimates of the future profits that MRIA would lose to the three IMI
facilities beginning in 2007. See 2007 Wilhoite Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. B) at 13. Like
Budge's alternatives, Wilhoite's models were very similar to one another, differing only in the
date on which damages ended (2015 vs. 2023) and the methodology used to measure future scan
loses to IMI's Meridian facility ("all" Meridian scans vs. "affiliated" Meridian scans). See id. at
14 table 9. Wilhoite's estimate oflost future profits (as discounted to present value) ranged from
approximately $15 million (damages from 2007 to 2015 using the "affiliated" scans model for
IMI Meridian) to approximately $33 million (damages from 2007 to 2023 using the "all" scans
model for IMI Meridian). See id.
At trial, MRIA sought and received lost-profit damages for the period 1999 through 2023
using Mr. Budge's "affiliated Meridian" methodology. See 2007 Trial Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. C)
at 2747-48,2756-60,2860-61. So measured by Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite, MRIA's damages
were approximately $36.3 million. See id. at 2760 ($15.4 million from 1999 to 2006); id. at
2860 ($20.9 million from 2007 to 2023). 3

3

The jury awarded $63.5 million, but this amount was remitted to $36.3 million after the trial court
determined, and MRIA conceded, that the jury had improperly added together MRIA's lost-profits theory and its
alternative "purchase price" damages theory. See Mem. Decision, Nov. 19,2007, at 9-10. The "purchase price"
theory is no longer in this case, having been held by the Supreme Court to be an improper measure of damages for
any of the claims in this case. See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,
498,224 P.3d 1068, 1087 (2009).
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The Supreme Court's Decision and this Court's Rulings on Remand- The amount of
damages that MRIA could claim was subsequently limited in several respects by the decision of
the Supreme Court and certain rulings by this Court on remand. Most directly, the Supreme
Court held that MRIA's damages could not extend beyond 2015, and thus reduced by $6 million,
to $30.6 million, the damages allowable under Mr. Budge's "affiliated Meridian" methodology.

See SADC, 148 Idaho at 497, 224 P .3d at 1086.
Separately, the Supreme Court rejected MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully
dissociated in violation of an express provision, and this Court then held that Saint Alphonsus
had a legal right to dissociate and therefore "had no duty not to compete after the expiration of
the noncompetition agreement" on April1, 2005. Consolidated Order re: Motions in Limine
Heard May 18,2011, at 3. It follows that Saint Alphonsus cannot be liable for damages resulting
from competition after April 1, 2005, although, as this Court recognized, it might be possible for
MRIA to prove damages that "can reasonably [be] attribute[d] to business lost even after that
date arising out of the breach of [Saint Alphonsus' s] obligation not to compete prior to that
date." Hr'g Tr., May 18, 2011, at 59 (Gjording Aff. Ex. D).

MRIA 's Revised Damages Theories - On remand, MRIA has repeatedly taken the
position that the retrial should essentially follow the proof and legal rulings of the first trial
except where the Supreme Court's decision requires otherwise. With respect to damages, Saint
Alphonsus moved for a limited reopening of discovery to allow for new expert evaluation of
damages in light of the case's changed posture, including the fact that the Supreme Court had

limited the amount of allowable damages and that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation had been held
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lawful. See Mot. to Reopen Expert Discovery (Dec. 23, 2010); Reply in Support ofMotion to
Reopen (Feb. 4, 2011). Opposing that motion, MRIA asserted that nothing relevant to damages
had changed, and represented that it had "determined that its prior damages proof was the proof
with which it could and would go to trial." Opp'n to Motion to Reopen at 3 (Feb. 2., 2011).
The Court agreed that the changed posture of the case justified a limited reopening of
damages discovery and gave Saint Alphonsus the right to bring in a new expert for the retrial.
See Order Reopening Discovery and Setting Schedule at 4 (Feb. 15, 2011). On May 2, MRIA

filed supplemental expert reports for Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite. While these new reports
followed the spirit of the Court's ruling in using actual data rather than projections for the period
2007 to 2010 and in recognizing that damages cannot run beyond 2015, the reports constituted a
striking departure from the prior legal rulings and the damages methodology employed at the
first trial in two respects. First, although court rulings since the first trial make clear that Saint
Alphonsus had a right to dissociate and a right to compete with MRIA after April1, 2005,
nothing in the experts' supplemental reports reflected any acknowledgement of these rulings or
any diminution in the amounts claimed as damages after that date. Second, the supplemental

reports disclosed an entirely new "Calculation Method 5" that claims as damages the profits from
all MRI scans ever performed (and projected to be performed through 2015) by IMI. See 2011

Budge Suppl. Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. E) at 7-8, 15; 2011 Wilhoite Report (Gjording Aff. Ex.
F) at 2, 5. Under this methodology, MRIA seeks $75.8 million in damages-more than two and
a halftimes the $30.6 million in damages awarded for the same period of time at the first trial.
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See 2011 Budge Suppl. Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. E) at 15 fig. 10 ($52.6 million); 2011 Wilhoite
Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. F) at 5 table 5 ($23.2 million). 4
Mr. Budge's supplemental report explains the theory behind his new Calculation
Method 5:
"MRIA alleges that [Saint Alphonsus], by its wrongful acts,
usurped various partnership opportunities that [Saint Alphonsus]
should have presented to its MRIA partners. One of the usurped
opportunities was the opportunity to partner with GSR radiologists
and Intermountain Medical Imaging LLP ("IMI") at the time IMI
was formed."
2011 Budge Supplemental Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. E) at 5. Until the disclosure of Budge's
report on May 2, 2011, MRIA had never-not at the first trial, nor in its pleadings on remandasserted damages on the basis that Saint Alphonsus "usurped [from MRIA] the opportunity to
partner with GSR radiologists and [IMI] at the time IMI was formed."
Further-nearly three months after the May 2 expert disclosure deadline-MRIA
revealed a second new theory of damages never previously claimed in this litigation. In their
Rebuttal Expert Reports dated July 29, 2011, Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite disclosed their
estimates of the amount of profits that Saint Alphonsus has earned (and will earn) from its
participation in the MRI profits ofiMI after April1, 2005. See Budge Rebuttal Report (Gjording
Aff. Ex. G) at 4; Wilhoite Rebuttal Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. H) at 6. At their depositions, Mr.
Budge and Mr. Wilhoite testified that these calculations were made in support of an undisclosed
4

Mr. Wilhoite also offers a second method for calculating future damages that reduces the total claimed
damages for Calculation Method 5 to $70.3 million, still more than double the allowable damages at the first trial.
See 2011 Wilhoite Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. F) at 6 table 6.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO EXCLUDE
MRIA'S NEW AND IMPROPER DAMAGES THEORIES - 7
002325

"sixth" method of calculating damages based on disgorgement of Saint Alphonsus's profits from
IMI's MRI business. See 2011 Wilhoite Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. I) at 42-43 ("I had further
discussions with Mr. Budge [after the May disclosures] and I understood that he had considered
an alternative theory relating to lost profits based on a disgorgement concept."); 2011 Budge
Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 29. Budge even revealed that he had prepared schedules
supporting such a calculation method, but had failed to disclose them to Saint Alphonsus until
doing so at his deposition on August 11,2011. See Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 2531; excerpts from Budge Dep. Ex. 4 (Gjording Aff. Ex. M) (Budge's .6 series of schedules).
ARGUMENT
The Court should preclude MRIA from offering expert testimony or other evidence in
support of damages in three discrete respects.

First, MRIA should be precluded from seeking damages arising out the alleged
"usurpation of the opportunity to partner with GSR ... at the time IMI was formed" because that
new claim is beyond the scope of the matters at issue on retrial and is in any event time barred.

Second, MRIA may not pursue an "entirely different" theory seeking disgorgement of
Saint Alphonsus's profits from IMI's MRI business for three reasons: (i) that new claim is
beyond the scope of the matters at issue on retrial; (ii) it was improperly disclosed after the
expert disclosure deadline; and (iii) it improperly seeks damages arising solely out of Saint
Alphonsus's lawful post-dissociation conduct.

Third, MRIA's experts should be precluded from offering their estimates of the damages
allegedly suffered after April 1, 2005, when Saint Alphonsus was entitled to begin competing
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with MRIA. While this Court has stated that MRIA may argue for recovery of damages
"reasonably attribut[able] to business lost ... after [April 1, 2005]" if such damages are shown to
"aris[e] out of the breach of that obligation not to compete prior to that date," Hr'g Tr., May 18,
2011, at 59 (Gjording Aff. Ex. D), MRIA's experts concede that their estimates ofpost-2005
damages are not limited in that way.

I.

MRIA Should Be Precluded From Claiming Damages for Usurpation of the
Opportunity to Partner with GSR at the Time IMI Was Formed
MRIA's new claim that Saint Alphonsus usurped from MRIA "the opportunity to partner

with GSR radiologists and [IMI] at the time IMI was formed," such that MRIA is entitled to
claim "all ofiMI's scans" as lost profits (Budge Suppl. Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. E) at 5),
should be excluded for two separate reasons.
A.

First, this damages claim is beyond the scope of the issues on retrial. At the first

trial, MRIA never pursued any claim for damages arising out of this alleged usurpation or
measured by "all ofiMI's scans." To the contrary, all four of the damages models disclosed by
MRIA prior to the first trial measured the scans allegedly lost to IMI' s downtown facility
according to Mr. Budge's "affiliated scans" model. See 2007 Budge Report (Gjording Aff. Ex.
A) at 14. And the sole damages model presented to the jury at the first trial measured scans lost
to both IMI's downtown facility and IMI's Meridian facility by the "affiliated scans" model. See
2007 Trial Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. C) at 2747-48, 2756-60, 2860-61. This model resulted in
MRIA claiming approximately one half-a far cry from "all"--ofiMI's total scan volume as
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representing scans (and profits) wrongfully diverted from MRIA. See 2007 Trial Ex. 4517
(Gjording Aff. Ex. K) (MRIA demonstrative showing proportion of scans diverted). 5
MRIA's new usurpation theory of damages grossly expands (to $75.8 million) Saint
Alphonsus's potential liability and injects completely new factual questions into the case, most
notably what the alleged partnership between MRIA and GSR would have looked like. This is
especially prejudicial because Saint Alphonsus has been held bound by certain tactical decisions

(e.g., its evidentiary stipulations) made during the first trial, when the stakes were lower, and is
particularly ironic given that Saint Alphonsus was the prevailing party in a Supreme Court
appeal resulting in limitations on MRIA's potential damages in the retrial. Simply put, having
told the Court and Saint Alphonsus that "its prior damages proof was the proof with which it
could and would go to trial," MRIA Opp'n to Motion to Reopen at 3 (Feb. 2., 2011), and having
persuaded the Court that, by and large, "the previous proceedings stand," Consolidated Order re
Motions Heard Aug. 5, 2011, MRIA should not now be permitted to inject a completely new
theory of damages that seeks in excess of$75 million-more than two and a halftimes the $30.6
million in damages awarded for the same period of time at the first trial.
B.

In any event, MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus usurped an opportunity to

partner with GSR "at the time IMI was formed" (2011 Budge Suppl. Rep. (Gjording Aff. Ex. E)
5

MRIA's new usurpation theory is entirely distinct from the claim advanced previously that, several years
after IMI opened, Saint Alphonsus co-opted from MRIA the opportunity to expand into Meridian. See 2007 Budge
Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. A) at 13 ("MRIA alleges that ... SARMC should not have facilitated or supported IMI's
expansion into Meridian [in 2002]. Rather, MRIA contends that this partnership opportunity should have been
presented to MRIA."); 2011 Budge Suppl. Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. E) at 9 (employing "the same method
discussed in my Original report" for this lost Meridian opportunity). This motion is not directed at MRIA's
"Meridian usurpation" claim.
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at 5) is time barred. This is so even on the assumption that the claim relates back to MRIA' s
earliest pleading in this case. IMI "was formed" no later than September 1999 when it opened its
doors for business. See 2007 Trial Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. C) at 1488. Moreover, by MRIA's
own account, MRIA knew of the alleged loss of its opportunity to partner with GSR no later than
December 1999. Specifically, MRIA's Dr. Prochaska testified at the first trial that "after ...
December (1999] ... there was no point discussing doing a deal with the [GSR] radiologists.
Everything shifted to Saint Al's buying us out ... and then doing whatever they wanted with
their radiologists. We were no longer negotiating with the radiologists .... It was history, and
we knew it after the December meeting .... " 2007 Trial Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. C) at 4233-34.
A claim for the usurpation or co-opting of a partnership opportunity is a claim for breach
of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 233, 61 P.3d 585, 590 (2002).
The statute of limitations for fiduciary duty claims is four years. See I. C. § 5-224; Jones v.
Kootenai County Title Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 607,614, 873 P.2d 861, 868 (1994). This means that
MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus usurped from MRIA an opportunity to partner with GSR "at
the time IMI was formed" in September 1999 had to be filed no later than four years after the
alleged usurpation occurred, i.e., by September 2003.
But MRIA did not file its original counterclaim against Saint Alphonsus until more than a
year after that, on May 20, 2005. See Answer & Countercl. This was nearly six years after "IMI
was formed" and more than five years after MRIA "knew" that any opportunity to partner with
the GSR radiologists "was history." 2007 Trial Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. C) at 4233-34. The
usurpation claim thus has been time barred since before this lawsuit began, which may explain
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO EXCLUDE
MRIA'S NEW AND IMPROPER DAMAGES THEORIES - 11
002329

why MRIA did not include this claim in its original counterclaim and did not pursue it at the first
trial. Accordingly, MRIA may not pursue that claim here.

II.

MRIA Should Be Precluded From Seeking Disgorgement of Saint Alphonsus's MRI
Profits
MRIA's new claim for disgorgement of the profits that Saint Alphonsus earned after it

joined as a partner in IMI's MRI business should be excluded for three separate and independent
reasons.

First, like MRIA's new claim for usurpation, MRIA's new disgorgement claim is beyond
the scope of the issues on retrial. MRIA never mentioned disgorgement at the first trial, and
disgorgement was not included in the 2007 reports ofMRIA's damages experts. See 2007
Budge Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. A); 2007 Wilhoite Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. B). Indeed, as
Mr. Budge stated at his recent deposition, as compared to his other damages theories,
disgorgement "has an entirely different premise, and it's [an] entirely different measurement and
an entirely different remedy." Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 30. Moreover, MRIA
never mentioned this "entirely different remedy" in its pleadings in this case, even after the Court
on remand gave MRIA an opportunity to file an amended counterclaim. See 3d Am. Countercl.
(failing to mention disgorgement either in the allegations or as part of the relief requested). This
Court recently held that the assertion of a new claim by Saint Alphonsus "would be unduly
prejudicial because it was not pled." Consolidated Order re: Motions Heard August 5, 2011, at 1
(Aug. 23, 2011). Certainly the same is true ofMRIA's eve-of-trial effort to seek disgorgement.
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Second, MRIA's new claim for disgorgement should be excluded because it was
belatedly disclosed after the May 2 deadline for MRIA's expert disclosures-inexplicably so,
given that Mr. Budge had prepared, but did not include, schedules to his supplemental report
purporting to show the measure ofthe disgorgement remedy. See Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff.
Ex. J) at 25-26 ("I'm somewhat mystified by this because I think that there should be a 2.6 and a
3.6 Well, there's a possibility this was not produced ... in the report."); excerpts from Budge
Dep. Ex. 4 (Gjording Aff. Ex. M) (Budge's .6 series of schedules produced for first time at his
deposition). This late disclosure is not only "mystiflYing]," Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex.
J) at 25-26, it is inherently prejudicial because it came after the submission of Saint Alphonsus's

own expert reports and too late for Saint Alphonsus to properly prepare to defend against it at
trial. Exclusion is an appropriate remedy for this late disclosure. See, e.g., City ofMcCall v.
Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 586, 130 P.3d 1118, 1124 (2006); Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal Co.,
136 Idaho 648, 652, 39 P.3d 588, 592 (2001).
Third, as a matter of law, MRIA is not entitled to the disgorgement remedy it seeks
because the entirety of that remedy is directed at profits earned by Saint Alphonsus after April 1,
2005, i.e., after Saint Alphonsus's dissociation and the expiration one year later of all noncompete obligations. Indeed, Mr. Budge explained at his deposition that he began calculations
for the disgorgement remedy "after April 1, 2005," "[b]ecause of [his] understanding that [Saint
Alphonsus] did not have any interest in IMI's net income prior to that date." Budge Dep. Tr.
(Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 35.
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Where applicable, disgorgement is an equitable remedy directed not at compensating a
plaintiff for its losses, but rather at depriving the defendant of gains attributable to wrongdoing.
See generally SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 116-20 (2d Cir. 2006). 6 It has already been

established, however, that Saint Alphonsus had every right to join IMI and compete with MRIA
after April1, 2005. Thus, profits earned by Saint Alphonsus after April1, 2005, are not illgotten gains. They are the result of lawful conduct and cannot properly be subject to
disgorgement. Similarly, because disgorgement bears no relationship to MRIA's actual
damages, see id., MRIA's effort to seek disgorgement cannot be justified by the Court's ruling
that MRIA may try to prove "damages" suffered after April1, 2005, "arising out of'' misconduct
occurring before that date. Hr'g Tr., May 18, 2011, at 59 (Gjording Aff. Ex. D).

III.

MRIA Should Be Precluded From Seeking Damages Suffered After Aprill, 2005
It has now been established that Saint Alphonsus rightfully dissociated on April 1, 2004,

and committed no wrong by simply competing with MRIA after April1, 2005, when all noncompete obligations expired. These legal rulings have a significant impact on the "lost profits"
damages recoverable in this case. Specifically, the rulings mean that MRIA can no longer
claim-as it did at the first trial-that all scans allegedly diverted by Saint Alphonsus from

6

It is unclear whether Idaho law recognizes disgorgement as an available remedy in this sort of case and, if
so, whether the matter would have to be tried to the bench rather than the jury. See id (emphasizing equitable
nature of remedy). Certainly, permitting a disgorgement remedy would be in tension, if not outright conflict, with
the Supreme Court's instruction that this case is to be governed by Pope, which holds that a plaintifrs recovery
must be measured by the plaintifrs proven losses, not by the defendant's gain. See SADC, 148 Idaho at 498, 224
P.3d at 1087; Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217,234, 646 P.2d 988, 1005 (1982). There is no need for
the Court to grapple with these difficult issues at this time, however, since MRIA may not assert its claim for
disgorgement for the reasons set forth herein.
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MRIA to IMI after that day "count" as lost scans for damages purposes. Rather, as this Court
recognized at a prior hearing, for the period after April 1, 2005, the MRIA entities may recover
for injuries suffered after April 1, 2005, only by proving that such injuries are "reasonably
attribute[able] to" Saint Alphonsus' s "breach of [its] obligation not to compete prior to that
date." Hearing Tr., May 18, 2011, at 59 (Gjording Aff. Ex. D). 7
But MRIA's experts have not even tried to determine which, if any, business losses
occurring after April 1, 2005, are attributable to misconduct occurring before that date. Instead,
without any alteration to their methodologies, these experts claim the same--or greaterquantities of lost scans for the time period 2005 to 2015 as at the first trial. They do this because,
as Mr. Budge conceded at his deposition, his damages calculations are designed to measure the
business lost by MRIA as a result of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation and entering into postdissociation competition with MRIA. See Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 84-86. Yet
we know now that Saint Alphonsus had a right to dissociate when it did and to enter into legal
competition when its non-compete obligations expired.
Mr. Budge further conceded that if Saint Alphonsus were assumed to have rightfully
dissociated-as this Court has ruled as a matter of law that it did-then he would have had to
calculate damages suffered after April1, 2005, by analyzing "the effects of the wrongful conduct

7

This limitation on MRIA's ability to claim post-dissociation damages is plainly correct. See, e.g., Hite v.
Biomet, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1025-26 (N.D. Ind. 1999) ("[c]ommon sense dictates that a valid [termination]
subsequent to a[n improper] act cuts off ... liability"); All Line Inc. v. Rabar Crop., 919 F.2d 475,480 (7th Cir.
1990); Porous Media Corp. v. Midland Brake, Inc., 220 F.3d 954, 961-62 (8th Cir. 2000); Osborn v. Commanche
Cattle Indus., Inc., 545 P.2d 827, 831 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975); Buckley v. Coe, 385 S.W.2d 354,359 (Mo. Ct. App.
1964).
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... through the tail period where that wrongful behavior finishes manifesting itself." !d. at 86.
On that premise, Mr. Budge would have recognized a rapid decrease in MRIA's scans caused by
the lawful severing of the relationship between Saint Alphonsus and MRIA, with MRIA' s "but
for" scan volume ultimately converging, after just a handful of years, with MRIA's real-world
scan volume, thus ending the damages period. See id. at 88-93. At his deposition, Mr. Budge
illustrated this concept by modifying one ofhis own charts to show how MRIA's "but for" scan
volume (i.e., the scans claimed as "lost" for damages purposes) would sharply decline if one
assumes that Saint Alphonsus rightfully dissociated and began competing with MRIA after April
1, 2005. See Budge Dep. Ex. 1, at 13 (Gjording Aff. Ex. L). This chart as it was actually
modified by Mr. Budge is shown below, with the shaded area conceptually representing the very
limited damages to which MRIA might be entitled under the proper analysis:
Chart 2

Actual and But-for MRIC Scan Volume
14,000
12,000
But-for Scan Volume
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000

Actual MRIC Scan Volume

2,000
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The tailing off of damages represented by Mr. Budge's revised but-for line is precisely the sort
of analysis envisioned by this Court's statement that the MRIA entities may seek to prove
damages "that they can reasonably attribute to business lost even after that date arising out of the
breach of [Saint Alphonsus's] obligation not to compete prior to that date." Hearing Tr., May
18,2011, at 59 (Gjording Aff. Ex. D). Yet Mr. Budge admitted at his deposition that the
damages figures in his report do not reflect such an analysis and that he had "not" performed
such an analysis. Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 88. And MRIA's second expert,
Charles Wilhoite, admitted that he used Mr. Budge's grossly inflated 2010 estimates as his own
starting point for estimating future damages, see Wilhoite Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. I) at 2223, thus making his analysis equally deficient. In other words, rather than reduce damages
through this "tail period," MRIA's experts simply continued to grow them, as if Saint Alphonsus
never exercised its right to dissociate, and as if the rulings that Saint Alphonsus had a right to
dissociate never happened. This utter failure to perform the required analysis-an analysis that
is "too complicated" for Mr. Budge himself to do on the spot, Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex.
J) at 90, and hence too complicated for a jury to perform based solely on the information

provided-requires that the Court preclude MRIA from presenting its experts' estimates of
damages after April1, 2005.
While Mr. Budge's failure to adjust damages "through the tail period where th[e]
wrongful behavior finishes manifesting itself' (Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 86)
completely undermines his entire calculation of damages for the period after April 1, 2005, this
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failure is most egregious with respect to MRIA's claims for damages based on scans lost to
IMI's on-campus and Eagle facilities, both ofwhich only came into existence after April 1, 2005.
Specifically, when Mr. Budge estimated damages in 2007 for scans allegedly lost to
IMI's on-campus facility, which opened after April1, 2005, he explained that Saint Alphonsus
"was prohibited from competing with or supporting competition against MRIA in the provision
ofMRI scans on the SARMC campus"; that IMI therefore "should not have performed any MRI
scans on the SARMC campus"; and that "MRIA has therefore lost scan volume on the SARMC
campus equal to the number of scans performed by IMI on the SARMC campus." 2007 Budge
Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. A) at 12. Mr. Budge's 2011 analysis relies on the same premise of
continuing illegal competition after April 1, 2005. See 2011 Budge Suppl. Report (Gjording Aff.
Ex E) at 9 (calculating scans and profits lost to IMI's operations on the SARMC campus "using
the same method discussed in my Original report"). But that premise is now incorrect as a
matter of law: Saint Alphonsus had every right in 2005 to replace MRIA with IMI as the
provider ofMRI services on the hospital campus. And Mr. Budge offers no alternative
explanation how damages arising out of that replacement "can reasonably [be] attribute[ d)" to
Saint Alphonsus's alleged "breach ofth[e] obligation not to compete prior to" April1, 2005.
Hearing Tr., May 18, 2011, at 59 (Gjording Aff. Ex. D).
So, too, for IMI's Eagle facility, which opened after the first trial, in October 2007.
MRIA contends that Saint Alphonsus "should not have facilitated or supported IMI' s expansion
into Eagle, Idaho," and thereby "usurped" from MRIA the opportunity to expand into Eagle.
2011 Budge Suppl. Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. E) at 10. But Mr. Budge conceded at his
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deposition that his calculations "assume[] that the opportunity in terms of this diversion didn't
happen until actually IMI opened its doors" there in 2007. Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J)
at 132. Here, too, Mr. Budge simply ignores the ruling that by 2007 Saint Alphonsus had the
right to facilitate IMI's entry into Eagle, and makes no effort to calculate what portion (if any) of
the business allegedly lost to IMI' s Eagle facility is traceable to misconduct occurring prior to
April1, 2005.
In sum, MRIA was given the opportunity to submit expert opinion estimating damages
after April 1, 2005, that were caused by alleged misconduct occurring prior to that date, and
completely failed to do so. Instead, MRIA has submitted expert estimates that do no more than
calculate damages arising from the fact of competition after April 1, 2005. Since that
competition was entirely lawful, the estimates ofMRIA's experts for damages after April1,
2005, must be excluded.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should preclude MRIA from presenting any claim
for or expert testimony concerning (i) usurpation ofMRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR in
IMI at the time IMI was formed; (ii) disgorgement of Saint Alphonsus's post-April1, 2005,
MRI-related profits; and (iii) scans and profits allegedly lost to IMI after April 1, 2005.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 2nd day of September 2011.
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liability partnership,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
VS.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
No exhibit in this case has been more emphatically excluded from evidence than the socalled "Harder Letter." MRIA Ex. 4140. Five times Judge McLaughlin and this Court have
ruled the Harder Letter inadmissible. Yet MRIA counsel has advised Saint Alphonsus counsel of
his intention to refer to the Harder letter, as well as a draft of the Harder Letter, among 60+ other
exhibits during his opening statement. MRIA counsel should be precluded from referring to the
Harder Letter or any draft of the Harder Letter at any time during trial. MRIA Ex. 4140 (the
"final" form ofthe Harder letter); SARMC Ex. 358 and Ex. 357 (two "drafts" of the Harder
Letter, discussed further below).
On August 6, 2007, Judge McLaughlin excluded the Harder Letter from evidence, on the
ground that there was no foundation to show that the letter was ever, in fact, delivered. See 2007
Trial Tr. at 1189-90, 1196. The Court reiterated its ruling the next day, finding that a jury could
only speculate on whether the letter was delivered. !d. at 1272. MRIA then attempted to use the
letter as "impeachment" of a Saint Alphonsus witness, which the Court denied as improper. !d.
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at 2324-25. MRIA then filed an unsolicited brief on the admissibility of the letter, which the
Court treated as a motion for reconsideration. The Court again ruled that the letter was
inadmissible. !d. at 2922-25. And on June 9, 2011, this Court held that Judge McLaughlin's
ruling on the Harder Letter was the law-of-the case. See Consolidated Order re: Motions in
Limine Heard May 18,2011 at 2-3.
Notwithstanding this history, MRIA has indicated, in a letter to Saint Alphonsus, that it
intends to use during its opening statement the Harder Letter (MRIA Ex. 4140), as well as a draft
copy of the Harder Letter that was marked as an exhibit but never referred to on the record
during the 2007 trial. (SARMC Ex. 358).
In the latter respect, MRIA counsel seeks to exploit the fact that two "drafts" of the
Harder Letter were marked in 2007 as Exhibits 357 and 358, identified as "Prochaska Deposition
Exhibit 18 and 19." Despite the fact that neither Exhibits 357 and 358 were ever mentioned by
any party on the record of the 2007 proceeding, they appear later, on the exhibit list
accompanying the "Reporter's Transcript on Appeal", inexplicably annotated to indicate that
they were among hundreds of exhibits "admitted by stipulation off the record." Given the
exhaustive consideration (and exclusion) ofthe "final" Harder Letter (MRIA Ex. 4140), and the
fact that the drafts were never mentioned by anyone on the transcript at the 2007 trial, the
inclusion of the two "drafts" on a lengthy list of documents stipulated into evidence, can only be
a simple mistake. Surely the Court did not intend that its lengthy consideration and repeated
exclusion of the "final" Harder Letter would be cancelled by receipt into evidence of two drafts
of the same inadmissible document. Clearly this is the type of"error in [the] original findings
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not passed upon on appeal" that should be remedied for the forthcoming proceeding, despite the
ostensible "stipulation off the record" in 2007.
CONCLUSION
MRIA counsel should be precluded from referring to the Harder Letter or any draft of the
Harder Letter at any time during trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 2nd day of September, 2011.
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liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
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N~E

______________________________________ SEAT#________

_____________

TIJROR~BER

JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE
Welcome and thank you for fulfilling one of the most important duties that American
citizens have: serving on a jury to resolve a dispute. Before the jury is selected, the court must
learn a little about each potential juror to make sure that you are sitting only on a case that is
appropriate for you. The questions on this form are designed to help the court and the lawyers
learn something about your background and your views on issues that may be related to this
lawsuit. They are also asked to be sure you do not have some personal knowledge of the subject
matter of the suit or personal, business, social or family ties with any of the parties that could
make it difficult or impossible for you to render a fair and impartial verdict in this case based
only on the evidence and law which you hear about the case in this courtroom. The questions are
not asked to invade your privacy or to make you uncomfortable. This process is followed to
assure that jurors will be fair and impartial in deciding the case. Please answer the questions
carefully and completely. Remember that you are under oath to tell the truth and accurate
and truthful answers by you are required to assure that all of the parties are treated fairly.
•

Do not leave any questions blank.

•

If a question does not apply to you, simply write N/A (for Not Applicable or No Answer)
in the space for the answer. If there is no response to a question, we will assume that you
mistakenly skipped it and may ask you about it in court later in the second part of this
process.

•

Since we need to make copies, and because the forms become part of the court record,
please DO NOT write on the back of any page. If you need more room, continue at the
bottom or side of the page or use the lined pages provided at the back of the form. When
you have completed the questionnaire, please return it to the jury clerk.

There are no right or wrong answers! Just tell the court the truth. You may be asked
follow-up questions later about your answers.
If there are questions that you would feel more comfortable answering in private, simply
write "private" in the space for your answer and circle the question number. The follow-up
questions on that topic will be asked in a private setting, and not in front of other jurors.
If you have trouble reading, understanding, or filling out this form, or in answering a
specific question, simply write "Do not know how to respond" in the space for that question and
you will be questioned later in the process on that matter, if necessary. Thank you very much for
.
.
your Jury servtce.
I certify, under penalty of perjury, that the following answers are true and correct to the
best of my knowledge. Signed in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, on: August __, 2011.
SIGNATURE______________________________

DATE- - - - - -
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JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE
PLEASE PRINT ANSWERS SO THEY MAY BE MORE EASILY READ.

1. Full name

-------------------------------------------------

2. Date ofBirth ------------3. Are you a citizen of the United States? Yes L_) No L_)
4. List any other names you've ever been known by. --------------------------

5. In what city and county do you currently reside?--------------------------

How long have you lived there? --------------------------------------Where else have you lived in the past 10 years?

6. What is your current marital status? Single L_) Married L_)
Widowed ( _ ) Divorced ( _ ) Separated L_)
7. Do you have any children? Yes L_) No L_) If yes, what are their ages?

8. If you are married or living with someone, what is his or her present occupation and
where does he or she work?

-----------------------------------------

-2-
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9. Education:
Yes(_)

a. Did you complete high school?

No(_)

If not, what is the highest grade completed?
b. Did you attend any vocational
or technical schools?

Yes(_)

No(_)

Did you graduate?

Yes(_)

No(_)

Yes(_)

No(_)

Yes(_)

No(_)

Yes(_)

No(_)

Yes(_)

No(_)

Degree(s) attained:
c. Did you attend college?
Did you graduate?
How many years did you attend?
Degree(s) attained:
d. Did you attend graduate school?
Degree( s) attained:
e. Are you a student now?
Name of School:
Grade or Level:
10. What is your current employment status? Full-time (_) Part-time (_) Retired (_)
Disabled(_) Unemployed L_) For how long? _ _ __
Present job position: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Employer: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Length of employment: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
11. If retired or unemployed, please list:
Most recent job p o s i t i o n : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Employer: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Length of employment: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
12. Briefly explain your duties at your current job (or your last job, if you are retired,
unemployed, or have been in your current job less than three years): _ _ _ _ _ _ __

13. Please list any organizations you belong to or participate in. This could include military
or veterans groups, volunteer work, church or religious organizations, neighborhood
groups, or political groups: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

14. a. Have you or a family member ever received treatment from Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center or any of its affiliates ofwhich you are aware? Yes(__) No(__) If
yes, please explain: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

-4-
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b. If your answer is "yes," is there anything about that experience that would make it
difficult for you to be a fair and impartial juror? Yes (__) No (__) If yes, please
explain: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

15. a. Have you or a family member ever received treatment from MRI Center of Idaho or
MRI Mobile? Yes(__) No(__) Ifyes, please explain: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

b. If your answer is "yes," is there anything about that experience that would make it
difficult for you to be a fair and impartial juror? Yes (__) No (__) If yes, please
explain: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

16. a. Have you or a family member ever received treatment from Intermountain Medical
Imaging? Yes(__) No(__) Ifyes, please explain: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

-5-
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b. If your answer is "yes," is there anything about that experience that would make it
difficult for you to be a fair and impartial juror? Yes (__) No (__) If yes, please
explain: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

17. Have you or a family member ever received treatment from any of the following medical
doctors:
a. Dr. Roger Curran
b. Dr. David Giles
c. Dr. John Havlina
d. Dr. Thomas Henson
e. Dr. James Prochaska
Yes(__) No(__) If yes, please indicate which doctor(s) you have received treatment
from, and the nature of that treatment: - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

-6-
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If your answer is yes, is there anything about that experience that would make it difficult
for you to be a fair and impartial juror in a case in which any of them were included?
Yes(_) No(_) lfyes,pleaseexplain _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

18. Do you have any education, training, or work experience in the following areas?
a. Accounting, finance, or economics?

Yes(_) No(_)

b. Statistics or Mathematics?

Yes(_) No(_)

c. Law?

Yes(_) No(_)

d. Medicine or Medical Imaging?

Yes(_) No(_)

e. Computers or Information Technology (IT)?

Yes(_) No(_)

If yes to any of these, please explain:

f.

If your answer is yes, is there anything about that experience that would make it
difficult for you to be a fair and impartial jury in a case in which any of them were
included?

Yes(_) No(_)

-7-
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If yes to any of these, please explain: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

19. Have you ever been a member of a partnership? Yes ( _ ) No (___) If yes,
a. When did you become a p a r t n e r ? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - b. Are you still a member of a partnership? Yes(_) No(___) Ifnot, when did
your membership in the partnership end, and how? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

c. What was the business purpose of the partnership? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

d. Have you had any negative experiences as a result of your membership in the
partnership? Yes(..___--->) No(_)

Ifyes, please explain: _ _ _ _ _ __

20. Have you ever had the responsibility for organizing a new business, reorganizing an
existing business or negotiating changes to an existing business? Yes(___) No(___)
-8-
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If yes, please d e s c r i b e : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

21. Have you, or anyone close to you, ever been involved in a lawsuit or other legal dispute
over a business matter? Yes(__) No(__) If yes, please explain, including the
outcome:

--------------------------------

22. Have you, or anyone close to you, ever lose a significant amount of money in a business
deal, or been prevented from participating in a successful business deal?
Yes(__) No(_)

If yes, please describe what happened, including what caused the

loss or prevented your participation, and the result: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

23. Do you have any close friends or relatives who are medical doctors or physicians?
Yes(_) No(_) lfyes, describe your relationship with those individuals, and the
type of medicine practiced by the doctor or physician: ______________
-9-
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24. Have you ever been a health care provider? Yes(__) No(__) If yes, describe the
health care position you held, the city and state where you worked, and the years you
worked as a health care provider: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

25. Are you or any member of your family, holders of privileges to practice as a health care
provider or Doctor at Saint Alphonsus or any of its affiliated organizations?
Yes(__) No(__) Ifyes, please explain: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

26. Do you or a member of your household, have any specialized training or work experience
in the following fields? (Please circle appropriate numbers)
a. Radiology
b. Magnetic Resonance Imaging (or "MRI")
c. Computed tomography imaging ("CT scans" or "CAT scans")
d. Ultrasound
e. X-ray imaging
-10-
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27. a. Have you had any interactions with any of the following law firms, including having
an attorney client relationship with them or any of their members now or in the past:
Jones Day, Washington, D.C. Office
Gjording & Fouser PLLC
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC
Greener Banducci Shoemaker, PA

Yes (_J No (_J lfyes, please explain: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

b. Does anything about that relationship lead you to believe you could not be a fair and
impartial juror in this case? Yes (_J No (_J
28. Do you have any vision problems, hearing problems, or any current health issues which
you believe render you incapable of performing satisfactory jury service?
Yes (_J No (_J
29. Would a reasonable accommodation by the court allow you to overcome this difficulty?
Yes (_J No (_J lfyour answer is yes, what accommodation would be required?

30. Are you able to read, speak, and understand the English language? Yes (_J No (_J

-11-
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31. Have you ever served as a juror in the past? Yes (_) No (_)
a. If Yes, how many times: _____________________
When:

-----------------------------

Type of case(s): - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Were you the foreperson for any of this cases? Yes(_) No(_) Which ones?

b. Did the case(s) reach a verdict? Yes(_) No(_)
If not, was that because the jury could not agree on a verdict or because of some
other reason?

--------------------------

Please give that r e a s o n : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

c. How did you feel about your jury service? - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

32. Other than as described in your previous answers, have you had any interaction with any
of the entities listed below? By "interactions," we mean have you or any member of your
immediate family ever been an investor in, employed by, or sought employment with or
done business with the following individuals or entities? If yes, please circle the
appropriate letter(s).
a.

Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center

-12-
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b.

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care

c.

MRI Associates, LLP

d.

MRI Limited, doing business as MRI Center of Idaho

e.

MRI Mobile Limited

f.

Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC

g.

Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP

h.

Gem State Radiologists, LLP

1.

West Valley Medical Center

J.

Holy Rosary Hospital

k.

Mercy Medical Center

If you circled any of these entities, please describe the work sought, the work performed,
or the nature of the business conducted:

----------------------------------

33. The principal owners ofMRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile Limited
are (a) Dr. Thomas Henson, (b) Dr. Jack Havlina, (c) Dr. David Giles, (d) Dr. James
Prochaska, (e) the estate of Dr. Roger Curran, (f) West Valley Medical Center I HCA,
and (g) CHI Catholic Health Initiatives. There are also several limited partners in MRI

-13-
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Limited and MRI Mobile Limited, who are listed on an attached Exhibit A to this
questionnaire. Do you know any of these entities or individuals? Yes L_) No L_)
If yes, please identify the entities or individuals and please describe how you know them:

34. This lawsuit involves a dispute involving several of the entities listed in Question 31.
Have you read, heard, or seen anything on television or on the internet or any other
electronic sites about this lawsuit? Yes L_) No L_) If yes, please identify the source
of any information you have received and briefly state what you recall about this lawsuit:

35. Do you owe money to any of these entities, or do any of these entities owe money to
you? Yes L_) No L_)
YOU ARE ADVISED YOU ARE NOW A SWORN POSSIBLE JUROR IN THIS CASE
AND YOU MAY NOT, FROM THIS POINT FORWARD UNTIL THIS CASE IS FULLY
PRESENTED TO YOU FOR YOUR DECISION, DISCUSS THIS CASE WITH ANYONE
INCLUDING YOUR FELLOW illRORS, NOR MAY YOU DO INDEPENDENT
RESEARCH ABOUT THIS CASE OR READ ANY ARTICLES OR ELECTRONIC
-14-
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INTERNET SITES, NEWSPAPER ARTICLES OR OTHER DESCRIPTIONS OF THE
CASE. THAT WOULD BE UNFAIR TO ALL THE PARTIES. YOUR DECISION MUST
BE BASED ON THE EVIDENCE YOU HEAR IN THE COURTROOM ONLY. THE
PARTIES CANNOT ADDRESS ISSUES NOT IN EVIDENCE NOR MAY YOU BASE
ANY DECISION ON THINGS YOU MIGHT SEE OR HEAR OUTSIDE OF THE
COURTROOM.
36. Are you interested in any manner in the outcome of this lawsuit or the principle question
involved in it? Yes (_) No (_)
37. Do you have any bias or prejudice, for or against, any of the individuals or entities listed
above? Yes (_) No (_) If yes, please state the name of the entity or entities and
briefly explain the reasons for your feelings: - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

-15-
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38. Are you acquainted with any of the people listed on the attached witness list? (Exhibit B)
Please circle the number in front of one or more names where appropriate. If you have
circled any numbers, please describe how you know that person and when you met him
or her:

-----------------------------------------------------------

39. Do you have any ethical, religious, moral, philosophical, or other beliefs that prevent you
from serving as a juror? Yes (_) No (_)
40. This trial may last four to six weeks. If asked to serve as a juror, will the length of this
trial or its location interfere with your ability to be a fair and impartial juror? Yes (_)
No(_) If yes, please explain:--------------------------

-16-
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41. One of the Court's duties is to instruct the jury as to the law that applies to this lawsuit.
The role of the jury is to determine the facts and apply those facts to the law as instructed
by the Court. Will you follow the Court's instructions as to the law that must be applied
in deciding this lawsuit? Yes(_) No(_)
Ifno,whynot? _____________________________________________________

42. Is there any matter not covered by this questionnaire that you think the attorneys or the
Court might want to know about you as a juror in this lawsuit?

Print your name: _______________________________
Signature: _____________________________________

-17-
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SPACE FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION

If you need further space to explain an answer, please use these sheets. ONLY
WRITE ON THE FRONT OF THE SHEETS. Identify the question by question number
in front of the extended explanation you are giving to the question.
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EXHIBIT A
MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
General Partner - MRI Associates (MRIA) - MRIA is only General Partner
Saint Alphonsus RMC
Mednow, Inc
West Valley Medical Center
Holy Rosary Medical Center
Doctors Magnetic Resonance

Limited Partners
Saint Alphonsus RMC
Mednow, Inc
West Valley Medical Center
Holy Rosary Medical Center
Robert C. & Diana M. Burton
Taylor Allan Campbell
Adam Christopher Curran Trust
Andrew R Curran
Camas Chanel Curran
Hannah Leigh Curran
Jacqueline Susan Curran Trust
Kathryn Lynn Curran Trust
Ruth Jane Curran Trust
The John Andrew Curran Trust
Calliope Anne Curran Trust
John Patrick Curran
Christopher Law Curran
Curran Investment LP
Sophia Zoe Curran Trust
Julia Curran Flynn
The Derrek Robinson Flynn Trust
Bailey Lake Flynn
Marcus Roger Flynn Trust
Giles Family L.P.
The David and Randa Giles Family Revocable Trust
John M. Havlina III
John M. Havlina, Jr., M.D.
Natalie J. Havlina
The Thomas E. Henson Living Trust
Judith K. Jones
Phyllis A. Miller Survivor's Trust
Wendell L. Miller Family Trust
Julie M. Gilbert
Michael W. Prochaska
Prochaska Family Trust
Frank A. Roberts, M.D.
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Douglas M. Rogers, M.D.
Beverly P. Smith
Thoreson Family Trust
Elizabeth Havlina Volgamore
Richard W. Wilson, M.D.

MRI MOBILE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
General Partner - MRI Associates (MRIA) (MRIA is the only GP)
Saint Alphonsus RMC
Mednow, Inc
West Valley Medical Center
Holy Rosary Medical Center
Doctors Magnetic Resonance
Limited Partners
MRI Ltd. Partnership
Saint Alphonsus RMC
Mednow, Inc
West Valley Medical Center
David and Randa Giles Revocable Trust
Charles B. Greene
Robert F. Malison
Barbara E. Miller
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EXHIBITB
The following individuals have been identified by one or both parties as potential witnesses:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Allen Hahn
Bob Bell
Bruce Anderson, M.D.
Bruce Budge
Carolyn Corbett
Charles Wilhoite
Chris Anton
Cindy Schamp
Darrell Fugate
David Giles, M.D.
Dennis Reinstein
Diane Newton, M.D.
Edward McEachern, M.D.
Grant Chamberlain
Greg Vistnes
Holly Wallace
Ian Davey, M.D.
Jack Floyd, M.D.
James Prochaska, M.D.
Janelle Reilly
JeffCliff
Jeffrey Seaboum, M.D.
Jennifer Mann
Joe Gobel, M.D.
Joe Messmer, M.D.
John ("Jack") Havlina, M.D.
John Knochel, M.D.
Julli Hopkins
Karen Noyes
KenFry
Lani O'Malley
Leslie Kelly Hall
Lisa Scales, M.D.
Lyndee Chatterton
Lynn Miller
Manfred Steiner
Marc Meier, M.D.
Mark Adams
Mark Dalley
Mark Lawrence
Mary River, M.D.
Mike Cacchillo
Mike Czech
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44.
45.
46.
4 7.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Mike Finnerty
Milt Kutsurelis
Neil Davey, M.D.
Patricia Vandenberg
Patti Hameck Sulc
Paul DeWitt
Paul Traughber, M.D.
Peter Reedy, M.D.
Ridgley Denning
Robert George
Robin Matzek (fka Robin Cioffi)
Sally Jeffcoat
Sam Gibson, M.D.
Sandra Bruce (Bennett)
Scott Berger
Scott Christensen
Stephanie Westermeier
Terry Krogstad
Thomas McCarthy
Tim Hall, M.D.
Tom Henson, M.D.
Vicken Garabedian, M.D.
Yvonne Ketchum
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Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO PREVENT SAINT
ALPHONSUS FROM REFERRING
TO EXTENSION OF TERM TO 2023

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

MOTION TO PREVENT SAINT ALPHONSUS FROM REFERRING TO EXTENSION OF TERM TO 2023 - 1
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") move the Court for an order preventing Saint Alphonsus
from referring to the extension of any term to 2023, in opening argument or at trial. Saint
Alphonsus has disclosed a number of illustrative exhibits, attached hereto, referring to motions to
"extend term" to 2023. As the Idaho Supreme Court held, there was no written instrument
extending the term ofMRI Center past 2015, to 2023, as MRIA had argued. Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 497, 224 P.3d 1068, 1086 (2009).
Further, this Court held that the MRIA partnership had an indefinite term, rather than a definite
term based upon the terms ofthe limited partnerships, as MRIA had argued. (Memorandum
Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment on Pleadings and Motions for
Summary Judgment, Nov. 16, 2010.) As such, any reference to 2023 is simply irrelevant, and is
therefore inadmissible. I.R.E. 401, 402. MRIA would therefore request that the Court prevent
Saint Alphonsus from making reference thereto.
DATED this 8th day of September, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

J:?.,.

tRL

Dara L. Pirker
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

MOTION TO PREVENT SAINT ALPHONSUS FROM REFERRING TO EXTENSION OF TERM TO 2023 - 2

002368

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of September, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintifflCounterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintifflCounterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

}(Facsimile

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

%-facsimile

15ara L. Pfrker

MOTION TO PREVENT SAINT ALPHONSUS FROM REFERRING TO EXTENSION OF TERM TO 2023 - 3
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Giles Plans for a New Imaging Center
March -August 1998
Giles alld the Radiol<>gists plan a new imaging center
March 2
"a meeting Thursday...
an Independent
Imaging Center."
Signed:
"David Giles"

May13
"Dr. Giles expressed his
feeling of urgency ... now
was the time to open an
Imaging Center."
Initialed: "OG"

March 11

·a few possible

May11
"Dr. Giles stated that if
the imaging center is not
built now, it most likely
will not happen ... "
Initialed: "DG"

properties in the
downtown area ... "
Initialed: "OG"

00
00

(j)

..-i

March

••

August17
"building purchase
dosed at 1:00 PM
today." "Dr. Giles ...
to discuss what is to
be said to Sandra..."
Initialed: "DG"

July20
"Dr. Giles would like to get
through the next MRI meetlng
before Sandra Bruce has
knowledge.•." Initialed "DG"
~
"Dr. Giles again stressed ...
confidentiality .• "Carl Harder feels
very comfortable representing the
group ... Dr. Giles feels ... a
confidential discussion with Dr.
Prochaska ..." Initialed "DG"

AugustS
"Dr. Giles
would like to
open as quickly
as possible ..."
Initialed "DG"

June

Giles and
Radiologists
disclose plans for
imaging center to
Sandra Bruce.

August

1:------;July 16
Harder
!reviewed
noncompete.''
"Discussion re
1"carl

tApri11S

business"
jSigned:
David J. Giles

'June 17

1
MRIA retains carl

jCarl Harder

; Harder, Esq.
i"No further
!business."
!Signed:
J. Giles

jattends.
j"Nofurther
r business."
!signed:
;David.J. Giles

l

I

IIRadiolog~:,Sl

:•nterest... no
!further business"
Isigned:
rDavid J. Giles

~-----;August 19
~"Motlon was ..•
:,approved to
~extend term ... to
!December 31,
!2023..." "No
Jfurther business."'
!Signed:
iDavid J. Giles
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Giles Plans for a New Imaging Center
March -August 1998
71

Gili!s alii :tbe Radiologists plan a new imaging center
July6
"Dr. Giles again stressed ...
confidentiality ."
"Carl Harder feels very
comfortable representing
the group ... Dr. Giles
feels ... a confidential
discussion with Dr.
Prochaska ... "
Initialed "DG"
00
00

en
'C""i

July

;June 17
Carl Harder attends.
"No further business."
'Signed:
J.Giles

July20
"Dr. Giles would like to
get through the next
MRI meeting before
Sandra Bruce has
knowledge ••• "
Initialed "DG"

I

0

August 17
"building purchase closed at
1:00 PM today. " "Dr. Giles ...
to discuss what is to be said to
Sandra ... " Initialed: "DG"
August 5
"Dr. Giles would like to
open as quickly as
possible ..."
Initialed "DG"

August 20
Giles and
Radiologists
disclose plans for
imaging center to
Sandra Bruce.

..

:July 16
l"carl Harder reviewed
;noncompete." "Discussion
lre [Radiologists] interest ... "
;"No further business"

August 19
'"Motion was ... approved to
;extend term ... to December 31,
2023 ..." "No further business."
Signed:
David J. Giles
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"

I

Radiologists Creates IMI
,g~ Giles

leads the RadiologistS" effort to create new independent imaging center
July-August 1998
Radiologists
purchase $950,000
building

March 1998
Radiologists begin
planning to create
a new imaging
center

August 19, 1998
' MRIA votes to
extend to 2023
August 20, 1998
Drs. Giles, Traughber,
and Hall inform Saint Afs
October22.1998

Radiologists/MRIA/Saint Al's
agree at MRIA Meeting to
pursue parallel negotiations

March 1998
Radiologists
begin planning
to create new
center

September 1999
IMI Opens

IMI opens with no
agreement completed
with either MRIA (MRI)
or Saint Al's mo,n·"~Kn

April2004
SaintAI's
withdraws from
MRIA

2001

2004
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
Shelli Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED
EXHIBIT LIST

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.

~
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,

.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") submit the following list
of exhibits for Saint Alphonsus's case in chief, including notations indicating whether a
document had been admitted at the previous trial, and whether the exhibit is the subject of a
stipulation or stipulations with respect to authenticity, foundation, and/or admissibility.
In addition to the exhibits identified on the following list, Saint Alphonsus reserves the
right to utilize any exhibit, document or other thing identified by any party in this case as an
exhibit; any exhibit necessary for impeachment of any witness; any exhibit, document or other
thing identified or produced during the discovery or in response to subpoena in this case by any
party or other person or entity; and demonstrative exhibits to otherwise explain or highlight any
other evidence or facts presented in this case.
Saint Alphonsus reserves the right to add to, subtract from, or otherwise amend,
supplement or withdraw exhibits identified in this list.
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST- 2-
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Evidence

1
2

X

3

X

X

Date

Description

X

4

Memo re: Buy-Sell DR's Corp from M. Lindstrom toR.
Curran (0 15496-98)

2001

R. Curran handwritten notes (024516-21)

2003

SARG 1983 Partnership Agreement (Giles 67-82)

I 0/1/1983

D. Giles handwritten notes (005921-23)

10/31/1984

5

X

Letter to prospective general partners (SARMC681 - 700
Givens Pursley)

1118/1984

6

X

R. Curran letter to C. Anton (3357 - 3358)

11/21/1984

7

X

Letter from A. Kuykendall, M.D. to D. Giles, M.D. (004672)

12/13/1984

8

Memo to Dr. Giles from MTBR&F (16495- 16498)

2/8/1985

9

Letter from L. Ed Miller to Neal Newhouse (SARMC2489
Office of Pres.)

2/2611985

10

Proposed Mod. To Draft No.3 of Art. OfMRIA (SARMC
2490- 2494 Office of Pres.)

2/26/1985

11

Draft Articles of Partnership (6091-6110)

3/5/1985

X

12

**

Letter from L. Ed Miller to Sr. Pat Vandenberg (SARMC568570 GP)

3/5/1985

13

**

Signed Art. Of Partnership ofMRIA (26799- 26821)

3!7/1985

Letter from R. Curran toN. Newhouse (016480-84)

3/25/1985

15

Articles of Partnership of MRIA (SARMCO I 032-1054 Office
ofCFO)

4/26/1985

16

Draft Articles of Partnership ofMRIA (SARMC 467-486
GP)

4/30/1985

17

Draft Articles of Partnership ofMRIA (SARMC450 -466 GP)

5/1/1985

18

Draft Articles of Partnership ofMRIA (11452- 11473)

5/16/1985

19

Limited Partnership Agreement of MRI Limited (9940 - 9952)

8/2/1985

Building Lease Agreement (14604- 14638)

9/19/1985

14

20

X

X

**

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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SA No.

.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence
Ground Lease b/t SARMC and SABC (16055- 16064)

9/19/1985

22

Tentative Plan Regarding Financing ofMRI Machine for MRI
Center of Idaho (CHOOI210-Il)

12/10/1987

23

C. Harder Letter to MRI Limited Brd. Of Partners (0 I 0917010920)

5/9/1988

Limited Partnership Agreement of MRI Mobile Limited
(26877- 26891)

10/17/1988

25

West Boise Radiology Partnership Agreement (Giles 00307318)

3/1/1990

26

Deloitte and Touche Fairmarket Value Assessment of 50%
Controlling interest in MRIA (SARMC5272 - 5296 CFO)

8/18/1992

Letter from SADC et alto R. Curran et al (011483)

8/24/1992

IMI Partnership Agreement (Giles 00084-109)

9/1/1992

MTBR&F Letter to Drs. Giles and Prochaska (65- 66)

2/3/1997

**

21

24

27

**

X

X

28
29

4182
X

X

30

**

SARMC/SARG Medical Services Agreement (Giles 0000219)

5/1/1997

31

**

ICR Partnership Agreement (Giles 00328-338)

8/10/1998

32

**

SBB Notes (SARMC 10620- 10621 Office ofthe Pres.)

8/20/1998

33

X

C. Harder invoice to MRIA (CHOOI835)

9/1/1998

34

X

Memo from S. Cruz to C. Schamp (SARMC 02657 Office of
CFO)

9/16/1998

Handwritten notes (023467)

11/12/1998

35
36

X

X

X

Draft outline ofletter of intent with 11/16 notes from D. Giles
to C. Harder- (GSRRPOOI502-04)

11/16/1998

37

X

X

X

Draft outline ofletter of intent with II /16 notes from D. Giles
to C. Harder (GSR/671-672)

11/16/1998

Memo from T. Henson to SBB (033027 -31) (corrected to
include omitted pages)

1/27/1999

Email from C. Harder to J. Prochaska (000920, 926-30)

2/2/1999

38
39

**
X

X

X

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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)

SA No.

.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence
Kurtz Letter to A Hahn (SARMC I 0596 - I 0597 Office of
Pres.)

2/5/1999

Email re: MRIA-SARG Proposal from C. Harder to Dr.
Prochaska w/ attachments (898-903) (corrected- prior exhibit
contained wrong document)

2/1511999

PWC Letter to C. Schamp (SARMCI745 - 1752 CFO)

2/16/1999

C. Harder letter to J. Cliff (CH001815)

4/22/1999

A Hahn visit agenda (SARMC 00934 Office of CFO)

7/16/1999

PWC FMV Assessment of 20% Partnership Interest
(Draft)(SARMC 07445-07494 Office ofCFO)

7/31/1999

A Hahn email to S. Bratley (SARMC 7429- 7430 Office of
CFO)

8/4/1999

47

USB Business Loan Transmittal (USB00979- 981)

8/5/1999

48

USB Application for Approval (USB00982)

8/5/1999

49

Fax to C. Harder from J. Cliff (33756)

8/10/1999

50

JCRIIMI Lease Agreement (Giles 00020-38)

8/16/1999

USB/ICR Loan Agreement (USBJOI9- 1041)

8/18/1999

USB/IMIIICR Loan Agreement (USB163- 196)

8/18/1999

Promissory Note-ICR to USB ($908,000)(USB00177- 178)

8/18/1999

54

Promissory Note-ICR to USB ($960,000)(USBOOJ79-180)

8/18/1999

55

Commercial Security Agreement-USB/ICR (USB210- 213)

8/18/1999

56

Commercial Guarantee-USB/ICR-Wm. T. Murray, Guarantor
(USB00378 -380)

8/18/1999

57

USB/ICR Deed ofTrust (USB 183-188)

8/18/1999

58

Business Loan Agreement USB/Wm T. Murray et al (USB191
- 195)

8/18/1999

59

Construction Loan Agreement USB/ICR (USB369- 375)

8/18/1999

**

40

41

**

42
43

X

X

44

**

45

46

X

51
52
53

4111
X

X

X

4102

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST- 5002377

..
SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

60

Promissory Note USB/ICR (3,600,000)(USB00357)

8/18/1999

61

**

Operating Agreement of Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC
(Giles 00351-54)

8/20/1999

62

**

Dr. Giles/IMI Letter to R. Denning (GSRRP1595 - 1598),
with double hearsay redacted

8/24/1999

63

**

PWC Valuation of 50 Percent Interest in Intermountain
Medical Imaging LLC (SARMCOI321-1336 Office of the
CFO)

9/1/1999

64

**

Letter re: opening of IMI (GSRRP/000218-219)

10/4/1999

65

**

PWC letter to C. Schamp re: financial advisory services
(SARMC1822- 1836 CFO)

10/25/1999

66

**

Memo to SBB and C. Schamp from R. Curran (SARMC
07417 Office ofCFO)

10/27/1999

67

**

Memo re: Joint Venture Imaging Center (SARMC 06847-48
Office of Pres.)

ll/11/1999

68

**

Power Point Pres. Re: IMI Joint Venture (SARMC 068496866 Office of Pres.)

11/11/1999

69

**

Restructuring ofMRIA General Partnership (SHI551 - 1562)

11/29/1999

70

**

Dr. Henson Memo to SBB (032441)

12/6/1999

71

**

Email from R. Abello to SBB (SARMC 9200 Office of Pres.)

12/14/1999

72

**

SBB Notes (SARMC 09913-15 Office of Pres.)

12/16/1999

73

**

Email from D. Giles to J. Prochaska et al (001365)

12/18/1999

74

**

Email from D. Giles to J. Pochaska (001364)

12/19/1999

75

**

Doctors Corp. letter to Sandra Bruce dated I/4/2000
(SARMC9910-9911 Office of Pres.)

1/4/2000

76
77

78

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (1431-1432)

X

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (1436)
Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce ( 1444-1448)

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST- 6-
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

79

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (I 468)

80

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (14876)

81

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (24635)

82

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (24646)

83

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (35281-35282)

84

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (38758-38759)

85

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (38760-3876 I)

86

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (38762-38763)

87

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (32367)

88

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (32445-32446)

89

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (SARMC99259926 Office of the Pres.)

90

Reserved
Agenda for meeting with J. Cliff(SARMC OI239 Office of
CFO)

I/26/2000

Email from D. Giles toR. Curran (011962)

1/29/2000

Email to D. Giles from R. Curran (011963)

1/31/2000

94

Application of Retainer pd. By MRI Center of Idaho w/
attached invoices (CHOO 1800, CH004687 ,004862,000600)

2/1/2000

95

Email from K. Sands to S. Bratley (SARMC 07991 Office of
CFO)

2/8/2000

Memo from K. Sands to C. Schamp (SARMC 07984-07986
Office ofCFO)

2/18/2000

Memo from T. Henson to SBB (032432)

2/23/2000

Draft Agenda for Discussion (SARMC 01211 Office ofCFO)

3/8/2000

M. Czech letter toR. Curran (0 12421-28)

4/10/2000

**

91
92

X

X

3149

93

**

96
97

X

98

X

99

X

X

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST -7-

002379

SA No.

100

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Evidence

X

X

X

Date

Description

Email from C. Schamp to T. Hall (GSR0357)

51512000

101

**

Letter to C. Schamp from PWC re: Assessment of FMV of
MRIM (SARMC 07766-7775 Office ofCFO) (corrected to
include full copy of document)

5/16/2000

102

**

J. Cliff letter toR. Curran (014909-14910)

7117/2000

103

**

Letter from J. Cliff toR. Curran (022512-13)

7117/2000

104

3523

Idaho Sec. Of State receipt w/ attachments (CH000008-12)

8118/2000

105

Amendment to Loan Agreement between ICR et al & USB
(Giles 00285-86)

8/20/2000

106

Amend. And Restated Cert. Of Limited Partnership--MRI
Limited (24 755)

8/22/2000

107

Amend. And Restated Cert. Of Limited Partnership--MRI
Mobile (24903)

8/22/2000

108

C. Harder invoice for professional services (CH00003)

91112000

Release and Reaffirmation Agreement between Murray et al
and USB (Giles 00283-84)

10118/2000

Notice of Offer to Purchase (027670)

11127/2000

Letter from A. Curran to J. Curran (02 7660)

11127/2000

C. Harder Letter to D. Giles (Giles 00276-277)

3/8/2001

Memo from T. Henson to DMR (033023-33025)

4/5/2001

**

109
110

X

111

X

X

112
113

X

X

X

114

**

IMI Operating Agreement (IMI0007-89)

711/2001

115

**

Professional Services Agreement (Radiology Services)
(SARMC 00591-00641 Corporate Development)

711/2001

116

**

Letter from J. Floyd to K. Fry (SARMC 00182-183 Office of
CFO)

811/2001

USB Credit Approval (USB00009-15)

8/6/2001

117
118

**

Notes re: meetings with MRIA stake holders (SH0089- 90)

9118/2001

119

**

G. Chamberlain handwritten option I (SH1562)

111112001

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST- 8-
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

120

**

Shattuck Hammond Presentation of Strategic Options
(SARMCI0728-I0766 Office of the Pres)

11/6/2001

121

**

Shattuck Hammond Presentation of Valuation of MRIA
(SARMCI0767-108010ffice of the Pres)

11/6/2001

122

**

Request for Financing Proposals prepared by Shattuck
Hammond (SARMC06752 -6756 Office ofCFO)

12/11/2001

123

**

Memo to Leslie Kelly Hall from Patti Harneck (SARMC184 7
-1849CIO)

1/23/2002

124

**

Memo to K. Fry from G. Chamberlain (SARMC 06764 Office
ofCFO)

2112/2002

125

**

Email from G. Chamberlain to P. Miller and Ken Fry
(SHI202)

4/9/2002

126

**

G. Chamberlain discussion outline with Dr. Curran w/ GC
handwritten note (SH 120 I)

4/9/2002

127

**

Letter from T. Hall to MRICI Scheduling Dept. (0 16331)

817/2002

Letter from T. Henson toM. Dalley (039265)

8/11/2002

Email from Mark Lawrence to David Giles et at (000061)

8/19/2002

Dr. Curran Handwritten Notes (027235)

10/9/2002

USB Standard Credit Display Exec. Summary (USB00781792)

1/13/2003

128

X

**

129
130

X

X

**

131

132

X

Email from R. Curran to Henson, Prochaska, Giles, Havlina
(037453)

1113/2003

133

X

Curran Memo to Fellow Board Members ofMRIA (013864013866)

1/14/2003

134

Email from R. Curran toM. Kutsurelis et al (037643)

2/19/2003

135

M. Panattoni letter toP. DeWitt (002747)

4/312003

136
137
138
139

Reserved

3297

Email from Dr. Havlina to Dr. Curran et al (037250)

5/5/2003

Reserved
0. Karame letter to J. Floyd (034315)

5/23/2003

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST- 9-

002381

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

140

Amend. To Limited Partnership Agreement of MRI Mobile
(SARMC00601 • 00605 Accounting)

6/17/2003

141

IT Service Level Agreement (015307-15312)

7/112003

Email from T. Henson to J. Floyd (036222)

7/18/2003

0. Karame letter to J. Floyd (034316)

8/19/2003

Agenda for MRICI and SARMC Meeting (014333)

9/23/2003

CEO Report (SARMC 07043-07044 Office of Pres.)

9/30/2003

D. Giles handwritten notes re: DMR meeting (014187)

10/14/2003

Email from J. Floyd to D. Giles et al re Meeting with D.
Carmona (036150)

10/27/2003

Shattuck Hammond Power Point re: Overview of
Restructuring ofMRIA and Simultaneous Merger ofMRICI
and IMI (SARMC 06777-06786 Office ofCFO)

10/30/2003

Memo from D. Giles toM. Brandt re: MRI reading
Opportunity (0 15159)

12/5/2003

Email from P. Hamick to J. Floyd (025617-25618)

12/8/2003

Letter from P. Miller toT. Banducci (025153)

12/22/2003

Agreement for MRI Services (SARMC 00241-256 Patient
Care Services)

1/1/2004

Email from Dr. Havlina to Dr. Giles et al (035919)

1112/2004

142

X

143
144

X

**

145
146
147

X

X

**

148

149

X

150

X

X

**

151
152
153

X

X

X

154

**

Letter from J. Curran to C. Corbett (SARMC0051 0 Patient
Care Services)

2/1012004

155

**

SBB letter to Dr. Curran (003016-17)

2/24/2004

Memo from J. Floyd to D. Giles et al (014861)

3/4/2004

156
157

X

X

Reserved

158

Letter from S. Kim to C. Corbett (SARMC 00235-36 Patient
Care Services)

8/2/2004

159

Letter from S. Scales to J. Hopkins (SARMC 00237 Patient
Care Services)

8/3/2004

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

160

Handwritten notes (SARMC 00238 Patient Care Services)

8/9/2004

161

**

Meeting notes (SARMC 01940 Office ofCIO)

11/15/2004

162

**

Letter from MRI Center to S. Bruce (025045)

12/3/2004

163

**

Letter J. Seaborn to J. Floyd (SARMC00174 Patient Care
Services)

12/8/2004

164

**

Letter from C. Corbett to J. Gobel (SARMC 00180 Patient
Care Services)

12/8/2004

165

**

Memo re: MRI from SBB (SARMC 00175 Patient Care
Services)

12/20/2004

Agreement for MRI Services (SARMC 00158-00172 Patient
Care Services)

1/3/2005

Email from D. Seaborn to C. Corbet el al (SARMC 01036
Patient Care Services)

1/10/2005

A Report to the Dept. of Radiology and Radiology
Administration on Strategic Conversations with Customers
(SARMC625 - 635 Patient Care Services)

3/29/2005

First Amendment to Operating Agreement oflntermountain
Medical Imaging (SARMC244 - 252 OGC)

12/9/2005

170

Agreement for MRI Services (IMIRP/001719-36)

12/9/2005

171

Curriculum Vitae of Dennis Reinstein

N/A

172

Opinions 1-4 of Budge's Report contained in Reinstein's
Expert Report

4/23/2007

173

Opinions 1-7 of Wilhoite Report contained in Reinstein's
Expert Report

4/23/2007

174

Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Mary River

175

Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Bruce Anderson

176

Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Peter Reedy

177

Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Samuel Gibson

178

Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Mark Maier

166

167

**

168

169

**

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. I d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST -11-
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

179

Curriculum Vitae of Manfred Steiner

180

Any chart or diagram in the Wellspring report dated as of
April I, 2004 from pp. 3-20, 36-47, 53-57, 64-73, 77-79, 8291.

181

Tables I & 2, Fig. 1-3, App. 2 to Expert report of G. Vistnes
Ph.D

182

Curriculum Vitae of Greg Vistnes, Ph.D

183

Curriculum Vitae of all witnesses to be called by Saint
Alphonsus to the extent such CVs have been produced.

184

Proposal for obtaining mobile MRI (032280-32284)

unknown date

185

**

Memo re: issues imaging center joint venture (001142-44)

unknown date

186

**

SARG/MRIA Joint Venture Proposals Nos. 6&7 (000931)

unknown date

187

X

Memo re: Radiology Imaging Center (014512)

unknown date

187A

X

Memo re: Radiology Imaging Center (028432)

3/15/99

188

X

Memo entitled: "Some thoughts after talking to Roger"
(35394-35395)

unknown date

Memo re: Project to Maintain/Achieve Competitive Quality
(021621-23)

unknown date

Buy-Sell of DR's Corp (26614-26615)

unknown date

191

J. Floyd Volume projections (016230)

unknown date

192

Memo re: Advent of IMI (0 16323)

unknown date

193

Memo re: Thoughts on Radiology Issues at MRICI (01615216153)

unknown date

194

J. Curran Memo re: Considerations Regarding Purchase of
New MRI (023072-23073)

unknown date

Letter from J. Hall to SBB (IMI0521)

unknown date

Videotape of MRIM mobile magnet

unknown date

189
190

195
196

X

**

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

197

**

First Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRIA
(SARMCOI055- 1061 Office ofCFO)

8/25/1988

198

**

Second Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRIA
(SARMCI062-1067 Office of the CFO)

5/1/1991

199

**

Third Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRIA
(SARMC I 068-1080 Office of the CFO)

4/21/1995

200

**

Fourth Amendment to Articles of Partnership of MRIA
(SARMC5354-5359 Office of the CFO)

7/15/1998

201

**

Fifth Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRIA (3910839114)

8/1/2002

202

**

Sixth Amendment to Articles of Partnership of MRIA (3911639129)

4/15/2003

203

X

X

Draft of Articles ofMRIA Partnership No. I (5977-5996)

unknown date

204

X

X

Draft of Articles ofMRIA Partnership No.2 (5814-5838)

1/30/1985

205

X

X

Draft of Articles ofMRIA Partnership No.3 (6430- 6455)

2/13/1985

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC08022-8032 Office of the Pres.)

12/16/1983

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC6928-6939 Office of the Pres.)

3/22/1984

208

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC8532-8538 Office of the Pres.)

3/30/1984

209

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7319-7329 & 7401 Office of the Pres.)

4/6/1984

210

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7144-7157& 7248-7255 Office of the Pres.)

7/13/1984

211

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7557-7566 Office of the Pres.)

I 0/1/1984

212

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC07262 -7271 & SARMC7219-7232 Office of the
Pres.)

10/19/1984

213

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC9545-9547 Office of the Pres.)

11/2/1984

206

207

X

X

X

**

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

214

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMCI39-143 Office of the Pres.)

l/ll/1985

215

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee
Minutes(SARMC7094-7103 Office of the Pres.)

4/14/1989

216

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7090-7093 & 7077-7089 Office of the Pres.)

7/21/1989

217

**

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7067- 7076 & 12722-12745 Office of the Pres.)

8/18/1999

217A

**

Map of Existing and Potential MRI Mobile Sites (Excerpted
from Saint Alphonsus Exhibit 217 (SARMC07073))

8/18/1999

2178

**

Map- 499 Mile Radius (Excerpted from Saint Alphonsus
Exhibit 217 (SARMC07074))

8/18/1999

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC6835-6840 Office of the CFO &SARMCI288712892 Office of the Pres.)

3/16/2000

218

219

**

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7043 -7044 Office of the Pres.)

9/30/2003

220

**

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7053- 7055 Office of the Pres.)

3/15/2004

221

**

SARMC Board ofTrustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7038-7042 Office of the Pres.)

11/18/2003

222

**

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7049-7052 Office of the Pres.)

3/15/2004

223

**

DR Rollout Minutes (GSRRP670- 671)

3/6/2001

224

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP502- 503)

2/20/2001

225

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP504-505)

3/21/2001

226

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP508-510)

4/18/2002

227

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP511-512)

5/3/2001

228

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP513-514)

5/15/2001

229

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP515)

6/6/2001

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

230

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP516-518)

6/26/2001

231

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP519-520)

7/3112001

232

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP521)

8/31/2001

233

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP522-523)

9/1312001

234

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP524-525)

10/5/2001

235

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP526-527)

I 0/17/200 I

236

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP528-531 R)

11/712001

237

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP532-533)

11/19/2001

238

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP534-535R)

12/17/2001

239

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP725)

1/2/2002

240

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP726)

2/4/2002

241

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP727-728)

2120/2002

242

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP729)

3/5/2002

243

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP730 -733R)

4/12/2002

244

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP734-735R)

4/3012002

245

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP737-738R)

5/13/2002

246

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP739-740R)

5129/2002

247

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP741-742R)

6/10/2002

248

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP743-744)

7/29/2002

249

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP745)

9/25/2002

250

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP746-747)

9/10/2002

251

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP748-749)

11120/2002

252

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP795-796R)

1/30/2002

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST- 15-

002387

SA No.
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Authenticity
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Date

Description

In
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253

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP797-798)

2/19/2002

254

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP799)

3/6/2002

255

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP860-861)

1/16/2003

256

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP862-863)

4/8/2003

257

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP864-865R)

5/13/2003

258

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP866)

6/4/2003

259

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP867)

8/12/2003

260

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP873-874)

7/15/2003

261

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP875-876)

9/2/2003

262

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP877-879)

10/1/2003

263

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP880-881)

I 0/27/2003

264

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP882-883)

11/14/2003

265

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP884-887)

12/1/2003

266

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP970-971)

1/12/2004

267

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP972-974)

4/5/2004

268

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP975)

61312004

269

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP976)

7/14/2004

270

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP977-978)

8/24/2004

271

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP979-980)

9/14/2004

272

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP981-982)

10/21/2004

273

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP983-984)

11/8/2004

274

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP985)

11/29/2004

275

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP1157-1158)

1/31/2005

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

276

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP1159-1160R)

2/14/2005

277

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP1161)

3/21/2005

278

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP1162)

4/4/2005

279

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP1163)

6/13/2005

280

**

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP1164R)

7/5/2005

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP1165R)

8/12/2005

281
282

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP506)

3/23/2001

283

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP507)

4/2/2001

284

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP665-667)

1/16/2001

285

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP668-669)

2/8/2001

286

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP674)

4/1612001

287

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP675)

5/4/2001

288

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP676)

5/17/2001

289

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP677-678)

7/20/2001

290

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP679-680)

10/2/2001

291

3708

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP68!-683)

11/5/2001

292

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP800-801R)

4/2/2002

293

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP802-803)

4/16/2002

294

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP804-805)

8/20/2002

295

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP806-807)

9/25/2002

296

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP808-809)

11/12/2002

297

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP914-915)

1115/2003

298

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP916-918)

2/25/2003

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.
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Admitted
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Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

299

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP919-920)

3/13/2003

300

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP928-931)

4/30/2003

301

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP934-935)

5/12/2003

302

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP938-939)

6/2/2003

303

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP940-941)

6/20/2003

304

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP946)

7/2/2003

305

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP947-948)

7/16/2003

306

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP949)

7/30/2003

307

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP957-958)

9/5/2003

308

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP959-960)

9/30/2003

309

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP961-962R)

10/28/2003

310

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP963-964)

12/10/2003

311

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP965-966)

12/24/2003

312

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1070-1072)

1/10/2005

313

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1084-1085)

9/7/2004

314

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1086-1087)

9/29/2004

315

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI091-1092)

11/3/2004

316

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1093)

11/30/2004

317

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1103)

1113/2004

318

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1104-1105)

2/6/2004

319

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1106-1107)

3/3/2004

320

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPII08-1110)

3/29/2004

321

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1111-1112)

5/19/2004

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.
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Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description
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322

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPIII3-III4)

6/16/2004

323

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPIII5-1116)

7/12/2004

324

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPIII9-1120)

8/3/2004

325

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI204-1206)

1/10/2005

326

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI207-1208)

2/22/2005

327

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI209)

3/15/2005

328

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI210)

3/29/2005

329

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1211)

4/512005

330

**

Operations Technical Committee Minutes (GSRRPI2281229)

412512005

331

**

Operations Technical Committee Minutes (GSRRPI230)

5/1712005

332

**

Operations Technical Committee Minutes (GSRRPI2241225)

6/10/2005

333

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI212-1213)

6/14/2005

334

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI214-1215R)

7/6/2005

335

**

Operations Technical Committee Minutes (GSRRPI226)

7/1112005

336

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI216-1217R)

8/1/2005

337

**

Operations Technical Minutes (GSRRPI227)

8/2/2005

338

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI218-1221)

9/26/2005

339

**

Operations Technical Committee Minutes (GSRRPI2311232)

10/6/2005

340

**

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1222-1223)

10/10/2005

341

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit I (42584- 42596)

342

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 3 (34172)

343

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 4 (42139)

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST -19-
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Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

344

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 5 (33569)

345

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 6 (SARMC10643 Office of
Pres.)

346

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 7 (42146)

347

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 8 (34173)

348

**

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 16 (34325)

349

**

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 7 (1468)

350

**

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 8 (1444)

351

**

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 9 (1436)

352

**

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 10 (1447)

353

**

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit II (1446)

354

**

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 13 (1448)

355

**

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 14 (1440 - 1442)

356

**

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 15 (1437-1439)
Exhibit Nos. 357-58 Reserved

359

**

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 21 (1366-1367)

360

**

S. Berger Deposition Exhibit 7(40229-40241)

361

**

S. Berger Deposition Exhibit 9(40220-40228)

362

**

R. Cioffi Deposition Exhibit 2

363

**

R. Cioffi Deposition Exhibit 6 (40220-40228)

364

**

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 3 (33603)

365

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 4 (36150)

366

**

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 7 (33607)

367

**

"MRI Volumes" for Center and Mobile; J. Floyd Deposition
Exhibit 9 (40055-40060)

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST- 20-
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Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

368

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 13

369

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 15 (SARMC3089 Office of CFO)

370

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 17 (33329)

371

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 18 (34315)

372

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 19 (34316)

373

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 20 (34313 - 34314)

374

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 21 (MT001275-1276)

375

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 22 (MT001018-1042)

376

**

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (I 0393-1 0402)

12/1990-1991

377

**

MRI Limited Financial Statements (10227-10236)

12/1990-1991

378

**

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (SARMC380-3910ffice of
the Pres.)

12/1996-1997

379

**

MRI Limited Financial Statements (32190-32199)

12/1996-1997

380

**

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (SARMC9942-9953 Office
ofthe Pres.)

12/1997-1998

381

**

MRI Limited Financial Statements (32154-32162)

12/1997-1998

382

**

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (12062-12071)

12/1998-1999

383

**

MRI Limited Financial Statements (12052-12061)

12/1998-1999

384

**

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (SARMC779-789 Office of
the CFO)

12/1999-2000

385

**

MRI Limited Financial Statements (32113-32120)

12/1999-2000

386

**

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (13090-13099)

12/2000-2001

387

**

MRI Limited Financial Statements (SARMC137-142 Office
of the CFO)

12/2000-200 I

388

**

MRI Limited Financial Statements (32017-32024)

12/2001-2002

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST- 21-
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Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

389

**

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (32028-32035)

12/2001-2002

390

**

MRI Limited Financial Statements (21428-21437)

12/2002-2003

391

**

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (21439-21448)

12/2002-2003

392

**

MRI Limited Financial Statements (40197-40207)

12/2003-2004

393

**

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (40208-40218)

12/2003-2004

394

**

MRI Limited Financial Statements (42191-42200)

12/2004-2005

395

**

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (42181-42190)

12/2004-2005

396

**

R. Curran email to D. Giles re: PAC with SARMC (3368633687)

9/10/1999

397

**

Leslie Kelly Hall email re: MRI Connectivity (33688)

9/13/1999

398

**

Sarah Bratley email to R. Curran re Update (33689)

9/8/1999

399

**

Leslie Kelly Hall memo to Lyndee Chatterton re:
SARMC/MRICI Networking Interface (33691)

6/4/1999

400

Lyndee Chatterton memo to Mike Czech re MRICIISARMC
Networking Link (33697)

12/29/1998

401

Sandra Bruce email to Cindy Schamp re SARMC/MRICI
Phase II (33698)

1/6/1999

402

Review ofSARMC/MRI Meeting (33702-33704)

2/8/1999

403

Rachel Rorer memo to Lyndee Chatterton re Summer plan
(33705)

unknown date

404

Leslie Kelly Hall email to R. Curran re computer start date
(33706)

7/28/1999

405

Meeting notes re Interface (33708)

6/15/1999

406

X

X

X

Leslie Kelly Hall email to L. Chatterton re MRI (33711)

7/29/1999

407

X

X

X

Patti Hameck to C. Schamp re MRI Clinical Desktop (33712)

8/19/1999

Lyndee Chatterton email to L. Kelly Hall re MRICI (33724)

7/29/1999

408

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST- 22-
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SA No.

409

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Evidence

X

X

X

Date

Description

Leslie Kelly Hall email to L. Chatterton re MRICI
Connectivity (33729)

9/8/1999

410

**

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG ( 3401934023)

unknown date

411

**

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (3391 033915)

unknown date

412

**

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG
(SARMC10824-10829 Office of the Pres.)

unknown date

413

**

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (I 0781083)

unknown date

414

**

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG (3395633961)

4/13/1999

415

**

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG (1450614511)

51311999

416

**

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (3391833923)

5/18/1999

417

**

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (2405924064)

unknown date

418

**

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (3388733892)

9/15/1999

419

**

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG (3386933875)

9/17/1999

420

**

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (3387933885)

9/17/1999

421

**

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG (3386133865)

9/30/1999

422

**

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (3385433860)

9/30/1999

423

**

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG
(SARMC1379A-1379E Office of the CFO)

10/27/1999

424

**

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRWSARG
(SARMC6625-6629 Office of the Pres.)

10/18/1999

425

**

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11210-11212)

1/2/1985

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

426

**

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (I 1213-11215)

1/8/1985

427

**

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (I 1234-11235)

2121/1985

428

**

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11208-11209)

2/28/1985

429

**

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (I 1236-11238)

317/1985

430

**

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (I 1244-11246)

3/27/1985

431

**

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11300-11301)

6/5/1985

432

**

MRICJ Board meeting minutes (4488-4490)

4/25/1988

433

**

MRICJ Board meeting minutes (4481-4484)

7/25/1988

434

**

MRICJ Board meeting minutes (SARMC4064-4067 Office of
the Pres.)

5/15/1991

435

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC4060-4063 Office of
the Pres.)

5/15/1991

436

**

MRICJ Board meeting minutes (SARMC3993-3996 Office of
the Pres.)

8/12/1991

437

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC3881-3883 Office of
the Pres.)

11/18/1991

438

**

MRIA meeting minutes (SARMC5094-5096 Office of the
Pres.)

10/13/1994

439

**

MRICI Board meeting minutes (SARMC4998-5000 Office of
the Pres.)

11/21/1994

440

**

MRIA meeting minutes (SARMC4993-4994 Office of the
Pres.)

11/22/1994

441

**

MRICI Board meeting minutes (SARMC4565-4566 Office of
the Pres.)

8/9/1995

442

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC4567-4568 Office of
the Pres.)

8/9/1995

443

**

MRIA meeting minutes (SARMC4508-4509 Office of the
Pres.)

11/16/1995

444

**

MRICJ Board meeting minutes (SARMC4506-4507 Office of
the Pres.)

11/1611995

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST- 24-
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Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

445

**

MRICI meeting minutes (SARMC6339-6340 Office of the
CFO)

11/25/1996

446

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC6341-6342 Office of
the CFO)

11/25/1996

447

**

Any response to Requests for Admission or Interrogatories

various

448

**

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (I 1296-11297)

6/19/1985

449

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (4488-4490)

4/25/1988

450

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (7214-7216)

5/25/1988

451

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (669-671)

7/16/1998

452

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (20943-20945)

10/22/1998

453

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (1412-1413)

12/15/1999

454

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (1414-1415)

12/15/1999

455

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (1494-1495)

1/19/2000

456

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (28366-28367)

1/1912000

457

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (1472-1473)

2/16/2000

458

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (1474-1476)

2/16/2000

459

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (1525-1527)

3/15/2000

460

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (1528-1530)

3/1512000

461

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC9112-9113 Office of
the Pres.)

4/21/2000

462

**

MRI Board meeting minutes- executive session (9116-9117)

4/21/2000

463

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (28344-28347)

6/21/2000

464

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC9053-9055 Office of
the Pres.)

7/19/2000

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.
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Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

465

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC9056-9060 Office of
the Pres.)

7/19/2000

466

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (1692-1695)

8/16/2000

467

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC9023-9028 Office of
the Pres.)

8/16/2000

468

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC9011-9015 Office of
the Pres.)

9120/2000

469

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC9004-9010 Office of
the Pres.)

9/20/2000

470

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC8980-8985 Office of
the Pres.)

10/18/2000

471

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC8986-8988 Office of
the Pres.)

10/18/2000

472

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC8967-8968 Office of
the Pres.)

11115/2000

473

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC8545-8548 Office of
the Pres.)

1/17/2001

474

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC8560-8561 Office of
the Pres.)

2/16/2001

475

**

MRICI and Mobile Strategic Planning Meeting
(SARMC8562-8566 Office of the Pres.)

2/16/2001

476

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC8610-8614 Office of
the Pres.)

4/18/2001

477

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC8625-8629 Office of
the Pres.)

5/16/2001

478

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (12404-12407)

7/18/2001

479

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (2158-2159)

9/19/2001

480

**

MRl Board meeting minutes (2209-221 0)

10/17/2001

481

3508

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (2271-2273)

12/19/2001

482

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (2343-2345)

212012002

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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.

SA No.

'

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

483

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (28183-28185)

3/20/2002

484

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (2419-2421)

4/17/2002

485

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (28169-28172)

5/21/2002

486

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (2472-2474)

6/18/2002

487

3510

MRI Board meeting minutes (2522-2524)

7/16/2002

488

**

MRI Board and Executive Session meeting minutes (25602563)

8/1/2002

489

**

MR1 Mobile meeting minutes (14149-14151)

9/17/2002

490

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (14111-14113)

9/17/2002

491

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC00471-472
Accounting)

11119/2002

492

**

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC00800-802
Accounting)

12/17/2002

493

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC00262-264
Accounting)

1/21/2003

494

**

MR1 Board meeting minutes with Summary Forecast (281 0928111 & SARMC354 Hudspeth)

2/18/2003

495

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC00195-198
Accounting)

3/1812003

496

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC00515-518
Accounting)

4/1512003

497

**

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC00523-526
Accounting)

5/20/2003

498

**

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/4375-4382

5/29/1997

499

**

IMI Executive meeting minutes (IM1RP/4438-4440)

5/16/1997

500

**

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/4817)

6/1/1998

501

**

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/4748-4750)

1/19/1999

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

502

**

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/4956-4958)

717/1999

503

**

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/772-775)

8/4/1999

504

**

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/811-812),

8/24/1999

505

**

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/815-819)

9/22/1999

506

**

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/886-889)

8/14/2001

507

**

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/898-901)

9/26/2001

508

**

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP932 & 945)

11/28/2001

509

**

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/993-994)

4/30/2002

510

**

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP1046)

5/19/2003

511

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSREX265-268)

1/14/1998

512

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREXII-13)

2/2/1998

513

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREXI6-17)

2/16/1998

514

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR585-588)

3/11/1998

515

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR589-592)

4/8/1998

516

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX36-39), as redacted
to remove double hearsar

5/11/1998

517

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR593-600)

5/13/1998

518

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR601-604)

6/16/1998

519

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR605-608)

6/29/1998

520

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX44-52)

7/6/1998

521

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR609-611)

717/1998

522

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX56-64)

7/20/1998

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.
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SA No.

Date
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Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

523

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR612-615)

7/27/1998

524

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR616-618)

7/30/1998

525

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR619-632)

8/5/1998

526

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX67-69)

8/31/1998

527

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR638-644)

9/9/1998

528

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX70-71)

9/14/1998

529

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX72)

9/21/1998

530

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX73-74)

10/8/1998

531

**

GSR Equipment meeting minutes (GSREX75)

10/5/1998

532

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX76-78)

10/12/1998

533

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR647-653)

10/14/1998

534

**

Radiology Department meeting minutes (GSR654-655)

10/21/1998

535

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR656-662)

10/28/1998

536

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR663-664)

1113/1998

537

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR665-666)

11/9/1998

538

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR667-672)

11/11/1998

539

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR673-681)

12/9/1998

540

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX136-138)

2/8/1999

541

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR700-706)

2/10/1999

542

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX259-260)

6/21/1999

543

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX261-264)

6/28/1999

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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Offered

Date
Admitted
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Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

544

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP184-186)

8123/1999

545

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP122-126)

9/8/1999

546

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSR59)

10/25/1999

547

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP153-156)

11/10/1999

548

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP262)

11/22/1999

549

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP267-268)

12/20/1999

550

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP269-270R)

12/27/1999

551

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP273-277)

1/12/2000

552

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP288-291)

1/2612000

553

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP441)

3/13/2000

554

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP336-340R)

8/812000

555

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP465-468)

8/30/2000

556

**

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP469-471)

9/6/2000

557

**

GSR Executive meeting mintues (GSRRP400-403

9/19/2000

558

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP645)

2122/2001

559

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP568-571)

5/9/2001

560

**

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR129)

12/18/2001

561

**

Marketing Committee Meeting (GSRRP I 040-1 041)

3/10/2004

562

X

X

X

Sandra Bruce letter toM. Adams, M. Dalley and J. Messmer
re Saint Alphonsus Withdrawal (SARMCI0646-10647 Office
of the Pres)

3/10/2004

563

X

X

X

PACS presentation materials (SARMCO 1796-1818 Office of
the Pres.)

9/16/1999

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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SA No.

564

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Evidence

X

X

X

Date

Description

D. Giles email toR. Curran re: PAC with SARMC (2402324024)

9110/1999

565

3082

D. Giles email toR. Curran re: PAC with SARMC (2843328434)

9110/1999

566

1304

Pie chart re: Overview ofMRIA Ownership Interests

NA

567

**

Counter Designations from Ms. Schamps's Trial Deposition
Testimony Read into the Record by SADC

NA

568

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0020-0023)

3/2/1998

569

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0024- 0025)

3/9/1998

570

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0040-0041)

5/29/1998

571

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0053-0055)

7/13/1998

572

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0065-0066)

8/1711998

573

**

GSR Limited Group Meeting Minutes (GSR0636-0637)

8119/1998

574

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0139-0142)

2/15/1999

575

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0174- 0180)

3/811999

576

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREXOI81-0182)

3/15/1999

577

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0181-0182)

3/15/1999

578

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0183- 0185)

3122/1999

579

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0188-0199)

3/29/1999

580

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0203- 0204)

4/12/1999

581

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0215 -0217)

4/26/1999

582

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0221 - 0223)

5/3/1999

583

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0244- 0245)

5124/1999

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

584

**

585
586

**
**

587
588

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0246- 0248)

6/7/1999

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSRRP195- 200)

9/13/1999

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSRRP138- 140)

10113/1999

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSRRP251 - 253)

10/18/1999

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSRRP260)

11/l/1999

Exhibit Nos. 589-90 Reserved

2908

591

4/2/07

Handwritten Notes Prepared by Charles Wilhoite

Exhibit Nos. 592-93 Reserved
Demonstrative re: Correlation of Value & Other
Considerations (from Steiner's report)

594

NA

Exhibit Nos. 595-96 Reserved

3765
597

Letter from Referring Physicians from Seaboum Correcting
the Issue of Availablilty ofMRl Scans on PACS System. GSR
151

1/26/05

Exhibit Nos. 598-99 Reserved

600

X

X

X

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1985 (0 I 002835)

12/31/85

601

X

X

X

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, I986 (01001622)

12/3 I/86

602

X

X

X

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1987 (0 I 000715)

12/31/87

603

X

X

X

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1988 and 1987
(009994-1 0002)

12/31/88

604

X

X

X

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1989 and 1988
(009984-93)

12/31/89

605

X

X

X

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1990 and 1989
(0 I 0046-55)

12/31/90

606

X

X

X

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1991 and 1990
(010227-36)

12/31/91

607

X

X

X

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1992 and 1991
(0 I 0999-1 008)

12/31/92

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Date

Description

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Evidence

608

X

X

X

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1993 and 1992
(008853-62)

12/31/93

609

X

X

X

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1994 and 1993
(SARMC00477-87)

12/31/94

610

X

X

X

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1995 and 1994
(021809-19)

12/31/95

611

X

X

X

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1996 and 1995
(032200-12)

12/31/96

612

Reserved

613

Reserved

614

Reserved

615

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 616-624 Reserved

625

X

X

X

MRl Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1990
and 1989 (007647-55)

12/31/90

626

X

X

X

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1992
and 1991 011009-19)

12/31/92

627

X

X

X

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1993
and 1992 (008863-73)

12/31/93

628

X

X

X

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1994
and 1993 (021797 -808)

12/31/94

629

X

X

X

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1995
and 1994 (SARMC00443-53)

12/31/95

630

X

X

X

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1996
and I 995 (020888-99)

12/31/96

631

Reserved

632

Reserved

633

Reserved

634

Reserved

635

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 636-649 Reserved

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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002405

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Evidence

650

X

X

X

651

X

652

Date

Description

MRI Center, MRI Mobile, and MRIA Board minutes
(013916-18, 021235-37, 013933-34)

3/18/98

X

MRI Center and Mobile minutes (000572-73, 000589-90)

4/15/98

X

X

MRI Center, MRl Mobile, and MRIA Board minutes
(000599-606)

5/20/98

653

X

X

MRI Center, MRl Mobile, and MRIA Board minutes
(000625-631)

6/17/98

654

X

X

MRI Center, MRI Mobile, and MRIA Board minutes
(000767-772)

9/10/98

655

X

X

MRI Center/MRI Mobile Executive Meeting Minutes
(025396)

12/17/02

656

Reserved

657

Reserved

658

Reserved

659

Reserved

660

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 661-674 Reserved

675

X

X

676

X

X

677

X

678
679

GSR Executive Committee minutes (GSREX/0020-23)

3/2/98

GSR Executive Committee minutes (GSREX/0024-25)

3/9/98

X

GSR Executive Committee minutes (GSREX/0030-33)

4/6/98

X

X

GSR Executive Committee minutes (GSREX/0040-41)

5/29/98

X

X

GSR Imaging Center minutes (lMIRP/004817)

6/1/98

X

X

680

Reserved

681

Reserved

682

Reserved

683

Reserved

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. Id
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

684

Reserved

685

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 686-699 Reserved

700

X

SARMC Trustees Executive Committee minutes (Office of
President SARMC07953-91)

3/26/84

701

X

Giles Handwritten notes (Giles Dep. Ex. 4) (005917)

undated

702

X

Gill letter to Newhouse (005342)

12/12/84

703

X

Gill letter to Newhouse (CH000279-82)

1/14/85

704

X

Newhouse letter to Curran, Giles, Havlina, Henson, Prochaska
re: MR1 Associates Limited Partnership (005975)

3/8/85

705

X

MRllimited schedule of investor payments (Office ofCFO
SARMC03648-49)

7/23/85

706

X

Certificate of Limited Partnership of MRI Limited Partnership
(024740-48)

8/2/85

707

X

MRI limited schedule of investor payments (Office ofCFO
SARMC03650-51)

8/9/85

708

X

MRI Limited Partnership Private Placement Memorandum
(012779-890)

5/24/85

709

X

MRI Limited Partners (CH001075-76)

6/1/87

710

X

X

MRI Mobile Limited Partnership Private Placement
Memorandum (020349-506)

9/6/88

711

X

X

Certificate of Limited Partnership ofMRI Mobile- Limited
Partnership (024893-99)

10/17/88

712

X

MRI Ltd, DBA MRI Center of Idaho Ownership and MRJ
Mobile, L.P. Ownership Before Buyout and After Buyout
(SARMC04899-900)

Undated

713

X

MRICI- Limited Partnership Units I MRI Mobile Limited
Partnership Units (SARMC01019)

Undated

X

X

X

X

X

714

Reserved

715

Reserved

716

Reserved

717

Reserved

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST- 35-
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence
Reserved

718

Exhibit Nos. 719-724 Reserved

725

DVI Financial letter to Chamberlain (SH 1513-16)

12/7/01

726

GE Financial Healthcare letter to Chamberlain (SH 1517-21)

12/7/01

727

DVI email to Chamberlain with proposal letter (SH 1782-85)

12/7/01

728

MRIA ownership structure percentages (SH 2021)

8/15/01

729

Volume and Revenue Summary MRICI (SH 0139)

2000

730

MRICI, MRI Mobile LP spreadsheets, Ownership Allocation
at July 31, 1999, and Cash Flow Analysis for Possible Trade
(SH 0141-47)

Undated

731

X

X

X

Floyd email to Giles et al., etc. re Confidentiality Agreement
and Engagement letter (032362-63)

10/10/03

732

X

X

X

Curran email to Prochaska et al. re Reminder (037607)

10113/03

733

X

X

X

Board Agenda (027980)

I 0/14/03

734

X

West email to Miller re Shattuck Hammond Ltr (NEW
REDLINE 10-14-03) (016406-13)

10/14/03

735

X

West email to Miller re Shattuck Hammond Ltr (NEW
REDLINE 10-14-03) with hlw note "Rec'd 10/14" (03234961)

10114/03

736

X

Voice Mail of J. Kevin West Transcribed on October 16,2003
(SARMC 01549 Givens Pursley)

10116/03

737

X

Miller e-mail to Chamberlain et al. re FW: Shattuck
Hammond Ltr (NEW REDLINE 10-14-03) (SH 1699-1711)

11/4/03

738

X

Miller e-mail to Chamberlain re 9-12-03 Confidentiality
Agreement (SH 1727-40)

11113/03

739

X

Miller e-mail to Chamberlain et al. re FW: Confidentiality
Agreement and Engagement Letter (SH 1741-50)

11/13/03

740

X

Miller letter to VanValkenburg and Banducci re: MRI
Associates (SARMC 01526-34 Givens Pursley)

12/5/03

741

Reserved

742

Reserved

743

Reserved

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST- 36-

002408

•

SA No.

..
Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

744

Reserved

745

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 746-749 Reserved

750

X

X

Employment Agreement- David Giles and DMR (0343 7476)

12/17/2002

751

X

X

Employment Agreement- Jack Havlin a and DMR (03437779)

12/17/2002

752

X

X

Employment Agreement- Thomas Henson and DMR
(034364-67)

12/17/2002

753

X

X

Employment Agreement- James Prochaska and DMR
(034371-73)

12/17/2002

754

X

X

Consent of Shareholders and Directors of DMR, Inc. in Lieu
of Meeting re: Annual Meetings 1986-2001 (034354-55)

12/17/2002

755

X

X

Consents of Shareholders/Directors of DMR in Lieu of
Meeting re: Annual Meeting 2002 (034357-62)

12/17/2002

756

X

X

Minutes of Annual Meeting of Shareholders/Directors of
DMR for 2003 (034432-36)

3/17/2003

757

X

X

Consent of Shareholders and Directors of DMR in Lieu of
Meeting re: Reverse Stock Split and Amended and Restated
Shareholders A_greement (034438-62)

5/20/2003

758

X

X

Doctors Magnetic Resonance Inc. (DMR) Cash receipts YTD
2003 (0 13406)

March 2003

759

X

X

Doctors Magnetic Resonance Inc. (DMR) Schedule of
Compensation and Distributions to Shareholders I" Quarter
2003 (002916-17)

3/31/03

760

X

X

Consent of Directors of DMR in Lieu of Meeting- Capital
Distribution for 1st Quarter

4/2/03

761

X

X

Doctors Magnetic Resonance Inc. (DMR) I 005 -Cash in
General Checking (013404-05)

4/18/03

762

X

X

Doctors Magnetic Resonance Inc. (DMR) Schedule of
Compensation and Distributions to Shareholders 2"d Quarter
2003 (002918-19)

7/1/03

763

X

X

MRI Mobile- Distribution of Earnings 2003 (032661)

8123/03

764

X

X

Doctors Magnetic Resonance Inc. (DMR) Schedule of
Compensation and Distributions to Shareholders 3nd Quarter
2003 (002804)

I 0/1/03

765

X

X

MRI Associates Management Fees and Partner Distributions
From MRIC and MRIM, etc. (SARMCOO 111-13)

12/31 I /2003

766

X

X

MRI Limited Partnership List oflnvestors/Transfer Ledger
Commencing at January 1, 2003 (024886-88)

1/1/03

767

X

Reserved

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

768

Reserved

769

Reserved

770

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 771-774 Reserved

775

X

776

X

777

X

778

X

X

779

X

X

780

X

781

X

781R

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

MRI Mobile Operations Assessment (000608-15)

6/98

Denning letter to Cliff and Giles (Denning Dep. Ex. 7)

7/28/99

Draft letter Sands to Schamp re PWC engagement (Office of
CFO SARMCOI081-90) (Hahn Dep. Ex 7)

11/9/99

Outline for Discussion Presentation by Cindy Schamp
February I, 2000 Purchase/Restructuring Options for MRI
Associates (Office of the CFO SARMCOI240-42)

2/1/00

Bylaws of the Medical Staff of Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center

10/14/97

Top Referring Physician Group Analysis Y-T-D 2001
(002023-24)

2001

An Introduction to MRI Associates Legal Ownership of the
Partnerships (Office of the CFO SARMC00964-73)

undated

Redacted version of An Introduction to MRI Associates
Legal Ownership of the Partnerships (Office of the CFO
SARMC00964-73).

undated

Redacted to remove irrelevant , prejudicial, and confusing
language stating an incorrect legal conclusion .

782

Reserved

783

Reserved

784

Reserved

785

Reserved

786

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 787-799 Reserved

800

X

801

X

X

Curran email to Prochaska re Hitachi (037938)

6/17/99

Curran final report as CEO to MRICIIMRIM Board (03261518)

6/2000

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

802

X

Curran Handwritten Notes re: PM! (042118-21)

7/12/00

803

X

Curran Handwritten Notes re: War? (042122-26)

undated

804

X

Matters for Thought and Discussion ( 027311-13)

undated

805

X

Curran Handwritten notes (025140)

undated

806

X

Curran email to Prochska re: Trip (037676)

6/7/99

X

X

807

Reserved

808

Reserved

809

Reserved

810

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 811-819 Reserved

820

X

X

Dr. Giles Funds received from DMR before DMR expenses,
etc. (014391-93)

2003

821

X

X

MRI Buyout (014409-10)

Undated

822

X

Giles fax to Harder, Draft Outline of Letter of Intent, etc.
(GSRRP001505-07)

11/11/98

823

X

Giles letter to Ridgley Denning (GSRRPOO 1602-04)

8/19/99

824

Reserved

825

Reserved

826

Reserved

827

Reserved

828

Reserved

829

Reserved

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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Date
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Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

830

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Intermountain Medical Imaging,
LLP (GSRRPOOI501)

11/30/98

831

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (CHOOI823)

1/1/99

832

X

Letter from Carl W. Harder to David J. Giles, M.D.
(GSRRP002621)

1/21/99

833

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (033766)

2/1/99

834

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRPOOI524)

311199

835

X

Letter from Carl W. Harder to Jeffrey R. Cliffre: February
MRI Statements (CHOOI816)

3/8/99

836

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (033763)

4/1/99

837

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRPOOI517)

4/1/99

838

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(re: Saint Alphonsus RMC) (GSRRPOOI736)

5/1/99

839

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(re: Partnership) (GSRRP001512)

5/1/99

840

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRP001734)

6/1/99

841

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (040458)

7/1/99

842

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRPOOJ733)

7/1/99

843

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (CH003870)

8/1/99

844

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRPOO 1732)

8/1/99

845

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (CH003869)

9/1/99

846

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Intermountain Medical Imaging,
LLC (GSRRP001594)

9/1/99

847

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRPOO 1509)

9/1/99

848

X

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (033754)

I 0/1/99

849

X

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (040477)

11/1/99

850

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRPOOI731)

12/1/99

X

X

X

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

851

X

Letter from Carl W. Harder to Jeffrey R. Cliff re: July through
November Radiology Statements (GSRRP002741)

12117/99

852

X

Letter from Carl W. Harder to J. Roger Curran re: Statements
for 1999 Legal Fees and Related Retainer (CHOOI801-02)

8/2/00

853

Reserved

854

Reserved

855

Reserved

856

Reserved

857

Reserved

858

Reserved

859

Reserved

860

X

"G.P. Dist'' and "L.P. Dist" and "Dist per Unit" 1986-2001
(038606)

Undated

861

X

The Basics of the Deal (038790-92)

Undated

862

X

JP Notes Meeting with Sandra & her team. (000044-48)

Undated

863

Reserved

864

Reserved

865

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 866-879 Reserved

880

X

Request

881

X

X

X

882

X

X

X

883

X

X

Expert Report of Thomas R. McCarthy, Ph.D. with Exhibits

6/15/11

Curriculum Vitae of Thomas R. McCarthy (Expert Report

6/15/11

Ex. I)
Materials Considered by Thomas R. McCarthy (Expert Report
Ex. 2)

6/15/11

Exhibits 3 to 26A of Expert Report of Thomas R. McCarthy,
Ph.D.

6/5/11

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Evidence

No
position
vet
No
position
yet
No
position
yet
No
position
yet
No
position
yet

No
position
vet
No
position
yet
No
position
yet
No
position
yet
No
position
yet

884

X

885

X

886

X

887

X

888

X

889

X

X

889R

X

X

Date

Description

CD-ROM containing electronic files ofPMI-generated IMI
scan data and IMI financial statements relied upon by Thomas
R. McCarthy and produced by him at his deposition

undated

Electronic file produced by MRIA entitled IMI Data with
Affiliations and Prior MRIA Referral. xis

undated

Electronic file produced by MRIA entitled MRI Center Exams
200 I -Current. xis

undated

Electronic file produced by MRIA entitled MRI 2007PresentSARMCvsMRIA.xls

undated

Electronic file produced by MRIA entitled IMI Scan Data
2006 - 20 I O.xlsx

undated

X

Chart 2 (at page 13) of the Supplemental Expert Report of
Bruce P. Budge, as modified by Mr. Budge at his deposition
(Dep. Ex. I)

8/1 1/11

X

Redacted version of Exhibit 889

8/11/IJ

890

Reserved

891

Reserved

892

Reserved

893

Reserved

894

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 895-999 Reserved
Any Exhibit used at any deposition taken in this case.

Various

Any Exhibit identified by MRIA in this case.

Various

Any document disclosed in discovery for the purposes of
impeachment or rebuttal

Various

All Radiology Group & Executive Committee minutes
produced by GSR in discovery

Various

All IMI meeting minutes and subcommittees thereof produced
in discovery

various

All MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile meeting minutes,
including MRIA executive meeting and executive session
minutes

various

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on AppeaL Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

Redacted Versions of MRIA Exhibits Ordered I Proposed to Be Used in Lieu of Originals:
4138R

With redactions per Court's 6/9/11 order

4147R

Redacted to remove irrelevant , prejudicial, and confusing
language stating an incorrect legal conclusion .

4149R

Redacted to remove irrelevant , prejudicial, and confusing
language stating an incorrect legal conclusion .

4150R

Redacted to remove irrelevant , prejudicial, and confusing
language stating an incorrect legal conclusion .

4234R

Redacted per Court's 6/9/11 and 8/9/11 Orders

4239R

Redacted per Court's 6/9/11 and 8/9/11 Orders

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 9th day of September, 2011.

GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of September, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

D
D
D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

**Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. !d.
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·-JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION
TO MRIA'S MOTION TO PREVENT
SAINT ALPHONSUS FROM
REFERRING TO EXTENSION OF
TERMT02023

Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S MOTION TO PREVENT SAINT

~ ALPHONSUS FROM REFERRING TO EXTENSION OF TERM TO 2023 - 1

002417

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

MRIA has moved to prevent Saint Alphonsus from referring to the vote by the MRIA
board to extend the terms of the MRI Center and MRI Mobile limited partnerships to 2023.
Those votes occurred during an MRIA board meeting on August 19, 1998, as shown in minutes
of the meeting marked as Trial Exhibits 4054 and 4109. Both of these exhibits were admitted by
stipulation at the first trial, and MRIA even displayed one of them (Exhibit 4054) during its
opening statement. See Trial Tr. (Sept. 9) at 27.
The evidence shows that Dr. Giles's actively concealed from Saint Alphonsus the
radiologists' plan to create their new outpatient imaging center. See, e.g., Trial Ex. 520 ("Dr.
Giles again stressed the importance of confidentiality regarding this matter"). Saint Alphonsus
intends to suggest to the jury that one reason "Dr. Giles [wanted] to get through the next [i.e.,
August 19] MRI meeting before Sandra Bruce has knowledge ofthe center" (Trial Ex. 522) was
to secure Saint Alphonsus's votes for these term extensions before it knew of the radiologists'

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S MOTION TO PREVENT SAINT
002418
ALPHONSUS FROM REFERRING TO EXTENSION OF TERM TO 2023 - 2

plans to launch a competing venture. This is obviously part of the overarching story that the jury
will learn during the trial, and nothing about these facts is unfairly prejudicial in any sense that
might arguably support exclusion of evidence or arguments. Accordingly, these facts and
argument come within the scope of those that parties, in a factually complex case, must be
allowed to present in order to assist the jury in construing the evidence.
MRIA contends that evidence of the vote to extend the limited partnerships' terms should
be excluded because, as the Supreme Court held, that vote was ineffective. But the failure of Dr.
Giles's attempt does not detract from what the attempt tells us about Dr. Giles's motivations and
conduct during the time period at issue. Further, MRIA has not explained how the jury's
knowledge of the fact of the vote in any way unfairly prejudices MRIA. In all events, any such
prejudice would be completely alleviated by a limiting instruction informing the jury that the
vote was ineffective. Saint Alphonsus supports such a limiting instruction. In all other respects,
MRIA's motion should be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 13th day of September, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S MOTION TO PREVENT SAINT
002419
ALPHONSUS FROM REFERRING TO EXTENSION OF TERM TO 2023 - 3

...

t

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of September 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

~

D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S MOTION TO PREVENT SAINT
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-~~
1()J~ OR\G\NAL
~ 6 Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
..

C)- /4

~---"Fili5'-~~
.....,.=
Fn.e;,
~~
'----IP.M

OD (_

SEP 13 2011

(tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
-{WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
ByJEAIHEATON
DEPUTY

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

OBJECTION TO JURY
INSTRUCTION REGARDING
CONSULTANT ESTIMATE

v.

'

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

OBJECTION TO JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING CONSULTANT ESTIMATE- I

002421

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this objection to a jury instruction which has
been submitted regarding a consultant estimate. That jury instruction reads as follows:
The amount a consultant estimated Saint Alphonsus might have to pay
MRIA to buy MRIA or MRI Center is not a measure of damages which may or
may not have been suffered by the various MRI entities, nor does the fact that
Saint Alphonsus sought such an opinion establish that Saint Alphonsus was
legally required to purchase MRIA or MRI Center or pay that price to purchase
MRIA or MRI Center. These claims assert breach of partnership obligations and
allege conspiracy; they are not breach of purchase agreement claims. Indeed
there never was any purchase agreement between the parties. You may not use
this evidence in any way to calculate damages if you find that damages are due
from Saint Alphonsus to any of the MRI entities. The cost to purchase MRIA or
MRI Mobile [sic] is not the measure of damages suffered by MRIA, MRI Center,
or MRI Mobile on any of their claims.
This instruction is not an accurate statement of the law. It is MRIA's intent to present one theory
of damages that the values ofMRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile
Limited have dropped precipitously because of the actions of Saint Alphonsus. In particular,
MRIA intends to compare the present value of these entities with the estimate provided by
Shattuck Hammond when Saint Alphonsus considered buying out various interests.

A.

Diminution ofValue is a Valid Measure of Damages
The goal of the law of compensatory damages is reimbursement of the plaintiff for the

actual loss suffered. Bratton v. Scott, 248 P.3d 1265, 1272 (2011). See also Rest. (Second) of
Torts§ 901 cmt. a (1979) ("[T]he law of torts attempts primarily to put an injured person in a
position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to the tort."). As such, the
diminution in the value of a business entity is a valid measure of damages for wrongful or
tortious conduct. For example, in the case Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881,
897, 522 P.2d 1102, 1118 (1974), a corporation brought an action for slander and tortious
interference with contract. On the question of the corporation's damages, the Court found it

OBJECTION TO JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING CONSULTANT ESTIMATE- 2
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proper for the majority owner of a corporation to testify that the business had an actual net worth
prior to alleged commission ofthe torts of$183,000 and that the net amount the business was
able to salvage after it closed down as result of the alleged torts was $97,000. See Inland Group
of Companies, Inc. v. Providence Washington Insurance Company, 133 Idaho 249,253,259, 985

P.2d 674, 678, 684 (1999) (party sought damages for the lost value of the business as a going
concern under a bad faith claim); Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho
41, 896 P.2d 949 (1995) (damages appropriately based on majority owner's testimony that
business was worth $200,000 before breach and worth nothing afterwards). As such, the jury
may properly be presented with a damages theory for the loss in the value or worth of MRIA.
The valuation presented by Shattuck Hammond is relevant to this analysis.

B.

The Supreme Court's Opinion Does Not Preclude this Measure of Damages
Moreover, this theory is not precluded by the Supreme Court's opinion regarding the

previously-presented "purchase price" theory of damages. In the prior proceeding, MRIA
presented as an alternative measure of damages the sum that Saint Alphonsus would have had to
pay to purchase MRI Center, based on the valuation provided by Shattuck Hammond. The
Supreme Court rejected the "purchase price" theory of damages because "[t]his is not an action
for breach of a contract to purchase MRI Center. The cost to purchase MRI Center is not the
measure of damages suffered by MRIA on any of the alleged causes of action." The diminution
of value theory proposed by MRIA is not based on an assertion that Saint Alphonsus could have
or should have purchased MRI Center for the amount contained in the Shattuck Hammond
evaluation. Rather, this appraisal of the value of MRI Center is simply one piece of evidence to
demonstrate how the value of MRI Center has fallen since Saint Alphonsus engaged in the
wrongful conduct. The Supreme Court's opinion does not address this diminution in value

OBJECTION TO JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING CONSULTANT ESTIMATE- 3
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theory, and cannot be read to hold that the Shattuck Hammond evaluation is inadmissible on
such a theory.
As a diminution of value theory is a valid measure of damages and is not precluded by
the Supreme Court's opinion in this case, MRIA should be allowed to present this theory and
supporting evidence to the jury. The proposed jury instruction quoted above should not be given
to the jury, because it is an incorrect statement of the law and/or the law of this case.
DATED this 13th day of September 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

-I

~~ L'f.?.~~

DaraL. Pa~r
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

OBJECTION TO JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING CONSULTANT ESTIMATE- 4

002424

' '

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of September, 2011, a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintifjlCounterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintifjlCounterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

J(.Facsimile

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

¢_Facsimile

~~k
Dara L. Par er
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FILED

A.M _ _ _---JP.M

SEP 16 2011
CHRJSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JERI HEATON
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO
EXCLUDE MRIA'S NEW AND
IMPROPER DAMAGES THEORIES

Defendant.

ORIGINAl
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S NEW AND IMPROPER DAMAGES THEORIES- 1
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRl LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

Saint Alphonsus has moved to exclude two ofMRlA's six models of damages on the
grounds, among others, that the theories were not presented at the first trial, are in no way
justified by any intervening ruling of the Supreme Court or this Court, and (in the case of one of
those theories) were improperly disclosed several months after the Court's May deadline for
MRIA's expert disclosures. While this motion was pending and after trial had begun, MRIA
revealed for the first time that it intends to introduce a seventh theory of damages-that the
values ofMRlA, MRIA Center, and MRIA Mobile diminished between 2001 and the present.
This new theory should be excluded too, for similar reasons: it is new; it was affirmatively
waived at the first trial; it was not disclosed in accordance with MRlA's discovery obligations;
and Saint Alphonsus would be severely prejudiced by having to defend against it. In addition,
the alleged decline in the value of the MRIA entities between 2001 and the present is not a
legally appropriate measure of any damages suffered by the MRIA entities in this case.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S NEW AND IMPROPER DAMAGES THEORIES- 2
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MRIA' s first indication of its intent to rely on this "diminution of value" theory of
damages was expressed on September 13 in a written objection to the Court's proposed limiting
instruction on MRIA's now-defunct "purchase price" damages theory. Specifically, MRIA
stated that it "inten[ds] to present one theory of damages that the values of MRI Associates, LLP,
MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited have dropped precipitously because of the
actions of Saint Alphonsus. In particular, MRIA intends to compare the present value of these
entities with the estimate provided by Shatttuck Hammond [on November 6, 2001] when Saint
Alphonsus considered buying out various interests." MRIA Obj. to Jury Instr. at 2; see also Trial
Ex. 4274 (Shattuck Hammond Presentation of Strategic Options). MRIA calls this a "diminution
of value theory." Obj. to Jury Instr. at 2. MRIA should be precluded from offering this new
"theory of damages" for three separate reasons.
1.

First, the diminution theory should be excluded because MRIA at the first trial

did not make any claim for "the loss in the value or worth ofMRIA." Rather, three times in
open court, MRIA affirmatively waived any such theory. See 2007 Trial Tr. at 793 (Mr.
Banducci stating, in connection with the same Shattuck Hammond valuation, that "we never
asserted a drop in value between 2001 and 2006 as the measure of damages"); id. at 3372 (Mr.
Woodard "agree[ing]" with statement by Saint Alphonsus's counsel that MRIA was not making
"a diminution in value claim"); id. at 3374 (Mr. Banducci representing that "it's not a diminution
in value").
MRIA should not be permitted to expand its theories of liability and damages beyond
those pursued at the first trial and, in particular, should not be allowed to include a "diminution
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of value" theory that it affirmatively disclaimed at the first trial. As explained in more detail in
the memorandum in support of Saint Alphonsus's pending motion, MRIA has repeatedly taken
the position that the retrial should essentially follow the proof and legal rulings of the first trial
except where the Supreme Court's decision requires otherwise, and has represented that "its prior
damages proofwas the proof with which it could and would go to trial." Opp'n to Motion to
Reopen at 3 (Feb. 2, 2011). MRIA recently persuaded the Court that Saint Alphonsus had
waived an argument (that MRIA breached its fiduciary duties) by not making that argument at
the first trial or including it in the pleadings, see Consolidated Order reMotions Heard Aug. 5,
2011, at 1, and MRIA similarly persuaded the Court to preclude Saint Alphonsus from
withdrawing evidentiary stipulations made at the first trial, see id. at 2-4. As this Court stated,
"[t]his matter needs to be tried before a new jury with the errors found by the Supreme Court
corrected, but otherwise the previous proceedings stand." !d. at 3.
Saint Alphonsus respectfully disagreed with aspects of this ruling, but surely the ruling
must apply evenhandedly, so as to also bind MRIA to the prior proceedings and prohibit it from
seeking to expand Saint Alphonsus's liability beyond the claims and damages theories asserted at
the first trial. MRIA is plainly disappointed that the Supreme Court substantially reduced
MRIA's recoverable damages, but under the parameters set by this Court, that reduction in
damages must "stand," id., and may not be undermined by the injection into the case of"entirely
different remed[ies ]" with "entirely different premise[ s]" seeking "entirely different"-and
massively increased-"measurement[s]" of damages. Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at
30.
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In sum, MRIA affirmatively waived the "diminution of value" theory at the first trial. It
may not revive it now.
2.

Second, the diminution theory should be excluded for the separate and

independent reason that MRIA's mid-trial revelation that it has changed its mind and now
intends to pursue a diminution theory after all is nothing less than trial by ambush and a gross
and severely prejudicial violation ofMRIA's discovery obligations.
MRIA has given seemingly conflicting accounts of whether it intends to present this new
theory by fact or expert testimony. Compare 2011 Trial Tr. at 461-62 (Dr. Prochaska noting that
MRIA's experts "prepared the loss numbers") with id. at 645-46 (Mr. Woodard stating that the
"loss in value" would be presented by fact witnesses). But MRIA's belated disclosure is
improper no matter how the theory is presented. To the extent that MRIA seeks to present expert
testimony on diminution of value, that testimony must be excluded because this theory of
damages was not included in the expert disclosures that were due in May. See Order Granting
Joint Mot. to Amend Discovery Schedule at 2; City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 586,
130 P.3d 1118, 1124 (2006) (exclusion appropriate remedy for belated disclosure); Saint
Alphonsus's Mem. Supp. Mot. to Exclude MRIA's New and Improper Damages Theories at 13
(explaining that MRIA's belated disclosure of its "disgorgement" theory requires exclusion).
The same result follows even if MRIA seeks to rely solely on lay witnesses to present
evidence ofthe alleged diminution in value. This Court's order required that fact discovery on
damages be completed by July 15. See Order Reopening Discovery and Setting Schedule at 4.
In addition, MRIA had an outstanding obligation under Rule 26(e) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil
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Procedure to supplement its prior discovery responses, including its response to Saint
Alphonsus's Interrogatory No.7, which sought disclosure of the nature ofMRIA's damages
claims. By not disclosing its "diminution in value" theory before or during the reopened
discovery period, MRIA prevented Saint Alphonsus from discovering evidence of the "present
value" of the MRIA entities--evidence uniquely in the possession ofMRIA. Thus, Saint
Alphonsus did not request or receive documents sufficient to show the MRIA entities' present
value. Saint Alphonsus did not have an opportunity to depose those persons at MRIA
knowledgeable about the MRIA entities' present value. Indeed, to this day, Saint Alphonsus has
no idea-and no way to find out-what the present value of the MRIA entities is. How can
Saint Alphonsus possibly mount an intelligible defense to this claim?
Moreover, whether or not MRIA offers evidence ofthe present value of the MRIA
entities through lay testimony, surely on so complex a matter as business valuations, Saint
Alphonsus would be entitled to rebut that testimony through expert analysis. See Idaho R. Evid.
702; City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 585-86, 130 P.3d 1118, 1123-24 (2006)
(upholding admission of expert testimony on valuation). And, with trial already underway, Saint
Alphonsus and its counsel cannot possibly work with a valuation expert-be it Dr. McCarthy or
a new expert-to prepare a valuation opinion for the jury without sacrificing the adequacy of
their other trial responsibilities. Indeed, without sufficient evidence ofMRIA's present value,
they cannot prepare a valuation opinion, period. Again, how can Saint Alphonsus possibly
mount an intelligible defense to this new claim?
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It is precisely for these reasons that courts set orderly discovery schedules and expect the

parties to follow them. See, e.g., Perry v. Magic Valley Reg. Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 53,995
P .2d 816, 823 (2000) (upholding exclusion of evidence disclosed eight days into trial). Having
had, to this day still, no opportunity to develop either evidence or expert opinion on the "present
value" of the MRIA entities, Saint Alphonsus will plainly be severely prejudiced if MRIA is
allowed to inject this new theory into the case and present its own one-sided view ofthe
evidence to the jury. For this reason, too, the new damages theory must be excluded.
3.

Third, and finally, the "diminution in value" theory should also be excluded

because the difference between "the present value of the[] [MRIA] entities [and] the estimate
provided by Shattuck Hammond" in November 2001 (Obj. to Jury Instr. at 2) is not an
appropriate measure of any damages that MRIA is alleged to have suffered in this case.
It is well-settled that MRIA "must" establish that any "loss [in business value] was

produced by [Saint Alphonsus's] conduct rather than by ... other variables." Wing v. Hulet,
106 Idaho 912,919,684 P.2d 314,321 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout
Co., 143 Idaho 733, 739-40, 152 P.3d 604, 610-11 (2007) (plaintiff must establish "both amount
and causation"); Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P.3d 1119, 1121
(2007) ("[t]he measure of damages for the breach of an anti-competition clause is the amount
that the plaintiff lost by reason ofthe breach" (emphasis added)).
MRIA contends that it is entitled to damages measured by the difference between the
value of the MRIA entities in November 2001 and the value of the MRIA entities today. See
Obj. to Jury Instr. at 2. But MRIA' s present value-seven and a half years after Saint
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S NEW AND IMPROPER DAMAGES THEORIES- 7
002432

Alphonsus' s dissociation and six and a half years after the expiration of all of Saint Alphonsus' s
non-compete obligations-has no plausible relationship to Saint Alphonsus's conduct, even
assuming that every one ofMRIA's allegations is true. MRIA's theory thus improperly assumes
with no proof that the entirety of any loss in business value over a full decade is attributable to
alleged misconduct occurring more than six years ago, rather than to innumerable other possible
causes, such as the state of the economy, declining medical reimbursement rates, the loss of
business to lawful post-2005 competition from Saint Alphonsus, the loss of business over the
entire decade to other MRI competitors in the Boise area, MRIA's own business decisions, and
so on.
MRIA simply ignores the impact on its business of these "other variables." Wing,
106 Idaho at 919, 684 P.2d at 321. This is precisely what the Supreme Court told MRIA it may
not do. See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care v. MRI Assocs., 148 Idaho 479, 498, 224 P.3d
1068, 1087 (2010) (instructing MRIA to supply '"a method of figuring damages"' that
distinguishes between business lost as a result of the alleged bad acts and business that would
have been lost absent those bad acts (quoting Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217,
646 P.2d 988 (1982))). For this reason, too, the diminution theory must be excluded.
CONCLUSION

In addition to granting the relief sought in Saint Alphonsus' s pending motion, the Court
should preclude MRIA from presenting any claim for recovery of the diminution of value of the
MRIA entities from 2001 to the present.
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August 11, 2011

rapidly after the alleged events occurred than for IMI.
Q. Okay.
MR. VERGONIS: I'm going to mark, as a third
exhibit, your rebuttal expert report dated July 29th, 2011.
(Whereupon a Rebuttal Expert Report of Bruce P.
Budge dated 7/29/11 was marked Exhibit 3 for
identification.)
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Is that the rebuttal expert report that you
prepared in this case?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. You note, on Page 3, the second paragraph, that
you were provided with the expert report of Thomas McCarthy?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you read that report?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Okay. On Page 4 you write that-- underneath the
rebuttal Figure 1, you write that "I have also learned that
St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, SARMC, did not begin
participating in the MRI profits ofiMI until April 1st,
2005."
Did I read that correctly?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that something that you previously had not
known?
Page 21
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A. Through all the data that we have forecasted, yes.
Q. Okay. That the net cash flow from operations was
approximately 37.4 million.
First question: What do you mean by "net cash flow"?
A. It's basically the operating profit plus
depreciation minus the capital contributions that were
required in the years that they were required.
Q. Mm-hm. So profit-- the profit plus the
depreciation?
A. Right, minus capital investment.
Q. All right. Do you have-- maybe these-- they're
not certainly in the short rebuttal report.
Are there tables in your supplemental report of
May 20, '11 where you can show me, even walk me through how
you get to the 37.4 million?
A. You said May 20.
Q. I might have misspoken. May-- May 2nd, 2011,
marked as Exhibit 1.
A. It's easier to find them if I use my file.
Q. Okay. That would be fine. Maybe you could...
I think maybe before you start flipping through
it, can we mark the notebook as Exhibit 4?
A. Does that mean I have to give it to you or -Q. It means they can photocopy it during a break.
A. That's -- that's certainly fine, but I would also
Page 23
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A. No. I -- I think that I had known it, and I think
that it -- because of the passage of time, it escaped my
recollection.
Q. Okay. And how did you learn then -- how were you
reminded ofthis fact?
A. There's a footnote in my report which basically
shows the portion of cash flows which could be attributed to
St. Alphonsus Hospital and -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- basically takes my damages calculations and
multiplies them by 50 percent which I understand to be their
ownership percentage.
Q. Okay.
A. It's -- in reviewing that note, it was pointed out
to me that that was -- it's an improper calculation that
includes partnership distributions for a period prior to
when they had an interest that needed to be corrected.
Q. Okay. Who pointed that out to you?
A. I don't -- I can't remember for sure. I think
that the first time that I became aware of it may have been
in a discussion with Drew Voth who was my assistant on this
project.
Q. Okay. So you say in this paragraph that for the
time period April -- April I st through -- April 1st, 2005
through-- I assume you say 2010. Is that the end of2010?
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point out there's a CD in it which I brought just for you to
have-Q. Okay.
A. -- which is the data that we used. And -- and -but otherwise, I certainly have no objection to that.
Q. Okay. But otherwise you would want it back? I
mean, if you -- if it's a copy already, they won't need to
make a copy. If it's your originals -A. It's my originals -Q. Okay.
A. -- unfortunately.
Q. So they'll --they'll make us a copy.
A. Yeah.

Q. We did that the other day.
A. We're going to have to deal with my aged eyesight
here today -Q. Okay.
A. -- so give me a moment.
MR. WOODARD: I forgot to remind you. Glad you
remembered.
MR. VERGONIS: Wade, since we only have one copy
of the book, would you mind ifl walked over-MR. WOODARD: No.
MR. VERGONIS: -- and sat in that chair to look
over Mr. Budge's shoulder?
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MR. WOODARD: No.
MR. VERGONIS: Okay.
A. It's-- actually, I can answer your question. It's
Schedule 2.6.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Oh.
A. 2.6-Q. I'll stay seated for now.
A. -- in my report is what was -- what the source of
that is.
MR. WOODARD: Pretty sure you're talking about
your supplemental report.
THE WITNESS: Talking about my May 2nd
supplemental report.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. 2.6 did you say?
A. Well, that's what it says here.
Q. I'm not sure I have a 2.6.
A. Let me go farther back. (Witness peruses
document.)
I have a Schedule 2.5 -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- on the back, which these aren't Bates stamped
by page, but -Q. No, but I understand the order that everything's
Page 25
in, so I -- I've been able to flip to 2.5, so I have that in
front of me.
A. Well, I'm somewhat mystified by this because I
think that there should be a 2.6 and a 3.6. Well, there's a
possibility this was not produced -Q. Okay.
A. -- in the report.
Q. Do you have a 2.6 in your binder there?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Okay.
A. I have a 3.6, an 8.6, a 15.6. I see none of
those. You know, I didn't look through every page.
Q. No. I don't see them either. Before we look at
2.6, what's the schedule numbering convention that you use?
In other words, there's a lot of-A. Yeah.
Q. -- there are Schedules 1 through whatever number,
maybe 15 or 18. Then it starts over with Schedule 2 point
-A. 1.
Q. -- 2 I think or-A. 2 point -- yeah.
THE COURT REPORTER: I need one at a time
speaking.
MR. VERGONIS: Yeah. I'm sorry.
Page 26
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THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Yeah. So you know --you know what I'm talking
about, Mr. Budge. Can you -A. Yeah.
Q. -- explain that convention to me?
A. The number after the decimal point is the method
number.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So when --when you have your summary, for
instance, Figure I 0, and I know Figure I 0 on Page I5 of your
May 2nd report, I know that figure's been revised by your
rebuttal report, so we'll get to that momentarily, but
Figure I 0 lists five calculation methods.
A. Yes.
Q. So any schedule without a decimal point after it
relates to Calculation Method I; is that correct?
A. I believe it is. I just want to make sure that I

20

--

21

Q. Sure. Take your time. As you're flipping pages,
I'll represent that there are no schedules -A. That are point 1.
Q. -- numbered dot I -A. Yeah.
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Q. --so-A. So-Q. -- in the absence of a dot -A. That's right.
Q. -- is Calculation Method 1?
A. Right.
Q. And the schedules that are numbered dot 2 are
related to Calculation Method 2?
A. Yes.
Q. And if there's not a schedule number dot 2, is it
okay to infer that the original schedule is also applicable
to this calculation method?
A. I would have to look at a specific -Q. Okay.
A. -- instance where there's not a dot 2 in order to
see what the reason -Q. Okay.
A. -- for that is.
Q. But in other words, for-THE COURT REPORTER: In order to what?
THE WITNESS: See what the reason for that is.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. For example, there's no Schedule 1.2?
A. Right.
Q. So Schedule 1 -Page 28
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Q. Schedule 1 is your overall-- is your list of five
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damages scenario.
A. Right.
Q. So that one applies to all?
A. (Witness nods head.)
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. And so forth probably?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And then just for completeness, any
schedule that is labeled dot 3 applies to your third
calculation method?
A. Yes.
Q. Dot 4 to your fourth?
A. Yes.
Q. Dot 5 to your fifth?
A. Correct.
Q. What does dot 6 apply to?
A. This footnote.
Q. Okay. Is the footnote a damages calculation
method?
A. I think that that conceivably could be if there's
some kind of a disgorgement type of remedy that's advocated.
Q. Okay. Do you know if such a remedy is advocated?
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methods in chief, we didn't include them as an exhibit in
the report.
Q. Okay. All right. Going back then to the tables,
can you-A. To which tables?
Q. To the dot 6 tables -A. Yes.
Q. -- that were never produced to us.
Can you walk me through how you calculated the
$37.4 million figure just by-- maybe by showing me those
schedules?
A. Figure out the best way to do this.
Would you like to look at them first or-Q. Yeah. Why don't -- why don't you pass them over.
A. (Witness complies.)
Q. (Peruses document.)
Okay.
A. So-Q. Do you need to look at them in order to -A. I might but -Q. --talk to me? Okay.
A. -- but basically the overall approach is to
basically -- if I made a calculation of what the profits
accruing to IMI were during these periods, and then I added
them up originally for this period that included, you know,
Page 31
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Q. Did they ask you to put it in a footnote?
A. Not specifically. I don't really recall how that
occurred.
Q. Do you know why you didn't put it in Figure 10 as
Calculation Method 6?
A. Because it really isn't. The calculation is of a
different nature. It basically has to do with a
disgorgement premise and the others don't. They're injury
to MRIA. And so that seems illogical to me.
Q. It seems illogical to put it in Figure 10?
A. Yeah, because it's -- it really isn't comparable.
It has an entirely different premise, and it's an entirely
different measurement and an entirely different remedy.
Q. Do you think it was plain to someone reading your
report that that was a claimed measure of damages?
A. I don't know if it would be or not.
Q. Did you provide the dot 6 tables to the lawyers as
part of your report?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. You think you failed to provide those?
A. I think these are our work papers and -Q. Okay.
A. --we-- because they weren't part of the five
Page 30
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dates prior to 2005 -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- and I multiplied them by 50 percent. In doing
that I took the operating income and made some adjustments
for -- for depreciation and for capital investments I
described to you earlier. And those are reflected in there.
Q. Okay. What's capital investment?
A. It's primarily the purchase of magnets.
THE COURT REPORTER: It's primarily what?
THE WITNESS: For the purchase of magnets. MRI
machines.
BYMR. VERGONIS:
Q. Okay. And I would see that summarized here in
Schedule 15 .6?
A. Yes, that's the one.
Q. Okay. Then you-- so you took the profits, plus
depreciation, minus capital investment and -- for the years
in question, and divide it by two to reach SARMC's share of
18.7 million, right?
A. Yeah, multiplied times 50 percent, same thing.
Q. Yeah. Okay. Multiply by 50 percent to reach 18.7
million.
Does the 18.7 million take into account SARMC's
$11.6 million investment in IMI in -A. No.
Page 32
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Why not?
Those are the returns on -- on that.
What do you mean by that?
Those are the returns that they got in five years
before the $11 million investment, but I have not deducted
the $11 million investment.
Q. Okay. I'm sorry. Let's break that down because
those are the returns that SARMC got, you said?
A. They're the financial returns. I don't know -- I
don't mean to say that they were necessarily distributed,
but they represent their proportionate interest in the cash
flows of IMI over the period after their ownership
commenced.
Q. Okay. And why don't those get deducted against-A. Well, it depends on what-- for what purpose
you're looking at them. My purpose here is to show what
their investment returns had been during the period that
they were an owner in IMI. If you asked me what was their -you know, how much of their investment they'd recover,
that type of thing, that's a different question and I
probably would have answered-- you know, I probably would
have taken the 11 million in the context of that question.
Q. I see. I understand. So we're talking about
SARMC's profits. We would --we would want to deduct the
11.6 million?
Page 33
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A. Not in the sense that accountants usually would
use the word "profit" because it's their investment, and
that usually isn't deducted from operating income. It's not
amortized. You basically have an interest in the business
enterprise, and it continues on into perpetuity. It can
change in value, but it's not a deduction from the earnings
of it. So-- so it would not be proper to deduct it to
compute their profits.
If you wanted to deduct-- you know, do some
calculation as to how they were -- what type of return on
investment they were getting, or something like that, you
could -- I think that the average earnings in this period is
maybe around three and a half million a year that is
attributable to them. They-- they invested 11 million.
That would say they're getting -- I don't know exactly, but
you know, 33 percent return on that investment.
Q. Okay.
A. So you could use it, and it would be logical to
use it in that context, but it would not be logical to
deduct it to describe what their profits had been, because
at the end of that period, they still have that interest. It
still has a large value. There's been no diminution of the
value of it.
Q. Okay.
A. And, in fact, it may have become more valuable.
Page 34

Q. But-- but what if you extend the calculations
into perpetuity to try to value SARMC's return in perpetuity
from its investment in this entity?
A. I don't understand the question, what if-Q. Well, you end in-- you end in 2010, but I-- but
I think Mr. Wilhoite then extends the numbers into the

future.
A. Yeah. You'd have to ask him about that. But my
assignment was basically to calculate the economic benefit
that SARMC has received from their investment and
affiliation with IMI, and that's what I did.
Q. Okay. And the economic benefit that SARMC has
received are 18.7 million in cash flows during this time?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. With no regard for the 11.6 million
investment?
A. Well, that would be improper. They still own it.
And I'm assuming it's still worth 11 million and probably
more than 11 million.
Q. Okay. Do you know why this disgorgement measure
begins after April 1st, 2005 when SARMC -A. Well, I'll let you finish the question.
Q. I'll finish the question there. Why does it begin
after April 1st, 2005?
A. Because of my understanding that they did not have
Page 35
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any interest in IMI's net income prior to that date.
Q. Okay. Let's move on to a different topic.
In your rebuttal report, on Page 4 in the Rebuttal
Figure No. 1, that's your-- am I right that that's your new
bottom line for your five damages alternatives?
A. Well, what it does is it apportions them between
MRlC and MRlM instead of the way that I previously did which
was to apportion them between the three plaintiffs.
Q. Right.
A. And so that's how I would characterize it. I'm
not -- I don't believe that the total changed.
Q. Right, the total did not change, but this is -this Rebuttal Figure 1 substitutes for any tables that came
before in terms of what your ultimate opinions on damages
are?
A. Yes. In terms of the apportionment between the
entities, yeah.
Q. Okay. So-- so Column A is what you claim MRl -MRlC, which we sometimes refer to as "Center," suffered as
damages in this case?
A. Under these various methods.
Q. Yeah. Alternative methodologies.
A. Right.
Q. And Column B is what MRlM, what we sometimes refer
to as "Mobile," suffered under each of the different
Page 36
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A. It's basically showing what the economic value is
under the -- MRIA's theory of the usurped corporate
opportunity. And actually there are several of them and
basically calculates what the total amount of profit
involved in those -- all the operations that MRIA asserts
were improperly usurped.
Q. You said-- you referred to "all of them."
A. Meaning Meridian, Downtown, Eagle.
Q. Okay. So are you saying there are multiple
usurped corporate opportunities?
A. That's my understanding, yes.
Q. Being measured by Method No. 5?
A. Correct.
Q. Let's take a look at that paragraph here.
A. Let me take a moment to read it if-Q. Okay.
A. --you don't mind.
Q. Yes, please.
A. (Witness peruses document.)
Okay. I've read it.
Q. Okay. The first sentence says multiple usurped
partnership opportunities -- or it says various partnership
opportunities, which is what you just testified to. Second
sentence says one of the usurped corporate opportunities was
the opportunity to partner with GSR Radiologists and IMI at
Page 49
the time IMI was formed.
Is Calculation Method 5 trying to measure that one
usurped opportunity to partner with GSR Radiologists?
A. I think that's the primary difference between that
and the others, is that Meridian and Eagle were already
included in the calculus for Methods 1 through 4.
Q. Okay.
A. But the -- but the method -- but this opportunity
was not, and it is in Method 5.
Q. So Meridian and Eagle are usurped opportunities
that are in the other calculations?
A. Yes.
Q. And this Calculation Method 5 is measuring a
usurped opportunity to partner at the inception of IMI?
A. Yes.
Q. Which then, under your assumptions, would have
included the other facilities, Eagle and Meridian?
A. It doesn't change MRI's allegations with respect
to the other, but -- so they would have all basically been
in the MRIA umbrella under Method 5.
Q. Okay. You said-- stepping away from Method 5 for
a moment, you said Methods 1 through 4 all reflect the
usurped opportunity that there is for Meridian and Eagle;
did I hear you correctly?
A. Yes.
Page 50

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1
2

3
4

5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. Okay. Do-- two of those calculation methods, I
and 2, seek, as damages, all scanned profits, all MRI
scanned profits received by Meridian and Eagle; is that
right? Two of them seek only affiliated Meridian and Eagle
referrals?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. Maybe I'm wrong about this, but I was
interpreting the -- what you call the all Meridian and Eagle
referrals, Theories I and 2 -A. Uh-huh.
Q. -- as -- as including-- I'm looking at Page 6, at
your summary table.
A. Okay.
Q. The all Meridian and Eagle referrals is including
usurpation damages, but the Methods 3 and 4 of affiliated
Meridian and Eagle referrals is not including usurpation
damages.
A. Well, I think that they do include damage that
those were usurped. The only thing I'm doing here is
basically using an analytical method that says had the
corporate opportunity been given to MRIA --

Q. Mm-hm.
A. --let's assume that instead of doing all of the
business which those two units did under IMI that they were
only able to basically avail themselves of the St. Al's
Page 51
affiliated networking, and so it's just a lower volume of
scans.
Q. I see.
A. There's no difference in the theory as to
usurpation between the four of them.
Q. Okay. Ifwe find that-- ifthe -- ifthejury
were to find that the Meridian and Eagle opportunities were
not usurped, would the Meridian and Eagle damages fall out
ofthe equations?
A. My -- I haven't thought through it carefully, but
my initial reaction would be that they would, but,
ultimately, I think that's what the jury would decide -Q. Right. Right.
A. -- not me. And -- but they are based on a theory
of usurpation.
Q. Okay. Going back to Method 5, after the sentence
that talks about one of the usurped opportunities being the
opportunity to partner with IMI at the time IMI is formed,
you have another sentence that says, "Further, MRIA contends
that but for the encouragement, direct support, and
affiliation of SARMC, IMI would never have provided MRI
services at any of its locations."
My question is whether -A. That makes me reconsider my previous answer. It
may be that the attorneys have some theory where the
Page 52
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A. -- and that the corporate opportunities weren't
usurped and that there wasn't a deliberate attempt to divert
scans from MRIA to IMI, which is alleged -- I'm not saying
that to be the case -- that my model in the later years
presumes that everybody would have been a happy family and
that St. Alphonsus would not have had a reason to
disassociate, but it doesn't assume that they couldn't have
disassociated at any time and honored that noncompete.
So, for example, if-- if you go through the
allegations which MRI intends to offer so that they actually
become, you know, the first arrivers in Meridian, that
they're not undermined in the practice of their center so
that their scans are not diverted, that there isn't
accommodation with GSR so that all of these things occur, I
don't see any reason to interpose an assumption at some
future date, in '07 or '8 or '9, that St. Alphonsus
withdraws, but if there was a reason that that might be the
case, I provided the details of my analysis so that you can
go in and say, okay, let's just assume that St. Al's decides
to dissociate -- in '08?
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And I think you can use the data I have to kind of
look at what the glide path is going to be in terms of the
decline in referrals from the-- because affiliation is
important in my opinion. And so that -- so my calculations
Page 85
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are all useful. So I don't want to be misunderstood that
I'm saying that St. Al's couldn't have dissociated at any
time. I'm just saying that they assume that they wouldn't
have. And I think that that's a rebuttable assumption. And
if-- if it was rebutted, I could alter the calculations.
Q. And are we talking about Method 5 here?
A. All methods.
Q. Okay. So all five of your methods assume that St.
Alphonsus -- the bottom line numbers assume that St.
Alphonsus would not have dissociated?
A. That in likelihood would not have dissociated.
But, you know, I'm open to evidence and that type of thing.
And if it were found by the jury or-- that dissociation was
likely at some particular -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- date, they could still use my calculations in
order to quantify the wrongful behavior-- the effects of
the wrongful behavior through that date and kind of through
the tail period where that wrongful behavior finishes
manifesting itself.
Q. Okay. I want to -- I want to talk a little more
about that because I don't fully understand it, but I think
I -- I think I see what you're saying.
So you said the -- what -- what is the tail
period?
Page 86
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A. Well, I think that-- you know, if you look at the
actual data in terms of what happened to the MRIA business-

Q. Mm-hm.

A. --you know, basically it could be characterized
6 as a business that had been strongly growing, benefitting, I
7 believe, through -- by its status as a provider within the
8 St. Al's network. And when that disassociation occurs,
9 those affiliations don't -- you know, referral patterns
1 0 don't just change immediately. It takes time for them to
11 do, but I don't know -- but you'll see that over a period of
12 one or two years basically the referrals dry up.
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Q. Hm.

A. And I'm saying that if-- if you have wrongful
conduct through a certain date, and -- and then there's no
more conduct after that, you don't just truncate the damages
through the date that the conduct stopped. You basically
look at the impacts of the conduct.
Q. Okay.
A. And -- and so in the case where -- let's say for
some reason you're looking at my Method No. 1, and you sayQ. Mm-hm.

A. --well, we have evidence that even if these
opportunities have not been usurped and all this occurred in
Page 87
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2008, St. Al's would have dissociated. Then what you could
do at that point of time is you could look at my but-for
line in terms of what scans would-Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- have been -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- and then you would pause it in decline in those
scans as a result of dissociation, and damages then would be
the difference between that but-for line and the actual
scans-Q. Okay.
A. -- instead of the original one.
Q. Okay. I understand. So that's an analysis that
could be done?
A. And I actually think that it could be done in an
approximate way, but -- by the jury looking at my data by
year. If you would give them a particular year to assume
dissociation, they can see that what the pattern of-- and - you know, and some way they could decide, well, maybe
we'll give them, you know, three-quarters of year one after
dissociation and one-quarter of year two, or something like
that.
Q. Okay. How's the jury to know what percentages to
use?
A. Well, they just look at, basically, the pattern of
Page 88
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how the -- what the attrition was in terms of referrals
after dissociation. We have hard data on that. We can show
them how the scans went down.
Q. Okay. So that's not --this -- this tail analysis
is not something you've performed in your tables?
A. It's -- it's not in here. I really-- you know,
if somebody gave me assumptions, I could do an analysis
fairly readily, but I believe that MRIA's assumption is that
had these course of conducts not occurred that there would
have been a state of affairs where St. Al's had -- had
little reason to want to dissociate. And so that -- and the
model assumes that they would have continued to be in this - in association. That certainly doesn't assume that they
had to legally.
Q. Right. What if we-- what if we change the
assumption and assume that even in the but-for world, St.
Alphonsus would have dissociated on April 1st, 2004 and
would have been free to compete on April 1st, 2005? Can you
tell me, sitting here today, how your numbers would be
affected by the change in assumption?
A. Well, I would not truncate the damages at the date
that their noncompete expired.
Q. Okay.
A. I would basically-- you know, assuming that this
wrongful conduct --you know, it affects MRIA's business
Page 89
going on into the future. I would basically try to -- and
so under the wrongful conduct, I'm basically positing a butfor line as to what would happen to their scans. Then if
you tell me that there was a -- a dissociation which was
proper-Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- I would basically look at what the attrition
period was that -- that -- that MRI would lose because of
lack of affiliation.
Q. Right.
A. Calculate a new but-for line, compare it to their
actuals, and compute the damages that way.
Q. Can you do that right now?
A. No. It's too -Q. Too complicated?
A. -- complicated to do it right now.
Q. Okay. Would it-- you said before it would maybe
be three-quarters of the damages for the -A. Yeah. I didn't mean to actually hang a number on
any of those. That was for illustration purposes -Q. Okay.
A. --only. Yeah.
Q. Is this something the jury could do?
A. Well, I-- I don't think that they could do it
with absolute precision. I think that the juries have the
Page 90

1 ability in terms of assessing damages and testimony to try
2 to come at equitable result and they can kind of see how
3 much asso- -- damages associated with those years. They can
4 understand that -- that some of those losses are now from
5 causes that aren't being accused.
6
Q. Right.
7
A. And they can make some decision as to how much of
8 them has to do with the bad conduct as opposed to just
9 dissociation itself.
10
Q. Can you give --you said the numbers you gave
11 before were for illustrative purposes.
12
Can you -- can you give any assistance to the jury
13 as to how they ought -- as to how they ought to quantifY
14 this tailing off of damages?
15
A. Well, I think I could tell-- basically I think
16 the biggest difference is that the but-for line would be the
17 same through the end of the date, and then that they would
18 need to lower that but-for line for the decline in scans
19 that happens after -20
Q. Mm-hm.
21
A. -- dissociation, and then take that amount and
22 reduce my damages for it.
23
Q. How quickly would the line lower?
24
A. Well, it's -- I haven't studied that exactly. It
25 appears to me that, if you look at Page 8, for example-Page 91
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Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- and we have disassociation occurring in that
one vertical line in -Q. Yep.
A. -- in at about 12 months later appears to -- I
don't believe that it did, but it sort of seems to coincide
with IMI opening on SARMC campus --

Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- so -- and during that interim -- I don't think
this is the case -- but SARMC was under a duty not to
compete and to support a competitor. They did that. That
affected the amount of scans that occurred during that
period. But after that one year is completed -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- you can see what happens when there's no longer
an affiliation. They go from over 6,500 scans down a level,
you know, below 2,000 within one, two, three years.

Q. Mm-hm.
A. And so that's the approximate pattern that I would
-- you know, the -- the referral pattern doesn't shift
instantly, but ultimately it does, like when there's not an
affiliation because the affiliations are very important in
the pattern of referrals in my opinion.
Q. Okay.
A. So I would probably take a line that starts where
Page 92
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Q. Okay.
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yeah.

Q. Okay. Here's a pen.
A. (Witness complies.) So you'd have something like
this, and it comes down, you know, within a period of two or
three years.
Q. Okay. And what -A. And then -- and then the damages basically instead
of being this area, are this area (drawing).
Q. Can you shade that in?
A. (Witness complies.)
Q. Okay. And if you had time to look at the numbers
and examine everything, you could -- you could draw that
line --you can estimate that line better?
A. More closely.
Q. Yeah.
A. But, you know, MRIA's belief is that if this
Page 93
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wrongful conduct occurred, then it's quite unlikely there
would have been a dissociation. But if I'm given an
instruction to assume there would have, I can do that
calculation.
Q. Okay. Get my pen back.
A. Oh.
Q. Thank you.
MR. WOODARD: Do you want to mark that?
MR. VERGONIS: Urn. Yeah, I think he drew it into
Exhibit 1.
MR. WOODARD: Okay. So it is on the exhibit.
MR. VERGONIS: Is that okay, court reporter?
THE COURT REPORTER: Yes.
MR. VERGONIS: Yes.
MR. WOODARD: Okay. Okay. I just couldn't
remember if that was the actual exhibit-MR. VERGONIS: Yeah.
MR. WOODARD: -- or a copy.
MR. VERGONIS: Yeah. Good question.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Mr. Vergonis, five-- five
minutes.
MR. VERGONIS: Why don't we take a break now then
to change the tape.
THE WI1NESS: Well, and I'm going to need to
supplement my answer. It'll only take a minute.

Page 94

MR. VERGONIS: Okay.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Yeah. No problem.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Go ahead.
A. I made the mistake in drawing this chart to assume
that this gray line was a but-for line. It's not. It's-Q. Okay.
A. -- MRI's scan. And so assuming that this line was
the but-for line, I would make this adjustment, okay?
Q. Okay. I see. Maybe we should have used a
different chart.
A. Yeah. But I think the point is still
understandable.
Q. It's actually Chart 2, right, that we've been
working on -MR. WOODARD: Page 13.
CONTINUING BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. --on Page 13?
A. And so in this case -Q. I'll give you the pen back if you can just do that
again. We have-- we don't have the lines that show exactly
when the dissociation occurred, but we can -A. Yeah.
Q. -- pick a point in 2005 representing the -A. So somehow then you get a decline in scans that is
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caused by loss of the referral network -Q. Mrn-hm.
A. -- that's not unlawful, comes down here, and the
damages period is the area I shaded here.
Q. Okay.
A. And I don't know what the pattern of that is, so
you know, it might cut out here a little bit more than I
drew, but there is some way that you divide this area
between declines in scans and just attrition of referrals
from one that assumes continuing affiliation.
Q. Okay. I understand. That was very helpful. Thank
you.
MR. VERGONIS: And, yeah, now would be a good time
to change the tape.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Here marks the end of Videotape
Label No. I in the deposition of Bruce Budge.
The time is approximately II :I 0 a.m. We're off
the record.
(Recess taken.)
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the record. Here marks the
beginning of Videotape Label No. 2 in the deposition of
Bruce Budge. The time is approximately II :27 a.m.
EXAMINATION (Continuing)
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Okay. Mr. Budge, you were saying before we broke
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with St. Al's, then they will be getting more than if St.
Al's had stayed in the partnership and they te11 us that's
true.
Q. Okay. And -- and St. Al's would have been in the
partnership in the but-for world?
A. Yes.
Q. And you agree that the purposes of-- do you agree
that the purpose of the damages award is to put the parties
back in the position they would have been in the but-for
world?
A. I understand the party to be MRIA, and I do
understand that.
Q. Okay. You -- you were describing to me the tail
if-- on -- on the assumption that St. Alphonsus, in the
but-for world, would have dissociated in-- at the same day
it did in the real world, April 1st, 2004, and would have
competed as of April 1st, 2005.
Is the tail analysis any different for on-campus
scans?
A. Well, basically what a tail is-- what I'm trying
to measure is what the attribution that's caused by
dissociation is.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And part of the problem we have here is that if
MRIA prevails, there are a lot of wrongful acts,
Page 101

scan is sent?
A. I don't.
Q. Or how it gets decided?
A. Well, I thought that there was a contract with a
radiology group which indicated they would do the readings.
But in terms of which imaging center, I-- I don't.
Q. Okay. If we assume that inpatient scans are
performed -- that all inpatient scans are performed by the
facility used by the hospital to perform scans such that
referring practices don't matter, does that assumption -before I finish the question, does that assumption make
sense to you? Can we assume that the hospital has an
affiliation with a business providing the scans, and all
inpatient scans get sent to that business, and the referring
physician has no choice in the matter of where to send a
scan; do you understand what I'm asking you to assume?
A. I think I do.
Q. Okay. If we make that assumption and couple it
with the assumption that St. Alphonsus was allowed to
compete as of April 1st, 2005, and, in the but-for world,
would have competed and would have brought IMI onto its
campus as its scan provider -A. Which it indeed did -Q. Which it -A. -- am I correct?
Page 103
..............•...•...............................................................................................................

1

2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

disparagement, things like that, which could have lasting
consequences which are reflected in that attrition rate.
Q. Okay.
A. And in -- you know, it might make it appear to go
down faster than it actually does. But, you know, it
depends on the specific -- if-- if one assumes that the
Meridian facility was open, for example, and because the
arguments that Mr. McCarthy makes, that scans occur more as
a result of its location than they do because of
affiliations -Q. Mm-hm.
A. --then you could have a but-for scenario which
would possibly be different than the one that's on campus. I
haven't really thought about it, so ...
Q. Okay. The reason I ask about on campus is-- is
because of the nature of the scans being performed there.
Does your analysis distinguish in any way between
inpatient scans and outpatient scans?
A. Not-- not quantitatively, no.
Q. Okay. Do you understand what an inpatient scan
is?
A. Yes. I believe I do. It's a-- it's a scan
that's done for somebody that's been admitted to the
hospital.
Q. Okay. Do you know who decides where an inpatient
Page 102
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Q. -- indeed did. So in other words, I'm asking you
to assume that the but-for world followed the real world in
the -- in this '04, '05 dissociation time period.
Would the tail analysis apply to the inpatient
scans the way you describe it?
A. I think the thing that's most relevant is what the
actual migration was in terms ofthe attrition of the
referral base because what you described is what -- my
understanding is what happened -Q. Mm-hm.
A. --in 2005. And so I've actually measured what
the migration of affiliated physicians is between St. Al's
and IMI. And it shows, pretty precisely, what occurred.
Now, I-- you know, I got the other issue that I mentioned
before. That -- that pattern of attrition -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- might be conflated with the consequences of
other bad acts that don't have to -- anything to do with
dissociation -Q. Right.
A. -- but the bad acts.
Q. Right. Right. Right.
A. So it's complete. But I don't -- there is no
reason why we go in and take an assumption that you suggest,
which I believe actually occurred, and modifY the patterns
Page 104
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authorized, as Your Honor said, legally authorized
by RUPA to be done without liability. Those were
the words Your Honor used.
THE COURT: Well, the entire philosophy
behind that change in the act as I read the
materials related to that act was we're going to
make it easier for partners to get out of
partnerships.
MR. AYER: Correct.
THE COURT: We're going to --I mean, all of
us here with the gray hair learned a different
kind of partnership law. We learned a partnership
law in which you can withdraw from the
partnership.
MR. AYER: That's right.
THE COURT: TI1e partnership ceases to exist.
It has no existence. The partners have to go back
to the drawing board who are remaining there.
They have to enter into a new agreement that says
here is the new relationship between the partners.
They provided in the partnership agreement for how
that would occur sometimes and sometimes they
didn't.
But the new act basically said, and as
a mattet· of fact some of the law review articles
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on it talk about bringing a new era of cowboy
capitalism to pm'tnerships, fOl' whatever that may
be worth, basically saying that you've got the
right now to dissociate and get out. And that
doesn't destroy the partnership. That doesn't
remove the partnership. You may have things in
your partnership agreement you have to comply
with. You may have other standards that will be
out there based upon our common law and equity
rulings in this state, but you can't -- there is
no liability other than that provided in the
statute or in the partnership agreement for simply
dissociating.
MR. AYER: Precisely correct.
THE COURT: That's my reading of the
statute.
MR. AYER: I think you're entirely correct.
And the other thing that flows from that directly
and it's literally -- in the statute and
specifically in 603, A through C, when that
dissociation takes place the fiduciary duty of
loyalty of care that is owed ends, unless there is
some other provision in the contract that provides
otherwise. But there's not. The fiduciary d~tty
ends. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing

18

17
ends. Any duties under that end. And in this
agreement there is a noncompete agreement that by
its terms runs one year following dissociation or
withdrawal. And that ran on Aprill, 2005.
And so as a result of those three
6 things it isn't, as Yom Honor said absolutely
7 correctly, it isn't that they can't make
8 allegations and put on evidence that we breached
9 our fiduciary duty prior to dissociating or that
10 we breached the covenant of good faith and fair
11 dealing prior to dissociating, or that we
12 committed tortious interference, if they have
13 evidence of tortious interference at any time, or
14 that we violated the noncompete prior to Aprill,
15 2005. All of that is fair game. What isn't -16
THE COURT: Or that you co-opted a
17 partnership opporttmity.
18
MR. AYER: That's true. That's right. But
19 it would have to be when we were a partner. It
20 would have to be. And all of that is conect.
21
And my only concem is that for
22 purposes of trial preparation, for pmposes of
23 expert witness reports sort of shaping the damage
24 theory, for pmposes of any settlement discussions
25 that we may have, the clarity on this point is
1

2
3
4
5

critical. Because as I said before if it's
possible for MRIA to somehow make an argument that
3 even though we didn't violate an express provision
4 when we dissociated we somehow or other wrongfully
5 dissociated then they can appeal to the jury -6 they may not prevail-- they can argue to the
7 jury, well, Saint Alphonsus it was tmfair, it was
8 this, it was that, they never should have left,
9 that was a bad thing for them to do and argue that
10 our conduct afterwards was somehow wrong.
11
Everybody needs to understand what Your
12 Honor has said. And that is when we dissociated
13 that was legally proper and we were out of the
14 partnership. Talk about what we did when we were
15 in the partnership or talk about tortious
16 interference. Because nobody can tortiously
17 interfere. If you have acts of tortious
18 interference that occurred after 2005, that's all
19 fair game if there is any such evidence. We don't
20 think there is.
21
But everybody needs to be on the same
22 page, the one Your Honor put us on by the Court's
23 November 17 order. And that's what this motion is
24 here to try and clarify. Thank you, Your Honor.
25
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
1
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OPERATING AGREEMENT
OF

(~~~--=~~

This OPERATING AGREEMENT is made and entered into effective as of the
day of
, 1999, by and between Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., an Idaho
nonprofit corporation ("Diversified Care"), and GenrS-tate·Ra-dioJc:>gy-Greup-E-t-P;-dfb/a-Saint
Alp110nsu~-Radm!ogy---Gr0up. ("Sr.\-RG"), an Idaho limited partnership, as Members.

ARTICLE 1
FORMATION
1.1
Background. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("Saint
Alphonsus") is an Intem.al Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) corporation which owns and
operates a regional medical center (the "Medical Center"), licensed under laws in the State
of Idaho and accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care
Organization. The Medical Center is located in Boise, Idaho. Saint Alphonsus provides
patient care services consistent with the moral principles and philosophies of the Roman
Catholic Church as expressed in the ethical and religious directives for Catholic Health Care
· Services promulgated by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Diversified Care is
a wholly owned subsidiary of Saint Alphonsus. SARGis an Idaho professional association
consisting entirely of physicians licensed to practice medicine in the State ofidaho.

Diversified Care and SARG are entering into this Operating Agreement to make
certain medical imaging services more available to the community and to incre(lse the costeffectiveness, efficiency and quality ofmedica1 imaging services available in the community.
The primary initial purpose of
(the "Company"), shall be to own and operate
a free standing medicai imaging center at 927 Myrtle Street in Boise, Idaho"laboratories in
and around Boise, Idaho.
1.2
Formation. The Members hereby intend to fom1 the Company pursuant to the
Act in accordance with the terms and conditions ofthis Agreement, effective upon the filing
of Articles of Organization. Upon the request of the Managing Conunittee or as required by
law, the parties shall promptly execute all amendments ofthe Articles of Organization and
all other documents that are needed to enable the Managing Committee to accomplish all
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filing, recording, publishing and other acts necessary or appropriate to comply with all
requirements for the formation and operation of the Company under the Act.
1.3
Intent. It is the intent of the Members that the Company be operated in a
manner consistent with its treatment as a "partnership" for federal and state income tax
purposes. It is also the intent of the Members that the Company not be operated or treated
as a "partnership" for purposes ofSection 303 ofthe Federal Bankruptcy Code.; No Member
shall take any action inconsistent with the express intent of the parties hereto as set forth
herein.
1.4

Definitions. Capitalized terms used in this Agreement are defined in Article 2.

ARTICLE2
DEFINITIONS
The following terms used in this Agreement shall have the meanings described below:
2.1
"Act" shall mean the Idaho Limited Liability Company Act, Idaho Code, Title
53, Chapter 6, as may be amended from time to time.
2.2
the Code.

"Adjusted Basis" shall have the meaning given such term in Section l 011 of

2.3
"Adjusted Capital Account Deficit" means with respect to any Member, the
deficit balance, if any, in that Member's Capital Account as of the end ofthe relevant Fiscal
Year, after giving effect to the following adjustments: (i) credit to that Capital Account the
amount by which that Member is obligated to restore or is deemed to be obligated to restore
pursuant to the penultimate sentences ofTreasury Regulation Sections 1. 704-2(g)( 1) and
(i)( 5); and (ii) debit to that Capital Account the items described in paragraphs (4), (5) and (6)
in Section I. 704-1 (b )(2)(ii)( d) of the Treasury Regulations. 'This definition of Adjusted
Capital Account Deficit is intended to comply with the provisions of Section
1. 704-1 (b )(2 )(ii)(d) of the Treasury Regulations and shall be interpreted and applied
consistently therewith.
2.4
"Affiliate" means a Person who, with respect to any other Person: (a) directly
or indirectly controls, is controlled by or is under common control with such other Person;
(b) owns or controls ten percent ( 10%) or more of the outstanding voting securities of such
other Person; (c) is an officer, director, partner or member of such other Person; or (d) if such
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other Person is an officer, director, partner or member of any Person for which such other
Person acts in any such capacity.
2.5
"Agreemcn t" means this Operating Agreement, as it may be amended from
time to time, complete with all exhibits and schedules hereto.
2.6
"Articles of Organization" means the Company's Articles of Organization
filed with the Secretary of State of Idaho, as amended or restated from time to time.

2.7
following:

"Bankruptcy'' means, with respect to a Person, the happening of any ofthe

2. 7:1 the making of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors;
2.7 .2 the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy or the filing of a pleading
in any court of record admitting in writing an inability to pay debts as they become due;
2. 7.3 the entry of an order, judgment or decree by any court of competent
jurisdiction adjudicating the Person to be bankrupt or insolvent;
2. 7.4 the filing of a petition or answer seeking any reorganization,
arrangement, composition, readjustment, liquidation, dissolution or similar relief under any
statute, law or regulation;
2.7.5 the filing of an answer or other pleading admitting the material
allegations of, or consenting to, or defaulting in answering, a bankruptcy petition filed
against the Person in any bankruptcy proceeding;
2.7.6 the filing of an application or other pleading or any action otherwise
seeking, consenting to or acquiescing in the appointment of a liquidating trustee, receiver or
other liquidator of all or any substantial part of the Person's properties;

2. 7. 7 the commencement of any proceeding seeking reorganization,
arrangement, composition, readjustment, liquidation, dissolution or similar relief under any
statute, law or regulation which has not been quashed or dismissed within one hundred eighty
( 180) days; or
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2.7.8 the appointment without consent of such Person or acquiescence of a
liquidating trustee, receiver or other liquidator of all or any substantial part of such Person's
properties without such appointment being vacated or stayed within ninety (90) days and, if
stayed, without such appointment being vacated within ninety (90) days after the expiration
of any such stay.
2.8
"Capital Account" shall mean the accounting record of each Member's
interest in the Company created and maintained in accordance with this Section 2.8. There
shall be credited to each Member's Capital Account 2.8.0.1 the amount of any contribution
of cash by that Member, 2.8.0.2 the Gross Asset Value of property contributed by that
Member, 2.8.0.3 that Member's allocable share of Profits and any items in the nature of
income allocated to that Member hereunder, and 2.8.0.4 the amount of any Company
liabilities that the Member assumes or takes subject to Code Section 752. There shall be
debited against each Member's Capita! Account lhe amount of all distributions of cash to
that Member unless a distribution to the Member is a loan or is deemed a payment under
Code Section 707(a) or707(c), the Gross Asset Value of property distributed to that Member
by the Company, that Member's allocable share of Losses and any items in the nat11re of
expenses or losses which are specifically allocated td that Member hereunder, and the
amount of any liabilities of that Member that the Company assumes or takes subject to Code
Section 752. This definition of Capital Account and the other provisions herein relating to
the maintenance of Capital Accounts are intended to comply with Treasury Regulation
Sections 1. 704-1 (b) and 1. 704-2 and shall be interpreted and applied consistently therewith.
In the event the Managing Committee determines that it is in the. best interests of both
Members to modify the manner in which the Capital Accounts, or any debits or credits
thereto (including, without limitation, debits or credits relating to liabilities that are secured
by contributed or distributed property or which are assumed by the Company or the
Members), are computed in order to comply with such Treasury Regulations, the Managing
. Committee may make such modification provided that it is not likely to have a material
effect on the amounts distributed to any Member pursuant to Section 5.2. The Managing
Committee shall also make any appropriate modifications in the event unanticipated events
might otherwise cause this Agreement not to comply with Treasury Regulation Sections
1.704-l(b) and 1.704-2.
2.9
"Capital Contribution" means, with respect to any Member, the amount of
money contributed by that Member to the Company and, if property other than money is
contributed, the initial Gross Asset Value of such property. The principal amount of a
promissory note which is not readily traded on an established securities market and which
is contributed to the Company by the maker of the note (or a person related to the maker of
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the note within the meaning ofTreasury Regulations Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(c)) shall not
be included in the Capital Account of any Member until the Company makes a taxable
disposition of the note _or until (and to the extent) principal payments are made on the note,
all in accordance with Treasury Regulations Section 1.704jl(b)(2)(iv)(d)(2).
2.10 "Code" shall mean the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (or successor thereto),
as amended from time to time.

2.11 "Company" means the limited liability company formed pursuant to this
Agreement, as such limited liability company may from time to time be constituted.
2.12 "Contribution Percentage" means 2. 12. i with respect to SARG, fifty percent
(50%) and 2.12.2 with respect to Diversified Care, fifty percent (50%). The Contribution
Percentage shall not be changed except as provided in Section ·~7-:6Ec-)tvir) hereof.
.·

2.13 "Defaulting MembJr" means a Member that has committed an event of
default as described in Section 9.1 hereof.

2.14 "Depreciation'' shall mean, for each Fiscal Year or portion thereof, an amount
equal to the depreciation, amortization or other cost recovery deduction allowable with
respect to an asset for that Fiscal Year or portion thereof, except that if the Gross Asset Value
of an asset differs from its Adjusted Basis at the beginning of the Fiscal Year or portion
thereof, Depreciation shall be an amount which bears the same ratio to that different Gross
Asset Value (as originally computed) as the federal income tax depreciation, amortization,
or other cost recovery deduction for that Fiscal Year or portion thereof bears to the Adjusted
Tax Basis (as originally computed); provided, however, that if the federal income tax
depreciation, amortization or other cost recovery deduction for the applicable year or period
is zero, Depreciation shall be determined with reference to the Gross Asset Value (as
originally computed) using any reasonable method selected by the Managing Committee.
2.15 "Fiscal Year" means the year on which the accounting and federal income tax
records of the Company are kept as set forth in Section 12.2 hereof.
2.16 "Gross Asset Value" shall mean with. respect to any Company asset, the
asset's Adjusted Basis, except as follows:
2.16.1 the initial Gross Asset Value of any asset contributed by a Member to
the Company shall be the gross fair market value of that asset, as determined by the
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contributing Member and the non"contributing Member. In the event the Members cannot
agree on the gross fair market value of the asset, the value ofthe asset shall be detennincd
by an independent appraisal conducted by an appraiser selected by the Members in good
faith. Such appraiser shall be experienced in making appraisals and the appraiser's decision
shall be final and binding upon the Company and the Members;
2.16.2 the Gross Asset Value of all Company assets shall be adjusted to equal
their respective gross fair market values, as detennined by the Managing Committee, as of
the date upon which any of the following occurs: 2.16.2.1 the acquisition of an additional
Interest in the Company after the date hereof by any new or existing Member, in exchange
for more than a de minimis Capital Contribution or the distribution by the Company to a
Member of more than a de minimis amount of Company property as consideration for an
Interest in the Company, if the Managing Committee determines that such adjustment is
necessary or appropriate to reflect the relative economic interest of the Members of the
Company; and 2.16.2.2 the liquidation of the Company within the meaning of Treasury
Regulation Section 1. 704-1 (b )(2)(ii)(g);
2.16.3 the Gross Asset Value of any Company asset distributed to any Member
shall be the gross fair market value of that asset on the date of distribution, as determined by
the Member receiving that distribution ru1d the other Member; and
2.16.4 if an election under Section 754 of the Code has been made, the Gross
Asset Value of Company assets shaH be increased (or decreased) to reflect any adjustments
to the adjusted basis of the assets pursuant to Code Section 734(b) or Code Section 743(b),
but only to the extent that those adjustments are taken into account in determining Capital
Accounts pursuant to Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1 (b)(2)(iv)(m) and Section 6.2
hereof; provided, however, that Gross Asset Value shall not be adjusted pursuant to this
subsection (d) to the e>-.'tent that the Managing Committee determines that an adjustment
pursuant to subsection (b) hereof is necessary or appropriate in connection with a transaction
that would otherwise result in an adjustment pursuant to this subsection (d).
If the Gross Asset Value of an asset has been determined or adjusted thereby, that Gross
Asset Value shall thereafter be further adjusted by the Depreciation, if any, taken into
account with respect to that asset for purposes of computing Profits and Losses.
2.17 "Interest" means the interest of a Member in the Company as a Member
representing such Member's rights, powers and privileges as specified in this Agreement.
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2.18

"Major Decisions" shall have the meaning set forth in Section 8.5 hereof.

2.19 "Managing Committee" means that committee designated as such pursuant
to Section 8.1 of this Agreement.
2.20 "Medica] Imaging" means the physician/professional component of the full
range of those Medical services and/or procedures, whether invasive or non~ invasive that
involve the use of imaging equipment and/or any technique or modality related to imaging
of the body, all related supervision, interpretations, consultations and imaging guided
inter;ventional services and/or procedures typically and customarily performed by radiologists
as listed in the Radiology (including Nuclear Medicine and Diagnostic Ultrasound) and the
Adjunctive Surgical Procedures Sections of the current edition of the American Medical
Association Physician's CuiTent Procedural Tenninology ("CPT Codes"),
2.21 "Member" means any Person that executed this Agreement as a Member, and
any other Person admitted to the Company as an additional or substituted Member, that has
not made a disposition of such Person's entire Interest.
2.22 "Net Cash From Operations" means the gross cash proceeds from Company
operations (including sales and dispositions of Company property in the ordinary course of
business) less the portion thereof used to pay or establish reserves for all Company expenses,
debt payments, capital improvements, replacements, and contingencies, all as reasonably
determined by the Managing Committee. "Net Cash From Operations" shall not be reduced
by depreciation, amortization, cost recovery deductions, or similar allowances, but shall be
increased by any reductions of reserves previously established pursuant to the first sentence
of this Section 2.22 and Section 2.23 hereof.

2.23 "Net Cash From Sales or Refinancings" means the net cash proceeds from
all sales and other dispositions (other than in the ordinary course of business) and all
refinancing of Company property, less any portion thereof used to establish reserves, a!! as
reasonably determined by the Managing Committee. "Net Cash From Sales or Refinancings"
shall include all principal and interest payments with respect to any note or other obligation
received by the Company in connection with sales or other dispositions (other than in the
ordinary course of business) of Company property.
2.24 "Person" means an individual, firm, corporation, partnership, limited
partnership, limited liability company, association, estate, trust, pension or profit-sharing
plan, or any other entity.
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2.25 "Principal Office" means the registered Idaho office of the Company at which
the records of the Company are kept as required under the Act.
2.26 "Profits" and "Losses" shall mean for each Fiscal Year or portion thereof,
an amount equal to the Company's taxable income or loss for that year or period, detennined
in accordance with Code Section 703(a) (for this purpose, all items of income, gain, loss or
deduction required to be stated separately pursuant to Code Section 703(a)(l) shall be
included in taxable income or loss), with the following adjustments:

2.26.1 any income of the Company exempt from federal income tax not
otherwise taken into account in computing Profits or Losses shall be added to that taxable
income or loss;
2.26.2 any expenditures of the Company described in Code Section
705(a)(2)(B) or treated as Code Section 705(a)(2)(B) expenditures pursuant to Treasury
Regulation Section 1. 704- I (b )(2)(iv)(i), and not otherwise taken into account in computing
Profits and Losses shall be subtracted from that taxable income or loss;
2.26.3 in the event the Gross Asset Value of any Company asset is adjusted as
cequired by subsections (b) or (c) ofthe definition of Gross Asset Value, the amount of that
adjustment shall be taken into account as gain or loss from the disposition of that asset for
purposes of computing Profits or Losses in the Fiscal Year of adjustment;
2.26.4 gain or loss resulting from any disposition of Company property with
respect to which gain or loss is recognized for federal income tax purposes shall be computed
by reference to the Gross Asset Value of the property disposed of, notwithstanding that the
Adjusted Basis of that property may differ from its Gross Asset Value;
2.26.5 in lieu of the depreciation, amortization and other cost recovery
deductions taken into account in computing the taxable income or loss, there shall be taken
into account the Depreciation for the Fiscal Year or portion thereof;
2.26.6 to the extent an adjustment to the adjusted tax basis of any Company
asset pursuant to Code Section 734(b) or Code Section 743(b) is required pursuant to
Regulations Section 1.704-1 (b )(2)(iv)(m)( 4) to be taken into account in determining Capital
Accounts as a result of a distribution other than in complete liquidation of a Member's
Interest, the amount of such adjustment shall be treated as an item of gain (if the adjustment
increases the basis of the asset) or loss (if the adjustment decreases the basis of the asset)
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from the disposition of the asset and shall be taken into account for purposes of computing
·
Profits or Losses; and
2.26. 7 any items of income, gain; loss or deduction that are specially allocated
pursuant to Sections 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 or 6.5 hereof shall not be taken into account in computing
Profits or Losses.
"Tax Matters Member" means the "tax matters partner" as defined in Section
623l(a)(7) ofthe Code.
2.27

2.28 "Transfer'' means to sell, assign, transfer, give, donate, pledge, deposit,
alienate, bequeath, devise or otherwise dispose of or encumber to any Person other than the
Company.
2.29

"Transferee" means a Person to whom a Transfer is made.

2.30 "Treasury Regulations" shall mean pronouncements, as amended from time
to time, or their successor pronouncements, which clarify, interpret and apply the provisions
of the Code, and which are designated as "Treasury Regulations" by the United States
Department of the Treasury.
Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such
terms in this Agreement.
ARTICLE 3
GENERAL PROVISIONS
3.1
Name. The name of the Company shall be
· - - - - - - or such
other name as the Managing Committee from time to time shall select.

3.2
Principal Office and Place of Business. The principal office and place of
business of the Company shall be located at 927 Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho 83702,
Attention:
, or such other place as the M<.maging
Committee from time to time shall detem1ine.
3.3
Company Purposes. The initial purpose of the Company shall be to engage
in the ownership and operation of;r. free standing medical imaging cente_!)'and such other
lawful activities as may be approved by the Members.
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3.3 .1 Prohibited Purposes, Relationships and Understandings. It is
expressly understood by the parties hereto that the Company's operations are subject to
various state and federal laws regulating pennissible relationships between the Members and
entities such as the Company, including 42 U.S.C. § 1320a~ 7(b) (the "Fraud and Abuse
Statute"), and 42 U.S. C. § 1395nn (the "Stark Act"). It is the intent of the parties that the
Company operate in a manner consistent with the foregoing statutes. Accordingly,
notwithstanding anything else contained in this Agreement to the contrary,
3.3 .1.1 No contract or other agreement may be entered into by the
Company with any Member or Affiliate or any other third party, unless such contract or
agreement is at arms-length and for fair value and is approved in accordance with Section
8.6 ofthis Agreement;
3.3 .1.2 Both Members represent and warrantthat there is no intent to
induce the referral of patients to the Company by any person or entity in connection with the
formation and operation of the Company and it is expressly understood between the parties
that each Member, its Affiliates and its employees are not precluded or discouraged from
referring patients to any alternate provider of services other than the Company;
3.3 .1.3 The Company shall not loan funds to or guarantee a Joan for
any Member to enable such Member to make a Capital Contribution;
3.3.1.4 Any distributions to Members shall be directly proportional to
such Members' Contribution Percentage; and
3.3 .1.5 The Company shall not furnish or provide services to patients
who are referred by Member;5, their Affiliates or employees, on terms different from those
offered to patients referred by any other person, after taking into account ·any difference in
provision of services due to the terms and conditions of a patient's health care coverage.
3.3.2 SARG Responsibilities. It is expressly understood by the parties that
the Company shall not be operated in a manner which would violate the professional
responsibilities or jeopardize the professional licenses of the physician members of SARG.
Nothing contained in this Section shall be interpreted to authorize or require the Company
or the Members to exercise any specific control over the physician members of SARG's
exercise of their professional medical judgment in the care and treatment of patients.
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3.3.3 Community Benefit.
The Company and its Members shall not
discriminate in patient selection based upon a patients' race, sex, creed, national origin,
religion. The Company and its Members will not discriminate against Medicare or Medicaid
patients. Further, the Management. Committee shall address community health needs,
including delivering health~care services to under-served populations and providing
educational opportunities to the community. The amount spent on these activities shall be
documented at each year end.
3.3 .4 Information Resources. The Members acknowledge and agree that the
computer information resources and capabilities thereof of the Company shall be developed,
implemented and maintained in a commercially reasonable in the good faith judgment of the
Members so that they will be interactive and conununicate with the computer soft\:vare,
programs and system utilized by Diversified Care and its Affiliates in the Medical Center.
Without limiting the foregoing and Subject to budgetary constraints, the Company agrees tc
integrate the computer, image viewing, and Picture Archiving and Communications System
(PACS) at the Center with Diversified Care's infonnation system. The Company agrees to
acquire the requisite hardware and software in order to accomplish such integration and to
update such hardware and software as may be reasonably necessary to maintain connectivity.
To the extent the Company acquires any such hardware or software from Diversified Care,
it shall be required to pay fair market value for such hardware and software. The Company
shall further pay Diversified Care the fair market value of any support $ervices rendered by
Diversified Care to the Company in connection with the PACS.
3.4
Te1·m. The term of the Company shall commence.on the filing of the Articles
of Organization and shall continue perpetually until dissolved in accordance with Section
11.1 ofthis Agreement.
3.5
Agent for Service of Process. The name and business address of the Agen~.
for Service of Process for the Company is
or such
other person as the Managing Committee shall appoint from time to time.

ARTICLE 4
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS
4.1
Initial Capital Contributions by the Members. As of the date of this
Agreement, Diversified Care and SARG shall each contribute cash to the Company in the
amounts reflected on Exhibit A, attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference,
in exchange for the Contribution Percentage indicated on Exhibit A. Exhibit A shall be
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amended from time to time to reflect the admission of new Members, if any, and the relative
Contribution Percentages thereafter. No Member can be assessed additional capital unless
unanimously agreed by all Members.
4.2
Member Loans. If Capital Contributions or revenues of the Company are
insufficient to satisfy all financial requirements of the Company, or if bridge funds are
needed by the Company on an interim basis, the Managing Committee may in accordance
with Section 8.5.3 ofthis Agreement request a loan to the Company in such amount as it
reasonably determines is needed by the Company. In the event the Managing Commit1ee
determines the need for such a loan, the Managing Committee shall immediately notify the
Members in writing of the amount and the terms thereof and the Members, at any time
thereafter and in their sole discretion, may agree (in writing by notice given to the Managing
Committee) to share as participant lenders in such loan in a percentage amount specified by
the Member's Contribution Percentage. Members may not loan funds to the Company in
proportions which differ from their Contribution Percentage.
4.3
Operating and Capital Budgets. The Company shall annually adopt capital
and an operating budget as provided in 8.5.2. The amount of the operating and capital
budgets and the specific budget items shall be identified based upon criteria which include
community need. Adjustments to the capital or operating budgets or approval of capital or
operating expenses not provided for in the budget may be approved at any time by the
Management Committee in accordance with Section 8.5 and subject to limitations on debt
provided in Section 8.5 .1 and the prohibition on additional capital contributions as stated in
Section 4.1. The parties agree to set their initial capital contribution and the Company initial
borrowing limitations in amounts reasonably believed to be sufficient to fund the capital
needs of the Company. It is the parties intent that the long terrn capital needs of the
Company be met either by retained earnings of the Company or by borrowings using the
assets of the Company as collateral. The parties shall exercise their best efforts to have the
next year's operating and capital budgets approved by November 30 of each year.
ARTICLE 5
DISTRIBUTIONS
5.1
Amount and Time ofDistributions. The Management Committee will retain
sufficient cash within the Company to fund current operations and debt service. However,
absent a seventy-five percent (~~,%) vote of the Management Committee, at least sixty
percent (60%) ofNet Cash from bjJerations will be distributed to the Members on the 15th
day of the month following the end of each operating quarter.
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5.2
Distributions to Members. All distributions to the Members shall be made
based on their Contribution Percentage.
5.3
Distribution Upon Withdrawal. No withdrawing Member shall be entitled
to receive any distribution or the value of such Member's Interest in the Company as a result·
of withdrawal from the Company prior to the liquidation of the Company, except as
specifically provided in this Agreement.

5.4
Return of Capital. No Member shall be entitled to the return of, or interest
on, that Member's Capital Contributions except as provided herein. Under such
circumstances requiring a return of any Capital Contributions, no Member shall have the
right to receive property other than cash.
ARTICLE 6
PROFITS AND LOSSES

Profits and Losses. Profits and Losses for any Fiscal Year shall be allocated
to each Member iiJ accordance with their Contribution Percentage.
6.1

6.2
Allocation In the Event of Section 754 Election. To the extent an adjustment
to the Adjusted Basis of any Company asset pursuant to Code Section 734(b) or Code
Section 743(b) is required to be taken into account in determining Capital Accounts, pursuant
to Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(m), the amount of that adjustment to the
Capital Accounts shall be treated as an item of gain (if the adjustment increases the basis of
the asset), then that gain or loss shall be specially allocated to the Members in the manner
consistent with the manner in which their Capital Accounts are required to be adjusted
pursuant to that Treasury Regulation.

6.3
Capital Account Allocations. At all times, the Capital Accounts of the
Company shall be maintained in accordaiJce with Code Section 704 and all related Treasury
Regulations thereunder.
6.4

Special Tax Allocations.

6.4.1 Contributed Property. In accordance with Code Section 704(c) aiJd
the Treasury Regulations thereunder, income, gain, loss and deduction with respect to any
property contributed to the Company shall be allocated among the Members so that a
contributing member, to the maximum extent possible, recognizes the variation, if any,
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between the Adjusted Basis and the initial Gross Asset Value of the property contributed by
that Member.
6.4.2 Adjusted Property. In the event the Gross Asset Value of any
Company asset is adjusted pursuant to subsection (b) of the definition of Gross Asset Value,
subsequent allocations of income, gain, loss and deduction with respect to that asset shall
take into account any variation between the Gross Asset Value of that asset before such
adjustment and its Gross Asset Value after such adjustment in the same manner as the
variation between Adjusted Basis and Gross Asset Value is taken into account under Section
6.5.1 hereof with respect to contributed property, and such variation shall be allocated in
accordance with the principles of Treasury Regulation Section 1. 704· 1(b )(2)(iv)(f).
6.4.3 Recapture of Deductions and Credits. If any "recapture" of
deductions or credits previously claimed by the Company is required under the Code upon
the sale or other taxable disposition of any Company property, those recaptured deductions
or credits shall, to the extent possible, be allocated to the Members pro rata in the same
manner that the deductions and credits giving rise to the recapture items were originally
allocated using the "first-in, first·out" method of accounting; provided, however, that this
Section 6.4.3 shall only affect the characterization of income allocated among the Members
for tax purposes.
6.4.4 Discretion of the Managing Committee. Any elections or other
decisions relating to the allocations under this Section 6.4 shall be made by the Managing
Committee in a11y manner that reasonably reflects the purpose and intention of this
Agreement. Allocations pursuant to this Section 6.4 are solely for purposes of federal, state
and local taxes and shall not affect or in any way be taken into account in computing any
Member's Capital Account or share of Profits, Losses, other items or distributions pursuant
to any provision of this Agreement

6.5

Regulatory and Curative Allocations.

6.5.1 Qualified Income Offset. In the event any member unexpectedly
receives any adjustment, allocation or distribution described in Treasury Regulation
paragraph (4 ), (5) or (6) of Section !.704- I (b)(2)(ii)(d), items of Company income and gain
shall be specially allocated to the Members in an amow1t and manner sufficient to eliminate,
to the extent required by the Treasury Regulations, the Adjusted Capital Account Deficit of
that Member as quickly as possible, provided that an allocation pursuant to this Section 6.5 .1
shall be made only if and to the extent that such Member would have an Adjusted Capital

OPERATING AGREEMENT· !4

GSR/0399

S·ICiients\337\1 174\0perating Ag1 (RED 01-A).wp<l

20

002471

---=----.
-~
DISCUSSION DRAFf
11/03/99 (RED 01~A)

Account Deficit after all other allocations provided for in this Article 6 have been tentatively
made as if this Section 6.5.1 were not in the Agreement.
6.5.2 Gross Income Allocation. In the event that any Member has a def!cit
Capital Account at the end of any Company Fiscal Year that is in excess of the sum of (i) the
amount that such Member is obligated to restore and (ii) the amount that the Member is
deemed to be obligated to restore pursuant to the penultimate sentence of Treasury
Regulation Sections 1.704-2(g)( 1) and (i)(5), that Member shall be specially allocated items
of Company income and gain in the amount of such excess as quickly as possible, provided
that an allocation pursuant to this Section 6.5.2 shall be made only if, and to the extent that,
such Member would have a deficit Capital Account in excess of such sum after all other
allocations provided for LTJ. this Article 6 have been made as if Section 6.5 .1 and 6.5 .2 were
not in the Agreement.
6.5.3 Curative Allocation. The allocations set forth in Sections 6.5.1 and
6.5 .2 (the "Regulatory Allocations") are intended to comply with certairi requirements of
Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1 (b) and 1.704-2. Notwithstanding any other provision
of this Article 6 (other than the Regulatory Allocations), the Regulatory Allocations shall be
taken into account in allocating other items of income, gain, loss, and deduction among the
Members so that, to the extent possible, the net amount of such allocation of other items and
the Regulatory Allocations to each Member should be equal to the net amount that would
have been allocated to each such Member if the Regulatory Allocations had not occuiTed.
6.5.4 Nonrecourse Deductions. The allocations set forth in Section 6.1 are
intended generally to comply with requirements of Regulations Sections 1. 704-1 (b) and
1.704-2. Ifthe Company incurs "nonrecourse deductions orpartnernonrecourse deductions"
or if there is any change in the Company's "minimum gain," as those terms are defined in
such Regulations, the allocation ofProfits, Losses and items thereof to the Members shall be
modified. as deemed reasonably necessary or advisable by the Managing Committee to
comply with such Regulations.

ARTICLE 7
THE MEMBERS
7.1
Meetings of the Members. Written notice of the time, place and purpose of
a meeting of the Members shall be given no less than ten ( 10) nor more than sixty (60) days
before the date of the meeting, either personally or by mail, to each Member. Notices of
special meetings shall state the purpose or purposes of the meeting, and no business may be
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conducted at a special meeting, except for the business specified in the notice ofthe meeting;
provided, however, if both Members waive their right to notice of the purposes of the
meeting, any business may be transacted at such special meeting. If a meeting is adjourned
to another time or place, it is not necessary to give notice of the adjourned meeting if the time
and place to which the meeting is adjourned are announced at the meeting at which the
adjournment is taken and at the adjourned meeting, only such business may be transacted as
might have been transacted at the original meeting. A waiver of any required notice shiill be
equivalent to the giving of such notice if such waiver is in writing and signed by the Person
entitled to such notice, whether before, at or after the time stated therein. The Members may
make use of telephones and other electronic devices to hold meetings, provided that each
Member may simultaneously participate with the other Members with respect to all
discussions and votes of the Member. The ·Members may act without a meeting, if the action
taken is reduced to writing (either prior to or thereafter) and approved and signed by the vote
of the Members in accordance with the other voting provisions of this Agreement. Written
minutes shall be taken .at each meeting of the Members; however, any action taken or matter
agreed upon by the Members shall be deemed final, whether or not written minutes are
prepared or finalized.
7.2
Other Business Interests of the Members. Except as specifically provided
in Section 7.3 this Agreement shall not be construed to grant any right, privilege or option
to 16 a Member to participate in any manner in any other business, corporation, joint venture,
limited partnership, general partnership, limited liability company, limited liability
partnership or inve.stment in which the other Members may participate, including those
which may be the same as or similar to the Company's business. Except as provided in
Section 7.3 hereof, each Member expressly waives the doctrine of corporate opportunity (or
any analogous doctrine) with respect to any other such business, corporation, partnership or
investment of any other Member or Affiliate.

7.3

Participation in Additional Operations.

7.3.1 General Prohibition. In order to protect the goodwill and business and
professional relationship of the Company and the Members, SARG agrees that neither it nor
its~Aff}lia@will build, establish or acquire in whole or in part any new medicaJl!!lflging_,
service within Ada or Canyon Counties without the unanimous consent of the(tl./fembers');f
·---~
the Company. Diversified Care agrees that neither it nor its Affiliates will build, establish
or acquire in whole or in part any new medical imaging service within Ada or Canyon
Counties without the unanimous consent of the ,.K1effi1:lei=S:>of the Company, provided,
'----'
however, that Diversified Care's prohibition shall not applx to Diversitled Cares or it~~
'

.

i
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Afftliates 's(~_lliiC.Hiig•..es.tabJi.s.hing_Qt.r.~quirlpz1 a.ny hospital which provides medical imaging
services or any ambulatory care center wherein medical imaging services are only provided
incident., to other physician services provided at such site. The Members' consent required
by this paragraph may be withheld at each Member's discretion. If a new venture is
approved by the Members, then each of the Members shall have the first right of refusal to
be up to a fifty percent (50%) owner in the imaging component of such venture. If
Diversified Care acquires a hospital or other facility in which medical imaging services are
provided other than incident to other physician services provided at such site, Diversifi(fd'
Car~ will grant to SARG the frrstright of refusal to provide the professional services at su~~
facility except where such facility already has in place a contract for professional radiology
services. SARG shall have the right to make an offer to become the provider of professional
radiology services at the expiration of any existing relationship or contract with an existing
provider at such facility. If a new venture is approved by the Members, then each of the
partners shall have the first right of refusal to be up to a fifty percent (50%) owner in the
imaging component of the venture.
....:.::..

_____

7.3.2. Participation in MRJ. In the event Diversified Care is not restricted
by any contract or otherwise from participating in an MR:I-center_Qroviding magnetic
resonance imaging ("MRI"), SARG will give Diversified Care the option to buy up to a fifty
percent (50%) interest in anyAfYnu center in which SARG has an ownership interest in Ada
or Canyon Counties. The purchase price for such interest shall be at the th_en existing fair
market value of such interest.
7.3 .3 Agreement to Pursue Meridian Facility. Notwithstanding the e:enera!

prohibition on establishing any new medical imaging service within Ada or Canyon Counties
without the unanimous consent of the Members of the Company as provided in Section 7.3 .1,
{he..Members agre.e...in....~ood faith to pursue the development of~ medical imaging center
withim.::a&le-half(Y2) m1le radius ofthe St. Luke's Meridian Medical Center located at 520
South fute-Itoaa;ln Meridian, Idaho. Irboth-MembeFS-i-n-their-complete~andindividual.
El-is~retion-ggree-tharestabHshing;:_suclra--cemcrwoutd-b'e-economicanyviaore;wClul d not
illiY_~r-se-l:- -affec-t-e:ther-o · er-at-ieflS-ef-the-Gom J!B.. -·er-:of-either-Memberamhvouta-tcbe"·<!
-beneitnotlieeomtirtrnity. · e Members agFee-that-·they will either consent to the Company ·
establishing such a center or jpat the other Member may pursue the establis=h=m=e=n=t=o=f=su=c="h
.9entcr not withstar;ding_thsu2rohibition. against such cen~ers provided in S_ection 7.3 above.

7.4
Participation in Managed Care Programs. Diversified Care and SARG
agree to use their best efforts to include the Company as a participating provider in all
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managed care programs in which Diversified Care or its Affiliates are involved which
include physician services as a service covered under the program. However, the tina!
decision conceming the Company's participation in any managed care program shall be
subject to the discretion of the Managing Committee. Each member of the Managing
Committee shall make its decision based on the best interests ofMember who appointed such
member to the Managing Committee.
7.5
Transaction With Members or Affiliates. Except as otherwise provided in
this Agreement, no Member or its Affiliate may, directly or indirectly, deal with the
Company in connection with carrying out the business of the Company without the express
approval ofthe other Member(s).
7.6

Rights and Obligations of Members.

7.6.1 Limitation of Liability. Each Member's liability for the debts and
obligations of the Company shall be limited as set forth in the Act and other applicable law.
In this regard, no Member shall have liability in excess of its Capital Contribution unless it
expressly agrees in writing to assume such liability.
7.6.2 Company Records. Upon written request, each Member shall have the
right, during ordinary business hours, to inspect and copy the Company records required to
be maintained by the Managing Committee at the Company's registered office as set forth
in Section 12.1 hereof.
7.6.3 Responsibilities of the Members. The Members shall have the
following rights and responsibilities which shall require the unanimous consent of all of the
Members, in each Member's sole discretion, to undertake:
7.6.3 .l Approval of the merger of the Company with another company
or to participate as a shareholder, partner, member or joint venturer or in any corporation,·
partnership, limited liability company or joint venture, respectively;
7 .6.3 .2 Approval of any transaction between the Company and any
Member, Management Committee member or Affiliate;
7 .6.3".3 Approval of any amendment to the Articles of Organization:
7.6.3.4 Approval of admitting a new Member;
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7.6.3 .5 Approval of any change in the Contribution Percentage.
7.6.3.6 Changing the Company's purposes;
7 .6.3 .7 Approval of any contractthat would remove operational control
from the Management Committee and vest operational control in any other entity or persori.;
7.6.3.8 Declaration ofban.kruptcy or similar action;
7.6.3 .9 Approval of any changes to the distribution requirements of
paragraph 12 hereof.
7.6.3.10 Approval of any change to the prohibition against Members
making a loan to the Company in a percentage different from their capital contribution
·
percentage. {See...par.agraph.:-1-}.-

7. 7
Additional Members. Additional Members may be admitted to the Company
only with the prior unanimous written consent of the Members in accordance with Section
7.6.3.~ Admission of a new Member shall occur upon execution and delivery by such
Member of a counteqJart of this Agreement in the form attached hereto as Exhibit B, delivery
of the required Capital Contribution, if any, and execution and delivery of such other
documents, instruments and items as the Managing Committee may reqUire.
7.8
Exercise of Rights by Diversified Care. The Members' exercise of their
authority and rights hereunder shall not be limited T0 any duty to the Company or to any
other Member. Each Member expressly understands that the Company's profitability is an
appropriate goal, but Diversified Care will necessarily be guided by Saint Alphonsus'
charitable mission.
ARTICLE 8
MANAGEMENT
8.1
Managing Committee. The Members agree that the management of the
Company shall be vested in the Members, and that the Members shall appoint a Managing .
Committee. The number of Members of the Managing Committee shall be determined from
time to time by the Membersjin·aGcordanG{}With·-See-Hen-9-:-63-hereof;·provided, at all times
the number ofManaging Committee members will be divided equally between Diversified
Care and SARG. Upon the execution of this Agreement the Members agree that the initial
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Managing Committee shall be composed of six (6) members, with Diversified Care being
entitled to appoint three (3) such members, and SARG being entitled to appoint three (3)
such members. Each Member shall have the right to appoint and remove its representatives
to the Managing Committee at any time subject solely to its discretion. No Member shall
have any authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the Company or to othervvise bind or
obligate the Company without a vote or the consent of the Members as provided under this
Agreement
8.2

Rights and Powers of Managing Committee.

Exclusive Rights of Managing Committee. Except for powers or
duties expressly reserved or assigned to the Members under the Articles ofOrganization, this
Agreement or applicable law, the Managing Committee shall have full, exclusive and
complete power to manage and control the business and affairs ofthe Company. Amajority
(of the Managi~g Com~ittee shall consti_tute a quo~m for th_e transaction of.bu~in7ss at any
)regular or spec1al meetmg of the Managmg Committee, but 1f Jess than a majonty IS present
at a meeting or-i.f-the--w.ithdrawaJ-0[-a-jvfember·-'leaves--less-·ilian-a-quortlln--present, no
Company business may be transacted, but a majority of the remaining members present may
,adjourn the meeting from time to time without further notice. Decisions of the Managing'
Committee sha!! require the affirmative vote of at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the
members of the Managing Committee.
·
8.2.1

8.2.2 Reliance by Third Parties. Any· third party not affiliated with either
Member shall be entitled to rely on all actions of the Managing Committee and shall be
entitled to deal with the Managing Committee as if it was the sole party in interest therein,
both legally and beneficially. A third party not affiliated with either Member shall not. be
required to verify whether any consents required hereofhave been obtained by the Managing
Committee.
·
8.3
Duties and Besponsibilities ~the Managing Commitiee. Subject to the
provisions of Section 7.6.3 and Section 8.5 hereof, the Managing Committee shall have the
~-~cl_1.J.,sivG..m_<i_~omplete power to manage and control the atTairs of the Company. The
·Managing Com:m:ittee. shall be responsible for conducting the daily business affairs of the
Company-and fofinai<ing the day-to-day operating decisions in carryjng out the purposes,
objectives and policies established by this Agreement and the Meii1'b5:a~ including but not
limited to the following:_,
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8.3 .1 Expend its best efforts with respect to the operations of the Company,
taking into account the best interests of the Members in carrying out such duties and
responsibilities;
8.3 .2 Operate and administer the Center in conformity with prudent servicing
standards customary in the industry among prudent providers of similar services, and
exercise the same judgment as if the action or failure to act were entirely for its own account;
8.3,3 Cause all books of account and other records of the Company to be kept
in-accordance with the tenns ofthis Agreement;
8.3.4 Prepare and deliver to each Member all reports required by the terms
of this Agreement;
8.3.5 To the extent that funds ofthe Company are available, pay all debts and
other obligations of the Company as they come due;
8.3.6 Maintain all fimds ofthe Company in a Company account in a bank or
ba11ks located in Boise, Idaho, and designate the signatories to such accounts;
8.3.7 Make distributions periodically to the Members in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement;
8.3 .8 Undertake such actions as are necessary or desirable in order that the
Company, within reason, promptly complies with all material present and future laws,
ordinances, orders, rules, regulations and requirements of all governmental authorities having
jurisdiction which may be applicable to the Company, its property, and the operations and
management of the Company;
8.3.9 Perform all other duties required by law or this Agreement to be
perfonned by the Managing Committee; and
8.3 .1 0 Managing Committee may delegate one or more of the duties provided
for in this Section 8.3 to an individual who will act as the general manager ("Center
Manager") of the Center which Center Manager will report directly to the Managing
Committee. The Center Manager, in consultation with the Managing Committee, shall be
responsible for those duties delegated to it by the Managing Committee which may include
the day to day management of the Company, and, in consultation with SARG, o~ersee the
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hiring/and retention of all eJirrieal employees(d.evelopment of clinical protocols, procedures
and standards, and the development, impld~entation and maintenance of ongoing quality
assurance, quality control and group compliance programs. The Center Manager's duties
shall not include, however, approval of payor or managed care contracts; the approval of
which is reserved to the Managing Committee.
8.4
Action by Managing Colllmittee. Any action required or permitted to be
taken at a meeting of the Managing Committee may be taken without a meeting, without
prior notice, and without a vote, if all of the members shall severally or collectively consent
in writing to any action to be taken by the Company. Such action shall be as valid a
Company action as though it had been authorized at a meeting of the Managing Committee.
Members of the 1\1anaging Committee may participate in and act at any meeting of the
Managing Committee by means of conference telephone or similar cornmtmications
equipment if all persons participating in the meeting can hear each other simultaneously.
8.5
Actions Requiring Super Majority Vote. The following actions shall be
considered "Major Decisions," which the Managing Committee shall not undertake without
the consent of at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the members of the Managing
Committee:
· 8.5.1 Approval of the purchase, sale, lease, mortgage, encumbrance or
disposal of any single item of real or personal property which involves a value in excess of
$25,000 Thousand Dollars ($25,000) which has not been approved as a part of the annual
operating and capital budget;
8.5 .2 Approval of the annual operating and capital expenditure budgets of the
Company or material modifications to such budgets once approved;
8.5 .3 Changing the criteria by which to approve capital expenditures;
8.5.4 Making loans on behalf of the Company, requesting a loan from the
Members or causing the Company to guarantee the obligations of others;
8.5.5 Approval of the incurrence by the Company of any indebtedness in
excess ofTen Thousand Dollars ($1 0,000) or such amount as is designated from time to time
by the Members in accordance with this Section 8.5 or any contract (including a lease) which
would require the annual expenditure of greater than Ten Thousand Dollars ($I 0,000);
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8.5.6 Using the Company's funds or capital in any way other than for the
business purposes of the Company;
8.5. 7 Appointment, removal, setting of compensation, identification of duties
and authority of the Center Manager or chief executive office for the Company;
8.5.8 Approval of any change or amendment in this Agreement, ~luding
distributions that are less than or greater than the amount required by Section 5.1 hereof;
8.5.9 Pledging or encumbering any Company asset as security for an
obligation of a Member or any Affiliate of a Member;

8.5 .1 0 Commibgqng any Company funds or capital with the funds of any other
Person;
8.5 .11 Determining the amount of reserves required by the Company; and
8.5 .12 The entering into, modification of, or termination of any agreement with
third party payors. [Drafting Note: Section 8.5.8- 12 have not previously been discussed
but are standard provisions.]
. 8.6
Actions Regarding Member Transactions. Any decision regarding any
contract or other arrangement between the Co~any and a Member may only be approved
by the Members pursuant to Section 7.6.3.~ The Managing Committee shall make a
recommendation to the Members regarding such contract or other arrangement;-rrovicled-;
hewever;th-at-HG-·merneei--of-the.Managing-eom-mi-tt$-appeint@d-by--the-int:erestecl-Member-sha-l-!-partie-i-pateJnJ.h.~ji~.~~.iliw_or-YGte-en--the-re-commenaatrun-t-o-·th~M@meers.

-la-aJJ-

,events,-8iversifreltCares members-onthe-Maa.agin-gG-ommittee-sl:laU-vote.irLac.CQrriance and
:I c.ons.istent..w.ith.its--I-ntemal-Re..v..enue_Code
Sectlim_5Jll(q(J.)-st-atus,
.
8. 7
Filing of Documents. The Managing Committee shall file or cause to be filed
all certificates or documents as may be determined by the Managing Committee to be
necessary or appropriate for the formation, continuation, qualification and operation of a
limited liability company in the State of Idaho and any other state, .inclYdin-g-.Grogon, in
which the Company may elect to do business. To the extent that the Managing Committee
determines the action to be necessary or appropriate, the Managing Committee shall do all
things to maintain the Company as a limited liability company under the laws of the State of
Idaho and any other state in which the Company may elect to do business.
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8.8
Meetings of the Managing Committee. The Managing Committee shall hold
regular meetings on a quarterly basis at such place and time as shall be fixed by the chair of
the Managing Committee, or as may be determined or approved by a majority of the
members ofthe Managing Committee. Special meetings of the committee may be called by
the chair of the Managing Conunitiee or upon the written request of one-third ( 113) of the
members of such committee. At least ten (I 0) days' written notice shall be given before the
date of the meeting for all meetings. Notice of a special meeting shall specify the topics to
be addressed at such special meeting and only such matiers as have been identified in such
notices shall be voted upon or have other action taken with respect to such matters.
•

•

•

4

8.9
Managing Committee Chair. The"(;'hair of the respective committee shall
/
preside at all meetings of the Managing Co~ittee. A person shall serve as the chair of a
committee for a one year term. The chair/or each committee shall alternate from year-toyear amongst a member appointed by Diversified Care and a member appointed by SARG.
8.10 Quorum and Proxy. No action shall be taken at any meeting ofthe Managing
Committee unless a quorum is present. A quorum ofthe Managing Committee shall consist.
of fifty-one percent (51%) of the members of the Managing Committee who are present
either personally or by proxy. A member of the Managing Committee may give his or her_
proxy to another member of the Managing Committee. 'lne person holding ti;-;p~~y;hall
"l)ee;titled to exercise all rights of the member of the Managing Committee who gave the
proxy.

8.11

Indemnification of the Managing Committee.

8.11.1 Indemnification. The Company, its receiver or trustee shall, to the
maximum extent provided by law, indemnify, defend and hold harmless the Managing
Committee and its Affiliates (each, an "Actor"), to the extent of the Company's assets, for,
from and against any liability, damage, cost, expense, loss, claim or judgment incurred by
the Actor arising out of any claim based upon acts performed or omitted to be perfonned by
the Actor ir1 connection with the business of the Company, including without limitation,
attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the Actor in settlement or defense of such claims.
Amounts incurred by an Actor in connection with Company affairs shall be reimbursed by
the Company. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no Actor shall be so indemnified, defended
or held harmless for (I) claims based upon its acts or omissions in the breach of this
Agreement or which constitute, fraud, negligence, misconduct, or breach of fiduciary duty
to the Company or to the Members or (2) for acts or omissions for which the Company is
prohibited from indemnifying under Section 53-624 of the Act.

OPERA TfNG AGREEMENT· 24

GSR/0409

S:\Ciien!s\33711174\0perating Agl (RED 01·A).wpd

30

002481

DISCUSSION DRAFT
11/03/99 (RED 01-A)

8.11.2 Liability. Actor (as defined in Section 8.11.1 hereof) shall not be
personally liable for the failure of the Company to make distributions as set forth in this
Agreement or otherwise to the Company or the Members for any act or omission performed
or omitted by such Actor in connection with the Company or its business. Notwithstanding
the foregoing, an Actor shall in all instances be liable for acts or omissions in breach of this
Agreement or which constitute fraud, gross negligence, or breach of fiduciary duty.
8.12

Compensation of Managing Committee.

8.12.1 Fees. The Company will not pay the Managing Committee any fees or
other compensation for its services except as set forth in this Agreement.
8.12.2 Reimbursable Expenses. Subject to restrictions for payment to
Members and affiliates under this Agreement, the Companywill reimburse the Managing
Committee for all actual out-of-pocket third-party expenses reasonably incurred in
connection with_Q}~.f.ii.rryjng..QU.!.Q_fthe duties set forth in this Agreement. The Company will
pay all ~~-ns~§_.Qf the Company~)ncluding without limitation (i) all costs of botTowed
money, taxes, J._us_1;Jran~~.m"d:assessm.ent with respect to the assets and operation of the
Company; (~~~1rr~!:~~~_E.tlJlgJs;~ and (iii) expenses for the acquisition, financing,
operation, copstruction and disposition oft~~ as?_~~-~f~le Company.
ARTICLE 9
MEMBER DEFAULTS
9.1
Events of Default. The occurrence of any of the following events shall
constitute an event of default and the Member so defaulting (herein referred to as the
Defaulting Member) shall (except as otherwise provided herein) thereafter be deemed to be
in default without any further action whatsoever on the part of the Company or the other
Member:

9.1.1 attempted dissolution of the Company by any Member other than
pursuant to the provisions contained elsewhere in this Agreement;
9.1.2 a Bankruptcy occurs as to a Member;
9.1.3 failure of any Member to make required additional capital contributions;

,;./

or
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9.1.4 failure of any Member to perform any obligation, act or acts required
of that Member by the provisions of this Agreement, which shall be necessary for or in
connection with the fulfilling of the purposes of the Company (other than the making of
additional capital contributions), or the Member violates or breaches any of the other terms
or provisions of this Agreement.
A Merrtber shall not be deemed to be in default of this Section 9(it);-(-iii};-or-(i-v.j until after
thiriy ~0) days 1 written notice thereof and if such default is a nonmonetary default 1fDd
cannot reasonably and with due diligence and in good faith
be cured within said thirty ~0)
.
v
day period, and if the Defaulting Member immediately commences and proceeds to complete
the cure of such default with due diligence and in good faith, the thirty ~;0) day period with
respect to such default shall be extended to include such additional period of time as may be
reasonably necessary to cure such default.
9.2
Dispute Resolution. If the Members are in dispute regarding a substantive
matter underlying an occurrence of default or a question exists regarding facts surrounding
an occurrence of default, then either Member may reguest that such dispute be submitted to
binding arbitration in accordance with Section 14.81lereof.

ARTICLE 10
TRANSFERS, WITHDRAWALS
10.1

Transfers.
10.1.1 Restriction. Except as expressly provided below, a Member shall not

make any direct or indirect Transfer of all or any portion of its Interest; pr-ovteecl,-J:wwe.v:er,
a-Memhermay-'fransfen.lg!_l_!?tq:f!]:fi:fr,tuss·e-s-or-·distributions-tua:-Transferee-who-does·
nG t-eeeome-a:-suosri:rmect--l'vtembeF--o£.the-CGmpany:10.1.2 Requirements for Transferee Becoming a Substituted Member. No

Person shall become a substituted Member in the Company, unless the following conditions
precedent are satisfied: (a) the other Member(s), in their sole discretion, shall have consented
in writing to the Transferee becoming a Member; (b) the Transferee shall have assumed any
and all of the obligations under this Agreement with respect to the Interest to ·which the
Transfer relates; (c) all reasonable expenses required in connection with the Transfer shall
have been paid by or for the account of the Transferee; and (d) all agreements, articles,
minutes, written consents and all other necessary documents and instruments shall have been
executed and filed and all other acts shall have been performed which the Managing
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Committee deems necessary to make the Transferee a substitute Member of the Company
and to preserve the status of the Company as a limited liability company.
10.2 Termination. A Member's membership in the Company shall continue until
it is terminated as follows:

10.2.1 upon the Member's withdrawal, effectuated by providj.ng-the___gther
Member(s) with ninety (90) days prior written notice;
10.2.2 upon the Member's bankruptcy;
10.2.3 upon the Member's dissolution;

10.2.4 upori the sale of a controlling interest in Saint Alphons~ bY)J/non50 1(c)(3) entity or [Dr~Jting Note: This is our standard language.] upon the sa!eof all or
substantially all ofSAA6's assets<:§fri-n-t:he-event-the~curfenr-physician-owners-ef-sARB-il.G
.1Gn-g0r:-mainta.in-aUeasta.majoriLy-owncJ=Ship-inter-est--and-v.ot-in-g-contre1-in-SARG-;..,-~

L9..:~~?-:~upon thirty (30) days notice by SARG, in the event that certain
Professional Services Agreement between SARG and Saint Alphonsus dated
--~----' in which SARG is granted the exclusive right to provide professional
Medical Imaging Services at Saint Alphonsus, if such tennination is made at Saint
Alphonsus' election, and SARG is otherwise in compliance with the contract. SARG must
exercise this right within ninety (90) days of the termination the Professional Services
Agreement;
__ ..,-.c:;__

/'1'0.2.6 ~~pon thirty (30) days notice by Diversified Care in the event the

termination ~!1fieProfessionai Services Agreement described in Section 10.2.5 where such
termination results from the voluntary election by SARG not to renew such contract (and
Saint Alphonsus is not otherwise in breach of the Professional Services Agreement).
Diversified Care must exercise this right within ninety (90) days of the termination of the
Professional Services Agreement;
10.2. 7 upon a Member's breach of a material term of the Operating Agreement,
o fwhich breach the breaching party has been notified in writing by the non-breaching party,
has had ninety (90) days to correct the breach and has failedto do so; or
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10.2. 8 in the event legislation or administrative int~rpretation of such
legislation renders continued participation in the Company by either party illegal 9r-·
significantly jeopardizes the nonprofit or tax exempt status of Saint Alphonsus andlthe
parties have in good faith failed to negotiate changes to this Agreement necessary to bring
the Company into compliance with all applicable state and/or federal laws, then Saint
Alphonsus' membership interest shall terminate at the election of SARG, which election
shall be made within ninety (90) days of which such negotiations fail.
10.3

Purchase of Withdrawing Member's Membership Interest. In the event

the termination of a Member's membership interest under Section 10.2, the remaining
Members shall have the following rights:
10.3 .1 In the event the tem1ination ?ta Member's interest in the Company is
made pursuant to Sections 10.2.1t"hrough 10.2.3,1he remaining Member (or Members) may
continue the business of the Company by providing notice to the terminating Member of such
. intent within ninety (90) days of discovery of such termination or notice of i~nt to
withdraw, otherwise the Company shall be dissolved as provided in AJticle 11 of this
Agreement. If the remaining Member (or Members) elects to continue the business of the
Company, such continuing Member (or Members) shall pay t11e terminated Member an
am otint eq u a! to the 1ess ~QL!J.l<;(.l~t[Jll.Jl.JkY.LYi!.IY.~..Q.f~.Y,S:JU'f.!e~J2~!.~tQY!:P.:.~!~~hiP. lB.~~E~~ t in
the Company (as agreed upon by the Members or as determin.ed by an appraiser mutually
selected by the parties hereto) or ·its Capital Account, as of the date of termination. ' Such
amount shall be paid by the remaining Member (or Members) over a three (3) year period.
Such payments shall be amortized over the three (3) year period as of the date the remaining
Member (or Members) gives notice of its intent to continue the business of the Company
with the first payment on such date and annually thereafter. The rate of interest shall be. fixed
at the "prime rate" plus one as such "prime rate" is publicly announced by the Wall Street
Joumal on the date of the first payment. 1be terminated Member also agrees to cooperate
with the other Member (or Members) in taking the necessary steps to restructure the
Company to conform with law; provided, however, that such cooperation will not require any
additional expenditures by the terminated Member. Such cooperation may include the
creation of an interim management agreement to facilitate the transfer of the applicable
provider numbers.
10.3.2 In the event the termination of the Member's interest in the Company
is made pursuant to Section I 0.2.4, the remaining Member (or Members) shall pay to the
tenninated Member an amount equal to the fair market value of the Company at the time of
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the termination of such Member's interest multiplied by the Member's existing percentage
membership interest in the Company immediately prior to termination.
10.3 .3 In the event the termination of the Member's interest in the Company
is made pursuant to Section 10.2.5 or 10.2.6, the remaining Member(or Members) shall have
the right to immediately purchase the other Member's interest at a pr:ice £.,q!J_{tlt.1t.d.1~...fui.L.
nJ.E;rk~L.Y!!l1J5:....9.!:J.ht.£_om_g@y ...~t the time of termination of the Professional Services
Agreement multiplied by the terminating Member's then percentage interest in the Company.
The purchase price shall be paid in cash.

10.3.4 In the event the termination of the Member's interest in the Company
is made pursuant to Section 10.2. 7, non-breaching Member (or Members) shall have the right
to irrunediately purchase the breaching Member's interest at a price equal to the fair market.
y_alue of the Company at the time of the breach multiplied by the tenninating M;;rnber"G;til~~l
p;rcentage-interestin.the Company. The purchase price shall be amortized over three (3)
years at a rate of interest which shall be fixed at the then existing U.S. prime rate plus one
( 1) percentage point.
10.3.5 In the event Diversified Care's interest in the Company is tem1inated
pursuant to Section 10.2.8, the remaining Member (or Members) shall have the right to
purchase Diversified Care's interests at a P,.d£.~.,~f]Jt.~lt\LW$J.?..4:.m.~!~:::~1~~.5?.f!b~.,{;,QplPi¢Ii,Y
at the time of the termination ml.lltiplied by Diversified Care's then existing percentage
interest in the Company. The purchase price shall be paid in cash.

10.4 Transfer. If a Member purports to transfer its Interest in breach of Section
10.1 of this Agreement, that purported Transfer shall be void and of no effect.
ARTICLE 11
LIQUIDATION AND WINDING UP
11.1 Dissolution. The Company shall dissolve upon the .earliest to occur of the
following events:
11.1.1 the unanimous vote ofthe Members;
11.1.2 upon the acquisition by one Person of all ofthe outstanding Interests;
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11.1.3 upon termination of a Member's membership interest, unless the
business of the Company is continued by the remaining Member as provided in Section 10.3 ;·
11.1.4 the occurrence of any event. which makes it unlawful for the businesS'
of the Company to be carried on;
·
\

11.1.5 the sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of the Company's
assets and properties and the collection of all notes received in connection with such sale or
other disposition;
11.1.6 the loss of any provider number or license after all appropriate appeals
and other actions have been taken which substantially restricts the Company's ability to

participate in a reimbursement or medical insurance program which is material to the overall
operations ofthe Company;
11.1.7 a -fmfuaLGr-infurmal detenniriatio1 finding-..o.r._n~.ling (e.g., Revenue
Ruling, General Counsel Memorandum, Private Letter Ruling) by the Internal Revenue
Service or any authoritative extension thereof that the Company's operations cause the net
earnings of any Member or Affiliate of a Member, which is exempt from taxation under
Section 501 ( c)(3) of the Code, to inure to the benefit ofa private individual or entity, or that
the formation or operation ofthe Company provides more than an incidental private benefit
to any individual.
11.2 Renegotiation in L.ieu o.fDisso~ution. In the event di~tiotfis.trigge~ed by
the occurrence of an event descnbed m SectiOn 11.1.4,_tg).-.<.0~Eflf,~pnor to d1ssolutwn as
provided for in this Article 11, the Members shall negotiate in good faith for a period not to
exceed one hundred eighty (180) days the necessary amendments or revisions to this
Agreement so that an event of dissolution no longer exists; provided, however, if an
agreement c<;lnnot be reached which maintains the economic benefit to the Company <md
each Member as contemplated hereby, then dissolution will be commenced in accordance
with this Article 11.
11.3

Filing Upon Dissolution. As soon as possible following the dissolution ofthe

Company, the liquidating trustee of the Company shall execute and file a certificate of
dissolution with the Secretary of State ofldaho as required by Section 53-647 of the Act.
Upon the dissolution of the Company, the Company shall cease to carry on its business,
except insofar as may be necessary for the winding up of its business.

l
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1104 Liquidation. Upon dissolution ofthe Company, the business and affairs of the
Company shall be wound up and liquidated as rapidly as business circumstan~g.s.pcu~1it, _0~.
Managing Conunittee shall act as the liquidating truste7pur-suant..te--&ecti-o~&<?"':...l~Y, arid' the
assets ofthe Company shall be liquidated and the proceeds thereof shall be pmd (to the extent
pennitted by applicable Jaw) in the following order:

11.4.1 First, to creditors, including Members that are creditors, in the order of
priority as required by applicable law;
11.4.2 Second, to a reserve for contingent liabilities that are not liquidated, but
will not be barred, to be distributed at the time and in the manner as the liquidating trustee

detem1ines in its reasonable discretion;

11.4.3 Third, to Members, pro rata, in satisfaction of their Capital Accounts;
and
11.4.4 Thereafter, to the Members as set forth in Section 5.2,

The Managing Committee shall accomplish such liquidation with the purpose of maximizing
the economic value to be provided to the Members of the Company. If the Managing
Committee determines that an immediate sale of the Company's assets and liquidation of the
Company would cause undue losses to the Members, it may defer liquidation of any assets,
other than those assets necessary to satisfy current obligations, for a reasonable time, or may
distribute such assets in kind according to the order and priority set forth in this section. Any
asset distributed in kind shall be valued and treated as though the assets were sold and the
cash proceeds were distributed.
11.5 Reasonable Time for Winding Up. A reasonable time shall be allowed for
the orderly winding up of the b~ess and affairs of the Company and the liquidation of its
assets pursuant to Section 11.4 in order to minimize any losses otherwise related to that
winding up.
11.6 Deficit Capital Account. Upon liquidation, each Member shall look solely
to the assets of the Company for the rctum of that Member's Capital Contribution. No
Member shall be personally liable for a deficit Capital Account balance of that Member, it
being expressly understood that the distribution ofliquidation proceeds shall be made solely
from existing Company assets.
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ARTICLE 12
BOOKS, RECORDS, REPORTS AND ACCOUNTING
12.1 Records. The Managing Committee shall keep or cause to be kept at the
Principal Office of the Company the following: (a) a current list of the futl name and last
known business, residence or mailing address of each Member; (b) a copy of the initial
articles of organization and all amendments thereto; (c) copies of all written operating
agreements and all attachments to the agreements, including any prior written operating
agreements no longer in effect; (d) copies of any written and signed promises by Member to
make Capital Contributions to the Company; (e) copies of the Company's federal, state and
local income tax returns and reports, if any, with the three (3) most recent years;(£) copies
of any prepared fmancial statements of the Company for the three (3) most recent years; and
(g) minutes of every meeting of the Members as well as any written consents of Members
or actions taken by Members without a meeting. Any such records maintained by the
Company may be kept on or be in the form of any information storage device, provided that
the records so kept are convertible into legible written form within a reasonable period of
time.
12.2 Fiscal Year and Accounting. The Fiscal Year of the Company shall be
comprised of twelve (12) months, commencing on the 1st day of January and ending ~E...9.L
~ll~ thirty-first (31st) day of December of each year. All amounts computed for the
purposes of this Agreement and all applicable questions concerning the rights of Members
shall be determined using the accrual method of accounting. AU decisions as to other
accounting matters, except as specifically provided to the contrary herein, shall be made by
the Managing Committee.
12.3 Annual Reports. As soon as practicable, but in no event later that( t_hr:~~J
months after the close of each Fiscal Year, the Managing Committee shall cau5ero-oe
furnished to the Members, as of the last day of that Fiscal Year, reports containing such
financial statements of the Company for the Fiscal Year, presented in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles, including a balance sheet, a statement of income,
J]....2!_atement of Members' equity and a statement of changes in financial position, which
stat~·nts shalfoer~di~d at the expense of the Company by an independent public
accountant selected by-n(e Managing Committee.
12.4 Interim Reports. Tbe Managing Committee shall provide the Members with
interim written reports in such detail a_§_~rnbers p~ reasonably require setting out the
progress and status ofthe business ofthe Company. In addition, as soon as practicable, but
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in no event later than one (1) month after the close of each calendar quarter, the Managing
Committee shall cause to be furnished to the Members as of the last day of that calendar
quarter reports containing stich financial statements of the Company for that calendar quarter,
including balance sheet and statement of income.
12.5 Preparation of Tax Returns. The Managing Committee shall arrange for the
preparation and timely filing of all returns of Company income, gains, deductions, losses and
other items necessary for federal and state income tax purposes and shall cause to be
furnished to the Members the tax information reasonably required for federal and state
income tax reporting purposes. The classification, realization and recognjtion of income,
gain, losses and deductions and other items, for federal income tax purposes, shall be based
on that method of accounting as the Managing Committee shall determine in its reasonable
discretion.

12.6

Tax Elections. The Managing Committee, in its reasonable discretion, may
determine and in the best interests of all Members whether to make any available elections
pursuant to the Code.
Tax Controversies. Subject to the provisions hereof, Qiversifi~££!!_!..§__.
q.£.~i.gnat<;;Q.Jh.~...I~...Matte.Q>.J:1~!!!~er, and is authorized and required to represent the
Company in connection with all examinations of the Company's affairs by tax authorities,
including resulting administrative a_ndjudicial proceedings, and to expend Company funds
for professional services and costs associated therewith as· approved by the Members. The
Members agree to cooperate with the Tax Matters Member and to do or refrain from doing
any or all things reasonably required by the Tax Matters Member to conduct those
proceedings. The Tax Matters Member agrees to promptly notify the Members upon the
receipt of any correspondence from any federal, state or local tax authorities relating to the
examination of the Company's. affairs. The Tax Matters Member shall not enter into a
financial arrangement, agreement, or settlement of any kind related to the Company's tax
matters without the Managing Committee's express authorization unless such arrangement
or agreement is expressly budgeted for the Management Committee (e.g., engagement of an
accounting firm to prepare the Company's tax filings).

12.7

ARTICLE 13
OTHER AGREEMENTS
Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, the party shall also enter into the
agreements set forth below.
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13.1 Administrative Services. The Company may purchase certain administrative
.services necessary to the operation of the Center, including, without limitation, cleaning,
linen, medical record retention, accounting and billing, maintenance and repair, and
hazardous waste disposal, from Diversified Care or an Affiliate thereof as provided in the
service agreement between the company and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.

att£:0~~r1;1~s:ilimi1trtt?1·~35"1::,~
13.2 Information Services.· 'The Company-shall-purchase its information system
support from Diversified Care or an affiliate of Diversified Care. in-erde-r-tD--ensureUhe
inte-grity·amhompatibi"lity·oHh~Center~s_infurmation.system-with-the-information.systems

-utittzea1iy"SaillfATpl1 ons us ....Lfh-e·agre em en t sfiaff5effiSi:il:JsfanTi1Itlythe form-atta:ched-hereto
as:EXFirmFf3:::2~____,

13.3 Medical Director. The Con1pariy shall enter into a medical director agreemenJ;
with SARG for the provision of medical director services to the Company. The agreemer\t
shall be substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit 13.3.
13.4 Lease of Space. The Company shall enter into a lease agreement with SARG
or an affiliate thereof with respect to lease of space to the Company for the operation of the
Center substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit 13.4.

ARTICLE 14
MISCELLANEOUS

14.1 Governing Laws. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho.
14.2 Notices. Notices may be delivered either by hand or by mail. Any notice or
document required or pemiitted hereunder to a Member shall be in writing and shall be
deemed to be given on the date received by the Member; provided, however, that all notices,
and documents mailed to a Member in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, certified
mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the Member at its respective address as shown
in the ·records of the Company, shall be deemed to have been received five (5) days after
mailing. The address of each of the Members shall for all purposes be as set forth on the
signature page hereto, unless otherwise changed by the applicable Member by notice to the
other as provided herein.
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14.3 Severability. If any provision of this Agreement shall be conclusively
delennined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable to any extent,
the remainder of this Agreement shall not be affected thereby.
14.4 Binding Effect. Except as othenvise provided herein, this Agreement shall
inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the Members and their respective successors and,
where permitted, assigns.

14.5 Titles and Captions. All article, section and paragraph titles and captions
contained in this Agreement are for convenience only and are not a part ofthe context hereof.

14.6

Pronouns and Plurals. All pronouns and any variations thereof are deemed

to refer to the masculine, feminine, neuter, singular or plural as the identity of the appropriate
Pcrson(s) may require.

14.7 . No Third Party Rights. This Agreement is intended to create enforceable
rights between the parties hereto only, and creates no rights in, or obligations to, any other
Persons whatsoever.
.
1-4.8----Ar~itration.

or

14.8.1 Right to Arbitrate. Any dispute disagreement arising hereunder or
othenvise betwee' the members of the Managing Conunittee or the Members, including but
not limited to the (txistence of a default under Article 9, shall, upon the request of any party
involved, but sub~tted to bindin.g arbitration in accordance with procedures set forth in this
Article and the rules
of the American Arbitration Association.
·
I

14.8.2\Pre-Arbitration Procedure.
.
1~
'8.2.1
Any dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration by
· notifying the other part or parties, as the case may be, hereto in writing of the submission
of such dispute to arbitrat ~n (the "Arbitration Notice"). The party delivering the Arbitration
Notice shall specify thereirt\to the fullest extent possible, its version of the facts surrounding
the dispute, issue or matter and the resolution of the matter desired by such party anc!/or the
nature of any injunctive or other relief such party claims.
\fhe party (or parties, as the case may be) receiving such
14.8.2.2
Arbitration Notice shall respond wit'hjn fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof in writing (the
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"Arbitration Response"), stating its version ofthe facts to the fullest extent then possible and,
if applica?l~,. it: positi?n a~ to resolution of the matter, damages and other relief sought by
the pmty uutmtmg at1b1tratwn.

114.8.2.3
The parties shall then endeavor, in good faith, to resolve
the dispute outlined the Arbitration Notice and Arbitration Response. In the event the
parties are unable to r~~olve
such dispute within ten ( 10) days after receipt of the Arbitration
I
Response, the parties $hall initiate the arbitration procedure outlined below; provided,
however, that neither party shall make factual assertions in such arbitration with respect to
the dispute that were not included in the Arbitration Notice or Arbitration Response, unless
the party could not reasonably have been aware of such facts at the time.

iX

14.8.3 Arbitration Procedure.

14.8.3.1
If the parties hereto are unable to resolve the dispute
within ten (10) days after receipt of the Arbitration Response as set forth above, the patties
shall select a mutually-acceptable arbitrator (the "Arbitrator1').
14.8.4 Arbitration Rules.

The Arbitrator shall agree to resolve all factual disputes

14.8.4.1

prior to resolving legal disputes.

14.8.4.2 \
The Arbitrator shall be guided by, and shall substantially
comply with, the then-applicab~e rules of the American Arbitration Association.
The Arbitrator shall be empowered to include in any
award made hereunder such reli~f as the Arbitrator deems appropriate (other than punitive
damages), including, without Iikitation, (i) injunctive relief in addition to or in lieu of
monetary damages and (ii) reasob[ble attorneys' fees and expenses.
14.8.4.3

\

14. 8.4 .4
( Should any party refuse or neg Iect to appear or participate
in the arbitration proceedings, if11 Iuding the procedures relating to the selection of an
Arbitrator, the participating party~may select the Arbitrator and the Arbitrator shall be
empowered to decide the controveteyy in accordance with whatever evidence is presented.
14.9 Time is of the Essence. Time is of the essence in the performance of each and
every obligation herein imposed.
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14.10 Finders. The parties hereto each represent and warrant that they have not
employed or utilized the services of any broker, finder or agent in connection with this
Agreement, incurred any liability to any broker, finder or agent, and that there are no claims
for any brokerage fees, finder's fees or commissions in connection with the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement.
14.11 Further Assurances. The parties hereto shall execute all further instruments
and perform all acts which are or may become necessary to effectuate and to carry on the
business contemplated by this Agreement.

14.12 Estoppel Certificates. The Members hereby agree that, at the request of any
Member, they will each execute and deliver an estoppel certificate stating that this
Agreement is in full force and effect and that to the best of such Member's knowledge and
belief there are no defaults by any Member (or that certain defaults exist), as the case may
be, under this Agreement.
14.13 Schedules Included in Exhibits; Incorporation by Reference. Any
reference to an Exhibit to this Agreement contained herein shall be deemed to include any
Schedules to such Exhibit. Each of the Exhibits referred to in this Agreement, and each
Schedule to such Exhibits, is hereby incorporated by reference in this Agreement as if such
Schedules and Exhibits were set out in full in the te;,.i of this Agreement.
14.14 Amendments. This Agreement may not be amended except by unanimous
written agreement of all of the Members.
14.15 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts.
14.16 Creditors. None of the provisions of this Agreement shall be for the benefit
of or enforceable by any creditors of the Company.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement effective as
of the day and year first above written.
MEMBERS:
SARG Associates, P.A.
a professional association

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care,
Inc., an Idaho nonprofit corporation

By:

By:
Its:

By:

By:

By:

By:

By:

By:
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By:

By:

By:
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EXHIBIT A
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Member

Capital
Contribution

Diversified Care

~~:mtribution

Percentage

50%

Cash
Equipment
Inventory
Total

SARG

50%

Cash
Equipment
Inventory
Total
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EXHIBIT
MEMBERSHIP AGREEMENT FOR _ _ __
The undersigned, desiring to become a Member in
, an Idaho limited
liability company (the "Company"), and further desiring to enter into the Operating
Agreement between the Company and all of its Members, dated as of _ _ _ _ _ __
199_ (the "Operating Agreement"), hereby joins in and executes the Operating Agreement,
agrees to all of the terms and conditions of the Operating Agreement and agrees to be bound
thereby. The undersigned authorizes this Signature Page to be attached to the Operating
Agreement.

Date:------Capital Contribution:
Printed Name of Member

$

-------------------Signature of Member

Contribution Percentage:
Address ofMember:
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EXHIDITC
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF MEMBER TO TERMS OF OPERATING
AGREEMENT
The undersigned Member (or physician owner or employee thereof) acknowledges
that such Person has reviewed, understands and agrees to be individually bound by
paragraph 7.4 of the Operating Agreement of
, by and between Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and SARG. 1l1e undersigned Person further acknowledges
that such Person has received a substantial benefit as a consequence of
- - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - b e i n g a member of _ _ _ _ __
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EXHilliTD
CONSENT OF PHYSICIAN TO TERMS OF OPERATING AGREEMENT
The undersigned, a physician owner and/or employee joining SARG following the
creation of
, an Idaho limited liability company (the "Company"), and
further desiririg to participate in the Company by and through SARG, hereby agrees to be
bound by the Operating Agreement between the Company and all of its Members, dated as
of
, 199_ (the "Operating Agreement"), and hereby agrees to all ofthe
tenm and conditions of the Operating Agreement. The undersigned authorizes this Signature
Page to be attached to the Operating Agreement.

Date: - - - - ·
Printed Name of Physician Owner

Signature of Physician Owner
Address of Physician Owner
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SERVICE AGREEMENT
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EX.HIBIT F
EMPLOYEE LEASE AGREEMENT
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ATTE:l.\'DEES:

Sandra Bruce; Jeff Cliff; Ian Davey, M.D.; Neil Davey, M.D.; Leslie Kelly Hall; Tim Hall, M.D.; John Knochel, M.D.;
Diane Newton, M.D.; Bob Polk, M.D.; Janelle Reilly; Lisa Scales, M.D.; Cindy Schamp; JeffSeabourn, M.D.

I.

Objectives of Meeting: Clarity of"go fmward" regarding the partnership between SaintAlphonsus Regional Medical Center and Gem
State Radiology, and understanding of each others strategies and needs.

IL

Assignment of Roles:
Tim Hall, M.D.
Leader:
Facilitator:
Sandra Bruce
Nicole Lindauer
Recorder.

Information

4.

5.
6.

8.
9.

- dldC4 )'{a;~"<!- 0z..;;
'/;;aJu.~ rd.;d4/:~ ~"l..Y

a) Competitive Advantage
b) Distribution
c) Relationship to
business

• i'Z4lA.l:
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RADIOLOGY STRATEGY MEETING RECORD
Tuesday, February 13, 2001
Pioneer Room: 5:30p.m. - 7:30 p.m.

...

.' (i) 1fp}rJrcuv f

:J,~
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EXHIBITE
002507

Confidential

IMI Management Committee Meeting Agenda
Thursday, May 30, 2002 - Pioneer Room 9:00 am
Attendees:
Jeff Cliff, Execu~ve Director; Tim Hall, MD; Nell Davey, MD; Ken Fry, CFO; Leslie Kelly Hall, VP Information Technology; Scott fhristensen, Manager
.\ '
Radiology and Medical Imaging; Karen Noyes, Director Medical Imaging
, :' I.J
Absent:
Joe Gobel, MD; Jeff Sea bourn, MD and Mike Ondracek
1
Minutes:
Nicole Lindauer
/,,!" f.• e
Objectives:
I~ '
Assignments Leader:
Jeff Cliff

\t'\'"

and network issues being worked on. IMI West to open with
nursing, and a blood draw station for IDX Pathology. Once the
4)

0

&
-...

Fees & Finance Committee
Report
Pet Agreement:
Ken Fry motioned to leave inpatient lease rate as APC rate, track, and modify if it becomes a problem and Dr.
Hall seconded. All agreed.
IMI Lease:
Dr. Hall motioned to accept a 20-year lease with three 5-year options to renew at $20.00/sq ft triple net lease
and Leslie Kelly-Hall seconded. All agreed. Jeff Cliff to attach, to the minutes, a document that reflects the fair market
value.
Medical Director Agreement:

G) IMI Management Meeting
Time

Date:

1:/:.efo·2

IMIRP/001004
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Confidential
Marketing Report
May 2002
IMI Meridian
Open house May 30 and 31, 4pm to 9pm
Attendance encouraged with Radiologist attendance mandatory
Statesman advert ran Wednesday and again Friday and Sunday
Press release out
Article to Statesman, Idaho Business Review and Idaho Press Tribune
Channel 7 filming an Interview at IMI Meridian next Wednesday· Dr. Coulam to discuss screening CT
Office Visits
Cherry Lane Family Practice
Horizon Health (St. Luke's Meridian)
St. Luke's Internal Medicine- lunch scheduled for 5·30·02
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1

than the drop in value.

2

But I guess the bigger question here is

3

Mr. Miller just

I did,

4

It's our theory of the case.

5

THE COURT:

6

opening statement.

It's why it's relevant.

They got to hear part of your

MR. BANDUCCI:

7

indeed, argue a lot of facts.

Well, hopefully, it will be a

8

little better than that, but the point is it's relevant.

9

And so, that is -- that's why we're here.

I!

[:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. BANDUCCI:

I!

Okay.

[w

We want to talk about it.

We

12

want to be able to refer to it.

13

its contents.

14

asserted a drop in value between 2001 and 2006 as the

15

measure of damages.

16

Mr. Miller and Mr. Gjording will be vigilant about us

17

trying to do something different than we have already

18

done.

19
20

I am not going to

And I know that this court and

before you -THE COURT:

I assume you're going to redact the

22

scorched earth and all that?

23

MR. BANDUCCI:

25

and, right, we never

Let me ask the court one question, though,

21

24

We want to talk about

The scorched earth is not in that

report.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I thought it was.
,,,,,,,
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1

see that?

2

A

Yes,

3

Q

Okay.

4

blow that up.

5

"IMI West."

6

A

7
8
9

I do.
And then, if you would, go to line 4 and
Okay.

The fourth item on the agenda is

What is IMI West?

I believe that's referring to our Meridian

location, IMI in Meridian.
Q

Okay.

IMI Meridian.

And who is presenting on

IMI West?

10

A

Reilly, Janelle Reilly.

11

Q

Janelle Reilly.

So, a Saint Alphonsus employee

12

is presenting on plans for -- is leading the discussion

13

on IMI West in Meridian; correct?

14

A

Well, this isn't enough information for me to

15

say correct or incorrect.

16

had questions about IMI West in Meridian.

17
18

19
20
21
22

23
24

25

Q

I don't know.

She may have

It's really hard to see that gray bar above the

names.

A

Well,

I see it says, "Presenter."

But we don't

know what she is presenting.
Q

We know she is presenting about IMI West in

Meridian; right?

A

That's what it says?

Correct.
MR. BANDUCCI:

The next exhibit, please.

Actually --
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1

Facility."

Do you see that?

2

A

I'm sorry?

3

Q

7.3.3.

4

A

Yes.

5

Q And that is an agreement for the hospital and

6

the radiologists to join together and go to Meridian;

7

correct?

8

A

Yes,

9

Q

And at the time that this document was signed,

it is.

10

the hospital and the radiologists knew they were going to

11

put a magnetic resonance imaging scanner in Meridian?

12

A

Correct.

13

Q

All right.

So, let me ask this question:

Did

14

the Management Committee that consisted of half Saint

15

Alphonsus and half radiologists oversee the

16

implementation of the Meridian facility?

17

A

No.

18

Q

They were not involved at all?

19

A

Not to my recollection, no.

20

Q

All right.

If your recollection is incorrect,

21

would you agree with me that this Management Committee,

22

which has been reported to the state of Idaho as IMI's

23

Management Committee, shouldn't be looking at Meridian

24

because i t involves an MRI scanner?

25

A

I'm not sure I understand the question.
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1
2

Q

Read the question back, please.

(Court reporter read back the question.)

3

MR. GJORDING:

Your Honor, the point I had

4

the objection I have is I don't understand whether

5

Mr. Banducci is saying that they shouldn't from the point

6

of view of the state of Idaho or whether he was asking

7

Mr. Cliff whether they shouldn't from some point of view

8

that --

9

THE COURT:

Do you understand the question?

10

THE WITNESS:

11

MR. BANDUCCI:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. BANDUCCI:

I'm not sure that I do.
All right.

I'll rephrase it.

Rephrase it.
Your Honor, with all due respect,

14

I think if there is an objection, it ought to be

15

"ambiguous," "vague," rather than this sort of speaking

16

objection.
l

17

MR. GJORDING:

18

THE COURT:

19

next question.

20

BY MR. BANDUCCI:

21

!'

Q

Well, --

I've ruled on it.

Proceed with the

Mr. Cliff, if I show you that the IMI Management

22

Committee was involved with Meridian and was constituted

23

of both Saint Alphonsus and radiologists representatives

24

at the time it was involved with Meridian, would that

25

surprise you?
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1

A

No, it would not.

2

Q

So, are you telling this jury that the IMI

3

Management Committee that consists of Saint Al's reps and

4

radiologists reps was involved with Meridian?

5
6
7

A
answer.
Q

I can't really answer that with a yes or no
I have to explain.
Well, hang on.

And at the time that this

8

document is signed, everybody knows Meridian is going to

9

have an MRI in it; right?

10

A

At the time this document was signed, Gem State

11

Radiology, without any assistance of Saint Al's, were

12

already moving forward with IMI Meridian.

13

Q

That's not the question.

14

A

So, it was a de facto event occurring, so I

15

can't really answer your question yes or no.

16

MR. BANDUCCI:

17

THE COURT:

18

Again.

19

BY MR. BANDUCCI:

20

Q

Your Honor?

The last response will be stricken.

Repeat your question to the witness.

At the time this document was signed, everybody

21

at IMI and the hospital knew that there was going to be a

22

magnetic resonance imaging scanner at Meridian?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Thank you.

25

7.3.2.

Take a look at the paragraph above,

Now, that is the MRI participation paragraph and
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1

A.

There are

one example I've seen

2

used in some instances is where you have a market

3

that's pretty well defined in terms of the total

4

amount of business that's being done, you know, in

5

some area.

6

it could be cellular telephones.

7

I mean, it could be lemonade stands or

If you can define the whole market

8

some way reliably and then estimate what the

9

market share of what one participant would be, you

10

can take a whole profit pool and apportion it that

11

way.

12

the business does not have good operating history,

13

this is a method that's used.

14

Q.

I~

Finally, are there ways of

approaching a measurement of loss through

16

valuation, through dimunition in value, as we say?
A.

Sometimes when we're dealing with a

18

situation where we have either the destruction of

19

a business or where it is permanently impaired,

20

something happens to it where it's not going to

21

recover, the valuation method can be the most

22

direct method.

23

I~

And in some situations, particularly where

15

17

I~

The reason that is is that basically

24

the value of a company, what it represents

25

economically is what somebody would pay to have
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1

the rights to all the profits that are going to

2

come in the future.

3

we do where we can take a projected stream of

4

profits in the future and calculate how much

5

somebody would pay to own that.

And there's calculations that

And if the business was destroyed,

6
7

for example, and you know what that value is, then

8

that is a good proxy for all those future earnings

9

that never occurred.

Or if a business was

10

impaired in some way where it was permanently

11

crippled, you can take what that valuation would

12

have been had it not been injured, what it is in

13

its present state; and the difference in that

14

valuation can represent the damage.

15

fairly commonly used, too.

16

Q.

And that's

Now, in this case, Mr. Budge, we

17

have a number of valuations of MRIA or MRI Center

18

during the time of the facts in this case.

19

those valuations were suggested to the hospital as

20

And

a way of valuing a buyout.

21

Can that approach or those facts be

22

used to measure damages in this case in connection

23

specifically with a wrongful withdrawal by a

24

partner?

25

1.1

A.

I~

If you're going to determine the
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1

industry information indicates that the growth rate could

~
I~

2

be significantly higher.
Additionally, there is a lot of discussion/

3

4

publishings going on currently in the valuation industry

5

regarding tax-affecting the earnings of a pass-through

6

entity.

7

income taxes at the corporate level.

8

tax-affect these earnings, you would have a number that's

9

probably 40 percent higher.

MRIA is a partnership.

They don't pay any
And if you didn't

cases that have come out very strongly saylng when you're

11

valuing a pass-through entity, you should not take into

12

consideration income taxes when you're developing a

13

discount rate.

15

Q

Okay.

Now, did you review the Shattuck Hammond

report?

16

A

Yes, I did.

17

Q

And I guess there are actually two reports: the

18

valuation report and the Strategic Options Assessment;

19

correct?

20

A

That's correct.

21

Q

And can you tell the jury one of the reasons

22

that you reviewed the Shattuck Hammond report relative to

23

business valuation and loss of value?

24
25

[1

And there have been court

10

14

I

A

Yes.

Basically, as I testified to earlier,

we're covering a long time frame with regard to the
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1

alleged damage period.

2

and others have testified that the damage period actually

3

started in 1999.

4

was developed as of November, 2001.

5

damage period started.

6

Willamette, and I was retained to look at the damages

7

that relate to loss in business value, so we needed some

8

starting point to use as an estimated loss in business

9

value when we compared it to the current value of the

10
11

Counsel has presented information

The Shattuck Hammond valuation report

Excuse me.

So, it's after the

I
I+

And we, at

businesses today.
And Shattuck Hammond performed an analysis.

I

12

reviewed that analysis in the same way that I have been

13

retained as an expert to review other valuation experts'

14

reports and write opinions on those reports.

15

actually been retained as an expert just to go to trial

16

to determine whether or not another expert valuation

17

report followed the Uniform Standards of Professional

18

Appraisal Practice.

19

up the procedures that you should follow, and if you

20

follow them, your conclusion could be and should be

21

deemed reasonable.

I have

And those standards, basically, line

22

So, we looked at the Shattuck Hammond analysis.

23

I, personally, looked at that report in relation to the

24

Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and

25

determined that their conclusion --
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1

MR. GJORDING:

2

gotten into a narrative here.

3
4

THE COURT:

Your Honor, this has kind of

Sustained.

' !:

::

Okay.

BY MR. BANDUCCI:

5

Q

Let me ask you this question:

You looked at the

6

Shattuck Hammond analysis, and you also did your own

7

valuation as of what year?

8

A

We did a valuation as of the current time.

9

Q

2006?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Okay.

Now, when you compared the valuation done

12

by Shattuck Hammond in 2001 to your valuation done in

13

2006, what did you deter.mine to be the differential

14

between MRIA companies in 2001 and MRIA companies in

15

2006?

16

r

!!
!~

MR. GJORDING:

Your Honor, I have an objection.

17

And I would like to ask some questions in aid of an

18

objection, Your Honor.

But I think you -il

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. GJORDING:

21

22
23

24
25

If!

You may.
If counsel -- could we approach

the bench?
THE COURT:

Well, what is your specific

objection?
MR. GJORDING:

Okay.

Well, I want to test his

foundation.
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1
2

THE COURT:

All right.

You may ask questions in

aid of an objection.

3

MR. GJORDING:

Mr. Wilhoite, did you say that

4

the Shattuck Hammond valuation was done as of November

5

2001?

6
7

THE WITNESS:

That's when the report was issued

and dated.

8

MR. GJORDING:

9

did was done in 2006?

10

THE WITNESS:

Okay.

And the valuation that you

It was completed and my report was

11

issued March 12th, 2007, but it was based, primarily, on

12

financial results through 2006.

13
14

MR. GJORDING:

I'll keep this brief, Your Honor,

but I need Exhibit 4518, please.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. GJORDING:

17

I'll represent to you, Mr. Wilhoite, that that

4518.

Do you wish to display that?

Yeah.

That would work.

18

is 4518.

19

had taken quite a fall between 2001 and 2006; correct?

And you can see the performance of Center/MRIA

20

THE WITNESS:

21

MR. GJORDING:

22

,~

That's what's indicated, yes.
Okay.

Did you take that into

consideration?

23

THE WITNESS:

24

MR. GJORDING:

25

THE WITNESS:

In my valuation?
Yes, sir.
Excuse me.

Yes.
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1

MR. GJORDING:

11

Your Honor, my objection here is

2

that he has been asked to, basically, say that the -- the

3

2006 evaluation and the 2001 evaluation are the same.

4

And I don't think there has been a sufficient foundation

II

5

here, nor do I think it's relevant.

1:~

6

MR. BANDUCCI:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BANDUCCI:

9

Your Honor

Overruled.
Thank you, Your Honor.

BY MR. BANDUCCI:

10

Q

Let's get back to the question I asked you.

11

A

Ask it again.

12

Q

Sure.

Did you look at the differential in value

13

between the Shattuck Hammond report in 2001 and your

14

valuation in 2006?

15

A

Yes, I did.

16

Q

And did you report that in your report so that

17

Mr. Gjording could talk to you about that?

18

A

Yes, I did.

li

19

Q

And that was in your report that you just

I!li

20

referenced; correct?

21

A

March 12th, 2007, yeah.

22

Q

So, Mr. Gjording had a chance to understand what

23

your testimony would be on this topic?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Thank you.

Ill
1¥

And that-- what's the difference
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1

between 2001 and 2006 as far as the valuation of those

2

same companies in those different periods of time?

3
4

5

A

Based on my current valuation, the value

declined approximately $32.5 million.
Q

All right.

And the $32.5 million, can that be

6

compared to the $20.9 million that you put on

7

Exhibit 4526?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

And explain to the jury how the 20.9 relates to

10

the 32.5 and what conclusions you draw from the

11

difference in those two numbers?

12

A

Well, basically, if the value declined

13

$32-1/2 million, there are a lot of things that could

14

have caused that.

15

million, roughly 20.9 million of it relates to the acts

16

of Saint Alphonsus and related parties because it is

17

based on the lost referrals that Mr. Budge presented to

18

you yesterday.

19

translates into lost profits which translates into lost

20

business value.

21
22
23

~

Q

My conclusion is that of that $32.5

That translates into lost revenue which

So, is there approximately $12 million that is

in business value lost that is not being asserted here
as attributable to the acts of Saint Alphonsus?

24

A

That's correct.

25

Q

Now, what I'd like to do now is talk,
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MR. MILLER:

1

On No. 35, paragraph 1 -- it may be

2

a little confusing to the jury because they have

3

presented evidence of lost profits, and I would think

4

that what we ought to do is say that MRIA's, you know,

5

lost profits -- I think we ought to say that they are

6

entitled to pursue what they think is their lost profits.

7

They have put on damage of that through Mr. Budge and

8

Mr. Wilhoite.

9

instruction that we asked for that when you ask for lost

And then, we think we ought to have the

10

profits, you've got to prove them both as to amount and

11

causation with reasonable certainty.

12

paragraph 1 that it's -- that they're entitled to claim

13

net lost profits, but then the measure can be dropped off

14

because their proof takes care of that.

15

So, I suggest

The second point is -- and I may not have

16

completely understood the evidence when it went in

17

through Mr. Wilhoite and Budge -- I had not understood

18

that MRIA had made a diminution in value claim.

19

remember, specifically, from Mr. Wilhoite's deposition he

20

was asked:

21

MRICI and MRI Mobile for purposes of opining to

22

diminution of value?"

23

opinion.

24

profit analysis."

25

n

I

"Have you calculated the value of MRIA and

li

And he said, "No, that's not my

I provided that as a check against my lost
So, he didn't actually testify--

MR. WOODARD:

Your Honor, we agree -- that's why
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1

ll'

we got rid of that second part.

2

MR. MILLER:

Okay.

3

MR. BANDUCCI:

15

I~

Never mind.

I think we still may have -- I

4

don't mean to jump in your argument, Pat, but if I'm

5

going to agree with you --

6

THE COURT:

7

So, let me make sure what I

understand the agreement is, then.
MR. BANDUCCI:

8

9

Okay.

On Instruction 35?

Your Honor, yes.

On 35, there

are two elements -- and the second one is MRIA's lost

10

fair market value.

11

prove loss two different ways, lost profits or diminution

12

in value, what we did in this case was we had Mr. Budge

13

testify to historical lost profits.

14

measured the transfer of scans from, you know, revenues

15

associated with scans from one of the businesses to the

16

other.

17

Recognizing the law allows you to

And he simply

What Mr. Wilhoite did, although he is the

18

business appraiser and he used a business appraiser's

19

approach, what he did was he took lost profits, projected

20

them out --

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. BANDUCCI:

23

to present value.

.j

Right.
and then, discounted them back

So, it is a lost profits analysis --

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. BANDUCCI:

Okay.
using the appraisal methods,
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1

if you will.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. BANDUCCI:

4

All right.
So, it's not a diminution in

value.
THE COURT:

5

Both parties agree,

so we'll just--

6

net profits lost are measured from MRI scans lost through

7

the term of the partnership.

8

All right.

9

MR. MILLER:

Okay?

Go ahead.

Continue, Mr. Miller.

Paragraph 30 -- excuse me.

10

Instruction 38 the last phrase "or percentage of

11

negligence," I think that-- I don't--

12
13

THE COURT:
negligence."

14

15

We're going to strike "percentage of

MR. MILLER:

They have already mentioned that.

Maybe I didn't hear that.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. MILLER:
again,

They did.
Okay.

As to the special verdict

I;

18

form,

I think we will -- you know, we have one

19

that I believe we're comfortable with,

20

to help the jury understand that there is proximate cause

21

requirements and different proximate cause requirements,

22

different proof requirements, causes of actions, the

23

damages ought to be referenced by claim.

24

ought to be an instruction that says,

25

only award the amount once.

I think.

In order

And then, there

"Look.

You can

You don't double-dip or
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3. Financial Support Before SARMC Withdrew From MRIA

In addition to the financial investment in IT set forth above, SARMC, while still a partner in
MRIA, gave IMI $546,146 and assumed almost $1.5 million ofiMI's debt. (!d. at1557:41558:2; 1622:22-1623:8.)
'

(

4. SARMC/IMPs Joint Marketing to Shift Referrals from MRIA to IMI.

While still a partner in MRIA, SARMC worked with IMI to obtain a combined market share

I
I

for MRI, in direct competition with MRIA. (Trial Ex. 4248; TR Vol. II at 1643:7-13; TR Vol. III
at 4169:10-17.) SARMC and IMijointly marketed by television, radio, newspapers, letters to
referring physicians and physician-to-physician office visits. (Trial Exs. 4248 & 41 07; TR Vol. II
at 1643:23-1644:22.) This pervasive marketing effort had the goal of promoting both SARMC
and IMI to referring physicians. (TR Vol. II at 1646: 1-7.) Because affiliation with SARMC was a
strong marketing tool, marketing for MRIA became difficult by early 2000 when IMI was being
marketed as SARMC's MRI imaging center as (/d. at 2420:11-16, 2428:21-2429:6.) it caused
confusion among the refelTing doctors as to which imaging center was·affiliated with SARMC.
5. SARMC Visibly Shifts its Name Association to IMI by Making IMI a
SARMC "Outpatient Facility,

While still a partner in MRIA, SARMC made IMI an outpatient facility for SARMC. (!d. at
1582:10-1583:24, Trial Ex. 4209.) This development was communicated to the referring doctor
community (MRIA's source of business) causing MRIA to lose scans as doctors became "used to
sending patients to IMI, not just for CT, but for MRI as well." (!d. at 1583:17-24.)
6. SARMC's Usurpation ofMRIA's Meridian Opportunity

10
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While still a partner in MRIA, SARMC and GSR agreed to pursue and establish IMI Meridian
(aka IMI West), which would include an MRI scanner. (Trial Exs. 4115,4211 & 4275; TR Vol.
II at 1590: l1M23; 1613:SM12; 1615:20M23.) SARMC provided this suppot1 even though it knew
MRIA was planning to expand operations into Meridian and thereby usurped MRIA's
opportunity to establish an MRI scanner in Meridian. To add insult to injury MRICI and MRIM
lost scans to IMI Meridian. (Trial Exs. 4425, 4515, 4516, & 4517.)
I.

SARMC Condones and/or Turns a Blind Eye to Conduct by the Radiologists
Intended to Shift Referrals from MRIA to IMI.

Shortly after IMI opened in fall 1999, MRIA began to notice a "shift in attitude" in the
radiologists relative to the performance of their responsibilities at MRICI. (TR Vol. II at
1176: 19M 1177:3.) Initially, this shift in attitude was demonstrated by reduced time and attention

in MRICI's "lab" as well as inadequate support ofMRICI's technicians. (ld at 1176: 19-1177:3;
2385:2M2387:1; 2511 :3-24.) MRIA requested Bruce to intervene and return radiologist service

to its previous, professional level:
"The time has come for SARMC to insist [that its radiologists] provide full, supportive
radiologic coverage ofthe lab at historical levels of professionalism and service .... [Such
coverage] cannot be allowed to be withdrawn simply because the radiologists ofthe lab are
now also its competitors. We now view as a necessity SARMC's providing the lab with full,
supp011ive, traditional radiologist coverage or permitting the MRI Center of Idaho to contract
directly with radiologists as a fiduciary responsibility of SARMC to its other general and
limited partners.
(Trial Ex. 4137 at 2.) Bruce never responded to MRIA's request. (TR VoL II at 1182:9-14.)
As time progressed, and SARMC's relationship with IMI deepened, the radiologists became
bolder in their unfair tactics. For example, (1) the radiologists unil.aterally reduced their weekday

ll
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impracticable to perform the analysis SARMC erroneously alleges is required. (TR Vol. II at
2766:8-2768:6.) Performing such an analysis is also impracticable because it is difficult to (1)
get a representative sample, (2) get doctors to participate, and (3) get an unbiased sample. (/d.)
SARMC's expert likewise did not do such an analysis. (TR Vol. III at 3235:15-3236:8.) MRIA
analysis, without interviewing all 1900 referring physicians, proved the amount of damage with
reasonable certainty and SARMC as the wrongdoer cannot complain about any uncet1ainty.
Griffith, 143 Idaho at 740-41, 152 P.3d at 611-12. 39

3. MRIA is also Entitled to Damages Because SARMC Usurped a
Partnership Opportunity.

SARMC owed a fiduciary duty to MRIA not to usurp a partnership opportunity. I.C. § 53-3404(b)(1). Under this rule. the misappropriation of a partnership opportunity is considered a
usurpation of partnership property and a breach of a fiduciary duty and the partnership is entitled
to any profits realized from such usurpation. See id. (official comment). Here, as set forth in Part
I. E. F. supra., SARMC usurped MRIA's opportunity to partner with the radiologists, GSR, in an

imaging center and took that opportunity for itself by partnering with the radiologists in IMI. As
discussed above, MRIA took a more conservative approach than what would be allowed under a
theory of usurpation.
4.

MRIA Is Entitled to Lost Profits Through 2023

SARMC argues the tl'ial court erred in allowing MRIA to seek lost scan damages for the years
2015 to 2023 and bases its argument on the erroneous assertion that MRIA "did not make any
39

Conspicuously, SARMC offered no alternative methodology.
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Charles Wilhoite
1

2
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3
4
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August 9, 2011

1
Q. On page 6 of your report. Let me --let
2
me just take a step back. I'm sorry. If we were to
3
hypothetically assume that Mr. Budge omitted certain
I 4
variable costs from his figures to arrive at these
numbers, would you still have confidence in those
6
numbers?
7
MR. WOODARD: Objection. Improper
hypothetical.
8~
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. I think you can still answer.
t1
Hypothetically, if he omitted a significant variable
2
cost, would you have confidence in his numbers?
3
A. Well-4
MR. WOODARD: Objection. Vague and
5
ambiguous, as well.
6
THE WITNESS: I'll answer. Hypothetically,
7
if he omitted anything that had a material impact,
8
possibly. But once again, I've adjusted numbers
t9
myself and I'm comfortable with the margin that I
'
0
arrive at. In that, you know, you have to have some
1
definition of materiality with regard to losing
2
confidence in numbers.
3
BY MR. VERGONIS:
4
Q. Would 7.5 percent in revenues be material?
5
A. Not according to Mr. McCarthy.
Page 41

Is

j

i

............

Q. What do you mean by that?
1
A. Well, in his testimony, he said a
2
difference of25 percent was no material change.
3
Q. Would 7.5 percent of revenues be material
4
to you?
5
A. Possibly.
6
7
Q. What would it depend on?
7
8
A. If it was factual and you're telling me to
8
9 hypothetically assume it.
9
0
Q. Yeah.
0
1
A. I think a better way to answer is it may
1
2 have some impact on his number, but it wouldn't have
2
3 any impact on my number.
3
4
Q. On page 6 of your report, you have a
4
5 paragraph with regard to Footnote 1 and Supplemental
5
6 Report of Bruce Budge. "It is important to note
6
7 that the present value of the estimated future
7
8 profits that will be realized by IMI through 20 15 is
8
9 approximately 16.5 million," then the sentence
9
0 continues. Do you see that?
0
1
A. Yes.
1
2
Q. This paragraph is not in your May report,
3 right?
4
A. No, it is not.
~4
5
Q. Why did you add this paragraph?
~5
Page 42!
1
2
3
4
5
6

t

t
i

~~

A. Well, in clarifying the difference between
my management fee cash flow and the component value
relating to management fee, I had further
discussions with Mr. Budge and I understood that he
had considered an alternative theory relating to
lost profits based on a disgorgement concept. And
I'm not an attorney so I won't pretend to give you
all the legal definitions, but basically he
explained to me that he viewed the potential profits
that SARMC stood to gain in the future-- I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
He looked at the historical profits that
IMI realized and said if that had not happened, MRIA
would have realized those profits, meaning, if IMI
hadn't gone into affiliation with SARMC. And in
talking about that I should -- well, the way I would
look at that going forward is I can look at the
expected future profits that IMI will realize, or is
expected to realize, and assume that the same -that half of that would have gone to MRIA, and
that's why this paragraph was included.
Q. Okay. Budge explained that to you
sometime between May and -- May 2nd and July 29th?
A. Yes. It was a brief conversation about
it. I believe he had a reference to it in his
Page 43
·························································-·········

································

report. I can't recall as I sit here.
Q. Well, what-- how did that conversation
come about? Did he call you to tell you about this
new theory?
A. No. I believe we were talking about
capacity and the management fee and it came up
during the course of that conversation.
Q. Okay. So this paragraph isn't in response
to anything in Dr. McCarthy's report, right, this
paragraph?
A. I can't recall exactly if it related to
anything specifically in Dr. McCarthy's report.
Q. Okay. Why do you say, "It's important to
note," this point there, on the second line of
paragraph?
A. Because of the relationship implied, Mr.
Budge looked at the profits ofiMI over roughly a
12-year period and based on the court ruling
instruction -- instructing us to look at damages
only through 2015, I said, "Well, if you look at the
profits that IMI is expected or projected to realize
from 2011 through 2015, it's roughly a four-year
period."
Q. Okay.
A. His analysis was 12 years. I said the
Page 44
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tb"nducci@greenerlaw.com
G. Rey Reinhardt, IV (ISB No. 6209)
greinhardt@greenerlaw. com
Daniel J. Gordon (ISB No. 6051)
dgordon@greenerlaw. com
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third
Party PlaintiffMRI Associates, LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. CV OC 0408219D
MRIA 'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSES TO
INTERROGATORY NO.7

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership, on its own behalf, and on behalf ofMRI
Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership,
CounterClaimants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
CounterDefendants.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,
Third-Part Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendant!Counterclaimant, MRI Associates, LLP, ("MRIA"), by and
through its counsel of record, Greener Banducci Shoemaker, P .A., and again supplements its
responses to Interrogatory No.7 as follows.
INTERROGATORY NO.7:

Please identify with specificity every item and

amount of damage you allege under Paragraphs 26, 27, 29 and 31 ofyour Answer to Complaint
and Counterclaim.
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER: For the items and amounts of damages
alleged by MRIA, see the expert reports of Bruce P. Budge, Charles A. Wilhoite, and W. Ed.
Whitelaw and the depositions of those experts.

Without limiting the types or amounts of

damages described in the expert reports, the damages sustained by MRIA as a result of the
wrongful dissociation by SARMC from the MRIA Partnership are described in footnote 5 of the
Expert Opinion of Charles A. Wilhoite, dated March 12, 2007. As explained in greater detail in
footnote 5 of the Wilhoite Expert Report, and without limiting the measure of damages stated
therein, the damages for wrongful dissociation are the amounts SARMC would have had to pay

MRIA'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORY NO.7- Page 2
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MRIA in order to lawfully release itself from its contractual obligations to MRIA-that is, $35.8
million.
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER:

Paragraph 26 ofMRIA's counterclaim alleges that

MRIA is entitled to recover damages for wrongful dissociation pursuant to Idaho Code § 53-3602. Idaho Code § 53-3-602(c) provides that a partner who wrongfully dissociates is liable to
the partnership and to the other partner for damages caused by the dissociation. MRIA contends
that SARMC is responsible for all expenses and damages that are causally related to the
wrongful dissociation of SARMC from the MRIA partnership. This would include all direct and
consequential damages arising from its wrongful withdraw! from the partnership, including
economic losses such as lost profits, diminution in value and injured business reputation.

Paragraph 27 of MR.IA's counterclaim seeks declaratory relief, and therefore does not
seek damages, per se. By its terms, the declaratory relief claim contained in paragraph 27 seeks
an order declaring that MRIA is entitled to obtain damages for wrongful dissociation.
In paragraph 29 of MRIA's counterclaim, MRIA seeks damages arising out of alleged
breaches of fiduciary duty by SARMC. Idaho Code § 53-3-404 provides that a partner which
breaches its fiduciary duties of loyalty and care is liable to its partners and partnership for
damages. As such, MRIA is entitled to recover damages arising from conduct prohibited in §
53-3-404(b)(l), (2) and (3). Likewise, insofar as SARMC's conduct amounted to "reckless" or
"intentional misconduct" as those terms are used under Idaho Code § 53-3-404, MRIA would be
entitled to recover damages causally connected to SARMC's misconduct in the performance of
its partnership responsibilities.

Such damages would include economic losses such as lost

profits, diminution in value and injured business reputation.

MRIA'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORY NO.7- Page 3
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With respect to paragraph 31 of MRJA's counterclaim, MRIA contends that it is entitled
to all direct and consequential damages arising out of SARMC's breaches of the obligation of
good faith and fair dealing as described in Idaho Code § 53-3-404(d). Such damages would
include the economic losses described above.
DATED this

day of April, 2007.
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A.

Attorneys for Defendant

MRIA'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORY NO.7- Page 4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'f~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of April, 2007, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:

0

Wan·en E. Jones
EBERLE BERLIN
300 N. 6th Street, 2nd Floor
Post Office Box 1368
Boise, ID 83 701
[Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants]

U.S.Mail
D Facsimile (208) 344-8542
ffHand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

Rodney R. Saetrum
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
101 South Capitol Boulevard
Suite 1800
Boise, ID 83 702
[Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants]

0

U.S. Mail
bL,Eaesimile (208) 336-0448
,t::J Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

D

JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER
509 West Hayes
Post Office Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
[Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants]

U.S.Mail

[:J.Jacsimile (208) 336-9177
-t:::f Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

D

0

Patrick J. Miller
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
[Attorneys for Plaintif£'Counter-Defendants]

U.S.Mail

bJ j:acsimile (208) 388-13 00

l i Hand Delivery

D

Overnight Deli very

I
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
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Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
ISTARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

OPPOSITION TO SAINT
v.
ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO
EXCLUDE MRIA'S DAMAGES
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability THEORIES
Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership; MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an
Idaho Limited Partnership; and MRI MOBILE
LIMITED, an Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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ORIGINAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this opposition to Saint Alphonsus 's Motion to
exclude MRIA's damages theories, filed September 2, 2011, as well as Saint Alphonsus 's
Supplemental Memorandum in support of the same, filed September 16, 2011.
Only days before trial of this matter was slated to begin, Saint Alphonsus submitted what
is essentially a Motion for Summary Judgment on various damages theories presented by MRIA.
This is long past the time set by the Court for the filing of dispositive motions, much less
motions of any kind. Notably, MRIA submitted its experts' reports on damages four months ago,
on May 5, 2011. None of Saint Alphonsus 's arguments or assertions is based on newly
discovered evidence. Saint Alphonsus could have and should have brought this motion in
conformance with the Court's scheduling orders. Instead, Saint Alphonsus has burdened the
Court and Counsel with a late motion on several critical factors of MRIA's case. The Court
ordered that all motions be heard by August 5, 2011. (Order Setting Deadline for NonDispositive Motions, July 26, 2011.) In addition, Saint Alphonsus 's arguments are chiefly
arguments that "causation" has not been adequately shown. The Court already rejected this
argument once, in its Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motions for Judgment on
the Pleadings and Motions for Summary Judgment, Nov. 16, 2010, p. 18-20. As such, this Court
should simply decline to hear this tardy motion. Nevertheless, MRIA will respond to the
unmeritorious arguments raised by Saint Alphonsus.
In addition, Saint Alphonsus recently filed a Supplemental Memorandum, apparently in
response to MRIA's Objection to Jury Instruction Regarding Consulting Estimate (September 13,
2011 ). In that filing, MRIA indicated its intent to present the theory of damages that the values
of MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited have dropped

OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S DAMAGES THEORIES- 2
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precipitously because of the actions of Saint Alphonsus. Saint Alphonsus argues that this theory
was abandoned in the prior proceedings, that the theory was not previously disclosed, and that it
is an inappropriate measure of damages. MRIA will likewise respond to these unmeritorious
contentions.

BACKGROUND
On February 15, 2011, upon Saint Alphonsus 's motion, the Court permitted the parties to
reopen expert discovery regarding damages. (Order Reopening Discovery and Setting Schedule,
Feb. 15, 2011.) Indeed, pursuant to its request, Saint Alphonsus was permitted to obtain an
entirely new expert and present entirely new defenses to MRIA's damages. After being
permitted to disclose an entirely new expert with entirely new theories, Saint Alphonsus
complains that MRIA's experts, who pursuant to the Court's order, submitted their updated
reports on May 2, 2011 1, present "new" theories of damages in those updated reports. Because
Saint Alphonsus disclosed an entirely new expert with an entirely new report containing entirely
new theories, it has no standing to complain even if any new theories were propounded by
MRIA's experts.
The fact, however, is that the opinions ofMRIA's experts, Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite,
are not new, but instead are truly updates of their prior opinions. These updated reports take into
account the changes in the case stemming from the Supreme Court's opinion, and also new data
available for actual operations of the IMI entities and MRIA since the last trial of this matter. As

Mr. Budge said, "[m ]y method for calculating damages to MRIA has not changed, therefore I
will discuss how my analysis of additional operating results from late 2006 through 2010 by the

1

Mr. Budge provided an amendment, adding one table, on May 23, 2011.

OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S DAMAGES THEORIES- 3
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parties has led me to update my damages figures." (Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of
SaintAlphonsus's Motion to Exclude MRIA's New and Improper Damages Theories ("Gjording
Aff."), Ex. E, Supplemental Expert Report of Bruce P. Budge ("Budge Supp. Report"), p. 5-6.)
In Mr. Budge's first report, he presented four calculation methods. In Calculation
Method 1, he calculated MRIA's damages from 1999 through 2006 as "lost scans," i.e., all of
IMI's scans on the Saint Alphonsus campus, all of IMI's operations in Meridian, and the scans
done by IMI in downtown Boise which had been previously affiliated with Saint Alphonsus or
MRIA. (Gjording Aff., Ex. A, Expert Report of Bruce P. Budge ("Budge First Report"), p. 11.)
These damages were based on the premise that, had Saint Alphonsus not improperly supported
IMI, IMI would not have performed any scans at the Saint Alphonsus Campus, (id. at p. 12); that
MRIA should have been given the Meridian opportunity, (id. at p. 13); and that if Saint
Alphonsus had honored its responsibilities as a partner in MRIA, the Saint Alphonsus/MRIA
affiliated physicians would have continued to refer patients to MRI Center rather than IMI (id. at
p. 14.) Calculation Method 2 was the same as Method 1, save that the damages period began on
July 1, 2001. (!d. at p. 17 .) Calculation Method 3 was similar to Method 1, save that the lost
Meridian revenues were computed under the assumption that not all scans were lost, but only
those from previously affiliated physicians. (Id. at p. 13, n. 5.) Calculation Method 4 was the
same as Method 3, save that the damages period began on July 1, 2001. (Id. at p. 17, n. 10.) Mr.
Wilhoite then used these numbers as a starting point to project future lost profits. (Gjording Aff.
Ex. B, Expert Opinion of Charles Wilhoite, March 12, 2007 ("Wilhoite First Report").)
Mr. Budge's supplemental expert report took into account a number of changed
circumstances, which caused an increase in his damages calculations. One of those changes, of
course, is the passage of time between 2006 through 2010, which shifted those damages from the

OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS 'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S DAMAGES THEORIES- 4

002542

"future loss" calculation in Mr. Wilhoite's report to the "past loss" calculation in Mr. Budge's
report. Another notable change is the opening of a fourth IMI facility in Eagle, which occurred
after the prior trial of this matter. Mr. Budge's Updated Calculation Method 1 is an update from
the Original Calculation Method 1, inserting the data since 2006 and the data concerning IMI
Eagle. (Budge Supp. Report, p. 7.) Mr. Budge's analysis of the IMI Eagle facility is premised
on the idea that Saint Alphonsus usurped MRIA's opportunity to partner with IMI and participate
in the opening of new facilities, such as Eagle. It is also premised on the idea that Saint
Alphonsus should have assisted MRIA in establishing an Eagle location. (!d. at p. 10.) Updated
Calculation Method 2 is the same as Method 1, but the damages period is changed to begin on
July 1, 2001, rather than 1999. Mr. Budge also presented two alternative calculations, Methods 3
and 4, for computing lost Meridian and Eagle revenues and profits under the assumption that
only scans diverted from Saint Alphonsus or MRIA affiliated physicians were lost scans. (!d. at
p. 11.)

Mr. Budge also takes into account the changed circumstances caused by the Supreme
Court's ruling that Saint Alphonsus had lawfully dissociated and could therefore lawfully
compete after 2005. In the previous trial, as the dissociation was unlawful, anything which
occurred after that dissociation was also unlawful. The Supreme Court's ruling necessarily
altered MRIA's approach to damages after 2005. On retrial it becomes necessary for MRIA to
connect those later damages to prior bad acts. All of Mr. Budge's calculation methods do so.
However, in response to the Supreme Court's ruling, MRIA has also presented the alternative
theory that those damages after 2005 flow from the fact that Saint Alphonsus usurped MRIA's
opportunity to partner with IMI.

Mr. Budge therefore presents Calculation Method 5, which

calculates the damages upon the theory that Saint Alphonsus usurped MRIA's opportunity to
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partner with IMI. (Budge Supp. Report at p. 12; Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion to Exclude MRIA's Damages Theories ("Parker Aff."), Ex. A ("Budge
Depo."), p. 49:1-3 "[Method 5 is] basically showing what the economic value is under ...
MRIA's theory of the usurped corporate opportunity"). Notably, this calculation is also based on
an alternative non-usurpation theory that IMI would never have commenced operations but for
Saint Alphonsus 's affiliation with it. (Budge Supp. Report at p. 12.) Under this calculation, it is
assumed that all IMI scans (including all of the IMI Downtown scans) rightfully belonged to
MRIA. !d. This calculation method also includes the capital expenditures that MRIA would have
been required to incur in order to meet increased volume. !d. From each of Mr. Budge's
alternatives, Mr. Wilhoite uses these numbers as a starting point to project future lost profits.
(GjordingAff. Ex. F, Expert Opinion of Charles Wilhoite, May 2, 2011 ("Wilhoite Supp.
Report").)
ARGUMENT
A.

Damages Beyond 2005
1.

Damages Beyond 2005 are Permissible as a Matter of Law

Saint Alphonsus seeks to prevent MRIA's experts from advancing the argument that Saint
Alphonsus may be liable for damages after 2005. To the extent that Saint Alphonsus asserts that
damages cannot be assessed beyond 2005 because Saint Alphonsus was not in breach of the
partnership agreement, Saint Alphonsus is mistaken. These damages can be based on Saint
Alphonsus's breach of fiduciary duty. This is illustrated by the case Bushi v. Sage Health Care,
PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 203 P.3d 694 (2009). In Bushi, members of a limited liability company
changed the operating agreement to allow for the expulsion of a member upon the votes of the
other members, and had then immediately expelled the member. The expelled member argued
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that the other members had breached their fiduciary duties. The other members asserted that
since they had acted in conformance with the operating agreement, as a matter of law they could
not have violated their fiduciary duties. The Supreme Court found otherwise. The Court noted
that "[ w ]hile it is true that generally a member of an LLC is not liable to the LLC or any other
member for actions taken in compliance with the operating agreement, the member must have
relied on the provisions of the agreement in good faith." !d. at 770, 203 P.3d at 700. The Court
illustrated by noting cases in which a capital call made for the purpose of diluting a partner's
interest or using economic coercion to make limited partners sell at a reduced price, even though
technically not a breach of the operative agreements, were breaches of fiduciary duty. !d. The
Court said that "'whether a technical breach has occurred is not the sole consideration' because
actions taken in accordance with [an operating agreement] can still be a breach of fiduciary duty
if [members] have improperly taken advantage of their position to obtain financial gain."' !d.,
citing Schafer v. RMS Realty, 741 N.E.2d 155, 175 (Ohio 2000). The Court held that the action

of expelling the LLC member, while technically in conformance with the operating agreement,
could nevertheless constitute a "breach of fiduciary duty ifthose actions were improperly
motivated." Bushi, 146 Idaho at 771, 203 P.3d at 701. The Court therefore remanded for an
inquiry into the motivation, holding that if the other members "acted in bad faith by removing
[the member] from the LLC in order to advance their personal financial interests .... [they]
would be liable to [a member] despite their technical compliance with the operating agreement."
!d.

Such is the case here. Saint Alphonsus contends that it cannot be liable for damages after
2005 or disgorgement because it was in technical compliance with the provisions of the
partnership agreement. However, as Bushi expressly holds, if Saint Alphonsus was acting in bad

OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S DAMAGES THEORIES- 7

002545

faith in order to advance its own financial interest, it has committed a breach of fiduciary duty
notwithstanding that it was in technical compliance with the partnership agreement. Although
Saint Alphonsus properly dissociated, as found by the Supreme Court and this Court, the
evidence will show that it did so with the improper motivation to compete with MRIA- and in
fact began to do so even before it dissociated. This places Saint Alphonsus's conduct squarely
within the Bushi analysis. As such, the Court should not prevent any argument about damages
which occurred after 2005.
Moreover, setting aside the above, the evidence will show that St. Alphonsus, while still a
partner in MRIA and while under a duty not to compete, did in fact compete and/or support a
competitor ofMRIA with such devastating effect that by the time Saint Alphonsus withdrew,
MRIA was no longer in a condition to compete. Additionally, MRIA will show that after Saint
Alphonsus withdrew, it intentionally interfered with MRIA's referrals causing MRIA to suffer
damages after withdrawal and completion of the non-compete period. If such evidence is proved
at trial, damages should not be cut-off after 2005.

2.

The Supreme Court Did Not Limit Damages that Could be Awarded to only
those which Occurred Before 2005

A number oftimes in Saint Alphonsus 's briefing, it argues that the Idaho Supreme Court
in some manner "limited" the amount of damages to those which occurred before 2005. The
argument is absurd. The Supreme Court found that Saint Alphonsus had not wrongfully
dissociated, but did not say that this in any way limited damages to those which occurred before
the running of the noncompete in 2005. The only thing the Supreme Court said about the dates
of damages concerned damages past 2015. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI
Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 497, 224 P.3d 1068, 1086 (2009). It said nothing at all about
the amount of damages, or that removal of the claim of unlawful dissociation would in any way
OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S DAMAGES THEORIES- 8
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affect the damages award on the other theories of liability. This court should disregard Saint
Alphonsus's attempt to overstate the Supreme Court's opinion.
Moreover, contrary to Saint Alphonsus 's argument otherwise, this court has already held
that MRIA should not be precluded from seeking damages after April1, 2005. As this Court has
noted, MRIA has a "right to argue in terms of their damages anything that they can reasonably
attribute to business lost even after [April 5, 2005] arising out of the breach ofthat obligation not
to compete prior to that date ... " (Gj ording Aff., Ex. D (Hearing of May 18, 2011 ). ) Saint
Alphonsus contends that MRIA will be unable to do so because MRIA's experts have not
calculated which business losses are attributable to misconduct occurring before April 5, 2005.
Saint Alphonsus has not cited to any legal reason why this constitutes legal grounds to prevent
MRIA's experts from giving their opinions about damages after 2005. Rather, Saint Alphonsus
has apparently given the Court a preview of its cross examination ofMRIA's experts- and cross
examination is where this argument belongs, as opposed to an untimely motion to prevent MRIA
from presenting an argument for damages after 2005. Regardless, SaintAlphonsus's argument
has no merit.
It appears that Saint Alphonsus 's bases the majority of this portion of its argument on an

exchange which occurred during Mr. Budge's deposition, concerning a hypothetical world in
which Saint Alphonsus had committed no bad acts, but still dissociated. Mr. Budge explained
that his "lost scans" calculations assumed that, had Saint Alphonsus not engaged in bad acts,
everyone would have remained a "happy family" and that Saint Alphonsus would likely not have
dissociated. (Budge Depo. p. 85.) Mr. Budge explained that, in that non-existent world, if Saint
Alphonsus had dissociated after all at some point, there would have been a natural, non-wrongful
impact on MRIA's scans. (Budge Depo. p. 86) Mr. Budge explained that if the jury thought that
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Saint Alphonsus would have dissociated anyway, MRIA could have lost scans due to nonactionable conduct because oflack of affiliation. (Budge Depo. p. 90-96.) Mr. Budge testified
that he did not make the calculation about that "but for" world. (!d. at 90) To the extent that
Saint Alphonsus believes that these calculations are deficient, this is not grounds for excluding
the expert testimony of MRIA's experts, but is a matter for cross-examination and Saint
Alphonsus's own expert.
It appears that Saint Alphonsus also argues that, because Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite

assume a "happy family" world in which Saint Alphonsus does not dissociate, their opinions are
simply assertions that Saint Alphonsus should not have competed after April2005, when in fact
it could lawfully do so. Saint Alphonsus apparently believes that MRIA's experts must be
causation experts, and that the jury is incapable of examining the facts to determine if anything
that Saint Alphonsus did before April 5, 2005, has caused ongoing damages to MRIA. MRIA
does intend to demonstrate how it has been so harmed, by presenting evidence that IMI would
not have existed (or would not existed in a form able to harm MRIA to the extent that it did); that
Saint Alphonsus wrongfully directed and encouraged MRIA's customers (i.e., the referring
doctors) to use IMI facilities instead of MRIA facilities; that Saint Alphonsus destroyed MRIA's
business and reputation prior to April 2005 so that it was unable to compete after that date; that
Saint Alphonsus assisted IMI with opportunities prior to its dissociation rather than giving that
assistance to MRIA; that Saint Alphonsus gave IMI a competitive edge by giving it significant
technical assistance; that Saint Alphonsus thwarted the growth ofMRI Mobile; and that Saint
Alphonsus generally "feathered its nest" prior to April2005 for a soft landing at a fullyfunctional IMI, etc. As Mr. Budge testified,
I've actually measured what the migration of affiliated physicians is
between St. Al 's and IMI. ... that pattern of attrition ... might be conflated with
OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S DAMAGES THEORIES- 10
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the consequences of other bad acts that don't have to- anything to do with the
dissociation ... but the bad acts.
(Budge Depo. p. 104.) As such, MRIA's experts should not be precluded from giving the jury
the tools, through its expert witnesses, to calculate the amount of those damages. Put another
way, the jury could agree (and is fully capable of making its own determination) that, despite the
fact that Saint Alphonsus could lawfully compete after April2005, all or most ofMRIA's
damages came from Saint Alphonsus 's bad acts that occurred prior to April 5, 2005.

B.

Usurpation
Saint Alphonsus brings what is essentially a breathtakingly late Motion for Summary

Judgment, seeking for the Court to hold that MRIA cannot seek damages arising out of Saint
Alphonsus 's usurpation of MRIA's opportunity to partner with IMI. Saint Alphonsus argues that
this theory is "entirely new" and time barred under the statute of limitations. Saint Alphonsus 's
complaints about any "new" theory of damages are disingenuous, as Saint Alphonsus itself has
presented its own entirely new expert with an entirely new theory of damages which, at times,
directly contradicts positions previously taken by Saint Alphonsus. Furthermore, Saint
Alphonsus previously agreed that usurpation of a corporate opportunity was "fair game" at trial.
At a hearing on April 22, 2011, the Court and counsel were discussing the impact of the court's
ruling regarding the wrongful dissociation statute. Counsel for Saint Alphonsus noted:
MR AYER: ... Your Honor said absolutely correctly, it isn't that they can't make
allegations and put on evidence that we breached our fiduciary duty prior to
dissociating or that we breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing prior
to dissociating, or that we committed tortious interference, if they have evidence
of tortious interference at any time, or that we violated the noncompete prior to
April, 2005. All of that is fair game. What isn'tTHE COURT: Or that you co-opted a partnership opportunity.
MR. AYER: That's triie. That's right. But it would have to be when we were a
partner. It would have to be. And all of that is correct.
OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS 'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S DAMAGES THEORIES- 11
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(Parker Aff., Ex. B (Hearing of April22, 2011), p. 17:6-20.) SaintAlphonsus should be held to
its previous agreements about the theories that were proper to present at trial.
Regardless, MRIA's usurpation theory is not new, and was presented in the first trial and
on appeal. SARMC owed a fiduciary duty to MRIA not to usurp a partnership opportunity. I. C.
§ 53-3-404(b)(1 ). Under this rule, the misappropriation of a partnership opportunity is
considered an usurpation of partnership property and a breach of a fiduciary duty, and the
partnership is entitled to any profits realized from such usurpation. See id. (official comment).
MRIA raised the co-opting of a partnership opportunity in its Counterclaim. (First Amended
Counterclaim, May 7, 2006, ~ 81; Second Amended Counterclaim, Feb. 28,2007

at~

93.) In the

first trial, MRIA presented evidence that while still a partner in MRIA, SARMC agreed to pursue
and establish IMI Meridian. (Parker Aff., Exs. C-E (Initial Trial Exs. 4115, 4211 & 4275), Ex. F
(TR Vol. II at 1590:11-23; 1613:5-12; 1615:20-23.) MRIAargued that SARMC provided this
support even though it knew MRIA was planning to expand operations into Meridian and thereby
usurped MRIA's opportunity to establish an MRI scanner in Meridian. In addition, MRIA
argued on appeal that Saint Alphonsus had usurped MRIA's opportunity to partner with IMI.
(Parker Aff., Ex. G (Respondent's Brief), p. 10-11, 53.) Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's argument
otherwise, this is not a new theory.
Saint Alphonsus also argues that this damage calculation is time barred, asserting that
because IMI was formed in 1999, MRIA had four years (i.e., until September 3, 2003) to
advance this theory of damages under the statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty, I. C.
§ 5-224. MRIA filed its original counterclaim on May 20, 2005. Saint Alphonsus's argument
that a theory of damages - rather than a cause of action - is barred by the statute of limitations is
a novel one. Notably, Saint Alphonsus has not cited any case law at all for that proposition.
OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S DAMAGES THEORIES- 12
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Even if the Court is inclined to consider this statute oflimitations argument (which certainly
could have been raised in May 2011, when Saint Alphonsus admits that Mr. Budge raised the
theory in his expert report), the statute oflimitations does not bar recovery for usurped
opportunities that occurred after May 20, 2001. Notably, Saint Alphonsus became a partner of
IMI in June 2001. As such, even if Saint Alphonsus 's statute of limitations argument was
relevant, the statute of limitations does not bar recovery for this usurpation of a partnership
opportunity in June 2001.

C.

MRIA's Disgorgement Theory of Damages
1.

The Theory is Appropriate for Retrial

Saint Alphonsus also challenges MRIA's "disgorgement" theory of damages. It first
argues that disgorgement is a new theory beyond the scope of the issues on retrial. Idaho Code §
53-3-404(b)(1) provides that a partnership must "hold as trustee" any benefit derived from the
appropriation of a partnership opportunity. The official comment to that section notes that "the
partnership can recover any money or property in the partner's hands that can be traced to the
partnership;" that is, require disgorgement. In the prior trial of this matter, there was no need for
MRIA to advance the theory of disgorgement for usurpation of a partnership opportunity because
damages flowed from Saint Alphonsus 's wrongful withdrawal. As Saint Alphonsus points out so
often, the Supreme Court explicitly held that that Saint Alphonsus 's withdrawal was not
wrongful. And, as Saint Alphonsus likewise notes, it is now necessary for MRIA to connect its
damages to bad acts which occurred before 2005. MRIA has done so with this damages theory.
This damage theory is not beyond the scope of the issues on retrial, because it directly addresses
damages in light ofthe Supreme Court's ruling, which removed SaintAlphonsus's dissociation
as the connecting bad act to damages after 2005.
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2.

The Disgorgement Theory of Damages did not have to be Plead

Saint Alphonsus next argues that the damage theory of disgorgement should not be
allowed because it does not appear in the pleadings. It notes, for example, that Saint Alphonsus
was recently prevented from advancing the claim that MRIA breached fiduciary duties because it
had not been pled. (Consolidated Order re: Motions Heard Aug. 5, 2011, at p. 1.) Saint
Alphonsus attempts to use this holding to assert that MRIA could have pled the damages theory
of disgorgement in its Counterclaim. Saint Alphonsus fails to recognize that there is a significant
difference between a claim of liability and a theory of damages. Breach of fiduciary duty is a
claim ofliability. Disgorgement, on the other hand, is merely one way of calculating damages
once liability on that underlying claim is found. SeeR. G Nelson, A.IA. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409,
413, 797 P.2d 117, 121 (1990) (allowing disgorgement, although it had not been pled). Idaho is a
notice pleading state. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a pleading is sufficient
if it contains a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,
and a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Under notice
pleading, a party is not
slavishly bound to stating particular theories in its pleadings ... A complaint must
merely state claims upon which relief may be granted, and pleadings should be
liberally construed in the interest of securing "a just, speedy and inexpensive
resolution of the case." ... The technical rules of pleading have long been
abandoned in Idaho, and the "general policy behind the current rules of civil
procedure is to provide every litigant with his or her day in court."

Brown v. City ofPocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 807, 229 P.3d 1164, 1169 (20 10) (citations omitted).
"There is no requirement that a complaint include a statement of the various legal theories upon
which the plaintiff relies." Quinto v. Millwood Forest Products, Inc., 130 Idaho 162, 167, 938
P.2d 189, 194 (Ct. App.,l997). As such, it is immaterial that MRIA's Counterclaim does not
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explicitly set forth the damages theory of disgorgement. Indeed, it would have been odd for it to
have done so.

3.

The Disgorgement Theory of Damages was Properly Disclosed

Saint Alphonsus contends that the disgorgement theory of damages should be excluded
because it was disclosed after the May 2, 2011, deadline for MRIA's expert disclosures. First,
disgorgement does not require expert testimony. As noted above, disgorgement simply extracts
from Saint Alphonsus the money that it improperly received. This number can be introduced
through lay testimony and documentary evidence. The amount of money which Saint Alphonsus
received is within the usual and ordinary experience of a lay person, and thus need not be
introduced through expert opinion. See Harrison v. Binnion, 147 Idaho 645,651,214 P.3d 631,
637 (2009). As such, even if it did not appear in expert reports, MRIA should not be precluded
from advancing the theory through lay testimony.
Moreover, contrary to Saint Alphonsus's assertion otherwise, this theory was timely
disclosed in an expert report. Specifically, it is outlined in footnote 1 of Mr. Budge's
supplemental report of May 2, 2011. In that report, Mr. Budge calculates the net cash flow
operations for IMI from 1999 through 2010. (Budge Supp. Report, p. 8 n. 1.) Net cash flow is
the operating profit plus depreciation, minus capital contributions. (Budge Depo. p. 23:4-7.) He
then calculates SaintAlphonsus's interests in that cash flow. (Budge Supp. Report, p. 8 n. 1.)
This theory of damages was not merely disclosed in Mr. Budge's report, but Saint Alphonsus
then asked Mr. Budge questions about that theory during his deposition. (Budge Depo. p. 2230.) Several tables supporting that theory of damages were inadvertently omitted from the
report, but turned over to Saint Alphonsus at that deposition. Saint Alphonsus deposed Mr.
Budge regarding these tables. (Budge Depo. p. 31-36.) Saint Alphonsus actually knew of this
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damages theory, as it was timely disclosed in Mr. Budge's report, and examined Mr. Budge about
the theory and the tables during his deposition. Mr. Wilhoite was likewise deposed about this
issue. (Parker Aff., Ex. H (Wilhoite Depo.) at p. 42:14-43:21.) As such, MRIA should be
permitted to present this theory to expert testimony.

4.

Disgorgement is Appropriate for Profits After 2005

Finally, Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA is not entitled to disgorgement as a matter of
law because disgorgement cannot be obtained for profits earned by Saint Alphonsus after April 1,
2005. Again, this is an argument that could and should have been brought months ago.
Regardless, Saint Alphonsus 's argument is incorrect. Idaho Code § 53-3-603 explicitly notes
that even after a party dissociates, a party's duty of loyalty relating to the co-opting of
partnership opportunities continues ''with regard to matters arising and events occurring before
the partner's dissociation." (Emphasis added.) Saint Alphonsus's co-opting ofMRIA's
partnership opportunities occurred before dissociation. As such, Saint Alphonsus can still be
required to disgorge the profits that it received from that improper conduct, including those
which occurred after April2005, because it flows from events which occurred prior to
dissociation. SaintAlphonsus's argument otherwise is nonsensical; it would permit a partner to
take a partnership opportunity, immediately dissociate, and have its ill-gotten profits shielded
from disgorgement.
Indeed, a number of cases from other jurisdictions hold that profits obtained from prior
dealings can be reached through disgorgement. For example, in Fortugno v. Hudson Manure

Co., 51 N.J.Super. 482, 499, 144 A.2d 207, 216 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1958), a New Jersey court noted
that when a partner sought to transfer assets of the partnership to a new corporation without the
permission of the other partners, the property remained that of the partnership and could be
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recovered from that corporation. Similarly, in the Oregon case Harestad v. Weitzel, 272 Or. 199,
536 P.2d 522 (1975), a real estate partnership was dissolving. The issue was whether the
partnership could recover profits from the sale of an apartment complex built by one of the
partners in his individual capacity. The Court held that the partnership was allowed to share in
these profits. Another notable case is Unzipped Apparel, LLC v. Sweet Sportswear, LLC, 2010
WL2677441 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 2010) (reversed on other grounds) (unreported). In that case, the
defendants used the business's resources, personnel, and business contacts to establish a
competing business. The partnership sought to recover the benefit that defendants obtained as a
result of their wrongful conduct during the time that they had been in a fiduciary relationship.
The Court held that "[d]isgorgement of the defendant's unjust enrichment or wrongful gain is a
proper remedy for breach of fiduciary duty." Id.

5.

Disgorgement is an Appropriate Remedy

In a footnote, Saint Alphonsus suggests that disgorgement would be inconsistent with

Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 234, 646 P.2d 988, 1005 (1982) and the Supreme

Court's opinion in this case addressing Pope. Saint Alphonsus would apparently have the Court
ignore the legislature's express pronouncement that a partner has a duty to "hold as trustee for
[the partnership] any property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner ... derived from ... the
appropriation of a partnership opportunity." I. C. § 53-3-404(b )(1 ). In other words, the
applicable Idaho statute explicitly holds that disgorgement is not only available under these
circumstances, but a requirement of a duty of loyalty, which extends even after dissociation if the
appropriation of a partnership opportunity occurred before dissociation. I. C. § 53-3-603( c).
In addition, disgorgement of unjustly retained profits has long been deemed an
appropriate theory of recovery for breaches of fiduciary duty. An illustrative case is R. G Nelson,
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A.IA. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 797 P.2d 117 (1990). In that case, the trial court held that damages
could not be received for a breach of fiduciary duty because the party had not shown actual lost
profits. The Supreme Court disagreed, saying,
The trial court's opinion also demonstrates an incomplete understanding of the
broad remedies available for a breach of fiduciary duty.... From the passage
cited above, it appears the court believed the remedies available are identical with
those for loss of prospective advantage--damages at law flowing from a lost
business opportunity. However, there have always been equitable remedies at
hand as well. Upon establishment of a fiduciary breach, the principal may
recover in restitution any benefit acquired by the agent.

!d. at 413, 797 P.2d at 121 (emphasis added). The Court adopted Restatement of Restitution,
1937, § 138(1), which provides that "[a] fiduciary who has acquired a benefit by a breach ofhis
duty as fiduciary is under a duty of restitution to the beneficiary." R. G Nelson, 118 Idaho at 413,
797 P.2d at 121 (quoting Restatement of Restitution, 1937, § 138(1)). The comment to the
Restatement notes that "A fiduciary who commits a breach of his duty as fiduciary is guilty of
tortious conduct and the beneficiary can obtain redress either at law or in equity for the harm
done. As an alternative. the beneficiary is entitled to obtain the benefits derived by the fiduciary
through the breach of duty." !d. at cmt. a (emphasis added). Idaho courts often impose
"constructive trusts" in favor of persons who are rightfully entitled to property which has been
obtained by the other through "fraud or by violation of confidence or of fiduciary relations, [or]
in any other unconscientious manner, so that he cannot equitably retain the property which really
belongs to another." Hanger v. Hess, 49 Idaho 325, 328, 288 P. 160, 161 (1930). See also
REST 2d Trusts § 205 (where a trustee takes trust properly for himself and makes profits on it,
the trustee is "chargeable with ... any profit made by him through the breach of trust");
Holladay v. Lindsay, 143 Idaho 767, 770, 152 P.3d 638, 641 (Ct. App. 2006) (noting that if a
fiduciary makes profits, or gets interest on the money he wrongly takes from the beneficiary, he
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must be held liable for the profits or interest he makes on such funds). Contrary to Saint
Alphonsus 's argument otherwise, it is absolutely clear that Idaho law recognizes disgorgement as
a proper remedy.
Neither Pope nor the Supreme Court's discussion of Pope cast doubt on, much less
override, I. C. § 53-3-603(c) or the disgorgement theory of damages for breaches of fiduciary
duty. Pope was an antitrust case in which a group of insulators sued Intermountain Gas Co. and
its subsidiary, HomeGuard on various antitrust claims essentially alleging the defendants were
selling insulation at a loss in an attempt to monopolize the market. 103 Idaho at 220, 646 P.2d at
991. The Supreme Court found, however, as quoted in its opinion in this case, that
[t]here was no justification in the present case for the trial court's determination
that the gross revenues of the defendants ... provide a reasonable foundation for
calculating the lost profits of plaintiffs. Such a method of figuring damages
assumes, without any support in the record, that the HomeGuard operation would
not have won any portion of the insulation market absent antitrust violations.
Furthermore, it assumes that the plaintiffs had the capacity to assimilate all of the
business which HomeGuard performed, and that plaintiffs would have won that
business over other insulators who chose not to participate in this action. There is
simply no evidence in the record to demonstrate a relationship between
HomeGuard's sales figures and plaintiffs' damages so as to support a conclusion
that HomeGuard's income was the equivalent of plaintiffs' lost profits.
Id. at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005. In sum, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he record reflects" that
"none of the plaintiffs so much as made an estimate, reasoned or unreasoned, as to how much
money they lost due to the alleged antitrust violations by the defendant." !d. As this Court
found, MRIA's lost profits theory of damages did not run afoul of Pope. (Memorandum
Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motions for
Summary Judgment, Nov. 16, 2010, p. 18-20.) Nor does this disgorgement theory.
Disgorgement, of course, is not a measure of lost profits. Rather, it is a remedy that requires a
party who has breached its fiduciary duties to give up its ill gotten gains- a remedy specifically
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allowed by Idaho law for breaches of fiduciary duty. As such, the concerns articulated in Pope,
which are directly at a lost profits analysis in the context of an antitrust action, do not apply.

D.

Diminution Theory of Damages
In MRIA's Objection to Jury Instruction Regarding Consulting Estimate (September 13,

2011 ), MRIA noted that it would present as one theory of damages that the values of MRI
Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited have dropped precipitously
because of the actions of Saint Alphonsus. Saint Alphonsus has objected, contending that this
theory was abandoned in the prior proceedings, that the theory was not previously disclosed, and
that it is an inappropriate measure of damages.

1.

MRIA has Disclosed this Damages Theory Numerous Times Since 2007

Saint Alphonsus has objected on the grounds that this theory was not previously disclosed
and that presentation of the theory now is "trial by ambush." Contrary to Saint Alphonsus 's
argument, however, this damage theory has been disclosed numerous times in this litigation.
Saint Alphonsus complains that MRIA should have supplemented its prior discovery responses to
disclose this theory, particularly Interrogatory No. 7. Either Saint Alphonsus has chosen to
purposely misrepresent the record, or Saint Alphonsus did not bother to read MRIA's
supplemental discovery responses before it made this baseless assertion. In a supplemental
answer in to Interrogatory No. 7 made in April 2007, MRIA expressly disclosed to Saint
Alphonsus that its damages included "diminution in value." (Parker Aff., Ex. I, MRIA's Second
Supplemental Responses to Interrogatory No. 7, April4, 2007, at p. 3.) Saint Alphonsus has
known about this damages theory for over four years. Moreover, MRIA's experts testified
regarding the diminution in value theory in the prior proceedings. In those proceeding~, Mr.
Budge was asked:
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Q.
Finally, are there ways of approaching a measurement of loss through
valuation, through diminution in value, as we say?
A.
Sometimes when we're dealing with a situation where we have either the
destruction of a business or where it is permanently impaired, something happens
to it where it's not going to recover, the valuation method can be the most direct
method.
The reason that is is that basically the value of a company, what it
represents economically is what somebody would pay to have the rights to all the
profits that are going to come in the future. And there's calculations that we do
where we can take a projected stream of profits in the future and calculate how
much somebody would pay to own that.
And if the business was destroyed, for example, and you know what that
value is, then that is a good proxy for all those future earnings that never
occurred. Or if a business was impaired in some way where it was permanently
crippled, you can take what that valuation would have been had it not been
injured, what it is in its present state; and the difference in that valuation can
represent the damage. And that's fairly commonly used, too.
(Parker Aff., Ex. F ("Trial Transcript"), Aug. 20, 2007,) at pp. 2723:14-2724:15). Mr. Wilhoite
was likewise asked:
Q.

Okay. Now, did you review the Shattuck Hammond report?

A.

Yes, I did.

And I guess there are actually two reports: the valuation report and the
Q.
Strategic Options Assessment; correct?

A.

That's correct.

And can you tell the jury one of the reasons that you reviewed the
Q.
Shattuck Hammond report relative to business valuation and loss of value?
A.
Yes. Basically, as I testified to earlier, we're covering a long time frame
with regard to the alleged damage period. Counsel has presented information and
others have testified that the damage period actually started in 1999. The
Shattuck Hammond valuation report was developed as ofNovember, 2001. So,
it's after the damage period started. Excuse me. And we, at Willamette, and I was
retained to look at the damages that relate to loss in business value, so we needed
some starting point to use as an estimated loss in business value when we
compared it to the current value of the businesses today.
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And Shattuck Hammond performed an analysis. I reviewed that
analysis in the same way that I have been retained as an expert to review other
valuation experts' reports and write opinions on those reports. I have actually
been retained as an expert just to go to trial to determine whether or not another
expert valuation report followed the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal
Practice. And those standards, basically, line up the procedures that you should
follow, and if you follow them, your conclusion could be and should be deemed
reasonable.
So, we looked at the Shattuck Hammond analysis. I, personally, looked
at that report in relation to the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal
Practice and determined that their conclusion --

Q.
Let me ask you this question: You looked at the Shattuck Hammond
analysis, and you also did your own valuation as of what year?
A.

We did a valuation as of the current time.

Q.

2006?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. Now, when you compared the valuation done by Shattuck
Hammond in 2001 to your valuation done in 2006, what did you determine to be
the differential between MRIA companies in 2001 and MRIA companies in 2006?

Q.

Let's get back to the question I asked you.

A.

Ask it again.

Q.
Sure. Did you look at the differential in value between the Shattuck
Hammond report in 2001 and your valuation in 2006?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.
And that-- what's the difference between 2001 and 2006 as far as the
valuation of those same companies in those different periods of time?
A.
Based on my current valuation, the value declined approximately $32.5
million.
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Q.
All right. And the $32.5 million, can that be compared to the $20.9
million that you put on Exhibit 4526?
A.

Yes.

And explain to the jury how the 20.9 relates to the 32.5 and what
Q.
conclusions you draw from the difference in those two numbers?
A.
Well, basically, ifthe value declined $32-112 million, there are a lot of
things that could have caused that. My conclusion is that ofthat $32.5 million,
roughly 20.9 million of it relates to the acts of Saint Alphonsus and related parties
because it is based on the lost referrals that Mr. Budge presented to you yesterday.
That translates into lost revenue which translates into lost profits which translates
into lost business value.

Q.
So, is there approximately $12 million that is-- in business value lost that
is not being asserted here as attributable to the acts of Saint Alphonsus?
A.

That's correct.

(Trial Transcript, Aug. 21, 2007, at pp. 2869:14 - 287 4:24). This analysis was contained in Mr.
Wilhoite's initial report. (Gjording Aff., Ex. B (Wilhoite Original Report,) at p. 11-14). Perhaps
most significantly, and contrary to Saint A1phonsus's assertion otherwise, this analysis is also
contained in Mr. Wilhoite's most recent supplemental report disclosed on May 2, 2011.
(Gjording Aff., Ex. F (Wilhoite Supp. Report), at pp. 4-6; see especially p. 5 ("the decrease in the
operating revenue level for MRIA as a result of the Acts has resulting in a decrease in the current
value of MRIA ... the conversion of lost revenue to current value can be equated to the
calculation of lost business value") (emphasis added.))
As evidenced above, Saint Alphonsus has long had notice about this theory of damages,
which was disclosed during discovery, contained in Mr. Wilhoite's initial expert report, raised at
the previous trial, and revisited in Mr. Wilhoite's supplemental report. In short, Saint
Alphonsus 's argument that MRIA failed to disclose this theory or that Saint Alphonsus has had
no opportunity to prepare for it is overwhelmingly contradicted by actual events of this case. If
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Saint Alphonsus is unprepared for this damages theory, it is no fault ofMRIA, which has
disclosed it to Saint Alphonsus on numerous occasions before the first trial and again in this
proceeding.

2. MRIA Did Not Abandon This Theory
Notwithstanding the fact that MRIA disclosed this theory on multiple occasions in the
proceedings below, Saint Alphonsus contends that MRIA abandoned this theory at the previous
trial. Saint Alphonsus notes in particular two comments made by counsel during that lengthy
prior proceeding. The first was an argument about the relevancy of the Shattuck Hammond
memorandum. Counsel indicated at that time that he did not intend to present an argument about
MRIA's drop in value. (Trial Transcript, Aug. 1, 2007, p. 793.) The second was made at a jury
instruction conference on August 24, 2007, during which the parties were discussing which
damages theories should be presented to the jury. Counsel for Saint Alphonsus said that he had
not understood that a diminution in value argument was going to be presented. (Trial Transcript,
p. 3372:15-24.) Counsel for MRIAnoted that "the law allows you to prove loss two different
ways, lost profits or diminution in value," but elected to proceed with only the lost profits
analysis in that proceeding. (Trial Transcript, Aug. 24, 2007, p. 3373:10-3374:3.)
In the prior trial of this matter, there was no need for MRIA to advance the theory
diminution in value. Given the fact the jury had been instructed that Saint Alphonsus had
wrongfully dissociated, MRIA elected to proceed with the more straightforward damages theory
of"lost scans," which connected very naturally to the wrongful dissociation claim. On this
retrial, with wrongful dissociation no longer on the table, MRIA has elected to reinstate this
damages theory. Contrary to Saint Alphonsus 's assertion otherwise, this damage theory is not
beyond the scope of the issues on retrial, because it directly addresses damages in light of the
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Supreme Court's ruling, which removed SaintAlphonsus's dissociation. Moreover, as noted
above, MRIA disclosed this theory for purposes of retrial in Mr. Wilhoite's expert report of May
2, 2001. (Gjording Aff., Ex. F (Wilhoite Supp. Report), at pp. 4-6). As such, MRIA should be
permitted to present this damages theory to the jury.

3.

This Theory Does not Require Expert Testimony

As noted above, this theory was disclosed in the reports and supplemental reports of
MRIA's experts, and discussed by those experts in their prior trial testimony. However, even if it
was not, this would not be a valid basis for excluding the theory, because this is not a damages
theory for which expert testimony is required. The diminution of value damages theory is a
comparison between the value of the MRI Entities prior to Saint Alphonsus's wrongful conduct,
and their value after the wrongful conduct. The first data point - the value before the wrongful
conduct - is established through the valuations conducted by Shattuck Hammond, and can also
be established by the owners of the MRI Entities. The second data point - the present value of
the MRI Entities - can be established through the testimony of the owners of the MRI Entities.
The case Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 897, 522 P.2d 1102, 1118 ( 1974)
is directly on point. In that case, a corporation brought an action for slander and tortious
interference with contract. Its theory of damages was the net worth of the company before and
after the commission of the torts. The fifty-five percent owner testified that business had an
actual net worth prior to the commission alleged of the torts of$183,000 and that the net amount
the business was able to salvage after it closed down as result of the alleged torts was $97,000.
The Idaho Supreme Court noted that:
[i]t is a settled rule in Idaho that the owner of property is a competent witness to
its value .... "The general rule, that to qualify a witness to testify as to market
value, a proper foundation must be laid showing the witness to have knowledge
upon the subject, does not apply to a party who is testifying to the value of
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property which he owns. The owner of property is presumed, in a way, to be
familiar with its value, by reason of inquiries, comparisons, purchases and sales.
The weight of such testimony is another question, and may be affected by
disclosures made upon cross-examination as to the basis for such knowledge, but
this will not disqualify the owner as a witness."
Id., citing Rankin v. Caldwell, 15 Idaho 625, 632, 99 P. 108 (1908). The Supreme Court
therefore held that the owner's testimony about the drop in the value of the business provided
sufficient and substantial evidence which supported the jury's verdict. Barlow, 95 Idaho at 987,
522 P.2d at 1118. The Court reached the same conclusion in Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo
Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 896 P.2d 949 (1995). It noted that:
For more than eighty-five years, this Court has followed the rule that the owner of
property is a competent witness concerning its value. E.g., Howes v. Curtis, 104
Idaho 563, 568, 661 P.2d 729, 734 (1983); Rankin v. Caldwell, 15 Idaho 625,
632-33, 99 P. 108, 110 (1908). An owner is competent to testify to the value of a
going business without further qualification. Bancroft v. Smith, 80 Idaho 63, 67,
323 P.2d 879, 883 (1958). The owner's failure or inability to explain the basis for
the value given may affect the weight to be given the testimony, but it does not
disqualify the owner's opinion. Smith v. Big Lost River Irrigation Dist., 83 Idaho
374, 386, 364 P.2d 146, 158 (1961).
Pocatello Auto Color, 127 Idaho at44, 896 P.2d at 952.
The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly approved of the use oflay testimony by the
owner of a company to establish this damage theory. As noted above, MRIA's experts properly
disclosed this theory in their expert reports, and thus should be permitted to present it through
their experts. However, even if the Court finds that this theory was not adequately contained in
the expert reports, MRIA should be permitted to present it through lay testimony.

4.

Diminution in Value is an Appropriate Theory

Contrary to Saint Alphonsus 's argument otherwise, diminution in value is an entirely
appropriate measure of damages. The cases cited in the section above expressly recognize and
approve of the theory. Saint Alphonsus nevertheless argues that MRIA will not be able to show
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that its present value has a "plausible relationship" to Saint Alphonsus 's conduct. It notes other
factors which might have caused MRIA to lose value. However, as expressly noted in the cases
above, this is not a reason to exclude testimony concerning this damages theory, but rather goes
to the weight of the evidence. Saint Alphons.us is free to make this argument to the jury, but this
does not provide a legal basis for the exclusion of the theory.
Saint Alphonsus asserts that the Supreme Court would disagree with the presentation of
this damages analysis because of Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 234, 646 P.2d
988, 1005 ( 1982). Saint Alphonsus made this same argument in its motion for summary
judgment relating to MRIA's "lost scans" damage theories. (Saint Alphonsus 's Memorandum in
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment Based on the Legal Insufficiently ofMRIA's
Evidence of Lost Profits, August 6, 2010.) The Court rejected the argument then (Memorandum
Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motions for Judgment on Pleadings and Motions for Summary
Judgment, Nov. 16, 2010), and should do so again.
As this Court well knows, Pope was an antitrust case directed at the proof needed in a
"lost profits" analysis. Diminution in value is not a lost profits analysis. Saint Alphonsus cites a
breach of contract case for crop damage entitled Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 919, 684 P.2d
314, 321 (Ct. App. 1984), which notes that "the general rule on damages for breach of contract is
that they 'are not recoverable unless ... clearly ascertainable both in their nature and origin, and
unless it is also so established that they are the natural and proximate consequence of the breach
and are not contingent or speculative."' The present case, of course, is not merely a breach of
contract case. Saint Alphonsus also cites an anti-competition case discussing lost profits, Trilogy
Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P.3d 1119, 1121 (2007), which is not
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relevant to the diminution in value question for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and
tortious interference.
The evidence that MRIA will present to the jury, even if circumstantial, is more than
sufficient to put the issue before the jury. The fact that Saint Alphonsus can spin other possible
hypothetical causes does not warrant taking the issue from the jury. As the Court noted in
Trilogy Network Systems, "[d]amages need be proved only with a 'reasonable certainty[,]' and

this means 'that [the] existence of damages must be taken out of the realm of speculation."' !d.
As the Court in Wing noted, "[w ]here causation is to be inferred from circumstantial evidence,
the trier of fact must be able to find, reasonably, that the inference linking the defendant's
conduct to the damage is more probable than an inference connecting the loss to other causes."
The jury that MRIA will present is sufficient for the jury to make this inference.
An illustrative case is one cited by Saint Alphonsus called Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout

Co., Inc. 143 Idaho 733, 741, 152 P.3d 604, 612 (2007). In that case, the defendant argued that

the defendant had failed to show causation because the plaintiff never performed an analysis to
show that it had suffered increased costs because the defendant had refused to accept and
purchase certain trout. The defendant noted other possible variables, such as changes in salary,
insurance, feed, fuel, repair, etc. The Court noted that it was reasonable to infer that keeping fish
longer increased costs, notwithstanding that the plaintiff did not "analyze every potential
alternative cause." !d. Likewise, Saint Alphonsus's argument that MRIA did not analyze other
"innumerable other possible causes, such as the state of the economy, declining medical
reimbursement rates, the loss of business to lawful post-2005 competition ... the loss of business
[to other competition] .. and so on," (Supplemental Memo. p. 8,) is precisely like the argument
advanced by the defendant in Griffith. Here the jury will be presented with evidence that Saint
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Alphonsus 's many misdeeds, including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious
interference which almost completely destroyed MRIA's business. Ajury could infer from this
evidence that Saint Alphonsus's conduct is the more probable cause ofMRIA's damages than
other causes. For all of these reasons, the Court should not prevent MRIA from presenting a
diminution in value theory of damages to the jury.
CONCLUSION
The Court should not even consider Saint Alphonsus's extremely untimely motion, which
could have and should have been brought in conformance with the Court's scheduling order.
Even if the Court is inclined to consider this tardy motion, there are no grounds for excluding the
expert opinions or damages theories concerning usurpation, disgorgement, damages after April
2005, or diminution in value. As such, the Court should deny SaintAlphonsus's motion.

DATED this 19th day of September, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Dara L. Par~r
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

MRIA has attempted to inject into this case three entirely different remedies with entirely
different premises seeking entirely different-and massively increased-measurements of
damages. The assertion of these new damages remedies-two of which were prejudicially
disclosed long after the discovery deadlines, and all three of which fail as a matter of lawconflicts with MRIA's representation that "its prior damages proof was the proof with which it
could and would go to trial," MRIA Opp'n to Mot. to Reopen at 3 (Feb. 2, 2011), and with this
Court's ruling that, except to correct errors identified by the Supreme Court, "the previous
proceedings stand," Consol. Order reMotions Heard Aug. 5, 2011. MRIA should therefore be
barred from pursuing these damages claims.
In addition, MRIA has failed to take to heart this Court's repeated rulings that Saint
Alphonsus had a statutory right to dissociate and to compete with MRIA after April1, 2005.
Those rulings are a basis for limiting-not increasing-MRIA's recoverable damages. By his
own admission, Mr. Budge's damages calculations (on which Mr. Wilhoite's damages
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calculations rely) make no attempt to show what losses in the post-2005 time period are
attributable to misconduct in the pre-2005 time period. Instead, MRIA simply continues to seek
dissociation damages by another name. MRIA's proffered expert testimony ofpost-2005
damages is thus legally deficient and must be excluded.

I.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT
MRIA complains that Saint Alphonsus's motion is untimely (Opp'n at 2), but Saint

Alphonsus could not have filed it any earlier, since it challenges claims belatedly disclosed on
July 29 and September 13 and relies in large part on depositions taken on August 9 and 11.
Moreover, Saint Alphonsus has a right to bring the motion however it is characterized. See Hr'g
Tr., Feb. 9, 2011, at 23 ("[a]nybody can file a motion in limine at any time"); Idaho R. Civ. P.
50(a) (motions for directed verdict); Best v. District ofColumbia, 291 U.S. 411,415 (1934)
(courts may grant motions for directed verdict filed after plaintiffs opening statement).

II.

MRIA MAY NOT PURSUE A "DIMINUTION IN VALUE" THEORY
As explained in Saint Alphonsus's supplemental memorandum, MRIA should be barred

from pursuing a claim for, or presenting evidence of, the difference in value of the MRIA entities
between 2001 and the present because that claim is new to this trial, was belatedly disclosed and
not subjected to discovery, and fails as a matter of law.
MRIA concedes that it "indicated" to the Court on multiple occasions "(i]n the prior trial
of this matter" that it "elected" not "to proceed with" or "to advance" a theory of diminution of
value. Opp'n at 24. This unequivocal abandonment of any claim for diminution of value
prevents MRIA from asserting that claim here. See Suppl. Mem. at 3. So, too, do MRIA's
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representation that "its prior damages proof was the proof with which it could and would go to
trial," MRIA Opp'n to Mot. to Reopen at 3 (Feb. 2, 2011), and this Court's understanding that
"the previous proceedings stand," Consol. Order reMotions Heard Aug. 5, 2011.
MRIA asserts that it mentioned a diminution claim in an interrogatory response made in
April2007, see Opp'n at 20, but that response preceded MRIA's subsequent waiver of the claim
during the first trial. MRIA's attempt to retract its waiver and re-assert the abandoned claim was
not disclosed until September 13, making it both new to this trial and improperly late.
Notably, MRIA's opposition contains not a single word in response to Saint Alphonsus's
showing (see Suppl. Mem. at 5-7) that Saint Alphonsus has been severely prejudiced by the late
disclosure because it deprived Saint Alphonsus of the opportunity for discovery as to the present
value of the MRI entities. Indeed, MRIA affirmatively resisted any discovery that might have
shed light on the present value of MRI Mobile. See MRIA Resp. to Second Set of Interrogs. &
RFDs at 7, 9 ("MRI Mobile's damages consist only of the opportunity to expand into Meridian
that was lost because of Saint Alphonsus' s wrongful conduct. As such, data on its operations ...
are irrelevant to this lawsuit."). Rules and deadlines exist precisely to prevent parties from doing
what MRIA is seeking to do here: avoid discovery on an issue in order to make a one-sided
presentation of the evidence. 1

1

MRIA devotes several pages of its opposition to the argument that it may show present
value without expert testimony, a contention that Saint Alphonsus has not disputed. The point,
rather, is that Saint Alphonsus would be entitled to present its own expert and non-expert
evidence, but has been prevented by MRIA's late disclosure from doing so on this issue.
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Nor is there any merit to MRIA's contention (Opp'n at 23) that its experts disclosed a
diminution in value theory. While even that disclosure would be insufficient to revive a waived
claim, it simply is not accurate. To be sure, Mr. Wilhoite employs a valuation methodology, but
he does so in an effort to place a value on an allegedly lost stream of future business. See
Wilhoite Dep. at 20-21, 51-53. Nowhere in his analysis does Mr. Wilhoite opine on the actual
present value of the MRI entities. That is why MRIA previously told the Court that "Mr.
Wilhoite" was not offering a "diminution in value" theory. See 2007 Trial Tr. at 3372.
Finally, MRIA's discussion of the cases (Opp'n at 26-29) simply confirms Saint
Alphonsus's argument that, to recover for loss in value of the MRIA entities between 2001 and
the present, MRIA would need to show what portion of the loss was caused by the alleged
misconduct, as opposed to other factors. This Court recognized as much in denying Saint
Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment as to MRIA's claim for lost profits, when it
concluded that MRIA's "expert evidence [of lost profits] takes into account other competitors
and provides a historic view" and "distinguishes scans which may have been lost for other
reasons." Mem. Decision and Order on Motions for Summ. J. at 19-20 (Nov. 16, 2010).
MRIA's crude comparison of the value of the MRI entities at two essentially random points in
time lacks these critical features, and therefore provides !1Q "reasonable foundation from which a
reasonable jury could calculate the amount of damages." !d. at 20. For this reason, too, MRIA
should be precluded from pursuing a claim for diminution in value.
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III.

MRIA MAY NOT PURSUE DISGORGEMENT OF POST-2005 PROFITS
As explained in Saint Alphonsus's opening memorandum, MRIA should be barred from

pursuing a claim for disgorgement of, or presenting evidence of, Saint Alphonsus' s share of
IMI's MRI-related profits (all of which were concededly earned after Aprill, 2005) because that
claim is new to this trial, was belatedly disclosed, and improperly seeks to strip Saint Alphonsus
of the proceeds of activity already held to be perfectly lawful.
MRIA concedes that it did not assert a claim for disgorgement in the first trial. Opp 'n at
13. 2 That concession suffices to bar MRIA from asserting that claim here, since "the previous
proceedings stand." Order re Motions Heard Aug. 5, 2011.
The claim is also barred because it was disclosed late. MRIA says the claim is "outlined"
in footnote 1 of Mr. Budge's May 2 disclosure, but that footnote nowhere mentions
disgorgement. See Budge Suppl. Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. E) at 8 n.l. Also, the footnote
provides an estimate ofiMI's MRI-related profits from 1999 through 2010, whereas the
disgorgement claim is based on Saint Alphonsus's share of the MRI-related profits from 2005 to
2015. !d. No reasonable person could read Mr. Budge's footnote 1 and discern any claim for
disgorgement. Saint Alphonsus was able to ask Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite about the claim at
their August depositions (Opp'n at 15-16) only because the claim was disclosed, belatedly, in the
expert rebuttal reports on July 29.

2

MRIA repeatedly refers to disgorgement as a "theory of damages," but disgorgement is
more accurately described as an equitable remedy. See Opening Mem. at 14.
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Finally, as MRIA concedes, all of Saint Alphonsus's MRI-related profits were earned
after April 1, 2005, when, as this Court has already held, Saint Alphonsus had every right to
compete. MRIA simply may not disgorge profits earned from perfectly lawful activity. None of
MRIA's cases are to the contrary; as MRIA concedes, all involve the disgorgement of benefits
obtained "during the time that [the parties] had been in a fiduciary relationship," Opp'n at 17,
and not, as here, disgorgement of the benefits earned after the partnership had ended and all
fiduciary relationships terminated.

IV.

MRIA MAY NOT ASSERT ITS NEW USURPATION CLAIM
As explained in Saint Alphonsus's opening memorandum, MRIA should be barred from

pursuing a claim for usurpation (or co-opting) of the opportunity to partner with GSR at the time
ofiMI's formation in 1999 because that claim-which seeks $75 million, more than two and a
half times the damages awarded for the same period of time at the first trial-is new to this trial
and in any event is time barred.
MRIA contends that it did bring a usurpation claim in the first trial. Opp'n at 11-12
("[i]n the first trial, MRIA presented evidence that while still a partner in MRIA, SARMC agreed
to pursue and establish IMI Meridian"). But MRIA is referring to a different usurpation claim.
At the first trial, MRIA asserted only that Saint Alphonsus co-opted from MRIA to opportunity
to expand into Meridian-a claim that is still in the case and which Saint Alphonsus does not
challenge here. See Opening Mem. at 10 n.5. The claim that Saint Alphonsus does challenge
here is the entirely new and different claim-which could have been, but was not, asserted in the
first trial-that Saint Alphonsus usurped from MRIA the opportunity to partner with GSR at the
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time ofiMI's formation in 1999. See Budge Dep. Tr. at 48 ("Q. This is a new calculation
method that was not in your 2007 report; is that correct? A. Yes.").
In a similar vein, MRIA misleadingly quotes a colloquy between Saint Alphonsus and the
Court in which co-opting a partnership opportunity is mentioned, and says that Saint Alphonsus
should be bound by its recognition of this claim. Opp'n at 11-12. But that colloquy took place
on April 22, 2011, and it plainly refers to the "Meridian usurpation" theory-the only usurpation
theory in the case at that time. MRIA would not disclose its new usurpation theory until nearly
two weeks later, on May 2.
In any case, MRIA's new usurpation claim is also time barred. See Opening Mem. at 1112. MRIA contends that a "theory of damages" cannot be time barred, but Mr. Budge's
Calculation Method No. 5 is not some free-floating damages theory untethered to any alleged
cause of action. Rather, Mr. Budge's Calculation Method No. 5 seeks damages arising out of a
specific act of usurpation: that, "[a]t the beginning of the formation ofiMI," "[s]ometime in
'99," Saint Alphonsus prevented MRIA from partnering with GSR. Budge Dep. Tr. at 61. The
date of this specific alleged act of wrongdoing determines whether the claim is time barred.

3

3

See, e.g., State v. Bilbao, 130 Idaho 500, 503, 943 P.2d 926, 929 (1997) (whether statute
of limitations has run depends on when the "act occurred"); Jones v. Runfl, Leroy, Coffin &
Matthews, Chtd., 125 Idaho 607,613, 873 P.2d 861,867 (1994) ("To determine whether this
statute of limitations bars the claim, we must determine when the first negligent act occurred.
This analysis focuses upon the acts complained of .... "); Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179, 18081,484 P.2d 728,729-30 (1971) (assessing statute oflimitations on breach of contract claims act
by act); McCormack v. Caldwell,--- Idaho---,--- P.3d ---, 2011 WL 2585754, at *5 (Idaho Ct.
App. July 1, 2011) ("McCormack's cause of action for the conversion of each check accrued
when the conversion occurred").
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And, as MRIA implicitly concedes, a claim based on an act occurring in 1999 is untimely. See
Opp'n at 13.
MRIA says that the statute of limitations would allow a claim based on Saint Alphonsus's
becoming a partner (in the non-MRI side) ofiMI in 2001. Opp'n at 13. Whether or not this is
true, that is a different claim resting on a different set of predicate facts and requiring a different
damages calculation-one that MRIA's experts have not performed. The usurpation claim that
MRIA does assert here seeks $75 million in damages based on the allegation that had Saint
Alphonsus not prevented GSR and MRIA from partnering in 1999, all ofiMI's scans would have
been "performed under the MRIA umbrella." Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 62. This
claim was already time barred when this lawsuit began, and it may not be added now.

V.

MRIA'S EXPERT TESTIMONY ON POST-2005 DAMAGES MUST BE
EXCLUDED
As demonstrated in Saint Alphonsus's opening memorandum, the opinions ofMRIA's

experts cannot justify any damages after April 1, 2005, because those opinions concededly do
not, as this Court has required, make any effort to establish that business lost after that date is
attributable to misconduct occurring prior to that date. See Opening Mem. at 14-19.
MRIA does not dispute that Mr. Budge fails to perform the analysis that he himself
admits would be required: an analysis of "the effects of the wrongful conduct ... through the
[post-2005] tail period where that wrongful behavior finishes manifesting itself." Budge Dep.
Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 86; see also Budge Dep. Ex. 1, at 13 (Gjording Aff. Ex. L) (chart
showing how proper analysis would be conducted). Instead, citing Bushi v. Sage Health Care,

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S
002577
NEW AND IMPROPER DAMAGES THEORIES - 9

146 Idaho 764, 203 P.3d 694 (2009), MRIA appears to contend that it is entitled to post-2005
damages on a "breach of fiduciary duty" theory if it can prove that Saint Alphonsus dissociated
"with the improper motivation to compete with MRIA." Opp'n at 8. This argument has already
been rejected by this Court, and finds no support in Bushi.
This Court previously held that Saint Alphonsus exercised its statutory power under
Idaho Code§ 53-3-602 to "dissociate without liability," Nov. 17, 2010 Op. at 6, 8-9, and has
already instructed the jury on this point. As the Court recognized, there are only three
circumstances under which dissociation gives rise to liability-and an alleged "motivation to
compete" (Opp'n at 8) is not among them. /d.; see also Idaho Code§ 53-3-603 official cmt. 2
(partner's fiduciary "duty not to compete terminates upon dissociation, and the dissociated
partner is free immediately to engage in a competitive business, without any further consent").
As a result, "there is no liability simply for the act of dissociating from a partnership except as
provided for in the RUP A; the common law concepts of liability for the simple act of
withdrawing from a partnership no longer exist." Order re Mot. for Summ. J. at 6 (May 6, 2011).
Bushi is not to the contrary. In Bushi, the Supreme Court held that where a partnership

had expelled a partner consistent with the terms of the partnership agreement, the expelled
partner could still claim that his expulsion was a breach of fiduciary duty because it was done in
bad faith. 140 Idaho at 771, 203 P .3d at 701. That is just a routine application of the settled
rule-not disputed here-that the exercise of a contractual right in bad faith may under certain
circumstances breach a fiduciary duty. And so Saint Alphonsus's pre-dissociation conduct must
be judged against the Bushi standard. But it was established by Judge McLaughlin (and not

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO EXCLUDE MRIA'S
002578
NEW AND IMPROPER DAMAGES THEORIES - 10

appealed by MRIA) that Saint Alphonsus did not leave the partnership pursuant to a contractual
provision. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007, at 6.
Rather, it left the partnership pursuant to its unqualified statutory right to do so under RUP A,
and that right, as this Court already held, trumps all of"the common law concepts of liability,"
including any claim for fiduciary duty based on Bus hi. Indeed, MRIA's contention that Saint
Alphonsus can be liable for dissociating with "the improper motivation to compete" (Opp'n at 8)
is directly contradicted by the statutory drafters' recognition that a "dissociated partner is free
immediately to engage in a competitive business." Idaho Code§ 53-3-603 official cmt. 2.
MRIA next argues that its experts' analysis ofpost-2005 damages is proper because
(i) those damages were caused by the dissociation, and (ii) MRIA's experts assume that Saint
Alphonsus would not have dissociated "but for" Saint Alphonsus's earlier wrongful acts. Opp'n
at 8-11. This is a transparent attempt by MRIA to reassert its "wrongful dissociation" claim
under a different name. In fact, MRIA is entitled to recover only those damages proximately
caused by Saint Alphonsus's bad acts, and the cases cited in Saint Alphonsus's opening
memorandum universally show that the exercise of a right to terminate a contract or a
relationship is an superseding cause that "cuts off' any new liability. Opening Mem. at 15 n.7.
As one court has explained, "[c]ommon sense dictates that a valid [termination] subsequent to
a[n improper] act cuts off ... liability .... This is logical because the valid termination ...
severs the ... relationship and the joint obligations which compose such a relationship. In this
way, the [defendant's] liability is limited since the valid termination is, essentially, a superseding
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cause which relieves it from further liability .... " Hite v. Biomet, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1013,
1025-26 (N.D. Ind. 1999).4
That is why this Court explained that MRIA can recover for injuries after April 1, 2005,

only by proving that such injuries are "reasonably attribut[able] to" Saint Alphonsus's "breach of
[its] obligation not to compete prior to that date." Hr'g Tr., May 18,2011, at 59 (Gjording Aff.
Ex. D). And it is why Mr. Budge was able to explain the correct analysis required to show "the
effects of the wrongful conduct ... through the [post-2005] tail period where that wrongful
behavior finishes manifesting itself." Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 86; see also Budge
Dep. Ex. 1, at 13 (Gjording Aff. Ex. L) (chart showing how proper analysis would be
conducted). Because Mr. Budge concededly did not perform this analysis, MRIA's experts
should be precluded from providing estimates of damages after April 1, 2005.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein and in the memorandum and supplemental memorandum in
support of Saint Alphonsus's motion, the Court should preclude MRIA from presenting its new
4

See also All Line Inc. v. Rabar Crop., 919 F.2d 475,480 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[t]he remedy
for a breach of a terminable-at-will contract" like the MRIA partnership agreement "is pretermination lost profits only"); Porous Media Corp. v. Midland Brake, Inc., 220 F.3d 954, 96162 (8th Cir. 2000) (overruling award of "damages for post-contractuallost profits"); Osborn v.
Commanche Cattle Indus., Inc., 545 P.2d 827, 831 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) ("the courts of other
jurisdiction are virtually unanimous in holding that breach of a contract terminable at any time
upon notice entitles the aggrieved party to recover only those net profits which he could have
earned during the notice period; he may not recover profits for the entire term of the contract");
Buckley v. Coe, 385 S.W.2d 354, 359 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) ("[claimant] can recover damages but
only such damages or lost profits as he can show would be reasonably expected to accrue prior to
March 1, 1962, the date upon which [counterclaim defendant] had a legal right to end the joint
venture").
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'

'

claims for (i) usurpation, (ii) disgorgement, and (iii) diminution in value, and should preclude
Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite from offering testimony about damages suffered after April 1,
2005.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 20th day of September 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

omeys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
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ORIGlNAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") bring this Motion in Limine to prevent Saint
Alphonsus's former Chief Operating Officer, Cindy Schamp, from volunteering, or Saint
Alphonsus from eliciting, Ms. Schamp's own out-of-court statements.

BACKGROUND
It is anticipated the Cindy Schamp may attempt to inject into her testimony during the

examination conducted by MRIA, or be asked directly by Saint Alphonsus during its
examination, a description of certain conversations that she had with the late chairman of the
MRIA Board, Dr. Roger Curran. The following are few illustrative examples of the kind of
testimony that MRIA anticipates Ms. Schamp will try to interject into her testimony.
•

•

•

In her deposition of June 22, 2007, Ms. Schamp was asked whether in 2000, "that
what the hospital was left with in the way of alternatives was some sort of
business deal that would allow the hospital to partner with the radiologists
through all modalities?" (Ex. A, p. 100:22-101 :2). She was not asked to describe
conversations. Nevertheless, she answered "we were still noodling between
myself and Dr. Curran and everybody else when I was back from maternity leave
on whether there was still any way to salvage some way to get everybody to be
okay with a relationship that respected all the parties." (Ex. A, p. 101 :9-15).
In another question, she was asked whether Saint Alphonsus had followed up with
certain requests made in a letter written by Dr. Prochaska concerning coverage by
the radiologists. She answered that "I believe all along in discussions that Dr.
Curran and I had on an ongoing basis we wanted to make sure the radiologists
were continuing to provide coverage in the MRI Center because it impacted our
patients." (Ex. A, p. 133:19-25).
She was asked whether she communicated a dollar figure to MRIA for the
purchase of MRIA. She said that she "remember[ ed] communicating or being
present at communications with Dr. Curran." (Ex. A, p. 146:7-8).

Such testimony, in which Ms. Schamp describes conversations with Dr. Curran and claims to
have disclosed important information to him, can be found throughout Ms. Schamp's prior
deposition testimony. As the Court knows, Dr. Curran passed away several years ago, and
cannot confirm or deny these supposed conversations. Ms. Schamp should be prevented from
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testifying about out-of-court the statements that she made, as these statements are hearsay.

1

ARGUMENT
A party's own non-judicial statements are hearsay when offered by that party. As such,
Ms. Schamp should be prevented from testifying about her own out-of-court statements. As the
Court is well aware, hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Idaho R.
Evid. 801(c). From the illustrative examples above, it is apparent that Ms. Schamp is going to
try to testify that she made certain statements to Dr. Curran (which were clearly not testimony at
the time they were made), offered to prove that Ms. Schamp disclosed those facts to MRIA.
These statements are hearsay, and do not qualify for any exception. Any statements Ms. Schamp
made to MRIA members, including Dr. Curran, are clearly not statements made "while
testifying," but are non-judicial statements.
Moreover, Idaho case law is clear that a party may not introduce into evidence its own
non-judicial statements. Absent a hearsay exception under Rule 803 or 804, the courts have held
that one's own prior statements are hearsay. An illustrative case is State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho
210, 207 P.3d 186 (Ct. App.,2009). In that case, defense counsel attempted to elicit testimony
from the interrogating officer regarding defendant's statements made during an interrogation.
The district court sustained a hearsay objection by the state, noting that although the statement
would be admissible if offered by the state as the statement of the "party opponent" under Rule
80l(d)(2), "there is no corresponding right for a defendant to introduce his own statements." !d.
at 200, 207 P.3d at 224. See State v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 205 P.3d 671 (Ct. App. 2009) (a

The statements that others made to her during these conversations may or may not qualify
for hearsay exceptions. Those statements are not the focus of this motion, which is brought to
prevent Ms. Schamp from testifying about her own out-of-court statements.
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nonjudicial statement is admissible only as against the party who made the statement); State v.
Chacon, 145 Idaho 814, 818, 186 P.3d 670, 674 (Ct. App. 2008) (same).
That Ms. Schamp would herself be testifying about her own prior non-judicial statements
does not change their character. Those statements are still hearsay. As the United States
Supreme Court has noted:
Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded because they lack the
conventional indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under oath or other
circumstances that impress the speaker with the solemnity of his statements; the
declarant's word is not subject to cross-examination; and he is not available in
order that his demeanor and credibility may be assessed by the jury.
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1047 (1973). As a Florida court
said, when applying a hearsay rule identical to Idaho R. Evid. 801(c):
Hearsay includes an out-of-court statement of a witness who testifies at
trial, as well as an out-of-court statement by someone who is not a
witness on the stand testifying to the statement." ... "Merely repeating a
statement in the courtroom does not convert a hearsay statement into nonhearsay." ... "The necessary reliability of the statement is lacking because the
jury was not present to observe the demeanor of the witness when the statement
was originally made and there was no opportunity for cross-examination at that
time.
Pierre-Charles v. State, 2011 WL 1376969 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 2011) (citations omitted). Here, the
untrustworthiness of Ms. Schamp's self-serving out-of-court statements is further underscored by
the fact that the party to whom they were made, Dr. Curran, is dead, and cannot confirm or deny
that these statements occurred. It is also notable that the Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that
the prior statement of a witness actually testifying at trial is non-hearsay only when the prior
statement was either (1) a judicial statement inconsistent with the declarant's present testimony,
(2) consistent with declarant's present testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (3) one of
identification of a person made after perceiving the person. I.R.E. 80l(d)(l). None of those
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circumstances exist here. 2 See State v. Yeates, 112 Idaho 377, 385, 732 P.2d 346, 354 (Ct.
App.,1987) (noting that even if witness testifies at trial, his prior statements are still hearsay,
although they might be admissible for impeachment).

CONCLUSION
Any statements made by Ms. Schamp concerning her own prior statements are hearsay.
As such, she should be permitted to volunteer such testimony during MRIA's examination of
her, and Saint Alphonsus should be told to so instruct her. In addition, Saint Alphonsus should
be prevented from eliciting such testimony.
DATED this 22nd day of September, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

ara L. Par er
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

2

A statement could also be admissible, regardless of availability, under Rule 803. None of
those hearsay exceptions apply.
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Cindy K. Schamp
June 22, 2007
1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2

3
4
5

Saint Alphonsus uiversified Care, Inc. vs.
MRI Associates, LLP

C. Schamp - by Mr. Banducci
things, that referrals may be going in a higher
quantity to that other enterprise reducing the
profitability or whatever of the interest or
shareholders and thus creating a concern over
direction of referrals.
Q. A lawsuit; right? Legal challenge?
A. Legal challenge, yes.
Q. All right. I think we're done with
that document.
Would you agree with me, Ms. Schamp,
that by early January 2000 you knew that the
radiologists weren't interested in buying into
MRI Associates?
A. I don't know the time frame of that.
I do know there came a time when I was aware
they did not believe they could come to some
amenable relationship amongst everybody, but I
can't give you the timing.
Q. Okay. Would it be fair to say that
by January of 2000 it was likely a dead deal
between the radiologists and MRIA?
MR. GJORDING: Object to the
question. It's vague.
A. Again, I don't want to specify
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Q. Someone -- you or Sandy reading that
Scenario 5.
MR. GJORDING: Same.
A. No. I would not use a document from
a consultant to give me legal advice over what
I could do.
Q. Okay. If-- all right. Reading
that document but before you talked to a legal
consultant. Reading that document would leave
you with that impression; correct?
MR. GJORDING: Same objection.
A. It would leave me with a big
question over what we could or couldn't do.
Q. Okay. Setting aside withdrawal.
A. Yes.
Q. And setting aside the radiologists
MRIA-A. Venture.
Q. -- combination -A. Yes.
Q. -- would you agree with me that what
the hospital was left with in the way of
alternatives was some sort of business deal
that would allow the hospital to partner with
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dates. I don't know.
Q. Well, referring to the restructuring
document, that second page of that document
tells you that the radiologists aren't
interested in buying in; correct?
A. That's fair, yes.
Q. Now, is it also fair to say that if
someone had read Scenario 5, they would also
understand that withdrawal unless it was for
one of those four reasons was a breach of
contract?
MR. GJORDING: Object; calls
for speculation and for legal conclusion.
Q. Let me rephrase the question. Would
it be fair to say that for someone reading
Scenario 5 they would be under the impression
based on Mr. Hahn's analysis that withdrawal
from the partnership to form potentially
competing ventures would likely be a breach of
contract and could result in litigation?
MR. GJORDING: Same
objections.
A. They being me or Sandy or they being
a lay person off the street?
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the radiologists through all modalities?
MR. GJORDING: At what point
in time, Counsel?
MR. BANDUCCI: As of early
2000, January of2000.
MR. GJORDING: Same
objections.
A. I believe in early 2000 it's fair to
say we were still noodling between myself and
Dr. Curran and everybody else when I was back
from maternity leave on whether there was still
any way to salvage some way to get everybody to
be okay with a relationship that respected all
the parties. That's what I believe.
Q. But that was unlikely; correct?
A. At that point in time I don't
believe I thought so or Dr. Curran thought so.
Q. All right.
A. I did ultimately think so, yes.
Q. Let's take a look at Page 412 of
your deposition.
A. Sure.
MR. GJORDING: What was the
page?
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Cindy K. Schamp

Saint A1phonsus

June 22, 2007
C. Schamp - by Mr. Banducci
and be sure that we're absolutely on spot.
Q. Before Mr. Gjording stated at
Line 10, Page 333, quote, "Object to the form
and I object, Tom, because I'm not convinced
this letter was ever sent," unquote, were you
aware of the hospital's position that this
letter from Carl Harder was never sent?
A. No, I was not aware.
Q. So this was the first time you heard
that?
A. Yes. I hadn't discussed a Carl
Harder letter before.
Q. I'm sorry?
A. I had not discussed a Carl Harder
letter before.
Q. Okay. Now, would you go to the
second page of Mr. Harder's letter?
A. Certainly.
Q. And let me refer you to the third
full paragraph that starts out "In the
absence." Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. That says in part "In the absence of
a mutually agreeable partnership agreement
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between the MRI Center ofldaho and SARG" which
is St. Alphonsus Radiology Group "St. Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center would breach its
fiduciary responsibility as a general partner
if it were to give an exclusive contract to
St. Alphonsus Radiology Group to read MRJ scans
at the MRI Center of Idaho. St. Alphonsus
Radiology Group is clearly competing with the
center and an exclusive contract would permit
St. Alphonsus Radiology Group to harm the
center further. Unless a mutually acceptable
agreement is reached between St. Alphonsus
Radiology Group and the MRI Center of Idaho,
then the center must be permitted to contract
for radiology services as it sees fit." Do you
see that?
A. I do.
Q. Now, if you would be so kind as to
pull out Dr. Prochaska's letter. And on the
second page of Dr. Prochaska's letter
Dr. Prochaska is also asking the hospital for
the right to select the radiology group who
would read at MRI Center; correct?
MR. GJORDING: Where are you
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C. Schamp - by Mr. Banducci
reading from?
A. On Dr. Prochaska's letter?
Q. Yes.
A. I'm sorry. I don't see that part of
his letter.
Q. All right.
A. I see him reference the
radiologists. I apologize. I have to take
this.
(Discussion held off the
record.)
Q. Okay. I think before you went off
the record you were asking me to direct you to
the place in -A. Dr. Prochaska's letter.
Q. --Dr. Prochaska's letter. Sure.
A. Referencing what you said.
Q. Let me refer you to the fourth line
or actually fifth line from the bottom of the
first paragraph on Page 2 where it says "We now
view as a necessity St. Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center providing the lab with full,
supportive, traditional radiologist coverage or
:.
permitting the MRI Center of Idaho to contract
Page 132
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directly with radiologists as a fiduciary
responsibility of St. Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center to its other general and limited
partners."
A. I do see that now. Thank you.
Q. Okay.
A. Okay.
Q. Now, did you respond to
Dr. Prochaska's request for either full
coverage or the right to select radiologists?
A. I don't recall having any
conversation with Dr. Prochaska regarding his
letter.
Q. Is it fair to say that as far as you
know no one from the hospital followed up with
the requests made in this letter by
Dr. Prochaska?
A. I don't think that's fair to say. I
believe all along in discussions that
Dr. Curran and I had on an ongoing basis we
wanted to make sure the radiologists were
continuing to provide coverage in the MRI
Center because it impacted our patients.
And so any issues that became
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MRI Associates, LLP

C. Schamp - by Mr. Banducci
number being put in writing.

Q. Okay. Do you remember communicating
a dollar figure to MRIA for the purchase of the
entire organization or a portion of it whether
it was in writing or not?
A. I remember communicating or being
present at communications with Dr. Curran and
members of Doctor's Corp. during the period of
time that Price, Waterhouse, Coopers was
around.

Q. That's not my question.
A. Well, you asked me if I gave them a
number and that was there.

Q. I'm asking if there was an offer -the question was do you remember communicating
a dollar figure to MRIA for the purchase of the
entire organization or a portion of it whether
it was in writing or not?
A. I communicated a dollar figure, not
an offer. It was a discussion around the
dollar figure.

Q. What was the dollar figure that you
communicated?
A.

I do not remember.
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understand it was we would do this deal with
the MRIA physicians at simultaneous to the
transaction with the radiologists such that the
equipment and the whole enterprise would not
require us to impact hospital capital. We
could use hospital capital for other things and
it would allow the enterprise to finance the
debt for the project.

Q. Okay.

ll

I'

A. So I can't separate buying it from
MRI from that other piece of the word.

I'

Q. Okay. Just so let's make sure that
the record is clear then. Your understanding
in early 2000 -A.

With this document.

Q. -- was that the radiologists would
fund a transaction to buy MRIA or a portion of
MRIA?
A.

I~ :

No.

Q. I thought that's what you said. I

!I

apologize. Say what you said again so I
understand it.
A. Okay. Based upon my interpretation
of my notes at that time, what the intent was
Page 148
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Q. And when you communicated that
dollar figure, were you offering to pay that
amount to MRIA for all or a portion ofMRIA?
A. Offering to buy MRIA or a portion of
MRIA?

Q. Yes.
A. The discussion was around that
through a restructuring that would allow us to
partner with the radiologists.

Q. That's not the question.
MR. BANDUCCI: Could you read
the question back, please.
(Question read back.)
A. Only in conjunction with a
transaction with the radiologists, and the
reason I -- if I can explain for just a
moment. In this document the reason -- and my
comments are written on the side of the
document you handed to me which helps me
remember what was going on. And I have read
them since I sat here. It says SARMC without
any capital expenditure are notes to myself.
It also says comments about debt and equity.
The relationship at this point in time as I
Page 147
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was for the venture to separate itself, in this
scenario, to separate itself simultaneous to
the creation of an enterprise with the hospital
and the radiologists together. That enterprise
would have the capital and the debt and the
obligation for the creation of that enterprise.
From a technical perspective there's
a capital play for I guess you would call it a
nano second where actually St. Alphonsus would
own it and then it would move it into this
other venture. From a capital call for Trinity
at that point in time really meant nothing
because it would be funded and capitalized by
this new venture and I could still have
candidly all the money St. Alphonsus needed for
its own capital to not have to use it for this
venture.

Q. Okay.
A. That's what was my understanding of
the intent of that piece.

Q. Okay. So the structure of the
transaction that you are referring to in
Scenario 1 is that MRIA would separate and the
MRI Center would go into a new company that
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
Some three weeks into trial, during which multiple witnesses have testified about their
own prior acts and statements, MRIA now asserts that a particular witness-Cindy Schampmust be prevented from giving live, in-person testimony about events that took place in this case,
under the remarkable assertion that her live, in-court testimony subject to cross-examination is
"hearsay." MRIA's motion has no basis and should be denied.

ARGUMENT
I.

IN-COURT TESTIMONY SUBJECT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION IS NOT
HEARSAY
MRIA asserts that if Cindy Schamp testifies live and in court about what she said to Dr.

Curran in the past, that Ms. Schamp's live, in-court testimony is a "prior statement by the
witness" subject to a hearsay analysis. Mem. at 3. This is baseless. Cindy Schamp's live, inperson testimony about what she said to Dr. Curran, derived from her own contemporaneous
memories of the events, is a statement made under oath and subject to cross-examination. It is,
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by definition, not a "hearsay" statement. See Idaho R. Evid. 801(c) ("'Hearsay' is a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered into evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted."); accord, e.g., State v. Smith, 916 P.2d 773,777 (Mont.
1996) (holding that where the witness "himself was the declarant ... with regard to his own
statements and he was testifying at trial as to those statements" those statements "did not come
within the definition of hearsay contained in Rule 801(c)."); United States v. Bellomo, 176 F.3d
580, 587 (2d Cir. 1999) (party's "testifying to what he himself had said" is not hearsay); United
States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 518 (4th Cir. 1995) (a witness "testifying in court as to what he had

said on another occasion" is "not hearsay."); Atwell v. State, 667 S.E.2d 442, 445 (Ga. App.
2008) ("A witness's testimony as to what he (the witness) said is not hearsay") (internal
punctuation marks omitted); State v. Marecek, 568 S.E.2d 237, 252 (N.C. App. 2002) ("Because
Kirk was testifying to her own statements, these statements were not hearsay statements" under
Rule 801(c)).
MRIA's argument that live, in-court testimony about prior events are "prior statements"
is premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of what a "prior statement" is under the hearsay
rule: namely, the attempt to introduce direct evidence of prior statements in lieu of live, in-court
testimony by the same witness. Thus, in the primary case cited by MRIA in its brief, State v.
Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 223-24, 207 P.3d 186, 199-200 (Idaho App. 2009), the question was

whether a DVD recording ofthe defendant's statements during a police interrogation could be
published to the jury in order to place into context other portions of the DVD that the State had
used as non-hearsay admissions of a party-opponent. And while the Court found that use of the
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DVD was, standing alone, inadmissible hearsay, it noted that exclusion of the DVD would have
been permissible even if otherwise admissible because Parmer himself testified live at trial and
could have offered in-court testimony about what he had previously said. 1 147 Idaho 224, 207
P .3d 200. Parmer itself therefore demonstrates the fundamental error in MRIA' s argument.
Here, Cindy Schamp is not intending to offer as evidence some prior recorded or written
statement she made sometime in the past recounting conversations with Dr. Curran. Ms. Schamp
is going to testify, live, in-court, and subject to cross-examination, as to her memories of what
she said and did, with respect to Dr. Curran and others. The jury can assess her demeanor while
recounting these memories, and MRIA will be able to cross-examine her as to her recollection.

1

The other Idaho authorities cited by MRIA are no different. In State v Gerardo, 205
P.3d 671 (Idaho App. 2009), at issue was the admissibility of a statement made by a Mr.
Gonzales about defendant Gerardo immediately following Mr. Gonzales's arrest. There was no
issue of whether Gonzales could have testified live, from his memory, about what he had said to
police. Likewise, in State v. Chacon, 186 P.3d 670 (Idaho App. 2008), at issue was the
admissibility of a written note regarding the defendant, and not any issue of live, in-court
testimony. And in State v. Yeates, 732 P.2d 346 (Idaho App. 1987), the issue was whether Mr.
Hill's statement to police implicating Mr. Yeates could be admissible; again, the Court noted that
the prior statement would be inadmissible but that there was no "impelling need for Hill's
statement in Yeates' trial because, presumably, Hill would be available to testify." /d. at 354.
The other cases cited by MRIA again demonstrate the error in MRIA' s argument. In
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973), the Court noted that a hearsay exception
applied to witness testimony about a declarant's prior statements, but held that the alleged
declarant himself could testify about his own alleged prior statements because he "was present in
the courtroom and was under oath. He could have been cross-examined by the State, and his
demeanor and responses weighed by the jury." /d. at 300-301. And in Pierre-Charles v. State,
2011 WL 1376969 (Fla. App. 2001), the issue was whether a videotape of a witness nodding his
head, to indicate that his brother committed a murder, would be admissible. The Court did not
hold that the witnesses' live testimony about what he had said were inadmissible; in fact, the
Court noted that because the witness "admitted nodding his head" during his live testimony, it
precluded even the use of the videotape as impeachment. See id. at *3-4.
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Such live testimony, subject to cross, is not hearsay; indeed, it is the very opposite of hearsay.
MRIA's motion should be denied.

II.

IN ALL EVENTS, TESTIMONY ABOUT SCHAMP'S CONVERSATIONS WITH
CURRAN WERE ADMITTED AT THE FIRST TRIAL, WERE NOT OBJECTED
TO OR APPEALED, AND REMAIN ADMISSffiLE NOW.
Finally, MRIA's attempt to preclude Ms. Schamp from testifying about "disclosures" to

Dr. Curran should be denied for an even simpler reason: Cindy Schamp was permitted to testify
about her conversations with Dr. Curran during the first trial, either via deposition transcripts
introduced by MRIA itself or otherwise, either without objection or over MRIA's objection. 2 The
admission of that testimony was not appealed, and thus its admissibility remains law-of-the-case.
Indeed, of the three deposition excerpts MRIA purports as "examples" of potential testimony to
be excluded (Mot. at 2), one was affirmatively introduced by MRIA during its case-in-chief, 3
and another was counter-designated by Saint Alphonsus without objection and published to the
jury. 4 This testimony was introduced last time, and MRIA-having either failed to object or
appeal from lost objections-cannot move to exclude the testimony now.

2

See, e.g., 2007 Trial Tr. at 2271, 2299, 2302, 2331, 2237-38, 2342, 3419-23.

3

See 2007 Trial Tr. at 2299 ("I believe in early 2000 it's fair to say we were still
noodling between myself and Dr. Curran and everybody else when I was back from maternity
leave on whether there was still any way to salvage some way to get everybody to be okay with a
relationship that respected all the parties. That's what I believe.")
4

See 2007 Trial Tr. at 2331 ("I remember communicating or being present at
communications with Dr. Curran and members of Doctor's Corp. during the period of time that
Price, Waterhouse, Coopers was around.")
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CONCLUSION
For any or all of the independent reasons cited above, the Court should deny MRIA's
motion in limine.

DATED this 23rd day of September, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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ORIGINAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Motion for leave to offer Prior Trial Exhibit
4332 1 into evidence.
Prior Trial Exhibit 4332 is a settlement letter which MRIA sent to Saint Alphonsus on
March 5, 2004, after Saint Alphonsus dissociated, in which MRIA offered to sell MRI Center
and MRI Mobile to Saint Alphonsus for a net sum of$23,457,000. (Prior Trial Exhibit 4332).
During the prior trial, MRIA offered the letter into evidence as a fair market valuation of MRI
Center and MRI Mobile.' The Supreme Court held that admission of this letter for that purpose
was in error under Rule 408 because it was an attempt to "prove liability for ... or amount of the
claim." Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 495, 224
P.3d 1068, 1084 (2009).
Despite the Supreme Court's ruling, during Saint Alphonsus's examination of Sandra
Bruce, Saint Alphonsus opened the door for admission of this letter by directly referencing this
letter and then claiming that the offer, the amount of which Saint Alphonsus did not reveal, was
"ridiculous." Ms. Bruce was asked:
Q. BY MR. A YER: Can you tell us- I mean, you finally made the decision to
withdraw after all the events that we have spoken of through your testimony.
Why did you make the decision now, at this time, to withdraw from MRIA?
A. Because we couldn't continue to tolerate the stress and turmoil and anger that
was being generated out of the conflict between the two groups. We couldn't
continue to do that because I felt we were going to put patients at risk at Saint
Alphonsus.
Q. And were you approached, after sending this letter, by representatives of
MRIA, essentially asking for further reconsideration?
A. Yes.

A copy of that exhibit is appended hereto.
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Q. And who were those representatives?
A. I believe they were the CEOs of the partner hospitals.
Q. And did they actually come forward with some sort of a proposal to allegedly
work toward some sort of a deal?
A. Yes. I believe I had a letter with a dollar amount in it.

Q. Okay. And what was your reaction and response to that proposal?
A. My CFO and I reviewed it.

Q. That would be Ken Fry?
A. Yes.

Q. Okay.
A. And he felt that the numbers were ridiculous, and that we should not go down
that path.

Q. Okay. So did you communicate back to them?
A. Yes.
(Trial Tr., Sept. 23, 2011, p. 1845:4-1846:13). Saint Alphonsus's counsel directly solicited
testimony about this letter. Saint Alphonsus, not MRIA, put this letter back at issue, and has
opened the door for its admission.
MRIA is entitled to place this letter into evidence to rebut Saint Alphonsus's contention
that the amount ofthe offer was "ridiculous." See, e.g., Thomson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho 99, 205
P.3d 1235 (2009) (party opened the door to otherwise improper evidence through his own
testimony); State v. Mace, 133 Idaho 903, 994 P.2d 1066 (Ct. App. 2000) (although evidence of
prior DUI conviction was initially inadmissible under the rules of evidence, defendant had
opened the door with his statement on direct examination that he did not drink and drive). As it
is not being presented to prove liability for or the amount of a claim, presentation of the letter
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does not run afoul of Rule 408. Notably, Saint Alphonsus's contention that the offer was
"ridiculous" was a bald assertion. Saint Alphonsus did not present the letter, or even disclose to
the jury the amount of the offer. With this testimony, the jury might conclude that the offer was
to sell for some astronomical amount. MRIA is now entitled to present that letter to show the
amount offered, and allow the jury to draw its own conclusions about whether that amount was
"ridiculous" or not. Saint Alphonsus chose to open the door. It cannot be permitted opine about
the letter, and then claim that the letter is inadmissible in MRIA's case. MRIA is entitled to
show that Saint Alphonsus's in-trial characterization of this letter is incorrect.
DATED this 2ih day of September, 2011.

BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Dara L. Par er
Attorneys fo MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Saint Alphonsus v. MRI Associates
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Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care has decided to
withdraw as a partner in MRI Associates. Saint
Alphonsus has on four occasions tried to buy the
MRI Center of Idaho operations and achieve a
mutual agreeable withdrawal from MRI Associates."
Do you remember, what were the four
that -- you were referring to four times when you
had tried to work out a deal. What were those
four occasions, if you remember?
A. Well, one of those occasions was in the
'90s, when Karl Kurtz was the CFO and had -- MRIA
and the hospital apparently were exchanging offers
about a buyout. So that was one attempt; it
didn't result in a buyout. And then we had the
PricewaterhouseCoopers engagement in 2001. And
then-Q. 2000, or was it 2001?
A. PricewaterhouseCoopers was 2000.
Q. Okay.
A. And then Shattuck Hammond in the end of
2001, early 2002. And then Shattuck Hammond again
for this 2003 process, where we tried to do a
three-way engagement of it.
Q. Okay. And then it goes on to say that
"This has been done at great expense to Saint

1

2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Alphonsus, and without success."
Just what do you mean by "great
expense"? What expense, to your knowledge, had
been incurred in fact?
A. Well, tens of thousands if not hundreds
of thousands of dollars for the engagement of the
consults were paid for by Saint Alphonsus.
Q. Okay. What about the energy of your
staff and your employees and yourself and others?
A. Well, absolutely, yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes.
Q. And then it goes on to say that "Recent
experience suggests that further attempts will
likewise not be successful."
Why did you feel that to be true?
A. "Recent experience suggests that
further attempts will likely not be successful."
Because in September we met, and we agreed upon a
timeline. We got two days past that timeline,
invited to a meeting only to be told that nothing
had been done and that we needed to take another
three or four months. And we just felt that, once
again, this was going nowhere and we were being
strung along, frankly.
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MR. AYER: Could I have just one second,
Your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
Q. BY MR. A YER: Can you tell us -- I
mean, you finally made the decision to withdraw
after all the events that we have spoken of
through your testimony. Why did you make the
decision now, at this time, to withdraw from MRIA?
A. Because we couldn't continue to
tolerate the stress and turmoil and anger that was
being generated out of the conflict between the
two groups. We couldn't continue to do that
because I felt we were going to put patients at
risk at Saint Alphonsus.
Q. And were you approached, after sending
this letter, by representatives ofMRIA,
essentially asking for further reconsideration?
A. Yes.
Q. And who were those representatives?
A. I believe they were the CEOs of the
partner hospitals.
Q. And did they actually come forward with
some sort of a proposal to allegedly work toward
some sort of a deal?
A. Yes. I believe I had a letter with a
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dollar amount in it.
Q. Okay. And what was your reaction and
response to that proposal?
A. My CFO and I reviewed it.
Q. That would be Ken Fry?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. And he felt that the numbers were
ridiculous, and that we should not go down that
path.
Q. Okay. So did you communicate back to
them?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, following -- and so your
withdrawal was effective as of what date? Do you
know? It is in this letter, I think.
A. I believe it was -- I don't have that.
It is in this letter. I think it was April of
2004.
Q. Correct. That is correct. And it is
correct, is it not, that the agreement, the MRIA
agreement has a non-compete period that follows
any withdrawal. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And what's the_l)eriod of the
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March 5, 2004

CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT
OFFER MADE PURSUANT TO I.R.E 408

Sandra Bruce
Chief Executive Officer
St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
I055 North Curtis Road
Boise, ID 83706
Re:

MRI Associates

Dear Sandra:

MRI Associates ("MRIA") has received your Jetter of withdrawal from MRIA
which discussed your perception that the transaction you desire could not be
achieved. Wcare concerned that the withdrawal of St. Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center ("SARMC") from MRIA could lead to litigation. In order to
avoid such a result, and before MRIA responds formally to that letter, MRIA
wanted to offer SARMC the opportunity to purchase the MRI Center of Idaho
("MR! Center") and to sell its interest in MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
("MRI Mobile"). This is the transaction that you proposed and the one that
we have been investigating. As you know, MRIA has employed professionals
to analyze its business in order to detem1ine a reasonable and fair value for
both MRI Center and MRI Mobile. That analysis has now been completed
and the MRIA Board of Partners ha<> unanimously directed us to present this
offer to SARMC.
MRI Ct;nler. MRIA hereby offers to sell the MRI Center to SARMC bas<;d on
a valuation of MRI Center of $35,000,000 exclusive of its interest in MRI
Mobile. After adjustment for SARMC's combined partnership interests (i.e.,
GP and LP interests) this would require a $27,440,000 payment by SARMC.
That payment would be reduced by the purchase price for MRI Mobile
discussed in the next paragraph. The valuation was determined on an "as is"
basis with SARMC as a partner and without consideration of the savings that
SARMC may experience from its existing infrastructure.
MRI Mobile. MRIA hereby offers, in conjunction with the sale of the MRI
Center to SAR..MC, to purchase SARMC's interests in MRI Mobile based on a
valuation of MRI Mobile of$15,000,000. Therefore, the amount that MRIA

EXHIBIT

J ' 43$4.
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Sandra Bruce
March 5, 2004
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would pay lor SARJ\1C's combined partnership interests (i.e., GP and LP
interests) in MRI Mobile would be $3,983,000.
The net amount from SARMC to complete this transaction would be
$23,457,000 and the end result would be that SARMC would not have any
ownership interest, either directly or indirectly, in MRI Mobile and SARMC
would own all of MRI Center. Obviously, additional details and tenns would
need to be worked out anu included in a definitive agreement.
If we do not hear from you by the close of business on March 11, 2004, we
will assume you have rejected our offer. We are willing to extend this
deadline upon receiving indication of serious interest by SARMC.
Thank you for considering this proposal and we look forward to your
response.
Very truly yours,
WEST VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER

By

/~'i~~ .~~····

Mark Adams
Its Chief Executive Officer

THE DOMINICAN SISTERS OF ONTARIO, INC.
HOLY ROSARY MF.DfCAL CENTER

~/~·Jd-"~-~-'~-~u~·~:......z2.:::...,~~-"/

By
_ _ _ __
Mark Dalley
,,lts Chief Executive Officer ~

MEDNOW, INC.

By~

1/Y(~

Joseph Messmer
The Chief Executive Officer of Mercy Medical Center,
Majority Shareholder of MedNow, Inc.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, INC., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

SEP 2 7 2011

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219

ORDER RE: MOTION TO EXCLUDE
DAMAGES THEORIES

)
)
)
)

Defendant.

----------------------------

)

Presently before the Court is a motion made by Saint Alphonsus to exclude several
damages theories from this case. The motion was filed on September 2, 2011, and the Court
heard argument on September 21, 2011. Following hearing, the Court took this matter under
advisement.

BACKGROUND
Because a great deal of this motion deals with the scope of the proceedings on remand,
the Court believes that a detailed review of the proceedings following remand is necessary to
give context to the Court's rulings and the parties' respective positions.
The issues remaining in the case initially arose from MRIA' s First Answer and
Counterclaim filed on May 20, 2005.

MRIA, which, at the time, was the only defendant-

counterclaimant in the action, identified MRI Center of Idaho and MRI Mobile as two operating
entities in which MRIA was a general partner with management responsibilities. (First Answer
and Counterclaim, at p. 6). This counterclaim provides a history, from MRIA's standpoint of
MIRA and the two operating entities and the involvement of Saint Alphonsus and the SARG
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group (which later became Gem State Radiology). The counterclaim specifically asserted that
Saint Alphonsus was " ... compromising MRIA's efforts to grow its business and/or compete
with IMI ... ,"listing several specific alleged acts. ld. at p. 12.
In its third claim for relief asserted in the first counterclaim, MRIA asserted Saint

Alphonsus had violated fiduciary duties of loyalty and care set forth in Idaho Code section 53-3404. Id. at p. 15. It further asserted that "as a result ofthese breaches of fiduciary duties, MRIA
has been damaged in an amount to be proved at trial." Id. at p. 15. MRIA also alleged damages
arising from wrongful dissociation under Idaho Code section 53-3-602(b)(1)-(2). In the earlier
proceeding, the presiding trial judge ruled that, as a matter of law, Saint Alphonsus had
wrongfully dissociated by violating an express term of the partnership agreement. This ruling
was overturned on appeal by the Supreme Court, and the case was remanded for further
proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI

Associates LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 224 P.3d 1068 (2009).
Once remanded, and following the disqualification of the original trial judge, this Court
held a hearing on February 17, 2010, to establish the procedures governing this case on remand.
At that hearing the Court reviewed with the parties the Supreme Court ruling and what matters it
believed were decided and which issues it believed were still at issue. At that hearing, the Court
gave the parties the opportunity to comment on the Court's summary and understanding of the
case and to address what issues they believed were still present in the case.
During the comment period, it became apparent that there was still substantial
disagreement between the parties as to several issues. As to the issue of damages, counsel for
Saint Alphonsus, Mr. Ayer stated that in light ofthe Supreme Court decision and its reference to

Pope, that the damages issue might need to be readdressed, stating: "And the only thing I can say
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about that is that could all be short-circuited if Mr. Banducci were to decide without us bringing
a motion that he is going to present new and different somewhat modified expert testimony." Tr.
ofhrg. held Feb. 17, 2010, at p. 12, ll. 17-22. Mr. Ayer added that ifMRIA came forward with a
similar damages calculation, that Saint Alphonsus would bring a motion that MRIA's damage
theory was inadequate under Pope. " ... and if it's inadequate, then MRIA I think would have
the choice of either seeking leave to present new damage evidence or the case would be over
because they don't have a viable damage theory." Id. at p. 13, ll. 6-9. Mr. Ayer also noted that
removal of the wrongful dissociation theory would " ... trigger the need without doubt for ...
new expert discovery in this case on the issue of damages . . . . Then I think he would need a
new report. We would definitely want to put in expert testimony in response to his damage
theory .... " Id. at p. 13, 11. 13-19.
Mr. Banducci, on behalf of MRIA, addressed the matter of damages and the Supreme
Court's reference to Pope, stating: "I think the Court should pay attention to Pope, but I think the
Court should pay attention to all of the cases that exist relative to damages analysis and damage
calculations. That's an example." (Tr. ofhrg., Feb. 17, 2010, at p. 28, ll. 13-17). Mr. Banducci
further stated " ... I don't believe that we are going to be substantially changing any of our
theories. I think that the evidence to prove our damages is in the record .... They want me to
conduct more discovery. They want me to file new expert reports ... " Id. at p. 18 ll. 24-25; p.
19 ll. 1-7.

In resisting Saint Alphonsus' s position that discovery should be reopened, Mr.

Banducci stated: " ... we do not intend to add new claims. We do not intend to omit claims. We
intend to go on the theories that we ultimately submitted ...." Id. at p. 23. Mr. Banducci also
stated "we withdrew a significant number of ... claims before it was submitted to the jury. We
wouldn't go back to them." Id. at p. 24, ll. 6-9.
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Following argument and comments from the parties, the Court defined the procedure for
initiating the proceedings of the second trial. The Court allowed MRIA to file an amended
counterclaim and Saint Alphonsus to file a new answer to clearly establish those matters the
parties felt were at issue. !d. at pp. 27-29. The Court stated: " ... the plaintiff has the right to
define at least in his initial filing what ... causes of action he is going to assert and the defendant
has the right to raise in their answer any defenses that they feel are appropriate." !d. at p. 28 11. 824. The Court allowed the parties to file any dispositive motions so the Court could address the
newly asserted claims and defenses. The Court also stated, as to damages, that in its view, the
Supreme Court opinion opened up the area of damages saying there needed to be more work
done upon retrial in this area. !d. at p. 19ll. 17-25; p. 20 11. 1-25.
MRIA filed its Third Amended Counterclaim on March 22, 2010. In this pleading, it
alleged that Saint Alphonsus dissociated before the expiration of the definite term of the MRIA
agreement. (Third Amended Counterclaim, at p. 23). It further asserted that Saint Alphonsus
had "breached [its] fiduciary duties by competing with MRIA, [and] by co-opting partnership
opportunities .... " !d. Following that filing, on November 16, 2010, the Court ruled that Saint
Alphonsus had not dissociated in violation of the RUP A.
On February 9, 2011, the Court held a lengthy hearing on whether Saint Alphonsus
should be allowed to reopen discovery in the case on the issue of damages in light of the
Supreme Court's decision and this Court's ruling allowing the MRI entities to file a Third
Amended Counterclaim. MRIA opposed the motion. At this hearing, the parties again rehashed
the issue of whether the issue of damages was reopened by the Supreme Court's decision,
commenting on the damages issues the parties saw in the case, and the parties' perceptions on the
changed posture of the case.
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In resisting the reopening of damages discovery, Mr. Banducci pointed out that the MRI
entities' position on damage calculations had assumed two start dates: the end of 1999, when IMI
was opened as well as the July 2001 date when Saint Alphonsus entered into its partnership
agreement with IMI. He also stated that the damages calculations assumed two end dates: the
end date of2015, the end date of the unmodified Center partnership agreement and 2023, the end
date of the allegedly modified Center partnership agreement. Tr. ofhrg. Feb. 9, 2011, at pp. 2-3.
Mr. Vergonis, for Saint Alphonsus, argued that the Court's rulings on certain motions
filed following the filing of the Third Amended Counterclaim and Answer necessitated further
discovery because the Court ruled that Saint Alphonsus had lawfully dissociated in 2004. The
Court pointed out hat Saint Alphonsus had already had the opportunity to examine the MRIA
experts on the two theories of damages. Mr. Vergonis countered that when the depositions were
taken, however, Judge McLaughlin had already ruled that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully
dissociated, a ruling the Supreme Court found to be in error. Id. at p. 6.
Mr. Vergonis further argued that discovery should be reopened because" ... their entire
lost profits theory is based on the assumption that we were not permitted to compete with them
from the years 1999-2015." Mr. Vergonis also conceded that while Saint Alphonsus would argue
damages continued only through 2004, if damages were available, that Mr. Banducci would be
arguing that they would continue through 2015. Id. at pp. 7-9.
Mr. Vergonis, in arguing to reopen discovery on damages stated:
"Now, I think the parties are very far apart because Mr. Banducci has indicated he
intends to stick with his experts' damage analysis. Apparently he thinks that
they're entitled-that our wrongful conduct prior to 2005 caused all these
damages, and this is tens of millions of dollars, in future damages after 2005. And
we think damages can't be traced that way and that is a very limited damages
period with 1999-2005, which is a few single digits, I think millions of dollars,
even on their assumptions. And maybe some lingering effects that really trail off
going out after 2005. Mr. Banducci's experts grew damages after 2005 .... That,
Order re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories 5
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we think, is not an appropriate damages assessment. Now that we have lawfully
dissociated in 2005 .... " !d. at p. 11.
Later, Mr. Vergonis responded to the Court's question about their expert apparently
testifying based upon a new defense theory of damages that had never been heard in the case that:
"well, again, I think the new theory is based on the new posture of the case. It is a
theory-it is a new theory because we have now been held to have lawfully
dissociated in 2004 and it's a theory premised on that holding.... [W]e can't be
held to the strategic decisions we made under that rubric when everything-and
frankly everything has changed here. . . . And now that we've lawfully
dissociated, we'd like to put in new expert analysis that addresses that critical,
critical fact. ... I think it is really unfair [and] an abuse of discretion ... to allow
MRIA to fix its offensive case to take into account rulings that went against it on
appeal while disallowing Saint Alphonsus the right to change its defensive case
based on the rulings that made the case better for Saint Alphonsus." !d. at pp. 1819.
Further, Mr. Vergonis argued in support of the reopening of damage discovery using the
example of IMI Center:
"This facility accounts for millions of dollars of their damages based on the
assumption it wasn't allowed to be there. Now, all of a sudden, we've lawfully
dissociated, we've waited a year, we bring the competitor to the hospital, we have
every right to do that. And we need to have a number that says, you know, Mr.
Banduccis's experts rely on this assumption that the hospital couldn't be there and
that amounts to seven or eight or whatever million dollars. Well cross that one
out, because that's wrong. And that gets subtracted from the damages line." !d. at
p. 20 ll. 4-23.
Then, as to the Meridian facility, Mr. Vergonis stated:
" ... then likewise the Meridian and downtown facilities; well they count all the
business that they say IMI took from MRIA from 2005-2015. Well, our experts
would say, no, you don't count all of the business because they had every right to
compete at that time. You look at what happened in 1999-2004, and you phase
that out by some proper or appropriate economic methodology. And then you
come in with a number that is much, much smaller than what they are claiming."
Mr. Banducci argued against reopening damages discovery, calling it a "slippery slope."

!d. at p. 29 ll. 3-4. Specifically, Mr. Banducci argued: "The damages case, as you put it very
succinctly, we're going to put those damages on that we have presented to various courts five
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times. This is our measure of damages. This is our lost profits theory. That's our problem." /d.
at p. 28 ll. 14-18. Later in argument, Mr. Banducci stated:" ... the question remains[:] was this
a breach of something other than the express terms[?] ... As the court knows, there are implied
terms ... so our position is ... there are implied terms ... in the partnership agreement that were
breached when they withdrew." /d. at p. 31ll. 21-25; p. 32, ll. 10-13.
Mr. Vergonis, in response to Mr. Banducci's statement that Saint Alphonsus wanted a
mulligan or a do-over, stated: "you gave them a mulligan to add [Center and Mobile, which]
were not ... in the case when it came down from the Supreme Court . . . . And I think you did
that because you realized it's not a game of gotcha, where you're trying to trap parties into
positions they took under different circumstances .... now we have a changed case and we
ought to be allowed, just as they were allowed to add parties, we ought to be allowed to sort of
react to the changed posture ofthe case." /d. at p. 33, 1. 25; p. 34, ll. 1-19.
Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of Saint Alphonsus, allowing them to reopen
discovery.
Following the reopening of discovery, both MRIA's and Saint Alphonsus's experts filed
reports and were deposed by the opposing parties. Saint Alphonsus now moves for several
damages theories to be precluded because they are beyond the scope of the case and due to
discovery violations.
DISCUSSION
In its motion, Saint Alphonsus seeks to preclude argument and evidence regarding several

things: (1) MRIA's usurpation of partnership opportunity theory; (2) MRIA's disgorgement
theory of damages as it relates to profits made after April 1, 2005; (3) MRIA's diminution in
value theory of damages; and (4) claims of scans and profits lost by MRIA after April 1, 2005.
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In its opposition to the motion MRIA raised the issue of timeliness of Saint Alphonsus's motion.

At the outset, the Court notes that in substance, these motions are motions for summary
judgment-the motions are not evidentiary in nature and are attacking, in large part, the
substance of MRIA's damages theories.

Consequently, the Court believes the motion is

untimely, but in an excess of caution and to give guidance to the parties, the Court will address
the merits of the motions.

I. Usurpation of a Partnership Opportunity
Saint Alphonsus claims that the theory of usurpation of a partnership opportunity is
beyond the scope of issues on retrial and is time-barred. The Court disagrees on both points.
A. The usurpation claim is not outside the scope of this trial.
The extensive review of the record above reveals the procedure established for defining
the proceedings on remand, and that record is filled with references, both before and after the
appeal, to the co-opting of partnership opportunities. In its first counterclaim, MRIA alleged that
Saint Alphonsus had breached duties pursuant to Idaho Code section 53-3-404.
Furthermore, MRIA specifically alleged in its Third Amended Counterclaim, filed
following remand, that Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary responsibilities by "co-opting
partnership opportunities. 1" Consequently, this Court specifically finds that based upon the
pleadings and the argument by the parties to this Court on various occasions that both parties
were on notice of the claims and defenses that were being asserted by both parties; that neither
the claims asserted nor the defenses advanced are at odds with the decisions of the Idaho
Supreme Court after the Court addressed the parties' respective motions following the filing of
the Third Amended Counterclaim and Saint Alphonsus's Answer.

1

Plural. This is contrary to Saint Alphonsus's contention that MRIA was only referring to the IMI Meridian
opportunity.
Order re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories 8
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Both parties were allowed further discovery on the impact of damages calculations taking
into account the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling as it impacted the calculation of damages. The
Court allowed the reopening of discovery so the parties could clarify the impact of the rulings at
the Supreme Court as to specific timelines to allow MRlA to fully examine the issues of what
impacts these various time calculations had on the asserted damages and so Saint Alphonsus
could be aware of the position ofMRlA's experts and Saint Alphonsus could fully explore the
position ofMRlA's experts on these issues.
The usurpation theory has been pled since the very beginning of this lawsuit, and is an
appropriate theory to link Saint Alphonsus's allegedly wrongful conduct to damages after the
April 1, 2005, date.

Consequently, the Court finds that MRIA's claim for usurpation of a

partnership opportunity is not outside the scope of these proceedings.
B. The usurpation claim is not time-barred as a matter of law

A claim of usurpation of partnership opportunity is a breach of a fiduciary duty. I. C. §
53-3-404(b)(1) (defining one of the "fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership"). Claims
for breach of fiduciary duty must be brought within a four years of the breach. See I.C. § 5-224.
Saint Alphonsus argues that the statute of limitations began to run in September 1999.
Saint Alphonsus bases that assertion on Dr. Prochaska's testimony at the prior trial that suggests
MRIA's relationship with the radiologists had soured by 1999, and thus there was no partnership
opportunity to usurp. On the other hand, MRlA asserts that the usurpation "occurred" in June
2001, the date when Saint Alphonsus partnered with IMI. It filed its counterclaim on May 20,
2005.

Consequently, which date marks the beginning of the statute of limitations period

determines whether the usurpation claim is time barred.
The Court cannot rule on this issue as a matter of law; there is a genuine issue of material
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fact as to which date is the date when the usurpation "occurred." Consequently, this is a question
for the jury to resolve.
II. Disgorgement

Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA should be precluded from presenting its disgorgement
theory of damages. Saint Alphonsus argues for precluding this theory because it is beyond the
scope of these proceedings, it was belatedly disclosed, and it asks for profits earned after April 1,
2005.
A. The disgorgement theory of damages is not beyond the scope of proceedings

The Court finds that this theory of damages is not beyond the scope of the present
proceedings. The review of the record above shows that the parties and the Court understood the
issue of damages to be reopened following remand. The Supreme Court, when it remanded this
case, commented on how damages calculations are to be performed. Furthermore, there was a
great deal of discussion about the fact that damages had to be somehow linked to misconduct
occurring prior to April 1, 2005, on retrial.
Disgorgement is a damages theory, and the issue of damages is one of the areas that the
parties have consistently agreed must be reevaluated on remand. Furthermore, disgorgement is
an appropriate remedy that links allegedly improper conduct to damages after April 1, 2005.
Consequently, the Court finds that this damages theory is not beyond the scope of the present
proceedings. If this Court were to bind Mr. Banducci to the position taken in opposition to a
motion he lost, it would essentially be opening discovery for Saint Alphonsus without opening
discovery for MRIA. The Court would be trapping MRIA in precisely the kind of "gotcha" Mr.
Vergonis argued against in February.

The Court's position might well be different if Mr.

Banducci had won the motion based on his argument that he would be proceeding on the same
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causes of action and damages theories in spite of the Supreme Court's rulings striking down
some ofhis theories.
B. The expert opinion was not properly disclosed

Saint Alphonsus argues that this damages theory should be excluded because it was
belatedly disclosed. While the Court agrees that the theory was not as clearly disclosed as it
should have been, it does not believe that precluding expert testimony on the issue is the
appropriate remedy.

The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure require pleadings merely put the

opposing party on notice of the claims leveled against it or of the defenses raised to those claims.
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(2). It does not require the detailed disclosure of each facet of a claim; discovery is
the process by which the claims are fleshed out.

The record reveals that usurpation of a

partnership opportunity was pled, and that the law cited in MRIA's counterclaims includes clear
language that disgorgement is an appropriate remedy for that cause of action since the law clearly
requires that funds realized for appropriation of a partnership opportunity are to be held in trust.
I.C. § 53-3-404(b)(1). Furthermore, a remedy for a breach of that duty is restitution of any
amount brought in. R.G. Nelson, A.IA. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409,413,797 P.2d 117, 121 (1990).
That remedy is indistinguishable from the remedy presently sought by MRIA.

Thus, Saint

Alphonsus was on notice of the possibility of this theory of damages, and thus, the theory was
properly pled.
During discovery involving experts, the parties must disclose "[a] complete statement of
all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore, the data or other information
considered by the witness in forming the opinions [and] any exhibits to be used as a summary of
or support for the opinions." I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i). If a party does not comply with this rule,
the Court, in its discretion, may sanctio~ the noncompliant party. Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho
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867, 872, 136 P.3d 338, 343 (2006).
In arguing that its expert's opinion as to disgorgement was properly disclosed, MRIA

relies on a footnote in its expert's report. That footnote merely indicates the estimated allocation
of profits to SARMC for its interest in IMI between 1999 and 2010. The Court finds that the
footnote is vague and consequently is not an adequate disclosure of the damages theory being
advanced based upon the legal theory alleged by the MRI entities. Furthermore, that inadequate
disclosure may well have prejudiced Saint Alphonsus. Saint Alphonsus was not made aware that
there would be expert testimony on this theory of damages until after the deadline for expert
disclosures had passed. Consequently, it was not able to obtain an expert to defend against this
theory of damages.
Since there was an inadequate disclosure (even if it was late due to he parties' own
stipulation to extend discovery deadlines) that may well have prejudiced Saint Alphonsus, the
Court must determine what sanction is appropriate. The Court will begin by noting that Saint
Alphonsus actually did depose MRIA's expert on this theory, and MRIA's failure to disclose was
apparently not intentional-MRIA's expert, Bruce Budge, was clearly confused at the deposition
as to why portions of his report were not disclosed. Furthermore, this is an eight-week trial, and
the documents necessary to develop this theory of damages are, as conceded by counsel for Saint
Alphonsus, in Saint Alphonsus's possession. Given the length of the trial and the inadvertence
of the vague disclosure, the Court finds that precluding Mr. Budge from testifying as to this
theory is a harsh remedy that is to be avoided under Idaho law. Consequently, the Court will
allow Saint Alphonsus to obtain an expert witness to address this theory, or allow Dr. McCarthy
to address the disgorgement theory. Whatever expert Saint Alphonsus chooses will provide an
expert report as to this theory, and MRIA will be allowed to depose the expert. MRIA's expert
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may address Saint Alphonsus's expert's report-in rebuttal if necessary.
C. The disgorgement theory properly includes profits earned after April1, 2005
The RUP A provides that "[a] partner's duty of loyalty ... includes [the duty to] hold as
trustee for [the partnership] any ... benefit derived by the partner in the conduct ... of the
partnership business ... including the appropriation of a partnership opportunity ...."I. C. § 533-404(b)(1 ). Because the law requires that a partner hold in trust any benefit obtained from the
appropriation of a partnership opportunity, constructive trust is an appropriate remedy for
usurpation of a partnership opportunity. See I.C. § 53-3-404 cmt. 2. Under that theory, "the
partnership can recover any money or property in the partner's hands that can be traced to the
partnership." Id
Saint Alphonsus argues that it should not have to disgorge profits earned after April 1,
2005, because it was engaged in lawful competition at that point. The Court disagrees. The
RUP A provides that following dissociation "[t]he partner's duty of loyalty under section 53-3404(b)(1) . . . continues . . . with regard to matters arising and events occurring before the
partner's dissociation." I.C. § 53-3-603(c). Consequently, the duty to hold profits obtained from
the appropriation of a partnership opportunity in trust for the partnership continues after
dissociation.

Consequently, if Saint Alphonsus is found to have usurped a partnership

opportunity, any profits derived from that usurpation, even after April 1, 2005, must be
disgorged.

III. Diminution in Value
Saint Alphonsus also argues that the diminution in value theory of damages should be
excluded because it is outside the scope of the present proceedings, it was belatedly disclosed,
and it is legally deficient under Pope. The Court disagrees.
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·.
A. The diminution in value theory of damages is not outside the scope of the present proceedings
As explained above, the review of the record makes clear that damages were an area that
was opened by the Supreme Court's decision in this case. For the reasons set forth above, the
Court also believes that the diminution in value theory is not something that must have been
specifically pled. The parties were on notice that this theory of damages could be presented in
the retrial of this case. The Supreme Court simply held that the value established by Saint
Alphonsus's consultant was not a proper measure of damages-the so called "purchase price"
theory. The Supreme Court did not hold that a diminution in value theory could not be argued as
a component of damages.
B. There was no discovery violation or improper pleading
Saint Alphonsus argues that, though this theory of damages is not going to be proved
through expert testimony, MRIA should have disclosed the damages theory.

The Court

disagrees. As discussed above, notice of the claims leveled or of the defenses raised is all that is
required of pleadings. Saint Alphonsus was on notice that damages theories were an open issue.
In fact, this theory was specifically disclosed in discovery in the prior proceedings. Aff. of Dara
Parker, Exh. I, at p. 3. The Court finds that this theory was adequately disclosed, and that there
has been no discovery violation.
C. The Court cannot determine the sufficiency of the evidence prior to its presentation
While the Court notes that MRIA must present evidence sufficient to satisfy the Supreme
Court's Pope concerns, the Court will reserve ruling on the sufficiency of evidence until after the
evidence has been submitted. The Court will note, however, that it has already ruled that MRIA
has already met the threshold issue of Pope. (November 16, 2010, Decision).

IV. Lost Scans and Lost Profits After Aprill, 2005
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The Court has, on numerous occasions, ruled that MRIA may recover any damages
caused by wrongful conduct, regardless of when the damages accrue so long as they arise from
conduct engaged in prior to 2005. The RUP A provides that the liability for dissociation is not
exclusive, stating " ... the liability is in addition to any other obligation of the partner to the
partnership or to the partners." I.C. § 53-3-602(c).
Furthermore, the Statute specifically spells out that duties apply following the dissociation
of a partner. A dissociated partner still owes a duty of loyalty under section 53-3-404(b)(1 )-(2),
and a duty of care under section 53-3-404(c) with regard to matters arising and events occurring
before the partner's dissociation. Section 53-3-404(b)(l) requires that the partner hold as trustee
any partnership property, profits, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct of the business,
or derived from the use of partnership property or information. Section 53-3-404(b )(2) requires
that a partner refrain from self-dealing or on behalf of an adverse party in the conduct of the
business. Section 53-3-404(c) requires that a partner refrain from grossly negligent or reckless
conduct, or intentional or knowing misconduct or violations of the law in the conduct and
winding up of partnership business.
Each of these duties is contained within section 53-3-404, which was the pled basis for
liability, and each continues following the dissociation of the partner. Consequently, a breach of
any of these obligations can form a legitimate basis for damages regardless of whether the
damages occurred prior to or after dissociation. Were that not the case, there would be no need
for these provisions if all partnership obligations were cut off due to dissociation.
Saint Alphonsus now brings a motion to exclude any lost scans damages after April 1,
2005, because Mr. Budge's damages calculations wrongly include damages caused by
dissociation. MRIA admits that its experts assumed a world in which Saint Alphonsus did not
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..
dissociate in its but-for world, which increases damages recoverable. However, MRIA argues
that its expert is not including damages from the dissociation, but rather from the enhanced
market position it had as a result of self-dealing and other bad acts prior to dissociation.
The Court has reviewed Mr. Budge's reports and deposition testimony.

Mr. Budge

clearly states that he has not assumed that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated or wrongfully
competed after April 1, 2005. Aff. of Jack Gjording, Exh. J, at p. 84. He also states, however,
that his damages calculation would be different if he were to assume a rightful dissociation in
2004 with rightful competition beginning in 2005. !d. at p. 89-90. The Court, therefore, does not
believe it has adequate facts before it at this point to rule. The Court therefore reserves ruling on
the legal sufficiency of the theory until the evidence has been presented.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this.zfdayofSeptember, 2011.
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I hereby certify that on this,;l1 day of September 2011, I mailed (served) a true and
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ORIGINAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this objection to Saint Alphonsus's motions for
mistrial.

BACKGROUND
As this Court is well aware, before the trial of this matter, it instructed the parties to take
care not to reference the "prior trial" of this matter, but instead refer to that trial as the "prior
proceedings." (Memorandum of Actions Taken at May 18, 2011 Hearing, p. 2, filed June 13,
2011; Transcript Motions Hearing May 18, 2011, p. 37 -40). This matter was raised again at the
pretrial conference, where the following conversation took place:
THE COURT: ... There is no way in my opinion that you folks are
going to be able to try this case without the jury figuring out there was a prior trial
or proceeding. I mean, you are going to be using transcripts from the prior trial to
impeach witnesses. And this Court thinks that at some point we're going to have
to advise this jury that there was a prior proceeding, and they're not to concern
themselves with that. That hasn't got anything to do with their determination.
They are going to be hearing things that were said in the prior proceeding
from transcripts of that proceeding. They're only to be considered for the use that
they're put to in this trial. And I think that will solve a lot of problems with
regard to slips of the tongue with the jury in the jury box if the Court just says at
the outset there was a prior proceeding, there were issues between the parties, and
you are just not to concern yourselves with what happened in that other
proceeding. I think that resolves the problem.
Mr. Banducci.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I completely agree with that. I've been
concerned -- in fact, I shared my concerns with Mr. Vergonis at the McCarthy
deposition. I think the less direct we are about the existence of a prior trial the
more likely somebody on that panel is going to go, you know, I just-- what's this
prior proceeding that they're talking about? They're going to get curious, and
they're going to look into it. And this trial was reported in the newspaper. It was
in the Statesman. It was in the Boise Weekly. They can go on the web and find
that stuff and the amount of the verdict.
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Ifboth sides have done what we can do to prevent that from happening-we both had --both law firms had references to this case on their websites. You
can imagine that I have mine relating to the trial, and they had theirs relating to
the appeal, but it talked about that. We removed those from our websites.
I think you're right. Juries are always a lot smarter and a lot more aware
than we give them credit for. And ifwe don't address this directly, tell them there
was a prior trial, and that they are absolutely not to deal with anything like that, I
will feel a lot better because I don't want somebody on the stand to innocently
slip up and say "prior trial," and then have a motion for a mistrial. I just think that
would be horrible.
THE COURT: Well, I do give a standard instruction-- so both of you,
both parties will know -- to the jury that you are not to use the internet. You are
not to use your cell phones or your smart phones or any other electronic means to
check on anything outside of this courtroom. That's not your job. It's unfair to
both parties if you go out there and get information that maybe bloggers put up or
somebody else that for all we know don't know a thing about what happened,
that have an axe to grind, and that aren't subject to cross-examination in this
courtroom, so just don't do it.
And I threw a guy off a jury once who had done it. And it was done in
front of the other jurors so it would be impressed upon them the fact that I meant
it.
MR. AYER: Your Honor, could I just say one thing?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. A YER: I think we're on very much the same page Your Honor is
indicating you intend to go.
The only, I guess, request or question I would raise would be I think Your
Honor's language about a prior proceeding is the most appropriate way to do it. I
think it would not be appropriate to tell the jury that there was a prior trial.
THE COURT: "Prior proceeding" is a perfectly good term. And I think
both parties at one point in time agreed with that.
MR. BANDUCCI: We are in agreement to it, Your Honor. The only
concern I have is if- and we actually decided that as we prepare our witnesses,
we are going to hand them a document that says -- and make them sign it -saying I'm not going to make reference to the prior trial.
You know, best -- you know what they say about best intentions and
where that leads us.
OBJECTION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS 'S MOTIONS FOR MISTRIAL - 3
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The problem is this: I am concerned that if someone says "trial"
innocently- I assume that it would only happen innocently as between counsel
and the witnesses-- I don't- it would be an incredible shame, an incredible waste
of money and resources and court time to have to deal with a mistrial motion.
THE COURT: Well, immediately what I would do if that happened is I
would just stop the witness and I would tum to the jury and I would say you have
been told there has been a prior proceeding. It is not part of this proceeding, and
you shall disregard any comments with regard to a prior proceeding in this case
period. Put it out of your heads.
MR. BANDUCCI: I agree with that, Your Honor.
MR. AYER: That's fine, Your Honor.
(Hearing Tr., Aug. 5, 2011, p. 16:1 to 20:14)
MRIA has endeavored to comply with the court's directive to reference the prior trial
only as the "prior proceeding," including providing explicit written instructions to its witnesses
to avoid reference to the prior trial. Unfortunately, counsel for MRIA has inadvertently
mentioned the existence of a "prior trial" twice to the jury. Counsel for MRIA, Mr. Banducci,
has been involved in this case since 2005 and was lead counsel at the prior trial. His
examination of witnesses has included impeachment using testimony from the earlier trial,
including transcripts of proceedings that directly reference the previous jury. While reading
from those transcripts, Mr. Banducci has, on the fly, 1 altered the text so as not to reference the
prior jury. (Trial Tr. Sept. 21, 2011, at p. 1461 :22-1462:4.) However, in juggling all the details
of trial, reference to the prior trial has nevertheless slipped out of his mouth.
The first occasion was on September 16, 2011. An objection had been made to certain
evidence, and in argument on the evidence, while the jury was present, Mr. Banducci noted that

As described in more detail below, counsel for Saint Alphonsus was unable to do the
same in its own examination, and read a portion of the transcript from the prior proceedings that
explicitly referenced the prior jury. (Trial Tr., Sept. 23,2011, at pp. 1777:15-18; 1778:221779:24).
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no objection had been asserted "in the first trial." (Trial Tr. Sept. 16,2011, p. 896:16-18).
Despite the parties' agreement at the pretrial conference that an instruction to the jury would cure
this error, Saint Alphonsus moved for a mistrial. 2 The court declined to grant one, but
immediately instructed the jury that "Mr. Banducci referred to an earlier trial. You are not to
concern yourself with the proceedings relating to any earlier trial or proceeding. Nor to
speculate about that. And you will disregard the comment with regard to any prior trial." (Id. at
p. 897:13-18).
The second occurrence was on September 22,2011. Mr. Banducci was examining Sandra
Bruce, and had presented her with a number of transcripts of her prior testimony. In an effort to
direct Ms. Bruce to a particular transcript, Mr. Banducci said "let's take a look at the trial
transcript, page 1840." (Trial Tr. Sept. 22,2011, p. 1421:7-8). Saint Alphonsus again moved for
a mistrial, despite its previous agreement that a jury instruction was curative. (Id. at p. 1460:2225). The Court again declined to grant this motion, but stated as follows:
Well, the fact of the matter is that this Court made it clear that we were
going to try to avoid, in every way possible, getting into a situation in which we
might have a jury that heard that there was another trial in the matter, with all of
the modem electronic abilities and abilities to search records, accessibility, to
have juror misbehavior, in terms of going out and doing independent research.
Both parties agreed to that.
I mean, that was discussed, and both parties agreed that that was the best
way to handle it was simply to refer to prior proceedings and avoid talking about
a trial because it was less probable that you could get juror misconduct. And this
Court felt that that was the appropriate way to handle it.
The difficulty, Mr. Banducci, and I will tell you this right now, is that it
gets to be a point where it become a cumulative issue if it happens once or twice
or three times or four times. Every time it happens, I'm going to tell you that
there is going to be a greater probability that this Court would grant a mistrial
2

Saint Alphonsus seems intent on derailing these proceedings. It attempted to disqualify
this Court shortly before this trial began, and has moved for a mistrial at the slightest
provocation, despite its previous agreement that a corrective instruction would cure this problem.
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because I believe that it can invite juror misconduct and having information
placed into that jury room that neither party has an opportunity to address. It
could be to your detriment; it could be to Mr. Gjording's detriment.
And at this point in time, I believe that the standard is appropriately stated.
Does it endanger a fair trial? Not at this point, but every time it happens, it gets
closer to that happening. So I will just -- I will deny the motion for a mistriaL
As I have stated previously, this Court doesn't get mad at any attorney for
making his record, but I will put counsel on notice that as this comes -- if this
comes up again, you get very close to the possibility of having a motion like this
granted. That's my ruling.
And given the argument that was made last time with regard to the Court
giving an instruction and the current concern expressed by the defendant that all
I'm doing when I give that instruction is ringing the bell again, I will only give an
instruction if Saint Alphonsus provides me with a proposed instruction and
requests that it be given.
(Id. at p. 1465:1 to 1466:24). MRIA appreciates this Court's position, and will obviously

endeavor not to make this error again. However, MRIA's research has revealed that, even if it
does occur again, this is not grounds for granting a mistrial.

ARGUMENT
A.

Reference to Prior Trial is Not Grounds for a Mistrial
Rule 47(u) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court "may declare a

mistrial if it determines an occurrence at trial has prevented a fair trial." An error is grounds for
mistrial if that error affects a party's substantial rights. Weinstein v. Prudential Property and
Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 233 P.3d 1221 (2010). A motion for mistrial is properly denied if

the error does not rise to the level of preventing the party from receiving a fair trial. Johannsen
v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 431, 196 P.3d 341, 349 (2008). See Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136

Idaho 681, 686-87 39 P.3d 621, 626-27 (2001) ("slip ofthe tongue" in which witness
inadvertently mentioned prohibited information not grounds for mistrial).
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Notably, where an instruction cures the error, the court should decline to grant a mistrial.

Barry v. Arrow Transp. Co., 83 Idaho 41, 47, 358 P.2d 1041, 1045 (1960). Under Idaho law, the
admission of improper evidence is deemed "cured by proper instruction, and it must be presumed
that the jury obeyed the trial court's direction." Cook v. Skyline Corp. 135 Idaho 26, 32, 13 P.3d
857, 863 (2000). The only circumstance in which an instruction does not cure the error is when
the evidence is so highly prejudicial that no instruction could cure the error. Id. See State v.

Knutson, 47 Idaho 281, 274 P. 108, 109 (1929) (instruction does not cure only "where evidence
is so material and highly prejudicial that no instruction which the court may give will cure the
error.") Put another way, "we normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to
disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an overwhelming
probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood
that the effect of the evidence would be devastating." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498,
198 P.3d 128, 136 (Ct. App. 2008).
If a corrective instruction is curative, we trust that a jury appropriately instructed will in
fact set aside improper remarks. An illustrative case is Watkins v. Mountain Home Co-operative

Irr. Co., 33 Idaho 623, 197 P. 247 (1921). In that case, trial counsel improperly remarked that
the opposing party was a "gigantic corporation" and "artificial being." The court instructed the
jury that it was not to take into consideration whether a party was a corporation or a person. The
Supreme Court held that, in light of the

correctiv~

instruction, there was no prejudicial error.

The Supreme Court noted:
Something must be presumed for the intelligence and fairness of the jurymen, and
that they will not ordinarily be influenced into rendering a verdict contrary to the
instructions of the court and the evidence by every idle or improper remark that
may be made during the progress of a trial.
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ld. at 251. See !nama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 383,973 P.2d 148, 154 (1999) (holding that

instruction to the jury after the prohibited fact was mentioned cured the error and thus court
properly declined to grant a mistrial).
The doctrine is equally true when the improper remark discloses to the jury that there was
a prior trial of the matter. While there do not appear to be cases in Idaho which address this
issue, numerous other jurisdiction have done so. One such case is Olitsky v. Spencer Gifts, Inc.,
964 F.2d 1471 (5th Cir. 1992). In that case, the jury was told not merely about the existence of
the prior trial, as has occurred in the present case, but also the result of that trial. The opposing
party moved for a mistrial. The court declined to do so, but instead instructed the jury that the
fact and outcome of the previous trial was irrelevant. On appeal the Fifth Circuit held the "the
curative instruction given by the district court negated any prejudice" and "were sufficient to
cure any harm that may have resulted from the mention of the first trial and its results." Id. at
1475-76.
Another illustrative case is Yokely v. Hedgepeth 2011 WL 2971627, 1 (C.D.Cal.)
(C.D.Cal. 2011). In that case, the trial court ordered the parties to inform their witnesses that
they were not to mention the prior trial, but to refer to the first trial as a "hearing" or
"proceeding." While attempting to impeach a witness, counsel asked whether a certain question
had been asked at the "prior trial." Another reference to the "prior trial" was made by another
witness during his testimony. At another point, a witness referenced "an appeal," which implied
the existence of a previous trial. The defendant moved for a mistrial, which was denied. On
appeal, the appellate court affirmed, saying:
Petitioner has failed to identify any Supreme Court precedent which holds that a
fleeting mention by a witness of a prior trial . . . which is then "excluded by the
trial court with an instruction to the jury to disregard it was nonetheless deemed
prejudicial enough to undermine the fundamental fairness of a criminal trial."
OBJECTION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTIONS FOR MISTRIAL- 8
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Moreover, any potential prejudice to Petitioner was cured by the trial court's
striking the testimony and instructing the jury to disregard it."

Yokely v. Hedgepeth, 2011 WL 2971627, 1 (C.D.Cal. 2011). See Moore v. Quarterman, 526
F.Supp.2d 654, 692 (W.D.Tex. 2007) (instruction cured improper reference to prior trial); State

v. Bridges, 854 A.2d 855, 859 (Me. 2004) (mistrial properly denied because "curative instruction
was adequate to protect against improper consideration of the reference to the first trial by the
jury."); National BankofCommerce (ofEl Dorado) v. HCA Health Services ofMidwest, Inc.
304 Ark. 55, 69, 800 S.W.2d 694, 703 (Ark. 1990) (holding that reference to previous trial, made
by counsel as he was reading excerpts from a deposition, did not cause substantial prejudice);

Brown v. Arlen Management Corp. 663 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1981) (statement disclosing
existence of prior trial did not justify a new trial); State v. Libby, 435 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Me.1981)
("Knowledge by jurors that a prior trial had occurred 'does not per se mean they cannot give a
fair trial to an accused on retrial.' When the court gives a curative instruction, it is presumed that
'the jury heeds the court's instruction."').
Here, as with the cases cited above, reference to the prior trial does not cause such
prejudice as to render the trial unfair. This is particularly true because the Court has instructed
the jury to put the matter out of their minds, which we must presume they will do. As such, if
the matter is mentioned again (despite counsel's best attempts to prevent it), the Court should not
entertain a motion for a mistrial.

B.

Reference to the Prior Trial Does Not Disclose More Information than the Jury
Could Infer
Further suggesting that this evidence does not justify the extreme remedy of a mistrial,

the disclosure of the existence of the prior trial does not disclose to the jury any more
information than they could infer themselves. As the Court noted on the hearing of August 5,
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2011, the jury is intelligent and it is likely to "figure[ e ]out there was a prior trial." (Hearing Tr.,
Aug. 5, 2011, at p. 16:3-4.). During voir dire when the entire panel of jurors was present, several
prospective jurors indicated a familiarity with a previous proceeding and/or appeal. One juror
mentioned that a "Justice" had previously been involved in this case. He said:
PROSPECTIVE JUROR 112: I found out last night that my girlfriend,
she's a clerk for Eismann, so she has that case. I don't think I have a problem with
it. I just wanted to put that on the record.
MR. GJORDING: Clerk for who?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR 112: Eismann, Justice.
(Trial Tr. Sept. 6, 2011, p. 374:5-11). A juror familiar with the Idaho judiciary would know that
Justice Eismann is a justice ofthe Idaho Supreme Court, and thus that ifhe was involved with
this case, it was because a prior verdict had been on appeal. Another juror hinted that he was
aware of a prior trial, saying:
A. To be honest, I have become privy to what this is all about. No offense to -- I
can't say your name.
Q. Mr. Banducci?

A. Yeah. Hearing-- he's done an excellent job.

Q. Okay. So are you saying, sir, that based on what you've heard in this room thus
far you kind of already -

A. No. It's just something thatQ. Okay.
A. -- I've known but didn't really put two and two together.
(Trial Tr. Sept. 6, 2011, p. 356:10-357:4). Notably, Saint Alphonsus has itself revealed
information to the jury from which it could infer the existence of a prior trial. During voir dire,
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Saint Alphonsus revealed to the jury that a lawsuit had been filed. (Trial Tr. Sept. 6, 2011, p.
353:1-4). In addition, as one of Saint Aiphonsus's affirmative defenses is laches, it will likely
elicit testimony that this lawsuit began six years ago, in 2005. Perhaps most significantly, during
the proceedings on September 23, 2011, counsel for Saint Alphonsus itself discovered the
difficulty in conducting this trial without referencing the prior trial. Counsel for Saint Alphonsus
was reading a transcript from the prior trial during the examination of a witness. That transcript
from the prior proceedings referenced that earlier jury. The quoted portion of that transcript
stated "[a]s you sit here today, you can't tell this jury [i.e., the prior jury] that Cindy Schamp told
Roger Curran about these operating drafts."' (Trial Tr. Sept. 23,2011, at p. 1777:15-18). Unlike
Mr. Banducci, counsel for Saint Alphonsus did not alter this transcript on the fly, but read the

transcript verbatim, and thereby disclosed to the jury that it was not the first jury to have heard
testimony in the case.
Reference has been made to "prior proceedings," and the jury has seen the parties
reading from extensive transcripts from those proceedings. Even without being told that there
had been a prior trial, it is not a difficult leap for the jury to suspect that a "prior proceeding"
which followed the filing of a lawsuit six years ago, generated extensive transcripts, and was
accomplished with a jury present, was in fact a trial. Several cases have held that the ability of
the jury to make such inferences weighs against a finding of prejudice.

In Yokely, 2011 WL

2971627 at *1, the court noted that reference to prior trial was not prejudicial when "it is
probable that, even without mention of a prior trial ... , the jurors would have surmised that this
was a retrial, given that 17 years had passed between the crime and the new trial". In Keen v.

State, 775 So.2d 263 (Fla. 2000), the court held that improper reference to prior trial did not
warrant mistrial, particularly when the circumstances, including the use of prior testimony and
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the passage of time, meant that "the average juror could reasonably infer there had been prior
proceedings in this case ... [and] reasonably conclude that something had previously occurred in
the case." Furthermore, unlike some of the cases above, the jury has not been informed of the
outcome of the prior trial. 3 See Major v. Com., 275 S.W.3d 706 (Ky. 2009) (noting that mistrial
not warranted when the disclosure of the previous trial did not indicate any favorable or
unfavorable outcome). Given these circumstances, there is little prejudice from the fact that the
jury has been told there was a prior trial, rather than merely inferring it from the surrounding
facts. In fact, since the jurors have now been instructed to put that previous trial out of their
minds, there should be no speculation about the possible results of that trial.

C.

Jury Research
The Court has indicated that its primary concern, especially the more times the prior trial

is mentioned, is that such repetition may cause curious jurors to conduct independent research on
that trial. This assumes that the jury has violated the Court's explicit instructions not to conduct
any independent investigation. As the Court told the jury, "[y]ou are not to conduct research of
any kind on this case, and that includes internet research, internet blogs of any type, world wide
web contact as to the case, or any issues in this case." (Trial Tr. Sept. 6, 2011, p. 404:15-19.) We
must presume that the jury will follow the court's instructions not to research the case. State v.
Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 207 P.3d 186 (Ct. App. 2009). This instruction, which directs the jury's
own affirmative conduct, cannot be presumed to be the kind of instruction that a jury is unable to
follow. 4

3

In those cases, even the disclosure of the outcome was not enough to render the trial

unfair.
4

The classic example of circumstance in which an instruction cannot be followed is the
situation in which one cannot "unring the bell," that is, the jury hears a terrible fact which is
inadmissible and, despite the court's instructions to disregard the issue, it likely to be unable to
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However, to the extent that the Court believes that any further reference to the prior trial
might cross the threshold and begin to provoke the jury's curiosity, before imposing the extreme
remedy of a mistrial, the court should conduct voir dire of the jury to see if they have
nevertheless remained faithful to the Court's instruction not to conduct outside research. The
case State v. Libby, 435 A.2d 1075 (Me., 1981) illustrates that this procedure is appropriate. In
that case, during the course of trial a newspaper had published a front-page headline that the
defendants were facing "retrial." Fearing that the jury may not have been able to avoid this
headline, the jury was polled to determine whether they had seen it. While some of the jurors
admitted to seeing the headline, voir dire of the jurors revealed that they did not have an
understanding that defendants had faced trial before. The Court noted that:
jurors' knowledge of a prior trial does not per se mean they cannot give a fair trial
to an accused on retrial. Since the voir dire revealed that the jurors had failed to
glean from the headline the prejudicial inference feared by defendants, we find no
error, obvious or otherwise, in the justice's conclusion that defendants were not
prejudiced.
Id. at 1079. Here, if the Court has concerns that any subsequent reference to the prior trial may

have caused the jury to conduct research, the Court should so inquire. If the jury has not
conducted outside research, then a repeated reference to the prior trial is harmless; it is no more
prejudicial than the first reference, which the jury was explicitly instructed to disregard.
CONCLUSION
Counsel for MRIA obviously hopes to avoid any further reference to the prior trial.
However, this is a long proceeding, and there is always a danger that this slip may occur again,
whether by counsel for MRIA, a witness, or counsel for Saint Alphonsus. As described in detail

set its knowledge aside. That is not the circumstance here, where the jury has simply been
instructed to control its own affirmative conduct.
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above, this error can be and has been cured by an instruction to the jury. As such, the Court
should not consider entering a mistrial.
DATED this 28th day of September, 2011.

~~\RL

ara L. P rker
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
jd_Facsimile

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
jt-Facsimile

~.1~. Dara L. qarker
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MRIA's motion to preclude reference to St. Al's
departing partner share.
MR. WOODARD: Your Honor, actually this is
good timing to have this motion after the comments
that were just made by Mr. Ayer. And I think what
he talked about was in the last trial there was a
ruling by Judge McLaughlin that Saint Alphonsus
wrongfully dissociated. And I think what Mr. Ayer
said is that it's foreseeable at that point that
the jury was then going to find that Saint
Alphonsus also breached fiduciary duties and, you
know, was liable for all of the other claims we
made. And certainly the Supreme Court found that
that summary judgment ruling and then giving that
to the jury and letting the jury know about that
prejudiced the jury. And that's the same concern
we have here about the departing partner shares.
If we communicate to the jury that
Saint Alphonsus sued for its departing partner
share, and then it won on that lawsuit, on that
claim, that's going to prejudice the jury into
disregarding the evidence on our claims now which
are completely different, of breaches of fiduciary
duty and tortious interference of contract. And I
think if we allow the jury to hear that, we'll be
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inviting the same error that Judge McLaughlin was
found to have had when he allowed us to
communicate that to the jury.
That's our concern is that the jury
would be prejudiced by hearing this. And the jury
doesn't need to know the amount that was awarded
for the departing partner share, that Saint
Alphonsus has been awarded the departing partner
share. It's not an issue in this case.
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
Mr. Ayer.
MR. AYER: Yes, Your Honor. We certainly
agree, Your Honor, that theres's no reason to talk
about the amount.
The situation we have is one where the
case began with us as the plaintiff, and we are
still nominally the plaintiff, and they are the
counterclaimants. And here looking-- just
looking back to what Judge McLaughlin did, that's
all we're really suggesting the Court should do to
indicate that -- I mean, somehow or another the
jury needs to understand how we were the
plaintiff, and they're the counterclaimant, unless
we're going to rename the parties. We could do it
that way.
Page 16
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But the simple point I think that's
appropriate is what he did. He simply told the
jury that we had brought a claim with regard to
recovering our share. The Court has or is
resolving that, and there's no reason for them to
deal with that. And that accounts for the fact
that we're the plaintiff, and that's all we're
suggesting, is doing what Judge McLaughlin did.
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Response?
MR. WOODARD: Your Honor, I don't know that
I disagree with anything he just said. I think
probably, though, for this case the easiest way to
do it is MRIA, for what's left and what's being
tried, is the plaintiff, and Saint At's is the
defendant. I don't think that the jury needs to
be confused by there was a lawsuit first filed by
Saint At's, and that there's been a ruling in that
lawsuit-- I mean, the only lawsuit that the jury
needs to decide is the claims that are brought by
MRIA.
THE COURT: Well, there are several things
that are going to have to be discussed. And maybe
we will do that when we get to the pre-trial
conference part of this.
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There is no way in my opinion that you
folks are going to be able to try this case
without the jury figuring out there was a prior
trial or proceeding. I mean, you are going to be
using transcripts from the prior trial to impeach
witnesses. And this Court thinks that at some
point we're going to have to advise this jury that
there was a prior proceeding, and they're not to
concern themselves with that. That hasn't got
anything to do with their determination.
They are going to be hearing things
that were said in the prior proceeding from
transcripts of that proceeding. They're only to
be considered for the use that they're put to in
this trial. And I think that will solve a lot of
problems with regard to slips of the tongue with
the jury in the jury box if the Court just says at
the outset there was a prior proceeding, there
were issues between the parties, and you are just
not to concern yourselves with what happened in
that other proceeding. I think that resolves the
problem.
Mr. Banducci.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I completely
agree with that. I've been concerned -- in fact,
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I shared my concerns with Mr. Vergonis at the
McCarthy deposition. I think the less direct we
are about the existence of a prior trial the more
likely somebody on that panel is going to go, you
know, I just-- what's this prior proceeding that
they're talking about? They're going to get
curious, and they're going to look into it. And
this trial was reported in the newspaper. It was
in the Statesman. It was in the Boise Weekly.
They can go on the web and find that stuff and the
amount of the verdict.
If both sides have done what we can do
to prevent that from happening-- we both had -both law firms had references to this case on
their websites. You can imagine that I have mine
relating to the trial, and they had theirs
relating to the appeal, but it talked about that.
We removed those from our websites.
But I think you're right. Juries are
always a lot smarter and a lot more aware than we
give them credit for. And if we don't address
this directly, tell them there was a prior trial,
and that they are absolutely not to deal with
anything like that, I will feel a lot better
because I don't want somebody on the stand to
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innocently slip up and say "prior trial," and then
have a motion for a mistrial. I just think that
would be horrible.
THE COURT: Well, I do give a standard
instruction -- so both of you, both parties will
know --to the jury that you are not to use the
internet. You are not to use your cell phones or
your smart phones or any other electronic means to
check on anything outside of this courtroom.
That's not your job. It's unfair to both parties
if you go out there and get information that maybe
bloggers put up or somebody else that for all we
know don't know a thing about what happened, that
have an axe to grind, and that aren't subject to
cross-examination in this courtroom, so just don't
do it.
And I threw a guy off a jury once who
had done it. And it was done in front of the
other jurors so it would be impressed upon them
the fact that I meant it.
MR. AYER: Your Honor, could I just say one
thing?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. AYER: I think we're on very much the
same page Your Honor is indicating you intend to

-~
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go.
The only, I guess, request or question
I would raise would be I think Your Honor's
language about a prior proceeding is the most
appropriate way to do it. I think it would not be
appropriate to tell the jury that there was a
prior trial.
THE COURT: "Prior proceeding" is a
perfectly good term. And I think both parties at
one point in time agreed with that.
MR. BANDUCCI: We are in agreement to it,
Your Honor. The only concern I have is if-- and
we actually decided that as we prepare our
witnesses, we are going to hand them a document
that says -- and make them sign it -- saying I'm
not going to make reference to the prior trial.
You know, best-- you know what they
say about best intentions and where that leads us.
The problem is this: I am concerned
that if someone says "trial" innocently-- I
assume that it would only happen innocently as
between counsel and the witnesses-- I don't-- it
would be an incredible shame, an incredible waste
of money and resources and court time to have to
deal with a mistrial motion.
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THE COURT: Well, immediately what I would
do if that happened is I would just stop the
witness and I would turn to the jury and I would
say you have been told there has been a prior
proceeding. It is not part of this proceeding,
and you shall disregard any comments with regard
to a prior proceeding in this case period. Put it
out of your heads.
MR. BANDUCCI: I agree with that, Your
Honor.
MR. AYER: That's fine, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I would be just as afraid as you
that I might be the first one to make the mistake,
so I don't want to do that.
All right. Mr. Ayers, you had
something else?
MR. AYER: No, I don't, Your Honor. I was
just waiting for you call on the next one.
THE COURT: All right. Let's try number
three, the motion to have deemed admitted the
exhibits admitted in the previous trial.
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor. It's
briefed. I'm not going to take a lot of time on
this. I just have a few points. Number one,
certainly I had no idea that the stipulations
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1

the reason we are here is because MRI and the

2

other affiliate companies have brought a lawsuit

3

against us,

4

causes of action.

5

why it is that they have brought this lawsuit.

6

But the reason that we are here is because we

7

don't agree with that,

8

raise our hand and say wait just a minute.

9

in dispute over that.

and they have listed these various
And they're going to tell you

My question,

10

and we want to be able to
We're

next general question is

11

is there anyone in here who believes or feels that

12

just because someone files a lawsuit that there

13

must be or there probably is liability?
In other words,

14

I want to make sure,

15

folks,

16

there's fire does not exist in this room.

17
18
19

that the analogy of where there's smoke

Is there anyone who believes that just
because they sued us they're probably right?
And along with that is there anyone

20

and this gets back to the imposition thing.

Even

21

if it takes four weeks to get to our case,

22

to the point where we can indeed raise our hand

23

and say we want to tell our side of the story,

24

there anyone in here who feels that because of

25

their frustration -- and you've heard it -- is

to get

is

002641

1

do your best.

Okay?

2

3

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION JUROR NO.

4

BY MR. GJORDING:

5

Q.

There was another

6

A.

92.

7

Q.

92?

8

A.

Do I

9

Q.

I

10

A.

To be honest,

--

don't think so.

what this is all about.

12

say your name.

13

Q.

Mr.

14

A.

Yeah.

I

have become privy to

No offense to -- I

Hearing -- he's done an
I

really feel

excellent job.

16

begun.

17

what's going on,

18

from what we know,

19

it has to turn the other.

like the trial has

And some of that stuff I

And I

and so I
I

I mean,

know it starts one way,

just
and

really don't know -- you know,

unless you want to go private,

22

should say much more.
Okay.

kind of know

really

21

Q.

can't

Banducci?

15

20

sir?

your number,

need this?

11

23

92

I

don't think I

So are you saying,

sir,

that

24

based on what you've heard in this room thus far

25

you kind of already --
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

-- I've known but didn't really put two

4

It's just something that--

and two together.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

And yeah.

7

Q.

Okay.

But I guess the bottom line is

8

that because of what you're -- and I

9

you not saying because for obvious reasons.

10

A.

11

when I hear Mr.

12

done an excellent job.

13

addressed,

14

stuff and the words that he's using,

15

-- I mean,

16

about,

17

Let me just try to explain it.
Banducci -- like I

you know,

say,

You know,

Like

you've

the way he's

the potential

i t ' s like I

and I
Q.

appreciate

jurors and
I

just know

know what the sides are

know why we're all here.

Okay.

And so I

think you're saying

18

that at least at this point you know that the

19

parties don't start on the same level?

20

A.

21

MR.

Correct.
GJORDING:

All right.

Thank you.

22

23
24
25
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1

not getting the work out because I'm not there.
And your jury number is,

2

MR. GJORDING:

3

PROSPECTIVE JUROR 116:

4

MR. GJORDING:

5

PROSPECTIVE JUROR 112:

116.

6

night that my girlfriend,

7

Eismann,

8

have a problem with it.

9

on the record.

116.

112?
I found out last

she's a clerk for

so she has that case.
I

Clerk for who?

MR. GJORDING:

11

PROSPECTIVE JUROR 112:

12

MR. GJORDING:

Okay.

Last question.
again,

I don't think I

just wanted to put that

10

13

Eismann,

Justice.

Anybody else?
Is there anyone in this

14

room -- and,

15

heart and your gut.

16

who feels that Saint Alphonsus does not have a

17

right to come in here and ask you to listen to

18

their story,

I would ask you to go to your
Is there anybody in this room

their side of the story?

Your Honor,

19

sir?

with the same provision

20

that Mr. Banducci said about the hardships,

21

pass the jury for cause.

22

THE COURT:

Thank you,

we

Counsel.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to

23
24

break at this point.

25

room.

You can return to the jury

And we are going to discuss the remaining
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1

these proceedings; however,

no written transcript

2

will be made of these proceedings for review by

3

the jury.

4

As you can well surmise,

this case is

5

important to both sides, and each party to the

6

suit is entitled to your full and fair

7

consideration.

8

way with the parties,

9

witnesses.

You are not to associate in any
their attorneys,

agents,

or

You are likewise not to discuss the

10

case with anyone or permit anyone to discuss the

11

case with you,

12

house,

13

not yourself to contact anyone in an attempt to

14

discuss or gain greater understanding of the case.

whether within or without the Court

during the course of the trial,

and you are

You are not to conduct research of any

15
16

kind on this case,

and that includes internet

17

research,

18

web contact as to the case,

19

case.

internet blogs of any type,

world wide

or any issues in this

In the event that anyone attempts to

20
21

discuss the case with you or to influence your

22

decision,

23

you will report it to me promptly.
You are not even to discuss the case

24

among yourselves until you retire to the jury room

25

to deliberate at the close of the entire case,

and
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Radiology was.
A. It was a small office owned by a
radiology group, and it was located on the
hospital campus but not directly within the
immediate hospital building. It was part of a
medical office building that's on the campus of
Saint Alphonsus.
And it provided-- West Boise was there
to provide x-ray and ultrasound services only to
physicians who were in that building. It was a
five-story medical office building, several
physicians who see patients in the building, and
many of whom had need for x-ray and ultrasound
services.
Q. All right. So it was an imaging
center?
A. Yes.
Q. It had ultrasound?
A. Yes.
Q. I'm not good with all these modalities.
What else did it have?
A. Just x-ray and ultrasound.
Q. X-ray and ultrasound. And were you
aware that when Saint Alphonsus allowed this
imaging center run by the radiologists to go into
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operation, that the hospital put some restrictions
on what could be done there?
A. I am not sure I recall that. West
Boise was opened long before I joined Practice
Management. I certainly may have, during the
course of my business with West Boise, seen
something like that, but nothing is coming to mind
right at the moment.
Q. Okay. So but suffice it to say that
this -- there was already a small imaging center,
independent imaging center, that the radiologists
had in operation certainly by the date of this
minutes in 1998; correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. All right. Now, let me focus your
attention on the first paragraph that we had
expanded here, and there is a reference here to
"autonomy." Do you see that?
A. I do, yes.
Q. It says, "An independent imaging center
would be beneficial and would help to maintain a
professional image as well as autonomy."
What did you understand that word,
autonomy, to mean?
A. My understanding from the radiologists
Page 896
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was that they felt they were tied exclusively at
the time to Saint Alphonsus, that they had the
exclusive agreement to provide radiology services
to hospital patients; and that at the, for lack of
a better word, whim of the hospital, they could be
terminated, their contract not renewed, and
whatever the number was of physicians at the time
as partners in Gem State Radiology -- seven,
eight, nine radiologists --who were in the
community, engrained in the community, had kids in
the community, would be forced to basically leave
town.
So the autonomy was to have something
that would enable them to continue to stay in the
community should they -- any termination occur
with their hospital agreement.
Q. So it was autonomy from the hospital?
A. It really was, yes.
Q. Okay. And had something happened with
the pathology group a little before the time frame
of this May 1998 meeting that was, you know, known
to the practicing physicians that might create an
additional concern?
A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. Can you tell jury about that?
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A. I don't have any direct knowledge, but
I have what the radiologists were telling me at
the time. And there was some dispute -MR. ROMATOWSKI: Your Honor, in that case,
if we have it only on a secondhand or
multiple-hearsay basis, I think it is excludable.
THE COURT: Mr. Banducci?
MR. BANDUCCI: It is not being offered for
the truth of the matter stated, Your Honor. It is
being offered for the basis of explaining the
concern that the radiologists had regarding what
might happen to their radiology contract.
And so whether it is true or not, it
was their basis for fear and their desire for
autonomy.
This was gone into in the first trial,
and no objection was -- and no objection was
asserted.
THE COURT: All right. Well, I will allow
him to testify with regard to his understanding of
the radiologists' concerns. To that extent, I
will allow the testimony.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: May we approach, Your
Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
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(Discussion off the record with court
and counsel.)
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the
jury, I am allowing this question for the limited
purpose of the witness being able to testify with
his -- with regard to his understanding of
concerns, not as testimony that those concerns
were actually legitimate or had been expressed in
other areas, only that that was this witness's
understanding of those concerns. And the
testimony is offered for that limited purpose.
MR. BANDUCCI: Okay.
THE COURT: In addition, Mr. Banducci
referred to an earlier trial. You are not to
concern yourself with the proceedings relating to
any earlier trial or proceeding. Nor to speculate
about that. And you will disregard the comment
with regard to any prior trial.
Go ahead.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: Mr. Cliff, you were
going to describe what you had heard from the
radiologists relative to their concerns as to what
had happened with the pathologists. So if you can
explain that to the jury.
A. Sure. To the best of my recollection,
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some number or all -- I don't believe it was all
of the pathologists-- well, let me back up one
step.
The pathology group at Saint Al's had
the same sort of contract -- and I'm assuming; I
never saw that contract -- but they had the same
sort of agreement with Saint Al's as the
radiologists. They were the exclusive providers
of pathology services for hospital patients.
And sometime before this '98 -- May of
'98 date -- I don't recall exactly when -- I was
told by the radiologists that some number of the
pathologists were -- their contract to provide
services at Saint Alphonsus was not renewed.
And I believe it was maybe -- this is
just a recollection. I think it may have been two
out of four of the pathologists who were
practicing at the hospital at the time were -their contracts were not renewed, and they were
basically forced-- one of them left town, and one
ofthem stayed in town.
Q. Okay. Now, can we go back to *-4047,
please. And let's go to B. It says, "The
question was raised as to how important the
relationships are with the physicians at the
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hospital. Bob Polk" -Now, who is Bob Polk?
A. He is one of the administrators for
Saint Alphonsus.
Q. Okay. And it says, "Bob Polk has
stated that anyone working for other institutions,
i.e., TVH, is working for the competition and
should therefore be 'punished."'
Do you see that?
A. I do, yes.
Q. Now, the radiologists at the time were
working for Treasure Valley Hospital; correct?
A. It is possible. I don't recall. I
know that there was a time when the radiologists
were working for Treasure Valley Hospital. I
don't recall what those dates were.
Q. So you don't recall. Let's go to
*-4077.

And I think, Kathy, this is in
evidence. It is -THE COURT: The Court will note that *-4077
is in evidence.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: All right. Now,
Mr. Cliff, let me direct you to a page here. All
right. Let's go to the bottom of the page.

Page 900

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A. On page what?
Q. On the first page, under "Hospital
Negotiations." Now, this a little bit ahead of
time. We have now jumped from May of'98 to March
of'99, but I want to run down this Treasure
Valley Hospital issue.
It says, "Dr. Traughber" -- who was
member of the radiology group; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. -- "has asked Cindy" -- that would be
Cindy Schamp; correct?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. -- "for information and regulations on
nonprofit organizations. She is still getting the
national data on this. Jeff' -- that would be
you; correct?
A. I believe so.
Q. -- "and Cindy are working on a new pro
forma. Many issues have been closed but TVH" -that's Treasure Valley Hospital; right?
A. Correct.
Q. -- "and governance are still major
obstacles to work out."
Would you agree with me that, in '99,
Treasure Valley Hospital was a major issue to work
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1
2
3

PricewaterhouseCoopers', report; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. And then there was one more
4
time, starting in early 2000; right? Where Allen
5
Hahn and Jeff Cliff, representing MRIA, talked
6
about a valuation for the business; correct?
7
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So that's early-- that's
8
9
January, February, that time frame?
10
A. I know it was early 2000.
11
Q. Okay. Well, Jet's just put "early."
12
Early works for you?
13
A. Yes.
14
Q. All right. And we will put "PWC" here.
15
All right. And just so that we have got a time
16
frame, this is 2001, 2002, 2003.
17
Obviously, this timeline is not to
18
scale; correct? All right.
19
So Jet's talk about the first
20
negotiations in early '99. And you already
21
testified, didn't you, that Ms. Schamp was the one
22
who was involved in those discussions; correct?
23
A. Correct.
Q. And you don't know whether Saint
24
~--·-· Alphonsus ever made an offer in connection with
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Q. And you don't know whether Cindy Schamp
had a conversation with Jeff Cliff during this
time frame; correct?
A. I believe she did. You just told me
that she did.
Q. Okay. Well, let's take a look at the
trial transcript at page 1840.
MR. AYER: Your Honor, could we approach?
THE COURT: You can.
(Discussion off record at the bench
with court and counsel.)
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: All right. Let's
take a look at the transcript, please, and we were
looking at 1840.
MR. BANDUCCI: Just a second, let me get to
that, Ms. Bruce.
THE WITNESS: Take all the time you need.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: All right. Could you
go to line 19, please.
A. Yes.
Q. Question, at line 19:
"QUESTION: As you sit here today, can
you tell me whether or not Ms. Schamp ever had
conversations with Mr. Cliff?

those first discussions; correct?
A. I believe what was being discussed at
the time was the value of the Henson partnership.
And if an agreement were reached around that, then
this would be a foundation for making an offer or
furthering the partnership.
Q. Well, my question was: Did you make an
offer in connection with the mid-'99 discussions?
Yes or no?
A. I would say we did not because that
wouldn't be -- you don't make an offer until there
is agreement on the numbers and the value.
Q. No offer. Okay.
Now, let's talk about the early 2000
discussions. And you would agree with me that
Cindy Schamp was the one who provided leadership
on that at the time; correct? Those would be
discussions; correct?
A. I believe so. She may have been
assisted by Ken Fry, the CFO.
Q. I'm sorry. Say that again.
A. She may have been assisted by the chief
financial officer, Ken Fry. I don't recall.
Q. Okay. But you do recall Cindy Schamp
being involved?
Page 1422
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"ANSWER: I don't know whether she did
or not."
Was that your testimony?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. And you're not aware of any
written offer made by Ms. Schamp to Dr. Curran or
anyone else at MRIA; correct?
A. Are you reading -Q. No. I am asking you a question.
A. Would you repeat that, please?
Q. Sure. You would agree with me that
you're unaware of any written offer made by Ms.
Schamp to Dr. Curran or anyone else at MRIA;
correct?
A. What I'm aware of is that the work of
Shattuck Hammond was shared. I don't know if it
was with Dr. Curran, with whom Cindy talked
frequently, or Jeff Cliff, but there was no
interest expressed on the part ofDMR to further
that proposal.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, that's completely
nonresponsive to my question.
THE COURT: I will instruct the jury to
disregard it. The court reporter will reread the
question, to which the witness will respond
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Mark Adams about all of those components.
Q. All right. And the end result of this
is that West Valley didn't get this advancement in
patient care, at this time; correct?
A. I don't know if they put it in
themselves or not.
Q. Certainly, Saint Al's didn't help them
with it; right?
A. I don't know if we subsequently did or
not.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I think we are at
a good stopping point.
THE COURT: Very well. Ladies and gentlemen
of the jury, I will admonish you that you are not
to discuss the case among yourselves nor with
anyone else, nor to form any opinions as to the
merits of the case until it has been fully
submitted to you for your determination. We will
be in recess for the next 15 to 20 minutes.
(Jury excused.)
THE COURT: Ms. Bruce, you can step down.
(Witness steps down.)
THE COURT: The reason for the conference at
the bench was that Mr. Banducci, again, slipped in
part of his questioning and referred to a trial
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transcript.
Mr. Ayer, I will allow you to make your
argument with regard to this matter.
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor?
THE COURT: Mr. Gjording.
MR. GJORDING: What I would really like to
do, Your Honor, before we discuss this, I would
like to talk to Ms. Westermeier about this. Could
we come back before the jury comes in and provide
you with our thoughts on this? I really would
like to talk to her about this.
THE COURT: All right. Very well. We will
be in recess then.
(Recess.)
THE COURT: The Court will note that the
parties are present in the courtroom with their
counsel.
Mr. Gjording?
MR. GJORDING: Yes, sir. I won't belabor
this, Your Honor, because I know we have time
constraints.
This is the second occasion that we
have had mention by our opponent of a previous
trial, and we move for a mistrial. We renew our
motion for a mistrial.
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THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
Mr. Banducci, response?
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
As I understand it, mistrial can only
be granted in the event that, in the Court's
determination, that an occurrence has taken place
at the trial that would prevent a fair trial.
At the commencement of this case and at
pretrial, I made it clear on the record that this
could happen. It has.
I would note that I did not refer to a
"prior trial"; I referred to a "trial transcript."
It may be a small difference, but nevertheless, I
certainly have not, in either situation, made a
point of a prior trial. It simply has been a
slip.
I know this Court wants us to use
particular words, "prior proceeding," and I have
done everything I can. This is an eight-week
trial, Your Honor, and it is just very difficult
because there was a prior trial.
I would want the Court to understand
that there are often times when -- I would guess
five or six -- when I have been reading
impeachment testimony, and my question has been:
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"Are you telling this jury that?" And I have had
to, on the fly, change that question so that the
existence of a jury in the prior proceeding would
not come out.
My point here is simply the
circumstances here are fraught with the
possibility that this is going to happen, and at
pretrial, I pointed this out to the Court.
And it is very difficult to be before
you, Your Honor, making this argument, having been
the one to make the slip. But I'm not perfect,
and I, as I think the Court understands, I didn't
even know I said it. When I approached the bench,
it didn't-- it wasn't known to me.
This jury knows there has been a prior
proceeding. And so if this Court is to grant a
mistrial on this, then this Court must be making a
determination that there is -- the difference
between "prior proceeding" and "prior trial" is so
different that there can't be a fair trial.
And I don't understand that because, in
fact, what is really the prejudice that would
result isn't whether there was a prior trial or a
prior proceeding. The question is whether or not
the jurors have gone out and looked for
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information about whatever prior proceeding there
was, whether it was an administrative proceeding
or some other. And the question is about
publicity, not about the word that is used here.
And so, again, that's why I raised it
at the pretrial. And I have gone back and looked
at the transcript for pretrial. Both sides agreed
to an instruction in the event that the word
"trial" was used. Saint Alphonsus agreed to that.
It is at pages 14 and 15 of the transcripts of the
pretrial. This is the situation where the Court
deems it necessary, if Saint Alphonsus wants it,
the instruction should be given.
I wish I could make a guarantee to this
Court that there will never be a mention of a
trial in this case. We have got another five
weeks. The fact is, there was a prior trial, and
sometimes, you know, it is very difficult to not
make reference to it in that word.
And so my view of this is this is not
prejudicial. There is a fair trial occurring
here. This is a trap, and it has nothing to do
with fair trial. It simply has-- it is a
"gotcha" that Saint Alphonsus would love to get.
And so I, you know, I-- again, I find
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myself in a position of apologizing to this Court
for use of that term, but I think the Court
understands that there was no intention in it.
I do believe, however, that it would be
grossly unfair to declare a mistrial, and I think
that that's why we have this instruction.
I will continue to make absolutely my
best effort, and I guess I am going to need to
slow down. And I'm not sure to do what, because
some of this stuff has to be done on the fly, and
I think the Court understands that.
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
Mr. Gjording, response?
MR GJORDING: Well, Your Honor, I wasn't
going to respond at all because we do have time
constraints here. I have to respond to part of
it.
You heard what I had to say last time
about the possible prejudice, but this comment
about we are playing the "I gotcha card," Your
Honor, I think he has got it inside out here. I
don't think that the potential victim over here at
this table should be addressed as the offender.
That just isn't right.
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
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Well, the fact of the matter is that
this Court made it clear that we were going to try
to avoid, in every way possible, getting into a
situation in which we might have a jury that heard
that there was another trial in the matter, with
all of the modern electronic abilities and
abilities to search records, accessibility, to
have juror misbehavior, in terms of going out and
doing independent research. Both parties agreed
to that.
I mean, that was discussed, and both
parties agreed that that was the best way to
handle it was simply to refer to prior proceedings
and avoid talking about a trial because it was
less probable that you could get juror misconduct.
And this Court felt that that was the appropriate
way to handle it.
The difficulty, Mr. Banducci, and I
will tell you this right now, is that it gets to
be a point where it become a cumulative issue if
it happens once or twice or three times or four
times. Every time it happens, I'm going to tell
you that there is going to be a greater
probability that this Court would grant a mistrial
because I believe that it can invite juror
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misconduct and having information placed into that
jury room that neither party has an opportunity to
address. It could be to your detriment; it could
be to Mr. Gjording's detriment.
And at this point in time, I believe
that the standard is appropriately stated. Does
it endanger a fair trial? Not at this point, but
every time it happens, it gets closer to that
happening. So I will just -- I will deny the
motion for a mistrial.
As I have stated previously, this Court
doesn't get mad at any attorney for making his
record, but I will put counsel on notice that as
this comes -- if this comes up again, you get very
close to the possibility of having a motion like
this granted. That's my ruling.
And given the argument that was made
last time with regard to the Court giving an
instruction and the current concern expressed by
the defendant that all I'm doing when I give that
instruction is ringing the bell again, I will only
give an instruction if Saint Alphonsus provides me
with a proposed instruction and requests that it
be given.
MR GJORDING: Your Honor, that's certainly
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situation. Do you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. And I want to read you some of the
testimony and it appears at page 1320, if can you
find the transcript up there. If you don't have
it, I will get you one. I am sorry. I am on
wrong page; it is 1801. I apologize.
MR. BANDUCCI: Eighteen -MR. AYER: 1801 and it is lines 6 through
1Q
Q. BY MR. AYER: And Mr. Banducci read
this to you -- it actually starts on line 7.
MR. BANDUCCI: 1801, line what?
Q. BY MR. AYER: Let's start on line 7
with word "are you."
A. Um-hmm (Response).
Q. Okay.
"Are you testifying that Dr. Giles has
knowledge of these operating drafts? Do you know
that?" That's the question.
"ANSWER: I don't know that. I don't
know that Dr. Giles has knowledge of that.
"QUESTION: Okay. Ifhe says he
doesn't -- he has never seen those operating
drafts before, you wouldn't dispute it, would you?
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MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I ask that he
continue to read.
MR. AYER: Your Honor, I have no obligation
to continue to read. He is perfectly welcome to
do it on recross if he wishes to.
MR. BANDUCCI: There's just another three
lines, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. That's fine. The
right to put the evidence in under 106 exists and
you can do it on cross.
MR. AYER: Well, actually, I am happy to
read the next few lines.
Answer-- let's see, let me get
organized.
Okay. The next ones are, "As you sit
here today, you can't tell this jury that Cindy
Schamp told Roger Curran about these operating
drafts?
"No."
Is that the part you wanted read?
THE COURT: Mr. Banducci.
MR. BANDUCCI: That's fine, Your Honor.
Q. BY MR. AYER: Okay. I would like now
to direct your attention, Ms. Bruce -MR. AYER: Unless, Your Honor, do you wish a

"ANSWER: I wouldn't because I don't
know."
Do you recall that testimony being read
to you?
A. Yes.
Q. And now Jet's continue on with the next
twelve lines here, between line 11 and line 23.
"Okay. If he says he doesn't" -- I'm
sorry. Wait a minute. Okay.
"Okay. If he says he doesn't, he has
never seen those operating drafts before, you
wouldn't dispute it, would you?
"I wouldn't because I don't know.
"Okay. Thank you.
"But I think Ms. Schamp was having
conversation with Roger Curran and others. Both
sides were trying to keep each other apprised of
the status of our negotiations.
"QUESTION: Are you testifying that
Cindy Schamp told Roger Curran about these
negotiating drafts?
"ANSWER: Not specifically the drafts,
more the status of the negotiations, you know, how
we were doing."
Is that also your sworn testimony?
Page 1778

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

break or would you like to continue?
THE COURT: How much longer do think the
time will take on this portion? More than -MR. AYER: Well, you know, it all kind of
goes along, so I can break here, I can break in a
while.
THE COURT: All right. Let's take the
recess, then. I gather we have got some more time
that you are going to take.
So ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I
will admonish you not to discuss the case among
yourselves nor with anyone else nor to form any
opinion as to the merits of the case until it has
been fully presented to you for your
determination. We will be in recess for about 15
minutes.
(Jury excused.)
THE COURT: Any matters which either counsel
wishes to raise with the Court before the recess?
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Banducci.
MR. BANDUCCI: I didn't want bring this up
in front of the jury, obviously, but-- and I'm-1 guess the best word is "compassionate" as to
what happened here because it is hard to do this
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without making reference to the prior proceedings.
But we have all been confronted with
this when we're starting to read from testimony
and Mr. Ayer made reference to the jury from the
prior transcript. And so, you know, it's the same
sort of problem.
I think we need to find a way to
address this because I know Mr. Ayer didn't do
that on purpose. In fact, it looks like he didn't
even know he had done it until just now. So we
have the same problem and we are going to have to
find a solution to this.
I don't think it is a mistrial issue.
We are going to be filing a brief on Monday-actually prefer then to just leave it as it is
until we can get a brief filed for you so that you
can at least understand how we view this issue.
THE COURT: And the only thing that I will
point out is that this was a determination that I
made based upon the request of both parties that
they didn't want a prior trial or appeals referred
to and so I came up with the prior proceeding
language. So I just want to make that clear. I
was just trying to satisfy the parties.
MR BANDUCCI: Understood, Your Honor.
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effective date of this agreement, Ms. Bruce?
A. The first day ofJuly, 2001.
Q. Okay. Now, Bill, if we could go down
and instead highlight all of the bottom paragraph
as it is-- the whole paragraph, just the whole
thing you have there, let's highlight that.
Now, I would ask you first-- in fact,
could you read the first line and a half down
through "Boise, Idaho," ifyou would.
A. "The company owns and operates both the
MRI and the non-MRI medical imaging business at
927 Myrtlewood Street, Boise, Idaho."
Q. Okay. And Bill, if can you now
highlight the sentence that begins, "The company
maintains." And then the next sentence as well,
that ends with those three numbers. And
Ms. Bruce, if you could read those words as well.
A. "The company maintains separate
financial statements for each operation. Certain
administrative, lease, and other expenses are
allocated between the two operations as provided
in Sections 12.8, 13.3, 13.4."
Q. Okay. Now Bill, if could you
highlight -- I guess now why don't we highlight
the rest of the paragraph down to the

THE COURT: All right. So we will be in
recess.
(Recess.)
THE COURT: Any matters that counsel wish to
raise with the Court before the jury is brought
in.
MR. BANDUCCI: No, Your Honor.
MR AVER: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Very well, let's bring them in.
(Jury present.)
THE COURT: The Court will note that the
parties and their counsel are present, and
Ms. Bruce has retaken the witness stand.
Mr. Ayer, you may continue.
MR AYER: Thank you, Your Honor. I would
like to show the witness now Exhibit *-4226, which
is admitted in evidence. And it is in fact the
final operating agreement that we have been
speaking about earlier here today.
Bill, if we could highlight -- pass
over the table of contents to page six, which is
the beginning of the agreement itself. And let's
highlight just very briefly the heading of the
first paragraph.
Q. BY MR. AYER: And can you tell us the
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second-to-the-last line, the word "ICR" at the end
of the sentence. "Diversified" there, very good.
Yes.
And I will read this one now.
"Diversified Care is acquiring a 50 percent
interest in the non-MRI operations of the company
under this agreement. This agreement, which sets
forth the terms and conditions of the ownership,
operation, and management of the non-MRI portion
of the company's operations, does not apply to
ICR's ownership, operation, and management of the
MRI operation.
"Profits, losses, and distributions for
the non-MRI operation are allocated equally
between ICR and Diversified Care; and, for the MRI
operation, entirely to ICR."
Now, Mr. Banducci questioned you about
the division essentially that you testified was
created between the MRI side and the non-MRI side.
And you indicated that there were a number of
provisions that were adopted and agreed to in
order to accomplish this financial and otherwise
division between the two.
Are these some of the provisions that
you were referring to?
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Liability Partnership,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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ORIGINAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") present this notice of intent to impeach Sandra Bruce
through a witness named Dr. Steve Wilson, whom it has not previously disclosed. MRIA intends
to call Dr. Wilson on Monday October 3, 2011, and therefore requests that this matter be heard
on Friday, September 30, 2011. MRIA will use Dr. Wilson to impeach Ms. Bruce with respect
to the following inquiry:

Q. All right. Mr. Cliff testified before you and he talked about something
that occurred while you were chief executive officer of Saint Alphonsus that
contributed to a culture of fear amongst the radiologists, and that event was the
termination of the pathologists' contract. Do you remember terminating a
pathologists' contract while you were CEO?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. And is it fair to say that was a contract that was held by Dr.
Steven Wilson; correct?
A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. And is it fair to say that you terminated Dr. Steven Wilson's contract
and never told them why?
A. I don't recall that he was never told why.
Q. Well, do you-- are you testifying to this jury that you told him?
A. It's just that I don't recall whether he was told or not.
Q. Was he given any notice?
A. I don't recall.
Q. So if Dr. Wilson testifies that he was given no notice and was never
told why he was terminated by you, you wouldn't debate that?
A. I would have to look at the documents to see whether he had been
given notice or- I wouldn't know whether to debate it without reviewing the
record.
Q. As you sit here right now, you wouldn't debate that?
NOTICE OF INTENT TO IMPEACH - 2
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A. As I sit here right now, I would have to look at the information to be
able to have an informed opinion.
(Trial Tr. Sept. 20, 2011, p. 1174:21 to 1176:6). MRIA intends to call Dr. Wilson to testify that
his contract was terminated without being told why. This testimony is relevant because the
termination of Dr. Wilson's pathology contract was referenced in Dr. Cliff's testimony has a
contributory factor to the "culture of fear" arising out of Saint Alphonsus's hospital
administration's vindictive conduct toward certain of its physician groups.
This is also proper impeachment testimony. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(e)(6)(J) and I.R.C.P.
16(h), impeachment witnesses need not be disclosed prior to trial. Thomson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho
99, 205 P.3d 1235 (2009) (permitting impeachment witness to testify contrary to assertion by
doctor that the impeachment witness had expertise and had been consulted on that expertise).
When asked whether she had never told Dr. Wilson why his contract had been terminated, Ms.
Bruce testified that she didn't "recall that he was never told why." Dr. Wilson's testimony will
impeach Ms. Bruce's testimony that she cannot remember the details of the termination. As the
Court of Appeals has said,
impeachment is [evidence] which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce
the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which explains
why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony. Examples of
impeachment evidence would include prior inconsistent statements, bias, attacks
on [the] character of a witness, prior felony convictions, and attacks on the
capacity of the witness to observe, recall or relate. Evidence may be both
substantive and impeaching.
State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-69, 119 P.3d 637, 643-44 (Ct.App.2004) (quoting Small v.
State, 132 Idaho 327, 334-35,971 P.2d 1151, 1158-59 (Ct.App.1998)) (emphasis added). A
party's own previous actions and statements may be used to impeach an assertion that she cannot
remember prior events. An illustrative case is State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 124, 714 P .2d 93
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(Ct. App. 1986). The Court held that testimony by an officer that after he had stopped defendant
for driving while intoxicated he observed rifle on seat next to defendant and asked defendant
about it, to which defendant replied that his "girl friend has talked to you about it," was
admissible to refute defendant's assertion that he did not remember making a gun-related threat
against victim. See State v. Gallatin, 106 Idaho 564, 682 P.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1984) (allowing
admission of recorded statement as impeachment when party had said that he did not recall
making the statement). Preuss v. Thomson; 112 Idaho 169, 171, 730 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Ct. App.
1986) (Testimony by a witness that he or she cannot remember is sufficient to complete the
foundation for impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement).
As Dr. Wilson's testimony will impeach Ms. Bruce's assertion that she cannot remember
the details of terminating his contract, MRIA requests leave ofthe court to present Dr. Wilson as
an impeachment witness.
DATED this 29th day of September, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

-·v. .

iRk-

Dara L. Par er
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
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Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
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on her testimony, and I don't want to argue it in
front of the jury.
THE COURT: Very well.
(Discussion off the record at the bench
with court and counsel.)
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: I will rephrase the
question. In your mind is it appropriate patient
care for the hospital to have its only magnetic
resonance imaging service without a contract for
radiological services for outpatients?
A. The hospital did not have its own MRI
service. The hospital was a partner in an MRI
service and it's my understanding, Mr. Banducci,
that for years there had been some informal
agreement, possibly reached before I ever arrived
at Saint Al's, for the Gem State radiologists to
provide reading services to MRIA. It was in place
when I arrived and was operating in that fashion.
So-Q. Well, then let's go look at *-4033. My
question was a little different and I would ask
that the court reporter read the question back to
~u.

(Question read back.)
THE WITNESS: The premise of your question
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is flawed because Saint Alphonsus didn't have its
own MRI service.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: I realize that-A It was a partnership. I don't know how
to respond to the question.
Q. Well, it doesn't have anything to do
with whether it is a partnership or its own. The
question is whether or not you have radiologic
services for-- the question is: Is it
appropriate for the hospitals only -- the only
service, the only magnetic resonance imaging
service on campus is not bound by a radiologic
contract? Is that appropriate in your view?
A I don't know how to respond other than
what I have said to you so far, Mr. Banducci.
Q. Thank you. Let's go to page 2.
MR BANDUCCI: Kathy, can you expand from
the word "agreement" all the way down to the
bottom of the page? Thank you.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: Take a look at the
description of physician services and duties. Do
you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. It says, "The Group, through its
individual Physicians, shall perform all services
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generally and customarily performed by the Medical
Center hospital-based radiologist group."
Do you see that?
~

Y~.

Q. So before you arrived, there was a
customarily performed set of duties and
responsibilities by the radiologists; correct?
For MRI; correct?
A. They had been providing that service,
yes.
Q. Thank you. Let's go to *-4055. Now,
on August 20th, 1998, the three radiologists came
and visited you to inform you of the radiology
group's decision to open an independent imaging
center; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And these handwritten notes, which are
Exhibit *-4055, which are in evidence, Your Honor,
reflect your notes of that meeting; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And the radiologists' proposal to Saint
Alphonsus would be that Saint Alphonsus would
purchase equipment for the center and lease it
back to the radiologists; correct?
A. They did propose that in the meeting,
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yes.

Q. All right. Now, did you understand
that one of the reasons that the radiologists
wanted this independent imaging center was for an
autonomy or independence from hospital?
A. I don't recall those words ever being
used.
Q. Okay. Did you ever come to understand
that one of the reasons that the radiologists
wanted to have an independent imaging center was
because they wanted some separation and distance
from the hospital? They didn't want to be so
dependent on the hospital?
A. Again, I have no recollection of that
being said.
Q. Well, my question is: Did you ever
come into information of that after this meeting?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Okay. Now, you know who Jeff Cliff is?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Mr. Clifftestified before
you and he talked about something that occurred
while you were chief executive officer of Saint
Alphonsus that contributed to a culture of fear
amongst the radiologists, and that event was the
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termination of the pathologists' contract. Do you
remember terminating a pathologists' contract
while you were CEO?
A Y~.
Q. All right. And is it fair to say that
was a contract that was held by Dr. Steven Wilson;
correct?
A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. And is it fair to say that you
terminated Dr. Steven Wilson's contract and never
told them why?
A. I don't recall that he was never told
why.
Q. Well, do you -- are you testifying to
this jury that you told him?
A. It's just that I don't recall whether
he was told or not.
Q. Was he given any notice?
A. I don't recall.
Q. So if Dr. Wilson testifies that he was
given no notice and was never told why he was
terminated by you, you wouldn't debate that?
A. I would have to look at the documents
to see whether he had been given notice or -- I
wouldn't know whether to debate it without
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were upset with the radiologists was because they
were going to compete with the hospital; correct?
A. Well, I was upset on several fronts. I
think one was the senses of-Q. Ma'am, my question to you is: One of
the reasons you were upset was because the
radiologists were going to compete with you;
correct?
A. Yes. And Dr. Giles was part ofthe -MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I'm going to ask
that you instruct this witness please to answer my
questions.
THE COURT: Ms. Bruce, you are to answers
the questions from counsel. Your counsel will
have an opportunity to cross-examine and clarify
in his examination.
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE WITNESS: I understand.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: So one of the reasons
that you were upset was because the radiologists
were going to compete with the hospital; right?
A. And they were going to compete in
MRI -Q. Okay.
A. -- with Dr. Giles --

reviewing the record.
Q. As you sit here right now, you wouldn't
debate that?
A. As I sit here right now, I would have
to look at the information to be able to have an
informed opinion.
Q. Now, when the -- was there some
upheaval amongst the medical staff when you
terminated the pathology contract?
A. I'm not recalling upheaval.
Q. Now, were you angry or upset at the
radiologists when they came to talk to you about
this imaging center?
A. I was clearly upset when they came to
talk to me about the imaging center, yes.
Q. Did you feel that they were being
disloyal to the hospital by opening up this
imaging center?
A. I think I had some initial feelings
about whether or not they were being disloyal,
yes.
Q. Okay. Did you ever tell them that they
were disloyal for pursuing this business strategy?
A. I don't know if I ever told them that.
Q. Okay. And one of the reasons that you
Page 1178
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MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I'm sorry.
THE WITNESS: -- participating in both.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I would ask that
the instruction -MR. AYER: Your Honor, she should be allowed
to answer this question.
MR. BANDUCCI: This is a simple question.
THE COURT: This is a direct question. You
will have an opportunity, Mr. Ayer, to seek
qualification of any answer on cross-examination.
Mr. Banducci has the right to have his question
answered directly, and you have the right to come
back in your cross-examination and put any
clarification in. That's the way it works.
Go ahead.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: Would it be fair to
say, Ms. Bruce, that in addition to taking away
business from the hospital, if the radiologists
build an additional imaging center, they would
gain some independence from the hospital's
exclusive radiology contract?
A. They already had that independence.
Q. They did? Would you agree with me that
the radiology contract allowed you significant
leverage over the radiologists?
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Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership,

MOTION IN LIMINE TO PREVENT
SAINT ALPHONSUS FROM
PRESENTING EVIDENCE ABOUT
"ARID CLUB" CONVERSATION
UNLESS COURT FIRST DETERMINES
IT IS ADMISSIBLE

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership; MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho
Limited Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT ALPHONSUS
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

MOTION IN LIMINE TO PREVENT SAINT ALPHONSUS FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE ABOUT "ARID
CLUB" CONVERSATION UNLESS COURT FIRST DETERMINES IT IS ADMISSIBLE- 1
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ORIGINAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") move the Court to order in limine that, while the jury is
present, Saint Alphonsus will not attempt to elicit testimony from any witness, or present any
evidence, concerning the events which allegedly occurred at a dinner at the Arid Club without
first establishing its admissibility.
As the Court is aware, Saint Alphonsus made an offer of proof in which Cindy Schamp
testified that at this dinner, Dr. Giles asked Ms. Schamp to pass on to him any confidential
information she received regarding Saint Alphonsus's CEO, Sandra Bruce. (Trial Tr. Sept. 27,
2011, p. 2275:10-2278:5). The Court held that, although the information might otherwise be
relevant, its probative value was outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice under Idaho Rule
of Evidence 403. (!d. at p. 2280:15-2282:7.) MRIA anticipates that Saint Alphonsus may
attempt to elicit this testimony through other means, such as through a question about this
incident to Dr. Giles or others. MRIA asks that the Court instruct Saint Alphonsus that, if it is
going to attempt to elicit any such testimony or present such evidence, this first be done outside
the presence of the jury so that the Court can determine whether the evidence is admissible. As
the Court has already held that such evidence is unduly prejudicial, it would be inappropriate for
the jury to hear a question along these lines, unless or until the Court first determines that the
evidence is admissible.
DATED this 291h day of September, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~·I
?-haTI:L.

Pafker
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of September, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for P laintiff/Counterdefendant
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me say first: Were these communications with
Dr. Curran in person or by telephone or both?
A. They were generally always in person.
Q. Always in person. And where would you
speak with him?
A. Well, let me correct that. In person
or occasionally by e-mail, but generally in
person.
Q. Okay.
A. In my office.
Q. In your office?
A. Yes.
Q. Were they always in your office?
A. Other than the MRI board meetings -Q. Okay.
A. -- they were generally always in my
office.
Q. And roughly -- and again, this may have
a varied answer in terms of time periods. But how
often would you speak with Dr. Curran?
A. Well, it did vary. Because he liked to
travel sometimes.
Q. He liked to travel?
A. He liked to travel sometimes.
Q. Okay.
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MRIA in a product at the end that would still meet
everybody's needs.
Q. Okay. We will come back to that. But
just let me ask one more question about the
PricewaterhouseCoopers. Who initiated the
engagement with PricewaterhouseCoopers that you
just referred to?
A. The initial one, I believe, was
initiated by Karl Kurtz.
Q. Karl Kurtz is associated with -A. He was CFO at Saint Alphonsus.
Q. So Saint Alphonsus initiated -A. Yes.
Q. -- the work that PWC did; is that
accurate?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. What was the tone of your conversations
if you can give -- if you can generalize? What
was the tone of your conversations with
Dr. Curran?
A. I would say the nature of my meetings
with Dr. Curran were always very collegial. He
was a very nice man.
Q. Okay.
A. And really was seeking a desire to find

A. Or at least take vacations away from
work; we will leave it at that.
It would be anywhere from the low of
once or twice a month to a high of four or five
times a month, depending upon the month.
Q. Okay. And what would these
conversations be about? What topics did you talk
about?
A. Well, many things. MRI business, "
issues around challenges he was having with
leading MRI. I don't believe he had a history of
running an enterprise as large as MRIA. And so he
would use me as a sounding board for things he was
trying to manage. We would discuss the status of
PricewaterhouseCoopers and what was happening -Q. When you refer to that, what are you
referring about? What are you talking about?
A. Well, there was a valuation done by
PricewaterhouseCoopers early on. And then
following that, there was an engagement with
PricewaterhouseCoopers to look at other possible
ways to restructure MRIA to achieve what the
hospital wanted in alignment.
Q. Okay.
A. And to respect all of the members of
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a fix for all of the parties of MRIA and would
express that to me. And that was consistent with
what I wanted, so we were very -- very much able
to work collaboratively on things.
Q. Okay. Now, did you understand at that
time why he was coming by, dropping by your office
to talk to you about these things?

MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, that's-- now we
are looking into the intent and motive of someone
who is no longer with us.
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection. I
believe that the question calls for speculation.
Q. BY MR. AYER: Okay. Your Honor--

THE COURT: This might be a good place to
break for lunch.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I
will admonish you are not to discuss this case
among yourselves nor with anyone else nor to form
any opinions as to the merits of the case until it
has been fully submitted to you for your
determination. We will be in recess until1:15.
(Jury excused.)
THE COURT: Counsel was proceeding to ask
some questions regarding the witness's meeting
with Dr. Giles that was the dinner to apparently
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celebrate her promotion. The Court determined
that it would be best to take this matter up
outside the presence ofthe jury and allow counsel
to make an offer of proof.
So, Counsel, you may make an offer of
proof by continuing with your questions of the
witness.
MR. AYER: Thank you, Your Honor.
Q. BY MR. A YER: This follows up on
questions we asked earlier before the jury and
began with a question about whether there was any
particularly memorable conversation you had with
Dr. Giles.
And am I -- this occurred at the time
you were on the MRIA board; is that correct?
A. It would have been summer of 1998. In
summer of 1998, I was not yet on the board of
MRIA.
Q. Okay.
A. That would be true.
Q. Okay. And then I would like to read
from the prior proceeding, if I could, and ask you
whether it refreshes your recollection.
And this is in connection with, it will
become apparent, the same conversation. It was
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purposes of proof because he can't use the
deposition of his own party.
THE COURT: Go ahead, Counsel. Just ask
your questions.
Q. BY MR. AYER: And so does the testimony
that I just read you from the prior proceeding
refresh your recollection about the timing of
this?
A. Yes, it does, because -- well, I
shouldn't -Q. Go ahead. Yes, it does. And explain
why-A. Well, it refreshes my recollection
sitting here when -- I had said earlier it was
summer of '99 -- summer of '98 when I was
promoted.
Q. Right?
A. And he was, in his way, celebrating my
role.
Q. Okay.
A. But it was after I went on the MRIA
board because he took me to The Arid Club, and The
Arid Club was only something I really became
familiar with because the MRIA board members
routinely would go to The Arid Club after the

admitted at the last trial, Your Honor.
MR. BANDUCCI: If we can just have a cite,
Your Honor.
MR. AYER: A what?
MR. BANDUCCI: A cite to a page.
MR. AYER: Sure. Page 3410, line 5. And I
can read it, Your Honor. It says, "And do you
recall when the conversation was?"
"To the best of my recollection, it was
in 19 --I want to say '98, early 1999. I can't
remember the exact date of when that was."
"Okay. And where did it take place?"
"At The Arid Club. Well, it would have
been -- I correct that. It would have been 1999,
because it was after I joined the MRI board."
"Mter you joined --"
"Mter I joined the board, yes."
"And explain to the jury what The Arid
Club is."
And then she proceeds to -- I mean, we
could proceed using the prior testimony, Your
Honor. That's the other way we can do this. If
you wish, I can simply read the prior testimony
and make that the offer of proof.
MR. BANDUCCI: Obviously, he can't for
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meetings.
Q. Okay.
A. And so that makes sense to me sitting
here. I was out of sequence in my recollection
sitting here before that.
Q. Okay. So can you tell us-- tell the
Court the substance of the conversation that you
had that you indicated was pretty memorable to
you.
A. The substance of the conversation was,
after pleasantries and dialogue, in the course of
the dinner, Dr. Giles then indicated to me that he
wanted me to keep him apprised of what Sandy was,
quote, "up to."
Q. Sandy who?
A. Sandy Bruce.
Q. Okay.
A. What she was up to. And that I should,
if you will, report back to him, and that Sandy
wouldn't -- a reference to be there forever or not
be in that job forever, references like that. And
that he would take care of me, meaning -- my
interpretation of that was that he would make sure
I did well in my career by staying close to him
and keeping him informed of what Sandy was doing.
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Q. Okay. And what was your reaction to
that statement by him to you, that request by him
to you?
A Well, I was first stunned and offended.
I had never had a conversation like that in my
career, at that point in my entire career.
Q. Why did you find that stunning and
offensive?
A. Because it was very clear in that
communication that he wanted me to give him
information about what Sandy was doing
businesswise that was not -- that was confidential
or business communication he otherwise wouldn't
have access to.
And by doing so, I would then advantage
myself but not necessarily the interests of Sandy
or the organization.
And I had never been approached by
someone to do such a thing before. So I remember
it very clearly -Q. Okay. Do you-A -- because of how I felt when I -- I
mean, I was sick to my stomach when I left that
meeting. I really was surprised.
Q. Do you recall what, if anything, you
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A. And, otherwise, to continue moving
forward.
Q. Did you fmd thereafter that you were
able to deal with him and have a functioning
relationship?
A. I did my best, yes.
MR AYER: Okay. That's the testimony, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Banducci?
MR BANDUCCI: Well, Your Honor, I think it
is a 403 set of circumstances. Certainly, there
is a lot of conjecture on what it is that
Dr. Giles meant with what he said. Moreover, I
don't see what Dr. Giles is saying here is binding
on the party.
MRIA did not send him to have dinner
with Cindy Schamp to have this conversation. And
there is actually no connection in what I just
heard relative to the testimony that would suggest
that Dr. Giles was doing something in the interest
of MRI Associates.
Rather, it is-- well, we don't even
know. It could be in the interest of Gem State
Radiology, or it could be in the interest of
Dr. Giles.

said to him in response to this?
A I don't remember exactly what I said.
I think probably something noncommittal. Maybe I
remembered more last time I testified. I don't,
sitting here, remember.
Q. Okay.
A. I just remember being unclear what to
do. I mean, it was uncharted territory for me.
Q. And what did you do following this
meeting?
A. I met with Sandy at the next available
moment. I believe it was the very next day. It
may have been a day or two later, depending upon
her availability.
Q. Okay. And did you thereafter-- how
did this, if at all, affect your dealings with
Dr. Giles?
A Well, I disclosed it all to Sandy, and
she reminded me that essentially we have to work
with all of these individuals, in any event, but
to proceed forward on the course of what I was
doing but just keep her informed of anything that
Dr. Giles was or wasn't doing along the way that I
thought she might need to know.
Q. Okay.
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There is a bit of background on this in
the fact that Dr. Giles had been identified to
take a rather important position on the medical
staff that he believed that Ms. Bruce torpedoed
him on, to use a not-so-legal term.
But I think this is a personal deal,
and to have it come in as something relevant in
this case, the prejudicial nature of the
commentary here and the fact that it made
Ms. Schamp almost sick to her stomach, etcetera,
is much more prejudicial than it is probative.
THE COURT: Mr. Ayer?
MR AYER: Your Honor, this case is all
about the conflict and tension and problems in
relationships among parties and the hospital's
effort over a period of years to work out a
functional aligned relationship that would work.
The role of Dr. Giles here in seeking,
apparently, to spy on the CEO of Saint Alphonsus,
for whatever set of reasons he wanted to do it, is
a piece of information that is highly relevant to
the dysfunctional relationships that were the
problems Saint Alphonsus was trying to fix.
And the notion that it is not at all
relevant that he approached the COO of the
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hospital and asked her to spy on the chief
executive officer of the hospital is -- would be
surprising, I think.
There is no question but that this is
highly disruptive behavior of the relationships
that must work well in order for patient care to
be provided at the highest level.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, a great example.
It is now spying. This is the kind of
hyperbole -MR. AYER: This is what?
MR. BANDUCCI: This is the kind of hyperbole
that this conversation will be turned into if you
allow it in.
THE COURT: Well, Counsel, there are two
objections that have been made. One is that the
statement itself was not representative of the -of any position of MRIA.
801(2), which is the section dealing
with admission of a party opponent, specifically
states, "The statement is offer against a party
and is, A, the party's own statement in either an
individual or a representative capacity."
The Court will, therefore, overrule the
objection on the basis of it was a statement that
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but I haven't seen anything yet that indicates
this is being presented for anything other than
what has been represented so far.
So I will sustain the objection under
Rule 403, even though I believe technically the
evidence would otherwise be admissible as
relevant.
The second thing that I want to address
is that we did have a meeting at the bench with
regard to - it is in evidence which the Court
ruled at the bench -MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I recall that. I
objected on the grounds of relevance. And I will
withdraw that objection after the conversation at
the bench, so I don't think you need go into it
unless you see it necessary.
THE COURT: Very well. I just was going to
give counsel an opportunity to make their record
outside the of presence of the jury, if they
wised.
MR. BANDUCCI: After talking with the Court,
I understand the court's perspective on that, and
I'll withdraw the objection.
THE COURT: Okay. Very well, then.
Ms. Schamp, then, you may step down.

was not made in a representative capacity on
behalf of MRIA, since the definition specifically
includes even a statement made as an individual in
an individual capacity.
The second item relates to prejudicial
value outweighing the probative -- prejudicial
effect outweighing the probative value.
The Court does find that the statement
can be relevant to the issue of whether or not the
parties got along. But at this point, the Court
is going to rule that in the witness's testimony
here, that this statement is a statement that can
be, in fact, highly prejudicial. And there is no
indication that this statement was endorsed by
anyone at MRIA, and their claims are the claims
that could be impacted by the statement, even
though this statement was apparently made in an
individual capacity.
It is this type of dichotomy that this
Court believes is the basis for Rule 403, which
allows the Court to exclude otherwise relevant
evidence because of its prejudicial impact. And
the Court will exclude the evidence at this point.
I will also point out that this
evidence could be admissible for other purposes,
Page 2283
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And, Counsel, we will be in recess
until1:15. That's why I gave the jury an extra
15 minutes, because I thought that's how much
longer I figured we were going to be here.
(Noon recess.)
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ORIGINAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") bring this motion in limine regarding evidence of a
lawsuit threatened by Dr. Knochel.
During Saint Alphonsus's examination of Dr. Prochaska, counsel for Saint Alphonsus
asked about a lawsuit that a Saint Alphonsus Radiology Group doctor named Dr. Knochel had
threatened to bring against Dr. Prochaska and Dr. Giles. (See Trial Tr., Sept. 13,2011, p. 600:1923.) Counsel for MRIA immediately requested a bench conference. (!d. at p. 600: 24.) At the
bench, the Court held that "[t]his lawsuit, had it been brought, was brought pursuant to a 1983
agreement that had nothing to do with entering into the agreement that created MRIA. So the
Court will not allow further inquiry into a lawsuit that did not involve the parties to the actual
MRIA agreement." (!d. at p. 601 :3-9). In an abundance of caution, MRIA asks the Court for a
ruling that this evidence is irrelevant under Idaho Rule of Evidence 401, and/or that any limited
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury under Rule 403. MRIA also asks the Court to direct Saint
Alphonsus not to attempt to elicit this evidence through any other witness.
DATED this 291h day of September, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

-~12~-

Dara L. Pafker
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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is -- it is irrelevant.
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. I will
allow the question for the limited purpose stated.
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Can you ask me
again?
Q. MR. ROMA TOWSKI: Did you ask
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Dr. Curran, Dr. Henson, Dr. Havlina whether they
had any objection to you sharing the profits from
MRIA with your radiologist partners?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Dr. Prochaska, did you ask Dr. Curran,
Dr. Henson, or Dr. Havlina to object to your
radiologist partners participating in order to
have an excuse to them as to why they were
excluded?
A. No.
Q. Let me direct your attention, Doctor,
to Exhibit *-0425. While we are getting that, the
three who were excluded were Dr. Pratt, Dr.
Knochel, and who was the third partner?
A. Dr. O'Reilly. They were excluded as
generals, but not limiteds.
Q. The group of you who participated in
planning MRIA met as a group frequently; is that
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A. Yes.
Q. And there were formal minutes taken of
those proceedings; correct?
A. I don't know.
Q. Let me show you *-0425, in evidence.
And could we show that, Bill.
These are minutes that are captioned at
the top "Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Inc, Boise,
Idaho, Wednesday, January 2, 1985."
You recognize that, right, Doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you recognize this as a typical
set of minutes of the meetings that you had when
planning this venture?
A. I did not remember that any minutes
were taken.
Q. Now, two-thirds of the way down the
page there is a line, "Selection of Chair," which
notes that Chris Anton was selected to chair the
management board. Is that so?
A. Yes.
Q. And is that consistent with your
recollection?
A. Yes.
Q. And down at the bottom under "Legal and
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Finance," there are two committees established; is
~ri~?
~

Y~.

Q. And the legal committee has three of
five members from among your doctors' group:
Dr. Henson, Dr. Havlina, and Dr. Curran; is that
right?
A. Yes.
Q. And the finance committee, three of
four members from your doctors group, right?
Curran, Henson, and Havlina?
A. Yes.
Q. Let me ask you to turn to the second
page. At the bottom, where the group appoints the
initial radiologists to read scans, body scans,
for the group. Could you read to us what you see
there?
A. Wait a minute. I'm trying to catch up
to you.
Q. The last entry on page two.
A. Yes.
Q. And you see there that: "The group
selected John Knochel, MD, to be the initial
radiologist to read body scans."
Is that so?
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A. That's what it says.
Q. Do you remember that to be the case?
A. I don't remember -- no, I don't
remember that specifically.
Q. But you don't doubt what you read here
in the minutes, do you?
A. Right now I have no reason to doubt
that.
Q. But this is Dr. Knochel, one of the
three who, in your recollection, all three of your
DMR partners said had nothing to add to the group;
is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. And so he was excluded as a general
partner in MRIA, right?
A. He wasn't excluded. I mean -- I don't
feel "excluded" explains the way it came about,
but it could explain the end result.
Q. Isn't it the case, Dr. Prochaska, that
years later Dr. Knochel heard a different
explanation for why he had been excluded as a
general partner and threatened to sue you and Dr.
Giles for misrepresentation?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, may we approach?
THE COURT: You may.
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(Discussion off the record at the bench
with court and counsel.)
THE COURT: This lawsuit, had it been
brought, was brought pursuant to a 1983 agreement
that had nothing to do with entering into the
agreement that created MRIA. So the Court will
not allow further inquiry into a lawsuit that did
not involve the parties to the actual MRIA
agreement.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Very well, Your Honor.
Q. BY MR. ROMATOWSKI: Dr. Prochaska, who
was Dr. AI Kuykendall? Is that how you pronounce
his name? K-u-y-k-e-n-d-a-1-1.
A. He was a character, and he was a
neurosurgeon.
Q. At Saint Alphonsus; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And did he object to being excluded as
a general partner in the MRI arrangement?
A. I remember him joking and teasing about
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MR. ROMATOWSKI: May I have Exhibit *-0007,
which, I believe, is not in evidence.
Q. BY MR. ROMA TOWSKI: Let me show you,
Doctor, what's been marked as Exhibit *-0007. Is
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that the joke that you're referring to?
A. AI and I were on great terms. He joked
about it over a long period of time, and I can't
tell you if this is anyone that I -- I didn't know
about that, so probably not.
Q. Very well. You mentioned that
Dr. Curran's firm, The Cooperative for Magnetic
Imaging Inc., was eventually retained by the MRI
partnership on a consulting basis; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And that group, before retention by the
MRI partnership, was a consultant to you and your
counsel in establishing this venture; isn't that
so?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Let me show you what has been marked as
Exhibit *-0703. Let me ask you, Doctor, Neal
Newhouse was an attorney advising the five of you,
the DMR doctors, in the formation of the
partnership; is that right?
A. My memory was he was advising -- his
law firm was advising the entire general
partnership, but I could be wrong.
Q. Now, do you recognize this as a letter
from The Cooperative for Magnetic Imaging, Inc.
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through Dr. Newhouse to you and others among the
DMR doctors?
A. I don't recognize this.
Q. Well, let me ask you separate from
the -- put the document to one side, Doctor.
Do you remember that there was obvious
economic and professional jealousy expressed at
the time that this partnership was formed, over
the role of you five DMR doctors?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, there is no
evidence. He is pre-supposing evidence in the
record. He has got to establish that.
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection.
Q. BY MR. ROMA TOWSKI: Let me show you,
Doctor -- let me ask you this. Did there come a
time when Saint Alphonsus proposed terms for the
MRIA partnership, that you remember?
MR. BANDUCCI: Timeframe, Your Honor.
Foundation as to time.
Q. BY MR. ROMATOWSKI: In late 1984.
A. I'm not sure I'm clear what you mean by
"terms."
Q. Well, let me show you what has been
mark as Exhibit *-0005. I believe this is not yet
in evidence.
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THE COURT: Exhibit *-0005 has been provided
to the witness.
Mr. Banducci, do you have this exhibit?
MR. BANDUCCI: I'm bringing it up right now,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
Q. BY MR. ROMA TOWSKI: Let me ask you to
examine this document, Doctor. Look at the whole
thing, but, in particular, that page which ends in
the Bates number -- do you know what I mean by
"Bates number," sir?
A. I think so.
Q. Okay. The little number down at the
bottom of the page, some of them. The one-- the
page ending in 686 I would refer you to in
particular, and ask if you recognize this
document?
A. I don't know that I have ever seen this
document before. I don't recognize it.
Q. Do you recognize that you're among the
addressees?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, now we are
referring to a document that hasn't been entered
into evidence.
THE COURT: Sustain the objection.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
Saint Alphonsus respectfully requests that the Court quash the trial subpoena (Ex. A)
issued by MRIA on September 26, 2011, to Jan Hove, an office manager at a small clinic at Saint
Alphonsus's Eagle Health Plaza, who was not in that position during the relevant times in this
case, and who is not a percipient witness to any of the events at issue in this case. 1 MRIA' s
subpoena of Ms. Hove, on its face, is an attempt to obtain broad, new, and irrelevant discovery
during the middle of trial, in direct violation of this Court's July 20, 2011 order precluding any
further discovery in this case. Moreover, Ms. Hove has never been included on any list of
potential witness in discovery, and was not disclosed as a potential witness prior to either the
2007 trial or 2011 retrial, precluding her appearance as a witness now.
1

Between 1991 and 2003, Ms. Hove was a manager of Saint Alphonsus's Addiction
Recovery Center, after which she left Saint Alphonsus. She returned in 2007, at which time she
became office manager at the Eagle clinic. An electronic search of the discovery database
compiled for this case shows that Ms. Hove's name does not appear on a single document
produced by either Saint Alphonsus or MRIA.
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I.

MRIA MAY NOT OBTAIN THE ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY IT SEEKS MIDTRIAL, PER THIS COURT'S JULY 20, 2011 ORDER
On July 20, 2011, on MRIA' s motion, this Court issued a ruling precluding Saint

Alphonsus from exercising its statutory right to inspect and copy MRIA's books and records
because the information was being sought to "potentially be used at trial." July 20, 2001 Order
at 2. Noting that discovery had been "reopened ... for the very limited purpose of determining
whether expert testimony relating to damages or the lack thereof would change as a result of the
Supreme Court's opinion in this case" but that "[d]iscovery for other purposes was not
reopened," the Court explained that:
The rules governing discovery exist to define the scope of proceedings well in
advance to that both parties may develop their trial strategies and not be
surprised at trial. See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 878, 136 P.3d 338,
349 (2006). Allowing a party to use information obtained outside the
discovery process so long after the discovery deadlines have passed would
frustrate the purpose of the discovery rules and allow for the trials by surprise
sought to be avoided by the rules.
July 20, 2001 Order at 2. Despite this ruling, MRIA has issued a subpoena to Jan Hove seeking
such untimely discovery mid-trial, commanding that she "produce ... all documents created by
you or any other representative of Saint Alphonsus from 1999 to 2009 ... that depicts referrals
to preferred and non-preferred specialty groups as well as all comments related thereto." Ex. A
at 2. Consistent with this Court's July 20, 2011 order, MRIA may not use a trial subpoena to
obtain such additional discovery in this case. 2
2

Courts routinely quash trial subpoenas used to seek discovery after a pretrial discovery
deadline. See, e.g., Martin v. Trinity Hosp., 755 N.W.2d 900,908 (N.D. 2008) ("We agree with
the district court that the attempted use of overbroad and burdensome trial subpoenas on the eve
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Further, the request MRIA makes is "unreasonable, oppressive, fails to allow time for
compliance, ... or subjects a person to undue burden." See Idaho R. Civ. P. 45(d) (providing
grounds for quashing subpoena). On its face, MRIA's subpoena asks for all documents related
to referrals to "preferred or non-preferred" specialty groups between 1999 and 2009, and
includes an "example" document, which apparently relates to referrals by a single medical
doctor. Ex. A at 2-3. It is unclear exactly what the document attached to the subpoena is-or
where it came from-but a search for responsive materials in ten years' worth of referral
documents would be a massive undertaking. This request is made even more oppressive given
that it comes mid-trial while Saint Alphonsus' s attorneys are busy attempting to try the case. 3
In short, MRIA's trial subpoena seeks discovery long after the deadline for discovery had
passed, is in violation of the Court's order precluding further discovery in June, and attempts to

(continued ... )

of trial is an improper substitute for orderly pretrial discovery."); Comeaux v. Uniroyal Chern.
Corp., 849 F.2d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a subpoena duces tecum filed "two days
before trial ... was in effect a motion for additional discovery, and the court . . . did not abuse
its discretion by granting appellee's motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum as untimely.");
Dodson v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 2005 WL 3177723, *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Rule 45 trial
subpoenas duces tecum may not be used ... to engage in discovery after the discovery deadline
has passed.") (internal punctuation omitted) (collecting numerous cases in support).
3

Moreover, MRIA asks for this search to be done in an impossibly short time frame:
MRIA served this subpoena on September 26, 2011, and it commands Ms. Hove to provide the
documents on October 7, 2011-a mere eleven days later. Had a similar document request been
served on Saint Alphonsus during discovery, Saint Alphonsus would have had a minimum of
thirty days to respond, see Idaho R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2), a timeframe that, in practice, is routinely
extended when dealing with extensive document requests.
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evade the time frames of normal civil discovery by burdening Saint Alphonsus with a document
production mid-trial. The subpoena should be quashed.

II.

THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT BY MRIA IS IRRELEVANT AS IT DOES NOT
RELATE TO MEDICAL IMAGING CENTERS OR MRI REFERRALS
In addition to being an improper request for discovery mid-trial, MRIA's request also

appears to be a fishing expedition for documents with no apparent relevance to the case. The
trial subpoena demands documents "depict[ing] referrals to preferred and non-preferred specialty
groups," without any limitation. Ex. A at 2. While the subpoena does not define the term
"specialty groups," the attached "example" purports to identify referrals to groups of specialist
physicians providing professional medical services such as neurology, endocrinology, heart care,
and the like. !d. at 3. Neither the subpoena itself nor the "example" document refers to MRI
Center, MRI Mobile, IMI, any other medical imaging center, medical imaging generally, or
radiological services. !d. at 2-3. Nor is there any apparent relevance to the issues currently
being tried. MRIA is not entitled to obtain overbroad and irrelevant discovery.

III.

MRIA HAS NEVER IDENTIFIED JAN HOVE ON ANY WITNESS LIST
The subpoena should also be quashed because Jan Hove has never appeared on any

witness list. A district court has the power to exclude a witness from testifying if the witness is
untimely disclosed. McKim v. Horner, 143 Idaho 568, 571, 149 P.3d 843, 846 (2006). "When
the identity of a witness is tardily disclosed, the trial judge should request an explanation of the
late disclosure, weigh the importance of the testimony in question, determine the time needed for
preparation to meet the testimony, and consider the possibility of a continuance." Viehweg v.
Thompson, 103 Idaho 265,271,647 P.2d 311,317 (Ct. App. 1982). Thus, in McKim, the
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exclusion of a witness was upheld where he was untimely disclosed "twelve days before trial,
leaving [defendant] little time to prepare," where the plaintiff was without "good cause" for the
late disclosure and a continuance was inappropriate. McKim, 143 Idaho at 571, 149 P.3d at 846.

4

Under these principles, MRIA's subpoena should be quashed. Jan Hove was never
disclosed as a potential witness during discovery. She was not disclosed as a witness prior to the
first trial. And during the pre-trial conference, MRIA's counsel represented to the Court that "all
the witnesses [have] been disclosed," Aug. 8, 2011 Tr. at 3, a list that did not include Ms. Hove.
MRIA has, as of yet, offered no explanation for the late disclosure, but MRIA has been long
aware as to the substance of the testimony to be offered by all of Saint Alphonsus's witnesses,
and thus could have included Ms. Hove on a witness list if she had relevant "rebuttal" testimony.
The case for excluding this witness is far stronger than even the exclusion in McKim.
MRIA's subpoena was issued four weeks into a two-month trial. For the reasons described
above, MRIA is not entitled to have further discovery of any kind via its trial subpoena, much
less overbroad and irrelevant discovery, and so Ms. Hove's "testimony" is of no importance.
Even if MRIA were entitled to obtain further documents, MRIA purports to have Ms. Hove
arrive at trial the week of October 7, giving Saint Alphonsus less than two weeks to search
through some ten years' worth of records to find responsive documents, an all-but-impossible
4

Ms. Hove is not a percipient witness and cannot possibly give testimony about the
events in this case, see supra note 1, and so MRIA cannot characterize her as a "rebuttal
witness." But even if she could be, purported "rebuttal witnesses" must still be timely identified
where the identity of Saint Alphonsus' s witnesses and the substance of their testimony was
provided "over a month prior to trial," making clear "the type of rebuttal testimony [the latedisclosing party] might need." City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 1118 (2006).
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task that would give little, if any, time for Saint Alphonsus to review the documents, let alone
prepare a response. 5 And there can be no continuance in this case; a jury is already empanelled,
and the Court has made clear that this case will end on October 28, 2011.
In short, without documents, Ms. Hove has nothing to testify about. And even ifMRIA
could obtain documents, the sheer magnitude ofthe discovery requested of Ms. Hove means that
her late disclosure is grossly prejudicial to Saint Alphonsus and cannot be cured by a
continuance. For this reason, too, MRIA's trial subpoena should be quashed.
CONCLUSION

The Court should quash the trial subpoena for Jan Hove.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 30th day of September, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

5

In any event, MRIA cannot show that Ms. Hove is a proper recipient of a trial subpoena
duces tecum. MRIA asks her to produce responsive documents made by "any ...
representative" of Saint Alphonsus. See Ex. A at 2. However, Ms. Hove is not an officer or
other documents custodian for Saint Alphonsus. Rather, she is an office manager for a small
satellite clinic. She is thus not a proper recipient of a subpoena for records kept by "any ...
representative" of Saint Alphonsus. See 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses § 29 ("In general, the proper
recipient of a subpoena duces tecum served upon a corporation is the particular officer of the
corporation who has custody of the books or records sought.").
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of September, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery /
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup. com

WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup. com

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRl Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTif JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
TRIAL SUBPOENA JAN HOVE

v.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRl MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counter-defendant.
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I

•

THE STATE OF IDAHO TO:

JAN HOVE

YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear before Judge Michael E. Wetherell at the trial in
this matter, which will be held at the Ada County Courthouse, Courtroom 400, 200 West Front
Street, Boise, Idaho 83702 beginning October 7, 2011 at the hour of nine o'clock a.m.as a
witness in this case.
YOU ARE ALSO COMMANDED to produce at the above time and place all documents
created by you or any other representative of Saint Alphonsus from 1999 to 2009 similar to
Exhibit A, attached hereto, that depicts referrals to preferred and non-preferred specialty groups,
as well as all comments related thereto.
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above,
you may be held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum
of$100.00 and all damages which the party may sustain by yo'u.r failure to comply with this
subpoena.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT.

DATED this 26th day of September, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

WadeL. Woodard
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JAMIE RANDALL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MRIA'S
NOTICE OF INTENT TO IMPEACH

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this reply in support of their notice of intent to
impeach. Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's testimony otherwise, the testimony that Saint
Alphonsus intends to present is impeachment testimony and does not run afoul of Idaho Rule of
Evidence 403.

A.

Dr. Wilson's Testimony is Impeachment Testimony
As this Court knows, when a witness is called to impeach, that witness need not be

disclosed in pre-trial disclosures. I.R.C.P. 16(e)(6)(J) and I.R.C.P. 16(h). During Sandra
Bruce's testimony, Ms. Bruce was asked about the termination of a contract that Saint Alphonsus
had with a pathology group. She was asked "is it fair to say that you terminated Dr. Steven
Wilson's contract and never told them why?" and answered "I don't recall that he was never told
why." (Trial Tr. Sept. 20, 2011, p. 1174:21-25). First, contrary to Saint Alphonsus's assertion
otherwise, this is not merely a statement that Ms. Bruce did not remember what occurred.
Although carefully couched in multiple negatives, her answer "I don't recall that he was never
told" implies that he was told. That is, Sandra Bruce's testimony she doesn't remember that he
was not told suggests that she does remember that he was told. Under these circumstances, Dr.
Wilson's testimony to the contrary directly rebuts this assertion that he told why his contract was
terminated.
Even accepting as true, however, that Sandra Bruce's testimony was that she did not
remember anything about whether or not Dr. Wilson was told the reason for his termination,
MRIA may also impeach this claim not to remember. Saint Alphonsus appears to argue that any
substantive assertion that Dr. Wilson was left in the dark does not impeach a claim of faulty
memory. However, as the Court of Appeals has explicitly said, evidence may be simultaneously
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substantive and impeaching. State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-69, 119 P.3d 637, 643-44 (Ct.
App. 2004 ). Regardless of its substantive content, testimony is impeaching if it is "designed to
discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the
evidence which explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony." Idaho courts
routinely allow a party to impeach a claim of faulty memory. Such evidence is impeaching
because it communicates to the jury that a witness was not being truthful when she told the jury
that she could not remember a particular fact. When testimony is presented that suggests that she
could in fact remember that fact, it impeaches the credibility of her entire testimony.
As the Court of Appeals has said, "[a] witness may be impeached by evidence, that he
has made, at other times, statements inconsistent with his present testimony." Preuss v.
Thomson, 112 Idaho 169, 171, 730 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Ct. App. 1986). Notably, "[a] witness's

declaration that he cannot remember making the purported statement is equivalent to a denial."
/d. (emphasis added). 1 Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's assertion otherwise, Preuss is directly on

point. In that case, a witness had made statements to her psychologist that symptoms occurred
prior to the accident which was the subject of the litigation. When confronted with these
statements, the witness said that she could not remember making them. The Court of Appeals
held that it would have been proper to call the psychologist as an impeaching witness. /d. In the
present case, it is asserted that Ms. Bruce failed to tell Dr. Wilson why he was being fired. When
confronted with this failure, Ms. Bruce said that she could not remember whether she told him.

Moreover, the Court may wish to note that during her testimony, Sandra Bruce claimed
not to remember various incidents more than one-hundred (100) times. This begins to looks like
evasion of the questions by a claim of faulty memory. Dr. Wilson's testimony will be about a
memorable conversation, the kind of which a person would normally have some recollection.
MRIA is entitled to present this testimony to suggest to the jury that Ms. Bruce's claim of faulty
memory may not be truthful, a question that goes directly to her credibility.
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As in Preuss, it is therefore proper to call Dr. Wilson as an impeaching witness. It is immaterial
that the witness in Preuss said she could not remember making a statement, while Ms. Bruce said
she could not remember failing to make a statement. The analysis is the same; the witness's
claim not to remember what she did may be impeached by evidence about what she actually did.
The circumstance in State v. Gallatin, 106 Idaho 564, 682 P.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1984) is the
same. In that case, a defendant testified that he had had no involvement in a criminal transaction.
On cross examination, the prosecutor asked if he recalled that he had stated in earlier
proceedings that he had not had "as much" involvement as other involved parties. The defendant
responding that he did not remember making the statement, and the statement was itself was
them admitted as impeachment. The court held that admission of the statement was proper as
impeachment because it "[i]t clarified the ambiguity of whether [defendant] had in fact made a
statement concerning his involvement in the transaction, useful to the jury in determining the
credibility of [defendant] and the weight to be accorded to his testimony." !d. at 566, 682 P.2d
107. Here, Ms. Bruce testified that she did not remember if she had told Dr. Wilson the reasons
for his termination. The admission of what she did or did not tell him is therefore proper because
it clarifies the ambiguity and is useful to the jury in assessing Ms. Bruce's credibility. Again, the
fact that the defendant in Gallatin was confronted with a statement, which Ms. Bruce was
confronted with the failure to make a statement, does not change the analysis. Under Idaho case
law, MRIA clearly may present evidence of what actually occurred to impeach Ms. Bruce's
assertion that she does not remember what occurred.

B.

Impeachment Evidence is an Exception to Rule 404
Saint Alphonsus contends that this evidence is "classic character evidence" that does not

meet the provision of Rule 404. However, as the Court of Appeals has explicitly stated,
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impeachment evidence is an exception to Rule 404. State v. Arledge, 119 Idaho 584, 588, 808
P.2d 1329, 1333 (Ct. App. 1991).

As such, Rule 404 is no barrier to the admission ofthis

evidence.

C.

The Evidence is Relevant and is Not Prejudicial
Saint Alphonsus claims that this evidence runs afoul of Idaho Rule of Evidence 403

because it is not relevant to the broader case and/or is unduly prejudicial. Saint Alphonsus has
misstated the standard for relevancy when impeachment evidence is at issue. Impeachment
evidence does not have to be relevant to the broader case, but only the trial testimony of the
witness who is being impeached. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961 (2010). Here, the
evidence goes directly to an incident that Ms. Bruce claimed not to remember during her direct
examination. It is therefore relevant to her trial testimony. As the Court of Appeals stated in
State v. Arledge, 119 Idaho 584, 588, 808 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Ct. App.1991):

Here, as in any case, whenever evidence is introduced for purposes of
impeachment, it necessarily involves a witness' credibility, and credibility is
always relevant. ... Therefore, we need only determine whether the prejudicial
effect of this statement outweighed its probative value. In this case, the statement
did have probative value, because it showed that (witness's] testimony may not be
credible.
!d.

As Arledge shows, Saint Alphonsus has also misstated the standard for the probative
value of impeaching evidence. Again, the question is not probative value of the impeachment
evidence to the case generally, but the probative value of impeaching the witness. Here, the
probative value of impeaching Ms. Bruce far exceeds any alleged prejudicial effect. There is
high probative value to impeaching Ms. Bruce, who was the CEO of Saint Alphonsus at all times
relevant to the case and who was directly involved in the actions for which MRIA now claims
were unlawful. Much of the case hinges on whether or not the jury believes her testimony. As
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such, the probative value of impeaching her testimony in any respect is enormous. Further, the
evidence has additional probative value +to the underlying case because it informs the SARG
radiologists desire secure Saint Alphonsus's blessing before proceeding to built IMI, for fear was
that if they did not, their contract would be summarily terminated, as had occurred with Dr.
Wilson. As such, Saint Alphonsus' s claim of prejudice stemming from informing the jury of a
separate incident is outweighed by the probative value of this evidence.
Saint Alphonsus additionally contends that it has evidence as to why Dr. Wilson was
fired, and will seek to introduce this evidence, thus prolonging the trial. However, such evidence
concerning the reasons that Dr. Wilson was fired is beyond the scope of impeaching testimony
that Ms. Bruce did not tell him the reason.
For the reasons stated above and in MRIA's opening brief, MRIA should be permitted to
put Dr. Wilson on the stand to impeach Ms. Bruce.
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2011.

Attorneys for Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI
Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of October, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served by hand on the following:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

Brent Bastian

l.f' l:.
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Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com

DEPUTY

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
v.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 16
AND PROPOSAL FOR PUTTING
THE PARTIES "ON THE CLOCK"

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Notice ofNon-Opposition to Proposed
Instruction No. 16 and Proposal for the Parties to be "Put on the Clock."

Non-Opposition to Instruction No. 16
MRIA believes that an instruction is probably enough at the present time to cure the
prejudice engendered by Mr. Ayer's comment about a judgment on Friday, September 30.
Moreover, MRIA is comfortable with the form and content of the proposed Instruction No. 16
drafted by the Court. That said, MRIA wishes to make clear that should Mr. Ayer, or any of
Saint Alphonsus's counsel, violate the Court's order in such an egregious manner again, it will
move to have Saint Alphonsus's most current answer stricken. 1

Suggestion for Putting the Parties "on the Clock"
As noted orally on September 30, MRIA believes that both parties be "put on the clock."
MRIA proposes the following system:
•

The Court advise the parties of how may total hours were possible in this case,
calculating from September 9 (the day opening statements were made) until October
28.

1

Given Mr. Ayer's resume and the lengthy discussions about what could and could not be asked
about the departing partner share immediately before Mr. Ayer's offending question, MRIA
harbors serious questions as to whether Mr. Ayer's comments were actually as innocent as he has
suggested. Nonetheless, MRIA is willing to give him the benefit of the doubt at this time. If,
however, any similar comments are made in the future-i.e., those informing the jury of not just
the fact of a previous trial, but the actual result of a prior trial-MRIA will move to have Saint
Alphonsus's answer stricken. IDAHO R. Crv. P. 16(i), by reference to IDAHO R. Crv. P.
37(b)(2)(B)-(D), allows the Court to strike the pleadings and remove defenses for failure to
comply with pre-trial orders. "Pre-trial orders" include evidentiary orders made in limine prior
to trial, as here. See, e.g., Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 743, 132 P.3d 1261, 1271 (Idaho
App., 2006). Moreover, IDAHO R. Crv. P. 41(b) gives this Court the discretion to dismiss a case
for failure to comply with "any order of [the] court." See also Osterhoudt v. Wal-Mart Stores
Inc., 273 A.D.2d 673,674-675, 709 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2000).
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•

The Court then divide that number equally among the two parties (i.e., by half).

•

The Court calculate the number of hours each party has had thus far in the case, and
subtract these already-used hours from the total amount of trial time each party was
given in the bullet-point above.

•

The Court then advise the parties of how much time each has remaining.

•

Any sidebar which a party does not "win" will count against that party's time.

Alternatively, MRIA is willing to attempt these calculations itself so as to save the Court
from any unnecessary work. MRIA worries, however, that any judgment calls it makes as to
whose time was used in September will be questioned by Saint Alphonsus, meaning that the
Court would have to involve itself either way.

DATED this 2nd day of October, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~~B!ti~

I

•4

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION- 3

002692

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of October, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served by electronic mail on the following:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintijjlCounterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintijjlCounterdefendant

\ ·,
Brent Bastian
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this opposition to the Motion filed by Saint
Alphonsus to quash the trial subpoena served on Jan Hove.
On September 26, 2011, MRIA served a trial subpoena on Jan Hove, an office manager at
a clinic at Saint Alphonsus' s Eagle Health Plaza, seeking her testimony and documents from
1999 to 2009 depicting referrals to Saint Alphonsus-preferred and non-preferred specialty
groups. Saint Alphonsus objects to the timing of this mid-trial subpoena of a witness who was
not previously disclosed, and also contends that the evidence is irrelevant. While it is true that
this is an unusual procedure in the midst of trial, it is permissible because MRIA is seeking
information and testimony for rebuttal on a critical fact that they only learned of on the eve of
trial.
A few days before the trial of this matter, MRIA received information, as illustrated by
Exhibit A to the subpoena, 1 which makes it clear that Saint Alphonsus is tracking and giving
"good marks" to physicians who send referrals to its "preferred specialty groups," while also
tracking referrals to specific organizations which are "out of network" and recommending
specific organizations to which the doctor should refer instead? Prior to receiving this
information, MRIA had no idea and no reason to know that such tracking between preferred
groups and non-preferred groups was occurring. MRIA strongly suspects that these referral
practices may be in breach of federal law, including the "Stark Act," 42 U.S.C. §1395nn(a)(l),

A copy of the subpoena at issue is attached to Saint Alphonsus' s Motion to Quash as
Exhibit A.
2

This information came to MRIA on the condition of anonymity. If the court thinks that
it is important to know the source of this information to ensure that it is not information that
MRIA possessed prior to a few days before trial, MRIA will be willing to disclose the identity of
the person in camera and ex parte.
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and the "Anti-Kickback Statute," 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b). These laws are designed to prevent
fraud by preventing self-dealing referrals by physicians and medical institutions. In particular,
the Stark Act provides that, subject to certain exceptions, if a physician has a financial
relationship with an entity, the physician may not make a referral to the entity and the entity may
not present those referrals for payment under a federal health services program. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395nn(a)(1 ). Similarly, the Anti-Kickback Statute provides criminal and civil penalties when

a person knowingly and willfully solicits, receives, offers, or pays any remuneration in return for
referring or inducing the referral of a patient. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).

A. The Evidence is Relevant
The information sought by the subpoena is directly relevant because one ofMRIA's
causes of action is tortious interference. Among other methods, tortious interference can be
shown by demonstrating that the defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the
prospective business relationship. Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 893,
243 P.3d 1069, 1081 (2010). In order to establish a prima facie case of intentional interference, a
plaintiff must show that the claimed interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact
of the interference itself. Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824
P .2d 841 ( 1991 ). In other words, "the means used to cause injury must be wrongful by reason of
a statute, regulation, recognized common law rule, or an established standard of a trade or
profession." Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 178, 923 P.2d 416, 423 (1996)
(emphasis added) (citing Downey Clinic v. Nampa Restaurant Corp., 127 Idaho 283, 286, 900
P.2d 191, 194 (1995). Courts have held that violation of these "Stark" and "antikickback"
federal laws can be the "wrongful means" by which tortious interference is established. See, e.g.,
Baptist Health v. Murphy, 226 S.W.3d 800, 809 (Ark. 2006) (violation of antikickback statutes
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may be considered evidence of impropriety in improper interference analysis); Synthes (USA.)

v. Globus Medical, Inc., 2005 WL 2233441 (E.D.Pa. 2005) (unpublished) (conduct allegedly
violating the anti-kickback statute may form the basis for liability under tortious interference
claim). It is MRIA's direct contention that Saint Alphonsus injured MRIA by directing referrals
away from MRIA. MRIA is therefore entitled to show that Saint Alphonsus' s referral practices
violate federal law.
Beyond that, however, the information sought is relevant for several other reasons. For
example, the documents sought speak directly to the "culture of fear" argument MRIA has
advanced, and provide strong evidence that Saint Alphonsus's goal is money, not patient care. In
particular, if, as the document attached to the subpoena indicates, Saint Alphonsus is giving their
doctors "low marks" every time they refer a patient outside the Saint Alphonsus system, then
these documents would support the evidence already seen by this Court showing that Saint
Alphonsus considers any support of non-Saint Alphonsus entities as treasonous. Moreover,
giving a doctor "low marks" for sending a patient out-of-network, in spite of the fact that that
doctor presumably was sending the patient to the out-of-network doctor because he or she felt it
was in the best interests of the patient, strongly suggests that Saint Alphonsus's central thesis in
this case-patient care-is false.
Finally, and maybe most importantly, the fact that Saint Alphonsus generally works hard
to keep referrals going to "preferred" doctors and clinics is persuasive proof that MRIA did not
lose scans to IMI because IMI was simply better, but because Saint Alphonsus had a habit of
pushing its referrals to those it benefitted most from. The jury is entitled to see this evidence and
at least weigh it in this regard.
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B. Ms. Hove is an Impeachment Witness, and Thus MRIA was not Required to
Disclose Her
Saint Alphonsus complains that Ms. Hove was not disclosed as a witness. However,
MRIA intends to present her as a rebuttal/impeachment witness to rebut the testimony of Ms.
Bruce and Ms. Schamp that Saint Alphonsus did not attempt to influence or track referrals. (See,
e.g., Trial Tr. Sept. 21, 2011, p. 1518-1527; Trial Tr. Sept. 26,2011, p. 2118-2122.) For

example, Ms. Bruce testified that Saint Alphonsus did not track referrals to non-preferred groups.
(Trial Tr., Sept. 21,2011, p. 1526:14-21.) As noted above, the evidence into which MRIA has
recently come into possession suggests that Saint Alphonsus is in fact tracking referrals to nonpreferred facilities. Thus, even if Ms. Hove's testimony and the documents do not reflect
"imaging center" referrals like those referred away from MRIA, this evidence will directly rebut
Ms. Bruce's testimony. As this Court knows, impeachment witnesses need not be disclosed
prior to trial. I.R.C.P. 16(e)(6)(J) and 16(h). As such, the fact that Ms. Hove was not previously
disclosed does not disqualify MRIA from presenting her testimony.
Moreover, even if the Court were to hold that she is not a rebuttal witness, the trial court
has discretion to permit the testimony of an undisclosed witness in the interests of justice.
I.R.C.P. 16(e)(6)(J) and 16(h). "When the identity of a witness is tardily disclosed, the trial
judge should request an explanation of the late disclosure, weigh the importance of the testimony
in question, determine the time needed for preparation to meet the testimony, and consider the
possibility of a continuance." Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 271, 647 P.2d 311, 317 (Ct.
App., 1982). See also McKim v. Horner, 143 Idaho 568, 571, 149 P.3d 843, 846 (2006). As
noted above, MRIA became aware of evidence only a few days before trial. This testimony and
evidence is important because it goes directly to MRIA's tortious interference claim.
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C. The Court Should Permit MRIA to Secure Documents on this Recently Discovered
Issue
Saint Alphonsus also objects that the instruction to Ms. Hove to bring documents with
her is an attempt to conduct discovery during trial, and is also unduly burdensome. However, as
noted above, MRIA became aware of this line of evidence only a few days before trial. This
distinguishes these circumstances from Saint Alphonsus's attempt to exercise statutory authority
under the Partnership Act to inspect and copy MRIA's books. That was something that Saint
Alphonsus could have and should have done earlier. In contrast, MRIA has just learned of the
evidence that it is seeking to secure. It could not have previously requested these documents
because it had no idea that they even existed. The Court has discretion to allow discovery past
the deadlines that it previously set. Taylor v. AlA Services Corp., 2011 WL 3904754, *19
(Idaho, 2011) ("Control of discovery is within the discretion of the trial court."); I.R.C.P. 16(h)
("the court, for good cause shown and in order to prevent injustice may permit additional
exhibits to be used ... at the trial.").
Nor is the production of these documents unduly burdensome, in spite of Saint
Alphonsus's hyperbole. MRIA has asked that Ms. Hove bring documents from a ten-year span
which reflect referrals to preferred and non-preferred specialty groups. MRIA also provided an
illustrative example ofthe form these documents typically take. This is a discrete and narrowlydefined set of documents, with specific key words, and should not be difficult to compile in the
eleven days given her.
In addition, MRIA seeks only to call Ms. Hove as the record's custodian to lay
foundation for the documents and for her experience with Saint Alphonsus's referral policy, and
thus preparing for her testimony is not arduous. Furthermore, it should not be difficult to slot
Ms. Hove in during this trial, which is slated to continue for another month.
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MRIA should be permitted to present this rebuttal testimony evidence in order to
demonstrate that, contrary to the assertions of Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp, Saint Alphonsus does
in fact monitor referrals and instruct its physicians to refer patients to Saint Alphonsus affiliated
facilities, in likely violation of federal law.
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
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Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
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51 Louisiana Avenue NW
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Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
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.3. .............~
Brent Bastian
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
MRIA has filed a notice of its intent to call Dr. Steve Wilson, a pathologist whose
contract with Saint Alphonsus was terminated by the hospital, to testify that he was never told of
the reasons for his termination. Dr. Wilson was not included on any list of potential witness in
discovery and was not disclosed as a potential witness prior to either the 2007 trial or 2011
retrial. He is therefore ineligible to be called as a witness now.
MRIA tries to sidestep this problem by characterizing Dr. Wilson as an "impeachment
witness" who will purportedly impeach Sandra Bruce's testimony that she "do[es]n't recall
whether" Dr. Wilson "was told" why Saint Alphonsus terminated his contract. MRIA Notice at
2-3. But Ms. Bruce's assertion that she does not currently recall an event is not "impeached" by
evidence from an independent source that an event did or did not occur. Dr. Wilson has no
insight into, and cannot contradict, Sandra Bruce's current state of mind. Entirely apart from that
fact, Dr. Wilson's testimony must also be excluded as a needless diversion focusing on an
unrelated controversy, and as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.
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First, testimony by Dr. Wilson that he was not told of the reasons for his termination does
not impeach any of Ms. Bruce's testimony. Ms. Bruce has not claimed that she or anyone else at
Saint Alphonsus told Dr. Wilson of the reasons for his termination. Rather, she simply testified
that she did not recall whether he was told, and would want to review the relevant files in order
to have an informed opinion on the matter. See MRIA Notice at 2-3 (quoting testimony of Ms.
Bruce). Dr. Wilson's purported testimony does not cast doubt on the credibility of Ms. Bruce's
failure to remember the event at issue; rather, it is simply an attempt to discuss the substantive
event that Ms. Bruce cannot recall. That is not "impeachment" evidence. See State v. Holm,
93 Idaho 904,910,478 P.2d 284,290 (1970) (rejecting attempt to impeach with evidence
unrelated to "the truth or falsity" of witness's testimony); Oregon v. Staley, 995 P.2d 1217, 1220
(Ore. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting attempt to "impeach" an "asserted lack of memory" with
evidence of the prior event, because "[t]he only thing that is inconsistent with a claimed loss of
memory is evidence that suggests that the witness in fact remembers"). 1

1

None ofMRIA's cases hold that one may "impeach" a lack of memory with substantive
evidence of the unremembered event. The first two simply hold that a witness's claim that she
did not remember making a prior sworn statement constitutes sufficient foundation to use the
prior sworn statement as impeachment. See Preuss v. Thomson, 112 Idaho 169, 170, 730 P.2d
1089, 1090 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Gallatin, 106 Idaho 564,565-66,682 P.2d 105, 106-07 (Ct.
App. 1984). Here, there is no issue of prior inconsistent testimony by Ms. Bruce on this issue.
The third case, State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 124, 129, 714 P.2d 93, 98 (Ct. App.
1986), involved a witness who testified that "he was unable to recall events occurring while he
was intoxicated." The court noted the witness's prior statement about the event, given while
under the influence, contradicted that claim. !d. Rosencrantz is therefore a case wherein the lack
of memory is being impeached by evidence that the witness did in fact remember. As described
above, MRIA is not trying to show that Ms. Bruce remembers, and Rosencrantz is inapplicable.
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Second, Dr. Wilson's testimony should be excluded under Rule 403 because it is not
relevant to the issues in this case and because any marginal relevance is greatly outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, and waste of time.
As to relevance, Jeff Cliff testified that the radiologists were concerned about the security of
their contract with the hospital because they believed that the pathologists' contract was
terminated without cause. That subjective belief may be relevant insofar as it tends to explain
why the radiologists opened their own imaging center. But whether an individual pathologist
was or was not provided with notice of the reason for his termination is irrelevant, because the
actual circumstances underlying that termination (as opposed to what the radiologists believed
those circumstances to be) shed no light on the motivation of radiologists.
Even if somehow relevant, Dr. Wilson's testimony would create unfair prejudice and
confusion and open the door to a side issue that will be a waste of time. This case is about the
relationships between Saint Alphonsus, MRIA, and the radiologists-not about the relationship
between Saint Alphonsus and the pathologists. Evidence that Saint Alphonsus allegedly treated
the pathologists badly is classic character evidence from which any jury might tend to infer that
the doing of bad acts on one occasion indicates a tendency to do bad acts on other occasions. 2
Such evidence is thus generally inadmissible under Rule 404, save where there is some

2

Indeed, evidence about Dr. Wilson's relationship with Saint Alphonsus is far more
attenuated and prejudicial than evidence about Dr. Knochel's relationship with Dr. Giles and Dr.
Prochaska, which evidence the Court excluded because it involved an "agreement that had
nothing to do with entering into the agreement that created MRIA" and a dispute "that did not
involve the parties to the actual MRIA agreement." Trial Tr., Sept. 13, 2011, at 600-01; see also
MRIA's Mot. in Limine Regarding Lawsuit Threatened by Dr. Knochel.

4
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compelling reason to consider it, e.g., Rule 404(b), and then only with a limiting instruction. No
such compelling reasons to recount this evidence exists here.
Just as importantly, Saint Alphonsus has evidence that Dr. Wilson was legitimately fired
for cause, and will seek to introduce that evidence should Dr. Wilson be permitted to testify.
With this case already running long, the parties, the Court, and the jury should not be forced to
engage in side-show litigation regarding Dr. Wilson, a stranger to the events at issue in this case,
even if his termination had some marginal relevance (which it does not).
CONCLUSION

For any or all of the independent reasons set forth above, the Court should preclude the
testimony of Dr. Wilson.

DATED this 2nd day of October 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
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P.O. Box 2837
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Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Peter J. Romatowski
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Thomas J. Davis
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Telephone: (202) 879-3939
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
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liability partnership,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
Saint Alphonsus respectfully submits this memorandum in support of the admissibility, as
non-hearsay statements of a party-opponent, of Trial Exhibits 802 and 803, the authenticated
handwritten notes of Dr. Roger Curran.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) provides, among other things, that
A statement is not hearsay if ... [it] is offered against a party and
is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a
representative capacity, or . . . (C) a statement by a person
authorized by a party to make a statement concerning the subject,
or (D) a statement by a party's agent or servant concerning a
matter within the scope of the agency or employment of the
servant or agent, made during the existence of the relationship.
This general rule was specifically applied to permit the admission of Dr. Curran's out-ofcourt statements at the first trial, in a ruling re-adopted by this Court. Specifically, MRIA raised
a hearsay objection during the first trial to Dr. Curran's out-of-court statements. See Trial Tr.
3423-3425, 3479-80. The Court overruled that objection, holding that Dr. Curran's statements
are non-hearsay admissions of a party-opponent under Rule 801 (d)(2) and, alternatively,
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admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). !d. at 3426-27, 3480. MRIA did not appeal this ruling, and on
June 9, 2011, this Court held it to be the law of the case. Consolidated Order re: Motions in
Limine Heard May 18, 2011, at 2-3. Thus, the ruling from the first trial-which was correct on
the merits-should control here as to the admissibility of out-of-court statements of Dr. Curran.
The same is true whether the out-of-court statements are Dr. Curran's oral utterances,
such as those admitted at the first trial (spoken to Cindy Schamp, who testified about them at
trial), while Exhibits 802 and 803 are Dr. Curran's written utterances. Written utterances are
likewise non-hearsay if made by a party-opponent. See State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho 814, 817-18,
186 P.3d 670, 673-74 (Ct. App. 2008) (handwritten note found in defendant's jail cell).
Moreover, "[t]he Idaho Rules of Evidence do not include a heightened requirement to
authenticate a written document offered as the nonhearsay admission of a party-opponent." /d. at
818, 186 P.3d at 674. Rather, the written document "may be authenticated through
circumstantial evidence," including "lay opinion testimony" as to authorship. /d. at 817, 186
P.3d at 673. Mr. Cliffs testimony identifying the notes as Dr. Curran's, based on Dr. Curran's
distinctive handwriting, is thus more than sufficient to authenticate those notes. See Idaho R.
Evid. 901 (b) (authentication satisfied by "[n]onexpert opinion as to the genuineness of
handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation").
Nor do the notes need to be qualified as business records, as MRIA argued in support of
its objection. The "business records" exception to the hearsay rule is just that-an exception
permitting the admissibility of a document that would otherwise constitute hearsay. See Idaho R.
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Evid. 803(6). But as statements of a party-opponent, Dr. Curran's notes are not hearsay to begin
with, and thus need no exception to qualify for admission. Idaho R. Evid. 801 (d)(2)
In addition, the handwritten notes qualify as non-hearsay whether or not MRIA or DMR
authorized Dr. Curran to make them because Rule 801 (d)(2) applies to statements made "an
individual ... capacity," as well as a representative one. In any event, Dr. Curran's handwritten
notes on their face concern the business activities ofMRIA and DMR. Specifically, Exhibit 802
concerns the termination ofthe ongoing relationship between MRIA/DMR and Jeff Cliff, their
"de facto CFO." And Exhibit 803 concerns MRIA's relationship with the Radiologists and, in
particular, whether "[i]t [is] time to bring in [MRIA's] own rads." Moreover, both documents
were produced from-and therefore maintained for many years after their creation in-the files
ofMRI Center, making it all the more clear that Dr. Curran wrote the notes in his capacity as a
director, partner, and shareholder ofMRIA and DMR. There is no requirement that a statement
of a party opponent be shown to have been communicated to anyone else in order to be
admissible; the requirement is simply that it be shown to be the party's statement.
The fact that Exhibit 803 is undated is of no consequence. The document refers to
specific ongoing events relevant to this case, thus satisfying any temporal dimension to the
relevance requirement. At a minimum, it is apparent from the face of the document that the
notes were written after the IMI downtown imaging center had opened (in September 1999) but
before Saint Alphonsus had dissociated (in April 2004). Moreover, the notes refer to a potential
"joint venture" between MRIA and the "cardiologists," Exhibit 803 at 2 (last paragraph), and
other evidence in this case makes clear that MRIA was considering a joint venture with the
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cardiologists in the middle of 2001. See, e.g., Trial Ex. 4 77 at 4 (May 16, 2001) ("Dr. Curran
reported that the Idaho Cardiology Group would like to partner with us"); Trial Ex. 4237 at 1
(Sept. 18, 2001) ("[l]ooking to do a JV with the cardiologists"). We thus know that the
document was written at a time when Dr. Curran's thoughts and observations were relevant to
the events being adjudicated in this trial.
Finally, both Exhibits contain admissions by Dr. Curran that are highly relevant to key
issues in this case. This is true whether one considers the broad issues of the relationships and
conflicts among the parties that led to Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation from the MRIA
partnership, or the more specific issue cited by the Court, concerning Jeff Cliff's credibility on
the issue whether he was straightforward in the manner in which he left his firm PMI to join the
Radiologists full time.
As to Cliff's credibility in his account of his departure from PMI, the following excerpts
from page 1 and page 4 of Exhibit 802 are directly relevant:
•

Exhibit 802, page 1, first paragraph, shows Dr. Curran's awareness that "Jeff
[Cliff] leaves PMI (but still some ownership & will help Paul [De Witt, the
remaining partner in PM!} out when needed but will be full time mngr [manager}

for Rad group," thereby undermining MRIA' s contention that Cliff failed to
disclose his true intentions to MRIA;
•

Exhibit 802, page 4 (last page), in three sentences likewise shows Dr. Curran's
understanding and favorable view of the manner in which Cliff handled the
situation:
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o

"Jeff knows that ifrads put in second magnet (&hurt us) that war is
likely."

o "Jeff will likely be a voice of reason with the rads & will try to avoid
things that harm us because if war happens everyone loses."
o

"Having Jeff work for them [the Radiologists] could actually be to our
advantage"

The foregoing excerpts from Exhibit 802, as well as the following examples from
Exhibit 803, likewise illustrate in Dr. Curran's own words the conflict between the DMR doctors
and MRIA on the one side, and the Radiologists on the other, and thus support Saint Alphonsus's
contention that it was caught between two feuding factions and was motivated in its dealings
with MRIA and the Radiologists by a desire to navigate that dispute:
•

Exhibit 803, page 1, shows that Dr. Curran's subject in these notes is "War?'' He
begins his discussion with the question "[i]s it time to bring in our own rads?''

•

Exhibit 803, page 2, begins with the question: "Any advantage to war?" The
advantages listed are that "[i]t would be fun to 'get even' with the rads" and
"[p ]erhaps we could profit on reading fees- but how do we find outstanding rads
who are willing to let us keep some of the fee?'' This shows a depth of personal
animosity between the two sides that has key relevance in this case.

•

Exhibit 803, page 2, continues with Dr. Curran's admission that the Radiologists
"are personal friends with the main referral sources," thus supporting Saint
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Alphonsus's argument that the bulk ofMRIA's losses were caused by MRIA's
firing of the Radiologists and not by anything Saint Alphonsus did.
•

Exhibit 803, page 3, shows Dr. Curran's admission that it might make sense for
MRIA to "sit tight long enough," thus supporting Saint Alphonsus's contention
that MRIA was not interested in making a deal during this time period.

•

Exhibit 803, page 3, shows Dr. Curran's admission that MRIA knew and
approved of Saint Alphonsus's participation in the non-MRI side ofiMI: "If we
sit tight long enough & Al's watches the rad center do so-so on everything but
MRI & maybe well on MRI in which Al's can't participate might they finally get
tough with the rads?"
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court should overrule MRIA's objections and hold
that Trial Exhibits 802 and 803, authenticated as the handwritten notes of Dr. Curran, are
admissible as non-hearsay admissions of a party-opponent.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 4th day of October 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

torneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
Saint Alphonsus respectfully submits this memorandum in support of the admissibility, as
non-hearsay statements of a party-opponent, of Trial Exhibits 802 and 803, the authenticated
handwritten notes of Dr. Roger Curran.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2) provides, among other things, that
A statement is not hearsay if ... [it] is offered against a party and
is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a
representative capacity, or . . . (C) a statement by a person
authorized by a party to make a statement concerning the subject,
or (D) a statement by a party's agent or servant concerning a
matter within the scope of the agency or employment of the
servant or agent, made during the existence of the relationship.
This general rule was specifically applied to permit the admission of Dr. Curran's out-ofcourt statements at the first trial, in a ruling re-adopted by this Court. Specifically, MRIA raised
a hearsay objection during the first trial to Dr. Curran's out-of-court statements. See Trial Tr.
3423-3425, 3479-80. The Court overruled that objection, holding that Dr. Curran's statements
are non-hearsay admissions of a party-opponent under Rule 801 (d)(2) and, alternatively,
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admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). !d. at 3426-27, 3480. MRIA did not appeal this ruling, and on
June 9, 2011, this Court held it to be the law of the case. Consolidated Order re: Motions in
Limine Heard May 18,2011, at 2-3. Thus, the ruling from the first trial-which was correct on
the merits-should control here as to the admissibility of out-of-court statements of Dr. Curran.
The same is true whether the out-of-court statements are Dr. Curran's oral utterances,
such as those admitted at the first trial (spoken to Cindy Schamp, who testified about them at
trial), while Exhibits 802 and 803 are Dr. Curran's written utterances. Written utterances are
likewise non-hearsay if made by a party-opponent. See State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho 814, 817-18,
186 P.3d 670, 673-74 (Ct. App. 2008) (handwritten note found in defendant's jail cell).
Moreover, "[t]he Idaho Rules of Evidence do not include a heightened requirement to
authenticate a written document offered as the nonhearsay admission of a party-opponent." !d. at
818, 186 P.3d at 674. Rather, the written document "may be authenticated through
circumstantial evidence," including "lay opinion testimony" as to authorship. !d. at 817, 186
P.3d at 673. Mr. Cliffs testimony identifying the notes as Dr. Curran's, based on Dr. Curran's
distinctive handwriting, is thus more than sufficient to authenticate those notes. See Idaho R.
Evid. 901(b) (authentication satisfied by "[n]onexpert opinion as to the genuineness of
handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation").
Nor do the notes need to be qualified as business records, as MRIA argued in support of
its objection. The "business records" exception to the hearsay rule is just that-an exception
permitting the admissibility of a document that would otherwise constitute hearsay. See Idaho R.
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Evid. 803(6). But as statements of a party-opponent, Dr. Curran's notes are not hearsay to begin
with, and thus need no exception to qualify for admission. Idaho R. Evid. 801 (d)(2)
In addition, the handwritten notes qualify as non-hearsay whether or not MRIA or DMR
authorized Dr. Curran to make them because Rule 801 (d)(2) applies to statements made "an
individual ... capacity," as well as a representative one. In any event, Dr. Curran's handwritten
notes on their face concern the business activities of MRIA and DMR. Specifically, Exhibit 802
concerns the termination of the ongoing relationship between MRIA/DMR and Jeff Cliff, their
"de facto CFO." And Exhibit 803 concerns MRIA's relationship with the Radiologists and, in
particular, whether "[i]t [is] time to bring in [MRIA's] own rads." Moreover, both documents
were produced from-and therefore maintained for many years after their creation in-the files
of MRI Center, making it all the more clear that Dr. Curran wrote the notes in his capacity as a
director, partner, and shareholder of MRIA and DMR. There is no requirement that a statement
of a party opponent be shown to have been communicated to anyone else in order to be
admissible; the requirement is simply that it be shown to be the party's statement.
The fact that Exhibit 803 is undated is of no consequence. The document refers to
specific ongoing events relevant to this case, thus satisfying any temporal dimension to the
relevance requirement. At a minimum, it is apparent from the face of the document that the
notes were written after the IMI downtown imaging center had opened (in September 1999) but
before Saint Alphonsus had dissociated (in April2004). Moreover, the notes refer to a potential
"joint venture" between MRIA and the "cardiologists," Exhibit 803 at 2 (last paragraph), and
other evidence in this case makes clear that MRIA was considering a joint venture with the
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cardiologists in the middle of 2001. See, e.g., Trial Ex. 4 77 at 4 (May 16, 2001) ("Dr. Curran
reported that the Idaho Cardiology Group would like to partner with us"); Trial Ex. 4237 at 1
(Sept. 18, 2001) ("[l]ooking to do a JV with the cardiologists"). We thus know that the
document was written at a time when Dr. Curran's thoughts and observations were relevant to
the events being adjudicated in this trial.
Finally, both Exhibits contain admissions by Dr. Curran that are highly relevant to key
issues in this case. This is true whether one considers the broad issues of the relationships and
conflicts among the parties that led to Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from the MRIA
partnership, or the more specific issue cited by the Court, concerning Jeff Cliffs credibility on
the issue whether he was straightforward in the manner in which he left his firm PMI to join the
Radiologists full time.
As to Cliffs credibility in his account of his departure from PMI, the following excerpts
from page 1 and page 4 of Exhibit 802 are directly relevant:
•

Exhibit 802, page 1, first paragraph, shows Dr. Curran's awareness that "Jeff
[Cliff] leaves PMI (but still some ownership & will help Paul [De Witt, the
remaining partner in PM!] out when needed but will be full time mngr [manager]

for Rad group," thereby undermining MRIA' s contention that Cliff failed to
disclose his true intentions to MRIA;
•

Exhibit 802, page 4 (last page), in three sentences likewise shows Dr. Curran's
understanding and favorable view of the manner in which Cliff handled the
situation:
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o "Jeffknows that ifrads put in second magnet (&hurt us) that war is
likely."
o "Jeff will likely be a voice of reason with the rads & will try to avoid
things that harm us because if war happens everyone loses."
o "Having Jeff work for them [the Radiologists] could actually be to our
advantage"
The foregoing excerpts from Exhibit 802, as well as the following examples from
Exhibit 803, likewise illustrate in Dr. Curran's own words the conflict between the DMR doctors
and MRIA on the one side, and the Radiologists on the other, and thus support Saint Alphonsus's
contention that it was caught between two feuding factions and was motivated in its dealings
with MRIA and the Radiologists by a desire to navigate that dispute:
•

Exhibit 803, page 1, shows that Dr. Curran's subject in these notes is "War?" He
begins his discussion with the question "[i]s it time to bring in our own rads?"

•

Exhibit 803, page 2, begins with the question: "Any advantage to war?'' The
advantages listed are that "[i]t would be fun to 'get even' with the rads" and
"[p ]erhaps we could profit on reading fees- but how do we find outstanding rads
who are willing to let us keep some of the fee?" This shows a depth of personal
animosity between the two sides that has key relevance in this case.

•

Exhibit 803, page 2, continues with Dr. Curran's admission that the Radiologists
"are personal friends with the main referral sources," thus supporting Saint
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Alphonsus' s argument that the bulk of MRIA' s losses were caused by MRIA' s
firing of the Radiologists and not by anything Saint Alphonsus did.
•

Exhibit 803, page 3, shows Dr. Curran's admission that it might make sense for
MRIA to "sit tight long enough," thus supporting Saint Alphonsus's contention
that MRIA was not interested in making a deal during this time period.

•

Exhibit 803, page 3, shows Dr. Curran's admission that MRIA knew and
approved of Saint Alphonsus's participation in the non-MRI side ofiMI: "If we
sit tight long enough & Al' s watches the rad center do so-so on everything but
MRI & maybe well on MRI in which Al's can't participate might they finally get
tough with the rads?"
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court should overrule MRIA's objections and hold
that Trial Exhibits 802 and 803, authenticated as the handwritten notes of Dr. Curran, are
admissible as non-hearsay admissions of a party-opponent.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 4th day of October 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

omeys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
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I hereby certify that on the 4th day of October 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

~

0
0

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") bring this Motion in Limine to exclude evidence and
argument concerning alleged "misconduct" by Dr. Giles. Such evidence is irrelevant, and any
probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury. Idaho R. Evid. 401, 403.
As has been demonstrated at trial in the questioning of other witnesses, Saint Alphonsus
is attempting to suggest that Dr. Giles somehow caused or contributed to Saint Alphonsus's
decision to withdraw. MRIA is concerned, however, that Saint Alphonsus may also attempt to
attack Dr. Giles's character by referencing other circumstances (disputed by MRIA), where
Dr. Giles engaged in other alleged "misconduct." For example, MRIA anticipates that such
arguments might include the assertion that Dr. Giles misrepresented his reason for leaving Gem
State Radiology ("GSR") in 2000, tried to read images at MRI Center after he left GSR, or
engaged in other purported "misbehavior" at GSR in 2000. Such evidence is irrelevant. What
Dr. Giles did or did not do in his professional capacity as a radiologist, or even in his personal
life, has no bearing on any ofMRIA's claims or Saint Alphonsus's defenses.
This Court had indicated that Dr. Giles's conduct may be relevant, insofar as it might
impact Saint Alphonsus's decisions and motivations. However, the reasons that Dr. Giles may
or may not have left GSR, the fact that he attempted to read at MRI Center after leaving GSR, or
other similar alleged misbehavior with respect to third parties is simply irrelevant to Saint
Alphonsus. These actions do not impact Saint Alphonsus, much less inform its decisions. What
Dr. Giles may have done in his professional life as a radiologist, or even his personal life, has no
effect on Saint Alphonsus, and certainly does not provide an explanation for anything that Saint
Alphonsus did. In short, evidence that Dr. Giles may have engaged in improper conduct with
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respect to his former employer or any other third party is simply irrelevant to this case. As such,
it should be excluded. I.R.E. 401.
Moreover, to the extent that this evidence has any probative value at all, it is outweighed
by the assertion of undue prejudice. The argument that an MRIA partner engaged in misconduct
as a physician or in his personal life is highly prejudicial information. Dr. Giles is a partner of
MRIA, but his personal and professional conduct cannot be imputed to MRIA because in those
areas, he is not acting in his capacity as a partner ofMRIA. See I.C. § 53-3-301 (noting that a
"partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business") (emphasis added). This
point also leads to the possibility of confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, as the jury
might wrongly believe that any such purported misbehavior can be imputed to MRIA. For these
reasons, Saint Alphonsus should be prevented from arguing or presenting evidence that Dr. Giles
engaged in any misconduct in his professional or personal life.
DATED this

JL day of October 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

,. Dara L. Parqer
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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ORIGINAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") move in limine for an order precluding Saint Alphonsus
from presenting evidence, argument, or questioning that an damages award must be decreased by
Saint Alphonsus's former ownership interest in MRI Associates and its current interest in the
limited partnerships, MRI Center and MRI Mobile.
Before it dissociated from MRIA, Saint Alphonsus had an approximately 25 percent
ownership interest in MRI Associates. It still owns a limited partner interest in both MRI Center
and MRI Mobile of approximately seven (7) percent. At various times, Saint Alphonsus has
indicated its intention to argue that any damages award or theory must take into account this
ownership. For example, in Saint Alphonsus's deposition ofMRIA's expert, Bruce Budge, Saint
Alphonsus asked:

Q. In order to accurately-- in order not to overcompensate the current
shareholders and accurately account for St. Alphonsus' equity interest in MRIA in
the but-for world, wouldn't we need to make some adjustments to these numbers
to remove St. Alphonsus' share?
A. I'm not sure. It really pretty much I think involves some legal issues
that I'm not competent to weigh in on. If I was instructed to do that, I could make
such a calculation. You know, I don't know, if MRIA receives an award, how it's
going to be distributed among its current and former stakeholders.

Q. Okay. But putting aside the legal issues, is it your opinion that if the
current MRIA stakeholders retained the benefits of the entirety of the damages set
forth in your Models 1 through 4, that those current MRIA stakeholders would be
overcompensated relative to the amounts they would have received in the but-for
world?
A. Again, I don't know how the law weighs in on this, but what I'm saying
is that I basically calculated damages to MRIA Q. Mm-hm.
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A. -- in itself, and if-- if those damages are not shared with St. Alphonsus
in some way, then-- because of some legal reason where they're not entitled to
them -- then that's going to result in a number which is more that would have
occurred had there been no wrongful conduct in dispute and they still were in
partnership and-- and so forth.

Q. Okay. So I think the answer to my question then was a yes, they would
be overcompensated.
A. I don't use the word overcompensated -

Q. Okay.
A. -- because it makes implications about the law and equity and things
like that so -

Q. Okay.
A. -- I'm not going to Q. I understand A. -- be able to endorse that.

Q. Okay. So they would be-- assuming they held on to the money, they,
the MRIA stakeholders, would be recovering more based on these damages
figures than they would have earned in the but-for world?
A. If St. Al's had not withdrawn from the partnership. The problem with
answering your question is I don't know what's going to happen. I don't know if
there is going to be some sharing with MRIA for the years that are -- I just don't
know.

Q. Okay. Right. That's why I'm asking you. I'm not asking you to make an
opinion on the legal question. Just --just on the assumption -- or irrespective of
the legal position, if the MRI -- if MRIA is awarded these amounts, and the
stakeholders get what you're saying they're entitled to, they would be earn- -- they
would be getting more money A. See, I haven't issued -- or rendered an opinion on what the stakeholders
should get. I've just calculated injury to MRIA.
(Budge Depo. p. 97:25-100:20).
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Saint Alphonsus has also developed this point in the report of its expert, Dr. Thomas
McCarthy who contends that damages must be reduced by the proportion of Saint Alphonsus's
partnership ownership in MRI Associates, LLP.

(Report~~

47, 53, Exhibits 18-18D, 19-19A.)

For example, MRI Associates, LLP, receives 7.5 percent of the revenues generated by MRI
Center and MRI Mobile as an administrative fee for managing those entities. When MRI Center
and MRI Mobile lost scans, they lost revenues and the management fee was obviously impacted.
In paragraphs 47 and 53 of his Report, McCarthy asserts because Saint Alphonsus owned a 24.75
percent share of MRI Associates from September 1999 through March 2004, any damages to
MRI Associates, must be offset to reflect Saint Alphonsus's share in those management fees.
(See McCarthy Depo. p. 40:4-22.)

Saint Alphonsus should be prevented for arguing that any ownership interest it has MRI
Associates or the limited partnerships in any way impact damages or should result in an "offset."
First, Saint Alphonsus did not plead the affirmative defense of offset. Second, it is an attempt to
receive more money for the buyout of its partnership share in MRI Associates. Finally, this
argument should not be permitted because the present lawsuit does not seek damages "on behalf'
of the stakeholders in these entities.

A.

Saint Alphonsus Did not Plead Offset
First, this attempt to offset the damages award in this fashion was not pleaded in Saint

Alphonsus's Answer, and thus cannot be allowed. (See Answer to Third Amended Counterclaim
filed April16, 2010.) Affirmative defenses must be affirmatively pleaded. I.R.C.P. 8(c). While
offset is not particularly listed, Idaho case law suggests that offset must be pleaded. See Wing v.
Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 684 P .2d 314 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing cases). As such, Saint Alphonsus

should not be permitted to maintain such defense.
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B.

Saint Alphonsus's Buyout Share in MRI Associates has Already Been Determined
As noted above, MRI Associate's management fee is based on a percentage of the

revenue of the limited partnerships. MRI Associates contends that that revenue - and thus the
management fee - was reduced before and after Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation because of Saint
Alphonsus's bad acts. Saint Alphonsus contends that, as to damages for any such fees prior to its
dissociation in 2005, those damages must be offset by the amount of those fees which Saint
Alphonsus would have received as a partner of MRIA. In other words, it contends that, had it
not engaged in wrongful conduct, it would have received a percentage of the larger management
fee, and thus that that amount must be offset from the damages award. This argument severely
flawed, however, since it is an attempt on Saint Alphonsus's part to receive more money for the
buyout of its partnership share.
Saint Alphonsus dissociated from MRI Associates in 2005, and thus its ownership
interest in MRI Associates ended six years ago. When a partner dissociates, that partner is
entitled to have its interest in the partnership purchased. I.C. § 53-3-701(a). That buyout price is
the amount that would have been distributable to the dissociating partner upon winding up the
business if, on the date of dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a price equal to
the greater of the liquidation value or the value based on a sale of the entire business as a going
concern without the dissociated partner. I.C. § 53-3-701(b). Saint Alphonsus actually instituted
the present litigation under I. C. § 53-3-701 (i) to determine the buyout price of its interests. In
the prior proceedings, this amount was determined to be $4.6 million. (Findings of Fact,
Conclusion of Law and Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007.) This Court has re-confirmed that ruling.
(Consolidated Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May 18,2011, filed June 17,
2011, p. 3-4).
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Notably, the comments to I.C. § 53-3-701 provide that "[a] dissociating partner, on the
other hand, is not entitled to an add-on for amounts owing to him by the partnership." (ld. at cmt.
4 1). If a damages award related to the management fee was reduced to reflect the amount that
Saint Alphonsus would have received if it had not itself engaged in wrongful conduct, this will
result, in substance, in an increase in the buyout price. See Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 275 Neb.
112, 134, 745 N.W.2d 299 (Neb. 2008) (although UPA permitted dissociated partner to take a
share of future profits rather than buyout, this did not carry over to the RUP A). This would be in
error, since the buyout price is calculated as of the "date of dissociation," which clearly does not
contemplate upward adjustments if the partnership is later able to secure money which was owed
to it. Put more simply, because Saint Alphonsus has already received full compensation for its
ownership interest in MRI Associates on the day it dissociated, it should not be permitted to
argue that the damages award related to the management of MRI Associates should be offset by
its putative "share" of that management fee.

C.

Saint Alphonsus is Not Entitled to an Offset for Its Ownership in the Limited
Partnerships or MRI Associates Because the Damages are Not Sought for the
Stakeholders of These Entities
Saint Alphonsus's assertions concerning a setoff of any alleged "share" of its damages--

whether related to its prior ownership in MRI Associates or its current ownership ofMRI Center
and MRI Mobile--should not be permitted because the present lawsuit does not seek damages
"on behalf' of the stakeholders in these entities. The entities are seeking damages on their own
behalf. It is therefore unnecessary, and indeed, improper, to attempt to guess what amount any
individual stakeholder, such as Saint Alphonsus, would receive from a damages award awarded
to and collected by the entity.

This comment is speaking about the fact that debts that might be owed by the partnership to the partner are
not accelerated, but the principle is the same: the buyout price reflects the partner's full interest.
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At this point, it is unknown whether, and in what amount, the stakeholders would realize
any individual distribution based on a damages award. It is not a simple matter of calculating a
stakeholder's interest in the entity, and then taking a proportional share from the gross damages
award. The entities first, of course, have to use any judgment they receive to pay the costs of this
litigation. In addition, there may be other debts and operational costs to be paid, or other
decisions by the managing partner about the use of a damages award, before any distribution of a
damages award will be made to the stakeholders of these entities. Finally, the entities then have
their own bylaws, contracts, and procedures about the payment of any net revenues from a
damages award to their stakeholders. Determining the proper payment to the stakeholders will
be a highly factual inquiry based on circumstances that are not in the record here, and indeed,
would not be germane to the present case. Saint Alphonsus has brought forth no evidence of
what that amount should be in spite of the fact that, even if permissible as an affirmative defense,
such proof would be their burden. In short, Saint Alphonsus is seeking an offset based on the
gross amount of a damages award, without any evidence that it is entitled to the same. As the
plaintiff in the action, the entities should be awarded the full damages award, without reference
to any amount any stakeholder might ultimately receive. The entities should then be allowed to
make a distribution, if any, as outlined in their own bylaws and procedures. It is not the job of
this jury or this Court to direct the MRI Entities about how a damages award is to be distributed
since none of those facts have been pled or litigated in this case. Indeed, Saint Alphonsus's
assertion that it is entitled to an offset based on the gross damage award may well result in a
windfall beyond the distribution received by the other stakeholders. As such, Saint Alphonsus
should not be allowed to make the argument to the jury.
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DATED this 11th day of October, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

BrentS. Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
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Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
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802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
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Telephone: (208) 342-4411
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Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

'Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
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V.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
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PRECLUDE QUESTIONING OF
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THE REASONABLENESS OF NONTECHNICAL FACTUAL
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Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
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ORIGINAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") and move this Court to preclude questioning ofMRIA's
experts concerning the reasonableness of non-technical factual assumptions.
This motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion In Limine
to Preclude Questioning ofMRIA's Experts Concerning the Reasonableness ofNon-Technical
Factual Assumptions and by the Affidavit of BrentS. Bastian in support.

DATED this 11th day of October, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

\4
BrentS. Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an
Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
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Plaintiff,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership,
Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership; MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho
Limited Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
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Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT ALPHONSUS
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ORIGINAL

County of Ada
State of Idaho

)
): ss
)

Brent S. Bastian, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI

Mobile Limited Partnership in the above captioned case.
2.

I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge.

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A, is the deposition of Bruce Budge, dated August 8,

2011.

DATED this 11th day of October, 2011.

l:S

l ~B

BrentS. Bastian

1·.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 11th day of October, 2011

Not ry Public for Idaho
My commission expires: \Of~tJ..O\\
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August 11,2011

Bruce Budge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
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7

5
1

1

2

2

BRUCE P. BUDGE, having been first duly sworn, was exami lfd

3

3

and testified as fo II ows:

4

4

5

5

EXAMINATION

6

6

BY MR. VERGONIS:

7
8

VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF BRUCE P. BUDGE

7

Taken on behalf of the Plaintiff
August 11,2011

9

Q. Good morning, Mr. Budge.

8

A

9

Q. Thanks for coming in. You testified previously in

10

10

11

11

12

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT, pursuant to the Washington R les 12

Good morning.

this case; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q. Twice, actually, right? Once by deposition?

13

of Civil Procedure, the deposition of BRUCE P BUDGE was

13

A

14

taken before EVA P. JANKOVITS, a Certified Court Reporter

14

Q. And once at the prior proceed·ings?

15

#1915, on August 11,2011, commencing at the hour of9:02

15

A

16

a.m., the proceedings being reported at 601 Union Street,

16

17

Suite 1624, Seattle, Washington.

17

Yes.

Q. How much to date has your firm been paid for your
work in this case?

18

18

A

19

19

Q. Do you know approximately?

20

20

21

21

years ago, and I have billed time over the last six or eight
months on it, but I don't -- I did bring my bills, so --

22

22

23

23

24

24

25

25

I

Thaf s correct.

A

I don't know.
I actually don't. The prior proceeding was four

Q. Okay. You brought your bills?
A

-- so that you could see the amount, but I haven't

actually looked at any of them.

6
1

2

VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF BRUCE BUDGE
THURSDAY, AUGUST 11, 2011

3

9:02A.M.

Q. Okay. For the recent time?
A. Yes.

4

Q. Okay. So I can determine the amount you billed
for the recent time since the remand of the case from tho~

5

bills?

3

4

5

1
2

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are on the record. This.

6

a statement for a video deposition. I'm the videographer

6

A. Yes.

7

and my name is Sid Fox. This videotaped deposition has bee

7

Q. Do you have your files with you?

8

noticed by attorney Jack Gjording, is being held on August

8

A. Yes.

9

lith, 2011, at approximately 9:06a.m.

9

Q. Could I see them, please?

10

The location is Naegeli Reporting Corporation, 601

10

A. Right here.

•

11

Union Street, Suite 1624, Seattle, Washington 98101. Case

11

Q. This book?

12

caption is Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., versus

12

A. Yeah.

13

MRI Associates. Case NO. CV OC 0408219D in the District

13

14

Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho

14

15

in and for the County of ADA The deponent is Bruce Budge

15

Q. I'll set this aside and look at it during a break.
A. I may need it to answer some questions -Q. Why don't we --

16

A. --but--

16
17

Will counsel and all present please identify

17

yourselves and state whom you represent.

18

MR. VERGONIS: My name is Christian Vergonis, an

18

19

I represent St. Alphonsus Diversified Care and St. Alphonsus

19

20

Regional Medical Center.

20

21

22
23

MR. WOODARD: Wade Woodard, and I represent M
Associates, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The deposition is being take

U

21

22
23

24

before Eva Jankovits, court reporter, who will now swear in

24

25

the witness.

25

Q. Why don't we let you have it and we'll get it
during a break.
A. All right.

Q. Does your firm do any other work for the Bandu c
Woodard firm?
A. Let me think about that. I can't --

MR. WOODARD: Is that currently or in the past
MR. VERGONIS: At any time, but we can break

~~~~-

J
~
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11

9
1

1

BY MR. VERGONIS:

opinion in that matter?

2

Q. Are you currently doing any other work for them?

2

A. I think it's confidential. It was an arbitration.

3

A

3

Q. Okay. What about Steinbeck versus Gaskill?

4

Q. Have you in the past?

4

A

5

A I can't think of anything at -- at this time.
Q. Okay. How much of your work at FTI is litigation

5

woman whose children, basically, got power of attorney and •

6

then sold her house and bought themselves another one, and .:
we were trying to help her make a recovery on that.

6

No. I'm trying to think ifl have.

7

related?

7

8

A

8

9

Almost all of it. It varies from year to year.

There are times when basically I might get involved in a

9
10

That was a pro bono case that I did on behalf of a

I

Q. Okay. What about Gray's Harbor Energy versus
Energy Northwest?
A

That was a dispute about the enforceability of a

10

financial investigation or something for a board of

11

directors or for company management or something like th t, 11

power purchase contract between Energy Northwest and Gr y'

12

so it varies from year to year, but, you know, as I think

Harbor Energy.

13

about my present portfolio, it's -- most of it is --

14

Q. Okay.

15

A

13

-- litigation.

16

12

MR. VERGONIS: I'm going to mark, as Exhibit I,

,

Q. I see that was also an arbitration. Without

14

really get into confidential matters, can you tell me

15

generally the scope of your testimony?

16

A

Basically, I computed what the cost of energy that

17

the supplemental expert report that you submitted in this

17

was going to be delivered would have been under the terms f

18

case dated May 2nd, 200 I [sic].

18

the contract.

19
20

(Whereupon a Supplemental Expert Report of Bruce

19

Q. Okay. How about moving back to Worman. Withot :

P. Budge dated 5/2/2011 was marked Exhibit 1 for

20

disclosing anything confidential, can you, sort of, in

21

identification.)

21

general terms, describe your testimony?

22

BYMR. VERGONIS:

22

23
24
25

Q. Do you recognize that as the report you filed in

23

this case?

A

It appears to be, yes.

A. Yeah. It had to do with the value of the

24

Q. Okay. Richard Tinney versus David Syre?

25

A

Yeah.

12

10
1
2

Q.

Okay. Can you turn to the --to your CV, which is

after the report but before the schedules.

It

opportunity that was taken by the defendant.

1

Q. What was that about?

2

A

That's a -- was a partnership dispute having to do

3

A

I'm going to --

3

with a couple of gentlemen that were in the hardwood !urn

4

Q.

Yeah.

4

business. And it had to do with certain allegations of

A

--take the exhibit apart if that's okay. And I'll

5

self-dealing. And I probably can't be too much more

6

specific than that.

5
6
7

-- and I'm there.

Q.

7

Q. Okay. Again because of confidential--

8

on Page 6. Some ofthis -- some of these are recent

8

A

9

engagements since you last testified, so I just want to ask

9

Q. -- concerns?

Okay. I want to turn to the testimony experience

Yes.

10

you about them, maybe working up from the bottom so the m re 10

11

recent ones first, if you could just briefly, I'll name the

11

A

12

case and you can tell me what it's about and more -- more

12

Q. Was he the claimant or plaintiff?

13

specifically, what your testimony was about in that case.

13

A

14

Q. Okay. Who did you represent in the Gray's Harbor

14
15
16

Worman versus Green?
A

That was an arbitration matter. It had to do with

15

a partnership dispute.

16

17

Q.

18

A. Basically, that one of the partners took the

Okay. And what was the dispute?

Which party did you represent?
I represented David Syre.
There were cross-claims.

Energy case?
A

Energy Northwest.

17

Q. Okay. Is that the defendant?

18

A Well, it may be somewhat similar to this case. I

19

business opportunity and at the -- to the disadvantage of

19

think they were the --might be called the counter-

20

the partnership.

20

plaintiff, or something like that.

21

Q.

22
23
24
25
'""''

21

Q. Okay. So in both those cases, were you-- well,

A. The plaintiff.

22

let's take them one at a time. In Gray's Harbor, were you

Q.

Okay. Would that be Worman?

23

providing opinion testimony about amounts that Energy

A

Yes, it would.

24

Northwest was claiming were due to it?

Q.

What was your -- what was the scope of your

25

''""''"

What party did you represent?

'·"»»N•o•'

.•.•ww•

,

h

I

A No. I was basically providing opinions as to what

"i'!JI'~<,v,
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15

13
1

the-- if they were-- had been allowed to purchase energ'

1

2

as they thought they had an option to, what the pricing

2

3

would have been.

3

4

Q.

4

Okay. What about the Syre case; were you

A. This is a case involving the rights to broadcast
Hispanic novellas. These soap operas --

Q.

'

Mm-hm.

A. -- they're very popular. And Telivisa is a

c

5

Mexican TV company. And Univision is an American!Hisp! ~-IC

A. In part.

6

network. And they had a dispute over the content in their -

7

Q.

7

- I believe it had to do with obligation to provide the

8

Babbitt?

8

content.

9

Q.

5
6

9
10

11
12

providing testimony about damages or claims by Syre?
Okay. What was Summit REIT versus Jameson

A. I don't remember it very well, but it's a legal

10

malpractice case.

Q.

11

Okay.

A. And it had to do with some losses that were

13

incurred that were allegedly due to legal malpractice. An

14

I can't really remember much more about it.

15

Q.

16

A. Summit REIT.

17

Q.

18
19

Okay. Who did you represent there?

Nestle USA?
A. That was a case about the appropriateness of

as opposed to the defendants?

14

A. That varies a lot from year to year.

Q.

16

A. I think probably in the -- over the course of my

Yeah.

career, because I've had a couple of very large engagements,

18

I've probably been a little bit more on the defendants'

19

side.

calculations of a division of profit for a joint venture

20
21

Q.

Okay. Just a few more of these, I think, before

we go to what was on your old CV.

22

International Garden Products versus Langeveld,

23

A. J.R. Simplot.

23

24

Q.

24

A. Yes.

25

A. Yes.

25

Q.

The plaintiff?

"

15

that they had.
Okay. Who did you represent there?

In your cases overall, would you say there's a --

13

21

Q.

Q.

is there a percentage of time you represent the plaintiffs

20
22

Who did you represent there?

A. Telivisa.

12

Okay. What about the J.R. Simp lot Company ver us 17

another arbitration matter; do you recall that one?
What was that about?

16 ~

14
1

Q.

2

A. I don't have a real clear recollection of this. It

2

3

didn't go to trial, but it was a case having to do with one

3

4

of the officers of a-- of the former Montana Power Compa y

4

A. Basically had to do with the sale of a business

5

and some allegations that were made by him from a trustee of 5

and some allegations of violations of reps' warranties.

What about Brent Williams versus Robert Gannon?

1

A. It was a post acquisition dispute.

Q.

Okay. Can you describe that in a little more

detail?

6

that company after it went in bankruptcy, and I was --I wa

6

Q.

7

involved in his defense.

7

A. I just can't-- I remember their faces. I can't -

8

- I believe it was Lange veld. Yes, it was. Langeveld.

8
9
10

Q.

Okay. What about Weyerhaeuser versus Accurate

Recycling?
A. This involved a contractual dispute between

9
10

Q.

Okay. And who did you represent there?

t!

Okay. Were they the defendant or the--

A. Yes, they were.

11

Weyerhaeuser and a provider of corrugated waste that they

11

Q.

12

use for recycling.

12

Young?

Okay. What about SMC Corporation versus Ernst I!
'*'

13

Q.

14

A. Weyerhaeuser.

14

testified on having -- on issues having to do with the

15

Q.

15

standard of care for consulting engagements by accountan

16

A. Yes.

16

Q.

17

Q.

17

A. Yes, I am.

18
19

Okay. Who did you represent there?
There they were the plaintiff?
What were they trying to recover, if you recall? I

don't mean amount, but -- but what was their theory?
A. No, that's what I'm trying to remember, what the

13

A. This was a professional malpractice case that I

18

Q.

19

that case?

nature of the -- I believe that --my recollection is that

20

A. Yes.

Weyerhaeuser rejected some of their material because it ha

21

Q.

22

-- didn't meet specifications, and it rose into some kind of

22

A. I represented Ernst & Young.

23

a commercial dispute, and they had injury from it. That's

23

Q.

24

all I can remember.

24

A. Yes.

25

Q.

Q.

Okay. What about Telivisa versus Univision?
"'

"

So you were an expert on the standard of care in

20

25

n

Okay. And you have a CPA, right?

21

"*" ,.,.

~

Who did you represent?
The defendant?
Transportation Factoring, Inc., versus Grant
<<

'<i;@",.@~J:'fl>,''

',,,.

j
f.'N%:1.ml':'t;,,,;
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1

Thornton?

19
1

Q. Is this the amendment to the supplemental expel1.
report that you filed on May 19th, 2011, that you prepar ~?

2

A. This was also an accounting malpractice case

2

3

having to do with massive fraud that was not detected by

3

A. Yes, it is.

4

Grant Thornton, and I testified both on the standard of care

4

Q. Okay. Can you-- looking at the c!}art on Page --

5

and on damages rebuttal.

~

5

the chart that is Schedule 17.5, can you just tell me what

6

Q. Okay. And you represented--

6

this is and what it's showing?

7

A. Grant Thornton.

7

A. At Counsel's request, we basically prepared a

8

Q. --Thornton?

8

recap by year of the average net revenue per scan for bo

~

9

MRIC IMI based on the data that we have.

~·

And the People of the State of California versus

9
10

Sierra Pacific Industries?

10

Q. Okay. How does this-- what-- what-- based on ·i

11

A. Yes.

11

the data that you had -- I think I know the answer to this •

12

Q. What was that about?

12

but what data did you use to prepare this document?
A. Basically the number of the scans and the net
~~
revenue per scan from the financial statements of those fi

13

A. I don't remember very well. It only went to

13

14

deposition. It was a dispute over -- the center of it had

14

15

to do with some alleged emissions that were beyond standru ~s 15

16

and permit for the plant. And there was some fmancial

16

17

evidence which Sierra Pacific wished to produce to the --

17

18

that was somehow relevant, and I was the one that put it

18

19

together.

19

entities.
Q. Okay. Was it-- was it from the financial
statements or was it from the PMI?
A. Let me read that. You make a good point.
(Witness peruses document.)

21

Q. Okay. Who did you represent there?
A. Sierra Pacific Industries.

21

Q. Okay.

22

Q. As we went through these-- you said you didn't

22

A. Yeah.

23

Q. So that-- those are-- I don't have a copy here,

24

but those are those lengthy Excel spreadsheets, right?

20

23

recall if you did any other work for Mr. Woodard's firm.

24
25

20

Were any of these cases for his fum?
A. No.

25

I believe it was for PMI.

~

A. Correct.

20

18
1

2

Q. You could just look. I'm not going to go through
these because these are --

1

2

Q. So you had totaled number of scans from there. And I &~·,
I think they have price information as well.

A. Let me just look at them individually to make sure

3
4

Q. Okay. So --and then the calculations you

5

Q. That's all I was going to say. If you could look

5

performed --just --just so I'm clear, you totaled the

6

at the ones on the previous page as well and see if that

6

amounts charged and then averaged it by the number of scru

7

refreshes your recollection.

7

A. Basically, there are three colunms under each, and

8

we take the average charge per scan and then the net amoun

9

collected per scan by -- by looking at the total scans

3
4

8
9

A. Yes. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center was

for his fum.

10

Q. Right, but that's --

10

11

A. I know. That's my attempt at humor.

11

12

Q. Okay. When we were talking to Mr. Wilhoite

12

these figures relate to the supplemental report that we were

13

looking at a moment ago?

Q. Okay. Now, how does-- how does this chart and

yesterday, there was some-- or day before yesterday, there

14

was some confusion about whether that was one or two

14

A. They don't directly in terms of there being these

15

engagements. Not confusion, but just unclarity.

15

calculations being directly used in that. Of course there

16

are parallel calculations --

17
18

A. No, I don't believe any of these were for their

fum.
Q. Okay. Great. Thank you.

,
?

I

divided by each of those.

13

16

t

A. Yes.

17

Q. Okay.

18

A. -- in there. But this was basically to prepare a

I

19

summary so these data could be compared together for somt f!

20

the report we've just been looking at that's dated May 19th,

20

purpose that the attorneys had, which I may not fully

21

2011. You probably have a page there.

21

understand.

19

I'm going to mark as Exhibit 2 the amendment to

22

(Whereupon an Amendment to the Supplemental Exp rt 22

23

Report of Bruce P. Budge dated 5/19/11 was marked Exhibi 2 2 3

24

for identification.)

24

Q. Okay. Do you partially understand the purpose?

A. I think they wanted-- I think what it
demonstrates, I don't know how -- how they intend to use

BY MR. VERGONIS:
25
this, is that the revenue per scan for MRIC declined more ~
25
L-~~wm~~~0~.w-~.~~~~~~~~~~~4''~·•-.v~.-.~"~~··~-,~~~~~~~~~~~~-.~.~
•. ~~--~~~--~~~--~
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1

2

rapidly after the alleged events occurred than for IMI.

2

MR. VERGONIS: I'm going to mark, as a third

3

exhibit, your rebuttal expert report dated July 29th, 2011.
(Whereupon a Rebuttal Expert Report of Bruce P.

5

6

1

Q. Okay.

3
4

23

Budge dated 7/29/11 was marked Exhibit 3 for

First question: What do you mean by "net cash flow"?
A. It's basically the operating profit plus

6

depreciation minus the capital contributions that were
required in the years that they were required.

identification.)

7

BY MR. VERGONIS:

8

10

Q. Is that the rebuttal expert report that you

Q. Okay. That the net cash flow from operations was
approximately 37.4 million.

4

7

9

A. Through all the data that we have forecasted, yes.

5

8

9

Q. Mm-hm. So profit-- the profit plus the

depreciation?

10

A. Right, minus capital investment.

11

A. Yes, it is.

11

Q. All right. Do you have -- maybe these -- they're

12

Q. You note, on Page 3, the second paragraph, that

12

13

prepared in this case?

r

not certainly in the short rebuttal report.

you were provided with the expert report of Thomas McCartliY? 13

Are there tables in your supplemental report of

14

A. Yes.

14

May 20, '11 where you can show me, even walk me through h

!w

15

Q.

15

you get to the 37.4 million?

1

Did you read that report?

16

A. Yes, I did.

16

A. You said May 20.

17

Q.

Okay. On Page 4 you write that-- underneath the

17

Q.

18

rebuttal Figure 1, you write that "I have also learned that

18

19

St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, SARMC, did not be in 19

A. It's easier to find them ifl use my file.

20

participating in the MRI profits ofiMI until April 1st,

20

Q.

21

2005."

21

22

22

Did I read that correctly?

I might have misspoken. May-- May 2nd, 2011,

Okay. That would be fine. Maybe you could...

~'

I think maybe before you start flipping through

~

it, can we mark the notebook as Exhibit 4?

23

A. Yes.

23

A. Does that mean I have to give it to you or --

24

Q.

24

Q. It means they can photocopy it during a break.

25

known?

25

A. That's --that's certainly fine, but I would also

Is that something that you previously had not

~

marked as Exhibit 1.

I
24

22
1

A. No. I -- I think that I had known it, and I think

1

point out there's a CD in it which I brought just for you to

2

that it-- because of the passage of time, it escaped my

2

have--

3

recollection.

3

Q. Okay.

4

A. -- which is the data that we used. And -- and --

4
5

Q. Okay. And how did you learn then-- how were yo
reminded of this fact?

6

A. There's a footnote in my report which basically

7

shows the portion of cash flows which could be attributed

8

St. Alphonsus Hospital and --

9
10

Q. Mm-hm.

A. -- basically takes my damages calculations and

5
6

p

8

make a copy. If it's your originals --

10

multiplies them by 50 percent which I understand to be the r 11

12

ownership percentage.

14

Q. So they'll-- they'll make us a copy.

13

A. Yeah.

A. It's -- in reviewing that note, it was pointed out

14

Q. We did that the other day.

15

16

includes partnership distributions for a period prior to

16

17

when they had an interest that needed to be corrected.

19

Q. Okay. Who pointed that out to you?
A. I don't -- I can't remember for sure. I think

that the first time that I became aware of it may have been

17

Q. Okay.
A. -- so give me a moment.

19

20

in a discussion with Drew Voth who was my assistant on tl is 21

22

project.

Q. Okay. So you say in this paragraph that for the

A. We're going to have to deal with my aged eyesight

here today --

18

21
23

A. -- unfortunately.

Q. Okay.
to me that that was -- it's an improper calculation that

20

A. It's my originals --

Q. Okay.

12

15

18

Q. Okay. But otherwise you would want it back? I
mean, if you-- if it's a copy already, they won't need to

11
13

but otherwise, I certainly have no objection to that.

7

9

22
23

24

time period April-- April 1st through-- April 1st, 2005

24

25

through-- I assume you say 2010. Is that the end of2010?

25

~

MR. WOODARD: I forgot to remind you. Glad you ,•
remembered.
MR. VERGONIS: Wade, since we only have one coy
of the book, would you mind if I walked over -MR. WOODARD: No.
MR. VERGONIS: --and sat in that chair to look
over Mr. Budge's shoulder?
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1

2
3

4
5
6

7

8

9
10
11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

27'

1
MR. WOODARD: No.
2
MR. VERGONIS: Okay.
3
A. It's-- actually, I can answer your question. It's
4
Schedule 2.6.
5
BY MR. VERGONIS:
6
Q. Oh.
7
A. 2.6 -8
Q. I'll stay seated for now.
A. -- in my report is what was -- what the source o
9
that is.
1o
MR. WOODARD: Pretty sure you're talking alx ut 11
12
your supplemental report.
13
THE WITNESS: Talking about my May 2nd
14
supplemental report.
15
BY MR. VERGONIS:
16
Q. 2.6 did you say?
17

A. Well, that's what it says here.
Q. I'm not sure I have a 2.6.
A. Let me go farther back. (Witness peruses

18
19

document.)
I have a Schedule 2.5 -Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- on the back, which these aren't Bates stampec
by page, but -Q. No, but I understand the order that everything's

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Yeah. So you know-- you know what I'm talking

about,
A.
Q.
A.

Mr. Budge. Can you --

[!

Yeah.
-- explain that convention to me?
The number after the decimal point is the method

number.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So when-- when you have your surmnary, for
instance, Figure 10, and I know Figure 10 on Page 15 ofy br
May 2nd report, I know that figure's been revised by your
rebuttal report, so we'll get to that momentarily, but
Figure 10 lists five calculation methods.
A. Yes.
Q. So any schedule without a decimal point after it

relates to Calculation Method 1; is that correct?
A. I believe it is. I just want to make sure that I

20
21

22
23
24
25

Q. Sure. Take your time. As you're flipping pages,
I'll represent that there are no schedules -A. That are point 1.
Q. --numbered. dot 1 -A. Yeah.

26
1
2

3

4
5
6

7
8
9

10
11

12

13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

in, so I -- I've been able to flip to 2.5, so I have that in
front of me.
A. Well, I'm somewhat mystified by this because I
think that there should be a 2.6 and a 3.6. Well, there's a

1
2

3
4

possibility this was not produced -5
Q. Okay.
6
A. -- in the report.
7
Q. Do you have a 2.6 in your binder there?
8
A. Yes, I do.
9
Q. Okay.
10
A. I have a 3.6, an 8.6, a 15.6. I see none of
11
those. You know, I didn't look through every page.
12
Q. No. I don't see them either. Before we look at
13
2.6, what's the schedule numbering convention that you u e?l4
In other words, there's a lot of-15
A. Yeah.
16
Q. --there are Schedules 1 through whatever number 17
maybe 15 or 18. Then it starts over with Schedule 2 poin 18
19
A. 1.
20
Q. -- 2 I think or-21
22
A. 2 point -- yeah.
THE COURT REPORTER: I need one at a time
23
speaking.
24
MR. VERGONIS: Yeah. I'm sorry.
25

Q. --so-A. So-Q. -- in the absence of a dot-A. That's right.
Q. -- is Calculation Method 1?
A. Right.
Q. And the schedules that are numbered dot 2 are
related to Calculation Method 2?
A. Yes.
Q. And if there's not a schedule number dot 2, is i [1
okay to infer that the original schedule is also applicat
to this calculation method?
A. I would have to look at a specific -j
Q. Okay.
A. -- instance where there's not a dot 2 in order to ,
see what the reason -Q. Okay.
A. -- for that is.
Q. But in other words, for-THE COURT REPORTER: In order to what?

fe

I

THE 'Y~TNESS: See what the reason for that i
BY MR. VERGONIS:
~
Q. For example, there's no Schedule 1.2?
A. Right.
Q. So Schedule 1 --
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29
1
2
3
4

A. So ...

Q.

Schedule 1 is your overall -- is your list of five

damages scenario.

1

methods in chief, we didn't include them as an exhibit in •

2

the report.

3

Q.

Okay. All right. Going back then to the tables,

A. Right.

4

5

Q.

5

A. To which tables?

6

A. (Witness nods head.)

6

Q.

7

Q.

Okay.

7

A. Yes.

8

A. Yeah.

8

Q.

9

Q.

9

So that one applies to all?

And so forth probably?

can you-;

To the dot 6 tables--- that were never produced to us.
Can you walk me through how you calculated the

10

A. Yes.

10

$3 7.4 million figure just by -- maybe by showing me tho

11

Q.

11

schedules?

Okay. And then just for completeness, any

12

schedule that is labeled dot 3 applies to your third

12

13

calculation method?

13

A. Figure out the best way to do this.
Would you like to look at them first or-~
Yeah. Why don't -- why don't you pass them ove

A. Yes.

14

Q.

15

Q.

15

A. (Witness complies.)

16

A. Yes.

16

Q.

17

Q.

17

Okay.

18

A. Correct.

18

19

Q.

19

Q.

20

A. This footnote.

20

A. I might but --

21

Q.

21

Q.

22

method?

22

A. -- but basically the overall approach is to

14

23
24
25

Dot 4 to your fourth?
Dot 5 to your fifth?
What does dot 6 apply to?
Okay. Is the footnote a damages calculation

A. I think that that conceivably could be if there's

23

some kind of a disgorgement type of remedy that's advocat d. 24

Q.

25

Okay. Do you know if such a remedy is advocated

;

(Peruses document.)

A. So-Do you need to look at them in order to ---talk to me? Okay.

basically -- if! made a calculation of what the profits

1
3

them up originally for this period that included, you knO\ ;

32

4

Did they ask you to put it in a footnote?

A. Not specifically. I don't really recall how that

5

occurred.

6

Q.

7
8
9
10
11

1

A. I think that there was a reason they asked me to
do the calculation, so I assume there is, but I don't kno~

Q.

Do you know why you didn't put it in Figure 10

Calculation Method 6?
A. Because it really isn't. The calculation is of a

IS

Q.

3

A. -- and I multiplied them by 50 percent. In doing

4

that I took the operating income and made some adjustmer
for -- for depreciation and for capital investments I

6

described to you earlier. And those are reflected in there.

7

Q.

8

A. It's primarily the purchase of magnets.

disgorgement premise and the others don't. They're inju ry 10
11
to MRIA. And so that seems illogical to me.

Q.

13

A. Yeah, because it's-- it really isn't comparable.

13

14

It has an entirely different premise, and it's an entirely

14

15

different measurement and an entirely different remedy.

15

17

12

It seems illogical to put it in Figure I 0?

Mm-hm.

5

12

16

dates prior to 2005 --

2

9

different nature. It basically has to do with a

0

,,,

accruing to IMI were during these periods, and then I adc ~ld

30
2

~

Q.

Do you think it was plain to someone reading yo llr 16
17
report that that was a claimed measure of damages?

IS

Okay. What's capital investment?
THE COURT REPORTER: It's primarily what?
THE WITNESS: For the purchase of magnets. MR

machines.
BY MR. VERGONIS:

Q.

Okay. And I would see that summarized here in

Schedule 15.6?

;

A. Yes, that's the one.

Q.

F

~

Okay. Then you-- so you took the profits, plus

depreciation, minus capital investment and -- for the years

~

18

A. I don't know if it would be or not.

18

in question, and divide it by two to reach SARMC's share f

19

Q.

19

18.7 million, right?

20

Did you provide the dot 6 tables to the lawyers a

20

part of your report?

A. Yeah, multiplied times 50 percent, same thing.

21

A. Not that I recall.

21

Q.

22

Q.

22

million.

23

A. I think these are our work papers and --

23

24

Q.

24

25

A. --we-- because they weren't part of the five

You think you failed to provide those?
Okay.
iv/#//..0.<'

_._.,_,

"•······

25

Yeah. Okay. Multiply by 50 percent to reach 18.7
Does the 18.7 million talce into account SARMC's

$11.6 million investment in IMI in-A. No.
';;;.

....
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33
Q. But-- but what if you extend the calculations

1

Q. Whynot?

1

2

A. Those are the returns on -- on that.

2

into perpetuity to try to value SARMC's return in perpetui

3

Q. What do you mean by that?

3

from its investment in this entity?

4

A. Those are the returns that they got in five years

4

5

before the $11 million investment, but I have not deducted

5

6

the $11 million investment.

6

I think Mr. Wilhoite then extends the numbers into the

7

future.

7

8
9

Q. Okay. I'm sorry. Let's break that down because

those are the returns that SARMC got, you said?

8

A. They're the financial returns. I don't know-- I

9

A. I don't understand the question, what if--

Q. Well, you end in-- you end in 2010, but I-- but

A. Yeah. You'd have to ask him about that. But my
assignment was basically to calculate the economic benefi

10

don't mean to say that they were necessarily distributed,

10

that SARMC has received from their investment and

11

but they represent their proportionate interest in the cash

11

affiliation with IMI, and that's what I did.

12

flows ofiMI over the period after their ownership

12

13

commenced.

13

14

Q. Okay. And why don't those get deducted against--

14

15

A. Well, it depends on what-- for what purpose

15

16

you're looking at them. My purpose here is to show what

16

17

their investment returns had been during the period that

17

18

they were an owner in IMI. If you asked me what was thei - 18

19

-you know, how much of their investment they'd recover,

19

20

that type of thing, that's a different question and I

20

21

probably would have answered-- you know, I probably wo ld 21

22

have taken the 11 million in the context of that question.

23

Q. I see. I understand. So we're talking about

22
23

24

SARMC's profits. We would-- we would want to deduct tl

24

25

11.6 million?

25

Q. Okay. And the economic benefit that SARMC has
received are 18.7 million in cash flows during this time?
A. Yes.

Q. Okay. With no regard for the 11.6 million
investment?
A. Well, that would be improper. They still own it.
And I'm assuming it's still worth 11 million and probably "
more than 11 million.
Q. Okay. Do you know why this disgorgement measu I!

begins after Aprillst, 2005 when SARMC -A. Well, I'll let you fmish the question.
Q. I'll finish the question there. Why does it begin

after Aprillst, 2005?
A. Because of my understanding that they did not hav

36

34
1

A. Not in the sense that accountants usually would

1

any interest in IMI's net income prior to that date.

Q. Okay. Let's move on to a different topic.

2

use the word "profit" because it's their investment, and

2

3

that usually isn't deducted from operating income. It's rot

3

4

amortized. You basically have an interest in the busine s

4

Figure No. 1, that's your-- am I right that that's your new

5

enterprise, and it continues on into perpetuity. It can

5

bottom line for your five damages alternatives?

6

change in value, but it's not a deduction from the earnin s

6

In your rebuttal report, on Page 4 in the Rebuttal

A. Well, what it does is it apportions them between

7

of it. So -- so it would not be proper to deduct it to

7

MRIC and MRIM instead of the way that I previously did wt ~h

8

compute their profits.

8

was to apportion them between the three plaintiffs.

9

If you wanted to deduct-- you know, do some

9

Q. Right.

A. And so that's how I would characterize it. I'm

10

calculation as to how they were -- what type of return o

1o

11

investment they were getting, or something like that, yo

11

12

could -- I think that the average earnings in this period i

12

13

maybe around three and a half million a year that is

13

this Rebuttal Figure 1 substitutes for any tables that came

14

attributable to them. They-- they invested 11 million.

14

before in terms of what your ultimate opinions on damages

15

That would say they're getting-- I don't know exactly, t ~t 15

16

you know, 33 percent return on that investment.

16

17

Q. Okay.

17

18

A. So you could use it, and it would be logical to

18

not -- I don't believe that the total changed.

Q. Right, the total did not change, but this is --

are?
A. Yes. In terms of the apportionment between the
entities, yeah.
Q. Okay. So -- so Column A is what you claim MRI --

1
~

use it in that context, but it would not be logical to

19

MRIC, which we sometimes refer to as "Center," suffered as

20

deduct it to describe what their profits had been, becaus

20

damages in this case?

21

at the end of that period, they still have that interest. It

21

A. Under these various methods.

22

still has a large value. There's been no diminution ofth

22

Q. Yeah. Alternative methodologies.

23

value of it.

23

A. Right.

Q. And Column B is what MRIM, what we sometimes n er

19

24

Q. Okay.

24

25

A. And, in fact, it may have become more valuable.

25

to as "Mobile," suffered under each of the different
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1

2

alternatives?
A. Right. In preparing for the deposition, I was

39
1

A. Mrn-hrn.

2

Q. -- my understanding was that in Calculation

3

informed by Mr. Woodard that we had a misunderstanding,

3

Methods I and 2, where you split damages between Center aJ ~

4

however, and that there may be additional supplementation

4

Mobile, the lost Center scans would have been performed at

5

required. That is in 3 and 4.

5

the MRI Center facility on the St. Alphonsus Hospital

6

campus; is that correct?
A. That's correct.

6

Q. Mm-hm.

7

A. We understood our instruction to be that to assume

7

8

that if Meridian and Eagle were only damaged by the amount

8

9

of referrals that were diverted from affiliate -- formerly

9

10

affiliate physicians --

Q. And the MRI Mobile scans would have been perform ~
by new MRI Mobile magnets established in Meridian and Ea ~e

10

Q. Mm-hm.

11

A. Right.

12

A. -- that those operations would have been housed

12

Q. -- is that correct?

13

from a corporate standpoint within Center as opposed to

13

14

Mobile.

14

11

'

I

A. Two magnets in Eagle, one magnet in -- two magnets

in Meridian, one magnet in Eagle.

15

Q. Mm-hm.

15

16

A. Mr. Woodard informs me that we misunderstood that

16

what was intended here, that for the Models 3 and 4, the

17

affiliated scans, all scans would have been performed at the

17

and that it was his intention that all of Eagle and Meridian

18

would have been housed under Mobile even under Methods 3 ~ nd 18

19

4. And he proposed to me that we should correct that in

19

20

order to be responsive for what he thinks the facts are.

Q. Okay. Now, I thought, but maybe I was wrong about

MRI Center magnet at the hospital.
A. (Witness shakes head.)

20

Q. No.

21

Q. Do you intend to correct that then?

21

A. That's not --

22

A. Yeah. He asked me to and I will do that.

22

Q. You're shaking your head no.

23

Q. When do you think you'll do that?

23

A. No. That's not what I mean to indicate. I mean

24

A. It's very easy to do. It could certainly be done

24

to indicate that just from the standpoint of corporate

25

ownership -- and this affects -- you know, they have

25

within the next week or something. I'm going on vacation

40

38
1

tomorrow--

1

different stakeholders and partners in each of the two.

2

Q. Okay.

2

Q. Sure.

3

A. -- but I -- I think I will have my -- Drew Voth

3

A. And so it affects who would have been the owners

4

work on the calculation so I can review it when I get bad

4

5

which is on about the 21st, and it would be ready then.

5

of those magnets and the beneficiary of earnings from that.
Q. Right. So it's important to get the ownership

6

interest right?

7

Do you know why Eagle and Meridian -- I guess y u

7

A. It is.

8

say they would have been housed under Mobile. Is -- do s

8

Q. Okay.

9

that mean that the alleged lost scans would have been

9

A. And apparently we misunderstood, for some reason,

10

that ifthere was a lower volume of scans due to them being

6

10

11
12

Q. Okay. What's your understanding-- strike that.

performed by the MRI Mobile entity?
A. There's no difference in terms of-- in-- in
terms of what we model in terms of where magnets were

limited strictly to -- to affiliated physicians that for

12

some how, for some reason, MRIC would have been the owne of

located and what would have been done. The question is

13

those two physically separate facilities, but I understand

14

under which corporate entity would they have put the

14

now that's not the case.

15

ownership of those two facilities. And I -- it doesn't

15

16

affect the total amount of damages. I, frankly, don't

16

17

understand what the significance of the division is. I was

17

A. Mm-hm.

18

just asked to make it.

18

Q. -- Models 3 and 4 assume that new magnets would be

19

Q. Mm-hm.

20

A. Apparently we misunderstood our instruction and ~e 2 0

22
23

24
25

made it wrong even in the supplemental one.

Q. Okay. I just want to probe that a little further
to make sure I understand.
Who -- putting aside the corporate entities and
focusing on the physical scanners --

I

11

13

21

~

19

21
22

I

Q. Okay. So even -- even before this is -- even

before your forthcoming corrections --

built in Eagle and Meridian?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Okay. And those models took into-- took into

account capital costs --

23

A. Yes.

24

Q. --of those?

25

A. They did.
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1

Q. Okay.

1

2

A. And--

2

3

Q. Okay.

3

require them to pay 7.5 percent to MRIA of any award th y

4

A. Yes.

4

obtain in this case?

5

Q. So now the change is intended to make the

5

6

ownership interests consistent among all four models of

6

7

those new hypothetical magnets in Eagle and Meridian?

7

8

A. Exactly.

8

9

Q. Okay. And the difference in ownership, you said,

9

A. It's the top line. It's not the bottom line.
Q. So it's your understanding that the contract would ''

A. I'm not sure that I'm in a position to opine on
what the actual mechanics would be -Q. Okay.
A. -- but some amount. I think it may be the amount
that you said, but I don't know exactly. But at any rate,

10

has no effect on the -- on the numbers here in their damages

10

it would be -- I would double-count the damages ifl wer ~o

11

estimates?

11

put the amounts by attribution that MRIA is entitled to

12

A. On the total.

12

because that, as I said they're -- they're derivative of

13

Q. On the total. Right. Okay. Right.

13

these.

14

The only thing I'll do is take some of the damages

14

Q. What if we assume that the contract requires therr '

15

that are allocated to Center and move them to the Mobile

15

to pay 7.5 percent of revenues but would not require then jto

16

column?

16

pay 7.5 percent of the damages awarded in this case?

17

A. That's exactly right.

18

Q. Okay. So Column A is damages for Center, Column B 18

17

A. Then MRIA would have an interest by attribution of
whatever its ownership interest is in these two, I think it

19

is damages for Mobile, Columns A plus B is total damages.

19

20

You're claiming zero damages, I take it, for MRIA?

20

Q. Okay. Similar to a shareholder?

21

A. Well, I think that's not strictly true. MRIA's

21

A. Well, yeah, of course.

22

damages are completely derivative from those ofMRIC and

22

23

MRIM. My understanding is that they have a contractual

23

24

right to seven and a half percent of the gross revenues of

24

25

those two entities and they --

25

Q. Yeah. But-- but on my assumption that they

2

Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- have, by attribution, some percentage -- I

~

wouldn't get the 7.5 percent?
A. Yeah, without endorsing your assumption, I don't
-if you say that they wouldn't, then--

42
1

44
1

Q. Okay.

2

A. -- how else could I answer? They wouldn't.

Q. Right. Why-- why is the-- why is the 7.5

3

think it's 30, might not be right -- in the earnings of

3

4

those two.

4

percent of revenues not a cost to Center and Mobile of doi
business?

5

Q. Okay.

5

6

A. And so by "attribution," if the jury awarded any

6

of these amounts to either the Center or MRIM, MRIA has an

7

Q. It--

8

interest in it, but the counterplaintiffs -- is that a word

8

A. -- typically.

9

I should use to describe MRIA?

Q. Counterclaimants we use --

10

11

A. Okay.

11

12

Q. -- but we understand what you mean.

12

13

A. Counterclaimants? Okay. So the counterclaimants

13

deduct the cost of doing business from their revenues,

14

aren't you overstating their profits?

will basically make those distributions. So, in fact,

IIll

Q. -- is a cost.

10

14

~

A. It -- it is --

7

9

t

being 30 percent.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Generally speaking, if your company-- if
you're calculating a company's profits and you fail to

15

because of the amounts owed by the two operating entities o 15

16

MRIA, they won't get all of these amounts because the

16

17

counterplaintiffs will have to divide that according to

17

basically showed them going to MRIA, and we put those iJ ·•

18

their contract.

18

three different buckets.

19
20

Q. Okay. Well, the contract says 7.5 percent of--

19

A. Well, I think, as you know, in our original
calculations, we did make those deductions, and then we

~

Q. Mm-hm.

20

A. However, in terms of the three plaintiffs as a

A. No.

21

group, the total amount of damages, neither of these

22

Q. Revenues?

22

scenarios is correct. And if you assume that it is MRIC an

23

A. Might even say cash receipts. I don't have an

23

MRIM who will then make the distribution to their

24

constituents and you end up in the right spot.

21

24
25
wk~,/.l'",".Y

of what profits or--

exact--

Q. Okay.

25

Q. Assuming they'll make that -- assuming they'll go

I
I

·••w••
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1

back and make the distribution. How would they figure out

1

Q. Okay. But you did it once?

2

the distribution to make?

2

A. I did it in the first instance, yes.

3

Q. Why did you change?

A. I was asked to.

3

A. They basically have legal documents that describe

4

their relationships, and I assume they'll follow them.

4

5

Q. Okay. But if-- assume they're required to

5

Q. By Counsel"

6

A. Yes. And I might also add that I believe that

6

distribute revenues.

7

A. Yes.

7

that puts these calculations more in harmony with Mr.

8

Q. Your-- your claim damages here are styled as lost

8

Wilhoite. Although I haven't reviewed his report, that's

9

what I understand to be the case.

9

profits, right?

10

A. Yes.

10

11

Q. So ifMRI Center obtains an award of$23 million

11

MR. VERGONIS: Okay. We've been going for just

under an hour. Could we take a short break?

12

and change oflost profits, Calculation Method 1, how would

12

13

they figure out what the revenues were on those profits?

13

MR. WOODARD: Sure. That's fine.

14

A. I don't know exactly what they do, again, as I

14

a.m. We are off the record.

15

haven't studied their documents in that much detail. Ifl

15

(Recess taken.)

16

was to do it, I would basically say these lost profits

16

17

assume so much in revenues on which I would have had to p~y 17

approximately 10:09 a.m. EXAMINATION (Continuing)

18

a seven and a half percent fee, and then by attribution --

18

BY MR. VERGONIS:

19

you know, when -- when the money actually comes in, it wil

19

20

be attributed to the stakeholders of which MRIA is one I

20

21

assume just like in any corporation.

21

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is approximately 9: ~

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the record. The tim i

Q. Okay. Just a couple of administrative things, Mr.

Budge. Can you state your address for the record, please.
A. My home or my work address?

22

Q. Right. Right. That's--

22

Q. Your-- your home address.

23

A. Alternative-- alternatively, if they were to

23

A. 28 Scriver Woods Road, Garden Valley, Idaho 83622.

24

defme the award in this case as revenues, then I would do

24

25

the calculation differently and I would give them seven and

25

Q. And there's a CD ROM or DVD ROM that was part of

the binder of your work papers.

48

46
1

a half percent of the award and then make a deduction frorr

2

these two for that payment and then distribute the rest by

2

A. It's basically the documents that were produced

3

attribution through their ownership percent.

3

that we relied on and used in making the calculations that

4

Q. Distributing profits to equity holders is
different than paying a fee to a management company that

4

appear in Exhibits 1 through 3.

5

5

Q. Okay.

6

also happened to be an equity holder, isn't it?

6

A. And I think there may actually be a copy of my

It~.

7

A.

8

Q. How is it different?

9
10

11

12
13

14
15

A. Well, basically, just formulaically it's

different.

Q. Okay. But in the one hand, it's the return of

1

7

Could you tell us what's on that CD?

report on there too. I'm not sure about that.

8

Q. Okay. Exhibits 1 through 3 of which report?

9

A. I meant deposition exhibit.

10
11

1.1

Q. Okay. Deposition Exhibit I, which are your
reports?

12

A. Yes.

A. Mm-hm. Yes.

13

Q. Let's tum to Deposition Exhibit I, which is the

Q. In the other hand, it's the payment of a fee to an

14

supplemental report of May 2nd, 2011. I want to spend a il

15

little time focusing on your Calculation Method No. 5.

equity to stakeholders?

entity that's performing services for you?

16

A. Right.

16

17

Q. Okay. Generally speaking, putting this aside, if

17

18

you were calculating a company's profits, and the compan'

18

19

pays a fee to a management entity, would you deduct that

e 19

A. Okay.

Q. This is a new calculation method that was not in
your 2007 report; is that correct?
A. Yes. What page does that start on?

20

from the revenues as part of your calculations of the

20

Q. Well, I'm going to start on Page 5.

21

profits?

21

A. Okay.

Q. The last full paragraph describes Calculation

22

A. Yes.

22

23

Q. But you don't do that here?

23

Method 5, so I'm going to ask you some questions about tl1

~

24

A. No, for the reasons I described. I could do it,

24

paragraph, but before I tum to those, what is Calculation

b

25

Method 5 measuring?

P

25

but I didn't do it.
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1

A. It's basically showing what the economic value is

51
1

Q. Okay. Do-- two of those calculation methods, 1

2

under the-- MRIA's theory of the usurped corporate

2

and 2, seek, as damages, all scanned profits, all MRI

3

opportunity. And actually there are several of them and

3

scanned profits received by Meridian and Eagle; is that

t

4

basically calculates what the total amount of profit

4

right? Two of them seek only affiliated Meridian and Ea le

5

involved in those -- all the operations that MRlA asserts

5

referrals?

6

were improperly usurped.

6

~

A. That's correct.

7

Q. You said-- you referred to "all of them."

7

8

A. Meaning Meridian, Downtown, Eagle.

8

interpreting the -- what you calJ the all Meridian and Eag F

9

referrals, Theories 1 and 2 --

9
10
11

Q. Okay. So are you saying there are multiple

10

usurped corporate opportunities?

A. That's my understanding, yes.

11

Q. Okay. Maybe I'm wrong about this, but I was
~

A. Uh-huh.
Q. --as-- as including-- I'm looking at Page 6, at

12

Q. Being measured by Method No.5?

12

13

A. Correct.

13

A. Okay.

14

Q. Let's take a look at that paragraph here.

14

Q. The all Meridian and Eagle referrals is including

your summary table.

15

A. Let me take a moment to read it if--

15

usurpation damages, but the Methods 3 and 4 of affiliate<

16

Q. Okay.

16

Meridian and Eagle referrals is not including usurpation

17

A. -- you don't mind.

17

damages.

18

Q. Yes, please.

18

A. Well, I think that they do include damage that

19

A. (Witness peruses document.)

19

those were usurped. The only thing I'm doing here is

20

20

basically using an analytical method that says had the

21

Okay. I've read it.

Q. Okay. The first sentence says multiple usurped

21

corporate opportunity been given to MRIA --

22

partnership opportunities -- or it says various partnership

22

23

opportunities, which is what you just testified to. Second

23

24

sentence says one of the usurped corporate opportunities wits 2 4

business which those two units did under IMI that they w

25

the opportunity to partner with GSR Radiologists and IMI t 2 5

only able to basically avail themselves of the St. Al's

Q. Mm-hm.
A. --let's assume that instead of doing all of the

52

50
1
2

3
4

the time IMI was formed.
Is Calculation Method 5 trying to measure that one
usurped opportunity to partner with GSR Radiologists?
A. I think that's the primary difference between that

5

and the others, is that Meridian and Eagle were already

6

included in the calculus for Methods 1 through 4.

7

8
9

10
11

1

affiliated networking, and so it's just a lower volume of

2

scans.

3
4

5
6

Q. I see.

A. There's no difference in the theory as to
usurpation between the four of them.

Q. Okay. If we fmd that-- if the-- if the jury

Q. Okay.

7

were to find that the Meridian and Eagle opportunities were

A. But the -- but the method -- but this opportunity

8

not usurped, would the Meridian and Eagle damages fall ou

9

of the equations?

was not, and it is in Method 5.

Q. So Meridian and Eagle are usurped opportunities
that are in the other calculations?

10

A. My -- I haven't thought through it carefully, but

11

my initial reaction would be that they would, but,
ultimately, I think that's what the jury would decide --

12

A. Yes.

12

13

Q. And this Calculation Method 5 is measuring a

13

Q. Right. Right.

14

A. -- not me. And -- but they are based on a theory

14

usurped opportunity to partner at the inception ofiMI?

15

A. Yes.

15

16

Q. Which then, under your assumptions, would have

16

17

18

included the other facilities, Eagle and Meridian?

A. It doesn't change MRI's allegations with respect

that talks about one of the usurped opportunities being the
opportunity to partner with IMI at the time IMI is formed,
you have another sentence that says, "Further, MRIA conten Is

to the other, but -- so they would have all basically been

19

in the MRIA umbrella under Method 5.

20

Q. Okay. You said-- stepping away from Method 5 or 21

22

a moment, you said Methods 1 through 4 all reflect the

22

23

usurped opportunity that there is for Meridian and Eagle;

24

did I hear you correctly?

23
24

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Going back to Method 5, after the sentence

18

20

25

of usurpation.

17

19
21

h

25

that but for the encouragement, direct support, and
affiliation of SARMC, IMI would never have provided MRI
services at any of its locations."

I
I

My question is whether -A. That makes me reconsider my previous answer. It

may be that the attorneys have some theory where the

~
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1

wrongful acts led to a diversion of referrals to these other

1

2

things, so I would just make that qualification.

2

understand that in isolation, but what I don't understand is

3

how the two theories work together.

3
4

5
6

I don't want to be in a position of speaking for
the attorneys their theory, but -- and that -- in that

4

regard.

5

or are you trying to say -- are you trying to make two

6

different assumptions here?

Q. Okay. Fair enough. But the previous answer that

7

you just modified was your answer to the question about

7

8

Methods 1 through 4?

8

9

10
11

12

13

never have provided services at any of its locations. And I ;

A. Yes.

9

Q. Okay. Well, let's step back there to then just to
make sure I'm clear.
Your damages for calculation of Methods I through

A. The first sentence is having to do with the missed
opportunity to partner with GSR.

Q. Mm-hm.

10

A. The second one -- sentence says that there are --

~

11

my understanding is that MRIA alleges that there are othe

f;

12

wrongful acts of the hospital that basically led to IMI

13

providing services in these locations that go beyond the

14

A. Yes.

14

inability to enter into a contract with GSR.

15

Q. And you're assuming, in Methods I through 4, that

15

Q. Okay. That's what I thought you were saying.

Eagle and Meridian were opportunities that should have be n 16

Does Calculation Method 5 purport to measure

16

4 are based on certain assumptions, right?

Are those different ways of saying the same thing

17

presented to MRIA but were not, and that if-- if presented

17

damages for both sets of allegations? You know, let me ta f:e

18

to MRIA, MRIA would have taken advantage ofthose

18

-- strike that question and let me take a step back.

19

opportunities and opened up magnets at those locations an

19

20

performed scans?

20

As I understood your testimony, the two sentences
we've been focused on -- focusing on relate to two

21

A. That's what I'm assuming, yes.

21

different, discrete assumptions. One is that St. Alphonsus

22

Q. Okay. And if we take that assumption out--

22

usurped an opportunity that MRIA would have had to partl tr

23

A. Mm-hm.

23

with GSR and go into business together with them to --to

24

Q. -- are you making any other assumptions that woul<

24

run this IMI business.

25
25
allow Meridian and Eagle to recover to allow Center and
A. Mm-hm.
~
r---------------------------------------+---------------------------------------~

54

56~

1

Mobile to recover for damages performed at Meridian and

1

Q. The second sentence seems to be saying that St.

2

Eagle?

2

Alphonsus took certain actions that facilitated the openin

3

of an IMI business by IMI which, but for St. Alphonsus'

3

A. What I'm saying is that I haven't. If some- -- if

4

there were other assumptions that were provided to me whic

4

5

indicated that there could have been a diversion, I think

5

6

such a calculation could be made, but I haven't made it.

6

7

actions, would not -- would never have provided those M U
services, you say?
A. Right. Those two are mutually exclusive, of

Q. You haven't made that?

7

8

A. Yeah.

8

Q. They're-- they're not.

9

Q. Okay. And, in fact, all Methods 1 through 4

9

A. Yeah.

10

assume that MRI Mobile would have erected physical magn ts 1 0

11

in Meridian and Eagle?

course.

Q. But are you-- is Method 5 purporting to measure :

11

damages -- they're not mutually exclusive, but the jury

A. Yes.

12

could fmd one and not the other?

13

Q. Okay. Jumping back. I'm sorry to jump around on

13

14

you. Back to Method 5 and the paragraph we were looking t

14

Q. You understand that, right?

15

on Page 5, what I'm trying to understand is how the second

15

A. Yes.

16

sentence relates to the first sentence that -- and by first

16

17

and second I mean the first and second sentence that we've

17

12

•

~

A. Mm-hm.

Q. And I'm just wondering, you know, if the jury
finds -- if the jury fmds no usurped partnership

18

been focusing on which are the second and third sentences o

18

opportunity but does fmd that St. Alphonsus -- but does

~

19

the paragraph.

19

find that but for the encouragement, direct support, and

,

20

affiliation of St. Alphonsus, IMI would never have provi

21

MRI services at any of its location?

20

So the second sentence of the paragraph says there

21

was a -- is assuming a usurped opportunity at the time IMI

22

was formed?

22

A. IMI wouldn't have. Is that what you said?

23

A. Correct.

23

24

Q. And I conceptually understand that. The second

24

Q. Yeah. I-A. I think you might have --

25

Q. I might have misspoke, but I meant to be reading

25

sentence says that but for St. Alphonsus' acts, IMI would

14 (Pages 53 to 56)
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1

591

your sentence.

1

~

assumption is reasonable?

2

A. Okay.

2

A. From-- personal opinion in terms of the-- what I

3

Q. So if the jury rejects the usurpation theory,

3

know about the case, and that type of thing, that there are

4

assuming they do, but agrees with MRI's allegations that H 1I

4

substantive allegations that -- that would -- could cause

5

would never have provided MRl services but for St.

5

the jury to come to that conclusion, but I'm not offering
them expert opinion about it.

6

Alphonsus' alleged misconduct, can the jury rely on

6

7

Calculation Method 5 for damages for that theory?

7

Q. You're not offering an opinion. Okay.

8

A. Calculation 5 assumes usurpation, and --

8

A. About--

Q. Okay.

9

10

Q. About whether the assumption is reasonable?

9

10

A. --so I think your question says if the jury found

A. Yes.

11

that there was no usurpation, then they should not use

11

Q. Okay.

12

Calculation 5 --

12

A. They're going to have to basically weigh the

13

Q. Okay.

13

A. -- in my opinion. I mean, there -- there are

14

14

evidence and decide that on their own.

Q. So it's irrelevant to your job, as you see it

15

other wrongful acts which clearly -- that are being alleged

15

here, whether the assumptions you're relying upon are

16

which clearly could have caused a diversion of referrals.

16

reasonable or unreasonable?

17

Q. I understand that.

17

A. Well, depends on which assumptions. I mean, I'm

18

A. But Calculation No. 5 assumes that the downtown

18

- I'm -- I'm modelling basically what I think the pattern of

19

referrals and scans would have been, and all the assumptio

Q. Okay.

20

that -- that go in to what I do in terms of developing a

A. And if that doesn't happen, I'm not aware of any

21

19

location ofiMI and MRIA's participation was usurped.

20
21

22

logical reason we had to calculate damages so that they ha e 2 2

23

a portion of those.
Q. Okay. So if the jury fmd that MRl --that IMI

24
25

model which is responsive to the allegations, that type of
against the hospital are proven or not, I have not weighed

24

m.

1

60;

but for the conduct of St. Alphonsus --

3
4

I don't have an opinion about...

1

A

A. Let me think about that carefully.

2

Q. So you have no opinion --no expert opinion on

Q. --it shouldn't use Method No. 5 if that's all it

3

whether IMI would have opened and no expert on whether thf $::

4

was a usurpation?

wants?

5

A

6

Q. No expert opinion.

5

A. Hm. That's an interesting question because if

6

they never did, then I guess the question, as asked, is then

7

would MRIA have been free to go forward with the plans tl ~y

7

A

8

were interested in opening Meridian, opening Eagle, possib ~

8

Q. Did you do any -- I think my questions were

9

10

other locations. And so, actually, it might have an

9

applicability in that sense.

Q. Okay. Is it your opinion that IMI would never

11

No expert opinion.
Yeah.

focusing on the IMI would never have provided MRI services N

10

theory. I think your answers are going to be the same, but

11

just for completeness I'm going to ask you the same set of

12

have provided MRl services but for the acts of St.

12

questions with respect to the usurpation theory that's in

13

Alphonsus?

13

this paragraph.

14

14

A

15

know, guilt and innocent and that sort of thing, so I don't

15

Q. You're assuming a usurped opportunity to partner

16

have an opinion on it.

A. I don't weigh in on those issues in terms of, you

16

with GSR, a usurped opportunity by MRIA to partner with

Q. Just an assumption?

17

What is the basis for that assumption?

18

A. Yes.

18

A

19

Q. What is the basis for the assumption?

19

be shown at trial that this was wrongfully interfered with

A. My instruction in my assigmnent.

20

or usurped.

Q. Did you do any independent assessment of the

21

23
24

22

facts?

23

A. I don't. As an expert witness, I think that's
outside my proper role. I did not.

25

24

Q. Okay. So do you have an opinion whether the
·····"-"•

25
-~·

''"

~

m ·~

An instruction given to me to assume that it will

20

22

f*

Mm-hm.

17

21

..

Q. Okay.

58
2

11>

thing, I have evaluated. Whether or not MRI's allegations .

23

would never have provided MRl service at any of its locati n 2 5

4

Q. Okay. And did you do any independent assessment

of the facts of the record as relates to that theory?

A

Well, I didn't from the standpoint of trying to

form an opinion on the merits ofMRIA's allegations.
Q. Do you have an opinion --do you have an expert

,-'
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61
1
2

3

opinion whether the assumption is reasonable?

1

A. I basically understood that no one was asking for
my opinion on that --

been under that umbrella, if you're asking me was it a

2

proper measurement of damages with respect to the various

3

stakeholders' --

4

Q. Okay.

4

Q. Mm-hm.

5

A. -- so I didn't undertake to do that.

5

A. -- allegation, I would probably have a different

6

Q. So the answer is no, you don't?

6

7

A. Yeah, I think that's right.

7

Q. Okay. Under your assumption, when did this

8

question? Is that a proper measure of damages to the

9

various stakeholders in this litigation?

8
9

usurpation occur?

answer.
Q. What's your -- what's your answer to that

I

10

A. When did my instruction occur or when did the --

10

A. Then I think that there would be an additional

11

Q. No.

11

analysis that needs to look at their ownership interest and

12

A. -- actual usurpation --

12

percentages so that you could-- and those calculations

13

Q. When are you assuming the usurpation occurred?

13

could be done with this as a starting point.

14

A. At the beginning of the formation ofiMI.

14

Q. Okay. The ownership in-- so this amount, 52

15

Q. Okay. Do you know what-- do you know when that

15

million and change, relates to a hypothetical partnership

16

between MRIA or one of its entities and GSR --

16

was?

17

A. Sometime in '99.

17

MR. WOODARD: Objection; misstates --

18

Q. Okay. Yousaythatoneoftheusurped

18

CONTINUING BY MR. VERGONIS:

Q. -- is that -- is that correct?
MR. WOODARD: --prior testimony.

19

opportunities -- you -- you write in your report that the

19

20

usurped opportunity that Method 5 is measuring was the

20

21

opportunity to partner with GSR Radiologists and

22

Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLP, IMI, at the time IMI

23

formed?

24
25

21
as 22

1

I'

THE COURT REPORTER: Misstates what?

23

A. It basically -- I don't know the exact form that

A. Yes.

24

MRIA's alleging, but, yes, it basically assumes that these

Q. What is the nature of the partnership that you are

25

scans that occurred downtown would have been in a new MR [A

assuming would have existed?
A. Well, I don't think I need to make an assumption

64
1

entity which includes those locations.

2

BY MR. VERGONIS:

about the exact nature of the partnership, but I assume

3

4

that, basically, MRIA would have partnered with them in--

4

5

in some sense so that it participated in -- in -- so that

5

would have had different stakeholders than the ones that we

6

these scans were basically performed under the MRIA

6

fmd today.

7

umbrella.

7

Q. Right. Including GSR --

8

A. Yes.

9

Q. Okay. Rather than under an IMI umbrella?
A. Yeah. Although by attribution it-- you know, it

9

A. And it wouldn't -- it potentially and probably

could take a number of corporate forms. It doesn't really

10

11

matter to me, but...

11

Q. So what would we have to do if we were trying to

12

fmd out how much of the $52 million would have been own

13

by the stakeholders that are -- that currently constitute
MRIA?

13

Q. Okay. Does it matter to the amount of damages

that you're claiming?

A. Yes.

14

A. Well, I guess it depends on what sense you're --

14

15

what question you're trying to answer with my calculations.

15

A. If somebody -- I've looked at this in terms of

16

actually who the parties are in the litigation, but if you -

16
17

If you want to know what is the total value of the
effect of these alleged wrongful acts and the usurpation --

18

Q. Mm-hm.

18

Q. Mm-hm.

A. -- then the amount that I've quantified will be a

19

A. -- wanted to go one step down and look at the

20

good -- is a reliable indication to the jury of just how big

20

stakeholders, you would basically have to take the

21

these -- these opportunities were. How much money we're

21

respective ownership interest and, by attribution, basically

22

talking about.

22

step it into down into how much they would end up with.

23

Q. Yeah. You know, I'm not --I'm not so concerned

If you're talking on the other hand, and this is

r
'
~

17

19

23

f]

Q. -- as a stakeholder?

10

12

~

Q. And includes GSR as a partner?

3

8

I

MR. WOODARD: Prior testimony.

62
2

~

24

the amount that would have accrued under my understanding pf 2 4

with the stakeholders -- with each limited partner. Let me

25

the MRI's theory to the MRI entity because it would have

take a -- with each limited partner. I'm concerned with

25
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67

1

trying to find out. I mean, you're envisioning a

1

2

hypothetical partnership between the MRIA entities and GS

2

3
4

A. Not -- yeah. I don't mean to say it would take a
legal form of a partnership --

the calculation.

"

Q. Okay. Assuming the hypothetical partnership would

3

have been 50/50, would Dr. McCarthy's approach be the

4

correct one to take?

5

Q. Yeah.

5

6

A. -- as opposed to corporation, but some type of

6

keeping in mind that I haven't done that, there are issues

7

about that MRIA only has 30 percent interest in the

7

joining of-- of business interests, yes.

A. I haven't looked at it closely, but this -- so
:

8

Q. Some type of joining of business interests--

8

operating entities, so I'm assuming GSR would have half of

9

A. Yes.

9

30 percent of the interest in the operating entities. I

10

Q. --where some portion of the business interests

10

11

are owned by MRIA and some portion of the business intere ts 11

12

are owned by GSR?

12

13

A. Right.

13

14

Q. And if we're trying to deter--- I'm just trying

14

15

to figure out if we're trying to determine how much of the

15

16

business interests -- or if I'm trying to determine how much

16

17

of the total damages go to that part of the business

17

18

interest owned by MRIA, the plaintiff in this case, then how

18

don't know whether this contemplated they would have an
interest in the operating entities directly -Q. Okay.

A. -- GSR. So all of those factors would have to be
specified to me before I could do that.

Q. Okay. Under your assumption, which entity would
have partnered with the GSR Radiologists?
A. I don't think that's important to my calculation.
I haven't made an assumption about that.

Q. Are you assuming that this hypothetical entity,

19

much of that business interest-- how much of those damage:

19

20

go to the business interest owned by GSR. I'm trying to

20

the joint-- I'll call it a joint venture because I -- and

21

figure out how would we do that.

21

by that I mean we're not -- we're not assuming any

22
23

A. You basically would need to make assumptions as to
what their respective percentages were.

22

particular corporate form but some sort of joint venture

23

between GSR and MRIA. Do you assume that this joint vent rre
would have expanded into Meridian and Eagle?

24

Q. Okay.

24

25

A. And to basically then go ahead and do the

25

A. Yes, I believe so.

66
1
2

distribution of profits to the various entities.
Mr. McCarthy -- or perhaps it's Dr.?

68
1

Q. And what's the basis for that assumption?

2

A. I don't know. Till you posed the question, I

3

Q. Dr. McCarthy.

3

hadn't thought about it explicitly. But I guess it isn't

4

A. Dr. McCarthy, you know, proposes a calculation

4

actually a necessary assumption that -- that they would have

which I haven't -- I'm not endorsing his specific

5

included them all. They certainly could have. And that

calculation, but if the question posed to me --

6

would have to be specified to me before making the
calculations we referred to a minute ago --

5

6
7

Q. Mm-hrn.

7

8

A. -- is how do the -- how under that scenario would

8

Q. Mm-hrn.

9

A. -- as to which entities actually GSR did have an

9

a particular stakeholder group come out, I conceptually

10

agree with him for the need for a calculation. He

10

11

basically, I think, advocates that this number would be

11

Q. Okay.

about half of what it is.

12

A. I don't know why I assumed that would be the case.

12
13

Q. Mm-hrn.

13

14

A. And I'm not in a position to say that I agree

14

15

completely with him or disagree --

interest in.

That might be wrong on my part.

Q. Okay. If the joint venture did not go into Eagle

15

and Meridian, would we have to deduct the Eagle and Meridi ~
part of the damages?

16

Q. Okay.

16

17

A. -- with the calculations, but I -- if that's the

17

A. Well, under the usurpation theory I would think

18

purpose for which Calculation Method 5 is used, then I thi k 18

not. I think that the -- that the MRIA is advocating that

19

that there's a valid point that needs to be pursued.

20

Q. Okay. Do you think it's reasonable to believe

19

if St. Alphonsus had been a loyal partner and had acted

20

properly that those would have been in the MRIA umbrella. :

21

that the hypothetical partnership would have been roughly

21

And they may believe -- and this is where I don't want to

22

50150?

22

speak for MRIA --that that could have occurred

23

A. That's what I don't know. I would --

23

independently of the GSR negotiations and whether or not

24

Q. Okay.

24

they were included in those entities.

25

A. -- need to be given that assumption in order to do

25

Q. Okay.
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1
2

A. I haven't made an assumption about it -- that

11
1

affects the calculations.

2

3

Q. Okay. Now, you said we could use Calculation

Do you have a personal opinion on whether MRIA

3

would have performed all of the scans that IMI performe 'if

4

Method 5 to measure damages under the theory that but fo

4

IMI never existed including the scans of the nonaffiliated

5

St. Alphonsus' alleged wrongdoing, IMI would never have

5

physicians?

6

opened?

6

7

A.

8
9

Y~.

enough to really have a sense either way on that question I

Q. Does that mean you're assuming that ifiMI had

8

feel pretty neutral about that.

never opened, MRIA or one of its operating entities would

9

have performed all the scans that IMI performed over the

10

11

years?

11

13

~

A. I haven't gotten into the underlying evidence

7

10
12

I

opinion earlier.

A. Well, that is the assumption that is made from a

calculation standpoint.

Q. Your Methods I through 4 assume that would not be
the case; is that correct?
A. Yes. Not be the -- let's just make sure we're

12

talking about what I think we are. We're talking about th

13

scans that occurred at IMI that have nothing to do with tl:
affiliate -- the base of affiliated physicians.

14

Q. ForMethod5?

14

15

A. Yeah. I understand that the truth of that

15

Q. Correct.

~

l

16

assumption could be tested and argued about and everythin 5 , 16

A. Yeah.

17

but that is the assumption that is made by Method 5 that a!

17

Q. That's what I'm talking about.

18

of the scans, even for non-affiliated services, that MRIA

18

A. Okay. Yeah. So I answered correctly.

19

would have filled that void --

19

Q. Okay. And the correct answer was Methods I

20

Q. Okay.

20

through 4 assume that MRI would not have performed th se

21

A. -- under that particular theory that it never

21

scans--

22

opened.

22

A. Yes.

23

Q. Okay.

23

Q. --the nonaffiliated scans?

24

A. I understand that that's subject to examination,

24

A. That's correct.

25

Q. Putting aside some differences for Meridian and

25

but that's the assumption I made.

70
1

Q. Okay. Do you have an opinion on that assumption?

1

2

A. No. That gets into the causation and evidence --

2

Eagle?
A. Yeah, but we weren't talking about --

3

evidentiary matters I think that are going to be put for the

3

Q. Yeah.

4

jury--

4

A. --Meridian and Eagle. We were talking about

5

Q. Okay.

5

6

A. -- aren't properly put before me.

6

7

Q. What should the jury look for in trying to

7

8

determine whether all of the scans that IMI performed woul(

8

9

have been performed by MRIA if St. Alphonsus had prevent d

9

10

IMI --if St.-- if-- if St. Alphonsus caused IMI to open?

downtown.
Q. Okay. Yeah. That's-- that's really what I was

focusing on.
A. Yeah.
Q. Downtown. Okay. Do you have any opinion whethe ·

10

the assumption made in Calculation Methods I through 4 ab( ~t

11

the downtown scans is more or less reasonable than the

i;'

12

testified he's not providing expert testimony in that area.

12

assumption made in Calculation Method 5 about the downto

[n

13

I'm not instructing him not answer.

13

scans?

11

14

MR. WOODARD: I'm going to object. He just

A. Yeah. I -- I just was going to say that I don't

14

A. Well, I'm aware of the course of conduct that's

15

really know how to answer the question. I would-- I would

15

16

encourage them to look at the evidence, but I -- I'm not in

16

Q. Mm-hm.

17

a position to be an advisor to them as to what they need to

17

A. -- during the course of the prior proceeding, and

18

look at.

18

in the last few months I've been exposed to some of the

19

BY MR. VERGONIS:

19

evidence. And I suppose -- I think that MRIA's allegations

~

20

are plausible. And I think, just as a layperson, that --

R

21

that many of them are persuasive --

20
21
22
23
24

25

Q. Okay. Do you have any idea what sort of evidence
they would look at?
A. I'd just be guessing about something that's really
not my business, so, no.

Q. Okay. I know you're not offering an expert
opinion on it, but do you have-- you offered your personal

being alleged in the --

22

Q. Mm-hm.

23

A. -- but I don't view it as my job as to basically

24

weigh in on that. I'm an accountant. I'm supposed -- and

25

my job is-- you know, they-- they're going to advance

. .

......

!!

~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~--~----~~----~~~~.~~~00~~-~~~~~~~.~,.~.~0~~~~.~
~.-~.~.~~~~.-~~~~~.~,,,----J
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1
2

75

certain theories and evidence, and they need somebody to

1

quantify the dollar impact of those if they prevail --

2

the-MR. VERGONIS: Yeah. I know, Wade. And--

3

Q. Okay.

3

MR. WOODARD: -- first deposition.

4

4

MR. VERGONIS: -- what I'm trying -- what I'm

5

A -- and that's what I think my job is.
Q. You're not offering any opinion on which scans

5

trying -- if you -- I -- what I'm trying to get at, though,

6

would have gone to MRIA but for the alleged bad acts?

6

is this Calculation Method 5.

Well, I'm not sure I like the way that question is

7

7

A

MR. WOODARD: Okay. Let's tie it in--

8

formed. I'm -- I am -- I do have an opinion about my -- m\

8

MR. VERGONIS: Okay.

9

-- the methodology I selected.

9

MR. WOODARD: -- otherwise I'm going to -- becat

10
11

Q. Mm-hm.

10

A. And I believe that it's accurate. And I -- and

11

12

the question of what were the diversions of scans from MR A 12

13

to IMI --

MR. VERGONIS: Okay.
MR. WOODARD: That foundation's already been

13

established. I know it's kind of odd in a new deposition,
but that foundation has been covered.

14

Q. Mm-hm.

14

15

A

-- is something I have a high degree of conviction

15

16

is accurate. But whether those are the result of wrongful

16

17

acts is something that I'm not weighing in on.

MR. VERGONIS: Right. Right. I just -- I just-I'm trying to make sure we're on the same page here before

17

ask my questions about No. 5. I understand. I will-- as

18

Q. Okay. I think I understand you to be drawing a

18

we talked about the other day, I disagree with your premise

19

distinction between the diversion of business and the cause

19

but I'm going to try to stick to new material.

20

ofthe diversion?

20

MR. WOODARD: Okay.

21

MR. VERGONIS: Can the --just to get my bearings

21

A

22

Q. So you have an opinion of whether MRIA lost

23

That's correct.

business to IMI?

24

A

25

Q. Okay. Is your opinion that MR.--- is your opinion

Yes.

22

can the reporter please read back the last question and

23

answer?

24
25

portion.)

76

1

that the lost business for the loss to the downtown locatio

1

2

ofiMI includes every scan ever performed at the IMI

2

3

downtown location?

3

5
6

7

A. Depends under which ofthe five methods.

4

Q. Okay. I thought you said you had an opinion on

5

6

it.
A. Oh, I have an -- an opinion under Methods I

8

through 4 about what the quantification of diverted scans

9

were.

Q. Okay.

11

A. And -- and to the extent that those are included

12

in 5 for the affiliated physician --

Q. In other words, your-- your expert opinion is
that those scans were diverted from MRIA to IMI?

A That's correct. That's exactly what I'm trying to
measure. Excuse me.
That's correct [sic], what I'm trying to measure
precisely.

7
8
9

10

10

(Whereupon the readback concluded.)
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Okay. And the "those scans" in that question were

the affiliated physician scans, right?

11

A

12

Q. Okay.

That's my recollection --

13

Q. Mm-hm.

13

A

14

A. -- group, I do have an affirmative opinion about

14

Q. That's fine.

15

that, yes.

16

Q. What's that opinion?

17

A. It's reflected in the numbers that are in my

18
19
20

report.

Q. In other words, your-- your expert opinion is
that those scans were diverted from MRIA to IMI?

-- though I'm not really quite --

15

A

16

Q. We might have to go back and read further.

17

-- sure at this point.

Okay. So I'm trying to compare your opinion in

18

Calculation Methods 1 through 4 that the affiliated scans

19

were diverted from MRlA to IMI with the assumption in

20

Calculation Method No. 5 that all scans in Downtown IMI w te
diverted from MRIA to IMI.

21

A. That's what I'm trying to measure --

21

22

Q. Okay.

22

A

23

A. --precisely.

23

Q. Do you see any inconsistency between your opinion

MR. WOODARD: And, Chris, I mean, this truly i a 2 4

in Calculation Methods 1 through 4 and your assumption in

24
25

topic that was covered ad nauseam in the first trial and in

~

(The following encompasses the entire readback

74

4

~

I--

25

Mm-hm.

Calculation Method 5?
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1

A. Well, they are not the same assumption.

79
1

A. Mm-hm.
Q. --model damages. I'm trying to-- just trying to

Calculation Method 5 is based on a usurpation argument w d,

2

3

in which case, MRI would be a-- you know, a participant ·

3

-- and I think I got your answer. You're assuming that if

4

the downtown location. And I'm saying that MRIA may al o

4

IMI would never have opened, that MRI would have performe

5

have theories that if IMI was never formed --

5

all of the affiliated scans.

2

6

Q. Mm-hm.

6

A. Yes.

7

A. -- that -- that this -- these market -- this

7

Q. You're-- you're not only assuming that, you're

8

section of the market that IMI did is outside the affiliated

8

9

group might have accrued to MRIA.

9

10

10

I'm not aware of that. I'm certainly not offering

opining that that would have happened?
A. Yes.

Q But you're not opining that IMI would have
performed the nonaffiliated scans.

11

an opinion of the reasonableness of that. If they have such

11

12

--if they can demonstrate that through the evidence as

12

A. Well--

13

being a reasonable assumption, then this would be a useful

13

Q. I'm sorry. That MRIA would not have performed the

14

measurement for the jury. But I'm -- I don't know whether

14

15

can do that or not. I don't know whether they are going to

15

16

try to advance that argument independently from the

16

17

usurpation. I just don't know --

17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. Okay.

18

A. -- what their plan is.

19

Q. So you're-- okay. And you're not offering an
opinion on that?

A. That MRIA would have or not have?
Q. I misspoke. Let me take the whole thing from the

top.
MR. WOODARD: You know, Chris, could we just go
off the record real quick?

20

MR. VERGONIS: Sure.

21

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is approximately 10

22

A. On what their plan is?

nonaffiliated scans.

23

(Pause in the proceedings.)

-- you're not offering an opinion on the universe of scans

24

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're back on the record. Th

diverted from MRIA to IMI for Calculation Method 5?

25

Q. No. On the reasonableness -- or on the number of

time is approximately 10:50 a.m.

80 tt

78
1

A. I am offering an opinion with respect to the

1

Go ahead.
BY MR. VERGONIS:

2

affiliated ones. What -- what I'm aware of is that there i

2

3

another section of scans that don't relate to affiliated

3

4

ones. I believe that those rely on the usurpation --

4

5
6

7

Q. Okay.
A. -- argument in order to prevail. I'm saying I
don't know, but there may be other arguments.

;o

a.m. We're off the record.

5

I

Q. Okay. Let's -- let me try to rephrase my question

better, Mr. Budge.
Am I correct in my understanding that you have an

6

opinion as to Calculation Method No.5 that IMI --that MRI

7

would have performed the affiliated physician scans had IMI

~

8

Q. Okay. And I'm-- and I'm trying here to focus on

8

never opened, but you do not have an opinion that MRIA wo !d

9

other arguments because as we discussed, there seem to e

9

have performed the nonaffiliated scans had IMI never opene< ·

10

two arguments -- two different assumptions built into yo r 1 0

11

model.

A. That's not how I would articulate it. What I

11

would say is that I have done a calculation and I have an
opinion that is accurate that if there is a theory which

12

A. Right.

12

13

Q. We determined they're not mutually exclusive--

13

succeeds that there was -- we're not talking about

14

A. Right.

14

usurpation right now, right?

15

Q. Right.

16

the usurpation model, the theory is MRI should get

16

A. -- that IMI never opened --

17

everything.

17

Q. Mm-hm.

18

A. --that ifMRIA and its counsel through the

15

18
19
20

Q. -- but they're different. And I understand how

A. Mm-hm.

Q. Or at least its portion of everything with -- with
the partner in this joint venture --

19

evidence can give evidence that, had that not happened,

20

these other scans from nonaffiliated groups would have gone

21

A. Yeah.

21

to MRIA, my calculation measures that. I have no opinion o

22

Q. -- and its portion pulled out, correct?

22

whether that's a good assumption.

23

A. Right.

23

Q. But putting aside the usurpation model, the IMI

24

24
25

would never have opened --

25

Q. Okay. But you do have an opinion as to the

affiliated's case?
A. Yeah. The affiliates is something that is -- is

20 (Pages 77 to SO)
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1

1

something that I just-- I designed the methodology.

A. -- what's the measure of damages.

2

Q. Mm-hm.

2

3

A. I believe that it's going to result in responsive

3

you're not opining that St. Alphonsus caused any of the--

4

measurement. And I think it's accurate. And I do think

4

of the diversions, you're just assuming that St. Alphonsus

5

that it shows what the diversion was.

5

caused them, correct?

Q. Right. You're not-- you're not assuming--

6

Q. Okay.

6

A. I'm instructed to assume that, yes.

7

A. For the affiliated.

7

Q. But you are opining that the diversions were

Q. Right. Why don't you have an opinion as to the

8

8
9

10

11

other scans, the nonaffiliated scans?

9

A. Well, I don't-- I haven't studied those scans in
the same -- with the same amount of data and the

10

caused-A. That they occurred.
Q. That the diversions occurred?

11

A. Yes.

12

Q. Okay. In other words, that IMI --that MRIA would '

12

completeness of data that was possible for the affiliateds

13

and I don't feel comfortable extending my opinion to the ln.. 13

14

Q. Okay.

14

15

A. My opin- -- not my opinion as to the

15

have gotten this business ifiMI wasn't there?
A. Under one of the -- I mean, there are other
wrongful acts which cause diversions besides -- doesn't rely

16

quantification but as to the causation of why they might e 16

on IMI not being there, but, yes, if I -- if I understand

17

-- have been performed by MRIA.

what you're asking me.

18
19
20

17

Q. But-- but isn't it also your opinion as to the

18

quantification of them?

19

A. That's what is included in my opinion, is if it is

20

Q. I'm going to ask you about some changes in
assumptions between your 2007 and 2011 report.
On Page 6 of your 2011 report, you write, under

true, that if IMI hadn't opened, MRIA would have done pe 2 1

"Summary of Updated Opinions," "For purposes of my analy 1s,

22

scans for nonaffiliated physicians, I have -- my opinion i

22

I have assumed that SARMC will be found liable for the

23

I've accurately quantified --

23

allegations made by MRIA. "To the extent all or some of the
allegations are dismissed, my damages calculations may be
revised."

21

24

Q. Okay.

24

25

A. --what the economic effect of that is.

25

84

82
1

Q. Okay. But earlier we said as to the-- earlier we

1

2

broke out on Model 1 through 4, we said there was a quest pn 2

3

about -- two separate questions. One about whether the

4

scans were diverted and a second question about whether d e

4

5

diversions were caused by St. Al's. Do you recall --

5

3

Do you see that?

I

A. Yes.

Q. Do the wrongful acts that you're assuming SA.RM ~

will be found liable for include wrongful dissociation?

A. No.

6

A. Sort of, yeah.

6

Q. Do they include an ongoing obligation not to

7

Q. --breaking that down?

7

compete with MRIA extending through the present day?

8

A. Yeah.

8

9

Q. And you said --you were offering your opinion

9

17

A. No.
Q. Why don't they?
A. Because it's my understanding that there's been
adjudication of that issue and that the dissociation was n< ;
wrongful.
Q. Okay. Is it also your understanding that it
follows from the dissociation not being wrongful that St.
Alphonsus has a right to compete with MRIA after a cert •n
date?
A. Again, without trying to commit either parties to

Q. Mm.

18

their positions, that is my understanding, is that they

A. My assigmnent is to measure what that diversion

19

basically had to withhold participation for a year after

20

their dissociation.

10

that the scans were diverted from one business to another,

10

11

but you were not offering an opinion that the scans were

11

12

caused by--

12

13

A. I know what the--

14

Q. -- St. Al's conduct?

14

15

A. I know what the allegations were. I've been told

15

16

to assume that the allegations that the jury will find that

16

17

wrongful conduct by St. Al's caused a diversion of scans.

18
19
20

was.

13

Q. Right.

21

22

A. And my opinion extends only to that assigmnent as

22

that St. Al's could compete after that year expired?

23
24

this wrongful course of conduct not occurred --

25

-- as a -- you know, assuming that those things are in
evidence-Q. Right.

25

B

Q. So all your opinions are based on the assumption •

21

23
24

'

A. Right. They in fact assume that, you know, had
Q. Mm-hm.

21 (Pages 81 to 84)
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1

A. -- and that the corporate opportunities weren't

A. Well, I think that-- you know, if you look at the

usurped and that there wasn't a deliberate attempt to divert

2

3

scans from MRIA to IMI, which is alleged -- I'm not saying

3

4

that to be the case -- that my model in the later years

4

5

presumes that everybody would have been a happy family a d

5

A. -- you know, basically it could be characterized

6

that St. Alphonsus would not have had a reason to

6

as a business that had been strongly growing, benefitting, I

7

disassociate, but it doesn't assume that they couldn't have

7

believe, through -- by its status as a provider within the

8

disassociated at any time and honored that noncompete.

8

St. Al's network. And when that disassociation occurs,

9

those affiliations don't --you know, referral patterns

2

9

So, for example, if-- if you go through the

actual data in terms of what happened to the MRIA business Q. Mrn-hrn.

10

allegations which MRI intends to offer so that they actually

10

don't just change immediately. It takes time for them to

11

become, you know, the first arrivers in Meridian, that

11

do, but I don't know --but you'll see that over a period of

12

they're not undermined in the practice of their center so

12

one or two years basically the referrals dry up.

13

that their scans are not diverted, that there isn't

13

Q. Hm.

14

accommodation with GSR so that all of these things occur,

14

A. And I'm saying that if-- if you have wrongful

'

15

don't see any reason to interpose an assumption at some

15

conduct through a certain date, and -- and then there's no

16

future date, in '07 or '8 or '9, that St. Alphonsus

16

more conduct after that, you don't just truncate the damages r,

17

withdraws, but if there was a reason that that might be the

17

through the date that the conduct stopped. You basically

18

case, I provided the details of my analysis so that you can

18

look at the impacts of the conduct.

19

go in and say, okay, let's just assume that St. Al's decides

19

Q. Okay.

20

to dissociate -- in '08?

20

A. And -- and so in the case where -- let's say for

21

Q. Mrn-hrn.

21

22

A. And I think you can use the data I have to kind of

22

look at what the glide path is going to be in terms of the

23

24

decline in referrals from the -- because affiliation is

24

25

important in my opinion. And so that -- so my calculations

25

23

,

some reason you're looking at my Method No. I, and you sa:
Q. Mrn-hrn.
A. --well, we have evidence that even if these

opportunities have not been usurped and all this occurred in ..

88

86
1

are all useful. So I don't want to be misunderstood that

1

2008, St. Al's would have dissociated. Then what you cou lJ.

2

I'm saying that St. Al's couldn't have dissociated at any

2

do at that point of time is you could look at my but-for

3

time. I'm just saying that they assume that they wouldn't

3

line in terms of what scans would--

4

have. And I think that that's a rebuttable assumption. An -1

4

Q. Mrn-hrn.

5

if-- if it was rebutted, I could alter the calculations.

5

A. -- have been --

6

Q. And are we talking about Method 5 here?

6

Q. Mrn-hrn.

7

A. All methods.

7

A. -- and then you would pause it in decline in those

Q. Okay. So all five of your methods assume that St

8

scans as a result of dissociation, and damages then would t I?

9

the difference between that but-for line and the actual

8
9

10

Alphonsus -- the bottom line numbers assume that St.
Alphonsus would not have dissociated?

10

scans--

11

A. That in likelihood would not have dissociated.

11

Q. Okay.

12

But, you know, I'm open to evidence and that type of thin

12

A. --instead of the original one.

13

And if it were found by the jury or -- that dissociation wa

13

14

likely at some particular --

14

Q. Okay. I understand. So that's an analysis that
could be done?

15

Q. Mrn-hrn.

15

A. And I actually think that it could be done in an

16

A. -- date, they could still use my calculations in

16

approximate way, but-- by the jury looking at my data by

17

order to quantifY the wrongful behavior -- the effects of

17

year. If you would give them a particular year to assume

18

the wrongful behavior through that date and kind of throu gh 18

dissociation, they can see that what the pattern of-- and -

19

the tail period where that wrongful behavior finishes

19

- you know, and some way they could decide, well, maybe

20

manifesting itself.

20

we'll give them, you know, three-quarters of year one

i~l

I

after~

21

Q. Okay. I want to --I want to talk a little more

21

dissociation and one-quarter of year two, or something like·.

22

about that because I don't fully understand it, but I think

22

that.

23

I -- I think I see what you're saying.

23

24
25

So you said the -- what -- what is the tail
period?

24
25

Q. Okay. How's the jury to know what percentages to
use?
A. Well, they just look at, basically, the pattern of

22 (Pages 85 to 88)
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how the-- what the attrition was in terms of referrals

1

ability in terms of assessing damages and testimony to try

2

after dissociation. We have hard data on that. We can show

2

to come at equitable result and they can kind of see how

3

them how the scans went down.

3

much asso- -- damages associated with those years. They c

4

understand that -- that some of those losses are now from
causes that aren't being accused.

4

Q. Okay. So that's not-- this-- this tail analysis

1

f

5

is not something you've performed in your tables?

5

6

A. It's -- it's not in here. I really -- you know,

6

Q. Right.

if somebody gave me assumptions, I could do an analysis

7

A. And they can make some decision as to how much< If

8

fairly readily, but I believe that MRIA's assumption is that

8

them has to do with the bad conduct as opposed to just

9

had these course of conducts not occurred that there would

9

dissociation itself

7

Q. Can you give-- you said the numbers you gave

10

have been a state of affairs where St. Al's had-- had

10

11

little reason to want to dissociate. And so that -- and the

11

12

model assumes that they would have continued to be in this

12

13

- in association. That certainly doesn't assume that they

13

as to how they ought -- as to how they ought to quantify

14

had to legally.

14

this tailing off of damages?

15

Q. Right. Whatifwe--whatifwechangethe

15

before were for illustrative purposes.
Can you -- can you give any assistance to the jury

A. Well, I think I could tell -- basically I think

assumption and assume that even in the but-for world, St.

16

17

Alphonsus would have dissociated on April 1st, 2004 and

17

18

would have been free to compete on April 1st, 2005? Can y u 18

need to lower that but-for line for the decline in scans

19

tell me, sitting here today, how your numbers would be

19

that happens after --

20

affected by the change in assumption?

20

Q. Mm-hm.

21

A. -- dissociation, and then take that amount and

16

21
22

A. Well, I would not truncate the damages at the date
that their noncompete expired.

22

23

Q. Okay.

23

24

A. I would basically --you know, assuming that this

24

25

wrongful conduct --you know, it affects MRIA's business

25

the biggest difference is that the but-for line would be the
same through the end of the date, and then that they would

reduce my damages for it.
Q. How quickly would the line lower?
A. Well, it's-- I haven't studied that exactly. It
appears to me that, if you look at Page 8, for example --

90

92

1

going on into the future. I would basically try to -- and

2

so under the wrongful conduct, I'm basically positing a 1: 11t- 2

1

Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- and we have disassociation occurring in that

3

for line as to what would happen to their scans. Then if

3

4

you tell me that there was a-- a dissociation which was

4

5

proper--

5

A. -- in at about 12 months later appears to -- I

6

don't believe that it did, but it sort of seems to coincide
with IMI opening on SARMC campus --

6

Q. Mm-hm.

one vertical line in -Q. Yep.

7

A. -- I would basically look at what the attrition

7

8

period was that -- that -- that MRI would lose because o

8

Q. Mm ..hm.

9

lack of affiliation.

9

A. -- so -- and during that interim -- I don't think

10
11

12

Q. Right.

10

this is the case -- but SARMC was under a duty not to

A. Calculate a new but-for line, compare it to their

11

compete and to support a comp~titor. They did that. Th

12

affected the amount of scans that occurred during that
period. But after that one year is completed --

actuals, and compute the damages that way.

13

Q. Can you do that right now?

13

14

A. No. It's too--

14

15

Q. Too complicated?

15

16

A. -- complicated to do it right now.

16

17

Q. Okay. Would it-- you said before it would mayt e 17

18
19

20

m

be three-quarters of the damages for the -A. Yeah. I didn't mean to actually hang a number o
any of those. That was for illustration purposes--

18
19

20

Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- you can see what happens when there's no long r
an affiliation. They go from over 6,500 scans down a lev I,
you know, below 2,000 within one, two, three years.
Q. Mm-hm.

•

A. And so that's the approximate pattern that I would~
-- you know, the -- the referral pattern doesn't shift

21

Q. Okay.

21

instantly, but ultimately it does, like when there's not an

22

A. --only. Yeah.

22

affiliation because the affiliations are very important in

23

Q. Is this something the jury could do?

23

the pattern of referrals in my opinion.

24

A. Well, I -- I don't think that they could do it

24

Q. Okay.

25

A. So I would probably take a line that starts where

25

with absolute precision. I think that the juries have the

I
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1

this -- I'm looking at Chart I.

95
MR. VERGONIS: Okay.

1

2

Q. Mm-hm.

2

3

A. It starts with the end of the one-year period.

3

4

Q. Okay.

4

Q. Goahead.

5

A. And then probably mimic a decline down after that.

5

A. I made the mistake in drawing this chart to assum

6

Q. Okay.

6

7

A. Down on a similar pattern.

7

8

Q. Could you draw that?

8

9

A. It's going to be very approximate, but I could,

9

10

11
12

yeah.

10

Q. Okay. Here's a pen.

11

A. (Witness complies.) So you'd have something like

12

13

this, and it comes down, you know, within a period of two pr 13

14

three years.

15
16
17

14

Q. Okay. And what--

15

A. And then -- and then the damages basically instead

16

of being this area, are this area (drawing).

18

Q. Can you shade that in?

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Yeah. No problem.
BY MR. VERGONIS:

that this gray line was a but-for line. It's not. It's --

Q. Okay.

A. -- MRI's scan. And so assuming that this line wa
the but-for line, I would make this adjustment, okay?

Q. Okay. I see. Maybe we should have used a
different chart.
A. Yeah. But I think the point is still
understandable.

Q. It's actually Chart 2, right, that we've been
working on --

MR. WOODARD: Page 13.
CONTINUING BY MR. VERGONIS:

17
18

Q. --on Page 13?
A. And so in this case --

19

A. (Witness complies.)

19

20

Q. Okay. And if you had time to look at the numbers

20

21

and examine everything, you could --you could draw that

21

again. We have -- we don't have the lines that show exac y

22

line -- you can estimate that line better?

22

when the dissociation occurred, but we can --

Q. I'll give you the pen back if you can just do that

23

A. More closely.

23

A. Yeah.

24

Q. Yeah.

24

Q. --pick a point in 2005 representing the--

25

A. But, you know, MRIA's belief is that if this

25

A. So somehow then you get a decline in scans that i :

94

96
caused by loss of the referral network --

1

wrongful conduct occurred, then it's quite unlikely there

2

would have been a dissociation. But if I'm given an

2

Q. Mm-hm.

3

instruction to assume there would have, I can do that

3

A. --that's not unlawful, comes down here, and the

4

calculation.

1

4

damages period is the area I shaded here.

5

Q. Okay. Get my pen back.

5

Q. Okay.

6

A. Oh.

6

A. And I don't know what the pattern of that is, so

7

Q. Thank you.

7

you know, it might cut out here a little bit more than I
drew, but there is some way that you divide this area

8

MR. WOODARD: Do you want to mark that?

8

9

MR. VERGONIS: Urn. Yeah, I think he drew it into

9

10

Exhibit 1.

10

11

MR. WOODARD: Okay. So it is on the exhibit.

11

12

MR. VERGONIS: Is that okay, court reporter?

12

13

THE COURT REPORTER: Yes.

13

14

MR. VERGONIS: Yes.

14

15

MR. WOODARD: Okay. Okay. I just couldn't

15

16

remember if that was the actual exhibit --

16

17

MR. VERGONIS: Yeah.

17

18

MR. WOODARD: --or a copy.

18

19

MR. VERGONIS: Yeah. Good question.

19

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Mr. Vergonis, five-- five

20

20
21

22

23
24
25

minutes.

21

MR. VERGONIS: Why don't we take a break now th n 2 2
to change the tape.
THE WITNESS: Well, and I'm going to need to
supplement my answer. It'll only take a minute.

between declines in scans and just attrition of referrals
from one that assumes continuing affiliation.
Q. Okay. I understand. That was very helpful. Thank

you.
MR. VERGONIS: And, yeah, now would be a good time
to change the tape.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Here marks the end of Videotape .
Label No. I in the deposition of Bruce Budge.
The time is approximately II: I 0 a.m. We're off
the record.
(Recess taken.)
THE VIDEOGR.APHER: We are back on the record. Here marks e
beginning of Videotape Label No. 2 in the deposition of
Bruce Budge. The time is approximately 11:27 a.m.

23

EXAMINATION (Continuing)

24

BYMR. VERGONIS:

25

Q. Okay. Mr. Budge, you were saying before we broke
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1

that your assumption is that St. Alphonsus would have

1

but what I'm saying is that I basically calculated damages

2

remained a partner in MRIA through the end of the-- throug

2

to MRIA --

3

the end of at least the damages period that you calculated?

3

4

A. I understand that to be the position which MRIA

4

5

believes that they can establish, is that had this wrongful

5

I;
rj

Q. Mm-hm.
A. --in itself, and if-- if those damages are not

shared with St. Alphonsus in some way, then -- because of L

6

conduct not occurred, that there would have been a situation

6

some legal reason where they're not entitled to them -- the

7

where there would have been little reason for -- certainly

7

that's going t.o result in a number which is more that woulc •.

8

St. Alphonsus would not have been undertaking any conduc to

8

have occurred had there been no wrongful conduct in disp Me

9

undermine MRIA, and they would have resulted in a place

9

and they still were in partnership and -- and so forth.

10

where it was satisfactory to all parties and there would be

10

11

no reason for them to dissociate.

11

12

12

Q. Okay. So then St. Alphonsus, under that

·

Q. Okay. So I think the answer to my question then
was a yes, they would be overcompensated.
A. I don't use the word overcompensated --

13

hypothetical but-for world, would have shared as an equity

13

Q. Okay.

14

shareholder and these profits that we're calculating under

14

A. -- because it makes implications about the law and

15

Methods 1 through 4 --

15

equity and things like that so --

16

A. Yes.

16

Q. Okay.

17

Q. -- is that correct?

17

A. -- I'm not going to --

18
19

A. They would. And I believe with respect to their
limited partnership interest, I think they still do.

18

Q. I understand--

19

A. -- be able to endorse that.

Q. Okay.

20

21

A. Yeah.

21

22

Q. With respect to any interest they have in MRIA,

22

20

23

23

they don't, however, right?

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. I can't-MR. VERGONIS: I'm sorry.
A. I can't really endorse the word choice -BY MR. VERGONIS:

24

A. That's my understanding.

24

Q. Okay.

25

Q. In order to accurately -- in order not to

25

A. -- but I can tell you that the number might be

100

98
1

overcompensate the current shareholders and accurately

1

bigger than would have resulted in St. Al's not dissociated. !!

2

account for St. Alphonsus' equity interest in MRIA in the

2

Q. Okay. So they would be-- assuming they held on

3

but-for world, wouldn't we need to make some adjustment to

3

4

these numbers to remove St. Alphonsus' share?

4

recovering more based on these damages figures than they "

5

would have earned in the but-for world?

5

A. I'm not sure. It really pretty much I think

I

to the money, they, the MRIA stakeholders, would be

A. If St. Al's had not withdrawn from the

6

involves some legal issues that I'm not competent to weigh

6

7

in~

7

partnership. The problem with answering your question is

8

don't know what's going to happen. I don't know if there i

9

going to be some sharing with MRIA for the years that are b-~

8
9

If I was instructed to do that, I could make such
a calculation. You know, I don't know, ifMRIA receives

In

10

award, how it's going to be distributed among its current

10

11

and former stakeholders. I just don't have any idea. But

11

12

if you were to give me-- my assigmnent was to compute

12

asking you to make an opinion on the legal question. Just -

13

injury for -- to MRIA --

13

just on the assumption -- or irrespective of the legal

14

position, if the MRI -- ifMRIA is awarded these

14
15
16

Q. Mm-hm.
A. --as the entity. But ifyou gave me a different
assigmnent to compute the injury to the stakeholders, then

Q. Okay. Right. That's why I'm asking you. I'm not '

15

and the stakeholders get what you're saying they're entitlec •
to, they would be earn- -- they would be getting more mon ry

could do the calculation similar to what we discussed unde

17

18

the Method 5 scenarios.

18

A. See, I haven't issued -- or rendered an opinion on

19

what the stakeholders should get. I've just calculated

your opinion that if the current MRIA stakeholders retaine

20

injury to MRIA.

21

the benefits of the entirety of the damages set forth in

21

Q. Okay.

22

your Models 1 through 4, that those current MRIA

22

A. And-- and so, obviously, if you asked me to do a

23

stakeholders would be overcompensated relative to the

23

calculation for the stakeholders, I could do it, but I

24

amounts they would have received in the but-for world?

24

haven't. But-- you know, and if the present stakeholders

25

don't have to share the injury to MRIA with somebody els

20

25

Q. Okay. But putting aside the legal issues, is it

A. Again, I don't know how the law weighs in on this,

-

amounts,~

16

17
19

I just don't know.

25 (Pages 97 to 1OOJ
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1

with St. Al's, then they will be getting more than if St.

1

2

Al's had stayed in the partnership and they tell us that's

2

3

true.

3

Q. Or how it gets decided?

4

A. Well, I thought that there was a contract with a

5

radiology group which indicated they would do the readin!

6

But in terms of which imaging center, I-- I don't.

4
5

Q. Okay. And-- and St. Al's would have been in th
partnership in the but-for world?

6

A. Yes.

7

Q. And you agree that the purposes of-- do you agr e

7

8

that the purpose of the damages award is to put the parti s

8

9
10

11
12

9

back in the position they would have been in the but-for
world?
A. I understand the party to be MRIA, and I do
understand that.

13

Q. Okay. You -- you were describing to me the tail

before I finish the question, does that assumption make
sense to you? Can we assume that the hospital has an

13

affiliation with a business providing the scariS, and all

14

inpatient scans get sent to that business, and the referring

but-for world, would have dissociated in -- at the same d y 15
16
it did in the real world, April 1st, 2004, and would have

17

competed as of April 1st, 2005.

17

18

Is the tail analysis any different for on-campus

20

facility used by the hospital to perform scans such that

12

15

scans?

Q. Okay. If we assume that inpatient scariS are

11

16

s.

performed -- that all inpatient scans are performed by the
referring practices don't matter, does that assumption --

if-- on -- on the assumption that St. Alphonsus, in the

19

A. I don't.

10

14

18

scan is sent?

1

physician has no choice in the matter of where to send a
scan; do you understand what I'm asking you to assume?
A. I think I do.

Q. Okay. If we make that assumption and couple it

19

with the assumption that St. Alphonsus was allowed to

20

compete as of April 1st, 2005, and, in the but-for world,

21

to measure is what the attribution that's caused by

21

would have competed and would have brought IMI onto it ,1

22

dissociation is.

22

campus as its scan provider --

A. Well, basically what a tail is -- what I'm trying

23

Q. Mm-hm.

23

24

A. And part of the problem we have here is that if

24

A. Which it indeed did -Q. Which it --

25

A. -- am I correct?

25

MRIA prevails, there are a lot of wrongful acts,

1

104 ~

102

Q. -- indeed did. So in other words, I'm asking you

~

1

disparagement, things like that, which could have lasting

1

2

consequences which are reflected in that attrition rate.

2

to assume that the but-for world followed the real world in ru
the -- in this '04, 'OS dissociation time period.

3

Q. Okay.

3

4

A. And in --you know, it might make it appear to go

4

5

down faster than it actually does. But, you know, it

5

Would the tail analysis apply to the inpatient
scans the way you describe it?

6

depends on the specific -- if-- if one assumes that the

6

7

Meridian facility was open, for example, and because the

7

actual migration was in terms of the attrition of the

8

arguments that Mr. McCarthy makes, that scans occur more

8

referral base because what you described is what -- my

9

a result of its location than they do because of

9

understanding is what happened --

10

affiliations --

IS

10

A. I think the thing that's most relevant is what the

Q. Mm-hm.

11

Q. Mm-hm.

11

12

A. --then you could have a but-for scenario which

12

13

would possibly be different than the one that's on campus. I

13

and !MI. And it shows, pretty precisely, what occurred.

14

haven't really thought about it, so...

14

Now, I -- you know, I got the other issue that I mentioned

15

before. That -- that pattern of attrition --

15

Q. Okay. The reason I ask about on campus is-- is

A. -- in 2005. And so I've actually measured what

the migration of affiliated physicians is between St. Al's

16

because of the nature of the scans being performed there.

16

Q. Mm-hm.

17

Does your analysis distinguish in any way between

17

A. -- might be conflated with the consequences of

18

inpatient scans and outpatient scans?

18

other bad acts that don't have to -- anything to do with

19

A. Not-- not quantitatively, no.

19

dissociation --

20

Q. Okay. Do you understand what an inpatient scan

20

Q. Right.

21

A. -- but the bad acts.

22

Q. Right. Right. Right.

21
22

is?
A. Yes. I believe I do. It's a-- it's a scan

23

that's done for somebody that's been admitted to the

23

24

hospital.

24

reason why we go in and take an assumption that you sugge .

25

which I believe actually occurred, and modifY the patterns

25

Q. Okay. Do you know who decides where an inpatient

A. So it's complete. But I don't -- there is no

26 (Pages 101 to 104)
002768

"
!

August 11,2011

Bruce Budge

107

105
1
2

and the data that I observed.

Q.

Yeah. I think I might not have been expressing

1

A. Yes.

2

Q. In particular, Paragraph 21. Do you see the

3

3

myself right. What I was trying to get at is you described

4

a methodology before we broke.

4

5

(Cell phone interruption.)

5

6
7

A. Sorry.
BY MR. VERGONIS:

8

Q.

9

A. Just let me power my phone down. I apologize fo

10
11

12

Okay. You want to go off the record?

Q.

Okay. No apology necessary. Let me-- let me
You described a methodology that involved a

!1

I
above the footnotes, "Given that the MRI scanning capacit I

sentence in Paragraph 21, two -- two lines from the bottom
0

::e::;:e:~:~~ ~:;~::i:s ::; :;:~~~e~ ~:~ea -- ~

7

"it is highly likely that these physicians might have

8

referred some of their MRI patients to these other MRI

9

facilities, even if the IMI facility had not existed in the
but-for world."
MR. WOODARD: Did you have a question or did' u

11

12

start over.

13

u

6

10

the interruption.

just ask him if he --

13

MR. VERGONIS: Well, I just asked-MR. WOODARD: -- sees that?

14

tailing off, I guess -- you call it the tailing -- the

14

15

tailing offofthe damages where we try to figure out, I

15

MR. VERGONIS: --him ifhe sees that, I guess.

16

think, and correct me if I'm describing this inaccurately,

16

A. I'm trying to figure out who he means by "these

17

trying to describe the effect of the bad acts --

17

physicians." Are these people that did refer to IMI or...

A. Mm-hm.

18

BY MR. VERGONIS:

Q.

19

18
19

-- prior to the dissociation that we're assuming

w

I

Q. These physicians I believe in the prior sentence

20

occurred in the but-for world now on the-- on the scans

20

he's referring to the affiliated referring physicians by

21

that occur after the date that they were free to compete.

21

which he means everyone in your two categories.

22

A. Yes.

22

A. They may have and very well. And that would be

23

Q.

23

reflected in the data, and their scans wouldn't be included

24

in my definition of those that had been diverted if they had -,

I was -- I was wondering if that analysis would

24

not apply at all to inpatient scans because I don't

25

understand how bad acts prior to April 1st, 2005 could ha e 25

done that.

108

106
1

had a continuing effect on the referral of inpatient scans

1

2

on my assumption that all inpatient scans go to the provider

2

3

of choice by the hospital.

4

A. I -- I think the actual data reflects what happens

5

with the migration. I don't -- I can't differentiate in my

6

data between -- or haven't, between inpatient and outpatient

7

scans.

8

Q.

9

A. But it shows, in the combination between the two

10
11

12
13

Mm-hm.

of them, what actually occurs--

Q.

Right.

A. -- when in the course of events you described

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12

14

happens. And so I think my -- my measurements are accur e 13
14
and useful for that, and they already encompass that

15

possibility.

16
17
18

Q.

Okay. You testified earlier that you read Dr.

McCarthy's report, right?
A. Yes.

19

MR. VERGONIS: I'd like to mark that report as the

20

next exhibit.

21

15

were-- there was other competition in the valley. Ifth I)'
used Elks Rehabilitation scanner or the Boise Orthope< ic
scanner, something like that, that's not in the populatio
of scans which I'm saying are diverted.

Q. What if they used both MRIA and-- or-- I see
what you're saying. If they use Boise Imaging instead

f

IM~.

~

Then that is not in the population of scans that

I'm saying were diverted.
Q. Okay. But I think Dr. McCarthy is saying, in tt

i

but-for world-- what was one of the imaging centers y !U
named?

A. I don't know. I think that-- I thought that the
Elks Rehabilitation Hospital. I just -- he said maybe th

t

18

have a scanner. You know, I don't care who it is.

f'

19

Q. Okay. Why don't we use Boise Radiology then :A. Okay.
Q. --just for the-- just for hypothetical
discussion.
A. Yeah.
Q. If Dr. McCarthy is saying in this sentence, I
believe, that it is highly likely that if these physicians

20

22

identification.)

23

24

BY MR. VERGONIS:

24

Can I ask you to tum to Page 9 of that report.

.

A. Only if IMI performed a scan for them. If they .;

17

23

Q.

your list of diverted scans?

16

(Whereupon an Expert Report of Thomas R. McCart! ~' 21
Ph.D., dated 6/15/11 was marked Exhibit 5 for
22

25

1

Q. Well, around all of these physicians included in

25

, i

,;;

'>

'

~,,:;'

W#..i[i@>.;:?;;.:.{u,-<;

h

~

M~
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1

had not referred to -- let me strike that and let me start

1

of its business from referrals from the St. Al's network and

2

over.

2

continued.

3

3

These are the -- these physicians that we're

4

referring to are the so-called affiliated referring

5

physicians, your universe of the physicians who you say

fnY

I

Once St. Al's tries to intentionally divert those

4

to another party and a competitor, that -- that's what I'm

5

measuring because prior to the wrongful acts, you can see

6

scan they sent to IMI would have gone to the MRIA in th

6

what the, basically, audience and the market was for-- for

7

but-for world?

7

the affiliated radiology center.

8

A. Yes.

8

9

Q. Dr. McCarthy is saying that some of the scans tha

9

So I agree with Dr. McCarthy that there could be

I
~

possible isolated instances. I don't agree in the aggregate
that you can't use hospital affiliation to put together a

10

went to IMI in the real world would have gone not to MR fA,10

11

but to facilities like Boise Radiology in the but-for world.

11

reliable model as what would have happened had that not be i;n

12

A. Well, I'm assuming that that happened. And thoS<

12

interrupted.

13

are not being measured by me as diversions from MRIA.

13

~

Q. What do you mean by hospital affiliation --

14

Q. But aren't they?

14

A. I just mean --

15

A. They aren't. It's only ifiMI did -- did a scan

15

Q. -- in this context?

16
17
18

16

from the affiliated -Q. Right. But what Dr. McCarthy's talking about he
is the scan that IMI did in the real world --

A. I mean that, basically, physicians in different

17

areas of medicine that are affiliated with the same hospital

18

are encouraged to refer to each other. It makes the

19

A. Mm-hm.

19

organization stronger. It benefits them. It's important to

20

Q. -- from a physician who is in your group of

20

physicians in terms of what hospital groups they affiliate
with.

a

k

i

21

affiliated referring physicians because that physician, for

21

22

instance, had a prior referral pattern of sending scans to

22

23

MRI Center. You're assuming that that physician's scan

23

I've had the same doctor for 30 years. He changed his

24

IMI was diverted from MRIA?

24

affiliation from Swedish Medical to the Polyclinic and

I

25

suddenly, when I needed a cancer screening or a biopsy or

~;

25

A. Yes.

I know from my own personal experience, my own -- ,,

110

112

1

Q. And you're opining that that happened?

1

some other procedure, I got sent to the provider that was 1;1

2

A. Right.

2

his network.

3

Q. Dr. McCarthy is saying, Well, isn't it possible

3

I've audited a number of hospitals. I have

4

that that physician in the but-for world would have sent the

4

friends that are -- were administrators and financial

5

scan not to MRI Center or MRI Mobile, but to a third-party

5

officers of hospitals. I know what they're trying to do

6

provider like Boise Radiology?

6

when they create a network, affiliations, and that they try ·

7

to support all of the branches of that because it brings the 1'1

7

A. That kind of runs to basically my central

I'

8

hypothesis that the affiliations are very important in the

8

whole together. So I think affiliations are really

9

hospital network and where the scans go.

9

important. Some of Dr. McCarthy's own work, in my vif iY·

10

Now, they -- there could be an isolated instance

10

11

where something like that happened, but I have a high degree

11

12

of conviction that the affiliations are very significant.

12

the amount of money and returns that St. Alphonsus got

13

And being the official MRI center for St. Alphonsus is

13

its investment in IMI.

14

valuable because of the referral network that it confers.

14

15

And I think there's, you know, a lot of evidence as to why

15

16

the affiliated patients' network is important in how it

16

Q. Mm-hm.
A. Over that five- or six-year period, they basically
had gained economic returns of over $18 million, accord' ~g

17

generally functions in defining the market and the number of

17

to my calculation in the footnote.

18

scans that would have been.

18

Q. Okay.
A. They paid 11 for that -- 11 million for that.

19

Now, of course there are individual exceptions

19

20

that could have occurred. And there's referral patterns for

20

21

individuals that might be different. But what I've tried to

21

22

do in the aggregate is to basically develop a method which

22

23

shows that had these accused acts of St. Alphonsus not

23

24

occurred, that the steady state is the situation that

24

25

happened before the bad acts occurred in which MRIA got m st 25

supports the fact that the affiliations are quite important.
If you look at-- we were talking earlier about

That's a 33 percent return on their equity.
Why would IMI have sold-- and that's just for the
first five years.
Why would IMI have sold a cash flow stream that
lucrative for that cheap? What were they trying to get?
They were trying to get an affiliation with St.

,,,,,,'
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1

Al's because they understood it was a good referral source.

1

~

Q. Mm-hm.

&

2

That's the only thing that occurs to me. They understood

2

3

that having the contract with St. Al's and being a part of

3

4

that referral network was highly valuable and they were--

4

basic things. It can be shown that they were the customer

5

they -- they gave up a huge amount of money in order to

5

base that provided businesses for MRlA prior to 1999. Som

6

access that. And I think that goes to the issue of whether

6

of those could have been referring to St. Luke's, but they

7

the value of being in the network is real.

7

still obviously are making referrals to St. Al's.

8
9

Dr. McCarthy did an analysis where he showed that
30 -- on split referrals --

A. I only took about two-thirds of, basically, the
total referral pool in doing that. I said these are the

8

Now, after that point in time, it is true that if

9

I encounter that physician again, and they made a referral

~a~~~~sl'::a~::: ::~a;e:: :;;~:~:::~~~=:d ~

0

10

Q. Mm-hm.

10

11

A. -- he showed that 35 percent -- over a five-year

11

12

period, only 35 percent of the physicians made one or mon

12

to the public -- telling the public that their official

13

referrals to MRIA. That means that after the date of these

13

provider was !MI.

14

wrongful acts that 65 percent of all those referring

14

Q. Mm-hm.

15

physicians in the affiliated base, in four or five years

15

16

didn't have the occasion to make one single referral to MRl A 16

17

who has a magnet on that campus in any circumstance.

18

That indicates to me the same thing: That once St.

f

A. And that those other referrals in the St. Luke's

system we don't even see. They would continue to make the fn·

17

They're not part of the population that was diverted. And

18

so-- I've actually lost track of your question.

Q. Okay. The question, I guess, was why are you

19

Al's says IMI is our official provider, it causes a

19

20

diversion. Not that there weren't other bad acts that were

20

including St. Luke's affiliated physicians in your

21

causing a diversion of referrals, but the best way to go in

21

collection of so-called affiliated referring physicians?

22

the but-for world and look at what the scans that would ha' e 2 2

23

been done by MRIA is, is to basically look at the universe

23

24

of referrals which accompanies St. Al's delivery system, and 2 4

25

that's what I've done.

25

II

A. Yeah. Because I think I'm only measuring a
portion of their referrals that is within the St. Al's
system in my methodology.
Q. Okay. But you're counting --you're counting a

114

116

1

MR. WOODARD: Chris, can we take a quick break?

1

St. Luke's physician who sent one scan to MRl Center at sor !>:

2

MR. VERGONIS: Sure.

2

point prior to 1999 who then sends a lot of his business to

3

MR. WOODARD: He -- I just--

3

St. Luke's after that and also sends some referrals to IMI

4

MR. VERGONIS: Sure. We'll go off the record.

4

Meridian, for instance. Those IMI Meridian scans will be

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 11:53 a.m. We're

5

counted in your totals, right?

5
6
7

off the record.
(Recess taken.)

6

A. Right. I mean, I think it's impossible to put

7

together a perfect decision rule in order to defme this

8

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the record. The tim is

8

population, but it is possible to put together a reasonable

9

approximately 12:15 p.m. EXAMINATION (Continuing)

9

and even-handed one.

10
11

BY MR. VERGONIS:

Q. Before we went off the record, Mr. Budge, you were

10

So there is some risk in a situation like -- that

11

you mentioned where possibly there might have been a
referring physician that made a referral to IMI that came

12

telling me how-- how important in your opinion the

12

13

affiliation was, the relationship between the hospital and

13

out of the St. Luke's system. On the other hand, I think

14

the scanning facility and the physicians there?

14

analytically and a much bigger issue which goes in the othe

15

direction, that for all physicians that came on the scene

15

A. Well, it's as a-- as a basis for developing an

16

analytical model of what the but-for world would have looked

16

after '99, and a proportion of those grows every single year

17

like, I think it is significant.

17

between the pre-'99 that are still practicing, I'm assuming

18

Q. What about physicians who are affiliated with a

18

that if they had admitting privileges at St. Luke's that

19

different hospital like St. Luke's? You include some of

19

they wouldn't make a single referral to MRlA.

20

them in your model, right?

20

21

A. Right.

That's not a reasonable assumption. It's quite

21

conservative. I think that it covers -- more than covers

22

Q. Why do you do that?

22

the possibility that these 50-some physicians that actually

23

A. For physicians that have --well, first of all, I

23

had admitted practices at St. Luke's wouldn't have referral
patterns in the opposite direction.

24

identizy the group of physicians that were historical

24

25

referrers.

25

h

So that's how I reconcile that. And I covered
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1

that in the prior proceeding.

s

1

from -- do you know what proportion of the scans in your '

2

affiliated referring physicians model come from doctors th

i

3

ground that you've covered already, but I do want to see if

3

are actually affiliated with St. Alphonsus and what

~

4

you have any more reactions to Dr. McCarthy's report.

4

proportion come from doctors affiliated with other hospital ~

Do you think it's a valid criticism of your

2

Q. Yes, I recall that. I'm trying not to rehash

5

who at one time sent -- who at one time prior to 1999 sent

6

methodology for Dr. McCarthy to say that a-- that the IMI

6

scan to MRI Center?

7

facilities generally draw patients from a different set of

7

8

ZIP Codes than the MRI Center, as he says on Paragraph 22

8

9

Page 10?

9

5

I

A. Not precisely. My understanding is--

MR. WOODARD: Is that limited to time period or ·
i

that just--

10

A. I didn't find that particularly persuasive, no.

10

11

Q. Why -- why not?

11

scan counts. Maybe it would be better to limit it to a time

12

A. Just because I believe that the primary drivers

12

period.

13

here are basically St. Al's actions, its -- MRI's ability to

13

BY MR. VERGONIS:

14

compete, the actions that St. Al took that would basically

14

15

impair that ability to compete and the actions they took to

15

16

deliberately divert scans to IMI. And they do that within

16

17

the network of the referrals that are covered in their

17

18

service area. And I -- and I think that that's far more

18

19

important than any patterns of-- you know, where the

19

20

operations are located.

20

21

Also, under the usurpation theories it's

21

MR. VERGONIS: It's meant to include all of his

Q. Do you have a sense of how they're divided, either
overall or in time periods?

A. I don't know what we're talking about now. What's

'

I

that were diverted --

A. Right.

Q. -- for each year.

•

A. Uh-huh.

23

locations.

Q. And you have two -- and we're on Methods I throu

25

Q. Okay. Under Methods 1 through 4 it's relevant

24

because IMI would have existed in the but-for world?

25

4, not the usurpation theory. And --

1

120

A. Well, IMI could have existed in the but-for world.
And I'm not really making -- I'm just simply saying that

~

.

1

Q. Okay.

2

A. -- though --

3

--St. Alphonsus, regardless, it assumes basically, that

3

Q. Not--

4

they continued to be affiliated and designate MRIA as tht ·r

4

A. -- with Meridian and Eagle.

5

official provider through that period.

5

Q. Okay. So not the usurpation of the full

Actually, as I make that statement, it causes me

6

lf1
I

A. Well, they include a usurpation component--

118
2

I

Q. Okay. You-- you count up a total number of scans

completely irrelevant because MRIA would have been in th( ~e 2 2

24

I

divided?

22

23

I

6

opportunity --

7

to think that I ought to clarify what I said earlier, is

7

8

that there isn't necessarily a connection between who the

8

Q. -- of downtown?

9

designate as a provider and their membership in that. An

9

10

A. Yeah.
Q. And your scan universe consists of St. Alphonsus

A. Of downtown?

10

so that's the assumption that my model makes, is that the

11

continue to designate MRIA as their provider. And, real! , 11

affili- -- scans from St. Alphonsus' facility -- affiliated

12

I think I made this statement before that had to do with

12

physicians, St. Alphonsus only affiliated physicians and

13

their actual association, and it's -- it's just a little bit

13

non-St. Alphonsus physicians who at one time prior to 1~ ~9

14

of a step away from that.

14

sent at least one scan to MRI Center?

15
16

Q. Okay. Did you do your own analysis of the servi<
areas?

15
16

17

A. In terms of ZIP Codes?

18

Q. Yes.

18

19

A. No.

19

20
21

Q. Or in terms of any sort to attempt to measure
where the scans came from geographically?

17

20
21

J

A. Mm-hm.
Q. Do you have a sense of the relative proportions o
those two groups within any given year?

A. Not without looking at the data, no.
Q. Okay. Can we determine that from your data?
A. There -- basically there are lists, and the -- on
the CD that I gave you --

22

A. Geographically? I did --

22

Q. Mm-hm.

23

Q. Yeah.

23

A. -- you can tell by how I designated a physician as

24

A. I did not.

24

25

Q. Okay. Do you know what proportion of scans co e 2 5

to which of those groups he's-Q. Okay.
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1

A. -- he or she is in.

123 '
1

w

The problem with that is, is that it's completely

~
~

2

Q. Okay. You commented already on Dr. McCarthy's

2

dependent on choosing the right variables and not missing

3

Paragraph 23 and the --his observation that 35 percent of

3

important variables. That line, there is no reason to

4

the affiliated physicians referred at least one patient to

4

accept the assumption that line would have been a steady i:!

5

both -- both IMI and MRI Center during a period in questi< !Jl.

5

state growth into the future. There's all kinds of things

6

And you told me why you thought that was invalid.

6

in terms of the market, in terms of the competitive factors

7

Do you have any sense of the number of scans over

8

that period that -- strike -- strike that question. That

9

question does not make sense.

10

7

that he talks about in terms of St. Al's conduct which bend

8

that line and cause changes in it.

9

Are you familiar with regression analysis?

The -- what the regression does is that he uses --

10

and if I'm not mistaken, they're actually dummy variables,

11

A. Somewhat, yes.

11

which he basically takes events and he tries to measure

12

Q. Do you consider yourself an expert in regression

12

interaction with them.

13
14

analysis?
A. I use some regression analysis in terms of

13

Q. Mm-hm.

14

A. And so the events that he chose are the opening of

15

identifying cost behavior and that type of thing, but I

15

16

don't -- I don't have any extensive econometrics training or

16

IMI, the firing ofGSR, the opening ofMeridian, the three most significant ones. And what the regression mathemati ?s

17

anything which would make me an expert. I think I have a

17

do is they basically say I'm going to take these three --

18

working knowledge of statistics that's adequate for my pas

18

it's like a toggle switch. It's on or it's off.

19

work as an auditor in terms of just having a general

19

Q. Mm-hm.

20

understanding about what the implication of statistical

20

A. Is the condition present or is it not present? And

21

conclusions are.

22
23

Q. Have you ever used a regression analysis when
offering an opinion in connection with a litigation?

21

they basically have complete freedom to just more or less

22

experiment with themselves in assigning coefficients or

23

weights to the significance of each of these --

24

A. Probably, yes.

24

Q. Mm-hm.

25

Q. Okay. And that would have been expert opinion?

25

A. -- in order to try to basically contort that line

122

124

1

A. Yeah.

1

2

Q. Do you recall if the Court allowed-- allowed your

2

3

expert testimony in that case?

3

to equal what actually happened.
The first thing I would say about it is that two
of those interaction events are actually allegations ofMR

4

A. I don't recall --

4

in this case, that the Meridian, opening of Meridian was

5

Q. Or in those cases?

5

usurpation of a corporate opportunity. And so to the extt

6

A. --my testimony ever being excluded on any

6

that he shows that that is highly correlated with the

7

diversion of scans, he's basically proving the injury that

8

was caused to MRIA.

7

8
9
10
11

12

subject, so I assume so.
Q. Okay. Did you read the paragraphs in Dr.

McCarthy's report about the regression analysis he employe<?

9

The second one is I believe that MRIA is going to

A. I did.

10

Q. Do you have any criticisms of how Dr. McCarthy

11

of the radiologist was something that they were backed

12

the comer that they had to do and resulted from St. Al's

constructed the regression analysis?

&t

-- it believes and will introduce evidence that the firing

iiI.

13

A. Yes.

13

actions. If they-- I'm not weighing in on that evidence.

14

Q. What are those criticisms?

14

If they succeed in that, then what Dr. McCarthy has done is

A. Well, I think that his model is -- it basically

15

to show that that was highly related to the actual decline

15
16

posits for a starting place an upwards-sloping, continuous

16

in scans which occurred, and, again, I think he's proving ~)

17

line as a time series. He uses a logarithmic function so it

17

damages.

18

has a curve to it.

18

19

Q. Mm-hm.

19

object to is that I don't think this is the only choice of

A. He's basically saying let's start with the

20

dummy variables that-- that you could use.

20

[:

I read his deposition also. The other thing I

21

assumption that MRIA scans are going to increase at a stead

21

22

rate into -- and now I'm going to try to identify the

22

23

variables which will bend that line to match what actually

23

24

happened and try to make an assessment as to whether I fow d 2 4

which St. Al's -- and they can be given time identiflcatio

25

the right variables.

too, as to when they started and stopped, so he could

25

THE COURT REPORTER: Of dummy?
THE WITNESS: Dummy variables.
A. There's a number of discrete alleged bad acts
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1

127
1

measure interaction variables with a number of-- ofthe

A. It depends, but missing variables is something

2

accused actions of-- of St. Alphonsus which MRIA is

2

3

alleging caused a diversion of scans, and he could find a

3

4

line that -- presumably that would somewhat closely

4

5

approximate what actually happened, and he would make a

5

6

perfect allocation in terms of what all these alleged

6

in that we have not asked him to give an opinion on Mr.

7

wrongful acts contributed to, basically, MRIA's demise.

7

McCarthy's regression analysis.

8

I don't think it's particularly probative what he did. He's

8

MR. VERGONIS: Okay.

9

just selecting three particular variables.

9

10

0

The second -- another thing that I think is very

that-MR. WOODARD: Just real quick, let me interlineate
an objection.
I just want to object to this line of questioning

MR. WOODARD: And that's not part of his report,

10

it's not in his rebuttal report, but you can go ahead and
answer.

11

hard to understand is that his regression shows that the

11

12

opening ofiMI, which, incidentally, I don't see any reaso

12

MR. VERGONIS: Okay.

13

to associate that opening as being the only source of

13

14

injury. You know, as I read the course of conduct that's

14

15

being accused, it was over a long period of time and

15

16

preceded the opening of the MRI piece. And-- but he's

16

17
18

actually showing that the opening of the downtown locati n 17
18
conferred a benefit on MRIA --or MRIC on campus.

19

19

open to what his opinions are, the evidence that he's found.

20

And anything that should cause me to change my opinions w a
-- really the upshot of what I'm saying is there's nothing

I can't -- I'm just not aware of any economic

THE WITNESS: The question was ... ?
BY MR. VERGONIS:

Q. I'll ask the question again, but just to confirm
then, you have no intention -- present intention of

,

testifying about Dr. McCarthy's regression analysis?
A. No. When I made my criticisms, it was -- I'm very

20

theory which possibly would conclude that opening a

21

competitor within the service area of an existing business

21

22

is going to cause their service and revenue levels to go up

22

in there which caused me to feel like I needed a revision to

23

That simply can't be the case. I think it impeaches his

23

either my approach or my conclusions.

24

methodology right out of the gate.

24

25

Let me think ifl have any other criticisms of it.

25

Q. Okay. You can't think of any reason why the

opening of the downtown IMI center might be correlated wit! '

126

128
1

a slight -- might be slightly correlated with an increase in

2

part it largely confirms the allegations which are being

2

business to MRI Center?

3

made with respect to Meridian and GSR, if they're

3

A. It doesn't occur to me. And particularly when you

4

established that there were injury from that. And,

4

become acquainted with the actual data in terms of what was

5

secondly, the results that it implies with respect to

5

happening with individual referrals, it's something that's

opening downtown don't make any sense to me.

6

not credible to me.

1

6
7
8

So -- so, basically, I think, to recap, is that in

Q. How can it confirm two things and be wrong on tp.e
third?

7

Q. Okay. The question I asked when Wade interrupted

8

your answer for clarification on the record was whether the
testing of-- the failure to test for other variables

9

A. Well, that's a great question because I'm not--

9

10

I'm not sure, because of the very high risk of missing

10

undermine the conclusion as to the variables tested for.

variables, that it actually does confirm it. But his

11

A. I don't know, but I know just in general that it -

11

12
13
14

12

implication is somehow that, I believe, that it somehow
undermines the pattern of migration of referrals which I' e 13
14
identified. I'm simply saying that I don't think that it

- it could is all I would say.
Q. One of the allegations, I think on ModelS,

Calculation Method 5, is that IMI Downtown would never ha ~,,e

15

necessarily does. I don't know. But I certainly endorse i

15

16

in the sense that you asked the question as proving that i

16

A. Mm-hm.

does.

17

Q. Why wouldn't testing that-- why wouldn't-- why

wouldn't using a regression analysis with a variable of!MI

17

opened.
;'

18

Q. And you mentioned he only used three variables.

18

19

A. He might have used a fourth one. I'm trying to

19

Downtown's opening be an appropriate measure for testing

20

that theory of damages?

20
21
22
23
24
25

remember if Eagle was in there maybe.
Q. But -- but you -- but you said he omitted some
events.
Does the omission of some events without more

21

A. Well, I may not understand what he's trying to do,

~

22

but the whole regression underlying assumptions of a steady

1

23

state growth and, basically, you know, trying to identify

~

undermine the regression analysis as to the events that w re 24
25

tested?

t!

independent dummy variables that somehow can-- is someth.g
I just don't fmd very persuasive.
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1

I know, from my use of regressions, that

1

strategies to deal with peaks, that it certainly didn't

in, you know, my total of diverted scans that they had

2

correlation doesn't indicate causation. And so there's

2

3

nothing when I read that to cause me to think that I need to

3

require people coming in in the middle of the night, and

4

rethink or revise what I'm doing.

4

that sort of thing. But I'm going to --I basically am

5

Q. Okay. And nothing in his other criticisms that we

5

assuming that he is going to testify as to their capacities,

6

were discussing earlier cause you to rethink or revise --

6

and I'm relying on what he told me that there was adequate

7

revise either?

7

capacity.

8

A. Well, I think earlier we discussed the fact that

8

Q. Okay.

9

in certain contests-- you know, for example, if you were

9

A. The other thing that I point out is that I

10

asking me to quantify damages for a stakeholder then I wo lid 10

actually have an extra magnet in my model because I didn't

11

give some credence to that.

11

understand, until I saw Dr. McCarthy's report, that the two

12

Q. Mm-hm.

12

magnets that were originally put in to Meridian, one ofther .

13

A. So--

13

had been moved to Eagle, so I actually have one more mag~ et

14
15

Q. I guess I meant the ZIP Code analysis or the
practice of splitting referrals.

14

in my system than IMI actually has, which provides

1

15

additional capacity.

'

16

A. Yeah. The whole concept of splitting referrals

16

17

may be quite misleading because it only takes a single

17

18

referral in order for him to put somebody in that category,

18

you know, all of that period of time.

19

Eagle operations -- or damages caused by IMI's Eagle
operations and St. Al's alleged conduct in relation thereto.

19

20

Q. Mm-hm.

20

21

A. And so, you know, I -- I'm very skeptical of-- of

21

22

the measurement at all, but I think it actually tends to

22

Q. Okay. We can jump back to Exhibit 1, which is

your supplemental report, on Page 10 in particular.
You have a paragraph there about damages to the

That's -- those are new damages that did not exist
in your 2007 report, right?

23

prove the importance ofbeing designated by St. Al's as an

23

A. Yes.

24

affiliate more than it disproves it.

24

Q. Because Eagle was not open at the time, right?

25

A. Correct.

25

Q. It only takes a single referral to MRI Center by a

132

130
1

St. Luke's physician to fall within your category of

1

2

affiliated physicians, right?

2

A. That's true. And -- but as I explained, I think

Q. You write that "MRIA alleges that SARMC usuq; ed
MRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR and IMI to ope

3

additional facilities," one of which I assume is the Eagle

4

that I have observations that more than overcome any sligh

4

facility?

5

tendency that might have to count a few scans that weren't

5

6

appropriately in there.

6

would be in partnership with GSR. I don't have a comple t1:

7

understanding of what MRI's allegations are except that i R

8

had an interest in Eagle from a very early date, and that

9

because ofSARMC's allegations, that opportunity was

3

7
8
9
10

Q. Can you flip to Page 22, Paragraph 49 of Dr.
McCarthy's report?

A.

Y~.

Q. And that paragraph -- and take as much time you

10

suppressed and ultimately funneled to IMI. That's about

11

what I know.

11

need to reread it --but Dr. McCarthy criticizes your

12

Methods 1 through 4 for being above -- being 160 percent f 12

13

the capacity that MRI Central would have had.

14
15
16

Do you have any -- do you think that's a valid
criticism?

A. I don't. I basically discussed this same issues

}

A. I'm not sure that it's necessarily a precedent. It

13
14
15
16

ve 17

1

Q. What's the basis for your understanding that MRL ~
had an interest in Eagle from a very early date?

A. Simply was told that by --that was told to me by
Counsel.

Q. Okay.

17

with Jack Floyd. I'm relying on Mr. Floyd. And we did h~

18

a pretty grand discussion as to what the capacity was, what

18

usurping of a corporate opportunity, and that's -- that's

19

our models showed in terms of scans.

19

what I got.

20

!i

A. And I was asked to basically assume that Eagle w Ill

20

Q. Okay. When did that usurping occur?

21

here shows that scans actually done at MRIC exceeded the

21

A. Well, I think-- this was a little bit of an

22

capacity limits that he's advocating before even getting

22

analytical issue because, as I understand it, this -- it

23

into the but-for period. So I believe that-- well, what

23

occurred quite a number of periods prior to when Eagle v ,s

24

Jack Floyd told me is that they have done, during peak

24

actually opened by IMI, but I've assumed that the

25

periods, scans of the-- of the magnitude which are include

25

opportunity in terms of this diversion didn't happen until

I would point out that Dr. McCarthy's own table in
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1

135
1

actually IMI opened its doors.

2

I think the record might show that had there not

2

3

been this usurpation by St. Al's that MRIA would have opene

3

4

it earlier, but I haven't tried to model damages for that

4

5

earlier period.

5

6

Q. Okay. If the usurpation occurred in 2007 when

6

7

Eagle opened, how could it -- how -- how would it be

7

8

included in the damages calculation based on bad acts

8

9

occurring before April 1st, 2005?

9

10

A. Well, the lawyers are going to have to establish

10

Q. Are you certain they are unrelated to this case?
A. Well, does any-- is McGovern Law Offices in
Phoenix involved in this case at all?

MR. WOODARD: No.

A. Dr. James, is there a Dr. James involved in-McGovern, or Heather McGovern Law Offices?

MR. WOODARD: No.
BY MR. VERGONIS:
Q. Okay. So it looks like thee-mails are completely ·
irrelevant.

11

that, but I think that they believe that the usurpation and

11

12

the origins of it was during the period when MRIA was in

12

the end? There's a reference to MRI, I think, but I suspe'

13

association with St. Alphonsus.

13

this is irrelevant, too, from -- to the extent I can make

14

out the handwriting.

14

15
16

Q. Okay. And you're assuming that for purposes of
your opinion?

15

A. I'm not offering an opinion as to the correctness

16

I

Could you take a look at that green page, then, at

A. From Asia to Asia. Where do you see the referen

:l:

toMRIA?

17

Q. Not MRIA, but just MRI scans, I think, down at t

f

18

Q. Okay. You write in that paragraph, "Additionally,

18

bottom of it. Looks like it might be a medical case. Thn

~

19

as a partner in MRIA, and as a party to the MRIA partnership

19

lines from the bottom.

20

agreement, SARMC should not have facilitated a supported I v1J. 2 0

21

expansion into Eagle."

17

of that. I'm making that assumption.

22
23

A. Yeah., I see. "Improvement by doctor."

21

I guess I have the same questions about that as I

22

had about the first sentence.

23

Is there a Dr. Fall?
Q. Hm-mm.
A. I don't -- this is nothing I relied on; I can

24

Is it-- and you probably answered it already. Is

24

assure you --

25

it your understanding then that the facilitation or -- or

25

Q. Okay.

"
"

134

136
;'i

1

support ofiMI's expansion into Eagle came at a time pr pr

2

to April 1st, 2005?

3

4

5

I asked if that was your understanding. Is that
your assumption?
A. Yeah. It actually is that -- that this was an

1

A. --of that.

2

Q. I have no objection to removing --

3

A. I appreciate that.

4

Q. -- that from there.

Do you think -- do you think it's possible that

5

~

I

6

opportunity which the-- and that the roots of the

6

something may have been omitted from your binder when y u

7

usurpation happened back in that time period.

7

were putting the binder together that should have gone

8

behind Tab No. 5 or Tab No. 6?

8
9

Q. Okay. Here is your binder. You can have this

9

back.

10

A. Thank you.

10

11

Q. Can you turn to Tab 5 though? I think it's Tab 5

11

A. This?

12

13

Q. That's the wrong tab. Actually, Tab 6.

13

14

A. Okay.

14

12

15
16

17
18

19

Q. Then there's another tab right behind 6 that says
"Reports."

Q. What are-- what's the relevance of those

e-mail~

to this case?

A. Yeah. I think that's originally where my expert
report was filed.

15

Q. Okay.

A. It's now at the front of the binder.

18
19

20

A. I think they were mistakenly put in this binder.

20

21

Q. Okay. That was my assumption.

21

22

A. I appreciate you pointing it out for me.

22

23

Q. Yeah. I'm sorry. It's behind the Reports tab

that comes after Tab No. 6.

16
17

A. Yeah.

A. Well, there is stuffbehind Tab No.6, is there
not?

Do you have any objection if we remove them ftc~ 2 3

24

the exhibit since they may relate to confidential matters

24

25

having to do with -- unrelated to the case?

25

Q. All right. Well, I removed those pages from the
copies as well.
A. Kind of you. Thank you.
MR. VERGONIS: We can take a short break. I migh~
be done or close to being done.
MR. WOODARD: Did we remove them from the co

i
y

that's going to be the exhibit?
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is --you still wan ·•
to go off the record?
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1

MR. WOODARD: You can go off the record.

1

2

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 12:47 p.m. We're

2

3
4

off the record.

3

(Recess taken.)

question and answer, please?
(The following encompasses the entire readback
portion.)

11!

4

Q. What is more accurate with reference to Methods

5

through four that the assumption is that MR.IA would have •

5

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the record. The tim Is

6

approximately 12:52 p.m. EXAMINATION (Continuing)

6

remained a designated St. Alphonsus imaging center or th~

7

BY MR. VERGONIS:

7

the assumption is that affiliated physicians with St.

8

Alphonsus would confer to refer with MR.IA?

8
9

Q. I want to jump back, Mr. Budge, to Dr. McCarthy's

report. Do you have that handy? At Page 14, Dr. McCarthy

9

A. Actually what my model does is the latter. It

10

criticizes there in this section of his report some of your

10

assumes that this referral base continues to make the

11

--some of your assumptions about the but-for world. I

11

referrals to MR.IA. And it really isn't built on a

12

don't want to get into whether the assumptions are

12

foundation that it's because of an official nomination of it

13

reasonable or not, but I did want to -- if you can turn to

13

is a site or any other reason.

14

Page 15 and Paragraph 31, Dr. McCarthy does some

14

(Whereupon the readback concluded.)

15

calculations that show the impact on your damages

15

MR. VERGONIS: Okay. I have nothing further.

16

calculations and Mr. Wilhoite's calculations. I'm assuming

16

MR. WOODARD: Did you have "confer" in there? It

17

that the on-campus and Eagle facilities would have existed

17

18

anyway in the but-for world.

18

THE COURT REPORTER: Okay.

Do you have any -- assuming those assumptions --

19

MR. WOODARD: Well, and then I want to makes e

20

assuming the assumptions are as Dr. McCarthy states them, do

20

he understood that I was saying continue to refer than

21

you generally agree with his calculations there?

21

confer to refer I think is --

19

should be "continue to refer."

22

A. Well, I haven't really evaluated them. I think

22

THE WITNESS: Okay.

23

what I understand him to say is he's taking out IMI -- St.

23

MR. WOODARD: --how it was read.

24

Alphonsus' campus facility and Eagle and -- and then -- and

24

25

then calculating what remains, but I haven't checked his

25

THE WITNESS: Yeah. I understood you to be aski g
me--

140

138
1
2

calculations.

Q. I guess I was going to ask the same question abou
Downto~ '11

1

MR. VERGONIS: Is this on the record now?

2

THE COURT REPORTER: Yes.

3

Paragraph 34 where he is assuming that the IMI

3

MR. VERGONIS: Okay.

4

facility would have existed anyway and changing the

4

THE WITNESS: -- whether the underlying assumption

5

calculations based on that assumption.

5

was that these affiliated physicians would continue to refer

6

patients.

6
7
8
9
10

A. I haven't tried to recompute his amount, so I
don't know.
MR. VERGONIS: Okay. That's fine. I have no
further questions.
MR. WOODARD: Okay. I--Ihavejust--Ithink

8

MR. VERGONIS: Okay.

9

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Here marks the end ofVideot fe

10

Label No.2 in the deposition of Bruce Budge. Transcript
orders will now be taken by the court reporter.

just one question for you, Mr. Budge.

11

12

EXAMINATION

12

13

BY MR. WOODARD:

13

Q. What is more accurate with reference to Methods

MR. WOODARD: Okay.

7

11

14

'b

THE COURT REPORTER: Mr. Vergonis, do you want
order the original?

~

14

MR. VERGONIS: Yes.

15

THE COURT REPORTER: And you indicated you war ~d

15

through 4 that the assumption is that MRIA would have

16

remained a designated St. Alphonsus imaging center or tlJ at 16

17

the assumption is that affiliated physicians with St.

18

Alphonsus would continue to refer to MRIA?

a rough draft?

17

MR. VERGONIS: Yes, please.

18

THE COURT REPORTER: Mr. Woodard?

19

A. Actually what my model does is the latter. It

19

MR. WOODARD: Same.

20

assumes that this referral base continues to make the

20

THE COURT REPORTER: Rough draft for you too?

21

referrals to MRIA. And it really isn't built on a

21

MR. WOODARD: Please.

22

foundation that it's because of an official nomination of it

22

THE COURT REPORTER: Thank you.

is the site or any other reason.

23

MR. WOODARD: And I guess we'll have the same dea

23

N

24

MR. WOODARD: Thank you. Nothing else.

24

as before. We'll -- we'll have him sign based on reading a

25

MR. VERGONIS: Can you read that back for me,

25

copy.
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MR. VERGONIS: Okay. Great. And within ten days,

1

2

if possible. I don't want to ruin your --

3

MR. WOODARD: Yeah, ten days.

143
1

TIME

2

12:52:47 2

ONREC

3

12:54:50 2

CHX

12:58:47 2

OFFREC

4

MR. VERGONIS: -- fishing vacation.

4

5

MR. WOODARD: Ten days of--

5

6

MR. VERGONIS: Ten days of receipt, so-- of the

7

file -- of the -THE WITNESS: Let's make sure I've got--

8

THE COURT REPORTER: Stay on the record?

9

MR. VERGONIS: We can go off the record, I think,

13

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 12:58 p.m. We

e 12
13

off the record.
(Whereupon a Supplemental Expert Report of Bruce

14

10
11

for this.

12

VERGONIS
WOODARD

6

9

11

i

EXAMINATION OBJECT! iN

7

8

10

VIDEO KEY WORD

14

15

P. Budge was marked Exhibit 4 for identification.)

15

16

(Whereupon the deposition was concluded.)

16

17

(Signature reserved.)

17

18

18

19

19

20

20

21

21

22

22

23

23

24

24

25

25

142
VIDEOGRAPHER'S EVENT LOG
2

ASSIGNMENT:

14315-2

3

ASSIGNMENT DATE: 8/11/2011

4

CASE I IN RE:

5

VIDEOGRPAHER:

6

BEGIN TIME:

7

ENDTIME:

8

TIME

144
1

OBJECTION KEY

2

ANA

ASKED AND ANSWERED

=

3

ACP

=

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

SAINT ALPHONSUS vs. MRI ASSOCIATES, LP 4

ARG

=

ARGUMENTATIVE

5

BDG

=

BADGERING

6

CHX

=

CHANGE EXAMINATION

7

COM

=

8

CLC

=

CALLS FOR LEGAL CONCLUSION

CSP

=

CALLS FOR SPECULATION

SID FOX

09:06AM
12:58 PM

VIDEO KEYWORD

EXAMINATION OBJECTIO'i

9

09:06:23 I

ONREC

10

09:10:12 1

EX. #I

VERGONIS

VERGONIS

10

9

FRM

11

09:22:28 I

EX. #2

VERGONIS

11

INA

12

09:26:00 I

EX. #3

VERGONIS

13

09:59:47 I

OFFREC

14

10:09:26 I

ONREC

15

10:31:34 I

MST

16

10:40:16 I

OBJ

17

10:50:10 I

OFFREC

VERGONIS

18

10:50:50 I

ONREC

VERGONIS

19

II: II :06 I

OFFREC

VERGONIS

20

11:27:46 2

ONREC

VERGONIS

20

VERGONIS
VERGONIS
VERGONIS
VERGONIS

21

11:42:16 2

EX. #5

22

11:53:15 2

OFFREC

VERGONIS

23

12:15:15 2

ONREC

VERGONIS

24

12:33:43 2

OBJ

25

12:47:34 2

OFFREC

WOODARD
WOODARD

VERGONIS

VERGONIS
VERGONIS

WOODARD

COMPOUND

FORM

=

INSTRUCTED NOT TO ANSWER

=

12

LDG

=

LEADING

13

LKF

=

LACKS FOUNDATION

14

MTS

=

MOVE TO STRIKE

15

MST

=

MISSTATES THE TESTIMONY

16

MCT

=

MISCHAR.ACTERIZES THE TESTIMON V

17

OBJ

=

*OBJECTION

18

REL

=

RELEVANCE

19

SOB

=

SAME OBJECTION

STQ

=

STRIKE THE QUESTION

0

21

VAG

22

ONREC

=

VAGUE
ON THE RECORD

23

OFFREC

=

OFF THE RECORD

24

*Objections not noted on this Key are to be indicated wit '

25

the "OBJ" abbreviation.

=
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CERTIFICATE OF VIDEOGRAPHER

1
2
3

I the undersigned, Sid Fox, am a videographer on behalf

147
1

Date:

2

Attorney: WadeL. Woodard, Esquire

3

4

of the NAEGELI REPORTING CORPORATION. I do hereby ce ify 4

5

that I have accurately made the video recording of the

August 24, 2011

Assignment#: 14315-2

Deponent: Bruce Budge
Case:

SACD Vs. MRIA

5

6

deposition of Bruce Budge, in the above captioned matter on

6

ATTORNEY- TRANSCRIPT ENCLOSED: Signature of

I

7

the eleventh day of August, 2011, taken at the location of

7

your client is required. Please have your client make any

i,

8

Naegeli Reporting, 601 Union Street, Suite 1624, Seattle, WA

8

corrections necessary. Sign the Correction Sheet where

l

9

98101, consisting of2 DVD(s).

9

indicated. Forward a COPY of the executed Correction Sh ft

10
11

12

10
No alterations, additions or deletions were made
thereto.

13
14

I further certify that I am not related to any of the

directly to the attomey(s) listed below. (The Address(es)

11

can be found on the Appearance page of the deposition.)

12

Also, send a COPY of the executed Correction Sheet to our

13

corporation.

14

15

parties in the action and have no financial interest in the

15

16

outcome of this matter.

16

17

17

18

18

19

Sid Fox

19

20

Videographer

20

21

I

21

22

22

23

8111/2011

23

24

Date

24

25

CC:Christian G. Vergonis, Esquire

I

25
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1

CORRECTION SHEET

1

CERTIFICATE

2

Deposition of: Bruce Budge

3

Regarding:

to the Rules of Civil Procedure, the witness named herein

4

Reporter:

5

appeared before me at the time and place set forth in the

5

6

caption herein; that at the said time and place, I reported

6

Please make all corrections, changes or clarifications

7

in stenotype all testimony adduced and other oral

7

to your testimony on this sheet, showing page and line

8

proceedings had in the foregoing matter; and that the

8

number. Ifthere are no changes, write "none" across

9

foregoing transcript pages constitute a full, true and

9

the page. Sign this sheet on the line provided.

2

3
4

I, Eva Jankovits, do hereby certifY that pursuant

Date: 8/11 /II

SADC Vs. MRIA
Eva Jankovits

10

correct record of such testimony adduced and oral proceed ~g 1 0

Page Line Reason for Change

11

had and of the whole thereof.

11

-- -- --------------r

12

12

13

IN WITNESS HEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand t1 is 13

---------------------------------------;
----------------------------------------wt

14

17th day of August, 2011.

14

---------------------------------------;

15

15

16

16

17

17

-- -- ---------------{
-- -- ---------------{
-- -- ---------------{

18

18

19

19

---------------------------------------;

20

-- -- --------------1!

20

/Signed

21

Eva Jankovits

September 29, 2013

---------------------------------------;'

21

-- -- --------------1!

22

22

-- --

23

23

-----------------------------------------)

24

24

Commission Expiration

25

25

______________,

Signature_____________________
Bruce Budge

,..g,:;,
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1

DECLARATION

2
3

Deposition of: Bruce Budge

4

Regarding:

Date: 8/11111

SADC Vs. MRlA

5
6
7
8

I declare under penalty of perjury the following to be

9

true:

i'

10
11

I have read my deposition and the same is true and

12

accurate save and except for any corrections as made

13

by me on the Correction Page herein.

14
15

Signed at

16

on the

{

day of

2011.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Bruce Budge

25
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Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
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MOTION IN LIMINE TO
PRECLUDE QUESTIONING OF
MRIA'S EXPERTS CONCERNING
THE REASONABLENESS OF NONTECHNICAL FACTUAL
ASSUMPTIONS

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
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PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
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ORIGINAL

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Memorandum in Support oftheir Motion in
Limine to Preclude Questioning ofMRIA's Experts Concerning the Reasonableness ofNon-

Technical Factual Assumptions.

I.

INTRODUCTION

At deposition, Saint Alphonsus repeatedly asked MRIA's expert, Bruce Budge, whether
he considered the non-technical factual assumptions provided to him to be reasonable. These
sorts of questions are improper. As this Court has already held, if the alleged facts involved can
and will be weighed by a jury, an expert should refrain from opining as to their reasonableness,
since such testimony would be unhelpful. As such, MRIA moves to preclude any questions by
Saint Alphonsus concerning whether MRIA' s experts consider the non-technical factual
assumptions provided to them to be reasonable, since these sorts of questions clearly invade the
province of the jury and are likely to cause unnecessary confusion.

II.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

Though this Motion concerns the testimony ofMRIA's experts (particularly Bruce
Budge), a decision this Court has already made concerning Saint Alphonsus's expert, Dr.
Thomas McCarthy, is controlling. As this Court knows, on July 29, 2011, MRIA filed a motion
to preclude certain portions of Dr. McCarthy's expert report because he was obviously opining
as to whether the facts underlying some ofMRIA's experts' opinions were reasonable. In
particular, MRIA took exception to the fact that in several places, Dr. McCarthy stated outright
that he considered certain non-technical factual assumptions which MRIA's experts relied upon,
and which were to be proven at trial, as "implausible." MRIA argued that Dr. McCarthy's
testimony concerning his views ofthe plausibility of these factual scenarios clearly infringed on
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the mandate of the jury, whose job it will be to determine whether MRIA has proved the facts
relied upon by MRIA's experts.
After full briefing and argument, this Court agreed that an expert generally should not
opine on whether the underlying facts-especially facts that a jury is capable of understanding
on its own-are reasonable or not:
Here, the Court finds that portions of... Dr. McCarthy's report are not admissible because
they will not aid the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. The Court understands
[portions of the Dr. McCarthy's report] to attack the assumptions of Drs. Budge and
Wilhoite .... [Certain of Dr. McCarthy's report's] paragraphs ... appear to be nothing
more than argument and fact testimony. There is nothing technical contained in those
paragraphs. ... It falls upon counsel to prove the facts underlying the case, and the jurors
may then adopt calculations provided by experts. However, counsel may not cloak their
arguments as to the existence of certain facts in the authority of an expert.
Consolidated Order Re: Motions Heard August 5, 2011, p. 6 (emphasis added). The Court's
decision comports with clear Idaho law. See, e.g., State v. Ellington,--- Idaho---, 253 P.3d 727
(2011) (whether party acted intentionally was an inference that could be drawn by jurors, and
thus expert testimony was inappropriate); Chapman v. Chapman, 147 Idaho 756,760,215 P.3d
476, 480 (2009) (whether design of bathroom presented a hazard was within the competence of
the average juror and therefore expert opinion would not assist the trier of fact); Warren v.
Sharp 139 Idaho 599, 606, 83 P.3d 773, 780 (2003) Gurors do not need an expert to determine
whether party could have avoided accident); Sheridan v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center,
135 Idaho 775, 786, 25 P.3d 88, 99 (2001) (expert testimony on causation unnecessary when jury
"could reasonably and naturally infer from the chain of circumstances that a breach of the
standard of care ... proximately caused [the] injuries.").
In spite of this Court's decision and unambigous Idaho law, when Mr. Budge was
deposed, counsel for Saint Alphonsus repeatedly asked him if he factored into his analysis
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whether the assumptions provided to him-which again were based on facts that would be
proven at trial-seemed reasonable to him. The following exchange serves as just one example:

Q. Okay. Is it your opinion that IMI would never have provided MRI services but for
the acts of St. Alphonsus?
A. I don't weigh in on those issues in terms of, you know, guilt and innocent and that
sort of thing, so I don't have an opinion on it.
Q. Just an assumption?
A. Yes.
Q. What is the basis for the assumption?
A. My instruction in my assignment.
Q. Did you do any independent assessment of the facts?
A. I don't. As an expert witness, I think that's outside my proper role. I did not.
Q. Okay. So do you have an opinion whether the assumption is reasonable?
A. From-- personal opinion in terms of the-- what I know about the case, and that type
of thing, that there are substantive allegations that -- that would -- could cause the
jury to come to that conclusion, but I'm not offering them expert opinion about it.
Q. You're not offering an opinion. Okay.
A. About-Q. About whether the assumption is reasonable?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. They're going to have to basically weigh the evidence and decide that on their own.
Q. So it's irrelevant to your job, as you see it here, whether the assumptions you're
relying upon are reasonable or unreasonable?
A. Well, depends on which assumptions. I mean, I'm -- I'm -- I'm modelling basically
what I think the pattern of referrals and scans would have been, and all the
assumptions that -- that go in to what I do in terms of developing a model which is
responsive to the allegations, that type of thing, I have evaluated. Whether or not
MRI's allegations against the hospital are proven or not, I have not weighed in.
See the Deposition of Bruce Budge, Aug. 8, 2011, which is attached to the Affidavit of Brent
Bastian in support ofthis motion, at 58:11-59:24 (emphasis added).
These sorts of questions by Saint Alphonsus are obviously improper under this Court's
order and Idaho law. Again, this Court has already found that expert testimony concerning the
non-technical facts at issue in this case is impermissible. Consolidated Order Re: Motions Heard
August 5, 2011, p. 6. And if it is unallowable for an expert to opine on the reasonableness of
these non-technical facts, it is similarly unallowable for counsel to ask these same experts
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whether they did, in fact, personally investigate the reasonableness of these same facts. The
unfair implication, as from the above exchange, is that the expert somehow did something wrong
by not independently testing yet-to-be-proven assumptions when, in actuality, the expert had no
business doing so in the first place.
Several evidentiary rules support this position. Obviously, Rule 401 would bar these
questions, since this Court has already found that expert testimony concerning the
reasonableness of non-technical factual assumptions is not admissible. Furthermore, even if
minimally relevant, Rule 403 would preclude such questions, since the jurors might be misled
into believing that the expert should have investigated the reasonableness of the factual
assumptions prior to relying on them. Finally, because this Court has already found that
testimony concerning the reasonableness of non-technical factual assumptions in this case would
be unhelpful under Rule 702, questions aimed at extracting opinions concerning this same
subject matter would be similarly prohibited.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, MRIA asks that this Court grant its Motion in Limine to
Preclude Questions to MRIA's Experts Concerning the Reasonableness ofNon-Technical
Factual Assumptions.
DATED this 11th day of October, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent S. Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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the within and foregoing instrument was served by hand on the following:
JackS. Gjording
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Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
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Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
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Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
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Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

MOTION TO QUASH/MODIFY
SUBPOENAS OR OTHERWISE
PRECLUDE MRIA FROM CALLING
WITNESSES WITHOUT ADEQUATE
NOTICE

Defendant.

MOTION TO QUASH/MODIFY SUBPOENAS OR OTHERWISE PRECLUDE MRIA FROM
CALLING WITNESSES WITHOUT ADEQUATE NOTICE - I

002787

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
VS.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d) provides that a subpoena may be quashed if it is
"unreasonable, oppressive, fails to allow time for compliance, ... or subjects a person to undue
burden." Likewise, the trial has discretion under Idaho Rule of Evidence 611 (a)(3) to "exercise
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence
so as to ... protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."
Saint Alphonsus respectfully requests that the Court exercise its power under these rules
to deny enforcement of the outstanding subpoenas and prevent MRIA from calling Sally
Jeffcoat, Carolyn Corbett, and Ken Fry, at least temporarily, based on MRIA's attempt to evade
this Court's order regarding the procedure for advance identification of planned trial witnesses,
and in light ofMRIA's attempt to retract its representation as to its remaining witnesses.
By way of background, during the September 2, 2011 pre-trial conference, undersigned
counsel had the following colloquy with Mr. Banducci and the Court:
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MR. GJORDING: Yes, sir. Talking about procedure, we may have
talked about this at the pre-trial, but is it -- am I understanding it
correctly that at the end of the trial day the party who was
presenting their case will advise the opposing party of what
witnesses will be called the following day?
THE COURT: That is what I understand, number one, would be
this Court's policy, and, number two, both parties agreed to do that.
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: So, yes.
Sept. 2, 2011 Trial Tr. at 14-15 (excerpted at Ex. A) (emphasis added). On Friday,
October 7, 2011, MRIA represented that on Tuesday, October lOth, MRIA would continue the
direct of Jack Floyd, would call Dr. Giles, and "[i]fwe end up with spare time on Tuesday, it
will be a short witness in duration, probably someone like Jack Havlina. And I believe at that
point we'll be ready to go into our two damage experts, Your Honor." 10/7/2011 Trial Tr. at
3948-49. MRIA then represented that "We will rest after the experts. I will tell you that."
On Sunday, October 10, Saint Alphonsus notified MRIA that, upon consideration of
MRIA' s asserted fact witnesses, and "in view of the limitations of cross examination to the scope
of direct, we believe that the remaining fact witnesses may well not fill up Tuesday." (See Ex.
B) (12:37 PM email). MRIA responded by stating that, instead of proceeding to its experts as it
had stated on Friday, it would instead call additional Saint Alphonsus witnesses "on Tuesday" to
fill any additional time. (Ex. B) ( 1:18 PM email). MRIA then left a voicemail for Saint
Alphonsus's counsel indicating that it was "thinking about" putting on Saint Alphonsus's CEO
and its former Vice President Carolyn Corbett. Saint Alphonsus responded by reminding MRIA
what it had stated in Court, including the fact that MRIA did not give notice that it might call

MOTION TO QUASH/MODIFY SUBPOENAS OR OTHERWISE PRECLUDE MRIA FROM
CALLING WITNESSES WITHOUT ADEQUATE NOTICE- 3

002789

Ms. Jeffcoat or Ms. Corbett, and that MRIA was not providing reasonable notice to call Ms.
Jeffcoat or Ms. Corbett as witnesses. (Ex. B) (3:56PM email).
MRIA then responded that its "plans had changed" based on the fact that Saint Alphonsus
might not fill Tuesday by cross-examining MRIA witnesses. 1 (Ex. B) (4:20PM email). MRIA
then stated that "I am giving you more than 24 hour notice for Jeffcoat and Corbett. They are
under subpoena. If you plan on not having them there, you should move to quash." (!d.) MRIA
followed up with yet another email, indicating that it would also call Ken Fry. (Ex. C) (Oct. 10
email chain) (11: 19 AM email). Saint Alphonsus responded that Ms. Jeffcoat and Ms. Corbett
were not available based on longstanding commitments, but that it was still checking on Mr. Fry.

(!d.) (12: 17 PM email). MRIA responded: "Jack, you will need to move to quash. We have
given 24 hours notice, and the subpoena takes precedence. We will ask for assistance from the
sheriff, unless you are moving to quash." (Ex. C) ( 12:21 PM email). Saint Alphonsus was later
able to contact Ken Fry, and although MRIA had not properly identified him, offered to make
him available at 4 pm Tuesday, even though this required Mr. Fry to cut short his vacation. (Ex.
C) (5:30PM email.) At approximately 8:45pm, MRIA refused the offer.

MRIA's threat to call the sheriffto procure Ms. Jeffcoat, Ms. Corbett, and Mr. Fry is
improper, and should be prevented by the Court. The Court ordered, and MRIA agreed, that
forthcoming witnesses must be identified during the prior trial day. 912/2011 Hr'g Tr. at 14-15.

1

MRIA's response that Saint Alphonsus's shorter-than-anticipated cross-examination
somehow justifies adding additional witnesses on Tuesday is a non-sequitur. The length of the
cross does not delay MRIA or prevent it from going forward with the witnesses it identified.
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Not only did MRIA fail to identify Ms. Jeffcoat, Ms. Corbett, Mr. Fry on Friday, October 7th, it
also represented that it would not call any more Saint Alphonsus witnesses before ending its
case. Instead, it represented that it would call Floyd, Giles, Havlina, Budge, and Wilhoite, and
then rest. The Court should hold MRIA to its representation and quash MRIA's remaining
subpoenas for Saint Alphonsus's witnesses.
Alternatively, the Court should prevent MRIA, under Rule 611(a)(3), from calling Ms.
Jeffcoat, Ms. Corbett, or Mr. Fry on Tuesday in contravention of this Court's order requiring
notice on the prior trial day. Further, the Court should likewise provide that these witnesses
cannot be called until their prior commitments have ended, to avoid harassing or embarrassing
these witnesses. See id But for MRIA's unwarranted change from its Friday representation,
Ms. Jeffcoat, Ms. Corbett, and Mr. Fry could have attended to their commitments this week
without worry that MRIA would send the sheriff to haul them into court. They should be
allowed to see to those commitments, without MRIA's improper threat hanging over them.
CONCLUSION
The Court should quash or modify the subpoenas for remaining Saint Alphonsus
witnesses, or else preclude under I.R.E 611(a) MRIA's attempt to call witnesses inconsistent
with the terms of this Court's order of September 2, 2011.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 11th day ofOctober, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of October, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

MOTION TO QUASH/MODIFY SUBPOENAS OR OTHERWISE PRECLUDE MRIA FROM
CALLING WITNESSES WITHOUT ADEQUATE NOTICE - 6

002792

BOISE, IDAHO

1

Friday,

2

September 2, 2011,

3:00 p.m.

3

THE COURT:

4

I have presented to you

5

pre-proof instructions that I

6

jury prior to my voir dire examination.

7

counsel can feel free if they want to send

8

something by e-mail over the weekend for me to

9

look at.

10

I

will give to the
And

will probably be down here either on

Sunday or Monday.

11

The Court will note that since we were

12

last handling this case on jury selection for the

13

distribution of the questionnaires that two jurors

14

have called the Court,

15

84.

16

in one case plans that developed because someone

17

gave him tickets on transportation to go back to

18

Georgia,

19

service deferred,

20

stipulate that that juror could be dismissed.

21

second juror who had filled out his questionnaire,

22

but it had been missed on the questionnaire that

23

he had a pre-existing vacation package and airline

24

ticket and was leaving on Tuesday morning.

25

would have been excused in any event by the Court,

Jurors No.

80 and Juror No.

Those two jurors had issues with regard to --

and he asked if he could have his jury
and counsel were kind enough to

1

A

He
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1

there.

THE COURT:

2
3

I know that Ms. Westermier will be there.
So there are going to be at

least two people?

4

MR. GJORDING:

5

THE COURT:

6

I don't have any objection

Mr. Banducci, who are you going to have
at counsel table?
MR. BANDUCCI:

9

10

Prochaska,

11

Floyd.

12

Well,

with you introducing those folks.

7

8

Yes.

Dr.

Your Honor,

Jim Prochaska,

THE COURT:

probably Jim

and perhaps Mr.

And I don't have any

All right.

13

problem with you introducing those.

14

will be introducing my staff,

15

introduce your clients.

I mean,

I

and you're free to

Anything else?

16
17

Jack

MR. GJORDING:

Yes,

sir.

Talking about

18

procedure, we may have talked about this at the

19

pre-trial, but is it -- am I understanding it

20

correctly that at the end of the trial day the

21

party who was presenting their case will advise

22

the opposing party of what witnesses will be

23

called the following day?

24
25

THE COURT:
number one,

That is what I understand,

would be this Court's policy,

14

and,
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1

number two,

both parties agreed to do that.

2

MR. BANDUCCI:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. GJORDING:

Yes,

So,

sir.

yes.
And one other thing does come
Having listened carefully to

5

to mind,

Your Honor

6

your instruction when we met with the folks to get

7

the questionnaire,

8

indicated that this case concludes on the 14th of

9

October,

the instruction that you gave

certainly no later than the 17th.

And I

10

know we have already covered this in one of our

11

pre-trial discussions,

12

if it does go over you will get a plan B judge to

13

do whatever it is that you need to do.

and that is that you said

Is it -- I think it's possible,

14

Your

15

Honor -- like if MRIA doesn't finish their case,

16

say,

17

we would not be able to finish by the 14th, and I

18

just wanted to have some guidance,

19

inquire whether or not the jury should be

20

forewarned about that.

21

by the 30th of September,

THE COURT:

it's possible that

A,

and,

B,

to

I think -- obviously if I am

22

being advised now

23

parties sort of determined that that timeline gave

24

sufficient flexibility for any period or

25

additional things that might be needed.

I thought this was

15

the

I would
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1

be happy to add a statement that this is the

2

parties' best estimate, but the Court cannot

3

guarantee what the date of closing might be

4

because things happen in trials that might require

5

it to go longer.

6

over how long they decide to deliberate.

And obviously we have no control

And if somebody has a vacation that's

7
8

starting on October 20th,

9

to Hawaii or something,

that they have tickets

they better let us know.

And if I forget to do that,

10

counsel can

11

feel free to remind me at the time of the

12

examination.

13

MR.

GJORDING:

14

MR. BANDUCCI:

Thank you,

Your Honor.

Your Honor,

I know we

15

discussed this at the pre-trial,

but I

just want

16

to reconfirm this.

17

will proceed with voir dire -- actually,

18

two things that I want to address.

After the Court's voir dire,

I

there are

One is it can happen that we get a

19
20

potential juror who is really raising some issues

21

that either we're not completely articulating in

22

the questionnaire or in the course of my questions

23

I am getting a lot of push back on either hardship

24

or something that probably would result in a cause

25

excuse.

And I will do it however the Court would

16
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Fw: Fwd:

Begin forwarded message:
From: Thomas Banducci <TBanducci(wBWSLawGroup.com>
Date: October 9, 2011 1:18:13 PM MDT
To: Jack Gjording <jgjording@g-g.com>, Wade Woodard<
WWoodard(w B WSLawGroup.com>, Brent Bastian <bbastian(ai,B WSLawGroup.com>,
Dara Parker <dparker@:bwslawgroup.com>
Subject: Re: Fwd:
Jack, got your email. We intend to finish Floyd, and call Giles and will add Havlina to our list for
Tuesday. The exams of Floyd and Giles will be rather thorough. We expect them to both last
roughly an hour and a half on direct. If your cross exams are likely to be substantially shorter
than our direct examinations, please advise. I have been considering calling a couple more SA
witnesses, so if time is available, I may add them on Tuesday. Please let me know ASAP so I can
adjust our witness schedules accordingly. Thanks.

From: Jack Gjording [mailto:jgjording@g-g.com]
Sent: Sunday, October 09, 2011 01:10PM
To: Thomas Banducci; Wade Woodard; Brent Bastian; Dara Parker
Subject: Fwd:

Tom, et al,
I have tried to send this mail to you a couple of times but I keep getting it back.
Please confirm that you have received it. Jack

Begin forwarded message:
From: Jack Gjording <jgjording@g-g.com>
Date: October 9, 2011 12:37:40 PM MDT
To: Banducci Tom <tbanducci(cvbwslawgroup.com>

Tom, Wade and Brent,
We have considered further the remaining potential fact witnesses that you
have identified for Tuesday before you call your experts. Especially in view of
the limitations of cross examination to the scope of direct, we believe that the
remaining fact witnesses may well not fi ll up Tuesday. We wanted you to know
our thinking on this ASAP, so that you can plan accordingly. Jack

!SIG:4e91 f1 a415445250 1316720!
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Begin forwarded message:
From: Thomas Banducci <TBanducciCU)BWSLawGroup.com>
Date: October 9, 2011 4:20:29 PM MDT
To: Jack Gjording <jgjording(mg-g.com>
Subject: Re: Tuesday
Jack, neither of my experts will be here on Tuesday. They are out of town. If you had told me this
sooner, I might have been able to do something.
Further, if you took in all of what I said in court, you would note that I said I would tell you if
plans changed. Apparently they have changed, based on this Sunday information from you.
I am giving you more than 24 hour notice for Jeffcoat and Corbett. They are under subpoena. If
you plan on not having them there, you should move to quash.

From: Jack Gjording [mailto:jgjording@g-g.com]

Sent: Sunday, October 09, 2011 03:56PM
To: Thomas Banducci
Subject: Tuesday

Tom:
On Friday you mentioned that on Tuesday you would call Floyd, Giles and
perhaps Havlina, adding "[i]fwe end up with spare time on Tuesday, it will
be a short witness in duration, probably someone like Jack Havlina. And I
believe at that point we'll be ready to go into our two damage experts,
Your Honor." I asked, "And what if you finish?" You responded, "I'm
pretty confident ... the damage experts would follow after. I'm still
debating whether I'm going to put Dr. Havlina on. But we obvious ly want
to get this done next week and get through our damage experts and rest. So
either the damages experts will follow Giles or they will follow Havlina,
who will follow Giles. And if there's a change to that, obviously we'll
have time to let you know." Your concluding remark in this colloquy was,
"I've just given you what my plan is."
Thus Floyd, Giles and possibly Havlina are the only fact witnesses that you
mentioned Friday, to be followed by your experts. With that in mind, my
earlier message to you today was to say that we believe those fact
witnesses may well not fill up Tuesday. That would include our cross
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examination of those witnesses on your case.
Your plan as of Friday before the holiday weekend did not include any
notice to us of a request that Saint Alphonsus produce additional witnesses
for testimony on your case. Your voicemail to me today at midafternoon
Sunday for the first time mentions that you have been "thinking about
putting on" our CEO, Sally Jeffcoat, and our former Vice President, Patient
Care Services, Carolyn Corbett, for testimony on Tuesday. I have no idea whether either
ofthose two witnesses are available on Tuesday, and this is not reasonable notice to
require me to
investigate their availability.
Jack
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From: Jack Gjording <jgjording(iilg-g.com>
Date: October 10, 2011 5:30:40 PM MDT
To: Jack Gjording <jgjording(li;g-g.com>
Subject: Re: SA witnesses for MRIA case in chief
Tom, We finally located Ken Fry. He is on vacation today and was planning on being
on vacation tomorrow. We can, however, make him available at the courthouse
tomorrow at 4pm. Please let me know asap if you want him as I would prefer not to mess
up his vacation unless you plan to call him. Jack

On Oct 10, 2011, at 12:24 PM, "Jack Gjording" <jgjording(Zi)g-g.com> wrote:
Tom, we will be moving quash/modify the subpoena. Jack

On Oct 10,2011, at 12:21 PM, "Thomas Banducci"<
TBanducci(ilJ.BWSLawGroup.com> wrote:
Jack, you will need to move to quash. We have given 24 hours notice, and the
subpoena takes precedence. We will ask for assistance from the sheriff, unless
you are moving to quash.

From: Jack Gjording [mailto:jgjording@g-g.com]
Sent: Monday, October 10, 201112:17 PM
To: Thomas Banducci
Cc: Wade Woodard; Kathy Savell
Subject: Re: SA witnesses for MRIA case in chief

Tom, Because of long standing commitments, Corbett and Jeffcoat are
unavailable for Tuesday and Wednesday. I'm still checking on Fry. Jack

On Oct 10, 2011, at 11: 19 AM, "Thomas Banducci" <
TBanducci(ii),BWSLawGroup.com> wrote:

Jack, in addition to Corbett and Jeffcoat, we will need to call Ken
Fry briefly for our case in chief. We can call him before or after
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our experts testify. Please confirm his availability.

<imageOO l.jpg>
Thomas A. Banducci
tel. 208.342.4411

802 W. Bannock; Suite 500

fax 208.342.4455

Boise, ID 83702

tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com

-!SIG:4e9336c2165141050311649!
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 70 I
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Peter J. Romatowski
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION
TO MRIA'S MOTION TO
PRECLUDE QUESTIONING ABOUT
REASONABLENESS OF EXPERTS'
FACTUAL ASSUMPTIONS

Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S MOTION TO PRECLUDE QUESTIONING
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

It has long been the rule in Idaho that an expert may be examined regarding the facts and

assumptions underlying his opinion. Tyson Creek R. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 174 P. 1004, 1005
(Idaho 1918). It is well-established that if an expert's opinion is "speculative, conclusory, or
unsubstantiated by facts in the record" then the testimony is excludable. Coombs v. Curnow, 148
Idaho 129, 140,219 P.3d 453,464 (2009). Moreover, Idaho Rule ofEvidence 705 provides that
an expert may be "required to disclose the underlying facts or data" with respect to his opinion
"on cross-examination." Given that the reasonableness of the assumptions underlying an
experts' opinion goes to the ultimate issue of whether any credence should be given to the
expert's views, the nature ofthe expert's assumptions and the effect those assumptions have on
the expert's analysis is a primary topic for a vigorous expert cross-examination. See Humetrix,
Inc., v. Gemplus S.C.A., 268 F.3d 910,919 (9th Cir. 2001) ("the reasonableness ofthe
assumptions underlying the experts' ... analysis ... [is] a matter for the jury's consideration in

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S MOTION TO PRECLUDE QUESTIONING
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weighing that evidence."); Dorn v. Burlington N Santa Fe R.R., 397 F.3d 1183, 1196 (9th Cir.
2005) (same); Yacht West, Ltd. v. Christensen Shipyards, Ltd., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1300 (D.
Ore. 2010) ("it is within the jury's realm to weigh criticisms of an expert's assumptions").
Despite the fact that Mr. Budge must base his assumptions on facts in the record, and
cannot offer opinions on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork, MRIA now suggests that,
however implausible Budge's assumptions are, Saint Alphonsus should be precluded from
examining Budge about the "reasonableness" of these assumptions. It is unclear exactly what
reliefMRIA requests. IfMRIA only asks that Budge not be asked to give his opinion on
disputed factual issues Gust as Dr. McCarthy cannot give "opinion" as to the resolution of factual
disputes about liability), then the motion is unnecessary. Saint Alphonsus has no plans to ask
Budge whether it is reasonable to assume that Saint Alphonsus breached fiduciary duties,
breached the contract, or engaged in other conduct at issue in the case.
By contrast, questions designed to flesh out and illuminate the specific factual
assumptions on which Mr. Budge relied upon in creating his opinion, and how his damages
analysis changes based on changes to those assumptions, are highly relevant. To cite one
example, Budge assumes as a basis for his expert opinion that IMI would not have gotten any
referrals from any physician that referred even a single patient to MRIA prior to IMI's opening.
Saint Alphonsus is entitled to probe the source, basis, and reasonableness of this assumption.

1

1

More to the point, this example illuminates the vague nature ofMRIA's motion. Jurors
are unlikely to have knowledge of medical referral practices, and so the assumption underlying
Budge's analysis on this point should be considered "technical" and outside the scope ofMRIA's
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Mr. Budge's damages calculations did not materialize out of thin air. He made certain
assumptions, and Saint Alphonsus is entitled to ask him what those assumptions are and where
they came from, challenge him on what effect those assumptions have on his opinion, and
inquire into how his opinions change-or whether his opinion is even sustainable-if those
assumptions are proven false. To the extent that MRIA seeks to preclude this customary and
necessary mode of expert cross-examination, then its motion should be denied.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 12th day of October 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

(continued ... )

motion. This is likely true for many of Budge's assumptions, and the Court should not grant
MRIA's motion in limine in the abstract. Until the Court hears the context of the questions and
the source of the expert's assumptions, it should not decide whether hypothetical questions to
that expert are unreasonable or forbidden under the Rules.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 12th day of October 2011, a true and correct copy ofthe
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

~

D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Peter J. Romatowski
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION
TO MOTION IN LIMINE TO
PREVENT ARGUMENT AND
EVIDENCE THAT SAINT
ALPHONSUS IS ENTITLED TO AN
"OFFSET" BASED ON ITS
OWNERSHIP OF THE MRI
ENTITIES
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
The black-letter rule regarding compensatory damages in a civil matter is that damages
"'will compensate the injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing more; such as will
simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury."' Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho
598, 609, 850 P.2d 749, 760 (1993) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 352 (5th ed. 1983)). A
party is not entitled to a windfall recovery exceeding its actual loss. See, e.g., Gen. Auto Parts

Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 855, 979 P.2d 1207, I213 (I999); Gilbert v. City
ofCaldwell, II2 Idaho 386, 396, 732 P.2d 355, 365 (Ct. App. I987). MRIA's motion has
nothing to do with any offset being sought by Saint Alphonsus, and is simply an effort to bar
proof that MRIA suffered less damages than it now claims.
As part oftheir calculation oflost profits, MRIA's experts have assumed that, if Saint
Alphonsus's alleged misconduct had not occurred, Saint Alphonsus would have remained a
partner in MRIA throughout the damages period. See 20 II Budge Dep. Tr. at 85 ("my model in
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later years presumes that everybody would have been a happy family and that St. Alphonsus
would not have had a reason to dissociate"); id. at 86 ("Q. Okay, So all five of your methods
assume that St. Alphonsus -the bottom line numbers assume that St. Alphonsus would not have
dissociated? A. That in likelihood would not have dissociated."). The effect of this assumption
is to envision a but-for world in which, after April 1, 2004, a hypothetical version ofMRIA
would have continued to have five partners, including Saint Alphonsus, and on that account
would have been more profitable than MRIA actually was. At the same time, the experts would
have these hypothetical enhanced "five-partner MRIA" profits be recovered by the existing,
four-partner MRIA. The experts have thus inflated the damages that were suffered by the actual
party in this case, giving MRIA as actually constituted a windfall substantially beyond what it
would have earned had the alleged misconduct not occurred.
Not only is this improper, it has already been fully briefed and argued to the Court,
which declined to grant similar relief. Specifically, MRIA's memorandum in support of its
motion to exclude testimony of Saint Alphonsus's expert, Thomas McCarthy ("McCarthy
Mem."), argued the precise grounds set forth in the current "offset" motion, i.e., that it was not
pleaded in the answer to the counterclaim, that it was already accounted for in the buyout share,
and that this is an attempt to "guess" what demand Saint Alphonsus might make on MRIA.
Compare McCarthy Mem. at 16-17 with Offset Mot. at 4-7. The Court's opinion limited Dr.

McCarthy's testimony in some respects, but-although it technically reserved judgment on all
other matters-the ruling in no way credited MRIA's attempt to prohibit Dr. McCarthy's
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criticisms ofMRIA's experts on this point. See Consolidated Order Re: Motions Heard August
5, 2011 at 5-6. Nor should the Court do so now.
MRIA's contention that Saint Alphonsus seeks an "offset" mischaracterizes the issue.
An "offset" is a reduction in actual damages owed to a plaintiff, based on some judgment or
damages owed, on other grounds, to the defendant. See Magic Valley Foods, Inc. v. Sun Valley
Potatoes, Inc., 134 Idaho 785, 791, 10 P.3d 734, 740 (2000). That is not the issue here. 1 Rather,
Saint Alphonsus is challenging MRIA's expert opinions about the amount of actual damages that
MRIA has suffered, and asserting that the claimed amount needs to be reduced by an amount not
suffered. The Supreme Court has already held that MRIA is not entitled to a "damage award
[that] exceed[s] any damages suffered by MRIA" and that MRIA cannot "recover damages on
behalf ofnonparties." Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho
479, 496, 224 P.3d 1068, 1085 (2009). Yet that is precisely what MRIA is attempting to do.
Specifically, MRIA's experts calculate lost profits based on what would have accrued to
a different entity (the hypothetical five-partner "MRIA" that continued to include Saint
Alphonsus), but then fail to determine what share of that hypothetical entity's profits would have
gone to the actual existing four-partner MRIA partnership. Without adjusting the hypothetical
entity's profits to account for what proportion of that loss was suffered by the actual MRIA
plaintiff, MRIA is seeking more than its actual loss-an improper windfall. Thus, the expert's

1

Notably, MRIA's motion is not directed at argument that any award against Saint
Alphonsus must be offset by the outstanding judgment against MRIA for Saint Alphonsus's
partnership share. That is a true "offset," reserved for the Court after a verdict has been rendered
and not to be discussed before the jury.
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explicit assumption that MRIA would have continued as it was with Saint Alphonsus as a
partner, and the relationship between that hypothetical entity's earnings and the actual MRIA's
losses, is a legitimate issue for cross-examination and criticism. See, e.g., Great Lakes Aircraft
Co., Inc. v. City of Claremont, 608 A.2d 840, 857 (N.H. 1992) (rejecting damages award based
on "lost profit estimates [of] a hypothetical business entity" that included the plaintiffbecause
comparison of hypothetical entity's lost profits to the plaintiffs lost profits was "apples and
oranges"); McMillian v. McMillian, 713 S.E.2d 920, 923 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) ("when a partner
wrongfully appropriates a prospective business opportunity of his partnership to his own use or
that of another, the remaining partners ... may recover their share of the profits that the
partnership would have earned from the business opportunity" (emphasis added)).
In short, MRIA is seeking more damages that it personally suffered, through a model of
damages which overestimates MRIA's loss. That has nothing to do with the concept of offset, or
with Saint Alphonsus's departing partner share or Saint Alphonsus's continuing ownership
interest in the limited partnerships. It is solely a challenge to the measure of damages, relating to
the fundamental principle that MRIA cannot recover more than it actually lost.
CONCLUSION

MRIA's motion in limine should be denied.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
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Introduction
Saint Alphonsus (the "Hospital") brings this motion asking the Court to construe the
Radiology Services Contract applicable between the Hospital and Gem State Radiology (the
"Radiologists") and to rule, as a matter of law, that it creates rights and obligations between
those parties with regard to Hospital patients only. Saint Alphonsus requests several orders on
the ground that the Contract creates no rights and obligations of the Radiologists with reference
to non-Hospital patients, as to whom the MRIA parties were free at any time to enter into their
own agreement, with the Radiologists or with others. The Court should enter a directed verdict
that Saint Alphonsus breached no duty owed to any of the MRIA parties by failing to assert the
Radiology Services Contract as an obligation of the Radiologists to serve MRIA outpatients,
instruct the jury to that effect, and enter an order foreclosing MRIA from arguing to the contrary.
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Background
On August 7, 2002, Gem State Radiology ("GSR") informed MRI Center that it would
not monitor scans for certain non-emergency patients between 7:00pm and 7:00am. Ex. 4277.
MRIA argues that the Radiologists were obligated under their Radiology Services Contract with
Saint Alphonsus to provide more extensive coverage than that for all patients receiving scans at
MRIA. In support of this view, MRIA argues that the Contract draws no distinction between
patients of the Hospital, and non-Hospital outpatients whose relationship is exclusively with
MRIA, who by 2002 were the substantial majority ofMRI Center's patients. 1 It also argues that
the Contract precluded MRIA from hiring its own radiologists to interpret those scans. Based on
that interpretation of the contract, MRIA claims that Saint Alphonsus breached its duties by
refusing to enforce that contractual obligation to the benefit of MRI Center.
Under Idaho law, however, the interpretation of a contract is a matter for the court to
decide, and only may be decided by a jury if the contract is ambiguous. The Radiology Services
Contract between Saint Alphonsus and the Radiologists unambiguously creates both an
obligation and an exclusive right of GSR to read only the scans of hospital patients, not MRI
outpatients, and expressly disclaims any intent to create third-party beneficiaries. Thus, as a
matter of law, the Contract does not apply to non-hospital patients. The Court should so hold,
and the jury should be so instructed.

1

See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 194 (Dr. Prochaska expressing his opinion that the Contract covers
all patients on the Medical Center campus, even "if somebody is not a patient at the hospital but
an outpatient coming to MRI Center."
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE RADIOLOGY CONTRACT UNAMBIGUOUSLY APPLIES ONLY TO THE
INTERPRETATION OF SCANS FOR HOSPITAL PATIENTS
During the time period relevant to this case, MRI Center had three types of patients: Saint

Alphonsus hospital inpatients, Saint Alphonsus emergency department patients, and outpatients
who are not admitted to Saint Alphonsus. 2011 Trial Tr. at 92 (MRIA Opening Statement).
MRIA' s counsel has referred to the third category-outpatients referred to MRI Center from
outside physicians-"the bread and butter ofMRI Center," and other evidence indicates that they
accounted for the vast majority of patients receiving MRis there. See Ex. 4309 (9/8/2003 MRIA
Minutes noting that agreement covering "hospital inpatients and hospital outpatients" would not
directly address "85% of the volume of [MRI Center]). Although these "outpatients" were not
hospital patents, MRIA argues that the Contract between Saint Alphonsus and the Radiologists,
to which MRIA was not a party, created both an obligation and an exclusive right in the
Radiologists to read scans for MRI Center patients, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. 2 Based
on MRIA's interpretation of the contract, MRIA argues that Saint Alphonsus's failure to enforce

2

See, e.g., 2011 Trial Tr. at 33:25-34:2 (MRIA Opening Statement) ("So the radiologists
had a responsibility to provide reading services for the MRI Center on the Saint Alphonsus
Campus"); id. at 35:2-5 ("In return for that promise, the radiologists got what is called
'exclusivity.' That means they got to read all of the scans that were generated on the campus.");
9/9111 Trial Tr. at 194 (Prochaska) ("Q .... During opening statement, I believe I heard that the
radiology contract covered all patients at the hospital. Does the responsibility of the radiologists
cover more than that? A. It covers, as it says, the entire medical center campus. Q. So if
somebody is not a patient at the hospital but is an outpatient coming to MRI Center, was it your
view that this covered - this contract covered the services that should be provided? A. Yes.")
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO DIRECT A VERDICT ON CLAIMS RELATED TO
ENFORCEMENT OF THE RADIOLOGY SERVICES CONTRACT - 4

002816

this "obligation" owed to MRIA to hire other radiologists is one of the alleged breaches of duty
supporting each ofMRIA's claims. 3
The legal effect and interpretation of a contract is generally a matter of law for the Court,
and the only exception is where the language of the contract is found to be ambiguous. Bondy v.

Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 829 P.2d 1342, 1347 (1992). A contract is to be construed viewing the
"entire agreement as a whole." Henderson v. Henderson Jnv. Props., L.L.C., 148 Idaho 638, 640,
227 P.3d 568, 570 (Idaho 2010). The question "whether a contract is ambiguous is [itself] an
issue oflaw." McDevitt v. Sportsman's Warehouse, Inc., 255 P.3d 1166, 1169 (Idaho 2011).
The Radiology Services Contract at issue here is not ambiguous and clearly creates no rights or
obligations of the Radiologists relating to the outpatients ofMRI Center.

A.

Under Both the Prior 1997 Agreement and the Relevant 2001 Agreement, the
Scope of the Radiologists' Obligation is Limited to the Medical Staff and
Patients of the "Medical Center"- i.e., the Hospital Itself.

The 1997 Contract. Although not operative at the time the radiologists reduced their
hours of coverage, MRIA has primarily focused on the 1997 Radiology Services Contract. To
the extent needed to establish the historic practice in place during the years from 1997 until
3

See, e.g., 2011 Trial Tr. at 83:11-23 (MRIA Opening Statement):
[Exhibit] 4277. In August of 2002, the radiologists write a
letter to MRI Center saying, "We're only going to service you
Monday to Friday from 7 o'clock to 7 o'clock. Thereafter, we will
only service you if it's an emergency."
Saint Alphonsus-let's go to 4292. Saint Alphonsus is
notified of this cut in hours and does nothing. Remember the
radiology contract. The radiologists would provide the modalities
full and competent service 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
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2001, the document is relevant as it shows, as a matter of law, that there was no contractual
obligation by the radiologists to serve non-hospital outpatients of MRIA.
The extent of the Radiologists' obligations under the 1997 Services Contract are
discernible from the first two pages of that document. Ex. 4033. Recital A on page 1 states that
Saint Alphonsus is a "501(c)(3) corporation" that "owns and operates a regional medical center
(the 'Medical Center')" in Boise, Idaho. Recital Don the bottom of page 1 states further that
"Saint Alphonsus and the Group contemplate that all radiology services required by the Medical
Center and its medical staff and patients shall be provided by the Group except for certain
exclusions described in this Agreement." (emphasis added).
These two provisions together make clear that services to be provided pursuant to the
contract are those "required by the Medical Center" - which is the "regional medical center" that
is "own[ed] and operate[ d)" by Saint Alphonsus- and required by the Medical Center's
"medical staff and patients." The term "Medical Center" on its face, does not apply to MRI
Center, which is not "owned and operated" by Saint Alphonsus, is not a corporation, and is not a
501(c)(3) non-profit organization. MRI Center is owned and operated by MRIA, a for-profit
limited liability partnership which simply rented space from the hospital.
These basic provisions are reiterated and elaborated upon in a number of other
provisions of the 1997 Contract, and in each instance the scope of the obligation and rights of the
Radiologists is defined in terms of the "Medical Center" - the hospital owned by Saint
Alphonsus - and its patients. Recital E on page 2 states that the Radiologists "accept the
responsibility of providing medical and professional component of radiology and medical
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imaging services to patients in the Medical Center"- that is patients of the Hospital- "in
accordance with recognized medical standards." Section 1.1.1, also on page 2, then provides
that "the Group's clinical responsibilities" include "[p]erform[ing] all Physician clinical medical
imaging services required in the Medical Center, including without limitation all X-ray, Nuclear
Medicine, Ultrasound, Magnetic Resonance, [etc.]." /d. § 1.1.1 (emphasis supplied). On the
face of the agreement, then, GSR was obligated to read MRI scans required in the hospital (that
is, hospital patients), but no more.

The 2001 Contract. The contract most relevant to the question of whether Saint
Alphonsus had a duty in August of 2002 to somehow stop the Radiologists from cutting back
their hours of availability for non-emergency patients is the contract actually in effect at that
time: the Professional Services Agreement executed in mid-2001. Ex. 4229. This contract, too,
unambiguously applies only to the Hospital, and not MRI Center.
That Contract states that the radiologists must "[p]rovide and/or perform all Radiologic
medical imaging services required in the Medical Center, including without limitation all X-ray,
Nuclear Medicine, Ultrasound, Magnetic Resonance, [etc.]," and must "[a]ssure that a sufficient
number of Radiologists are available in the Department or on call to assure complete and timely
24-hour per day, 7-day per week coverage for all services described in this agreement." Ex.
4229 § 1.3.1, 1.3.2. Once again, in Recital A, the Contract provides that the "Medical Center" is
the regional medical center owned and operated by Saint Alphonsus, but also expressly defines it
more broadly in a quite precise way:: "For purposes of this Agreement, the Medical Center
includes the Breast Care Center located at 6200 W. Emerald in Boise, Idaho, but does not
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include any affiliates or otherwise ancillary operations of Saint Alphonsus located on Saint
Alphonsus's campus or otherwise." Ex. 4229, p.4 (emphasis added) Thus, unambiguously,
"Medical Center" does not include MRI Center.
In addition, the 2001 contract binds the Radiologists not to compete with Saint
Alphonsus, precluding them from reading scans for other hospitals and independent imaging
centers. !d. § 11.1. That non-compete clause, however, explicitly excluded "MRI Center of
Idaho" from the scope of the non-compete. !d. § 11.1.1 (ii). If, as MRIA now claims, the term
"Medical Center" in the radiology contract was already understood to include MRI Center, this
carve-out would be superfluous. Thus, as with the 1997 contract, the 2001 radiology agreement
covers services required in the hospital (i.e., for hospital patients) but not by MRI Center.

B.

The Radiologists' "Exclusive" Right To Read Scans Does Not Apply To MRI
Center and Could Not Be Applied In Any Event To MRI Center Outpatients.

Just as the contract unambiguously obligates the Radiologists to read only scans of
hospital patients, the contract likewise does not give the Radiologists exclusive rights to read
scans performed at MRI Center. Section 3.1 of the 200 1 agreement provides that the
Radiologists "shall be the exclusive provider of Radiology Services at the Medical Center." Ex.
4229 § 3.1. As described supra, the "Medical Center" does not include MRI Center.
Section 8.1 likewise excludes MRI Center from that definition by limiting it to services
performed with respect to equipment owned and/or controlled by Saint Alphonsus and located
on the medical center campus. It is undisputed that MRI Associates is the owner of MRI
Center's equipment, and it was DMR-with five votes and the ability to break a 5-5 deadlock-
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which controlled MRI Associates. See Ex. 4023, § 5.1.2; Ex. 4032 § 6.3 (modifying contract to
give DMR the tie-breaking vote). Saint Alphonsus neither owned nor controlled the equipment.
More fundamentally, however, whatever the contractual language, MRIA cannot claim
that the radiologists had an exclusive right to perform services in relation to scans done on
MRIA's equipment for MRI patients where, as here, MRIA was not even a party or a signatory
to the agreement. See Ex. 4229, p. 1 & p. 34; Ex. 4033 p.l & p. 18. "It goes without saying that
a contract cannot bind a nonparty." EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002); see
also, e.g., Walter E. Wilhite Revocable Living Trust v. Nw. Yearly Meeting Pension Fund, 128

Idaho 539,548,916 P.2d 1264, 1273 (1996) (party's "contractual rights ... [may] not be taken
away by a contract between [different parties]"). Simply put, Saint Alphonsus and the
Radiologists did not have the power to unilaterally force MRIA to give the Radiologists the
exclusive right to read scans that were not taken for the hospital.

II.

THE COURT SHOULD DIRECT A VERDICT ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
SAINT ALPHONSUS OR THE RADIOLOGISTS BREACHED OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE CONTRACTS TO MRI CENTER.
A directed verdict may be had with respect to specific issues in contention. See Wing v.

Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 918, 684 P.2d 314, 320 (Idaho App. 1984) ("A trial court may withdraw

an issue from the jury if no substantial evidence supports the claim."); Nat '1 Motor Serv. Co. v.
Walters, 85 Idaho 349, 357, 379 P.2d 643, 648 (1963) (holding that court's withdrawal of issues

from jury consideration is a grant of directed verdict on those issues).
Here, MRIA intends to go to the jury with a theory that Saint Alphonsus's contract with
the radiologists created an obligation for the Radiologists to perform 24/7 services for MRI
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Center patients, and that Saint Alphonsus's alleged failure to enforce that obligation supports a
verdict on each ofthe claims in MRIA's case. See, e.g., 3rd Amended Counterclaim ,-r,-r 38, 57,
62-98 (incorporating allegation into each claim). This should not be permitted to go to the jury.
Both the 1997 and the 2001 contracts obligate the Radiologists only to perform services for Saint
Alphonsus, and the Radiologists only had exclusive rights at Saint Alphonsus or on Saint
Alphonsus-controlled equipment. MRIA, therefore, cannot prove that it had any rights under
those contracts, and cannot assert that Saint Alphonsus failed to assert rights that did not exist.
In addition to directing a verdict on this issue, the Court should instruct the jury of its
ruling, to ensure that the jury does not consider this invalid assertion in deciding any issues that
remain in the case. That instruction should state that (1) as a matter oflaw, the radiology
contract between the hospital and Gem State Radiology only required the Radiologists to read
scans of hospital patients and emergency room patients, but did not apply to MRI Center
outpatients, and (2) that Gem State Radiology did not have the exclusive right to read scans for
MRI Center outpatients. Such an instruction would be consistent with the terms of the contracts,
and cure the prejudice created by MRIA's legally-flawed arguments suggested thus far.
CONCLUSION
This Court should direct a verdict on the issue of whether the radiology contract applied
to MRI Center or precluded MRI Center from hiring its own radiologists, preclude MRIA from
further argument in support of that legally-flawed theory, and instruct the jury appropriately.
DATED this 18th day of October, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
On September 26, 2011, MRIA served a trial subpoena on Saint Alphonsus employee Jan
Hove. On October 2, 2011, MRIA disclosed that the Hove subpoena was intended to obtain
discovery on an entirely new theory of liability: that Saint Alphonsus violated the federal Stark
and Anti-Kickback statutes, and that these federal violations are the "wrongful" act necessary to
prove MRIA's claims for interference with prospective contractual relations. Opp'n to Motion to
Quash at 3-4. And even though the Court quashed MRIA's subpoena, MRIA subsequently
reaffirmed its intent to argue that Saint Alphonsus breached these statutes, as a predicate for its
claims of "pre-withdrawal, pre-non-compete fiduciary breaches as well as post non-compete
interferences with respect to contractual relations." 10/3/2011 Trial Tr. at 3003.
For multiple reasons, the Court should direct a verdict on this issue, and preclude MRIA
from arguing in any respect that Saint Alphonsus violated these laws. MRIA admits that it did
not plead any Stark or Anti-Kickback claims, that it conceived of this theory only after trial
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began, and admits that the theory has not been the subject of discovery. Moreover, MRIA has no
standing to allege Stark and Anti-Kickback violations, nor is there evidence in the record that
would support liability or damages flowing from alleged violations of these statutes.

ARGUMENT
I.

A DIRECTED VERDICT MUST BE ENTERED FOR DEFENDANT ON ALL
TORT CLAIMS BASED ON STARK AND ANTI-KICKBACK ACT
VIOLATIONS, BECAUSE THESE THEORIES WERE NOT PLED, WERE
CONCEIVED ONLY "A FEW DAYS BEFORE TRIAL," WERE NOT
DISCLOSED UNTIL FOUR WEEKS INTO TRIAL, AND HAVE NEVER BEEN
THE SUBJECT OF DISCOVERY
The Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized that the civil discovery rules exist to

prevent trial by ambush, and that it is thus improper to allow a party to unilaterally advance a
new theory of liability that had never been disclosed by that party, or been the subject of
discovery. See Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B. V., 148 Idaho 89, 106,218 P.3d 1150, 1167
(2009) (holding that in order to "assure[] that the parties have notice of the issues before the
court and an opportunity to address those issues with evidence and argument," that "unpleaded
issues be tried by at least the implied consent of the parties"); Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 191,
191 P .3d 1107, 1111 (Ct. App. 2008) ("due process requires that parties have sufficient notice of
the issues to be tried and an opportunity to address those issues with evidence and argument.");

Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 91, 813 P.2d 897, 902 (1991) (error to allow
undisclosed theory of liability, as plaintiffs' lack of disclosure during discovery meant defendant
was "unprepared to meet and effectively challenge [plaintiffs'] new theory").
Here, MRIA's theory that it may advance fiduciary duty and interference claims based on
alleged violations of the Stark and Anti-Kickback laws was not part of the counterclaims. MRIA
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO DIRECT A VERDICT OR OTHERWISE PRECLUDE
MRIA'S TORT CLAIMS ALLEGING STARK AND ANTI-KICKBACK VIOLATIONS- 3
002826

concedes that it did not "learn" about this theory until a "few days before the trial of this matter."
Opp'n to Motion to Quash at 2. There has been no discovery on these claims: MRIA itself
conceded that its trial subpoena was intended to obtain discovery, id. at 6, and as the Court
recognized, MRIA' s failure to disclose the source of its new allegations has precluded Saint
Alphonsus from exercising its right to depose MRIA' s source and investigate the claims, see
10/3/2011 Trial Tr. at 2878-79. Saint Alphonsus thus has been deprived of a fair opportunity to
address the Stark and Anti-Kickback claims, and the Court should preclude MRIA from placing
those issues before the jury.
MRIA may suggest that it had no obligation to provide discovery on these issues,
inasmuch as the IMI non-MRI Operating Agreement contains a provision discussing compliance
with the Stark and Anti-Kickback laws (see Ex. 4226 § 3.3.1). Such a suggestion would be
wrong. Not only do MRIA's counterclaims contain no reference to this contract provisioncontained in a contract to which MRIA was not a party-but proof that the Stark or AntiKickback statutes have been breached (as MRIA has suggested to at least one witness, see
9/21/11 Trial Tr. at 1523-24), requires specific evidence entirely separate from issues of
compliance with any contractual policy. A private company policy cannot expand the scope of
what the federal laws prohibit, and alleged violations of IMI policy that do not independently
violate the Stark and Anti-Kickback law are not a basis for any tort claim.

1

1

See, e.g., Johnson v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 1162, 1165 (lOth Cir. 2011)
("When you violate a corporate policy you may well be in trouble with your boss, but that
doesn't necessarily mean you have committed a tort. Our role as a court of law is not to enforce

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO DIRECT A VERDICT OR OTHERWISE PRECLUDE
MRIA'S TORT CLAIMS ALLEGING STARK AND ANTI-KICKBACK VIOLATIONS- 4
002827

Thus, MRIA's untimely allegations of Stark or AKS violations, as a basis for fiduciary
duty or tortuous interference liability, must be rejected on wholly procedural grounds.

II.

THESE CLAIMS ALSO HAVE NO SUBSTANTIVE MERIT
When faced with a motion for a directed verdict, the Court must "determine whether

there was sufficient evidence to justify submitting the claim to the jury, viewing as true all
adverse evidence and drawing every legitimate inference in favor of the party opposing the
motion for a directed verdict." Todd v. Sullivan Constr. LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 124, 191 P.3d 196,
202 (2008). The directed verdict should be granted unless there is "substantial evidence to
support the jury's verdict," with "substantial evidence" meaning "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Howell v. E. Idaho R.R.,
Inc., 135 Idaho 733, 737,24 P.3d 50, 54 (2001) (citation omitted). A directed verdict may be
had with respect to specific issues in contention. See Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 918, 684
P.2d 314, 320 (Ct. App. 1984) ("trial court may withdraw an issue from the jury if no substantial
evidence supports the claim"); Nat'! Motor Serv. Co. v. Walters, 85 Idaho 349, 357, 379 P.2d
643,648 (1963) (holding that court's withdrawal of issues from jury consideration is a grant of
directed verdict on those issues).

(continued ... )

private corporate policy but to assess public legal liability."); Havensure, L.L.C. v. Prudential
Ins. Co. ofAm., 595 F.3d 312, 317 (6th Cir. 2010) ("Havensure alleges that Prudential violated
its own internal policies and that this violation suffices to render Prudential's conduct wrongful
[for purposes of a tortious interference claim]. This argument has no legal basis.").
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Here, the Court should direct a verdict on the Stark and Anti-Kickback issues for two
reasons: ( 1) as a matter of law, MRIA has no right to bring a private cause of action for alleged
violations of the Stark and Anti-Kickback laws, and (2) even if it could, it has utterly failed to
introduce evidence necessary to demonstrate Stark or Anti-Kickback violations, or any damages
claimed to result from such violations.

A.

MRIA Cannot Assert Stark and Anti-Kickback Violations Directly, or
Indirectly Through Assertions of Its State-Law Claims

The Stark Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn, is part of the Medicare Act, and governs referrals
"for which payment otherwise may be made under this subchapter," i.e., Medicare and Medicaid.

/d.§ 1395nn(a)(1); accord, e.g., Renal Physicians Ass'n v. US. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 489 F.3d 1267, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (explaining history and scope of law). The AntiKickback statute ("AKS"), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b, is a federal criminal statute that precludes
offering or soliciting bribes and kickbacks in exchange for referrals for which payment will be
made by any "Federal health care program." /d. Because these two statutes define the
relationship between the federal government and parties which seek reimbursement under federal
health programs, and do not include any provision for private-party enforcement, courts have
uniformly held that there is no private right of action under Stark or AKS. 2

2

See, e.g., WAllis Mem 'l Hasp. v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251,254 (7th Cir. 1988) ("we find
that neither the structure of [the AKS] nor its legislative history suggests that Congress intended
to provide a private remedy to Medicare providers such as West Allis which may be injured as a
result of a competitor's noncompliance with the provisions of that statute"); Saint Agnes Med.
Ctr. v. Dogali, 2010 WL 307916, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ("[t]he purpose ofthe Stark Law is to
protect the government from Medicare fraud and there is no indication that any private right can
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Nor can a party simply manufacture a private right of action by using Stark or AKS
violations as the underlying predicate for a state-law tort claim, when the underlying behavior is
not independently improper. 3 Claiming a Stark/AKS violation as the "wrongful" behavior
required by some other, state-law claim is nothing more than an "end run around the entire
implied right of action inquiry." Action Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Atlanticare Health Servs., Inc.,
815 F. Supp. 33,40 (D. Mass. 1993); see also, e.g., State Med. Oxygen & Supply, Inc. v. Am.

Med. Oxygen Co., 750 P.2d 1085, 1086-87 (Mont. 1988) (holding that plaintiff cannot use
alleged AKS violation as the "unlawful act" required by the state-law cause of action); Reliable

Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Mercy Hosp. of Laredo, 2003 WL 21972724, at *6 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003)
("We conclude that recognizing a common law cause of action by a competitor for damages and
injunctive relief for violation of the anti-kickback statute would be inconsistent with the intent of
(continued ... )

be extrapolated therefrom"); United States ex rel. Villafane v. Solinger, 543 F. Supp. 2d 678
(W.D. Ky. 2008) ("[n]either the Anti-Kickback law nor the Stark law provides for a private right
of enforcement"); United States ex rel. Barmak v. Sutter Corp., 2002 WL 987109, at *5-6
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("[t]here is absolutely no private right of action provided [under the AKS] and
the statute is to be enforced by the Department of Justice"); US. ex rel. Barrett v.
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 251 F. Supp. 2d 28, 37 (D.D.C. 2003) ("[t]here is no private
right of action under the Anti-Kickback Act").
3

MRIA does not claim (nor could it reasonably claim) that an alleged referral of a
customer to an affiliated business, or an alleged offer of an incentive to obtain future businessthings done every day in the business world-is wrongful interference in the absence ofthe Stark
or AKS laws. Since the conduct at issue is allegedly wrongful only because of the Stark/AKS
laws, the conduct does not give rise to an independent basis for a wrongful interference claim.
See, e.g., Synthes (USA.) v. Globus Med., Inc., 2007 WL 1001587, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (party
cannot sustain tortious interference claim when "[a]bsent the Anti-Kickback implications, the
underlying conduct itself-i.e., sponsoring conferences, providing research grants, and offering
promotional incentives-is not inherently unfair or tortious").
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Congress."). As MRIA cannot legally assert a Stark/AKS violation as the predicate for one of its
pleaded, state-law claims, the Court should direct a verdict on the issue.

B.

MRIA Has Failed to Offer Legally Sufficient Evidence to Establish Any
Stark or Anti-Kickback Violation

Even apart from the fact that alleged Stark and AKS violations cannot form the basis for
state-law tort claims, MRIA has not presented legally sufficient evidence to support any Stark
Law or AKS violation, let alone damages from any such violation. Both of these laws are very
complex, and apply only to referrals and other activities done with respect to Medicare or, in the
case of AKS, other federal health programs. Even with respect to patients of such programs,
proof of a violation demands individualized proof on a physician-by-physician basis, which
MRIA has entirely failed to offer. Further, both statutes include explicit exceptions to their
coverage which could very possibly be applicable had MRIA offered specific evidence capable
of being evaluated.
The Stark Law provides that "if a physician . . . has a financial relationship with [an]
entity" defined elsewhere in the statute, then "the physician may not make a referral to the
entity," and "the entity may not present or cause to be presented a claim" directly or indirectly to
Medicare, unless it falls into one of numerous statutory or regulatory exceptions. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (stating general rule); id. § 1395nn(b)-(e) (setting out multiple exceptions);
42 C.F.R. § 411.351 et seq. (setting out multiple exceptions). Thus, to show a Stark Law
violation, MRIA would have to show that (1) a referring physician had a financial interest in
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some entity, (2) that he or she referred a patient to that entity, (3) the referral was for a Medicare
patient, and (4) that Saint Alphonsus presented that claim to Medicare. /d.
MRIA, however has not identified even one physician who allegedly referred a patient to
an entity with which the physician had a "financial relationship," nor has it shown whether any
alleged referrals were for Medicare patients, or whether Saint Alphonsus presented claims for
those services to Medicare. And without evidence of which physician referrals were allegedly
improper, the applicability of any exceptions cannot be determined. 4
Similarly, the AKS precludes a party from "knowingly and willfully" offering or
soliciting bribes and kickbacks in return for referrals, but only where the service is paid for by a
"Federal health care program" (i.e., Medicare), and only if one of multiple exceptions or safe
harbors does not apply. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)-(2) (setting forth prohibitions); id. §
1320a-7b(b)(3) (exceptions); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (setting forth safe harbors). 5 Again, MRIA
does not identify any person who was allegedly offered a bribe for referrals, let alone that any

4

The exceptions provide, for example, that "a request by a radiologist for diagnostic
radiology services ... if such services are furnished by (or under the supervision of) such ...
radiologist ... pursuant to a consultation requested by another physician does not constitute a
'referral' by a 'referring physician."' 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(5)(C). There are also exceptions
related to employer-employee relationships among and between the referrer and the entity, or
involving hospitals. See id. § 1395nn(b)(l)-(2), (d)(3), (e)(2)-(3). There is even a provision that
expressly permits an entity to require referrals from employed or contracted physicians
consistent with the scope of services covered by the contract. 42 C.F.R. § 411.354(d)(4).
5

Failure to show that a referral comes within a safe harbor does not excuse the
government from establishing the elements of a violation. In other words, the safe harbor
elements are not requirements for AKS compliance-whether or not they are incorporated into a
contract. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952 (July 29, 1991) (setting forth the original AKS safe harbors).
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alleged bribe was for a referral to a Federal Health Care program and thus within the scope of the
AKS. As with the Stark law, the lack of specificity as to the alleged wrongdoing precludes any
inquiry into the exceptions or safe harbors which may be made. 6
Instead of offering relevant evidence on these points, MRIA's theory appears to be that
the mere fact that a hospital allegedly kept track of referrals is a blanket violation of federal civil
and/or criminal law, which in turn gives rise to tort liability for all ofMRIA's lost scans-both
Medicare and non-Medicare alike. But that is not what the law says. The act of"keeping track"
of referrals does not state a violation under either law, and it is not even referenced in either

6

MRIA might suggest that there are AKS violations due to the alleged provision of
laptops to referring physicians. MRIA has offered one specific example of a laptop, identifying
the alleged recipient. 10/5/11 Trial Tr. at 3526-31 (Holly Wallace testimony regarding provision
oflaptop to specific doctor). But MRIA's witness offered no evidence that the laptop was a
"bribe" in exchange for a Medicare, Medicaid, or other federal health care referral, and MRIA's
evidence thus falls far short of proving an AKS violation. See id.
In any event, the Department of Health and Human Services has interpreted the AKS
such that, with respect to "the practice of giving away free computers," when the "computer can
only be used as part of a particular service that is being provided, for example, printing out the
results of laboratory tests," "it appears that the computer has no independent value apart from the
service that is being provided and that the purpose of the free computer is not to induce an act
prohibited by the statute." 56 Fed. Reg. 35952-01 (July 21, 1991). Likewise, for Stark
purposes, the relevant regulations define "remuneration" by specifically excluding the furnishing
of certain items "that are used solely to collect, transport, process, or store specimens for the
entity furnishing the items, devices, or supplies or are used solely to order or communicate the
results oftests or procedures for the entity." 42 C.F.R. § 411.351.
MRIA has not offered any evidence regarding the capability of the laptops, and, indeed,
has suggested that the purpose of the laptop to allow referring physicians to view radiological
images that they had ordered-a permitted purpose per the HHS regulations. 10/5111 Trial Tr. at
3526-31. Absent evidence that a laptop was provided for some other purpose that violates the
AKS or Stark laws, MRIA has failed to provide evidence sufficient for a jury to find an AKS or
Stark violation.
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statute. Even if it were prohibited by either statute, it would not apply to private-insurance
referrals. MRIA likewise has no evidence that any, let alone how many, alleged referrals might
have been violations of either law, and offers no analysis of the alleged damages arising from
such allegedly unlawful referrals. A directed verdict thus must be granted on this issue, and the
jury must be instructed that there has been no evidence ofviolations of federal law, and that they
are to disregard MRIA's suggestion to the contrary.
CONCLUSION

This Court should direct a verdict that no liability in this case-whether for breach of
fiduciary duty or any interference with prospective business claim-may be predicated on
alleged violations of the Stark and Anti-Kickback laws. Such claims were never pled, and were
disclosed only after trial began, so that there has been no opportunity for discovery. Further,
MRIA has no standing, as a private entity, to raise Stark or Anti-Kickback violations either
directly or through a state-law tort claim. Beyond that, MRIA has completely failed to offer
evidence necessary to establish any violations of either of these complex federal statutes.

DATED this 18th day of October, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
During its case, MRIA presented evidence, through its experts Budge and Wilhoite, of
two purported damages theories: the "lost profits" damages theory referred to in Bruce Budge's
expert report as "Scenario 1," and a disgorgement theory. 1 Both the lost-profits theory and
disgorgement theory cannot hold in light of the evidence presented, and are subject to a directed
verdict in Saint Alphonsus' s favor for failure to prove damages. Moreover, a verdict should be
directed on several other issues arising out of MRIA' s case.
ARGUMENT

When faced with a directed verdict motion, the Court must "determine whether there was
sufficient evidence to justify submitting the claim to the jury, viewing as true all adverse
evidence and drawing every legitimate inference in favor of the party opposing the motion for a
directed verdict." Todd v. Sullivan Constr. LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 124, 191 P .3d 196, 202 (2008).
1

MRIA has previously suggested that it might present a diminution-in-value theory. It
did not, as described below, and a directed verdict is appropriate on that damages theory as well.
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The directed verdict is to be granted unless there is "substantial evidence to support the jury's
verdict," with "substantial evidence" meaning "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Howell v. E. Idaho R.R., Inc., 135 Idaho 733,
737, 24 P.3d 50, 54 (2001) (citation omitted). A directed verdict may be granted as to specific
issues in contention. See Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912,918,684 P.2d 314,320 (Ct. App. 1984)
("A trial court may withdraw an issue from the jury if no substantial evidence supports the
claim."); Nat'! Motor Serv. Co. v. Walters, 85 Idaho 349, 357, 379 P.2d 643, 648 (1963) (court's
withdrawal of issues from jury is a grant of directed verdict on those issues).
I.

MRI CENTER AND MRI MOBILE HAVE FAILED TO SHOW WHAT LOSSES
WERE CAUSED BY WRONGDOING, AND MOBILE HAS OFFERED ONLY
SPECULATION AS TO LOST PROFITS FOR MERIDIAN AND EAGLE
As the Court is aware, one of the issues the Supreme Court indicated should be

determined upon retrial is the issue raised in Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 21 7, 646
P.2d 988 (1982): that a damages analysis is not sufficient if it assumes, "without any support in
the record, that the [defendant's] operation would not have won any portion of the ... market
absent" the defendant's misconduct. 103 Idaho at 234, 646 P .2d at 1005, quoted in Saint

Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at 498, 224 P.3d at 1087. Thus, as the Court reiterated on October 14,
"[a]s to lost profits measure of damages, they must be broken out as to the portion of the
business lost as a result of competitors' misconduct, and between the portion lost as a result of
other factors." 10/14/11 Trial Tr. at 4362. Further, as the Court noted, while it held the
threshold Pope burden was met based on pre-trial allegations, "it will not rule with regard to the
Supreme Court's Pope concerns until it hears the evidence in the case." !d. at 4365.
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MRIA has failed to introduce evidence in this trial which satisfies the Supreme Court's
requirement. The evidence presented in this case is that IMI-which had no non-compete with
MRIA-entered the market in September 1999. MRIA has abandoned its theory that IMI would
not have opened in a but-for world, 2 and the undisputed evidence is "that from the moment IMI
opened, it was in direct competition with MRIA." 9/14/11 Trial Tr. at 782 (Prochaska).
Thus, given that IMI would have existed anyway as a competitor whether or not MRIA
proves misconduct by Saint Alphonsus, MRIA's burden under Pope was to distinguish between
physician referrals of scans to IMI as a result of Saint Alphonsus' s improper acts, and physician
referrals that would have gone to IMI as a new competitor in the market anyway. It has not
carried its burden. With respect to both MRI Center's alleged lost-profits damages, and MRI
Mobile's alleged damages, MRIA has failed to offer damages evidence consistent with Pope.

A.

MRI Center Damages - Downtown and On-Campus

With respect to MRI Center damages (IMI downtown and IMI on-campus), Mr. Budge
simply assumed that every scan performed by IMI was the result ofwrongdoing if it came from
either (1) a doctor who had referred even one scan to MRI Center before IMI opened, or (2) any
doctor after IMI opened, if that doctor had admitting privileges at Saint Alphonsus but not Saint
Luke's. 10/14/2011 Tr. at 4526-30, 4588-89; Ex. 5000. Budge also testified that, absent any
2

During the last trial, and in MRIA's pre-trial papers regarding the Pope issue, MRIA
suggested that IMI's start-up funds were "contingent on" Saint Alphonsus's assurances to U.S.
Bank, and thus would not have opened at all but for Saint Alphonsus's help. See Mem. in Opp'n
to Mot. for Summ. J. Based on the Alleged Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's Evidence of Lost
Profits at 5; see also, e.g., 2007 Trial Tr. at 4003-4079 (examining Jeff Cliff on this issue).
MRIA has not made any such argument in this trial.
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wrongdoing by Saint Alphonsus, MRIA's observed losses in scans would have been the result of
competition and other factors. 10114111 Trial Tr. at 4607-4609. Budge's analysis thus set up an
"either-or" world-either 100% of lost scans were due to wrongdoing, or none of them were.
Budge acknowledged, but did not attempt to account for, the third scenario that Pope
requires to be addressed: if the new competitor would have existed anyway, some business
would have migrated from MRI Center to IMI as a result of reasons other than wrongdoing, and
that loss cannot be claimed as damages. 3 See, e.g., id. at 4531,4598-99,4642,4653. He also
conceded that his model would overstate MRIA's losses by counting as damages all scans that
went to IMI, even if those scans were, in fact, "diverted" to IMI not from MRIA, but from
another competitor. !d. at 4594-4600; Ex. 975, 976.

3

Budge's admissions on this point, among others, include that:
•

"It's possible, in this pre-'99 group of physicians that referred to MRIA, that if the
downtown [IMI] location opened up, it was independent of Saint Alphonsus, that
those guys for some reason because of where a patient lived or something else
might send a patient there and I would be counting them as diverted, that would
have a tendency to maybe over state it." !d. at 4531.

•

"Q .... If you have admitting privileges at Saint Al's, does that mean that you
will never as a physician refer a patient to any other facility except as a result of
wrongdoing? A. No." !d. at 4598-99.

•

"I think the question you're raising is: Are there scenarios where there's lawful
competition from IMI that I'm counting as diverted scans? And we've discussed
what the risk of those are." !d. at 4642.

•

He did not "disaggregate ... that portion of what [he] identified as damages
caused by wrongful conduct from that portion of any decline in the profitability of
MRIA that was simply attributable to competitive circumstances in the
marketplace" as "Mr. Banducci ... hasn't asked me to model" that. !d. at 4653.
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Instead of doing the analysis Pope requires and trying to identify the sources of diverted
scans, Budge instead theorized that he had accounted for any overcompensation in his model by

declining to include in his damages analysis any scans that MRIA might have received from
doctors who had not previously referred to it, or new doctors who had admitting privileges
elsewhere. See, e.g., id. at 4599-4600 ("I recognize and I admit to you that [the methodology]
has a risk of overstatement. But I also think that I severely understated referrals by the exclusion
of all these new SARMC physicians that also have admitting privileges at St. Lukes.") Mr.
Budge's attempt at "rough justice" does not solve his methodological problems for two reasons.

First, Budge admits that he "never tried to quantify" either the overstatement in scans he
does claim as damages, or the understatement from the scans he does not claim as damages,
"because [he doesn't] know how to do it." !d. at 4640-41. In other words, Mr. Budge was not
basing his "rough justice" claim on any scientific or expert model; rather, he was just speculating
and hoping that this is the case. That admission invalidated any attempt to justify his
imprecision. See, e.g., Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140,219 P.3d 453,464 (2009)
("Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of
no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible.").

Second, the fact that Budge decided to ignore one source of potential damages did not
excuse Plaintiffs from proving that damages from Budge's chosen source were the result of
wrongdoing. That is MRIA's obligation whatever the source of alleged damages; MRIA is not
entitled to speculative damages because Budge's opinions were inadequate. See SADC, 148
Idaho at 498, 224 P.3d at 1087 (an "assum[ption] that ... jobs done by [a competitor of the
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plaintiffs] would have all have been done by [the plaintiffs] but for [defendant's] violations" is
"not a proper manner to measure the [plaintiffs'] lost profits").
In short, Budge has posited an admittedly flawed model, which makes no attempt to
ascertain what portion of the alleged lost scans were lost to lawful competition from IMI, and
gives MRIA damages for scans gained by IMI that were "diverted" from other competitors. And
since Mr. Wilhoite's future damages expert opinion merely builds on Budge's assumptions, his
opinion is similarly flawed. Pope requires a directed verdict for failure of damages proof. 4

B.

MRI Mobile Damages - Meridian and Eagle

In addition to being excludable due to the same flaws as the Center damages above,
MRIA's evidence oflost profits with respect to MRI Mobile's damages (i.e., those at Meridian
and Eagle, 10/14/11 Tr. at 4575) has an independent error that requires a directed verdict. With
respect to Meridian and Eagle, Budge expressly concedes that his methodology was simply to
assume that MRIA's loss was IMI's gain. Budge testified that:
I'm assuming that it would have been the same center with a different
name on the door. It would have said MRIA instead of IMI, and that
the operations on the MRI side of it would have been identical in
terms of the amounts paid and the costs that it took to generate the

4

Were the court disinclined to direct a verdict on this ground, at a minimum the jury
would have to be carefully instructed on a special verdict form to ensure that the assumptions
underlying Budge's "1 00% wrongdoing" theory have been actually determined. Otherwise,
Budge's model admittedly overstates lost-profits damages, does not provide an alternative
measure of damages, and requires a verdict of zero damages. See, e.g., Pope, 103 Idaho at
234,646 P.2d at 1005 ("the factfinder may not determine damages by mere speculation and
guesswork, and there must be a reasonable foundation established by the evidence from which
the factfinder can calculate the amount of damages.").
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revenue. So I'm using IMI's margins and I'm using the actual
amounts received per scans that actually occurred on that site.
10/14/11 Trial Tr. at 4545. He did not, however, assume that the GSR radiologists would be
reading Meridian's scans. /d. at 4637. With respect to Eagle, Budge made the same assumption:
as with Meridian, he didn't "rely on a migration of scans from one to the other. It's simply what
is basically the business operations of those two locations." /d. at 4573.
This lost-profits damages methodology of simply appropriating IMI's profit margins,
costs, and scan volumes, and assuming MRI Mobile would have had the same experience, fails
as a matter of law regardless of MRIA' s theory of Saint Alphonsus' s wrongdoing. MRIA is
required to prove what its own margins, costs, and volumes would have been if the hypothetical
MRIM-Meridian or MRIM-Eagle had opened. The case of Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v.
Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119 (2007) is directly on point. There, the district court held

that proof of the competitor's profits were only allowable to "determine[] the reasonableness of
the plaintiffs' proof as to its lost profits, but not as a substitute for such proof." 144 Idaho at 847,
172 P.3d at 1122. The court then held that conclusory statements by the plaintiffs' witnesses that
its profits "would have been in the vicinity" and "very similar" to the competitor were
insufficient proof of the plaintiffs' lost profits. /d. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
plaintiffs needed evidence of "what its costs and profits would have been," and that "stating a
conclusion regarding its profit margin, without any factual support" is not sufficient to "take the
issue of damages out of the realm of speculation." /d.
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MRIA's evidence here is even less than the Supreme Court held insufficient in Trilogy.
By his own admission, Mr. Budge simply assumed IMI's profit margins and volumes would
have been replicated by MRI Mobile. No MRIA witness-fact or expert-testified as to what a
hypothetical MRIM-Meridian or MRIM-Eagle's profit margins would have been, its volumes, its
costs, or anything needed to "take its measure of damages out of the realm of speculation."
Indeed, there are only two mentions ofMRI Mobile's margins in the record, neither of which had
to do with the profits and costs of a never-built, hypothetical MRIM-Meridian or MRIM-Eagle:
•

Sandra Bruce's testimony regarding the 2001 Shattuck Hammond report (Ex.
4246, p. 33), which indicated that Mobile had projected profit margins from 2001
to 2006 "in the neighborhood of 28 and 29 percent," 9/24/11 Trial Tr. at 1884, a
figure considerably lower than IMI-Meridian's profit margins, variously between
51% to 67%, used by Budge used in calculating MRIM's lost Meridian and Eagle
profits (Ex. 5087, Ex. 5089); and

•

Jack Floyd's agreement that in 2001, MRI Mobile was "making healthy margins."
10/11111 Trial Tr. at3918-19.

These stray instances do not mention, and are not sufficient under Trilogy for a jury to
determine, what MRIM-Meridian or MRIM-Eagle's actual costs and profits would have been,
and thus what profits were lost by those entities due to any alleged wrongdoing. Because MRI
Mobile only assumed IMI's costs and profits as its own, without offering evidence of what its
actual costs would be for these hypothetical locations, MRI Mobile failed to introduce legally
sufficient evidence of damages and a verdict should be directed on all alleged lost-profits
damages from those two locations. Trilogy, 144 Idaho at 847, 172 P.3d at 1122.
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II.

MRIA HAS FAILED TO OFFER EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT
DAMAGES AFTER THE APRIL 1, 2005 NON-COMPETE ENDED, OR TO
SHOW THAT SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MRI PROFITS WERE EARNED FROM
WRONGDOING AS OPPOSED TO LAWFUL COMPETITION.
This Court has repeatedly made clear that "Saint Alphonsus had no duty not to compete

after the expiration of the noncompetition agreement," Consolidated Order re: Motions in Limine
Filed May 18, 2011, p.3 (June 9, 2011 ); and that "damages are not awardable to MRIA simply
because of Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care's exercise of its right to dissociate from the MRIA
partnership," but that "damages may, however, be awarded for all damages which the jury finds
were proximately caused by Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care to MRIA as a result of actions
taken by Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care prior to its dissociation from the partnership on April
1st of2004" or before the "expiration of the non-competition clause on Aprillst, 2005."
10/14/11 Trial Tr. at 4363 (emphasis added).
Despite this obligation, MRIA's expert made no effort to determine which, if any,
business losses occurring after April 1, 2005, were attributable to misconduct occurring before
that date. Indeed, Budge agreed with MRIA counsel's statement that it was only an "allegation
that [Saint Alphonsus] w[as] able to lawfully compete after 2005" and admitted that he "did not"
"assume that this dissociation cut off damages." /d. at 4563 (emphasis added). He then
reiterated that his but-for damages assumption was "that Saint Alphonsus was not going to be
able to lawfully compete" after 2005, id. at 4566, and that "for purposes of [his] damages
calculation," he "did not assume" that "Saint Alphonsus was entitled to compete beginning in
2005," id. at 4580-81. By Budge's own admission, then, he did not attempt to determine post-
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2005 damages accruing from pre-2005 liability; rather, he assumed that post-2005 competition
was a basis for liability despite the dissociation and non-compete. Budge's assumptions that
Saint Alphonsus could be held liable for new acts of competition after April 1, 2005, whether
directly or under a "but-for" assumption that Saint Alphonsus would not have dissociated, is
impermissible, as Saint Alphonsus's actual dissociation and termination of the non-compete was
a legally superseding cause that cut off any liability due to later acts of lawful competition. 5
By contrast, Budge admitted that he did not do what the Court said was required: i.e.,
determine the amount of "splash-over" or "lasting effect of the prior bad acts" which continued
beyond the point of dissociation and the end ofthe non-compete. 10/14/11 Trial Tr. at 4573.
Indeed, he admitted, as he had at his deposition, that such an analysis would have resulted in a
different damages calculation. Budge explained that the drawing he made at his deposition (Ex.
889R) illustrated what such a damages analysis would have looked like, but was only "an
approximate diagram" that "wasn't based on actual data [or] numbers." 10/14/11 Trial Tr. at
4566. And although he explained that he would draw his approximate diagram differently now
that he had been given additional assumptions by MRIA counsel, 6 he did not offer any expert

5

See Hite v. Biomet, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1025-26 (N.D. Ind. 1999) ("Common
sense dictates that a valid [termination] subsequent to a[n improper] act cuts off ... liability ....
This is logical because the valid termination ... severs the ... relationship and the joint
obligations which compose such a relationship. In this way, the [defendant's] liability is limited
since the valid termination is, essentially, a superseding cause which relieves it from further
liability .... ").
6

In addition to speculating that Saint Alphonsus would have required a six-month lead
time to start competing (which, in fact happened, as the IMI on-campus magnet did not open
until December 2005), Budge made a new assumption related to alleged Stark and Anti-
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opinion as to what the damages would have been assuming dissociation and lawful competition
after Aprill, 2005. /d. at 4638 ("I haven't been asked to do it and I haven't done it."). Instead,
Budge simply conceded that all damages for IMI on-campus scans, and all damages IMI
downtown scans from 2006 onward would have to be excised from his report. /d. at 4574-75.
Given that Budge's expert opinion (and, derivatively, Wilhoite's opinion) does not heed the
Court's ruling that only so "splash-forward" damages are permitted after April 1, 2005, and
because MRIA failed to provide such damages evidence consistent with that ruling, the Court
should hold as a matter of law that MRIA is not entitled to damages accruing after April 1, 2005.
This holding should also extend to MRIA's disgorgement theory, barring it in whole.
This theory seeks to recover Saint Alphonsus's MRI profits, but by Budge's concession, Saint
Alphonsus did not receive any MRI profits unti12006. 10/14111 Trial Tr. at 4512. Since Mr.
Budge (and, consequently, Mr. Wilhoite) has no model from which to determine what acts of
competition after April!, 2005 were based on liability arising before April!, 2005, there is
likewise no model for determining whether any of Saint Alphonsus's profits from the MRI-side
of IMI were due to lawful competition.

Kickback violations. 10114111 Trial Tr. at 4569-72. For reasons stated in an accompanying
motion, MRIA is not entitled to advance its newly asserted Stark and AKS claims, nor in any
event would all IMI scans violate the Stark or AKS law, which only apply to Medicare and other
federal health programs. Budge's model does not account for what proportion of referrals would
allegedly violate these laws as a basis for new, post-2005 liability.
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III.

SEVERAL OF MRIA'S SPECIFIC DAMAGES AND RELATED CAUSATION
THEORIES FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In addition to the Pope issues and MRIA's failure to properly account for alleged post-

2005 damages, the Court should grant directed verdicts or otherwise modify several other
damages-related issues before they go to the jury.

A.

MRIA's Theory that Saint Alphonsus "Usurped" Its Opportunity to Partner
with IMI is Time Barred, and in All Events, Damages Before July 1, 2001
May Not Be Presented to the Jury.

During its October 14 summary of its prior damages rulings, the Court noted that if the
alleged usurpation ofMRIA's opportunity to partner with IMI occurred in 1999, then MRIA's
claim on that score was time barred, but if the usurpation happened in 2001 as MRIA claimed in
its motion papers, then "if damages are found to be awardable, they would be measured from the
-- I believe it is the July 1st, 2001, date, at the earliest, to 2015 at the latest." 10/14111 Tr. at
4363-65. MRIA did not introduce evidence of its "usurpation" damages theory (Budge's
"Scenario 5"), and the underlying usurpation claim should be out of the case.
To the extent MRIA still intends to claim this usurpation for any purpose, including as a
predicate for the disgorgement claim, the Court should direct a verdict on the usurpation theory
as it is time barred. There is no substantial evidence in the record from which this jury could
reasonably infer that MRIA and GSR/IMI could have come to a deal following the December 16,
1999 meeting in which the radiologists rejected MRIA's deal; indeed, the witnesses have
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uniformly indicated that as of late 1999 and early 2000, a merger of MRIA and IMI was dead
and that Dr. Giles and Dr. Prochaska knew it. 7 The alleged usurpation, if any, is time-barred.
Moreover, if MRIA does, in fact, intend to claim liability based on an alleged usurpation
of the opportunity to partner with IMI, then a directed verdict should be granted because there is
a failure of damages proof on such a liability theory. MRIA's expert testimony as presented at
trial simply awards MRI Center 100% of the damages from scans that shifted from MRI Center
to IMI. That is not a proper method of calculating usurpation damages, however. If the claimed
usurpation had not occurred, MRIA would have given a 1111 th or more share of its own profits to
IMI, and may have been only a part-owner ofiMI's MRI-side. In either scenario, MRIA would
have been entitled to only a part of the profits that would have resulted from scans done to IMI
in the but-for world. 8 But Budge assumes that 100% of the profits done from scans at IMI were

7

See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 775-76 (Dr. Prochaska agreeing it was "probably true" that the
deal was dead as of December 16); id. at 820 (same, agreeing that "there was no point any longer
to MRIA discussing doing a deal with the radiologists" if"Sandra Bruce was going to remain as
passive as she was in the meeting"); id. at 822 (same, referencing Dr. Prochaska's prior
proceedings testimony that "I think I testified earlier that after the December -- what we have
called 'ambush' meeting after this letter, there was no point discussing doing a deal with the
radiologists"); id. at 1762 (Sandra Bruce describing "three major hurdles" for a deal with GSR
and MRIA in December 1999 to January 2000, including restructuring DMR, more than 1/11 th
share, and spinning offMRI Mobile, none ofwhich were compatible with MRIA's 1999 deal);
4397-4400 (Dr. Giles testifying that he was removed from GSR leadership in January 2000 due
to tensions with his position as MRIA owner); id. at 4402-03 (Giles, indicating that "around this
time" the GSR partners told him "[w ]e have decided to compete with the MRI Center of Idaho"
and asked Giles to leave GSR).
8

While the record contains various notions of what the allegedly usurped deal would
have been, MRIA's witnesses have testified that it would have obtained a 50% ownership in the
MRI-side ofiMI, in exchange for 1111th or more ofMRIA, and there is no evidence that IMI
would have just given away its MRI business to MRIA for free. Budge's damages calculations
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lost profits to MRI Center. There is thus a failure of damages evidence on what MRIA's lost
profits would have been, if a 1999 or 2001 usurpation is the basis for liability.
Finally, at a minimum, given that MRIA has asserted that usurpation did not occur until
July 1, 2001, the Court should hold that lost-profit damages before July 1, 2001 cannot go to the
jury. According to MRIA 's expert, the "lost profits" theory presented to the jury ("Scenario 1")
would be reduced by $2,446,668 if counting from July 1, 2001, instead of 1999. Compare Ex.
4496, p. 15, Scenario 1 with id. Scenario 2. That portion of damages should be disallowed.

B.

MRIA Has Failed to Offer Sufficient Evidence of "Usurpation" of an
Opportunity to Go to Eagle.

MRIA has also, offered no substantial evidence regarding its claim that Saint Alphonsus
"usurped" MRIA's opportunity to go to Eagle. Idaho law has recognized usurpation in the
corporate context, holding that usurpation requires proof of a business opportunity with "which
the corporation is financially able to undertake, is, from its nature, in the line of the corporation's
business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in which the corporation has an interest or a
reasonable expectancy, and, by embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or
director will be brought into conflict with that of his corporation." Jenkins v. Jenkins, 138 Idaho
424, 428, 64 P.3d 953, 957, 64 P.3d 953 (2003). This standard, on its face, necessarily requires
proof that the defendant take the opportunity at a time where it can cause a conflict.

can only be understood as relying on that improper assumption, since he does not attempt to
calculate what portion ofiMI's profits would flow to MRIA in the non-usurpation world.
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Here, the entirety of fact evidence on the alleged "usurpation" of Eagle appears in Jack
Floyd's October 10, 2011 testimony at pages 3905-10. There, Floyd claims that a February 16,
2001 PowerPoint presentation he provided (which does not appear in the record) "relate[d] to the
need for a site in either Meridian or Eagle." !d. at 3908. Floyd then stated that "there was a
sense of urgency that we, Saint Al' s, as part of the MRIA partnership, get into the
Meridian/Eagle area. But yet that sense of urgency did not seem to be shared." !d. That is all.
There is no evidence explaining how Saint Alphonsus blocked MRI Mobile from going to Eagle,
no evidence that Saint Alphonsus's vote was necessary for MRI Mobile to go to Eagle; no
evidence that Saint Alphonsus was discussing going to Eagle with IMI at this time (unlike what
MRIA has attempted to show with Meridian); and no evidence as to how Saint Alphonsus
somehow prevented MRI Mobile from going to Eagle for nearly three years after Saint
Alphonsus dissociated.
What does appear in the record is that whatever "opportunity" there was for expansion
into Eagle was known to MRIA since 2001 yet left on the table for nearly six years, during a
time when MRI Mobile admittedly was sending magnets to multiple locations around the Pacific
Northwest despite Saint Alphonsus's alleged lack of support. See Ex. 5043 (map ofMRI Mobile
locations). The record does not support a finding that MRI Mobile had any interest or
expectancy in Eagle, let alone that Saint Alphonsus usurped the opportunity from its MRI
partners, given that Eagle was not pursued by IMI until three years after Saint Alphonsus ceased
to be a partner. A directed verdict should be granted on this issue.
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C.

MRI Center and MRI Mobile's Lost-Profits Figures Must Be Reduced by
7.5% to Account for Their Management Fee Expense.

Between the submission ofMRIA's supplemental expert reports on May 2, 2011, and
now, MRIA has elected to rescind its claim for damages to MRIA based upon the management
fee that flowed directly from MRI Center and MRI Mobile's gross revenues, and instead to
present evidence that the management fee should be part of Center and Mobile's damages
instead. 10/14/11 Trial Tr. at 4628-29. There is no substantial evidence in the record (or any
evidence at all) that MRI Center and MRI Mobile would not have paid this expense had they
obtained the allegedly lost scans, or that MRIA would not have received it the but-for world;
indeed, Bruce Budge admitted that he did that the first time, and that "it would be more accurate
to actually show the administrative fees being paid and who got them." /d. at 4630. MRI Center
and Mobile's damages are each overstated by 7.5%, and the jury should not be permitted to
award such inflated damages.
Moreover, Saint Alphonsus is concerned that MRIA structured its damages claim this
way in order to prevent Saint Alphonsus from setting off its departing partner share
(approximately $4.5 million plus interest running from the date of dissociation) from any
judgment in MRI Center and MRI Mobile's favor, on the theory that MRI Associates owes the
buyout judgment but claims none of the awarded damages. Whether, at this late date, MRIA
should be entitled to simply re-assert a claim for that 7.5% of damages to MRI Associates is a
matter for the Court's discretion. But whatever the Court's resolution, MRIA should not
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permitted be able to overcompensate Center and Mobile in order to place roadblocks in the way
of Saint Alphonsus' s recovery of its countervailing judgment.

D.

The Court Should Also Direct a Verdict on the Diminution Theory.

Finally, the Court should also direct a verdict on MRI Center's diminution theory of
damages-i.e., the theory that damages should be measured as the difference between the 2001
Shattuck Hammond valuation ofMRI Center and its value as of2010. See 9/14/11 Trial Tr. at
691-92. Not only should the theory be disallowed given that there been no discovery on MRIA's
asserted 2010 value, thus unfairly preventing Saint Alphonsus from defending this newly
advanced claim, MRIA has failed to prove what diminution in value, if any, was attributable to
wrongful acts as opposed to other factors such as competition, the state of the markets,
reimbursement rates, and other related factors. See, e.g., Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912,919,684
P.2d 314, 321 (Ct. App. 1984) (party "must" establish that any "loss [in business value] was
produced by defendant's conduct rather than by ... other variables."); SADC, 148 Idaho 479,
498, 224 P.3d 1068, 1087 (2010) (instructing MRIA to supply "'a method of figuring damages'"
that distinguishes between business lost as a result of the alleged bad acts and business that
would have been lost absent those bad acts) (quoting Pope, 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988).
Here, while Dr. Prochaska asserted his opinion of Center's current value, MRIA's
expert did not mention the diminution theory or offer testimony indicating what portion was due
to wrongdoing, as Dr. Prochaska indicated the experts would. See 9112111 Trial Tr. at 431-433,
9/13/11 Trial Tr. at 462-63. As MRIA has failed its burden of proof on this issue, a directed
verdict should be granted on the diminution theory.
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CONCLUSION

This Court should grant a directed verdict motion as to all or part ofMRIA's lost-profits
and disgorgement claims, and on the other damages-related issues as discussed above.

DATED this 18th day of October, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Directed Verdict on Violation ofthe Stark and Anti-Kickback Statutes (the "Motion").

I.

INTRODUCTION

The evidence presented in this case overwhelmingly indicates that Saint Alphonsus
engaged in unlawful conduct related to patient referrals-conduct which MRIA contends
violates statutes, public policy, Saint Alphonsus's own internal policy, and IMI's operating
agreement. Saint Alphonsus nonetheless argues that in spite of this evidence, it has not
technically violated certain statutes, and therefore should not be accountable for its acts. As
explained below, however, this position is flatly incorrect and is irrelevant to most ofMRIA's
arguments concerning tortious interference. The motion should accordingly be denied.

II.

A.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

Standard
The standard which a moving party must meet in order to obtain a directed verdict is

exceedingly difficult. Indeed, a directed verdict is proper "only where the evidence is so clear
that all reasonable minds would reach only one conclusion: that the moving party should
prevail." Doe I v. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 899, 71 P.3d 1040, 1046, 71 P.3d 1040 (2003) (emphasis
added). This onerous standard clearly has not been met here.

B.

MRIA 's claims were properly pled.
Saint Alphonsus begins its Motion by complaining that raising issues related to the Stark

and Anti-Kickback statutes is somehow a "trial by ambush." Motion, pp. 3-4. According to
Saint Alphonsus, MRIA is presenting a "new theory of liability" which was "unpleaded" and
"not part of the counterclaims." Motion, pp. 3-4. Saint Alphonsus also argues that it was not
provided with an opportunity for "discovery on these claims." !d. All of this is false.
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Saint Alphonsus's confusion apparently stems from an erroneous belief that MRIA is
asserting statutory violations as new and independent causes of action. It is not. Instead, MRIA
is simply using Saint Alphonsus's statutory breaches as: (1) evidence that Saint Alphonsus
breached its fiduciary duty to MRIA; and (2) one of several "wrongful means" or purposes used
by Saint Alphonsus in tortiously interfering with MRIA's business. Obviously, MRIA long ago
adequately pled these claims for breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference. Thus, MRIA
is not presenting a new "theory of liability" with these statutory breaches, but is instead simply
trying to prove its existing "theories of liability" with them-theories which have been active in
this case for years.
In light of this critical clarification, Saint Alphonsus's argument may be that ifMRIA
was going to prove a statutory violation as part of another claim, the statute would need to appear
in the complaint with the cause of action. Yet this is directly contrary to Idaho R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l ),
which only requires a "short and plain" statement of facts. MRIA pled its fiduciary duty and
tortious interference claims in this "short and plain" manner, and the time has long since passed
for asking for a more definite statement. More to the point, there is nothing in that rule obliging
a plaintiff to state every factual ground upon which a claim for breach of fiduciary duty or
tortious interference may lie. See, e.g., Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 715 P.2d 993 (1986).

Maaloufv. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 2003 WL 1858153, *6 (S.D.N.Y., 2003), is
particularly instructive in this regard. In that case, a defendant moved to dismiss a complaint
alleging tortious interference because the plaintiff did not indicate exactly how the interference
was wrongful. The Court rejected that argument, holding that all the similarly-worded Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8 required was a "short and plain" statement of the facts. Thus, said the Court, "the
Complaint sufficiently puts Smith Barney on notice of plaintiffs claim for tortious interference
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with prospective business transactions. The specifics of that claim, as well as defendant's
motives and methods," were not necessary to be pled. Such is the case here as well.

Nor has Saint Alphonsus been denied discovery on this issue, in spite of its protestations
to the contrary. Saint Alphonsus specifically and purposefully waived any explanation of the
facts upon which these two claims would be based, and decided instead to simply rely on the
documents produced. This is evidenced in MRIA's responses to Saint Alphonsus's fifth set of
interrogatories, which are attached hereto. 1 In response to Saint Alphonsus's questions
concerning the "facts" which underlie the claims of breach of fiduciary duty and tortious
interference, Saint Alphonsus was reminded that "at a meet and confer" occurring "on November
29,2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories, the parties
would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their respective

claims and defenses in this case." See Interrogatories 18 and 20 (emphasis added). Notably,
during this trial, MRIA's proof concerning the statutory violation at issue has not included any
materials not properly produced in this matter; indeed, this Court's decision to quash the Hove
subpoena (mentioned on p. 1 of the Motion) ensured as much?
C.

Nothing in the Motion is capable of having an effect on MRIA 's claim for breach of
fiduciary duty.

While MRIA has discussed both the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and tortious
interference as being impacted by the statutory violations at issue, MRIA wants to make clear
that its breach of fiduciary duty claim related to referrals does not depend on any sort of statutory
or policy violation. As this Court knows, MRIA's allegation is that Saint Alphonsus owed a duty

1

See the Affidavit of Brent Bastian ("Bastian Aff.) in support of this Opposition at Ex. A.

2

Moreover, even from a theoretical-harm point of view, all the documents MRIA would need in order to prove that
Saint Alphonsus had made improper referrals of Saint Alphonsus patients would logically be located at Saint
Alphonsus, since it is Saint Alphonsus who does the referring.
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of loyalty to MRIA yet nonetheless engaged in conduct aimed at steering patients away from
MRIA and towards IMI (among several other bad acts). Thus, such conduct would be clearly
wrongful as to MRIA, regardless of whether Saint Alphonsus also breached a statute or policy in
the process. That said, if these acts were also in violation of statute or policy, that fact would
obviously serve to greatly highlight just how improper Saint Alphonsus' s conduct was.
Fiduciary duty is therefore included, as Saint Alphonsus correctly notes, as one of the claims
MRIA believes would be supported by a violation of statute or policy, with the caveat that in no
manner does the claim depend on such a violation. Motion, p. 2.

D.

As it relates to patient referrals, MRIA is not solely relying upon statutory violations,
but also upon violations ofpublic and internal policy and upon breach of Saint
Alphonsus 's third-party contract.
Saint Alphonsus argues that the only way to make Saint Alphonsus's referrals of patients

unlawful for the purposes of proving tortious interference is to prove an actual violation of the
Stark and Anti-Kickback statutes. Motion, p. 4. While MRIA believes that it has demonstrated
such a violation of at least one of these statutes, as discussed in detail below, it is false to assert
that these statutes are the only manner in which MRIA can prove its tortious interference claim
related to patient referrals. 3
In order to prove tortious interference, a plaintiff must show that "(I) the defendant had
an improper objective or purpose to harm the plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used a wrongful
means to cause injury .... " Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 893, 243 P.3d

1069 (2010) (emphasis added); BECO Canst. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719,
723-24, 184 P.3d 844, 848-49 (2008). The Restatement of Torts,§ 767, which Idaho has

3

While hopefully obvious, MRIA makes clear here that it has several other grounds which it believes constitute
"improper means" as well, but which are not necessarily directly related to the subject matter of the Motion.
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adopted, 4 makes clear that a plaintiff can show these wrongful means or objectives in a number
of ways: by a breach of statute, certainly, but also by a breach of a public policy or other
established policies. Restatement (Second) Torts, § 767, comment c ("Conduct .. .contrary to
established public policy may for that reason make an interference improper. ... Violation
of. ..practices regarding disapproved actions or methods may also be significant .... ") (emphasis

added). In addition, even "a breach of contract can constitute a wrongful means if the breach
was for the purpose of injuring or destroying prospective business relationships." Foam
Supplies, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 2008 WL 3159598, *7 (E.D. Mo. 2008); Harsha v. State
Sav. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 799 (Iowa 1984) (when "a party breaches a contract with the

immediate purpose of injuring or destroying prospective business relationships the means may be
considered improper"); Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc., 647 F.3d 291, 311 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing
several cases, the Court states that the fact that defendant breached a contract with a third party
could be used to determine whether wrongful means were exercised in present case).
MRIA believes that it has proved-and that the record is replete with evidence
supporting-all of these "wrongful means" violations related to the referrals (i.e., breach of
statute, breach of public policy, breach of internal policy, and breach of contract). Thus, even if
Saint Alphonsus was to prevail on the immediate Motion-which is directed only at a statutory
breach-MRIA would not be precluded from arguing that Saint Alphonsus's actions related to
referrals were nonetheless "wrongful" for the purposes of its tortious interference claim in these
other ways. Because of the importance ofthese other "wrongful means," MRIA addresses them
in turn.
Internal Policy. As to internal policy, Whatley Coffee Service, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp.

2006 WL 2631387, **2-3 (E.D. Ark. 2006), is particularly instructive. In that case, Whatley
4

BECO Canst., 145 Idaho at 723-24.
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Coffee sued Sara Lee for tortious interference and asserted that one of the ways that Sara Lee
had employed improper means was by violating its own internal policy against "swapping
business" from one vendor to another. After an objection by the defendant was raised-an
objection very similar to the one found on p. 4 of the Motion-the Court stated:
Significantly, the evidence demonstrated that Sara Lee's conduct was contrary to
its own internal policy not to "swap business" or to favor one distributor over
another. ... In that connection, although the Court expressed concern during trial
over the potential that the discussion of Sara Lee's internal policy violations might
confuse the jury, such evidence was clearly relevant to the jury's analysis of Sara
Lee's conduct and whether it was improper. The Comments to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts ... specifically states: "Violation of recognized ethical codes for
a particular area of business activity or of established customs or practices
regarding disapproved actions or methods may also be significant in evaluating
the nature of the actor's conduct as a factor in determining whether his
interference with the plaintiffs contractual relations was improper or not."
Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 767, Comment c (regarding nature of actor's
conduct).
!d. (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Nelson Jewellery Arts Co., Ltd. v. Fein Designs Co., Ltd.,

L.L. C., 2007 WL 4554448, *7 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 2007) (plaintiff could have avoided a directed
verdict on tortious interference if it had been able to bring forth evidence that a company policy
had been disregarded).
Put simply, then, Whatley Coffee makes clear that a violation of internal policy can serve
as evidence of the "wrongful means" necessary for a tortious interference claim. This holding
obviously has immediate application to the facts of this case. The jury has heard plenty of
evidence concerning Saint Alphonsus's internal policy concerning referrals-that Saint
Alphonsus reputes to allow its doctors and medical staff to send its patients to whomever they
believe will do the best work. See, e.g., 1517-1524 (Sandra Bruce), 4129-4137 (Sally Jeffcoat).
As a result, the jury is now in a competent position to determine whether or not the acts of Saint
Alphonsus violated its own policy. And again, as Whatley Coffee makes clear, such evidence
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..

would be "clearly relevant to the jury's analysis of [Saint Alphonsus' s] conduct and whether it
was improper" for the purposes of tortious interference. !d.
Public Policy. As to violation of public policy-which, again, can serve as the
"wrongful means" in the context of a tortious interference claim-the law is similarly clear in
that there is a strong and recognized public policy of allowing patients to choose the doctors they
want to see, without undue influence. See, e.g., Mercy Health System of Northwest Arkansas,
Inc. v. Bicak, 2011 WL 1785618 (Ark. App. 2011) (" ... it is contrary to public policy to unduly

restrict the public's right of access to the physicians of their choice."); Murfreesboro Medical
Clinic, P.A. v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674,683, (Tenn. 2005) ("The right of a person to choose the

physician that he or she believes is best able to provide treatment is so fundamental that we can
not allow it to be denied ... [It is a] Public policy consideration [to have] the right to freedom of
choice in physicians ... "). Notably, state and federal statutes like the Anti-Kickback Act did not
create this public policy, but simply embody the preexisting public policy of freedom of patient
choice of doctors. See, e.g., Vana v. Vista Hasp. Systems, Inc., 1993 WL 597402, *7 (Cal. App.
Super. 1993) ("The Federal and State statutes embody a clear and strong public policy against
any improper influence being exerted in the realm of physician judgments over patient referrals
or care"). MRIA believes that the evidence is clear that Saint Alphonsus breached this public
policy by steering patients to a clinic in which Saint Alphonsus had an ownership interest.
Contractual Breach. It is also undisputed that Saint Alphonsus and GSR entered into a
contract which governed how they were to make referrals. Ex. 4226, § 3.3.1.2 (p. 14). While
that contract references the Stark and Anti-Kickback statutes for context, it does not incorporate
them, and the obligations stated therein are independent of these statutes. The relevant provision
reads:
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Both Members represent and warrant that there is no intent to induce the referral
of patients to the Company by any person or entity in connection with the
formation and operation of the Company and it is expressly understood between
the parties that each Member, its Affiliates and its employees are not precluded or
discouraged from referring patients to any alternate provider of services other
than the Company.

!d. (emphasis added).
At the risk of stating the obvious, this provision specifically disallows Saint Alphonsus
from telling its employees where they must send Saint Alphonsus patients for radiological
services. Yet if the evidence already heard by this jury is deemed to be credible, clearly this
provision will have been breached, since there are several instances in which, for example, it is
alleged that Saint Alphonsus unambiguously informed its employees that it must refer to
GSR/IMI and even knowingly allowed the IMI doctors to literally take patients out of the MRIC
waiting area and escort them to IMI. Ex. 4377, and Transcript ("Tr.") at, e.g., pp. 3729-30,
3983-85, and 4297-4300. And again, such a contractual breach can be the "wrongful means" by
which tortious interference can be proven. Ventas, 647 F.3d at 311.
In short, given these breaches of public and internal policies and contract, much of Saint
Alphonsus's motion is largely irrelevant since whether there was a technical violation of the
precise language of the statutes does no harm to these other grounds, which clearly do not
depend on such technical statutory language.

E.

Saint Alphonsus 's arguments concerning standing and private rights are misplaced.
Saint Alphonsus next argues that MRIA cannot prove violations of the Stark and Anti-

Kickback statutes because they do not provide for "private-party enforcement." Motion, pp. 6-8.
This argument misses the point. MRIA is not attempting to "enforce" any statute. Instead, it is
simply trying to prove its tortious interference claim by showing that Saint Alphonsus used the
"improper means" of violating a statute. This distinction is key, because the law is clear that a
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party can show "improper means" by demonstrating that referrals were influenced in violation of
the Stark and Anti-Kickback statutes, regardless of their putative prohibitions on not being
enforced privately.
Baptist Health v. Murphy, 365 Ark. 115, 126, 226 S.W.3d 800, 809 (Ark. 2006) is
directly on point. In that case, certain doctors argued that a hospital had engaged in tortious
interference, and cited as the "wrongful means" of that cause of action the violation of the AntiKickback statute. The hospital apparently advanced the same argument as to "private
enforcement" as Saint Alphonsus is asserting here. The Court, however, rejected that argument
outright: "The circuit court correctly noted that while these statutes create no private right of
action, a violation may be considered evidence of impropriety." !d. at n.5.
In contrast to this clear law, which directly contradicts Saint Alphonsus's argument, Saint
Alphonsus fails to cite any case from any jurisdiction in which lack of standing as to the
underlying violated statute is an issue in the context of a tortious interference claim. The
portions quoted in Saint Alphonsus's Motion from Action Ambulance, State Med. Oxygen &
Supply, and Reliable Serv., Inc. are from the context of state law anti-trust/consumer protection
and general damages statutes, 5 all of which present a far different inquiry from that of tortious
interference. Motion, p. 7. That is, in tortious interference, the plaintiff is seeking damages for
the loss of a contract or opportunity caused by a party's interference, which happens to be
wrongful because of the violation of a statute. Conversely, in these consumer protection and
general damages statutes, the party is actually seeking damages because of the violation of
statute itself-not the underlying interference-which obviously presents a far more direct
relationship to the statute.

5

Reliable Serv. was based on a violation of an antiquated and possibly non-viable cause of action which, boiled to
its essence, was essentially an unfair restraint on trade claim.
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Indeed, one of the cases cited by Saint Alphonsus-State Me d. Oxygen & Supplyironically seems to recognize this truth in its holding. Motion, p. 7. Though far from a model of
clarity, State Med. Oxygen & Supply first found that provisions of the Anti-Kickback Act cannot
be enforced through a Montana statute which basically allows for the generic redressing of
wrongful acts. 230 Mont. at 458-460. But the Court then also found immediately afterwards
that a tortious interference claim at issue in that case was dismissed improvidently, even though

it was ostensibly based a breach of the exact same federal statute. !d. at 460-63; see also
Reliable Ambulance Service, Inc., 2003 WL 21972724 at *6 (interpreting State Med. Oxygen &
Supply as allowing a tortious interference claim to be based on a violation of the non-privateright federal statute). The insinuation from the State Me d. Oxygen & Supply is accordingly that
while a party might not be able to enforce a non-private-right federal statute, it does not follow
that same party cannot base its tortious interference claim on that exact same violation, since the
party is not actually trying to enforce that law in this cause of action. Put more simply, Saint
Alphonsus's cited case actually seems to disprove its argument.

F.

Saint Alphonsus 's acts clearly violate the Anti-Kickback Statute.
MRIA is not attempting to prove that Saint Alphonsus violated the Stark Act. The Anti-

Kickback Statute, however, was clearly violated, and is discussed below.
The Anti-Kickback Statute-sometimes also known as the "Fraud and Abuse Statute"makes it unlawful to offer, pay, solicit, or receive any remuneration to induce or reward referrals
of items or services payable by a federal health care program. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) and
(2). Where remuneration is paid purposefully to induce or reward referrals of items or services
paid for by a federal health care program, the anti-kickback statute is violated. !d.
"Remuneration" is defined very broadly, and includes the transfer of anything of value, directly
or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind. !d. Given this breadth, the statute has been
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interpreted to cover any arrangement where one purpose of the remuneration was to obtain
money for the referral of services or to induce further referrals. US. v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105,
108 (9th Cir. 1989).
Saint Alphonsus's referral practices related to IMI unmistakably violate this statute. As a
hospital, it clearly has directed its employees and staff physicians to refer hospital patients only
to IMI. See, e.g., Ex. 4377. In return for that referral, Saint Alphonsus is remunerated by
directly increasing the profitability of a company it has a 50% ownership in. Put more simply,
Saint Alphonsus is inducing referrals of unwitting patients in order to reward itself.
The Office oflnspector General ("OIG") ofthe federal Department of Health & Human
Services, has encountered a nearly identical situation and found it to violate the Anti-Kickback
Statute. In 2003, it rendered an advisory opinion, which is attached hereto, 6 for a hospital which
was nervous about whether an independent MRI center it had agreed to form with its radiologists
was in conformance with the Anti-Kickback Statute. See pp. 1-5. Similar to the situation at
hand, the hospital and its radiologists decided to create a new business, with a 49/51 ownership
split, with the stated goal of providing MRI to the public. ld., p. 3. Moreover, as here, the
radiologists were to be the ones reading at the outpatient MRI center. ld. Thus, as with Saint
Alphonsus, if the hospital referred its patients to the new MRI center, it would be increasing its
own bottom line as a 51% owner ofthat center. Clearly apprehensive about the Anti-Kickback
Statute implications of that arrangement, the hospital asked the OIG for an opinion. ld.
The OIG stated that, on its face, this arrangement plainly violated the Anti-Kickback
Statute, and that no "safe harbor" exceptions could exist-again, under facts virtually identical to
those here. In specific, it stated that "[t]he Medical Center," as an owner of the Facility, "will be

in a position to influence referrals to the Facility and both investors will furnish services to the
6

See Bastian Aff., Ex. B.
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Facility. Therefore, the Facility will have no disinterested investors, and the Proposed
Arrangement will not qualify for safe harbor protection." !d., p. 6 (emphasis added).

Ultimately, because scienter is a component of the Anti-Kickback Statute, the OIG found
that in spite of these violations of the statute, the hospital's participation would be allowable if
and only if it engaged in several proactive measures made to insulate itself from even the

possibility of influencing referrals. !d., pp. 6-8. For example, the hospital was to ensure, among
other things, that:
•

"[O]nly a small percentage of the Facility's referrals (i.e., less than 10%) will
come from the Medical Center or physicians employed by the Medical Center";

•

It "refrain[ed] from taking any action to require or encourage [its doctors] to refer

patients to the Facility."
•

It did "not track referrals made by [its doctors] to the Facility."

•

"On an annual basis, the Medical Center will notify all Affiliated Physicians of''
the fact that they are not tracking referrals or attempting to encourage referrals.

!d. (emphasis in original). Critically, it was only because of these and other "safeguards" that the
OIG felt comfortable not putting the hospital on "administrative sanctions in connection with the
anti-kickback law." !d.
In the case at hand, Saint Alphonsus is in the exact same underlying situation as the
hospital found to be in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute in the OIG opinion (Bastian Aff.,
Ex. B), but has taken none of the steps outlined above in order to not be seen as illegally
influencing referrals. In fact, it has done just the opposite. That is, while the OIG stated that it
was important that only 10% of referrals came from the hospital, in this case, Saint Alphonsus
has actually directed everyone working for it to only refer hospital patients to IMI, i.e., 100%.
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See Ex. 4377. Similarly, where the hospital in the OIG opinion purposefully refrained from
encouraging its staff to refer to the facility, Saint Alphonsus has brazenly done just the opposite,
telling its employees that it must send its patients to GSR/IMI. !d. Moreover, where the tracking
of referrals is found to be highly problematic by the OIG, Saint Alphonsus seems to admit in this
very Motion that it keeps track of the referrals, an admission that comports with the evidence in
this case. Motion, p. 10; Tr., pp. 1524-27, 2911-13. Stated succinctly, then, Saint Alphonsus is
in the same position as the hospital found to be in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute in the
OIG opinion, but unlike that hospital, has no mitigating factors in its favor, since it is
unabashedly doing all the things that the OIG found to be violative of the law.
Moreover, when the problems described in the OIG opinion are considered in light of the
other evidence in this case--evidence that the OIG did not have before it in the opinion (see
Bastian Aff., Ex. B)-the conclusion that Saint Alphonsus is in violation of the Anti-Kickback
statute is even more unavoidable. By way of example only, and not meant as an exhaustive list,
consider the following:
•

The fact that Saint Alphonsus clearly tried to refer patients to its self-owned
facility by purposefully making it difficult for referring doctors to see MRIC's
scans on a system MRIC had already paid for, while simultaneously dedicating a
huge amount of time and resources to making sure that IMI' s images would be
easily and quickly made available to the referring doctors immediately. See
generally, testimony of Holly Wallace, 10/7/11.

•

The fact that Saint Alphonsus knowingly allowed (if not encouraged) its partner
doctors at IMI to literally walk patients out ofMRIC and over to IMI. Tr., pp.
3729-30, 3983-85.
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•

The fact that Saint Alphonsus took no efforts to stop its doctors from drastically
cutting their hours back at MRIC while increasing hours at IMI so that MRIC
would lose business to IMI. Tr., pp. 3938-46.

All this the hospital did knowingly; or at least the jury has been presented with enough evidence
to conclude it did.
Saint Alphonsus alleges that MRIA cannot prove that IMI saw any Medicare or Medicaid
patients such that these laws might be implicated. Motion, pp. 9-11. This argument need not
detain the Court long, since IMI's operating agreement, which Saint Alphonsus helped draft and
then executed, specifically states the opposite:
It is expressly understood ... that the Company's operations are subject to various state
andfederallaws .. .including .. .42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (the "Fraud and Abuse Statute") ...
[and that] it is the intent of the parties that the Company operate in a manner consistent
with the[se} statutes.
See Ex. 4226, § 3.3.1. (p. 14) (emphasis added). That is, Saint Alphonsus cannot credibly argue

now that IMI did not see or refer Medicare or Medicaid patients. As the Agreement states, the
"Company's operations" were such that it would need, as a matter of course, to comply with the
statutes. This can be nothing else but an admission that Medicare and Medicaid patients would
be so prevalent that IMI was set up to routinely "operate in a manner" consistent with these laws.
Even putting that admission to the side, however, as a matter of simple common sense, it
is extraordinarily implausible Saint Alphonsus's illegal referrals did not impact Medicare and
Medicaid patients. Again, Saint Alphonsus sent a memorandum which specifically instructed its
entire hospital nursing staff that it was to now avoid MRIC completely and only refer to Saint

Alphonsus patients to GSR/IMI. Ex. 4377. Nowhere in that memorandum is there any
indication that this edict would only apply to non-Medicare/Medicaid patients. Moreover,
Ms. Jeffcoat testified that Saint Alphonsus sees a number of high-needs Medicaid patients as part
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•
of its "mission" every year. Tr., pp. 4799-4802. As such, unless Saint Alphonsus is prepared to
state that it has not sent any Saint Alphonsus patient who was paying (even partially) by way of
Medicare and Medicaid to IMI, its self-serving arguments should fall on deaf ears.
Nor would it be believable to assert that Saint Alphonsus was unaware that its actions
were violative of the Anti-Kickback Statute. Several Saint Alphonsus representatives stated that
this was an issue upon which they keep themselves up to date, knew much about, and developed
internal policies in order to ensure compliance with. Tr., 1524-27, 2117-22, 4129-35. And
again, they even made sure to reference the statute in their agreement with IMI so as to pretend
as though they were trying to be obey it. Ex. 4226, § 3.3.1. (p. 14).
In short, the evidence is clear that Saint Alphonsus has knowingly violated the AntiKickback Statute. More importantly, its violation of that statute unquestionably can be used as
one of the many "wrongful means" supporting MRIA's claim for tortious interference.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, MRIA respectfully requests that this Court deny Saint
Alphonsus's Motion.
DATED this 21st day of October 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~#<f~l..- ~

Brent Basti n
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, l'vfRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third
Party PlaintiffMRI Associates, LLP

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

v.
MRJ ASSOCIATES, LIJP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,

Case No. CV OC 0408219D
MRIA'S RESPONSES TO SADC
AND SARMC'S FIFTH SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
EIGHTH SET OF REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
AND FOURTH SET OF REQUESTS
FOR ADMISSIONS

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership, on its own behalf, and on behalf of MRI
Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership,
CounterClaimants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
CounterDefendants.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
·
partnership,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

v.
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,
Third-Party Defendants.

Defendant/Counterclaimant MRI Associates, LLP (hereinafter "Defendant"), by and
through the undersigned counsel of record, answers Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.'s and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s Fifth Set oflnterrogatories, Eighth Set of
Requests for Production and Fourth Set of Requests for Admissions, served on April30, 2007, as
follows:

GENERAL STATEMENT
Defendant's investigation in this matter is ongoing and continuing. Consequently,
defendant will respond to these requests for production to the best of its present existing ability.
The discovery process may reveal facts, documents and witnesses not presently known to
defendant, but upon which the defendant may rely and to which defendant reserves its right to
supplement its responses. Consequently, the responses contained herein are not intended to, and
shall not preclude defendant from making any contentions or from relying on any facts,
documents or witnesses at trial based upon additional evidence obtained during the discovery
process.
These responses are made solely for the purpose of this action. Each response is subject
to all objections as to competence, relevance, materiality, propriety and admissibility, and to any
and all other objections on any grounds that would require the exclusion of any statements
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contained herein if such request asked of, or statements contained herein where made by, a
witness testifying in court, all of which objections and grounds are hereby expressly reserved and
may be interposed at the time of trial. The responses given herein are without prejudice to any or
all of defendant's rights to produce any subsequently discovered documents or to revise these
responses if further discovery so indicates.
These responses shall not be deemed to constitute admissions (i) that any particular
document or thing ex.ists, is relevant, non-privileged, or admissible in evidence, or (ii) that any
statement or characterization in plaintiff's interrogatory is accurate or complete.

GENERAL OBJECTIONS
Defendant objects to each of the requests for production to the extent that they call for
information already known by Plaintiff.
Defendant objects to the entire set of requests for production, and to each and every
individual request contained therein, to the extent that it purports to call for information
protected by the attorney-client privilege, or materials subject to the attorney work product
doctrine, or for otherwise privileged materials. Said information, documents, and/or materials
will not be produced.
Defendant objects to the entire set of requests for production, and to each and every
individual request therein, to the extent that it seeks private or confidential information. Despite
Defendant's efforts to negotiate a Confidentiality Stipulation with the Plaintiff, to date, Plaintiff
has failed to execute Defendant's proposed Confidentiality Stipulation or to propose its own
Confidentiality Stipulation for Defendant to execute. As such, no additional documents will be
produced by Defendant until a mutually agreeable confidentiality stipulation is executed by the
parties.
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To the extent that the requests for production seek information outside the custody or
control of defendant, defendant objects to the request as unreasonable and unduly burdensome.
Defendant objects to the entire set of requests for production, and to each and every
individual request therein, to the extent that it attempts to impose obligations upon defendant that
are contrary to or inconsistent with Rules 33 and 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendant will respond to plaintiffs requests for production in accordance with Rules 3 3 and 34
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendant reserves all objections or other questions as to competency, relevance,
materiality, privilege or admissibility as evidence in any subsequent proceeding or in the trial of
this or any other action of this response and any document or thing or information provided in
response to plaintiffs requests for production. Nothing in these responses is to be construed as
an admission by defendant with respect to the authenticity, admissibility or relevance of any
document produced, or of the truth or accuracy of any characterization or statement of any kind
contained in any document.
Defendant's responses to plaintiffs requests for production will be made to the best of its
present knowledge, information and belief. The responses will, at all times, be subject to
additional or different information that discovery or further investigation may disclose.
Defendant reserves the right to make usc of or to introduce at any hearing or trial documents and
information responsive to plaintiffs requests for production after the date ofthese responses.
Defendant expressly incorporates the above General Objections into each specific
response to the requests for production set forth below as if set forth in full therein. A response
to an individual request shall not constitute a waiver of any applicable specific or general
objection to the individual request.
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INTERROGATORIES

INTERROGATORY NO. I 0: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that suppotts, in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 42 of your Second Amended Counterclaim, second bullet point, that Saint Alphonsus
disparaged MRIA's services.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA has produced such list of witnesses, which it has supplemented MRIA
is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support the subject allegation.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 42 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim, third bullet point, that Saint Alphonsus
promoted IMI's services over MRIA's.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
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the subject allegation.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 42 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim, fourth bullet point, that Saint Alphonsus
voted against growth initiatives at the MRIA board leveL
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 43 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus provided
"confidential business information from MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile" to IMI In Your
Answer to this Interrogatory, please specifically describe the "confidential business information"
that you allege Saint Alphonsus inappropriately provided to 1MI and how You believe this
information was obtained.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
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parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 46 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that "[Sandra] Bruce became frustrated
with the Hospital's position in IMI' after Saint Alphonsus "officially" joined IMI in 2001. In
Your Answer to this Interrogatory, please specifically identify all evidence you intend to offer at
trial to show Ms. Bruce's state of mind during the relevant time period.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the patties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that supp01t their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
intenogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Intenogatories to IRCP 33(a).
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports. in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 48 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus intended to make
MRIA and MRI Center the "exclusive" provider ofMRis on Saint Alphonsus' campus "for the
duration of the partnership (at least 2023)," In Your Answer to this Interrogatory, please
MRIA'S RESPONSES TO SADC AND SARMC'S FIFTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND EIGHTH SET OF
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND FOURTH SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS002883
-7

specifically identify all evidence you intend to offer at trial to show MRlA and MRI Center had
the right to be the "exclusive" provider ofMRis on the Saint Alphonsus Campus.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 49, bullet point two, of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that since its
dissociation from MRIA Saint Alphonsus has directed its physicians "to refer magnetic
resonance imaging patients to IMI, to the exclusion ofMRI Center." In your Answer to this
Interrogatory, please specifically identify each physician or other individual you intend to call at
trial who will offer testimony supporting this allegation and summarize each witness' proposed
trial testimony.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 16: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence ret1ected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
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interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which suppmi
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 49, bullet point three, of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that since its
dissociation f1 'Om MRIA Saint Alphonsus has created "uncertainty among referring physicians
and MRI Center employees by spreading rumors that MRI Center would close in the near
future. 11

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 17: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the pmiies would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims m1d defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
IntelTogatories to IRCP 33(a).
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegations contained in
paragraph 82 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus breached "certain
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care" prior to its dissociation from MRIA. In Your Answer to this
Interrogatory, please specifically identify the alleged duties m1d all actions taken by Saint
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Alphonsus that you allege that were a breach of its alleged fiduciary duties to MRlA and all
witnesses that will testify at trial that such alleged actions were a breach of any alleged fiduciary
duties.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 18: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MIUA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
INTERROGATORY NO. 19: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegations contained in
paragraph 96 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus failed to discharge
its "duties as a partner in good faith." In Your Answer to this Interrogatory, please specifically
identify each of the "various acts" You allege were taken in breach of Saint Alphonsus' alleged
duty to act in good faith toward MRIA.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 19: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
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would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegations contained in
paragraph 101 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus "intentionally and
wrongfully interfered with, terminated, and/or induced a breach ofMRI Center's prospective
contractual relations and business expectations." In Your Answer to this Interrogatory, please
specifically identify all "prospective contractual relations and business expectations" that You
allege in which Saint Alphonsus interfered.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 20: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: With regard to the allegations contained in paragraph 105
of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that "MRIA contributed capital for the development and
implementation of SARMC's PACS/RIS system, and is an owner of the system," please
specifically identify the pieces of hardware or software You purchased directly from DR
Systems, Inc., and the amount paid for any such items.
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RESI>ONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was 110t practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: With regard to the allegations contained in paragraph 151
of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus' appointed representatives to the
1Ml Management Committee "who regularly received MRIA confidential and trade secret

information in the course of their work at SARMC or in their roles as SARMC representatives to
MRLA," please specifically identify the nature of the "confidential and trade secret information"
that You allege has been misappropriated.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
intenogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
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INTERROGATORY NO. 23: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports. in any way, the allegations contained in
paragraph 158 of Your Second Amended CO llll terclaim that Saint Alphonsus has "appropriated
MRIA's and MRI Center's confidential business information" In Your Answer to this
Interrogatory, please specifically identify the nature of the "confidential business information"
that You allege has been misappropriated.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 23: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRlA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
INTERROGATORY NO. 24: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegations contained in
paragraph 165 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus "has knowingly and
intentionally destroyed information, or knowingly and intentionally allowed in1ormation to be
destroyed, which is relevant to this litigation."
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
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parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
INTERROGATORY NO. 25: Please identify the date, author and intended purpose ofthe
document attached hereto as Exhibit A [Bates Nos. 021621-021623].
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 25: MRIA is currently unable to identify

the author of this document. This Interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of Interrogatories
allowed by IRCP 33(a).
INTERROGATORY NO. 26: Please identify the recipients of the document attached
hereto as Exhibit A [Bates Nos. 021621-021623].
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 26: This Interrogatory exceeds the

allowable number of Interrogatories allowed by IRCP 3 3(a).
INTERROGATORY NO. 27: Please identify the date, author and intended purpose ofthe
document attached hereto as Exhibit B [Bates Nos. 022714-022716].
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 27: This Interrogatory exceeds the

allowable number of Interrogatories allowed by IRCP 33(a).
INTERROGATORY NO. 28: Please identify the recipients of the document attached
hereto as Exhibit 13 [Bates Nos. 022714-022716].
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 28: This Interrogatory exceeds the

allowable number ofinterrogatories allowed by IRCP 33(a).
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24; Please admit that MRlA did not have a written
document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic information in April
2004.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24: Objection. Irrelevant.

SARMC has not asserted a claim for spoliation. The nonexistence of a retention policy is also
irrelevant to a claim of spoliation.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25: Please admit that MRIA did not have a
written document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic
information in May, 2004.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25: See Response to

No. 24.
REOUES'J' FOR ADMISSION NO. 26: Please admit that MRIA did not have a
written document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic
information in June 2004.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26: See Response to No.

24.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27: Please admit that MRIA did not have a
written document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic
information in July 2004.
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27: See Response to
No. 24.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 28: Please admit that MRIA did not have a
written document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic information in
August 2004.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 28: See Response to
No. 24.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 29: Please admit MRIA did not have a
written document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic
information in September 2004.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 29: See Response to
No. 24.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 30: Please admit Saint Alphonsus did not
spoliate any evidence as alleged in Your Second Amended Counterclaim.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 30: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 31: Please admit no MRIA representative,
other than Saint Alphonsus' agents and representatives, ever received any copy of the
document entitled

~~Presentation

of Strategic Options MRIA Ownership for SARMC"

dated November 6, 2001, which was generated by Shattuck Hammond Partners, prior to
initiation of this lawsuit.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 31: Denied. Unknown
as to whom SARMC or its agents distributed said document. MRIA is unaware of any
MRIA representative (other than SARMC) receiving or reviewing such document.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 32: Please admit no MRlA representative,
other than Saint Alphonsus' agents and representatives, ever received any copy of the
document entitled "Presentation ofValuation ofMRI Association GP and Affiliates"
dated November 6, 2001, which was generated by Shattuck Hammond Partners, prior to
initiation of this lawsuit.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 32: Denied. Unknown

as to whom SARMC or its agents distributed said document. MRIA is unaware of any
MRIA representative (other than SARMC) receiving or reviewing such document.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 33: Please admit no MRIA representative,
other than Saint A 1phonsus' agents and representatives, ever reviewed any copy of the
document entitled "Presentation of Strategic Options MRIA Ownership for SARMC"
dated November 6, 2001, which was generated by Shattuck Hammond Partners, prior to
initiation of this lawsuit.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 33: Denied. Unknown

as to whom SARMC or its agents distributed said document. MRIA is unaware of any
MRIA representative (other than SARMC) receiving or reviewing such document.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 34: Please admit no MRlA representative,
other than Saint Alphonsus' agents and representatives, ever reviewed any copy of the
document entitled "Presentation of Valuation of MRI Association GP and Affiliates"
dated November 6, 2001, which was generated by Shattuck Hammond Partners, prior to
initiation ofthis lawsuit.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 34: Denied. Unknown

as to whom SARMC or its agents distributed said docwnent. MRIA is unaware of any
MRIA representative (other than SARMC) receiving or reviewing such document.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 35: Please admit Dr. Giles authored the
document attached hereto as Exhibit A [Bates Nos. 0216:21-021.623].
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 35: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 36: Please admit Dr. Curran authored the
document attached hereto as Exhibit B [Bates Nos. 022714-022716].
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 36: In all likelihood, Dr.
Curran authored said document, however MRIA is unable to confinn this response given
that Dr. Curran is deceased.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 37: Please admit Exhibit B [Bates Nos.
022714- 022716] was drafted in the regular course of business of Mercy Medical Center.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 37: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 38: Please admit Exhibit B [Bates Nos.
022714-022716] was kept in the regular course ofbusiness of Mercy Medical Center.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST .FOR ADMISSION NO. 38: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 39: Please admit Exhibit B [Bates Nos.
022714- 022716J was produced from the business records of Mercy Medical Center.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 39: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 40: Please admit Exhibit B [Bates Nos.
022714-022716] is admissible evidence at trial.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 40: Denied.
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 78: Please produce any and all Documents
in Your possession or control that were generated by Shattuck Hammond Partners
(Shattuck Hammond), including, but not limited to, any correspondence between any
representative of Shattuck Hammond and MRIA, MRI Center or MRIA Mobile. This
Request includes only Documents coming into Your possession or control prior to the
filing of Your Answer and Counterclaim.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 78: Any such documents have
already been produced.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 79: Please produce any and all copies in
Your possession or control of the document entitled "Presentation of Strategic Options
MRIA Ownership for SARMC" dated November 6, 2001. This Request includes only
Documents coming into Yom possession or control prior to the filing of Your Answer
and Counterclaim.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 79: See Response to
No. 78.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 80: Please produce any and all copies in
Your possession or control of the document entitled "Presentation of Valuation of MRI
Association GP and Affiliates" dated November 6, 2001. This Request includes only
Documents coming into Your possession or control prior to the filing of Your Answer
and Counterclaim.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 80: See Response to
No. 78.
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 81: Please produce any and all copies in
Your possession or contro I of any Document memorializing any discussions with
Shattuck Hammond by any representative of MRIA, MRI Center or MRl Mobile. This
Request includes only Documents coming into Your possession or control prior to the
filing of Your Answer and Counterclaim.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 80: See Response to
No. 80.
DATED this

·-s 0

,.te,
day of May, 2007.

GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
of May, 2007, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
Warren E. Jones
EBERLE BERLIN
300 N. 6th Street, 2nd Floor
Post Office Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701
[Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants]
Rodney R. Sactrum
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
101 South Capitol Boulevard
Suite 1800
Boise, ID 83702
[Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants]
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER
509 West Hayes
Post Office Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
[Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants]
Patrick J. Miller
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
601 W. Brumock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
[Attorneys for Plaintifi'i'Counter-Defendants]

~.Mail

ff Facsimile (208) 344-8542
0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery

'6-S.Mail

~acsimile (208) 336-0448

0
0

Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

if'~:~ Mail

ka""Facsimile (208) 336-9177
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

0
0

6m:'Mail
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
liand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery

Attorneys for Defendant/CounterCiaimant
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[We redact certain identifying information and certain potentially privileged,
confidential, or proprietary information associated with the individual or entity, unless
otherwise approved by the requestors.]

Issued:

May 22,2003

Posted:

May 29,2003

[names and addresses redacted]

Re:

OIG Advisory Opinion No. 03-12

Dear Gentlemen:
We are writing in response to your request for an advisory opinion regarding a proposed
joint venture between a medical center and a radiology group to own and operate an
outpatient open magnetic resonance imaging facility (the "Facility") and several related
ancillary agreements (the "Proposed Arrangement"). Specifically, you have inquired
whether the Proposed Arrangement would constitute grounds for the imposition of
sanctions under the exclusion authority at section 1128(b)(7) of the Social Security Act
(the "Act") or the civil monetary penalty provision at section 1128A(a)(7) of the Act, as
those sections relate to the commission of acts described in section 1128B(b) of the Act.
For purposes of this advisory opinion, the term "Proposed Arrangement" collectively
includes the following arrangements or agreements described in your request letter and
supplemental submissions: (i) the ownership interests of the Medical Center and the
Radiology Group, both as hereinafter defined, in the Facility; (ii) a professional services
agreement under which the Radiology Group will provide professional radiology services
at the Facility; (iii) a staffing agreement under which the Medical Center will provide
three of its employees to the Facility; (iv) an equipment sublease under which the
Radiology Group will sublease equipment to the Facility; and (v) an assignment under
which the Radiology Group will assign its space lease to the Facility.
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You have certified that all of the information provided in your request, including all
supplementary letters, is true and correct and constitutes a complete description of the
relevant facts and agreements among the parties.
In issuing this opinion, we have relied solely on the facts and information presented to us.
We have not undertaken an independent investigation of such information. This opinion
is limited to the facts presented. If material facts have not been disclosed or have been
misrepresented, this opinion is without force and effect.
Based on the facts certified in your request for an advisory opinion and supplemental
submissions, we conclude that the Proposed Arrangement could potentially generate
prohibited remuneration under the anti-kickback statute, if the requisite intent to induce or
reward referrals of federal health care program business were present, but that the Office
oflnspector General ("OIG") would not impose administrative sanctions on [Entity A] or
[Entity B] under sections 1128(b)(7) or 1128A(a)(7) of the Act (as those sections relate to
the commission of acts described in section 1128B(b) of the Act) in connection with the
Proposed Arrangement. This opinion is limited to the Proposed Arrangement and,
therefore, we express no opinion about any ancillary agreements or arrangements
disclosed or referenced in your request letter or supplemental submissions.
This opinion may not be relied on by any persons other than [Entity A] and [Entity B], the
requestors of this opinion (the "Requestors"), and is further qualified as set out in Part IV
below and in 42 C.F.R. Part 1008.
1.

FACTUALBACKGROUND

Under the Proposed Arrangement, the Medical Center and the Radiology Group will form
a joint venture to own and operate the Facility.

A.

The Parties.

[Entity A] (the "Medical Center"), an acute care hospital, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
[Entity C], a health care system that also includes five provider-based clinics. 1 The
Medical Center has a number of affiliations with referring physicians as employees,
independent contractors, and medical staff members (collectively, the "Affiliated
1

For purposes of this advisory opinion, we consider the Medical Center, [Entity C],
and all other affiliated entities owned and controlled in whole or in part, directly or
indirectly, by any of the foregoing to be sufficiently related to be treated as a single entity,
which will be referred to individually and collectively as the "Medical Center."
002900
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Physicians"), including ten employed physicians who provide primary care services at its
clinics. The Medical Center currently owns and operates (and, after implementation of
the Proposed Arrangement, will continue to own and operate) a radiology department,
which provides inpatient and outpatient radiology services.
Six radiologists (the "Investing Radiologists") are the sole shareholders of [Entity D], a
professional association that meets all of the requirements of the group practice safe
harbor, 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(p). The Investing Radiologists formed a holding company,
[Entity B], for the sole purpose of investing in the Facility. Each Investing Radiologist
contributed equally to, and owns an equal share in, the holding company. For purposes of
this advisory opinion, we consider [Entity B] and [Entity D] to be sufficiently related to
be treated as a single entity, which will be referred to individually and collectively as the
"Radiology Group."
The Radiology Group is the exclusive provider of professional radiology services for the
Medical Center. For services provided to the Medical Center's clinic patients, the
Medical Center pays the Radiology Group a set fee per radiological read and report and
bills patients and their third party payors for both the technical and professional
components. For services provided to the Medical Center's inpatients and outpatients
(excluding clinic patients), the Radiology Group bills patients and their third party payors
directly for the professional component. The Requestors have certified that the
compensation that the Radiology Group receives from the Medical Center for its services
represents fair market value in arms' -length transactions.

B.

The Proposed Arrangement.

The Medical Center and the Radiology Group will own 51% and 49% of the Facility,
respectively, based on their capital contributions. The Facility's profits and losses, if any,
will be distributed to each investor in direct proportion to the amount of capital invested
by that investor. The terms upon which the investment interests in the Facility were
offered to the investors were not related to the previous or expected volume of referrals,
services furnished, or the amount of business that might otherwise be generated from the
investor to the Facility. None of the capital contributed by the Medical Center or the
Radiology Group was, or will be, obtained with funds loaned or guaranteed by the
Facility, any direct or indirect investor, or any individual or entity acting on behalf of the
Facility or any direct or indirect investor.
The Facility will be the only open magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") facility within
the Medical Center's three-county service area. Patients referred to the Facility by the
Medical Center or by physicians employed by the Medical Center will be fully informed
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in writing of the Medical Center's investment interest both through a written disclosure to
each such patient and through a notice posted in the office of each employed physician.
The Facility, the Medical Center, the Radiology Group, and the Investing Radiologists
will treat patients receiving medical benefits or assistance under any federal health care
program in a nondiscriminatory manner. The Medical Center has certified that it will not
include on its cost report or any claim for payment from a federal health care program any
costs associated with the Facility, unless such costs are required to be included by a
federal health care program.
According to the Medical Center, less than 10% ofthe Facility's referrals will come from
the Medical Center or physicians employed by the Medical Center. In order to limit its
ability to control referrals to the Facility, the Medical Center has certified that:
•

The Medical Center will refrain from taking any action to require or encourage
Affiliated Physicians to refer patients to the Facility.

•

The Medical Center will not track referrals made by Affiliated Physicians to the
Facility.

•

Compensation paid to Affiliated Physicians, whether pursuant to employment or
personal services contracts, will not be related directly or indirectly to the volume
or value of referrals or other business generated by such physicians to or for the
Facility. Such compensation will be consistent with fair market value in arms'length transactions.

On an annual basis, the Medical Center will notify all Affiliated Physicians of the
foregoing three measures.
The Facility will enter into four written ancillary agreements. There will be two services
agreements: (i) a professional services agreement, pursuant to which the Radiology Group
will be the exclusive provider of professional radiology services at the Facility and bill
patients and their third party payors directly for the professional component, as payment
in full for its services; and (ii) a staffing agreement, pursuant to which the Medical Center
will provide to the Facility one clerical staff person and one technician to operate the
Facility on a full-time basis and one administrator on a part-time basis not to exceed
twenty hours per month, in exchange for a monthly payment equal to the Medical
Center's payroll expenses for the leased employees, prorated accordingly for the part-time
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employee? There will be two pass-through agreements: (i) an equipment sublease,
pursuant to which the Radiology Group will sublease to the Facility certain equipment,
including the open MRI equipment; and (ii) an assignment, pursuant to which the
Radiology Group will assign to the Facility the lease for the space where the Facility will
be located. The Radiology Group leases the equipment and space from different,
unrelated third parties. The Requestors have certified that the effect of the sublease and
the assignment will be to subject the Facility to all material terms and conditions of the
underlying leases and that payments under all four ancillary agreements will be consistent
with fair market value in arms'-length transactions. 3

II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Law

The anti-kickback statute makes it a criminal offense knowingly and willfully to offer,
pay, solicit, or receive any remuneration to induce or reward referrals of items or services
payable by a federal health care program. See section 1128B(b) ofthe Act. Where
remuneration is paid purposefully to induce or reward referrals of items or services paid
for by a federal health care program, the anti-kickback statute is violated. By its terms,
the statute ascribes criminal liability to parties on both sides of an impermissible
"kickback" transaction. For purposes of the anti-kickback statute, "remuneration"
includes the transfer of anything of value, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in
cash or in kind.
The statute has been interpreted to cover any arrangement where one purpose of the
remuneration was to obtain money for the referral of services or to induce further
referrals. United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Greber,
760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985). Violation ofthe statute
constitutes a felony punishable by a maximum fine of $25,000, imprisonment up to five
years, or both. Conviction will also lead to automatic exclusion from federal health care
2

W e express no opinion regarding payments made or received under the staffing
agreement for the part-time administrator.
3

The Requestors have also certified that the underlying space lease and the
equipment sublease will meet all ofthe requirements ofthe applicable safe harbors (42
C.P.R.§§ 1001.952(b), (c)), except for the minimum one-year term requirement. If any
ancillary agreement is terminated prior to the initial one-year term and, during that time
period, the parties either renegotiate the agreement or enter into further financial
arrangements, this opinion is without force and effect.
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programs, including Medicare and Medicaid. Where a party commits an act described in
section 1128B(b) of the Act, the OIG may initiate administrative proceedings to impose
civil monetary penalties on such party under section 1128A(a)(7) of the Act. The OIG
may also initiate administrative proceedings to exclude such party from the federal health
care programs under section 1128(b)(7) ofthe Act.
The Department of Health and Human Services has promulgated safe harbor regulations
that define practices that are not subject to the anti-kickback statute because such
practices would be unlikely to result in fraud or abuse. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952. The
safe harbors set forth specific conditions that, if met, assure entities involved of not being
prosecuted or sanctioned for the arrangement qualifying for the safe harbor. However,
safe harbor protection is afforded only to those arrangements that precisely meet all of the
conditions set forth in the safe harbor.
Because the Proposed Arrangement involves ownership of a non-public entity by
interested investors, the small entity investment safe harbor, 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)(2),
is potentially applicable. This safe harbor has eight elements, each of which must be
satisfied in order for an arrangement to qualify for the exception. Of particular relevance
here is one of the safe harbor's two "60-40" tests (the "investor test"), which requires that
at least 60% of an entity's investment interests be held by persons that are not in a
position to make or influence referrals to, furnish items or services to, or otherwise
generate business for the entity ("disinterested investors"). See 42 C.P.R.
§ 1001.952(a)(2)(i).

B.

Analysis.

The Proposed Arrangement will not fit into the small entity investment safe harbor. In
particular, the investor test will not be met. The Medical Center will be in a position to
influence referrals to the Facility and both investors will furnish services to the Facility.
Therefore, the Facility will have no disinterested investors, and the Proposed
Arrangement will not qualify for safe harbor protection. Consequently, we must carefully
scrutinize the Proposed Arrangement in its entirety to determine whether, based upon a
totality of the facts and circumstances presented, the potential risk of fraud and abuse is
acceptably low.
A number of factors under the Proposed Arrangement mitigate the risk of fraud or abuse
or otherwise merit consideration. First, unlike most hospital-physician joint ventures, the
physician investors (i.e., the Investing Radiologists) are not referral sources for the
Facility or the Medical Center. In general, radiologists do not order the radiological tests
they perform; instead, such tests are ordered by a patient's treating physician. Although
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there may be situations in which a radiologist can recommend additional testing during
the course of a consultation and, as a practical matter, indirectly generate some additional
business, those tests must be approved by the patient's treating physician, except in very
limited, well-defined circumstances. 4
Second, according to the Medical Center's certification, only a small percentage of the
Facility's referrals (i.e., less than 10%) will come from the Medical Center or physicians
employed by the Medical Center. Additionally, the Medical Center will continue to own
and operate its own radiology department.
Third, although the Medical Center is in a position to direct or influence referrals to the
Facility directly and by using its control and influence over its Affiliated Physicians, the
Medical Center has certified that it will take the following steps to limit its ability to
direct or influence such referrals:
•

The Medical Center will refrain from taking any action to require or encourage
Affiliated Physicians to refer patients to the Facility.

•

The Medical Center will not track referrals made by Affiliated Physicians to the
Facility.

•

Compensation paid to Affiliated Physicians, whether pursuant to employment or
personal services contracts, will not be related directly or indirectly to the volume
or value of referrals or other business generated by such physicians to or for the
Facility. Such compensation will be consistent with fair market value in arms'length transactions.

On an annual basis, the Medical Center will notifY all Affiliated Physicians of the
foregoing three measures.
Fourth, any return on the Medical Center's or the Radiology Group's investment in the
Facility will be proportional to its respective capital investments and will not be based on
the previous or expected volume of referrals, services furnished, or the amount of
business that might otherwise be generated from either investor to the Facility.
Fifth, the four ancillary agreements do not appreciably increase the risk of fraud and
abuse. Under the professional services agreement between the Facility and the Radiology
4

See the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' Carriers Manual (Pub. 14),
Part 3, section 1502l.D.
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Group, the Radiology Group will be the exclusive provider of professional radiology
services at the Facility and will accept, as payment in full for such services,
reimbursement from patients and their third party payors. No payments will flow from
the Facility to the Radiology Group or the Investing Radiologists for such services. The
staffing agreement, equipment sublease, and assignment of the space lease will be, in
effect, pass-through agreements, because the payments that the Facility will be required to
make under each agreement will be equal to the expenses incurred (i.e., with respect to
the equipment sublease and the space lease assignment, the Radiology Group's expenses
under the underlying leases and, with respect to the leased employees, the Medical
Center's payroll expenses for the leased employees, prorated accordingly for the part-time
employee). Moreover, compensation paid under each agreement will be consistent with
fair market value in arms' -length transactions. 5
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that, while the Proposed Arrangement poses
some risk, the safeguards put in place by the Requestors will make that risk sufficiently
low that we would not subject the Proposed Arrangement to administrative sanctions in
connection with the anti-kickback law.

III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the facts certified in your request for an advisory opinion and supplemental
submissions, we conclude that the Proposed Arrangement could potentially generate
prohibited remuneration under the anti-kickback statute, if the requisite intent to induce or
reward referrals of federal health care program business were present, but that the OIG
would not impose administrative sanctions on [Entity A] or [Entity B] under sections
1128(b)(7) or 1128A(a)(7) of the Act (as those sections relate to the commission of acts
described in section 1128B(b) of the Act) in connection with the Proposed Arrangement.
This opinion is limited to the Proposed Arrangement and, therefore, we express no
opinion about any ancillary agreements or arrangements disclosed or referenced in your
request letter or supplemental submissions.

5

W e are precluded by statute from opining on whether fair market value shall be or
was paid for goods, services, or property. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)(3)(A). For
purposes of this advisory opinion, we rely on the Requestors' certifications of fair market
value. If the fees paid are not fair market value, this opinion is without force and effect.
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IV.

LIMITATIONS

The limitations applicable to this opinion include the following:
•

This advisory opinion is issued only to [Entity A] and [Entity B], the
requestors of this opinion. This advisory opinion has no application to, and
cannot be relied upon by, any other individual or entity.

•

This advisory opinion may not be introduced into evidence in any matter
involving an entity or individual that is not a requestor of this opinion.

•

This advisory opinion is applicable only to the statutory provisions
specifically noted above. No opinion is expressed or implied herein with
respect to the application of any other federal, state, or local statute, rule,
regulation, ordinance, or other law that may be applicable to the Proposed
Arrangement, including, without limitation, the physician self-referral law,
section 1877 ofthe Act.

•

This advisory opinion will not bind or obligate any agency other than the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

•

This advisory opinion is limited in scope to the specific arrangement
described in this letter and has no applicability to other arrangements, even
those which appear similar in nature or scope.

•

No opinion is expressed herein regarding the liability of any party under the
False Claims Act or other legal authorities for any improper billing, claims
submission, cost reporting, or related conduct.

This opinion is also subject to any additional limitations set forth at 42 C.F .R. Part 1008.
The OIG will not proceed against the Requestors with respect to any action that is part of
the Proposed Arrangement taken in good faith reliance upon this advisory opinion, as
long as all of the material facts have been fully, completely, and accurately presented, and
the Proposed Arrangement in practice comports with the information provided. The OIG
reserves the right to reconsider the questions and issues raised in this advisory opinion
and, where the public interest requires, to rescind, modifY, or terminate this opinion. In
the event that this advisory opinion is modified or terminated, the OIG will not proceed
against the Requestors with respect to any action taken in good faith reliance upon this
advisory opinion, where all ofthe relevant facts were fully, completely, and accurately
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presented and where such action was promptly discontinued upon notification of the
modification or termination of this advisory opinion. An advisory opinion may be
rescinded only if the relevant and material facts have not been fully, completely, and
accurately disclosed to the OIG.
Sincerely,

Is/
Lewis Morris
Chief Counsel to the Inspector General
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
ISTARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SAINT
ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT ON CLAIMS
RELATED TO ENFORCEMENT OF
RADIOLOGY SERVICES
CONTRACT

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Directed Verdict on Claims Related to Enforcement ofthe Radiology Services Contract (the
"Motion").
I.

INTRODUCTION

Saint Alphonsus's Motion is curious. Saint Alphonsus starts by arguing that it was
powerless to control its radiologists from their undisputed malfeasance, and apparently even
wants "several" instructions given to the jury to that effect. Motion, p. 2. As an initial matter,
this argument is false: the contract at issue clearly does require the radiologists to read MRIC's
scans, and even if it did not, Saint Alphonsus had other legal means of control over the
radiologists at its disposal. But even if true, this argument seems to do more harm to Saint
Alphonsus than good. Essentially, Saint Alphonsus is arguing that it purposefully tied its own
hands by knowingly entering into a deficient contract with the radiologists, even though it also
knew that to do so would be in breach of its fiduciary duty to provide radiologists to read
MRIC's scans. Either way, the Motion must accordingly be denied.

II.

A.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

Standard
The standard which a moving party must meet in order to obtain a directed verdict is

exceedingly difficult. In fact, a directed verdict is proper "only where the evidence is so clear
that all reasonable minds would reach only one conclusion: that the moving party should
prevail." Doe I v. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 899, 71 P.3d 1040, 1046, 71 P.3d 1040 (2003) (emphasis
added). This onerous standard clearly has not been met here.

OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON RADIOLOGY SERVICES CONTRACT- 2
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B.

Even if Saint Alphonsus's tenuous contract interpretation is accepted, this Court could
not grant much of the relief sought.
Saint Alphonsus's interpretation ofthe radiology contracts is contradicted by the

contracts' plain language and by a several admissions of the persons who negotiated them.
While that issue will be discussed in detail below, it is worth noting first that even if Saint
Alphonsus was correct, it still would not be entitled to much of the relief it seeks, since Saint
Alphonsus seeks declarations concerning rights unrelated to the contracts.
In particular, Saint Alphonsus asks this Court to rule that "Saint Alphonsus breached no
duty owed to any of the MRIA parties by failing to assert the Radiology Services Contract as an
obligation of the Radiologists to serve MRIA patients." Motion, p. 2. Moreover, it wants a
declaration that MRIA "cannot assert that Saint Alphonsus failed to assert rights that did not
exist." However, neither of these proposed declarations logically flow from Saint Alphonsus's
arguments concerning the radiology services contracts.
Instead, the evidence presented in this case has been clear that Saint Alphonsus, like each
of the other hospital partners, knew that the MRIA entities were depending on these hospital
partners to provide radiologists to read the MRI images at their respective institutions.
Dr. Curran-who was present in 1985-stated that each of the hospitals had given assurance in
the beginning of the relationship that this would be the case; and Chris Anton, Saint Alphonsus' s
CFO at the time, testified that this had in fact been the way it had occurred. Ex. 4498; Transcript
("Tr."), pp. 3800-04. To that end, Joe Messmer, a former executive at Mercy Medical, testified
that he required the radiologists at his hospital to read the images created by MRIM, and that he
believed Saint Alphonsus had an obligation to do the same for MRIC at its hospital. Tr., pp.
2626, 2652-54. Even Sandra Bruce concurred, testifying that there was a long-standing
"informal agreement" for Saint Alphonsus to provide radiologists to read at MRIC. Tr., p. 1171.

OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON RADIOLOGY SERVICES CONTRACT- 3
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And perhaps most tellingly, Cindy Schamp stated this principle in the inverse when she assured
GSR in a radiology meeting in 2000 that GSR had nothing to fear from MRIC since it was the
hospitals, and not the Limiteds, that had the absolute right to choose who got to read the scans:
"the MRI Board [can] not bind the Hospital to specify who can read." Ex. 4184, p. 1.
Given this undisputed backdrop, it is clear that Saint Alphonsus had the same duty as the
other hospital partners to provide radiologists to read at MRIC so that the company could sustain
itself-or, at the very least, to tell its partners that it was no longer going to provide those
services at MRIC after nearly two decades worth of constant coverage. But it did not do so.
Indeed, it now argues that in 2001 it purposefully signed a services contract which specifically
excluded these services-essentially leaving its fiduciary, MRIC, 1 in a gigantic lurch-but
admits that it told no one at MRIC about it, even at times where it would have made complete
sense for Saint Alphonsus to do so, such as when MRIC was actively complaining about the
radiologic services. Tr., 134 7-48. Yet this argument is strange, since it catches Saint Alphonsus
inexplicably choosing to put itself between a rock and a hard place. That is, if Saint Alphonsus's
interpretation of its 2001 contract was credible-and it is not-then it would be agreeing that it
breached its fiduciary duty in 2001 by entering into an agreement which it knew would harm its
partners and by: (1) not providing adequate radiologic coverage, as per its fiduciary duty to the
other partners; and (2) not telling them about the contractual provisions that would harm them.
As a result, when Saint Alphonsus argues that it "breached no duty owed to any of the
MRIA parties" by failing to obligate "the Radiologists to serve MRIA outpatients," it is not
being truthful. Motion, p. 2. That is, to use Saint Alphonsus's verbiage, if it knowingly entered
into a contract that harmed its partners, as it now alleges, then it clearly "breached [its fiduciary]

1

Ms. Bruce testified that Saint Alphonsus owed a duty to MRI Center and Mobile. Tr., p. 1102.
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duty owed to [all] of the MRIA parties" by so agreeing. Put more bluntly, Saint Alphonsus's
argument is not the get-out-of-jail-free card they think it is; it is an admission ofliability.
Moreover, it is worth noting that even if Saint Alphonsus had no contractual right to
insist on performance, it does not follow that it had no power to compel the radiologists to read
at MRIC. For example, the evidence presented in this matter is that Saint Alphonsus made it a
habit to threaten these radiologists' jobs whenever it did not get what it wanted from them. See,
e.g., Ex. 4199, Tr., pp. 1008-09. JeffClifftestified that the doctors at GSR felt like the threat of

being fired gave the hospital "big leverage" in the relationship with them. !d. Critically,
however, Sandra Bruce testified that she pointedly refused to even try to use even some of that
recognized leverage to get the doctors at GSR to simply continue doing what they had been
doing for the previous two decades: reading MRIC scans competently. Tr., pp. 1180-81. And
this was in spite ofthe fact that she had used that exact same leverage about the time of the
agreement to extract a comparatively trivial concession from the radiologists concerning noncompetition. Ex. 4199, Tr., pp. 1008-09.
Moreover, the evidence this jury has seen suggests that it was not even necessary to
threaten the radiologists' contract in order to influence them to read appropriately at MRIC. It is
undisputed here that Saint Alphonsus was half the management at IMI at both the time IMI
increased its hours at its own facilities and decreased them at MRIC. As such, Saint Alphonsus
was in a unique position to know just how busy its radiologists would be by increasing hours at
IMI, and how that would affect their coverage at MRIC. Moreover, given that Saint Alphonsus
held a 50% vote at IMI, it could have stopped IMI from increasing its hours at the expense of
coverage at MRIC. Yet there is no evidence that it did so.
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The truth of the matter is that the jury has now seen enough evidence to determine, if it so
chooses, that Saint Alphonsus sat idly by, knowing that its radiologists were doing harm to
MRIC, in spite of the fact that it had the obvious ability to stop these deleterious acts-contract
or no. As a result, when Saint Alphonsus argues that the jury should be instructed that Saint
Alphonsus was powerless in this situation-that MRIA should be barred from asserting that
"Saint Alphonsus failed to assert rights that did not exist"-it is again misrepresenting the facts.
Motion, p. 10. That is, whether Saint Alphonsus had a contractual right or not, it clearly had a
right and ability to control its radiologists in other ways, and indeed owed a fiduciary obligation
to the MRIA entities and partners to exercise that right and ability. Its failure to do so is a breach
of fiduciary duty.
C.

Saint Alphonsus's self-serving interpretation of the 1997 and 2001 agreements is
contrary to the contracts' plain language and the testimony at this trial.
Saint Alphonsus's current interpretation of the radiology services agreements arose only

recently. Despite the fact that this litigation has been pending for about 7 years and the fact that
the agreements themselves are 14 and 10 years old, respectively, the first time that MRIA heard
Saint Alphonsus seriously advance its interpretation that its contracts with the radiologists did
not require the radiologists to read scans at MRIC was at the beginning of this second trial.
Given that Saint Alphonsus's interpretation seems to be born of whole cloth, it is perhaps
unsurprising that the testimony by both the radiologists and even Saint Alphonsus itself directly
conflicts with it. Moreover, the plain language of these agreements themselves is also
inconsistent with it. These agreements are considered in turn below.

1.

1997 Agreement

Saint Alphonsus' s interpretation of the 1997 agreement only works, if at all, by ignoring
several key provisions of the agreement, as well as the pertinent testimony of the parties to it.
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Indeed, the inquiry is almost over before it begins if one reads just two sentences up from
§ 1.1.1., which is the focus area for Saint Alphonsus's Motion. Motion, pp. 5-7. In§ 1, found
on the same page as § 1.1.1., the agreement states that the radiologists "shall perform all services

generally and customarily performed by the Medical Center hospital-based radiologist group."
Ex. 4033, p. 2 (emphasis added). That is, the agreement expressly requires the radiologists to
continue performing the services that they had "customarily" provided earlier as part of this
agreement. !d. There is no dispute in this case that the GSR radiologists (i.e., "the hospitalbased radiologist group") had been performing the "service" of reading at MRIC for 12 years by
the time ofthis agreement. Tr., pp. 1171, 3800-04. Under any definition ofthe term, this service
had clearly become "customary" by 1997 and thus was required under this contract. This clause
is dispositive.
Saint Alphonsus ignores this provision entirely and instead argues principally that the
term "Medical Center" must mean something besides MRIC. Motion, pp. 5-7. There is nothing
in the contract to support this theory, and, in fact, there is much to disprove it. First and
foremost, it is undisputed that MRIC is physically located inside the hospital itself, in "the back
end of the radiology department." Tr., 3800. It would be difficult to know where else that would
be located other than in the "medical center."
Secondly, § 1.1.1. of the agreement states clearly that the radiologists had a responsibility
to provide "services required in the Medical Center," including "Magnetic Resonance."
Ex. 4033, p. 2. It is undisputed that there were no other magnetic resonance services at the
"Medical Center" at that time other than those at MRIC. As a result, this provision concerning
magnetic resonance services would be meaningless if the services at MRIC were not intended to
be included. Obviously, the Court should avoid interpretations that render parts of a contract
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meaningless. See, e.g., Ace Realty v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 749-50, 682 P.2d 1289, 129697 (Ct. App. 1984) (court must "construe this contract so as to give effect to every part of it").
Next,§ 8.1 ofthe agreement states that the radiologists have the responsibility to read on

any equipment owned by Saint Alphonsus located on the "medical center campus." Even
Ms. Bruce admitted that the MRIC "equipment" was located "on campus," Tr., p. 1158, which
means that the only thing left for Saint Alphonsus to quibble about is whether it has an
ownership interest in the equipment. Yet that is easily answered since Saint Alphonsus did, in
fact, have an ownership interest in MRIC and therefore in its equipment. Indeed, it is for this
reason that Dr. Giles-who led the radiologists at the time and therefore also took lead on the
negotiations of this agreement-stated that Saint Alphonsus did have an indirect ownership
interest in the MRI equipment and for that reason believed that MRIC was covered in this
services agreement he negotiated. Tr., pp. 4236-38.
Finally, and relatedly, at least two of the signatories of the 1997 agreement are on record
that they believed that the contract did cover MRIC services for the reasons mentioned above.
Again, Dr. Giles led negotiations on this agreement and emphatically testified that he believes
that the language in it was specifically written to include MRIC as part of the radiologists'
responsibilities. Tr., pp. 4236-42. Dr. Prochaska, who also executed the agreement, has echoed
those comments. Tr., pp. 193-94, 855-858. More notably still, Cindy Schamp, Saint
Alphonsus's COO during most of the life of this agreement, adopted this interpretation as well,
agreeing that in 1999 and 2000, the "hospital had a contractual obligation to the radiologists such
that the radiologists had the exclusive right to read the MRIA Center's images." Tr., pp. 203539. Given this common understanding of what the agreement meant at the time it was made by
both parties to it, Saint Alphonsus's current self-serving revisionist history must be ignored.
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Indeed, where, as here, "the parties attached the same meaning to the contractual term, it is to be
interpreted in accordance with that meaning." USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 120
Idaho 271,274, 815 P.2d 469,472 (Ct. App. 1991).

2.

2001 Agreement

The 2001 agreement is similar to the 1997 agreement in that it unambiguously states that
the radiologists are to provide services in the "Medical Center," and that one of those services is
"magnetic resonance." Ex. 4229, § 1.3.1, p. 7. Again, Saint Alphonsus had no magnetic
resonance services available at the center in 2001 other than those at MRIC, so, as with the 1997
agreement, ifMRIC-which, again, is located in the medical center and is physically part of the
radiology department-is counter-intuitively read as not being part of the medical center, that
provision becomes a nullity. As such, Saint Alphonsus's argument is contrary to both common
sense and the rules of contract interpretation. Ace Realty, 106 Idaho at 749-50.
Saint Alphonsus nonetheless argues that 1.3.1. of the 2001 agreement, which states that
"services required in the Medical Center includ[e] ... magnetic resonance" does not include
MRIC because Saint Alphonsus considered MRIC to be somehow separate from the hospital
itself. Motion, pp. 7-8. Yet this argument catches Saint Alphonsus speaking out both sides of its
mouth, given that it executed an agreement on the same day and with the same parties that said
just the opposite. In particular, Saint Alphonsus and GSR executed this services contract on July
1, 2001. Ex. 4229, p. 1. On that same day these same two parties also executed the IMI
operating agreement. Ex. 4226, p. 6. In the IMI agreement, these same parties agreed for IMI
the ability to acquire "a fifty percent (50%) interest in the MRI services servicing the Medical
Center." !d., p. 21 (emphasis added). Critically, Ms. Bruce testified that the term "MRI services
servicing the Medical Center" was in specific reference to MRIC. Tr., pp. 1281-82, 1305-06.
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As such, Saint Alphonsus would have this Court believe that a clause it executed stating
"MRI services servicing the Medical Center" did mean MRIC, while a clause it executed five
minutes later stating "[MRI] services required in the Medical Center"-a functionally identical
phrase-somehow did not mean MRIC. Put more simply, Saint Alphonsus is advancing the
untenable argument that the same phrase used in the same context on the same day as between
the same parties somehow means two very different things. Unfortunately for Saint Alphonsus,
Idaho law is clear that "contemporaneous instruments executed by the same parties and having
relation to the same subject matter must be construed together as parts of one agreement." Hill v.

Schultz, 71 Idaho 145, 148,227 P.2d 586, 589 (1951). This should end the inquiry.
Moreover, as with the 1997 agreement, Saint Alphonsus's new interpretation is at direct
odds with the stated understanding ofthe parties to it. JiffCliff, GSR's lead negotiator on this
transaction, stated that he understood§ 1.3.1. to require the radiologists to read at MRIC.
Tr., pp. 2956-57. Critically, Mr. Cliff did not qualify his answer here to make Saint Alphonsus's
confusing inpatient/outpatient distinction. He simply agreed that the radiologists had the
responsibility to read scans at MRIC. !d. This is more than enough to create a fact issue for the
jury to decide.
Finally, an additional piece of evidence supporting Mr. Cliffs view that the radiologists
had an obligation to read all the scans at MRIC should be noted. Section 1.3 .2. specifically
requires the radiologists to provide to 24/7 services "in the Department." Ex. 4229, p. 7. The
"Department" is defined as the "Department of Radiology," which is located "on the first floor of
the Medical Center and provides a broad range of radiologic and medical imaging services to
patients in connection with other care provided in the Medical Center and to patients who are

referred on an outpatient basis solely for radiologic or medical imaging services." !d., p. 4 (~ C)
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(emphasis added). It would be hard to find a more apt description for what MRIC was at the
time than what is described in that clause: MRIC was found on the first floor of the Medical
Center, it was one of the many imaging services found there, it served hospital patients, and it
served outpatients there solely for imaging services as well. Tr., 3800; Motion, p. 4. Moreover,
Chris Anton testified that MRIC was actually considered part of the radiology department. Tr.,
3800-04. In short, the "Department" to which the radiologists owed a duty to provide 24/7
services, according to the plain language of the agreement, clearly included MRIC.
In sum, as to both the 1997 and the 2001 agreements, there is a mountain of evidence
indicating that the radiologists were contractually obligated to read at MRIC. As such, there is,
at a minimum, a fact issue regarding this matter. As a result, the jury should surely have the
right, especially after 7 weeks of listening to testimony on this matter, to make up its own mind.

D.

Saint Alphonsus's argument concerning hospital patients and non-hospital patients is
not supported by any provision of the contract.
Throughout its Motion-and indeed throughout the trial-Saint Alphonsus has made the

strange argument that GSR had an exclusive right (and obligation) to read the hospital patient
scans taken at MRIC, but had no concomitant responsibility to read scans for certain outpatients.
There is nothing in either contract making that distinction, and, as Saint Alphonsus notes, even if
it did, it would not be binding on MRIC as a non-party to it. But more importantly, this
supposed distinction again demonstrates Saint Alphonsus completely missing the point.
Contrary to Saint Alphonsus' s arguments, MRIA is not trying to insert itself in, or be a
beneficiary to, Saint Alphonsus's relationship with its own radiologists. Rather, it is saying that
Saint Alphonsus had a duty as a hospital partner in MRIA to provide radiologists to read all of
MRIC's scans-inpatient, outpatient, or otherwise. And at the risk of repetition, if Saint
Alphonsus entered into an agreement in which less than all ofMRIC's scans would be read-
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whatever the patient source-then it did so in direct violation of its partnership duties. Again,
either way, Saint Alphonsus is in breach of its fiduciary duty.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, MRIA respectfully requests that this Court deny Saint
Alphonsus' s Motion.
DATED this 21st day of October, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Dara L. Pa er
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of October, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served by M:111 i anti electronic mail on the following:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to
Direct a Verdict on MRIA' s Damages and Disgorgement Theories.
INTRODUCTION

Characterizing it as a motion for a "directed verdict," Saint Alphonsus has asked for the
Court to again revisit whether the testimony ofMRIA's experts meets the standards articulated in
Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P .2d 988 (1982); the question of damages
after 2005; and other damages-related issues. Many of these issues have already been briefed
and decided by the Court. To the extent that the Court has already decided these issues, it should
not entertain what is essentially a request for reconsideration. Further, MRIA has presented
ample evidence concerning damages from which the jury can reasonably find and calculate
damages. 1
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

A.

Standard
The standard that a moving party must meet in order to be granted a directed verdict is

exceedingly difficult. In specific, this Court must start by "admitting the truth of the adverse
evidence and drawing every legitimate inference most favorably to the opposing party," and then
decide whether there "exists substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury."
Doe Iv. Doe, 138 Idaho 893,899,71 P.3d 1040, 1046,71 P.3d 1040 (2003). Substantial
evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Howell v. Eastern Idaho R.R., Inc. 135 Idaho 733, 737, 24 P.3d 50, 54, 24 P.3d 50
MRIA was given three briefs on directed verdict issues on Tuesday October 18,
2011, and has had less than four days, in the midst of trial, to prepare these responses. MRIA
has not been able to scour the record to show to the Court every piece of evidence that supports
its claims, but will point out highlights that support some of its major damages themes.
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON MRIA'S
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(200 1). As such, a directed verdict that withdraws an issue from the jury's consideration is
proper "only where the evidence is so clear that all reasonable minds would reach only one
conclusion: that the moving party should prevail." Doe I, 138 Idaho at 899, 71 P.3d at 1046
(emphasis added). Saint Alphonsus has not met this onerous standard.

B.

The Damages Evidence Presented in this Case Satisfies the Pope Standard
1.

The Court has Already Ruled on this Issue

Saint Alphonsus argues, yet again, that MRIA's damage proof does not meet the standard
articulated in Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P .2d 988 (1982). As the Court
well knows, the Supreme Court has directed that the issues presented in Pope be considered on
retrial. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 498, 224
P.3d 1068, 1087,224 P.3d 1068 (2009). Pope was an antitrust case in which a group of
insulators sued Intermountain Gas Co. and its subsidiary, HomeGuard on various antitrust claims
alleging the defendants were selling insulation at a loss in an attempt to monopolize the market.
Pope, 103 Idaho at 220, 646 P.2d at 991. In calculating damages, the trial court assumed that the

insulation jobs done by HomeGuard would have all have been done by their competitors but for
the antitrust violations. It therefore calculated the damages suffered by the competitors based
upon HomeGuard's gross sales figures for those jobs. In reversing, the Supreme Court held that
this was not a proper manner to measure the competitors' lost profits, saying:
[t]here was no justification in the present case for the trial court's
determination that the gross revenues of the defendants ... provide a reasonable
foundation for calculating the lost profits of plaintiffs. Such a method of figuring
damages assumes, without any support in the record, that the HomeGuard
operation would not have won any portion of the insulation market absent
antitrust violations. Furthermore, it assumes that the plaintiffs had the capacity to
assimilate all of the business which HomeGuard performed, and that plaintiffs
would have won that business over other insulators who chose not to participate
in this action. There is simply no evidence in the record to demonstrate a
relationship between HomeGuard's sales figures and plaintiffs' damages so as to
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support a conclusion that HomeGuard's income was the equivalent of plaintiffs'
lost profits.

!d. at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005.
Saint Alphonsus contends that Pope has not been satisfied because MRIA's experts
allegedly did not parse out physician referrals of scans which would have been received by IMI
as a competitor in the market, even in the absence of Saint Alphonsus' s misconduct. This Court
has already rejected this argument once. Saint Alphonsus brought a "Motion for Summary
Judgment on the Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's Evidence of Lost Profits," in which it argued, as
it does here, that MRIA's damage experts had not conducted an analysis as to what percentage of
the lost scans would have been lost solely due to IMI' s entry into the market. The Court held as
follows:
Saint Alphonsus contends that Pope stands for the proposition that a
claimant must present evidence distinguishing between the portion of business
lost as a result of a competitor's misconduct and the portion lost as a result of
other factors. Saint Alphonsus further contends that the Supreme Court held that
MRlA relies on expert testimony which "assumes" without any evidence that
Saint Alphonsus' alleged misconduct caused all of the cited business migration.
Saint Alphonsus argues that MRlA's damage experts have made no effort to
conduct an analysis as to what percentage of the lost scans would have been lost
solely due to IMI's entry into the market and that there is no evidence in the
record from which MRIA could conduct such an analysis. Therefore Saint
Alphonsus claims the evidence that MRIA has put forth in its claim for lost profits
is legally insufficient and all claims for lost profits must be dismissed.

In Pope, the Idaho Supreme Court was concerned that there was no
evidence in the record to support the fact finder's findings and that the award of
damages was the result of mere speculation and guesswork. Pope, 103 Idaho at
234, 646 P.2d at 1005. The Court held "there must be a reasonable foundation
established by the evidence from which the fact finder can calculate the amount of
damages." !d.
It is MRIA' s position that without the actions of Saint Alphonsus, IMI
would not have gotten these specific referral, would not have gotten funding,
would not have had a scanner at Saint Alphonsus' campus, and would not have
been in a position to open the IMI Meridian facility. The inclusion of scans which
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON MRIA'S
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migrated to IMI from physicians who had historically been MRIA's customers,
scans for the usurped Meridian opportunity, and scans from the IMI machine
placed on Saint Alphonsus' campus is consistent with its claims. In the instant
case, the Court finds the expert evidence takes into account other competitors and
provides a historical view. Further, the Court finds that the damage estimate does
not merely presume that its damage due to lost profits is equivalent to IMI's
profits, but instead distinguishes scans which may have been lost for other
reasons. All experts make some assumptions. Saint Alphonsus had the
opportunity and took the opportunity to cross examine regarding those
assumptions. The Court finds the damage calculation of lost profits is supported
by a reasonable foundation from which a reasonable jury could calculate the
amount of damages. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court finds the evidence satisfies the Pope concerns.
(Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Motions for Judgment on Pleadings and
Motions for Summary Judgment, Nov. 16,2010, at pp. 18-20.) The Court reiterated this holding
on October 14, 2011, saying:
As to lost profits measure of damages, they must be broken out as to the
portion ofthe business lost as a result of competitors' misconduct, and between
the portion lost as a result of other factors.
And the Court has already found that the MRIA expert has met the
threshold requirement there. That's the Pope decision.
(Trial Tr., Oct. 14,2011, at pp. 4362:18-25.) As the Court has already ruled on this question,
applying the same standard as exists in directed verdicts motions (i.e., presuming the truth of the
adverse evidence and drawing every legitimate inference most favorably to the opposing party),
the Court should decline to address this question again. Regardless, however, MRIA will
demonstrate that they have satisfied the concerns of Pope.
2.

Pope has been Satisfied with Respect to MRI Center's Damages Downtown
and on Campus

Saint Alphonsus asserts that Pope has not been satisfied with respect to those damages
related to IMI's Downtown and Campus scans because "Mr. Budge simply assumed that every
scan performed by IMI was the result of wrongdoing." (Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a
Verdict on MRIA's Damages and Disgorgement Theories, p. 4.) In particular, Saint Alphonsus
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON MRIA'S
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states that Mr. Budge has inappropriately included as lost profits all IMI scans done either by
(1) a doctor who had previously referred one scan to MRI Center or (2) had privileges at Saint

Alphonsus but not St. Luke's.
Saint Alphonsus contends that Mr. Budge has failed to take into account lawful
competition by IMI. However, significant evidence has been presented in this case that Saint
Alphonsus created the competition by sabotaging any attempt to establish "one big happy
family." Also, evidence has been presented that Saint Alphonsus unlawfully supported the
competition while still a partner in MRIA. If so found by the jury, then all the scans received by
IMI were the result of Saint Alphonsus's bad acts. Moreover, MRIA has presented evidence that
Saint Alphonsus and GSR engaged in a conspiracy to compete against MRIA through IMI. If
the jury so finds, then IMI was not engaged in lawful competition and, again, all the scans
received by IMI were the result of Saint Alphonsus's bad acts. If so, the concerns of Pope are
inapplicable.
Regardless, as the Court has already found, the damage estimate presented by MRIA
does not merely presume that its damage due to lost profits is equivalent to IMI's profits, but
instead distinguishes scans which may have been lost for other reasons. Mr. Budge's trial
testimony bears this out. Mr. Budge engaged in a reasoned analysis to determine which scans
lost to each of the IMI locations were the result of Saint Alphonsus' s bad acts. First, with respect
to the IMI downtown location, Mr. Budge determined that forty-nine percent (49%) of the scans
done at that facility should not be considered "lost scans." The jury was presented with exhibit
5000, which is a pie chart used to explain to the jury which scans conducted by IMI were
included in the lost profits analysis, and which scans had been excluded from that calculation.
Mr. Budge explained:
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The way it worked mechanically is that we basically had these documents that
were in those big stacks of raw data in terms of scans that had been done at IMI
downtown. I then had prepared the list that I described to you of who were the
referring physicians that basically fed MRI's business prior to 1999. And I had a
list of new arrivals on the scene, doctors with Saint Al's affiliations that had
joined the scene.
If they were on that list, which I called the affiliated physicians list, and
IMI did the scan, I counted it as a scan that was diverted for what would have
been MRIA's business to IMI. The 42 percent on here is the percentage of the
exams which fall into the category of exams from referring physicians that
traditionally referred to MRIA.
This purple 9 percent slice of the chart is basically those new doctors who
came on the scene afterwards that only had admitting privileges at Saint
Alphonsus.
The 49 percent are exams which occurred at IMI which I am not
calculating as having been diverted. Those exams, if IMI had independently of
Saint Alphonsus opened an Imaging Center and these physicians had referred
exams to it, they would not be diverted exams from MRIA.
(Trial Tr., Oct. 14, 2011, at pp. 4527:4-4528:5 (emphasis added).) Contrary to Saint
Alphonsus's assertion otherwise, Mr. Budge clearly took into account the fact that IMI would
have had 49 percent of the MRI business by virtue of competition even without Saint
Alphonsus's wrongful conduct. Notably, Mr. Budge also took into account competition by other
third party imaging centers, and was careful not to include that outside competition in his
analysis of the scans lost by MRIA. (!d. at pp 4531:17-4532:17 and 4560:5-21). As such, he has
fully satisfied the concerns articulated in Pope. 2
It appears that Saint Alphonsus' s primary argument is that Mr. Budge did not try to

determine what portion of the business that IMI might have won from the scans referred to IMI
2

With respect to the IMI magnet placed on the Saint Alphonsus campus, Mr.
Budge did not use an analysis of affiliations of the doctors, but rather assumed that had these
various accused acts not occurred, that any scan that was done at the IMI magnet at the Saint
Alphonsus campus would have been done by MRIA, because Saint Alphonsus would not have
permitted IMI to put a competing magnet on its property. (Trial Tr. Oct. 14,2011, pp. 4536:14
to 4537: 1.) Saint Alphonsus has raised no objection to this assumption.
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON MRIA'S
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by either a doctor who had previously referred scans to MRI Center, or one who had privileges
exclusively at Saint Alphonsus. This is, of course, far different from the circumstance in Pope,
where the plaintiff made no effort to separate the effects of valid competition from profits lost to
wrongful conduct. Mr. Budge has engaged in a reasoned analysis as to why referrals from these
discrete sets of doctors are scans that have been lost. As the Pope court itself explained, while
damages cannot be based on mere speculation and guesswork, all that is necessary is that there
be "a reasonable foundation established by the evidence from which the factfinder can calculate
the amount of damages." Pope, 103 Idaho at 234,646 P.2d at1005. The Supreme Court has
said:
The (factfinder) may make a just and reasonable estimate ofthe damage based on
relevant data, and render its verdict accordingly .... (I)t will be enough if the
evidence show(s) the extent ofthe damages as a matter of just and reasonable
inference, although the result be only approximate.

!d.
Mr. Budge explained to the jury his reasoned analysis as to why he determined that "lost
scans" consisted of all of the referrals from doctors who had previously referred scans or were
affiliated with Alphonsus. He said:
One of the things I did with this data is I basically looked at what was the
population or the source of referrals that basically was creating the scans that
made up MRIA's business prior to the formation ofiMI. And I got a list just
through looking through historical data of all the of the physicians, referring
physicians that had previously referred to MRIA, MRIC in particular.
Then obviously for the period 1995 forward there's new physicians that
come on the scene. Some doctors are retiring. Some are coming to the Treasure
Valley. So I got a list of new physicians that were making referrals.
And I also associated them with as to whether they had privileges at Saint
Alphonsus only or Saint Alphonsus and St. Luke's. Because I wanted to basically
complete an analysis which showed the referral network that was associated with
Saint Alphonsus. And I used that identification for that purpose of which
physicians either previously were referring to MRIA or were affiliated with Saint
Alphonsus but only Saint Alphonsus ....
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON MRIA'S
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A. [I included physicians who were solely affiliated with Saint
Alphonsus] I think that based upon historical referral patterns and what I
understand about the business, that people that have patients at Saint Alphonsus
typically were using MRIA when they were doing on-campus scans.
(Trial Tr., Oct. 14, 2011, at pp. 4506:25-4508:6). He later explained:
The purpose of my measurement is to look at scans that were diverted from this
existing business in which Saint Alphonsus was a partner to the new business.
And so I think the best way to define a market or population of business is to look
at the referring physicians that basically provided that business. And only if those
basically showed a shift or a diversion from where they had traditionally gotten
their images made to IMI did I count them as a diversion.

(ld. at p. 4529:3-13)
Mr. Budge is not required to establish with mathematical precision which scans were
actually diverted. Instead, "it [is] enough if the evidence shows the extent of the damages as a
matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate." Pope, 103
Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at1005. It is a just and reasonable inference that scans referred to IMI
from physicians who had actually referred scans to MRIA facilities in the past were "lost scans."

It is likewise reasonable to presume that physicians who refer patients exclusively to Saint
Alphonsus facilities, MRI Center's traditional referral pool, would have referred their patients to
MRI Center but for Saint Alphonsus's conduct to steer those referring physicians to IMI.
Mr. Budge also went beyond this. He tracked the trends among this stable of physicians, and
found that as MRIA was losing referrals from a particular physician, IMI was gaining referrals
from that physician. (See Trial Tr. Oct. 14,2011, at p. 4538:19-4542:10.) Although it may be
approximate, this evidence is more than enough from which the jury can draw a reasonable
inference about which scans were lost as a result of Saint Alphonsus's conduct. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to MRIA, as the Court must, it is clear that the evidence
satisfies the Pope concerns.
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3.

Pope is Inapplicable with Respect to MRI Mobile's Damages Regarding
Meridian and Eagle

Saint Alphonsus next asserts that Mr. Budge inappropriately assumed that MRI Mobile
would have done all scans conducted by IMI in Meridian and Eagle. However, the evidence
establishes that, had Saint Alphonsus not engaged in the bad acts, it would have supported
MRIA's entry into the Meridian and Eagle markets, rather than IMI's, and thus IMI, not MRIA,
would have been crowded out of that market. As Mr. Budge said:
And so the assumptions I made is that if MRIA had been supported in
going forward and opening this facility in Meridian, that they would have been
the first to arrive there, and that instead of being crowded out of that market by
IMI, which is what actually happened, they would be there first and IMI would
have been crowded out and prevented from opening the center.
(Trial Tr. Oct. 14,2011, at p. 4545:4-11). In short, Mr. Budge presumed that MRIA would have
been as IMI is today in those markets, and IMI would not have existed in those markets. As
Mr. Budge said:
I'm assuming that it would have been the same center with a different name on
the door. It would have said MRIA instead of IMI, and that the operations on the
MRI side of it would have been identical in terms of the amounts paid and the
costs that it took to generate the revenue. So I'm using IMI's margins and I'm
using the actual amounts received per scans that actually occurred on that site.

(ld. at p. 4545:14-22). Mr. Budge therefore calculates MRIA's damages by the profits that IMI
would have received, less capital expenditures. (!d. at p. 4546:21-20). Indeed, Mr. Budge's
calculation is actually highly conservative, because it assumes that MRIA would not have
opened in Meridian and Eagle at an earlier time (id. at p. 4547:23-4548:23), and would have
purchased the additional MRI magnets that IMI actually purchased (id. at p. 4548:24-4549:23).
Under this damages scenario, the Pope concern of taking into account valid competition does not
exist, because the competition (i.e., IMI) would have been squeezed out of the market in the
same manner that MRIA has been squeezed out of that market.
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This is not a "lost scans" theory, but a "usurpation" theory. The argument is that Saint
Alphonsus usurped MRIA's ability to enter the market by supporting IMI. The case cited to by
Saint Alphonsus, Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119
(2007) is inapposite because it is a competition case. In that case, Johnson and Trilogy were in
business as competitors against each other. Pursuant to the settlement of an earlier lawsuit,
Johnson agreed not to solicit certain customers. Johnson breached that agreement. Trilogy
attempted to measure its damages by the profits that Johnson received. The Court reject that,
noting that "[t]he measure of damages for the breach of an anti-competition clause is the amount
that the plaintiff lost by reason of the breach, not the amount of profits made by the defendant."
!d. at 84 7, 172 P .3d 1121. In the present case, it is not argued that IMI and MRIA would have
been competitors in the market in Meridian and Eagle, but rather that Saint Alphonsus should
have supported MRIA, such that MRIA would have received all of the benefits that IMI has now
reaped.
An analogy illustrates this circumstance. Presume that two partners were engaged in a
real estate business. During that course of that partnership, one of the partners learned of a
lucrative real estate development opportunity. Rather than informing the partnership about that
opportunity, he then dissociated from the partnership, and purchased that real estate development
for himself. This is the usurpation of a partnership opportunity that should have belonged to the
partnership. The partnership is therefore entitled to reimbursement from the wrong-doing
partner for the opportunity that it lost. See Harestad v. Weitzel, 242 Or. 199, 536 P.2d 522
( 197 5) (a real estate partnership could recover profits from the sale of an apartment complex
built by one of the partners in his individual capacity because that kind of project had been
within the scope ofthe partnership business).
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In addition, MRIA has presented a disgorgement theory, which is a damages theory under
which MRIA is to receive all of the profits that Saint Alphonsus received from its wrongful
ventures. The Idaho legislature has expressly stated that a partner has a fiduciary duty to "hold
as trustee for [the partnership] any property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner ... derived
from ... the appropriation of a partnership opportunity." I. C. § 53-3-404(b)(1 ). See Steelman v.
Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986); R.G. Nelson, A.IA. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409,797

P .2d 117 (1990). This includes Saint Alphonsus' s share of the profits from all ofiMI' s facilities,
which obviously includes the Meridian and Eagle facilities. Mr. Budge first used the full IMI
profits analysis as a basis, and then calculated what portion of those profits, related to MRI
services, that Saint Alphonsus had received. Referencing exhibit 5066, he explained that he first
made an "estimate of the MRI operation's profitability for IMI as a legal entity. And then my
understanding is that in about April of 2006 Saint Alphonsus acquired a 50-percent interest in the
MRI modality. And this is my calculation or estimate of their share ofthe MRI profits from
IMI." (Trial Tr. Oct. 14,2011, p. 4512:11-20 (emphasis added).) He explicitly explained that
this was his disgorgement analysis. (ld. at p. 4517:6-15.) With respect to Mr. Budge's analysis
of disgorgement for profits unjustly retained by Saint Alphonsus, the considerations of Pope are
inapplicable, and it was appropriate (and indeed required), for Mr. Budge to model the
disgorgement damages on the circumstances that actually exist at IMI.

C.

MRIA has Offered Sufficient Evidence of Damages after Aprill, 2005
Saint Alphonsus next contends that there is insufficient evidence to permit damages after

the running of the noncompetition provision in April1, 2005. As the Court has held, damages
may be awarded for all damages which the jury finds were proximately caused by Saint
Alphonsus as a result of its actions prior to dissociation or before the expiration of the non-
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competition clause. (Trial Tr. Oct. 14, 2011, at p. 4363.) Saint Alphonsus looks only to
Mr. Budge's trial testimony. This is utterly inappropriate. Mr. Budge is not and has never been
a causation expert, but has simply outlined the amount of damages which can be awarded if the
jury finds that Saint Alphonsus's conduct was the proximate cause. MRIA has used other
witnesses and exhibits to show that Saint Alphonsus's actions prior to dissociation or the end of
the noncompetition agreement have had continuing effect beyond 2005.

1.

If Saint Alphonsus's Manner of Withdrawal was a Breach of Fiduciary Duty,
its Competition Following Withdrawal was Unlawful

Saint Alphonsus argues that it was entitled to compete after 2005, and thus no
competition-based activities after that date can serve as a basis for liability or damages.
However, MRIA has presented evidence that the manner in which Saint Alphonsus dissociated
from MRIA, and/or its motivation therefore, was in bad faith, and thus a breach of its fiduciary
duty notwithstanding that it was in technical compliance with the partnership agreement. See
Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 203 P.3d 694 (2009) (even iftechnically in

compliance with operating agreement, such actions can nevertheless be a breach of fiduciary
duty if members have improperly taken advantage of their position to obtain financial gain.)
Although Saint Alphonsus properly dissociated, as found by the Supreme Court and this Court,
MRIA has presented evidence that it did so with the improper motivation to compete with
MRIA-and in fact began to do so even before it dissociated. For example, MRIA presented
evidence that Saint Alphonsus thought it was a "strategic imperative" to partner with IMI and
compete with MRIA, (Exs. 4247, 4315). This places Saint Alphonsus's conduct squarely within
the Bushi analysis. If the jury were to find that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal was a breach of
fiduciary duty, then Saint Alphonsus's competition was likewise improper, and there is no basis
for cutting off damages as of April 1, 2005.
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2.

MRIA has Presented Substantial Evidence that Saint Alphonsus Destroyed
MRIA Prior to 2005, Thus Justifying Lost Profits after that Date

MRIA has also presented substantial evidence that, through Saint Alphonsus' s bad acts
prior to April2005, the shift of referrals from MRIA to IMI had been largely completed so that
MRIA no longer had an ability to compete. As Jack Floyd testified, by the time the noncompete
ran in April2005, "[w]e were pretty much dead in the water, and we weren't really able to
compete effectively." (Trial Tr. p. 4032:25-4033:8.) As such, it is entirely reasonable for the
jury to find that lost profits damages from those acts continue forward after that date. The end of
the non-competition agreement does not sanitize these earlier bad acts, nor does it cut off
damages flowing therefrom. A brief sampling of the evidence introduced at trial is more than
sufficient to demonstrate that Saint Alphonsus's bad acts prior to 2005 crippled MRIA:
•

Saint Alphonsus killed negotiations between MRIA and GSR. For example,
Sandra Bruce told GSR to backburner negotiations with MRIA in favor of
negotiations with Saint Alphonsus. (Ex. 4101 ). Ms. Bruce also failed to
communicate an offer from MRIA to GSR to sell GSR a six-eleventh's interest in
MRIA, instead of the much smaller interest which had previously been offered.
(Trial Tr. p. 1334:14-1398:19.)

•

MRIA presented extensive evidence that Saint Alphonsus gave IMI significant
technical assistance (such as the "DR" system), while denying that support to
MRIA. MRIA also presented evidence that Saint Alphonsus approved of a letter
which misstated MRIA's access to the DR system. Exhibit 4533 is a letter sent on
January 4, 2005, from GSR to the referring physician community. This letter was
approved by Saint Alphonsus before it was sent. 3 As Jeff Cliff confirmed, it
untruthfully states that "Saint Alphonsus inpatient and ER patient examination
will be the only MRICI exams available to you on DR/Web Ambassador." (Trial
Tr. Oct. 3, 2011, at p. 2973:9-2975:7.) As Mr. Floyd testified, this technology
was critical important to the referring physician community, and MRIA lost
referring physicians because they did not have it, and did not have it first. (Trial
Tr. Oct. 11,2011, at p. 4034:1-4036:24.) By the time MRIA did get this
technology, the referring physicians were already familiar with using IMI's
portals, and did not want the hassle of dealing with MRIA's portals. (!d) These

3

Dr. Seabourn will testify to this fact. It was agreed that for Dr. Seabourn's convenience, the
parties would call him only once. It was agreed to do so during Saint Alphonsus's case-in-chief,
but this witness is nevertheless part of Saint Alphonsus' s direct evidence.
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referring physicians became "customers" of IMI because Saint Alphonsus had
given IMI this technological advantage first, and did not return to MRIA.
•

MRIA presented evidence that, with Saint Alphonsus's explicit or implicit
approval, the GSR radiologists reduced service at MRI Center (especially on
evenings and weekends), while ramping up those services at IMI. Mr. Floyd
testified that this shut down their weekend business, increased costs, and limited
the types of patients who could be seen. (Trial Tr. 3943:25-3945:18.) This
inconvenienced the referring physicians who, "just wanted to go to one site where
they knew that they would be able to get coverage when they needed it. And
that's what we had up until this [reduction]. And once we lost that we lost a lot of
referrals as a result." (!d. at p. 3946:4-10.)

•

MRIA presented evidence that, while Saint Alphonsus was a partner of MRIA, it
passed on confidential information that it learned in MRIA's meetings to IMI,
thereby giving IMI a competitive advantage over MRIA.

•

MRIA presented evidence that Saint Alphonsus thought it was a "strategic
imperative" to partner with IMI and compete with MRIA, (Exs. 424 7, 4315), and
thus created a strong competitor that MRIA would not otherwise had have to
contend with, whether before or after 2005.

•

Saint Alphonsus thwarted the growth of MRI Mobile by refusing to let it expand
into Meridian and Eagle.

This is sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Saint Alphonsus's wrongful
actions prior to 2005 have continued to damage MRIA after 2005 and continuing into the future.

3.

Post-2005 Tortious Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations
Provides a Basis for Damages after 2005

MRIA has also pled and presented evidence that Saint Alphonsus engaged in tortious
interference with MRIA's prospective contractual relations after April1, 2005. This is not
lawful "competitive" activity, but a tort. In particular, MRIA contends that Saint Alphonsus
engaged in unlawful conduct related to patient referrals. Briefly stated, MRIA asserts that Saint
Alphonsus influenced patient referrals in a way that violates statutes, public policy, Saint
Alphonsus's own internal policy, and IMI's operating agreement. For a complete discussion of
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this theory ofliability, see MRIA's Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Directed Verdict
on Violations of the Stark and Anti-Kickback Statutes, filed contemporaneously herewith.
MRIA has presented significant and substantial evidence about these wrongful post-2005
actions. The following is a brief sampling of this evidence:
•

Saint Alphonsus continued to put roadblocks up on technical support for the
ability for physicians to remotely access imaging materials. Mr. Floyd testified
that after April2005, MRIA attempted to win back business from IMI, but was
stymied because Saint Alphonsus responded very slowly to requests to deal with
technical issues, or refused to make them all together. As a result, the referring
physicians would not come back to MRIA. (Trial Tr. Oct. 11, 2011, at p. 4034: 14036:24.)

•

In February 2004, after dissociation, IMI informed Saint Alphonsus that its
affiliated MD's were underutilizing IMI, and that Saint Alphonsus should
therefore inform them of the relationship to IMI. (Ex. 4 331.) On December 11,
2005, after the expiration of the noncompete, Saint Alphonsus circulated a letter
stating the IMI was the sole provider of MRI services that MRIA was no longer to
provide services to Saint Alphonsus connected patients. (Ex. 4377). Both of
these steps, taken in order to ensure that Saint Alphonsus doctors would refer their
patients to IMI, are in violation of Saint Alphonsus' s internal policy concerning
referrals under which Saint Alphonsus reputes to allow its doctors and medical
staff to send its patients to whomever they believe will do the best work. (See,
e.g., Trial Tr. p. 1517-1524 (Sandra Bruce), 4129-4137 (Sally Jeffcoat).) It is also
in violation of the IMI/Saint Alphonsus contract, which expressly states that "each
Member, its Affiliates and its employees are not precluded or discouraged from
referring patients to any alternate provider of services other than the Company.
(Ex. 4226, § 3.3.1.2 (p. 14).

The tortious interference claim and the evidence presented in support of this theory provide a
direct tie to damages after 2005, because, of course, much of this tortious activity itself occurred
after 2005. This is sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that MRIA is entitled
to damages after 2005.
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4.

Disgorgement is Not Affected by the Running of the Noncom petition
Agreement

Saint Alphonsus also argues that the running of the noncompetition agreement affects the
disgorgement theory of damages. This is directly contrary to Idaho law, and the express ruling
of this Court. This Court has held:
The RUPA provides that "[a] partner's duty ofloyalty .. , includes [the
duty to] hold as trustee for [the partnership] any ... benefit derived by the partner
in the conduct ... of the partnership business ... including the appropriation of a
partnership opportunity .... " I.C. §533- 404(b)(I). Because the law requires that a
partner hold in trust any benefit obtained from the appropriation of a partnership
opportunity, constructive trust is an appropriate remedy for usurpation of a
partnership opportunity. See I. C. § 53-3-404 cmt. 2. Under that theory, "the
partnership can recover any money or property in the partner's hands that can be
traced to the partnership." Id
Saint Alphonsus argues that it should not have to disgorge profits earned
after April 1, 2005, because it was engaged in lawful competition at that point.
The Court disagrees. The RUPA provides that following dissociation "[t]he
partner's duty ofloyalty under section 53-3404(b)(I) ... continues ... with regard to
matters arising and events occurring before the partner's dissociation." I.C. § 533-603(c). Consequently, the duty to hold profits obtained from the appropriation
of a partnership opportunity in trust for the partnership continues after
dissociation. Consequently, if Saint Alphonsus is found to have usurped a
partnership opportunity, any profits derived from that usurpation, even after April
1, 2005, must be disgorged.
(Order re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories, Sept. 27, 2011, at p. 12-13.) It is of no
consequence that Saint Alphonsus did not begin receiving MRI profits until 2006 or that Saint
Alphonsus believes it was lawfully competing when it received the same. Rather, "if Saint
Alphonsus is found to have usurped a partnership opportunity, any profits derived from that
usurpation, even after April 1, 2005, must be disgorged." (!d.) As outlined at length above,
MRIA has presented substantial evidence concerning the usurpation of partnership opportunities,
prior to 2005, upon which the jury could reasonably award disgorgement damages.
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D.

MRIA's Damages and Causation Theories are Proper
1.

Argument that Usurpation Claim is Time Barred.

Saint Alphonsus first contends that Mr. Budge did not present any evidence ofMRIA's
usurpation damages theory. This is absurd. Mr. Budge's testimony on this theory is outlined at
length earlier in this briefing. Saint Alphonsus also asserts that the Court should direct the
verdict on the question of whether the usurpation claim is time barred. However, the Court has
already expressly held that this is a question for the jury. As the Court said in its Order Re:
Motion to Exclude Damages Theories of September 27, 2011:
A claim of usurpation of partnership opportunity is a breach of a fiduciary
duty. I.C. § 53-3-404(b)(l) (defining one of the "fiduciary duties a partner owes to
the partnership"). Claims for breach of fiduciary duty must be brought within a
four years of the breach. See i.e. § 5-224.
Saint Alphonsus argues that the statute of limitations began to run in
September 1999. Saint Alphonsus bases that assertion on Dr. Prochaska's
testimony at the prior trial that suggests MRIA's relationship with the radiologists
had soured by 1999, and thus there was no partnership opportunity to usurp. On
the other hand, MRIA asserts that the usurpation "occurred" in June 2001, the
date when Saint Alphonsus partnered with IMI. It filed its counterclaim on May
20, 2005. Consequently, which date marks the beginning of the statute of
limitations period determines whether the usurpation claim is time barred. The
Court cannot rule on this issue as a matter of law; there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to which date is the date when the usurpation "occurred."
Consequently, this is a question for the jury to resolve.
The same evidence, and posture of the evidence, still exists. Whether the relationship soured in
1999, or whether usurpation occurred in June 2001, the date when Saint Alphonsus partnered
with IMI, is still a question of fact that, as the Court said, is "for the jury to resolve."
Saint Alphonsus argues that, at a minimum, the jury should not be permitted to find
damages before July 1, 2001. Saint Alphonsus has cited no case law for the proposition that
damages are cut off by the statute of limitations. In fact where, as here, it is argued that an injury
might not have come about but for an entire course of conduct, "then all damages caused by the
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tortious conduct are recoverable even though some of the conduct occurred outside the
limitations period." John McShain, Inc. v. L 'Enfant Plaza Properties, Inc. 402 A.2d 1222, 1231
n. 29 (D.C. 1979). Indeed, Judge McLaughlin ruled on this very issue, holding that the claims
advanced by MRIA were "continuing" in nature. When an instruction was requested regarding
the statute of limitations, Judge McLaughlin said:
I'll give you a ruling. I think it-- I concur with MRIA. I think it's continuous
tort, and that the -- my reading of the law is that I think the Curtis V Firth case,
123 Idaho 598, is applicable here. And it will be the court's ruling that the claims
asserted by MRIA are not barred by the statute of limitations based upon that. So,
that's the court's ruling.
(Trial Tr. August 29,2007, at p. 4196:5-12.) As this issue was not appealed, it is the law ofthe
case. Moreover, usurpation for violations of fiduciary duties is not MRIA's only claim. The
jury could properly find damages prior to July 1, 2001, for any ofthe other claims raised by
MRIA.

2.

Usurpation of Eagle Opportunity

Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's assertion otherwise, there is substantial evidence to justify
submitting the question of whether Saint Alphonsus usurped MRIA's opportunity to go to Eagle.
First, as discussed at length above, MRIA has presented evidence that Saint Alphonsus usurped
MRIA's ability to cooperatively partner with GSR in the MRI ventures. In this world, had Saint
Alphonsus not committed bad acts, the Eagle imaging facility would have been an MRIA/IMI
owned facility, rather than a Saint Alphonsus/IMI owned facility. Saint Alphonsus has not
addressed the significant evidence on this point. This evidence, standing alone, is sufficient to
demonstrate usurpation of MRIA' s ability to partner with IMI and enter into Eagle with IMI.
Regardless, Mr. Floyd also testified that in 2001, he made a presentation to MRIA, which
included Saint Alphonsus representatives, in which he described opportunities in Eagle and
Meridian. He explained that MRIA had a sense of urgency about getting MRI Mobile into the
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Meridian and Eagle area, and that this had also been communicated several times prior. (Trial
Tr. Oct. 11,2011, at p. 3908:5-3909:5; 3910:13-16.) Significantly, Mr. Floyd also testified that
Saint Alphonsus was strongly opposed to such an expansion (Trial Tr. Oct. 11, 2011, at
p. 3908:5-3909:5; 3910:13-16), and that MRIA would not undertake any action that its partner,
Saint Alphonsus, was opposed to. (Trial Tr. Oct. 11,2011, at p. 3915:17-3917:2.) By the time
Saint Alphonsus withdrew, MRIA was no longer in the position to take advantage of new
opportunities, but instead was trying to salvage what remained. (Trial Tr. Oct. 11, 2011, at
p. 4034:1-4036:24.) The evidence shows that Saint Alphonsus stymied MRI Mobile's growth, so
that IMI could reach those markets instead of or ahead of MRIA.
Saint Alphonsus argues that it must be shown that the usurped business opportunity is
one that MRIA was on the brink of starting, and that since it did not attempt to enter the Eagle
market after 2001, that this is not an usurped opportunity. Saint Alphonsus cites no case law for
this proposition. Even the case it cites concerning the fiduciary duties owed by a corporate
officer, Jenkins v. Jenkins, 138 Idaho 424, 428, 64 P.3d 953, 957 (2003) does not require that the
usurped opportunity be imminent, but simply requires that a corporate director not usurp an
opportunity "in the line ofthe corporation's business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in
which the corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy."
The analysis is not whether MRIA was actually on the brink of opening an Eagle facility,
but rather, whether an Eagle MRI facility was within the scope ofMRIA's business. See Lifshutz
v. Lifshutz, 199 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006) (when it was undisputed that entity was
engaged in the acquisition of rental properties, partner appropriated a partnership opportunity
when he engaged in the acquisitions of rental properties); Harestad v. Weitzel, 242 Or. 199, 536
P .2d 522 ( 197 5) (a real estate partnership could recover profits from the sale of an apartment
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complex built by one of the partners in his individual capacity because that kind of project had
been within the scope of the partnership business). Opening an MRI magnet in Eagle is within
the line ofMRIA's business, and one that it had actually discussed. It certainly had a reasonable
business expectancy in serving the Eagle area. No case law requires that MRIA have made an
attempt to enter that market. MRIA has presented sufficient evidence upon which the jury could
reasonably determine that Saint Alphonsus either usurped MRIA's ability to partner with IMI in
an Eagle venture, or open its own Eagle facility.
On page 14 of its briefing, Saint Alphonsus also argues that a directed verdict should be
granted on the usurpation of the opportunity to partner with IMI because "MRIA would have
given a 1/11 thor more share of its own profits to IMI, and may have been only a part owner of
IMI's MRI-side." However, as noted above, the proper measure of damages for usurpation is the
partnership opportunity which Saint Alphonsus diverted. The form that an IMIIMRIA
partnership might have hypothetically taken in the absence of Saint Alphonsus's bad acts is
irrelevant to the disgorgement of the profits related to that opportunity.

3.

Management Fee Expense

Saint Alphonsus brings what is apparently a request for a jury instruction on how to deal
with MRI Associates' 7.5% management fee. The damages ofMRI Associates are premised on
whatever the damages of MRI Center and MRI Mobile are awarded, because it is entitled to a
7.5% management fee related to those entities. Rather than complicate the math, MRIA has
determined that it will request a verdict from the jury simply on the damages relating to MRI
Center and MRI Mobile. The damages of MRI Associates can then be mathematically calculated
from that point.
Saint Alphonsus nevertheless contends that the damages award to MRI Center and MRI
Mobile must be reduced by 7.5%. This is absurd, because MRI Associates will then still have a
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demand for its management fee from MRI Center and MRI Mobile, when that management was
already deducted by the jury. This would result in under-compensation to MRI Center and MRI
Mobile. Neither the Court nor Saint Alphonsus need concern themselves contractual distribution
of the management fee from MRI Center and MRI Mobile to their managing partner.
Saint Alphonsus also asserts that if the damages are awarded only to MRI Center and
MRI Mobile, it will not be able to "offset" its departing partner share. This is not a valid
consideration. Saint Alphonsus has a judgment against MRIA for its departing partner share
from MRIA. Saint Alphonsus will be entitled to enforce this judgment, without regard to
whether it is paid by offsetting the verdict, or receiving payment from MRIA.

4.

Diminution in Value

Saint Alphonsus asserts that the Court should direct a verdict on MRIA's diminution in
value theory. It asserts that MRIA was required to present the theory through expert testimony,
and that MRIA did not prove what portion was attributable to other factors. 4

a.

Expert Testimony is Not Required to Prove Diminution in Value

Saint Alphonsus contends that a verdict must be directed because this theory was not
addressed by MRIA's experts. However, this is not a damages theory for which expert testimony
is required. The diminution of value damages theory is a comparison between the value ofthe
MRI Entities prior to Saint Alphonsus's wrongful conduct, and their value after the wrongful
conduct. The first data point-the value before the wrongful conduct-has been established
through the valuations conducted by Shattuck Hammond. The second data point-the present
value of the MRI Entities-had been established through the testimony ofthe owners ofthe MRI
Entities. The case Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 897, 522 P.2d 1102,
4

Saint Alphonsus also contends that this is a "new" theory on which Saint
Alphonsus was given no discovery. The Court has already explicitly rejected this argument.
(Order Re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories, September 27, 2011, p. 14.)
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1118 ( 1974) is directly on point. In that case, a corporation brought an action for slander and
tortious interference with contract. Its theory of damages was the net worth of the company
before and after the commission of the torts. The fifty-five percent owner testified that
business had an actual net worth prior to the commission alleged ofthe torts of$183,000 and that
the net amount the business was able to salvage after it closed down as result of the alleged torts
was $97,000. The Idaho Supreme Court noted that:
[i]t is a settled rule in Idaho that the owner of property is a competent
witness to its value .... "The general rule, that to qualify a witness to testify as to
market value, a proper foundation must be laid showing the witness to have
knowledge upon the subject, does not apply to a party who is testifying to the
value of property which he owns. The owner of property is presumed, in a way, to
be familiar with its value, by reason of inquiries, comparisons, purchases and
sales. The weight of such testimony is another question, and may be affected by
disclosures made upon cross-examination as to the basis for such knowledge, but
this will not disqualify the owner as a witness."

!d., citing Rankin v. Caldwell, 15 Idaho 625, 632, 99 P. 108 (1908). The Supreme Court
therefore held that the owner's testimony about the drop in the value of the business provided
sufficient and substantial evidence which supported the jury's verdict. Barlow, 95 Idaho at 987,
522 P .2d at 1118. The Court reached the same conclusion in Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo
Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 896 P.2d 949 (1995). It noted that:
For more than eighty-five years, this Court has followed the rule that the
owner of property is a competent witness concerning its value. E.g., Howes v.
Curtis, 104 Idaho 563, 568, 661 P.2d 729,734 (1983); Rankin v. Caldwell, 15
Idaho 625, 632-33, 99 P. 108, 110 (1908). An owner is competent to testify to the
value of a going business without further qualification. Bancroft v. Smith, 80
Idaho 63, 67, 323 P.2d 879, 883 (1958). The owner's failure or inability to
explain the basis for the value given may affect the weight to be given the
testimony, but it does not disqualify the owner's opinion. Smith v. Big Lost River
Irrigation Dist., 83 Idaho 374, 386, 364 P.2d 146, 158 (1961).
Pocatello Auto Color, 127 Idaho at 44, 896 P.2d at 952. The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly
approved of the use of lay testimony by the owner of a company to establish this damage theory,
which MRIA has done.
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b.

The Evidence is Sufficient for a Jury to Find that Diminution in Value
was Caused by Saint Alphonsus's Bad Acts

Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA has not shown that its diminution in value has a
causal relationship to Saint Alphonsus's conduct. It notes that MRIA has not addressed other
factors which might have caused MRIA to lose value. However, as expressly noted in the cases
above, this is not a reason to exclude testimony concerning this damages theory, but rather goes
to the weight ofthe evidence. An illustrative case is Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143
Idaho 733, 741, 152 P.3d 604, 612 (2007). In that case, the defendant argued that the plaintiff
had failed to show causation because the plaintiff never performed an analysis to show that it had
suffered increased costs because the defendant had refused to accept and purchase certain trout.
The defendant noted other possible variables, such as changes in salary, insurance, feed, fuel,
repair, etc. The Court noted that it was reasonable to infer that keeping fish longer increased
costs, notwithstanding that the plaintiff did not "analyze every potential alternative cause." !d.
Likewise, Saint Alphonsus's argument that MRIA did not analyze innumerable other possible
causes, such as the state of the economy, declining medical reimbursement rates, etc. is precisely
like the argument advanced by the defendant in Griffith. The jury had been presented with
evidence that Saint Alphonsus's many misdeeds, including breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, and tortious interference which almost completely destroyed MRIA's business.
As noted above, Mr. Budge tracked the trends the referring physicians, and found that as MRIA
was losing referrals from a particular physician, IMI was gaining referrals from that physician.
(See Trial Tr. Oct. 14,2011, at p. 4538:19-4542:10, Ex. 5011.) A jury could infer from the
evidence that has been presented that Saint Alphonsus's conduct is the more probable cause of
MRIA's diminution in value than other causes. For all of these reasons, the Court should not
prevent MRIA from presenting a diminution in value theory of damages to the jury.
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CONCLUSION

MRIA has presented substantial evidence to justify submitting this entire case, including
all damages issues, to the jury. As such, the Court should deny this motion for directed verdict.
DATED this 21st day of October, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~.,., {B.I!<r

Dara L. Parke
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE ANTI-KICKBACK CLAIM, WHETHER "STATUTORY" OR "POLICY"
BASED, WAS NOT IN THE PLEADINGS, WAS NOT SUBJECT TO
DISCOVERY, AND IN ALL EVENTS FAILS FOR A LACK OF PROOF
A.

MRIA's Contention Interrogatory Responses, Compelled by the Discovery
Master, Did Not Include These Stark, AKS, or "Policy" Bases for its Claims.

Despite its previous admission that these claims were entirely new, MRIA now claims
that Stark/AKS issues have always been in the case and subject to discovery. Opp. at 2-4. It
claims that Saint Alphonsus waived its right to know what the factual basis ofMRIA's claims,
citing MRIA's May 30, 2007 response to Saint Alphonsus's contention interrogatories Nos. 18
and 20. !d. at 4; Aff. Of Brent Bastian Ex. A. What MRIA omits is that on June 12, 2007, in
response to a motion to compel, the discovery master rejected MRIA's waiver claim, and forced
it to answer Saint Alphonsus's contention interrogatories. See Report of Discovery Master at 3-4
(attached as Ex. A).
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MRIA then filed a second version of its responses to the Fifth Set of Interrogatories,
dated July 12, 2007, which included "supplemental responses." Ex. B. In that response, MRIA
asserted that the factual allegations underlying its fiduciary duty claims were set forth in its
punitive damages briefing, and that its wrongful interference claims were those cited in Bruce
Budge's 2007 report. See "Supplemental Responses" to Interrogs. 18 and 20 (Ex. Bat 13-14).
Budge's 2007 report contains no reference to Stark, AKS, or violations of policy as elements of a
wrongful interference claim. See Ex. 4417. And MRIA's punitive damages brief does not allege
fiduciary duty breaches due to such statutory or policy breaches. 1 These claims have never been
in the case, and were not identified in discovery.

B.

MRIA Cannot Prove AKS Liability, And Cannot Assert "Policy" Breaches
as "Wrongful" Behavior Unrelated to Actual AKS Violations.

On the merits, MRIA concedes that it cannot prove any Stark violation. Opp. at 11. It
does, however, claim sufficient evidence to prove AKS violations, or else violations of
SARMC's "internal policy" related to Stark or AKS violations. These arguments must fail.
1.

Claims of AKS Violations

With respect to violations of AKS itself, MRIA's argument suffers from many flaws.
First, MRIA claims that Saint Alphonsus "fails to cite any case" for the proposition that one
1

See Mem. in Support ofMRIA's Mot. to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages (Dec. 20,
2006). This brief mentions Stark and AKS in a footnote, but not for the purposes of claiming
Stark or AKS as a basis for liability in this case. Rather, in a section of the brief related to
wrongful withdrawal, MRIA noted that a portion of the PWC memo discussing dissociation
references potential "State and Federal" investigations in the event of withdrawal. !d. at 6-7 &
n.3. MRIA opined that this referred to Stark or AKS investigations. See id. Neither that
footnote or any other part of the brief claims that Stark, AKS, or policy violations as the basis of
MRIA's fiduciary duty claims or that referrals shifted due to such violations. See id. at 10-25.
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cannot avoid the bar to private enforcement of AKS by pleading AKS as the "wrongdoing" in a
tortious interference claim. MRIA simply ignores the significant authority cited in support of
that claim. Mot. at 7. MRIA cannot use an AKS violation as a basis for its claims. !d.

Second, MRIA's "merits" argument is at odds with the law. Citing a single document
(Ex. 43 77), it claims that Saint Alphonsus "clearly has directed its employees and staff
physicians to refer hospital patients only to IMI," and that Saint Alphonsus is benefitted. MRIA
is required, however, to show that renumeration has been paid to referring physicians in
exchange for the referrals. 42 U. S.C. § 1320a-7b("whoever knowingly and willfully offers or
pays any remuneration ... to any person to induce such person (1) to refer an individual" for
services). The fact that Saint Alphonsus pays its employees is not sufficient "renumeration," by
the plain terms of AKS itself. See id. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B) ([the statutory prohibition] shall not
apply to ... any amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a bona fide employment
relationship with such employer) for employment in the provision of covered items or
services."). MRIA cites no case law to the contrary. 2
Moreover, MRIA recognizes that an AKS violation requires both proof of scienter and
that the kickback related to a federal health program; however, it cites no evidence related to
scienter at all (Opp. 15) or that any kickback related to Medicare/Medicaid patients. As to the
second missing element, MRIA variously, and wrongly, asserts that one can simply speculate as
2

MRIA cites a 2003 advisory opinion, suggesting that it held a situation like Saint
Alphonsus's to be a violation of AKS. Opp. at 12-14. As the title indicates, it is advisory and not
binding on other parties. That document does not address, let alone state, that there is blanket
AKS liability for the act of a hospital having its own employees refer to a facility it owns.
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a matter of"common sense" that Medicare/Medicaid patients were referred (Opp. 15), that
evidence from Saint Alphonsus 's case-in-chief fills the gap (id. at 15-16), or that Saint A1phonsus
has the burden of disproving this element of AKS. (!d. at 16.) These are all patently wrong.
MRIA has the burden of introducing evidence during its case to support its claims, or directed
verdict must lie. And even if such speculation or unwarranted burden-shifting were allowed,
MRIA still has pointed to no evidence as to the number of referrals that allegedly violated AKS,
leaving no basis for a jury to conclude any damages for the violation.
2.

Violations of"Internal" or "Public" Policy re: Stark/AKS Violations

MRIA's alternative argument is that it may allege Stark and AKS violations indirectly
through (1) public policy, (2) IMI's internal policy, or (3) alleged breaches of the Saint
Alphonsus-IMI agreement. Opp. At 5-9. Each of these fail as well.
First, with respect to public policy, MRIA is simply attempting to recast Stark and AKS

violations as some amorphous "public policy" proscription. Opp. at 8. But Stark and AKS, if
anything, state a policy against defrauding Medicare or other federal health programs. See, e.g.,
Saint Agnes Med. Ctr. v. Dogali, 2010 WL 307916, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ("[t]he purpose of the

Stark Law is to protect the government from Medicare fraud"). Without proof of AKS or Stark
violations, there is no public policy breach. Moreover, MRIA's authority3 regarding an alleged
public policy regarding access to physicians both involve public policy restrictions on noncompete clauses in physician contracts, and are of no use here. Nor has MRIA cited any case
3

See Mercy Health System v. Bicak, 2011 WL 1785618, at *8-9 (Ark. App. 2011);
Murfreesboro Med. Clinic v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 683 (Tenn. 2005) (cited in Opp. 8).
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where the alleged referral of hospital patients to a hospital-owned facility is, without more,
wrongful action supporting a tort claim. The "public policy" argument has no merit.

Second, as Saint Alphonsus showed, violation of a private, internal company policy-a
policy to which MRIA was a stranger-cannot support a wrongful interference claim. Mot. at 4
& n.l. MRIA's authorities are inapposite, as neither involved strangers to the policy. In Whatley

Coffee v. Sara Lee Corp., the relevant fact was that a policy was not applied even-handedly to
two vendors who sought its help, 2006 WL 2631387, at *2-3 (E.D. Ark. 2006) (policy not to
"favor one distributor over another" was violated). And Nelson Jewelry v. Fein Design, 2007
WL 4554888, at *7 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 2007), the issue was whether a policy not to compete with
customers was violated as to the customer.

Third, for the same reasons, MRIA's assertion of a contract breach must fail. First, the
provision in context was intended to address Stark and AKS issues, so MRIA's attempt to simply
disregard that limitation should be rejected. More fundamentally, MRIA was not a party to the
IMI contract containing the alleged policy, nor does it claim it was a third-party beneficiary of
the Saint Alphonsus-IMI Joint Venture Agreement. See Ex. 4226, § 14.7 ("No Third Party

Rights. This Agreement is intended to create enforceable rights between the parties hereto only,
and creates no rights in, or obligations to, any other Persons whatsoever."). The authority cited
by MRIA, moreover, makes clear that breach of a contract is not sufficient to state a wrongful
interference claim, yet that is what MRIA now purports to claim. See Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc.,
64 7 F .3d 291, 311 (20 11 ). MRIA may not claim an alleged breach of a contract it was not a

party to, in order to prove that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully interfered with MRIA's business.
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II.

THE 1997 AND 2001 RADIOLOGY CONTRACTS UNAMBIGUOUSLY
REQUIRES GSR SERVICES FOR THE HOSPITAL, AND NOT MRI CENTER.
The 1997 radiology contract explicitly defines the term "Medical Center" as the "regional

medical center" in Boise owned and operated by "501(c)(3) corporation" Saint Alphonsus. Mot.
at 6. Further, the initial recital makes clear that "Saint Alphonsus and the Group contemplate
that all radiology services required by the Medical Center and its medical staff and patients shall
be provided by the Group except for certain exclusions described in this Agreement," id., and the
operative provisions make clear that the radiologists' interpretive duties, including their duty to
read MRI images, are only those images required in the "Medical Center." !d. at 6-7.
The 2001 agreement is even more explicit. It again defines Medical Center as the
"regional medical center" owned and operated by the non-profit Saint Alphonsus, and then states
that that "Medical Center" also includes the "Breast Care Center" it "does not include any
affiliates or otherwise ancillary operations of Saint Alphonsus located on Saint Alphonsus' s
campus or otherwise." !d. at 7-8. It likewise defines the radiologists' obligation to perform
services, including MRI interpretations, required in the "Medical Center." !d.
In both cases, then, the express language of the contracts (1) defines the term "Medical
Center" to mean the hospital itself, and (2) provides that the services to be provided are limited
to the "Medical Center." MRIA offers no response to these points. It again simply claims that
the term "Medical Center" must include MRI Center because Center is located on the campus.
(Opp. at 7, 9). But "Medical Center" is a defined term under the contract, which does not mean
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"campus" but rather means the non-profit 501(c)(3), hospital-owned regional medical center.
That definition excludes MRI Center-a point which MRIA does not and cannot contest. 4
MRIA also argues that the term "Medical Center" must include MRI Center because the
radiologists must read MRI scans for the "Medical Center," and only MRI Center had an MRI.
Opp. at 7. MRIA mixes apples and oranges. Essentially, MRIA claims that GSR had to perform
professional services for MRI Center patients because it owned the technical equipment. This is
a non-sequitur. The contracts apply to professional services required by the Medical Center, not
technical services. Mot. at 6-7. The contract does not define the obligation to read as a function
of the supplier of the scans-hospital, affiliate, or otherwise-at all, and MRIA points to no such
provision. See generally Ex. 4033, 4229. Per the contract, if the "Medical Center" had a need
for an MRI interpretation, then GSR had to do it. It simply does not follow that, because MRI
Center owned a scanner, that GSR was obligated to perform professional services for MRI
Center patients who were not "Medical Center" patients as defined in the contracts.
MRIA then suggests that the exclusivity provision of§ 8.1 is somehow relevant. Opp. at
8. But that clause does not define the radiologist's duties; it discusses their exclusive right to
read scans taken on equipment owned and controlled by the hospital. Mot. at 8-9. This
4

MRIA claims, with respect to the 1997 contract but not the 2001 contract, that the
prefatory language of Section 1.1.1 stating that "The Group, through its individual Physicians,
shall perform all services generally and customarily performed by the Medical Center hospitalbased radiologist group including, but not limited to the following," somehow applies to MRI
Center. (Opp. at 7.) But that provision again refers to services performed at the Medical Center,
raising the definitional problem that MRIA has failed to address. Moreover, the prefatory
language then leads into a discussion of the duties required, which as noted, are services for "the
Medical Center"-the hospital, not MRI Center.
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provision does not apply to MRI Center's equipment for two reasons: first, MRI Associates, and
not Saint Alphonsus, owns and controls MRI Center's equipment. The fact that Saint Alphonsus
is a partner in MRI Associates is irrelevant; the partnership is a distinct legal entity separate
from its partners. See Idaho Code§ 53-3-201(a) ("A partnership is an entity distinct from its
partners."). MRIA has offered no evidence that Saint Alphonsus individually has any ownership
interest in MRI Center's equipment. More to the point, MRI Center has not responded to the
pertinent issue that the use of its equipment cannot be limited by a contract by other parties.
MRI Center did not agree to give exclusive rights for GSR to read scans done on Center's
equipment, and thus there was no such right as a matter oflaw. Mot. at 9.
MRIA then suggests that it should be able to argue its "theory" of the contract to the jury
based on parol evidence such as the lay interpretation of its witnesses or terms in contracts. Opp.
at 8-11. But the "legal effect and interpretation of a contract is generally a matter of law for the
Court, and the only exception is where the language of the contract is found to be ambiguous,"

Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 829 P.2d 1342, 1347 (1992), and in any event, parol evidence
cannot "contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract from the terms of the contract" and "[a] written
contract that contains a merger clause is complete upon its face." 5 In re Univ. Place/Idaho Water

Center Project, 146 Idaho 527, 536, 199 P .3d 102, Ill, 199 P .3d 102 (Idaho 2008). The Court
must interpret the contract, according to its own terms, without regard to the lay interpretations
offered by MRIA's interested witnesses.
5

Both the 1997 and 2001 contracts contain a merger clause. See Ex. 4033 § 11.6 ("Entire
Agreement" clause); Ex. 4229 § 14.1 ("Entire Agreement" clause).
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Finally, MRIA argues that, if the Court rules in Saint Alphonsus's favor, it will advance
yet more new theories: that (1) there was some non-contractual duty for Saint Alphonsus to
provide free interpretive services at MRI Center, the failure to do so was a breach of fiduciary
duty; or (2) the 2001 contract secretly took away MRI's rights under the 1997 contract. Opp. at
3-6. But this case is far past the point where MRIA can avoid legal rulings by making lawyer
argument. It has put on its case, and must have evidence to support its theories. MRIA does not
identify any factual or legal basis for the first alleged duty, nor has it advanced any claim that the
2001 contract took away rights. It has presented evidence on one theory: that these contracts
obligated Gem State to perform professional interpretive services for MRI Center's patients, and

that GSR and/or Saint Alphonsus injured MRI Center by not enforcing or following those
contracts. But the 1997 and 2001 contracts do not require GSR to provide those services, and a
directed verdict should be granted on this issue with appropriate jury instruction.

III.

MRIA HAS FAILED TO PROVE SOME OR ALL OF ITS DAMAGES.
MRIA has also failed to establish, through the evidence presented in its case, the theories

of damages it has propounded. As the Court already noted in its October 14 recapitulation of its
rulings, the damages evidence must be evaluated based on the state of the proof placed before the
jury. See 10/14/11 Trial Tr. at 4362-65. On the trial record, MRIA's damages theories fail.

A.

MRIA Effectively Concedes that its Lost-Profits Damages for Meridian and
Eagle Fail as a Matter of Law.

In Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119 (2007), the
Supreme Court held that, in performing a lost profits analysis, a party must establish proof as to
what its own profit margins and costs would have been as to a hypothetical business, and that
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S CONSOLIDATED REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DIRECTED VERDICT
MOTIONS FILED OCTOBER 18,2011- 10
002957

..

evidence of the competitor's own margins and costs is insufficient to take damages out of the
realm of speculation. Mot. at 7-9. Here, MRIA's expert Mr. Budge explicitly assumed, in
calculating lost profits, that MRI Mobile's margins and costs would be identical to IMI's actual
margins and costs. !d. There has been no evidence of what MRI Mobile's own margins would
have been at Meridian or Eagle. !d.
In response, MRIA concedes that "Budge calculates MRIA 's damages by the profits that
IMI would have received," and does not dispute that it failed to prove MRI Mobile's actual profit
margins. Opp. at 10-12. It claims that Trilogy is inapposite because the wrongdoing at issue was
breach of a non-compete (Opp. at 11); however, this is curious since, just as in Trilogy, MRIA
claims that the defendant improperly competed, preventing Mobile from performing that work
and causing lost profits. See Trilogy, 144 Idaho at 846, 172 P.3d 1121. But more importantly,
the theory of wrongdoing is not important; what is relevant is that Trilogy defined what proof is
sufficient and what proof is insufficient for a lost profits claim. Budge's claim for Meridian and
Eagle damages was based on a lost profits theory, so Trilogy is directly on point. Since MRIA
has not offered evidence of what a hypothetical MRIM-Meridian or MRI-Eagle's profit margins
and costs would have been, but instead assumed IMI's profits and costs as its own, MRIA's lostprofits damages claims for MRI Mobile fail as a matter of law.
Thus, Mr. Budge's theory that MRI Mobile suffered lost profits in the amount of
$19,061,617 at Meridian and $4,237,522 at Eagle (Ex. 5067) should not be allowed to go to the
jury. Likewise, per Mr. Wilhoite's testimony as to the 51% of future lost profits attributable to
Mobile via Meridian and Eagle, in the amount of$ 6,987,000, should be disallowed as well.
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10/17/2011 Trial Tr. at 5706. To the extent that any lost profits damages theory goes to the jury
(and no such theory should be allowed, see infra), only the$ 29,734,898 attributable to MRI
Center is allowed; the rest is speculative. Ex. 5078; Trial Tr. at 4705 (fixing typo in Ex. 5078).

B.

MRIA Has Not Presented Evidence Sufficient to Resolve the Supreme
Court's Pope Concern, and Concedes that Unless the Jury Finds 100% of
Lost Scans Were Caused By Wrongdoing, Its Damages Claim Fails

Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 234,
646 P.2d 988, 1005 (1982), a damages analysis is insufficient if it assumes, "without any support
in the record, that the [defendant's] operation would not have won any portion of the ... market
absent" the defendant's misconduct. Thus, as the Court noted, "[a]s to lost profits measure of
damages, they must be broken out as to the portion of the business lost as a result of competitors'
misconduct, and between the portion lost as a result of other factors." 10/14/11 Trial Tr. at 4362.
MRIA concedes that Bruce Budge did not do this analysis; rather, it suggests that this
burden is satisfied by proving Saint Alphonsus's liability by improperly supporting IMI. Opp. at
6. But that is irrelevant. As Pope contemplated and as Mr. Budge himself recognized, the
damages in a lost-profits case must be analyzed by comparing what the defendant actually lost,

and what they would have lost anyway in the but-for world, and computing the difference. See
10/14/2011 Trial Tr. at 4463-64. The "difference" between the actual world, and the world that
would have occurred, is the lost profits. 6

6

MRIA suggests that Mr. Budge satisfied Pope based on his decision not to seek lost
profits damages for one potential pool of scans-new doctors who had not referred to IMI and
who had admitting privileges at St. Luke's, suggesting that this is settled due to the pre-trial
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Thus, in the but-for world, ifiMI would have opened as a competitor anyway, or there
were other causes of lost profits (such as competition from others) there would have been some
lost profits to MRIA anyway, and those have to be filtered out of any damages claim. Mot at 5.
Here, IMI would have existed in the but-for world; MRIA abandoned its 2007 claim that Saint
Alphonsus improperly assisted IMI's start-up. See Mot. at 4 n.2. Mr. Budge did not calculate
what share of the market IMI would have received in the but-for world, or otherwise analyze
other factors that might have caused losses, such as other competition. !d. at 6. Contrary to
MRIA's claim, we are not dealing with an imperfect model; instead, Mr. Budge candidly
admitted that he did not model this but-for world at all, because MRIA's counsel didn't ask.
10/14/11 Trial Tr. at 4653. To be sure, MRIA argues that there would have been no competition
at all in the but-for world, because "Saint Alphonsus created the competition by sabotaging any
attempt to establish 'one big happy family."'-i.e., that Saint Alphonsus usurped the opportunity
ofMRIA to partner with GSR in 1999 or 2001. Opp. at 6. This fails for multiple reasons.
First, this case is well past the stage where lawyer argument can paper over the flaws in
the evidence. MRIA's expert has failed to analyze what the competitive marketplace would have

(continued ... )

pleadings. Opp. at 7. But this is wrong; the directed verdict motion must be decided on the trial
evidence. During the trial testimony, Mr. Budge made disqualifying admissions that his decision
to do "rough justice" by arbitrarily seeking only one category of lost profits is not based on any
scientific or mathematical computation, but rather his own speculation. Mot. at 6-7. MRIA has
not offered any rebuttal to Saint Alphonsus's arguments on this point, let alone established that
Budge's admitted speculation his "lost profits" universe is proper under Idaho law. See id.
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looked like in a but-for world, with IMI as a competitor, or otherwise. There is no evidence on
this point, and no way to calculate losses to MRIA from wrongdoing as opposed to other factors.

Second, there is a fundamental mismatch between the theory of a 1999/2001 MRIA-GSR
usurpation and the damages model presented in this case, such that the 1999/200 1 usurpation
theory cannot be used as the basis for any lost profits analysis. As noted, Mr. Budge's report
contained a "Scenario 5" damages model for a 1999/20001 MRIA-GSR usurpation theory, but he
did not present that to the jury. And Mr. Budge failed to account, in his damages model, for the
fact that in the "assumed" world of a MRIA-GSR partnership, some part of the profits would
have flowed to GSR, and not MRIA. Mot. at 14-15. MRIA concedes that the usurpation theory
can only be used for disgorgement, apparently recognizing this flaw in Budge's analysis. Opp. at
21. Thus, Budge's damages models are insufficient under a 1999/2001 usurpation theory.

Third, even if MRIA could avoid Pope problems by a bare assertion that no scans would
have gone to IMI but for Saint Alphonsus's help, this necessitates a special verdict question to
determine whether this very narrow (and implausible) fact has been proven. If the jury finds that
IMI would have received some business even without Saint Alphonsus, then by MRIA's own
concession it has failed to offer a damages model that accounts for the effect of such proper
competition, and no lost-profits damages can be awarded.

C.

MRIA Has Not Presented Damages Evidence Accounting for the Fact that
Saint Alphonsus had a Right to Compete After April 1, 2005.

MRIA concedes that Bruce Budge has made no attempt to determine what damages
occurring after April 1, 2005 were caused by acts of liability before April 1, 2005. Opp. at 13.
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This admission should be dispositive. This Court has held that the mere act of dissociation
cannot be the basis for damages, and that Saint Alphonsus had no duty not to compete after April
1, 2005; as such, there is no new liability for acts of competition after April 1, 2005. Rather,
damages may be awarded after that date, but only if it flowed from prior bad acts. Mot. at 10.
Again, Mr. Budge simply assumed that post-2005 competition was a basis for liability and that
Saint Alphonsus had no right to compete; these are legally-flawed premises and there has been
no effort by MRIA to comply with this Court's instruction regarding post-2005 liability.
Perhaps recognizing this flaw, MRIA now directly argues, contrary to this Court's
rulings, that Saint Alphonsus is liable for dissociating and competing. First, it claims that under

Bushi v. Sage Health Care, 165 Idaho 764 (2009), that "the manner in which Saint Alphonsus
dissociated from MRIA, and/or its motivation therefore, was in bad faith, and thus in breach of
its fiduciary duty notwithstanding that it was in technical compliance with the partnership
agreement." Opp. at 13. But, as has been repeatedly noted in this case, Saint Alphonsus did not
dissociate pursuant to any provision of the partnership agreement; it exercised its statutory right
to withdraw under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. MRIA is seeking the same wrongful
dissociation damages it did at the first trial, on grounds that Saint Alphonsus had no right to
leave the MRIA partnership, and thus its competition after that date was wrongful. Opp. at 13.
This is a claim for wrongful dissociation damages, and is impermissible.
Further, MRIA's conclusion does not follow from its premise. Even if the "act" of
dissociating is wrongful because it is bad faith (despite the fact that "bad faith" is not a ground
for wrongful dissociation, Idaho Code § 53-3-602, and RUPA acknowledges that dissociation for
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the purpose of competition is legitimate, id. § 53-3-603 & official cmt. 2), it does not follow that
Saint Alphonsus's subsequent competition is a basis for damages. Rather, RUPA provides that
the measure of damages for a wrongful dissociation is the "damages caused by the dissociation,"
that is to say, damages "caused by the wrongful nature of the dissociation" itself. !d. § 53-3602(c) & official cmt. 3. The example given is "expenses resulting from a partner's premature
withdrawal from a term partnership, such as replacing the partner's expertise or obtaining new
financing." !d. Thus, MRIA would thus be entitled to damages arising from the wrongful means
by which the dissociation occurred, but not subsequent competition after Saint Alphonsus
lawfully. Competition is a legally-permitted consequence of the dissociation, even if the manner
of the dissociation somehow caused harm.

Second, MRIA claims that it is simply entitled to prove that all damages after 2005 were
caused by pre-2005 acts, and cites several alleged examples of bad acts: the claimed usurpation
of the opportunity to partner with IMI from its inception, technical assistance, hours of coverage,
etc. Opp. at 15. Again, however, MRIA offers no actual evidence of the splash-forward effect
of these allegedly pre-2005 wrongful acts. For instance, MRIA does not cite any evidence that,
once Saint Alphonsus dissociated, that it could not hire as many radiologists as it wanted to open
Center 2417, or that it was unable to obtain IT services from any one of numerous alternative
vendors (as it, in fact did, per its own complaint). It has no evidence from which a jury could
conclude, for example, that a doctor who first shifted a referral to IMI in 2009 did so because of
wrongful acts instead of legitimate competition, at a time when MRIA was fully in control of its
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own schedule, had its own P ACS system, and so forth. Proof of prior bad acts is not sufficient
evidence of future causation, as a matter of logic or as reflected in any evidence cited by MRIA.
Third, MRIA claims that it has evidence of post-2005 wrongful interference that justifies
its post-2005 claims, citing (1) a claim that in 2005, Jack Floyd could not get technical help from
Saint Alphonsus such that "referring physicians would not come back," and (2) the Stark/AKS
claims that should be dismissed for the reasons cited supra. Again, even accepting the Floyd
evidence, how does proof that "referring physicians would not come back" in 2005 prove that
new referrals that shifted from 2006-2010, and which will shift through 2015, was due to a 2005
"slowness" in IT support? And MRIA certainly has no substantial evidence from which a jury
could reasonably conclude that all post-2005 scans were due to Stark/AKS (which does not
apply to private referrals) or to an alleged 2005 "slowness" in IT support.
Finally, MRIA claims that "disgorgement" is not affected by the non-compete, but seems
to concede that it is not entitled to disgorgement at all unless it proves its usurpation theories.
Opp. at 17. It does not claim, and should not be allowed, disgorgement based on theories other
than usurpation. Any other basis for disgoregement is subject to the post-2005 damages analysis.

D.

MRIA's Responses to the Remaining Damages/Causation Issues Are Either
Conceded or Are Wrong.
1.

The Usurpation of the Opportunity to Partner with IMI is Time-Barred
and Was Not Ruled on During the Prior Proceeding

As set forth in the motion, there is no evidence in the record from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that MRIA would have partnered with IMI after 1999. Mot. at 13-14.
MRIA does not cite any record evidence to the contrary, and directed verdict is appropriate.
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Second, MRIA claims that there is "no case law" for the proposition that the statute of
limitations is applicable to damages. Again, MRIA is wrong. In the earlier motion to exclude
damages theories, Saint Alphonsus cited significant authority for the proposition that the statute
of limitations begins running from when the wrongful act occurs; MRIA cannot claim damages
from a 1999 usurpation that is time-barred, 7 a point that MRIA implicitly conceded in its prior
briefing. See Opp. to Mot. to Exclude Damages Theories at p. 13.

Third, MRIA claims this issue was decided by Judge McLaughlin and not appealed.
This is also false. MRIA never argued in the 2007 case that Saint Alphonsus usurped an
opportunity ofMRIA's to partner with GSR at its inception. This specific claim of usurpation
was advanced for the first time in Budge's 20 11 expert report as "Scenario 5." And even MRIA
conceded that the first time it ever mentioned anything of the sort was in the fact section of its
Supreme Court brief in 2008. See Opp. to Mot. to Exclude Damages Theories at 12. The issue
has never been advanced in the trial court, and there is no law-of-the-case impediment here.
2.

There Was No Eagle Usurpation as a Matter of Law.

Saint Alphonsus showed that, apart from a stray Jack Floyd reference to Eagle, there is
no reference to any Eagle usurpation, and there is certainly no substantial evidence from which a
jury could find that Saint Alphonsus usurped MRIA's ability to go into Eagle, when that facility
7

See, e.g., State v. Bilbao, 130 Idaho 500, 503,943 P.2d 926, 929 (1997) (whether statute
of limitations has run depends on when the "act occurred"); Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin &
Matthews, Chtd., 125 Idaho 607, 613, 873 P.2d 861, 867 (1994) {"To determine whether this
statute of limitations bars the claim, we must determine when the first negligent act occurred.
This analysis focuses upon the acts complained of .... "); Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179, 18081,484 P.2d 728, 729-30 (1971) (assessing statute of limitations on contract claims act by act)
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did not even open until over 3 years following Saint Alphonsus's dissociation. Mot. at 15.
MRIA responds by inadvertently conceding the point: it admits that MRIA chose not to take the
opportunity: it claims that since Saint Alphonsus had no "urgency" to go to Eagle in 2001 and
that "MRIA would not undertake any action that its partner, Saint Alphonsus, was opposed to,"
that Mobile never went. Opp. at 20. In other words, MRIA does not claim that Saint Alphonsus
prevented MRI Mobile from going to Eagle (as it cannot given DMR's 5 votes on the MRIA
board), but rather that it voluntarily chose not to go. MRIA's acknowledged passivity cannot, in
any linguistic or legal sense be viewed as Saint Alphonsus taking that opportunity for itself. By
MRIA's own logic, the opportunity was untaken by anyone until2007. A verdict should be
directed on the Eagle claim.
3.

MRIA Admits MRI Center and MRI Mobile are Overcompensated in
Budge's Model by 7.5%. and Those Damages Should Be Disallowed.

Saint Alphonsus also showed that MRI Center and MRI Mobile's asserted damages are
overstated by 7.5% each, because Mr. Budge was instructed not to deduct their management fee
expense from their profits. Mot. at 17. MRI does not dispute this; rather, it claims it was just
doing this to simplify the math. Opp. at 21. Simple math or not, MRI Center and Mobile
concede that they are overcompensated, and their damages should be reduced by that amount.
What is more troubling is that MRIA does not dispute that its "simplifying the math" has
the effect of zeroing-out MRI Associates' own damages, thus precluding Saint Alphonsus from
offsetting its departing partner share against any award of damages to MRIA. Opp. at 22.
Rather, MRIA suggests that this is their intent, and that Saint Alphonsus will have to sue to
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enforce its judgment separately. !d. The Court should prevent such gamesmanship. At a
minimum, MRI Center and MRI Mobile's damages must be reduced by 7.5%, with that 7.5%
being reassigned as MRIA damages. Mot. at 17-18.
4.

The Court Should Direct a Verdict on the Diminution Claim

Finally, Saint Alphonsus showed that a directed verdict is appropriate on the diminution
theory. There has been no discovery allowed on MRIA's claim of its 2011 value; moreover,
although Dr. Prochaska testified as to the value of MRI Center, his promise that MRIA experts
would address the causation factor never materialized. Mot. at 18. MRIA's response,
effectively, is that it does not need to prove damages causation; however, this is clearly wrong.
See, e.g., Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912,919,684 P.2d 314,321 (Ct. App. 1984) (party "must"

establish that any "loss [in business value] was produced by defendant's conduct rather than by .
. . other variables."); SADC, 148 Idaho 479, 498, 224 P.3d 1068, 1087 (2010) (instructing MRIA
to supply '"a method of figuring damages"' that distinguishes between business lost as a result of
the alleged bad acts and business that would have been lost absent those bad acts). Mr. Budge
did not attempt to distinguish what diminution of value was caused by wrongdoing and what was
caused by other factors, and so this theory fails as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the directed verdict motions.
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DATED this 22th day of October, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 22th day of October, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

~

D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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INTRODUCTION
St. Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.
(collectively SARMC) moved the Discovery Master (DM) for an order requiring MRl
Associates, LLP (MRlA) to provide complete responses to:
1.

Interrogatory Nos. 10-24 (the "contention" interrogatories);

2.

Interrogatory Nos. 26·28; and

3.

Requests for Admission Nos. 24-29.

MRlA resisted SARMC's motion with respect to all responses sought.
The parties submitted briefs and affidavits in support of their respective positions. The
matter was heard on a time-shortened basis pursuant to agreement at the DM' s offices. Counsel
for SARMC and MRIA presented argument. Counsel for TI·lird·Party Defendants appeared but
did not argue.

BACKGROUND
SARMC's motion, as indicated above, addresses three issues: the first two issues deal
with responses to interrogatories. MRIA asse1ts that it is not required to answer Interrogatory
Nos. 10-24 on the basis that the parties had reached an agreement not to answer "contention''
interrogatories. It also asserts that it is not required to answer Interrogatory Nos. 26-28 on the
basis that SARMC has exceeded the 40-interrogatory limit allowed under Ru1e 33(a), Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, MRlA believes that it should not be required to respond to
Requests for Admission Nos. 24-29, on the grounds that the responses, if any, would be
irrelevant since SARMC has not asserted a claim against MRIA for spoliation of evidence.
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SARMC argues that, although there had been an agreement not to pose "contention"
interrogatories, that agreement had been waived by MRIA's conduct and that SARMC had
already answered similar "contention'' interrogatories from MRIA based on its belief that MRIA
had waived the agreement. SARMC denies that it has exceeded the 40-interrogatory limit and
instead comends that it has only submined a total of 32 interrogatories, counting sub-parts.
SARMC, in Requests for Admission Nos. 24-29, had asked MRJA questions regarding its
records-retention policy. SARMC asserts that such questions are pennitted under Rule 26(b),
I.R.C.P., since they may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
The DM made an oral finding at the hearing that he would grant SARMC's motion with
respect to the ''contention" interrogatmies and that he would order MRIA to respond to those
requests.
The DM also told the parties at the hearing that he would compel MRIA to respond to

Requests for Admission Nos. 24 through 29 relating to the records-retention policies ofMRIA.
The DM reserved his ruling on the issue of whether SARMC has exceeded the 40·
interrogatory limit.
FINDINGS

I.

"CONTENTION" INTERROGATORIES. Although both parties agree that at a

meet and confer meeting in December of 2006, they had reached an agreement that instead of
requiring the parties to respond to the so-called "contention" interrogatories, the parties would
simply produce all documents and identify aJI witnesses that support their respective claims and
defenses in the matter. However, apparently there was a misunderstanding between and among
REPORT OF DISCOVERY MASTER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO FIFTH SET OF
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the parties relating to that agreement, such that SARMC came to believe that the agreement had
been waived by MRIA. MRIA's counsel, at hearing, admitted that they had mistakenly sent out
"contention" interrogatories to SARMC. \Vhatever the reason for the confusion, SARMC did
respond to MRIA's "contention" interrogatories after setting forth its objections.
The DM is persuaded that the parties should be treated exactly equally with
respect to "contention" interrogatories. The DM does not assign blame to either side over the
issue and the misunderstanding that resulted, but does believe that the parties should be placed on
the same footing concerning these kinds of interrogatories. Accordingly, the DM orders that
MRIA must answer Interrogatory Nos. 10-24. Such a ruling places the parties in parity and
serves the interests of justice.

2.

RECORDS-RETENTION REQUESTS. SARMC has requested in Requests for

Admission Nos. 24-29 that MRlA provide it with infonnation regarding its records-retention
policy, if any. MRIA refuses to do so on the basis of relevance since it points out that SARMC
does not have a claim against MRIA for spoliation of evidence. MRIA seems to make the
argwnent that any inquiries to it about its document-retention policy is per se irrelevant since

SARMC has not asserted a claim fot spoliation.
Under the broad latitude permitted under Rule 26(b), I.R.C.P ., the parties to
litigation may pose questions~ the answers to which would perhaps be irrelevant under
evidentiary standards applicable to trial evidence. If the answers sought could be reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, the questions and answers thereto are
allowed. Using this standard. the DM believes and therefore finds that it is possible that
information relating to MRIA's written document-retention policy, if any, could lead to the
REPORT OF DISCOVERY MASTER RE: MOTlON TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO FIFTH SET OF
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discovery of admissible evidence. Accordingly, the DM finds and orders that the Requests for
Admission Nos. 24~29 must be answered by MRI.A.
3.

THE 40~INTERROGATORY RULE UNDER RULE 33(a)) I.R.C.P. MRIA has

refused to answer Interrogatory Nos. 26-28 propounded by SARMC on the grounds that SARMC
has exceeded the limit of 40 interrogatories allowed under Rule 33(a), I.R.C.P. MR.JA asserts,
through counsel that, according to its count, SARMC has exceeded 60 interrogatories when the
subparts contained within the interrogatories are taken into account. SARMC contends that even
with a liberal application of the subpart rule, it is still comfortably under the 40~interrogatories
limit.
Counsel for SARMC argued that courts, in considering this issue in the past, have
adopted what he termed as a "cornmon sense'' rule. If an interrogatory contains within it discrete
subparts seeking different categories of information, each subpart should be counted. However>
an interrogatory may still be only seeking one basic fact, which could include subparts (for
example, names, addresses, telephone numbers).
The DM has now reviewed the interrogatories cited by MRlA as containing in excess of
the 40·interrogatory rule:
According to the DM's count, SARMC had, ineluding subparts~ propounded 38

inteiTogatories to MRlA in their First through Fourth sets ofinterrogatories. The Fifth set of
interrogatories includes Interrogatories l 0-24 which are the "contention" interrogatories referred
to above and which the DM has found that MRIA must answer in order to bring it into parity
with SARMC. Those "contention" interrogatories, when subparts are counted, actually contain
an additional 29 interrogatories.

Accordingly~

the DM will not order MRIA to answer any
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further interrogatories beyond those required in responding to the "contention" interrogatories
Nos. I 0~24. SARMC's Motion to Compel Responses to lntetrogatories 26-28 is denied.

SUMMARY
ln summary, the DM finds as follows:
1.

SARMC's Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1Ow24, the

''contention'' interrogatories is granted;

2.

SARMC's Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Admission Nos. 24w29 is

granted;
3.

SARMC's Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 26-28 is denied.

DATED this

.tJl/ly

of June, 2007.
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Attorneys tbr Defendants/Counterclaimants!fhird
Party Plaintiff MRI Associates, LLP
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICJAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,

Case No. CV OC 04082190

an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,

MRIA'S RESPONSES TO SADC
AND SARMC'S FIFTH SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
EIGHTH SET OF REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
AND FOURTH SET OF REQUESTS
FOR ADMISSIONS

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership, on its own behalf, and on behalf ofMRI
Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership, and MRT
Mobile Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership,
CounterCl aimants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
CounterDefendants.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Tdaho limited liability
partnership,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

v.
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,
Third~Party

Defendants.

Defendant/Counterclaimant MRI Associates, LLP (hereinafter ''Defendant''), by and

through the undersigned counsel ofl'ecord, answers Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.'s and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s Fifth Set oflnterrogatories, Eighth Set of
Requests for Production and Fourth Set of Requests for Admissions, served on April 30, 2007, as
follows:

GENERAL STATEMENT
Defendant's investigation in this matter is ongoing and continuing. Consequently,
defendant will respond to these requests for production to the best of its present existing ability.
The discovery process may reveal facts, documents and witnesses not presently known to
defendant, but upon which the defendant may rely and to which defendant reserves its right to
supplement its responses. Consequently, the responses contained herein are not intended to, and
shall not preclude defendant from making any contentions or from relying on any facts,
docwnents or witnesses at trial based upon additional evidence obtained dwing the discovery
process.
These responses are made solely for the purpose of this action. Each response is subject
to all objections as to competence, relevance, materiality, propriety and admissibility, and to any
MRlA'S SUPPLEMENTAL RBSPONSES TO SADC AND SARMC'S FIFTH SETOP INTERROGATORIF.:S AND
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and all other objections on any grounds that would require the exclusion of any statements
contained herein if such request asked of, or statements contained herein where made by, a
witness testifying in court, all of which objections and grounds are hereby expressly reserved and
may be interposed at the time of trial. The responses given herein are without prejudice to any or
all of defendant's rights to produce any subsequently discovered documents or to revj.se these
responses if further discovery so indicates.
These responses shall not be deemed to constitute admissions (i) that any particular
docwncnt or thing exists, is relevant, non-privileged, or admissible in evidence, or (ii) that any
statement Ol' characterization in plaintiffs interrogatory is accurate or complete.

GENERAL OBJECTIONS
Defendant objects to each of the requests for production to the extent that they call for
intbnnation already known by Plaintiff.
Defendant objects to the entire set of requests for production, and to each and every
individual request contained therein, to the extent that it purports to call for information
protected by the attomey~client privilege, or materials subject to the attorney work product
doctrine, or for otherwise privileged materials. Said information, documents, and/or materials

will not be produced.
Defendant objects to the entire set of requests for production, and to each and every
individual request therein, to the extent that it seeks private or confidential information. Despite
Defendant's efforts to negotiate a Confidentiality Stipulation with the Plaintiff, to date, Plaintiff
has failed to execute Defendant's proposed Confidentiality Stipulation or to propose its own

Confidentiality Stipulation for Defendant to execute. As such, no additional documents will be
produced by D~fendant until a mutually agreeable confidentiality stipulation is executed by the
parties.
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To the extent that the requests for production seek information outside the custody or
control of defendant, defendant objects to the request as unreasonable and unduly burdensome.
Defendant objects to the entire set of requests for production, and to each and every
individual request therein, to the extent that it attempts to impose obligations upon defendant that
are contrary to or inconsistent with Rules 33 and 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.·
Defendant will respond to plaintiff's requests for production in accordance with Rules 33 and 34
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendant reserves all objections or other questions as to competency, relevance,
materiality, privilege or admissibility as evidence in any subsequent proceeding or in the trial of
this or any othe1· action ofthis response and ru1y document or thing or information provided in
response to plaintitrs requests for production. Nothing in these responses is to be construed as
an admission by defendant with respect to the authenticity, admissibility or relevance of any
docume11t produced, or of the truth or accuracy of any characterization or statement of any kind
contained in any document.
Defendant's responses to plaintiffs requests tor production will be made to the best of its

present knowledge, information and belief. The responses will, at all times, be subject to
additional or diffe1'ent infonnation that discovery or further investigation may disclose.
Defendant reserves the right to make use of or to introduce at any hearing or trial documents and
infonnation responsive to plaint.iff's requests for production aLter the date of these responses.
Defendant expressly incorporates the above General Objections into each specific
response to the requests for production set forth below as if set rorth in full therein. A response
to an individual request shall not constitute a waiver of any applicable specific or general
objection to the individual request.
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INTERRQGATOIUES
INJJ!RROOATORYNQ. 10: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 42 of your Second Amended Counterclaim, second bullet point, that Saint Alphonsus
disparaged MRINs services.
RESPONSE TO WTERROGATORY NO. 10: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu or responding to contention intcrrogato1ies,
the pruties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses. that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention

interrogatories. Pursuant to that ~tipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each

~ide

would call at trial. MlUA has produced such list of witnesses, which it has supplemented MRIA
is unaware of any documents not produced jn discovery which support the subject allegation.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10: SARMC

disparaged MRIA's services by compadng them unfavorably to IMI's services when SARMC
directed its staff to refer all inpatients, outpatients and emergency room patients to the IMI
mobile magnet in late Decembe!, 2005. See1 Ben Murray deposition Exhibit 23. SARMC
disparaged MRJA's business in it.., presentation to Trinity Jiealtb in October 2003. Cindy
Schamp disparaged MRlA 's business by suggesting that MRI Center did not maintain state of
the art equipment at a board meeting of MR1 Center in May, 2001.
INTSRROGATORY NO. 11: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 42 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim, third bullet point, that Saint Alphoosus
promoted IMl's services over M.RJA1s.
MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO SADC AND SARMC'S FJFTH SET OF lNTERROOATORIES AND
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO.ll: SARMC

p1·omoted IMl's services over MRIA's services continuously, once IMI downtown opened for
business. Likewise, SARMC promoted JMI over MRICI when SARMC directed its staff to refer
all inpatients, outpatients and emergency room patients to the TMI mobile magnet in late
December 2005. SARMC promoted IMI services over MRIA's services by representing to the
market as part of its branding strategy, that lM I was a partner with SAMRC in the delivery of

imaging services, including magnetic resonance imaging services. SARMC participated in
nwnerousjoint marketing efforts with IMI that promoted all ofiMI's imaging services, including
a pilot program whereby referring doctors were provided with laptops so that they could access
radiological images (including magnetic resonance scan images) from laptops that displayed the
IMI and SARMC logos. SARMC participated in and supported IMi's marketing efforts that
highlighted its connectivity to SARMC's IT system. SARMC failed to maintain a levet playing
field between MRICI and IMI (which was in the hospital's power and control) when GSR
radiologists unilaterally cut back MRICI's hours of coverage and service.
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lliTER,ROG£\,TORY NO. 12: Please identify aU witnesses and documents and desc1ibe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 42 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim, fourth bullet point that Saint Alphonsus
voted against growth initiatives at the MRlA board level.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORX NO.ll: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not pract~cal for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositjons or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stiplllation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation.

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGA'[ORY NO. 12: See Deposition
of Cindy Schamp relative to her testimony on this topic. Also see, Minutes of the MRI Mobile
meeting of May 161 2001. Also see the Shattuck Hammond memoranda dated August 30,2001
and October 1, 2001.

INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports in any way, the allegation contailled in
paragraph 43 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus provided
"confidential business information from MRIA, MR1 Center, and MRI Mobile" to IMI In Your

Answer to this Interrogatory, please specifically describe the "confidential business jnfonnation"
that you allege Saint Alphonsus inappropriately provided to lMI and how You believe this
information was obtained.

MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO SADC AND SARMC'S fiFTH SET OF INTERROOATORIES AND
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RESfONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29,2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,

the patties would agt"ee to produce all document::; and identify all witnesses that ::;upport their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY N0.13: See deposition of

Cindy Schamp on this topic. Ms. Schamp repeatedly informed MRIA' s competition that
SARMC was tryjng various strategies to "get out" of the MRJA relationship. She also provided
information regarding what she perceived to be the timeframe within which SARMC would take
steps to get out of its lease relationship with MRIA. She also reported back to JMI information
relative to MRlA's operational strategies for its PET operation. Infonnation contajned in the

MRIA partnership agreements and leases was confidential to MRlA. Likewise, to the extent that
Ms. Schamp discussed with IMT SARMC's strategies for leaving MRJA, this information (as to
its timing and method) was valuable infonnation to MRIA's competitor.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 46 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that "[Sandra) Bruce became frustrated
with the Hospital's position in IMI' after Saint Alphonsus "ot'ficially" joined IMI in 2001. In
Your Answer to this Interrogatory, please specifically identify all evidence you intend to offer at
trial to show Ms. Bruce's state of mind during the relevant tim.e period.
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MSPO~SE

TO INTERROGATORY NO~

14: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practjcal for the

parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the pru:ties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRTA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROAGORY N0.14! Objection, calls for

attorney work product. Without waiving this t)bjection, see deposition of Sandra Bruce. Ms.
Bruce has testified inconsistently on this matter. At one point> she testified that she did not know
whether the hospital's investment in IMrs "non MRI'' operation was losing money. At another
p6int, she acknowledged knowing this fact. Although she claimed she was unaware that there
were complaints coming out of the hospital that the joint venture was not making money for the
hospital, she did admit, upon reviewing exhibit 17 to her deposition that "someone's not happy
[at the hospitalr about the joint venture's financial performance. She also testified that she
recalled that Mr. Fry wa..'l concerned in this regard.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports. in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 48 of Your SecOtld Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus intended to make
MRIA and MRI Center the 11 exclusive" provider ofMRI's on Saint Alphonsus' carnpus 11 for the
duration of the partnership (at least 2023)," In Your Answer to this Interrogatory, please
specifically identify all evidence you intend to offer at trial to show MRlA and MRI Center had
MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL RFSPONSES TO SADC AND SARMC'S FIFTH SST OF INTERROGATORIES AND
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the right to be the 11 e:xclusivc" provider ofMRis on the Saint Alphonsus Campus.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support' their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unawru:e of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONS;& TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Objectio~ calls

for attorney work product. Without waiving this ob,jection, see the MRJ Associates Partnership
Agreement. When SARMC entered into the MRl Associates Partnership Agreement in 1985, it
agreed that it would not engage in any prohibited competitive activity, as defined in the
agreement, within 100 miles of the SARMC camt-,us. Accordingly it could not, through its own
business, or that of an affiliate (e.g., IMI) offer MRI services on the SARMC campus.
TNTERROQATORY NO. 16: Please identjfy all witnesses and docwnents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 49, bullet point two, of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that since its
dissociation from MRIA Saint Alphonsus luis directed its physicians ''to refer magnetic
resonance imaging patients to IMI, to the exclusion ofMRl Center." In your Answer to this
Interrogatory, please specHically identify each physician or other individual you intend to call at
trial who will offer testimony supporting this allegation and summarize each witness' proposed
trial testimony.
MRlA'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO SADC AND SARMC'S F:rFTil SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 16: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29, 2006, the pruties agreed that in lieu of responding

to

contention interrogatories,

the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at triaL MRlA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of

Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO lNTERgOGATORY NO. 16: Objection, calls
for attomey work product. Without waiving this objection, see answers to Interrogatories 10 and
11.

INTERROGATORY NO. 1'Z.; Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 49, bullet point three, of Your Second Amended CoWl.terclaim that since its
· dissociation from MRIA Saint Alphonsus has created "uncertainty among referring physicians
and MRI Center employees by spreading rumors that MRI Center would close in the near
future.''
IU~SPQNSE

TO INTERROGATORY NO. 17i At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
I\1RIA'S SUPPLEtv:IENTAL RESPONSES TO SA.DC AND SARMC'S FJFTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND
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would call at trial. MRlA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable nwnber of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11; Sec deposition of
Jack Floyd, Robin Matzek (f.k.a. Robin Cioffi), Julli Hopkins and Meeting Minutes dated April
15, 2003 and September 8, 2003 (see the deposition of ClU'olyn Corbett Exhibit 6). Rumors of
MRICl closing, or losing its lease were generally circulated before withdrawal. Although asked
. to assist in quelling these rumors, SARMC apparently did nothing. After dissociation, emails
between Carolyn Corbett and Jeffrey Seabourne suggest that SARMC and GSR were discussing
the timing for excluding MRlCI from SARMC' s DR, and further suggest that this information

was made known to the referring physician community. See exhibit 30 to the Leslie Kelly Hall
September 20f 2006 deposition.
INTERROGATORY NO,

18: Please identify all' witnesses and documents and describe

with particularity each and every fact that supp011s, in any way, the allegations contained in
paragraph 82 of Your Second Amended Coun~erclaim that Saint Alphonsus breached "certain
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care 11 prior to its dissociation from MRIA. In Your Answer to this
Interrogatory, please specifically identify the alleged duties and all actions taken by Saint
Alphonsus that you allege tbat were a breach of its alleged fiduciary duties to MRlA and all
witnesses that will testify at trial that such alleged actions were a breach of any alleged fiduciary
duties.

RE;SPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 18: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29. 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
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parties to identify all evidence reflected in deposition~ or in docwnents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation> the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additjonally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Objection, calls

for attorney work product. Without waiving this objection, see MRIA>s Brief in Support of
Motion to Amend for Punitive Damages, as well as the affidavits> attacluncnts, and deposition
testimony submitted with that briefing. Although that memorandum explores the willful and
reckless nature of SARMc>s breaches of duty, it describes in detail the facts and evidence which
also support MRIA's breach of fiduciary duties claim.

INTERROGATORY NO. 19: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegations contah'1ed in

paragraph 96 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus failed to discharge
its "duties as a partner in good faith. 11 In Your Answer to this Inten·ogatory, please specifically
identify each of the 11 Various acts" You allege were taken in breach of Saint Alphonsus' alleged
duty to act in good faith toward MRIA. ,
BESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12; At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29> 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents artd identify all witnesses that support their·
respective claims and defenses in this case. The patties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trlal. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
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the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
SUPPLEMENT,AL RESPONSE TO lNTERROGATORY NO. See artswer to
Interrogatories 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, and 18.
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe

with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegations contained in
paragraph 101 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsu~> "intentionally and
wrongfully interfered with, terminated. and/or induced a breach ofMRI Center's prospective
contractual relations and business expectations." In Your Answer to this Interrogatory, please
specifically identify all "prospective contractual relations and business expectations" that you

alJege in which Saint Alphonsus interfered.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 20: At a meet and conter conference held
on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all wjtnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identity witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).

SUffLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 20; See the Report of
Bruce Budge, for a discussion of the methodology used to estimate the profits lost a.,c; a result of
the various breaches of fiduciary duty committed by SARMC as well as the breaches of the non
compete clause in the Partnership Agreement. These various breaches interfered with MRIA' s
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business opportunities with its long established custorner base.
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: With regard to the allegations contained in pa1·agraph 105
of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that 11 MRIA contributed capital for the development and
implementation of SARMC's PACS!RTS system, and is an owner of the system, 11 please
spedficallyidentify the pieces of hardware or software you purchased directly from DR
Systems, Inc., and the amount paid for any such items.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable :number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGAGORY NO. 21: Please see

deposition of Robin Cioffi and the exhibits to her deposition.
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: With regard to the allegations contained in paragraph 151
of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus' appointed representatives to the
lMl Management Committee "who regularly received MRIA confidential and trade secret
information in the course of their work at SARMC or in their roles as SARMC representatives to
MRIA," please specifically identify the nature of the "confidential and trade secret infonnatio:n"
that You allege has been misappropriated.
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu ofrespondjng to contention intextogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
intelTogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is Wlaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22: While sitting on

both the MRIA Board of Partners and the IMI Management Committee, SARMC representatives
regularly received MRIA confidential infonnation such as business plans, financial info1mation,
marketing strategies, HR information, compensation plans, and equipment and capital
purchasing information. Please see the minutes of the meetings attended by these ~'dual role"

SARMC representatives for details.
INTERROGATORY NO. 23: Please identify all witnesses and docwnents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports. in any way, the allegations contained in

pangraph 15 8 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus has "appropriated
MRIA's and MRI CentelJS confidential business infoiTl'lation" In Your Answer to this
Interrogatory, please specifically identify the nature of the "confidential business infotmation"
that You allege ha.~ been misappropriated.
RESPO;NSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 23: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the pruties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES '1'0 SADC AND SARMC'S FIFTH SET Of INTERROGATORIES AND
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respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions OJ.' in documents in response to contention

interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of

Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. Z3: Although MRIA
has voluntarily dismissed its misappropriation claims, it nevetthelcss maintains that the
information described in answer to Interrogatory 22 was misappropriated by SARMC, in that it
was received by SARMC repre!lentatives under fal.se pretenses, i.e., through concealment of the
fact that the SARMC representatives sitting on the MRIA Board of Partners were also Members

of the IMI Management Committee. SARMC breached jts fiduciary duty when it failed to

disclose these material facts.
INTERROGATORY NO. 24: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every factthat supports, in any way, the allegations contained in
paragraph J65 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus 11 has knowingly and
intentionally destroyed jnfonnation, or knowingly and intentionally allowed information to be
destroyed, which is relevant to this litigation."
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24: At a meet and confer conference held
on Novembet· 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of respondil'tg to contention interrogatories,
the parties would asree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL RllSPONSES TO SADC AND SARMC'S FIFTII SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND
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would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the sllbject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable nwnber of

Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24: SARMC

knowingly failed to preserve its electronic infonnation when it anticipated litigation with MRIA.
SARMC also knowingly failed to preserve itS electronic information at the time it filed the
present litigation. Sec 30 (b) (6) deposition of SARMC taken November 1, 2005. Throughout
discovery, SARMC has refused to produce various docwnents and drafts of documents, to which
MRIA is entitled (e.g., drafts of the IMI Operating Agreement). Thjs failure to produce

documents also amounts to spoliation.
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24: Please admit that MRIA did not have a written
document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic inf01mation in April
2004.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24: Objection. Irrelevant.

SARMC has not asserted a claim for spoliation. The nonexistence of a retentjon policy is also
irrelevant to a claim of spoHation.
SUPPLEMENTAL MSPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24: To the

extent that the MRIA partnership had a duty to maintain documents electronic or otherwise, that
responsibility fell equally upon all partners, including SARMC. MRIA's document retention
policy, which went into effect in July 2006, was marked as Exhibit 2 to the Robin Cioffi
deposition. Prior to this time, the practice at MRICl was to maintain medical records (electronic
or otherwise) for ten years, or until the date ofm~jority in the case of a minor.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO~Please admit that MRIA did not have a
written document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic
information in May, 2004.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25: See Response to

No. 24.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25:

See Response to No. 24.
B$0UEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26: Please admit that MRIA did not have a
written document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic
information in June 2004.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26: See Response to No.

24.
SUPPLEMEN;TAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26:

See Response to No. 24.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27: Please admit that MRlA did not have a
written document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic
information in July 2004.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27: See Response to

No.24.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO BEQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27:

See Response to No. 24.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2B: Please admit rhat MRIA did not have a
Written document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic information in
Augwt2004.
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 28: Sec Response to

No. 24.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 28:

See Response to No. 24.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 29: Please admit MRlA did not have a

written document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic
information in September 2004.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST t'OR ADMISSION NO. 29: Sec Response to

No. 24.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 29:
Sec Response to No. 24.

DATED this / (

day of July, 2007.
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A.

</2:__ _. . .- _,
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2

The decision to have you report today for jury service after our court session on
Tuesday, August 30, 2011, dealing with hardship and business contact issues and to
respond to the questionnaire prepared in this case, has been determined by this Court and
will not be revisited today during this process. Today the Court will conduct additional voir
dire and so will the attorneys. We have now had an opportunity to review the specific juror
questionnaires you have previously completed and there may be additional questions
based upon your responses to that questionnaire.
Please understand that this questioning is not for the purpose of prying into your
affairs for personal reasons but is only for the purpose of obtaining a fair and impartial jury.
Each question has an important bearing upon your qualifications as a juror and
each question is based upon a requirement of the law with respect to those qualifications.
Each question is asked of each of you, as though each of you were being questioned
separately.
If your answer to any question is yes, please raise your hand. You will then be
asked to identify yourself both by name and juror number.
At this time I would instruct both sides to avoid repeating any question during this
voir dire process that has already been asked. I would ask counsel to note, however, that
you certainly have the right to ask follow-up questions of any individual juror based upon
that juror's response to any previous question.
The jury should be aware that during and following the voir dire examination one or
more of you might be challenged.
Each side has a certain number of "peremptory challenges." in this case the
Plaintiffs have 6 peremptory challenges, and the Defendant has 6 peremptory challenges,
by which I mean each side can challenge a juror and ask that he or she be excused
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without giving a reason. In addition each side has challenges "for cause", by which I mean
that each side can ask that a juror be excused for a specific reason. If either side excuses
you please do not feel offended or feel that your honesty or integrity is being questioned. It
is not.
Before we start, I want to introduce to you the attorneys who will be representing the
parties. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. is being represented by:
Mr. Jack S. Gjording
Mr. Donald B. Ayer
Mr. Peter J. Romatowski

MRI Associates LLP, MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited are being
represented by:
Mr. Thomas A. Banducci
Mr. Wade L. Woodard
Mr. BrentS. Bastian
I will admonish all possible jurors once again that you are not to discuss this case
among yourselves or with anyone else or to form any opinions as to the merits of the case
until it has been fully submitted to you for your determination. If anyone tries to talk to you
about the case, tell them you are a juror and cannot discuss it. If they continue to talk,
walk away and tell the Bailiff what has happened. Do not tell your fellow jurors what has
happened.
I will now ask you a number of questions. If as to any question you would prefer to
give your answer in private rather than by responding in front of everyone in the courtroom,
please feel free to raise your hand and tell me that, and we will proceed accordingly.
1. As I stated last Tuesday, this trial is scheduled to run from today until October 14,
2011.

However, there may be circumstances that necessitate the trial running into the
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following week, the week of October 17, 2011.

Does any one of you have a specific

conflict that week?
2.

You have heard the Court describe in summary fashion the nature of the claims

and defenses in this case earlier. Other than what I have told you, do any of you know
anything about this case, either through your own personal knowledge, by discussion with
anyone else or from radio, television, newspapers, or other electronic media?
3.

Does the relationship of guardian and ward, attorney and client, master and

servant, landlord and tenant, boarder or lodger exist between any of you and any of the
parties? Are any of you a party in a civil action against any of the parties?
4.

You have been introduced to the lawyers representing the parties. Are any

of you related by blood or marriage to any of the lawyers or do any of you know any of the
lawyers from any professional, business, or social relationship?
5.

Do any of you have a religious or moral position that would make it impossible

to render judgment?
6.

Do any of you have any bias or prejudice either for or against either the

Plaintiffs or Defendant?
7.

Do any of you know any other member of the jury panel?

8.
Are there any of you who are unwilling to follow my instructions to you, the
jury, as to the law that you must apply in determining this case?
9. COURT CLUB
Prior juror? What kind of case, verdict, presiding juror?
Prior witness in a case? What kind of dispute?
Prior party in a case? What was the dispute? What was the outcome?
Prior Defendant in a criminal case.
10. Have any of you ever filed a claim or complaint for medical malpractice or filed a
claim or complaint against a doctor, health care professional or hospital?
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11.

Do any of you have physical problems that would affect your ability to hear the

testimony presented in court or read evidence that will be presented in this case?
12.

Are there any of you, if selected as a juror in this case, who is unwilling or unable

to render a fair and impartial verdict based upon the evidence presented in this courtroom
and the law as instructed by the Court?
13.

Do any of you have any other reason why you cannot give this case your

undivided attention and render a fair and impartial verdict?
14.

Saint Alphonsus Hospital is a Catholic charitable hospital. Does any member of

the jury panel feel that because of the nature of the hospital that they could not be fair and
impartial in deciding this case?

Mclaughlin Instruction No. 2
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3

Ladies and gentlemen we are now about to begin the trial of a lawsuit. Some of you
may be unfamiliar with the procedures in which you are about to participate; and I am
going, therefore, to outline briefly for you how this trial will proceed.
Now that the jury is selected and sworn, the court will read to you some of your
instructions. Then, the attorneys will make opening statements; or the defendant's attorney
may, if he wishes, save his opening statement until later.

The opening statement is

intended to inform you about the party's case, and what they claim, and what evidence
they intend to produce for you. The opening statement is not evidence, however. In fact,
none of the statements made by any of the attorneys or by the Court when arguing or
ruling on issues that may be raised during the trial are evidence.
Each side will offer evidence to support its claim. The Plaintiffs, MRI Associates,
MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited, will proceed first and offer all their
evidence on their claims. Then the Defendant Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc will
proceed to offer all of their evidence on its defenses. Thereafter rebuttal evidence may be
offered.
After all of the evidence is in, I will read to you the rest of your instructions. In those
instructions I will tell you what the law is and will tell you what you will have to decide.
Then the trial concludes with the arguments of the lawyers for both sides and
selection of the alternate jurors
Finally, you will be taken to a place where you can deliberate on your verdict in
privacy.

Mclaughlin Instruction No. 3 Modified
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INSTRUCTION NO. 4

These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to
this case.

It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these

instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be
based upon a rational and objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based
on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it
is your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a
whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions
are given or the manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the
importance of any of them. If you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note
to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or explain the point further if it is possible for
me to do so.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial.
This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into
evidence, and any stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the
attorneys may help you understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say
is not evidence. If an attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you
should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rules of law. At times during the
trial, I may sustain an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or
to an offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and
are solely my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection
that was made, or my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider
such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown.
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Remember, a question is not evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning
to the answer.
There will be occasions where an objection is made after an answer is given or the
remark is made, and in my ruling on the objection I will instruct that the answer or remark
be stricken, or direct that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your
minds. In your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat
it as though you had never heard it.
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of
the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe
and what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the
experience and background of your lives.

There is no magical formula for evaluating

testimony. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what
you believe, and how much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations
you use in making the more important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same
considerations you should apply to your deliberations in this case.
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion on
that matter. In determining the weight to be given such an opinion, you should consider
the qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for the opinion. You
are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled.

IDJI2d 1.00
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5

The following facts are not in dispute:
St. Alphonsus and MRIA were partners and entered into a partnerhship agreement
in 1985.
St. Alphonsus disassociated from the partnership in April 2004. The mere act of
dissociation from a partenership is not a violation of Idaho law. Whether other actions of
Saint Alphonsus's may have violated the law or legal obligations to the other parties to the
partnership, as is alleged by the plaintiffs, is for you to determine.

IDJI2d 1.07
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Instruction No. 6

As I have told you earlier, this is a complex case involving several claims. Because
certain terms that will be used in this case are legal terms, many of you may have never
heard them; or if you have heard them, you may not know their legal definition. Thus, to
assist you, I will give the general legal definition of several terms. At the conclusion of the
case, I will give you more specific definitions and instructions as to what the terms mean
and how you are to address these defined terms in your deliberations.
1.) "Fiduciary Duty" simply means that a person or entity has a duty to act primarily for
the benefit of another. The duty involves both the duty of loyalty and the duty of
care.

Further direction on the duties of loyalty and care will be given at the

conclusion of the evidence.
2.) The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing is an implied obligation of every
contract under the law of Idaho that requires the parties to perform in good faith the
obligations contained in their agreement.

The covenant does not inject new

material terms into the contract, but it does require the parties to perform in good
faith those terms agreed to by the parties.
3.) "Prospective Contractual Advantages" or "Reasonable Prospective Business
Expectations" simply means future contractual advantage or future business
expectations.
4.) Civil Conspiracy means an agreement between two or more persons to acomplish
an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in an unlawful manner.
5.) Breach of Contract- When it is claimed that a contract is breached, it simply means
that a specifically stated or legally implied provision of the contract has been broken
without a legal basis.
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6.) "Waiver by Estoppel" means that a party is deemd to have waived a claimed breach
of contract by reason of that party's own conduct.
The fact I have given you the general definitions of these terms does not indicate in
any way that any claim involving these terms has either been proven or disproven in this
case. At the conclusion of all of the evidence and the closing arguments of counsel you,
the jury, will alone determine based upon the evidence presented in the case and the more
complete instructions, which will be given at the close of the evidence whether any of
these issues are present in this case, whether they have been proven and if proven
whether damages are owing or not owing to any of the plaintiffs from the defendant.

June 13, 2007, decision; Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. 121 Idaho 266, 277, 824 P.2d 841,
852 (1991).
Mclaughlin Instruction No. 26
McPheters v. Maile, 1381daho 391,395,64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003)
IDJI 6.22.2
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7

During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into
evidence, and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby
diverted from the witness or their testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and
not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberation at the end of the trial.
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said and
not be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot assign to one
person the duty of taking notes for all of you.
I advised you that we have a court reporter that also keeps a verbatim record of
these proceedings. However, no written transcript will be made of these proceedings for
review by the jury.

IDJI2d 1.01 Modified
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INSTRUCTION NO. 8
As you can well surmise, this case is important to both sides, and each party to the
suit is entitled to your full and fair consideration. You are not to associate in any way with
the parties, their attorneys, agents, or witnesses. You are likewise not to discuss the case
with anyone or permit anyone to discuss the case with you, whether within or without the
courthouse, during the course of the trial; and you are not yourself to contact anyone in an
attempt to discuss or gain a greater understanding of the case. You are not to conduct
research of any kind on this case and that includes internet research, internet blogs or any
type of World Wide Web contact as to this case or any issues in this case. In the event
that anyone attempts to discuss the case with you or to influence your decision, you will
report it to me promptly.
You are not even to discuss the case among yourselves until you retire to the jury
room to deliberate at the close of the entire case and you are not to form or express any
opinion on the case until you have heard all of the testimony and have had the benefit of
my instructions as to the law which applies to the case.

IDJI2d 1.03 Modified
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INSTRUCTION NO. 9

Whether there is or is not insurance is a fact that must not be discussed or
considered by the jury. The case should be decided solely on the facts and law presented
to the jury.

IDJI1.04
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INSTRUCTION NO. 10

If during the trial I may say or do anything, which suggest to you that I am inclined to
favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by
any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate,
any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief; what facts are or are not
established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of
mine seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to
disregard it.

ICJI1.05

003012

INSTRUCTION NO. 11
You are instructed that any terms in these instructions which have a special legal
meaning are defined for you in these instructions. Under Idaho law, if a word or phrase is
not otherwise defined in these instructions, you are to construe that word or phrase
according to its context and the approved usage of the language as the ordinary reading
public would read and understand it. Words not otherwise defined, should be given their
ordinary significance as popularly understood. They do not have some mysterious or
specialized meaning simply because they are a part of a jury instruction unless the Court
has specifically defined them for you.

I.C.§73-113

003013

INSTRUCTION NO. 12

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have noticed, I am sure, that counsel
sometimes refer to an exhibit as being produced by one side or the other in the case.
Sometimes they do this to assist each other in locating an exhibit, sometimes they do it in
an effort to help a witness recall the document or refresh the witness's memory of what
occurred. The Court advises you that it does not matter who initially produced a document
or exhibit. All admitted exhibits are evidence in this case regardless of who may have
produced them initially.

Original. Given at parties' request.

003014

INSTRUCTION NO. 13

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are advised that the December 31, 2023,
date referred to was a date voted upon by the MRIA board to extend the contract beyond
its expiration date of December 31, 2015. The contract required that any change in the
agreement had to be in writing, which was never done, and thus, the December 31, 2023,
date did not become a part of the contract.

Saint Alphonsus has maintained that the

December 31, 2023, date was of no force and effect and has prevailed on that point.

Original. Agreed to by parties

003015

INSTRUCTION NO. 14

You have seen an offer which was made to Saint Alphonsus to purchase MRIA
properties (Exh. 4332) and a letter from Saint Alphonsus rejecting that offer (Exh. 4333).
You are advised that this evidence has been presented only for the limited purpose of
allowing you to determine what weight and credibility you give to witness testimony relating
to the content and reasonableness of efforts by the parties to resolve their disputes and
whether a contention of undue delay is valid. The specific values stated in the settlement
letter may not be used by you to determine the amount of or liability for any claim.

I.R.E. 408
Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 56, 995 P.2d 816, 827 (2000).
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care v. MRI Associates, 1481daho 479, 495, 224 P.3d 1068, 1084 (2009).

003016

INSTRUCTION N0.15

You have been shown a letter sent by Sandra Bruce as President and CEO of Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center to J. Roger Curran, MD, as chairman of the Board of
Partners of MRI Associates (Exh. 4329) in which Saint Alphonsus withdrew as a partner
from MRI Associates. The letter contains language, at page 2, in which Ms. Bruce
mentions terms for the purchase or buyout of Saint Alphonsus's share of the partnership
and describes Saint Alphonsus's position as to the one-year noncompetition clause in the
partnership agreement.
You are instructed that just as MRIA had the right to enforce the
noncompetition clause in the contract, Saint Alphonsus had the right to enforce its legal
right to have its partnership share purchased or bought out by the remaining partners upon
its withdrawal.

003017

INSTRUCTION NO. 16

You have heard reference to a judgment entered in favor of Saint Alphonsus. You
are advised that the claims underlying that judgment involve no allegations of wrongdoing
of any kind on the part of MRIA, but involved a dispute regarding how to determine how
much money might be owed to Saint Alphonsus under certain provisions of Idaho law as to
what Saint Alphonsus was entitled to be paid for its withdrawing partner's share of the
MRIA partnership. None of the facts or claims underlying that judgment are at all relevant
to the present lawsuit, and you are not to concern yourself with the nature of the judgment.
Put simply, the fact a judgment has been entered on behalf of Saint Alphonsus in
another matter has no relevance whatsoever to the merits of MRIA's claims in this
proceeding or Saint Alphonsus's defense of these claims.

003018

INSTRUCTION NO. 17
You have been shown paragraph 8 of a letter identified as Exhibit 4015. The Court
advises the jury that the $5,000,000 figure referred to never became a part of any contract
between the parties and has no relevance as to what damages may or may not have been
suffered by MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile, should you find Saint Alphonsus does owe
any damages in this case to these parties.

003019

INSTRUCTION NO. 18
You have heard evidence concerning certain information possessed or received by
Dr. Giles and/or Dr. Prochaska regarding the plans by the radiologists for an independent
imaging center. You are advised that there are no claims which have been brought as part
of this lawsuit that either Dr. Giles or Dr. Prochaska breached a duty to MRIA or any MRIA
partner (including Saint Alphonsus) with respect to this information.
This evidence may be used by you to evaluate possible bias of either of these two
witnesses and what weight you choose to give to their testimony. You may also use this
evidence in evaluating whether Saint Alphonsus acted in good faith or with a lack of good
faith in taking any actions related to the MRIA partnership and the MRI entities and for no
other purpose.

003020

INSTRUCTION NO. 19

You have heard testimony that Mr. Jeff Cliff advised Dr. Giles he had been told by
Cindy Schamp that the cheapest thing the hospital could do in its negotiations with MRIA
was to wait. This statement may be considered by you for only one purpose, and that is to
determine what weight you attach to the prior testimony of Jeff Cliff on this subject and for
no other purpose. It is not substantive evidence in this case nor does it prove that Ms.
Schamp actually made the statement.

003021

INSTRUCTION NO. 20

The MRI entities have alleged in this case that Saint Alphonsus acted together with
Gem State Radiology (GSR), Intermountain Medical Imaging (IMI), and Imaging Center
Radiologists (ICR) in a way that caused the MRI entities harm. This is known as a civil
conspiracy claim. Because of that claim, the MRI entities, and Saint Alphonsus have been
allowed to introduce evidence of allegedly wrongful acts done by GSR, IMI, and ICR,
though they are not parties to this law suit. Because of the law governing this claim, as will
be described in later instructions, if the jury finds that the MRI entities suffered damages
resulting from a civil conspiracy, you will be required to determine what percentage of the
damages found were caused by the acts of Saint Alphonsus, and what percentage of the
damages were caused by GSR, IMI, and ICR. Your apportionment will not result in any
money damages having to be paid by GSR, IMI, or ICR. Rather, the reason you must
decide this issue is to ensure that, if Saint Alphonsus is held liable for civil conspiracy, it
will be held accountable only for the damages caused by its own wrongful acts associated
with this claim, and not the wrongful acts of others.
Not only is it appropriate for counsel for both parties to argue that GSR, IMI, and
ICR are responsible for some, all, or none of the acts that allegedly harmed the MRI
entities, it is their obligation in representing the interests of their clients. I instruct you to
disregard any comments that suggest otherwise.

It will be your legal duty as jurors to

decide what portion of the damages, if any, was caused by the acts of GSR, IMI, and ICR,
and what portion of the damages, if any, was caused by Saint Alphonsus.
By providing this explanation, this Court expresses no opinion as to whether Saint
Alphonsus , GSR, IMI, or ICR have participated in a civil conspiracy to the economic
detriment of the MRI entities, or whether any of the MRI entities suffered damages as a
result. That is for you alone to determine based on the evidence you have heard in this
case.

003022

INSTRUCTION NO.

All of the evidence has been presented in this case. You are to determine the facts
solely from the evidence you heard or saw during the trial. I want to remind you of some
things that are not evidence. They include questions and comments to witnesses;
objections or statements about the admissibility of evidence; testimony that was excluded
or stricken, or that you were instructed to disregard; and anything you may have heard or
seen when court was not in session.
I will not re-read the instructions I gave you at the beginning of the trial. If you have
any questions about those instructions, please review them during your deliberations. You
must consider the instructions as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others.
The order in which you are instructed on various issues has no significance as to their
relative importance.
You will have the original jury instructions and the trial exhibits with you in the jury
room. The exhibits are part of the official court record. For this reason please do not alter
them or mark on them in any way. However, the jury instructions are provided to each of
you for your use. You may mark on them if you wish to do so.
You will also have the original jury verdict form. Please use it to return your verdict.

003023

INSTRUCTION NO.

The fact that the Court either overrules or sustains an objection to a question, or to
testimony made, or to an argument advanced is not a comment on the evidence in the
case or upon which counsel's argument is or is not to be believed. Counsel's statements
are not evidence, nor are my rulings on objections made in a case. It is the job of counsel
to raise objections they feel are appropriate, just as it is my job to rule upon them.

003024

INSTRUCTION NO.

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that
directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact,
by proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the
degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is
respected for such convincing force as it may carry.

IDJI 1.24.2
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INSTRUCTION NO.

In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. I remind you that
whenever evidence was admitted for a limited purpose, you must not consider such
evidence for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it is admitted.

IDJI1.28
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INSTRUCTION NO.
In deciding the facts in this case, you may have to decide which testimony to
believe and which testimony not to believe. You may believe everything a witness says, or
part of it, or none of it. Proof of a fact does not necessarily depend on the number of
witnesses who testify about it. In considering the testimony of any witness, you may take
into account:
(1) the opportunity and ability of the witness to see or hear or know the things testified to;
(2) the witness's memory;
(3) the witness's manner while testifying;
(4) the witness's interest in the outcome of the case and any bias or prejudice;
(5) whether other evidence contradicted the witness's testimony;
(6) the reasonableness of the witness's testimony in light of all the evidence; and
(7) any other factors that bear on believability.
The weight of the evidence as to a fact does not necessarily depend on the number
of witnesses who testify about it.

9th Cirtuit Civil Model Jury Instruction 1.11
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care Inc, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,
MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, MRI Mobile Limited are corporations or
limited liability business organizations and are entitled to the same fair and unprejudiced
treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances.
You should decide this case with the same impartiality that you would use in
deciding a case between individuals.

003028

INSTRUCTION NO.
Evidence has been admitted which will go with you into the jury room that has been
redacted. You are not to concern yourselves with those redactions or speculate as to what
may have been removed.

003029

INSTRUCTION NO.

Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case.
have advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be
decided.

003030

INSTRUCTION NO.

When I use the term "MRIA," I am referring to MRI Associates, LLP. When I use the
term "MRI Center," I am referring to MRI Limited Partnership, of which MRIA is a general
partner.

When I use the term "MRI Mobile," I am referring to MRI Mobile Limited

Partnership, of which MRIA is a general partner. When I use the term "MRI entities," I am
referring to MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile. When I use the term "Saint Alphonsus," I
am referring both to Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. (SADC) and Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center (SARMC). When I use the term "GSR," I am referring to Gem
State Radiology, LLP.

003031

INSTRUCTION NO.

When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the
expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the
proposition is more probably true than not true.

003032

INSTRUCTION NO.

When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in natural or
probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained of and but for
that cause the damage would not have occurred.

It need not be the only cause. It is

sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway.
Proximate causation of damages must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

003033

INSTRUCTION NO.

+he term of the MRIA partnership, of which-Saffit Alphonsus was a general partner,
was--t-e-rurt-Uflt.i.l..fl.eomber 31, 2015 . If you determine that damages were suffered by the
other partiesM Rl entities as a result of the actions of Saint Alphonsus and that these
actions violated Idaho law or the partnership agreement, damages may not be awarded for
losses that might occur after December 31, 2015, since the partnership 'Nould have
expired

by~ts

own terms after that~te.

(MRIA note for court: MRIA is not a partnership for term)
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INSTRUCTION NO.

You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by
any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the written
agreement, which is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement.
While you may consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to clarify an ambiguity,
you may not consider such testimony to completely change the agreement, or to construe
a term of the agreement in such a fashion that it no longer fits with the other, nonambiguous terms or parts.

IDJI2d 6.08.2
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INSTRUCTION NO.
The parties agree that certain events occurred on the following dates:
1. The partnership agreement forming MRI Associates was entered into on April
26, 1985
2. The partnership agreement forming MRI Center was entered into on August 2,
1985
3. The partnership agreement forming MRI Mobile was entered into on October 17,
1988
4. IM I opened its downtown imaging facility on September 1, 1999
5. lMt-The radiologists, through ICR. and Saint Alphonsus entered into the tJ:Ie.if
partnership operating agreement for Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC on
July 1, 2001
6. The Meridian IMI facility opened on June 3, 2002
7. Saint Alphonsus gave notice of its dissociation from MRIA on February 24, 2004
8. Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from MRIA became effective on April1, 2004.
9. MRIA terminated its contract with GSR on January 3, 2005
+Go-The noncomf*ltiOOA-€1-ause in the MRIA-f*lrtneFtihip agreement expired ofi-A.pftl
1, 2005.
IMI on-campus opened on Saint Alphonsus's campus on December 19,
2005
'h2-o1Cl'"'~Saint

Alphonsus acquired 50% interest in IMI's MRI business April 1, 2006

l31LIMI's Eagle facility opened on October 1, 2007
14.1 :?c_The partnership agreement creating M Rl Center expired on December 31,
2015

003036

The partnership agreement creating MRI Mobile expired on December 31,

2018

003037
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Saint Alphonsus dissociated from the MRIA partnership on April1, 2004, pursuant

+

·
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to its right to do so under Idaho law.
You may not award damages to MRIA. MRI Center, or MRI Mobile based upon the
act of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from MRIA alone- something Saint Alphonsus had
the right to do.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Under the terms of the MRIA partnership agreement. a partner cannot engage in

{ Formatted: Left, Line spacing: Double
:..:c::_:_ _

restricted activities as defined by the MRIA partnership agreement until one year after it
dissociated. In this case. Saint Alphonsus dissociated on April 1, 2004.
A partner may adhere to the strict legal requirements of a written agreement and
still be held responsible for violating a fiduciary obliqation to its partners if the action taken
was improperly motivated, such as taking advantage of its partnership position to obtain
financial gain. It is for you, the jury, to determine whether an alleged action has taken
place and, if it is otherwise in compliance with the terms of the written agreement between
the parties, whether the action was improperly motivated.
You may award damages to the MRI Entities after April1, 2005, if you find one or
more of the following circumstances has occurred:
1. If you find that Saint Alphonsus actions prior to April 1, 2005, caused economic
damages to the MRI entities after April 1, 2005;
2. If you find that Saint Alphonsus dissociation was a violation of its fiduciary
obligations to its partners because it was improperly motivated; or

003038

3. If you find that Saint Alphonsus interfered with the MRI entities prospective
economic advantages after April 1, 2005, as described in Instruction No.
f.M_RIA note to court- we would like this instruction placed after Instruction No. 49.1

I NSTRUCTIGNN-l'N"-Gr..- --------Saffit-A~I:fS

dissociated from the MRIA partnership on April 1, 2004 pursuant to
its-light to do -s9-\ffi€1er Idaho law,
Under the terms of the MIR,C.. partnership, Saint Alphonsus could not compete
~nst-th-e-busiflesses run by MRIA until one year after it dissociated, or April 1, 2005.
-----¥etl--may-R-Ot-awar4-damages to MR-IA,-MR-1-Center, or MRI Mobile based--u-pOR
Sai-nt Alphonsus's dissociation from the MRIA partnership something Saint Alphonsus
haG-th-e-~ht-t~ Furthermore, you may not awamtlamage-s-t:e-MRIA, MRI Center, Of
MRI Mobile-simply because Saint Alphonsus competed vvith these businesses after April 1,
2005, which it had the right to do.
If, however, you find that Sain-t-Alpflensus begafl-to.-.Gompete by its actions vvith
MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile prior to April 1, 2005, or otherwise caused economic
damages to the MRI entities-by-its actions prior te--Apffi-+, 2005, you may then award
damages to MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile for any injury caused by Saint
AJ.phonsus's oon£1~r-t~,eveA-i.f-the damages caused by those actieA-s--ecct~ffe€~
after 2005. However, if you find damages should be awarded, you may only award
damages which you find 'Nere incurred prior to December 31, 2015, because the
!)aftnership 'l.'as to expire for all purposes by its 0\Vn terms after that date.

I. C. § 53-3-404(b)(1 )-(2)
I.C. § 53-3-603(c)
Saint Alphonsus Divesified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 224 P.3d 1068 (2009)
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INSTRUCTION NO.

In this case, MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile have made the following claims:
A. Contract Claims

1.

Breach of the Partnership Agreement by breach of the noncompetition clause

2.

Breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing

B. Tort Claims
1.

Intentional interference with prospective contractual relations

2.

Breach of fiduciary duty

business expectations

C. Civil conspiracy
In this case Saint Alphonsus has asserted estoppel and waiver as defenses to
these claims.

Saint Alphonsus also asserts that other factors caused the claimed

damages.

003040

INSTRUCTION NO.
MRIA Breach of the Partnership Agreement Claim: Breach of the NonCompete Clause

MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile, claim that Saint Alphonsus breached the
express terms of the MRIA Partnership Agreement by breaching the terms of the noncompetition provisions within the MRIA Partnership Agreement. On this claim, MRIA, MRI
Center, and MRI Mobile have the burden of proving each of the following propositions.
1.

A contract existed between MRIA and Saint Alphonsus;

2.

The contract contained a non-competition provision;

3.

Saint Alphonsus breached the contract by competing with MRIA;

4.

MRIA has been damaged as a proximate cause of the breach of contract;

5.

The amount of the damages.

This Court has already ruled that MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile have met their
burden of proving the first proposition. Specifically, this Court has already ruled that: a
contract existed, the MRIA Partnership Agreement. You, therefore, need only determine
whether MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile have met their burden of proving the second,
third, fourth, and fifth propositions above.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the second, third, fourth,
and fifth of these propositions has been proved by MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile,
then you must consider the affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver raised by Saint
Alphonsus. If you find after considering all the evidence that either the second, third, fouth
or fifth propositions in this instruction have not been proved, your verdict should be for
Saint Alphonsus as to this claim.
IDJI6.10.1 modified

003041

INSTRUCTION NO.
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an implied obligation of every contract
and requires the parties to perform in good faith the obligations contained in their
agreement. The covenant does not inject new material terms into the contract, but it does
require the parties to perform in good faith those terms agreed upon by the parties.

003042

INSTRUCTION NO.
Elements of Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

In order for the MRIA entities to recover on its-their claim that Saint Alphonsus
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, MR!A-the MRIA entities haves the
burden of proving each of the following:
1.

There was a contract between MRIA and Saint Alphonsus in the form of a

partnership agreement;
2.

Action by Saint Alphonsus violated, nullified or significantly impaired the

ben.!2.ifit of the contract; and,
3.

MRIA suffered damages that were a natural and proximate result of Saint

Alphonsus's actions.
The first of these propositions, that a contract existed in the form of a partnership
agreement, is not a disputed fact. Therefore, you must only consider whether the second
and third of these propositions has been proved. If you find from your consideration of all
the evidence that the second and third propositions have been proved, then you must
consider the issue of the affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver raised by Saint
Alphonsus as set forth in Instructions No. _and_. If you find from your consideration
of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proven, then your verdict
should be for Saint Alphonsus on this claim.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
St Alphonsus's defense of Waiver by Estoppel ("Estoppel")

Saint Alphonsus has raised the defense of waiver by estoppel. This is a legal term
which means that a party is deemed to have waived a claimed breach of contract by
reason of the party's own conduct. To establish the defense of waiver by estoppel, Saint
Alphonsus has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

MRIA represented to Saint Alphonsus by words or conduct or by silence

when a duty to speak and protest the action of Saint Alphonsus existed that MRIA was
waiving, excusing or forgiving Saint Alphonsus's breach of contract; and
2.

Saint Alphonsus relied upon this representation and materially changed

position in reliance thereon; and
3.

The reliance was reasonable in light of all of the circumstances; and

4.

The change of position was to Saint Alphonsus's detriment.

If you find that each of these propositions has been proved, you should find that
Saint Alphonsus is not liable to MRIA for the claimed breach of contract claims set forth in
Instructions Nos. _ , _ , _

and _ .

If Saint Alphonsus fails to prove all of the

propositions, then Saint Alphonsus has not established the affirmative defense of estoppel
as to the contract claims.

IDJI2d 6.22.2
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INSTRUCTION NO.
St Alphonsus's defense of Waiver

Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be evidenced by
conduct, by words, or by acquiescence.

IDJI2d 6.24.1
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Tort Claim of Intentional Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations or
Business Expectations

In this case, MRJA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile claim that Saint Alphonsus
interfered with their prospective contractual relations or business expectations. To recover
on this claim, MRIA Center and MRI Mobile must prove the following elements:
1.

The existence of a prospective economic advantage;

2.

Knowledge of the prospective economic advantage on the part of Saint
Alphonsus;

3.

Intentional interference by Saint Alphonsus that induced termination of the
prospective economic advantage of MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile

4.

That the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the
interference (in other words, that Saint Alphonsus interfered for an improper
purpose or through improper means); and

5.

Damages proximately caused by the interference.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that these propositions have
been proved, then your verdict should be for MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile. If you
find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been
proven, then your verdict should be for Saint Alphonsus on this claim.

003046

INSTRUCTION NO.
M-RtA-The MRI Entities claims that Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary duties to

MRJ.Athe MRI Entites. A partner owes fiduciary duties to the partnership. A fiduciary is a
person or entity with a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another. These fiduciary
duties include both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. You must determine whether
St. Alphonsus breached the fiduciary duties owed to MRIA.

Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 277, 824 P.2d 841, 852 (1991)
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INSTRUCTION NO.

A partner's duty of loyalty includes the following:
1.

The partner must refrain from misappropriating partnership opportunities.

2.

The partner should not act adversely to the partnership, either for itself or

3.

The partner must refrain from competing with the partnership at any time

others.

before disassociation or as set forth in the partnership agreement.
If you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached any of the above elements of the duty
of loyalty in regards to the duty Saint Alphonsus owes to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile,
then your verdict should be for MRIA, MRI Center,or MRI Mobile. If you find that Saint
Alphonsus has not breached any of the above elements of the duty of loyalty in regards to
the duty Saint Alphonsus owes to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile, then your verdict
should be for Saint Alphonsus on this claim.

I.C. § 53-3-404(b)
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INSTRUCTION NO.
When I refer to misappropriating a partnership opportunity, I am referring to a
partner taking advantage of a partnership opportunity for the partner's individual benefit.

003049

INSTRUCTION NO.

A partner's duty of care requires the partner to conduct partnership business in a
manner that is not reckless, grossly negligent, intentional misconduct, or a knowing
violation of the law.
If you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached the duty of care in regards to the duty
Saint Alphonsus owes to MR+Athe MRI enties, then your verdict should be for MR+Athe
MRI entites. If you find that Saint Alphonsus has not breached the duty of care in regards
to the duty Saint Alphonsus owes to

MR~Athe

MRI entites, then your verdict should be for

Saint Alphonsus on this claim.

003050

INSTRUCTION NO.

A partner must discharge the duties to the partnership and the other partners as found in
the law and in the partnership agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing.

003051

INSTRUCTION NO.

A partner does not violate the duty of loyalty or duty of care merely by acting in the
partner's individual interest.

Those actions must be in conflict with the partnership's

interest in order for the duty of loyalty or duty of care to be at issue.

003052

INSTRUCTION NO.
MRIA claims that Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary duties by misappropriating a
partnership-t}Pf')Ortunity when it entered into the Intermountain Medical Imaging partnership
in August 2001. Saint /\lphonsus contends that any partnership opportunity that may have
ex-istetl-was gone by 1999, and therefore could not have been misappropriated. If yatHifl.d
that Saint Alphonsus did not misappropriate a partnerhsip opportunity of MRIA's, or that

MR.fA's-Gla-im-is-time barred and you must find for Saint AlphoRSIJ&.-l.f,Rowever, you find
that Saint Alphonsus misappropriated a partnership opportunity on or after May 20, 2001,
thefl-yetHllUSt find for M RIA on this cla-im-c

MRIA note to court:

that thi~jJJgructiillJJ~ unne.:essarv and .:ontrarv to the law of tJ.lL?sasc. because
.ludgc._hlc,;.Laul!hlin rukd__on this verv issue. holding that the claims advanced bv MRIA were
"<:nntinuing" in nature. \Vh.:n an instruction was requested regarding the statute of limitations,
.ludg~j'vlcLaloii2.hlin said:

.MBl!'~_Qs:lL~.:s

1'11 give vou a ruling. I think it-- I concur with MRIA. I think it's continuous tort.
and that the-- mv reading of the law is that I think the Curtis V Firth case. 123
Idah()_59&, i~AP.J1Ii<:<t!Jl_.,: _ bere_,_ .A tl\i)t.'vi lLbc..tii<:S(ltt[l's ryJing tll<t!th.;sl<tim_s
asserted hv MRli\ are not barred hx_ the statute of! imitations based upon th<}l:__So.
that's the court's ruling.
(lri_ill_Ir. i\ugust 29. 2007. at p. 4196:5-12.) As this issue was not appealed. it is t~ law of the
case. l'vloreover. usurpation for violations of ficluciarv duties is not MRii\ 's onlv claim. The jurv
£i~Y)Q_J1Xil!2<:rlv lind damages prior to Julv I. 200 I. fiJr anv of the other claims raised bv MRii\.
-(fOmlatted: Left, Indent: First line: 0"
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INSTRUCTION NO.

A partner may adhere to the strict legal requirements of a written agreement and
still be held responsible for violating a fiduciary obligation to its partners if the action taken
was improperly motivated, such as taking advantage of its partnership position to obtain
financial gain. It is for you, the jury, to determine whether an alleged action has taken
place and, if it is otherwise in compliance with the terms of the written agreement between
the parties, whether the action was improperly motivated.

Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 203 P.3d 694 (2009).
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INSTRUCTION NO.
MRIA's Claim of Civil Conspiracy

MRlA-The MRI entites claims that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil conspiracy

with GSR to harm MR!Athe MRI entites. To recover on this claim MRJA-the MRI entites
must prove the following elements to establish that a conspiracy existed:
1.

Saint Alphonsus had an express agreement with GSR;

2.

To accomplish an unlawful objective or accomplish a lawful objective through

unlawful means
The essence of a cause of action for civil conspiracy is the civil wrong committed as
the objective of the conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that these propositions
required of MRJA--the MRI entities have been proved, then you must consider the issue of
the affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver raised by Saint Alphonsus as set forth in
Instructions Nos. _

and _ . If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that

any of these propositions has not been proven, then your verdict should be for Saint
Alphonsus on this claim.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

If you determine that a conspiracy existed, consider which acts caused damage to
MR~Athe

MRI entites. Saint Alphonsus will be liable for an act that proximately causes

MR-1-A-damages to the MRI entities if the act was both:
1.

Perpetrated by Saint Alphonsus or perpetrated by GSR in furtherance of the

conspiracy; and
2.

The act was a natural and probable consequence of the agreed upon

objective of the conspiracy.
If you find that both of these elements were proven with regard to an act, then you
should find that Saint Alphonsus is liable for the damages proximately caused by that act.
If you find that either of these elements was not proven with regard to an act, then you
should not find that Saint Alphonsus is liable for the damages caused by this act.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion
as to whether MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile is entitled to damages.

IDJI2d 9.00
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INSTRUCTION NO.

The amount of damages must be proven by MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile
with reasonable certainty. Reasonable certainty requires neither absolute assurance nor
mathematical exactitude of damages; rather the evidence need only be sufficient to
remove the existence of damages from the realm of speculation.

IDJI2d 2.301
Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 146 Idaho 613, 200 P.3d 1163 (2009)
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INSTRUCTION NO.

If you find Saint Alphonsus breached its obilgations, and, as a result, MRIA, MRI
Center, and MRI Mobile suffered financial damages, then those damages are awardable to
MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile regardless of the fact that Saint Alphonsus is a
charitable hospital.

Saint /\lphonsus enjoys no exemption from any legal OO+J.gation at

issue in this case.

If you find Saint l\lphonsus acted in such a way as to cause financial

1:\ar-m--ffi.-.-another -aR€1- if the party allegedly harmed proves these damages to yotlf
satisfacti-oR,--tAe-n-ft-f~ to

a•Nard them tl:le--Gama~€reeh

If, ho•Never. the party claiming the harm has not proven to your satisfaction--Sai-Flt
A$honsus breached its otwgatkms--eF--#lat any financial harm flowing from any other
alleged illegal acts by Saint Alphonsus occurred. it is your obligation to reject the claim and
award-n-o-d~to

MRIA, MRI Mobile, or MRI Center from Saint ,A,Iph-oRstl&.-
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Damages: Breach of Non Compete Clausethe Partnership Agreement, Breach of
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Tortious Interference, and GWU
~nspiracy

Claims Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim

If the jury decides that MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile are entitled to recover
from Saint Alphonsus on the breach of the non compete clause claimpartnership
agreement, the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, the tortious
interference claim, or the Gi-vff--coospir-aeyfiduciary duty claim, then the jury must determine
the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate MRIA, MRI Center, and
MRI Mobile for the net profits lost that the evidence proves to have been a natural and
proximate result of Saint Alphonsus's breaches of contract.
Whether MRIA, MRI Center, MRI Mobile have proved any of these elements is for
the jury to decide.
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IDJI2d 9.03
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INSTRUCTION NO.

If you determine that Saint Alphonsus is liable to MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile
for a cause of action based on breaching a fiducfaFy-<itlty by acting adversly to MRIA on
behalf of GSR, IMI, or ICR; byfor interfering with the prospective contractual relations of
the MRI entities; or engaging in civil conspiracy, you must take into account that under
those theories, others are potentially jointly responsible for what harm, if any, MRIA, MRI
Center, or MRI Mobile suffered. Thus, if you find that MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile
were harmed by wrongful acts jointly committed by Saint Alphonsus and other actors, then
you must determine what percentage of the damages is attributable to Saint Alphonsus
and what percentage is attributable to other actors.
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INSTRUCTION NO;

Damages: Intentional Interference Claim
If the jury decides the M Rl entities are entitled to recover from Saint Alphonsus on
the intentional interference claim, the jury must determine the amount of money that will
fea~pemte-the-MR+-eflttties for their net pr-e#ts lost that the
evidence proves to have been proximately caused by Saint Alphonsus's intentional

································-···- -------------·-···--·----·--··---·--·········-·····-····-'
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-----VVhether the MRI entities has prov-eEi-ooy of these elements is for the jury to decide,
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I

INSTRUCTION NO.
Damages: Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim
lf-tfle-jufY-Eiesides MRIA is entitled to recover from Saint Alphonsus on the breach of

{Formatted: Centered, Indent: First line: 0"

fiduciary duty claim. the jury must determine the amount of the net profits that Saint
i\lphonsus realized as a result of its breach of fidueiary duty ovmd to MRIA
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INSTRUCTION NO.

------In this case, you may calculate damages in twa-three
Alphonsus-eAgaged in

bef\~ximate-cause

ways~

if you find that Saint

of financial harm to MRIA,

MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile .•
i.

{ Formatted: Font: Bold

Lost profits: harm proximately cause by breach of contract. breach of

fiduciary duty, intentional interference, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, or civil conspiracy can be measured by the lost profits sustained by MRI Center or
MRI Mobile, The damages found by you, if any, must then be apportioned by you to each
of the MRI entities based upon your finding as to what profits were lost by each individual
business entity.
ii.

Disgorgement: if you find that Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary

duties, an alternative measure of damages is to disgorge the benefits derived _Qy Saint
Alphonsus as a consequce of its wrongful behavior. The damages found by you, if any,
must then be apportioned by you to MRI Center and MRI Mobile.
iii.

Diminution in Value: damages to MRI Center can also be measured

by the loss in value sustained by the company as a result of Saint Alphonsus's alleged
unlawful conduct

.If yotJ find that Saint AlphonstJs violated the non competition clatJse in the MRIA •

(~~~~~~~=~i~i~~~~~~~~--

·· · · · · · -- ]

partnership agreement and that damages were proximately catJsed as a restJit of that
breach, then the measure of damages is the profits lost by MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI
Mobile as a result of that breach.

The damages fotJnd by yotJ, if any, mtJst then be

apportioned by you to each of the MRI entities based tJpon yotJr finding as to what profits,
if any,were lost by each individtJal btJsiness entity.
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If you find Saint Alphonsus breached the partnership agreement with MRIA by
breaching the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and that damages were proximately
caused as a result of that breach, then you must find the amount of those damages. The
measure of damages for that breach is also the amount of profits, if any, you find were lost
by MIRA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile as a result of that breach. The damages found by
you, if any, must then be apportioned by you to each of the MRI entities based upon your
finding as to what profits, if any, Vt'ere lost by each individual business entity.
If you find that Saint Alphonsus breached its duty of loyalty and care to the
partnership, and as a result, MRIA, MRI Center and MRI Mobile suffered financial
damages that were proximately caused by the violation of those duties, the measure of
damages is the amount of profits, if any, you find were lost by MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI
Mobile as a result of those actions.
::f-he damages found by you, if any, must then be apportioned by you to each of the
MRI entitfes-based upen-.yot!f-.finding as to what--pr-efits were lost 9-y---each-indJ.vidual
l:>us+ness-eRtity,

)f you u find thatSaillt AIJ3hOf1~liS ubreachedu it~ fiduciarymduties to UPJI ~lp.u tlY- . .

j Formatted: Strikethrough

misappropriating a partnership opportunity, the measure in damages is not the profits lost
by MRIA, but instead is the disgorgement or return of all of the net profits realized by Saint
Alphonsus as a result of its misappropriation of the partnership opportunities.
INSTRUCTION NO.
, - - I f you _ftnd there .,...as _<3 C()I1S!)iracy t>etiAf~e_n GSR (3nd §e~int_,A.Iphonsljs_ which
resulted in damage to MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile, then the measure of
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damages is the profits lost, if any, by MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile as a natural and
probable consequence of the agreed upon objective of the conspiracy.
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l

J
______

J

Once you determine the amount of those damages, if any, you must apportion the
damages amount you find was proximately caused by the conspiracy among the
conspirators.

After you make that apportionment, you must then apportion the money

damages you find attributable to Saint Alphonsus between MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI
Mobile.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

You are instructed that because MRIA's sole source of income was the 7.5%
management fee it collected from MRI Center and MRI Mobile, its lost revenues are limited
the reduction, if any, to the management fee income it would have collected.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such
care cannot be recovered.
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IDJI2d 9.14
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INSTRUCTION NO.

In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or
decide any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws.

If

money damages are to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may
not agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method
of determining the amount of the damage award.

003071

INSTRUCTION NO.

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may
send a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate
with me by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on
any of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by
me.

IDJI2d 1.11
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INSTRUCTION NO.

I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case.

I have instructed you

regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts.
In a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire
to the jury room for your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the
outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of
opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the
beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change
that position, even if shown that it is wrong.

Remember that you are not partisans or

advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the
ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another.

Consider each other's views.

Deliberate with the

objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after
a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

I will now draw the name of the alternate jurors, to whom I will once again apologize
in advance. I will advise the alternates chosen that even at this time, it is possible, should
some problem arise, that you could be recalled and the jury instructed to begin its
deliberations anew with the alternate juror or jurors seated. For that reason, you are
admonished not to discuss this case with other jurors or anyone else, nor to form an
opinion as to the merits of the case.
Please leave your names and telephone numbers with the bailiff. The Court will call
you to advise you when any verdict is reached and what that verdict may be, or to advise
you if for any reason, you may be required to return to court for deliberations. Thank you
for your service.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict.
This form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict
form to you now.
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
As to MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus breached the Partnership Agreement
by breach of the non-compete clause?:
Question No. 1: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached the Partnership

Agreement by breaching the non-compete clause, as set forth in Instruction No. _ ?
Answer to Question No. 1:

Yes [__J

No [__J

As to MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus breached the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing:
Question No. 2: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing as set forth in Instructions Nos. _and_?
Answer to Question No 2.

Yes [__J

No [__J

As to Saint Alphonsus's affirmative defenses:
Question No. 3: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has established the affirmative

defense of either estoppel or waiver, described in Instructions Nos._ and_ as it
applies to the breach of the non-compete clauses, as set forth in Instruction No. _ ?
Answer to Question No.3:

Yes [__J

No [__J

Question No.4: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has established the affirmative

defense of either estoppel or waiver, described in Instructions Nos. _and_, as it
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applies to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as set forth in Instructions Nos. _
and 27?
Answer to Question No. 4:

Yes [__J

No [__J

As to MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus intentionally interfered with MRI
Associates', MRI Center's, or MRI Mobile's prospective contractual relations or
business expectations:
Question No. 5: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus intentionally interfered with MRI

entities' prospective economic relations or business expectations, as described in
Instruction No.

?

Answer to Question No.5: Yes [__J

No [__J

Question No. 6: If you answered "yes" to Question 5, do you find that the Gem

State Radiologists, Intermountain Medical Imaging, or Imaging Center Radiologists
engaged jointly with Saint Alphonsus in conduct that interfered with the MRI entities'
prospective contractual relations?
Answer to Question No.6: Yes [__J

No [__J

As to MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary owed to MRIA:
Question No. 7: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary duty owed

to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile, as described in Instructions Nos._,_,_, and

?
Answer to Question No. 7:

Yes [__J

No [__J

Question No.8: If you answered "yes" to question no. 7, do you find that Saint

Alphonsus misappropriated a partnership opportunity as described in Instruction No. _ ?
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Answer to Question No. 8:

Yes [__J

No [__J

Question No. 9: If you answered "yes" to question no. 8, what date did the
misappropriation of the partnership opportunity occur?
Answer to Question No. 9:

Question No. 10: If you answered "yes" to Question No. 7, did Saint Alphonsus
breach its fiduciary duty by dealing on behalf of the Gem State Radiologists, Intermountain
Medical Imaging, or Imaging Center Radiologists?
Answer to Question No. 10

Yes [__J

No [__J

As to MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil conspiracy:
Question No. 11: Has Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil conspiracy, as described
in Instruction No

?

Answer to Question No. 11

Yes [__J

No [__J

If you answered Questions Nos. 1, 2, 5, 7, and 11 a// no, then sign the special
verdict form and present it to the Bailiff. If you answered Questions Nos. 5, 7, and
11 a// no and also answered Questions Nos. 3 and 4 both yes, then sign the special
verdict form and present it to the Bailiff. If neither of the above directions apply
based on your answers, then continue to Question No. 12 below.

As to Damages:
Question No. 12: If you answered "yes" to Question No. 5, what is the amount of net
earnings each of the MRI entities lost as a result of the interference with prospective
contractual relations?
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Answer to Question No. 12
MRI Associates:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Center:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Mobile:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

If you answered "no" to either question 5 or 6, skip to question 16

Question No. 13: If you answered "yes" to Question No.6, what percentage of the
damages from the interference with prospective contractual relations is attributable to Saint
Alphonsus?
Answer to Question No. 13:

_ _ _ _ _%

Question No. 14: If you answered "yes" to Question No. 6, what percentage of the
damages from the interference with prospective contractual relations is attributable to Gem
State Radiology, Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Imaging Center Radiologists?
Answer to Question No. 14:

_ _ _ _ _%

Question No. 15: If you answered "yes" to Question No. 6, what is the amount of net
earnings each of the MRI entities lost as a result of Saint Alphonsus's interference in
prospective contractual relations?
Answer to Question No. 15
MRI Associates:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Center:

$. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Mobile:

$._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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Question No. 16: If you answered "yes" to Question No. 7, what is the amount of net
earnings each of the MRI entities lost as a result of the breach of the breach of fiduciary
duty?
Answer to Question No. 16
MRI Associates:

$._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Center:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Mobile:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

If you answered "no" to either question 7 or 10, skip to question 20

Question No. 17: If you answered "yes" to Question No. 10, what percentage of the
damages from dealing on behalf of Gem State Radiologists, Intermountain Medical
Imaging, and Imaging Center Radiologists is attributable to Saint Alphonsus?
Answer to Question No. 17:

_ _ _ _ _ _%

Question No. 18: If you answered "yes" to Question No. 10, what percentage of the
damages from dealing on behalf of Gem State Radiologists, Intermountain Medical
Imaging, and Imaging Center Radiologists is attributable to Gem State Radiology,
Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Imaging Center Radiologists?
Answer to Question No. 18:

_ _ _ _ _ _%

Question No. 19: If you answered "yes" to Question No. 10, what is the amount of net
earnings each of the MRI entities lost as a result of Saint Alphonsus's dealing on behalf of
Gem State Radiologists, Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Imaging Center
Radiologists?
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Answer to Question No. 19
MRI Associates:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Center:

$._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Mobile:

$._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Question No. 20: If you answered "yes" to Question No. 10, what is the amount of net
earnings each of the MRI entities lost as a result of the conspiracy?
Answer to Question No. 20
MRI Associates:

$._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Center:

$._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Mobile:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Question No. 21: If you answered "yes" to Question No. 11, what percentage of the
damages from the conspiracy is attributable to Saint Alphonsus?
Answer to Question No. 21:

_____%

Question No. 22: If you answered "yes" to Question No. 11, what percentage of the
damages from the conspiracy is attributable to Gem State Radiology?
Answer to Question No. 22:

_ _ _ _ _%

Question No. 23: If you answered "yes" to Question No. 11, what is the amount of net
earnings each of the MRI entities lost as a result of Saint Alphonsus's conduct in the
conspiracy?
Answer to Question No. 23
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MRI Associates:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Center:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Mobile:

$._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Question No. 24 If you answered "yes" to Questions No. 1,or 2 what is the amount
of net earnings each of the MRI entities lost as a result of Saint Alphonsus's conduct

Answer to Question No. 24
MRI Associates:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Center:

$._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Mobile:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Question No. 25: If you answered "no" to Questions No. 7 or 8, or determined in
Question No. 9 a date on or before May 20, 2001, do not answer this question. If you
answered "yes" to Questions No. 7 and 8, and determined in Question 9 a date after May
20, 2001, what is the amount of money Saint Alphonsus gained by misappropriating the
partnership opportunity?

Answer to Question No. 25:

$_________________
DATEDthis _ _ _ dayof _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Presiding Juror
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INSTRUCTION NO.

On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a presiding juror, who will
preside over your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow
the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the
instructions on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon
as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the
verdict, you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the
same nine agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, the presiding juror alone
will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing
will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff,
who will then return you into open court.

Dated this_ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2011.

Judge Mike Wetherell

IDJI2d 1.15.1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
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FORM

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REDLINE OF COURT'S PROPOSED POST-EVIDENCE
INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 2
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

All of the evidence has been presented in this case. You are to determine the facts
solely from the evidence you heard or saw during the trial. I want to remind you of some
things that are not evidence. They include questions and comments to witnesses;
objections or statements about the admissibility of evidence; testimony that was excluded
or stricken, or that you were instructed to disregard; and anything you may have heard or
seen when court was not in session.
I will not re-read the instructions I gave you at the beginning of the trial. If you have
any questions about those instructions, please review them during your deliberations. You
must consider the instructions as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others.
The order in which you are instructed on various issues has no significance as to their
relative importance.
You will have the original jury instructions and the trial exhibits with you in the jury
room. The exhibits are part of the official court record. For this reason please do not alter
them or mark on them in any way. However, the jury instructions are provided to each of
you for your use. You may mark on them if you wish to do so.
You will also have the original jury verdict form. Please use it to return your verdict.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REDLINE OF COURT'S PROPOSED POST-EVIDENCE
INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 3
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

The fact that the Court either overrules or sustains an objection to a question, or to
testimony made, or to an argument advanced is not a comment on the evidence in the
case or upon which counsel's argument is or is not to be believed. Counsel's statements
are not evidence, nor are my rulings on objections made in a case. It is the job of counsel
to raise objections they feel are appropriate, just as it is my job to rule upon them.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REDLINE OF COURT'S PROPOSED POST-EVIDENCE
INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 4
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that
directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact,
by proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the
degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is
respected for such convincing force as it may carry.

IDJI1.24.2
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. I remind you that
whenever evidence was admitted for a limited purpose, you must not consider such
evidence for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it is admitted.

IDJI1.28
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

In deciding the facts in this case, you may have to decide which testimony to
believe and which testimony not to believe. You may believe everything a witness says, or
part of it, or none of it. Proof of a fact does not necessarily depend on the number of
witnesses who testify about it. In considering the testimony of any witness, you may take
into account:
(1) the opportunity and ability of the witness to see or hear or know the things testified to;
(2) the witness's memory;
(3) the witness's manner while testifying;
(4) the witness's interest in the outcome of the case and any bias or prejudice;
(5) whether other evidence contradicted the witness's testimony;
(6) the reasonableness of the witness's testimony in light of all the evidence; and
(7) any other factors that bear on believability.
The weight of the evidence as to a fact does not necessarily depend on the number
of witnesses who testify about it.
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9th Cirtuit Civil Model Jury Instruction 1.11
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care Inc, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,
MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, MRI Mobile Limited are corporations or
limited liability business organizations and are entitled to the same fair and unprejudiced
treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances.
You should decide this case with the same impartiality that you would use in
deciding a case between individuals.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

Evidence has been admitted which will go with you into the jury room that has been
redacted. You are not to concern yourselves with those redactions or speculate as to what
may have been removed.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case.
have advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be
decided.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

When I use the term "MRIA," I am referring to MRI Associates, LLP. When I use the
term "MRI Center," I am referring to MRI Limited Partnership, of which MRIA is a general
partner.

When I use the term "MRI Mobile," I am referring to MRI Mobile Limited

Partnership, of which MRIA is a general partner. When I use the term "Saint Alphonsus," I
am referring both to Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. (SADC) and Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center (SARMC). When I use the term "GSR," I am referring to Gem
State Radiology, LLP.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the
expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the
proposition is more probably true than not true.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in natural or
probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained of and but for
that cause the damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause.

It is

sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway.
Proximate causation of damages must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

The term of the MRIA partnership, of which Saint Alphonsus was a general partner,
'Nas to run until Decmber 31, 2015 . If you determine that damages were suffered by the
other parties as a result of the actions of Saint Alphonsus and that these actions violated
Idaho law or the partnership agreement, damages may not be awarded for losses that
might occur after December 31, 2015., since the partnership vvould have expired by its
own terms after that date.

**The MRIA general partnership did not have a definite term, as this Court held in its November
16, 2010 opinion, pp. 5-9. The MRI Center limited partnership had an end date of2015, and the
Mobile limited partnership had an end date of2018. The damages limit of2015 was imposed by
the Supreme Court because, during the first trial, MRIA claimed that damages flowed from injuries
to MRI Center (and did not claim damages for Mobile.)
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by
any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the written
agreement, which is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement.
While you may consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to clarify an ambiguity,
you may not consider such testimony to completely change the agreement, or to construe
a term of the agreement in such a fashion that it no longer fits with the other, nonambiguous terms or parts.

IDJI2d 6.08.2
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
The parties agree that certain events occurred on the following dates:
1. The partnership agreement forming MRI Associates was entered into on April
26, 1985
2. The partnership agreement forming MRI Center was entered into on August 2,
1985
3. The partnership agreement forming MRI Mobile was entered into on October 17,
1988
4. IMI opened its downtown imaging facility on September 1, 1999
5. IMI and Saint Alphonsus entered into their partnership agreement on July 1,
2001., which on its face states that it is for non-MRI portion of IMI's business.
The parties dispute the effectiveness of that provision and whether it was
followed in practice. That will be an issue for you, the jury, to decide.
6. The Meridian IMI facility opened on June 3, 2002
7. Saint Alphonsus gave notice of its dissociation from MRIA on February 24, 2004
8. Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from MRIA became effective on April1, 2004.
9. MRIA terminated its contract with GSR on January 3, 2005
10. The noncom petition clause in the MRIA partnership agreement expired on April
1' 2005.
11. IMI on-campus opened on Saint Alphonsus's campus on December 19, 2005
12. Saint Alphonsus acquired 50% interest in IMI's MRI business April 1, 2006
13.1MI's Eagle facility opened on October 1, 2007
14. The partnership agreement creating MRI Center expired on December 31, 2015
15. The partnership agreement creating MRI Mobile expired on December 31, 2018
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REDLINE OF COURT'S PROPOSED POST-EVIDENCE
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

Saint Alphonsus dissociated from the MRIA partnership on April 1, 2004 pursuant to
its right to do so under Idaho law.
Under the terms of the MIRA MRIA partnership, Saint Alphonsus could not compete
against the businesses run by MRIA until one year after it dissociated, GF-that is, until April
1' 2005.
You may not award damages to MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile based upon
Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from the MRIA partnership-something Saint Alphonsus
had the right to do. Furthermore, you may not award damages to MRIA, MRI Center, or
MRI Mobile simply because Saint Alphonsus competed with these businesses after April1,
2005, which it had the right to do.
If, however, you find that Saint Alphonsus began to compete by its actions with
MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile prior to April 1, 2005, or otherwise caused economic
damages to the MRI entities by its actions prior to April 1, 2005, you may then award
damages to MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile for any injury caused by Saint
Alphonsus's conduct prior to 2005, even if the damages caused by those actions occurred
after 2005.

However, if you find damages should be awarded, you may only award

damages which you find were incurred prior to December 31, 2015, because the
partnership was to expire for all purposes by its own terms after that date.

I. C. § 53-3-404(b)(1 )-(2)
I.C. § 53-3-603(c)
Saint Alphonsus Divesified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates LLP, 1481daho 479, 224 P.3d 1068 (2009)
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

In this case, MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile have made the following claims:
A. Contract Claims
1.

Breach of the Partnership Agreement by breach of the noncompetition clause

2.

Breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing

B. Tort Claims
1.

Intentional interference with prospective contractual relations

2.

Breach of fiduciary duty

C. Civil conspiracy
In this case Saint Alphonsus has asserted estoppel and waiver as defenses to
these claims.

Saint Alphonsus also asserts that other factors caused the claimed

damages.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
MRIA Breach of the Partnership Agreement Claim: Breach of the NonCompete Clause
MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile, claim that Saint Alphonsus breached the
express terms of the MRIA Partnership Agreement by breaching the terms of the noncompetition provisions within the MRIA Partnership Agreement. On this claim, MRIA, MRI
Center, and MRI Mobile have the burden of proving each of the following propositions.
1.

A contract existed between MRIA and Saint Alphonsus;

2.

The contract contained a non-competition provision;

3.

Saint Alphonsus breached the contract by competing with MRIA prior to April

1' 2005;
4.

MRIA has been damaged as a proximate cause of the breach of contract;

5.

The amount of the damages.

This Court has already ruled that MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile have met their
burden of proving the first proposition. Specifically, this Court has already ruled that: a
contract existed, the MRIA Partnership Agreement. You, therefore, need only determine
whether MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile have met their burden of proving the second,
third, fourth, and fifth propositions above.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the second, third, fourth,
and fifth of these propositions has been proved by MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile,
then you must consider the affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver raised by Saint
Alphonsus. If you find after considering all the evidence that either the second, third, fouth
or fifth propositions in this instruction have not been proved, your verdict should be for
Saint Alphonsus as to this claim.
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** Saint Alphonsus understands the Court's summary judgment ruling holding that MRI
Center and MRI Mobile are third-party beneficiaries of the MRI Partnership Agreement;
however, Saint Alphonsus objects to this instruction on grounds that it grants MRI Center
and MRI Mobile third-party beneficiary status, and intends to preserve the issue for review.
IDJ16.10.1 modified
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an implied obligation of every contract
and requires the parties to perform in good faith the obligations contained in their
agreement. The covenant does not inject new material terms into the contract, but it does
require the parties to perform in good faith those terms agreed upon by the parties.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
Elements of Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

In order for MRIA to recover on its claim that Saint Alphonsus breached the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, MRIA has the burden of proving each of the
following:
1.

There was a contract between MRIA and Saint Alphonsus in the form of a

partnership agreement;
2.

Action by Saint Alphonsus violated, nullified or significantly impaired the

benifit of the contract; and,
3.

MRIA suffered damages that were a natural and proximate result of Saint

Alphonsus's actions.
The first of these propositions, that a contract existed in the form of a partnership
agreement, is not a disputed fact. Therefore, you must only consider whether the second
and third of these propositions has been proved. If you find from your consideration of all
the evidence that the second and third propositions have been proved, then you must
consider the issue of the affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver raised by Saint
Alphonsus as set forth in Instructions No. _

and _ . If you find from your consideration

of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proven, then your verdict
should be for Saint Alphonsus on this claim.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
St Alphonsus defense of Waiver by Estoppel ("Estoppel")

Saint Alphonsus has raised the defense of waiver by estoppel. This is a legal term
which means that a party is deemed to have waived a claimed breach of contract by
reason of the party's own conduct. To establish the defense of waiver by estoppel, Saint
Alphonsus has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

MRIA represented to Saint Alphonsus by words or conduct or by silence

when a duty to speak and protest the action of Saint Alphonsus existed that MRIA was
waiving, excusing or forgiving Saint Alphonsus's breach of contract; and
2.

Saint Alphonsus relied upon this representation and materially changed

position in reliance thereon; and
3.

The reliance was reasonable in light of all of the circumstances; and

4.

The change of position was to Saint Alphonsus's detriment.

If you find that each of these propositions has been proved, you should find that
Saint Alphonsus is not liable to MRIA for the claimed breach of contract claims set forth in
Instructions Nos. _ , _ , _

and _ .

If Saint Alphonsus fails to prove all of the

propositions, then Saint Alphonsus has not established the affirmative defense of estoppel
as to the contract claims.

IDJI2d 6.22.2
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
St Alphonsus defense of Waiver

Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be evidenced by
conduct, by words, or by acquiescence.

The defense of waiver applies to tort claims,

including breach of fiduciary duty claims and interference with prospective contractual
relations.

A partnership can authorize a specific act or transaction by a partner that

otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty. It may also ratify, after-the-fact, a specific act
or transaction that would otherwise have been a breach of the duty of loyalty after full
disclosure of all material facts.

If an action has been authorized or ratified, then the

partner taking that action is not in breach of its fiduciary duties.

IDJI2d 6.24.1

As to the notion that the defense of waiver applies to tort claims, such as breach of fiduciary
duties arising out of contractual agreements, see 24 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel§ 212 (''A right of
action or defense arising out of contract may usually be waived, such as fraud inducing the
execution of a contract."); id. § 214 ("Parties can waive statutory rights and protections");
Vinewood Capital, LLC v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP, 735 F. Supp. 2d 503, 516,
518-19 (N.D. Tex. 201 0) (holding that "waiver is defined as an intentional relinquishment of a
known right" and applying law to find that party "waived its claim for breach of fiduciary duty");
Robert C. Montgomery, The Fiduciary Duties o(General Partners, 17 Colo. Law. 1959, 1964
( 1988) ("Breaches of fiduciary duty clearly may be waived ... Consent, waiver or ratification
should be explicit but, in certain circumstances, also may be implied by silence or failure to act after
an adversely afTected partner lcams of the breach of duty.") (citing pre-RUP A authorities); c( State
v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994) ("[G]iven the fact that constitutional
rights may be waived, there is no doubt that a statutory right may be waived as well."); c(' Idaho
Code § 53-3-1 03(b )(3 )(ii) (providing for authorization or ratification of breaches of duty of loyalty);
id. § 53-3-103 otT. cmt. 5 ("Subsection (b)(3)(ii) is intended to clarify the right ofpartners,
recognized under general law, to consent to a known past or anticipated violation of duty and to
waive their legal remedies for redress of that violation.").
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
Tort Claim of Intentional Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations or
Business Expectations

In this case, MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile claim that Saint Alphonsus
interfered with their prospective contractual relations or business expectations. To recover
on this claim, MRIA Center and MRI Mobile must prove the following elements:
1.

The existence of a prospective economic advantage;

2.

Knowledge of the prospective economic advantage on the part of Saint
Alphonsus;

3.

Intentional interference by Saint Alphonsus that induced termination of the
prospective economic advantage of MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile

4.

That the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the
interference (in other words, that Saint Alphonsus interfered for an improper
purpose or through improper means); and

5.

Damages proximately caused by the interference.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that these propositions have
been proved, then your verdict should be for MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile. If you
find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been
proven, then your verdict should be for Saint Alphonsus on this claim.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Parties have a privilege to engage in competition, unless they have agreed by
contract not to do so or have a fiduciary duty not to compete. If a party is not otherwise
forbidden from competition, and if a party's purpose, even just in part, is to engage in
competition, its competition is privileged and may not be the basis of an intentional
interference with prospective contractual relations claim.

As to the instruction that there is a privilege to compete, which defeats liability, even against
interference with some wrongful purpose, see Yoakum v. HartfOrd Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171,
178, 923 P.2d 416, 423 ( 1996) ("What may be wrongful for an unprivileged defendant in a given
situation, however, may not be so when the defendant is acting under a recognized privilege.");
Frantz v. Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 1012, 729 P.2d 1068, 1075 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) ("There is a
qualified privilege allowing competitors to interfere with prospective contracts. The Second
Restatement, at § 768, provides: (1) One who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a
prospective contractual relation with another who is his competitor or not to continue an existing
contract terminable at will docs not interfere improperly with the other's relation if (a) the relation
concerns a matter involved in the competition between the actor and the other and (b) the actor does
not employ wrongful means and (c) his action docs not create or continue an unlawful restraint of
trade and (d) his purpose is at least in part to advance his interest in competing with the other.")
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 768); Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 768 cmt. g ("Ifhis
conduct is directed, at least in part, to that end, the fact that he is also motivated by other impulses,
as, for example, hatred or a desire for revenge is not alone sufficient to make his interference
improper. But if his conduct is directed solely to the satisfaction of his spite or ill will and not at all
to the advancement of his competitive interests over the person harmed, his interference is held to
be improper")

**Saint Alphonsus suggests that this instruction is necessary as without it, the jury might
improperly award "intentional interference with prospective contractual relations" based on GSR's
acts of competition with MRI Associates, or Saint Alphonsus's competition after the April 1, 2005
non-compete; however, competition is privileged even though, by nature, it interferes with a
competitor's business.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

MRIA claims that Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary duties to MRIA, MRI
Center, and/or MRI Mobile. A partner owes fiduciary duties to the partnership. A fiduciary
is a person or entity with a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another. These fiduciary
duties include both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. You must determine whether
St. Alphonsus breached the fiduciary duties owed to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile.

**Saint Alphonsus objects to the term "[a] fiduciary is a person or entity with a duty to act
primarily for the benefit of another." That phrase appears in Bliss Valley in the context of
determining, as a factual matter, whether a fiduciary relationship should be imposed as a matter of
common law in situations where "one party is in a superior position to the other and that such a
position enables him to exercise influence over one who reposes special trust and confidence in
him." Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 277-78, 824 P.2d 841, 852-53
(1991 ). This is not appropriate in the partnership context where the duty of loyalty and the duty of
care are defined, and that definition does not obligate partners to act "primarily for the benefit of'
the partnership.

** Saint A1phonsus also objects on the grounds that the jury should determine whether Saint
Alphonsus owed any fiduciary duty to MRI Center and MRI Mobile, as no such duty arises under
the partnership statute, as stated in the proposed jury instructions filed July 15, 2011
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Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 277, 824 P.2d 841, 852 (1991)

INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

A partner's duty of loyalty includes the following:
1.

The partner must refrain from misappropriating partnership opportunities.

The partner should not act adversely to the partnership, either for itself or others.
2.

The partner must refrain from competing with the partnership at any time

before disassociation or as set forth in the partnership agreement.
A partner does not breach the duty of loyalty by engaging in business activities that
are outside the scope of the partnership business, and does not have to share its profits
from such activity with the partnership.
If you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached any of the above elements of the duty
of loyalty in regards to the duty Saint Alphonsus owes to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile,
then your verdict should be for MRIA. If you find that Saint Alphonsus has not breached
any of the above elements of the duty of loyalty in regards to the duty Saint Alphonsus
owes to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile, then your verdict should be for Saint Alphonsus
on this claim.

I.C. § 53-3-404(b)

As to the instruction that a partner does not breach the duty of loyalty by engaging in
activities outside the scope of the partnership's business, sec Truman v. Martin, 321 N.W.2d
420, 423 (Neb. 1982) ("[T]here is nothing inherently wrong with a partner engaging, in good faith,
in enterprises in his own behalf other than the line of trade or business in which the partnership is
engaged. His partners are not entitled to share in the profits from such enterprises."); Robert C.
Montgomery, The Fiduciary Duties a( General Partners, 17 Colo. Law. 1959, 1960 (1988) ("[A]
partner is free to maintain business interests outside of the scope of the partnership's business,
without accounting to his partners for any profits therefrom. In particular, a partner may have
outside interests in the same industry as the partnership, as long as the outside interests ( 1) do not
directly compete with the partnership and (2) do not fall within the scope of the partnership's
business.")
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

When I refer to misappropriating or "usurping" a partnership opportunity, I am
referring to a partner taking advantage of a partnership opportunity for the partner's
individual benefit. In order to show a misappropriation or "usurpation" of a partnership
opportunity, the partnership must show:
(1) the partner took a partnership opportunity for its own benefit;
(2) that the partnership was financially able to undertake the opportunity;
(3) that the opportunity was in the line of the partnership's business and was of
practical advantage to it;
(4) that the opportunity is one in which the partnership has an interest or reasonable
expectancy; and
(5) by embracing the opportunity for itself. the self-interest of the partner will be
brought into conflict with that of the partnership.
If a partner personally claims an opportunity belonging to the partnership, the
partnership may acquire all of the profits derived from the transaction by the partner.

For the requirements of a "usurpation" claim, see Jenkins v. Jenkins. 138 Idaho 424,
428, 64 P.3d 953, 957, 64 P.3d 953 (2003) ("A corporate officer must not take a business
opportunity which the corporation is financially able to undertake, is, from its nature, in the
line of the corporation's business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in which the
corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy, and, by embracing the
opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or director will be brought into conflict with that of
his corporation. If an officer personally claims an opportunity belonging to the corporation,
the corporation may acquire all of the profits derived from the transaction by the officer.")
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

A partner's duty of care requires the partner to conduct partnership business in a
manner that is not reckless, grossly negligent, intentional misconduct, or a knowing
violation of the law.
If you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached the duty of care in regards to the duty
Saint Alphonsus owes to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile, then your verdict should be for
MRIA. If you find that Saint Alphonsus has not breached the duty of care in regards to the
duty Saint Alphonsus owes to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile, then your verdict should
be for Saint Alphonsus on this claim.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

A partner does not violate the duty of loyalty or duty of care merely by acting in the
partner's individual interest.

Those actions must be in conflict with the partnership's

interest in order for the duty of loyalty or duty of care to be at issue.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

MRIA claims three alleged misappropriations or "usurpations" of partnership
opportunities. The first alleged misappropriation is that tRa-t-Saint Alphonsus breached its
fiduciary duties by misappropriated MRIA's opportunity to become a partner with Gem
State Radiology in what would become Intermountain Medical Imaging.
Saint Alphonsus contends that even if this was a aflY-partnership opportunity, that
the opportunity was no longer available by that may have existed '.Vas gone by 1999. but
in all events was made unavailable prior to May 20, 2001., and therefore could not have
been misappropriated.

You must determine whether this partnership opportunity was

misappropriated, and if so, whether this misappropriation was completed before May 20,
2001 or after May 20, 2001.
Your decision on this matter will assist me in deciding whether or not a
disgorgement remedy is appropriate. The usurpation claim is not be considered by you in
determining any award of lost profits.

Rather, lost profits may only be based on other

breaches, if any, of fiduciary, contractual. or tort duties. If you find that Saint Alphonsus
did not misappropriate a partnerhsip opportunity of MRIA's, or that Saint /\lphonsus
misappropriated a partnership opportunity prior to May 20, 2001, then MRIA's claim is
time barred and you must find for Saint Alphonsus.

If, hmvever, you find that Saint

Alphonsus misappropriated a partnership opportunity on or after May 20, 2001, then you
must find for MRIA on this claim.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

MRIA also asserts that (1) Saint Alphonsus misappropriated MRI Mobile's
opportunity to open a facility in Meridian, Idaho, and (2) that Saint Alphonsus
misappropriated MRI Mobile's opportunity to open a facility in Eagle, Idaho. You must
determine whether or not Saint Alphonsus misappropriated the Meridian opportunity, and
you must also determine whether or not Saint Alphonsus misappropriated the Eagle
opportunity.
Your decision on this matter will assist me in deciding whether or not a
disgorgement remedy is appropriate for MRI Mobile. These usurpation claims are not to
be considered by you in determining any award of lost profits, and in fact MRI Mobile is not
entitled to any award of lost profits.

**NOTE: If the Court does not find that MRI Mobile's lost-profits analysis is
speculative and impermissible under Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 172
P. 3d 1119, 1441daho 844 (2007), as argued in Saint Alphonsus's directed verdict
motion, then the final sentence will need modification.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

A partner may adhere to the strict legal requirements of a 'Nritten agreement and
still be held responsible for violating a fiduciary obligation to its partners if the action taken
was improperly motivated, such as taking advantage of its partnership position to obtain
financial gain. It is for you, the jury, to determine whether an alleged action has taken
place and, if it is other\vise in compliance with the terms of the written agreement between
the parties, whether the action \Vas improperly motivated.

Saint Alphonsus objects to this instruction. It is unclear what contractual right this instruction
might refer to. To the extent that this instruction would open the door for MRIA to argue that
*dissociation* was wrongful because it was "improperly motivated," Saint Alphonsus would object
on multiple grounds, including (1) that dissociation here was not done subject to any contractual
provision, but rather was an express statutory right; (2) the Revised Uniform Partnership Act allows
liability for the act of dissociating in only three instances (express term, defined term, or particular
undertaking), which does not include "bad motivation," Idaho Code§ 53-3-602 ; (3) RUPA itself
indicates that following dissociation, a partner may immediately begin competition, undercutting
any suggestion that dissociation with the intent to compete is wrongful or a basis for liability, id. §
53-3-603 & official cmt. 2; and (4) under such a "bad-motive" theory of dissociation, nearly any
otherwise lawful dissociation would be the subject of a fiduciary duty breach-of-loyalty claim (as
dissociation can always be said to reflect a lack of loyalty to the remaining partners), which is not
consistent with the terms of the statute.

Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 203 P.3d 694 (2009).
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
MRIA's Claim of Civil Conspiracy

MRIA claims that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil conspiracy with GSR to harm
MRIA. To recover on this claim MRIA must prove the following elements to establish that
a conspiracy existed:
To prove civil conspiracy, MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile must show:
(1)

Specific evidence of an agreement between Saint Alphonsus and GSR, IMI,

and/or ICR to commit one or more of the other wrongful acts on which you have already
been instructed;
(2)

One or more of Saint Alphonsus, GSR, IMI, and ICR did, in fact, commit one

or more of those wrongful acts, in furtherance of their specific agreement; and
(3)

The conspirator's wrongful act proximately caused MRIA, MRI Center, and

MRI Mobile damage.
1.

Saint Alphonsus had an express agreement with GSR ;

2.

To accomplish an unla111ful objective or accomplish a lawful objective through

The essence of a cause of action for civil conspiracy is the civil wrong committed as
the objective of the conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself.
If you find that GSR, IMI, and/or ICR committed one of the wrongful acts upon which
you've been instructed, but it was not done in furtherance of a specific agreement with
Saint Alphonsus, you must disregard that act as evidence for ALL of the claims in this
case, because Saint Alphonsus may not be held responsible for such an act.
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If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that these propositions
required of MRIA have been proved, then you must consider the issue of the affirmative
defenses of estoppel and waiver raised by Saint Alphonsus as set forth in Instructions Nos.
_

and _ .

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these

propositions has not been proven, then your verdict should be for Saint Alphonsus on this
claim.

As to the statement that a conspiracy itself is not actionable, but rather only the wrongful
actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy, see, e.g., Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest,
149ldaho 881, 898,243 P.3d 1069, 1086 (2010) ("Civil conspiracy is not an independent claim for
relief because the essence of a cause of action for civil conspiracy is the civil wrong committed as
the objective of the conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself."); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. White, 86 Idaho
374, 379, 386 P.2d 964, 966 (Idaho 1963) ("It is quite well settled that a conspiracy to commit an
actionable wrong is not in itself a cause of action. Wrongful acts committed by conspirators
resulting in injury alone give rise to a cause of action. The gist of a civil action for conspiracy is the
act or acts committed in pursuance thereot: the damage, not the conspiracy or the combination")
As to the requirement for specific evidence of an agreement to commit wrongdoing, see Wesco,
149 Idaho at 898-99, 243 P.3d at 1086-87 (" Furthermore, there must be specific evidence of a plan
or agreement to demonstrate the existence of the conspiracy at the time the allegedly unlawful
objective was accomplished."); Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 935, 155 P.3d 1166, 1174 (Idaho
2007) ("Mannos has failed to offer, and the records fails to contain, any specific evidence regarding
an alleged agreement or plan among the defendants to defraud him. As a result, the district court
did not err in granting summary judgment on this charge.").

As to the instruction that Saint Alphonsus cannot be held liable for wrongful acts done by
non-parties if they were not done in furtherance of a conspiracy with Saint Alphonsus, see
Wesco, 149 Idaho at 898, 243 P.3d at 1086 ("the essence of a cause of action for civil conspiracy is
the civil wrong committed as the objective of the conspiracy) (emphasis added); State v.
Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, , 24 7 P.3d 582, 597 (Idaho 201 0) (disregarding evidence of
statements made when "a conspiracy had not been formed, and ... the statements, on their face,
were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy"); 4 Causes of Action 2d 517, § 18 ("[T)he
defendant can defeat a conspiracy claim, even if it is not possible to rebut allegations of wrongful
actions by the participants in the alleged conspiracy, by showing that these actions were not
undertaken in furtherance of a mutual agreement or understanding.")
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

If you determine that a conspiracy existed, consider which acts caused damage to
MRIA. Saint Alphonsus will be liable for a wrongfuiR act that proximately causes MRIA
damages if the wrongful act was both:
1.

Perpetrated by Saint Alphonsus or perpetrated by GSR in furtherance of the

conspiracy; and
2.

The act was a natural and probable consequence of the agreed upon

objective of the conspiracy.
If you find that both of these elements were proven with regard to an wrongful act,
then you should find that Saint Alphonsus is liable for the damages proximately caused by
that act. If you find that either of these elements was not proven with regard to an act,
then you should not find that Saint Alphonsus is liable for the damages caused by this act.

**Saint Alphonsus objects to the instruction as written because it implies that an act which
causes harm is a basis for damages, even if it is not a wrongful act for purposes of the
conspiracy law
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion
as to whether MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile is entitled to damages.

IDJI2d 9.00
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

The amount of damages must be proven by MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile
with reasonable certainty. Reasonable certainty requires neither absolute assurance nor
mathematical exactitude of damages; rather the evidence need only be sufficient to
remove the existence of damages from the realm of speculation.

IDJI2d 2.301
Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 146 Idaho 613, 200 P.3d 1163 (2009)
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

If you find Saint Alphonsus breached its obilgations, and, as a result, MRIA, MRI
Center, and MRI Mobile suffered financial damages, then those damages are awardable to
MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile.:. regardless of the fact that Saint Alphonsus is a
charitable hospital.

Saint Alphonsus enjoys no exemption from any legal obilgation at

issue in this case.

If you find Saint Alphonsus acted in such a way as to cause financial

harm to another and if the party allegedly harmed proves these damages to your
satisfaction, then it is your obligation to a'.vard them the damages you find they suffered.
If, however, the party claiming the harm has not proven to your satisfaction Saint
Alphonsus breached its obligations or that any financial harm flowing from any other
alleged illegal acts by Saint Alphonsus occurred, it is your obligation to reject the claim and
award no damages to MRIA, MRI Mobile, or MRI Center from Saint Alphonsus.

**Saint Alphonsus objects to the stricken portion, as it is not neutral. Saint Alphonsus has not
claimed, and there is no reason to suppose, it would have an exemption from legal obligations due
to its status as a charitable hospital.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

Lost-Profit Damages: Breach of Non Compete Clause, Breach of Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing, and Civil Conspiracy Claims

If the jury decides that MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile are entitled to recover
from Saint Alphonsus on the breach of the non-compete clause claim, the breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, the breach of fiduciary duty claims (except
for usurpation), the wrongful interference claim, or the civil conspiracy claim, then the jury
must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate MRIA,
MRI Center, and MRI Mobile for the net profits lost that the evidence proves to have been
a natural and proximate result of Saint Alphonsus's breaches or interference breach of
contractWhether MRIA, MRI Center, MRI Mobile have proved any of these elements is for
the jury to decide.

** Saint Alphonsus proposes to simply the instructions by simply distinguishing lost-profits
(the only damages theory presented) from disgorgement (which is an equitable remedy.)
All of the lost profits damages are tied to the various breaches save usurpation.

IDJI2d 9.03
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

If you determine that Saint Alphonsus is liable to MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile fef-a
cause of action based on breaching a fiduciary duty by acting adversely to MRIA on behalf
of GSR, IMI, or ICR; by interfering with the prospective contractual relations of the MRI
entities; or engaging in civil conspiracy, you must take into account that under MRIA. MRI
Center, and MRI Mobile's theory of the case, those theories, others the GSR doctors are
are potentially jointly responsible for what harm, if any, MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile
suffered. Thus, if you find that MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile were harmed by wrongful
acts jointly committed by Saint Alphonsus and other actors, then you must determine what
percentage of the damages is attributable to the acts of Saint Alphonsus and what
percentage is attributable to the acts of GSR. other actors.

The Court's June 17, 2011 order correctly held that, for purposes of apportionment of
damages, the issue of whether a party is a joint tortfeasor is not a fact for the jury to decide, but is
rather a question for the court based upon the pleadings. !d. at 5 (citing Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho
759, 783, 727 P.2d 1187, 1211 (1986)). In that ruling, the Court held that:
Based on the pleadings of MRIA, Saint Alphonsus and the Rads are joint tortfeasors.
Half of the claims leveled against Saint Alphonsus are allegations of tortuous
conduct engaged in by Saint Alphonsus along with the Rads. Consequently, the
Court finds that based on MRIA's Third Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus
and the Rads were acting in concert, and are joint tortfeasors within the meaning of
Section 6-805, Idaho Code. Consequently, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a reduction
in any damages awarded against it in an amount based on apportionment of fault to
be determined at trial."

!d. at 7. Per Idaho law and this Court's earlier ruling, all damages must be apportioned as a
consequence ofMRIA's pleadings. This includes contract claims, which is based on conduct
(alleged violation of non-compete obligation) that also sounds in tort, for breach of the duty of
loyalty. See Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413,419 (N.J. 1995) ("it is appropriate ... to apportion
responsibility based on a breach of contract that is alleged to have proximately caused personal
injury" under joint tortfeasor contribution act).
MRIA does not allege a contract claim with discrete and separate damages, nor did its
experts apportion damages by claim. Rather, MRIA alleged a single lost-profits damages figure
based on the business it allegedly lost to IMI as a result of the supposedly improper concerted acts
of Saint Alphonsus and the settling defendants, thus making Saint Alphonsus and the settling
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defendants "joint tortfeasors" for purposes of that injury within the meaning of§ 6-803(4). See Joe
& Dan Int'l Corp. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 533 N.E.2d 912, 918 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988) (plaintiffs
assertion of contract claim does not remove parties from coverage of the uniform act where
underlying joint conduct was tortious and parties were therefore joint tortfeasors). Further, by
apportioning harm between the acts of Saint Alphonsus and the acts of Gem State Radiology, the
jury necessarily is only removing liability for GSR's tort-based harms.
Saint Alphonsus thus objects to the instruction without the clarifications noted above,
because as the Court ruled, apportionment of responsibility is required based on the pleadings. The
conspiracy claim is not the relevant factor in deciding whether contribution is allowed; rather, as
suggested in the Court's conspiracy instruction (see infra), the conspiracy claim is merely the
conduit for allowing GSR's allegedly wrongful conduct to be used against Saint Alphonsus on the
other, substantive claims.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Damages: Intentional Interference Claim
If the jury decides MRIA is entitled to recover from Saint ,6,1phonsus on either the
intentional interference claim, the jury must determine the amount of money that will
reasonably and fairly compensate MRIA for its net profits lost that the evidence proves to
have been proximately caused by Saint Alphonsus's intentional interference claim.
Whether MRIA has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide.

** This instruction has been incorporated into the lost-profits damages instruction above.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Damages: Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim
If the jury decides MRIA is entitled to recover from Saint Alphonsus on the breach of
fiduciary duty claim, the jury must determine the amount of the net profits that Saint
Alphonsus realized as a result of its breach of fiduciary duty owed to MRIA.

** This instruction has been incorporated into the lost-profits damages instruction above.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
USURPATION
In this case, you may calculate damages in

t'llO

ways if you find that Saint

Alphonsus engaged in behavior that was the proximate cause of financial harm to MRIA,
MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile.
If you find that Saint Alphonsus violated the non competition clause in the MRIA
partnership agreement and that damages were proximately caused as result of that
breach, then the measure of damages is the profits lost by MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI
Mobile as a result of that breach. The damages found by you, if any, must then be
apportioned by you to each of the MRI entities based upon your finding as to what profits
were lost by each individual business entity.
If you find Saint Alphonsus breached the partnership agreement with MRIA by
breaching the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and that damages were proximately
caused as a result of that breach, then you must find the amount of those damages. The
measure of damages for that breach is also the amount of profits you find were lost by
MIRA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile as a result of that breach.
The damages found by you, if any, must then be apportioned by you to each of the
MRI entities based upon your finding as to what profits were lost by each individual
business entity.
If you find that Saint Alphonsus violated its duty of loyalty and care to the
partnership, and as a result, MRIA, MRI Center and MRI Mobile suffered financial
damages that were proximately caused by the violation of those duties, the measure of
damages is the amount of profits you find were lost by MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile
as a result of those actions.
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The damages found by you, if any, must then be apportioned by you to each of the
MRI entities based upon your finding as to what profits were lost by each individual
business entities.
_ _ If you find that Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary duties to MRIA by
misappropriating a partnership opportunity, the measure in damages is not the profits lost
by MRIA, but instead is the disgorgement or return of all of the net profits realized by Saint
Alphonsus as a result of its misappropriation of the partnership opportunities.
The usurpation claim may not be considered as a basis for lost profits award.
Usurpation is relevant to whether a disgorgement remedy is appropriate. Disgorgement is
an equitable remedy to be decided by the court, and not the jury.
If you find there was a conspiracy bet'.veen GSR and Saint Alphonsus which
resulted in damage to MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile, then the measure of
damages is the profits lost by MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile as a natural and
probable consequence of the agreed upon objective of the conspiracy.
Once you determine the amount of those damages, if any, you must apportion the
damages amount you find were proximately caused by the conspiracy among the
conspirators. After you make that apportionment, you must then apportion the money
damages you find attributable to Saint Alphonsus bet\.veen MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI
Mobile.

**The points omitted from this instruction are set forth at the instruction on lost profits that
appears above. Saint Alphonsus proposes two distinct instructions: one for lost-profits
(which is the only damages theory for the jury) and one for usurpation (which the jury
should find facts on, but not the amount of the equitable remedy).
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such
care cannot be recovered.

IDJI2d 9.14
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or
decide any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws.

If

money damages are to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may
not agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method
of determining the amount of the damage award.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may
send a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate
with me by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on
any of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by
me.

IDJI2d 1.11
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

1 have given you the rules of law that apply to this case.

I have instructed you

regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts.
In a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire
to the jury room for your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the
outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of
opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the
beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change
that position, even if shown that it is wrong.

Remember that you are not partisans or

advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the
ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another.

Consider each other's views.

Deliberate with the

objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after
a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

I will now draw the name of the alternate jurors, to whom I will once again apologize
in advance. I will advise the alternates chosen that even at this time, it is possible, should
some problem arise, that you could be recalled and the jury instructed to begin its
deliberations anew with the alternate juror or jurors seated. For that reason, you are
admonished not to discuss this case with other jurors or anyone else, nor to form an
opinion as to the merits of the case.
Please leave your names and telephone numbers with the bailiff. The Court will call
you to advise you when any verdict is reached and what that verdict may be, or to advise
you if for any reason, you may be required to return to court for deliberations. Thank you
for your service.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

You are instructed that because MRIA's sole source of income v1as the 7.5% management
fee it collected from MRI Center and MRI Mobile, its lost revenues are limited the
reduction, if any, to the management fee income it would have collected.

**As described in Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Directed Verdict on Damages, MRIA's expert
improperly "zeroed out" damages for MRIA and allocated them to MRI Center and MRI Mobile.
As such, the jury will likely be confused by this instruction because they have not been presented
with any damages for MRIA. Rather than give this instruction, the Court should instead simply
reallocate 7.5% of any lost profits damages from MRI Center and Mobile as "MRIA" damages, and
offset Saint Alphonsus's departing partner share (with interest) from that MRIA award.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict.
This form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict
form to you now.
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
As to the claim that Saint Alphonsus breached the Partnership Agreement by
breach of the non-compete clause:
Question No. 1: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached the Partnership

Agreement by breaching the non-compete clause, as set forth in Instruction No. _?
Answer to Question No. 1:

Yes.._[_ __..

No f.__ _..

Question No. 2: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has established the affirmative

defense of waiver by estoppel, described in Instruction No._ as it applies to this claim?
If your answer to Question No. 1 was "no," then leave this answer blank.
Answer to Question No.2:

Yes.._[_ __..

No [L--__..

As to the claim that Saint Alphonsus breached the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing:
Question No. 3: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing as set forth in Instructions Nos. _and _?
Answer to Question No 3.

Yes f

No ._[_ __.

1

NOTE: Instead of redline, Saint Alphonsus presents its proposed special verdict form as a clean
document, with footnotes explaining certain changes.
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Question No. 4: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has established the affirmative

defense of waiver by estoppel or waiver, described in Instruction No. _

, as it applies to

this claim? If you answer to Question No.3 was "no," then leave this answer blank.
Answer to Question No. 4:

Yes [..______,

No[.__ _.

As to the claim that Saint Alphonsus intentionally interfered with MRIA's
prospective contractual relations or business expectations:
Question No. 5: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus intentionally interfered with

MRIA's prospective economic relations or business expectations, as described in
Instruction No.

?

Answer to Question No.5: Yes [

No[...____,

Question No. 6: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has established the affirmative

defense of waiver, described in Instruction No._, as it applies to this claim? If your
answer to Question No.5 was "no," then leave this answer blank.
Answer to Question No.6: Yes [

No[...____,

As to MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary owed to MRI
Center (not including the usurpation claims):
Question No. 7: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary duty owed

to MRI Center as described further in Instructions Nos._,_,_, and_?
Answer to Question No.7:

Yes [..______,

No._[_ _.

Question No. 8: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has established the affirmative

defense of waiver, described in Instruction No. _

, as it applies to this claim? If your

answer to Question No.7 was "no," then leave this answer blank.
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Answer to Question No. 8:

Yes..._[_ ___,

No..._[_ ___,

Special Interrogatories on MRIA and MRI Mobile's usurpation claims:
Question No.9: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus misappropriated MRIA's
opportunity to partner with GSR in the formation of Intermountain Medical Imaging?

Answer to Question No.9:

Yes [..._______,

No..._[_ ___,

Question No. 10: If you answered "yes" to question no. 8, did the misappropriation
of this partnership opportunity occur before to May 20, 2001?

Answer to Question No. 10:

Yes [..._______,

No..._[_ ___,

Question No. 11: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus misappropriated an opportunity
for MRI Mobile to open a facility in Meridian, Idaho?

Answer to Question No. 11 :

Yes [..._______,

No[...__ ___,

Question No. 12: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus misappropriated an opportunity
for MRI Mobile to open a facility in Eagle, Idaho?

Answer to Question No. 12:

Yes [

No.__[_ ___,

As to MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil conspiracy:
Question No. 13: Has Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil conspiracy, as described
in Instruction No

?

Answer to Question No. 13

Yes..._[_ __,

No'-[_ __,
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If every answer to Questions Nos. 2, 4, 6, and 8 is either "yes" or is left blank,
then sign this special verdict form and present it to the Bailiff. Otherwise, continue
to Question No. 14 below.

Special Interrogatories for Lost-Profits Damages Theory: 2
Question No. 14: Do you find that Intermountain Medical Imaging received at least some
referrals from MRI Center for reasons other than the wrongdoing you have identified
above?
Answer to Question No. 14

Yes[...___.

No._[_ _.

If you answer Question No. 14 yes, then sign the special verdict form and
present it to the Bailiff. If you answer Question No. 14 no, then continue to Question
No.14.

Question No. 15: Do you find that at least some of the scans lost by MRI Associates after
April 1, 2005 were lost due to lawful competition by Saint Alphonsus?

2

Note: The special interrogatory regarding whether IMI received any referrals for reasons
other than wrongdoing is necessary due to MRIA's "solution" to the concerns raised by the
Supreme Court in Pope, for the reasons set forth in the Consolidated Reply in Support of the
Directed Verdict motions. Because Mr. Budge did not decide what portion of the lost referrals was
due to wrongdoing, and what portion would have been lost to IMI anyway in the but-for world, any
damages award would be speculative unless no scans would have gone to IMI in the but-for world.
Likewise, the special instruction regarding post-April 2005 damages is necessary for the
reasons set forth in the Consolidated Reply in Support of the Directed Verdict motions. Again,
MRIA's expert did not attempt to distinguish between "splash forward" damages from prior
wrongdoing, and losses due to Saint Alphonsus's permitted competition after April 1, 2005. Thus,
unless the jury finds that all post-2005 damages are "splash forward," there is no non-speculative
basis for MRIA's post-April 1, 2005 lost profits claims.
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Answer to Question No. 15

Yes [....._____.

No

L...[_

_.

If you answer Question No. 15 yes, then you may not award lost profits
damages to MRI Center which occurred after April 1, 2005, but you may still lost
profits damages to MRI Center which occurred before April 1, 2005.

Question No. 15: What is the amount of lost profits suffered by MRI Center3 as a result of
the harm you identified above?

Answer to Question No. 15

MRI Center:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Question No. 16: What percentage of the harm to MRI Center is attributable to the acts of
Saint Alphonsus, and what percentage of the harm is attributable to the acts of GSR? 4

Answer to Question No. 16:
Acts of Saint Alphonsus _ _ _ _ _ _%
Acts of GSR

- - - - - -%

(Total must equal100%)
3

Note: The jury is only asked to find lost profits, and not disgorgement. Disgorgement is an
equitable remedy arising out of the usurpation claims. The jury should only be asked to make the
factfinding necessary to establish whether or not usurpation occurred.
Moreover, per Saint Alphonsus's Directed Verdict motions, MRI Mobile's claims for lostprofits damages at Meridian and Eagle (the two locations where lost profits for Mobile are alleged)
should be disallowed under the rule in Trilogy Network Systems ..
Finally, MRIA does not seek lost profits damages; to avoid confusion, only MRI Center's
damages line should be presented to the jury. However, for the reasons stated in Saint Alphonsus's
directed verdict motion, 7.5% of any damages awarded to Center should be reallocated by the
Court, if necessary, as MRIA damages
4

As the Court's June 17, 2011 ruling held, all damages in this case must be apportioned.
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', .
DATED this _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Presiding Juror
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 25th day of October, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of October, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

0
~

0
0

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OCT 2 6 2011
RICH, Clerk

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF AI§:A
...

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, INC., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Defendant-Counterclaimant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

,,SMAN
,

'''/

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219
ORDER DENYING REQUEST
FROM SAINT ALPHONSUS

The Court has received a request be email that two of the attorneys representing Saint
Alphonsus be allowed to give portions of the closing argument to the jury. From the beginning
of this case, the Court has taken the position that each witness will be examined by one attorney
and cross examined by one attorney. The Court further indicated that opening statements would
be given by one attorney and closing arguments would be given by one attorney.
Each party may designate which attorney it wishes to give its closing argument. Neither
party may designate more than one attorney to give its closing argument. If Saint Alphonsus
chooses to designate an attorney to make its closing argument who has not been here for the
entire trial, the Court has no objection; that is for Saint Alphonsus to determine. Mr. Friedman
was in fact admitted in this case to fill in for Mr. Vergonis, whose wife was going to have a child.
Just as Mr. Vergonis could have been designated to make the closing argument, Mr. Friedman
can be designated to make the closing argument.

However, the Court will not allow Saint

Alphonsus to split its closing argument between attorneys.

~

om.- Denying R<Q""'

1
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~
SO ORDERED AND DATED this 2? day of October, 2011.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this .£;:.;of October, 2011, I mailed (served) a true and correct
copy of the within instrument to:
JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
POBOX2837
BOISE, ID 83701
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST. STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court

ui2..Y'\A.-& . =

By
Deputy Court Clerk

Order Denying Request 2

003146

\})~
t~lJJI\1.
s~

ORIGINAL

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

:t·· I=

NO. __--FiiJ;n---/-~4,_.A.M. ______

F'L,~~.

I

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)

OCT 2 7 2011

dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

By JAMIE RANDALL
DEPUTY

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

RESPONSE TO SAINT
ALPHONSUS'S NOTICE OF
AUTHORITY RE: ALLOCATION
OF DAMAGES AMONG
DIFFERENT CAUSES OF ACTION

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") hereby submit this response to Saint Alphonsus's Notice
of Authority re: Allocation of Damages Among Different Causes of Action.
During the jury instruction conference on October 26, 2011, the parties disagreed about
whether the jury should be instructed to apportion a damages award among separate causes of
action. Saint Alphonsus argues that the jury should come up with some number that it believes
are the damages of the case, and then apportion those damages out to the five causes of action.
Saint Alphonsus sent the court an email containing several cases which allegedly support its
position.

A.

Idaho Law Does not Allow the Procedure Proposed by Saint Alphonsus

More importantly, the procedure suggested by Saint Alphonsus is contrary to Idaho law.
In Idaho, a party is entitled to advance various theories of liability for the underlying acts. An
illustrative case is Nalen v. Jenkins, 113 Idaho 79, 741 P.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1987). In that case,
the defendant refused to return an advance when the plaintiff decided it no longer wanted to
purchase a log home. The plaintiff filed suit upon four different theories: violation of the
Consumer Protection Act, fraud, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract. The jury found for
the plaintiffs on the two of the claims-the Consumer Protection Act and unjust enrichmentand awarded the plaintiff damages. Notably, the jury did not apportion the damages between the
two claims upon which the plaintiff was successful. On appeal, the issue was attorney fees. The
district court had determined plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees only for those theories upon
which it prevailed. The Court of Appeals reversed, noting that:
under modern pleading practice, the plaintiff may advance alternative theories
relating to an alleged set of facts .... The trial court should not narrowly view
each theory as an island of unique facts. Such restrictive characterization of
theories misconstrues the practice of advancing multiple theories, which may only
RESPONSE TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S NOTICE OF AUTHORITY RE: ALLOCATION OF DAMAGES
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represent different ways to obtain one specific recovery-a single claim. Clearly,
several theories may draw upon a common nucleus of facts which give rise to a
single claim .... It is important to keep in mind the distinction between multiple
"claims" and multiple "theories."

ld. at 81, 741 P.2d 368. Although the present dispute does not involve attorney fees, the
principle still carries over. In Idaho, a plaintiff may advance alternative theories relating to a set
of facts. That is, a plaintiff may say "I was hurt by these actions of the defendants, and it is my
belief that these actions were wrongful under these multiple legal theories." Although there may
be multiple "theories" ofliability, there is only one "claim"-only one underlying hurt. When a
party prevails in this matter, it is inappropriate to apportion attorney fees to the "successful" or
"unsuccessful" theories of liability, because the various theories of liability were merely
alternative routes to a single claim. For the same reason, it is inappropriate to apportion the
damages among the various causes of action. As the Court of Appeals said, such a "restrictive
characterization of theories misconstrues the practice of advancing multiple theories-a single
claim." 1
An Idaho case that directly illustrates this principle and expressly rejects Saint
Alphonsus's argument is Hoglan v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA., 120 Idaho 682, 819 P.2d 100
(1991 ). In that case, a jury found the defendant liable under all three causes of action presented
to it, which were libel, negligence, and breach of contract. The jury awarded $20,000 in
compensatory damages. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed on the issue of liability as to
libel. However, it did not reverse the damages award. The Court said:
This can be contrasted against situations where there genuinely are multiple
claims, not merely multiple theories of liability for a single claim. See Burns v. County of
Boundary, 120 Idaho 623, 818 P .2d 327 (Ct. App. 1990) ("Here, the district court distinguished,
not between two separate theories supporting a single claim for relief, but between two entirely
separate claims-one seeking equitable injunctive relief and the other seeking damages in an
action at law."); Nalen. at 81, 741 P.2d 368 (noting that the plaintiffs maintained four theories of
recovery for a single claim against defendant, and maintained an additional claim for punitive
damages).
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While the jury did not apportion the $20,000 in compensatory damages between
the three theories of liability that they found in favor of the plaintiffs, they were
not asked to perform such task. The fact that we vacate the judgment as to the
claim of libel is no basis to impugn the verdict of the jury. The $20,000 was
awarded as a total amount for "damages sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of
defendant's conduct.. .. " The jury's specific findings of negligence and breach of
contract support the award of compensatory damages. Therefore, we affirm the
jury verdict as to compensatory damages.

!d. at 687, 819 P.2d at 105. This case clearly stands for the proposition that when a jury finds in
favor of the plaintiff on more than one theory liability, it is finding that the plaintiff is entitled to
100 percent ofthe damages-100 percent ofthe "claim"-under either legal theory. As such,
the apportionment of the damages related to the defendant's conduct should not be apportioned
among the various theories of liability that the plaintiff advances for that underlying conduct.
Each theory of liability is only one road to damages for a single uniform claim.
Other jurisdictions have expressly rejected arguments such as the one advanced by Saint
Alphonsus, even where joint and several liability is an issue. An illustrative case is Rotating
Productions Systems, Inc. v. Bock Specialities, Inc. 42 Fed. Appx. 460, 462, 2002 WL 1560776,

2 (C.A. Fed.) (Fed. Cir. 2002). In that case, the plaintiffs sued a number of defendants for willful
infringement of a patent, unfair competition, deceptive trade practices, interference with
contractual relations, interference with prospective business advantage, civil conspiracy, and
copyright infringement. The jury found for the plaintiffs on most of the causes of action and
awarded damages of $640,000, as to which the court determined the defendants were jointly and
severally liable. On appeal, one of the defendants challenged the district court's failure to
instruct the jury to apportion the damages among the various causes of action. The damages
expert for the plaintiff had testified that it was impossible to determine how many sales were
diverted by each of the tortious infractions, that is, how many sales were lost due to patent
infringement, how many due to interference with contractual relations, etc. The appeals court
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found that the aggregate award which did not apportion damages was appropriate. The
defendant nevertheless argued that the jury should have been required to apportion the damages
because it was illogical for him to be held jointly liable for damages some of which might have
arisen from activities in which he did not participate. The appellate court rejected this argument,
noting that all of the acts for which the various defendants had been found liable were part of a
common plan or design to unlawfully infringe and take the plaintiffs' property and rights
associated with the patent in suit.
In summary, Idaho case law is clear that multiple theories ofliability for a single claim
do not lead to multiple damages awards, but rather simply provide alternative methods upon
which a single damages award is based. See Hog! an, 120 Idaho 682, 819 P .2d 100. In fact,
apportioning the damages award for theories of liability would result in the inappropriate
division of a single claim.
B.

The Cases Cited by Saint Alphonsus are Readily Distinguishable

It is notable that in Saint Alphonsus' s email to the court of October 27, 2011, Saint

Alphonsus cites no Idaho case law. This is because Idaho courts have clearly ruled that
apportionment is inappropriate between multiple theories of liability related to an underlying
pattern of conduct common to all the theories. Moreover, the cases cited by Saint Alphonsus are
readily distinguishable.
Saint Alphonsus first cites the case Medina v. District of Columbia, 643 F.3d 323, 326
(D.C. Cir. 2011). This was a case concerned not with apportionment, but with double recovery.
In that case, a jury heard five claims brought by the plaintiff. The jury awarded damages of
$90,000 on each of two claims. The appellate court noted that the jury was not necessarily
precluded from allocating a single award apportioned between two theories of liability.
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However, it held that under both of the claims, the plaintiff had alleged only one injury of
emotional distress and humiliation. The appellate court therefore held that because the two
claims arose from the same operative facts and sought identical relief, separate awards under
both theories resulted in double recovery.
Saint Alphonsus next cites the case Indu Craft, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda, 4 7 F .3d 490, 497
(2d Cir.1995). In that case, a jury awarded $2 million on a breach of contract claim and $1.25
million on a tort claim. The jury was specifically polled to determine whether the jury meant the
plaintiff to receive a total award of $3.25 million, or if the tort award was meant to be subsumed
by the larger contract award. The jury responded that the intent was to award $3.25 million. The
Court noted that a "plaintiff seeking compensation for the same injury under different legal
theories is of course only entitled to one recovery." !d. at 497. The court also noted its duty to
preserve the jury's verdict where possible. Noting that the award of $3.25 million was consistent
with expert testimony, and that the jury had specifically said that this was their intent, the court
upheld the allocation, holding that is was not duplicative. This case does not stand for the
proposition that this is a proper procedure, but rather that the Court allowed it only because it
was reluctant to hold that one verdict subsumed the other when the jury's intent otherwise was
clear.
The Iowa case Hunter v. Board ofTrustees ofBroadlawns Medical Center, 481 N.W.2d
510, 518-19 (Iowa 1992) is likewise readily distinguishable. In that case, an employee argued
that termination of this employment by a company was in violation of his employment contract.
He further alleged that a company executive tortiously interfered with that contract and directly
brought about its wrongful termination. A jury awarded the plaintiff $521,462 against the
company and $173,821 against the executive. This verdict was apparently arrived at by
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accepting the sum suggested by plaintiff's damage expert as an accurate measure of the total
damages and then apportioning seventy-five percent of that sum to the breach-of-contract claim
and twenty-five percent to the tort claim. This case is readily distinguishable because, although
the parties were both severally liable for the losses related to the contract claim and the tort
claim, the jury in that case was apportioning the damages to differing underlying conduct
relating to different parties-the conduct of the company in terminating the plaintiff, and the
conduct of the executive who interfered with the employment contract to bring that termination
about. Referencing back to the Idaho cases, these were not alternative theories of liability
relating to the same wrongful conduct, but two different claims relating to the conduct of two
different defendants. The circumstances in Hunter are quite different from the present case.
Finally, Saint Alphonsus cites to the case Reuben C. Setliff, IlL MD., P.C. v. Stewart,
694 N.W.2d 859, 867 (S.D. 2005). In that case, an employer made claims against independent
consultant for wrongful interference with business relations and civil conspiracy relating to the
solicitation of an employee. The court noted in a footnote that the consultant could have asked
for a special interrogatory or special verdict form requiring the jury to apportion between the two
causes of action of wrongful interference and conspiracy, but noted that because he had not, he
had waived the issue of damages between the two causes of action. This case does not remotely
stand for the proposition that apportionment would have been appropriate under these
circumstances, but simply the unremarkable proposal that the failure to ask for relief in the trial
court waives that issue for appeal. The cases cited by Saint Alphonsus are readily
distinguishable from the present case. Indeed, even if they were on point, their value is
negligible in light of clear Idaho law which holds that multiple theories of liability do not justify
a split in the underlying claim.
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For these reasons, the jury should not be asked to apportion damages among the legal
theories advanced by MRIA.
DATED this 27th day of October 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~~J~
. .ara L. Parker
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of October 2011, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff!Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile
~lectronic Mail- jgjording@g-g.com

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff!Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile
~Electronic Mail- dbayer@jonesday.com
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Liability Partnership,
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Counter-defendants.
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") object to the language proposed for Jury Instruction 56,
in which the Court has stated that it will limit damages for misappropriation of a partnership
opportunity to disgorgement damages. However, MRIA asserts that both disgorgement and lost
profits are appropriate alternative measures of damages for this wrongful act.
First, it is notable that in the context of Saint Alphonsus's directed verdict, this court has
already ruled that MRIA' s damages theories, including lost profits, are appropriate.
Significantly, the Idaho Code does not provide that disgorgement is the sole remedy for
misappropriation of partnership opportunities. Idaho 53-3-404(b) provides that a partner's duty
of loyalty includes the duty to "account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property,
profit, or benefit derived by the partner ... [by] the appropriation of a partnership opportunity."
The comments to this rule provide that under a constructive trust theory, the partnership "can
recover any money or property in the partner's hands that can be traced to the partnership."
(Emphasis added). Neither the statute nor the comments provide that this is the sole remedy, but
simply that the partnership may require that such profits can be disgorged.
Lost profits are also available as an alternative measure of damages. They must be - a
partnership that can demonstrate that its lost profits are higher than the profits wrongfully
retained by the breaching partner is certainly entitled to seek that measure of damages.
Otherwise, a partnership limited to disgorgement damages would not be fully compensated for
its loss. An illustrative case is the Georgia case McMillian v. McMillian, 310 Ga.App. 735, 713
S.E.2d 920 (Ga.App. 2011). Georgia has a provision similar to I.C. § 53-3-404(b), which
provides that "[ e]very partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee
for it any profits derived by him without the consent ofthe other partners from any transaction
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connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him
of its property." Ga. Code Ann,§ 14-8-21(a). Nevertheless, the Georgia courts have held that
"when a partner wrongfully appropriates a prospective business opportunity of his partnership to
his own use or that of another, the remaining partners, who are deprived of an opportunity to
profit from the misappropriated business opportunity, may recover their share of the profits that
the partnership would have earned from the business opportunity" (emphasis added). See
Patman v. Hobbs, 280 S.W.3d 589 (Ky.App. 2009) ("at a minimum," partner is required to hold

in trust all benefits and profits derived by him as the result of his misuse of partnership
opportunity ... "typically a breach of fiduciary duty in the partnership context results in ...
damages (again for the profits lost or losses incurred as a result of the breach.)"); Dowd and
Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 352 Ill.App.3d 365, 816 N.E.2d 754 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2004) ("Evidence

was sufficient to support damages for lost profits due to breach of fiduciary duty by departing
law firm partners, where law firm provided expert testimony regarding the money firm would
have earned had client that departing partners solicited remained with the firm); Bohn v.
Johnson, 371 N.W.2d 781, 789) (N.D. 1985 (when partnership asset misappropriated, the

partnership was entitled to be fully compensated, whether by way of recovery of lost profits or
recovery ofthe asset). See also Delay v. Foster, 34 Idaho 691,203 P. 461 (1921) (A partner who
dissolves the partnership before the end of the term is liable, in an action by his copartner for
breach of the agreement, for damages for the value of the profits which the latter would
otherwise have received).
This Court should likewise hold that MRIA is entitled to assert alternative measures of
damages of disgorgement or lost profits for Saint Alphonsus's misappropriation of a partnership
opportunity.
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DATED this 26th day of October, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~~ {2·~
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Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of October 2011, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintijjlCounterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
%]-Iand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
0 Facsimile

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintijjlCounterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
;g.Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
0 Facsimile

y,. {Rc.Dara L. P rker

OBJECTION TO LANGUAGE PROPOSED FOR JURY INSTRUCTION 56- 4

003159

OCT 2 8 2011

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
VS.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

During the jury instruction conference, the Court ruled that it would not direct the jury to
apportion any lost-profits damages that the jury may award pursuant to any contract theory of
liability. It so ruled, even though MRIA's claims for lost profits all rest on the assertion that
Saint Alphonsus and the radiologists acted in concert to compete improperly with the MRI
entities, and that concerted activity caused IMI to take business from MRI Center and MRI
Mobile. Saint Alphonsus argued, and wishes to preserve now, the argument that there should be
an apportionment of all lost-profits damages and that MRIA' s insertion of a contract claim into
that alleged concerted effort does not defeat apportionment of fault for the harm, where what is
at issue is a single alleged pattern of concerted activity to compete improperly. See Dunn v.

Praiss, 656 A.2d 413,419 (N.J. 1995) ("it is appropriate ... to apportion responsibility based on
a breach of contract that is alleged to have proximately caused personal injury" under joint
tortfeasor contribution act); Joe & Dan Int'l Corp. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 533 N.E.2d 912,
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918 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988) (plaintiffs assertion of contract claim does not remove parties from
coverage of the uniform act where underlying joint conduct was tortious and parties were
therefore joint tortfeasors).
Given the Court's ruling, Saint Alphonsus proposed that, in order to preserve some
apportionment of fault between the alleged joint wrongdoers, the Court should require the jury to
allocate any lost profits awarded among the various causes of action on which the jury finds
liability. In response, MRIA argued that there is no authority that would allow a jury to allocate
a sum of damages among various causes of action.
On October 26, 2011, Saint Alphonsus sent to the Court's attention, via email, authority
which contradicted MRIA's assertion. That email read as follows:
To the Court:
During the jury instruction conference today, there was a
suggestion that there is no authority that permits a jury to apportion
a damages award among separate causes of action. There is such
authority. For example,
22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 36 ("the jury is not prohibited from
allocating a total damages award between different theories of
recovery")
Medina v. District of Columbia, 643 F.3d 323, 326 (D.C. Cir.
2011) ("That said, a jury is not prohibited from allocating a single
damages award between two distinct theories of liability. See, e.g.,
Indu Craft, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda, 47 F.3d 490,497 (2d Cir.1995)
(upholding a jury award that apportioned damages between two
causes of action)).
Hunter v. Board of Trustees of Broad/awns Medical Center, 481
N.W.2d 510,518-19 (Iowa 1992), as here, there was an alleged
breach of contract AND tortious interference arising out of the
same act of wrongdoing (plaintiffs termination). It was held that
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"that the apportionment of the monetary award between the
tortfeasor and the breaching party is a matter that must be
committed to the sound discretion of the trier of fact" and the
Court found no error where the jury found "total damages
sustained by Hunter and then apportioned seventy-five percent of
that sum to the breach-of-contract claim and twenty-five percent to
the tort claim")

Reuben C. Setliff, III, M.D., P.C. v. Stewart, 694 N.W.2d 859, 867
(S.D. 2005) (noting it is appropriate to "request a special
interrogatory or special verdict form requiring the jury to apportion
between the two causes of action").
We will file a pleading containing this notice of authority on
Thursday or Friday morning.
MRIA's responsive pleading, filed October 27, 2011, suggests that such an allocation is
forbidden by Idaho law. But neither case involves anything remotely like the situation at hand,
and neither forbids a jury from allocating a fixed sum of damages among the causes of action on
which liability is found.
Specifically, inNalen v. Jenkins, 113 Idaho 79,741 P.2d 366,367 (Ct. App. 1987), the
jury found for Plaintiffs on two claims and rejected two others. One of the claims that the
Plaintiffs won allowed for attorney fees "to the prevailing party," and the Court of Appeals found
it was erroneous for the district court to cut fees in half because Plaintiff lost some of the claims,
reasoning that the Plaintiff had still "prevailed" in his claim and that the statute did not permit
reduction due to lost theories. !d. at 369. And in Hog/an v. Firs! Sec. Bank of Idaho, 120 Idaho
682,687, 819 P.2d 100, 105 (1991), the Court did not say it wasforbidden to apportion-indeed,
it noted that the jury was "not asked to perform such task .. " Thus, despite MRIA' s attempt to
claim that these two cases state some prohibition against apportion, this is simply not the case.
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These authorities do not help MRIA, nor does their attempt to distinguish, on the facts, the
significant authority demonstrating that jury allocation of damages amongst claims is permissible
I
.
an d appropnate.

Asking the jury to perform such an allocation is particularly appropriate here. Allocation
has no effect on the jury's end result of lost profits suffered, nor would it here. The only reason
that allocation is being resisted here is that, as noted, MRIA is attempting to avoid apportionment
as an act of gamesmanship to avoid the consequences of its settlement with GSR. MRIA chose
to bring this suit alleging wrongdoing by GSR, it signed a settlement agreement that, under Idaho
law, bars Saint Alphonsus from seeking contribution from GSR, and now the jury should decide
how to allocate the damages it seems amongst the claims it alleges. The fact that there will be
some reduction in the amount Saint Alphonsus pays (as opposed to the amount of lost profits
suffered) as a result ofMRIA's own litigation choices should not dissuade the Court from
instructing the jury to allocate, and in fact, MRIA's choices should require such an allocation, if
only to avoid somewhat the prejudice which MRIA now seeks to impose on Saint Alphonsus.
To elaborate, MRIA has been allowed to introduce a significant amount of evidence that
does nothing to prove the alleged breach of contract into which MRIA now wishes to shoehorn
its entire damages award. For instance:

1

MRIA's brief completely ignores the black-letter law indicating that, as Saint
Alphonsus argued, it is entirely permissible for a jury to apportion damages amongst claims. See
22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 36 ("the jury is not prohibited from allocating a total damages award
between different theories of recovery").
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•

Providing IT support. MRIA has introduced a significant amount of
documentary evidence attempting to show that Saint Alphonsus
somehow improperly provided IT support to IMI while not providing
similar support to MRIA. However, the provision of IT services is not
"competition" by Saint Alphonsus in the provision ofMRI services,
and cannot be considered as evidence of a breach of the non-compete.
Rather, if this evidence is relevant at all, it is relevant in tort as an
alleged breach of the duty of loyalty or wrongful intereference.

•

Hours of Operation Issue. MRIA has also attempted to argue, via
numerous witnesses, that Saint Alphonsus failed to provide radiologist
coverage for MRI Center. Again, this is not a breach of the noncompete; it is not competition by Saint Alphonsus in the provision of
MRI services. Again, this is relevant in tort only (as the alleged
contract breach here is the radiologist contract, not the partnership
agreement).

•

Disparagement by GSR. For the same reasons, the allegation that
GSR "disparaged" MRIA and that Saint Alphonsus did not "cure" that
disparagement is not competition. If anything, it is relevant in tort.

MRIA has alleged a significant menu of wrongdoing, much of which would be irrelevant
or prejudicial if it was introduced as evidence of a contract breach. Moreover, MRIA has been
allowed to introduce other evidence and statements of GSR employees that would not have been
permissible but for the conspiracy theory on which it brought this suit. If the Court is going to
deny Saint Alphonsus's request to simply allow apportionment of damages between Saint
Alphonsus and GSR for all claims due to MRIA's joint-tortfeasor claims, as other courts have
done under their uniform contribution acts, then the Court should require the jury to allocate the
fixed sum of lost-profits damages amongst the theories on which they find liability, as best they
can consistent with the evidence in this case.
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On the other hand, ifMRIA wishes to recover entirely on a contract theory without taking
into account the other 80% of claims in this case that are non-contract related, then Saint
Alphonsus should be entitled to a new trial free of the irrelevant and prejudicial tort and
conspirator evidence which has no place in a contract breach action. In any event, the jury
should be instructed to disregard all evidence related to Gem State's alleged bad acts in
determining either liability or damages from a contract breach.
CONCLUSION

This Court should reconsider its decision not to permit all lost-profits damages to be
apportioned, and if not, should instruct the jury to divide the lost profits among the various
claims that MRIA advances. Further, the jury should be instructed to disregard all evidence
related to Gem State's alleged bad acts in determining whether there has been a contract breach
and in determining damages from the contract breach.

DATED this 27th day of October, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

ounter-Defendants
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C~CATE

OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on th~ day of October, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

~

0
0

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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OCT 3 1 2011
CHRISTOPHEf1 0. RICH, Clem
By OtANI OATMAN
~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MRI ASSOCIATES, INC., an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited liability
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED,
an Idaho limited liability partnership,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
and SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

)
Defendants.

_____________________________ ))
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:

As to the MRIA entities' claims that Saint Alphonsus breached the
Partnership Agreement by breach of the non-compete clause?:
Question No. 1: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached the Partnership
Agreement by breaching the non-compete clause, as set forth in Instruction No. 39?

Answer to Question No. 1:

Yes [

V

1

No ._[_ _.

Question No. 2: If you answered "yes" to Question 1, do you find that Saint Alphonsus

~

proved either its defense of Estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or Waiver, as
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described in Instruction 43, as to the breach of the partnership agreement? If you
answered "no" to Question 1, leave your answer to this question blank.

Answer to Question No.2:

Yes[..._____..

No [

V1

As to the MRIA entities' claims that Saint Alphonsus breached the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing:
Question No. 3: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing as set forth in Instructions Nos. 40 and 41?

Answer to Question No 3.

Yes

LJiJ

No [..._____..

Question No. 4: If you answered "yes" to Question 3, do you find that Saint Alphonsus
proved either its defense of Estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or Waiver, as
described in Instruction 43, as to breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
If you answered "no" to Question 3, leave your answer to this question blank.

Answer to Question No. 4:

Yes,__[-~

As to MRI Center's and MRI Mobile's claims that Saint Alphonsus
intentionally interfered with MRI Center's, or MRI Mobile's prospective contractual
relations or business expectations:
Question No.5: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus intentionally interfered with MRI
entities' prospective economic relations or business expectations, as described in
Instruction No. 44?

Answer to Question No. 5:
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Question No. 6: If you answered "yes" to Question 5, do you find that Saint Alphonsus
proved either its defense of estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or waiver, as
described in Instruction 43, as to interference with prospective contractual relations? If
you answered "no" to Question 5, leave your answer to this question blank.
Answer to Question No. 6:

Yes[....____.

No

LlLJ

As to the MRI entities' claims that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary
duty owed to the MRI entities:
Question No. 7: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary duty owed to
MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile, as described in Instructions Nos. 45, 46, 47, 48, 49
and 50?
Answer to Question No. 7:

No[.___..

Question No. 8: If you answered "yes" to question no. 7, do you find that Saint
Alphonsus misappropriated a partnership opportunity as described in Instruction No.
47? You must decide separately as to the two misappropriations alleged in this case:
(A) the opportunity for MRIA to partner with GSR in IMI, and (B) MRI Mobile's
opportunity to open a facility in Meridian, Idaho
Answers to Question No. 8
For the opportunity to partner with radiologists in imaging centers: Yes
For the Meridian opportunity:

Yes [ /

1

No

~..-f

lLJ

NoL_]

___.

Question No. 9: If you answered "yes" to Question 7, do you find that Saint Alphonsus
proved either its defense of estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or waiver, as

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 3

003170

described in Instruction 43, as to breach of fiduciary duty? If you answered "no" to
Question 7, leave your answer to this question blank.

Answer to Question No.9:

Yes [

No [

V1

As to MRI entities' claims that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil
conspiracy:
Question No. 10: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil conspiracy, as
described in Instruction No 51?

Answer to Question No. 10

Yes [

V1

No

L-[_

__.

Question No. 11: If you answered "yes" to Question 10, do you find that Saint
Alphonsus proved either its defense of estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or
waiver, as described in Instruction 43, as to civil conspiracy? If you answered "no" to
Question 10, leave your answer to this question blank.

Answer to Question No. 11:

Yes [

No

L.l,LJ

If you left blank or answered "yes" to Questions 2, 4, 6, 9, and 11, then sign
the special verdict form and present it to the Bailiff. If you answered "no" to any
of Questions 2, 4, 6, 9, or 11, then continue to Question No. 12 below.

As to Damages:
Question No. 12: If you answered "yes" to Question 1, and "no" to Question 2, what
amount of net profits, if any, did each of the MRI entities lose as a result of the breach of
the partnership agreement? If you answered "no" to Question 1, or "yes" to Question 2,
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or if the MRI entities have not adequately proven any amount of lost profits leave the
answers to this question blank.
Answer to Question No. 12:
MRI center: $

·;u-=r, qzz,-sgz

----~.~--~--~----

MRI Mobile:

$_...::....Z_4_,_J_I(:,_·_z.-+1_/_2_7-:;___ _

You must now determine MRIA's share of those damages, and adjust the
amounts of damages to MRI Center and MRI Mobile

A. Total the damages for MRI Center and MRI Mobile

S2JOZ4,SIS
..

C. Multiply MRI Center's damages by 0.925

3 1 cy o~a1 s-sz
2S 1'8 28 1 7.{)8

D. Multiply MRI Mobile's damages by 0.925

z z,, :s'rt, 967-

B. Multiply the result in A by 0.075

You must now enter the amounts you calculated above as your final answer to
this question
MRI Associates (answer to B above):

$_""""':S-+-,t:l_D~p. :. . . .1j·....._5--=3-=8;,____

MRI Center (answer to C above):

$--=z=-s_,_
1 ""o_,Z::...:::Z=~J-Z.:...=IJ:......::Z..___

MRI Mobile (answer to D above):

$_Z_Z___,I,__:5.:;:_4-=-Cj.:....t/-9.:......::0::.....<:l_ _

Question No. 13: If you answered "yes" to Question 1, and "no" to Question 2, what
amount of value, if any, did MRI Center lose as a result of the breach of the partnership
agreement? If you answered "no" to Question 1, or "yes" to Question 2, or if MRI
Center has not adequately proven any amount of lost value leave the answer to this
question blank.
Answer to Question No. 13:
MRI Center:

$___JZ~E;-~1 . . .!,_4=ZD=-:.,~1~_O_D_
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Question No. 14: If you answered "yes" to Question 3, and "no" to Question 4, what
amount of net profits, if any, did each of the MRI entities lose as a result of the breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? If you answered "no" to Question 3, or
"yes" to Question 4, or if the MRI entities have not adequately proven any amount of lost
profits leave the answers to this question blank.
Answer to Question No. 14:

Z..._.l---r-,'__,<1'--..:::Z'--2--1--J-=3'--""Z<-.:::8==-M Rl Center: $_.....
M Rl Mobile:

$____,2.~lj<-+J__,[._,tJ:......;::·z=-J+-/L...:Z::;;_J_.___

You must now determine MRIA's share of those damages, and adjust the
amounts of damages to MRI Center and MRI Mobile
A. Total the damages for MRI Center and MRI Mobile

0'84 J 5;/.S

52,
,

r

qo", s:ss

'3 1

B. Multiply the result in A by 0.075
C. Multiply MRI Center's damages by 0.925

z '5'1 zzg, z()8

D. Multiply MRI Mobile's damages by 0.925

2 z.l
F

34 q /1 t:, ·~
I

You must now enter the amounts you calculated above as your final answer to
this question
MRI Associates (answer to B above):

$_3-=-.,l,__q.!...-.:06--!::...~+-"'
,
I 5=5~8~-

MRI Center (answer to C above):

$_z_s__,_,-=-~--z.._z_,_l-=z_o-=8
__
I

MRI Mobile (answer to D above):

$---=Z=-2-=---.,,_,'3=-4~~-4-l--=~--""'&--~-.r__

Question No. 15: If you answered "yes" to Question 3, and "no" to Question 4, what
amount of value, if any, did MRI Center lose as a result of the breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing? If you answered "no" to Question 3, or "yes" to Question 4,
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•

I

..

or if MRI Center has not adequately proven any amount of lost value leave the answer
to this question blank.

Answer to Question No. 15:
MRI Center:

$

2~ 1.12..0) ()IJ()

Question No. 16: If you answered "yes" to Question 5, and "no" to Question 6, what
amount of net profits, if any, did MRI Center or MRI Mobile lose as a result of the
intentional interference with prospective contractual relations? If you answered "no" to
Question 5, or "yes" to Question 6, or if the MRI Center and MRI Mobile have not
adequately proven any amount of lost profits leave the answers to this question blank.
Answer to Question No. 16:
MRI Center:
MRI Mobile:

$--=Z'---'-1-+-J~_,_z_z.+1 3_g_8_

$___;_Z_~-,-~-, ~_z_.-~-1 _IZ---=--7--'--1

Question No. 17: If you answered "yes" to Question 5, and "no" to Question 6, what
amount of value, if any did MRI Center lose as a result of the intentional interference
with prospective contractual relations? If you answered "no" to Question 5, or "yes" to
Question 6, or if the MRI Center has not adequately proven any amount of lost value
leave the answer to this question blank.
Answer to Question No. 17:
MRI Center:

$---=->Z~S--~1_4:_::2=:....:{)~)--==0::;.....;o;_,.tJ_ _

Question No. 18: If you assigned damages in Question 16 or 17, what percentage of
the damages is attributable to Saint Alphonsus, and what percentage is attributable to
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.

Gem State Radiology, Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Imaging Center
Radiologists? Your answers together must equal one hundred percent (1 00%)
Answer to Question No. 18:
Saint Alphonsus
GSR, IMI, and ICR

9o
IO

%
%

Question No. 19: If you assigned damages in Question 16, applying the percentage
from Question 18, what is the total dollar amount of lost net profits attributable to Saint
Alphonsus?
Answer to Question No. 19:
MRI Center:
MRI Mobile:

Question No. 20: If you assigned damages in Question 17, applying the percentage
from Question 18, what is the total dollar amount of lost business value attributable to
Saint Alphonsus?
Answer to Question No. 20:
MRI Center:

Question No. 21: If you answered "yes" to Question 7 and/or answered "yes" to
Question 8 as to the Meridian opportunity, and "no" to Question 9, what amount of net
profits, if any did each of the MRI entities lose as a result of the breach of fiduciary
duty? If you answered "no" to Question 7, or "yes" to Question 9, or if the MRI entities
have not adequately proven any amount of lost profits leave the answers to this
question blank.
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003175

'
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.

Answer to Question No. 21:
MRI Center: $
MRI Mobile: $

2=!-1 'lzz 3Z8
1
2 t..f, lb z I I
I

I

zr

You must now determine MRIA's share of those damages, and adjust the
amounts of damages to MRI Center and MRI Mobile
A. Total the damages for MRI Center and MRI Mobile
B. Multiply the result in A by 0.075
C. Multiply MRI Center's damages by 0.925
D. Multiply MRI Mobile's damages by 0.925

50 084/SIS
3) CJ 01a 3 ?8
1

ZS; ~zi1 ZOO

Z2.1 3<t9 qhf1

You must now enter the amounts you calculated above as your final answer to
this question
MRI Associates (answer to B above):
MRI Center (answer to C above):
MRI Mobile (answer to D above):

Question No. 22: If you answered "yes" to Question 7, and "no" to Question 9, what
amount of value, if any, did MRI Center lose as a result of the breach of fiduciary duty?
If you answered "no" to Question 7, or "yes" to Question 9, or if MRI Center has not
adequately proven any amount of lost value leave the answer to this question blank.

Answer to Question No. 22:
MRI Center:

Question No. 23: If you assigned damages in Question 21 or 22, what percentage of
the damages is attributable to Saint Alphonsus, and what percentage is attributable to
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Gem State Radiology, Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Imaging Center
Radiologists? Your answers together must equal one hundred percent (1 00%)
Answer to Question No. 23:
Saint Alphonsus

--'-=10--=---D_ %

GSR, IMI, and ICR ___0~

__%

Question No. 24: If you assigned damages in Question 21, applying the percentage
from Question 23, what is the total dollar amount of net lost profits attributable to Saint
Alphonsus?
Answer to Question No. 24:
MRI Center:

$_ _z_s___,,...._~"--z_gf:1 -=z-=o--8..__

MRI Mobile:

$_ _2=-o.Z.....,...J_,.$...._4L......ICJ'-f-j----"4...S..&_._7_

MRI Associates

$_

____;3~1f--11--Jo.O........Ii7"-'1'--""£=-3~8-

Question No. 25: If you assigned damages in Question 22, applying the percentage
from Question 23, what is the total dollar amount of lost business value attributable to
Saint Alphonsus?
Answer to Question No. 25:
MRI Center:

$_

__,2=-=-s--J-,___,4. . . Zo<..>.Oy,_._.QL...>o0'
..
-"0,___
'

I

Question No. 26: If you answered "yes" to Question 10, and "no" to Question 11, what
amount of net profits did each of the MRI entities lose as a result of the civil conspiracy?
If you answered "no" to Question 10, or "yes" to Question 11, or if the MRI entities have
not adequately proven any amount of lost profits leave the answers to this question
blank.
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Answer to Question No. 26:
M Rl Center:

$_.....!:2,_1.L..,1,_t9.LJ2-=."Z..--+J_3....,::,o:!....,;Z:..L__

M Rl Mobile: $__Z_4+-).:__/fo::::::__Z-+/-1_2._1...:....__
You must now determine MRIA's share of those damages, and adjust the
amounts of damages to MRI Center and MRI Mobile
A. Total the damages for MRI Center and MRI Mobile

s-z, 0'8'-I,SIS
I

v

ss 8

3, 9/)fal

B. Multiply the result in A by 0.075
C. Multiply MRI Center's damages by 0.925

z. s-, gz3 zjj8

D. Multiply MRI Mobile's damages by 0.925

Zz

1

I

f

I

1

3ii<=J I

I
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You must now enter the amounts you calculated above as your final answer to
this question
MRI Associates (answer to B above):

$__~-+-I<1~0--="::...,,,_,=s__:So!....l8ioL---

M Rl Center (answer to C above):

$_~Z==~=.,J~Z'"""Z8"'-=-~J-2~0.8'---..

MRI Mobile (answer to D above):

$_-=Z=o..;2=+-,
3"""'-flf1'-'-',_q-'-'&,O£....L.1_ _
I
I

Question No. 27: If you answered "yes" to Question 10, and "no" to Question 11, what
amount of value did MRI Center lose as a result of the civil conspiracy? If you
answered "no" to Question 7, or "yes" to Question 9, or if MRI Center has not
adequately proven any amount of lost value leave the answer to this question blank.
Answer to Question No. 27:
MRI Center:

$_~2-=-S-+-J__._Lf-=Z'-=-0-1-)=-06=-=D-

Question No. 28: If you assigned damages in Question 26 or 27, what percentage of
the damages is attributable to Saint Alphonsus, and what percentage is attributable to
Gem State Radiology, Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Imaging Center
Radiologists? Your answers together must equal one hundred percent (1 00%)
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Answer to Question No. 28:
Saint Alphonsus

'30

--=-_::__ _ %

GSR, IMI, and ICR __Z{)::::.......>ooo<----%

Question No. 29: If you assigned damages in Question 26, applying the percentage
from Question 28, what is the total dollar amount of net lost profits attributable to Saint
AI phon sus?
Answer to Question No. 29:
MRI Center:

$

z._O 1 tot;,zJ s-c,c,

MRI Mobile:

$

I "11 81-q I 97--.S

MRI Associates

$

~J I 25 r5f-D

1

Question No. 30: If you assigned damages in Question 27, applying the percentage
from Question 28, what is the total dollar amount of lost business value attributable to
Saint Alphonsus?

Answer to Question No. 30:
MRI Center:

Question 31: Which of Questions 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 29, and 30 resulted in
the largest total dollar amount?
Answer to Question No. 31:

I~

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 12
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Question No. 32: If you answered "yes" to Question 8 and "no" to Question 9, what is
the total amount of net profits Saint Alphonsus realized as a result of misappropriating a
partnership opportunity or opportunities?
Answer to Question No. 32:
Opportunity to partner with radiologists in imaging centers

$

ll ) SIc) Jgy~

Meridian opportunity

$

\3,

0~ ')(o f-=1-

DATED this

3

J

day of

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 13

Dc:+opgt'

'2011.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1
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OCT 31 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By DIANE OATMAN
Deputy

This is the case ofMRI Associates LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, MRI
Limited Partnership, an Idaho Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited, an Idaho Limited
Partnership, which, for the purposes of this trial will be referred to as the plaintiffs v. Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care Inc., which, for the purposes of this trial will be referred to as the
defendant.
In a moment the Clerk will call the roll of the jury. When your name is called you will
also be identified with a number. Please remember your number as we will be using it later in
the jury selection process. Some jurors failed to appear and they are subject to a fine and jail. I
will announce for the jurors that failed to appear that a show cause will issue why they should
not be held in contempt of court.
The Clerk will now call the roll of the jury.
Ladies and gentlemen, we are about to begin the trial of a lawsuit and what we are doing
today begins the process of selecting a jury- an important part of that process. Some of you
may be unfamiliar with the procedures in which you are about to participate, so I am going to
outline briefly for you how this trial will proceed.
You have been summoned as prospective jurors in the lawsuit now before us. The first
thing we will do in this trial is to select 16 jurors from among you. Because this trial is to last
approximately 6 weeks (until October 14, 2011), we are choosing 4 alternate jurors. They will
not know who they are until the end of the trial. We do not do that to inconvenience those four
jurors but to be sure we do not inconvenience all the other participants in this trial if some jurors
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should fall ill or have serious personal or family emergencies which might require them to be
excused from the jury.
I am Judge Mike Wetherell, the judge in charge of the courtroom and this trial. The
Deputy Clerk of the Court, Diane Oatman, marks the trial exhibits and administers oaths to you
jurors and the witnesses. The Bailiff will assist me in maintaining courtroom order and will
work with you as jurors in this case. The Court Reporter, Nicole Omsberg, will keep a verbatim
account of all matters of record during the trial.
Each of you is qualified to serve as a juror of this Court. This call upon your time does
not frequently come to you but is part of your obligation of citizenship in this State and Country.
Service on a jury affords you an opportunity to be part of the judicial process, by which
the legal affairs of your fellow men and women are determined and protected under our form of
government. You are being asked to perform one of the highest duties of citizenship, that is, to
sit in judgment on facts, which will determine the outcome of this case.
The trial day is from 9:00am to 5:00pm with a one hour lunch break at 12:00 noon.
This trial is set for 23 days, from Tuesday, September 6, 2011, through Friday, October 14, 2011.
We will break every Wednesday at approximately noon, and the trial will not be conducted on
Thursdays. Jury deliberations are to commence on October 14, 2011, unless we go late in which
case they will start on October 17, 2011.
This case involves a dispute between Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and MRI
Associates LLP, MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited. All of the entities involved
in the suit are Idaho entities and were involved together in a limited liability partnership.
Without going into a great deal of detail at this time, money damages are being sought by MRI
Associates LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited from Saint Alphonsus
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Diversified Care, Inc. They assert that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. breached certain
legal obligations owed to them and to the partnership that existed and that the breach of those
duties caused them to suffer financial damage for which Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.
should be required to reimburse them in the form of money damages they will assert have flowed
from Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.'s actions.
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. denies it breached any legal obligations to the
other partners who have claimed these breaches and as such no duties, as defined by the law
were breached, and therefore no damages are owed by Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. to
the other entities who were members of the partnership who have brought this action against
them.
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. further claims that in the event that any breach of
duty should be found by the jury that the damages asserted by the other parties are overstated and
excessive.
A more detailed opemng statement will be presented by the parties later at the
commencement of this trial.
The Court wishes to advise the panel that this is a complex case and there have
been several other proceedings involving the parties prior to this trial. You may hear other
proceedings referred to in this trial. You are not to concern yourself with what may or may not
have been decided in any other proceedings. Nor are you to conduct any independent inquiry or
research electronically or otherwise check into any prior proceedings. Such research would be
unfair to all of the parties.
If for any reason you have any independent knowledge of any prior proceedings between

these parties, you are not to discuss them in any way with your fellow jurors. At some point, you
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will be asked about that knowledge outside the presence of the other jurors so a determination
may be made as to whether you should remain on this jury panel because of that knowledge. As
you can imagine, this case is important to all of the parties and we want to assure every juror will
be fair and impartial in hearing the evidence and deciding the case.
As the judge in charge of this courtroom, it is my duty, at various times during the course
of this trial, to instruct you as to the law that applies to this case.
The duty of the jury is to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in the instructions
to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In applying the Court's instruction as to the
controlling law, you must follow those instructions regardless of your opinion of what the law is
or what the law should be, or what any lawyer may state the law to be.
During the course of this trial, including the jury selection process, you are instructed that
you are not to discuss this case among yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion
as to the merits of the case until after the case has been fully submitted to you for your
determination.
THE CLERK WILL NOW SWEAR IN THE JURY PANEL.

Today we are going to present to each of you a questionnaire to focus your attention on
two critical issues as to your possible service as jurors in this case. The issues concern your
ability to serve during this extended jury trial during the six weeks it is anticipated to take and if
you have any direct or indirect employment or business relationship with any of the parties to
this case. The written questionnaire, it is hoped, will simplify the jury selection process.
After you have responded to the questionnaire, the Court and lawyers will meet after you
have gone home and discuss your responses. The Court will then make a determination as to
who will be called back for the jury panel on Tuesday, September 6, 2011, for further
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proceedings to select the jury. You will be notified by the jury office if you are !!:!!!. to report for
this case on Tuesday. So if you are not notified by the Ada County Jury Office that you have
been excused then you are to report on Tuesday morning, September 6, 2011 at 8:00AM for this
case. On Tuesday, the Court and counsel will ask more specific questions and select the 16
jurors to decide this case. Also on Tuesday you may receive additional instructions on the law
and more detailed opening statements from counsel.
I know that service on this jury is an imposition for all of you in one way or another.
Keeping that in mind, the jury system is vital to the administration of justice and these parties
have requested your assistance in resolving this dispute.
The questionnaire being given you at this time is somewhat long but is designed to make
the jury selection process go more efficiently and smoothly.
Please print your answers. Please read the questions carefully and respond as accurately
as you can. Remember that this case is important to all of the parties. The parties and the Court
will be relying in part on your answers to these questionnaires in this jury selection process to
assure the selection of fair and impartial jurors to hear this case. All of us, were we in the
position of having an important case decided in court by a jury would want the jury to be fair and
impartial in hearing the evidence and deciding the case, and that is the desire of these parties and
of this Court as well.
Remember that you are under oath to tell the truth in your responses. There are no right
or wrong answers. Our desire is to receive truthful and accurate answers.
During this process I cannot answer questions from you. We have attempted to make the
questionnaire as self-explanatory as possible. I will now read to you the opening statement on
the questionnaire.
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The questionnaire will now be distributed and you may begin answering the questions
presented. When you are done, please return the questionnaire to the Jury Commissioner or her
designated staff and when you have done so you may leave. You are to follow up with the Jury
Commissioner's Office as instructed to receive further instructions on your service. I thank all of
you for your service, time, patience and cooperation in this process.
Does the Jury Commissioner have anything she wishes to add?
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2

The decision to have you report today for jury service after our court session on
Tuesday, August 30, 2011, dealing with hardship and business contact issues and to
respond to the questionnaire prepared in this case, has been determined by this Court and
will not be revisited today during this process. Today the Court will conduct additional voir
dire and so will the attorneys. We have now had an opportunity to review the specific juror
questionnaires you have previously completed and there may be additional questions
based upon your responses to that questionnaire.
Please understand that this questioning is not for the purpose of prying into your
affairs for personal reasons but is only for the purpose of obtaining a fair and impartial jury.
Each question has an important bearing upon your qualifications as a juror and
each question is based upon a requirement of the law with respect to those qualifications.
Each question is asked of each of you, as though each of you were being questioned
separately.
If your answer to any question is yes, please raise your hand. You will then be
asked to identify yourself both by name and juror number.
At this time I would instruct both sides to avoid repeating any question during this
voir dire process that has already been asked. I would ask counsel to note, however, that
you certainly have the right to ask follow-up questions of any individual juror based upon
that juror's response to any previous question.
The jury should be aware that during and following the voir dire examination one or
more of you might be challenged.
Each side has a certain number of "peremptory challenges." in this case the
Plaintiffs have 6 peremptory challenges, and the Defendant has 6 peremptory challenges,
by which I mean each side can challenge a juror and ask that he or she be excused
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without giving a reason. In addition each side has challenges "for cause", by which I mean
that each side can ask that a juror be excused for a specific reason. If either side excuses
you please do not feel offended or feel that your honesty or integrity is being questioned. It
is not.
Before we start, I want to introduce to you the attorneys who will be representing the
parties. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. is being represented by:
Mr. Jack S. Gjording
Mr. Donald B. Ayer
Mr. Peter J. Romatowski

MRI Associates LLP, MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited are being
represented by:
Mr. Thomas A. Banducci
Mr. Wade L. Woodard
Mr. Brent S. Bastian

I will admonish all possible jurors once again that you are not to discuss this case
among yourselves or with anyone else or to form any opinions as to the merits of the case
until it has been fully submitted to you for your determination. If anyone tries to talk to you
about the case, tell them you are a juror and cannot discuss it. If they continue to talk,
walk away and tell the Bailiff what has happened. Do not tell your fellow jurors what has
happened.
I will now ask you a number of questions. If as to any question you would prefer to
give your answer in private rather than by responding in front of everyone in the courtroom,
please feel free to raise your hand and tell me that, and we will proceed accordingly.
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1. As I stated last Tuesday, this trial is scheduled to run from today until October 14,
2011. However, there may be circumstances that necessitate the trial running into the
following week, the week of October 17, 2011.

Does any one of you have a specific

conflict that week?
2.

You have heard the Court describe in summary fashion the nature of the claims

and defenses in this case earlier. Other than what I have told you, do any of you know
anything about this case, either through your own personal knowledge, by discussion with
anyone else or from radio, television, newspapers, or other electronic media?
3.

Does the relationship of guardian and ward, attorney and client, master and

servant, landlord and tenant, boarder or lodger exist between any of you and any of the
parties? Are any of you a party in a civil action against any of the parties?
4.

You have been introduced to the lawyers representing the parties. Are any

of you related by blood or marriage to any of the lawyers or do any of you know any of the
lawyers from any professional, business, or social relationship?
5.

Do any of you have a religious or moral position that would make it impossible

to render judgment?
6.

Do any of you have any bias or prejudice either for or against either the

Plaintiffs or Defendant?
7.

Do any of you know any other member of the jury panel?

8.

Are there any of you who are unwilling to follow my instructions to you, the

jury, as to the law that you must apply in determining this case?

9. COURT CLUB
Prior juror? What kind of case, verdict, presiding juror?
Prior witness in a case? What kind of dispute?
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Prior party in a case? What was the dispute? What was the outcome?
Prior Defendant in a criminal case.

10. Have any of you ever filed a claim or complaint for medical malpractice or filed a
claim or complaint against a doctor, health care professional or hospital?
11.

Do any of you have physical problems that would affect your ability to hear the

testimony presented in court or read evidence that will be presented in this case?
12.

Are there any of you, if selected as a juror in this case, who is unwilling or unable

to render a fair and impartial verdict based upon the evidence presented in this courtroom
and the law as instructed by the Court?
13.

Do any of you have any other reason why you cannot give this case your

undivided attention and render a fair and impartial verdict?
14.

Saint Alphonsus Hospital is a Catholic charitable hospital. Does any member of

the jury panel feel that because of the nature of the hospital that they could not be fair and
impartial in deciding this case?
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3

Ladies and gentlemen we are now about to begin the trial of a lawsuit. Some of you
may be unfamiliar with the procedures in which you are about to participate; and I am
going, therefore, to outline briefly for you how this trial will proceed.
Now that the jury is selected and sworn, the court will read to you some of your
instructions. Then, the attorneys will make opening statements; or the defendant's attorney
may, if he wishes, save his opening statement until later.

The opening statement is

intended to inform you about the party's case, and what they claim, and what evidence
they intend to produce for you. The opening statement is not evidence, however. In fact,
none of the statements made by any of the attorneys or by the Court when arguing or
ruling on issues that may be raised during the trial are evidence.
Each side will offer evidence to support its claim. The Plaintiffs, MRI Associates,
MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited, will proceed first and offer all their
evidence on their claims. Then the Defendants, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
and Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc, will proceed to offer all of their evidence on its
defenses. Thereafter rebuttal evidence may be offered.
After all of the evidence is in, I will read to you the rest of your instructions. In those
instructions I will tell you what the law is and will tell you what you will have to decide.
Then the trial concludes with the arguments of the lawyers for both sides and
selection of the alternate jurors
Finally, you will be taken to a place where you can deliberate on your verdict in
privacy.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 4

These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to
this case.

It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these

instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be
based upon a rational and objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based
on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it
is your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a
whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions
are given or the manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the
importance of any of them. If you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note
to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or explain the point further if it is possible for
me to do so.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial.
This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into
evidence, and any stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the
attorneys may help you understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say
is not evidence. If an attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you
should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rules of law. At times during the
trial, I may sustain an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or
to an offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and
are solely my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection
that was made, or my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider
such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown.
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Remember, a question is not evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning
to the answer.
There will be occasions where an objection is made after an answer is given or the
remark is made, and in my ruling on the objection I will instruct that the answer or remark
be stricken, or direct that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your
minds. In your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat
it as though you had never heard it.
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of
the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe
and what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the
experience and background of your lives.

There is no magical formula for evaluating

testimony. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what
you believe, and how much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations
you use in making the more important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same
considerations you should apply to your deliberations in this case.
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion on
that matter. In determining the weight to be given such an opinion, you should consider
the qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for the opinion. You
are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5

The following facts are not in dispute:
St. Alphonsus and MRIA were partners and entered into a partnerhship agreement
in 1985.
St. Alphonsus disassociated from the partnership in April 2004. The mere act of
dissociation from a partenership is not a violation of Idaho law. Whether other actions of
Saint Alphonsus's may have violated the law or legal obligations to the other parties to the
partnership, as is alleged by the plaintiffs, is for you to determine.
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INSTRUCTION NO.6

As I have told you earlier, this is a complex case involving several claims. Because
certain terms that will be used in this case are legal terms, many of you may have never
heard them; or if you have heard them, you may not know their legal definition. Thus, to
assist you, I will give the general legal definition of several terms. At the conclusion of the
case, I will give you more specific definitions and instructions as to what the terms mean
and how you are to address these defined terms in your deliberations.
1.) "Fiduciary Duty" simply means that a person or entity has a duty to act primarily for
the benefit of another. The duty involves both the duty of loyalty and the duty of
care.

Further direction on the duties of loyalty and care will be given at the

conclusion of the evidence.
2.) The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing is an implied obligation of every
contract under the law of Idaho that requires the parties to perform in good faith the
obligations contained in their agreement.

The covenant does not inject new

material terms into the contract, but it does require the parties to perform in good
faith those terms agreed to by the parties.
3.) "Prospective Contractual Advantages" or "Reasonable Prospective Business
Expectations" simply means future contractual advantage or future business
expectations.
4.) Civil Conspiracy means an agreement between two or more persons to acomplish
an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in an unlawful manner.
5.) Breach of Contract- When it is claimed that a contract is breached, it simply means
that a specifically stated or legally implied provision of the contract has been broken
without a legal basis.
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6.) 'Waiver by Estoppel" means that a party is deemd to have waived a claimed breach
of contract by reason of that party's own conduct.
The fact I have given you the general definitions of these terms does not indicate in any
way that any claim involving these terms has either been proven or disproven in this case.
At the conclusion of all of the evidence and the closing arguments of counsel you, the jury,
will alone determine based upon the evidence presented in the case and the more
complete instructions, which will be given at the close of the evidence whether any of
these issues are present in this case, whether they have been proven and if proven
whether damages are owing or not owing to any of the plaintiffs from the defendant.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7

During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the Jaw that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into
evidence, and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby
diverted from the witness or their testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and
not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberation at the end of the trial.
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said and
not be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot assign to one
person the duty of taking notes for all of you.
I advised you that we have a court reporter that also keeps a verbatim record of
these proceedings. However, no written transcript will be made of these proceedings for
review by the jury.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 8

As you can well surmise, this case is important to both sides, and each party to the
suit is entitled to your full and fair consideration. You are not to associate in any way with
the parties, their attorneys, agents, or witnesses. You are likewise not to discuss the case
with anyone or permit anyone to discuss the case with you, whether within or without the
courthouse, during the course of the trial; and you are not yourself to contact anyone in an
attempt to discuss or gain a greater understanding of the case. You are not to conduct
research of any kind on this case and that includes internet research, internet blogs or any
type of World Wide Web contact as to this case or any issues in this case. In the event
that anyone attempts to discuss the case with you or to influence your decision, you will
report it to me promptly.
You are not even to discuss the case among yourselves until you retire to the jury
room to deliberate at the close of the entire case and you are not to form or express any
opinion on the case until you have heard all of the testimony and have had the benefit of
my instructions as to the law which applies to the case.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 9

Whether there is or is not insurance is a fact that must not be discussed or
considered by the jury. The case should be decided solely on the facts and law presented
to the jury.
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INSTRUCTION N0.10
If during the trial I may say or do anything, which suggest to you that I am inclined to
favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by
any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate,
any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief; what facts are or are not
established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of
mine seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to
disregard it.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 11

You are instructed that any terms in these instructions which have a special legal
meaning are defined for you in these instructions. Under Idaho law, if a word or phrase is
not otherwise defined in these instructions, you are to construe that word or phrase
according to its context and the approved usage of the language as the ordinary reading
public would read and understand it. Words not otherwise defined, should be given their
ordinary significance as popularly understood. They do not have some mysterious or
specialized meaning simply because they are a part of a jury instruction unless the Court
has specifically defined them for you.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 12

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have noticed, I am sure, that counsel
sometimes refer to an exhibit as being produced by one side or the other in the case.
Sometimes they do this to assist each other in locating an exhibit, sometimes they do it in
an effort to help a witness recall the document or refresh the witness's memory of what
occurred. The Court advises you that it does not matter who initially produced a document
or exhibit. All admitted exhibits are evidence in this case regardless of who may have
produced them initially.

003202

INSTRUCTION NO. 13

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are advised that the December 31, 2023,
date referred to was a date voted upon by the MRIA board to extend the contract beyond
its expiration date of December 31, 2015. The contract required that any change in the
agreement had to be in writing, which was never done, and thus, the December 31, 2023,
date did not become a part of the contract.

Saint Alphonsus has maintained that the

December 31, 2023, date was of no force and effect and has prevailed on that point.
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INSTRUCTION N0.14
You have seen an offer which was made to Saint Alphonsus to purchase MRIA
properties (Exh. 4332) and a letter from Saint Alphonsus rejecting that offer (Exh. 4333).
You are advised that this evidence has been presented only for the limited purpose of
allowing you to determine what weight and credibility you give to witness testimony relating
to the content and reasonableness of efforts by the parties to resolve their disputes and
whether a contention of undue delay is valid. The specific values stated in the settlement
letter may not be used by you to determine the amount of or liability for any claim.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15
You have been shown a letter sent by Sandra Bruce as President and CEO of Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center to J. Roger Curran, MD, as chairman of the Board of
Partners of MRI Associates (Exh. 4329) in which Saint Alphonsus withdrew as a partner
from MRI Associates. The letter contains language, at page 2, in which Ms. Bruce
mentions terms for the purchase or buyout of Saint Alphonsus's share of the partnership
and describes Saint Alphonsus's position as to the one-year noncompetition clause in the
partnership agreement.
You are instructed that just as MRIA had the right to enforce the
noncompetition clause in the contract, Saint Alphonsus had the right to enforce its legal
right to have its partnership share purchased or bought out by the remaining partners upon
its withdrawaI.
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INSTRUCTION N0.16
You have heard reference to a judgment entered in favor of Saint Alphonsus. You
are advised that the claims underlying that judgment involve no allegations of wrongdoing
of any kind on the part of MRIA, but involved a dispute regarding how to determine how
much money might be owed to Saint Alphonsus under certain provisions of Idaho law as to
what Saint Alphonsus was entitled to be paid for its withdrawing partner's share of the
MRIA partnership. None of the facts or claims underlying that judgment are at all relevant
to the present lawsuit, and you are not to concern yourself with the nature of the judgment.
Put simply, the fact a judgment has been entered on behalf of Saint Alphonsus in another
matter has no relevance whatsoever to the merits of MRIA's claims in this proceeding or
Saint Alphonsus's defense of these claims.

003206

.
INSTRUCTION NO. 17

You have been shown paragraph 8 of a letter identified as Exhibit 4015. The Court
advises the jury that the $5,000,000 figure referred to never became a part of any contract
between the parties and has no relevance as to what damages may or may not have been
suffered by MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile, should you find Saint Alphonsus does owe
any damages in this case to these parties.
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INSTRUCTION N0.18
You have heard evidence concerning certain information possessed or received by
Dr. Giles and/or Dr. Prochaska regarding the plans by the radiologists for an independent
imaging center. You are advised that there are no claims which have been brought as part
of this lawsuit that either Dr. Giles or Dr. Prochaska breached a duty to MRIA or any MRIA
partner (including Saint Alphonsus) with respect to this information.
This evidence may be used by you to evaluate possible bias of either of these two
witnesses and what weight you choose to give to their testimony. You may also use this
evidence in evaluating whether Saint Alphonsus acted in good faith or with a lack of good
faith in taking any actions related to the MRIA partnership and the MRI entities and for no
other purpose.
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INSTRUCTION N0.19
You have heard testimony that Mr. Jeff Cliff advised Dr. Giles he had been told by
Cindy Schamp that the cheapest thing the hospital could do in its negotiations with MRIA
was to wait. This statement may be considered by you for only one purpose, and that is to
determine what weight you attach to the prior testimony of Jeff Cliff on this subject and for
no other purpose. It is not substantive evidence in this case nor does it prove that Ms.
Schamp actually made the statement.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 20

The MRI entities have alleged in this case that Saint Alphonsus acted together with
Gem State Radiology (GSR), Intermountain Medical Imaging (IMI), and Imaging Center
Radiologists (ICR) in a way that caused the MRI entities harm. This is known as a civil
conspiracy claim. Because of that claim, the MRI entities, and Saint Alphonsus have been
allowed to introduce evidence of allegedly wrongful acts done by GSR, IMI, and ICR,
though they are not parties to this law suit. Because of the law governing this claim, as will
be described in later instructions, if the jury finds that the MRI entities suffered damages
resulting from a civil conspiracy, you will be required to determine what percentage of the
damages found were caused by the acts of Saint Alphonsus, and what percentage of the
damages were caused by GSR, IMI, and ICR. Your apportionment will not result in any
money damages having to be paid by GSR, IMI, or ICR. Rather, the reason you must
decide this issue is to ensure that, if Saint Alphonsus is held liable for civil conspiracy, it
will be held accountable only for the damages caused by its own wrongful acts associated
with this claim, and not the wrongful acts of others.
Not only is it appropriate for counsel for both parties to argue that GSR, IMI, and
ICR are responsible for some, all, or none of the acts that allegedly harmed the MRI
entities, it is their obligation in representing the interests of their clients. I instruct you to
disregard any comments that suggest otherwise.

It will be your legal duty as jurors to

decide what portion of the damages, if any, was caused by the acts of GSR, IMI, and ICR,
and what portion of the damages, if any, was caused by Saint Alphonsus.
By providing this explanation, this Court expresses no opinion as to whether Saint
Alphonsus, GSR, IMI, or ICR have participated in a civil conspiracy to the economic
detriment of the MRI entities, or whether any of the MRI entities suffered damages as a
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result. That is for you alone to determine based on the evidence you have heard in this
case.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 21

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this morning the Court ruled, based on what this
Court believed was a specific provision of Idaho law applicable to the claims of economic
loss by the MRI entities, that damages could not be awarded that are alleged to have
occurred as a result of the opening of the Eagle facility. Because this Court ruled only this
morning, some of the prepared exhibits you will see will have reference to the Eagle
facility. You are to ignore and disregard this material, as it is no longer a part of the case.
You are instructed that the fact the Court has ruled on this single issue in the case as a
matter of law has no bearing on the other claims and defenses in this case. It is for you
alone to evaluate the evidence and make the appropriate findings as to the remaining
claims and what damages, if any, arise from them.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 22
You have heard reference made to alleged violations of federal statutes related to
the referrals of patients, namely the Stark Law and the Anti-Kickback Law. The Court has
ruled that these statutes do not establish a basis for either liability or damages in this case.
You are instructed to disregard these federal statutes.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 23

All of the evidence has been presented in this case. You are to determine the facts
solely from the evidence you heard or saw during the trial. I want to remind you of some
things that are not evidence. They include questions and comments to witnesses;
objections or statements about the admissibility of evidence; testimony that was excluded
or stricken, or that you were instructed to disregard; and anything you may have heard or
seen when court was not in session.
I will not re-read the instructions I gave you at the beginning of the trial. If you have
any questions about those instructions, please review them during your deliberations. You
must consider the instructions as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others.
The order in which you are instructed on various issues has no significance as to their
relative importance.
You will have the original jury instructions and the trial exhibits with you in the jury
room. The exhibits are part of the official court record. For this reason please do not alter
them or mark on them in any way. However, the jury instructions are provided to each of
you for your use. You may mark on them if you wish to do so.
You will also have the original jury verdict form. Please use it to return your verdict.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 24

The fact that the Court either overrules or sustains an objection to a question, or to
testimony made, or to an argument advanced is not a comment on the evidence in the
case or upon which counsel's argument is or is not to be believed. Counsel's statements
are not evidence, nor are my rulings on objections made in a case. It is the job of counsel
to raise objections they feel are appropriate, just as it is my job to rule upon them.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that
directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact,
by proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as
to the degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and
each is respected for such convincing force as it may carry.

003216

INSTRUCTION NO. 26

In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. I remind you that
whenever evidence was admitted for a limited purpose, you must not consider such
evidence for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it is admitted.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 27

In deciding the facts in this case, you may have to decide which testimony to
believe and which testimony not to believe. You may believe everything a witness says, or
part of it, or none of it. Proof of a fact does not necessarily depend on the number of
witnesses who testify about it. In considering the testimony of any witness, you may take
into account:
(1) the opportunity and ability of the witness to see or hear or know the things testified to;
(2) the witness's memory;
(3) the witness's manner while testifying;
(4) the witness's interest in the outcome of the case and any bias or prejudice;
(5) whether other evidence contradicted the witness's testimony;
(6) the reasonableness of the witness's testimony in light of all the evidence; and
(7) any other factors that bear on believability.
The weight of the evidence as to a fact does not necessarily depend on the number
of witnesses who testify about it.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 28

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care Inc, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,
MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, MRI Mobile Limited are corporations or
limited liability business organizations and are entitled to the same fair and unprejudiced
treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances.
You should decide this case with the same impartiality that you would use in
deciding a case between individuals.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 29

Evidence has been admitted which will go with you into the jury room that has been
redacted. You are not to concern yourselves with those redactions or speculate as to what
may have been removed.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 30
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this
case. I have advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the
issues to be decided.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 31

When I use the term "MRIA," I am referring to MRI Associates, LLP. When I use the
term "MRI Center," I am referring to MRI Limited Partnership, of which MRIA is a general
partner.

When I use the term "MRI Mobile," I am referring to MRI Mobile Limited

Partnership, of which MRIA is a general partner. When I use the term "MRI entities," I am
referring to MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile. When I use the term "Saint Alphonsus," I
am referring both to Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. (SADC) and Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center (SARMC). When I use the term "GSR," I am referring to Gem
State Radiology, LLP.

When I use the term "IMI," I am referring to Intermountain Medical

Imaging. When I use the term "ICR," I am referring to Imaging Center Radiologists. When
I use the term "SARG" I am referring to Saint Alphonsus Radiology Group.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 32

When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the
expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the
proposition is more probably true than not true.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 33

When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in natural or
probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained of and but for
that cause the damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is
sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway.
Proximate causation of damages must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 34

If you determine that damages were suffered by the MRI entities as a result
of the actions of Saint Alphonsus and that these actions violated Idaho law or the
partnership agreement, damages may not be awarded for losses that might occur after
December 31, 2015.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 35

You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the partnership
agreement offered by any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before
execution of the written agreement, which is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning
of the written agreement. While you may consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary
to clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider such testimony to completely change the
agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in such a fashion that it no longer fits
with the other, non-ambiguous terms or parts.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 36

The parties agree that certain events occurred on the following dates:
1. The partnership agreement forming MRI Associates was entered into on April 26,
1985
2. The partnership agreement forming MRI Center was entered into on August 2, 1985
3. The partnership agreement forming MRI Mobile was entered into on October 17,
1988
4. IMI opened its downtown imaging facility on September 1, 1999
5. The Radiologists, through ICR, and Saint Alphonsus entered into their partnership
agreement on July 1, 2001. There is a dispute between the parties as to the
interpretation of the agreement, which is for you to resolve.
6. The Meridian IMI facility opened on June 3, 2002
7. Saint Alphonsus gave notice of its dissociation from MRIA on February 24, 2004
8. Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from MRIA became effective on April 1, 2004.
9. MRIA terminated its relationship with GSR on January 3, 2005, as to outpatient
services
10. The non competition clause in the MRIA partnership agreement expired on April 1,
2005.
11. IMI on-campus opened MRI services on Saint Alphonsus's campus on December
19,2005
12.Saint Alphonsus acquired 50% interest in IMI's MRI business April1, 2006
13.1MI's Eagle facility opened on October 1, 2007
14. The partnership agreement creating MRI Center expired on December 31, 2015
The partnership agreement creating MRI Mobile expired on December 31, 2018
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INSTRUCTION NO. 37

Saint Alphonsus dissociated from the MRIA partnership on April 1, 2004 pursuant to
its right to do so under Idaho law.
Under the terms of the MIRA partnership, Saint Alphonsus could not compete
against the businesses run by MRIA until one year after it dissociated, that is April1, 2005.
You may not award damages to MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile based upon
Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from the MRIA partnership-something Saint Alphonsus
had the right to do. Furthermore, you may not award damages to MRIA, MRI Center, or
MRI Mobile simply because Saint Alphonsus competed with these businesses after April 1,
2005, which it had the right to do.
If, however, you find that Saint Alphonsus began to compete by its actions
with MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile prior to April 1, 2005, or otherwise caused
economic damages to the MRI entities by its actions prior to April 1, 2004, you may then
award damages to MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile for any injury caused by Saint
Alphonsus's conduct prior to 2005, even if the damages caused by those actions occurred
after 2005. However, if you find damages should be awarded, you may only award
damages which you find were incurred prior to December 31, 2015.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 38

In this case, MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile have made the following claims:
A. Contract Claims
1.

Breach of the Partnership Agreement by breach of the noncompetition clause

2.

Breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing

B. Tort Claims
1.

Intentional interference with prospective contractual relations

2.

Breach of fiduciary duty

C. Civil conspiracy
In this case Saint Alphonsus has asserted estoppel and waiver as defenses
to these claims. Saint Alphonsus also asserts that other factors caused the claimed
damages.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 38A

You have heard testimony regarding the conduct of the Gem State Radiologists,
Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Imaging Center Radiologists. You may not consider
the conduct of the Gem State Radiologists, Intermountain Medical Imaging, or Imaging
Center Radiologists in determining liability or damages for the MRI entities' breach of
partnership agreement claim or breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim.
However, you may consider the conduct of the Gem State Radiologists, Intermountain
Medical Imaging, and Imaging Center Radiologists with regard to the MRI entities' claims
of breach of fiduciary duty, intentional interference with prospective contractual relations,
and civil conspiracy. You may give the evidence of the Gem State Radiologists',
Intermountain Medical Imaging's, and Imaging Center Radiologists' conduct whatever
weight, if any, you find appropriate.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 39
Breach of the Partnership Agreement Claim: Breach of the Non-Compete Clause

MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile, claim that Saint Alphonsus breached the
express terms of the MRIA Partnership Agreement by breaching the terms of the noncompetition provisions within the MRIA Partnership Agreement. On this claim, MRIA, MRI
Center, and MRI Mobile have the burden of proving each of the following propositions.
1. A contract existed between MRIA and Saint Alphonsus;
2. The contract contained a non-competition provision;
3. Saint Alphonsus breached the contract by competing with the MRI entities prior to
April 1, 2005;
4. The MRI entities have been damaged as a proximate cause of the breach of contract;
5. The amount of the damages.
This Court has already ruled that MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile have met their
burden of proving the first proposition. Specifically, this Court has already ruled that: a
contract existed, the MRIA Partnership Agreement. You, therefore, need only determine
whether MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile have met their burden of proving the second,
third, fourth, and fifth propositions above.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the second, third,
fourth, and fifth of these propositions has been proved by MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI
Mobile, then you must consider the affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver raised by
Saint Alphonsus. If you find after considering all the evidence that either the second, third,
fouth or fifth propositions in this instruction have not been proved, your verdict should be
for Saint Alphonsus as to this claim.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 40
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an implied obligation of every contract
and requires the parties to perform in good faith the obligations contained in their
agreement. The covenant does not inject new material terms into the contract, but it does
require the parties to perform in good faith those terms agreed upon by the parties.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 41

Elements of Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

In order for the MRI entities to recover on their claim that Saint Alphonsus breached
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the MRI entities have the burden of proving
each of the following:
1.

There was a contract between MRIA and Saint Alphonsus in the form of a

partnership agreement;
2.

Action by Saint Alphonsus violated, nullified or significantly impaired the

benefit of the contract; and,
3.

The MRI entities suffered damages that were a natural and proximate result

of Saint Alphonsus's actions.
The first of these propositions, that a contract existed in the form of a
partnership agreement, is not a disputed fact. Therefore, you must only consider whether
the second and third of these propositions has been proved. If you find from your
consideration of all the evidence that the second and third propositions have been proved,
then you must consider the issue of the affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver raised
by Saint Alphonsus as set forth in Instructions No. 42 and 43. If you find from your
consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proven, then
your verdict should be for Saint Alphonsus on this claim.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 42
Saint Alphonsus's defense of Waiver by Estoppel ("Estoppel")

Saint Alphonsus has raised the defense of waiver by estoppel. This is a legal term
which means that a party is deemed to have waived a claimed breach of contract by
reason of the party's own conduct. To establish the defense of waiver by estoppel, Saint
Alphonsus has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

MRIA represented to Saint Alphonsus by words or conduct or by silence

when a duty to speak and protest the action of Saint Alphonsus existed that MRIA was
waiving, excusing or forgiving Saint Alphonsus's conduct; and
2.

Saint Alphonsus relied upon this representation and materially changed

position in reliance thereon; and
3.

The reliance was reasonable in light of all of the circumstances; and

4.

The change of position was to Saint Alphonsus's detriment.

If you find that each of these propositions has been proved, you should find that
Saint Alphonsus is not liable to the MRI entities for claims set forth in Instruction No. 38. If
Saint Alphonsus fails to prove all of the propositions, then Saint Alphonsus has not
established the affirmative defense of estoppel.

003234

INSTRUCTION NO. 43
Saint Alphonsus's defense of Waiver

Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be evidenced by
conduct, by words, or by acquiescence. The jury may consider this defense as to any
claim. It is for you to decide whether the defense of waiver has been proven.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 44
Tort Claim of Intentional Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations or
Business Expectations

In this case, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile claim that Saint Alphonsus interfered with
their prospective contractual relations or business expectations. To recover on this claim,
MRI Center and MRI Mobile must prove the following elements:
1.

The existence of a prospective economic advantage;

2.

Knowledge of the prospective economic advantage on the part of Saint
Alphonsus;

3.

Intentional interference by Saint Alphonsus that induced termination of the
prospective economic advantage of MRI Center and MRI Mobile

4.

That the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the
interference (in other words, that Saint Alphonsus interfered for an improper
purpose or through improper means); and

5.

Damages proximately caused by the interference.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that these propositions

have been proved, then your verdict should be for MRI Center and MRI Mobile. If you find
from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been
proven, then your verdict should be for Saint Alphonsus on this claim.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 45

The MRI entities claim that Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary duties to
MRIA, MRI Center, and/or MRI Mobile. A partner owes fiduciary duties to the partnership.
A fiduciary is a person or entity with a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another.
These fiduciary duties include both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. You must
determine whether St. Alphonsus breached the duties owed to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI
Mobile.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 46

A partner's duty of loyalty includes the following:
1.

The partner must refrain from misappropriating partnership opportunities.

2.

The partner should not act adversely to the partnership, either for itself or

others.
3.

The partner must refrain from competing with the partnership at any time

before disassociation or as set forth in the partnership agreement.
If you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached any of the above elements of
the duty of loyalty in regards to the duty Saint Alphonsus owes to MRIA, MRI Center or
MRI Mobile, then your verdict should be for MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile. If you find
that Saint Alphonsus has not breached any of the above elements of the duty of loyalty in
regards to the duty Saint Alphonsus owes to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile, then your
verdict should be for Saint Alphonsus on this claim.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 47
When I refer to misappropriating or usurping a partnership opportunity, I am
referring to a partner taking advantage of a partnership opportunity for the partner's
individual benefit. To show a misappropriation or usurpation of a partnership opportunity,
the partnership must show:
1. that the partner took a partnership opportunity for its own benefit;
2. that the partnership was or could have been financially able to undertake the
opportunity absent the partner's actions;
3. that the opportunity was in line with the partnership's business and was of
practical advantage to it;
4. that the opportunity is one in which the partnership had an interest or reasonable
expectancy; and
5. that by embracing the partnership opportunity itself, the self-interest of the
partner was brought into conflict with that of the partnership.
If a partner personally claims an opportunity belonging to the partnership, then one
measure of damages is the partnership may receive all of the profits derived from the
transaction by the partner.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 48

A partner's duty of care requires the partner to conduct partnership business in a
manner that is not reckless, grossly negligent, intentional misconduct, or a knowing
violation of the law.
If you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached the duty of care in regards to
the duty Saint Alphonsus owes to the MRI entities, then your verdict should be for the MRI
entities. If you find that Saint Alphonsus has not breached the duty of care in regards to
the duty Saint Alphonsus owes to the MRI entities, then your verdict should be for Saint
Alphonsus on this claim.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 49

A partner does not violate the duty of loyalty or duty of care merely by acting
in the partner's individual interest. For the duty of loyalty or care to be at issue, the
partner's actions must involve the business of the partnership and be in conflict with the
partnership's interest in order for the duty of loyalty or duty of care to be at issue.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 50

A partner may adhere to the strict legal requirements of a written agreement,
in this case the MRI partnership agreement, and still be held responsible for violating a
fiduciary obligation to its partners if the action taken was improperly motivated, such as
taking advantage of its partnership position to obtain financial gain. It is for you, the jury, to
determine whether an alleged action has taken place and, if it is otherwise in compliance
with the terms of the MRIA partnership agreement between the parties, whether the action
was improperly motivated.

003242

INSTRUCTION NO. 51
MRIA's Claim of Civil Conspiracy

The MRI entities claim that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil conspiracy with GSR,
IMI, and ICR to harm MRIA. To recover on this claim the MRI entities must prove the
following elements to establish that a conspiracy existed:
1.

Saint Alphonsus had an express agreement with GSR, IMI, or ICR;

2.

To accomplish an unlawful objective or accomplish a lawful objective through

unlawful means
The essence of a cause of action for civil conspiracy is the civil wrong committed as
the objective of the conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that these propositions
required of the MRI entities have been proved, then you must consider the issue of the
affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver raised by Saint Alphonsus as set forth in
Instructions Nos. 42 and 43. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that
any of these propositions has not been proven, then your verdict should be for Saint
Alphonsus on this claim.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 52

If you determine that a conspiracy existed, consider which acts caused damage to
the MRI entities. Saint Alphonsus will be liable for a wrongful act that proximately causes
the MRI entities damages if the wrongful act was both:
1.

Perpetrated by Saint Alphonsus or perpetrated by GSR, ICR, or IMI in

furtherance of the conspiracy; and
2.

The act was a natural and probable consequence of the agreed upon

objective of the conspiracy.
If you find that both of these elements were proven with regard to an act,
then you should find that Saint Alphonsus is liable for the damages proximately caused by
that act. If you find that either of these elements was not proven with regard to an act,
then you should not find that Saint Alphonsus is liable for the damages caused by this act.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 53

By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion
as to whether MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile is entitled to damages.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 54

The amount of damages must be proven by MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile
with reasonable certainty. Reasonable certainty requires neither absolute assurance nor
mathematical exactitude of damages; rather the evidence need only be sufficient to
remove the existence of damages from the realm of speculation.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 55

If you find Saint Alphonsus breached its obilgations, and, as a result, MRIA, MRI
Center, and MRI Mobile suffered financial damages, then those damages are awardable to
MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile regardless of the fact that Saint Alphonsus is a
charitable hospital.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 56
Damages: Breach of Non-Compete Clause, Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and Civil Conspiracy Claims

If the jury decides that MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile are entitled to recover
from Saint Alphonsus on the breach of the non-compete clause claim, the breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, the civil conspiracy claim, the intentional
interference with prospective contractual relations claim, the breach of fiduciary duty claim,
or the misappropriation of a partnership opportunity claim, then the jury must determine the
amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI
Mobile for the net profits lost that the evidence proves to have been a natural and
proximate result of Saint Alphonsus's breach of contract.
Whether MRIA, MRI Center, MRI Mobile have proved any of these elements
is for the jury to decide.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 57

If you determine that Saint Alphonsus is liable to MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI
Mobile for a cause of action based on breaching a fiduciary duty by acting adversly to
MRIA on behalf of GSR, IMI, or ICR; by interfering with the prospective contractual
relations of the MRI entities; or engaging in civil conspiracy, you must take into account
that under those theories, others are potentially jointly responsible for what harm, if any,
MRIA, MRI Center, or MRI Mobile suffered. Thus, if you find that MRIA, MRI Center, or
MRI Mobile were harmed by wrongful acts jointly committed by Saint Alphonsus and GSR,
IMI, or ICR, then you must determine what percentage of the damages, if any are found, is
attributable to Saint Alphonsus and what percentage is attributable to the acts of GSR, IMI,
or ICR.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 57A
Alternatively, damages to MRI Center can also be measured by the loss in the
value or worth of MRI Center, which was sustained by MRI Center as a result of Saint
Alphonsus's alleged unlawful conduct. In considering the value of the business, you may
assume that the owner of a business is competent to testify about its value, although it is
up to you to decide the weight that you give to that testimony.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 58

If you find that Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary duties to the MRI entities by
misappropriating a partnership opportunity, the measure of damages is the disgorgement
or return of all of the net profits realized by Saint Alphonsus as a result of its
misappropriation or usurpation of the partnership opportunity.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 59

You are instructed that because MRIA's sole source of income was the 7.5%
management fee it collected from MRI Center and MRI Mobile, its lost revenues are limited
to the reduction, if any, to the management fee income it would have collected.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 60
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such
care cannot be recovered.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 61

In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or
decide any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws.

If

money damages are to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may
not agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method
of determining the amount of the damage award.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 62

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may
send a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate
with me by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on
any of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by
me.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 63

I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case.

I have instructed you

regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts.
In a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire
to the jury room for your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the
outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of
opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the
beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change
that position, even if shown that it is wrong.

Remember that you are not partisans or

advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the
ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after
a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 64

I will now draw the name of the alternate juror, to whom I will once again apologize
in advance. I will advise the alternate chosen that even at this time, it is possible, should
some problem arise, that you could be recalled and the jury instructed to begin its
deliberations anew with the alternate juror seated. For that reason, you are admonished
not to discuss this case with other jurors or anyone else, nor to form an opinion as to the
merits of the case.
Please leave your name and telephone number with the bailiff. The Court
will call you to advise you when any verdict is reached and what that verdict may be, or to
advise you if for any reason, you may be required to return to court for deliberations.
Thank you for your service.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 65
In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict.
This form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict
form to you now.
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
As to the MRIA entities' claims that Saint Alphonsus breached the Partnership
Agreement by breach of the non-compete clause?:
Question No. 1: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached the Partnership
Agreement by breaching the non-compete clause, as set forth in Instruction No. 39?
Answer to Question No. 1 :

Yes [

No [..__---J

Question No. 2: If you answered "yes" to Question 1, do you find that Saint Alphonsus
proved either its defense of Estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or Waiver, as
described in Instruction 43, as to the breach of the partnership agreement? If you
answered "no" to Question 1, leave your answer to this question blank.
Answer to Question No.2:

Yes [

No

L-[_

__.

As to the MRIA entities' claims that Saint Alphonsus breached the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing:
Question No. 3: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus has breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing as setforth in Instructions Nos. 40 and 41?
Answer to Question No 3.

Yes [

No [..____.

Question No. 4: If you answered "yes" to Question 3, do you find that Saint Alphonsus
proved either its defense of Estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or Waiver, as
described in Instruction 43, as to breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? If
you answered "no" to Question 3, leave your answer to this question blank.
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Answer to Question No. 4:

Yes.__[_ __,

No [._______.

As to MRI Center's and MRI Mobile's claims that Saint Alphonsus intentionally
interfered with MRI Center's, or MRI Mobile's prospective contractual relations or
business expectations:
Question No. 5: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus intentionally interfered with MRI
entities' prospective economic relations or business expectations, as described in
Instruction No. 44?

Answer to Question No.5: Yes

L....[_

__,

1

No [

Question No. 6: If you answered "yes" to Question 5, do you find that Saint Alphonsus
proved either its defense of estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or waiver, as
described in Instruction 43, as to interference with prospective contractual relations? If you
answered "no" to Question 5, leave your answer to this question blank.

Answer to Question No. 6:

Yes [

No

L...[_

__.

As to the MRI entities' claims that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary duty
owed to the MRI entities:
Question No. 7: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary duty owed to
MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile, as described in Instructions Nos. 45, 46, 47, 48, 49 and
50?

Answer to Question No. 7:

Yes

L....[_

__,

No [._______.

Question No. 8: If you answered "yes" to question no. 7, do you find that Saint Alphonsus
misappropriated a partnership opportunity as described in Instruction No. 47? You must
decide separately as to the two misappropriations alleged in this case: (A) the opportunity
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for MRIA to partner with GSR in IMI, and (B) MRI Mobile's opportunity to open a facility in
Meridian, Idaho
Answers to Question No. 8
For the opportunity to partner with radiologists in imaging centers: Yes [
For the Meridian opportunity:

Yes [

No

L...[_

_J

No[...._____.

Question No. 9: If you answered "yes" to Question 7, do you find that Saint Alphonsus
proved either its defense of estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or waiver, as
described in Instruction 43, as to breach of fiduciary duty? If you answered "no" to
Question 7, leave your answer to this question blank.
Answer to Question No.9:

Yes [

No [

1

As to MRI entities' claims that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil conspiracy:
Question No. 10: Do you find that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil conspiracy, as
described in Instruction No 51?
Answer to Question No. 10

Yes[...._____.

No,_[_ _.1

Question No. 11: If you answered "yes" to Question 10, do you find that Saint Alphonsus
proved either its defense of estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or waiver, as
described in Instruction 43, as to civil conspiracy? If you answered "no" to Question 10,
leave your answer to this question blank.
Answer to Question No. 11 :

Yes [

1

No [

1

If you left blank or answered "yes" to Questions 2, 4, 6, 9, and 11, then sign
the special verdict form and present it to the Bailiff. If you answered "no" to any of
Questions 2, 4, 6, 9, or 11, then continue to Question No. 12 below.
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As to Damages:
Question No.12: If you answered "yes" to Question 1, and "no" to Question 2, what

amount of net profits, if any, did each of the MRI entities lose as a result of the breach of
the partnership agreement? If you answered "no" to Question 1, or "yes" to Question 2, or
if the MRI entities have not adequately proven any amount of lost profits leave the answers
to this question blank.
Answer to Question No. 12:

MRI Center: $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
MRI Mobile: $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
You must now determine MRIA's share of those damages, and adjust the amounts
of damages to MRI Center and MRI Mobile

A. Total the damages for MRI Center and MRI Mobile
B. Multiply the result in A by 0.075
C. Multiply MRI Center's damages by 0.925
D. Multiply MRI Mobile's damages by 0.925
You must now enter the amounts you calculated above as your final answer to this
question

MRI Associates (answer to 8 above):

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Center (answer to C above):

$._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Mobile (answer to D above):

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Question No. 13: If you answered "yes" to Question 1, and "no" to Question 2, what

amount of value, if any, did MRI Center lose as a result of the breach of the partnership
agreement? If you answered "no" to Question 1, or "yes" to Question 2, or if MRI Center
has not adequately proven any amount of lost value leave the answer to this question
blank.
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Answer to Question No. 13:
MRI Center:

$

--------------------

Question No. 14: If you answered "yes" to Question 3, and "no" to Question 4, what
amount of net profits, if any, did each of the MRI entities lose as a result of the breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? If you answered "no" to Question 3, or "yes" to
Question 4, or if the MRI entities have not adequately proven any amount of lost profits
leave the answers to this question blank.
Answer to Question No. 14:
MRI Center: $_________________
MRI Mobile: $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
You must now determine MRIA's share of those damages, and adjust the amounts
of damages to MRI Center and MRI Mobile

A Total the damages for MRI Center and MRI Mobile
B. Multiply the result in A by 0.075
C. Multiply MRI Center's damages by 0.925
D. Multiply MRI Mobile's damages by 0.925
You must now enter the amounts you calculated above as your final answer to this
question
MRI Associates (answer to 8 above):

$_________________

MRI Center (answer to C above):

$______________

MRI Mobile (answer to D above):

$______________

Question No. 15: If you answered "yes" to Question 3, and "no" to Question 4, what
amount of value, if any, did MRI Center lose as a result of the breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing? If you answered "no" to Question 3, or "yes" to Question 4, or
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if MRI Center has not adequately proven any amount of lost value leave the answer to this
question blank.

Answer to Question No. 15:
MRI Center:

$

--------------------

Question No. 16: If you answered "yes" to Question 5, and "no" to Question 6, what
amount of net profits, if any, did MRI Center or MRI Mobile lose as a result of the
intentional interference with prospective contractual relations? If you answered "no" to
Question 5, or "yes" to Question 6, or if the MRI Center and MRI Mobile have not
adequately proven any amount of lost profits leave the answers to this question blank.
Answer to Question No. 16:
M Rl Center:
MRI Mobile:

$

-------------------$
--------------------

Question No. 17: If you answered "yes" to Question 5, and "no" to Question 6, what
amount of value, if any did MRI Center lose as a result of the intentional interference with
prospective contractual relations? If you answered "no" to Question 5, or "yes" to Question
6, or if the MRI Center has not adequately proven any amount of lost value leave the
answer to this question blank.
Answer to Question No. 17:
MRI Center:

$

--------------------

Question No.18: If you assigned damages in Question 16 or 17, what percentage of the
damages is attributable to Saint Alphonsus, and what percentage is attributable to Gem
State Radiology, Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Imaging Center Radiologists? Your
answers together must equal one hundred percent (100%)

003263

Answer to Question No. 18:
Saint Alphonsus

%

GSR, IMI, and ICR

%

Question No. 19: If you assigned damages in Question 16, applying the percentage from
Question 18, what is the total dollar amount of lost net profits attributable to Saint
Alphonsus?

Answer to Question No. 19:
MRI Center:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Mobile:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Question No. 20: If you assigned damages in Question 17, applying the percentage from
Question 18, what is the total dollar amount of lost business value attributable to Saint
Alphonsus?

Answer to Question No. 20:
MRI Center:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Question No. 21: If you answered "yes" to Question 7 and/or answered "yes" to Question
8 as to the Meridian opportunity, and "no" to Question 9, what amount of net profits, if any
did each of the MRI entities lose as a result of the breach of fiduciary duty? If you
answered "no" to Question 7, or "yes" to Question 9, or if the MRI entities have not
adequately proven any amount of lost profits leave the answers to this question blank.

Answer to Question No. 21:
MRI Center. $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
MRI Mobile: $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

You must now determine MRIA's share of those damages, and adjust the amounts
of damages to MRI Center and MRI Mobile
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A. Total the damages for MRI Center and MRI Mobile
B. Multiply the result in A by 0.075
C. Multiply MRI Center's damages by 0.925
D. Multiply MRI Mobile's damages by 0.925
You must now enter the amounts you calculated above as your final answer to this
question
MRI Associates (answer to 8 above):

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Center (answer to C above):

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Mobile (answer to D above):

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Question No. 22: If you answered "yes" to Question 7, and "no" to Question 9, what
amount of value, if any, did MRI Center lose as a result of the breach of fiduciary duty? If
you answered "no" to Question 7, or "yes" to Question 9, or if MRI Center has not
adequately proven any amount of lost value leave the answer to this question blank.
Answer to Question No. 22:
MRI Center:

$

---------------

Question No. 23: If you assigned damages in Question 21 or 22, what percentage of the
damages is attributable to Saint Alphonsus, and what percentage is attributable to Gem
State Radiology, Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Imaging Center Radiologists? Your
answers together must equal one hundred percent (100%)
Answer to Question No. 23:
Saint Alphonsus

%

GSR, IMI, and ICR _ _ _ _ _%
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Question No. 24: If you assigned damages in Question 21, applying the percentage from
Question 23, what is the total dollar amount of net lost profits attributable to Saint
Alphonsus?
Answer to Question No. 24:
MRI Center:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Mobile:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Associates

$

--------------------

Question No. 25: If you assigned damages in Question 22, applying the percentage from
Question 23, what is the total dollar amount of lost business value attributable to Saint
Alphonsus?
Answer to Question No. 25:
MRI Center:

$

--------------------

Question No. 26: If you answered "yes" to Question 10, and "no" to Question 11, what
amount of net profits did each of the MRI entities lose as a result of the civil conspiracy? If
you answered "no" to Question 10, or "yes" to Question 11, or if the MRI entities have not
adequately proven any amount of lost profits leave the answers to this question blank.
Answer to Question No. 26:
MRI Center: $_______________
MRI Mobile: $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
You must now determine MRIA's share of those damages, and adjust the amounts
of damages to MRI Center and MRI Mobile

A. Total the damages for MRI Center and MRI Mobile
B. Multiply the result in A by 0.075
C. Multiply MRI Center's damages by 0.925
D. Multiply MRI Mobile's damages by 0.925
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You must now enter the amounts you calculated above as your final answer to this
question
MRI Associates (answer to B above):

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Center (answer to C above):

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MRI Mobile (answer to D above):

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Question No. 27: If you answered "yes" to Question 10, and "no" to Question 11, what
amount of value did MRI Center lose as a result of the civil conspiracy? If you answered
"no" to Question 7, or ''yes" to Question 9, or if MRI Center has not adequately proven any
amount of lost value leave the answer to this question blank.
Answer to Question No. 27:
MRI Center:

$

-------------

Question No. 28: If you assigned damages in Question 26 or 27, what percentage of the
damages is attributable to Saint Alphonsus, and what percentage is attributable to Gem
State Radiology, Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Imaging Center Radiologists? Your
answers together must equal one hundred percent (100%)
Answer to Question No. 28:

%

Saint Alphonsus

GSR, IMI, and ICR _ _ _ _ _ %

Question No. 29: If you assigned damages in Question 26, applying the percentage from
Question 28, what is the total dollar amount of net lost profits attributable to Saint
Alphonsus?
Answer to Question No. 29:
MRI Center:

$

MRI Mobile:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

M Rl Associates

$
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Question No. 30: If you assigned damages in Question 27, applying the percentage from

Question 28, what is the total dollar amount of lost business value attributable to Saint
Alphonsus?

Answer to Question No. 30:

MRI Center:

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Question 31: Which of Questions 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 29, and 30 resulted in the

largest total dollar amount?
Answer to Question No. 31:

Question No. 32: If you answered "yes" to Question 8 and "no" to Question 9, what is the

total amount of net profits Saint Alphonsus realized as a result of misappropriating a
partnership opportunity or opportunities?
Answer to Question No. 32:

Opportunity to partner with radiologists in imaging centers $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Meridian opportunity

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

DATED this _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,

Presiding Juror
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INSTRUCTION NO. 66

On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a presiding juror, who will
preside over your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow
the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the
instructions on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon
as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the
verdict, you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the
same nine agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, the presiding juror alone
will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing
will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff,
who will then return you into open court.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 66A

The Jury has asked:
We need the following evidence (posters):
Time lines that Banducci used in closing with blue (we know) above the line
and red (we didn't know) below the line.

The Court responds as follows:
While the exhibit you refer to was marked for identification and used in
closing argument, it was not an admitted exhibit.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 67

You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged with
the sincere thanks of this Court. The question may arise as to whether you may discuss
this case with the attorneys or with anyone else. For your guidance, the Court instructs
you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to anyone else, is entirely your own decision.
It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you wish to, but you are not required to do so,
and you may choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you choose to, you may
tell them as much or as little as you like, but you should be careful to respect the privacy
and feelings of your fellow jurors. Remember that they understood their deliberations to be
confidential. Therefore, you should limit your comments to your own perceptions and
feelings. If anyone persists in discussing the case over your objection, or becomes critical
of your service, either before or after any discussion has begun, please report it to me.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 68
In the past, it has been my practice to meet with jurors following a case to answer
any questions you might have to which it was appropriate for me to respond. Upon
request, I have allowed counsel for both parties to be present. However, the Idaho
Supreme Court on July 22, 2005, adopted the following language in an opinion which
addressed this practice:
"To the extent there is a practice of trial judges engaging jurors in a dialogue of
questions and answers following a verdict, but before post trial matters, including
sentencing, are heard and decided, it is improper. It is no different than any other ex parte
contact that may influence the outcome of a proceeding. After a verdict is taken the judge
may thank the jury members for their service and address those issues of accommodating
the jury members' convenience. Otherwise, the door between the bench and the jury is
closed so long as the case is pending, only to be opened in a proper proceeding."
This Court and all officers of the court are required to obey the orders of the
Supreme Court. I will thus be unable to meet with you as per the Idaho Supreme Court's
directive to all trial judges in this state.

~

Dated this 1.8 day of

Ov-k.J., , 2011.
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IUA---'P.M.~
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

.

NOV 0 2 2011

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ~4&TOPHER 0. RICH Clerk

_...,

IV DIANE OATMAN'

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, INC., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219

ORDER RE: PROPOSED JUDGMENT

---------------------------- )
The Court has received a proposed judgment, as requested, from MRI Associates. The
Court is concerned about the inclusion of the disgorgement figure on the judgment without
language clarifying that the jury's figure was advisory to the Court. Both parties have until 5:00
PM on November 8, 2011, to file responses to the Court's concerns or to raise any other concerns
the parties have with the judgment proposed by MRI Associates.

,J

SO ORDERED AND DATED this~ day ofNovember, 2011.

Order re: Proposed Judgment 1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
~·
I hereby certify that on this
day ofNovember, 2011, I mailed (served) a true and
· correct copy of the within instrument to:

3__

JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
PO BOX2837
BOISE, ID 83701
DONALDAYER
JONES DAY
51 LOUSIANA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST. STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court

~~~:-~
Deputy Court Clerk

Order re: Proposed Judgment 2
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AM.________.P,M..-----,~--f--

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)

NOV 0 2 2011

wwoodard@bwslawgroup~com

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

Dara Parker (ISB ~-177)

By CHRISTINE SWEET
DEPUTY

dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
ISTARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

SUBMISSION OF PROPOSED
JUDGMENT

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

SUBMISSION OF PROPOSED JUDGMENT - 1

ORIGINAL
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As instructed by the Court, MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership ("MRI
Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited ("MRI Limited") submit the attached Proposed Judgment
DATED this 2nd day ofNovember, 2011.

~--~~~~
ara L. ~arker
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMAN
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

SUBMISSION OF PROPOSED JUDGMENT - 2

003277

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day ofNovember, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

SUBMISSION OF PROPOSED JUDGMENT - 3

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
~Facsimile

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
~Facsimile
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT
v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT- 1
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This action having come for jury trial before the Hon. Michael E. Wetherell, and the
issues having been duly tried and a verdict having been rendered by the jury on October 31,
2011, IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDICATED THAT:
1.

As to the claims of MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA") MRI Limited Partnership

("MRI Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited ("MRI Limited") (collectively "MRIA entities") that
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
(collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") breached the Partnership Agreement by breaching the noncompete clause found therein, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages
MRIA: $3,906,338
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages
MRI Center: $25,420,000
2.

As to the claims of the MRI entities that Saint Alphonsus breached the covenant

of good faith and fair dealing, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages
MRIA: $3,906,338
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages
MRI Center: $25,420,000

[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT- 2

003280

3.

As to the claims ofMRI Center and MRI Mobile that Saint Alphonsus

intentionally interfered with MRI Center's or MRI Mobile's prospective contractual relations the
following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages
MRI Center: $25,130,149
MRI Mobile: $21,745,914
Lost Value Damages
MRI Center: $22,878,000
4.

As to the claims of the MRI entities that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary

duty owed to the MRI entities the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages
MRIA: $3,906,338
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages
MRI Center: $25,420,000
Disgorgement
Opportunity to partner with the radiologist: $11,510,949
Meridian opportunity: $19,061,617
5.

As to the claims of the MRI entities that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil

conspiracy the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages
MRIA: $3,125,070
MRI Center: $20,662,566
MRI Mobile: $17,879,973

[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT- 3
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.
Lost Value Damages
MRI Center: $20,336,000
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, based upon the finding of the
jury, the amount of $52,084,515 is awarded to the MRI entities, plus post-judgment interest at
the statutory rate.
The judgment shall be amended at such time as the Court determines the amount of
attorneys' fees and costs it will award to the MRI entities
DATED this_ day ofNovember 2011.

Michael E. Wetherell
District Judge

[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT - 4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ _ day of
the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:

2011, a true and correct copy of

Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plainti.ff/Counterdefendant

0
0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Facsimile

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plainti.ff/Counterdefendant

0
0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Facsimile

Thomas A. Banducci
Wade L. Woodard
Dara Parker
BrentS. Bastian
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Fax Number: 208-342-4455

0
0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Facsimile

[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT- 5
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~·----F'-IL'~·~· 4; 3'!
Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)

NOV 0 8 2011

tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-D08219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
CONCERNING DISGORGEMENT

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
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In place of the disgorgement section in its previously-submitted Proposed Judgment,
Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile
Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit the attached proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law concerning disgorgement. A memorandum in support follows immediately below.
As this Court has recognized, Idaho statutes provide that if a partner breaches a fiduciary
duty to the partnership, he must hold in trust any funds realized as a result of such breach. I. C. §
53-3-404(b) and cmt. 2. (See Order re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories, Sept. 27, 2011 at
pp. 12-13; Trial Tr. Sept. 26, 2011 at pp. 2148-49.) The Court therefore held that disgorgement
was an appropriate remedy in this case. (!d.) Notably, disgorgement is a form of unjust
enrichment, an equitable remedy. Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 612, 200 P.3d 1153, 1161
(2009) (unjust enrichment is a measure of equitable recovery). The Court, not a jury, must hear
equitable claims. David Steed and Associates, Inc. v. Young, 115 Idaho 247, 256, 766 P.2d 717,
726 (1988) (overturned on other grounds by Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc.,
121 Idaho 266, 824 P .2d 841 ( 1991)). It is appropriate, however, for a court to ask the jury to
make advisory findings on equitable questions, as the Court did in this case. I.R.C.P. 39(c);
Bach v. Bagley 148 Idaho 784, 7976, 229 P.3d 1146, 1158 (2010). In its verdict, the jury was
asked and answered:
Question No.8: If you answered "yes" to question no. 7, do you find that Saint
Alphonsus misappropriated a partnership opportunity as described in Instruction
No. 47? You must decide separately as to the two misappropriations alleged in
this case: (A) the opportunity for MRIA to partner with GSR in IMI, and (B) MRI
Mobile's opportunity to open a facility in Meridian, Idaho.
Answers to Question No.8
For the opportunity to partner with radiologists in imaging centers: Yes L.XJ No[]
For the Meridian opportunity: Yes IX.l No[_]
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Question No.9: If you answered "yes" to Question 7, do you find that Saint
Alphonsus proved either its defense of estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or
waiver, as described in Instruction 43, as to breach of fiduciary duty? If you
answered "no" to Question 7, leave your answer to this question blank.
Answer to Question No.9: Yes [_] No

LXJ

Question No. 32: If you answered "yes" to Question 8 and "no" to Question 9,
what is the total amount of net profits Saint Alphonsus realized as a result of
misappropriating a partnership opportunity or opportunities?
Answer to Question No. 32:
Opportunity to partner with radiologist imaging centers
$11,510,949
Meridian Opportunity
$19,061,617
(Jury verdict of October 31, 2011 ). Notwithstanding this advisory opinion, "[ w ]here an advisory
verdict is issued on equitable claims, the trial judge is still required to make independent findings
of fact and conclusions of law on the equitable claims before him, not solely relying on the jury's
findings." Bach, 148 Idaho at 7976, 229 P.3d at 1158. See also Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(a);

Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 553, 165 P.3d 261, 267 (2007).
MRIA therefore asks that the Court make the proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law attached hereto as Exhibit A, based on the following. As the jury found, the Court should
hold that Saint Alphonsus misappropriated a partnership opportunity as to (A) the opportunity
for MRIA to partner with GSR in IMI, and (B) MRI Mobile's opportunity to open a facility in
Meridian, Idaho. The Court should likewise find that Saint Alphonsus proved neither its defense
of estoppel nor waiver as to breach of fiduciary duty.
As to damages, MRIA asks that the Court find differently than the jury advised. As noted
above, the jury awarded $11 ,510,949 for the overall opportunity to partner with the radiologists

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
CONCERNING DISGORGEMENT - 3

003286

and $19,061,617 for the Meridian opportunity. The Meridian opportunity, however, should be a
part of and therefore smaller than the overall opportunity to partner with the radiologists. The
jury may have thought that these numbers were cumulative. (See Ex. 5067R-2). The
$11,510,949 number appears to be taken from Exhibit 5067R-2 as well; it appears that the jury
mistakenly took the sum of the profits from the IMI Campus facility ($1 0, 724,466) and the IMI
Downtown facility ($12,297,432) through 2010, and then divided that sum in half. Neither of
these approaches was taken by any expert or witness in the case.
Rather, as to the opportunity to partner with the radiologists, MRIA presented the
unrebutted method of computing disgorgement damages through its experts, Mr. Budge and Mr.
Wilhoite. Mr. Budge testified that Saint Alphonsus's 50 percent share ofiMI's MRI-related
profits from April2006 through 2010 was $17,078,469. (See Trial Tr., Oct. 14, 2011, at pp.
4510:25-4518:21; Ex. 5082). Mr. Wilhoite testified that Saint Alphonsus's 50 percent share of
all IMI's MRI-related profits from 2011 through 2015 was $8,250,000. (See Trial Tr. Oct. 17,
2011, at pp. 4724:6-4725:7; Ex. 5082). The sum of these figures, and the proper amount of
disgorgement for MRIA's opportunity to partner with all radiologist imaging centers, is
$25,328,469. (See Trial Tr. Oct. 17,2011, at pp. 4726:16-4727:4; Ex. 5082).
It is MRIA's position that the Court should simply award the full disgorgement amount,

which encompasses the Meridian opportunity. Such disgorgement represents the full
disgorgement amount for Saint Alphonsus's usurpation of the opportunity to join with the
radiologists. As noted above, the Meridian opportunity is otherwise incorporated into the
calculation for the full $25,328,469. However, to the extent that the Court disagrees with the
jury's advisory verdict with respect to Question No.8 and holds that Saint Alphonsus did not
misappropriate the opportunity to partner with radiologists in imaging centers but agrees with the
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jury that Saint Alphonsus did misappropriate the Meridian opportunity, the calculation of the
Meridian opportunity alone can be computed from the evidence presented.
As to the Meridian opportunity alone, the undisputed amount of profits derived by Saint
Alphonsus related to that opportunity is $7,158,029. 1 That amount is derived from the testimony
of Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite and Exhibit Numbers 5067R-2 and 5078R. That amount is
calculated by taking two-thirds of the amount of IMI profits in 2006 for the Magicview
(Meridian) location as depicted on Exhibit Number 5067R-2 to derive IMI's profits for the
Magicview location for April2006 through December 2006, that is, $2,341,227. (See Trial Tr.
Oct. 14, 2010, at pp. 4512:25-4513:6). That amount is then added to the totals for Magicview for
the years 2007 through 2010 on Exhibit Number 5067R-2 for a total of$10,979,014,
representing IMI's profits for the Magicview location from April2006 through 2010. Then,
according to Mr. Wilhoite, to determine the future profits of IMI related to the Magicview
location, one must take the Magicview amount for 2010 on Exhibit 5067R-2, $1,592,155, and
divide it by the total of all locations for 2010 on Exhibit 5067R-2, $4,771,631, to determine what
percentage Magicview is of the total for 2010. (Trial Tr. Oct. 17, 2011 at 4720-21.) That
percentage is .333671. That percentage is then applied to the $10,001,000 future profits figure
calculated by Wilhoite on Exhibit Number 5078R for an amount of$3,337,044, which represents
future IMI profits related to the Magicview location. (Id.) The $3,337,044 future profits amount
is then added to $10,979,014lost profits for April2005 through 2010 for a total of$14,316,058.

MRIA did not directly present this number in its expert testimony, although it can be derived from this
testimony.
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That amount should then be reduced by 50 percent for a total of$7,158,029 to reflect Saint
Alphonsus's share of the IMI's profits related to the Magicview location. 2
Saint Alphonsus's expert offered no evidence to rebut either of these amounts, (see Trial
Tr. Oct. 25, 2011, at 6236, 6-13). Therefore, MRIA requests that the Court to enter
disgorgement damages in the amount of$25,328,469, which is the proper amount of
disgorgement for MRIA's opportunity to partner with all radiologist imaging centers, which
includes the Meridian opportunity.
DATED this 8th day ofNovember, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Attorney for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

2

The following is that calculation presented in table form:

2/3 IMI Profits for April-December 2006
Sum of totals for Magicview for the years 2007 through
2010

Subtotal for IMI Profits for Magicview from April
2006 through 2010
Magicview amount for 2010 divided by total of all
locations for 2010, to determine what percentage of
Magicview is total for 2010
Apply to future profits figure to determine Subtotal
for IMI Future Profits for Magicview
Sum of subtotal for past and future IMI profits
Divided by Y:z for Saint Alphonsus's share

.66666($3,511 ,842)
$3,484,268 +
1,828,963 +
1,732,401 +
1,592,155

$2,341,227
$8,637,787

$10,979,014
$1,592,155/4,771,631

.333671

.333671($1 0,001 ,000)

$3,337,044

$10,979,014 +
$3,337,044
$14,316,058/2

$14,316,058
$7,158,029
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0 Hand Delivery
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Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
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Thomas Davis
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The Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the
disgorgement theory of damages presented in this case.

FINDINGS OF FACT
This theory of damages was presented to the jury for an advisory opinion. In its verdict,
the jury was asked and answered:
Question No.8: If you answered "yes" to question no. 7, do you find that Saint
Alphonsus misappropriated a partnership opportunity as described in Instruction
No. 47? You must decide separately as to the two misappropriations alleged in
this case: (A) the opportunity for MRIA to partner with GSR in IMI, and (B) MRI
Mobile's opportunity to open a facility in Meridian, Idaho.
Answers to Question No. 8
For the opportunity to partner with radiologists in imaging centers: Yes UU No[]
For the Meridian opportunity: Yes IXJ No

LJ

Question No.9: If you answered "yes" to Question 7, do you find that Saint
Alphonsus proved either its defense of estoppel, as described in Instruction 42, or
waiver, as described in Instruction 43, as to breach of fiduciary duty? If you
answered "no" to Question 7, leave your answer to this question blank.
Answer to Question No.9: Yes

LJ No LX]

Question No. 32: If you answered "yes" to Question 8 and "no" to Question 9,
what is the total amount of net profits Saint Alphonsus realized as a result of
misappropriating a partnership opportunity or opportunities?
Answer to Question No. 32:
Opportunity to partner with radiologist imaging centers
$11,510,949
Meridian Opportunity
$19,061,617
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The Court finds, in agreement with the jury's recommendation, that Saint Alphonsus breached its
fiduciary duties including misappropriating the opportunity for MRIA to partner with GSR in
IMI and open a facility in Meridian, Idaho. Although not uncontested, this conclusion is wellsupported by substantial evidence presented by multiple witnesses during the course of this trial.
The Court also finds that Saint Alphonsus did not meet its burden to demonstrate its alleged
defenses of waiver and estoppel.
The Court also holds that disgorgement damages were proven in this case in the amount
of$25,328,469. The Court notes that the disgorgement damages suggested by the jury in its
advisory opinion were apparently the result of some type of confusion on the part of the jury,
most strongly evidenced by the fact that its award of damages concerning the Meridian
opportunity was more than Saint Alphonsus's breach of fiduciary duty, including the opportunity
to partner with the radiologists. The Meridian opportunity is subsumed by the larger opportunity
to partner with the radiologists. Therefore, while the Court agrees with the jury's finding of
liability, it notes again that it must make its own factual conclusions as to the amount of
damages.
The amount of disgorgement damages for Saint Alphonsus's breach of fiduciary duty as a
whole, including the opportunity to partner with the radiologists, was presented through MRIA's
experts, Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite. Mr. Budge testified that Saint Alphonsus's 50 percent
share ofiMI's MRI-related profits from April2006 through 2010 was $17,078,469. (See Trial
Tr., Oct. 14, 2011, at pp. 4510:25-4518:21; Ex. 5082). Mr. Wilhoite testified that Saint
Alphonsus's prospective 50 percent share of all IMI's MRI-related profits from 2011 through
2015 was $8,250,000. (See Trial Tr. Oct. 17, 2011, at pp. 4724:6-4725:7; Ex. 5082). The sum of
[PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW CONCERNING
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these figures, and the proper amount of disgorgement for MRIA's opportunity to partner with all
radiologist imaging centers, is $25,328,469. (See Trial Tr. Oct. 17, 2011, at pp. 4726:16-4727:4;
Ex. 5082). The Court finds there is no need to award damages specific to the Meridian
opportunity, as these damages are subsumed by the broader award related to Saint Alphonsus's
breach of fiduciary duty, including the opportunity to partner with the radiologists. The Court
notes that while Saint Alphonsus disputed MRIA' s entitlement to such damages, the amount of
such damages was unrebutted by Saint Alphonsus (Trial Tr. Oct. 25, 2011, at 6236, 6-13).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") presented a disgorgement theory of damages in this case,
contending that Saint Alphonsus was required to disgorge any profits it received as a result of its
breaches of fiduciary duty. Idaho partnership law specifically provides for this theory. The
RUPA provides that "[a] partner's duty ofloyalty ... , includes [the duty to] hold as trustee for
[the partnership] any ... benefit derived by the partner in the conduct ... of the partnership
business ... including the appropriation of a partnership opportunity ...."I. C. § 53-3-404(b)(1 ).
Under that theory, "the partnership can recover any money or property in the partner's hands that
can be traced to the partnership." I. C. § 53-3-404 cmt. 2. In addition, the RUPA provides that
following dissociation "[t]he partner's duty ofloyalty under section 53-3-404(b)(l) ... continues
... with regard to matters arising and events occurring before the partner's dissociation." I. C. §
53-3-603(c). Consequently, the duty to hold profits obtained from breaches of fiduciary duty,
including the appropriation of a partnership opportunity, in trust for the partnership continues
after dissociation. Therefore, any profits derived from Saint Alphonsus's breach of the duty of
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loyalty, including usurping a partnership opportunity, even if accruing after the end of the
noncompetition agreement on April1, 2005, must be disgorged.
Disgorgement is a form of unjust enrichment, an equitable remedy. Farrell v. Whiteman,
146 Idaho 604, 612, 200 P.3d 1153, 1161 (2009) (unjust enrichment is a measure of equitable
recovery). The Court, not a jury, must hear equitable claims. David Steed and Associates, Inc. v.

Young, 115 Idaho 247, 256, 766 P.2d 717, 726 (1988) (overturned on other grounds by Idaho
First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991)). It is
appropriate, however, for a court to ask the jury to make advisory findings on equitable
questions, as the Court has done in this case. I.R.C.P. 39(c); Bach v. Bagley 148 Idaho 784,
7976, 229 P.3d 1146, 1158 (2010).
Notwithstanding this advisory opinion, "[w]here an advisory verdict is issued on
equitable claims, the trial judge is still required to make independent findings of fact and
conclusions oflaw on the equitable claims before him, not solely relying on the jury's findings."

Bach, 148 Idaho at 7976, 229 P.3d at 1158. See also Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(a); Vanderford Co. v.
Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 553, 165 P.3d 261, 267 (2007). While the Court recognizes the
advisory opinion ofthe jury, it nevertheless makes these independent findings based upon the
evidence presented at trial. Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court
holds that MRIA is entitled to disgorgement damages in the amount of$25,328,469. These
findings will be incorporated into the judgment.
DATED this_ day ofNovember, 2011.

Michael E. Wetherell
District Judge
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Lost Profit Summary Without Eagle Through 2010

-

SARMC

Magicview

1999

Eagle

Total

Downtmvn

$

252,749

$

252,749

2000

1,254,972

1,254,972

2001

1,927,852

2002
2003

$

2004
2005

$

2006
2007
2008

29,420

2010

$

1,566,169

2,341,547
1,730,890

1,375,115

3,716,662

1,274,214
963,754

3,005,104
4,835,538

805,507
947,963

5,700,998
6,848,002

3,842,364
3,511,842
3,484,268

1,383,649
2,415,771

2009

(1,002,813)

1,927,852
563,356

2,069,080
2,283,427

1,828,963

687,981

4,586,024

1,732,401

604,799

2,543,119
10,724,466

1,592,155
19,061,617

636,357
12,297,432

4,620,627
4,771,631
42,083,515

$

$

$
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DAMAGES
Without Eagle
METHOD 1(1999-2010)

METHOD I (2011-2015)

(Lost Profits)
MRIC

$10,001,000 X 49%

$4,900,490

MRIM

$10,001,000 X

$5,100,510

51%

$10,001,000

$42,083,515
$10,001,000
$52,084,515

..
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lMI Profits
Year

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

$

Operations

frotn Apr-2006

$

(1,677,697)
1,628,475
2,458,680
1,322,647
4,467,774
3,646,145
2,952,224
6,580,143
6,947,130
7,540,117
7,293,388
7,441)93
50,600,219

$

16l500l000
67,100,219

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

2011-2015
TOTAL

from MRI

SARMC
50(}{, Profit Share

$

$

2,467,554
3,473,565
3,770,059
3,646,694
3,720,597
17,078,469

$

8,250l000
25,328,469
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Peter J. Romatowski
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OBJECTIONS
AND RESPONSE TO MRIA'S
PROPOSED JUDGMENT

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
In accordance with the Court's order ofNovember 2, 2011, Saint Alphonsus offers the
following objections and response to MRIA's proposed judgment.
I.

THE JUDGMENT SHOULD INCLUDE SAINT ALPHONSUS'S DEPARTING
PARTNER SHARE PLUS STATUTORY INTEREST ON THAT SHARE

The judgment in this matter must reflect the relief previously awarded to Saint Alphonsus
on its claim for the return of its equity interest in the MRIA partnership, which relief was
recently reconfirmed by this Court. See Consolidated Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment
Heard May 18,2011, at 4.
In findings of fact and conclusions of law issued after the first trial, Judge McLaughlin
held that the valuation of Saint Alphonsus's recoverable ownership interest in MRIA is
controlled by the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUP A"), and not by the provisions of the
MRIA partnership agreement, and valued that ownership interest at $4.6 million. See Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Sept. 21,2007, at 6. MRIA did not appeal this
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ruling. Accordingly, on April 11, 2011, Saint Alphonsus moved for summary judgment in favor
of Saint Alphonsus for "the buy-out price to which it is entitled under Idaho Code § 53-3-701,
which totals $4,600,000 plus 12% statutory interest running from the date of dissociation (April
1, 2004) until the date of payment." Mot. for Summ. J. on Claim for Partnership Interest at 2;
Idaho Code§ 53-3-701(b) ("Interest shall be paid [on the buy-out price] from the date of
dissociation to the date of payment."); see also Hr'g Tr., May 18, 2011, at 86 (argument of
MRIA counsel conceding that "[i]fthe RUPA provisions apply," then Saint Alphonsus is entitled
to "well over four million, plus 12 percent interest" "accruing" "from the date of withdrawal").
This Court held on June 17, 2011, that the Supreme Court had not disturbed Judge McLaughlin's
ruling that RUP A applies, see Consolidated Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard
May 18, 2011, at 4, and ruled that "Saint Alphonsus' s motion for summary judgment regarding
its share ofMRIA to which it is entitled is hereby GRANTED," id. at 9.
This relief must be reflected in the Court's judgment. Moreover, because the full amount
of the award in favor of Saint Alphonsus, including the $4.6 million buy-out price and
approximately $4.1 million in interest accrued to date, exceeds the approximately $3.9 million in
damages awarded by the jury to MRIA, the judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus should reflect
an offset of the amount awarded to MRIA. Accordingly, Saint Alphonsus requests that the
judgment include the following language:
Pursuant to the Court's Consolidated Order re: Motions for Summary
Judgment Heard May 18, 2011, and the Court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law dated September 21, 2007, judgment on Plaintiff
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care's claim against MRI Associates, LLP,
for the buyout price required under Idaho Code § 53-3-701 is hereby
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entered on behalf of Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care and against MRI
Associates, LLP, in the amount of $4,600,000, plus interest at the
statutory rate of 12% per year from April1, 2004, through the date that
MRIA satisfies this judgment, with the total amount due from MRIA to
be reduced by $3,906,388.

II.

THE COURT SHOULD AWARD A SINGLE JUDGMENT, NOT MULTIPLE
"ALTERNATIVES"
MRIA's proposed judgment is improper because it seeks multiple alternative awards of

money. There needs to be a single judgment which defines to whom, and in what amounts, Saint
Alphonsus is liable. In view of the Court's decision to structure the verdict form using multiple
damage alternatives and a single question, No. 31, asking which ofthe alternatives is the largest,
the Court should now carry through on the decision made at that time, at the request of MRIA.
The jury responded to Special Verdict Question No. 31 that the award under Question No. 12 is
the largest (as indeed it is), and therefore the Court should enter judgment on the amounts set
forth there: $3,906,338 for MRIA, $25,828,208 for MRI Center, and $22,349,967 for MRI
Mobile. 1 This course is dictated by the decisions already made by the Court in formulating the
verdict form? Moreover, a definite and certain judgment is necessary in order to define the
obligations of the parties, and to clarify precisely the issues on appeal.

1

As noted above, the judgment in favor of MRIA must then be set off against the judgment in
favor of Saint Alphonsus on its claim for return of its partnership share.
2

By raising this point, which flows from the decisions the Court already made, Saint Alphonsus

does not waive its objections to the special verdict form, including its argument that there should have
been apportionment of fault as to all claims, including the contract claim. Moreover, any judgment
entered at this time would be subject to any modifications that the Court might find appropriate as a result
of motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial, which are not due to be filed until
"fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment." See Idaho R. Civ. P. 50(b) & 59(b ).
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III.

THE JURY'S DISGORGEMENT FINDINGS ARE ADVISORY, AND THE
MERIDIAN DISGORGEMENT FIGURE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY
EVIDENCE
MRIA's proposed judgment also erroneously treats the jury's disgorgement findings and

disgorgement amounts as binding factual findings. However, as noted by the Court prior to the
submission of the case to the jury, disgorgement is an equitable remedy to be decided by the
Court, and that the jury's findings on disgorgement were advisory only. See 10/26111 Tr. at
6434. And in the event that the lost profit award should be set aside, this disgorgement could
become relevant as an alternative recovery. Thus, before judgment can be entered, the Court will
have to determine whether MRIA is entitled to disgorgement, and if so, what amount of
disgorgement, is established by the record. This determination cannot simply be done by
reference to the jury's advisory findings, which are not supportable in the record and are contrary
to even MRIA's own prior arguments.
In particular, the jury's advisory finding that Saint Alphonsus realized approximately $19
million in net profits as a result of misappropriating the Meridian opportunity, see Special
Verdict Form, Question No. 32, is incorrect and unsupportable on the record. Saint Alphonsus's
share ofiMI's MRI profits attributable to IMI's Meridian facility is nowhere close to $19
million, and MRIA has never claimed that it is. Rather, during closing argument, MRIA's
counsel merely stated that the calculation for Meridian was "complicated" but did not state what
that amount would be (see draft of 10/28/11 Tr. at p. 291 (Ex. A)), and though counsel did not
state the figure aloud on the record, the jury verdict form that counsel wrote on suggested a
figure of approximately $8 million for Meridian disgorgement. In fact, Saint Alphonsus believes
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the amount is significantly lower than that when one accounts for the portion of Saint
Alphonsus's $11 million investment attributable to IMI's Meridian operations. But whatever the
"complicated" calculation upon which MRIA's counsel was relying, the fact remains that MRIA
did not offer evidence during the trial that broke down Saint Alphonsus's MRI profits on a
facility-by-facility basis, and without such evidence, there should be no award of disgorgement
for the Meridian facility, let alone an award of $19 million that finds no support in the evidence.
CONCLUSION

MRIA's proposed judgment is deficient, and must be modified, in three respects. First,
the Court's judgment must include the relief already awarded to Saint Alphonsus: $4.6 million
for Saint Alphonsus's share of the MRIA partnership, plus 12% statutory interest from the date
of dissociation to the date of satisfaction of the judgment. Second, the judgment should reflect a
single award broken out as to each of the MRIA entities, not multiple alternatives followed by a
single lump sum to the MRIA entities collectively. Third, prior to entering the judgment, the
Court should decide whether and in what amount MRIA is entitled to disgorgement and, in doing
so, must reject, as unsupported by any evidence, the jury's advisory finding that Saint Alphonsus
realized $19 million in net profits as a result of misappropriating the Meridian opportunity.
DATED this 8th day ofNovember, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

ounter-Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 8th day ofNovember, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

0
0

~

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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1

BOISE,

IDAHO

2

Friday, October 28, 2011,

8:31 a.m.

3
4

5

THE COURT:

The Court will note that counsel

for both of the parties are present.
And a couple of things that the Court

6
7

wants to note is the receipt of an e-mail from

8

Saint Alphonsus with regard to allocation of

9

damages,

a response to Saint Alphonsus notice of

10

authority re allocation of damages,

11

Alphonsus notice of authority re allocation of

12

damages in reply to MRIA's counternotice.
I have received these.

13

The parties,

I

know,

and Saint

I read them
are making

14

this morning.

15

their record on these matters.

16

ruled on these matters,

17

full day arguing the jury instructions on

18

Wednesday,

19

file so that the record is preserved.

The Court has

after we spent nearly a

and the briefs will be placed in the

We have attempted to get all of the

20
21

jury instructions out and have reviewed the total

22

packet of jury instructions and have made the

23

changes that had been -- that were discussed on

24

Wednesday.

25

We have also determined -- I guess I
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•

1

that will be the recovery,

2

if any,

of MRIA.

Okay?

I am going to say this one more time

3

because I think it is important.

4

don't get added together as between the various

5

questions.

6

contractual relations doesn't get added to breach

7

of contract.

9

Interference with prospective

Okay?

Last,

8

These recoveries

tough question.

but not least,
Question No.

and this is a

32 asks for the

10

total amount of net profits that Saint Alphonsus

11

got as a result of misappropriating a partnership

12

opportunity.
Remember I talked about disgorgement.

13

14

That's what this one is.

15

you,

16

is for the benefits received by Saint Alphonsus

17

that we contend arose out of their bad conduct.

18

In other words,

19

that should have been MRIA's.

And I showed this to

and that amount total is $25,328,469.

for usurping the opportunities

I don't know if I can explain in five

20

21

minutes the Meridian opportunity.

22

complicated calculation,

23

here.

24
25

That

and I'm going to stop

I want to thank you,
leave you with this.

It is a rather

and I

just want to

There is an old saying that
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JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Peter J. Romatowski
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO
SET DATE FOR RESPONSE TO
MRIA'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendant

ORIGINAL
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO SET DATE FOR RESPONSE TO MRIA'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 1
003311

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
On November 2, 2011 the Court issued the following order:
The Court has received a proposed judgment, as requested, from
MRI Associates. The Court is concerned about the inclusion of the
disgorgement figure on the judgment without language clarifying
that the jury's figure was advisory to the Court. Both parties have
until 5:00 PM on November 8, 2011, to file responses to the
Court's concerns or to raise any other concerns the parties have
with the judgment proposed by MRI Associates.
Saint Alphonsus's filing responded to the proposed judgment issued by MRIA, as
requested. MRIA's response, however, did not defend its proposed judgment, but instead asked
for different relief: proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for the Court to make on the
usurpation and disgorgement issues, presumably to be inserted into a different judgment.
Given this turn of events, Saint Alphonsus requests that it be allowed until November 16,
2011 (7 days from today) to respond to MRIA's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
on the usurpation and disgorgement issues. Saint Alphonsus disagrees that the evidence supports
a finding by this Court of either usurpation or of the disgorgement figures suggested by MRIA.
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO SET DATE FOR RESPONSE TO MRIA'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW- 2
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In the interests of time, Saint Alphonsus previously sent this request to the Court via email on November 9, 2011. This pleading is intended to memorialize that request.
DATED this 9th day ofNovember, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

<.

ter-Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 9th day ofNovember, 2011, a true and correct copy ofthe
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

D
D
D
~

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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NO.

Nov 15 201t

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup. com
BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)

CHRISTOPHER 0
By JERI HEAT~~CH, Clerk
DEPUTy

b~tian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
V.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

RESPONSE TO SAINT
ALPHONSUS' OBJECTIONS AND
RESPONSE TO MRIA'S PROPOSED
JUDGMENT

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,

J

Counter-defendants.
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") provide this response to Saint Alphonsus's objections
and response to MRIA's proposed judgment.
A.

Saint Alphonsus's Departin_g Partner Share

Saint Alphonsus first objects that the judgment does not reflect the relief previously
awarded to Saint Alphonsus for its departing partner share, as well as prejudgment statutory
interest on that share at the rate of 12 percent from the date of dissociation. Saint Alphonsus,
however, is not entitled to its departing partner share or any interest thereon.
1.

Saint Alphonsus is not Entitled to its Departing Partner Share

As the Court knows, after the first trial, Judge McLaughlin awarded Saint Alphonsus $4.6
million as the value of its departing partner share. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007). In its Motion for Clarification Regarding Withdrawing Partner's
Share, MRIA argued to this Court that the Supreme Court overturned the underpinnings of that
decision. (Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Clarification Regarding Withdrawing
Partner's Share, filed Aprilll, 2011.) This Court disagreed. (Consolidated Order re: Motions
for Summary Judgment Heard May 18,2011, at p. 4.) MRIA nevertheless maintains this
argument as outlined in that earlier motion.
Moreover, Saint Alphonsus is not entitled to its departing partner share by virtue of its
own unclean hands. As Judge McLaughlin noted, "the issue ofSADC partnership share [is] an
issue based in equity and more appropriately within the purview of a trial court judge."
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007, p. 2.) The doctrine of
unclean hands allows "a court to deny equitable relief to a litigant on the ground that his conduct
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has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy at
issue." Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 648, 115 P .3d 731, 739 (2005). Regardless of
whether a partner is acting in conformance with its agreements, "actions taken in accordance
with [an operating agreement] can still be a breach of fiduciary duty if [members] have
improperly taken advantage of their position to obtain financial gain."' Bushi v. Sage Health
Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764,770,203 P.3d 694, 700 (2009) citing Schafer v. RMS Realty, 741

N.E.2d 155, 175 (Ohio 2000).
In this case there was substantial evidence presented at trial from which this Court could
find that that Saint Alphonsus committed wrongful actions prior to its dissociation from the MRI
Associates partnership, including actions that were breaches of its fiduciary duty to MRI
Associates. The evidence establishes that Saint Alphonsus was acting in bad faith in order to
advance its own financial interest, that Saint Alphonsus violated the non-competition agreement,
that Saint Alphonsus intentionally interfered with MRIA's referrals, and that withdrawal itself
was done for the purpose of competing with MRIA. Therefore, Saint Alphonsus's own unclean
hands, as established by the evidence presented in this trial, provide more than sufficient grounds
upon which this Court could deny Saint Alphonsus the equitable relief of its partnership share.

2.

Saint Alphonsus is not Entitled to Prejudgment Statutory Interest
a.

Saint Alphonsus did Not Appeal Judge McLaughlin's Decision that
Saint Alphonsus was Not Entitled to Interest

If the Court finds that Saint Alphonsus is entitled to its departing partner share, it would
nevertheless be inappropriate to award 12 percent statutory interest from the date of dissociation,
as Saint Alphonsus requests. As noted above, after the first trial, Judge McLaughlin awarded
Saint Alphonsus $4.6 million as the value of its departing partner share. (Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007). In particular, the question before Judge
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McLaughlin was whether to calculate Saint Alphonsus' s buy-out pursuant to Articles 6.1 and 6.2
of the Partnership Agreement, or pursuant to the default provisions of RUP A. Judge
McLaughlin cited to Article 6.1 in its entirely, but only cited to a portion of Article 6.2. Article
6.2 reads as follows, with the portion cited by Judge McLaughlin underlined:
6.2 Payment for Interest. The price for the withdrawing Hospital
Partner's interest in the Partnership shall be paid to such Hospital Partner by the
Partners to which its interest in the Partnership has been allocated, without interest,
in installment equal to, and due at the same time as, distributions of the Net Cash
Flow which the Hospital Partner should have received had it remained a Partner in
the Partnership.
(Trial Exhibit 4023; see Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007, at
p. 3.) Judge McLaughlin's concern with the applicability of Article 6.2 was only with the final
section, which discusses the timing provision of this Article, not with the provision related to
interest. Judge McLaughlin held:
[a]t the time the Court issued the Memorandum Decision on July 24, 2006,
the Court was not able to determine which method of calculating the buyout
amount owed SADC was correct. ... this Court concludes that the buyout
calculation provision contained in Article 6.1 and the payment timing provision
contained in Article 6.2 were applicable [only for the types ofwithdrawal outlined
in Article 6.1]. Thus, there being no general buyout calculation for other
partnership withdrawals, the default provision contained in Idaho Code section
53-3-701 controls.
The Court finds that Mr. Steiner [Saint Alphonsus's expert] is well
qualified, reliable, and that his testimony regarding valuation was an accurate
measure of the partnership interest . . . This amount, $4,600,000, will be applied
to offset the jury verdict in favor of MRIA.
(Id. at pp. 4, 6 (emphasis added).)

Significantly, Judge McLaughlin did not award any interest, but simply the amount of
Saint Alphonsus 's share calculated by its expert. The offset provided to Saint Alphonsus by
Judge McLaughlin was $4.6 million without any payment of interest. (Id. at p. 6). Judge
McLaughlin did so for a very specific reason-because Article 6.2 provides that "[t]he price for
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the withdrawing Hospital Partner's interest in the Partnership shall be paid to such Hospital
Partner by the Partners to which its interest in the Partnership has been allocated, without
interest." (Trial Exhibit 4023, at Article 6.2 (emphasis added).) RUPA specifically states that
only "[i]f an obligation to pay interest arises under this act [RUPA] and the rate is not specified,
the rate is that specified in subsection (1) of section 28-22-104, Idaho Code." I. C. § 53-3104(b). That the gap-filling statutory rate of interest applies only if the rate of interest is not
specified in the partnership agreement. In making an award without interest, Judge McLaughlin
was following the mandate of RUP A, for Article 6.2 specifically states that the price for the
withdrawing Hospital Partner's interest in the Partnership is "without interest." Although Judge
McLaughlin held that the timing portion of Article 6.2 was inapplicable, he clearly did not hold
the same for the interest portion of that Article.
Saint Alphonsus did not appeal this. As this Court has held, "Judge McLaughlin's
decision regarding the share of the partnership to which Saint Alphonsus is entitled stands and
remains the law of the case." (Consolidated Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard
May 18, 2011, at p. 4.) Thus, because Saint Alphonsus did not appeal Judge McLaughlin's
decision not to award interest, Saint Alphonsus is not entitled to have that ruling reconsidered.
Per Judge McLaughlin's ruling and Article 6.2 of the Partnership Agreement, Saint Alphonsus is
not entitled to the award of interest.

b.

Equity Prevents the Award of Prejudgment Interest

To the extent that the Court is inclined to set aside Judge McLaughlin's decision, this
Court should nevertheless decline to award prejudgment interest for equitable reasons. Whether
to award prejudgment interest requires the court to consider equitable considerations. See
Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp. 115 Idaho 281, 289, 766 P.2d 751, 759 (1988) ("in the area of
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prejudgment interest, equitable principles are emphasized.");U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Clover Creek Cattle Co. 92 Idaho 889, 900, 452 P.2d 993, 1004 (1969) (allowing prejudgment
interest when the interest of fully compensating the injured party predominates over other
equitable considerations); Stueve v. Northern Lights, Inc., 122 Idaho 720, 723, 838 P.2d 323, 326
(Ct. App. 1992) (whether to award prejudgment interest "is a question of fairness that is to be
answered by balancing the equities.") In this case, Saint Alphonsus should be prevented from
collecting prejudgment interests because its own unclean hands. "[T]he Court has the discretion
to evaluate the relative conduct of both parties and to determine whether the party seeking
equitable relief should in light of all the circumstances be precluded from such relief." Thomas
v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 209, 61 P.3d 557, 566 (2002); For the same
equitable reasons noted above, the equities weigh against Saint Alphonsus receiving an award of
prejudgment interest on its partnership share after dissociation.

c. The Amount of Saint Alphonsus's Partnership Share was not Liquidated
until September 21, 2007
Even if Saint Alphonsus was entitled to interest despite its unclean hands and its failure
to appeal Judge McLaughlin's ruling which did not award interest, Saint Alphonsus is not
entitled to the prejudgment interest that it claims. The award of interest in this case is governed
by the interactions between RUPA and Idaho's legal rate of interest statute. Idaho Code§ 53-3701 (b) provides that:
The buyout price of a dissociated partner's interest is the amount that would have
been distributable to the dissociating partner under section 53-3-807(b), Idaho
Code, if, on the date of dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a
price equal to the greater of the liquidation value or the value based on a sale of
the entire business as a going concern without the dissociated partner and the
partnership was wound up as of that date. Interest shall be paid from the date of
dissociation to the date of payment.
!d. (emphasis added). Official comment 3 to that rule notes that:
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Since the buyout price is based on the value of the business at the time of
dissociation, the partnership must pay interest on the amount due from the date of
dissociation until payment to compensate the dissociating partner for the use of
his interest in the firm. Section 104(b) provides that interest shall be at the legal
rate unless otherwise provided in the partnership agreement.
I.C. § 53-3-701(b), cmt. 3 (emphasis added). Idaho Code§ 53-3-104(b) notes that "[i]fan
obligation to pay interest arises under this act [RUPA] and the rate is not specified, the rate is
that specified in subsection (1) of section 28-22-104, Idaho Code." 1
Notably, however, I.C. § 28-22-104 allows prejudgment interest only on liquidated
amounts or amounts ascertainable by mere mathematical process. BECO Canst. Co., Inc. v. J-UB Engineers Inc., 149 Idaho 294, 298, 233 P.3d 1216, 1220 (2010); Ervin Canst. Co. v. Van
Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 704, 874 P.2d 506, 515 (1993). As the Idaho Supreme Court has said:
[e]ven though pre-judgment interest can be allowed by an agreement in a contract
or by statute, under either, a grant of pre-judgment interest requires a showing that
the damages were liquidated. When pre-judgment interest is granted under I. C. §
28-22-104, governing the legal rate of interest on judgments, the amount to bear
interest must be liquidated.
Bouten Canst. Co. v. HF. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 762, 992 P.2d 751, 757 (1999). As
noted above, Judge McLauglin specifically stated that he was not able to calculate Saint
Alphonsus' s partnership interest until after the court had examined the evidence presented at the
first trial. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007, at p. 4.) In short,
the amount due was not liquidated and ascertainable until Judge McLaughlin's ruling of

As noted above, Article 6.2 of the Partnership Agreement specifically states that no
interest is permitted, a provision that Judge McLaughlin did not hold was inapplicable. As the
Partnership Agreement is controlling on this issue, not RUPA, the Court should not apply the
statutory interest rate in any event. MRIA nevertheless presents the analysis under I. C. § 28-22104 to demonstrate that the amount of interest requested by Saint Alphonsus is in excess of this
statutory provision.
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September 21, 2007. For all of these reasons, Saint Alphonsus is not entitled to the interest it
requests.

B.

The Judgment Should Reflect the Jury's Verdict
Saint Alphonsus argues that the Judgment should not reflect the various options awarded

by the jury. The jury in this case admirably navigated the special verdict form, awarding specific
damages to each of the counter-plaintiffs under each of the causes of action and the various
theories of damages presented on those causes of action. The judgment proposed by MRIA fully
memorializes these various options awarded by the jury, and also provides for the actual award
ofthe highest ofthese numbers, so that Saint Alphonsus knows and is aware of its obligations.
Notably, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure specifically allow for the judgment outline the
damages related to various claims for relief. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( a) provides that a
judgment "shall state the relief to which a party is entitled on one or more claims for relief in the
action." (Emphasis added).
In this case, a judgment which fully memorializes all of the jury's findings is particularly
appropriate. To the extent that there is error on a particular cause of action or theory of damages,
if the judgment outlines all of the theories as found by the jury, the judgment might nevertheless
be sustained on grounds where there is no error found. As the Supreme Court has noted, when it
reviews a case, "the fact that one of the grounds may be in error is of no consequence and may
be disregarded if the judgment can be sustained upon one of the other grounds." Department of
Health & Welfare v. Doe, 147 Idaho 357, 362, 209 P.3d 654, 659 (2009). To the extent that

there is an error, a judgment that comprehensively outlines the jury's findings will provide the
Supreme Court a broad base upon which it might sustain the judgment, if necessary, without the
need to again remand the case.
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C.

Disgorgement
MRIA addressed the issue of disgorgement in its recently-filed Memorandum in Support

of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Concerning Disgorgement, as well as a
Proposed Judgment on that issue. Those documents address the appropriate measure of
damages, the calculation for those damages, and the unrebutted evidence supporting the measure
of disgorgement damages proposed by MRIA. The Court is required to make independent
findings of fact and conclusions of law on this equitable claim. Bach v. Bagley 148 Idaho 784,
7976, 229 P.3d 1146, 1158 (2010). MRIA asks that the Court do so, as outlined more fully in
MRIA's earlier briefing. To the extent that Saint Alphonsus challenges those methods, MRIA
will address such arguments in its reply.
DATED this 15th day ofNovember, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

·p. {e~.

ara L. Par er
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day ofNovember, 2011, a true and correct copy of
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Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintifJICounterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintifJICounterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
MRIA correctly notes that this Court has an independent obligation to determine whether
the preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that Saint Alphonsus usurped partnership
opportunities from MRIA, and if so, the amount of any profits to be disgorged. See MRIA Mem.
Supp. Proposed Findings at 3; accord, e.g., Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 796, 229 P.3d 1146,
1158 (20 I 0) ("Where an advisory verdict is issued on equitable claims, the trial judge is still
required to make independent findings of fact and conclusions of law on the equitable claims
before him, not solely relying on the jury's findings.").
Contrary to MRIA's assertions, however, the preponderance of the evidence shows that
Saint Alphonsus did not usurp from MRIA either the opportunity to partner with GSR or the
opportunity to open a facility in Meridian. And even if there had been a usurpation, the evidence
shows that Saint Alphonsus's net profits are substantially lower than claimed by MRIA.
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I.

THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A
FINDING THAT SAINT ALPHONSUS "USURPED" EITHER ALLEGED MRIA
OPPORTUNITY
A.

Saint Alphonsus Did Not Usurp MRIA's Opportunity to Partner with GSR
to Form IMI

The first alleged usurpation claimed by MRIA is that Saint Alphonsus in 1999 caused
MRIA to lose the opportunity to become partners with the GSR radiologists in the MRI side of
IMI. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 6607. The most obvious reason that this claim should be rejected is
that it is time barred. MRIA has acknowledged that any such usurpation was completed by 1999,

see id at 6638-39 (closing argument). Because MRIA never alleged this usurpation during the
2007 trial (but, rather, only the Meridian opportunity which unquestionably would have occurred
during the statute-of-limitations period), there can be no "law of the case" from 2007 which
allows MRIA to pursue this facially time-barred usurpation claim. See, e.g. Saint Alphonsus's
Consol. Reply in Support ofDirected Verdict Mots. Filed Oct. 18,2011 at 17-18. 1

1

Saint Alphonsus recognizes that the Court ruled to the contrary, based on its view that Judge McLaughlin's ruling
that other, non-usurpation-based fiduciary duty claims were timely "continuing torts," is law of the case establishing
that the 1999 usurpation claim was also timely. Trial Tr. at 6315-17. Saint Alphonsus respectfully requests that the
Court reconsider. By definition, law-of-the-case doctrine can only apply to issues that were raised at the first trial,
and could have been appealed, but were not. Capps v. Wood, 117 Idaho 614, 618, 790 P.2d 395, 399 (Ct. App.
1990) ("under the 'law of the case' principle, ... courts generally will not consider errors which arose prior to the
first appeal and which might have been raised as issues in the earlier appeal").
MRIA brought no claim at the first trial that Saint Alphonsus had usurped a partnership opportunity to partner with
GSR in IMI. Therefore, Judge McLaughlin was not presented with, and thus could not have ruled on, the issue of
whether that usurpation claim (as opposed to other alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, such as wrongful competition,
that were then at issue) is time-barred, or is rather a continuing tort. Moreover, usurpation is qualitatively different
than the sort of fiduciary duty claims that were before Judge McLaughlin, such as wrongful competition, which
might be viewed as repetitive wrongful behavior. Cf Rogers v. Ardella Veigel Inter Vivos Trust No.2, 162 S.W.3d
281, 290 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (distinguishing between "repetitive wrongful or tortious acts" and "continuing injury
arising from one wrongful act," and holding that statute-of-limitations applies when, even if"the injury was
continuing, it arose from a single act of usurpation."). Since Judge McLaughlin was not faced with this issue, Saint
Alphonsus could not have received a ruling on it, or appealed the issue to the Supreme Court. Law-of-the-case
principles do not apply here.
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Further, even if this claim were timely, the preponderance of the evidence does not
support a finding that Saint Alphonsus usurped this opportunity from MRIA, but rather shows
that MRIA and GSR failed to come to a deal because they could not agree on terms. MRIA has
tried to assert that a usurpation occurred because a hearsay statement from Dr. Hall contained in
April 1999 meeting minutes (Ex. 4079) indicated that a deal was "very close to being finalized,"
and then the deal never happened. See Trial Tr. at 252-55 (Dr. Prochaska discussing same). But
the unambiguous record evidence shows that in April 1999, and throughout all of 1999, there
were many unresolved issues necessary for a deal between MRIA and GSR? It also shows that
after April1999, MRIA acted unilaterally to alter its position with regard to several terms of the
deal, to the disadvantage of GSR, including increasing the size of the non-compete radius that
GSR would be required to respect, 3 and decreasing the amount of the management fee that GSR
would receive. 4 With respect to MRIA's changing offer, on June 17, 1999, Dr. Curran himself
noted that "I don't think the rads are going to accept the decisions we made at the Board re the
rad imaging center partnership." 5 Ex. 800.

2

See, e.g. Ex. 415 §§ 1.1, 2.2, 2.6 (May 1999 draft proposal noting umesolved "issues").

3

For instance, the non-compete radius that MRIA proposed for GSR went from 4 miles in April 1999, to 10 miles
in May 1999, to 100 miles in June 1999. See Ex. 415 (May proposal changing "4 mile" to "10 mile" radius); Ex.
4085, p.2 (June minutes suggesting 100 mile radius, except for Meridian and Eagle); Ex. 418, § 2.2 (September
1999, further modifying to impose same non-compete for GSR, with no carve-outs)
4

Compare Ex. 415 (May proposal offering GSR 3.5% of gross revenues as fee) with Ex. 4085, p.2 (offering 3.5%
of net profits as fee).
5

This was confirmed by witness testimony. See Trial Tr. at 2323:25-2324:12 (9/27/11 Schamp) ("My view is that
through much of'99, as talks progressed, they actually got a bit further apart."); id. at 3323:8-18 (10/4/11 Clift) ("in
late August, the week before IMI opened," MRIA and GSR were "getting further and further apart in the
negotiations. They were coming nowhere near a deal before IMI opened.").
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Further, when, as Dr. Curran anticipated, GSR refused MRIA's offer of partnership in
August 1999 (Ex. 4099, 4104), MRIA quickly knew about it. In early September 1999, Dr.
Curran stated in an email to Cindy Schamp's assistant his understanding that the radiologists had
"rejected the proposal that the rad center be owned by" Center. Ex. 398. This understanding
was further confirmed in Dr. Curran's October 27, 1999 "big stick" memo, in which he urged
Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp to use the coercive effect of the hospital's professional services
contract to force the radiologists to accept an arrangement by which they would own only 9% of
their own imaging center, via a 1111th ownership in MRIA. Ex. 66.
In the face of this documentary evidence, MRIA asserts that despite the clear evidence
that MRIA changed its offer for the worse and proposed unacceptable terms to GSR, and that
IMI was an immediate success when it was opened by GSR alone in September 1999, it still was
somehow Saint Alphonsus' s misconduct that caused GSR not to enter into a deal with MRIA.
Specifically, MRIA claimed that Saint Alphonsus "took over" negotiations in the summer of
1999, and then, in December 1999, Saint Alphonsus offered GSR a "better deal" than what
MRIA was offering, by promising them 50% ofMRI Center. See, e.g., Tr. at 257, 278-280; Ex.
4125, pp. 23-24. The source of this alleged "better offer" was a single section in a draft version
of what would, eighteen months later, become an agreement between Saint Alphonsus and GSR
to partner in the non-MRI side ofiMI.
In exercising its duty to independently assess whether Saint Alphonsus usurped from
MRIA the chance to partner with GSR in the IMI business, the Court should conclude that no
such misappropriation has been proven. The claimed "take-over" in the summer of 1999 rests
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wholly on the purported recollection of Dr. Prochaska. Trial Tr. 256-57. No suggestion that
Saint Alphonsus took over the representation of MRIA in these discussions appears in any of the
numerous sets of MRIA or GSR minutes around this time, a fact which would be surprising if the
"takeover" had occurred, given the detail and frequency of both organizations' minutes. As late
as June 1999, MRIA was unambiguously in charge of the negotiations, with Dr. Curran
bemoaning that GSR would not accept the changes that "we made at the Board re the rad
imaging center partnership." Ex. 800.
Nor is Dr. Prochaska's alleged recollection consistent with the testimony of other
witnesses, several of whom testified that Saint Alphonsus did not take over negotiations in the
summer of 1999. See 9/23/11 Trial Tr. at 1706:14-25 (Bruce) (stating she was never asked to
take over negotiations); 9/27111 Trial Tr. at 2339:11-2341:5 (Schamp) (stating that she was never
told that Saint Alphonsus was taking over negotiations); 10/4/11 Trial Tr. at 3315:5-9 (Cliff)
(noting he participated in MRI-side discussions, and that Saint Alphonsus did not take over
negotiations in the summer of 1999).
Even if Saint Alphonsus had assumed responsibility for representing MRIA in its
negotiations with GSR, the claim that Saint Alphonsus blew the deal apart by offering a "better
deal" would not be remotely plausible. The language of the draft agreement, assuming it were to
be agreed to, amounted to nothing but a contingent promise, and depended on MRIA's voluntary
agreement to sell Center before it could be implemented. See, e.g., Ex. 4125, pp. 23-24. Further,
the supposed offer of a "better deal" by Saint Alphonsus had, in fact, been added at the request of
the radiologists, and, as ofDecember 17, 1999, not yet considered by Saint Alphonsus. Ex. 4125
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at pp. 23-24 ("drafting note" stating that the language was "requested by the radiologists but has
not yet been fully evaluated by Saint Alphonsus' senior management." The provision said only
that if Saint Alphonsus or its affiliates acquired a 100% ownership in Center, then IMI could
purchase 50% (Ex. 4125 p. 24), something that would have required MRIA's consent.
Other facts in the record demonstrate that the MRIA-GSR negotiations failed for reasons
unrelated to anything Saint Alphonsus did. By the time of this December 1999 draft agreement,
the Gem State Radiologists had already rejected, in August 1999, the offer that MRIA was
making. MRIA has not cited any evidence to suggest that the radiologists would have come
crawling back to take MRIA' s offer in December 1999, several months after rejecting the 1Ill th
deal and then successfully opening IMI on September 1, 1999 without any partner. 6 Substantial
evidence, including the testimony of GSR Doctors Seabourn and Davey, shows otherwise. See,

e.g., 10/4/11 Trial Tr. at 3319, 3323 (Cliff); 10/17/11 Trial Tr. at 4960-63, 4966-68 (Davey);
10/19/11 Trial Tr. 5275-76, 5289-92 (Seabourn).
In short, the preponderance of the evidence is that GSR and MRIA failed to come to a
deal because MRIA's proposals were unacceptable to the radiologists. MRIA did not lose that
opportunity because Saint Alphonsus "usurped" it, and the Court should so hold. Thus, MRIA
should not be entitled to any disgorgement remedy based on this usurpation.

6

The far more reasonable inference to be drawn from the December 1999 draft is that it merely reflected the reality
which the DMR doctors themselves recognized: that by December 1999 there was no longer any chance for a
partnership, so a Saint Alphonsus buyout was the only realistic possibility remaining at that time. See 9/16111 Trial
Tr. at 822-25 (Prochaska) . .ifsuch a buyout occurred, then IMI could buy into that business.
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B.

Saint Alphonsus Did Not Usurp MRIA's Opportunity to Open a Meridian
Facility

The preponderance of the evidence also shows that Saint Alphonsus did not "usurp" MRI
Mobile's ability to go into Meridian. First, it is undisputed that the GSR doctors' desire to open
a Meridian facility was well known to all parties during the 1999 negotiations (and, indeed, was
a subject of negotiations with respect to the non-compete), and MRIA was discussing Meridian
as a potential expansion site only months after IMI downtown opened. See, e.g., Ex. 542; Ex.
4085, Ex. 4156. The evidence is undisputed that GSR doctors made the choice to go to
Meridian, and it was not Saint Alphonsus's call. 10119/11 Trial Tr. at 5339-40 (Seabourn). To
the extent that there was an "opportunity" in Meridian, it was on the table, known to all parties,
and GSR was going to take it, regardless of Saint Alphonsus' s actions.

Second, MRIA does not claim that Saint Alphonsus had any power to prevent MRI
Mobile from expanding into Meridian. Saint Alphonsus had only two votes on the MRIA Board
and the remaining 8 votes would have been sufficient for MRIA to both purchase the real estate
in Meridian and to obtain financing for its operations. See, e.g., Ex. 4023 §§ 5.4.1, 5.4.2, & Ex.
4032 § 6.3 (terms of partnership agreement requiring eight votes for purchases of real estate, and
five for borrowing funds less than $5 million); Trial Tr. at 4546-47 (testimony ofMRIA expert
Budge claiming that capital expenditures at Meridian would have been only $2.2 million). Given
the undisputable fact that Saint Alphonsus had no ability to prevent MRIA from opening a
Mobile facility in Meridian, MRIA instead claims only that it chose not to go to Meridian
because Saint Alphonsus allegedly did not want to. See, e.g., Tr. at 3908-09 (Floyd); Tr. 6675
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(closing argument). This amounts to a concession that it was MRIA's choice- not Saint
Alphonsus's wrongdoing- that caused MRIA's failure to open a Mobile site in Meridian.
Third, MRIA has not offered any evidence, other than self-serving speculation, that there
was no more opportunity for MRI Mobile to open in Meridian after IMI did in 2002. To the
contrary, MRI Mobile could have still opened a facility in Meridian after IMI did, as at least
three other entities did after IMI Meridian opened. See, e.g., Tr. at 6173-78, Ex. 991. Thus, the
evidence is that there was a continuing opportunity to open in Meridian, but MRIA chose not to
pursue it. Saint Alphonsus could not have "usurped" an opportunity that still existed after the
alleged usurpation occurred. The Court should find that there was no Meridian "usurpation."

II.

IF THE COURT ORDERS DISGORGEMENT, THE PREPONDERANCE OF
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT SAINT ALPHONSUS'S NET PROFITS
ARE FAR LOWER THAN THAT CLAIMED BY MRIA
Even if disgorgement were an appropriate remedy, the preponderance of the evidence

establishes that the amounts claimed by MRIA are excessive, and that the lesser amounts set
forth below constitute more accurate estimations of Saint Alphonsus' s net profits from the
opportunities at issue.

A.

MRIAts Estimate of Saint Alphonsus's Net Profits From the Opportunity to
Partner with the Radiologists Improperly Ignores Saint Alphonsus's Costs
and Improperly Includes Eagle Pro:frts

Although the jury found that Saint Alphonsus realized approximately $11.5 million in net
profits as a result of misappropriating the opportunity to partner with GSR, MRIA contends that
the amount of profits realized by Saint Alphonsus (including projected receipts through 2015) is
$25.3 million. See MRIA Mem. Supp. Proposed Findings at 3-4. MRIA is incorrect because its
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figure of$25.3 million-which represents partnership income earned by Saint Alphonsus as a
result of its fifty percent ownership ofiMI's MRI business-grossly overstates Saint
Alphonsus' s net profits in two critical respects.
First, MRIA' s figure does not account for the cost to Saint Alphonsus of acquiring the

opportunity to partner with GSR in the MRI side ofiMI' s imaging business. It is undisputed that
Saint Alphonsus paid approximately $11.2 million for that opportunity. See Trial Tr. at 4888
(Saint Alphonsus CFO Ken Fry testifying that the ''total Saint Alphonsus paid forth[ e] 50
percent interest ofthe MRI portion ofiMI" "was roughly 11.2 million"). Thus, Saint
Alphonsus' s net profits-the amount it gained as a result of the alleged misappropriation of the
opportunity to own half of IMI' s MRI business-cannot exceed the difference between the $25.3
million in estimated partner income and the $11.2 million that it cost Saint Alphonsus to enter
the partnership and purchase that income stream. That figure, $14.1 million, represents the
outer limit of the disgorgement remedy with respect to the opportunity to partner with GSR.
Second, MRIA's figure improperly includes profits attributable to IMI's Eagle facility.

Specifically, the $25.3 million represents MRIA's estimate of Saint Alphonsus's share of all of
IMI's MRI profits since 2006, when Saint Alphonsus bought into the MRI side ofiMI. See Trial
Tr. at 4510-4518; Trial Ex. 5082. It thus necessarily includes profits attributable to IMI's Eagle
facility, which opened in 2007. But this Court has already held that MRIA may not recover
damages for the Eagle facility because it is ''too remote in time from both the dissociation and
the expiration of the non-compete obligation." Trial Tr. at 6069.
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By MRIA's own estimations, Eagle accounted for $4,237,522 ofiMI's MRI-related
profits from 2006 to 2010. See Trial Ex. 5067. Half of that amount, or $2,118,761, must
therefore be deducted from the $17,078,469 that, according to Mr. Budge, constitutes Saint
Alphonsus's fifty percent share ofiMI's MRI-related profits from April2006 through 2010. See
Ex. 5082; MRIA Mem. Supp. Findings of Fact at 4. This adjusted figure is $14,959,708.
Similarly, Eagle accounted for approximately 23.7% ofiMI's overall MRI profits in
2010. See Trial Exs. 5067 & 5082 (2010 Eagle profits of$1,767,189, as shown on Exhibit 5067,
are 23.7% of2010 total MRI-related profits of$7,441,193, as shown on Exhibit 5082).
Assuming that the 2010 percentages are constant for 2011 to 2015, as MRIA assumes in its
similar calculations for Meridian, see MRIA Mem. Supp. Findings at 5, then the Court must
reduce by 23.7% the $8,250,000 that, according to Mr. Wilhoite, constitutes Saint Alphonsus's
fifty percent share ofiMI's MRI-related profits from 2011 through 2015. See Ex. 5082; MRIA
Mem. Supp. Findings at 4. This adjusted figure is $6,294,750.
Adding together the adjusted figures for 2006-2010 and for 2011-2015 yields a total of
$21,254,458, which represents the amount of income allegedly received by Saint Alphonsus as a
result of its ownership interest in IMI's MRI business, adjusted to exclude income from Eagle.
To determine Saint Alphonsus's net profits without Eagle, this figure, too, must be
reduced by the amount that it cost Saint Alphonsus to purchase the opportunity to partner in the
MRI portion ofiMI. Based on relative profitability, the Eagle facility accounts for
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approximately 16% of Saint Alphonsus' s MRI -related income. 7 Reducing the $11.2 million
purchase price by that percentage results in an adjusted purchase price (excluding Eagle) of
$9,408,000. To determine Saint Alphonsus's net profits (excluding Eagle), this adjusted
purchase price must be deducted from Saint Alphonsus's non-Eagle income of$21,254,458. The
resulting figure of $11 ,846,458-very similar to the $11.5 million figure found by the jury-is
the most that the Court should find is appropriate disgorgement should it conclude that Saint
Alphonsus misappropriated from MRIA the opportunity to partner with GSR.

B.

MRIA Concedes That It Presented No Evidence in Support of a Meridian
Disgorgement Figure, and MRIA's Attempt to Manufacture Such a Figure
Should Be Rejected

MRIA concedes that the jury's advisory finding, suggesting that Saint Alphonsus realized
approximately $19 million in net profits as a result of misappropriating the Meridian opportunity,
was incorrect and not supported by the record. See MRIA Mem. Supp. Proposed Findings at 3-4.
MRIA also concedes that it "did not directly present [a Meridian disgorgement] number in its
expert testimony." /d. at 5 n.1. For this reason alone, the Court should relegate MRIA to a

7

$25,328,469 (Saint Alphonsus income including Eagle as set forth in Exhibit 5082) minus $21,254,458 (Saint
Alphonsus income excluding Eagle as derived above) equals $4,074,011 (Saint Alphonsus income attributable to
Eagle). Saint Alphonsus income attributable to Eagle is 16% of the total income ($4,074,011 divided by
$25,328,469). It is thus reasonable to attribute 16% of Saint Alphonsus's purchase price to Eagle.
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damages remedy for this claim and decline to find any amount of disgorgement for usurpation of
the Meridian opportunity. 8
If, however, the Court accepts MRIA's invitation to reverse engineer a figure from the
numbers that MRIA's expert did present, then it should reject the $7,158,029 figure proposed by
MRIA as incorrect because, like MRIA's calculations of profits related to the opportunity to
partner with GSR, it ignores the cost to Saint Alphonsus of purchasing a 50% share ofiMI's
MRI business. As noted above, that undisputed figure is $11.2 million. See Trial Tr. at 4888.
Because the Meridian facility accounts for approximately 28% of Saint Alphonsus's MRI-related
income, 9 the amount of Saint Alphonsus's purchase price attributable to Meridian is 28% of
$11.2 million, or $3,136,000. Deducting this cost from Saint Alphonsus's Meridian-related
income of $7,158,029 yields a net profit figure attributable to Meridian of $4,022,029. This
figure is the most that the Court should find is appropriate disgorgement should it conclude that
Saint Alphonsus usurped from MRIA the opportunity to open an MRI facility in Meridian.

8

MRIA seeks to remedy this shortcoming by asking the Court to "derive[]" an appropriate figure (which it claims is
$7, 158,029) from the numbers that were presented during the trial. Id at 5-6. However, MRIA's exercise in afterthe-fact derivation is fundamentally flawed. It concludes that Meridian accounted for approximately 33% ofiMI
MRI-related profits by looking at Meridian's 2010 income of$1,592, 155 as a percentage of the "lost profits"
claimed by MRIA for 2010. See MRIA Mem. Supp. Findings at 5; Trial Ex. 5067R-2 (lost profit summary). This is
an apples to oranges approach: MRIA's claimed lost profits are not equivalent to IMI's income. Compare Trial Ex.
5067R-2 with Trial Ex. 5082. In fact, IMI's Meridian income constitutes a substantially smaller percentage (24.1 %)
ofiMI's overall MRI-related income.
9

Dividing $7,158,029 (the amount of Saint Alphonsus's MRI-related income that MRIA argues is attributable to
Meridian) by $25,328,469 (Saint Alphonsus total MRI-related income, as set forth in Exhibit 5082) yields 0.2826, or
28%. It is thus reasonable to attribute 28% of Saint Alphonsus's purchase price to Meridian.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should hold that there was no usurpation in this case. In the alternative, if the
Court finds usurpation of the 1999 opportunity, the disgorgement remedy should be limited to
either $14,959,708 (including Eagle-related gains) or $11,846,458 (excluding Eagle-related
gains). If the Court finds usurpation only of the Meridian opportunity, then the Court should
decline to find disgorgement appropriate due to a failure of evidentiary proof of Saint
Alphonsus's Meridian-related profits, but in any event the Meridian disgorgement remedy should
be limited to $4,022,029.
DATED this 15th day ofNovember, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
In opposing Saint Alphonsus's request to include in the judgment Judge McLaughlin's
award of its $4.6 million departing partner's share-which this Court reaffirmed by its order of
June 17, 2011-plus statutory interest, MRIA acts as ifthis issue has not already been finally
decided. By a mish-mash of rejected, waived, and incorrect arguments, MRIA asks the Court to
ignore these prior determinations, and also statutory law and MRIA's own prior concessions.
The Court should issue a judgment in accordance with the law as set forth in Saint Alphonsus's
briefing.

I.

THIS COURT HAS ALREADY GRANTED SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION
FOR ITS DEPARTING PARTNER SHARE, AND RECONSIDERATION BASED
ON NEWLY RAISED ARGUMENTS IS IMPROPER
Seven months ago, in challenging Saint Alphonsus's right to its departing partner share,

MRIA argued that (1) contrary to Judge McLaughlin's prior ruling, Section 6.1 of the partnership
agreement and not RUPA should control Saint Alphonsus's buyout, so that Saint Alphonsus
should receive only the "balance of [its] capital account at the time of withdrawal," and (2) that
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Section 6.2 of the agreement should apply to bar interest on the departing partner share. See
Motion for Clarification Regarding Withdrawing Partner Share at 3-9 (Apr. 11, 2011); MRIA's
Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Claim for its Partnership
Interest at 10-11 & 11-12 (Apr. 25, 2011 ).
Nowhere in that briefing did MRIA argue, as it does now, that "unclean hands" prevented
a buyout share, or that law-of-the-case or equity precluded an award of statutory interest.
Instead, MRIA's briefing conceded that Saint Alphonsus would be entitled to some buyout share
(whether under Section 6.1 or RUPA). See id. Further, at the hearing on the motions, MRIA
told the Court that "[i]fthe RUPA provisions apply," then Saint Alphonsus is entitled to "well
over four million, plus 12 percent interest" "accruing" "from the date of withdrawal" as a result
of its rightful dissociation. Hr' g Tr., May 18, 2011, at 86 (argument of counsel (emphasis
added)). Accordingly, the Court should decline to consider MRIA's new arguments. See
Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208,217, 177 P.3d

955, 964 (2008) (upholding trial court's exercise of discretion in "decid[ing] not to consider [a]
claim," that was raised for the first time in a motion to reconsider); AlA Servs. Corp. v. Idaho
State Tax Comm 'n, 136 Idaho 184, 188, 30 P.3d 962,966 (2001) ("issue may be considered

waived if raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration"); 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions,
Rules, and Orders§ 40 ("nor, generally, may an issue be raised for the first time in a motion to

reconsider").
In any event, for the reasons set forth below, MRIA's arguments must be rejected on the
merits.
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II.

MRIA'S ARGUMENTS TO UNDO THE AWARD OF THE BUYOUT SHARE OR
IGNORE THE STATUTE'S INTEREST PAYMENT REQUIREMENT HAVE NO
MERIT
A.

Saint Alphonsus's Statutory Right To Its Partnership Share Rest On Its
Dissociation From MRIA, And Is Not Revocable Based On A Claim Of
"Unclean Hands"

Idaho Code§ 53-3-701(a) states that ''the partnership shall cause the dissociated partner's
interest in the partnership to be purchased for a buyout price," and does not make that right
contingent on whether the dissociating party acted with "clean hands." Indeed, even a party that
wrongfully dissociates is entitled to a buyout. See id. § 53-3-701(c) ("[d]amages for wrongful
dissociation ... shall be offset against the buyout price").
MRIA nonetheless argues that Saint Alphonsus's clear right to recover under the statute
is barred by "unclean hands." Response Br. at 2-3. The best that can be said in support of this
argument, which simply ignores the clear text of the statute, is that it is yet another attempt to
argue that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was wrongful and that Saint Alphonsus should be
punished as a result. But as this Court has repeatedly held, Saint Alphonsus had a right to
dissociate under RUPA. The Court has also rejected MRIA's argument that, under Bushi v. Sage
Health, 146 Idaho 764, 769, 203 P.3d 694, 699 (2009), a rightful dissociation can still be
"wrongful" and subject Saint Alphonsus to penalty. See Trial Tr. at 6338-43.
Accordingly, MRIA's "unclean hands" argument for ignoring RUPA's directive is
wholly without merit.
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B.

MRIA's Arguments For Ignoring The Statutory Directive To Pay Interest
Have No Merit
1.

There is no "law of the case" holding that Saint Alphonsus should be
denied interest based on Section 6.2 of the Partnership Agreement,
which provides for no interest

MRIA next suggests that Saint Alphonsus is not entitled to statutory interest because
Judge McLaughlin held that Section 6.2 of the partnership agreement-providing that no interest
is to be paid when a party withdraws under Section 6.1-is applicable here, and that Saint
Alphonsus did not appeal that ruling. Response Br. at 4-5. But in fact, as MRIA concedes
(Response Br. at 4), Judge McLaughlin said not one word about the "no interest" language from
Section 6.2, and certainly did not suggest that Section 6.2 of the agreement controlled that issue.
To the contrary, Judge McLaughlin unambiguously held that RUPA, and not Sections 6.1
and 6.2 of the partnership agreement, controlled the buyout. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007, at 6.
Rather, the reason that Judge McLaughlin did not award-or even address-the subject
of interest to be paid on the award of Saint Alphonsus' s departing partner share is that, at that
time, given the first jury's verdict finding dissociation in breach of a definite durational term,
Saint Alphonsus was not entitled to interest. While Idaho Code§ 53-3-701(b) directs the
payment of such interest, § 53-3-701(h) creates an express exception stating that "a partner ,who
wrongfully dissociates before the expiration of a definite term ... is not entitled to payment of
any portion of the buyout price until the expiration of the term." Since there was no right to
receive the money before the term expired (then held to be 2023), there was no basis for claiming
statutory interest due to non-payment in 2007. By contrast, interest is owing now, due to the
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interim decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court that dissociation was neither wrongful nor
done "before the expiration of a definite term."
As this Court has already noted, law-of-the-case doctrine does not eliminate the Court's
"power to correct any errors in its original findings not passed upon on appeal." Consol. Order
Re: Motions Heard August 5, 2011, at 3 (Aug. 24, 2011) (citing Hutchins v. State, 100 Idaho
661, 603 P.2d 995 (1979); Blinzler v. Andrews, 95 Idaho 769, 519 P.2d 438 (1973)). Here, Idaho
Code § 53-3-701 (b) expressly provides that "[i]nterest shall be paid from the date of dissociation
to the date of payment" following a party's dissociation. Given this Court's subsequent finding
that Saint Alphonsus rightfully dissociated and the clear statutory language that interest "shall be
paid" on the departing partner's share, law-of-the-case doctrine does not preclude this Court
from ordering what the law unambiguously requires: that interest ~'shall be paid" on the buyout
share.

2.

There is no "equitable" basis for denying the statutory award of
interest

MRIA's argument that "equity prevents the award of prejudgment interest" here,
Response Br. at 5, also fails for multiple reasons.

First, this case does not involve "prejudgment interest" in the sense MRIA claims.
Prejudgment interest is "[ s]tatutorily prescribed interest accrued either from the date of the loss
or from the date when the complaint was filed up to the date the final judgment is entered."
Black's Law Dictionary, 876 (9th ed. 2009) (definition of"prejudgment interest"). The interest
due on a RUPA departing partner share is not compensation for "loss," nor does it extend from
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the time ofthe "loss" to the entry of judgment. Specifically, RUPA provides that interest on the
buyout share (1) "shall be paid from the date of dissociation to the date of payment," and not
simply until the judgment is entered, as with prejudgment interest, and (2) the interest here is not
compensation for losses due to tort or contract breaches, but rather ''the buyout price is based on
the value of the business at the time of dissociation," with interest intended to "compensate the
dissociating partner for the use of his interest in the firm". Idaho Code § 53-3-701 cmt. 3.

Second, the award of interest on the buyout share is not an "equitable" issue. It is a
statutory command. RUPA expressly states that "[i]nterest shall be paid from the date of
dissociation to the date of payment." !d. § 53-3-701(b). Accordingly, the RUPA right to interest
on the buyout share rests on an unambiguous statutory directive, and equitable, common-law
cases involving "prejudgment interest" for losses in tort or contract are irrelevant.

Third, even if this case did involve an award of"prejudgment interest," none of the cases
MRIA cites involve an "unclean hands" defense to an award of prejudgment interest. Rather,
those cases note the affirmative equitable reasons for the common-law rule that allows
prejudgment interest-i.e., to compensate a party for the fact that it was unable to use money it
was owed. 1 The RUPA section in issue directing the award of interest reflects the legislature's

1

See Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 115 Idaho 281, 289, 766 P.2d 751, 759 (1988) (stating
because party had to sue to recover money, it was "inequitable to deny Agri-Lines for the use of its
money during the period of six years"); US. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle Co., 92 Idaho 889,
900, 452 P .2d 993, 1004 (1969) (noting that rule allowing prejudgment interest on liquidated sums is
"apparently based upon equitable considerations"); Stueve v. N Lights, Inc., 122 Idaho 720, 723, 838 P.2d
323, 326 (Ct. App. 1992) (affirming ruling that prejudgment interest not equitable because to "add interest
to the penalties holding that it would be inconsistent with the already substantial penalties imposed by the
legislature").
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same conclusion that interest on a dissociating partner's share is "equitable" and proper. See
Idaho Code § 53-3-701 cmt. 3 (payment of interest is proper to "compensate the dissociating
partner for the use of his interest in the firm"). The legislature made that award mandatory, see
id. at§ 53-3-701(b), and it should be awarded here.

3.

Payment of interest cannot be denied on the ground that the amount
recoverable was not a "liquidated" amount at the time of dissociation

MRIA' s final argument is that interest on the buyout share may not be awarded because
the value of the departing partner's share was not "liquidated" at the time of dissociation-or
until the court's award on September 21, 2007-as required under interpretations of Idaho Code
§ 28-22-104. Response Br. at 6-8. But the reference te § 28-22-104 is misleading. RUPA's
reference to that provision in Idaho Code§ 53-3-104(b) merely says that the rate of interest
should be the legal rate specified in Idaho Code§ 28-22-104. This reference in no way
countermands the express directive ofldaho Code§ 53-3-701(b) that interest shall be paid on a
departing partner's share from the date of dissociation. Nor does it suggest that§ 28-22-104
imports additional substantive requirements that must be satisfied in order for interest to be
awarded.
Idaho Code § 53-3-701(b) states categorically that a partner is entitled to a buyout share
based on what would have been recovered if the "the assets of the partnership were sold at a
price equal to the greater of the liquidation value or the value based on a sale of the entire
business as a going concern without the dissociated partner and the partnership was wound up as
of that date," and "[i]nterest shall be paid from the date of dissociation to the date of payment."
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On its face, the statute contemplates both that the business value must be calculated, and that
interest will be due on that calculated value. It does not state, as MRIA implies, that a partner is
entitled to interest only if its buyout share can be calculated without having to "examin[e] the
evidence." Response Br. at 7. Indeed,§ 53-3-701(i) expressly provides for judicial
determination of a "buyout price" when the parties cannot agree on the buyout value, indicating
that "buyout price," and the interest which attaches to the "buyout price," see id. § 53-3-701(b)
& off. cmt. 3, will often have to be determined after judicial review of the evidence.

CONCLUSION
Any judgment issued by the Court should include an award to Saint Alphonsus of its
buyout share ($4.6 million) plus interest from the date of dissociation until the date of payment.
Further, for the reasons stated in Saint Alphonsus's original objections and response to the
proposed judgment, the Court should not list multiple "alternative" awards or award
disgorgement.
DATED this 21st day ofNovember, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

ounter-Defendants
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Reply in support of their Proposed Findings
ofF act and Conclusions of Law Concerning Disgorgement. Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's
assertion otherwise, the preponderance of the evidence shows that Saint Alphonsus usurped
MRIA's opportunities to partner with GSR and to open a facility in Meridian. In addition, the
evidence about the amount of profits that should be disgorged is unrebutted;

A.

Usurpation is not the Only Basis Upon Which to Award Disgorgement Damages
As described in detail below, Saint Alphonsus obviously usurped critical corporate

opportunities belonging to MRIA, and did so in purposeful breach of its fiduciary duties. That
said, the first and most fundamental flaw found in Saint Alphonsus's Response (the "Response")
is that Saint Alphonsus apparently believes that disgorgement can only be awarded if this Court
finds that these usurpations have occurred. The law is not nearly so narrow. The language used
in Idaho cases describes disgorgement as an appropriate remedy for all breaches of fiduciary
duty generally, not just those resulting in an usurpation. See, e.g., Pickering v. El Jay Equipment
Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 512, 517, 700 P.2d 134, 139 (Ct. App. 1985) ("The measure of damages in

an action for breach offiduciary duty is the same as the measure of damages in an action for
breach oftrust," i.e., disgorgement) (emphasis added); Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637,
643, 39 P.3d 577, 583 (2001) (" ... an agent who breaches his fiduciary duties forfeits his entire
compensation.") (emphasis added).
This application of the disgorgement remedy to all breaches of fiduciary duty makes
sense, since it would be strange indeed to allow a party to profit from its knowing breaches of
fiduciary duty simply because those breaches did not result in a technical usurpation of a
corporate opportunity. Triton Canst. Co., Inc. v. Eastern Shore Elec., 2009 WL 1387115, *28
(Del .Ch. 2009), a case out of Delaware, is illustrative. Similar to the case at hand, a party in that
MRIA'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
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case began secretly competing with a corporation in violation of his fiduciary duty. The
breaching party argued, however, that his competition had no effect on the corporation-that the
fiduciary lost no measurable profits or opportunities-and so the Court should not disgorge the
profits which he made while breaching his fiduciary duties. The Triton Court found that
argument unpersuasive:
The absence of specific damage to a beneficiary is not the sole test for
determining disloyalty by one occupying a fiduciary position .... [The] law
prohibits fiduciaries from profiting personally from disloyal acts that constitute
fiduciary breaches. Such damages are designed to discourage disloyalty by
fiduciaries .... [As such, a]ll profits obtained from a breach of the duty of loyalty
should be disgorged .... Delaware law requires that improper gains, such as Kirk's
compensation from Eastern, be recoverable by Triton even though no specific
injury to Triton can be measured. Such a penalty ... serves to discourage
disloyalty and prevents an unjust windfall by stripping the profits gained from
their disloyal acts.

!d. (emphasis added). That is, any disloyalty that results in gain for a breaching party-whether
damages or a lost opportunity to the fiduciary can be shown or not-should be disgorged so that
the breaching party does not profit from its own malfeasance. See also, ERI Consulting v.
Swinnea, 318 S.W. 3d 867, 873 (Tex. 2010) (holding that while "courts may disgorge all illgotten profits from a fiduciary when a fiduciary agent usurps an opportunity properly belonging
to a principal," it may also do so when the agent merely "competes with a principal").
Put more simply, then, there is no requirement that MRIA prove a formal usurpation in
order for this Court to disgorge the profits made by Saint Alphonsus in its relationship with GSR;
it is enough that MRIA prove that Saint Alphonsus simply breached its duty of loyalty to MRIA
and profited therelty. In this case, there was overwhelming evidence that Saint Alphonsus
partnered with GSR in direct violation of its fiduciary obligations to MRIA. Moreover, there is
also substantial evidence that Saint Alphonsus' s technical, business, and marketing expertise
greatly strengthened-and for all intents and purposes created-a formidable competitor for
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MRIA. In addition, the record is clear that Saint Alphonsus then conspired with GSR to
systematically siphon offMRIA's prospective clients. All of this was done in obvious breach of
its fiduciary obligations. As such, disgorgement of the profits Saint Alphonsus made while
violating its fiduciary duty in this way is appropriate, whether an opportunity has been formally
"usurped" or not. ERI Consulting, 318 S.W. 3d at 873.

B.

The Court Should Find that a Preponderance of the Evidence Supports a Finding
that Saint Alphonsus Usurped Partnership Opportunities

1.

Several witnesses and documents indicate that Saint Alphonsus knowingly
"killed" an imminent deal between MRIA and GSR in 1999

Saint Alphonsus argues that because the proposed deal between GSR and MRIA still had
a few "unresolved issues" to be worked out at the time Saint Alphonsus brokered its own deal for
its own benefit, Saint Alphonsus was justified in appropriating an opportunity that it specifically
knew its partners were interested in. Response, pp. 4-7. This argument is faulty on several
levels. 1

a.

Saint Alphonsus misunderstands Idaho law on usurping opportunities

First and foremost, Saint Alphonsus's arguments misstate the law. Saint Alphonsus
apparently believes that in order for MRIA to be successful on this claim, MRIA must show that
MRIA and GSR had their pens out ready to sign a fully-negotiated agreement when Saint
Alphonsus broke down the door and halted the deal. Idaho law does not require anything of the
sort. Indeed, as Saint Alphonsus itself has repeatedly stated, all MRIA must show here is that it
merely had either "an interest or a reasonable expectancy" in getting a deal done with GSR.
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 138 Idaho 424, 428, 64 P.3d 953, 957 (2003) (emphasis added). There is no
dispute here that MRIA had "an interest" in getting a deal done with GSR, and the several
1

Saint Alphonsus also reasserts its argument that usurpation is time barred. As Saint Alphonsus itself notes,
however, it has already presented this exact argument, and the Court has already ruled against it. Response, p. 3,
n.l; Tr., 6039; Tr., 6315-17. MRIA will accordingly not belabor the point here.
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negotiating drafts between the parties easily establish a "reasonable expectancy" of a deal, even
if there were a few details left to iron out. This should end the inquiry.

b.

Saint Alphonsus is the reason no deal between GSR and MRIA
occurred

The second reason that Saint Alphonsus cannot be justified in appropriating the GSR deal
for itself is because in order for it to invoke the defense that GSR was refusing to deal with
MRIA-as it does in the Response-Saint Alphonsus must meet two criteria that it indisputably
has no chance of meeting under the facts presented at trial. In specific, the "refusal to deal"
defense Saint Alphonsus is asserting-i.e., a defense based on the idea that the third party would
not have done a deal with the fiduciary anyway--can only be asserted "when the party can
establish that the refusal was communicated to the partner and was not a result of any nefarious
actions on the part of the person asserting the defense." Triple Five of Minnesota, Inc. v. Simon,
280 F. Supp. 2d 895, 905 (D. Minn. 2003) (reversed in part on other grounds); Regal-Beloit
Corp. v. Drecoll, 955 F. Supp. 849, 862 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Saint Alphonsus has clearly shown

neither of these things here.
As to communication of the refusal, the disclosure must be unambiguous and must come
from the party with the fiduciary duty. Regal-Beloit, 955 F. Supp. at 862. Moreover, this duty to
disclose necessarily requires that the party seeking to do its own deal keeps the fiduciary abreast
of the final state of negotiations between it and the third party. In re Sullivan, 305 B.R. 809, 820
(Bkrtcy.W.D. Mich. 2004). The failure to do so will result in the party not being able to invoke
the defense. As the Court in In re Sullivan stated: "[b]ecause the Debtor never reported the end
of his negotiations with ASR to anyone at Digital Commerce, particularly Hall, he may not
invoke 'refusal to deal' as justification for diverting the ASR opportunity." Id
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In this case, the evidence is incontrovertible that while MRIA knew that Saint Alphonsus
was negotiating with GSR, MRIA believed that Saint Alphonsus, as its fiduciary, was
negotiating towards a "one big happy family" approach. Yet in this MRIA was betrayed, since
the record is also abundantly clear that Saint Alphonsus never reported "the end of [its]
negotiations" with GSR to MRIA. See In re Sullivan, 305 B.R. at 820. Tellingly, there is no
dispute that the first time Saint Alphonsus showed MRIA the IMI operating agreement was in
this litigation. See the Transcript ("Tr."), 317-18. And this is just the tip of the iceberg of things
Saint Alphonsus failed to disclose to MRIA about its negotiations with GSR; indeed, not only
did Saint Alphonsus fail to "report the end of its negotiations" with GSR, it failed to accurately
report the beginning and middle of those negotiations to MRIA as well. 2 Saint Alphonsus
accordingly "may not invoke 'refusal to deal' as justification for diverting the [GSR]
opportunity." In re Sullivan, 305 B.R. at 820.
Much more importantly, however, Saint Alphonsus is barred from making its "refusal to
deal" argument since the evidence is overwhelmingly clear that it was the "nefarious acts" of
Saint Alphonsus itself which caused the deal between GSR and MRIA to evaporate. Triple Five,
280 F. Supp. 2d at 905. The timeline here is both damning and undisputed. As discussed in
more detail below, in late spring of 1999 GSR was reporting in its confidential meetings that the
deal between it and MRIA was all but sewn up-that the deal was "very close to being
2

The examples here are literally too numerous to be cited completely. Some of the more important non-disclosures
can be found in the transcript at pp. 325-28 (MRIA only learned later that Schamp had taken confidential
information from 2/16/01 MRI meeting and given it to GSR during the IMI negotiations); p. 1290 (during
negotiations, Saint Alphonsus failed to tell MRIA that it was offering much bigger piece of MRIA to GSR than
MRIA was offering); pp. 1319-20 (Saint Alphonsus failed to tell MRIA that Saint Alphonsus's negotiations with
GSR were creating barrier in the MRIA/GSR deal); pp. 1443-46 (during negotiations with GSR, Saint Alphonsus
told GSR that it was looking to cancel lease and kick out MRIA, but does not tell MRIA anything about it);
pp. 1510-11, 2112-14 (Saint Alphonsus fails to disclose to MRIA that they had already negotiated with GSR/IMI to
go to Meridian while simultaneously discouraging MRIA from doing the same thing); pp. 1514-17,2534-35 (Saint
A1phonsus negotiates to sell to GSR 50% ofMRIA but does not disclose as much to MRIA); 2513-18 (Saint
Alphonsus did not tell MRIA that it was thinking about getting out of the relationship, even though GSR knew by
way of the negotiations); pp. 3513-16 (Saint Alphonsus offered significant technological support and support staff to
GSR-even before partnership agreement-but does not tell MRlA about it).
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finalized." Exs. 4077, p. 3; 4079, p. 2. Immediately after these reports, in the summer of 1999,
Sandra Bruce admits that she was asked to step in to help out with the only serious sticking point
left: the non-competition clause. Tr., 1249-53, 1892-96. She did step in, but instead of
negotiating for the benefit ofMRIA, she began negotiating solely for the benefit of the hospital.
In particular, by late summer 1999, Bruce or her COO, Cindy Schamp, was telling GSR that
Saint Alphonsus wanted to create a deal for the hospital first-before any deal with MRIA was
finished. !d.; Ex. 4101. And in what would prove to be the death knell for an MRIA/GSR deal,
in November and December of 1999, Saint Alphonsus effectively offered GSR a 50% ownership
in MRIA down the road if GSR would give it a 50% ownership in IMI. Tr., 2530-36. This, of
course, gave GSR no reason to do any deal with MRIA: Saint Alphonsus was taking for itself
the 50% ownership MRIA was proposing to take in IMI, and now GSR was also going to own
MRIA's operation of Saint Alphonsus's campus by way of a sale from Saint Alphonsus. !d. The
result, obviously, was that because of Saint Alphonsus's negotiations, MRIA now had nothing to
offer GSR-GSR would already get everything MRIA could offer it, and it would get it at better
terms from Saint Alphonsus. ld.; Tr., 1310-11 (Bruce admits that her deal would provide GSR
with more equity). As Cindy Schamp was forced to reluctantly admit at trial, these negotiations
effectively "killed" any hope of a deal between MRIA and GSR. Tr., 2530-36. These behindthe-scenes negotiations explain the ambush meeting a few weeks later in which the radiologists
to MRIA's mind inexplicably rejected the very concept ofpartnering with MRIA, when only a
few short months prior GSR had stated it was certain a deal would be finalized shortly. Tr., 26568;Ex.4077,p.3;Ex.4079,p.2.
The conclusion here is accordingly inescapable: before Saint Alphonsus stepped in, a
MRIA/GSR deal was "close to being finalized," but once Saint Alphonsus brokered its own deal,
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the MRIA/GSR deal was dead in the water. There can accordingly be no dispute that Saint
Alphonsus is the reason that GSR "refused to deal." It cannot now use its own underhanded acts
to purposefully kill the deal to shield itself from liability on usurpation.
Saint Alphonsus seems to try to wish all this uncomplimentary evidence away by arguing
that Sandra Bruce was willing to testify at the most recent trial that she "cannot remember" being
asked to take over negotiations. Response, p. 6. As an initial matter, whether she "took over"
negotiations is irrelevant here, since regardless of the role it took with GSR in the fall of 1999,
there is no doubt that Saint Alphosus brokered a deal with GSR that killed MRIA's opportunity.
Secondly, Bruce was specifically impeached by MRIA on this point, meaning that she testified
earlier to the opposite of what she stated in this trial. Tr., 1249-53, 1892-96. In short, she was
changing her story in this regard for the purposes of expediency. Sadly, by MRIA's count, this
impeachment was just one of an incredible 38 times Bruce was impeached on issues of
significance at the trial of this matter. Moreover, by MRIA's count, her convenient attestation
that she cannot remember being asked to step in is just one of an astounding 171 responses at
trial that she "could not remember" key events or facts. Thus, at the risk of stating the obvious,
she made up new facts at trial when she could, and when she could not, feigned convenient
memory failure. Her testimony is patently untrustworthy, regardless of subject matter. The jury
seems to have found as much, and so should this Court.

c.

By GSR's own admission, a deal between it and MRIA was imminent

Finally, though it is not necessary to show as much, it is worth noting that there is a
massive amount of persuasive evidence that MRIA and GSR were, in fact, close to a deal at the
time Saint Alphonsus usurped the opportunity, even if a few points remained to be negotiated.
As alluded to above, the evidence in the record which existed prior to this litigation or arguments
between the parties-and therefore has the least amount of reason to be biased-is that GSR
MRIA'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
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thought a deal with MRIA was imminent. For example, Saint Alphonsus itself cites Ex. 4079, in
which Dr. Hall of GSR reports to GSR in late spring of 1999 that "a partnership with MRI is very

close to beingfinalized." Ex. 4079, p. 2 (~ L) (emphasis added). Indeed, GSR felt so confident
about the finality of a deal with MRIA that it voted to "give the negotiating team discretion in
finishing the negotiations." Jd. Saint Alphonsus seems to recognize the significant harm this
document does to its current position, but offers no reason in its Response whatsoever as to why
these candid and contemporaneous statements should be ignored. Response, p. 4.
Nor is Ex. 4079 the only piece of evidence or testimony supporting the imminence of a
deal. Ex. 4077, which is another set of meeting minutes for GSR, states (also in spring of 1999)
that "MRI negotiations are close to being complete," and that the "Group would like to finalize
the MRI partnership [with MRIA] quickly to help make the hospital negotiations smoother."
Ex. 4077, p. 3 (emphasis added). As with Ex. 4079, this statement was made long before this
litigation began and was made behind closed doors between only members of GSR. It is
accordingly obviously a very persuasive piece of evidence for which Saint Alphonsus has no
explanation.
In addition, as Saint Alphonsus admits, Dr. Prochaska-a major player in these
negotiations-stated he thought a deal was close to being done at the time. Tr., 250-54. And
Dr. Prochaska was not alone in this belief, in spite of Saint Alphonsus' s intimations; several
other witnesses, such as Dr. Giles, Jeff Cliff, and Sandra Bruce, were all shown at trial to have
testified to that fact as well. Tr., 950 (Cliff says he has no reason to dispute that GSR believed a
deal with MRIA was close to being finalized); Tr., 1249-53 (Bruce admits that she was asked to
step in to finish up the MRIA/GSR deal); Tr., 4329-34 (Dr. Giles stated that GSR always
assumed IMI would become part of MRIA).
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Instead, Saint Alphonsus apparently hopes that current testimony from admittedly highlyprepared and self-interested witnesses3 in a second trial taking place a decade after the events
transpired, and with tens of millions of dollars on the line, should somehow trump the
unambiguous statements made behind closed doors at a time when no one at GSR had a reason
to misrepresent the true nature of the negotiations. These current attestations are suspicious on
their face. As with Ms. Bruce, the jury apparently gave this self-interested testimony no
credence, and neither should this Court.

2.

The Meridian opportunity was usurped

Saint Alphonsus next argues that there is no evidence that it usurped the Meridian
opportunity. Response, pp. 8-9. It is worth noting initially that such arguments are nothing more
than academic if the Court finds that Saint Alphonsus usurped the opportunity to partner with
GSR, since if GSR and MRIA became partners in 1999, they obviously would have gone to
Meridian together.
Moreover, there is plenty of evidence that Saint Alphonsus did usurp the Meridian
opportunity. In fact, the undisputed facts presented to the jury were that Saint Alphonsus
knowingly thwarted MRIA's efforts to move into Meridian, advising MRIA that the timing was
not right because Saint Alphonsus had not yet made its mind on what services it wanted on its
Meridian facility. See, e.g., Tr., 1503-14, 2112-14, 3912-13; Exs. 4210, 4211, 4215. Sadly,
however, as Saint Alphonsus was forced to admit at trial, this was nothing more than an outright
misrepresentation; in fact, Saint Alphonsus had agreed with GSR mere weeks before that they
would go to Meridian together, and begun making plans to do so. ld.

3

See, e.g., Tr., 3353-60 (Cliff met with Saint Alphonsus's counsel for several hours over the course of multiple days
and has a financial interest in IMI's well being).
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In response, Saint Alphonsus does not even attempt to argue that it did not lie to its
partners so as to profit at their expense. Instead, it seeks to cover its undisputed malfeasance by
arguing that GSR wanted to go to Meridian even before Saint Alphonsus usurped the
opportunity. Response, p. 8. This argument is, however, irrelevant since the question here is not
what GSR might have done--since it was not the party with a fiduciary duty-but instead what
Saint Alphonsus actually did. And what Saint Alphonsus actually did was to blatantly usurp a
corporate opportunity.
Saint Alphonsus also contends that MRIA could have gone to Meridian over its contrary
vote. Response, pp. 8-9. This position ignores the nature of Saint Alphonsus's admitted
misrepresentation. Saint Alphonsus did not tell MRIA that it should not try to ever go to
Meridian, nor did it tell MRIA that if a vote was taken, Saint Alphonsus would vote against it.
Instead, Saint Alphonsus misled MRIA into believing that the time was not yet right since Saint
Alphonsus had not yet decided on what services its proposed site would have. See, e.g., Tr.,
1503-14, 2112-14, 3912-13; Exs. 4210,4211,4215. Put more simply, Saint Alphonsus did not
"prevent MRIA from expanding into Meridian" by voting against it, but by lying to it
Finally, Saint A1phonsus argues that there still might have been an opportunity to go into
Meridian in spite of Saint Alphonsus's usurpation. Response, p. 9. Once again, however, this
argument finds Saint Alphonsus missing the point. The issue before this Court is not whether
MRIA might have been able to find another opportunity later to move into Meridian; the issue is
instead whether Saint Alphonsus usurped this opportunity in violation of its fiduciary duty such
that its profits from it should be disgorged. Again, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains is required
even if no damages result to the fiduciary. Triton Const., 2009 WL 1387115 at *28. Moreover,
Saint Alphonsus's argument that "three other entities" opened after IMI Meridian did is highly
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misleading, since Saint Alphonsus has admitted that it has no idea whether those entities actually
compared with centers like MRIA or IMI in terms of MRI systems or services, nor is there any
indication from Saint Alphonsus that they were profitable. Tr., 6174-76. As such, there is no
indication here that anything can be understood about "opportunities" for MRIA by these
entities' inclusion in the market. !d.

C.

The Unrebutted Evidence Establishes Disgorgement Damages in the Amount
Requested by MRIA

1.

The opportunity to partner with the radiologists

Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's assertion otherwise, the unrebutted evidence clearly
establishes that $25.3 million is the correct measure of damages to measure the disgorgement of
Saint Alphonsus's usurpation of the opportunity to partner with the radiologists.

a.

It is inappropriate to include the buy-in cost

Saint Alphonsus first contends that MRIA's disgorgement figures do not account for the
cost to Saint Alphonsus of its "buy-in" cost, that that the cost of $11.2 million which Saint
Alphonsus had paid for the opportunity to partner with IMI should be offset from the
disgorgement amount. However, Mr. Budge explained why it was inappropriate to offset Saint
Alphonsus's $11.2 million investment in his disgorgement analysis. Mr. Budge was asked:
Q. All right. Thank you. Now, do you consider this amount through 2010 for
Saint Alphonsus' 50-percent profit share in the amount of $17,078,000 to be
conservative?
A. Yeah. In one specific respect I do, yes.

Q. And can you tell the jury why that is.
A. Well, this can be seen, according to these calculations Saint Alphonsus
basically realized a $17,078,000 in profits from what I'm going to call an $11
million investment in 2006.

So if this investment continued to produce something around three and a half
million dollars a year, that's a return on investment of over 30 percent.
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It strikes me, without having done the valuation, that there is some probability
that what they owned, the value of that 50-percent interest is actually much higher
than the $11 million that they paid. But because ofthe complexity and issues that
would be involved in valuing their 50-percent interest, I have not made
calculations for them to disgorge the gain that they've made on their investment.
It's strictly the profits that are produced to which they have a claim.

Q. Okay. So in other words, if they ended up with this $11 million acquiring
something in the 50-percent profit share that is worth a lot more than that, you're
not including that in the disgorgement analysis?
A. Right. I think that under other disgorgement calculations I've made over my
career, that is something in many cases would have been included, but it's not.
Q. Now, since we're measuring the benefit ofSaint Alphonsus, why isn't the $11
million invested by Saint Alphonsus into the IMI business, why doesn't that reduce
this $17 million number?
A. Because Saint Alphonsus still owns that asset. You know, they paid $11
million. They received 50-percent interest in all of the future earnings that come
from these MRI operations.

At this date in 2011 they still own that asset. They still own 50 percent of all the
future earnings. It has not depreciated. It hasn't gone away. You know, it
presumably could be sold. It has value. So it shouldn't be deducted. It still
exists. It hasn't been wasted.
Tr., 4518:17-4520:16 (emphasis added). In short, Mr. Budge specifically did not include
disgorgement for the increase of Saint Alphonsus' s $11.2 million investment, but simply the
profits that Saint Alphonsus received by virtue of the fact that it owned a 50 percent interest in
IMI's MRI-related profits.
This distinction can be illustrated by comparing the circumstances of this case to a much
simpler investment, such as the purchase of a stock, and the streams of revenue that are related to
that kind of investment. A party who has purchased stock might realize an increase in the value
of that investment-i.e., his stock might go up in value, and he will make money on that
investment when he later sells at a price higher than the price he paid. The stockowner might
also receive dividends paid on that stock-i.e., a portion ofthe profits produced by the company
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in which he owns an interest. In this case, because Saint Alphonsus still owns the underlying
investment, MRIA decided not to seek disgorgement for the increase in the value of Saint
Alphonsus's investment. 4 Instead, MRIA's expert calculated disgorgement only for the
"dividend" or profits that Saint Alphonsus received because of its ownership in IMI. As
Mr. Budge did not include the increase in the value of Saint Alphonsus's investment as a part of
the disgorgement damages, it would in fact be inappropriate to offset that buy-in amount. 5 Saint
Alphonsus would receive an offset related to subset of damages which MRIA has not requested.
Notably, Saint Alphonsus chose to offer no evidence to rebut the amount of disgorgement
damages outlined by MRIA's experts. See Tr., at 6236. Indeed, Saint Alphonsus did not rebut
Mr. Budge's assertion that it would be inappropriate to offset the disgorgement amount with the
buy-in price. As this evidence is undisputed, MRIA therefore asks the Court to award
disgorgement damages in the amount outlined in its earlier briefing

b.

The disgorgement analysis for the usurped opportunity to partner
with the radiologists should include profits attributable to IMI's Eagle
facility

The disgorgement analysis for the usurped opportunity to partner with the radiologists
should include profits attributable to IMI' s Eagle facility which opened in 2007. MRIA
recognizes this Court's ruling of October 25,2011, that:
4

Had Mr. Budge included this analysis, his calculation would have included an analysis about the increase in the
value of Saint Alphonsus's $11.2 million investment in 50 percent ofiMI's MRI, that is, what Saint Alphonsus
could now sell that interest for. Had this disgorgement analysis been presented, Saint Alphonsus would have been
required to disgorge not merely the money that it made because it had this 50 percent interest in the IMI MRI
operations, but also any increase in the value of its $11.2 million investment. Mr. Budge's analysis was much more
conservative, and did not contain this value analysis.
5

In Footnote 8, Saint Alphonsus also argues that the conclusion that Meridian accounted for 33 percent ofiMI's
MRI-related profits was incon-ect because this was based on a portion ofthe "lost profits" analysis instead of a
separate "disgorgement" analysis. This percentage is material only to the determination ofiMI's "future" profits
beyond 2010. What Saint Alphonsus fails to realize is that the "future" lost profits calculation and the "futur-e"
disgorgement calculation necessarily begin at the same place-i.e., how much would IMI have made in the futti're.
MRIA' s lost profits, and the profits that Saint Alphonsus is projected to receive, are then calculated through
different methods based on that amount. But use of the underlying projection ofiMJ's future MRI-related profit as
the base of both calculation is not a comparison of"apples to oranges," as Saint Alphonsus alleges.
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With regard to the Eagle opportunity, under Idaho law, "a partner's duty of
loyalty continues after dissociation only with regard to matters arising and events
occurring before the partner's dissociation." That's Idaho Code Section 53-3-603.
The action in opening the Eagle facility is too remote in time from both the
dissociation and the expiration of the non-compete obligation to find that
damages, if found, may be awarded for the Eagle facility profits that might have
been realized by the MRI entities or the profits Saint Alphonsus realized under a
disgorgement theory.
Tr., 6068:24-6069:12. 6 MRIA respectfully disagrees and requests reconsideration on this point.
The theory of damages related to the usurpation ofMRIA's opportunity to partner with the
radiologists is not directed at any particular facility. Nor is it an argument that MRIA lost profits
related to a specific facility that lMI opened with Saint Alphonsus's support. It is not an
assertion that this facility was in any way related to dissociation or the non-compete obligation.
Rather, it is an argument that Saint Alphonsus profited by creating, supporting, and ultimately
joining a competitor ofMRIA-a competitor that established an Eagle operation. Likewise,
MRIA, not Saint Alphonsus, would have been associated with the radiologists but for Saint
Alphonsus's breaches. It is not remote or speculative that this facility was actually opened. If
Saint Alphonsus had not usurped MRIA's opportunity to join with the radiologists, MRIA would
have been involved with this project. As such, it is entirely appropriate to include the Eagle
facility as part of the disgorgement damages related to Saint Alphonsus's usurpation of the
opportunity to partner with the radiologists.
To the extent that the Court is inclined to remove the Eagle facility from disgorgement
damages, despite the allegation that Saint Alphonsus usurped the opportunity to join with the
radiologists in all future ventures, that amount can easily be backed out. Eagle accounted for
$4,237,522 ofiMI's MRI-related profits from 2006 to 2010. Ex. 5067. Turning to damages
between 2010 and 2015, Mr. Wilhoite presented the appropriate calculation. According to
6

This ruling came after MRIA had presented its damages experts.
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Mr. Wilhoite, to determine the future profits of IMI related to the Eagle location, one must take
the Eagle amount for 2010 on Ex. 5067, $1,767,189, and divide it by the total of all locations for
2010 on Ex. 5067, $6,538,820, to determine what percentage Eagle is of the total for 2010. Tr.,
4 720-21. That percentage is .2702. That percentage is then applied to the $13,700,000 total
future profits figure calculated by Wilhoite on Ex. 5078 for an amount of$3,701,740, which
represents future IMI profits related to the Eagle location. !d. 7
The total profits ofiMI related to the Eagle location are the sum of$4,237,522 and
$3,701,740, or $7,939,262. This number is then reduced by 50 percent to reflect Saint
Alphonsus's share, or $3,969,631. Thus, when the Eagle-related profits are "backed out" from
the total of$25,328,469 (as per Ex. 5082), the disgorgement amount is $21,358,838. 8 MRIA
asks the Court to award its originally requested amount of $25,328,469, which is the proper
amount of disgorgement for MRIA's opportunity to partner with all radiologist imaging centers,
which includes the Eagle opportunity. However, to the extent that the Court determines that the
Eagle opportunity must be removed, MRIA requests the disgorgement amount of$21,358,838.

2.

The Meridian opportunity

As noted in MRIA's initial briefing, if the Court awards disgorgement damages for the
overall opportunity to partner with the radiologists, there is no need to separately calculate
damages for the Meridian opportunity, because MRIA's experts included that opportunity in the
overall disgorgement theory. Nevertheless, MRIA will rebut Saint Alphonsus's contention that
the separate Meridian analysis is insufficient.
7

The calculation proposed by Saint Alphonsus on page II of its briefing does not correctly apply Mr. Wilhoite's
calculation. The Court should see MRIA's original briefing, in which Mr. Wilhoite's calculation as outlined above
is used to determine the portion of total disgorgement related solely to the Meridian opportunity.
8

Saint Alphonsus then further reduces this to reflect its "buy in" amount. Saint Alphonsus would be entitled to such
an offset only if it was also required to disgorge the increase in investment value of its buy-in. As noted in the
section above, this is inappropriate, because MRIA decided not to pursue disgorgement for the increase in the value
ofthe investment.
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Saint Alphonsus first argues that because the Court must calculate the damages amount
for disgorgement related to the Meridian opportunity from the evidence presented at trial, rather
than simply inserting a down-to-the-penny number explicitly stated on the record by an expert,
that the Court should decline to find any amount of disgorgement. However, there is no
requirement that the exact requested amount of damages be presented to the finder of fact in
some prepackaged fashion. Rather, the finder of fact must be presented with evidence from
which that amount can be calculated. The law in Idaho is that damages need not be proved with
mathematical certainty, but only reasonable certainty. Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson,
144 Idaho 844, 172 P .3d 1119 (2007). "The mere fact that it is difficult to arrive at [an] exact
amount of damages, where it is shown that damages resulted, does not mean that damages may
not be awarded; it is for the trier-offact to fix the amount." Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho
629, 640, 862 P.2d 321, 332 (Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added) (factfinder could calculate
damages from testimony about the appropriate number and size of trees wrongfully removed,
and the value of trees of various sizes in the open market).
The evidence that MRIA presented through its experts and the documentary evidence is ·
more than sufficient to fix the amount of disgorgement damages in the amount of $7,158,029.
This calculation and the supporting evidence are described in detail in MRIA's opening brief.
Saint Alphonsus nevertheless contends that the calculation fails to take into account the cost to
Saint Alphonsus of purchasing a 50 percent share ofthe Meridian opportunity, which it contends
is 28 percent ofthe $11.2 million buy-in. Notably, Saint Alphonsus does not point to any
evidence that it presented in the record that 28 percent of the buy-in was related to its buy-in to
MRI Mobile. Rather, it claims that it is "reasonable" to attribute 28 percent of the purchase price
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to Meridian because 28 percent of its receipts from its partnership with IMI come from Meridian.
Saint Alphonsus did not present any evidence at trial that attributes its buy-in in this fashion.
More importantly, as explained in the section above, MRIA is not seeking disgorgement
of the increase in Saint Alphonsus's investment, but merely the portion of the profits it has
received as a partial owner of IMI. As Mr. Budge explained, it would in fact be inappropriate to
offset Saint Alphonsus's $11.2 million investment in his disgorgement analysis. Tr., 4518:174520:16. As Saint Alphonsus offered no evidence to rebut the amount of disgorgement damages
outlined by MRIA's experts (see Tr., 6236), MRIA therefore asks the Court to award
disgorgement damages in the amount outlined in its earlier briefing.

D.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, MRIA respectfully requests that this Court enter a judgment

consistent with MRIA's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
DATED this 21st day ofNovember 2011.
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Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRJ Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Peter J. Romatowski
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:
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

JAN 18 201?

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAcHt:us; ::

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Defendant.

_____________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV -OC-2004-08219

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED, an Idaho
limited partnership; MRI MOBILE LIMITED,
an Idaho limited partnership,

)
)
)
)
)
)
Counter-claimants,
)
)
vs.
)
)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, )
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)
Counter-defendants.
)
)

Presently before the Court is the issue of whether and in what amount to award an
equitable remedy in favor of the counterclaimants. Trial was held in months of September and
October 2011, and argument was heard on this specific issue in December 2011. The Court now
makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1
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FINDINGS OF FACT
At the close of trial in this matter, the jury found that the counter-defendants (collectively
Saint Alphonsus) had misappropriated MRI Associates' opportunity to partner with the Gem
State Radiologists (GSR) and MRI Mobile's opportunity to open an MRI facility in Meridian,
Idaho. The jury also found that Saint Alphonsus had not proven any affirmative defense as to
these claims. Furthermore, the jury, in an advisory finding, found that the amount of profit Saint
Alphonsus realized by misappropriating the opportunity to partner with GSR was $11,510,949.
The jury also found that Saint Alphonsus realized $19,061,617 by misappropriating MRI
Mobile's opportunity to open an MRI facility in Meridian, Idaho.
Though the Court believes it is bound by jury's findings as to liability, it would make
identical findings based on the evidence presented at trial if liability were an issue for the Court.
Though the jury's findings as to liability are appropriate, the Court finds that the jury's advisory
findings as to damages are erroneous. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds
the MRI Entities proved that the downtown and Meridian opportunities misappropriated by Saint
Alphonsus netted Saint Alphonsus $21,353,838. Specifically excluded from this amount are any
damages arising out of the Eagle opportunity.

Though there has been argument as to whether

the Court should deduct Saint Alphonsus's initial investment in Intermountain Medical Imaging
from the total award, the Court finds that it would be inappropriate to do so because Saint
Alphonsus has retained its interest in Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Saint Alphonsus is
only required to disgorge the cash flows it would have received up until 2015, retaining its full
interest in any cash flows after 2015.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Under Idaho law, a partner owes a duty to "hold as trustee for [the partnership] any ...

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 2
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benefit derived by the partner in the conduct . . . of the partnership . . . including the
appropriation of a partnership opportunity."

I.C § 53-3-404(b)(1). The remedy for a breach of

the duty to hold partnership opportunities in trust is the disgorgement of "any money or property
in the partner's hands that can be traced to the partnership." I.C. § 53-3-404 cmt. 2. Thus, where
a partner is found to have misappropriated a partnership opportunity, it must disgorge any benefit
it received from the misappropriation.
Because the jury has found that Saint Alphonsus has misappropriated a partnership
opportunity, the Court finds it appropriate that Saint Alphonsus disgorge the profits it realized as
a result of the misappropriation. Thus, MRIA is entitled to disgorgement damages in the amount
of $21,353,838.
~

DATED this 17 day of January, 2012.

/
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRiaiAN
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY opj\b{\

1 ~. 2012

".· ..~ . .~,...,;;:;;:· Clerk
w.:,~

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Defendant.

) ·
)
)
)
Case No. CV -OC-2004-08219
)
)
)
)
JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED, an Idaho
limited partnership; MRI MOBILE LIMITED,
an Idaho limited partnership,

)
)
)
)
)
)
Counter-claimants,
)
)
)
vs.
)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, )
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
)
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
Counter-defendants.
)

This action having come for jury trial, and the issues having been duly tried and a verdict
having been rendered by the jury on October 31, 2011, IT IS SO ORDERED THAT MRI
Associates, LLP (MRIA), MRI Limited (MRI Center), and MRI Mobile Limited (MRI Mobile)
(collectively MRI Entities) may execute on any one of the following alternatives:
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1. As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care (SADC) and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (SARMC) (collectively "Saint Alphonsus")
breached the Partnership Agreement by breaching the non-competition clause found
therein, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:

$25,420,000

2. As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
$3,906,338
MRIA:
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:

$25,420,000

3. As to the claims of MRI Center and MRI Mobile that Saint Alphonsus intentionally
interfered with their prospective contractual relations, the following damages are awarded
in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRI Center: $25,130,149
MRI Mobile: $21,745,914

Judgment2
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Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center: $22,349,967
4. As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary duty owed
to the MRI Entities, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:

$25,420,000

Disgorgement:
MRIA:

$21,358,838

5. As to the claim of the MRI entities that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil conspiracy,
the following damages are awarded:
Lost Profit Damages:
$3,125,070
MRIA:
MRI Center: $20,662,566
MRI Mobile: $17,879,973
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:

$20,336,000

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amount executed upon by the MRI entities will
bear interest at the judgment rate of 5.375% per annum until paid in full.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Saint Alphonsus is awarded $4,600,000 against MRI
Associates, bearing interest at the judgment rate of 10% per annum, calculated from September

Judgment 3
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21, 2007, until paid in full .

.

DATED this/.L_ day of January, 2012.

•

/-

~
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I hereby certify that on this
of January, 2012, I
mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the within instrument
to:
JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
PO BOX 2837
BOISE, ID 83701
DONALD AYER
JONES DAY
51 LOUSIANA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST., STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
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NO. _ _ _ _i:iii:i~~~~~A.M. _ _ _ _F_IL,~.~
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JAN 3 1 2012
JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk .
By JOANNA ORTEGA
DEPUTY

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP,
Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT OR NEW TRIAL

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.; and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

v

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
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OR NEW TRIAL - 1

COME NOW Plaintiff/Counterdefendants, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.
("SADC"), and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc, ("SARMC") (collectively,
"Saint Alphonsus") and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), move this Court for an
order granting Saint Alphonsus judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Saint Alphonsus further moves the Court pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
59(a), subparts (1) (irregularities in the proceedings ofthe court, jury or adverse party or any
order of the court or abuse of discretion by which Saint Alphonsus was prevented from receiving
a fair trial), (5) (excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion
or prejudice), (6) (insufficient evidence to justify the verdict), and (7) (errors in law) for an order
granting a new trial, or for a remittitur in lieu of a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 .1.
This motion is supported by a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial ("Memorandum") and the Affidavit of
JackS. Gjording filed contemporaneously herewith, as well as the Court's records and files.
As stated in detail in the Memorandum, the jury's verdict on lost profits, and the
alternative awards of disgorgement and diminution in value are legally improper and not
supported by substantial evidence in the record, and Saint Alphonsus is thus entitled to a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Saint Alphonsus is also entitled to judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on the claims of MRI Center and MRI Mobile, and to a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict based on the failure to correctly apportion damages.
As further stated in detail in the Memorandum, Saint Alphonsus is in the alternative
entitled to a new trial (or to a remittitur in lieu of a new trial) because: ( 1) the verdict is against
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
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OR NEW TRIAL - 2

.

:

the clear weight of the evidence; (2) the verdict is excessive and appears to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice; (3) errors in law occurred during the trial; and
(4) irregularities in the proceedings, orders of the court, and abuses of discretion prevented Saint
Alphonsus from receiving a fair trial. See I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l), (5), (6) & (7). Again, the basis for
each of these grounds for relief are discussed in detail in the Memorandum.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.
DATED this 31st day of January, 2012.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 31st day of January, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

~

0
0

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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JAN 3 1 2012
JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JOANNA ORTEGA
DEPUTY

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

AFFIDAVIT OF JACK S. GJORDING
IN SUPPORT OF SAINT
ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT OR NEW TRIAL

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
)
County of Ada
I, JACKS. GJORDING, being first duly sworn upon oath, and based upon my own
personal knowledge of the following, am competent to and do testify as follows:
1.

I am an Idaho licensed attorney. I represent Plaintiff/Counterdefendants, Saint

Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("SADC"), and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.
("SARMC") (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus").
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Supreme Court's

decision in Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 847, 172 P.3d 1119, 1122
(2007).

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING IN SUPPORT OF SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION
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3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the portions of the 2011

Trial Transcript cited in Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial, filed herewith.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Judge McLaughlin's

Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and Saint Alphonsus Medical
Center, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Fourth Claim for Relief in Second
Amended Counterclaim (Jun. 13, 2007).
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Dis a true and correct copy of Saint Alphonsus's

Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for Summary Judgment Based on the Legal Insufficiency
ofMRIA's Evidence of Lost Profit (Aug. 6, 2010).
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Eisa true and correct copy of Saint Alphonsus's

Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Judgment on the Claims of the Limited Partnerships
(Aug. 6, 2010).
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of the Court's

Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Motions for Judgment on Pleadings and
Motions for Summary Judgment (Nov. 16, 2010).
8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy ofMRIA's Opposition to

Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery Regarding Damages (Feb. 2, 2011).
9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit His a true and correct copy of the Court's Order

Reopening Discovery and Setting Schedule (Feb. 15, 2011).
AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING IN SUPPORT OF SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION
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10.

Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of Saint Alphonsus's

Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment on Its Second Affirmative
Defense (Apr. 11, 2011 ).
11.

Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of Saint Alphonsus' s

Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment on MRI Center's and MRI
Mobile's Third-Party Beneficiary Claims (Apr. 11, 2011).
12.

Attached hereto as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of Saint Alphonsus's

Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment on Its Second Affirmative
Defense (May 2, 2011).
13.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Lis a true and correct copy of Saint Alphonsus's

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Compliance with Statutory Rights to Inspect
Partnership Books and Records (Jun. 10, 2011).
14.

Attached hereto as Exhibit M is a true and correct copy ofthe Court's

Consolidated Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May 18, 2011 (Jun. 17, 2011).
15.

Attached hereto as Exhibit N is a true and correct copy of Saint Alphonsus's

Requested Jury Instruction No. 25 (Jul. 15, 2011).
16.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 0 is a true and correct copy of the Court's Order

Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Compel Compliance with Statutory Right to Inspect
MRIA's Books and Records (Jul. 20, 2011).
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17.

Attached hereto as Exhibit P is a true and correct copy of Saint Alphonsus' s

Memorandum in Support of Its Motion in Limine to Exclude "Hearsay Within Hearsay" in
Business Records (Jul25, 2011).
18.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Q is a true and correct copy of the Court's Order re:

Motions Heard August 5, 2011 (Aug. 23, 2011).
19.

Attached hereto as Exhibit R is a true and correct copy of Saint Alphonsus' s

Memorandum in Support oflts Motion to Exclude MRIA's New and Improper Damages
Theories (Sept. 2, 2011).
20.

Attached hereto as ExhibitS is a true and correct copy of Saint Alphonsus's

Opposition to MRIA's Motion in Limine Concerning out of Court Statements of Cindy Schamp
(Sept. 23, 2011).
21.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Tis a true and correct copy of the Court's Order Re:

Motion to Exclude Damages Theories (Sept. 27, 2011).
22.

Attached hereto as Exhibit U is a true and correct copy of Saint Alphonsus's

Opposition to Motion in Limine to Prevent Argument and Evidence that Saint Alphonsus is
Entitled to an "Offset" Based on Its Ownership of the MRI Entities (Oct. 12, 2011).
23.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Vis a true and correct copy of Saint Alphonsus's

Motion to Direct a Verdict on MRIA's Damages and Disgorgement Theories (Oct. 18, 2011).

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING IN SUPPORT OF SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION
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24.

Attached hereto as Exhibit W is a true and correct copy ofMRIA's Opposition to

Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Directed Verdict on MRIA's Damages and Disgorgement
Theories (Oct. 21, 2011).
25.

Attached hereto as Exhibit X is a true and correct copy of Saint Alphonsus's

Consolidated Reply in Support of Directed Verdict Motions Filed October 18, 2011 (Oct. 22,
2011).
26.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Y is a true and correct copy of Saint Alphonsus's

Response to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Usurpation and
Disgorgement (Nov. 15, 2011).
27.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Z is a true and correct copy of the Court's Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law (Jan. 18, 2012).
28.

Attached hereto as Exhibit AA is a true and correct copy of the Court's Judgment

(Jan. 17, 2012).
29.

Attached hereto as Exhibit BB is a true and correct copy ofthe portions of the

2007 Trial Transcript cited in Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial, filed herewith.
30.

Attached hereto as Exhibit CC is a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs Trial

Exhibit 730.
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31.

Attached hereto as Exhibit DD is a true and correct copy ofPlaintiffs Trial

Exhibit 730A
32.

Attached hereto as Exhibit EE is a true and correct copy of Trial Exhibit 730B

33.

Attached hereto as Exhibit FF is a true and correct copy of Trial Exhibit 782.

34.

Attached hereto as Exhibit GG is a true and correct copy of Trial Exhibit 975.

35.

Attached hereto as Exhibit HH is a true and correct copy of Trial Exhibit 976.

36.

Attached hereto as Exhibit II is a true and correct copy of Trial Exhibit 987.

3 7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit JJ is a true and correct copy of Trial Exhibit 404 7.

38.

Attached hereto as Exhibit KK is a true and correct copy of Trial Exhibit 4057.

39.

Attached hereto as Exhibit LL is a true and correct copy ofTrial Exhibit 4101.

40.

Attached hereto as Exhibit MM is a true and correct copy ofTrial Exhibit 4219.

41.

Attached hereto as Exhibit NN is a true and correct copy of Defendant Trial

Exhibit 5000.
42.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 00 is a true and correct copy of Trial Exhibit 5067R2.

43.

Attached hereto as Exhibit PP is a true and correct copy of Trial Exhibit 5078R.

44.

Attached hereto as Exhibit QQ is a true and correct copy of portions of the

Transcript of the Deposition of Bruce Budge taken August 11, 2011, cited in Saint Alphonsus's
Memorandum in Support of Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial, filed herewith.
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FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public, this 31st Day of January,
2012.

Notary P IC for Idaho
Residing at Meridian, Idaho
My Commission Expires: /! -/0-
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I hereby certify that on the 31st day of January, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
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802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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TRILOGY NETWORK SYSTEMS, INC. v. JOHNSON

Idaho

A

1119

Cite as 172 P.3d 1119 (Idaho 2007)

evidence that she had incorporated what she
had learned into her life. Finally, the court
found no evidence that Doe was available to
parent her children, who lived in the Pocatello area, as she had chosen to remain in Ada
County after her release and had no plans to
return to southeastern Idaho, and that the
children needed a large support network
which Doe could not provide as a single
parent.
All of these findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Emee
Drews, a social worker from Utah, testified
that the children needed extensive dental
work and lacked immunization records when
they were taken into custody. She also testified that Doe failed to pay any child support
during the time her children were in Utah's
custody. Doe herself testified that she and
the children left their home in Fort Hall,
taking only the clothing on their backs, and
that they fled from a domestic violence situation. Toni Vollmer, a lieutenant with the
Bannock County Sheriffs Department who
declared the children to be in imminent danger, testified to the conditions of the home at
the time the children were taken into custody, including broken and bloody glass on the
floor and drug paraphernalia in one of the
bedrooms. Jason Norman, the social worker
who took the children into custody, testified
to the same conditions and also testified that
there were no provisions to care for young
children in the home. He also testified to a
general lack of parental supervision which
could have prevented the physical injuries
present on the children on the day he took
them into custody. Donna Cunningham, the
children's foster mother, testified to the injuries to the children, as well as their behavioral problems such as the older son being
behind in school, the younger daughter having problems with inappropriate boundaries
and the younger son being behind developmentally.
Additionally, Doe testified to her long
criminal history and long history of drug
abuse. She also testified that at the time of
trial she had been hired for a part-time job,
but had not yet started work, that she was
living in a women's shelter in Boise, that she
did not have a car or a valid driver's license

and that she had paid no child support during the time her children were in state custody.
Therefore, we hold that the magistrate did
not err in finding neglect and ordering termination of Doe's parental rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the order terminating Doe's parental rights because there was substantial
and competent evidence supporting the magistrate's finding of neglect under I.C. § 16-2005(b) (2005).
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices J.
JONES, W. JONES and HORTON concur.

144 Idaho 844

TRILOGY NETWORK SYSTEMS,
INC., a Nevada corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

David JOHNSON, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 33824.
Supreme Court of Idaho,
Twin Falls, November 2007.

Nov. 30, 2007.
Background: Former employer brought
action against former employee for breaching settlement agreement by doing business with former employer's customer.
The Fifth Judicial District Court, Minidoka County, John K. Butler, J., entered
judgment in favor of former employer
without awarding damages or attorney
fees. Former employer appealed.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Burdick,
J., held that:
(1) former employer failed to prove dam-

ages, and

003388

1120 Idaho

172 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES

(2) it was not entitled to attorney fees and
costs.
Affirmed.
1. Appeal and Error <P1013
The decision to not award damages is
reviewed for clear error.
2. Appeal and Error <P1013
The findings of the trial court on the
question of damages will not be set aside
when based on substantial and competent
evidence.

mer employer made conclusory statements
that its profit margins were similar to those
of former employee, but former employer
failed to offer any proof of its costs and
profits if it had the contract.
9. Costs <P194.32
Failure to award attorney fees and costs
to former employer for former employee's
breach of non-compete clause in settlement
agreement was not abuse of discretion; former employee was prevailing party on damages. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 54(d)(l)(B).
10. Appeal and Error <P984(5)

3. Damages <P120(7)
The measure of damages for the breach
of an anti-competition clause is the amount
that the plaintiff lost by reason of the breaeh,
not the amount of profits made by the defendant.

The determination of who is the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees is within
the trial court's sound discretion, and Supreme Court will not disturb that decision
unless there is an abuse of discretion. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 54(d)(l)(B).

4. Damages <P190
Since the measure of damages for loss of
profits is rarely susceptible of accurate proof,
the law does not require accurate proof with
any degree of mathematical certainty.

11. Appeal and Error <P946

5. Damages <P184
Damages need be proved only with a
reasonable certainty, and this means that the
existence of damages must be taken out of
the realm of speculation.
6. Damages <P6, 208(1)
The mere fact that it is difficult to arrive
at an exact amount of damages, where it is
shown that damages resulted, does not mean
that damages may not be awarded; it is for
the trier-of-fact to fix the amount.
7. Damages <P120(7)
The profits realized by the defendant as
result of breach of anti-competition clause
may be considered by the trier-of-fact, if
shown to correspond with the loss of the
plaintiff.
8. Damages <P190
Former employer failed to prove damages from former employee's breach of noncompete clause in settlement agreement by
entering contract with former employer's
customer to provide computer software; for-

When examining whether a trial court
abused its discretion, Supreme Court considers whether (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of this
discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it, and (3) reached its decision by
an exercise of reason.
12. Costs <P252
Rule requiring claim for attorney fees on
appeal to be asserted as an issue presented
on appeal in the fust appellate brief filed by
the party did not provide authority for award
of attorney fees on appeal. Appellate Rule
41(a).
13. Costs <P252
Rule requiring claim for attorney fees on
appeal to be indicated in brief in the division
of issues on appeal did not provide authority
for award of attorney fees on appeal. Appellate Rule 35(b)(5).

J. Justin May, Boise, argued for appellant.
Kent David Jensen, Jerome, argued for
respondent.
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BURDICK, Justice.
Appellant Trilogy Networks Systems, Inc.
(Trilogy) appeals the district court decision
denying it damages and attorney fees after it
prevailed on its breach of contract claim at
trial. We affirm.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Respondent David Johnson was employed
by Trilogy. After Johnson terminated his
employment with Trilogy, Trilogy instituted
a lawsuit against Johnson. That lawsuit was
ultimately settled with Trilogy and Johnson
entering into a stipulated settlement agreement that contained provisions regarding
with which of Trilogy's customers Johnson
could and could not do business for one year.
During the year covered by the stipulation,
Johnson did business with Seastrom Manufacturing, Inc. (Seastrom). Both Trilogy and
Johnson had submitted bids to Seastrom.
Seastrom awarded Johnson the contract on
the software and Trilogy the contract on the
hardware. However, Seastrom was one of
the customers with whom Johnson was not to
do business.
During the bidding process, Trilogy became aware of Johnson's bid and notified
Johnson that it objected to his dealings with
Seastrom. Nonetheless, Johnson continued
dealing with Seastrom, and Trilogy ultimately filed suit against Johnson for breach of
contract and damages.
After a court trial, the district court found
that Johnson had breached the agreement
with Trilogy. However, the district court
also found that Trilogy had failed to prove its
damages with reasonable certainty. It then
entered judgment in favor of Trilogy, but did
not award Trilogy damages or attorney fees.
Trilogy appeals the district court decision as
to damages and attorney fees.
II. ANALYSIS
This Court must consider three issues.
First, whether there was sufficient evidence
from which the trial court could calculate
damages and whether the court's failure to
award damages was error. Second, whether

the trial court erred by denying Trilogy attorney fees below, and third, whether either
party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
We will turn first to the question of damages.

A. Damages
[1, 2] Trilogy argues that the trial court
erred by not awarding it damages after determining that Johnson had breached the
settlement agreement. The decision to not
award damages is reviewed for clear error.
Moeller v. Harshbarger, 118 Idaho 92, 93,
794 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct.App.1990). The findings of the trial court on the question of
damages will not be set aside when based on
substantial and competent evidence. Idaho
Falls Bonded Produce Supply Co. v. General
Mills Rest. Group, Inc., 105 Idaho 46, 49, 665
P.2d 1056, 1059 (1983).
[3-7] The measure of damages for the
breach of an anti-competition clause is the
amount that the plaintiff lost by reason of the
breach, not the amount of profits made by
the defendant. Dunn v. Ward, 105 Idaho
354, 356, 670 P.2d 59, 61 (Ct.App.1983). The
measure of damages for loss of profits is
"rarely susceptible of accurate proof .... "
Ryska v. Anderson, 70 Idaho 207, 213, 214
P.2d 874, 876 (1950). Therefore, the law
does not require "accurate proof with any
degree of mathematical certainty .... " Vancil v. Anderson, 71 Idaho 95, 105, 227 P.2d
74, 80 (1951). Damages need be proved only
with a "reasonable certainty[,]" and this
means "that [the] existence of damages must
be taken out of the realm of speculation."
Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc.,
100 Idaho 175, 182-83, 595 P.2d 709, 716-17
(1979) (citations omitted). "The mere fact
that it is difficult to arrive at [an] exact
amount of damages, where it is shown that
damages resulted, does not mean that damages may not be awarded; it is for the trierof-fact to fix the amount." Bumgarner v.
Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 640, 862 P.2d
321, 332 (Ct.App.1993) (citing Smith v. Daniels, 93 Idaho 716, 718, 471 P.2d 571, 573
(1970)). The profits realized by the defendant may be considered by the trier-of-fact,
if shown to correspond with the loss of the
plaintiff. Dunn, 105 Idaho at 356, 670 P.2d at
61.
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[8] In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, the district court
determined that Trilogy had failed to prove
its damages because it had failed to offer into
evidence its original bid to Seastrom or any
comparison between its costs and the costs to
Johnson. Additionally, it noted while it could
consider Johnson's profits as evidence, it
could only consider them "in determining the
reasonableness of the plaintiffs proof as to
its lost profits," but not as a substitute for
such proof. The district court also set out
the reasons why it was not persuaded by
plaintiffs submitted proof.
The district court's decision is supported
by the record. Scott A. Wilson, president of
Trilogy, testified that Trilogy's profit margin
and Johnson's profit margin were similar.
After discussing Johnson's actual purchasing
costs and profits, Wilson testified that Trilogy would have made a comparable profit
working within its profit margins. On crossexamination, Wilson testified that Johnson's
profit "would have been in the vicinity" of
Trilogy's profits, but that he would need a
list of the exact software used "and go
through [Trilogy's] pricing to tell ... exactly
what [Trilogy] would have made." When the
district court examined him, Wilson again
testified that Trilogy's profit would have
been "very similar" to Johnson's and that he
would expect to make eleven to twelve percent profit on the purchase price. In addition to Wilson's testimony, Jeff Jardine, a
Trilogy employee and shareholder, testified
that Trilogy would have used an eleven to
twelve percent markup in its dealings with
Seastrom.
Trilogy argues that stating a conclusion
regarding its profit margin, without any factual support, is enough to take the issue of
damages out of the realm of speculation.
Such is not the standard under Idaho law.
See Dunn, 105 Idaho at 357, 670 P.2d at 62.
Trilogy failed to offer into evidence any proof
of what its costs and profits would have been
had Seastrom awarded it the contract. Its
only proof was conclusory statements that
Johnson and Trilogy would have made similar profits. Trilogy failed to offer into evidence its bid to Seastrom for the software
portion of the project, which would have

shown its costs and the profit margin it
expected for that portion of the bid. Although Trilogy had a list of the software
Johnson supplied Seastrom, there was no
showing as to what the costs to Trilogy
would have been for the software ultimately
used by Johnson to complete the project. As
such, Trilogy failed to persuade the district
court of any correspondence between what
its profit would have been and Johnson's
actual profit, and thus failed to take the
measure of its damages out of the realm of
speculation. Therefore, the district court did
not err when it declined to award damages.

B. Attorney Fees Below
[9] The district court determined that
Trilogy had prevailed on the issue of breach
and that Johnson had prevailed on the issue
of damages. It concluded, therefore, that
there was no prevailing party pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B). Trilogy argues that the
district court erred by failing to award it
attorney fees and costs as it was the prevailing party.
[10, 11] The determination of who is the
prevailing party is within the trial court's
sound discretion, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B), and
this Court will not disturb that decision unless there is an abuse of discretion. Farm
Credit Bank of Spokane v. Wissel, 122 Idaho
565, 568, 836 P.2d 511, 514 (1992). When
examining whether a trial court abused its
discretion, this Court considers:
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the
outer boundaries of this discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it;
and (3) whether the trial court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason.
!d. (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v.
Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 803 P.2d 993
(1991)).
Here, the district court correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion (it cited to
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B)). It also acted consistently with the legal standards. Rule 54
directs courts to consider who the prevailing
party is in relation to the relief sought by
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each party. Here, Trilogy sought as damages the profits Johnson obtained, and Johnson sought to have his breach excused because of a unilateral mistake. The court
noted this and considered the relief sought
when determining whether to award attorney
fees. Finally, it reached its decision through
the exercise of reason. Therefore, we affirm
the decision to have each party bear its own
costs and fees.

144 Idaho 848

Adam Paul STEED, an individual, and
Benjamin Paul Steed, an individual,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.

GRAND TETON COUNCIL OF THE
BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, INC.,
a corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
and

C. Attorney Fees on Appeal
[12, 13] Trilogy seeks attorney fees on
appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-120. However,
we decline to award attorney fees because
Trilogy is not the prevailing party. See
Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 780, 133 P.3d
1240, 1245 (2006). Johnson also seeks attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules
35(b)(5) 1 and 41(a). However, as we have
ruled numerous times, Rule 41 provides the
procedure for requesting attorney fees on
appeal, but is not authority alone for awarding fees, Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622,
628, 151 P.3d 818, 824 (2007), and Rule 35
does not provide authority for the award of
attorney fees. Therefore, we decline to
award Johnson attorney fees.
III.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court because Trilogy failed to provide evidence from which the
trial court could calculate damages and because the district court did not abuse its
discretion by not awarding attorney fees below. We decline to award attorney fees on
appeal to either party. Costs to Repondent.
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices J.
JONES, W. JONES, and HORTON concur.

Boy Scouts of America, a corporation;
Bradley Grant Stowell, an individual;
Judith Stowel, an individual; Carl Brad·
ford Allen, an individual; Jim Summers,
an individual; C. Hart Bullock, an indi·
vidual; Elias Lopez, an individual; Kim
A. Hansen, an individual; Robert Fawcett, an individual; and John Doe indi·
viduals I through V; and John Doe Cor·
porations I through V, Defendants.
No. 33272.
Supreme Court of Idaho,
Pocatello, October 2007 Term.
Nov. 30, 2007.
Background: Plaintiffs, former junior
staff members of nonprofit youth organization, brought action against organization
seeking to recover for alleged sexual abuse
they suffered as children while at a camp
operated by the organization. The District
Court, Sixth Judicial District, Bannock
County, Ronald E. Bush, J., denied organization's motion to dismiss on statute of
limitations grounds. Organization appealed.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Eismann,
C.J., held that:
(1) a defendant can be liable for damages
for child abuse even if the defendant
did not actually harm the child;
(2) statute creating cause of action for
damages for child abuse may not form
the basis of a negligence per se claim;

I.

It appears Johnson is citing to I.A.R. 35 for the
authority that he must indicate he seeks attorney

fees in his opening brief. I.A.R. 35(b)(S).
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MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile on any of their
claims."
And that's true. The amount to
purchase, that's not a damage theory that's left
in the case anymore.
What we do intend to do, Your Honor, is
to use that Shattuck Hammond valuation, which is
in evidence, and as Your Honor just said, you can
use things for other purposes, and the Supreme
Court did not in any way limit or exclude -- I
should say exclude the Shattuck Hammond
evaluation. It wasn't excluded. It just said we
couldn't argue this purchase price damage theory.
So what we intend to do is as one of
our alternate theories of damages is a diminution
in value theory. And we should be able to use the
Shattuck Hammond valuation which was done before
all this conduct from SARMC really began taking a
devastating effect. The conduct had began to
occur, but it's almost at the height of MRI
Center's worth. We can take that valuation which
was done by their consultant and then couple that
with testimony from the owners of the MRI Center
as to what that business is worth now, and then
the difference being the diminution in value which
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to anything the Supreme Court said about this
case, and that ought to be enough to exclude the
theory from this case because as Your Honor has
pointed out this is a retrial of the issues in the
first trial not a completely new trial.
Your Honor did allow for a limited
re-opening of discovery and the precise contours
of that are probably at issue in our pending
motion. But that required the disclosure of
expert theories of damages by May 2nd. This
theory was not part of that. There was a limited
re-opening of discovery. I don't know if there
has been discovery on the evidence of the current
value of MRIA. I don't think the discovery has
covered that.
I think this sort of theory requires
expert testimony. So their failure to disclose it
during the expert discovery period ought to
preclude it, even if they want to try to do the
theory without an expert, our expert ought to have
a right to respond to that. I believe there were
outstanding interrogatories from the first trial
asking what their damage theories would be. They
never supplemented those interrogatories to
disclose this theory.
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would be our damage theory.
And what our concern is with this
instruction is the instruction, other than that
last sentence, leaves the jury with the impression
that Shattuck Hammond valuation can't be used by
any means by MRIA and MRI Center and MRI Mobile to
prove their damages, and that's not accurate,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
Response?
MR. VERGONIS: Good morning, Your Honor.
First off, we're okay with your instruction as
written, so we have no objection to that.
Last night when we received their brief
was the first time in the history of this case
that we've heard of this diminution of value
alternative damages theory.
It's the third new damages theory that
they've tried to inject in this case. The first
two new ones are the subject of our pending motion
to preclude certain testimony and damages that
Your Honor said you'll take up on Friday.
This third new one we learned as I said
for the first time yesterday two weeks into trial.
It wasn't in the first trial. It's not responsive

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

So plain and simple, it's too late to
argue for the diminution of value of MRIA. The
evidence isn't in the case. The experts haven't
had a chance to consider it, and they're trying to
inject a new damages claim two weeks into trial.
THE COURT: Mr. Woodard, response.
MR. WOODARD: Sure, Your Honor.
Your Honor, I don't know have the cite
with me right now, but I believe Mr. Wilhoite did
express this in his testimony at the first trial
that was one of the ways that the Shattuck Hammond
valuation could be used.
On the disclosure issue, Your Honor,
there's not expert testimony here, so there was no
expert disclosure that needed to be done.
The other thing I point out is, they -well, the first theory. There was a suggestion
that our experts have whole new damage theories,
which we've briefed that, and we'll show that not
to be true.
But the other thing is, I don't
understand their protestations when they were
allowed to get a whole new expert and completely
change their whole theories regarding damages.
But again, there's no disclosure required because
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on the calendar, quite frankly, because my clerk
took vacation, and as frequently happens when that
occurs, I end up fouling up the calendar.
And she reminded me that we had
additional time available because I had scheduled
some things on Thursday that otherwise might have
been scheduled Wednesday afternoon. So we will go
ahead and do it Wednesday afternoon at 2:00.
Any other matters that counsel wish to
raise with the Court before the jury is brought
in?
Mr. Romatowski.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: I have one briefly, Your
Honor. Your Honor, we would like to offer this
morning three new exhibits that I will hand up
with an excerpt of testimony in order to explain
ourselves.
Your Honor, I was surprised, frankly,
the other day on Dr. Prochaska's direct
examination when Mr. Banducci went into in
detail -- well, I wasn't surprised by this part -he went into detail into the agreement that was
entered into between Saint Alphonsus and the
radiologists effective July 1, 2001, for Saint
Alphonsus to joint venture in the radiologists'
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new imaging center. That's a widely known,
accepted, uncontroversial fact in the case.
But then when he asked Dr. Prochaska
about his agreement, you will see beginning at the
top of page 348 -MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I don't have a
copy of what you have been handed so I really -MR. ROMATOWSKI: I apologize, Your Honor. I
gave Mr. Banducci this morning copies ofthe three
exhibits I have handed up. To get to the bottom
line, he has stipulated to two of them.
MR. BANDUCCI: I am talking about the
transcript that's being read from.
THE COURT: Why don't we give this
transcript to Mr. Banducci -MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor. I
appreciate that -THE COURT: (Continuing:)-- so he will have
it in front of him.
MR. ROMA TOW SKI: I hadn't realized that
Mr. Banducci didn't have a transcript.
MR. BANDUCCI: I just don't know what he is
referring to, Your Honor. If he had told me, I
could have probably retrieved it before starting
oral argument this morning.
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THE COURT: Let Mr. Banducci take a few
moments to read that.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, thank you.
MR. ROMA TOWSKI: Your Honor, you handed back
to Mr. Banducci copies of the exhibit as well,
which he already has. Perhaps I will retrieve
those for the Court.
THE COURT: When he is done, the packet can
be returned to me. That's fine.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: I'm referring, Tom, to 348
and 349.
·•
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, here you go.
THE COURT: Just bring them up, Counsel.
All right. Mr. Banducci has returned
the exhibits, so Mr. Romatowski.
MR. ROMA TOWSKI: Beginning at the top of-this is the part that surprised me, Your Honor,
beginning at the top of page 348. This is a
question by Mr. Banducci.
"QUESTION: At the time that this
operating agreement was executed between Saint
Al's and the radiologists, relative to IMI, was
MRIA made known of its answer?
"ANSWER: No.
"QUESTION: How did MRIA come to learn
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of this agreement?
"ANSWER: During the proceedings
leading up to this trial.
"QUESTION: At the time that Saint
Alphonsus entered into this agreement with a
competitor ofMRIA, was Saint Alphonsus still a
partner in MRIA?
"ANSWER: Yes.
"QUESTION: Did MRI --excuse me-- did
Saint Alphonsus ever tell MRIA that it was making
an investment in IMI?
"ANSWER: No.
"QUESTION: In this time frame?
"ANSWER: No."
And then he quotes from the agreement
by way of preface to establish that Saint
Alphonsus was participating in the management.
And then continuing over at the bottom
of page 349, Your Honor, after directing the
witness's attention to that portion of the
agreement, he asks the question:
"QUESTION: At any time during the time
that Saint Alphonsus was a partner in MRIA, did
they disclose that the managing committee of your
competitor was managed by 50 percent of the
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management were Saint Alphonsus employees?
"ANSWER: No."
Well, Your Honor, that came as a
surprise, as I mentioned, and put at issue the
implication that Saint Alphonsus had hidden its
ownership in the IMI venture.
And that brings us, Your Honor, to
Exhibit *-0782, which is the first two pages of
the Idaho Business Review for September 3, 2001.
And on page 2-A, the second page, there is an
article bearing the headline: "Medical Imaging
Group Plans Second Clinic For Eagle Road."
And it begins: "Diagnostic radiology
group Intermountain Medical Imaging has begun
preparing a site north of the Eagle Road
interchange with Interstate 84 for the
construction of a 16,000-square-foot building. It
will serve as a second clinic for IMI, which
opened at 9th and Myrtle Street downtown Boise in
August 1999."
And it goes on to describe an interview
with JeffSeabourn, one ofthe diagnostic
radiologists involved in IMI, describing this new
center.
And then down in the next to last
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paragraph of the article, Your Honor, it says:
"Seabourn said IMI started as a sole
proprietorship and then went through long
negotiations with Saint Al's to gain the contract
and make the nonprofit Saint Al's a part owner of
the Boise imaging center. Both centers operate
under parent Gem State Radiology, which is based
in the Wells Fargo building on Main Street in
Boise and handles the billing for the group."
So here we have, Your Honor, an article
just exactly two months after Saint Al's bought
into the joint venture, establishing that it was
public record published in the press that Saint
Al's had bought into this venture. Which
goes directly to counter the inference of
Dr. Prochaska's direct that Saint Al's somehow
had kept this a secret.
Now, as to Exhibit *-0782, Your Honor,
the rules of authentication are, as Your Honor
reminded us recently, the general rule, Idaho Rule
90l(a), is that authentication is satisfied by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims.
And there's just a -- there's no doubt. Of
course, this is a photocopy of that publication.
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More specifically, Rule 902 specifies
certain categories of documents that are
self-authenticating. And 902(6), captioned
"Newspapers and Periodicals," includes among
self-authenticating documents printed materials
purporting to be newspapers or periodicals.
And so, Your Honor, we have here a
document that is plainly relevant for the reasons
explained and is automatically
self-authenticating. And so there is a sufficient
basis simply to admit on the record what we have
so far.
Now, in addition to that, Your Honor, I
won't belabor the remainder ofthis, but the other
two exhibits are filings with the Secretary of
State in April of2002 and then in May of2002.
Exhibit *-0783 is from April 12th,
2002, and it lists the two members of
Intermountain Medical Imaging, the second of which
member is Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.,
with their address listed.
The point of *-0784, Your Honor, it
goes to that aspect of the testimony where
Dr. Prochaska referred specifically to, in his
words, or the words of the question that he
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adopted: "At any time during that time that Saint
Alphonsus was a partner with MRIA, did they
disclose that the managing committee of your
competitor was managed by 50 percent of the
management were Saint Alphonsus employees?"
And what *-0784 shows, Your Honor, is
an annual report form dated May 15th, 2002, which
lists the eight managers of IMI -MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, we stipulated to
these. This is just argument.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Well, that's fine. Well,
that's the relevant -MR. BANDUCCI: We are now at 9:15. We have
got a full day where -- I hope this counts against
Mr. Romatowski's time in the hour and a half he
had.
We are now talking about exhibits that
are admitted, that we have stipulated to, and he
is wasting time. This is a filibuster.
The Court: Well, Counsel, it appears that,
based upon what Mr. Banducci is saying, that
Exhibit *-0782, Exhibit *-0783, and Exhibit *-0784
have already been admitted into evidence by -MR. BANDUCCI: Not *-0782, Your Honor.
*-0783 and *-0784.
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MR. ROMATOWSKI: The only reason I bring
this up, Your Honor, is because he does not agree
to *-0782.
THE COURT: All right. *-0783 and *-0784
have been stipulated to as to admissibility, so
that doesn't have to be further argued.
So with regard to *-0782, what is the
position of the plaintiff?
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
Number one, first as to admissibility, Your Honor,
and then we will get to its purpose.
But as to admissibility, setting aside
the authentication issues, it is hearsay. This is
-- these are the interview notes of Jeff Seabourn,
who is available. He lives here in Boise. He is
a radiologist. They can bring him in; they can
ask him what he said to the Idaho Business Review.
But we don't know whether this is
reporters' license. We haven't brought Brad
Carlson in to evaluate what information he was
really provided. And it is double hearsay, which
I don't think there's any doubt about.
Number two, if it is being brought in
for purposes of impeachment, the testimony before
you -- we asked -- I asked Dr. Prochaska, "Did

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

your partner tell you?"
Now, I guess, the argument here by
Saint Alphonsus is that in order to monitor the
behavior of its partner, who has fiduciary duties
of loyalty, they've got to really-- they've got
to read the newspaper to find out whether or not
they're forming a competitive partnership or maybe
they need to make occasional surfing of the
Secretary of State web site.
I mean, it is not impeachment. It may
be useful in the testimony of Seabourn, but it is
not, at this time, relevant in the
cross-examination of Dr. Prochaska because he
didn't say that he has read the Idaho Business
Review. He hasn't said that all newspaper
articles available at the time are consistent with
his perspective.
And most importantly, it is not
contrary to what he said on the stand because he
would have, appropriately, looked to his partner,
who owes him a fiduciary duty, to tell him about
this. This isn't Saint Al's telling their
partners. This is Jeff Seabourn, a radiologist,
telling the newspaper.
THE COURT: Mr. Romatowski?
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MR. ROMATOWSKI: Your Honor, it is offered
for a nonhearsay purpose. As Idaho Trial Handbook
Section 21.1 reminds us in the general discussion
of documentary evidence, at the end of that
section: "Documents which evidence an agreement
or embody a legally relevant event, such as a
notice or a warning, may be relevant in their own
right without reliance on the truth of the matter
asserted in the document, and thereby avoid
hearsay concerns."
The hearsay use ofthis document, Your
Honor, would be if we needed it in order to prove,
in fact, that Saint Alphonsus had invested in the
manner described.
But Mr. Banducci has already proven
that in spades. It is not controversial. It is
well established in the record that the contract
is there. So the fact ofthe investment is fully
established in the record, and that's not the
reason we want the newspaper article.
The newspaper article is useful and
relevant here to show that there was public notice
of our investment, and it negatives the
implication of Dr. Prochaska's testimony that
somehow we were trying to hide this. It is not
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necessary that it be for impeachment of his
testimony in order to be relevant for that
purpose.
THE COURT: Well, at this time, the Court is
not going to allow the admissibility of *-0782.
The Court believes that there are too many
questions with regard to this article. It is my
understanding, based upon what has been stated,
that Mr. Seabourn is probably going to be
available to testify. And, certainly, he can
testify and he can be questioned with regard to
this article.
The Court also notes that the document
referred to in Dr. Prochaska's testimony was a
July 1st, 2001, document, and the question was
with regard to Saint Al's told them ofthis in
that time frame. And this is a September 2001
article, and the Court, quite frankly, doesn't
know what import based upon the testimony I have
currently got ofthe period between July 1st and
September 3rd.
So with regard to introduction of the
document at this point, the Court will not admit
the document. Certainly, that's without prejudice
to see whether sufficient foundation could be laid
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or what Dr. Seabourn may say in his testimony.
So *-0783, *-0784 are in the record.
782 will not be admitted at this time, but

depending on what occurs, it may, in fact, be
admitted at a later time.
Anything further?
MR. ROMATOWSKI: No, Your Honor. I
understand your ruling.
I would just say as to one detail of
what Your Honor raised, anticipating further
consideration of this later, the relevance is as
to the time periods involved, Your Honor, is that
Dr. Prochaska's testimony was that they did not
know about this until the litigation, which, of
course, is years later. So that's what makes
relevant this disclosure just two months after the
agreement was entered. But I will leave it at
that. I understand your ruling.
The Court: There are probably a Jot of
things in the newspaper that I wouldn't know about
until litigation was commenced, but that may, in
fact, be there. But the key here is I want to
hear what Dr. Seabourn has to say, what he states
he said and what his efforts were.
Anything further?
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MR. BANDUCCI: I No, Your Honor.
MR. ROMA TOWSKI: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Very well. Let's bring in the
jury.
Dr. Prochaska, you can come up, and as
always, I will remind you you remain under oath.
(Jury present.)
The Court: Ladies and gentlemen of the
jury, I will advise you that the microphone in
front of you isn't to pick up your conversations.
It is to assist the court reporter in her duties
oftaking a transcript. So I thought you might
want to know what it was there for.
Mr. Romatowski, you may continue.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Thank you, Your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION (continued)
BY MR. ROMA TOWSKI:
Q. Good morning, Dr. Prochaska.
A. Good morning.
Q. Let me turn, Dr. Prochaska, to the
subject of efforts to buy out the DMR doctors and
to resolve the MRIA relationship. You explained
to us last week that the original MRIA agreement
did not have any -- either any option on Saint

Page 815
1
2
3

4
5
6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

Al's part nor any obligation on Saint Al's part to
buy out MRIA; is that correct?
A. That's my understanding.
Q. Now, let me direct your attention to
1992, seven years after MRIA was founded. Now,
MRIA was a great success in those first seven
years; is that right?
A. I would say so.
Q. Both in terms of the number of
examinations conducted; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And financially; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And so by seven years out, in 1992 it
was the case that all of the original investors
had been repaid from the MRIA entities amounts
that exceeded their original investment many fold?
A. I believe that's probably true.
Q. Let me show you what has been marked as
Exhibit *-0027. And before we discuss that
document, I have a couple of questions for you.
Let me know if you've had a chance to look at it,
and I will ask you a couple of preliminary
questions.
A. Okay.
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Q. Now 1992, it was around this time that
there was this change in the federal law that you
referred to as the "Stark Law"; is that right?
A. I don't remember exactly when that came
in.
Q. But that was a provision of federal law
that raised legal concerns about physicians owning
an imaging center and also referring patients to
an imaging center. Was that the gist of it?
A. It only referred to situations like
that where there were inducements in the
partnership agreement to refer patients, which
ours didn't have.
Q. But there were discussions, were there
not, between the five of you doctors and the
hospitals about perhaps selling to the hospitals?
A. Not because of Stark legislation.
Q. But there came a point where there were
offers exchanged; is that so?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you recognize Exhibit *-027?
A. No.
Q. You don't? It is addressed to you; is
that so?
A. Yes.
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had a separate entrance.
Q. Okay. So is there only one entrance to
Saint Al's?
A. MRIA had a separate entrance.
Q. Sure. And you began to -- you began to
radiology -THE REPORTER: I'm sorry. I'm sorry.
MR. BANDUCCI: Excuse me.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: You could get into
the radiology department through MRIA; right?
A. I believe that's correct.
Q. Okay. So you are saying that all
patients would understand that MRI Center was
not-MR. AYER: Objection, Your Honor.
Foundation.
MR. BANDUCCI: I haven't finished the
question, Your Honor.
MR. A YER: She didn't say that, Your Honor.
MR. BANDUCCI: I haven't finished the
question.
THE COURT: I will give counsel the
opportunity to finish his question, and then if
you wish to object, go ahead.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: Are you saying that
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this: Do you care about the level of care
received by anyone treated at the Saint Al's
campus?
A. I always care about the level of care
that patients were provided. There were many
parts of the campus, physician offices totally
legally independent from Saint Alphonsus where we
would have no way of knowing the quality of care.
Q. Well, you certainly understood the
quality of care at MRIA because you were a
partner; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. So my question to you is:
Did you care about the quality of care received by
this young lady who has a brain tumor? She is
being referred to MRI Center and she doesn't know
that the radiologists have no obligation to read
her scan. Do you care about that?
A. I care about the quality of care that
patient receives, yes.
Q. Well, do you care about the fact that
Saint Alphonsus has taken no steps to inform this
young woman with a brain tumor, who is being
referred by her family physician for imaging, that
she doesn't even know that the radiologists have

all members of the public would understand that
MRI Center had -- excuse me -- are you saying that
members of the public going to Saint Alphonsus'
campus would understand that the radiologists
practicing on the campus had no obligation to read
magnetic resonance i111ages of those outpatients?
A. I have no way of knowing what all
members of the public would understand. I do know
that there were deliberate, explicit actions taken
to create a separate identity, a separate
registration office, a separate entrance for the
center.
Q. Now, at the time of this contract, did
Saint Alphonsus have its own magnetic resonance
scanner on campus?
A. No.
Q. Okay. And in the prior proceeding, you
even referred to MRI Center as Saint Al's MRI,
didn't you?
A. We were a 25 percent owner in it, yes,
sir.
Q. You referred to the MRI Center as Saint
Al's MRI, didn't you?
A. If that's in the proceedings, I did.
Q. All right. Now, the question is simply
Page 1170
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no obligation to read her scan?
MR. AYER: Objection, Your Honor.
Argumentative.
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection.
Rephrase question, Counsel.
MR. BANDUCCI: I will. Thank you, Your
Honor.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: Is it appropriate to
leave the public uninformed that the only magnetic
resonance imaging scanner on your campus does not
provide radiologic services for outpatients?
MR. AYER: Objection, Your Honor. Misstates
the premise of the facts of her testimony.
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection.
Counsel, rephrase the question.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: All right. We were
talking about our young lady with a brain tumor.
All right. And do you think it is appropriate to
leave this young lady uninformed that MRI Center
does not have radiological services for her scan?
MR. AYER: Same objection, Your Honor. That
misstates her testimony.
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection.
MR. BANDUCCI: I'm sorry, Your Honor. May I
approach? And I'm not sure what I am missing here
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persons on your medical staff went so far as to
say that those who helped the competition like
Treasure Valley Hospital ought to be punished.
A. I don't recall that.
Q. It's not inconsistent with your
perspective, though; correct?
A. What perspective do you think I have?
Q. Well, the perspective is that those who
are not loyal to Saint Alphonsus and who help the
competition ought to be punished?
A. No, I don't ever recall saying that
nor-Q. All right. We will get to that in a
little while. It says, "The Radiologists could
build anything they want outside a two-mile radius
of the hospital, but would be unable to read some
exams due to the non-compete. If the Radiologists
are not able to dominate the market place, the
Group will have less flexibility in contracting,
and possibly lose its competitive advantages -its current competitive advantage. Sandra
questioned what is in it for the Hospital if the
Group is out and building relationships and
enabling competitors of the Hospital to compete
with Saint Alphonsus."

1
2
3

4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Page 1193

1
2
3

4
5
6
7

8
9

10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17

18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

their success, that that's also harmful to patient
care in the Valley?
A. No. Patients could come to Saint
Alphonsus and access the services of those
excellent radiologists.
Q. So they have to come to Saint Alphonsus
to get the good patient care?
A. To get the good the radiologists, yes.
Q. Okay. So withholding radiologists from
our little girl in Caldwell with a brain tumor
because she is going to Treasure Valley or she is
going to -- what is it? Caldwell -- Caldwell
Memorial Hospital, thank you -- if our little girl
with a brain tumor is going to Caldwell Memorial
Hospital and doesn't get the same kind of patient
care, that doesn't concern you because she could
have gone to Saint Al's; right?
A. It would concern me if that hospital
had no access to radiologists and no ability to
interpret films for that patient, yes. And
ultimately, I believe that Saint Al's radiologists
did provide services at West Valley.
Q. Well, I'm using this as a hypothetical.
Let's say Holy Rosary?
A. I believe they are providing services

Do you remember making a statement to
that effect?
A. Or asking questions to that effect,
yes.
Q. Okay. And it goes on to say, "If we
are going to partner, she does not want the Group
helping competitors of Saint Alphonsus succeed."
Do you remember saying that?
A. Well, I don't recall saying it. I see
this in the minutes and· I think it is possible
that I would have expressed my reservations about
their helping the competition succeed.
Q. How is that good for healthcare?
A. I'm sorry. I don't quite understand
your question.
Q. You don't understand that question?
A. No.
Q. Well, let's frame it in the negative.
Is causing other hospitals in the Treasure Valley
to fail good for healthcare?
A. Probably not.
Q. Okay. So would you agree with me that
if you are an impediment to their success, that if
you are keeping good radiological services away
from competitor hospitals and thereby impeding
Page 1194
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there today, too.
Q. Today. But not back in this time
frame; right?
A. Nor were they requested to, to my
knowledge.
Q. Well, Ms. Bruce, I think we are
digressing here. My point is this: Would you
agree with me that impeding the success of other
Treasure Valley hospitals is not good for
healthcare?
A. I would agree that Saint Alphonsus was
trying to deliver the very best quality of care.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I'd ask that she
be instructed to answer my question.
THE COURT: I will instruct the witness to
answer the questions.
THE WITNESS: We would not want to ever harm
patients in the Treasure Valley.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: That's not my
question either.
A. Okay.
Q. My question is: Is it fair to say that
impeding the success of other Treasure Valley
hospitals is not good for healthcare? Yes or no?
A. Not necessarily.
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until it has been fully submitted to you for your
determination. We will be in recess for
approximately 15 to 20 minutes.
(Jury excused.)
THE COURT: Ms. Bruce, you may step down.
(Witness steps down.)
THE COURT: Counsel have pointed out that
the exhibits numbered *-4166 in the plaintiffs
records and in the defense records are not
identical.
MR. BANDUCCI: I think they are, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Ayer?
MR. AVER: Well, Your Honor, what this is,
is we know what -- we are familiar with the first
page. The first page-- well, I actually, I am
not sure if I am familiar with what it is. It
seems to combine multiple documents and Mr.
Banducci indicated at the bench that he only
really wants to use the first 12 pages of it-MR. BANDUCCI: Twenty.
MR. AYER: Twenty?
MR. BANDUCCI: Twenty.
MR. A YER: The first 20 pages of it. Our
view of it is that part of the first 20 pages are,
in fact, a separate document that we have under a
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afternoon, if we take up time that would be
available in the morning to continue with the
witness, it would obviously take away from trial
time. Parties want to argue the respective
motions at 1:30 tomorrow rather than the 8:30 time
frame? I figured that that would be the case.
So we will set the hearing on the
various motions before the Court for 1:30
Wednesday afternoon, and we will start the trial
time at the regular time of9:00.
Were the parties able to reach any
agreement as to the exhibit?
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, Your Honor. We found
actually two alternate exhibits that have the
information that I will need for
cross-examination.
MR. A YER: And we are fine with that, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Very well then.
MR. A YER: Your Honor, I do have two points,
if I might raise them?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. A YER: One is that we heard this morning
sort of repeatedly about a little girl from
Caldwell and first she had a torn ACL and then she

different number. The rest of the document
following the first 20, I guess we all agree are
not part of this document-MR. BANDUCCI: No.
THE COURT: No. Just a moment. Wait until
he is finished, Mr. Banducci.
MR. A YER: I think there is a substantial
question which may take a while to unscramble as
to whether this is, in fact, a document or
multiple documents. And at the moment, I have to
object because I can't see -- perhaps if we would
have a chance to look at it and try to understand
it, we can figure out why it might be one
document.
THE COURT: Well, why don't we take the
recess, Counsel, and counsel can then look at it
and see whether they can work it out. And if they
can't, well then we'll just take it up again, I
guess.
MR. BANDUCCI: All right. Thank you, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: We will be in recess.
(Recess.)
THE COURT: Counsel, first item since the
jury is not going to be able to come in tomorrow
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had a brain tumor. And she not in this case. And
it keeps coming up. I would just suggest and
request that perhaps we don't hear about her
anymore.
THE COURT: Mr. Banducci, response.
MR. BANDUCCI: Well, Your Honor, is that an
objection?
MR. A YER: It is, Your Honor. It is an
objection that I think that's prejudicial and
argumentative and an effort, really, to inject an
emotional element into this that's not in this
case.
MR. BANDUCCI: Well, Your Honor, the first
words out of Mr. Romatowski's mouth was that the
mission of Saint Alphonsus is patient care. I am
humanizing that issue. I don't think that
there -- unless there is some objection, I am not
aware of one.
THE COURT: I will overrule the objection
for the simple point, Mr. Ayer, that he is
entitled to frame his questions as a hypothetical
situation. He gets to choose the disease, he gets
to choose the example. I don't believe it is
argumentative. We are talking about an MRI. He
is talking about torn ligaments and diagnosis for
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a brain tumor. So I don't think it is outside the
bounds of proper questioning. So I am going to
allow him to continue to use those two examples if
he wishes.
MR. AYER: Thank you, Your Honor. The other
thing I would ask leave ofthe Court on is, there
have been times this morning when I think
Mr. Banducci was cutting off the witness, verging
on harassing the witness.
I think the right rule is that if
something isn't a yes-or-no question, the witness
has a right to give a responsive answer. And the
fact that Mr. Banducci at certain times isn't
getting the answer he wants to hear and cuts her
off, I think it's really not appropriate.
I don't want to jump up and down. I am
not going jump up and down and object all time,
but it it does seem to me that the tone of this
could be cooled down a little bit to everyone's
benefit.
THE COURT: Mr. Banducci, response.
MR. BANDUCCI: Well, Your Honor, again, if
Mr. Ayer has an objection to a question when I ask
it, he has got to make that objection. That's the
point of preserving the record. He knows that,
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again and it is -- I recognize it's no fun being a
witness. I have been in that chair before. So it
is -- the parties each have their respective
opportunities to tell their story or to clarifY.
The Court is certainly going to grant them that
opportunity, but each of them also has the right
to conduct their examination within the
appropriate rules in the manner in which they feel
is appropriate.
Anything else?
MR. AYER: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, very quickly, we
would ask that since the witness has written on
Exhibit *-4033, that a clean copy be substituted
for that which has been written on before it is
submitted to the jury.
THE COURT: Well, I guess at this point,
Mr. Banducci, that both exhibits would be in
evidence because you have referred to the written
on exhibit and you have referred to the
underlinings. So the Court would allow both the
clean copy and the underlined copy, which I think
would be the appropriate thing to do under the
circumstances.
MR. A YER: We would agree.

he's an appellate lawyer.
If he thinks I am being argumentative
with my question, he can jump up and say
"Argumentative." That's his choice. But to bring
this up as a kind of a omnibus concern, again, I
don't know how to respond to that. Because he is
talking about questions I haven't asked yet. I
don't know that the Court can do anything with
that.
THE COURT: Well, the Court is going to
point out that this is an advocacy proceeding.
The parties are representing their respective
clients and their respective viewpoints.
Mr. Banducci has the right to ask his questions
and have the witness respond to those questions
rather than to give a narrative response.
Mr. Ayer, at the time that
cross-examination comes, keeps track of where he
thinks Mr. Banducci has cut the witness off and
asks the witness, "What were you going to tell
us?" so that the witness can respond with any
additional clarifications that she wishes. That's
the nature of direct and cross-examination at
trial.
So the Court will point that out once
Page 1214
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MR. BANDUCCI: I think that's right, Your
Honor. Perhaps what we should do then is mark
*-4033 as clean copy and *-4033A as the marked up
copy?
MR. AYER: That's fine, Your Honor.
THE COURT: That's would be appropriate.
Anything else?
MR. BANDUCCI: No, that's it.
MR. AYER: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Very well. Let's bring in the
jury.
(Jury present.)
THE COURT: Court will note that the jury
has returned and that counsel for both parties and
the parties are present in the courtroom.
Mr. Banducci, you may continue with
your examination.
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: Ms. Bruce, I think we
left off, and correct me if I'm wrong on this, I
think you testified that the hospital never
considered the alternative of firing the
radiologists in connection with this creation of
the independent imaging center; is that correct?
A. I believe I testified that I certainly
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BOISE, IDAHO
Monday, September 26, 2011, 9:00a.m.
THE COURT: Do we have any matters counsel
wish to raise with the Court before we proceed?
MR. BANDUCCI: No, Your Honor.
MR. A YER: The only question I have, Your
Honor, is given that Ms. Schamp will be testifYing
this morning, the pending motion that counsel
filed.
THE COURT: All right. Does counsel wish to
make any oral argument?
MR. BANDUCCI: No, Your Honor. I think it
is properly briefed, and I think this is a
situation where under normal circumstances if
Ms. Schamp says, I told somebody X, and it is an
out-of-court statement, the fact that she is an
agent of the party doesn't save that because it is
not being offered against.
And so the point here is this most
often arose in her prior testimony in
conversations that she seemed to recall having
with Roger Curran, who is obviously no longer with
us.
And so it is not reliable under any
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standard of hearsay rule, and so I think the
motion should be well taken by this court as to
what she says she said in conversations outside
this courtroom.
THE COURT: Mr. Ayer?
MR. AYER: Just two points, Your Honor.
One is, it is not hearsay. This is a
statement of fact made today by the witness of
something that happened in the past. It is
significant and important that she said things or
had conversations with Roger Curran or other
people. And that fact of the conversation is an
event in the past just like if she said, "I
climbed Mount Everest five years ago," that would
be admissible today as well.
The second point, which I think is very
significant, is that these statements came in in
the prior trial. There were no objections; they
were admitted. It didn't go up an appeal. This
is something that's already been decided in the
past and resolved. In any event, I think the
issue is plainly without merit.
THE COURT: Mr. Banducci, response?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, on that score,
the voluntary comments of Ms. Schamp came out most
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I would make is that the statements we are talking
about here didn't happen in open court. They were
read into the record by Mr. Banducci.
So it is not a question of the witness
blurting out anything. It's a question of him
deciding to put in these statements by reading her
prior deposition into the record. So I think
that's very significant.
THE COURT: Mr. Banducci?
MR. BANDUCCI: Well, Your Honor, it was a
trial preservation depo on video. And as far as I
know, you can't cut off an answer in the middle of
an answer. I'm not aware of that.
THE COURT: Well, Counsel, first of all, the
one thing I will point out is that it is a
legitimate issue to raise. I think, as both
counsel know, it is also one of the easiest
statements in the world for the door to be opened
to the admissibility of it, depending on what
happens on cross-examination.
The Court has reviewed both briefs.
The appropriate rules to consider are Rule 40 I,
and there is no question that the evidence here,
if admitted, would be relevant evidence.
Rule 613, where a witness is being

often on my questioning ofher; where I would say,
you know, "Did you do this?" l\.nd she would say
things like, "No, but I am sure I told Roger
Curran about X."
And at that point, I'm not in a
position to object to that statement. That's why
we filed a motion in limine on this. And whatever
she says-- I mean, if Mr. Ayer is going to say
that, you know, she is going to say precisely what
she said before, I guess that's one thing.
But, you know, she is going to be up on
the stand testifYing; and to the extent that she
comes up with some recollection of what she said
outside this courtroom not under oath, it is
inadmissible. And I wanted to anticipate that
with the motion in limine.
One other thing that Mr. Ayer seems to
miss the point is exactly the point, "I climbed
Mount Everest." If she says, "I climbed Mount
Everest," and it is offered for the truth of the
matter stated, and it is her statement of"I
climbed Mount Everest," and she's offering her own
statement, it is hearsay, inadmissible.
THE COURT: Mr. Ayer?
MR. A YER: Your Honor, the only other point
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examined as to prior statements, and it does not
matter in this context whether it is a consistent
or inconsistent statement, that if you're being
impeached, and this Rule 615 does not specifically
apply to admissions of the party opponent.
And then, of course, Rule SOI(d)(l),
which allows the use of prior inconsistent
statements under oath and subject to
cross-examination: Consistent statements may be
used-- prior out-of-court consistent statements
-- to rebut an express or implied charge of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive or
identification, which obviously isn't at issue
here.
And 80l(d)(2): A statement can be
offered against a party opponent and the party's
own statement in either an individual or a
representative capacity.
The way the rule is structured is one
that is always distressing to the other side.
When Mr. Banducci examines, he can raise an
out-of-court statement that is-- pardon me, that
the witness has previously made under the rules,
and it can come in where you're dealing with that
witness's statement, usually a party opponent.
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And the reason it can come in is
because it is considered basically under the old
admission against interest rule, and it is not
considered to be hearsay.
However, when the party who is calling
that witness in most events attempts to get the
same information in, it is no longer an admission
against interest. It is no longer a -- it becomes
a hearsay statement when the other side attempts
to bring it in.
And the case law is pretty clear, so
I'm going to grant the motion. But as I said,
this is probably one of the easiest matters in
which a door gets opened because of something said
or which occurs in examination or
cross-examination, but I'm not going to rule on
that. We will wait and see what happens, but it
is, in fact, hearsay. And the examples are clear
in the case law relating to interpretation of the
rule, so I will rule in that way.
Anything else?
MR. BANDUCCI: No, Your Honor.
MR. AYER: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Very well. Let's bring in the
jury.
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Q. And are you currently employed in the
healthcare industry?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. All right. I'm not going to spend time
on your current employment but take you back in
time to the time that you were an employee of
Saint Alphonsus Medical Regional Center -- or
Regional Medical Center, excuse me.
You came first as a vice-president of
administrative services; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And as an executive director of a PHO;
correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Arrived in 1997?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Now, throughout your
examination, I'm going to be strolling over to
this, what is now a blank time line, just so that
we can provide the jury with some sense of
chronology. I am not going to try and include
everything we talk about on it, but I want you to
know why I'm strolling_ around the courtroom and

CINDY K. SCHAMP,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the
plaintiff, having been first duly sworn, was
examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q. Good morning, Ms. Schamp.
A. Good morning.
Q. Could you state your full name for the
record, please.
A. My name is Cindy K. Schamp.
Q. And where do you currently reside?
A. Currently, in Colleyville, Texas.
Page 1915

Page 1914
1

(Jury present.)
THE COURT: The Court will note that both
parties are present with their counsel and that
the jury has returned to the courtroom.
Mr. Banducci, you may call your next
witness.
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor. I
call Cindy Schamp.
(Witness sworn.)
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
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not standing behind the podium.
Is that okay?
A. Fine.
Q. All right. So you came to work for
Saint Alphonsus in 1997; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were hired by Ms. Bruce?
A. That's correct.
Q. And so I will just put "Schamp hired."
And you became a CFO, correct, in about 1998;
correct?
A. I was not CFO.
Q. I'm sorry, COO. I am having a little
trouble getting started this morning.
COO; correct?
A. Yes. In 1998.
Q. Mid-1998?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, let's put a couple of years in
here on this timeline, and we will go to the first
part of2001 on this first chart.
So mid-1998, COO?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Okay. Now, as the summer
-- I will start again. I'm not sure why I'm
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the radiologists?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Would that be another reason why it
would be appropriate for MRIA to contact the CEO
of the hospital where these radiologists were
serving?
A. Yes, that's exactly what should happen.
Q. Did you expect Ms. Bruce at Saint Al's
to take this concern seriously and take corrective
action?
A. Oh, I mean, absolutely. Anytime I
received any kind of communication, either written
or oral, I mean, that was a top priority. We got
right on it. We investigated it. We met with
medical staff and put a plan of action together to
correct it.
Q. Okay. And specifically addressing the
concerns in here, why would the hospital have an
interest in addressing those concerns?
A. Well, from a quality-of-care
perspective to their patients. I mean, the MRI
Center cared for patients at Saint Al's, both on
an inpatient and outpatient basis. I mean, our
commitment to the community is to provide the best
patient care we have. It needed to be addressed
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and addressed very promptly.
Q. And would your answer change if this
conduct only affected outpatients?
A. Absolutely not.
MR. WOODARD: Let's hand the witness Exhibit
*-4292, which has also been admitted, Your Honor.
Q. BY MR. WOODARD: Mr. Messmer, do you
know Jack Floyd?
A. I do know Jack Floyd.
Q. And what positions did Mr. Floyd hold
with MRI Center of Idaho and MRI Mobile?
A. Jack was the CEO of MRI Associates.
Q. And do you know who Ken Fry is?
A. I do know Ken Fry.
Q. And who did he work for, and what was
his position when you were working at Mercy?
A. Ken Fry was the chief financial officer
at Saint Al's. I actually knew Ken Fry when he
worked back -- I think it was in Twin Falls as CFO
there, as well.
Q. Okay. Now, this statement from
Mr. Floyd to Mr. Fry, it says, "Ken, as a heads
up, the following topics will be on the November
MRI board agenda. I believe that I have touched
on all of these areas in my previous
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correspondence with you. Therefore, there should
be no surprises. Given the negative impact on the

Center's operation and to revenue for Saint Al's,
the hope is that these items can be resolved by
year end."
Then, for some reason, Mr. Floyd
repeats that same sentence; must have liked it.
And then he says, "If I can provide further
assistance, please call."
Now, let's move from there, actually,
to the -- can you highlight the box that says
"concern."
Okay. And under "concern," it says
there are "No monitored exams after 7 p.m. and on
weekends. Radiology set up and read need for MRI
volume insufficient. Referrals in Meridian may be
going to Saint Luke's for follow up services.
In-patient transport moved to Materials causing
scheduling delays. Coverage/protocols/structured
inattentiveness to in-patients may be increasing
malpractice exposure. Patients may be spending
unnecessary days in hospital because of lack of
adequate rad coverage. Above concerns reducing
revenue for Saint Alphonsus in the range of
375,000 to 650,000."
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Do you see that?
I do.
Q. Did you know that Saint Al's had been
contacted about these issues?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. As a CEO of a hospital partner in MRI
Associates, what did you expect Saint Al's to do
with regard to this first complaint, the top one,
regarding reduced hours?
A. Again, no monitored exams after
7:00 p.m., I mean, we are a 24/7 operation. That
should have been addressed immediately.
Q. Okay.
MR. A YER: Your Honor, may I voir dire the
witness as to his knowledge of the subject matter
that he is addressing?
THE COURT: You may.

A.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BYMR.AYER:
Q. Mr. Messmer, did you have any knowledge
at the time of this document -- which I believe is
dated down at the bottom, it says 11/1/02, of any
coverage issues with regard to MRIA?
A. Yes. I had knowledge through Milt
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MR. BANDUCCI: I'm asking him if he told
Dr. Giles. That's not hearsay.
THE COURT: I will overrule the objection.
I will allow the question.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: Did you tell
Dr. Giles of this conversation?
A. I don't recall ever telling Dr. Giles
of a conversation with Cindy Schamp in that
early-2000 time period.
Q. Let me reframe the question. Do you
ever recall telling Dr. Giles of a conversation
where Cindy Schamp said to you: "The cheapest
thing for me to do is wait"?
A. I just don't recall.
Q. Okay. Now, I'm going to change gears
here, and I want to talk to you about the 2000,
2001 time frame wherein the Radiology Group had
conversations with the hospital. And I think it
is clear that you moved from PMI to Gem State/IMI
sometime in mid-2000; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. All right. Let's go to *-4199. Since
you testified last, Ms. Schamp has been on the
stand. This is a meeting in November of2000.
Ms. Schamp and yourself are in attendance.
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MR. BANDUCCI: And, Kathy, I wanted you to
expand the second paragraph under "MRI Two-Year
Clause."
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: And the-- I want to
draw your attention to this statement, Mr. Cliff,
where we have talked about the two-year clause in
the context of your first exam, but I didn't ask
you this question.
It says: "Cindy believes there is no
reason they won't get the deal done. A big piece
is reassessing, evaluating and getting the final
numbers on the valuation ofMRIC and MRI Mobile.
They're estimating a five-month time frame to
complete closure ofthe entire deal."
Do you see that?
A. I do, yes.
Q. All right. I'm going to read to you
from the testimony of Ms. Schamp.
MR. BANDUCCI: And, Counsel, it starts at
line nine.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Which line nine?
MR. BANDUCCI: Line nine on page 3565 of the
prior proceeding.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Can we have that page
again?
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MR. BANDUCCI: I will write it down for you.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: You can just tell me, and
start with the page and the proceeding. You can
do better than "start with the line."
MR. BANDUCCI: Line nine, page 3565 of the
prior proceeding. Are you with me?
MR. ROMA TOWSKI: Not quite.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: All right.
"QUESTION: And there I'm asking you
about -- at line eight, I say: 'All right. After
receiving Dr. Prochaska's letter and after
receiving Mr. Hahn's analysis of restructuring
MRIA, did the hospital consider any scenarios for
buying out all or portions ofMRI Associates?"
Ms. Schamp's answer:
"ANSWER: At the time the Hahn letter came
in or any time in the -- any time in the time I
was there?
"QUESTION: After the Hahn letter came in.
And that would be both pieces of the Hahn letter,
both the late November and then the first part of
January, Scenario 5 portion?
"ANSWER: To the best of my recollection,
the discussions around any purchasing or the -are you speaking of the hospital purchasing pieces
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of this?
"QUESTION: Yes.
"ANSWER: None of that would have occurred,
I don't believe, until the Shattuck Hammond
engagement. We were in the middle of the whole
time frame of Holy Cross conversion to Trinity,
changes in how capital is done and changes in
process. I believe without looking at all of the
document time line laid out, that that wouldn't
have been a time we could have felt that would
have been prudent to capitalize that."
I asked her at the proceeding:
"QUESTION: Was that your testimony.
"ANSWER: That's correct.
"QUESTION: And 'capitalize' means purchase;
correct?"
And she says:
"ANSWER: That's correct.
"QUESTION: Did you tell anyone from MRIA as
far as you were concerned it wouldn't be prudent
to capitalize or purchase all or a portion of MRIA
until the Shattuck Hammond time frame of 2001 ?"
Her answer:
"ANSWER: No. My response about it being
prudent and the issue that I disagreed with you
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indicating you're checking the data against the
original?
A. Correct.
Q. And you mentioned that you found some
variances between the financial statements
provided to you in *-0730C and what you see on
*-0730A; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you describe in general terms how
many of the numbers, over 200 checkmarks that you
make there, where you found variances?
A. I think just three of them, and they
are relatively minor considering the overall scope
of the total dollars here.
Q. What do the -- those variances, what is
effect on the calculations that appear on
Exhibit *-0730A of those variances?
A. I didn't check all of them, but I
believe that the --I'm sorry. I can't tell
you -- I know unequivocally that the income to the
partners, the various partners ofMRIA, was
understated originally in that *-0730 document,
Exhibit *-0730.
Q. So the variances would have the effect
of increasing the amount that you calculated in
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Q. You said originally *-0730A is your
work?
A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. Is that still your testimony?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you were gone-- this shows
revenue through the year 2000; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Are you saying that you had access and
information about MRIA's revenues after you left
and went to work for IMI?
A. No, I didn't. Certainly not.
Q. So the 2000 column is not your work?
A. It is not.
Q. I thought you testified it was.
A. No, I testified -- he asked who
originated this.
Q. Yes. And that includes the 2000
revenue line; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So what's the truth?
A. The truth is, I believe I -- this is
all my work, except for the year 2000, in which
Paul DeWitt would have updated this same schedule
for the 2000 year, that I had done from '85

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q. Mr. Cliff, just for my understanding,
you testified that *-0730A is your work; correct?
A. I'm sorry. I think *-0730B is my
work -- or I'm sorry. Originally -Page 3064
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*-0730A; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. By about what percentage in total?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, now we are
actually using the document to testify. This is
not foundation, any longer.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Just one last question,
Your Honor, as to what the magnitude of the
difference of the variances is.
MR. BANDUCCI: That's not-THE COURT: Well, he is correct. You are
now asking him to testify with regard to what the
document contains. At this point I believe that
you have laid adequate foundation, unless
Mr. Banducci can show me where it isn't. So go
ahead.
MR. BANDUCCI: A couple questions, and then
I would like to approach, Your Honor.
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forward.
Q. Okay. So what you said earlier was not
correct?
A. I don't know. I don't recall what I
said.
Q. Well, you testified that Mr. Romatowski
asked you, "Did you prepare *-0730A?" And you
said, "Yes"; correct?
Isn't that what you told this jury?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's not true? Correct?
A. I originated *-0730A. And all the
numbers on here, 99 percent of them were done by
me. The year 2000, you're right, was not me.
Q. All right. Okay. Now, one other
question. There is a-- on *-0730B are your
initials and the date, August 16, 2011; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And so, is that around the time that
Mr. Romatowski came to you and asked you to do
work on these financials?
A. To validate these numbers, yes.
Q. To validate the numbers?
MR. BANDUCCI: I have two objections, Your
Honor. Number one is, adequate foundation has not
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been laid for the document because one of the
years is not his work. Number two, this is expert
testimony. And he was not identified as an
expert. I haven't seen this work until just now.
And it is a summary. I have not been provided
with the underlying checking, as required by
Rule 1006. And it relates to, again, work he
didn't do.
So we have a number of issues with this
document.
THE COURT: All right. Well, let's a take a
brief recess, counsel. I will admonish the jury
not to discuss the case among themselves, or form
any opinions as to its merits until after it has
been fully submitted to them for their
determination.
We will be in recess for approximately
20 minutes, counsel. I will be back here in about
ten to take this up with you.
(Jury excused.)
(Recess.)
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Your Honor, if it would be
helpful, I can hand up copies. I am not sure what
has been tendered to Your Honor. I can hand up
courtesy copies of *-0730A, *-0730B, and *-0730C.
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documents presented to us. And I believe that
when the deposition was taken back in probably
2007, the Bates stamps were identified. So I am
going to have to look to see about that.
There were 2500 documents presented at
that time, and we'd actually have to go back and
look, but I don't think this is even Jeff Cliffs
work.
Moreover, if you look at *-0730A, the
bottom line is financial information relative to
MRIA and its partners for the year 2000. And
Mr. Cliff admitted on my voir dire that he did not
prepare that. So that's a problem.
This is -- I don't know where he got
it, but he didn't do it. And we haven't
established that it was done by PMI. If this
document was presented in 2007, it couldn't have
been done by Jeff Cliff. So this is not his
handiwork by virtue of the fact that it is
about -- this document itself is four years old.
And Mr. Cliff wasn't preparing documents back
then.
Now, we go to *-703B.
THE COURT: I think it is *-0730B.
MR. BANDUCCI: I'm sorry. *-0730B. Thank

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Banducci, you
were making an objection. I kind of cut you off
so people could get out of here and rest for a
while. Go ahead.
MR. BANDUCCI: Well, Your Honor, let's start
with *-0730A, if you have that.
MR. ROMA TOWSKI: Your Honor, it might be
helpful, and it simplify this, ifl make clear our
offer, Your Honor, is only as to *-0730A.
*-0730B, the working copy for Mr. Cliff, and
*-0730C, the source documents that are already in
evidence, those are just foundation for our offer
of*-0730A.
MR. BANDUCCI: Well, Your Honor, that's not
quite right based on the testimony that has been
elicited in the alleged foundational examination
by Mr. Romatowski.
But let's start at the top. *-0730A,
this is a Shattuck Hammond document. Look down to
the lower left-hand comer *-0730, it says
"SH 0141." I am going to need to look at this,
but I believe it is work product of Shattuck
Hammond.
There was at the deposition of Grant
Chamberlain -- before the deposition -- a stack of
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you. *-0730B this is the checking of the work, I
guess, in *-0730A.
Now, *-0730B apparently has something
like 200 checks on it, which means, I guess, that
Jeff Cliff around a month and half ago took the
financial statements of MRIA and went through the
financial statements and checked them against this
particular document.
That is the work of an expert. I have
no way of cross-examining Mr. Cliff on his work.
*-0730B was presented to us for the very first
time right now. Moreover, it is a summary, so it
is entirely inappropriate.
Moreover, *-0730C is not just the
collection of financial statements. If you look
at it, it is tabbed. And I have never seen them
tabbed before, and there are footnotes.
May I approach, Your Honor? Just as an
example, I'm looking at the first tab that I have
or the second tab that I have. And this shows 1,
3, and 2 highlighted. I've never seen that
before. I don't know what it is about. I haven't
had the opportunity to determine what was done.
And this is the first time I have seen
these marked up. The financial statements have
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been in the possession of Saint Alphonsus for I
don't know how long but years; And today for the
very first time, I get them handed to me in a
changed condition with footnotes.
I can't cross-examine on that.
Moreover, I shouldn't have to cross-examine on
that because this is the stuff of expert
testimony. Jeff Cliff was not disclosed as an
expert; and yet, that's what they are going to
have him do.
So, for various reasons, he should not
be allowed to testifY to any of these documents -*-0730A, because it is not his. Irrespective of
what he says, it is a Shattuck Hammond document,
and he has admitted that he didn't prepare all of
it. *-07308, because it is a brand-new document
with work done in the nature of expert work and
not provided until just before it was handed to
the witness. And *-0730C for the same reasons
that we objected to *-07308.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: May I, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes,youmay.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Your Honor, I can fill in a
little of the history here to the extent that it
is helpful, and it is also responsive to
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direction of either one of the DMR doctors or
someone else from MRIA asked him to create this
spreadsheet.
Your Honor, because we haven't
elaborated for the jury about content of the
documents, Mr. Cliff has not yet explained that
while *-0730A is in two pages, really, it is a
spreadsheet of a time familiar from Microsoft
Excel and other computer spreadsheet programs, and
it is meant to be laid side by side.
The first page of *-0730A goes to the
left. It has a column with dates, and then the
figures begin. And the second page, the page
Bates stamped "SH 0142" goes to the right. So it
is meant to be laid side by side and read across.
And Mr. Cliff has testified and it is
undisputed and there can't be any proof to the
contrary, this was not created by Shattuck
Hammond; it was created by Mr. Cliff, and Shattuck
Hammond later obtained it, I think we all can
infer. And by 2006, they had it in their files to
produce.
Number two, Mr. Cliff did not create
this recently as an expert in connection with this
litigation. He created it back when he was at PMI

Mr. Banducci.
Your Honor, as to the -- I'm going to a
number of these points. I suppose first and
foremost as to the surprise implication here, this
document -- the overall document is, Exhibit
*-0730, it has got about a half a dozen pages
attached to it, these were produced to all of us
in this litigation in response to Mr. Banducci's
subpoena September 27th, 2006, five years ago last
week by coincidence.
Shattuck Hammond produced these to
Mr. Banducci in the first instance. And thanks to
Mr. Banducci's subpoena, we all got them. You
know, we can come back to that, and we can
speculate about how Shattuck Hammond got these
things. But they are not originally -- *-0730A,
the two pages that were we're offering here, to be
sure, they have Shattuck Hammond Bates stamps
because that's the party that produced them to
Mr. Banducci, but it is not a Shattuck Hammond
document in any other sense.
This witness has testified that while
at PMI, in his role as de facto chief financial
officer for MRIA, that he created this. And he
states he created it -- it would have been at the
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in his role as de facto chief financial officer
for MRIA at the request of his client. In other
words, he created this in the ordinary course of
their business.
Now, the fact that it made its way to
Shattuck Hammond and it has been produced to us
makes no difference as to its authenticity and to
its foundation. The creator of the document has
testified as to how it came to be and that he did
it. I will come to the year 2000 in just a
second, Your Honor.
But the fact that it made its way to
Shattuck Hammond and then was produced in this
litigation is of no moment. It in no way
undermines the foundation for admitting it.
Your Honor, if a document were, you
know, put in a bottle with a cork and tossed in
the ocean and miraculously showed up on the beach,
if once opened the author can still identity the
document and it is relevant to the case, it comes
in regardless of where it has been in the
meantime.
As to the year 2000 data, to be sure,
Mr. Cliff has testified that he left PMI
September 1. The full-year 2000 data was not

52 (Pages 3069 to 3072)
Tucker & Associates, 605 W. Fort St., Boise, ID 83702 (208) 345-3704
www.etucker.net

003409

Saint

~phonsus

v. MRI Associates

10/3/2011
Page 3073

1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

available the last time he updated this
spreadsheet. But his recent checking confirms -and he has said so and his *-0730B demonstrates-that he has simply laid the financial statements
side by side with the spreadsheet and confirmed
that the 2000 data are accurate as are the rest
with a couple of minor exceptions we will come to.
But the point, Your Honor, is as to
*-0730B, his marked-up copy of this spreadsheet
where he double-checked it recently, the method,
as he explained, was simply look up on the
financial statement and confirm that the number on
the financial statement corresponds to the number
on *-0730A.
In other words, just double-checking
and confirming the work he did 12 or 13 years ago.
That is foundational to support the reliability of
the original spreadsheet it is not new expert work
offered in evidence in this case.
And once again, what we are offering is
the *-0730A, the document created back at the
time. Now, he has testified that he did it, and
he did it from two sources: the financial
statements as he found them at the time and the
formulas by which management fees and profits were
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testimony from the witness.
*-0730B, once again, is just his
working copy to double-check the figures. And
*-0730C are no more than the financial statements,
likewise, showing that he double-checked figures
to make sure one corresponds with the other. On
that basis, Your Honor -THE COURT: If this was done in August, why
was it not provided to Mr. Banducci as soon as it
was discovered that there were inaccuracies in the
document?
You have a continuing obligation to
supplement discovery when you find errors. Why
was it not provided to Mr. Banducci as soon as you
found there were errors in these numbers?
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Your Honor, the errors
simply go to the weight, which is minor -- I will
come to it, if I may not -- not the admissibility
of the document.
It goes-- it is not as if, Your Honor,
it were an expert compilation tendered to the
other side in which it is then revised in the
course of discovery. This is an original document
from back at the time of the events in question,
from back in the 1990s when he was at PMI.

distributed from the MRIA partnerships, which were
well known to him in his role as de facto CFO.
And he has testified to that as his
original work through 1999. And as to 2000, he
has testified further to his reconfirmation of the
original-- of the 2000 data simply by comparing
the spreadsheets.
Now, the fact that his notebook of the
exhibits includes his check marks or notations as
they correspond to his checks marks on *-0730B
just to confirm that the numbers are the same does
not constitute expert work product of a sort that
needs to be the subject of expert disclosure and
examination. It is simply foundational to confirm
the reliability of the original exhibit.
And he adds, Your Honor -- he has
testified that in the ordinary course and manner
they did business, once he, Mr. Cliff, left PMI,
it fell to Mr. DeWitt to do this; and that he
knows from his experience in operating that
business those ten years, that it would have been
Mr. DeWitt who did the 2000 version of this.
In short, Your Honor, it is incorrect
to say that this is a Shattuck Hammond document.
It is a Jeff Cliff document, and that's the
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THE COURT: And you discovered that it was
inaccurate, and you didn't provide Mr. Banducci
with information of that fact as you soon as you
found out.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Well, Your Honor, what we
found -- I hesitate over the word "inaccuracies."
There are -- in two or three cases out of 230
numbers that Mr. Cliff checked, in two or three
cases, as he has testified, there was a variance
between the exhibits we were able to provide him,
the financial statements, and the figure that he
found in his original spreadsheet.
THE COURT: Well, one of the variances was
over $500,000.
MR. ROMA TOWSKI: Well, we ought to rely on
Mr. Cliff for how much it was, but -THE COURT: Because why? He is an expert?
MR. ROMATOWSKI: No. Because he is the
author of the document, Your Honor. He is the one
who created it.
But, Your Honor, the further point is
this is -- as you can see, this a compilation and
calculation of the profits paid to the MRIA
partners. And what he testifies is in the two or
three cases where he finds a variance in the
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financial statement, he can't account for it, but
the consequence is to understate. the amounts paid
to the MRIA partners.
In other words, Your Honor, ifthere is
any prejudice to one side or the other in the
variance, it is to the side that would argue that
they made more money rather than less.
In other words, what he says is the
variance he finds, although he can't explain where
it comes from, it is minor. It is a fraction, I
think if we calculate it, of one percent, and it
understates the amount of profits paid to the
partners.
Thus, Your Honor, it goes to weight,
not to admissibility. And I would suggest to you
it is not subject to some special disclosure
rules. It is just as if, Your Honor, we have a
narrative document, memorandum -THE COURT: That's not a special disclosure
rule. That's a continuing obligation of discovery
is to update, particularly if you find an error in
some document.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: But, Your Honor, I would
urge -- I acknowledge that requirement with regard
to compilations or expert work specially created
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and disclosed as expert work for the sake of the
litigation. But this is -- that's not what this
is. This is an historical document created at the
time of the events.
Your Honor, it is as if we got one of
the financial statements from 1986 that's been
disclosed in the case, if we were to find or MRIA
were to find that there was some error in the
financial statement from that year, I would submit
there is not an obligation to update discovery in
the sense of pointing out to the other side every
time we find an error in the historical documents.
If it is relevant, it is available to
the parties to argue about the weight, not the
admissibility, I would say, of the evidence. But
it is not -- the requirement to update
disclosures, Your Honor, we fully appreciate and
fully understand, goes to expert compilations and
materials created for the litigation.
But, instead, what we have here are the
documents created by the entity at the time.
THE COURT: Well, this was a document
created for this litigation. You brought him in.
You gave him the document. You said review this
to make sure it is accurate. He gives you a
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summary of it. He finds errors. I mean, this
*-0730B was prepared to assist you in the
litigation and to review the document for
accuracy, wasn't it?
MR. ROMATOWSKI: We asked a fact witness to
review certain underlying documents, yes, Your
Honor, and to advise us what his findings were,
his observations are.
But, Your Honor, I would submit that's
not different than parties separately in the
litigation with witnesses willing to cooperate
with them, asking them to review documents and
advise at times. "Look, is this accurate to your
recollection, or is it not?"
Frequently witnesses will read a
memorandum or minutes of a meeting, perhaps, and
then say to you, "No, that's not what happened. I
dispute that."
It is not the obligation of one side
then to take that information and disclose it to
the other. You are free to call the witness and
for them to give their different understanding of
it. And this is no different in that respect,
Your Honor. It is an historical document created
from back at the time. It is not --
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THE COURT: Mr. Banducci, response?
MR. BANDUCCI: That is an utter, utter myth.
May I take the Court to -- I am going to show the
court the full Exhibit *-0730, because you
understand-- *-0730A, by the way, is only the
first two pages of *-0730.
Ifi may, if we can flip off the
overhead.
Your Honor, this document, this is the
first page of*-0730A. To say that this is a
historical document is untrue. You will note it
has got 2000 in it right here. Jeff Cliff
testified that's not his work.
This document where my finger is
pointing here is a total. The total includes
2000. Jeff Cliff didn't put that on there. This
is not his work.
Same thing with the totals and
percentages shown at the bottom of the right.
Now, let's go to the rest of the
document. Here is the last page ofthe document.
It is nothing but analysis of2000. This is not
Jeff Cliffs work, and it hasn't been established
whose work it is.
The fact that the witness initially
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said it was his work and then was impeached when
he said, "Well, no, I guess it really isn't," says
it all, Your Honor. It falls apart in the first
instance at the foundation. And that is: This is
not Jeff Cliffs document; so, therefore, it is
not his historical work that he has checking.
What he is checking, as far as we know, is
Shattuck Hammond's work. We don't have the backup
for this work.
And moreover, it is expert -- it is
expert testimony. And on top of it, Your Honor,
you know, the notice requirement under 1006 is,
"To facilitate meaningful cross-examination, the
party planning to offer a summary should notify
the opposing party and should make the underlying
documents available to him or her." That's State
v. Barlow, 113 Idaho 573.
We have had no chance. We have a
partial exhibit of dubious source. I don't care
what Mr. Romatowski says. What I care about is
what the witness says, and he can't have prepared
this document because he wasn't around in 2000.
Therefore, he couldn't do the totals, and he can't
do the bottom line.
Moreover, he can't do the last page of
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Mr. Clift's document.
Now, if the objection-- if
Mr. Banducci wants to offer the remainder of
these, we don't have any objection to that, but we
don't offer them because we believe they are
unrelated, just happened to be filed together.
And so we only offer the first two pages, which is
what the witness did authenticate.
And, Your Honor, this is not -- and we
do not offer this as Rule 1006 summary. This is
not a summary that Mr. Cliff created recently from
these exhibits. The exhibit we are offering, once
again, is *-0730A, which is what he has testified
was the document he created at the -- back at the
time during his tenure at PMI.
Ifthe objection, Your Honor, is to the
year 2000 and the totals that follow from the year
2000, we will redact it. We will simply take off
the year 2000 figures despite the fact that
Mr. Cliff has double-checked them in the financial
statements and found them to be -- to correspond.
We will just take off the year 2000 and take off
the total, and we can substitute the document
Exhibit *-0730A in that form with just 1985
through 1999.

the document, which has been conveniently
separated from the first two pages. That's not
even addressing the fact that the convenient
checking of numbers in August was not made known
to us.
So, like I said before, it has got all
sorts of problems with it, not the least of which
is, you know, if you are going to do this sort of
thing, it would be great if you provided it in
advance so that at least we could file a motion in
limine for this Court.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: May I respond to that?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Your Honor, as to *-0730,
*-0730 is the document in the form we got it from
Shattuck Hammond, and so -- in response to
Mr. Banducci's subpoena. And so we faithfully
marked the complete clutch of papers in the manner
that they were produced to us.
But as the witness has explained, Your
Honor, he doesn't recognize the remaining five
pages of Exhibit *-0730 as produced by Shattuck
Hammond. And those are apparently just an
unrelated clutch of documents that Shattuck
Hammond happened to keep in a file together with
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THE COURT: Well, I can appreciate what
counsel is saying, but the fact of the matter is
there isn't any exception in Rule 1006 with regard
to summaries. It simply says, "The contents of
voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs
which cannot conveniently be examined in court may
be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or
calculation. The originals or duplicates shall be
made available for examination or copying or both
by other parties at a reasonable time and place,
and the Court may order that they be produced in
court."
There is no statement there that that
requirement is there only for items prepared in
anticipation of litigation. Indeed, most of the
summaries we have here are summaries of materials
that are historical in nature.
I guess the question-- one of the
questions I have is: What is the exhibit being
introduced for? Is it to show that these are the
figures that were made during this period of time
to go to the issue of damages? Is it being
produced to show that Mr. Cliff was providing the
information to parties at least up until 2000?
What is it being utilized for?
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MR. ROMATOWSKI: It is relevant on several
issues, Your Honor. First, as Judge McLaughlin
ruled and Your Honor has adopted, the amount that
the DMR doctors made from this partnership is
relevant to the question of their bias.
THE COURT: Well, it certainly goes to
credibility. I mean, they have a reason to have a
financial interest in the outcome of the
litigation.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: And may I elaborate, Your
Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: On examination of
Mr. Messmer last week, MRI elicited that his
hospital received distributions, made substantial
profits from MRIA, and that benefited the hospital
and disadvantaged them when Saint Al's withdrew.
On cross-examination, Mr. Messmer
couldn't remember and couldn't estimate how much
they got. So MRIA has injected the issue when
they see it to their advantage, but their witness,
like Dr. Prochaska before him for his part,
couldn't remember how much they had gotten.
So it goes not just to their bias, Your
Honor, but MRIA has injected the issue directly as
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$15 million was paid over a period of time to DMR.
That's apparently what's in here, as I read it. I
don't think it goes to what we are really dealing
with here.
If this is what they intended to do and
have Jeff Cliff testify as really basically,
again, an expert on these issues through 2000,
they should have designated him or somebody else,
frankly, to go through the financial statements
and say: Isn't it true, you know, you did your
work? Yes. And reviewed the financial
statements? Yes. And isn't it true that we got
this kind of return on investment, and this is the
management fee, and this is how much they made?
Yes.
And I would have been able to
cross-examine based on the information that was
available at the time. This is an ambush.
THE COURT: Well, Counsel, the Court is
going to rule that the entire reason that we have
the discovery rules is so that there will be
transparency and that you won't have, quote,
"trial by ambush."
This document I believe was, in fact,
at least up to the year 2000, based upon materials

a matter of substantiative evidence in the case
where it appropriately belongs in these respects,
Your Honor.
We are charged with breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of
our fiduciary duty of loyalty. It goes squarely
to whether or not we acted in good faith, whether
we treated them fairly, and whether we were loyal
to them that we extended terms to these partners
of ours that resulted in these financial benefits
to them.
Your Honor, in a case where the
question is the fairness or unfairness, good faith
or bad faith as to a financial transaction, the
results of the financial transaction are central
in importance to deciding those questions and so
are squarely relevant directly to the claims in
the case and not just to the bias ofDMR and MRIA
partners.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Banducci,
anything further?
MR. BANDUCCI: Well, Your Honor, I think-thank you. The point relative to bias, this Court
and Judge McLaughlin's court has ruled on that.
Mr. Cliff already testified that
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and a document that was prepared by Mr. Cliff. I
think that he has testified to that. He so stated
under oath. So that foundation has been laid.
My concern, however, is that an error
was found in these documents by a summary prepared
by Mr. Cliff, that that discovery of that error
was never made known to opposing counsel until
today. That the rule requires if you are going to
use a summary, that you are supposed to provide
the documents upon which the summary is based so
that opposing counsel can have an opportunity to
review or have his experts review, as necessary,
those documents to allow him or her to make a
determination as to whether or not this is
evidence that is accurate to help him prepare to
cross-examine -- to examine the witness, so that
it can be determined whether the summary is, in
fact, accurate.
That simply wasn't done in this case.
And frankly, this Court was struggling with how to
allow this evidence in, because I hate to exclude
evidence that may be relevant. But Counsel has
told me what he wanted to use this evidence for,
and he wants to use that evidence for the purpose
of showing that Dr. Prochaska and Dr. Giles and
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the other doctors involved in this -- Dr.
Henson -- have a great bias because of the loss
that they have experienced because of the fact
that the hospital withdrew. He wants to use it to
show that the hospital dealt with them fairly
because they had a significant return on their
investment.
Well, that's in evidence. It is
already in evidence. The witness testified that
over the period of time that he had done a
summary, that they realized $15 million,
approximately a million dollars a year for 15
years.
Now, if that isn't enough to make the
point with the jury that they had an economic
interest, I don't know what is.
So I'm -- certainly the witness can
testify with regard to what he found and his
summary. He can testify with regard to the errors
that he found -- which, in effect, he already has
anyway -- and he can certainly testify that they
got a million dollars a year, $200,000 apiece,
over 15 years, which is $15 million. That's what
I'm am told it was offered for. And I am sure
counsel knows how to argue that point to the jury.
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CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. ROMATOWSKI:
Q. Mr. Cliff, to change the subject to the
subject ofMRI Mobile, is it the case that MRI
Mobile had just been founded when you joined PMI?
A. Yes.
Q. And Mobile was founded in 1988. You
joined in '89 is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. And you became acquainted with MRI
Mobile promptly after your joining PMI?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And did you come to learn what the
original purpose ofMRI Mobile was?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And what was that?
A. To provide service to the member
hospitals, the other non-Saint Al's hospitals of
MRIA, provide service on their campuses. At the
time, the fixed unit at Saint Alphonsus was the
only MRI provided within the MRIA entity, and
patients were having to come from Mercy and West
Valley specifically to Saint Al's to receive their
MRI. And the administrators of those two
hospitals wanted service on their campuses.

And the Court will deny the admissibility of
*-0730A.
In addition, I don't think Rule 1006
contemplated that you could have thousand of pages
of documents, pulled together a certain number of
them, arrange them in a certain way, have the
expert summarize them, and then not have an
obligation to produce what the result was and the
documents specifically relied on to the opposing
side. That's trial by ambush. That's not the
purpose ofthe rule.
So the Court is going to deny the
admissibility of Plaintiffs Exhibit *-0730A,
*-07308, *-0730 for the purpose stated. And we
can bring back the jury, and we will allow the
examination to continue.
(Jury present.)
THE COURT: The Court will note that counsel
and their clients are present in the courtroom,
the witness has resumed the witness stand, and the
jury has returned.
Counsel, you may continue with your
examination of the witness.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Yes, Your Honor.
Ill
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Q. Now, in the period when -- from the
time you joined PMI in 1989 until you left in
2000, did you have any role in your function at
PMI with regard to MRI Mobile?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was it?
A. Provide about the same service as I did
to MRI Center, all the accountings services and
billing, et cetera.
Q. And over the course ofthat ten-plus
years, was MRIA -- was MRI Mobile stagnant, or did
it grow?
A. No, it grew.
Q. And in what respect did it grow?
A. In terms of number oflocations served
as well as the number of magnets owned.
Q. And when you say "magnets owned," do
you mean separate MRI devices?
A. Correct.
Q. And in the case of Mobile, were they
each mounted on a separate truck? Is that how it
worked?
A. Separate trailer.
Q. Separate trailer. Okay. Do you
remember when -- you've described the original
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Dr. Garabedian and just asked him what exactly
that meant, that I did not see anything wrong with
the exam. What did the technical limitations
mean? What did that refer to?
Q. Okay. And what did Dr. Garabedian say?
A. He didn't respond. It was -- he made a
sarcastic comment.
Q. Okay. And was that the only time that
you saw references in reports that suggested
technical limitations that were being provided to
referring physicians?
A. No.
Q. Can you identifY other events or
occasions when this occurred to the jury, please.
A. Well, I can't recall every one, but
there were other reports that the technical
limitations came through that we saw.
Q. Was it always Dr. Garabedian?
A. No. There was one from Dr. Hall and
maybe Dr. Davey.
Q. Okay. All right. Now, you also talked
about an ER issue.
A. Yes.
Q. Can you tell the jury about that
instance.
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Q. Explain that to the jury, please.

MR. GJORDING: Objection, Your Honor. More
foundation, please.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: All right. Can you
explain to the jury by giving time and place as
best you can so that they have just a general
timeframe and who was involved in this response
issue.
A. Timeframe was probably in 2002-2003.
We had a patient that needed some assistance after
the exam. After they were off the table, the
technologist was walking them back to the dressing
area, and they passed out.
So normally what we do is we place a
phone call through the Saint Alphonsus phone
system and call a what we call a code. It wasn't
a code blue. The patient was still breathing, but
the patient had fainted. So we call a cardiac
assist.
And what that does is notifY Saint
Alphonsus that there is a need -- and we say
cardiac assist in the MRI suite -- that there's a
need in our department for the assistance of the
cardiac assist team and the radiologist. So the
cardiac assist team responded, but the radiologist

A. We had an ER patient scheduled in our
department. And the technologist called down to
the ER department to let them know we were coming
down to get the patient to bring them down for
their exam. And whoever they spoke to in the ER
department informed our technologist that that
patient had been directed downtown to IMI.
Q. Now, do you know how the emergency room
patient made it from -- or emergency room
department patient made it from the hospital to
IMI downtown?
A. I do not.
Q. And how far is MRI Center from the
emergency department?
A. Oh, we're right on campus. So I
don't-Q. Close?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. All right. There was also I
think -- and I've got my own notes here and
correct me ifl'm wrong on this -- a response.
There was an issue regarding a response time or a
failure to respond by a radiologist; is that
correct?
A. Yes, yes.
Page 3752
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did not respond.
Q. All right. Who was the radiologist on
duty?
A. Dr. Garabedian.
MR. BANDUCCI: Okay. Let's go to Exhibit
*-4280. Did you bring that up? Yes, it's already
in evidence. Thanks, Shannon.
All right. Now, Shannon, if you could
expand the top above kind of the gray bar so that
we see what this refers to.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: This is a radiology
MRI meeting record, Friday, August 30th, 2002.
And in attendance are a number of people,
including yourself.
The jury's heard most ofthese names.
But I'm not sure that they've heard Carolyn
Corbett's name very much. Who was Carolyn
Corbett?
A. She was -- I think her title was vice
president of patient relations, Saint Alphonsus.
Q. Okay. Let's go through this document.
You attended this meeting along with Mr. Floyd;
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. And do you know why the
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meeting was called?
1
A. We wanted to discuss the concerns we
2
3
had regarding the reduction in contrast coverage
hours.
4
Q. All right. So this was a meeting that
5
MRI Center requested?
6
A. Yes.
7
Q. Now, let's start with-- this
8
document's got -- it's kind of formatted in a
9
slightly unusual way. We've got the left side and
10
the right side. I'm going to start on the left
11
side here, and then we'll go over to the right
12
side to see what decisions came out of the
13
discussion that's on the left.
14
It says, "Carolyn Corbett stated some
15
concerns had been brought to her attention
16
regarding inpatient MRI treatments that required a 17
radiologist consultation being scheduled after
18
hours when they could have been scheduled during 19
regular business hours. Additional concerns
20
expressed by the radiologists included the types
21
of outpatient cases that are scheduled after hours
22
and strain the radiologist coverage of emergency
23
work. Dr. Hall provided some examples of
24
situations and expressed concerns regarding the
25

quality of care provided under such circumstances
when staff and resources as limited."
Did I read that correctly?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So this was a meeting where the
radiologists also had some concerns that they
brought up; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Now, in the course of this
meeting with Dr. Hall from Saint Alphonsus
Radiology Group and representatives of the
hospital, did anybody ever say: Well, gee,
Dr. Hall, you don't have any responsibility to
read outpatient images, so why are you concerned?
A. No.
Q. Okay. From the perspective ofMRI
Center, what was the problem here with respect to
this scheduling issue?
A. Well, it affected our flexibility. The
7 p.m. cutoff, if we were to get an order for an
inpatient at say 6 p.m. -- which we did on a
pretty consistent basis. I mean, they would come
down in the evening -- we would have to track down
the radiologist and find out -- get his okay to
even put that patient on the schedule to scan it
Page 3756
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that evening.
Q. All right. So were the radiologists
always easy to find under those circumstances?
A. No.
Q. What would happen then if-- what would
happen to the scheduling if you couldn't get a
radiologist to set up an exam before 7 p.m.?
A. Well, contrast exams we would not be
able to do, and it just put a delay in getting the
patients taken care of in a timely manner.
Q. Did that affect patient care?
A. Yes. Delayed their exam.
Q. All right. And what did it do to the
scheduling during the daylight hours at MRI
Center?
A. Well, basically we could scan
non-routine -- or excuse me -- routine exams after
7 p.m. So those patients would just be moved to
the 7 p.m. hour.
It didn't necessarily -- I mean, we
still had contrast exams that we could schedule
during those hours, so.
Q. Well, what about patient preference?
What if a patient wanted to be imaged after 7 p.m.
and a contrast reaction -- or a contrast
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administration was needed, what would happen then?
A. Well, we wouldn't be able to schedule
it or we'd have to take it to the radiologists and
get their okay.
Q. And did the radiologist take a position
with respect to participating in the
administration of a contrast if it wasn't on an
emergency basis?
A. I'm sorry. Would you repeat that.
Q. Sure. You talked about if a patient
preferred a post-7 p.m. exam and there was
contrast involved, you said that you'd have to go
find a radiologist to get their agreement to do
that; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And my question is -- I forgot what my
question was. My question is: What if the-well, did the radiologists ever say sorry, this
isn't an emergency and, you know, you're going to
have to wait till 7 in the morning?
A. Yes.
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, it's calling for
hearsay. I'd ask for better foundation as well.
THE COURT: Counsel, lay some additional
foundation.
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MR. BANDUCCI: Sure.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: Did you ever run into
a situation where the radiologist said: I'm not
going to be involved in the administration of
contrast because it's not an emergency and it's
after 7 p.m.?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And when did that occur in terms
of the timeframe? After you came back in 2001?
A. Yes.
Q. Did anything like that ever occur
before you left?
A. No.
Q. Before '99?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever have trouble getting
contrast administration scheduled at any time?
A. Not prior to 2001, no.
Q. All right. Thank you.
MR. BANDUCCI: Now, let's take a look at the
decision column, Kathy-- I mean Shannon. Ifyou
could expand, yeah, the right-hand column on the
first page.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: And the first bullet
point says, "Dr. Hall and possibly Dr. Gobel will
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meet with Julli Hopkins on Thursday, September 5th
to refine the development of protocols for routine
cases and identifYing those most appropriate for
after hours."
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And did that happen?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, good. Now let's go down to the
bottom. The bottom bullet point, same column
says, "Dr. Hall or another radiologist will meet
regularly with MRI Center management to review
scheduling concerns that have arisen in the
interim."
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Did that occur?
A. No, it did not.
MR. BANDUCCI: Let's go to the second page.
And let's stay on the left side of that page,
Shannon.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: And the second bullet
point here says, "MRI equipment quality. The
radiologists believe the quality of images
produced by the GE magnet is unacceptable."
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Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Had they ever asserted that before to
your knowledge?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. In the time that you were at MRI Center
working with the radiologists up till1999, did
anybody complain about the GE?
~ ~-

Q. Okay. Now let's go to the right side
and the third bullet down. It says, "Dr. Hall
will provide MRI Center management with a written
detailed list of concerns and experiences with the
GE equipment."
To your knowledge did Dr. Hall ever
provide such a written list of concerns?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. All right. Thank you. Ms. Hopkins,
are you aware of a rumor that was circulating in
the 2003 timeframe regarding the potential closure
of MRI Center before year-end 2003?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Can you tell the jury how you
found out about that and the impact of that rumor
on MRI Center's business.
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MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, if we can do
those one at a time, I'll get the foundation on
the first part hopefully.
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection as
compound.
Go ahead, Counsel.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: Can you tell the jury
how you found out about the rumor.
A. Through an employee of our company.
Q. All right. And what timeframe do you
recall?
A. I can't recall the exact timeframe.
Q. Do you recall whether or not you
learned that this rumor was impacting the program
run at MRI Center for students who wanted to come
to the center for training?
A. Yes.
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, may I voir dire
the witness briefly, please?
THE COURT: You may.
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. GJORDING:
Q. Ms. Hopkins, you said an employee told
you about this rumor?
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Honor.
THE COURT: Very well. Can this witness be
excused?
MR. WOODARD: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Very well, sir. You're excused.
Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
(Witness excused.)
MR. BANDUCCI: I call Jack Floyd. No, not
Jack Floyd.
THE COURT: Mr. Floyd does not want to come
back.
MR. BANDUCCI: He has been released. Let's
start again. I call Dr. Dave Giles.
THE COURT: All right. Dr. Giles.
MR. BANDUCCI: Before I proceed with that
examination, Your Honor, I would like to talk to
counsel.
THE COURT: Go right ahead.
MR. BANDUCCI: We can approach the bench
now.
THE COURT: Well, why don't you approach the
bench.
(Discussion off the record with Court
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this Court that individuals cannot communicate
directly or indirectly with witnesses in this
trial who may appear for other -- for either side
with regard to the subject matter of the trial
until those witnesses have completed their
testimony. That is to assure that their testimony
will not be in any way influenced by anything that
anyone sees in the courtroom until after they have
testified. That is a standard order of this
Court.
If it is your desire to report back not
understanding until now of that order, and you
have some type of a commitment to do that, then
the Court will have no choice but to bar you from
the courtroom in viewing any further proceedings
in this matter. Do you understand that?
MR. McFEELEY: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And can I be assured that you
will follow that order?
MR. McFEELEY: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, may Mr. Banducci
and I approach?
THE COURT: You may.
(Discussion off the record at the bench
with court and counsel.)

and counsel.)
THE COURT: We will just take a moment,
ladies and gentlemen ofthejury. I am not going
make you leave the courtroom.
(Discussion off the record.)
THE COURT: Just in the interest of
expediting things, does counsel for either side
have any objection to allowing the clerk to swear
Dr. Giles so he can take the witness stand?
MR. WOODARD: No, Your Honor.
MS. MARKS: No, Your Honor.
(Witness sworn.)
THE COURT: Doctor, I will warn you, this
pitcher, be careful when you pour water out of it,
if you do.
THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
THE COURT: Counsel, I will advise you that
in your absence, I had your co-counsel agree to
allow the doctor to be sworn so he could take the
witness stand. Dr. Giles has been sworn.
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Discussion off the record at the bench
with Court and counsel.)
THE COURT: Mr. McFeeley, I am going to
advise_you that there is a standing order with
Page 4105
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THE COURT: All right. Very well,
Mr. Banducci.
DAVID GILES, M.D.,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the state,
having been first duly sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:
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DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q. Dr. Giles, how are you this afternoon?
A. Very well. Thank you.
Q. All right. Well, Doctor, we will spend
a little bit of time with you getting your
background. I believe that we will be
interrupting your testimony here in a little bit
to bring on another witness, but let's start with
an introduction to the jury. Tell them who you
are, where you come from, a little bit about your
background, please.
A. My name is David Giles. I am a
physician. I was born in Minnesota, received all
of my education, including my medical education at
the University of Minnesota.
From there, I went to Los Angeles for
an internship, then to the Army, back to
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(Jury absent.)
THE COURT: The Court will note that Counsel
and the parties are present. The Court has
received the briefs that were filed last night by
Saint Al's. And I have reviewed those along with
the briefs filed by MRIA relating to the issues of
the expert testimony and the factual assumptions
oftheir expert and also the motion in limine with
regard to Saint Alphonsus being allowed to argue
through its expert basically that Saint Al's is
allowed to seek an offset, if you will, is the
term that is used -- though there's some dispute
over the specific term -- of any damages since it
retains its share in MRI Mobile and MRI Center and
should the jury calculate or be given an
instruction and then allowed to testify with
regard to that particular reduction in the damages
calculation.
So I guess, Mr. Banducci.
MR. BANDUCCI: Mr. Bastian, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Bastian, go ahead.
MR. BASTIAN: And Your Honor, which of those
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Mr. Banducci?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, just so that the
Court isn't under an impression that we loaded
them up with 15 brand new exhibits, other than the
two -- in fact, actually all but one are excerpts
from either the report that they have had since
2007 of Bruce Budge, there are charts within the
report, or charts within the report that was
supplemented in 2011. So it is not new
information. It is not new data. It is not new
anything.
With respect to *-5090, this is also
the case background excerpt from the report. So
it is not new. But I have decided, actually
before talking to Mr. Friedman, that I wasn't
going to use it. But I have developed a practice
of marking things sometimes when I think I might
use them, and that's all that there is to that.
And I will talk to Mr. Friedman at the
break about *-4566 because, again, all the
information that that's based on has been in the
hands of the defendant for, in some cases years,
in other cases months; but it is sliced
differently, and I want to make sure he
understands what's in there.

4362
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT: All right. Very well.
Anything further, Mr. Friedman?
MR. FRIEDMAN: No, Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
The thing I wanted to go over just
briefly, in summary, to make sure that we are all
on the same page with regard to the expert opinion
testimony, I went back through, early this
morning, prior rulings of the Court as to expert
testimony, and I just want to review them.
As to damages under the civil
conspiracy claim, if they are found owing, well,
certainly they've got to be apportioned between
the conspirators. They must be also be broken out
as to MRIA, MRI Mobile and MRI Center, because of
the change in landscape of the case as a result of
the Supreme Court decision.
As to lost profits measure of damages,
they must be broken out as to the portion of the
business lost as a result of competitors'
misconduct, and between the portion lost as a
result of other factors.
And the Court has already found that
the MRIA expert has met the threshold requirement
there. That's the Pope decision.
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As to the breach of fiduciary duty, the
law requires that any profits realized from the
appropriation of the partnership opportunity are
to be held in trust, as required by Idaho Code
Section 53-3-404(b )(1 ).
The funds so held are the net profits
realized as a result of the breach of the duty.
They, too, must be apportioned where that is
appropriate. If the jury finds there is a breach,
then they must apportion those damages.
In this particular case, damages are
not awardable to MRIA simply because of Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care's exercise of its right
to dissociate -- dissociate from the MRIA
partnership.
The damages may, however, be awarded
for all damages which the jury finds were
proximately caused by Saint Alphonsus Diversified
Care to MRIA as a result of actions taken by Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care prior to its
dissociation from the partnership on April 1st of
2004.
Also coming into play in that is the
expiration of the non-competition clause on
April 1st 2005. If the damages are found, they
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may not be awarded based upon any time period
which extends beyond -- I believe it is the
December 31st, 2015, date.
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care claims
that if any damages are due as a result of the
breach of fiduciary duty, then they should be
barred by the statute of limitations because it is
clear that the relationship between MRIA and the
radiologists had so badly deteriorated by 1999
that there was no partnership opportunity to
usurp, and if any claim was to be made it should
have been made by 2003.
MRIA asserts that the breach occurred
on July 1st of 2001, the date Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care actually entered into the
partnership with IMI.
It is for the jury to determine on what
date the usurpation of partnership opportunity
occurred. If the jury finds it occurred in 1999,
this claim would be barred by the statute of
limitations.
If the jury finds it occurred in 2001,
then the claim is not barred, and if damages are
found to be awardable, they would be measured from
the --I believe it is the July 1st, 2001, date,

.
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with Dr. Giles.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Your Honor, if -- two
things. If we could dispense with the "only if,"
the last clause of the instruction.
And the one other thing, Your Honor, is
the witness will have just testified to what he
said she said, so I don't know that it is
necessary for the Court to repeat that "the
cheapest thing would be."
I mean, they will have the remark fully
in mind, so I don't -- I would ask that it not be
repeated. It's simply that: That you heard
testimony that Jeff Cliff advised Dr. Giles that
Cindy Schamp said something. And then the
remainder, I think, is fine up to the last clause,
which I think is unnecessary.
THE COURT: The last clause, "It is not
substantiative evidence in this case, nor does it
prove that Ms. Schamp actually made the statement,
but only that Mr. Cliff attributed it to her in
his conversation with Dr. Giles"?
MR. ROMATOWSKI: The "only if"-- the "only
that," Your Honor. The "only that" clause.
I want the first portion of what you
just mentioned. But the trouble is, the "only
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that" clause I think weighs in, on the part of the
Court, in favor of the credibility of Dr. Giles'
account of what Cliff says, if you read it
closely.
I don't think it is necessary. It just
goes to Jeff Cliff's credibility and what weight
you give his testimony. And I think the
instruction is, you know, it is fully understood
and it is clear if you stop at that point, before
the word "only" in the last phrase.
THE COURT: I think that's probably an
appropriate change, since the Court feels that
that language is more protective of you, as the
plaintiff's position, I will strike it if you feel
it isn't.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: I want to be clear, I mean,
I want the part about, "it is not substantiative
evidence that Ms. Schamp said that."
THE COURT: Right.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: That remains, I understand.
THE COURT: However, I will not just say
that, "You recall that Dr. Giles said Jeff Cliff
said something."
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Very well, Your Honor.
THE COURT: That makes the instruction
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totally nonsensical, in the Court's opinion.
So the instruction would be: You have
heard testimony that Mr. Jeff Cliff advised
Dr. Giles he had been told by Cindy Schamp the
cheapest thing the hospital could do in its
negotiations with MRI was to wait.
This statement may be considered by you
for only one purpose, and that is to determine
what weight you attach to the prior testimony of
Mr. Jeff Cliff on this subject, and for no other
purpose. It is not substantiative evidence in
this case, nor does it prove that Ms. Schamp
actual actually made the statement.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Very well, Your Honor.
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Let's bring them
back in.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Oh, one -THE COURT: Before we do that...
(Discussion off the record.)

THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Do I take it, then, we are
not going to go further into Exhibit *-4154?
MR. BANDUCO: That's correct.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Very well. So *-4154 --
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MR. BANDUCO: Just to ease Mr. Romatowski's
concerns, I am not going to mention the document
at all.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Very well.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay. Let's take about a 5-,
10-minute break so that we can have a mercy break
for the staff and the parties.
(Recess, 10:06 a.m.)
(Court called to order at 10:15 a.m.)

THE COURT: Any matters that counsel wish to
raise with the Court before we bring the jury
back?
MR. ROMATOWSKI: No, Your Honor.
MR. BANDUCO: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Let's bring them
back in.
Oury present.)

THE COURT: The Court will note that the
parties are present in the courtroom with their
respective counsel, that the witness has resumed
the witness stand and the jury is present.
Mr. Banducci, you may continue.
MR. BANDUCO: Thank you, Your Honor.

.
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DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q. Dr. Giles, did Mr. Cliff ever inform
you of a conversation that he had with Cindy
Schamp, wherein Ms. Schamp told Cliff that the
cheapest thing for the hospital to do in the
negotiations was to wait?
A. Yes.
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
That's all I have.
THE COURT: All right.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you
have heard testimony that Mr. Jeff Cliff advised
Dr. Giles he had been told by Cindy Schamp the
cheapest thing the hospital could do in the
negotiations with MRIA was to wait.
This statement may be considered by you
for only one purpose, and that is to determine
what weight you attach to the prior testimony of
Mr. Jeff Cliff on this subject, and for no other
purpose. It is not substantiative evidence in
this case, nor does it prove that Ms. Schamp
actually made the statement.
Cross-examination.
MR. ROMATOWSKI: Your Honor, we plan to call
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KENNETH WAYNE FRY,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the
plaintiffs, having been first duly sworn, was
examined and testified as follows:
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Dr. Giles on the defense case. And so in order to
expedite matters, we will waive cross-examination
on MRI's case.
THE COURT: Very well. Then
cross-examination of Dr. Giles has been waived.
MR. BANDUCCI: All right.
THE COURT: Doctor -MR. BANDUCCI: Well, then, Dr. Giles, you
get to step down.
(Witness steps down.)
MR. BANDUCCI: Then we would call Ken Fry.
Your Honor, may we approach?
THE COURT: Yes.
(Discussion off the record at the bench
with Court and counsel.)
THE COURT: All right.
MR. BANDUCCI: Call Ken Fry.
(Witness sworn.)
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team that would meet and discuss things from a
strategic standpoint for the hospital. I also
attended board meetings from time to time.
Q. Those are Saint Alphonsus board of
trustees meetings?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And with respect to your
responsibility as CFO for financial oversight of
the finances of the Regional Medical Center, could
you explain your accountability for that position?
A. Well, obviously, it would be to make
sure that our financial statements were accurate
and correct; making sure that we had accurate and
proper controls in place to plan for things like
major capital renovations or additions; and, you
know, just be able to explain to senior leadership
and the board our financial position. I would
also be relating to our home office group on
financial issues, those kinds of things.
Q. Now, are you trained as a CPA?
A. No, I'm not a CPA.
Q. Okay. Let's go to Exhibit*-4226.
And Kathy, if we could go to page 23.
You have been handed a copy of the IMI
operating agreement that was executed - some
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DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q. Mr. Fry, could you state your full name
for the record, please.
A. Kenneth Wayne Fry.
Q. And Mr. Fry, you are chief financial
officer for Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center; correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. How long have you held that position?
A. I have been there since August of 1999.
Q. All right. And could you tell the jury
a little bit about your responsibilities as chief
financial officer for Saint Alphonsus?
A. Well, I have an operational role,
several departments that I would be in charge of,
things like registration, some of the billing
functions; those kind of things, an operational
role.
I was a member of the senior leadership
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this is only from 1999 to 2006. You see that?
1 1999, for example, is that for every dollar of
2 revenue from a scan, 68 cents was profit, which
A. Yes.
Q. Why is that?
3 compared to most businesses is a very, very high
4 level of profitability.
A. This is the analysis that I did in a
previous proceeding, and the data after 2006 was
5
Q. All right. So if we just take 99 as an
not available.
6 example, there were 434 scans performed downtown.
Q. And we'll show the jury what was done
7 The amount paid for those 434 scans was $370,746.
between 2006 and 2010 in a minute. But for
8 And using the variable margin that MRI Center had
purposes of discussion, how did you come up with
9 for its operations, you come up with a profit of
this variable margin?
10 $252,749, which is really 68 percent of that
A. Basically I had financial information
11 $370,000 figure; correct?
for MRIC's magnets on the Saint Alphonsus campus. 12
A. Right. The only clarification I'd like
So I had their financial statements. I could
13 to make is I don't want to leave the impression
therefore determine how much profit they made out 14 that the 434 scans was all of the scans done at
of each scan.
15 downtown. That's only the scans that were done
Now, to do that, I had some interviews
16 from the traditional referral base of MRIA, plus
with Mr. Jack Floyd, who I think you've been
17 if there was that year any new physicians with new
introduced to, and some of MRIA's consultants,
18 privileges only at Saint Al's. That's those
Mr. Rich Drury was one of them, to basically look
19 scans.
at the components of their costs and determine
20
Q. Actually, I'm glad you mentioned that.
which ones, every time an additional scan
21
MR. BANDUCCI: Let's show the witness
occurred, the cost to be incurred.
22 Exhibit *-5000.
Now, I found that the margins in this
23
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: Now, you mentioned
business and certainly at MRIA were fairly high.
24 this a little bit earlier in your general
What that variable margin line means, looking at
25 discussion of your methodology. But would you use
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this pie chart to explain to the jury which scans
1 at IMI which I am not calculating as having been
you included as lost profits to MRI Center and
2 diverted. Those exams, if IMI had independently
which scans you did not include.
3 of Saint Alphonsus opened an Imaging Center and
A. Sure. The way it worked mechanically
4 these physicians had referred exams to it, they
is that we basically had these documents that were
5 would not be diverted exams from MRIA.
in those big stacks of raw data in terms of scans
6
Q. So that's it clear for the jury, we've
that had been done at IMI downtown. I then had
7 got the yellow section in the pie. That
prepared the list that I described to you of who
8 represents 42 percent of the entirety of
were the referring physicians that basically fed
9 physicians who are doing exams or who have
MRI's business prior to 1999. And I had a list of
10 referred exams to IMI; correct?
new arrivals on the scene, doctors with Saint Al's
11
A. Correct.
affiliations that had joined the scene.
12
Q. And over what period of time for this
If they were on that list, which I
13 particular pie chart?
14
called the affiliated physicians list, and IMI did
A. I actually am having trouble
the scan, I counted it as a scan that was diverted
15 remembering if this was from the earlier
for what would have been MRIA's business to IMI.
16 proceeding or if this has been updated. I think
The 42 percent on here is the percentage of the
17 it has been updated.
exams which fall into the category of exams from
18
Q. This has been updated.
referring physicians that traditionally referred
19
A. Yeah. This is for then the entire
toMRIA.
20 period of 1999 through 2010.
This purple 9 percent slice of the
21
Q. Okay. And so of the physicians
chart is basically those new doctors who came on
22 referring to IMI downtown, you excluded from the
the scene afterwards that only had admitting
23 damages calculation 49 percent, which amount to
privileges at Saint Alphonsus.
24 20,795 exams; correct?
The 49 percent are exams which occurred
25
A. Correct.
District Court, Fourth Judicial District
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Q. And I'm not sure you made it clear.
Why did you exclude those exams?
A. The purpose of my measurement is to
look at scans that were diverted from this
existing business in which Saint Alphonsus was a
partner to the new business. And so I think the
best way to define a market or population of
business is to look at the referring physicians
that basically provided that business. And only
if those basically showed a shift or a diversion
from where they had traditionally gotten their
images made to IMI did I count them as a
diversion.
Q. Now I want to go --just before we
leave this pie chart, I want to go to the purple
chart, the 9 percent.
A. Yeah.
Q. So that we're all clear on why you
added that into the damage amount or the scan
amounts for the benefit of MRI Center.
A. So I basically am viewing this stable
of affiliated physicians with Saint Alphonsus as
being the source of the referrals that
traditionally have provided MRIA its business. It
was on campus. It was in partnership with Saint
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Alphonsus. It was the only magnet on campus. And
that was the base of their business.
There are all of these allegations that
Saint Alphonsus undertook a number of steps to try
to basically assist a competitor and to migrate
business over there. So I looked at this stable
of physicians that had provided the business, and
I individually tracked how they started to change
their referral patterns to IMI.
In the case of this purple piece, that
assumption I think is extremely conservative,
because only if I found the physician-- if a
physician could admit patients at Saint Al's or
St. Luke's, I made the assumption that they
wouldn't have sent one single scan to MRIA in this
but-for world, in this perfect world where no
injury was done.
I think that that is a very
conservative --you'd think if somebody had
privileges at both hospitals they would at least
send some to MRIA. The reason I did that is
because there's also an issue that might cause an
overstatement of my counting of diverted scans.
It's possible, in this pre-'99 group of physicians
that referred to MRIA, that if the downtown
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location opened up, it was independent of Saint
1 that came from the traditional referral base of
Alphonsus, that those guys for some reason because
2 MRIA.
of where a patient lived or something else might
Q. So let's say that there's -- setting
3
send a patient there and I would be counting them
4 aside St. Luke's, let's suppose that there are
as diverted, that would have a tendency to maybe
5 other new competitors that enter the market and
overstate it.
6 attract scans away from MRI Center. Would your
But I think that it is by far
7 damage analysis wrongly include this migration to
overcompensated for the ones I left out for these
8 other competitors in the market?
people with dual admitting privileges.
9
A. The only time I count-- account for a
Q. Well, now, let's take the situation
10 scan as being diverted is if IMI got the scan.
where you have a Saint Alphonsus affiliated
11 And so if, you know, one of these physicians that
physician. He's been going to MRI Center. And
12 had traditionally referred to MRIA referred a scan
then IMI opens, and he decides he's going to -13 to Boise Orthopedic or something, that would not
he's not going to refer to either place. He's
14 be - the fact that MRIA lost it would not cause
going to send it to St. Luke's, St. Luke's
15 me to calculate it as damages in this case,
Radiology Imaging Center.
16 because that's a loss that probably would have
Would the departure of that scan from
17 occurred anyway.
MRI Center to St. Luke's be counted in your damage
18
MR. BANDUCCI: All right. Now, we have
analysis?
19 looked at '99 through 2006 for downtown. Kathy,
A. No. Because we have to allow for the
20 can we now bring up Exhibit *-5084. Actually, I
fact that there were additional magnets which were
21 think the best thing to do is enlarge if you can,
entering the Treasure Valley during this period.
22 I'm not sure you'll be able to do it very well,
So if actual scans went to ABC Radiology as a
23 but enlarge if you can the bottom figure.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: Is this an
magnet, they're not in the population I'm looking
24
at. I'm only looking at scans that IMI received
25 accumulation of all the years between 1999 and
District Court, Fourth Judicial District

003424

4546

4545
1

1

A.

2
3
4
5
6

2

Q. Can you tell the jury what you're doing

And so this is a little bit different
claim in that the claim is basically this
opportunity was taken away or usurped, taken away
from MRIA. And so the assumptions I made is that
if MRIA had been supported in going forward and
opening this facility in Meridian, that they would
7 have been the first to arriver there, and that
8 instead of being crowded out of that market by
9 IMI, which is what actually happened, they would
10 be there first and IMI would have been crowded out
11 and prevented from opening the center.
12
So the implication for that is that I
13 don't need to worry about affiliations or where
14 the scans carne from. I'm assuming that it would
15 have been the same center with a different name on
16 the door. It would have said MRIA instead of IMI,
17 and that the operations on the MRI side of it
18 would have been identical in terms of the amounts
19 paid and the costs that it took to generate the
20 revenue. So I'm using IMI's margins and I'm using
21 the actual amounts received per scans that
22 actually occurred on that site.
23
Q. All right. Both of these charts show a
24 line entitled "less capital expenditures." Do you
25 see that?
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3

Yes.

there.

A. Yeah. I don't think it has a major
effect on the calculation, but it should be
understood. Because I've used the word profits to
7 indicate lost profits, and they are except that I
8 have made one change. I'm really looking at the
9 cash flows.
10
Typically in an accounting financial
11 statement, if I bought an MRI magnet and it had a
12 ten-year life, I would take 10 percent of the cost
13 of that off my income statement every year and
14 call it depreciation.
15
In this case, and partially because my
16 work is going to be used by Mr. Wilhoite, who you
17 will be introduced to later, his calculations are
18 looking at cash flows. And so the actual cash
19 flow is when you buy the equipment, not when you
20 allocate its cost over the years for depreciation.
21
So we basically -- when I calculated
22 the profit percentages, it was before
23 depreciation. And then I deduct how much MRIA
24 would have had to spend, same amount that IMI did,
25 to buy a magnet. That's why you see negative
4

5
6
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damages, for example, in 2002, which doesn't make
1 happened if the alleged stealing of this
2 opportunity had not occurred, is there's no reason
sense. That basically means that yeah, they would
3 to think that if MRIA was interested in opening a
have gotten some revenue, a million two, from
4 Meridian facility that they would have waited till
4 doing scans, but they would have had to pay 2.2,
5 $2 million for the equipment. So that year would
5 2002 to do it or that- and we'll be talking
6 be negative.
6 about Eagle - if they would have waited until the
7 date that that was open. They may have actually,
7
Q. All right. So in other words, this
8 if they're interested in the opportunity, had been
8 reference to capital expenditure refers to the
9 supported, moved forward and opened it earlier and
9 cost of the magnetic resonance imaging equipment;
10 correct?
10 generated profits earlier.
11
A. Yes.
11
The problem is that it would involve me
12
Q. And what you've done is you basically
12 developing a lot of assumptions and possibly some
13 put it all into a single year so that what you're
13 speculation as to how quickly they could have
14 really doing is you're measuring cash flows?
14 opened that up. And I thought that it would be
15
A. Right. I call it profits, but you
15 more conservative, certainly less controversial if
16 should keep in mind that one nuance. In the
16 I just made the assumption that they would have
17 totality of the ten-year period, I don't think it
17 stepped into IMI's shoes.
18
Q. At the same time?
18 really matters in terms of kind of the amount of
19
A. Atthe same time that IMI did. And so
19 the damages looking over that whole period. But
20 in an individual year it does look bad.
20 I believe that in fact there is value that was
21
Q. All right. Is this calculation with
21 lost for this opportunity that is not measured by
22 respect to Meridian in your view conservative?
22 me to the extent that they would have entered the
23
A. It is in one important respect, is that
23 market sooner than IMI did.
24
Q. Okay. Now with respect to the number
24 I think if you're trying to model what I've been
25 of magnets at Meridian, is there also an aspect of
25 calling this but-for world, what would have
District Court, Fourth Judicial District
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the Saint Alphonsus attorney to make certain
assumptions or clarify certain assumptions about
the but-for line?
A. Yes.
MR. BANDUCCI: Can the witness be shown
Exhibit *-0889. I assume you don't have an
objection to that?
MR. VERGONIS: We'd prefer to show the
redacted version *-0889R.
MR. BANDUCCI: Oh, okay. Let's do that. I
don't know if we have that.
MR. VERGONIS: We have it.
MR. BANDUCCI: Bill, can we put up *-0889R.
MR. WOODARD: She has it.
MR. BANDUCCI: Oh, she has it?
THE COURT: Is this the redacted version,
Counsel?
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, it is.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: Now, this is a
document that you --this is the but-for line that
we saw just a few minutes ago, but there's some
additional drawing on that; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And whose drawing is that on there?
A. Mine.
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Q. What is it that you were asked to
illustrate with this additional drawing?
A. As I described to you, my but-for line
assumes basically that the pattern of referrals
would never be interrupted and that at least under
one scenario that Saint Alphonsus was not going to
be able to lawfully compete. I was posed the
hypothetical question that what if that's wrong,
and assuming in April of 2005 after the expiration
of the non-compete period it was okay for them to
compete, they had every right to do it, what would
the but-for line look like?
That question had never been posed for
me before. And I did my best at the time to
basically do a depiction of what I thought it
might look like with everybody's understanding
that this wasn't based on actual data, numbers.
It was just an approximate diagram.
Q. Now, did you assume in this line that
Saint Alphonsus could lawfully compete?
A. I did.
Q. All right. And is that accurate? I
mean, I shouldn't say whether it's accurate or
not. Are you aware of allegations that that's an
issue to be left for the jury?
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A.

I'm aware that that's highly contested,

yes.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, I believe this
contravenes the Court's ruling. I would invite
the Court to its order filed June 13, 2011. Shall
I go to the bench? Shall I approach?
THE COURT: I want to be sure that I have the
exact language in front of me. That was September
2011 ruling?
MR. FRIEDMAN: June 13,2011, yes.
THE COURT: June 13, 2011 ruling.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Bottom of page 3.
THE COURT: And what page, Counsel?
MR. FRIEDMAN: Page 3 at the bottom, Your
Honor.
THE WITNESS: Do I stay or what?
MR. BANDUCCI: I think you stay.
(Discussion off the record at the bench
with court and counsel.)
THE COURT: I think we've got it straightened
out at this point. All right. Thank you,
Counsel. Go ahead.
MR. BANDUCCI: All right. Your Honor, just
so I get back into the swing of things, can I have
the question and answer back, please.
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THE COURT: Very well.
(Record read.)
MR. BANDUCCI: All right, thank you.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: Now, let's talk about
the configuration.
MR. BANDUCCI: Kathy, don't go away.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: Let's talk about the
configuration of this sketch that you drew.
Assume for purposes of our discussion that Saint
Alphonsus could compete rightfully after April
2005. Okay? Assuming that to be the case, is
this sketch properly configured in your opinion?
A. Not based upon what I'm aware of now,
it does not.
Q. You need to lean closer to the
microphone.
A. I think I'm turned off maybe.
MR. BANDUCCI: I think we are off.
THE COURT: She turned it off when we were at
the bench.
THE WITNESS: Am I on?
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: You're on.
A. I think you were asking me if I believe
that this is - the but-for line is properly
configured under the assumption that there could
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A. Well, two of them are basically not
based on scans being diverted from MRIA to IMI.
They're based upon an opportunity to have a
business in Meridian and in Eagle and were
basically allegedly taken by Saint Alphonsus away
from MRIA. So these two columns here don't rely
on a migration of scans from one to the other.
It's simply what is basically the business
operations of those two locations.
Q. Okay. Now, let me ask the question
this way so that the jury can kind of get a sense
for this hypothetical. Let's assume that in 2005
Saint Alphonsus could legally compete and that
there was no splash-over, let's call it, no
lasting effect of the prior bad acts so that we
cut off all of the purported damages as of 2005
where lawful competition could occur.
A. Yes.
Q. Explain how that would look, what the
jury would be looking at on this chart, to
determine the impact of that hypothetical.
A. In that situation where none of these
damages relate to pre-withdrawal acts, if this was
all lawful competition for 2006 forward let's say,
that would take about $10.7 million out of my
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46,321 on your chart?
A. Yeah, assuming of course that they find
that there was liability for the other Q. Of course.
A. -allegations of the usurpation, yes.
Q. All right. Now, I want to make one
more point clear, one more area. On this chart
can you identify which of the damages go to MRI
Center, which go to MRI Mobile, and why there is
not a damage figure per se for MRI Associates.
A. All right. Basically my calculations
assume that the scans at SARMC and at downtown
were diversions from scans that would have
happened on campus at the MRI Center. And I had
been told to assume that had the opportunity to
open up MRI Centers in Meridian and Eagle been
supported for MRIA, that they would have been
within the rubric of the Mobile MRIM entity.
The reason that -- I have looked at
this from the standpoint of trying to then compute
discrete damages for MRIA, but it's not necessary
in my opinion, because MRIA's revenues are
derivative upon these two - or these four rather.
MRIA gets an administrative fee of
seven and a half percent of revenues. And so
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damages calculation.
It would not change Magicview, because
that's a usurped opportunity. The issue there is
who basically owns that business and is going to
control that business. Same would be true for
Eagle.
For downtown, if I assume that all of
these periods from 2006 forward are not unlawful
diversions, they're just the result of
competition, then that's going to take another
about $4 million, a little less than $4 million
out of the damages.
For those years between this group here
and this group here, there is a little more than
$14 million, I think about $14.4 million of
damages that would be removed from my model. So
this $46 million goes to a little less than $32.
I think it's fairly close to $31.9 million, if you
assume that all of these injuries were the result
of lawful competition and not bad acts.
Q. Okay. So that it's clear for the jury
then, if they assume that after 2005 Saint
Alphonsus could compete lawfully at the magnet on
campus and downtown, the remainder amount of
damage is roughly $32 million as opposed to the
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their damages will basically be taken out of these
entities if there is an award in the amount of
that seven and a half percent.
Q. So if we asked for separate damages for
MRIA, we would be asking for a double recovery in
effect?
A. If you'd - well, not if you deducted
from the other two entities, but if you didn't
deduct them, yes, you would.
Q. All right. So just so it's clear then,
the first column Saint Alphonsus, SARMC, that's
the campus IMI magnet, that goes to MRI Center.
The next two, Magicview and Eagle, are part of the
MRI Mobile damages. And downtown is part of MRI
Center.
A. Correct.
MR. BANDUCCI: I have no further questions
at this time. Wait. Maybe I do.
THE COURT: Mr. Friedman, you may
cross-examine.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, just one moment.
I have a late coming question from my team.
THE COURT: All right. One moment.
Q. BY MR. BANDUCCI: Let me ask you one
more question about disgorgement. Recognizing
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that disgorgement is the benefit received by Saint
Alphonsus, if this jury were to award disgorgement
rather than lost profits, because these are all
targeted measures of damages; right?
A. Right.
Q. They can't be added together; right?
A. They certainly don't intend that they
be added together.
Q. That if they were to award disgorgement
as opposed to lost profits as between MRI Center
and MRI Mobile, is there a rough apportionment
that you could do based on your information on the
overall lost profits analysis?
A. Yeah, there would be. Basically if you
add up the damages that I've calculated in lost
profits for both MRIM and MRIC, those two entities
that would contain these four operations,
coincidently but nonetheless they do split about
50/50, so you could use that as a measure.
MR. BANDUCCI: All right. Thank you. No
further questions, Your Honor.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I
wanted to use the flip chart in the course of our
discussion. Should I go get it and put it over
here?
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THE COURT: Yeah. If that's where you want
to put it, Counsel.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you very much. May I
approach? Your Honor, if I put it here, will that
be satisfactory to the Court?
THE COURT: That's fine, if Mr. Banducci can
see it from there.
MR. BANDUCCI: Well, I can't. But
Mr. Friedman, if you put it here that would help.
THE COURT: That way everybody can see it. I
guess I should ask: Can all of the jurors see
this flip chart? Very well. I notice that the
jurors at the end are both saying they can, so go
ahead, Mr. Friedman.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. FRIEDMAN:
Q. Mr. Budge, I wanted to touch on a
couple of things that you discussed with
Mr. Banducci toward the end of your testimony.
Then we'll circle back and cover some other
things.
Do you still have Exhibit *-5067 before
you?
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A. I have the file down here. I don't
really need to have a physical one, do I, if I can
see this?
Q. You were kind enough to discuss with
Mr. Banducci by what amount your damages
calculations would be reduced if you assumed that
Saint Alphonsus was entitled to compete 2005 and
thereafter. Do you recall that?
A. Assumed not only that but that there
was no carryover from the other allegations yes, I
do.
Q. Yes, thank you for pointing that out.
Now I want to invite your attention to this
summary chart *-5067. And I think you said that
the amounts for diverted scans as you've
calculated them would be reduced by something on
the order of $10 million or more, bringing it down
to a net of $32 million; right?
A. Slightly less than $32 million, yes.
Q. But you also said that the lost
opportunities that you described in Meridian and
Eagle would not be reduced; correct?
A. I did.
Q. Okay. Now, Meridian-- or pardon me.
Eagle began in 2007; did it not?
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A.

Itdid.

Q. And so you have assumed that, assuming
that Saint Alphonsus established an Eagle MRI
location in 2007, it was entitled to do so;
correct?
A. Actually, in answering that question, I
assumed that it was usurped.
Q. All right.
A. And that it was MRIA who if supported
would have opened the center.
Q. You have assumed, have you not,
Mr. Budge, that Saint Alphonsus dissociated from
the partnership effective Aprill, 2004; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have assumed for purposes of
your analysis -A. Of this question?
Q. In general of your question. You have
assumed for purposes of this analysis and for this
question that Saint Alphonsus was entitled to
compete beginning in 2005; correct?
A. That is not correct.
Q. All right.
A. I assumed it for purposes of this last
question. I did not assume it for purposes of my
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damage calculation.
Q. Okay, thank you. Then let me ask you
now for purposes of this last question that you
discussed with Mr. Banducci, you did assume that
Saint Alphonsus was entitled to compete in 2005;
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. If the Eagle facility was
not established until2007, by which time Saint
Alphonsus according to your own assumptions was no
longer a member of the partnership, how in your
estimation for purposes of this-- what was the
mechanism by which the opportunity was usurped?
A. Well, that's what I was trying to
explain earlier is that, again, I'm not the trier
of fact. I don't know the details of the
allegations of usurpation. But I do understand
that they occurred while Saint Alphonsus was a
partner with MRIA.
I mentioned in my direct testimony that
I think this calculation is conservative because
in fact if the allegations are proved, my
understanding is they would have opened in Eagle
in an earlier year before withdrawal and before
dissociation, which I have not calculated damages
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want to belabor this point, but I don't understand
your reasoning that conduct that under the
assumptions indicated was legal and proper, namely
competition in 2007, was somehow a usurped
opportunity in 2007.
A. I assume that because of my
understanding that the allegations is, is that the
usurpation of that opportunity occurred before
there was withdrawal, before there was a
separation of the fiduciary duty, and that you
basically can't unscramble those eggs, that the
injury was caused, that the allegations again
being, not my conclusion, that this was taken from
MRIA. And the fact that later on after that
injury had occurred they could legally compete
doesn't seem to me to cure. So I didn't take it
out.
Q. And so what you're saying as I
understand it is the Eagle facility opportunity
was taken, according to that assumption, years
before the Eagle MRI Center was established?
A. That is what my understanding of the
allegations is. And as I said, it would cause me
to make some assumptions which I might be accused
of speculating. But if I modeled what it would

7

4582
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

for. But in answering the question about the
assumption that they could lawfully compete in
April of 2005, I'm assuming that they did not
usurp the Eagle opportunity and that that facility
would be owned by MRIA and that its profits would
accrue to MRIA.
Q. I see. So if I understand what you're
telling us, that for purposes of this last round
of questions with Mr. Banducci, even though
according to the assumptions implicit in that
question Saint Alphonsus was entitled to compete
and had withdrawn from the partnership, you
believe that MRIA would have established a
legal -- pardon me -- an Eagle MRI facility before
2007?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, that misstates
the witness' testimony. Mr. Budge has been
infinitely clear that he's not assuming that
conduct at all. He's speaking as to allegations.
THE COURT: All right. Counsel, rephrase.
Q. BY MR. FRIEDMAN: And thank you for the
clarification, because I understand perfectly well
that you are making assumed facts based on
allegations, that you are not a finder of fact.
So I want to focus on -- and I don't
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have been like to open that facility when it was
originally suggested, there would be injury back
in years prior to 2007.
Q. I'm focused on the 2004 period. And I
think I understand your testimony. Let me turn to
something else that you touched on briefly. You
talked about the issue of control from an
accounting perspective for purposes of financial
statement consolidation.
A. Yes.
Q. Have you taken the opportunity to
examine the consolidated financial statements of
SARMC?
A. I have not.
Q. Would it interest you to know for
purposes of your analysis that they were audited
financial statements certified by Deloitte?
A. I would expect them to have been
audited by a reputable firm, yes.
Q. Would it interest you to know that on
those consolidated financial statements, the
investment in IMI has been presented on the equity
method? Is that meaningful to you?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. What does that mean to you as an
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accountant?
A. It means that under a situation where
you have joint control, where you don't have a
majority, that you may not have to consolidate it.
You can carry it on the equity method with a
50-percent interest.
Q. As you sit here today, obviously, even
though you're a former audit partner for Arthur
Andersen, you have not taken the opportunity and
have not had the opportunity to audit the
consolidated financial statements of SARMC; right?
A. Quite right.
Q. And you're not in a position for
purposes of consolidation to second guess whatever
treatment Deloitte has decided in certifying the
financial statements is appropriate?
A. Well, I'm not, but I don't think it's
also inconsistent with the opinion I expressed to
you. The equity method could be used in a
situation of common control.
Q. I want to tum back to your background
insofar as it relates to the investigation that
you've conducted in this case. As I understand
it, insofar as you've been involved in healthcare
work, most of your activity has been auditing
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financial statements; right?
A. I think that's a fair characterization.
There's a few exceptions but most of it.
Q. Is it correct then that you have never
before this engagement had a professional
engagement that called upon you to analyze the
referral patterns of physicians?
A. I think so.
Q. And so what you have done basically as
you've explained it is to assume that certain
allegations are true and then try to devise
accounting methods by which to quantify damages
that would be assumed to be caused by the
allegations; right?
A. I think you can say it that way.
Q. Okay. And I think just to return to
your basic fundamental statement, the first thing
you do is you look at what happened and you ask
yourself what would have happened if there had
been no wrongdoing of the kind alleged; right?
A. Right.
Q. And then you try to trace out history,
because you've confined yourself to the historical
analysis, of what the profit experience would have
been of the plaintiff had the plaintiff not been
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wronged; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you try to trace out what the
profit experience was and subtract the difference
if one assumes that what happened was wrongdoing;
right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. You've talked about hospital
affiliations and hospital affiliations of
physicians. And I'm wondering whether you mean -do you mean medical staff status or do you mean
something else?
A. I mean admitting privileges generally.
Q. And do you have to be on the medical
staff to get admitting privileges?
A. No.
Q. So the affiliation as you called it
that you have hypothesized and used in your
analysis is not even a medical staff membership.
It's simply admitting; is that right?
A. That's right. It's basically the
historical referral source.
Q. All right. And it is commonplace for
doctors to have admitting privileges at more than
one facility, more than one hospital in a given
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community; right?
A. Certainly can happen, yes.
Q. I want you to tum to Exhibit *-5000,
which is the pie chart.
MR. FRIEDMAN: May we have that, please.
Q. BY MR. FRIEDMAN: And I want to make
sure that I understand what the different sections
of this chart mean, particularly the ones on the
left. In the yellow section it says "Exams by
physicians included in damages pre-9/99
relationships." Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And if I --I'm going to say what my
understanding is, what that means. Correct me if
I'm wrong. That means that is the exams, the MRI
studies referred by physicians who at any time
prior to September of 1999 had ever even once
referred a scan to MRIA; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And so it could have been ten years
earlier that there was a single referral -A. Actually, I need to complete my answer.
It's not quite correct. Because I don't- we had
a tendency in identifying these just to find the
big referrers. So I don't think-- it's possible
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a big referrer could have given one referral as
you're indicating, but generally they were doctors
in disciplines that used a lot of MRI.
Q. When you say a big referrer, how you do
you quantify the threshold?
A. Well, somehow my recollection is that
the population of scans were only 3 percent of the
doctors, but they were a very high percentage of
scans. And that's the only clarification I want
to make.
Q. All right. But you certainly had more
than 3 percent of the doctors included in your
populations, though?
A. Yes.
Q. So I am correct then that all it took
to qualify to be a physician whose scans were
included in the yellow portion was to have
referred even a single scan before September 1999?
A. I think that's possible, that that
person could be in there, yes.
Q. And if I understand correctly, many of
the physicians in the yellow portion who had
referred even a single scan before 1999 were
likely, and I don't know if you know the amount,
to have been and had admitting privileges at more
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than one hospital in Boise; correct?
A. I can't really corroborate the
assumption that they were more than likely to have
admitting privileges at more than one hospital.
Q. I think fortunately your data, and we
will examine this, permit this. So we can examine
it together. Now, I'm interested in how you
determine for purposes of qualifying a physician
who had an affiliation as you call it prior to
1999, where did you go to find out who these
people were?
A. This has been a about five years ago,
but I believe it was from the historical referral
records of MRIA.
Q. And did those referral records tell you
what the hospital affiliation was?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Okay. As a matter of fact, they
didn't; did they?
A. I don't remember.
Q. So isn't it correct, Mr. Budge, that at
some point what you did was I think you went
online and got listings of medical staff members
of St. Luke's and Saint Alphonsus and others and
listed them for your own purposes; right?
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A.

Not with respect to the pre-'99 period.
1 other centers, including St. Luke's?
For basically new physicians after that point in
2
A. I don't know that for sure. I think
time.
3 it's certainly possibly there were some.
Q. Okay. So as you sit here today with
4
Q. You can't rule it out; can you?
respect to all the physicians in yellow, you have
5
A. I can't.
no idea what their affiliations were prior to
6
Q. Okay. And indeed they may have had
September 1999?
7 referrals to other institutions besides St. Luke's
A. Simply that they formed the referral
8 and Saint Alphonsus; right?
basis upon which MRIA operated prior to 1999.
9
A. Yes.
Q. And those are physicians who as you
10
Q. Now, for the magenta, the small sliver
explained had referred at least one patient to
11 at the bottom, the 9 percent, those are physicians
MRIC and but who may well have referred many
12 whom you have identified as having only one
patients to other facilities than MRIC; right?
13 hospital with which they had admitting privileges;
A. It's possible that they could have
14 is that right?
referred to others. I mean, I know the
15
A. I didn't define it quite that way. I
approximate volume of the referrals by looking at
16 defined them as having - I just used the two
the '99 data. You know, I think that it is wrong
17 major providers in the Boise area, Saint Al's and
to leave the impression that there was a large
18 St. Luke's, and I basically looked at those two,
number of physicians that just had a single
19 yes.
referral. Most of them were significant referral
20
Q. So what you were admitting as a
sources.
21 possibility as for those physicians who fall
Q. Well, I know that you haven't
22 within the 9 percent you've identified, they may
quantified this, so I don't want to spend time
23 have had admitting privileges not only at
belaboring it. But there were lots of physicians,
24 Saint Al's but elsewhere, even if it wasn't St.
don't you agree, who had substantial referrals to
25 Luke's?
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A.

No. Exactly the opposite if I
understand your question. These are -- we
excluded a large number of physicians, which are
included in the dark blue on the right, who if
they had admitting privileges at St. Luke's, we
assumed that they would not have made a single
referral to MRIA.
So this purple, if I can call it
purple, slice of the pie is those physicians who
only had admitting privileges at St. Luke's and
did not have them -- Saint Al's and did not have
them at St. Luke's.
Q. I think I've got you. The bottom, the
small9 percent slice.
A. Yes.
Q. Are physicians who had admitting
privileges at Saint Al's and not St. Luke's?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Now so we have a population of
physicians, some of whom you have identified as
having only Saint Al's admitting privileges and
not St. Luke's and some of whom you have
identified as having admitting privileges at both;
correct?
A. Yes.

1

Q. Now, I want to understand how your

2

analysis works. Let's suppose that you start with
a doctor whom you have identified -A. I'm sorry. I can't hear.
Q. I know. I'm sorry, too. You start
with a doctor whom you have identified as being in
the customer base as of September 1999; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And that would include a doctor who in
1998 referred patients to both St. Luke's and to
MRICI; right?
A. Yes. I mean, it could include such a
doctor.
Q. It could include such a person.
A. Yeah.
Q. I'm going to call him Dr. Smith. And
I'm going to give you his 1998 referrals. L means
Luke's, so I'll put Luke's here. He refers nine.
And MRICI, he refers one in 1998.
Are you with me?
A. Yep.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I think this
needs to be clear whether this is a hypothetical.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Of course it is.
MR. BANDUCCI: Or whether this is based on
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the record.
2
MR. FRIEDMAN: This is a hypothetical. I
3 want to be clear about it. Thank you for asking
4 for the clarification.
5
Q. BY MR. FRIEDMAN: In order to
6 illustrate how your methodology works. Okay?
7
A. Okay.
Q. Now we go to 1999. And Dr. Smith makes
8
9 the following referrals: Luke's he refers one
10 patient. IMI, which has come on the scene
11 effective September of '99, he refers eight
12 patients to. And MRI he refers one patient to.
13
Are you with me?
14
A. Yep.
15
Q. Okay. Your methodology assumes that
16 all of these eight scans, patients who have been
17 referred to IMI for MRI studies to be performed by
18 a physician affiliated with IMI, all of these
19 eight were scans taken from MRIC; doesn't it?
20
A. ltdoes.
21
Q. That's wrong; isn't it?
22
A. I don't think in the aggregate it is
23 wrong.
24
Q. Let's start -- we can get to the
25 aggregate in a minute. But you agree with me that
1
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that would be a wrong conclusion even though
that's how your method works on this hypothetical?
A. I'm not sure I would, because what I'm
saying is that I don't know why the doctor would
have changed his referral patterns so radically.
He was referring nine to St. Luke's and one to
MRIC, and suddenly he does one to St. Luke's,
eight to IMI, and one to MRIA. I said when I was
testifying that this is a source of concern
because it can cause an overstatement of my
damages.
Q. All right. That's what I'm focusing
on.
A. And so-Q. I understand you have arguments about
it, but please answer my question.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, he's got to let
the witness answer.
THE WITNESS: So I think that-THE COURT: Let the witness answer.
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. So I think that
what I need to acknowledge is that if there wasn't
an IMI, there is a potential that those eight
would not have gone to MRIC, that some of them
could have gone to St. Luke's. That is a risk in
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my model. It's one that I try to compensate for
with this ultraconservative assumption I make
about new doctors. But it is a risk.
Q. BY MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, in fact, the
model as you've described it would in fact on this
hypothetical count eight IMI scans as having been
taken from MRIC; right?
A. It would.
Q. Okay. When in fact on these numbers
the more likely situation is that those scans were
taken from St. Luke's if they were taken from
anybody?
A. Yeah, I'm not certain about the later
part, but they do assume that anything that IMI
did was basically diverted from what MRIC would
have done.
Q. Okay. We can do a variation on this.
I'm sure you thought these things through. I'm
going to give you Dr. Jones. 1998 he refers
patients to Luke's, five, and MRIC, five. So he's
made equal referrals. You see that?
A. Yep.
Q. And in 1999 he refers three to Luke's,
four to IMI, and three to MRIA.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I'm assuming that
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these hypotheticals must be based on evidence.
There must be something in the record to support
this. I'm not aware of any evidence that Saint
Alphonsus is going to put in that shows referrals
to St. Luke's. And if they don't have any
evidence to show this sort of behavior, then they
are creating an impression with this jury totally
unsupported by the record.
THE COURT: Counsel, this is crossexamination of the expert. He's allowed to use
the hypotheticals, and I'll allow him to use it,
and we'll see what the evidence shows.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
Q. BY MR. FRIEDMAN: So in this example,
again your methodology counts four scans as having
been lost to MRIC; right?
A. Yes.
Q. When in fact both Saint Alphonsus and
MRIC, if you were going to say that these were
somehow causally related by assumption, lost two;
right?
A. If you were going to make that
assumption that that's how the migration worked.
Q. Okay. Now, let me ask you something.
If you have admitting privileges at Saint Al's,
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does that mean that you will never as a physician
refer a patient to any other facility except as a
result of wrongdoing?
A. No.
Q. Of course not. And so even if I'm in
your 9 percent sliver at the bottom, if I refer a
patient of mine to another facility because it's
more convenient to him geographically or because I
know the radiologist there and he's very highly
regarded for this kind of study and so forth, I
could do that and you would expect that to happen;
right?
A. I expect it and I saw evidence of it.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. But if what your methodology counts is
if I make that referral to a radiologist who works
with IMI, then you're counting that as a loss scan
for purposes of damage; aren't you?
A. I am basically-- again, it's based on
my understanding of the allegations of an active
program to divert referrals to them that when
something shows up, it comes from somebody
referred before, that it was diverted. But I
recognize and I admit to you that it has a risk of
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overstatement. But I also think that I severely
understated referrals by the exclusion of all of
these new SARMC physicians that also have
admitting privileges at St. Luke's.
Q. I know you like to say that and you
said it, you volunteered it several times. And I
promise you I will let you talk about that, but
first I want to understand how your model, your
damages model works, and then you can talk about
what other offsetting errors or understatements
there may be that would compensate for what you
agree is an overstatement.
A. The risk of an overstatement. I don't
know that it is.
Q. The risk of an overstatement. Okay.
So we both agree that if you're a physician who
has admitting privileges at Saint Al's, you are
free to refer patients to IMI whether or not you
have been illegally induced to do so; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, I think you have at times
referred to the population in yellow and magenta
on your chart, the Saint Al's only and the others,
as the customer base of MRIC; right?
A. I might have. I don't remember that.
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different name on the door that the same GSR
radiologists would have been reading for MRIA when
were reading for IMI?
MR. BANDUCCI: Asked and answered.
1HE COURT: I'll allow the question to
clarify.
1HE WITNESS: As I listen to your question,
I think that my illustrative statement about the
same center with a different name on the door
really overstepped. I'm not making a specific
assumption about the radiologists.
Q. BY MR. FRIEDMAN: I want to go to
*-0889R. This is the chart that you drew a line
on at your deposition in August.
A. Okay.
Q. You're looking at *-0889R. And you've
explained that you've had time to think about it
since you gave that pre-trial deposition; correct?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Now that you've had a couple months to
think about it, do you have and have you tried to
trace where the line should have been?
A. No. I tried to describe to the jury
where it might go, but I haven't actually put
pencil to paper.
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Q. Okay. Now, I think it is a comfort to

Q. Did anybody ask you to?
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Yeah. I think I tried to make the
points that I think are wrong, but I haven't been
asked to do it and I haven't done it. I haven't
been asked not to do it.
Q. I promised you, Mr. Budge, that I would
let you talk about the right hand of Exhibit
*-5000. And I like to keep my promises, so let's
tum to Exhibit *-5000. Now you remember, I took
you through some illustrations of circumstances
that could cause your methodology to overstate the
number of scans taken from MRI by the IMI
facility; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have indicated that you agree
that there's a risk of overstatement; right?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. But you have never yourself tried to
quantify that risk of overstatement; have you?
A. Haven't really known how to approach
that. I have not tried.
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better characterized as degrees of precision in
that basically what I'm trying to do is find a
method which is evenhanded which doesn't have a
bias one way or the other, recognizing it can't be
done with exact precision. And I think that that
there is risk of imprecision on both sides but
wouldn't call it an error in the sense that that
might imply that the analysis wasn't technically
or clerically done right or that type of thing.
I do think that the overall conclusion
that there was a massive migration of referrals
from MRIA to IMI is borne out by the data in the
aggregate that we also looked at. So if I'm
wrong, I don't think I'm very wrong.
Q. Let me get back to my question, which
is: You understand and agree that there's a risk
of overstatement of lost scans and damages on the
left-hand side; right?
A. Yep.
Q. And you believe that there is a
corresponding understatement of lost scans and
damages on the right-hand side; right?
A. That's it, right.
Q. You have never tried to quantify either
of those because you don't know how to do it;

A.

No.

Q. Did anybody ask you not to?

A.

No.

Q. You just chose not to do it; right?

A.

4639
you as you think about it because I know you don't
want to be wrong that while there is a risk of
overstatement on the left-hand side of the pie
chart, you believe there is a counterbalancing
understatement -- pardon me. I said it backwards.
While there is a risk of overstatement of lost
scans and damages on the left-hand side, you
believe there is a counterbalancing risk of
understatement on the right-hand side. Have I
said that correctly?
A. Yeah, that's my general sense.
Q. Have you ever tried to quantify the
amount of risk of understatement on the right-hand
side?
A. No. For similar reasons. I'm not
quite sure how I would want to approach that.
Q. So isn't it fair to say, Mr. Budge,
that you believe as you look at your own analysis
that it has errors on both -- or at least a
substantial risk of error on both the left-hand
side and the right-hand side and you hope they
counterbalance each other?
A. Well, I don't think I'd agree that
there are errors. I think that they could be
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A.

Let me just for the discipline of an
accurate answer limit it to two pieces. My model
fully incorporates competition that came from
outsiders. IMI didn't get the scans if they went
to somebody else. Neither did MRIA. I think the
question that you are raising is: Are there
scenarios where there's lawful competition from
IMI that I'm counting as diverted scans? And
we've discussed what the risk of those are.
Q. Thank you very much. It's a pleasure
to meet you, Mr. Budge.
A. That's mutual.
MR. FRIEDMAN: That concludes my crossexamination.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Friedman.
Mr. Banducci.
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, thank you.
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right?
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pizza. And let's leave the McDonald's analogy for
1 Frankie convinces Giuseppe to move over to his
a moment. All right.
2 pizza place. And now Joe's by himself and
And let's assume that Giuseppe is one
3 Giuseppe's down here. And now it's Frankie and
of the greatest pizza makers in the world. And he
4 Giuseppe's. Okay.
comes from the town where my dad was born, comes 5
Oh, and one other thing. We've got a
from Tassignano. And Giuseppe makes a great
6 Burger King over here.
pizza. And you can't get pizza like Giuseppe's
7
Now, let's suppose that Joe calls
pizza anywhere else.
8 Giuseppe one day and says, "Hey, I thought we had
And Giuseppe hooks up with Joe, and
9 a non-compete?"
And Giuseppe says, "Well, I'm not
they form a partnership. And Giuseppe makes the
10
pizza, and Joe is a part of this partnership, and
11 really doing the pizza. I'm just doing the salad
they have a very substantial following because you
12 bar."
can't get great Lucchese pizza outside of Giuseppe
13
But sure enough Frankie's and
and Joe's. Okay?
14 Giuseppe's, they start providing the same kind of
A. Okay.
15 pizza. And all of the customers that used to be
Q. And let's suppose that Joe knows how
16 at Giuseppe and Joe's, they migrate to Frankie's
talented Giuseppe is and he enters into a
17 and Giuseppe's.
Now, is that good ol' American
non-compete with Giuseppe and he says, "Giuseppe, 18
I love you, but I'm not going to let you go to
19 competition as Mr. Friedman called it?
another place within ten miles of our shop and
20
A. Well, it sounds to me like there's a
start a competing pizza place." And Giuseppe
21 wrongful act involved, but I'm not totally sure
signs up for that non-compete.
22 what you mean by "good ol' American competition."
Now down 184 is Frankie's Pizza Place.
23 But it sounds like it would be a wrongful act for
Frankie's is new. It doesn't have the same sort
24 Giuseppe to do that.
Q. Does it change if these customers
of following that Giuseppe has. And one day
25

A.

Right.

Q. And you believe that they tend to
offset each other, but you can't say for certain?
A. Well, except for the comment I made for
the question a minute ago. I think that the other
analysis of the data in the aggregate is quite
corroborative of the conclusion. So I can't
actually measure these precise referral patterns
for these split physicians. But I know that if
the allegations are true, that my model does a
pretty good job of measuring that migration of
referrals from MRIA to IMI over time.
Whether that's wrongful is what these
proceedings are about. But in terms of the amount
of that migration, I'm highly confident that I've
got a number which is evenhanded and generally
reliable and sufficiently precise.
Q. But you can't even quantify the amount
of migration that would have occurred simply by
virtue of competition in the marketplace as
opposed to wrongdoing; right?
A. Well, if you're talking about from
competition from people other than IMI?
Q. Including IMI.
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q. Mr. Budge, it's Friday. It's 10 after
5. With a last name like Banducci, I can't talk
about hamburgers. But we are going to talk about
pizza for a minute. Okay. So let's talk about
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words to separate, that portion of what you have
identified as damages caused by wrongful conduct
from that portion of any decline in the
profitability of MRIA that was simply attributable
to competitive circumstances in the marketplace?
A. Well, I think I explained that the
overall competitive circumstances in the market I
do think is considered by my methodology because
they are outside of the scope of these referrals
that I'm saying were diverted. But I view my
role, I work for Mr. Banducci. I could have as
easily worked for you. I work for plaintiffs and
defendants.
Mr. Banducci said I have a particular
theory and understanding and belief about this
case I'm going to try to present to the jury, and
I need an accountant to tell me what are the
financial implications of that if I succeed.
That's been my only assignment. He hasn't asked
me to model, you know, situations where you win on
some arguments and he wins on others. I just
simply haven't done it because that's not my role
in this proceeding.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Mr. Budge.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
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make the following factual findings with regard to
the evidence presented: that the evidence
presented will be of assistance to the trier of
fact; that the expert has established that his
method of calculation reasonably relies on the
same type of facts relied upon by other experts in
the field; and that the probative value of the
opinion testimony is not substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial value relying upon Idaho Rules
of Evidence 403, 702, and 703. It's an
interesting little case called Ryan v. Beisner,
B-e-i-s-n-e-r, 123 Idaho 42, cited by the Idaho
Court of Appeals in 1992, which indicates the
following testimony the Court is supposed to
address those specific items specifically and make
a record. So I've done that.
Go ahead, Counsel.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. We
have placed exhibit tags on the three drawings
that I made. They are *-0975, *-0976, and *-0977.
And I offer them as illustrations of the
examination of the witness.
(Exhibits *-0975, *-0976, and *-0977
marked.)
THE COURT: Very well.
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THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
Mr. Banducci, anything further?
MR. BANDUCCI: Nothing further, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,
I'll admonish you you're not to discuss the case
among yourselves, nor with anyone else, nor to
form any opinions as to the merits the case until
it's been fully submitted to you for your
determination.
I want to complement Counsel. They
said they'd get this done by 5:30. It's exactly
5:30. We'll be in recess until9 o'clock Monday
morning.
MR. BANDUCCI: May Mr. Budge be released?
THE COURT: The witness may be released.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, I had only the
issue of offering the drawings that I made, as
poor as they are, into evidence.
THE COURT: Why don't we just go ahead and do
that afterward.
Gury absent.)
THE COURT: Counsel, the Court will find,
having listened at this point to the testimony,
that the expert is in fact fully qualified to
testify on these matters and that the Court will
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MR. BANDUCCI: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: They will be admitted for
illustrative purposes.
(Exhibits *-0975, *-0976, and *-0977
admitted.)
THE COURT: Mr. Banducci, you want Giuseppe
in?
MR. BANDUCCI: No. I think Giuseppe can
stay on the pad, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Very well, Counsel.
Anything else you wish to raise before we recess?
MR. BANDUCCI: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
MR. GJORDING: The usual, Your Honor, about
what we're going to do on Monday.
MR. BANDUCCI: Well, we'll have Mr. Wilhoite
on, and then I believe we will rest. So we will
need to know who you intend to call.
MR. GJORDING: Okay. Are you able to give
us any kind of an estimation time wise?
MR. BANDUCCI: You know what, I think we all
get into trouble. I think he should be done by
the morning.
MR. GJORDING: Okay. And Your Honor, given
that and there's a little-- obviously there could
be a little give in that, we plan to call Sally
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BOISE, IDAHO
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Friday, October 21, 2011, 8:30 a.m.

2

3

3
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THE COURT: The Court will note that the
4
5
parties are present in the courtroom with their
6
counsel. I guess I should say just the counsel
are present.
7
There was an e-mail received last
8
9
evening indicating that Saint Alphonsus wished to
raise some issues with the Court this morning.
10
Go ahead, Counsel.
11
12
MR. AYER: We apologize for the late notice
last night and appreciate everybody's flexibility
13
in coming in early.
14
We reflected after court yesterday on
15
MRIA's counsel's comment related to the throwing
16
17
under the bus. And like so many things in this
case, it is part of a complicated web of facts and
18
inferences and arguments, that nothing is simple
19
in this case, it doesn't seem like.
20
And as we reflected on it, we frankly
21
became even more concerned than we were yesterday 22
in court. And I wanted to take just about five or
23
eight minutes to chat with you all and raise what
24
I think is a serious problem.
25

5
6
7

8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

5402

5401
apportionment with regard to the torts in the
2 case. And Your Honor ruled clearly that we were,
3 based on the fact that in the pleadings this was
4 pled as a joint tortfeasor situation.
5
And then the issue was, well, how are
6 we going to do this, and we had argued for a 50/50
7 allocation, for which there is some authority in
8 the cases. And there is, of course, some
9 authority in the cases for the approach Your Honor
10 took, which was to say this would be litigated to
11
the jury and the jury would decide the proper
12 apportionment.
13
And we have no quarrel with the Court's
14 decision on that as a matter decided at the time
15 it was decided. I think that was certainly within
16 the Court's discretion to decide the issue that
17 way.
18
But the problem that's been created now
19 by counsel's comment essentially creates a problem
20 that burdens Saint Alphonsus's right to litigate
21
this issue and greatly impairs, as a matter of
22 sort of court procedure and practicality, the
23 jury's ability to decide the apportionment issue
24 that Your Honor said the jury should be deciding.
25 And it does that essentially in two distinct ways.
1

By way of background, of course, as
everyone knows, MRIA alleged in this case that
Saint Alphonsus and GSR, IMI, ICR were joint
feasors. And of course, this Court, back in a
decision of June 17th of this year, so found based
on the pleadings under the Supreme Court's Quick
case.
MRIA did that I think, obviously, to
try to hold Saint Alphonsus responsible for the
acts of GSR and IMI, as it is permitted to do
under a joint tort feasor statute. And then MRIA
settled those claims back years ago, four years
ago.
And that settlement, under Idaho
Code 6-805, essentially was only possible and
could only give meaningful relief to the settling
defendants because MRIA agreed that Saint
Alphonsus would not be responsible for the share
of the harm that was caused by the acts of GSR and
IMI.
Now, back last this spring-- this last
spring in your decision, Your Honor, of June 17th,
we litigated essentially this question, and there
were two important issues there.
One was: Are we, in fact, entitled to

First, the comment suggests two very
2 negative things about Saint Alphonsus if it does,
3 as it must, as the Court ruled we are entitled to
4 do but, indeed, as we must do in order to get a
5 fair determination of the apportionment issue, it
6 burdens our ability in two ways.
7
Number one, it suggests that we were
8 doing something we shouldn't be doing. Throwing
9 someone under the bus is not a nice thing, and the
10 idea that we would suggest that they are
11 responsible is a suggestion that we shouldn't be
12 doing what we're doing.
13
And second, and as seriously, is a
14 suggestion that resonates with MRIA's theme in
15 this case. One of its themes that Saint Alphonsus
16 is really a disloyal entity that runs around
17 betraying its partners and does things to people
18 that it has intimate fiduciary understandings with
19 and treats them unfairly. And so the idea would
20 be here we are being disloyal.
21
Once again, we are not being disloyal
22 to IMI by coming into this court and making an
23 argument that they are responsible in part, as the
24 Court ruled we are entitled to do. But indeed, if
25 you think about the way the law works, it must be
1
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of it is not very interesting to me. I am
terribly sorry, but it really isn't.
Q. Okay. And how did you learn that-4 just a second on that. Strike that.
5
I think you said that you wanted to go
6 where these Gem State radiologists were reading;
7 correct?
8
A. Correct.
9
Q. Okay. And in 2001, isn't it true that
10 these Gem State radiologists, along with Saint
11 Al's, gave you a laptop where you could view
12 images or reports?
13
A. Correct.
14
Q. Okay. And you didn't pay for the
15 laptop; correct?
16
A. No.
17
Q. Okay. And you and your partner,
18 Dr. Lindholm, when you guys first got this, you
19 used it extensively; correct?
20
A. Correct.
21
Q. Okay. And you found it to be very
22 helpful in your practice; it was a wonderful
23 convenience.
24
A. It was a convenience.
25
Q. And one of the reasons you liked it is
1
2
3

1
2

you could get immediate results; correct?
A. Yes.
3
Q. And it was -- I think you testified in
4 a prior proceeding that it was easy to use,
5 because you had been going down to Saint Al's and
6 reading at reading stations, and this was kind of
7 the same thing but you could just do it in your
8 office.
9
A. Actually, I figured that when they put
10 that in there-- and I think I explained this to
11 Mr. Gjording --but I figured that when they had
12 put that in there where I had previously worked,
13 we would, since the faxed report wouldn't come
14 over for 24 hours after it was done and read, this
15 was, A, one way of looking at it immediately, and
16 was, B, a way to keep me and Dr. Lindholm from
17 calling the receptionists and trying to get them
18 to fax over a report, or to put us through to the
19 radiologist and get a verbal report.
20
So I figured it was a matter of
21 convenience for them. I did not think of it as a
22 present.
23
MR. WOODARD: Okay. No further questions.
24 Thank you, Dr. River.
25
THE WITNESS: Okay.
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RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. WOODARD:
Q. I think you said previously, before you
were employed, it didn't matter where; you just
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
wanted them -- does it make a difference now that
you are an employee of Saint Alphonsus?
BY MR. GJORDING:
Q. Dr. River, in terms of your preference
7
A. I'm sorry. Please ask me the question
8 again.
to use Gem State Radiology, did it make any
9
Q. I'm sorry. That was a little bit
difference to you with whom they had a
relationship?
10 confusing.
11
Does it matter to where you refer,
A. Currently, I'm employed by Saint
Alphonsus. And what I told you before, which is
12 which site you are choosing, that you are now an
very, very true, is that if I were to leave
13 employee of Saint Alphonsus?
14
A. Saint Alphonsus would prefer that we
tomorrow and go to private practice, I would still
send all of my patients through to whatever
15 keep all of the scans in house. If the patient is
facility they are reading their scans at.
16 an employee of Luke's, they can get their scans
Q. Okay. Regardless of where their
17 done there cheaper. If they've got 20 scans at
facility was?
18 Luke's, I just keep them there. If it is really,
A. Regardless of where it is.
19 really important to me, I do it at whatever
MR. GJORDING: Thank you.
20 facility these guys are reading, because I get a
MR. WOODARD: Your Honor, if can I have just 21 better scan.
one follow-up question?
22
MR. WOODARD: Okay. Thank you.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
23
MR. GJORDING: That's all I have, Your
24 Honor.
///
25
THE COURT: Very well.
///

MR. GJORDING: Just one more or two, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Gjording.
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then call me in my office and say, "This is what
we are up against, and this is what it looks
like."
And then we would come to a decision
together of whether to drain it or not, and then
they go ahead and put a drain in. That's -basically refers to interventional radiology as
opposed to just rendering opinion. It is also
doing a procedure. And in addition, liver
biopsies are done 99 percent in the radiology
suite now as well, which would also be called an
intervention oftypes.
Q. You mention -- you used the word, I
think, "phenomenal" to describe the radiologists
with whom you work there. Can you say a little
bit more about what it is about them that makes
them phenomenal as opposed to just pretty good or
okay?
A. Well, I think that we have developed a
relationship with this particular group. As an
example, we have a gastroenterology, radiology
conference once a month where we meet on our own
and go through cases, problem cases or interesting
cases and things like that.
So from my standpoint, when I refer a
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abdomen, there is basically an algorithm you go
through.
And it is based on, first of all,
patient choice. If they have a choice and they
want to go somewhere, I respect those wishes. If
they don't, the second level is where their
insurance will allow them to go. And the third
level is, as the Valley has gotten bigger and we
see patients from outside the Valley, they may
have a preference to go to Meridian or St. Luke's,
downtown or wherever they are, based on age or
whatever.
So there's three different choices in
there or three different levels of why people go
places.
Q. So your preference, to the extent you
have one, is to send them to IMI is not
necessarily the one that always covers it, I take
it?
MR. BASTIAN: Misleading, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Rephrase, Counsel.
Q. BY MR. A YER: There are other factors
other than your particular preference, from what
you just said, that affect the place where they

patient, whether it be for surgery or whatever, I
want to refer that patient to the group that I'm
most comfortable with that I think does the best
job. And that's why I like working with this
group of radiologists because it is not -- they
don't just render an opinion. It is also a
discussion. So my comfort level lies with this
group.
I mean, I order tests throughout the
Valley. Sometimes I get a patient that I don't
really understand or are not clear to me. And I
can actually have those images transferred to the
Saint Alphonsus system or over the IMI system and
go through that with them. Basically, the
terminology would be an "over-read," for which
they're not reimbursed so.
So that's the type of things that we
do. We can obtain images, and I can actually sit
down with them and go through that.
Q. You mentioned that you sometimes refer
patients to other imaging centers, you say,
"throughout the Valley." Why do you do that?
A. Well, the way in my-- the way images
are based, if I'm in a clinic situation and I tell
the patient we should get an ultrasound of your
Page 5780
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actually go to be imaged; is that accurate?
MR. BASTIAN: I think that's also leading,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection.
Rephrase, Counsel. It was a leading
question.
Q. BY MR. A YER: Do you in every case
dictate the precise center to which a patient will
be sent?
A. I am unable to do that on many cases.
Q. Okay. Have you in the past referred
patients to MRI Center ofldaho?
A. I believe I have.
Q. And do you still do so?
A. I don't know, quite honestly, because
I'm not -- I don't think that I have received an
MRI reading from that particular center for
several years I would say.
Q. Okay. And can you tell us -- tell the
jury of what importance in your decision whether
to -- where to refer a patient is it -- let me
start over again.
Does the fact that Saint Alphonsus
Hospital is affiliated with or has an ownership
interest in an imaging center something that has
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why I was there.

3
4

MR. GJORDING: We are going to go to a new
topic. Your Honor, can I take this -THE COURT: You may.
MR. GJORDING: -- down?
JUROR: Excuse me. I need to be excused.
MR. GJORDING: She needs to be excused.
THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.
Ladies and gentlemen ofthejury, why
don't we just take a brief recess. As a matter of
fact, it might be a good idea, since we are at a
point where you going to move to a new topic, to
just take the lunch recess.
I will admonish you, you are not to
discuss the case among yourselves nor with anyone
else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits of
the case until it is fully submitted to you for
your determination.
We will be in recess until one o'clock.
(Jury excused.)
THE COURT: Ma'am, you can step down.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
(Witness steps down.)
THE COURT: I will find out, Counsel, from
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(Jury not present.)
THE COURT: Any matters that counsel wish to
raise with the Court before we bring in the jury?
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, Mr. Ayer asked me
ifl would move the admission of Defendant's
*-0786, which is illustrative of Dr. Andersen's
testimony.
And I would move the admission of
*-0787A, 8 and C, and *-0788 as illustrative of
the testimony of Ms. Hall.
THE COURT: *-0787A, 8 and C?
MR. GJORDING: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And *-0788?
MR. GJORDING: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Any objection, Counsel?
MR. WOODARD: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Without objection, Exhibits
*-0786, *-0787A, *-07878, *-0787C, and *-0788 are
admitted.
(Defendant's Exhibits *-0786, *-0787A,
*-07878, *-0787C, and *-0788 admitted.)
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor--

the bailiff what we are dealing with here.
Hopefully it is not iiiness. But we will -- I
will find out and let you know what's going on as
soon as I can.
Anything that either counsel wishes to
raise with the Court?
THE BAILIFF: She's fine, Your Honor.
I just need to know what time you want
them back.
THE COURT: One o'clock.
I guess that solves that problem.
Anything else, Counsel?
MR. GJORDING: No, sir.
MR. BANDUCCI: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Very well. We will be in
recess.
(Noon recess.)
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THE COURT: For illustrative purposes, I
guess I should say.
(Discussion held off the record.)
THE COURT: Anything else, Counsel?
MR. BANDUCCI: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Let's bring in the jury.
(Jury present.)
THE COURT: The Court will note that the
parties are present with their counsel, the
witness has resumed the witness box, and is
reminded that she remains under oath; and the jury
has returned.
Counsel.
MR. GJORDING: Thank you very much, Your
Honor.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (continued)
BY MR. GJORDING:
Q. Ms. Hall, you explained to the jury
before lunch about the eHealth, the health
strategy.
A. Yes.
Q. And I would ask you -- do you have a
mission?
Do you have an objective that you try
to -- that you achieve to do with regard to your
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IT department?
A. Our mission was to provide information
technology services to Saint Alphonsus and all of
our affiliates, to -- in order for clinicians to
provide the best possible care to the patients
that we served.
Q. Okay. When you talk about the
patients, are you talking about the patients of
Saint Alphonsus as well as the patients of Saint
Alphonsus' affiliates?
A. Yes.
Q. I want to go through -- this has
happened a few times, and so I want the jury to
understand your definition. I want to go through
a few terms that have been used in this case
frequently. I want you to give us your
definition.
I will start with Job Lister.
A. Job Lister is a software teacher
through the Dictaphone Corporation. And that
product was primarily for dictation and the Job
Lister would organize the dictation. And the Job
Lister would organize the dictation that would
come in from all physicians all over the hospital
and the network, and organize that on a list so
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A. SATS is Saint Alphonsus Transcription
System. And Saint Alphonsus Transcription System
was a combination of software that we wrote -- so
it was proprietary to Saint Alphonsus -- also
using commercially available software like Word to
generate transcriptions that could be stored and
retrieved and moved to many different systems.
So it not only provided the ability for
a transcriptionist to be highly efficient in
actually transcribing all the work, but also to
integrate that with the electronic medical record,
to integrate that transcription with CD-Web, to
get things like the patient ID into the
transcription, or the physician's name and
routing.
It would -- for the physicians that
didn't have computers, SATS would automatically
distribute or autofax those transcriptions to the
physician, referring physician, or even the office
within the hospital that didn't yet have a
computer. So it managed all of the transcription
that was done in organization.
Q. And it could be sent on the computer?
A. It could be sent on the computer, as
well, through our CD-Web product.

that you could see what transcription had started,
what transcription had been completed, what was
ready to be transcribed by a transcriptionist,
what the status of that transcription was, when
that was complete, when it was printed or filed.
So it was an administrative tool for centralized
dictation.
Up until that time, we had tapes, and
so you were managing physical tapes. And you
could pretty well see that this tape was not on
someone's desk, or this tape was in a machine.
When we went to centralized dictation, then we had
to have a window into the system that said where
something was, what the status of that particular
dictation was.
Q. Did Job Lister also give you the
opportunity to actually listen to the voice of the
physician as he or she dictated?
A. Yes. The Dictaphone system had that
ability, up until the time that the document was
transcribed, anyone could dial over the phone and
listen to the voice of the transcription.
Q. Fine. Thank you.
Give us your definition of SATS,
S-A-T-S.
Page 5876
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Q. Could it be printed on a unit, the
hospital unit?
A. Yes. Actually, we often had things
automatically printed, based upon what department
that would be in. And so we had it autoprinted or
autofaxed or electronically distributed. We could
do this because it was now stored in a central
location and pushed to wherever it needed to be.
Q. You said it was proprietary?
A. Yes. Saint Alphonsus developed the
Saint Alphonsus Transcription System.
Q. And did you offer it to anyone who
wanted to transmit their reports electronically on
the web?
Did you offer it to people?
A. We offered it to our organizations or
physicians that were affiliated with us in a
couple of ways. One was to either work to
integrate with their system, and another was that
we just simply charge thirteen cents a line and
our transcriptionists did the actual transcription
of whatever dictation came in to them.
Q. Okay. If they wanted that service,
would they pay thirteen cent a line?
A. Right.
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determined, the jury must determine this issue in
order to get a fair outcome in this case.
So the very strong suggestion is that
we are doing something wrong and -- in being
disloyal. And, of course, the suggestion of
disloyalty is flatly false. It is flatly false
because the reality that we can't tell the jury,
for various reasons, is that their case is
settled. They resolved the case. They paid
$800,000. They settled their case. They don't
have any risk of liability. No one is being
thrown under any bus.
And yet the suggestion is somehow when
we come in to do what we are entitled to do,
according to Your Honor's totally correct, as we
view it, order, we are being disloyal and we are
being unfair.
The second thing that I think is
significant, although not as important as the
first thing, is that the comment unfairly tends to
influence the testimony of Dr. Seabourn, a key
witness in this case, as I think anyone would
agree, following the testimony he has given
already.
And, of course, this comes in a
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entitled to a mistrial. That this conduct so
disrupts our ability to litigate a very important
issue that we think we are entitled to a mistrial.
Now, we also think that there are two
ways of avoiding that result. One is pretty
obvious. And I think, from our perspective, is
probably the preferred course, but it is not the
only course. And that is, whereas we don't have a
quarrel with Your Honor's decision in June on the
facts and circumstances under which it was made to
let this issue go to the jury, I think we
demonstrated in our papers there that it is also
permissible and we argued then it was more
practical and probably the better course to do a
pro rata allocation of 50/50 responsibility.
And what that would come accomplish,
along with Your Honor's instruction yesterday to
simply disregard the comment, is that would take
this issue out of the hands of the jury. And
there would not be a need to litigate this issue,
and it would simply by resolved on a pro rata
50/50 basis. And that's one approach that we
think could avoid what we otherwise think is a
need for a mistrial.
The second approach, which we think

situation, Your Honor, where the same settlement
agreement that is the-- that takes them out of
the case also prevents us from talking to
Dr. Seabourn, so we are not able to go and assure
Dr. Seabourn that, in fact, there is no risk of
liability here; there is no concern about us doing
something that's going to hurt IMI.
And he is sitting there on the stand
being told that Saint Alphonsus -- as he has been
told, and I don't think that's a bell that can be
unrung that essentially will, we think, serious
risk chilling his testimony. So there are those
two problems.
Now, we thought a fair amount last
night about -- or yesterday and last night about,
well, what do we do about this? And where we come
out, Your Honor-- and it is sort of a three-part
point.
As the case is now structured with Your
Honor's perfectly reasonable plan, as it was at
the time, to litigate this issue to the jury of
allocation. If nothing is done to correct this
problem in a major way, a significant alteration
of course that will correct the concerns I have
just raised, we think, Your Honor, that we are
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also would suffice, although it is not our
preferred course, is a jury instruction -- instead
of going the 50/50 route, a jury instruction that
would do three things to correct the concerns.
And I have a copy of such an instruction here,
which I'm-- should I hand it up, Your Honor, to
the Court?
THE COURT: Certainly.
MR. AYER: And the three things that this
does, and we can -- we would -- obviously, this
would be discussed and debated, but number one,
the jury needs to be told very clearly that
counsel's comment was improper.
Number two, the jury, we think, should
be told that Saint Alphonsus has a right to be
pursuing this issue of apportionment and further,
that it is important for the jury to decide that
issue in an impartial way.
And third, and I think also very
importantly, that GSR, IMI, ICR will not suffer
any consequence as a result of this jury's
decision with regard to that allocation, the
reason being they are not a party in this case.
They are not in this case; they won't suffer any
consequence of the decision. This is simply a
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decision that needs to be made for the
2 determination of Saint Alphonsus's liability.
And we think, Your Honor, that an
3
4 instruction like this -- and I would add one other
5 thing. We think this instruction, given the
6 problem with Dr. Seaboum, who we can't talk to,
7 being essentially influenced improperly by the
8 comment that was made, this instruction should be
9 given in court with the witness seated in the
10 witness stand. That is our suggestion, Your
11 Honor. Thank you very much.
12
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
Mr. Banducci?
13
MR. BANDUCCI: Well, Your Honor, obviously
14
15 we haven't had a chance to review this
16 instruction, and so I can't comment on that.
17
Just a few points. First, I find it
18 ironic that this argument would be made for a
19 mistrial by counsel who willingly, openly,
20 obviously ignored the instructions of this Court
21 and disclosed to the jury, after briefing over and
22 over again, that a judgment relative to this
23 partnership should not be disclosed. We find
24 ourselves, again, in the -- in an effort to create
25 some sort of mistrial by comments made in argument
1

over an objection, and I think that this is
2 really, truly much ado about something that the
3 Court has already cured with an instruction.
I could have asked Dr. Seaboum, "Do
4
5 you realize that Saint Alphonsus's is throwing you
6 under the bus?" I could have asked that question.
7 The objection would have been, if an objection was
8 raised, argumentative. The Court would have,
9 perhaps, sustained the objection, and at the
10 request of counsel, may have issued an
11 instruction. That's not a basis for a mistrial
12 under any circumstances.
So this is simply an effort by counsel
13
14 at this stage of the case to build a matter for
15 appeal. It is painfully obvious that that's
16 exactly what they are trying to do here, and the
17 matter has been handled by a curative instruction.
18
The suggestion that this Court should
19 create new law on apportionment and pro rata share
20 is an invitation to reversible error, and I don't
21 think that the Court should strike out on its own,
22 given the well-settled law in Quick v. Crane, to
23 come up with a new way of apportioning damages.
24
Finally, this is, perhaps, new to
25 counsel that is not used to practicing in this
1
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jurisdiction, but indeed, this is the sort of
situation that arises all the time when one party
3 has settled and another remains in court.
4
There is a very definite effort by both
5 sides to shift responsibility back and forth
6 between the settled defendant and the nonsettled
7 defendant. And, of course, Saint Alphonsus is
8 entitled to point their finger at the empty chair.
9 That's what they are doing, and the fact that I
10 brought attention to the fact that they are
11 pointing to the empty chair is entirely
12 appropriate.
13
Last, but not least, Your Honor, I
14 think it is a bit -- I think it is a bit
15 underhanded to put a witness on the stand and play
16 nice with him and take the position that, you
17 know, you're our partner, you are on our side, and
18 then at closing suggest that they're responsible
19 for all that has gone wrong, as presented to this
20 jury. I think that's underhanded, and what they
21 are trying to do is hamstring us from pointing
22 that out.
So I don't think that the -- whatever
23
24 this is, the motion for a mistrial, is well taken.
25 I think it is simply an effort to create a record
1
2

for appeal, which they certainly have a right to
do. The Court has cured the issue. That's all I
3 have to say. Thank you.
4
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
Well, first of all, I will look at
5
6 Saint Al's instruction. I will point out that at
7 the request of the defense -- or pardon me, the
8 request of the plaintiff, I will be pointing out
9 to the jury in my Instruction No. 18 the fact that
10 there is no claim against Dr. Prochaska or
11 Dr. Giles in this case. And that that's something
12 that goes to credibility as a witness. It does
13 not go to any legal liability or -- in the case.
14 It goes to whether you are going to believe the
15 witness or not.
The Court feels that those kinds of
16
17 instructions are important because lay people can
18 misinterpret these actions and these instructions
19 if you don't point those things out.
20
So I believe that Saint Al's is
21 entitled to an instruction that points out to the
22 jury that GSR is not a party in this litigation
23 but that Saint Al's does have the-- not only -24 Saint Al's counsel not only has the right but the
25 obligation to argue to the jury any potential
1
2
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proportionate liability which GSR may have in the
2 case. I mean, that's-- that, after all, is their
3 job.
4
The law apportions in a civil
5 conspiracy claim. The plaintiffs brought a civil
6 conspiracy claim. An instruction to the jury that
7 explains the nature of a civil conspiracy claim is
8 perfectly appropriate, and the Court doesn't have
9 any problem with that.
10
I am not going to revisit the
11 allocation argument. I have already done that; I
12 have given my reasons for the prior decision. And
13 it is, in fact, the jury that in this Court's
14 opinion must make that determination. But Saint
15 Al's has every right to argue that.
16
The fact of the matter is Mr. Banducci
17 made a mistake. He should not have said what he
18 said. The fact of the matter is that Mr. Ayer
19 also made a mistake. He shouldn't have said what
20 he said earlier on in this case.
21
The Court would have been perfectly
22 within its rights at that point in time to have
23 simply said, "Okay, we are going to start over
24 again. We are going to declare a mistrial."
25
I don't need Mr. Banducci to make a
1
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there. They live in the community; they know
2 what's going on in the community. They know the
3 vernacular, and they know the language.
4
So a mistrial is not going to be
5 granted. Change in the Court's position with
6 regard to the 50/50 issue and the allocation is
7 not going to be changed.
8
The Court will give a jury instruction
9 in which it will make it clear that not only is it
10 Saint Al's right but it is Saint Al's counsel's
11
obligation to argue for any appropriate
12 apportionment under this theory of the case.
13
I have already held that the fact that
14 this is in the case and the fact that with regard
15 to the witness a direct examination clearly laid
16 out and asked the witness, you know: Did you do
17 this? Did you do this? Did Saint Al's do this?
18 Did they influence you?
19
And I have already pointed out that
20 because of the fact that that has been pursued,
21
that Mr. Banducci has the right to pursue, then,
22 with the witness what other things may have
23 occurred to pursue and impeach that testimony that
24 Saint Al's had nothing to do with it or wasn't
25 involved or didn't do anything to influence them
1

motion to declare a mistrial if I feel it is so
bad that it should have happened.
But the Court accepted Mr. Ayer's
explanation that there had been a
misunderstanding, and I instructed the jury. I'm
going to do the same thing here. I have already
done it.
These are difficult cases. They're -everybody is on edge. There is a lot of money at
issue here. Counsel are dedicated to their
clients as they are supposed to be, and sometimes
things come out in an adversary proceeding when
emotions are running high that don't justify a
mistrial but justify an instruction to the jury to
disregard.
This is not the type of error that this
Court feels rises to the level of declaring a
mistrial. Period.
If this Court thought that a jury was
going to make a determination in a case based upon
a statement that somebody was throwing somebody
under the bus, I wouldn't have any problem. Those
jurors hear that statement probably five times a
week from somebody on some subject. It is not as
though we've got a group of virgin ears over

or didn't help them, all of those factors.
2
You know, you try and prove one thing
3 with a witness. They got an opportunity to take
4 that same witness and try and prove you didn't get
5 it all before the jury during the direct
6 examination. That's why we have
7 cross-examination.
8
The rules of evidence are not designed
9 to hide facts. I know some attorneys find that
10 distressing. The rules of evidence are designed
11 to exclude irrelevant facts or facts that are
12 alleged that are not the type of facts that you
13 can depend upon. That's why we have hearsay
14 exceptions, and that's why there has to be a
15 specific hearsay exception when somebody says
16 something. So I will give an instruction. I will
17 work on an instruction.
18
Speaking of which, we have got an
19 instruction packet that I promised to you. Please
20 be advised that except for the standard form
21
instructions from the Idaho pattern jury
22 instructions, that this Court is perfectly willing
23 to entertain ways of improving the instructions.
24
The standard advice I always give to
25 counsel when I am talking about instructions is:
1
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Because that's where the Gem State
radiologists were reading, and I preferred their
reads to anybody else in town.
Q. Okay. And I would like for you to, if
you would, to explain to the folks on the jury why
it is that you preferred that the Gem State
radiologists read the scans of your patients.
A. There is a certain amount of time and
energy that's involved in seeing a patient, taking
a history, examining the patient, deciding on the
tests, deciding when they come back in, writing it
all up. There is a certain amount of time
involved.
And if they have a scan and if I can
rely 99 percent on the scan report being very
accurate, then it makes my life easier, which is
selfish, but it also makes the patient care
better. And those would be the two reasons why I
would refer to Gem State Radiology.
MR. GJORDING: Thank you. That's all I have
at the moment.
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
Mr. Banducci.
MR. BANDUCCI: Mr. Woodard, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Woodard.
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that correct?
A. That is.
Q. Okay. So if they went to IMI for the
first exam, the subsequent exams would be taken at
IMI; would that be correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, I think you testified that
there was an issue that came up where you had to
have a rescan; is that what you said?
A. I had to have a reread.
Q. A reread. Okay. So the scans weren't
done; it was just a reread?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Now, when you testified in the
last time, in the prior proceeding, you didn't
mention that as a reason for why you referred to
IMI, did you?
A. That wasn't a reason for referring to
IMI. What-- that was when I found out that they
weren't reading at MRI Center of Idaho any more.
Q. Okay. And by "they," you mean the Gem
State radiologists?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Now, do you know if Saint Al's
was responsible for the Gem State radiologists no
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MR. WOODARD: Thank you, Your Honor. I am a
little slow today.
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longer reading at MRI Center?
A. I can't say that I paid too much
attention to that. All I knew was that the group
that was reading my scans wasn't there any more.
And so wherever they went, that's where I was
going to send my studies.
Q. Okay. And now I think you also
testified about-- that it wasn't until around
2005 that you understood that Saint Al's had a
relationship with IMI; is that correct?
A. That Saint-- you mean with GSR or
Saint Al's with IMI?
Q. That Saint Al's had a relationship with
IMI; I think that's what you testified?
A. I had no idea what their specific
relationship is.
Q. Okay. But I think you said that you
learned in 2005, they were somehow related?
A. No. What I learned in 2005 was that,
that MRI Center of Idaho was not specifically a
part of Saint Al's, and that they had let the
radiologists go and replaced them with two new
ones; and that the people that I knew well and
trusted weren't reading those scans there any
more. That's really all I learned. The politics

5605

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. WOODARD:
Q. Good afternoon, Dr. River.
A. Good afternoon.
Q. I think you testified that in 2008, you
became an employee of Saint Alphonsus?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Before 2008, from the time you arrived
here around 2000 -- I think you said -A. Yes.
Q. -- did you have admitting privileges at
Saint Al's?
A. At both hospitals.
Q. Okay. So Saint Al's and St. Luke's?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. If you can give me just a
second.
I think you testified that one of the
things that you did, at least when you first got
here, is that if a patient had an exam at one
facility, when they had follow-up exams you would
like to send them back to that same facility; is
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Because that's where the Gem State
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radiologists were reading, and I preferred their
reads to anybody else in town.
Q. Okay. And I would like for you to, if
you would, to explain to the folks on the jury why
it is that you preferred that the Gem State
radiologists read the scans of your patients.
A. There is a certain amount of time and
energy that's involved in seeing a patient, taking
a history, examining the patient, deciding on the
tests, deciding when they come back in, writing it
all up. There is a certain amount of time
involved.
And if they have a scan and if I can
rely 99 percent on the scan report being very
accurate, then it makes my life easier, which is
selfish, but it also makes the patient care
better. And those would be the two reasons why I
would refer to Gem State Radiology.
MR. GJORDING: Thank you. That's all I have
at the moment.
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
Mr. Banducci.
MR. BANDUCCI: Mr. Woodard, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Woodard.
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that correct?
A. Thatis.
Q. Okay. So if they went to IMI for the
first exam, the subsequent exams would be taken at
IMI; would that be correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, I think you testified that
there was an issue that came up where you had to
have a rescan; is that what you said?
A. I had to have a reread.
Q. A reread. Okay. So the scans weren't
done; it was just a reread?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Now, when you testified in the
last time, in the prior proceeding, you didn't
mention that as a reason for why you referred to
IMI, did you?
A. That wasn't a reason for referring to
IMI. What - that was when I found out that they
weren't reading at MRI Center of Idaho any more.
Q. Okay. And by "they," you mean the Gem
State radiologists?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Now, do you know if Saint Al's
was responsible for the Gem State radiologists no
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MR. WOODARD: Thank you, Your Honor. I am a
little slow today.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. WOODARD:
Q. Good afternoon, Dr. River.
A. Good afternoon.
Q. I think you testified that in 2008, you
became an employee of Saint Alphonsus?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Before 2008, from the time you arrived
here around 2000 -- I think you said -A. Yes.
Q. -- did you have admitting privileges at
Saint Al's?
A. At both hospitals.
Q. Okay. So Saint Al's and St. Luke's?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. If you can give me just a
second.
I think you testified that one of the
things that you did, at least when you first got
here, is that if a patient had an exam at one
facility, when they had follow-up exams you would
like to send them back to that same facility; is
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longer reading at MRI Center?
A. I can't say that I paid too much
attention to that. All I knew was that the group
that was reading my scans wasn't there any more.
And so wherever they went, that's where I was
going to send my studies.
Q. Okay. And now I think you also
testified about -- that it wasn't until around
2005 that you understood that Saint Al's had a
relationship with IMI; is that correct?
A. That Saint --you mean with GSR or
Saint Al's with IMI?
Q. That Saint Al's had a relationship with
IMI; I think that's what you testified?
A. I had no idea what their specific
relationship is.
Q. Okay. But I think you said that you
learned in 2005, they were somehow related?
A. No. What I learned in 2005 was that,
that MRI Center of Idaho was not specifically a
part of Saint Al's, and that they had let the
radiologists go and replaced them with two new
ones; and that the people that I knew well and
trusted weren't reading those scans there any
more. That's really all I learned. The politics
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Q. What is a line?
A. It's actually a line of typed words.
And that's the commercially available rate.
Basically everyone charges by line when you farm
out dictation to be transcribed. And so we
provided that service through our medical record
department transcriptionists.
Q. Okay. Define for us, please, "CD-Web."
A. "CD-Web" stands for Clinician Desktop
on the Web. And it was the ability to view a
variety of reports, notes and results in a common
way through the web. And it was software that
Saint Alphonsus developed ourselves. We wrote it.
And we took everything that was sent in
to our clinical data repository and then made it
available through the web on CD-Web. So things
that were created in a nursing system or a lab
system or pathology system or radiology system or
cardiology -- let's see -- the blood bank, and
then the patient demographics, family history,
social history, any narrative report, op note,
anything we collected from those best ofbreed
specialized systems, we put into the clinical data
repository.
And that was viewable through CD-Web.
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So the firewall protected Saint
Alphonsus from external hackers and viruses and so
forth, and also allowed us to communicate in a
secure way out across through the Internet,
services and applications.
So CD-Web, even though it was a
hospital-based system, was viewable through
someone outside the firewall through the Internet.
Q. When we talk about the Saint Alphonsus
network, Ms. Hall, are we talking about the system
that is inside the firewall?
A. Yes. That's how it starts, inside
firewall as Saint Alphonsus network. Outside of
that, we would be using the Internet as a
transport vehicle to send information outside of
the organization.
Q. Okay. Next, please define "Web
Ambassador."
A. Web Ambassador is a product that's
developed and owned by DR Systems, which is a
PACS -- a picture archiving communication
system-- company.
And Web Ambassador was the ability to
take information that was on the inside of our
firewall and our PACS system, put it on a server

And CD-Web was the mechanism for anyone affiliated
that could get a look at all of the reports and
labs and so on.
Q. Okay. I know you've explained this to
me, and I am not too sure I understand it. But
was CD-Web available both inside and outside the
firewall?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Okay. One more time for me, explain to
me what the firewall is.
A. Well, the best way I think I can
describe this is that when we first started,
everything at Saint Alphonsus was inside the
domain of Saint Alphonsus, inside our walls. And
the equivalent of inside our walls electronically
was our network.
And our private network communicated
with devices that we controlled and we managed and
attached. They were always secure.
But when we wanted to communicate
outside of our organization, oftentimes through
the Internet at the time, or the web, we would put
in special features that would allow us to break
through this barrier, this firewall, and go out
and connect with others in a secure way.
Page 5880
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that communicated through the Internet, a web
server, and displayed images, reports, and audio
of a radiologist's voice through its software, Web
Ambassador, loaded on a PC somewhere else across
the Internet.
Q. Okay. And was the vehicle-- if that's
the correct term, was the vehicle that allowed you
to transport this information outside the firewall
done via software provided by DR?
A. Yes, and hardware. There was a
hardware, a new server that had to be implemented
that would allow for this web-based software to be
used in a secure way, as well, initially, as disks
that would be delivered, and eventually just
through the Internet.
Q. Okay. And the-- you did not create
DR?
A. No.
Q. So it was not proprietary?
A. Not to us. It was proprietary to DR.
Q. And you had to buy it if you want to
use it?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. Now, let's talk again about CD-Web.
And you said this was developed by Saint
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Alphonsus. Was access to the CD-Web free to Saint
Alphonsus and Saint Alphonsus' affiliates?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And if you-- if you were in
that category, Saint Alphonsus or their
affiliates, what did you have to do in order to
gain access to CD-Web?
A. You would have to place a call to our
help desk, and we would provide training, a user
ID and password. You would sign a contract
stating you knew that it was appropriate use and
you would honor confidentiality and so forth.
Q. What would happen if-- could a -let's take the hypothetical that MRI has a
referring doctor who refers to MRI. MRI is an
affiliate of Saint Alphonsus. Could that doctor
access CD-Web?
A. Yes, if they had called and asked for a
user ID and password.
Q. And like who would call who?
A. It would depend. I mean, most often
our affiliates would call us and say, "Hey, I have
got a doctor that I would like you to get signed
up for CD-Web." And we would go out and see them
and provide training and a user ID, password.
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Wednesday, and he has made your job quite a bit
easier because he explained -- I will represent to
you that he explained how the idea of PACS was
created, who developed it, who paid for it, who
did the research on it and that sort of thing. So
we don't have go through that.
But I will ask -- I will ask you this:
He represented that when he and Dr. Giles and
others from GSR were doing the investigation or
the research looking into PACS, they would go to
various cities to watch it in action.
Did you accompany them, occasionally?
A. I did.
Q. Okay. He also explained that it was
GSR that selected -- GSR selected DR. Do you
agree with that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Do you recall, were there -were there other brands of software other than DR
that were available for selection back then?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And do you know why DR was
picked?
A. Well, the radiologists wanted to make
sure that they had a system that really helped

Q. All they had to do was call?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Let's go to Web Ambassador,
then. As you mentioned, Web Ambassador utilized
software that was provided --that was sold to you
by DR?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So that wasn't free?
A. No.
Q. And how does -- what do they charge,
license fees?
Or how did DR get compensated for
allowing its software to be used?
A. They -- we would purchase hardware and
software from DR that included a server to handle
this new web-based software. And we would
purchase a number of user licenses to be used, and
those user licenses could be loaded on a PC for
use by anyone that we had bought the licenses for.
Q. Okay. So we will talk about that a
little bit later, but we are going to change
topics here just slightly and we are going to talk
about PACS.
And I can tell you, Ms. Hall, that
Dr. Seaboum was here last, I think, Friday and
Page 5884

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

their work flow. They wanted something that would
be easy to use, that would be scalable, that would
be able to eventually go out onto the Internet,
and they wanted something that was pretty
state-of-the-art, new technology. So all of those
things were important to them.
Q. Okay. He also explained to the jury
that GSR picked DR for their software, but they
also picked you, picked Saint Alphonsus, as their
IT support for PACS. Is that correct, in your
memory?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And I think we -- I think I
talked to him a little bit about, was he always -"was he" -- was GSR always totally pleased with
your IT service?
And he said, "No."
Do you agree with that?
A. I agree.
Q. Okay. Was this the first time-- well,
was this the first time you had ever heard of
PACS?
A. Yes, actually. It was brand new. It
was emerging. Dr. Giles and others were very
excited about this. It was a great new concept.
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And it will be the Court's ruling that the claims
asserted by MRIA are not barred by the statute of
limitations based upon that. So, that's the
Court's ruling."
Now, the claims, Your Honor, the
theories of the damages may have been modified
somewhat, but the claims themselves have not
changed. And that ruling is the law of the case
in this case. It was not appealed by Saint
Alphonsus. Now they are trying to back-door it at
this time with their directed verdict motion and
with some of the-THE COURT: Well, as I recall, Mr. Woodard,
it was never called to this Court's attention
either before I entered my ruling. So this is the
first that I have heard about the assertion that
Judge McLaughlin made a ruling in the first case
on the statute of limitations issue.
So I think I agree with MRIA. If he
did rule and it was not appealed and it does apply
to this claim, it is, in fact, the law of the
case. But this is the first time it was -- when
this motion was placed before me that I was made
aware of the fact, that I can recall, that Judge
McLaughlin had, in fact, ruled on this issue in
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caused us to lose those referrals that never came
back after 2005, it doesn't matter that they could
later rightfully compete.
And then on the issue of rightful
competition, I do not believe there has been a
ruling on that. I think Your Honor has made that
very clear. There has been a ruling that they
rightfully dissociated, but there hasn't been a
ruling about whether they could rightfully compete
after 2005. And I think that depends on whether
they breached their fiduciary duties before they
withdrew, which would make it, then, so that they
could not rightfully compete after 2005.
And, Your Honor, I think we talked -THE COURT: I think I stated that position
probably -- this might be the seventh time for me.
MR. WOODARD: I think it probably has.
THE COURT: The Court believes the law is
clear in this respect. If MRIA and the MRI
entities can show that the damages after 2005 were
linked to inappropriate behavior and causes of
action arising before April 1st, 2005, then they
are, in fact, liable for those damages.
They are not liable for damages simply
because they withdrew, or dissociated-- since we

the prior case. And, in fact, this Court had
ruled that the issue had to go to the jury.
MR. WOODARD: And, Your Honor, I apologize
if we hadn't brought it up before you earlier. I
apologize. There has been a lot of stuff going on
in this case. I can't remember if we did or we
didn't.
THE COURT: Well, we've got over two years
of various motions. But the fact of matter is I
don't recall it being called to my attention until
I got the briefing the other day.
MR. WOODARD: Your Honor, just quickly so
that -- Mr. Bastian has the argument on the other
two motions.
The after-2005 damages, I think they
misunderstand the theories of damages. And one of
the things is that these bad acts by Saint
Alphonsus and what the testimony has been is that
by 2005 the migration had already occurred. Those
customers had already been lost. And Mr. Wilhoite
testified that despite all their attempts to win
those back, they were lost.
And once they are lost, regardless of
whether Saint Alphonsus can or cannot rightfully
compete, if they did things before 2005 that
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aren't using the word "withdrew" anymore in
partnership law -- in 2004, and the non-compete
clause ended in 2005.
MR. WOODARD: Thank you, Your Honor. And
just to make clear, and I am going to tum it over
in just a couple minutes to Mr. Bastian instead.
We believe the evidence has shown that
the dissociation was done for an improper purpose.
That it was done and motivated in bad faith.
Matter of fact, Saint Alphonsus was -back in 2001 says it was a strategic imperative of
theirs to partner with these radiologists and
compete against their partner, MRI Center.
Something they started doing before they withdrew,
and the fact of withdrawal doesn't stop that
breach.
I will turn the time over to
Mr. Bastian quickly before the Court -THE COURT: Well, damages can't flow from
the dissociation.
MR. WOODARD: Correct.
THE COURT: Period.
MR. WOODARD: Right.
THE COURT: I mean, the Supreme Court made
that clear. They have to flow from something that
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to review those statements made on the floor of
the United States Congress and in committee with
regard to the intent of the committees. Having
drafted legislation in Congress for about five
years, I'm fully aware of legislative history and
what you have to look to.
To adequately prepare to litigate such
an integral issue, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to
notice in the pleadings beyond MRIA's statements
in its third amended counterclaim.
Consequently, this late disclosure of
these statutes as legal underpinning ofMRIA's
interference with prospective contractual
relations amounts to trial by ambush.
Further, the laws do not announce a
public policy that protects MRIA, as far as this
Court can determine. Though the parties may argue
about whom the statute is intended to protect,
there can be no reasonable contention that it was
designed to protect the business interests of a
hospital's care providers or a competitors.
It appears the statute was, indeed,
passed to protect the taxpayers from being
overcharged or for open fraud within the Medicare
and Medicaid systems.
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competitors or discouraging the use of the MRI
entity's services, there is no need to argue in
addition a possible unlitigated and unproven
criminal violation.
Such an argument opens the very real
possibility that the jury would decide a claim
based on the argument surrounding an asserted
criminal law violation rather than based upon the
other evidence in the case.
This is the classic definition of a
403 -- Rule 403 exclusion. The probative value of
this evidence is substantially outweighed by the
risk of unfair prejudice.
With regard to enforcement of the
radiology contract, the Court agrees with MRIA as
to this claim and will deny this motion for
directed verdict.
The Court believes there is a factual
issue as to whether the contract obligates the
radiologists to read for MRIA. The bare fact that
the contract requires the radiologists to provide
reads on MRI scans is sufficient to establish a
factual issue for the jury to decide as to whether
the radiologists were required to read scans for
MRIA because the only MRI machine on Saint

Consequently, the Court finds that MRIA
cannot argue that Saint Alphonsus violated the
Stark law or the anti-kickback statute. The
Court's rulings as to the Stark Law and
Anti-Kickback Statute only preclude arguments of
the laws themselves.
The Court will not preclude argument of
the facts underlying the alleged violations if
they are somehow otherwise wrongful. Not saying
that they can say that there was a violation of
law, but if, in fact, there were inappropriate
referrals or there was an effort to stop
referrals, that goes to other issues in the case.
The Court notes that while the
provisions of a criminal statute may in some cases
be relevant to liability for a civil claim, such
is the case after all with nearly all traffic
laws, that there is a significant danger of
introducing into a civil case the provisions of a
criminal statute as a basis for civil liability on
a claim of a private party.
Whereas here there is ample evidence
for the jury to consider whether Saint Alphonsus
acted inappropriately in directing, tracking, or
encouraging referrals to the MRI entity's
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Alphonsus' campus was the MRI Center magnet and
because of the testimony as to past practices by
witnesses in the case.
Furthermore, the Court believes that it
is not the enforceability ofthe contract at issue
here. It is whether Saint Alphonsus was meeting
its duties to the partnership in providing
radiologists for the MRI entities.
Consequently, the Court will deny Saint
Alphonsus' motion for directed verdict on this
point.
On the damages issues: As to lost
profits for -- as to MRI Mobile, the testimony of
witnesses Budge and Wilhoite satisfies the
concerns of the Supreme Court as to the dictates
of the Pope decision.
They have taken into account other
competition and the fact that scan revenue could,
in fact, be lost because of factors other than the
simple fact that IMI competed with them in the MRI
services field.
The analysis takes these issues beyond
mere speculation for the jury to consider. Saint
Alphonsus's argument goes to the weight to be
given to these opinions, not to their
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times the damages they calculate.
Anything else, Counsel?
MR. BANDUCCI: I just want to make sure I
understand, Your Honor, with respect to Eagle and
given the Court's ruling.
I'm not sure whether we -- we've got
overheads and the PowerPoints and the rest with
Eagle in there. And I think from the standpoint
of how this should be presented to the jury, I was
unclear, probably my inability to follow exactly
what you said at the very end there.
Are you taking out Eagle damages from
the presentation to the jury?
THE COURT: I'm taking out Eagle damages.
MR. BANDUCCI: Okay. So then we have a-just a presentation issue. That's what I assume.
THE COURT: Yeah. And the parties can
simply revise their exhibits if they wish to or
the parties can explain to the jury that the Eagle
damages are no longer being claimed.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
Inasmuch as these exhibits were in
accordance with the Court's rulings yesterday, the
reason I asked and they haven't been changed and
there is no objection to them as they are prior to
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MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, I have just an
inquiry of the Court. Because I don't-- I want
to make sure that I conform in the course of
today's testimony, of the Court's customary
practice.
I heard yesterday that counsel are not
supposed to confer with witnesses while they are
being cross-examined, including at break.
THE COURT: That's correct.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Does that customary practice
apply to experts?
THE COURT: We have allowed experts to be in
the courtroom for the purposes of listening to the
testimony of other experts and assisting counsel
in examination and cross-examination.
This Court has taken the position that
once the expert gets on the stand, once they start
testifYing and once they are subject to
cross-examination, the attorneys cannot coach that
expert.
So once that cross-examination starts,
there is not to be any discussion with that expert
out in the hall about their testimony.
MR. FRIEDMAN: And that custom and practice

the Court's ruling this morning.
We, for the sake of simplicity, prefer
simply to be able to -- either ourselves or have
the Court instruct the jury during the -- at the
appropriate point in the presentation that the
Eagle damages are no longer in the case.
MR. BANDUCCI: I'm happy either way. I
think, probably, it would be best coming from the
Judge.
MR. FRIEDMAN: I agree with that, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I will have to work
up a little written instruction first.
MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, I'm sorry, just one
clarification. There was the Pope issue, and then
there was a separate issue in argument of
usurpation regarding Trilogy Network Systems
assuming the competitor's profits. Has Your
Honor -- has the Court ruled on that or -- I just
wasn't sure. I didn't hear you.
THE COURT: I believe that the
appropriate -- that the testimony has been given.
It is for the jury to weigh that testimony. I'm
not throwing out any of the damages testimony from
the plaintiffs experts.
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and direction from the Court applies during the
period of cross-examination?
THE COURT: During the period of
cross-examination. I have never kept anybody from
preparing their witness.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Or from redirect? Is that
correct, Your Honor?
I just want to make sure. I really
want to follow the Court's ruling.
THE COURT: I'm going to rule that it will
apply on redirect as well. Because the witness
should be fully prepared to begin with. And what
I don't want to see is changes made as a result of
coaching going on out in the hall.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, I'm not concerned
about the witness's preparation. I am concerned
about my own. And sometimes I need some
explanation.
May we have the representation of
counsel that he has, in complete accordance with
Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite's testimony, followed
what Your Honor has stated?
MR. BANDUCCI: Absolutely.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you very much.
THE COURT: Anything else, Counsel?
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BOISE, IDAHO
Wednesday, October 26, 2011, 9:00a.m.
THE COURT: The Court will note that counsel
are present in the courtroom with regard to the
jury instruction conference.
Counsel, I promised both of you a
ruling on the statute of limitations issue that
had been raised. I have got that prepared.
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
and Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care's brief filed
on July 18th of 2007 specifically states, as to
fiduciary duty, quote, "The Idaho version ofRUPA
does not provide that the duty of loyalty includes
the enumerated duties found -- or that the duty of
loyalty does provide that the duty of loyalty
includes the enumerated duties found in Section
53-3-404(b).
As we all know, Subpart I of
53-3-404(b) specifically holds one of those
fiduciary duties is to hold as trustee any
property, profit, or benefit derived from
appropriation of a partnership opportunity.
This provision of RUPA is also
specifically noted in the Saint Alphonsus Regional
II
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Medical Center's and Saint Alphonsus Diversified
Care trial brief.
And Saint Al's in its pre-trial briefs
specifically argued, quote, "All claims for breach
of fiduciary duty arising prior to May 20th, 2001,
are time-barred."
Based on the briefing and the argument
presented to the Court, this assertion included
the provisions ofldaho Code Section
53-3-404(b )( 1).
Thus, when Judge McLaughlin ruled as to
the statute of limitations that as a matter of law
this was a continuing tort, citing to Curtis v.
Firth, 123 Idaho 598, the ruling encompassed the
appropriation of partnership opportunity language
contained in Idaho Code Section 53-3-404(b)(l).
The fact that the case ofBushi v. Sage
Healthcare, 146 Idaho 764, 203 P.3d 694, decided
in 2009, and that it clarified-- was decided in
2009 and that it clarified the definition and
application of fiduciary duties between partners,
as we have discussed at length in the context of
this case, has no bearing on the statute of
limitations decisions entered by Judge McLaughlin
on August 29th of2007, which was not appealed and
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thus has become the law of the case. This Court
will adhere to Judge McLaughlin's ruling.
I will also note for the record that
the Court feels it was a correct ruling, even
though, if this were a matter of first impression,
this Court might well have determined to present
it to the jury.
The Court, therefore, finds that the
claim is not barred by the statute of limitations
and that the instruction related to the jury
finding when the harm occurred need not be given
in the proceeding since that matter was resolved
in the prior proceedings in this case which have
become the law of this case.
So I wanted to be sure that that was
out of the way so the parties would know where the
Court was coming from.
That did take away from me this morning
about an hour and a half that I had thought I was
going to have available to review the jury
instructions prior to the conference today, but I
did get the jury instructions reviewed previously.
Kyle has delivered to each of you a
packet with the instructions numbered. We had not
numbered the instructions previously because,
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to add anything to that instruction that might be
appropriate in light of the testimony in the case.
Instruction number 27, instruction
number 28, instruction number 29, and instruction
number 30.
This instruction, basically, was taken
from the instruction that Saint Alphonsus provided
because they provided a larger number of
alphabet-soup identifiers in this instruction so
that the jury would be aware of and recall what
the initials stood for.
Instruction number 31, instruction
number 32, instruction number 34, instruction
number 37, instruction number 39, instruction
number 41, instruction number 48, instruction
number 53, instruction number 54, instruction
number 62, instruction number 63, instruction
number 64, instruction number 65, instruction
number 66, instruction number 68, instruction
number 69, and instruction number 70, which,
appropriately to this case, is where I throw the
Supreme Court under the bus when I point out to
the jury that we used to be able to meet with them
after a trial and discuss matters, but the Supreme
Court in 2007 said we couldn't do that anymore.

quite frankly, we didn't know where we were going
to be in terms of the number of instructions until
after the parties rested yesterday.
Twenty-one instructions have been given
to this point. Counsel have been allowed to make
their record with regard to any of those
instructions before they were delivered. I
believe that, based upon a review of the
instructions, the following instructions are
uncontested by either party.
That's the instruction numbered 22, the
instruction numbered 23, the instruction numbered
24, the instruction numbered 25, the instruction
numbered 26.
And the Court does want to point out
with regard to instruction number 26 that the
Idaho Court of Appeals made a decision about a
year and a half or two years ago, went into great
detail, with regard to giving an instruction to
the jury on factors to be considered with regard
to testimony at trial, and found the Ninth Circuit
model jury instruction to be an appropriate
instruction for the Court to rely on if it were to
give such an instruction. And that it also held
that it was basically the right ofthe trial court
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So I always like to explain to the jury why that's
the case.
MR. AYER: Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. AYER: Could I just raise one point?
It's a very minor point, but in
instruction 30 we noticed that it has got almost
everything there, but it doesn't have IMI and ICR,
which have also been referred to. And it would
seem, if we are doing alphabet-soup definitions,
we probably should include them, I would think.
I think we may have included them in
ours. I am not certain of that.
THE COURT: Maybe we just didn't get it
transferred over. IMI -MR. AYER: Intermountain Medical Imaging.
THE COURT: And what was the other one?
MR. AYER: ICR, Imaging Center Radiologists.
MR. BANDUCCI: In that case, Your Honor,
SARG, Saint Alphonsus Radiology Group should also
be added.
THE COURT: The more we can give to them, it
makes it easier for them to know, the better. I
don't have any problem with adding any of them.
Is there any other additional
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not liability.
THE COURT: I understand the basis for the
argument. The Court will not give the proposed
instruction 43A. I think this matter is fully
addressed, and the major issue where it could have
had an impact has been removed from the case by
the Court.
MR. WOODARD: Your Honor, I just-- not with
the instructions, but I guess because it was
brought up what we can and can't argue. I would
like a little bit of clarification so Friday Tom
doesn't get into trouble.
With tortious interference, there can
be a tortious interference after 2005. I mean,
the dissociation -THE COURT: Yes, but no separate facts have
been argued with regard to a new act after 2005
for tortious interference.
MR. WOODARD: Well, there is the Ben Murray
memo, Your Honor, which is in late 2005, which was
directing the patients to IMI away from MRI
Center, in violation of Saint Alphonsus' own
internal policy, which is interference with
prospective economic advantage for an improper
means or an improper purpose.
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Stark Act violation. I don't know whether it is
or not.
But, I mean, how do you get to the
damages there where they have the right to
compete?
MR. WOODARD: Because it was-- Your Honor,
it was briefed and what the case law says is that
if they have their own internal policy that says
they won't do that or they have a contract and
even if this is with a third party -- we briefed
this -- we are not going to do this, which is what
the IMI operating agreement says, we are not going
to influence referrals to this business, once they
set that policy, once they have that contract,
then the case law says that that becomes an
improper means.
And a third party, such as MRI
Associates, they're tortiously interfering with
that business by influencing those referrals. It
falls under the improper means portion. It is not
anti-kickback. It is not Stark Law violation, but
it is improper means.
MR. BASTIAN: Your Honor, ifl could just
address that, because Mr. Woodard is correct, this
was produced. The argument that was made, and, I

And as I understood your ruling, I
believe it was yesterday, Stark and anti-kickback
and all that stuff is out. But they can still
do-- in violation of their own policy, and that
still applies as an improper means and due cause
for tortious interference.
Those claims, those are acts that
happened after they dissociated, after the
non-compete. It has nothing to do with
competition. It is the improper means.
THE COURT: How is it an improper means for
a competitor to try and get the business after
they have the right to compete?
I mean other than if you disparage or
something of that nature where you go out and-with a position, let's say, that Saint Al's has
and let's just say that Saint Al's is the -- as
the major hospital goes out and says, "Boy, we'd
never use these guys because they just aren't
really good at their job."
Now, that's improper, and that's
intentional interference with a contract. But
sending out a letter that says, "Hey, you know,
we're now free to compete. We would like to have
you go here or there," even though maybe it is a
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believe, what the Court's ruling was, is that this
assertion, this Stark kickback and this internal
policy, which relates to Stark and anti-kickback,
these are not in the case.
The contention in the interrogatories
that they responded to did not allege these, and
the first time this was ever raised as an issue
was after Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp had left,
and it is not part of the case.
And on the merits, Your Honor, didn't
reach it because it wasn't necessary, but internal
policies are not a source of improper means -THE COURT: Well, actually there is a
dispute in the law and in various jurisdictions as
to whether or not it is or not.
The Court did rule on this, as I
recall, and indicated that this wasn't properly in
the case, so I don't think you can argue something
they did in 2007.
MR. WOODARD: Then, I'm sorry, Your Honor,
we misunderstood your ruling. We thought you said
we couldn't argue as to anti-kickback, Stark, and
public policy. We didn't understand your ruling
as to apply to breach of their own contract.
THE COURT: I think it has to-- I'm sorry,
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partner should not act adversely to the
partnership, either for itself or others. The
partner must refrain from competing with the
partnership.
And the rest of the language comes
directly from Judge McLaughlin's instruction
number 33.
Saint Al's has proposed a clarification
that a partner does not breach the duty of loyalty
by engaging in business activities that are
outside the scope of the partnership business and
does not have to share its profits from such
activity with the partnership.
Who is going to argue that one?
Mr. Davis.
MR. DAVIS: I will, Your Honor. Yes.
And there is one additional thing based
on what has happened today. I think that, again,
this goes to the point that there is a dispute in
this case about whether or not Saint Alphonsus
engaged in the business activities ofMRI, or
whether it was engaged in non-MRI, which is not
part of the partnership and thus is not forbidden.
So this is just language to clarifY
that.
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I think it is confusing to the jury.
The instruction as is quotes the statute, and I
think we should keep it as is.
MR. DAVIS: And, Your Honor, we would
have no problem with -- instead of-- I think this
is-- I am not sure if this is-- part of this may
be paraphrased, but part of it is, but I would
have no problem if we just included the exact
language out of the statute with regard to
ratification and authorization.
On the point, I think I just want to
make this clear for the record. I think that with
regard to suggesting that the jury instructions
are law of the case, the jury instructions are the
Court's -- in the Court's discretion, the Court's
description of what the law is.
Ifthere is something inaccurate in the
law, that would be law of the case. But for the
Court to insert accurate law into its own jury
instructions does not violate the law of the case
principle. It has nothing to do with law of the
case.
THE COURT: Well, once again, the Court is
going to state that I have taken the position from
the outset that with regard to instructions that

And in addition to that, I think when
it was-- I'm sorry, Your Honor. Yes, the
instruction 42 that Kyle handed out today with the
defense of waiver, there was some language that
was taken out of that.
The instruction that Your Honor gave us
here is from -- I can see at the bottom there,
from the annotation that this comes directly out
ofldaho Code 53-3-404(b), the language from our
proposed instruction 42 regarding ratification or
authorization, not breaching the duty of loyalty,
which is what this instruction relates to, is also
out of the Idaho Code. It is 53-31 03(b )(32). And
so I think it would be appropriate to move that
language into the duty of loyalty instruction,
because that does accurately reflect what the duty
of loyalty does not include.
THE COURT: Okay.
Mr. Woodard.
MR. WOODARD: Your Honor, I think this is,
again, an instruction that Judge McLaughlin gave.
This additional -- which again, is
argumentative-type language that they are asking
to put in here. They didn't appeal this. They
didn't ask for this language before.
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were not appealed and that were not questioned on
appeal, that the Court is going to stick with the
language of Judge McLaughlin.
The only thing I did here was to
separate two of the items rather than including
them in one sentence.
I will continue to stick with that
ruling, unless there is something that was
misstated.
In this case I don't believe that this
instruction number 45 misstates the law. I
believe that there is an instruction that does
address the fact that the-- any breach of the
partnership obligation has to be a breach that
involves the business of the partnership; that a
partner has the right to pursue its own
self-interests, but it does not have the right to
breach -- to pursue its own self-interest where it
is at odds with the partnership interests.
So I think I have clarified that in
another instruction. And if it is not in here, I
would, because it is an instruction to which Saint
Al's is entitled. But I believe it is in the
instructions.
So I am going go with instruction
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MR. WOODARD: Yes. I understand your
ruling.
THE COURT: I mean, if you don't want to
withdraw it, just say you want it and make your
record.
MR. WOODARD: We want it. We understand
your ruling, Your Honor, and let's move on.
THE COURT: All right.
Then with regard to 49, that
instruction is no longer necessary based upon the
Court's ruling this morning. And neither is 49A,
the Court having found the law of the case being
Judge McLaughlin's previous ruling.
MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, and on that one we
would just obviously want to preserve our
objection.
THE COURT: All right. And the Court does
note that Saint Al's has argued vigorously on the
other side of the Court's decision with regard to
the statute of limitations issue.
Instruction number 50, this is not one
of Judge McLaughlin's instructions, because
obviously Bushi had not been decided at the time
of the original trial. Saint Alphonsus objects to
the instruction.
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It is for you, the jury, to determine
whether an alleged action has taken place and if
it is otherwise in compliance with the terms of
the MRIA partnership agreement between the
parties, and whether the action was improperly
motivated.
So that clarifies that we are talking
about the MRIA partnership agreement.
MR. A YER: Your Honor, I guess -- it
certainly does that, but I am afraid it doesn't
alleviate our concern that we may be seeing here
something that we would regard as a clear
reversible error, if an argument were to be
made -- and I think Your Honor is in agreement
with this -- if an argument were to be made that
Saint Alphonsus' act of dissociating is, itself, a
basis for liability -THE COURT: Well, Mr. Banducci has just
indicated to me he is not going to make that
argument. And he knows, just as I told you with
regard to the 2005 argument, if he makes that
argument to the jury, he is going to have the
Court stop him during his closing argument and
say, "That's not what this Court has ruled."
MR. A YER: Well, then, Your Honor, we are

MR. AYER: Yes, Your Honor.
Again, our concern about this, we are
uncertain what this could allude to or allow the
jury to consider, other than the issue that's -Your Honor has addressed numerous times related to
the withdrawal, the dissociation.
And we are -- we are fearful that this
might be-- clearly would be misunderstood, given
Your Honor's clear statements on this, as a
license to view the dissociation as a basis for
liability.
Now I may be mistaken in that, but I'm
not clear on what relevance it has other than
that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And I agree that it should be
made clear that what we are talking about here is
the MRIA partnership agreement. A partner may
adhere to the strict legal requirements of a
written agreement -- in this case the MRIA
partnership agreement -- and still be held
responsible for violating a fiduciary obligation
to its partners, ifthe action taken was
improperly motivated, such as taking advantage of
its partnership position to obtain financial gain.
That's specific language out of Bushi.
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puzzled as to why -- why this instruction has any
bearing on this case. We just -- we don't
understand.
THE COURT: Because it's an instruction that
relates to the fiduciary obligation that was
established by the Bushi case with regard to
limited partnership agreements. And the fact that
strict compliance with the agreement does not
relieve the partner of the obligation-- the
obligations of the partnership and the fiduciary
obligation, in particular, taking advantage of a
partnership position to obtain financial gain, and
that you can be adhering strictly to the terms of
the contract.
You can argue that, you know, there is
no-- there is no cause of action, you know: You
should not award damages for anything that
occurred after 2005. You should not award
disgorgement.
Mr. Banducci can argue on the other
side that: Oh, yes, there are things that
happened before 2005 that may have been in strict
compliance with the agreement, but were undertaken
in bad faith, that they were improperly motivated.
And you don't get out from underneath
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in a way that caused the MRI entities hann. This
is known as a civil conspiracy claim.
"Because of that claim, the MRI
entities and Saint Alphonsus have been allowed to
introduce evidence of allegedly wrongful acts done
by GSR, IMI, and ICR, though they are not parties
to this lawsuit."
And then you went on with your
instruction. I think that's what I was
remembering so vividly. I think I will continue
to look to see if there were others mentioned.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. I will look
at that transcript.
Instruction number 56, breach of
non-compete clause, damages, breach of covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and civil conspiracy
claims; just indicating that the net profits lost,
measure of damages here.
MR. A YER: Your Honor, could I address that?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. A YER: Well, this opens a larger subject
and I don't -- I doubt that we are going to get it
done in the next eight minutes. But it opens the
question of-- you could open it through any
number of these instructions-- this whole
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lost scans.
And it is the products of an
undifferentiated collection of harmful conduct
that's alleged. And the proof of it is that -their experts made no effort, and can't, given the
common nature of this behavior, to allocate
damages as between different theories. There is
essentially no way that could be done.
The breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is essentially the same
conduct. That's the breach of fiduciary duty.
That's the tortious interference. That's the -etcetera.
And so the jury has nothing before it
that would let it allocate damages among the
causes of action -- again leaving aside
misappropriation -- and therefore the
apportionment must apply as between the two, as to
all the acts that are in issue -THE COURT: No, I agree with you with regard
to -- to the negligence or the tort claims. I
mean, Idaho law is clear in that. You've always
got the right to have the empty chair over there
on a tort claim.
I don't agree with you with regard to

question of apportionment of responsibility for
the harm that may have occurred.
And let me -- let me begin, rather than
focusing particularly on the language of this,
what we have tried to do in our proposed
revisions, because we think it's the only
plausible way to apply this concept of
apportionment -- what we have tried to do is
recognize some of the basic things about the proof
in this case, which are, other than the
misappropriation/usurpation theory, which of
course has a disgorgement remedy, the rest of this
case, all of the claims, including tort claims and
contract claims, are focused upon a common pattern
of behavior that allegedly was essentially a
conspiracy, a joint --joint behavior between
Saint Alphonsus and GSR, IMI and ICR, to wrongly
support -- for Saint Alphonsus, to wrongly support
the conduct of IMI in various ways and support
their competition.
And the mechanism of the hann, under
whatever theory you want to think about it, except
for the misappropriation theories which are off to
one side, the mechanism of the harm in every
instance is identical. It is lost profit. It is
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contract claims. I mean, the contract claims, I
mean, we are talking apples and oranges. Contract
claims are not apportionable. Tort claims are
apportionable.
I -MR. AYER: Your Honor, I guess my point is
if what has been proven, as I think is true in
this case, is that an undifferentiated -undifferentiatable [sic] harm in the fonn of lost
scans, then if, in fact, one maintains a
separation as between the tort claims and, you
know, breach ofthe covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, for example, the net result,
predictably, assuming there is any liability, will
be that the apportionment will be meaningless.
THE COURT: Well, it may be. I mean, if
they award on the contract claim, the
apportionment isn't going to happen. Ifthey
award on a tort claim, the apportionment is going
to happen.
I mean, these are entirely different
causes of action with different remedies and
different rules applying to them. And -MR. A YER: Your Honor, could I --you know,
we argued this issue -- not this exact issue, but

27 (Pages 6417 to 6420)
Tucker & Associates, 605 W. Fort St., Boise, ID 83702 (208) 345-3704
www.etucker.net

003457

Saint Alphonsus v. MRI Associates

10/26/2011
Page 6421

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

we argued the general issue of apportionment, and
Your Honor decided on June 17th -THE COURT: I know. I looked very carefully
at that decision in the context of an argument
over the tort claims -MR. AYER: Right.
THE COURT: -- not over an argument over the
contract claims.
MR. DAVIS: Well, to be fair, Your Honor,
the briefs did address this. I mean, part of what
we cite here in the annotations and what we gave
you came directly out of our briefs. So the issue
of whether -- this was part -THE COURT: No, I recognize you argued it in
the brief. But the response I made was with
regard to the tort claims. I was discussing the
tort claims at that point, as I recall.
MR. DAVIS: Well, Your Honor, and we would
just also just want to make record, then, that
there is certainly authority -- and we cite
this -- that when you have, as here, where the
harm is both, that the contract claims can be
apportioned.
I guess the other point would be, by
apportioning -- by the acts of Gem State -- and
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this is what I have been suggesting-- if you
actually have the jury apportion what harm is
caused to MRIA as result of GSR's acts and what
harm is apportioned due to Saint Alphonsus' acts,
since GSR didn't have a contract to breach,
anything the jury awards, by nature, is not
because of the contract.
So there is no mechanism by which
Mr. Budge or anyone else said this was the damage
of the contract, this was from the tortious
interference. That would just be speculation.
But by apportioning, Saint Alphonsus
will be paying for its contract breach, and GSR
will, by nature, only be paying for tort breaches.
So an apportionment still would not be
apportioning contract damages; it would be
breaking out what GSR's harm was as a result of
their torts.
THE COURT: Response.
MR. BASTIAN: Your Honor, I think there is
no doubt that one act could be both a breach of
contract and -- and maybe a tort. But that
doesn't change the fact that Idaho law makes
pretty clear that you can apportion torts, but you
can't apportion contractual damages.
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THE COURT: Well, I think I have crossed
that bridge in terms of my decision with regard to
the damages claim. I firmly believe that the law
in this state is that tort claim damages are
apportionable. You get the chance to put the
empty chair there. You get to say: It's all
their fault; it's not our fault, and you ought to
apportion 100 percent of the damage over to the
radiologists because they are the ones that caused
it all.
I mean, you can argue that until the
cows come home.
But in terms of the contract claims,
this Court believes that the contract claims are
not apportionable. It's a breach of contract
claim, and the parties that have the contract are
the ones that are obligated.
Ifl'm wrong, the Supreme Court never
has any difficulty telling me that.
MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, if I can make one
more point on this, this goes to the point we were
just discussing before.
If they had just brought a breach of
contract claim, since you can't conspire to breach
a contract -- or at least that's what -- either
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one of two things: either they would argue that
you can't have a conspiracy to breach a contract,
in which case it is tortious; if not, they would
not have been able to introduce evidence of the
wrongdoing of GSR showing that we breached our
contract.
And they have. They have alleged both
contract and tort. And it cannot be the case that
any party can simply avoid apportionment by
throwing in a breach of contract claim, which is
completely covered by the tortious and
conspiratorial army of evidence that they are
alleging.
I mean, this really -- not just in this
case, but in any case, this would be an invitation
to eliminate apportionment.
MR. AYER: Your Honor, could I just ask -- I
know Your Honor has to leave -THE COURT: Right.
MR. AYER: -- and I don't want to belabor
this. I wonder, could we take this up for a
couple of minutes after lunch?
THE COURT: Oh, yes. That's fine.
We will be in recess until about a
quarter after. I know you guys are going to have
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these people, why would they do that?
Well, it is real simple. The reason
Saint Alphonsus wanted to deal only with the
radiologists is because the new Saint Alphonsus,
under Sandra Bruce, didn't like the Saint
Alphonsus deal that was cut in 1985.
The deal in 1985 was a community-wide
project that brought in all these hospitals.
Remember, they even offered it to St. Luke's.
They brought in all these hospitals to do a
cooperative program. And Holy Rosary joined;
Mercy joined. West Valley Medical Center joined.
And in order to protect those hospitals, they put
non-competes into that partnership agreement.
Well, the new Saint Al's didn't like
that. They didn't want that. How do you compete
in Treasure Valley, where St. Luke's is a
formidable competitor, when you are held back with
a bunch of non-competes in your partnership
agreement with MRIA?
You know, Saint Alphonsus is going to
tell you, "Oh, well, we didn't like the old
doctors at MRIA. And we didn't like MRI
Mobile" -- even though it was profitable as heck.
It's a bunch of baloney. They didn't
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stepped in front of their partners at MRIA so it
could get the deal, so it could compete with
Luke's in the Valley unencumbered by a
non-compete.
Now, you are going to hear from Saint
Alphonsus, "Well, those rads, they would have
never done the deal anyway with MRIA." They put
someone on the stand saying we didn't like them
for this, and we didn't like them for that.
Ladies and gentlemen, when you go back
into that jury room and you read those
instructions -- they are exciting -- I want you to
pay attention to Instruction No. 47 because
Instruction No. 47 sets out what needs to be
proved to show misappropriation of a partnership
opportunity.
And it says that: "The partner took a
partnership opportunity for its own benefit."
Yes.
"The partnership was or could have been
financially able to undertake the opportunity. Of
course. MRIA was very healthy. It could have
undertaken the opportunity.
"The opportunity was in line with the
partnership's business." Yeah.

like the non-compete, and they didn't want to be
encumbered by having to protect the other
hospitals that weren't part ofMRIA. Remember,
Sandra Bruce called them "competitors."
That's why when Saint Alphonsus saw the
opportunity to partner with the radiologists they
jumped all over it. This was an opportunity with
some other group, the radiologists who had no
non-compete, that was chomping at the bit to go to
Meridian, to go wherever they wanted to go,
certainly within 100-mile radius of that
non-compete in the MRIA agreement.
They loved the deal. They wanted the
deal. Why? Part of their larger strategic plan
to compete with St. Luke's.
Let's take a look at what happened in
1999.
And, Kathy, if you can bring up
Exhibit *-4125, page 23.
There it is. Now, nobody else, except
maybe you folks and the attorneys, could read this
and go, "I know the background on this. I know
what happened beforehand."
This is kind of the moment of change.
It is the point in time in which Saint Alphonsus
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"4. The opportunity is one which the
partnership had an interest or reasonable
expectancy." They were in negotiations.
And "5: That by embracing the
partnership opportunity itself, the self-interest
of the partner"-- which is Saint Al's --"was
brought into conflict with that of the
partnership."
It doesn't say here that Saint Al's can
take the partnership opportunity ifthe
radiologists didn't want to do the deal with MRIA.
That's not a defense.
In fact, I would suggest that if taking
this opportunity with the radiologists violated
their duty, I mean, watching out for the best
interests of the partnership, then it was a breach
of fiduciary duty.
You can't say, "Gosh, those guys
weren't going to get it, so I will take it."
If they couldn't have cut a deal with
MRIA --if the radiologists weren't going to cut a
deal with MRIA, Saint Alphonsus's responsibility
was to walk away.
The radiologists would have been
pleased as punch. They didn't need them. They
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didn't need them for the independent imaging
center, as long as they kept their exclusive
radiology contract so they could do reads at Saint
Alphonsus and have their own independent imaging
center without Saint Alphonsus getting 50 percent
of it. They would have loved it.
Remember how concerned the radiologists
were all the time about Saint Alphonsus trying to
take control? They didn't need them. Saint
Alphonsus made a concerted effort to hitch its
cart to the IMI horse.
So -- wait a minute, one last thing.
This isn't just about usurping an opportunity.
When I asked Cindy Schamp about *-4125, I said,
"You know, once it stopped being one big happy
family, what was left?" Competition.
Saint Alphonsus not only usurped an
opportunity -- that's bad enough -- they created a
competitor for their partners at MRIA. It was
completely within their power to do the right
thing, but their self-interest in competing with
St. Luke's, they let it get the best of them.
Now, they are going to claim, "Oh, no,
no, no. We were only non-MRI." They knew what
they were doing.
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morning and the first thing I did I said:
"Ms. Schamp, you didn't write that."
"Yes, I did."
"Well, here's the transmittal document
from Allen Hahn. He sent it to you the night -the day before you were to present it on February
1st and this is in here, so you didn't write
this."
And she looked at me and she goes:
"Well, obviously not."
You know, it is not just enough that
they were told once because there were also told
again -- and I'm trying to see if I've got the
cite to that, Kathy. It is *-4246 -- *-4247. I'm
sorry. *-4247, and I think it is page 23. In
fact, it is not there. We will move on. It is in
the Shattuck Hammond report as well. No. Missed
it. That's all right. Forget it. Let's go to
*-4125.
The other telltale document is actually
December 17th operating agreement, let's go back
to page 23, because this document, remember, this
was drafted by the lawyer for Saint Alphonsus, and
what does it say?
It says: "In the event Diversified

Let's put up *-4150. Remember this?
This is presented in February of2000 to the
senior leadership team of Saint Al's. There are,
like, 12 or 13 people, including the CEO, the COO,
the CFO, the head of employment, the head of
planning, smart people. And what they are trying
to tell you is that nobody went, "Excuse me. Just
a minute here. Don't we have a problem going
forward with IMI if we have to get the unanimous
favorable vote?"
This clearly tells them you can't
participate in the imaging business of IMI without
getting permission from your partners of 15 years.
Sandra Bruce said: "That's not what it
means. It doesn't" -- she actually said this to
me. I said: "So you are telling me it doesn't
mean how it reads?"
"Yes."
Cindy Schamp, when she was on the stand
at the end of day one she said: "I know what it
means because I wrote it."
Do you remember that: I know what it
means because I wrote it?
I was driving home that night and I am
thinking, that isn't right. I got here the next
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Care is not restricted by any contract or
otherwise from participating in a center providing
magnetic resonance imaging ... "
Well, what does IMI do? It is a Center
that provides all modalities, including magnetic
resonance imaging. They acknowledge the existence
of a contract, which is the MRIA partnership
agreement, that prohibited them from participating
in an imaging center that provides magnetic
resonance imaging.
Not a totally earth-shattering concept
when you look at the partnership agreement, which
is *-4023, at page 16. Because the partnership
agreement, at the top, 9.2.1, defines the
competitive-- what is the competitive activity.
What can't a partner do?
Well, a partner can't engage in
competitive activity. What is that? That's a
business activity in which the partnership is
engaged. Well, what MRIA engaged in? They are
engaged in imaging centers that provide magnetic
resonance imaging. It is a competitive activity.
Let's talk about Exhibit *-4226, which
is the operating agreement that was ultimately
executed in July of2001. That's the one where
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it. Two consultants told them the same thing.
*-4125, that's the December agreement.
Jeff Cliffs testimony. Remember, I
took him through examination and said: "Can you
divide up IMI?"
"It is one business, yes."
"One receptionist?"
"Yes."
"One front door?"
"Yes."
"One name?"
"Yes."
"One management fee?"
"Yes."
I asked him: "Is the IMI operating
agreement really solely non-MRI?
He said: "No."
That's Jeff Cliff. He is the executive
director ofiMI. They supported technology,
marketing, planning, and management
indiscriminately as between non-MRI and MRI.
The operating agreement covers
Meridian. They knew Meridian was going to have a
magnet in it, and it includes an MRI clause.
I want to talk just for a moment about
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We have requests for assistance. Huh?
Requests for assistance by Jack Floyd, Jim
Prochaska to Saint Alphonsus: Please help us with
coverage in the lab; please tell us what is going
on with the reduced hours. They never got a
letter back from Saint Alphonsus saying, "Hey, we
can't help you." They never took that position.
We have the testimony of Joe Messmer,
which was great testimony. Basically, here's the
CEO ofMercy, and he said: "You know, if anybody
ever suggested that I didn't control the
radiologists who were performing in my MRI and
they were taking the position that they didn't
have a responsibility to cover outpatients for
that MRI, we'd have a meeting. And ifthey
weren't going to cover outpatients for that MRI, I
would find another group."
Show me the contract provision. How
many times did you hear me say that? Could you
plea show me in this contract where it
distinguishes between inpatients and outpatients?
I got two answers: "I'm not aware,"
and, "I can't show you."
All right. Enough of this, which comes
to damages. I am going to cover damages quickly

Giles and the non-MRI designation because really
what this is it is another way of saying: "If it
was good enough for Giles, it was good enough for
the hospital."
You know what happened to Dave Giles
because he had a relationship with MRIA? Tried to
keep it separate, his relationship with the
Imaging Center by designating his investment
"non-MRI." He is gone. The radiologists made him
step down, and they substituted for David Giles
another MRIA partner, the hospital.
THE COURT: Ten minutes, Mr. Banducci.
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor. Your
Honor, I think I may go probably 20, and I will
just take that off of my overture.
We couldn't control the radiologists-is that all right, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Just better be sure the jury
gets their lunch.
MR. BANDUCCI: I will submit we couldn't
control the radiologists first.
We couldn't control the radiologists.
The first proceeding testimony, everything in the
first proceeding admits that the radiology
contract covers inpatients and outpatients.
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at this point, and then we are going into more
discussion per Mr. Romatowski, and I have a chance
to return.
Three categories of damages. Okay?
Real simple. Frankly, you have lost profits. We
have a remedy called "disgorgement," and we have a
remedy called "diminution in value." And I will
explain how this fits in into this verdict form
when I return.
Diminution in value. Let's show
*-5011. I am going to talk about lost profits
quickly first. Look at this slope, as it is
almost symmetrical. It is almost symmetrical. As
MRI is going down at a one-to-one slope, with the
blue line, the chartreuse line is going up at the
same slope. My partners have been making fun of
me ever since.
Now, let me ask you this question:
When you see a graph like this and then you go
into the records of IMI and MRI Center and you
find that the doctors who were over here -- in
fact, let me show you. The doctors who were at
MRI Center are migrating and showing up -- this is
a really ugly drawing.
It makes -- they are going from here,
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minutes talking about 1985, talking about
investment, talking about the doctors and how much
they didn't have to invest.
I have to say that $12,000 of
investment in initial investment isn't going to
buy you an MRI machine. I think we all know that.
There was more debt. But the implication was the
doctors made a lot of money so that justifies us
taking advantage ofthem 15 years later. I don't
think so.
They didn't address what happened in
December '99, did they? Did you see Exhibit
*-4125 go up there and have anybody explain to you
why that happened? Why all of a sudden they went
from the non-MRI side of the negotiation and all
of a sudden Saint Alphonsus is hanging out talking
about MRI, talking about giving the rads 50
percent of the MRI Center and swapping that for
the IMI interest in MRI. That's not non-MRI in
case anybody didn't notice, right? They step in
front of the opportunity. They usurp it.
You can't stand here and say we never
usurped an opportunity and not back it up. That's
what that document showed.
That's what Cindy Schamp said. I asked
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hospital, goes to MRI Center and is an outpatient.
And then, you know, he is not our problem.
You know those are the patients -- two
I believe, and let's blow up "clinical duties."
Okay.
Clinical duties. Remember
Mr. Romatowski said, "They don't mention MRI
Center anywhere"?
Well, you all know that magnetic
resonance "perform all physician clinical imaging
services in the Medical Center, including without
limitation, all" --all is said twice in the same
sentence.
Now, setting aside the fact that that's
not very good style, it does mean all. All
imaging services for all magnetic resonance
imaging. And you know the answer to this
question. What's the only magnetic resonance
imager on Saint Alphonsus' campus? MRI Center.
So there you have it. This is a
provision in the contract. Mr. Romatowski showed
you the introductory language in the recitals on
the first page. It may not even be binding.
This is what the radiologists agreed to
do. They agreed to provide all x-ray, magnetic

Cindy Schamp what happened when that -- that term
regarding MRI Center, migrated-- I think I used
the word was "absorbed" into the non-MRI side of
the agreement and what happened?
She said, "Well, they"-- she agreed
with me. "There was no longer one, big, happy
family."
"What was left?"
"Competition."
Competition between IMI and MRIA.
They didn't address the smoking gun,
*-4150, May 2000: You cannot involve yourself and
participate in the imaging business ofiMI without
a majority -- without a unanimous vote of the
board of partners. You need to talk about it.
You know, accountability,
accountability. Stand up and take responsibility
for your actions. They didn't do it, and they
certainly didn't do it with the radiologists.
Let's put up *-4033.
I think this is probably one of most
sad, it is one of the saddest things to see a
hospital do. You know, Mr. Romatowski, Saint
Alphonsus says: We are all about patient care,
except if somebody comes in the front door of our
Page 6812
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resonance imaging at the Medical Center.
It doesn't say just for inpatients,
outpatients, ED patients. All patients.
Everybody. You come into the hospital, you are a
patient. You come into my law firm, you are a
client. You go into the grocery store, you are a
customer. You go into the hospital, you are a
patient. You see what I'm saying? This is just a
lack of accountability.
On top of that, it is just wrong for
them to be saying we don't have this
responsibility to our patients when the first
words out of Mr. Romatowski's mouth is we are all
about healthcare. We are all about patient care.
There is an asterisk: We are all about patient
care if you're an inpatient. But, you know,
sorry. We are not going to take care of you if
you are an outpatient.
And, you know, I admit I got a little
carried away with little Sally or Susie from
Caldwell with the brain tumor who didn't know when
she went in to get an MRI for her brain tumor that
she wasn't going to get the quality of radiologic
services that she would have under this contract.
But, really, seriously, that's how
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PROCEEDINGS
These matters came before the Court on June 5, 2007, upon Saint Alphonsus

18

Diversified Care, Inc., and Saint Alphonsus Medical Center, Inc.'s Motion for Partial
19

Summary Judgment on the Fourth Claim for Relief in Second Amended Counterclaim.
20
21

Following oral argument by counsel the Court took the matter under advisement.

BACKGROUND

22

23

This

litigation stems from Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care's ("SADC")

24

dissociation from an Idaho limited liability partnership, MRI Associates, LLP rMRIA").

25

On October 18, 2004, SADC filed an action against MAlA to determine the buyout

26

terms of its dissociation under Idaho law. In turn, MRIA filed a counterclaim against
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SADC, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("SARMC")
2
3

141003/012

1

(collectively "Saint

Alphonsus") alleging breach of contract and wrongful dissociation, breach of fiduciary
duty, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Both the

4

Plaintiff's Complaint and the Defendant's Counterclaim sought declaratory relief and

5

damages. The Defendant then filed its First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party

s

Complaint on March 7, 2006, adding fifteen (15) new claims against SARMC and three

7

(3) third-parties-Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC C'IMI"), Gem State Radiology,

8

LLP ("GSA"), and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP ("ICR"). Then on March 2, 2007,

9

the Defendant filed a Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
10

Complaint.
11

On April 13, 2007, Saint Alphonsus filed their present Motion for Partial

12
13

Summary Judgment on the Fourth Claim for Relief in Second Amended Counterclaim.
LEGAL STANDARD

14
15

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) states that summary judgment shall be

16

rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the

17

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

18

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment may be

19

rendered upon an entire case or discrete claims or issues. See I.R.C.P. 56(d). To
20

defeat a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party may not simply rely upon
21

22

mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts in an affidavit

23

presenting a genuine issue of fact for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125

24

Idaho 208,211,868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994}. On a motion for summary judgment, all

25

facts and inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v.

26
1

SADC is an Idaho nonprofit corporation whose sole voting member is SARMC.
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Hollingsworth, M.D. eta/., 136ldaho 800,41 P.3d 228 (2001).

DISCUSSION

2
3

Saint Alphonsus requests the Court to enter an order granting summary

4

judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus regarding MRIA's fourth claim of relief for alleged

s

breach of fiduciary duty owed to MAl Limited and MRI Mobile Limited as alleged in the

6

Second Amended Counterclaim.

7
8

Saint Alphonsus argued that SADC, a partner in

MRIA, as a matter of law did not owe a fiduciary duty to the limited partnerships known
as MRI Limited Partnership or MRI Mobile Limited Partnership.

Additionally, Saint

9

Alphonsus asserted SARMC, as a matter of law, did not owe a fiduciary duty to MRI
10

Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership as a result of SARMC's role as
11
12

a limited partner. Saint Alphonsus maintained neither the common law nor a statute

13

creates a fiduciary duty upon either SADC or SARMC on behalf of MRI Limited

14

Partnership or MRI Mobile Limited Partnership.

1s

In opposition to Saint Alphonsus' motion, MRIA first argued Saint Alphonsus

16

owed a fiduciary duty to MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

17

under the Idaho Uniform Partnership Act. Next, MRIA argued Saint Alphonsus owed a

18

fiduciary to MRI Limited Partnership and MAl Mobile Limited Partnership because it

19

was a member of the board directing the business of MRI Limited Partnership and MRI
20

Mobile Umited Partnership. Finally, MRIA argued the common law imposes a fiduciary
21

22
23

duty upon Saint Alphonsus because of the special trust and confidence MRIA placed in
Saint Alphonsus.

24

The factual background for purposes of this motion is not intensely contested.

25

MRIA, an Idaho limited liability partnership, was founded in April 1985. The original

26

members of MRIA were Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc. ("DMR"), SADC, Mednow,
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Inc. and HCA of Idaho, Inc. SADC was a general partner in MRIA until it dissociated
2
3

effective April 1, 2004. The business and affairs of MRIA were to be conducted through
a Board of Partners. As the MRIA partnership agreement states, "[t]he business and

4

affairs of the Partnership shall be conducted by the Partners through a Board of

5

Partners, which Board is vested with all authority and responsibility necessary for the

6

management of the Partnership and its business." Within the Board, DMR had the right

7

to designate five members; SADC had the right to appoint two members; and the other

8

entities immaterial to this litigation had the right to designate the remaining three

9

members to the Board.
10

In August 1985, pursuant to the MRIA partnership agreement, MRIA formed MRI
11

12

Limited Partnership ("MRICI").

MRIA was the general partner of MRICI.

Then in

13

August 1988, pursuant to the MRIA partnership agreement, MRIA also formed MRI

14

Mobile Limited Partnership ("MAIM"). MAlA was the general partner of MAIM. SARMC

15

was a limited partner with no management rights in both MRICI and MAIM.

16
17

In light of this background, the Fourth Claim for Relief contained within MRIA's
Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third Party Complaint states:

18
19

20
21

22
23

24
25

26

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Against SARMC: Breach of Fiduciary Duties to MRI Limited and MRI
Mobil [sic] Limited)
84. The allegations included in all of the foregoing paragraphs are
incorporated by reference and made part hereof.
85. Before dissociation, SARMC owed MRIA certain fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care pursuant to I.C. § 53-3-404.
86. As a general partner, MRIA owes (and at all relevant times
owed) MRI Limited and MAl Mobile Limited certain fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care pursuant to I.C. § 53-2-408.
87. As a partner in the MAlA general partnership, [sic] SARMC
therefore owed MRI Limited and MRI Mobile Limited certain fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care and is jointly and severally liable fo [sic] the
general partnership's obligations pursuant to I. C. § 53-3~306.
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88. On information and belief, SARMC breached its fiduciary duties
owed to MRI Limited and MRI Mobile Limited by, inter alia, competing with
MRIA , MRI Limited, MRIA Mobile Limited, by co-opting partnership
opportunities, dealing with MRIA, MRI Limited and/or MRI Mobile Limited
an its/their own behalf and on behalf of SARG/GSRICR [sic} and IMi [sic]
when such entities had interests adverse to MRIA, MRI Mobile [sic]
Limited, and/or MRI Mobile Limited, While [sic] on the MRIA Board, voting
in opposition to MRIA and MRI Mobile growth initiatives, and wrongfully
dissociating from the general partnership.
89. As a result of these breaches of fiduciary duties, MRIA, in the
name of MRI Limited and MR\ Mobile Limited, has been damages in an
amount to be proved at trial.
Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third Party Complaint, p.27.

9

Although MAlA's Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third Party

10

Complaint primarily relies upon a statutorily created fiduciary duty, the Court

11

acknowledges the existence of a fiduciary duty can arise pursuant to statute or under

12

common law. The Court therefore will analyze the parties' arguments with respect to

13

both theories.

14
15

16
17

18

I. Whether Saint Alphonsus owed a Fiduciary Duty to MRICI or MRIM
Pursuant a Statute
"To establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiff must establish that
defendants owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty and that the fiduciary duty was breached."

Sorensen v. Saint A/phonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., lnc.i 141 Idaho 754, 760, 118 P.3d 86, 92

19

(2005) (quoting Tolley v. THI Co., 140 Idaho 253, 261, 92 P.3d 503, 511 (2004)}. The
20

21
22

first step in determining whether or not there has been a breach of fiduciary duty is to
establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship. ''A fiduciary relation exists between

23

two parties when one is under a duty to act or to give advice for the benefit of the other

24

upon a matter within the scope of the relation.n Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services,

25

Inc., 123 Idaho 937, 946, 854 P.2d 280, 289 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing RESTATEMENT

26

(SECOND) OF TORTS§ 874 comment a (1979)). Undeniably a fiduciary relationship
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can be created by statute. See, e.g., I. C.§§ 53-2-408 and 53-3-404.
1

2

A. Idaho Limited Partnership Act
SARMC was a limited partner in MRICI and MRIM, but this does not create a

4

fiduciary relationship.

5

Partnership Act establishing that limited partners owe a fiduciary duty to the limited

6

partnership. See I.C. §§ 53-201 to 53-268. As such, any fiduciary relationship owed to

7
8

The Court cannot find any provision of the Idaho Limited

MRICI and MRIM must exist as a result of SAOC being a general partner in MRIA.

B. Uniform Partnership Act

9

Undeniably, SADC, as a general partner in MRIA, owed MRIA a fiduciary duty.
10
11
12

I.C. § 53-3-404. But the question presently before the Court is whether the Uniform
Partnership Act '1merges partnerships and their general partners into a single legal

13

identity'' as asserted by MRIA, thus creating a fiduciary relationship between SADC and

14

the entities operated by MRIA, i.e. MRICI and MRIM.

15

Much of MRIA's argument is premised upon Idaho Code § 53-3-306 which

16

creates joint and several liability among partners for all obligations of the partnership.

17

However, an express exception to this general rule reads in relevant part,

~~[a]n

18

obligation of a partnership incurred while the partnership is a limited partnership,
19

whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, is solely the obligation of the partnership.
20
21

22

I.C. § 5303-SOS(c). MRIA is an Idaho limited liability partnership. Therefore, MRIA's
argument that Idaho Code § 53-3-306 merges partnerships and their general partners

23

into a single legal identity is misplaced. As a general partner in MRIA, SADC are not

24

jointly and severally liable for all the obligations of MRIA.

25

Similarly, the Court is unpersuaded by MAlA's argument that Idaho Code § 53-3-

26

301 creates a fiduciary relationship between SADC and both MRICI and MAIM. This
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section of the Uniform Partnership Act merely sets forth an individual partner's authority
2
3

to bind the partnership to third-parties based upon each partner being an "agent" of the
partnership. The Court cannot find this provision of the Uniform Partnership Act, or all

4

the provisions of the Act read together, creates a fiduciary relationship between a

s

general partner in a limited liability partnership and the limited partnerships operated by

6

the limited liability partnership.

7
8

In conclusion, the Court cannot find a fiduciary relationship between SADC and
MRICI/MRIM is created by statute. The Court will not infer a fiduciary duty from the

9

statutory obligation a general partner owes a partnership plus the statutory obligation
10

imposed upon a general partner in a limited partnership somehow results in the
11
12

fiduciary duty as asserted between SADC and MRICI/MRIM. Although MRIA argued

13

such a finding would produce absurd results, this Court does not possess the authority

14

to create a statutory obligation where one does not exist.

15

11. Whether Saint Alphonsus owed a Fiduciary Duty to MRICI or MRIM under
Common Law

16

17

Though fiduciary relationships arise in limited circumstances, the common law

18

recognizes various circumstances when one party is under a duty to act or to give

19

advice for the benefit of the other party.

20
21

22
23

"A fiduciary relationship does not depend upon some technical relation created
by or defined in law, but it exists in cases where there has been

a special

confidence

imposed in another who, in equity and good conscience, is bound to act in good faith
and with due regard to the interest of one reposing the confidence."

Steams v.

24

Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 288, 240 P.2d 833, 840-41 (1952) (citing Staab v. Staab, 160
25

Kan. 417, 163 P.2d 418; Renegar v. Bruning, 190 Okl. 340, 123 P.2d 686; Dyblie v.
26

Dyblie, 389 Ill. 326, 59 N.E.2d 657; and Szekeres v. Reed, 96 Cai.App.2d 348, 215
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p .2d 522). "The facts and circumstances must indicate that the one reposing the trust
2
3

has foundation for his belief that the one giving advice or presenting arguments is
acting not in his own behalf, but in the interests of the other party." Burwell v. South

4

carolina Nat. Bank, 288 S.C. 34, 340 S.E.2d 786, 790 (1986) (quoted in Idaho First

s

Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 278, 824 P.2d 841, 853 (1991)).

6

Quoting the Supreme Court of Kansas, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated:

7

A fiduciary relationship imparts a position of peculiar confidence placed by
one individual in another. A fiduciary is a person with a duty to act
primarily for the benefit of another. A fiduciary is in a position to have and
exercise, and does have and exercise influence over another. A fiduciary
relationship implies a condition of superiority of one of the parties over the
other. Generally. in a fiduciary relationship. the property. interest or
authority of the other is placed in the charge of the fiduciarv....

a
9
10
11
12

Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 277, 824 P.2d 841,

13

852 (1991) (emphasis in original) (quoting Dennison State Bank v. Madeira, 640 P.2d

14

1235, 1241-42 (Kan. 1982)).

15

16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23

Similarly, also in Bliss Valley Foods, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted the South
Carolina Supreme Court for the following description:
The term fiduciary implies that one party is in a superior position to the
other and that such a position enables him to exercise influence over one
who reposes special trust and confidence in him.... As a general rule,
mere respect for anothe~s judgment or trust in this character is usually not
sufficient to establish such a relationship. The facts and circumstances
must indicate that the one reposing the trust has foundation for his belief
that the one giving advice or presenting arguments is acting not in his own
behalf, but in the interests of the other pa~.
/d. at 278, 824 P.2d at 853 (quoting Burwell v. South Carolina Nat. Bank, 288 S.C. 34,
340 S.E.2d 786, 790 (1986)) (emphasis in original).

24

Additionally, the Idaho Court of Appeals has provided an arguably non25

26

exhaustive list suggesting, "[e]xamples of relationships from which the law will impose
fiduciary obligations on the parties include when the parties are: members of the same
MEMORANDUM DECISION- CASE NO. CVOC0408219D ·PAGE 9
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family, partners, attorney and client, executor and beneficiary of an estate, principal and
1
2

3

agent, insurer and insured, or close friends." Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837,
844, 820 P.2d 707, 714 (Ct. App. 1991).

4

Idaho appellate courts have also identified relations that do not give rise to a

s

fiduciary relationship as a matter of law. See, e.g., Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143

6

Idaho 595, 150 P.3d 288, 296 (2006) ("a debtor-creditor relationship does not give rise

7

to a fiduciary duty"); and Wade Baker & Sons Farms v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of

8

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 1361daho 922, 928, 42 P.3d 715, 722 (Ct.

9

App. 2002) ("no fiduciary duty ordinarily arises between parties to an arm's length
10

business transaction").
11
12

After reviewing the entire record and construing all reasonable inferences in

1 ~ favor of the non-moving party, MRIA in this instance, the Court finds a reasonable juror
14

could find a fiduciary relationship existed between SADC and MRICI/MRIM.

15

though the evidence presented in this case shows SADC and the limited partnerships

16

share none of the relationships prescribed in Mitchell, the Court cannot as a matter of

17
18

Even

law find that SADC was not in a position to exercise influence over the limited
partnerships.

Acknowledging that SADC representatives only had two of ten votes,

19

SADC representatives nonetheless sat on the MRIA Board of Partners that managed
20

both MRICI and MRIM. The MRIA partnership agreement provides that the business
21
22

and affairs of MRIA were to be conducted by the Board. And MRICI and MAIM were

23

the business and affairs of MRIA.

Viewed in light most favorable to MRIA, SADC

24

representatives were placed in charge of MRICI and MRIM. Moreover, these facts and

25

circumstances suggest MRICI and MRIM were not unreasonable in believing SADC

26

would act in the best interests of the limited partnerships when exercising the authority
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placed upon SADC representatives as Board members.
2

The Court finds the question of whether a fiduciary relationship is present

3

between SADC and the limited partnerships is a question more appropriate for the trier

4

of fact, thus precluding the entry of summary judgment upon this issue. Unlike the

s

question previously posited by the Third-Party Defendants, the Court in this instance

6

cannot conclude that a reasonable juror could not find a fiduciary relationship existed

7
6

between SADC and MRICI/MRIM as a matter of law. This is due to the unique manner
in which these partnerships were organized, structured, and operated as set forth on

9

the record before this Court.
10

CONCLUSION

11

12

For the reasons specified above, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and

13

Saint Alphonsus Medical Center, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the

14

Fourth Claim for Relief in Second Amended Counterclaim is hereby DENIED
.
. . -..

15

DATED this

__j_2._ day of June, 2007.

16
17

18

I AEL McLAUGHLIN
DISTRICT JUDGE

19
20

21

22
23

24

25
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION· CASE NO. CVOC0408219D ·PAGE 11

003473

- - - -208287752~
---

06/13/2007 13:02 FAX

- ---·

---

_ _ _Jli_STRICT COURT

141012/012

CERTIFI~TE OF MAILING

1hereby certify that on the
2

3
4

s
s
7
8

e

J5

day of June 2007, I mailed (served) a true and

correct copy of the within instrument to:
THOMAS A. BANDUCCI
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER
815 W. WASHINGTON ST.
BOISE, ID 83702
VIA FACSIMILE: 319-2601
JACKS. GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
P.0. BOX 2837
BOISE, 10 83701
VIA FACSIMILE: 336-9177

10
11

12
13

14
15
16

PATRICK J. MILLER
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
P.O. BOX2720
BOISE, ID 83701
VIA FACSIMILE: 388~1300
WARREN E. JONES
EBERLE BERLIN KADING TURNBOW
McKLVEEN & JONES, CHTD
P .0. BOX 1368
BOISE, ID 83701
VIA FACSIMILE: 344-8542

17

20

RODNEY R. SAETRUM
AITORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 7425
BOISE, ID 83702
VIA FACSIMILE: 336-0448

21

W. ANTHONY PARK

18

19

22
23

HUNTLEY PARK
P.O. BOX 2188
BOISE, ID 83701
VIA FACSIMILE: 388-0234

24
25
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION- CASE NO. CVOC0408219D- PAGE 12

003474

AUG 0 6 2010
J. OAVU..J

~-.1'\vMnnv, v1erk

ByL.AMES
DEPUTY

EXHIBIT

I

D

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04082 19D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BASED ON THE LEGAL
INSUFFICIENCY OF MRIA'S
EVIDENCE OF LOST PROFITS

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
VS.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
Counter-Claimants (collectively, "MRIA") seek to recover "lost profits" based on the
contention that Saint Alphonsus's pre-dissociation conduct caused the diversion of business from
MRI Center and MRI Mobile to their competitor Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC ("IMI").

See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assoc., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, ---,224 P.3d
1068, 1086-87 (2009). [n support of this claim for lost profits, MRIA relies on expert testimony
that "assume[s]" without any evidence that Saint Alphonsus's alleged misconduct caused all of
the cited business migration. Id at---, 224 P.3d at 1087. The Supreme Court instructed this
Court to consider on remand whether this assumption is sufficient under Pope v. Intermountain

Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988 (1982), which held that a plaintiff must present evidence
distinguishing between the portion of business lost as a result of the defendant's misconduct and
the portion lost as a result of other factors, such as a competitor's proper entry into the

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF lTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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003476

competitive marketplace. 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1087. Because MRIA's evidence here
fails to create a genuine issue for trial under Pope, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to summary
judgment on the legal inadequacy of this evidence, and, therefore, on all of MRIA' s claims for
which it seeks to recover lost profits.

BACKGROUND
The background and procedural history of this case is set forth in Saint Alphonsus' s
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment on MRIA' s claim for wrongful
dissociation, filed concurrently herewith. As described therein, MRIA advances two separate
theories of damages, including a "purchase price" theory relating to the claim for wrongful
dissociation, and a "lost scans" or "lost profits" theory that purports to measure the damages
caused in connection with all non-dissociation causes of action-i.e., the claims for breach of the
partnership agreement's non-compete clause, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, interference with prospective contractual relations, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil
conspiracy. See Opp. to Mot. for J.N.O.V. and Mot. for New Trial, at 1-3 (Oct. 24, 2007).
MRIA's "lost profits" measure of damages is based on the theory that, by allegedly
providing assistance to IMI, a competitor ofMRI Center and MRI Mobile, Saint Alphonsus
helped IMI win scan business that otherwise would have gone to MRI Center or MRI Mobile.
MRIA's expert, Bruce Budge, identified three categories of scans (and profits) that allegedly
migrated from MRI Center and/or MRI Mobile to IMI: (i) scans performed by IMI at its
downtown Boise location, (ii) scans performed by IMI at its Meridian location, and (iii) scans
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performed by IMI at Saint Alphonsus's Boise campus. Trial Ex. 4417 (Tab 8) at 11; see also
Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 273 8. 1
With respect to IMI's downtown Boise and Meridian locations, Budge determined the
number of scans performed by IMI for patients referred to those locations by physicians who
either were exclusively affiliated with Saint Alphonsus or had referred patients to MRI Center
before IMI opened. See Trial Ex. 4417 (Tab 8) at 13-14 & n.S; Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2738-39,
2741-46. This was, according to Budge, MRIA's "historical[]" "customer base." Trial Tr. (Tab
10) at 2739. Budge then "assumed" that all of these scans would have been performed by MRI
Center but for Saint Alphonsus's alleged misconduct. See Trial Ex. 4417 (Tab 8) at 13-14 & n.S;
Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2741-47, 2756-59. This assumption accounted for approximately $13.9
million in alleged historical lost scan profits ($9.4 million from IMI downtown and $4.5 million
from IMI Meridian). See Trial Ex. 4417 (Tab 8) at 13-14 & n.S; Trial Ex. 4520 (Tab 11). 2
Budge similarly assumed that that MRI Center would have performed all of the scans that IMI
performed at its facility on the Saint Alphonsus campus, amounting to another $1.4 million in
alleged historica11ost profits. See Trial Ex. 4417 (Tab 8) at 12; Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2747; Trial
Ex. 4520 (Tab 11 ).

1

"Tab" numbers refer to the binder of Record Documents in Support of Saint Alphonsus's
Motions for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings, submitted herewith.
2

Budge's expert report alternatively calculated lost scan profits based on "the
assumption" that MRIA would have won all of the scans performed at IMI's Meridian facility,
see Trial Ex. 4417 (Tab 8) at 13-14, but Budge did not present, or rely upon, this alternative
calculation at trial, see Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2810-11.
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MRIA's other expert, Charles Wilhoite, extrapolated Budge's data for the year 2006 in
order to determine MRI Center's and MRI Mobile's projected future lost profits through 2015
and 2023. See Trial Ex. 4522 (Tab 9) at 13-15. 3 As Budge did for past scans, Wilhoite for future
scans "assum[ed]" that all of IMI' s scans referred by the identified physicians "would have been
realized by MRIA" but for Saint Alphonsus's alleged assistance to IMI. !d. at 14. This resulted
in present-value estimates of future lost profits of $14.9 million (through 2015) and $20.9 million
(through 2023). !d. at 15.4
On appeal, Saint Alphonsus challenged, among other things, the legal and factual
sufficiency ofMRIA's proof of past and future lost scan profits. Though the Supreme Court's
decision to order a new trial made it unnecessary to decide the adequacy of MRIA's "lost
profits" evidence, the Court elected to "briefly address this issue" and, in doing so, raised
substantial doubt about the sufficiency ofMRIA's evidence. 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1087.
The Court began by emphasizing that MRIA' s expert, Budge, had "assumed" without
evidence that, for two categories of physicians, Saint Alphonsus's alleged misconduct caused the
entirety of the business migration that had occurred from MRI Center to IMI' s downtown Boise
location. !d. at---, 224 P.3d at 1086-87. The Court noted Saint Alphonsus's "argu[ment] that
MRIA could not simply assume" without evidence that "none of those physicians would have
3

The Supreme Court subsequently held that MRIA cannot recover damages beyond
2015. See Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1086.
4

Like Budge's report, Wilhoite's report alternatively calculated lost scan profits based on
"the assumption" that MRIA would have won all of the scans performed at IMI' s Meridian
facility, see Trial Ex. 4522 (Tab 9) at 14-15, but Wilhoite did not present this alternative
calculation at trial, see Trial Tr. (Tab 12) at 2860-61.
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referred patients to Intermountain Imaging for MRI scans but for St. Alphonsus's wrongful
conduct." !d. at---, 224 P.3d at 1087. And, in response to this argument, the Court quoted
extensively from its previous decision in Pope, 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988, which rejected, as
inadequate proof of a plaintiffs lost profits, an approach that '"assumes, without any support in
the record, that [a competitor] would not have won any portion of the ... market absent [the
defendant's alleged wrongdoing]."' Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1087. The
Court held that the "concerns expressed in Pope should be considered" on remand. Id
ARGUMENT

MRIA's "lost profits" theory of damages, and the claims that depend upon it, fail as a
matter oflaw because MRIA cannot point to record evidence showing what portion (if any) of
the scans that MRI Center and MRI Mobile allegedly lost to IMI were caused by Saint
Alphonsus's alleged misconduct, rather than by other factors such as IMI's presence in the
competitive marketplace. The only evidence in the record on this point is the unsupported
"assumption" ofMRIA's experts that Saint Alphonsus's alleged assistance to JMI was
responsible for 100% of the alleged business migration from MRIA's "historical[]" "customer
base" (Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2739) to IMI. Such an assumption is insufficient to create a genuine
issue for trial, as the Supreme Court made clear in the very case (Pope) that it instructed this
Court to apply to MRIA's damages theory on remand.
As to MRIA's proof relating to its "lost profits" theory of damages, the Supreme Court
stated:
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The lost profits evidence offered by MRIA was based upon "lost
scans." MRIA's expert determined which physicians referred
patients to MRI Center and/or MRI Mobile prior to Intermountain
Imaging opening. He assumed that all MRI scans later performed
at Intermountain Imaging for patients of those physicians would
have been done at MRI Center and/or MRI Mobile but for St.
Alphonsus's wrongful conduct.
He also assumed that all
physicians who were admitted to St. Alphonsus only and who had
not previously referred patients to MRIA prior to Intermountain
Imaging opening would have referred all of their patients needing
MRI scans to MRI Center and/or MRI Mobile but for St.
Alphonsus's wrongful conduct. This assumption as to MRIA's
lost scans was the basis for the past and future lost profits allegedly
suffered by MRI Center and MRI Mobile.
148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1087.
In Pope the trial court had awarded lost-profit damages for antitrust violations based on
the defendant's total revenues during the period that the violations occurred. 103 Idaho at 222,
646 P .2d at 993. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning-in language that it quoted in
reviewing this case-that "[s]uch a method of figuring damages assumes, without any support in
the record, that the [defendant's] operation would not have won any portion of the ... market
absent" the defendant's misconduct. 103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005, quoted in Saint

Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1087. In the context of claims for lost business or lost
profits, in other words, a plaintiff may not simply presume that its loss is equivalent to its
competitor's gain. Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 847, 172 P.3d 1119,
1122 (2007).

Pope and Trilogy Network are specific applications of the principle that "[t]he burden is
upon the plaintiff to prove not only that it was injured, but that its injury was the result of the
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defendant's breach; both amount and causation must be proven with reasonable certainty."
Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604, 611 (2007). Moreover,
"the trier of fact must be able to find, reasonably, that the inference linking the defendant's
conduct to the damage is more probable than an inference connecting the loss to other causes."
Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 919, 684 P.2d 314, 321 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Nw. Bee-Corp v.
Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 840, 41 P.3d 263, 268 (2002) (affirming district court's grant
of summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had failed as a matter of law to establish
damage causation). Thus, damages may not be awarded for business losses where "the evidence
does not support a finding that all ofth[ose] losses ... were the result ofthe [defendants']
breaches." Twin Falls Farm & City Distrib., Inc. v. D & B Supply Co., 96 Idaho 351, 360, 528
P.2d 1286, 1295 (1974) (emphasis added); see also Synthes Spine Co. v. Walden, No. 04-CV4140,2006 WL 3053317, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2006) (improper to assume "that 100% of[a
company's] business losses" are attributable to a competitor's misconduct where the plaintiff
"never attempted to isolate the effect of other causes on the volume of sales," including, for
example, "the entry of [the competitor] into the competitive marketplace"). 5
There is no doubt that MRIA' s "lost scan" damages proof is deficient under these
decisions. In its argument to the Supreme Court, MRIA conceded that its experts, Budge and

5

As one court has explained, to accept a damages award based on the difference between
the plaintiffs revenues before and after the defendant's misconduct would ''make a joke of the
concept of expert knowledge" where the plaintiff's expert "ascribe[s] the entire difference
between these revenue streams ... to [the defendant's] misconduct, and none to ... lawful
competition." Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Wilhoite, had recognized "the fact that IMI would have taken scans away from MRIA even if
[Saint Alphonsus] had not supported IMI." See MRIA's Appellate Br. at 52, available at 2008
WL 5328238. Nevertheless, in calculating how many scans MRIA "lost" to IMI's downtown
Boise and Meridian locations as a result of the assistance allegedly provided to IMI by Saint
Alphonsus, Budge included every scan from every doctor who had previously referred scans to
Center but then switched to IMI, as well as every scan from every doctor affiliated only with
Saint Alphonsus. See Trial Ex. 4417 (Tab 8) at 14; Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2738-39,2741-46. In
other words, Budge's damages estimates are based on the assumption that, but for Saint
Alphonsus's alleged assistance, IMI would not have won any business-not a single scan-from
the physicians constituting what he contends was MRI Center's "historical[]" "customer base."
Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2739.
Budge does not explain how or why all these changes in referrals were caused by Saint
Alphonsus's alleged misconduct, but rather "assum[es]" it, as though some other evidence will
establish causation:
A. [Budge:] I'm assuming that without that course of conduct,
that migration would not have occurred.
Q. And you're not here to say that the bad acts caused it; you're
assuming that they caused it?
A. I'm not offering testimony on that. Logically, I need to
understand the causation, and it seems reasonable. But I'm not
weighing in on that.
Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2785-86, see also id. at 2792 ("Q. Yes or no, Mr. Budge: Doesn't logic
dictate that ifiMI ran into a very formidable competitor, IMI, in 1999, logic certainly follows as
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to why IMI' s business would flourish and MRI' s business would begin to tail off? A. It could
explain it."); id. at 2801-02 ("Q. But for the purpose of your analysis, you were asked to assume
that these bad acts caused this picture, true? [Objection overruled.] A. Yes.") And in
extrapolating for future lost profits from 2006 to 2023, Wilhoite, simply "started ... where Mr.
Budge left off," adopting Budge's "assumption" that all IMI business from the identified
physicians constituting MRIA's historical customer base "would have been realized by MRIA."
Trial Ex. 4522 (Tab 9) at 13-14; Trial Tr. (Tab 12) at 2860-61.
This approach plainly fails to establish that Saint Alphonsus actually caused all of the
changed referrals or to show what portion of those changed referrals were caused by Saint
Alphonsus' s conduct. Budge does not dispute that IMI would have existed regardless of Saint
Alphonsus's actions, as MRIA conceded before the Supreme Court. See supra pp. 8-9. But he
nevertheless completely ignores the effects of "the entry of [IMI] into the competitive
marketplace," Synthes Spine Co., 2006 WL 3053317, at *16, and simply "assumes ... that (IMI]
would not have won any portion of [this business] absent [Saint Alphonsus's conduct]," Pope,
103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005.
Nor is there any other evidence in the record to fill the evidentiary gap. Indeed, there is
no evidence that even one single physician-let alone all of those in the two categories of
physicians at issue-actually changed his referring practices as a result of Saint Alphonsus's
actions. Budge candidly admitted that he did not seek such evidence. Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at
2801-02 ("I didn't interview any doctors."); accord id. at 2818-19. But contrary to Budge's bare
assumption, several physicians gave unrebutted trial testimony that they began referring to IMI
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because of the identity and reputation of the IMI radiologists reading the scans, not because of
any conduct by Saint Alphonsus. See Trial Tr. of Mary River, M.D. (Tab 13) at 3889-91, 3901
("I knew nothing about the politics that were involved. I only knew the radiologists. And I
knew ifl sent my patients over there, they would read them, and I would get great results.");
Trial Tr. of Bruce Anderson, M.D. (Tab 14) at 3977-80 ("Q. What role does the fact that Saint
Alphonsus owns a portion oflntermountain Medical Imaging play in your decision to refer or
not refer patients to Intermountain Medical Imaging? A. Zero."); Trial Tr. of David Reedy,
M.D. (Tab 15) at 4130-34 ("[Q.] What role, if any, does it play in your decision to send a patient
to IMI that Saint Alphonsus is or is not a participant[?] A. It has nothing to do with it.").
Indeed, the idea that Saint Alphonsus's conduct, including assistance it allegedly gave to
IMI, could have caused all of the identified IMI referrals defies common sense. Budge admits
that MRIA "had a monopoly" before IMI opened, "[a]nd when IMI came in, all of the sudden
that referral base was diverted." See Trial Tr. (Tab 10) at 2790. When a monopolist faces a new
competitor, some of its business is going to shift to the competitor, as Budge also concedes. See
id. at 2792 ("Doesn't logic dictate that ifMRI ran into a very formidable competitor, IMI, in

1999, logic certainly follows as to why IMI's business would flourish and MRI's business would
begin to tail off? [Budge:] It could explain it."); see also id. at 2822 ("Q. Isn't it true, Mr.
Budge, that if this jury determines that this curve and that curve were not caused by these bad
acts but, rather, were caused by good, stiff competition from IMI, then your damage figure is
zero, true? A. If none of them were proved, I would think so."). More specifically, IMI was
owned and operated by the group of radiologists who had, for many years, been serving the
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needs of patients at Saint Alphonsus and reading the scans generated at Center, and thus had
long-standing consulting relationships with the treating physicians who worked at Saint
Alphonsus. See Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1072-73. It is absurd to suggestand thus improper to allow the jury to infer-that none of the doctors that previously referred to
Center would have sent any referrals-not one-to the people they trusted at IMI, if only Saint
Alphonsus had refrained from providing some technical support to IMI. Indeed, as noted above,
the only evidence on this issue actually presented at trial showed that the identity of the
radiologists and their established relationships and reputations were the main reasons that IMI
took business away from Center. See supra p. 11. 6
In sum, to recover for lost profits, it is incumbent upon MRIA "to isolate the effect of
other causes" for its lost scans, including "the entry of [IMI] into the competitive marketplace."

Synthes Spine Co., 2006 WL 3053317, at *16; see also Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224
P.3d at 1087 (quoting Pope's holding that an "assum[ption] that ... jobs done by [a competitor
ofthe plaintiffs] would have all have been done by [the plaintiffs] but for the [defendant's]
violations" is "not a proper manner to measure the [plaintiffs'] lost profits"). Because MRIA's
damages experts have made no effort to conduct this analysis, and there is no record evidence
allowing MRIA to do so, MRIA's proof of lost profits damages is legally insufficient as a matter
of law.

6

This case is thus unlike Griffith, in which there was no evidence of alternative causation
and every lost opportunity was "more likely than not attributable to" the defendant's conduct.
143 Idaho at 741, 152 P.3d at 612.
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The absence of"a reasonable foundation for calculating [the plaintiffs] lost profits" is a
"failure in proof of damages" requiring "judgment [to] be[] entered in favor of the [defendant]."

Pope, 103 Idaho at 237, 646 P.2d at 1008. Because each one ofMRIA's non-dissociation claims
is premised upon MRIA's legally and factually insufficient claim for lost profits, Saint
Alphonsus is entitled to summary judgment on those claims.
CONCLUSION

Because MRIA has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the question of the
quantum of lost profits, if any, caused by Saint Alphonsus' s alleged pre-dissociation conduct,
Saint Alphonsus is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of lost profit damages, and
therefore on each of MRIA' s causes of action that relies on lost profits as a measure of damages.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 6th day of August, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

nter-Defendants
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

When MRIA filed its counterclaim in 2005 and twice amended that counterclaim before
trial, it declined to join as parties the two limited partnerships (MRI Center and MRI Mobile)
that provide MRI services under MRIA' s management. Instead, beginning with its second
amended counterclaim in December 2006, MRIA contended that, as the general partner of these
two limited partnerships, it was entitled to recover damages "on [their] behalf." MRIA
subsequently resisted Saint Alphonsus's January 2007 objection that only parties to the case
could collect damages. After discussing this issue at some length, the Supreme Court agreed
with Saint Alphonsus and held that the "[t]he limited partnerships were not parties to this action"
and "therefore could not recover a judgment." Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI
Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, ---,224 P.3d 1068, 1086 (2009).
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Now, years after its tactical decision not to join the limited partnerships, MRIA has filed
an amended counterclaim naming MR1 Center and MRI Mobile as additional parties with
separate claims of their own. This amendment comes too late. The relevant statutes of
limitations have run on the claims now asserted by Center and Mobile, and no mle of civil
procedure permits those claims under the circumstances of this case to "relate back" to the filing
date ofMRIA's original counterclaim or any prior amendment thereof. For this reason, Saint
Alphonsus is entitled to judgment on the claims asserted by Center and Mobile.

BACKGROUND
The background and procedural history of this case is set forth in Saint Alphonsus's
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment on MRIA' s claim for wrongful
dissociation, filed concurrently herewith. As described therein, MRIA served as the general
partner of two limited partnerships: MRI Limited Partnership, doing business as MR1 Center of
Idaho ("Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership ("Mobile"). Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho
at--, 224 P.3d at 1072. MRIA provided no imaging services directly, but rather derived all of its
revenues from the distribution of profits based on its 30% ownership interests in Center and
Mobile and from a "management fee" equal to 7.5% of their cash receipts from operations. !d. at
--, 224 P.3d at 1072, 1085.
Center and Mobile were not named as parties in Saint Alphonsus's complaint (filed
October 18, 2004), in MRIA's counterclaim (filed May 20, 2005), or in MRIA's first amended
counterclaim (filed January 31, 2006). On December 20, 2006, MRIA moved to amend its
counterclaim a second time, this time "to assert claims on behalf of Center and Mobile without
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making them parties to this lawsuit." Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at--, 224 P .3d at 1084; see
also 2d Am. Countercl., 7. Saint Alphonsus objected to this amendment on the ground that
MRIA could not recover damages on behalf ofMRI Center and MRI Mobile, which are distinct
legal entities with the power to sue in their own names. Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at --, 224
P.3d at 1084. MRIA refused to correct its proposed pleading, and on February 6, 2007, the court
allowed MRIA' s new counterclaim, reasoning that MRIA had the authority to bring claims on
behalf of the limited partnerships pursuant to the limited partnership agreements. Id at--, 224
P.3d at 1085. The jury ultimately awarded damages to MRIA based on a theory of profits
allegedly lost by Center and Mobile, even though MRIA had much less than a one-half
ownership interest in each of those limited partnerships. ld
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that although MRIA, as the general
partner of Center and Mobile, controlled them and could have joined them in the lawsuit, "there
is a difference between having the power to have the limited partnerships join in this lawsuit and
actually doing so." !d. at ---, 224 P .3d at 1086. Here, the Court concluded, "the limited
partnerships [had] not [been made] parties to the this action." !d. Thus, the damages award
"must be vacated" because it included amounts allegedly suffered by Center and Mobile and
"MRIA could not recover damages on behalf of nonparties." I d.
On remand, this Court granted MRIA permission to amend its pleading in light of the
Supreme Court's decision, and on March 22, 2010, MRIA filed its Third Amended
Counterclaim. In this new pleading, MRIA for the first time actually joined Center and Mobile
as additional counterclaimants, with these two limited partnerships asserting claims for breach of
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the MRIA partnership agreement (as alleged third-party beneficiaries), breach of fiduciary duty,
interference with prospective business relations, and "civil conspiracy." See 3d Am. Countercl.
~~

68-70, 79-81, 84-97,99.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE CLAIMS OF CENTER AND MOBILE ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS
The events giving rise to the claims of MRIA, Center, and Mobile began more a decade

ago and culminated in Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from the MRIA partnership effective April
1, 2004, over six years ago. See Saint A/phonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1073. Yet it was
not until the filing of the Third Amended Counterclaim on March 22, 2010 that the limited
partnerships were joined as parties to this lawsuit. See id. at---, 224 P.2d at 1086 ("[t]he limited
partnerships were not parties to this action"). Their claims are therefore barred by the applicable
four-year and five-year statutes of limitations unless those claims "relate back" to an earlier
filing in this case. Under the applicable rules of civil procedure, however, the claims do not
relate back. Accordingly, those claims must be dismissed.

A.

The Statute of Limitations Has Run on Each of Center's and Mobile's
Claims

The allegations in the Third Amended Counterclaim establish that each of the claims of
Center and Mobile was filed outside the applicable limitations period. Specifically:
•

Center and Mobile, as alleged third-party beneficiaries of the MRIA partnership
agreement, assert wrongful dissociation and breach of contract claims (including a
claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing) based on Saint
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Alphonsus's dissociation from the MRIA partnership on Aprill, 2004, see 3d
Am. Countercl.

~~

63-64, and its alleged breach of the contract "before it

withdrew from the partnership," id. ~~ 67; see also id. ~ 83. But the statute of
limitations for contract claims is five years. See I.C. § 5-216. Thus, the statutory
period for Center and Mobile to file contract claims ran out no later than April 1,
2009, nearly a year before Center and Mobile were joined as parties in this case
on March 22, 2010.
•

Center and Mobile assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on duties that
Saint Alphonsus allegedly owed them "[b]efore [Saint Alphonsus's] dissociation"
on Aprill, 2004. 3d Am. Countercl. ~ 77; see also id.

~~

78-79. But the statute

oflimitations for fiduciary duty claims is four years. See I.C. § 5-224; Jones v.

Kootenai County Title Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 607, 614, 873 P.2d 861, 868 (1994).
Thus, the statutory period for Center and Mobile to file fiduciary duty claims ran
out no later than April 1, 2008, nearly two years before Center and Mobile were
joined as parties in this case.
•

Based on the same alleged conduct occurring prior to Saint Alphonsus's
dissociation on April 1, 2004, both limited partnerships assert claims for
interference with prospective business relations. See 3d Am. Countercl.

~~

89-90,

95-96, 99. But the statute of limitations for such clams is also four years, see I. C.
§ 5-224, and the statutory period for Center and Mobile to file claims for
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interference with prospective business relations thus also expired no later than
April 1, 2008. 1
Thus, the claims of Center and Mobile are time barred unless those claims somehow
"relate back" to the date of an earlier pleading in this case.

B.

The Claims of Center and Mobile Do Not Relate Back to Any Prior Pleading

Relation back is governed by Rule 15(c) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which
establishes three different standards for relation back depending upon the nature of the amended
pleading. The rule provides in relevant part:
[1] Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
[2] An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is
asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and
[certain other conditions relating to notice are satisfied]. [3] The
relation back of an amendment joining or substituting a real party
in interest shall be as provided in Rule 17(a).
I.R.C.P. 15(c) (numbering added).
Idaho rules should be "interpret[ed] ... in conformance with the interpretation placed
upon the same language in the federal rules," Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., 145 Idaho 892,
Center and Mobile also assert a claim for "civil conspiracy." See 3d Am. Compl. ~~ 98100. However, as explained in Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for
Judgment on the Conspiracy Claim, filed contemporaneously herewith, "[c]ivil conspiracy is not,
by itself, a claim for relief," but rather is derivative of some other underlying cause of action.
McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003); see also Wesco Autobody
Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, No. 35732, ---Idaho---,--- P.3d ---,2010 WL 2927078, at *17 (July 28,
2010); Dahlquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 386-87, 233 P. 883, 887 (1925). Thus, any "civil
conspiracy" claim necessarily has the same limitations period as the underlying causes of action
pleaded in the other counts of the Third Amended Counterclaim.
1
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897, 188 P.3d 834, 839 (2008), but federal interpretations are not followed when the "relevant
wording of ... the Idaho Rules ... differs from that of the corresponding federal rule," Wait v.

Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 796,41 P.3d 220, 224 (2001). In the case ofldaho Rule
l5(c), which was adopted in its current form in 1975, the first sentence is identical to the
language ofthe original federal rule adopted in 1937; the second sentence tracks language added
to the federal rule in 1966; and the third sentence was "added" by Idaho and is "not contained in
the federal rule." Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 272-73 & n.l, 723 P.2d 814, 816-17
& n.l (1986).2

While this piecemeal development of Rule 15(c) renders it somewhat confusing at first
glance, careful review of the language and history of the rule leads unmistakably to the following
interpretation: The first sentence of Rule 15(c) governs amendments asserting additional claims
between the original parties to the original pleading. 3 The second sentence governs amendments
changing the party "against whom" an existing claim is being asserted, i.e., amendments adding
2

The federal rule was amended in 1991 and since then has differed from the Idaho rule.
See Wait, 136 Idaho at 796,41 P.3d at 224; Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
3

Before 1966, it was well settled that the federal rule, which then included only the
current first sentence of the Idaho rule, applied only to amendments by or against the original
parties to the case, such that amendments joining additional claimants or defendants "did not
relate back to the time of the original filing ... for statute oflimitations purposes." Chacon,
111 Idaho at 272,723 P.2d at 816 (citing Athas v. Day, 161 F. Supp. 916,919 (D. Colo. 1958)
(claims of newly joined plaintiffs did not relate back) and Robbins v. Esso Shipping Co., 190 F.
Supp. 880, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (claims against newly joined defendants did not relate back));
see also, e.g., Murjkan v. Kahn, 11 F.R.D. 520, 522 (S.D. Fla. 1951) ("[e]ven though the rights
of the original plaintiff and the plaintiff sought to be added arose out of the same transaction ... ,
an amendment will not be allowed to permit the addition of a party plaintiff after the expiration
of the time allowed by statute in which to institute suit").
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a new defendant. 4 And the third sentence-which appears in the Idaho rule but not in the
corresponding federal rule-governs amendments adding or substituting a real party in interest
"as provided in Rule 17(a)," i.e., amendments adding a new claimant (such as a plaintiff or a
counterclaimant). 5
The Supreme Court's decision in Chacon explains the history and purpose ofthe rule's
three sentences, as well as the rule's application to the addition of a party plaintiff or
counterclaimant, as on the facts of this case. The Court there explained that the 1966 version of
the federal rule, on which the Idaho Rule is based, lacked the third sentence and thus, as to
joinder of new parties, '"only deal[t] with an amendment ... changing the party defendant.'" !d.
at 273 n.1, 723 P.2d at 817 n.l (quoting comments to 1975 amendments to the Idaho rules). For
that reason, the third sentence of the Idaho Rule was added for the "purpose" of providing for the
"'relation back effect'" of joining or substituting additional plaintiffs or other claimants. !d.
(quoting comments to 1975 amendments to the Idaho rules).

4

After the addition of the second sentence in 1966, the language of the federal rule
provided for relation back of claims "against" newly joined parties-but not for claims by newly
joined claimants. See, e.g., Newell v. Harrison, 779 F. Supp. 388, 391-92 (E.D. La. 1991)
("[federal] Rule 15(c) was not intended for a party to amend its pleadings to add or change party
plaintiffs"); Utah v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 50 F.R.D. 99, 109 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (under federal
Rule 15(c), "(a] new party-plaintiff cannot be added by amendment after the statute [of
limitations] has run"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 473 F.2d 580 (9th Cir.
1973), aff'd, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
5

"Rule 17(a) applies only to those who are asserting a claim." 6A Charles Alan Wright
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1543, at 339 (2d ed. 1990); see also Damian v. Estate of
Pina, 132 Idaho 447,450,974 P.2d 93,96 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Rule 17(a) addresses the
substitution of parties plaintifF' (emphasis in original)).
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As a result, in order to add a new plaintiff or counterclaimant outside the limitations
period pursuant to the relation-back provisions of Rule 15(c), as MRIA seeks to do here, the new
party's pleading must constitute "an amendment joining or substituting a real party in interest ...
as provided in Rule 17(a)." I.R.C.P. 15(c); accord Chacon, 111 Idaho at 273 n.l, 723 P.2d at
817 n.l. Rule 17(a) provides:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest .... No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is
not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a
reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of
commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the
real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution
shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in
the name of the real party in interest.
I.R.C.P. 17(a).
The Supreme Court has provided clear guideposts limiting application of the relationback doctrine to claims by a party newly added to a case. First, the new party must be the real
party in interest, i.e., the entity "who will be entitled to the benefits of the action if successful."

St. Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. ofComm 'rs, 146 Idaho 753, 757, 203 P.3d 683, 687
(2009). Rule 17(a) and the third sentence of Rule 15(c) thus permit relation back only where
someone other than the original party is entitled to the benefits of the causes of action asserted-

i.e., '"if [the] suit was originally brought in the name of the wrong party, and later the proper
party plaintiff was substituted in the action."' Chacon, 111 Idaho at 273 n.1, 723 P.2d at 817 n.l
(quoting comments to the 1975 amendments); see also Freiberger v. Am. Triticale, Inc.,
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120 Idaho 239, 241, 815 P.2d 437,439 (1991) ("Rule 15(c) does not allow one party's pleading
to relate back to a different party's pleadings").
Second, the Supreme Court's decision in Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 867 P.2d
960 (1994), makes clear that Rule 17(a) permits relation back for real parties in interest only
where there was an "inadvertent" and "understandable" "factual mistake" in identifying the
proper party in the original pleading because the identification of that proper party was
"difficult," and even then the rule only "affords a reasonable amount oftime to correct" the error.

Id at 92, 867 P.2d at 966.
Under these principles, the claims of Center and Mobile do not qualify for relation back
to MRIA's original counterclaim or to either of the two previously filed amended counterclaims.

First, as to MRIA's original counterclaim, which was filed on May 20, 2005, Center and
Mobile plainly are not real parties in interest with respect to any of the claims. A real party in
interest is the party who should have been named originally because it, rather than the party
named, is the one "entitled to the benefit of the action if successful." St. Luke's Reg'! Med Ctr.,
146 Idaho at 757, 203 P.3d at 687. But with regard to the claims asserted in the original
counterclaim-for breach of the MRIA partnership agreement and for breach of duties that Saint
Alphonsus allegedly owed to MRIA as a result of the partnership, see Answer & Countercl.
~~

23-31-no one is being substituted for MRIA, and MRIA was not the "wrong party" to bring

any of the claims advanced therein. Indeed, all of the causes of action asserted in the original
counterclaim plainly belong to MRIA exclusively and are still being asserted by MRIA in its
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own name today. There is therefore no basis for concluding that the claims now brought by
Center and Mobile relate back to the May 20, 2005 filing of the original counterclaim.
Second, MRIA was similarly the real party in interest with respect to the claims asserted
in the First Amended Counterclaim filed on January 31, 2006. Like the original counterclaim,
the First Amended Counterclaim made no mention at all of any claims of Center and Mobile.
And all of the claims newly added there-for breach of the non-compete clause of the MRIA
partnership agreement, interference with prospective contractual relations, and conspiracy-were
brought in MRIA's own name on behalf ofMRIA itself, and (unless otherwise dismissed) are
still being asserted by MRIA in its own name today. Thus, the recent addition of Center and
Mobile as parties, far from substituting them in place of the "wrong party" to bring those claims,
simply seeks to bring additional claims-for different harms but using the same legal theorieson behalf of the newly added entities. Here, too, therefore, Center and Mobile may not take
advantage of the Rule 17(a) mechanism for substituting a real party in interest-the one who
actually possesses the claim-for one who was mistakenly said to possess that claim in the
earlier pleading.
Third, it was in the Second Amended Counterclaim, filed December 20, 2006, that MRIA
for the first time purported to bring claims "on behalf of MRI Center and MRI Mobile without
making them parties to this lawsuit." Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at---, 224 P.3d at 1084; see
also 2d Am. Countercl. , 7. Center and Mobile arguably are the real parties in interest with
respect to those claims asserted in the Second Amended Counterclaim on their behalf, but, if so,
relation back is nevertheless improper under the Supreme Court's holding in Tingley that Rule
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17(a) applies only to reasonable, inadvertent errors that are corrected relatively promptly.
Indeed, as explained below, denial of relation back to the Second Amended Counterclaim
follows a fortiori from the Tingley decision.
In Tingley, an individual in bankruptcy filed a malpractice claim against his former
attorneys during 1987, prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations on Aprill8, 1988. Id.
at 91, 867 P.2d at 965. The defendants' answer, filed on August 10, 1987, properly objected that
the bankruptcy trustee, not Tingley, was the owner of the malpractice claim and thus the real
party in interest. Id. A year later, in August 1988-four months after the expiration of the
limitations period-the bankruptcy trustee "enter[ed] the scene," joined in Tingley's complaint,
and sought to rely on Rule 17(a) to have its untimely claim "relate back" to Tingley's original
timely filing. Id.
The Supreme Court held Rule 17(a) inapplicable for reasons that are dispositive here.
The Court reasoned that "the purpose of [Rule 17(a)] is to prevent forfeiture of an action when
determination of the right party to sue is difficult or when an understandable mistake has been
made," and that Rule 17(a) therefore applies "only" where there was an "inadvertent error" or
"honest mistake" in naming the original party. !d. at 91-92, 867 P.2d at 965-66. The Court thus
ruled that, because Tingley's decision to bring the claims in his own name, rather than in the
name of the bankruptcy trustee, was calculated and strategic, rather than inadvertent, Rule 17(a)
did not apply. ld. (noting "no evidence of a factual mistake in naming plaintiff Tingley"). The
Court further held that Rule 17(a) only "affords a 'reasonable' amount oftime to correct" the
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"error in naming the party plaintiff," and that delaying for a full year after the defendants'
objections before joining the trustee "was not 'reasonable."' Id
This case presents a stronger case than Tingley for rejecting relation back to MRIA's
Second Amended Counterclaim, which purported to bring claims on behalf of Center and Mobile
but refused to name them as parties. First, like the defendants in Tingley, Saint Alphonsus filed a
timely objection to MRIA's failure to join the parties on whose behalf the claims were being
asserted. See Saint Alphonsus Mem. Opp'n to MRIA's Mot. for Leave to File 2d Am.
Countercl. at 4, Jan. 4, 2007. That objection fully explained what the Supreme Court later
confirmed-that to pursue claims and collect damages that belong to a legal entity, that entity
must be a party-and MRIA's decision to resist that requirement was not an "understandable
mistake."
Second, where Tingley found a delay of one year in joining the correct party to be
"unreasonable" and a reason for denial of relation back, MRIA here waited more than three years
from the time Saint Alphonsus pointed out its error on January 4, 2007.
Third, as with the plaintiff in Tingley, MRIA's decision was not an "inadvertent" "honest
mistake" resulting from reasonable confusion about who should be named. Instead, it was a
tactical choice, explainable by the substantial benefits that would accrue to MRIA as a result. In
particular, pursuing claims belonging to Center and Mobile without actually joining them as
parties offered MRIA distinct litigation advantages: (a) doing so would finesse the problem of
the statute of limitations that would be squarely presented if the limited partnerships were added
as parties in 2006, after the statute on many of their claims had run; (b) MRIA would then be
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able to control 100% of any recovery, most of which would derive from alleged lost income of
the Center and Mobile, even though MRIA owns only 30% of the limited partnerships; (c) the
substantial income streams and assets of Center and Mobile would be shielded from liability for
substantial attorney's fees and costs should the claims asserted by MRIA on their behalf prove
unsuccessful; 6 and (d) it would greatly simplify the presentation ofMRIA's case-as in fact it
did at the first trial-by yielding a verdict as to MRIA only, and allowing it to avoid the complex
but critical distinctions as to the duties owing to and the damages recoverable by each of three
distinct entities. It was MRIA's tactical choice to follow the path it did. Having done so, it
would be an abuse of Rule 17(a) as defined by the Supreme Court in Tingley to allow a do-over
by permitting Center and Mobile to join as parties long after numerous statutes of limitations
have expired.
CONCLUSION
Center and Mobile have been joined as new parties in this case. Rules 15(c) and 17(a)
are inapplicable here, however, and the claims of Center and Mobile therefore do not relate back
to any earlier pleading. As a result, all contract claims of Center and Mobile based on conduct

6

Indeed, Saint Alphonsus has obtained a final judgment against MRIA for over $425,000
in costs as a result of prevailing in the appeal of that case. See Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at--,
224 P.3d at 1091. Because Center and Mobile were non-parties to the case, that judgment may
not currently be enforceable against them. But if Center and Mobile are permitted to enter this
case as the "real parties in interest" with respect to the claims asserted in the first trial, then
Center and Mobile would be liable on the existing judgment arising out of the successful appeal
ofthose claims. See Explosives Corp. ofAm. v. Garlam Enters. Corp., 817 F.2d 894, 907 (1st
Cir. 1987) (holding that "[l]itigation is a two-way street" and, as a result, substituted real party in
interest was bound by judgment entered against original party).
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occurring prior to March 22, 2005, and all other claims based on conduct occurring prior to
March 22,2006, are barred by the statutes of limitations. Judgment as thus defined against
Center and Mobile should be entered in favor of Saint Alphonsus.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITIED, this 6th day of August, 2010.
GJORDING & FOUSER, ~LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of August, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

~

0
0

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D~i8f!'l~erk
DEPUTY

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership,

EXHIBIT

I
Case No. CVOC-0408219

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho
limited liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited
partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED,
an Idaho limited partnership,
Counter-claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit
corporation,
Counter-defendant.

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on
Claim of Wrongful Dissociation, Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Civil Conspiracy Claim,
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on the Legal Insufficiency of Evidence of Lost Profits,
and Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Claims of Limited Partnerships. The Court heard oral
argument on October 1, 2010. Donald Ayer appeared for the Plaintiff/Counter-defendant the
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Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. (Saint Alphonsus). Thomas Banducci appeared for the
Defendant/Counter-claimant MRI Associates, LLP (MRIA). The Court took all four motions
fully under advisement at that time.
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

In 1985, Plaintiff Saint Alphonsus and several other parties formed a partnership called
MRI Associates (MRIA) to acquire and operate diagnostic and therapeutic devices, equipment,
and accessories, specifically magnetic resonance imaging devices. In 2004, Saint Alphonsus
sought to withdraw from the partnership and brought this suit for a judicial determination of the
amount it was entitled to for its share of the partnership. MRIA counterclaimed for wrongful
dissociation. MRIA alleged that Saint Alphonsus significantly and materially assisted a direct
competitor, Intermountain Imaging (IMI), in establishing an MRI facility on Saint Alphonsus'
campus in Boise and in usurping MRIA's opportunity to expand to the Meridian market.
The trial court held on summary judgment that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully
dissociated as a matter of law. The case proceeded to trial and the Court instructed the jury that
Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated. On October 21, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of the district court in this matter and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Subsequently, this Court granted the Defendants leave to file the Third Amended
Counterclaim, which was filed on March 22, 2010. This pleading added two counterclaimants:
MRI Limited Partnership (Center) and MRI Mobile Limited (Mobile), the limited partnerships
formed by MRIA. Saint Alphonsus moved to strike immaterial matter from the Third Amended
Counterclaim and the Court granted that motion on September 27, 2010, eliminating language
from the counterclaim that contradicts the Supreme Court's holdings.
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The parties were unable to stipulate to a schedule for pre-trial motions and the Court
entered an order imposing a schedule on July 9, 2010. The parties moved to amend that
scheduling order, seeking to remove the page limits on the briefings. The Court denied the
motion to lift the page limit and on August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus filed two motions for
judgment on the pleadings and two motions for summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) governs motions for judgment on the pleadings. It
provides:
After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any
party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If on a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Because Rule 12(c) treats motions for judgment on the pleadings similarly to motions for
summary judgment, "the standard of review applicable to lower courts' rulings on motions for
summary judgment also applies to motions for judgment on the pleadings." Trimble v.
Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 302, 939 P.2d 1379, 1381 (1997) (citing Orthman v. Idaho Power
Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561, 563 (1995)).

"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents
on file with the court ... demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd. Partnership.
145 Idaho 735, 738, 184 P.3d 860, 863 (2008) (quoting Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765
P.2d 126, 127 (1988) (citing I.R.C.P. 56(c)). The burden of proof is on the moving party to
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Rouse v. Household Finance Corp ..
144 Idaho 68, 70, 156 P.3d 569, 571 (2007) (citing Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935
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P.2d 165, 168 (1997)). In construing the facts, the court must draw all reasonable factual
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408,
410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008).
Moreover, "[s]ummary judgment proceedings are generally decided on the basis of
admissible evidence." Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 236, 178 P.3d 597, 601 (2008) (citing
I.R.C.P. 56(e)). Idaho Rule of Procedure 56(e) provides as follows:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to
be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits.
!d.

"Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the
burden shifts to the non-moving party," to provide specific facts showing there is a genuine issue
for trial. Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 228, 159 P.3d 862, 864 (2007) (citing Hei v. Holzer,
139 Idaho 81, 85, 73 P.3d 94, 98 (2003)); Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134
Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000). The non-moving party's case must be anchored in
something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine
issue. Zimmerman v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69 (1996).
The non-moving party may not simply rely upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set
forth in affidavits specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e); see
Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). If the non-moving party

does not provide such a response, "summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
the party." I.R.C.P. 56(t).
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRIA's CLAIM OF WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION
Before the first trial in this matter, the trial court granted MRIA's motion for summary
judgment on wrongful dissociation, holding that Saint Alphonsus' dissociation was wrongful
because it breached an express provision of the Partnership Agreement. Saint Alphonsus

Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,

___J

224 P.3d 1068, 1073 (2009).

In that same motion, MRIA also argued an alternative theory that the dissociation was wrongful
because it occurred prior to the expiration of the definite term of the Partnership. !d. The trial
court did not address the alternate theory in the summary judgment order. !d. at 1080. Holding
that the provisions of the contract must be construed in light of the Uniform Partnership Law
(UPL), which was the law at the time the parties entered into the Partnership Agreement, the
Idaho Supreme Court overturned the trial court's ruling that the dissociation was in breach of an
express provision of the Partnership Agreement. !d. at 1077-78. The Idaho Supreme Court held
that the four provisions were not the only ways a partner could rightfully withdraw from the
Partnership and thus Saint Alphonsus' withdrawal was not in breach of an express provision. !d.
Because the trial court did not rule on the issue of whether the Partnership was for a definite term
and because Saint Alphonsus did not timely object to the submission of the issue to the jury, the
Supreme Court did not consider the issue on appeal. !d. at 1081. The Supreme Court stated:
Because we remand this case for a new trial, the issue of whether the partnership
was for a definite term and, if so, whether Saint Alphonsus dissociated prior to the
expiration of that term will have to be determined in further proceedings.

!d.
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The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) 1 gives a partner a statutory right to
dissociate without liability from a partnership except where the dissociation 1) breaches an
express provision of the partnership agreement; 2) occurs before the expiration of a definite term
set forth in the agreement; or 3) occurs before the completion of a particular undertaking set forth
in the agreement. I. C. § 53-3-602. The Supreme Court has specifically held that Saint Alphonsus
did not breach an express provision of the agreement by its withdrawal from MRIA and MRIA
does not assert that Saint Alphonsus withdrew prior to the completion of a particular
undertaking.
Saint

Alphonsus

seeks

summary judgment

that

the

Partnership

Agreement

unambiguously provides that the Partnership has an indefinjte term. Saint Alphonsus argues that
the Partnership Agreement is an integrated contract with clear language establishing an indefinite
term and therefore Saint Alphonsus merely exercised its statutory right to dissociate. MRIA
argues that when considered as a whole, the provision of the Partnership Agreement setting forth
the term of the Partnership clearly sets forth a definite term for the duration of ''the business of
the Partnership." It is MRIA's position that the business of the Partnership is the management of
the business affairs of the limited partnerships and because these limited partnerships have
express tenns, the life of the MRIA Partnership is necessarily limited by those contracts. Finally,
1

Although the Idaho Supreme Court spent several paragraphs reviewing the history of the UPL and held that the
partnership agreement at issue must be construed in the context of the UPL, the Supreme Court then employed the
RUPA in making its decision. LC. § 53-3-1204 governs applicability of the RUPA to Idaho partnerships formed
before and after the enactment of the RUPA. The Official Comment to this section states:
This section provides for a transition period in the applicability of the Act to existing
partnerships, similar to that provided in the revised Texas partnership act. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 6132b-l0.03 (Vernon Supp. 1994). Subsection (a) makes application of the Act
mandatory for all partnerships formed after the effective date of the Act and permissive, by
election, for existing partnerships. That affords existing partnerships and partners an
opportunity to consider the changes effected by RUPA and to amend their partnership
agreements, if appropriate.
Under subsection (b), application of the Act becomes mandatory for all partnerships,
including existing partnerships that did not previously elect to be governed by it, upon a
future date to be established by the adopting State.
I.C. § 53-3-1204 Official Comment (emphasis added).
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MRIA asserts that the only way to determine the life of the MRIA Partnership is to examine the
relevant extrinsic evidence, including but not limited to the limited partnership agreements.
Article 1, Section 1.1 of the Articles of Partnership of MRI Associates (the Partnership
Agreement) governs the effective date and term of the agreement. It states in full:
Section 1.1 Effective Date and Term The effective date of these Articles of
Partnership is the twenty-sixth day of April, 1985, and shall terminate as follows:
1.1.1 If the Limited Partnership contemplated pursuant to Section 1.6 is not
formed and the limited partnership interests sold in accordance with the Private
Placement Memorandum, or this Partnership does not otherwise acquire financing
acceptable to all Partners to replace the funds which were to be acquired by the
limited partnership offering, on or before December 31, 1985, then the term of
this Partnership shall end on December 31, 1985.
1.1.2 If the Limited Partnership contemplated by Section 1.6 is formed and the
limited partnership interests sold, and/or other financing mutually acceptable to
all Partners to replace all or a portion of the funds which were to be acquired by
the limited partnership offering is acquired on or before December 31, 1985, then
the term of this Partnership shall end on the date which is within a reasonable
time after the business of the Partnership is wound up and dissolved under Article
10.
Article 10, Section 10.1 governs dissolution. It states:
Section 10.1 Dissolution At a meeting of the Board of Partners held in Boise,
Idaho, pursuant to due notice, the Partnership may be dissolved through the
affirmative vote of seven-ninths (7/9) or more of the eligible votes of the Board of
Partners. 2
Saint Alphonsus contends that the plain language of Section 1.1.2 stating "the term of this
Partnership shall end on the date which is within a reasonable time after the business of the
Partnership is wound up and dissolved under Article 10" means the Partnership has an indefinite
term and can be dissolved at any time pursuant to Article 10. MRIA argues with equal vigor that
the reference to the "business of the Partnership" in the term provision must be construed in
reference to Section 1.6, which states the purpose of the partnership and that the purpose would
be accomplished via the limited partnerships. MRIA asserts that because the limited partnerships
2

Section I 0.1 was arnt:nut:llto t:ighl tenths by the Third Amendment dated April 21, 1985.
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formed pursuant to the MRIA Partnership Agreement have definite terms, the business of the
Partnership to conduct the limited partnerships is necessarily for the term of the limited
partnerships.
A contract is ambiguous, as a matter of law, if it is reasonably susceptible to conflicting
interpretations. Hoffman v. United Silver Mines, Inc., 116 Idaho 240, 246, 775 P.2d 132, 138
(Ct.App.l989). In construing the parties' agreement, the court looks first to the instrument itself.

Storrer v. Russo, 123 Idaho 442,444, 849 P.2d 115, 117 (Ct. App. 1991). If Section 1.1.2 read
only " ... then the term of this Partnership shall end on the date which is within a reasonable
time after the business of the Partnership is wound up and dissolved," then MRIA's argument
that there is a built in ambiguity based on the phrase 'business of the Partnership' would be a
viable argument. But this construction reads out the last words "under Article 10." Article 10,
provides for ending the Partnership with a 7/9ths (amended to 8/10ths) vote.
In its Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim for Wrongful Dissociation,

MRIA suggests that even when a contract is facially unambiguous, the Court may look to
extrinsic evidence to determine whether an ambiguity exists. Storrer v. Russo, 123 Idaho 442,
444, 849 P.2d 115, 117 (Ct. App. 1991). MRIA also argues that the RUPA commentators
acknowledge that the agreed upon term cannot always be determined from the four comers of the
document and may require consideration of documents, conduct, and statements outside the
agreement, citing RUPA, § 602, Authors' Comments 5.a. The Court notes that these comments
were not adopted by the Idaho Legislature and are not listed in the Official Comment in the
Idaho Code.
The Court finds the Partnership Agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. The
Court finds that the agreement is not reasonably susceptible to two meanings. The Court finds
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that the clear language of the Agreement, when reading the contract as a whole and giving
meaning to all the words and phrases, is that it was a partnership meant to end when 7/9ths (now
8/lOths) of the partners voted to dissolve the partnership. The Court finds this an indefinite term.
Saint Alphonsus' motion for partial summary judgment that as a matter of law the contract was
for an indefinite term is GRANTED.
MRIA next argues that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel prevents Saint Alphonsus from
asserting that the Agreement was for a definite term. MRIA has placed into the record two
instances when Saint Alphonsus has made statements which MRIA alleges indicate Saint
Alphonsus' intent and understanding that the Partnership was for a definite term. The doctrine of
quasi-estoppel "prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment of another party, which
is inconsistent with a position previously taken." Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 138 P.3d
310, 314 (2006) (quoting C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 144, 75
P.3d 194, 198 (2003)). The elements of quasi-estoppel are:
(1) the offending party took a different position than his or her original position,
and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change
positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to
maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit
or acquiesced in.
Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d 663, 668 (2008). MRIA argues that Saint

Alphonsus is clearly taking a different position than one earlier taken, in an attempt to gain an
advantage over MRIA, where it previously sought to induce the other partners to enter the
agreement, and it would be unconscionable to allow them to take a position contrary to the one
under which all of the parties previously operated.
The first piece of extrinsic evidence that MRIA asks the Court to consider is a Jetter
written by counsel for Saint Alphonsus approximately six weeks prior to the execution of the
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Agreement attached to a revised draft. MRIA asserts that this letter makes clear that Saint
Alphonsus informed the other partners that a definite term ''was unnecessary given that the
Partnership Agreement would automatically terminate with the expiration of the limited
partnerships anyway." (Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim for Wrongful
Disscoiation, 13.) The relevant paragraph of the letter states in full:
The enclosed draft does not address termination and/or a buy-out clause. As you
and I discussed, a "sunset" clause would be preferable, but it is not critical.
Additionally, the life of this partnership will undoubtedly be determined by the
terms of the lease and the limited partnership.
The language of this paragraph established that Saint Alphonsus would have preferred to
have a "sunset" clause but that one had not been agreed upon. Saint Alphonsus' use of the term
"life ofthe partnership" rather than "term of the partnership", where it uses term ofthe lease and
term of the limited partnership in the same sentence, does not indicate that Saint Alphonsus
believed this Partnership to have a definite term. Finally, that the executed version does include a
buy-out clause, which Saint Alphonsus sought to enforce in this suit, reinforces that at the time
this letter was sent, negotiations were not yet complete. The Court does not find this letter
evidences a belief that the contract was for a definite term such that Saint Alphonsus is changing
its position in an attempt to gain an advantage over MRIA, that Saint Alphonsus induced MRIA
to change positions, or that Saint Alphonsus benefitted from this position and that it would be
unconscionable to allow it to now assert that the contract is for an indefinite term.
The second document MRIA asks the Court to consider is the minutes of a Saint
Alphonsus Board of Directors meeting on October 11, 1999 at which the board ratified
"extending the term of the MRI partnership agreement to 12/31123." MRIA contends that this
statement "stands as remarkably clear proof that Saint Alphonsus considered the MRIA
Partnership to have a 'term' that needed to be 'extended."' (Opposition to Motion for Summary
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Judgment on Claim for Wrongful Disscoiation, 15.) The Court notes that the minutes approved
extension of the "MRI partnership agreement" but not the MRIA or MRI Associates partnership
agreement. The Court does not find this document evidences a clear belief that the contract at
issue was for a definite term such that Saint Alphonsus is changing its position in an attempt to
gain an advantage over MRIA, that Saint Alphonsus induced MRIA to change positions, or that
Saint Alphonsus benefitted from this position and that it would be unconscionable to allow it to
now assert that the contract is for an indefinite term.
Saint Alphonsus also seeks summary judgment dismissing MRIA's claim for wrongful
dissociation becuase MRIA's evidence fails to establish any damages caused by the dissociation,
arguing that the Idaho Supreme Court held that the only measure of damages put forth by MRIA
is not valid. MRIA counters that the purchase price damages are not the only damages in the
record, but instead there are two expert reports which contain significant support for a lostprofits theory. Although the Court has granted Saint Alphonsus' motion for summary judgment
dismissing the wrongful dissociation claim, the Court will nonetheless address the second
portion of the motion. The Supreme Court held that "MRlA's alternative measure of damages,"
the sum Saint Alphonsus would have had to pay to purchase MRI Center, was not an allowable
measure of damages on any of the alleged causes of action because this contract was not a
contract to purchase MRI Center. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP,
148 Idaho 479, _, 224 P.3d 1068, 1087 (2009). The Supreme Court also held that evidence of
MRI Center's lost profits beyond December 31, 2015 was not admissible because the term of
that limited partnership had not been extended beyond that date, but the Supreme Court stated it
addressed the issue because MRIA's damages could include its portion of the lost income of
MRI Center before that expiration. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc at 1086. In light of the
Supreme Court's holding that the alternative measure of damages was not appropriate but that
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the lost profits measure of damages could not extend beyond the terms of the limited partnership,
the Court does not find that the Supreme Court held there was no measure of damages available
to MRIA. Saint Alphonsus' motion for summary judgment on the insufficiency of evidence of
damages supporting the wrongful dissociation in a contract for a definite term is DENIED.
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE CIVIL CONSPIRACY CLAIM

Saint Alphonsus seeks an order dismissing MRIA's cause of action for civil conspiracy.
Saint Alphonsus raises three arguments in support of its motion for judgment on the pleadings on
this cause of action. First, Saint Alphonsus contends that the allegations of conspiracy to commit
misappropriation and defamation fail as a matter of law because MRIA' s misappropriation and
defamation claims have been dismissed with prejudice. Second, Saint Alphonsus asserts that
where a complaint separately sets out a cause of action, a claim for civil conspiracy is redundant
and duplicative. Finally, Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA may not allege conspiracy to
wrongfully withdraw because the Idaho Supreme Court held that Saint Aphonsus did not
wrongfully dissociate.
MRIA contends that this motion for judgment on the civil conspiracy claim is precluded
because it was made by Saint Alphonsus, prior to the first trial, denied by the trial court, and then
not appealed by Saint Alphonsus. It is accurate that Saint Alphonsus previously moved for
judgment on the civil conspiracy claim and that Saint Alphonsus did not appeal that denial. In its
prior motion, Saint Alphonsus argued that the civil conspiracy claim should be dismissed
because it was barred by the four year statute of limitations, because there was no evidence in the
record to support such a claim, because there was no evidence of any damages caused by the
alleged conspiracy, and because it was redundant in the face of the third party defendants having
been dismissed. Saint Alphonsus' current motion argues redundancy by duplication and that the
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claims should be dismissed because some of the underlying claims have been dismissed with
prejudice. The Court does not find the two motions for judgment to be the same motion,
therefore Saint Alphonsus' motion for judgment on the civil conspiracy claim is not precluded.
MRIA's misappropriation and defamation claims were dismissed with prejudice. Because
under Idaho law no conspiracy claim can exist where the underlying claim does not exist or
cannot be shown, Saint Alphonsus contends that no civil conspiracy claim can stand where the
underlying substantive claims have been dismissed. Saint Alphonsus also argues Center and
Mobile are equally bound by this voluntary dismissal because they were in privity with MRIA
and because the dismissal was expressly made by MRIA on their behalf. MRIA contends that
although it dismissed its claims for misappropriation and defamation, no part of its civil
conspiracy claim needs to be dismissed because this behavior is only part of the wrongful
conduct that makes up MRIA's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and its
other tort claims. Whether a civil conspiracy claim fails where some but not all of the underlying
tort claims have been dismissed appears to be a matter of first impression in Idaho.
"A civil conspiracy that gives rise to legal remedies exists only if there is an agreement
between two or more to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in
an unlawful manner." McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003). There
must be specific evidence of a plan or agreement to demonstrate the existence of the conspiracy
at the time the allegedly unlawful objective was accomplished. Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927,
935, 155 P.3d 1166, 1174 (2007). It has been held that where liability for the underlying tort has
been dismissed, there can be no claim for civil conspiracy. See Rogers v. Dallas Morning News,
Inc., 889 S.W.2d 467 (Rex. App. Dallas 1994) (holding that a civil conspiracy to commit libel

claim was properly dismissed on summary judgment where the underlying libel claim was
dismissed on summary judgment for truth); Kelly v. Diocese of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 88
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(Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1992) (holding that a civil conspiracy to commit slander was properly
dismissed where a directed verdict was granted to the opposing party on the underlying slander
claim. It has also been held that civil conspiracy is not an independent, stand alone cause of
action but is only a derivative claim. McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321
(2003) ("Civil conspiracy is not, by itself, a claim for relief.") (citing Argonaut Insurance Co. v.
White, 86 Idaho 374, 379, 386 P.2d 964, 966 (1963)).

In support of its contention that the civil conspiracy claim as to misappropriation and
defamation must be dismissed because the underlying tort claims were dismissed, Saint
Alphonsus cites McPheters v. Maile, Mannos v. Moss, and several unreported Federal District
Court of Idaho opinions. In McPheters, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
dismissal of a claim for civil conspiracy because the underlying tort claim was negligence,
holding that there must be an agreement between two or more people to "accomplish an unlawful
objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in an unlawful manner." 138 Idaho at 395, 64 P.3d
at 321. Negligence "denotes culpable carelessness." Black's Law Dictionary 1061 (8th ed. 2004).
Inherent in the Court's decision to dismiss the civil conspiracy claim in McPheters is a finding
that one cannot agree to be careless. Such an advance intention to be careless would be indicative
of an intentional tort. That the Idaho Supreme Court held that the elements of negligence were
not met and as a result the civil conspiracy claim was properly dismissed does not require a
dismissal of the civil conspiracy claim in the case at hand where negligence is not a cause of
action.
In Mannos v Moss, the plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim was based on the defendants'
purported attempts to defraud him. Mannos, 143 Idaho at 934, 155 P.3d at 1173. The district
court then dismissed the civil conspiracy claim after it dismissed the fraud claim, holding that
"Idaho does not allow an independent cause of action for civil conspiracy." /d. at 934-35, 155
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P.3d at 1173-74. Although the Idaho Supreme Court noted the trial court's reasoning for the
dismissal of the civil conspiracy claim, the Supreme Court did not affirm the dismissal based on
that reasoning. Instead, the Supreme Court held that because "an agreement is the foundation of
a conspiracy charge and there must be some showing of specific evidence of a plan or agreement
to defraud to demonstrate the pendency of the conspiracy at the time the alleged fraud occurred,''
the plaintiffs failure to offer any specific evidence regarding an alleged agreement or plan was
fatal to his civil conspir,acy claim. !d. at 935, 155 P .3d at 1174. The Supreme Court stated, "As a
result, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on this charge." !d. The
argument that the record does not contain evidence of such an agreement has previously been
rejected by the trial court in this matter on Saint Alphonsus' earlier motion for judgment on the
civil conspiracy claim. The holding in Man nos does not require dismissal of the civil conspiracy
claim in the instant case.
In the unreported case MA. Deately Construction v. City of Lewiston, the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho dismissed a state civil conspiracy claim for failure to
plead the cause of action with particularity and alternatively because the relief available for a
civil conspiracy claim was identical to the relief available under the statutory claim. 2006 WL
980730 (D.Idaho *1) ("When relief is provided pursuant to a statute, there is no reason to allow
an additional tort that offers the same remedy."). Deately Construction is distinguishable from
the case at hand in that Saint Alphonsus has not claimed the civil conspiracy claim was not pled
with particularity and in that MRIA is not making any claims under Idaho's competitive bidding
statutes.
In the unreported federal case Fibertection v. Jensen, the plaintiffs brought two categories
of claims: the interference claims of interference with contractual relationship and interference
with prospective economic advantage and claims based on the Code of Federal Regulations.
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2008 WL 5384552 (D. Idaho *3-*5). The Court dismissed the interference claims holding that
the plaintiff had failed to meet its burden on summary judgment "by offering nothing more than
speculation and unreasonable inferences." !d. at *4. Next, the Court held that no private right of
action to enforce the particular regulations had been established by Congress and therefore no
cause of action based on those regulations was available to the plaintiff. /d. at *5. Having held
that there was no basis for any of the underlying claims brought by the plaintiff, the Court
dismissed the plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim. !d.
MRIA does not bring a mirror civil conspiracy claim for each underlying tort cause of
action, but brings one blanket civil conspiracy claim alleging multiple behaviors as part of an
overall scheme. Although MRIA has dismissed two of its tort claims, there are remaining tort
claims on which the civil conspiracy claim is based. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, there are allegations of behaviors from which a reasonable
jury could find the existence of a civil conspiracy. Saint Alphonsus' motion to dismiss the civil
conspiracy claim because two tort claims have been dismissed with prejudice is DENIED.
Saint Alphonsus argues that the claim for civil conspiracy is duplicative of the underlying
tort claims and must be dismissed as redundant because a party is not permitted to assert
identical claims twice. MRIA responds that Saint Alphonsus misconstrues the law of conspiracy
because first it argues that the claim must be dismissed if there is no underlying cause of action
and then argues that the claim must be dismissed if there is an underlying cause of action. The
Court agrees with MRIA that such an interpretation would mean no claimant could ever bring a
civil conspiracy claim in Idaho. Saint Alphonsus fails to cite and the Court has not found a single
Idaho case holding that civil conspiracy is not a cause of action in Idaho. If the Idaho Appellate
Courts had intended to eliminate the civil conspiracy cause of action, they could have done so in
Argonaut Insurance Co. v. White, 86 Idaho 374, 386 P.2d 964 (1963); McPheters v. Maile, 138
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Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003) ("Civil conspiracy is not, by itself, a claim for relief.")
(emphasis added); Cunningham v. Jensen, 2004 WL 2034988 (Ct. App. 2004) ( "Civil
conspiracy is not an independent tort but rather is a derivative tort that relies on an underlying
actionable wrong.") (opinion withdrawn on granting of motion to dismiss appeal); Mannos v.
Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 935, 155 P.3d 1166, 1174 (2007); or Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v
Ernest, No. 35732, _Idaho_,_ P.3d _, 2010 WL 2927078 (July 28, 2010). While each of
those cases admittedly dismisses the civil conspiracy cause of action, the Idaho Supreme Court
has not gone so far as to hold that no such cause of action exists nor that it cannot be asserted
where an underlying claim has been asserted. Saint Alphonsus' motion to dismiss the civil
conspiracy claim as redundant is DENIED.
Finally, Saint Alphonsus contends that the civil conspiracy claim must be dismissed
because the Supreme Court held that Saint Alphonsus did not wrongfully dissociate. The
Supreme Court held that Saint Alphonsus did not withdraw in breach of an express provision of
the partnership agreement. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148
Idaho 479, _, 224 P.3d 1068, 1077-78 (2009). However, the Supreme Court did not consider
the issue ofwhether the dissociation was wrongful because it occurred prior to the expiration of a
definite term. Above, the Court found that the Partnership Agreement did not have a definite
term. MRIA does not bring a mirror civil conspiracy claim for each underlying tort cause of
action, but brings one blanket civil conspiracy claim alleging multiple behaviors as part of an
overall scheme. Although the Court has dismissed the wrongful dissociation claim, there are
remaining tort claims on which the civil conspiracy claim is based. Therefore, the Court will not
dismiss MRIA's civil conspiracy claim. However, MRIA may not base its claim for civil

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS AND
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Page 17

003522

conspiracy on the wrongful dissociation claim. 3 Saint Alphonsus' motion to dismiss the civil
conspiracy claim because the Supreme Court held that Saint Alphonsus did not wrongfully
dissociate is DENIED.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LEGAL INSUFFICIENCY OF
MRIA's EVIDENCE OF LOST PROFITS

On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, Saint Alphonsus argued that the damage award
must be vacated because there was insufficient evidence to support the award of lost profits.
Rather than vacating the damage award, the Idaho Supreme Court instructed this Court to
consider the concerns expressed in Pope v. Intermountain Gas, 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988
(1982).
Saint Alphonsus contends that Pope stands for the proposition that a claimant must
present evidence distinguishing between the portion of business lost as a result of a competitor's
misconduct and the portion lost as a result of other factors. Saint Alphonsus further contends that
the Supreme Court held that MRIA relies on expert testimony which "assumes" without any
evidence that Saint Alphonsus' alleged misconduct caused all of the cited business migration.
Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA's damage experts have made no effort to conduct an analysis
as to what percentage of the lost scans would have been lost solely due to IMI's entry into the
market and that there is no evidence in the record from which MRIA could conduct such an
analysis. Therefore Saint Alphonsus claims the evidence that MRIA has put forth in its claim for
lost profits is legally insufficient and all claims for lost profits must be dismissed.
MRIA's asserts that its damage calculation does not suffer from the problems in Pope.
MRIA argues that its damage calculation takes into account that had IMI opened without Saint

3

Recognizing that three of the claims underlying the single civil conspiracy claim have been dismissed, the Court
anticipates the filing of motions in limine to determine evidentiary issues.
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Alphonsus' assistance it would have won some of the market. MRIA contends that its damage
analysis also accounts for other market factors, including competition from other sources. MRIA
argues that it does not seek all of IMI's profits, but only the scans which migrated to IMI from
physicians who had historically been MRIA's customers, scans for the usurped Meridian
opportunity, and scans from the IMI machine placed on Saint Alphonsus' campus. MRIA states
that doctors who did not have privileges at Saint Alphonsus or who had privileges at more than
one facility were not included in the damage calculation and that scans lost to competitors other
than IMI were not included in the damage calculation. Because MRIA was the sole supplier of
MRis on the Saint Alphonsus campus prior to Saint Alphonsus' assistance to IMI, MRIA
contends that all of the IMI scans on Saint Alphonsus' campus were properly included. Finally,
MRIA argues that unlike the claimant in Pope, it did not attempt to calculate its losses as IMI' s
gains.
In Pope, the Idaho Supreme Court was concerned that there was no evidence in the
record to support the fact finder's findings and that the award of damages was the result of mere
speculation and guesswork. Pope, 103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005. The Court held "there
must be a reasonable foundation established by the evidence from which the fact finder can
calculate the amount of damages." !d.
It is MRIA's position that without the actions of Saint Alphonsus, IMI would not have
gotten these specific referrals, would not have gotten funding, would not have had a scanner at
Saint Alphonsus' campus, and would not have been in a position to open the IMI Meridian
facility. The inclusion of scans which migrated to IMI from physicians who had historically been
MRIA's customers, scans for the usurped Meridian opportunity, and scans from the IMI machine
placed on Saint Alphonsus' campus is consistent with its claims. In the instant case, the Court
finds the expert evidence takes into account other competitors and provides a historical view.
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Further, the Court finds that the damage estimate does not merely presume that its damage due to
lost profits is equivalent to IMI's profits, but instead distinguishes scans which may have been
lost for other reasons. All experts make some assumptions. Saint Alphonsus had the opportunity
and took the opportunity to cross examine regarding those assumptions. The Court finds the
damage calculation of lost profits is supported by a reasonable foundation from which a
reasonable jury could calculate the amount of damages. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, the Court finds the evidence satisfies the Pope concerns.
Saint Alphonsus' motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss each of MRIA's causes of
action that relies on lost profits as a measure of damages is DENIED.
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS

The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the damage award holding that a limited partnership is
an entity distinct from its partners and although MRIA has the general power to join the limited
partnerships in the suit, MRIA had not actually done so. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.
v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,

, 224 P.3d 1068, 1086 (2009). At the oral argument on

MRIA's motion to file a second amended counterclaim, MRIA argued in the alternative to add
Center and Mobile as claimants pursuant to Rule 17(a) if the Court found that MRIA was not
able to bring the claims on their behalf. (Tr., Vol. I, p.275). The trial court specifically found that
MRIA could pursue claims on behalf of the limited partnerships under the limited partnership
agreements.
[T[he Court will find that MRIA is able to assert claims on behalf of MRICI and
MRIM. Generally, general partners may have the authority to bind a limited
partnership for actions taken within the ordinary course of business. The
partnership agreements of MRICI and MRIM adopt this rationale and state the
general partner [MRIA] "is vested with all authority and responsibility necessary
for the management of the Partnership and its business."
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(Memorandum Decision on MRI Associates' Motion to Amend the Counterclaim and Third
Party Complaint to Seek Punitive Damages and to File a Second Amended Counterclaim and
First Amended Third-Party Complaint; Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike References to
Privileged Documents and Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Professor Douglas M.
Branson, 28-29.)
In seeking judgment on the pleadings dismissing the claims of the limited partnerships,
Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA should have joined the two limited partnerships before the
trial of this matter rather than waiting until after the appeal. Saint Alphonsus contends that all of
the applicable statutes of limitations have passed and that there is no rule of civil procedure
which allows these claims to relate back. MRIA argues that it would have joined the limited
partnerships but for the ruling of the trial court which made joinder of the limited partnerships
unnecessary. MRIA also contends that the limited partnerships are real parties in interest, that the
limited partnerships are third party beneficiaries of the Partnership Agreement, and that policy
considerations require the joinder of the limited partnerships.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) controls relation back of amendments to pleadings. It
states;
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back
if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for
commencing the action against the party, the party to be brought in by amendment
( l) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not
be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the
action would have been brought against the party. The relation back of an
amendment joining or substituting a real party in interest shall be as provided in
Rule 17(a). The delivery or mailing of process to the Idaho attorney general or
designee of the attorney general, or an agency or officer who would have been a
proper defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses ( l) and (2) hereof
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with respect to the state of Idaho or any agency or officer thereof to be brought
into the action as a defendant.
The parties agree that pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure lS(c), Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 17(a) controls the relation back of the claims of the Second Amended Counterclaim. It
provides:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An
executor, administrator, personal representative, guardian, conservator, bailee,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has
been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in
this capacity without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought; and
when a statute of the state of Idaho so provides, an action for the use or benefit of
another shall be brought in the name of the state of Idaho. No action shall be
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of
commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in
interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as
if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
Saint Alphonsus asserts that Rule 17(a) permits relation back for real parties in interest
only where there was an inadvertent and understandable factual mistake in identifying the proper
claimant because the identification of that claimant was difficult and that even under those
circumstances, Rule 17(a) only allows such relation back where the time between the original
pleading and the amendment was "reasonable." It is Saint Alphonsus position that since this case
was filed in 2004, has proceeded to trial and has been appealed, the delay in seeking this
amendment can in no way be considered reasonable, particularly in light of the fact that the
parties have previously argued whether the limited partnerships should be joined as parties to the
litigation.
Saint Alphonsus contends that the Idaho Supreme Court "has provided clear guideposts
limiting application of the relation-back doctrine to claims by a party newly added to a case."
(Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Judgment on the Claims of the
Limited Partnerships, 10.) First, the new party must be a real party in interest, i.e. the entity "who
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will be entitled to the benefits of the action if successful." St. Luke's Regional Medical Center,

Ltd. v. Board of Commissioners, 146 Idaho 753, 757, 203 P.3d 683, 687 (2009). Second, citing
Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 272-73 n.1, 723 P.2d 814, 816-17 n.l (1986), Saint
Alphonsus argues that Rule 17(a) and Rule 15(c) "permit relation back only where someone
other than the original party is entitled to the benefits of the causes of action asserted-i.e., 'if
[the] suit was originally brought in the name of the wrong party, and later the proper party
plaintiff was substituted in the action."' In Chacon, a plaintiff used fictitious names for certain
defendants pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a)(4), intending to amend his complaint
when the true identities ofthose defendants became known. Chacon at 271, 723 P.2d at 815. The
injury occurred on August 1, 1981 and the complaint was filed on July 28, 1983, near the end of
the applicable statute of limitations. Id. The plaintiff determined the true identity of the
defendants in April of 1984, amended his complaint on June 4, 1984, and served the new
defendants on June 14, 1984. Id. The defendants sought to dismiss the amended complaint,
arguing that the statute of limitations had passed. ld. The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether the notice requirement of
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) permitted relation back of the claim in the absence of notice
to those defendants within the applicable statute oflimitation. Id. at 272-74, 723 P.2d at 816-18.
The Court notes that Chacon did not involve a ruling on relation back of amendments to
pleadings involving additional claimants, but rather the language quoted by Saint Alphonsus
comes from an example in a parenthetical in a comment to the 1975 amendments to the Idaho
rules quoted in a footnote to show that the Idaho Supreme Court was aware "[t]he scope and
conditions of the relations back of amendments has always been one of considerable difficulty,
particularly where it involves the statutes of limitation" as shown by the language the Idaho
Supreme Court chose to emphasize. The Court does not find that the use of this parenthetical
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example in a footnote is a "clear guidepost limiting application of the relation-back doctrine"
only where someone other than the original party is entitled to the benefits of the causes of action
asserted, but instead the Court finds that the language is an example of one such time that an
amendment may relate back.
"Liberal construction should be given to [Rule 17(a)] and courts should 'further the
policy favoring the just resolution of actions-providing litigants their day in court."' Hayward
v. Valley Vista Care Corp .. 136 Idaho 342, 33 P.3d 816 (2001) (quoting Gonda Partnership, Inc.
v. M.D. Construction Co., Inc., 115 Idaho 902, 904, 771 P.2d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 1989). The

Idaho Supreme Court has also adopted the considerations regarding Rule 17(a) joinders
established by the Court of Appeals in Gonda consisting ofthe good faith of the claimant and the
prejudice to the defendant. Hayward at 348-49, 33 P.3d at 822-23. Thus, in order for a claim to
relate back under Rule 17(a), the claimant must be a real party in interest, the claimant must have
proceeded in good faith, and any prejudice to the defendant must be considered.
"A real party in interest 'is the person who will be entitled to the benefits of the action if
successful, one who is actually and substantially interested in the subject matter."' St. Luke's
Regional Medical Center, Ltd. v. Board of Commissioners, 146 Idaho 753, 757, 203 P.3d 683,

687 (2009) (quoting Carrington v. Crandall, 63 Idaho 651,658, 124 P.2d 914,917 (1942)). Saint
Alphonsus argues that the limited partnerships could not have been real parties in interest to the
original counterclaim or the amended counterclaim as all of the causes of action in those
counterclaims were brought solely in the name of MRIA for breaches of duties owed to MRIA.
Saint Alphonsus concedes that the limited partnerships are arguably real parties in interest to the
Second Amended Counterclaim because that was the first time that MRIA attempted to seek
damages "on behalf of' the limited partnerships. MRIA contends that the limited partnerships are
clearly real parties in interest to the Third Amended Counterclaim, in which they seek damages
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as third party beneficiaries of the Partnership Agreement and for direct damages for duties owed
to them by Saint Alphonsus. MRIA further asserts that the limited partnerships have been present
in this litigation since the filing of the original Counterclaim which stated:
MRI Associates, LLP is an Idaho limited liability partnership ("MRIA") which
has acted as a general partner with management responsibilities for two
operational entities, MRI Limited Partnerships known as MRI Center of Idaho
("MRICI") and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership known as MRI Mobile. Unless
otherwise referenced, the designation "MRIA" shall refer to all three entities"
MRIA, MRICI and MRI Mobile.
The Court finds that it has been clear since early in this litigation that MRIA has
attempted to act in accordance with the limited partnership agreements by bringing a claim as the
general partner and by seeking damages experienced by the limited partnerships. As the entities
in direct competition with IMI, whose business was affected by the alleged actions of Saint
Alphonsus, and whose existence is the very purpose of the MRIA Partnership Agreement, the
Court finds that the limited partnerships are real parties in interest to this action and have been
contemplated by this litigation since its inception.
MRIA argues that it acted in good faith when it filed its Second Amended Counterclaim
on behalf of the limited partnerships rather than joining the limited partnerships as parties
because it believed it had the power to manage the limited partnerships and bind them to actions
pursuant to the limited partnership agreements. Further, MRIA contends that it relied on the
holding of the trial court that MRIA had the authority to bring this suit on behalf of the limited
partnerships and that such reliance on the order of the trial court was reasonable given the
language of Rule 17(a) and the language of the limited partnership agreements. "[A) party with
whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party
authorized by statute may sue in this capacity without joining the party for whose benefit the
action is brought." Idaho Rule ofCivil Procedure 17(a)(emphasis added). This was not a claim
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where the complaint was filed and then a suitable plaintiff was found. Based upon the language
of Rule 17(a), the language of the limited partnership agreements, and MRIA's motion in the
alternative to join the limited partnerships, the Court finds that MRIA's reliance on the trial
court's order granting the motion for leave to file the Second Amended Counterclaim holding
that MRIA had the authority to bring these claims on behalf of the limited partnerships was
reasonable and that MRIA was acting in good faith.
Saint Alphonsus argues that it would be prejudiced by the joinder of the limited
partnerships in that new fact discovery "may'' have to be completed to address the claims of the
limited partnerships as third party beneficiaries of the MRIA Partnership Agreement and by the
cost of a new

incr~asingly

complex trial. Saint Alphonsus has not established that discovery will

have to be reopened or even given the Court an estimate of what sort of discovery would be
required at what costs and what length. Instead it relies on the vague assertion that it would be
prejudiced because discovery "may" have to be reopened. The Court does not find this
ambiguous assertion of potential discovery to be prejudicial to Saint Alphonsus. Additionally,
the Court finds that the cost of a new trial is a calculation that a party makes when it decides
whether to file an appeal. Here, Saint Alphonsus argued in its appeal that the damages to MRIA
could not include the damages to the limited partnerships. Therefore, Saint Alphonsus must have
had some idea what the damages MRIA alone must have sustained. The Court does not find
Saint Alphonsus' argument that it will be prejudiced by the cost of breaking down damages by
party based upon its own argument for the new trial it sought is sufficient prejudice to overcome
the policy of resolving disputes on the merits.
However, Saint Alphonsus cites Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 867 P.2d 960 (1994),
in support of its contentions that 1) there is no relation back in the absence of "an 'inadvertent'
and 'understandable' 'factual mistake"' and 2) the joinder of a claimant after an appeal and after
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the statute of limitations has run is "unreasonable." (Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support
of Its Motion for Judgment on the Claims of the Limited Partnerships, 11.) Mr. Tingley was
injured fighting a fire and filed a personal injury suit against the mill where the fire had occurred.
Tingley at 88, 867 P.2d at 962. Tingley hired attorneys Harrison and Herndon to represent him in

personal injury suit. !d. Two years into that litigation, the claim was dismissed pursuant to Rule
41 for failure to prosecute. !d. Tingley learned his claim had been dismissed two years after it
was dismissed. !d. Then Tingley filed for bankruptcy protection and listed the possible
malpractice claim against the attorneys as an asset. Id. After filing bankruptcy, Tingley filed a
malpractice claim, four years after the dismissal of the personal injury claim, which was outside
of the extended discovery statute of limitations for fraudulent concealment, but within the
applicable statute of limitations if the federal law applicable to Bankruptcy trustees had applied.
!d. at 91, 867 P.2d at 965. More than a year after the malpractice suit was filed, the Bankruptcy

Trustee filed a ratification agreement allowing Tingley to file the suit in his name, but stating
that the claim belonged to the estate. Id. The attorneys, Harrison and Herndon, sought to dismiss
the malpractice suit as barred by the statute of limitations, but Tingley and the Trustee argued
that federal law allowed the case to be filed past the statute of limitations and that the attorneys
fraudulently concealed the dismissal. Id. Also relevant is that in their answer, Harrison and
Herndon raised the defense that Tingley was not the real party in interest. !d. The Idaho Supreme
Court held that Rule 17(a) did not allow relation back in that case because 1) Tingley had been
made aware he was not the real party in interest on August 10, 1987 but no effort was made to
join the proper party for a full year; 2) Rule l7(a) only allows retroactive ratification where there
was a mistake in naming the original party; and 3) Rule 17(a) only applies when the original
complaint is not time barred. !d. at 91-92, 867 P.2d at 965-66.
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In the case at hand, Saint Alphonsus argues that there was no mistake in MRIA's failure
to join the limited partnerships because Saint Alphonsus argued that the limited partnerships
needed to be joined in late 2006 and early 2007. Saint Alphonsus alleges that MRIA made a
calculated decision not to join the limited partnerships in order to protect the assets of the limited
partnerships in the event that Saint Alphonsus were to prevail. Saint Alphonsus further contends
that the three years between that argument and the motion for leave to file the Third Amended
Counterclaim is patently unreasonable, given MRIA's notice that the limited partnerships should
be joined as parties.
As the Court found above, MRIA's reliance on the ruling of the trial court in not joining
the limited partnerships as parties was reasonable. When MRIA argued its motion to file its
Second Amended Counterclaim, it sought in the alternative to add Center and Mobile as
claimants if the Court found that MRIA was not able to bring the claims on their behalf. The trial
court specifically found that MRIA could pursue claims on behalf of the limited partnerships
under the limited partnership agreements. The Second Amended Counterclaim was filed in
accordance with the trial court's findings and before the applicable statutes of limitations ran.
Under the UPL which was in effect at the time the parties entered into the Partnership
Agreement, "a partnership was not a legal entity distinct from its partners." St. Alphonsus v.
MRIA, 148 Idaho 479, _, 224 P.3d 1068, 1074 (2010) (citing Swope v. Swope, 112 Idaho 974,
739 P.2d 273 (1987)). Also, Rule 17(a) itself allows contract claims of "a party with whom or in
whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another" to be brought without joining
that party. Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that it was a reasonable mistake (if it can
truly be called a "mistake" given the trial court's order) not to join the limited partnerships prior
to this point in the litigation.
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Finally, Saint Alphonsus argues that the time delay between the filing of the motion for
leave to file the Second Amended Counterclaim and the filing of the Third Amended
Counterclaim finally adding the limited partnerships as parties is patently unreasonable. In light
ofthe trial court's ruling that MRIA could bring the claims on behalfofthe limited partnerships,
the length of the trial, and the length of the appellate process, the Court does not find that the
amount oftime to correct the mistake is unreasonable.
The Court finds that the limited partnerships are real parties in interest; that MRIA acted
in good faith when it filed the Second Amended Complaint instead of joining the limited
partnerships as counterclaimants; and that Saint Alphonsus is not prejudiced by the relation back
of these counterclaims. Further, the Court fmds that MRIA's failure to join the limited
partnerships at the time of filing the Second Amended Counterclaim was a reasonable mistake
and that the time to correct the mistake was not unreasonable given the length of the trial and
appellate process. Saint Alphonsus' motion for judgment on the pleadings dismissing the claims
of the limited partnerships is DENIED.
CONCLUSION

Saint Alphonsus' motion for judgment on the pleadings dismissing the claims of the
limited partnerships is DENIED. Saint Alphonsus' motion for partial summary judgment that as
a matter of law the contract was for an indefinite term is GRANTED. Saint Alphonsus' motion
for summary judgment on the insufficiency of evidence of damages supporting the wrongful
dissociation in a contract for a definite term is DENIED. Saint Alphonsus' motion to dismiss the
civil conspiracy claim because two tort claims have been dismissed with prejudice is DENIED.
Saint Alphonsus' motion to dismiss the civil conspiracy claim as redundant is DENIED. Saint
Alphonsus' motion to dismiss the civil conspiracy claim because the Supreme Court held that
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Saint Alphonsus did not wrongfully dissociate is DENIED. Saint Alphonsus' motion for
summary judgment seeking to dismiss each ofMRIA's causes of action that relies on lost profits
as a measure of damages is DENIED. Saint Alphonsus' motion for judgment on the pleadings
dismissing the claims of the limited partnerships is DENIED.

SO ORDERED AND DATED THIS

.16fa;, ofNovember 2010.
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Defendanls/Cotulter-chtimants MRl Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership ("MRl
Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited ("MRJA Mobile") 1 submit tlus Opposition to the Motion of
Pl~intiffs/Cotmter-defendants

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, htc, and Saint Alphonstls

Regional Medical Cettter (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery
Regarding Damages. This opposi!lon is supported by the Affidavit of Counsel in Oppositio11 to
Motion to Reopen Fact and E..'{pert Discovery Regarding Damages, and in Oppositio11 to Motion.
to Set Scheduling 01·der (hereinafter ''Pru:ker Aff."), filed

I.

contemporaneo~Jsly botewith.

INTRODUCTION

Saint Alp11011S\1S, by its motion, seeks to obtain a new expert and conduct new discovery,
even though the deadlines for disclosing expel'ts and conducting discovery have long since
expired. Saint Alphonsus attempts to justify its request by erroneously claiming that
cil·c\Jmstances have changed since rhose deadlines expired. The fact, however, ls that nothing
IHlS

changed Justifying new discovery or new experts. Saint Alph011SUS simply is seeki11g an

impermissible mulligan.
As this court is aware, in the previous ll'ial of this mfltter, the jllry awarded a verdict in
favor of MRIA in the amount of $63.5 ntillion.2 Simply put, one jmy has ah'eady rejected Sainf
Alphonsus's damages analysis and fully adopted the damages analyses presented by MRIA. It is
for this reason that Sai11t Alpllonsns so strenuously seeks new damages discovery and a new
damages cxpel't, As noted above, however, discovery ill this 111!\tter is long past as it closed on
December 29, 2006.3 MRIA ht~s not changed its expe1'ts or the opinions of its experts, who were

1

All DefendAnts/Counter-claimnnts will be referred to collectively as ''MR.lA." MRI CentCl' <'1lld
MRI Mobile will be referred to collectively as «the Limited Partnerships."
2
Saint Alphonsus Diversffied C(lre, Inc. v. MRI As.voc/ales, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 4M, 224 P.3d
1068, 1073 (2009). Tlte district comt reduced lhe verdict to $36.3 1nilliou. .ld.
3
Pa ..ket Aff., Ex. A (horeinaftet "Amended Scheduling Order,"), at p. 4.
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fully deposed ftnd subject to cross-ex~mination at the previous trial of this lll!lller. As such, Saint

Alpllo•1sus has already had ample opportunity to conduct discove.t·y 1·egarding the damages
analysis which will be presented by MRTA. Likewise, Saint Alphonsus already had the

opportunity to retain and disclose n weH-qtlnlified damages expert, and indeed, Saint Alphonsus
did disclose such an expert who bad (!iUld will have) the opportunity to critique MRIA's damage
theory as well as present Saint Alphonsus's theory of damages. Moreover, as described more
f\llly below, the posture oft11is case after remand from the S\Jpreme Court and !his Cm.nt's
decision on summary judgment have 110t caused any alteration to the facts or circumstances. of
MRIA's dfttnages analysis so as to justi.fY new discove1:y nnd expe1 ts. Therefore, for these

reasons, which are more ftllly developed below, there is no basis to reopen discovery.
Conseqllenlly, Saint A1phonsus's Motion should be denied.
II.
A.

OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO REOPEN DAMAGES DISCOVERY

The Remnncl ofthis Cnsc docs Not Necessitate the Reopening of Discovery
Saint Alphonsus seeks to reopen fact and expert discovery regarding damages. The

parties had discussed the possibility of reopening discovery when Saint Alphonsus filed its
1-ecent Motion fur Summary Judgment on the S\lfficiMc.y of MRJA'.s evidence of lost profits.
MRTA considered submitting updated expert reports in response to that Motioll, but after

consideration, determined that the remand of this case for retdal did not authorize reopening
discovety 011 damages and that there was no need to change the expert 1-eports. MRIA
determined that its prior damages proof was the proof with which it co1.1ld and would go to trial,
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and this CoUI't agreed.'1 In sho11, MtUA has not changed its eKperts or the opinions of its experts,

who were fully deposed and sllbject to cxoss-exftmination at lhe previo\lS trial of this matte~·.
There is nothing ill the Supreme Co\ll't's opinion that a\tthOl·izes reopening the case, and
the case was not rema11ded for the purpose of conducting more discovery. When a case is
reversed and remanded, the case then stands as it did before the eno11eous decision, order, or
judgment was entered. Hutchins''· SMe, 100 Idaho 661, 665,603 P.2d 995, 999 (1979). As the
S\1pre:~ne

Court xeversed the jnry' s verdict, the present case therefore stands as it did immediately

prior to trial-past the deadlines fm discovery, which closed on December 29, 2006,5 Thus, the
decision to reopen discovery is within the Coul'l's discretion.
The purpose of the discovery ttdes is to fnciJi!ate fair and expedient pretrial fact
gathering.

Edmund~·''·

Kremer, 142 Idaho 867, 873,136 P.3d 338, 344 (2006). The procedutes

and techniques of discovery ptovide means by which litigants mn)' enter upon the trial of a ca.\lSe
reasonably assured against surprise of unknown or undisclosed facts. R. E. W. Const. Co. v.

District Court ofThird Judicial Dfsll'ict, 88 Idaho 426, 442,400 P.2d 390, 400 (1965), Trial
courts ~re expected to effectively and actively manage discovel·y to achieve the Plll'poses of
the discovery rules and to reach a "just, speedy, tmd inexpensive" determination of the issues,

Edmunds, 142 Idaho nt 878, 136 PJd at 349. Jn the present case, there is no need to reopen
discovery on the issue of damages because the facts have alret'ldy been fully developed in

4

As this Court recognized, •·ather than vacating the damages flWnrd, the Idaho Sup1·eme Coun
insl!ucted tl1e Cotll1 to consider the concerns express in Pope v. Imermottntain G(ls1 103 Idaho
217,646 P.2d 988 (1982). (MemorandtlmDecision and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment on Pleadings and Motions for Smnmary Judgment, filed Nov. 16,2010, at p. 18). This
Court agreed that the damage calculation of lost profits was suppol'ted by a reasonable
foundation fi·om which a rensonable jury co\lld calculate the amount of datnages. (Jd. at p. 20).
5
Amended Scheduling Order at p, 4, ·
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discovery and at the p1·ior ll'lal. To reopen discovery now will needlessly increase the expense of
this mattet·. 6
ll.

The Opinions oflV1lUA1s Drunages Ex(lerts nrc Not Premised Upon Dismissed
.

~~

1.

The Decisions of the Supreme Court !md this C01nt llavc Not Clumgcd the
Damnges Analysts

Saint Alphons\ls first conte11ds that discovery should be reopened because the opinions of
MRIA's e."{pel1 witnesses, Bl'uce Budge and Charles Wilhoite, are "expressly premised" on a
finding I hat Saint Alphonsns had wrongfully dis!>ochued from MRJA in 2004/ As this Court
knows, among MRTNs claims for relief in this ense, MRIA brought stalutory clahns for

.

wrongful dissociation for (l) breach of an express provision of the Pattnr.rship Agreement, Idaho
Code§ 53-:3-602(b)(l); and/or (2) withdlnwlng prior to the expimlion of the definite tel'm~ I. C.§
52-3~602(b)(2). 8 The Supreme Court found that Saint Alphansus could not have wrongf\llly

dissociated by breaching an ~ pl'ovision of the Partuet·ship Agreement. Saint Alphonsus

Divers(fled Care, lnc., 148ldl\ho at 488-89, 224P.3d at 1017-78. On Summary Judgment, this
Court held that there was not a defmite tel'm to the paduership, Md thus that Saint Alphonsus

6

-.
It ls notable that this reqttest to teopen discovery and Sai11t Alphonsus's concomitant motion to

· rel)pen briefing cpme nt the same time Sahrt Alph~nS\1S ttlso seeks to .~nforce the aw11rd of costs
on appeal, despite Justice Jones's advice that "rather than ... pmsing hardball tactics against
MRIA on collection of any cost award that may J'esult ft·om the apjleal, St. Alpho1lS\lS migllt be
advised to consider withholding collection proceedings pending the ultimate m.1tcome of the
litigation!' Saint Alphonsus Divenl'ified Care., Inc. 1'. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idabo 479, 224
P.3d 1068, 1092 (Jones, J., specially concul1'ing). The cmwergence ofthese motions and the
attempt to collect this debt ft·om MlUA, which is already 011 the verge of insolvency, S\tggests the
possibility that Saint Alphons\ls is attempting to avoid a tetrial of this mattet• by making illoo
cost-prohibitive for MRlA to relt-y.
.
1
Malian to Reopen Fact nnd Expert Discovery Regardh1g Damages and Set a Discove~.·y
Schedule, filed Dec. 23,2010 (hereinafter ''Saint Alphonsus Discovery Motion") p. 3),
8
Second Amended Counterclaim, filed March 2, 2007.
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could not have wtongfully dissociated in violation ofTdaho· Code § 5)-3-602(h)(2), by
withdrawing pl'iot· 10 Ihe end of a definite term. 9
The dismissal of~lA's claims for stat1.1tory wrongful dlssociliti<i11 has no bearing on !he
remaining damoge theory in this case. In the :first trial, MRTA had two alternoth•e theories of
damoges. The first was what Saim Alphonsus called the ''I>Urchase price dll.mage theory;'' m·
what it wo\lld have cost Saint Alphonsus to buy out MRTA. 10 That damnge theory related solely
to the statl.ltOl'}' wrongful dissoci11tion claims. 11 Howe,rer, because the Sttpreme Court rejected

thnl theory of damages, it is no Iongel' at issue in this case. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care,

Inc,, 148 Idaho at 498, 224 P.3d at l 081.
The second theory of damage~) which is the damage theory MIUA will purSl.le at the
retrial of this maller, and is the theory that tins Court has nbendy found legally sufficient, is lost
profits, otherwise known as "lost scan volmnes," or the cHlculation of MRI scans lost to the

competitor which Saint Alphonsus supported, called Jntermollntain Medical Imaging or "IMI."
Themeasnre of"lost scan volumes" w11s used at the first trial fo1· all ofMRJA's. causes of actions
including the cat1ses of action stillremnining at retrial: breach of contract, breach of fiduciaty

duty, breach of the covenant of good faith tmd fail• dealing, interference with prospective
contractual relations or business expectations, and civil conspiracy. 12
As Mr. Wilhoite explained:
A: .. , [The purchase price damages theory] relates to the notion that
SARMC could have pmchased the other party's interest a11d we would uotfind
9

on

Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motions for Summaty Judgment Pleadings
and Motions for Summary Judgment filed Nov. 16,2010, at p. 6-1_1.
10
Parker Aff. at Ex. D (hereinafter "Budge Trial Testimony), at p, p. 2679:22-2682: I 0~ 2724:212725:15.
11
Budge Tl'ial Testimony at p. 2679:14-2680:21; 2727:10-15; Parket• Aff, at Ex. G (bereinafter
..Wilhoite Trial Testimony''), at p. 2875:1-4,2891:7-13.
12
Third Amended Counterclaim, filed Mal'ch 22, 2010.
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·ourselves sitting here today had they paid what Shattuck Hammond estimated as
the fair mnrket vah1e of all the other partners' interests as of2001.
So thnt is separace from forward-looking lost ptofits that'reh\tes; ns I
testified to e1ulier, to historical profit.
Q. Earlier I asked you if you had broken down the damage analysis by
claim, and I believe yon1esponded that you had not; is that conect?
A. Not by specific claim; however, dissociation, as I referenced in the
foolnote, co\lld be viewed as a manner of buying your way out of a partnership. 13
Indeed, 111 its ID:YJl briefing to this Court in it.'l Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Rununary Judgment relating to the·evidence of lost profits, Saint Alphonsus itself states that:
MRIA advnnces two sepc:trate theories of damages, including a "purchase pli.cc"
theory relAting to the clnim for WJ'ongful dissocint!Qn, and a "lost scnnsu or
nlost profits'' tbeol'l' tltnt J>ln·uotts to meAsure the damages en us eel in
connection wm nlluolHlissociAtlon CllllliCS of action- i,e,J the claims fo1· breach
of the partnership agreeme11t's no11-compete ciu·use, bl'eaeh of the covenant of
good faith and fail: denting, ll1terference with P.J.'Ospective contractual relations,
breach offiducinry duly, and civil conspiracy. H
The now-diSI11issed wrongful dissociation claims were the only cause of action with a specific
damages theory altacl1ed. The damage theory that remains in this case, lost scans, is viable on
any ofMRIA's currently-existing claims. Thus, it js not anew damage theo1·y and the decisions
of the Supreme Court and this Cout·t on the slat11tory wrongful dissociation claims have not
altered the .lost scan volnrne damages analysis il1 any way.
2.

M1•, Bndge,s Opinion is Not Expressly Promisee! on n Wrongful Dissociation

Claim

Mt:. Budge was an expert hired by MRJA to opine about histol"icnl damt~ges. This
opinion Wt'ls based upon a calclllation of the numbe1· of sca11s lost to JMI. 15 Saini Alphonsus cites
only to page 10 ofM1•, Budge's report in .support of its proposition that Mr. B-udge "expressly
13

Parker Af£, Ex. F (l1ereinafter" Wilhoite Depo.'') at p. 153:19-154:10.
Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support ofits Motion for Summary Judgment Based on
the Legal Insufficienc)' ofMRTA's Evidence of Lost Pt'ofits, filed August 6, 2010 (hereinafter
"Saint Alphonsus's Lost Profits MSr), atp. 3 (emphasis added).
ls Parker Aff., Bx. B (hereinafter "Budge Repmf') at p. 6; Budge Trial Testimony at p,
2733:5-9.
14
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premised'' his estin1ate oflost profits tlpon w1·ongful dissociation. 16 Tllis page is a part ofM1·,
Budge's tecitation of the "Case Background," it1 which Mr. B\tdge merely notes as a pal't of the

timeline of the case that it was found by the trial court that on Apt'il 4, 2004, SARMC wrongfully
dissociated fi-om MRIA. 17
Mr. Bu.dg~'s Opinion regarding histodcnl lost scan voh1me damnges is not at all
dependent upon the statutory wwngful dissociation claims, but l'ather aU the "bad acts" generally
alleged by MRJA. 18 As Mr. Budge explained his l'Ole, "[i]n this litigation there's an alleged
course of conduct by the hospitttl which hftd the tCS\llt of diverting business :from MRIA to IMI.
And my assignment was basically lo calculate the profits that were lost in connection \Vith this
loss ofbusiness." 19 He continued:

Q: . , . to on extent you have referred to these bad acts in your repm't, my
question is: For the pU1'pose of your analysis, do yollreally need to know what
those were Ot' are?
A. Well, I think it's de1ii1itely useful to be informed aboul fhem, but I
don't know if 1need to have a detailed understanding of tho.ee.

Q. Does it make any difference to yo\I --you have explained to us a
CO\lplc of times that you're

not here to opine aboutthe bad acts. Yotl're here to
opine about the impact of the bad acts; correct?

A. I think that's generally a·ight, yes.
Q, Does yom analysis depend on all of those bnd acts being ttlle?
A. No.

Q. Oue of them being true?

16

Saint Alphonsl,ls Discovery Motion at p. 3.
Budge Repol't Qt p. 10,
18
Budge Trial Testimony atpp. 2732:21-2733:9,2785:17-2586:17,2788:1-5,2800:4-8, and
2809:4-5; Budge Report at p. 8-10.
19
Budge Trial Testimony at p. 2726:11-16 (emphasis added).
17
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A. I think that what it depends upon is n finding that St. Al's breacl1ed its
fiduciary duties or that it tmlawfully CQlllpeted against MIUA or th11t it wrongil.llly
dissociated. I view, using yout· term '•bad aots," things which basically put the
legs under those three stools. So what combinations of those is llecessary to
establish one of those three things is not that impm1ant to me?0
In other words, \Vhile his necessat·y llllderly.ing assumption as a damages expert is that
Saint Alphonsus wlll be held Hable for these losses on some legal theory tor its "bad acts»
(othetwise there wotlld obviously be no damagesi 1, the precise nature of the legal theory
has no bearing on his opinion. As he explained:
Q: Did yoll do tltl evaluation of the allegations of breach off1d11ciary duty
or wrongful withd1awal or violatiOll 011 the noncompete 011 yotlr own?

A: No. That's really not my view or my role as a damages expert. I
basically am taking those conditions, which I think basically you will have to
decide whether they're factual enough. And if they occ\Jrred, thetl what I've
calculated is wbat the financial implication are of those actions. 22
His analysis was not directed at any specific cause of action, but was informed by the entire
course of conduct. As the Co'Urt fonnd in its mliug on Saint Alphonstls's Motion for Stnnmary
Judgment. MRJA's damage analysis is appropriate for calc\dating damages for past lost scan
profits from Saint Alphonsus's general course of conduct under the linbility theol'ies remaining
in the case. fu short, the fact that the staMory wrongful dissociatio11 claims have bee11 dismissed
does not affect Mr. Budge's expert opinion in any way.
3.

Mt•, Wilhoite's Ol>inion is Not l"~remisecl oun Wrongful Dissocintion Clnhn

Likewise, ML". Wilhoite's opinion as to lost scans/profits is not pl'etnised on the wrongful
dissociatiotl clainis. Mr. Wilhoite was an expert hired to opine ubom futtu·e damages. 23 His

work projected fm'W11l'd fl'OlU M1·. Budge's opinion in Ol'der to arrive at the present value of the
20

Pt~rker Aft:, Ex. C (hereinafier "Btldge Depo.") at p. 63:16-64:15.

21

Budge Trial Testimony atp. 2820:22-2821:21.
;u Budge Tl'ial Testimony at p. 2764: l&-2765:3.
23
Wilhoite Trial Testimony a p. 2848; 17-20.
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. cash flow from lost scans lhat wotlld Iuive been received ln the future? 4 As with Mr. Budge, Mr.
Wilhoite's opinion regarding damages is not at all dependent upon the dismissed statutory

wi·ongful dissociation claims, b\lt rather all the ''bad acts" generally nlleged by MRJA. As M1·.
Wilhoite explained:
[We started witb the amount that Mr. Budge] said that MRIA lost becaus~
of the acts of Saint Alphonsus ... and we grow it over this period because if Saint
Alphonsus had not committed those acts, set up with JMI, taken that business, that
$3.7 million would have remained inside the operations ofMIUA. So that's our
starting poh1t. We grow it O\lt tlu'OtJgh the end of the partnership? 5
As Mr. Wilhoite stated in his expel't report, "the Acts of the part of the Counterdefendants ...

generally are sumlnal'ized as (1) unfair business pra~tices, (2) business interference, (3) violation
of the uoncompete agreeme11t, and (4) wrong fill dissociation."26 Wl'Ongful dissociation Wi'IS only
one of the "bad nets" which Ivfr. Wilhoite noted lllight provide the basis for finding liability.
As a damages expert, Mr. Wilhoite necessarily assumed thal Saint Alphonsus would be

held liable fm· these losses on some legal theol'y for its "bad acts."27 As he testified, ''[w]hat I'm
assuming is the ref~rrals, the relationships that 1eft MRlA as a result of Saint Alphonsus leavil1g
and these othe1· acts, that's what ca\lsed the loss in profits and the loss il1 valnc.."l8 The precise
nature of the theory ofliability is llnimportatlt to Mr. Wilhoite's lost futme profits analysis. As
Ml'. Wilhoite testified durh1g his deposition:

Q: Whe1·e in yotu• Expel't Opinion do you bl'eak out the amount of
economic loss caused by each individual act?
A: We don't break them out that way, and we weren't asked to. We look
at the collective acts. That's why we refer to them as "the 1'!Cts."29
24
25

26
27
28

lSI

kl atp. 2851:18-2852:16; WiU1oiteDepo. p. 79:4-19.
Wilhoite Tl'ial Testimony at p. 2863:5~12 (emphasis added).
Parkel' Aff., Ex. E {hereinnfter "Wilhoite Repott'') at p. 2.
Wilhoite Depo. at p. 96:7-ll.
Wilhoite Tl'ial Testimony at p. 2897:23-2898:1 (emphasis added).
Wilhoite Depo. nt p. 67:15-20.
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His d!lnu1ge analysis is aptnopriate for C81culating damages for fulure damages from Saint
Alphonsus' s general course of conduct, regardless of 1he precise theory of liability under which
such conduct is found to be improper.
The opinions ofthese experts, which are premised on a gcnetal coul'se of"bad acts" and
nol dependant on the wmngful dissociation claims, are unchanged by the posnue of this la·wsuit
upon remand and this Court's recent decisions on sununary judgment. As such, there is no need

to t-eopen discovery with regard to their opiuion.s,
C.

Tile Addition of the Limltell Pnrtmws)Ji}JS Does not Alter the Dnmnges Landscape
Saint Alp.ho11StlS next asserts that the joinder of the Limited Partnerships, MRl Centel' <md

MRI Mobile, necessitate the reopening of damages discovery. This is an untenable position, as
Saint Alphonsus has previotlsly argued on appeal Utnt the damages were those cxclusivclv of the
(then) absent parties, MRI Centet• and MRl Mobile. ill Saint AlphonSllS 1SOWJl appeal bl:iefto the
ldaho S\1pren1e Collrl, Saint Alphomms recognized, attd specifically argued, that the damages
figut'es presented by MRlA 's expe1ts \Vere in fact the damages of the Limited Pnrtnerships:
the nwn1·d of $36.3 million in damages l'cpl'eseuts profits allegedly lost by one
or both of the limited Plll'tnerahins, Center nnd Mobile. MRIA, whicl• owns
just a fraction of Center fmcl Mobile, tbercfOI'C did not suffcl' these
dnmnges.' ...
Center and Mobile are the two Iimited pa1·tnerships established by MRJA
fOl' the pmpose of engaging in the business ofproviding MRl se1vices ... MRlA
"provides no services directly'' ... b\tt rather receives a management fee of7.S%
of Center and Mobiles mmual cash 1eceipts for overseeing their operations. . ..
1n presenting evidence oflost profits, MRlA's two drunnges experts
relied exclusively on alleg11tlons ofinjlll'Y to Center aud MobHe's business.
·Specifically, Bruce Budge estimated the nllmber of scans diverted f1·om the
limited nartnersh!J!! to IMI and applied their revenue and cost figures in order to
calculate the profits that were thus lost. MRTA's other extJet·t, Charles Wilhoite,
ttsed B\1dge's calculation to predict diverted lost future scaus and resnltlng lost
profits....
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The $36.3 million in damages thus renl'csenb J)l·ofits ollcgeillY_lost by
Ccntca· mul/or Mobile-the entities actually pt•oving MRI scmming services~
rather than any conceivable injury to MRTA itself.l0

The Idaho Supreme Co·urt likewise recognlted that tlte lost profits SO\lght by MRIA in the first

trial wet-e the damages to the Lilllited Ptwtnerships:
(t]he lost m·ofits included profits lost by botlt MRI Center aucl MRI Mobile
for nast ftnd fuhu·e MRI scnns diverted to lllttl'l110lllltHln !mnging. MRJA did
not provide any setvices. Its income came fmm management fees. MRI Centet·
agreed to pay MRIA a management fee of$90,000 o1· 7.5% of its cash l'eceipts
from operations, whicheve1· was gte!ltel'. MRI Mobile agreed to pay MRIA a
management fee of7.5% of its cash receipts ftom operations. In addition, MRTA
would receive its share of the net cash flow from the limited partnerships.
MRJA 's lost pl'ofits would be the tmmagement fees and its share of the net cash
flow from the limited partnerships.:H

Saint Alphonsus prevailed in its arg\lment on appeal that the damages awarded by the jury wet·e

the damages ofMRI Centel' and MRI Mobile. As such, it is now judicially estopped from taking
a contrary position. See hulian t>"'prings LLCv. Indian Springs Land In¥., UC; 147ldaho 737,

748,215 P.3d 457, 468 (2009) (''[t]he doctrine ofj\tdicial estoppel prohibits 'a party from

assuming a position in one proceeding nnd then taking an inconsistent position in a subsequent
proceeding."'); Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 240, 178 P.3d 597, 605 (2Q08) ("Judicial
estoppel is applied when a litigant obtains ajtldgment, advantage, or conslderntion from one

party. , . and subsequently ftdopts inconsislent and contral'y allegations or testimony to obtain a
recovery Ol' a right against another party, arish1g out of the same transactio11 or subject matter").
Indeed, the pnrties have always known that the lost scRn daiiU~ges opined to by Mr.
Budge and Mr. Wilhoite were the damages of the Limited Parlnerships. This case Wllll otiginally
tried as if the Limited Partnerships were present. The Limited Partnerships h1we been

refere11ced, and in fact included h1 each of the claims, since the filing of the original
30

31

Parket· Aff. Ex. Hat p. 43-44 (emphasis added).
&lint Alphonsus DiveJ•sifled Care, Inc, 148 Idaho at 496, 224 P.3d at 1Q85 (emphasis added).
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Connterclaim.l2 Jn the Second Amended Counterclaim, MRIA explicitly sought damages "on
behalf of'' the Limited Partnerships.33 That all the parties were treating trial M if the Limited
Partnerships were present was succinctly Sllllllllllrized by the trial CO\Irt during one of the jm·y
instruction confere11ces:
And w1ten I say "these folks/' I'm talkh1g about, renlly, MRI Mobile/MRI Center
·were interwoven with MRlA, thollgh there were distinctions and they IUay have
been fot tax Plll'POSes or other heAlth· laW p\lrposes, the overwhelming evidence is
that they were all bundled together and decisions were made. 34
In sum, the damnges belonging to the Limited Partnerships has permeated tlus litigation.
The patties all know that the Limited Partnerships were the only entities who had scans to
lose. In its own briefing to this Court in is Memorandum in Support oflts Motion For Summary
Ju~gl)'lent Based on

the Legal Insufficiently ofMRIA's Evidence of Lost Profi~, Saint

Alphonsus states that "MRJA's 'lost profits' mensure of damages is based on the theory that by
allegedly providing assistance to IMI ... Saint Alphonsos helped IMI win scan business that
otherwise wotdd have gone to MRT Center or MIU Mobile.":H The formal joinder of the Limited
Partnerships as parties to this action has 11ot changed the dam!lges analysis, w1li~b has always
been premised on damages to the Limited Partnerships. Because the parties ha"e always kuown
that the lost scan dftmages h~y~ ~lwtlys bee11 the damages of the Limited Parhterships and not
MRJA; there is no need to "pal'se out" the lost sc~m damages as between MRIA and the Limited
Pmtnerships,
F\lrthermore, there is no need to conduct further discover)' in order to parse out the lost
scan damages as between the Limited Pm'tnerships, MRl Center and MR1 Mobile, because such

32
33

34
35

Co\mterclaitn, filed May 20, 2005.
Second Ame11ded Counterclaim, filed March 2, 2007,
Parkel' Aff., Ex. I til p. 4202:24-4203:4.
Saint Alphonsus's Lost Profits MSJ at p. 3.
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parsing has already been done. Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite calculated the sclltlS lost to lMI
from three localions?6 The first was on the campus at Saint Alphonsus, where the MRI Center
. facilities were located. 37 The second was SCllns lost by MRI Center to IMI's downtown Boise
office. 38 The third was scans lost to IMI's Meridian, Idaho, office?fl The scans lost to IMI's
downtown Boise office and on the Saint Alphonsus campus were considered the lost scans of
MRI Center. The Meridian, Idaho, lost scans were also genemlly considered the lost scans of
MRI Center, with the possibility that the scans from Mel'idi!'m wotlld have been the lost scans of
MIUMobile. As Mr. Budge testified:
Q: I want to make sure, Mr. Budge, that what we'1·e talking a out here- whal
you're talking ahotlf here is the loss of profits to MRI Cente1· ofldaho, true?

A: I have to make a q\ltllificatiou with l'espect to Meridian because I haven't
made an nsstllllption about what tlnit that would be in.

Q: But insofar as any income that would flow from the mobile side, say, from the
Pacific Northwest operations, you'te not talking about that.
A: I'm not talking abo\lt any diversion ofMRh\1 revenues.
Q: Right In fact, you're not talking about any loss of revemte fi·om the mobile
side, are you?

A: I'm not, unless MRIA had chosen to service Meridian out of that location. 40
As Mr. Wilhoite explained:
Q; ; .. For the lost scans that you have attributed to_ the Meridian site or
the prior affiliated physiciani·efeu:als, what MRI entity did those •• the dtunages
associated with those lost scans affect?

J(j

37

Parket• Aff. at Ex. J; Budge Report at p. 51.
Parkm· Aff. at Ex. J.

33 ](l

39

40

ld.; Budge Report at p. 56.
Budge 'Trial Testimony at p. 2783:21-2784:13.
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A. Let's assume that, but fOl' the acts of your clients, the reven\les of
MRIC and MRIM would have been at a higher level, \Vl1ich would hnve generated
higher management fees.

Q. So the lost scan voJume, if you will, is damage that you have attributed
-- or the damage attributed to lost sc11ns is d11mnge to eithel' MRI Center or MRI
Mobile; is that correct?

A. Based on the fact that they would have ass1.nned to have performed the
scnns and generated the related profits.'11
As Saint Alphonsus had itself stated to this Comt:
With respect to lMI's downtown Boise and Mel'idianloc£1tions, Budge
determined the mtmber of scans pel'formed by lMI for patients 1eferred to those
locations who eitllel' were exclusively nffiliated with Saint Alphonsns or had
referred patients to MRI Center ... wmtld hnve been perfo•·med by MRI Center
hut for Saint Alphonsus's alleged Iuisconduct ... Budge simill'll'ly assumed that
1vfRI Center would htwe performed all of the scans that Iivll performed at its
-facility oil the Saint Alphonsus campus.42
In short, the damages landscape, llpon which e..xtensive discovel'y was held and evidence actually
pres011ted at trial, has not been altered at all by the addition of the Limited Partnerships, because
the damages sought have always been the damages incuned by the Limited Pat·tnerships.
D.

Sai11t Alphomus Is Not Entltle1l to A New Expe1·t
Saint Alphousus asserts that it ''intends to designAte irs own expert witness to address

how Saint Alphonstls's lawful'0 dissociation from MRIA in 2004limits the damages i:'lllegedJy

41

Wilhoite Depo at p. 175:19 to 176:9.
~2 Saiut Alphonsus's Lost Pl'ofits MSJ at p. 4.
~3 The assertion that its dissociation from MRIA in 2004 is "lawfuJ" is disingenuous. The
finding of the Supreme Court an.d this Comt ate simply that Saint Alphonsus did not violate any
statute by dissociating in 2004 because an e:-.:press tcnn of the Parlnership Agreement was not.
violated. Unlike the statutory cJnim, a breach of contract claim does not hinge on the violation of
atl ''express" provision of a contract, but simply a breach of a contl'actuaJ provision. See, e.g.,
E1·1•in Const. Co. v. Van Orde11, 125 Idaho 695,700, 874 P.2d 506,511 (1993). Whether
St. Alphonsus's withdrnwal was a bre~ch of conti'~Ct is a question of fact for the jury. Borah v.
McCcmdless, 147 Idaho 73, 79, 2.05 P.3d 1209, 1215 (2009); Clark v. St. Paul Prope1·ty and
Liability Ins. Compcmies, 102 Idaho 756,151, 639 P.2d 454, 455 (1981). A questionoffact
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suffered by MRIA" nnd "to opine on the apportionlllent of damages omong these three entities
[MRIA, MRI Cente1·, and MRI Mobile].''~~ The time for expert designation expired over four
years ago.~ 5 A court 1nay pl'Operly exclude nn e~pert witness who is disclosed after the deadline
to d~ so.

Edmund~

v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873, 136 P.3d 338, 344 (2006) City ofMcCall v.

Seube/'1, 142 Idaho 580, 586, 130 P.3d 1118, 1124 (2006), Moreover, as outfined above, the
damages landscape on the remaining damages theory of lost scan/profits has not changed at all
since that time, nor been impacted by the pl'\lllillg of the claims or formal addition of the Limiled
Pattnerships. As such, there ls 110 need for a new expert to analyze damages.
Jn addition, MRIA hns not ch!lnged its experts ol' the content of lts expert's reports or
testimony. Saint AlphonsliS already has a well-qualified expert, Manfred Steinel·, who is highly
experienced in financial valuation ofhealthcare otganizations. 46 He was hired by SAint
Altlhonsus to analyze the opinions ofMr, Budge and Mr. Wi1hoite:
Q: ... Mr. Steiner, did l ask yotJ to do any other analysis or work in this

case?
A: You asked us to review the BlJdgc and Wilhoite reports.
Q: And what did you do in that l'egard?

A: We reviewed the reasonableness of the assuru.ptions that were
underlying the damage calculations.

Q: And, again, when --what damage calculations are we talking·- ate you
talking about when you say Jookh1g at the undel'lying flSSl.Unptions?

A: The htlt~for a11alysis. But for the bad acts -but for the bad nets, the
damagt)s, the •·esnlt h1 damages.

remains as to whether by dissociating in 2004, Saint Alphonsus committed the other acts {bl'each
of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, etc.} outlined in MRIA' s Third Amended Complaint.
~~ Siiint Alphonsus Discovery Motion at p. 4.
45
Amended Scheduling Order at p. 4.
46
Patker Aff. at Ex. K (hereinafter" Steiner Trial Testimony"), at p. 3187:1!-3189:9.
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Q: And when ·• to your understa11ding, when Mr. Wilhoite and Mr. Budge
looked tlt the damage calculation, were they looking at .. weH, what wel'e they
looking at? Were they looking at the value of the companies or were they looking
at the value of potentially losl scans? ·

A: They 1.vere looking at the value of potentially lost scans.
Q: Okay, And yo\1, as I understand, looked at the assumptions behind
some of those cHlcliiHtions?

A: Yes, we did.
Q: And based on yom· experience, Mr. Steiner, in the healthcare field and
in valuation, did yo\1 have any criticisms of those assumptious?

A: I think we q\lestioned the reasonableness of the assumptions that the
scaus that were lost at Center would have been able lo be kept at Center given
some of the deficieucies that we saw in the business model a£ Center.47 .
Notably, Mr. Steiner's analysis recognized that the opinions of Mr. Budge and Mt': Wilhoite
were based 011 the "bad acts," rather tha11 a particular cause of action, and that the lost ptOfits
were primarily those ofMRI Centel'. As the opinions of11r, Budge nnd Wilhoite have not
changed, there 1s no need for Saint Alphonsus to sec\1t'e a different expert to a11alyze their
reports,
Significantly, Saint Alphonsus elected to instruct ~fr. S!einer not to COI'!duct his own
damages analysis, but simply to critique the analysis ofMl·, Budge and Mr. Wilhoite.'13 As such,
Saint Alphonsus did not have an alternative sum of damages to present to lhe juty, which fully
accepted the damages numbers presented by MlUA's experrs. Although the opportunity to
designate experts is long past, and MRIA's damages analysis remains uucha11ged, Saint

47
4

Steiner Trial Testimony at p. 3213:11- 3217:10; see, (tl.vo, Parker Aff. Ex. L, atp. 14Ml6.
~ Steiner Trial Testimony at p. 3226:11-18.
.
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Alphonsus is seeking a do-over. Saint Alphousus WEIUts a chance to correct m1y weaknesses in
the opinion of its expert-which is perhaps unsurprising, since a jmy has previously rejected tl:tis

expel't's opinion. Unfortunately for Saint Alphonsus, the time for designating experts nnd
conducting discovery is long past and, as demonstrated above, there is no reason to 1-eopen these

iss\les,
lU.

CONCLUSION

Because the decisio11s of this Supreme Court and this court have not altered the damages
Mnlysis, and because Saint AlphonStl9 had ulready had ample oppol'lunity to conduct discovery
attd designate its own experts, the Motion ro Reopen Discovery should be denied. FOl' these
reasons, emd those stnted above, MRIA l'espcctfully requests that Saint Alphonsus's Motion to
Reopett Discovery be denied.
DATED this

LJ day ofFebl'llary 2011.
homas A. Ba lducci
BANDUCOWOODARDSCHWAKfil~J\NPLLC

MRT Associates, LLP, i\tlRI Limited Parlnetship,
and lvlRI Mobile Limited Pal'tn.ership
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OHR1STOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
By DIA':~TMAN

EXHIBIT
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFffiD, CARE )
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
)
liability partnership,
)
)
Defendant.

I

H

Case No. CV-OC-2004-00821g3''-1111111..,__ _ _ _~
ORDER REOPENING DISCOVERY
AND SETTING SCHEDULE

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership, on its own behalf, and on
behalf ofMRI Limited, and Idaho limited
partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited, an Idaho
limited partnership,

)
)
)
)
)
)
CounterClaimant,
)
)
)
vs.
)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED, CARE )
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)
)
CounterDefendants.

Presently before the Court is a motion by Saint Alphonsus to reopen discovery and issue
a scheduling order. St. Alphonsus is seeking to have expert and fact discovery reopened due to
the "changed landscape" caused by the Idaho Supreme Court's decision reversing decisions

~ OrderReopeningDiscoveryAndSettingSchedule I
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made by the original trial court. 1 MRI Associates opposes St. Alphonsus's motion, arguing that
discovery covering the new legal issues had already been conducted.

BACKGROUND
This action arises from a partnership, MRI Associates (MRIA), formed in 1985 between
St. Alphonsus and several other parties. In 2004, St. Alphonsus dissociated from MRIA and
sought a judicial determination of its share of MRIA.

MRIA counterclaimed for wrongful

dissociation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
interference with prospective contractual relations, and civil conspiracy.

At trial, the

counterclaimant, MRIA, presented two theories of damages: one based on the buyout value of
MRIA, and one based on the lost profits of MRIA caused by St. Alphonsus's bad acts.
Ultimately MRIA was awarded $63.5 million by the jury, which was reduced to $36.3 million by
the trial court on the finding that the jury had aggregated the two alternate theories of damages.
St. Alphonsus appealed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed several decisions of the trial court. Among other
things, it reversed the trial court's determination that St. Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated
as a matter of law. It further held that the buyout theory of damages is not a proper measure of
damages given the nature of the contract between the parties. It also held that the damage award
could not be based on the purportedly extended end date of the partnership because the
partnership term had not been properly extended.

On remand, this Court found that St.

Alphonsus had a statutory right to dissociate, and thus did not wrongfully dissociate as a matter
of law.

1

The issue of whether further dispositive motions could be filed was raised, but at hearing both parties agreed that
more motions could be filed, so that issue will not be addressed.
OrderReopeningDiscoveryAndSettingSchedule 2
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DISCUSSION
St. Alphonsus argues that discovery should be reopened because the circumstances
surrounding the upcoming trial have changed materially. It argues that this Court's ruling that
St. Alphonsus did not wrongfully dissociate and the joinder of MRI Center and MRI Mobile
require further fact discovery and new expert testimony.
St. Alphonsus first argues that MRIA's experts expressly premised their lost-pr0fit
damage calculations on the court's decision that St. Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated. To
support their contention, St. Alphonsus notes that both experts cited to the wrongful dissociation
in their lost-profits damages calculations. However, St. Alphonsus's position is rebutted by the
experts' trial and deposition testimony. One expert, Mr. Budge, explicitly states that what theory
St. Alphonsus might be found liable on is irrelevant to his analysis ofMRIA's lost profits. The
other expert for MRIA, Mr. Wilhoite, based his analysis on Mr. Budge's analysis, and also
explained at trial that his analysis was based generally on "the acts of St. Alphonsus" including
dissociation and other acts.

Since both of MRIA's experts looked to numerous theories of

liability, and apparently weren't relying on any particular one for their analyses, this Court finds
St. Alphonsus's argument unpersuasive.
St. Alphonsus's second argument, that the damage models of MRIA's fails to parse out
the injury to each of the now joined parties, is also unpersuasive. The examination ofMRIA's
experts makes clear that the experts had already made conclusions about the damages to each of
the entities. In fact, Mr. Budge specifically spells out his assumptions about which conduct
damaged each particular entity in his trial testimony. Thus, there is no need for additional
discovery to determine the proportions of damages to which each entity is entitled.
However, the record is unclear as to the timelines for the damage calculations.
Specifically, it is unclear whether the damage calculations used at the first trial were broken out
OrderReopeningDiscoveryAndSettingSchedule 3
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into timeframes that could be permissibly used under the Supreme Court's and this Court's
rulings. Due to the lack of clarity on that point, discovery will be reopened for the limited
purpose of determining what damages would have been given different beginning and end dates
for the lost profit calculations. Furthermore, St. Alphonsus will be allowed to bring in a new
expert for the trial on remand with the caveat that should it use a completely new theory of
damages, MRIA may use St. Alphonsus's previous expert's testimony to cross examine its new
expert.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, St. Alponsus's motion to reopen discovery is hereby
GRANTED subject to the limitations discussed above. Furthermore, the parties will be bound

by the following schedule:
1. MRIA shall serve its expert reports on damages, if any new reports are done, by
April1, 2011.
2. Saint Alphonsus shall serve its expert reports on damages no later than May 15,
2011.
3. Both Parties shall depose the designated expert witnesses by June 15,2011.
4. Both parties may serve additional fact discovery limited to the subject of damages.
All such discovery must be completed by July 15, 2011.
5. Both parties have until April 11, 2011 to file motions in limine or motions for
summary judgment together with supporting briefs. Responsive briefs shall be filed
by April 25, 2011, and rebuttal briefs by May 2, 2011. Motions will be set for
hearing to be heard no later than May 18,2011.
6. Proposed jury instructions shall be provided to the Court by July 15,2011.
7. The Court will not be available between the dates of June 24 and July 19, 2011.
8. A Pretrial Conference will be on August 5, 2011 at 1:30PM.
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SO ORDERED AND DATED this .1£_ day of February, 2011.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04082190
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON ITS SECOND
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
MRIA has consistently alleged that its injuries were caused by the concerted actions of
Saint Alphonsus, Gem State Radiology LLP ("GSR"), Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
("ICR"), and Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC ("IMI"), and that each of these entities is
therefore jointly and severally liable for all of the damages suffered by MRIA. Under Idaho's
version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, any one of multiple jointly and
severally liable tortfeasors may ordinarily be held liable for the entirety of a plaintiffs injuries,
with a joint tortfeasor that pays more than its share of the joint liability relegated to suing its
fellow joint tortfeasors in an action for contribution. At the same time, in order to facilitate
settlements with fewer than all of the joint tortfeasors, the Idaho Act makes it possible to cut off
a non-settling defendant's right to seek contribution against the settling defendants. That is
accomplished by the plaintiffs agreement in the settlement to reduce any subsequent award that
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the plaintiff might obtain against the non-settling defendant by the amount of the settling
defendants' pro rata share ofliability. Idaho Code § 6-806. MRIA entered into just such an
agreement when it settled its claims against GSR, ICR, and IMI (collectively, the "settling
defendants"). As a result, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a holding that it may be held liable for
no more than its own pro rata share of whatever amount of damages MRIA proves at trial.

BACKGROUND
The gravamen ofMRIA's counterclaim is that Saint Alphonsus, GSR, ICR, and IMI
"engaged in a conspiracy for the purpose of running MRI Center out of business or diminishing
its value ... substantially." 3d Am. Campi.~ 56. 1 Specifically, MRIA contends that the entirety
of Saint Alphonsus' s alleged wrongful conduct was taken in concert with the settling defendants
as part of a "conspiracy to compete against MRIA in violation of Saint AI [phonsus 's] fiduciary,
contractual and tort duties." MRIA Mem. Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. on Civil Conspiracy
Claim at 19; see also id. at 1-17 (describing conspiratorial conduct). "MRIA's position is that St.
Al[phonsus] is [therefore] jointly and severally liable for the wrongful acts" allegedly committed
in concert by Saint Alphonsus and the settling defendants. Jd. at 19; see also id. ("the
[conspiracy] count is in [MRIA's] counterclaim for purposes ofholding St. Al[phonsus] liable
for the acts of the [GSR] rads and IMI in furtherance of the conspiracy"); id. at 18 (conspiracy
claim asserted "as a means of assigning joint and several liability"); id. at 24-25 (same).
1

These allegations of concerted activity have persisted through various incarnations of
MRIA's pleadings, including the most recent. See 1st Am. Countcl. ~~ 45, 48, 57, 66, 70-71,
141-43; 2d Am. Countercl. ~~ 45, 49, 58, 67, 71-72,147-49; 3d Am. Countercl. ~~ 43, 47, 56-61,
98-100.
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Perhaps most importantly, as MRIA tells the story and frames its claim for damages,
MRIA was injured because the competitive MRI imaging business, begun and primarily operated
by the settling defendants, allegedly with Saint Alphonsus's support, took business away from
MRIA. See 3d Am. Countercl.

~

61 ("MRI Center's volume has dwindled from a high of

approximately 8,000 outpatient scans in 2003 to roughly 3,000 outpatient scans in 2005.") Thus,
the settling defendants, by allegedly engaging in improper competition that won business from
MRIA, were the direct cause of the damages MRIA seeks to recover.
Notwithstanding these allegations, MRIA settled its claims against GSR, ICR, and IMI
shortly before the first trial, releasing all claims against them in exchange for payment of
$825,000. See Affidavit of JackS. Gjording, Ex. D (Settlement Agreement) at 2. To induce that
settlement and in accordance with conventional practice in cases of joint-and-several liability,
MRIA immunized the third-party defendants from any contribution claim that Saint Alphonsus
might thereafter have against them. To accomplish this, MRIA expressly agreed that "[a]ny
2

damages recovered or recoverable by [MRIA] against ... [Saint Alphonsus] shall be reduced in
amount by the ratio, portion, pro rata share, or percentage of causal negligence, contractual
liability, any claims arising from joint activities, or in any form for fault for which [the settling
defendants] are found liable as may be determined in a ... disposition of these matters." !d. at 4.
2

The settlement agreement applies to claims by all three counter-claimants here-MRIA
Associates LLP, MRI Limited Partnership ("MRI Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited ("MRI
Mobile")-as well as to claims by any ofMRIA's general partners and other affiliated persons
and entities. See Affidavit of Counsel Jack Gjording, Ex. D at 1. For purposes of this
memorandum, the term "MRIA" refers collectively to MRIA Associates, MRI Center, and MRI
Mobile.
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Following remand from the Supreme Court, MRIA's new amended counterclaim
continued to allege that it was harmed by the concerted acts of Saint Alphonsus and the settling
defendants. See 3d Am. Countercl. ,, 43, 47, 56-61, 98-100. Saint Alphonsus's answer
included a Second Affirmative Defense that, "(p ]ursuant to th [el settlement agreement and Idaho
Code §§ 6-802 to 6-806, any claims and/or damages awarded against Saint Alphonsus and/or
Diversified Care must be reduced by the [settling] defendants' pro rata share of liability or
otherwise reduced in accordance with Idaho law." Answer to 3d Am. Countercl., 103. Saint
Alphonsus now moves for summary judgment establishing and specifically defining its right to a
reduction in any damages award in accordance with the settlement agreement and ldaho taw.

ARGUMENT
I.

MRIA'S SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH GSR, ICR, AND IMI INVOKES
THE PROVISIONS OF IDAHO LAW THAT PROTECT THE SETTLING
DEFENDANTS AGAINST A CONTRIBUTION ACTION
In 1971, the Idaho Legislature adopted the 1939 version ofthe Uniform Contribution

Among Tortfeasors Act to govern the liabilities among multiple tortfeasors where joint-andseveral liability makes each of the tortfeasors responsible to the injured party for the entirety of
the injury sustained. See Idaho Code § 6-803 et seq.; Halve v. Draper, 95 Idaho 193, 194-95,
505 P.2d 1265, 1266-67 (1973). The statute defines a "joint tortfeasor" as "one oftwo or more
persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property," id § 6803(4), and creates a "right of contribution ... among joint tortfeasors" that accrues after one
joint tortfeasor "has paid more than his pro rata share" of the common liability. Idaho Code § 6803(1).
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The Act recognizes, however, that the existence of a right to contribution among joint
tortfeasors has a substantial impact on partial settlements in multi-party cases because any one
alleged joint tortfeasor will be unlikely to settle with a plaintiff if the settling tortfeasor continues
to be exposed to a contribution claim by the non-settling tortfeasor. To address this concern, the
Act allows a plaintiff to extinguish the non-settling tortfeasor's right to contribution by making a
legally binding commitment, enforceable by any non-settling defendants, to reduce the amount
of any subsequent award against them and in favor of the plaintiff by the amount for which the
settling tortfeasor would be liable in a suit for contribution. Specifically, a settling defendant
will be "relieve[d) ... from liability to make contribution" only if the release by the plaintiff
"provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share ofthe released tortfeasor, of the
injured person's damages recoverable against all the other tortfeasors." Idaho Code§ 6-806. In
that event, the "claim against the other tortfeasors" is "reduce[ d)" "in the amount of the
consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides
that the total claim shall be reduced, if such amount or proportion is greater than the
consideration paid." Idaho Code § 6-805(1 ).
MRIA's agreement with the settling defendants, on its face, plainly invokes these
provisions of the Act, with the intention to protect the settling defendants against a right of
contribution. After alleging claims giving rise to joint and several liability, MRIA induced GSR,
ICR, and IMI to settle with MRIA in exchange for a release that protects them against
contribution claims by Saint Alphonsus. Specifically, that agreement was made "before the right
of [Saint Alphonsus] to secure a money judgment for contribution has accrued," Idaho Code§ 6-
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806, and releases the settling defendants from liability to MRIA. Further, it states that "(a]ny
damages recovered or recoverable by [MRIA] against any other joint tortfcasor [e.g., Saint
Alphonsus] shall be reduced in amount by," among other things, the "pro rata share ... for
which [the settling defendants] are found liable as may be determined in a future trial or other
disposition of these matters." Affidavit of JackS. Gjording, Ex. D at 4. The agreement thus
"provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of the [settling defendants], of
[MRIA's] damages recoverable against [Saint Alphonsus]." Idaho Code§ 6-806. As a result,
the settlement agreement extinguishes Saint Alphonsus's right under Idaho Code§ 6-803(1) to
seek contribution from the settling defendants for their "pro rata share" of the judgment, and
replaces it with a right to a comparable reduction in the amount of damages recoverable here by
MRIA. See Idaho Code§ 6-805(1).
It is also entirely clear that this case involves allegations of the sort of joint-and-several

liability to which these contribution-foreclosing provisions ofldaho law can apply. The
Supreme Court has held that, for purposes of applying Idaho Code § 6-805(1 ), the
"determination whether a settling party is a joint tortfeasor must be based on the pleadings and
notthejury'sapportionmentoffault." Quickv. Crane, 111 Idaho759, 783, 727P.2d 1187,1211
(1986). In so holding, the Supreme Court explained:
"Even though the plaintiff now contends that he, in fact, had no
cause of action in tort against one of the [settling] defendants, the
court will consider the issues as framed by the pleadings. Where
the plaintiff charges several defendants with tort, and one of the
defendants buys its way out of the suit and is given a release ... ,
the court will not go into the question of liability of such
defendant. The test in such case is: was the defendant sued as a
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tort-feasor? If so, any liability of the remaining defendants to the
plaintiff must be reduced . . . . The question of actual liability in
tort of any of the defendants so discharged by release and covenant
not to sue is wholly immaterial .... "

Id (quoting Levi v. Montgomery, 120 N.W.2d 383 (N.D.

1963))~

see also Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 885(3) (1977) (settlement payment reduces claim against non-settling tortfeasors
"whether or not the person making the payment is liable to the injured person"). 3
MRIA's pleadings unambiguously establish that Saint Alphonsus and the settling thirdparty defendants were "sued as" joint tortfeasors for purposes ofldaho Code§ 6-805(1). Under
current law, entities are jointly and severally liabile where the parties were "acting in concert,"
which is defined as "pursuing a common plan or design which results in the commission of an
intentional or reckless tortious act" Idaho Code§ 6-803(5); see also Halve, 95 Idaho at 195, 505
P.2d at 1267 (noting that the statute applies to intentional tortfeasors). MRIA alleges precisely
such concerted activity in this case: it asserts that Saint Alphonsus and the third-party
defendants "conspire[ed] to compete against MRIA in violation of Saint Al[phonsus' s] fiduciary,
contractual and tort duties." MRIA Mem. Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. on Civil Conspiracy

3

In Quick, the defendants were attempting to reduce the award by the amount of the
settlement payments because that amount was greater than the settling defendants' pro rata share
of responsibility. However, I.C. § 6-805(1) reduces the plaintiffs claim by the greater of the
settlement amount or the proportion of the settling party's liability, and nothing in Quick
suggests that its pleadings-based approach does not fully apply in both situations. Additionally,
though Quick was an automobile negligence case decided prior to the Legislature's 1987
decision to replace joint-and-severalliability with comparative fault in run-of-the-mill
negligence cases, see I.C. § 6-803(3); Tuttle v. Wayment Farms, Inc., 131 Idaho 105, 108,952
P .2d 1241, 1244 ( 1998), nothing in the legislative revisions can be read to alter the rule of Quick
where, as here, joint-and-sevcralliability continues to apply.
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Claim at 19; see also 3d Am. Countercl.

~~

43, 47, 56-61, 98-100. Indeed, MRIA recently

conceded that "MRIA's position is that" Saint Alphonsus and the third-party defendants are
"jointly and severally liable for the wrongful acts" set forth in MRIA's counterclaims. MRIA
Mem. Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. on Civil Conspiracy Claim at 19; see also id. at 18, 24-25. As
a result, pursuant to Quick's instruction that "the trial court's determination whether [the] settling
part[ies are] joint tortfeasor[s] must be based on the pleadings," 111 Idaho at 783, 727 P.2d at
1211, Saint Alphonsus and the settling defendants meet the statutory definition ofjoint
tortfeasors for purposes of applying the set-off rules ofidaho Code§§ 6-805(1) & 6-806.

II.

UNDER IDAHO LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT, SAINT ALPHONSUS MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR NO MORE
THAN ITS OWN PRO RATA SHARE OF MRIA'S TOTAL DAMAGES
The statute entitles Saint Alphonsus to a "pro rata" reduction in damages, Idaho Code

§ 6-806, which means that the size of the reduction is to be determined by this Court as a matter
of simple arithmetic, rather than submitted to the jury as a question of proportionate fault. A
"pro rata" share is an equal share, i.e., the whole award divided according to the number of
alleged tortfeasors. See W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law ofTorts § 50, at 340
(5th ed. 1984) ("a pro rata share [is] arrived at by dividing the damages by the number of
tortfeasors"); Fowler V. Harper et al., Harper, James and Gray on Torts§ 10.2 at 62 n.33 (3d ed.
2007) ("[w]ith one exception [discussed below], the term 'pro rata' shares has usually been
thought to mean equal shares, divided according to the number of defendants"); id. at 62
("[t]raditionally, the damages have been shared equally among the tortfeasors rather than being
apportioned on the basis of their comparative negligence").
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Thus, for example, in a two-defendant case, each joint tortfeasor's pro rata share of the
injured party's damages would be 50%, without regard to that tortfeasor's relative culpability; in
a three-defendant case, each share would be one third, and so forth. See, e.g, In re Masters
Mates & Pilots Pension Plan & !RAP Litig., 957 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The pro rata

rule apportions an equal share of the liability to each defendant in a lawsuit. Relative culpability
is irrelevant under this approach. When, for example, a plaintiff settles with one defendant in a
two defendant case, a judgment against the nonsettling defendant is reduced by one-half,
regardless of whether the settling defendant was primarily or only minimally culpable."); In re

JiffY Lube Sees. Litig., 927 F.2d 155, 160 n.3 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[under the] Pro rata [method], ...
the judgment amount is simply divided by the number of defendants, settling and non-settling,
that are found liable. Relative culpability is not an issue").
Though the Idaho Code does not expressly define the term "pro rata share," the 1939
uniform act from which the Code provisions are derived, see Halve, 95 Idaho at I 94, 505 P.2d at
1266, adopts this traditional understanding. The official comments to the uniform act state that,
"[w]ithout [an optional] Subsection" providing for equitable readjustment of the joint tortfeasors'
relative shares according to fault, "the ordinary rule of apportionment of the common liability
among the tortfeasors in accordance with the number of them commonly liable obtains. Thus, if
P is hurt by A, B and C, who were concurrently negligent, and he recovers his damages from A
alone, A may shift one-third of the burden to Band one-third to C. Ordinarily no inquiry is

made into the respective degrees ofjault ofthe tort-(easors as amongst themselves." 1939
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Uniform Act§ 2 cmt on Subsection 4 (emphasis added). The optional subsection that would
alter this default rule is not currently part of the Idaho Code. 4
The Legislature's decision to require a "pro rata" or equal-shares approach to
apportioning liability in the context of alleged joint tortfeasors acting in concert to commit
intentional torts makes sense. In the negligence context, where a plaintiff's injury is often the
result of several independent causes (as in a multi-car accident), a rule of proportionate fault
based on relative levels of culpability both does justice and is readily comprehended by lay
jurors. This is presumably why, in the negligence context, the Legislature (like the legislatures
of most other states) has replaced joint-and-severalliability with comparative fault. See Idaho
Code § 6-803(3). By contrast, where joint tortfeasors are alleged to have purposefully acted in
concert to intentionally commit a tortious act desired by all, questions like which tortfeasor is
more at fault defy answer. Moreover, the non-settling defendant would be severely prejudiced if
it had to assert to a jury simultaneously that there was no conspiracy and that the other

4

An earlier version of I. C. § 6-803(3) did include the referenced optional subsection,
providing that "[w ]hen there is such a disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors as to render
inequitable an equal distribution among them of the common liability by contribution, the
relative degrees of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their pro rata
share solely for the purpose of determining their rights and contribution among themselves, each
remaining severally liable to the injured person for the whole injury as at common law." Tucker
v. Union Oil Co., 100 Idaho 590,598-99, 603 P.2d 156, 164-65 (1979) (quoting earlier version
of I. C. § 6-803(3)). This provision was deleted as part of the 1987 amendments abolishing jointand-several liability in negligence cases, see Idaho 1987 Session Laws ch. 278, § 4, thereby
demonstrating that the Legislature intended, in those narrow circumstances in which joint-andseveral liability has been retained, to follow the "ordinary rule" of apportioning liability among
the tortfeasors "in accordance with the number of them commonly liable." 1939 Uniform Act
§ 2 cmt on Subsection 4 (emphasis added).
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conspirators were more culpable. A rule that liability is to be apportioned equally among the
alleged tortfeasors avoids these problems and complements the holding in Quick that the
existence ofjoint-and-several liability is to be determined from the pleadings as a matter oflaw.

Together, these two principles obviate the need in cases such as this to submit to the jury any
question about the relative fault of the settling tortfeasors, thereby simplifying the trial and
providing a straightforward method for the court to determine whether and to what extent the
settlement reduces the award against the remaining defendants.
Thus, rather than submit the question of relative fault to the jury, the Court should follow
the language of the statute and the "traditional" and "ordinary" understanding of the term "pro
rata share," and hold that Saint Alphonsus's liability must be reduced as a matter of law by the
settling defendants' equal share of liability. 5
The only remaining question is the number of entities among which equal shares of
liability must be allocated. Technically, there are five alleged joint tortfeasors here: the three
settling defendants (GSR, ICR, and IMI) and two Saint Alphonsus entities (Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center). While a simple headcount
would therefore entitle Saint Alphonsus to a three-fifths reduction in damages, the "one
exception" to a completely equal division of shares is that entities with vicarious relationshipslike a corporate parent and its wholly owned subsidiary-are treated as a single entity. Harper,

supra, § 10.2, at 62 n.33. Applying this exception here would mean that Saint Alphonsus
5

Of course, if the Court disagrees, then the question of apportionment of damages among
Saint Alphonsus and the settling defendants will need to be put to the jury.
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Regional Medical Center and its wholly owned subsidiary, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care,
must be treated as a single entity. Similarly, MRIA could reasonably contend that IMI, lCR, and
GSR, three separate legal entities controlled in whole or in part by the same group of
radiologists, are sufficiently related that they should constitute a single entity for purposes of
Idaho Code § 6-805(1 ). Thus, the simplest and most equitable approach under the circumstances
would be to treat these two sets of entities (i.e., the two Saint Alphonsus entities and the three
settling defendants) as each responsible for a single pro rata share of liability. Under this
approach, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to have any award against it reduced by one-half, thus
making Saint Alphonsus liable for no more than 50% of whatever overall damages MRIA might
prove at trial.

CONCLUSION
MRIA could have chosen not to settle with GSR, ICR, and IMI, and instead sought to
hold Saint Alphonsus liable for 100% of any judgment awarded to MRIA in this case. In that
case, Saint Alphonsus would have been entitled to recover contribution from GSR, ICR, and IMI
for their pro rata share of the judgment. Idaho Code § 6-803( 1). In its settlement with GSR,
ICR, and fMI, however, MRIA extinguished Saint Alphonsus's right to seek contribution from
the settling defendants for their share of any judgment and provided instead for an automatic
reduction by that same share of the amount of total damages that MRIA may recover against
Saint Alphonsus. Affidavit of JackS. Gjording, Ex. D at 4. Idaho Code§ 6-805(1) makes this
provision of the settlement enforceable here as a matter of law. Saint Alphonsus therefore can be
liable for no more than its own pro rata share of any damages that MRIA proves at trial. Because
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Saint Alphonsus constitutes one of two groups of alleged joint tortfeasors, that pro rata share is
one half.
The Court should therefore grant summary judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus on its
Second Affirmative Defense, and hold that Saint Alphonsus may not be liable for more than 50%
of any damages MRIA might prove at trial.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 11th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
P ARTNERSIDP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
INTRODUCTION

When MRIA amended its counterclaim following remand from the Supreme Court, it
alleged-for the first time in this litigation-that MRI Center and MRI Mobile, the two limited
partnerships that provide MRI services under MRIA 's management, are third-party beneficiaries
of the MRIA general partnership agreement. Under Idaho law, however, an entity is a thirdparty beneficiary of a contract only if that contract is made primarily for its benefit. Here, the
MRIA partnership agreement, by its terms, is a formative agreement defining the duties and
obligations that the MRIA general partners owe amongst themselves. The agreement was thus
made primarily for the general partners' benefit, not the benefit of Center and Mobile. Indeed, if
anything, the contract establishes that Center and Mobile were created to benefit MRIA, and not
the other way around.
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BACKGROUND
A.

Statement of Undisputed Facts

MRIA is an Idaho general partnership created on April 26, 1985, by Saint Alphonsus,
certain other hospitals and a consortium of physicians known as Doctors Magnetic Resonance,
Inc. ("DMR"), pursuant to a written partnership agreement whose purpose was to "form [the]
general partnership." Trial Ex. 4023, preamble; see also Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.
v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479,483, 224 P.3d 1068, 1072 (2009).

Consistent with its formative nature, the MRIA partnership agreement sets forth the
structure and operation of the partnership, and the rights and obligations of the partners to one
another. Thus, Article 1 establishes MRIA' s effective date and term, the location of its offices,
the identities of its partners, the name ofthe partnership, and its business purpose. Trial Ex.
4023. Article 2 establishes a management fee that will be paid to MRIA by the limited
partnership it intends to create, and describes how that fee will be allocated among the MRIA
partners. ld. Article 3 describes the MRIA partners' capital contributions. /d. Article 4 defines
how the partnership's cash flow is to be distributed. ld Article 5 details how the partners shall
manage MRIA. !d. Article 6 relates to withdrawals from the partnership. Id Article 7 sets
forth conditions for the transfer of general partnership interests. !d. Article 8 defines certain
special duties owed to the partnership by DMR, one of the general partners. /d. Article 9
imposes certain obligations on the general partners not to compete with partnership. Id Finally,
Article 10 sets forth provisions governing the dissolution of the general partnership. !d.
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MRIA and others subsequently created the limited partnerships MRI Center and MRI
Mobile. SADC, 148 Idaho at 483,224 PJd at 1072. Center and Mobile each has its own
limited partnership agreement setting forth the rights and duties owed to one another by the
parties to those agreements. See Trial Exs. 4024 & 4028.

B.

Procedural History

Prior to the first trial, MRIA asserted a series of claims against Saint Alphonsus,
including several breach-of-contract claims. It also purported to assert a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty on behalf of Center and Mobile. Nowhere in any ofMRIA's pleadings did MRIA
allege that Center and Mobile were intended third-party beneficiaries of the MRIA partnership
agreement.
On remand from the Supreme Court, this Court permitted MRIA to amend its pleading in
light ofthe Supreme Court's decision, and on March 22,2010, MRIA filed its Third Amended
Counterclaim. In this new pleading, MRIA formally joined Center and Mobile as additional
counterclaimants. In addition to reasserting the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim that MRIA had
unsuccessfully tried to bring on Center's and Mobile's behalf in the first trial, the new
counterclaim alleged for the first time that Center and Mobile are third-party beneficiaries of the
MRIA partnership agreement, and asserted claims by Center and Mobile for breach of that
agreement. See 3d Am. Countercl.

~

69 (asserting third-party-beneficiary claim for wrongful

dissociation and breach of the MRIA partnership agreement's non-compete clause); id.

~

84

(asserting third-party-beneficiary claim for breach of the MRIA partnership agreement's
covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
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ARGUMENT
While MRIA expressly asserted claims "on behalf of' Center and Mobile prior to and
during the first trial, see 2d Am. Countercl., it never once-until the filing of its Third Amended
Counterclaim last year-mentioned Center's and Mobile's alleged status as third-party
beneficiaries of the MRIA partnership agreement. Yet now, although MRI Center and MRI
Mobile are distinct entities organized and operated pursuant to their own partnership agreements,
MRIA purports to have belatedly realized that these entities are in fact intended beneficiaries of
the MRIA general partnership agreement made between DMR and the hospital partners. The
limited partnerships' newly minted claims for breach of contract fail as a matter of law, however,
because the written MRIA partnership agreement unambiguously forecloses the possibility that
the parties to that agreement intended to confer third-party beneficiary status upon the limited
partnerships.
"The test for determining a party's status as a third-party beneficiary is whether the
agreement reflects an intent to benefit the third party." Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 687,
183 P.3d 771,775 (2008) (internal citation omitted); see also Idaho Code§ 29-102 (allowing a
third party to enforce "a contract[] made expressly for the [third party's] benefit"). "The third
party must show the contract was made primarily for his benefit; it is not sufficient that the third
party is a mere incidental beneficiary to the contract." Partout, 145 Idaho at 687, 183 P.3d at
775 (emphasis added). "The intent to benefit the third party must be expressed in the contract
itself," and "circumstances surrounding the contract's formation are only considered when the
contract is ambiguous as to the intent to benefit a third party." !d. at 687 & n.3, 183 P.3d at 775

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
003579
JUDGMENT ON CENTER'S AND MOBILE'S THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY CLAIMS5

& n.3; see also Fenwick v. Idaho Dep 't of Lands, 144 Idaho 318, 323-24, 160 P.3d 757, 762-63

(2007); Idaho Power Co. v. Hulet, 140 Idaho 110, 112-13, 90 P.3d 335, 337-38 (2004). An oftcited example of third-party-beneficiary status is found in Just's Inc. v. Arrington Construction
Co., 99 Idaho 462, 463, 583 P.2d 997, 998 (1978), in which a contract between the city ... and a

construction company contained a provision that "specifically" conferred a benefit on a class of
area businesses by "requir[ing] the construction company to take precautions to limit the
disruption to th[ose] businesses." Idaho Power Co., 140 Idaho at 113,90 P.3d at 338 (discussing
Just's).

Here, several factors, taken together, demonstrate as a matter of law that "the contract
itself' (the MRIA partnership agreement) does not reflect the requisite "intent to benefit" Center
and Mobile. First, the very nature of the MRIA partnership agreement undermines any
suggestion that Center and Mobile-two entities that did not yet even exist when the agreement
was executed-are third-party beneficiaries. The contract at issue comprises articles of
partnership creating the MRIA partnership and setting forth the rights and duties of the MRIA
partners to one another. It would be extremely unusual for such a formative document,
governing the internal relations of a new business entity, to be made primarily for the benefit of
other entities. See, e.g., Laclede Inv. Corp. v. Kaiser, 596 S.W.2d 36, 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that partnership agreement identifying a company as the source of a loan to the
partnership did not confer third-party-beneficiary status on that company because "[t]he entire
partnership agreement dealt with the interrelationship between the partnership and its members").
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Second, the MRIA partnership agreement neither states an intent to benefit Center and
Mobile nor contains any promise to confer a benefit upon them. To be sure, the MRIA
partnership agreement contemplates the formation of a limited partnership by providing that
"[t]his Partnership intends to promote and organize an Idaho limited partnership," which,
"[w]hen formed, ... shall have the same purpose as this Partnership," Partnership Agreement
§ 1.6, and further stating that the limited partnership agreement will provide for the payment of a
management fee to MRIA, see id. § 2.1. But neither the mere recognition of a transaction
involving a third party, nor the fact that a third party might incidentally benefit from a contract
between others, suffices to confer third-party beneficiary status. See, e.g., Partout, 145 Idaho at
687, 183 P.3d at 775; Blickenstaffv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 579, 97 P.3d 439,446 (2004);

Laclede Inv. Corp., 596 S.W.2d at 43. If it did, enforceable contract rights would arise by
accident, simply through contractual references to third parties having some connection to the
subject of the contract.

Just's v. Annington is instructive insofar as the Supreme Court's discussion of the
language of the contract there demonstrates the sort of specificity--completely absent here-that
is needed to confer third-party-beneficiary status on a non-signatory. In particular, the contract
in Just's quite explicitly spelled out certain duties that the contractor owed to the area businesses
held to be third-party beneficiaries: the contract required the contractor, for example, to "keep
the businesses within the project area advised of his proposed schedule," to "continuously and
courteously provide[]" "[a]ccess to and from the various businesses," and to "protect the
adjacent businesses" from harm. Just's, 99 Idaho at 465-66, 583 P.2d at 1000-01 (quoting
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contractual language, emphasis added by Just's). And the contract emphasized that the parties to
the contract "intended that ... the amount of disruption to the downtown businesses be as
minimal as possible." !d. (quoting contractual language, emphasis added by Just's). While the
MRIA partnership agreement does note the partners' intent to create Center, see Trial Ex. 4023
§ 1.6, the agreement is devoid of any language requiring the partners "to take specific steps"

(Just's , 99 Idaho at 466, 5 83 P .2d at 1001) to benefit Center and Mobile in any way.
In contrast, contracts with language similar to the MRIA partnership agreement have
been held not to confer third-party beneficiary status. In Laclede Investment, for example,
various entities had executed an agreement to form a limited partnership for the purpose of
completing construction of an apartment project. 596 S.W.2d at 38-39. The partnership
agreement contemplated that the project would be funded by a loan from an affiliate of one of
the partners, and even incorporated by reference the applicable loan agreement. Jd. at 39. When
the partnership abandoned the project and defaulted on the loan, the lender sued as an alleged
third-party beneficiary of the partnership agreement's term calling for completion of the project.
!d. at 40. The court held that this claim failed as a matter of law, even though the lender would
obviously have benefited by performance of the contract. The court ruled that "[t]here fwa]s
nothing in ... the limited partnership agreement which require[ d the] defendants to perform any
promise to [the lender]," and it was not enough that the parties to the contract had "a generalized
intention to advance [the lender's] interest or to promote its welfare." !d. at 43-44. They must
manifest an intention to give the third party enforceable rights under the contract.
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Similarly, the court found no third-party beneficiary status as a matter oflaw in Russell v.
Birmingham Oxygen Service, Inc., 408 So. 2d 90 (Ala. 1981 ). There, in connection with their
sale of an oxygen business, the defendants had executed a non-competition agreement in which
they promised not to compete with the purchaser for a period often years. /d. at 92. The
purchaser thereafter operated the acquired oxygen business through a wholly owned subsidiary.

!d. After the defendants set up a competing oxygen business during the non-compete period, the
subsidiary-i.e., the company engaging in the business purchased from the defendants-sued as
a third-party beneficiary of the non-competition agreement. /d. at 92-93. The claim failed as a
matter oflaw, the court held, because the agreement's promise not to compete had been given to
the contracting parent, not to its non-party subsidiary. !d. at 93.
In this case, too, none of the handful of provisions referencing a limited partnership
constitutes a promise to confer a benefit on that limited partnership. In other words, unlike the
paradigmatic example of the construction company in Just's, but like the partnership agreement
in Laclede Investment and the non-competition agreement in Birmingham Oxygen, the MRIA
partnership agreement provides no indication that the parties were intending through the MRIA
partnership agreement to confer enforceable rights on the limited partnership entities that they
planned to create in the future. Indeed, if anything, the MRIA partnership agreement expressly
contemplates that the limited partnerships would be created solely to benefit MRIA, and not the
other way around.
Third, the parties' failure to give the limited partnerships enforceable rights under the
MRIA partnership agreement is quite sensible, since Center and Mobile have their own limited
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partnership agreements which define the rights and duties between all parties concerned,
including those between the limited partnerships and their general partner, MRIA. See Trial Exs.
4024 & 4028. Those agreements, and not the MRIA partnership agreement, define the rights of
the limited partnerships in relation to MRIA and its partners. By trying to claim third-partybeneficiary status under the MRIA partnership agreement, the limited partnerships are simply
attempting to make an end run around the more limited rights conferred by their own limited
partnership agreements.
For these reasons, the MRIA partnership agreement as a matter oflaw fails to "express[]"
an "intent to benefit" Center and Mobile, and was not "made primarily for [their] benefit." As a
result, these limited partnerships have no rights under that agreement, and their claims for breach
of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Because the MRIA Partnership Agreement was not, as a matter of law, made primarily
for the benefit of either MRI Center or MRI Mobile, neither Center nor Mobile may claim to be
third-party beneficiaries of that agreement. As a result, the Court should grant summary
judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus on Center and Mobile's third-party beneficiary claims.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 11th day of April, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

In its opening memorandum, Saint Alphonsus demonstrated that MRIA'~ settlement with
the third-party defendants, together with MRIA's allegations that it was injured by concerted
action of Saint Alphonsus and the third-party defendants, entitles Saint Alphonsus to a reduction
in any damages by the greater of the amount of the settlement or the "pro rata share" of the
settling defendants' liability. Also, the phrase "pro rata share," though undefined in the statute,
is best read as referring to equal shares divided according to the number of defendants (or groups
of related defendants) rather than to percentages of proportionate fault as determined by the jury.
Under this interpretation of"pro rata share," Saint Alphonsus is entitled as a matter oflaw to a
holding that it can be liable for no more than 50% of whatever damages MRIA might prove.
In an overwrought response directed at evading the consequences of its voluntary
settlement of its claims against Saint Alphonsus's alleged co-conspirators, MRIA takes issue
with Saint Alphonsus's interpretation ofthe phrase "pro rata share." MRIA repeatedly insists
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that applying the traditional understanding of that term-as numerous legislatures, courts, model
codes, and treatise writers have done for decades-would be "patently absurd" and "irrational."
To the contrary, for reasons explained in Saint Alphonsus's opening memorandum and discussed
further below, the "equal shares" approach is superior to a proportionate fault submission to the
jury both as a reading of the statutory language and as a matter of fairness and judicial efficiency.
Just as importantly, MRIA's exaggerated arguments about the meaning of"pro rata
share" should not obscure the fact that MRIA takes serious issue only with the manner of
determining the respective liability shares of Saint Alphonsus and the third-party defendants.
Assuming the settlement agreement is genuine-and it is-MRIA does not dispute that Idaho
Code § 6-805 entitles Saint Alphonsus to have any damages awarded at trial reduced by some
percentage ofliability attributable to the third-party defendants. The only open question,
therefore, is whether that percentage should be determined through application of the "eq.ual
shares" rule or by the jury as a matter of fact.

A.

MRIA's "Authenticity" Argument Is Frivolous

It is undisputed and a matter of record in this case that MRIA settled its claims against
the third-party defendants. See Stipulation for Dismissal of Third Party Defendants With
Prejudice (filed July 31, 2007) (noting that MRIA and the third-party defendants "have mutually
resolved and settled their dispute"); July 2, 2007 Hr'g Tr. at 5 ("We have entered into ... a
release/settlement agreement."). Because that settlement has undeniable legal effect on the
remainder ofMRIA's case, Saint Alphonsus's counsel submitted by affidavit a copy of the
settlement agreement previously provided to him by the third-party defendants.
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MRIA's purported questions about the authenticity of the agreement are a sham. MRIA
is a party to the settlement agreement and its counsel, Mr. Banducci, personally signed it. Thus,
MRIA knows what the settlement agreement says. If the document provided to Saint Alphonsus
did not accurately reflect the terms ofthat agreement, then MRIA should have said so. See
I.R.C.P. 56(e) ("adverse party may not rest upon ... mere allegations or denials ... , but the
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."); Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 814, 907 P.2d
783, 791 (1995) (noting rule that "adverse inferences" may be drawn against party that fails "to
produce evidence within its control").
Instead MRIAjust played cat and mouse, invoking the technicality that the document
submitted was not a signed copy, even as MRIA's counsel knew full well that the submitted
copy is verbatim identical to the slightly reformatted.fmal executed version. To confirm that
fact, Saint Alphonsus is filing with this reply brief a supplemental affidavit attaching the
executed settlement agreement.

B.

Saint Alphonsus Is Entitled To Have Any Damages Reduced by the Settling
Defendants' "Pro Rata Share"

MRIA does not dispute (i) that the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act requires an
equivalent reduction in the non-settling defendant's liability when a joint tortfeasor settles and
invokes the Act's provisions, see Idaho Code §§ 6-805 & 6-806; (ii) that the "determination
whether a settling party is a joint tortfeasor [for purposes of applying the statute] must be based
on the pleadings and not the jury's apportionment ofliability," Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759,
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783, 727 P .2d 1187, 1211 (1986); or (iii) that MRIA' s conspiracy allegations, embodying all of
the claimed substantive wrongs, make Saint Alphonsus and the third-party defendants joint
tortfeasors for purposes of the statute because joint-and-several liability arises where parties were
"acting in concert" by "pursuing a common plan or design which results in the commission of an
intentional or reckless tortious act," Idaho Code§ 6-803(5). Plainly, the language ofMRIA's
settlement agreement with the third-party defendants falls within the statute-as MRIA also does
not dispute-and thus triggers the right to a reduction in Saint Alphonsus's damages. 1
MRIA contends, however, that the statute requires a reduction in damages only for
MRIA's conspiracy claim, and does not apply to any ofMRIA's substantive counterclaims (for
tortious interference with contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract) because
those claims "are specifically only about Saint Alphonsus" and "only one" claim, for civil
conspiracy, "speaks to conspiracy." Opp'n at 7. This baldly misrepresents MRIA's
counterclaims and is otherwise incorrect for several reasons.
First, "[c Jivil conspiracy is not an independent tort but rather is a derivative tort that relies
on an underlying actionable wrong." Mem. Decision and Order dated Nov. 17, 2010, at 17. In
this case, those other "underlying actionable wrong[s]" always have been the other counts of
MRIA's counterclaim, and the conspiracy has always been one to commit the other substantive
1

Th9ugh MIUA does not actually contend that Saint Alphonsus is barred from raising its
properly pleaded§ 6-&05 defense, it argu~s that doing so is inconsistent with Saint Alphonsus's
separate motion seel<ing to apply the Court's prior ruling on partnership share. Opp'n at 5.
There is no ineollSistency. The§ 6.-805 issue is properly before the Court because the parties are
still litigating MRIA's counterclaims, and there is no prior ruling on the§ 6-805 issue, and hence
neither a failure to appeal a ruling nor any attempt to re-litigate a ruling.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
003590
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE- 5

...

wrongs. See MRIA Mem. Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. on Civil Conspiracy Claim at 18
(explaining that MRIA's civil conspiracy claim "is not an independent claim for relief' but rather
rests on allegations of"breach of fiduciary duty, wrongful dissociation, interference with
prospective business relations and breach of contract''); id. at 22 (conceding that "MRIA must
succeed on one of the above claims in order to hold St. Als liable for acts committed in
furtherance of its conspiracy to harm MRIA").
Thus, MRIA's claims for tortious interference, fiduciary duty, and breach of contract
have never been about "Saint Alphonsus alone." By MRIA's own description, MRIA's entire
case amounts to the allegation that "St. Als and the [GSR] rads engaged in a conspiracy to
compete with, and take business away from, MRIA. [They] did so by forming IMI and directly
competing with MRIA in violation of St. Al's contractual, tort, statutory and fiduciary duties to
its partners in MRIA. . . . Such actions ... were in violation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty that
St. Als owned to MR1A and its limited partners, the contractual duty not to compete, and the tort
duty not to interfere with MRIA's relationships with its customers." MRIA Mem. Opp'n to Mot
for Summ. J. on Civil Conspiracy Claim at 23. 2 MRIA thus has repeatedly alleged that Saint
Alphonsus and the third-party defendants are ')ointly and severally liable for the wrongful acts

2

MRIA's counterclaim similarly states that Saint Alphonsus "conspired with" the thirdparty defendants by, among other things, "interfering with prospective business opportunities,"
"[c]o-opting a partnership opportunity that should have been offered to MRIA" in violation of
Saint Alphonsus's fiduciary duties, and "[w]rongfully withdrawing from MRIA" in violation of
Saint Alphonsus' s contractual duties, 3d Am. Countercl. 1 99, and emphasizes that the "acts in
furtherance of th[e] conspiracy" "[l]ikewise" include that Saint Alphonsus "wrongfully engaged
in conduct which breached its partnership obligations," id. ~~57-58.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
003591
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE- 6

')

that [they] committed in furtherance of their conspiracy to compete against MRIA in violation of
Saint Al[phonsus's] fiduciary, contractual and tort duties." MRlA Mem. Opp'n to Mot for
Summ. J. on Civil Conspiracy Claim at 19.
Thus, every act of alleged wrongdoing set forth in the counterclaim--every last one--is
alleged to have been part of a conspiracy and taken in concert by Saint Alphonsus and the GSR
radiologists. Under Quick v. Crane, these allegations control for purposes of determining
whether§ 6-805 applies.3

3

MRIA also makes the more limited argument that § 6-805 does not apply to its claims
for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract because those claims do not sound in tort.
Opp'n at 8; see also Idaho Code§ 6-803(4) (defining "joint tortfeasors" as entities "jointly or
severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property"). This, too, is wrong.
As to breach of fiduciary duty, MRIA's premise is mistaken; that claim does, in fact,
sound in tort. See Hoyle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 373, 48 P.3d 1256, 1262 (2002)
("the breach of a fiduciary duty sounds in tort"); Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637,644, 39
P.3d 577, 584 (2001) (same); Prop. Mgmt. W, Inc. v. Hunt, 126 Idaho 897, 900, 894 P.2d 130,
133 (1995) (same). Moreover, by alleging that SaintAlpWl1Sl:iS and the third-party defendants
conspired to breach the contract, MRIA has alleged jGint•and-seye_ralliability ~fjn tort," because a
conspiracy claim "sounds in tort, and not in contract" eve:n where the acts constituting the wrong
are a breach of contract, 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy§ 24, and a "party to a contract ... who breaches
it on the inducement of another is ... a joint tortfeasor," 44B Am. Jur. 2d Interforence § 55.
In any event, MRIA' s counterclaim cannot be divided into tort and contract actions for
purposes of applying the pro rata reduction because MRIA does not allege a contract claim with
discrete and separate damages. Rather, it alleges a single injury resulting from the business it
allegedly lost to TMI as a result of the supposedly improper concerted acts of Saint Alphonsus
and the settling defendants, thus making Saint Alphonsus and the settling defendants ')oint
tortfeasors" for purposes of that injury within the meaning of§ 6-803(4). See Joe & Dan Int 'l
Corp. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 533 N.E.2d 912,918 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988) (plaintiffs assertion of
contract claim does not remove parties from coverage ofthe uniform act where underlying joint
conduct was tortious and parties were therefore joint tortfeasors).
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C.

The "Pro Rata Share" Reduction to Which Saint Alphonsus Is Entitled
Should Be Determined by the Number ofDefendants (or Groups of
Associated Defendants) Rather Than by a Jury Determination of
Comparative Fault

Saint Alphonsus is thus entitled to have its liability reduced by the "pro rata share" of the
third-party defendants' liability, whatever that means. The statute does not define this term.
MRIA says it must mean the percentage of proportionate fault as determined by the jury in this
case, and also argues that Saint Alphonsus cannot show that the settling parties intended
otherwise.
Taking the latter objection first, MRIA misses the point in trying to divine what the
settling parties intended "pro rata" to mean. The statute applies if and only if the settlement, by

its terms, ''provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor,
of the injured person's damages recoverable against all the other tortfeasors." Idaho Code§ 6806 (emphasis added). The settlement agreement here includes the required statutory language,
providing that "(a]ny damages ... recoverable" by MRIA against Saint Alphonsus "shall be
reduced" by the "pro rata share" of the third-party defendants, among other phrases the
agreement uses to describe that share. Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel Jack Gjording, Ex. C
at 4.4 In using the term "pro rata share," the settlement agreement thus, on its face, invokes the

4

To be sure, the settlement agreement includes additional language directed at other
contingencies. But that does not change the fact that the agreement unambiguously triggers the
statue by providing for a "pro rata share" reduction in damages.
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application of the statute, protecting the settling defendants against a contribution action by
allowing the remaining defendant, S~nt Alphonsus, to reduce any later award "pro rata " 5
While MRIA is right that the phrase "pro rata share" does not necessarily mean equal
shares, as evidenced by the cases it cites from two other jurisdictions (Rhode Island and
Oklahoma) that have interpreted the phrase to refer to proportionate fault as determined by a fact
finder, this is neither the only reasonable interpretation of the phrase, nor the better one. To the
contrary, the two leading torts treatises explain that "a pro rata share [is] arrived at by dividing
the damages by the number oftortfeasors," W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts § 50, at 340 (5th ed. 1984), and that "the term 'pro rata' shares has usually been thought to

mean equal shares, divided according to the number of defendants," Fowler V. Harper et al.,
Harper, James and Gray on Torts§ 10.2 at 62 n.33 (3d ed. 2007). See also Mem. at 10 (citing

additional authorities). Courts in numerous states have adopted this definition of"pro rata share"
in construing their own versions of the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. 6 Indeed, when
Idaho adopted its statute, the rule that "the tortfeasors who are liable will end by paying equal
5

Having signed the agreement including the statute's "pro rata" reduction language,
surely MRIA cannot now mean to suggest that the language is legally ineffective and the settling
defendants may be sued by Saint Alphonsus for contribution notwithstanding their settlement
payment.
6

See, e.g., Zeller v. Cantu, 478 N.E.2d 930, 933 (Mass. 1985) (act "bars any
consideration of the relative fault of a codefendant in assessing his or her pro rata share of the
damages); Great W. Cas. Co. v. Fletcher, 287 S.E.2d 429, 431 (N.C. Ct. App.l982) ("the pro
rata share of each defendant is determined by dividing the amount of the judgment by the
number of persons against whom it has been obtained"); Lincenberg v. lssen, 318 So.2d 386, 393
(Fla. 1975) ("contribution [is] on a pro rata basis [and] the relative degrees of fault [are] not to be
considered").
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shares"-known as "pro-rata contribution"-was "still followed by a majority of the courts."
Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 886A cmt. h (1979). 7

Moreover, "the Idaho Legislature saw fit to adopt the 1939 version of the Uniform
[Contribution Among Tortfeasors] Act." Holve v. Draper, 95 Idaho 193, 194,505 P.2d 1265,
1266 (1973). The official comments to that uniform act make clear that, absent a specific
optional provision to the contrary, "the ordinary rule of apportionment of the common liability
among the tortfeasors [is] in accordance with the number of them commonly liable," and that "no
inquiry is made into the respective degrees of fault of the tort-feasors as amongst themselves."
1939 Uniform Act § 2 cmt on Subsection 4 (emphasis added); see also Mem. at 10-11. 8
Critically, in 1987, at the same time it replacedjoint-and-severalliability with
comparative fault in most actions, the Idaho Legislature deleted a subsection of the uniform act
that had required consideration, in some cases, of ''the relative degrees of fault of the joint
tortfeasors." Mem. at 11 n.4 (quoting earlier version of§ 6-803(3)). This action shows that the
Legislature intended the default "equal shares" rule to apply in the few remaining instances of
joint-and-several liability, of which this case is plainly one. See Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho

7

According to the Restatement, the approach advocated here by MRIA is "called
comparative contribution." Id.
8

The 1955 version ofthe uniform act is even more explicit, providing that "[i]n
determining the pro rata shares oftortfeasors in the entire liability (a) their relative degrees of
fault shall not be considered." Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act 1955 Revised Act
§ 2 (emphasis added). While this version of the uniform act (which differs from the 1939
version in many respects) is not in effect in Idaho, it further demonstrates that there is nothing
unusual about interpreting the phrase "pro rata share" to mean "equal share."

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
003595
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE -10

239, 242, 953 P.2d 989, 992 (1998) {legislative "deletion" of statutory provision demonstrated
that "the legislature intended to eliminate" effects of provision); Hendrix v. Gold Ridge Mines,
56 Idaho 326, 337-38, 54 P.2d 254,258 (1936) ("fact that ... provision was omitted from our
statute leads to the conclusion that it was not intended that such practice should prevail here").
This history ofthe Idaho statute rebuts MRIA's argument (Opp'n at 13-15) that the
parties' relative degrees of fault should be tried to the jury here simply because that is the
practice in cases of comparative fault. The Court should reject MRIA's attempt to resurrect by
judicial decision a rule that the Legislature deliberately chose not to make applicable to the few
situations in whichjoint-and-severalliability is still applicable. 9

9

MRIA cites two Supreme Court cases in which the Court made statements appearing to
assume that the statute would require jury determinations of relative fault. Opp'n at 11-12. Both
statements were plainly dicta that was not relevant to any of the disputed issues in those cases;
"[s]uch dicta cannot be relied upon as binding precedent." St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'/ Med.
Ctr., Ltd v. Bd ofCnty. Comm 'rs, 149 Idaho 584, 595,237 P.3d 1210, 1221 (2010)(intemal
quotation marks omitted). Moreover, one of the cases, Quick v. Crane, was decided in 1986, a
year before the Legislature deleted the provision of the statute providing for relative degrees of
fault to be considered. The other, Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 119 Idaho 299, 805 P .2d
1223 (1991), also appears to have involved the pre-1987 version ofthe statute, since the Court
referred to contribution for "relative negligence," Opp'n at 13 (quoting Burgess), a cause of
action that no longer existed after the Legislature's 1987 abolition of joint-and-several liability in
negligence actions. In any event, neither of these cases involved conspiracy allegations, for
which (as discussed further below) an equal shares approach is particularly appropriate. These
cases thus do not help MRIA here.
MRlA also relies on the last sentence of§ 6-806, which provides that a settling joint
tortfeasor is relieved from liability for contribution "only if the issue of proportionate fault is
litigated between joint tortfeasors in the same action." MRIA cites no authority interpreting this
provision, and Saint Alphonsus is aware of none. This provision appears to mean only that the
joint tortfeasors must be sued together in the same lawsuit and/or that the matter of the release
must be placed at issue in the litigation. These conditions are obviously satisfied here.
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Far from being an "odd interpretation" or a "patently ridiculous outcome" {Opp'n at 11,

13), defming "pro rata share" to mean an equal share without regard to relative fault would thus
conform with the "usualO" and "ordinar[y]" meaning of the term as understood by "a majority of
the courts" at the time the Legislature adopted the statute at issue.
It also is a sensible and fair interpretation. For one thing, it is widely recognized that the
"equal shares" rule "is simpler to administer," Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A cmt. h,
especially in the limited context in which contribution and set off are still relevant, i.e., to alleged
conspirators acting in concert. The concept of comparative fault is ill-suited to conspiracies,
where multiple parties work together for the same result, and each co-conspirator is fully
responsible for the acts and conduct of the others. In both the criminal and civil contexts, the law
thus treats co-conspirators as equally at fault for the harms brought about. See, e.g., United

States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095, 1102 (4th Cir. 1983) ("all co-conspirators are equally
responsible for the acts of others done in furtherance of the conspiracy"). By the intentional and
cooperative nature of conspiracy, the co-conspirators are always each fully and equally liable for
the harm done, which is probably why the Legislature chose to retainjoint-and-severalliability
in cases of alleged conspiracies. Thus, while it will not be impossible for a jury to allocate
percentages of fault if this Court decides to go that route, the result will necessarily be somewhat

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
003597
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE - 12

arbitrary and less accurate than an "equal shares" allocation that reflects the co-conspirators
"equal responsibility" for the conduct alleged. 10

CONCLUSION
Idaho's Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act entitles Saint Alphonsus to a reduction in
any damages against it by the "pro rata share" of the settling third-party defendants. The only
question is whether this reduction requires a jury allocation of "fault," or whether each defendant
(or each group of related defendants) should share equally. For the reasons set forth herein and

in Saint Alphonsus's opening memorandum, the Court should adopt the "equal shares" approach

)

and hold that Saint Alphonsus may not be liable for more than 50% of any damages MRIA might
prove at trial. If the Court rejects that conclusion, it should submit the issue of comparative
responsibility to the jury.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 2nd day of May, 2011.

10

Similar considerations exist in the only other context where the act still applies, i.e.,
where parties are principal and agent or master and servant. Who is more "at fault"-the
principal who orders the act or the agent who carries it out? Philosophers may debate the "just
following orders" defense; jurors should not need to.
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
On June 2, 2011, Saint Alphonsus 's Chief Financial Officer Kenneth Fry sent a letter
(Exhibit A attached to the Affidavit of JackS. Gjording filed in support herewith) to MRI
Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), MRI Limited Partnership ("Center") and MRI Mobile Limited
Partnership ("Mobile") (collectively, the "Partnerships"), requesting the recipients to provide
access to certain fundamental partnership and limited partnership financial records, based on
Saint Alphonsus's statutory rights under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA") and the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act ("RULPA"). Idaho Code§ 53-3-101 et seq. and§ 532-101 et seq., respectively. As a former partner in MRIA and as a current limited partner in
Center and Mobile, Saint Alphonsus requested from each of the entities:
1. Annual financial statements for the years 1985 through 2004.
2. Records sufficient to show all partnership distributions in cash or in kind, and all
management fees and other monies paid on account of each general and limited partner's
interest in the partnerships for the years 1985 through 2004.
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
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3. Records sufficient to show all accounting activity in the capital accounts of each general
and limited partner for the years 1985 through 2004, in order to show contributions in,
distributions out, and income retained.
4. Documentation for any loans to the partnership by any partner, and any borrowings or
financings by the partnership from third parties in amounts in excess of $50,000, during
the years 1985 through 2004.

See Exhibit A.
On June 7, 2011, counsel for MRIA, Center, and Mobile sent a letter refusing Saint
Alphonsus's request, without disputing that Saint Alphonsus in fact had these rights of access
under RUPA and RULPA. The Partnerships' sole basis for refusing to comply with the statutes
was that "[d]uring the course of litigation, the discovery of information must be pursued through
the orderly process outlined in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure," and that discovery
limitations made the requests "unreasonable or otherwise improper under the circumstances"
under RUPA. (Gjording Aff, Ex. B).
That response is beside the point: a party's discovery rights in litigation have nothing to
do with a partner's unconditional statutory right to inspect and copy partnership records. The
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not cancel the Revised Uniform Partnership Act and the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, or the rights created by contract when the
partnerships were formed. Because Saint Alphonsus has rights under RUP A and RULP A as well
as by contract to inspect and copy these materials-rights which the Partnerships have not
disputed-and because the materials are relevant to the current lawsuit challenging Saint
Alphonsus's "proper exercise of [a] partner's rights and duties," Idaho Code§ 53-3-403(c)(l ),
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the court should order MRIA, Center, and Mobile to comply with the statutes and provide Saint
Alphonsus access to the books and records listed in its June 2, 2011letter.

I.

AS A FORMER GENERAL PARTNER OF MRIA, AND A CURRENT LIMITED
PARTNER OF CENTER AND MOBILE, SAINT ALPHONSUS HAS BROAD
RIGHTS OF ACCESS UNDER RUPA AND RULPA AND BY CONTRACT TO
THE PARTNERSHIPS' RECORDS.
Saint Alphonsus was a founding general partner in 1985 of MRIA, an Idaho general

partnership, and remained a general partner unti12004. MRIA was itself the sole general partner,
30% owner, and in full operating control, of two Idaho limited partnerships, Center (organized
simultaneously with MRIA in 1985, to acquire and operate the magnetic resonance imaging
device at Saint Alphonsus Hospital) and Mobile (established in 1988 to operate mobile MRI
devices). Saint Alphonsus was also a limited partner of Center and Mobile from the time they
were organized, and remains a limited partner in both to this day.
A series of overlapping provisions of RUP A and RULP A provide to all partners - both
general and limited, both current and former-various rights of access to inspect and copy
partnership records. These provisions considered one by one are decisive in favor of Saint
Alphonsus·s rights to the records that have been requested. Considered together, they are an
emphatic statement of the legislature's intent that partners should have such access. And if the
statutes were not enough, the private placement memoranda that were the basis upon which
Center and Mobile sold the limited partnership interests to Saint Alphonsus and others,
guaranteed similar rights by contract.
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A.

As a former general partner of MRIA, Saint Alphonsus has an unqualified
right to the Partnerships' "books and records" and "any other information
concerning the partnership's business affairs" for 1985-2004

The Idaho Revised Uniform Partnership Act§ 53-3-403, titled "Partner's rights and
duties with respect to information," defines the right of a general partner and former general
partner to certain general partnership material. Per the statutory text, there are two types of
relevant data: "books and records," and "information" which "concem[s] the partnership's
business and affairs" apart from books and records. See id § 53-3-403(b) (describing access to
"books and records"); id. § 53-3-403(c) (discussing other information); accord id § 53-3-403
official cmt. 2 & 3 (noting these separate rights as to "books and records" and "partnership
information other than books and records").
The books-and-records provision provides an absolute right of access, stating that "[a]
partnership ... shall provide former partners and their agents and attorneys access to books and
records pertaining to the period during which they were partners." ld. § 53-3-403(b) (emphasis
added). It contains no exception; indeed, the official comment expressly notes that "[a] partner's
right to inspect and copy the partnership's books and records is not conditioned on the partner's
purpose or motive," but instead partners have "an unqualified right of access to the partnership
books and records." Jd § 53-3-403(b) official cmt. 2.
Books and records include "financial records," id. § 53-3-403 official cmt 1, and thus
include the basic financial records that Saint Alphonsus has requested here: (1) the annual
financial statements, (2) records of distributions to partners, (3) records of partners' capital to
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include their contributions to the Partnerships, and (4) loans by partners (in any amount) and by
third parties (in amounts over $50,000) to the Partnerships, during the period 1985 to 2004 when
Saint Alphonsus was a general partner in MRIA.
Were that unqualified right not sufficient, there is also a right of access, "without
demand," to information, apart from books and records, "concerning the partnership's business
and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the
partnership agreement or this act." Jd. § 53-3-403(c)(l). Finally, after defining these broad
rights that guarantee Saint Alphonsus access to all the materials demanded here, the statute
provides a right to "any other information concerning the partnership's business and affairs."
Only in this final, catch-all category may the Partnerships object that a request for access "is
unreasonable or otherwise improper under the circumstances," id. § 53-3-403(c)(2), and "[t]he
burden is on the partnership or partner from whom the information is requested to show that the
demand is unreasonable or improper," id § 53-3-403 official cmt. 3.
But even under this "reasonable and proper" test-which, again, has no application to the
unconditional rights discussed above-Saint Alphonsus is entitled to the records that it has
demanded. It is precisely Saint Alphonsus's "proper exercise of [a] partner's rights and duties"
that the Partnerships have attacked in this lawsuit. Saint Alphonsus's need to defend a lawsuit
over its "proper exercise of [a] partner's rights and duties" is a reason - if such a showing were
necessary- for the Court to enforce Saint Alphonsus's unconditional rights under RUPA to the
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Partnership materials. The Partnerships' attempt to impose discovery limitations in this lawsuit
as a reason to cancel these statutory rights, stands Idaho law on its head.
The "business and affairs" of MRIA was the operation of Center and Mobile. MRIA has
served as the sole general partner, exercising complete control over the operation and affairs of
Center and Mobile since their inception. MRIA also has long owned a 30% interest in each of
those two limited partnerships. Saint Alphonsus's rights of access as a general partner in MRIA
to the "books and records" ofMRIA, and to "information concerning the partnership's business
and affairs," includes the requested records relating to Center and Mobile, since MRIA's
business includes managing and profiting from ownership in those limited partnerships. This
statutory right of a partner "to inspect and copy the partnership's books and records is not
conditioned on the partner's purpose or motive," but instead is "an unqualified right of access to
the partnership books and records." Id § 53-3-403(b) official cmt. 2.

B.

As a limited partner of Center and Mobile, Saint Alphonsus has an
unconditional right to records showing all contributions by partners under
RULPA §§53-2-304(1) and 53-2-111(9)(a)

The Idaho Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, Idaho Code§ 53-2-304(1),
provides that "a limited partner may inspect and copy required information during regular
business hours in the limited partnership's principal office" and that "[t]he limited partner need
not have any particular purpose for seeking the information." Such "required information" is
defined in RULPA § 53-2-111, and includes information describing "[t]he amount of cash, and a
description and statement of the agreed value of the other benefits, contributed and agreed to be
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contributed by each partner," and the "the times at which, or events on the happening of which,
any additional contributions agreed to be made by each partner are to be made." !d. § 53-2111(9)(a) and (b) (emphasis added). One of the items requested by Saint Alphonsus is precisely
this information: "Records sufficient to show all accounting activity in the capital accounts of
each general and limited partner for the years 198 5 through 2004, in order to show contributions
in, distributions out, and income retained." Ex. A, item #3. Saint Alphonsus is entitled to such
information, and "need not have any particular purpose for seeking the information." RULP A
§ 53-2-304(1).

C.

As a limited partner of Center and Mobile, Saint Alphonsus has further
rights to "true and full information regarding the state of activities and
financial condition of the limited partnership and other information
regarding the activities of the limited partnership as is just and reasonable,"
under RULP A §§53-2-304(2)

RULPA § 53-2-304(2) further provides that "a limited partner may obtain from the
limited partnership and inspect and copy true and full information regarding the state of the
activities and fmancial condition of the limited partnership and other information regarding the
activities of the limited partnership as is just and reasonable if:
(a) The limited partner seeks the information for a purpose
reasonably related to the partner's interest as a limited partner;
(b) The limited partner makes a demand in a record received by the
limited partnership, describing with reasonable particularity the
information sought and the purpose for seeking the information;
and
(c) The information sought is directly connected to the limited
partner's purpose. !d.
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
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Once again, this litigation by the Partnerships is a basis to enforce, not to deny, Saint
Alphonsus access to this information that the Partnerships seek to conceal. "True and full
information regarding the state ofthe activities and financial condition of the limited partnership
and other information regarding the activities of the limited partnership" are central- not merely
"reasonably related"- to Saint Alphonsus's need to defend its performance of its responsibilities
as a partner.

D.

As a limited partner of Center and Mobile, Saint Alphonsus has an
unconditional contract right to "inspect the books and records of the
Partnership at any time during normal business hours."

Limited partnership interests were sold to Saint Alphonsus and others on the basis of a
"private placement memorandum" that guaranteed without qualification that "Limited Partners
may inspect the books and records of the Partnership at any time during normal business hours."
Gjording Aff., Ex. Cat 60 (Center) and Ex. D. at 80 (Mobile). Such rights are enforceable
independent of any statutory right. See Bond Purchase, L.L. C. v. Patriot Tax Credit Properties,
L.P., 746 A.2d 842, 850 (Del. Ch. 1999) (enforcing limited partner's contractual right to certain

information independent from rights granted by limited partnership statute). For this fourth
reason, the Court should order access to the books and records of Center and Mobile.
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CONCLUSION

The Court should compel MRIA, Center, and Mobile to allow Saint Alphonsus to access,
inspect, and copy the limited financial records it seeks, as provided by statute and by contract.
DATED this 9th day of June, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/0

I hereby certify that on thelth day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

D
~
D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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CONSOLIDATED ORDER RE:
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT HEARD MAY 18,2011

-------------------------- )
Presently before the Court are several motions for summary judgment filed by Saint
Alphonsus and a related Motion for Clarification filed by MRI Associates. Hearing was held on
May 18, 2011, and the matter was taken under advisement. The Court now issues the following
opinion.

BACKGROUND
In 1985, Saint Alphonsus and several other parties formed a partnership called MRI
Associates (MRIA) for the purpose of acquiring and operating magnetic resonance imaging
devices.

MRIA formed two limited partnerships through which it conducted its business of

operating the MRI machines. St. Alphonsus ultimately dissociated from MRIA and entered into
another partnership that operated MRI machines and began competing with MRIA. Afterward,
Saint Alphonsus brought suit for the share of the partnership to which it was entitled under Idaho
Code Section 53-3-701. MRIA counterclaimed against Saint Alphonsus on several theories.
At trial, the court, with Judge McLaughlin presiding, determined the share of MRIA to
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which Saint Alphonsus was entitled upon dissociation from MRIA, determining that the RUPA,
not the partnership agreement, governed the calculation. In the same opinion, it also addressed
whether the partnership agreement expressly limited Saint Alphonsus's right to dissociate from
MRIA. The trial court also determined that it was appropriate for MRIA to seek damages from
Saint Alphonsus on behalf of its limited partnerships. After trial, both sides appealed numerous
issues, including the issue of whether MRIA could collect damages on behalf of the limited
partnerships it had organized.
The Supreme Court reversed several decisions of the trial court, including its decision that
Saint Alphonsus could collect damages on behalf of the limited partnerships. The Supreme Court
remanded this cause for new trial, and now both parties move for partial summary judgment on
several issues.
DISCUSSION

Summary judgment may be entered when ''the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c); see also
Kelso v. Lance, 134 Idaho 373, 375, 3 P.3d 51, 53 (2000). In a summary judgment context, the

moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. BMC West
Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 893, 174 P.3d 399, 402 (2007). However, the non-moving party

"cannot rest on mere speculation because a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a
genuine issue of fact." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991). Furthermore,
the non-moving party may not rest on bare allegations or denials; it must set forth specific facts
that show a genuine issue. Vebillis v. Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335, 689 P.2d 227
(Ct. App. 1984). However, the disputed facts are construed liberally in favor of the non-moving
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party, and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are drawn in favor of the non-moving
party. BMC West, 144 Idaho at 893, 174 P.3d at 402.
I. Motion for Clarification and Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Saint Alphonsus's
Partnership Share
MRI Associates filed a motion for clarification on whether this Court will revisit Judge
McLaughlin's decision as to the share to which Saint Alphonsus was entitled upon dissociation
from MRIA.

MRIA argues that Judge McLaughlin's decision was inextricably linked to his

decision that the partnership agreement expressly limited Saint Alphonsus's right to dissociate
from MRIA, and thus the ruling on the partnership share was affected by the Supreme Court's
decision in this case. Saint Alphonsus contemporaneously filed a motion for summary judgment
asking this Court to reinstate Judge McLaughlin's decision on the ground that Judge McLaughlin's
decision was not affected by the Supreme Court's decision in this case.
The Court does not believe that Judge McLaughlin's decision as to Saint Alphonsus's share
upon dissociation from MRIA was affected by the Supreme Court's decision regarding the
propriety of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation. The Supreme Court's decision was limited to whether
the Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from MRIA was in contravention of an express term of the
partnership agreement. It concluded that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was not in contravention
of an express term of the partnership agreement. In doing so, it determined that Section 6.1 of the
partnership agreement, delineating circumstances in which partners could rightfully dissociate, did
not expressly limit the right to dissociate. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed Judge
McLaughlin's decision that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated in contravention of an
express term ofthe partnership agreement as a matter oflaw.
In the same opinion reversed by the Supreme Court, Judge McLaughlin determined that the
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contractual buyout provisions only applied in the circumstances enumerated in Section 6.1. Noting
that all of the reasons for dissociation listed in Section 6.1 would require Saint Alphonsus to
dissociate on short notice, the Court reasoned that the buyout provision was designed to protect
MRIA from a liquidity shortage in the event Saint Alphonsus had to dissociate from the
partnership. Judge McLaughlin ultimately ruled that because Saint Alphonsus had not dissociated
for one of the reasons listed in Section 6.1, the buyout provision of the contract did not apply, and
the RUPA provision applied.
The Supreme Court reversed Judge McLaughlin based upon his interpretation of RUP A
provisions that are irrelevant to Judge McLaughlin's analysis of the buyout provisions.
Conspicuously absent from Judge McLaughlin's opinion regarding the buyout provision is any
reference to the rightfulness of wrongfulness of dissociations. Consequently, the Court cannot find
that the Supreme Court's opinion affects Judge McLaughlin's opinion regarding the buyout
provisions of the partnership agreement. Judge McLaughlin's decision regarding the share of the
partnership to which Saint Alphonsus is entitled stands and remains the law of the case.
IT. Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Saint Alphonsus's Second Affirmative Defense and
MRIA's Motion to Strike.
Saint Alphonsus moves for summary judgment seeking to have any damages ultimately
awarded against it reduced by approximately half. Saint Alphonsus argues that Idaho law provides
for a reduction of damages awarded at trial where a jointly and severally liable codefendant settles
before trial. It argues that the amount of the reduction is calculated by determining the number of
defendants, dividing by that number to determine each defendant's pro rata share, then subtracting
from the total damage award the pro rata share of each settling defendant.

Finally, Saint

Alphonsus argues that its former codefendants-Intermountain Medical Imaging, Gem State
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Radiology, and Imaging Center Radiologists (collectively "the Rads")-were jointly and severally
liable for all of the claims MRIA has leveled against Saint Alphonsus because the gravamen of
MRIA' s theory is that Saint Alphonsus conspired with the Rads to destroy MRIA' s business.
MRIA also moves to strike the copy of the settlement agreement reached between the Rads
and MRIA, provided in the Affidavit of Jack Gjording, because it is untimely and improperly
authenticated. The Court will note that this is a preliminary matter and the rules of evidence are
not in full force. The Court will also note that MRIA has never contested the authenticity of the
settlement agreement provided by Saint Alphonsus. Furthermore, the only use that the Court
makes of this settlement agreement is to note that an agreement in fact exists. The Court will
therefore deny MRIA's motion to strike the Affidavit of Jack Gjording, but will note that any
copies presented at trial must be properly authenticated and otherwise comply with the rules of
evidence.
Idaho code provides for a reduction in the amount awarded to a joint tortfeasor in the
amount of any settling defendant's pro rata shares or in the amount for which the joint tortfeasors
settled, whichever is greater. I.C. § 6-806. A joint tortfeasor is "one (1) of two (2) or more persons
jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property ...." I.C. § 6-803(4).
To be jointly and severally liable for an injury, the tortfeasors must have been acting in concert to
commit a tort. I.C. § 6-803(5). In other words, the tortfeasors must be "pursuing a common plan
or design which results in the commission of an intentional or reckless tortuous act.

Id.

Furthermore, the designation of parties as 'joint tortfeasors" within the meaning of the statute is a
question for the court based upon the pleadings. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 783, 727 P.2d
1187, 1211 (1986). Thus, to receive a pro rata reduction to a damage award, it must be evident
from the pleadings that the settling party was pursuing a common plan along with the non-settling
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tortfeasor.
Once the court finds that a settling defendant is a joint tortfeasor and that a non-settling
party is entitled to a reduction in the damages awarded, the next issue is determining the amount.
Idaho law provides that damages recoverable against the non settling joint tortfeasor are to be
reduced by either the pro rata share of the settling joint tortfeasor' s liability or the amount paid for
the settlement, whichever is greater. I.C. § 6-805(1).
While pro rata is not a defined term within the statute, the Court finds that it refers to a joint
tortfeasor's share based on his fault apportioned by the finder of fact. The Idaho Code seems to
assume that pro rata has some relationship with apportionment of fault. For example, one Section
provides for "reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor, of the injured
person's damages recoverable against all the other tortfeasors," but makes the reduction available
"only if the issue of proportionate fault is litigated between the joint tortfeasors ...." I.C. § 6-806.
In another Section, the Code allows for a reduction of damage awards against tortfeasors who are

not jointly and severally liable, and thus by pro rata share, "whether or not the finder of fact
apportions responsibility to the tortfeasor receiving the release." I. C. § 6-805(2). Both of these
Sections of the Idaho Code suggest that apportionment of fault is necessary where a joint tortfeasor
is released. It is also noteworthy that the Supreme Court has upheld a damages award reduced
based on the apportionment of fault among joint tortfeasors, though the definition of"pro rata" was
not specifically at issue there. See Quick, 111 Idaho at 782-84, 727 P.2d at 1210-1212. Thus the
Court finds that defining "pro rata share" as one's share of a damages award based on
apportionment of fault is more just-the defendants who are more at fault should be required to
pay more of the damages--and has more support in the Idaho law than the definition proposed by
Saint Alphonsus. This is one of those occasions where the law and common sense appear to be in

OrderRe:MotionForSummaryJudgment 6

003615

accord.
Based on the pleadings of MRIA, Saint Alphonsus and the Rads are joint tortfeasors. Half
of the claims leveled against Saint Alphonsus are allegations of tortuous conduct engaged in by
Saint Alphonsus along with the Rads. Consequently, the Court finds that based on MRIA's Third
Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and the Rads were acting in concert, and are joint
tortfeasors within the meaning of Section 6-805, Idaho Code. Consequently, Saint Alphonsus is
entitled to a reduction in any damages awarded against it in an amount based on apportionment of
fault to be determined at trial.
III. Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Third-Party Beneficiary Claims.
Saint Alphonsus moves for summary judgment on the basis that two of the parties, MRI
Center and MRI Mobile (collectively the "Limited Partnerships"), do not have enforceable rights
under the MRIA partnership agreement.

The basis of their argument is that the partnership

agreement was not intended for the benefit of the Limited Partnerships, and thus the Limited
Partners do not have third-party beneficiary status under the partnership agreement.
For a party to be a third-party beneficiary, and thus have rights in a contract between others,
the contract must have been intended to benefit the third party. Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683,
687, 183 P.3d 771, 775 (2008). Furthermore, the intent to benefit the third party must be expressed
within the contract. Id. And it is not sufficient that the purported third-party beneficiary receive
an incidental benefit from the contract; the contract must be made primarily for the benefit of the
third party. !d. In other words, "a party must show that the contract was made for its direct benefit,
and that it is not merely an indirect beneficiary/' Idaho Power v. Hulet, 140 Idaho 110, 113, 90
P.3d 335-338 (2004).
To establish third-party beneficiary status, it is not necessary to show the entire contract
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was designed for the benefit of the third party. Rather, there must simply be direct benefits
conferred upon the third party beneficiary.

For example, in one case, the Supreme Court

recognized a business entity as a third-party beneficiary to a contract between a city and a
construction company. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 467, 583 P.2d
997, 1002 (1978). There, the plaintiff, a local business, sued a construction company that was
performing construction work near the plaintiffs place of business because it was not adhering to
contractual terms designed to minimize disruption to the businesses in the area. /d. at 465-466,
583 P.2d at 1000-01.

The construction being performed under the contract was designed to

improve the retail atmosphere of the downtown area. Id at 467, 583 P.2d at 1002. The court
reasoned that since the provisions of the contract being enforced were designed for the benefit of
the businesses in the area, the businesses in the downtown area could enforce the provisions of the
construction contract. /d.
Here, the partnership agreement was intended to benefit the Limited Partnerships. MRIA
was formed for the express purpose of purchasing and operating imaging equipment. The way
MRIA intended to do so was ''to promote and organize an Idaho limited partnership ..." that
would "have the same purpose as [MRIA]." Essentially, MRIA intended to conduct its business
through the Limited Partnerships. Furthermore, the partnership agreement proscribed competition
with the partnership. Since the limited partnerships were the vehicles by which MRIA conducted
its business, the prohibition on competition would be meaningless if it did not extend to the limited
partners. Consequently, the Court finds that the noncompetition provisions were made for the
benefit of the Limited Partners, and thus, the limited partners have enforcement rights as thirdparty beneficiaries. Furthermore, the Court finds that the partnership agreement's statement of
purpose indicating that MRIA would dissolve if it could not secure financing to form the Limited
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Partnerships indicates a general intent to benefit the Limited Partnerships.
Saint Alphonsus argues that the partnership agreement was designed to dictate relations
among the MRIA partners, and the benefits flowed from the Limited Partnerships to MRIA, and
thus the partnership agreement was designed to benefit MRIA, not the Limited Partnerships. The
Court does not find this argument persuasive. The Court is convinced that the city in Just's
received benefits in the form of attracting business or stimulating the local economy, not to
mention new streets, sidewalks, and other infrastructure. However, the fact that the city received
benefits did not preclude the businesses from enforcing their rights. Consequently, the Court finds
that the Limited Partners are third-party beneficiaries under the partnership agreement.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment regarding its
share of MRIA to which it is entitled is hereby GRANTED, with a consistent disposition for
MRIA's motion for clarification. Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment regarding its
second affirmative defense is hereby GRANTED in part. Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary
judgment regarding the third-party beneficiary claims of MRI Center and MRI Mobile is hereby
DENIED. At the time of hearing, the parties agreed on many issues and reserved argument on
others. The Court believes that it has addressed all the issues which were argued and which it was
asked to address. If, however, the parties feel that the Court has not addressed an issue raised at in
the motions heard May 18, 2011, they are free to call such lapses to the Court's attention.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this Ll._1:y of June 2011.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25
Instruction re: Breach of Fiduciary Duties to MRI Center & MRI Mobile (non-IDJI)
MRI Center and MRI Mobile have also asserted that Saint Alphonsus breached fiduciary
duties it owed to them. While there is no statute that imposes a fiduciary duty on Saint
Alphonsus with respect to MRI Center or l'viRI Mobile, MRI Center and MRI Mobile may still
be able to prove that Saint Alphonsus owed them fiduciary duties based on the specific nature of
their relationship.
In addition to fiduciary duties imposed by statute, a fiduciary relationship may be found
based on the fact that one party is in a position of superiority over the other, which position
enables that party to exercise influence over the other, who reposes special trust and confidence
in him. The facts and circumstances must demonstrate that the peculiar confidence placed by
one individual in the other is justified in ·view of the actual relationship between them, in which
the fiduciary acts primarily for the benefit of the other, and is in a position to have and exercise,
and does have and exercise influence over the other.
Examples of relationships which impose fiduciary obligations include relationships
between attorney and client, between an executor and the beneficiary of an estate, between a
principal and agent, or between insurer and insured. Idaho law establishes, however, that no
fiduciary duty ordinarily arises between parties to an "arms-length" business relationship.
Further, that one party has mere trust or respect for another's judgment is usually not sufficient
to establish a fiduciary relationship.

003621

To establish that Saint Alphonsus owed them fiduciary duties, MRI Center and MRI
Mobile must show that Saint Alphonsus occupied such a superior position, and that the MRIA
entities occupied a position of dependence on Saint Alphonsus so that it was reasonable to
conclude that Saint Alphonsus owed them a duty to act primarily for their benefit.
If you find that Saint Alphonsus was in a fiduciary relationship with MRI Center or MRI
Mobile, then you must go on to determine whether Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary duty
to MRI Center and MRI Mobile, the elements of which I explained in my previous instruction.

)

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that MRIA has proven each of the
elements ofbreach of fiduciary duty, then you must consider Saint Alphonsus's affirmative
defenses of laches, and waiver by the MRI entities, as I will describe them to you.
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that MRI Center and MRI Mobile
have proven that they were owed fiduciary duties, that Saint Alphonsus breached those duties,
that the breach proximately caused MRI Center and MRI Mobile a sum of damages, and you find
that Saint Alphonsus has not proven its affirmative defenses, then your verdict must be for MRI
Center and/or MRI Mobile. If you find that MRI Center and MRI Mobile have not proven each
of these elements, or if you find that any of the affirmative defenses have been proven, your
verdict must be for Saint Alphonsus.

Sources:
As to the test for determining whether there is a common-law fiduciary duty under
Idaho law, see Idaho First Nat'[ Bankv. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266,277-78,824 P.2d
841, 852-53 (1991):
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A fiduciary relationship imparts a position of peculiar confidence
placed by one individual in another. A fiduciary is a person with a
duty to act primarily for the benefit of another. A fiduciary is in a
position to have and exercise, and does have and exercise influence
over another. A fiduciary relationship implies a condition of
superiority of one of the parties over the other.... The term
fiduciary implies that one party is in a superior position to the other
and that such a position enables him to exercise influence over one
who reposes special trust and confidence in him. . . . The facts and
circumstances must indicate that the one reposing the trust has
foundation for his belief that the one giving advice or presenting
arguments is acting not in his own behalf but in the interests of the
other party.
')

For the proposition that neither an arms' length transaction nor respect for
judgment and trust establishes a fiduciary relationship, see id at 278, 824 P.3d at 853 ("As a
general rule, mere respect for another's judgment or trust in this character is usually not
sufficient to establish such a that relationship."); High Valley Concrete, L.L.C. v. Sargent, 149
Idaho 423, 428, 234 P.3d 747, 752 (2010) ("a [fiduciary] relationship does not exist when parties
are dealing with one another at 'arm's length"').
As to the examples of fiduciary relationships, see id ("Examples of relationships from
which the law will impose fiduciary obligations on the parties include when the parties are:
members of the same family, partners, attorney and client, executor and beneficiary of an estate,
principal and agent, insurer and insured, or close friends") (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
For the proposition that the jury must decide whether a fiduciary relationship exists
as between Saint Alphonsus and the limited partners, see Memorandum Decision on Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Medical Center, Inc.'s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Fourth Amended Claim for Relief in Second Amended Counterclaim
at 8, 11 (June 13, 2007) ("In conclusion, the Court cannot find a fiduciary relationship between
SADC and MRICIIMRlM is created by statute.... The Court finds the question of whether a
fiduciary relationship is present between SADC and the limited partnerships is a question more
appropriate for the trier of fact, thus precluding the entry of summary judgment upon this
issue.").
GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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Presently before the Court is Saint Alphonsus' s Motion to Compel Compliance with
Statutory Rights to Inspect Partnership Books and Records. Hearing was held on this matter on
June 22, 2011. At hearing, case law that was not cited in the parties' briefs was discussed, and the
parties were given an opportunity for further briefing. All the supplemental briefing was submitted
by July 5, 2011. The Court now issues the following opinion.
DISCUSSION
The sole issue before the Court is whether this Court should enforce the statutory right of
Saint Alphonsus to inspect the books and records of MRIA. On June 2, 2011, Saint Alphonsus
requested access to some of MRIA's, MRI Mobile's, and MRI Center's books and records
pursuant to the RUP A. On June 7, 2011, counsel for MRIA, MRI Mobile, and MRI Center refused
access to the requested records on the basis that the request came outside the scope of discovery in
the pending litigation. Saint Alphonsus argues that regardless of the rules of discovery, it has the
right to inspect the books and records, and therefore this Court should compel compliance with the
statutory rights found in the RUP A.
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Saint Alphonsus argues that the statutory right of a partner to examine partnership records
is nearly absolute, while MRIA argues that the right is suspended during the pendency of litigation.
The Court is inclined to agree with Saint Alphonsus that the right to examine partnership books
and records is nearly absolute, but the Court does not believe the scope of the right is at issue here.
The issue here is whether this Court should enforce the statutory right in the context of this
litigation. The Court believes that on the facts before it, it would be inappropriate to do so.
The rules governing discovery exist to define the scope of proceedings well in advance so
that both parties may develop their trial strategies and not be surprised at trial. See Edmunds v.
Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 878, 136 P.3d 338, 349 (2006). Allowing a party to use infonnation

obtained outside the discovery process so long after the discovery deadlines have passed would
frustrate the purpose of the discovery rules and allow for the trials by surprise sought to be avoided
by the rules. While cases have been cited that allow this practice even though it was conceded to
be "backdoor discovery," none of these cases involved, as this case does, a second trial after
appeal.
Here, this Court reopened discovery in this casefor the very limited purpose of detennining
whether expet1 testimony relating to damages or the lack thereof would change as a result of the
Supreme Court's opinion in this case. Discovery for other purposes was not reopened. Thus, this
is not simple backdoor discovery, which might otherwise be allowed-it is an effort specifically
designed to avoid this Court's order limiting further discovery. That was made clear when the
Court asked whether any materials found would be used in this case, and plaintiffs counsel, to his
credit, honestly told the Court that the materials would potentially be used at trial. As the Court
indicated at the time, it might well be willing to require the inspection so long as nothing reviewed
would be used in the trial. But the Court does not believe it is required to compel the inspection in
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light of its previous discovery ruling and the fact that the sole reason for the request is to see
whether there is any further information that might be used at trial. In this context, the plaintiffs
purpose is not transparency-it is discovery. Consequently, it is subject to this Court's discovery
ruling and the Court will not compel MRIA to comply with Saint Alphonsus's statutory right to
inspect partnership books of this purpose.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Compel Compliance with the
Statutory Right to Inspect Partnership Books and Records is DENIED. The Court expresses no
opinion on whether the statutory right is suspended during the pendency of litigation. The Court
finds that it would be inappropriate to enforce those statutory rights in the context of this litigation,
or to admit evidence obtained outside of discovery as ordered by the Court by use of what in
another context might be permissible "backdoor discovery."

.
~
SO ORDERED AND DATED thts~ day of July 2011.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PAR1NERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
At the first trial, Saint Alphonsus stipulated liberally to the admission of numerous
business records, including the minutes of meetings of several organizations, as a matter of
judicial economy and professional courtesy. MRIA counsel made aggressive use of this
stipulation, to argue the truth of individual hearsay statements contained within the minutes. The
result was the improper use of"hearsay within hearsay". I.R.E. 805. To illustrate this problem
and to preclude several specific examples, Saint Alphonsus hereby moves pre-trial for an order
excluding the double hearsay included in five exhibits discussed herein, and will make similar
objections as further inadmissible hearsay may be offered at trial by MRIA.
II. ARGUMENT

A.

Statements included in a business record memorializing the out-of-court statements
of others are inadmissible hearsay.

A document, such as the minutes describing a meeting of an organization, is classic
hearsay, because it is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
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trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.R.E. 801(c), 802;

State v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375, 378, 924 P.2d 637, 640 (Idaho App. 1996). Once properly
authenticated, however, meeting minutes are often readily admissible under the "business
records" exception to the hearsay rule, to prove the details of the meeting, such as who attended,
the agenda, and the discussions had at the meeting. 1
But when such minutes include statements by a meeting participant that describe his
earlier activities, outside of the meeting, they introduce a second level ofhearsay. And when the

meeting participant describes what a third party purportedly said to the meeting participant at
some earlier time, the minutes add a third level of hearsay.
To be sure, "[h]earsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule

if

each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule ... "
I.R.E. 805 ("Hearsay within hearsay"; emphasis added). But the converse is also true: when "a
written report, itselfhearsay,.. relate[s] the statements of third persons," then "[i]n such a
situation each level ofhearsay is subject to a separate hearsay objection." Idaho Trial Handbook
§ 19.9. Thus, while a police officer's report may be admissible under the "business records
exception, I.R.E. 803(6)," the statement of an individual incorporated into that report is itself
"hearsay and not admissible unless it [meets] a separate hearsay exception." State v. Vivian, 129

1

I.R.E. 803(6) "Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in
any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it
was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation ...
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness."
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Idaho at 378, 924 P.2d at 640. Above all, as to meeting minutes, when "the statements recorded
in the minutes could not be attributed to any particular person," no exception to the hearsay rule
can be established. 2
There were offered in evidence at the first trial numerous minutes of meetings of a group
of radiologists, who were led during a portion of the events in controversy by Dr. David Giles,
who is a principal antagonist of Saint Alphonsus in this litigation. In many cases, Dr. Giles
himself initialed and apparently drafted these rninutes. 3 We accept for the sake of this motion,
and expect to stipulate at trial, that such minutes qualify as business records. However, the
minutes frequently include statements, sometimes attributed by name to Dr. Giles or another
meeting participant, and sometimes not attributed to anyone by name, that describe the
declarant's activities prior to coming to the meeting. Those statements, when offered by MRIA
to prove that those activities occurred, are hearsay that is subject to no exception, and therefore
must be excluded.

2

See Estate of Burton v. Trover Clinic Found Inc.,--- S.W.3d ---,2010 WL 6816338, at *5 (Ky. App. 2010) ("most
importantly, the statements recorded in the minutes could not be attributed to any particular person. In reviewing
KRE 803(6), one of the requirements of the exception requires the statements in the business records to have been
made by a person with knowledge. The exception does not allow the admission of anonymous statements into
evidence ..."); accord Walton v. Bridgestone!Firestone, Inc., No. 05-3027,2009 WL 2778441, at *6 (D. Ariz.
2009) (holding that statements in meeting minutes "do not satisfy the ... knowledge requirement" when "the
original declarants are unidentified," because despite fact that one could infer that speakers were employees, the
Court could only speculate that these "employees had personal knowledge of the testing and other facts mentioned
in the document, including [a second-level] hearsay [statement]" found therein).
3

The "Giles minutes" that are the subject of this motion uniformly include the notation at the end "DG/kas",
indicating that they were typed by "kas" for "DG" (David Giles), and bear the handwritten initials "DG." See Trial
Exhibit Nos. 4047,4057 and 4101, attached to the Affidavit of JackS. Gjording filed concurrently herewith.
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At a third level, the hearsay declarant in these meeting minutes sometimes describes prior
meetings with Saint Alphonsus, and attributes inflammatory statements to certain Saint
Alphonsus officials. We acknowledge that if the hearsay declarant were to appear at trial and
testify to the Saint Alphonsus statements, then the Saint Alphonsus statements would be nonhearsay as an admission of a party opponent. I.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A). But when the Saint
Alphonsus statement is included in a hearsay statement by a meeting participant that is included
in hearsay meeting minutes, "each level of hearsay is subject to a separate hearsay objection,"
Idaho Trial Handbook§ 19.9, and the Saint Alphonsus statement is admissible only "if each part
ofthe combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule." I.R.E. 805.
Because the Saint Alphonsus statement is included in inadmissible hearsay by the meeting
participant, both must be excluded.

B.

The Court should exclude the following hearsay-within-hearsay statements and
order their redaction if the documents are introduced for other purposes.4
The following exhibits admitted at the last trial, among others, contain hearsay statements

which should themselves be excluded from evidence, even assuming the underlying document
itself is admissible as a business record under I.R.E. 803(6):

1.

May 11. 1998 OSR Executive Committee Meeting Minutes (Tr. Exh. 4047).

Dr. Giles's minutes of this meeting ofthe radiologists ("GSR") state that "the question
was raised as to how important the relationships are with the physicians at the hospital." The

4

Submitted herewith are copies of the five exhibits that are the subject of this motion, highlighted to indicate the
portions that should be excluded. See, Gjording Aff., Trial Exhibit Nos. 4047, 4057, 4101, 4219 and 4154.
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"questioner" is not identified, but the minutes continue with this anonymous attribution of a
prnported prior conversation with J. Robert Polk, M.D., who was then Vice President of Medical
Affairs at Saint Alphonsus:
"Bob Polk has stated that anyone {i.e., any physician] working for other
institutions i.e. TVH [Treasure Valley Hospital], is working for the
competition and should therefore be 'punished.' Perhaps by way of
exclusion of contract with Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center."
The statement at the meeting by an unidentified declarant to describe a purported
conversation with Dr. Polk is itself hearsay, subject to no exception, and should be excluded,
along with the purported Polk statement included within the inadmissible hearsay. See Estate of
Burton, 2010 WL 6816338, at *5; Walton, 2009 WL 2778441, at *6.
2.

September 9. 1998 GSR Group Minutes (Tr. Exh. 4057).

Dr. Giles's minutes of this meeting include the following description (attributed to no
particular declarant by name) of a meeting by Giles and two other members of the group, with
Sandra Bruce, the CEO, and Cindy Schamp, COO, of Saint Alphonsus:
"Drs. Giles, Traughber and Hall met with Sandra Bruce to discuss the
Imaging Center. As expected, her initial response was not in the Group's
favor as she felt the Radiology Group had violated their relationship with
the hospital. The offer was made to lease the equipment from the hospital
but Sandra felt that this would not be enough. The hospital's position is
that the Imaging Center will take business so they want as much of the
center as possible. Sandra and Cindy Schamp are trying to determine how
much of an impact this will have on the hospital and how much of a profit
they can get from the center... Dr. Traughber stated that Cindy talked of
obtaining a global fee (technical and profession fees) of 50% ... "
IfMRIA calls any of Drs. Giles, Traughber or Hall at trial to testify subject to cross
examination about this meeting with Ms. Bruce and Ms. Schamp, that witness testimony in court
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would not be hearsay, and the statements that they would attribute to Bruce and Schamp would
be admissible as admissions by Saint Alphonsus representatives. I.R.E. 80l(d)(2)(a). But MRJA
may not "mail in" this testimony in hearsay form, just because the hearsay is included in a
business record.
3.

August 24, 1999 Imaging Center minutes (Tr. Exh. 41 0 I).

Dr. Giles's minutes of this meeting include the following views attributed to Sandra
Bruce, who of course was not present at the meeting:
"Sandra Bruce would like to have the hospital and Imaging Center
contracts finished before the MRI deal is completed."
The minutes do not even indicate whether this statement is merely the opinion of the anonymous
declarant, in which case it is irrelevant to any issue in this case, or the declarant's assertion of a
prior conversation with Ms. Bruce, which would be hearsay, and equally as inadmissible as the
previous examples.
4.

Aprill9. 2001 IMI Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (Tr. Exh. 4219).

By this date the radiologists had expelled Dr. Giles from their group, and the minutes are
drafted by others, but the hearsay objection is the same. The minutes include the following
sentence fragment, not identified to any speaker in attendance at the meeting, that contains a
statement purporting to express the views of Saint Alphonsus:
"Discussion: Hospital looking strongly into avenues to get out ofMRICI
[i.e. one of the claimants against Saint Alphonsus at this trial]. Jeff Cliff
to set up a meeting with Cindy Schamp to discuss possible solutions."
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Once again, the assertion of this fact, apparently by an unidentified participant in the
meeting, is itself hearsay that can only be admitted if it independently satisfies an exception to
the hearsay rule. While the minutes are themselves a business record of what transpired at the
meeting, no hearsay exception supports the admission of this anonymous statement as proof that
Saint Alphonsus was in fact at this time looking "into avenues to get out ofMRICI."
5.

Dr. Giles Notes "Docs Corp 2/14/00" (Tr. Exh. 4154).

Apart from these examples from meeting minutes, one further serious instance of
multiple hearsay deserves attention pre-trial. MRIA offered at trial a random page of Dr. Giles's
personal notes, which by no means qualify as business records. This note, which is itself
inadmissible hearsay, attributes remarks to Jeff Cliff, which are similarly hearsay, that purport to
quote Cindy Schamp, COO of Saint Alphonsus, speaking of the underlying dispute with MRIA
that is the subject of this litigation:
"Cindy told Jeff that soon the ctr magnet 'will be only an inpt [perhaps
"inpatient"] magnet'- threat to induce a sale. 'Cheapest thing to me to
do is nothing.'
Tax consequences would be huge - must investigate. Must do
rene g. of agreement to make it an exchange."
Unlike the instances of hearsay within meeting minutes, here neither the document itself,
nor the Cliff hearsay contained within, have any basis for admission under the hearsay rule.
When the time comes, if necessary Saint Alphonsus will press additional objections to the
foundation for this document. But the hearsay objection is a sufficient basis to exclude it now.
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II. CONCLUSION
The Court should hold that the hearsay statements in Trial Exhibit Nos. 4047, 4057,
4101,4219, and 4154 cited above are excluded from evidence, and likewise, if it becomes
necessary, exclude other such statements upon objection made during trial.
DATED this 25th day of July, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

0
~
0

0

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

)
)

Deputy

)
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, lNC., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Defendant-Counterclaimant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219
CONSOLIDATED ORDER RE:
MOTIONS HEARD AUGUST 5,
2011

Presently before the Court are MRIA's Motion for Clarification, Motion to Preclude
Reference to Departing Partner's Share, Motion to Have Deemed Admitted Exhibits, Motion To
Exclude Mention of Saint Alphonsus's Non-Profit Status, and Motion to Exclude Testimony of
Thomas McCarthy. Also before the Court are Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Reconsider, and
Motion to Exclude Hearsay within Hearsay.

Hearing was held on August 5, 2011, and the

matter was taken under advisement that day. The Court now issues the following opinion.

I.

MRIA'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
MRIA is not claimed to have breached any fiduciary duty to the partnership. Thus, to the

extent that any claim may legally exist, it has been waived. Furthermore, if argued, it would be
unduly prejudicial because it was not pled. Furthermore, Judge McLaughlin stated in his July 30,
2007 ruling that "Saint Alphonsus may not assert MRIA breached an alleged fiduciary duty owed
to Saint Alphonsus ...." That ruling was not appealed and is therefore the law of the case.
Consequently, Saint Alphonsus may not argue either directly or indirectly that MRIA breached
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any alleged fiduciary duty owed to Saint Alphonsus.
MRIA's Motion for Clarification is hereby GRANTED.
IT.

MRIA'S MOTION TO PRECLUDE REFERENCE TO DEPARTING PARTNER'S
SHARE
Issues relating to Saint Alphonsus's departing partner's share were fully disposed of by

Judge McLaughlin in the first proceeding in this matter. That ruling was not reversed by the
Idaho Supreme Court.

Consequently, there is no remaining issue in this case as to Saint

Alphonsus's departing partner's share and thus this Court finds there is no need, as the case
currently stands, for either party to refer to this issue.

Furthermore, the Court finds such

discussion and argument could both confuse and mislead the jury, and it could be unfairly
prejudicial. Consequently, given that the departing partner's share has little or no relevance to
the case, the Court finds that the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative
value. Accordingly, MRIA's Motion in Limine as to the departing partner's share is hereby
GRANTED.
lli.

MRIA'S MOTION TO HAVE EXHIBITS DEEMED ADMITTED AND SAINT
ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE "HEARSAY WITHIN HEARSAY"
FROM BUSINESS RECORDS.
Where a case is remanded to the District Court following appeal, the District Court is

bound by the law of the case. The extent to which law of the case binds a court depends on the
language used by the Supreme Court in remanding the case. Where the Supreme Court remands
a case "for new trial," the case comes for trial the same in all respects as though it had never been
tried, subject to the condition that it must be tried in light of rules of law announced by the
appellate court. Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 5 P.3d 973 (2000); Creem v. Nothwestem
Mutual Fire Association of Seattle, Wash., 58 Idaho 349, 352, 74 P.2d 762, 765 (1938). In
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Creem, the Supreme Court adopted the position that unless there was a specific mandate as to
what issues were to be corrected and retried, the District Court was to try the case de novo.
Creem, 58 Idaho at 352, 74 P.2d at 765. In determining that the case before it was to be retried
de novo, the Creem Court looked to the language of the remand and noted that it stated "for new
trial." Id. On the other hand, where a case is remanded "for further proceedings," a trial Court
has the power to correct any errors. in its original findings not passed upon on appeal. Hutchins v.
State, 100 Idaho 661, 603 P.2d 995 (1979); Blinzler v. Andrews, 95 Idaho 769, 519 P.2d 438
(1973).

With that exception, the District Court and the parties are bound by the previous

decisions in the case not reversed by the appellate court.
Here, the Court is bound by all of the pre-appeal decisions that were not reversed by the
Supreme Court.

The case presently before the Court is before it on remand "for further

proceedings that are consistent with this opinion." Saint A/phonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI
Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, _ , 224 P.3d 1068, 1090 (2009). The language used in this
case is far narrower that that used in Creem. Compare id. with Creem v. Northwestern Mutual
Fire Association, 56 Idaho 529, 537, 56 P.2d 762, 770 (1936). The Court believes the language
used by the Supreme Court in this case is clear and unambiguous. This matter needs to be retried
before a new jury with the errors found by the Supreme Court corrected, but otherwise the
previous proceedings stand.
It is inconceivable to this Court that the Supreme Court somehow was implying that every
issue and piece of evidence previously admitted and not found to have been admitted in error, or
admitted without objection, or admitted over an objection that was not appealed, should be
reexamined.

The Court does not believe that the Supreme Court intended that every piece of

evidence be revisited as to foundation, nor does it believe that the Supreme Court intended for
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the stipulations on admissibility to be redefined. Consequently, the Court will only correct errors
made by the previous court, and will not revisit every piece of evidence.
The way the Court sees the issues presented as to these previously admitted exhibits is
that there is no error as to their admission for this Court to correct at this time. The parties
stipulated to their admission in the first trial. As to all of the exhibits presented and admitted in
the first trial, whose admission was not appealed or found inappropriate, the Court can fmd no
error that it must correct on remand, with one exception. It appears from the record that the notes
of Dr. Giles, (Tr. Exh. 4154) may have been admitted in error and with the exception of that
exhibit, the Court will deem admitted in this trial all of the exhibits that were admitting by
stipulation in the frrst trial. No error was committed by the Court in admitted the exhibits
stipulated into evidence by both of the parties, and thus the Court will not set aside the
stipulation for the purposes of the second trial.
The Court will exercise its discretion and deem the exhibits admitted. The Court believes
that there is no unfair prejudice to Saint Alphonsus by doing so. Furthermore, the Court believes
that this ruling will advance the purpose of securing "fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay ... to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined." I.R.E. 102.
MRIA's motion to have the exhibits admitted in the first trial deemed admitted in this
trial is hereby GRANTED with respect to all exhibits except Trial Exhibit 4i54. Ruling on Trial
Exhibit 4154 is hereby RESERVED.

IV.

MOTION TO EXCLUDE MENTION OF ST. ALPHONSUS'S NON-PROFIT
STATUS
The term "non-profit" is a creation of the tax code not fully understood by most
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laypeople. Use of the term, though relevant and legal, could be unduly confusing and could
mislead the jury. The Court finds that it could also be unfairly prejudicial and the Court will
exclude the use of the term under Rule 403. Saint Alphonsus is clearly entitled to describe itself
as a charitable organization-that is what Saint Alphonsus is in fact. Whether it chooses to
describe itself as a Catholic charitable hospital seems to make little difference since that will
undoubtedly be known to most jurors in any event.
MRIA's Motion in Limine as to Saint Alphonsus's non-profit status under the tax and
corporate law is hereby GRANTED.

V.

MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF THOMAS McCARTHY
MRIA seeks to have several portions of Saint Alphonsus's expert's report stricken

and preclude him from testifying as to those stricken portions.

Generally, MRIA seeks to

preclude Dr. McCarthy from giving opinions as to causation.
Expert opinion testimony is admissible "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue ..
. ." I.R.E. 702. Such opinion testimony may only be offered by "a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education ...." Id. If the testimony and expert meet
these criteria, the testimony is competent and relevant, and may be admissible. State v. Hopkins,
113 Idaho 679, 680-81, 747 P.2d 88, 89-90 (Ct. App. 1987). illtimately, the admissibility of
expert opinion is in the discretion ofthe trial court. Id. at 681, 747 P.2d at 90.
As to Sections N(A) and V, the Court finds that Dr. McCarthy's testimony must be
limited. Specifically, Dr. McCarthy may not give an opinion as to causation based upon his
regression analysis because his own testimony is that causation may not be determined by
regression analysis. See Deposition of Thomas McCarthy, at p. 113. However, Dr. McCarthy
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may otherwise explain the regression analysis he performed, including the fact that an inference
may be drawn as to causation from the analysis. The Court fmds that regression analysis could
aid the jury in determining causation, but given Dr. McCarthy's testimony that he cannot
determine causation from regression analysis, Dr. McCarthy may not testify as to his opinion on
causation.
Here, the Court finds that portions of Section N(B) of Dr. McCarthy's report are not
admissible because they will not aid the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. The Court
understands Section N.B.l-2 to attack the assumptions of Drs. Budge and Willhoite.
Specifically, Dr. McCarthy concludes that IMI's facilities in downtown Boise and in Eagle would
have existed anyway. Paragraphs 30, 32, 33, 36, and portions of 40 (as to the structure of a
partnership deal between GSR and MRIA) appear to be nothing more than argument and fact
testimony. There is nothing technical contained in those paragraphs. Of course the attorneys are
welcome to make the arguments Dr. McCarthy makes in those paragraphs, and elicit the fact
testimony from those with personal knowledge.

Furthermore, counsel may elicit testimony

related to paragraphs 31, 34, and portions of 40-the damages deductions based on these
differing assumptions-but counsel may not elicit non-technical argument from Dr. McCarthy.

It falls upon counsel to prove the facts underlying the case, and the jurors may then adopt
calculations provided by experts. However, counsel may not cloak their arguments as to the
existence of certain facts in the authority of an expert. Consequently, paragraph 30, 32, 33, 36,
and any paragraphs referencing them, are stricken. Dr. McCarthy may not testify in accordance
with the contents of those paragraphs.
The Court reserves ruling on whether Dr. McCarthy is qualified to testify as to the matters

in his expert report.
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VI.

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

A. Court's decision to preclude labeling Saint Alphonsus's dissociation "rightful"
This Court will not revisit its decision.

This Court will instruct the jury that Saint

Alphonsus's dissociation from the partnership, standing alone, is not a basis for an award of
damages to MRIA.

Saint Alphonsus prevailed on this issue on appeal, and this Court

subsequently ruled that Saint Alphonsus's mere act of dissociation standing alone could not form
a basis of liability. Consequently, there is no issue of rightful or wrongful dissociation in this
case. The Court will not allow the reintroduction of the issue by allowing the use of these terms
by either counsel. The Court will follow the law of the case as spelled out by the Supreme Court
and this Court's order on the issue and not allow any comment on the propriety of Saint
Alphonsus's dissociation from MRIA.
The motion to reconsider as to the use of the word ''rightful" is hereby DENIED.
B. Redaction ofthe Shattuck Hammond Memo
As to the first paragraph, the Court erred. The words "there may be a" were inadvertently
stricken. They should not be stricken from the trial exhibit because the sentence makes no sense
without them and they could potentially confuse the jury.
The Court will only make one further redaction: the words ''by counsel" will be removed
from the Shattuck Hammond memo. The Court believes the words indicate that attorneys for
Saint Alphonsus made a legal determination when in fact it may have been nothing more than a
practical "heads up," so to speak. Use of the term ''by counsel," in this Court's view, unfairly
indicates that the attorneys told Saint Alphonsus that their actions were somehow illegal.
As to the further requested redactions, the Court believes there is nothing unfairly
prejudicial about the content of the Shattuck Hammond Memo as redacted. Consequently, the
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Court will not have anything further redacted from the Shattuck Hammond Memo.
SO ORDERED AND DATED

thistr~ay of August, 2011.
-~

~
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's opinion, reversing a judgment for MRIA of$36.3 million,
significantly reduced the damages that MRIA might be entitled to recover in this case. Despite
this, MRIA has disclosed theories for the retrial that dramatically increase-to more than $75
million-the damages sought. MRIA accomplishes this more than doubling of its claimed
damages in two ways. First, MRIA improperly invokes two completely new legal theories"usurpation of the opportunity to partner with GSR and [IMI] at the time IMI was formed" and
"disgorgement" ofiMI profits received by Saint Alphonsus between 2005 and 2015-that were
not presented at the first trial, are in no way justified by any intervening ruling of the Supreme
Court or this Court, and (in the case of disgorgement) were belatedly disclosed months after the
deadline for expert disclosures. Second, MRIA ignores the limitations placed by the Supreme
Court and this Court on MRIA's ability to recover for Saint Alphonsus's rightful dissociation
and its lawful competition against MRIA after April 1, 2005. For these reasons and others set
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forth below, the Court should preclude MRIA from asserting damages claims for disgorgement,
for the usurpation of the opportunity to partner with GSR and IMI "at the time IMI was formed,"
and for scans lost to IMI after Aprill, 2005. 1

BACKGROUND
MRIA 's Original Damages Theories -

Prior to the first trial, MRIA' s expert Bruce

Budge disclosed four alternative estimates of the profits that MRIA allegedly lost through 2006
to three separate IMI facilities (downtown, Meridian, and on-campus). See 2007 Budge Report
(Gjording Aff. Ex. A) at 6 fig. 1 (Calculation Methods 1 and 2); id at 13 n.5 (Calculation
Method 3); id. at 17 n.lO (Calculation Method 4). All four ofBudge's models purported to
identify which subset of the scans performed at the IMI facilities would have instead been
performed by MRIA absent the alleged misconduct by Saint Alphonsus. 2 The models differed
only in the date on which damages began (1999 vs. 2001) and the methodology by which Budge
measured the scans allegedly lost to IMI's Meridian location ("all" Meridian scans vs.
"affiliated" Meridian scans). See id at 6, 13 n.5, 17 n.lO. Budge's lost profits estimates ranged
from approximately $13 million (damages from 2001 to 2006 using the "affiliated" scans model
1

Saint Alphonsus files this motion at this time because it depends substantially on material contained in
MRIA's rebuttal expert reports, submitted on July 29,2011, and on the recent deposition testimony ofMRIA's
expert witnesses, who were deposed on August 9 and ll (i.e., after the August 5 motions hearing). Saint Alphonsus
respectfully requests that the motion be heard during trial prior to the testimony ofMRIA's damages experts.
2
Specifically, Budge counted as "lost" all of the scans performed by IMI at its on-campus facility, on the
theory that the partnership agreement prohibited Saint Alphonsus from competing against MRIA there and
"[t]herefore IMI should not have performed any scans on the SARMC campus." !d. at 12. Budge also counted as
"lost" those scans sent to IMI's downtown facility by Saint Alphonsus-affiliated physicians and physicians who had
prior relationships with MRI Center, on the theory that those physicians "would have continued to refer patients to
MRl Center rather than to MRI downtown." !d. at 14. For scans performed at IMI's Meridian facility, Budge
calculated damages under both an "all scans" and an "affiliated scans" approach, on the theory that Saint Alphonsus
should have "assisted MRIA [rather than IMI] in establishing [a] Meridian location." I d. at 13 & n.5, 17 & n.IO.
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for IMI Meridian) to approximately $21 million (damages from 1999 to 2006 using the "all"
scans model for IMI Meridian). See id.
MRIA's second expert, Charles Wilhoite, used Budge's 2006 figures as a starting point
for four alternative estimates of the future profits that MRIA would lose to the three IMI
facilities beginning in 2007. See 2007 Wilhoite Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. B) at 13. Like
Budge's alternatives, Wilhoite's models were very similar to one another, differing only in the
date on which damages ended (2015 vs. 2023) and the methodology used to measure future scan
loses to IMI's Meridian facility ("all" Meridian scans vs. "affiliated" Meridian scans). See id. at
14 table 9. Wilhoite's estimate oflost future profits (as discounted to present value) ranged from
approximately $15 million (damages from 2007 to 2015 using the "affiliated" scans model for
IMI Meridian) to approximately $33 million (damages from 2007 to 2023 using the "all" scans
model for IMI Meridian). See id.
At trial, MRIA sought and received lost-profit damages for the period 1999 through 2023
using Mr. Budge's "affiliated Meridian" methodology. See 2007 Trial Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. C)
at 2747-48, 2756-60,2860-61. So measured by Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite, MRIA's damages
were approximately $36.3 million. See id. at 2760 ($15.4 million from 1999 to 2006); id. at
2860 ($20.9 million from 2007 to 2023)_3

3
The jury awarded $63.5 million, but this amount was remitted to $36.3 million after the trial court
determined, and MRIA conceded, that the jury had improperly added together MRIA's lost-profits theory and its
alternative ''purchase price" damages theory. See Mem. Decision, Nov. 19,2007, at 9-10. The "purchase price"
theory is no longer in this case, having been held by the Supreme Court to be an improper measure of damages for
any of the claims in this case. See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MR1 Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,
498, 224 P.3d 1068, 1087 (2009).
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The Supreme Court's Decision and this Court's Rulings on Remand- The amount of
damages that MRIA could claim was subsequently limited in several respects by the decision of
the Supreme Court and certain rulings by this Court on remand. Most directly, the Supreme
Court held that MRIA's damages could not extend beyond 2015, and thus reduced by $6 million,
to $30.6 million, the damages allowable under Mr. Budge's "affiliated Meridian" methodology.

See SADC, 148 Idaho at 497,224 P.3d at 1086.
Separately, the Supreme Court rejected MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully
dissociated in violation of an express provision, and this Court then held that Saint Alphonsus
had a legal right to dissociate and therefore "had no duty not to compete after the expiration of
the noncompetition agreement" on Aprill, 2005. Consolidated Order re: Motions in Limine
Heard May 18, 2011, at 3. It follows that Saint Alphonsus cannot be liable for damages resulting
from competition after April1, 2005, although, as this Court recognized, it might be possible for
MRIA to prove damages that "can reasonably [be] attribute[d] to business lost even after that
date arising out of the breach of [Saint Alphonsus's] obligation not to compete prior to that
date." Hr'g Tr., May 18, 2011, at 59 (Gjording Aff. Ex. D).

MRJA 's Revised Damages Theories - On remand, MRIA has repeatedly taken the
position that the retrial should essentially follow the proof and legal rulings of the first trial
except where the Supreme Court's decision requires otherwise. With respect to damages, Saint
Alphonsus moved for a limited reopening of discovery to allow for new expert evaluation of
damages in light of the case's changed posture, including the fact that the Supreme Court had

limited the amount of allowable damages and that Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation had been held
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lawful. See Mot. to Reopen Expert Discovery (Dec. 23, 2010); Reply in Support ofMotion to
Reopen (Feb. 4, 2011). Opposing that motion, MRIA asserted that nothing relevant to damages
had changed, and represented that it had "determined that its prior damages proof was the proof
with which it could and would go to trial." Opp'n to Motion to Reopen at 3 (Feb. 2., 2011).
The Court agreed that the changed posture of the case justified a limited reopening of
damages discovery and gave Saint Alphonsus the right to bring in a new expert for the retrial.

See Order Reopening Discovery and Setting Schedule at 4 (Feb. 15, 2011). On May 2, MRIA
filed supplemental expert reports for Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite. While these new reports
followed the spirit of the Court's ruling in using actual data rather than projections for the period
2007 to 2010 and in recognizing that damages cannot run beyond 2015, the reports constituted a
striking departure from the prior legal rulings and the damages methodology employed at the
first trial in two respects. First, although court rulings since the first trial make clear that Saint
Alphonsus had a right to dissociate and a right to compete with MRIA after April 1, 2005,

nothing in the experts' supplemental reports reflected any acknowledgement of these rulings or
any diminution in the amounts claimed as damages after that date. Second, the supplemental
reports disclosed an entirely new "Calculation Method 5" that claims as damages the profits from

all MRl scans ever performed (and projected to be performed through 2015) by !MI. See 2011
Budge Suppl. Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. E) at 7-8, 15; 2011 Wilhoite Report (Gjording Aff. Ex.
F) at 2, 5. Under this methodology, MRIA seeks $75.8 million in damages-more than two and

a halftimes the $30.6 million in damages awarded for the same period of time at the first trial.
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See 2011 Budge Suppl. Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. E) at 15 fig. 10 ($52.6 million); 2011 Wilhoite
Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. F) at 5 table 5 ($23.2 million). 4

Mr. Budge's supplemental report explains the theory behind his new Calculation
MethodS:
"'MRIA alleges that [Saint Alphonsus], by its wrongful acts,
usurped various partnership opportunities that [Saint Alphonsus]
should have presented to its MRIA partners. One of the usurped
opportunities was the opportunity to partner with GSR radiologists
and Intermountain Medical Imaging LLP ("IMI") at the time IMI
was formed."
2011 Budge Supplemental Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. E) at 5. Until the disclosure ofBudge's
report on May 2, 2011, MRIA had never-not at the first trial, nor in its pleadings on remandasserted damages on the basis that Saint Alphonsus ''usurped [from MRIA] the opportunity to
partner with GSR radiologists and [IMI] at the time IMI was formed."
Further-nearly three months after the May 2 expert disclosure deadline-MRIA
revealed a second new theory of damages never previously claimed in this litigation. In their
Rebuttal Expert Reports dated July 29, 2011, Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite disclosed their
estimates of the amount of profits that Saint Alphonsus has earned (and will earn) from its
participation in the MRI profits ofiMI after April1, 2005. See Budge Rebuttal Report (Gjording
Aff. Ex. G) at 4; Wilhoite Rebuttal Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. H) at 6. At their depositions, Mr.
Budge and Mr. Wilhoite testified that these calculations were made in support of an undisclosed
4

Mr. Wilhoite also offers a second method for calculating future damages that reduces the total claimed
damages for Calculation Method 5 to $70.3 million, still more than double the allowable damages at the first trial.
See 20 II Wilhoite Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. F) at 6 table 6.
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"sixth" method of calculating damages based on disgorgement of Saint Alphonsus' s profits from
IMI's MRI business. See 2011 Wilhoite Dep. Tr. (Gjording Af£ Ex. I) at 42-43 ("I had further
discussions with Mr. Budge [after the May disclosures] and I understood that he had considered
an alternative theory relating to lost profits based on a disgorgement concept."); 2011 Budge
Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 29. Budge even revealed that he had prepared schedules
supporting such a calculation method, but had failed to disclose them to Saint Alphonsus until
doing so at his deposition on August 11,2011. See Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 2531; excerpts from Budge Dep. Ex. 4 (Gjording Aff. Ex. M) (Budge's .6 series of schedules).
ARGUMENT
The Court should preclude MRIA from offering expert testimony or other evidence in
support of damages in three discrete respects.

First, MRIA should be precluded from seeking damages arising out the alleged
"usurpation of the opportunity to partner with GSR ... at the time IMI was formed" because that
new claim is beyond the scope of the matters at issue on retrial and is in any event time barred.

Second, MRIA may not pursue an "entirely different" theory seeking disgorgement of
Saint Alphonsus's profits from IMI's MRI business for three reasons: (i) that new claim is
beyond the scope of the matters at issue on retrial; (ii) it was improperly disclosed after the
expert disclosure deadline; and (iii) it improperly seeks damages arising solely out of Saint
Alphonsus's lawful post-dissociation conduct.

Third, MRIA' s experts should be precluded from offering their estimates of the damages
allegedly suffered after April 1, 2005, when Saint Alphonsus was entitled to begin competing
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with MRIA. While this Court has stated that MRIA may argue for recovery of damages
"reasonably attribut[able] to business lost ... after [April 1, 2005]" if such damages are shown to
"aris[e] out of the breach of that obligation not to compete prior to that date," Hr'g Tr., May 18,
2011, at 59 (Gjording Aff. Ex. D), MRIA's experts concede that their estimates ofpost-2005
damages are not limited in that way.

I.

MRIA Should Be Precluded From Claiming Damages for Usurpation of the
Opportunity to Partner with GSR at the Time IMI Was Formed
MRIA's new claim that Saint Alphonsus usurped from MRIA "the opportunity to partner

with GSR radiologists and [IMI] at the time IMI was formed," such that MRIA is entitled to
claim "all ofiMI's scans" as lost profits (Budge Suppl. Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. E) at 5),
should be excluded for two separate reasons.
A.

First, this damages claim is beyond the scope of the issues on retrial. At the first

trial, MRIA never pursued any claim for damages arising out of this alleged usurpation or
measured by "all of IMI's scans." To the contrary, all four of the damages models disclosed by
MRIA prior to the first trial measured the scans allegedly lost to IMI' s downtown facility
according to Mr. Budge's "affiliated scans" model. See 2007 Budge Report (Gjording Aff. Ex.
A) at 14. And the sole damages model presented to the jury at the first trial measured scans lost
to both IMI' s downtown facility and IMI' s Meridian facility by the "affiliated scans" model. See
2007 Trial Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. C) at 2747-48, 2756-60, 2860-61. This model resulted in
MRIA claiming approximately one half-a far cry from "all"-ofiMI's total scan volume as
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representing scans (and profits) wrongfully diverted from MRIA. See 2007 Trial Ex. 4517
(Gjording Aff. Ex. K) (MRIA demonstrative showing proportion of scans diverted). 5
MRIA's new usurpation theory of damages grossly expands (to $75.8 million) Saint
Alphonsus's potential liability and injects completely new factual questions into the case, most
notably what the alleged partnership between MRIA and GSR would have looked like. This is
especially prejudicial because Saint Alphonsus has been held bound by certain tactical decisions

(e.g., its evidentiary stipulations) made during the first trial, when the stakes were lower, and is
particularly ironic given that Saint Alphonsus was the prevailing party in a Supreme Court
appeal resulting in limitations on MRIA' s potential damages in the retrial. Simply put, having
told the Court and Saint Alphonsus that "its prior damages proof was the proof with which it
could and would go to trial," MRIA Opp'n to Motion to Reopen at 3 (Feb. 2., 2011), and having
persuaded the Court that, by and large, "the previous proceedings stand," Consolidated Order re
Motions Heard Aug. 5, 2011, MRIA should not now be permitted to inject a completely new
theory of damages that seeks in excess of$75 million-more than two and a halftimes the $30.6
million in damages awarded for the same period of time at the first trial.
B.

In any event, MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus usurped an opportunity to

partner with GSR "at the time IMI was formed" (2011 Budge Suppl. Rep. (Gjording Aff. Ex. E)
5

MRIA's new usurpation theory is entirely distinct from the claim advanced previously that, several years
after IMI opened, Saint Alphonsus co-opted from MRIA the opportunity to expand into Meridian. See 2007 Budge
Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. A) at 13 ("MRIA alleges that ... SARMC should not have facilitated or supported IMI's
expansion into Meridian [in 2002]. Rather, MRIA contends that this partnership opportunity should have been
presented to MRIA."); 2011 Budge SuppL Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. E) at 9 (employing "the same method
discussed in my Original report" for this lost Meridian opportunity). This motion is nol directed at MRIA's
"Meridian usurpation" claim.
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at 5) is time barred. This is so even on the assumption that the claim relates back to MRIA's
earliest pleading in this case. IMI "was formed" no later than September 1999 when it opened its
doors for business. See 2007 Trial Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. C) at 1488. Moreover, by MRIA's
own account, MRIA knew of the alleged loss of its opportunity to partner with GSR no later than
December 1999. Specifically, MRIA's Dr. Prochaska testified at the first trial that "after ...
December [1999] ... there was no point discussing doing a deal with the [GSR] radiologists.
Everything shifted to Saint Al' s buying us out ... and then doing whatever they wanted with
their radiologists. We were no longer negotiating with the radiologists .... It was history, and
we knew it after the December meeting .... " 2007 Trial Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. C) at 4233-34.
A claim for the usurpation or co-opting of a partnership opportunity is a claim for breach
of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228,233, 61 P.3d 585, 590 (2002).
The statute of limitations for fiduciary duty claims is four years. See I. C. § 5-224; Jones v.
Kootenai County Title Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 607,614, 873 P.2d 861, 868 (1994). This means that
MRIA' s claim that Saint Alphonsus usurped from MRIA an opportunity to partner with GSR "at
the time IMI was formed" in September 1999 had to be filed no later than four years after the
alleged usurpation occurred, i.e., by September 2003.
But MRIA did not file its original counterclaim against Saint Alphonsus until more than a
year after that, on May 20, 2005. See Answer & Countercl. This was nearly six years after "IMI
was formed" and more than five years after MRIA "knew" that any opportunity to partner with
the GSR rddiologists "was history." 2007 Trial Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. C) at 4233-34. The
usurpation claim thus has been time barred since before this lawsuit began, which may explain
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why MRlA did not include this claim in its original counterclaim and did not pursue it at the first
trial. Accordingly, MRIA may not pursue that claim here.

II.

MRIA Should Be Precluded From Seeking Disgorgement of Saint Alphonsus's MRI
Profits
MRIA's new claim for disgorgement of the profits that Saint Alphonsus earned after it

joined as a partner in IMI's MRI business should be excluded for three separate and independent
reasons.

First, like MRIA's new claim for usurpation, MRIA's new disgorgement claim is beyond
the scope of the issues on retrial. MRIA never mentioned disgorgement at the first trial, and
disgorgement was not included in the 2007 reports of MRIA' s damages experts. See 2007
Budge Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. A); 2007 Wilhoite Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. B). Indeed, as
Mr. Budge stated at his recent deposition, as compared to his other damages theories,
disgorgement "has an entirely different premise, and it's [an] entirely different measurement and
an entirely different remedy." Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 30. Moreover, MRIA
never mentioned this "entirely different remedy" in its pleadings in this case, even after the Court
on remand gave MRIA an opportunity to file an amended counterclaim. See 3d Am. Countercl.
(failing to mention disgorgement either in the allegations or as part ofthe relief requested). This
Court recently held that the assertion of a new claim by Saint Alphonsus "would be unduly
prejudicial because it was not pled." Consolidated Order re: Motions Heard August 5, 2011, at 1
(Aug. 23, 2011). Certainly the same is true ofMRIA's eve-of-trial effort to seek disgorgement.
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Second, MRIA's new claim for disgorgement should be excluded because it was
belatedly disclosed after the May 2 deadline for MRIA's expert disclosures-inexplicably so,
given that Mr. Budge had prepared, but did not include, schedules to his supplemental report
purporting to show the measure of the disgorgement remedy. See Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff.
Ex. J) at 25-26 ("I'm somewhat mystified by this because I think that there should be a 2.6 and a
3.6 Well, there's a possibility this was not produced ... in the report."); excerpts from Budge
Dep. Ex. 4 (Gjording AfT. Ex. M) (Budge's .6 series of schedules produced for first time at his
deposition). This late disclosure is not only "mystif[ying]," Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex.
J) at 25-26, it is inherently prejudicial because it carne after the submission of Saint Alphonsus's

own expert reports and too late for Saint Alphonsus to properly prepare to defend against it at
trial. Exclusion is an appropriate remedy for this late disclosure. See, e.g., City ofMcCall v.
Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 586, 130 P.3d 1118, 1124 (2006); Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal Co.,
136 Idaho 648, 652, 39 P.3d 588, 592 (2001).
Third, as a matter of law, MRIA is not entitled to the disgorgement remedy it seeks
because the entirety of that remedy is directed at profits earned by Saint Alphonsus after April1,
2005, i.e., after Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation and the expiration one year later of all noncompete obligations. Indeed, Mr. Budge explained at his deposition that he began calculations
for the disgorgement remedy "after April 1, 2005," "[b]ecause of [his] understanding that [Saint
Alphonsus] did not have any interest in IMI's net income prior to that date." Budge Dep. Tr.
(Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 35.
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Where applicable, disgorgement is an equitable remedy directed not at compensating a
plaintiff for its losses, but rather at depriving the defendant of gains attributable to wrongdoing.

See generally SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 116-20 (2d Cir. 2006). 6 It has already been
established, however, that Saint Alphonsus had every right to join IMI and compete with MRIA
after April 1, 2005. Thus, profits earned by Saint Alphonsus after April1, 2005, are not illgotten gains. They are the result of lawful conduct and cannot properly be subject to
disgorgement. Similarly, because disgorgement bears no relationship to MRIA's actual
damages, see id, MRIA's effort to seek disgorgement cannot be justified by the Court's ruling
that MRIA may try to prove "damages" suffered after April 1, 2005, "arising out of' misconduct
occurring before that date. Hr'g Tr., May 18,2011, at 59 (Gjording Aff. Ex. D).

III.

MRIA Should Be Precluded From Seeking Damages Suffered After April!, 2005
It has now been established that Saint Alphonsus rightfully dissociated on April1, 2004,

and committed no wrong by simply competing with MRIA after April1, 2005, when all noncompete obligations expired. These legal rulings have a significant impact on the "lost profits"
damages recoverable in this case. Specifically, the rulings mean that MRIA can no longer
claim-as it did at the first trial-that all scans allegedly diverted by Saint Alphonsus from

6

It is unclear whether Idaho law recognizes disgorgement as an available remedy in this sort of case and, if
so, whether the matter would have to be tried to the bench rather than the jury. See id. (emphasizing equitable
nature of remedy). Certainly, permitting a disgorgement remedy would be in tension, if not outright conflict, with
the Supreme Court's instruction that this case is to be governed by Pope, which holds that a plaintiff's recovery
must be measured by the plaintif-fs proven losses, not by the defendant's gain. See SADC, 148 Idaho at 498, 224
P.3d at 1087; Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217,234,646 P.2d 988, 1005 (1982). There is no need for
the Court to grapple with these difficult issues at this time, however, since MRIA may not assert its claim for
disgorgement for the reasons set forth herein.
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MRIA to IMI after that day "count" as lost scans for damages purposes. Rather, as this Court
recognized at a prior hearing, for the period after April 1, 2005, the MRIA entities may recover
for injuries suffered after April 1, 2005, only by proving that such injuries are "reasonably
attribute[able] to" Saint Alphonsus' s "breach of [its] obligation not to compete prior to that
date." Hearing Tr., May 18,2011, at 59 (Gjording Aff. Ex. D). 7
But MRIA's experts have not even tried to determine which, if any, business losses
occurring after April 1, 2005, are attributable to misconduct occurring before that date. Instead,
without any alteration to their methodologies, these experts claim the same--or greaterquantities of lost scans for the time period 2005 to 2015 as at the first trial. They do this because,
as Mr. Budge conceded at his deposition, his damages calculations are designed to measure the
business lost by MRIA as a result of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation and entering into postdissociation competition with MRIA. See Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 84-86. Yet
we know now that Saint Alphonsus had a right to dissociate when it did and to enter into legal
competition when its non-compete obligations expired.
Mr. Budge further conceded that if Saint Alphonsus were assumed to have rightfully
dissociated--as this Court has ruled as a matter oflaw that it did-then he would have had to
calculate damages suffered after April 1, 2005, by analyzing "the effects of the wrongful conduct

7

This limitation on MRJA's ability to claim post-dissociation damages is plainly correct. See, e.g., Hite v.
Biomet, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1025-26 (N.D. Ind. 1999) ("[c]ommon sense dictates that a valid [termination]
subsequent to a[n improper] act cuts off ... liability"); All Line Inc. v. Rabar Crop., 919 F.2d 475, 480 (7th Cir.
1990); Porous Media Corp. v. Midland Brake, Inc., 220 F.3d 954, 961-62 (8th Cir. 2000); Osborn v. Commanche
Cattle Indus., Inc., 545 P.2d 827, 831 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975); Buckley v. Coe, 385 S.W.2d 354, 359 (Mo. Ct. App.
1964).
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... through the tail period where that wrongful behavior finishes manifesting itself." Id at 86.
On that premise, Mr. Budge would have recognized a rapid decrease in MRIA's scans caused by
the lawful severing of the relationship between Saint Alphonsus and MRIA, with MRIA's "but
for" scan volume ultimately converging, after just a handful of years, with MRIA's real-world
scan volume, thus ending the damages period. See id at 88-93. At his deposition, Mr. Budge
illustrated this concept by modifying one of his own charts to show how MRIA's "but for" scan
volume (i.e., the scans claimed as "lost" for damages purposes) would sharply decline if one
assumes that Saint Alphonsus rightfully dissociated and began competing with MRIA after April
1, 2005. See Budge Dep. Ex. 1, at 13 (Gjording Aff. Ex. L). This chart as it was actually

modified by Mr. Budge is shown below, with the shaded area conceptually representing the very
limited damages to which MRIA might be entitled under the proper analysis:
Chart 2

Actual and But-for MRIC Scan Volume
14,000
12,000

lMIOpens
But-for Scan Volume

10,000
S,OOO

6,000
4,000

Actual MRIC Scan Volume

2,000
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The tailing off of damages represented by Mr. Budge's revised but-for line is precisely the sort
of analysis envisioned by this Court's statement that the MRIA entities may seek to prove
damages "that they can reasonably attribute to business lost even after that date arising out of the
breach of [Saint Alphonsus' s] obligation not to compete prior to that date." Hearing Tr., May
18, 2011, at 59 (Gjording Aff. Ex. D). Yet Mr. Budge admitted at his deposition that the
damages figures in his report do not reflect such an analysis and that he had "not" performed
such an analysis. Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 88. And MRIA's second expert,
Charles Wilhoite, admitted that he used Mr. Budge's grossly inflated 2010 estimates as his own
starting point for estimating future damages, see Wilhoite Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. I) at 2223, thus making his analysis equally deficient. In other words, rather than reduce damages
through this "tail period," MRIA' s experts simply continued to grow them, as if Saint Alphonsus
never exercised its right to dissociate, and as if the rulings that Saint Alphonsus had a right to
dissociate never happened. This utter failure to perform the required analysis-an analysis that
is "too complicated" for Mr. Budge himself to do on the spot, Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex.
J) at 90, and hence too complicated for a jury to perform based solely on the information

provided-requires that the Court preclude MRIA from presenting its experts' estimates of
damages after April 1, 2005.
While Mr. Budge's failure to adjust damages "through the tail period where th[e]
wrongful behavior finishes manifesting itself' (Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J) at 86)
completely undermines his entire calculation of damages for the period after April 1, 2005, this
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failure is most egregious with respect to MRIA' s claims for damages based on scans lost to
IMI's on-campus and Eagle facilities, both of which only came into existence after Aprill, 2005.
Specifically, when Mr. Budge estimated damages in 2007 for scans allegedly lost to
IMI's on-campus facility, which opened after April1, 2005, he explained that Saint Alphonsus
"was prohibited from competing with or supporting competition against MRIA in the provision
ofMRI scans on the SARMC campus"; that IMI therefore "should not have performed any MRI
scans on the SARMC campus"; and that "MRIA has therefore lost scan volume on the SARMC
campus equal to the number of scans performed by IMI on the SARMC campus." 2007 Budge
Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. A) at 12. Mr. Budge's 2011 analysis relies on the same premise of
continuing illegal competition after April1, 2005. See 2011 Budge Suppl. Report (Gjording Aff.
Ex E) at 9 (calculating scans and profits lost to IMI's operations on the SARMC campus "using
the same method discussed in my Original report"). But that premise is now incorrect as a
matter of law: Saint Alphonsus had every right in 2005 to replace MRIA with IMI as the
provider ofMRI services on the hospital campus. And Mr. Budge offers no alternative
explanation how damages arising out of that replacement "can reasonably [be] attribute[d)" to
Saint Alphonsus's alleged "breach ofth[e] obligation not to compete prior to" April1, 2005.
Hearing Tr., May 18,2011, at 59 (Gjording Aff. Ex. D).
So, too, for IMI' s Eagle facility, which opened after the first trial, in October 2007.
MRIA contends that Saint Alphonsus "should not have facilitated or supported IMI's expansion
into Eagle, Idaho," and thereby "usurped" from MRIA the opportunity to expand into Eagle.
2011 Budge Suppl. Report (Gjording Aff. Ex. E) at 10. But Mr. Budge conceded at his
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deposition that his calculations "assume[] that the opportunity in terms of this diversion didn't
happen until actually IMI opened its doors" there in 2007. Budge Dep. Tr. (Gjording Aff. Ex. J)
at 132. Here, too, Mr. Budge simply ignores the ruling that by 2007 Saint Alphonsus had the
right to facilitate IMI's entry into Eagle, and makes no effort to calculate what portion (if any) of
the business allegedly lost to IMI's Eagle facility is traceable to misconduct occurring prior to
April I, 2005.
In sum, MRIA was given the opportunity to submit expert opinion estimating damages
after April 1, 2005, that were caused by alleged misconduct occurring prior to that date, and
completely failed to do so. Instead, MRIA has submitted expert estimates that do no more than
calculate damages arising from the fact of competition after April 1, 2005. Since that
competition was entirely lawful, the estimates ofMRIA's experts for damages after April1,
2005, must be excluded.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should preclude MRIA from presenting any claim
for or expert testimony concerning (i) usurpation ofMRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR in
IMI at the time IMI was formed; (ii) disgorgement of Saint Alphonsus's post-Apri11, 2005,
MRI-related profits; and (iii) scans and profits allegedly lost to IMI after Aprill, 2005.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 2nd day of September 2011.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
Some three weeks into trial, during which multiple witnesses have testified about their
own prior acts and statements, MRIA now asserts that a particular witness-Cindy Schampmust be prevented from giving live, in-person testimony about events that took place in this case,
under the remarkable assertion that her live, in-court testimony subject to cross-examination is
"hearsay." MRIA's motion has no basis and should be denied.

ARGUMENT
I.

IN-COURT TESTIMONY SUBJECT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION IS NOT
HEARSAY
MRIA asserts that if Cindy Schamp testifies live and in court about what she said to Dr.

Curran in the past, that Ms. Schamp's live, in-court testimony is a "prior statement by the
witness" subject to a hearsay analysis. Mem. at 3. This is baseless. Cindy Schamp's live, inperson testimony about what she said to Dr. Curran, derived from her own contemporaneous
memories of the events, is a statement made under oath and subject to cross-examination. It is,
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by definition, not a "hearsay" statement. See Idaho R. Evid. SOl(c) ("'Hearsay' is a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered into evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted."); accord, e.g., State v. Smith, 916 P.2d 773, 777 (Mont.
1996) (holding that where the witness "himself was the declarant ... with regard to his own
statements and he was testifying at trial as to those statements'' those statements "did not come
within the definition of hearsay contained in Rule 801(c)."); United States v. Bellomo, 176 F.3d
580, 587 (2d Cir. 1999) (party's "testifying to what he himself had said" is not hearsay); United
States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 518 (4th Cir. 1995) (a witness ''testifying in court as to what he had

said on another occasion" is "not hearsay."); Atwell v. State, 667 S.E.2d 442, 445 (Ga. App.
2008) ("A witness's testimony as to what he (the witness) said is not hearsay") (internal
punctuation marks omitted); State v. Marecek, 568 S.E.2d 237, 252 (N.C. App. 2002) ("Because
Kirk was testifying to her own statements, these statements were not hearsay statements" under
Rule 801(c)).
MRIA's argument that live, in-court testimony about prior events are "prior statements"
is premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of what a "prior statement" is under the hearsay
rule: namely, the attempt to introduce direct evidence of prior statements in lieu oflive, in-court
testimony by the same witness. Thus, in the primary case cited by MRIA in its brief, State v.
Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 223-24, 207 P.3d 186, 199-200 (Idaho App. 2009), the question was

whether a DVD recording of the defendant's statements during a police interrogation could be
published to the jury in order to place into context other portions of the DVD that the State had
used as non-hearsay admissions of a party-opponent. And while the Court found that use of the
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DVD was, standing alone, inadmissible hearsay, it noted that exclusion of the DVD would have
been permissible even if otherwise admissible because Parmer himself testified live at trial and
could have offered in-court testimony about what he had previously said. 1 147 Idaho 224, 207
P.3d 200. Parmer itself therefore demonstrates the fundamental error in MRIA's argument.
Here, Cindy Schamp is not intending to offer as evidence some prior recorded or written
statement she made sometime in the past recounting conversations with Dr. Curran. Ms. Schamp
is going to testify, live, in-court, and subject to cross-examination, as to her memories of what
she said and did, with respect to Dr. Curran and others. The jury can assess her demeanor while
recounting these memories, and MRIA will be able to cross-examine her as to her recollection.

1

The other Idaho authorities cited by MRIA are no different. In State v Gerardo, 205
P.3d 671 (Idaho App. 2009), at issue was the admissibility of a statement made by a Mr.
Gonzales about defendant Gerardo immediately following Mr. Gonzales's arrest. There was no
issue of whether Gonzales could have testified live, from his memory, about what he had said to
police. Likewise, in State v. Chacon, 186 P.3d 670 (Idaho App. 2008), at issue was the
admissibility of a written note regarding the defendant, and not any issue of live, in-court
testimony. And in State v. Yeates, 732 P.2d 346 (Idaho App. 1987), the issue was whether Mr.
Hill's statement to police implicating Mr. Yeates could be admissible; again, the Court noted that
the prior statement would be inadmissible but that there was no "impelling need for Hill's
statement in Yeates' trial because, presumably, Hill would be available to testify." ld. at 354.
The other cases cited by MRIA again demonstrate the error in MRIA' s argument. In
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973), the Court noted that a hearsay exception
applied to witness testimony about a declarant's prior statements, but held that the alleged
declarant himself could testify about his own alleged prior statements because he "was present in
the courtroom and was under oath. He could have been cross-examined by the State, and his
demeanor and responses weighed by the jury." !d. at 300-301. And in Pierre-Charles v. State,
2011 WL 1376969 (Fla. App. 2001), the issue was whether a videotape of a witness nodding his
head, to indicate that his brother committed a murder, would be admissible. The Court did not
hold that the witnesses' live testimony about what he had said were inadmissible; in fact, the
Court noted that because the witness "admitted nodding his head" during his live testimony, it
precluded even the use of the videotape as impeachment. See id at *3-4.
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Such live testimony, subject to cross, is not hearsay; indeed, it is the very opposite of hearsay.
MRIA' s motion should be denied.

II.

IN ALL EVENTS, TESTIMONY ABOUT SCHAMP'S CONVERSATIONS WITH
CURRAN WERE ADMITTED AT THE FIRST TRIAL, WERE NOT OBJECTED
TO OR APPEALED, AND REMAIN ADMISSWLE NOW.
Finally, MRIA's attempt to preclude Ms. Schamp from testifying about "disclosures" to

Dr. Curran should be denied for an even simpler reason: Cindy Schamp was permitted to testify
about her conversations with Dr. Curran during the first trial, either via deposition transcripts
introduced by MRIA itself or otherwise, either without objection or over MRIA's objection. 2 The
admission of that testimony was not appealed, and thus its admissibility remains law-of-the-case.
Indeed, of the three deposition excerpts MRIA purports as "examples" of potential testimony to
be excluded (Mot. at 2), one was affirmatively introduced by MRIA during its case-in-chief, 3
and another was counter-designated by Saint Alphonsus without objection and published to the
jury.

4

This testimony was introduced last time, and MRIA-having either failed to object or

appeal from lost objections-cannot move to exclude the testimony now.

2

See, e.g., 2007 Trial Tr. at 2271, 2299, 2302, 2331, 2237-38, 2342, 3419-23.

3

See 2007 Trial Tr. at 2299 ("I believe in early 2000 it's fair to say we were still
noodling between myself and Dr. Curran and everybody else when I was back from maternity
leave on whether there was still any way to salvage some way to get everybody to be okay with a
relationship that respected all the parties. That's what I believe.")
4

See 2007 Trial Tr. at 2331 ("I remember communicating or being present at
communications with Dr. Curran and members of Doctor's Corp. during the period of time that
Price, Waterhouse, Coopers was around.")
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CONCLUSION
For any or all of the independent reasons cited above, the Court should deny MRIA's
motion in limine.

DATED this 23rd day of September. 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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I

ORDER RE: MOTION TO EXCLUDE
DAMAGES THEORIES

Presently before the Court is a motion made by Saint Alphonsus to exclude several
damages theories from this case. The motion was filed on September 2, 2011, and the Court
heard argument on September 21, 2011. Following hearing, the Court took this matter under
advisement.

BACKGROUND
Because a great deal of this motion deals with the scope of the proceedings on remand,
the Court believes that a detailed review of the proceedings following remand is necessary to
give context to the Court's rulings and the parties' respective positions.
The issues remaining in the case initially arose from MRIA's First Answer and
Counterclaim filed on May 20, 2005.

MRIA, which, at the time, was the only defendant-

counterclaimant in the action, identified MRI Center of Idaho and MRI Mobile as two operating
entities in which MRIA was a general partner with management responsibilities. (First Answer
and Counterclaim, at p. 6). This counterclaim provides a history, from MRIA's standpoint of
MIRA and the two operating entities and the involvement of Saint Alphonsus and the SARG
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group (which later became Gem State Radiology). The counterclaim specifically asserted that
Saint Alphonsus was " ... compromising MRIA's efforts to grow its business and/or compete
with IMI ... ,"listing several specific alleged acts. !d. at p. 12.
In its third claim for relief asserted in the first counterclaim, MRIA asserted Saint

Alphonsus had violated fiduciary duties of loyalty and care set forth in Idaho Code section 53-3404. !d. at p. 15. It further asserted that "as a result of these breaches of fiduciary duties, MRIA
has been damaged in an amount to be proved at trial." !d. at p. 15. MRIA also alleged damages
arising from wrongful dissociation under Idaho Code section 53-3-602(b)(1)-(2). In the earlier
proceeding, the presiding trial judge ruled that, as a matter of law, Saint Alphonsus had
wrongfully dissociated by violating an express term of the partnership agreement. This ruling
was overturned on appeal by the Supreme Court, and the case was remanded for further
proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI

Associates LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 224 P.3d 1068 (2009).
Once remanded, and following the disqualification of the original trial judge, this Court
held a hearing on February 17, 2010, to establish the procedures governing this case on remand.
At that hearing the Court reviewed with the parties the Supreme Court ruling and what matters it
believed were decided and which issues it believed were still at issue. At that hearing, the Court
gave the parties the opportunity to comment on the Court's summary and understanding of the
case and to address what issues they believed were still present in the case.
During the comment period, it became apparent that there was still substantial
disagreement between the parties as to several issues. As to the issue of damages, counsel for
Saint Alphonsus, Mr. Ayer stated that in light ofthe Supreme Court decision and its reference to

Pope, that the damages issue might need to be readdressed, stating: "And the only thing I can say
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•
about that is that could all be short-circuited if Mr. Banducci were to decide without us bringing
a motion that he is going to present new and different somewhat modified expert testimony." Tr.
ofhrg. held Feb. 17, 2010, at p. 12, 11. 17-22. Mr. Ayer added that ifMRIA came forward with a
similar damages calculation, that Saint Alphonsus would bring a motion that MRIA' s damage
theory was inadequate under Pope. " ... and if it's inadequate, then MRIA I think would have
the choice of either seeking leave to present new damage evidence or the case would be over
because they don't have a viable damage theory." !d. at p. 13, 11. 6-9. Mr. Ayer also noted that
removal of the wrongful dissociation theory would"... trigger the need without doubt for ...
new expert discovery in this case on the issue of damages . . . . Then I think he would need a
new report. We would definitely want to put in expert testimony in response to his damage
theory .... " !d. at p. 13, 11. 13-19.
Mr. Banducci, on behalf of MRIA, addressed the matter of damages and the Supreme
Court's reference to Pope, stating: "I think the Court should pay attention to Pope, but I think the
Court should pay attention to all of the cases that exist relative to damages analysis and damage
calculations. That's an example." (Tr. ofhrg., Feb. 17,2010, at p. 28, 11. 13-17). Mr. Banducci
further stated " ... I don't believe that we are going to be substantially changing any of our
theories. I think that the evidence to prove our damages is in the record.... They want me to
conduct more discovery. They want me to file new expert reports ..." !d. at p. 18 11. 24-25; p.
19 11. 1-7.

In resisting Saint Alphonsus's position that discovery should be reopened, Mr.

Banducci stated:" ... we do not intend to add new claims. We do not intend to omit claims. We
intend to go on the theories that we ultimately submitted ...." /d. at p. 23. Mr. Banducci also
stated "we withdrew a significant number of ... claims before it was submitted to the jury. We
wouldn't go back to them." Id. at p. 24, 11. 6-9.
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Following argument and comments from the parties, the Court defined the procedure for
initiating the proceedings of the second trial. The Court allowed MRIA to file an amended
counterclaim and Saint Alphonsus to file a new answer to clearly establish those matters the
parties felt were at issue. !d. at pp. 27-29. The Court stated: " ... the plaintiff has the right to
define at least in his initial filing what ... causes of action he is going to assert and the defendant
has the right to raise in their answer any defenses that they feel are appropriate." !d. at p. 28 ll. 824. The Court allowed the parties to file any dispositive motions so the Court could address the
newly asserted claims and defenses. The Court also stated, as to damages, that in its view, the
Supreme Court opinion opened up the area of damages saying there needed to be more work
done upon retrial in this area. !d. at p. 19ll. 17-25; p. 20 ll. 1-25.
MRIA filed its Third Amended Counterclaim on March 22, 2010. In this pleading, it
alleged that Saint Alphonsus dissociated before the expiration of the definite term of the MRIA
agreement. (Third Amended Counterclaim, at p. 23). It further asserted that Saint Alphonsus
had "breached [its] fiduciary duties by competing with MRIA, [and] by co-opting partnership
opportunities .... " !d. Following that filing, on November 16, 2010, the Court ruled that Saint
Alphonsus had not dissociated in violation of the RUP A.
On February 9, 2011, the Court held a lengthy hearing on whether Saint Alphonsus
should be allowed to reopen discovery in the case on the issue of damages in light of the
Supreme Court's decision and this Court's ruling allowing the MRI entities to file a Third
Amended Counterclaim. MRIA opposed the motion. At this hearing, the parties again rehashed
the issue of whether the issue of damages was reopened by the Supreme Court's decision,
commenting on the damages issues the parties saw in the case, and the parties' perceptions on the
changed posture of the case.
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In resisting the

r~opening

of damages discovery, Mr. Banducci pointed out that the MRI

entities' position on damage calculations had assumed two start dates: the end of 1999, when IMI
was opened as well as the July 2001 date when Saint Alphonsus entered into its partnership
agreement with IMI. He also stated that the damages calculations assumed two end dates: the
end date of2015, the end date of the unmodified Center partnership agreement and 2023, the end
date of the allegedly modified Center partnership agreement. Tr. ofhrg. Feb. 9, 2011, at pp. 2-3.
Mr. Vergonis, for Saint Alphonsus, argued that the Court's rulings on certain motions

filed following the filing of the Third Amended Counterclaim and Answer necessitated further
discovery because the Court ruled that Saint Alphonsus had lawfully dissociated in 2004. The
Court pointed out hat Saint Alphonsus had already had the opportunity to examine the MRIA
experts on the two theories of damages. Mr. Vergonis countered that when the depositions were
taken, however, Judge McLaughlin had already ruled that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully
dissociated, a ruling the Supreme Court found to be in error. /d. at p. 6.
Mr. Vergonis further argued that discovery should be reopened because" ... their entire
lost profits theory is based on the assumption that we were not permitted to compete with them
from the years 1999-2015." Mr. Vergonis also conceded that while Saint Alphonsus would argue
damages continued only through 2004, if damages were available, that Mr. Banducci would be
arguing that they would continue through 2015. /d. at pp. 7-9.
Mr. Vergonis, in arguing to reopen discovery on damages stated:
"Now, I think the parties are very far apart because Mr. Banducci has indicated he
intends to stick with his experts' damage analysis. Apparently he thinks that
they're entitled-that our wrongful conduct prior to 2005 caused all these
damages, and this is tens of millions of dollars, in future damages after 2005. And
we think damages can't be traced that way and that is a very limited damages
period with 1999-2005, which is a few single digits, I think millions of dollars,
even on their assumptions. And maybe some lingering effects that really trail off
going out after 2005. Mr. Banducci's experts grew damages after 2005 .... That,
Order re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories 5
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we think, is not an appropriate damages assessment. Now that we have lawfully
dissociated in 2005 ...." !d. at p. 11.
Later, Mr. Vergonis responded to the Court's question about their expert apparently
testifying based upon a new defense theory of damages that had never been heard in the case that:
''well, again, I think the new theory is based on the new posture of the case. It is a
theory-it is a new theory because we have now been held to have lawfully
dissociated in 2004 and it's a theory premised on that holding.... [W]e can't be
held to the strategic decisions we made under that rubric when everything-and
frankly everything has changed here. . . . And now that we've lawfully
dissociated, we'd like to put in new expert analysis that addresses that critical,
critical fact. ... I think it is really unfair [and] an abuse of discretion ... to allow
MRIA to fix its offensive case to take into account rulings that went against it on
appeal while disallowing Saint Alphonsus the right to change its defensive case
based on the rulings that made the case better for Saint Alphonsus." Id. at pp. 1819.
Further, Mr. Vergonis argued in support of the reopening of damage discovery using the
example ofiMI Center:
"This facility accounts for millions of dollars of their damages based on the
assumption it wasn't allowed to be there. Now, all of a sudden, we've lawfully
dissociated, we've waited a year, we bring the competitor to the hospital, we have
every right to do that. And we need to have a number that says, you know, Mr.
Banduccis's experts rely on this assumption that the hospital couldn't be there and
that amounts to seven or eight or whatever million dollars. Well cross that one
out, because that's wrong. And that gets subtracted from the damages line." !d. at
p. 20 ll. 4-23.
Then, as to the Meridian facility, Mr. Vergonis stated:
" ... then likewise the Meridian and downtown facilities; well they count all the
business that they say IMI took from MRIA from 2005-2015. Well, our experts
would say, no, you don't count all of the business because they had every right to
compete at that time. You look at what happened in 1999-2004, and you phase
that out by some proper or appropriate economic methodology. And then you
come in with a number that is much, much smaller than what they are claiming."
Mr. Banducci argued against reopening damages discovery, calling it a "slippery slope."
Id. at p. 29 ll. 3-4. Specifically, Mr. Banducci argued: "The damages case, as you put it very
succinctly, we're going to put those damages on that we have presented to various courts five
Order re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories 6
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times. This is our measure of damages. This is our lost profits theory. That's our problem." ld.
at p. 28 II. 14-18. Later in argument, Mr. Banducci stated:"... the question remains[:] was this
a breach of something other than the express terms[?] ... As the court knows, there are implied
terms ... so our position is ... there are implied terms ... in the partnership agreement that were
breached when they withdrew." !d. at p. 31 II. 21-25; p. 32, II. 10-13.
Mr. Vergonis, in response to Mr. Banducci's statement that Saint Alphonsus wanted a
mulligan or a do-over, stated: "you gave them a mulligan to add [Center and Mobile, which]
were not ... in the case when it came down from the Supreme Court . . . . And I think you did
that because you realized it's not a game of gotcha, where you're trying to trap parties into
positions they took under different circumstances .... now we have a changed case and we
ought to be allowed, just as they were allowed to add parties, we ought to be allowed to sort of
react to the changed posture of the case." Id. at p. 33, 1. 25; p. 34, 11. 1-19.
Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of Saint Alphonsus, allowing them to reopen
discovery.
Following the reopening of discovery, both MRIA's and Saint Alphonsus's experts filed
reports and were deposed by the opposing parties. Saint Alphonsus now moves for several
damages theories to be precluded because they are beyond the scope of the case and due to
discovery violations.
DISCUSSION
In its motion, Saint Alphonsus seeks to preclude argument and evidence regarding several

things: (1) MRIA's usurpation of partnership opportunity theory; (2) MRIA's disgorgement
theory of damages as it relates to profits made after April 1, 2005; (3) MRIA's diminution in
value theory of damages; and (4) claims of scans and profits lost by MRIA after April 1, 2005.
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In its opposition to the motion MRIA raised the issue of timeliness of Saint Alphonsus's motion.
At the outset, the Court notes that in substance, these motions are motions for summary
judgment-the motions are not evidentiary in nature and are attacking, in large part, the
substance of MRIA's damages theories.

Consequently, the Court believes the motion is

untimely, but in an excess of caution and to give guidance to the parties, the Court will address
the merits of the motions.

I. Usurpation of a Partnership Opportunity
Saint Alphonsus claims that the theory of usurpation of a partnership opportunity is
beyond the scope of issues on retrial and is time-barred. The Court disagrees on both points.
A. The usurpation claim is not outside the scope of this trial.
The extensive review of the record above reveals the procedure established for defining
the proceedings on remand, and that record is filled with references, both before and after the
appeal, to the co-opting of partnership opportunities. In its first counterclaim, MRIA alleged that
Saint Alphonsus had breached duties pursuant to Idaho Code section 53-3-404.
Furthermore, MRIA specifically alleged in its Third Amended Counterclaim, filed
following remand, that Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary responsibilities by "co-opting
partnership opportunities.'" Consequently, this Court specifically finds that based upon the
pleadings and the argument by the parties to this Court on various occasions that both parties
were on notice of the claims and defenses that were being asserted by both parties; that neither
the claims asserted nor the defenses advanced are at odds with the decisions of the Idaho
Supreme Court after the Court addressed the parties' respective motions following the filing of
the Third Amended Counterclaim and Saint Alphonsus's Answer.

1

Plural. This is contrary to Saint Alphonsus's contention that MRIA was only referring to the IMI Meridian
opportunity.
Order re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories 8
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Both parties were allowed further discovery on the impact of damages calculations taking
into account the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling as it impacted the calculation of damages. The
Court allowed the reopening of discovery so the parties could clarify the impact of the rulings at
the Supreme Court as to specific timelines to allow MRIA to fully examine the issues of what
impacts these various time calculations had on the asserted damages and so Saint Alphonsus
could be aware of the position ofMRIA's experts and Saint Alphonsus could fully explore the
position ofMRIA's experts on these issues.
The usurpation theory has been pled since the very beginning of this lawsuit, and is an
appropriate theory to link Saint Alphonsus's allegedly wrongful conduct to damages after the
April 1, 2005, date.

Consequently, the Court finds that MRIA's claim for usurpation of a

partnership opportunity is not outside the scope of these proceedings.
B. The usurpation claim is not time-barred as a matter of law

A claim of usurpation of partnership opportunity is a breach of a fiduciary duty. I. C. §
53-3-404(b)(l) (defining one of the "fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership"). Claims
for breach of fiduciary duty must be brought within a four years of the breach. See I. C. § 5-224.
Saint Alphonsus argues that the statute of limitations began to run in September 1999.
Saint Alphonsus bases that assertion on Dr. Prochaska's testimony at the prior trial that suggests
MRIA's relationship with the radiologists had soured by 1999, and thus there was no partnership
opportunity to usurp. On the other hand, MRIA asserts that the usurpation "occurred" in June
2001, the date when Saint Alphonsus partnered with IMI. It filed its counterclaim on May 20,
2005.

Consequently, which date marks the beginning of the statute of limitations period

determines whether the usurpation claim is time barred.
The Court cannot rule on this issue as a matter of law; there is a genuine issue of material
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fact as to which date is the date when the usurpation "occurred." Consequently, this is a question
for the jury to resolve.
II. Disgorgement

Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA should be precluded from presenting its disgorgement
theory of damages. Saint Alphonsus argues for precluding this theory because it is beyond the
scope of these proceedings, it was belatedly disclosed, and it asks for profits earned after April1,
2005.
A. The disgorgement theory of damages is not beyond the scope of proceedings
The Court finds that this theory of damages is not beyond the scope of the present
proceedings. The review of the record above shows that the parties and the Court understood the
issue of damages to be reopened following remand. The Supreme Court, when it remanded this
case, commented on how damages calculations are to be performed. Furthermore, there was a
great deal of discussion about the fact that damages had to be somehow linked to misconduct
occurring prior to April 1, 2005, on retrial.
Disgorgement is a damages theory, and the issue of damages is one of the areas that the
parties have consistently agreed must be reevaluated on remand. Furthermore, disgorgement is
an appropriate remedy that links allegedly improper conduct to damages after April 1, 2005.
Consequently, the Court finds that this damages theory is not beyond the scope of the present
proceedings. If this Court were to bind Mr. Banducci to the position taken in opposition to a
motion he lost, it would essentially be opening discovery for Saint Alphonsus without opening
discovery for MRIA. The Court would be trapping MRIA in precisely the kind of "gotcha" Mr.
Vergonis argued against in February.

The Court's position might well be different if Mr.

Banducci had won the motion based on his argument that he would be proceeding on the same
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causes of action and damages theories in spite of the Supreme Court's rulings striking down
some of his theories.
B. The expert opinion was not properly disclosed
Saint Alphonsus argues that this damages theory should be excluded because it was
belatedly disclosed. While the Court agrees that the theory was not as clearly disclosed as it
should have been, it does not believe that precluding expert testimony on the issue is the
appropriate remedy.

The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure require pleadings merely put the

opposing party on notice of the claims leveled against it or ofthe defenses raised to those claims.
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(2). It does not require the detailed disclosure of each facet of a claim; discovery is
the process by which the claims are fleshed out.

The record reveals that usurpation of a

partnership opportunity was pled, and that the law cited in MRIA's counterclaims includes clear
language that disgorgement is an appropriate remedy for that cause of action since the law clearly
requires that funds realized for appropriation of a partnership opportunity are to be held in trust.
I.C. § 53-3-404(b)(1). Furthermore, a remedy for a breach of that duty is restitution of any
amount brought in. R.G. Nelson, A.IA. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 413, 797 P.2d 117, 121 (1990).
That remedy is indistinguishable :from the remedy presently sought by MRIA. Thus, Saint
Alphonsus was on notice of the possibility of this theory of damages, and thus, the theory was
properly pled.
During discovery involving experts, the parties must disclose "[a] complete statement of
all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore, the data or other information
considered by the witness in forming the opinions [and] any exhibits to be used as a summary of
or support for the opinions." I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i). If a party does not comply with this rule,
the Court, in its discretion, may sanction the noncompliant party. Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho
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867, 872, 136 P.3d 338, 343 (2006).
In arguing that its expert's opinion as to disgorgement was properly disclosed, MRIA

relies on a footnote in its expert's report. That footnote merely indicates the estimated allocation
of profits to SARMC for its interest in IMI between 1999 and 2010. The Court finds that the
footnote is vague and consequently is not an adequate disclosure of the damages theory being
advanced based upon the legal theory alleged by the MRI entities. Furthermore, that inadequate
disclosure may well have prejudiced Saint Alphonsus. Saint Alphonsus was not made aware that
there would be expert testimony on this theory of damages until after the deadline for expert
disclosures had passed. Consequently, it was not able to obtain an expert to defend against this
theory of damages.
Since there was an inadequate disclosure (even if it was late due to he parties' own
stipulation to extend discovery deadlines) that may well have prejudiced Saint Alphonsus, the
Court must determine what sanction is appropriate. The Court will begin by noting that Saint
Alphonsus actually did depose MRIA's expert on this theory, and MRIA's failure to disclose was
apparently not intentional-MRIA' s expert, Bruce Budge, was clearly confused at the deposition
as to why portions of his report were not disclosed. Furthermore, this is an eight-week trial, and
the documents necessary to develop this theory of damages are, as conceded by counsel for Saint
Alphonsus, in Saint Alphonsus's possession. Given the length ofthe trial and the inadvertence
of the vague disclosure, the Court finds that precluding Mr. Budge from testifying as to this
theory is a harsh remedy that is to be avoided under Idaho law. Consequently, the Court will
allow Saint Alphonsus to obtain an expert witness to address this theory, or allow Dr. McCarthy
to address the disgorgement theory. Whatever expert Saint Alphonsus chooses will provide an
expert report as to this theory, and MRIA will be allowed to depose the expert. MRIA's expert
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may address Saint Alphonsus's expert's report-in rebuttal if necessary.
C. The disgorgement theory properly includes profits earned after April 1, 2005
The RUPA provides that "[a] partner's duty of loyalty ... includes [the duty to] hold as
trustee for [the partnership] any ... benefit derived by the partner in the conduct ... of the
partnership business ... including the appropriation of a partnership opportunity ...." I. C. § 533-404(b)(l). Because the law requires that a partner hold in trust any benefit obtained from the
appropriation of a partnership opportunity, constructive trust is an appropriate remedy for
usurpation of a partnership opportunity. See I.C. § 53-3-404 cmt. 2. Under that theory, "the
partnership can recover any money or property in the partner's hands that can be traced to the
partnership." ld
'

Saint Alphonsus argues that it should not have to disgorge profits earned after April 1,
2005, because it was engaged in lawful competition at that point. The Court disagrees. The
RUPA provides that following dissociation "[t]he partner's duty of loyalty under section 53-3404(b)(l) ... continues ... with regard to matters arising and events occurring before the
partner's dissociation." I.C. § 53-3-603(c). Consequently, the duty to hold profits obtained from
the appropriation of a partnership opportunity in trust for the partnership continues after
dissociation

Consequently, if Saint Alphonsus is found to have usurped a partnership

opportunity, any profits derived from that usurpation, even after April 1, 2005, must be
disgorged.
III. Diminution in Value

Saint Alphonsus also argues that the diminution in value theory of damages should be
excluded because it is outside the scope of the present proceedings, it was belatedly disclosed,
and it is legally deficient under Pope. The Court disagrees.
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A. The diminution in value theory of damages is not outside the scope of the present proceedings

As explained above, the review of the record makes clear that damages were an area that
was opened by the Supreme Court's decision in this case. For the reasons set forth above, the
Court also believes that the diminution in value theory is not something that must have been
specifically pled. The parties were on notice that this theory of damages could be presented in
the retrial of this case. The Supreme Court simply held that the value established by Saint
Alphonsus's consultant was not a proper measure of damages-the so called "purchase price"
theory. The Supreme Court did not hold that a diminution in value theory could not be argued as
a component of damages.
B. There was no discovery violation or improper pleading
Saint Alphonsus argues that, though this theory of damages is not going to be proved
through expert testimony, MRIA should have disclosed the damages theory.

The Court

disagrees. As discussed above, notice of the claims leveled or of the defenses raised is all that is
required of pleadings. Saint Alphonsus was on notice that damages theories were an open issue.
In fact, this theory was specifically disclosed in discovery in the prior proceedings. Aff. of Dara

Parker, Exh. I, at p. 3. The Court finds that this theory was adequately disclosed, and that there
has been no discovery violation.
C. The Court cannot determine the sufficiency of the evidence prior to its presentation
While the Court notes that MRIA must present evidence sufficient to satisfy the Supreme
Court's Pope concerns, the Court will reserve ruling on the sufficiency of evidence until after the
evidence has been submitted. The Court will note, however, that it has already ruled that MRIA
has already met the threshold issue of Pope. (November 16, 2010, Decision).

IV. Lost Scans and Lost Profits After Aprill, 2005
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The Court has, on numerous occasions, ruled that MRIA may recover any damages
caused by wrongful conduct, regardless of when the damages accrue so long as they arise from
conduct engaged in prior to 2005. The RUPA provides that the liability for dissociation is not
exclusive, stating " ... the liability is in addition to any other obligation of the partner to the
partnership or to the partners." I.C. § 53-3-602(c).
Furthermore, the Statute specifically spells out that duties apply following the dissociation
of a partner. A dissociated partner still owes a duty of loyalty under section 53-3-404(b)(1 )-(2),
and a duty of care under section 53-3-404(c) with regard to matters arising and events occurring
before the partner's dissociation. Section 53-3-404(b)(l) requires that the partner hold as trustee
any partnership property, profits, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct of the business,
or derived from the use of partnership property or information. Section 53-3-404(b)(2) requires
that a partner refrain from self-dealing or on behalf of an adverse party in the conduct of the
business. Section 53-3-404(c) requires that a partner refrain from grossly negligent or reckless
conduct, or intentional or knowing misconduct or violations of the law in the conduct and
winding up of partnership business.
Each of these duties is contained within section 53-3-404, which was the pled basis for
liability, and each continues following the dissociation of the partner. Consequently, a breach of
any of these obligations can form a legitimate basis for damages regardless of whether the
damages occurred prior to or after dissociation. Were that not the case, there would be no need
for these provisions if all partnership obligations were cut off due to dissociation.
Saint Alphonsus now brings a motion to exclude any lost scans damages after April 1,
2005, because Mr. Budge's damages calculations wrongly include damages caused by
dissociation. MRIA admits that its experts assumed a world in which Saint Alphonsus did not
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dissociate in its but-for world, which increases damages recoverable. However, MRIA argues
that its expert is not including damages from the dissociation, but rather from the enhanced
market position it had as a result of self-dealing and other bad acts prior to dissociation.
The Court has reviewed Mr. Budge's reports and deposition testimony.

Mr. Budge

clearly states that he has not assumed that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated or wrongfully
competed after April 1, 2005. Aff. of Jack Gjording, Exh. J, at p. 84. He also states, however,
that his damages calculation would be different if he were to assume a rightful dissociation in
2004 with rightful competition beginning in 2005. /d. at p. 89-90. The Court, therefore, does not
believe it has adequate facts before it at this point to rule. The Court therefore reserves ruling on
the legal sufficiency of the theory until the evidence has been presented.
SO ORDERED AND DATED
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Clerk

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
P AR1NERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
The black-letter rule regarding compensatory damages in a civil matter is that damages
'"will compensate the injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing more; such as will
simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury."' Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho
598, 609, 850 P.2d 749, 760 (1993) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 352 (5th ed. 1983)). A
party is not entitled to a windfall recovery exceeding its actual loss. See, e.g., Gen. Auto Parts
Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 855, 979 P.2d 1207, 1213 (1999); Gilbert v. City
ofCaldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 396, 732 P.2d 355, 365 (Ct. App. 1987). MRIA's motion has

nothing to do with any offset being sought by Saint Alphonsus, and is simply an effort to bar
proof that MRIA suffered less damages than it now claims.
As part oftheir calculation of lost profits, MRIA's experts have assumed that, if Saint
Alphonsus's alleged misconduct had not occurred, Saint Alphonsus would have remained a
partner in MRIA throughout the damages period. See 2011 Budge Dep. Tr. at 85 ("my model in
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later years presumes that everybody would have been a happy family and that St. Alphonsus
would not have had a reason to dissociate"); id at 86 (''Q. Okay, So all five of your methods
assume that St. Alphonsus -the bottom line numbers assume that St. Alphonsus would not have
dissociated? A. That in likelihood would not have dissociated!'). The effect of this assumption
is to envision a but-for world in which, after April 1, 2004, a hypothetical version ofMRIA
would have continued to have five partners, including Saint Alphonsus, and on that account
would have been more profitable than MRIA actually was. At the same time, the experts would
have these hypothetical enhanced "five-partner MRIA" profits be recovered by the existing,
four-partner MRIA. The experts have thus inflated the damages that were suffered by the actual
party in this

case~

giving MRIA as actually constituted a windfall substantially beyond what it

would have earned had the alleged misconduct not occurred.
Not only is this improper, it has already been fully briefed- and argued to the Court,
which declined to grant similar relief. Specifically, MRIA's memorandum in support of its
motion to exclude testimony of Saint Alphonsus' s expert, Thomas McCarthy ("McCarthy
Mem."), argued the precise grounds set forth in the current "offset" motion, i.e., that it was not
pleaded in the answer to the counterclaim, that it was already accounted for in the buyout share,
and that this is an attempt to "guess" what demand Saint Alphonsus might make on MRIA.

Compare McCarthy Mem. at 16-17 with Offset Mot. at 4-7. The Court's opinion limited Dr.
McCarthy's testimony in some respects, but-although it technically reserved judgment on all
other matters-the ruling in no way credited MRIA's attempt to prohibit Dr. McCarthy's
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criticisms ofMRIA's experts on this point. See Consolidated Order Re: Motions Heard August
5, 2011 at 5-6. Nor should the Court do so now.
MRIA's contention that SaintAiphonsus seeks an "offset" mischaracterizes the issue.
An "offset" is a reduction in actual damages owed to a plaintiff, based on some judgment or
damages owed, on other grounds, to the defendant. See Magic Valley Foods, Inc. v. Sun Valley

Potatoes, Inc., 134 Idaho 785, 791, 10 P.3d 734, 740 (2000). That is not the issue here. 1 Rather,
Saint Alphonsus is challenging MRIA's expert opinions about the amount of actual damages that
MRIA has suffered, and asserting that the claimed amount needs to be reduced by an amount not
suffered. The Supreme Court has already held that MRIA is not entitled to a "damage award

)

[that] exceed[s] any damages suffered by MRIA" and that MRIA cannot ''recover damages on
behalf of non parties." Saint A/phonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRl Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho
479, 496, 224 P.3d 1068, 1085 (2009). Yet that is precisely what MRIA is attempting to do.
Specifically, MRIA's experts calculate lost profits based on what would have accrued to
a different entity (the hypothetical five-partner "MRIA" that continued to include Saint
Alphonsus), but then fail to determine what share of that hypothetical entity's profits would have
gone to the actual existing four-partner MRIA partnership. Without adjusting the hypothetical
entity's profits to account for what proportion of that loss was suffered by the actual MRIA
plaintiff, MRIA is seeking more than its actual loss-an improper windfall. Thus, the expert's

1

Notably, MRIA's motion is not directed at argument that any award against Saint
Alphonsus must be offset by the outstanding judgment against MRIA for Saint Alphonsus's
partnership share. That is a true "offset," reserved for the Court after a verdict has been rendered
and not to be discussed before the jury.
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explicit assumption that MRIA would have continued as it was with Saint Alphonsus as a
partner, and the relationship between that hypothetical entity's earnings and the actual MRIA's
losses, is a legitimate issue for cross-examination and criticism. See, e.g., Great Lakes Aircraft
Co., Inc. v. City of Claremont, 608 A.2d 840, 857 (N.H. 1992) (rejecting damages award based
on "lost profit estimates [of] a hypothetical business entity'' that included the plaintiff because
comparison of hypothetical entity's lost profits to the plaintiff's lost profits was "apples and
oranges"); McMillian v. McMillian, 713 S.E.2d 920, 923 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) ("when a partner
wrongfully appropriates a prospective business opportunity of his partnership to his own use or
that of another, the remaining partners ... may recover their share of the profits that the

)

partnership would have earned from the business opportunity" (emphasis added)).
In short, MRIA is seeking more damages that it personally suffered, through a model of
damages which overestimates MRIA' s loss. That has nothing to do with the concept of offset, or
with Saint Alphonsus's departing partner share or Saint Alphonsus's continuing ownership
interest in the limited partnerships. It is solely a challenge to the measure of damages, relating to
the fundamental principle that MRIA cannot recover more than it actually lost.

CONCLUSION
MRIA's motion in limine should be denied.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
During its case, MRIA presented evidence, through its experts Budge and Wilhoite, of
two purported damages theories: the "lost profits" damages theory referred to in Bruce Budge's
expert report as "Scenario 1,"and a disgorgement theory. 1 Both the lost-profits theory and
disgorgement theory cannot hold in light of the evidence presented, and are subject to a directed
verdict in Saint Alphonsus's favor for failure to prove damages. Moreover, a verdict should be
directed on several other issues arising out ofMRIA's case.
ARGUMENT

When faced with a directed verdict motion, the Court must "determine whether there was
sufficient evidence to justify submitting the claim to the jury, viewing as true all adverse
evidence and drawing every legitimate inference in favor of the party opposing the motion for a
directed verdict." Todd v. Sullivan Constr. LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 124, 191 P.3d 196,202 (2008).
1

MRIA has previously suggested that it might present a diminution-in-value theory. It
did not, as described below, and a directed verdict is appropriate on that damages theory as well.
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The directed verdict is to be granted unless there is "substantial evidence to support the jury's
verdict," with "substantial evidence" meaning "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Howell v. E. Idaho R.R., Inc., 135 Idaho 733,
737, 24 P.3d 50, 54 (2001) (citation omitted). A directed verdict may be granted as to specific
issues in contention. See Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912,918,684 P.2d 314,320 (Ct. App. 1984)
("A trial court may withdraw an issue from the jury if no substantial evidence supports the
claim."); Nat 'l Motor Serv. Co. v. Walters, 85 Idaho 349, 357, 3 79 P.2d 643, 648 ( 1963) (court's
withdrawal of issues from jury is a grant of directed verdict on those issues).
I.

MRI CENTER AND MRI MOBILE HAVE FAILED TO SHOW WHAT LOSSES
WERE CAUSED BY WRONGDOING, AND MOBILE HAS OFFERED ONLY
SPECULATION AS TO LOST PROFITS FOR MERIDIAN AND EAGLE
As the Court is aware, one of the issues the Supreme Court indicated should be

determined upon retrial is the issue raised in Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646
P.2d 988 (1982): that a damages analysis is not sufficient if it assumes, "without any support in
the record, that the [defendant's] operation would not have won any portion of the ... market
absent" the defendant's misconduct. 103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005, quoted in Saint
Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at 498, 224 P.3d at 1087. Thus, as the Court reiterated on October 14,
"[a]s to lost profits measure of damages, they must be broken out as to the portion of the
business lost as a result of competitors' misconduct, and between the portion lost as a result of
other factors." 10/14/11 Trial Tr. at 4362. Further, as the Court noted, while it held the
threshold Pope burden was met based on pre-trial allegations, "it will not rule with regard to the
Supreme Court's Pope concerns until it hears the evidence in the case." !d. at 4365.
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MRIA has failed to introduce evidence in this trial which satisfies the Supreme Court's
requirement. The evidence presented in this case is that IMI-which had no non-compete with
MRIA-entered the market in September 1999. MRIA has abandoned its theory that IMI would
not have opened in a but-for world, 2 and the undisputed evidence is "that from the moment IMI
opened, it was in direct competition with MRIA." 9/14/11 Trial Tr. at 782 (Prochaska).
Thus, given that IMI would have existed anyway as a competitor whether or not MRIA
proves misconduct by Saint Alphonsus, MRIA' s burden under Pope was to distinguish between
physician referrals of scans to IMI as a result of Saint Alphonsus 's improper acts, and physician
referrals that would have gone to IMI as a new competitor in the market anyway. It has not
carried its burden. With respect to both MRI Center's alleged lost-profits damages, and MRI
Mobile's alleged damages, MRIA has failed to offer damages evidence consistent with Pope.

A.

MRI Center Damages - Downtown and On-Campus

With respect to MRI Center damages (IMI downtown and IMI on-campus), Mr. Budge
simply assumed that every scan performed by IMI was the result of wrongdoing if it came from
either (1) a doctor who had referred even one scan to MRI Center before IMI opened, or (2) any
doctor after IMI opened, if that doctor had admitting privileges at Saint Alphonsus but not Saint
Luke's. 10/14/2011 Tr. at 4526-30, 4588-89; Ex. 5000. Budge also testified that, absent any
2

During the last trial, and in MRIA's pre-trial papers regarding the Pope issue, MRIA
suggested that IMI's start-up funds were "contingent on" Saint Alphonsus's assurances to U.S.
Bank, and thus would not have opened at all but for Saint Alphonsus's help. See Mem. in Opp'n
to Mot. for Summ. J. Based on the Alleged Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's Evidence of Lost
Profits at 5; see also, e.g., 2007 Trial Tr. at 4003-4079 (examining Jeff Cliff on this issue).
MRIA has not made any such argument in this trial.
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wrongdoing by Saint Alphonsus, MRIA's observed losses in scans would have been the result of
competition and other factors.

10114111 Trial Tr. at 4607-4609. Budge's analysis thus set up an

"either-or" world-either 100% of lost scans were due to wrongdoing, or none of them were.
Budge acknowledged, but did not attempt to account for, the third scenario that Pope
requires to be addressed: if the new competitor would have existed anyway, some business
would have migrated from MRI Center to IMI as a result of reasons other than wrongdoing, and
that loss cannot be claimed as damages. 3 See, e.g., id. at 4531, 4598-99, 4642, 4653. He also
conceded that his model would overstate MRIA's losses by counting as damages all scans that
went to IMI, even if those scans were, in fact, "diverted" to IMI not from MRIA, but from
another competitor. !d. at 4594-4600; Ex. 975, 976.

3

Budge's admissions on this point, among others, include that:
•

"It's possible, in this pre-'99 group of physicians that referred to MRIA, that if the
downtown [IMI] location opened up, it was independent of Saint Alphonsus, that
those guys for some reason because of where a patient lived or something else
might send a patient there and I would be counting them as diverted, that would
have a tendency to maybe over state it." !d. at 4531.

•

"Q .... If you have admitting privileges at Saint Al's, does that mean that you
will never as a physician refer a patient to any other facility except as a result of
wrongdoing? A. No." !d. at 4598-99.

•

"I think the question you're raising is: Are there scenarios where there's lawful
competition from IMI that I'm counting as diverted scans? And we've discussed
what the risk of those are." !d. at 4642.

•

He did not "disaggregate ... that portion of what [he] identified as damages
caused by wrongful conduct from that portion of any decline in the profitability of
MRIA that was simply attributable to competitive circumstances in the
marketplace" as "Mr. Banducci ... hasn't asked me to model" that. !d. at 4653.
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Instead of doing the analysis Pope requires and trying to identify the sources of diverted
scans, Budge instead theorized that he had accounted for any overcompensation in his model by
declining to include in his damages analysis any scans that MRIA might have received from

doctors who had not previously referred to it, or new doctors who had admitting privileges
elsewhere. See, e.g., id. at 4599-4600 ("I recognize and I admit to you that [the methodology]
has a risk of overstatement. But I also think that I severely understated referrals by the exclusion
of all these new SARMC physicians that also have admitting privileges at St. Lukes.") Mr.
Budge's attempt at "rough justice" does not solve his methodological problems for two reasons.
First, Budge admits that he "never tried to quantify" either the overstatement in scans he
does claim as damages, or the understatement from the scans he does not claim as damages,

"because [he doesn't] know how to do it." Id. at 4640-41. In other words, Mr. Budge was not
basing his "rough justice" claim on any scientific or expert model; rather, he was just speculating
and hoping that this is the case. That admission invalidated any attempt to justify his
imprecision. See, e.g., Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140,219 P.3d 453,464 (2009)
("Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of
no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible.").
Second, the fact that Budge decided to ignore one source of potential damages did not

excuse Plaintiffs from proving that damages from Budge's chosen source were the result of
wrongdoing. That is MRIA's obligation whatever the source of alleged damages; MRIA is not
entitled to speculative damages because Budge's opinions were inadequate. See SADC, 148
Idaho at 498, 224 P.3d at 1087 (an "assum[ption] that ... jobs done by [a competitor of the
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plaintiffs] would have all have been done by [the plaintiffs] but for [defendant's] violations" is
"not a proper manner to measure the [plaintiffs'] lost profits").
In short, Budge has posited an admittedly flawed model, which makes no attempt to
ascertain what portion of the alleged lost scans were lost to lawful competition from IMI, and
gives MRIA damages for scans gained by IMI that were "diverted" from other competitors. And
since Mr. Wilhoite's future damages expert opinion merely builds on Budge's assumptions, his
opinion is similarly flawed. Pope requires a directed verdict for failure of damages proof. 4

B.

MRI Mobile Damages - Meridian and Eagle

In addition to being excludable due to the same flaws as the Center damages above,
MRIA's evidence oflost profits with respect to MRl Mobile's damages (i.e., those at Meridian
and Eagle, 10/14/11 Tr. at 4575) has an independent error that requires a directed verdict. With
respect to Meridian and Eagle, Budge expressly concedes that his methodology was simply to
assume that MRIA's loss was IMI's gain. Budge testified that:
I'm assuming that it would have been the same center with a different
name on the door. It would have said MRIA instead ofiMI, and that
the operations on the MRl side of it would have been identical in
terms of the amounts paid and the costs that it took to generate the

4

Were the court disinclined to direct a verdict on this ground, at a minimum the jury
would have to be carefully instructed on a special verdict form to ensure that the assumptions
underlying Budge's "100% wrongdoing" theory have been actually determined. Otherwise,
Budge's model admittedly overstates lost-profits damages, does not provide an alternative
measure of damages, and requires a verdict of zero damages. See, e.g., Pope, 103 Idaho at
234,646 P .2d at 1005 ("the factfinder may not determine damages by mere speculation and
guesswork, and there must be a reasonable foundation established by the evidence from which
the factfinder can calculate the amount of damages.").
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revenue. So I'm using IMI's margins and I'm using the actual
amounts received per scans that actually occurred on that site.
10/14111 Trial Tr. at 4545. He did not, however, assume that the GSR radiologists would be
reading Meridian's scans. Id. at 4637. With respect to Eagle, Budge made the same assumption:
as with Meridian, he didn't "rely on a migration of scans from one to the other. It's simply what
is basically the business operations of those two locations." Id. at 4573.
This lost-profits damages methodology of simply appropriating IMI's profit margins,
costs, and scan volumes, and assuming MRI Mobile would have had the same experience, fails
as a matter of law regardless ofMRIA's theory of Saint Alphonsus's wrongdoing. MRIA is
required to prove what its own margins, costs, and volumes would have been if the hypothetical
MRIM-Meridian or MRIM-Eagle had opened. The case of Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v.
Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119 (2007) is directly on point. There, the district court held

that proof of the competitor's profits were only allowable to "determine[] the reasonableness of
the plaintiffs' proof as to its lost profits, but not as a substitute for such proof." 144 Idaho at 847,
172 P .3d at 1122. The court then held that conclusory statements by the plaintiffs' witnesses that
its profits "would have been in the vicinity" and "very similar" to the competitor were
insufficient proof of the plaintiffs' lost profits. !d. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
plaintiffs needed evidence of "what its costs and profits would have been," and that "stating a
conclusion regarding its profit margin, without any factual support" is not sufficient to "take the
issue of damages out of the realm of speculation." !d.
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MRIA's evidence here is even less than the Supreme Court held insufficient in Trilogy.
By his own admission, Mr. Budge simply assumed IMI's profit margins and volumes would

have been replicated by MRI Mobile. No MRIA witness-fact or expert-testified as to what a
hypothetical MRIM-Meridian or MRIM-Eagle's profit margins would have been, its volumes, its
costs, or anything needed to "take its measure of damages out of the realm of speculation."
Indeed, there arc only two mentions ofMRI Mobile's margins in the record, neither of which had
to do with the profits and costs of a never-built, hypothetical MRIM-Meridian or MRIM-Eagle:
•

Sandra Bruce's testimony regarding the 2001 Shattuck Hammond report (Ex.
4246, p. 33), which indicated that Mobile had projected profit margins from 2001
to 2006 "in the neighborhood of28 and 29 percent," 9/24/11 Trial Tr. at 1884, a
figure considerably lower than IMI-Meridian's profit margins, variously between
51% to 67%, used by Budge used in calculating MRIM's lost Meridian and Eagle
profits (Ex. 5087, Ex. 5089); and

•

Jack Floyd's agreement that in 2001, MRI Mobile was "making healthy margins."
10111/11 Trial Tr. at 3918-19.

These stray instances do not mention, and are not sufficient under Trilogy for a jury to
determine, what MRIM-Meridian or MRIM-Eagle's actual costs and profits would have been,
and thus what profits were lost by those entities due to any alleged wrongdoing. Because MRI
Mobile only assumed IMJ's costs and profits as its own, without offering evidence of what its
actual costs would be for these hypothetical locations, MRI Mobile failed to introduce legally

sufficient evidence of damages and a verdict should be directed on all alleged lost-profits
damages from those two locations. Trilogy, 144 Idaho at 847, 172 P.3d at 1122.
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II.

MRIA HAS FAILED TO OFFER EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT
DAMAGES AFTER THE APRIL 1, 2005 NON-COMPETE ENDED, OR TO
SHOW THAT SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MRI PROFITS WERE EARNED FROM
WRONGDOING AS OPPOSED TO LAWFUL COMPETITION.

This Court has repeatedly made clear that "Saint Alphonsus had no duty not to compete
after the expiration of the noncompetition agreement," Consolidated Order re: Motions in Limine
Filed May 18, 2011, p.3 (June 9, 2011); and that "damages are not awardable to MRIA simply
because of Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care's exercise of its right to dissociate from the MRIA
partnership," but that "damages may, however, be awarded for all damages which the jury finds
were proximately caused by Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care to MRIA as a result of actions
taken by Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care prior to its dissociation from the partnership on April
1st of 2004" or before the "expiration of the non-competition clause on April 1st, 2005."
10/14/11 Trial Tr. at 4363 (emphasis added).
Despite this obligation, MRIA's expert made no effort to determine which, if any,
business losses occurring after April 1, 2005, were attributable to misconduct occurring before
that date. Indeed, Budge agreed with MRJA counsel's statement that it was only an "allegation
that [Saint Alphonsus] w[as] able to lawfully compete after 2005" and admitted that he "did not"
"assume that this dissociation cut off damages." Jd. at 4563 (emphasis added). He then
reiterated that his but-for damages assumption was "that Saint Alphonsus was not going to be
able to lawfully compete" after 2005, id. at 4566, and that "for purposes of [his] damages
calculation," he "did not assume" that "Saint Alphonsus was entitled to compete beginning in
2005," id. at 4580-81. By Budge's own admission, then, he did not attempt to determine post-
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2005 damages accruing from pre-2005 liability; rather, he assumed that post-2005 competition
was a basis for liability despite the dissociation and non-compete. Budge's assumptions that
Saint Alphonsus could be held liable for new acts of competition after April 1, 2005, whether
directly or under a "but-for" assumption that Saint Alphonsus would not have dissociated, is
impermissible, as Saint Alphonsus's actual dissociation and termination of the non-compete was
a legally superseding cause that cut off any liability due to later acts of lawful competition. 5
By contrast, Budge admitted that he did not do what the Court said was required: i.e.,
determine the amount of"splash-over" or "lasting effect of the prior bad acts" which continued
beyond the point of dissociation and the end of the non-compete. 10/14111 Trial Tr. at 4573.
Indeed, he admitted, as he had at his deposition, that such an analysis would have resulted in a
different damages calculation. Budge explained that the drawing he made at his deposition (Ex.
889R) illustrated what such a damages analysis would have looked like, but was only "an
approximate diagram" that "wasn't based on actual data [or] numbers." 10/14/11 Trial Tr. at
4566. And although he explained that he would draw his approximate diagram differently now
that he had been given additional assumptions by MRIA counsel, 6 he did not offer any expert

5

See Hite v. Biomet, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1025-26 (N.D. Ind. 1999) ("Common
sense dictates that a valid [termination] subsequent to a[n improper] act cuts off ... liability ....
This is logical because the valid termination ... severs the ... relationship and the joint
obligations which compose such a relationship. In this way, the [defendant's) liability is limited
since the valid termination is, essentially, a superseding cause which relieves it from further

")
11.ab1'lt'ty .....
6

In addition to speculating that Saint Alphonsus would have required a six-month lead
time to start competing (which, in fact happened, as the IMI on-campus magnet did not open
until December 2005), Budge made a new assumption related to alleged Stark and Anti-
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opinion as to what the damages would have been assuming dissociation and lawful competition
after April 1, 2005. !d. at 4638 ("I haven't been asked to do it and I haven't done it."). Instead,
Budge simply conceded that all damages for IMI on-campus scans, and all damages IMI
downtown scans from 2006 onward would have to be excised from his report. !d. at 4574-75.
Given that Budge's expert opinion (and, derivatively, Wilhoite's opinion) does not heed the
Court's ruling that only so "splash-forward" damages are permitted after Apri11, 2005, and
because MRIA failed to provide such damages evidence consistent with that ruling, the Court
should hold as a matter of law that MRIA is not entitled to damages accruing after April 1, 2005.
This holding should also extend to MRIA's disgorgement theory, barring it in whole.
This theory seeks to recover Saint Alphonsus's MRI profits, but by Budge's concession, Saint
Alphonsus did not receive any MRI profits until2006. 10/14111 Trial Tr. at 4512. Since Mr.
Budge (and, consequently, Mr. Wilhoite) has no model from which to determine what acts of
competition after April 1, 2005 were based on liability arising before April 1, 2005, there is
likewise no model for determining whether any of Saint Alphonsus's profits from the MRI-side
of IMI were due to lawful competition.

Kickback violations. 10/14/11 Trial Tr. at 4569-72. For reasons stated in an accompanying
motion, MRIA is not entitled to advance its newly asserted Stark and AKS claims, nor in any
event would all IMI scans violate the Stark or AKS law, which only apply to Medicare and other
federal health programs. Budge's model does not account for what proportion of referrals would
allegedly violate these laws as a basis for new, post-2005 liability.
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III.

SEVERAL OF MRIA'S SPECIFIC DAMAGES AND RELATED CAUSATION
THEORIES FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In addition to the Pope issues and MRIA 's failure to properly account for alleged post-

2005 damages, the Court should grant directed verdicts or otherwise modify several other
damages-related issues before they go to the jury.

A.

MRIA 's Theory that Saint Alphonsus "Usurped" Its Opportunity to Partner
with IMI is Time Barred, and in All Events, Damages Before July 1, 2001
May Not Be Presented to the Jury.

During its October 14 summary of its prior damages rulings, the Court noted that if the
alleged usurpation ofMRIA's opportunity to partner with IMI occurred in 1999, then MRIA's
claim on that score was time barred, but if the usurpation happened in 2001 as MRIA claimed in
its motion papers, then "if damages are found to be awardable, they would be measured from the
--I believe it is the July 1st, 2001, date, at the earliest, to 2015 at the latest." 10/14/11 Tr. at
4363-65. MRIA did not introduce evidence of its "usurpation" damages theory (Budge's
"Scenario 5"), and the underlying usurpation claim should be out of the case.
To the extent MRIA still intends to claim this usurpation for any purpose, including as a
predicate for the disgorgement claim, the Court should direct a verdict on the usurpation theory
as it is time barred. There is no substantial evidence in the record from which this jury could
reasonably infer that MRIA and GSR/IMI could have come to a deal following the December 16,
1999 meeting in which the radiologists rejected MRIA's deal; indeed, the witnesses have
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uniformly indicated that as of late 1999 and early 2000, a merger of MRIA and IMI was dead
and that Dr. Giles and Dr. Prochaska knew it. 7 The alleged usurpation, if any, is time-barred.
Moreover, ifMRIA does, in fact, intend to claim liability based on an alleged usurpation
of the opportunity to partner with IMI, then a directed verdict should be granted because there is
a failure of damages proof on such a liability theory. MRIA' s expert testimony as presented at
trial simply awards MRI Center 100% of the damages from scans that shifted from MRI Center
to IMI. That is not a proper method of calculating usurpation damages, however. If the claimed
usurpation had not occurred, MRIA would have given a 1111 th or more share of its own profits to
IMI, and may have been only a part-owner ofiMI's MRI-side. In either scenario, MRIA would
have been entitled to only a part of the profits that would have resulted from scans done to IMI
in the but-for world. 8 But Budge assumes that 100% of the profits done from scans at IMI were

7

See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 775-76 (Dr. Prochaska agreeing it was "probably true" that the
deal was dead as of December 16); id. at 820 (same, agreeing that "there was no point any longer
to MRIA discussing doing a deal with the radiologists" if "Sandra Bruce was going to remain as
passive as she was in the meeting"); id. at 822 (same, referencing Dr. Prochaska's prior
proceedings testimony that "I think I testified earlier that after the December -- what we have
called 'ambush' meeting after this letter, there was no point discussing doing a deal with the
radiologists"); id. at 1762 (Sandra Bruce describing "three major hurdles" for a deal with GSR
and MRIA in December 1999 to January 2000, including restructuring DMR, more than 1/11 th
share, and spinning offMRI Mobile, none of which were compatible with MRIA's 1999 deal);
4397-4400 (Dr. Giles testifying that he was removed from GSR leadership in January 2000 due
to tensions with his position as MRIA owner); id. at 4402-03 (Giles, indicating that "around this
time" the GSR partners told him "[w ]e have decided to compete with the MRI Center of Idaho"
and asked Giles to leave GSR).
8

While the record contains various notions of what the allegedly usurped deal would
have been, MRIA's witnesses have testified that it would have obtained a 50% ownership in the
MRI-side ofiMI, in exchange for 1/llth or more ofMRIA, and there is no evidence that IMI
would have just given away its MRI business to MRIA for free. Budge's damages calculations
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lost profits to MRI Center. There is thus a failure of damages evidence on what MRIA's lost
profits would have been, if a 1999 or 2001 usurpation is the basis for liability.
Finally, at a minimum, given that MRIA has asserted that usurpation did not occur until
July 1, 2001, the Court should hold that lost-profit damages before July 1, 2001 cannot go to the
jury. According to MRIA's expert, the "lost profits" theory presented to the jury ("Scenario 1")
would be reduced by $2,446,668 if counting from July l, 2001, instead of 1999. Compare Ex.
4496, p. 15, Scenario l with id. Scenario 2. That portion of damages should be disallowed.

B.

MRIA Has Failed to Offer Sufficient Evidence of "Usurpation" of an
Opportunity to Go to Eagle.

MRIA has also offered no substantial evidence regarding its claim that Saint Alphonsus
"usurped" MRIA's opportunity to go to Eagle. Idaho law has recognized usurpation in the
corporate context, holding that usurpation requires proof of a business opportunity with "which
the corporation is financially able to undertake, is, from its nature, in the line of the corporation's
business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in which the corporation has an interest or a
reasonable expectancy, and, by embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or
director will be brought into conflict with that of his corporation." Jenkins v. Jenkins, 138 Idaho
424, 428, 64 P.3d 953, 957, 64 P.3d 953 (2003). This standard, on its face, necessarily requires
proof that the defendant take the opportunity at a time where it can cause a conflict.

can only be understood as relying on that improper assumption, since he does not attempt to
calculate what portion of IMI's profits would flow to MRIA in the non-usurpation world.
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Here, the entirety of fact evidence on the alleged "usurpation" of Eagle appears in Jack
Floyd's October 10, 2011 testimony at pages 3905-10. There, Floyd claims that a February 16,
2001 PowerPoint presentation he provided (which does not appear in the record) "relate[d] to the
need for a site in either Meridian or Eagle." Jd. at 3908. Floyd then stated that "there was a
sense of urgency that we, Saint Al's, as part of the MRIA partnership, get into the
Meridian/Eagle area. But yet that sense of urgency did not seem to be shared." Id. That is all.
There is no evidence explaining how Saint Alphonsus blocked MRI Mobile from going to Eagle,
no evidence that Saint Alphonsus's vote was necessary for MRI Mobile to go to Eagle; no
evidence that Saint Alphonsus was discussing going to Eagle with IMI at this time (unlike what
MRIA has attempted to show with Meridian); and no evidence as to how Saint Alphonsus
somehow prevented MRI Mobile from going to Eagle for nearly three years after Saint
Alphonsus dissociated.
What does appear in the record is that whatever "opportunity" there was for expansion
into Eagle was known to MRIA since 2001 yet left on the table for nearly six years, during a
time when MRI Mobile admittedly was sending magnets to multiple locations around the Pacific
Northwest despite Saint Alphonsus's alleged lack of support. See Ex. 5043 (map ofMRI Mobile
locations). The record does not support a finding that MRI Mobile had any interest or
expectancy in Eagle, let alone that Saint Alphonsus usurped the opportunity from its MRI
partners, given that Eagle was not pursued by IMI until three years after Saint Alphonsus ceased
to be a partner. A directed verdict should be granted on this issue.
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C.

MRI Center and MRI Mobile's Lost-Profits Figures Must Be Reduced by
7.5% to Account for Their Management Fee Expense.

Between the submission ofMRIA's supplemental expert reports on May 2, 2011, and
now, MRIA has elected to rescind its claim for damages to MRIA based upon the management
fee that flowed directly from MRI Center and MRI Mobile's gross revenues, and instead to
present evidence that the management fee should be part of Center and Mobile's damages
instead. 10/14/11 Trial Tr. at 4628-29. There is no substantial evidence in the record (or any
evidence at all) that MRI Center and MRI Mobile would not have paid this expense had they
obtained the allegedly lost scans, or that MRIA would not have received it the but-for world;
indeed, Bruce Budge admitted that he did that the first time, and that "it would be more accurate
to actually show the administrative fees being paid and who got them." Id. at 4630. MRI Center
and Mobile's damages are each overstated by 7.5%, and the jury should not be permitted to
award such inflated damages.
Moreover, Saint Alphonsus is concerned that MRIA structured its damages claim this
way in order to prevent Saint Alphonsus from setting off its departing partner share
(approximately $4.5 million plus interest running from the date of dissociation) from any
judgment in MRI Center and MRI Mobile's favor, on the theory that MRI Associates owes the
buyout judgment but claims none of the awarded damages. Whether, at this late date, MRIA
should be entitled to simply re-assert a claim for that 7.5% of damages to MRI Associates is a
matter for the Court's discretion. But whatever the Court's resolution, MRIA should not
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permitted be able to overcompensate Center and Mobile in order to place roadblocks in the way
of Saint Alphonsus' s recovery of its countervailing judgment.

D.

The Court Should Also Direct a Verdict on the Diminution Theory.

Finally, the Court should also direct a verdict on MRI Center's diminution theory of
damages-i.e., the theory that damages should be measured as the difference between the 2001
Shattuck Hammond valuation ofMRI Center and its value as of2010. See 9114/11 Trial Tr. at
691-92. Not only should the theory be disallowed given that there been no discovery on MRIA's
asserted 2010 value, thus unfairly preventing Saint Alphonsus from defending this newly
advanced claim, MRIA has failed to prove what diminution in value, if any, was attributable to
wrongful acts as opposed to other factors such as competition, the state of the markets,
reimbursement rates, and other related factors. See, e.g., Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 919, 684
P.2d 314,321 (Ct. App. 1984) (party "must" establish that any "loss [in business value] was
produced by defendant's conduct rather than by ... other variables."); SADC, 148 Idaho 479,
498,224 P.3d 1068, 1087 (2010) (instructing MRIA to supply "'a method of figuring damages'"
that distinguishes between business lost as a result of the alleged bad acts and business that
would have been lost absent those bad acts) (quoting Pope, 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988).
Here, while Dr. Prochaska asserted his opinion of Center's current value, MRIA's
expert did not mention the diminution theory or offer testimony indicating what portion was due
to wrongdoing, as Dr. Prochaska indicated the experts would. See 9/12/11 Trial Tr. at 431-433,
9/13/11 Trial Tr. at 462-63. As MRIA has failed its burden of proof on this issue, a directed
verdict should be granted on the diminution theory.
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CONCLUSION

This Court should grant a directed verdict motion as to all or part ofMRIA's lost~ profits
and disgorgement claims, and on the other damages~related issues as discussed above.

DATED this 18th day of October, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

/Counter-Defendants
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Pat1nership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to
Direct a Verdict on MRIA's Damages and Disgorgement Theories.
INTRODUCTION

Characterizing it as a motion for a "directed verdict," Saint Alphonsus has asked for the
Court to again revisit whether the testimony ofMRIA's experts meets the standards articulated in
Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P .2d 988 ( 1982); the question of damages

after 2005; and other damages-related issues. Many of these issues have already been briefed
and decided by the Court. To the extent that the Court has already decided these issues, it should
not entertain what is essentially a request for reconsideration. Further, MRIA has presented
ample evidence concerning damages from which the jury can reasonably find and calculate
damages.'
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
A.

Standard

The standard that a moving party must meet in order to be granted a directed verdict is
exceedingly difficult. In specific, this Court must stmt by "admitting the truth of the adverse
evidence and drawing every legitimate inference most favorably to the opposing party," and then
decide whether there "exists substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury."
Doe lv. Doe, 138 Idaho 893,899,71 P.3d 1040,1046,71 P.3d 1040 (2003). Substantial

evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Howell v. Eastern Idaho R.R., Inc. 135 Idaho 733,737,24 P.3d 50, 54,24 P.3d 50
MRIA was given three briefs on directed verdict issues on Tuesday October 18,
20 ll, and has had less than four days, in the midst of trial, to prepare these responses. MRIA
has not been able to scour the record to show to the Court every piece of evidence that supports
its claims, but will point out highlights that support some of its major damages themes.
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(2001). As such, a directed verdict that withdraws an issue from the jury's consideration is
proper "only where the evidence is so clear that all reasonable minds would reach only one
conclusion: that the moving party should prevail." Doe I, 138 Idaho at 899, 71 P.3d at 1046
(emphasis added). Saint Alphonsus has not met this onerous standard.

B.

The Damages EYidence Presented in this Case Satisfies the Pope Standard
1.

The Court has Already Ruled on this Issue

Saint Alphonsus argues, yet again, that MRIA's damage proof does not meet the standard
articulated in Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217,646 P.2d 988 (1982). As the Court
·well knows, the Supreme Court has directed that the issues presented in Pope be considered on
retrial. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 498, 224
P.3d 1068, 1087, 224 P.3d 1068 (2009). Pope was an antitrust case in which a group of
insulators sued Intermountain Gas Co. and its subsidiary, HomeGuard on various antitrust claims
alleging the defendants were selling insulation at a loss in an attempt to monopolize the market.

Pope, 103 Idaho at 220, 646 P.2d at 991. In calculating damages, the trial court assumed that the
insulation jobs done by HomeGuard would have all have been done by their competitors but for
the antitrust violations. It therefore calculated the damages suffered by the competitors based
upon HomeGuard's gross sales figures for those jobs. In reversing, the Supreme Court held that
this was not a proper manner to measure the competitors' lost profits, saying:
[t]here was no justification in the present case for the trial court's
determination that the gross revenues of the defendants ... provide a reasonable
foundation for calculating the lost profits of plaintiffs. Such a method of figuring
damages assumes, without any support in the record, that the HomeGuard
operation would not have won any portion of the insulation market absent
antitrust violations. Furthermore, it assumes that the plaintiffs had the capacity to
assimilate all of the business which HomeGuard performed, and that plaintiffs
would have won that business over other insulators who chose not to participate
in this action. There is simply no evidence in the record to demonstrate a
relationship between HomeGuard 's sales figures and plaintiffs' damages so as to
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support a conclusion that HomeGuard's income was the equivalent of plaintiffs'
lost profits.

!d. at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005.
Saint Alphonsus contends that Pope has not been satisfied because MRIA' s experts
allegedly did not parse out physician referrals of scans which would have been received by IMI
as a competitor in the market, even in the absence of Saint Alphonsus's misconduct. This Court
has already rejected this argument once. Saint Alphonsus brought a "Motion for Summary
Judgment on the Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's Evidence of Lost Profits," in which it argued, as
it does here, that MRIA's damage experts had not conducted an analysis as to what percentage of
the lost scans would have been lost solely due to IMI's entry into the market. The Court held as
follows:
Saint Alphonsus contends that Pope stands for the proposition that a
claimant must present evidence distinguishing between the portion of business
lost as a result of a competitor's misconduct and the portion lost as a result of
other factors. Saint Alphonsus further contends that the Supreme Court held that
MRlA relies on expert testimony which "assumes" without any evidence that
Saint Alphonsus' alleged misconduct caused all of the cited business migration.
Saint Alphonsus argues that MRlA's damage experts have made no effort to
conduct an analysis as to what percentage of the lost scans would have been lost
solely due to IMI's entry into the market and that there is no evidence in the
record from which MRIA could conduct such an analysis. Therefore Saint
Alphonsus claims the evidence that MRIA has put forth in its claim for lost profits
is legally insufficient and all claims for lost profits must be dismissed.

In Pope, the Idaho Supreme Court was concerned that there was no
evidence in the record to support the fact finder's findings and that the award of
damages was the result ofmere speculation and guesswork. Pope, 103 Idaho at
234, 646 P.2d at I 005. The Court held "there must be a reasonable foundation
established by the evidence from which the fact finder can calculate the amount of
damages." ld.

It is MRIA's position that without the actions of Saint Alphonsus, IMI
would not have gotten these specific referral, would not have gotten funding,
would not have had a scmmer at Saint Alphonsus' campus, and would not have
been in a position to open the IMI Meridian facility. The inclusion of scans which
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON MRIA'S
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migrated to IMI from physicians who had historically been MRIA's customers,
scans for the usurped Meridian opportunity, and scans from the IMI machine
placed on Saint Alphonsus' campus is consistent with its claims. In the instant
case, the Court finds the expert evidence takes into account other competitors and
provides a historical view. Further, the Court finds that the damage estimate does
not merely presume that its damage due to lost profits is equivalent to IMI's
profits, but instead distinguishes scans which may have been lost for other
reasons. All experts make some assumptions. Saint Alphonsus had the
oppmtunity and took the opportunity to cross examine regarding those
assumptions. The Comt finds the damage calculation of lost profits is supported
by a reasonable foundation from which a reasonable jury could calculate the
amount of damages. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court finds the evidence satisfies the Pope concerns.
(Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Motions for Judgment on Pleadings and
Motions for Summary Judgment, Nov. 16,2010, at pp. 18-20.) The Court reiterated this holding
on October 14, 2011, saying:
As to lost profits measure of damages, they must be broken out as to the
portion of the business lost as a result of competitors' misconduct, and between
the portion lost as a result of other factors.
And the Court has already fmmd that the MRIA expert has met the
threshold requirement there. That's the Pope decision.
(Trial Tr., Oct. 14,2011, at pp. 4362:18-25.) As the Court has already ruled on this question,
applying the same standard as exists in directed verdicts motions (i.e., presuming the truth of the
adverse evidence and drawing every legitimate inference most favorably to the opposing pat1y),
the Court should decline to address this question again. Regardless, however, MRIA will
demonstrate that they have satisfied the concerns of Pope.

2.

Pope has been Satisfied with Respect to MRI Center's Damages Downtown
and on Campus

Saint A!phonsus asserts that Pope has not been satisfied with respect to those damages
related to IMI's Downtown and Campus scans because "Mr. Budge simply assumed that eve1y
scan performed by IMI was the result of wrongdoing." (Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a
Verdict on MRIA's Damages and Disgorgement Theories, p. 4.) In particular, Saint Alphonsus
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON MRIA'S
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states that Mr. Budge has inappropriately included as lost profits all IMI scans done either by
( 1) a doctor who had previously referred one scan to MRI Center or (2) had privileges at Saint
Alphonsus but not St. Luke's.
Saint Alphonsus contends that Mr. Budge has failed to take into account lawful
competition by IMI. However, significant evidence has been presented in this case that Saint
Alphonsus created the competition by sabotaging any attempt to establish "one big happy
family." Also, evidence has been presented that Saint Alphonsus unlawfully supported the
competition while still a partner in MRIA. If so found by the jury, then all the scans received by
IMI were the result of Saint Alphonsus's bad acts. Moreover, MRIA has presented evidence that
Saint Alphonsus and GSR engaged in a conspiracy to compete against MRIA through IMI. If
the jury so finds, then IMI was not engaged in lawful competition and, again, all the scans
received by IMI were the result of Saint Alphonsus's bad acts. If so, the concerns of Pope are
inapplicable.
Regardless, as the Court has already found, the damage estimate presented by MRIA
does not merely presume that its damage due to lost profits is equivalent to IMI's profits, but
instead distinguishes scans which may have been lost for other reasons. Mr. Budge's trial
testimony bears this out. Mr. Budge engaged in a reasoned analysis to determine which scans
lost to each of the IMI locations were the result of Saint Alphonsus's bad acts. First, with respect
to the IMI downtown location, Mr. Budge determined that forty-nine percent (49%) of the scans
done at that facility should not be considered "lost scans." The jury was presented with exhibit
5000, which is a pie chart used to explain to the jury which scans conducted by IMI were
included in the lost profits analysis, and which scans had been excluded from that calculation.
Mr. Budge explained:
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The way it worked mechanically is that we basically had these documents that
were in those big stacks of raw data in terms of scans that had been done at IMI
downtown. I then had prepared the list that I described to you of who were the
referring physicians that basically fed MRI' s business prior to 1999. And I had a
list of new anivals on the scene, doctors with Saint Al's affiliations that had
joined the scene.
If they were on that list, which I called the affiliated physicians list, and
IMI did the scan, I counted it as a scan that was diverted for what would have
been MRIA's business to IMI. The 42 percent on here is the percentage of the
exams which fall into the category of exams from referring physicians that
traditionally referred to MRTA.
This purple 9 percent slice of the chart is basically those new doctors who
came on the scene afterwards that only had admitting privileges at Saint
Alphonsus.
The 49 percent are exams which occurred at IMI which I am not
calculating as having been diverted. Those exams, ifiMI had independently of
Saint Alphonsus opened an Imaging Center and these physicians had referred
exams to it, they would not be diverted exams from MRIA.
(Trial Tr., Oct. 14, 2011, at pp. 4527:4-4528:5 (emphasis added).) Contrary to Saint
Alphonsus's assertion otherwise, Mr. Budge clearly took into account the fact that IMI would
have had 49 percent of the MRI business by virtue of competition even without Saint
Alphonsus's wrongful conduct. Notably, Mr. Budge also took into account competition by other
third party imaging centers, and was careful not to include that outside competition in his
analysis of the scans lost by MRIA. (ld. at pp 4531:17-4532:17 and 4560:5-21). As such, he has
fully satisfied the concerns articulated in Pope. 2

It appears that Saint Alphonsus's primary argument is that Mr. Budge did not try to
determine what portion of the business that IMI might have won from the scans referred to IMI

2

With respect to the IMI magnet placed on the Saint Alphonsus campus, Mr.
Budge did not use an analysis of affiliations ofthe doctors, but rather assumed that had these
variollS accused acts not occurred, that any scan that was done at the JMI magnet at the Saint
Alphonsus campus would have been done by MRIA, because Saint Alphonsus would not have
permitted IMI to put a competing magnet on its property. (Trial Tr. Oct. 14,2011, pp. 4536:14
to 4537: 1.) Saint Alphonsus has raised no objection to this assumption.
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by either a doctor who had previously referred scans to MRI Center, or one who had privileges
exclusively at Saint Alphonsus. This is, of course, far different from the circumstance in Pope,
where the plaintiff made no effort to separate the effects of valid competition from profits lost to
wrongful conduct. Mr. Budge has engaged in a reasoned analysis as to why referrals from these
discrete sets of doctors are scans that have been lost. As the Pope court itself explained, while
damages cannot be based on mere speculation and guesswork, all that is necessary is that there
be "a reasonable foundation established by the evidence from which the factfinder can calculate
the amount of damages." Pope, 103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at1 005. The Supreme Court has
said:
The (factfindcr) may make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on
relevant data, and render its verdict accordingly.... (I)t will be enough if the
evidence show(s) the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable
inference, although the result be only approximate.

Id
Mr. Budge explained to the jury his reasoned analysis as to why he determined that "lost
scans" consisted of all of the referrals from doctors who had previously referred scans or were
affiliated with Alphonsus. He said:
One of the things I did with this data is I basically looked at what was the
population or the source of referrals that basically was creating the scans that
made up MRIA's business prior to the formation ofiMI. And I got a list just
through looking through historical data of all the of the physicians, referring
physicians that had previously referred to MRIA, MRIC in particular.
Then obviously for the period 1995 forward there's new physicians that
come on the scene. Some doctors are retiring. Some are coming to the Treasure
Valley. So I got a list of new physicians that were making referrals.
And I also associated them with as to whether they had privileges at Saint
Alphonsus only or Saint Alphonsus and St. Luke's. Because I wanted to basically
complete an analysis which showed the referral network that was associated with
Saint Alphonsus. And I used that identification for that purpose of which
physicians either previously were referring to MRJA or were affiliated with Saint
Alphonsus but only Saint Alphonsus ....
MRTA'S OPPOSITION TO SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON MRIA'S
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A. [I included physicians who were solely affiliated with Saint
Alphonsus] I think that based upon historical referral patterns and what I
understand about the business, that people that have patients at Saint Alphonsus
typically were using MRIA when they were doing on-campus scans.
(Trial Tr., Oct. 14, 2011, at pp. 4506:25-4508:6). He later explained:
The purpose of my measurement is to look at scans that were diverted from this
existing business in which Saint Alphonsus was a partner to the new business.
And so I think the best way to define a market or population of business is to look
at the referring physicians that basically provided that business. And only if those
basically showed a shift or a diversion from where they had traditionally gotten
their images made to IMI did I count them as a diversion.

(ld. at p. 4529:3-13)
Mr. Budge is not required to establish with mathematical precision which scans were
actually diverted. Instead, "it [is] enough ifthe evidence shows the extent ofthe damages as a
matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate." Pope, 103
Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d atlOOS. It is a just and reasonable inference that scans referred to IMI
from physicians who had actually referred scans to MRIA facilities in the past were "lost scans."

It is likewise reasonable to presume that physicians who refer patients exclusively to Saint
Alphonsus facilities, MRI Center's traditional referral pool, would have referred their patients to
MRI Center but for Saint Alphonsus's conduct to steer those referring physicians to IMI.
Mr. Budge also went beyond this. He tracked the trends among this stable of physicians, and
found that as MRIA was losing referrals from a particular physician, IMI was gaining referrals
from that physician. (See Trial Tr. Oct. 14,2011, at p. 4538:19-4542:10.) Although it maybe
approximate, this evidence is more than enough from which the jury can draw a reasonable
inference about which scans were lost as a result of Saint Alphonsus's conduct. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to MRIA, as the Court must, it is clear that the evidence
satisfies the Pope concerns.
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3.

Pope is Inapplicable \\'ith Respect to MRI Mobile's Damages Regat•diug
Meridian and Eagle

Saint Alphonsus next asserts that Mr. Budge inappropriately assumed that MRI Mobile
would have done all scans conducted by IMI in Meridian and Eagle. However, the evidence
establishes that, had Saint Alphonsus not engaged in the bad acts, it would have supported
MRIA's entry into the Meridian and Eagle markets, rather than IMI's, and thus IMI, not MRIA,
would have been crowded out of that market. As Mr. Budge said:
And so the assumptions I made is that if MRIA had been supported in
going forward and opening this facility in Meridian, that they would have been
the first to arrive there, and that instead of being crowded out of that market by
JMI, which is what actually happened, they would be there first and IMI would
have been crowded out and prevented tl'om opening the center.
(Trial Tr. Oct. 14,2011, at p. 4545:4-11). In short, Mr. Budge presumed that MRIA would have
been as IMI is today in those markets, and IMI would not have existed in those markets. As
Mr. Budge said:
I'm assuming that it would have been the same center with a different name on
the door. It would have said MRIA instead of IMI, and that the operations on the
MRI side of it would have been identical in terms of the amounts paid and the
costs that it took to generate the revenue. So I'm using IMJ's margins and I'm
tlsing the actual amounts received per scans that actually occurred on that site.

(ld at p. 4545:14-22). Mr. Budge therefore calculates MRIA's damages by the profits that IMI
would have received, less capital expenditures. (kl at p. 4546:21-20). Indeed, Mr. Budge's
calculation is actually highly conservative, because it assumes that MRIA would not have
opened in Meridian and Eagle at an earlier time (id. at p. 4547:23-4548:23), and would have
purchased the additional MRI magnets that IMI actually purchased (id. at p. 4548:24-4549:23).
Under this damages scenario, the Pope concern of taking into account valid competition does not
exist, because the competition (i.e., IMI) would have been squeezed out of the market in the
same maimer that MRIA has been squeezed out of that market.
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This is not a "lost scans, theory, but a "usurpation" theory. The argument is that Saint
Alphonsus usurped MRIA's ability to enter the market by supporting IMI. The case cited to by
Saint Alphonsus, Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119
(2007) is inapposite because it is a competition case. In that case, Johnson and Trilogy were in
business as competitors against each other. Pursuant to the settlement of an earlier lawsuit,
Johnson agreed not to solicit certain customers. Jolmson breached that agreement. Trilogy
attempted to measure its damages by the profits that Johnson received. The Court reject that,
noting that "[t]he measure of damages for the breach of an anti-competition clause is the amount
that the plaintifflost by reason of the breach, not the amount of profits made by the defendant."
!d. at 84 7, 172 P .3d 1121. In the present case, it is not argued that IMI and MRIA would have

been competitors in the market in Meridian and Eagle, but rather that Saint Alphonsus should
have supported MRIA, such that MRIA would have received all of the benefits that IMI has now
reaped.
An analogy illustrates this circumstance. Presume that two partners were engaged in a
real estate business. During that course of that partnership, one of the partners leamed of a
lucrative real estate development opportunity. Rather than informing the partnership about that
opportunity, he then dissociated from the partnership, and purchased that real estate development
for himself. This is the usurpation of a partnership opportunity that should have belonged to the
partnership. The pa11nership is therefore entitled to reimbursement fmm the wrong-doing
partner for the opportunity that it lost. See Harestad v. Weitzel, 242 Or. 199, 536 P.2d 522
(1975) (a real estate partnership could recover profits from the sale of an apartment complex
built by one of the partners in his individual capacity because that kind of project had been
within the scope of the partnership business).
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In addition, MRIA has presented a disgorgement theory, which is a damages theory under
which MRIA is to receive all of the profits that Saint Alphonsus received from its wrongful
ventures. The Idaho legislature has expressly stated that a partner has a fiduciary duty to "hold
as trustee for [the partnership] any property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner ... derived
from ... the appropriation of a partnership opportunity." l.C. § 53-3-404(b)(l). See Steelman v.
MallmJ', 110 Idaho 510,716 P.2d 1282 (1986); R.G. Nelson, A.l.A. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409,797

P .2d 117 ( 1990). This includes Saint Alphonsus' s share of the profits from all of IMI' s facilities,
which obviously includes the Meridian and Eagle facilities. Mr. Budge first used the fulliMI
profits analysis as a basis, and then calculated what portion of those profits, related to MRI
services, that Saint Alphonsus had received. Referencing exhibit 5066, he explained that he first
made an "estimate of the MRI operation's profitability for TMI as a legal entity. And then my
understanding is that in about April of 2006 Saint Alphonsus acquired a 50-percent interest in the
MRI modality. And this is my calculation or estimate of their share of the MRI profits from
JMI." (Trial Tr. Oct. 14,2011, p. 4512:11-20 (emphasis added).) He explicitly explained that
this was his disgorgement analysis. (Jd. at p.

4517:6~ 15.)

With respect to Mr. Budge's analysis

of disgorgement for profits unjustly retained by Saint Alphonsus, the considerations of Pope are
inapplicable, and it was appropriate (and indeed required), for Mr. Budge to model the
disgorgement damages on the circumstances that actually exist at IMI.

C.

MRIA has Offered Sufficient Evidence of Damages after Aprill, 2005
Saint Alphonst1s next contends that there is insufficient evidence to permit damages after

the running of the noncompetition provision in Aprill, 2005. As the Court has held, damages
may be awarded for all damages which the jury finds were proximately caused by Saint
Alphonsus as a result of its actions prior to dissociation or before the expiration of the non-
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competition clause. (Trial Tr. Oct. 14, 2011, at p. 4363.) Saint Alphonsus looks only to
Mr. Budge's trial testimony. This is utterly inappropriate. Mr. Budge is not and has never been
a causation expert, but has simply outlined the amount of damages which can be awarded if the
jury finds that Saint Alphonsus's conduct was the proximate cause. MRIA has used other
witnesses and exhibits to show that Saint Alphonsus 's actions prior to dissociation or the end of
the noncompetition agreement have had continuing effect beyond 2005.
1.

If Saint Alphonsus's Manner of Withdrawal was a Breach of Fiduciary Duty,
its Competition Following Withdrawal was Unlawful

Saint Alphonsus argues that it was entitled to compete after 2005, and thus no
competition-based activities after that date can serve as a basis for liability or damages.
However, MRIA has presented evidence that the manner in which Saint Alphonsus dissociated
from MRIA, and/or its motivation therefore, was in bad faith, and thus a breach of its fiduciary
duty notwithstanding that it was in technical compliance with the partnership agreement. See

Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 203 P.3d 694 (2009) (even if technically in
compliance with operating agreement, such actions can nevertheless be a breach of fiduciary
duty if members have improperly taken advantage of their position to obtain financial gain.)
Although Saint Alphonsus properly dissociated, as found by the Supreme Court and this Court,
MRIA has presented evidence that it did so with the improper motivation to compete with
MRIA-and in fact began to do so even before it dissociated. For example, MRIA presented
evidence that Saint Alphonsus thought it was a "strategic imperative" to partner with IMI and
compete with MRIA, (Exs. 4247, 4315). This places Saint Alphonsus's conduct squarely within
the Bushi analysis. If the jury were to find that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal was a breach of
fiduciary duty, then Saint Alphonsus's competition was likewise improper, and there is no basis
for cutting off damages as of April l, 2005.
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2.

MRIA has Presented Substantial Evidence that Saint Alphonsus Destroyed
MRIA Prior to 2005, Thus Justifying Lost Profits afte1· that Date

MRIA has also presented substantial evidence that, through Saint Alphonsus's bad acts
prior to April 2005, the shift of referrals from MRIA to IMI had been largely completed so that
MRIA no longer had an ability to compete. As Jack Floyd testified, by the time the noncompete
ran in Apri12005, "[w]e were pretty much dead in the water, and we weren't really able to
compete effectively." (Trial Tr. p. 4032:25-4033:8.) As such, it is entirely reasonable for the
jury to find that lost profits damages from those acts continue f01ward after that date. The end of
the non-competition agreement does not sanitize these earlier bad acts, nor does it cut off
damages flowing therefrom. A brief sampling of the evidence introduced at trial is more than
sufficient to demonstrate that Saint Alphonsus's bad acts prior to 2005 crippled MRIA:
•

Saint Alphonsus killed negotiations between MRIA and GSR. For example,
Sandra Bruce told GSR to backburner negotiations with MRIA in favor of
negotiations with Saint Alphonsus. (Ex. 410 I). Ms. Bruce also failed to
communicate an offer from MRIA to GSR to sell GSR a six-eleventh's interest in
MRIA, instead of the much smaller interest which had previously been offered.
(Trial Tr. p. 1334:14-1398:19.)

•

MRIA presented extensive evidence that Saint Alphonsus gave IMI significant
teclmical assistance (such as the "DR" system), while denying that support to
MRIA. MRIA also presented evidence that Saint Alphonsus approved of a letter
which misstated MRIA's access to the DR system. Exhibit 4533 is a letter sent on
January 4, 2005, from GSR to the referring physician community. This letter was
approved by Saint Alphonsus before it was sent. 3 As Jeff Cliff confirmed, it
untruthfully states that "Saint Alphonsus inpatient and ER patient examination
will be the only MRICI exams available to you on DR/Web Ambassador." (Trial
Tr. Oct. 3, 2011, at p. 2973:9·2975:7.) As Mr. Floyd testified, this technology
was critical important to the refening physician community, and MRIA lost
referring physicians because they did not have it, and did not have it first. (Trial
Tr. Oct. 11, 2011, at p. 4034: 1-4036:24.) By the time MRIA did get this
technology, the referring physicians were already familiar with using IMI's
portals, and did not want the hassle of dealing with MRIA's portals. (Id.) These

3

Dr. Seabourn will testify to this fact. It was agreed that for Dr. Seaboum's convenience, the
parties wotlld call him only once. It was agreed to do so during Saint Alphonsus's case-in-chief,
but this witness is nevettheless pat1 of Saint Alphonsus's direct evidence.
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referring physicians became "customers" of IMI because Saint Alphonsus had
given IMI this technological advantage first, and did not retum to MRIA.
•

MRIA presented evidence that, with Saint Alphonsus's explicit or implicit
approval, the GSR radiologists reduced service at MRI Center (especially on
evenings and weekends), while ramping up those services at IMI. Mr. Floyd
testified that this shut down their weekend business, increased costs, and limited
the types of patients who could be seen. (Trial Tr. 3943:25-3945: 18.) This
inconvenienced the referring physicians who, "just wanted to go to one site where
they knew that they would be able to get coverage when they needed it. And
that's what we had up until this [reduction]. And once we lost that we lost a lot of
referrals as a result." (Id at p. 3946:4-10.)

•

MRIA presented evidence that, while Saint Alphonsus was a partner of MRIA, it
passed on confidential information that it learned in MRIA's meetings to IMI,
thereby giving IMI a competitive advantage over MRIA.

•

MRIA presented evidence that Saint Alphonsus thought it was a "strategic
imperative" to partner with IMI and compete with MRIA, (Exs. 424 7, 4315), and
thus created a strong competitor that MRIA would not otherwise had have to
contend with, whether before or after 2005.

•

Saint Alphonsus thwarted the growth ofMRI Mobile by refusing to let it expand
into Meridian and Eagle.

This is sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Saint Alphonsus's wrongful
actions prior to 2005 have continued to damage MRIA after 2005 and continuing into the future.

3.

Post-2005 Tortious Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations
Provides a Basis for Damages after 2005

MRIA has also pled and presented evidence that Saint Alphonsus engaged in tortious
interference with MRIA's prospective contractual relations after Aprill, 2005. This is not
lawful "competitive" activity, but a tort. In particular, MRIA contends that Saint Alphonsus
engaged in unlawful conduct related to patient referrals. Briefly stated, MRIA asserts that Saint
Alphonsus influenced patient referrals in a way that violates statutes, public policy, Saint
Alphonsus's own internal policy, and IMI's operating agreement. For a complete discussion of
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this theory of liability, see MRIA's Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Directed Verdict
on Violations of the Stark and Anti-Kickback Statutes, filed contemporaneously herewith.
MRIA has presented significant and substantial evidence about these wrongful post-2005
actions. The following is a brief sampling of this evidence:
•

Saint Alphonsus continued to put roadblocks up on technical support for the
ability for physicians to remotely access imaging materials. Mr. Floyd testified
that after Apri12005, MRIA attempted to win back business from IMI, but was
stymied because Saint Alphonsus responded very slowly to requests to deal with
technical issues, or refused to make them all together. As a result, the referring
physicians would not come back to MRIA. (Trial Tr. Oct. 11,2011, at p. 4034:14036:24.)

•

In February 2004, after dissociation, IMI informed Saint Alphonsus that its
affiliated MD's were underutilizing IMI, and that Saint Alphonsus should
therefore inform them of the relationship to IMI. (Ex. 4 331.) On December 11,
2005, after the expiration of the noncompete, Saint Alphonsus circulated a letter
stating the IMI was the sole provider of MRI services that MRIA was no longer to
provide services to Saint Alphonsus connected patients. (Ex. 4377). Both of
these steps, taken in order to ensure that Saint Alphonsus doctors would refer their
patients to IMI, are in violation of Saint Alphonsus's internal policy concerning
referrals under which Saint Alphonsus reputes to allow its doctors and medical
staff to send its patients to whomever they believe will do the best work. (See,
e.g., Trial Tr. p. 1517-1524 (Sandra Bruce), 4129-4137 (Sally Jeffcoat).) It is also
in violation of the IMI/Saint Alphonsus contract, which expressly states that "each
Member, its Affiliates and its employees are not precluded or discouraged from
referring patients to any alternate provider of services other than the Company.
(Ex. 4226, § 3.3.1.2 (p. 14).

The tortious interference claim and the evidence presented in support of this theory provide a
direct tie to damages after 2005, because, of course, much of this tortious activity itself occurred
after 2005. This is sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that MRIA is entitled
to damages after 2005.
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4.

Disgorgemcnt is Not Affected by the Running of the Noncompetition
Agreement

Saint Alphonsus also argues that the running of the noncompetition agreement affects the
disgorgement theory of damages. This is directly contrary to Idaho law, and the express ruling
of this Court. This Court has held:
The RUP A provides that "(a] partner's duty of loyalty .. , includes [the
duty to] hold as trustee for [the partnership] any ... benefit derived by the partner
in the conduct ... of the partnership business ... including the appropriation of a
partnership opportunity .... " I.C. §533w 404(b)(I). Because the law requires that a
partner hold in trust any benefit obtained from the appropriation of a partnership
opportunity, constructive trust is an appropriate remedy for usmpation of a
partnership opportunity. See I. C. § 53-3-404 cmt. 2. Under that theory, "the
partnership can recover any money or property in the patiner's hands that can be
traced to the partnership." ld
Saint Alphonsus argues that it should not have to disgorge profits earned
after April 1, 2005, because it was engaged in lawful competition at that point.
The Court disagrees. The RUPA provides that following dissociation "[t]he
partner's duty ofloyalty under section 53-3404(b)(I) ... continues ... with regard to
matters arising and events occurring before the partner's dissociation." I. C. § 533-603(c). Consequently, the duty to hold profits obtained from the appropriation
of a partnership opportunity in trust for the partnership continues after
dissociation. Consequently, if Saint Alphonsus is found to have usurped a
partnership opportunity, any profits derived from that usurpation, even after April
1, 2005, must be disgorged.
(Order re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories, Sept. 27, 2011, at p. 12-13.) It is of no
consequence that Saint Alphonsus did not begin receiving MRI profits until 2006 or that Saint
Alphonsus believes it was lawfully competing when it received the same. Rather, "if Saint
Alphonsus is found to have usurped a partnership opportunity, any profits derived from that
usurpation, even after Aprill, 2005, must be disgorged." (!d.) As outlined at length above,
MRIA has presented substantial evidence concerning the usurpation of partnership opportunities,
prior to 2005, upon which the jury could reasonably award disgorgement damages.
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D.

MRIA's Damages and Causation Theories are Proper
1.

Argument that Usurpation Claim is Time Bal'l'ed.

Saint Alphonsus first contends that Mr. Budge did not present any evidence ofMRIA's
usurpation damages theory. This is absurd. Mr. Budge's testimony on this theory is outlined at
length earlier in this briefing. Saint Alphonsus also asserts that the Court should direct the
verdict on the question of whether the usurpation claim is time barred. However, the Court has
already expressly held that this is a question for the jury. As the Court said in its Order Re:
Motion to Exclude Damages Theories of September 27, 2011:
A claim of usurpation of partnership opportunity is a breach of a fiduciary
duty. I. C. § 53-3-404(b)(1) (defining one of the "fiduciary duties a partner owes to
the partnership"). Claims for breach of fiduciary duty must be brought within a
four years of the breach. See i.e. § 5-224.
Saint Alphonsus argues that the statute of limitations began to run in
September 1999. Saint Alphonsus bases that assertion on Dr. Prochaska's
testimony at the prior trial that suggests MRIA's relationship with the radiologists
had soured by 1999, and thus there was no partnership opportunity to usurp. On
the other hand, MRIA asserts that the usurpation "occurred" in June 2001, the
date when Saint Alphonsus partnered with IMI. It filed its counterclaim on May
20,2005. Consequently, which date marks the beginning of the statute of
limitations period determines whether the usurpation claim is time barred. The
Court cannot rule on this issue as a matter of law; there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to which date is the date when the usurpation "occurred."
Consequently, this is a question for the jury to resolve.
The same evidence, and posture of the evidence, still exists. Whether the relationship soured in
1999, or whether usurpation occurred in June 2001, the date when Saint Alphonsus pm1nered
with IMI, is still a question of fact that, as the Court said, is "for the jury to resolve."
Saint Alphonsus argues that, at a minimum, the jury should not be permitted to find
damages before July 1, 2001. Saint Alphonsus has cited no case law for the proposition that
damages are cut off by the statute of limitations. In fact where, as here, it is argued that an injury
might not have come about but for an entire course of conduct, "then all damages caused by the
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tortious conduct are recoverable even though some of the conduct occurred outside the
limitations period." John McShain, Inc. v. L 'Enfant Plaza Properties, Inc. 402 A.2d 1222, 1231
n. 29 (D.C. 1979). Indeed, Judge McLaughlin ruled on this very issue, holding that the claims
advanced by MRIA were "continuing" in nature. When an instruction was requested regarding
the statute of limitations, Judge McLaughlin said:

I'll give you a ruling. I think it-- I concur with MRIA. I think it's continuous
tort, and that the -- my reading of the law is that I think the Curtis r;: Firth case,
123 Idaho 598, is applicable here. And it will be the court's ruling that the claims
asserted by MRIA are not barred by the statute of limitations based upon that. So,
that's the court's ruling.
(Trial Tr. August 29,2007, at p. 4196:5-12.) As this issue was not appealed, it is the law of the
case. Moreover, usurpation for violations of fiduciary duties is not MRIA's only claim. The
jury could properly find damages prior to July 1, 2001, for any of the other claims raised by
MRIA.
2.

Usurpation of Eagle Opportunity

Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's assertion othe1wise, there is substantial evidence to justify
submitting the question of whether Saint Alphonsus usurped MRIA's oppmtunity to go to Eagle.
First, as discussed at length above, MRIA has presented evidence that Saint Alphonsus usurped
MRIA's ability to cooperatively partner with GSR in the MRI ventures. In this world, had Saint
Alphonsus not committed bad acts, the Eagle imaging facility would have been an MRIA/IMI
owned facility, rather than a Saint Alphonsus/IMI owned facility. Saint Alphonsus has not
addressed the significant evidence on this point. This evidence, standing alone, is sufficient to
demonstrate usurpation ofMRIA's ability to partner with IMI and enter into Eagle with IMI.
Regardless, Mr. Floyd also testified that in 2001, he made a presentation to MRIA, which
included Saint Alphonsus representatives, in which he described opportunities in Eagle and
Meridian. He explained that MRIA had a sense of urgency about getting MRI Mobile into the
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Meridian and Eagle area, and that this had also been communicated several times prior. (Trial
Tr. Oct. 11,2011, at p. 3908:5-3909:5; 3910:13-16.) Significantly, Mr. Floyd also testified that
Saint Alphonsus was strongly opposed to such an expansion (Trial Tr. Oct. 11, 2011, at
p. 3908:5-3909:5; 3910:13-16), and that MRJA would not undettake any action that its partner,
Saint Alphonsus, was opposed to. (Trial Tr. Oct. 11,2011, at p. 3915:17-3917:2.) By the time
Saint Alphonsus withdrew, MRIA was no longer in the position to take advantage of new
opportunities, but instead was trying to salvage what remained. (Trial Tr. Oct. 11, 2011, at
p. 4034: 1-4036:24.) The evidence shows that Saint Alphonsus stymied MRI Mobile's growth, so
that IMI could reach those markets instead of or ahead ofMRIA.
Saint Alphonsus argues that it must be shown that the usurped business opportunity is
one that MRIA was on the brink of starting, and that since it did not attempt to enter the Eagle
market after 2001, that this is not an usurped opportunity. Saint Alphonsus cites no case law for
this proposition. Even the case it cites concerning the fiduciary duties owed by a corporate
officer, Jenkins v. Jenkins, 138 Idaho 424, 428, 64 P.3d 953, 957 (2003) does not require that the
usurped opportunity be imminent, but simply requh·es that a corporate director not usurp an
opportunity "in the line of the corporation's business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in
which the corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy."
The analysis is not whether MRIA was actually on the brink of opening an Eagle facility,
but rather, whether an Eagle MRI facility was within the scope ofMRIA's business. See Lifshutz

v. L{(shutz, 199 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006) (when it was undisputed that entity was
engaged in the acquisition of rental properties, partner appropriated a partnership opportunity
when he engaged in the acquisitions of rental properties); Harestad v. Weitzel, 242 Or. 199, 536
P.2d 522 (1975) (a real estate partnership could recover profits from the sale of an apartment
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complex built by one of the partners in his individual capacity because that kind of project had
been within the scope of the partnership business). Opening an MRI magnet in Eagle is within
the line ofMRIA's business, and one that it had actually discussed. It certainly had a reasonable
business expectancy in serving the Eagle area. No case law requires that MRIA have made an
attempt to enter that market. MRIA has presented sufficient evidence upon which the jury could
reasonably determine that Saint Alphonsus either usurped MRIA's ability to partner with IMI in
an Eagle venture, or open its own Eagle facility.
On page 14 of its briefing, Saint Alphonsus also argues that a directed verdict should be
granted on the usurpation of the opportunity to partner with IMI becalJSe "MRIA would have
given a 1/11 111 or more share ofits own profits to IMI, and may have been only a part owner of
IMI' s MRI -side." However, as noted above, the proper measure of damages for usurpation is the
partnership opportunity which Saint Alphonsus diverted. The form that an IMIIMRIA
partnership might have hypothetically taken in the absence of Saint Alphonsus's bad acts is
irrelevant to the disgorgement of the profits related to that opportunity.

3.

Management Fee Expense

Saint Alphonsus brings what is apparently a request for a jury instruction on how to deal
with MRI Associates' 7.5% management fee. The damages ofMRI Associates are premised on
whatever the damages ofMRI Center and MRJ Mobile are awarded, because it is entitled to a
7.5% management fee related to those entities. Rather than complicate the math, MRIA has
determined that it will request a verdict from the jury simply on the damages relating to MRI
Center and MRI Mobile. The damages of MRI Associates can then be mathematically calculated
from that point.
Saint Alphonsus nevertheless contends that the damages award to MRI Center and MRI
Mobile must be reduced by 7 .5%. This is absurd, because MRI Associates will then still have a
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DAMAGES AND DISGORGEMENT THEORIES- 2l

003735

demand for its management fee from MRI Center and MRI Mobile, when that management was
already deducted by the jury. This would result in under-compensation to MRI Center and MRI
Mobile. Neither the Comt nor Saint Alphonsus need concern themselves contractual distribution
of the management fee from MRI Center and MRI Mobile to their managing partner.
Saint Alphonsus also asserts that if the damages are awarded only to MRI Center and
MRI Mobile, it will not be able to "offset" its departing partner share. This is not a valid
consideration. Saint Alphonsus has a judgment against MRIA for its departing partner share
from MRIA. Saint Alphonsus will be entitled to enforce this judgment, without regard to
whether it is paid by offsetting the verdict, or receiving payment from MRIA.

4.

Diminution in Value

Saint Alphonsus asserts that the Court should direct a verdict on MRIA's diminution in
value theory. It asserts that MRIA was required to present the theory through expert testimony,
and that MRIA did not prove what portion was attributable to other factors. 4

a.

Expcl't Testimony is Not Required to Pt·ove Diminution in Value

Saint Alphonsus contends that a verdict must be directed because this theory was not
addressed by MRIA' s experts. However, this is not a damages theory for which expert testimony
is required. The diminution of value damages theory is a comparison between the value of the
MRI Entities prior to Saint Alphonsus's wrongful conduct, and their value after the wrongful
conduct. The first data point-the value before the wrongful conduct-has been established
through the valuations conducted by Shattuck Hammond. The second data point-the present
value of the MRI Entities-had been established through the testimony of the owners ofthe MRI
Entities. The case Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 897, 522 P .2d 1102,
4

Saint Alphonsus also contends that this is a "new" theory on which Saint
Alphonsus was given no discovery. The Court has already explicitly rejected this argument.
(Order Re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories, September 27, 2011, p. 14.)
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1118 (1974) is directly on point. In that case, a corporation brought an action for slander and
tortious interference with contract. Its theory of damages was the net worth of the company
before and after the commission of the torts. The fifty-five percent owner testified that
business had an actual net worth prior to the commission alleged of the torts of$183,000 and that
the net amount the business was able to salvage after it closed down as result of the alleged torts
was $97,000. The Idaho Supreme Cout1 noted that:
[i]t is a settled rule in Idaho that the owner of property is a competent
witness to its value.... "The general rule, that to qualify a witness to testify as to
market value, a proper foundation must be laid showing the witness to have
knowledge upon the subject, does not apply to a party who is testifying to the
value of property which he owns. The owner of property is presumed, in a way, to
be familiar with its value, by reason of inquiries, comparisons, purchases and
sales. The weight of such testimony is another question, and may be affected by
disclosures made upon cross-examination as to the basis for such knowledge, but
this will not disqualify the owner as a witness."

Id., citing Rankin v. Caldwell, 15 Idaho 625, 632, 99 P. 108 (1908). The Supreme Court
therefore held that the owner's testimony about the drop in the value of the business provided
sufficient and substantial evidence which supported the jury's verdict. Barlow, 95 Idaho at 987,
522 P .2d at 1118. The Court reached the same conclusion in Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo

Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 896 P.2d 949 (1995). It noted that:
For more than eighty-five years, this Court has followed the rule that the
owner of property is a competent witness concerning its value. E.g., Howes v.
Curtis, 104ldaho 563,568,661 P.2d 729,734 (1983); Rankin v. Caldwell, 15
Idaho 625, 632-33, 99 P. 108, 110 (1908). An owner is competent to testify to the
value of a going business without further qualification. Bancroft v. Smith, 80
Idaho 63, 67,323 P.2d 879,883 (1958). The owner's failure or inability to
explain the basis for the value given may affect the weight to be given the
testimony, but it does not disqualify the owner's opinion. Smith v. Big Lost River
Irrigation Dis!., 83 Idaho 374,386,364 P.2d 146, 158 (1961).

Pocatello Auto Color, 127 Idaho at 44, 896 P.2d at 952. The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly
approved of the use of lay testimony by the owner of a company to establish this damage theory,
which MRIA has done.
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b.

The Evidence is Sufficient for a Jm'Y to Find that Diminution in Value
was Caused by Saint Alpbonsus's Bad Acts

Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA has not shown that its diminution in value has a
causal relationship to Saint Alphonsus's conduct. It notes that MRIA has not addressed other
factors which might have caused MRIA to lose value. However, as expressly noted in the cases
above, this is not a reason to exclude testimony concerning this damages theory, but rather goes
to the weight of the evidence. An illustrative case is Grijftth v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143
Idaho 733, 741, 152 P.3d 604, 612 (2007). In that case, the defendant argued that the plaintiff
had failed to show causation because the plaintiff never performed an analysis to show that it had
S\.Jffered increased costs because the defendant had refused to accept and purchase certain trout.
The defendant noted other possible variables, such as changes in salary, insurance, feed, fuel,
repair, etc. The Court noted that it was reasonable to infer that keeping fish longer increased
costs, notwithstanding that the plaintiff did not "analyze every potential alternative cause." !d.
Likewise, Saint Alphonsus's argument that MRIA did not analyze innumerable other possible
causes, such as the state of the economy, declining medical reimbursement rates, etc. is precisely
like the argument advanced by the defendant in Gr(ffith. The jury had been presented with
evidence that Saint Alphonsus's many misdeeds, including breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, and tortious interference which almost completely destroyed MRIA's business.
As noted above, Mr. Budge tracked the trends the referring physicians, and found that as MRIA
was losing referrals from a particular physician, IMI was gaining referrals from that physician.
(See Trial Tr. Oct. 14, 2011, at p. 4538:19-4542:10, Ex. 5011.) A jury could infer from the
evidence that has been presented that Saint Alphonsus's conduct is the more probable cause of
MRIA's diminution in value than other causes. For all of these reasons, the Court should not
prevent MRIA from presenting a diminution in value theory of damages to the jury.
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CONCLUSION
MRIA has presented substantial evidence to justify submitting this entire case, including
all damages issues, to the jury. As such, the Court should deny this motion for directed verdict.
DATED this 21st day ofOctober, 2011.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

"J>~, (R~.r

Dara L. Parke ·
Attorneys for 1\1Rl Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE ANTI-KICKBACK CLAIM, WHETHER '"STATUTORY" OR "POLICY"
BASED, WAS NOT IN THE PLEADINGS, WAS NOT SUBJECT TO
DISCOVERY, AND IN ALL EVENTS FAILS FOR A LACK OF PROOF
A.

MRIA's Contention Interrogatory Responses, Compelled by the Discovery
Master, Did Not Include These Stark, AKS, or "Policy" Bases for its Claims.

Despite its previous admission that these claims were entirely new, MRIA now claims
that Stark/AKS issues have always been in the case and subject to discovery. Opp. at 2-4. It
claims that Saint Alphonsus waived its right to know what the factual basis of MRIA' s claims,
citing MRIA's May 30, 2007 response to Saint Alphonsus's contention interrogatories Nos. 18
and 20. /d. at 4; Aff. Of Brent Bastian Ex. A. What MRIA omits is that on June 12, 2007, in
response to a motion to compel, the discovery master rejected MRIA's waiver claim, and forced
it to answer Saint Alphonsus's contention interrogatories. See Report of Discovery Master at 3-4
(attached as Ex. A).
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MRIA then filed a second version of its responses to the Fifth Set of Interrogatories,
dated July 12, 2007, which included "supplemental responses." Ex. B. In that response, MRIA
asserted that the factual allegations underlying its fiduciary duty claims were set forth in its
punitive damages briefing, and that its wrongful interference claims were those cited in Bruce
Budge's 2007 report. See "Supplemental Responses" to Interrogs. 18 and 20 (Ex. Bat 13-14).
Budge's 2007 report contains no reference to Stark, AKS, or violations of policy as elements of a
wrongful interference claim. See Ex. 4417. And MRIA's punitive damages brief does not allege
fiduciary duty breaches due to such statutory or policy breaches. 1 These claims have never been
in the case, and were not identified in discovery.

B.

MRIA Cannot Prove AKS Liability, And Cannot Assert "Policy" Breaches
as "Wrongful" Behavior Unrelated to Actual AKS Violations.

On the merits, MRIA concedes that it cannot prove any Stark violation. Opp. at 11. It
does, however, claim sufficient evidence to prove AKS violations, or else violations of
SARMC's "internal policy" related to Stark or AKS violations. These arguments must fail.
1.

Claims of AKS Violations

With respect to violations of AKS itself, MRIA's argument suffers from many flaws.

First, MRIA claims that Saint Alphonsus "fails to cite any case" for the proposition that one
1

See Mem. in Support ofMRIA's Mot. to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages (Dec. 20,
2006). This brief mentions Stark and AKS in a footnote, but not for the purposes of claiming
Stark or AKS as a basis for liability in this case. Rather, in a section of the brief related to
wrongful withdrawal, MRIA noted that a portion of the PWC memo discussing dissociation
references potential "State and Federal" investigations in the event of withdrawal. !d. at 6-7 &
n.3. MRIA opined that this referred to Stark or AKS investigations. See id. Neither that
footnote or any other part of the brief claims that Stark, AKS, or policy violations as the basis of
MRIA 's fiduciary duty claims or that referrals shifted due to such violations. See id. at 10-25.
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cannot avoid the bar to private enforcement of AKS by pleading AKS as the "wrongdoing" in a
tortious interference claim. MRIA simply ignores the significant authority cited in support of
that claim. Mot. at 7. MRIA cannot use an AKS violation as a basis for its claims. !d.
Second, MRIA's "merits" argument is at odds with the law. Citing a single document

(Ex. 4377), it claims that Saint Alphonsus "clearly has directed its employees and staff
physicians to refer hospital patients only to IMI," and that Saint Alphonsus is benefitted. MRIA
is required, however, to show that renumeration has been paid to referring physicians in
exchange for the referrals. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b("whoever knowingly and willfully offers or
pays any remuneration ... to any person to induce such person (1) to refer an individual" for
services). The fact that Saint Alphonsus pays its employees is not sufficient "renumeration," by
the plain terms of AKS itself. See id. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B) ([the statutory prohibition] shall not
apply to ... any amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a bona fide employment
relationship with such employer) for employment in the provision of covered items or
services."). MRIA cites no case law to the contrary. 2
Moreover, MRIA recognizes that an AKS violation requires both proof of scienter and
that the kickback related to a federal health program; however, it cites no evidence related to
scienter at all {Opp. 15) or that any kickback related to Medicare/Medicaid patients. As to the
second missing element, MRIA variously, and wrongly, asserts that one can simply speculate as
2

MRIA cites a 2003 advisory opinion, suggesting that it held a situation like Saint
Alphonsus's to be a violation of AKS. Opp. at 12-14. As the title indicates, it is advisory and not
binding on other parties. That document does not address, let alone state, that there is blanket
AKS liability for the act of a hospital having its own employees refer to a facility it owns.
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a matter of"common sense" that Medicare/Medicaid patients were referred (Opp. 15), that
evidence from Saint Alphonsus 's case-in-chief fills the gap (id. at 15-16), or that Saint Alphonsus
has the burden of disproving this element of AKS. (Id. at 16.) These are all patently wrong.
MRIA has the burden of introducing evidence during its case to support its claims, or directed
verdict must lie. And even if such speculation or unwarranted burden-shifting were allowed,
MRIA still has pointed to no evidence as to the number of referrals that allegedly violated AKS,
leaving no basis for a jury to conclude any damages for the violation.
2.

Violations of"Internal" or "Public" Policy re: Stark/AKS Violations

MRIA's alternative argument is that it may allege Stark and AKS violations indirectly
through (1) public policy, (2) IMI's internal policy, or (3) alleged breaches of the Saint
Alphonsus-IMI agreement. Opp. At 5-9. Each of these fail as well.
First, with respect to public policy, MRIA is simply attempting to recast Stark and AKS
violations as some amorphous "public policy" proscription. Opp. at 8. But Stark and AKS, if
anything, state a policy against defrauding Medicare or other federal health programs. See, e.g.,
Saint Agnes Med. Ctr. v. Dogali, 2010 WL 307916, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ("[t]he purpose of the
Stark Law is to protect the government from Medicare fraud"). Without proof of AKS or Stark
violations, there is no public policy breach. Moreover, MRIA's authority3 regarding an alleged
public policy regarding access to physicians both involve public policy restrictions on noncompete clauses in physician contracts, and are of no use here. Nor has MRIA cited any case
3

See Mercy Health System v. Bicak, 2011 WL 1785618, at *8-9 (Ark. App. 2011);
Murfreesboro Med. Clinic v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 683 (Tenn. 2005) (cited in Opp. 8).
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where the alleged referral of hospital patients to a hospital-owned facility is, without more,
wrongful action supporting a tort claim. The "public policy" argument has no merit.

Second, as Saint Alphonsus showed, violation of a private, internal company policy-a
policy to which MRIA was a stranger-cannot support a wrongful interference claim. Mot. at 4
& n.l. MRIA's authorities are inapposite, as neither involved strangers to the policy. In Whatley

Coffee v. Sara Lee Corp., the relevant fact was that a policy was not applied even-handedly to
two vendors who sought its help, 2006 WL 2631387, at *2-3 (E.D. Ark. 2006) (policy not to
"favor one distributor over another" was violated). And Nelson Jewelry v. Fein Design, 2007
WL 4554888, at *7 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 2007), the issue was whether a policy not to compete with
customers was violated as to the customer.

Third, for the same reasons, MRIA 's assertion of a contract breach must fail. First, the
provision in context was intended to address Stark and AKS issues, so MRIA's attempt to simply
disregard that limitation should be rejected. More fundamentally, MRIA was not a party to the
IMI contract containing the alleged policy, nor does it claim it was a third-party beneficiary of
the Saint Alphonsus-IMI Joint Venture Agreement. See Ex. 4226, § 14.7 ("No Third Party

Rights. This Agreement is intended to create enforceable rights between the parties hereto only,
and creates no rights in, or obligations to, any other Persons whatsoever."). The authority cited
by MRIA, moreover, makes clear that breach of a contract is not sufficient to state a wrongful
interference claim, yet that is what MRIA now purports to claim. See Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc.,
647 F.3d 291, 311 (2011). MRIA may not claim an alleged breach of a contract it was not a

party to, in order to prove that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully interfered with MRIA' s business.
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II.

THE 1997 AND 2001 RADIOLOGY CONTRACTS UNAMBIGUOUSLY
REQUIRES GSR SERVICES FOR THE HOSPITAL, AND NOT MRI CENTER.
The 1997 radiology contract explicitly defines the term "Medical Center" as the "regional

medical center" in Boise owned and operated by "501(c)(3) corporation" Saint Alphonsus. Mot.
at 6. Further, the initial recital makes clear that "Saint Alphonsus and the Group contemplate
that all radiology services required by the Medical Center and its medical staff and patients shall
be provided by the Group except for certain exclusions described in this Agreement," id., and the
operative provisions make clear that the radiologists' interpretive duties, including their duty to
read MRI images, are only those images required in the "Medical Center." /d. at 6-7.
The 2001 agreement is even more explicit. It again defines Medical Center as the
"regional medical center" owned and operated by the non-profit Saint Alphonsus, and then states
that that "Medical Center" also includes the "Breast Care Center" it "does not include any
affiliates or otherwise ancillary operations of Saint Alphonsus located on Saint Alphonsus's
campus or otherwise." /d. at 7-8. It likewise defines the radiologists' obligation to perform
services, including MRI interpretations, required in the "Medical Center." Id.
In both cases, then, the express language of the contracts (1) defines the term "Medical
Center" to mean the hospital itself, and (2) provides that the services to be provided are limited
to the "Medical Center." MRIA offers no response to these points. It again simply claims that
the term "Medical Center" must include MRI Center because Center is located on the campus.
(Opp. at 7, 9). But "Medical Center" is a defined term under the contract, which does not mean
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"campus" but rather means the non-profit 501(c)(3), hospital-owned regional medical center.
That definition excludes MRI Center-a point which MRIA does not and cannot contest. 4
MRIA also argues that the term "Medical Center" must include MRI Center because the
radiologists must read MRI scans for the "Medical Center," and only MRI Center had an MRI.
Opp. at 7. MRIA mixes apples and oranges. Essentially, MRIA claims that GSR had to perform
professional services for MRI Center patients because it owned the technical equipment. This is
a non-sequitur. The contracts apply to professional services required by the Medical Center, not
technical services. Mot. at 6-7. The contract does not define the obligation to read as a function
of the supplier of the scans-hospital, affiliate, or otherwise-at all, and MRIA points to no such
provision. See generally Ex. 4033, 4229. Per the contract, if the "Medical Center" had a need
for an MRI interpretation, then GSR had to do it. It simply does not follow that, because MRI
Center owned a scanner, that GSR was obligated to perform professional services for MRI
Center patients who were not "Medical Center" patients as defined in the contracts.
MRIA then suggests that the exclusivity provision of§ 8.1 is somehow relevant. Opp. at
8. But that clause does not define the radiologist's duties; it discusses their exclusive right to
read scans taken on equipment owned and controlled by the hospital. Mot. at 8-9. This
4

MRIA claims, with respect to the 1997 contract but not the 2001 contract, that the
prefatory language of Section 1.1.1 stating that "The Group, through its individual Physicians,
shall perform all services generally and customarily performed by the Medical Center hospitalbased radiologist group including, but not limited to the following," somehow applies to MRI
Center. (Opp. at 7.) But that provision again refers to services performed at the Medical Center,
raising the definitional problem that MRIA has failed to address. Moreover, the prefatory
language then leads into a discussion of the duties required, which as noted, are services for "the
Medical Center"-the hospital, not MRI Center.
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provision does not apply to MRI Center's equipment for two reasons: first, MRI Associates, and
not Saint Alphonsus, owns and controls MRI Center's equipment. The fact that Saint Alphonsus
is a partner in MRI Associates is irrelevant; the partnership is a distinct legal entity separate
from its partners. See Idaho Code§ 53-3-201(a) ("A partnership is an entity distinct from its
partners."). MRIA has offered no evidence that Saint Alphonsus individually has any ownership
interest in MRI Center's equipment. More to the point, MRI Center has not responded to the
pertinent issue that the use of its equipment cannot be limited by a contract by other parties.
MRl Center did not agree to give exclusive rights for GSR to read scans done on Center's

equipment, and thus there was no such right as a matter oflaw. Mot. at 9.
MRIA then suggests that it should be able to argue its "theory" of the contract to the jury
based on parol evidence such as the lay interpretation of its witnesses or terms in contracts. Opp.
at 8-11. But the "legal effect and interpretation of a contract is generally a matter of law for the
Court, and the only exception is where the language of the contract is found to be ambiguous,"
Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 829 P.2d 1342, 1347 (1992), and in any event, parol evidence
cannot "contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract from the terms of the contract" and "[a] written
contract that contains a merger clause is complete upon its face." 5 In re Univ. Place/Idaho Water
Center Project, 146 Idaho 527, 536, 199 P.3d 102, 111, 199 P.3d 102 (Idaho 2008). The Court
must interpret the contract, according to its own terms, without regard to the lay interpretations
offered by MRIA's interested witnesses.
5

Both the 1997 and 2001 contracts contain a merger clause. See Ex. 4033 § 11.6 ("Entire
Agreement" clause); Ex. 4229 § 14.1 ("Entire Agreement" clause).
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Finally, MRIA argues that, if the Court rules in Saint Alphonsus's favor, it will advance
yet more new theories: that (1) there was some non-contractual duty for Saint Alphonsus to
provide free interpretive services at MRI Center, the failure to do so was a breach of fiduciary
duty; or (2) the 2001 contract secretly took away MRI's rights under the 1997 contract. Opp. at
3-6. But this case is far past the point where MRIA can avoid legal rulings by making lawyer
argument. It has put on its case, and must have evidence to support its theories. MRIA does not
identify any factual or legal basis for the first alleged duty, nor has it advanced any claim that the
2001 contract took away rights. It has presented evidence on one theory: that these contracts
obligated Gem State to perform professional interpretive services for MRI Center's patients, and

that GSR and/or Saint Alphonsus injured MRI Center by not enforcing or following those
contracts. But the 1997 and 2001 contracts do not require GSR to provide those services, and a
directed verdict should be granted on this issue with appropriate jury instruction.

III.

MRIA HAS FAILED TO PROVE SOME OR ALL OF ITS DAMAGES.
MRIA has also failed to establish, through the evidence presented in its case, the theories

of damages it has propounded. As the Court already noted in its October 14 recapitulation of its
rulings, the damages evidence must be evaluated based on the state of the proof placed before the
jury. See 10/14111 Trial Tr. at 4362-65. On the trial record, MRIA's damages theories fail.

A.

MRIA Effectively Concedes that its Lost-Profits Damages for Meridian and
Eagle Fail as a Matter of Law.

In Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119 (2007), the
Supreme Court held that, in performing a lost profits analysis, a party must establish proof as to
what its own profit margins and costs would have been as to a hypothetical business, and that
SAINT ALPHONSUS 'S CONSOLIDATED REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DIRECTED VERDICT
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evidence of the competitor's own margins and costs is insufficient to take damages out of the
realm of speculation. Mot. at 7-9. Here, MRIA's expert Mr. Budge explicitly assumed, in
calculating lost profits, that MRI Mobile's margins and costs would be identical to IMI's actual
margins and costs. !d. There has been no evidence of what MRI Mobile's own margins would
have been at Meridian or Eagle. !d.
In response, MRIA concedes that "Budge calculates MRIA's damages by the profits that
IMI would have received," and does not dispute that it failed to prove MRI Mobile's actual profit
margins. Opp. at 10-12. It claims that Trilogy is inapposite because the wrongdoing at issue was
breach of a non-compete (Opp. at 11 ); however, this is curious since, just as in Trilogy, MRIA
claims that the defendant improperly competed, preventing Mobile from performing that work
and causing lost profits. See Trilogy, 144 Idaho at 846, 172 P.3d 1121. But more importantly,
the theory of wrongdoing is not important; what is relevant is that Trilogy defined what proof is
sufficient and what proof is insufficient for a lost profits claim. Budge's claim for Meridian and
Eagle damages was based on a lost profits theory, so Trilogy is directly on point. Since MRIA
has not offered evidence of what a hypothetical MRIM-Meridian or MRI-Eagle's profit margins
and costs would have been, but instead assumed IMI's profits and costs as its own, MRIA's lostprofits damages claims for MRI Mobile fail as a matter of law.
Thus, Mr. Budge's theory that MRI Mobile suffered lost profits in the amount of
$19,061,617 at Meridian and $4,237,522 at Eagle (Ex. 5067) should not be allowed to go to the
jury. Likewise, per Mr. Wilhoite's testimony as to the 51% of future lost profits attributable to
Mobile via Meridian and Eagle, in the amount of$ 6,987,000, should be disallowed as well.
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10/17/2011 Trial Tr. at 5706. To the extent that any lost profits damages theory goes to the jury
(and no such theory should be allowed, see infra), only the$ 29,734,898 attributable to MRI
Center is allowed; the rest is speculative. Ex. 5078; Trial Tr. at 4705 (fixing typo in Ex. 5078).

B.

MRIA Has Not Presented Evidence Sufficient to Resolve the Supreme
Court's Pope Concern, and Concedes that Unless the Jury Finds 100% of
Lost Scans Were Caused By Wrongdoing, Its Damages Claim Fails

Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 234,
646 P.2d 988, 1005 (1982), a damages analysis is insufficient if it assumes, "without any support
in the record, that the [defendant's] operation would not have won any portion of the ... market
absent" the defendant's misconduct. Thus, as the Court noted, "[a]s to lost profits measure of
damages, they must be broken out as to the portion of the business lost as a result of competitors'
misconduct, and between the portion lost as a result of other factors." 10114/11 Trial Tr. at 4362.
MRIA concedes that Bruce Budge did not do this analysis; rather, it suggests that this
burden is satisfied by proving Saint Alphonsus's liability by improperly supporting IMI. Opp. at
6. But that is irrelevant. As Pope contemplated and as Mr. Budge himself recognized, the
damages in a lost-profits case must be analyzed by comparing what the defendant actually lost,

and what they would have lost anyway in the but-for world, and computing the difference. See
10/14/2011 Trial Tr. at 4463-64. The "difference" between the actual world, and the world that
would have occurred, is the lost profits. 6

6

MRIA suggests that Mr. Budge satisfied Pope based on his decision not to seek lost
profits damages for one potential pool of scans-new doctors who had not referred to IMI and
who had admitting privileges at St. Luke's, suggesting that this is settled due to the pre-trial
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Thus, in the but-for world, ifiMI would have opened as a competitor anyway, or there
were other causes oflost profits (such as competition from others) there would have been some
lost profits to MRIA anyway, and those have to be filtered out of any damages claim. Mot at 5.
Here, IMI would have existed in the but-for world; MRIA abandoned its 2007 claim that Saint
Alphonsus improperly assisted IMI's start-up. See Mot. at 4 n.2. Mr. Budge did not calculate
what share of the market IMI would have received in the but-for world, or otherwise analyze
other factors that might have caused losses, such as other competition. !d. at 6. Contrary to
MRIA's claim, we are not dealing with an imperfect model; instead, Mr. Budge candidly
admitted that he did not model this but-for world at all, because MRIA's counsel didn't ask.
10/14/11 Trial Tr. at 4653. To be sure, MRIA argues that there would have been no competition
at all in the but-for world, because "Saint Alphonsus created the competition by sabotaging any
attempt to establish 'one big happy family.'"-i.e., that Saint Alphonsus usurped the opportunity
of MRIA to partner with GSR in 1999 or 2001. Opp. at 6. This fails for multiple reasons.
First, this case is well past the stage where lawyer argument can paper over the flaws in

the evidence. MRIA's expert has failed to analyze what the competitive marketplace would have

(continued ... )

pleadings. Opp. at 7. But this is wrong; the directed verdict motion must be decided on the trial
evidence. During the trial testimony, Mr. Budge made disqualifying admissions that his decision
to do "rough justice" by arbitrarily seeking only one category of lost profits is not based on any
scientific or mathematical computation, but rather his own speculation. Mot. at 6-7. MRIA has
not offered any rebuttal to Saint Alphonsus 's arguments on this point, let alone established that
Budge's admitted speculation his "lost profits" universe is proper under Idaho law. See id.
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looked like in a but-for world, with IMI as a competitor, or otherwise. There is no evidence on
this point, and no way to calculate losses to MRIA from wrongdoing as opposed to other factors.
Second, there is a fundamental mismatch between the theory of a 1999/2001 MRIA-GSR
usurpation and the damages model presented in this case, such that the 1999/200 I usurpation
theory cannot be used as the basis for any lost profits analysis. As noted, Mr. Budge's report
contained a "Scenario 5" damages model for a 1999/20001 MRIA-GSR usurpation theory, but he
did not present that to the jury. And Mr. Budge failed to account, in his damages model, for the
fact that in the "assumed" world of a MRIA-GSR partnership, some part of the profits would
have flowed to GSR, and not MRIA. Mot. at 14-15. MRIA concedes that the usurpation theory
can only be used for disgorgement, apparently recognizing this flaw in Budge's analysis. Opp. at
21. Thus, Budge's damages models are insufficient under a 1999/2001 usurpation theory.

Third, even ifMRIA could avoid Pope problems by a bare assertion that no scans would
have gone to IMI but for Saint Alphonsus's help, this necessitates a special verdict question to
determine whether this very narrow (and implausible) fact has been proven. If the jury finds that
IMI would have received some business even without Saint Alphonsus, then by MRIA's own
concession it has failed to offer a damages model that accounts for the effect of such proper
competition, and no lost-profits damages can be awarded.

C.

MRIA Has Not Presented Damages Evidence Accounting for the Fact that
Saint Alphonsus had a Right to Compete After April 1, 2005.

MRIA concedes that Bruce Budge has made no attempt to determine what damages
occurring after April1, 2005 were caused by acts ofliability before April1, 2005. Opp. at 13.
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This admission should be dispositive. This Court has held that the mere act of dissociation
cannot be the basis for damages, and that Saint Alphonsus had no duty not to compete after April
1, 2005; as such, there is no new liability for acts of competition after April 1, 2005. Rather,
damages may be awarded after that date, but only if it flowed from prior bad acts. Mot. at 10.
Again, Mr. Budge simply assumed that post-2005 competition was a basis for liability and that
Saint Alphonsus had no right to compete; these are legally-flawed premises and there has been
no effort by MRIA to comply with this Court's instruction regarding post-2005 liability.
Perhaps recognizing this flaw, MRIA now directly argues, contrary to this Court's
rulings, that Saint Alphonsus is liable for dissociating and competing. First, it claims that under

Bushi v. Sage Health Care, 165 Idaho 764 (2009), that "the manner in which Saint Alphonsus
dissociated from MRIA, and/or its motivation therefore, was in bad faith, and thus in breach of
its fiduciary duty notwithstanding that it was in technical compliance with the partnership
agreement." Opp. at 13. But, as has been repeatedly noted in this case, Saint Alphonsus did not
dissociate pursuant to any provision of the partnership agreement; it exercised its statutory right
to withdraw under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. MRIA is seeking the same wrongful
dissociation damages it did at the first trial, on grounds that Saint Alphonsus had no right to
leave the MRIA partnership, and thus its competition after that date was wrongful. Opp. at 13.
This is a claim for wrongful dissociation damages, and is impermissible.
Further, MRIA's conclusion does not follow from its premise. Even if the "act" of
dissociating is wrongful because it is bad faith (despite the fact that "bad faith" is not a ground
for wrongful dissociation, Idaho Code § 53-3-602, and RUP A acknowledges that dissociation for
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the purpose of competition is legitimate, id. § 53-3-603 & official cmt. 2), it does not follow that
Saint Alphonsus's subsequent competition is a basis for damages. Rather, RUPA provides that
the measure of damages for a wrongful dissociation is the "damages caused by the dissociation,"
that is to say, damages "caused by the wrongful nature of the dissociation" itself. !d. § 53-3602(c) & official cmt. 3. The example given is "expenses resulting from a partner's premature
withdrawal from a term partnership, such as replacing the partner's expertise or obtaining new
financing." !d. Thus, MRIA would thus be entitled to damages arising from the wrongful means
by which the dissociation occurred, but not subsequent competition after Saint Alphonsus
lawfully. Competition is a legally-permitted consequence of the dissociation, even if the manner
of the dissociation somehow caused harm.
Second, MRIA claims that it is simply entitled to prove that all damages after 2005 were
caused by pre-2005 acts, and cites several alleged examples of bad acts: the claimed usurpation
of the opportunity to partner with IMI from its inception, technical assistance, hours of coverage,
etc. Opp. at 15. Again, however, MRIA offers no actual evidence of the splash-forward effect
of these allegedly pre-2005 wrongful acts. For instance, MRIA does not cite any evidence that,
once Saint Alphonsus dissociated, that it could not hire as many radiologists as it wanted to open
Center 2417, or that it was unable to obtain IT services from any one of numerous alternative
vendors (as it, in fact did, per its own complaint). It has no evidence from which a jury could
conclude, for example, that a doctor who first shifted a referral to IMI in 2009 did so because of
wrongful acts instead of legitimate competition, at a time when MRIA was fully in control of its
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own schedule, had its own PACS system, and so forth. Proof of prior bad acts is not sufficient
evidence of future causation, as a matter of logic or as reflected in any evidence cited by MRIA.
Third, MRIA claims that it has evidence ofpost-2005 wrongful interference that justifies

its post-2005 claims, citing (1) a claim that in 2005, Jack Floyd could not get technical help from
Saint Alphonsus such that "referring physicians would not come back," and (2) the Stark/AKS
claims that should be dismissed for the reasons cited supra. Again, even accepting the Floyd
evidence, how does proof that "referring physicians would not come back" in 2005 prove that
new referrals that shifted from 2006-2010, and which will shift through 2015, was due to a 2005

"slowness" in IT support? And MRIA certainly has no substantial evidence from which a jury
could reasonably conclude that all post-2005 scans were due to Stark/AKS (which does not
apply to private referrals) or to an alleged 2005 "slowness" in IT support.
Finally, MRIA claims that "disgorgement" is not affected by the non-compete, but seems
to concede that it is not entitled to disgorgement at all unless it proves its usurpation theories.
Opp. at 17. It does not claim, and should not be allowed, disgorgement based on theories other
than usurpation. Any other basis for disgoregement is subject to the post-2005 damages analysis.

D.

MRIA's Responses to the Remaining Damages/Causation Issues Are Either
Conceded or Are Wrong.
1.

The Uswpation of the Opportunity to Partner with IMI is Time-Barred
and Was Not Ruled on During the Prior Proceeding

As set forth in the motion, there is no evidence in the record from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that MRIA would have partnered with IMI after 1999. Mot. at 13-14.
MRIA does not cite any record evidence to the contrary, and directed verdict is appropriate.
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Second, MRIA claims that there is "no case law" for the proposition that the statute of
limitations is applicable to damages. Again, MRIA is wrong. In the earlier motion to exclude
damages theories, Saint Alphonsus cited significant authority for the proposition that the statute
of limitations begins running from when the wrongful act occurs; MRIA cannot claim damages
from a 1999 usurpation that is time-barred/ a point that MRIA implicitly conceded in its prior
briefing. See Opp. to Mot. to Exclude Damages Theories at p. 13.
Third, MRIA claims this issue was decided by Judge McLaughlin and not appealed.
This is also false. MRIA never argued in the 2007 case that Saint Alphonsus usurped an
opportunity ofMRIA's to partner with GSR at its inception. This specific claim of usurpation
was advanced for the first time in Budge's 2011 expert report as "Scenario 5." And even MRIA
conceded that the first time it ever mentioned anything of the sort was in the fact section of its
Supreme Court brief in 2008. See Opp. to Mot. to Exclude Damages Theories at 12. The issue
has never been advanced in the trial court, and there is no law-of-the-case impediment here.
2.

There Was No Eagle Usurpation as a Matter of Law.

Saint Alphonsus showed that, apart from a stray Jack Floyd reference to Eagle, there is
no reference to any Eagle usurpation, and there is certainly no substantial evidence from which a
jury could find that Saint Alphonsus usurped MRIA's ability to go into Eagle, when that facility
7

See, e.g., State v. Bilbao, 130 Idaho 500, 503, 943 P.2d 926, 929 (1997) (whether statute
of limitations has run depends on when the "act occurred"); Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin &
Matthews, Chtd., 125 Idaho 607,613,873 P.2d 861,867 (1994) ("To determine whether this
statute of limitations bars the claim, we must determine when the first negligent act occurred.
This analysis focuses upon the acts complained of .... "); Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179, 18081,484 P.2d 728, 729-30 (1971) (assessing statute oflimitations on contract claims act by act)
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did not even open until over 3 years following Saint Alphonsus's dissociation. Mot. at 15.
MRIA responds by inadvertently conceding the point: it admits that MRIA chose not to take the
opportunity: it claims that since Saint Alphonsus had no "urgency" to go to Eagle in 2001 and
that "MRIA would not undertake any action that its partner, Saint Alphonsus, was opposed to,"
that Mobile never went. Opp. at 20. In other words, MRIA does not claim that Saint Alphonsus

prevented MRI Mobile from going to Eagle (as it cannot given DMR's 5 votes on the MRIA
board), but rather that it voluntarily chose not to go. MRIA's acknowledged passivity cannot, in
any linguistic or legal sense be viewed as Saint Alphonsus taking that opportunity for itself. By
MRIA' s own logic, the opportunity was untaken by anyone until 2007. A verdict should be
directed on the Eagle claim.
3.

MRIA Admits MRI Center and MRI Mobile are Overcompensated in
Budge's Model by 7.5%. and Those Damages Should Be Disallowed.

Saint Alphonsus also showed that MRI Center and MRI Mobile's asserted damages are
overstated by 7.5% each, because Mr. Budge was instructed not to deduct their management fee
expense from their profits. Mot. at 17. MRI does not dispute this; rather, it claims it was just
doing this to simplify the math. Opp. at 21. Simple math or not, MRI Center and Mobile
concede that they are overcompensated, and their damages should be reduced by that amount.
What is more troubling is that MRIA does not dispute that its "simplifying the math" has
the effect of zeroing-out MRI Associates' own damages, thus precluding Saint Alphonsus from
offsetting its departing partner share against any award of damages to MRIA. Opp. at 22.
Rather, MRIA suggests that this is their intent, and that Saint Alphonsus will have to sue to
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enforce its judgment separately. Id. The Court should prevent such gamesmanship. At a
minimum, MRI Center and MRI Mobile's damages must be reduced by 7.5%, with that 7.5%
being reassigned as MRIA damages. Mot. at 17-18.
4.

The Court Should Direct a Verdict on the Diminution Claim

Finally, Saint Alphonsus showed that a directed verdict is appropriate on the diminution
theory. There has been no discovery allowed on MRIA's claim of its 2011 value; moreover,
although Dr. Prochaska testified as to the value ofMRI Center, his promise that MRIA experts
would address the causation factor never materialized. Mot. at 18. MRIA's response,
effectively, is that it does not need to prove damages causation; however, this is clearly wrong.

See, e.g., Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 919, 684 P.2d 314, 321 (Ct. App. 1984) (party "must"
establish that any "loss [in business value] was produced by defendant's conduct rather than by .
. . other variables."); SADC, 148 Idaho 479, 498,224 P.3d 1068, 1087 (2010) (instructing MRIA
to supply "'a method of figuring damages'" that distinguishes between business lost as a result of
the alleged bad acts and business that would have been lost absent those bad acts). Mr. Budge
did not attempt to distinguish what diminution of value was caused by wrongdoing and what was
caused by other factors, and so this theory fails as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
This Court should grant the directed verdict motions.
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DATED this 22th day of October, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 22th day of October, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

v
D

D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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I~TRODUCTION

St. Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.
(collectively SARMC) moved the Discovery Master (DM) for an order requiring MRI
Associates, LLP (MRlA) to provide complete responses to:
1.

Interrogatory Nos. I 0-24 (the "contention" interrogatories);

2.

Interrogatory Nos. 26~28; and

3.

Requests for Admission Nos. 24-29.

MRlA resisted SARlvfC's motion with respect to all responses sought.
The parties submitted briefs and affidavits in support of their respective positions. The

matter was heard on a time-shortened basis pursuant to agreement at the DM' s offices. Counsel
for SARMC and MRIA presented argument. Counsel for TI1ird~Party Defendants appeared but
did not argue.

BACKGROUND
SARMC's motion, as indicated above, addresses three issues: the first two issues deal
with responses to interrogatories. MRIA asserts that it is not required to answer Interrogatory
Nos. 10-24 on the basis that the parties had reached an agreement not to answer ''contention''
interrogatories. It also asserts that it is not required to answer Interrogatory Nos. 26-28 on the
basis that SARMC has exceeded the 40-interrogatory limit allowed under Ru1e 33(a), Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, MRlA believes that it should not be required to respond to
Requests for Admission Nos. 24-29, on the grounds that the responses, if any, would be
irrelevant since SARMC has not asserted a claim against MRlA for spoliation of evidence.
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SARMC argues that, although there had been an agreement not to pose 14Contention"
interrogatories, that agreement had been waived by MRIA's conduct and that SARMC had
already answered similar "contention'' interrogatories from MRIA based on its belief that MRIA
had waived the agreement. SARMC denies that it has exceeded the 40-interrogatory limit and
instead comends that it has only submined a total of 32 interrogatories, counting sub-parts.
SARMC, in Requests for Admission Nos. :24-29, had asked MRIA questions regarding its
records-retention policy. SAR.MC asserts that such questions are pennitted under Rule 26(b),
I.R.C.P., since they may lead to the discovery ofadmissible evidence.

The DM made an oral finding at the hearing that he would grant SARMC's motion with
respect to the ''contention" interrogatories and that he would order MRlA to respond to those
requests.

The DM also told the parties at the hearing that he would compel MIUA to respond to

Requests for Admission Nos. 24 thrOugh 29 relating to the records-retention policies ofMRIA.
The DM reserved his ruling on the issue of whether SARMC has exceeded the 40interrogatory limit.
FINDINGS

I.

"CONTENTION11 INTERROGATORIES. Although both parties agree that at a

meet and confer meeting in December of 2006, they had reached an agreement that instead of
requiring the parties to respond to the so-called "contention'' interrogatories~ the parties would
simply produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their respective claims and

defenses in the matter. However, apparently there was a misunderstanding between and among
REPORT OF DISCOVERY MASTER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO FIFTH SBT OF
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the parties relating to that agreement, such that SARMC came to believe that the agreement had
been waived by MRJA. MRIA's counsel, at hearing, admitted that they had mistakenly sent out
"contention" interrogatories to SARMC. Whatever the reason for the confusion, SARMC did
respond to MRlA's "contention" interrogatories after setting forth its objections.
The OM is persuaded 1hat the panies should be treated exactly equally with
respect to "contention" interrogatories. The DM does not assign blame to either side over the
issue and the misunderstanding that resulted, but does believe that the parties should be placed on
the same footing concerning these kinds of interrogatories. Accordingly, the DM orders that
MRlA must answer Interrogatory Nos. 10-24. Such a ruling places the parties in parity and
serves the interests of justice.
2.

RECORDS-RETENTION REQUESTS. SARMC has requested in Requests for

Admission Nos. 24-29 that MRIA provide it with infonnation regarding its recordS·l'etention
policy, if any. MRIA refuses to do so on the basis of relevance since it points out that SARMC
does not have a claim against MRIA for spoliation of evidence. MRIA seems to make the
argwnent that any inquiries to it about its document-retention policy is per se irrelevant since
SARMC has not asserted a claim fot spoliation.
Under the broad Iatitllde permitted under Rule 26(b), I.R.C.P .• the parties to
litigation may pose questions~ the answers to which would perhaps be irrelevant under
evidentiary standards applicable to trial evidence. If the answers sought could be reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, the questions and answers thereto are
allowed. Using this standard, the DM believes and therefore finds that it is possible that
information relating to MRIA's written document-retention policy, if any, could lead to the
REPORT OF DTSCOVERY MASTER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO FlFTH SET OF
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discovery of admissible evidence. Accordingly, the DM finds and orders that the Requests for
Admission Nos. 24·29 must be answered by MR.IJ\.
3.

THE 4D·INTERROGATORY RULE UNDER RULE 33(a), I.R.C.P. MRIA has

refused to answer Interrogatory Nos.

26~28

propotmded by SARMC on the grounds that SARMC

bas exceeded the limit of 40 interrogatories allowed under Rule 33(a), I.R.C.P. MRIA asserts,
through counsel that, according to its count, SARMC has exceeded 60 interrogatories when the
subparts contained within the interrogatories are taken into account. SARMC contends that even
with a liberal application of the subpart rule, it is still comfortably under the 40·interrogatories
limit.
Counsel for SARMC argued that courts, in considering this issue in the past, have
adopted what he termed as a "common sense'' rule. If an interrogatory contains within it discrete
subparts seeking different categories of information, each subpart should be counted. However)
an interrogatory may still be only seeking one basic fact, which could include subparts (for
example, names, addresses, telephone numbers).
The DM has now reviewed the interrogatories cited by MRlA as containing in excess of
the 40-interrogatory rule:
According to the DM's count, SARMC had, including subparts, propounded 38
interrogatories to MRIA in their First through Fourth sets ofinterrogatories. The Fifth set of
interrogatories includes Interrogatories 10~24 which are the "contention" interrogatories referred
to above and which the OM has found that MRIA must answer in order to bring it into parity
with SARMC. Those 11Contention,' interrogatories, when subparts are counted, actually contain
illl

additional 29 interrogatories. Accordingly, the DM will not order MRIA to answer any
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further interrogatories beyond those required in responding to the "contention" interrogatories
Nos. l 0~24. SARMC's Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatories 26-28 is denied.
SUMMARY

In swnmary, the DM finds as follows:
1.
'

SARMC's Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1Ow24, the

contentionn interrogatories is granted;

4

2.

SARMC's Motion to Comp·el Responses to Requests for Admission Nos. 24w29 is

granted;
3.

SARMC's Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 26-28 is denied,

DATED this

ti!!Jy

of June, 2007.
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CERTIFICATE OF MATLJNQ
I hereby certify that on the
copy of the within instrument to:

~of JWle, 2007, I mailed (served) a true and correct

Thomas A. Banducci
Greener Banducci Shoemaker
950 W. BaMock, Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702
Via Fax: 319-2601
Jack S. Gjording
Gjording & Fauser
P. 0. Box 2837

Boise, ID 83701
Via Fax: 336-9177
Patrick J. Miller
Givens Pursley LLP
P. 0. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701
Via Fax: 388-1300
Warren E. Jones
Eberle Berlin
P. 0. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701
Via Fax: 344-8542

Rodney R. Saetrum
David Lloyd
Saetrum Law Offices

P. 0. Box 7425
Boise. ID 83702
Via Fax: 336-0448
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G. Rey Reinhardt, IV (ISB No. 6209)
greinhardt@greenerlaw. com
Daniel J. Gordon (ISB No. 6051)
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GREBNeR BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, lD 83702
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Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third
Party Plaintiff MRJ Associates, LLP
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICJAL DISTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DfVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,

Case No. CV OC 04082190
MRIA'S RESPONSES TO SADC
AND SARMC'S FIFTH SET OF
lNTltRROGATOR1ES AND
EIGHTH SET OF REQUltST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
AND FOURTH SET OF REQUESTS
~'OR ADMISSIONS

Defendant.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership, on its own behalf, and on behalf ofMRl
Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership, and MRT
Mobile Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership,
CounterClain1ants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE. INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MBDlCAL CENTER.
CounterDefendants.

MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL R.ESPONSaS TO SADC AND SARMC'S FJFTH SBT OF INTERROOATORIES AND
ElGHTH SET OF REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMRNTS AND FOURTH SET OF REQUESTS FOR
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Exhibit B: Consolidated Reply in
Suooort of Directed Verdict Motions

003769

MRI ASS6CIATBS, LLP, an tdaho limitCd liability
partnership,

Third-Party Plaintiff,

"·
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDlCAL IMAGING, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE
RAOIOLOOY, LLP. an Idaho limited liability
partnership; and IMAGINO CENTER
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership,

Defendant/Counterclaimmtt MRI Associates, LLP (hereinafter ''Defendant''), by and
through the undersigned counsel of record, axtswers Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.'s and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s Fifth Set of!nterrogatories, Eighth Set of
Requests fo:r Production and Fourth Set of Requests for Admissions, served on t\p:dt 30, 2007, as
follows:

GENERAL STATEMENT
Defendant's investigation in this matter is ongoing and continuing. Consequently,
defendant will respond to these requests for production to the best of its present existing ability.

The discovery process may reveal factS 1 documents and witnesses not presently known to
defendant, but vpon which the defendant may rely and to which defendant reserves its right to
supplement its responses. Consequently, the resp()nses contained herein are not intended to, and
shall not preclude defendant ftom making any contentions or from relying on any facts,
docwnents or witnesses at trial based upon additional evidence obtained during the discovery

process.
These responses are made solely for the purpose of this action. Each response is subject
to all objections as to competence, relevance, materiality, propriety and admissibility, and to any
MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO SADC AND SA.R.MC'S f[f'Til SETOP INTERROGATORIES AND
EIGHTH S.BT OF REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND POURTll SET OF REQUESTS FOR
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and all other objections on any grounds that would require the exclusion of any statements
contained herein if such request asked of, or statements contained herein where made by, a
witness testifying in court, all of which ob.jections and grounds are hereby expressly reserved and
may be interposed at the time of trial. The responses given herein are without prejudice to any or

all of defendant's rights to produce any subsequently discovered documents or to revise these
responses if further discovery so indicates.
These responses shall not be deemed to constitute admissions (i) that any particular
document or thing exists, is relevant, non-privileged, or admissible in evidence, or (ii) that any
statement or characterizatjon in plaintiffs interrogatory is accurate or complete.
GENERAL OBJECTIONS

Defendant objects to each of the requests for production to the extent that they call for
intbrmadon already known by Plaintiff.
Defendant objects to the entire set of requests for production, and to each and every
individual request contained therein, to the extent that it purports to caH for information
protected by the attorney-client privilege, or materials subject to the attorney work product
doctrine, or for otherwise privileged materials. Said information, docwnents, and/or materials

will not be produced.
Defendant objects to the entire set of requests for production, and to each and every
jndividua! request therein, to the extent that it seeks private or confidential information. Despite
Defendant's efforts to

ne~otiate

a Confidentiality Stipulation with the Plaintiff~ to date, Plaintiff

has failed to execute Defendant's proposed Confidentiality Stipulation or to propose its own
Confidentiality Stipulation for Defendant to execute. As such, no additional documents will be
produced by D~fendant until a mutually agreeable confidentiality stipulation is executed by the
parties.
MRTA'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES 1'0 SADC AND SARMC'S FIFTH SET OF' fNTERROGA1'0'RIES AND
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To the extent that the requests for production seek information outside the custody or
control of defendant, defendant objects to the request as unreasonable and unduly burdensome.
Defendant objects to the entire set of requests for production, and to each and every
individual request therein, to the extent that it attempts to impose obligations upon defendant that
are contrary to or inconsistent with Rules 33 and 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.·
Defendant will respond to plaintiff's requests for production in accordance with Rules 33 and 34
ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendant reserves all objections or other questions as to competency, relevance,
materialityt privilege or admissibility as evidence in any subsequent proceeding or in the trial of
this or any other action of this response and any 'document or thing or information provided in
response to plaintiff's requests fOT production. Nothing in these responses is to be construed as
an admission by defendant with respect to the authenticity, admissibility or relevance of any
documertt produced, or of the truth or accuracy of any characterization or statement of any kind
contained in any document.
Defendant's responses to plaintiff's requests for production will be made to the best of its
present knowledge. information and belief. The responses will, at all times, be su~jcct to
additional or diffe1·ent information that discovery or further investigation may disclose.
Defendant reserves the right to make usc of or to introduce at any hearing or trial documents and
information responsive to plaint.iff's requests for pl'Oduction after the date of these responses.
Defendant expressly incorporates the above General Objections into each specific
response to the requests for production set forth below as if set forth in full therein. A response
to an individual request shall not constitute a waiver of any applicable specific or general
objection to the individual request.
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INT£RROQATOIUES
INII}RRQOATORYNO. IQ: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegation contained in
p.aragraph 42 of your Second Amended Counterclajm, second bullet poit1t, that Saint Alphonsus
disparaged MRIA 's services.

BESPONSE TO I~T&RROGATORY NO.IO: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu

or responding Lo contention intorrogatmies,

the pruties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesse~ that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identity all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulalion, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each ~ide
would ca\1 at trial. MRIA has produced such list of witnesses, which it has S\lp,Pleroented MRIA
is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support the subject allegation.

QPI.EMJNTAL RESPQNU TO INTER.Rfg!ATORX NO.!O; SARMC
disparaged MRIA' s services by compaling them unfa~orably to IMPs services when SARMC
directed its staff to refer all inpatients, outpatients and emergency room patients to the IMI
mobile magnet in late Decembe;, 2005. See, Ben Murray deposition Exhibit 23. SARMC
disparaged MRJA's business in its presentation to Trinity Health in October 2003. Cindy
Schamp disparaged MRLA's business by suggesting that MRI Center did not maintain state of
the art equipment at a board meeting ofMRl Center in May, 2001.

Il'fmRROGATORY NO, 11: Plea..c;e identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with partjcularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegation contained in

paragraph 42 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim, third bullet point, that Saint Alphonsus
promoted IMI's services over MRJA's.
MR.IA'S SUPPLEMENTAL ltBSPONSES TO SADC AND SARMC'S FJFtH SET OF tNTERR.OOATORIES AND
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation.

§!!PfLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO IJ'ITERRQGAIQRX NQ, U: SARMC
p~·omoted

IMl's services over MRIA 's services continuously, once IMI downtown opened for

business. Likewise, SARMC promoted lMI over MRICI when SARMC directed its staff to refer

all inpatients, outpatients and emergency room patients to the TMI mobile magnet in late
December 2005. SARMC promoted IMJ services over MRIA's services by representing to the
market as part of it!"l branding strategy, that IM I was a partner with SAMRC irt the delivery of

imaging services, including magnetic resonance imaging services. SARMC participated jn
nwnerous joint marketing efforts with IMI that promoted all ofiMI's imaging services, including

a. pilot program. whereby referring doctors were provided. with laptops so that they could access
radiological images (including magnetic resonance scan images) front laptops that displayed the
IMI and SARMC logos. SARMC participated in and supported IMI's marketing efforts that
highlighted its connectivity to SARMC's IT system. SARMC failed to maintain a level pJaying
field between MRICI and IMI (which was in the hospital's power and control) when GSR
radiologists unilaterally cut back MRICI's hours of coverage and service.
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INTERROGATORY NQ. 12: Please identitY aU witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 42 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim, fourth bullet point that Saint Alphonsus
voted against growth initiatives at the MRIA board level.
BJSPONSE TO INTERROGATORX.NO. 1~: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not pract~cal for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identitY witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRJA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation.

SUPPLEMENTAL Rt§PONSE TQ INIERB.QGA'IQRY NO.!l: See Deposition
of Cindy Schamp relative to her testimony on this topic. Also see, Minutes of the MRI Mobile
meeting of May 16, 2001 . .A..lso see the Shattuck Hammond memoranda dated August 30,2001

•

and October 1, 200 I.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports in any way, the allegation contained in

paragraph 43 of Your Second Amended Co'l,lnterclaim that Saint Alphonsus provided
"confidential business infonnation from MRIA, MR1 Center, and MRI Mobile" to IMI In Your
Answer to this lnterrogatory, please specifically describe the "confidential business infonnation"
that you allege Saint Alphonsus inappropriately provided to lMI and how You believe this
information was obtained,

MRJA'S SUPPl-EMENTAL RESPONSES TO SADC AND SARMC'S ftFTH SET OF lNTERROOA TORII~S AND
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;RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. U: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29,2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agfee to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was nol practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRJA is unaware of any documents not produced in djscovery which support
the subject allegation.

SUPPJJEMENTAL BESPON8E TO lNTQ.R9GATORY NO. 13: See deposition of
Cindy Schamp on this topic. Ms. Schamp repeatedly informed MRIA's competition that
SARMC was tryjng various strategies to "get out" of the MRlA relationship. She also provided
infonnation regarding what she perceived to be the timeframe within which SARMC would take
steps to get out ofits lease relationship with MRIA. She also reported back to JMI information
relative to MRlA's operational strategies for its PET operation. lnfonnation contained in the

MRIA partnership agreement!; attd leases was confidential to MRlA. Likcwi~;e, to the extent that
Ms. Schamp discussed with IMI SARMC's strategies for leaving MRJA> this information (as to

its timing and method) was valuable infonnation to MRJA's competitor.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way> the allegation contained in
paragraph 46 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that "[Sandra) Bt·uce became frustrated
with the Hospital's position in 1MI' after Saint Alphonsus "officially" joined TMI in 2001. In
Your Answer to this Interrogatory~ please specifically identify all evidence you intend to offer at
trial to show Ms. Bruce's state of mind during the relevant time pe1iod.
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO~ lii At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practjcal for the
parties to identify all evidence rellected in depositiorts or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRTA is Wlaware of any documents not produced in discovery which suppol't
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROAGORY NO. 14: Objection, calls for

attorney work product. Without waiving lhis objection, see depositiort of Sandra Bruce. Ms.
Bruce has testified inconsistently on this matter. At one point, she testified that she did 110t know
whether the hospital's investment in IMrs "non MRI'' operation was losing money. At another
point, she acknowledged knowing this fact. Although she claimed she was unaware that there
were complaints coming out of the hospital that the joint venture was not making mooey for the
hospital. she did admit, upon reviewing exhibit 17 to her deposition that "someone's not happy
[at the hospital]" about the joint venture's financial pe,.formance. She also testified that she
recalled that Mr. Fry was concerned in this regard.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Please identify all witnesses and documents and descnoe
with particularity each and every fact that supports. in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 48 of Your Secottd Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus intended to make
MRIA and MRI Center the "exclusive" provider ofMRI's on Saint Alphonsus' earn-pus 11for the
duration ofthe partnership (at least 2023)," In Your Answer to this Interrogatory, please
specifically identify all evidence you intend to offer at trial to show MRlA and MRI Center had
MRTA'S SUPPLEMENTAL RBS'PONSES TO SADC AND SARMC'S FifTH SBT OF INTERROOATORIES AND
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the right to be the 11 exclusivc11 provider of MRis on the Saint Alphonsus Campu..c;,
,RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support·their
respecdve claims and defenses in this case. The pa1ties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contentio.n
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation> the partie~ agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to lRCP 33(a).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGA'I'ORX NO. 15: Objection, call!!

for attorney work product. Without waiving this ob,jection, see the MRl Associates Partnership
Agreement. When SARMC entered into the MRI Associates Partnership Agreement in 1985, it
agreed that it would not engage in any prohibited competitive activity, as defined in the
agreement, within 100 miles of the SARMC carnt')US. Accordingly it could not, through its own
business, or that of an affiliate (e.g., IMI) offer MRI services on the SARMC campus.
TNTERROQATORY NO. 16: Please identify all witnesses and docwnents and describe
with particularity each and every fa.et that supports 1 in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 49~ bullet point two, ofYour Second Amended Counterclaim that since its
dissociation from MRIA Saint Alpbonsus h4s directed its physicians "to refer magnetic
resonance imaging patients to IMI, to the exclusion ofMRl Center." In your Answer to this
Interrogatory, please specHically identify each physician or other individual you intend to call at
trial who will offer testimony supporting this allegation and summarize each witness• proposed
trial testimony.
MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO SADC AND SAAMC'S FifTH SET OF lNTERROGATORIES AND
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 16: At a meet and confer conference held
on Novembel' 29, 2006, the p&ties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not praetical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in docW\\ents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would caU at triaL MRlA is unaware of any documenLs not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).

§JJnLIMENIAL 1\ESPOI!SE I0 m:fQBOGATOBY NO• 16:

Objection, calls

for attomey work product. Without waiving this objection, see answers to Interrogatories 10 and
11.

INTERROGATORY NO. 17; Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegation contained in
paragraph 49, bullet point three, of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that since its
· dissociation from MRIA Saint Alphonsus bas created "uncertainty among referring physicians
and MRI Center employees by spreading rumors that MRI Center would close in the near
future."

IU:SPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 17: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identifY all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this ca$c. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agJ·eed to identify witnesses each side
MRlA'S SUPPLEMENTAL RF..SPONS.ES TO SADC AND SARMC'S FJFTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND
.EIGHTI·T SET OF REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND FOURTH SET OF REQUESTS FOR.
ADMTSSIONS • 11
Exhibit 8: Consolidated Reply In
Suooort of Directed Verdict Motions

003779

----would call at trial. MRlA is unaware of My documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
~YPPJ<EMINTAL BESPON§E TQ ~TERRQGATORY NO.

12:. Sec deposition of

Jack Floyd, Robin Matzek (f.k.a. Robin Cioffi), Julli Hopkins and Meeting Minutes dated April
lS, 2003 and September 8, 2003 (see the deposition of Cfll'Olyn Corbett Exhibit 6). Rumors of

MRICI closing, or losing its lease were generally circulated before withdrawaL Although asked
, to assist in quelling these rumors, SARMC apparently did nothing. After dissociation., emails
between Carolyn Corbett and Jeffrey Seaboume suggest that SARMC and GSR were discussing
the timing for excluding MRICI from SARMC's DR, and further suggest that this information
was made known to the referring physician community. See exhibit 30 to the Leslie Kelly Hall
September 20, 2006 deposition.
INTERROGATORY N0, t 8: Please identify all' witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that suppo11.s, in any wa.y, the allegation$ contained in
paragraph 82 of Your Second Amended Counlercla1m that Saint Alphonsus breacbed "certain
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care" prior to its dissociation from MRIA. In Your Answer to this
Interrogatory, please specifically identify the alleged duties and all actions taken by Saint
Alphonsus that you allege that were a breach of its alleged fiduciary duties to MRlA and all
witnesses that will testify at trial that such alleged actions were a breach of any alleged fiduciary
duties.
RJ!1SPO~SE

TO INJ']£RROGATOR¥ NO. 18: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
MRlA'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO SADC AND SARMC'S FIFTH SET OF iNTERROGATORIES AND
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parties to identify all evidence reflected in deposition~ or in docwnents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation) the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Addidonally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number ot
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Objection, calls
for attorney work product. Without waiving this objection, see MRINs Brief in Support of
Motion to Amend for Punitive Damages, as well o.s the affidavits, attacluncnts, and deposition
testimony submitted with that briefing. Although that memorandum explores the willful and
reckless nature ofSARMC's breaches of duty, it describes in detail the facts

~md

evidence which

also support MRIA's breach of fiduciary duties claim.
lNTERROOATORY NO. 12: Please identify all witnesses and docUinents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegations contained in

paragraph 96 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus failed to discharge
its "duties as a partner in good faith." In Your Answer to this rnten·ogatory, please specifically
identify each of the "various acts" You allege were taken in breach of Saint Alphonsus' alleged
duty to act in good faith towaxd MRIA. ,
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NQ. 12: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their.
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed lhat it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in docwnents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would wl at trial. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO SADC AND SARMC'S FIFTH SET OF INTERROGATOlUES AND
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the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
SypPLEMENIAL RES"fONSE TO INTERRQGAIQRX NO. See answer to
Interrogatories 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, and 18.
INTERR09ATORY NO. zo:.Piease identify aU witnesses and documents and describe

with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegatjons contained in
paragraph 101 of Your Second Amended Counterclaill'l that Saint Alphonsus "intentionally and
wrongfully interfered with, tenninated. andlot induced a breach ofMRI Center's prospective
contractual relations and business expectations." In Your Answer to this Interrogatory, please
specifically identify all "prospective contractual relations and business expectations" that you
allege in which Saint Alphonsus interfered.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGAJQRX NO. 20: At a meet and conJer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu oftesponding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all wjtnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence retlected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of any document$ not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 20; See the Report of
Bruce Budge, for a discussion of the methodology used to estimate the profits lost a..fi a result of
the various breaches of fiduciary duty committed by SARMC as well as the breaches of the non
compete clause in the Partnership Agreement. These various breaches interfered with MRIA' s
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business opportWlitics with its long established customer base.
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: With regard to the allegations contained in paragraph 105
of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that "MRIA contributed capital for the development and
implementation of SARMC's PACS/RTS system, and is an owner of the system," please
specUicallyidentify the pieces of hardware or software you purchased directly from DR
Systems, Inc., and the amoullt paid for any such items.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical fQr the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA js unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this jnterrogatory exceeds the itllowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).

SUPPLEMENTAL RESfQNSE TO INTERRO$iAGOJtX NQ. 21LPlep.se see
deposition of Robin Cioffi and the exhibits to her deposition.
JNTER.l}OGATORY NO. 22: With regard to the allegations contained in paragraph 151
of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus' appointed rcpresentative:s to the
lMl Management Committee ''who regularly received MRIA confidential and trade secret
information in the eourse of their work at SARMC or in their roles as SARMC representatives to
MRlA," please specifically identify the nature of the "confidential and trade secret information"

that You allege has been misappropriated.
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22: At a meet and confer conference held
on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu ofrespondjng to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case.

Th~

parties agreed that it was not practical for the

parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in documents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRIA is unaware of MY documents not produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22: While sitting on

both the MRIA Board of Partners and the IMI Management Committee, SARMC representatives
regularly received MRIA confidential infonnation such as business plans, finru.tcial info1·mation,
marketing strategies, HR information, compensation plans, and equipment and capital
purchasing infomtation. Please see the minutes of the meetings attended by these "dual role"

SARMC representatives for details.
lNTERROGATORY NO. 23: Please identifY all witnesses and docwnents and describe

with particularity each and every fact that supports. in any way, tbe allegations contained in

pa1·agraph 15 8 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus has "aPpropriated

MRIA's and MRl Center's confidential business infonnation" In Your Answer to this
Interrogatory, please specifically identify the nature of the .. confidential business infonnation"

that You allege has been misappropriated.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 23: At a meet and confer conference held

on November 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the pruties would agree to produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
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respective claims and defexlses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions

OJ.'

in documents in response to contention

interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation, the parties agteed to identify witnesses each side
would call at trial. MRlA is unaware of any documents nol produced in discovery which support
the subject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of
Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
§!JPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 23: Although MRIA
has voluntarily dismissed its misappropriation claims, it nevertheless maintains that the
information described in answer to Interrogatory 22 was misappropria!ed by SARMC, in that it

was received by SARMC representatives under false pretenses, i.e., through concealment of the
fact that the SARMC representatives sitting on the MRIA Board of Partners were also Members
of the IMI Management Committee. SARMC breached its fiduciary duty when it failed to

disclose these material facts.
INTERROGATORY NO. 24: Please identify all witnesses and documents and describe
with particularity each and every fact that supports, in any way, the allegations contained in
paragraph J65 of Your Second Amended Counterclaim that Saint Alphonsus "has knowingly and
intentionally destroyed jnfonuation, or knowingly and intentionally allowed information to be
destroyed, which is relevant to this litigation."

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24: At a meet and confer conferertcc held

on Novembet· 29, 2006, the parties agreed that in lieu of responding to contention interrogatories,
the parties would agree to p1·oduce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their
respective claims and defenses in this case. The parties agreed that it was not practical for the
parties to identify all evidence reflected in depositions or in doc\.IXrlents in response to contention
interrogatories. Pursuant to that stipulation) the parties agreed to identify witnesses each side
MRlA'S SUPPLEMENTAL RnSPONSES TO SADC AND SARMC'S FIFTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND
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would call at tdal. MRIA is unaware of any documents not produced in discovery which support
the Sllbject allegation. Additionally this interrogatory exceeds the allowable number of

Interrogatories to IRCP 33(a).
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24: SARMC

knowingly failed to preserve its electronic information when it anticipated litigation with MRIA.
SARMC also knowingly failed to preserve itS electronic information at the time i! filed the
present litigatiort. Sec 30 (b) (6) deposition of SARMC taken November 1, 2005. Throughout
discovery, SARMC has refused to produce various documents and drafts of documents, to which
MRIA is entitled (e.g., drafts of the IMI Operating Agreement). Tbjs failure to produce
documents also amounts to spoliation.
I

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION§

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21: Please adrt1it that MRlA did not have a written
document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic infotmation in April
2004.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24: Objection. Irrelevant.

SARMC has not asserted a claim for spoliation. The nonexistence of a retenlion policy is also
irrelevant to a claim of spoHation.
SUPPLEMENTAL MSPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24: To the

extent that the MRIA partnership had a duty to maintain documents electronic or otherwise, that
responsibility fell equally upon all partners. including SARMC. MRIA's document retentjon

policy, which went into effect in July 2006, was marked as Exhibit 2 to the Robin Cioffi
deposition. Prior to this time, the practice at MRTCI was to maintain medical records (electronic
or otherwise) for ten years, or until the date of majority in the case of a minor.
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REQUEST fOR ADMISSION NO....l2.;_Please admit that MRIA did not have a
written document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic
infonnation in Mayl 2004.
RESPQNSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2S: See Response to

No.24.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO 8EOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. ~5:

See Response to No. 24.
B$0UEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26: Please admit that MRIA did not have a
written document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic
information in June 2004.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26: See Rcsponlie to No.

24.
SUPPLEMENTAL R£SPONSE TO REOUEST FOR ADMJSSION NO. 26:

See Response to No. 24.
REQUEST FQR ADMISSION NO. 21: Please admit that MRlA did not have a
written document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic
information in July 2004.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27: See Response to
No. 24.

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27:
See Response to No. 24.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2B: Please admit that MRIA did not have a

Written document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic information in
August 2004.
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 28: Sec Response to
No. 24.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO BEOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 28:

See Response to No. 24.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 29; Please admit M!UA did not have a

written document retention policy for the retention and organization of electronic
information in September 2004.
RESPONSE TO R.JtOUEST t'OR ADMISSION NO. 29: Sec Response to

No. 24.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 19:

Sec Response to No. 24.

DATED thi~ / (

day of July, 2007.

GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A.

~

'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the If day of July, 2007, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
JackS. Gjording

GJOROTNG & FOUSER
509 West Haye!l
Post Office Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
[Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants]

Patrick J. Miller
GIVENS PURSLEY.• LLP
601 W. Bannock Street

P.O. Box 2720

.S. Mail
acsimilc (208) 336-9177

Hand Delivery
vemight Delivery

OJ.1.&:'Mait

lZfFacsimile (208) 388-1300
0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery

Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
[Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter~Defendants]
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EXHIBIT

y
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~~.-----,Aenr------________

AM------~P.M

NOV 15 2011
JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JAMIE RANDALL
DEPUTY

Donald B. Ayer
Peter J. Romatowski
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE
TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE:
USURPATION AND
DISGORGEMENT

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
MRIA correctly notes that this Court has an independent obligation to determine whether
the preponderance of the evidence supports a fmding that Saint Alphonsus usurped partnership
opportunities from MRIA, and if so, the amount of any profits to be disgorged. See MRIA Mem.
Supp. Proposed Findings at 3; accord, e.g., Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 796,229 P.3d 1146,
1158 (20 10) ("Where an advisory verdict is issued on equitable claims, the trial judge is still
required to make independent findings of fact and conclusions of law on the equitable claims
before him, not solely relying on the jury's findings.").
Contrary to MRIA's assertions, however, the preponderance of the evidence shows that
Saint Alphonsus did not usurp from MRIA either the opportunity to partner with GSR or the
opportunity to open a facility in Meridian. And even if there had been a usurpation, the evidence
shows that Saint Alphonsus's net profits are substantially lower than claimed by MRIA.
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I.

THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A
FINDING THAT SAINT ALPHONSUS "USURPED" EITHER ALLEGED MRIA
OPPORTUNITY
A.

Saint Alphonsus Did Not Usurp MRIA's Opportunity to Partner with GSR
to Form IMI

The first alleged usurpation claimed by MRIA is that Saint Alphonsus in 1999 caused
MRIA to lose the opportunity to become partners with the GSR radiologists in the MRI side of
IMI. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 6607. The most obvious reason that this claim should be rejected is
that it is time barred. MRIA has acknowledged that any such usurpation was completed by 1999,

see id at 6638-39 (closing argument). Because MRIA never alleged this usurpation during the
2007 trial (but, rather, only the Meridian opportunity which unquestionably would have occurred
during the statute-of-limitations period), there can be no "law of the case" from 2007 which
allows MRIA to pursue this facially time-barred usurpation claim. See, e.g. Saint Alphonsus's
Consol. Reply in Support of Directed Verdict Mots. Filed Oct. 18, 2011 at 17-18. 1

1

Saint Alphonsus recognizes that the Court ruled to the contrary, based on its view that Judge McLaughlin's ruling
that other, non-usurpation-based fiduciary duty claims were timely "continuing torts," is law ofthe case establishing
that the 1999 usurpation claim was also timely. Trial Tr. at 6315-17. Saint Alphonsus respectfully requests that the
Court reconsider. By definition, law-of-the-case doctrine can only apply to issues that were raised at the first trial,
and could have been appealed, but were not. Capps v. Wood, 117 Idaho 614,618,790 P.2d 395, 399 (Ct. App.
1990) ("under the 'law of the case' principle, ... courts generally will not consider errors which arose prior to the
first appeal and which might have been raised as issues in the earlier appeal").
MRIA brought no claim at the first trial that Saint Alphonsus had usurped a partnership opportunity to partner with
GSR in IMI. Therefore, Judge McLaughlin was not presented with, and thus could not have ruled on, the issue of
whether that usurpation claim (as opposed to other alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, such as wrongful competition,
that were then at issue) is time-barred, or is rather a continuing tort. Moreover, usurpation is qualitatively different
than the sort of fiduciary duty claims that were before Judge McLaughlin, such as wrongful competition, which
might be viewed as repetitive wrongful behavior. Cf Rogers v. Ardella Veigel Inter Vivos Trust No.2, 162 S.W.3d
281,290 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (distinguishing between "repetitive wrongful or tortious acts" and "continuing injury
arising from one wrongful act," and holding that statute-of-limitations applies when, even if"the injury was
continuing, it arose from a single act of usurpation."). Since Judge McLaughlin was not faced with this issue, Saint
Alphonsus could not have received a ruling on it, or appealed the issue to the Supreme Court. Law-of-the-case
principles do not apply here.
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Further, even if this claim were timely, the preponderance of the evidence does not
support a fmding that Saint Alphonsus usurped this opportunity from MRlA, but rather shows
that MRIA and GSR failed to come to a deal because they could not agree on terms. MRlA has
tried to assert that a usurpation occurred because a hearsay statement from Dr. Hall contained in
April 1999 meeting minutes (Ex. 4079) indicated that a deal was "very close to being finalized,"
and then the deal never happened. See Trial Tr. at 252-55 (Dr. Prochaska discussing same). But
the unambiguous record evidence shows that in April 1999, and throughout all of 1999, there
were many unresolved issues necessary for a deal between MRIA and GSR? It also shows that
after April1999, MRIA acted unilaterally to alter its position with regard to several terms of the
deal, to the disadvantage of GSR, including increasing the size of the non-compete radius that
GSR would be required to respect, 3 and decreasing the amount of the management fee that GSR
would receive. 4 With respect to MRlA's changing offer, on June 17, 1999, Dr. Curran himself
noted that "I don't think the rads are going to accept the decisions we made at the Board re the
rad imaging center partnership." 5 Ex. 800.

2

See, e.g. Ex. 415 §§ 1.1, 2 .2, 2.6 (May 1999 draft proposal noting unresolved "issues").

3

For instance, the non-compete radius that MRIA proposed for GSR went from 4 miles in April1999, to 10 miles

in May 1999, to 100 miles in June 1999. See Ex. 415 (May proposal changing "4 mile" to "10 mile" radius); Ex.
4085, p.2 (June minutes suggesting 100 mile radius, except for Meridian and Eagle); Ex. 418, § 2.2 (September
1999, further modifying to impose same non-compete for GSR, with no carve-outs)
4

Compare Ex. 415 (May proposal offering GSR 3.5% of gross revenues as fee) with Ex. 4085, p.2 (offering 3.5%
of net profits as fee).

s This was confirmed by witness testimony. See Trial Tr. at 2323:25-2324:12 (9/27/11 Schamp) ("My view is that
through much of '99, as talks progressed, they actually got a bit further apart."); id. at 3323:8-18 (1 0/4/11 Clift) ("in
late August, the week before IMI opened," MRIA and GSR were "getting further and further apart in the
negotiations. They were coming nowhere near a deal before IMI opened.").
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Further, when, as Dr. Curran anticipated, GSR refused MRIA's offer of partnership in
August 1999 (Ex. 4099, 4104), MRIA quickly knew about it. In early September 1999, Dr.
Curran stated in an email to Cindy Schamp's assistant his understanding that the radiologists had
"rejected the proposal that the rad center be owned by" Center. Ex. 398. This understanding
was further confirmed in Dr. Curran's October 27, 1999 "big stick" memo, in which he urged
Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp to use the coercive effect of the hospital's professional services
contract to force the radiologists to accept an arrangement by which they would own only 9% of
their own imaging center, via a l/11th ownership in MRIA. Ex. 66.
In the face of this docwnentary evidence, MRIA asserts that despite the clear evidence
that MRIA changed its offer for the worse and proposed unacceptable terms to GSR, and that
IMI was an immediate success when it was opened by GSR alone in September 1999, it still was
somehow Saint Alphonsus's misconduct that caused GSR not to enter into a deal with MRIA.
Specifically, MRIA claimed that Saint Alphonsus "took over" negotiations in the summer of
1999, and then, in December 1999, Saint Alphonsus offered GSR a "better deal" than what
MRIA was offering, by promising them 50% of MRI Center. See, e.g., Tr. at 257, 278-280; Ex.
4125, pp. 23-24. The source of this alleged "better offer" was a single section in a draft version
of what would, eighteen months later, become an agreement between Saint Alphonsus and GSR
to partner in the non-MRI side ofiMI.
In exercising its duty to independently assess whether Saint Alphonsus usurped from
MRIA the chance to partner with GSR in the IMI business, the Court should conclude that no
such misappropriation has been proven. The claimed "take-over" in the summer of 1999 rests
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wholly on the purported recollection of Dr. Prochaska. Trial Tr. 256-57. No suggestion that
Saint Alphonsus took over the representation ofMRIA in these discussions appears in any of the
numerous sets of MRIA or GSR minutes around this time, a fact which would be surprising if the
''takeover" had occurred, given the detail and frequency of both organizations' minutes. As late
as June 1999, MRIA was unambiguously in charge of the negotiations, with Dr. Curran
bemoaning that GSR would not accept the changes that "we made at the Board re the rad
imaging center partnership." Ex. 800.
Nor is Dr. Prochaska's alleged recollection consistent with the testimony of other
witnesses, several of whom testified that Saint Alphonsus did not take over negotiations in the
summer of 1999. See 9/23/11 Trial Tr. at 1706:14-25 (Bruce) (stating she was never asked to
take over negotiations); 9/27/11 Trial Tr. at 2339:11-2341:5 (Schamp) (stating that she was never
told that Saint Alphonsus was taking over negotiations); 10/4/11 Trial Tr. at 3315:5-9 (Clift)
(noting he participated in MRI-side discussions, and that Saint Alphonsus did not take over
negotiations in the summer of 1999).
Even if Saint Alphonsus had assumed responsibility for representing MRIA in its
negotiations with GSR, the claim that Saint Alphonsus blew the deal apart by offering a "better
deal" would not be remotely plausible. The language of the draft agreement, assuming it were to
be agreed to, amounted to nothing but a contingent promise, and depended on MRIA's voluntary
agreement to sell Center before it could be implemented. See, e.g., Ex. 4125, pp. 23-24. Further,
the supposed offer of a "better deal" by Saint Alphonsus had, in fact, been added at the request of
the radiologists, and, as ofDecember 17, 1999, not yet considered by Saint Alphonsus. Ex. 4125
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•
at pp. 23-24 ("drafting note" stating that the language was "requested by the radiologists but has
not yet been fully evaluated by Saint Alphonsus' senior management." The provision said only
that if Saint Alphonsus or its affiliates acquired a 100% ownership in Center, then IMI could
purchase 50% (Ex. 4125 p. 24), something that would have required MRIA's consent.
Other facts in the record demonstrate that the MRIA-GSR negotiations failed for reasons
unrelated to anything Saint Alphonsus did. By the time of this December 1999 draft agreement,
the Gem State Radiologists had already rejected, in August 1999, the offer that MRIA was
making. MRIA has not cited any evidence to suggest that the radiologists would have come
crawling back to take MRIA's offer in December 1999, several months after rejecting the l/11th
deal and then successfully opening IMI on September 1, 1999 without any partner. 6 Substantial
evidence, including the testimony ofGSR Doctors Seabourn and Davey, shows otherwise. See,

e.g., 10/4/11 Trial Tr. at 3319, 3323 (Cliff); 10/17/11 Trial Tr. at 4960-63, 4966-68 (Davey);
10/19/11 Tri,al Tr. 5275-76, 5289-92 (Seabourn).
In short, the preponderance of the evidence is that GSR and MRIA failed to come to a
deal because MRIA' s proposals were unacceptable to the radiologists. MRIA did not lose that
opportunity because Saint Alphonsus "usurped" it, and the Court should so hold. Thus, MRIA
should not be entitled to any disgorgement remedy based on this usurpation.

6

The far more reasonable inference to be drawn from the December 1999 draft is that it merely reflected the reality
which the DMR doctors themselves recognized: that by December 1999 there was no longer any chance for a
partnership, so a Saint Alphonsus buyout was the only realistic possibility remaining at that time. See 9116111 Trial
Tr. at 822-25 (Prochaska) . .ifsuch a buyout occurred, then IMI could buy into that business.
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B.

Saint Alphonsus Did Not Usurp MRIA's Opportunity to Open a Meridian
Facility

The preponderance of the evidence also shows that Saint Alphonsus did not "usurp" MRI
Mobile's ability to go into Meridian. First, it is undisputed that the GSR doctors' desire to open
a Meridian facility was well known to all parties during the 1999 negotiations (and, indeed, was
a subject of negotiations with respect to the non-compete), and MRIA was discussing Meridian
as a potential expansion site only months after IMI downtown opened. See, e.g., Ex. 542; Ex.
4085, Ex. 4156. The evidence is undisputed that GSR doctors made the choice to go to
Meridian, and it was not Saint Alphonsus's call. 10/19/11 Trial Tr. at 5339-40 (Seabourn). To
the extent that there was an "opportunity" in Meridian, it was on the table, known to all parties,
and GSR was going to take it, regardless of Saint Alphonsus's actions.

Second, MRIA does not claim that Saint Alphonsus had any power to prevent MRI
Mobile from expanding into Meridian. Saint Alphonsus had only two votes on the MRIA Board
and the remaining 8 votes would have been sufficient for MRIA to both purchase the real estate
in Meridian and to obtain fmancing for its operations. See, e.g., Ex. 4023 §§ 5.4.1, 5.4.2, & Ex.
4032 § 6.3 (terms of partnership agreement requiring eight votes for purchases of real estate, and
five for borrowing funds less than $5 million); Trial Tr. at 4546-47 (testimony ofMRIA expert
Budge claiming that capital expenditures at Meridian would have been only $2.2 million). Given
the undisputable fact that Saint Alphonsus had no ability to prevent MRIA from opening a
Mobile facility in Meridian, MRIA instead claims only that it chose not to go to Meridian
because Saint Alphonsus allegedly did not want to. See, e.g., Tr. at 3908-09 (Floyd); Tr. 6675
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(closing argument). This amounts to a concession that it was MRIA's choice- not Saint
Alphonsus's wrongdoing- that caused MRIA's failure to open a Mobile site in Meridian.

Third, MRIA has not offered any evidence, other than self-serving speculation, that there
was no more opportunity for MRI Mobile to open in Meridian after IMI did in 2002. To the
contrary, MRI Mobile could have still opened a facility in Meridian after IMI did, as at least
three other entities did after IMI Meridian opened. See, e.g., Tr. at 6173-78, Ex. 991. Thus, the
evidence is that there was a continuing opportunity to open in Meridian, but MRIA chose not to
pursue it. Saint Alphonsus could not have "usurped" an opportunity that still existed after the
alleged usurpation occurred. The Court should find that there was no Meridian "usurpation."

II.

IF THE COURT ORDERS DISGORGEMENT, THE PREPONDERANCE OF
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT SAINT ALPHONSUS'S NET PROFITS
AREFARLO~RTHANTHATCLMMEDBYMRIA

Even if disgorgement were an appropriate remedy, the preponderance of the evidence
establishes that the amounts claimed by MRIA are excessive, and that the lesser amounts set
forth below constitute more accurate estimations of Saint Alphonsus's net profits from the
opportunities at issue.

A.

MRIA's Estimate of Saint Alphonsus's Net Profits From the Opportunity to
Partner with the Radiologists Improperly Ignores Saint Alphonsus's Costs
and Improperly Includes Eagle Profits

Although the jury found that Saint Alphonsus realized approximately $11.5 million in net
profits as a result of misappropriating the opportunity to partner with GSR, MRIA contends that
the amount of profits realized by Saint Alphonsus (including projected receipts through 2015) is
$25.3 million. See MRIA Mem. Supp. Proposed Findings at 3-4. MRIA is incorrect because its
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figure of $25.3 million-which represents partnership income earned by Saint Alphonsus as a
result of its fifty percent ownership ofiMI's MRI business-grossly overstates Saint
Alphonsus's net profits in two critical respects.

First, MRIA 's figure does not account for the cost to Saint Alphonsus of acquiring the
opportunity to partner with GSR in the MRI side of IMI' s imaging business. It is undisputed that
Saint Alphonsus paid approximately $11.2 million for that opportunity. See Trial Tr. at 4888
(Saint Alphonsus CFO Ken Fry testifying that the "total Saint Alphonsus paid for th[e] 50
percent interest of the MRI portion of IMI" "was roughly 11.2 million"). Thus, Saint
Alphonsus's net profits-the amount it gained as a result of the alleged misappropriation of the
opportunity to own half of IMI' s MRI business-cannot exceed the difference between the $25.3
million in estimated partner income and the $11.2 million that it cost Saint Alphonsus to enter
the partnership and purchase that income stream. That figure, $14.1 million, represents the
outer limit of the disgorgement remedy with respect to the opportunity to partner with GSR.

Second, MRIA's figure improperly includes profits attributable to IMI's Eagle facility.
Specifically, the $25.3 million represents MRIA's estimate of Saint Alphonsus's share of all of
IMI's MRI profits since 2006, when Saint Alphonsus bought into the MRI side ofiMI. See Trial
Tr. at 4510-4518; Trial Ex. 5082. It thus necessarily includes profits attributable to IMI's Eagle
facility, which opened in 2007. But this Court has already held that MRIA may not recover
damages for the Eagle facility because it is "too remote in time from both the dissociation and
the expiration of the non-compete obligation." Trial Tr. at 6069.
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By MRIA's own estimations, Eagle accounted for $4,237,522 ofiMI's MRI-related
profits from 2006 to 2010. See Trial Ex. 5067. Halfofthat amount, or $2,118,761, must
therefore be deducted from the $17,078,469 that, according to Mr. Budge, constitutes Saint
Alphonsus's fifty percent share ofiMI's MRI-related profits from April2006 through 2010. See
Ex. 5082; MRIA Mem. Supp. Findings of Fact at 4. This adjusted figure is $14,959,708.
Similarly, Eagle accounted for approximately 23.7% ofiMI's overall MRI profits in
2010. See Trial Exs. 5067 & 5082 (2010 Eagle profits of$1,767,189, as shown on Exhibit 5067,
are 23.7% of2010 total MRI-related profits of$7,441,193, as shown on Exhibit 5082).
Assuming that the 2010 percentages are constant for 2011 to 2015, as MRIA assumes in its
similar calculations for Meridian, see MRIA Mem. Supp. Findings at 5, then the Court must
reduce by 23.7% the $8,250,000 that, according to Mr. Wilhoite, constitutes Saint Alphonsus's
fifty percent share ofiMI's MRI-related profits from 2011 through 2015. See Ex. 5082; MRIA
Mem. Supp. Findings at 4. This adjusted figure is $6,294,750.
Adding together the adjusted figures for 2006-2010 and for 2011-2015 yields a total of
$21,254,458, which represents the amount of income allegedly received by Saint Alphonsus as a
result of its ownership interest in IMI's MRI business, adjusted to exclude income from Eagle.
To determine Saint Alphonsus's net profits without Eagle, this figure, too, must be
reduced by the amount that it cost Saint Alphonsus to purchase the opportunity to partner in the
MRI portion ofiMI. Based on relative profitability, the Eagle facility accounts for
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approximately 16% of Saint Alphonsus's MRI-related income. 7 Reducing the $11.2 million
purchase price by that percentage results in an adjusted purchase price (excluding Eagle) of
$9,408,000. To determine Saint Alphonsus's net profits (excluding Eagle), this adjusted
purchase price must be deducted from Saint Alphonsus's non-Eagle income of$21,254,458. The
resulting figure of $11 ,846,458-very similar to the $11.5 million figure found by the jury-is
the most that the Court should find is appropriate disgorgement should it conclude that Saint
Alphonsus misappropriated from MRIA the opportunity to partner with GSR.

B.

MRIA Concedes That It Presented No Evidence in Support of a Meridian
Disgorgement Figure, and MRIA's Attempt to Manufacture Such a Figure
Should Be Rejected

MRIA concedes that the jury's advisory finding, suggesting that Saint Alphonsus realized
approximately $19 million in net profits as a result of misappropriating the Meridian opportunity,
was incorrect and not supported by the record. See MRIA Mem. Supp. Proposed Findings at 3-4.
MRIA also concedes that it "'did not directly present [a Meridian disgorgement] number in its
expert testimony." ld at 5 n.l. For this reason alone, the Court should relegate MRIA to a

7

$25,328,469 (Saint Alphonsus income including Eagle as set forth in Exhibit 5082) minus $21,254,458 (Saint
Alphonsus income excluding Eagle as derived above) equals $4,074,011 (Saint Alphonsus income attributable to
Eagle). Saint Alphonsus income attributable to Eagle is 16% of the total income ($4,074,011 divided by
$25,328,469). It is thus reasonable to attribute 16% of Saint Alphonsus's purchase price to Eagle.
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damages remedy for this claim and decline to fmd any amount of disgorgement for usurpation of
the Meridian opportunity. 8
If, however, the Court accepts MRIA's invitation to reverse engineer a figure from the
numbers that MRIA's expert did present, then it should reject the $7,158,029 figure proposed by
MRIA as incorrect because, like MRIA's calculations of profits related to the opportunity to
partner with GSR, it ignores the cost to Saint Alphonsus of purchasing a 50% share of IMI' s
MRI business. As noted above, that undisputed figure is $11.2 million. See Trial Tr. at 4888.
Because the Meridian facility accounts for approximately 28% of Saint Alphonsus's MRI-related
income,9 the amount of Saint Alphonsus's purchase price attributable to Meridian is 28% of
$11.2 million, or $3,136,000. Deducting this cost from Saint Alphonsus's Meridian-related
income of $7, 158,029 yields a net profit figure attributable to Meridian of $4,022,029. This
figure is the most that the Court should find is appropriate disgorgement should it conclude that
Saint Alphonsus usurped from MRIA the opportunity to open an MRI facility in Meridian.

8

MRIA seeks to remedy this shortcoming by asking the Court to "derive[]" an appropriate figure (which it claims is
$7,158,029) from the numbers that were presented during the trial. Jd. at 5-6. However, MRIA's exercise in afterthe-fact derivation is fundamentally flawed. It concludes that Meridian accounted for approximately 33% ofiMI
MRI-related profits by looking at Meridian's 2010 income of $1,592,155 as a percentage of the "lost profits"
claimed by MRIA for 2010. See MRIA Mem. Supp. Findings at 5; Trial Ex. 5067R-2 (lost profit summary). This is
an apples to oranges approach: MRIA 's claimed lost profits are not equivalent to IMI's income. Compare Trial Ex.
5067R-2 with Trial Ex. 5082. In fact, IMI's Meridian income constitutes a substantially smaller percentage (24.1 %)
ofiMI's overall MRI-re1ated income.
9

Dividing $7,158,029 (the amount of Saint Alphonsus's MRI-related income that MRIA argues is attributable to
Meridian) by $25,328,469 (Saint Alphonsus total MRI-related income, as set forth in Exhibit 5082) yields 0.2826, or
28%. It is thus reasonable to attribute 28% of Saint Alphonsus's purchase price to Meridian.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should hold that there was no usurpation in this case. In the alternative, if the
Court finds usurpation ofthe 1999 opportunity, the disgorgement remedy should be limited to
either $14,959,708 (including Eagle-related gains) or $11,846,458 (excluding Eagle-related
gains). If the Court finds usurpation only of the Meridian opportunity, then the Court should
decline to find disgorgement appropriate due to a failure of evidentiary proof of Saint
Alphonsus's Meridian-related profits, but in any event the Meridian disgorgement remedy should
be limited to $4,022,029.
DATED this 15th day ofNovember, 2011.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC

Counter-Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on the 15th day ofNovember, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

0
)!

D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery

Via Facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
)
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership,
)
)
)
Defendant.
)

Case No. CV -OC-2004-08219

'

EXHIBIT

- -;_

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

--------------------------MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited ))
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED, an Idaho )
limited partnership; MRI MOBILE LIMITED, )
an Idaho limited partnership,
)
)
)
Counter-claimants,
)
)
vs.
)
)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, )
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)
Counter-defendants.
)

------------------------------ )
Presently before the Court is the issue of whether and in what amount to award an
equitable remedy in favor of the counterclaimants. Trial was held in months of September and
October 2011, and argument was heard on this specific issue in December 2011. The Court now
makes the following fmdings of fact and conclusions of law.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1
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-

FINDINGS OF FACT
At the close of trial in this matter, the jury found that the counter-defendants (collectively
Saint Alphonsus) had misappropriated MRI Associates' opportunity to partner with the Gem
State Radiologists (GSR) and MRI Mobile's opportunity to open an MRI facility in Meridian,
Idaho. The jury also found that Saint Alphonsus had not proven any affirmative defense as to
these claims. Furthermore, the jury, in an advisory finding, found that the amount of profit Saint
Alphonsus realized by misappropriating the opportunity to partner with GSR was $11 ,510,949.
The jury also found that Saint Alphonsus realized $19,061,617 by misappropriating MRl
Mobile's opportunity to open an MRI facility in Meridian, Idaho.
Though the Court believes it is bound by jury's findings as to liability, it would make
identical findings based on the evidence presented at trial if liability were an issue for the Court.
Though the jury's findings as to liability are appropriate, the Court fmds that the jury's advisory
fmdings as to damages are erroneous. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds
the MRI Entities proved that the downtown and Meridian opportunities misappropriated by Saint
Alphonsus netted Saint Alphonsus $21,353,838. Specifically excluded from this amount are any
damages arising out of the Eagle opportunity.

Though there has been argument as to whether

the Court should deduct Saint Alphonsus's initial investment in Intermountain Medical Imaging
from the total award, the Court finds that it would be inappropriate to do so because Saint
Alphonsus has retained its interest in Intermountain Medical Imaging, and Saint Alphonsus is
only required to disgorge the cash flows it would have received up until2015, retaining its full
interest in any cash flows after 2015.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Under Idaho law, a partner owes a duty to "hold as trustee for [the partnership] any ...

Findings ofFact and Conclusions of Law 2
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benefit derived by the partner in the conduct . . . of the partnership . . . including the
appropriation of a partnership opportunity." I.C § 53-3-404(b)(1). The remedy for a breach of
the duty to hold partnership opportunities in trust is the disgorgement of "any money or property
in the partner's hands that can be traced to the partnership." I. C. § 53-3-404 cmt. 2. Thus, where
a partner is found to have misappropriated a partnership opportunity, it must disgorge any benefit
it received from the misappropriation.
Because the jury has found that Saint Alphonsus has misappropriated a partnership
opportunity, the Court fmds it appropriate that Saint Alphonsus disgorge the profits it realized as
a result of the misappropriation. Thus, MRIA is entitled to disgorgement damages in the amount
of$21,353,838.
~

DATED this 17 day of January, 2012.
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF11fuA ·
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP ., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
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Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219.__ _ _ _ __ ,

JUDGMENT

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED, an Idaho
limited partnership; MRI MOBILE LIMITED,
an Idaho limited partnership,

)
)
)
)
)
)
Counter-claimants,
)
)
vs.
)
)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, )
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)
Counter-defendants.
)

This action having come for jury trial, and the issues having been duly tried and a verdict
having been rendered by the jury on October 31, 2011, IT IS SO ORDERED THAT MRI
Associates, LLP (MRIA), MRI Limited (MRI Center), and MRI Mobile Limited (MRI Mobile)
(collectively MRI Entities) may execute on any one of the following alternatives:

~gmentl
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1. As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care (SADC) and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (SARMC) (collectively "Saint Alphonsus")
breached the Partnership Agreement by breaching the non-competition clause found
therein, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
MRl Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:

$25,420,000

2. As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
MRl Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:

$25,420,000

3. As to the claims of MRl Center and MRI Mobile that Saint Alphonsus intentionally
interfered with their prospective contractual relations, the following damages are awarded

in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRI Center: $25,130,149
MRI Mobile: $21,745,914

Judgment2
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Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center: $22,349,967
4. As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary duty owed
to the MRI Entities, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
$3,906,338
MRIA:
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center: $25,420,000
Disgorgement:
.MRIA:

$21,358,838

5. As to the claim of the MRI entities that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil conspiracy,
the following damages are awarded:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,125,070
MRI Center: $20,662,566
MRI Mobile: $17,879,973

Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:

$20,336,000

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amount executed upon by the MRI entities will
bear interest at the judgment rate of 5.375% per annum until paid in full.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Saint Alphonsus is awarded $4,600,000 against MRI
Associates, bearing interest at the judgment rate of 10% per annum, calculated from September

Judgmcnt3
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21,2007, until paid in full.

DATED this

.
a

day of January, 2012.

•

L__

WETIIERELL
~~
strict Judge
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JONES DAY
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THOMAS BANDUCCI
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Judgment 5

003813

EXHIBIT
St. Alphonsus v. MRI Associates

I

8/1/2007

Page 612

Page 610
1

2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE CLERK: Seat 135, Linsay Adams.
THE COURT: Linsay Marie Adams failed to appear.
THE CLERK: And seat 138, Edward Cook.
THE COURT: Edward August Cook, C-double 0-K,
failed to appear.
So, we have FTAs -- one, two, three, four, five,
six, seven, eight, nine, ten, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. Okay.
Fifteen FTAs.
The record will reflect it's now 9: 10, and these
jurors were summoned to appear at 8:00. Show causes will
issue.
Okay. Can we bring them in?
Again, we'll probably break about-- depending
on when they get in, I'd like to go an hour-and-a-half.
So, we'll take a break. So, that will be of assistance
to you. If you need to leave, why, you can do that.
(Off the record.)
THE CLERK: We have someone who has now
appeared.
THE COURT: That person has come to life, and
that person is?
THE CLERK: Seat No. 20, Charlene Wieme.
THE COURT: Charlene Markum Wieme has come back
to life. Oh, good.
We have Jeffrey Scott Johnson is diabetic, and
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a $300 fme or both. So, we thank you for your
attendance this morning.
Madam Clerk, you may commence the roll call.
(Roll call taken.)
THE COURT: "Well, ladies and gentlemen, we're
about to begin the trial of a lawsuit. Some ofyou may
be unfamiliar with the procedures which you are about to
participate in, and I'm going to briefly outline for you
how the trial will proceed. You have been summoned as
prospective jurors before us. The first thing we're
going to do in this trial is to select 15 jurors from
among you, ladies and gentlemen," and that will actually
occur on Monday, August 6th.
"I'm Judge Michael McLaughlin, the judge in
charge of the courtroom and this trial. The deputy clerk
of the court, Kristin, marks the trial exhibits and
administers oaths to you as jurors and to the witnesses.
The bailiff, Hal, will assist me in maintaining courtroom
order and will work with you as jurors in this case."
Actually, Gil will be the bailiff assigned to this case
starting on Monday. You'll like him. "The court
reporter, Tammy, will keep a verbatim account of all
matters of record during the trial.
"Now, each of you are qualified to serve as a
juror ofthis court. Now this call upon your time
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1 he is -- I'm going to excuse him. He is excused.
2
(Prospective jurors present.)
3
THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
4 This is the case of Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care,
5 Incorporated, an Idaho nonprofit corporation, plaintiffs,
6 versus MRI Associates, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
7 partnership, defendants.
8
I inquired of counsel earlier this morning, and
9 they have announced to the court that they're ready to
10 proceed.
11
In a moment, the clerk is going to call the roll
12 call of all of you. I know that it's a little slow at
13 the beginning, but by law, we have to do a roll call of
14 the jury. When your name is called, you will also be
15 identified by your number. And to indicate your
16 presence, just raise your hand, and I'll announce to the
17 clerk that you're here. Remember your number, and that's
18 the reporting number that we'll be using during the jury
19 selection process.
20
Now, we had some jurors that failed to appear
21 this morning. And so, when their name is called, you
22 will hear me announce, "Show cause will issue." And what
23 that means is that they have to come in and show cause to
24 the court to explain why they failed to appear, and
25 they're subject to five days in the county jail and up to
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doesn't frequently come to you but is part of your
obligation for your citizenship in this state and
country. Service on this jury is going to afford you the
opportunity to be a part of the judicial process by which
the legal affairs of your fellow men and women are
determined and protected under our form of government.
You're being asked to perform one of the highest duties
of citizenship; that is, to sit in judgment on facts
which will determine the outcome of this case."
Now, you received the trial schedule when you
were in the jury office. And, again, we go from 8:45 to
2:15 --take a 20-minute break. And then, from 10:45 to
12:25, take a 20-minute break. This trial is set for 16
days. I promise you the court is going to be snapping
the whip on this case. We're going to be on time. And
we'll give you, obviously, part of August 30th, August
31st to deliberate. If you need more time, we would have
you come back after the Labor Day holiday to continue
deliberations, if needed.
"To assist both --to assist you with the issues
and claims of the parties in this case, the attorney for
each party will be given up to five minutes to introduce
their client and give you a brief summary of what they
intent to present as claims and defenses in this case.
These statements are not evidence and are presented to
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in a way that doesn't ruffle your feathers too much.
But, thank you very much.
My co-counsel this morning, all through this
case, will be Pat Miller. Pat Miller is from the local
firm of Givens & Pursley here in Boise, and you'll see a
lot and hear a lot from Patrick Miller.
Behind Patrick is Trudy Fouser. The name of my
firm is Gjording & Fouser and she is the Fouser and I'm
the Gjording.
We have-- actually, Saint Alphonsus, as you
might guess, has hundreds of people, and we have brought
one here this morning. The rest of them are working. We
brought one of them here this morning as a representative
of Saint Alphonsus, and that is Stephanie Westermeier,
who is the general counsel.
Behind her is Harry Plotkin, who is a staff
person who is helping us with this case.
Tom has outlined the case, but, of course, you
probably already realize that we wouldn't be here if we
were in agreement with him or with their case. There is
another side of the story. And that's what you folks
will be doing here for a month, those of you-- I was
tempted to say, "are lucky enough to be here." But those
of you who are ultimately chosen to be here will be
listening to both sides-- of two sides of the story in
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to the presentation of the bad acts. And, of course,
from my point of view, importantly, you're going to be
listening to our responses to those bad acts because we
deny each and every one of them.
THE COURT: One minute.
MR. GJORDING: So, before I sit down, I wanted
to make one mention because perhaps this is confusing.
The judge has determined that Saint Alphonsus breached
its contract when it left the partnership in April of
2004. The judge will tell you, I believe, however, that
that breach of contract was not unlawful. Despite the
fact that we might be referring to it from time to time
as a "wrongful" move, it was not unlawful.
This, even though it might be confusing to you
this morning, it will be explained to you as we go along.
So, I just invite you to, if you're selected, to listen
to both sides.
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.
"Now, as the judge in charge of this courtroom,
it's my duty at various times during the course of this
trial to instruct you as to the law that applies to this
case. The duty of the jury is to determine the facts, to
apply the law as set forth in the instructions to those
facts, and in this way decide this case. In applying the
court's instructions as to the controlling law you must
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order to resolve this dispute between my client and MRIA.
I would say in terms of context that this
case -- we're the plaintiff in this case; albeit, MRI is
going first. We decided that they would go first. We
agreed that they could go first as a matter of actually
shortening this time. We thought the time would be a
shorter trial if they went first.
But this case started because, as Mr. Banducci
mentioned, Saint Alphonsus left this partnership -- and
I'll get to the wrongful part of it in a minute. Saint
Alphonsus left this partnership on April 1, 2004. And in
order for us to recoup our investment from the
partnership, which we were entitled to do, it became
necessary for us to sue MRI to get that money back.
In response to that complaint that we filed in
this courthouse, MRI filed a counterclaim, and it's on
the basis of that counterclaim that MRIA is going to be
outlining to you what I am going to refer to throughout
this trial as "bad acts." There are going to be
different -- different forms of activities or different
things that we did that they are complaining of, but I'm
going to call them the "bad acts."
So, basically what you're going to be doing here
is you're going to be listening to our claim to get our
equity back. But then you're also going to be listening
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follow those instructions regardless of your opinion of
what the law is or what the law should be or what any
lawyer may state the law to be.
"Now, during the course of this trial, including
this jury selection process" -- which is a little bit
protracted here -- "you are instructed that you're not to
discuss this case amongst yourselves or with anyone else
nor form any opinion as to the merits of this case until
after the case has been submitted to you for your
determination."
I know you took an oath earlier today regarding
the questionnaires that you filled out. And now, we'll
have you take an oath regarding the questions that we're
going to be asking of you today and those of you that
will be coming back on Monday. So, that means that you
have to be doubly truthful.
So, if you could please stand, face the clerk,
raise your right hand, and I want to hear an enthusiastic
"I do."
(Prospective jurors sworn.)
THE COURT: Very good. Be seated.
"Today, we are going to focus on two critical
issues in this case as to your service as jurors in this
case. These issues concern your ability to serve on this
extended jury trial for the month of August and if you
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Now, it seems that we-- and the reason we
didn't move in limine for any other -- to eliminate the
diminution in value theory, was he specifically testified
in his deposition he wasn't going to give that kind of
theory.
So, that comes back to the statement you made at
the start here is: "Are they going to bootstrap it?"
Well, we have a significant fear that that's exactly what
they're trying to do at this point. Having gotten the
purchase price damage theory excluded, they are going to
come back now and say, "Well, we'd like to argue a
diminution in value theory and argue that what Shattuck
said it was worth in 2004 is relevant to the loss that
was suffered by 2004 due to these other bad acts." Well,
him having said he is not going to give that opinion, we
don't think they can come back and try to bootstrap that
now.
So, what we're saying here is that we shouldn't
be arguing today about -- or we would like the court to
again make clear that they -- MRIA cannot assert,
mention, insinuate, infer, argue in front of this jury
that the work that Shattuck did is any way related to the
damages that MRIA has claimed in this litigation.
So, that's really what we're trying to do here.
Now, Mr. Banducci did argue a significant
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You will hear from Grant Chamberlain that he
worked on this process until April of 2002 and wanted to
share his assumptions with Gem State to see if he could
bring consensus regarding the numbers, and MRI said, "No
we will not let you share your assumptions with Gem
State." So, we couldn't proceed with any further
discussions at that time.
So, again, you know, there is a temptation to
argue the facts of the case, but the point here is that
MRIA should not, now -- having carefully constructed
their damage theory around a lost scan analysis and this
purchase price damage theory, now try to use this
Shattuck Hammond number for some purpose that is not
already disclosed in their expert opinion reports.
The final point -- well, that is my final point,
Your Honor. Thank you.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Mr. Banducci, are you going to use the decrease
in equity value? That's his concern.
MR. BANDUCCI: Yeah. You know, Your Honor, I
think Mr. Miller very eloquently points out that it's a
data point I didn't ever suggest to this court in my
argument. I said it provides the experts with support
that the damage analysis that they did is much smaller-not much-- well, it's significantly smaller, actually,
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portion of the facts in this case in his argument. And
I'm tempted to respond to some of those, but I'm going to
only respond to one of them, which is the Shattuck
Hammond.
Shattuck Hammond did come in for Saint Alphonsus
and evaluated both the Mobile and the Center. And it's
interesting that they're now saying that his valuation of
Mobile was good. Because in the process of all ofthese
discussions, sometimes MRI Center would say, "Mobile is
the best business in the world, and you should pay us a
lot of numbers -- a lot of money for it." But then, when
we're negotiating about splitting the business, all of a
sudden, MRI Mobile wasn't a good business. It had risky
contracts, that it couldn't keep the business for very
long at any particular hospital, and was a significant
risky business, and therefore, shouldn't be valued as
highly.
So, through all of this negotiation process,
Saint Al's was always looking at a moving target with
MRIA. It would get down to a point where they thought
they had a deal. They had consensus. And then, MRI
would change -- want to change the assumptions. You will
hear testimony about that through the Price Waterhouse
Coopers' negotiations where everybody thought there was a
deal, and then the assumptions changed.

'
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than the drop in value.
But I guess the bigger question here is
Mr. Miller just-- I did, indeed, argue a lot of facts.
It's our theory of the case. It's why it's relevant.
THE COURT: They got to hear part of your
opening statement.
MR. BANDUCCI: Well, hopefully, it will be a
little better than that, but the point is it's relevant.
And so, that is -- that's why we're here.
THECOURT: Okay.
MR. BANDUCCI: We want to talk about it. We
want to be able to refer to it. We want to talk about
its contents. I am not going to-- and, right, we never
asserted a drop in value between 2001 and 2006 as the
measure of damages. And I know that this court and
Mr. Miller and Mr. Gjording will be vigilant about us
trying to do something different than we have already
done.
Let me ask the court one question, though,
before you -THE COURT: I assume you're going to redact the
scorched earth and all that?
MR. BANDUCCI: The scorched earth is not in that
report.
THE COURT: Okay. I thought it was.
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presence of the other jurors.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 661: It's just that I
don't focus well anymore.
THE COURT: You don't focus well anymore?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 661: I mean, pay
attention. I think this is a big case and to pay
attention -- and I don't remember and -THE COURT: Well, have you been to a doctor?
Have they said that there is any issues?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 661: No. It's just old
age.
THE COURT: All right. Well, I appreciate your
sharing that with us. Thank you.
Any additional questions of counsel? Mr.
Gjording or -MR. BANDUCCI: A follow-up question to that.
Have you been in circumstances where you've had to sit
for long periods of time and listen to things and then
find that you don't remember a lot of it?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 661: I don't focus on
what's going on.
MR. GJORDING: May I?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. GJORDING: Ms. Jones, I kind of identified
with whatyou're talking about. But you know, there is
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Again, for the record, folks, Nos. 4 --well,
never mind.
(Prospective jurors present.)
THE COURT: Look to your right. Look to your
left. Is your neighbor still there?
Mr. Banducci, you may continue.
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you, Your Honor.
To try to pick up where we left off, I asked the
panel, the group of you, about concern for how a judgment
in the tens of millions might impact costs ofhealthcare.
Let me ask this question -- is the next question
to this entire group, and that is: Ifyou found that
Saint Alphonsus owed MRI Associates tens of millions of
dollars because of their breaches of their partnership
obligations, would your concern for whether or not that
damage figure or that damage amount would be passed
through as a healthcare cost -- would that concern affect
your ability to be objective and fair and do your job as
a juror? All right. Thank you.
I asked about charitable donations a while ago.
Anybody make charitable donations to Saint Alphonsus?
Ms. Donnelly?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 452: Yes.
MR. BANDUCCI: You make donations to Saint
Alphonsus?
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-- the durability is probably measured by what we used to
be able to do. You know what I'm saying? That maybe
when you were 20 years younger, you thought you retained
things better. Okay. You don't have any-- you don't
have any problems in your daily living -PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 661: No.
MR. GJORDING: --getting all the things that
you've always done; right?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 661: No.
MR. GJORDING: And you don't find yourself being
overly confused by things that you confront in your daily
life?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 661: No.
MR. GJORDING: Because, you know, a lot of these
jurors are -- will probably do some daydreaming. It
isn't like any of us would be able to soak up every bit
of this that's going to come out in front of us. I
appreciate what you're saying, but you don't have any
problems with your daily living?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 661: No.
MR. GJORDING: Okay.
THE COURT: Additional questions?
MR. BANDUCCI: No.
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Jones. Let's bring
up the rest of the jury.

Page 932
1
PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 452: It's called "Cardio
2 Chicks." Yeah.
3
MR. BANDUCCI: Are you a Cardio Chick?
4
PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 452: Well, I give to them
5 every year.
6
MR. BANDUCCI: All right. Okay.
7
A question was asked earlier about whether or
8 not Saint Alphonsus is a nonprofit or a for-profit, and I
9 think the answer is, "yes, both," in certain ways that
10 it's organized. I didn't want to leave that question
11 unanswered.
12
Some doctors are going to testifY, actually, for
13 both sides. Is there anybody here that thinks that a
14 doctor's testimony deserves more weight than another
15 witness's testimony because of the doctor's involvement
16 in providing healthcare? Okay.
17
Now, there are a number of you-- actually, let
18 me ask for a show of placards. How many of you work for
'
19 St. Luke's? Okay. You can put those down now.
20
I'm going to ask that group that just raised
21 their placards whether or not your employment with
22 St. Luke's would cause you to either be biased or unfair
23 in your consideration of the evidence with respect to
24 Saint Alphonsus? Would the relationship that you have
25 with St. Luke's somehow color the way you look at
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the day-to-day operations. Because we're not involved at
that level. And we challenged each other to review our
memory and review our experience on the Board. Was there
ever a time when there was a quality issue raised?
Because, perhaps we had heard one and not followed up on
it. In the meeting, none of us remembered any, but we
wanted to have the Board members just go check and report
back.
Q Okay. And did you do your own research?
A Mostly, I had been at virtually all the Board
meetings. I knew nothing had ever been brought to me.
And I don't have a good record system so I was trusting
our employees and our staff to go through the company
records. I did review the documents I could find that I
had and my memory.
Q Okay. Now, yesterday, you testified that you
were unaware of any quality issues as a result of this
review.
A Yes.
Q Okay. Explain to the jury, if you would, what
an "incident report" is.
A Unfortunately, when you're taking care of a
large volume of patients, which a hospital is, things
happen. Things happen that you wouldn't like to have
happen, like a patient falls out of bed. They pinch
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That's part of the incident report and the incident
response.
If-- if there is a pattern of incident reports
from a certain location or a certain individual, you
investigate that pattern, and that may be a quality issue "
that you have to address because there is an abnormal
number of incident reports coming from a certain area.
The major one we are concerned with in radiology
is that we somehow have a piece of equipment that isn't
measuring up. And those aren't incident reports. Those
would be deficiencies that the radiologists would have to ;
bring because they're the experts who are trying to get
the most out of the equipment.
Q Now, when you testified yesterday that you found
no quality issues, did that mean that there had never
been any incidents that were reported in incident reports
over the course from 1985 until you reviewed them in
2003?
A Unfortunately, no.
Q Okay. Now, let me show you Exhibit 4227.
Now, are we having some technical issues?
MS. BLAESING: We're not plugged into the
projector up there. Can you tighten that?
THE COURT: Has this been admitted?
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes.
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their fingers in the bathroom door. And suddenly, they
he need medical attention or some decision to be made for
this accident that happened. I think you probably all
know about that. They happen in all health care provider
institutions.
And in order to see ifthere is a quality issue,
the nurses, the technicians, the orderlies, the doctors,
anybody who has one of these episodes happen is required
to have a physician check the patient and/or at least
fill out an incident report. And that is reviewed by the
staff. These people are professionals. They know
they're supposed to get a doctor to check a patient.
So, in the X-ray department, if a patient falls
off a table or an IV infiltrates, and the patient is
complaining, an incident report has to be filled out and
all of those signed. And the doctor who checks the
patient will generally make a note. If it's a serious
incident, the patient goes to the emergency room or a
medical team responds, and it's all in the medical
records.
Those happen inevitably. If you get too many of
those from one technician or one nurse or one ward or one
imaging room, you've investigated each one of them to
find out if there is something we did to make this happen
so that we can prevent it from happening in the future.
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THE COURT: 4227 has been admitted. It can be
shown to the witness. Proceed.
MR. BANDUCCI: Sorry, Your Honor.
Can we bring up the first page of this document?
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q 4227. There we go. Thank you. Dr. Prochaska,
what is being displayed to the jury and is in paper form
in front of you is an Operating Agreement of
Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC.
MR. BANDUCCI: And, ifyou would, Lauren, could
you go to page 6? And, if you would, enlarge, please,
the first two paragraphs under "Formation."
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q This is the background or part of the background
on formation. I just want to make sure that we
understand who is involved in this contract. This refers
to "Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center" and also
makes reference to -- well, let me read it so we don't
get too confused here.
I made a mistake, Lauren. I would like you to
raise that so we can see who the parties are and where it
starts, "This Operating Agreement." Okay. There we go.
Thank you.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q Okay. At the very top it says, "This Operating
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Agreement is made and entered into effective as of the
1st day ofJuly, 2001, by and between Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care, Inc., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Diversified Care, and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP,
an Idaho limited liability partnership, as members."
Now, I'll represent to you, Dr. Prochaska, just
so we don't have to jump around here, this is something
that was entered into between Saint Alphonsus Diversified
Care and Imaging Center Radiologists in June, late June
of 200 I. Did you know that Saint Alphonsus or one of its
subsidiaries had entered into a contract with Imaging
Center Radiologists?
A No.
Q Okay. Now, let's go down further to the second
paragraph, and it says, "Diversified Care and ICR are
entering into this Operating Agreement to make certain
medical imaging services more available to the community
and to increase the cost effectiveness, efficiency, and
quality of medical imaging services available in the
community. The primary purpose of Intermountain Medical
Imaging, LLC, the company, shall be to own and operate
freestanding medical imaging centers in and around Boise,
Idaho."
Did you know that Saint Alphonsus had entered
into an agreement with Imaging Center Radiologists to own
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And at the bottom is 8.1. And 8.1 is part of Article 8
entitled "Management." And that says, "The members"-who are the radiologists in Saint Alphonsus -- "agree
that the management of the Company shall be vested in the
members, and the members shall appoint a Managing
Committee. The number of members of the Managing
Committee shall be determined from time to time by the
members; provided, at all times the number of Managing
Committee members will be divided equally between
Diversified Care" -- identified as Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care-- "and ICR, Imaging Center
Radiologists.
"Upon the execution of this agreement, the
members agree that the initial Managing Committee shall
be composed of six members, with Diversified Care being
entitled to appoint three such members and ICR being
entitled to appoint three such members."
Were you aware in 200 I when Saint Alphonsus was
still a partner of MRIA that it had entered into an
agreement with Imaging Center Radiologists to manage IMI,
Intermountain Medical Imaging, using a management
committee of-- of three members from Saint Alphonsus and
three members from the radiologists?
A No.
Q I lost my train of thought. Let's go to page
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and operate freestanding medical imaging centers in and
around Boise, Idaho, in 200 I?
A No, I did not.
Q Now, in 2001, Saint Alphonsus was still a
partner in MRI Associates. Is that true?
A Yes.
Q Okay. Now, let me ask you a couple of-- let me
direct you to a couple other pages. And I'm sure that
Mr. Gjording will cover with you the next paragraph -before we leave this the next paragraph that talks about
MRI and non-MRI, but I'll let him talk to you about that.
Let us, instead, though, go to page 21. I'm
looking at the number at the bottom that -- right in the
middle of the page. And that-- at the bottom, is
Section 7.3.3. And that talks about an "Agreement to
Pursue Meridian Facility." And in part, this says, that,
"The members agree in good faith to pursue the
development of a medical imaging center within a one-mile
radius of the St. Luke's Meridian Medical Center on Eagle
Road in Meridian, Idaho."
Were you aware that Saint Alphonsus had agreed
with the radiologists to pursue an imaging center in
Meridian as of 200 I?
A No.
Q Now, let's go to page 42. Excuse me. Page 23.
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42. Now, page 42 represents capital contributions, cash
contributions. In 200 I, did you know that Saint
Alphonsus contributed $546,347 to IMI?
A No, I did not.
Q And this is 2001. Now, IMI has been competing
with MRI Center for how long?
A Since August of 1999.
Q Okay. So, about two years. And-THE COURT: I'm sorry. I didn't hear your
response to the last question: "About two years?"
A Excuse me. I'm sorry. August of 1999.
THE COURT: And then, there was a question. "Is
that about two years?" and your response was?
THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry. Yes.
MR. BANDUCCI: Thank you.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q Is it your understanding that since fall of
1999, IMI has been operating in downtown Boise at Ninth
and Myrtle with a magnetic resonance imaging scanner?
A Yes.
Q Was it your understanding in 200 I that doctors
who had referred to MRI Center were referring to IMI at
the time that this $500,000 donation -- contribution was
made?
A Yes.
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part?

2

"Q. Yes.
"A. We from the early days had wanted to have
a relationship across the modalities to align with the
strategic expansion for our branding strategies
throughout the region.
"Q. When you say across the modalities, you
mean including magnetic resonance imaging?
"A. To the extent we could make that happen,
yes.
"Q. Okay. And when you say early on, that's
before the independent imaging center opened?
"A. We did have discussion about at the point
St. Alphonsus could get into that part, we would want to
do so, yes."
(End video clip.)
MR. MILLER: Break.
(Reading as follows:)
"Q. And when you say we had discussions,
that's the hospital had discussions with the
radiologists?
"A. We actually had a discussion with all the
parties; the radiologists, the MRI folks, Dr. Giles,
Dr. Curran. Many parties all knew that that was
important to St. Alphonsus.
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syllables at least every time I ask it.
"So you were responsible for negotiating the
hospital's participation in IMI; correct?
"A. Correct.
"Q. And that participation in IMI was to be
reflected in an agreement?
"A. That's correct."
(End video clip.)
MR. MILLER: Now, we're jumping to page 56,
line 2.
(Reading as follows:)
"Q. I'm going to show you a draft of the IMI
Operating Agreement dated November 3, 1999.
"Do you see that?
"A. I do.
"Q. Were you involved in negotiating the
Operating Agreement that is represented by Exhibit 3?
"A. Yes.
"Q. If the imaging center opened in September
or August of 1999, does this refresh your recollection
that you did not have an operating agreement signed with
the radiologists regarding IMI by the time the imaging
center opened?
"A. Yes.
"0. In your opinion is it advisable for the
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"Q. Okay. Now, are you aware that when
Sandra Bruce announced the hospital's intention to
partner with the radiologists that she stated that the
hospital intended to partner only in the non MRI
modalities?
"MR. GJORDING: What time frame are you
talking about?
"MR. BANDUCCI: 1988.
"A. That would be consistent, yes. I do know
that. That's true.
"Q. Now, you were responsible for
representing the hospital, St. Alphonsus, in negotiations
over the hospital's participation in the new imaging
center; correct?
"A. Correct."
(End reading.)
(Video clip played as follows:)
"Q. Okay. And let's shift now because I
think the new imaging center had a name. It was
Intermountain Medical Imaging; correct?
"A. Correct.
"Q. So If I refer to that imaging center as
IMI, we'll be communicating on the same wave length?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Okay. Good. That will save a few
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hospital to have a signed contract that identifies what
the hospital can and can't do before the hospital gets
involved in IMI's startup?
"A. I'm not following the question.
"Q. I'll ask the question again. Let me
rephrase the question. Given the limitations on the
hospital's involvement in IMI because of the MRIA
Partnership -"A. Correct.
"Q. -- would it be advisable in your opinion
to have a signed contract that identified what the
hospital could and could not be involved in before the
hospital got involved in IMI's startup?
"MR. GJORDING: Mr. Banducci, I'm kind of
confused too. I don't know what you mean about advisable
and I don't know what you mean about involved.
"MR. BANDUCCI: Okay.
"Well, I think we've established that before IMI
opened-"A. Yes.
"Q. -- there were some services provided by
the hospital to IMI; correct?
"A. I believe that's true, yes.
"Q. And yet there was no signed operating
agreement identifying what could and could not be
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provided to IMI as a result of the limitations in the MRI
Associates Agreement; correct?
"MR. GJORDING: Object. It calls for a
legal conclusion.
"A. And that would not have been unusual.
"Q. Okay. So it wouldn't be unusual from
your perspective that the hospital would go in and
provide support to IMI without a signed contract?
"A. This was not something specific to IMI.
The hospital had a practice of focusing on what was
necessary to get the services for the patients. We did
the same IT services for many physician practices in the
whole community to connect into the hospital to get
access to those services, so it would not have been
related to the operating agreement. That's why, I'm
sorry, I'm losing your connection because it's not
connected to this document.
"It is a separate piece of work the hospital
would do.
"Q. So it's your view that if the assistance
provided by the hospital to IMI had to do with patient
care, then the hospital could provide assistance whether
or not it related to MRI or non MRI?
"A. I can't speak for the interpretation,
legal interpretation of that.
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services that you could buy on the open market from
anybody. We opted to be the provider so we could gain
access to patient care.
"Q. Okay. So your answer to my question I
think is that yes, the hospital could support IMI
generally if it was a service that could be bought from
someone else?
"MR. GJORDING: Object to the question.
It misstates her-"Q. Is that correct?
"MR. GJORDING: It misstates her previous
testimony.
"A. If we were providing something to them
that was consistent with what we provided to gain access
to patient information, yes, that would be fair."
THE COURT: All right. We'll stop and take our
lunch break at this time.
(Recess.)
(Jury absent.)
THE COURT: Was there a matter you wished to
address?
MR. BANDUCCI: Just very briefly, Your Honor. I
didn't realize this, but during the taking of the
testimony of Ms. Schamp, Mr. Gjording has not been in th~
courtroom, and I just want to make sure that the record
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"At that point in time St. Alphonsus provided
that service to competing and non competing physicians in
the community to make sure we could get access to patien
information.
"Q. That's not my question. My question has
to do with what your testimony was earlier today. We
testified that or you testified I think, not me -"A. Yes.
"Q. --that the hospital was limited,
supporting only the non MRI side of IMI; correct?
"A. That we were limited in creating a
business relationship with them, yes. From that point of
perspective, yes.
"Q. Okay. All right. Now, are you saying
that there are exceptions to that in that the hospital
could provide, say, IT support and service to IMI that
would assist the MRI side or the entirety of the IMI?
"A. My position is that that was fully known
by everybody that we did that. That, in fact, we
provided IT availability as a purchased service, as a
piece of work that St. Alphonsus did and had been doing
for a long time that we did not view inconsistent with
the non compete language or anything related to MRI or
our relationship on the side of MRI because it was not
viewed as advantaging or disadvantaging. They were

1
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reflects that.
THE COURT: Oh.
MR. MILLER: Mr. Banducci mentioned to me,
Your Honor, that his position is if Mr. Banducci [sic] is
not present for the reading of this deposition -MR. BANDUCCI: Mr. Gjording.
MR. MILLER: -- Mr. Gjording cannot conduct the
closing arguments in this case.
MR. BANDUCCI: We would object to conducting
closing argument ifyou haven't been in the courtroom the
entire time, and I think that's the rule.
THE COURT: Do you want to refer the judge to
the rule?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I'll have to go look
for it. I'll take a look at it.
MR. MILLER: If that's the case, Mr. Gjording
has been gone for maybe -- I'm not aware of any rule. It
may be discretionary even ifthere is a rule, but the
record will reflect, apparently, he was gone for a
portion of the reading of the deposition.
MR. BANDUCCI: That's all I wanted to do was to
make the record.
THE COURT: Let's proceed this way so we have
got a record. I assume we're going to get a CD ofthis
edited deposition.
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MR. BANDUCCI: We can create one.
THE COURT: We need one. We'll mark that as an
exhibit for purposes of an appellate record.
MR. BANDUCCI: Fine.
THE COURT: I'm assuming that, obviously, these
cases occasionally go up on appeal. And so, with that
assumption, we'll do that. And then, if you could make a
list of what excerpts you're reading from her deposition
and submit that to the court, and that will be also an
exhibit. Okay?
We're taking care of all sorts of things.
I've been presented a question by a juror. "Why
is the witness Cindy Schamp not here in person?" "Why
are pages being skipped ... " and pauses deposition.
"Why is half deposition on video and half being read?"
Okay. "Are we ever going to be able to read Idaho state
law that Saint Al's exited partnership under, question
mark (since we can't do research on our own)?"
Well, should I answer those questions? Let me
hear from both -- I would propose to say that Cindy
Schamp -- "The rules allow for a witness to have their
deposition read in court, and so do not concern
yourselves as to why she is not here in person." "The
parties have the right to submit those portions of the
deposition that they deem to be relevant " as to the
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I've received a question. Let me go through -after talking with counsel.
Question: "Why is witness Cindy Schamp not here
in person?"
The rules allow for the presentation of
testimony in the manner that is being presented here.
So, don't concern yourself with that. The rules allow
for it, and we're following those rules.
"Why are pages being skipped in the deposition?"
The parties are presenting to you the evidence
that they deem to be the most relevant evidence. And so,
in the process of doing this, these depositions can be
edited to present to a jury the most germane and relevant
evidence. And so, that's why there are some areas that
are being skipped.
"Why is half the deposition on video, half being
read?"
These attorneys have been working around the
clock. And late last night, they met and conferred.
And, again, when we're having deposition evidence
presented, the party that's offering the deposition
evidence will submit what portions they're going to be
presenting to the jury. Late last night, that was
exchanged. Saint Alphonsus, to, again, facilitate
getting all of this to you they didn't necessarily have
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second question. I can certainly explain to them that
the deposition was edited late last night because the
attorneys are certainly putting in long hours on this and
to move it along, Saint Alphonsus stipulated to have
theirs read.
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I think so long as
the jury understands, our purpose in skipping is to
condense the time.
THE COURT: To give them the most relevant
information. Okay. And then, I'll just tell them -I'll remind them I'm going to give them all sorts of
instructions that are going to be so clear and
understandable at the end ofthe evidence they will have
a good understanding ofthe law. Let's bring them in.
MR. VARIN: May I take the witness stand?
THE COURT: Ms. Schamp, you may retake the
stand.
MR. VARIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: For the record, that would be
Mr. Varin.
(Jury present.)
THE COURT: All of our jurors are present in
their proper places. I might say well fed. Okay.
JUROR: Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank the jury office.
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the video portion of it prepared or queued up for today.
They stipulated to read that into the record.
So, it's to get this presented to you today in
as cohesive and accurate a manner as we can.
So, again, follow that Instruction No. 9 that I
gave you, and I think it will give you clear insight.
As far as the law, you will be getting the law
at the end of the case to help answer any questions you
have regarding issues that are being presented here in
this courtroom. Okay?
So, with that, you may continue with your
reading of the deposition, Mr. Miller.
Mr. Varin is at the stand.
Proceed.
MR. MILLER: For the record, I'm Mr. Banducci in
terms of asking these questions from the deposition.
(Reading from deposition as follows:)
"Q. Okay. And so ifSt. Alphonsus provided
IT services and support to IMI that benefitted the IMI
generally and not just the non MRI modalities, that would
be okay. Is that what you're saying?
"A. I don't believe you're characterizing my
comments correctly. I'm not saying it benefitted IMI.
It benefitted the patients.
"Q. Well, it also benefitted--
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"A. That's a different -"Q. It also benefitted IMI, didn't it?
"A. Well, we may choose to differ on that,
but it benefitted the patient.
"Q. So it's your testimony that the provision
of IT services and support only benefitted the patients
and not IMI?
"MR. GJORDING: Object to the question;
misstates her testimony.
"Q. Is that your testimony?
"A. My testimony is it benefitted the
patient. I had no discussion with anyone that that
benefitted anybody except the patient.
"Q. Okay. So as far as you are concerned,
the provision of IT support and services from St.
Alphonsus had nothing to do with the success of IMI?
"A. I can't hypothesize what would have
happened if that didn't occur. I don't know that."
(End reading.)
MR. MILLER: That's the end of that one. Oh,
excuse me. We have a little bit more. I'm sorry.
(Reading as follows:)
"Q. Now, let me ask you this question:
"If IT services provided by the hospital to IMI
not only supported the entire business but were a factor
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"A. I believe Alan works for Price,
Waterhouse, Coopers I believe.
"Q. And does Mr. Hahn have a certain area of
expertise?
"A. Imaging.
"Q. And does that mean he's a radiologists or
what does it mean?
"A. No. He has-- my recollection is he had
been involved in radiology joint ventures or imaging
structures around the country and valuation of different
types of structures to the best of my recollection.
"Q. Okay. And you hired Mr. Hahn to look at
the potential restructure of MRI Associates; correct?
"A. Yes. That's correct.
"Q. And do you recall the specific questions
that you asked Mr. Hahn to look into?
"A. I don't recall the specific questions,
no.
"Q. Do you recall asking Mr. Hahn to help you
understand the complexity of the deal, the deal that
would occur whereby St. Alphonsus would extract itself
from MRI Associates?
"A. I'm trying to remember the sense of the
engagement. I apologize. We used two different firms;
Price, Waterhouse, Coopers and Shattuck Hammond later in
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in the success of IMI's overall business, would that be a
violation of the MRIA Partnership Agreement?
"MR. GJORDING: I'll object on the grounds
that it calls for a legal conclusion. Perhaps it's also
calling for speculation.
"A. I can't speculate about that being an
issue or not being an issue. I don't know.
"Q. Okay. Well, let me make sure that I
understand your testimony, and that is that your belief
is that the hospital could provide information technology
that was used by the entire IMI business which would
relate to the MRI modality and that would not in your
opinion be outside the confines of the MRI Associates'
Partnership Agreement?
"MR. GJORDING: Same objection. And I'll
add that it's vague.
"A. I think that that's fair and consistent
with what I knew the MRIA doctors knew we were doing."
MR. MILLER: That's the end of our insert.
THE COURT: All right. Continue to play the
deposition.
(Video clip played as follows:)
"Q. Okay. Do you recall the name Alan Hahn?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Who is Mr. Hahn?
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my time there, and what each of them did I would have to
look at some of their documents to be clear on. I
believe Price, Waterhouse, Coopers initially was valuing
parts of the enterprise so that the radiologists could
enter into -- there could be like a combination of the
radiologists, the MRI group and the hospital in some
reasonably fair relationship. I can't give you more
specifics.
"Q. All right. And I realize you had two
different consultants at two different times.
"A. Yes.
"Q. Let me hand you a document and we can
work from that."
(End video clip.)
(Video clip played as follows:)
"Q. Now, you've been handed Exhibit 4 to this
deposition. Do you recognize that document?
"A. Yes.
"Q. This is the document prepared for St.
Alphonsus by Mr. Hahn; correct?
"A. That's I believe correct.
"Q. Okay. And it's dated November 29, 1999;
is that right?
"A. Correct.
"Q. So the work done by Mr. Hahn on this
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instruction to the jury on the partnership issue ought to
be, "Saint Alphonsus, as a partner, owed the fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care. The duty of loyalty is
defined as ... "and then, we go to the statute. "And
the duty of care is defined as ... ," and we can go to
the statute. I think by putting this phrase in here, it
suggests that the duty of a partner is much higher than
it is. And so, we think this is a-- it is a
substantially inaccurate instruction in that regard.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. MILLER: No. 30, paragraph I. We have the
same objection. Note the MRIA has agreed to take out the
word "primarily," but we still think this is an
inaccurate statement. Again, I think that statement of
law comes from the Bliss Valley case defining what you
need to show in order to show whether somebody is a
fiduciary. It is not the scope of defining the duty.
So, this sentence really is the -- paragraph I of the
full paragraph, prima facie case. It's the -- they must
establish they're a fiduciary, and to establish that,
they have got to establish somebody has to work for the
benefit of the other. Paragraph 2. Did they breach the
duty? Paragraph 3, proximate cause. Paragraph 4,
damages.
Paragraph 32 -- Instruction No. 32. Again, I
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MR. MILLER: On No. 35, paragraph 1 -- it may be
a little confusing to the jury because they have
presented evidence oflost profits, and I would think
that what we ought to do is say that MRIA's, you know,
lost profits-- I think we ought to say that they are
entitled to pursue what they think is their lost profits.
They have put on damage of that through Mr. Budge and
Mr. Wilhoite. And then, we think we ought to have the
instruction that we asked for that when you ask for lost
profits, you've got to prove them both as to amount and
causation with reasonable certainty. So, I suggest
paragraph I that it's-- that they're entitled to claim
net lost profits, but then the measure can be dropped off
because their proof takes care of that.
The second point is-- and I may not have
completely understood the evidence when it went in
through Mr. Wilhoite and Budge-- I had not understood
that MRIA had made a diminution in value claim. I
remember, specifically, from Mr. Wilhoite's deposition he
was asked: "Have you calculated the value of MRIA and
MRICI and MRI Mobile for purposes of opining to
diminution of value?" And he said, "No, that's not my
opinion. I provided that as a check against my lost
profit analysis." So, he didn't actually testify -MR. WOODARD: Your Honor, we agree -- that's why
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think here we go back to the comment I made before abou
--on civil conspiracy. We believe there ought be to a
higher burden of proof-- you know, the Idaho case said
there has to be an agreement. I think the word "common
intent" doesn't necessarily equate an agreement. The way
I would suggest this be read is that, "It has to be an
agreement. The agreement can either be express or
implied, but if you're going to imply the agreement
you've got to have clear and convincing evidence of it."
The "common intent" language, I think, could be
confusing and just ask-- if two people had something in
the same mind, but they had never, ever talked to another
or never acted in combination that they could be in a
conspiracy, I think there actually has to be evidence of
an agreement, that evidence can be implied, could be
circumstantial, but if it's circumstantial, it needs to
be clear and convincing. I don't think "common intent"
does it.
I think, really, 33 is --this may be redundant.
If 32 is given, I think that covers what a conspiracy is
and what needs to be proven. And then, I think 33 is
either redundant or just adds confusion because it really
kind of instructs on the same thing but in a little bit
different way.
THE COURT: Okay.
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we got rid of that second part.
MR. MILLER: Okay. Never mind.
MR. BANDUCCI: I think we still may have -- I
don't mean to jump in your argument, Pat, but if I'm
going to agree with you -THE COURT: Okay. So, let me make sure what I
understand the agreement is, then. On Instruction 35?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, yes. On 35, there
are two elements -- and the second one is MRIA's lost
fair market value. Recognizing the law allows you to
prove loss two different ways, lost profits or diminution
in value, what we did in this case was we had Mr. Budge
testify to historical lost profits. And he simply
measured the transfer of scans from, you know, revenues
associated with scans from one of the businesses to the
other.
What Mr. Wilhoite did, although he is the
business appraiser and he used a business appraiser's
approach, what he did was he took lost profits, projected
them out-THE COURT: Right.
MR. BANDUCCI: -- and then, discounted them back
to present value. So, it is a lost profits analysis -THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BANDUCCI: -- using the appraisal methods,
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ifyou will.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. BANDUCCI: So, it's not a diminution in
value.
THE COURT: Both parties agree, so we'll just-net profits lost are measured from MRI scans lost through
the term of the partnership. Okay?
All right. Go ahead. Continue, Mr. Miller.
MR. MILLER: Paragraph 30 -- excuse me.
Instruction 38 the last phrase "or percentage of
negligence," I think that -- I don't -THE COURT: We're going to strike "percentage of
negligence."
MR. MILLER: They have already mentioned that.
Maybe I didn't hear that.
THE COURT: They did.
MR. MILLER: Okay. As to the special verdict
form, again, I think we will-- you know, we have one
that I believe we're comfortable with, I think. In order
to help the jury understand that there is proximate cause
requirements and different proximate cause requirements,
different proof requirements, causes of actions, the
damages ought to be referenced by claim. And then, there
ought to be an instruction that says, "Look. You can
only award the amount once. You don't double-dip or
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on implied agreements -- I mean, our position here is
that there is no implied agreement. There is an express
agreement. It's in writing. It's an operating
agreement. The Utah law that seems to be the support for
the claim or the suggestion that it should be clear and
convincing would make sense if what was being talked
about here was some sort of a tacit understanding. We
have an express understanding here that we contend is a
basis for that.
And then, finally, I-- I cannot agree with the
characterization of the duty or the element of proof that
seems to be imposed in front of this instruction about
fiduciary duty. If you are a partner, you owe a
fiduciary duty. There is no additional proof required to
show that you owe a fiduciary duty. If you are a
partner, you owe a fiduciary duty. And so, -- I think
that's borne out by 53-404. I want to make sure that -ifl heard Mr. Miller correctly, that is-- that is a
point of disagreement.
And last but not least, subsection (e) I think
is going to be a very big bone of contention in this
case, and, in fact, it was a topic that we raised by way
of the motions in limine. Our view of the law is
different than their view of the law. Our view of the
law is simply that yes, a partner can put its interests
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don't double count them," would be the way to handle
that.
And, Your Honor, those are our-- oh, yeah. On
the fiduciary duty claim, too, Judge, our instruction
references the statute, not only the duty of care and the
duty of loyalty, but also it incorporates subparagraph
(e) of 53-3-404, which talks about, "A partner may act in
its own interests." And so, we think that ought to be -the jury ought to be instructed on the full statute.
THE COURT: Okay. Anything further to address,
then?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, just a couple of
comments. First of all, I heard what Mr. Miller had to
say about this substantial factor issue.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. BANDUCCI: And it seems to me that we're
mixing up concepts here. Substantial factor is part of
what is causation. It is not -- if a party -- a party's
conduct is a substantial factor, then the proximate cause
element has been met. Whether the substantial factor
turns out to be 20 percent or 80 percent or I 00 percent
is the way that the jury measures the damages. So, the
substantial factor language needs to stay in there
because that's the law of the state.
The other thoughts here -- the conspiracy issue

'
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in front of the partnership so long as they don't
conflict with the interests of the partnership. And I
think that that's what the Jaw says.
And I think what we're going to get in closing
argument and in connection with this interpretation of
(e), if it's not expressly meted out in your
instructions, is that Saint Alphonsus could put its
interests in front of the partnership ifhealthcare
mattered or if something else mattered, business
interests mattered, alignment with their radiologists
mattered. And that is not the law. If those interests
conflicted with the interests of the partnership, then
partnership law says, "No, you can't."
And so, that's -- I know that's where Jack and I
are going to disagree, and I think it would be just
helpful to have the court settle that little debate
before we get in front of this jury because that will
lead to a tremendous amount of confusion.
MR. WOODARD: Two more things. Your Honor,
there is two more things, if I may have the court's
indulgence?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. WOODARD: And I forgot these two things when
I was going through them before. In Instruction 16,
there is reference to "Defendant" and "Plaintiff."
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say, "Cindy, I want you to be involved in the
negotiations with the radiologists"?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Who was on the other side of
the negotiations? Who was on the IMI side?
A. For a sizable period of time,
Dr. Giles was involved, Jeff Cliff, and
Dr. Seabourn, at times Dr. Hall. Those are the
principal ones that I remember.
Q. Okay. And when did those
negotiations start?
A. That would have been 1999.
Q. Now, Ms. Schamp, would you meet
frequently with Dr. Giles both on the PHO and on
this transaction as well?
A. I would.
Q. Now, I want you to explain to the
jury your relationship with Dr. Giles -A. Okay.
Q. -- in terms of how open this
relationship was and whether or not it was a
trusting relationship. Okay. I want to address
that.
A. Okay.
Q. Was there ever an occasion where you
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A. I was not a member of The Arid Club.
Q. Were you invited to The Arid Club?
A. I was invited to The Arid Club.
Q. By whom?
A. By Dr. Giles.
Q. And there did you -- on that
occasion did you have a conversation?
A. I did.
Q. Relate the conversation, if you
will, to the jury.
MR. BANDUCCI: Excuse me, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you have an objection?
MR. BANDUCCI: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: What is it?
MR. BANDUCCI: The objection is I think
she's simply talking about credibility on a
conversation I can't cross on. There's no tie-in
to the relevancy of the case. At least at this
point, there's no foundation laid as to its
relevancy.
And ifhe's talking with her about
something unrelated to this matter, that would
simply be character assassination.
THE COURT: Overruled. Proceed.
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) Let's back up a
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had reason to question his integrity?
A. There was.
Q. Okay. And was it a conversation?
A. It was.
Q. Okay. And do you recall when the
conversation was?
A. To the best of my recollection, it
was in 19 --I want to say 1998, early 1999. I
can't remember the exact date of when that was.
Q. Okay. And where did it take place?
A. At The Arid Club. Well, it would
have been -- I correct that. It would have been
1999, because it was after I joined the MRI board.
Q. After you joined-A. After I joined the board, yes.
Q. And explain to the jury what The
Arid Club is.
A. The Arid Club is a private -- I
understood it to be a formerly good ol' boys club
is what I had heard it referred to in Boise. But
it is a private club that is a members-only club
down along the river that is a restaurant. They
serve cocktails and dinner for their clients,
their customers.
Q. Were you a member of The Arid Club?
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little bit.
A. Okay.
Q. Before you talk about the
conversation, did the conversation include
references by Dr. Giles to Sandra Bruce?
A. It did.
Q. And did the conversation include
references by Dr. Giles about Sandra Bruce's
involvement in this very topic?
A. In the topic of the MRI deal?
Q. Yes.
A. In a general course, yes.
Q. Tell us about the conversation.
A. I had been in the process of
transitioning out of my role over the PHO.
Because the PHO was going to be moving on to
somebody else's responsibilities, as I continued
as operating officer.
And Dr. Giles asked me in that
conversation -- it was sort of a general happy for
me, sort of doing a good job type of conversation
and then moved into a request that, along the way,
as I continued into this role, to ask me to please
report back to him things that Sandy was, quote,
up to; to keep him informed on what she was up to;

'
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and that, you know, as she got hers, I think the
phrase was or something to that effect, that he
would take care of me.
Q. First of all, in the context of this
conversation as well as in the context of other
conversations that you had with Dr. Giles about
Sandra Bruce, give us your understanding of his
regard or how did he look at Sandra Bruce.
MR. BANDUCCI: Objection. Calls for
speculation.
THE COURT: Relevance?
MR. GJORDING: His state of mind about
Sandra Bruce as this person understood it as it
being important in the context of this
conversation we're talking about.
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain.
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) In talking with
Dr. Giles, Ms. Schamp, were you able to form your
own impression about whether or not he respected
Sandra Bruce?
A. I was.
MR. BANDUCCI: Same objection, Your Honor.
And relevancy.
THE COURT: I'll allow some latitude.
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) And what was that?
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objection.
MR. GJORDING: Well, Your Honor, I'm
putting -- it's context for how she took this
comment from Dr. Giles, the one that is supporting
her impression about his integrity.
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain.
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) In terms of this
conversation, Ms. Schamp, what was your reaction
to it?
A. I was very-MR. BANDUCCI: Again, objection, Your
Honor. Irrelevant what her reaction was to the
comment.
MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, further
relevance -THE COURT: I'm going to allow it. She
can tell what her reaction was.
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) What was your
reaction?
A. I was very -- I was offended, but I
was uncomfortable because I had never, in all of
my years, been placed in that position and have
not since then. And I tried to sort of move the
conversation away from that as best I could, and I
think he sensed that I wasn't really comfortable
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A. I did not believe that he held Sandy
in any high regard.
Q. Okay. So he said would you keep an
eye on her, would you -- what did he say?
MR. BANDUCCI: Leading.
THE COURT: Well, the way he finished it
out is not leading. Proceed.
Answer the question.
THE WITNESS: What he asked me was
essentially to keep him informed on what -- I
believe he said what Sandy was up to; and that, in
the course of doing that, she would get hers and
that-Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) Let's go back to
the what's she up to. What did you understand
that to mean?
A. I understand that to mean the
strategies and the work that Sandy was doing at
Saint Alphonsus in her role and scope there.
Q. What did you understand Dr. Giles to
mean when he said "when she gets hers"?
MR. BANDUCCI: Your Honor, I object. I
really don't -- I'm going to object on the grounds
of relevancy, speculation, and-THE COURT: Response. I'll hear your
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continuing that line of discussion.
And then I shared those comments
with Sandy the next morning at work.
Q. What did you understand when he said
"I'll take care of you"?
MR. BANDUCCI: Same objection, Your Honor.
This is speculation.
MR. GJORDING: It's context for the
conversation, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled. I'll allow it.
Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) Go ahead.
A. I understood that I was in a new
role as chief operating officer, and that my
impression of that was if Sandy was moved out of
her role, that he would either make sure I kept my
role or I would be moved up in my role.
Q. Did you report this conversation to
Sandra Bruce?
A. I did.
Q. What did she say?
A. She was not overtly shocked. I
don't believe she felt that Dr. Giles had -MR. BANDUCCI: Objection, Your Honor.
Speculation.
THE COURT: Sustained.
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Q. (BY MR. GJORDING) Did she say
anything to you about how she thought you should
interact with Dr. Giles?
A. Yes.
Q. What did she say?
A. She encouraged me to be very
cautious and to be very careful in what I shared,
recognizing that it might be used inappropriately,
and to keep her informed in my conversations with
Dr. Giles if I ever felt like it would create a
difficulty for her or for Saint Alphonsus.
Q. And thereafter, were you cautious?
A. I was.
Q. Importantly, Ms. Schamp, tell the
jury whether or not that experience caused you any
difficulty in actually interacting with Dr. Giles
from that point forward.
A. I would characterize it as cautious.
I still did my job, but I was very cautious.
Q. And thereafter, did you get along
with Dr. Giles?
A. Yes.
Q. And were you able to discuss back
and forth the issues that attended the IMI-MRI -A. I was.
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making the necessary preparations to get open in
September of'99, were you involved in any of
those preparations?
A. Yes. I was involved in the
discussions about the facility and how it would
work because we expected to partner on the non-MRI
part of that center.
Q. So you knew what they were going to
do down there?
A. I did.
Q. All right. So tell us -- as you
have with Dr. Giles, tell us about your
relationship with Dr. Curran.
A. I had a very nice relationship with
Dr. Curran. Dr. Curran was-- and I understand
he's since deceased since I left.
Q. Correct.
A. But Dr. Curran was a very kind man.
He was very much a gentleman.
Q. And how did you -- did you two
interact?
A. We did.
Q. Frequently?
A. Frequently, yes.
Q. And give us a mind's eye picture of
Page 3420
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Q. All right. I want to -- I want to
ask you to address a period of time. I want you
to understand that I'm referring here from the
period of time that you first learned from Sandy
Bruce that IMI was going to open a center
downtown. And I believe that was in August of
'98.
A. Yes.
Q. And that's the start of the period
of time. And the ending of the period of time is
when the center actually opened downtown in
September of'99. So essentially a year.
A. Okay.
Q. During that year, did you continue
to negotiate with IMI as concerns the red
transaction?
A. I did.
Q. Okay. Did you have any involvement
at all in the planning or the creation or the
development of the plan for IMI to open downtown
in September of '99?
A. I was not directly negotiating the
--I guess you refer to it as a blue deal. I was
not negotiating that, no.
Q. But specifically in terms of IMI

~
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how and when and why you would interact with
Dr. Curran.
A. Dr. Curran I interacted in
greater-- different parts of time in more
frequency than other periods of time. For a
while, I was engaged with Dr. Curran relative to
the MRI and my work on the board there.
And then as we moved into many parts
of the deal after the blue deal fell apart, more
conversations with Dr. Curran on trying to come up
with strategies and ways that would work for all
the parties.
He was very much interested in
creating a win-win for everybody that was involved
in the venture, which is where I was. And then I
was very involved with Dr. Curran when he took
over more leadership of MRI after some personnel
changes on the MRI operations itself, MRIA and
Center, particularly those operations. He would
frequently wander in my office, talk to my
assistant, see if he could catch me between
meetings, grab ten minutes here or there when he'd
be in the building, more onsite management than he
had for a period of time.
And I would interact with him that

'

f{

~
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BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q Now, this is a letter to Ridgley Denning?
A Correct.
Q Ridgley Denning was the person you identified as
the banker; correct?
A Correct.
Q Actually, this is the same date as the minutes
where Sandra Bruce was recorded as asking that the
negotiations between the radiologists and MRI be -- I'll
use the word back-bumered -- for the other negotiations;
correct?
A It's-MR. GJORDING: Object to the characterization,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained. Rephrase it.
BY MR. BANDUCCI:
Q It refers to those minutes we were just looking
at, correct?
A The same date, yes.
Q The same date. Okay. Now, let's go to the body
of this. Yeah, ifwe can blow it up.
"The purpose of this letter is to document the
cooperation between IMI and Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center, an Idaho nonprofit, and the cooperation
between IMI and MRI Associates, an Idaho general
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by which Saint Alphonsus or a subsidiary would become a
member within IMI, may require as much as 60 days further
from the date of the opening of the center to be
concluded. Most major issues have been negotiated,
however, and Saint Alphonsus already has made a number o
tangible investments in IMI, including the following."
Now, could you split-screen that back with the
document that we were just looking at, Lauren. Nope.
The -- you know what I'm talking about, second page of
the fax. There we go. The second page ofthe fax.
There we go.
Now, let's blow up the top paragraph for Mr.
Cliff and put that at the top of the screen, and then
let's blow up the bottom paragraph on the other one, and
let's put that -Do you see any similarities between those two
paragraphs?
A Yes, I do.
Q So, this document that you say you never saw was
actually a predecessor?
A Itwas.
Q And, in fact, both of these documents then refer
to these tangible investments; correct?
A Correct.
Q All right. Let's split-screen the tangible
Page 4083
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partnership, with respect to IMI's ownership and
operation of an independent imaging center to be located
at 927 Myrtle.
"Final negotiations are proceeding between IMI
and Saint Alphonsus with the objective of Saint Alphonsus
or a subsidiary becoming a member ofiMI and thereby
becoming a part owner ofthe portion ofthe center's
business other than magnetic resonance imaging. Final
negotiations are proceeding between IMI and MRI
Associates with the objective of MRI Associates becoming
a member in IMI and thereby becoming a part owner of the
MRI portion of the center's business?
"In the course ofthose negotiations, both Saint
Alphonsus and MRI Associates have reviewed and approved
IMI's budget projections as part of the negotiation
process."
So, here we're all one happy family, all
thinking -- Saint Alphonsus and MRIA and IMI all thinking
they're going to be working together; correct?
A No.
Q No?
A No.
Q Not according to you?
A Not according to me, no.
Q "The agreement between IMI and Saint Alphonsus
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investments. That would be the second page. Thank you.
Well, let's blow up the ones on the Cliff fax first.
There we go. Let's just do them one at a time, because I
don't think we have screen room here. Just what you
have, just so it's centered. There we go.
"This agreement between Saint Alphonsus and IMI
is an estimated 60 days out. Saint Alphonsus has already
made a number of tangible investments into IMI, including
the following." Do you see that?
A I do.
Q Okay. And you don't dispute any but the first
bullet point, correct, as tangible investments by Saint
Alphonsus?
A No. We didn't supply-- I'm sorry. Do you mean
of this list of five bullet points-Q Yes.
A --I don't dispute any but No.1?
Q Yes.
A No, I don't.
Q Okay. Now, let's go to the tangible investments
in the final letter. Okay. And this says, "Saint
Alphonsus provided case volumes," which is the same first
bullet point on the fax that has your handwriting.
The next bullet point is: "Saint Alphonsus has
expanded in excess of$100,000" --did I say expanded?
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BOISE, IDAHO
AUGUST 30, 2007

1

(Jury absent.)
THE COURT: We'll take up Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care V. MRI Associates.
I think my clerk
indicated there were three exhibits that she had some
questions regarding.
And Madam Clerk, go ahead and -THE CLERK: Actually, four.
THE COURT:
Four?
THE CLERK:
I just want to make sure.
This is
4504, not admitted.
MR. GORDON:
It's not admitted, you said?
THE CLERK:
Nope.
MR. MILLER:
I think that's one we did object to
because it didn't quote from the minutes.
THE COURT:
Okay. All right.
THE CLERK:
That's fine.
And then, this was a time line not even marked.
MR. MILLER:
Your Honor, I think we can probably
dispose of that.
MR. VARIN:
We can probably all agree on that

one.
THE CLERK:

Page 4200

And these two are -- have not been

2
3
4

5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

made last night is to Instruction 32. I eliminated the
sentence: "The Court has already ruled that Saint
Alphonsus owed fiduciary duties to MRIA, MRI Center, and
MRI Mobile." I'll talk to that in a moment.
The -- as to Instruction 17, I think that when
it comes down to the distinction between Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center in relationship to the breach of contract claims,
I don't know that there were -- had been any distinctions
demonstrated here. And I believe that the totality of
the evidence is such that the court is not going to
differentiate between those two entities in terms of
instructing the jury. It could lead to some potential
confusion, as well. And throughout the course of this
trial, I realize there have been some distinctions made.
That's the court's ruling.
As to Instruction 20, I know that Saint
Alphonsus submitted some changes -- proposed changes to
that instruction, but this is an outline to give a
simplified overview ofthe instructions on the
substantive law, and so, the court will decline to amend
that.
The court has amended Instruction 21 to reflect
the changes that Saint Alphonsus had submitted. I think
they did provide clarity. And so, we made those changes,

Page 4199
1 admitted?
2
MR. MILLER: Right.
3
THE CLERK: Okay.
4
THE COURT: So, did they get everything cleared
5 up?
6
THE CLERK: Yep.
7
THE COURT: Okay. Today, we will have Sandra
8 Bruce, as I understand, and rebuttal evidence from
9 Dr. Prochaska. Yes, Prochaska. Correct?
10
MR. GORDON: Yes, Your Honor.
11
THE COURT: Any matters to be addressed by MRIA?
12
MR. GORDON: Not at this time, Your Honor.
13
THE COURT: Saint Alphonsus?
14
MR. MILLER: No, Your Honor. I suppose we
15 probably need to make sure we have got a common
16 understanding of what exhibits are admitted, and I think
17 Kendra has -- our paralegal has checked with the clerk.
18 So, I think we're okay there, but we probably ought to
19 double-check that.
20
THE COURT: We'll give you that opportunity
21 before you rest.
22
MR. MILLER: Okay. Thank you.
23
THE COURT: Sure.
24
Let me go through some of the instructions.
25 Those are being printed up now. The only change that I

Page 4201
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

and I think those were reflected in the instructions you
received yesterday.
As far as Instruction No. 28, we corrected that
to eliminate the reference to Instruction 23. I think
that's consistent with the court's earlier rulings.
Folks, we're in session, please.
As to Instruction 3 1, the proximate cause
instruction, I think, first of all, the evidence that was
submitted was basically relying upon a but-for analysis.
But even assuming that wasn't the case, I don't read
Idaho Code Section 53-3-602(c) to refer only to cause or
causation. There is no mention of either but-for or
substantial factor.
And so, in-- in this case, really, the focus
has been the actions of Saint Alphonsus. And, certainly,
there is an issue of fact here, whether or not it was
Saint Alphonsus or whether it was a radiologist or
competition or other factors. And my reading of the law ,
is that when it comes down to claims of this kind, both
tort and contract-based claims, that the but-for
instruction is appropriate based upon the law and the
facts as presented in this case.
Instruction 32. I know that Saint Alphonsus
wanted a breakdown of the elements, and the court ruled
that the first element, the "existence of a duty" and,
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quote, "the second and third elements," breach of
damages, are specifically asked in the special verdict
form. And so, I don't believe there is going to be any
risk of jury confusion on that.
The, quote, "act primarily" language was left in
as a description of fiduciaries and is not inconsistent
with the case law describing fiduciary duty. This
language is separate from the descriptions of the duty of
loyalty and duty of care which follow in Instructions 33
and 34. So, the court will not amend Instruction 32
other than the sentence that the court indicated.
In this case, I don't see from the totality of
the evidence that was presented in this case -- when I
was addressing the summary judgment motion by Saint
Alphonsus regarding the fiduciary duty to MRI Center/
MRI Mobile as limited partnerships, the court concluded
that that was an issue of fact that should go to the
jury. The court had, from the significant number of
minute meetings and -- or minutes from meetings and the
substantial role, I believe, Saint Alphonsus played in
their partnership with MRIA, that realistic- -- the
evidence -- and I haven't really heard any evidence to
the contrary -- that there was a confidence placed by
these folks. And when I say "these folks," I'm talking
about, really, MRI Mobile/MRI Center were interwoven with
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that's really the only amendment to the instructions that
will be going to the jury today.
The court will, as far as Instruction 40 -- the
reason that 40 and 41 remain separate rather than
combining them is because the concepts of proximate cause
and natural and proximate result separate the tort claims
and the contract claims, and so, 40 deals with the
contract claims. Forty-one deals with the tort claims.
The reason that the court is not instructing on a, quote,
"reasonably certain" standard is because I believe those
have been adequately covered throughout the instructions.
The special verdict form -- I'm not going to
amend that. There will be -- when the jury goes through
this, they're going to check off what they believe to be
the claims ofMRIA that were established. I know that in
your closing remarks you will be able to give them your
theories on damages.
I realize that MRIA has this concern that if or
when this is appealed that they're concerned about
what-- whether or not the breach of the Partnership
Agreement for the wrongful dissociation will stand. But
the jury is going to go through and indicate which
theories that they believe were proven or not proven and
the amount. Obviously, that they-- in the event they
find damages, I think by requiring them to differentiate
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MRIA, though there were distinctions and they may have
been for tax purposes or other health-law purposes, the
overwhelming evidence is that they were all bundled
together and decisions were made.
I realize Saint Alphonsus was not-- and the
evidence has come in that, certainly, they were not as
interested in MRI Mobile in terms of trying to resolve
some of these disputes. But, still, they were there.
They were voting. They were acting as a fiduciary. And
certainly, there is, I believe, clear evidence and,
really, no contradictory evidence to that effect.
So, the facts and circumstances really fall into
that-- as I cited in Bliss Valley Foods at 121 Idaho 226
[sic], that, clearly, in this case, I think MRIA had a
very, very reasonable reliance on the trust and belief
that Saint Alphonsus was acting in a fiduciary capacity
towards both MRIA, MRI Mobile!MRI Center in their limited
partnership capacities. And so, the court will decline
to differentiate between or give separate instructions as
to MRIA and then MRI Mobile and MRI Center, the limited
liability partnerships.
But as I said, I did strike the language that,
"The court has already ruled that Saint Alphonsus owed
fiduciary duties to MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile." I
hadn't made that ruling because -- and I think that's --
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between profits and loss of the benefit of the bargain,
my review of the case law in this area is that that's
certainly not a requirement, and I believe that they can
grasp these issues that are going to be presented to them
throughout this trial, as well as through the closing
remarks. So, the special verdict form will remain as
presented earlier.
So, those are the court's rulings. I know that
you have all set forth your objections, corrections. I
will make sure the record reflects all of these various
drafts of these instructions, whether they were given,
whether they were covered. I'll make sure that the
packet that goes up in the event that this is appealed
will reflect both the instructions that you proposed and
what was covered, what was not covered.
As far as an owner's right to testify as to the
value of property, that-- I don't disagree that that's
certainly allowed.
In this case, I -- my ruling is is that these
experts have come in. They have done a thorough and
complete evaluation of this process, and that that is the
level of evidence that I think the jury should consider.
Though, I think one witness did testify as to he
thought that was the value of the MRIA Center, he was
really keying off of documentation that had been
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part of the official court record. For this reason,
please do not alter them or mark on them in any way.
"You will also have the original jury verdict
form. Please use it to return your verdict." And that's
this blue back, jury special verdict.
"Instruction 16. You have heard evidence in
this case as to the amount of money that Saint Alphonsus
is entitled to receive for their share of the MRIA
partnership.
"The Court will decide the amount of money that
Saint Alphonsus is entitled to receive for their share of
the partnership. This is part of the Court's
responsibility in this case.
"Therefore, you should not factor into your
deliberations or your determination of damages the amount
that Saint Alphonsus is entitled to receive for their
share ofthe partnership."
"Instruction 17. When I use the term 'MRIA,'
I'm referring to MRI Associates, LLP. When I use the
term 'Saint Alphonsus,' I'm referring both to Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Incorporated, and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Incorporated. When I
use the term 'MRI Center,' I'm referring to MRI Center of
Idaho, of which MRIA is a general partner. When I use
the term 'MRI Mobile,' I'm referring to MRI Mobile
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"Two. Breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
"B. Tort Claims.
"One. Intentional interference with prospective
contractual relations or business expectations.
"Two. Breach of fiduciary duty."
And, "C. Civil conspiracy.
"In this case, Saint Alphonsus has asserted
estoppel and waiver as defenses to MRIA's claims. Saint
Alphonsus also asserts that other factors caused MRIA's
claimed damages."
"Instruction 21. One of the issues in this case
that you must decide is whether MRIA was a partnership
for a specific term or whether the partnership had an
indefinite term. MRIA contends that the partnership was
for a specific term and was extended to 2023, whereas
Saint Alphonsus contends that there was no applicable
term to the partnership.
"You must determine what was intended by the
parties as evidenced by the contract in this case. In
making this determination, you should consider, from the ·
evidence, the following:
"One. The contract must be construed as a
whole, including all of the circumstances giving rise to
it to give consistent meaning to every part of it.
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Limited Partnership, of which MRIA is a general partner.
When I use the term 'GSR,' I'm referring to Gem State
Radiology, LLP."
"Instruction 18. The following facts are not in
dispute:
"Saint Alphonsus and MRIA were partners and
entered into a Partnership Agreement in 1985.
"Saint Alphonsus dissociated from the
partnership in April of 2004, and this dissociation
has been determined by the court to be a wrongful
dissociation."
"Instruction 19. When I say that a party has
the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the
expression 'if you find' or 'if you decide,' I mean you
must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably
true than not true."
"Instruction 20. In this case, MRIA has made
the following claims:
"A. Contract claims.
"One. Breach of the Partnership Agreement:
"a. wrongful dissociation from the MRIA
partnership;
"b. dissociation before the end of the
partnership term;
"c. breach of the noncompete clause;
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"Two. Language must be given its ordinary
meaning, unless you find from the evidence that a special
meaning was intended.
"Three. Any communications, conduct, or
dealings between the contracting parties showing that
what they intended and how they construed the doubtful
language may be considered, provided that such may not
completely change the agreement or construe one term
inconsistently with the remainder of the terms.
"Four. The contract should be construed to
avoid any contradiction or absurdities."
"Instruction 22. You may not consider any
explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by
any witness or any oral agreement of the parties
occurring before execution of the written agreement which
is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the
written agreement. While you may consider the testimony
of witnesses if necessary to clarify any ambiguity, you
may not consider such testimony to completely change the
agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in such
a fashion that it no longer fits with the other,
nonambiguous terms or parts."
"Instruction 23. MRIA Breach of the Partnership
Agreement Claim: Wrongful Dissociation.
"MRIA claims that Saint Alphonsus breached the
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Revenue

MRICI
Income MGMT Fee G.P. Dlst

003833

0

$68,400

l..!:!£2m!

MRI Mobile, L.P.
MGMT Fee G.P. Dist

L.P. Djst

Total

MRI Assoc.
Dist

$68,400

$0

$1,362,579

$228,317

$98,822

$3,606

$357,000

$459.428

$0

1987

$2,764,965

$1,105,436

$175,422

$8,462

$836,000

$1,021,884

$0

1988 Partner Contribution - Mobile
1988 $3,126,001 $1,346,779

$213,910 $205,714

$480,000

$899,624

$333,357

$99,231

$7,703

1989

$2,825,695 $1,000,810

$186,440 $257,143

$600,000

$1,043,583

$1,595,028

$305,201

$99,068

$0

$0

$99,068

1990

$3,623,513

$1,574,329

$231,264 $349,714

$816,000

$1,396,978

$2,090,288

$465,089

$146,994

$9,212

$912,000

$1,068,206

1991

$4,277,515

$1,886,327

$276,430 $514,284

$1,200,000

$1,990,714

$2,151,904

$273,476

$146,751

$155,073

$438,000

$739,824

1992

$4,722.739

$1,915,665

$332,728 $488,571

$1,140,000

$1,961,299

$2,760,258

$402,944

$182,681

$195,428

$456,000

$834,109

$80,000

1993

$4,526,379

$1,677,548

$327,506 $655,713

$1,530,000

$2,513,219

$2,798,798

$292,514

$194,160 $205,714

$480,000

$879,874

$165,000

1994

$5,326,736

$2,460,733

$358,743 $514,285

$1,200,000

$2,073,028

$3,162,685

$918,040

$210,559 $226,286

$528,000

$964,845

$367,001

$771,423

$1,800,000

$2,944,280

$3,323,291

$893,279

$227,515 $205,714

$480,000

$913,229

$455,000

($20,000) ($1,980,000)
$7,703

1996

$5,286,274 $2,435,990

$404,075 $822,855

$1,920,000

$3,146,930

$3,768,434

$1,112,940

$253,946 $380,571

$888,000

$1,522,517

$56,300

1997

$5,845,582

$2,551,776

$443,496 $822,857

$1,920,000

$3,186,353

$4,163,506

$1,197,767

$295,947

$390,857

$912,000

$1,598,804

$1,176,227

1998

$5,953,924

$2,916,918

$451,585 $668,571

$1,560,000

$2,680,156

$6,329,613

$1,816,360

$442,179

$226,286

$528,000

$1,196,465

I

r

1999

$7,263,744

$3,780,845

$514,457

$720,000

$1,680,000

$2,914,457

$8,720,992

$1,824,169

$604,789 $195,429

$456,000

$1,256,218

I

I

2000

$7,017,658

$3,993,004

$521,194 $822,857

$1,920,000

$3,264,051

$11,629,009

$2,307,031

$786,708 $257,143

$600,000

$1,643,851

$6,046,713
2326%

$6,678,000
26%

Total Income/Average annual return

w

.....l.

Revenue

1986

-..J
0
I
0
0
0

Total

($12,000) ($1,200,000}

1985 Partner Contribution - MRICI
$31,026 ($159,062)
1985

Holy Rosary Partner Contribution - Assoc.
1995 $5,111,077 $2,397,864 $372,857

/

L.P. Dist

SH 0141

$12,603,384 $18,961,000
6564%
99%

I

rLAINTIFPS
EXHIBIT
730

'C'

~
:!:
m

-1

Total
MGMTFee

003834

0
--....1
(..)

0
I
0
0
0

1\.)

Total
G,('. Oist

Total

Total

L.P. Dist

All

SARMC

% Retrun

Mednow

.QM.B

% Retrun

1267%

($246,000}
$38,000

15%

% Retrun Healthtrust

% Retrun

($600)
$7,600

~

%Retrun

$68,400

$0

$0

$68,400

($93,300)
$15,200

16%

($22,100)
$7,600

34%

$98,822

$3,606

$357,000

$459,428

$49,727

53%

$17,561

79%

$11,161

1860%

$128,104

52%

$175,422

$8,462

$838,000

$1,021,884

$104,160

112%

$34,939

158%

$19,914

3319%

$269,288

109%

$221,613

$205,714

$480,000

$907,327

($302,500)
$141,819

36%

($432,500)
$68,624

15%

($100,000)
$34,909

35%

($10,000)
$321,975

126%

$285,508

$257,143

$600,000

$1,142,651

$179,161

45%

$86,723

19%

$44,580

44%

$407,187

159%

$378,258

$358,926

$1,728,000

$2,465,184

$380,762

96%

$316,041

70%

$105,575

105%

$552,806

216%

$423,181

$669,357

$1,638,000

$2,730,538

$433,813

110%

$279,058

61%

$102,388

102%

$809,779

316%

$515,409

$763,999

$1,596,000

$2,875,408

$478,535

121%

$308,767

68%

$118,268

118%

$896,338

350%

$521,666 $1,026,427

$2,010,000

$3,558,093

$584,943

148%

$367,088

81%

$133,284

132%

$1,109,028

433%

$569,302 $1,107,572

$1,728,000

$3,404,874

$600,294

152%

$391,481

86%

$145,034

144%

$1,110,065

434%

$600,372 $1,432,137

$2,280,000

$4,312,509

$681,528

172%

$419,599

92%

$148,483

148%

($888,888)
$203,251

23%

$1,304,648

510%

$658,021

$1,259,726

$2,808,000

$4,725,747

$720,586

182%

$488,609

107%

$166,890

166%

$191,775

22%

$1,279,887

500%

$739,443 $2,389,941

$2,832,000

$5,961,384 $1,020,199

258%

$679,960

150%

$227,092

226%

$312,938

35%

$1,829,195

715%

$893,764

$894,857

$2,088,000

$3,876,621

$795,330

201%

$489,016

108%

$189,845

189%

$254,262

29%

$1,528,168

597%

$1,119,246

$915,429

$2,136,000

$4,170,675

$859,018

217%

$510,305

112%

$212,319

211%

$284,667

32%

$1,702,366

665%

$1,307,902 $1,080,000

$2,520,000

$4,907,902

$1,007,680

255%

$608,490

134%

$250;990

249%

$331,590

37%

$1,975,151

772%

$8,052,755

136% $5,073,860

30% $15,261,984

373%

SH 0142

86% $1,918,333

520% $1.578,484

MRICIIMRI Mobile, L.P.
Ownership Allocation
at July 31, 1999

MRICI
G.P.

003835

w

0
I
0
0
0

w

~

~

Total

10.392% 16.164%

26.556%

Mednow, Inc.

4.725%

6.475%

11.200%

6.613% 17.754%

24.367%

Healthtrust, Inc.

1.350%

1.517%

2.867%

1.889%

4.106%

5.995%

Holy Rosary Medical Center

3.000%

3.383%

6.383%

4.199%

1.352%

5.551%

13.500% 30.450%

43.950%

18.894% 12.167%

31.062%

14.000%

14.000%

5.594%

5.594%

0.875%

0.875%

TOTAL

-....!

L.P.

21.600%

Other MRI Mobile Limited Partner Investors

0

G.P.

7.425% 14.175%

Other MRICI Limited Partner Investors

~

Total

St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center

Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc.

=

L.P.

MRI Mobile, L.P.

-

-

-

3_Q.OOQC>/o 70.000% 100.000%

-

41.987% 58.013% 100.0000/o

SB 0144

003836
0730-0004

YEAR

MRICI
Income Mgmt Fee G.P. Dist

Revenue

003837

w

0
I
0
0
0

c:.n

Revenue

MRI Mobile, L.P.
Income Ma.mtFee G.P. Dist

L.P. Dist

MRI Assoc.
Distribution

{$12,000) ($1,200,000)

1985 Partner Contribution- MRICI
($159,062)
$31,026
1985

$68,400

Total Paid
To SARMC

% Retrun

($93,300)
$15,200

16%

1986

$1,362,579

$228,317

$98,822

$3,606

$357,000

$49,727

530.4

1987

$2.764,965

$1,105,436

$175.422

$8,462

$838,000

$104,160

112%

1988 Partner Contribution • Mobile
1988 $3,126,001 $1,346,779

$213,910 $205,714

$480,000

$333,357

$99,231

$7,703

($302,500)
$141,81,9

36%

($20,000) ($1,980,000)

1989

$2,825,695

$1,000,810

$186,440 $257,143

$600,000

$1,595,028

$305,201

$99,068

$0

$0

$179,161

45%

1990

$3,623,513

$1,574,329

$231,264 $349,714

$816,000

$2,090,288

$465,089

$146,994

$9,212

$912,000

$380,762

96%

1991

$4,277,515

$1,886,327

$276,430 $514,284

$1,200,000

$2,151,904

$273,476

$146.751

$155,073

$438,000

$433,813

110%

1992

$4,722,739

$1,915,665

$332,728 $488,571

$1,140,000

$2,760,258

$402,944

$182,681

$195.428

$456,000

$80,000

$478,535

121%

1993

$4,526,379

$1,677,548

$327,506 $655,713

$1,530,000

$2,798,798

$292,514

$194,160

$205,714

$480,000

$165,000

$584,943

148%

1994

$5,326,736

$2,460,733

$358,743 $514,285

$1,200,000

$3,162,685

$918,040

$210,559 $226,286

$528,000

$367,001

$600,294

152%

1995

$5,111,077

$2,397,864

$372,857

$771,423

$1,800,000

$3,323,291

$893,279

$227,515 $205,714

$480,000

$455,000

$681,528

172%

1996

$5,286,274

$2,435,990

$404,075 $822,855

$1,920,000

$3,768,434

$1,112,940

$253,946

$380,571

$888,000

$56,300

$720,586

182%

1997

$5,845,582

$2,551,776

$443,496 $822,857

$1,920,000

$4,163,506

$1,197,767

$295,947

$390,857

$912,000

$1,176,227

$1,020,199

258%

1998

$5,953,924

$2,916,918

$451,585 $668,571

$1,560,000

$6,329,613

$1,816,360

$442,179 $226,286

$528,000

$795,330

201%

$5,622,000
26%

$6,186,057
122°.4

TotaJ Income
Average Annual Return

0
-...!

LP. Dist

00

-=
=
~

Ul

$10,024,876 $15,361,000
91%
5967%

$4,202,644
1910%

~

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1981
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

MRICI
Revenue
l!!f9!!!!
$31,026
$1,362,579
$2,764,965
$3,126.001
$2,825,695
$3,623,513
$4,277,515
$4,722,739
$4,526,379
$5.326.736
$5,111,077
$5,286,274
$5,845,582
$5,953,924

($159,062)
$228,317
$1,105,436
$1,346,779
$1,000,810
$1,574,329
$1,886,327
$1,915,665
$1,677,548
$2,460,733
$2,397,864
$2,435,990
$2,551,776
$2,916,918

MRI Mobile, L.P.

Bmn!!!

$333,357
$1,595,028
$2,090,288
$2,151,904
$2,760,258
$2,798,798
$3,162,685
$3,323,291
$3,768,434
$4,163,506
$6,329,613

Total Paid

!n9!m!IEA8 ToSARMC
. 1985
1986
1987
$99,231 1988
$305,201 1989
$465,089 1990
$273,476 1991
$402,944 1992
$292,514 1993
$918,040 1994
$893,279 1995
$1,112,940 1996
$1,197,767 1997
$1,816,360 1998

MRI Center of Idaho

$15.200

$49,n7
$104,160
$141,819
$179,161
$380.762
$433,813
$478,535
$584,943
$600,294
$681,528
$720,586
$1,020,199
$795,330

1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Yau

MRI Mobile, LP.
Return to
St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Canter

$600,000

$7,000,000 .,,.,,,.,,,."'"'"'""'''"'"'''""'''"''·''"''""''""''~
$6,000,000 J;f"-"'oo".;..::_;-"'-'._:.:_c...;;;.+.~:..:.:.::.'="-:..a;;;
$5,000,000 li*-*""--"-......,,;--.,...._,;--~~-:.a-<
$4,000,000 k:-;~.,..,--~~~,...-.~-----"!
$3,000,000 j;F~~~""::::-~;o,a-,........
$2.000,000 ~-',F~.;.;,.,.,..,...,...,..,..,.;.,a,.;

5400,000

$1,000,000 P...:.-'11-'ff"il-"''l...:.:.:arll:-artiiHIII-!

$1.200,000
$1,000,000

,..-'i

S800,000

soJA~.-_._._..-~~._._.

$200,000

1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998

so
1915 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997

v....

8 Toto/Paid
roSARMC

Year

SB 0146

003838
0730-0006

MR/ CENTER AND MOBILE
CASH FLOW ANALYSIS FOR POSSIBLE TRADE

YEAR

2000

MRICI
MGT FEES AND GENERAL PARTNER DISTRIBUTIONS
WEST
VALLEY
MEDNOW
HRMC
DMR
TOTAL
SARMC

$322.746

MHSP-+ DMR

YEAR
2000

MHSP +DMR
DMR

~

Q

003839

0
-.....1

(..)

0
I
0
0
0
-.....1

,.....,.

$191,169

$91,848 $140,405

$657,883 $1,404,051

$206,134

$191,169

$91,848 $140.405

$657,883 $1,081,305

$1,081,305
$657,883

$657,883

DMR

$657,883

MRICI
MGT FEES, GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNER DISTRIBUTIONS
WEST
VALLEY
OIIR
TOTAL
MEONOW
HRIIC
SARMC

$711,546

MRIMOBILE
MGT FEES AND GENERAL PARTNER DISTRIBUTIONS
WEST
VALLEY
SARMC
MEDNOW
HRMC
TOTAL
DMR

$368.769 $133,448 $233,205 $1,493,083 $2,940,051

$983,851

18,752

$575,555 $459,214

$516,092 $2,528,752

$5,160,917

98,366

525%

$350,176 $279,393

$313,998 $1,538,531

$3,139,982

59,847

319%

#of EXAMS

%INCREASE

$87,542

MRIMOBILE
MGT FEES, GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNER DISTRIBUTIONS
WEST
SARMC
VALLEY
MEONOW
HRMC
OMR
TOTAL

$296,134

%INCREASE

$482,068

$109,721

$98,385

#of EXAMS

$239,721

$117,542

$98,385

$482,068

$1,233,851

18,752

$368.769 $133,448 $233,205 $1,493,083 $2,228,505

$2,228,505 $1,803,975 $884,542

$740,379 $3,627,716

$9,285,116

141,115

753%

$1,493,083 $1,493,083

$1 ,493,083 $1,208,650 $592,637

$496,049 $2,430,544

$6,220,962

94,546

504%

YEAR

Revenue

MRICI
Income MGMJFee ~

~

I9B!

Revenue

MRI Mobile, L.P.
Income MGMT Fee G.P. Dist

L.P. Dist

Total

MRIAssoc.
Dist

($12,000) ($1,200,000)

1985 Partner Contribution· MRICI
$31,026 ($159,062)
1985

$68,400

$68,400

$0

1986

$1,362,579

$228,317

$98,822

$3,606

$357,000

$459,428

$0

1987

$2,764,965 $1,105,436

$175,422

$8,462

$838,000

$1,021,884

$0

1988 Partner Contribution- Mobile
1988 $3,126,001 $1,346,779

$213,910 $205,714

$480,000

$899,624

$333,357

$99.~31

$7,703

1989

$2,825,695 $1,000,810

$186,440 $257,143

$600,000

$1,043,583

$1,595,028

$305,201

$99,068

$0

$0

$99,068

1990

$3,623,513- $1,574,329

$231,264 $349,714

$816,000

$1,396,978

$2,090,288

$465,089

$146,994

$9,212

$912,000

$1,068,206

1991

$4,277,515 $1,886,327

$276,430 $514,284

$1,200,000

$1,990,714

$2,151,904

$273,476

$146,751

$155,073

$438,000

$739,824

1992

$4,722,739 $1,915,665

$332,728 $488,571

$1,140,000

$1,961,299

$2,760,258

$402,944

$182,681

$195,428

$456,000

$834,109

$80,000

1993

$4,526,379 $1,677,548

$327,506 $655,713

$1,530,000

$2,513,219

$2,798,798

$292,514

$194,160 $205.714

$480,000

$879,874

$165,000

1994

$5,326,736

$2,460,733

$358,743 $514,285

$1,200,000

$2,073,028

$3,162,685

$918,040

$210,559

$226,286

$528,000

$964,845

$367,001

($20,000) ($1 ,980,000)
$7,703

Holy Rosary Partner Contribution -Assoc.

003840

1995

$5,111,077 $2,397,864

$372,857 $771,423

$1,800,000

$2,944,280

$3,323,291

$893,279

$227,515 $205,714

$480,000

$913,229

$455,000

1996

$5,286,274 $2,435,990

$404,075 $822,855

$1,920,000

$3,146,930

$3,768,434 $1,112,940

$253,946 $380,571

$888,000

$1,522,517

$56,300

1997

$5,845,582 $2,551,776

$443,496 $822,857

$1,920,000

$3,186,353

$4,163,506 $1 '197,767

$295,947 $390,857

$912,000

$1,598,804

$1,176,227

1998

$5,953,924 $2,916,918

$451,585 $668,571

$1,560,000

$2,680,156

$6,329,613 $1,816,360

$442,179 $226,286

$528,000

$1,196,465

1999

$7,263.744 $3.780,845

$514,457 $720,000

$1,680,000

$2,914,457

$8,720,992

$1,824,169

$604,789 $195,429

$456,000

$1,256,218

2000

$7,017,658 $3,993,004

$521,194 $822,857

$1,920,000

$3,264,051

$11,629,009 $2,307,031

$786,708 $257,143

$600,000

$1,643,851

$6,046,713
2326%

$6,678,000
26%

Total Income/Average annual retum

SH 0141

$12,603,384 $18,961,000
6564%
99%

I

111

I

fg

I

I

-

~

l:

m

=f

Total
MGMTFee

Total
G.P. Dist

Total
L.P. Dist

Total

All

~

% Retrun

Mednow

$68,400

$0

$0

$68,400

($93,300)
$15,200

16%

($22, 100)
$7,600

34%

$98,822

$3,606

$357,000

$459,428

$49,727

53%

$17,561

79%

$175,422

$8,462

$838,000

$1,021.884

$104.160

112%

$34,939

$221,613

$205,714

$480,000

$907,327

($302,500)
$141,819

36%

$285,508

$257,143

$600,000

$1,142,651

$179,161

$378,258

$358,926

$1,728,000

$2,465,184

$423,181

$669,357

$1,638,000

$515,409

$763,999

003841

DMR

"/, Retrun

1267%

($246,000)
$38,000

15%

$11,161

1860%

$128,104

52%

158%

$19,914

3319%

$269,288

109%

($432,500)
$68,624

15%

($100,000)
$34,909

35%

($10,000)
$321.975

126%

45%

$86,723

19%

$44,580

44%

$407,187

159%

$380,762

96%

$316,041

70%

$105,575

105%

$552,806

216%

$2,730,538

$433,813

110%

$279,058

61%

$102,388

102%

$809,779

316%

$1,596,000

$2,875,408

$478,535

121%

$308,767

68%

$118,268

118%

$896,338

350%

$521,666 $1,026,427

$2,010,000

$3,558,093

$584,943

148%

$367,088

81%

$133,284

132%

$1,109,028

433%

$569,302 $1,107,572

$1,728,000

$3,404,874

$600,294

152%

$391,481

86%

$145,034

144%

$1,110,065

434%

$600,372 $1,432,137

$2,280,000

$4,312,509

$681,528

172%

$419,599

92%

$148,483

148%

($888,888)
$203,251

23%

$1,304,648

510%

$658,021

$1,259,726

$2,808,000

$4,725,747

$720,586

182%

$488,609

107%

$166,890

166%

$191,775

22%

$1.279,887

500%

$739,443 $2,389,941

$2,832,000

$5,961,384 $1,020,199

258%

$679,960

150""

$227,092

226%

$312,938

35%

$1,829,195

715%

$893,764

$894,857

$2,088,000

$3,876,621

$795,330

201%

$489,016

108%

$189,845

189%

$254,262

29%

$1,528,168

597%

$1,119,246

$915,429

$2,136,000

$4,170,675

$859,018

217%

$510,305

112%

$212,319

211%

$284,667

32%

$1,702,366

665%

$1,307,902 $1.080,000

$2,520,000

$4,907,902 $1,007,680

255%

$608,490

134%

$250;990

249%

$331,590

37%

$1,975,151

772%

30% $15,261,984

373%

$8,052,755
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136% $5,073,860

% Retrun Healthtrust

"/e Retrun

($600)
$7,600

86% $1,918,333

~

520% $1,578,484

% Retrun

YEAR

~ue ~
IDMRICI~
R
~ MGMT Fee G.iC

~

~

(f)
L.P. Dist

ReVenue

'LV

(i) M~bile, L.~

Income MGMT Fee G.P. Diet

§

1985 Partner Contributipn- MRICI . /
)$12,000){1,200,000) ../
/
1985
$31,026 \{ ($159,062) $68,400
$68,400 'V

$0

1986

$1,362,579./$228,317/$98,822../ $3,606J $357,000/$459,428../

$0

1987

$2,764,9654, 105,436V$175,422../ $8,462/ $838,000"$1,021,884 . /

$0

1988 Partner Contribu!!Pn- Mobile
I
/
1988 $3,12s,oo1v$1,34s.n9/$213,91o..t$205.714
1989
199o
1991

v' $899,624v
$2,825,695v(1,000,810/$186,440v'$257,143
$600,000~1.043,583 ~
$3,623,513~1,574,329 .V$231,264 v'$349.714-./ $e1s.ooo~$1,396,978vl
$4.277.515V$1.886,327~276,430~~m
$48o,ooo

~\~Q~

/

~~

1992

$4,722,739" $1.915,665 /$332,728~$488,571 ""11, «o.ooov$1,961,299 v

1993

$4,526,379-Ats77.s4aV'$327,5o6J$6s5.713v' $1,53o.ooov$2,513,219

1994

$5,326,736V$2,460.733J $358.74W~2,o7j:oii)

V

1 3't.t-z. \~s~ f3""2.~"

Holy Rosary Partner Contribution - As}OC.

1995

$5,111 ,on./$2,397,864 ../$372.857.1$771.423/$1 ,8oo,ooo ./$2,944,280\/

1996

$5,286,274 v$2,435,990 ./$404,075 v(a22,855

1997
1998
1999
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2000

'If)
$333.357

/

l.:i§9,231..., $7,703

($20,000)~,980,000) V
tJ>..,... ~ .../"'

$1,595,028V"$305,201 V $99,068V
$2,o9o,zssvs4s5.o89./$146,994
$2.151,904./$273,476

$0......-

~$9.212 /

MRI Assoc.

Total

L.P. Dist

Dist

./
$7.703

$0 .../ $99,068V"'
$912,ooovls1,oss.2o6

J

~146,751 '-1'155,073 . / $438,000 V$739.824 v-

$2.760,258./$402,944 v$1B2,681IA195.428'-""" $456,ooov/" $834.109 ../
$2,798.79av $292,514v$194,1sov"$'2os.714../ $4Bo,ooo V$879,874 /
$3,162,685 v $918,o4o vi21o,ss9vi226,2as.,...... $52a,ooo

v

$964,s4s

$3,323,291 v"'$893,279 V$227,515 v$2o5,714 .........-$48o,ooo

v

~443.496 t-1822,857

~ $~0 5~0 \3

$1,92o,ooo V$3, 186,353/ $4,

Total income/Average annual retum

$12,603,384 $18,961,000
6564%
99%

~-11

=i

$455,ooo

i, . ·.

SH 0141

tt\

/

163,506~1.197.767 ~295,947"139o,s57"' $912,ooo~1.598,804 v $1,176,227
$5,953,924v!2.916,918 v$451,585 V'$6s8,571 V$1,56o,ooo V$2,680, 156/ $6,329,613 ~1.816,360 ../$442,179v'$226,286 /$528,ooo ~.196,465 /
$7,263.744v'$3.780,845V$514,4s7./$no.ooo /$1,68o.ooo ,.{2,914,457 V $8,720,992 t41,B24, 169 v1so4,789 vf'195.429 /$456,ooov"'$1,256,218 ~
$7.D17,ssav1'3,993,0o4./$s21.194v'$a22,857v/$1,920.ooov"$3,264,051 V $11,629,009~2,307,031 V$786,708 vi257,143/ $60o,ooo ~,643,851
&.,..
$5,845,582 v!2.551,776

~;

m

$367,oo1

$913,229 v

$1,920,000 ./$3,146,930/ $3, 768,434"'1' 112,940 v"$253,946 -"$'380,571 V""$888,000 /$1,522,517

$80,000
$16s.ooo

J

·

u-.

@ b~

$6,046,713
2326%
(lt\.

}'t ~

$6,678,000
26%

.t_,.,J,'rl-4 l~rr~Av (N, ~ {) ~LA-tt~

•

Total

Total

Total

MGMT Fee

G.P. Dist

L.P. Dist

Total
All

SARMC

% Retrun

Mednow

DMR

% Retrun

1267%

($246,000)
$38,000

15%

% Retrun Healthtrust

% Retrun

($600)
$7,600

HRMC

% Retrun

$68,400

v

($93,300)
$15,200

16%

($22, 100)
$7,600

34%

$98,822 . / $3,606./ $357,000/ $459,428

~

$49,727

53%

$17,561

79%

$11,161

1860%

$128,104

52%

$8,462/ $838,000/$1,021,884./$104,160

112%

$34,939

158%

$19,914

3319%

$269,288

109%

36%

($432,500)
$68,624

15%

($100,000)
$34,909

35%

($10,000)
$321,975

126%

$68,400 /

$175,422

$0 /

~

/
$221,613 V$205,714/

$0 ./

$480,000/ $907,327

/($302,500)
$141,819

$285,508 /

$257,143 /$600,000/$1,142,651/$179,161

45%

$86,723

19%

$44,580

44%

$407,187

159%

$378,258

$358,926

96%

$316,041

70%

$105,575

105%

$552,806

216%

$433,813

110%

$279,058

61%

$102,388

102%

$809,779

316%

$515,409.1 $763,999:?'$1,59fi]OO ..-12,87A.408 Y$478,535

121%

$308,767

68%

$118,268

118%

$896,338

350%

$521,666/$1,026,427/$2,010,000/$3,558,093./$584,943

148%

$367,088

81%

$133,284

132%

$11109,028

433%

$600,294

152%

$391,481

86%

$145,034

144%

$1,110,065

434%

$681,528

172%

$419,599

92%

$148,483

148%

$720,586

182%

$488,609

107%

$166,890

$739,44Y $2,389,94¥ $2,832,00<V $5,961,384.A"',020,199

258%

$679,960

150%

$893,764 \) $894,857./$2,088,000/$3,876,621 ,/' $795,330

201%

$489,016

$1,119,246/$915,429../$2,136,000 ./$4,170,675 c/$859,018

217%

$1,307,902 .;$'1,080,000/$2,520,000/$4,907,902v'!1,007,680

255%

$1,728,000

$2,465,184/$380,762

$423,181/ @9,3V~~53§)

_A.. n:'()t- ~

$569,302 /(; 107,5W

.lc

1.728,

.-1--)

o

•~

3,404.87 ~

..}~ "\).. sv ..r ttJ,..,ri &
/'

$600,372 $1,432, 13( $2.2§0.000

/.$4,312,509 /

I -::f(-3. ;Jl~
$658,021 vl'~726 $2,808,000 vi~7

/

'l~'\i)Jil

/

$8,052,755

($888,888)~
$203,251

23%

$1,304,648

510%

166%

$191,775

22%

$1,279,887

500%

$227,092

226%

$312,938

35%

$1,829,195

715%

108%

$189,845

189%

$254,262

29%

$1,528,168

597%

$510,305

112%

$212,319

211%

$284,667

32%

$1,702,366

665%

$608,490

134%

$250;990

249%

$331,590

37%

$1,975,151

772%

30% $15,261,984

373%

136% $5,073,860

86% $1,918,333

520% $1,578,484

003843

SH 0142

f t ' I{ @ J#:M~ Co.../. 'fh. J,.,... ~ Mil. I A- D."'~ .'\,v.\v~ tJ~ f"' l,
&~I~

,'

11.•

J ~~vdvJ

;I\. ~ PAr"~ rk-'v~"~J>. ..

J:J ... f. 1).::.

+.

EXHIBIT

~~~~~~~ lt'adlncl1od«our~

1114 Olll' custalllen.. ~ .... quoll!d
br11!o Rbii.SIIwf .blmalaoi&Jinl.
~ to ,._... bo1lw-. BCC
bam't"""" lllh:tl!d. -lcalb' bf the
1!111:111. donllll Ula fiatt tllat allcclt liOO

-eatlll&lll:a&llhmRAN.
"'Wt~ ~~no lmpooct an..,.
...,..,_ openttons; be said to an
~

"Wo doa't fi!e!WI.... Iolt ey

003844

Meaicatlmili~i _ t~Jb$··
second-clinic' for Elgie ·Road~.

SUbourll said ~IMl Weat eq~pt W1U

Diagnostic radlolof!Y group llltermountaln
~cal IJwl8ln& hes beiW\ pre~ a aile
north of the Eaglo Road inlei'Cbange with lnlllr·

m._

84

It will serve as the secojlll clillic for IMI. which

opened at Ninth and Myrtle streets In downtown
Boise In Ausust 19!1!1.
Jeff Seabourn, one or 12

d\aanostlc radlologlsU In
Bols&-hased lMI. said the new
clinic would support a growtna
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5440 franklin Road, 1202
Boise, Idaho 13705

• 429-11 05
(208)
www.spencemed.com

iiib, that allowa all cllaBDofllc tmiaea except
mammosrams - "wbbcb theY are wodt:lllt out.·

ror,.i:onStrw:don ot a 16,(1(1tHquare-foot he sal.d - to be tran&pol1ed, viewed and areblvlld

bulJdlna.

want Technical?
We have-Technical.

Include a CT scan. MRI and llllraDuDd llldmaJo.
ex Posltnm Emllaloo ~ IIICl PACS the Plctme An:f>Mna and-~~ Sys-

'We'll

el~oa!cl PACS wllllru:n!aSe Int8nnoun-

Wtt's abUlty to serw patients and their ~1clalla olf•llla, and allow 1M! to
illitlallr operate the omterwtth
ltswnentllneupot 12dl.Eoohave to

tic radloloslsts anc~-t!OOTstatr
staff up to
members.
'
"We'll have to stal'f up to
number of mecllcal coUeall\les
moet clemand" eventuallY. he
meet demand .. :
with offices near St. Luke's
sal.d.
Meridian Mecllcal Center on
SL Alphonsus Regional Med--Jeff Seaboum
EagleRoatl, I
Ical Center has a 5-year con"It Is to wpport our tllnlcal
tract tor 1M! to prvvide diagnos.
coUeagues and serve patients
tic radlolorY services to Sl Al's.
closer to their communities." he said.
1M! serves doctors on the staffs of several
Seabourn expects Falash and Ross C<>nstrUctton. Meridian, to complete the on<>-story buUd· TreaStm Valley hospitals.
Seabourn
said IMl startl!d es a sole propr\·
Ins, on Magic View Drive west ot Eagle Road, In
Mil)! C<>nstructton wW cost about $2.5 mUllon, etorshlp. then went throuih 101111 negotiations
and lMl West wW contain about $5 mUlion worth with SL Al's to pin the contract and maim the
nonprollt St. Al's a part owner ot the Bolle imal·
of equipment.
"By opening our second location, we 1\trther Inc center. Both centers operate Wlder parent
establish ourselves as not only lnnOII!Ilors In Gem Stale RadloiOIY. wb1cb Is bued In the Wells
cllqnostlc Imaging. hut also as educators of the Fargo Bulldlng on Main Street In Boise and hanthe poup.
pbyalclan community and the community at dles b!Wna
SL Luke's Roponal Medical Cenler, Boise,
Jarso.. ho said.
"'
'I'M new location continues a trend toward reportedly plan8 to buUd • cllqnostlc Imaging
center u wall.
ambulatory; outpatient medical services.
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Most Referrals to IMI Facilities Were from
Physicians Affiliated with Both Saint Alphonsus and
St. Luke's
1999-2010
·····················································
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EXHIBIT
MINUTE~

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
MAY 11,1998

I

In attendance: David Giles, Tim Hall, Paul Traughber, Jeff Cliff, and Kathy Sharpe, Secretary.

I

II

III

IMAGING CENTER.
A.

Dr. Giles expressed his feelings that the hospital will issue a "non-compete" clause within
the next six months . It was agreed that this is not a direction in which the Group would
benefit from. An independent Imaging Center would be beneficial and would help to
maintain a professional image as well as autonomy. Dr. Giles stated that if the Imaging
Center is not built now, it is most likely that it will not happen after the contract with the
hospital is renegotiated.

B.

The question was raised as to how important the relationships are with the physicians at the
hospital. Bob Polk has stated that anyone working for other institutions i.e. TVH, is
working for the competition and should therefore be "punished". Perhaps by .way of .
exclusion of contract with Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. Dr. Hall will speak
with him in a more social setting to hopefully gain some insight into this matter. Dr. Giles
feels that a separate Imaging Center will cause some real problems with the current hospital
staff and the ideal situation would be to somehow partner with the hospital.

C.

Dr. Hall stated that he believes that the Group is in control now, but that they are in jeopardy
of losing that control with each passing year. Jeff agrees that now is the time to open a
center and feels confident that the Group's income will significantly increase and the
younger partners will be happy with the risk in a few short years . It was agreed that
expansion to the east toward Saint Luke's Regional Medical Center would be the best option.

D.

Dr. Giles felt it was not necessary for a consultant to be brought in, as there are many
contacts within the Group . Jeff will gather some demographics to present.

MANPOWER.
A.

Neil Davey was very well received on his visit to the department. It was felt that if both Ian
and Neil join the Group, a clause in their contract will need to be drawn to exch.1de the
brothers from monopolizing votes on certain issues i.e. votes that pertain to each other. A
Jetter of intent wiJJ be sent to Ian.

B.

Lisa Scales will be out for her interview this month.

SCHEDULE.
A.

Dr. Gobel has brought up some ideas on scheduling and will present them at the Group
Meeting. Dr. Hall would like someone rather than himself to take over the schedule, Dr.
Giles volunteered to take on scheduling.

GSREX/0036
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IV

INVESTIGATION PROTOCOL.
A.

Dr. Traughber presented an article by ACR regarding Investigation Protocol. Dr. Traughber
would like to set up a protocol for WBR that will help employees know how to handle any
agency that may visit WBR and ask to see files etc. Drs. Giles and Hall agreed that this was
a good idea. Jeff also suggested a Compliance protocol that would protect the office and
employees. Dr. Traughber will work on an outline for the protocol and get back to the
Executive Committee.

STARKII.

V

A.

VI

Dr. Traughber questioned how the Stark II Self~ Referral law would effect WBR. (See
attaclunent). It was felt that it is ok to bill for films if the bill is to go the patient and not the
referring agency. The biggest problem could be with BeQ.side. Jeff and Dr. Traughber will
look into this article and work up a written agreement for the offices that will be most
effected by this.

VENCOR.
A.

Dr. Hall met with the Cooperate Head of the Vencor. Dr. Hall was asked if the Group
would be interested in doing business with Vencor. Vencor is currently in the process of
seeking HealthSouth. Dr. Hall told Wm that he would be interested in talking to them.
More on this issue to come.

WEST BOISE NUMB~RS.

VII

A.

VIII

Jeff presented profit information to the committee on WBR. Dr. Giles has requested these
nwnbers to determine if the profits can be utilized in the financing of the new Imaging
Center.

CAROLYN COFFMAN.

A.

Dr. Coffi:nan talked to Jeff regarding her malpractice insurance, which is approximately
$6,000 per year. She is the only Radiologist who pays this herself. Dr. Giles feels that the
Group should pay a percentage (perhaps two-thirds). Jeff will talk to Dr. Coffinan about her
premium.

IX

DIANE NEWTON.
A.

X

Dr. Newton recently went to San Francisco as a consultant. A motion was made and carried
to reimburse her for her expenses.

MOUNTAIN HOME REPORTS.

A.

The reports from Mountain Home continue to be problematic due to the Jack of history. Dr.
Hall will talk to them about this problem.

DG/kas
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Stark II Self-Referral Law Frequently
Asked Questions

n January the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) proposed regulations that would implement
the Stark II self-referral law. HCFA has extended the
original comment period for 60 days, unW May 11, 1998.
The ACR will file comments when it completes its analysis of the regulations' impact on members' practices.
Following are answers to questions about Stark IT laws
that have been asked most frequently by ACR member
radiologists and radiation oncologists.

I

What ls the Stark II law?
In 1993 Congress enacted the Stark II law, which extends
Medicare and Medicaid's self-reierral prohibitions to a
broader array of "designated health services," including
radiology (e.g., MRI, CT and ultrasound) and radiation
therapy services. Effective since January 1995, Stark II
prohibits the referral of patients or the submission of
Medicare or Medicaid claims for these designated services if the referring physician or an immediate family
member has a "financial relationship" with the entity that
provides the services.
What is a "financial relationship"?
A financial relationship is an ownership or investment
interest in or a compensation arrangement with. an entity.
!f a financial relationship exists, chen either an exception
applies and referrals are still permitted, or the referral is
illegal.
Does Stark II affect ACR members?
When it speaks of "illegal" referrals, the Stark II law
specifically exempts requests by radiologists and radiation
oncologists for diagnostic radiology or radiation therapy
services. as long as the services are furnished or supervised by the radiologist or radiation oncologist after a consultation has been requested by another physician.
8

APRIL

1998 +

VOI.UMI:

However, other ownership or compensation arrangements
ACR members might have with referring physicians could
fall under the statute. In those cases, the arrangements
would need to meet criteria for an exception. For instance,
Stark II could apply to diagnostic radiologists who are paid
to interpret radiographs perfonned Lrt primary care physicians' offices. Under Stark U this would constitute a financial relationship, since it is a compensation arrangement
for interpretative services. The arrangement could avoid
Stark II prohibitions under a personal service exception.
Such an exception requires that if the referring physician
bills for those radiographs, the radiologist must receive
fair market value for the interpretative-seyvice.

-

.....................

oes this mean that ACR members need to~
into a personal service arrangement when prov lng services to an entity with which they have a
ompensatlon arrangement?
Yes. F
e
onal service
exception, ACR members should ensure that the arrangement:
• is written, signed by all parties and specifies the ser·
vices covered by the arrangement;
• covers all services provided by them to the entity;
• has at least a one-year term;
• involves compensation that is agreed upon in advance,
does not exceed fair market value and (except forcertain physician incentive plans with managed care entities) does not take into account the volume or value of
any referrals or other business generated between
themselves and the entity; and
• does not involve the cow1seling or promotion of a business arrangement or activity that violates any state or
federai law.
continued 011 page 25
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legal
contin.ud jrrnn page 8
What are the key exceptions for
ACR members?
l. Personal service arrangements (e.g.,

or provider who violates the Stark
ban. The Stark ll amendment to the
Medicaid Act only prohibits me federal government from paying iederal
funds to a state for services furnished
pursuant to a prohibited referral.

a referring physician contr.lcts with a
radiologist to interpret films taken in
the referring physician's office)
May a current or Mure stream of
2. In-office ancillary services (e.g., a
patient referrals be reflected in an
radiologist or radiation oocologist
arrangement's fair market value?
who is an owner or employee of a
No. The Office of Inspector General tramultispecialty group practice perditionally has defined "fair market
forms a radiology or radiation oncolo- value" to eXclude arrangements that
gy procedure in a facility owned by
take into account the volume or value of
thegroup)
·
patient referrals.
3. Discount (All discounts must be
passed along to patients or their
What other statutes or rules
insurers and may not inure at all to
related to Stark self-referral
the referring physician.)
concern ACR members?
4. Designated services furnished by
Federal antikickback statute and
entities in rural areas
Medicare reassignment rules. An
arrangement by a diagnostic radiologist
Are any radiology or radiation ther- to provide interpretative services to
apy services excluded from the
other physicians for compensation could
Stark II law or regulations?
trigger the Stark law but, in some
Yes. In the proposed regulations, HCFA instances, might also involve amikickplans to exempt invasive or interventional radiology and screening mamnews
mography from the category of designated radiology services. Diagnostic
mammography would remain a "designated radiology service."
ACR flies amicus brief in medical
staff privilege dispute
What liability would an ACR
The ACRhas filed an amicus brief in a
member have for violating the
medical staff privilege dispute
Stark II law?
between a Florida radiation oncolo1. Denial of Medicare or Medicaid paygist. Jerome J. Spunberg, and
men£ or required refund of any payColumbia!]FK Medical Center. The
ment made for a claim billed in violahospital attempted to deprive
tion of the law.
Spunberg of the right to practice after
2. Civil penalties of up to $15,000 for
it granted an exclusive contract to
another group of radiation oncologists.
each service improperly billed and up
to $100,000 for a scheme to circumA trial judge granted him a temporary
vent the Stark II starute and regulainjunction permitting Spunberg the
tions. None of these sanctions could
right of continued access to the hospibe imposed on a Medicaid physician
tal's cancer center and the right to

back, reassignment or even state feesplitting issues. For example, some.
times such arrangements involve a
demand that radiologists reduce their
professional fees below fair market
value or (Wlder global billing) allow the
referring physician to retain a portion of
the fee in exchange for the patient
referrals. Therefore. ACR members
must take care to examine health care
arrangements Wlder aU these legal

areas..
Do states have self-referral laws
that follow the federal Stark law?

Yes. California. Florida. Georgia, illinois,
New York and other states have selfreferral statutes that either are modeled
after Starlc or have provisions to regulate or require disclosure of certain
financial relationships. Because those
state ·laws may differ from the Stark law
and affect an ACR member's individual
relationships. consultation with an experienced health care attorney is strongly
recommended. +

treat tili; patients there. The hospital

haS appealed.
Joining the ACR in the amicus brief
are the.American Medical Association,
the Florida Medical Association and
the Florida Radiological SOciety. The
brief argues that the trial court correctly held that the radiation oncologists were entitled to a fair hearing
and other procedural rights required
by t.he,medical staff bylaws and
Florida law before the hospital
attempted to expel them. Furthermore, the brief argues that there are
no "exclusive contract" or "business
decision" exceptions to these procedW<ll rights. +
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EXHIBIT
MINUTES
GROUP. MEETING
SEPTEMBER 9, 1998

I

In attendance: Jeff Seaboum, Ricardo Abello, Tim Hall, Neil Davey, Vicken Garabedian, Diane Newton,
John Knochel, Joe Gobel, David Giles, Paul Traughber, Jeff Cliff and Kathy S~arpe, Secretary.
I

MCCALL
A.

II

MANPOWER
A.

III

The question was raised as to whether the digitalized system at McCall will meet with ACR
standards. Dr. Knochel has been told that it will not be a problem. Due to the backlog from
the US West strike, it will be a while before the Tl line is installed and the system is fully
running. Dr. Abello suggested that perhaps a test period could be done with the digitalized
films versus the hard copies to compare the quality and determine if they are up to the
standards that the Group is willing to accept. This issue has been tabled until the Tiline has
been installed.

Dr. Gobel has spoken with Lisa Scales and stated that she is still very interested in relocating
to Boise but that she is currently looking elsewhere and may not be available in the future.
With the opening of the Imaging Center, and TVH continuing to grow, there will be a
shortage of Radiologists for adequate coverage. This would be a good time to talk to Lisa
again. Dr. Abello motioned that Lisa be brought back out to meet with the Radiologists that
she did not have the opportunity to meet on a previous visit to Boise. Dr. Traughber
seconded the motion. Dr. Giles stated that it would be unfair to bring her out if the Group is
not going to offer her a job. Dr. Knochel motioned to hire "Dr. Somebody", Dr. Abello
seconded. The motion carried. Dr. Giles stated that there are some new CVs in the file and
a committee should be put together to sort through them for potential candidates for
interviews. Dr. Hall stated that a Pediatric Radiologist from Arkansas has contacted him.
She is moving to Boise and is looking for a job. Although there is not a need for a Pediatric
Radiologist, it was decided that she should be invited to the department to meet with her.
Drs. Traughber, Abello and Knochel felt that the areas for concern for backup would be
women's studies, cardiac and musculoskeletal. Dr. Davey stated that there are three
Radiologists from Denver that would be interested in relocating to Boise. He will contact
them to send their CVs.

HAITI
A.

The hospital in Haiti docs not have a trained ultrasound tech at this time. It will cost
$6,000.00 to send a tech to the states to be trained. The hospital has agreed to match the
$3,000.00 from the Radiology Group. Dr. Giles stated that contributions should be
voluntary and Group members should pledge only what they are comfortable with.
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IV

MAMMOGRAPHY CERTIFICATION
A.

V

BILLING FOR OUTSIDE CONSULTATION
A.

VI

VII

A.

Jeff asked for clarification as to whether a bill should be sent on a professional courtesy. Dr.
Giles felt that if the patient is not being billed due to a professional courtesy, than nothing
should be sent to the patient.

B.

Jeff will look at the data on the exact number of professional courtesies and who is getting
them. Currently, professional courtesies are being extended to physicians and their
immediate family unless the Radiologist pays for a specific professional courtesy. More on
this issue later.

STAFF ISSUES FOR WBR AND THE IMAGING CENTER
Dr. Abello stated that the staff at WBR has some concerns regarding the future of WBR and
the Imaging Center. Dr. Giles will talk to the staff of WBR.

RETREAT
A.

lX

Jeff has looked at the billing problem and has stated that if a report has not been read, a
consultation fee only can be billed. It was stressed that the Radiologists must be careful
with "curbside" consults if there is not a report read, as there will not be a paper trail and the
possibility for misinterpretation is high. Dr. Seaboum also stated that the number of films
looked at should be documented.

PROFESSIONAL COURTESIES

A.

VIII

Dr. Traughber stated that some members of the Group will fail to be recertified due to their
low numbers of mammography studies. Drs. Seaboum and Garabedian will probably need
to be dropped from the study due to their numbers. Dr. Traughber stated that more of the
Junior Partners need to be qualified and that mammography should be assigned to more
members. Drs. Traughber and Knochel will look at the schedule and work out a system to
help the mammography numbers. More on this issue to come.

Dr. Abello would like to discuss subspecialty and the call schedule at the retreat on
November 14, 1998.

TRAUMA ULTRASOUND
A.

Bob Korn has talked to Dr. Giles about the use of ultrasound in the trauma departments as
an extension of the stethoscope. Dr. Giles expressed the Group's opposition to this, as this
raises a potential problem in that the trauma physicians may not be trained enough to fully
evaluate an ultrasound. Dr. Traughber would like to write a position paper to give to the
trauma physicians. Dr. Hall felt that before a letter is sent, a few Radiologists should
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infonnally get together with some of the trauma physicians to discuss their willingness to
work with the trauma department and their availability. Dr. Traughber felt a protocol should
be established to follow the use of ultrasound in the trauma department. The Executive
Committee with work out a meeting with the trauma surgeons. More to come on this issue.

X

IMA DELEGATES
A.

XI

TVH
A.

XII

The Executive Committee will put together a list of information that will go on the plaques
below the photos. If anyone has any ideas of what should be on the list, please let Drs.
Traughber, Knochel or Garabedian know. Those that have not had their picture done yet are
strongly encouraged to do so.
·

INCREASED FEES
A.

XIV

Dr. Knochel felt that perhaps the Group should inform TVH about the Imaging Center. Dr.
Giles felt that it would be better to wait until after the MRI Board has been told.

PHOTOS
A.

XIII

Dr. Giles stated that the IMA needs delegates if anyone is interested. There has been a poor
representation in the past and Dr. Hall would like to encourage attendance. Dr. Hall will
attend if he is not on call.

Jeff stated that Blue Cross has cut fees down by 9%. To offset this, the Executive
Committee has asked Jeff to look for codes that will allow fees to be increased around 5% to
10%. There has been an overall net of3.3% so far. Jeffwill continue to monitor procedures
that Blue Cross is not cutting and steadily increase those until they hit a ceiling.

IMAGING CENTER
A.

Drs. Giles, Traughber and Hall met with Sandra Bruce to discuss the Imaging Center. As
expected, her initial response was not in the Group's favor as she felt the Radiology Group
had violated their relationship with the hospital. The offer was made to lease the equipment
from the hospital but Sandra felt that this would not be enough. The hospital's position is
that the Imaging Center will take business so they want as much. of the center as possible.
Sandra and Cindy Schamp are trying to detennine how much of an impact this will have on
the hospital and how much of a profit they can get from the center. Dr. Giles feels that this
will allow the center to market on the hospital campus. Dr. Traughber stated that Cindy
talked of obtaining a global fee (technical and profession fees) of 50%. Dr. Traughber
questioned if the Group will allow the Executive Committee to barter with the hospital. It
was unanimously felt that the Group must maintain complete control over the center at all
cost. It was also felt that the center must not be tied to the hospital for new projects. The
issues that were definitely off the table for discussion included: professional fees, control
over new projects and management. Those issues up for discussion with the hospital would
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be: a percentage of involvement, options for new projects and a new contract for the
hospital. A possible discussion for a nocompete clause and TVH was also raised. Jeff
stressed that the Group must protect the center and not give control to the hospital. Jeff also
questioned how successful the center would be if the hospital becomes too involved. Is the
Group willing to give up a higher percentage of technical fee to maintain total control? Dr.
Giles suggested telling Sandra that the hospital can have 30% ifthey stay out ofTVH and
the Group maintains complete control of the center. The hospital will present their case
based on 50% control tomorrow. Jeff will get back to the Group with this information.

B.

Carl has drawn up a new contract for the partnership with the Imaging Center. He has taken
the SARG contract as a base and modified it for review. Dr. Hall questioned if there could
be a main contract that would state that splinter groups could be spun off and each of these
entities would have its own contract. The main contract would also state that none of the
separate entities could supersede the main contract in any way. Jeff felt that this would not
be a problem and should be discussed with Carl.
1.

2.

The profits and losses wiii be shared equaliy among the partners and vesting will be
immediate for those partners that established the center. Anyone coming into the
Group after the center is open will have to have a buy in/buy out contract similar to
the SARG and WBR contracts. Senior partners will guarantee the salaries for the
junior partners if the hospital contract is lost. Each partner has equal equity so each
partner could ask for a guaranteed salary, but it was thought that some partners
would not have to do so. Dr. Gobel felt that there should be a cap or a percentage of
what can be requested. It was felt that all partners should have the opportunity to
request a guarantee salary and those who do not need to use this option can choose
not to. Dr. Hall suggested that Jeff meet with each partner individually to discuss
their position and report back to the Group. This issue will be tabled until further
discussed.
Jeff also expressed his concerns over how to account for losses at the hospital if the
center is extremely successful. He questioned if there should be compensation to the
Saint Alphonsus Radiology Group to cover the center's profits and what to pay for
that coverage. Perhaps the pay should be based on market value per hour such as
$150.00 per hour, which will help offset operating costs if the center struggles in the
beginning. This will help to keep a Senior partner from making less than a Junior
partner. This issue will be tabled until members have a chance to look at the
contracts.

C.

Dr. Giles told Mike Falash that two vendors have been selected.' MR1: Philips & Siemens,
Specials Room: Philips & Siemens and CT: GE & Siemens. Dr. Hall spoke with someone
who will give the Group a Panorex machine for a fee per examination.

D.

Jeff spoke with someone concerning the success of having an MRI in an Imaging Center.
The spokesperson stated that in a town similar in size to Boise that out of five Imaging
Centers, three do not have MRl. They are very successful but not as profitable as those with
MRl.
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VX

MRIBOARD
A.

Jeff stated that he feels that Tom Hensen is strongly considering the offer of$1.8 million for
all his shares. Hensen will wait until after the MRl Board meeting to get back to Jeff with
his decision.· Dr. Giles questioned when the Group should approach the MRI Board
regarding leasing a magnet for the center. It was felt that this sl\ould wait until after Hensen
has made his decision.

EXECUTIVE SESSION:
I

COMMISSION
A.

II

GILES REPORT
A.

ni

Jeff presented the amendment for WBR with the new name of Southwest Idaho Imaing dba
West Boise Radiology. This has been signed by all six of the original partners with the
exception of Dr. Murray. It was also noted that the revenue source for WBR is brittle.

PARTY FOR NEW PARTNERS
A.

VI

The issue was again raised to remove Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center name from
the TVH billing. Jeff suggested corning up with a new name for billing purposes.

WBR
A.

V

A report on the sources of revenue will be presented at each Executive Session. The current
breakdown is 21.6% for in-patients, 60.8% for out-patients and 17.6% for ER.

BILLING FOR TVH
A

IV

Dr. Giles presented a letter from Arthur Berry (see attachment) regarding the commission on
the building. Dr. Hall stated that the Group should probably pay the rest of the commission
$23,750.00 but it certainly leaves a "bad taste". Dr. Traughber seconded and the motion was
carried. Dr. Hall would like Arthur Berry to know that the Group would like to be able to
trust his integrity and would iike help with the future purchase of the adjacent lot. Dr. Giies
will take the check to Arthur Berry on Friday. Due to the commission issue, Dr. Knochel
would like to use another agency for any future real estate purchases.

It was agreed that a party to introduce the newer partners to the Group should be given. Drs.
Knochel and Traughber will help Dr. Garabedian with this project.

SACC
A.

As of November 1, 1998 Owyhee and State SACC facilities will have WBR bill their
patients directly.
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VII

IC RECRUITING
A.

Recruiting for the Imaging Center will have to be done soon. More on this issue later.
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September 9; 1998

Commercial Aeal Estate
9GO aroadWilY Avonve, Sulto 450
Bolso, Idaho 83706
(208) 336-8000

FAX (20ll)

Dr. Dave Giles
410 S. Orchard
Boise, 10 83705

~5·0609

arthurberry@ arthutberry.com

PERSONAL & C...QN:PIPENTIAL
Fax. Transmission: 367-2824

Dear D~wc:
[ undetslund that you arc going to be having a partnership meeting in the next day or so and,
therefore,. I wanted to set out our posilion why we are hopeful that the remainder of the
commission for the IOlh and Myrtle property will be paid by yol!r incdical group.
When we originally met in the St. Alphonsus conference room to tonfldential!y discuss your
potential real estate needs, I outlined a program that involved our performing a specific and
unlimited search for the potential office site you described. Due to your need for anonymity, this
was to be done without disclosing your identity. J indicat~d to you that we had two or "three
''listed properties which probably would not meet your n'eeds, and that we were aware of five or
six (lthcr propctties listed by other agencies which may have an interest level." l thought it was
acceptable to your group that the "best site" which we probably would find for you would be
prOperties somewhere along the Myrtle connector that presently were not listed for sale. I
indicated that in the event we found such property, and the seller was willing to sell but
unwilling to pay us our commission, that you would "protect us on 011r fcc" I think at this
original meeting 1 even mentioned ]v1s. J.c('.ccsc's 10111 & Myr:tle property since l knew she was
considcring.selling and felt it was an ideal site for you.
In nny event, Ms. Lecesse agreed to accept your la!>t proposal of $950,000 provided she would
only have to pay us a fee of three percent. I regret that 1 was not able to "control her" in paying
the standard fee we previously discussed, but this often happens in circumstances whero we
show unlisted property which the seller is unwilling to initially execute a written listing
agreement on. Therefore, I am asking that your group pay tnc $23,750 remainder of commission
to us, which we think is only fair:.
·
Very tl'uly yours,

Arthur J. Berry
Arthur Deny & Company
AJB:sg
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Confidential
EXHIBIT
MINUTES
IMAGING CENTER MEETING
AUGUST 24, 1999

I

Lk

In attendance: David Giles~ Joe Gobel, Lisa Scales, John Knochel, Ian Davey, Paul Traughber,
Bill Murray, Jeff Scaboum, Karen Noyes and Kathy Sharpe, Secretary.
I

II

IMAGING CENTER UPDATE
A.

Karen stated that approximately six trial patients were scanned on the :MRI ti.nit at
the center today with approximately six scheduled for tomorrow.

B.

Transcription has developed a problem due to the computer interface not being
up. Reports will need to be printed on hardcopy until this can be resolved.

C.

DR will be on site next week. Karen stated that for DR to run, other systems,
such as Radiology Information, needs to be on line.

D.

The MedRad power injectors arc not compatible with the angio system. Karen
has spoken to someone regarding this problem and is waiting to hear back from
them as to how they will make this work at no charge to the center.

E.

The temporary license for mammography has been obtained with a 45-day
timcframe to tum in sample images.

F.

Business cards are in.

G.

The Lumysis system is in but needs AGFA cassettes to work. Karen and Dr.
Seabourn will work on this issue.

H.

Dr. Newton stated that the signs should be ready for the October 4, 1999 deadline
for the video shoot at the center. They will definitely been finished by the
opening party. A signed contract should be ready by the end of the week. Also,
two temporary signs will be done ~y the end of the week.

I.

Nothing new on dark fiber. Carl is working on a contract that will state that the
Group's lease rate will decrease when someone else comes onto the existing
cable.

MRI NEGOTIATIONS
A.

Sandra Bruce would like to have the hospital and Imaging Center contracts
finished before the MRI deal is completed. This could cause a problem with
financing due to the bank grouping the loan to MRl and the hospital as potential
partners. It was felt that perhaps this was part of the reason US Bank has not
closed the deal as of yet. The MRI Board would like to own the MRI portion of
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Confidential
the center with the Group being only a 1111 owner. This would make the center
an extension ofMRI Center ofldaho. The Group feels strongly that this is not an
acceptable option.

m

INTERMOUNTAIN ORTHOPEDICS
A

IV

TREASURE VALLEY HOSPITAL
A.

V

Dr. Traughber drafted a letter of intent (see attachment) to send to Buzz
Showalter, which would give the Group 30 days to continue working on this and
to notify the MRI Board of this venture. Dr. Knochel raised the question of
whether the :MRI Board will stall in a decision using the 30-day grace period from
the letter of intent: The Board will have to be notified that there is a time limit
and they will have to respond quickly. If the MRI Board is not interested, then
the money already set aside for the MRI deal could be used to finance buying the
magnet at the Elks annex. If the MRI Board is interested, then this could be done
jointly. It was felt that the bank would be favorable to this, as the orthopedics
proforma is very strong and this is a win-win situation. Dr. Gobel will look into
the Elks site for potential growth as a second imaging center. Dr. Newton
motioned that Dr. Traughber go forward with the letter of intent to Dr. Showalter.
Dr. Gobel seconded and the motion passed.

Brian Deever would like to talk to the Group regarding Blue Cross. There is
another Radiologist interested in doing the imaging under the Blue Cross
restrictions and discount services. Dr. Knochel will gather more information on
this issue.

SCHEDULE ROTATION
A.

Dr. Knochel stated that the winter quarter including spring break needs to be
picked. Dr. Knochel suggested that this needs to rotate in the same way the
rotation works for RSNA. This will be discussed further_at the next meeting.
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Confidential
EXHIBIT

I MM

..............8

FINANCE AND !fEES COMMITTEE
APRIL 18,2001
~
MINUTES

~

(l)

'-<
(fJ

tTJ

In attendance: Joe Gobel, MD; John Knoche 1, MD; Tim Hall, MD: Jeff Cliff, and Nicole
Limlaucr (secretary)

l.

'-<
(l)
(fJ

BliDGF;T

a. Jeff Cliff will get a disk to all group members with the 2002-2006 IMT
budget figures.

II.

COMMITTEES /ISSUES
a. Discussed how much committees can spend without rad exec or group
approval. The marketing committee has received the marketing report from
Carrie Strader. The committee requested a proposal from SMCS to
implement the: strategy for 2001. The total proposal cost is lU"ound $180,000
tor 2001 including sub-contractors. Dr. Gobel will poll the group for
approval.
Rad exec will define what guidelines will be used for committee spending.

III.

MRICI
a. Discussion: Hospital looking strongly into avenues to get out ofMRICI. Jeff
Cliff to set up a meeting with Cindy Schamp to discuss possible solutions.

IV.

FINANClALS
a. kiT Cliff presented a tirst quarter tinancial summary for GSR. The physi;.;ian
productivity numbers will be distributed by the end of this month.

V.

SURVEY
a. Jeff Cliff has e-mailed a copy of the survey done previously to group
members. Each committee will begin addressing issues/concerns raised by
group members over the next few meetings.
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IMI WEST liQUIPMENT BIDS
CT SCANNER

I. Seimens CT Zoom( current platform) $991,291
Fluoro(28,800) and cardiac( 46,800+ 39,600) as options
Doesn't include 16 channel upgrade
Care bolus(25,200) option
No injector( 15,000) total-$1, !48,693
Maintainence (see attached) 129-141 [(/year

2. Toshiba Aquilion(aclvallcecl platform) $1,160,588
Includes 64 row O.Smm detector- ?deliver as 8 or 16 channel
Fl uoro( 65,000)
Bonus( vitrea upgrade or CT fluoro) hu 3-31-01
Maintaincnce -$175K after warrrenty/year minus 5% on
Both scanners
·

MRI SCANNER
l. Phi llps $1 ,662, 168

2. Seimens
Quantum $1 ,668,5RO
Ultra $1,495,780

MULTIPURPOSE ROOM
1. Polystar $659,978
1024 X 1024,40 em
RO kW generator
up to 8 fr/scc
96 image RAM
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? number of monitors

2. GE Advantx Tilt:-C $576.158
I 024 X I 024, 40cm
I 00 kW generator

6-8 Jl·/scc
>I 000 image RAM
dual monitors
$9420 ceiling mount

Radiography and Fluoroscopy room
l. Siemens Sireskop $4 I 0,205
2. GE $323,012

Angio $14K
!ntcrventional $1 O.SK
Vertical Bucky $9K
Mobile C-arm
I. Siemens $173,836
2. OS I table $49,000

Radiography
1. GE Proleus with vertical bucky $97,432
Tomo $16K

2. Siemens Multix with vert bucky
Turno $~" 12K

~$

130K
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IMI Exams at the Downtown Location

42%

Exams by Physicians
Included in Damages:
Pre-9/99
Relationships
17,760 Exams

_________.

9%

Exams by Physicians Included in Damages: Other
SARMC Affiliates
4,100Exams

49%

~a;
=i
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Lost Profit Summary Without Eagle Through 2010
Mngicvbv

SARMC

1999
2000
2002
2003
2004
2006
2007
2008
2009

2010

Downtuwn

$

2001

2005

Eilgle

$

$

29/420
1,383/649
2,415,771
2,069,080

00

2521749
t254/972
1,927/852

$

252,749
1,254,972

1,927,852
563/356
3/716/662

(1,002,813)
2/341/547

11566,169
1137511.15

11730,890
3,842,364

1,274/214

3/51t842

805,507
947,963

5,700,998

687,981

4,586/024
4,620,627

3,484,268

1,828,963
1,732,401

2,283,427
2,543,119
1,592,155
$ 10,724,466 $ 19,061,617

963,754

604/799
636,357
$ 12,297,432

3/005/104
4,835/538
6,848,002

4,771,631

$ 42,083,515
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$10,001,000 X 49%

$ 4~900,490
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82
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

a.

Okay. But earlier we said as to the- earlier we
broke out on Model1 through 4, we said there was a question
about - two separate questions. One about whether the
scans were diverted and a second question about whether the
diversions were caused by St. Al's. Do you recall A. Sort of, yeah.
breaking that down?
A. Yeah.
And you said - you were offering your opinion
that the scans were diverted from one business to another,
but you were not offering an opinion that the scans were
caused byA. I know what the - St. Al's conduct?
A. I know what the allegations were. I've been told
to assume that the allegations that the jury will find that
wrongful conduct by St. Al's caused a diversion of scans.
Mm.
A. My assignment is to measure what that diversion
was.
Right.
A. And my opinion extends only to that assignment as
- as a - you know, assuming that those things are in
evidenceRight.
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a. a.

a.

a.

a.

a.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Do the wrongful acts that you're assuming SARMC
will be found liable for include wrongful dissociation?
A. No.
Do they include an ongoing obligation not to
compete with MRIA extending through the present day?
A. No.
Why don't they?
A. Because it's my understanding that there's been
adjudication of that issue and that the dissociation was not
wrongful.
Okay. Is it also your understanding that it
follows from the dissociation not being wrongful that St.
Alphonsus has a right to compete with MRIA after a certain
date?
A. Again, without trying to commit either parties to
their positions, that is my understanding, is that they
basically had to withhold participation for a year after
their dissociation.
So all your opinions are based on the assumption
that St. Al's could compete after that year expired?
A. Right. They in fact assume that, you know, had
this wrongful course of conduct not occurred Mm-hm.

a.

a.

a.

a.

a.

a.
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A. - what's the measure of damages.
Right. You're not- you're not assumingyou're not opining that St. Alphonsus caused any of the of the diversions, you're just assuming that St. Alphonsus
caused them, correct?
A. I'm instructed to assume that, yes.
But you are opining that the diversions were
causedA. That they occurred.
That the diversions occurred?
A. Yes.
Okay. In other words, that IMI- that MRIA would
have gotten this business if IMI wasn't there?
A. Under one of the - I mean, there are other
wrongful acts which cause diversions besides - doesn't rely
on IMI not being there, but, yes, if 1- if I understand
what you're asking me.
I'm going to ask you about some changes in
assumptions between your 2007 and 2011 report.
On Page 6 of your 2011 report, you write, under
"Summary of Updated Opinions," "For purposes of my analysis,
I have assumed that SARMC will be found liable for the
allegations made by MRIA. ''To the extent all or some of the
allegations are dismissed, my damages calculations may be
revised."

a.

a.

a.

a.

a.
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1
A. - and that the corporate opportunities weren't
2 usurped and that there wasn't a deliberate attempt to divert
3 scans from MRIA to IMI, which is alleged - I'm not saying
4 that to be the case - that my model in the later years
5 presumes that everybody would have been a happy family and
6 that St. Alphonsus would not have had a reason to
7 disassociate, but it doesn't assume that they couldn't have
8 disassociated at any time and honored that noncompete.
So, for example, if- if you go through the
9
10 • allegations which MRI intends to offer so that they actually
11 become, you know, the first arrivers in Meridian, that
12 they're not undermined in the practice of their center so
13 that their scans are not diverted, that there isn't
14 accommodation with GSR so that all of these things occur, I
15 don't see any reason to interpose an assumption at some
16 future date, in '07 or '8 or '9, that St. Alphonsus
17 withdraws, but if there was a reason that that might be the
18 case, I provided the details of my analysis so that you can
19 go in and say, okay, let's just assume that St. Ars decides
20 to dissociate - in '08?
21
Mm-hm.
22
A. And I think you can use the data I have to kind of
23 look at what the glide path is going to be in terms of the
24 decline in referrals from the - because affiliation is
25 important in my opinion. And so that - so my calculations

a.
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are all useful. So I don't want to be misunderetoOd that
I'm saying that St. Al's couldn't have dissociated at any
time. I'm just saying that they assume that they wouldn't
have. And I think that that's a rebuttable assumption. And
if- if it was rebutted, I could alter the calculations.
a. And are we talking about Method 5 here?
A. All methods.
a. Okay. So all five of your methods assume that St.
Alphonsus - the bottom line numbers assume that St.
Alphonsus would not have dissociated?
A. That in likelihood would not have dissociated.
But, you know, I'm open to evidence and that type of thing.
And if it were found by the jury or- that dissociation was
likely at some particulara. Mm-hm.
A. -date, they could still use my calculations in
order to quantify the wrongful behavior- the effects of
the wrongful behavior through that date and kind of through
the tail period where that wrongful behavior finishes
manifesting itself.
a. Okay. I want to - I want to talk a little more
about that because I don't fully understand it, but I think
I - I think I see what you're saying.
So you said the - what - what is the tail
period?
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2008, St. Al's would have dissociated. Then what you could
do at that point of time is you could look at my but-for
line in terms of what scans would a. Mm-hm.
A. - have been a. Mm-hm.
A. - and then you would pause it in decline in those
scans as a result of dissociation, and damages then would be
the difference between that but-for line and the actual
scansa. Okay.
A. -instead of the original one.
a. Okay. I understand. So that's an analysis that
could be done?
A. And I actually think that it could be done in an
approximate way, but- by the jury looking at my data by
year. If you would give them a particular year to assume
dissociation, they can see that what the pattern of - and -you know, and some way they could decide, wen, maybe
we'll give them, you know, three-quarters of year one after
dissociation and one-quarter of year two, or something like
that.
a. Okay. How's the jury to know what percentages to
use?
A. Well, they just look at, basically, the pattern of

87
1
A. Well, I think that- you know, if you look at the
2 actual data in terms of what happened to the MRIA business -
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a.

Mm-hm.

A. -you know, basically it could be characterized
as a business that had been strongly growing, benefrtting, I
believe, through - by its status as a provider within the
St. Al's network. And when that disassociation occurs,
those affiliations don't - you know, referral patterns
don't just change immediately. It takes time for them to
do, but I don't know- but you'll see that over a period of
one or two years basically the referrals dry up.
a. Hm.
A. And I'm saying that if - if you have wrongful
conduct through a certain date, and- and then there's no
more conduct after that, you don't just truncate the damages
through the date that the conduct stopped. You basically
look at the impacts of the conduct.
a. Okay.
A. And - and so in the case where - let's say for
some reason you're looking at my Method No. 1, and you say-

22 a. Mm-hm.
23
24
A. - well, we have evidence that even if these
25 opportunities have not been usurped and all this occurred in
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how the - what the attrition was in terms of referrals
after dissociation. We have hard data on that. We can show
them h01111 the scans went down.
a. Okay. So that's not- this -this tail analysis
is not something you've performed in your tables?
A. It's - it's not in here. I really- you know,
if somebody gave me assumptions, I could do an analysis
fairly readily, but I believe that MRIA's assumption is that
had these course of conducts not occurred that there would
have been a state of affairs where St. Al's had - had
little reason to want to dissociate. And so that- and the
model assumes that they would have continued to be in this- in association. That certainly doesn't assume that they
had to legally.
a. Right. What if we -what if we change the
assumption and assume that even in the but-for world, St.
Alphonsus would have dissociated on April1 st, 2004 and
would have been free to compete on April 1st, 2005? Can you
tell me, sitting here today, how your numbers would be
affected by the change in assumption?
A. Well, I would not truncate the damages at the date
that their noncompete expired.
a. Okay.
A. I would basically- you know, assuming that this
wrongful conduct- you know, it affects MRIA's business
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Numerous gaps in MRIA' s evidence and fundamental errors in the conduct of these
proceedings entitle Saint Alphonsus to judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") or, in the
alternative, to a new trial. First, for multiple reasons, the lost-profit and diminution-in-value
damages awarded by the jury are legally improper and factually unsupportable. Second, MRIA
should not have been permitted to add claims for disgorgement, and those claims are time-barred
and unsupported by the evidence, and overstate Saint Alphonsus's gains. Third, the Court failed
to properly apportion fault between Saint Alphonsus and the third-party defendants, and MRIA
obtained inconsistent verdicts in that regard. Fourth, Center and Mobile should not have been
joined as parties, and their claims are time barred and legally and factually unsupportable. Fifth,
the Court erroneously and unevenly applied an unwarranted "law of the case" rule that prevented
Saint Alphonsus from having a fair trial and effectively defending the claims against it. Sixth,
multiple other erroneous rulings and court actions, alone and in combination, deprived Saint
Alphonsus of a fair trial. Seventh, the Court should have awarded interest on Saint Alphonsus's
departing-partner share from the date of dissociation at the rate of 12%.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JNOV OR ORDER A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE
MRIA FAILED TO PROVE LEGALLY RECOVERABLE DAMAGES
Saint Alphonsus is entitled to JNOV because the damages (or portions thereof) claimed

by the MRIA entities and awarded by the jury are legally improper and unsupported by
substantial evidence. See Quick v. Crane, Ill Idaho 759, 763-65, 727 P .2d 1187, 1190-92
(1987) (standard for JNOV). Alternatively, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a new trial (or
remittitur) under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l), (5), (6), and (7) because the damages (or portions thereof) are
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excessive, are against the clear weight of the evidence, and resulted from errors of law occurring
at trial. See Quick, 111 Idaho at 766, 727 P.2d at 1194 (standard for new trial).

A.

MRIA Failed To Prove Lost Profits Caused By Saint Alphonsus

The jury's award of$27,922,388 in profits lost by MRI Center (of which 7.5%, or
$2,094,180, was allocated to MRI Associates) cannot stand. That award was premised on the
contention that (i) IMI's downtown and on-campus facilities took scan business from Center and
(ii) Saint Alphonsus's alleged misconduct was the cause of this business migration. But MRIA's
experts admitted that their testimony about the amount of business migration from MRI Center to
IMI was entirely speculative, and no factual or expert evidence was offered showing that Saint
Alphonsus' s conduct caused MRI Center to "lose" all or any of the scans on which damages
were based. The damages award thus rested on a conceded, erroneous "overstatement" of lost
business that MRIA's experts hoped-without any evidence or analysis-would be offset by
their model's purported, unquantified exclusion of other lost business. Trial Tr. at 4599-4600.
Specifically, MRIA's expert Budge counted IMI scans as wrongly "diverted" from MRI
Center to IMI's downtown location if they came to IMI from either (1) a physician who had
referred even one scan to MRI Center before IMI opened, or (2) any physician who had
admitting privileges at Saint Alphonsus but not St. Luke's. Trial Tr. at 4526-30, 4588-89; 4642,
4653; Ex. 5000. The vast majority (around 82%) ofthe scans for which damages were awarded
fell into the first category. Ex. 5000. And at least two thirds of those scans came to IMI from
physicians with privileges at both St. Luke's and Saint Alphonsus. See Ex. 987. Budge's model
thus concededly included numerous scans that, had IMI never existed, would have gone to
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St. Luke's-not to MRI-and therefore clearly overstates the number of scans that may properly
be included in damages. Trial Tr. at 4594-4600; Exs. 975 & 976. MRIA's damages proof thus
fails to support the jury's verdict because it is significantly and indeterminately over-inclusive.
Budge's assertion that he compensated for this gross overestimation of scan losses by
undercounting some indeterminate amount of lost scans attributable to other physicians, thus
leading to rough justice in the final damages figure, Trial Tr. at 5000; see also Mot. for Directed
Verdict on Damages at 5-7 (Oct. 18, 2011), cannot salvage his methodology since this rough
justice was not based on any mathematical model, evidence, or analysis, but rather just on
improper speculation. This is barely more supportable than if Budge had counted as "lost" all
IMI scans referred from doctors whose last names started with the letters A through M, and
defended that methodology by asserting that any over-counting was offset by not counting any
scans from doctors whose last names began with the letters N through Z.
MRIA's lost-profit damages proof also does not comply with Pope v. Intermountain Gas
Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P .2d 988 (1982), which held that a damages analysis is insufficient if it
assumes, "without any support in the record, that the [defendant's] operation would not have
won any portion ofthe ... market absent" the defendant's misconduct. /d. at 234, 646 P.2d at
1005. Here, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's intervening admonition to comply with Pope,
SADC v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479,498,498,224 P.3d 1068, 1087 (2009), MRIA chose
to proceed exactly as at the first trial, with its experts simply assuming that Saint Alphonsus's
wrongdoing caused all the referrals to IMI by the two categories of physicians referenced above.
Trial Tr. at 4526-30, 4588-89; 4642, 4653; Ex. 5000. MRIA made no effort to distinguish
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between scans, if any, that went to IMI due to Saint Alphonsus's alleged improper acts, and
scans that IMI would have received as a new market competitor in any event, even though Budge
conceded that just because a customer once patronized one business in the past does not mean
the customer would never patronize a competing business when it opens down the block. Trial
Tr. at 4602. Indeed, the only evidence at trial was that physician referral decisions were based
on factors other than Saint Alphonsus's alleged wrongdoing. Trial Tr. at 5606-10, 5807-09,
5870-81. See also Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Based on the Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's Evidence
of Lost Profits at 6-13 (Aug. 6, 2010); Mot. Directed Verdict on Damages at 3-9 (Oct. 18, 2011).

B.

MRI Mobile's Lost Profits "Evidence" Is Insufficient Under Directly
Controlling Supreme Court Authority

The jury's award of $24,162,127 in profits lost by MRI Mobile (of which 7 .5%, or
$1,812,160, was allocated to MRIA) conflicts with the Supreme Court's express directive in
Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 847, 172 P.3d 1119, 1122 (2007), that

a plaintiff seeking an award of lost profits due to improper competition must provide evidence of
what its own costs and profits would have been, and not just rely on assumptions that its own
costs, profit margins, and profits would have been similar to the defendant competitor's. /d.
Here, Budge conceded that he was simply "assuming that" MRI Mobile's Meridian
"operations ... would have been identical" to IMI's in terms of"where the scans came from"
and "the amounts paid and the costs that it took to generate the revenue," and that he was "using
IMI's margins and ... the actual amounts received per scans that actually occurred on that site."
10/14/11 Trial Tr. at 4545. Under Trilogy, this use ofiMI's volumes, costs, margins, and profits
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as a substitute for proving what Mobile would have earned is insufficient to support the verdict.

C.

The MRIA Entities May Not Recover for Profits Lost After Aprill, 2005

Because there was no tortious activity after April 1, 2005, see Trial Tr. at 6365-68, the
Court held that MRIA could only recover damages accruing after April 1, 2005, that were caused
by wrongdoing occurring before that time. !d. at 4363. This was correct, since Saint Alphonsus
legally dissociated and the contractual bar to competition expired on that date. See, e.g., All Line

Inc. v. Rabar Crop., 919 F.2d 475,480 (7th Cir. 1990); Hite v. Biomet, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1013,
1025-26 (N.D. Ind. 1999); Mem. re: Mot. to Exclude Damages Theories at 11-12 (Sept. 2, 2011).
MRIA failed to prove such "splash forward" damages. Contrary to the Court's holding,
MRIA's expert assumed that competition by Saint Alphonsus even after April!, 2005, was
wrongful and a basis for liability. Trial Tr. at 4566, 4580-81. Indeed, Budge expressly conceded
that if Saint Alphonsus had a right to compete after April!, 2005, then all damages for IMI oncampus scans, and all damages for IMI downtown scans after April 1, 2005, would have had to
be excised from his report. !d. at 4574-75. Thus Budge admitted that Saint Alphonsus's legal
right to compete after April 1, 2005, substantially reduces his damages estimate-and
derivatively that of Wilhoite-both of which the jury adopted in their unmodified form. !d. at
4638. See Mot. for Directed Verdict on Damages at 10-12 (Oct. 18, 2011).
The award ofpost-2005 damages is also invalid because there is no substantial evidence
supporting MRIA's illogical theory that any physician who referred a patient to IMI prior to
2005 was permanently lost to MRIA, so that all post-2005 referrals were also includable in
damages even though Saint Alphonsus was entirely free to compete at that time. See Trial Tr. at
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6052-53. 1 To the contrary, both before and after 2005, physicians who used IMI did send new
referrals to Center or MRIA. See Trial Tr. at 5604, 5610,5778-79. Each new referral was a new
decision based on many factors, including geography and patient convenience, yet MRIA offered
no evidence that any doctor's new referral decision after April 1, 2005, was due to prior
wrongdoing. See Consol. Reply in Support of Directed Verdict Mots. at 16-17 (Oct. 22, 2011).
The jury's damages also include referrals by physicians who, having previously referred
one or more patients to MRIA, made their first referral to IMI after April 1, 2005, when
competition was lawful and there was no misconduct. There is no substantial evidence
supporting an inference that some earlier, unidentified misconduct caused these referrals. See id
For these reasons, the Court should grant JNOV reducing the lost-profit damages
awarded to the MRI entities by the $40,154,935 in claimed losses occurring after April1, 2005,2
or, in the alternative, order a new trial. (If the Court determines that this failure of proof affects
only MRI Center's claims, then the damages awarded to MRI Center and MRI Associates should
be reduced by $20,052,443. 3) Alternatively, the Court should order a new trial for its failure to
give Saint Alphonsus' s proposed jury instruction directing the jury to award zero damages if any
1

"MR. WOODARD: ... [B]y 2005 the migration had already occurred. Those
customers had already been lost. . . . And once they are lost, regardless of whether Saint
Alphonsus can or cannot rightfully compete, if they did things before 2005 that by 2005 the
migration had already occurred. Those customers had already been lost."
2

MRIA's experts claimed $36,528,282 in losses attributable to the years 2006 to 2015.
See Exs. 5067R-2 & 5078R. In addition, MRIA may not recover three quarters, or $3,626,653
(representing the months April through December), of the $4,835,538 in losses claimed for 2005.
3

MRIA claimed $19,307,563 in Center losses attributable to the years 2006 to 2015.
Exs. 5067R-2 & 5078R. And MRIA may not recover three quarters, or $744,880 (representing
the months April through December), of the $993,174 in MRI Center losses claimed for 2005.
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scans after April1, 2005, resulted from lawful competition.

D.

MRIA May Not Recover for Profits Lost to IMI's On-Campus Facility

A subset of the jury's award of damages for scans lost after April1, 2005, consists of
business that MRI Center purportedly lost to IMI's on-campus facility, which opened in
December 2005. While excludable as part of the category ofpost-2005 damages, these damages
are also improper because IMI's on-campus facility provides scans for Saint Alphonsus's
hospital inpatients, see Trial Ex. 4377, and, as the Court ultimately noted, Saint Alphonsus did
nothing improper by opening a competing in-patient center after it had the right to compete. See
Trial Tr. at 6365-68. MRlA's "splash forward" theory ofpost-2005 damages (by which the
alleged pre-2005 misconduct impacted the post-2005 referring practices of referring physicians,
not the referral practices of Saint Alphonsus itself) can have no applicability here, since on April
l, 2005, Saint Alphonsus had the absolute right to send its own patients to IMI rather than to MRI
Center. For this additional, independent reason, the Court should at a minimum grant JNOV
reducing the lost profits awarded to MRl Center and MRI Associates by the $16,054,999 in
claimed losses attributable to IMI's on-campus facility, 4 or, in the alternative, order a new trial.

E.

MRIA May Not Recover Amounts That Saint Alphonsus Would Have
Received Under MRIA's But-For Assumptions

A critical assumption ofMRlA's experts was that, absent the alleged misconduct, Saint
Alphonsus would have remained a partner in MRlA through 2015. 2011 Budge Dep. Tr. at 854

Budge allocated $10,724,466 in damages to IMI on-campus through 2010. Ex. 5067R2. Because IMI on-campus accounted for 53.3% ofMRIA's claimed losses during 2010, id.,
Wilhoite's projected 2011-2015 losses of$10,001,000 (Ex. 5078R) should be reduced by a like
percentage, to $5,330,533. Past and future lost profits for IMI on-campus thus are $16,054,999.
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86. On this express premise, the experts hypothesized that, in the but-for world, the five partners
ofMRIA (including SARMC) would have realized certain profits. The jury awarded to MRIA
as it exists today-four partners, not including Saint Alphonsus-1 00% of those hypothetical
five-partner MRIA's profits. The jury's award thus overstates the amount of damages suffered
by DMR and the other current MRIA partners, resulting in an improper windfall to those entities.

See Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 609, 850 P.2d 749, 760 (1993).
The Court ruled that Saint Alphonsus could not present evidence that MRIA' s claimed
damages were overstated on this basis, on the ground Saint Alphonsus had already been awarded
a departing partner share ("buy-out price"). Trial Tr. at 4191. But that is a wholly distinct issue.
The buy-out price reflects the actual value of Saint Alphonsus's partnership share at the time it
departed from MRIA, and has nothing to do with the profits that MRIA would have earned-and
paid to Saint Alphonsus-in the but-for world. See Opp. to Mot. in Limine re: "Offset" at 2, 4-5
(Oct. 12, 2011). This error, viewed separately from all others, results in an award substantially
higher than it should have been, and should be remedied by a new trial or a JNOV or remittitur
reducing the damages by an amount to be determined at an evidentiary hearing.

F.

MRIA May Not Recover Damages for MRI Center's Diminution in Value

The jury's alternative award for the diminution in the value of Center is also legally
improper and factually unsupportable for two reasons. First, the Court should not have
permitted MRIA to present this claim, because MRIA affirmatively abandoned it at the first trial,

see 2007 Trial Tr. at 793, 3372, 3374; infra Section V, and did not disclose it in this trial until
well after discovery had ended, thereby preventing Saint Alphonsus from discovering and
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presenting any fact or expert evidence to test or contradict Dr. Prochaska's ipse dixit testimony
that MRI Center was all but worthless in 2011 as a result of misconduct ending years earlier.
Second, MRIA's evidence was legally insufficient on multiple grounds. Dr. Prochaska's
valuation testimony was unsupported by any calculations or other evidence, and his own
horseback estimate is plainly insufficient to value a complex entity such as an ongoing business.
MRIA also presented no evidence showing what portion, if any, ofthe alleged diminution in
value was attributable to wrongful acts as opposed to other factors, as required by Pope, 103
Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988. Further, the alleged diminution ofvalue took place over a period often
years-from 2001 through 2011, yet for the majority of that time, Saint Alphonsus had a right to
compete with MRIA. Neither Dr. Prochaska nor any other witness offered evidence to support
the idea that all of the diminution in value was caused by wrongful acts prior to April1, 2005,
and none of it was caused by lawful competition in the six and a half years following April 1,
2005. Yet that is what MRIA's diminution award reflects. MRIA has therefore failed to prove
its damages as measured by its alleged diminution in value. See also supra Part I.C.

II.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JNOV OR ORDER A NEW TRIAL ON MRIA'S
CLAIMS FOR USURPATION AND DISGORGEMENT
The Court should grant JNOV or a new trial (or remittitur) as to MRIA's two claims for

disgorgement based on the alleged usurpation of two partnership opportunities.

A.

The Court Should Not Have Permitted MRIA To Add Disgorgement Claims
That Were Not Advanced at the First Trial or Timely Disclosed

On remand, MRIA substantially persuaded the Court to enforce the strategy decisions
made at the first trial, in part by stating that "its prior damages proof [i.e., lost-profits damages]
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was the proof with which it could and would go to trial," MRIA Opp'n to Mot. to Reopen at 3
(Feb. 2., 2011). Then, after the Court reopened discovery "for the limited purpose of
determining what damages would have been given different beginning and end dates for the lost
profit calculations," Order Reopening Discovery at 4 (Feb. 15, 2011), MRIA asserted, and the
Court allowed, new claims for disgorgement. Order re: Mot. to Exclude Damages Theories at
10-11. The disgorgement claims should have been excluded because the reopening of discovery
was not so broad to justify new claims unrelated to lost profits, and because the disgorgement
claims were not disclosed until after the deadline for expert disclosures had passed. 5

B.

The 1999 Usurpation Claim is Time-Barred

The Court's order of September 27,2011, relating to MRIA's damages theories, held (at
pp. 9-10) that the jury would decide whether the alleged usurpation ofMRIA's opportunity to
partner with GSR occurred in 1999 (in which case the claim would be untimely) or in 2001. But
the Court later ruled, on October 26, 2011, that Saint Alphonsus's challenge to the timeliness of
MRIA's claim was barred by law-of-the-case doctrine. Trial Tr. 6315-17. Secure in its right to
pursue the claim, MRIA thereafter asserted that the usurpation occurred in 1999. !d. at 6638-41.
The Court's ruling was error. Law-of-the-case doctrine "prevents consideration on a
subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier
appeal." Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009) (emphasis added).

5

While the Court did hold, mid-trial, that Saint Alphonsus could reopen expert discovery
to address disgorgement, see Order re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories at 12-13, this
remedy was neither practical nor fair to Saint Alphonsus in light of counsel's and Dr.
McCarthy's press of trial-related work, and Saint Alphonsus had no choice but to decline it.
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At the first trial, MRIA's only usurpation claim related to the Meridian usurpation that allegedly
occurred in 2002, and MRIA never claimed that Saint Alphonsus usurped an opportunity to
partner with GSR in 1999. Saint Alphonsus had no opportunity to challenge as untimely this
claim that was not even advanced, and Judge McLaughlin likewise could not and did not address
the timeliness of the claim. Accordingly, there is no law of the case on that issue, and given
MRIA's clear contention that the usurpation occurred in 1999, the usurpation claim is time
barred. See Jones v. Runft, 125 Idaho 607,614, 873 P.2d 861, 868 (1994) (four-year statute of
limitations for fiduciary duty claims, per I.C. § 5-224).

C.

The Usurpation Claims Are Unsupported By the Evidence

The Court erred in holding that it need not decide whether the evidence supports a
finding of usurpation, and again in holding in conclusory fashion that its findings would match
the jury's. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Jan. 17, 2012). "Where an advisory
verdict is issued on equitable claims, the trial judge is still required to make independent findings
of fact and conclusions of law on the equitable claims before him, not solely relying on the jury's
findings." Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 796, 229 P.3d 1146,1158 (2010).
In any event, the jury's verdicts (and the Court's findings) as to the two usurpation claims
are not supported by substantial evidence and are against the clear weight of the evidence. The
record shows that MRIA and GSR failed to come to a deal in 1999 not because of Saint
Alphonsus, but because they could not agree on terms, and in fact moved further and further
apart during the course of negotiations. See Resp. to Proposed Findings of Fact Re: Usurpation
and Disgorgement at 3-7 (Nov. 15, 2011). Likewise, there was no Meridian usurpation as the
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evidence undisputedly showed that Saint Alphonsus did not have the means to block MRIA from
opening in Meridian, and the opportunity for MRIA to open there never ended. Instead, MRIA
admittedly chose not to pursue that existing opportunity. /d. at 8-9.

D.

The Disgorgement Must Be Reduced by Saint Alphonsus's $11 Million
Investment

The Court also erred in declining to subtract Saint Alphonsus' s $11.2 million investment
in IMI' s imaging business from the disgorgement totals. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law at 2-3 (Jan. 17, 2012). As the Court recognized, MRIA is only entitled to disgorge the
benefit derived from the alleged usurpation-and Saint Alphonsus's benefit was its profits minus

the costs it had to incur to obtain those profits. The fact that Saint Alphonsus still owns a part of
IMI is a non-sequitur; it does not change the net benefit received by Saint Alphonsus through
2015. See Resp. to Findings of Fact re: Usurpation and Disgorgement at 9-12 (Nov. 15, 2011).

III.

THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO PROPERLY APPORTION FAULT BETWEEN
SAINT ALPHONSUS AND GSR REQUIRES JNOV OR A NEW TRIAL
Prior to the 2007 trial, MRIA settled with third-party defendants and alleged co-

conspirators GSR, IMI, and ICR. Saint Alphonsus argued that, as a result, all damages should be
apportioned under Idaho Code § 6-806, while MRIA claimed that only tort damages should be
apportioned. This Court's ruling, on its face, agreed with Saint Alphonsus that it was "entitled to
a reduction in any damages awarded against it in an amount based on apportionment of fault to
be determined at trial." Order re: Mots. for Summ. J. Heard May 18, 2011 at 4-7 (Jun. 17, 2011)
(emphasis added). But the Court then prejudiced Saint Alphonsus by reversing its own ruling
after the close of evidence, and erred further in submitting apportionment to the jury.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR NEW TRIAL- 12
003884

First, the Court erred by ruling, for the first time at the jury conference and contrary to its
June 17 order, that MRIA's contract claims would not be apportioned. Trial Tr. 6417-23. 6
Given that the conduct that allegedly breached the contract was part of a single alleged
conspiracy to commit wrongful acts, all damages should have been apportioned. See Dunn v.

Praiss, 656 A.2d 413,419 (N.J. 1995); Joe & Dan Int'l Corp. v. US. Fid. & Guar. Co., 533
N.E.2d 912,918 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988); 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy§ 24; 44B Am. Jur. 2dlnterference
§55; Saint Alphonsus Reply re 2d Affirmative Defense at 7 n.3 (May 2, 2011).

Second, the Court should have read the statutory term "pro rata" to mean an equal share
of damages and ordered the jury to reduce any award of damages by 50%. See Mem. in Support
ofSumm. J. on Saint Alphonsus's 2d Aff. Def. at 9-13 (Apr. 11, 2011). And even if not required
by the statutory language, counsel's improper remark that Saint Alphonsus was trying to "throw
GSR under the bus" required an equal-shares approach as a remedy. See Trial Tr. at 5399-5413.

Third, assuming arguendo that a 50%-50% allocation were not required, the Court erred
in instructing the jury to determine relative fault separately for each cause of action (rather than
once for the body of joint wrongdoing), and in refusing a request that the total damages be
allocated among the different causes of action. See, e.g., 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages§ 36; Medina

6

This reversal was particularly prejudicial given its timing. At the start of trial, both
parties plainly anticipated that contract damages would be apportioned, as both Saint Alphonsus
and MRIA submitted proposed special verdict forms which apportioned damages among all
claims. Had Saint Alphonsus known that only tort damages would be apportioned, it would have
been able to tailor its trial strategy appropriately to convince the jury to not award damages on
the contract claims, or otherwise moved to sever the contract claims. The Court's last-minute
ruling, reversing both parties' understanding of the Court's pre-trial apportionment ruling,
prejudicially deprived Saint Alphonsus of the opportunity to do so.
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v. District of Columbia, 643 F.3d 323, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2011). As a result, the jury assigned 90%
fault to Saint Alphonsus for intentional interference, 100% for breach of fiduciary duty, and 80%
for conspiracy, even though all three are simply legal "hooks" for liability based on the same acts
of concerted wrongdoing. These errors require JNOV reducing the damages by 50%, or a new
trial. A partial but inadequate remedy would apply to all claims the jury's highest allocation of
GSR's fault (20%) and reduce the verdict by that amount.

IV.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JNOV OR ORDER A NEW TRIAL ON THE
CLAIMS OF CENTER AND MOBILE

Saint Alphonsus is entitled to JNOV on the claims of Center and Mobile for three
separate reasons. First, given the Court's decision to hold the parties to first trial strategy
decisions, see infra Section V, and MRIA's failure to join these parties during the first trial,
MRIA should not have been allowed to add new parties on remand.

Second, because the claims against Center and Mobile were not asserted until March 22,
2010, they are time-barred unless they relate back. See Saint Alphonsus's Mem. Re: Claims of
the Limited P'ships (Aug. 6, 2010). Idaho Rules 15(c) and 17 allow claims against a new party
to relate back only if (1) they were originally brought against an incorrect party and the new
party was substituted to correct that error, see id at 7-15; e.g., Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111
Idaho 270, 272-73 & n. 1, 723 P .2d 814, 816-17 & n. 1 (1986); (2) the error was "inadvertent" or
an "honest mistake," and (3) the error was corrected in a reasonable time. Tingley v. Harrison,
125 Idaho 86,91-92, 867 P.2d 960,965-66 (1994). Center and Mobile's claims do not relate
back to the original or first amended counterclaim because the named party there, MRIA, was
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not the "wrong" party. See Aug. 6, 2010 Mem. at 11-12. They do not relate back to the second
amended counterclaim because MRIA's decision not to name Center and Mobile was a strategic
decision designed to avoid the consequences of naming those entities as separate parties, and was
not inadvertent or an honest mistake. /d. at 12-15.
Third, the claims of Center and Mobile are legally invalid and fail for lack of proof:
Contract- The Court erred in holding that Center and Mobile were third-party
beneficiaries of the MRIA partnership agreement. See Order re: Motions for Summ. J. Heard
May 18, 2011 at 7-9; Mem. Re 3d Party Beneficiary Claims at 6-9 (Apr. 11, 2011). The MRIA
partnership agreement was not made "primarily for [the] benefit" of, and did not express an
intent to benefit, the limited partnerships. Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 687, 183 P.3d 771,
775 (2008); Idaho Power Co. v. Hulet, 140 Idaho 110, 112-13, 90 P.3d 335, 337-38 (2004).
Fiduciary Duty -

At the first trial, Judge McLaughlin first held that Saint Alphonsus

owed no statutory fiduciary duty to Center or Mobile, and that the existence of a common-law
fiduciary duty to those entities was "a question more appropriate for the trier of fact." Mem.
Decision at 8, 11 (June 13, 2007). He changed this ruling at the close of trial, however, asserting
that, based on the trial evidence, no reasonable jury could fail to find that Saint Alphonsus owed
the limited partnerships a common law fiduciary duty. 2007 Trial Tr. at 4201-03.
Whatever the basis for Judge McLaughlin's ruling on the record of the first trial, there is
no support in the present record for a finding that Saint Alphonsus owed common-law fiduciary
duties to the limited partnerships. See Idaho First Nat'/ Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho
266,277-78,824 P.2d 841,852-53 (1991) (explaining requirements of common-law duty). In the
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alternative, a new trial is required because the Court erred in not instructing the jury that it
should determine whether a common-law fiduciary duty existed between Saint Alphonsus and
the limited partnerships. See Saint Alphonsus's Requested Jury Instr. No. 25 (July 15, 2011).
Intentional Interference With Contractual Relations - In order to prove intentional
interference, a plaintiff must show that the "interference was wrongful by some measure beyond
the fact of the interference itself," Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 243
P.3d 1069, 1081 (2010), such as through breach of common-law rules. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 178, 923 P.2d 416, 423 (1996). The Court's erroneous ruling that Saint
Alphonsus owed contractual and common-law fiduciary duties essentially relieved MRIA of the
need to prove this element, since competition despite a duty not to compete is "wrongful." But if
no such duties were owed to Center and Mobile, as established above, then derivative
interference claims fail as well, since mere competition does not support an interference claim.
See Frantz v. Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 1012, 729 P.2d 1068, 1075 (Ct. App. 1986).
MRIA did not offer evidence of independently tortious activity by Saint Alphonsus, but
even if it did, a new trial is required because (i) there is no way of knowing whether the jury
based its verdict on those acts, as opposed to on the breaches of the non-compete that were the
centerpiece ofMRIA's case, and (ii) the large damage awards were entirely based on the premise
that Saint Alphonsus could not compete due to its contractual and fiduciary obligations. Also,
MRIA had no model for damages caused by non-competitive "wrongful" actions.
Conspiracy- As the Court held, "where liability for the underlying tort has been
dismissed, there can be no claim for civil conspiracy." Nov. 16, 2010 Mem. Decision and Order

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR NEW TRIAL - 16
003888

at 13 (Nov. 16, 2010). The conspiracy claims fail for the same reasons as the substantive claims.

V.

THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL DUE TO ITS ERRONEOUS
AND UNEVENLY APPLIED "LAW OF THE CASE" RULING
The trial was infected, and a new trial on all issues is required under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l) and

(7), by the Court's inconsistent and unfair application of a mistaken principle that litigation
strategy choices and evidentiary rulings made at the first trial would stand, absent a counterdirective from the Supreme Court.

First, citing Creem v. Northwestern Mutual Fire Ass'n, 58 Idaho 349,74 P.2d 702
(1937), Hutchins v. State, 100 Idaho 661,603 P.2d 995 (1979), and other cases, the Court found
a material distinction in conduct of a new trial following remand, depending on whether the
Supreme Court remands for "'further proceedings"-in which case the second trial must track the
first trial except as to issues specifically addressed and rejected by the Supreme Court-or
remands "'for new trial," in which event"' the case comes for trial the same in all respects as
though it had never been tried, subject to the condition that it must be tried in light of rules of
law announced by the appellate court." Order re: Motions Heard August 5, 2011 at 2-3 (Aug.
23, 2011). Finding this case to fall in the first category, the Court ruled that it would be "'retried
before a new jury with the errors found by the Supreme Court corrected, but otherwise the
previous proceedings stand." !d. at 3. The adoption of this mechanical rule requiring adherence
to the "'previous proceedings" was error, and finds no support in the cases cited by the Court. 7

7

None of the cited cases suggest that the scope of remand for another trial rests on some
talismanic phrase used in the Court's opinion. More fundamentally, the Supreme Court in this
case clearly did state that it was remanding "'for a new trial," and also held that, as a result, the
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Among other things, this ruling allowed MRIA to offer hearsay-within-hearsay
statements found in meeting minutes because the records were part of the stipulations at the first
trial. See Saint Alphonsus's Mot. in Limine to Exclude Hearsay Within Hearsay in Business
Records (July 25, 2011); Order re: Motions Heard August 5, 2011 at 2-4 (Aug. 23, 2011). MRIA
cited these hearsay statements to suggest that Saint Alphonsus had bad motivations (Ex. 404 7)
and knew IMI would take business from MRIA (Ex. 4057), and that Sandra Bruce "stepped in
front" of MRIA, thereby ending the GSR-MRIA deal (Ex. 4101 ), and conspired to leave MRIA
(Ex. 4219). This erroneous view oflaw-of-the-case also allowed MRIA to recover lost profits on
a new, admittedly untimely usurpation claim, see supra Part II.B, and largely held Saint
Alphonsus to the language of jury instructions from the first, vacated trial despite challenges to
their legal insufficiency, see, e.g., Trial Tr. at 6383-84, 6397.
At the same time, this mechanical ruling demanding deference to events as they unfolded
at the prior trial was not evenly applied. MRIA was allowed to change the posture of the case
contrary to this rule, for example, by amending its complaint to add new parties, by substantially
increasing the amount of lost profits sought, and by adding new damages theories and

(continued ... )

Court could address issues that the Supreme Court had chosen not to address. SADC, 148 Idaho
at 492, 224 P.3d at 1081 ("because we remand this case for a new trial, the issue of whether the
partnership was for a definite term and, if so, whether St. Alphonsus dissociated prior to the
expiration of that term will have to be determined in further proceedings"); id. at 497, 224 P.3d
at 1086 ("remanding ... case for a new trial"); id. at 502, 224 P .3d at 1091 (citing rule regarding
costs "[w]hen a new trial has been ordered or a judgment has been modified"). Plainly, under
Creem, this was a case where all issues should have been "open for trial anew as if [they] had
never been tried." Creem, 58 Idaho at 349, 74 P.2d at 702.
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disgorgement claims that it had affirmatively waived or not advanced in the prior proceedings.
Saint Alphonsus, by contrast, was actually denied the benefit of first-trial rulings that-in
addition to being correct when made-were never appealed or "corrected" by the Supreme
Court, and thus should have been allowed to "stand." For instance, at the first trial, Cindy
Schamp was allowed to testify, over objection, regarding Dr. Giles's statements at the Arid Club
and about her own statements to DMR doctors, see 2007 Trial Tr. at 3409-17, yet the Court held
that Ms. Schamp could not give this testimony at the retrial. Trial Tr. at 2272-83. Other
evidence allowed to be put before the jury at the first trial but not permitted by the Court this
time included the fact that Saint Alphonsus was a non-profit, and the fact that it had received a
departing partner share. See, e.g., 2007 Trial Tr. at 611, 619, 932, 1294-95, 4080, 4270.
For all of these reasons, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a new trial, without improper lawof-the-case constraints, and with rulings equally applied to both sides.
VI.

THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL ON LIABILITY DUE TO
MULTIPLE ERRONEOUS RULINGS THAT, ALONE AND IN COMBINATION,
DENIED SAINT ALPHONSUS A FAIR TRIAL

Saint Alphonsus was further prejudiced by a number of other serious errors, all of which,
separately and in combination, denied Saint Alphonsus a fair trial and require a new trial under
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1) and (7).
A.

The Court Erred in Allowing the Jury to Determine the Meaning of the
Unambiguous Radiology Services Agreement

Saint Alphonsus's alleged failure to enforce GSR's "obligation" to read scans 24/7 for
MRI Center outpatients was emphasized with multiple witnesses and was a key "bad act"
underlying MRIA's claims. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 2646, 3752-57,6670-71. The Court erred in
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rejecting Saint Alphonsus's motion for a directed verdict on the contract's interpretation, and
thus allowing MRIA to argue that GSR and Saint Alphonsus had violated the radiology contract.
The 1997 radiology contract explicitly defines the term "Medical Center" as the "regional
medical center" in Boise owned and operated by "501(c)(3) corporation" Saint Alphonsus. Mot.
for Directed Verdict re: Radiology Servs. Contract at 6 (Oct. 18, 2011). Further, the agreement
explicitly states that GSR shall provide services in "the Medical Center." /d. at 6-7. The 2001
agreement repeats the 1997 contractual language, and then states that with one exception, the
"Medical Center ... does not include any affiliates or otherwise ancillary operations of Saint
Alphonsus located on Saint Alphonsus's campus or otherwise." /d. at 7-8. GSR's obligation to
perform services, including MRI interpretations, is limited to the "Medical Center." /d.
The Court ruled, however, that there was a jury issue because the contract gave GSR the
right to read MRI scans, and only Center had an MRI machine. Trial Tr. at 6065-66. But the
contract only gave GSR the right and obligation to interpret scans, including MRI scans, for
patients ofthe Medical Center. As a result of this error, MRIA improperly argued, as a
centerpiece of its case, that Saint Alphonsus should somehow have compelled GSR to read scans
of MRIA outpatients, even though Saint Alphonsus had no contractual right or power to do so,
thereby enabling the jury to rely on this purported misconduct as a basis for its liability findings.

B.

The Court Erred in Holding that Cindy Schamp's Present Recollection of
her Own Prior Statements Were Inadmissible "Hearsay"

In response to a motion in limine by MRIA, the Court excluded, as inadmissible hearsay,
Cindy Schamp's live, in-court testimony recounting what she said to Dr. Curran. Trial Tr. at
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1907-12. But a party's in-court, live testimony about her own prior statements, admitted to show
that the statements were made, is not hearsay. See, e.g., Idaho R. Evid. 801(c); State v. Smith,
916 P .2d 773, 777 (Mont. 1996); United States v. Bellomo, 176 F.3d 580, 587 (2d Cir. 1999);
Opp. to MIL re: Statements of Cindy Schamp at 2-3 (Sept. 23, 2011) (citing more authority).
Further, Ms. Schamp was allowed to testify as to such statements at the first trial, and MRIA did
not appeal from the admission of that testimony. See Opp. to MIL re: Statements of Cindy
Schamp at 5 (Sept. 23, 2011). This excluded evidence was highly probative to refute MRlA's
assertion that Saint Alphonsus kept its involvement with IMI a secret.
C.

The Idaho Business Review Article was Not "Hearsay"

Compounding this error, during the cross-examination of Dr. Prochaska, Saint Alphonsus
moved to admit an article from the Idaho Business Review (Ex. 782) that directly rebutted Dr.
Prochaska's claim that Saint Alphonsus kept its partnership with IMI a secret. Trial Tr. at 80306. On MRIA's objection, the Court held the document inadmissible for use during Dr.
Prochaska's cross. Id at 809-813. The evidence was plainly admissible. The article was selfauthenticating under Idaho Rule 902(6), and was admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of
showing that Saint Alphonsus provided public notice of its partnership, see generally Idaho Trial
Handbook§ 21.1, and for the purpose of impeaching Dr. Prochaska.

D.

The Court Erred in Holding that Saint Alphonsus Could Not Exercise its
Statutory Right to Review MRIA's Books and Records, and Excluding
Proper Evidence of MRIA's Distributions

In a pre-trial ruling, the Court held that Saint Alphonsus was not entitled to exercise its
statutory rights to inspect MRIA's books and records under Idaho Code§§ 53-3-403, 53-2-
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304(1), and 53-2-111(9)(a). July 20, 2011 Order at 2-3. For reasons set forth at length in Saint
Alphonsus written motion, this was error. See Mem. in Support of Mot. to Compel Compliance
with Statutory Rights to Inspect P'ship Books & Records (Jun. 10, 2011). The resulting
prejudice, in denying access to information that would be potentially relevant and useful in
defense ofMRIA's claims, was compounded by subsequent developments. When the DMR
witnesses remarkably claimed ignorance as to the millions of dollars they received on their
MRIA investments (belying their claims that Saint Alphonsus treated them unfairly), Saint
Alphonsus was required to turn to other, incomplete documents which merely suggested these
witnesses' true financial gains--documents which the Court improperly held inadmissible. See
Trial Tr. at 3065-3090 & Exs. 730 & 730A-C. Saint Alphonsus was left with only Jeff Cliffs
offhand recollection of what DMR' s profits were for the 1985-2000 time period, and even that
testimony was weakened because MRIA was able to exclude the document that Cliff used to
refresh his recollection ofDMR's profits. Trial Tr. at 3062-65.

E.

Multiple Additional Rulings and Actions by the Court Prejudicially Disposed
the Jury To Infer that Saint Alphonsus Acted in Bad Faith

A central issue in the case was whether Saint Alphonsus breached duties it owed to its
partners in MRIA and (allegedly) to the limited partnerships, including fiduciary duties, the duty
to act in good faith, the duty not to compete, and the duty not to tortiously interfere in MRIA's
business. The Court made a number of erroneous rulings and took a number of actions that
improperly prejudiced Saint Alphonsus, either by implicitly supporting MRIA's claim that Saint
Alphonsus was a bad actor, or precluding Saint Alphonsus from refuting that characterization.
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First, the Court refused, despite repeated motions, to exclude language in the two
Shattuck Hammond memoranda stating that Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal from MRIA would
create a "risk of Saint Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary responsibility." See Consol. Order re:
Motions in Limine Heard May 18, 2011 at 2 (June 9, 2011); Order re: Motions Heard August 5,
2011 at 7 (Aug. 23, 2011). MRIA was thus able to use this evidence to imply that dissociation
was a breach of fiduciary duty, despite the fact that Saint Alphonsus rightfully dissociated.

Second, compounding this error, the Court held that Saint Alphonsus could not tell the
jury that it had "lawfully" or "rightfully" dissociated, even though this was a legally accurate
description found in the Idaho Code, and despite the fact that when the shoe was on the other
foot, at the prior trial, MRIA was permitted to argue that Saint Alphonsus had "wrongfully"
dissociated. Consol. Order re: Motions in Limine Heard May 18, 2011, at 1- 2 (June 9, 2011).

Third, the Court allowed MRIA to suggest that Saint Alphonsus would have prevented a
"little girl with a brain tumor" from receiving care by "withholding radiologists" from Caldwell
hospital, or from Center due to Saint Alphonsus's failure to enforce GSR's alleged contract
obligations. Trial Tr. at 1169, 1193, 1209-11. Not only was this suggestion prejudicial and
inflammatory-as MRIA's counsel essentially admitted during closing argument8-it was also a
false one, as GSR had no such obligation. See supra Part VI.A.

Fourth, the Court allowed the "rebuttal" testimony of Dr. Stephen Wilson, who said that

8

See Trial Tr. at 6812 ("I admit I got a little carried away with little Sally or Susie from
Caldwell with the brain tumor who didn't know when she went in to get an MRI for her brain
tumor that she wasn't going to get the quality of radiologic services that she would have under
this contract. But, really, seriously, that's how ridiculous [Saint Alphonsus's] position is.").
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he was fired by Sandra Bruce without being told why. MRIA thus introduced evidence asserting
that Sandra Bruce acted unfairly in a totally peripheral and unrelated situation-indeed a classic
instance of highly prejudicial and thus inadmissible character evidence. Purportedly this
evidence was offered to impeach Ms. Bruce's failure to recall whether she had told Dr. Wilson
why his was fired, but one cannot "impeach" a failure to remember with substantive evidence of
the underlying facts. See State v. Holm, 93 Idaho 904, 910,478 P.2d 284,290 (1970); Oregon v.
Staley, 995 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Ore. Ct. App. 2000).

Fifth, using a similar rationale, the Court allowed Dr. Giles to "rebut" Jeff Cliff's
inability to remember whether Cindy Schamp told him that "the cheapest thing to do would be
wait" with respect to negotiations with MRIA for the purchase of Center. Trial Tr. at 4415-17.
Again, however, Jeff Cliff did not recall Cindy Schamp making that statement, id. at 2917, and
he cannot be impeached by alleged substantive evidence of the event. See Staley, 995 P .2d at
1220. And while the Court did give a limiting instruction that Giles's testimony could only be
used to evaluate Cliff's testimony, Cliff's memory was not an issue in the case nor relevant in the
slightest. Its only effect was to present hearsay evidence that Saint Alphonsus was a bad partner.
Sixth, the Court erred in admonishing GSR's lawyer Neil McFeeley before the jury, and
suggesting that McFeeley was improperly in the courtroom in order to report to his clients to aid
them in preparing their testimony when called in Saint Alphonsus's case. Trial Tr. at 4103-04.
There had been no warrant for such a concern, and raising that accusation in front of the jury
through the weight of the Court, lent support to MRIA's contention that GSR and Saint Al's
were conspirators against MRIA.
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Individually or collectively, these errors, and the others cited above, deprived Saint
Alphonsus of a fair trial. A new trial on liability is warranted.

VII.

SAINT ALPHONSUS IS ENTITLED TO STATUTORY INTEREST ON ITS
PARTNERSHIP SHARE, RUNNING FROM THE DATE OF DISSOCIATION
UNTIL THE DATE OF PAYMENT
The Court's judgment awards Saint Alphonsus its departing partner share plus "interest at

the judgment rate" of 10%, running from September 21, 2007, the date that Saint Alphonsus
obtained this judgment at the first trial, "until paid in full." Judgment at 3-4 (Jan. 17, 2012).
This is error. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act expressly provides that a departing partner
is entitled to the legal rate of interest, running from "from the date of dissociation to the date of
payment." Idaho Code§ 53-3-701(b) & official cmt. 3; see also id §§ 53-3-104(b) (specifying
that interest is paid at legal rate);§ 28-22-104(1) (providing legal rate of 12%). Saint Alphonsus
is thus entitled to 12% interest on its departing partner share, from April 1, 2004, until it is paid.
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, or in the
alternative, remittitur, as described above.
DATED this 31st day of January, 2012.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership ("Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited
("Mobile") (collectively, "MRIA") hereby Petitions this Court for an award of Costs and Fees in
the total amount of$4,614,938.55 incurred in the above referenced matter against Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. This Petition is
supported by the Memorandum in Support of Petition for Costs and Fees and three affidavits:
(1) the Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMRIA's Memorandum of Costs and Fees), (2) the
Affidavit of Counsel Regarding Rule 54(e)(3) Criteria for Awarding Attorneys' Fees, and (3) the
Affidavit of Steven Andersen , all filed concurrently herewith.
DATED this 31st day of January 2011.

BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
Attorneys for Defendants
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STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss
)
County of Ada
I, Thomas A. Banducci, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says that the following
facts are true and correct:
1.

I have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein.

2.

I am lead trial counsel for the above-captioned counter-claimants (hereinafter

collectively referred to as "MRIA").
3.

In 2007, I submitted a similar affidavit in this matter after the jury in the first trial

of this matter found in MRIA's favor. This affidavit is intended to update the previous one.
4.

Among other things, as lead counsel for MRIA, I was responsible for preparing

the above-entitled litigation for trial twice, preparing for the appeal of this matter, overseeing the
work of other members of the trial and appeal teams, consulting with the client on matters
relating to this litigation, and overseeing the invoicing process for professional services rendered
in connection with the litigation. When this litigation began, I was a partner at Stoel Rives. I
departed Stoel Rives and took this case with me in January 2005, when I became a partner in
Greener Banducci Shoemaker. On October 1, 2007, I changed firms again, and am now a
partner in Banducci Woodard Schwartzman. MRIA is now a client of Banducci Woodard
Schwartzman.
5.

I was retained by Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc., Mercy Medical Center

(Mednow), West Valley Medical Center, and Holy Rosary Hospital in November of2003 to
provide those member partners of MRIA with litigation counsel in anticipation of Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's withdrawal from MRIA. (Hereinafter, Saint Alphonsus
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Regional Medical Center and it subsidiary, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, shall be referred to
collectively as "SARMC.")
6.

This affidavit is being submitted in support ofMRIA's petition for attorneys' fees

pursuant to IRCP 54. Recognizing the factors that the court must consider in connection with its
ruling on an award of attorneys fees as reflected in IRCP 54(e)(3), I offer the following for the
court's consideration:
A.

Time and labor required. Our representation of MRIA commenced in

November 2003, once SARMC's withdrawal from the partnership became foreseeable.
SARMC's original complaint against MRIA was filed October 18, 2004. MRIA filed an answer
and counterclaim on May 20,2005. From the time SARMC withdrew in April2004 to the time
initial pleadings were filed, I (or others whom I supervised) explored various means by which the
subject dispute could be resolved (including a failed mediation), and undertook a significant
amount of research touching upon the fundamental legal issues involved in this case. Over the
approximately 8-year course of this litigation, I (and/or other members of my litigation team):
1.

Took a total of 40 depositions of lay witnesses, experts, and

document custodians;
11.
111.

Defended a total of 24 depositions;
Discovered and reviewed over 125,000 pages of documents

produced by various parties and third parties, which were stored on an electronic database;
IV.

Retained and prepared five expert witnesses (Budge, Wilhoite,

Bell, Branson, and Whitelaw);
v.

Prepared or responded to numerous discovery motions, which were

heard by the prior court, this Court, or a discovery master;
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v1.

Prepared or responded to approximately 18 dispositive motions;

vn.

Prepared or responded to several dozen pretrial motions filed by

vm.

Participated in a trial that consumed the month of August 2007;

1x.

Participated in an appeal process that lasted over several months,

SARMC;

and which culminated in a lengthy decision by the Idaho Supreme Court; and
x.

Participated in a second trial that lasted for over eight weeks

during the months of September and October 2011.

B.

Novelty and difficulty of questions. This case presented novel and difficult

questions of fact and law, which translated into complicated and prolonged discovery, as well as
a complex legal analysis and strategy.

i.

Novelty and difficulty of factual issues. At the outset, it should be

remembered that this action involved a partnership that spanned almost twenty years. Since the
intent behind the MRIA Partnership Agreement was central to the resolution of various
important issues in this case (e.g., terms of withdrawal, partnership term, withdrawing partner's
share, terms of the noncompete provision), counsel was required to accumulate and review
numerous historical documents (including draft agreements, meeting minutes, and
correspondence) dating back to 1985, and interview involved parties, to determine the
significance of various contract provisions. Likewise, since much of the evidence supporting
MRIA's claims arose from conduct that occurred outside ofMRIA's knowledge, counsel was
required to piece together information contained in SARMC and IMI documents (involving the
review of thousands of pages of meeting minutes, contract drafts, consultant reports, memoranda,
and correspondence accumulated during the 1998-2004 timeframe) in order to discover the truth
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regarding SARMC's conduct and its support ofMRIA's competitor. Uncovering this
information was not easily accomplished. Many of SARMC' s witnesses could not recall
documents authored or received by them, or meetings that they attended. E-mail
communications at both SARMC and Gem State/IMI for the relevant time period was, at best,
incompletely preserved. Finally, it should be noted that this was a factually complex business
dispute between sophisticated business entities, cast in the context of a unique industry: medical
imaging. Counsel for MRIA was presented with the daunting task of explaining terminology,
partner relationships/obligations, and the course of SARMC's conduct over a period of twenty
years to two different juries.
Novelty and difficulty of legal issues. Novel and difficult legal

n.

issues abounded in this case. To list only a few, counsel was required to analyze and present for
the court's consideration, legal questions at trial and at appeal dealing with:
a.

Wrongful dissociation (a matter of first impression in Idaho);

b.

Applicability of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act to a
partnership agreement existing before the act's implementation;

c.

Fiduciary duty law, in the context of general and limited
partnerships;

d.

Daubert challenges to expert testimony;

e.

Unique attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine issues;

f.

Damages issues;

g.

Apportionment issues; and

h.

Statutes of limitation issues.
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This case was, without doubt, the most complicated commercial dispute your affiant has
ever tried.
C.

Skill requisite to perform legal services, and experience of counsel. Over

the last ten to twelve years, your affiant's practice has been focused on representing clients in
complex commercial disputes. More often than not, these cases involve complex commercial
relationships, contract interpretation, thousands of pages of discovery, and significant damage
claims. During this time I have been involved in representing business clients in complex
matters, as described above, that included allegations of unfair business practices. The following
represent only a few of those cases:
1.

NuWest v. AMEC: construction dispute involving improvements

to a phosphate mining and processing facility. A central issue in the case was a kickback scheme
between the construction manager and contractors. (Federal Court for the District of Idaho)
11.

Credit Suisse v. Tamarack: $250,000,000 foreclosure proceeding

by dozens of creditors, the claims of which included allegations of mismanagement of funds by
corporate officers. (Idaho State Court)
111.

Credit Suisse v. Yellowstone Club: action for recovery of over

$300,000,000 against former owner and officer for misappropriation of corporate funds. (Federal
Bankruptcy Court, Montana)
IV.

Bybee v. Snake River Sugar Co.: contract dispute concerning

unfair business practices of large sugar producer. (Federal Court for the Eastern District of
Washington)
As part of my continuing legal education, I have attempted to stay abreast of legal
developments in the area of unfair business practices.
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D.

Prevailing charges for like work. Please see the Affidavit of Steven

Andersen, filed concurrently herewith.
E.

Fee arrangement. Following the first trial ofthis matter, MRIA indicated

that it did not have the means to continue to pay our hourly rate. As such, my firm agreed to
represent MRIA on a contingency fee basis. Rather than pass the cost of that contingency fee on
to Saint Alphonsus, however, MRIA seeks only the cost of a reasonable hourly rate for the time
its attorneys spent litigating this matter.
F.

Time limitations imposed. Though there was sufficient time for discovery

and motion practice, the amount of discovery and motion practice necessary to complete this
case meant that many late nights were spent so as to avoid missing deadlines.
G.

The amount involved and the results obtained. This was a "bet the

company" case where MRIA had been effectively driven out of business. Results obtained
reflected the damage inflicted on the business by SARMC.
H.

Undesirability of the case. See discussion of difficult factual issues,

above. Although the case was not "undesirable," the litigation consumed your affiant's practice
where, on several occasions, all other matters had to be either transferred to other counsel or
deferred.

I.

Nature and length of relationship with the client. Your affiant was

selected by MRIA as trial and appeal counsel for this matter only. The relationship commenced
with my hiring in November, 2003.
J.

Awards in similar cases. I am unaware of similar cases tried in Idaho.

K.

Costs of automated legal research. Automated research was essential in

this matter, given the paucity oflaw in Idaho on many of the issues litigated. The amount of this
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I

research is detailed in the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Costs ofF ees, which is being filed
concomitantly.
L.

Other factors the court deems appropriate. As reflected by the evidence

offered at both trials, MRIA sought to resolve this case short of litigation so as to avoid the
enormous expense of attorneys' fees occasioned by this protracted dispute. The court should
consider the fact that SARMC's only offer of settlement in which it proposed to give MRIA any
money was a few weeks before the start of the second trial, in which it offered only about
$1MM.
7.

The discretionary costs set forth in the Memorandum of Costs and Fees were

necessary and exceptional costs that were reasonably incurred. As set forth above, this was a
novel, complex, and difficult case. The litigation was protracted over several years and
presented novel and difficult questions of fact and law which necessitated complex legal analysis
and strategy. Because of the novelty and complexity ofthe case, in order for MRIA to
adequately prepare its case, it was necessary for MRIA to incur these discretionary costs.
FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT,

SUBSCRIBE AND SWORN TO before me this 31st day of January 2012.

NolJryi>Ublic forio
My Commission Expires: I Cr I & ~ /

d.-_
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0 Hand Delivery
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MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership ("Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited
("Mobile") (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Memorandum in Support of their Memorandum
of Costs and Fees. This memorandum is supported by three affidavits: (1) the Affidavit of
Counsel in Support ofMRIA's Memorandum of Costs and Fees (the "Costs and Fees Aff.");
(2) the Affidavit of Counsel Regarding Rule 54(e)(3) Criteria for Awarding Attorneys' Fees (the
"54(e)(3) Aff."); and (3) the Affidavit of Steven Andersen (the "Andersen Aff.").

I.

INTRODUCTION

At the second trial of this matter, the jury awarded MRIA approximately $52 million,
finding for it on all of its claims while specifically rejecting Saint Alphonsus's defenses. There
is accordingly no question that MRIA was the prevailing party in this lawsuit. As such, pursuant
to IDAHO R. Clv. P. 54(d)(1), MRIA is entitled as a matter of right to recover the costs specified
in Rule 54(d)(1)(C). Moreover, MRIA should also be awarded discretionary costs as set forth in
Rule 54(d)(l)(D), since these costs were both necessary and actually incurred. In addition,
MRIA is entitled to recover its attorneys' fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120.

II.

ARGUMENT

The calculation of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees is within the discretion ofthe trial
court. See, e.g., Bott v. Idaho State Building Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 592, 917 P.2d 737, 749
(1996). In the exercise of this discretion, the Court must act consistently with the legal standards
listed in Rule 54. Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho 872, 811 P.2d 48 (Ct. App. 1991).

A.

This dispute was complicated, lengthy, and hard fought.
The verdict rendered by the jury in this matter was the culmination of two separate trials

and nearly eight years of very active litigation. This matter presented novel and difficult
questions of fact and law, which translated into two major discovery periods that cumulatively
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lasted for years. See the 54(e)(3) Aff.

at~~

4-6. The case was zealously prosecuted and

defended by MRIA and Saint Alphonsus. Many motions were filed by the parties; indeed,
MRIA estimates that Saint Alphonsus alone filed at least 18 different dispositive motions. !d. at
~

6. There were about 65 depositions taken, and well over 45,000 documents were produced and

reviewed (representing roughly 125,000 pages of material). !d. The first trial lasted about four
weeks, and the second trial lasted twice that long. MRIA was forced to employ 3-4 attorneys to
work on this matter full time at certain points, while it appeared that Saint Alphonsus had as
many as 8 lawyers billing full time on several days of the second trial. Both parties were wellprepared for the trials of these matters, as well as for the multitude of hearings held before,
during, and after the trials. Additionally, there was a lengthy appeal in between these trials that
lasted for several months, and which required substantial and lengthy briefing on issues of first
impression for the Idaho Supreme Court. These factors should be kept in mind by this Court
when reviewing the reasonableness of the costs and fees incurred by MRIA in this matter.

B.

Attorneys' fees
1.

MRIA 's fees from the entire litigation should be awarded.

"In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the discretion
of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party ... when provided for by any
statute or contract." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54(e)(l). Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) authorizes an award of
attorneys' fees to be taxed and collected as costs in "any commercial transaction." The term
"commercial transaction" is defined very broadly "to mean all transactions except transactions
for personal or household purposes." I.C. § 12-120(3).
In this case, Judge McLaughlin has already determined that MRIA's claims arose out of a
commercial transaction, and thus qualified under I.C. § 12-120(3) for the shifting of fees. See
Memorandum Decision, Nov. 19, 2007, at pp. 23-24, a copy of which is attached to the Costs
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and Fees Aff. at Ex. F. In particular, Judge McLaughlin agreed with MRIA's argument that "the
core basis ofMRIA's claims is that SARMC competed, in violation of the terms of the
partnership agreement, against its partners. That is a quintessential commercial transaction."

See MRIA's Verified Reply in Support of Motion for Costs and Fees, Oct. 26, 2007, p. 8. As
such, he awarded MRIA its attorneys' fees after the first trial. See Memorandum Decision, Nov.
19, 2007, at pp. 23-24; Memorandum Decision, Jan. 28, 2008, at pp. 2-3, a copy of which is
attached to the Costs and Fees Aff. at Ex. E; Second Amended Judgment, Feb. 26,2008, a copy
of which is attached to the Costs and Fees Aff. at Ex. C. And given that the second trial was a
remand dealing with the same issues as the first, the "core basis ofMRIA's claims" in the new
proceeding continued to be that "SARMC competed, in violation of the partnership agreement,
against its partners."
Saint Alphonsus did not dispute Judge McLaughlin's finding that this matter involved a
commercial transaction, nor did it appeal that decision. It therefore remains the law of the case.
Indeed, to the contrary, Saint Alphonsus asked the Supreme Court during the appeal for its own
fees by making the specific argument that the gravamen of MRIA' s claims arose from a
"commercial transaction." It stated:
After trial, the district court awarded fees to MRIA under § 12-120(3), holding
that MRIA's claims arose out of a commercial transaction because they relate to
the alleged "breach of express terms contained within a partnership agreement - a
contract." This holding reflects the general rule that fees are appropriate under
§ 12-120(3) where the claims at issue are "integral" to a business relationship,
such as claims for the breach of a commercial contract like the one that existed
between MRIA and Saint Alphonsus. Accordingly, if this Court rules for Saint
Alphonsus, it should award Saint Alphonsus its attorney fees on appeal ....
Appellant's Brief in the appeal ofthis matter, filed Sep. 12,2008, pp. 59-60 (emphasis added,
citations omitted), relevant excerpts of which are attached to the Costs and Fees Aff. at Ex. D.
Put another way, Saint Alphonsus's only disagreement with Judge McLaughlin as to fees was

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COSTS AND FEES- 4

003914

that he got the identity of the prevailing party wrong, not that the prevailing party was not
entitled to fees under§ 12-120(3). As a result, Saint Alphonsus admits that MRIA's claims at
trial arose from a commercial transaction. See also, e.g., Bybee v. Isaac, 145 Idaho 251, 260,
178 P .3d 616, 625 (2008) (breach of a noncompete agreement held to arise out of commercial
transaction). Attorneys' fees in favor of the prevailing party are irrefutably appropriate.
Given this agreement between the parties, the only question left under§ 12-120(3) is
whether MRIA is, in fact, the prevailing party. Yet, as noted, this question is easily answered in
the affirmative, given that MRIA obtained a judgment of over $52,000,000, won on every claim
it asserted at trial, and specifically defeated Saint Alphonsus's defenses on the verdict form. As
such, as Saint Alphonsus admits, MRIA must be awarded its fees as the prevailing party.
Nor can there be any dispute that MRIA is also entitled to its fees from the entire
litigation, including the appeal and prior trial. As to the appeal, the Supreme Court specifically
held that attorneys' fees should be given to the "prevailing party" in the entire "civil action,"
even if that party was not the "prevailing party" in the appeal itself. Saint Alphonsus Diversified
Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 501, 224 P.3d 1068, 1090 (2009).
Specifically, the Court held that a "prerequisite to an award of attorney fees under[§ 12-120(3)]
is that the party prevail in the 'civil action,"' not just a part of it. /d. (emphasis added). And
because the Supreme Court was "vacating the judgment and remanding this case, there [was] not
yet a prevailing party." /d. However, the Court continued,"[o]nee there is a final judgment"as there is now-"the district court [was to] consider attorney fees incurred on appeal in making
its award of a reasonable attorney fee to the prevailing party." /d. Put more simply, then, the
Supreme Court made clear that the fees incurred on appeal go to the party that prevails in the
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entire action, not just a particular battle in it. !d. The recent verdict makes clear that the
prevailing party in this case is MRIA.
In clarifying its intent, the Supreme Court quoted itself in Paloukos v. Intermountain

Chevrolet Co., 99 Idaho 740, 588 P.2d 939 (1978), where it held even more emphatically that
fees for an appeal "should of course [be] consider[ed]" once the prevailing party for the entire
civil action is determined:
Although Paloukos was successful, in part at least, on this appeal, it nonetheless
remains to be determined whether he will ultimately prevail on his cause of action
for breach of contract. Should Paloukos ultimately prevail and satisfy the other
requirements ofi.C. § 12-120 for an award of attorney fees, the district court, in
fixing the award, should of course consider the fees incurred in bringing this
appeal.

See Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at 501, quoting Paloukos (emphasis added). The Court's
phraseology here is important: the presumption is that the trial court will "of course" consider
the fees from the appeals once an ultimate prevailing party is determined.
This logic would also apply with equal force to the fees incurred prior to the appeal. At
the risk of repetition, the Supreme Court has interpreted I.C. § 12-120(3) as not just awarding
fees to the prevailing party at the concluding event in which it finally becomes the prevailing
party, but instead for the entire "civil action." Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at 501. As a result, all
fees incurred by MRIA from the beginning of this civil action would now be awardable to MRIA
as the prevailing party.

Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 146 Idaho 613, 623, 200 P.3d 1162, 1172 (2009),
is instructive here. In that case, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that a fee for the
entire case-before and after remand-was appropriate because "the final steps in this case were
merely the capstone of years of effort ... to redress ... grievances. As such, the [trial] court
[was not required to] view the hours expended after remand, or the latest amount recovered in a
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vacuum; rather, [it could view] the entire result obtained, and the hours required to do so." Id
(emphasis added). See also, Record Steel & Canst., Inc. v. Martel Canst., Inc., 129 Idaho 288,
293, 923 P.2d 995, 1000 (Ct. App. 1996) ("The attorney fees awarded must be reasonable
overall, but the trial court is not required to excise fees relating to each skirmish that may have
been lost during the litigation by the party who ultimately prevailed in the case.").
In this case, many of the fees from the first trial have already been vetted and liquidated
by Judge McLaughlin. After briefing and substantial argument on this matter, Judge
McLaughlin determined an appropriate amount of awardable fees and costs to MRIA for work in
this case prior to January 2008 was $2,172,677.63. See Second Amended Judgment, Feb. 26,
2008; Memorandum Decision on MRIA's revised Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs, Jan. 28,
2008, pp. 2-3. 1 Again, on appeal, Saint Alphonsus argued that it should have been the prevailing
party and therefore entitled to fees, but it did not dispute that this amount was accurate if MRIA
was the eventual prevailing party, nor did it argue that MRIA would not be entitled to that
amount if it was determined that MRIA was the prevailing party. Appellant's Brief, filed Sep.
12, 2008, pp. 59-60. As such, this finding is the law of this case and there is no reason to
reexamine it. Instead, that previous total should simply be added to the new fees generated since
that time in this civil action.
The amount and reasonableness of the new fees generated since January 2008 are
detailed in the Costs and Fees Aff., the 54(e)(3) Aff., and the Andersen Aff. Rather than repeat
the amounts and statements contained in these affidavits verbatim, MRIA simply incorporates
them by reference as if fully set forth herein, and respectfully requests that this Court award
them, and that it re-award those already decided by Judge McLaughlin.

1

There is a small difference between the Second Amended Judgment and the Memorandum Decision dated Jan. 28,
2008. J. McLaughlin revised his order slightly on Jan. 29, 2008 explaining the increase.
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2.

MRIA is seeking far less in attorneys' fees than the law allows.

As the Court is determining the reasonableness of this request for attorneys' fees, it
should also keep in mind that the amount MRIA seeks in attorneys' fees is significantly less than
the law allows. MRIA paid its attorneys on an hourly rate until the end of the first trial. But as
the jury found, Saint Alphonsus's venal acts largely destroyed MRIA as a business, and MRIA
thus had limited ability to continue to pay an hourly rate through the appeal and second trial.
MRIA accordingly came to an agreement with its attorneys for them to take the case on a
contingency fee basis. See the 54(e)(3) Aff.

at~

6(e). Cases like Griffith, cited above, make

clear that even when a change of this nature occurs, the prevailing party is nonetheless entitled to
its contingency fee. 146 Idaho 613. In this case, that amount would be over $17MM in attorney
fees (roughly a third of $52MM). MRIA, however, has chosen not to seek that amount here, and
has instead decided to pass along a reasonable hourly rate to Saint Alphonsus for the time its
attorneys incurred while they were working on a contingency fee basis. As is clear from the
foregoing, that hourly amount is a just small fraction of the $17MM to which the law indicates
MRIA may be entitled.

C.

MRIA 's costs should be awarded.
Rule 54 anticipates two types of costs: those as a matter of right and those which are

discretionary. As to the former, Rule 54(d)(l )(A) provides that "costs shall be allowed as a
matter of right to the prevailing party." The "prevailing party" is again determined by
considering the "final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the
parties." IDAHO R. Clv. P. 54(d)(1)(B). As to discretionary costs, Rule 54(d)(l)(D) states that in
addition to the mandatory costs, the court may award additional "exceptional" costs "upon a
showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in
the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party."
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COSTS AND FEES - 8
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As discussed in the context of fees, there can be no credible argument that MRIA was not
the prevailing party. Again, MRIA obtained a judgment of over $52,000,000, won on every
claim it presented to the jury, and defeated Saint Alphonsus's defenses on the verdict form.
Therefore, MRIA is entitled to the costs "allowed as a matter of right" under Rule 54(d)(1)(A).
Moreover, discretionary costs should also be awarded. As set forth in the attached affidavits,
these exceptional costs incurred by MRIA were reasonable and necessary, especially in light of
the complexity and length of this case, and the amount recovered. See generally the 54(e)(3)
Aff. Therefore, in the interests of justice, MRIA should be awarded these costs.
Just as with the attorneys' fees, many of these costs have already been liquidated by
Judge McLaughlin. Again, he was provided with briefing and argument on costs as of January
2008, and, after reasoned deliberation, awarded costs to MRIA. See Memorandum Decision on
MRIA's revised Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs, Jan. 28,2008, pp. 2-3; Second Amended
Judgment, Feb. 26, 2008. Once again, Saint Alphonsus did not appeal Judge McLaughlin's
determination of costs in the appeal. As such, that determination remains binding in this case
and should simply be added to the additional costs incurred by MRIA since the case was
remanded, which are detailed in the attached Costs and Fees Aff? See Irwin Rogers Ins. Agency,
Inc. v. Murphy, 122 Idaho 270, 277, 833 P.2d 128, 135 (Ct. App. 1992) (as with fees, costs to be

awarded to the "prevailing party" of the overall action, even if that party did not win every battle
in the litigation). As with the fees, the amount and reasonableness ofthe new costs generated
since remand are detailed in the Costs and Fees Aff., the 54(e)(3) Aff., and the Andersen Aff.
And again, rather than repeat the statements contained in these affidavits verbatim, MRIA simply
incorporates them by reference as if fully set forth herein.
2

The Supreme Court was clear that unlike fees incurred on appeal, the costs incurred on appeal were awardable to
Saint Alphonsus, as the prevailing party in the appeal. See Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at 501. As such, MRIA does
not seek its costs for appeal here.
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;

I

I

•

D.

The fees and costs should be awarded to MRI Center and MRI Mobile as the prevailing
parties in proportion to their verdict awards.
MRIA respectfully requests that when apportioning the award as between the MRIA

entities made party to this suit, the Court award 54% ofthe award for costs and fees for the entire
matter to MRI Center and the remaining 46% to MRI Mobile. The rationale for these
percentages is based on the verdict form, in which the jury awarded roughly 54% of the total
damages to MRI Center ($27,922,388) and 46% to MRI Mobile ($24,162,127). See the Verdict
at, e.g., Questions 12, 14, 16, 21, and 26. That is, these are the percentages in which the
"prevailing parties" in this matter prevailed, and the attorneys' fees should be awarded pursuant
to those percentages. 3

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, MRIA should be awarded its costs and attorneys' fees incurred
in this matter in the amounts set forth above and in the attached affidavits.
DATED this 31st day of January 2011.

1-j. Bastian\

2

1$

\'

4

BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
Attorneys for Defendants

3

MRI Associates also was awarded a small percentage of that money, but its award was derivative of the award to
MRI Center and MRI Mobile. In particular, its award was based off of its management fee, which means that if
MRI Center and MRI Mobile had not obtained an award, MRI Associates would not have been awarded anything
either. As such, MRIA believes that the award of attorneys' fees is most fairly awarded as described above.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of January, 2012, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintifflCounterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintifflCounterdefendant

D ~·Mail

avlland Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile

~.Mail

D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile

'e.

BrentS. Bastian
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com
BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

JAN 3 1 2012
CHRISTOPHER 0 RIC
By CHRISTINE 'sw H, Clerk
DEPUTY

EET

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN
ANDERSEN

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss
COUNTY OF ADA )
I, Steven Andersen, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says that the following facts
are true and correct:
1.

I am a partner of Holland & Hart LLP and am located in its Boise, Idaho office.

This affidavit is made based upon my own personal knowledge and in support ofMRIA's
request for recovery of attorney fees incurred in this action.
2.

I have been active in the Idaho State Bar for 31 years, since 1980. In that time, I

have practiced in civil and commercial litigation at Holland & Hart and its predecessor in Boise,
Langroise, Sullivan & Smylie.
3.

Among other things, I have previously served as Holland & Hart's Administrative

Partner for its Boise office from 1995 through 2002. I am a past president of the Idaho Trial
Lawyers Association. I served as the Ninth Circuit Lawyers Representative from 2007 to 2010.
4.

I am presently a senior litigation partner at Holland & Hart and have extensive

experience in commercial litigation. As a partner at Holland & Hart, I have participated in
hundreds of cases, many of which have been resolved by trial and many of which have involved
significant, multimillion dollar claims, including both hourly and contingent fee cases.
5.

During the course of my career, I have become personally familiar with the

current, prevailing hourly rates for attorneys and paralegals in the Boise community. My
knowledge is based upon, among other things, my review oflocal rates for purposes of
establishing the hourly rates of Holland & Hart lawyers and paralegals; my preparation of,
response to, or review of fee petitions; my involvement in RFPs; client communications; and
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information obtained from other law firms including when taking over the rendition of legal
services from other firms.
6.

I am familiar with the law firm of Banducci, Woodard, Schwartzman and am

aware of their backgrounds and levels of experience. Based upon their educational backgrounds
and successes, their prior employment at large law firms, Thomas Banducci's involvement as the
founder and Managing Partner for many years of Boise's Stoel Rives office, and their successful
handling of many high stakes, multimillion dollar cases, it is my opinion that Banducci,
Woodard, Schwartman is a prestigious law firm that can and does justifiably command
prevailing rates at the top of the market range in Boise.
7.

I have reviewed the Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofthe MRIA Entities'

Memorandum of Costs and Fees, including the rates charged by the attorneys who have
represented MRIA in this action. Based upon the affidavit, I understand MRIA requests an
award for attorney fees based upon the following hourly rates in 2008 through 2011:
Attorney

Position/Experience Year/Rate

Thomas A. Banducci

Partner, 32 years

2008:
2009:
2010:
2011:

$325
$350
$375
$425

Wade L. Woodard
Benjamin A. Schwartzman

Partner, 14 years
Partner, 15 years

2008:
2009:
2010:
2011:

$290
$300
$320
$340

BrentS. Bastian

Associate, 7 years

2009: $240
2010: $250
2011: $265

Dara Labrum Parker

Associate, 6 years

2008: $200
2009: $220
2010: $230
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2011: $240
Dari Huskey

Former associate,
9 years

2008: $220

Brian Knox

Former associate,
5 years

2008: $220

8.

In my opinion these rates are and were reasonable and within the range of

standard, customary, prevailing rates charged by other law firms and professionals with the same
or similar levels of experience and expertise in the Boise legal community. In particular, it is my
view that the amount at stake, the complexity of the issues, and the successful result obtained
warrant the prevailing rates that Banducci, Woodard, Schwartzman seeks.
9.

I also understand that MRIA is requesting an award of paralegal fees based upon

an hourly rate of$125 to $140 during 2008 through 2011. It is my opinion that these rates are
also within the range of standard, customary, prevailing rates charged for paralegal services in
the Boise legal community.
10.

I am very familiar with Idaho authorities governing the award of attorney fees to

prevailing parties including the decisions of Idaho federal courts and Idaho district courts, the
Idaho Court of Appeals, and the Idaho Supreme Court. It is my opinion, based upon these
authorities, that MRIA could recover the fees it incurred pursuant to its one-third contingency fee
agreement with Banducci, Woodard, Schwartzman or approximately $17,000,000. MRIA's
decision to request only those fees associated with its attorneys' hourly rates is very reasonable
both in light of its option under the law to recover significantly more and of the amount involved
and the successful results obtained.
11.

I have reviewed the district court's prior decisions entered by Judge McLaughlin

previously approving MRIA's attorney fee request for fees incurred during the first trial in this
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case, including the January 28,2008, Memorandum Decision on MRIA's Revised Motion for
Attorneys Fees and Costs. I have also reviewed the Affidavit of Charles F. Cole, filed on
October 9, 1997, in this matter. Based upon my personal knowledge ofthe prevailing rates in the
Boise legal community in 2004 through 2007, I agree that the rates charged during that period
were within the range of prevailing hourly rates.
DATED this

7

/day of January, 2012.

2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of January, 2012, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1 700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

0 U;,S. Mail
[J,Tfand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
0 Facsimile

~.Mail

0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
0 Facsimile

1?a

\~

. \

Brent S. Bastian
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com
BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

JAN 3 1 2012
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By CHRISTINE 'swe H, Clerk
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Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRJ Limited Partnership,
and MRJ Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
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Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
V.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF THE MRIA ENTITIES'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
FEES

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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STATE OF IDAHO )
ss.
)
County of Ada
I, Thomas A. Banducci, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am a partner with the firm of Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC, attorneys

of record for the above-captioned Counter-Claimants (collectively, "MRIA"). I submit this
affidavit in support ofMRIA's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. I have personal knowledge
of the facts relevant to Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC's legal representation of MRIA
and of the attorney fees and other costs that have been incurred in this case.
Attorney Fees
2.

From January 2008 through December 2011, MRIA incurred more than

$1,844,491.00 in attorney fees to defend against Saint Alphonsus's claims and prosecute its own
claims in this lawsuit. Therefore, the amount for which MRIA seeks an award herein is
$1,844,491.00 plus the previous award of attorney fees made by Judge McLaughlin for the time
spent prior to January 2008.
3.

The Attorney fees from January 2008 through December 2011 were calculated by

multiplying the time for each attorney and paralegal who worked on the case by his or her
billable hourly rate.
4.

Attached as Exhibit "A" is a true, complete, and detailed itemization of the fees

for which MRIA seeks an attorney fee award. Exhibit "A" shows: (a) the date on which the legal
services were performed; (b) the identity of the timekeeper who performed the services; (c) a
description of the services performed; and (d) the amount of time spent on the services
performed.
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5.

The following people are the timekeepers who have provided legal services on

behalf ofMRIA for the firm of Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC since January 2008.
These persons are identified on Exhibit "A" as listed below:
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC

A.

Thomas A. Banducci, Partner
Timekeeper reference: TAB
Hours billed for this Application: 243.10
2008 Rate: $325.00
Total billed for this Application: $79,007.50
Timekeeper reference: TAB
Hours billed for this Application: 60.50
2009 Rate: $350.00
Total billed for this Application: $21,175.00
Timekeeper reference: TAB
Hours billed for this Application: 93.9
2010 Rate: $375.00
Total billed for this Application: $35,212.50
Timekeeper reference: TAB
Hours billed for this Application: 1046
2011 Rate: $425.00
Total billed for this Application: $444,550.00

B.

WadeL. Woodard, Partner
Timekeeper reference: WL W
Hours billed for this Application: 455.20
2008 Rate: $290.00
Total billed for this Application: $132,008.00
Timekeeper reference: WL W
Hours billed for this Application: 96.5
2009 Rate: $300.00
Total billed for this Application: $28,950.00
Timekeeper reference: WL W
Hours billed for this Application: 240.70
2010 Rate: $320.00
Total billed for this Application: $77,024.00
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Timekeeper reference: WL W
Hours billed for this Application: 974.3
2011 Rate: $340.00
Total billed for this Application: $331,262.00

C.

Benjamin A. Schwartzman, Partner
Timekeeper reference: BAS
Hours billed for this Application: 4.1
2008 Rate: $290.00
Total billed for this Application: $1189.00
Timekeeper reference: BAS
Hours billed for this Application: 2. 7
2009 Rate: $300.00
Total billed for this Application: $810.00
Timekeeper reference: BAS
Hours billed for this Application: 5.7
2011 Rate: $340.00
Total billed for this Application: $1938.00

D.

Dari Huskey, Former Associate
Timekeeper reference: DMH
Hours billed for this Application: 32.8
2008 Rate: $220.00
Total billed for this Application: $7,216.00

E.

Brian Knox, Former Associate
Timekeeper reference: BDK
Hours billed for this Application: 89
2008 Rate: $220.00
Total billed for this Application: $19,580.00

F.

BrentS. Bastian, Associate
Timekeeper reference: BSB
Hours billed for this Application: 34.2
2009 Rate: $240.00
Total billed for this Application: $8,208.00
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Timekeeper reference: BSB
Hours billed for this Application: 66.70
2010 Rate: $250.00
Total billed for this Application: $16,675.00
Timekeeper reference: BSB
Hours billed for this Application: 900.40
2011 Rate: $265.00
Total billed for this Application: $238,606.00

G.

Dara Labrum Parker, Associate
Timekeeper reference: DLP/DL
Hours billed for this Application: 125.60
2008 Rate: $200.00
Total billed for this Application: $25,120.00
Timekeeper reference: DLP/DL
Hours billed for this Application: 56
2009 Rate: $220.00
Total billed for this Application: $12,320.00
Timekeeper reference: DLP/DL
Hours billed for this Application: 95.70
2010 Rate: $230.00
Total billed for this Application: $22,0 11.00
Timekeeper reference: DLP/DL
Hours billed for this Application: 648.00
2011 Rate: $240.00
Total billed for this Application: $155,520.00

H.

Kathy A. Savell, Paralegal
Timekeeper reference: KAS
Hours billed for this Application: 157.30
2008 Rate: $125.00
Total billed for this Application: $19,662.50
Timekeeper reference: KAS
Hours billed for this Application: 23.8
2009 Rate: $130.00
Total billed for this Application: $3,094.00
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Timekeeper reference: KAS
Hours billed for this Application: 45.10
2010 Rate: $135.00
Total billed for this Application: $6,088.50
Timekeeper reference: KAS
Hours billed for this Application: 706.60
2011 Rate: $140.00
Total billed for this Application: $98,924.00
I.

Lauren Blaesing, Former Paralegal

Timekeeper reference: LFB
Hours billed for this Application: 189.90
2008 Rate: $125.00
Total billed for this Application: $23,737.50
J.

Shannon E. Smith, Former Paralegal

Timekeeper reference: SES
Hours billed for this Application: 4.10
2008 Rate: $125.00
Total billed for this Application: $512.50
Timekeeper reference: SES
Hours billed for this Application: 94.50
2011 Rate: $140.00
Total billed for this Application: $13,230.00
J. Luke Howarth, Law Clerk

Timekeeper reference: LH
Hours billed for this Application: 149
2011 Rate: $140.00
Total billed for this Application: $20,860.00
Discretionary Costs
6.

Attached as Exhibit "B" is a true and complete statement of discretionary costs

incurred by MRIA in this matter since January 2008.
7.

All of these costs were incurred by Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC on

behalf ofMRIA directly.
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8.

The majority of these costs were expert witness fees. All the experts filed their

own reports in this litigation, and those reports provide the evidence for the skill, diligence,
expertise, and knowledge of each expert. This was a complex damages case and fees were
expended in the amount of$228,213.52 in excess of the $6,000.00 awarded as a matter of right.
9.

Total costs for Automated (Westlaw) Legal Research were incurred in the amount

of$7,828.54. Automated research was essential in this matter, given the paucity of law in Idaho
on many of the issues litigated.
10.

There were approximately 1200 exhibits identified in this matter, in addition to

expanded discovery. Copy and scanning charges were incurred in the amount of$22,179.95 in
excess ofthe $500.00 for costs as a matter of right.
11.

The total amount of discretionary costs incurred since January 2008 is

$551,425.10.
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
II.

COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, PURSUANT TO RULE 54(d)(l)(C) I.R.C.P.
1. Court Filing Fees

2. Costs of Exhibits/Models
(See, Exhibit B attached hereto)
3. Expert Fees

$0.00
$500.00

$6,000.00
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4. Fees for the service provided by a public officer or other person

$235.80

5. Witness Fees/Mileage- Trial Testimony

$632.50

6. Witness Travel Expenses

$1,758.96
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7. Charges for Reporting and Transcribing of a Deposition

8. Transcripts

$5,669.17

$31,458.39

30.00
72.00
45.00
112.50
105.75

TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT:
III.

$46,344.82

STATEMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES:
Defendant requests that the Court award the following as reasonable attorney fees

necessarily incurred in the pursuit of this action, pursuant to Rule 54(e)(1), Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Idaho Code§ 12-120 and, alternatively, and Idaho Code §§12-121. A copy of

the itemizations of said attorney fees is attached hereto.

TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES, PURSUANT TO RULE 54(e)(1)
IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:

$1,844,491.00
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IV.

PRIOR AWARD
On February 26, 2008, the Court awarded MRIA attorney fees and costs from the prior

proceeding in the amount of$2,172,677.63. A copy ofthat Judgment is attached Exhibit C.
PRIOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS PER
FEBRUARY 26, 2008 JUDGMENT

$2,172,677.63

TOTAL DISCRETIONARY COSTS SINCE JANUARY 2008,
PURSUANT TO RULES 54(d)(1) and 54(e)(1), IDAHO
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:

$551,425.10

TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT:

$46,344.82

TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED SINCE JANUARY
2008, PURSUANT TO RULE 54(e)(1),
IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
GRAND TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT,
DISCRETIONARY COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES:

$1,844,491.00

$4.614.938.55

As further proof in support of the Memorandum of Costs and Fees, attached as Exhibit D,
E and F respectively are:
(1)

A true and correct copy of excerpts of Appellant's Brief filed with the Supreme

Court of the State ofldaho; and
(2)

A true and correct copy of the Memorandum Decision on MRIA's Revised

Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs dated January 28, 2008.
(3)

A true and correct copy ofthe November 19,2007 Memorandum Decision on

Saint Alphonsus's Application for Attorney Fees Relative to Antitrust Claims; Saint Alphonsus's
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict; Saint Alphonsus's Motion for New Trial;
MRIA's Motion for Prejudgment Interest; MRIA's Motion for Reconsideration; MRIA's Motion
for Attorney Fees and Costs.
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I believe the fees and costs incurred were reasonable and commensurate with charges in
like cases. In my opinion, the sum of$4,614,938.55 constitutes necessary fees and costs
incurred in defending and prosecuting this case through two jury trials and an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Idaho.
DATED this 31st day of January 2012.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31st day of January 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of January 2012, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Attorneys for PlaintifJ!Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Attorneys for PlaintifJ!Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
GYI-Iand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
0 Facsimile: 336-9177

~.S.Mail

0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
0 Facsimile: 202-626-1700

'
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EXHIBIT A
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

4/24/2008

BAS

0.8

10/9/2008

BAS

0.4

10/24/2008 BAS
10/30/2008 BAS
11/13/2008 BAS

1.1
0.8
0.3

11/24/2008 BAS

0.7
4.1

Telephonic conference with Jim Prochaska regarding possible MRI partner purchase of competing imaging center; telephonic
conference with Thomas A. Banducci reg~rding same; factual research regarding same.
Formulate strategy and arguments for appellate brief, including arguments regarding court's ruling on summary judgment of
wrongful dissociation.
Review and edit appellate response brief sections.
Draft, edit and revise motion for extension of time, and affidavit in support thereof.
Conference with Wade Woodard regarding distinguishing cited authority of SARMC regarding proof of damages from
violation of non-compete; legal research regarding same.
Review and edit appellate brief.

BAS
BAS
BAS
BAS

0.7
0.7
0.7
0.6
2.7

Review and revise sections of reply brief.
Strategic conference regarding appellate argument.
Conference regarding strategy for oral argument on appeal.
Review and analyze supreme court opinion and effects of cost award.

11/9/2011 BAS
11/10/2011 BAS
11/11/2011 BAS

2.8
1.8
1.1
5.7

Analyze appellate and settlement strategy.
Strategic analysis of settlement and appeal approaches.
Analyze settlement and appellate strategy.

1/2/2008

BDK

6.4

1/3/2008

BDK

2.2

BDK
BDK
BDK
BDK
BDK

2.1
0.6
0.5
2.2
1.5

Review second amended petition; research dispositive authority behind conditional cross-appeals; conference with Thomas
A. Banducci to discuss supersedeas; research rules on supersedeas time limits; research conditional appeal issue; conference
with Thomas A. Banducci regarding objection to remittitur acceptance; research cross appeal and supersedeas issues in
appeal; draft research memo.
Research and calculate filing deadlines; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding conditional cross-appeal; phone calls
with Steve Kenyon (ld. Sup. Ct.) regarding conditional cross-appeals; research authority for conditional cross-appeals;
research time limits for supersedeas bond; draft and transmit research results via email
Research appellate rules to determine additional deadlines
Review conditional cross-appeal research in preparation to draft research memo
Further research re: conditional cross-appeals in Idaho
Additional Idaho cross-appeal research; draft research memo
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding evidentiary rules affecting appeal issue no. 4 in SARMC's
notice of appeal; research regarding use of settlement offers in evidence at trial or otherwise

1/29/2009
8/17/2009
8/18/2009
10/23/2009

I
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1/4/2008
1/16/2008
1/17/2008
1/18/2008
2/20/2008
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

2/21/2008

BDK

7

2/22/2008
2/25/2008

BDK
BDK

5.5
6.7

2/26/2008

BDK

3

2/27/2008

BDK

6.6

2/28/2008

BDK

3.9

Research General rules regarding admission of settlement offers; research continuing objections and nature of the objection
entered by opposing counsel to the admission of the letter sent to St. Al's; review trial transcripts from various members of
MRI regarding the trial exhibit (alleged settlement offer)
Research ability to use settlement offers and agreement documents at trial; draft research memorandum
Research case law and secondary sources regarding settlement agreement/offer introduction into evidence at trial; draft
research memorandum on the issues
Review pleadings regarding partners' fiduciary duty in Idaho to the partnership in general- common law fiduciary duty versus
statutory duty
Finish review of all pleadings dealing with the fiduciary duty owed between partners; research Idaho and other jurisdictions'
law on fiduciary duty, both statutory and common law duties
Research common law fiduciary duty in Idaho and other jurisdictions to bolster argument before ld. Supreme Court regarding
District Court's decision to not rule as a matter of law that SADC/SARMC had no fiduciary duty to MRIM and MRCIC

3/3/2008
3/4/2008

BDK
BDK

3.2
4.2

3/16/2008

BDK

1.9

3/20/2008

BDK

7.2

3/24/2008

BDK

3.9

3/25/2008

BDK

2.1

BDK

2.8

3/31/2008

BDK

7.5

4/14/2008

BDK

0.8

!

1

research case law regarding common law recognition of fiduciary duty in absence of statutory imposition of duty
research case law regarding common law recognition of fiduciary duty in absence of statutory imposition of duty; begin draft
of memorandum including language to be used in answer to notice of appeal
Research secondary sources regarding fiduciary duty matter for upcoming response brief to the court; draft portion of
response brief.
Research under what theory we pled the common law fiduciary duty of SARMC to MRIM & MRICI; Research notice pleading
requirements in Idaho and whether court was correct in its initial ruling by holding that SARMC had a common law fiduciary
duty to MRIM & MRICI; research standard for reversal in such a case; review pleadings for each instance in which MRIA pled
elements that support the argument that SARMC had a common law fiduciary duty to MRIM & MRICI
Review research materials on notice pleading requirements; analysis of facts and allegations pled in initial and amended
pleading to determine whether notice pleading requirements were met regarding common law fiduciary duty of SARMC to
MRIM & MRICI; additional research in other jurisdictions
Research additional case law regarding notice pleading in Idaho; review of pleadings to support court's initial decision
regarding common law fiduciary duty.

.
-~-·--

3/25/2008
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Telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding additional strategy for research and analysis of judge's decision;
I
review judge's decision regarding fiduciary duty; research whether judge was correct in holding that there is no statutory
fiduciary duty between SARMC and MRIM and MRICI.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding notice pleading research; additional research regarding notice pleading in Idaho
and other jurisdictions; review pleadings to determine whether SARMC effectively objected to sufficiency of pleadings prior
to the matter going to the jury; draft research memorandum regarding notice pleading.
Draft memorandum in response to fiduciary matters brought up in SARMC notice of appeal.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

4/15/2008

BDK

7.2

Research issues regarding fiduciary duties and whether judge was correct in ruling that SARMC did not owe a statutory duty
to MRIM and MRICI; draft memorandum.

89
11/3/2009

BSB

2.2

11/4/2009
11/5/2009

BSB
BSB

5.8
4.6

11/6/2009

BSB

5

11/7/2009 BSB
11/9/2009 BSB
11/10/2009 BSB

2.9
2.1
3.5

11/11/2009 BSB

4.4

11/12/2009 BSB

3.3

11/19/2009 BSB
11/20/2009 BSB

0.3
0.1
34.2

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

0.2
0.6
0.2
4.1

8/6/2010
8/9/2010

BSB
BSB

0.2
5.5

8/10/2010

BSB

2.9
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1/13/2010
8/2/2010
8/3/2010
8/5/2010

Analysis of order; analysis of statement of costs; research concerning same; conference with Dara Labrum and Wade
Woodard concerning same.
Begin draft of opposition to costs; research concerning same.
Continue draft of opposition to costs; research concerning same; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same; telephone
conference with clients and Tom Banducci concerning same; begin draft of affidavit in support of same.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for fees; continue research concerning issues in same; conference with Tom Banducci
concerning same; continue draft of affidavit in support of same; conference with Rich Drury concerning information in
affidavit.
Continue draft of objection; research concerning same.
Revise affidavit; revise opposition to costs; telephone conference with Rich Drury.
Revise draft of petition for rehearing; research concerning same; conferences with Tom Banducci and Wade Woodard
concerning same; revise draft of affidavit; telephone conference with Rich Drury concerning same; research of rules for filing
petition; telephone conference with clerk's office.
Revise memorandum in support of petition for rehearing; draft petition for rehearing; draft objection to costs; revise
affidavit; telephone conference with Rich Drury concerning same; coordination of notarization with staff; research concerning
filing petition for rehearing and objection.
Several revisions to affidavit of Rich Drury; several telephone conferences with Rich Drury; revise objection to costs; revise
petition for rehearing and memorandum in support of same; coordination of obtaining original affidavit; coordination of filing
various pleadings with court.
Analysis of response to objection to costs; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same.
Conference with Tom Banducci concerning status of case.

Analysis of decision allowing costs from Supreme Court.
Research concerning dissociation based on a definite term.
Review previous summary judgment motions concerning definite terms.
Analysis of several pleadings, motions, and decisions concerning breach of operating agreement for a definite term;
conferences with Thomas A. Banducci concerning same; factual and legal research concerning same.
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci concerning strategy for summary judgment response.
Analysis of motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning arguments made in same; draft of outline of
opposition; begin draft of opposition; conference with Wade L. Woodard concerning same.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; research of issues arising in same.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

8/11/2010

BSB

3.9

8/12/2010

BSB

3.2

Continue draft of opposition; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with WadeL. Woodard concerning
same.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with
Tom A. Banducci concerning same.

8/13/2010
8/16/2010
8/18/2010
8/19/2010

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

0.3
0.2
4.3
8.5

8/20/2010
8/23/2010
8/24/2010
8/25/2010
8/26/2010

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

2.6
9.9
5.9
0.4
1.6

8/27/2010

BSB

1.7

8/30/2010

BSB

3.4

9/13/2010
9/14/2010
9/15/2010

BSB
BSB
BSB

0.2
0.2
1.6

9/16/2010

BSB

2.4

9/30/2010

BSB
BSB

0.2
2.5

10/1/2010

Conferences with Wade L. Woodard concerning motion for summary judgment; continue draft of same.
Analysis and edits to motion for summary judgment.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same; conferences with
Wade L. Woodard and Tom A. Banducci concerning same.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; continue factual and legal research concerning same.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same.
Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; legal research concerning same.
Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same, especially as to
amendments to the partnership agreements; highlight evidentiary issues for support staff to correctly cite.
Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; double check citations to evidence; factual and legal research
concerning issues in same.
Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning estoppel and ratification;
coordination of filing opposition; revise tabs for binder.
Analysis of response to opposition to motion for summary judgment.
Review of reply to opposition to motion for summary judgment.
Analysis of reply to opposition to motion for summary judgment; begin draft of outline of response to same; factual and legal
research concerning same.

I

i

'

Draft of outline response to reply to opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning
same; conference with Thomas A. Banducci concerning same.
Conference with Tom Banducci concerning integration clauses.
Legal research concerning applicability of RUPA; conference with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning same; draft
of e-mail to Wade Woodard concerning same.

66.7

I
I

BSB

6.6

Review motion for summary judgment on damages; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with Tom
Banducci concerning same.

4/13/2011

BSB

9

4/18/2011

BSB

10.7

Continue research concerning motion for summary judgment; conference with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning
same; draft of outline for same.
Draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment on "pro rata" issue; factual and legal research concerning same;
conference with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning same.
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4/12/2011

Date

Staff

HRS

Description

4/19/2011

BSB

12.3

4/20/2011
4/21/2011

BSB
BSB

7
7.2

4/22/2011

BSB

5.8

4/25/2011
5/12/2011

BSB
BSB

0.5
1.6

5/17/2011

BSB

0.5

5/18/2011
6/10/2011

BSB
BSB

1
3.8

Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with
Wade Woodard concerning same.
Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same.
Continue revisions to opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same; conference
with Dara Labrum concerning same.
Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same; conferences with Tom
Banducci concerning same.
Revise opposition; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same; coordination of filing same.
In-depth review of reply to opposition to motion for summary judgment; research concerning same; draft of short outline
concerning same; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same.
Conference with Tom Banducci to discuss major flaws in arguments in response to opposition to motion for summary
judgment.
Attend hearing concerning second affirmative defense.
Research concerning independent rights to documents during discovery; analysis of motion to compel; analysis of motion to
shorten time; draft of outline of response to same.
Draft of opposition to motion to shorten time; research concerning same; revise affidavit in support of same; coordination of
filing same; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same; analysis of court order concerning same; draft of opposition
to motion to reopen discovery; research concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.

i

6/13/2011

BSB

13.1

I
BSB

8.8

6/15/2011

BSB

4.8

6/16/2011
6/21/2011

BSB
BSB

0.3
0.9

6/22/2011

BSB

4.3

6/30/2011
7/1/2011
7/5/2011
7/6/2011
7/7/2011
7/18/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

1.7
2.1
1
0.5
0.1
4.2
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6/14/2011

Continue draft of opposition to motion to compel; continue research concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard
concerning same.
Revise draft of opposition to motion to compel; coordination of filing same; research concerning same; conference with
Wade Woodard concerning same; analysis of opposition to opposition to motion for orders concerning Sandra Bruce.
Analysis of orders from court; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
Review of reply in support of motion to compel; research concerning same; draft of short outline concerning
counterarguments to same; review of court order on motion for summary judgment.
Review of argument in reply in support of motion to compel; research concerning cases in same; draft of outline for
responses to same; conference with Tom Banducci concerning hearing; travel to hearing; participate in hearing; travel from
hearing; research concerning cases cited at hearing.
Analysis of brief regarding implications of certain case; research concerning same; begin draft of response to same.
Revise draft of response to brief concerning Summit County case.
Revise draft of response to Summit County argument; coordination of filing same.
Conference with co-attorneys concerning witnesses at trial; coordination concerning same.
Review of hearing transcript to ensure representations in motion were aptly stated.
Review of deposition transcript and trial transcript of Robert Bell in preparation for trial; conference with Wade Woodard and
Tom Banducci concerning same.
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Staff

HRS

Description

7/19/2011

BSB

7

Review deposition and trial transcripts of Mark Dalley; conferences with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning same;
analysis of major claims remaining in matter; analysis of testimony of Mark Dalley in regards to same; prepare for trial.

7/20/2011
7/21/2011

BSB
BSB

0.5
3.2

7/22/2011
7/26/2011

BSB
BSB

0.5
7

7/27/2011

BSB

4.1

7/28/2011

BSB

4

Review trial transcript of Chris Anton; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
Continue preparation for trial; analysis of trial transcript and deposition transcript of Chris Anton; conference with Wade
Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning same.
Conference with Tom Banducci concerning trial issues and Dalley.
Conference with co-counsel in preparation for trial; draft of motion to have deemed admitted all documents admitted in
previous trial; factual and legal research concerning same.
Draft of motion in limine concerning term "non-profit"; factual and legal research concerning same; revise draft of motion to
have deemed admitted exhibits admitted in previous trial; conference with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning
trial strategy; meeting with Mark Dalley in preparation for trial.
Draft of response to motion to exclude hearsay within hearsay; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with
Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning same; revise other motions in limine to be filed; coordination of filing same.

7/30/2011
8/2/2011

BSB
BSB

5.4
3.3

8/3/2011

BSB

7.3

8/4/2011

BSB

1.1

8/5/2011
8/15/2011

BSB
BSB

0.4
3.2

8/16/2011

BSB

4.9

8/17/2011

BSB

4.5

BSB

7.8
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Date

8/18/2011

-

Attend mock trial; conference with co-counsel concerning issues arising in same.
Analysis of various motion responses filed; prepare for direct examination of Bob Bell; draft of outline for testimony
concerning same; analysis of prior deposition and trial testimony of Bob Bell.
Continue draft of outline of direct examination of Bob Bell; analysis of file concerning same; analysis of entire expert report of
Bob Bell; research concerning same; prepare for direct examination of Mark Dalley; research concerning same; analysis of file
concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci concerning same; analysis of responses and
replies to motions in limine.
Analysis of several pieces of correspondence from Tom Banducci concerning trial strategy; analysis of deposition transcripts
concerning same.
Telephonic conference with Wade Woodard concerning hearing strategy.
Review of several pleadings and arguments from previous week; prepare for direct examination of Mark Dalley; conference
with Tom Banducci and Wade Woodard concerning same.
Conference with co-counsel in preparation for trial; review of trial transcript of Grant Chamberlain; research concerning
same; draft of outline memorandum concerning same; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same.
Review of testimony of Grant Chamberlain for designation; review of court orders concerning exhibits used in deposition of
Grant Chamberlain; begin draft of new designations; review of research concerning conspiracy; conferences with Dara Parker
and Tom Banducci concerning same; research concerning same.
Continue designation of Grant Chamberlain's testimony; factual and legal research concerning same; review of deposition of
same; continue draft of direct examination of Chris Anton; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same.

- -
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Staff

HRS

Description

8/19/2011

BSB

6.6

8/22/2011

BSB

4.5

Continue preparation for Anton direct; factual research concerning same; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same;
revise direct of Mark Dailey; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same; conference with client and co-counsel
concerning demonstratives for computer systems.
Revise outlines for direct examinations of Chris Anton, Mark Dailey, and Bob Bell; coordination with staff concerning exhibits
to use in same; factual research of the record concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.

8/23/2011

BSB

7.1

8/24/2011

BSB

4.5

8/25/2011
8/26/2011
8/29/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB

1.3
4.3
9

8/30/2011

BSB

7.1

8/31/2011

BSB

7.5

9/1/2011

BSB

1.2

9/2/2011

BSB

7.1

9/3/2011

BSB

7.7

9/4/2011
9/5/2011
9/6/2011
9/7/2011
9/8/2011
9/9/2011
9/10/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

3.3
9.8
11.5
10.3
11.1
12
10.3
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Date

Revise direct examinations of Chris Anton, Bob Bell, and Mark Dailey; meeting with co-counsel concerning trial preparation;
research concerning direct examinations; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
Revise outline of questions for direct examinations of Anton, Bell, and Dailey; conference with Chris Anton to prepare him for
direct examination; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same; review of order from court; analysis of materials
associated with Bob Bell's deposition.
Review of Bob Bell's deposition file.
Research concerning referring doctor testimony; research concerning IMI's desire to partner with MRIA.
Prepare for trial; research of IMI minutes concerning sundry issues related to Dr. Giles and IMI's potential partnership with
MRIA; research of Dr. Prochaska and Chris Anton's testimony concerning board of partners; revise outline of Bob Bell's direct.
Prepare for trial; legal research concerning CV being hearsay; draft of business records questions for Bob Bell; conferences
with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning sundry trial issues; review and comment on several pocket briefs drafted
by Dara Parker; research concerning Harder documents.
Review juror questionnaires; recommend strikes as to same; conference with Wade Woodard as to same; analysis of prior
voir dire questions; create list of same; revise direct of Bob Bell; research concerning same; prepare for trial.
Review transcript of Bob Bell; revise direct examination of same; review new CV of Bob Bell; conference with Kathy Savell
concerning same; analysis of fiduciary duty jury instruction.
Review most recent pleadings and motions in limine; research concerning same; research of testimony of Sandra Bruce;
conference with Tom Banducci concerning same; prepare for "hanging chads" hearing; attend same; conference with Tom
Banducci and Wade Woodard concerning same; review of pleadings to ascertain our preliminary instruction on fiduciary duty;
conference with Tom Banducci concerning same.
Prepare for trial; review of deposition transcripts in preparation for same; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same.
Prepare for trial; review of deposition transcripts concerning same.
Prepare for trial.
Attend trial; conference with clients.
Attend trial; prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial; research for same; analysis of file for same.
Attend trial; prepare for trial; research concerning same.
Prepare for trial; research for issues in same; telephone calls related to same.
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Staff

HRS

Description

9/11/2011
9/12/2011
9/13/2011
9/14/2011
9/15/2011
9/16/2011
9/17/2011
9/19/2011
9/20/2011
9/21/2011
9/22/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

3.5
11.2
12.1
10.5
9.2
11
4.8
9.6
9.8
10.2
5.4

Prepare for trial; review of record in relation to same.
Prepare for trial; attend trial. -Prepare for trial; attend trial; research concerning issues arising at same.
Attend trial; prepare for trial; meet with clients in preparation for trial.
Prepare for trial; prepare witnesses for trial; revise questions for witnesses at trial; research concerning same.
Attend trial; prepare witness; prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial; review of prior transcripts.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; revise questions for direct of Chris Anton.
Prepare for trial; attend trial.
Attend trial; prepare for trial; conference with co-counsel concerning trial strategy.

9/23/2011
9/24/2011
9/26/2011
9/27/2011
9/28/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

11.1
4.9
12.6
11.1
9.6

9/29/2011
9/30/2011
10/1/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB

9.4
12
10.1

10/2/2011

BSB

8.8

10/3/2011

BSB

12.9

10/4/2011

BSB

11.1

BSB

13

Prepare for trial; attend trial; prepare examinations; review of transcript of Joe Messmer in preparation for Mark Dailey; draft
of outline for same; research of file concerning Mark Dailey's examination; revise examination of Chris Anton; telephone
conference with accountant Drury; telephone conference with Karen Marler; draft of correspondence to Bob Bell.

10/6/2011 IBSB

9.7

Prepare for trial; prepare witness for testimony; revise outlines of question; res~~!Ch concerning same.
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Date

10/5/2011

Attend trial meeting; conference with co-counsel concerning same; drafts of e-mail to Mark Dailey concerning testimony;
telephonic conference with Chris Anton; revise outlines for direct examination of Bob Bell, Mark Dailey, and Chris Anton;
research concerning mistrial for use of the term "prior trial"; conference with Dara Parker concerning same.
Attend trial; prepare for trial; research of file and law concerning issues arising in same.
Prepare outline for cross examinations of referring doctors; research concerning same; analysis of Hahn depo.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; prepare argument; prepare exams.
Attend trial; prepare for trial; factual and legal research concerning same; prepare exams for same.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; help prepare Dr. Giles for testimony; telephone conference with Mark Dailey; prepare exams.
Prepare for trial; help prepare witnesses for trial; revise exams; prepare for oral argument; search for testimony.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; revise opposition to quash; research concerning same.
Prepare for trial; draft of motion to strike answer; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with Tom Banducci,
concerning same; research of transcripts for Giles' direct; prepare examinations.
Prepare for trial; draft of motion to strike answer; research concerning same; revise opposition to motion to quash; prepare
for argument; conference with Tom Banducci concerning several research topics; prepare for examination; telephone
conference with Chris Anton.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; prepare for argument; deliver argument; revise opposition to motion to quash; revise motion to
exclude exhibits 802-803; draft of jury instruction; coordinate communication with witnesses; communicate with witnesses;
meeting concerning strategy and order of witnesses.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; prepare witness for examination; prepare argument; prepare documents to be distributed at
argument.

---

Date

Staff

HRS

Description

10/7/2011
10/8/2011
10/9/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB

11.2
6.7
4.5

Prepare for trial; attend trial; prepare witnesses for trial; conference with court after trial.
Prepare for trial; help prepare witnesses for trial; draft of motion in limine; research concerning same.
Prepare for trial; draft of motion in limine; research concerning same; draft of e-mail to Dara Parker concerning another
motion in limine; research concerning same; review of transcript for certain admissions; conference with Tom Banducci
concerning same.
Prepare for trial; prepare examinations; research concerning same; revise motion in limine to exclude questions concerning
the reasonableness of factual assumptions; research concerning same; conference with Dara Parker concerning other
motions in limine; revise same; prepare all for filing.
Prepare motions for court; prepare for trial; attend trial.
Prepare for trial; prepare for argument; deliver argument; attend trial; brainstorm closing; research concerning same; draft of
memorandum concerning same.
Prepare for trial; continue preparation for closing argument.
Prepare for trial; attend trial.
Prepare for trial; research concerning tortious interference.
Prepare for trial; help prepare witnesses for trial; research concerning same.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; review of several transcripts.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; analysis of directed verdict motions; begin research and response to same.
Draft of oppositions to motions for directed verdict; research concerning same; conferences with co-counsel concerning
same.
Draft of oppositions to motions for directed verdict; research concerning same; conferences concerning same; prepare for
trial.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; revise oppositions; coordination of filing same.
Prepare for trial; prepare for examination; review jury instructions.
Prepare for trial; prepare examination; review jury instructions; research concerning same.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; revise jury instructions; prepare for argument on directed verdict motions.
Prepare for hearings; prepare for trial; attend hearings; attend trial; review jury instructions; edits to same.
Prepare for jury instruction conference; attend jury instruction conference; research concerning same; assist in preparation
for closing argument; review of transcripts for same.
Help prepare T. Banducci for closing argument; review of jury instruction changes; review of testimony from trial; conference
with co-counsel concerning closing.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; conference with co-counsel concerning strategy for exhibits.
Trade e-mails concerning exhibit issues; research concerning same.
Trade several e-mails with opposing counsel concerning demonstratives; research of file concerning issues arising as to same;
review of "Eagle adjusted" demonstratives; conferen_cE! with Tom Bal)ducci concerning timelines.

10/10/2011 BSB

8.6

10/11/2011 BSB
10/13/2011 BSB

11.8
10.8

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

10.5
11.3
6.7
5.4
15
14.1
15.2

10/13/2011
10/14/2011
10/15/2011
10/16/2011
10/17/2011
10/18/2011
10/19/2011

10/20/2011 BSB
10/21/2011
10/22/2011
10/23/2011
10/24/2011
10/25/2011
10/26/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

17
11.2
7.4
8.4
15.4
13.1
15.2
9.4

10/28/2011 BSB
10/29/2011 BSB
10/30/2011 BSB

12.4
3.1
3.6

003949

10/27/2011 BSB

------··-··-

----
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HRS

Description

10/31/2011 BSB

7.3

11/1/2011
11/2/2011

BSB
BSB

1.3
3.2

11/3/2011
11/4/2011

BSB
BSB

0.5
1.5

11/7/2011

BSB

3.3

11/8/2011

BSB

2.2

11/9/2011

BSB

7.6

11/10/2011 BSB

7.5

Prepare for post-trial hearing; attend post-trial hearing; review of Saint Alphonsus' demonstrative exhibits; conference with
court and opposing counsel concerning same; review of jury verdict form; research concerning attorneys' fees; attend
announcement of jury decision; conference with co-counsel concerning strategy in lieu of same.
Trade several e-mails concerning form of judgment; review draft of same.
Review of proposed order; edits to same; research concerning possibility of pre-judgment interest; conference with Wade
Woodard concerning response to disgorgement advisory verdict; research concerning same.
Review e-mails with co-counsel concerning judgment.
Review of proposed judgment; research concerning disgorgement; review of decision concerning pre-judgment interest; draft
of e-mail to co-counsel concerning same.
Revise proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; conference with Dara Parker, Tom Banducci, and Wade Woodard
concerning same; review of transcript for relevant evidence for same; research concerning attorneys' fees; trade several emails with Kathy Savell concerning same.
Conference with co-counsel concerning draft of proposed judgment; research concerning same; edits to same; review of
Saint Alphonsus's proposed judgment; research concerning same.
Draft motion for attorneys fees and costs; factual and legal research for same; respond to Saint Alphonsus's request for
response.
Continue draft of motion for attorneys' fees; factual and legal research concerning same; research of deadlines for filing
same; draft of e-mail memorandum to co-counsel concerning same; review of court order.
Revise motion for attorneys' fees and costs; revise affidavit in support; research concerning same.
Revise fees motion; review response to objection to judgment; discuss comments to same with Dara Parker.
Analysis of response to proposed judgment; research concerning same; begin draft of reply to same.
Continue draft of reply to response to proposed judgment; research concerning same.
Continue draft of reply to response to proposed judgment; factual and legal research concerning same.
Continue draft of reply to response to proposed judgment; research concerning same; conference with co-counsel
concerning same.
Revise reply in support of proposed judgment; research concerning same; coordination with staff concerning filing and
serving same.
Revise motion for attorneys' fees and costs; revise affidavit of Tom Banducci in support of same.
Revise motion for attorneys' fees; research same; conference with co-counsel concerning same.
Revise attorneys' fees motion; research concerning same; analysis of file concerning same; conference with co-counsel
concerning same; conference with co-counsel concerning fees; prepare for hearing on "form of the judgment"; review of
reply from SARMC concerning same.
Prepare for "form of judgment" hearing; research concerning same; draft of outline concerning same; conferences with cocounsel concerning same.
Continue preparation for hearing; revise outline for same; conference with co-counsel concerning same; travel to
courthouse; present argument; travel to office; debrief co-counsel on hearing; research concerning attorneys' fees.
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Date

11/11/2011
11/14/2011
11/15/2011
11/16/2011
11/17/2011
11/18/2011

Staff

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

3.3
0.7
1.1
8.7
11.5
5.7

11/21/2011 BSB

2.2

11/29/2011 BSB
11/30/2011 BSB
12/7/2011 BSB

2.8
2
3

003950

12/8/2011

BSB

12.6

12/9/2011

BSB

9.9

Date

Staff

HRS

Description

12/12/2011 BSB

3.8

12/13/2011 BSB

3.8

12/14/2011 BSB
12/15/2011 BSB

2.1

Revise motion for attorneys' fees; research concerning same; revise affidavit of Tom Banducci in support of motion for
attorneys' fees; research concerning same; draft of affidavit in support of motion for attorneys' fees; research concerning
same.
Revise affidavit in support of attorney fees; revise affidavit of Tom Banducci; revise motion for attorneys' fees and costs;
research concerning same.
Research concerning appealable issues; conference with co-counsel concerning same; calculate deadlines for same.
Continue research concerning grounds for appeal; draft of outline of same; review of orders from court regarding same.

3
900.4

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

0.3
0.3
1
0.4
2
5.7
3.4

9/18/2008

DL

7.2

9/19/2008
9/22/2008
9/23/2008
9/24/2008
9/25/2008
9/26/2008
9/29/2008
9/30/2008
10/1/2008

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

6.3
6.5
6.7
7.8
6.6
5.2
6.9
7.1

10/2/2008
10/3/2008
10/6/2008
10/7/2008

DL
DL
DL
DL

5.6
6.7
0.2
2.4

10/15/2008 DL
10/27/2008 DL

1.6
3.5

003951

9/4/2008
9/5/2008
9/8/2008
9/9/2008
9/11/2008
9/12/2008
9/17/2008

5

Work on memorandum regard Prochaska deposition testimony for use in appellate brief.
Write background section from Prochaska deposition for appellate brief.
Review transcript of Jim Prochaska; draft background section of appellate brief.
Review Prochaska transcript for fact section of appellate brief.
Review deposition testimony for factual section of appellate brief.
Prepare fact section for appellate brief.
Meeting with W. Woodard about issues that need to be addressed in appellate brief; preparation of fact section for appellate
brief.
Work on fact section of appellate brief; work on legal analysis of claimed evidentiary error in permitting Hammond
memorandum for appellate brief.
Work on countering Shattuck Hammond memorandum argument for appellate brief.
Research regarding Shattuck Hammon memorandum and special verdict form for appellate brief.
Research and drafting of appellate brief on issues of attorney/client privilege and alleged deficiency in verdict form.
Research and drafting of appellate brief on issue of sustaining damages award to MRI Center and Mobile.
Research and drafting of various issues for appellate brief; meeting with T. Banducci regarding the same.
Work on various issues for appellate brief; meetings with T. Banducci regarding the same.
Work on research and drafting of appellate brief regarding damages award.
Research and drafting of appellate brief.
Research and drafting of appellate brief regarding wrongful dissociation; meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L.
Woodard regarding the same.
Drafting and research of appellate brief, with emphasis on damages and wrongful dissociation.
Draft section for appellate brief on wrongful dissociation.
Review research regarding wrongfully dissociation.
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding appellate brief; research regarding effect of remittitur for
appellate brief.
Research for appellate brief regarding motions in limine and preservation of objections.
Research for and drafting of antitrust section of appellate brief.
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Staff

HRS

Description

10/28/2008
10/29/2008
10/30/2008
11/5/2008
11/19/2008
11/20/2008
11/22/2008
12/22/2008
12/23/2008
12/29/2008
12/30/2008
12/31/2008

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

5.7
4.5
2.4
1.3
0.3
1.5
0.5

Antitrust research and drafting for appellate brief.
Research, editing, and drafting on various portions of appellate brief.
Research and drafting of "scorched earth" portion of appellate brief.
Phone meeting with C. Lewis and W. Woodard regarding appellate brief; editing of brief.
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade Woodard regarding appellate brief.
Telephone call with Craig Lewis regarding edits for appellate brief.
Review rules for appellate brief format.
Read SARMC's reply brief.
Read appellant's reply brief; begin work on our reply to cross-appeal.
Draft reply brief for cross appeal; discussions with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding the same.
Draft cross-appeal reply brief.
Research and draft cross appellant's reply brief.

1/6/2009
1/8/2009
1/9/2009
1/12/2009
1/13/2009
1/16/2009
1/20/2009
1/21/2009
1/29/2009
2/9/2009
2/11/2009
2/13/2009
2/17/2009
4/10/2009
8/17/2009
8/18/2009

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
'
DL

1.7
2.6
5.3
5.5
3.6
0.6
1.5
1.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
5.2
1.1
0.4
5.1
7.5

DL

2.9

10/21/2009 DL

0.8

003952

Date

8/19/2009

0.6
1.2
4.5
2
2.7
125.6

Draft reply brief.
Research and drafting of antitrust portion of reply brief.
Work on brief.
Work on antitrust portion of brief.
Draft and edit antitrust portion of reply brief.
Edit reply brief.
Edit reply brief.
Edit antitrust portion of reply brief.
Review reply brief.
Conversation with Thomas A. Banducci regarding response to opposing party's motion to strike portions of brief.
Discuss status of case and response to motion to strike.
-Draft opposition to motion to strike.
Edit and review response to motion to strike.
Draft response letter to Idaho Supreme Court regarding hearing dates.
Review briefs; research discrete queries by Thomas A. Banducci as he prepares for oral argument.
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci, Wade L. Woodard and Kathy A. Savell to assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for oral
argument; legal and factual research on a variety of discrete issues to assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for oral
argument.
Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for oral argument by researching discrete legal and factual issues; attend oral
argument.
Read decision on appeal from Idaho Supreme Court.
Page 12 of 65

HRS

Description

10/22/2009 DL

1.1

10/26/2009 DL
10/27/2009 DL
10/28/2009 DL

1.5
4.1
1.9

DL
DL
DL
DL

0.3
0.2
0.9
0.5

Research discrete questions from Thomas A. Banducci regarding procedure for requesting rehearing, challenging costs,
remand, etc.
Research various projects in preparation for post-appeal actions.
Research regarding joining limited partnerships to the lawsuit in retrial; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci.
Discuss post-appeal strategy with WadeL. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci; research motion for reconsideration regarding
costs.
Discuss cost objections with BrentS. Bastian.
Discuss objection to costs with BrentS. Bastian.
Edit motion for rehearing and discuss the same with BrentS. Bastian.
Draft letter to Moffatt Thomas in response to letter sent to Thomas A. Banducci .

12/11/2009 DL

0.1
56

Review and send letter to Moffatt Thomas on Thomas A. Banducci behalf.

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

0.3
0.1
0.9
0.1
0.1
2.6
4.1

Review and analyze Supreme Court's decision on rehearing; email Wade L. Woodard regarding the same.
Review status of upcoming projects and deadlines.
Research implications on request to consent to release the appeal bond.
Review stipulation to vacate supercedes bond.
Review status of the case with the partners.
Research joiner of limited partnerships.
Research regarding likelihood of success and objections to a motion to add the limited partnerships as real parties in interest.

3/9/2010
3/19/2010

DL
DL

1.1
5.3

3/22/2010
4/19/2010
4/22/2010
4/26/2010
5/7/2010
5/10/2010

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

0
1
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.2

Research on joining/substituting limited partnerships.
Reformat PDF version of Second Amended Counterclaim so that it can be amended; draft red line version of Third Amended
Counterclaim; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci.
Draft and proofread third amended counterclaim.
Legal and factual research on SARMC's motion to "strike as irrelevant" portions of the complaint.

5/13/2010
6/1/2010
6/11/2010

DL
DL
DL

0.1
1.4
2.7

Staff

Date

11/3/2009
11/5/2009
11/10/2009
12/10/2009

1/13/2010
1/25/2010
1/28/2010
2/5/2010
3/1/2010
3/5/2010
3/8/2010

1

003953

Review status of case, upcoming projects, and deadlines.
Discuss status of case and upcoming projects with Thomas A. Banducci.
Discuss status of case and upcoming projects with Wade L. Woodard.
Review email from Wade L. Woodard to experts regarding updating expert reports; re-read Pope case and Supreme Court
decision regarding damages.
Staff meeting to discuss strategy and deadlines.
Legal and factual research on SARMC's motion to strike.
Research regarding SARMC's Motion to Strike Immaterial Matters.
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Staff

HRS

Description

6/15/2010
6/18/2010

DL
DL

3.3
1.4

6/21/2010
6/23/2010
6/24/2010
6/25/2010
6/29/2010
6/30/2010
7/1/2010

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

0.7
0.6
6.5
3.6
2.6
1.2
1.4

Research regarding Rule 12(f) motion to strike.
Research regarding SARMC's Motion to Strike Immaterial matters and memorandum to Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L.
Woodard regarding the same.
Discuss opposition to motion to strike with Thomas A. Banducci and begin drafting the same.
Begin drafting opposition to motion to strike.
Draft opposition to motion to strike.
Draft opposition to motion to strike.
Discuss motion to strike with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci; amend opposition to the same.
Research for and editing of opposition to motion to strike.
Edit opposition to motion to strike immaterial matters; discuss the same with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci.

7/2/2010
7/6/2010

DL
DL

1.8
0.9

7/7/2010

DL

2

7/8/2010
7/9/2010
7/19/2010

DL
DL
DL

1
2.3
0.1

7/20/2010
7/21/2010

DL
DL

7/22/2010
7/23/2010
7/26/2010

DL
DL
DL

2.2
0.3
1.3
0.3
0.8

7/27/2010
7/29/2010
7/30/2010
8/2/2010
8/4/2010

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

0.4
0.2
0.2
0.2
2

DL
DL
DL
DL

0.6
0.7
0.1
4.7

003954

Date

8/5/2010
8/7/2010
8/10/2010
8/13/2010

Edit opposition to motion to strike.
Read St. Al's reply regarding motion to strike; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard; research to
rebut arguments in the same.
Legal research regarding common law contract claim in response to St. Al's reply on its motion to strike; assist Thomas A.
Banducci in preparing for hearing on the same.
Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for hearing on motion to strike immaterial matters.
Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for hearing on motion to strike immaterial matters and attend the same.
Review deadlines and plan upcoming projects, including motion to amend complaint and deadline for upcoming motions
ordered by Court.
Edit complaint; discuss case projects and strategy with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard.
Review "Pope" issues and discuss the same with WadeL. Woodard.
Draft motion to amend scheduling order; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard.
Edit motion to amend order.
Amend counterclaim and draft letter regarding the same; amend motion for page limit; discuss striking any Pope motion for
summary judgment with Wade L. Woodard and BrentS. Bastian
Amend counterclaim and letter regarding the same.
Review letter from Ayers regarding 4th Amendment Counterclaim, and discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci.
Draft letter to opposing counsel clarifying position on 4th Amended Counterclaim.
Review upcoming projects and deadlines; read SARMC's response to motion to remove page limitation.
Prepare for and attend hearing on motion for longer page limit; report to Thomas A. Banducci and staff regarding the same
and the procedure for filing appendix on upcoming motions.
Begin drafting motion to amend.
Email motions and briefing filed by SARMC.
Discuss response to motion for summary judgment on "definite term" with BrentS. Bastian.
Draft brief in opposition to Motion for Judgment on claims of the Limited Partnerships.
Page 14 of 65

i

Date

Staff

HRS

Description

8/14/2010
8/17/2010
8/18/2010
8/19/2010
8/20/2010
8/23/2010
8/24/2010

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

2.7
0.9
5.3
4.1
4.2
0.7
3.3

8/25/2010

DL

0.4

Draft Memorandum in opposition to Motion for Judgment on claims of Limited Partnerships.
Continue drafting brief in opposing to motion for judgment on the claims of the limited partnerships.
Draft memorandum in opposition to motion for judgment on claims of the limited partnerships.
Continue drafting brief in opposition to motion to dismiss the claims of the limited partnerships.
Continue drafting opposition to motion for judgment on claims of the limited partnerships.
Edit brief in opposition to judgment on the claims of the limited partnerships.
Discuss opposition to motion regarding limited partnerships with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard; edit brief
regarding the same.
Edit brief in opposition to motion on claims of limited partnerships.

8/26/2010
8/27/2010

DL
DL

1.7
1

Continue working on brief in opposition to motion for judgment on the claims of the limited partnerships.
Edit brief in opposition to motion for judgment on claims of the limited partnerships.

8/30/2010

DL

3.5

9/22/2010
9/29/2010
10/1/2010
10/18/2010

DL
DL
DL
DLP

0.2
2.7
0.2
0.2

Edit and finalize memorandum in opposition to motion for judgment on the claims of the limited partnerships; proofread
memorandum regarding conspiracy claim.
Review status of case and recent emails regarding the same.
Research regarding SARMC's reply arguments on relation back of the claims of the Limited Partnerships.
Discuss hearing with Wade L. Woodard.
Review emails sent while away and case status.

11/17/2010 DLP
12/15/2010 DLP
12/15/2010 DLP

0.3
0.1
0.1

Review court's order.
Review status of case.
Review status of case and emails.

95.7

003955

1/4/2011
1/5/2011
1/6/2011
1/7/2011
1/14/2011
1/17/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

0.4
0.9
2.7
5.4
0.1
0.6

Letter to Court about response to SARMC's motion to reopen discovery.
Begin drafting opposition to motion to reopen discovery.
Research for opposition to motion to reopen discovery.
Legal and factual research for, and drafting of, opposition to motion to reopen expert discovery.
Review motions filed by St. Alphonsus in the last week.
Draft response to motion to reopen discovery.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

1/18/2011
1/19/2011
1/20/2011
1/21/2011
1/27/2011
1/28/2011
1/31/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

7.3
5.8
5.5
3.1
4.9
6.4
7.8

2/1/2011

DLP

6

Draft opposition to motions to reopen; meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding the same.
Research for and drafting of opposition to motion to reopen damages and set trial schedule.
Draft opposition to motion to reopen discovery.
Draft opposition to motion to reopen discovery.
Draft opposition to motion to reopen discovery.
Legal research for and drafting of opposition to motion to reopen discovery and set briefing schedule.
Draft and edit opposition to motion to reopen discovery and opposition to motion to set scheduling order; discuss the same
with Wade L. Woodard.
Draft and edit opposition to motion to reopen discovery and set scheduling order; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci.

2/2/2011
2/8/2011

DLP
DLP

2
4.7

DLP

3

2/11/2011
2/14/2011
2/22/2011
2/24/2011
3/7/2011
3/8/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

0.1
0.2
0.1
2.5
0.2
1.2

3/10/2011

DLP

1

3/11/2011
3/14/2011

DLP
DLP

1.7
3.2

3/15/2011
3/16/2011

DLP
DLP

5.2
8.2

3/17/2011
3/18/2011

DLP
DLP

5.4
5

3/21/2011
3/23/2011
3/24/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

5.6
0.5
5.7

003956

2/9/2011

Draft, finalize, and file opposition to motion to reopen discovery and set scheduling order.
Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for hearing tomorrow on reopening expert discovery and motions practice; meeting
with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding the same.
Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for hearing, attend hearing, draft follow up letter to the Court; draft report for clients.
Check status of deadlines and projects.
Discuss case and upcoming projects with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci.
Discuss drafting motion to clarify with Wade L. Woodard.
Draft motion to clarify; review transcript of hearing.
Review email correspondence and filings related to case filed during previous week.
Review order from Court on deadlines; review motions for summary judgment filed by SARMC; review discovery filed by
SARMC; instruct staff regarding the same; discuss case with Wade L. Woodard.
Review SARMC motion for summary judgment; email correspondence with Karen Marler concerning production of
documents.
Begin working on response to SARMC's motion for summary judgment.
Discuss discovery and motion to compel with Wade L. Woodard; phone call and email correspondence with Karen Marler
regarding discovery production; work on response to motion for summary judgment.
Draft and research opposition to motion for summary judgment.
Draft opposition to motion for summary judgment regarding breach of contract theory of wrongful dissociation; begin
drafting motion to compel discovery regarding IMI Eagle.
Edit and proofread opposition to motion for summary judgment; draft motion to compel.
Draft and edit motion to compel and opposition to motion for summary judgment; discuss the same with Wade L. Woodard.
Edit opposition to motion for summary judgment; draft motion for clarification.
Review discovery; discussions with Thomas A. Banducci about future discovery.
Draft discovery; begin drafting motion regarding departing partner's share.
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I

Staff

HRS

Description

I

3/25/2011

DLP

3.8

1

3/28/2011

DLP

7.4

3/29/2011
3/30/2011
3/31/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

3.2
0.3
4.9

Review motion to compel; draft letter to opposing counsel regarding the same; review discovery requests; research for brief
regarding departing partner's share.
Finalize opposition to motion for summary judgment; draft motion for clarification regarding departing partner's share; begin
drafting motion in limine regarding reference to "lawful" withdrawal.
Draft motion in limine regarding "lawful dissociation".
Email correspondence with experts; phone message from MRIA regarding discovery answers.
Draft various motions in limine; telephone conference and email with expert Drew Voth; telephone conference with MRIA
representative regarding production of documents responsive to SARMC's discovery requests.

4/1/2011
4/4/2011

DLP
DLP

1.2
4.8

4/5/2011
4/6/2011
4/7/2011

DLP
DLP
IDLP

1
2.9
1.1

4/11/2011

DLP

3.1

4/12/2011

DLP

5.8

4/13/2011
4/14/2011
4/18/2011
4/19/2011
4/20/2011
4/21/2011
4/22/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

4.9
0.5
5.2
5.4
5
7.1
6.6

4/25/2011

DLP

4.3

4/26/2011
4/27/2011

DLP
DLP

2.3
6.2

4/28/2011
4/29/2011

DLP
DLP

1.7
3.5

003957

Date

Draft 4th requests for production; letter to opposing counsel following up on discovery.
Email correspondence with Karen Marler regarding discovery documents; draft and edit motions to file; discuss the same
with Wade L. Woodard.
Edit motions in limine; edit motions for clarification.
Edit discovery answers; edit briefs and supporting material for motions in limine and motions for clarification.
Review our discovery answers and production; review letter from opposing counsel regarding discovery; email to Drew Voth
regarding the same.
Finalize motion filings; review documents recently produced; email correspondence with Drew Voth regarding the same;
draft letter to Gjording regarding the same.
Draft response to SARMC's motions in limine's and motion for summary judgments; discuss the same with Wade L. Woodard
and BrentS. Bastian.
Draft responses to motions filed by SARMC.
Email correspondence with experts.
Draft opposition to various motions filed by SARMC.
Draft and edit opposition to various motions filed by SARMC.
Draft and edit opposition to various motions filed by SARMC.
Draft and edit responses to motions filed by SARMC.
Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for, and attend, hearing on motion for summary judgment regarding contractual
wrongful withdrawal; draft and edit brief on various motions filed by SARMC.
Finalize briefs in opposition to SARMC motions and discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard; begin
drafting reply in support of MRIA's motions.
Begin drafting replies to MRIA's motions in limine.
Draft replies to MRIA's motion; review discovery forwarded by SAMRC; draft letter to SARMC attorney regarding missing
documents.
Edit replies to MRIA's motions in limine; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci and WadeL. Woodard.
Edit replies to MRIA's motions; review and edit Budge report; meeting with Mr. Budge.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

5/2/2011
5/3/2011
5/5/2011
5/6/2011
5/9/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

0.9
4.2
0.1
6.6
1.5

5/10/2011
5/11/2011
5/12/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

1.6
0.6
5.5

Finalize replies in support of MRIA's motions; review supplemental report of Charles Wilhoite.
Draft motion to strike Gjording affidavit; review SARMC discovery non-answers for possible meet and confer letter.
Review SARMC's motion to disqualify judge.
Draft opposition to motion to disqualify court.
Edit opposition to motion to strike; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci; telephone conference with Jim Prochaska and
Thomas A. Banducci; review court's order on summary judgment on contract theory of wrongful dissociation and discuss the
same with Thomas A. Banducci.
Edit opposition to motion to recuse Judge Wetherell.
Finalize and file opposition to motion to recuse.
Draft reply in support of motion to strike; meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard on discovery and motions
to bring.

5/13/2011
5/17/2011
5/18/2011
5/19/2011
5/25/2011
5/26/2011
6/1/2011
6/2/2011
6/20/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

0.9
2
1.6
0.3
1.6
0.4
1.1
0.2
2.6

6/21/2011

DLP

2.1

6/23/2011
6/24/2011
6/27/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

3
0.6
1.7

6/28/2011
7/1/2011
7/5/2011
7/6/2011
7/7/2011
7/8/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

0.2
1.5
0.4
4.7
5.8
2.8

Edit and finalize reply in support of motion to strike Gjording affidavit.
Draft letter to Gjording regarding his previous letters; draft motion for preservation deposition of Sandra Bruce.
Letter to Gjording regarding witnesses; draft motion regarding Sandra Bruce as a witness.
Edit motion regarding Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp.
Draft discovery responses; email correspondence with Charles Wilhoight and Karen Marler regarding the same.
Edit discovery answers.
Review documents forwarded by Karen Marler; edit discovery responses.
Edit discovery responses.
Strategy meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and WadeL. Woodard; draft reply in support of motion regarding Schamp and
Bruce.
Finish reply regarding witnesses Bruce and Schamp; begin reading SARMC expert report; read Gjording closing to search for
admissions made on the record.
Work on jury instructions; read Gjording's closing to look for things to use against SARMC.
Research regarding using opposing counsel's statements at previous trial against SARMC in new trial.
Draft jury instructions.

I

I

i

.

003958

Discuss briefing with BrentS. Bastian.
Draft proposed jury instructions.
Telephone conference with Bruce Budge and Drew Voth regarding rebuttal report.
Draft jury instructions; trial team meeting.
Draft jury instructions.
Draft jury instructions.
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Staff

HRS

Description

7/12/2011
7/13/2011
7/14/2011
7/18/2011
7/19/2011
7/20/2011
7/21/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

2.7
3.8
0.3
3.8
1
2.6
5

7/22/2011
7/25/2011

DLP
DLP

2
2.6

7/26/2011 DLP
7/27/2011 DLP
7/28/2011 DLP
7/29/2011 DLP
DLP
8/1/2011
DLP
8/2/2011
DLP
8/3/2011
DLP
8/4/2011
DLP
8/5/2011
8/8/2011
IDLP

9.2
8
8
7.7
6.8
6.7
6.3
6.4
3.5

Trial team meeting; draft jury instructions; edit mock jury form.
Draft jury instructions and discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard.
Finalize proposed jury instructions.
Review SARMC jury instructions and begin drafting objections to the same.
Trial team preparation meeting; discuss case with BrentS. Bastian.
Research questions posed by Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard with respect to causes of action and hearsay.
Research questions and issues raised by Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci; draft supplemental discovery answer;
edit mock jury instructions.
Create "cast of characters" list; review mock jury instructions.
Edit mock jury instructions; draft supplemental instructions; review whether Rule 56( b) certification filed with respect to
motion for summary judgment.
Trial preparation meeting; edit mock jury instructions; draft motion to exclude expert testimony of McCarthy.
Edit mock jury instructions; draft and research motion to exclude McCarthy.
Draft motion to exclude McCarthy; edit mock jury instructions.
Draft and edit brief to exclude McCarthy; read McCarthy deposition.
Draft motions in limine; draft objections to jury instructions.
Draft opposition to SARMC jury instructions.
Object to SARMC jury instructions.
Finalize opposition to jury instructions; draft replies to our motions in limines.
Draft pocket memorandum on fiduciary duty.

6

Pocket brief on fiduciary duty; research whether dissociation breaches fiduciary duty; begin drafting motion for directed
verdict on affirmative defenses.

8/9/2011
8/10/2011
8/11/2011
8/13/2011
8/15/2011
8/16/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

2
0.8
0.2
6.1
5.6
6.3

Draft motion for exhibit list order; draft memorandum on SARMC affirmative defenses; review mock jury instructions.
Work on pocket briefs; review jury questionnaires.
Review emails sent by Thomas A. Banducci and upcoming projects.
Attend mock trial.

8/17/2011
8/18/2011
8/19/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

3.2
6.1
7.9

8/22/2011
8/23/2011
8/26/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

8.3
7.6
2.6

003959

Date

Research telling jury about effect of apportionment; research excluding statements made by dead MRIA agent.
Attend trial preparation meeting; pocket briefs on fiduciary duties and effect of apportionment; research regarding
conspiracy claim.
Research regarding consequences of conspiracy claim; pocket brief on affirmative defenses.
Draft motion to strike; research and drafting of reply to SARMC opposition to several of our witnesses.
Research memorandum on objections to witnesses; work with Holly Wallace regarding IT timeline; begin review of
documents critical for IT timeline testimony.
Review IT documents; meet with Holly Wallace.
Review documents for IT timeline.
Review Prochaska deposition.
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i

Date

Staff

HRS

Description

8/29/2011
8/30/2011
8/31/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

7.4
5.9
7.6

9/1/2011

DLP

6.6

9/2/2011
9/6/2011
9/7/2011
9/8/2011
9/9/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

4.1
8.5
7.4
8
6.3

DLP

7.6

9/13/2011
9/14/2011
9/15/2011
9/16/2011
9/17/2011
9/19/2011
9/21/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

7.5
7.9
5.7
2.3
1.7
5.3
1.8

Research aritikickback; draft motion in limine regarding Harder/Giles misconduct.
Trial preparation meeting; finalize Harder/Giles brief; draft second Harder brief; review jury list.
Finalize supplemental Harder memorandum; review juror questionnaire answers; discuss research projects with Thomas A.
Banducci.
Draft opposition to motion to exclude demonstrative exhibits; draft reply in support of motion to prevent argument that
Giles/Harder engaged in improper conduct; research business records hearsay exception.
Assist in trial preparation; research business records exception; begin working on opposition to SARMC damages motion.
Draft opposition to motion to exclude damages; discuss case and upcoming projects with trial team.
Research use of opening statement; draft opposition to motion to exclude damages testimony.
Draft opposition to motion to exclude MRIA damage theories.
Attend opening statement; read deposition transcripts of Wilhoite and Budge; edit opposition to SARMC motion on damage;
discuss trial strategy with trial team.
Draft memorandum of law regarding use of attorney opening/closing statements; read Wilhoite deposition; edit opposition
to SARMC motion to exclude damages theories.
Draft motion about damages based on market value loss; edit motion on damages; discuss the same with trial team.
Draft "Bushi" related motion; draft damages opposition regarding "diminution in value".
Research for motion regarding damages theories; research regarding Bushi decision.
Draft opposition regarding damages theories.
Draft response to SARMC's supplemental brief regarding damages theories.
Edit motion regarding damages and supporting documents.
Assist Wade L. Woodard in preparing for hearing on damages; research for motion in limine regarding Cindy Schamp hearsay.

9/22/2011
9/23/2011
9/26/2011
9/27/2011
9/28/2011
9/29/2011
9/30/2011
10/2/2011
10/3/2011
10/4/2011
10/5/2011
10/6/2011
10/7/2011
10/10/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

5.9
5.8
4.8
1.5
1.7
2.3
5
2.4
7.2
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.1
4.1

9/12/2011

1

003960

Draft motion regarding Schamp hearsay; draft motion regarding inadvertent reference to "prior trial".
Attend trial; draft objection to motions for mistrial (based on reference to "Prior Trial").
Draft motion regarding mistrial; draft motion regarding Ex. 4332.
Finalize motions; discuss case with trial team.
Edit motion; discuss motions in limine with BrentS. Bastian.
Draft motion regarding impeachment, conversation in restaurant, and lawsuit threatened by doctor.
Draft response to motion to quash subpoena.
Draft reply in support of notice of intent to impeach.
Draft motion in limine regarding Giles "bad acts"; draft motion in limine regarding Exhibits 802 and 803.
Review status of motions.
Edit Giles motion in limine.
Edit Giles motion in limine.
Discuss projects with trial team.
--·~
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Staff

HRS

Description

10/11/2011
10/12/2011
10/13/2011
10/14/2011
10/17/2011
10/18/2011
10/19/2011
10/20/2011
10/21/2011
10/24/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

0.6
0.1
2.8
0.2
1.8
3.8
8.7

10/25/2011 DLP
10/26/2011 DLP
10/27/2011 DLP

2.2
8.9
6.9

10/31/2011
11/1/2011
11/2/2011
11/7/2011
11/8/2011
11/9/2011
11/10/2011
11/11/2011
11/14/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

1.3
3.1
1.9
4.5
5
0.4
2
3.7
5.5

Look to see whether disgorgement jury instruction drafted; review motion filed by SARMC late last night.
Discuss case and projects with trial team.
Identify "laptop" and "Leslie Kelly Hall" exhibits.
Look at mitigation of damages.
Review discovery answers concerning tortious interference; discuss upcoming projects with BrentS. Bastian.
Begin drafting opposition to motion for directed verdict on damages.
Work on directed verdict concerning damages.
Research, draft, and edit opposition to motion for directed verdict on damages.
Edit directed verdict; review jury instructions
Review research on attorney statements as party admissions; edit court's jury instructions; assist Thomas A. Banducci in
finding AICPA standards for cross examination.
Find statute of limitation brief from prior proceeding and email to court; review SARMCs Red line Jury Instructions.
Attend jury instruction conference; write memorandum of law regarding lost profits for breach of fiduciary duty.
Draft memorandum regarding apportionment of damages between claims; review transcripts for impeachment; assist in
preparation of closing argument.
Discuss case with Thomas A. Banducci and BrentS. Bastian; attend reading of verdict.
Draft proposed judgment.
Edit proposed judgment.
Draft and edit proposed findings regarding disgorgement.
Draft and edit documents relating to disgorgement theory of damages findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Research regarding contingency fees.
Begin drafting response to SARMC's objection to proposed judgment.

11/15/2011
11/16/2011
11/17/2011
11/18/2011
11/29/2011
12/8/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

1.5
4.6
4.5
1.9
0.3
3.4

12/9/2011 DLP
12/14/2011 DLP

0.5
0.2

003961

Date

7.9
4.8
3.5

!

Draft response to SARMC objection to proposed judgment.
Edit response to SARMC's opposition to judgment; conversations with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding
the same.
Edit response to objections to proposed judgment; review SARMC's response to additional proposed findings.
Draft reply in support of proposed judgment.
Draft reply in support of proposed judgment.
Edit reply in support of judgment.
Organize notes for eventual appeal.
Assist BrentS. Bastian in preparing for hearing on judgment, with specific emphasis on countering argument that Saint
Alphonsus is entitled to departing partner share or interest thereon.
Assist BrentS. Bastian in preparing for hearing, with particular attention on SARMC argument against Wilhoite formula.
Discuss appeal issues with BrentS. Bastian and Wade L. Woodard

1648
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HRS

Date

Staff

2/21/2008

DMH 3.4

2/22/2008

DMH 0.9

2/26/2008

DMH 3.8

2/27/2008

DMH 3.8

2/28/2008

DMH 3.4

2/29/2008
3/3/2008
3/4/2008
3/6/2008
3/6/2008
3/10/2008

DMH
DMH
DMH
DMH
DMH
DMH

1.6
2.1
3.1
2.7
1
2.1

DMH
DMH
DMH
DMH
DMH

0.1
0.1
1.2
1.5
2

I

4/1/2008
4/29/2008
6/12/2008
6/13/2008
7/24/2008

Description

Conference with W. Woodard and Lauren concerning issues on appeal; review of exhibits and trial testimony in preparation
of drafting analysis regarding exhibit 4145.
Conferences with W. Woodard, T. Banducci and Lauren regarding appeal and exhibit 4145; research regarding hearsay and
hearsay requirements; reviewing transcripts.
Research and analysis in preparation for appellate brief on the issue of exhibit 4154 and the business record exception to the ,
I
hearsay rule.
Research and analysis in preparation of appellate brief on the issue of exhibit 4154 and its admissibility as a business record
and as an admission of a party opponent.
Research and analysis in preparation of appellate brief on issue of exhibit 4154 and its admissibility as an admission of a party
opponent.
Preparation of analysis, in anticipation of appellate brief, regarding exhibit 4154 and admissions of a party opponent.
'
!
Research and analysis for appellate brief concerning exhibit 4154 and whether or not SARMC waived its objection.
Research and analysis for appellate brief concerning exhibit 4154 on issues of waiver and harmless error.
Research and analysis for appellate brief regarding exhibit 4154 and the harmless error rule
Preparation of CLE case summaries for W. Woodard.
Preparation of analysis concerning cross appeal; research of appellate rules and collecting and reviewing previous motions
concerning Anti-trust claims.
Conference with BWS attorneys on status of case.
Conference with Tom and Wade about appeal regarding antitrust issues.
Research regarding conflicting expert opinions creating a material issue of fact, thus precluding summary judgment.
Research regarding conflicting expert opinion precluding summary judgment.
Research for Tom concerning possible employment claim for retaliation and/or interference with a perspective business
relationship.

32.8
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

3
4.1
2.4
0.5
1.6

8/6/2008
8/7/2008

KAS
KAS

2.7
4.5

8/11/2008

KAS
KAS

6.6
5.4

7/3/2008
7/7/2008
7/10/2008
7/21/2008
7/22/2008

003962

~_1_2/2008

Meet with W. Woodard regarding case status; review briefing and begin revising citations to the record for appeal.
Review of briefing and replacing citations to appeal record for use in briefing.
Review transcript and continue citing same to briefing for appeal.
Continue inserting citations to official record in briefing.
Continue review and revisions of citations to the trial transcript; telephone conference with Kristen at Judge McLaughlin's
chambers regarding record.
Continue checking cites to the trial transcript for use in appeal briefing.
Prepare records to be sent to expert witness; telephone call to C. Lewis; continue inserting citations to official trial transcript
in brief for use in appeal.
Continue insertion of trial transcript citations into brief for use in appeal.
Continue revising briefing to reflect citations to the trial transcript for use in appeal brief.
Page 22 of 65

Staff

HRS

Description

8/13/2008
8/14/2008
8/15/2008
8/18/2008
9/9/2008
9/11/2008
9/12/2008

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

1.7
2.1
2.7
2
0.2
0.3
1.5

Continue revisions to brief to include citations to trial transcript for use in appeal brief.
Continue citations to the record for use in appeal brief.
Continue review of trial transcript and citations to the record for use in appeal brief.
Finalize citations to trial transcript for use in appeal brief.
Telephone conference with Supreme Court clerk regarding briefing schedule.
Review appellate rules regarding briefing schedule.
Review rules regarding objection to oversize brief; research regarding response deadlines; review additions to the record.

9/15/2008

KAS

4.8

9/16/2008
9/17/2008
9/18/2008
9/22/2008
9/23/2008
9/24/2008
9/25/2008
9/26/2008
9/29/2008

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

1.2
0.2
1.6
3.5
3.7
4.1
6.8
5.9
5.9

9/30/2008
10/1/2008
10/2/2008
10/3/2008
10/6/2008
10/8/2008
10/9/2008
10/10/2008
10/13/2008
10/14/2008

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

1.2
1.5
1.2
0.5
1.9
1.9
1.2
0.9
2.1
3.6

10/15/2008
10/16/2008
10/17/2008
10/22/2008

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

0.9
3.2
1.8
0.7

Letter to Dr. Prochaska; letter to C. Lewis; work on motion for extension of time; review appendix to briefing; update clerk's
record; work on affidavit for extension of time; email brief to C. Lewis.
Review pleadings regarding clerk's record.
Telephone conference with Supreme Court clerk regarding pending appeal and stay of briefing schedule.
Continue to revise citations to brief to include exhibits.
Review clerk's record; research regarding database of transcript and exhibits; review trial testimony for summarizing.
Review and revise records; prepare documents for use in reply brief.
Work on Clerk's record; review trial transcript; prepare documents for use in respondent's brief.
Research and review record and transcript for citations to use in respondent's briefing.
Continue work on appeal including review of testimony and record for use in respondent's brief.
Letter to C. Lewis enclosing relevant documents; continue review of record and transcript for use in respondent's brief;
telephone conference with Felicia at Gjording's office regarding extension of time; revise motion for extension and begin
working on revised affidavit.
Continue record and transcript review for use in respondent's brief.
Revise motion for extension of time and affidavit; prepare motion and affidavit for oversized brief.
Review transcript and record for use in respondent brief.
Revise affidavits for extension of time and oversized briefing; file same with Supreme Court and serve upon counsel.
Review record regarding Hammond motions in limine; review transcript regarding Dr. Prochaska testimony.
Review transcript and exhibits for use in reply briefing.
Review transcript regarding bad acts.
Work on citations to the record for brief.
Prepare citations to the record for respondent's brief; research regarding citations to record.
Review record for use in respondent's brief, in particular, motions regarding standing, deposition testimony and transcript
citations.
Research regarding citations to record and transcript for use in briefing.
Research record and transcript regarding citations for respondent's brief.
Continue review and research on transcript and record.
Review transcript for citations to record in respondent's brief.
Page 23 of 65

003963

Date

Date

Staff

HRS

Description

10/23/2008
10/24/2008
10/27/2008
10/28/2008
10/29/2008

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

1.9
1.5
1.6
0.9
1.6

10/30/2008 KAS

2.3

Review record and transcript regarding exhibit 4333 stipulations.
Review record and transcript for documents and citations to be used in respondent's briefing.
Review transcript and record for citations for respondent's brief.
Review transcript and record for citations in Respondent's brief;
Telephone conference with S. Kenyon regarding extension {x2); Telephone conference with Jack Gjording assistant regarding
extension; revise motion for extension; revise affidavit in support of motion for extension;
Continue review of record and transcript for use in Respondent's brief; finalize motion for extension and affidavit in support;

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

0.8
2.8
1.1
1.2
1.6
1.2
1.9
2.4
3.1
7.5
7.3
6.8
7.2

12/22/2008 KAS

0.7

12/23/2008 KAS

0.3
Telephone conference with Dr. Prochaska; email brief; review file regarding recipients for brief.
157.3

10/31/2008
11/3/2008
11/7/2008
11/10/2008
11/11/2008
11/12/2008
11/13/2008
11/17/2008
11/19/2008
11/20/2008
11/21/2008
11/22/2008
11/24/2008

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

0.5
1.2
0.9
3.8
1.2
4.5
7.6

8/19/2009

KAS

4.1

003964

1/21/2009
1/23/2009
1/27/2009
1/28/2009
1/29/2009
8/17/2009
8/18/2009

Continue review of record and transcript regarding citations to the record for use in brief.
Review record and transcript for use in respondent's brief.
Prepare admitted exhibits for review.
Review record and transcript regarding citations to the record for respondent's brief.
Review record and transcript for use in respondent's brief.
Review records and transcript for respondent's brief.
Review transcript and record for use in statement of facts.
Review transcript regarding citations to the record for use in respondent's brief.
Review Respondent's brief and insert citations to the record and transcript.
Revise respondent's brief to reflect citations to the record and transcript.
Revise respondent's brief; continue insertion of citations to the record.
Revise brief; work on citations to the record.
Finalize respondent's brief; prepare motion and affidavit for additional pages; telephone conference supreme court {x2);
telephone conference with Felicia at J. Gjording's office.
Telephone conference with J. Gjording's office; telephone conference with P. Miller's office; prepare brief for distribution.

Review record regarding citations to the record for reply brief.
Review reply brief regarding appendix and citations to the record.
Finalize exhibits to brief; revise citations to appendix in reply brief.
i
Work on reply brief; revise citations to the record; review transcript; finalize appendix.
Final brief for filing and service.
Pull relevant case law for preparation of Supreme Court arguments; review exhibits for use at argument.
Assist in preparation for oral argument including pulling relevant case law; preparing exhibits for use at hearing and additional
information to be used at argument.
Prepare for and attend oral argument at Supreme Court.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

23.8
KAS
2/3/2010
5/18/2010 'KAS
KAS
7/2/2010
KAS
7/8/2010
KAS
7/9/2010
7/22/2010 KAS
7/27/2010 KAS
7/29/2010 KAS
KAS
8/2/2010
KAS
8/9/2010
8/16/2010 KAS
8/17/2010 KAS
8/18/2010 KAS
8/20/2010 KAS
8/23/2010 KAS
8/24/2010 KAS
8/25/2010 KAS
8/27/2010 KAS
8/30/2010 KAS
9/14/2010 KAS
9/15/2010 KAS
9/28/2010 KAS
9/29/2010 KAS
9/30/2010 KAS
10/1/2010 KAS

003965

1/4/2011
1/5/2011
1/11/2011
1/31/2011
2/23/2011
3/21/2011
3/23/2011

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

0.5
0.3
0.5
0.6
2.3
1.2
1.2
1.1
1.3
3.7
1.3
0.9
1.1
3.7
6.2
1.8
2.9
1
4.1
0.3
0.5
0.8
1.1
2.4
4.3
45.1

Review exhibits for minutes regarding 2023 extension; email same to M. Kushner.
Telephone conference with court regarding potential status conference.
Finalize opposition to motion to strike and serve the same.
Work on PowerPoint presentation for hearing.
Attend hearing and assist with computer technology at same.
Review record to determine status of expert reports and testimony.
Review record regarding damages for use in briefing.
Review record for relevant briefing and affidavits.
Prepare documents for review by B. Bakkes; review record regarding "definite term" for use in response briefing.
Review trial transcript for citations to brief.
Review record for citations for briefing; review transcript regarding the same.
Review records and provide additional citations for briefing.
Work on citations to the record for briefing.
Review brief regarding insufficiency; revise cites to the record; begin assembly of appendix.
Work on citations and appendix for briefs to be filed.
Continue working of citations for all briefing.
Work on citations for briefing and record review regarding the same.
Work on citations to briefing.
Finalize briefing and appendix to briefs.
Review regarding MRI Agreement; email to K. Marler regarding same.
Review exhibits regarding Code Blue issues and email documents to client.
Review exhibits for use at hearing on pending motions.
Research and obtain case law for use at hearing.
Work on presentation for hearing on pending motions.
Prepare for and attend hearing on pending motions.

1.5
0.3
0.7
1.8
0.3
0.5
0.5

Review testimony and discovery regarding M. Steiner.
Review and forward relevant discovery motions to Thomas A. Banducci.
Review records regarding Steiner Expert Report.
Pull previous trial records and reorganize same.
Telephone conference with Bond Agent regarding same.
Research regarding previous agreements as to witness disclosures.
Review records for ~evaQ!_findings of ~ct ancjconclusions of law.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

3/28/2011

KAS

0.6

3/29/2011
4/8/2011
4/13/2011
4/19/2011
5/6/2011
5/12/2011
5/19/2011
6/3/2011
6/7/2011
6/15/2011
6/17/2011
6/20/2011

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

0.6
0.4
0.2
1.2
0.8
0.3
0.8
0.9
0.9
0.5
3.2
6.2

Telephone conference with J. Gjording assistant regarding production; letter to Budge; letter to Voth; prepare copies of
SARMC production for experts.
Convert documents provided by SARMC and forward same to experts.
Prepare document production; forward additional documents to experts.
Review file regarding previous settlement with Radiologists.
Review record and obtain copies of relevant filings for summary judgment motions.
Research regarding Henson and conflicts.
Record review to obtain copy of juror questionnaire.
Pull relevant witness disclosures for MRIA and SARMC.
Prepare documents for production.
Update database with additional records.
Prepare documents for client review.
Review file; begin organization for trial.
Meet with counsel regarding strategy; draft assignment list; organization of war room and logistics; research witness
locations.

KAS
KAS
KAS

6/21/2011
6/22/2011
7/5/2011
7/6/2011
7/7/2011

1

0.5
0.4
2.1

KAS

2.1

KAS

5.8

KAS

7.2

,KAS
7/9/2011
7/11/2011 KAS

2.5
7.1

7/8/2011

7/12/2011
7/13/2011

003966

7/14/2011
7/18/2011
7/19/2011

KAS
KAS

6.2
7.3

KAS
KAS
KAS

3
6.1
6.6

Telephone conference with Robert Bell regarding trial.
Draft retention letter to R. Bell.
Review filings from previous trial and locate witness preparation notebooks; relevant settlement agreement; revise trial
status sheet.
Letter to McFeeley regarding Agreement and Subpoenas; letter to Gjording regarding subpoenas; email trial testimony to B.
Bell; attend trial strategy meeting; work on trial preparation.
Prepare packages for witness preparation; draft letter to Gjording regarding exhibits and jury instructions; work on exhibits
and trial preparation; begin drafting subpoenas.
Work on trial preparation and witness location; review exhibits and lists to update same; telephone conference with court
clerk regarding exhibits.
Work on trial preparation and exhibit organization for use at trial.
Work on trial preparation, exhibit review; review testimony at first trial; review deposition testimony; locate specific issue
exhibits;
Work on trial preparation; attend strategy meeting; work on trial subpoenas;
Revise and final motion to release exhibits; assist with transcript projects for trial; work on service of subpoenas; letter to
McFeeley regarding subpoenas; draft letters to Hopkins and Wallace regarding deposition and trial testimony; review
possible additional exhibits.
Work on trial preparation; exhibit review; review videos; prepare witness packages.
Work on trial preparation; review testimony; work on exhibits; work on witness location.
Prepare for McCarthy deposition; assemble relevant exhibits; telephone conference with Judge's clerk regarding original
exhibits; draft letter to J. Gjording regarding same; telephone conference toP. Harneck;
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Staff

HRS

Description

7/20/2011

KAS

7.1

7/21/2011
7/22/2011
7/25/2011
7/26/2011
7/27/2011
7/28/2011
7/29/2011
7/30/2011
8/1/2011
8/2/2011
8/3/2011
8/4/2011
8/5/2011
8/8/2011
8/9/2011
8/10/2011
8/11/2011
8/12/2011
8/13/2011
8/15/2011
8/16/2011
8/17/2011

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

7.4
0.8
6.8
7.3
7.1
8.1
8.1
7.2
8.2
6.1
7.4
7.8
8.4
1.2
0.9
6.9
7.2
7.3
7.3
8.2
8.1
0

8/18/2011

KAS

9.2

8/19/2011

KAS

6.9

8/20/2011
8/22/2011

KAS
KAS

5.3
9.1

8/24/2011
8/25/2011
8/26/2011

KAS
KAS
KAS

6.8
10.5
9.3

Work on exhibits; sanction files; finalize subpoenas and draft letters to potential witnesses; arrange for service; revise witness
list; telephone conference with clerk regarding releasing exhibits from first trial; work witness binders; prepare records for Dr.
Giles' review; work on scheduling issues; letters to Anton and Wallace regarding meetings.
Continue trial preparation; exhibit updates and revisions to lists.
Work on exhibits and trial preparation.
Email experts; revise subpoenas; work on trial preparation; review and revise exhibits.
Work on trial preparation; revision to exhibits; revise witness list; work on witness locations; draft letter to J. Gjording.
Test equipment; prepare for trial; work on exhibits and witness list updates.
Review and redact exhibits; work on opening statements.
Prepare exhibits and revise time lines; preparation for focus group.
Prepare for and assist with focus group.
Work on exhibits; trial preparation and witness lists.
Work on exhibits and trial preparation.
Work on exhibits and trial preparation.
Finalize exhibits and witness lists; work on trial preparation.
Work on exhibits/witness lists; attend pretrial.
Work on trial preparation and exhibit revision.
Work on power points and document retrieval for experts.
Work on trial preparation and mock jury issues.
Work on trial preparation; telephone conference with Dr. Henson; work on opening.
Work on trial preparation; exhibits; and mock jury.
Attend and assist with mock jury presentation.
Work on exhibits; witness preparation; meet with Dr. Henson.
Work revisions to exhibit list; assist with witness preparation; work on demonstratives; attend trial strategy meeting.
Letter to J. Gjording; revise exhibit list; work on trial preparation; work on demonstratives; telephone conference to
Marshall's office regarding arrangements.
Draft letter to K. Duke regarding Jones Day; meet with counsel regarding strategy; prepare additional exhibits; work on
witness preparation and assist with trial preparation.
Work on juror questionnaire; letter to counsel regarding the same; work on exhibits and trial preparation; telephone
conference with experts.
Work on electronic trial presentation.
Work on exhibits; work on trial preparation; assist clients with document review; meet with counsel regarding trial strategy;
letter to Judge Wetherell regarding questionnaire.
Revise McFeeley and Gjording letter; work on additional exhibits and document review.
Work on trial preparation. Work on demonstratives.
Work on demonstratives; work on exhibits; prepare for trial.
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Date

Date

Staff

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
9/1/2011
KAS
9/2/2011
KAS
9/3/2011
KAS
9/4/2011
KAS
9/5/2011
KAS
9/6/2011
KAS
9/7/2011
KAS
9/8/2011
KAS
9/9/2011
-9/11/2011 KAS
9/12/2011 KAS
9/13/2011 KAS
9/14/2011 KAS
9/15/2011 KAS
9/16/2011 KAS
9/18/2011 KAS
9/19/2011 KAS
9/20/2011 KAS
9/21/2011 KAS
9/22/2011 KAS
9/23/2011 KAS
9/25/2011 KAS
9/26/2011 KAS
9/27/2011 KAS
9/28/2011 KAS
9/29/2011 KAS
9/30/2011 KAS
10/2/2011 KAS
10/3/2011 KAS
10/4/2011 KAS
10/5/2011 KAS
10/11/2011 KAS
8/27/2011
8/29/2011
8/30/2011
8/31/2011

003968

HRS

Description

4.3
8.2
9.4
9.9
9.8
9.6
3.2
7.4
9.4
11.1
9.1
8.2
10.2
3.8
11.1
10.3
8.2
7.6
10.7
2.4
6.2
10.7
8.3
4.1
11.2
1.8
10.7
10.2
6.1
2.1
10.7
3.1
11.2
10.3
3.7
12.2

Work on presentation documents; work on videos.
Work on trial preparation.
Work on trial preparation; attend meeting with all counsel regarding exhibits; meet with trial team regarding strategy.
Work on trial preparation, exhibits and witness scheduling.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial; work on opening.
Work on trial preparation and opening statement.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on juror notebooks.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Attend strategy meeting; prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare subpoena; prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend t~ial.
Work on trial preparation and potential witness location.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Work on trial preparation.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
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HRS

Description

10/12/2011
10/13/2011
10/14/2011
10/17/2011
10/18/2011
10/19/2011
10/20/2011
10/21/2011
10/24/2011
10/25/2011
10/26/2011
10/27/2011
10/28/2011
10/30/2011
10/31/2011
11/7/2011
11/10/2011
11/21/2011

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

8.2
8.6
11.2
11.1
10.9
8.2
3.2
11.1
11.2
10.6
8.2
6.2
13
2
0.5
6.5
6.2
2.1
706.6

Prepare for and attend trial; prepare for next witnesses.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on preparation for closing.
Prepare for closing arguments.
Prepare for and attend trial for closing arguments.
Revise exhibits for use in deliberations as to Eagle revisions.
Attend jury verdict.
Work on attorney fees and costs calculations.
Continue review of charges, expenses for use in attorney fees and costs affidavit.
Research juror locations.

1/3/2008

LFB

0.5

1/6/2008

LFB

4.5

1/7/2008

LFB

0.8

1/9/2008

LFB

3

Review St. Al's objections to revised fees and costs; draft email to Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard re: same;
phone call to F. Edwards re: color copy of objections.
Review Court's Register of Actions and analyze in comparison to records requested in SARMC's notice of appeal; attend
hearing on attorneys' fees and costs.
Compile documents for Thomas A. Banducci to review in preparation for the hearing re: revised fees and costs; compile posttrial motions hearing binders and Wade L. Woodard working copies for storage; phone call to Judge Mclaughlin's chambers
re: requesting a copy of the Court's motions index; email K. Brown in Judge's office re: same
Review Idaho Appellate Rules 25-28 re: transcripts and clerk's record; email correspondence with Court reporter regarding
request listing of hearing transcripts; office conference with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding cross
appeal; compile and prepare color copy of Thomas A. Banducci's Affidavit of revised costs and fees for J. Gjording

1/10/2008

LFB

5.4

Compile and prepare color copy of Thomas A. Banducci's affidavit of revised costs and fees for J. Gjording; review email from
court reporter re: hearing transcripts and appeals record; continue reviewing St. Al's requests of the record and assist Thomas
A. Banducci with identifying counter requests per Rule 19; draft respondent's request for additional transcripts and records

1/11/2008

LFB

0.4

Draft letter to S. Kenyon - Clerk of Supreme Court re: appellate settlement ~onference
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Date

---

Date

Staff

HRS

Description

1/14/2008
1/16/2008

lFB
I lFB

0.6
2.6

Review and sort filing boxes to be placed in storage
Email Court Reporter re: estimate for supplemental transcripts requested for the appeal and ASCII files; phone
communications with Ada County Court Clerk re: estimated costs for supplemental record; office conference with Thomas A.
Banducci re: issues for Cross Appeal; review Idaho Rules re: filing cross appeal; begin drafting notice of cross-appeal

1/17/2008

lFB

5.3

1/18/2008
1/21/2008
1/25/2008
1/28/2008

lFB
lFB
lFB
lFB

0.3
0.5
0.3
1.7

Review email from court reporter regarding estimate for additional transcripts; office conference with Thomas A. Banducci
regarding notice of cross-appeal; continue drafting notice of cross-appeal; phone and email communication with District
Court Appeals Clerk's office regarding estimates for costs of records requested to supplement notice of appeal and for crossappeal; finalize notice of cross-appeal and filing fees
Draft letter to S. Kenyon- Clerk of the Supreme Court- re: response requesting appellate conference
Begin drafting request for appellate settlement conference form
'Draft request for settlement conference form to the Supreme Court
Review Court's Memorandum Decision regarding revised fees and costs; Review previous ruling regarding Costs as a Matter
of Right and phone conference with Kristin and Shary in Judge's office re: clarification of exclusion regarding copies of
deposition transcripts; Draft letter to court re: same; compile versions of judgment for Wade L. Woodard to revise

1/29/2008
1/30/2008

lFB
lFB

2.5
5

2/1/2008

lFB

2.3

2/4/2008

lFB

2

2/5/2008

lFB

2.1

2/6/2008

lFB

3.1

lFB

0.3

II

003970

2/6/2008

Revise calculations for costs as a matter of right per memorandum decisions
Review Court's clarification regarding attorneys fees and costs; revise costs as a matter of right in accordance with the
clarification; draft affidavit of Thomas A. Banducci in support of award of costs as a matter of right
Continue drafting Thomas A. Banducci's Affidavit in support of costs as a matter of right and revised judgment; review St. Al's
request for additional records on the cross-appeal; conference with Thomas A. Banducci re: affidavit and cross-appeal
records.
Finalize affidavit for costs as a matter of right and second amended judgment; re-calculate judgment; finalize proposed
second amended judgment; phone call to clerk regarding filing supplemental request for record on cross-appeal; email Dr.
Henson re: database search.
Review appeals rules regarding reporters' standard transcript; finish drafting supplemental request for records on crossappeal; phone conference with Supreme Court clerk's office regarding supplemental request for records; email
communication with court reporter regarding contents of standard transcript and Schamp video deposition.
Office conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding St. Al's objections to the second amended judgment and Cindy Schamp
deposition testimony; draft [second proposed] second amended judgment and supporting affidavit; draft letter to Judge
Mclaughlin regarding second amended judgment; phone call to Kristin in Judge Mclaughlin's office regarding depositions
published into the record; phone conference with J. Prochaska re: setting-up meeting with Thomas A. Banducci.
Email communication with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci regarding Schamp video deposition trial testimony;
Review St. Al's objections to proposed second amended judgment.
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Staff

HRS

Description

2/11/2008

LFB

1

2/12/2008
2/14/2008
2/14/2008

LFB
LFB
LFB

0.1
0.2
0.4

2/16/2008

LFB

4.4

Phone conference with District Court clerk regarding status of Schamp deposition and clerk's exhibit/witness list produced for
Supreme Court; review Schamp trial testimony for references to published depositions.
Email court reporter regarding Cindy Schamp video transcript.
Review Court's exhibit and witness list.
Review St. Al's request for additional records, notice of hearing regarding second amended judgment, and alternative
proposed second amended judgment; email correspondence with K. Brown at District Court regarding St. Al's objection to
second amended judgment and hearing.
Email communication with court reporter regarding transcription of Schamp video deposition; compile exhibits and transcript
for same; review incoming correspondence; compile and organize electronic copies of depositions, hearing, and trial
transcripts; compile pleadings and correspondence regarding appeal and cross-appeal for Dr. Prochaska's review.

2/19/2008

LFB

2.2

i Continue organizing electronic copies of trial and hearing transcripts; email court reporters requesting copies in ptx format;
create cd for court reporter with Cindy Schamp's video testimony; phone and email communication with Associated
Reporting regarding conversion of ASCII trial transcripts into ptx format; organize electronic copies of trial exhibits.
Email correspondence with Associated Reporting regarding conversion of ASCII transcripts in ptx format; compile electronic
files for same; email correspondence with trial court reporters regarding electronic transcripts; compile exhibits for Brian D.
Knox's appeal research regarding settlement communications and hearsay; review trial notes and transcripts to create trial
log spreadsheet.
Continue review of trial transcripts and creation of tracking log; review testimony references to exhibits 4332 and 4154;
office conferences with Dari M. Huskey and Brian D. Knox regarding same.
Organize electronic trial transcripts; office conference with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding possible
settlement discussions; continue review of trial transcripts and creation of log; email court reporter regarding extension.

---

I

LFB

6

2/21/2008

LFB

5.1

2/21/2008

LFB

3.7

2/25/2008

LFB

5.3

Continue review of trial transcripts and creation of trial log; compile testimony transcripts for Brian D. Knox regarding exhibit
4332.

2/26/2008

LFB

4.7

2/27/2008

LFB

1.6

Compile pleadings and transcripts for Brian D. Knox to review regarding various appeals issues; continue review of trial
transcripts and creation of trial summary log.
Email Associated Reporting regarding conversion and consolidation of Schamp trial transcripts into a ptx file; review clerk's
register of actions against MRIA and SARMC's requests for clerk's record (regarding the omission of the July 13, 2007
memorandum decision); draft second supplemental request for additional clerk's record; compile pleadings for Brian D. Knox.

LFB
LFB
LFB
LFB

0.5
0.4
0.3
1.5

003971

2/20/2008

2/28/2008
2/29/2008
3/4/2008
3/6/2008

Review trial testimony of Jeff Cliff relevant to discussions with C. Schamp.
Continue review of trial transcripts and creating of trial exhibit log.
Compile summary judgment briefing for Brian D. Knox's research on appeals issues.
Continue review of trial transcripts and creation of trial log spreadsheet; direction to runner regarding files.
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Staff

HRS

Description

3/7/2008
3/10/2008

LFB
LFB

3.5
5.3

3/11/2008

LFB

4

3/11/2008

LFB

0.3

3/13/2008
3/14/2008
3/17/2008

LFB
LFB
LFB

3
2
4.4

3/24/2008
3/28/2008

LFB
LFB

0.6
1.9

3/31/2008
4/1/2008

LFB
LFB

0.5
0.6

Continue review of trial transcripts and creation of tracking log spreadsheet; direction to runner regarding updating files.
Compile additional transcripts for Brian D. Knox relevant to Exhibit 4332; conference with Brian D. Knox regarding same;
review trial transcripts and finish updating trial tracking log.
Review notice of appeal, cross appeal, and requests for additional records and compile list of all records requested from
District Court clerk for Supreme Court; compile antitrust briefing for Dari M. Huskey.
Review memo. from Karen Marler regarding St. Al's CDweb; phone call to Karen Marler to set up telephone conference with
Thomas A. Banducci.
Continue compiling antitrust briefing for Dari M. Huskey for appeal issue.
Continue compiling antitrust briefing and other appeals-related briefing.
Compile briefing related to the antitrust appeal for Dari M. Huskey; call clerk of the Supreme Court regarding suspension of
clerk's record and reporter's transcript.
Review email correspondence and client memos regarding CD Web issues; compile same for file.
Create outline of case and key entities, persons, and facts for S. Smith; conference with S. Smith to discuss case background
and summary of trial proceedings.
Compile background documents and pleadings for S. Smith to review.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci regarding appeals issues; review District Court clerk's witness
and deposition list and check against trial log spreadsheet; draft third supplemental request for additional clerk's records.

4/4/2008

LFB

1.3
I

LFB

0.8

4/23/2008

LFB

2.6

4/28/2008

LFB

1.1

4/30/2008

LFB

0.4

5/5/2008
5/8/2008

LFB
LFB

0.2
0.8

003972

4/7/2008

Office conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding clerk's record and page limit rules for appeals briefing; telephone call to
appeals clerk regarding rule clarification; review clerk's record for antitrust related briefing; continue drafting third
supplemental request for clerk's record.
Office conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding clerk's record; finish drafting third supplemental request for clerk's
record; revise working copy of clerk's register of actions to reflect all record requests; review trial log and transcripts relevant
to punitive damages motion.
Review trial exhibit database; compile missing exhibits and create descriptive placeholders for demonstrative exhibits; review
Manfred Steiner testimony regarding exhibit no. 594.
Load missing trial exhibits into Concordance database; review and analysis of same; review St. Al's request for additional
transcripts.
Review notices from Supreme Court regarding deadlines to file clerk's record and transcript; telephone call to clerk regarding
same; email attorneys with update regarding same.
Email Tammy Hohenleitner regarding Cindy Schamp video deposition designations and related exhibits.
Review Supreme Court Clerk's order suspending record and transcript due date; telephone call with Dorothy Beaver at
Supreme Court Clerk's office regarding same and new deadline schedule for the record and transcript; conference with
Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding same; update docket calendar; begin reviewing Prochaska testimony
and drafting insert for briefing regardingformation of MRIA.___
--~-
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HRS

Description

5/12/2008

LFB

0.9

5/16/2008
5/21/2008

LFB
LFB

0.3
2.2

5/22/2008

LFB

1.6

Review appellate rule 34 regarding briefing deadlines; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding same; telephone call to
Supreme Court Clerk's office regarding same; calendar briefing schedule and prepare list of deadlines for distribution.
Compile proposed jury instructions and related transcripts for Wade L. Woodard.
Review Prochaska testimony and related exhibits and counterclaim; continue drafting background paragraphs for crossappeal brief.
Telephone call and email with Tammy Hohenleitner (Judge Mclaughlin's court reporter) regarding Cindy Schamp testimony;
compile briefing regarding anti-trust summary judgment and related motions for Wade L. Woodard to review for cross-

5/27/2008

LFB

1

5/28/2008

LFB

2

5/30/2008

LFB

1.5

LFB
LFB

1.5
3.1

6/4/2008
6/5/2008
6/10/2008

LFB
LFB
LFB

1.5
0.7
0.3

6/11/2008

LFB

2.5

6/12/2008

LFB

3.4

6/16/2008

LFB

1.3

003973

5/31/2008
6/2/2008

L___

appeal.
Compile pleadings for Wade L. Woodard for appeal briefing; review Court's memorandum decision on antitrust motion for
summary judgment; review Yvonne Ketchum Affidavit; continue reviewing Prochaska testimony and drafting background
paragraphs for cross-appeal brief.
Call Ed Whitelaw's office to schedule telephone conference; compile and email documents to Whitelaw regarding same;
continue reviewing Prochaska testimony.
Compile Court's decisions and hearing transcripts regarding motions to quash antitrust subpoenas and motion to reconsider
for Wade L. Woodard; review same.
Review hearing transcripts for objections and corrections.
Review appeal transcript indexes; review appellate rules regarding objections and corrections to the clerk's record and
transcripts; direction to Bridge City regarding printing transcript and organization into binders.
Continue review of hearing transcripts and related memorandum decisions for objections and corrections.
Compile briefing for Brian D. Knox regarding spoliation claim.
Telephone call to ECONorthwest regarding telephone conference with Ed Whitelaw; telephone call to Brad Thies at the
District Court clerk's office regarding the record; conference with WadeL. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Continue review of pre-trial hearing transcripts for objections and corrections; telephone call to Dorothy Beaver at Supreme •
Court clerk's office regarding District Court's motion for extension of time on the record; draft email memorandum to office
regarding same.
Continue review of pre-trial hearing transcripts for objections and corrections; conference with Thomas A. Banducci and
Wade L. Woodard regarding anti-trust appeal issues; telephone conference with Ed Whitelaw, Ed McMullan, Bryce Ward,
Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard; compile ECONorthwest reports and related subpoenas for Thomas A. Banducci
and Wade L. Woodard to review.
Review correspondence from Jack Gjording regarding brief deadline extension; review files for conformed copies of MRIA's
opposition to motion in limine regarding Shattuck Hammond and motion in limine regarding purchase price damage theory as
requested by Felicia Edwards; telephone call to Felicia Edwards regarding same; telephone call to Brad Thies at District Court
regarding same; email conformed copies of opposition briefs to Brad Thies; review and compile antitrust subpoenas for Wade
L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci; finalize and return new contract with ECONorthwest.
-----

-----

-----

-------
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6/24/2008

LFB

4

6/25/2008
6/26/2008

LFB
LFB

2.2
3.6

6/27/2008

LFB

4

6/30/2008

LFB

5

7/1/2008

LFB

5

7/2/2008
7/3/2008
7/3/2008
7/7/2008

LFB
LFB
LFB
LFB

3
0.3
5

7/8/2008

LFB

1

Telephone call to Supreme Court Clerk's office regarding extension of time for the record; revise briefing schedule, docket,
and draft email to Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding same; continue compiling working copy of trial
transcript and reviewing transcript for objections and corrections.
Continue review of transcript, creation of working copy.
Review electronic appeal transcript received from Tammy Hohenleitner; direction to Bridge City regarding printing and
compiling transcript volumes into working copy for Wade L. Woodard; finish reviewing appeal transcript and drafting list of
corrections; begin reviewing record from District Court.
Review record from district court and cross-check against records requests; conference with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas
A. Banducci regarding same; telephone call to Felicia Edwards at Gjording Fouser regarding organization of record; telephone
call to Brad Thies at district court regarding same.
Office conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding appeal record and transcript; review exhibit to appeal record regarding
affidavits and memoranda and cross reference with requests for portions of the record; compile working copies of appeal
transcript for Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci.
Continue review of exhibits to the appeal record and cross check against record requests; review District Court list of
admitted exhibits and cross check against Concordance database and court reporter's list of admitted exhibits; telephone call
to Brad Thies at District Court regarding omission of Court's draft jury instructions from the record; office conference with
Aaron Flake from Bridge City regarding copying the appeal record into binders for attorneys' use; begin compiling pleadings
designated as "exhibits to the record."
Continue compiling pleadings designated as "exhibits to the record."
Continue compiling pleadings designated as "exhibit to the appeal record."
Telephone call to Margaret Kushner regarding judgment and remitter; compile documents for her to review.
Continue compiling pleadings and documents designated in the "certificate of exhibits" to the appeal record; direction to
Bridge City vendor regarding same.
Continue compiling documents designated as exhibits to the appeal record; email and phone communication with Bridge City
regarding same; telephone to Brad Thies at District Court regarding obtaining copies of records that we are unable to locate;

7/9/2008

ILFB

7/10/2008

LFB

1

7/11/2008

LFB

2

7/14/2008

LFB

3.5

I

2

1.2

003974

Continue compiling documents marked as exhibits to the appeal record; telephone calls to Bridge City regarding copying and
assembling working copies of same.
Finish drafting notes regarding objections and correction to the appeal transcript and record; office conference with Wade L.
Woodard regarding same.
Begin drafting stipulation for additions and corrections to the record and transcript; review trial transcript regarding
admission of Finnerty memo.
Continue working on stipulation for corrections and additions to the appeal transcript and clerk's record; review working
copies of exhibits to the record and correct missing and incorrect pleadings; review St. Al's objections to the clerk's record.
--

---
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

7/15/2008

LFB

2.3

7/16/2008

LFB

3.5

7/17/2008

LFB

3

7/18/2008

LFB

0.6

Continue reviewing St. Al's objections and additions to the record; continue drafting stipulations for additions and corrections·
to the appellate record and transcript; draft letter to Jack Gjording regarding same; finish reviewing working copy binders of
exhibits to the record.
Telephone communication with Brad Thies regarding augmentation to record; review new Plaintiff exhibit list being
augmented to the record and compare to previous version; telephone call to Kristin Brown (Judge Mclaughlin's clerk)
regarding Plaintiff exhibit list; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding stipulation for additions and corrections to
record; draft letter to Jack Gjording regarding same and fax revised version; index Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L.
Woodard's working copies of the appeal transcript.
Continue indexing Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard's working copies of appeal transcript; draft objection to
reporter's transcript and request for additional items; draft affidavit of Wade L. Woodard in support of objection; conference
with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; prepare filing and exhibits to affidavit.
Email communication with Tammy Hohenleitner regarding objection to transcript; finish indexing Thomas A. Banducci's
working copy of appeal transcript.

189.9
7/6/2011
7/7/2011
7/8/2011
7/11/2011
7/12/2011
7/13/2011
7/18/2011
7/19/2011
7/20/2011

LH
LH
LH
LH
LH
LH
LH
LH
LH

3
2
6
8
3
2
7
7
7

7/21/2011

LH

9

7/22/2011

LH

7

LH
LH

2
7

LH

6.5

7/28/2011 I LH

6.5

7/25/2011
7/26/2011

003975

7/27/2011

1

Established contacts for focus juries; meeting discussing responsibilities going forward.
Established contacts for focus juries; conversion of trial transcripts to outlines for September trial.
Established contacts for focus juries; converted trial transcripts to preparation outlines for September trial.
Converted trial transcripts into outlines for use at September trial; developed contacts for focus juries.
Developed contacts for focus juries.
Developed contacts for focus juries.
Compiled exhibit lists and binders for use in depositions and at trial.
Compiled exhibit binders for use at trial; created questioning transcripts for use in examinations.
Compiled exhibit binders for use at trial; created questioning transcripts for use in examinations; compiled and narrowed
down members for July 30 focus jury.
Created deposition summary for use in examinations; made selections and communications with members of first focus jury.
Created deposition summary for use in examinations; made selections and communications with members of first focus jury;
prepared documents for use in mock trials.
Organized potential members of August 13 focus jury and made contacts.
Attended weekly meeting; reviewed answer to third amended counterclaim for analysis of affirmative defenses; reviewed
depositions for compiling witnesses.
Reviewed depositions to prepare for upcoming depositions and trial examinations; maintained contacts with focus jury
members.
Reviewed depositions to prepare for upcoming depositions and examinations; drafted and sent out final notice to all focus
jury

membe~s. _ _

-------

--~·~

- -

------

- -
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

7/29/2011

LH

6.5

8/1/2011

LH

6

8/2/2011

LH

7

8/3/2011

LH

7

8/4/2011

LH

6.5

8/8/2011
8/9/2011
8/10/2011

LH
LH
LH

6.5
5
7

8/11/2011
8/12/2011

LH
LH

7
7.5

Finalized forms and contacts for July 30 focus jury; reviewed depositions to prepare for upcoming depositions and
examinations.
Reviewed depositions to prepare for upcoming depositions and examinations; researched past exhibits in preparation for
trial.
Reviewed trial transcript for exhibit admission and stipulations; summarized findings of focus jury; followed up with potential
August 13 focus jury participants.
Drafted letter to opposing council regarding exhibit stipulations; reviewed and summarized depositions for upcoming
examinations; followed up with focus jury participants and analyzed feedback.
Drafted memorandum regarding admissibility of statements made by settling party; reviewed and summarized depositions in
preparation for upcoming examinations.
Corresponded with August 13 focus jurors; summarized deposition for use in upcoming examination.
Corresponded with August 13 focus jurors; summarized deposition to prepare for upcoming examination.
Corresponded with August 13 focus jurors and other attendees; summarized deposition to prepare for upcoming
examination.
Corresponded with focus jurors; summarized depositions to prepare for upcoming examinations.
Corresponded with focus jurors; set up and preparation for focus jury; summarized depositions to prepare for upcoming
examinations.

I

i
I

I

I

i

i

I'

i

.

149
3/28/2008
4/1/2008

SES
SES

1.5
2.6

Meeting with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding SARMC v. MRIA case background and trial.
Review second amended complaint, memorandum for punitive damages other background documents provided by Lauren F.
Blaesing.

4.1

003976

8/22/2011
8/23/2011
8/29/2011
8/30/2011
8/31/2011
9/1/2011
9/2/2011
9/3/2011
9/4/2011
9/5/2011
9/10/2011
9/19/2011

SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES

6.2
5.7
6.2
7.2
6.9
5.2
6.4
7.5
8.3
9.2
3.2
6.8

Search for documents to be included as exhibits.
Search for exhibits.
Various tasks for trial preparation.
Various tasks for trial preparation.
Various trial preparations.
Assist with trial preparations.
Trial preparation.
Jury research.
Jury research.
Juror research; meet with trial team.
Trial preparation.
Trial preparation and attendance.
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Date

Staff

9/20/2011 SES
10/7/2011 SES
10/10/2011 SES

HRS

Description

5.5

Trial preparation and attendance.
Attend trial in Kathy A. Savell's place
Search for documents relevant to Havlina's testimony.

8
2.2
94.5

I

TAB

0.8

1/3/2008

TAB

1.5

1/4/2008

TAB

1

Telephone conference Jack Gjording regarding hearing and review notice of hearing. review research on suprsedeas bond and
conditional appeal.
!

1/8/2008

TAB

2.6

1/9/2008

TAB

1.6

1/10/2008

TAB

2.5

1/15/2008

TAB

1

1/15/2008
1/16/2008
1/17/2008
1/22/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

2.5
0.5
2.3
1.2

1/24/2008
1/28/2008

TAB
TAB

0.3
1.5

Prepare for and attend hearing on stay and hearing on objections to fees and costs. Review transmittals from court;
Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding designation of record on cross appeal.
Review notice of appeal and check the rules regarding record designation. Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding
issues for cross appeal. Call from Gjording regarding stipulated amount.
Review designated record on appeal. Supplement record and transcript. Conference with Wade L. Woodard recross appeal
topics. Telephone conference with Jack Gjording regarding supersedeas bond amount.
Conference with L. Blaesing regarding cross appeal issues and record. Conference with Wade L. Woodard re same.
Conference with Brian Knox re conditional appeal.
Conference with Joe Messmer rearrangements for appeal. NO CHARGE
Work on cross appeal
Finalize cross appeal notice and review record for designation.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard recross appeal issues. Call to L. Trout. Telephone conference with Jim Prochaska. Review
issues on appeal to determine manner in which SARMC framed the purported error on remittitur.
Conference with Havlina regarding status of appeal.

1/29/2008

TAB

0.8

1/30/2008

TAB

0.7

Review court order and conferences with Lauren F. Blaesing and Wade L. Woodard regarding affidavits and final judgment

2/1/2008

TAB

1.2

2/4/2008

TAB

0.6

Conferences Lauren F. Blaesing regarding affidavit for fees; edit affidavit; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing and Wade L.
Woodard regarding supplementation of record raised by augmentation requested by SARMC.
Telephone conferences with Lauren F. Blaesing and Wade L. Woodard regarding judgment and affidavit in support of motion
for costs.
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1/2/2008

Conference with Wade L. Woodard and Brian Knox regarding "conditional appeal" and punitive damages cross appeal.
Conference Brian Knox regarding conditional appeal. Assign research re supersedeas bond.
Telephone conference with Aaron Katz (Credit Suisse). Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding SARMC's objection to
acceptance of remittitur. Telephone conference with Jack Gjording

Review court order on costs and fees. Conference with Wade L. Woodard and Lauren F. Blaesing regarding final judgment and
costs as a matter of right. Call to L.C. Trout. Edit letter to court regarding deposition copy costs.
Telephone conference with Jim Prochaska. Telephone conference with J. Mclaughlin regarding costs as a matter of right.
Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding same.

Date

Staff

HRS

Description

2/5/2008

TAB

1.8

2/11/2008

TAB

0.7

2/12/2008

TAB

3.2

Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding amended judgment and transcript; conference regarding Schamp testimony;
review correspondence from the court; edit letter to court; work on retainer agreement.
Edit retainer agreement and email to Prochaska; review order signed by court to stay execution and email to Wade L.
Woodard.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding order of stay and telephone call to Gjording; meeting with client and Harad.
Calls to Gjording; email to Wade L. Woodard and Lauren F. Blaesing regarding hearing on objection to second amended
judgment.
Telephone conference with Jack Gjording regarding supersedeas bond and hearing on the judgment; conference with Wade
L. Woodard regarding post judgment interest and review objection to judgment proposed by Gjording.
NO CHARGE-Conference with Jim Prochaska.
NO CHARGE- conference with Wade L. Woodard and edit retainer agreement and telephone conference with Jim Prochaska.

TAB

0.9

2/15/2008
2/16/2008

TAB
TAB

3
1.8

2/18/2008
2/20/2008

TAB
TAB

1.8
2.5

2/21/2008 ITAB
2/22/2008 ITAB

2.4
1.7

I
2/26/2008 ITAB

0.8

2/27/2008
2/28/2008
2/28/2008
2/29/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

0.3
0.3
0.4
0.5

3/4/2008
3/11/2008
3/13/2008
3/14/2008
3/17/2008
3/22/2008
3/25/2008
4/7/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

0.2
0.5
0.2
0.2
1
0.2
0.7
0.6

003978

2/13/2008

Conference with consultants and telephone conference with Pulliam regarding footnote.
Review case on RUPA (first case on RUPA from ld. Supreme Court); conference with Prochaska regarding various issues on
appeal; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding Sam Gibson testimony; telephone conference with court clerk regarding
rescheduling hearing; calls to identify cost of supersedeas bond; call to Gjording; conference regarding harmless error;
admissibility of settlement agreements; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding briefing on antitrust.
1

Correspondence and order resetting hearing; meeting with Gjording.
Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing and Wade L. Woodard regarding meeting with Gjording and telephone conference with
client (Prochaska) regarding meeting with Gjording. Review court notice and schedule order.
Voice mail from Gjording, correspondence from Gjording and email with court regarding hearing; telephone conference with
Prochaska and email to Drury.
Review email from Karen Marler regarding Blue Cross accreditation.
Telephone conference with Dave Giles regarding S. Bruce.
Telephone conference with Karen Marler.
Review supersedeas bond. Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing; telephone conference with Giles regarding contacting
Messmer regarding S. Bruce.
Telephone conference with Joe Messmer
Review correspondence authored by MRICI Call Center; telephone conference with Karen Marler and call to Prochaska.
Review orders from court regarding record and transcript.
Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding supplementation of record.
Presentation to MRIA employees regarding trial and appeal.
Review emails regarding transcript and record.
Conference with Brian D. Knox regarding duty owed to Limited Partnership.
Telephone conference with Mike Thomas and Steve Severn regarding Bob Burton's estate.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

4/14/2008
4/17/2008
5/12/2008
5/21/2008
5/23/2008
5/28/2008
6/10/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

0.3
0.4
0.4
0.8
0.6
0.5
1.3

Email exchange with Prochaska regarding status; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding retention of Schroeder.

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

1
0.4
0.9
0.7
1.3
3.3
0.5
2
6.2
3.5
5
1.1
2
3.2
2.2
3.9
4.1

9/26/2008

TAB

3.8

9/27/2008
9/28/2008
9/29/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB

3.7
3.4
4.6

TAB
TAB
TAB

1.2
6.8
2.8

003979

6/12/2008
6/13/2008
6/17/2008
6/27/2008
7/8/2008
7/14/2008
7/17/2008
7/20/2008
9/9/2008
9/10/2008
9/11/2008
9/15/2008
9/20/2008
9/22/2008
9/23/2008
9/24/2008
9/25/2008

10/1/2008
10/2/2008
10/3/2008

Telephone conference with Prochaska; review minutes.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding briefing deadlines and research on harmless error in instructions.
Conference with Prochaska regarding law firm selection for deal; telephone conference with Barbara Nay.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding antitrust issues.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard and telephone conference with Ed Whitelaw.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard and call to Gjording regarding briefing schedule. Review of materials prepared by Wade L.
Woodard on issues for appeal.
Review materials regarding antitrust issue on appeal
Telephone conference with Gjording regarding briefing schedule.
Telephone conference with Prochaska and attend board meeting.
Telephone conference with Barbara Nay and Margaret Kushner.
Telephone conference with Kushner and Nay
Review transcript.
Telephone conferences with Jack Gjording and conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding missing instructions.
Review transcript.
Transcript review.
Review transcript.
Review transcript.
Review record and brief; conference Wade L. Woodard and telephone conference Prochaska.
Review SARMC's brief.
Review brief and conference with Wade L. Woodard and telephone conference with Craig Lewis.
Work on brief; conference with Wade L. Woodard.
Review prior filed motion for summary judgment briefing on wrongful dissociation; work on appellate brief.
Review jury instructions, conference Wade L. Woodard; review jury instruction conferences; develop arguments regarding
lost profits and MRIA's right to recover lost profits.
Conference with K. Savell and Dara Labrum regarding arguments and support for arguments that MRIA entitlement for lost
profits is supported by the record and not raised as an issue until appeal; draft outline for argument.
Work on brief.
Work on brief.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding brief organization; telephone conference with Craig Lewis regarding antitrust
argument and remittitur briefing.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding wrongful dissociation arguments and stipulation for extension of time.
Work on summary of facts and conferences with Wade L. Woodard.
Conference Wade L. Woodard regarding brief organization; "taint" argument and motion to extend time and length of brief;
review transcript and work on outline for fact section.
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Staff

HRS

Description

10/4/2008
10/5/2008
10/6/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB

3.2
4.6
3.7

Work on summary of facts
Work on summary of facts and review transcript.
Conference Wade L. Woodard regarding SBB's admission regarding restrictive covenants; review Lewis outline; transcript
review and emails with Wade L. Woodard.

10/7/2008
10/8/2008
10/9/2008
10/10/2008
10/11/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

2.8
1.4
4.2
1.9
2.6

Review transcript and conferences with Wade L. Woodard regarding new trial standard and remittitur.
Review transcript and conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding brief.
Review transcript and work on brief outline.
Review dissociation arguments drafted by Wade L. Woodard; continue work on brief.
Review Wade L. Woodard's draft of initial sections of brief and comment/edit; review of causation evidence and argument.

10/12/2008
10/13/2008
10/14/2008
f---'-·
10/14/2008
10/20/2008
10/21/2008
10/22/2008
10/23/2008
10/25/2008
10/27/2008
11/2/2008
11/3/2008
11/4/2008
11/5/2008
11/6/2008
11/8/2008
11/10/2008
11/11/2008
11/13/2008
11/14/2008
11/15/2008
11/16/2008
11/17/2008
11/18/2008
11/19/2008
11/20/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
'TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

3.7
0.9
1.2
1.1
1.7
2.2
0.3
2.9
4.1
2.4
3.9
2.5
0.9
1.3
1.6
6.1
2.4
5.5
4.7
2.9
5.2
4.7
1.9
2.8
4.6
5.7

Review transcript and work on damages argument.
Conference WadeL. Woodard regarding brief organization and edit arguments.
Review Wilhoite testimony; conference K. Savell regarding motions concerning real party in interest.
Telephone conferences with Wendy Engels (Mercer), Nay and Kushman.
Transcript review.
Review transcript and telephone conference with Wade L. Woodard.
Conference Wade L. Woodard regarding brief.
Review draft of settlement letter argument; conference with Prochaska; work on introduction to brief.
Work on brief and conference with Wade L. Woodard.
Conference with Prochaska regarding status of brief; conference with Wade L. Woodard and work on brief
Work on brief.
Conferences with Wade L. Woodard regarding disgorgement; work on brief.
Work on brief and telephone conference with Wade L. Woodard.
Work on brief.
Work on brief
Work on brief.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard; work on brief.
Work on brief and conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding same.
Work on brief.
Work on brief.
Work on brief.
Work on brief.

003980

Date

Work
Work
Work
Work

on
on
on
on

brief and conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding causation arguments.
brief and Board meeting discussion.
brief.
brief.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

11/21/2008
11/22/2008
11/23/2008
11/24/2008
12/23/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

5.2
4.7
3.8
5.9
1.7
243.1

Work on brief.
Work on --brief.
Work on brief.
Finalize and serve brief.
Review brief and conference with Wade L. Woodard

1/3/2009
1/8/2009
1/25/2009
1/26/2009
1/30/2009
2/9/2009
2/20/2009
8/12/2009
8/14/2009
8/15/2009
8/16/2009
8/17/2009
8/18/2009
8/19/2009
8/24/2009
10/21/2009
10/22/2009
10/27/2009
11/3/2009
11/5/2009

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

2.1
0.5
1.1
0.5
0.6
0.3
0.5
4.4
4.7
4
4.5
8
12
6
0.5
2.5
2.5
3.2
0.5
1

Review and comment on brief.
Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner; email to Kushner and Prochaska after review of Mercer reports.
Review brief.
Conference Wade L. Woodard regarding reply brief.
Review brief
Conference with Dara Labrum regarding response to motion to strike.
Review response to objection.
Prepare for appeal
Prepare for oral argument.
Prepare for oral argument
Prepare for oral argument.
Prepare for oral argument
Prepare for oral argument
Prepare for and attend Supreme Court hearing and meeting with clients.
Telephone conference with in house counsel (CHI) regarding oral argument.
Review appeal; telephone conference with James Prochaska M.D. and conference with Benjamin A. Schwartzman.
Review decision and conference with Dara Labrum.
Prepare for and attend meeting with board
Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner regarding MRIM.
Telephone conferences with Prochaska and Drury and conferences with BrentS. Bastian regarding opposition to cost bill.

0.6
0.5
60.5

Review and edit affidavit and memorandum for rehearing.
Review affidavit of Drury and conference with BrentS. Bastian.

Telephone conference Tim Borton (CHI) regarding appeal.
Telephone conference with Tim Gorman (CHI) and counsel for CHI regarding status of appeal and sale of Mercy and HR to
Trinity.
Meet with MRIAjuror.
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11/11/2009 TAB
11/12/2009 TAB

003981

1/11/2010
1/18/2010

TAB
TAB

0.6
1

1/20/2010

TAB

1.1

"-"

-~

Staff

HRS

Description

1/20/2010
1/25/2010
1/28/2010
1/28/2010
1/29/2010
1/29/2010
2/1/2010
2/3/2010
2/3/2010

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

3.9
1.5
0.9
3
0.6
1.5
1.2
0.5
2

2/16/2010
2/17/2010
3/9/2010
3/10/2010
3/15/2010

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

2
1.3
0.3
0.9
0.9

Review chart from Kushner and transfer restrictions memorandum; meeting with Prochaska and call to B. Nay.
Telephone conferences with Prochaska; review materials from Prochaska.
Telephone conference client and conference Wade L. Woodard regarding judge; review law on release of bond.
Telephone conference with Kushner regarding CHI/Trinity transaction; telephone conference with client.
Conference with Margaret Kushner and review transfer restrictions and email regarding lease extensions
Telephone conference with Gjording and Ayers; check on Wetherell's background
Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner and Tim Gorman.
Review materials from Kushner; email exchange with Kushner and conference with Wade L. Woodard.
Telephone conference with Gjording and Ayers; telephone conference Budge and Wilhoite and conference with Kathy A.
Savell regarding materials to be sent.
Meeting with Board.
Prepare for and attend status conference.
Correspondence with Margaret Kushner.
Review correspondence from Kushner and telephone conference Gorman and Prochaska.
Review emails and telephone conference with Prochaska regarding his call with Gorman and email exchange with Kushner.

3/16/2010
3/16/2010
3/17/2010
3/18/2010
3/19/2010
4/19/2010
5/5/2010
5/11/2010
5/12/2010
5/18/2010

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

0.8
3.5
0.7
0.3
0.2
0.6
0.6
0.5
1.2
1.2

5/19/2010
5/24/2010

TAB
TAB

0.3
0.9

6/11/2010
6/15/2010
6/21/2010
7/1/2010

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

0.5
0.3
1.2
1.5

7/5/2010

TAB

1

003982

Date

Review memorandum by Dara Labrum regarding amending counterclaim.
Telephone conferences with Kushner and Prochaska; attend MRIA board meeting.
Review materials from Kushner and telephone conference Prochaska.
Telephone conference with Gjording and email to Prochaska regarding judgment on costs.
Review email from Messmer and Prochaska.
Review letters from Gorman; email to B. Nay.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding status conference.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard and Prochaska regarding status.
Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner.
Telephone conference with Ayers and review correspondence from Ayers regarding scheduling order; respond with letter to
Ayers.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding status and experts.
Telephone conference Prochaska regarding confidentiality agreement and telephone conference Kushner and Prochaska;
review confidentiality stipulation.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard and edit letter to Ayer.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding meeting with board.
Conference with Dara Labrum regarding motion filed by SARMC and telephone conference Gjording.
Review brief in opposition to motion to strike; conference with Wade L. Woodard and Dara Labrum; telephone conference
Gjording's office
Draft discovery for SARMC
Page 42 of 65

Staff

HRS

Description

7/6/2010
7/7/2010

TAB
ITAB

1
2.1

7/8/2010
7/9/2010
7/15/2010
7/15/2010
7/20/2010

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

2.5
3
1
0.5
1

7/21/2010

TAB

2.5

Conference with Dara Labrum and Wade L. Woodard regarding reply to SARM's reply brief
Telephone conference Bruce Budge; edit discovery requests; conference with Dara Labrum regarding PowerPoint for Friday's •
hearing; conference with W. Woodard
Prepare for hearing on motion to strike
Prepare for and attend hearing
Meeting with Giles regarding Mercy Hospital issues
Meeting with Giles
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding briefing schedule; review discovery draft and review briefing on damages for
discussion with experts and W. Woodard
Review materials relative to damages; telephone conference Prochaska and conference Wade L. Woodard regarding briefing

7/23/2010

TAB

2.5

7/27/2010
7/30/2010

TAB
TAB

0.4
1.5

8/2/2010
8/5/2010

TAB
TAB

1.5
0.3

8/9/2010
8/20/2010

TAB
TAB

2.1
1

8/22/2010
8/24/2010
8/25/2010
8/26/2010
8/27/2010
9/28/2010
9/29/2010
9/30/2010
10/1/2010
10/7/2010

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

3.2
1.1
3.9
2.5
1.7
1.5
3.2
8.5
5.9
1
93.9

Review and edit memorandum regarding lost profits
Conference with Dara Labrum and Wade L. Woodard regarding briefs and review email from Bakes.
Attend board meeting; review briefs.
Meeting with Bakes; review and edit arguments.
Review briefs.
Begin review of briefing for argument.
Review briefing and prepare for oral argument; call to Gjording.
Prepare for oral argument
Final preparation and oral argument.
Meeting with Bakes.

1/5/2011

TAB

1

Review of discovery motion.

003983

Date

i

Telephone conference Kushner; edit 4th Am. Complaint; conference with Dara Labrum; review motion to amend scheduling
order; and edit written discovery; call to Bob Bakes
Telephone conference Bob Bakes and conference with Dara Labrum regarding filing various motions
Conferences Wade L. Woodard regarding damages briefing and email to Dara Labrum regarding motion to amend;
correspondence with Kushner regarding settlement discussions
Meeting with Bakes and conference with Wade L. Woodard.
Conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding briefing on partnership for term; email to Dara Labrum regarding motion to
amend and follow-up on meeting schedule with experts.
Briefing from SARMC.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding briefing on conspiracy and telephone conference Prochaska; review email from
Kushner.
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Staff

HRS

Description

1/11/2011

TAB

3.3

Review deposition testimony, discovery responses and trial testimony of Steiner and review motion to compel discovery.

1/12/2011

TAB

1.4

1/14/2011
1/18/2011
1/20/2011
1/21/2011
1/22/2011
1/27/2011
2/1/2011
2/8/2011
2/9/2011
2/14/2011
2/21/2011
2/22/2011
2/23/2011
2/24/2011
2/25/2011
3/30/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

0.2
1.3
0.4
0.4
1.1
0.3
1.8
1.7
2.7
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.8
1.1
0.9
15

Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding scheduling order requested by SARMC; review Steiner report; and deposition
testimony.
Telephone conference with Gjording's office regarding hearing date
Meeting with Dara L. Parker and Wade L. Woodard regarding motion to reopen discovery.
Telephone conference with Dvorak regarding collection of costs.
Telephone conference with Prochaska regarding recovery of costs.
Review memorandum to oppose reopening discovery.
Draft response to Dvorak letter for client.

4/1/2011
4/2/2011
4/4/2011
4/5/2011
4/6/2011
4/11/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

0.6
2.4
1
0.3
1.9
1.1

4/12/2011

TAB

2.2

4/13/2011

TAB

1.3

003984

Date

Review and edit briefing; conference with Dara Parker; telephone conference with Prochaska and send letter to Dvorak.
Meet with Wade L. Woodard and Dara Parker regarding hearing and review our briefing.
Prepare for and attend hearing.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding update on hearing and matters going forward.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding discovery and expert reports
Telephone conference with Gjording and review letter from Gjording.
Attend MRIA Board meeting to discuss status of SARMC v. MRIA case.
Meet with Bruce Budge and Charles Wilhoite regarding damages.
Telephone conference with SARMC counsel and conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding various discovery issues.
Review and edit motion for summary judgment response; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding same; review
discovery from SARMC, and conference Dara Parker regarding responses; Review and edit motions for clarification;
telephone conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding strategy relative to departing partner share; conference with Wade L.
Woodard regarding Kushner's' settlement discussion with Westermeier; Develop to do list for case; Conference with Wade L.
Woodard regarding correspondence compelling Bruce and scamp attendance at trial; conference with Dara Parker regarding
Eagle facility info; begin review of transcript
Conference with Dara Parker regarding discovery from SARMC and responses.
Review of trial record.
Telephone conference with Prochaska and conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding departing partner share issue.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding departing partner share.
Telephone conference Kushner and Wade L. Woodard and review Dara Parker briefing.
Telephone conference Gjording regarding dates; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding motions; conferences with
Dara Parker regarding same.
.

Conference with Wade L. Woodard and BrentS. Bastian regarding motions in limine and motion for summary judgment
regarding Peirringer release.
Conference with BrentS. Bastian and review issues related to pro rata argument.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

4/14/2011

TAB

1.5

Review briefing from SARMC; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding same; conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding

4/15/2011
4/21/2011
4/22/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB

0.5
1.5
5.2

4/25/2011

TAB

1.3

4/26/2011
4/27/2011

TAB

4.9
2.2

ITAB

opposition to pro rata argument.
Conference with Dara Parker and Wade L. Woodard regarding briefing and expert reports.
Prepare for hearing.
Prepare for and attend motion for summary judgment hearing; review briefs conferences with BrentS. Bastian and Dara
Parker regarding same.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding hearing on Friday; telephone conference Prochaska; review memorandum in
response to SARMC's Motion in Limine's.
Telephone conferences with experts and meeting with Prochaska and Giles.
Telephone conference with Voth and Budge; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding usurping partnership opportunity;
conference with Kathy A. Savell; review of correspondence regarding witnesses; work on letter to Ayers and Gjording

'

1

'

4/29/2011 TAB
TAB
5/5/2011
TAB
5/6/2011
5/9/2011 ITAB

1.8
1
0.9
2.4

I

5/11/2011 iTAB
5/12/2011 TAB

0.5
2.9

5/17/2011 TAB
5/18/2011 TAB
5/19/2011 TAB
TAB
6/6/2011
6/10/2011 TAB
6/16/2011 'TAB
6/17/2011 TAB

1
8.5
0.5
0.5
0.3
1.5
1

TAB
TAB

1.9
2.2

6/22/2011

TAB

5.9

6/23/2011

TAB

0.3

6/20/2011
6/21/2011

Review and edit materials and conference W. Woodard meeting with Budge and telephone conference Wilhoite
Telephone conference Wade L. Woodard regarding motion to recuse and consideration of response
Emails to Wade L. Woodard and Dara Parker regarding response to motion to recuse and review motion.
Conference with Dara Parker and Wade L. Woodard regarding motion to recuse; telephone conference with Dr. Prochaska
regarding news release relative to Eismann; review order on motion for summary judgment; review and respond to
correspondence from Gjording.
Conference Wade L. Woodard regarding motions to be heard and letter to Gjording.
Email from Prochaska, call to Kelly (bankruptcy counsel), review SARMC discovery; conference with Wade L. Woodard
regarding status and go forward plan
Prepare for hearing.
Prepare for and attend hearing; attend MRIA board meeting.
Telephone conference with Drew Voth; review correspondence from Prochaska; review materials from Voth.
Review brief on depositions of Bruce and Schamp.
Conference regarding motions and pro hac vice.
Review filings of SARMC.
Telephone conference Gjording; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding expert report and to do; correspondence with
experts regarding deposition dates.
Meeting regarding to-do; call to Gjording
Review report of McCarthy and telephone conference Prochaska, review decision and conference with Wade L. Woodard.

003985

Review McCarthy report and assign matter to Kathy A. Savell; meet with Prochaska; attend motion to compel; and attend
board meeting; telephone conference with Gjording regarding depositions of experts; conference with opposing counsel
regarding stipulation.
Review email from Dara Parker regardin_g closi11g argu_ment of Gjording and further review of McCarthy.
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I

Date

Staff

HRS

Description

7/1/2011

TAB

0.9

Telephone conferences with Jack Gjording; conference with Wade L. Woodard and Dara Parker regarding rebuttal opinions.

7/4/2011
7/5/2011

TAB
TAB

2
4.6

7/6/2011
7/7/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

3.3
5.4
7.9
5.3
4.9
7.2
6.8
4.2

Review trial transcript.
Telephone conference with Gjording; review McCarthy report; telephone conference with Budge regarding rebuttal;
telephone conference with Prochaska; email to Board regarding settlement offer; begin review of Prochaska testimony.
Review trial transcript and meeting with trial team; telephone conference with Budge regarding regression analysis.
Review trial transcript; telephone conference with Prochaska; letter to Ayers regarding settlement offer.
Prepare for trial--review of exhibits and trial testimony.
Prepare for trial--review exhibits and witness testimony.
Prepare for trial-review exhibits.
Meet with Dave Giles; review exhibits.
Team meeting; telephone conference with experts and Floyd; meet with Giles; prepare for trial; review jury instructions.
Conference with WadeL. Woodard regarding damages; meet with Dara Parker and WadeL. Woodard regarding instructions
and telephone conference with Budge; meeting with Henson; review of exhibits.
Prepare for trial; meet with Giles; begin preparation for McCarthy deposition.
Prepare for deposition of McCarthy; conference with Giles; review correspondence from opposing counsel.
Prepare for McCarthy deposition and team meeting; letters to Gjording; travel to LA and further preparation.
Prepare for and attend McCarthy deposition.
I
Work on timeline; prepare for trial; conference with Giles; return from LA.
I
Work on trial preparation and mock trial.
Work on timeline; meeting with Giles; work with Kathy A. Savell regarding timeline and subpoenas; telephone conference
I
with Drew Voth and Budge.
Team meeting; conference with clients; telephone conference with experts; telephone conference with opposing counsel;
I
review brief in opposition to motion in limine.
Prepare for trial; conferences with Wade L. Woodard and Dara Parker.
Prepare for trial.
Deposition of Jeffcoat; prepare for mock trial.
Mock trial.
Prepare for trial (depo of Hall and Sea bourn testimony).
Review jury instructions and various motions; commence exam preparation; meet with Kathy A. Savell regarding new exhibits
to list.
Prepare for trial. (Exam of Cliff) (Exam of SBB)
Meeting with Giles, Floyd and Wallace; work on examinations.
Prepare for and attend motion hearing; prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial; exams of Cliff and Bruce; work on timeline.
Work on timeline.
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7/8/2011
7/9/2011
7/10/2011
7/11/2011
7/12/2011
7/13/2011

7/14/2011 TAB
7/18/2011 TAB
7/19/2011 TAB
7/20/2011 TAB
7/21/2011 TAB
7/23/2011 TAB
7/25/2011 TAB
7/26/2011

TAB

4.4
3.7
10.6
10.5
6.7
8.5
5.9
7

I

7/27/2011 TAB
7/28/2011 'TAB
7/29/2011 TAB
7/30/2011 TAB
7/31/2011 TAB
TAB
8/1/2011

003986

8/3/2011
8/4/2011
8/5/2011
8/6/2011
8/7/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

7.2
8.5
6.2
9
2.5
6
5.2
7.8
8.8
3.7
1

Staff

HRS

Description

8/8/2011
8/9/2011
8/10/2011
8/11/2011
8/12/2011
8/13/2011
8/14/2011
8/15/2011
8/16/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

4.7
6.6
5.4
4.3
7.7
8.5
3.9
5.5
9.5

Work on exams; telephone conference with Wade L. Woodard and Wilhoite.
Prepare for and attend pretrial; work on exams.
Telephone conference with Wade L. Woodard and Budge; work on exams and timeline.
Telephone conferences with Budge and Wade L. Woodard; work on exams of Cliff and Schamp.
Meeting with Messmer; prepare for mock trial.
Mock trial.
Final draft on Bruce exam.
Work on Bruce exam; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding IT issues.
Prepare for trial; meeting with Prochaska.

8/17/2011

TAB

5.5

Prepare for trial

8/18/2011
8/19/2011
8/20/2011
8/21/2011
8/22/2011
8/23/2011
8/24/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

11.1
10.9
12.2
9.9
14.3
10.8
12.9

8/25/2011
8/26/2011
8/27/2011
8/28/2011
8/29/2011
8/30/2011
8/31/2011
9/1/2011
9/2/2011
9/3/2011
9/4/2011
9/5/2011
9/6/2011
9/7/2011
9/8/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

11.2
7
12.6
10.5
8.4

Prepare for trial; and prepare Henson
Prepare for trial; meeting with Prochaska
Prepare for trial and review of Giles deposition
Prepare for trial, and work on exams
Meeting with Giles and work on exams
Continued preparation of Giles, and prepare other exams
Meeting with Chris Anton; conferences with BrentS. Bastian and meetings with Wade L. Woodard regarding order of proof.
Prepare for trial.
Meet with Messmer; prepare exams and conference with Wade L. Woodard
Work on exams and other trial preparation
Prepare for trial
Prepare for trial and work on timelines
Work on exams and meetings with trial team regarding witness order and scheduling
Meeting of counsel and hearing; prepare for trial
Work on questionnaire, exhibit stipulations and work on voir dire. Prepare for trial
Prepare for trial
Review motions, assign work to team and prepare for trial
Work on opening statement; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding same; work on voir dire
Prepare for trial
Opening statement, timelines, prepare fro trial
Trial and work on exams
Trial and work with Prochaska
Prepare for and attend trial
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003987

Date

I

10
11
9.5
11
12.5
10.1
14.2
12.7
13.2
12.1

Date

Staff

HRS

Description

9/9/2011
9/10/2011
9/11/2011
9/12/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

12.3
10.1
6.1
11.5
10.2
7.1
11.4
12.1
5.5
11.1
10.2
8.5
9.2
4.8
11.1
9.2
7.7
9.2
11.1
9.9
9.3
9.2
8.8
5.4
9.9
11
5.1
4.4
10.3
7.7
6.6
10.2
9.1
8.9
10.7
3.3

Prepare for and attend trial
Work on exams; prepare for trial and telephone conference with experts
Work on exams and other trial preparation
Prepare for and attend trial
Prepare for and attend trial
Trial and work on exams
Work on exam of Bruce
Attend trial and prepare for Cliff
Work on exhibits for Bruce exam
Finalize exam of Bruce
Attend trial and work on exam
Attend trial and work on exam of Bruce
Attend trial; gather exhibits for further exam of Bruce and Schamp
Prepare for trial
Attend trial and meet with witnesses
Prepare for Schamp exam
Prepare for Schamp exam
Attend trial and meet with trial team after trial
Meet with witnesses and attend trial
Meetings with WadeL. Woodard and BrentS. Bastian regarding witness exams and attend trial
Work with Wade L. Woodard on his exams and Prepare further exam of J. Cliff.
Attend trial

003988

9/13/2011
9/14/2011
9/15/2011
9/16/2011
9/17/2011
9/18/2011
9/19/2011
9/20/2011
9/21/2011
9/22/2011
9/23/2011
9/24/2011
9/25/2011
9/26/2011
9/27/2011
9/28/2011
9/29/2011
9/30/2011
10/1/2011
10/2/2011
10/3/2011
10/4/2011
10/5/2011
10/6/2011
10/7/2011
10/8/2011
10/10/2011
10/11/2011
10/12/2011
10/13/2011
10/14/2011
10/15/2011

Meetings with Wade L. Woodard regarding motion practice and get ready for other witness exams
Work on trial preparation; meet with witnesses
Attend trial; meet with team regarding witness preparation
Prepare for and attend trial
Attend trial and meet with witness
Prepare for Friday witnesses (Traughber, Hopkins, etc)
Prepare for and attend trial
Meetings with experts and get ready for exams on Tuesday (Giles, Jeffcoat, Havlina)
Prepare for trial
Prepare for and attend trial
Attend trial and work on direct exams
Get ready for expert examination
Prepare for and attend trial
Prepare for Chamberlain
Page 48 of 65
-------

------

-

I

I

----

'

'

I

Staff

HRS

Description

10/16/2011
10/17/2011
10/18/2011
10/19/2011
10/20/2011
10/21/2011
10/22/2011
10/23/2011
10/24/2011
10/25/2011
10/26/2011
10/27/2011
10/28/2011
10/31/2011
11/8/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

5.9
8.8
10.8
7.2
12.8
11.1
10.7
5.9
14.9
10.1
10.7
12.8
12
1.5
2.5

11/9/2011

TAB

1.4

Meeting with expert and work on exams
Attend trial
Prepare for and attend trial
Prepare for and attend trial
Prepare for trial and cross exam
Attend trial and prepare cross
Work on cross for McCarthy
Prepare for trial (work on cross exams)
Attend trial; prepare for McCarthy
Attend trial; work on jury instructions
Jury instruction conference; work on closing
Work on closing
Finalize closing argument and attend trial
Attend verdict and respond to questions from court
Review brief regarding disgorgement and conference with Wade L. Woodard and Dara Parker; review findings and
conclusions conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding various post trial issues.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding post-trial matters and disgorgement; conference regarding interview of jurors.

11/14/2011 TAB
11/15/2011 TAB

1.5
1.4

11/16/2011 TAB

2.9

12/8/2011

TAB

0.7
1046

1/2/2008
1/3/2008

WLW 0.3
1WLW 1.9

1/7/2008
1/9/2008
1/17/2008
1/22/2008
1/28/2008

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

003989

Date

0.3
0.5
0.3
0.2
0.6

Review brief on judgment; conference with WadeL. Woodard and Dara Parker regarding interest.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding correspondence to SARMC board and recommendations to MRIA board
regarding mediation; final edits on memorandum.
Board meeting; telephone conference with Gjording regarding mediation; conference with BrentS. Bastian and Wade L.
Woodard regarding disgorgement.
Conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding argument on judgment/disgorgement award

Work on issues and strategies re objection to acceptance of remittitur; conference with Thomas A. Banducci re same.
Work on issues recross-appeal; research re same; conferences with Thomas A. Banducci re same; conferences with Brian
Knox re same; prepare response to objection to acceptance of remittitur
Work on issues re designation of record and recross appeal
Work on notice of cross-appeal and on designation of record; conference with Thomas A. Banducci re same
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci recross-appeal
Conference with Mark Dalley reappeal
Review order regarding costs and fees; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; telephone call to Dr. Prochaska
regarding same; work on amended judgment
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.

I
!
I

HRS

Date

Istaff

1/30/2008

WLW 0.6

2/1/2008

WLW 1.8

2/4/2008
2/5/2008

WLW 0.4

2/6/2008

WLW 1.9

2/7/2008
2/13/2008

WLW 5.7
WLW 3.4

2/14/2008

WLW 0.7

2/19/2008
2/20/2008

WLW 0.7
WLW 0.8

2/22/2008

WLW 0.9

2/26/2008
2/27/2008
2/28/2008
3/18/2008
3/18/2008
3/19/2008

WLW 0.8
WLW 1.2
WLW 1.5
WLW 1.2
WLW 0.3
WLW 0.5

3/31/2008
4/1/2008

WLW 0.7
WLW 0.5

4/3/2008

WLW 3.3

4/3/2008
4/7/2008
4/8/2008
4/9/2008

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

WLW 16.1

i
1

003990

0.4
5.1
0.4
4.9

Description

Work on issues regarding calculation of costs, affidavit regarding same and amended judgment; conferences with Lauren
Blaesing and Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; review revised order from courtregarding same
Prepare Second Amended Judgment; work on affidavit regarding costs and fees; conferences with Lauren Blaesing regarding
same; work on appeal issues and research regarding same
Finalize amended judgment; work on affidavit regarding costs; work on issues regarding amending the record for appeal;
Work on issues regarding supplemental record; work on strategies regarding appeal of antitrust claim; research regarding
various standards of review for appeal and draft brief sections regarding standards
Work on appeal; research regarding same; review objection to judgment; work on response to same; conferences with
Lauren F. Blaesing regarding same
Work on appeal issues regarding anti-trust, punitive damages and wrongful
Research regarding post-judgment interest when a remittitur is entered; prepare objection to SARMC's proposed judgment
Work on issues regarding appellate record and confirming accuracy of the record; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing
regarding same; research regarding appeal
Research regarding appeals issues; conference with Brian Knox regarding same
Work on issues regarding appeal; conference with TAB regarding same; conferences with Thomas A. Banducci and Brian Knox
regarding research projects and regarding admissibility of March 28 offer to sell letter; research regarding appeal issues
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding settlement negotiations with Jack Gjording; research regarding alleged errors
in admitting certain exhibits; conference with Dari Huskey regarding Giles notes
Research regarding appeal issues; conference with Brian Knox regarding same
Work on issues regarding supplementing records; research regarding various appeal issues
Research regarding appeal issues.
Prepare for and attend Board meeting.
Work on issues related to CDweb.
Work on issues related to CDweb; review proposed letter to St. Al's; telephone conference with Jim Prochaska; analyze
message from St. Al's regarding same.
Conference with Brian Knox regarding fiduciary duty research; work on matters regarding appellate issues and research
Research regarding appeal issues; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding appeal issues; conference with Lauren F.
Blaesing regarding record.
Review record and determine additional items to add to the record; research rules regarding cross-appeal and briefing; work
on punitive damages issue.
Research regarding appeal.
Work on punitive damages issues; research regarding same.
Work on cross appeal brief.
Review record regarding punitive damages; research regarding same work on brief regarding same
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

4/10/2008
4/11/2008
----'---···-4/14/2008
4/21/2008
4/22/2008
4/28/2008
5/12/2008
5/13/2008
5/15/2008
5/19/2008
5/20/2008
5/22/2008
5/23/2008
5/27/2008
5/28/2008

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

4.9
2.2
0.8
2.9
3.2
0.3
2.3
0.7
0.5
7.2
4.3
0.4
3.5
5.1
5.3

Review trial transcript of Sandra Bruce; research regarding punitive damages.
Research regarding punitive damages; work on brief regarding same.
Work on punitive damages issues.
Work on punitive damages portion of brief.
Work on punitive damages portion of brief.
Work on issues regarding record; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding same; work on brief.
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding appeal; review trial transcripts
Work on appeal issues
Research regarding failure to object to Jury Instructions
Research regarding various appeal issues

3.2
1.2
0.5
1.3
4.5
0.1
3.5
1.3
0.2
0.6
0.7
0.9
0.3

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

7/15/2008

WLW 0.6

7/15/2008

WLW 0.3

7/16/2008

WLW 0.5

003991

5/29/2008
5/30/2008
6/2/2008
6/10/2008
6/12/2008
6/13/2008
6/16/2008
6/17/2008
6/23/2008
6/27/2008
6/30/2008
7/11/2008
7/14/2008

1

Research regarding appeal issues
Work on antitrust issues
Work on antitrust issues
Work on antitrust issues
Work on antitrust issues; conference call with Ed Whitelaw regarding same; conferences with Thomas A. Banducci regarding
same
Work on antitrust section of brief
Work on antitrust briefing
Work on antitrust issues
work on appeal research
Work on antitrust issues; telephone conference with Ed Whitelaw regarding same; research regarding same
Work on issues regarding record
Work on antitrust issues; research regarding same
Research regarding abuse of discretion to deny discovery of 3rd party providers; work on antitrust brief
Work on appeal
Work on issues regarding objection to record
Work on issues regarding appeal and record; conferences with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding same
Review transcripts for appeal
Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding objections to record; review SARMCs objections; work on matters regarding
same
Work on appeal; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding organizing the record; telephone conference with Jim
Prochaska regarding status of appeal
Work on objections to record; letter to Jack Gjording regarding same; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding same
Telephone conference with Jack Gjording regarding objections to record; revise stipulation; telephone call with Jack Gjording
regarding same.
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!

I

i

I
I
I

I

I

Staff

7/17/2008

WLW 1.1

7/18/2008
7/22/2008
7/24/2008
7/30/2008
7/31/2008
8/19/2008
9/1/2008
9/2/2008
9/3/2008
9/4/2008
9/9/2008
9/15/2008
9/16/2008
9/17/2008
9/18/2008
9/22/2008
9/23/2008
9/24/2008
9/24/2008
9/25/2008
9/26/2008
9/27/2008
9/29/2008
9/30/2008
10/1/2008

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

0.3
0.3
0.2
1.8
0.3
2.6
2.6
0.7
1.3
0.6
0.6
3.4
0.7
2.7
0.7
3.5
4.5
0.2
15.3
2.4
6.1
2.2
7
6.2
7.2

10/2/2008
10/3/2008
10/6/2008
10/7/2008
10/8/2008
10/9/2008
10/10/2008
10/13/2008

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

6.9
3.3
7.5
7.2
5.4
6.8
5.6
1.8

003992

Date

1

HRS

Description

Work on objections to record; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; work on strategies regarding same;
telephone calls with Jack Gjording regarding stipulation.
Conference Thomas A. Banducci regarding appeal and hiring Craig Lewis; work on appeal.
Telephone calls from and to Jack Gjording regarding hearing on objection to record; work on matters regarding same.
Work on issues regarding appeal and regarding retaining Craig Lewis
Prepare for and attend hearing; meeting with Jack Gjording regarding stipulation
Review and revise stipulation regarding record; telephone conference Jack Gjording regarding same
Review trial transcripts for appeal arguments.
Review transcripts.
Review trial transcripts.
Review trial transcripts.
Review transcripts.
Telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding strategies for appeal.
Work on response to appellant's brief; telephone conference Jim Prochaska; email with Craig Lewis.
Work on response brief.
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding strategies for response brief; work on same.
Work on response brief.
Work on appeal brief; telephone conference with Craig Lewis regarding same.
Work on appeal brief; conferences with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Emails with Angie Driessen regarding settlement; emails from Mark Geston regarding same.
Work on arguments regarding wrongful dissociation; review transcripts.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal brief; telephone conferences with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Work on appeal brief; meetings with Thomas A. Banducci regarding strategies.
Work on appeal brief
Work on appeal brief; telephone conference with Jack Gjording regarding extension; conference with Thomas A. Banducci
regarding appeal strategies.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal.
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Date

Istaff

HRS

10/14/2008
10/15/2008
10/16/2008
10/17/2008
10/20/2008
10/21/2008
10/22/2008

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

6.9
8.4
7.3
3.6
7.2
7.2
4.3
6.2

003993

10/23/2008
10/24/2008
10/25/2008
10/27/2008
10/28/2008
10/29/2008
10/30/2008
10/31/2008
11/1/2008
11/3/2008
11/4/2008
11/5/2008
11/6/2008
11/7/2008
11/10/2008
11/11/2008
11/12/2008
11/13/2008
11/14/2008
11/15/2008
11/17/2008
11/18/2008
11/19/2008
11/20/2008
11/21/2008
11/22/2008
11/24/2008
12/15/2008
12/29/2008

8
7
4.7
8.1
6.4
9.1
8.6
2.5
8.3
6.2
6.6
7.2
9.3
6.6
4.1
5.2
8
2.9
0.6
8.3
9.2
10.7
10.2
9.8
7.5
5.2
0.2
0.4

Description

Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on brief
Work on appeal
Work on appeal brief
Work on appeal brief
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief
Work on appeal brief
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on response brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on brief.
Iwork on brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal.
Follow up on issues regarding SARMC's reply
Work on reply brief
Page 53 of 65

Date

Staff

HRS

Description

Work on reply brief
12/30/2008 WLW 0.3
Work on reply brief
12/31/2008 WLW 2.7
455.2
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

2.1
4.1
4.2
3.8
4.3
2
5.1
4
2.4
3.8
6.6
4.1
1.7
4.5
5.9
5.5
0.2
3.8
0.3
0.9
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.3

8/17/2009
8/18/2009
8/19/2009
9/2/2009
10/26/2009
10/27/2009

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

4.4

003994

1/1/2009
1/2/2009
1/5/2009
1/6/2009
1/7/2009
1/15/2009
1/16/2009
1/19/2009
1/20/2009
1/21/2009
1/22/2009
1/23/2009
1/26/2009
1/27/2009
1/28/2009
1/29/2009
1/31/2009
2/16/2009
2/17/2009
2/20/2009
4/1/2009
4/2/2009
5/14/2009
6/29/2009
8/6/2009

9
6
0.2
2.2
,0.6

Work on reply brief.
Work on reply brief.
Work on reply brief.
Work on reply brief.
Research regarding punitive damages.
Work on reply brief.
Work on reply brief.
Work on reply brief.
Work on reply brief.
Work on reply brief.
Work on reply brief.
Work on reply brief.
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding reply brief; work on reply brief.
Work on reply brief.
Work on reply brief.
Finalize reply brief; telephone call and emails with Jim Prochaska regarding same.
Emails with Jim Prochaska regarding briefing and hearing
Work on and revise opposition to motion to strike.
Finalize opposition to motion to strike; telephone conference with Jim Prochaska regarding status of case.
Finalize response to motion to strike.
Review order from Supreme Court regarding motion to strike.
Correspondence from Supreme Court regarding hearing.
Telephone conference with Joe Messmer regarding status of case.
Draft letter to limited partners regarding appeal
Review Supreme Court press release; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same and regarding preparing for
hearing.
Prepare for oral argument.
Prepare for oral argument.
Prepare for and attend oral argument; meeting with clients regarding same.
Emails from Jim Prochaska regarding St. Al's purchase of Mercy; work on issues regarding same.
Review decision and order and work on strategies regarding same.
Review opinion; work on strategies regarding same; telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

10/28/2009
10/29/2009
11/10/2009
11/18/2009
11/19/2009
12/17/2009

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

0.3
0.5
1.3
0.2
0.8
0.6
96.5

Work on strategies regarding petition for rehearing.
Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner regarding MRIM transaction.
Work on petition for rehearing.
Review SARMC's response regarding costs.
Draft letter to the limiteds; review response regarding objections to costs; work on issues regarding same.
Work on strategies regarding claiming damages for the limiteds.

1/20/2010
1/25/2010

WLW 2
WLW 0.3

1/27/2010

1

WLW 0.2

1/28/2010 WLW
1/28/2010 WLW
1/29/2010 WLW
WLW
2/3/2010
WLW
2/3/2010
WLW
2/4/2010
WLW
2/4/2010
3/22/2010 WLW
4/13/2010 WLW
4/14/2010 WLW
4/20/2010 WLW
4/27/2010 WLW
WLW
5/5/2010
WLW
5/7/2010
5/10/2010 ·WLW

0.3
3.2
0.3
1.5
0.4
0.3
0.4
2.1
2.1
1.2
0.5
0.2
0.4
3.6
2.1

WLW 1.8
WLW 0.6
WLW 3.1

6/11/2010

WLW 0.4

003995

5/11/2010
5/19/2010
5/21/2010

Meeting with juror from first trial; meeting with Jim Prochaska regarding settlement issues.
Telephone conference with Jim Prochaska regarding Stoel Rives conflict issue; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding
same.
Telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding disqualifying Judge Neville; telephone conference to Jim Prochaska
regarding same.
Work on issues regarding whether to strike Judge Wetherell.
Telephone conference with counsel from Stoel Rives regarding CHI/Trinity transaction.
Work on strategies regarding striking Judge Wetherell.
I
Telephone conference with Don Ayers and Jack Gjording; work on issues regarding damages under Pope.
I
Emails with Margaret Kushner regarding issues regarding extension of the lease.
Work on strategies for extending the partnership term of the limiteds.
Correspondence with Margaret Kushner regarding partnership term issue; research regarding same.
Work on 3rd amended counterclaim.
Review memorandum regarding joinder of limiteds; research regarding same; work on strategies regarding same.
Research regarding Pope requirements and testimony at the first trial.
Review motion to strike; conference with Dara Labrum regarding strategies regarding same.
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding status conference.
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding status conference and strategies for same.
Prepare for and attend hearing; work on related matter; work on expert issues regarding Pope.
Correspondence with Charles Wilhoite and Bruce Budge regarding the effects of Pope on their reports; work on strategies for
dealing with Pope; email to Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; review opinion and Pope as well as expert reports.
I

Work on dealing with the Pope decision and its affect on MRIA's damages analysis.
Telephone conference with Bruce Budge regarding damages issues; analyze Pope and work on matters regarding same.
Prepare for meeting with Bruce Budge; review issues regarding Pope and evidence regarding same; meeting with Bruce
Budge regarding revising expert reports; meeting with Jim Prochaska regarding status of case and case strategies.
Review letter from Don p..yers; draft response to same.
Page 55 of 65

I

Date

Staff

HRS

WLW 1.5
I

6/29/2010
7/1/2010
7/2/2010
7/6/2010

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

0.6
0.5
0.8
0.9

7/7/2010
7/8/2010
7/12/2010
7/13/2010
7/20/2010

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

0.9
0.3
0.2
0.2
1.1

7/21/2010
7/22/2010
7/26/2010
7/27/2010
7/28/2010
7/29/2010
7/30/2010
8/2/2010
8/6/2010
8/7/2010
8/9/2010
8/10/2010
8/11/2010
8/12/2010
8/13/2010
8/14/2010
8/15/2010
8/16/2010

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

4.2
1.1
4.2
5.5
3.3
3.9
6.9
5.8
2.3
2.2
7.2
8.3
8.5
6.6
9.2
6.2
0.8
5.5

8/17/2010
8/18/2010
8/19/2010

WLW 7.7
WLW 7
WLW 8.4

003996

6/15/2010

Description

Correspondence from Don Ayers; emails with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; prepare for and attend MRIA board
meeting.
Work on response to motion to strike; conference with Dara Labrum regarding same.
Work on response to motion to strike; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Revise response to motion to strike.
Review SARMC reply ISO motion to strike; research regarding new arguments raised in same; conference with Dara Labrum
and Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Prepare for hearing and research regarding same; provide input on discovery requests; work on Pope issue.
Assist in preparing for hearing.
Conference with Dara Labrum regarding hearing and scheduling issues; work on same.
Review order; work on issues regarding briefing schedule.
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding case strategies; work on Pope issues; telephone call from Jim Prochaska
regarding meeting.
Research regarding Pope issues.
Work on Pope issues.
Work on Pope issues.
Research regarding Pope issues.
Work on Pope issues.
Work on Pope issues.
Work on Pope issues.
Work on Pope issues.
Work on Pope issues; conference with BrentS. Bastian and Thomas A. Banducci regarding partnership for term issues.
Review motions for summary judgment; work on strategies for responses to same.
Work on response to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment
Telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding motions for summary judgment; work on responses to same;
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment; meeting with Bob Bakes; meeting/telephone conference with experts.
Work on responses to motion for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motion for summary judgment.
Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner and Jim Prochaska regarding settlement; work on responses to motions for
summary judgment.
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Staff

HRS

Description

8/20/2010
8/21/2010
8/23/2010
8/24/2010
8/25/2010
8/26/2010
8/27/2010
8/28/2010
8/30/2010
8/31/2010
9/3/2010
9/17/2010
9/21/2010
9/27/2010
9/28/2010
9/29/2010
9/30/2010
10/1/2010

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

5.5
7
8.2
6.9
4.2
8.1
7.6
2.8
7.1
1.2
0.3
1.1
0.6
0.8
6.3
6.8
7.6
5.8

10/4/2010
10/7/2010
10/11/2010
12/28/2010
12/30/2010

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

1.2
1.3
0.6
0.4
0.5
240.7

Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Finalize oppositions to motions for summary judgment.
Work on issues regarding offset claim on departing partner's share; research regarding same
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci with settlement; work on issues regarding $4.6 million.
Prepare for hearing; conferences with BrentS. Bastian regarding same.
Prepare for hearing.
Prepare for hearing
Prepare for hearing
Prepare for hearing
Prepare for hearing; meeting with Bob Bakes
Prepare for and attend hearing on motions for summary judgment; research regarding supplemental briefing requested by
the Court.
Research regarding issues raised by court at hearing regarding applicability of the old statute vs. RUPA.
Work on strategies regarding departing partner's share.
Review new case regarding law of case; work on strategies regarding whether to submit supplemental authorities.
Review motion regarding discovery and experts; conference with Dara Parker regarding response to same.
Work on issues regarding settlement strategies and response to motion for discovery.

1/6/2011
1/10/2011
1/11/2011

WLW 0.5
WLW 1.9
WLW 2.9

Work on issues regarding scheduling of trial; work on response to motion for discovery.
Work on opposition to motion for discovery.
Review transcripts for response to motion seeking discovery; work on response; review SARMC's proposed scheduling order.

1/12/2011
1/18/2011
1/20/2011
1/26/2011
1/27/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

Review record for evidence regarding damages to oppose motion for discovery; draft Prochaska affidavit.
Work on responses to motions for discovery and scheduling order.
Work on opposition to motion regarding discovery.
Revise opposition to motion for discovery.
Work on opposition to motion for discovery.

003997

Date

2.2
2.1
0.4
0.5
0.4
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Date

Staff

1/28/2011

WLW 0.9

1/31/2011
2/2/2011
2/7/2011
2/8/2011
2/9/2011
2/14/2011
2/15/2011
2/16/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

2/17/2011
2/18/2011

WLW 0.5
WLW 1.4

HRS

2.6
4.2
0.8
1.5
0.7
1.1
0.2
0.3

2/21/2011 iWLW 3.1
I

Description

Telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding letter from SARMC; telephone conference with Jim Prochaska
regarding same; work on response to motion for fees.
Research regarding authority of court on remand; revise objection to scheduling order
Revise and finalize opposition briefs.
Review SARMC's reply in support of motion for discovery; prepare for hearing.
Prepare for hearing; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Prepare for hearing; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding hearing and going forward strategies; work on matters regarding same
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding bond issues.
Review scheduling order; work on issues regarding same; conference with Dara Parker regarding moving for clarification.
Work on issues regarding motion for clarification.
Work on strategies regarding experts; research regarding time limitation cut-off; correspondence with Charles Wilhoite
regarding expert reports.
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding expert opinions and strategies regarding same; research regarding alternative
damages theories; prepare new discovery requests; draft letter to Jack Gjording regarding discovery issues.
Prepare for and attend meeting with Bruce Budge and Charles Wilhoite regarding damages; correspondence regarding same;
telephone call to Jack Gjording regarding scheduling issues.
Prepare for telephone conference; telephone conference with SARMC's counsel regarding scheduling; conference with
Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; correspondence from experts; work on issues regarding bond.
Telephone conference from Bruce Budge and Drew Voth regarding expert report; email to Jim Prochaska regarding same;
correspondence with Chris Vergonis regarding revising stipulation; revise stipulation.
Meeting with Jim Prochaska.
Letter from Tom Dvorak; email to Jim Prochaska regarding same.

WLW 1

2/25/2011

WLW 0.9

3/2/2011

WLW 0.6

3/3/2011
3/4/2011
3/7/2011
3/7/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

3/9/2011
3/10/2011
3/11/2011

WLW 0.2
WLW 0.5
WLW 1.2

Correspondence with Jim Prochaska and others regarding bond and payment of judgment.
Prepare letter to Chris Vergonis regarding discovery; work on issues regarding Eagle facility.
Telephone conference with Jim Prochaska regarding Westermeirer email; telephone conference with Margaret Kushner and
Jim Prochaska regarding same; revise email to Westermeier regarding same; email to Jim Prochaska regarding Dara Parker.

WLW 0.5
WLW 0.4
WLW 0.6

Finalize letter to Dvorka; work on new discovery requests.
Work on discovery requests.
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding discovery issues; work on same; telephone call to Dara Parker regarding
same; telephone call from Tom Dvorak.
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003998

2/24/2011

3/14/2011
3/15/2011
3/16/2011

0.9
0.3
0.4
3.7

Letter from Chris'lfE!rgonis; _work on issues regarding same.
Prepare for and attend meeting with Mike Rowe, Jim Prochaska, David Giles and Jack Floyd; prepare response to Tom Dvorak
regarding collection efforts.

-------

Date

Staff

HRS

3/17/2011
3/17/2011

WLW 0.4
WLW 0.5

3/18/2011
3/18/2011

WLW 0.4
WLW 2.6

3/21/2011

WLW 2.7

3/21/2011
3/22/2011
3/23/2011
3/24/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

3/25/2011

WLW 3.1

0.5
2.4
4
2.9

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

0.2
0.3
1.6
4.5
2.3

4/7/2011
4/8/2011
4/11/2011
4/12/2011
4/13/2011
4/14/2011
4/15/2011
4/18/2011
4/19/2011
4/20/2011
4/25/2011
4/26/2011
4/27/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

0.6
0.7
0.6
4.9
5.5
5.6
4.7
3.8
6.1
5.4
5.1
5.1
3.3

4/28/2011

WLW 3.5

003999

3/30/2011
4/1/2011
4/4/2011
4/5/2011
4/6/2011

Description

Work on discovery responses.
Review and revise stipulation regarding stay of execution; telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same;
telephone conference with Jim Prochaska regarding same; telephone call from Jack Floyd regarding same.
I
Finalize stipulation regarding judgment; letter to Tom Dvorak regarding same.
Work on motion to compel; review and revise motion response to motion for summary judgment; work on motion for
clarification; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding case strategies.
Meeting with Giles, Prochaska and Floyd regarding case strategies; work on discovery issues; work on motion for clarification.
Revise stipulation; correspondence with Tom Dvorka regarding same.
Revise response regarding motion for summary judgment.
Work on response to motion for summary judgment.
Finalize response to motion for summary judgment; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding strategies regarding
motions regarding departing partner share; research regarding same.
Revise response to motion for summary judgment; work on motion regarding departing partner share; strategies regarding
possible motions in limine; conferences with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Work on discovery issues.
Work on discovery responses.
Revise motion for clarification and motions in limine.
Revise departing partner share brief.

i
I

Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner regarding departing partner share issues and regarding settlement; revise brief
regarding departing partner share.
Make final revisions to motion regarding departing partner share.
I
Work on discovery matters.
Finalize motions; work on expert reports.
Work on strategies for responding to the nine motions for summary judgment and in limine filed by St. Al's.
Work on responses to nine motions filed by SARMC.
I
Work on responses to motions; work on expert report issues; correspondence with Drew Voth regarding same.
Work on responses to motions.
Work on responses to motions in limine and motions for summary judgment; prepare affidavit of Jim Prochaska.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment and motions in limine.
Work on responses to motions.
Finalize responses to motions.
Work on issues regarding expert reports; research regarding fiduciary duty claims.
work on damages strategies; telephone conference with Experts regarding same; separate telephone conference with Drew
Voth regarding usurping corporate opportunities; research regarding same
Work on reply briefs; work on discovery issues; work with experts on reports
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Date

Staff

HRS

4/29/2011
5/2/2011
5/3/2011

WLW 3.9
WLW 3.9
WLW 0.9

5/3/2011

WLW 0.5

5/4/2011

WLW 1.3

5/5/2011

WLW 2.2

5/6/2011

WLW 2.4

5/9/2011

WLW 0.7

5/10/2011

WLW 0.7
I

5/11/2011
5/12/2011

WLW 0.5
WLW 2.8

5/13/2011
5/16/2011

WLW 2.6
WLW 4.3

004000

5/17/2011 WLW 4.2
5/18/2011 WLW 5.8
5/19/2011 WLW 0.4
WLW 0.5
6/2/2011
WLW 0.3
6/7/2011
,WLW 0.2
6/8/2011
WLW 0.3
6/9/2011
6/10/2011 WLW 0.9
6/13/2011 IWLW 1.8
6/14/2011 WLW 0.7
6/15/2011

WLW 0.7

Description

Finalize expert reports; meetings and telephone conferences with experts regarding same
Finalize and serve expert reports.
Revise motion to strike; work on strategies regarding damage theories; email from Thomas A. Banducci regarding same;
telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Review reply briefs; correspondence with Dara Parker regarding motion to compel; review Gjording Affidavit and work on
strategies regarding motion to strike.
Review discovery responses; correspondence with Dara Labrum regarding meet and confer; correspondence and telephone
conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; work on damage theories;
Work on issues regarding inadequate discovery responses; work on damages strategies; review motion to recuse and work
on issues regarding same
Review motion to disqualify; correspondence with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; work on strategies regarding
response to same
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding discovery issues; correspondence regarding same; correspondence with
experts and telephone call from Bruce Budge; review ruling on motion for summary judgment.
Telephone conference with Charles Wilhoite regarding damages; work on issues regarding themes; conference with Thomas
A. Banducci regarding same; work on discovery issues and responses regarding same; review and revise letter to court
regarding appeal.
Review and revise opposition to recusal.
Review discovery responses; work on issues regarding objections; review new discovery requests; work on responses;
conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding case strategies; prepare for hearing.
Work on discovery responses; prepare for hearing.
Prepare for hearing; telephone conference with Drew Voth regarding supplement to report; emails with Jim Prochaska
regarding same.
Telephone call from Drew Voth regarding changes to report; emails from client regarding hearing; prepare for hearing.
Prepare for and attend hearing; work on issue raised at hearing.
Work on supplement to expert report.
Work on discovery responses.
Work on discovery issues.
Follow up on status of discovery responses.
Conference with Jeri regarding SARMC's motion to compel and work on issues regarding same.
Work on issues regarding motion to compel and SARMC's request to change our hearing date.
Work on responses to motion to shorten time and motion to compel.
Conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding response to motion to compel; work on issues regarding same; work on strategies
regarding reply regarding witnesses.
Review and revise reply brief.
----
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Date

Staff

6/20/2011

WLW 2.2

Strategy meeting with Thomas A. Banducci; work on reply regarding witnesses; work on issues regarding motion to compel.

WLW 1.2

Review rulings on motions; work on issues regarding same; telephone conference with Jim Prochaska; review McCarthy
report.
Review SARMC's expert report; work on issues regarding same; prepare for meeting with clients; attend MRIA board meeting.

6/21/2011

HRS

I

WLW 3.1

6/23/2011
7/1/2011

WLW 0.4
WLW 0.7

7/2/2011
7/5/2011

WLW 0.5
WLW 0.5

7/6/2011
7/7/2011
7/8/2011
7/9/2011
7/11/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

1
0.9
0.6
1
0.7

7/12/2011
7/13/2011
7/14/2011
7/18/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

1.5
1.3
0.8
3.9

7/19/2011
7/20/2011
7/21/2011
7/22/2011
7/23/2011
7/26/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

6.6
7
7.2
6.1
5
7.5

7/27/2011
7/28/2011
7/29/2011
f-'--------'- ·7/30/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

7.1
8
9.2
7.8
6.6

004001

6/22/2011

8/1/2011

Description

Work on jury instructions; telephone call from Tom Henson.
Work on issues regarding rebuttal expert report; telephone call from Bruce Budge regarding same; telephone conference
with Jack Gjording regarding depositions; review letter regarding settlement; work on issues regarding same.
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding SARMC's settlement offer; work on settlement strategies.
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding settlement and regarding case strategies; revise letter to clients regarding
settlement; work on issues regarding case strategies.
Trial meeting; prepare for trial.
Work on settlement and case strategies; conferences with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Work on causation strategies.
Prepare for mock trial; meeting with Banducci's.
Meeting with David Giles; work on trial strategies; correspondence and conferences with Thomas A. Banducci regarding
same.
Trial strategy meeting; prepare for trial.
Work on jury instructions.
Prepare for trial.
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding order of proof; review SARMC's proposed instructions; work on objections to
same; review transcripts.
Attend strategy meeting; review transcripts.
Review transcripts; work on evidentiary issues; work on damages issue and rebuttal.
Prepare for trial.
Review transcripts; work on rebuttal report; prepare for mock jury.
Prepare for mock jury.
Work on supplemental expert reports; attend trial strategy meeting; attend telephone conference with opposing counsel
regarding exhibits and witnesses; meeting with clients; telephone conferences with experts; prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial.
Work on expert issues; prepare for mock trial.
Finalize expert reports; work on exams; prepare for mock trial; work on causation issues.
Prepare for and attend mock trial.
Deposition preparation with Wilhoite; telephone conference with Drew Voth and correspondence; work on Floyd
examination; work on exhibit issues; work on illustrative exhibits; review objection from St. Al's.
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Date

Staff

8/2/2011
8/3/2011
8/4/2011

WLW 6.1
WLW 5.6
WLW 6.4

8/5/2011
8/8/2011
8/9/2011

WLW 8.3
WLW 7.6
WLW 14.2

8/10/2011
8/11/2011

WLW 7.4
WLW 8.1
WLW 6.2
WLW 7
WLW 6.5
WLW 7

8/12/2011
8/13/2011
8/15/2011
8/16/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

9/1/2011
9/2/2011
9/3/2011
9/4/2011
9/5/2011
9/6/2011
9/7/2011
9/8/2011
9/9/2011
9/10/2011
9/11/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

004002

8/22/2011
8/23/2011
8/24/2011
8/25/2011
8/26/2011
8/27/2011
8/29/2011
8/30/2011
8/31/2011

HRS

7.9
7.3
9.1
7.8
8.7
7.7
8.3
9.3
WLW 9.9
6.9
8.8
8.3
4.9
5
10.8
11.2
9.8
11.1
6.7
5.6

Description

Review transcripts; prepare exams.
Review St. Al's proposed stipulations; work on response to same; work on witness exams.
Telephone conference with Charles Wilhoite; prepare for depositions; meeting with Holly Wallace and Jack Floyd; prepare for
hearings.
Prepare for hearings on motions; attend hearings; prepare witness exams.
Prepare for depositions; telephone conference with Charles Wilhoite.
Travel to Portland; meet with Charles Wilhoite; defend deposition of Charles Wilhoite; travel to Seattle; prepare for
deposition of Bruce Budge.
Prepare for deposition of Bruce Budge; meet with Bruce Budge and Drew Voth; review transcripts.
Prepare for and defend deposition of Bruce Budge; travel to Boise; prepare for mock trial.
Prepare for meeting with Joe Messmer; meeting with Joe Messmer; prepare for mock trial; work on damages issues.
Participate in mock trial.
Meeting with Jack Floyd and Holly Wallace; review exhibits.
Prepare for trial; meeting with Jim Prochaska; letter to Jack Gjording; email to experts regarding demonstratives; work in
exams.
Meet with witnesses; prepare for trial.
Meeting with Holly Wallace; work on demonstrative exhibits; telephone conference with Charles Wilhoite.
Work on exams; work on demonstratives; review order regarding motions.
Work on timelines; objections to exhibits; interview of Joe Messmer.
Meeting with Holly Wallace and Jack Floyd; work on timelines; objections to exhibits and witness exams.
Review St. Al's demonstrative; work on expert issues; work on witness exams and IT timeline.
Prepare exams; research regarding stark and antikickback; work with experts on damages.
Attend questionnaire hearing; attend meeting of counsel regarding stipulations; prepare for trial.
Work on jury questionnaire and conference with opposing counsel regarding same; work on exhibit stipulations and letter
regarding same; prepare witness exams; work on voir dire questions; review motion filed by St. Al's.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial; prepare for and attend hearing; review new motions filed by SARMC.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial.
Work on opening statements; work voir dire.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; interview with potential witnesses.
Interview witnesses; work on opening; prepare exams.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial; telephone calls with experts; work on exams.
Witness preparation with Jack Floyd.
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HRS

Description

9/12/2011
9/13/2011
9/14/2011
9/14/2011
9/15/2011
9/16/2011
9/17/2011
9/18/2011
9/19/2011
9/20/2011
9/21/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

11.4
12.3
0.6
10.9
1.7
10.2
5.2
3.3
9.2
11.9
9.5

9/22/2011
9/23/2011
9/24/2011
9/25/2011
9/26/2011
9/27/2011
9/28/2011
9/29/2011
9/30/2011
10/1/2011
10/2/2011
10/3/2011
10/4/2011
10/5/2011
10/6/2011
10/7/2011
10/8/2011
10/9/2011
10/10/2011
10/11/2011
10/12/2011
r---:
10/13/2011
10/14/2011
10/15/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

4.5
10
4.5
2
10.9
12.5
9.7
9.3
10.3
7
5.8
13
10.9
11.1
7
10.2
6.6
4.1
10.4
13.1
8.5
8.8
11
7

Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and a_ttend trial; work on strategies regarding Bushi.
Prepare for mediation.
Prepare for and attend trial; work with witnesses.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial.
Work on opposition to exclude damage theories.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on damages opposition and prepare for hearing.
Prepare for and attend trial; prepare for hearing on experts.
Prepare for and attend trial; prepare for and attend hearing regarding damages experts; work on issues regarding research
regarding mistrial.
Attend trial meeting; work on witness exams.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Work with witnesses.
Work on witness exams.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; meetings with witnesses.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on motion in limine; work on witness exams
Prepare witnesses; work on expert issues
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial; work on motions.
Prepare for trial; work on motions.
Prepare for and attend trial; work with witnesses.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on expert issues; prepare witness exams.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Meeting with Bruce Budge; work on witness exams; telephone conference with Charles Wilhoite.
Prepare for trial; work on motions in limine.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; prepare for following day.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on expert issues.
Work on expert issues; meet with experts.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare cross exams.
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Date

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

10/16/2011
10/17/2011
10/18/2011
10/19/2011
10/20/2011
10/21/2011
10/21/2011
10/23/2011
10/24/2011
10/25/2011
10/26/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

7.3
14.5
11.8
9.6
5.8
6.5
11
4.5
13.5
10.5
10.3

Prepare cross exams.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on cross-examinations.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare cross of Leslie Kelly Hall.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on jury instructions; prepare for oral argument regarding directed verdict.
Prepare for and attend trial;
Prepare for and attend jury instruction conference; research regarding issues regarding same; work on closing argument
issues.
Work on verdict form and jury instructions; work on briefs regarding same; review transcript for closing arguments and
otherwise prepare for closing arguments.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Correspondence regarding exhibits.
Correspondence regarding exhibits; work on issues regarding same.
Work on issues regarding exhibits; work on post trial matters; work on attorneys fees; attend hearing for jury verdict
Work on issues regarding judgment; telephone calls from reporters; work on prejudgment interest issue.
Work on findings of fact regarding disgorgement.
Work on attorneys fees motion; revise findings of fact regarding disgorgement; meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding
same
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding strategies for settlement; review opposition to judgment; work on issues
regarding same; work on attorneys fees issues.

10/27/2011 WLW 9.5
10/28/2011
10/29/2011
10/30/2011
10/31/2011
11/2/2011
11/7/2011
11/8/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

11.5
0.5
0.5
3.9
1.9
3.3
3.5

11/9/2011

WLW 3

11/10/2011 WLW 1.1
11/11/2011
11/14/2011
11/15/2011
11/16/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

2.4
2.7
2.2
3.4

004004

11/17/2011 WLW 2.2

11/18/2011 WLW 1.5
11/28/2011 WLW .0.3

Work on attorneys' fees motion; conference with Dara Parker regarding strategies for responding to objections to findings of
fact.
Work on objections to St. Al's request for offset and prejudgment interest.
Work on objection to offset and prejudgment interest; work on attorneys fees petition.
Work on settlement strategies; finalize response brief regarding judgment;
Work on response brief regarding judgment and disgorgement; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding settlement
strategies; attend board meeting.
Work on response to judgment motion; work on issues regarding settlement; telephone call from David Giles regarding
same; telephone conference with reporter from Lawyers USA.
Work on response regarding disgorgement.
Review replies regarding judgment.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

11/29/2011
11/30/2011
12/9/2011
12/13/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
.WLW

0.6
0.3
0.6
0.6

Work on attorney's fees petition; conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding same.
Work attorneys' fees issues; conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding same.
Review briefs; conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding hearing
Work on motion for fees
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EXHIBIT B
Date

TGtal Our

Rate/Price

Description

Amt

Copies

2/29/2008
4/28/2008
5/29/2008
6/30/2008
7/14/2008
7/18/2008
9/17/2008
10/1/2008
12/1/2008
1/5/2009
3/6/2009
5/1/2009
8/4/2009
8/31/2009
10/30/2009
11/30/2009
2/28/2010
4/1/2010
5/1/2010
5/31/2010
6/30/2010
7/31/2010
8/31/2010
9/30/2010
1/31/2011
2/28/2011
3/31/2011
4/22/2011
4/30/2011
5/31/2011
6/22/2011
6/30/2011
7/8/2011
7/31/2011
8/16/2011
8/31/2011
8/31/2011
9/14/2011
9/30/2011
10/31/2011
11/30/2011

0.1
1
1
1
1
1
1
422
1
1
1
25
1031
2493
31
506
66
506
46
28
261
568
1226
70
563
938
574
1
2477
770
5
975

$

120.00
3.96
105.66
265.08

$
$
$
$ 3,520.42
177.90
$
56.40
$
0.15
$
235.80
$
41.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
72.39
$
0.20
$
0.20
$
1.00
$
0.20
$

13040 $

0.20

13772 $
9439 $
439 $

0.20
0.20
0.20

$12.00
$3.96
$105.66
$265.08
$3,520.42
$177.90
$56.40
$63.30
$235.80
$41.20
$0.20
$5.00
$206.20
$498.60
$6.20
$101.20
$13.20
$101.20
$9.20
$5.60
$52.20
$113.60
$245.20
$14.00
$112.60
$187.60
$114.80
$72.39
$495.40
$154.00
$5.00
$195.00
$87.01
$2,608.00
$128.88
$2,317.05
$2,502.40
$3,116.50
$2,754.40
$1,887.80
$87.80
-$500.00
$22,179.95

Copy Charges- February
Document scanning and OCR
Copy Charges
Imaging blowbacks and binders
Copy Charges and bindering and trial transcripts
Imaging blowbacks with autofeed
Copy Charges and bindering
Copy Charges
Copy Charges- Litigation copying and binder creation.
Copy Charges- Litigation copying and binding
Copy Charges
Copy charges- April
Copy charges- July
Copy Charges August
Copy charges for October
Copy charges for month of November
Copy charges for February
Copy charges for March
Copy charges for April
Copy charges for May
Copy charges for June
Copy charges for July
Copy Charges for August
Copy September
Copy Charges for January
Copy charges
Copy charges for March 2011
Electronic Conversion and Bates numbering
Copy Print charges for April
Copy charges
Copying Charges- Color
Copy charges for June
Electronic Conversion of Documents for Trial Presentation
Copy charges for July
Copies of Exhibits
Electronic Conversion of Documents for Trial Presentation
Copies of Exhibits
Illustrative Exhibits for Trial
Copy charges for September
Copy charges for October
Copy charges for November
Costs as Matter of Right

1
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EXHIBIT B
MISC. FEES

7/11/2011
7/30/2011
7/30/2011
7/30/2011
8/13/2011
9/9/2011
10/31/2011

13.00
3 $
2 $ 3,000.00
24 $
150.00
1 $
63.75
46.75
1 $
1 $
1 $

100.00
185.31

$39.00 Fee to move 30 boxes of file and exhibits from storage
$6,000.00 LGB Consulting fee for focus groups
$3,600.00 Fee to focus group participants
$63.75 Additional staffing for first focus group
$46.75 Contract labor for second focus group
$100.00 Contract labor to move boxes of exhibits, etc. to court for trial
$185.31 Trial - Movers cost of transporting files to/from courthouse
$10,034.81

FEDERAL EXPRESS CHARGES

8/27/2008
9/29/2008
2/26/2009
11/30/2009
4/30/2011

1
1
1
1
1

$
$
$
$
$

84.80
33.09
51.65
27.98
62.28

$84.80
$33.09
$51.65
$27.98
$62.28

Fed Ex charges for July and August
Fed Ex
FedEx February
Fed Ex- November
Fed Ex charges- April

$259.80
MEALS

11/24/2008
8/25/2009
7/30/2011
8/2/2011
8/12/2011
8/13/2011
8/19/2011
8/29/2011
8/31/2011
9/30/2011
10/31/2011

28.00
10.27
175.00
16.48

$28.00
$10.27
$175.00
$16.48

1 $
47.09
196.23
1 $
18.55
1 $
1 $
11.66
1 $
41.35
1 $ 1,016.84
1 $ 1,778.40

$47.09
$196.23
$18.55
$11.66
$41.35
$1,016.84
$1,778.40
$3,339.87

1
1
1
1

$
$
$
$

Meals- Saturday meal for staff working on brief
Meals- TAB
Meals- Lunch and snacks for first focus group
Meals- TAB/WLW/Bruce Budge
Meals- Lunch for Thomas A. Banducci, Wade L. Woodard and
Joe Messmer
Meals- Lunch and snacks for second focus group
Meals- Lunch during meeting with Dr. Prochaska
Meals- Attorney's dinner during trial preparation
Meals- Trial preparation lunch meeting
Meals during trial for attorneys and witnesses
Trial Meals for month of October

PARKING

3/1/2010
8/1/2010
8/13/2010
10/1/2010
9/30/2011
10/31/2011

1 $
1
1
1
1
1

$
$
$
$
$

5.00
5.00
7.50
3.00
129.00
109.00

$5.00 Parking for Thomas A. Banducci during hearing
Parking for hearing- Hearing on Motion to Strike Immaterial
$5.00 Matter from the 3rd Amended Counterclaim
$7.50 Parking for Dara Labrum at court house
$3.00 Parking at courthouse- TAB
$129.00 Parking during trial
$109.00 Trial Parking for month of October

$258.50
WITNESS LOCATION

7/11/2011

1 $

24.00

$24.00 Online survey service assistance

2

004008

EXHIBIT B

7/29/2011
7/31/2011
8/1/2011

1 $
1 $
1 $

43.50
3.80
29.95

$43.50 Online searches for Dr. Traughber
$3.80 Online address searches for witnesses
$29.95 Online research to locate witnesses

$101.25

TRAVEL

1 $
1 $
1 $

395.48

7/21/2011
7/21/2011
7/22/2011

1 $

442.27

7/22/2011

1 $

50.40

7/22/2011

1 $

23.00

7/22/2011

1 $

49.50

8/1/2011
8/3/2011

1 $
1 $

541.23
20.95

8/11/2011
8/11/2011

1 $
1 $

360.04
142.68

8/11/2011

34.50

8/11/2011

1 $
1 $

168.00

8/31/2011

1 $

345.18

8/31/2011

1 $

863.18

7/19/2011

7.40
52.50

Travel -Airfare for Thomas A. Banducci to LA for deposition of
$395.48 Dr. Thomas McCarthy
$7.40 Travel - Meal for Thomas A. Banducci in LA during deposition
$52.50 Travel -Taxi for Thomas A. Banducci in Los Angeles
Travel - Lodging in LA for Thomas A. Banducci for deposition of
$442.27 Dr. Thomas McCarthy
$50.40 Travel - Meals in LA for Thomas A. Banducci during deposition
Travel - Parking at Boise airport for Thomas A. Banducci during
$23.00 deposition
Travel -Taxi in LA for Thomas A. Banducci for deposition of Dr.
$49.50 Thomas McCarthy
Travel -Airfare for Wade L. Woodard to Portland and Seattle
$541.23 for Budge and Wilhoite depositions
$20.95 Travel insurance for deposition travel
$360.04 Travel- Lodging for WadeL. Woodard in Seattle for depositions
$142.68 Travel - Meals for Wade L. Woodard in Portland and Seattle
Travel - Parking for Wade L. Woodard at Boise airport during
$34.50 depositions
$168.00 Travel -Taxis in Portland and Seattle for Wade L. Woodard
Travel- Wade L. Woodard- Taxi, Meals, Parking- Portland &
Seattle
$345.18
Travel -Wade L. Woodard -Airline Travel & Lodging for Portland
$863.18 & Seattle

$3,496.31

12/1/2007
12/17/2007
10/15/2008
11/20/2008
1/6/2009
1/6/2009
2/9/2009
3/5/2009
9/14/2009
11/1/2009
12/1/2009
2/1/2010

1 $
1 $
1 $
1 $
1 $
1 $
1 $
1 $
1 $
1 $
1 $
1 $

600.92
600.92
200.47
567.16
126.05
124.05
210.58
76.10
158.58
46.51
62.54
3.83

WESTLAW
$600.92 Westlaw research, November
$600.92 Westlaw charges November, 2007
$200.47 Westlaw legal research for September
$567.16 Westlaw legal research charges- October
$126.05 Westlaw legal research charges- December
$124.05 Westlaw legal research charges- November
$210.58 Westlaw legal research charges for January
$76.10 Westlaw legal research fees- February
$158.58 Westlaw legal research charges- August
$46.51 Westlaw legal research October
$62.54 Westlaw Legal Research November
$3.83 Westlaw Legal Research January
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3/1/2010
4/1/2010
6/1/2010
7/1/2010
8/5/2010
9/22/2010
10/30/2010
2/28/2011
4/30/2011
5/31/2011
6/30/2011
7/31/2011
8/31/2011
9/30/2011
10/31/2011
11/30/2011

1 $
1 $
1 $
1 $
1 $
1 $
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1.25
34.00
2.87
200.58
57.57
412.66
50.57

$
$
8.56
226.89
$
376.86
$
43.73
$
158.00
$
122.79
$
$ 1,567.41
738.51
$
$ 1,048.58

$1.25 Westlaw legal research
$34.00 Westlaw charges for March
$2.87 Westlaw charges for May
$200.58 Westlaw charges for June
$57.57 Westlaw charges for July
$412.66 Westlaw charges for August
$50.57 Westlaw charges for September
$8.56 Westlaw charges for February
$226.89 Westlaw charges
$376.86 Westlaw Charges
$43.73 Westlaw Charges for May
$158.00 Westlaw Charges for June
$122.79 Westlaw Charges for July
$1,567.41 Westlaw Charges for the month of August
$738.51 Westlaw charges for September
$1,048.58 Westlaw charges for October

$7,828.54

EXPERT FEES

12/16/2007
3/21/2011
4/18/2011
5/18/2011
6/22/2011
8/16/2011
9/20/2011
11/28/2011

1 $
980.00
1 $ 1,732.50
1 $
912.50
742.50
1 $
1 $ 6,435.00
1 $ 9,307.50
1 $11,904.17
1 $29,458.21

6/23/2011
9/29/2011

1 $ 2,000.00
1 $ 4,915.00

12/16/2007
2/25/2011
3/21/2011
4/15/2011
5/10/2011
5/29/2011
7/12/2011

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

$ 4,460.00
$ 7,500.00
$ 1,154.40
936.00
$
$25,001.60
$ 6,650.09
215.87
$
3,042.00
$

7/26/2011
8/9/2011
8/23/2011
8/31/2011
9/15/2011
10/12/2011

$
$
$
$
1 $

10/31/2011

1 $11,450.31

9,505.60
7,388.41
2,106.00
62.49
1,872.00

$980.00 FTI Consulting Charges
$1,732.50 FTI Consulting, Inc. February
$912.50 FTI Consulting March
$742.50 FTI Consulting April
$6,435.00 FTI Consulting for May services
$9,307.50 FTI Consulting July
$11,904.17 FTI Consulting August invoice
$29,458.21 FTI Consulting- Statement Through 10/31/2011
$2,000.00 R.A. Bell and Associates Expert Fees
$4,915.00 R.A. Bell Expert Fee
$4,460.00
$7,500.00
$1,154.40
$936.00
$25,001.60
$6,650.09
$215.87
$3,042.00
$9,505.60
$7,388.41

Willamette Management Expert Fees

Willamette
Willamette
Willamette
Willamette
Willamette
Willamette
Willamette
Willamette
Willamette
$2,106.00 Willamette
$62.49 Willamette
$1,872.00 Willamette

Management Associates
Management Associates.
Management Associates invoice through 4/15/11
Management April invoice
Management Associates- May
Management Associates June invoice
Management Associates July invoice
Management Associates 7/31/11 invoice
Management Associates invoice through 8/15/11
Management Associates 8/31/11 invoice
Management Associates 9/15/11 invoice
Management invoice through 9/30/11

$11,450.31 Willamette Mgmt- Statement for Period Through 10/15/2011
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11/30/2011

1 $ 1,891.18

3/21/2011
4/19/2011

1 $ 4,029.38
1 $ 9,896.25
1 $30,297.55

5/17/2011
6/14/2011
7/26/2011
8/23/2011
9/20/2011
10/31/2011

1 $ 2,953.13
1 $10,431.75
1 $13,760.25
1 $ 9,253.13
1 $ 1,968.75

$1,891.18 Willamette Management- Statement through 10/31/2011
$4,029.38 Grant Thornton LLP
$9,896.25 Grant Thornton
$30,297.55 Grant Thornton LLP April
$2,953.13 Grant Thornton Invoice- May
$10,431.75 Grant Thornton LLP- June Invoice
$13,760.25 Grant Thornton LLP July/August
$9,253.13 Grant Thornton, LLP August
$1,968.75 Grant Thornton - Invoice

-$6,000.00 Expert Fees as a Matter of Right
$228,213.52

$551,425.10

5
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Thomas A. Banducci (TSB No. 2453)
tbanducci@greenetlaw.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@greenerlaw. com

FEB 2 6 2008

lt~~ti/L,

BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC
802 West Bannock, Suite 700

Boise, lD 83702
Telephone; (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for Detendants/CounterclaimantsfThird
Party Plaintiff MRI Associates, LLP

IN THE DlSTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAlNT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 04082190
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant.

MRJ. ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
CounterClaimant,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER,
CounterDefendants.

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT- Page 1
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MRIASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.

INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING~
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; GEM
STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; and IMAGiNG CENTER
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Third-Party Defendants.
On January 3, 2008, this Court entered an Amended Judgment in favor of MRI
Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), and against Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., in the amount of $31,700,000.00. This Court
subsequently awarded MRIA attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of$2,172,677.63.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND Tlf.IS DOES ORDER, that
judgment be entered in favor ofMRIA on its own behalf and on behalfofMRI Limited, an Idaho
limited partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited, an Idaho limited partnership, in the amount of
$33,872,677.63. Post-judgment interest shall be deemed to accme on this amount as of
September 21, 2007; the date judgment was first entered in this matter.
DATED this_J-~
-, ... day ofFebruary, 2007.

SECOND AMENDED
f700/COO~

£00"d

JUDGMENT~

Page 2
.LH110:J .L:JIH.LSia

6ZSLLSZ80Z

\I'Z: LL

6ZSLL8Z80Z YV.:I oc·:rr 800Z/9VZ0-004014
awutalea X~

SOOZI9Z/ZO

:.

..

.
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~~fFebruary) 2008, a true and correct copy

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
of the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN,
PLLC
802 West Bannock, Suite 700
Boise, Idaho 83702
[Attorneys for Defendant/Counter-Claimant]

~Mail

~~iriJc (208) 336-9177

D
0

Hand Delivery

Overnight Delivery

~ail

JackS. Gjording

~acsimile (208) 336-9177

GJORDING & FOUSER
509 West Hayes
Post Office Box 2837

D
D

Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Boise, ID 83701
[Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-DefendmJts]

~Mail

Patrick J. Miller
GIVENS PURSLEY. LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720

[D?facsimile (208) 388-1300
0 Hand Delivery
[] OvenlightDelivery

Boise, Jdaho 83 701-2720
[Attomeys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants]
1.1

~ail

t:Ji;'~~~i:le (208) 388-1300
0 Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

JONES DAY
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
[Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants]

J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk

sy:

L~---wl/'bw ;~~
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,

an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

)
)
)

rv1Rl ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership,

)
Defendant-Respondent )
)
)
)
MRI AssoCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership, on its
)
ovm behalf. and on behalf of MRI Limited, an Idaho limited
)
partner.::;hip, and MRJ :f'..1obile Limited, an Idaho limited partnership,

CounrerClaimanJ-Respoudent

j

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an lda.~o nonprofit
corporation; SAINT A.LPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC.
CounterDefendants-Appellants

)
)
)
)
)

v.

APPELLANTS~

Supreme Court
Docket No. 34885

BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth .Judichll District for Adn County
Honuruble Michael R. McLaughlin, District Judge, Presid!ng
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis

Jack S. Gjording

JONES DAY

509 W .. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701

GJORDfNG & FOUSER.

51 Louisiana A venue, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113

PLLC

Atlomeysfor Appellants
Patrick J. Mil!er

Thomas A. Banducci
Wade L. Woodard
802 W. Bannock, Suite 700
Boise, ID 83 702

LLP
601 W. Ba11nock Street
P.O. Box 1720
Boise, ID 83701-2720

Attomeys far Respondent

Attomeys fer Appelia11ts

BANDUCCJ WOODARD SCHWARTZMA:-.l

GIVENS PURSLEY

PLLC

004017

Alphonsus] has, to date, secured wrongfully." (!d.; see also Tr., Vol. III, p. 4310, L. 22-23)
("'The $27.3 million represents what it would have cost Saint Al's to do this the right way.'·).)
The price that Saint Alphonsus would have paid for Center bears no relation to any harm
suffered by MRlA as a result of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation. In particular, MRIA has never
claimed that this dissociation totally destroyed Center or rendered it valueless, such that the
"purchase price" accurately measures actual injury. Nor did MRIA have any contractual right to
the "purchase price" that V·/as lost as a result of the dissociation, for the simple reason that Saint
Alphonsus had no contractual obligation to purchase Center, whether or not it stayed in the
partnership. Indeed, MRlA's "purchase price" theory of damages is all the more absurd given
that MRJA only O\Vns 30% of Center (see supra note 2) and therefore cannot possibly have
suffered damages equivalent to the full value of Center.
In sum, because the supposed price of purchasing Center has nothing to do with any
injury to MRIA caused by Saint Alphonsus's dissociation, MRIA cannot recover that "purchase
price" as a measure of damages.

IV.

SAINT ALPHONSUS IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides that "[i]n any civil action" arising out of"any

commercial transaction ... , the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to
be set by the court." This provision "compels an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in
a civil action to recover in any commercial transaction," Commercial Ventures, inc. v. Rex 1\1. &

Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 177 P.3d 955, 965 (2008), and provides for the recovery

-59-

004018

of fees incurred both at trial and on appeal, see, e.g., Fox v. }...fountain W Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho
703, 712, 52 P.3d 848, 857 (2002).
After trial, the district court awarded fees to MRIA under§ 12-120(3), holding that
MRIA's claims arose out of a commercial transaction because they relate to the alleged ''breach
of express terms contained within a partnership agreement- a contract.'' (R., Vol. XIII, p.
2448.) This holding reflects the general rule that fees are appropriate under§ 12-120(3) where
the claims at issue are "integral" to a business relationship, such as claims for the breach of a
commercial contract like the one that existed between MRlA and Saint Alphonsus. Esser Elec. v.

Lost River Ballislics Techs., Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 188 P.3d 854, 863 (2008).
Accordingly, if this Court rules for Saint Alphonsus, it should award Saint Alphonsus its
attorney fees on appeal to be determined in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. In
addition, because Saint Alphonsus rather than MRIA will be the "prevailing party" in this civil
action, the district court's award of fee and costs for MRIA should be vacated along with the
judgment for MRlA, and the case remanded with instructions that the district court calculate and
award the fees and costs incurred by Saint Alphonsus at trial.
CONCLUSION
1.

For the foregoing reasons, Saint Alphonsus requests entry of judgment as follows:
a.

Saint Alphonsus is entitled to judgment on MRIA's claims for \VTongful

dissociation because, as a matter of law, Saint Alphonsus's dissociation breached neither an
express term of the partnership agreement (see Part LA) nor a term of years (see Part I.C), and

- 60-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TH

a

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

4

5
6

7

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CVOC0408219

8

Plaintiff,

9

vs.

10
11

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MAlA'S
REVISED MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS
FEES AND COSTS

12

Defendant.

13
14
15

16

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership, on its own behalf, and
on behalf of MRI Umited, an Idaho Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,

17

Counterclaimants,

16

19

VS.

20

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation;
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER,

21

22
23

24

Counterdefendants.

APPEARANCES

25
26

For Plaintiff: JackS. Gjording of Gjording & Fauser and Patrick Miller of
Givens Pursley, LLP for Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.
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For Defendant: Thomas Banducci of Banducci Woodard Schwartzman,
PLLC for MRI Associates, LLP

3

PROCEEDINGS

4

This matter came on before the Court on January 8, 2008, on MRIA's revised
5

Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. Based upon the Court's earlier Memorandum
6

Decision of November 19, 2007, the Court in its November 19th decision requested that
7

8

MRIA submit a new list of attorney's fees and discretionary costs that exclude billings

9

and costs for a series of items. The Court addressed the costs as a matter of right and

10

the Defendant MRIA will submit a judgment that embodies the Court's ruling on costs

11

as a matter of right.

12

13
14

Subsequent to the November 19th Memorandum Decision, Defendant MRIA
submitted a revised affidavit in support of award of costs and fees which was filed with
the Court on December 7, 2007. During the hearing on January 8th, the Court inquired

15

of counsel and the Defendants further modified their request by excluding three items
16

17
18

from the December J'h affidavit in support of award of costs and fees.
The Court is satisfied from the review of the December 7th affidavit that the

19

Defendants have complied with the Court's November 19th Memorandum Decision.

20

The Court is satisfied that the paralegal services provided to the Defendants were

21

reasonable, necessary and justified in the presentation of this case to the jury.

22

Specifically, those billings listed in item nine (9) of the Court's Memorandum Decision at

23

24

page 25, will be allowed as set out in the revised affidavit of Thomas Banducci on
December 7th.

25

The Court will award attorneys fees and costs incurred regarding the discovery of
26
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Third Party Defendants' documents and deposition testimony. The Court is satisfied
2

that MAlA would have been allowed to pursue the Intermountain Medical Imaging and

3

Gem State Radiology documents through Third Party subpoenas.

4

would have been necessary for several of the claims that MRIA presented to the jury.

5

on the breach of the partnership agreement, interference with contractual relations and

6

the non-compete claims against SARMC.

7
8

Such discovery

Defendant MRIA has also redacted out the other matters that the Court outlined
in the November 19th Memorandum Decision and therefore the Court will award to

9

MRIA their attorneys fees as set forth in Exhibit 3 of the December 7th affidavit of one
10

million five hundred sixty-two thousand dollars ($1,562,000.00) which reflects a
11

12

subtraction of the items withdrawn by the Defendants. Discretionary costs awarded will

13

be five hundred fifty-five thousand eight hundred fifteen dollars and fifteen cents

14

($555,815.15) for a total of two million one hundred seventeen thousand eight hundred

15

fifteen dollars and fifteen cents ($2, 117,815.15).

16

judgment reflecting this award along with the Court's earlier ruling regarding the

17

remittitur as embodied in the November 19th Memorandum Decision.

18

Counsel for MRIA will prepare a

IT IS SO ORDERED.

19

DATED this

,;2 oday of January 2008.

20
21

22

ICHAEL McLAUGHLIN
DISTRICT JUDGE

23

24
25

26
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1

2

1hereby certify that on
3

4

11:35

t/-4

the~ day of January, 2008, I mailed (served) a true

and correct copy of 1he within instrument to:

5
6

1

s
9

10
11

JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
PO BOX2837
BOISE 10 83701
FAX: 336-9177
PATRICKMILLER
GIVENS PURSLEY
PO BOX 2720
BOISE ID 83701 2720
FAX: 388-1300

12
13

14
15

THOMAS A. BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC
802 W BANNOCK STREET, STE 700
BOISE, ID 83702
FAX: 342-4455

16

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court,..

17

··...:·

18
19

20
21

22
23

24
25
26

'
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

4
5
6

7
8

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CVOC0408219

9

Counterclaimants,

19

20

vs.

21

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation;
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER,

22
23

CounterDefendants.

24
25
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APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant: Jack S. Gjording of Gjording & Fauser;
Patrick J. Miller of Givens Pursley, LLP

2

3

Defendant/Counterclaimants: Thomas A. Banducci and Wade Woodard
of Banducci, Woodard, Schwartzman for MRI Associates, LLP

4

5

PROCEEDINGS
6

These matters came before the Court on October 31, 2007 upon: (1) Saint

7

8

Alphonsus's Application for Attorney Fees Relative to Antitrust and Equity Claims, {2)

9

Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, (3) Saint

10

Alphonsus's Motion for New Trial, (4) Defendant's Motion for Prejudgment Interest, (5)

11

Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, and {6) Defendanfs Motion for Costs and

12

13

Following oral argument by counsel, the Court took the matters under

Fees.

advisement.

14

BACKGROUND
15

15

17

This

litigation stems from

Saint Alphonsus

Diversified Care's (SADC)

dissociation from an Idaho limited liability partnership, MRI Associates, LLP (MRIA).

1B

SADC filed an action against MRIA to determine the value of their partnership interest

19

at the time of their dissociation under Idaho law. In tum, MRIA filed a counterclaim

20

against SADC, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (SARMC) (collectively "Saint

21

Alphonsusn). The Court, after granting several partial summary judgment motions in

22

23

favor of Saint Alphonsus, allowed MRIA to submit to the jury claims for breach of
contract

and

wrongful

dissociation,

interference

with

prospective

contractual

24

relationship or business expectations, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy and
25

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
26
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This matter came before the Court for a trial by jury. Prior to trial, the Court
2

decided in a Memorandum Decision issued July 24, 2006 that Saint Alphonsus's

3

dissociation in 2004 was wrongful. ln that decision, the Court also held that the

4

contractual language regarding the appropriate buyout calculation was too ambiguous

s

to be decided as a matter of law. During the trial, the Court ruled that the issue of Saint

8

Alphonsus's partnership valuation was an equity issue for the Court to determine and

7

that issue was not presented to the jury in the verdict form. The jury ultimately returned

B

a verdict on MRIA's counterclaims in the amount of $63.5 million.

g

After the jury verdict on September 21, 2007, the Court issued Rndings of Fact
10

and Conclusions of Law as to the partnership valuation claim on the part of Saint
11
12
13

Alphonsus in the amount of $4.1 million and entered judgment reflecting the offset of
this amount in the judgmenl

14

Saint Alphonsus subsequently filed an Application for Attorney Fees Relative to

15

Antitrust and Equity Claims, Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and

16

Motion for New Trial. MRIA also followed, filing its Motion for Prejudgment Interest,

17

Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Costs and Fees.

18

LEGAL STANDARD

19

I.

Attorney Fees

20

Under Rule 54(e)(1), the Court may award reasonable attorney fees to the
21
22

prevailing party "when provided for by any statute or contract." Rule 54(d)(1) allows the

23

trial court discretion to determine which, if any, party is the ~·prevailing party" for

24

purposes of an award of costs and fees. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B). To determine whether a

2s

party has prevailed, the court must consider, among other things, the extent to which

26
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each party prevailed relative to the "final judgment or result." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(8).
A. Re: Saint Alphansus's Requested Attorney Fees

3

Under Idaho Code § 12-121, a trial court may award attorney fees to a

4

prevailing party where it finds that the case was "brought, pursued or defended

s

frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Bums v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480,

6

486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003). However, if any alternative legal basis can be found to

7

a

support the opposing party's claims, attorney fees are unwarranted under this rule.

Hanf v. Syringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 370, 816 P.2d 320, 326 (1991). This

9

determination rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, but any such award "must
10

be supported by findings and those findings, in turn, must be supported by the
11

12
13

record." Sunshine Mining Co. v. Metropolitan Mines Corp., 111 Idaho 654, 659, 726
p .2d 766, 771 (1986).

14

Attorney-tees may also be awarded in cases arising from the purchase of a

15

partner's interest in a partnership. Idaho Code§ 53-3-701(i) states that a court "may

16

assess reasonable attorney's fees and the fees and expenses of appraisers or other

17

18

experts for a party to the action, in amounts the court finds equitable, against a party
that the court finds acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith."

19

Idaho Code section 48-113(1) states:
20

21

23
24

(1) Any person injured directly or threatened with direct injury by reason of
anything prohibited by this chapter, may bring an action for injunctive
relief, damages, and, as determined by the court, reasonable costs and
attorney's fees. The court shall exclude from the amount of monetary
relief awarded to a plaintiff under this section any amount which
duplicates amounts allocable to any other actual or potential plaintiff
including, without limitation, potential claims by the attorney general on
behalf of indirect purchasers for the same conduct or injury.

25

(2) If the district court finds that the violation at issue constituted a per se
26
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violation of section 48-104, Idaho Code, or an intentional violation of
section 48-105, Idaho Code, it shall increase the recovery to an amount
not in excess of three (3) times the damages sustained.

1

2
3

B. Re: MRIA 's Requested Attorney Fees

4

A trial court may provide for attorney fees to the prevailing party when there is a

s

nexus between the lawsuit and a commercial transaction, under Idaho Code § 12-

6

120(3).

Continental Cas. Co. v. Brady, 127 Idaho 830, 835, 907 P.2d 807, 812

(1995).

A commercial transaction Is defined as any transaction that is not for

7

8

"personal or household" purposes. Idaho Code § 12-120(3).

9

II.

Motion for JNOV

10

When deciding to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a trial judge should
11
12

"view all the evidence and all inferences drawn there from in favor of the nonmoving

13

party, and decide if • • • there can be but one conclusion as ·to the verdict that

14

reasonable minds could have reached." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 765 727 P.2d

Hi

1184, 1192 {1986).

16

credibility or compare its

17
18

However, a court may not reweigh evidence, consider witness

own factual findings with that of the jury. Griff, Inc. v. Curry

Bean Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 315, 319, 63 P.3d 441, 445 (2003).

A judgment

notwithstanding the verdict is aptly described as a tool for the trial court to correct an

19

error in denying a directed verdict. Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 478-79, 797 P.2d
20

1322, 1326-27.
21

22

Ill.

Motion for New Trial

23

A trial court decision whether to grant a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a) of

24

the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is given discretion upon appellate review. Warren v.

25

Sharp, 139ldaho 599, 602, 83 P.3d 773, 776 (2003). Such a motion is often supported

26
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by the same facts and arguments as a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
'
'

2

However, a motion for new trial allows the court to determine if the jury verdict should

3

stand, despite being supported by substantial evidence, when the Court finds that the

4

verdict is against the clear weight of the ~vidence. Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg. Med.

5

Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 779-80, 25 P.3d 88, 92-93 (2001).

6

IV.

'

7
8

Motion for Prejudgment Interest
An award of prejudgment interest is !reviewed by an abuse of discretion standard.

Belk v. Martin, 136 Idaho 652, 660, 39 P.3d 592, 600 (2001 ). To prove an abuse of

9

discretion, this Court applies the three-facfor test. The three factors are (1) whether the
10

district court correctly perceived the issue· as one of discretion, (2) whether the district
11

12

court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal

13

standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and (3) whether the district

14

court reached its decision by an exercise ~f reason. Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166,

1s

169, 16 P.3d 263, 266 (2000) (citing Sun V'alley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co.,

16

119 Idaho 87, 94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)).

17

v.

18

19

Motion for Reconsideration
j

This motion for reconsideration of Court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and
'

judgment is brought under Rule 59(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule is
20

'

I

designed to allow the Court to correct errors of judgment In either fact or law,
21
22

circumventing the need for an appeal. Fi'rst Sec. Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598, 603,
I

23

570 P.2d 276, 281 (1977). No new evidence is permitted in support of such a motion

24

because a motion under Rule 59(e) is properly brought after the f1nal judgment.

25

Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 n.3 (Ct. App. 2006). The

26
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Court has discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for reconsideration under
2

Rule 59(e). Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 1361daho 681, 690, 39 P.3d 621, 630 {2001).

DISCUSSION

3
4

1.

The Court will deny Saint Alphonsus's Application for Attorney Fees Relative
to Antitrust and Equity Claims.

5

6
7

Saint Alphonsus asserts its right to attorney fees and costs under Idaho Code §
53-3-701 (g) and (i) for attorney fees and costs associated with the antitrust claims

8

brought by MRIA.

9

attorney fees under the Idaho Competition Act, as well as Idaho Code § 12-121, for

10
11
12

Saint Alphonsus also offers Idaho Code § 48-113 as basis for

claims brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation
First under Idaho Code§ 12-121, an award of attorney fees may be awarded if a
party has defended a claim brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.

13

WhHe MRIA may not have been successful in pursuing the antitrust craim or other
14

claims, the Court cannot find that MAlA's antitrust claims were frivolous or without
15

foundation. While these claims ultimately were not part of MRIA's successful verdict,
16
17

the Court will find that these claims were brought reasonably and in good faith.

18

In part the basis for this finding is that the Court had set a date earlier In the

19

proceedings before discovery was completed requiring the parties to amend their

20

pleadings. The· Court is satisfied that there was information produced from early

21

discovery that formed a good faith basis for MRIA to file the antitrust claim against Saint

22

23

Alphonsus. The basis for this decision rests with the evidence presented at the Motion
to Dismiss pursued by Saint Alphonsus that MRIA had at least demonstrated that once

24

IMI opened there was an immediate drop in MAl scans at MRIA and there was
25

evidence of higher costs for MRI scans by IMI in the early discovery stages.

This

26
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preliminary information was sufficient to assert this claim for relief, though subsequent
1
2

discovery revealed there was not a basis to allow this issue to go to the jury.

3

Similarly, Idaho Code§ 53-3-701(i) gives the Court discretion to award attorney

4

fees if the opposing party acted "arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith." As the

s

Court indicated above, the Court finds no evidence indicating that MRIA asserted any

5

claim that could be characterized in such a way. The Court will accordingly decline to

7

award attorney fees under this statute, as welL

8

Idaho Code§ 48-113 is the final statutory basis claimed by Saint Alphonsus for

9

attorney fees. The statute, as part of the Idaho Competition Act, states that a party
10

"may bring an action for injunctive relief, damages, and, as determined by the court,
11

12

reasonable costs and attorney's fees." Saint Alphonsus asserts that they should be

13

awarded attorney fees for defending against an antitrust claim. The Court cannot find

14

any basis from the language or policy of the statute to award attorney fees to a

15

business entity that defends an antitrust lawsuit. The purpose of the statute is to

16

compensate a party who successfully prosecutes an antitrust claim. This Is in large part

17

due to the complexity and expense of this type of litigation and the benefits to the

18

consumer when monopolistic practices are exposed and eliminated. For the above

19

reasons, the Court does not find that Saint Alphonsus is entitled to any attorney fees
20

under the statute.
21

22
23

24

The Court will also decline to award Saint Alphonsus their costs as of right, also
finding that Saint Alphonsus has not demonstrated that Saint Alphonsus's defense of
the antitrust claim was particularly unique to the defense of other antitrust claims.

25
26
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The Court will issue a remitter on the verdict but will deny Saint Alphonsus·s
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial.

a.

Amount of Damages

4

Saint Alphonsus has argued that the most likely way the jury arrived at a verdict
5

of $63.5 million was due to the jury incorrectly adding the two alternative theories of
6

7

damages and they further submit that the evidence admitted cannot support an award

8

so large. Saint Alphonsus explains that the first damage theory, based on the purchase

9

price for MRICI in 2001, is mutually exclusive to the lost scans from 2001 through the

10
11

12
13

present.
Saint Alphonsus considers the source of this error the fact that the jury
instructions did not adequately instruct the jury that the two measures of damages were
alternatives and that Saint Alphonsus assumed that such a statement would be

14

contained in the final version of the Special Verdict Form.
15

The Court will find that the jury award evidences the jury's intention of awarding
16
17

both measures of damages at once is persuasive. MRIA did not set forth evidence that

18

would support a damage claim of $63.5 million. Rather, the largest amount of damages

19

that the evidence supports is that measured by lost profits in the amount of $36.3

20

million. Saint Alphonsus contends that this is sufficient error to justify an order for a

21

new trial.

22

23

The more appropriate :remedy is to allow the jury's findings to stand because the
jury heard substantial evidence as to the claims for relief and the damages during the

24

course of this trial that merit the reduced award that will be entered by the Court.
25

Further, Saint Alphonsus invited the error when counsel objected to a draft of the
26
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invites an error in jury instructions by declining to object or otherwise acquiescing, that

3

party cannot successfully complain of the issues that such an error creates. Vendelin v.

4

Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 433-434, 95 P.3d 34, 51-52 (2004).

s

insisting on a simple, single line for damages, rather than the more complicated multiple

6

lines in the Court's proposed special verdict form in which the alternative nature of the

7

damage theories was demonstrated. Saint Alphonsus invited any error from that

B

By

change that Saint Alphonsus now insists is the cause of its disfavored outcome.

9

The Court will find that a new trial is unnecessary in order to rectify the jury's
10

erroneous damage award. An issue of excessive damages can easily be corrected in
11
12

this case by way of a remittitur since Saint Alphonsus has not afforded an independent

13

measure of damages, and ttie only testimony as to damage figures came from MRIA's

14

witnesses, Mr. Budge and M.r. Wilhoite. Mr. Wilhoite's testimony supported the higher

15

of the two amounts, $36.3 million. Accordingly, the Court will order a remittitur reducing

16

the verdict to $36.3 million.

17

18
19

I
l

I

b.

Causation
I

Saint Alphonsus alleges that MRIA failed to provide evidence supporting the

I

jury's finding that Saint Alp~onsus's conduct caused the damages, namely the lost
I

20
21

scans that MAlA incurred. Saint
Alphonsus argues that the evidence merely supports
I
that the lost scans were, if

a~ all, only partially the cause of MRIA's damages and that

:

"there were numerous reasohs that MRICI's scans declined over the relevant period."

24

Mem. in Support of Saint Alphonsus's Mot. for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

25

and Mot. for New Trial 7. Specifically, Saint Alphonsus is critical of MRIA because they

I

26
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did not include testimony from a physician who changed his or her referral practices
I

i

based upon Saint Alphonsus~s conduct.
Saint Alphonsus atterhpts to distinguish this case from that in Griffith v. Clear

3
4

P.011

2082877529
DISTRICT COURT
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I

Lakes Trout Company.

148 Idaho 733, 152 P.Sd 604 (2007).

However absolute

I

I

5

certainty as to causation an~ an amount of damages is not the rule. Rather, the law
I

6
7
8

I

requires "reasonable certai~ty," which merely requires that sufficient evidence to
I

"remove the existence of darhages
from the realm of speculation." /d. (citing Fuller v.
I

i

.

Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 422,I 807 P.2d 633, 640 (1991 ). The tner of fact may make

9

reasonable inferences as to;the evidence admitted, weighing credibility and resolving
i

10

conflicts. Bumgarner v.
11

12

Bu~gamer, 124 Idaho 629, 640, 862 P.2d 321, 332 (Ct. App.

1993}.

13

Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's suggestion, MRIA was not required to show direct

14

proof of causation by testimony from a physician that changed his or her referral

I

;
I

'

'

Rather, MAlA w~s permitted to present evidence of causation by other

15

practice.

16

evidence, allowing the jury to:derive what reasonable inferences it chose to make.

'

I

The jury

disagreemen~ with Saint Alphonsus's characterization of the evidence Is

18

!

not an issue that the Court cin or should properly address. The Court will not award a
19

1

judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on this basis.

20

c.
21

"Purchase

Pric~ Damage" Theory
!

Saint Alphonsus's objsction to the use of the Shattuck Hammond Memorandum
22

I

23

is based on the claim that the purchase price indicated by Shattuck Hammond in the

24

2004 report was the sole basis of Mr. Wilhoit's damage analysis. From the Court's

25

review of Mr. Wilhoifs testimony, the record is clear that Mr. Wilhoit used the purchase

I

26
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Even

I

2

if Saint Alphonsus's claim w$s correct, the jury's verdict demonstrates that without this
'I

3

measure of damage, the j~ry would have also found the lost profits analysis of

4

damages to be persuasive. !Accordingly, the Court will not award a new trial on this

s

basis.

I
I

[

i
I

I

6

d.

. I

Jury lnstruct1ons
I

7

I

Saint Alphonsus asserts the Court erred in its instructions to the jury in several
I

8

respects. First, Saint Alpho*sus claims that the Court should have instructed the jury
'

9

that Saint Alphonsus's

wron~ful dissociation "was not illegal, unlawful, inappropriate or

10

even simply 'bad.'" Mem. ini Support of Saint Alphonsus's Mot. 12.

Saint Alphonsus

11
12

claims that by not doing so, the word "wrongful" was confusing and prejudicial.
''

13

However, this critique should not be voiced to the Court, but rather the Jaw itself.

14

The Court used the word •{vrongful" because that is the word used in the statute.

1s

Idaho Code § 53-3-602. R~phraslng the law to use a different word is unnecessary.

'

I

I

16

The Jury is certainly

capabl~ of understanding the word wrongful and any additional
I

17

18

I

modifying statements like "nof illegal" or "not unlawful" would only recharacterize the law
'

I

in a way that is not supporte~ by any cited case law, comment or other statute. Such a

19

jury instruction would not bJI proper because Saint Alphonsus's request is actually a
20

redrafting of the statute itself.

For that reason, this Court's instruction that Saint

21
22

23

Alphonsus's dissociation was ''wrongful" as opposed to "not unlawful" or "not illegaln was
proper.

I

I

24

Second, Saint Alphonsus asserts that the Court incorrectly instructed the jury as

25

to the scope of a partner's duty to a partnership. Instruction No. 32 states that a partner

26
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I

I

I

has the duty to act primarily for the benefit of the partnership.

Saint Alphonsus

I

2
3

contends that this statement !is in conflict with comment number 1 to Idaho Code § 53·
3-404, which provides:

;

i
I

4

5
6

7

a
9

Section 404 continues the term Ufiduciary" from UPA Section 21,
which is entitled "~artnership Accountable as a Fiduciary.n
Arguably, the term ~'fiducial)~' is inappropriate when used to
describe the duties of partner because a partner may legitimately
pursue self interest (see Section 404(e)) and not solely the interest
of the partnership and ~he other partners, as must a true trustee.

a

Saint Alphonsus argu~s that Instruction No. 32 was a prejudicial error. However,
!
i

the Court's Instruction No. 3.2 was merely one of a series of instructions regarding

10

fiduciary duty. Instruction
,1

help the jury understand
12

13

14
15

N9. 32 was the first instruction in the series and served to

wh~t makes a person or entity a "fiduciary" under the statute.
l

Further instructions explainep the specific scope of each duty.

Finally, to whatever

extent the jury may have misread Instruction No. 32, Instruction No. 35 corrects any
I

I

such misreading by stating that "[a] partner does not violate the duty of loyalty or duty of
I

I

16

care merely by acting in th~ partner's individual interest. Those actions must be in
i

17

18
19

conflict with the partnership's ~nterest in order for the duty of loyalty or duty of care to be
!
i
at issue.'' So, to the extent ~hat Instruction No. 32 could have been misread as Saint
l

i

Alphonsus suggests, Instruction No. 35 would have corrected the issue by stating that a

I

20

partner may legitimately
21

purs~e its own self-interest without violating any fiduciary duty
f
i

it owes to a partnership. For 1that reason, the Court finds that the jury instructions read
23

as a whole are not erroneous or prejudicial.

24

e.

25

The jury's special verdict form indicated that the jury found Saint Alphonsus to

.26

Civil Conspiracy

have engaged in a civil conspiracy.

This, Saint Alphonsus argues, is a finding not
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supported by the evidence admitted at trial because the only relevant agreement, the
2

IMI Operating Agreement, applied only to non-MRI modalities. However, through both

3

witness testimony and documents, there was ample evidence that IMI operated as one

4

business and that the MRJ/non-MRI distinction did not in fact exist. The question is

5

whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that this evidence

6

amounted to a conspiracy.

7
8

While on this issue there was clearly evidence on both

sides, the jury was persuaded by the evidence submitted by MRIA on this claim. For
that reason, the Court will decline to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and

9

the motion for a new trial.
10

f.

Admission of Shattuck Hammond Memorandum

11
12

Before trial, Saint Alphonsus moved in limine to exclude the Shattuck Hammond

13

Memorandum. (See the Courts Memorandum Decision dated July 30, 2007).

14

Court granted the portion of the motion in limine regarding the "scorched earth"

15

scenario language based on the unfair prejudicial nature of the evidence, but denied

16

the motion insofar as the motion in limine applied to the other proposed exclusions.

17
18

The

Some of the proposed redactions by Saint Alphonsus that were declined by the Court
included Shattuck Hammond employees' references to legal advice that Givens Pursley

19

had presented to Saint Alphonsus. Saint Alphonsus maintains that these portions of
20

the memo should have been redacted on the basis of attorney client privilege outlined
.21
22
23
24

25

in Idaho Rule of Evidence 502. This inclusion, Saint Alphonsus argues, allowed MAlA
to mislead the jury into believing that Saint Alphonsus knew it could not withdraw as
early as 2001 and was for that reason a prejudicial error.
First, IRE Rule 502 would not protect this memorandum since the document is

26
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not a communication between individuals outlined in Rule 502(b). Section (b)(4) of IRE
2

Rule 502 protects confidential communications made for the purpose of facintatlng the

3

rendition of professional legal services which were made "between representatives of

4

the client or between the client and a representative of the client." This section of the

5

rule contains the only possible combination of individuals that the Shattuck Hammond

6

employees may qualify for under the rule, but the Shattuck Hammond employees were

7

a

not communicating as representatives of Saint Alphonsus, thus that section of the rule
does not apply. Simply because the subject matter of the communication was about

9

counsel's representation does not put the communication within the rule. Furthermore,
10

there is doubt as to whether the purpose of this communication was to facilitate the
11

12

rendition of legal services.

13

The evidence was used to support MAlA's contention that Saint Alphonsus knew

14

as early as 2001 that it could not withdraw from the MRIA partnership and Cindy

15

Schamp's testimony could have alone supported the jury reaching that conclusion.

16

Thus, even if this were error, it was certainly not prejudicial.

17
18

Similarly, the fact that the redacted portions of this memorandum regarding the
''scorched earth" scenario were flashed on the courtroom screen for a matter of

19

seconds does not amount to a prejudicial error. While in the best of circumstances, the
20

accidental brief display of this un-redacted memo should not have happened, what did
21

22

23

happen was unlikely to have affected the jury at all. The memorandum without the
redactions flashed onto their screens for mere seconds; the chance that a jury member

24

would have by chance focused on that particular portion and was also able to read it in

25

its entirely during those few seconds is highly unlikely. Striking the memorandum would

26
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have done no more to cure the problem than what the Court chose to do, which was
1

2

address the situation with an instruction to disregard what they might have seen on the

3

screen that did not appear in the hardcopy redacted memorandum that they received

4

as evidence. As the Court did not see reason in striking the memorandum, the Court

5

will find that a new trial is not merited on this issue.

6

g.

7

To admit evidence that contains multiple levels of hearsay, there must be an

8

Admission of Dr. Giles' Notes re: Cindy Schamp and Jeff Cliff

exception for each level of hearsay.

I. R. E. 805.

During the trial, Saint Alphonsus

9

objected to MRIA's introduction of certain handwritten notes by Dr. Giles into evidence.
10

These notes contained Dr. Giles' impression of what Cindy Schamp told Jeff Cliff in a
11
12

meeting. These notes were made at the time of the conversation, while in the course of

13

a regular business meeting, and so is not a case of multiple levels of hearsay that

14

would require multiple exceptions for each level, as would be the case of a statement

15

made to Jeff Cliff, then made to Dr. Giles, and then recorded.

16

present sense impression exception or the business records exception suffices as

17

justification for its admission based on the foundation laid for either in Dr. Giles'

18

Rather, either the

testimony. Thus, the admission of this evidence was not in error.

19

h.

Admission of Settlement Offer

20

One letter introduced into evidence was a letter dated March 5, 2004 sent to
21

22
23

Sandra Bruce by the CEOs of the other hospital partners of MRIA. The content of the
letter includes details of a settlement offer whereby MRIA offered to sell MRICI and

24

MAIM to Saint Alphonsus based on assumed values of those entities.

25

admitted this evidence, which Saint Alphonsus alleges to have been a prejudicial error.

The Court

26
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I.R.E. 408 prohibits the admission of offers of settlement to "prove liability for, invalidity
1

2

of or amount of the claim or any other claim." If evidence is offered to prove anything

may be allowed

so long as it is instructed

3

other than for those purposes, the evidence

4

to be used for the limited purpose other than those prohibited. In this case, the Court

s

allowed the evidence to be used for the limited purpose of showing what MRIA believed

6

to be the value of the respective entities in 2004. The Court gave a limiting instruction,

7
8

the instruction provided that the evidence could be used for one of the proper purposes
outlined in IRE 408.

9

However, what MRIA believed to be the value of its respective entities in 2004 is
10

not necessarily the only factor that was used in determining the "purchase price11 theory
11
12

13

amount of damages. Furthermore, even if this evidence was not introduced, or even if
the purchase price theory had not been argued at an, there is a good argument that the

14

end result would be no different for Saint Alphonsus.

1s

damages was the higher of the two damage theories, and it is apparent from the jury

16

verdict that the jury found not just the purchase price theory persuasive, but also the

17

lost scan theory analysis. For that reason, this Court finds that even if there were an

18

The lost scan analysis of

error in admitting the settlement offer evidence, Saint Alphonsus has not adequately

19

shown that the evidence's absence would have affected the jury's findings.
20

i.
22
23

Fiduciary Duty by Saint Alphonsus to MRIC/ and MRIM

Prior to trial, the Court ruled that a question of fact existed as to whether or not
Saint Alphonsus owed a duty to either MRICI or MAIM as a partner in MRIA (See

24

Court's Memorandum Decision of June 13, 2007). However, the weight of the evidence

25

presented at trial, including countless documents and board minutes, established that

26
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such fiduciary duties did, in fact, exist. The Court accordingly instructed the jury to
1
2

determine if such a duty had been breached.

The Court did not instruct the jury

3

regarding whether there was, in fact, a duty because Saint Alphonsus did not provide

4

any evidence that would rebut that introduced by MRIA.

5

Saint Aiphonsus argues that this instruction left the jury with the impression that

6

the issue had already been determined. Saint Alphonsus also asserts that no evidence

7

was submitted that would support a claim of breach of fiduciary duty by Saint

6

Alphonsus to either MRICI or MAIM. The Court finds that its instruction was proper

9

because the evidence introduced at trial could only support a jury finding that there
10

were fiduciary duties owed by Saint Alphonsus to MRICI and MAIM. There would be no
11

12
13

reason to instruct the jury to make a finding that would not be supported by the
evidence.

14

Setting aside the fiduciary duties owed to MRICI and MAIM, the fact that Saint

15

Alphonsus was found to have owed a duty to MAlA itself stands alone to support the

ts

jury's verdict, along with MAlA's other causes of action that the jury found justified the

17

damage award.

16

j.

Statute of Limitations

19

Saint Alphonsus claims that MAlA's claims are barred by the statute of
20

limitations. Previously, this Court held that under a continuing tort theory, the statute of
21

22
23

limitations for MRIA's claims had not run. For this reason, the Court declined to give
instructions to the jury regarding the statute of limitations.

Altematively, Saint

24

Alphonsus argues that if the claims themselves are not barred, that damages should be

25

limited to that which occurred during the statutory period.

26
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The Court has addressed this argument in previous memoranda decisions and
2

Saint Alphonsus has not provided any new evidence or legal authority that merit further

3

consideration of Saint Alphonsus's continuing argument. The Court finds that this case

4

is not barred by the statute of limitations under the continuing tort theory, supported by

s

Idaho Supreme Court case law. See Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 603-04, 850P.2d

6

749, 754-55 (1993).

7

k.

8

Partnership Term

Saint Alphonsus asserts that there was not sufficient evidence to support the

9

jury's finding that the Partnership was for a term nor was there sufficient evidence to
10

support the jury's finding that the term was extended to 2023. Saint Alphonsus argues
11
12

that there was no term for MAlA partnership and claims that the submission of this

13

issue to the jury was a prejudicial error.

In support of this claim, Saint Alphonsus

14

provides an interpretation of the contract that supposes that upon the creation of MRI

15

mobile, the contractual term relating to the partnership term became ineffective.

16

This interpretation of the contract is not one that comes from the plain reading of

17

the contractual terms. Even if the contract were to be found ambiguous on its terms,

18

Saint Alphonsus's proposed interpretation is inconsistent with the weight of the

19

testimonial evidence regarding the term of the partnership from either MAlA or Saint
20

Alphonsus. Evidence was submitted that Saint Alphonsus voted to extend the term of
21

22
23

24

the partnership to 2023. The Court accordingly finds that there was sufficient evidence
to support that the partnership was for a term and also that the term was extended until
2023.

25
26
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Wrongful Withdrawal

The Court's finding that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully withdrew from the MRIA

2
3

partnership is itself alleged by Saint Alphonsus to have been a prejudicial error because

4

this finding prevented Saint Alphonsus from

s

Courts Memorandum Decision dated July 24, ·2007)

a fair trial on any other issue. (See the
!

6

7

8

Saint Alphonsus made this argument on summary judgment, then again on
reconsideration of the summary judgment, then again to the Idaho Supreme Court
asking for an immediate appeal.

Since Saint Alphonsus's argument, which

9

substantively has not changed, has already been addressed by this Court, a further
10

articulation of the Court's reasoning is unnecessary in this motion for new trial. Under
11

12

.

.

Idaho Code, a withdrawal from a partnership. before the end of the partnership term is
I.C. § 53-3-602(b)(2).: Thus, the Court will not enter either a

13

considered wrongful.

14

judgment notwithstanding the verdict nor order a new trial on this basis.

ts

3.

The Court will decline to grant MRIA's Motion for Prejudgment Interest.

16

MRIA has asked this Court to use its discretion to award prejudgment interest to

17

the damages awarded for its counterclaim. Prejudgment interest is awarded in cases

18

where the amount of liability is mathematically ascertainable. Bouten Canst. Co. v. H. F.

19

Magnuson Go.• 133 Idaho 756. 762, 992 P.2d 751, 757 (1999}. MAlA contends that
I

20

.21
22

prejudgment interest is necessary in order to fully compensate MRIA and make It whole
again.

23

This case is not one that involved a specific sum of money due during the length

24

of this suit, and prejudgment interest would be improper under Idaho case Jaw. Certain

2s

cases demonstrate Idaho courts' hesitation to award prejudgment interest in cases

26
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sounding in tort, absent cases of conversion. See, e.g.• Davis v. Professional Business
2
3

Srvcs., Inc., 109 Idaho 810, 815, 712 P.2d 511, 516 n.2 {1985). Additionally, Idaho

courts have been reluctant to award damages for lost profits or in cases where there

4

are two or more theories of damages. Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 739, 791

s

P.2d 1313, 1318 (Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting request for prejudgment interest on lost

6

profits award); Child v. Blaser, 111 Idaho 702, 706-707, 727 P.2d 893, 897-898 (Ct

7

a

App. 1986} (rejecting request for prejudgment interest where amount of damages was
determined based on conflicting expert testimony and differing theories of recovery).

9

Based on these cases, the Court will find that no money was in fact due until
10
11

12

final judgment was entered In this case. The Court will find that at the very earliest,
MRIA only provided Saint Alphonsus with an assessment of its damages in March of

13

2007, just before trial. Additionally, the fact that MRIA proceeded to try this case under

14

two separate theories regarding a damage amount reveals how. unlikely it would have

15

been to calculate the amount of damages prior to trial.

16

based on each separate theory of damage would be improper.

17

18

Also, prejudgment interest

First, prejudgment interest on the purchase price damage theory would be
improper because Saint Alphonsus did not have a clear obligation to purchase MRICI in

19

2004. Secondly, prejudgment interest on the lost scan damages would be improper
20

because there were significant variables that existed in this calculation process that
21

22

needed to be resolved by the trier of fact. The value of a single lost scan was unknown

23

since there was no agreed upon profit margin per scan. Additionally, the number of

24

scans lost was also unknown before trial.

25

would be inappropriate for either damage theory taken individually.

For these reasons, prejudgment interest

26
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This Court agrees that this case is not one where damages could be estimated
2
3

by the type of mathematical calculation that Idaho courts considered to be a good
predictor of damages.
The Court will decline to award prejudgment interest in this case.

4

s

4.

The Court will decline to grant MRIA's Motion for Reconsideration

6

Under Idaho Code, a partner who withdraws from a partnership for a term is not

7

necessarily entitled to the partner's equity share until the expiration of the partnership

8

term. I.C. § 53-3-701. The statute provides:

9

13

A partner who wrongfully dissociates before the expiration of a definite
term or the completion of a particular undertaking is not entitled to
payment of any portion of the buyout price until the expiration of the term
or completion of the undertaking, unless the partner establishes to the
satisfaction of the court that earlier payment will not cause undue hardship
to the business of the partnership. A deferred payment shall be
adequately secured and bear interest.

14

I.C. § 53-3-701 (h). However, before this provision, the same statute also provides that

15

damages from wrongful dissociation 11Shall be offset against the buy-out price." I.C. §

16

53-3-701(c). These two sections of the statute taken together demonstrate that only

17

under circumstances where a partnership cannot foreseeably continue to operate that a

10

11
12

18

deferred payment is appropriate. In many cases, especially in partnerships with highly

19

illiquid assets, that is certainly the rule, rather than the exception. However, the statute
20

also tends to assume that where there is a damage award that exceeds the buy-out
21
22

23

price, there are few if any circumstances where immediately awarding the equity share
to the withdrawing partner would cause "undue hardship," Since a damage award is

24

relatively a very liquid asset, this is a logical assumption for the drafters of the statute to

25

have made. For these reasons, the Court will award Saint Alphonsus's equity share as

26
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an offset to MRIA's counterclaim.
2
3
4

5.

MRIA's Motion for Costs and Fees
MRIA has asked this Court to award the following costs and attorney fees,

totaling $2,694,981.05:

5

Costs as a matter of right:

6

Discretionary costs:
Attorney fees:

7
8

$63,842.51
$921,519.97
$1,709,618.57

MRIA asserts its right to attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), pertaining
to actions arising out of any commercial transaction. Saint Alphonsus argues, though,

9

that Idaho courts have held that partnership dissolution cases are not commercial
10

transactions. See, Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 903 P.2d 1321 (1995).
11
12

However,

as MRIA correctly addresses in its Reply, this is not a case of partnership

13

dissolution, because the partnership has not been dissolved. Rather, the claim is a

14

wrongful withdrawal claim in breach of express terms contained within a partnership

1s

agreement- a contract.

16

17
18

Furthermore, Saint Alphonsus's claim that because MRIA also prevailed on tort
claims attorney fees are not warranted under section 12-120(3) is also weak. First, this
is an inaccurate interpretation of current case law, since attorney fees have been

19

awarded in such cases even where there were other theories of recovery sounding in
20

tort. See, e.g., Fritts v. Liddle & MoellerConst., Inc., 144Idaho 171, 158 P.3d 947,951
21
22

(2007) .. second, previous holdings that barred attorney fees under section 12~120(3)

23

because the cause of action sounded in tort have since been overruled in BHmka v. My

24

Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594,599 (2007).

2s

Additionally, Saint Alphonsus contends that MRIA is not a "prevailing party"

26
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under the statute and so is not entitled to attorney fees. This argument rests in MAlA's
1

2
3

theories of recovery that the Court ruled in favor for Saint Alphonsus in summary
judgment {i.e. the antitrust claim). However, that MRIA in the end received a verdict on

4

all of their damages claims combined, and even with a remittitur will receive a judgment

s

for damages that is still in the highest damage claims asserted by MRIA. Clearly MRIA

6

is a prevailing party. In the end the rule itself directs courts to determine whether a

7

party has "prevailed" considering the extent to which each party prevailed relative to the

B

"final judgment or result." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1}(8). While MRtA may not have succeeded

9

on every, theory of recovery that they asserted in their Counterclaim, they succeeded on
10

every theory that was brought to trial.
11

The Court will award MAlA attorney fees in consideration of the analysis above

12
13

for attorney fees relating to the claims that MAlA ultimately prevailed on at trial.

at this time to issue a final judgment reflecting the

14

However, the Court will decline

15

amount of attorney fees and costs because the affidavit of attorney fees and costs does

16

contain several categories of billings that either does not pertain to this case, i.e. the

17

estate of Dr. Curran, billings that pertain to matters that were dismissed by the Court

18

pursuant to partial summary judgment and billings for claims that were dismissed by

19

MAlA.
20

The Court will order and instruct MRIA to submit a new list of attorney's fees and
21

discretionary costs that exclude billings and costs for the following items:
22
23

24
25

1'

2.

3.
4.
5.

Any billings for public relations issues;
Any billings that pertain to conflicts of interest issues:
Any billings that pertain to the MRIA budget or budget issues;
Any billings that pertain to the estate of Dr. Curran matters;
Any billings that pertain to Saint Alphonsus rent payments and contact with
CHUBV;

26
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5

10.

6

11.

7

12.
13.
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14.
15.

9

16.

10

17.

11

18.
19.

12
13

20.

21.

14
15

22.
23.
24.

16

17

18
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Any billings that pertain to billing issues in this case;
Any billings that pertain to adjustor letters;
Any billings that pertain to the disqualification of Givens, Pursley as lawyers for
Saint Alphonsus;
Any billings generated involving Mike Rowe, Amanda Thomason, Jenny
Hamblin, Kristen S. Coddington, Matthew P. Prengaman, Stacy Lee. Shawn
Baileyl Brad Ebert, Lauren F. Blaesing, Kimber1y E. Aulenbacher and Alysha
1
Dammarell.
Any billings that pertain to Third Party Complaint and Third Party Defendants in
this case;
Any antitrust billings;
Any billings related to Peter Jarvis;
. Any billings with Chas. McDevitt or related disqualification Issues;
Any costs associated with meals set forth in MRIA's billings;
Subtract one of the filmed depositi.ons of Sandra Bruce for $405.00;
Any billings pertaining to Anton Litshfield or that pertain to NTl Forensic
Consulting;
Any and all billings resulting from subpoenas to Blue Cross, Blue Shield,
Pinnacle, and St. Lukes;
Any and all claims regarding trade secret misappropriation;
Any and all billings as to the claim for spoliation;
Any and all billings generated from the dismissal of claims against IMI and
SARMC;
Any and all billings pertaining to the motion to reconsider ethics experts and
antitrust testimony and monopoly claims;
Any and all billings generated through Stoel Rives, LLP for tax issues;
Any and all billings associated with the claim for conversion;
Any and all claims regarding CPM3 Corporation, Value Management, Balukoff
Lindstrom and CPM3 Corporation.
MRIA counsel will submit a revised billing within fourteen (14) days of the date of

this Order and St. Alphonsus will thereafter have fourteen (14) days to file any

19

objections.
20

COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
21

The Court will award fifty-four dollars ($54.00) for filing fees for the filing of the

22
23

Complaint but will not award the four hundred dollars ($400.00) for pro hac vice fees for

24

25
1

26

The Court is not aware of Who these individuals are or what ths basis for their compensation is. In the
event that MRIA can establish a basis for these billings the Court will consider the same.
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out of state counsel.
1

The Cou.rt will award service of ·process fees with the exception of the two

2
3

hundred twenty-five dollars and sixty :cents ($225.60) for service to Third Party

4

Defendants and the two hundred thirty.:six dollars ($236.00) fee regarding re-service

5

fees.

6
7

8
9
10

11

•

'
The Court will decline to award any witness fees for witnesses who did not testify

as set forth in the Saint Alphonsus Mer;norandum in Opposition to MAlA's Motion for
Attorney's Fees and Costs. The Court will decline to award travel expenses for
''
witnesses that did not testify.
'
The Court will award the costs ~for the preparation of trial exhibits, including

.
I

electronic scanning.
12

'

'
j

This case involv~d. hundreds of exhibits, models, maps and
'

13

scanning of documents into a database ~o they could be displayed electronically during

14

the course of the trial. These costs were reasonable and necessary in this litigation in

1s

light of the expansive number of years· and the significant amount of documents

16

generated over the course of that time.

i

'

17
18
19

20
21

22

1

i

The Court will grant witness fee~

as a matter of right as long as the witness

testified at trial. Doug Branson and J~hn McConnell did not testify, in addition, the
i

•

I

0

Court struck Professor Branson's tes~imony so those claims will be denied. Ed
! '
Whitelaw's fee' will be denied on the ba~is' that he was to testify as to antitrust matters

I .
I

and that claim for relief was dismissed by the Court.

23

i .
..ae Court will grant the charges f~r reporting and transcribing of depositions with

24

the exception of the deposition of Dr. Hensen and Dr. Havllna and for any duplicate

2s

copies in electronic form. Further, the Court will allow the charges for video taping of

26
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I

I

,I
I

I

I

experts even though they may have
1

2
3

4

te~tified
r

at trial in light of the potential logistical

'

'

issues of getting the experts to be availa~le ~o testify at trial.

.'

'

The Court will decline to grant a~y
costs associated with copies of depositions
I
that were taken.

j
t

5

The Court will allow all costs that pertain to Jeff Cliff and his deposition and trial
I

6

I

testimony.

I

:

r.

7

CONCLUSION
i

8

I
I

~

9

10

13

I

Antitrust and Equity Claims and DENY Saint Alphonsus's Motions for JNOV and New
i .
Trial. The Court will DENY MAlA's Mption for Prejudgment Interest, DENY MAlA's
I

! .

11
12

•

The Court will DENY Saint Alpho~sus's Application for Attorney Fees Relative to

Motion for Reconsideration, and GRANT; in :part MRIA's Motion for Costs and Fees.
i :

MRIA's counsel will submit

a revif,ed billing within fourteen (14) days of the date
I

•

14

of this Order and St. Alphonsus will thereafter have fourteen (14) days to file any

15

objections.

16
17

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

_j!j_ day of

rve

18
19

20

M( HAEL McLAUGHLIN
DISTRICT JUDGE

21

22

23
24

25

26
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.

'
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6
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The above-captioned Defendant/Counter-Claimants (collectively, "MRIA") submit this
Opposition to the above-captioned Counter-Defendants' (collectively, "St. Al's") Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial (the "Motion").

INTRODUCTION AND STANDARD
St. Al's spends the vast majority of its Motion rehashing the same arguments this Court
has already heard and denied-in some cases several times. St. Al's needless recycling of
unsuccessful arguments, however, means that it has failed to meet the stringent standard for a
motion JNOV, which requires St. Al's to admit any adverse facts and obliges the Court to draw
all inferences in the light most favorable to MRIA. Highland Enter. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330,
339, 986 P.2d 996, 1005 (1999). Moreover, nothing in the Motion comes anywhere close to
meeting the standards for a new trial set forth in Rule 59(a), and the Court's decisions in this
regard can only be overturned if the Court is found to have abused its discretion. Jd at 342-43.
In short, St. Al's falls well short of meeting its difficult burden here.

ARGUMENT

I.

MRIA Proved its Damages in Accordance with Idaho Law
A.

MRIA Proved Its Lost Profits Were Caused by St. Al's

St. Al's begins by asserting that the jury's award of lost profits to MRI Center cannot
stand because, according to St. Al's, "no factual or expert evidence was offered showing that [St.
Al's] conduct caused MRI Center to 'lose' all or any of the scans on which the damages were
based." (Motion, p. 2.) To the contrary, MRIA introduced a plethora of evidence indicating that
St. Al's caused the lost scans. Specifically, that evidence demonstrates that St. Al's intentionally
embarked on a course designed to take business from MRIA and transfer it to its new
partnership, IMI. Indeed, one is left with the question: what more could St. Al's have done,
while still a partner in MRIA, to shift business from MRIA to IMI?

OPPOSITION TO JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR NEW TRIAL- 1
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Because the Court heard all of the evidence, only a sampling is delineated below. That
said, even this small sampling shows that the scans were lost due to St. Al's unlawful conduct:
•St. AI 's created the competitor by sabotaging, rather than promoting, MRIA's opportunity to
partner with GSR and create "one big happy family" (Tr., 1290, 1319-20, 1334-41, 144346,2061-70, 1510-11,2513-18, 2530-36; Ex. 4101).
•St. Al's then took the opportunity to partner with GSR for itself (Tr., 2530-36; Ex. 4226).
•Upon determining to partner with GSR in violation of its duties to MRIA, St. Al's engaged
in tactics designed to misappropriate business from MRIA, including:

a Intentionally violating the competition clause of the MRIA Partnership Agreement
by joining IMI and providing exclusive assistance to IMI which enabled IMI to
become a devastating competitor, including:
•Providing knowledgeable St. Al's executives who began working for, and
who ultimately managed, IMI (Tr., 1489-93, 2104-05, 4440-41, 5996-99);
•Providing significant financial support to IMI (Tr., 21 06-07);
•Providing the exclusive ability to transmit images and reports to referring
physicians digitally and other IT support (Tr., 3496-3515, 3544-49);
•Marketing ofiMI by St. Al's directly to referring physicians (Tr., 1479-80,
3551-53, 3558-60; Ex. 4248);
•Providing assistance in the management, planning, and establishment ofiMI
Meridian (aka "IMI West"), while putting offMRIA's efforts to establish
facilities in Meridian and Eagle (Tr., 1503-13, 2112-14);
•Making IMI its "outpatient facility" (Tr., 1025-26, 2066-72, 2515-17; Ex.
4209); and
•Directing its medical staff to refer patients solely to IMI (Tr., 1485-89, 391619; Ex. 4377).
oSt. Al's refused to support the growth ofMRIA by voting against the expansion of
Mobile (Tr., 1485-89, 3916-19; Ex. 4221).
oSt. Al's condoned GSR's reduction in effort, services hours, and technician support
at MRIA's lab while at the same time increasing IMI's hours of operation (Ex.
4277; Tr., 289-94, 335-36, 2944-48, 3942-46, 3957-68).
oSt. Al's condoned GSR's disparagement ofMRI Center (Tr., 391-402, 3985-89; Exs.
4302, 4498).

OPPOSITION TO JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR NEW TRIAL- 2
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oSt. Al's assisted in spreading rumors that MRI Center was closing causing MRI
Center to lose employees and business to IMI and hurt MRI Center's ability to
attract new employees (!d., Tr., 2943-48).
oSt. Al's and GSR falsely stated that MRI Center would not have DR access (Tr.,
5510-5515; Ex. 4533).
oSt. Al's waited until the non-compete in the 4th Amended Partnership Agreement
expired before withdrawing, even though it had already joined MRIA's competitor
(Tr., 1633-37, 1854-60).
oSt. Al's sent confidential MRIA information to IMI (Tr., 326-28, 1491-96, 2968-69).
oSt. Al's told GSR it was going to withdraw from MRIA which encouraged and
justified GSR's bad acts (Tr., 1443-46, 2061-65, 2513-18).
Thus, contrary to St. Al's erroneous assertion that there is no evidence that St. Al's caused the
lost profits, the small sampling of evidence above sufficiently demonstrates conduct from which
a jury could reasonably find that St. Al's caused MRI Center to lose scans to IMI.
St. Al's next argues that MRIA's experts did not establish the amount of damages with
sufficient certainty. St. AI 's, however, cites no case law supporting its assertion, and to the
contrary, MRIA's expert testimony concerning the amount of damages satisfies Idaho law. In
Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 736-37, 152 P.3d 604, 607-08 (2007), the
Supreme Court held that although the existence of damages must be proved with reasonable
certainty, "reasonable certainty requires neither absolute assurance nor mathematical exactitude;
rather, the evidence need only be sufficient to remove the existence of damages from the realm
of speculation." However, when it comes to calculating the amount of damages, rather than the
existence of damages, a "less rigid standard of proof is imposed" because economic harm is
"difficult to quantify." Pope v. Intermountain Gas, 103 Idaho 217, 233, 646 P.2d 988, 1004
(1982). Therefore, because MRIAproved some damage occurred (i.e., some portion of scans
went from MRIA to IMI as a result of St. Al's conduct) it only needed to prove the amount of

OPPOSITION TO JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR NEW TRIAL- 3
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damages "with whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts permit[ed]," because any
uncertainty is borne by St. Al's as the wrongdoer. Griffith, 143 Idaho at 741.
MRIA's expert, Bruce Budge, testified that he obtained information from both MRI
Center and IMI showing the doctors that referred to those imaging centers and the number of
referrals from each of those doctors. (Tr., 4505-09; Ex. 4417A.) Budge used a conservative
analysis in that he only took into account: (1) MRIA's historical customers who had switched to
IMI, Downtown, and Meridian; (2) scans from IMI's mobile unit that St. Al's placed next to MRI
Center on St. AI 's campus; and (3) new St. Al's-related physicians. (!d.; see also Tr., 4524, 45264532; Ex. 5000.) Based on this information, he developed an approach which showed revenues
were diverted from MRI Center to IMI. (!d.; Exs. 5083, 4566.) Essentially, he tracked the
"migration of referrals" from MRIA to IMI. (!d.) His analysis was consistent with the testimony
at trial that MRIA lost scans to IMI. (Tr., 3540-41, 3944-46, 3961-65, 3969, 3973, 3983-85,
3988-89, 4013-14, 4029-30; Exs. 4010, 4233, 4292.)

B.

MRIA's Methodology is Not Speculative

St. Al's also attacks MRIA's methodology as too speculative. Indeed, without citation, St.
Al's asserts that MRIA's experts "admitted that their testimony about the amount of business
migration was entirely speculative." (Motion, p. 2.) St. Al's provided no citation because
MRIA's experts made no such admission. To the contrary, Budge testified that his methodology
was "extremely conservative." (Tr., 4530-31.) He looked at the physicians who historically
provided business to MRI Center and then tracked how they changed their referral patterns to
IMI. (Tr., 4530.) Furthermore, St. Al's intimation that MRI Center is claiming all ofiMI's scans
is false. Under Budge's methodology, MRI Center is actually claiming only 51% of IMI scans.
(Tr., 4527-28; Ex. 5000.)

OPPOSITION TO JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR NEW TRIAL- 4
004059

It is true, as St. Al's points out, that there is some imprecision in MRIA's methodology,
but as set forth above, a "less rigid standard of proof is imposed with respect to the amount of
damage" because economic harm is "difficult to quantify." Pope, 103 Idaho at 233. Indeed, the
measure of damages for loss of profits is "rarely susceptible of accurate proof." Ryska v.
Anderson, 70 Idaho 207, 213, 214 P.2d 874, 876 (1950). Therefore, the law does not require

"accurate proof with any degree of mathematical certainty." Vancil v. Anderson, 71 Idaho 95,
105,227 P.2d 74, 80 (1951). Thus, "[t]he mere fact that it is difficult to arrive at [an] exact
amount of damages, where it is shown that damages resulted, does not mean that damages may
not be awarded; it is for the trier-of-fact to fix the amount." Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho
629, 640, 862 P.2d 321, 332 (Ct. App. 1993). Here, MRIA's methodology proves the amount of
damages according to the "definiteness and accuracy the facts permit[ed]." Griffith, 143 Idaho at
741. St. Al's argument simply ignores Idaho law that any uncertainty must be borne by St. Al's
as the wrongdoer. !d.
In any event, any supposed imprecision is negated by reviewing the data in the aggregate.
(See Exs. 4566 and 5011.) When asked on cross-examination about whether there were errors in

his method, Budge testified:
Well, I don't think I'd agree that there are errors. I think that they could be better
characterized as degrees of precision in that basically what I'm trying to do is find a
method which is evenhanded which doesn't have a bias one way or the other, recognizing
it can't be done with exact precision. And I think that that there is risk of imprecision on
both sides but wouldn't call it an error in the sense that that might imply that the analysis
wasn't technically or clerically done right or that type of thing. I do think that the overall
conclusion that there was a massive migration of referrals from MRIA to IMI is borne out
by the data in the aggregate that we also looked at. ... I think that the other analysis of the
data in the aggregate is quite corroborative of the conclusion. So I can't actually measure
these precise referral patterns for these split physicians. But I know that if the allegations
are true, that my model does a pretty good job of measuring that migration of referrals
from MRIA to IMI over time.
(Tr., 4639-41.) Then on redirect, Budge further clarified that:
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That's what I was trying to indicate to Mr. Friedman in my cross-examination is that I
think that when you look at the patterns in the aggregate, which are shown on the screen,
it's very clear you're seeing a migration, that all ofMRIA's scans are drying up, and that
there are these hypothetical nuances which give me concern which deserve careful
thought. I think his questions were perfectly legitimate, but they don't have the effect of
causing a significant distortion in the measurement of the migration.
(Tr., 4646.) Mr. Budge's analysis is further corroborated by Exhibits 4292,4566, and 5011,
which demonstrate that as MRI Center was losing scans, IMI was seeing a reciprocal gain. Thus,
this was not "rough justice," as St. AI 's asserts, but rather a model fully corroborated by various
sources. Indeed, as Budge testified, to the extent there was imprecision, that imprecision caused
a significant understatement of the amount of damages rather than an overstatement. 1 (Tr., 453031, 4599-4600.) The jury's damage finding should be upheld.

C.

MRIA's Methodology Satisfies Pope

For at least the third time before this Court alone (and not including the arguments raised
before Judge McLaughlin and the Idaho Supreme Court), St. Al's asserts that MRIA's
methodology for calculating lost profits does not satisfy Pope. As this Court found, MRIA's lost
profits theory of damages did not run afoul of Pope. (Order, Nov. 16,2010, pp. 18-20.) Nothing
has changed since that ruling. The evidence at trial, like the evidence at summary judgment,
meets all of Pope :S requirements. Indeed, in addition to Budge's testimony that he took into
account competition, including competition from IMI (Tr., 4531-32), there was testimony from
St. Al's witness Grant Chamberlain that even taking into account IMI and other competitors
entering the market, MRI Center's business would still grow considerably, which supports the
1

St. Al's also erroneously asserts that Budge's model includes "numerous scans" that had IMI
never existed would have gone to St. Luke's. St. Al's, however, provides no evidence to support
this assertion other than the fact that MRI Center's historical stable of referring physicians
included physicians with privileges at both St. Al's and St. Luke's, a fact which does not support
the assertion. Moreover, Budge testified that his model does not incorporate scans that would
have gone to St. Luke's. (Tr., 4531.) Tellingly, St. Al's expert, Dr. McCarthy, testified he had no
evidence of referrals to St. Luke's. (Tr., 6227-33.)
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jury's conclusion that it declined because of St. Al's bad acts rather than legitimate competition.
(Tr., 5084-97; Ex. 5012B.) Pope is also inapposite because here, unlike in Pope, the competitor
was wrongfully created by St. Al 's. Thus, even though MRIA's experts did factor out scans that
IMI would have won had it competed lawfully, they did not need to do so because all scans taken
from MRI Center by IMI were due to St. AI 's creating the competitor in the first place.

D.

MRI Mobile's Lost Profit Evidence Was Sufficient

St. Al's next asserts that MRIA's evidence of lost profits sustained by MRI Mobile is
insufficient under Trilogy Network Systems v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119 (2007).
Contrary to St. Al 's assertion, however, Trilogy does not hold that a party cannot prove lost profit
damages for breach of a non-compete clause through evidence of the breaching party's profits.
Instead, the Court held that the trial court did not err in finding the proof of lost profits was
deficient because Trilogy failed to introduce evidence of "any correspondence between what its
profit would have been and [the breaching party's] actual profit, and thus failed to take the
measure of its damages out ofthe realm of speculation." !d. at 847. Accordingly, the premise
behind the Trilogy decision-which involved claims that one of Trilogy's former employees
violated a noncompetition agreement by successfully outbidding Trilogy to obtain a contract with
one of Trilogy's customers-was that the conclusory statements offered by Trilogy that its profit
would have been "'very similar' to the profit earned by the former employee, without showing
the amount of its bid and without providing any comparison between its costs to perform the
contract and the costs actually incurred by its former employee" were too speculative to support
Trilogy's damage claim. See also Todd v. Sullivan Constr., 146 Idaho 118, 122-23, 191 P.3d 196,
200-01 (2008) (explaining Trilogy's holding).
Moreover, the Trilogy decision is inapplicable to this case regardless. In this case, unlike
in Trilogy, there was a comparison of profit margins between what was received at MRI Center
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and what IMI received in Meridian. For example, Ex. 5084 at Schedules 4 and 7 shows that MRI
Center's profit margin was higher than IMI Meridian's. Thus, had MRIA used MRI Center's
profit margin, as St. Al's suggests should have been done, the result would actually have been a
higher damage award. Obviously, St. Al's cannot credibly complain about an alleged error that
would have resulted in a larger damage award.
Moreover, the Trilogy decision is inapposite because it did not involve the taking of an
opportunity to build a new facility where there would be a different cost structure and profit
margin than for existing facilities. Instead, it involved a situation akin to MRI Center's claim for
lost profits. Id When determining damages for the taking of an opportunity, the Supreme Court
has found that the loss can be measured by reference to the profits realized by entity that took the
opportunity. Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 514, 716 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1986). As Budge
explained, unlike with the diverted scan calculation for MRI Center-which applied MRI
Center's cost structure and profit margins to the diverted scans to arrive at the amount of
damages-because MRI Mobile's claim was that it was prevented from opening a facility in
Meridian, there was no existing MRI Mobile or MRI Center facility from which to derive a cost
structure and profit margin. (Tr., 4544-48.) Consequently, the most reasonable thing to do was
to assume, as Budge did, that MRI Mobile would have built a center in Meridian similar to that
built by St. Al's and GSR. (!d) Thus, rather than speculating, Budge used the costs actually
incurred by St. Al 's and GSR to build and operate a facility. (ld) So doing is certainly not
speculative as was the issue in Trilogy. Indeed, the best way to determine what the costs would

OPPOSITION TO JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR NEW TRIAL- 8
004063

have been is to look at a similar facility-IMI Meridian? Consequently, the damage analysis for
lost profits does not run afoul of Trilogy.

E.

MRIA Proved It Was Entitled to Lost Profit Damages After 2005

On pp. 5-7 of the Motion, St. Al's once again attacks MRIA's ability to recover lost
profits after 2005. This Court, however, has ruled "on numerous occasions" that "MRIA may
recover any damages caused by wrongful conduct, regardless of when the damages accrue so
long as they arise from conduct engaged in prior to 2005." (Order, Sept. 27, 2011, p. 15.) That
is precisely what MRIA did at trial.
In particular, MRIA introduced evidence showing that St. Al's, prior to dissociation,
destroyed MRI Center's business so that it was unable to win back the business taken by IMI.

(See, e.g., infra.,§ IA; Exs. 4566, 5011A; Tr., 4032-33.) Jack Floyd ofMRI Center testified that
by April of2005, when the non-compete expired, "we were pretty much dead in the water, and
we weren't really able to compete effectively." (!d.) He then described the efforts MRI Center
made to win back the referrals that it lost as a result of St. Al's unlawful conduct but explained
that, despite those efforts, MRI Center was unable to win back the stolen referrals. 3 (Tr., 432,
4032-35.) This testimony was unrebutted. 4

2

In fact, had MRI Mobile opened the Meridian facility instead of IMI, it would have had the
same equipment, the same scans, similar staff, etc.
3
The scans that MRIA did obtain from physicians who had switched to IMI were VA patients.
MRIA kept these scans because it had the VA contract, which typically included low pays or no
pays that IMI did not want due to the harm to its bottom line. (Tr., 3983-85.)
4
St. Al's disingenuously asserts that Budge admitted that if St. Al's was free to compete after
April2005 that all damages after that date should be excised from his report, citing to pp. 457475 of the Transcript. St. Al's, however, failed to cite to the preceding page, 4573, where Budge
specifically qualified his statement saying that if"none of these damages relate to pre-withdrawal
acts" and if competition was lawful, then those damages would need to be excised. That
testimony is obviously consistent with this Court's rulings.
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The fact that the damage to MRIA was already done by the time St. Al's was able to
lawfully compete is demonstrated vividly by Exs. 4566, 5011 and 5011A. Those exhibits
establish that once St. Al's joined IMI in 2001, MRI Center began losing thousands of scans to
IMI each year. As shown by Exhibit 4566, MRI Center went from doing 4,800 scans for
affiliated physicians in 2001 to 3,000 scans in 2004, to 2,000 scans in 2005, to 634 scans in
2006, and to 79 scans by 2008. In fact, at the end of2010, only 30 scans for affiliated physicians
were performed. (!d.) This was more than enough for a jury to conclude that the damage that
was done to MRI Center before the end of the non-compete period was so devastating that,
contrary to St. Al 's assertion, MRI Center was never able to recover from the impact of St. Al 's
deleterious acts and consequently was never able to regain those scans. As is depicted
graphically by Exhibit 5011A, the sharp downward decline in scans started long before St. Al's
dissociated and could lawfully compete. (Ex. 5011A is attached to hereto as Appendix A.)
Essentially, St. Al's complains that although the evidence is clear that it pushed MRI Center off
the cliffbefore it dissociated, it should not liable for all of the resulting damages because MRI
Center did not hit bottom until after St. Al's dissociated. St. Al's argument ignores the fact that it
is liable for damages that were set in motion by pre-dissociation conduct. 5

5

Furthermore, St. Al's argument completely ignores the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in
Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 203 P.3d 694 (2009), which states that partners
can be liable for technical compliance with the provisions ofthe partnership agreement if in so
doing they were acting in bad faith. Thus, although St. Al's may have technically dissociated in
a lawful manner, it did so in bad faith for the sole purpose of attempting to legitimize its ongoing
efforts to compete with MRIA. Additionally, damages to MRI Mobile should not be cut off in
2005 because that opportunity was stolen before St. Al's was technically free to compete.
Moreover, contrary to St. Al's assertion, the Court's Instruction No. 37 specifically told the jury
that St. Al's was free to compete after April2005, obviating any need to order a new trial where
the jury is instructed not to award damages for scans lost as a result of lawful competition.
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F.

MRIA Is Entitled to Recover Scans Lost to IMI's On-Campus Facility

As St. Al's recognizes, a subset ofMRI Center's post-April2005 damages is scans lost to
IMI's on-campus facility. The fact that those scans were lost to IMI's on-campus facility rather
than IMI's downtown facility makes no difference to the analysis. As set forth above, MRI
Center lost scans to IMI as a result of conduct that occurred before 2005. It does not matter
which of those facilities took the business. That is, the evidence is clear that IMI would not have
existed in opposition to MRIA, and certainly would not have been on St. Al's campus, but for St.
Al's concerted and unlawful efforts to create IMI, bleed MRIA dry over the course of several
years, and then supplant MRIA with IMI. Indeed, the only reason St. AI 's had the option of
sending its in-house patients to a competitor in 2005 is because St. Al's breached its contractual
and fiduciary duties in the years prior.
In addition, St. Al's belief that it "had the absolute right to send its own patients to IMI
rather than MRI" is demonstrably false. (Motion, p. 7.) First and foremost, St. Al's failed to
raise this argument at trial, and certainly presented no evidence of it. To the contrary, this new
position directly conflicts with the multitude of evidence and testimony presented at trial
showing that such a practice would be a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute, the IMI
Operating Agreement, and St. AI 's own internal policies. (See Opposition to Motion for Directed
Verdict on Stark and Anti-Kickback Statutes, pp. 11-16.; Tr., 1369-70, 1517-1527; Exs. 4502 at
12,4226 at§ 3.3.1.2.) Moreover, even if St. Al's had presented evidence that it had the right to
direct its in-patients to use IMI, St. Al's also failed to cite to any evidence that IMI's on-campus
facility only served St. AI 's in-patients. Therefore, scans lost to IMI's on-campus facility should
not be removed from MRI Center's damages.
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G.

St. Al's Is Not Entitled to Any Share of MRIA's Post-Dissociation Profits

St. Al 's argues that it is entitled to its share of the profits MRIA received as damages
because, according to St. Al's, the damage analysis was premised on St. Al's remaining a partner
in MRIA. At trial, Budge did not testify that his but-for analysis was premised on St. Al's
remaining a partner in MRIA, but was rather premised on the assumption that the pattern of
referrals would not be interrupted. (Tr., 4566-72.) He also testified that when he was asked a
hypothetical about this but-for assumption during his deposition he was under the misimpression
that St. Al's could direct scans to IMI. (/d.) Moreover, even if St. Al's position concerning the
premise was accurate, damages should not be reduced because St. Al's was compensated for its
share of all future profits when it was awarded its departing-partner share. As set forth in
MRIA's Motion in Limine on this subject, filed Oct. 11, 2011, which arguments are hereby
incorporated by reference, and the Court's subsequent decision (Tr., 4203-15), St. Al's was fully
compensated for its interest in future profits when it was awarded its departing-partner share
because St. AI 's departing-partner share included the present value of future profits. (September
21, 2007 Findings of Fact, p. 4.) Furthermore, St. Al's did not plead offset. Therefore, as this
Court previously ruled, St. Al's is not entitled to an offset.

H.

MRIA is Entitled to Damages for Diminution in Value

In the Motion, St. Al's makes the same arguments concerning MRIA's diminution-invalue proof that in it made in its pre-verdict motion regarding damages. In response to those
arguments, MRIA incorporates by reference the arguments made in its Opposition, filed Sept. 19,
2011, pp. 20-29. For the same reasons that this Court rejected St. Al's arguments pre-verdict, it
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should reject them post-verdict. 6 (See the Court's Sept. 27, 2011 Order, pp. 13-14.) Indeed, the
jury's findings support the Court's prior ruling.

II.

MRIAAppropriately Presented Claims for Usurpation and Disgorgement
A.

MRIA's Disgorgement Claims Were Not Untimely

St. Al's contends that MRIA's disgorgement claims were outside the Court's order reopening discovery. MRIA rebutted this argument at length in its Opposition to St. AI 's Motion to
Exclude MRIA's Damages Theories, Sept. 19,2011, at p. 13. As the Court correctly held in its
Order of Feb. 15, 2011, the disgorgement theory of damages was not beyond the scope ofthe
proceedings. The parties understood from the Supreme Court's order on remand that the issue of
damages was to be reopened and that the damages had to be linked to misconduct occurred prior
to April 1, 2005. Disgorgement is a remedy that links St. AI 's conduct to these later damages.
Moreover, St. Al's itself requested that damages discovery be reopened. Having succeeded on
that motion, St. Al's cannot be permitted to argue that MRIA's disgorgement calculations are
inappropriate: it would unfairly reopen discovery for St. Al's, but not for MRIA.
In addition, in response to St. Al's argument that MRIA did not adequately disclose the
damages theory in its expert report, MRIA noted that this theory did appear in footnote 1 of Mr.
Budge's supplemental report of May 2, 2011. The Court nonetheless held that this was not a
clear enough disclosure. The Court determined that the appropriate remedy for the inadequate
disclosure was to "allow Saint Alphonsus to obtain an expert witness to address this theory, or
allow Dr. McCarthy to address this theory." (Order, Feb. 15, 2011, p. 12-13.) St. Al's complains
6

St. Al's complains that Dr. Prochaska's testimony "was unsupported by any calculations or
other evidence." (Motion, p. 9.) That complaint is without merit. In fact, the empirical data
gathered by Budge corroborates Dr. Prochaska's testimony. For example, Exs. 4566, 5011, and
5012 are compilations of data demonstrating that MRI Center has virtually no remaining value.
Additionally, St. Al's claims that it had no opportunity for discovery regarding MRI Center's
financial condition is false. MRI Center's financial statements were produced and relied upon by
Budge in his expert report. (See Ex. 4417A.)
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that Dr. McCarthy was too busy with trial preparations to address this theory, apparently ignoring
the Court's permission to obtain an entirely new expert. (Motion, p. 10, n.5.) St. Al's decision
not to take advantage of the corrective remedy authorized by the Court waives the argument.

B.

The Usurpation Claim Is Not Time Barred

St. Al's argues that the usurpation ofMRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR occurred in
1999, and thus is time barred. However, this Court correctly held that Judge McLaughlin already
decided this issue, a decision that became the law of the case because it was not appealed. In the
first trial, Judge McLaughlin held that the appropriation of a partnership opportunity was a
continuing tort, meaning that the statute of limitation was no bar. (Tr., 6315-17; see also 2007
Tr., 4196:5-12.) At the time Judge McLaughlin made this ruling, he was addressing an argument
by St. Al's that all claims of breach of fiduciary duty arising prior to May 20, 2001, were time
barred. (See 2007 Tr., 6316:3-6.) Judge McLaughlin disagreed, a ruling that St. Al's did not
appeal. As MRIA's usurpation claim is a claim that St. Al's breached its fiduciary duties by
taking what should have been a partnership opportunity of MRIA, the Court correctly held that
this ruling is the law of the case.
C.

The Usurpation Claims are Supported by the Evidence

St. Al's argues that the usurpation claims are not supported by the evidence, and that the
record shows that the agreement between MRIA and GSR failed because the parties were not
able to agree on terms, not because of the actions of St. AI 's. MRIA rebutted this at length in its
Reply in Support of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Concerning
Disgorgement, Nov. 21, 2011, pp. 4-12, which is incorporated herein by reference. MRIA will
not repeat those arguments there. Suffice it to say that multiple witnesses and documents
demonstrate that St. Al 's knowingly "killed" an imminent deal between MRIA and GSR and
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knowingly thwarted MRIA's efforts to move into Meridian. This is more than sufficient to
support the finding that St. Al's usurped these opportunities.

D.

MRIA's Disgorgement Damages Should Not Be Reduced by St. Al's $11Million Investment

St. AI 's next argues that the Court should have reduced the disgorgement damages by $11
million to reflect St. Al's investment into IMI. As MRIA explained in detail in its earlier
briefing, it sought disgorgement only of the "dividends" related to St. Al's ownership in IMI
through 2015. Therefore, it is inappropriate to offset the disgorgement award by St. Al's buy-in
cost because St. Al's will still be able to receive profits after 2015 and because it still has the
value of its investment, which it can recoup if it ever decides to sell its interest in IMI. Indeed,
MRIApresented unrebutted expert testimony on this point. As such, St. Al's argument for a
reduction in damages in this manner is inappropriate because it seeks to offset costs related to a
category of damages that MRIA did not seek.

III.

The Court Aptly Declined to Apportion Fault to Joint Tortfeasors on Contract Claims
The Court correctly declined to apportion fault for MRIA's contract claims against St.

Al's to other joint tortfeasors who had settled with MRIA prior to the first trial. Idaho Code § 6806 clearly provides for apportionment only as between joint tortfeasors. St. AI 's nevertheless
argues that conduct which breached the contract was part of a single conspiracy to commit
wrongful acts, citing to the case Dunn v. Prasiss, 656A.2d 413,419 (N.J. 1995). Dunn, which is
not binding law in Idaho, was a case in which a physician found liable of medical malpractice
sought contribution from his HMO on its independent breach of contractual duty to the patientsubscriber of the HMO. Dunn has been severely limited to personal injury cases where an
HMO's contractual duties were closely analogous to tort. See Longport Ocean Plaza Condo,
Inc. v. Robert Cato & Assocs., 2002 WL 2013925 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Under all other
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circumstances, "[a]s the term 'joint tortfeasors' ... indicate[s], both the party against whom a
claim for contribution is asserted as well as the party asserting the claim must be tortfeasors,"
meaning that claims "grounded in contract" do not qualify. Id (emphasis in original).
Simply put, by definition, Idaho's tortfeasor apportionment statute applies only to
circumstances in which a tort has occurred. If the Court were to accept St. Al's interpretation, a
tortfeasor and conspirator could become liable for breach of contract claims related to a contract
to which he was not a party by simple virtue of the fact that he was named as a defendant in a
case where tort and contract claims were plead against his co-defendant. This is not
contemplated by the Idaho apportionment statute. See In re Singh, 457 B.R. 790, 805 (Bkrtcy.
E.D. Cal. 20 11) ("a person who is not a party to a contract cannot be bootstrapped into a
conspiracy tort"); CTTI Priesmeyer, Inc. v. K & 0 Ltd, 164 S.W.3d 675, 685 (Tex. App.-Austin
2005) ("If we were to hold that, due to the indivisible nature of the resulting injury, breach of
contract defendants and tort defendants are jointly and severally liable for all damages, we would
be forced to hold a person not a party to a contract liable for the breach of that contract.");
Cooper Indust. v. Tarmac Roofing, 276 F.3d 704, 716 n.IO (5th Cir. 2002) (apportionment statute
in Mississippi only applied to joint tortfeasors; thus because defendant's liability stemmed not
only from its negligence, but also from breach of contract, damages could not be apportioned). 7
St. Al's also argues that the Court erred in its interpretation that the term "pro rata" means
"50 percent." The Court correctly rejected this argument and held that "pro rata" means
apportionment of that percentage of fault as determined by the jury. (Order, May 18, 2011, pp.
5-7.) St. Al 's also advances the bizarre position that the interpretation of this statute is impacted

7

St. Al's argues that it was prejudiced by the timing of this ruling during the jury instruction
conference. However, there can be no prejudice from a ruling by the Court that is legally correct.
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by the comment of counsel that St. Al's was trying to "throw GSR under the bus." (Tr. pp. 53995413.) This comment obviously cannot change the statutory meaning of the term "pro rata."
St. Al's also argues that the Court erred in instructing the jury to determine fault
separately for each cause of action and in not allocating the total damages among the different
causes of action. However, this procedure was entirely appropriate, as it permitted the jury to
allocate damages for each of the tort causes of action. That the same acts may have provided the
evidentiary basis for the claims of intentional interference, breach of fiduciary duty, and
conspiracy does not alter the fact that they are entirely different claims with different elements,
and that it is appropriate for jury to separately consider the fault of the parties on each claim.

IV.

The Court Properly Allowed Amendment of the Pleadings to Include the Claims of
Center and Mobile
St. Al's next contends that the Court erred in permitting the joinder ofMRI Center and

MRI Mobile. St. Al's first argues that MRIA should be required to adhere to its previous "trial
strategy" of not joining the Limiteds as plaintiffs in the action. Notably, however, in the first
trial, MRIA requested one of two alternatives from Judge McLaughlin: (1) to be permitted to
bring the action on behalf of the Limiteds, or (2) to be permitted to amend the pleadings to join
the Limiteds as plaintiffs. (Appendix to Responsive Summary Judgment Briefs, R. Ex. 66 at pp.
10-11 (Tab 26), filed Aug. 30, 2010; Tr. Vol I, p. 275 (Tab 25).) Judge McLaughlin held that
MRIAssociates could bring the action on behalfofthe Limiteds, (!d., R. 00870 (Tab 15)), a
decision which the Supreme Court held was error. 224 P.3d at 1086. This Court appropriately
allowed MRIA to follow the alternative strategy, as requested in the first trial, of joining the
Limiteds as plaintiffs. As such, there is no merit to St. Al's assertion that MRIA was
inappropriately permitted to pursue a "new" strategy in the second trial.
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Furthermore, the claims of the Limiteds are not time barred because they relate back to
prior pleadings, which were timely filed. St. Al's argues, as it did in its Motion for Judgment on
the Claims of the Limited Partnerships, filed August 6, 2010, that in order for the claims of the
Limiteds to relate back, MRIA must be the "wrong" party. MRIA refuted this in its Opposition,
filed August 30,2010, which is incorporated by reference. Suffice it to say that St. Al's argument
ignores the Supreme Court's admonishment that the rule authorizing the joinder of real parties in
interest is to be liberally construed in order to "'further the policy favoring the just resolution of
actions-providing litigants their day in court.'" Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho
342, 348, 33 P.3d 816, 822 (2001). The Court correctly held in its Order ofNovember 16,2010,
that the claims of the Limited Partnerships properly related back and it was appropriate to join
them as plaintiffs pursuant to Rules 15(c) and 17(a). (See Order, Nov. 16, 2010, pp. 20-29.)
Finally, St. Al's argues that the claims of the Limiteds are invalid, particularly
challenging the Court's ruling on summary judgment that they were third party beneficiaries of
the MRIA partnership agreement, and standing by Judge McLaughlin's ruling that St. Al 's owed
them a common law fiduciary duty. St. Al's argues that these rulings render the claims of the
Limiteds invalid and cause them to fail for lack of proof.
On the issue of third-party beneficiary, St. Al's does not advance any new arguments,
simply arguing, as it did in it Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue, that the partnership
agreement was not for the benefit of the Limiteds. MRIA refuted this argument at length in its
Opposition, filed April 25, 2011, incorporated herein by reference. The Court correctly found
that the partnership agreement was intended to benefit the Limiteds, the vehicles by which MRIA
conducted its business. (Order, June 17, 2011, pp. 7-9).
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St. Al 's next argues that the Court erred in not instructing the jury that it should determine
whether a common-law fiduciary duty existed between St. Al's and the Limiteds, and that this
"wrongful" ruling infected the claims of intentional interference and conspiracy. In the previous

trial, Judge McLaughlin held that no reasonable jury could fail to find that St. Al 's owned the
Limiteds a common law fiduciary duty. (2007 Tr., 4201-03.) This was not appealed to the
Supreme Court. As such, in this trial, the Court gave the same instruction to the jury as given by
Judge McLaughlin in the previous trial of this matter asking the jury to determine whether these
fiduciary duties had been violated, an instruction which was not appealed. (Tr., 6377-78.)
Consequently, the Court properly declined to give a different instruction or revisit the matter of
whether common law fiduciary duties were owed. Moreover, contrary to St. Al 's assertion, there
was ample evidence in the record in this case that St. Al's in fact owed common-law fiduciary
duties to the Limiteds, including Sandra Bruce's own specific admission of that fact. (Tr. p.
1102).

V.

St. Al-3- "Law of the Case" Arguments Catch It Exercising a Selective Memory

St. Al's next argues-somewhat more globally than above-that the Court never should
have applied the law-of-the-case doctrine in this case. (Motion, pp. 17-19.) This argument
conveniently ignores the fact that it was actually St. Al 's who first asked this Court to apply the
doctrine (in its favor) when it sought to reaffirm Judge McLaughlin's decisions concerning the
departing partner share and the exclusion of certain evidence. The Court granted these and other
motions on law-of-the-case grounds, which greatly benefitted St. Al's. (See June 13, 2011 Order,
pp. 2-3; June 17 Order, pp. 3-4.) As such, what St. Al's is actually arguing is that the doctrine
should only be applied if it will benefit St. Al 's. Obviously, such a position is untenable.
Moreover, in all but a couple of minor exceptions, the only harm that St. Al 's alleges as a
result of this Court's application ofthe law-of-the-case doctrine is that St. Al's was held to its
OPPOSITION TO JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR NEW TRIAL- 19
004074

own stipulations concerning exhibits from the prior trial. That is, St. Al's is incredibly
complaining that it is somehow being prejudiced by being forced to live up to its freely-given
promises. Such self-serving arguments should be ignored.
Finally, St. Al's argument that the rule was unevenly applied is false. St. Al's argues first
that MRIA was unfairly allowed to amend its complaint and update its damages theories. Yet, as
noted above, these changes were due to either an obvious change in circumstances from the
Supreme Court (such as requiring the Limiteds to be plaintiffs) or had nothing to do with a prior
decision by Judge McLaughlin. Moreover, it is telling that as support for the "uneven
application" of the doctrine, St. Al's is unable to muster any more than two relatively
inconsequential examples of evidence it was not allowed to introduce: its non-profit status and
the Schamp/Giles story. When these are compared with the bevy of examples where St. Al's was
greatly benefitted by the rule-such as in the case of its departing partnership share 8-it is clear
that St. Al's was not the hapless victim of an "uneven application" of the doctrine. (See, e.g.,
June 13,2011 Order, pp. 2-3; June 17,2011 Order, pp. 3-4; Tr. 567-68,2693-94,3085, 4490-91;
Review of Status of Case, issued Sept. 2, 2011, pp. 5-8.)

VI.

None of the nErroneous Rulings" Alleged by St. Al's Raises a Reversible Issue
Section VI of St. Al 's Motion presents a jumble of unrelated complaints about

comparatively minor evidentiary decisions made at trial. (Motion, pp. 19-24.) None need detain
the Court for long: St. Al 's is plainly wrong on all counts, and even if it were correct, a new trial
would only be "merited if the [evidentiary] error affects a party's substantial right." Clark v.

Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156, 45 P.3d 810, 812 (2002). As is clear below, none of St. Al's
complaints come anywhere near affecting a "substantial right." The arguments are taken in order.

8

MRIA makes this argument without waiver of its position that this Court can and should
reconsider St. Al's award of its departing partner share.
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That the Court erred by allowing the jury to determine the meaning of the radiology
contract. St. Al's begins by arguing that the Court should have entered a directed verdict that St.

Al's contract with GSR divested it of the ability to require GSR to read MRIA scans. Yet, as this
Court has already found, such a ruling would be in error, since there is at least a "factual issue as
to whether the contract obligates the radiologists to read for MRIA." (Tr., 6065.) Furthermore,
even if St. Al 's contractual interpretation was correct, the result would be the same, since if St.
Al 's purposefully agreed to a contract with its radiologists which did not require them to read
MRIA scans, St. Al's would still be in violation of its fiduciary duties to MRIA by having
purposefully tied its own hands. Or, as the Court stated more succinctly, "it is not the
enforceability of the contract at issue here. It is whether Saint Alphonsus was meeting its duties
to the partnership in providing radiologists for the MRI entities." (Tr., 6066.)
That the Court erred by disallowing Cindy Schamp's testimony about what she said
to Dr. Curran. St. Al's next argues that the Court should not have granted MRIA's motion in

limine concerning Cindy Schamp's testimony about what she told Dr. Curran about St. Al's
negotiations with GSR/IMI. Yet, as the Court recognized, these statements were clearly hearsay.
(Tr., 1912.) Furthermore, even if the Court was wrong on this issue, it also made clear that its
ruling was only preliminary-that Schamp could testify as to her conversations with Dr. Curran
if the "door was opened" in some other way. !d. That door was clearly opened, since Schamp
testified repeatedly on direct that she informed Dr. Curran of the status of the negotiations with
GSR/IMI. (See, e.g., Tr., 2059,2233,2266-72,2292-93,2326-38,2343-45,2356-57,2443-44,
2524-25.) As such, regardless of the propriety of the Court's decision, St. Al's experienced no
cognizable prejudice.
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That the Court erred in its ruling concerning the Idaho Business Review article.
St. Al 's argues that it was improper to exclude the Idaho Business Review article during Dr.
Prochaska's initial testimony. St. Al's argument is faulty for at least two reasons. First, St. Al's
solely complains that the document was kept out on the grounds of hearsay, yet the record says
that this Court initially kept it out on foundational grounds. (Tr., 812-13.) St. Al's argument
concerning hearsay is accordingly irrelevant. Secondly, as this Court well knows, once Dr.
Seaboum testified, the article was admitted for all purposes. (Tr., 5337-38.) At that time, St. Al's
had the option of calling Dr. Prochaska back to ask him about it, yet it chose not to do so, even
though Dr. Prochaska was present in the courtroom nearly every day of the trial. As such, St.
Al's has no one to blame but itself for not examining Dr. Prochaska about the article.

That the Court erred in not allowing St. Al's additional discovery on the eve of trial.
St. Al 's further complains that it should have been allowed to reopen discovery on the eve of trial
under the guise of a minority-shareholder records request, and that the Court's refusal to do so
harmed St. Al's when it went to ask the DMR doctors how much they made. This is fallacious
on several levels. First, as this Court noted, "[a]llowing a party to use information, obtained
outside the discovery process so long after the discovery deadlines have passed would frustrate
the purpose of the discovery rules and allow for the trials by surprise sought to be avoided by the
rules." (Order, July 20, 2011.) Moreover, if St. Al's did not have all the documents it wanted for
trial, it is suffering from a self-inflicted wound. Discovery in this matter lasted years and with a
few minor exceptions, St. Al 's had access to virtually every document it wanted from MRlA. St.
Al's cannot claim prejudice for its own failure to plan ahead.
In addition, even accepting St. Al's recitation of the facts as true, there is again very little
apparent prejudice involved. St. Al's says it wanted to use its books-and-records request to prove
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that the DMR doctors made a good return on their initial investment in MRIA. But that fact was
not in material dispute; as St. Al 's itself noted at closing, it encountered little resistance to its
allegation that "between 1985 and year 2000 ... the five DMR doctors shared $15 million. There
was no pushback over that number. Rather, you heard Mr. Banducci embrace it." (Tr., 6699

(emphasis added).) Stated another way, the problem here was not that St. Al's failed to establish
that the DMR doctors made money, but instead that the jury did not seem to care. And this lack
of interest is understandable, given that the DMR doctors' compensation was at best tangentially
relevant to whether St. Al 's breached its contracts or fiduciary duties.

That the Court erred by not excluding the Shattuck Hammond memoranda. St. Al 's
complains that the Court did not excise the "fiduciary duty" language from the Shattuck
Hammond memoranda. But again, as this Court noted, this language was not unfairly
prejudicial. (Order, Aug. 24, 2011, p. 7.) Moreover, St. Al's cites to no evidence suggesting
MRIA "impl[ied] that dissociation was a breach of fiduciary duty," and even if it had, there were
repeated and specific instructions from this Court emphatically saying the exact opposite. (See
Jury Instruction Nos. 5 and 37.) These instructions are presumed to have cured any perceived
prejudice. Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 32, 13 P.3d 857, 863 (2000).

That the Court erred by not allowing St. Al's to state that its withdrawal was
"rightful." As with the Shattuck Hammond discussion above, St. Al's cannot show any actual
harm by not being able to refer to its withdrawal as "rightful" since, as noted above, the Court
specifically informed the jury twice that the withdrawal was, in fact, rightful in Instructions 5
and 37. Moreover, St. Al's argument that it should be able to use the term "rightful" because
MRIA used the term "wrongful" in the last trial ignores the glaring fact that the Supreme Court
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specifically overturned the prior verdict because the Court believed the term "wrongful" was
highly prejudicial. 148 Idaho at 489-90.
That the Court erred by allowing MRIA to refer to a "little girl with a brain tumor."

St. Al's argument that the Court should not have allowed MRIA to refer to a "little girl with a
brain tumor" is a red herring. First, as this Court noted, there is nothing unfairly prejudicial
about the use of this example, especially since St. Al's talked ad infinitum about how much its
patients meant to it. (Tr., 1209-11.) Moreover, St. Al's failed to object to the term's use during the
trial (Tr., 1169, 1193), and then only brought up its "objection" at a break some time later, which
obviously is the improper way to go about objecting to evidence. And though the objection was
not sustained, it is notable that the "little girl" did not reappear in any question after that initial
objection anyway. It is accordingly difficult to know how St. Al's believes it was harmed.
That the Court erred by allowing Dr. Wilson's testimony. St. Al's argument

concerning Dr. Wilson ignores Idaho law, which pointedly allows for rebuttal evidence when a
witness provides a self-serving "I don't know" response. See, e.g., Preuss v. Thomson, 112 Idaho
169, 171 (Ct. App. 1986). And contrary to St. Al's arguments, Ms. Bruce's credibility was
absolutely central to this case, as was the culture of fear she created by firing doctors at will.
That the Court erred by allowing Jeff Cliff to be rebutted. Similar to Dr. Wilson, St.

Al 's argument concerning Cliff ignores cases like Preuss as it relates to non-responsive answers.
Furthermore, this Court's limiting instruction related to Cliff (No. 19) cured any perceived
prejudice, since again: "[e]rror in admission of evidence may be cured by proper instruction, and
it must be presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court's direction." Cook, 135 Idaho at 32.
That the Court gave an instruction to Neil McFeeley. St. Al's argument that Neil

McFeeley was harshly "admonished" is overwrought. The record reflects that this Court, at
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worst, reminded McFeeley of the Court's standing order. Moreover, St. Al's contention that there
had been "no warrant for ... a concern" about why McF eeley was in the courtroom is unsupported
by the facts. McFeeley had no client with him or testifying on the day the Court talked to him,
which raised the question as to why he was there at all. And, in fact, in a subsequent discussion,
McFeeley admitted that he was there so as to be able to "prepare" his clients for testimony. Tr.,
4177-79. The Court's diplomatic reminder about its rule was accordingly appropriate.

VIL

St. AI~ Is Not Entitled to Interest Running from Dissociation
St. Al 's ends by contending that Uniform Partnership Act entitles it to interest on its

partnership share from the time of its dissociation. Motion, p. 25. Yet this position ignores the
fact that the Partnership Act only applies to the extent that the partnership agreement is silent,
and in this case, the partnership agreement specifically states that no interest is to be awarded.
I.C. § 53-3-103; Ex. 4023, p. 12 (§ 6.2). St. Al's argument accordingly fails. 9
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, MRIA respectfully requests this Court deny the Motion.
DATED this 14th day ofFebruary 2012.

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

9

This argument is made without waiver of MRIA's position that no interest should have been
awarded to St. Al's until January of2012.
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P.O. Box 2837
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Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
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Thomas Davis
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP,
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COME NOW Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center (collectively "Saint Alphonsus"), by and through the undersigned counsel of
record, Gjording & Fouser, PLLC, and pursuant to Rules 54(d)(6) and 54(e)(6) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, move this Court for an order to disallow in part the costs and attorney
fees requested by MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited
Partnership (collectively, "MRIA") in this matter on the grounds that (1) MRIA's attorney fee
request is unreasonable, excessive, and contrary to the law of the case; and (2) that MRIA has
not shown that the discretionary costs, or "matter of right" costs in excess of the limits imposed
by Idaho Rule, are necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, or in the interest of
justice should be assessed against Saint Alphonsus.
This motion is based upon the files and pleadings in this matter as well as the
memorandum and affidavits in support filed concurrently herewith.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED ON THIS MOTION.
DATED this 14th day of February, 2012.

GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

'--

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
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I hereby certify that on the 14th day of February, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
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Boise, ID 83 702
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Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
(collectively "Saint Alphonsus") submit this Memorandum in Support oftheir Motion to
Disallow MRIA's Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

I.

MRIA'S REQUEST FOR COSTS AND FEES SHOULD BE DISALLOWED IN
PART
MRIA takes the position that Judge McLaughlin's prior award of fees and costs

constitutes law of the case. See MRIA Mem. in Support of Fees at 7. However, Saint Alphonsus
appealed, and the Supreme Court vacated, that award, thus requiring this Court "to determine
anew any allowable costs." Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 170, 158 P.3d 937, 946 (2007)
(emphasis added); see also infra Part I.C. The vacated fee award thus obviously has no present
binding effect and cannot "simply be added to the new fees generated since that time," as MRIA
contends. MRIA Mem. in Support of Fees at 7. But Judge McLaughlin did make a number of
rulings setting forth the principles by which recoverable fees were to be determined, and those
rulings-not appealed by MRIA-do remain the law of the case. And under those rulings, much
of MRIA' s fee request must be disallowed.
Most significantly, Judge McLaughlin held that MRIA may only recover "attorney fees
relating to the claims that MRIA ultimately prevailed on at trial," and thus disallowed recovery
of fees and costs related to the claims that the Court or MRIA had dismissed, such as the
spoliation, misappropriation, conversion, and antitrust claims. See Nov. 19, 2007 Memorandum
Decision at 23-25. At that time, Judge McLaughlin ordered MRIA to file a new list of fees,
omitting billings related to these defunct claims. !d. This ruling requires that MRIA likewise
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excise from its current claim for fees and costs all billings-whenever made-for claims that
have become defunct since the first trial, including (but not limited to) MRIA's claim for
wrongful dissociation, which was responsible for substantial costs and fees incurred on appeal,
on remand, and at the first trial.

A.

MRIA Is Not Entitled to Appellate Costs and Fees

Under Judge McLaughlin's ruling that MRIA may recover costs and fees relating only to
claims on which it ultimately prevailed at trial, MRIA' s request for costs and fees related to the
appeal must be disallowed. 1
By far the predominant issue on the appeal was the validity ofMRIA's claim for
wrongful dissociation, a claim that was dismissed in part by the Supreme Court, see Saint
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479,484-491,224 P.3d 1068,
1073-80 (2009) ("SADC'), and subsequently dismissed in full by this Court. Other key issues on
appeal included (i) MRIA's claim for "purchase price" damages, which was likewise rejected on
the merits by the Supreme Court, see id. at 498,224 P.3d at 1087, and which in any event related
solely to the now-defunct claim for wrongful dissociation, see First Trial Tr. at 574-84, 4382-85;
(ii) MRIA's claim for damages after 2015, which was also rejected on the merits by the Supreme
Court, see SADC, 148 Idaho at 497, 224 P.3d at 1086; (iii) MRIA's standing to recover in its own
name for injuries suffered by Center and Mobile, which was also rejected by the Supreme Court,
see id. at 495-97, 224 P.3d at 1084-86; (iv) MRIA's cross-appeal issues, including its antitrust

1

These include all legal services listed in Appendix A of MRIA' s Affidavit in Support of
Costs and Fees as having been incurred between October 9, 2008, and February 5, 2010.
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claims and its claim for punitive damages, all of which were both rejected on the merits by the
Supreme Court, see id. at 499-501, 224 P .3d at 1088-90, and specifically disallowed as a basis
for costs and fees by Judge McLaughlin; and (v) the Supreme Court's award of appellate costs to
Saint Alphonsus, see id. at 501, 224 P .3d at 1090, which prompted an unsuccessful petition for
rehearing by MRIA, see id. at 501-02, 224 P.3d at 1090-91.
As noted, these matters were at the heart of the appellate proceedings. Collectively,
briefing on these various issues accounted for approximately twenty-eight pages of the fortyfive-page argument section of Saint Alphonsus's opening brief on appeal; approximately twentynine pages of the fifty-seven-page argument section ofMRIA's opening brief on appeal;
approximately thirty-one pages of Saint Alphonsus's fifty-three-page combined reply brief and
opposition to MRIA's cross-appeal; the entirety ofMRIA's thirty-six-page reply in support of its
cross-appeal, and the entirety ofMRIA's petition for rehearing. See Affidavit of Jack Gjording
Exs. A-D. Because MRIA has not attempted to break out those appellate fees related to claims
on which it ultimately prevailed from the far greater amount of fees related to claims on which
MRIA did not prevail, this Court should disallow all costs and fees for the appeal. 2 In the

2

Disallowing appellate costs and fees in their entirety is particularly appropriate here
because it would be unreasonable and contrary to the interests of justice to require Saint
Alphonsus to pays fees and costs for an appeal in which "St. Alphonsus was the prevailing
party," SADC, 148 Idaho at 502,224 P.3d at 1091. Contrary to MRIA's contentions, the
Supreme Court has not held that the party who prevails in the civil action on remand is
automatically entitled to fees from a prior appeal. Rather, the Court held only that prevailing in
the civil action on remand is a necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) "prerequisite" to the
district court's consideration ofthe inclusion of fees from the earlier appeal. Id. And the
hypothetical fee award referenced in Paloukos was for a party that prevailed both on the appeal
and on remand. See 99 Idaho 740, 746, 588 P.2d 939, 945 (1978). The Court in SADC and
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alternative, and at a minimum, the Court should either disallow the greater portion of the
appellate costs and fees to account for the fact that MRIA failed to prevail on most of the claims
at issue on appeal, or else require MRIA (as Judge McLaughlin did) to amend its list of costs and
fees to omit billings related to the claims on which MRIA did not prevail.

B.

MRIA Is Not Entitled to the Portion of its Post-Appeal Costs and Fees
Related to Claims on Which It Did Not Prevail

Judge McLaughlin's ruling that MRIA may only recover costs and fees relating to claims
on which MRIA ultimately prevailed likewise requires the Court to disallow some of the
requested costs and fees incurred following remand. Specifically, much of the early work on
remand centered on MRIA's efforts to continue to assert a claim for wrongful dissociation; those
efforts resulted in a successful motion by Saint Alphonsus to strike portions ofMRIA's amended
counterclaim, a successful motion for summary judgment by Saint Alphonsus on MRIA's "term
of years" theory of wrongful dissociation, and a successful motion by Saint Alphonsus for
judgment on MRIA's newly minted "common law" theory of wrongful dissociation. See Order
Granting Mot. to Strike Immaterial Matter from the Third Amended Countercl. (Sept. 29, 201 0),
Mem. Decision and Order on Pl.'s Mots. for J. on Pleadings and Mots. for Summ. J. at 5-9 (Nov.
17, 2010); Order Re: Saint Alphonsus's Mot. for Summ. J. on Contract Theory of Wrongful
Withdrawal (May 6, 2011). Despite MRIA's repeated efforts-and substantial expenditures, see,

e.g., Aff. in Support ofFees Ex. A at 56-60-Saint Alphonsus ultimately prevailed on the claim
(continued ... )

Paloukos did not discuss the situation in this case, where one party prevailed on appeal and the
other party prevailed on remand.
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for wrongful dissociation. Under Judge McLaughlin's ruling, MRIA is not entitled to these fees,
and they must be disallowed.
So too should MRIA be denied recovery for costs and fees expended in defense of Saint
Alphonsus's claim for its departing partner share. Though Saint Alphonsus prevailed on this
claim at the first trial, MRIA incurred costs and fees on remand in arguing that Judge
McLaughlin's award of the departing partner share to Saint Alphonsus should not be law of the
case and that the award should be substantially reduced or disallowed entirely. See, e.g., Aff. in
Support of Fees Ex. A at 59 (seeking fees related to "departing partner share" issue). This Court
rejected these arguments, and Saint Alphonsus ultimately prevailed-and recovered $4.6 million
plus interest-on this claim.

C.

MRIA Is Not Entitled to the Portion of its Retrial Costs and Fees Related to
Claims on Which It Did Not Prevail

MRIA also asks that the entire fee and cost award from the first trial be reinstated without
further analysis. As noted, this is improper because Saint Alphonsus appealed, and the Supreme
Court vacated, Judge McLaughlin's award of fees and costs. See SADC, 148 Idaho at 501, 224
P.3d at 1090. The district court's order, "made on the premise that [MRIA] prevailed," was
necessarily vacated as a result. Idaho Cardiology Assocs. v. Idaho Physicians Network, Inc., 141
Idaho 223, 228, 108 P. 3d 370, 375 (2005). As a result, "[f]ollowing the outcome of any new
trial, the district court will need to determine anew any allowable costs." Puckett, 144 Idaho at
170, 158 P.3d at 946 (emphasis added). MRIA must justify the amount of its costs "anew," and
is not simply entitled to reinstatement of the prior award.
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Once the old award is re-evaluated, it is plain that MRIA's requested prior-trial fees are
unsupportable. As noted, Judge McLaughlin ruled that MRIA would only be entitled to "claims
that MRIA ultimately prevailed on at trial." The original fee award, however, was made under
the premise that wrongful dissociation was a valid, successful claim, and fees/costs associated
with that "wrongful dissociation" claim were therefore fully included in MRIA's award. See
Nov. 19, 2007 Memorandum Decision at 23-25. Further, MRIA's first-trial award did not
exclude billings or expert costs related to proving MRIA's since-dismissed claim for "purchase
price" damages for the allegedly wrongful dissociation, nor did it exclude costs and fees related
to MRIA' s now-defunct claim for damages after 2015. !d. These claims-particularly the claim
for wrongful dissociation-were a major part ofMRIA's original trial strategy, and tainted the
entire first trial as a result. See SADC, 148 Idaho at 489,224 P.3d at 1078. And while MRIA
could presumably obtain some portion of the costs and fees it incurred in connection with the
first trial-i.e., those that were incurred in prosecuting claims on which MRIA did ultimately
succeed-MRIA has not offered any documentation that would allow Saint Alphonsus or this
Court to determine what portion of the first-trial costs and fees qualify. On this record, therefore,
the Court should simply disallow all costs and fees from the first trial. 3 In the alternative, and at
a minimum, the Court should require MRIA (as Judge McLaughlin did) to amend its list of costs
and fees to omit billings related to the claims on which MRIA did not prevail.

3

As with the appeal, it would also be unreasonable and contrary to the interests of justice
to require Saint Alphonsus to bear MRIA's fees and costs for both trials where the result of the
first trial was vacated as a result of MRIA' s pursuit of a claim on which it ultimately failed to
prevail.
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D.

MRIA Seeks Fees
Be Disallowed

Unrelat~d

to the Prosecution of this Case, Which Should

Judge McLaughlin also held that MRIA's original fee petition included "several
categories of billings that ... do[] not pertain to this case." Nov. 19, 2007 Memorandum
Decision at 24. Judge McLaughlin did not allow MRIA to charge these unrelated billings to
Saint Alphonsus. !d. MRIA nonetheless has submitted a fee request that appears to contain
several categories of billings that have nothing to do with the prosecution of this case on retrial.
Compounding this problem is that many of the time entries for MRIA attorneys and staff are
unspecific, making it difficult to determine the actual purpose (and thus the awardability) of
certain fees.
Some examples ofthese unrelated categories of fees are as follows (all citations are to
MRIA's Affidavit in Support of Costs and Fees, Exhibit A):
1. Billings for property purchases or sales by MRIA and its constituent hospitals, pp.
1, 41-42, 55;
2. Entries that were not charged to the client, e.g., p. 37-38;
3. Billing for "Bob Burton's estate," p. 38;
4. Billing for "Blue Cross accreditation" p. 38;
5. Billing related to MRI Center's "call center," p. 38;
6. Billings for conferences with in-house counsel or unknown persons (e.g., Barbara
Nay, Margaret Kushner, Wendy Engels) with no indication that the call related to
the trial, as opposed to other MRIA transactions, e.g., pp. 39, 40-42, 55;
7. Billings for attending MRI Board meetings, pp. 39, 42-43, 45, 49, 61, 64;
8. Billings related to MRIA's attempts to avoid paying the appellate cost judgment,
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including discussions with Saint Alphonsus's counsel (Mr. Dvorak) regarding the
same, e.g, pp. 42, 44, 58.
In addition, Judge McLaughlin also prohibited other categories of fees, such as billings
for "public relations," "billing issues," and so forth. Nov. 19, 2007 Memorandum Decision at
24-25. These categories should again be excluded.

****
For the reasons stated above, MRIA's fees request should be disallowed as it now stands.
As Judge McLaughlin did before, the Court should order MRIA to amend its affidavit to exclude
billings from the categories described above, as well as any billings pertaining to the appeal and
any billings related to claims from the first or second trial that MRIA lost. As before, Saint
Alphonsus should be given fourteen days to respond to MRIA's revised affidavit, so that it may
(if necessary) challenge that revised affidavit. This Court should disallow any line item that falls
into an impermissible category, or for which there is insufficient information for the Court to
determine whether the line item is for an allowable category of fees.

II.

MRIA'S REQUESTED HOURLY RATES ARE EXCESSIVE
Recent court decisions demonstrate that the hourly rates requested for MRIA's attorneys

and paralegals are excessive and must be reduced to levels more in line with prevailing rates in
the Boise market. For instance, one federal court in Boise recently held that the reasonable rate
in the Boise market for attorney with approximately thirty years of experience--like Mr.
Banducci here-is $315 per hour, and that the reasonable rate in the Boise market for attorney
with approximately fifteen years of experience-like Messrs. Wade and Schwartzman-is $225
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per hour. Brasley v. Fearless Farris Serv. Stations, Inc., 1:08-CV-173, 2010 WL 4867359, at
*4-5 (D. Idaho Nov. 23, 2010); see also Scenic Valley View, L.L.C. v. Ridgeway Holdings,
L.L.C., No. 4:09-CV-439, 2010 WL 3893888, at *2 (D. Idaho Aug. 13, 2010) ("managing case

partners in Boise with thirty years of experience typically charge $250-$300 per hour"); In re
Charterhouse Boise Downtown Properties, LLC, No. 07-01199,2010 WL 1049968, at *4 (D.
Idaho Bankr. Mar. 17, 201 0) (prevailing rates in Boise for "attorneys involved in commercial
litigation" range from $180 to $250 per hour). MRIA's requested rates for Mr. Banducci and his
partners far exceed these customary and reasonable rates; indeed, MRIA' s requested rates for
Ms. Parker and Mr. Bastian, associates with six and seven years of experience, exceed rates
appropriate for a partner with twice as many years of experience and, in Mr. Bastian's case, fall
within the range of rates appropriate for a partner with thirty years experience. MRIA's
paralegal rates of$125 to $140 per hour are also excessive relative to prevailing rates in the
Boise market. See, e.g, C & R Forestry, Inc. v. Consol. Human Res., AZ, Inc., No. CV 05-381,
2010 WL 231098, at *4 (D. Idaho Jan. 12, 2010) (prevailing rate for paralegals with five or more
years of experience is $70 to $100 per hour).

III.

THE COURT SHOULD DISALLOW MRIA'S COST REQUEST
Saint Alphonsus also objects, in full, to MRIA's request for all discretionary costs, and

all ofMRIA's "matter of right" costs in excess ofthe caps as defined in Idaho Rule 54(d)(l)(C).
Under the Idaho Rules, a party may only receive discretionary costs, or excessive "matter of
right" costs, "upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably
incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." Idaho R.
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Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(D). The rule contemplates that the party seeking costs offer specific argument
with respect to each item of costs it seeks, insofar as the district court is required "make express
findings as to why each specified item," Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Wash. Fed. Sav.,
135 Idaho 518, 525,20 P.3d 702, 709 (2001), is "exceptional, necessary, reasonably incurred,
and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." Bingham v. Montane
Res. Assocs., 133 Idaho 420,425,987 P.2d 1035, 1040 (1999). Thus, costs should be disallowed
summarily when a party does not "attempt to explain why these charges were necessary and
exceptional, and should in the interest of justice be assessed." Auto. Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson,
124 Idaho 874, 881, 865 P.2d 965, 972 (1993); accord Swallow v. Emer. Med. of Idaho, P.A.,
138 Idaho 589, 598, 67 P.3d 68, 77 (2003) (finding trial court abused discretion in awarding
costs when the requesting party did not present any evidence or make any argument" in support
ofthe Rule 54(d)(1)(D) requirements).
Here, MRIA seeks over $550,000 in such discretionary and excessive costs (see Aff. of
Counsel in Support ofthe MRIA Entities' Mem. of Costs and Fees, Ex. B). It does not, however,
offer any specific argument as to any of the costs it seeks, other than to perfunctorily state that
the costs were "necessary and exceptional" because "this was a novel, complex, and difficult
case." Amended Aff. of Counsel regarding Rule 54(e)(3), p. 8, ~ 7; accordMem. in Support of
Costs and Fees at 9 (saying only that "these exceptional costs incurred by MRIA were reasonable
and necessary, especially in light of the complexity and length of this case, and the amount
recovered"). Because MRIA has failed to make the specific showings required by Rule
54( d)(1 )(D), all of its discretionary and excessive costs should be summarily denied. Auto. Club,
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124 Idaho at 881, 865 P.2d at 972; see also Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., 150 Idaho 521,
530, 248 P.3d 1256, 1265 (2011) (failure to satisfy requirements of Rule 54 not cured by
subsequent filing more than fourteen days after entry of judgment). In any event, as described
below, the requested costs do not qualify as necessary, exceptional, or awardable in the interests
of justice.

A.

Copying Charges. MRIA seeks $22,179.95 in copying charges, apparently under

Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(6), which allows "[r]easonable costs ofthe preparation of models, maps,
pictures, photographs, or other exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits in a hearing or trial of an
action, but not to exceed the sum of $500 for all of such exhibits of each party." Costs Aff., Ex.
B, p. 1. These charges in excess of $500 should be disallowed.

First, the rule only allows recovery of costs of "exhibits admitted into evidence." But
only five entries indicate copying of exhibits, and none of the them explain what part, if any, of
the costs related to admitted exhibits. All of these copying costs should therefore be disallowed.

Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 753, 185 P.3d 258, 265 (2008) (trial court erred in
awarding copy costs when "there is nothing in the record showing what portion, if any, of the
[cost requested] was incurred to create the exhibits admitted during the hearing").

Second, none of the copying fees, for exhibits or otherwise, are "exceptional." Copying,
binding, and other paperwork-related expenses are a routine part of every case, and may not be
awarded. !nama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 384,973 P.2d 148, 155 (1999) (affirming
disallowance of costs on basis that "substantial copying charges" are "routine costs associated
with modern litigation overhead"); accord Nightengale v. Timme!, 151 Idaho 347,256 P.3d 755,
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763 (2011) ("certain cases ... generally involve copy, travel and expert witness fees such that
these costs are considered ordinary rather than 'exceptional"' (internal quotations omitted)).

Third, the generic nature of MRIA' s descriptions, and lack of any specific argumentation,
make it impossible to determine whether the copying charges are reasonable. The vast majority
of the exhibits in the retrial were the same as the exhibits from the first trial, and those exhibits
were copied (and electronically processed) in the first trial. MRIA should not be entitled to
duplicative costs related to exhibits, and MRIA has not shown that these duplication charges
relate only to the new exhibits.
B.

"Miscellaneous Fees." MRIA next asks for more than $10,000 in costs, some for

labor related to moving file boxes from storage and to court, but the majority for costs related to
a "focus group." Costs Aff., Ex. B, p. 2. Neither ofthese costs are awardable as of right, and
MRIA has not even attempted to justify the award as necessary, reasonable, and exceptional
under Rule 54( d)(l )(D). Nor could it.

First, moving and storage costs must be disallowed as they are ordinary, routine expenses
that constitute part of a law firm's overhead. Such costs are not exceptional and thus may not be
awarded under Rule 54. !nama, 132 Idaho at 384, 973 P.2d at 155.

Second, MRIA's expenses related to "focus groups" must be denied. There is no
explanation of what this focus group is, or what it did, and thus no basis for the court to
determine whether it was reasonable, necessary, and exceptional.
C.

Federal Express Charges. MRIA next asks to recover "Federal Express"

charges. Costs Aff., Ex. B, p. 2. These must be disallowed, not only because there is no
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explanation as to why these costs were incurred, but also because mail expenses are, again, a
routine, non-exceptional part of a law practice and thus not awardable under Rule 54( d)(l )(D).
See !nama, 132 Idaho at 384,973 P.2d at 155; accord, e.g., Landmark Winter Park, LLC v.
Colman, 24 So.3d 787, 789 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009) ("it was improper for the trial court to tax the
following overhead costs to the Seller: postage .... ").
D.

Meal Expenses. MRIA next asks for over $3000 in "meals." Costs Aff., Ex. B,

p. 2. Again, these are not exceptional charges and should not be awarded. Cf Billings v. Cape
Cod Child Development Program, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 175, 178 (D. Mass. 2003) (refusing to
award costs for "telephone bills, postage and overnight mail, computer research, travel, parking,
meals and secretarial services, all of which are more properly borne as attorney overhead
expenses").
E.

Parking. MRIA's request for parking charges, Costs Aff., Ex. B, p. 2, should

likewise be denied as routine, non-exceptional overhead. See id.
F.

Witness Location. MRIA's request for costs related to "witness location," Costs

Aff., Ex. B, pp. 2-3, should be disallowed. There is no explanation of why these charges had to
be undertaken (or why Internet searches cost MRIA money), and MRIA concedes (by including
the cost as "discretionary" and not "of right") that this cost does not relate to service of a
document in the case.
G.

Travel. MRIA next requests almost $3,500 in travel expenses for its attorneys in

order to take and defend expert depositions in this case. Costs Aff., Ex. B, p. 3. Travel and meal
expenses should be disallowed as a routine, non-exceptional cost in modern, commercial
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litigation. Nightengale, 256 P.3d at 763 ("[c]ertain cases ... generally involve copy, travel and
expert witness fees such that these costs are considered ordinary rather than 'exceptional"').
H.

Westlaw Charges. MRIA requests almost $8,000 in Westlaw expenses. Costs

Aff., Ex. B, pp. 3-4. These, again, are routine law-firm charges that should not be awarded as
"exceptional" costs. See, e.g., Billings, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 178; Landmark Winter Park, 24 So.3d
at 789 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009) ("it was improper for the trial court to tax the following overhead
costs to the Seller: ... online research .... "). In any event, computerized research is an element
of determining attorneys' fees, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3), and thus may not be
awarded as a discretionary cost. Lettunich, 145 Idaho at 752, 185 P.3d at 264.
I.

Expert Fees. MRIA's final, and largest cost request, is some $228,000 in fees for

four different experts fees. Under Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(8), a party only has a right to "[r]easonable
expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a deposition or at a trial of an action not to
exceed the sum of$2,000 for each expert witness for all appearances." Yet MRIA nonetheless
seeks in excess of$2,000 for each of three testifying experts, 4 and fees for an unexplained fourth
expert "Grant Thornton LLP." Costs Aff., Ex. B, pp. 4-5. Yet as before, MRIA offers only a
perfunctory statement as to why it should receive these costs.
These costs should all be denied. Moreso than any other aspect of discretionary costs, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that a party seeking expert costs has a significant burden it must
satisfy to receive such costs. For example, in Nightengale, the Court held that a trial court

4

FTI Consulting relates to Bruce Budge. Willamette Management relates to Charles
Wilhoite. R.A. Bell and Associates relates to Robert Bell.
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abused its discretion in allowing expert fees in a medical malpractice suit. The Court held that
since "specialized knowledge and expert testimony" is needed for "proving and defending a
medical-malpractice claim," it is "exactly the type of 'ordinary' cost" that is disallowed by Rule
54(d)(l)(D). Nightengale, 256 P.3d at 763. Numerous other cases are in accord. 5 A court may
not award expert fees just because the $2,000 maximum set forth in Rule 54(d)(l )(C) is not
adequate to cover the experts' fees. Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 755, 86 P.3d 458, 469
(2004 ). And a court may not award costs just because the expert was "instrumental, [and]
examined at some length by both" parties. Evans v. State, 135 Idaho 422,432, 18 P.3d 227,237
(Ct. App. 2001).
Under this authority, Budge and Wilhoite's excess expenses should not be awarded.
Budge and Wilhoite testified, so MRIA is only entitled to $4000 in costs ($2000 per witness) to
the extent the cost is reasonable. Any additional costs-here, some $70,000 for Budge and
$80,000 for Wilhoite-can only be awarding if MRIA proved that they were "necessary and
exceptional, and should in the interest of justice be assessed." Auto. Club, 124 Idaho at 881, 865
P.2d at 972. MRIA has not made this showing. Moroever, these costs cannot be claimed as
"exceptional." Just as a medical expert is commonplace in a malpractice case, financial experts

5

See, e.g, Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d
161, 168 (2005) (costs ofhiring experts to testify as to valuation of property not an exceptional
cost for a class action lawsuit affecting businesses); Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 493-94, 960
P.2d 175, 176-77 (1998) (cost of hiring experts on accident reconstruction not exceptional in
personal injury cases); Total Success Invs., LLC v. Ada County Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688,
694, 227 P.3d 942, 948 (Ct. App. 2010) (affirming finding that surveyor cost is "not exceptional
because it is a routine cost associated with modern litigation overhead, especially when a case
involves encroachments upon real property" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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are commonplace-indeed, necessary, in most lost profits cases. Their fees are therefore not
awardable under Rule 54. Nightengale, 256 P.3d at 763.
Moreover, MRIA cannot even justify these charges as reasonable. Budge and Wilhoite
offered opinions and testified at the first trial, and their opinions at the second trial were largely
identical. There is no explanation given (nor apparent in the sparse billing explanations
provided) as to why Budge and Wilhoite's continued services amounted to an additional
$150,000 in charges. For that matter, MRIA has not even attempted to justify why it was
reasonable or necessary to have two damages experts instead of one. Only $2000 in total should
be awarded for MRIA's testifying damages experts.
Robert Bell's expenses should also be disallowed. While Bell did testify, it is unclear
why this witness was even necessary, let alone a reasonable and exceptional cost that should, in
the interests of justice, be passed to Saint Alphonsus. The majority of Bell's testimony was a
detailed technical explanation of how MRI machines work, something that was not at issue or in
dispute in this case. MRIA's use of such a paid expert (as opposed to any number ofMRIA
radiologists who could presumably have testified about the same thing) was not reasonable.
Likewise, Bell's claim that the MRI machines passed inspection after dissociation was not
relevant-Saint Alphonsus had a right to dissociate and did not argue it was based on MRI' s
equipment. As Bell's testimony was not unreasonable, MRIA should not even receive $2000.
See Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(C). At a minimum, his expenses should be capped at the $2000

rate set forth in the rules, as no justification has been made, or can be made, as to the excess.
Finally, MRIA requests nearly $100,000 in expert expenses charged by "Grant Thornton
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LLP." There is no explanation anywhere in MRIA's cost petition as to who Grant Thornton,
LLP is, or what its function was in this case. No one from that firm testified at trial, so MRIA is
not even entitled to $2000 and must justify all of the expert costs. Given that MRIA does not
even say who Grant Thornton was, let alone attempt to justify its massive costs, their request for
costs related to Grant Thornton should be denied.
CONCLUSION

MRIA's petition for fees and costs should be disallowed in large part. MRIA should
receive no costs or fees related to the first trial or the appeal. Moreover, as to the second trial,
MRIA should be required to submit an amended schedule excluding fees incurred for matters
unrelated to the trial, fees for time spent working on matters for which it did not ultimately
prevail, and fees incurred in an attempt to relitigate issues already decided by the Supreme Court.
MRIA should not be allowed any discretionary costs, or more than $2000 in expert fees.

DATED this 14th day of February, 2012.

GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW
MRIA's ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS- 17
004104

.

•

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 14th day of February, 2012, a true and correct copy ofthe
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

~
D
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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FEB 1 4 2012
CHRJSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
liy JERI HEATON
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

-.
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING
IN SUPPORT OF SAINT
ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO
DISALLOW MRIA'S ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND COSTS

Defendant.

"L
, C1~d
'.J l I -.:. 14.
ORI
AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING IN SUPPORT OF SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
MOTION TO DISALLOW MRIA'S ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS- 1
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada
)
I, JACK S. GJORDING, being first duly sworn upon oath, and based upon my own
personal knowledge of the following, am competent to and do testify as follows:
1.

I am an Idaho licensed attorney. I represent Plaintiff/Counterdefendants, Saint

Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("SADC"), and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.
("SARMC") (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus").
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Appellant's Brief filed

in Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, Idaho Supreme Court Case,
Docket No., 34885, on September 12, 2008;
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.

'

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of Respondent's Brief

filed in Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, Idaho Supreme Court Case,
Docket No., 34885, and dated November 24, 2008;
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Cis a true and correct copy of Appellants' Combined

Reply and Response to Cross-Appeal filed in Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI
Assocs., LLP, Idaho Supreme Court Case, Docket No., 34885, on December 22, 2008;

5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Dis a true and correct copy of Respondent's Reply in

Support of Cross-Appeal filed in Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP,
Idaho Supreme Court Case, Docket No., 34885, and dated January 29, 2009.
FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

_)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public, this 14TH day of
February, 2012.

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING IN SUPPORT OF SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR NEW TRIAL- 3
004108

•

•

•

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of February, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMAN
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Respondent/Cross-Appellant MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), 1 hereby submits its reply
brief in support of its cross-appeal.

I. ARGUMENT
As indicated in MRIA's opening brief, if SARMC's2 request for a new trial is denied on
appeal, the Court need not address MRIA's cross-appeal. MRIA only seeks to appeal the
following rulings if the Court determines that a new trial is warranted. In the event SARMC is
granted a new trial, the trial cout1's denial of MRIA's motion for leave to seek punitive damages
should be reversed as there is overwhelming evidence that (1) SARMC acted in extreme
deviation from reasonable standards of conduct when it willfully and deliberately competed with
its partners in MRIA and that (2) SARMC did so with full knowledge that its conduct would
result in the destruction ofMRIA's business. Additionally, in the event SARMC is granted a
new trial, the trial courf s grant of summary judgment on MRIA' s antitrust claims should also be
reversed because MRIA sufficiently asserted an antitrust injury and showed that SARMC and
Intermountain Imaging ("IMI'') had market power.

A.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied MRIA's Request for Leave
to Seek Punitive Damages.
The overwhelming evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that SARMC, while

still a pat1ner in MRIA, deliberately competed with MRIA in violation of SARMC's contractual
and fiduciary duties. SARMC did so with willful disregard for the consequences of its wrongful
1

References to MRIA also include its business atms: MRI Limited Pat1nership aka MRI Center
of Idaho ("MRICI") and MRI Mobile ("MRIM").
2
References to SARMC include both Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center.

1
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conduct. As a result, MRIA's business was destroyed. (Trial Ex. 4519.) The evidence further
demonstrates that the trial court's failure to instruct on punitive damages "was so contrary to the
facts of the case as to amount to an abuse of discretion under the deferential standard." General

Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849,825,979 P.2d 1207, 1210 (1999).
1.

Punitive Damages Are Appropriate in a Commercial Context.

SARMC suggests that punitive damages are not warranted because "wrongful
dissociation is no different than a breach of contract, which does not give rise to punitive
damages." (SARMC's Reply Brief at 42.) SARMC, however, is wrong. As this Comt held in

Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 95 P.3d 977 (2004), "[i]t is not the nature of
the case, whether tort or contract, that controls the issue of punitive damages." What controls is
whether SARMC's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous. I. C.§ 61604(1).
According to this Court, I. C. § 6-1604( 1) "requires an intersection of two factors: a bad
act and a bad state of mind." Linscott v. Ranier Nat'/ Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854,858,606 P.2d
958, 962 (1980). The Court recognized that in the past it had used various terms to describe the
"bad act" requirement such as "deceit," acting "to violate another's legal right," acting "for
purpose of injuring plaintiff," "to oppress," acting "(in) disregard ... of the known property
rights," and "fraud." Id The Court also recognized it had used the following terms to describe a
"bad state of mind": "deliberate,', and "gross negligence." Id; see also Cheney v. Palos Verde

Inv. Cmp., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d 661, 669 (1983) (holding the bad state of mind can be
shown if the act was simply "deliberate or willful"). The Cout1 then noted "[i]n two cases

2
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involving breach of a contract, this court even held that it was proper to award punitive damages
when there was 'other sufficient reason."' Linscott, 100 Idaho at 858, 606 P .2d at 962; see also

Rockefeller v. Grabow,l36 Idaho 637,646-47,39 P.3d 577,586-87 (2001) (recognizing a
punitive damages amendment is proper where there is evidence of violations of fiduciary duties);

Cuddy Mountain Concrete Inc. v. Citadel Constr., Inc., 121 Idaho 220,229, 824 P.2d 151, 160
(Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing punitive damages are proper when a party breaches it duty to
act in good faith).
Thus, a breach of contract may give rise to punitive damages where the conduct "show[s]
a lack of professional regard for the consequences of the breach of the contractual agreement."

Cuddy Mountain, 121 Idaho at 229, 824 P.2d at 160. Stated simply, punitive damages are proper
when the conduct is willful or deliberate regardless of the type of claim. Cheney v. Palos Verde

Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897,905,665 P.2d 661,669 (1983). Here, SARMC's actions were willful,
deliberate, and much more egregious than a mere bt·each of contract. SARMC, in willful
violation of its fiduciary and contractual duties and with conscious disregard for the
consequences of its actions, competed with its partners in MRIA and took other actions which
caused the financial ruin of MRIA.

2.

The Standard of Review for Determining Whether the Trial Court Abused
Its Discretion is Substantial Evidence.

Although SARMC is correct that the decision of whether to submit the issue of punitive
damages to the jury is reviewed under abuse of discretion, "[t]his Court has interpreted the abuse
of discretion standard in the context of punitive damages as whether there was substantial
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evidence to support submitting the issue to the jury." Highland Enterprises Inc. v. Baker, 133
Idaho 330, 348, 986 P.2d 1011, 1014 (1999) (citing Student Loan Fund of Idaho Inc. v. Duerner,
131 Idaho 45, 52, 951 P.2d 1272, 1279 (1998) ("On appeal, we will not disturb the trial court's
decision unless there was an abuse of discretion, which has been interpreted within the punitive
damages context to mean whether there was substantial evidence to support submission of the
issue to the jury.")); see also Rockefeller v. Grabow,136 Idaho 637, 647, 39 P.3d 577, 587 (2001)
("In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion this Court will consider whether
substantial evidence supports submitting the issue [of punitive damages] to the jury."). Thus,
even though the standard is deferential, the law requires the trial coutt's decision to be reversed
if substantial evidence supported submitting the issue to the jury.

3.

The Issue of Punitive Damages Should Have Been Submitted to the Jury
Because There Was Substantial Evidence that SARMC Committed a "Bad
Actn with a "Bad State of Mind."

In this case, the issue of punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury because
there was clear and convincing (not just substantial) evidence that SARMC "deliberately" or as
the trial comt described, "blatantly" (the bad state of mind) competed with its partner MRIA and
"violated [MRIA's] legal right[sJ" (the bad act). (TR Vol. III at 4471 :9-17.) The evidence
demonstrates that SARMC's conduct, which the Jury found to be intentional and in bad faith,
was an extreme deviation from the reasonable standard of care and was taken without
professional regard for the consequences of the conduct. (R., Ex. 48 at,, 17~28, attached as Ex.
A to Reply Appendix (Reply App.'') attached hereto.) The evidence further demonstrates that
SARMC's wrongful conduct was more egregious than merely breaching a contract, as SARMC
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erroneously contends.

a.

SARMC Willfully and Knowingly Breached Its Fiduciary Duties to Its
Pat·tners and Breached the MRIA Partnership Agreement.

As fully set forth in prior briefing, SARMC wrongfully withdrew from MRIA on April 1,
2004. (R. Vol. II at 388-96, Vol. III at 538-46.) Moreover, it is not as if SARMC withdrew for a
benign purpose. Instead, it withdrew because it had joined MRIA 's competitot·, IMI. {Trial Ex.
4226.) Furthermore, at the time of its wrongful withdrawal from MRIA, SARMC knew that by
dissociating for purposes of competing with MRIA it would be violating the express terms of the
MRIA Partnership Agreement. This knowledge is evidenced by the clear language in the MRIA
Partnership Agreement (including the withdrawal and noncompete provisions), the analysis of
SARMC's consulting firms and the admonitions from SARMC's attorneys.
For example, SARMC was warned by PriceWaterhouseCoopers in January 2000 (over

•

four years before its wrongful withdrawal) that the MRIA Partnership Agreement restricted the
right of SARMC to withdraw from MRIA. (Trial Ex. 4138. at 16 attached as Reply App. Ex. B;
R. Vol. II at 388-96, Vol. III at 538-46.) SARMC also was reminded by its consultant Shattuck
Hammond that "SARMC ha[d] been advised by counsel that this option [withdrawal from
MRJA] would likely engender litigation with MRIA. ... Givens Pursley believes that that there
would likely be litigation as to whether the termination was wrongful. ... " (Trial Ex. 4239 at 2,
11.) The evidence established that SARMC fully understood the legal implications ofthese
warnings. (TR. Vol. II at 1950:10-15; TR Vol. III at 3594:9-13; 3595:23-3596:6.)
SARMC also knew its involvement in IMI, while still a partner in MRIA, violated
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SARMC's fiduciary duties to MRIA. Indeed, SARMC's CEO testified that she understood that
(1) "a partner must not help a third party compete with the partnership", (2) "a pat1ner must not

compete with the pat1nership", (3) "one of a pat1ner's responsibilities to his other partners is not
to exploit his position", (4) "a partner must not profit at the partnership's expense", and (5) "a
pat1ner must not exploit information obtained through his position as a partner." (TR Vol. II at

1686:7-13, 23-25; 1684:2-5; 1680:1-4; 1685: 12-15; 1682:6-18.) Despite this knowledge,
SARMC, under the leadership of its CEO, not only helped a third-party compete with the
partnership, but it also later joined that third-party competitor, competed with the partnership
itself, and ultimately profited at the partnership's expense. Likewise, SARMC's Chief Operating
Officer, Cindy Schamp, admitted that in 2001 she learned fi·om SARMC's consultants that ·
competing with MRIA through IMI could be a breach ofSARMC's fiduciary duties. (TR Vol.
III at 3593:21-3594:16.) Similarly, SARMC understood (by no later than 2001) that SARMC's
conduct created "a risk ofSt. Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary responsibility to [lv/RICI and
MRI Mobile]." (Trial Ex. 4239 at ll (emphasis added).) This evidence clearly establishes the

"bad state of mind" requirement.

b.

SARMC Also Wilfully Suppo1·ted and Joined a Competitor While Still
a Partner in MRIA with Knowledge of, and Disregal'd for, the
Consequences to MRIA.

In addition to wrongfully withdrawing, SARMC's willful bad acts, while still a partner in
MRIA, include:
•

Helping IMI establish itself as a MRIA's competitor;
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•

Usurping MRIA's opportunity to partner with GSRIIMe;

•

Formally partnering with IMI and providing IMI with significant financial suppol1;

•

Actively joint marketing with IMI to shift referrals from MRIA to IMI;

•

Making IMI its outpatient facility;

•

Condoning conduct by GSR which caused referrals to shift from MRIA to IMI;

•

Refusing to allow MRIA to contract with radiologists other than GSR;

•

Bringing IMI onto SARMC's campus virtually next-door to MRICI; and

•

Issuing a written mandate to all of its employees, including referring physicians, directing
that all patients be sent to the IMI magnet rather than to MRICI.

This conduct, which is described in more detail below, clearly and convincingly demonstrates
that SARMC deliberately competed with MRIA in violation ofSARMC's contractual and
fiduciary duties. SARMC knew or should have known that its conduct would destroy MRIA,
both in terms of lost revenues and the substantial fees and costs that MRIA would have to incur
in order to enforce its legal rights under the partnership agreement. (TR VoL II at 1690:201691:5; 1871:8-9.) SARMC's knowledge of, and professional disregard for, the consequences of
its wrongful conduct is aptly summarized by SARMC's CEO's testimony: "I was a partner with

3

References to "GSR" include St. Alphonsus Radiology Group nlk/a Gem State Radiology.
GSR was the exclusive reader ofSARMC's radiologic images including MRICI's images. (TR
Vol. II at 1446:10-1447:2.
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a competitor. I was supporting myself." (TR Vol. II at 1871 :8-9.)4

i.

SARMC Supported the Establishment of MRIA's Competitor,
IMI.

While still a partner in MRIA, SARMC knowingly helped IMI become a lethal
competitor of MRIA by investing money and resources into the establishment of I MI.
SARMC's support dul"ing IMI's initial start-up included: (1) providing the backing necessary for
IMI to obtain funding; (2) providing SARMC's case volume, database, technical component
charges, staffing costs, and other operational data for IMI's use in its business plan; (3) linking
IMI to the intranet between SARMC and its physician network; (4) suppm1ing Karen Noyes,
assistant director of the SARMC radiology department, in joining IMI as executive director; and
(5) converting SARMC to the same digital radiography system as IMI. (Trial Ex. 4095 attached
as Reply App. Ex. C; see also Trial Ex. 4074 (showing in February 1999, SARMC was working
on funding for IMI)). In fact, without SARMC's help, IMI likely would not have obtained
financing. (Trial Ex. 545 at 3, attached as Reply App. Ex. D ("[F]inancing [for IMI] was

contingent on a partnership with the hospital." (emphasis added)).
ii.

SARMC's IT Support Provided IMI with a Tremendous
Competitive Advantage.

Although· still a partner in MRIA, SARMC partnered with GSR, from IMI's inception, to
convert IMI's technology from film to digital imaging. SARMC helped bring this "digital
4

The evidence set forth in the proceeding sections was in large pat1 the same evidence submitted
with MRIA's motion for leave to seek punitive damages, which motion was renewed at the close
of the evidence. (SeeR., Ex. 47 at 1-20; R. Ex. 48 at~~ 17-28; R., Exs. 68 & 69.)
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revolution to IMI" by initially investing several hundred thousand dollars in IMI's IT system.
(TR Vol. II at 1505:10-1507:10; Trial Ex. 4095, attached as Reply App. Ex. C.) The investment
by SARMC in "dark fiber" connectivity to IMI, alone, was $780,000. (Trial Ex. 4231at 3
attached as Reply App. Ex. E; TR Vol. II at 1509:6-13.) SARMC also provided technical
resources to IMI, including the formation of a joint IT committee with IMI, which MRIA was
not allowed to join. (/d. at 1619:12-1621:20; 2437:18-2439:9.) Consequently, this support
provided IMI with an enormous competitive advantage over MRICI. (Ex. 4107, attached as
Reply App. Ex. G; TR Vol. II. 1618:22-1619:3, 1497:15-1502:24.)

iii.

SARMC Usurped MRIA's Opportunity to Partner with
GSRIIMI.

As set forth in MRIA's opening brief, MRIA had an opportunity to partner with GSR in
IMI rather than compete with IMI. In that regard, in June 1999, MRIA asked SARMC's CEO,
Sandra Bruce, to help MRIA close the deal with GSR. (TR Vol. II at 1164:2-1165:16, 1759:241760: 14.) Although Bruce agreed to help, instead of negotiating on MRIA's behalf, she put the
MRIA negotiations on hold and then offered GSR a better deal: a 50% interest in an MR imaging
business rather than the 9% (one-eleventh) interest offered by MRIA. (ld at 1165:8-1166:16,
1760:3-1761:18, 1769:7-10, 1788:19-1790:15, 1786:15-19,2043:24-2044:5,2371:4-10,3702:911, 4171: 13-21; Trial Ex. 4101; Trial Ex. 4191 at 3.) It is not surprising that GSR accepted
SARMC's better offer and partnered with SARMC instead ofMRIA. (Trial Ex. 4226). By this
conduct, SARMC, while still a partner in MRIA, deliberately took for itself an opportunity
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belonging to MRIA. 5
iv.

SARMC Formally Partnered with IMI and Provided IMI with
Significant Financial Support.

In June, 2001, while still a partner in MRIA, SARMC formally joined as a pat1ner with
GSR in IMI and received a 50 percent interest in IMI. (Trial Ex. 4226 at 6.) At that time,
SARMC gave IMI $546,146 and assumed almost $1.5 million ofiMI's debt. (TR Vol. II at
1557:4-1558:2; 1622:22-1623:8.) This financial support was in addition to SARMC's financial
investment in IMI's IT systems.

v.

SARMC Actively Competed With Its Partners in MRIA by
Joint Maa·keting with IMI to Shift Referrals from MRIA to
IMI.

Even though IMI was MRIA's main competitor and even though SARMC as a pat1ner in
MRIA owed MRIA a duty not to compete, SARMC actively worked with IMI to obtain a
combined market share for magnetic resonance imaging, in direct competition with MRIA. (Trial
Ex. 4248 attached as Reply App. Ex. F; TR Vol. II at 1643:7-13, 1646:1-7; TR Vol. III at
4169:10-17 .) SARMC and IMI jointly marketed by television, radio, newspapers, letters to
referring physicians and physician-to-physician office visits. (Trial Exs. 4248 & 4107 attached as
Reply App. Exs. F and G; TR Vol. II at 1643:23-1644:22.) This joint marketing caused
confusion among the referring doctors as to which imaging center was affiliated with SARMC.
(ld. at 2420: 11-16; 2428:21-2429:6.) As a result, marketing for MRIA became difficult. (ld.)

5

SARMC, while still a partner in MRIA, also usurped MRIA's opportunity to open an imaging
center in Meridian, Idaho by helping open IMI Meridian (AKA IMI West). (Trial Exs. 4156,
4115, 4211 & 4275; TR Vol. II at 1590: 11-23; 1613:5-12; 1615:20-23.)
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vi.

SARMC Ensured that IMI was Viewed by the Referring
Physicians as SARMC's Imaging Center.

In addition to joint marketing with IMI, SARMC, while still a partner in MRIA, made
IMI SARMC's outpatient facility which ensured that IMI (not MRIA) would be viewed by
referring physicians as SARMC's imaging center. (ld at 1582:10-1583:24.) Because this
development was communicated to the referring doctor community (the source ofMRIA's
business), MRIA lost scans because referring physicians became "used to sending patients to
IMI, not just for CT, but for MRI as well., (/d. at 1583:17-24.)

vii.

SARMC Allowed Its New Partne•· GSR to Engage in Conduct
Intended to Shift Refenals from MRIA to IMI.

Sh011ly after IMI opened in late 1999, GSR began to reduce its services to MRICI and
otherwise began engaging in conduct detrimental to MRICI. (TR Vol. II at 1176: 19-1180:7.)
Consequently, MRIA requested SARMC to intervene and return radiologist service to its
previous, professional level:
The time has come for SARMC to insist on and provide full, suppot1ive
radiologic coverage of the lab at historical levels of professionalism and service ..
. . [Such coverage] cannot be allowed to be withdrawn simply because the
radiologists of the lab are now also its competitors. The highest standard of care
for patients is essential and includes having radiologists on site to supervise
studies as needed. We now view as a necessity SARMC's providing the lab with
full, supportive, traditional radiologist coverage or permitting the MRI Center of
Idaho to contract directly with radiologists as a fiduciary responsibility of
SARMC to its other general and limited partners.
(Trial Ex. 4137 at 2 attached as Reply App. Ex. H; see also TR Vol. II at 1176: 19-1180:7.)
SARMC, although still a partner in MRIA, never responded to MRIA's request. (TR Vol. II at
1182:9·14.) Indeed. as SARMC's relationship with GSR in IMI intensified, the GSR
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radiologists became bolder in their unfair tactics by (1) unilaterally reducing weekday hours at
MRICI, while increasing IMI's hours of service for its MRI modality, and (2) cancelling all
weekend support to MRICI, except for emergency cases. (See, Trial Ex. 4277 & 4309 at 3-4, 2
attached as Reply App. Ex. I and J; TR Vol. II at 1217:11-1219:8; 1653:23-1655:25; 1924:3-20;
2195:2-7; 2392:5-24) Consequently, MRIA lost a substantial portion of its scan volume to IMI.
(TR Vol. II at 2633:8-2634:4; 2742: 13-2743:6; 2796:15-2797:1; 2877:25-2878:3; Trial Ex. 4247
at 13, Trial Ex. 4519 attached as Ex. D to the Appendix to MRIA's opening brief.) Again,
SARMC refused to help because by supporting IMI, it was supp011ing itself. (TR Vol. II at
1871 :8-9.)

viii.

SARMC Refused to Allow MRIA to Contract with Other
Radiologists.

After usurping MRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR in IMI, SARMC then helped
further destroy MRIA's business by forcing MRIA to have its images read by its competitor,
GSR (one of the owners of IMI), thereby allowing MRIA's competitor to interface with MRIA's
referring physicians. (Trial Ex. 4137 at 2, attached as Reply Ex. H; TR Vol. II at 1488:8-1489:3.)
When MRIA requested SARMC's permission to "contract directly with radiologists" who were
not MRIA's competitors, SARMC, although still a pat1ner in MRIA, ignored such requests. (TR
Vol. II at 1175:23-1176:11, 1182:9-14; Trial Ex. 4137, attached as Reply App. Ex. H.)
Essentially, SARMC insisted on using the fox to guard the henhouse.

ix.

SARMC Moved an IMI Magnet Onto Its Campus and
Ordered SARMC Physicians to Use IMI Instead of MRIA.

SARMC delivered a one-two death blow by opening an IMI magnet on its campus next
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to MRICI and by issuing a written mandate to all of its employees, including referring
physicians, directing that all patients be sent to the IMI magnet rather than to MRICI. (TR Vol.
II at 2173:21-24; Trial Ex. 4377, attached as Reply App. Ex. K.) This mandate along with
SARMC's other misconduct, reduced the MRICI business ofMRIA to an almost bankrupt
company. (Trial Ex. 4519, attached as Ex. D to the Appendix to MRIA's opening brief.)

4.

SARMC's "Scorched Earth Scenario.''

Among the evidence before the trial coutt when ruling on MRIA's motion was the
statement by SARMC's consultant that "SARMC has referred to [withdrawal from MRIA] as
their 'scorched earth scenario."' (Trial Ex. 4239 at 11; R. Vol. IX at 2116 18). This "scorched
4

earth scenal'io," as demonstrated by the evidence, was the strategy that SARMC ultimately
pursued in its relationship with MRIA. The fact that SARMC referred to the strategy as the
"scorched earth scenario" is very telling concerning SARMC's state of mind. It establishes that
SARMC's withdrawal and competition with its partners was done willfully, deliberately,
maliciously and with the intent to harm MRIA.

5.

6

SARMC's Conduct Constitutes an Extreme Deviation from Normal
Standards of Conduct.

SARMC erroneously asserts that there was no evidence that SARMC's conduct
constituted an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct. Contrary to SARMC's
assertion, the evidence set forth above and set forth more fully in MRIA's opening brief,
6

That the trial court went out of its way to prevent the jury from being prejudiced is
demonstrated by the trial court's decision, after it ruled upon MRIA's motion, to exclude from
the jury any reference to "scorched earth," This fact belies SARMC's arguments that the trial
court allowed MRIA to prejudice the jury.
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demonstrates that SARMC took numerous actions that were extreme deviations from reasonable
standards of conduct. The evidence shows that in addition to its wrongful withdrawal, SARMC
undertook a course of conduct intended to inflict the greatest harm possible on MRIA. Indeed, it
is axiomatic that it was an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct among
partners for a partner like SARMC to breach its contractual and fiduciary duties by competing
with its fellow partners and seeking to run those fellow partners out of business for the purpose
of reaping higher profits for itself. That, however, is exactly what SARMC did in the instant
case.
Furthermore, it must be noted that SARMC objected to MRIA's expert, Professor
Branson, on the grounds that whether SARMC's conduct was an extreme deviation from
reasonable standards of care was not a proper subject for expert testimony. (R., Ex. 73 at 9.)
The trial court agreed and excluded Professor Branson's testimony. (R. Vol. VII at 1317-1323.)
Nevertheless, the trial court had that testimony when it ruled on MRIA's motion. (R., Ex. 48.)
Professor Branson, after reviewing the evidence ofSARMC's shocking conduct,
concluded that SARMC's misconduct constituted an extreme deviation from normal standards of
conduct followed by pat1ners, and that the actions of SARMC were taken with a professional
disregard for their consequences to MRIA. (!d.

at~~

17-28.) Specifically Professor Branson

opined that:
•

SARMC knowingly engaged in conduct that was an extreme deviation
from the standards of conduct partners owe in a partnership in that it
repeatedly served the best interests of competitors (IMI, ICR, and
SARG/GSR) rather than the best interests of the MRIA Partnership, of
which it was a partner.
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• SARMC engaged in a fmther extreme departure from the applicable
partnership standard of conduct by its wrongful dissociation, without any
colorable grounds therefor, and despite warnings from authoritative
sources (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Shattuck Hammond Partners) that such
a dissociation would be wrongful.
• SARMC further departed from the applicable partnership standard of
conduct by efforts to dissociate from the partnership in bad faith,
apparently attempting to inflict harm on the MRlA pattnership and the
other partners therein by, inter alia, wrongfully demanding immediate
payment for its partnership interest; preparing a portable MRI unit pad in
the SARMC parking lot; threatening to restrict MRICI's access to the
SARMC DR setver and PACS systems, which required MRICI to build its
own PACS/RIS system; condoning or facilitating the curtailment of
services and availability of SARG/GSR radiologists at MRICI;
simultaneously condoning or facilitating the expansion of services and
availability of SARG/GSR physicians at the competing IMI facilities; and
in general pursuing what it termed a "scorched earth" approach to its
attempted dissociation.
• In addition to having departed from the standards of conduct which govern
partners in a partnership, SARMC violated the express provisions of the
MRIA Partnership Agreement by its attempted withdrawal from the MRIA
Partnership without any colorable grounds, or any grounds at all, therefor.
• SARMC violated the express provisions of the MRIA Pmtnership Agreement by
competing, alone and through its affiliate, IMI, with the MRIA Partnership, in
violation of the express covenant not to compete contained in the MRIA
Partnership Agreement.
• SARMC usurped a pmtnership opportunity, and aided and abetted the usrnpation
of a partnership opportunity by another, in providing inf01mation technology,
telecommunications, records storage and retrieval, human resources, experienced
personnel and other setvices, without distinction between MRI and non-MRI
lines of business, to the IMI 9111 and Myrtle diagnostic imaging facility in Boise,
Idaho.
• Similarly, SARMC usurped a second partnership opp01tunity, and aided and
abetted the usurpation of a partnership opportunity by another, in providing
information technology, telecommunications, records storage and retrieval,
15
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htunan resources, expetienced personnel and other setvices, without distinction
between MRI and non-MRI lines of business to the diagnostic imaging facility in
Meridian, Idaho.
(ld.

at~~

17-23.) Professor Branson further found that SARMC engaged in a "radical and

extreme departure from the standards applicable to dealings between or among partners when it
made affirmative misrepresentations, told half-truths, or dissembled, to its fellow partners, either
in response to inquiries from its partners, or on its own volition." (!d.

at~

27.) Professor

Branson then testified to the following as examples of such misrepresentations:
• SARMC [represented it] would not support MRI operations at IMI LLC
when in fact it did, over a period of several years.
• SARMC [represented it] had no plans for participation in any Meridian,
Idaho diagnostic imaging facility, when it in fact did have plans.
• SARMC not only failed to disclose but actively concealed its commitment
to pursue a Meridian, Idaho facility in connection with IMI.
• Dissembled regarding the undisclosed service by key SARMC employees
on the boards of managers, or of partners, respectively, of the competing
entitles, IMI and MRIA, in the latter of which SARMC was a partner.
• Failed to disclose to its partners the provision of confidential MRIA
financial information to potential third party investors or putative lenders to
SARMC.
• Misrepresented the affiliate status ofiMI once SARMC had become a
signatory to the IMI Operating Agreement, with 3 of 6 SARMC managers
on the MI Board of Managers.
• Did not accurately disclose the extent of its $2.1 million investment and the
use (commingling) of the investment in support ofiMI's MRI as well as its
non-MRI lines of business.
(/d.) This testimony suppotts the strong evidence that MRIA presented which demonstrated that
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SARMC's conduct constituted an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of care.

6.

SARMC's Conduct was at Least as Egregious as Conduct Found by this
Court to be Sufficient to Support a Claim for Punitive Damages.

Despite SARMCs protestation that its conduct was nothing more than a breach of
contract, the totality of the evidence demonstrates that its conduct was much more egregious.
Indeed, the conduct was at least as egregious as conduct found by this Court to be sufficient to
support a claim for punitive damages. For example, in Rockefeller v. Grabow, this Court
sustained an award of punitive damages in a commercial dispute where a realtor was "working
actively against [his clients'] interests" and favored one client to the detriment of another
"thereby violating his fiduciary duty to the Grabows." 136 Idaho 637, 647, 39 P.3d 577, 587
(2001). Here, SARMC's conduct was more egregious in that SARMC not only favored IMI over
its patiners in MRIA, it actively conspired to compete against, and ultimately destroy, MRIA
while still a partner in MRIA.
In General Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co.,l32 Idaho 849, 854, 979 P.2d 1207,
1212 (1999), this Court discussed with approval two Court of Appeals cases affirming punitive
damage awards under less egregious facts. The first case, Cuddy Mountain Concrete Inc. v.
Citadel Constr., Inc., 121 Idaho 220 824 P.2d 151 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) involved a breach of
contract claim between a general contractor (Citadel) and a subcontractor (Cuddy Mountain).
Citadel terminated the contract without giving Cuddy Mountain the required seven-day written
notice. The Com1 of Appeals "determined that the following behavior by Citadel constituted
oppressive conduct sufficient to support an award of punitive damages: ( l) the evidence showed
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that Citadel's decision to terminate 'was conceived in frustration and consummated in anger' and
there was no evidence that Citadel gave any thought to the consequences of its decision; (2) the
termination in fact caused financial hardship to Cuddy Mountain; (3) Citadel refused to pay the
balance Cuddy Mountain demanded for the work it had performed; and (4) following
termination, Citadel altered certain daily reports which had been prepared prior to the
termination." General Auto Parts,I32 Idaho at 854, 979 P.2d at 1212 (citing Cuddy Mountain,
121 Idaho at 227-28, 824 P.2d at 158-59.) Here, SARMC's actions were more egregious than
Citadel's. Whereas Citadel's actions were consummated in anger, SARMC's actions were cool,
deliberate and premeditated. Whereas Citadel's actions were taken without regard to the
consequences, SARMC conducted itself with full knowledge of, but with intentional and willful
disregard for, the consequences of its actions, taking a "scorched eat1h" approach.
The second case the Com1 discussed with approval is Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 682
P.2d 1282 (Ct.App.l984). In Davis, the Gages sold real property to the Davises so that Davises
could build a restaurant/tavern. !d. at 737-38, 682 P.2d at 1284-85. As pat1 ofthe sale, the
Gages agreed not to open a competing business on nearby property owned by the Gages. !d.
The Gages, in violation of the noncompete agreement, opened a competing business and tore
down the Davises' billboard advertising their restaurant. ld At tl'ial, the Davises were awarded
nominal damages and punitive damages. The Gage's appealed arguing, among other things, that
punitive damages may not be awarded in a breach of contract case. !d. at 739; 682 P.2d at 1286.
The Com1 of Appeals rejected the argument holding that:
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The district court stated that it could "imagine no clearer case of a
violation of the intent expressed by the noncompetition clause in
the original agreement." Nor can we. The covenant not to compete
was clear and unambiguous. The Gages' conduct was, according to
the district court, "willful, wanton, malicious and the proper
subject for punitive damages."

!d. Likewise, in the instant case, the covenant not to compete was clear and unambiguous and
SARMC's conduct was willful and deliberate. However, the relationship between SARMC and
MRIA was far closer than the relationship between the Gage's and the Davises. When compared
to the Gages conduct against a purchaser, SARMC's conduct was more egregious as it was
aimed at the partners to whom SARMC owed a duty of trust and fidelity. Despite such duty,
SARMC took conscious acts aimed at promoting, establishing and operating a competing
business in violation of the partnership's non-compete agreement and aimed at destroying MRIA
or otherwise hindering MRIA's ability to compete.
Thus, SARMC's conduct clearly justifies submitting the issue of punitive damages to the
jury as that conduct was at least as, if not more, egregious than conduct found by this Com1 to be
sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. SARMC deliberately and with conscious
disregard for the consequences of its actions, competed with its partners in MRIA and took other
actions which caused the destruction ofMRIA's business.

7.

The Court Did Not Exercise Reasoned Judgment When It Refused to Submit
the Issue of Punitive Damages to the Jury.

Because there was substantial evidence that SARMC willfully and deliberately violated
its contractual and fiduciary duties with conscious disregard for the legal right of MRIA, the trial
court did not exercise reasoned judgment when it refused to submit the issue of punitive damages
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to the jury. Studeht Loan Fund ofIdaho Inc. v. Duerner, 131 Idaho 45, 52,951 P.2d 1272, 1279
(1998). Additionally, the trial court's contradictory statements conceming the evidence
demonstrate that the trial court failed to exercise reason when it refused to submit the issue. It is
true that when MRIA renewed its motion at the close of the evidence, the trial court denied the
motion stating that MRIA did not prove the necessary conduct with clear and convincing
· evidence. (TR Vol. III at 4261: 18-4262:2.) That decision, however, is directly contradicted by
the trial court's comment on the evidence at the hearing on SARMC's motion for a new trial.
But this court listened to overwhelming evidence that the executive
management team at Saint Alphonsus really blatantly ignored the
partnership rights of a patiner. I think the evidence that came in
was clear and convincing. I think that's just what was out there
through the discovery process over many years. It was
demonstrated to this jury that Saint Alphonsus chose to compete
directly/indirectly with a partner. And the jury so found.

(ld. at 4471:9-17 (emphasis added).) This finding that MRIA proved with "clear and
convincing" evidence that SARMC "blatantly ignored the partnership rights of partner" by
competing with MRIA supports an award of punitive damages. Furthermore, this finding, which
came after further reflection upon the evidence by the trial couti, is consistent with the
substantial evidence produced at trial as illustrated above and proves that the trial court failed to
exercise reasoned judgment when it refused to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury.
Consequently, the trial comi's refusal to submit the issue to the jury should be reversed in the
event the Com1 grants SARMC a new trial.

B.

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing MRIA's Antitrust Claims.
The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of SARMC dismissing
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MRIA's antitrust counterclaims. (SeeR. Vol. V, at 905~946; R. Vol. XI at 2077~81). As
previously discussed in MRIA 's opening brief, the trial court wrongly held that MRIA lacked
standing because it had not suffered an "antitrust injury." This Court should also reject
SARMC's alternative theories that SARMC's actions increased competition, or that a jury would
be unable to conclude that SARMC had the ability to achieve monopoly power.

1.

Standard of Review.

On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, the Court employs the same
standard used by the district judge originally ruling on the motion. Intermountain Eye and Laser

Centers, P.L.L.C. v. }.t/i/ler, 142 Idaho 218, 222, 127 P.3d 121, 125 (2005). Summary judgment
is proper only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter oflaw. Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 778, 133 P.3d 1240, 1243 (2006);
I.R.C.P. 56(c). The facts must be liberally construed and all inferences will be drawn in favor of
the non-moving party. Fenn, 142 Idaho at 778, 133 P.3d at 1243. The Court reviews the record
before the district court, including the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, if any, to
determine de novo whether, after construing the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, there exists any genuine issues of material fact. Woodland Furniture, LLC v.

Larsen, 142 Idaho 140, 143, 124 P.3d 1016, 1019 (2005).
2.

Under Idaho Law, MRIA Did Not Need to Show Harm to Competition as a
Whole or Monopoly Power to Assert Its Antitrust Claims.

As noted in MRIA 's opening brief, Idaho law, as set forth in Twin Falls Farm & City

Distributing, Inc. v. D & B Supply Co, 96 Idaho 351, 528 P.2d 1286 (1974), does not require a
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showing of"market injury" and "market power" to sustain an antitrust claim. In, Twin Falls, the
Court ultimately held that a fiduciary's breach of loyalty, combined with a third-party's
knowledge of and assistance in that breach, constituted anticompetitive conduct in violation of
Idaho's antitrust laws. The Court did not require a showing of market injury or market power.
The facts of Twin Falls are similar to the facts ofthe instant case. In Twin Falls, the
manager of the plaintiff's retail store pursued an oppot1unity to join the defendant's competing
store. ld at 353, 528 P.2d at 1288. During this time, the defendant knew that the manager
worked for the plaintiff's store. !d. The manager assisted the defendant with a lease
opportunity, knowing this would give the defendant a competitive advantage over the plaintiff.

Id The manager was hired to manage the defendant's store, and they worked together to take
over the plaintiff's prime location. !d. As a result, the plaintiff lost its location, a portion of its
customer base, and some of its employees. /d. at 353-354, 528 P.2d at 1288-1289. Overturning
the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Idaho Supreme Court
determined that the manager breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff and that this breach, with
the defendant's knowledge and assistance, amounted to anticompetitive conduct in violation of
Idaho's antitrust laws. !d. at 356-360,528 P.2d at 1291-1295.
As with the manager and defendant in Twin Falls, SARMC's conduct also constitutes a
violation ofldaho's antitrust laws .. Like the manager in Twin Falls, SARMC breached its
fiduciary duties. (R. Vol. XII at 2296.) Like the manager and defendant in Twin Falls, SARMC
and IMI worked together to create a competing entity while disparaging MRIA, (R. Conf. Ex. I
at 7, Exhibit PP thereto), and providing advantages to the competing entity, IMI. (R. Conf. Ex. 1
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at 3, Exhibit Hand at 7, Exhibit 00 thereto.) Consistent with the rationale outlined in Twin

Falls, this conduct not only constitutes a breach of loyalty/fiduciary duty on SARMC's part, but
also constitutes a violation of antitrust laws by both SARMC and IMI.
In Twin Falls this Court did not require the plaintiff to show evidence of a market-wide
injury, as required by the district court in the instant case. Instead, this Court found it sufficient
that the plaintiff was injured by the conspiracy to drive the plaintiff out of business. Twin Falls.
at 359, 528 P.2d at 1294. Here, there was ample evidence presented to the trial court that
SARMC and IMI conspired to drive MRIA out of business. Such evidence is sufficient to
sustain an antitrust claim under this Court's decision in Twin Falls.
Notably, SARMC did not even address Twin Falls in its brief. Instead, SARMC focused
on federal cases and the requirements of federal law. SARMC apparently hopes that this Court
will ignore its prior holding in Twin Falls. The decision in T·win Falls, however, cannot be
ignored because it remains controlling law in Idaho and because MRIA's claim was made under
Idaho, not federal, law. (R., Vol. Vat 905-946.) Therefore, because MRIA's antitrust claims
were sufficient under T·wfn Falls, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment against
MRIA on those claims.

3.

Even if MRJA Was Required to Show Harm to Competition as Whole,
MRIA Satisfied that Requirement.

Even ifthe requirements of federal case law are applicable, MRIA has satisfied those
requirements. According to federal case law, a private plaintiff has standing to bring an antitrust
action if, among other things, it asserts an antitrust injury. Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 793,
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797 (2nd Cir. 1994 ). 'The purpose of antitrust laws is to protect the public by keeping the
channels of competition free. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Fed Power Com 'n., 193 F.2d
230 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Therefore, it has been said that a plaintiff shows an "antitrust injury" when
it shows harm to competition as a whole. See New York Medscan LLC v. New York Univ. Sch. of
Med., 430 F. Supp. 2d 140, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A plaintiff shows such harm to competition by

alleging adverse effects on the price, quality, or output of the relevant good or service. See id.
Contrary to the district comi's holding and SARMC's argument, MRIA presented ample
evidence establishing such advet·se effects on the local MRI services market.
MRIA alleged facts showing broadly that SARMC's tactics had market-wide effects
beyond merely impacting MRIA's own profits. Compare with Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 97 S.Ct. 690 (1977). These tactics, which are more fully

delineated in MRIA's opening brief(Respondent's Brief at 72-74, n. 47), include making
misleading reports to the referring physician community, providing lower levels of service to
MRIA patients, receiving higher prices for comparable goods and services, and directing patients
away from MRIA's facilities. MRIA outlined a number of ways that SARMC's tactics caused
an antitrust injury, including reducing patient care (R. Vol. Vat 905-46 at~~ 40, 68, 127);
increasing price (id. at ~~ 66, 127), and decreasing the output of medical imaging (id.

at~

72).

MRIA also submitted an affidavit and report from its economic expert, Edward Whitelaw,
stating a number of ways in which SARMC's actions increased price and harmed competition in
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the market. 7 (R., Ex. 144). Whitelaw opined in a similar manner in his deposition. (R., Ex. 104
at Ex. D, p. SO: 14-23; see also R., Ex.ll 0 at Ex. A, p. 2-14; R., Ex. 143 at 2, Ex. A thereto at
8

12). Construing these facts in favor ofMRIA, as the Court must, this evidence is more than
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that an antitmst injury had occmTed. Contrary
to SARMC's arguments, these facts reflect an injury to the competitive market, not merely to
MRIA as a competitor in the market.
SARMC nevertheless argues that the Court should affitm the summary judgment because
its activities increased competition by causing IMI to join the market. (Cross-Respondent's Brief
at 45-47). The facts and evidence submitted to the trial court establishes that the opposite
actually occurred. As discussed above, MRIA demonstrated that SARMC's activities damaged,
rather than increased, competition in the market. Moreover, SARMC's conduct was "without

7

To the extent that the district court reasoned that Whitelaw's report did not sufficiently show a
"market wide injury," the comt itself hampered MRIA's ability to prove mm·ket-wide injury
when it ruled that MRI providers in the relevant market would not be required to produce any
records ofMRI scans. (R. Vol. lil at 557-60). That decision prevented MRIA from presenting
relevant evidence concerning harm in the market. (SeeR., Ex. 110, Exhibit A at 2-3). The trial
court cannot complain about lack of evidence when a decision of the trial comt prevented MRIA
from obtaining that evidence. See Vaught v. Dairy/and Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 357,363, 956 P.2d
674, 680 (1998) (recognizing that it may be an abuse discretion to deny the discovery of critical
information unavailable from another source).
8

The fact that SARMC,s expert disputed Whitelaw's opinion does not support the trial court's
decision to grant summary judgment because summary judgment is inappropriate when
t·easonable minds come to different conclusions. Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v.
Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 870, 993 P .2d 1197, 1201 ( 1999) ("If reasonable minds might come
to different conclusions, summary judgment is inappropriate."); Walls v. Lynn, 125 Idaho 341,
346 870 P.2d 1300, 1305 (1994) (recognizing prior decisions holding that summary judgment is
inappropriate where conflicting testimony from experts is presented).
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legitimate business purpose" for it was only to eliminate competition, and not to increase
competition. Gen. Indus. Cmp. v. Hartz Mountain Cmp., 810 F.2d 795,804 (8th Cir. 1987). As
the Supreme Court has said, "[i]f a firm has been 'attempting to exclude rivals on some basis
other than efficiency,' it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory." Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 472 U.S. 585,605, 105 S.Ct. 2847,2859 (1985) (citation

omitted).
Gen. Indus. C01p., 810 F.2d 795, is illustrative. In that case, the plaintiff had been a non-

exclusive distributor of the defendant's products for a number of years. !d. at 798. In order to
meet a request made by one of the plaintiff's retail customers, the plaintiff began to distribute
competing products as well. Id. at 798-99. These products were of comparable quality for a
lower price. Id. at 798. As a result, the defendant began enforcing a contract provision limiting
credit to the plaintiff, despite years of waiving the provision. /d. at 798-99. The defendant also
began supplying orders that were shm1-shipped or othetwise inaccurate, causing fl'iction between
the plaintiff and its retail customers. ld. at 799. Ultimately, the defendant terminated the
contract and began heavily advertising on behalf of the plaintiff's closest competitor. !d. The
Court held that these actions were not reasonably gauged to promote competition based upon the
quality of the products or the efficiency of the companies, but instead that the defendant
"invoked its considerable market power to cause superior competing products to fail to reach
retail shelves, preempting any opportunity for the consumer to make a real choice." ld. at 804.
That is precisely what happened in this case. SARMC's tactics, including making
misleading reports to the referring physician community, (R. Conf. Ex. 1 at 7, Exhibit PP
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thereto), providing lower levels of service to MRI Center patients, (R. Conf. Ex. 1 at 7, Exhibit

00 thereto), directing patients away from MRIA's facilities, (R. Conf. Ex. 1 at 7, Exhibit LL and
Ex. 143 at 2, Exhibit B thereto), and preventing SARMC affiliated doctors from having the
ability to digitally review MRIA reports while allowing such doctors access to IMI repot1s (Tr.
Vol. II, 2437:10- 2439:17); were designed to prevent MRIA's comparable lower-priced

servic~s

from reaching the public and preempting any opp011unity for the consumer to make a real
9

choice. The facts and evidence establish that SARMC's conduct with respect to IMI was
predatory and not for a legitimate business purpose to increase competition, as SARMC would
have this Com1 believe.

4.

MRIA Has Not Conceded Its Antitrust Argument.

To the extent that SARMC argues that MRIA is precluded from making an antitmst
argument because it "concedes" that competition was the actionable conduct (CrossRespondent's Brief at 46-47), the argument is erroneous and misplaced. SARMC cites to a
footnote in MRIA's opening brief where MRIA discussed SARMC's irrelevant citations to
antitrust cases in a discussion of MRIA damages for SARMC's breaches of contract and
fiduciary duties. (Respondent's Brief at 45 n. 30). SARMC also notes a portion ofMRIA's brief
where MRIA discussed SARMC's promotion of certain technology for IMI which placed IMI in

9

Because MRIA showed damage to the competitive market, SARMC's argument that its
behavior merely constitutes a "business tort" and not anticompetitive conduct is inapposite.
(Cross"Respondent's Response, at 46-47). See Conwood Co., L.P. v. US. Tobacco Co. 290 F.3d
768, 783 "784 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that business torts do not constitute anticompetitive
conduct absent a "significant and more than a temporary effect on competition").
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a better competitive position. (Respondent's Brief at 9). SARMC takes these comments out of
context.
In its opening brief, SARMC argued that there had been no showing that its breaches of
fiduciary duty, breaches of the non-compete agreement, tortious interference and bad faith
caused "lost scan" damage to MRIA. (Appellant's Brief at 31 -36). Citing to antitrust cases,
SARMC suggested that MRIA was required to prove "what proportion of the scans that migrated
from MRIA to IMI did so as a result of Saint Alphonsus's alleged misconduct, as opposed to
other causes, such as IMI's entry into the competitive marketplace." !d. at 31. MRIA countered
this argument by stating that (1) IMI and SARMC were one in the same, (2) SARMC was a
partner in IMI, (3) IMI entered the market with SARMC's assistance, and that (4) SARMC and
GSR conspired to shift scans from MRIA to IMI. (Respondent Brief at 41-47.)
In the specific portions of its Respondent's Brief noted above, MRIA further argued that
SARMC was inappropriately conflating antitrust arguments with breach of fiduciary duty/breach
of contract arguments. MRIA explained that in the latter cases, to prove causation a plaintiff
need only show the defendant competed in violation of some agreement or duty and acquired
customers that were historically customers of the plaintiff. Vancil v. Anderson, 71 Idaho 95, 105,
227 P.2d 74, 79 (195 1) (holding that to prove causation in a non-compete case, the ·evidence
must show that "plaintiff business suffered a loss of profits by reason of its patrons and
customers trading with defendant"). MRIA contrasted this with antitrust cases, where the
plaintiff must show that the damages came from an antitrust injury rather than competition by
itself. Pope, 103 Idaho at 233-34, 646 P.2d at 1004-05 (1982); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of
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Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S~ 104, 116, 107 S.Ct. 484,492 (1986). MRJA's comments in its brief
that "competition was the actionable conduct" (Respondent's Brief at 45, n. 30) and that
SARMC had given IMI a competitive edge (/d. at 9), merely clarified, contrary to SARMC's
assertions otherwise, that competition is the appropriate source of the damages in breach of
fiduciary duty/breach of contract cases.
Those arguments are not incompatible with MRIA's antitrust claims. SARMC did not
enhance competition by assisting IMI's entry into the market. Instead, SARMC destroyed
competition. As demonstrated in Part I.A.4.b.i through Patt I.A.4.b.ix above, SARMC used its
considerable market power (i.e., its relationship with referring physicians) to destroy MRIA's
business in favor of IMI. SARMC acted "without legitimate business purpose" to eliminate
competition and it did so through predatory behavior. Gen. Indus. Corp., 810 F.2d at 804; Aspen

Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 605, lOS S.Ct. at 2859. Thus, whereas it was SARMC's competition
with MRIA that caused MRIA damages for purposes ofMRIA's non-antitrust claims, it was the
way that competition was conducted that gives rise to MRIA's antitrust claim and injury. The
claims are not incompatible.

5.

Even if MRIA Was Required to Present Evidence of Ma1·kct Power to

Sustain its Antitrust Claims, MRIA Satisfied that Requirement.
Although not required for MRIA to proceed on its Idaho law based antitrust claims,
MRIA presented ample evidence that SARMC/IMJ had the ability to achieve monopoly power in
the provision ofMRI services. To succeed on an attempted monopolization claim, a plaintiff
must show that there is a dangerous probability that the defendant will achieve "monopoly
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power." Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,456, 113 S.Ct. 884, 891 (1993);

Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 893 (9th Cir. 2008); Pope v.
Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217,229,646 P.2d 988, 1000 (1982). "Monopoly power is
the 'power to control prices or exclude competition' in the relevant market." Image Technical

Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing United States
v. E.L DuPont DeNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,391,76 S.Ct. 994, 1005 (1956)).
To determine whether a defendant is dangerously close to obtaining monopoly power, "it
is necessary for the court to measure and evaluate the degree of market power which the
defendant possesses." Pope, 103 Idaho at 229, 646 P.2d at 1000. In determining whether there
is a dangerous probability of monopolization, com1s "consider the relevant market and the
defendant's ability to lessen or destroy competition in that market." Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S.
at 456, 113 S.Ct. at 891. "[D]emonstrating the dangerous probability of monopolization in an
attempt case ... requires inquiry into the relevant product and geographic market and the
defendant's economic power in that market." /d. Monopoly power is often referred to as
"market power," and can be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Image Technical

Services, 125 F.3d at 1202.
MRIA presented evidence of market power through the affidavit, rep011, and deposition
testimony of its economics expert, Mr. Whitelaw. Specifically, MRIA showed that as IMI's
market share was increasing, its prices rose above the market for the same services. (R., Ex. 144
at~

2-4; R., Ex. 110 at Ex. A, p. 2; R., Ex. 104 at Ex. D, p. 50: 1-23). In his affidavit Mr.

Whitelaw presented evidence that:
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•

"IMI increased its market share while receiving higher payments for patient
seeking similar services of comparable quality." (R., Ex. 144 at~ 2).

•

"My analysis revealed that IMPs market share steadily increased over time and
will likely continue to increase. (Id. at~ 3).

•

"I concluded that dul'ing 2001-2006, IMI received higher payments for providing
services of comparable quality to similar patients relative to those received by
other sellers. Higher payments coupled with increasing market share indicated
that IMI possesses and has exercised market power in the relevant market." (ld.
at~ 4).

In his report, Mr. Whitelaw made the following germane statements:
•

"Based on our analysis ... the market share of the IMI-SADC imaging
pattnership increased from approximately 21-23 percent in 2001 to approximately
44-53 percent in 2006. Based on these results I conclude that the partnership has
a dangerous probability of achieving a monopoly share ofthe relevant market, if
they have not already done so. (R., Ex. 110 at Exhibit A, p. 2; see also id. at 7-12
for supporting data).

•

"I conclude that the IMI-SADC imaging pattnership has harmed competition in
the relevant market by receiving higher-than-market rates from taking MRI scans
relative to what these rates would have been in the absence of such
anticompetitive behavior. (/d. at 2; see also id. at 13-14 for supporting data)

Mr. Whitelaw also made these points in his deposition. (R., Ex. 104 at Ex. D, p. 50: 1-23.)

10

10

SARMC attacks the strength and re1iability ofMr. Whitelaw's analysis and conclusions.
(Cross-Respondent's Brief, p. 52-53). This is an inappropriate argument in the review of a
summary judgment decision, where the facts must be liberally construed and all inferences will
be drawn in favor ofMRIA, the non-moving party. Fenn, 142 Idaho at 778, 133 P.3d at 1243.
Furthermore, SARMC's contentions are incorrect. SARMC argues that Mr. Whitelaw's
report does not take into account the actual prices charged to consumers. On the contrary, Mr.
Whitelaw's repott indicates that he "calculat[ed] the statistical relationship between the amounts
paid by [an insurance provider] for MRI scans provided by IMI and all other providers." (R., Ex.
104 at Ex. G, p. 13). SARMC also argues that Mr. Whitelaw's report inappropriately excluded
data from another market participant, St. Luke's. On the contrary, Mr. Whitelaw's repott
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a.

Exclusive Output Is Not the Exclusive Form of Direct Evidence to
Prove Market Power.

The combination of the trends of increasing market share and higher prices is dire~t
evidence that SARMC could and did control prices in the market. SARMC nevertheless argues
that MRIA was required to present evidence of "restricted output" to show direct evidence of
market power. Restricted output refers to circumstances where, by restricting its own output, a
predator in the market restricts market-wide output and thereby increases market prices. Rebel
Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). SARMC relies on
Ninth Circuit cases which state that direct proof of market power "may be shown by evidence of
restricted output and supracompetitive prices." Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 FJd 1467,
1475 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). 11 See Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51
F.3d 1421, 1434(9thCir. 1995).
"The defining characteristic of direct evidence is that it demonstrates actual injury to
competition.'' In re Abbott Laboratories Norvir Anti-Trust Litigation, 562 F.Supp.2d 1080,
1086 (N.D.Cal. 2008). As such, it is absurd to read the Ninth Circuit cases cited above as
dictating the only type of acceptable direct evidence of the injurious exercise of market power to
indicates that he made his calculation both with St. Luke's data inserted and without, and that
both sets of data indicate that IMI received higher payments. ld (Indeed, removing the St.
Luke's data is to IMI's benefit, because it suggests that overpayment to IMI was not as
egregious).
11

In Forsyth, the Ninth Circuit stated that a mere increase in price is not sufficient to show that a
defendant has market power. Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1476. Unlike Forsyth, however, MRIA has
shown more than an increase in price. It has shown both IMI's increasing market share and a
contemporaneous increase in price as that market share has grown.
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be restricted output. Id. As the United States Supreme Court has said, "'proof of actual
detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output,' can obviate the need for an inquiry into
market power, which is but a 'surrogate for detrimental effects."' F. T. C. v. Indiana Federation

of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,460-461, 106 S.Ct. 2009,2019 (1986) (citing 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust
Law1fl511, p. 429 (1986) (emphasis added).)
This illustrative example by the Supreme Court does not limit the kinds of direct proof
that might exist. While high prices in conjunction with reduced output are one way of showing
market power, it is not the exclusive means of proving actual detrimental effects in the market.
Contrary to SARMC's argument, an increase in prices above the competitive level, as presented
by MRIA, may establish that monopoly power exists. See U.S. v. lvficrosoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,
51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (when evidence shows that firm has in fact profitably raised prices above
competitive level, monopoly power exists); American Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians

and Surgeons v. American Bd of Podiatric Surge1y, Inc., 185 F.3d 606, 623 (6th Cir. 1999)
("The price difference, coupled with the larger market share. suppot1s plaintiffs claim of
monopoly power by [the defendant]." (Emphasis added)); Natsource LLC v. GFI Group, Inc.,
332 F. Supp. 2d 626, 635 (S.D.N. Y. 2004) ("Market share is just a way of estimating market
power, which is the ultimate consideration. When there are better ways to estimate market
power, the court should use them. These ways include a contemporaneous rise in price with
increased market share." (Internal citations omitted and emphasis added).)
As noted above, "[m]onopoly power is the 'power to control prices or exclude
competition' in the relevant markeC' Image Technical Services: Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125
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F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997). The proof presented by MRIA of a contemporaneous rise in
price with increased market share is direct and perfectly appropriate evidence that SARMC and
IMI actually exercised monopoly power.
b.

Circumstantial Evidence Is Also Appropriate to Establish Monopoly
Power.

The Court could alternatively hold that Mr. Whitelaw's affidavit, report, and deposition
testimony showing increasing market share and increasing price provides circumstantial
evidence of monopoly power. To demonstrate market power by circumstantial evidence, a
plaintiff must: "(l) define the relevant market, 12 (2) show that the defendant owns a dominant
share of that market, and (3) show that there are significant barriers to entry and show that
existing competitors lack the capacity to increase their output in the short run." Image Technical
Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Rebel Oil, 51

F.3d at 1434.
''A rising [market] share may show more probability of success of achieving [a
monopoly] than a falling share." M & M Medical Supplies and Service, Inc. v. Pleasant Valley
Hosp.,lnc., 981 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1992). As the Idaho Supreme Court has said, there is

"no set degree or percentage of market power which must be possessed in order for a defendant
to be dangerously close to achieving a monopoly." Pope, 103 Idaho at 229, 646 P.2d at 1000.

12

A description of the relevant market is contained in Mr. Whitelaw's report. (R., Ex. 110 at Ex.
A at 3-6.) The parties previously used this is the definition of the market (seeR. Vol. IX at
1619), and there is no disagreement on this point on appeal.
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See Rebel OU, 51 FJd at 1438, n. 10 (declining to adopt bright-line market percentage rules).
Instead, "the extent of market power must be evaluated in conjunction with prevailing market
conditions, as well as the business policies and performance of the defendant." Pope, 103 Idaho
at 229; see also Theme Proinotions, Inc. v. News America Marketing FSI, 546 F.3d 991,
1002 (9th Cir. 2008) ("We have determined that a 45-70% market share may be enough to
establish a substantial share of the relevant market where it is accompanied by other factors.").
MRIA showed that IMI had a 40 to 50 percent market share that was steadily increasing, well
within the range of the "substantial share ofthe relevant market" required by Idaho comts.
Notwithstanding this, SARMC argues that this percentage is insufficient to show market
power in the absence of evidence showing "barriers to entry." Generally, the ability of new
competitors to enter a market is relevant because, if entry is easy, even a firm holding a
commanding percentage of the market cannot charge a price above the competitive price, for
once it does, competitors will enter the market and undercut the firm's price. See United States

v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659,667 (91h Cir. 1990). Barriers to entry m·e significant because they
"constrain[] the normal operation of the market to the extent that the problem is unlikely to be
self-correcting." Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1439.
In this case, rather than analysis of hypothetical barriers to entry, the parties and the court
were in a better position to evaluate any barriers to entry in light of the ex post description of the
relevant market, including IMI's

increasi~g

market share and its persistently higher prices for six

years. Despite any net entry that may have occurred (and, indeed, according to SARMC, which
did occur), this failed to offer enough market discipline to eliminate IMI's combination of
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increasing share and higher prices. Cf Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1440-41 ("BaiTiers may still be
'significant' if the market is unable to coiTect itself despite the entry of small rivals."). An
estimation of what may prospectively happen through a "barriers to entry" analysis is no
substitute for examining and analyzing what actually did happen. Here, where MRIA showed
that IMI owned an increasing 40 to 50 percent market share and was able to charge higher prices
than the rest of the market for comparable services regardless of entries into the market, MRIA
has shown market po~er sufficient to survive summary judgment.

II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the trial court's (l) refusal to submit the issue of punitive
damages to the jury should be reversed in the event the Court grants SARMC a new trial because
MRIA proved, through clear and convincing evidence, conduct sufficient to justify an award of
punitive damages and (2) the dismissal ofMRIA's antitrust claims should be reversed in the
event the Court grants SARMC a new trial because MRIA sufficiently assetted an antitrust claim
under both Idaho and federal law.
Dated: January 29, 2009

Respectfully Submitted,

~-<=~
Thomas A. Banducci
WadeL. Woodard
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys tor Respondent
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I hereby certify that on the 291h day of January, 2009, two true and correct copies of the
foregoing RESPONDENT'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPEAL were served upon the
following counsel for Appellant in the manner set forth below:
Donald B. Ayer (VIA FEDEX)
Christian G. Vergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113

JackS. Gjording (VIA HAND DELIVERY)
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 W. Hays Street
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GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 601 W. Bannock Street
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RECEIVED

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@greenerlaw.com
G. Rey Reinhardt, IV (ISB No. 6209)
greinhardt@greenerlaw .com
Daniel J. Gordon (ISB No. 6051)
dgordon@greenerlaw.com

DEC 2 0 2006

GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P .A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319·2601
Attorneys for
Defendants/Counterclaimantsfrhird Party
Plaintiff lviRl Associates, LLP

IN Tiffi DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STA1E OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

v.
:MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership,
Defendant.
Case No. CV OC 0408219D

:MRI AS SOCIA1ES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership,
CounterClaimant,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation~
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SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL rvffiDICAL CENTER,
CounterDefendants.
NJRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
INTERMOUNTAIN 1v1EDICAL Lv1AGING, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
GEM STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; and IlviAGING
CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership,
Third-Party Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF PROFESSOR DOUGLAS M. BRANSON
Douglas M. Branson, being first duty sworn, deposes and says:
1. I am the W. Edward Sell Chair in Business Law at the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law and have occupied that position since September 1, 1996.
2. Prior to September 1, 1996, I was a Professor of Law at Seattle University,
Seattle, Washington. I have also been a visiting professor of law at, inter alia, University
of Oregon, Cornell University, and Washington University (St. Louis, Mo.). I was the
Charles Tweedy Distinguished Visiting Professor in Business Law at the University of
Alabama School of Law in 1993 and again in 2003.

3. I reside at 810 St. James Street, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213, and at 193 Raft
Island, Gig Harbor, Washington 98335.
4. I am a member of the bars of Ohio, Illinois, \Vashington, and Pennsylvania. I
2
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am also admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court and various federal
circuit courts of appeal and district courts.
5. I teach, lecture continuing legal education groups, and consult extensively in the
area of business organizations, including unincorporated entities, business planning,
corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance, comparative corporate
governance, and securities regulation. From time to time, I have also taught the courses in
agency and partnership, bankruptcy and accounting for lawyers.
6. I received my Bachelor of Arts cum laude (Economics) from the University of
Notre Dame in 1965, my Juris Doctor cum laude from Northwestern University in 1970,
and my Master of Laws from the University of Virginia in 1974, where I ranked first in my
class.
7. I am the author of several books and treatises, including DOUGLAS M.
BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Lexis Law Publishing 1993)(with annual
supplements); DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, PROBLEMS IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (Cathedral Press 1997); DOUGLAS M. BRANSON,
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW (Matthew Bender Co. 1999)(2d ed. 2004)(with
A. Pinto); QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
(LexisNexis 2004); DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, INSIDE THE BOARDROOM (2003);
and DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE (NYU Press 2007).
8. I am the author of approximately sixty law review articles in the areas of

3

004164

business organizations, governance, mergers and acquisitions, and securities regulation,
including articles in Cornell Law Review, Tulane Law Review (2), Vanderbilt Law
Review (2), Emory Law Journal, Northwestern University Law Review (2), Minnesota
Law Review, Journal of Corporate Law, Nebraska Law Review, Fordham Law Review,
Corporate Practice Commentator (3), Maryland Law Review, University of Pittsburgh
Law Review, Cornell International Law Journal, Case Western Reserve Law Review,
Pepperdine Law Review, University of Cincinnati Law Review, South Carolina Law
Review, Southern Methodist Law Review, Wake Forest Law Review, Arizona State Law
Journal, Washington University Law Quarter!)!:, Oregon Law Review, Securities
Regulation Law Review, and other legal periodicals and journals.
9. In the last 25 years I have lectured continuing legal education and business
groups on issues, practices, and customs in business organizations (partnerships, limited
liability partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability companies, cotporations,
professional service corj,orations) and governance and in mergers and acquisitions in
Hawaii, Alaska, California, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida,
Louisiana, and New York. Overseas, I have lectured groups on governance issues and
practices in, inter alia, Spain, France, Belgium, Gennany, South Africa, the United
Kingdom, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Hong Kong.
10. I hold a pennanent appointment as a Senior Fellow at the School of Law,
University of Melbourne, Australia, where for the last thirteen years I have co-taught the
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graduate law offerings Corporate Governance and the Duties of Directors.
11. From 1976 to 1996, I served on, and actively participated in the affairs of, the
Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) Corporate Law Revision Committee. I also
served on the WSBA Securities Law Committee (1986-1994), the WSBA Limited
Partnership Act Revision Committee (1983-85), the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law
Revision Committee (1979-85), and the WSBA Committee to Evaluate the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act (1995-96).
12. I am an elected member of the American Law Institute. I was elected to
membership in 1981. From 1981 to 1994, I was an active participant in the American Law
Institute Corporate Governance Project and a member of the advisory committee which,
periodically, consulted with the Project's reporters.
13. From 2000-2002, I was a United States State Department consultant to the
Republic of Indonesia on business organizations law, governance, capital· markets, and
asset securitization refonn In 2000, I was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Gent,
Belgium, lecturing on corporate law and corporate governance. In 2003, I was a State
Department consultant to Ukraine, assisting on projects regarding partnerships and law
firm organization. In 2006, I was the Paul Hastings Distinguished Visiting Professor at the
University of Hong Kong, where I lectured, inter alia, at the Hong Kong Futures and
Exchange Commission and the Asian Development Bank on corporate governance. In
2006, I was a consultant to US Steel Corp., lecturing attorneys and executives from Serbia,
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Slovakia, and the United States on U.S. business law.
14. I am being compensated at $400 per hour.
15. In connection with this case, I have reviewed numerous documents, including
court papers (Complaint, Answer and Counterclaim, Scheduling Order, Court's
Memorandum Opinion Finding, inter alia, Wrongful Dissociation); deposition excerpts
(Christopher Anton, Sandra Bruce, Jeffery Cliff, Jack Floyd, Kenneth Fry, Leslie Kelly
Hall, Cindy Schamp, Jeffrey Seaboum, and Patricia Vandenberg); Agreements and Drafts
of Agreements, including term sheets (MRIA Partnership Agreement and First
Amendment thereto; SARG/GSR Exclusive Services Agreement with SARtVIC;
Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC Operating Agreement, including several preliminary
drafts; various Term Sheets outlining the terms upon which SARMC would invest in IMI;
Medical Director Employment Agreement; Information Resources Agreement); minutes of
meetings (IMI, :NfRIA, NIRICI, MRll\1, SARG/GSR; ICR); consultants reports (Shattuck
Hammond Partners Preliminary Report by "tvi. Finnerty and "Presentation of Strategic
Options" by Shattuck Hanunond Partners); letters from attorney and other independent
contractors (Leo Miller, Esq., to Sister Patricia Vandenberg dated :Niarch 5, 1985; Carl W.
Harder, Esq. to Ms. Sandra Bruce dated January 6, 2000; Patrick 1vliller, Esq., to Joseph
Uberuaga II, Esq., July 13, 2000; memorandum from Patti Harneck to Leslie Kelly Hall
dated January 31, 2002, re IMI use of SARi\tlC DR Server; Memorandum from J. Tim
Hall, MD, to rviRI Center Scheduling Department re "Mission Creep," and miscellaneous
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(SARMC 1122 application for Certificate ofNeed; US Bank documents reproposed llvll
loan; Power Point Slide Deck Entitled Intermountain Medical Imaging, A Joint Venture
Partnership Between St. Alphonsus Radiology Group and SARMC, dated Nov. 11, 1999;
PricewaterhouseCoopers outlines of SAR1v1C Scenarios Nos. 1-5; Restructuring· of NIRI
Associates, Discussion Draft dated Nov. 29, 1999; Health Technology Center, Report on
the Future of Medical Imaging II: PACS, August, 2003); SARMC Withdrawal Letter
dated February 24, 2004, and Demand for Payment Letter, dated March 30, 2004;
SARG/GSR correspondence by Jeffrey Seaboum re termination of GSR services at NIRICI
and ofMRlCI access to DR!Web Ambassador network, and the subsequent reinstatement
. thereof; email from Jeffrey Cliff to Carl Harder, Esq., listing investments SARlviC had
made in IMI prior to August 10, 1999.
16. In addition, on Thursday, December 7, 2006, I spent approximately 9 hours at
the law offices of Greener, Banducci Shoemaker, P.A., Boise, Idaho, reviewing
documents, correspondence and deposition excerpts relevant to this case.
17. Based upon my review of the foregoing, in my opinion, SAR1\1C knowingly
engaged in conduct that was an extreme deviation from the standards of conduct partners
owe in a partnership in that it repeatedly served the best interests of competitors (IMI,
ICR, and SARG/GSR) rather than the best interests of the MRIA Partnership, of which it
was a partner. As an experienced business law practitioner, I would hav~ advised SARMC
that, in every instance, over and above what the partnership agreement expressly provided,
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SARNIC's duty was to serve the best interests of the MRIA partnership and its fellow
participants in the partnership.
18. In my opinion, SARl'JC engaged in a further extreme departure from the
applicable partnership standard of conduct by its wrongful dissociation, without any
colorable grounds therefor, and despite warnings from authoritative sources
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, Shattuck Hammond Partners) that such a dissociation would be
wrongful.
19. In my opinion, SAR.i\tfC further departed from the applicable partnership
standard of conduct by efforts to dissociate from the partnership in bad faith, apparently
attempting to inflict harm on the MRJA partnership and the other partners therein by, inter

alia, wrongfully demanding immediate payment for its partnership interest; preparing a
portable MRI unit pad in the SARt\tiC parking lot; threatening to restrict MRICI's access
to the SARMC DR server and P A.CS. systems, which required MRICI to build its own
PACS/R.lS system; condoning or facilitating the curtailment of services and availability of
SAR.G/GSR radiologists at M:luCI; simultaneously condoning or facilitating the expansion
of services and availability of SARG/GSR physicians at the competing IMI facilities; and
in general pursuing what it termed a "scorched earth,; approach to its attempted
dissociation.
20. In addition to having departed from the standards of conduct which govern
partners in a partnership, SAR!'JC violated the express provisions of the lVfRlA.
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Partnership Agreement by its attempted withdrawal from the :tv1RIA Partnership without
any colorable grounds, or any grounds at all, therefor.
21. SAIUviC violated the express provisions of the :NIRIA Partnership Agreement
by competing, alone and through its affiliate, llvii, with the :NIRIA Partnership, in violation
of the express covenant not to compete contained in the MRIA Partnership Agreement.
22. SA.Rtv1C usurped a partnership opportunity, and aided and abetted the
usurpation of a partnership opportunity by another, in providing information technology,
telecommunications, records storage and retrieval, human resources, experienced
personnel and other services, without distinction between Iv1RI and non-MRI lines of
business, to the TMT 9th and Myrtle diagnostic imaging facility in Boise, Idaho.
23. Similarly, SARMC usurped a second partnership opportunity, and aided and
abetted the usurpation of a partnership opportunity by another, in providing information
technology, telecommunications, records storage and retrieval, human resources,
experienced personnel and other services, without distinction between MRI and non-:MRI
lines of business to the diagnostic imaging facility in Meridian, Idaho.
24. In support of the opinions expressed, supra paragraphs 17-23, I would note that
SARMC committed the following acts prior to the commencement of business by IMI at
the downtown Boise imaging center:
•

In order to obtain U.S. Bank financing for the IMI fadlity, represented, or
allowed the representation to be made, that SARMC would "partner" with
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SARG/GSR physicians in forming and operating a new ~facility.
•

Provided JvfRIA and MRICI data, in SARI.\1C's possession and control, as to
case volume, technical component charges, staffing levels, and operations
data for use in formulation of the IMI business plan.

•

Linked Th1I and its imaging facility to the SARMC intranet and attending
physician network.

•

Converted to another vendor and commenced utilization of DR Systems so
as to become compatible with the IMI computer network.

•

Supported the transfer of key .MRICl personnel to a putative competitor,

Tivii, including Karen Noyes, assistant director of Radiology, SARMC, to
lMl Executive Director of Operations.
•

Reviewed and approved pro forma projections IMI prepared.

25. In support of the opinions expressed, supra paragraphs 17-23, I would note
that SARMC committed the following acts from the time at which li\1I opened its first
imaging facility (August 1999) and the time at which SARMC formally entered into the
IMI LLC Operating Agreement:
•

Failed to investigate complaints of reduced care/hours of service by
SARG/GSR physicians to MRI Center operations, as well as to p~tients
referred to the center.

•

Insisted

t~at

SARG/GSR physicians continue to read MRICI images even
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after SARG/GSR physicians had opened a competing venture (IMI) and a
caution issued by a local health care attorney, Carl Harder, that adherence to
an exclusive services arrangement by competitors of~IRIA would result in
breaches of fiduciary duty.
•

Insistence that SARG/GSR physicians provide exclusive services despite
knowledge that physicians had intentionally curtailed hours and levels of
service.

•

Continued to provide infrastructure support (information technology,
including access to $350,000 DR server, telecommunications, transcription,
disaster recovery, down time and other services) without distinction between

Jv1RI and non :MRI lines of IMI business.
•

Provided confidential "NlRIA partners' and partners' relationship information
toiMI.

•

Opposed further growth of1vfRI Mobile (MRIM) despite robust growth of
that business.

26. In support of the opinions expressed, supra paragraphs 17-23, I would note that
SAR1v1C committed the following acts between the time at which it executed the IMI LLC
Operating Agreement (July 1, 2001) and the time at which it attempted to withdraw from
the MRlA Partnership (LLP as of April 2003) by letter dated February 24, 2004, to be
effective April 1, 2004:
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Executing an agreement to sell one half of:MRIA when SARMC did not
own one half, without disclosing to its rv.IRIA partners details of the
exchange offer to which it had agreed.
Condoning or assisting in disparagement, curtailment of physician services,
and other activities which would drive down the value of partnership
interests in the MR1A Partnership but which SARMC might acquire in the
future.
•

Contributing $546,34 7 in equity capital (which would be commingled with
other IMI funds) and as.suming responsibility for $1.6 million in bank loans
without distinction between 1v1RI and non MRllines ofiMI's business.

•

Entering into a 50-50 operating agreement with another 50 percent LLC
member, which made the LLC an "affiliate," thereby contractually
prohibited from the competition in which it was and had for some time been
engaged.

•

Utilizing SAR.i\1C employees who had duties and responsibilities to MRIA
as SARMC's representatives on the IMI Board of Managers, which managed
all ofiMI's activities, without distinction between 1v1RI and non MR.Ilines
of business.

•

Forming an IT/PACS committee exclusively of SAR.l\1C and IMI
representatives, thereby freezing NIRIA out of discussions regarding
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important P ACS developments.
•

Permitting or facilitating dual allegiances, and then the ttansfer of
allegiances and loyalties, of key independent contractors from 1v1RIA to IMI.

•

Making extortionate demands at the time of withdrawal, insisting on
immediate payment despite knowledge that withdrawal was wrongful and
that observance of a one year covenant not to compete was independent of
paymentvel non.

27. In addition, a partner engages in a radical and extreme departure from the
standards applicable to dealings between or among partners when it makes affurnative
misrepresentations, tells half truths, or dissembles, to one or more of its fellow partners,
either in response to inquiries from its partners, or on its own volition. In my opinion, in
the case at bar, SARMC told a number of untruths and made the following
misrepresentations, which constituted independent violations of the standards applicable to
partners in a partnership:
A). SARMC would not support .MRI operations at I.i\1! LLC when in fact it did,
over a period of several years.
B). SARMC had no plans for participation in any Meridian, Idaho diagnostic
imaging facility, when it in fact did have plans.
C). SAR.i\IIC not only failed to disclose but actively concealed its commitment to
pursue a Meridian, Idaho facility in connection with IMI.
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D). Dissembled regarding the undisclosed service by key SARMC employees on
the boards of managers, or of partners, respectively, of the competing entitles, lMI and

JviR.IA, in the latter of which SARMC was a partner.
E). Failed to disclose to its partners the provision of confidential :MRIA financial
information to potential third party investors or putative lenders to SARJ.viC.
F). Misrepresented the affiliate status ofiMI once SARMC had become a signatory
to the IMI Operating Agreement, with 3 of 6 SARMC managers on the 11\tfi Board of
Managers.
G). Did not accurately disclose the extent of its $2.1 million investment and the use
(commingling) of the investment in support ofiMI's MRI as well as its non MRI lines of
business.
H). Falsely asserted, via a court complaint and otherwise, that SARMC was free of
restraints on withdrawal from the 1viRIA Partnership, when it knew otherwise and had
been so informed by authoritative professionals and consultants.
I). Itiferred, or told, untruths regarding the coverage of the covenant not to compete
contained in the partnership agreement, asserting that the covenant would only be effective
ifMRIA bought out SARlviC within 120 days, when the agreement contained no such
provisions and provided otherwise (that is, the covenant applied in any event).
28. Partners owe to all participants in a partnership not only a duty of loyalty but a
duty of the "utmost good faith and loyalty" and a "punctilio of an honor the most
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sensitive." In my opinion, the acts of SARMC and those who aided and abetted their
violations of fiduciary duty, including failures to act, represented an extreme deviation
from the standards of conduct partners owe in a partnership and appear to have been
conducted in a wilful and deliberate manner .
GIVEN this

.--or::-···
/6 day ofDecember, 2

0

County of Allegheny

)
)
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania )
Sworn to and subscribed before me on this '511-lday ·of December, 2006.

I

l

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Notarial Seal
~olin~ M. Deasy, Nolaly Public
City Of P~rgh, Allegheny County
My CommiSSion Expres Feb. 12, 2010 1

Membe,, PennsyfvanJs Association of Notaries
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· CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY. CERTIFY that on the {d day of December, 2006, a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
Warren E. Jones
EBERLE BERLIN
300 N. 6th Street, 2nd Floor
Post Office Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701
[Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants]

D

U.S. Mail

0

Facsimile (208) 344-8542
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

0

D

Rodney R. Saetrum
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
101 South Capitol Boulevard
Suite 1800
Boise, ID 83702
[Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants]

0 U.S.Mail
[].,.Facsimile (208) 336-0448
tJ Hand Delivery

JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER
509 West Hayes
Post Office Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
[Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants]

0

Patrick J. Miller
GrvENSPURSLEY,LLP
601 \V. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
[Attorneys for Plaintiff7Counter-Defendants]

0

0

Overnight Delivery

U.S. Mail
0/ucsimile (208) 336-9177
0 Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

D

U.S.Mail

~Facsimile (208) 388-1300

lLJ Hand Delivery

D

Overnight Delivery

G. Rey Reinhardt IV
Daniel J. Gordon
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From:

To:
Date:
Subject:

<allen.hahn@us.pwcglobal.com>
SARMC.PO-SARMC(SARABRAT}
Wed, Jan 5, 2000 2:40 PM
Engagement Documents

Altached are the documents requested by Cindy and Ken. The report on the IMI
joint venture Is draft; please have Cindy/Helen review and call w/any comments.
We will send a final copy after suggested edits are Incorporated. Also Is
"Scenario 5" which Ken requested based on our reading of the relevant
partnership documents. A FED EX will arrive tomorrow with draft copies of both
documents. Please call if either Ken or Cindy would like to discuss.
regards
(See attached file: Report_IMI_9_1_99_flnal.doc)(See attached file: Scenario
5.doc)
The Information transmitted Is intbnded only for the person or entity to which
It is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. Any
review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action
in reliance upon, this information by persons or entitles other than the
intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this In error, please
contact the sender and delete the material from any computer.

P-1029
SARMC08047
office of the CFO
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••

.f

DRAFf- FOR DISCUSSION

January 5, 2000
CONFIDENTIAL

Ms. Cindy Schamp
Chief Operating Officer
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
1055 North Curtis Road
Boise, Idaho 83706·1370
Subject:

Valuation of 50 Percent Interest in Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC

Dear Ms. Schamp:
At your request, we have estimated the fair market value of Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center's ("SARMC") 50 percent. interest in Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC (''IMI," or "the
Center"), a joint venture between S.ARJ.\1C and Saint Alphonsus Radiology Group ("SARG"), as
of September 1, 1999 (the ''valuation date") on a going-concern basis. We understand that the
purpose of this analysis is to assist SARi\fC's management in its decision concerning the
valuation of its ownership interest in connection with the formation of the Center. Our valuation
analysis may not be used for any other purpose nor distributed to any third parties without the
prior written consent ofPricewaterhouseCoopers LLP ("PwC" or "PricewaterhouseCoopers").
Based on the asswnptions and limiting conditions as described in this report, as well as the facts
and circumstances as presented to us by SA&\IIC's management for the valuation date, we
estimate SAIUviC's 50 percent interest in IMI to be approximately book value, or no greater than
S.ARl.viC's cash contribution of approximately;
$622,000

This report describes the principles, assumptions, and procedures that were applied in our
valuation analysis of the aforementioned equity interest. The findings stated in this analysis are
based on data· obtained directly from SAR.l'vfC's management and from sources of publicly
available information. In addition, certain inf01mation in our report is based on our interviews
with representatives of SARI.'viC. Management has advised us that they consider the data used to
be accurate, and that no information known to them conflicts with the data or resulting use of
such data in this analysis.
This letter and report should not be used, quoted or circulated in whole or in part for any other
purpose other than that stated above. The PricewaterhouseCoopers name may not be used or
referenced in connection with this letter and report in any public or private offerings including,
but not limited to, those filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission or other goveniment
agencies. In addition, our findings are subject to the Statement of Assumptions and Limiting
Conditions shown in Appendix I.
SARMC08048
Office of the CFO
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Confidential Draft

. Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC
In the course of our analysis, we perfonned the following:

•

Read the proposed Term Sheet for Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC;

•

Read the pending Operating Agreement for the Center and associated exhibits;

• Read IMI's pro forma fmancinl statements, including maximum, minim\tm and anticipated
profit scenarios;
•

Read the Capital Contributions and Debt Schedule of Intermotmtain Medical Imaging
Center;

•

Read the Market Value Appraisal Report of the real property in which Il\IH leases space; and

•

Considered the impact of current industry trends and developments on the fair market value
ofiMI.

Because the procedures we perfonned during this engagement were limited in scope and did not
constitute an attest service as that defmed by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, we cannot express an opinion on the financial, statistical or other data included in
our analysis or findings. Our valuation analysis in no way constitutes an opinion of fairness to
any shareholders or an opinion of solvency.
·
According to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the "Code") as amended, aU
valuations of the stock of closely held corporations or the stock of corporations where market
quotations are not available must be made in accordance with Revenue Ruling 59-60 for estate
and gift tax purposes.' Revenue Ruling 65-192, as superseded by Revenue Ruling 69-609, 19682 C.B. 327, extended the concepts in Revenue 59-60 to income and other tax purposes as well as
to business interests of any type. Closely held corporations are enterprises whose shares are
owned by a relatively limited number of stockholders.
Among other factors, this valuation analysis considers Revenue Ruling 59-60, which, while not
prescribing any formula for concluding on value, provides guidance on how to approach the
valuation of business interests. In accordance with this guidance, the following factors, among
others, have been considered to the extent applicable in our estimate of value for IM1:

1

A.

The U.S. economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of the
industry in which IMI operates, in particular;

B.

The nature of the business and history of tlle enterprise from its inception;

c.

The book value of IMI and the financial condition of the business including its
need for additional investment funds to realize its business objectives;

D.

The earnings capacity ofiMI;

E.

The dividend paying capacity of IMI;

Internal Revenue Service Ruling 59-60 1959-1 C.B. 237.

PricewaterhouscCoopers LLP

Page2

SARMC08049
Office of the CFO

Financial Advisory Services
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Confidential Draft

Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC

F.

Whether or not Lvfl has goodwill or possesses any other intangible value;

G.

Recent sales of the stock and the size of the block of stock to be valued;

H.

The market price of publicly traded stock of corporations engaged in industries or
lines of business similar to IMI.

For estimating the value of closely held corporations, Revenue Ruling 59w60 defines fair market
value as, " ... the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller when the former is not under any compulsion to buy and the latter is not under any
compulsion to sell, both parties having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts" 2• The
hypothetical buyer and seller are assumed to be able, as well as willing, to trade and to be well
informed about the property and concerning the market for such property.
Although SARMC's 50 percent interest in IMI is not a controlling interest, the rights provided do
afford the hospital some elements typically associated with control, According to the proposed
Tenn Sheet, the LLC will have, at least initially, two members, each holding a 50 percent interest
in the Center with equal representation on the Management Committee. Both entities have
contributed an equal amount of capital and wi11 share equally in the profits and losses of the
Center. Neither entity has been granted supennajority voting rights nor any other rights which
would result in one entity having more strategic control than does the other. Given these facts,
SARMC does have some ability to influence the Center's strategic decisions. We therefore
consider SARiVIC's interest to be a significant non-controlling interest rather than a minority
interest.
The selection of the appropriate premise of value is an important step in defining the appraisal
process. Typically, in controlling interest valuation assignments, the selection of the appropriate
premise of value is a function of the highest and best use of the collective assets of the subject
business enterprise. When appraising a minority interest, the correct premise of value should
reflect business as usual for the subject company. In the unique case of valuing a minority or
nonwcontrolling interest in a start-up company, the tremendous l.lllcertainty about the enterprise
magnifies the importance of choosing the appropriate premise of value; the value conclusions
reached Wlder alternative premises of value, for the same business, may be materially different.
For purposes of this analysis, we considered the fair market value of a SO percent interest in IMI
under the premises of value as a goingwconcern.
There are three basic approaches to the valuation of a minority interest in a closely held
company: (1) a "top down" approach where the total enterprise value is computed from direct
comparison with the values of controlling interest transactions of guideline businesses, which is
then reduced by a minority or non-controlling interest discol.lllt reflecting its Jack of control in
the total entity; (2) a direct comparison approach that estimates the enterprise value of the subject
company using values of minority interests in publicly traded guideline companies, which are
then adjusted for lack of marketability; and (3) a "bottom up" approach which estimates the
benefits the owners will realize over the life of the investment, considering the effects of lack of
marketability if no easily accessible market is available to provide liquidity for the investment.
2
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In arriving at our estimate of aggregate value of SAR.1vfC's 50 percent interest in IMI on a non. controlling interest basis, we have relied upon the "bottom up" approach. A "top down"
approach was considered but rejected due to the early-stage nature of the entity. A direct
comparison with publicly tt·aded guideline companies was not performed because of the life
cycle differences that exist between private ownership of an early stage company and ownership
of an established publicly traded company.
INDUSTRY CONDITION AND OUTLOOK3

The health care industry (SIC 80) consists of public, private and non-profit institutions. These
institutions include hospitals, offices and clinics of medical doctors, nursing homes, managed
care providers such as health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"), preferred provider
organizations ("PPOs''), independent practice associations, and other specialized health care
facilities. The industry is labor intensive, employing approximately 10 million people in 1996,
of whom more than 650,000 were physicians. National healthcare expenditures are expected to
total $1.3 trillion in 1999, of which $235 billion will be spent for physician services. For
purposes of tllis report, only the imaging segment of the industry was considered.
Many hospitals and other health care providers require access to diagnostic imaging services to
remain competitive in the health care marketplace. At the same time, regulatory and licensing
requirements in many states may limit access to imaging systems, while health care providers
may lack the financial resources or sufficient patient volume to justify the high expense
associated with the purchase of diagnostic imaging systems. Even if fmancial resources are
available, some health care providers prefer to contract the services for many reasons, including,
among others: to obtain the use of the system without any financial risk; to retain the ability to
switch system types and avoid technological risk; to avoid future uncertainty with regard to
reimbursement; to eliminate the need to recruit, train and manage qualified technologists; or to
provide additional imaging services when patient demand exceeds in-house capability.
The diagnostic imaging segment of the health care industry is highly competitive, with numerous
small facilities and a few large, diversified healthcare companies in each geographic market. In
addition to hospitals that provide on-site imaging services, other competitors include multi-center
imaging companies, local independent diagnostic centers, and imaging centers owned by local
physician groups.

In IMI's defined geographic market, Boise already has two major hospitals providing full service
imaging procedures: Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center and St. Luke's Regional Medical
Center. In addition, there are two other imaging centers: Open ~IRI of Boise, owned by a
publicly traded company, and HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hospital. In the state of Idaho, no
certificate of need ("CON") regulations exist with respect to imaging centers. Consequently,
other healthcare providers face few barriers to entry and may increase the competitive
environment in which the Center currently operates,
SARMC08051
Office of the CFO
3 Information is derived from Industrial ForeCil3t: l998-2000, Richard K. Miller & Associates, p. 351-354; Standard
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In general, there is a growing trend for healthcare services 011 an outpatient basis, fueled by
advances in technology, demands for cost~effective care, and concerns for patient comfort and
convenience. However, the healtheare industry in the U.S. is subject to regulation at the federal,
state and local levels. Regulations can affect companies' growth, require licenses and/or
facilities certification, and control the reimbursement to the health care provider for services
provided. Over recent years, as technology has improved and the population has aged, the scope
of imaging procedures provided has widened to include more patients covered by Medicare and
Medicaid. This has resulted in a small but growing percentage of imaging services revenue
being reimbursed by govenunent programs. Given the uncertainty surrounding govemment
reimbursement and regulation, the ability of health care providers to accurately predict their
financial performance becomes even more difficult.

NATURE AND IDSTORY OF INTER.i\>IOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING
General

Intennountain Medical Imaging was formed on September l, 1999 as an Idaho Limited Liability
Company by two members: St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, a local hospital, and Saint
Alphonsus Radiology Group, a physician's group, for the purpose of owning and operating an
Independent Imaging Center in Boise, Idaho. The Center provides medical imaging services in
the following areas: computed tomography C'CT"), ultrasound, manunography, and radiography,
as well as special procedures. In addition, the Center has a computed radiography and picture
archiving commWlication system (PACS) that is integrated with SARI\tfC's information systems.
IMI is located in a free·standing imaging center in downtown Boise, Idaho. TI1e Center leases
4,950 sq. ft. from Gem State Radiology and operates five days per week on a regular basis and
six days when necessary, a key factor in the delivery of imaging services.
Capitalization of L'\-Il as of September 1, 1999

The Center is a 50/50 joint venture LLC owned and operated by two members: SARI.v1C and
SARG, both located in Boise, Idaho. As a new business in the diagnostic imaging field,
significant capital requirements were necessary to begin operations. The invesbnent in
equipment for start-up operations totalled $3.5 million, while initial working capital
requirements to fund projected losses amounted to $550,000. The investment in equipment was
financed by a long-tetm loan, the conditions of which required a 20 percent down payment, or
approximately $700,000. In addition to this debt financing totalling approximately $2.8 million,
each member contributed an equal amount of capital in cash to fund working capital
requirements and the equipment loan down payment. Total equity of $1.2 million, combined
with the debt fmancing, brings the total invested capital of the Center to approximately $4.0
million.
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FINANCIAL REVIEW

Only a fOtward-Iookhlg financial review of IMI as of the valuation date is possible usmg the pro

forma fmancial statement scenarios contemplated by management. Due to the high level of
uncertainty surrounding the assumptions and resulting cash flows of the newly fonned Center, its
projections are not as meaningful as historical operating results of established businesses.
Financial projections of newly established businesses are typically highly uncertain due to
forecasting e11ors experienced when projecting staffing requirements, overhead costs, and
volume of services, among other variable expenses. Higher scan volumes allow the company to
benefit from the operating leverage due to a high fixed cost expense structure, resulting in
increased profitability. However, the opposite is true of lower scan volumes. As a consequence,
small changes in revenue can greatly affect profitability, leading to above average financial risk.
In addition, IMI has entered a highly competitive environment in which it competes with wellestablished imaging centers associated with existing physician referral networks. Thus, given the
operating and financial risk that IMI faces and the highly competitive market in which it
operates, the achievement of anticipated financial projections is highly uncertain as of the
valuation date.
Discussion of Opening Balance Sheet
IMI's opening balance sheet as of September l, 1999 is shown in Exhibit L As of the valuation
date, the Center had total assets of approximately $4.0 million; $3.5 million or 86 percent of
which was classified as fixed assets. Current assets consisted of cash in the amount of $550,000,
or 14 percent of total assets.
Total liabilities as of the valuation date were approximately $2.8 million, which represented the
equipment loan financing used to capitalize the business. In addition, a line of credit is available
to meet working capital needs, but had not yet been drawn upon as of the valuation date. The
long~tenn loan was collateralized by the underlying equipment, while the "line of credit would be
collateralized by accounts receivable if drawn upon. The high leverage results in substantial
financial risk for the Center, as evidenced by its high debt to equity ratio of 2.2: 1. Debt to total
invested capital ratio is 69 percent.

;_:

Net Asset Value
The Center's net asset value ("book value") as of the valuation date was approximately $1.2
million. As mentioned above, IMI is capitalized with equal cash contributions fi·om each of the
members as well as the equipment ftnancing, for a total of approximately $4.0 million. Because
the Center began operations on the valuation date, there was no impact from operations on
retained earnings, nor the net asset value of the Center.
In valuing established companies, book value does not necessarily represent going concern
value, as it is an accounting term, not an appraisal term. Financial statement assets are accounted
for at historical cost, less depreciation, while some assets may be completely written off for
fmancial reporting purposes. Intangible assets nonnally do not appear on the balance sheet
unless they were purchased or the actual cost of development is capitalized. Neither contingent
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assets nor contingent liabilities are generally recorded, and liabilities are usually :shown at face
value. Therefore, a company's contributed equity capital may not bear an identifiable
relationship to· going concern value for the business as a whole. 4 However, in the case of Hvfi,
which has no operating history and highly uncertain future earnings, book value is likely a
reasonable estimate of fair market value. As of the valuation date, IMI began operations. As
such, the assets have not been depreciated nor written down, there are no identifiable intangible
assets or contingent liabilities, and the liabilities' face value approximates fair market value. In a
start-up situation such as this, the net asset value of a company is equivalent to the contributed
equity capital, and is a reasonable estimation of the going concern value for the business as a
whole.
Intangible Assets and Goodwill
An intangible asset is a right or non-physical resource that is presumed to represent an advantage
to the finn in the marketplace. Such assets include copyrights, patents, leases, franchises, and
goodwill, as well as other assets. "Intangible asset<; are the elements, after working capital and
tangible assets, that make the business work and are often the primary contributors to the earning
power of the enterprise. The existence of intangible assets, including goodwill, is dependent on
the presence, or expectation, of eamings."5 Goodwill, as defined by Revenue Ruling 59-60, is
"the customer patronage of a business, name of the business, ownership of a trade name or brand
name, location of the business, and a renewal of successful operations over a prolonged period."
As the evidence of goodwill results from "the measurement of historical or expected earnings in
excess of the normal industry return on all other tangible and intangible assets," 6 ascribing
goodwill to a start-up business with no operating history and highly tmcertain future earnings is
not appropriate in this instance.
Prior Transactions
Revenue Ruling 59-60 lists any previous transactions of stock or recent sale of tb.e entity being
valued as a factor to be considered in arriving at an estimate of its fair market value. Based on
our discussions with management, no transactions in !Nil's common stock had occurred as of the
valuation date.
VALUATION
Introduction
A Market Approach establishes the value of a privately-held corporation through analysis of
transactions of guideline companies. The infonnation derived from this analysis is used to infer
an opinion of market value for the subject company. In an Income Approach, value is dependent
upon the present value of future economic benefits to be derived from ownership. A price per
~Shannon Pratt, Valuing a Business (Homewood: Dow-Jones Irvin, 1989) p.29.
s Smith, Gordon V. and Parr, Russell L., Valuation ofintellecn!al Property and Intangible Assets, Second Edition, p.
83.
SARMC08054
'Danzig, Lawrence H., and Robison, Robert A., The Tax Adviser, January 1980, p. 33.
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· share or interest.is then estimated by discounting the net cash flows available for distribution to
their present value at market-based rates of return. The Cost Approach focuses on the present; it
utilizes estimates of the current cost to replace the entity's fixed assets and certain intangible
assets.
A valuation analysis of a start-up comp~y typically differs from traditional approaches applied
to a more established enterprise. A start-up company has a very limited operating history and, as
such, historical trends and ratios cannot be used to develop financial forecasts. When financial
projections are available, the achievement of projected results is often highly uncertain and often
differs from actual results attained. Management of SARJ\.fC provided us with several financial
projection scenarios due to the uncertainty associated with the operations of the entity. For
example, there is no assurance that physicians will refer patients to IMI over other imaging
centers or hospitals in the area, a crucial factor in an imaging center's success. These limitations
and others make it difficult to apply an income approach to valuation, which depends on the
availability of reasonable and reliable management projections.
The application of a market comparable approach to valuation is also difficult. A start-up
company typically has negative earnings and cash flows, while its revenues may be growing very
quickly. Applying guideline company multiples from recent transactions would likely not yield
meaningful results. Moreover, publicly traded guideline companies often are much larger than
the subject start~up company and have achieved stable and somewhat more predictable growth
rates. The multiples paid by investors for established publicly traded companies reflect both an
expectation of lower risk and a different level of future growth, and therefore. may not be an
appropriate benchmark of value for a start-up company.
Asset Accumulation Approach

Based on our analysis and understanding that IMI began operations on the valuation date, an
asset based valuation approach is an appropriate method to estimate the fair market value of
SARMC's 50 percent interest in llvll. An Asset Accwnulation Method essentially restates a
company's balance sheet to fair market. values. This approach involves the identification and
valuation of otherwise unrecorded tangible and intangible assets, if any, as well as the
revaluation of the asset and liability accounts already recorded on the company's GAAP balance
sheet. The value of the individually appraised assets less the value of the individually appraised
liabilities represents an estimate of the value of the entity.
The advantage of applying an Asset Accumulation Method, in llvfi's case, stems from its lack of
operating history and w1certain future as of the valuation date. IMI's assets and liabilities,
therefore, had not yet been adjusted and hence, the balance sheet as of the date of formation of
the Centel' is a reasonable estimation of the fair market value of the equity of IMI as of the
valuation date, or approximately $622,000.
APPLICATION OF DISCOUNTS

$ARMC08055
office of the CFO
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discounts for lack of marketability or ownership interest transfer restrictions. As with most
closely held enterprises, the factors that may give rise to a discount for lack of marketability
include: a lack of willing buyers for the interest; an uncertain time horizon to complete a
potential sale; the cost of the sale or liquidation, as well as the risk as to the eventual form of
transaction proceeds; restriction on transferability of interest; and the intent of the owners with
regard to the investment. In the case of the Center, there is no public market for its equity as of
the valuation date, nor is a public market anticipated. Transfer of SARMC's ownership interest
is restricted according to the Term Sheet, as SARG maintains a right of first refusal on SAR..vlC's
intere.'lt. However, given the competitive nature of the industry and strong merger and
acquisition activity, it could be reasonably anticipated that liquidity does exit for a 50 percent
ownership interest in the Center as of the valuation date.
The subject of whether or not a discount for lack of marketability should be applied to a
controlling interest has been and is being debated among valuation experts. 7 In our view, lack of
marketability is less of an issue for a controlling interest than for a minority interest, primarily
since a controlling shareholder can effect the sale of a company, cause dividends to be paid, or
cause a repurchase of shares, all of which tends to compensate for lack of liquidity. However,
even controJling interests in private companies can be less readily marketable than public
companies. Reasons for this include difficulties in seJling private companies and the
unwillingness of private company owners to publicly auction their companies as is typically
required by public companies.
Although SAR.tvfC does not own a controlling interest in the Center, it does own a significant
interest. Its 50 percent interest allows it to greatly influence the strategic
decisions concerning IMI, including the ability to, among others, select management, establish
compensation and benefits, set corporate strategies, acquire or liquidate assets, and liquidate, sell
or recapitalize the Center. Therefore, SARMC's 50 percent ownership interest in the Center
possesses many of the characteristics of a controlling interest.

non~controlling

According to an article published in the Business Valuation Review, 8 Christopher Mercer
suggests that there are two potential costs, transaction costs and taxes, that should be considered
in the detennination of an appropriate lack or marketability discount. Mercer suggests that
transaction costs for smaller businesses can range from 10 percent or more, while for larger
businesses, transaction cost would be much smaller as a percentage of value. He also assumes
that ta.."<es will always be paid by the selling shareholders. Depending on the market
capitalization of the subject company, Mercer indicates that the appropriate lack of marketability
discount for a controlling, non-marketable interest ranges fi:om 3 to 20 percent.
As the estimated market capitalization for IMI is $4.0 million, Mercer's guideline would suggest
a lack of marketability discount in the range of 15 to 20 percent, assuming a controlling interest.
However, SARMC does not have the control necessary to cause strategic decisions to be made,
but does have control to suppress strategic decisions, all else being equal. While the
combination of factors present in IMI as of the valuation date suggest the application of
1

Mercer, Z. Cltrfstopher, "Should Marketabilif:'J Discounts be Applied to ControiJing Interests of Private
Companies," Business VafualionReview, June 1994.
SARMC08056
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discounts would likely be appropriate in this instance1 we have considered the purpose of the
valuation, the intent of the parties, and the operational versus investment interest in the Center.
Evidence suggests that if the parties anticipated selling their interests, we might expect a
discoWlt for lack of marketability. However, given their intent to hold their investment as an
operational investment with a community interest1 we have not taken a discount in arriving at our
conclusion.
SUN.IMARY A.l'lD CONCLUSION
As discussed above, we have estimated the fair market value of SA.Ri'vfC's 50 percent interest in
IMI as of September 1, 1999 using the Asset Accumulation Approach. We have re~ied on the
Asset Accumulation Approach due to the early stage nature of the business. In this instance, the
Center's net asset (book) value is a reasonable proxy for fair market value as the Center
commenced operations as of the valuation date. Thus, we have relied upon infonnation supplied
to us by SARMC concerning the Center's opening balance sheet and its net asset value in
arriving at our estimate of fair market value, prior to consideration for any discmmts for lack of
marketability. In light of the current industry conditions and the facts and circumstances
surroWlding SARlv!C's investment in the Center, we have not applied any discounts in this
instance.

Based on the analysis and considerations described in this report, we have estimated the fair
market value of SAR1\4C's SO percent interest in IMI on a non-controlling interest basis to be
approximately $622,000.
Should you require any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact Raina Dennison
at (617) 478-9504 1 Allen D. Hahn at (617) 478-9018 or David A. Spieler at (617) 478-5057 in
our Boston office.
Very truly yorus,

SARMC08057
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Opening Balance Sheet
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Exhibit I

Opening Balance Sheet Mas of September 1,1999

ASSETS
Cash

Fixed Assets
Total Assets

$550,000
$3,466,673

$4,016,673

LIABILITIES
Long Tenn Loan
Total Liabilities

$2,773,338
$2,773,338

SHAREHOLDERS'EQLITTY
CaQital Contributed
Total Equity

$1,243,334

Total Liabilities and Equity

$4,016,673

$1!243,334

SARMC08059
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Statement of Limiting Conditions

The following Statement of Limiting Conditions applies to valuation services perfonned by
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (''PwC").
Valuation reports may contain estimates of future financial performance) or optmons that
represent management's view of reasonable expectations at a particular point in time, but such
infonnation, estimates, or opinions are not offered as predictions or as assurances that a
particular level of income or profit will be achieved, that events will occur, or that a particular
price will be offered or accepted. Actual results achieved during the period covered by the
prospective financial analyses will vary from those described in our report, !Ul.d the variations
may be material.
PwC does not, as part of these services, perform an audit, review, or examination (as defined by
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) of any of the historical or prospective

financial information used, and therefore does not express any opinion with regard to same.
Our procedures did not include investigation of, and we assume no responsibility for, the titles

to, or any liens against lntennountain Imaging Center ("IMI" or "the Center''). Furthennore, we
assume there are no hidden or unexpected conditions that could affect the value of Jlv.IT and
accept no responsibility for discovering such conditions.
None of our partners or employees who worked on this engagement has any known fmancial
interest in the outcome of this valuation. Further, the compensation for this engagement is
neither based nor contingent on the value determined.
Neither the report nor any portions thereof (especially any conclusions as to value, the identity of
the appraisers or PwC, or any reference to recognized appraisal organizations or the designations
they confer) shall be disseminated to the public through public relations media, news media,
advertising media, sales media, any other public means of communication without the prior
written consent and approval of the appraisers and PwC. The date(s) of the valuation to which
the value estimate conclusions apply is set forth in the letter of transmittal and within the body of
the report. The value is based on the purchasing power of the United States dollar as of that date.

or

fn the absence of competent .technical advice to the contrary, it is assumed that L.vii is not
adversely affected by concealed hazards such as, but not limited to asbestos, hazardous or

contaminated substances, toxic waste, or radioactivity.
No opinion is rendered as to property title, which is assumed to be good and marketable. Unless
otherwise stated, no consideration is given to liens or encumbrances against the property.
Sketches, maps, photos, or other graphic aids included in appraisal reports are intended to assist
the reader in ready identification and visualization of the property, and are not intended for
technical purposes.
Ta.1: positions taken by St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center or IMI, which utilize the results
of our work, are the responsibility of the taxpayer.
SARMC08061
Office of the CFO
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Confident!Rl Draft for Discussion
Restructuring of l\IIRI Associates General Partnership
Scenario 5
SARMC withdraws from iYIRI Associates to provide flexibility to fonn potentially
competing ventures
Considerations

l)

The Partnership Agreemeltt restricts the ability of Hospital Partners to
withdl'aW from iltlRI Associates.. A Hospital Partner may withdraw at any
time if, in the Hospital Partner's reasonable judgement, continued
participation in MRI Associates:
• jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of the Hospital Partner;

2)

•

jeopardizes medicare/medicaid
participations;

•

if the business activities of lv!RI Associates are contrary to the ethical
principles of the Roman Catholic Church; or

•

is or may be in violation of any local, state or federal laws, rules or
regulations (Articles of Partnership, Section 6.1)

or

insurance

reimbursements

or

SAR.1vfC would be restricted for a period of one year after becoming a
Terminated Partner from engaging in any Competitive Activity (T11ird
Amendment to Articles ofPartnership, Sectio11 8.1)

3)

A favorable vote of all current members of the Board ofPartners can waive
the Partnership's rights with respect to any particular activity and Restricted
Party (Articles ofPartnership, Section 9.4)

4)

The appearance of shifting referrals may potentially result in legal
challenges from GP and LP interest holders, and investigations from State
and Federal authorities

5)

Unless otherwise agreed, SARMC would receive the balance of its .
Partner's capital account at the time of withdrawal (Articles. of Partnership,
Section 6.1)

6)

Withdrawal would not relieve SARMC from any contingent liability in
existence at the time of withdrawal (Articles of Part11ershfp, Section 6.3)

7)

SARivfC would retain limitedpartnership interests in Idaho and Mobile
SARMC08062 .
Office of 1he CFO
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Tl\fAStll\f VALU:'l RD.

Tho purpose of this ferteT is to documcnllhc cooperfltion between Saint Al_phonsus
Regional Medical Canter, MRl Associates and lntennountain Medioat Jmaging. Final
neiotiatioos are proceeding between SARMC, MRI and tMT on SAR.\4C o.nd MRI
ber.:oming part owners of the CT and Mrtl divisions respectively oftMI. Both SARMC

o.nd MRI reviewed and approved the JMl budget projections as part of this process,
A~t.~- 0 I fl•.l M·'''-" .

The agreement between SA~\!C and J}..U is an csti.mated 60 3ays ouy SAR};{C hny- ·
alceady mede n number of tangible investments ilno IMI, including lle tbllowins: f
" SARMC provided its C<~se volume, databosc, teclmical component charges, staffing
and supply costs, and other operational data for IMl cefe~ncc in developing the lMI

business plan.
•

Karen Noyes, assistalll director of the SAAA(C radiology dep11rtment, is joining lMI
8$

¢xecutive director.

SARMC programmers have illtt'rconnected the SARMC and tMJ computers to ihare
demographic ond case management data lretween SARMC and !Ml.
• SAR.MC has 1inke.d IMI to its intrane1 between the b.ospitaJ and its phy.sl~;ian network,
the Cli.nici~~n Desktop system.
• Subsequent to IMf C<lnCracting to pl.ICeha.se the OR Systems digital rad,iology sy$tem,
SAR.\1C d!scontiflu~d its negotiations with another vendor and also be.san wo1king
with DR System:~, so !hill SARMC t.nd IMI will be using the same typo Of systems.
This entails a system conversion and investment several hundred thousand dollars
for SARMC.

•

or

The Saint Alphonsus Radioloay Group physicians have for 25 years worked closely with
SA~C and contracted with SARMC to provide the professional medical ~ervices fur
the radiology department at SARMC. This c;onuact has j\1~ been extended five years. In
respect of the SARMC coopetation and int~nded oWilership position in IMl, the
radiologists declined on jointly developing an imagirtg eenter with the £daho Elks
Rehabilitation HOS.Pltal.
The agreement herween MRl and lMl is 60 or more day! ~ut. An Aptlllltscl is being
completed by Price Waterhouse, Boston. rn regard to lhc MRl affiliation with IMI. the
following ue noted:
• Members of the MRl Associates board have ~mmunicatcd !heir full support of the
MRI ownenhip in IMiand lMI ownership in MRl, and commiucd their votes in
favor ofthe cross ownership.
• MRI has offered for IMI to lease employees from its pool of 40 ellperienced MRf
technologists on a.n as needed basis.
• 1'bc mnnoging partner oflMT is on the board ofMRI A3sociates, and is highly
rc:garded by bolh groups.
• 1Mt and MRI share the same financial manager. Practice Management. Inc., and other
key

prof~s.s.ional ~esources.

1"he Saint Alphot\'SUS Radiology Cifoup physicians nave for many yean ptovtded the
professJonal mc~Ucal servicu for MP.J Cilses ill MRJ Limited, and continue lo do so.
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MINUTES
GROUP MEETING
SEPTEMBER 8, 1999

In attendance: Joe Gobel, David GHes, Paul Traughber, Vic Garabedian, Neil Davey, Ian Davey,
JeffSeabourn, John Knochel, Jeff Cliff, Paul DeWitt, Karen Noyes and Kathy Sharpe, ·secretary.
I

IMAGING CENTER UPDATE

A.

Karen presented a site update (see attaclunent). The exterior on the north side is
nearly complete and the signs should be ready on time. The interior finishing
work is progressing with approximately 90% of the artwork having been hung.

B.

The referring physicians need to be reminded that they need to sign the order form
in order to have the correct ICD-9 codes.

C.

When reading cases from the center, the case needs to be identified as to whether
it is an l1v11 case or not. The patient's date of birth is currently being used as the
medical record number. Karen requested that if a Radiologist takes an JMI case
back to the hospital, that they let someone at the front desk know so that the case
can be tracked.

D.

The problem with the MRl unit has been fixed. The RF shielding had a leak into
the fire alann RF filters. These have been sealed and everything is up and
running well and the images look great. Dr. Seaboum would like to have the
missed application· time restored due to the magnet being down. Karen will check
into this.

E.

Karen stated that the repaired Lumysis system as yet to be delivered. Current'~···
plain film~ cannot be taken without· this system. Karen will check to see if DR
has a Lumysis system with Dr loaded on it. Dr. Knochel motioned to forget the
Lumysis and install the AGFA CR that is in storage and call DR to see how
quickly they can supple a digitizer that is DR configured. Dr. Gobel seconded the
motion and the motion passed. Karen will follow·up with DR.

F.

Karen presented an Emergency Medication and Treatment Protocol handout for
review. Dr. Gobel stated that ACLS training can be done as a group in three
sessions. Drs. Knochel and Ian Davey are already trained and certified and will
cover the department during these training sessions. Dr. Gobel will set the first
session up for Wednesday, September 15, 1999.

G.

Karen cautioned the Group not to promise too much to referring physicians, as the
center will need to continue to meet the standards of practice and protocols. Dr.
Seaboum would like to see what screening questions other offices are currently
asking patients and see if this can be streamlined.
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E\'II MANAGEMENT
MINUTES

August l4, 2001
5:30p.m.
Pioneer Room

DATI~:

TTME:
PLACE:

PRESENT:
Jeff Cliff

Tim Hall, MD
JeffSeabourn, MD
Neil Davey, MD
Joe Gobel, MD
Karen Noyes
Ken Fry
Mike Ondracek

EXCUSED:

RECORDER:
Karen Noyes

Leslie Kelly Hall
Scott Christensen

L

ASSIGNiVENTS
Decision made that Dr. Seabourn would be the IMI Chair, and Ken Fry would

be the SAR.tv!C Vice Chair.
Jeff Cliff will be delegated responsibility ofiCR Chair. For Executive
sessions, the Chair will decide if Jeff Cliff should chair that portion of the
board meeting.
:\t.Jtion

II.

Motion made to modify the operating agreement to include four members
ns reprcsent:ltives from ICR and SARJ.'I'IC instead of three. Motion
approved unanimously.

PHYSICIAN REFERRAL PATTERN
See attached graphs on physician referral pattems and SARl'vlC/IMf split on

referring physicians.
Discussed information regarding SL Luke's opening an outpatient Imaging
Center with PACS system.

IMI West update with timcline of May 2002 opening. Cherry Lane target of
October 2002.

IMIRP/000886
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Ill.

CONTTU-J CT
In order to complete the operating agt·ecmetJt the hoard needs to execute a
Medical Director Agreement, and Service Level Agreement.

Mike Ondracek will provide Jeff Cliff with some examples of Medical
Director agreements for review by ICR.
Leslie Kelly~flall will prepare a service level agreement fat' review by the
board.

IV.

FEES & FINANCE

TMI is covering any negative cash balances in the non-MRI component with
cash from the MRI component. Board agreed unanimously to charge interest
monthly, at the same rate as our line-of-credit with U.S. Bank on the negative
cash balance.
Jeff Cliff presented the current financial statements:

Jeff Cliff reported that the Group bas been approved for t1nancing ofiMI
West. Dl'. Seabourn conveyed a message from US Bank Account VP that
things are looking good; ratio bct1chmarks are being surpassed when
looking at IM! as a whole.

PET Billing discussion
Owned by 1MI; parked at SAR.NlC.

Medicare in-patients must be billed under APC schedule.
\Vhen coach is at IMI West, must bill under the physician fee schedule.
Motion

Motio11 rnadc to have St. Als "lcnsc" PET from IMI and bill Medicare
patients under Al1 C schedule. Approved unanimously.
SUBCOMITTEE: Mike Ondracek, Ken Fry, and Jeff Cliff will work on
the conlract for the lease agreement, reimbursement, etc for Medicare.

V.

i"l-IARKETING
Dr. Neil Davey presented an overview of the history and development of
Itvii's marketing plan.
Background:
Marketing consultant hired.
Continued sponsorship of the Shakespeare Festival.
Focusing on non-MRI component
Medical education event- slated form October 6111 at Grove Hotel
August 13th- Dr. Ed Coleman- Dinner/lecture/educational event. PET
expert from Duke University will do Grand Rounds at SARMC.

Physician office visits to continue and upgraded for PET.
IMIRPI000887
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Weh Page- Vendor selection in progress. Go live date of October 2001.
Leslie offered many "tips" when working with marketing web site
vendors, etc. She has also offered lu:r assistance in whatever level IMI
would like. The mark.:ting committee will review RFP'~ from web page
vendors.
Have seen results in the growth of the non-IvfRI numbers in the last 18
months of marketing

VI.

OPERATIONS
Focus un DR and connectivity. Emphasize contribution of Information
Resources as a key component of our success. Need IR to be adeq1.mtely
staffed and funded to grow!
Concern with DR Communicator- Web Base product and not being
"live" after 18 months of operation at IMI. Leslie reports dark fiber is all
in place ($780,000 investment by SARMC) to IMI West, Cherry Lane,
and Caldwell for connectivity.
DR- Communicator Button
• Firewall completed
• Internet pipe increased by 70%
• Security verified
• Programming done
• DR is working to rc-architect port site to
allow connection to intemct!SAR.l'vfC.
Unknown completion date.
Outstanding DR Issue
• Mt1lti-entity connectivity - not available yet
by DR. Slated for November 2001. This
will allow viewer to mix all entities together
(SAR.Iv1C, IMI, MRICI) or to view
independently/:;eparately.
Laptops- DR
• Exist at about 20 sites now
• Having difliculty getting writ~en "feedback"
from physician offices, but good verbal
feedback
AC'ITON: Le.-.;lie to present a repot1 on the following at each meeting:
• Physician feedback- DR- response
• Report specific to IMI or calls, response time, etc
• DR communicator update from SAfuviC/DR

IMIRP/000888
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Vll.

PET Site
Cindy Schamp has met with the MRICI group and discussed om· use of the
current MRI Mobile pad at SAlt..\[ C. MRJ is okay wi:h sharing the use of
the pad.
ACTION: JeffCliffto contact Cindy Schamp to ask MRJCI ifiMr can
share the semi to pull our PET off the pad and park it in the R V parking
tot behind Liberty when they need to utilize the pad.

VIII.

NEXT iJ!lEETJNG

Adriana to organize an 1R committee to work on IMI

W~::sl

colUlectivity.

Meetings will be held once a month for the next six months at 6:00a.m. Jeff
Cliff to schedule next meetings.

IMIRP/000889
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MARKF.TING COMMITTEE
MINlJTI~S

DATE:
TIME:

PLACE:

November 28,2001
12:00 p.m.
Radiology Conference Room

PRESENT:
Neil Davey, MD
!an Davey, \r[O
Joe Gobel, MD
Jeff Cliff
Rachel Bergmann

I.

EXCUSED:
Tim Hall, MD
Karen Noyes
RF.COHDI<:R:

N:cohll.indauer

LUNG CANCER SCREENING
Kim Carley to contact Dr. Neil Davey regarding presentation on channel 2.

II.

IMI/SARMC MARKETING

Ken Fry is making arrangements to have one of SA.Ri'v[C's marketing
members present at 1\\-U Marketing meetings. The committee to look at
splitting IMI mar!<eting and SARtvfC marketing into two meetings.
Contim1e to keep lMI bmnd name in the public to bring in busine~s that we do
not currently have at SARMC. SARMC and IMI to work towards a combined
market share. IflMI is full, will transfer patients to SARMC and vise versa.

lll.

J?..EFERRAL NU.l4BERS
Rachel Bergmann broke out information on each of the events and how t!l.e
referral numbers looked prior to and after. See attached.
Shakespeare - Use a~ a fundraising venue for Shakespeare.
CME -- Did not change where physician~ sent their patients, will need to
reevaluate.

IV.

DR STRATEGIC PLANNING
Current PACS Committee consists of Rachel Bergmann, Karen Noyes, Chris
Hayden, Leslie Kelly-Hall, Mark Wenstrom, Scott Christensen, Terry

~~~:~·;:~::==:.:~~:=~~!:.~::.~~:~"~:·=, II!~!!;JJ
GSRRP/000661

1

004206

Confidential
Quarterly evaluations on volumes are compared to SARlvlC, IMI and MRJCI,
having each pay their share for the rollout.
Leslie Kelly-Hall working on getting more support staff to begin office
toltow-cp. Key to success is backup service and follow-up.
The Web Ambassador will not be available over the Internet. Will be usil:g
direct Ambassador software, which has a more secure connection. Already
have the Ambassador soilware, just need to distribute it. Holdup ls staff, and
may have pmble:ns with connectivity due to need for broadband.

Drs. Neil and lan Davey tc look at marketing to the Djernes Group in Nampa.
Rachel Bergmann to contact.

v.

'NEWSLETTER

Dr. Scales has made ~orne changes. After changes made, Rachel will bring
tl1e proof back to Dr. Neil Davey to sign off.

Vl.

WEBSITE
Rachel discussed the maintenance plan with Wirestone. Rachel wiil continue
to batch changes or additions tor Wirestone to maintain. The Radiologist'!
nt:t:d to ge! an image librar; set up, not only to include images off of each
modality, but logos, maps, picture of the buildings, etc. Changes to cccur
quarterly.
Wirestone may be able to put in tracking capability to see areas where the site
is getting the most hits.

Working on having the newsletter on archive.
Vll.

PET

Discussion of Dr. Sawyer pick:ng days for potients to be scmmcd. Drs. Neil
a.nJ Jan Davey to revisit Dr. Sn...,yer.
Drs. Neil and Ian Davey and Rachel to meet with Pulmonologists.
only getting referrals from Dr. Crowley.

Cun~ently

Blue shield, not participating in the reading (professional component). Worth
accepting what's allowable ti·om Rlue Shield on the PC lo belp generate
business Olt the TC. Jetl:'Cliffto discuss with PMI.
Requisitions coming steadily. With recurrent brenst cancer and tracking of
treatment, numbers should increase.

Approve~

Da~c:

~~

GSRRP/000662

2

004207

Confidential

CMI:
36 Physician .1nd Mealcal ;>rovlder$ attended
··A~erage

monthly re~erral of t521or the 3 mcnths pier to the CME

"11-1 referrals noted for tl-.e Month of October, will con~nue to '11onitcr for !he ne~lccuple olmontlls.

Sllakespeare
27 Physicans and Medfca! Providers RSVPd

''Average montlll't raferral ol243 lor lhe 3 months pior to Shakespeare
''Average monthtt teferral of 214lor tile 3 months after Augllllt 4tll

DR
Communicator
26 Physoc'ans and Medical Provide!$ have ;ccess to Communicator since September
"Average :nond•ly referral of 134 for the 8 110nlhs prior to Communicator ceing available
"Average monthly referral of 110 a month :or U,a 'ast 2 months after Communicator has been avaiable, wll continue to maei!or

C')mmunicator~1ot

7 Physid.,ns h.'M! both the Communlca!Cr and Wlre:ess !aptops available to them

"Average monlhly re:erral of 49 for U1e 2 months prior to pilot lostaiJ
"Averege monthly referral of 35 for the month after the p'lot inslall
"Average monlhly refe11al of 33 after the Comm•nicator was avallalte
Wireless 0 Jol

68 Phys'd"ns and Medical Providers ha•Je access to a Wlteless Laptop
"Average monlllly re!e!l'al of 526 for the 2 months pr!cr to ~e pdl.lt insta•ls
"Average monthly referral of 57S
the 7 months after the pfct i~stalls

ror

GSRRPIC00663

3

004208

Confidential

lMI

:\olARKI~TING CO~L"\UTTEE

REPORT

NOVEMBER 2001
CURRENT PROJECTS:

NEWSLE'lTER :
January distribution
Lead articles -lMI West, Women's imaging
IMI West -Architectural illustration
-Floor plan
-Site photo
Won:en's imaging- role ofMRl in cervical cancer
Biographies of the three new IMl Radiologists
Draft of second edition to authors
WEBSITE:
Now online- www.idahoxray.com or www.aboutimi.com
Updated quarterly

CME:
Currently twenty video recordings distributed (10 to physicians)

FUTURE PROJECTS :

I:NU WEST:

Ongoing marketh1g efforts- Newsletter and website
New marketing efforts- MD to MD office visits (Meridinn zip codes)
- Press: NevJSpaper, TV, Radio (NPR}
- Open house
IDAHO SHAKESPEARE FESTlV AL :
Host the opening night of sponsored play
Six: tickets per play- distributed lo staff

GSRRP/000664
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Octcber 4,1999
VICKEN GARABEDIAN, MD
1055 N CURTIS RD
BOISE,ID837C6-1352

QUfPATlfNt
RADIOlOGY tfllllfl

RE: Opening of Intermountain Medical Imaging Outpa!lant Radiology

Center
Dear Dr. GARABEDIAN
We are proud to announce the opening of Intermountain Medical Imaging.
This brand new state-oHhe-art facility is the first full service outpatient
radio!cgy center in the Treasure Valley. As a physician group, we have
always been committed to providing high quality service to our valued
clinical colleagues. Additionally, we also pride ourselves in staying on !he
technological cutting edge of diagnostic imB!Jing. In that tradition, we are
making a paradigm shift away from our current film-based system to a
filrnless image management system. We will be using computers to
display, archive, transmii, and restore images at our facUlty. This precess
will include all digital imaging modalities: MRI, CT, US, standard x-rays,
Ruoroscopy, and special procedures. Mammography will continue to uHiize
a film-based medium for the foreseeable future.

BOARD CERTifiED
RI\DlOlOCISTS

RitBioo R ~~silo. ).(.O.
!•n C. Da>ey, M.D.

/loll C.

Da~<~t.

M.O,

'l•c< Garalltdian,MJl.

This change will have several benefits for you and your patients:

David Giles, -.uJ.

> Lost records will be eliminated-all images wiU be permanenb'y
archived in a digital format on CD ROM or DVD discs.

ll iue;h Gebel. \1.0.

J.T. Hall. M.D.
Jo~• ll.

Kro<'"'· ~to.

'lli!tiom t

~lunay,

>Images and reports will be available more promptly.

\1.0.

ni•ne R. Htwlon. M0.

Jofftey T. Se>bourn. M.D.
1J1a M. Sclltl, M.D

> Access to subspedalty Radiologists will be improved.

DIRECTOR Of
MEDICAl ftdAGINO
Cote II 1\uy.,., B.S. R.I.

> A paper image •montage'' of the Radiologist's key selected
images will be mailed with a final typewritten report sized for your
patients' charts.

l~liCII

> When fully implemented, you will be able to access irna~;es ar.d
audio report summaries via computer at remote locations such as
the O.R. or in your office. We w~l be scheduling office visits to
evaluate your current computer infrastructure so that we may
determine !he most affective way to transmit data to you.

> Hazardous waste associated with traditional film and chemicals
will be eliminated.

~n WEST \1YRTH STREH (COA~En Of 9llt MID MYRTUI

BOISE. IDAHO B3l0l 333·9119 nll-XRAYI TOll fREE IH ID·IHO ·17·331·1729 WVA'I.IOAIIO~MY.C·JM
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During the upcoming implementation, our staff will be !rained to use this
new system. Although we are working diligently to ensure a smooth
transition, we anticipate some growing pains. Our goal Is to improve upon
your current level of service. So, please let us know immediately If you are
inconvenienced in any way.

OUT!'ATIEIIT
RADIOlOGY CUITB

M•gnelic Rtstna<te
Conphte.\ for1111"~trt

Many physicians are accustomed to receiving copies of film to review In
their offices. Our long-term goal is to eliminate film completely, but we will
maintain the capability to prcduce film copies of exams as well. We would
appreciate you trying our new system which, when fully Implemented, will
improve access to images and reports.

r/a5(;1Jiu/tr.reneortonal

You may review Imaging studies performed at Intermountain Medical
Imaging from an Ambassador computer monitor in the St. Alphonsus file
room. The simple program takes less than five minutes to learn. We are
available to provide orientation at your convenience.

BOARD CERTIR£0
AAOIOlOGISTS
Riwda R. Abell>, \1.0.

Enclosed please find an informaticnal brochure on our facility as well as an
order pad. If you are unfamiliar with our group of Radiologists cr are
Interested In more detailed Information, we invite you to visit our website at:
WWH .ldahoxray.corn.

Ned C. D..,y,M.O.

We invite your feedback and open discussion. We look forward to seNing
your medical imaging needs.
Warm regards,

011ld Giles. M.D.
R. Joseph Got-. I, .\l.tl.

J.T. Ha11,1J.O.

Your Colleagues at lntennountain Medical Imaging

Jolla a. .<nxhil. M.D.
'NilliJB T. \luuay. M.O.
t)ione R, Na-~1011, M.G.

J•ffrey T. S••IJ•u•n. M.D.
Usa L!. Scaftl.. M.O.

DIRECTOR OE
MEOICAliMAOIIIG

911 'NEST

~WAllE

SfREET (f.OHHER OF nl o\IW M'IRilfl BGISL IOAI<O H102 3:J3·91231333·:<nAYJ lOll fR(E IN tOAIIO GJ7.3J3·9129 '1/WWIOAttO:<MY.f.OM
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January 4, 2000

Sand1 a Bruce
President and CEO
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.
I 055 N. Curtis Road
Boise. idaho 83 706
Dear 3andra,
Dr. Curran and 1 have reviewed with the other members of Doctors Corp our
impr< ssions of the meeting we attended with you and the radiologists on December 16. 1999.
This letter is intended to communicate our feelings on thal meeting subsequent to discussions
within Doctors Corp.

It is the opinion of Doctor's Corp that a win-win, coop.:rative solution to the
probl :m must be found and will require the strong use of your influence as CEO ofSARMC.
Most oflhe demands oflhe radiologists could he accomplished over t;me. The following general
fonn: t could be made to work.
I.

Three General Partnership positions could be rr.ade available for SARMC.
MRI Associates or the hospital partners lo purchase. These could be held
or resold to the radiologists. Two General Partnership positions would
come from Drs. Giles and Henson and. the third would be newly created.

2.

Dt·s. Curran, Havlina, and Prochaska are not cutTently willing sellers but
would listen lo offers. They have all agreed co~1ceptually to create an
agreement whereby they would be bought out at specific times according
to some mutually agreeable evaluation mechan,sm(s) or fonnula(s). The
Hospitals might have to establish rights of refusal and possibly commit
some of these to the radiologists.

3.

The suggestion by the radiologists to split the two companies is not
considered appropriate or desirable at this time ll would have to be
acceptable to all the hospital partners and the n·.ajority of Doctors Corp.

The concerns expressed at the meeting regarding the problems of not having a
seam ess department would be present regardless of who the owners l1re. Any solutions available
to tht radiologists as one of multiple partners could be incorporated under the present ownership.
Any talid concerns need to be addressed immediately and are independent of ownership.

SARMC00640
OFFICE OF THE CFO

1

004214

Sand·a Bruce
January 4, 2000
Page 2

The time hus c{)Jne for SARMC Lo insist on and provide full, supportive

radiologic coverage of the lab at historical levels of professionalism and service. These standards
are c ear nationally and in the SAR.1v1C radiology department. Along with the prolessional
inteq•retation and supervision of the lab comes the obligation to notify the lab/hospital of all
de fie encies and safety concerns and lo make professional recommendations as to departmental
need:, including new equipment and upgrades required to maintain the state of the art. This
cmnr 1itment is integral to all radiology professional contracts including the SAIUviC main
depal tment. It cannot be allowed to be withdrawn simply because the:· radiologists of the lab are
now .tlso its competitors. The highest standard of care for patienls is ~ssential and includes
havir g radiologists on site to supervise studies as needed. We now view as a necessity
SAR viC's providing the lab with full, supportive, traditional radiologist coveruge or pem1itting
lhe tv RJ Center of Idaho to contract directly with radiologists as a fidJciary responsibility of
SAR>A.C to its other general and limited partners. We also see it as our responsibility to point
this cut.
The MlU partnership has been a model of cooperative networking among multiple
hospitals and physicians. This has been accomplished by treating entities fairly and by
committing to a win-win approach to networking and problem resolution. The cun·ent position
oftht SARMC contract radiologists creates a real challenge to continuing this tradrtion. It is not
too late to create a mutuaJJy workable and beneficial solution. The MRl Center ofldaho has
estab ished an exemplary and extraordinary, patient-oriented service whose commitment to
excel el1ce has spread to the mobile operation and has benefited quality patient care throughout
the N JJ1hwest. SAR.i\1C made the decision lo provide MRI services f:lrough the mechanism of
this p1rtnership. Your support for the commitments ofSAR.tvlC to this partnership will be
clear! 'I needed to resolve the current impasse.
Sincerely,

"2?0 ·:'?. ~~
/:?2
.

--.://.....-,~--;~~

{

James Prochaska, M.D., for Doctors Corp

SARMC00641
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carolyn C<>lfman, M.D.

CurtiS H. Coulam, M.D.

August 7, 2002

tan c. Davey, M.D.

To: MRJ Center of Idaho Scheduling Department, Radiology Scheduling Department
From: Radiologist~

Nell

c. Davey, ~1.0.

Vlck Garabedian, M.D.

R. Joseph Gobel, M.D.

p:Jiall,M.O.

John Q. Knochel, M.D.

William T. Murcay, M.D.

!lalla• o. Peck, M.D.

Mld~aelf.

Ryan. M.l),

Re: Scheduling.
There has been a "mission creep" with respect to the scheduling of cases requiring the
administration of intravenous contrast material, and the scheduling of 'after-hours monitored
cases'. In addition, critically ill St Alphonsus house patient~ are often being examined during
the late night hours.
We are concerned witb this process, and want to reiterate that it cannot be assumed that we are
'immediately available' for care in the case of a contrast reaction, or to provide physician
monitoring, for the complicated patients being electively screened after· hours. We are as!ting
that all contrast cases after hours be restricted to 'emergent basis' only. House cases requiringnursing cat·e, and physician monitoring be performed during normal working hours. Add on
elective cases requiring physician input should appropriately be scheduled at times that we can
realistically be expected to be available. (Monday to Friday, 0700-1900). All cases thai fall
outside of this time frame, (other than routine, non-monitored case~). need to be specifically
approved by the On-call Radiologist as an emergent add-on.
Thank you for your time and consideration in this matter.
We will expect implementation of this policy by 8/1912002.

[cffrcy t Seabourn, M.D.

Sincerely,

Usa M. Scates. M.D.

Paul Traughber, M.D.

,G:;
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MRI of Idaho Special Meeting
Date:

September 8, 2003

Present:

Roger Curran, M.D. Chairman
Thomas Henson, M.D.
James Prochaska, M.D
Sandra Bruce, CEO SAR.MC

Ken Fry, CFO, SARL\IIC
Mark Dalley, CEO Holy Rosary Med. Ctr.
Mark Adams, CEO, West Valley Medical Center, Caldwell.
Joseph Messmer, CEO Mercy Medical Center
Randy Hudspeth, Dir. Professional Practice SARlviC
Rick Presnell, Chief Accounting Officer, SARivfC
Jack Floyd, CEO MRICIIMRI Mobile
Dr. Scott Henson

Guests:

Michael Cacchillo, Dir, Bus. Dev. lvlRICI/1\-fRIM
Kevin West, Gen. Counsel MRICI
Patrick Miller, SARMC Counsel
Stephanie Westermeier, SARMC Counsel

Absent:

David Giles, M.D. Medical Director
Jack Havlina, M.D
Andrew Fitzgerald, CFO Holy Rosary Med.Ctr

Recording:

Michael Cacch.illo
Chairman, Roger CUiian opened the special session at 5:09pm,
welcoming Sandra Bruce, Ken Fry and the SARMC Counsels as
well as Kevin West, tviRI Gen. Counsel to the meeting.. With the
Radiology agreement discussion as the primary item, Dr. Curran
recognized Sandra Bruce and asked that she share the St.
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center perspective on the proposed
agreement and her positions, insights etc. Sandra produced a single
page agenda (see enclosed document) aimed at addressing the
current MRI Service Agreement and a discussion of the Long
Tetm Relationship Issues. Stle then gave an overview of services
provided by the t•adiologists to St. Alphonsus. Ms. Bruce
acknowledged the Radiologists time cutback to 12 hours per day,
(5} five days per week with emergency coverage. The board
brought up the fact that the proposed agreement was for hospital
inpatients and hospital outpatients and the Radiologists were not
doi~g off-hour coverage. This meant that 85% of the volume of
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MRlCI was not being addressed directly. Additionally, after homs
Radiologi<>ts were not always receptive to handling emergencies.
Ms. Bruce requested data with patient names and days of
occwTences to allow her to address the rads with the issues.
The board indicated that information was being disseminated that
would have local physicians believe that Gem State Radiology/I~U
owned the DR system and could dictate exclusivity of what goes
on the system and who readc; scans. fvfs. Bruce said she was
unaware of the issues and suggested that a committee be fanned of
representatives from both St. Al's and MRICI to address the issues.
Initial names from St. Al's would be Ken Fry, Carolyn Corbett, Pat
Miller and one person from !T. These individuals would be joined
by individuals representing MRl of Idaho.
A discussion ensued on the relationship of the Radiologists,
techuologists and misinformation that was being propagated in the
Treasure Valley. (Jack Floyd or Board) sited five items of concem:
l. General review of protocols by Rads as the technology has
moved forward but the Radiologists haven't reviewed
capabilities and protocols with the technologists to update
2. Mentoring of the technologists with feedback from the
Radiologists no longer happens, especially to address concerns
by referring physicians
3. The Radiologists periodically express quality concems
regarding MRlCI systems and coils, but do not document them
for follow-up. In one case, rvrru invited and secured a visit by a
GE Vice President to address the purported issues but no one
from GSR came to meet with him
4. Statements of ~1RICI software being antiquated in light of
purchase and installation of the latest Excite and Quantum
software systems have not been dispelled
5. Alleged technology of httRICI Systems not compatible with
DR because of inadequate software configuration

Sandra suggested that the issues sited actually lead to the second
item on the agenda, that of on-going Long-term relationship issues.
She stated that she felt the Relationship of MRI of Idaho and St.
Alphonsus no longer worked. She saw the future as an integration
effott with her medical staff and physician ownership the direction
that St. Al's was heading. She felt that the best resolution would be
a St. Al's buy-out of the !viRI ofldaho business. At this statement,
Sandra produced a document (see enclosure) that she had put
together indicating a suggested timeline for the buyback
negotiation and valuation process and stated if the transaction did
not occur in a timely fashion that one of St. Al's options under the
current agreement would be withdrawal from the partnership. She
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stated that Ken Fry would lead the negotiations for St. Alphonsus
and asked that someone from ~1RI of Idaho be appointed to
represent itself. It was mutually agreed that the Board needed to
caucus to review the proposal and to select a team to represent the
Center. The special session was brought to a close at 5:39pm and
followed immediately by an abbreviated September Board
:\leeting. See September Board Meeting Minutes.

Jack Floyd, CEO

MRICUMRI Mobile
J. Roger Cun·an, M.D. Chairman,
.MRICIJMRI Mobile
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ATTENDEES:

Andy Fitzgerald; David Giles, MD; Jack Floyd; Jack Havlina, MD; James Prochaska, MD; Joe Messmer,
Mark Adams; Mark Dalley; Mike Cacchillo; Roger Cu.rran. MD; S. Henson, :MD; Thomas Henson, MD;
Randy Hudspeth; Richard Presnell,

GUESTS:

Kevin West, Patrick Miller, Stephanie Westcrmeier, Ken Fry, Sandra Bruce

_xiAt.~n.~·ful~,~~,:~:/'_: \, ·:",;..?;_; ~rJ~~--·4fr":s: ~ __ . :ar 'i~cil :{-//? !~~l;o~j!~:~ \/.-~;;::\: -.,~-;:~,1. MRl Service Agreement

10 Minutes

2. Long Term Relationship Issues

45 Minutes I NlA

N/A

Discussion

Appoint negotiation team to
resolve issues and set timeline for
resolution.

Discussion I Agreement on next steps.
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MRI of Idaho Special Meeting
September 8, 2003
5:00p.m. to 7:00p.m.
Sister Patricia Room

EXHIBITK

EXHIBITK
004223

From:
Scott Christensen
To:
BCC; CT; f(ont Office; Gen Rad Techs; Nuc Med Group; Nurses; Rad Admin; Rad
Asslistants; Specials; Ultrasound
Date:
12/12/05 8:44AM
Subject:
Fwd: New MRI Service

FYI
Scott E. Christensen B.S., R.T.(R)
Manager, Radiology and Medical Imaging
Saint Alphonsus R.M.C.
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208)-367-6546
FAX:
(208)-367-2989
e-mail: scotchri@SARMC.org

»>Ben Murray 12/11/05 07:48AM»>
Please see the attached memo and post for all staff -on the new Saint Alphonsus MRI service that begins
on Monday, December 19th. More information wfll be distributed thru the next week.
Also review an earlier email on fnservice programs related t the new monitors and pumps we have
purchased for use In the new MRI.

Ben Murray, RN

Director or Nursing
367-6234 (Office)
855-6908 (Beeper}

~-111!1!~11!1!1!!~~-~
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<@>Saint Alphonsus

To:
From:
Re:
Date:

I

INTER

0

FFICE MEMoRANDUM

Nurse Managers; All Nursing Staff
Ben Murray, RN. MSN. Director of Nursing
New MRI Operations Update
December 11, 2005

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
As many of you are already awareili a new MRI service is beginning operations on
campus on Monday December 19 . As of that date, Saint Alphonsus MRI will
be the sole provider of MRI services for all Saint Alphonsus Inpatient,
outpatient and ED patients. The Mobile MRI will be located at door 86 near
Endoscopy and Preadmission testing. A permanent MRI site Is being constructed
off the old mafn lobby, by the former cashiers office, and is expected to be
completed In the Fall of 2006. The same fundamental procedures that have
always been followed when utilizing MRI services wfll continue. There are a
number of key points that are important for all staff to be aware of:
1) MRI of Idaho will remain on campus as they have a long term lease on their
current space. They will continue to serve non Alphonsus outpatients, but as
of December 191", they will no longer provide services to Saint
Alphonsus connected patients.
2) Gem State Radiology will continue to be responsible for the interpretation of
all MRI studies and Saint Alphonsus will partner with Intermountain Medical
Imaging in operating the new MRI service.
3) To contact the Mobile MRI regarding ED and inpatients, staff should call3340
(as of December 19th). Further information about scheduling and contacting
the Mobile MRI will be prominently posted in all areas in the next few days.
When you enter STARS to process orders, the option that appears will be
Saint Alphonsus MRI.
4) Equipment - MRI compatible wheelchairs and gurneys have been purchased
and will be used for transporting patients. We also have MRI compatible
monitors and pumps - see related email of today re. education about the new
equipment.
5) Code Response -The Mobile unit is equipped with an emergency code
response button. If there is a code in the Mobile unit, the code team will
respond as usual. The Switchboard will overhead page - "Code Blue, Saint
Alphonsus MRI, Door S6". At this time we will continue to provide code
response for patients In the MRI of Idaho suite. If the switchboard pages a
"Code Blue- MRI Center of Idaho", the code response team should
respond as they always have. All ED and critical care nursing staff will be
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able to access the MRI unit using their hospitaiiD; proximity to the magnet
will not harm the 10 badge.
6) Transport ~As per usual, monitored patients will be accompanied by a nurse,
who will remain with the patient throughout the procedure. Pediatric patients
will be accompanied under the standard terms of security for pediatric
patients. If there are any delays at the point of service for critical care
patients, they can be housed In the Ambulatory Surgery Center until final
clearance to enter the MRI unit has been obtained.
7) Anesthesia - During the occasional anesthesia procedures that take
place in MRI, a Saint Alphonsus nurse will accompany and remain with
the patient throughout the procedure. This can be the critical care or ED
nurse who is always present anyway, the Radiology staff nurses or other
nurses who have been trained In conscious sedation support. MRI staff will
coordinate with the unit and the clinical coordinators to arrange the necessary
and appropriate nursing support for non critical care patients.
8) Facility- The Mobile MRI will have a sheltered canopy/ walkway, with
heat and lights, so that patients do not have to go "outside" to enter the unit.
The side of the Mobile has a garage door type opening and a lift to bring
wheelchair and gurney bound patients Into the control room.
9) Safety- The same basic safety issues apply, as always, when In proximity to
the magnet unit Including: staff do not enter the magnet room Itself unless
they have specific clearance from the tech on duty; everyone needs to be
mindful of metal objects such a name tag clips, pens, coins and so on; staff
should make the MRI techs aware of your own history of pacemaker
presence and other Issues of possible embedded metal; follow all
Instructions of the tech In regards to safety concerns (see MRI policy
online). Further inservice education opportunities will be announced soon.
10) Outpatients- All Saint Alphonsus MRI outpatients will be directed to enter
thru door S2. They will sign in at Registration and be escorted or directed to
the Radiology reception desk. Please assist any visitor who may be searching
for either Saint Afphonsus MRI or the MRI of Idaho office.
11 )More information will be forwarded to managers and staff in coming
days - please make sure al such announcements are posted In the units for
all staff to see.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability pmtnership,
Defendant-Respondent

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership, on its
own behalf, and on behalf ofMRI Limited, an Idaho limited
pmtnership, and MRI Mobile Limited, an Idaho limited partnership,
CounterClaimant-Respondent
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Supreme Court
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CounterDefendants-Appellants
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Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin, District ,Judge, Presiding
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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
(collectively "SARMC") have appealed an award of$36.3 million. On August 31,2007, an Ada
1

County jury found SARMC liable to its former partner, MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), for
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of its
partnership agreement, wrongful dissociation, tortious inference, and conspiracy. The facts
established at trial are as follows:

A. SARMC's Interest in MRI as a New Technology
In 1980, the neuroscience physicians at SARMC began investigating magnetic resonance
imaging ("MRI") technology as the next state-of-the-art imaging modality. (Trial Ex. 4022.)
They determined that MRI technology was essential for SARMC to remain the preeminent
neuroscience center in Idaho. By 1984, SARMC formed a general partnership (MRIA) with five
physicians (later known as "DMR"), Mercy Medical Center in Nampa and Caldwell Memorial
Hospital (n/k/a West Valley Regional Medical Center) to develop a jointly owned and operated
MRI center located on SARMC's campus. (/d.) (Trial Exs. 4022 & 4023; TR Vol. II at 110 I: 191105:10.)

B. MRIA's Formation, Fundraising and Governance.
To initially fund MRIA's business and purchase the necessary equipment, the partners created
1

References to MRIA also include MRI Limited Partnership aka MRI Center of Idaho
("MRICI") and MRI Mobile ("MRIM"). For the Court's reference, a "Cast of Characters" has
been attached as Exhibit A to the Appendix.
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MRI Limited Partnership which offered limited partnership interests in the business. (TR Vol. II
at 1108:11-1110:22.) MRIA, the general partner ofMRI Limited Partnership, had overall
responsibility for running the business, known as MRI Center ofldaho ("MRICI"). 2 (Trial Ex.
4024 at§ 4.1; TR Vol. II at 1108:24-1 I 09:5.) MRICI acquired a MRI scanner which was placed
on SARMC's campus and began operations. (TR Vol. II at 1325:21-1326:11.)
MRIA created a Board of Partners which directed the affairs of MRICI. (TR Vol. II at
1315:21-1316: 12.) Each hospital partner and each partner physician in DMR was a voting
member of the board. Board meetings were held monthly, typically chaired by SARMC's CEO.

(!d. at 1122:21-1123:25;1345:19-23.)
MRICI was viewed by the medical community, and treated by SARMC, as part of SARMC's
radiology department. (ld at 1418:7-11; 2420:1-4) MRICI's business benefitted from this
association. ;'It's always good to be ... part of a flagship like St. Al's. We were known as the
MRI at St. Al's. Being backed by some huge corporation was extremely valuable [for
marketing] ... in the field and with the referring physicians." (Jd. at 2420:11-16.) SARMCemployed physicians and physicians with privileges at SARMC referred patients to MRICI
because of its affiliation with SARMC. (Id. at 1517: 12-19.)

C. The Partnership Agreement Limited Withdrawal and Competition.
Article 6 of the MRIA Partnership Agreement provides the "Conditions for Withdrawal" by a
hospital partner. That section expressly limits a hospital partner's ability to withdraw from
2

MRIA later became general partner of a mobile MRI scanning business, MRIM. (Trial Ex.
4028.)
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MRIA, without breaching the agreement, to four narrow circumstances. (Trial Ex. 4023 at§ 6.1.)
Article 9 of the agreement prohibits partners and "affiliates" from engaging in competing
"business activities" within 100 miles of MRICI. Waiver of this non-compete provision requires
a unanimous vote of the Board. (Trial Ex. 4023 at § 9.4.)

D. The Delivery of MRI Services
MRI services involve two components:
• The "technical component," which includes MRI scanning equipment, technicians
who run the equipment, and the creation of the images. MRICI provided the technical
component of the service; and,
• The "professional component," which involves setting the "protocols" for the scan and
reading of the image. This component is provided by radiologists who diagnose
disease through interpretation of the MRI image.
(TR Vol. II at 1128:7-1136:9.) In practice, physicians with patients requiring radiologic
evaluation contact a radiologist to determine whether MRI will assist in diagnosing a disease.
(!d. at 1128:24-1129:9.) If an MRI is needed, the physician "refers" the patient to an MRI

center for imaging. After the images are created, the radiologist reads the image and reports his
findings to the referring physician. Thus, the referring physician's point of contact is the
radiologist. (TR Vol. III at 3618:14-3619:15.)
From MRIA's formation, SARMC designated St. Alphonsus Radiology Group ("SARG" n/k/a
Gem State Radiology and hereinafter "GSR" or the "radiologists") as the exclusive reader of
radiologic images on SARMC's campus. (TR Vol. II, at 2308:14-2309:7.) GSR and MRIA
worked together in a collegial and cooperative manner (TR Vol. II at 1110:23-1111 : 12; 23 83: 1625; 3165: 14-24) until 1998, when GSR initiated plans to build its own imaging center in Boise
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(known as Intermountain Medical Imaging ("IMI'')), which would compete with MRIA. The
present dispute arises out ofSARMC's decision to advance, support and partner with GSR in
IMI's business while still a partner in MRIA.

E. GSR Plans to Build IMI and Invites SARMC to be a Partner.
In 1998, GSR became concerned that most of its income was derived from its services contract
with SARMC, (/d. at 1445:15-1447:3; Trial Ex. 4047) and the consequences ofSARMC
terminating that arrangement. (TR Vol. II at 1447:5-1448:6.) Desiring autonomy from SARMC,
GSR decided to establish its own independent imaging center. (/d. at 1446:6-1448 :6; Trial Ex.
4052.)
GSR, however, knew that if it opened an imaging center that competed with SARMC,
SARMC's CEO, Sandra Bruce, would react negatively and refuse to renew GSR's services
contract. (TR Vol. II at 1455:9-1456:24.) GSR's solution was to invite SARMC to participate in
IMI. (/d.) Although Bruce's initial reaction was negative, she warmed to the idea, ultimately
seeking 50% of the new business. (!d. at 1456:21-1457:22; Trial Ex. 4057.)
When SARMC and GSR announced their intention to partner in the new imaging center,
SARMC understood that to avoid violating the noncompete clause in the MRIA partnership
agreement, MRIA needed to participate in the new imaging center. (Trial Ex. 4062; TR Vol. II at
1741 :9-1742:20.) For that reason, SARMC requested MRIA to pursue a partnership with GSR
to eliminate this conflict. (TR Vol. II at 1152:20-1153:9, 1748:22-1750:24.) MRIA pursued
discussions with GSR, offering Dr. Thomas Henson's (ofDMR) one-eleventh ownership interest
in MRIA (which included a seat on the Board of Partners), to the radiologists. (/d.atll52:20-
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1155:4; 1788: 19-1790:15.) This approach would join MRIA and IMI and create an opportunity
for MRIA to expand its business. (!d. at 1153: 19-1154:9.) In Spring 1999, a deal for the purchase
of Dr. Henson's interest was, according to GSR and MRIA, "very close to being finalized." (/d.
at 1157:6-22; Trial Ex. 4079.)

F. SARMC Sabotages MRIA's Negotiations with GSR.
In June 1999, Sandra Bruce injected herself into the MRINGSR negotiations and unbeknownst
to MRIA, asked GSR to backburner its discussions with MRIA to complete a deal with SARMC.

(ld. at 1164:2-1166:16, 1767:20-1769:11; Trial Ex. 4101.) SARMC then offered GSR a better
deal: a 50% interest in an MR imaging operation on its campus, with SARMC owning the other
50%. (!d. at 1788:19-1790: 15; 1786: 15-19; 2371:4-1 0.) Predictably GSR agreed to pursue
SARMC's proposal, and terminated its discussions with MRIA. (TR Vol. II, 1166:1-1168:20)
Bruce's interference with MRIA's negotiations revealed her long term ambition to "align"
SARMC with GSR. "[A]t least as far back as 1999" and before IMI opened, Bruce and her
COO, Cindy Schamp, pursued a relationship between SARMC and GSR whereby they would
establish imaging centers (with MRI) "throughout the region." (TR Vol. II at 1795:3-11,
2270:17-2271 :6.) Such a strategy clearly violated the MRIA non-compete provision. (Trial Ex.
4023 at§ 9.) This strategy also included the concept that SARMC would buy MRICI from
MRIA and sell 50% of that operation to GSR. (TR Vol. II at 1795:6-1798:20.)
By mid-1999, SARMC retained consultants to explore options to exit or "restructure" MRIA
so SARMC could achieve its objectives. Consultant Alan Hahn was hired to explore four
"scenarios" whereby SARMC would take control of the MRIA board and either liquidate MRIA
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or offer GSR an equity position in MRICI that excluded the DMR physicians. (Trial Ex. 4118.)
Hahn was also requested to evaluate the contractual implications if SARMC withdrew from
MRIA and competed. Hahn's evaluation ("Scenario 5") concluded that withdrawal would
breach the MRIA partnership agreement and could lead to litigation. (Trial Ex. 4138 at 16.)
Hahn's reports were not disclosed to MRIA. (TR. Vol. II at 1199:5-23.)
In fall 1999, SARMC began exchanging with GSR confidential draft operating agreements tor
IMI. (Trial Exs. 4115 &4125). Those drafts describe a joint venture where:
•
•
•

Neither SARMC nor SARMC's "Affiliate" (which would include MRIA) could expand
in Ada or Canyon counties without GSR's permission. (Ex. 4115 §7.3.1)
SARMC and GSR agreed to pursue development of an imaging center in Meridian (a
location which MRIA had picked to establish an imaging center. (Ex. 4115 §7.3.3)
SARMC would receive an option to purchase 50% of any IMI imaging facility in Ada
and Canyon counties.

SARMC's separate, confidential negotiations assured that GSR would partner with SARMC,
rather than MRIA. Consequently MRIA was deprived of the business opportunity to partner
with IMI. Moreover, MRIA was forced to accept SARMC's exclusive radiology group. GSR- as
the exclusive radiological readers for its business, meaning that GSR would interface with
MRIA's customer base. (Trial Ex. 4104, 4137; TR Vol. II at 1488:8-1489:3.) When MRIA
requested SARMC's permission to "contract directly with radiologists" who were not MRIA's
competitors, SARMC ignored such requests. (Trial Ex. 4137; TR Vol. II at 1175:23-1176:11,
1182:9-14.)

G. Although SARMC Knew it Must Buy its Way Out of MRIA to Join IMI,
SARMC Stalled Negotiations While MRIA's Value Diminished.

6
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When IMI opened in Fall 1999, SARMC clearly understood it could neither withdraw from the
partnership, nor participate in IMI without violating the MRIA partnership agreement. (Trial
Exs. 4137,4138 at 16,4149, 4150; TR Vol. II at 1690:21-1697:14.) According to SARMC's
own documents, any participation in IMI was a breach of the non-compete clause: "A waiver for
St. Alphonsus to participate in the imaging business of IMI requires a unanimous favorable vote
from all general partners." (Trial Exs. 413 7, 4149, 4150, 4118, & 414 7). 3
Recognizing that there was no easy "way around" the non-compete provisions to achieve its
objective of partnering with GSR, SARMC shifted focus in early 2000 to purchasing MRICI,
voiding the non-compete and sharing MRICI with GSR. (TR Vol. II at 1197:10-13, 1520:2152:16, 1812:12-24, 2057:2-12). In February 2000, representatives ofSARMC and MRIA
discussed a fair market value of$22 million for MRICI. (ld. at 1519:6-1525:10, Ex. 4144.)
3

At trial SARMC argued that it could participate in IMI, but only in the "non MRI" business
(i.e., x-ray, CT, ultrasound). This position ignores reality and the partnership agreement. First,
the non compete clause prohibited SARMC from engaging in a competitive diagnostic imaging
center within 100 miles of SARMC. Second, the non compete clause prohibited partner
controlled "affiliates" from competing with MRIA. The unrebutted testimony of Bruce Budge
was that IMI was commonly controlled by SARMC and the radiologists. (TR Vol. II at 2780:312.) Third, it was impossible to separately support the "non MRI" side of IMI..IMI was one
business, with one functional staff, and one management committee. (TR Vol. II at 1603:2-5;
1605:21-1606: 7) As far as customers were concerned, it was just "one big imaging center" that
marketed itselfas one business (1601:4-1603:17). Moreover, there is no indication that SARMC
ever tried to parse its participation in IMI (See supra Part I. H.). The trial court recognized that
the MRI/non-MRI distinction was a myth: "there was ample evidence that IMI operated as one
business and that the MRI/non-MRI distinction did not in fact exist. (R Vol. XIII p. 2439.)
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Unfortunately, $22 million wasn't ever in the "realm of discussion" for SARMC. (TR Vol. II at
1199:5-23; 1525:6-1528:8; TR Vol. III at 3559:4-3560:13, 3567:10-13.)4 With no intention of
paying that kind of money, SARMC dragged its feet, making no offer to purchase MRICI. (TR
Vol. II 1201:20-1202:17, 1212:22-1213:7, 1841:7-1842:14, 1845:5-6, 1919:19-23.) There was
method in this. SARMC understood that after IMI entered the market and started to take MRIA's
customer base: "the cheapest thing to do [would be] nothing." (/d. at 2662:17-2665:1 0; Trial Ex.
4154 at 1.) In other words, rather than negotiate a deal, SARMC would stand by and watch
MRIA's patient volumes "dwindle away," (Id. at 2664:3-2665:1 0) thereby allowing SARMC to
purchase MRICI for a reduced price. (Id.) SARMC pursued this strategy even though it knew
such a strategy was unethical. (/d. at 1869: 15-1870:20.)

H. While SARMC was Still an MRIA Partner, SARMC Helped IMI Establish Itself
as a Competitor of MRIA.
1. IMI was Established with SARMC's Support
Although SARMC understood it could not participate in IMI without breaching its obligations
to MRIA, it did so anyway. Basically, SARMC was feathering its nest in anticipation of
formally joining IMI. Before IMI opened its doors in 1999, SARMC had already begun to invest
in its new pattner.
SARMC has already made a number of tangible investments into IMI, including the
following: providing SARMC's case volume, database, technical component charges, staffing
4

A consistent theme throughout the trial was that "cash was tight" for SARMC. When SARMC
hired Shattuck Hammond ("SH") in 2001, SARMC told SHit was only interested in a buyout
strategy that would not require any SARMC funds because "capital was tight." (TR Vol. II at
2090; Trial Ex. 4247 at 5.) In 2003, it again was noted that "money was a big issue" for
SARMC; it was "tight on cash." (TR Vol. II at 1567:14-1568:8}
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costs, and other operational data for IMI's use in its business plan; linking IMI to its intranet
between the hospital and its physician network; supporting Karen Noyes, assistant director of
the SARMC radiology department, in joining IMI as executive director; converting SARMC
to the same digital radiography system as IMI.
(Trial Ex. 4095; see also Trial Ex. 4074.) GSR meeting minutes further reflect that "financing
[for IMI] was contingent on a partnership with the hospital." (Trial Ex. 545 (emphasis added).)

2. SARMC's IT Support Gives IMI a Competitive Edge Over MRIA.
From IMI's inception, SARMC partnered with GSR to convert IMI's technology from film to
digital imaging. This paradigm shift (which SARMC supported at IMI but not MRIA) provided
IMI a huge competitive advantage over MRICI. (Ex. 4107; TR Vol. II. 1618:22-1619:3,
1497:15-1502:24.) SARMC helped bring this "digital revolution to IMI" by initially investing
several hundred thousand dollars in IMI's IT system. (TR Vol. II at 1505:10-1507:10; Trial Ex.
4095.) The investment by SARMC in "dark fiber" connectivity to IMI, alone, was $780,000.
(Trial Ex. 4231at 3; TR Vol. II at 1509:6-13.) In sum, SARMC "was there with [IMI] making
that investment in getting doctors over the technology hump" and helping bring the "digital
revolution" to IMI while MRIA was left in the cold. (!d. at 1505:1 0-15; 1634:12-1 5; 2433:222440:7.) 5
5

As part ofthe IT support, SARMC and IMI had direct contact with MRIA's customers, the
referring physicians. (!d. at 1621 :7-20; 1639: 18-24.) SARMC provided laptops that allowed
referring physicians to view IMI reports and images, but not MRIA reports and images. (!d. at
2432:10-2435:1; 2436:21-2437:6; 2439:10-17; 2453:6-24543:9.) SARMC and GSR also tormed
an "ITPACS" committee staffed by knowledgeable SARMC IT personnel which planned the
future of the "entire digital paradigm shift for [SARMC], the radiologists and IML" (/d. at
1619:12-1621:20.) MRIA was not allowed to attend ITPACS meetings. (!d. at 2437:18-2439:9.)
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3. Financial Support Before SARMC Withdrew From MRIA
In addition to the financial investment in IT set forth above, SARMC, while still a partner in
MRIA, gave IMI $546,146 and assumed almost $1.5 million ofiMI's debt. (!d. at 1557:41558:2; 1622:22-1623:8.)
4. SARMC/IMI's Joint Marketing to Shift Referrals from MRIA to IMI.
While still a partner in MRIA, SARMC worked with IMI to obtain a combined market share
for MRI, in direct competition with MRIA. (Trial Ex. 4248; TR Vol. II at 1643:7-13; TR Vol. III
at 4169: 10-17.) SARMC and IMI jointly marketed by television, radio, newspapers, letters to
referring physicians and physician-to-physician office visits. (Trial Exs. 4248 & 41 07; TR Vol. II
at 1643:23-1644:22.) This pervasive marketing effort had the goal of promoting both SARMC
and IMI to referring physicians. (TR Vol. II at 1646:1-7.) Because affiliation with SARMC was a
strong marketing tool, marketing for MRIA became difficult by early 2000 when IMI was being
marketed as SARMC's MRI imaging center as (!d. at 2420:11-16, 2428:21-2429:6.) it caused
confusion among the referring doctors as to which imaging center was affiliated with SARMC.
5. SARMC Visibly Shifts its Name Association to IMI by Making IMI a
SARMC "Outt>atient Facility"
While still a partner in MRIA, SARMC made IMI an outpatient facility for SARMC. (ld. at
1582:10-1583:24, Trial Ex. 4209.) This development was communicated to the referring doctor
community (MRIA's source of business) causing MRIA to lose scans as doctors became "used to
sending patients to IMI, not just for CT, but for MRI as well." (!d. at 1583: 17-24.)
6. SARMC's Usurpation ofMRIA's Meridian Opportunity
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While still a partner in MRIA, SARMC and GSR agreed to pursue and establish IMI Meridian
(aka IMI West), which would include an MRI scanner. (Trial Exs. 4115,4211 & 4275; TR Vol.
II at 1590:11-23; 1613:5-12; 1615:20-23.) SARMC provided this support even though it knew
MRIA was planning to expand operations into Meridian and thereby usurped MRIA' s
opportunity to establish an MRI scanner in Meridian. To add insult to injury MRICI and MRIM
lost scans to IMI Meridian. (Trial Exs. 4425,4515,4516, & 4517.)

I.

SARMC Condones and/or Turns a Blind Eye to Conduct by the Radiologists
Intended to Shift Referrals from MRIA to IMI.

Shortly after IMI opened in fall 1999, MRIA began to notice a "shift in attitude" in the
radiologists relative to the performance of their responsibilities at MRICI. (TR Vol. II at
1176: 19-1177:3.) Initially, this shift in attitude was demonstrated by reduced time and attention
in MRICI's "lab" as well as inadequate support ofMRICI's technicians. (ld at 1176:19-1177:3;
2385:2-2387:1; 2511 :3-24.) MRIA requested Bruce to intervene and return radiologist service
to its previous, professional level:
"The time has come for SARMC to insist [that its radiologists] provide full, supportive
radiologic coverage of the lab at historical levels of professionalism and service .... [Such
coverage] cannot be allowed to be withdrawn simply because the radiologists of the lab are
now also its competitors. We now view as a necessity SARMC's providing the lab with full,
supportive, traditional radiologist coverage or permitting the MRI Center of Idaho to contract
directly with radiologists as a fiduciary responsibility of SARMC to its other general and
limited partners.
(Trial Ex. 4137 at 2.) Bruce never responded to MRIA's request. (TR Vol. II at 1182:9-14.)
As time progressed, and SARMC's relationship with IMI deepened, the radiologists became
bolder in their unfair tactics. For example, (1) the radiologists unilaterally reduced their weekday
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hours at MRICI, while IMI increased its hours of service for its MRI modality; and (2) the
radiologists completely cancelled weekend support to MRICI, except for emergency cases. (See,
Trial Ex. 4277 &4309; TR Vol. II at 1653:23-1655:25; 2195:2~17; 2392:5-24.) The result to
MRICI was increased cost and a substantial loss of scan volume. (Trial Ex. 4292, 4519; TR Vol.
II 2494:7-2499:18, 2507:9-2508:10; 2509:14-2510:15.)
Before IMI's opening, the radiologists had provided 24 hour a day, seven day a week coverage
(24/7) to SARMC's radiology department and MRICI. (TR Vol. II at 2496:8-12.) After IMI
opened, the only modality not receiving 24/7 coverage at SARMC was MRICI. (!d. at 2195:22197:4.) Although SARMC understood that this change in hours of coverage had a "huge
impact" on MRIA' s ability to do business, SARMC did nothing to change the situation. (!d.)

J. In June 2001, SARMC, While Still a MRIA Partner, Formalized its
Partnership with IMI by Executing an Operating Agreement.
In June, 2001, SARMC formalized its relationship with GSR and IMI through execution of the
Operating Agreement of Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC. (Trial Ex. 4226f In salient part,
the agreement provided:
•
•
•

SARMC would contribute over $500,000 to IMI. (Trial Ex. 4226 at§ 4.1.)
SARMC would not establish an imaging center in Ada or Canyon County without offering the
radiologists the right to participate in such venture. (/d. at §7.3.1.)
SARMC and GSR would develop an imaging center in Meridian, Idaho. (Jd.at § 7.3.3.)

6

To avoid the perception ofblatantly breaching the non-compete provisions of the MRIA
partnership agreement, SARMC included in the final draft of the Operating Agreement language
that purportedly limited the agreement to the alleged "non-MRI" operation of the company.
Testimony at trial, however, from IMI's own executive director demonstrated that this Operating
Agreement related to IMI' s entire business, including its magnetic resonance imaging operation
(TR. Vol. II at 1600:2-1604:7, 1613:9-12, 1616:10-1621: 15, 1630: l-1631: 17; see also footnote
3)
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•
•

IMI's 6 member Management Committee would consist of3 representatives from SARMC.
(/d. at§ 8.1, TR Vol. III at 3720:10-3723:11.)
SARMC and the radiologists would enter into an IT services agreement and create an
ITP ACS committee governing all IMI modalities. (/d. at § 13.2 and Exhibit 13.2 thereto; TR
Vol. II at 1618:18-1619:11.)

The Operating Agreement also described a process whereby SARMC would "make available" to
the radiologists a 50% interest in MRICI. (Trial Ex. 4226 at§ 7.3.2.) The terms of this
Operating Agreement were never revealed to MRIA. (TR Vol. II at 1297: 18-24.)

K. After Signing the IMI Operating Agreement, SARMC Hired Shattuck
Hammond to Present Options to Circumvent The MRIA Non-Compete.
SARMC's COO, Cindy Schamp, hired Grant Chamberlain of investment bank Shattuck
Hammond ("SH") to perform a Strategic Options Assessment ("SOA") evaluating the options
available to SARMC for meeting its objectives of owning MRICI and joint venturing with GSR
in other MRI facilities. (Trial Ex. 4239; TR Vol. II at 2547:12-2548:24.). In the course of its
work, SH employees discussed various strategic options with SARMC representatives. (Trial Ex.
4239). The results of these discussions were included in an ''Overview" (the "Finnerty
Memorandum") describing alternatives then being considered by SARMC. (/d.; TR Vol. II at
2562:3-21.). The document reveals that, as of September 2001:
•
•
•

SARMC anticipated litigation if it withdrew from MRIA.
SARMC understood that it owed a fiduciary duty to the Limited Partnerships and risked
breaching that duty, if it withdrew.
SARMC understood that if its termination was "wrongful," MRIA would be entitled to
damages arising from subsequent competition with MRIA.
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•
•

SARMC would not support the future growth of MRIA as long as there was no plan to
allow SARMC to meet its strategic goals ofpartnering with GSR. 7
SARMC refused to use SARMC funds to buyout MRICI. (Trial Ex. 4239 at 2, 11-13).

In November 2001, SH delivered to SARMC its final SOA and Valuation Analysis ofMRI
Associates. (Trial Ex. 4247, 4246). Page 5 of the SOA discusses SARMC's objectives relative to
partnering with GSR: ( 1) SARMC considered it a "strategic imperative" to partner with GSR to
pursue "outpatient diagnostic imaging opportunities in SARMC's service area"; (2) SARMC
wanted control ofMRICI; and, (3) SARMC sought to avoid the prohibitions in the non-compete.
The SOA evaluated 5 different "structural alternatives" (including withdrawal) which would
attain SARMC's stated objectives. 8 Given the business and litigation risks associated with these
alternatives, SH recommended that SARMC acquire all general and limited partner interests in
MRICI, leaving MRIA with only its mobile operation (Option 1). Upon acquiring MRICI,
SARMC could then merge that operation into IMI. According to the SOA the net cost to
SARMC for executing this strategy was $27.3 million. (Trial Ex. 4247.)
Ken Fry, SARMC's CFO, believed that SH's purchase price of MRICI was "fair" and that the
recommendation to purchase MRICI (Option 1) was a good approach (!d. at 2085:7-2087:12).

9

7

At trial, SARMC representatives vehemently denied that they had taken steps to inhibit the
growth of MRIA 's mobile business, even though meeting minutes indicate otherwise. (TR Vol.
II at 1882:6-1885:8; Trial Ex. 4221.)
8
The SOA warns SARMC (as did Alan Hahn) that "[a] waiver for SARMC to participate in the
imaging business of IMI requires a unanimous favorable vote from all general partners of
MRIA." (TR Vol. II at 1693:24-1694: 15; Trial Ex. 4149.)
9
Fry also testified repeatedly that Bruce and Schamp were involved in the process of reviewing
the SI-1 report and attended a presentation of the report by Chamberlain. (TR Vol. II at 2079:1218,2082:4-14,2084:7-15, 2088:1-5.) Amazingly, both Bruce and Schamp claimed ignorance as
to the contents ofthe SH reports. (!d. at 1886:2-8, 2376:8-2377:19.)
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However, SARMC never communicated the results of the valuation to MRIA, and never made
an offer to buy MRICI. (TR Vol. II at 2088:6-2089:18; 2092:21-2094:23). Fry did not know why
an offer was not made, but was aware that "capital was pretty tight" during that timeframe. (/d. at
2090:3-14; 2094:9-13.) Copies ofSH's reports were never provided to MRIA. (/d. at 2098:1012). 10
In fall 2003, after MRICI scan volumes had dropped precipitously, 11 Bruce requested a
meeting of the MRIA Board of Partners where she presented a three month time line for the
buyout ofMRICI. (TR Vol. II at 1217:1-12, 1920:4-9; 1931: 10-18.) She stated that if the
transaction did not occur timely, SARMC would consider withdrawal from the partnership.
(Trial Ex. 4309, TR Vol. II at 1920:14-1922:1.) Given that SARMC had been dragging its feet
on a buyout since 2000, MRIA questioned Bruce's motives. (TR Vol. II at 1222:12-1223:7.)
SARMC's proposal was made more difficult by two other demands: (1) that GSR participate in
the negotiations to buyout MRICI, thereby requiring MRIA to disclose confidential information
to its competitor, and (2) that Grant Chamberlain, SARMC's consultant, be used to facilitate the
negotiations. (TR Vol. II at 1224:16-1231:7.)
In a meeting on December 17, 2003, MRIA proposed that it be given 120 days to prepare a fair
market value for SARMC's purchase ofMRICI. (TR Vol. II at 1231:9-1232:17.) SARMC never
10

MRIA partners had been interviewed by Grant Chamberlain in 2001, and had been promised a
"fair market buyout" number as a result of his work. Chamberlain was not heard from after "a
couple of meetings" and MRIA was never provided with an explanation. (TR Vol. II at 1213:81215:20.)
11
The evidence at trial showed that IMI enjoyed a corresponding jump in its scan volumes at this
same time. (Trial Ex. 4518; TR Vol. II at 2796:15-2797:1.)
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responded to this request. (TR Vol. II at 1232: 12-17.) Instead, on February 24, SARMC notified
MRIA that SARMC was withdrawing from MRIA in 30 days and threatened that, only ifMRIA
paid SARMC its departing partner share, would SARMC delay competition with MRIA for one
year. (Trial Ex. 4329; TR Vol. II at 1952:22-25.) Bruce admitted that SARMC withdrew from
MRIA to partner with the radiologists and that she understood SARMC might be liable for
wrongful dissociation damages. (TR Vol. II at 1943:15-24, 1950:9-15.)
Upon receipt of SARMC' s notice of withdrawal, MRIA 's other hospital partners approached
SARMC with the fair market value buyout that MRIA had been working on since its December
meeting with SARMC. (Trial Ex. 4322.) Although the proposal from MRIA was the deal
SARMC had requested in September of2003, SARMC rejected the offer solely because it was
"too late." (TR Vol. II at 1954:4-8; 1954:15-1955:2.)
After withdrawal SARMC and GSR moved a mobile MRI scanner onto SARMC's campus for
IMI, within 100 feet of MRICI's operation. (TR Vol. II at 2173:21-24.) In mid December 2005,
SARMC notified its medical and nursing staff of the transition of all SARMC MRI imaging
business to the IMI mobile scanner:
"As you may be aware, St. Alphonsus and Gem State Radiology are currently in the process
oftransitioning MRI Services at St. Alphonsus. We are excited about our plans to bring MRI
imaging into our hospital in partnership with these exceptional radiologists .... " (Trial Ex.
4316.)
"As of [December 19, 2005), St. Alphonsus MRI [IMI's mobile unit at SARMC] will be the
sole provider of MRI services for all Saint Alphonsus inpatient, outpatient and ED
[emergency department] patients .... MRI of Idaho [MRICI] will no longer provide services to
St. Alphonsus connected patients ..... " (Trial Ex. 4377.)
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By the end of2005, SARMC had accomplished the objectives it had articulated and pursued
since 1999: SARMC had partnered with GSR in IMI on its campus, in downtown Boise and in
Meridian. As a result ofSARMC's efforts and the combined conduct of SARMC and GSR in
IMI, virtually all ofMRICI's business had been diverted to IMI. (Trial Ex. 4519; TR Vol. II at
2767:25-2768:6.) SARMC had effectively exited the MRIA partnership and accomplished its
objectives without paying anything to MRIA, leaving MRIA struggling to stay in business
(1301 :7-1302:1).
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

MRIA presents the following issues for cross-appeal: ( 1) did the trial court err by ruling
SARMC did not owe statutory fiduciary duties to MRICI and MRIM; (2) did the trial court err
by denying MRIA's request to seek punitive damages, and (3) did the trial court err by
dismissing MRIA' s antitrust claim.

III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Because the gravamen of this case is a commercial transaction, MRIA requests its attorneys'
fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. §12-120(3) and Appellate Rules 40 and 41.
IV. ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review

SARMC is appealing from "an award in the amount of$36.3 million" in MRIA's favor. At
trial, the jury awarded MRIA $63.5 Million, an amount which was the sum of two separate
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damage figures submitted for the jury's consideration: $36.3Million 12 (MRIA's lost profits
analysis) and $27.3 million (representing wrongful dissociation damages). These two damages
figures were combined by the jury on the verdict form as a result of SARMC's insistence that the
verdict form contain only one line for the damages figure rather than two lines, as requested by
MRIA's counsel. (R. Vol. XIII at 2434-35.) Recognizing the jury's addition ofthese two
figures could be cured by remittitur, MRIA requested the court to "pull apart" the two damage
figures combined on the verdict form. SARMC did not oppose this request, acknowledging the
damage figures had been added, and urging the court in its motion for new trial to reduce the
amount of the verdict, in lieu of granting a new trial. (R., Ex. 208 at 5.)
The trial court ordered a remittitur reducing the verdict from $63.5 million to $36.3 million, on
the basis that the jury, due to error invited by SARMC, added the two alternative damage
amounts. 13 (R., Vol. XIII, 2434-2435.) The trial court denied SARMC's new trial request
finding there was substantial evidence "as to the claims for relief and the damages ... [to
support] the reduced award." (!d.) Thus, SARMC's appeal is an appeal from the Court's denial
of a request for a new trial.
On a motion for new trial, the trial court has the responsibility to weigh the evidence and the
circumstances of the trial and determine whether a fair trial was had. Dinneen v. Finch, 100
12

MRIA expert Bruce Budge testified that the lost profits through 2006 were $15.4 million and
MRIA expert Charles Wilhoite testified that the lost profits from 2007 to 2023 were $20.9
million for a total of $36.3 million. (TR Vol. II at 2760:16-2761 :5; TR Vol. III at 2860: 11-16.)
13
The trial court found "the only testimony as to damage figures came from MRIA's witnesses,
Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite. Mr. Wilhoite's testimony supported the higher of the two amounts,
$36.3 million." (R., Vol. XIII, p.2435.)
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Idaho 620, 625-27, 603 P.2d 575, 580-82 (1979). A trial court has this responsibility because an
appellate court is not in a position to "weigh" the evidence. /d. at 626, 603 P.2d at 581.
Consequently, the standard of review for a denial of a motion for new trial is manifest abuse of
discretion. /d. This "more liberal rule" of review "recognizes the advantage enjoyed by the trial
court in reviewing the case because of the court's active participation in the trial." Seppi v. Betty,
99 Idaho 186, 189, 579 P.2d 683, 686 (1978).
Here, the appealed award of$36.3 million is a product of both the jury's effort in determining
lost profits and the court's independent review in determining the amount of remittitur. Because
the award was evaluated independently by the trial court, in the remittitur process, the standard
of review should be "manifest abuse of discretion" rather than substantial evidence.

B. The Trial Court Correctly Determined SARMC Wrongfully Dissociated.
The trial court did not err when it ruled as a matter of law that SARMC wrongfully dissociated
from MRIA. Before trial, both MRIA and SARMC moved for summary judgment on the issue.
(R. Vol. II at 386.) The resolution ofthe question turned upon the interpretation ofSection 6.1

ofthe MRIA Partnership Agreement (Trial Ex. 4023, § 6.1) and that section's interaction with
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"), which authorizes a partner to dissociate from
the partnership at any time, but provides that dissociation is "wrongful" ifit is a breach of an
express provision of the partnership agreement. I. C. § 53-3-602(b)(1 ). 14 When a partner

14

Importantly, RUPA governs a partnership only to the extent the affairs are not governed by an
agreement among the partners. I. C.§ 53-3-103. The official comment clarifies that RUPA is a
gap filler. See I.C. § 53~3-103, cmt. 1.
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wrongfully dissociates, the statute provides that the partner "is liable to the partnership and to the
other partners for damages caused by the dissociation." I. C. 53-3-602(c).
The trial court held that Section 6.1 of the partnership agreement made dissociation wrongful
in all but four limited circumstances. Section 6.1, which is entitled "Conditions of Withdrawal,"
provides:
Any Fiospital Partner may withdraw from the partnership at anytime if ... continued
participation in this partnership: (i) jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of such Hospital
Partner or its parent or their subsidiaries; or (ii) jeopardizes Medicare/Medicaid or
insurance reimbursements or participations; (iii) if the business activities of the
Partnership are contrary to the ethical principles of the Roman Catholic Church as
designated from time to time; or (iv) is or may be in violation of any local, state or
federal laws, rules or regulations.
(Trial Ex. 4023, § 6.1.) Determining SARMC had not withdrawn pursuant to these conditions,
the trial court held that SARMC's withdrawal was in breach of the partnership agreement, and
thus was wrongful under RUPA. (R. Vol. II at 388-96, Vol. III at 538-46.)
l. Section 6.1 Unambiguously Limits SARMC's right to Withdraw

Section 6.1, "Conditions of Withdrawal", unambiguously limits SARMC's right to withdraw
from the partnership. Despite this plain language, SARMC argues the section does not restrict
SARMC's right to withdraw and should be interpreted as a permissive grant of authority to
withdraw from the partnership without causing dissolution. The trial court correctly rejected this
argument, determining Section 6.1 "clearly and unequivocally" limited SARMC's right to
withdraw from the partnership to the four listed circumstances. (R. Vol. II at 395.)
By its express terms, Section 6.1 contains the parties' agreement on the "Conditions for
Withdrawal." The word "Conditions" must be given its ordinary and plain meaning. Martinez v.
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Idaho Counties Reciprocal Management Program, 134 Idaho 247,254,999 P.2d 902,909
(2000). The word "condition" is defined by the

Merriam~ Webster

Dictionary as "something

essential to the ... occurrence of something else : PREREQUISITE," or "a restricting or
modifying factor .... " See

http://www.m~w.com/dictionary/condition.

Accordingly, the four

"Conditions for Withdrawal" in Section 6.1 are "essential to the ... occurrence of' withdrawal
by SARMC, or are "restricting or modifying factor[s]" for withdrawal by SARMC. Thus,
SARMC's assertion that the conditions are not restrictive is inconsistent with the ordinary
meaning of the word "Conditions."
SARMC's interpretation that Section 6.1 "is entirely permissive;" that it "is not an 'express'
limitation of any sort" also contradicts the plain meaning of the word "if' in that section's
statement that withdrawal by SARMC is permitted "if' one of the four "Conditions for
Withdrawal" are present. The plain and ordinary meaning of the word "if' is "in the event that"
or "on condition that." See http:llwww.m-w.com/dictionary/if. Thus, by including the word "if'
in Section 6.1, the parties unambiguously agreed that SARMC could withdraw from MRIA "in
the event that" or ''on the condition that" one of the four expressly stated conditions in Section
6.1 was present. None of the conditions existed at the time SARMC withdrew.
Finally, the statement in Section 6.1 that SARMC "may" withdraw if one of the four conditions
is present does not, as suggested by SARMC, render the four "Conditions for Withdraw"
nonexclusive. As the trial court recognized, "the use of the word 'may' merely entitles the
Hospital Partners to dissociate for the four (4) reasons in Section 6.1, but does not require those
pa1tners to dissociate upon the happening of the listed events." (R. VoL II at 393-94). The word
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in no way changes the interpretation of"if." Simply put, under the plain meaning of the words in
Section 6.1, SARMC "may" withdraw "if'' one of the four circumstances is present, but SARMC
is not required to withdraw if one of those circumstances is present.

2. SARMCts Permissive Grant Interpretation Is Not Supported by
Statutory Law or the MRIA Partnership Agreement.
The keystone of SARMC's entire argument is its erroneous assertion that Section 6.1 was
intended as a permissive provision allowing the hospital partners to withdraw without triggering
the dissolution of the partnership. Because there is nothing in the plain language of Section 6.1
or the evidence to support SARMC's interpretation, SARMC, instead, improperly attempted to
manufacture the intent of the parties from a strained reading of the Uniform Partnership Act
("UPA"). I.C. § 53-301 et seq. (repealed effective July 1, 2001).
That SARMC relies on the UPA to manufacture the intent of the parties is amazing given that
SARMC recognized that RUPA now controls and that if, after RUP A, the language needed to be
changed to keep the parties intent under the UP A, the parties should have changed the language
during the grace period. Consequently, the UPA and any context it gives to the parties' intent is
irrelevant. Section 6.1 must be read only in the context of RUP A. I. C.

53~3-1204(b ).

As noted

above, Section 6.1 is entirely limiting. Thus, regardless of how that section read under the UPA,
under RUPA, the language which SARMC admits is unambiguous, limits the circumstances
under which SARMC could dissociate. Therefore, even ifSARMC's interpretation that Section
6.1 was meant to allow a hospital to withdraw without causing dissolution under the UPA was
accurate, RUP A changed the interpretation.
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SARMC's argument also is unreasonable because as the trial court properly found,
even viewed in the context of the UP A, this section did not grant any rights to the Hospital
Partners that were not already available under the UP A. Under the UPA (like the RUPA),
the Hospital Partners had the power to leave the partnership at any time, but the
partnership agreement could still limit the partners' ability to leave and dissolve the
partnership rightfully. (R. Vol. II. p. 394 (emphasis in original).)

3. SARMC's Current Interpretation Conflicts With Its Prior Interpretation.
Although SARMC's interpretation of Section 6.1 was an issue at trial due to SARMC's
assertion that it acted in good faith when dissociating, SARMC never offered any testimony to
show that Section 6.1 operated as a permissive grant of authority to dissociate. In fact, even
SARMC witnesses uniformly testified that Section 6.1 was restrictive. SARMC's CEO, Sandra
Bruce, testified she understood that Section 6.1 of the MRIA partnership agreement operated as a
restriction on the ability of the hospital partners to withdraw from the partnership. (TR Vol. II at
1828:9-19, 1950:9-15.) SARMC's former COO, Cindy Schamp, testified that it would be a
breach of the agreement to withdraw other than for the four listed reasons. (ld at 2295:202297:4.) Additionally, SARMC's hired consultant, Alan Hahn, interpreted Section 6.1 to be a
restriction on SARMC's right to withdraw. (Exhibit 4138 at 16.) 15
In conclusion, drawing all inferences in favor of SARMC, SARMC's "dissociation from
MRIA was wrongful as a matter of law because the restriction [on SARMC's right to withdraw]
contained in Section 6.1 was clearly and unequivocally expressed" and it was undisputed that
15

SARMC's conduct also demonstrates that SARMC did not really believe it could dissociate
without incurring liability. As set forth in Patt I supra, SARMC behaved in a manner consistent
with the perspective that it could not simply withdraw in order to rightfully exit the partnership.
(Trial Ex. 4138 at 16.)
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SARMC did not withdraw under any of the four circumstances pe1mitted in Section 6.1. (R. Vol.
III at 544, R. Vol. II at 395-96.)

C. SARMC's Dissociation also was Wrongful Because SARMC Dissociated Before
the End of the Partnership Term.
Dissociation is also wrongful if it occurs before the end ofthe partnership term.l.C. § 53-3602(b). SARMC did not appeal the jury's findings that the MRIA partnership was for a definite
term and that SARMC wrongfully dissociated before the expiration of the term. Instead,
SARMC argues the trial court erred in submitting this claim to the jury because the trial court
should have found as a matter of law that the partnership was not for a definite term. SARMC,
however, waived this argument. Frontier Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Douglass, 123 Idaho 808, 812,
853 P.2d 553, 557 (1993). The trial court never ruled on SARMC's motion on this issue (R. Vol.

II at 341-42, 384-406) and SARMC failed to raise the issue again.
l. The Court Properly Recognized that Partnership Term was Determined
from the Entirety of the Agreements That Made Up MRIA's Business
RUPA recognizes that "[w]hether there exists an agreed term or undertaking for a given
partnership cannot always be resolved by reference to the written partnership agreement."
RUPA, § 602, Authors' Comments 5.a. The existence of a "term" partnership requires
consideration of documents, conduct and statements outside the formal partnership agreement.

Jd.; see also Fischer v. Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Ky. 2006) ("[I]fthe partnership has for its
object ... the conduct of a business which obviously continues through a particular season, it
will be presumed that the parties intended the relationship should continue until the object had
been accomplished."); Haines v. City of New York, 396 N.Y.S.2d 155, 157 (N.Y. 1977) (holding
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when there is no express term, courts may "supply the missing term if a duration may be fairly
and reasonably fixed by the surrounding circumstances and the parties' intent "); Hooker

Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 456 N.Y.S.2d 587,

589 (N.Y.A.D. 1982) (same).
2. The MRIA Partnership Had a Definite Term
Here, the MRIA partnership had for its object the conduct of certain businesses, the limited
partnerships. The expressly stated purpose ofMRIA was to "organize and promote an Idaho
limited partnership" and to operate and manage medical diagnostic devices, including a magnetic
resonance imaging device through the limited partnership. (Trial Ex. 4023 at § 1.6.) MRIA
managed the business and affairs ofMRICI and later MRIM as their general partner. (/d. at
1316:5-16; Trial Exs. 4024 at § 4.1, 4028 at § 4.1.) During the relevant time of this dispute,
MRIA conducted no other business. (TR VoL II at 1326:12-1328:3.) Accordingly, MRIA's
existence is inextricably intertwined with the limited partnerships it managed.
As to term, Section 1.1 of the MRIA Agreement, entitled "Effective Date and Term," provides
that if the limited partnerships are not formed by December 31, 1985, MRIA will end on that
date. (Id. at § 1.1. 1). In turn, subsection 1.1.2 provides that if the limited partnerships are
formed, the MRIA shall end when the business of the partnership is completed. (!d. at§ 1.1.2.)
That business, as set forth above, is the management and operation of the limited partnerships.

(!d. at§§ 1.1, 1.6, 2.1; Trial Exs. 4024 at§ 4.1, 4028 at§ 4.1.) The duration of that business
therefore can be only for as long as the duration of the limited partnerships.
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The limited partnerships are for an express term. The agreement for MRICI provides "[t]he
partnership shall continue from the effective date through December 31, 20 15." (Trial Ex. 4024
at§ 1.1.) 16 MRICI's term was later amended by a vote of the general partners and extended until
December 31, 2023. (R., Ex. 222, Ex. VV; see infra. Part IV.I-1.4.) That MRIA's term is
coextensive with its limited partnerships is also reflected in SARMC board minutes wherein
SARMC ratified the extension of"the term of the MRI partnership agreement to 12/31/23."
(Trial Ex. 4109; TR Vol. III at 3521:7-21, 3534:11-18.) SARMC's former COO, who during the
relevant time was a member of the MRIA board of partners, agreed that the term of MRIA was
extended to 2023. (TR Vol. III at 3591 :22-3592:21.)
Accordingly, the MRIA partnership agreement demonstrates that the parties intended the term
of MRIA to be coextensive with the term of the limited partnerships. Therefore, the court did not
err in submitting the case to the jury because "drawing every legitimate inference most favorably
to [MRIA], there exists substantial evidence" indicating (l) MRIA and the limited partnerships
had terms that expired no earlier than December 31, 2023 and (2) SARMC dissociated before the
expiration ofthe term. Powers v. American Honda Motor Co., 139 Idaho 333, 335,79 PJd 154,
156 (2003).

D. The Jury Was Not "Prejudiced" by the Summary Judgment Ruling
SARMC argues the trial court's summary judgment ruling prevented SARMC from obtaining a
fair trial on MRIA's other claims. Notwithstanding the erroneous assumption that the ruling was
16

The agreement for MRIM provides that "[t]he partnership shall continue from the effective
date through December 31, 2015 ." (Trial Ex. 4028 at § 1. 1.)
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improper, the ruling had to be communicated to the jury because the amount of damages due to
wrongful dissociation was still a jury question.
Furthermore, SARMC cannot show the trial court's denial of a new trial on its taint accusation
was a manifest abuse of discretion. Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 626, 603 P.2d 575, 581
( 1979). The trial court was under the obligation to determine whether the verdict was rendered
under "the influence of passion or prejudice." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 768, 727 P.2d
1187, 1196 (1986) (emphasis added). Recognizing this obligation, the trial court found there was
no prejudice and "allow[ed] the jury's findings to stand because the jury heard substantial
evidence as to the claims for relief and the damages." (R. Vol. XIII at 2434-35.)
1. The Summary Judgment Ruling Was Not the Centerpiece of MRIA's
Case.

MRIA did not make the ruling the centerpiece of its case because, as found by the trial court
when ruling on SARMC's motion for a new trial, 17 the evidence was "overwhelming" and "clear
and convincing" that "the executive management team at Saint Alphonsus really blatantly
ignored the partnership rights of a partner .... It was demonstrated to th[eJ jury that Saint
Alphonsus chose to compete directly/indirectly with a partner." (TR Vol. III at 4471 :9-17.)
The centerpiece ofMRIA's case was that SARMC violated its fiduciary duties and partner
obligations by competing with MRIA through IMI even before it wrongfully dissociated from
MRIA. The evidence showed that SARMC, while still a partner in MRIA and with knowledge
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that it would be wrongful to do so, deliberately joined forces with MRIA's competitor, IMI, and
provided IMI with substantial sums of money, financing, IT support, marketing and management
expertise which caused MRIA's customers to migrate to SARMC's new joint venture, IMI. (See

supra Part I, E-K.) If anything swayed the jury against SARMC, it was the sheer volume of
evidence demonstrating SARMC's deliberate and malicious conduct which virtually destroyed
MRIA. (Jd.) As SARMC's CEO stated "I was a partner with a competitor. I was supporting
myself." (Id at 1871 :8-9.)

2. SARMC Failed to Satisfy Its Burden to Show Prejudicial Error.
SARMC has the burden to show more than that the summary judgment ruling was in error; it
must show prejudicial error as "[p]rejudice will not be presumed on appeal." Pacheco v. Safeco

Ins. Co. of America, 116 Idaho 794, 798,780 P.2d 116, 120 (1989); see also I.R.C.P. 61. To
show the alleged error was prejudicial, SARMC must demonstrate that but for the wrongful
dissociation ruling, the jury would not have returned a verdict in favor of MRIA on MRIA 's
other claims. Ernst v. Hemenway and Moser Co., Inc., 126 Idaho 980,986, 895 P.2d 581,587
(1995). In other words, SARMC must show the jury's verdict on MRIA's other claims is not
supported by substantial evidence. SARMC, however, did not even attempt to make such a
showing. In fact, it did not appeal the jury's determination that SARMC was liable for breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of the non-compete clause, breach of the covenant of good faith,
conspiracy and intentional interference, because there was overwhelming evidence supporting
17

Under Idaho law, when ruling on a motion for new trial, the trial court sits as a "thirteenth
juror" and weighs the evidence to determine whether the jury verdict should be overturned.

28

004260

the jury's verdict on these claims. Therefore, the jury's verdict must be affirmed because
SARMC did not demonstrate that but for the wrongful dissociation ruling, the jury would not
have returned a verdict in favor of MRIA.

3. It Was Not Error to Refer to SARMC's Dissociation as "Wrongful."
SARMC claims it was prejudiced because the jury was instructed that the dissociation was
wrongful and because SARMC allegedly was prohibited from clarifying the ruling's import. It
was not error for the trial court to instruct the jury that the dissociation was "wrongful."
Moreover, SARMC was allowed to clarify the ruling's import.

18

This Court has held on numerous occasions that it is not error to use the words of a statute
when instructing the jury. See State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358,362,690 P.2d 293,297 (1984);
Holland v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 728, 5 I 8 P.2d 1 I 90 (1974). Thus, because RUPA expressly refers
to dissociation in violation of a partnership agreement as "wrongful," the trial court did not err
by referring to SARMC's dissociation as "wrongful." To insure, however, there would be no
prejudice to SARMC, the trial court prohibited MRIA from referring to the withdrawal at trial as
"unlawful," "illegal," or a "violation of law" (R. Vol. XI, p. 2123.)
Moreover SARMC was allowed to explain to the jury that a "wrongful dissociation is not
necessarily illegal or blameworthy." In his mini-opening statement to the voir dire panel,
SARMC's counsel stated "the judge will tell you, I believe, however, that that breach of contract

Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 624, 603 P .2d 575, 579 ( 1979).
18
SARMC also alleges that the supposed prejudice to SARMC was exacerbated by the
admission of evidence that SARMC had been advised it did not have the right to withdraw. (Jd.
at 29, n. 8.) As set forth in Part IV. H-I in.ft-a., admission of that evidence was proper.
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was not unlawfuL Despite the fact that we might be referring to it from time to time as a
'wrongful' move, it was not unlawful." (TR Vol. I at 620:10-13 (emphasis added).) SARMC's
CEO likewise testified that SARMC was allowed to withdraw under RUPA. (TR Vol. II at
1949: I 5-19.) In closing statements SARMC then argued"[ w]e had the right to leave the
partnership." (TR VoL III at 4371 :20.) Thus, SARMC was allowed to explain it had a right to
dissociate and even that the dissociation was "not unlawful."

4. The Trial Court's Instruction Concerning SARMC's Wrongful
Dissociation Did Not "Amount to a Directed Verdict" on MRIA's Other
Claims.
SARMC attempts to stretch its "taint" argument by averring that the trial court's instruction to
the jury on wrongful dissociation "amounted to a directed verdict on critical elements of the
remaining claims." Notwithstanding that this argument is pure speculation, the argument also
has no merit, because there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict on these
claims. In light of this "overwhelming" and "clear and convincing" evidence, it cannot be said
the instructions to the jury about the summary judgment finding of wrongful dissociation
"tainted" the jury. 19 (TR Vol. III at 4471 :9-17.)
Furthermore, it was SARMC's counsel, in closing argument, who exacerbated the alleged
problem by repeatedly referring to SARMC's dissociation as a "bad act."
I want to talk about dissociation because that's the one where, obviously, even though we
didn't think we were committing a bad act at the time we did it, we later found out that it
wasn't something that we should have done. We had the right to leave the partnership, but
the way in which we left it was a wrongful dissociation. Of course, that's a bad act when
19

Conspicuously, SARMC does not cite to any objection to the instructions on this ground.
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we~-

we now have to accept the fact that it's a bad act. Certainly, in this room it's a bad act.
You didn't think it was a bad act, but it's a bad act in this room.

(TR Vol. III at 4371: 16~25 (emphasis added).) Neither MRIA nor the trial court referred to the
dissociation as a "bad act." Thus, if any statement "compelled'' the jury to find for MRIA on
MRIA's other claims, it was SARMC's repeated reference to its "bad act" in closing arguments.
SARMC cannot claim prejudice from its own conduct.
In conclusion, there is nothing in the jury's conduct or in its apparent decision making process
suggesting the jury was impassioned or prejudiced by the summary judgment ruling when it
determined liability on MRIA's other claims. To the contrary, the jury appears to have been very
deliberate in reaching its decision. The jury's verdict was then upheld by the trial court, which
after an independent review, denied SARMC's request for a new trial. SARMC's new request
must be denied as SARMC has failed to show manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court.
E. The Jury's Damages Award must be Affirmed Because MRIA Had Standing to
Bring the Claims.

The Jury's damages award must be affirmed because (1) SARMC failed to argue below that
MRIA is not entitled to recover lost profits and (2) all of the claims, not just the fiduciary duty
claims, were brought on behalf of the limited partnerships.

1. SARMC Failed to Preserve Its Argument.
SARMC's claim that the verdict form was flawed because of the disjunctive nature of Question
No.9

20

is premised on SARMC's erroneous assumption that MRIA is not entitled to recover lost

20

The Court should not consider SARMC's argument because SARMC failed to preserve it for
appeal. Although SARMC provided the trial court with a proposed special verdict form which

31

004263

profits. SARMC never took this position below. SARMC:
• Never sought a ruling that lost profit damages were not recoverable by MRIA;
• Agreed in the jury instruction conferences that MRIA was "entitled to pursue" lost
profits (TR Vol. III at 3372: 1-8; 3374:5-8);
• Implicitly agreed MRIA could recover lost profit damages by submitting jury instructions
allowing MRIA to recover lost profit damages (R. Ex. 230, Instructions Nos. 3, 24, 25); and
• Submitted a special verdict form acknowledging MRIA had standing to seek lost profits. (!d.
at Instruction No. 41 ).
Indeed, because SARMC never challenged MRIA's standing to recover lost profits, the trial
court never ruled on the matter. 21 Thus, there is no court order to appeal, and therefore the issue
was not preserved for appeal. Mihalka v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547, 552, 181 P.3d 473,478
(2008).
SARMC's conduct at the jury instruction conferences also unequivocally demonstrates that
SARMC agreed MRIA could seek lost profits because it was making claims on behalf of the
limited partnerships as well as its own behalf. SARMC never objected to the instructions or to
the verdict form on the grounds that MRIA is not entitled to damages for the lost scans suffered

separated the claims of MRIA from those of MRI Center and MRI Mobile, (Exhibit to R. No.
230, Instruction No. 41, Question Nos. 6, 8, 9), it did not object to the special verdict form or
Question No.9 on the record below. (See TR Vol. III at 3334-80,3962-70,4181-97,41994206). Further, SARMC did not support its arguments on this issue with any legal authority. As
stated by this Court, "[a] party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is
lacking." State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,263,923 P.2d 966,970 (1996).
21
That SARMC never raised this issue below is highlighted by the fact that the radiologists, who
were third-party defendants, did raise the issue in a motion for summary judgment. (R., Ex. 59.)
SARMC did not join in the motion or file a similar motion. When the radiologists subsequently
withdrew their motion before a decision was rendered, SARMC did not object to the withdrawal
of the motion. Because the motion was withdrawn, the issue was never before the trial court for
decision. (R. Vol. Vat 873-874.) SARMC cannot resurrect the radiologists' withdrawn motion
on appeal.
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by its limited partners. Instead, SARMC agreed MRIA could seek lost profits. Its counsel,
Patrick Miller, stated:
On No. 35, paragraph 1 --it may be a little confusing to the jury because they have
presented evidence of lost profits, and I would think that what we ought to do is say that
MRIA's, you know, lost profits-- I think we ought to say that they are entitled to pursue
what they think is their lost profits. They have put on damage of that through Mr. Budge
and Mr. Wilhoite. And then, we think we ought to have the instruction that we asked for
that when you ask for lost profits, you've got to prove them both as to amount and
causation with reasonable certainty. So, I suggest paragraph 1 that it's -- that they're
entitled to claim net lost profits, but then the measure can be dropped off because their
proof takes care of that.
(TR Vol. III at 3372:1-14 (emphasis added).) SARMC also submitted jury instructions and a
verdict form recognizing MRIA could recover lost profits on behalf of the enterprise, which
includes the limited partnerships, MRICI and MRIM. (R. Ex. 230, Instructions Nos. 3, 24, 25,
and 41.) The trial court likewise agreed tor purpose of the jury instructions and the verdict form
that, other than wrongful dissociation, the damages for all of the claims is the same: lost profits.
(TR Vol. III at 3962: 15-3970:22.)
The fact is that SARMC never argued MRIA is not entitled to damages on behalf of itself or on
behalf of the limited partners because, SARMC, like the court and everyone else, treated MRIA
and its limited partners as a single enterprise. (See also TR Vol. III at 4202:20A203:4.) MRIA
was the management head and MRICI and MRIM were the operational divisions of the business.
(TR Vol. II at 1316:3-19.) One could not function without the other. This integrated nature of the
entities was succinctly stated by the trial court.
And when I say "these folks," I'm talking about, really, MRI Mobile/MRI Center were
interwoven with MRIA, though there were distinctions and they may have been for tax
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purposes or other health-law purposes, the overwhelming evidence is that they were all
bundled together and decisions were made.
And so, the court will decline to differentiate between or give separate instructions as to
MRIA and then MRI Mobile and MRI Center, the limited liability partnerships.
(TR Vol. III at 4202:24-4203:4; 4203:18-21 (emphasis added).) Because ofthis "bundling," any
injury to the operations groups (MRICI and MRIM) are recoverable by the board (MRIA) in the
form of lost profits. 22

2. MRIA Was Authorized to Bring the Limited Partners' Claims.
The partnership agreements for MRICI and MRIM provide "[t]he business and affairs of the
Partnership shall be conducted by the General Partner, [MRIA,J which is vested with all
authority and responsibility necessary for the management of the Partnership and its business ...
. "(Trial Ex. 4024 at§ 4.1 and Ex. 4028 at§ 4.1.) The business and affairs of the limited
partnerships necessarily includes lawsuits.

3. MRIA Brought All of the Claims on Behalf of the Limited Partnerships
Contrary to SARMC's assertion, all of the claims were brought by MRIA on behalf ofMRICI
and MRIM, not just the breach of fiduciary duty claim. 23 This is made clear by the second
amended counterclaim which provides:
22

The concept that damage to the limited partnerships constituted damage to MRIA is also
memorialized in the MRIA partnership agreement, which states that partners could not engage in
competitive activity within 100 miles "of the first magnetic resonance imaging device installed
by the Limited Partnership," referring to the MRI Center facility. (Trial Ex. 4023, § 9.2.2.) Thus,
any damages suffered by the MRIA partners for a violation of the non-compete agreement was
clearly intended by the parties to be measured by the damages to the limited partnerships. (TR
Vol. II at 1316:3~19; 1327:10-15.)
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MRI Associates, LLP is an Idaho limited liability partnership ("MRIA"), which also acted
as a general partner with management responsibilities for two operational entities, MRI
Limited Partnership, known as MRI Center of Idaho ("MRI Center" or the "Center"), and
MRI Mobile Limited Partnership, known as MRI Mobile. MRIA brings this action on its
own behalf, and as general partner for these operational entities; MRIA is entitled to and
does hereby bring this action on behalf of these two limited partnerships. Unless otherwise
referenced, the designation "MRIA" shall refer to all three entities: MRIA, MRI Center
and MRI Mobile.
(R. Vol. Vat 907,, 7 (emphasis added).) Thus, MRIA brought the action on its own behalf and

on behalf of the limited partnerships. MRIA also made clear that when "MRIA" was used in the
counterclaim, it referred to MRIA and the limited partnerships. (/d.) The final jury instructions
also recognized that the parties and the trial court were treating MRIA and its limited
partnerships as one operational unit for purposes of the claims. For example, Instruction No. 33
provides that ifthejury finds that SARMC breached its duty ofloyalty "to MRIA, MRI Center,
or MRI Mobile, then your verdict should be for MRIA." (R. Ex. 202.) Because all of the claims,
except the fiduciary duty claims, were made by MRIA on behalfofMRICI and MRIM, and
because the jury found for MRJA on all of those claims the jury's damage award must stand
regardless of whether SARMC owed fiduciary duties to the limited partnerships, MRICI and
MRIM. (R. Vol. Vat 929-30, 932-34, 940; R. Vol. XII at 2294-96.)
Furthermore, SARMC's own proposed instructions, which recognized MRIA was bringing the
claims on behalf of the limited partnerships as well as its own behalf, reveal that this argument
23

Unlike all of the other claims, the breach of fiduciary duty claims were segregated between
MRIA and the limited partnerships. Instead one claim was brought by MRIA on its own behalf
and another claim was brought by MRIA on behalf of the limited partnerships. (R. Vol. V at 93031.) This was done because MRIA recognized that separate duties were owed by SARMC to
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was newly manufactured for appeal. For example, SARMC's proposed Jury Instruction No. 24
asserts that: ''MRI Associates has alleged causes of action for ... breach of fiduciary duty to
MRI Limited and MRI Mobile .... " (R. Ex. 230, Instructions No. 24.) SARMC also invited any
error when it successfully argued for one damage line on the verdict form. (TR Vol. III at
3968:7-3969:6.) It would have made no difference to have separate questions concerning
whether the jury was finding for MRIA or one of the limited partnerships with respect to the
fiduciary duty claims because if the jury found on behalf of MRIA for tortious interference,
which it did, and on behalf of the limited partnerships for breach of fiduciary duty, there would
be no way to distinguish to whom the damages were awarded. This invited error by SARMC
destroys SARMC's argument that the verdict form was defective. Burgess v. Salmon River
Canal Co. Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 571, 903 P.2d 730, 736 (1995).

4. SARMC Owed Fiduciary Duties MRICI and MRIM.
Because MRIA clearly brought all of the claims on behalf of the limited partnerships, not just
the fiduciary duty claims, and because SARMC has not appealed the jury's finding of liability on
these other claims, this Court need not address whether SARMC owed fiduciary duties to the
limited partnerships to sustain the verdict and damages award. However, even if the Court were
to find damages could be awarded to MRICI and MRIM only upon their breach of fiduciary duty
claims, the award is proper.

each entity. Because there were distinctly separate fiduciary duty claims, Instruction No.7 makes
clear that the limited partners are distinct entities. (R. Exhibit 202, Instruction No. 17.)
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A fiduciary relation exists between two parties when one is under a duty to act or to give
advice for the benefit of the other upon a matter within the scope of the relation. Podolan v.

Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937, 946, 854 P.2d 280, 289 (Ct. App. 1993). "To
establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiff must establish that defendants owed
plaintiff a fiduciary duty and that the fiduciary duty was breached." Sorensen v. Saint

AlphonsusRegional Medical Center, Inc., 141 Idaho 754, 760, 118 P.3d 86, 92 (2005).

a.

SARMC Owed Fiduciary Duties to MRICI and MRIM
Pursuant to Statute

The Court should find, contrary to the trial court's holding below, (R. Vol. X at 1876-77), that
SARMC owed fiduciary duties to MRICI and MRIM pursuant to statute. 24 Fiduciary
relationships can be created by statute, including the Idaho Uniform Partnership Act, I. C. § 53-3404(a)-(c), which provides partners owe fiduciary duties to the partnership. These statutory
duties flow from SARMC to both MRIA and the limited partnerships. 25
SARMC, however, attempts to make several artificial distinctions between SARMC as a
general partner of MRIA and MRIA itself. Of course, "[e ]ach partner is an agent of the
24

Although this is a cross-appeal issue, it is addressed here as it concerns the fiduciary duty
claims.
25
SARMC emphasizes this language from the comments to § 53-3-404: "[a]rguably, the term
'fiduciary' is inappropriate when used to describe the duties of a partner because a partner may
legitimately pursue self-interest ... and not solely the interest of the partnership and the other
partners, as must a true trustee. 25 " !d. at comment 1. However, the same comment acknowledges
that the characterization of partners as fiduciaries is a long-standing practice, and that "the law of
partnership reflects the broader law of principal and agent, under which every agent is a
fiduciary." !d.
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partnership for the purpose of its business" and "[a]n act of a partner ... binds the partnership."
Idaho Code § 53~3-30 1. Consistent with this fundamental rule, "all partners are liable jointly and
severally for all obligations of the partnership." !d. at§ 53-3-306. Through these and other rules,
Idaho law merges partnerships and their general partners into a single legal identity. Thus, if a
partnership such as MRIA was a fiduciary to the entities it operated, MRICI and MRIM, then the
general partners of MRIA are also fiduciaries to MRICI and MRIM.
SARMC's argument that it was not a fiduciary to MRICI and MRIM would render Idaho
partnership law incoherent. A partnership such as MRIA would be unable to observe its fiduciary
duties to the businesses it operates if its own general partners (who have the power to bind
MRIA as its agents) were not obligated to observe the same fiduciary duties. Moreover, as the
joint and several liability rule indicates, there is no "partnership veil" that relieves a general
partner from answering for the partnership's debts and obligations. Thus, there is no distinction
between MRIA's obligations and the obligations ofMRIA's general partners.
In re The Monetary Group, 2 F.3d 1098 (ll th Cir. 1993), reached a similar conclusion:
A general partner in a limited partnership stands in a fiduciary relationship with the limited
partners of that limited partnership. Atkins was a general partner of TSG. Thus, Atkins
owed a fiduciary duty to TSG's limited partners. Additionally, TSG was a general partner
of Groups. Therefore, because Atkins owed a fiduciary duty as a general partner of TSG
~nd TSG was a general partner of Groups, Atkins' fiduciary duty extended to Groups.
/d. at 1103 (citations omitted)(applying New York law). The same reasoning applies here: as a

fiduciary to MRIA, SARMC was also a fiduciary to MRICI and MRIM.
The artificial distinctions raised by SARMC exalt form over substance. This can be shown by
the following analogy. The responsibilities ofthe MRIA board of partners that managed the
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limited partnerships included functioning much like a board of directors over the limited
partnerships. SARMC's capacity as a member of the board ofpartners was much like that of an
individual director. Such an individual director owes a fiduciary duty to the businesses it
manages while sitting on the board. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 138 Idaho 424, 428, 64 P.3d 953, 957
(2003). In this light, it makes complete sense to find that SARMC's fiduciary responsibilities run
not only to MRIA, but also to the partnerships MRIA managed. 26
b.

SARMC Owed Fiduciary Duties to MRI Center and MRI
Mobile Pursuant to Common Law

SARMC also was a fiduciary to MRIA, MRICI, and MRIM due to the position of trust and
confidence it held in relationship to these entities. As this Court has long held, "[a] fiduciary
relationship does not depend upon some technical relation created by or defined in law, but it
exists in cases where there has been a special confidence imposed in another who, in equity and
good conscience, is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interest of one reposing
the confidence." Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276,288,240 P.2d 833,840-41 (1952). Thus,
"[g]enerally, in a fiduciary relationship, the property, interest or authority of the other is placed
in the charge of the fiduciary." Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,
277,824 P.2d 841,852 (1991).
26

SARMC, while citing I. C. § 53-224, asserts that "the Limited Partnership Act makes clear that
only MRIA, as general partner, and not Saint Alphonsus, as a limited partner, owed fiduciary
duties to [MRICI and MRIM]." That code section, however, does not support SARMC's
argument. It simply provides that a general partner owes the same duties in a limited partnership
that a partner owes in a general partnership. Thus it is completely consistent with MRIA's
arguments above.
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SARMC argues that because it held only two of the seats on the MRIA Board of Partners, no
reasonable jury could conclude that SARMC had authority over the limited partnerships.
SARMC again ignores the totality of the evidence. 27 As the trial court found, the evidence left
no doubt that SARMC exercised influence and authority over MRICI and MRIM.
The court had, from the significant number of minute meetings and -- or minutes
from meetings and the substantial role, I believe, Saint Alphonsus played in their
partnership with MRIA, that realistic- -- the evidence -- and I haven't really heard any
evidence to the contrary -- that there was a confidence placed by these folks. And when I
say "these folks," I'm talking about, really, MRI Mobile/MRI Center were interwoven with
MRIA, though there were distinctions and they may have been for tax purposes or other
health-law purposes, the overwhelming evidence is that they were all bundled together and
decisions were made ....
They [SARMC] were voting. They were acting as a fiduciary. And certainly,
there is, I believe, clear evidence and, really, no contradictory evidence to that effect. ...
I think MRIA had a very, very reasonable reliance on the trust and belief that
Saint Alphonsus was acting in a fiduciary capacity towards both MRIA, MRI
Mobile/MRI Center in their limited partnership capacities.
(TR. Vol. III at 4202:12-4203:18 (emphasis added).) Similarly in Matter ofBennett, 989 F.2d
779, 788 (5 111 Cir. 1993), the court held that "as the managing partner of the managing partner,
[Bennett] owed to the MG limited partners 'the highest fiduciary duty recognized in the law.'"
27

SARMC was the 800 pound gorilla in the relationship. The business depended on SARMC's
involvement. (!d. at 2420:10-16.) MRICI's magnet was sited on SARMC's campus. (TR VoL II
at 1325:21-1326: 11; 1860:6-15.) SARMC had the relationship with the referring doctors and the
radiologists that read the scans. (TR Vol. II at 2420:11-16; 2020:7-18; 2428:21-2429:6; Trial
Exs. 4329 at 2, 4505 at 1, & 4221 at 3.) SARMC sat on the board of partners, voted on matters
and exercised influence over the limited partnerships. (See e.g., Trial Exs. 4054 at 2 & 4221 at 3;
TR Vol. II at 1881 :8-24.) In fact, SARMC was entrusted to negotiate with the radiologists so the
radiologists would join MRIA rather than compete against MRICI. (See supra., Part I. F.) The
other partners gave SARMC a tremendous amount of deference and acceded to SARMC's
wishes even when doing so was not optimal for the partnership. (TR Vol. III at 3314:2-5;
3311 :5-3 315: 15; 1171: 14-1172:2.) In fact, SARMC was so valuable to the partnership, that after
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!d. at 790. See also Crenshaw v. Swenson, 611 S. W.2d 886, 888 (Tex.Civ.App. 1981) (holding
the general partner of a partnership that was itself the general partner of a limited partnership
owed the limited partnership fiduciary duties). To hold otherwise would invite attempts by such
"second-tier" general partners to evade partnership duties and liability by simply adding a second
partnership layer. See In re Abrams, 229 B.R. 784, 792 (9th Cir. B. App. 1999).
SARMC's argument would render the fiduciary duties ofMRIA's partners absolutely
meaningless. 28 Those partners indisputably owe MRIA fiduciary duties and MRIA as the general
partner of the limited partnerships indisputably owes fiduciary duties to those partnerships.
Surely Idaho partnership law also imposes on general partners such as SARMC fiduciary duties
for the benefit of entities in the position of MRICI and MRIM. Accordingly, the jury's verdict
should be sustained.

F. The Jury's Finding of Causation Must be Affirmed.
SARMC contends the jury's finding of causation must be overturned because MRIA did not
"isolate" the effect of (GSR) IMI' s entry into the competitive market (i.e, it was the reputation of
the radiologists in IMI that caused the referral migration). This contention fails because SARMC,
as a co-conspirator, joint venturer and partner with GSR in IMI, is liable for GSR's conduct in
IMI. This contention also fails because even if MRIA was required to isolate the effect of GSR in
IMI, MRIA proved with reasonable certainty that SARMC caused the claimed damage.

it dissociated, MRICI "struggl [ed] with how to stay in business." (TR Vol. II at 1301: 19~
1302: 1.)
28
In fact, SARMC's counsel thought SARMC's withdrawal created a risk ofSARMC
"breaching its fiduciary duties to the LPs." (Trial Ex. 4239 at 1 L)
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l.

SARMC Is Liable for the Conduct of the Radiologists in IMI

SARMC's argument that MRIA needed to isolate the effect of IMI is not a causation argument,
but instead is a liability argument as SARMC is really asserting it is not liable for the conduct of
GSR, its partner in IMI. This argument fails because there is no dispute that SARMC is liable
for the conduct ofGSR in IMI. The jury found that SARMC conspired with GSR to compete
with MRIA through IMI. a finding that SARMC has not appealed. (R. Ex. 202 at Instruction 36,
R. Vol. XII at 2296.) Thus, regardless of whether it was SARMC's conduct or GSR's conduct in
IMI that caused MRIA damage, SARMC is liable as a co-conspirator. Argonaut Ins. Co. v.

White, 86 Idaho 374, 379,386 P.2d 964,966 (1963). Therefore, because SARMC has not
disputed that MRIA proved $36.3 million dollars of the scans were lost to IMI, and because
SARMC did not appeal the conspiracy finding, SARMC's argument must be rejected and the
damages award must be affirmed.
Even without the conspiracy finding, SARMC's argument fails because it was IMI's entry into
the market with SARMC's support that caused MRIA damage. There is no dispute that had
SARMC opened a competing business on its own, it would be liable for the scans MRIA lost to
that business. Vancil v. Anderson, 71ldaho 95, 105,227 P.2d 74,79 (1951). It is no defense that
here, SARMC did so as a partner in IMI because SARMC is jointly and severally liable for
GSR's acts in the IMI partnership. I.C. § 53-3-306. SARMC is even liable for the acts ofiMI
before it formally joined IMI because it joint ventured with IMI from the beginning. Costa v.
Borges, 145 Idaho 353, 356, 179 P.3d 316, 319 (2008) (recognizing a joint venture "is an
association of two or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise" and that
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"partnership law generally governs joint ventures.") Accordingly, as there is no dispute the scans
were lost to IMI, the following equation summarizes causation: SARMC + Gem State Radiology
"" IMI.

2. Even if SARMC Was Not Liable for the Conduct of its Partner in IMI,
MRIA Adequately Proved Causation.
As set forth above, the Court need not address SARMC's causation argument because SARMC
is liable for the conduct of IMI. However, even if SARMC was not liable as a co-conspirator,
MRIA proved causation and damages.

a. MRIA's Burden of Proof Regarding Causation and Damages.
MRIA had three hurdles to clear in its proof of causation and damages:
Proximate cause: MRIA's burden was to prove its injury was proximately caused by SARMC's
conduct. Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 152 P.3d 604 (Idaho 2007).
Proximate cause is a cause that, in natural or probable sequence produced the claimed damage.
IDJI 2.30.2. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing
about the loss. /d.
The fact of damage: MRIA must prove with "reasonable certainty" that the alleged conduct
did, in fact, damage MRIA. Gr(ffith, 143 Idaho at 740, 152 P.3d at 61 I. "Reasonable certainty
requires neither absolute assurance nor mathematical exactitude; rather, the evidence need only
be sufficient to remove the existence of damages from the realm of speculation." /d. The fact of
damage can be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. Thomas Helicopters, Inc. v. San
Tan Ranches, 102 Idaho 567,570,633 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Idaho 1981).
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The amount of damage: The amount of damages must be "proved with whatever definiteness
and accuracy the facts permit, but no more." ld at 741, 152 P.3d at 612. Ultimately it is for the
trier of fact to fix the amount by determining the credibility of the witnesses, resolving conflicts
in the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. ld at 741, 152 P .3d at 612.
SARMC, "[t]he wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty [in the proof of the amount of
damages] which [its] own wrong has created." !d.

b. MRIA Proved SARMC Was a Proximate Cause ofMRIA's
Loss.
i. A Probable and Foreseeable Consequence of SARMC's

Conduct was that Scans Would Migrate from MRIA to I MI.
The evidence shows that SARMC specifically intended to shift scans from MRIA to its new
joint venture with GSR, IMI. The jury easily could have determined that the following acts by
SAR.t\1C, while still a partner in MRIA, were intended to steer referring physicians from MRIA
to IMI:
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

SARMC made IMI its "outpatient facility" for SARMC patients. (See supra Part I. H. 5.)
SARMC provided significant IT support and investment to IMI allowing IMI to digitally
present its images and reports to referring physicians. MRIA was excluded from much of
this IT support. (See supra Part I. H. 2.)
SARMC and GSRjointly marketed IMI directly to referring physicians. (See supra Part I. H.
4.)
SARMC assisted in the management, planning and establishment of IMI Meridian (aka "IMI
West") which competed with MRICI and MRIM. (See supra Part I. H. 6.)
SARMC and the radiologists placed a mobile scanning unit 100 feet away from MRICI' s
operation on the SARMC campus. (TR Vol. II at 2173:21-24.)
SARMC turned a blind eye to GSR's reduction in effort and technician support at MRICI's
lab. (See supra Part I. I.)
SARMC allowed GSR to reduce their weekday hours of service at MRICI, so that
radiologists were less available to schedule, attend or read an MRICI scanning procedure.
(!d.)
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•

•

SARMC allowed GSR to cancel all weekend hours of service to MRIA, except for
emergencies (previously, service had been 2417 for emergency and non-emergency cases).
(/d.)
SARMC pulled all affiliation with MRICI and directed its medical staff to refer patients
solely to IMI. (Trial Ex. 4377.)

The reasonable inference is that the natural and probable consequence of this conduct was the
loss of scan volume at MRICI. Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that SARMC took deliberate
steps to shift scan volumes away from MRICI to IMI. 29
Also, contrary to SARMCs argument, MRIA did not need not show that SARMC was the
"only cause" ofthe scan migration. Gr~ffith, 143 Idaho at 740-41, 152 P.3d at 611-12. 30 It was
sufficient for MRIA to show that SARMC was a substantial factor in bringing about the
migration. IDJI 2.30.2. In addition to the above, the evidence is overwhelming that IMI would
never have been the competitor it became without SARMC's support and assistance. In fact, the
29

This intention to compete with its partners in MRIA (i.e., take scan volumes) is reflected in
the work ofSAMC's consultants. SARMC CFO, Ken Fry asked Alan Hahn to prepare Scenario
5 which analyzes the consequences of SARMC competing with MRIA through IMI and warns
that doing so would cause "shifting referrals" that could result in litigation. (Trial Ex. 4138; TR
Vol. II at 1864: l-12; 2297:8-13.) Shattuck Hammond documents also reveal that SARMC was
"strongly considering withdrawing .... and competing with the existing MRI facilities on its own
campus" and that SARMC wanted "to continue pursue additional imaging center opportunities
within its service area through IMI." (Trial Ex. 4247; TR Vol. II at 1861 :21-1863:2; 2369:82370:10.)
30
SARMC's reliance on this Court's decisions in Pope v. Intermountain Gas, 103 Idaho 217,
646 P.2d 988 (1982) and Twin Falls Farm & City Distrb., Inc. v. D & B Supply Co., 96 Idaho
351, 528 P.2d 1286 (1974) is misplaced. Pope and Twin Falls are antitrust cases. For an antitrust
case, a claimant must show the damages were caused by an antitrust violation, not by other
factors such as competition. Pope, I 03 Idaho at 233-34, 646 P.2d at 1004-05. As set forth
above, in this case competition was the actionable conduct. See also Vancil v. Anderson, 71
Idaho 95, 105,227 P.2d 74,79 (1951).
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evidence demonstrates IMI might not have come into existence without SARMC's assistance.
(Trial Exs. 545 & 4074.) While still a pm1ner in MRIA:
•
•

•
•

IMI's financing was contingent on SARMC's involvement. (Trial Ex. 545.)
SARMC supported the opening of IMI by providing: (1) records of its case volume to
IMI to help IMI develop a business plan; (2) knowledgeable staff members who began
working for GSR in order to establish a functioning business at IMI; (3) IT support and
connections to SARMC's digital radiology system; and (4) assistance in securing loans
for the financing of IMI. (Trial Ex. 4095.)
SARMC provided IMI with significant financial support, including $546,146 in cash
and assumption of$1.5 million ofiMI's debt. (ld at 1557:4-1558:2; 1622:22-1623:8.)
SARMC provided IMI with exclusive IT support from IMI's inception including a
$780,000 investment in dark fiber connecting IMI to SARMC. Basically, SARMC
"was there with [IMI] making that investment in getting doctors over the technology
hump" and helping bring the "digital revolution'' to IMI while MRIA was left in the
cold. (See supra Part I. H. 2.)

SARMC's argument that scans migrated to IMI based on the professional reputation of the
radiologists does not change the analysis. The jury was presented with SARMC's evidence and
argument in this regard, and found, notwithstanding the radiologists' reputation, SARMC was a
substantial factor in bringing about MRIA's losses. 31 The argument, in fact, demonstrates why it
was so egregious for SARMC to join the radiologists in founding IMI to compete with MRIA.

32

c. The Fact of Injury is Undisputed.
31

SARMC's argument also misrepresents the testimony at trial. Sam Gibson, one of the referring
doctors called by SARMC stated he sent his referrals to SARMC. (TR Vol. III at 3328:233329:2.)
32
The argument is simply of no help to SARMC because the proof is (1) the radiologists'
reputation and practice was enhanced by continued affiliation with SARMC in IMI, (TR Vol. II
at 2420: l-16)and (2) any act of the radiologists that attracted a migration of scans to IMI was
done either as a joint venturer, partner or co-conspirator with SARMC.
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SARMC does not dispute that MRICI lost scan volumes after IMI opened and that the scans
lost by MRICI migrated to IMI. Trial exhibits 4518 and 4519, charts prepared by MRIA's expert
Bruce Budge, graphically show that MRIA lost scan volumes while IMI enjoyed a corresponding
increase in scans. (Ex. B to the Appendix attached hereto.) In his analysis, Budge painstakingly
identified approximately 1900 doctors who had historically used MRICI, but had shifted their
business to IMI. (TR Vol. II at 2745:23·2746:7.) Based on his analysis, Budge testified that
SARMC's course of conduct "handicapped MRIA to the advantage of one of its partners
[SARMC] and caused this migration of referrals .... Those scans ... they're not going out in the
community to some other competitor. They're going to IMI. You can see that from the data. And
it's not necessary to go and ask the physicians for their detailed information. We can observe
what that migration is." 33 (!d. at 2767:25·2768:6 (emphasis added.)
Moreover the jury was allowed to draw reasonable inferences from the conduct, bullet pointed
above, to tind that the intended consequence of SARMC's conduct had, in fact, caused the
injury. Griffith, 143 Idaho at 740, 152 P.3d at 611. It was therefore not unreasonable for the jury
to infer from the evidence that SARMC's conduct caused MRIA's harm. For example:
•

•

Carolyn Corbett, SARMC's Chief Nursing Officer testified she was "sure" the radiologists
curtailment of hours at MRICI had a "huge impact" on MRICI's capability to do business.
(TR Vol. II at 2195:14·17.)
Jack Floyd, CEO ofMRICI, presented Ken Fry, SARMC's CFO with a monthly report
showing the lost scans caused by SARMC's failure to require the radiologists to maintain a

33

Interestingly, because IMI kept track of its growth by measuring the number of SARMC
doctors that it was attracting. In the first months of operation, IMI's MRI customer base
consisted of74% SARMC doctors. (Trial Exs. 4127, 4517; TR Vol. II at 1512:3~1513:18.)
IMI's executive director testified that these doctors likely had used MRCI before IMI. (Id at
1517:12-19.)
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•

•

•

24/7 schedule at MRICI (as had been required before IMI opened). (!d. at 2509:14-2510: 19;
Trial Ex. 4292.)
Holly Wallace, MRICI's marketing director, testified that SARMC was doing marketing on
behalf of IMI which caused MRIA to lose customers because IMI became known as the
SARMC affiliated imaging center and she testified that SARMC gave IMI a two year head
start on technology which delivered digital reports to referring physicians. (TR Vol. II at
2420:11-16; 2428:21-2429:6; 2439:7-2440:7.) These activities occurred over a period time
while MRICI lost scan volumes. (!d. at 2440:8-12.)
The IMI Operating Agreement reveals SARMC's agreement with GSR to pursue and
establish an imaging center in Meridian ("IMI West"). (Trial Ex. 4226.) Cindy Schamp
acknowledged that SARMC could not, under the terms of the MRIA Partnership Agreement,
establish an imaging center in Meridian. (!d. at 2266:6-13.) Neve1theless, IMI West, under
the IMI Managing Committee (consisting of four SARMC executives) took thousands of
referrals away from MRICI and MRIM each year. (ld. at 2793-94; Trial Ex. 4516)
Bruce Budge testified that his analysis ofMRICI's records and IMI's records established
that, averaged over a five and a half year period, 52% of the scans performed by IMI at its
downtown operation were referred by doctors who had historically referred to MRICI. (TR
Vol. II at 2741 :7-22) MRICI's lost scans were not going to any other competitor in the
market, than IMI. (TR Vol. II at 2767:25-2768:6, 2748:20-2753:7; Trial Ex. 4518.)

An analysis of the overwhelming evidence supporting causation in comparison with SARMC's
sole fact in defense of causation is attached as Ex. C to the Appendix attached hereto.

d. MRIA Proved the Amount of Damages With Reasonable Certainty
Because MRIA proved some damage occurred it only needed to prove the amount "with
whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts permit[ed]" because any uncertainty in the amount
is borne by SARMC as the wrongdoer.

Gr~ffith,

143 Idaho at 741, 152 P.3d at 612.

MRIA's expert, Bruce Budge, testified he obtained infotmation from both MRIA and IMI
showing the doctors that referred to those imaging centers and the number of referrals from each
of those doctors. (TR Vol. II at 2730:3~2731 :7; 2735:13-21; 2737:9-18; 2738:25-2739:7; Trial
Exs. 4417 A; 4425, 4515, 4516, and 4517.) Budge used a conservative analysis; he only took
into account (1) MRIA's historical customers who had switched to IMI, downtown and
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Meridian, (2) scans from IMI's mobile unit that SARMC placed next to MRICI on SARMC's
campus, and (3) new SARMC related physicians. (!d. at 2741 :7-2743:6; 2765:4-2766:7.) Based
on this information he developed an approach which showed revenues were diverted from MRIA
to IMI. (!d. at 2733:5-9). Essentially, he tracked the "migration of referrals" from MRIA to IMI.

(!d. at 2764:5-17; 2767:25-2768:6.) His analysis was consistent with the testimony at trial that
MRIA lost scans to IMI. (TR Vol. II at 1301:24-1302:1; 1365:15-21; 1536:13-19.)
Budge then used the detailed information he had from both MRIA and IMI concerning their
revenues and costs per scans to determine how much profit MRIA lost as a result of the
migration of referrals from MRIA to IMI. (!d. at 2730:3-2731:7; 2753:17-2754: 16.) "So I
basically am multiplying the number of scans times the profit per scan to figure out the lost
profit." (Jd. at 2754:12-14.) 34
Budge's analysis, contrary to SARMC's assertion, accounted for other factors such as
competition. For example, for referring physicians in the market by 1999, Budge only included
in his calculations those physicians who had actually referred to MRICI. Likewise, he did not use
in his calculations referring doctors who did not have privileges at SARMC. He assumed IMI

34

This Court did not decide in Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172
P.3d 1119 (2007), as insinuated by SARMC' s out of context quote, that a party cannot prove lost
profit damages for breach of a non-compete clause through evidence of the breaching party's
profits. Instead, this Court held that the trial com1 did not err in finding the proof of lost profits
was deficient because Trilogy failed to introduce evidence of"any correspondence between what
its profit would have been and [the breaching party's] actual profit, and thus failed to take the
measure of its damages out of the realm of speculation. 144 Idaho at 847, I 72 P .3d at 1122; see
also Toddv. Sullivan Constr. LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 122-23, 191 P.3d 196,200-01 (2008). Here,
MRIA met this standard because it applied its revenue and cost structure figures to the scans that
were lost to I MI. (TR Vol. II at 2730:3-2731 :7; 2753:17 ~2754: 16.)
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would have obtained those scans even without SARMC's assistance. (/d. at 2742:24-2743:6.) 35
Budge then utilized MRIA's historical referral base (and MRIA's cost structure) to determine
what MRIA's profits would have been had SARMC not competed against MRIA through IMI.

(/d. at 2744:3-9.)
One of the things that I considered in computing the damage is to say there's
nothing really, had these actions by the hospital not occurred, that would have stopped
MRIA from just increasing into the foreseeable future ....
What this red line shows is the actual scans that were done by [MRIA] plus the
ones that I'm saying it would have performed but for the action of Saint Alphonsus in
supporting this competitor of MRIA.
And so this is what I call the but-for line. But for the actions of Saint Alphonsus,
this is what the scan volumes would have looked like for MRICI. You can see that they go
down. And we're basically saying in this alternative world that was really never allowed to
happen, it's probably reasonable to assume that the scan volume would have gone down for
MRICI because there would have been other entries in the market. This allows for the
existence of IMI for those scans that were kind of outside of this Saint Alphonsus stable of
referring physicians.

(!d. at 2769:13-2770:19 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2756:21-2757:3.) 36 In the above
testimony, Budge is referring to Trial Ex. 4519 (Ex. D to attached Appendix) which graphically
demonstrates the scans MRIA would have performed but for SARMC's association with IMI.

(!d.; TR Vol. II. at 2769:13-2770:19.)
35

MRIA's approach gave the jury great flexibility in determining the amount because MRIA's
experts divided the damages by date so that if the jury had found that damages began to accrue in
2001 when SARMC officially joined IMI rather than 1999 when SARMC began supporting IMI,
it was able to determine those damages. (Trial Exs. 4518, 4519; TR Vol. II at 2749:21-2752:6.)
36
Wilhoite also used a very conservative discount factor and growth rate. He testified that had
he not used such a conservative discount factor and growth, the damages would have been at
least $20 million more than what the amount argued by MRIA. (!d. at 2864:25-2869:13.)
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While Budge analyzed historical lost profits, MRIA's expert Charles Wilhoite analyzed future
lost profits. He did so by modeling what the profits would have been but for SARMC's
competition as compared to what the profits had been before SARMC's competition. (TR Vol.
III at 2864:19-2874:24; 2901:13-16.) His analysis is consistent with Idaho law. Ryska v.

Anderson, 70 Idaho 207,215,214 P.2d 874,878 (1950). Wilhoite, like Budge, accounted for
competition from sources other than SARMC and based his damages solely on the migration of
scans from MRICI to IMI. (TR Vol. III at 2864:19-2874:24, 2897:17-2898:22, 2901: 13~16,
2903: 10-18; 2907:23-2908:3.) Wilhoite's own appraisal ofMRICI demonstrated a drop in fair
market value from 2001 to 2006 of$32.5 million. This finding corroborates Budge's testimony
that his lost profits figure is $12 million less than the total drop in fair market value. Therefore
"other causes" impacting MRICI's loss in value were not included in Budge's analysis.

37

(ld at

2874:3-24.)

e. MRIA Was Not Required to Disprove that Referring Physicians
Switched from Referring to MRIA to IMI Because of the
Radiologists' Reputation.
SARMC suggests that MRIA had a burden to disprove that referring physicians switched from
MRIA to IMI because ofthe reputation of the radiologists who were partners with SARMC in

IMI. As set forth in Part IV. F. 1. above, that argument is a red herring because SARMC was a
co-conspirator, joint venture and partner with the radiologists in IMI, and therefore is liable for
referrals that IMI took from MRIA based on the reputation of SARMC's co-conspirator and
37

Further detail of the analysis ofMRIA's experts is set forth in TR Vol. II at 2745:23-2760:9
and TR Vol. III at 2853:17-2874:20.
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partner. Additionally, Idaho law does not require MRIA to disprove other causes. Gr{[/ith, 143
Idaho at 740-41, 152 P.3d at 611-12; Thomas Helicopters, Inc., 102 Idaho at 570-01,633 P.2d at
1149-50 (Idaho 1981) ("[I]t is ... the rule that 'the possibility, or even probability of another
cause for damages than that alleged does not defeat recovery where plaintiff presents sufficient
facts to justify a reasonable juror in concluding that the thing charged was the prime and moving
cause"); Adams v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining Co., 12 Idaho 637,643,89 P. 624 (1906)
(holding that "the jury would be justified in returning a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, although
it be possible that the injury may have resulted from some other cause").
Furthermore, even if SARMC's argument that the referring physicians switched from MRIA to
IMI because of the quality of the radiologists was relevant, it is not supported by the evidence.
From 1999 to 2005, the same radiologists read images for both MRIA and IMI. (Id. at 2460:202461:7.) Trial Exhibit 4519 demonstrates scans were being lost to IMI long before 2005 when
the radiologists began to read images exclusively for IMI.
The argument also ignores the evidence that Budge stated that in computing the damages he
only took into account the referrals that were lost because of SARMC's association with IMI.
(TR Vol. II at 2769: 13-2770:21.) In fact, as set forth above, Budge and Wilhoite specifically
took into account the fact that IMI would have taken scans away from MRIA even if SARMC
had not supported IMI. 38 (!d.; TR Vol. III at 2864:19-2874:24, 2897:17-2898:22, 2901:13-16,
2903:10-18; 2907:23-2908:3.) Furthermore, the sheer number of referring physicians made it
38

Even SARMC's expert could not rule out SARMC's conduct as a cause for the switch in
referrals. (TR Vol. III at 3234: 17-3235:6.)
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impracticable to perform the analysis SARMC erroneously alleges is required. (TR Vol. II at
2766:8~2768:6.)

Performing such an analysis is also impracticable because it is difficult to (1)

get a representative sample, (2) get doctors to participate, and (3) get an unbiased sample. (Id)
SARMC's expert likewise did not do such an analysis. (TR Vol. III at 3235:15-3236:8.) MRIA
analysis, without interviewing all 1900 referring physicians, proved the amount of damage with
reasonable certainty and SARMC as the wrongdoer cannot complain about any uncertainty.

Griffith, 143 Idaho at 740-41, 152 P.3d at 611-12. 39
3. MRIA is also Entitled to Damages Because SARMC Usurped a
Partnership Opportunity.
SARMC owed a fiduciary duty to MRIA not to usurp a partnership opportunity. I. C. § 53-3404(b )(1 ). Under this rule, the misappropriation of a partnership opportunity is considered a
usurpation of partnership property and a breach of a fiduciary duty and the partnership is entitled
to any profits realized from such usurpation. See id. (official comment). Here, as set forth in Part

I. E. F. supra., SARMC usurped MRIA's opportunity to partner with the radiologists, GSR, in an
imaging center and took that opportunity for itself by partnering with the radiologists in IMI. As
discussed above, MRIA took a more conservative approach than what would be allowed under a
theory of usurpation.

4.

MRIA Is Entitled to Lost Profits Through 2023

SARMC argues the trial court erred in allowing MRIA to seek lost scan damages for the years
2015 to 2023 and bases its argument on the erroneous assertion that MRIA "did not make any

39

Conspicuously, SARMC offered no alternative methodology.
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evidentiary showing to support its claim" that the partnership term for MRICI was extended from
2015 to 2023. Evidently SARMC' s new appellate counsel has not read the record. Numerous
witnesses, including SARMC witnesses, testified the partnership terms were extended to 2023.
For example, SARMC's CEO and CFO both testified they understood the term of MRICI had
been extended to 2023 and that SARMC ratified the extension. (Jd. at 1676:3-6, 1678:17-21,
3521:7-21,3534:11-18, 3535:10-14.) SARMC's COO even testified that the non-compete in the
MRIA partnership agreement was extended until2023. (/d. at 3592:5-21.) She further testified
the lease for MRICI on SARMC's campus was extended until2023 consistent with the extension
ofthe partnership term to 2023. (Jd. at 3533:6-3534:16.) Thus, SARMC's two top officers
testified the partnership term was extended to 2023.
The other members ofMRIA also testified the partnership terms were extended to 2023. Dr.
Jim Prochaska testified the extension of the partnership term to 2023 was approved by a
"unanimous vote" by the MRIA Board of Partners, which included SARMC. (TR. Vol. II at
1148:24-1149:1.) Dr. Prochaska also testified it was his understanding that ifSARMC withdrew
from MRIA, it could not compete until 2023. (Jd. at 1390:11-15, 1397:22-1398: 13.) Joe
Messmer, CEO of Mercy Medical Center (a member of the board of partners through its
subsidiary MedNow, Inc.), also testified it was his understanding that the partnership term was
extended to 2023, including the non-compete prohibition. (Jd. at 2221 :21-2222:2) Dr. Giles,
another member ofMRIA, testified that term for MRICI was extended to 2023. (ld. at 3054:6·9.)
The sole piece of evidence SARMC holds out to support its position, a perfunctory filing with
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the State of Idaho, is not sufficient to overturn the jury's verdict.

40

Thus, contrary to SARMC's

assertion, the testimony from all partners, including SARMC, was the same: the pat1nership term
had been extended to 2023. SARMC cited to no contrary testimony.

41

G. MRIA'S Measure of Damages for Wrongful Dissociation was Properly
Submitted to the Jury.
As set forth in Part IV. A., at trial MRIA submitted two alternate damage theories, consisting
of lost profits of $36.3 million and wrongful dissociation damages $27.3 million. SARMC
attacks the wrongful dissociation damages theory by asserting the amount bears no relation to
any harm suffered by MRIA. The Court need not address this argument, because as set forth
above, MRIA adequately proved its entitlement to lost profits and the remitted amount of the
verdict can be sustained on that basis alone. However, even if the argument was not moot, it fails
because Idaho law recognizes that a "[p ]laintiff may sue on the contract and seek damages based
on her expectation interest under the contract." White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94,
102,730 P.2d 1014, 1022 (1986). Those damages "may be measured by 'the loss in the value to
40

Additionally, the documentary evidence demonstrated the partnership terms were extended to
2023:
• Trial Exhibit 4054 is minutes from an MRIA board meeting reflecting that "Motion was
moved and approved to extend the term of MRI Center limited partnerships to December
3lst,2023." (Trial Ex. 4054 at2.)
• Trial Exhibit 4109 is meeting minutes of SARMC entity SADC showing SARMC ratified the
extension of"the term ofthe MRI Partnership Agreement to 12/31/23." (Trial Ex. 4109.)
• Trial Exhibit 4105 is meeting minutes of MRICI reflecting that Cindy Schamp of SARMC
informed the board that the lease for MRICI was extended to 2023. (Trial Ex. 4105 at 2.)
41
Moreover, SARMC waived any right to claim the partnership terms were not extended by
voluntarily relinquishing that claim through ratifying the vote to extend the term. Frontier Fed.
Sav. & Loan v. Douglass, 123 Idaho 808, 812, 853 P.2d 553, 557 (1993). Thus, SARMC is
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[the injured party] of [the breaching party's] performance caused by its failure or deficiency, plus
any loss, including incidental or consequential, caused by the breach."' /d. (quoting Restatement
(Second) Contracts, § 347 (1981 ).
At trial, it was shown that since 1999, SARMC had been advised by its consultants that if it
wished to exit MRIA, partner with the radiologists and pursue imaging opportunities in its
service area, the lawful approach would be to buy its way out of the partnership (and the noncompete provision which was part and parcel of the partnership) and purchase 100% ofMRICI
from MRIA. (TR Vol. III at 3593:22-3599:18; Trial Exs. 4118 & 4247.) This purchase of
MRICI would leave MRIA with only its mobile business, which served the other hospital
partners and other markets. By owning MRICI, SARMC could share ownership of its campus
operation with GSR and compete for MRI scanning business in the Treasure Valley.
SARMC's consultants also told SARMC that if it wished to achieve its objectives the cost
would be in excess of$20 million. (Trial Ex. 4247 at 25, 28-36.) Although this was the fair
market value for the transaction, SARMC refused to pay such an amount to its partners. Instead,
SARMC chose the "wrongful" method of achieving its goals: it wrongfully dissociated and
competed with MRIA's campus operation (MRICI), through its other partnership (IMI). By this
means, SARMC obtained the business of MRJCI without payingfor it.

MRIA's experts Budge and Wilhoite both testified that the value ofMRIA's contract rights
that were violated by SARMC' s wrongful dissociation could be measured by what SARMC

stopped. KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279,282,486 P.2d 992,995 (1971) (applying the
doctrine of quasi-estoppel to similar facts).
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would have to pay on the date of dissociation to rightfully attain its business objectives of
obtaining the business ofMRICI. (TR Vol. II at 2676:11· 2704:8; 2724:16-2725:15; Vol. III at
2883:5- 2891:15.) The fair market value ofMRICI on that date was $27.3 million. (TR Vol. III
at 2891 :6-15.) This evidence was unrebutted. In fact, the only cross examination before the jury
on the matter related to SARMC's effort to obtain an acknowledgement from Wilhoite that the
SARMC could have purchased MRICI for less than $27.3 million. (TR Vol. III at 2912:202916:7.)
In this case, it was difficult to isolate the impact of SARMC's wrongful dissociation. This was
because SARMC had engaged in various wrongful activities before the date of dissociation. As
a result, scan migration to IMI was well underway by the time SARMC dissociated. Thus,
MRIA's experts believed that measuring wrongful dissociation damages by the cost of what
SARMC would have to pay on the date of withdrawal to rightfully dissociate provided a fair
measure of the benefit ofMRIA's bargain which had been circumvented by SARMC's unlawful
withdrawal.

H.

Admitting the Shattuck Hammond Memorandum Was Not Error.

SARMC argues the trial court erred by admitting into evidence Trial Exhibit 4239 (the "SH
memorandum", also referred to below as the "Finnerty Memorandum"), an internal
memorandum prepared by SH. SARMC's objection is limited to the following passages in the 13
page memorandum: (1) "SARMC has been advised by counsel that this option [withdrawing and
competing with MRIA] will likely engender litigation with MRIA" and (2) "Givens Pursley
believes there likely would be litigation as to whether the termination was wrongful and that
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there may be a risk of St. Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary responsibility to the LPs." (Opening
Brief at 36-38; Trial Ex. 4239 at 2, 11.) SARMC's argument fails for the following reasons.
l. SARMC Failed to Preserve Its Objection.
"When presented with a motion in limine, a trial court has the authority to deny the motion and
wait until trial to determine if the evidence should or should not be excluded." Kirk v. Ford
Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 702, 116 P.3d 27, 32 (2005). When the trial court elects to wait and

hear foundation "the moving party is required to continue to object as the evidence is presented."

!d. Here, SARMC failed to preserve its objection because the trial court withheld its ruling, and
SARMC then failed to object when the evidence was presented.
Although SARMC filed two motions in limine on this exhibit (R. Vol. VIII at 1453, R. Vol. XI
at 2152), the privilege issue raised in the motions was never ruled upon by the trial court. (R.
2111-2141; TR. Vol. I at 985:14-24.) The trial court's ruling merely stated generically as to the
"Shattuck Hammond memorandum" that it would need to see more "further foundation before
that's presented to the jury." (!d. at 1086:2-6.)
The exhibit was first offered into evidence during the examination of Dr. James Prochaska.
(TR Vol. II at 1847: 11-1853:25). At the time it was offered, SARMC did not raise any objection
on privilege grounds. (!d). Therefore, SARMC failed to preserve its objection for appeal.

2. SARMC Waived Any Claim of Privilege.
Under I.R.E. 510, a privilege is waived if the holder of the privilege "voluntarily discloses or
consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication." Se.e Skelton v.
Spencer, 98 Idaho 417,420,565 P.2d 1374, 1377 (1977), State v. Nab, 113 Idaho 168, 174,742
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P.2d 423,429 (Ct. App. 1987). Waiver also occurs from failure to object to privileged testimony
or documents at a pre-trial deposition. Hawkins v. Stables, 148 F.3d 379, 384 (4 1h Cir. 1998); In

re Auto Specialties Mfg. Co., 153 B.R. 457,465 n.5 (W.O. Mich. 1993). Furthermore, such
conduct waives the privilege as to the entire subject matter of the disclosure. Hawkins, 148 F.3d
at 384 n.4.
The exhibit was produced at a discovery deposition of a SH employee. (R. Vol. IV at 785-86).
Before the deposition, SARMC's counsel told MRIA it had performed a privilege review and
was producing non-privileged documents at the deposition. (Jd). During the deposition, counsel
for SH stated on the record that, with respect to any privilege being claimed, it was up to Pat
Miller, SARMC's counsel, "to waive it and do whatever they want to do with it. So I'm
expecting that if Pat [Miller] has an issue relating to the privilege, he should invoke it here .... "
(ld. citing Confidential Ex. 2 to the Record,

at~

3 and Ex. B thereto at 36:14-37:2). Miller,

however, never objected to production of the SH documents at the deposition the SH
memorandum was identified as part of SH's work for SARMC, not its work for Givens Pursley.

(Id. at 787-88). Three months later, MRIA deposed Dr. Ian Davey, marked the memorandum as
an exhibit and asked numerous detailed questions about various statements in the document
without objection by SARMC's counsel. (Id. at 78; see also R. Ex. 131 at 9-1 0).
On May 27,2007, the deposition of Grant Chamberlain ofSH was taken for purposes of
perpetuating his testimony for trial. (R. Ex. 193, Ex. A thereto at 2; TR Vol. II at 2544: 13-17). At
that time, SARMC stipulated to the admission of the memorandum and did not make any
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objections to testimony associated with the allegedly privileged portions of the memorandum. 42
(TR Vol. II at 2546: 19-25). Chamberlain's deposition testimony concerning the memorandum,
including the allegedly privileged portions, was then read into the record at trial without
objection from SARMC. (TR Vol. II at 2543:23-2544:25; 2561:25-2562:13). Indeed,
Chamberlain repeatedly referred to information he learned from Pat Miller of Givens Pursley
with no objection at all from SARMC.

Q: Did you have an understanding, during the course of your engagement on this
particular project for Saint Alphonsus, that it was understood by Saint Alphonsus that if it
withdrew and competed with the existing MRI facilities on its own campus, that they
would likely --that that would likely engender litigation?
A. Was it a potential? Yes.
Q. And what were the likely sources of that information?
A. Pat Miller and the client.
(TR Vol. II at 2567:20-2568:3 (emphasis added); see also Ex. D to the Appendix attached
hereto.) All of this testimony came in without objection.

3. Even if the Objection Was Not Waived, Admitting the Memorandum
Was Not Error.
Trial comis have broad discretion over the admission of evidence at trial. Kirk v. Ford Motor

Co. 141 Idaho 697,700-701, 116 P.3d 27,30-31 (2005). Error may only be predicated upon a
ruling that is a ''manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and a substantial right of the party is
affected." Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co. Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739
42

This deposition took place before SARMC filed its motions in limine concerning the Shattuck
Hammond memorandum. Those motions were filed on June 5, 2007 (R. 1453) and August 3,
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(1995) (emphasis added). Here, the trial court's decision to admit the SH memorandum was
appropriate because the memorandum is not covered by the I.R.E. 502 privilege as the privilege
applies only if the communication is confidential within the meaning of the rule and is made
between persons described in the rule for the purposes of rendering legal advice. Farr v.
Mischler, 129 Idaho 201, 207, 923 P.2d 446, 452 (1996). The burden of showing information is

privileged is on the party asserting the privilege. Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 704,
116 P.3d 27,34 (2005).
SARMC has not shown the SH memorandum memorialized any communication between
persons described in the rule. The comments included in the memorandum were not
communications "between the client's lawyer and the lawyer's representative." I.R.E. 502(b)(2).
Although SH was hired on one occasion by Givens Pursley, the evidence is clear the
memorandum was prepared as a result of the separate retention of SH by SARMC. (R. at 785-89,
citing Confidential Ex. 2 to the Record,

at~

3 and Ex. B thereto; R. Ex. 131 at 7.) The

memorandum states that SH "has been engaged by SARMC to prepare a Strategic Options
Assessment" with the purpose to "advise SARMC on a potential transaction" (Trial Ex. 4239 at
2) (emphasis added). Thus, for purposes of the memorandum, SH was not a lawyer's
representative. I.R.E. 502(a)(4). The mere fact that SH indicated it had "reviewed [SARMC's
options] with Givens Pursley ... [and had] included their thoughts on the potential litigation
involved with each alternative,'' (Trial Ex. 4239 at 11 ), does not establish that those

2007 (R. 2152). By that time, it was too late, the privilege had already been waived at the May
27, 2007 deposition.
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communications were made while SH was acting as a "representative ofthe lawyer." Indeed, the
trial court found, the memorandum was prepared in connection with SARMC's retention ofSH.
(R. at 785-89, citing Confidential Ex. 2 to the Record, at, 3 and Ex. B thereto; R. at 850.) 43
Finally, SARMC presented no evidence that the memorandum was intended to be kept
confidential. (R. Ex. 131 at 7-8.) Therefore, the trial court did not err by admitting the
memorandum into evidence.

4. If There Was an Error, the Error was Harmless
Although the admission of the SH memorandum was not an error, even if it was an error, the
error was harmless because there was other evidence that SARMC "knew as early as 2001 that it
could not withdraw" (R. Vol. XIII at 2440). Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 116 Idaho
794,799,780 P.2d 116, 121 (1989). For example, SARMC's CEO testified she understood
before SARMC dissociated from MRIA that SARMC could be liable for damages for wrongful
dissociation. (TR. Vol. II at 1950: 10-15). She disavowed learning this information from the
memorandum. (!d. at 1950:16-1951 :4). Likewise, SARMC's COO testified that in 2001 she
understood withdrawal would likely engender litigation and could be a breach of fiduciary

43

In a footnote, SARMC suggests in the alternative that this was a privileged communication
between the client's representative and the client's lawyer. I.R.E. 502(b)(1 ). A '"representative of
the client' is one having authority to obtain professional legal services, or an employee of the
client who is authorized to communicate information obtained in the course of employment to
the attorney of the client." I.R.E. 502(a)(2). SARMC did not present any evidence that Shattuck
Hammond had such authority. Nor is there any evidence that the communication was made to
Shattuck Hammond for the purpose of conveying legal advice to SARMC. Moreover, this
argument was not raised below and therefore cannot be raised on appeal. Mihalka v. Shepherd,
145 Idaho 547,552, 181 P.3d 473,478 (2008).
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duties. (TR Vol. III at 3594:9~13; 3595:23-3596:6).

44

She further testified she learned this

infonnation from Grant Chamberlain, not Givens Pursley. (/d). Therefore, because there "was
other competent evidence to the same effect", any error was harmless.

I.

The Trial Court Did Not Err by Admitting Exhibit 4332.

SARMC argues that the trial court erred by admitting Exhibit 4332, a letter SARMC claims is
barred by I.R.E. 408. SARMC waived its objection to the admission of this exhibit by failing to
object at the necessary times. Even if SARMC had not waived its objection, however, the trial
court did not err in admitting the exhibit because the exhibit is not barred by I.R.E. 408.
Moreover, SARMC suffered no prejudice and any error was harmless.

1. Exhibit 4332 is Not Barred by Rule 408
Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 provides that offers to compromise are not admissible "to prove
liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the claim or any other claim." Nonetheless, the Rule
"does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay .... " ld (emphasis added). This
Court has also held that settlement offers may be admitted for impeachment. Davidson v. Beco

Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 109-111,753 P.2d 1253, 1255-57(1987).
SARMC complains that the use of Exhibit 4332 during the examination of Sandra Bruce and
during closing arguments violated I.R.E. 408. There was no violation, however, because the
document was used at those times to impeach SARMC's contention that it tried to work out a
deal, but MRIA would not allow it to do so. In opening statement, SARMC's counsel asserted
44

There was no objection by SARMC to this testimony from its CEO and COO.
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"the proofis going to show that she[, Sandra Bruce,] tried many, many efforts during this period
of time" to get a deal done. (TR Vol. I at I 076:25-1077:1 ). "She tried everything that she could
think of. She hired consultants to come in. The consultants were paid for out of Saint
Alphonsus's pocket. And she tried and tried and tried. She couldn't get it done." (!d. at 1077:2-5;

see also id. at I 077:5-18). The inference from counsel's statements was that SARMC tried to
reach a compromise with MRIA, but was unable to do so because ofMRIA's recalcitrance.
This same argument was continued when Ms. Bruce testified she tried for five years to buy out
MRIA but ultimately could not reach a deal because ofMRIA's conduct. (TR Vol. II at 1945:41948:13; 1954:4-13). The inference of this testimony, as with the opening statement, was that
MRIA impeded SARMC's alleged efforts to negotiate a deal. MRIA used Exhibit 4332 in its
examination of Bruce and in closing for the purpose of rebutting Bruce's contention ofundue
delay and otherwise impeaching her testimony by showing MRIA had offered SARMC the deal
Bruce claimed SARMC was seeking. (TR Vol. II at 1954:I5-I955:2). Thus, the exhibit shows
MRIA did make an attempt to settle in an amount similar to the valuation performed by
SARMC's consultants.
Indeed, MRIA' s use of the exhibit was similar to the use of a settlement offer in Davidwn v.

Be co Corp., which this Court found to be proper. In that case, this Court noted the "settlement
letter" indicated an offer was made that was rejected. Davidson, 114 Idaho at 111, 753 P.2d at
1257. "Of course, this is contrary to Beck's testimony at trial that Davidson had accepted the
tractor in full satisfaction of the debt." !d. Accordingly, this Court held "[tJhe probative value of
the statement in the settlement letter is great in that it tends to show Beck's testimony is

64
004296

unreliable. Probative evidence is always prejudicial to someone" and on that basis this Court
held the letter was admissible to impeach the contrary testimony. Id. For those same reasons,
Exhibit 4332 was admissible to impeach SARMC's assertions in opening statements and the
testimony of Sandra Bruce. 45

2. SARMC Waived Its Objection
Although SARMC objected to the exhibit when it was first offered, it did not object to the later
use of the exhibit with subsequent witnesses and during closing arguments. The exhibit was first
offered during the testimony of Dr. Prochaska. (TR. Vol. II at 1239:9-1246:25). The transcript
portions cited by SARMC in support of its argument that Exhibit 4332 was used for prejudicial
purposes, however, do not include any testimony from Dr. Prochaska. Instead, they include the
subsequent testimony of Sandra Bruce and MRIA' s closing argument. A review of those portions
of the transcript reveals that SARMC did not object when the exhibit was used at those times.
While SARMC may argue it had a continuing objection, the trial court was not able to
articulate a continuing objection because Judge McLaughlin was cut off by SARMC's counsel,
Jack Gjording. (TR Vol. II at 1245:19-21 ). As a result, the continuing objection was not
established, and when the trial court finally admitted the exhibit with a limiting instruction, it
made no mention of the continuing objection. (!d. at 1245: 19-1246:25). This is likely because
there was no need for a continuing objection as the matter was resolved by the limiting
45

Through selective passages, SARMC attempts to make it appear that MRIA in closing
argument used the exhibit as "the 'telltale' sign of [SARMC'sJ bad faith." If, however, the
statements are taken in their complete context, it shows that the exhibit was used for purposes of
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instruction. However, even if SARMC had perfected a continuing objection during the testimony
of Dr. Prochaska, that objection did not preserve SARMC's objection to (1) MRIA's use of the
exhibit outside of the limiting instruction (i.e., to show bad faith) and (2) MRIA's use of the
exhibit with a different witness, Sandra Bruce, and during closing argument.
The trial court's limiting instruction authorized MRIA to use the exhibit to show what MRIA
believed to be the fair market value ofMRIA. CfR. Vol. II at 1246: 17-24). SARMC now
complains that after the limiting instruction, MRIA used the exhibit to show bad faith by
SARMC. Although MRIA disputes it used the exhibit to show bad faith, had MRIA done so,
SARMC failed to preserve its objection to a use of the exhibit outside of the limiting instruction.
See Crossley by Crossley v. General Motors Cmp., 33 F.3d 818, 822

(i11 Cir. 1994); Rinker v.

Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 664 (Mo. App. 1978).

Additionally, this Court has recognized that a continuing objection does not preserve error
when another witness testifies to the same matter without objection. Mac Tools, Inc. v. Gr(ffin,
126 Idaho 193, 200, 879 P.2d 1126, 1133 (1994); See also Davis v. Fisk Elec. Co., 187 S.W.3d
570, 587 (Tex.Civ.App.2006). Therefore, because SARMC did not object to the use of the
exhibit during Sandra Bruce's testimony and did not object to the use of the exhibit during
closing argument, it tailed to preserve the objection for appeal. 46
3. SARMC Was Not Prejudiced By the Admission of Exhibit 4332.

negativing Ms. Bruce's testimony and SARMC's assertions in opening statement that SARMC
"tried and tried" to get a deal done. (See e.g., TR Vol. III at 4321 :19-4322:15).
46
SARMC also waived its objection, by SARMC's use of the exhibit during its direct
examination of Dr. David Giles. (TR Vol. III at 3147: 12-3148:5.)
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Trial courts have "broad discretion as to the admission of evidence and the exercise of that
discretion will not be overturned absent a clear showing of abuse." Cheney v. Palos Verdes
Investment Corp., 104 Idaho 897,900,665 P.2d 661,664 (1983) (emphasis added). SARMC

must show the exhibit was erroneously admitted and that the admission of the exhibit "had a
substantial influence in bringing about the verdict." Soria v. Sierra

Pac~fic

Airlines, Inc., 111

Idaho 594, 606, 726 P.2d 706, 718 (1986). SARMC cannot show the admission of this exhibit
had a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict, because as the trial court found, there
was overwhelming evidence ofSARMC's willful and malicious conduct. (TR Vol. III at 4471:917).
Also the exhibit did not affect the jury's findings on damages. (R. Vol. XIII at 2442.) The trial
cou1t recognized MRIA had two damage theories described by the trial court as the "purchase
price theory" and "the lost scan theory." (!d.) The primary evidence used to show the purchase
price theory (referred to by MRIA as the lost benefit of the bargain) was a valuation performed
by SH. (see Exhibits 4246 and 4247); MRIA did not use Exhibit 4332. From that valuation,
MRIA argued $27.3 million was the amount SARMC would have to pay to rightfully buy its
way out of the partnership. (TR Vol. III at 4382:20-4385: 17.)
Furthermore, as the trial court recognized "even if this evidence [Trial Ex. 4332] was not
introduced, or even if the purchase price theory had not been argued at all, there is a good
argument that the end result would be no different for Saint Alphonsus." (R. Vol. XIII at 2442.)
According to the trial court, "[t]he lost scan analysis of damages was the higher of the two
damage theories, and it is apparent from the jury verdict that the jury found not just the purchase
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price theory persuasive, but also the lost scan analysis." (/d. (emphasis added)). The trial court,
then concluded SARMC had "not adequately shown that the evidence's absence would have
affected the jury's findings." (!d.) On appeal, SARMC still has not demonstrated the admission
of the evidence "had a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict." Therefore, it is not
entitled to a new trial.
V. CROSS-APPEAL
IfSARMC's request for a new trial is denied on appeal, the Court need not address MRIA's
cross-appeal. MRIA only seeks to appeal the following rulings if the Court determines that a new
trial is warranted.
A. The Trial Court Erred by Denying MRIA's Request to Seek Punitive Damages.
The trial court denied both MRIA's motion to amend its complaint to add a claim for punitive
damages and its renewed motion after the close of the evidence. It found SARMC's conduct did
not rise to the level of'''willfulncss' and 'wantonness' the statute calls for nor can I find that
that's been demonstrated here by clear and convincing evidence." This finding was later
contradicted by the trial court when it stated during the hearing on SARMC's motion for new
trial that the evidence was "overwhelming" and "clear and convincing" that "the executive
management team at Saint Alphonsus really blatantly ignored the partnership rights of a partner .
. . . It was demonstrated to th[e] jury that Saint Alphonsus chose to compete directly/indirectly

with a partner." (TR Vol. III at 44 71 :9-17.) This finding that there was clear and convincing
evidence that (l) SARMC "blatantly ignored" the rights ofMRIA and (2) improperly competed
with MRIA while still a partner in MRIA demonstrates the trial court's failure to instruct on
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punitive damages "was so contrary to the facts of the case as to amount to an abuse of discretion
under the deferential standard." General Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho
849,825,979 P.2d 1207, 1210 (1999).

l. The Punitive Damages Standard
A party is entitled to punitive damages when it proves by clear and convincing evidence that
the other party's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous. I. C.§ 6-1604(1).
Interpreting this standard, this Court held in Linscott v. Ranier Nat 'l Life Ins. Co., I 00 Idaho 854,
858,606 P.2d 958,962 (1980) that the activity necessary to reach an award of punitive damages
"requires an intersection of two factors: a bad act and a bad state ofmind." /d. In the business
context, punitive damages may be awarded where the conduct "show[sJ a lack of professional
regard for the consequences of the breach of the contractual agreement." Cuddy Mountain

Concrete Inc. v. Citadel Consrr., Inc., 121 Idaho 220,229, 824 P.2d 151, 160 (Idaho Ct. App.
1992). Here, the issue of punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury because
SARMC in conscious disregard ofthe consequences (the bad state of mind) competed with its
partner MRIA and "violated another's [MRIA's] legal right[s]" (the bad act).
2. The Evidence is Clear and Convincing that SARMC Acted with a
Conscious Disregard for the Rights of MRIA.
As set forth above, even though the trial court denied MRIA's motions for leave to seek
punitive damages, the trial court found there was clear and convincing evidence that SARMC
"blatantly ignored the partnership rights of a partner." This finding satisfies the standard that this
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Court has set for awarding punitive damages in a business context. !d.. This finding also
highlights that it was error to deny MRIA leave to seek punitive damages.
The totality of the evidence as set forth in Part I supra., demonstrates in a clear and convincing
fashion that SARMC, while still a partner in MRIA, competed with its partners in MRIA by
conspiring with, supporting, and later becoming a partner in IMI. SARMC did so in conscious
violation of its fiduciary duties and the partnership agreement as it was warned by its consultants
and its attorneys that it would be a breach of its fiduciary duties to withdraw and compete. In
fact, Sandra Bruce admitted it would be a violation ofMRIA partnership agreement to operate a
competing imaging business that took revenue away from MRIA. (TR Vol. II at 1690:201691 :5.) Despite this knowledge, SARMC deliberately chose to support and join a competitor
while still a partner in MRIA. SARMC' s outrageous attitude toward its partners in MRIA is
summed up in its CEO testimony that: "I was a partner with a competitor. I was supporting
myself." (!d. at 1871 :8-9.) Thus, it was error to deny MRIA leave to seek punitive damages.
B. SARMC Erred by Dismissing MRIA's Antitrust Claims
The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor ofSARMC dismissing
MRIA's antitrust counterclaims. (SeeR. Vol. V, p. 905-946; R. Vol. XI p. 2077-81). The trial
court wrongly held that MRIA lacked standing because it had not suffered an "antitrust injury."
The evidence presented by MRIA on this issue is sufficient to prove that the antitrust claims
should have survived summary judgment.
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1.

MRIA Sufficiently Asserted an Antitrust Injury

Antitrust laws generally provide it is unlawful for a person to monopolize, attempt to
monopolize, or conspire to monopolize. See I.C. § 48-105; 15 U.S.C. § 2. A private plaintitfhas
standing to bring an antitrust claim if it (1) asserts an antitrust injury and (2) is a proper party to
assert the antitrust laws' application to a particular circumstance. See Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d
793, 797 n.9 (2nd Cir. 1994).
A plaintiff establishes an antitrust injury if it shows it has sustained an injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Daniel v. Amer. Bd.

<~{Emergency Med.,

428 F.3d 408,

438 (2'1d Cir. 2005). The purpose of antitrust laws is to protect the public by keeping the channels
of competition free so prices and services are determined by the workings of a free market.

Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Com'n., 193 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
Because antitrust laws were designed to protect competition, antitrust plaintiffs have standing if
they show harm to competition as a whole. See New York Medscan LLC v. New York Univ. Sch

ofMed., 430 F. Supp. 2d 140, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A plaintiffshows harm to competition by
alleging adverse effects on the price, quality, or output of the relevant good or service. See New

York Medscan, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 146.
In New York Medscan, PlaintiffMedscan and Defendant NYU entered a contract whereby
Medscan provided facilities, and diagnostic imaging services for NYU radiologists. Medscan
was an approved provider for an insurance entity called CCN. Because ofCCN's own exclusive
contracts with large regional insurance agencies, it was essential for an imaging company such as
Medscan to be CCN approved. As the agreement between Medscan and NYU approached is
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expiration, an NYU representative advised Medscan that if Medscan did not renew the
agreement under the terms demanded by NYU, NYU would use its influence and Medscan
would lose its CCN-approved status. No agreement was reached and Medscan's CCN approval
was terminated. Medscan brought an action alleging an antitrust violation. The Court held that
Medscan sufficiently alleged an antitrust injury, noting Medscan had alleged that NYU's conduct
caused reduced competition in the provision of medical imaging services, reduced competition in
the price of these services, and reduced quality of imaging services. The court also noted the
damages to Medscan's reputation, services, and profit had an anti-competitive impact on the
price and output on the market for imaging services in the New York City area as a whole./d. at

147-48.
As MRJA alleged, SARMC's tactics with its co-conspirators in IMI, which discouraged
MRIA's growth and damaged its business and reputation, (R. Vol. V., p. 905-46,

at,,~

40, 42, 49,

50-54,67-71, 110-118, 123-127, 128-132), 47 had the effect of reducing patient care; (id. at,,,, 40,
47

•

•
•

•

Specifically, MRIA asserted that these tactics included
Creating uncertainty among referring physicians and MRICI employees by disparaging
MRICI's services through confusing and misleading reports to the referring physician
community. (R. Conf. Ex. 1 at 7, Exhibit PP thereto)
Providing disparate levels of services as between IMI and MRICI when GSR operated as
the radiologists for both imaging entities. R., Conf. Ex. I at 7, Exhibit 00 thereto)
Threatening to terminate MRICI's access to SARMC's IT system, potentially jeopardizing
the ability of MRICI to store and transmit its electronic images to the referring physician
community. (R. Conf. Ex. 1 at 3, Exhibit Hand at 7, Exhibit 00 thereto)
Receiving higher prices for comparable goods and services, relative to other sellers in the
identified product and geographic market. (R. Ex. 143 at 2, Exhibits A & B thereto)
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68, 127); increasing price, (id.
at

~

at~~~

66, 127); and decreasing the output of medical imaging (id.

72). Additionally, MRIA submitted an affidavit and a report from its economic expert,

Edward Whitelaw, stating that "IMI received higher payments for providing services of
comparable quality to similar patients to those received by other sellers." (Exhibit to the R. No.
144 at~ 2). MRIA also submitted evidence that at the same time IMI was charging higher prices,
IMI was also increasing its market share. (!d. at ,[~2~3 ). Based on this evidence, Whitelaw opined
that IMI "acquired market power and harmed competition in the market." (!d.

at~

2. (See also

Exhibit to the R. No. 110 at Exhibit A, p. 2-14). Further, in his deposition, Whitelaw was asked
"[a]nd you find that the IMI-SADC imaging partnership has harmed competition in the relevant
market by receiving higher-than~market rates for taking MRI scans relative to what those scans
would have been in the absence of such anticompetitive behavior?" Whitelaw answered "Yes."
(Exhibit to the R. I 04 at Ex. D p. 50:14-23 ). According to Whitelaw, the anticompetitive
conduct, taken together, likely contributed to the growth of IMI's market share, thus affecting its
growing monopoly power. See, R. Ex. 143 at 2, Exhibit A thereto at 12).
This testimony from Whitelaw is sufficient to defeat summary judgment because, contrary to
the trial court's holding otherwise, MRIA has shown harm to competition, including adverse
effects on price, quality, and output of MRI scans in the Boise/Meridian market. As one court
held, antitrust standing is conferred on a plaintiff that can show higher prices coupled with a

•

Directing hospital inpatient and outpatients to an imaging center, IMI, in which the
SARMC had an interest in violation of STARK laws. (R. Conf. Ex. 1 at 6, Exhibit LL and
Ex. 143 at 2, Exhibit B thereto)
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large market share. American Council ofCert{fied Podiatric Physicians and Surgeons v.

American Bd. (~f Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 185 FJd 606, 623 (6 111 Cir. 1999). That is exactly what
MRIA demonstrated through Whitelaw's testimony. Because MRIA showed an antitrust injury,
the issue ofwhether SARMC's and IMI's conduct was the result ofanticompetitive motivation,
and thus an antitrust violation, should have been presented to the jury. 48

2.

MRIA Created an Issue of Fact Under this Court's Decision in Twin
Falls farm & City Distributing, Inc. v. D & B Supply Co.

The trial court's summary judgment ruling was also in error because it ignores this Court's
decision in Twin Falls Farm & City Distributing, Inc. v. D & B Supply Co, 96 Idaho 351, 528
P.2d 1286 (1974). Here, the conduct and damages are virtually identical to the conduct and
damages which this Court found to be sufficient to sustain an antitrust claim in Twin Falls.
This Court in Twin Falls did not require the plaintiff to show evidence of a market-wide injury,
as required by the trial court in the instant case. Instead, this Court found it sufficient that the
plaintiff was injured by the conspiracy between D & B and Fries to drive Twin Falls out of
business.Id. at 359, 528 P.2d at 1294. Here, there was evidence presented to the trial court
creating an issue offact that SARMC and IMI conspired to drive MRIA out of business. Such
evidence is sufficient to sustain an antitrust claim under this Court decision in Twin Falls.
48

To the extent that the trial court reasoned that Whitelaw's report did not sufficiently show a
"market wide injury," the comt itself hampered MRIA's ability to prove market-wide injury
when it ruled that MRI providers in the relevant market would not be required to produce any
records ofMRI scans. (R. Vol. III, p. 557-60.) That decision prevented MRIA from presenting
critical evidence concerning harm in the market. (See Exhibit to the R. No. 110, Exhibit A, p. 23). Vaught v. Dairy/and Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 357, 363, 956 P.2d 674, 680 (1998) (recognizing that
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Therefore, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment against MRIA on MRIA's
antitrust claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, MRIA respectfully requests the Court to deny
SARMC's requested relief and grant MRIA its attorneys' fees and costs. In the event a new trial
is ordered, MRIA also respectfully requests the Court to reverse the trial court and grant MRIA
leave to seek punitive damages and allow MRIA to present its anti-trust claims to the jury.
Dated: November 24, 2008

Respectfully Submitted,

802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702
Attorneysfor Respondent

it may be an abuse discretion to deny the discovery of critical information unavailable from
another source).
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EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A
004310

CAST OF CHARACTERS
PARTY /WITNESS
Adams, Mark
Anton, Chris
Bruce, Sandra
Budge, Bruce
Chamberlain, Grant
Cliff, Jeff
Curran, Roger MD
Dalley, Mark
DMR
Floyd, Jack
Fry, Kenneth
Giles, David MD
GSR
Hahn, Alan
Havlina, Jack MD
Henson, Thomas MD
Holy Rosary Hospital
IMI
Matzek, Robin
Messmer, Joe
MRIA
MRICI
MRIM
Prochaska, James MD
SADC
SARG
SARMC
Schamp, Cindy
Steiner, Manfred
Wallace, Holly
West Valley Medical Center
Wilhoite, Charles

·--·
--·-

-·

AFFILIATION
CEO, West Valley Medical Center
Fonner CEO, SARMC
-----·-CEO and President, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center
Expert Regarding Damages, MRIA
Consultant to SARMC, Shattuck Hammond
MRIA "CFO"; IMI Executive Director 2002-Present;
Accountant, MRIA and IMI
Member, DMR
Fonner Chainnan- MRIA
CEO, Holy Rosary Hospital
Doctor's Magnetic Resonance, Inc.
CEO, MRI Center and MRI Mobile
CFO, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
Member, DMR
Gem State Radiology
Consultant to SARMC, PriceWaterhouseCoopers
Member, DMR
Member, DMR
Partner, MRIA
Intennountain Medical Imaging
Fonner COO of MRI Center of Idaho
CEO, Mercy Medical Center
MRI Associates, Inc.
MRI Limited Partnership aka MRI Center of Idaho
MRI Mobile
Member, DMR
Chainnan of Board - MRI Associates
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.
Saint Alphonsus Radiology Group (dba Gem State
Radiology)
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
Fonner COO, Saint Alphonsus Medical Center
Expert Regarding Value, SARMC
MRICI, Staffing Coordinator, Marketing Director
Partner, MRIA
Expert Regarding Damages, MRIA
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EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT B
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IMI Exams for All Locations

48%

Exams by Physicians
Included in Damages:
Pre~9/99 Relationships
or SARMC Campus

46%

Exams

27,383 Exams

6%~
Exams by Physicians Included in
Damages: Other SARMC Affiliates
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3,438 Exams

DI:FENDANT"5

I

EXHIBIT

4-511-

Physicians Referring to IMI at the Downtown and Meridian Locations
Physicians Included in Damages: Pre9/99 Relationships
135

Physicians Included in Damages: - - . .
Other SARMC Affiliates
171

......_

7%

9%
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IMI Exams at the Downtown Location

Exams by Physicians
Included in Damages:

Pre-9/99

42%

Relationships
13,758 Exams
52%
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Exams by Physicians Included in Damages: Other
SARMC Affiliates
1,665 Exams

:;

I

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

45"15

INDUSTRY DYNAMICS
•

An estimated 10-15% of all diagnostic images in the U.S. are provided by outpatient diagnostic imaging
centers.

• More than 543 million diagnostic procedures were performed in 2003, compared to 300 million in 2000.
•

Spending for imaging services more than doubled between 2000 and 2005, from $6.6 billion to $13.7 billion.

• Implied annual grow1h rate in spending between 2000 and 2005 is 15.7%.
•

An estimated $8.0 billion was spent on MRI imaging and approximately 20 million scans were perfonned in

2004.

Historical MRI Procedure Growth
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I
!
!
Growth
1999-2ooo
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MRIA PROJECTED LOST PROFITS
(All Locations)
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MRIA Damages- Yearly Totals

Lost Scans

1999

2000

434

2,033

I

2001

2002

3,011

3,784

~093'

!

2004

2005

4,782
i
4,718
!
7,539
:
---l
$ 2,624,501 I $ 2,882,322 I $ 2,704,967 I $ 3,712,377
4,s2o

1

r
I

Lost Profits

$252,749

!

$1,254,9721$1,927,852

$ 23,447

2006

J

I

1

JVIRIA Damages - Total Losses
!Lost ~rofits

Lost Scans
30,821

1
!'

S15,383,187

,
I

!
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MRIA Damages- From IMI Downtown

Lost Scans

434

Lost Profits : $252,749

2,033

! $ 1,254,972

3,011

i

$ 1,927,852

2,600

I

$ 1,566,169

1,950

I

$ 1,375,115

i

1,667

!

$ 1,274,214

$963,754

15,423
$ 805,507

i

$ 9,420,332

l\tiRIA Damages - From IMI Meridian

Lost Scans
Lost Profits i ($1,542,722)

I $ 1,249,386 I S 1,608,108 I $ 1,711,793 I $ 1,523,221 I

$4,549,786

1\ttRIA Damages- From Il\tll SARMC

i! Lost Scans
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1

Lost Profits

2005

2006

Total

62

2,922

2,984

1

S 29,420

S 1,383,649

S 1,413,069
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Comparison of Causation Facts
~~-~------·----

MRIA's Facts in Support of Causation
·--··--··-----

---·

SARMC's Facts
Against Causation

MRIA damages were based only on scans lost to IMI. (TR Vol.
The referrals switched because of
the reputation of the radiol~gists
II at 2767:25-2?._68:§.:1.
SARMC-employed physicians and physicians with privileges at
SARMC referred patients to MRICI because of its affiliation
with SARMC. (/d. at 1517:12-19.)
...
·---------SARMC and GSR had the relationship with the referring
doctors. (TR 3617:24-3619:15,3626:5-15, 3233:9-14_.)
--·-IMI came into existence with SARMC's support. (Trial Exs.
545, 4074, 4095.)
--··
SARMC joint ventured with the radiologists in IMI from IMI's
beginning. (/d.; See supra. MRIA's Brief, Part I.E-H.}
..
SARMC conspired with the radiologists to compete with MRIA
through !MI. (R: Vol. XII at 2296.}
After initially joint venturing with IMI, SARMC formally joined
IMI ~~~rtner while still a Eartner in MRIA.
SARMC usurped MRIA's opportunity to partner with the
.
.. radiologists {See suf!_ra. MRIA 's Brief, Part I.F-G.)
SARMC usurped MRIA's Meridian opportunity. (See
supra.MRIA's Brief, Part I.H.6.)
SARMC made IMJ an outpatient center which caused MRIA to
lose scans. (TR Vol. II at 1582:10-1583:24; TR Vol. III at
3206:16-3207:13
SARMC jointly marketed IMI with the radiologists while still a
partner in MRIA. (Trial Exs. 4248 & 4107; TR Vol. II at 16431646,2420:11-16, 2428:21-2429:6; TR Vol. III at 4169:10-17.)
-SARMC provided IMI with exclusive IT support from IMI's
inception including a $780,000 investment. Basically, SARMC
"was there with [IMI] making that investment in getting doctors
over the technology hump" and helping bring the "digital
revolution" to IMI while MRIA was left in the cold. (TR Vol. II
at 1505-1512, 1618-1620, 1639:18-24, 1634:12-15,2433-2440,
2453:6-24543:9; Trial Exhibit 4231at 3.)
SARMC provided IMI with significant financial support while
still a partner in MRIA including $546,146 in cash and
assumption of$1.5 million ofiMI's debt. (/d. at 1557:4-1558:2;
1622:22-1623:8.)
SARMC delivered a written mandate to all of its employees,
including referring physicians, directing all patients be sent to
the IMI magnet rather than to MRICI. (Trial Ex. 4377.)
---··-·---·---~---

~-~-------
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SARMC also supported IMI to the detriment of MRIA by
refusing to provide any assistance to MRIA conceming the Gem
State Radiology's severe reduction in coverage to MRIA. (TR
Vol. II at 2505:1-2517:24; 2520:19-21; 252:2-12; 2528:2-20;
2534:25-2535:3.) Because of this reduction in coverage, MRIA
lost almost all of their weekend referrals to IMI. (Id. at 2520:19-

2!__L.)__- : - : - - : - : : - - - - : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - - · + - - - - - - - - - - - - - l

Jeff Cliff, IMI's business manager, testified that MRIA lost
scans due to SARMC's affiliation with IMI. (/d. at 1517: 12-19;
1536:13-19.) In fact, before IMI opened, SARMC provided
records of its case volume to IMI to help IMI develop a business
plan. (Trial Ex. 4095.) Thus, it was always assumed SARMC
affiliated physicians would follow SARMC to IMI. Cliff also
testified that before IMI opened "most" referring doctors
affiliated with SARMC sent their patients to MRIA. {Id. at
1517: 12-19.) Cliff further testified he has "no doubt" that IMI
caused MRIA to lose scans. (/d. at 1536: 13-19.) Other witnesses
testified that association with SARMC was a powerful marketing
tool with referring physicians. (ld. at 2420:5-16.) The chairman
ofMRIA's board testified that the scans were being lost directly
to IMI. ( 1301:24-1302: 1.) Even SARMC's own expert testified
that MRIA lost scans to IMI as a result ofSARMC's support of
IMI instead ofMRIA. (TR Vol. III at 3206:11-3207:13.) He
acknowledged that because SARMC departed the partnership,
the going concern value of MRIA must be calculated without
SARMC's "inpatient, outpatient and ER scans". !d.
One of the refetTing doctors called by SARMC stated that he
sent his referrals to SARMC thereby showing that it was the
relationship with SARMC that was important. (TR Vol. Ill at
332_8:23-3329:2.)
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Q: Did you have an understanding, during the course of your
engagement on this particular project for Saint Alphonsus, that it
was understood by Saint Alphonsus that if it withdrew and
competed with the existing MRI facilities on its own campus, that
they would likely -- that that would likely engender litigation?
A. Was it a potential? Yes.
Q. And what were the likely sources of that information?
A. Pat Miller and the client.
(TR Vol. II at 2567:-2568:3 (emphasis added)).
Q. And then it goes on: 'Givens Pursley believes that there would
likely be litigation as to whether the termination was wrongful and
that there may be a risk of Saint Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary
responsibilities to the LPs.' What does LP refer to there?
A. Limited partners.
Q. Okay. Thank you. And was this your understanding that there
would likely be litigation as to whether or not the termination was
wrongful in the context of this withdrawal scenario?
A. Given the context of this statement on this page and the nature
of how it was likely communicated, you know, by the fact that it's
in here and he's writing it and I read it, that I certainly was. This
was a review document I reviewed.
(TR Vol. II at 2579:3-21 (emphasis added)).

Q: The next sentence says: "Unfortunately, the noncompete
agreement contained in the general partnership agreement for
MRIA precludes Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center from
doing so." Is that your understanding?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And do you recall how you learned that?
A. Likely, Pat Miller.
(TR. Vol. II at 2565:22 (emphasis added)).

Q: Is it your understanding that this MRI, non-MRI distinction
referenced in the prior paragraph did not satisfy the long-term
strategic objectives of Saint Alphonsus?
A. Yes.
Q. What would be your source of information for these two pieces
of information that we've just discussed?
A. Likely the client and Pat Miller."
(TR. Vol. II at 2575:1-9 (emphasis added)).
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Q. Did you have an understanding during the course of your
assignment that Saint Alphonsus would have to wait one year after
exiting the general partnership before competing in magnetic
resonance imaging within I 00 miles of Boise?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was the likely source of that information?
A. Pat Miller and the client.
(TR. Vol. II at 2576:4-13 (emphasis added)).
Q. As you sit here today, do you remember talking about an
alternative that included selling- Saint Alphonsus selling its share
in MRI Associates to one of the hospital partners?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was your likely source for that information?
A. Pat Miller and the client likely.
(TR Vol. II at 2580:24-2581:7 (emphasis added)).
Q. Do you remember talking about the possibility that the hospital
would transfer MRI ownership to an affiliate and then sever ties
with the affiliate?
A. Yes.
And what was your likely source for that information?
A. Pat Miller and the client.
(TR Vol. II at 2581:9-16 (emphasis added)).
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL
As the gravamen of this case is a commercial transaction, Saint Alphonsus requests fees
and costs on cross-appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and Appellate Rules 40 and 41.

ARGUMENT
In its opening brief, Saint Alphonsus showed that the district court's summary judgment
ruling that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated from MRIA effectively pre-determined the
outcome of this case, and that the ruling was incorrect as a matter of law. Repeated references to
the ruling at trial severely prejudiced the jury against Saint Alphonsus and virtually compelled
findings of liability on all of MRIA' s other causes of action. This prejudice was compounded by
the improper admission of a privileged attorney-client communication and a settlement offer,
both of which were emphasized by MRIA's counsel as evidence of Saint Alphonsus's alleged
bad faith. Saint Alphonsus also showed that the jury's verdict on damages would have to be
reversed for several reasons even if the preceding contentions were rejected. First, though the
claims were brought on behalf ofthree separate legal entities, each with distinct ownership and
legal duties owed to it, the court refused to require separate liability findings as to each entity,
thus creating hopeless confusion about the duties owed to and damages suffered by each.
Second, MRIA's two alternative damages theories suffered from several legal and factual
deficiencies. Most significantly, the "assum[ption]" ofMRIA's experts that Saint Alphonsus
wrongfully caused every change of referral by every doctor who previously referred patients to
MRIA or had privileges to practice medicine at Saint Alphonsus is not supported by any
evidence and is otherwise contrary to both law and common sense.

-l -
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In responding to these contentions, MRIA relies on an inaccurate account of the facts and
on repeated baseless assertions that Saint Alphonsus has waived a number of its arguments.
(MRIA Br. at 24, 28,31-33,42,58, 59, 65-66.) While Saint Alphonsus's appeal rests on legal
errors and not the sufficiency of the evidence, 1 it vehemently disputes MRIA's renewed jury
argument that Saint Alphonsus knowingly and intentionally violated known obligations to MRIA,
and offers in response the factual statement in its own brief. (Opening Br. at 2-14.) In many
respects, MRIA's factual account is irreconcilable with the evidence as it emerged at trial,
including the very evidence upon which MRIA purports to rely. When relevant to the legal
errors that require reversal of the decision below, these factual errors will be identified in the
course of Saint Alphonsus's argument. Where MRIA does not simply rely on inaccurate claims
of waiver or misstatements of the facts, it often simply ignores Saint Alphonsus' s central legal
arguments and instead restates the issue at hand in a form more to its liking, in the apparent hope
of deflecting attention from the district court's legal errors.

1

MRIA's brief contains a number of puzzling assertions to the effect that Saint Alphonsus
"did not appeal" a number of issues on which reversal is expressly requested in its opening brief.
(See, e.g., MRIA Br. at 24 ("did not appeal the jury's findings" of wrongful dissociation before
expiration of a definite term); id. at 28 ("did not appeal the jury's determination" of liability with
regard to five enumerated claims); id at 42 ("has not appealed" jury finding of conspiracy with
GSR) (emphases in originals).) Since Saint Alphonsus obviously seeks reversal of all ofthese
verdicts on a number oflegal grounds (see, e.g., Opening Br. at 25~35, 60-62), it can only
suppose that MRIA means to say that Saint Alphonsus has not included in this appeal attacks on
those claims based on the sufficiency of the evidence. If so understood, the statements are
correct; if understood in any other way, they are not.
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I.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S DISSOCIATION FROM MRIA DID NOT BREACH THE
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S ERRONEOUS
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE CONTRARY PREJUDICED THE
ENTIRE TRIAL
A.

Once RUPA Took Effect In 2001, AU Idaho Partners Were Empowered To
Dissociate Without Causing Partnership Dissolution, And Section 6.1 Of The
1985 Partnership Agreement Is Not An "Express Provision" Making
Exercise Of That New Power Wrongful Under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602(b)

The trial in this case was over before it began, as a result of the district court's decision
on summary judgment that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated from the partnership in 2004.
This ruling was legal error because Saint Alphonsus had a right to dissociate under the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"), which, effective July 1, 2001, radically and retroactively
changed Idaho law to allow partners in existing and future partnerships to leave more easily and
with less disruption to all concerned. RUP A did this by establishing a uniform rule that a
partner's unilateral act ofleaving a partnership would no longer destroy the partnership entity,
but rather would amount to a "dissociation" that leaves the partnership intact. (Opening Br. at
17-19.) Further, RUPA made partners powerless to alter this rule, Idaho Code§ 53-3-l03(b)(6),
allowing them only to make dissociation a breach of contract by adopting, inter alia, an "express
provision of the partnership agreement" to that effect, id. § 53-3-602(b)(1). (Opening Br. at 1819.)
When written in 1985, prior to the enactment ofRUPA and under the then-applicable
Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA") regime in which a partner's withdrawal caused the partnership
to dissolve, Section 6.1 of the partnership agreement created an exception to the default rule of
total dissolution by which the hospital partners could withdraw for four specific reasons while
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the partnership continued on. (Opening Br. at 20-22.) By contrast, at that time, the non-hospital
partner, DMR, had no ability to withdraw or otherwise leave the partnership without causing a
dissolution. (/d. at 23.) As a result, the partnership agreement gave the hospital partners
additional rights as compared with DMR. (/d.) MRIA does not deny that since 2001 RUP A has
retroactively applied to the partnership agreement and has given DMR the right to dissociate
without causing dissolution. The issue here is whether the hospital partners should be denied
that same new RUP A right to dissociate solely because they received an additional right to
withdraw by agreement in 1985.
MRIA never comes to grips with the fact that RUPA provides a statutory right to all
partners to dissociate without causing dissolution, subject only to a breach of contract remedy
based on an "express provision" making such a dissociation wrongful. Instead, it focuses on the
scope ofthe contractual right contained in the 1985 agreement, emphasizing various words in
Section 6.1 (see MRIA Br. at 20 ("Conditions"); id. at 21 ("if' and "may")), to argue that the
section was "restrictive" and not "permissive" (id. at 21-23). Of course, under the then-existing
UP A, the section was both permissive in allowing hospital partners to withdraw without
dissolution (or contract breach) in four specific instances and restrictive in the sense of not going
beyond that to affirmatively create a contractual right to withdraw without causing a dissolution
in a broader range of cases. That fact does not make it an "express provision" limiting the
hospital partners' exercise of RUP A's later-granted statutory right to dissociate, any more than it
is an express provision limiting DMR's undisputed freedom under RUPA to exercise that same
right to dissociate without breaching the agreement.
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Rather than give legal effect to RUPA 's new retroactive power to dissociate, MRIA's
concept ofhow to give meaning to RUPA is that "Section 6.1 must be read only in the context of
RUPA." (MRIA Br. at 22.) Thus, MRIA says that this Court must interpret the intent and
meaning of Section 6.1 as though it had been adopted after RUPA came into effect. (!d. at 22.)
If Section 6.1 had actually been adopted after RUPA, then Section 6.1 's four specific stated
conditions supporting a hospital party's withdrawal, being narrower than RUP A's far broader
general power to dissociate, might by implication be seen as showing an intent to make hospital
dissociation for other reasons a breach of contract. 2 But that is not when Section 6.1 was
adopted. The parties entered into their agreement at a time when UP A granted no ability at all to
depart without causing dissolution. Thus, the section unambiguously reflects a contractual intent
to modestly expand the possibilities for proper, non-disruptive withdrawal available to the
hospital partners, while giving no such rights to the doctor partners. MRIA's reasoning, like the
summary judgment decision below, amounts to restricting Saint Alphonsus's exercise of
RUPA 's statutory right to dissociate by pretemling that the parties knew about it-and intended
to preempt it-when Section 6.1 was written in 1985. Such reasoning defeats the legislature's
objective of making RUPA retroactive to existing partnerships. (Opening Br. at 23~25.)
MRIA seeks to defend this fallacious reasoning with a factual claim that Saint Alphonsus
knew that its 2004 withdrawal would breach Section 6.1. (MRIA Br. at 23.) But the record
evidence upon which MRIA relies demonstrates precisely the opposite conclusion-that Saint
Even if viewed from this counter~factual frame of reference, it would be ambiguous-and
therefore a question of fact for the jury-whether the provision's enumeration of certain
contractual withdrawal rights constitutes a denial of other dissociation rights provided by statute.
2
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Alphonsus genuinely and quite correctly believed that RUP A gave it the right to dissociate
without breaching the agreement.
MRIA cites to testimony by Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp, Saint Alphonsus's CEO
and COO, but fails to disclose what those witnesses actually said. In each instance, the witness
was being asked not what she herselfknew or believed at the time of withdrawal, but rather to
interpret a consultant's memorandum written in January 2000, before RUPA even took effect.
That memorandum discusses a "Scenario 5," under which Saint Alphonsus would hypothetically
"withdraw[] from MRI Associates to provide flexibility to form potentially competing ventures,"
and, citing the four conditions enumerated in Section 6.1, states that "(t]he Partnership
Agreement restricts the ability of Hospital Partners to withdraw from MRI Associates." (Reply
3

App. 5 (Trial Ex. 4138, p. 16.)) The testimony cited by MRIA shows that Bruce and Schamp
acknowledged that none of the four conditions existed (Tr., VoL II, p. 1828. L. 4-19; id. p. 2295,
L. 20 top. 2297, L.4), and that withdrawal could "potentially result in legal challenges" and
"might" result in liability (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2297, L. 8 top. 2298, L. 7; p. 1950, L.13).
But in the very same testimony, each witness also made explicitly clear her belief that the
dissociation in 2004 had been entirely legal under RUP A. Bruce testified that she believed at the
time that the dissociation was not pursuant to Section 6.1, and thus was not limited by that
section's four conditions, and that she "understood that there was an Idaho statute that would
allow us to withdraw .... I think it's called RUPA." (Tr., Vol. II, p. 1827, L. 19-21; id. p. 1949,

3

Citations to "Reply App. _" refer to the pages of the Reply Appendix attached to this brief.
The Reply Appendix contains pertinent excerpts of the exhibits cited herein.
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L. 15-19.)4 And Schamp never said anything resembling the attributed statement that "it would
be a breach of the agreement to withdraw other than for the four listed reasons." (MRIA Br. at

23.) Rather, the testimony cited by MRIA shows a verbal wrestling match in which counsel
repeatedly demanded an answer not about whether there was any breach, but only about what
one would think from reading the language of the 2000 consultant's memorandum. (Tr., Vol. II,
p. 2295, L. 20 top. 2297, L. 4.i

4

In context, Sandra Bruce's testimony was as follows:

Q: ... So, as of2000 when you received this Scenario 5 [on Trial Ex. 4138],
and 2004, you were not aware of any of those four factors which would allow
Saint Alphonsus to withdraw rightfully under the MRIA Partnership
Agreement; correct? ....
A: I feel like this might be a have-you-stopped-beating-your-dog or -wife, or
whatever that scenario is, but I believe we did not withdraw under these, and
I did not believe these conditions existed at that time.

Q: ... I'm not asking you what you believe you withdrew under. I'm just
asking you whether under the Partnership Agreement any of those factors
existed so that you could rightfully withdraw under the Partnership Agreement?
A: It's the "rightfully" piece that bothers me, Mr. Banducci. ...

Q.... It's fair to say that you didn't understand how the Idaho Code played
into this issue of withdrawal?
A: No. I understood that there was an Idaho ~tatute that would allow us to
withdraw. . • • I think it's called RUPA.

(Tr., Vol. II, p. 1827, L. 9 top. 1828, L. 3; id. p. 1949, L. 12-19 (emphasis added).)
5

In context, Cindy Schamp's testimony was as follows:

Q: ... Referring you to No. 1 under Considerations [on Exhibit 4138] it says
"The Partnership Agreement restricts the ability of hospital partners to
withdraw from MRI Associates [then listing the four conditions of Section
6.1]." . . . Would you agree with me that some011e reading tltis scenario
would understand that Saint Alphonsus could only withdraw from the
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Ultimately, the fact that a consultant's memorandum drafted in 2000 would perceive the
conditions of Section 6.1 as setting the outer limit of a hospital partner's ability to withdraw is
not at all surprising. Idaho partners were not empowered to dissociate without causing
dissolution until RUPA took effect in July 2001. After that time, however, they could do so
rightfully absent an "express provision of the partnership agreement" to the contrary. When
Saint Alphonsus dissociated in 2004, it thus did so rightfully, unless Section 6.1 expressly made
the exercise of that statutory power wrongful. MRIA' s verbal gymnastics and misstatement of
the testimonial record do not begin to explain how that is so. Accordingly the district court's
order of summary judgment on wrongful dissociation must be reversed.

B.

Communication To The Jury Of The Court's Erroneous Summary
Judgment Ruling Prejudiced The Jury's Consideration Of The Entire Case

As explained in Saint Alphonsus's opening brief (at 25-31 ), the summary judgment
verdict for MRIA on the claim of wrongful dissociation had an enormous impact on every aspect

(continued ... )

Partnership Agreement if one ofthose circumstances occurred ... and
otherwise it would be a breach of the agreement?
A: I believe that was [consultant] Alan [Hahn]'s interpretation of the
documents he reviewed.

Q: ... What I want to know is whether you reading this document would
interpret that ~tatement under No. 1 ... to mean that Saint Alphonsus
would be in breach ofthe agreement if it withdrew for any reason other
than the four reasons next to the bullet points? ...
A: Based upon only the language here, yes.
(Tr., Vol. II, p. 2295, L. 20 top. 2297, L.4 (emphasis added).)
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. of this case and, if incorrect, requires reversal on all claims and a new trial. From the early
phases of jury selection until the final instructions, MRIA and the district court repeatedly told
the jury that the court had already determined that Saint Alphonsus had acted "wrongfully"
toward MRIA. (Opening Br. at 10-11.) This denied Saint Alphonsus any reasonable chance to
credibly argue that its officers had acted in good faith in their dealings with MRIA. (/d. at 28-29.)
And with regard to most elements of the other claims, the summary judgment decision simply
dictated the jury's verdict. (/d. at 29-30.)
MRIA does not materially dispute any of these points.6 Instead, MRIA's primary
argument is to offer a wholly novel and legally unsupported concept of how an appellate court is
to assess prejudicial error requiring a new trial. Rule 59(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
6

MRIA's efforts to minimize the prejudicial consequences of the incorrect summary
judgment order are wholly without merit. It first disputes Saint Alphonsus's characterization of
the summary judgment ruling as the "centerpiece" of its case, and takes that occasion to once
again argue its version of the facts. (MRIA Br. at 27-28.) It also argues that there was nothing
improper about its and the court's repeated use of the term "wrongful" to describe Saint
Alphonsus conduct, since that word appears in the statute giving rise to the cause of action. (/d.
at 29-30.) But the premise of Saint Alphonsus's prejudice claim is that the summary judgment
ruling was incorrect, in which event the court's characterization of proper conduct as "wrongful"
is obviously highly prejudicial.
Next, MRIA asserts that the summary judgment ruling did not effectively direct a verdict on
any other claims. (MRIA Br. at 30-31.) But MRIA offers no discussion of or rebuttal to Saint
Alphonsus's detailed and specific showing how the summary judgment decision effectively
dictated verdicts on critical elements ofMRIA's other claims. (See Opening Br. at 29-30.)
Finally, MRIA argues that Saint Alphonsus is to blame for the prejudice caused by the court's
wrongful dissociation ruling because its counsel used the term "bad act" when discussing the
ruling. (MRIA Br. at 30-31; see also Tr., Vol. III, p. 4371, L. 16 top. 4372, L. 8.) But, as the
cited material makes clear, counsel was attempting to mitigate the prejudice caused by the
court's wrongful dissociation ruling. Indeed, MRIA's argument on this point simply highlights
the impossible position in which the court's erroneous ruling placed Saint Alphonsus.
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provides for the grant of a new trial based on any circumstances "by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial." Where the claimed prejudice arises from information that
should not have been presented to the jury-like an erroneous ruling that the defendant breached
the contract at issue--a new trial is required where "the information reasonably could have
produced prejudice, when evaluated in light of all the events and evidence at trial." Dachlet v.
State, 136 Idaho 752, 760, 40 P .3d 110, 118 (2002). Where that is true, the court has a "duty to
grant a new trial" even if"the verdict is supported by substantial evidence." Davis v. Sun Valley
Ski Educ. Found., Inc., 130 Idaho 400,405,941 P.2d 1301, 1306 (1997).
Without acknowledging these well-established principles, which are fully set forth in
Saint Alphonsus's opening brief (at 26-27), MRIA appears to dispute them in two respects. First,
rather than recognizing the test set by this Court as whether the error "reasonably could have
produced prejudice," MRIA claims that a new trial is proper only upon a showing that "but for
the wrongful dissociation ruling, the jury would not have returned a verdict in favor of MRIA"
on the other claims. (MRIA Br. at 28.) As authority, MRIA cites only Ernst v. Hemenway &
Moser Co., 126 Idaho 980, 895 P.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1995), a case which says nothing ofthe sort. 7
Then, in an even more remarkable leap oflogic, and with no further citation of authority, MRIA
concludes that such "but for" causation cannot be established without a showing that "the jury's
verdict on MRIA's other claims is not supported by substantial evidence." (MRIA Br. at 28.)
7

In Ernst, the defendant in a non-jury trial complained about the admission of a single exhibit
on the issue of damages that reflected data outside the relevant damage period. 126 Idaho at 986,
895 P.2d at 587. The court of appeals ruled the exhibit irrelevant and inadmissible, but found the
error harmless because the damages award was based on other evidence and did not rely on the
inadmissible exhibit in any way. !d. Ernst makes no mention of a "but for" cause standard.
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MRIA then claims that Saint Alphonsus cannot show a lack of substantial evidence, and thus is
not entitled to a new trial based on possible prejudice, because it did not attack the remaining
verdicts based on the sufficiency of the evidence. (Id. at 28-29.)
So, according to MRIA, repeated erroneous statements at trial, by the court and counsel,
that the defendant was liable and acted wrongfully on one cause of action, would only require a
new trial upon a showing that there was no substantial evidence to support the other claims. But
such a standard would read the new trial remedy based on prejudicial error out of the law. A
party would have no right to a fair trial, just a right to reversal by showing legal insufficiency of
the evidence. That is obviously not the law in Idaho, see Dachlet, 136 Idaho at 760, 40 P .3d at
118; Davis, 130 Idaho at 405, 941 P .2d at 1306, or anywhere else.

C.

Because The MRIA Partnership Agreement Had An Indefinite Term As A
Matter Of Law, The District Court Erred In Asking The Jury To Decide
Whether The Dissociation Breached A Definite Partnership Term

Saint Alphonsus also demonstrated that, as a matter of law, the MRIA partnership
agreement was for an indefinite term and that the district court therefore erred in allowing the
jury to decide whether the 2004 dissociation was in breach of a definite partnership term.
(Opening Br. at 31-35.) MRIA effectively ignores Saint Alphonsus's arguments on this issue,
claiming waiver and then repeating the same arguments it raised below. The waiver argument is
demonstrably incorrect, however, and the other arguments are based on the same legally
inapplicable case law and flawed reasoning discussed in the Saint Alphonsus's opening brie£

First, MRIA argues that the issue was not preserved for appeal, claiming that "the trial
court never ruled on [Saint Alphonsus's] motion" on the issue and that it was not raised again.
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(MRIA Br. at 24.) MRIA is wrong, both legally and factually. Under Idaho law, "[t]o properly
preserve an issue for appeal, one must either receive an adverse ruling on the issue or raise it in
the court below." Kolar v. Cassia County Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 354, 127 P.3d 962,970 (2005)
(emphasis added). As MRIA concedes (MRIA Br. at 31 ), Saint Alphonsus moved for summary
judgment on MRIA's claim of wrongful dissociation based on a definite term (Exhibit toR. #8,
p. 14-16), and the trial court declined to so order, thus effectively denying the motion and
leaving the claim in the case for trial. Saint Alphonsus also renewed this argument post-trial,
explaining that "[a]s a matter oflaw, the MRIA partnership was not a partnership for a term, and
it was an error in law to submit this issue to the jury." (Exhibit to R. #208, p. 33.) In denying
relief, the district court expressly addressed and rejected this argument. (R., Vol. XIII, p. 2444.)
The issue was thus plainly preserved for appeal.
Second, citing out-of-state cases, MRIA claims that "[t]he existence of a 'term'
partnership requires consideration of documents, conduct and statements outside the formal
partnership agreement." (MRIA Br. at 24 (emphasis added).) This is incorrect as a matter of
Idaho law. As Saint Alphonsus showed, the question whether a partnership is for a "term" is no
different than any other question of contract interpretation-parol evidence is considered only if
the language of the agreement is ambiguous. Otherwise, the unambiguous language of the
contract is controlling as a matter oflaw. (Opening Br. at 33-35.) Indeed, this is shown in the
unofficial author's comment to the model RUPA quoted in MRIA's brief, which states that
"[ w ]hether there exists an agreed term ... cannot always be resolved by reference to the written
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partnership agreement." (MRIA Br. at 24 (emphasis added)l This necessarily means that in
many (or most) situations, whether a term exists can be resolved by reference to the written
partnership agreement. Such is the case here, where the written agreement is unambiguous. 9

Third, MRIA does not dispute that the Section 1.1.2 of the MRIA partnership agreement
uses unambiguous language setting an indefinite term, i.e., language to the effect that the
partnership will end whenever the partners act to end it. (Opening Br. at 32-33.) Rather, MRIA
simply asserts that the MRIA partnership agreement was for a definite term because its purpose
was to operate the limited partnerships, and the limited partnerships had an express term.
(MRIA Br. at 25-26.) Apart from improperly relying on parol evidence to dispute the
uncontested unambiguous language of the partnership agreement, this reasoning is also flawed
because it is inconsistent with the official comment to Idaho Code§ 53-3-101, which makes
clear that an indefinite-term partnership is not made definite due to the existence of partnership
obligations with fixed durations. (See Opening Br. at 33.)

8

In any event, this author's comment to the model RUPA is oflittle relevance, given that it
does not appear in the corresponding section of the Idaho RUPA. See Idaho Code§ 53-3-602.
9

Moreover, ofthe authorities cited on pages 24-25 ofMRIA's brief, the only one involving
RUPA-Fischer v. Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98 (Ky. 2006)-did not even involve the question of a
partnership term, but rather the question whether the defendant had dissociated before the
completion of a particular undertaking. Even then, the court found that the agreement at issue
should be interpreted as a matter oflaw and did not need to be decided by a jury. Id. at 104-06.
The other two cases are from New York, which has not adopted RUPA and, in any event, are
decades old, and thus were decided well before RUP A was even conceived o£ See National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About the Uniform
Partnership Act, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fsupa9497.asp (last visited Dec. 19, 2008.)
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In short, Section 1.1.2 of the MRIA partnership agreement unambiguously sets an
indefinite term for the partnership. As such, the district court should have granted judgment to
Saint Alphonsus on MRIA's claim for dissociation before the end of a definite tenn.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S EVIDENTIARY ERRORS REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL
Saint Alphonsus has demonstrated that the prejudice of the district court's wrongful

dissociation ruling was compounded by the court's erroneous admission of two exhibits-a
memorandum summarizing privileged

attomey~client

communications and an offer of settlement.

(Opening Br. at 36-42.) In response, MRIA seeks to avoid review of these errors through several
meritless claims of waiver, while failing to defend the merits of the district court's rulings.

A.

Attorney-Client Communications Summarized In The Shattuck Hammond
Memorandum Should Not Have Been Admitted
1.

Saint Alphonsus Preserved The Issue For Appeal

Saint Alphonsus filed two motions in limine to exclude from evidence the portions of the
Shattuck Hammond memo (Trial Ex. 4239) that summarized its lawyer's legal advice about risks
attendant to a decision to dissociate. (Opening Br. at 36 n.16.) Both were denied. (Jd.) It also
unsuccessfully raised the objection again post-trial. (Jd.) MRIA nonetheless argues that Saint
Alphonsus failed to preserve this objection. (MRIA Br. at 58 (citing Kirk v. Ford Motor Co.,
141 Idaho 697, 702, 116 P.3d 27, 32 (2005)).) MRIA's argument, however, rests on a inaccurate
recounting of Kirk, as well as a transparent misstatement of the record.
MRIA relies on the statement in Kirk that "(i]fthe trial court decides to wait and hear the
actual foundation laid before determining whether to admit or exclude evidence, the moving
party is required to continue to object as the evidence is presented." 141 Idaho at 701, 116 P.3d
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at 31. MRIA fails to note, however, the Court's further statement that where "the trial court
unqualifiedly rules on the admissibility of evidence prior to trial no further objection is required
to preserve the issue for appeal." /d. at 702, 116 P.3d at 32 (emphasis added).
Here, MRIA claims that Saint Alphonsus waived its privilege argument because "the
privilege issue raised in the motions was never ruled upon by the trial court." (MRIA Br. at 58.)
This statement is demonstrably false. On February 6, 2007, the court summarized Saint
Alphonsus' s privilege argument and held that it was "unable to find that Saint Alphonsus has
proven the Shattuck Hammond Memo is privileged and therefore any references to the Shattuck
Hammond Memo and the Memo itself will not be stricken." (R., Vol. V, p. 848-50.) On the eve
of trial, the court likewise rejected the second motion in limine to the extent it was addressed to
the claim of attorney-client privilege, stating that it had "previously addressed the admissibility
of this Shattuck Hammond Memorandum" and held that it "was admissible because Saint
Alphonsus had failed to prove the Memo was subject to the attorney-client privilege." (R., Vol.
XI, p. 2116-17.) The district court thus had twice categorically denied Saint Alphonsus's
motions to exclude portions of the memo based on attorney-client privilege. Pursuant to Kirk,
"no further objection [was] required" to preserve the issue. 141 Idaho at 702, 116 P .3d at 32. 10

10

Despite the unambiguous meaning of the district court's written decisions on privilege,
MRIA says that the "trial court's ruling merely stated generically as to the 'Shattuck Hammond
memorandum' that it would need to see 'further foundation before that's presented to the jury."'
(MRIA Br. at 58 (citing Tr., Vol. I, p. 1086, L. 2-6).) That is wrong. There were two different
Shattuck Hammond documents at issue in this case: the September 2001 ''Finnerty
Memorandum'' (Trial Ex. 4239) that involves the privilege issue (see Opening Br. at 36-39), and
a November 2001 "Damages Memo" (Trial Ex. 4247) on whicb MRIA relied to support its
4
'purchase price" damage theory (see Opening Br. at 9, 57-59). Discussing the Damages Memo,
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2.

Saint Alphonsus Did Not Waive The Privilege During Discovery

MRIA also claims that Saint Alphonsus waived the attorney-client privilege on three
occasions during the course of discovery: (i) when the memorandum was provided to MRIA by
Shattuck Hanunond employee Grant Chamberlain; (ii) when MRIA used the memorandum
during the deposition oflan Davey; and (iii) when Chamberlain was again deposed to preserve
his testimony for trial. (MRIA Br. at 59-60.} But once again, MRIA omits several significant
facts. One is that MRIA raised the same arguments before the district court three times, and yet
each time the district court decided the issue ofprivilege on the merits, thus implicitly rejecting
these waiver arguments. (SeeR., Vol. IV, p. 785-90; id., Vol. XII, p. 2228-29; id. p. 2384.) This
rejection was supported by substantial evidence, and this Court should likewise reject it here.
It is axiomatic, with respect to the attorney-client privilege, "that the client is the holder
of the privilege. Accordingly, only the client can waive the privilege." State v. Jwakiri,
106 Idaho 618, 621, 682 P.2d 571, 574 (1984); see also Idaho Code§ 9-203(2) ("[a]n attorney
cannot, without the consent ofhis client, be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon" (emphasis added)). Here, the document summarizing
privileged communications was contained in an internal memorandum circulated within Shattuck
Hanunond, a consultant hired to assist Saint Alphonsus's counsel, Givens Pursley, in providing

(continued ... )

the district court held on August 3, 2007, that MRIA could not refer to it at trial "until further
foundation is established" showing its "relevance and probative value as to damages or the value
of the partnership." (R., Vol. XI, p. 2164; see also Opening Br. at 9.) It is this ruling-which
has nothing to do with Finnerty Memorandum or the attorney-client privilege issu~that MRIA
misleadingly cites in support of its waiver claim. (MRIA Br. at 58.)
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legal advice. Such an internal memorialization of privileged information by a confidential
consultant is no less privileged than the original privileged statement of that information (see
Opening Br. at 38-39)-a point oflaw which MRIA does not contest. Saint Alphonsus did not
receive a copy ofthe memo at the time it was written, and thus had no knowledge of its contents.
(Exhibit toR. #155, Ex. A, p. 148, L. 19 top. 149, L. 6.)
Just as importantly, the document was not produced to MRIA by Saint Alphonsus.
Rather, Shattuck Hammond witness Grant Chamberlain brought the document to his deposition
and produced it to MRIA pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. (Exhibit toR. #52, pp. 3-4.) As a
matter oflaw, Chamberlain's production could not have waived the privilege since it was not his
privilege to waive. See, e.g., Iwakiri, 106 Idaho at 621; 682 P.3d at 574; cf Idaho R. Civ. P.
26(b)(5)(B) (requiring party in receipt of inadvertently disclosed privileged information to
destroy or return information at request of opposing party).
Likewise, the unrebutted record evidence shows that Saint Alphonsus attorney Patrick
Miller had approximately one hour to review the 1,560 pages of documents that Chamberlain
brought to the deposition. (Exhibit toR. #52, p. 4.) Thus, he was able to review the documents
only to see who had sent and received them-a review which would not have revealed a few
lines of privileged comments in the middle of this thirteen page memo to and from non-lawyers.
(See id.) Moreover, Mr. Miller explained that if he had seen the privileged material at the time
the memo was produced, he would have pulled the document and placed it on Saint Alphonsus' s
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privilege log. (ld.) MRIA offered no evidence to rebut Mr. Miller's affidavit, nor does MRIA
cite any authorities finding waiver of privilege under such circumstances. 11
Saint Alphonsus' s counsel did not become aware of any content of the memorandum
until December 11, 2006, when MRIA used the memorandum in the course of deposing witness
Ian Davey. (Exhibit toR. #53 at 3.) Although MRIA argues that it "asked [Mr. Davey]
numerous detailed questions about various statements in the document without objection by
[Saint Alphonsus] counsel" (MRIA Br. at 59), MRIA fails to mention that none of the questions
asked of Mr. Davey involved either of the privileged statements at issue on this appeal. (See
Exhibit toR. #53, Ex. A, p. 52 L. 11 top. 63, L. 5.) Further, also unmentioned by MRIA, Saint
Alphonsus attorney Jack Gjording stated in an affidavit that following Mr. Davey's deposition,
he reviewed the entire memorandum and realized for the first time that it contained privileged
material. (Exhibit toR. #53, p. 3.) On December 20, Mr. Gjording requested that MRIA return
the document pursuant to Rule 26(b)(5)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, but MRIA
refused to do so. (Id.) MRIA offered no evidence to rebut Mr. Gjording's affidavit and cites no
authority supporting a finding of waiver under such circumstances.
Finally, MRIA claims waiver because Saint Alphonsus did not object to the privileged
material on May 27, 2007, at a second deposition of Grant Chamberlain intended to preserve his
testimony for trial, and because that testimony was later read into the record at trial, without
11

MRIA' s authority regarding waiver of privilege in a deposition (MRIA Br. at 59) is wholly
inapposite. In Hawkins v. Stables, 148 F.3d 379, 384 (4th Cir. 1998), there was waiver because
the client herselfrevealed privileged conversations during her deposition, without objection.
And in In re Auto Specialties Mfg. Co., 153 B.R. 457, 465 & n.5 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993), the
alleged waiver occurred when the client's attorney gave testimony about privileged statements.
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objection. (MRIA Br. at 59-60.) MRIA contends that this deposition "took place before [Saint
Alphonsus] filed its motions in limine concerning the Shattuck Hammond memorandum" (id. at
60 n.42), but this, too, is demonstrably false. As explained above, Saint Alphonsus had long
since moved to exclude the memorandum on privilege grounds, and the district court had held
that the statements at issue were not privileged on February 6, 2007-nearly four months before
the second Chamberlain deposition. (R., Vol. V, pp. 848-50.) No further action by Saint
Alphonsus was necessary to preserve the issue for appeal. Kirk, 141 Idaho at 702, 116 P.3d at 32.

3.

The District Court Erred in Admitting the Memorandum

Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(b) protects "confidential communications made for the
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client," including
communications "between the client's lawyer and the lawyer's representative." Givens Pursley
was the client's lawyer and had retained Shattuck Hammond as its representative on June 14,
2001, "in connection with" its evaluation of the "legal and financial viability" of Saint
Alphonsus's "options with respect to the ... partnership interest[s] [it] holds in 'MRI Associates'
and related limited partnerships." (Reply App. 7 (Confidential Exhibit toR. #2, Ex. A, p. 4).)
The Shattuck Hammond memorandum memorialized a communication from the client's lawyer
to the lawyer's representative, thus rendering it privileged. (Opening Br. at 36-39.)
MRIA's sole argument to the contrary (MRIA Br. at 61-62) rests on the fact that on June
26, 2001-twelve days after Givens Pursley retained Shattuck Hammond-Saint Alphonsus
directly signed a separate consulting agreement with Shattuck Hammond for precisely the same
purpose: to provide confidential services "relating to Saint Alphonsus goal of restructuring its
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current relationship with" MRIA. (Reply App. 10 (Confidential Exhibit toR. #2, Ex. C, p. 2).)
Unsupported by either case law or logic, MRIA claims that the mere fact of this simultaneous
direct contractual relationship between Saint Alphonsus and Shattuck Hammond removes the
latter's activities from the protection of the privilege.
The relevant documents clearly show that the purpose of both contracts was to establish a
three-party relationship in which Shattuck Hammond would act as a confidential consultant,
participating in Givens Pursley's legal representation of Saint Alphonsus. The ori!,Ji.nalletter by
Givens Pursley retaining Shattuck Hammond states expressly that the retention is made "in
connection with our rendering of legal advice to Saint Alphonsus." (Reply App. 7 (Confidential
Exhibit toR. #2, Ex. A p. 4).) The letter also expressly anticipated that, as part of the
confidential relationship, Shattuck Hammond would be "in direct contact with representatives of
Saint Alphonsus." (ld.) And the contract between Shattuck Hammond and Saint Alphonsus
expressly references the use of Shattuck Hammond's work by Saint Alphonsus's legal advisors.
(Reply App. 15 (Confidential Exhibit toR. #2, Ex. C, p. 7).) 12 Under these circumstances, the
communications between Givens Pursley and Shattuck Hammond are plainly privileged.
MRIA appears to suggest that, contrary to the timing and content of the retention letters,
the second contract involved a project separate from the one which led to Given Pursley's
12

This arrangement reflects the well-established practice of having experts and other
consultants, retained by lawyers to aid in the provision of confidential legal services, also
contract directly with the client to define their mutual expectations and obligations. Such
agreements are often used to establish and define compensation arrangements and the scope of
services and responsibilities to be undertaken at the client's expense. The contract at hand was
entered into for precisely these reasons. (Reply App. 10-11 (Confidential Exhibit to R. #2, Ex. C,
pp. 2-5).)
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retention of Shattuck Hammond, and that, as such, the statements were not privileged. (MRIA
Br. at 61-62.) But even assuming there were separate projects, there is no doubt that the
statements at issue concerned legal and financial issues related to restructuring the Saint
Alphonsus/MRIA relationship, and thus were within the defined scope of the Givens Pursley
retention letter and the Rule 502(b)(2) privilege. Moreover, given that the second retention letter
also called for Shattuck Hammond to help with assessing various restructuring options for Saint
Alphonsus, the confidential legal advice at issue would be protected within the scope of that
relationship as well, either as a Rule 502(b)(l) communication between the client's
representative and the client's lawyer, or as a Rule 502(b)(3) communication "among clients,
their representatives, their lawyers, or their lawyers' representatives, in any combination,
concerning a matter of common interest." 13
Finally, the admission of this document was highly prejudicial. Despite MRIA's selfserving attempts to minimize the document as being introduced only for proof of the mundane
fact that litigation was a possibility (see MRIA Br. at 62-63), the undisputed fact is that MRIA
touted the memorandum as one of the "most critical documents in the case" and repeatedly
suggested that it proved that Saint Alphonsus knew that dissociation would be wrongful and

13

MRIA claims that any reliance on Rule 502(b)(l) was waived below because Saint
Alphonsus did not specifically assert privilege on grounds other than 502(b)(2). (MRIA Br. at
62 n.43.) But Saint Alphonsus is citing Rules 502(b)(l) and 502(b)(3) primarily to demonstrate
the flaw in MRIA's assertion that Rule 502(b)(2) is inapplicable due to the dual representation.
In any event, the district court made clear that it had examined all subsections of Section 502(b)
and found none applicable (R., Vol. XIII, at 2439-40), so there is an "adverse ruling" preserving
the applicability of each of those subsections as an issue for review by this Court. Kolar,
142 Idaho at 354, 127 P.3d at 970.
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ignored the legal advice in bad faith. {Opening Br. at 39-40.) This improper and inflammatory
use of privileged material requires a new trial.

B.

MRIA Fails To Contest That The District Court Erred In Admitting The
Settlement Letter For The Purpose Of Establishing Damages And Bad Faith

The district court also erred when it allowed MRIA to admit into evidence a confidential
settlement offer (Trial Ex. 4332) for the "limited purpose" of showing MRIA's opinion as to the
fair market value of the MRIA partnership. (Opening Br. at 40.) MRIA makes no attempt to
defend the district court's decision, despite the fact that this was the only ground ever articulated
in support of admissibility below. That alone should warrant reversal.
MRIA instead devotes the bulk of its argument to creating and attacking a complex straw
man: it conjures up a counterfactual scenario in which it sought admissibility on entirely

different grounds-specifically, to impeach Saint Alphonsus witnesses-and then claims (i) that
the court would have been able to admit the letter on this hypothetical ground, and (ii) that Saint
Alphonsus waived its objection to this hypothetical ground because MRIA made such
unauthorized use of the exhibit during its closing argument. (MRIA Br. at 63-66.)
This too-clever-by-half argument, however, obscures the reality of the situation. MRIA
sought admission of the letter for one purpose only: to establish its opinion as to the value of
Center in support ofMRIA's "purchase price" damages theory. When MRIA first tried to admit
the document, Saint Alphonsus objected on grounds that it was inadmissible under Rule 408,
and-contrary to MRIA' s claim otherwise-the Court expressly noted a continuing objection
after it decided to admit for this limited purpose. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 1243, L. 16 top. 1244, L.IO;
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id., p. 1245, L. 16 top. 1246, L.l.i 4 MRIA thereafter did, in fact, use the evidence for that
improper limited purpose. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 1953, L. 1 top. 1956, L. 6; id. p. 2063, L. 20 top.
2064, L. 17.) The Court's legal error in admitting this document to support MRIA's "purchase
price" damages theory was itself prejudicial, particularly given the fatal flaws in MRIA's
alternative "lost scan" damages theory. (See Opening Br. at 42-55; infra Part IV.A-B.)
At no point did MRIA move to have the settlement letter, already incorrectly allowed into
evidence over Saint Alphonsus's objection, admitted for any other purpose. Instead, MRIA
simply compounded the prejudicial effect of the district coutt's earlier error by using the
document to argue during closing argument about Saint Alphonsus's alleged bad faith. (Opening
Br. at 41-42.) Having done all it could to keep this inadmissible document out of the case, Saint
Alphonsus is entitled to demonstrate the full range of prejudice that the document ultimately
caused.

III.

IN ANY EVENT, THE DAMAGES AWARD MUST BE REVERSED
Even apart from the errors described above, the damages award must be set aside because

of improper instructions and legally inadequate proof.

14

MRIA claims that despite the continuing objection, Mac Tools, Inc. v. Griffin, 126 Idaho
193, 879 P.2d 1126 (1994), required Saint Alphonsus to keep objecting each time the letter was
used. (MRIA Br. at 66.) Mac Tools, however, held that an unfounded objection to the
admissibility of certain testimony was not sufficient to preserve a different and separate
objection to the later misuse of that testimony. Id. at 200, 879 P.2d at 1133. Here, by contrast,
Saint Alphonsus seeks this Court's review of the very same evidentiary ruling to which it made
its continuing objection: the district court's improper admission of the settlement letter.
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A.

The Only Claims Capable Of Supporting The Award Of Lost Profits Are
The Fiduciary Duty Claims Of Center And Mobile, And Those Claims Fail
As A Matter Of Law

Though the jury did not allocate damages on a claim-by-claim basis, its award of $36.3
million in "lost scan" damages must be attributable to a claim asserted on behalf of Center and
Mobile because it is undisputed that only those entities, and not MRIA, provided the scanning
services that were allegedly lost to IMI. (See Opening Br. at 43-44.) The only claims asserted
on behalf of Center and Mobile in this case were for breach of fiduciary duty. (!d. at 44.) And
liability on those claims must be set aside both because the district court's instructional error
makes it impossible to conclude that the jury found such liability (id. at 45-46) and because Saint
Alphonsus owed no fiduciary duties to those entities (id. at 47-50).
Significantly, MRIA does not dispute that Center and Mobile are legally distinct entities
from MRIA, that MRIA owns just 30% of Center and Mobile, and that the evidence of $36.3
million in alleged lost-scan profits presented at trial measures profits allegedly lost by Center and
Mobile, not by MRIA. MRIA also does not dispute that it is impossible to tell from the jury's
verdict whether the jury actually found Saint Alphonsus liable to Center or Mobile on the
fiduciary duty claim. In light of these concessions, MRIA' s arguments for affirming the award
are without merit.

First, MRIA's contention that Saint Alphonsus failed to preserve the argument that
MRIA lacks standing to recover Center's and Mobile's lost profits (MRIA Br. at 31-34)
misconstrues Saint Alphonsus's argument on appeal. Although the district court's decision to
allow MRIA to assert claims in a representative capacity on behalf of Center and Mobile was
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likely incorrect (see Opening Br. at 45 & n.21 ), Saint Alphonsus assumes for the sake of
argument that MRIA had standing to sue and to recover lost profits on behalf of those entities. 15
Rather, the two critical issues on appeal relating to MRIA's representative claims are (i) whether
the district court nonetheless erred in failing to distinguish between the claims of MRIA, Center
and Mobile, and (ii) whether the claims of Center and Mobile for lost profits, pursued by MRIA
as their representative, were meritorious. And Saint Alphonsus fully preserved its arguments on
these issues: (i) it proposed jury instructions distinguishing the separate fiduciary duty claims of
the three entities (Exhibit to R. #230, Instrs. 29-31 & Instr. 41, pp. 2-3) and objected to the
court's jury instructions on the ground that they failed to do so (Exhibit to R. #201, pp. 4-5), 16
and (ii) it unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on the only claims asserted on behalfofthose entities (seeR., Vol. X, p. 1880; Vol. XIII,
p. 2442-43). 17

15

It should be noted, however, that Saint Alphonsus did contemporaneously object to MRIA's
ability to assert claims on behalf of Center and Mobile (Exhibit to R. #57, pp. 4-5), and that the
district court's denial of this objection (R., Vol. V, pp. 869-71) helped set the stage for the other
legal errors described herein.
16

The cited exhibit to the record refutes MRIA's contention (MRIA Br. at 31-32 n.20) that
Saint Alphonsus failed to object to the instructions as given and failed to offer any legal
argument in support of its alternative instruction.
17

In connection with its preservation argument, MRIA at times appears to suggest that it is
entitled to keep for itself any damages recovered on behalf of Center and Mobile. (MRIA Br. at
31-34.) But "[t]he proceeds" of claims asserted in a representative capacity "belong" to "the real
part[ies] in interest," Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970), and, as noted, MRIA does not
dispute that Center and Mobile are the entities that suffered the alleged $36.3 million in lost-scan
damages. MRIA owns only 30% of Center and Mobile. (See Opening Br. at 3-4.)
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Second, MRIA' s contention that it was authorized to seek lost profits on behalf of Center
and Mobile (MRIA Br. at 34) is similarly beside the point. The critical question on appeal is not
whether MRIA was authorized to do so, but whether the jury found liability on the claims
asserted on behalf of Center and Mobile and whether those claims have any merit. If not, as
Saint Alphonsus has demonstrated, then MRIA is not entitled to recover any lost-scan damages.

Third, MRIA' s assertion, made for the first time on appeal, that "all of the claims" in this
lawsuit were asserted on behalf of Center and Mobile (MRIA Br. at 34-36) cannot be taken
seriously. MRIA points to a sentence in its amended counterclaims stating that "[u]nless
otherwise referenced, the designation 'MRIA' shall refer to all three entities." (MRIA Br. at 35.)
But that very document does "otherwise reference[]" a distinction among the three entities when
enumerating the causes of action: the fourth claim for relief, for "Breach of Fiduciary Duties to
MRI Limited and MRI Mobil[ e) Limited" alleges that "MRIA, in the name ofMRI Limited [i.e.,
Center] and MRI Mobile Limited, has been damaged in an amount to be proved at trial." (R.,
Vol. V, p. 931.) By contrast, every other counterclaim later submitted to the jury alleges
damages only to "MRIA." (/d. pp. 930, 933-34, 940.) Indeed, at the time it amended its
counterclaims, MRIA represented to the parties and the court that its purpose in doing so was to
clarify that harm allegedly suffered by Center and Mobile "gives rise to a claim by those limited
partnerships against [Saint Alphonsus] for breach of the fiduciary duties owed by [them]."
(Exhibit toR. #46, p. 6.) MRIA made no similar assertion with respect to any other cause of
action. Indeed, four of those other causes of action allege breach of the MRIA partnership
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agreement, to which Center and Mobile are concededly not parties and have never been alleged
to be third-party beneficiaries.
More importantly, the jury instructions reflect what claims were actually presented to the
jury, and in instructing the jury, the district court expressly distinguished between MRIA, Center
and Mobile: "When I use the term 'MRIA,' I'm referring to MRIA Associates, LLP .... When
I use the term 'MRI Center,' I'm referring to MRI Center ofldaho, of which MRIA is a general
partner. When I use the term 'MRI Mobile,' I'm referring to MRI Mobile Limited Partnership,
of which MRIA is a general partner." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4270, L. 18 top. 4271, L. 1.) On every
claim except the claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the disttict court instructed the jury that the
claim was made by "MRIA." (Instr. Nos. 23-26, 30; Tr., Vol. III, p. 4273, L. 23 top. 4277, L.
25; id., p. 4280, L. 11 top. 4281, L. 20.) Only the instruction for the breach of fiduciary duty
claim stated that claims were being asserted on behalf of Center and Mobile. (Instr. No. 32; Tr.,
Vol. III, p. 4281, L. 21 top. 4282, L. 4.)
Nor is it true, as MRIA contends (MRIA Br. at 35), that Saint Alphonsus's own proposed
instructions recognized that all claims were being brought on behalf of Center and Mobile. To
the contrary, as made clear by the very language that MRIA quotes, Saint Alphonsus's proposed
jury instructions specifically recognized that the only claims asserted on behalf of Center and
Mobile were the claims for breach of fiduciary duty. (!d. at 36 (quoting Instr. 24).)

Fourth, Saint Alphonsus did not "invite[] error" (MRIA Br. at 36) by successfully
arguing for one damage line on the verdict form after the court declined to use Saint Alphonsus' s
original proposed instructions differentiating between the respective fiduciary duty claims of
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MRIA, Center and Mobile. The question was whether there should be a separate damages line
for MRIA's $27.3 million in alleged dissociation damages because, in the words ofMRIA's
counsel, those damages "stand alone" and "are not measured in lost profits." (Tr., Vol. III, p.
3964, L. 4-5.) The court ruled that there should be one damages line and the jury ended up
combining the two measures of damages into a single verdict of$63.5 million. That is
completely irrelevant to the issue presented here. All parties agree that, following the district
court's remittitur, the outstanding $36.3 million judgment represents the lost-scan profits put
forward by MRIA's damages experts (see MRIA Br. at 17-18), and the only entities that could
have suffered those lost-scan profits are Center and Mobile. Saint Alphonsus is contending on
appeal that the district court's instructional error resulted in a verdict that does not indicate a
finding of liability as to Center and Mobile. It also asserts that the court erred in permitting the
fiduciary duty claims of Center and Mobile to go to the jury. A separate damages line for
MRIA's alleged dissociation damages would have had no bearing on these issues, and there is
thus no "invited error" to correct.

Fifth, MRIA tries to defend the jury's purported finding of liability on the fiduciary duty
claims asserted on behalf of Center and Mobile. (See MRIA Br. at 36-41.) Critically, however,
apart from the procedural arguments rebutted above, MRIA makes no effort to respond to Saint
Alphonsus's showing that the district court's instructional error resulted in an indeterminate
verdict that leaves totally uncertain the critical issue whether the jury in fact found Saint
Alphonsus liable on the fiduciary duty claims asserted on Center's and Mobile's behalf. (See
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Opening Br. at 45-46.) For this reason alone, the award of$36.3 million in lost-scan damages
must be set aside. (/d.)
Further, the fiduciary duty claims asserted on behalf of Center and Mobile fail as a matter
of law because Saint Alphonsus owed no fiduciary duties to these entities. (See Opening Br. at
47-50.) MRIA's argument that Saint Alphonsus owed such duties pursuant to statute (MRIA Br.
at 37-39), which was rejected by the district court (R., Vol. X, pp. 1876-77), misconstrues the
applicable provisions ofthe Idaho Code. The cited provisions ofRUPA set forth the duties of
partners in a general partnership to one another and to that general partnership. See Idaho Code
§§ 53-3-1 01(8), 53-3-202 & 53-3-404(a)-(c). Center and Mobile are limited partnerships, and no

statutory provision imposes any duties vis-a-vis those entities on Saint Alphonsus, either as one
of their limited partners or as a general partner of their general partner.
MRIA correctly notes that as a general partner ofMRIA, Saint Alphonsus is jointly and
severally liable for the acts of MRIA, see Idaho Code § 53-3-306, and may bind MRIA-albeit
only to the extent it acts or appears to be acting in furtherance of the business of the partnership,

see id. § 53-3-301. But the conclusion MRIA seeks to draw from these premises-namely, that
if MRIA is a fiduciary to Center and Mobile, "then the general partners of MRIA are also
fiduciaries to [Center] and [Mobile]" (MRIA Br. at 38)-simply does not follow. To be sure, as
a partner in MRIA, Saint Alphonsus could be held derivatively liable for MRIA's own breaches
of its duty to Center and Mobile, but MRIA has never alleged, and has submitted no evidence,
that the MRIA partnership breached its duties to Center and Mobile. Similarly, there has never
been any evidence or allegation that Saint Alphonsus was or appeared to be carrying out the
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business of the MRIA partnership when it took the acts at issue in this lawsuit. To the contrary,
the entire premise ofMRIA's lawsuit is that Saint Alphonsus was acting for its own purposes
and at odds with the interests ofMRIA. Finally, MRIA's "'analogy" to corporate directors (id. at
38-39) is inapt because Idaho law expressly imposes a statutory duty on directors, Idaho Code
§ 30-1-830, while no such statutory duty exists here.
Nor is there merit to MRIA's argument (MRIA Br. at 39-41) that Saint Alphonsus owed
Center and Mobile common-law fiduciary duties. MRIA does not dispute that Saint Alphonsus
was a minority member of the MRIA board that managed Center and Mobile and, as such, had
no ability to compel any action by MRIA. (Opening Br. at 49.) And MRIA cites to no trial
evidence suggesting that the limited partnerships had placed a "peculiar confidence" in Saint
Alphonsus, relying instead on the district court's ipse dixit assertion, also unsupported by any
citations to the evidence, that this was so. (MRIA Br. at 40.) MRIA does cite evidence that
Saint Alphonsus was important to the business endeavor (id. at 40 n.27), but a "condition of
superiority" and the placement of a "peculiar confidence"-not importance-must remain the
touchstone of a common-law fiduciary relationship lest any number of run-of-the-mill business
relationships be converted to fiduciary ones. Idaho First Nat 'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc.,
121 Idaho 266, 277, 824 P.2d 841, 852 (1991). MRIA's retort that the correct application of
Idaho common law would render the fiduciary duties ofMRIA's partners "absolutely
meaningless" (MRIA Br. at 41) is sheer hyperbole and unsupported by the facts.
In sum, Saint Alphonsus did not owe common-law fiduciary duties to Center and Mobile.
At a minimum, the question is sufficiently in doubt that it should have been left for the jury to
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resolve, and not decided by the court as a matter oflaw. Either way, the jury's finding of
liability on the only claims asserted by Center and Mobile-and therefore its award of Center's
and Mobile's lost-profits damages-must be set aside.

B.

MRIA Failed To Prove Lost Scan Profits

The award oflost-scan profits must also be set aside because it is based on the
unsupported "assumption" ofMRIA's experts that Saint Alphonsus's alleged assistance to IMI
caused every referral of a patient to IMI by every doctor who either had previously made
referrals to Center or was affiliated only with Saint Alphonsus. (See Opening Br. at 50-55.)
Much ofMRIA's lengthy argument in response (MRIA Br. at 41-53) misses the point of
this argument. Saint Alphonsus does not dispute that Center in fact lost scan business to IMI.
(See MRIA Br. at 46-48.) And Saint Alphonsus is willing to assume for the sake of argument

that its conduct could have caused some of that scan migration from Center to IMI. (/d. at 44-46.)
The critical point, rather, is that MRIA made no effort and offered no evidence to indicate what
proportion of the scans that migrated from MRIA to IMI did so as a result of Saint Alphonsus.'s

alleged misconduct, as opposed to other causes, such as IMI's entry into the competitive
marketplace. Instead, its experts simply assumed that Saint Alphonsus caused all of the referral
changes. Numerous well-reasoned authorities discussed in Saint Alphonsus's opening brief,
including this Court's decisions in Twin Falls and Pope, make clear that without such evidence
and analysis by MRIA, the award cannot be upheld. See, e.g., Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co.,

103 Idaho 217, 234,646 P.2d 988,993 (1982); Twin Falls Farm & City Distrib., Inc. v. D & B
Supply Co., 96 Idaho 351, 360, 528 P.2d 1286, 1295 (1974); Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco
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Corp., 969 F.2d 410,415 (7th Cir. 1992); Synthes Spine Co. v. Walden, No. 04-4140,2006 WL

3053317, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2006).
MRIA's arguments to the contrary misstate both the law and the facts. First, MRIA's
suggestion that Pope and Twin Falls do not govern here because they are antitrust cases (MRIA
Br. at 45 n.30) is wrong. While the underlying basis for liability in those cases (and similar ones
from other jurisdictions) was the antitrust laws, the cases do not purport to apply a mle unique to
the antitmst context. Rather, the cases make clear that where, as here, the allegation is that
wrongful conduct in aid of a competitor caused business to migrate from the plaintiff to the
competitor, the plaintiff may not proceed on the unexamined and wholly implausible premise
that the defendant's actions are legally responsible for 100% of identified adverse business
consequences. Yet here, MRIA and its experts expressly "assumed"--contrary to both the
evidence presented and common sense-that every single one of the changes in referral would
not have occurred absent Saint Alphonsus's conduct, notwithstanding the new entry into the
market of IMI, a technologically innovative competitor with close ties to the physicians making
the referrals.
Second, MRIA repeatedly mischaracterizes Saint Alphonsus' s argument as a contention
that MRIA needs to show that Saint Alphonsus was the "only cause" of the scan migration. (See
MRIA Br. at 45, 52.) But MRIA's cited authorities, such as Griffith and Thomas Helicopters,
deal with multiple causes of a single, undifferentiated injury, and not (as here) thousands of
independent business transactions, some unproven proportion of which allegedly resulted from
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the acts of the defendant and some other proportion of which were undeniably caused by other
factors such as the presence of a new competitor.
Third, there is no merit to MRIA' s contention that the evidence sufficed because Budge
used a supposedly "conservative" analysis that tracked the migration of referrals only from
doctors who had previously referred to Center or were affiliated with Saint Alphonsus, while
excluding referrals from other doctors, such as those who had never used Center and had no
privileges at Saint Alphonsus. (MRIA Br. at 49-50, 52.) The problem with Budge's analysis is
that, within the universe of doctors selected-namely those doctors he believed reasonably likely
to have migrated referrals from Center to IMI-MRIA and its experts made no effort to
distinguish which did so because of Saint Alphonsus's conduct and which would have migrated
to IMI in any event. Requiring MRIA to do so is not, as MRIA contends, a ''burden to disprove"
that physicians switched their referrals for other reasons. (MRIA Br. at 51.) It is the burden, to
be carried by every plaintiff in a case such as this one, to offer proof bearing on the portion of its
losses to a competitor that resulted from the defendant's improper conduct. See Pope, 103 Idaho
at 222, 646 P.2d at 993; Twin Falls, 96 Idaho at 360, 528 P.2d at 1295.

It is no answer to say, as MRIA does, that such proof was "impracticable." (MRIA Br. at
52-53.) It is not impracticable to make a reasonable effort to assess what "portion of the ...
market" IMI would "have won" absent Saint Alphonsus's alleged assistance to IMI. Pope,
103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005. No perfect precision is required. MRIA did not need to
"interview(] all 1900 referring physicians" (MRIA Br. at 53) to show damages with reasonable
certainty. Its experts could have interviewed a sample of those physicians and extrapolated from
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the results. 18 Or its experts could have created an economic model that estimated how much
business IMI would have taken from Center absent the competitive advantages allegedly given to
it by Saint Alphonsus. MRIA complains that Saint Alphonsus's experts also did not undertake
such studies, but that is irrelevant because MRIA, not Saint Alphonsus, had the burden of
proving damages.

Fourth, recognizing the evidentiary shortcomings of its damages case, MRIA speculates
that IMI "might not have come into existence" without Saint Alphonsus's assistance. (MRIA Br.
at 46.) Presumably, MRIA believes that if the evidence showed that Saint Alphonsus was the
cause ofiMI's existence in the first place, then MRIA will be able to recover for 100% of the
business that migrated from Center to IMI. The problem with this new argument, however, is
that it is contradicted by the evidence at trial.
Specifically, the undisputed evidence showed that the GSR radiologists formulated their
plans and acquired land in downtown Boise for IMI before disclosing their plans to Saint
Alphonsus, and planned to compete with Saint Alphonsus if it did not support IMI. 19 For
example, MRIA witness David Giles agreed that the GSR physicians had a "contingency plan"
to the effect that if Saint Alphonsus "refuses to partner with the group on [the IMI] project and
severs all ties, the new center will continue with a second center being built as close to Saint

18

In fact, there was testimony by referring physicians demonstrating that physicians referred
to IMI for reasons other than the support allegedly given to IMI by Saint Alphonsus. (Opening
Br. at 55.) MRIA's response to this evidence was to have its experts "assume" the opposite.
19

(See, e.g., Tr., Vol. II, p. 2655, L. 22 top. 2656, L. 9; Tr., Vol. Ill, p. 3054, L. 13 top. 3057,
L. 15; id., p. 3061, L. 110 top. 3062, L. 3; id., p. 3636, L. 21 top. 3637, L. 7; id., p. 3878, L. 123; id., p. 4152, L. 20-24; Reply App. 19-20 (Trial Ex. 517, pp. 2-3).)
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Alphonsus Regional Medical Center as possible to compete with them." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 2981,

L. 18 to p. 2983, L. 3.) And MRIA itself concedes that its experts testified "that IMI would have
taken scans away from [Center] even if[Saint Alphonsus] had not supported IMI." (MRIA Br.
20

at 52.)

In other words, MRIA's evidence showed that Saint Alphonsus gave IMI "a

competitive edge" (id. at 9) but did not cause IMI to be created. Under such circumstances,
MRIA bore the burden of proving, with reasonable certainty, what proportion ofthe scans lost to
IMI resulted from the alleged "competitive edge." Instead of trying to carry this burden, MRIA
just "assumed" that Saint Alphonsus caused all of the lost scans.

Fifth, MRIA's assertion that the jury's finding that Saint Alphonsus conspired with GSR
suffices to show that Saint Alphonsus "is liable for the conduct ofGSR in IMI" (MRIA Br. at
42), including, presumably, every single scan taken from Center by IMI, is incoherent. "A civil
conspiracy itself is not a tort, and until some act is done by the conspirators, there arises no cause
of action, and when an act is done which amounts to an actionable tort, then that is the gist of the
action." Dahlquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 386, 233 P. 883, 885 (1925). MRIA did not allege,
and certainly did not prove, that GSR had an independent legal duty not to compete with Center,
and therefore MRIA cannot seek to hold Saint Alphonsus liable for the competition that IMI
introduced into the marketplace. Rather, the "actionable" wrong allegedly proved at trial was
Saint Alphonsus's assistance to IMI's MRI business, and, again, it was incumbent upon MRIA to
prove the profits lost as a result ofthat assistance.
20

(CitingTr., Vol. II, p. 2769, L. 13 top. 2770, L. 21; Tr., Vol. III, p. 2864, L. 19 top. 2874,
L. 24; id., p. 2897, L. 17 top. 2898, L. 22; id., p. 2901, L. 13-16; id., p. 2903, L. 10-18; id., p.
2907, L. 23 top. 2908, L. 3).
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Sixth, this Court must also reject MRIA's new argument (MRIA Br. at 53) that it is
entitled to $36.3 million because Saint Alphonsus usurped from MRIA the opportunity to partner
with the GSR radiologists. MRIA did not press this theory of liability at trial. Moreover, the
$36.3 million in purported lost scans bears no rational relationship to the value of this supposedly
usurped opportunity, which would have depended on such facts as the structure of the
hypothetical partnership, the capital contributions made to it by MRIA and the share of IMI
profits that MRIA would have received from the enterprise.

C.

MRIA Is Not Entitled To Damages For Injuries Occurring After The Center
Limited Partnership Agreement Was Set To Expire

The district court further erred in allowing MRIA to recover $6 million in future lost
profits that Center supposedly would have earned between January 1, 2016, and December 31,
2023. (Opening Br. at 55-56.) This was erroneous because the Center limited partnership was
set to expire on December 31, 2015, and despite some testimony that some partners voted to
extend the partnership, there was no evidence that a "written instrument" was ever executed to
actually extend the partnership term, as required by the limited partnership agreement. (/d.) Not
only that, but the evidence showed that years after the supposed extension of the limited
partnership, MRIA filed an Amended Certificate of Limited Partnership indicating that the
limited partnership term would end in 2015. (Id.)
In response, MRIA does not even mention the "written instrument" provision of the
limited partnership agreement, let alone point to any evidence that such an instrument exists.
(MRIA Br. at 53-55.) Instead, MRIA simply cites to testimony showing that, at one point, the
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MRIA board, including its Saint Alphonsus representative, voted to extend the term of the
limited partnership agreement, and then offers the lay opinions of its own witnesses that they
"understood" it had been extended. (MRIA Br. at 54-5Sl 1
As Saint Alphonsus showed, however, the limited partnership agreement unambiguously
precluded any extension of its term by mere vote-let alone by the mere "understanding" of
MRIA representatives-but rather required a "written instrument" executed by both MRIA and
75% of Center's limited partners. (See Reply App. 2 (Trial Ex. 4024 § 9.1).) MRIA's brief does
not dispute that this requirement applied, yet MRIA points to no written instrument and none of

21

MRIA also misstates the record by claiming that Saint Alphonsus's "two top officers
[Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp] testified the partnership term was extended to 2023." (MRIA
Br. at 54.) In fact, MRIA's own cites make clear that this was not so, despite attempts by
MRIA's counsel to put words in the witnesses' mouths.
As to Ms. Bruce, counsel asked whether she "ha[d] an understanding that the Partnership
Agreement relative to the MRI Center was extended by MRI Associates to 2023," to which Ms.
Bruce replied that she "recalled looking at minutes of, I believe, an MRI Board meeting where it
was voted to do that." (Tr., Vol. II, p. 1676, L. 3-7 (emphasis added).) Counsel then asked
whether Ms. Bruce "attended the meeting where the term was extended to 12/31/23," to which
she responded, "I believe the minutes reflect that they were ratified .... And I'm not a lawyer
so I'm not sure what 'ratification' means." (Id, p. 1678, L. 17-21.)
The same is true for Ms. Schamp. Counsel asked whether "this is the Partnership Agreement,
by the way, that you not more than two years before had extended to 2023," to which Ms.
Schamp replied, ''[t]hat was voted upon, yes." (Tr., Vol. Ill, p. 3592 L. 18-21 (emphasis added).)
As for the other cites to Ms. Schamp's testimony, they show that she recounted meeting minutes
from 1999 reflecting that "the MRICI lease ... will be extended to 2023/' and indicated that
Saint Alphonsus had voted to do so, but she did not testify that it was ultimately extended. (/d.,
p. 3532, L. 10 top. 3533, L. 16; id., p. 3534, L. 11 top. 3535 L. 14.) Indeed, over the objection
of MRIA' s counsel, Schamp testified that to her knowledge no "written agreement amending the
partnership term [was] ever completed." (/d., p. 3521, L. 7 top. 3523, L. 9.)
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the cited testimony indicates that any such instrument was ever executed. 22 Likewise, MRIA
claims that its own subsequent filing of legal documentation indicating a 2015 termination date
was '"perfunctory" (MRIA Br. at 53-54), an unsupported claim that has no bearing on the fact
that it reflects a post-vote concession by MRIA refuting any inference that a written instrument
was executed or that the Center partnership term was extended.23 In short, MRIA does not point
to any evidence that a "written instrument" was executed, cannot explain its own subsequent
confirmation of a 2015 termination date, and thus cannot recover damages beyond 2015.

D.

The Alternative Measure Of Damages Based On The Hypothetical Purchase
Price Of Center Does Not Correspond To Any Injury Suffered By MRIA

Saint Alphonsus also showed that MRIA's so-called "purchase price" theory of
dissociation damages has no basis in the law and should not have been submitted to the jury.
(Opening Br. at 58-59.) MRIA concedes (MRIA Br. at 55-56) that, under Idaho law, the correct
22

Nor, for that matter, would any such testimony have been sufficient in lieu ofMRIA's
introduction into evidence of the original written instrument itself, or else an explanation for its
absence. See I.R.E 1002 ("To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the
original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules
or by statute."); l.R.E 1004 (requiring explanation of missing original).
23

MRIA seeks to avoid review of the issue altogether by claiming that Saint Alphonsus
cannot argue that the extension did not occur because Saint Alphonsus voted for an extension.
(MRIA Br. at 55 n.41.) MRIA offers no case law, let alone logic, to explain why or how a mere
vote for a failed deal should somehow bind the unsuccessful voter to the deal's unenacted terms.
Instead, MRIA cites two cases dealing with the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, which prevents a
party from taking a legal position after having "previously taken an inconsistent position, with
knowledge of the facts and his rights, to the detriment of the person seeking application of the
doctrine." KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 282,486 P.2d 992,995 (1971); see also
Frontier Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Douglass, 123 Idaho 808, 812, 853 P.2d 553, 557
(1993). MRIA does not, however, even argue, let alone prove, that Saint Alphonsus has
previously taken the position that the partnership term was extended despite the lack of a
"written instrument." As a result, the doctrine of quasi-estoppel has no applicability here.
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measure of damages for a claimed breach of contract is ''the loss in the value ... of [the
breaching party's] performance ... plus any loss, including incidental or consequential, caused
by the breach." Gilbert v. Tony Russell Constr., 115 Idaho 1035, 1039, 772 P.2d 242,245 (Ct.
App. 1989) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 347 (1981)). Despite this concession,
however, MRIA simply reasserts its theory of damages-that Saint Alphonsus would have had to
pay $27.3 million to purchase Center outright, and that this sum therefore represents dissociation
damages. (MRIA Br. at 56-57.)
MRIA makes no effort to explain how such a theory fits within the framework of Idaho
law. It does not claim that the dissociation reduced the value of Center to zero, thus making the
value of Center an accurate measure of the incidental or consequential loss caused by the
dissociation. It likewise does not contend that Saint Alphonsus had a contractual obligation to
purchase Center that was breached by the dissociation, thus making the value of Center an
accurate measure of the lost benefit of the bargain. Nor does it explain how the dissociation
damages suffered by MRIA could have equaled the full alleged $27.3 million value of Center,
when MRIA only owned 30% of Center. (See Opening Br. at 58-59.) In short, MRIA offers no
legal justification for the district court's decision to allow such a theory of damages to serve as
the basis for an award to MRIA.

IV.

MRIA'S CROSS-APPEAL LACKS MERIT

MRIA appeals (i) the district court's denial ofMRIA's motion to amend its
counterclaims to add a claim for punitive damages, and (ii) the district court's grant of summary
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judgment in favor of Saint Alphonsus on MRIA's antitrust claims. MRIA's arguments lack
merit and, as a result, these rulings should be affirmed.

A.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying MRIA's Request
For Punitive Damages

MRIA argues that, if (and only if) this Court grants Saint Alphonsus a new trial, MRIA
should be allowed to seek punitive damages. (See MRIA Br. at 68-70.) However, MRIA
ignores the relevant standard of appellate review and the district court's well-reasoned
decisions-before and after trial-that explain why punitive damages are not warranted here.
This Court has consistently held that "[p]unitive damages are not favored in the law and
should be awarded in only the most unusual and compelling circumstances." Seiniger Law

Office, P.A. v. N. Pac.lns. Co., 145 Idaho 241,249, 178 P.3d 606, 614 (2008). Such damages
cannot be awarded without "clear and convincing evidence [of] oppressive, fraudulent, malicious
or outrageous conduct." Idaho Code§ 6-1604(1).
Moreover, a party can bring a claim for punitive damages only "it: after weighing the
evidence presented, the court concludes that the moving party has established ... a reasonable
likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages." Seiniger,
145 Idaho at 249, 178 P.3d at 614. "The decision of whether to instruct on punitive damages is
within the discretion of the trial judge," and the court has "much greater latitude where the
decision is not to instruct on the issue, in light of the law's natural tendency to disfavor punitive
damages." Fitzgeraldv. Walker, 121ldaho 589,593,826 P.2d 1301, 1305 (1992). Upon
appellate review, the trial court's decision should be affirmed if three criteria are satisfied:
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"(1) whether the district judge correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the
district judge acted within the outer boundaries of her discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to her; and (3) whether the district judge
reached her decision through an exercise of reason." Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
140 Idaho 416,423, 95 P.3d 34,41 (2004). Here, the district court plainly satisfied all three.

First, the district court correctly recognized that allowing the punitive damages claim was
a matter of discretion, by stating that "[t]he decision of a district court to either grant or deny a
plaintiff's motion to amend a complaint to include a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages is
reviewed for abuse of discretion." (SeeR., Vol. V, p. 846.) This Court has held that such a
statement suffices to meet the first requirement. See Seiniger, 145 Idaho at 250, 178 P.3d at 615.

Second, the district court "acted within the outer boundaries of [its] discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to [it]."

Vendelin, 140 Idaho at 423, 95 P.3d at 41. In this context, this requirement is met so long as the
district court either granted or denied the motion. See Seiniger, 145 Idaho at 250, 178 P .3d at
615 ("The boundaries of the district court's decision were well~defined; it could either grant or
deny the motion. The decision to deny the motion to amend was thus within the boundaries of
its discretion."). The district court's denial here plainly satisfies this test.
The district court also applied the correct legal standard: MRIA had to "establish[] a
reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial that support an award of punitive damages by clear
and convincing evidence," and that "Saint Alphonsus acted in an oppressive, fraudulent,
malicious, or outrageous manner." (R., Vol. V, p. 855.) MRIA argues that the supposedly

~
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wrongful dissociation constituted oppressive conduct (see

MR~A

Br. at 69-70), but a wrongful

dissociation is not itself sufficient for punitive damages. RUP A makes clear that a wrongful
dissociation only gives rise to certain limited damages and that partners still have the power to
dissociate, see Idaho Code§ 53-3-602(a) ("[a] partner has the power to dissociate at any time,
rightfully or wrongfully, by express will"). (R., Vol. V, pp. 858-59). Thus, a wrongful
dissociation is no different than a breach of contract, which does not give rise to punitive
damages unless extreme conduct and a harmful state of mind accompany the breach. See Myers
v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 502, 95 P.3d 977, 984 (2004) (applying this standard
in a breach-of-contract case, and holding that "punitive damages are not available in the routine,
ordinary breach of contract action"); Jones v. Panhandle Distribs., Inc., 117 Idaho 750, 755, 792
P .2d 315, 320 (1990) ("( w ]hile punitive damages may be recovered in a contract action, they are
not favored in the law and therefore should be awarded only in the most compelling
circumstances" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).Z4

Third, the district court's carefully explained decision was "reached ... through an
exercise of reason." Vendelin, 140 Idaho at 423, 95 P.3d at 41. The court, after receiving
extensive motions and affidavits, and hearing more than three hours of argument on the issue,
issued a decision that rejected each of the numerous arguments put forward by MRIA. (SeeR.,

24

MRIA focuses on language in a case stating that punitive damages can be based on "a lack
of professional regard for the consequences of the breach of the contractual agreement." (MRIA
Br. at 69 (quoting Cuddy Mtn. Concrete, Inc. v. Citadel Constr., Inc., 121 Idaho 220, 229, 824
P.2d 151, 160 (Ct. App. 1992)).) However, Cuddy also recognized that the conduct must be "an
extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct" and that the defendant must have
"acted with an extremely harmful state of mind." 121 Idaho at 226-27, 824 P.2d at 157-58.
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VoL V, pp. 852-64.) The court explained that this was a business dispute where Saint Alphonsus
was simply trying to fulfill its obligations as a medical service provider:
This is a case involving a number of sophisticated parties that over
a significant number of years were unable to reach an agreement as
to medical imaging issues that center on health care delivery in
Boise, Idaho and all in the context of a medical business
environment. In terms of imaging services, the record is clear that
Saint Alphonsus, as a regional medical center, had a primary
objective of providing this vital medical service to ensure that
patients, doctors and health care organizations committed to
medical care and treatment in this valley were optimized.
(/d. at 855-56.) And none of the evidence showed that there was "oppressive, fraudulent,

malicious and outrageous conduct" on the part of Saint Alphonsus. (R., Vol. V, pp. 857-58, 86163.) Thus, Saint Alphonsus neither had "an extremely harmful state of mind," nor exhibited an
"extreme deviation from standards of reasonable conduct," both of which are required for
punitive damages, see Seiniger, 145ldaho at 250, 178 P.3d at 615. (R., Vol. V, p. 864.)
The district court also exercised reasoned judgment in rejecting MRIA's renewed motion
for punitive damages after the close of evidence. While the district court was not required to
reconsider its pretrial decision, see Idaho Code§ 6-1604(2) (requiring issue to be decided on
pretrial motion), it nevertheless again exercised its reasoned discretion in light of the evidence
introduced at trial:
I had ruled on this before, and the evidence that has come into this
trial doesn't cause this court to change its ruling regarding punitive
damages. . . . [The conduct] did not arise to the level of the
"willfulness" and "wantonness" that the statute calls for nor can I
find that that's been demonstrated here by clear and convincing
evidence. So, the court will decline the motion.
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(Tr., Vol. III, p. 4261, L. 18 top. 4262, L. 2.) MRIA's contention that the trial court contradicted
itself with its post-trial view of the evidence (MRIA Br. at 68) is thus belied by the record.
MRIA's suggestion that the district court's careful analysis, both before and after trial,
does not constitute an exercise of reason defies common sense and ignores the abuse-ofdiscretion standard. This Court has made clear that "[a]s long as there is sufficient evidence to
support its decision, we will give deference to the trial court's decision." Fitzgerald, 121 Idaho
at 593, 826 P .2d at 1305 (emphasis added). This Court has routinely affirmed the rejection of
punitive damages claims where there was a factual basis for the trial court's decision, without
second-guessing the trial court's analysis of the evidence. See, e.g., Seiniger, 145 Idaho at 250,

178 P.3d at 615 (holding that the trial court exercised reason because it "properly focused on [the
defendant's] conduct" and had a factual basis for its decision); Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303,
315, 17 P.3d 247, 259 (2000) (affirming the trial court's rejection of punitive damages because,
"as indicated by its comments, it reached its decision by an exercise of reason"). Similarly, here,
it is clear from the district court's decisions that the court had more than sufficient evidence to
reject MRIA's punitive damages claim.

B.

The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment On MRIA's
Antitrust Claims

The gravamen ofMRIA's lawsuit is the allegation that Saint Alphonsus, in violation of
its contractual and fiduciary duties to MRIA, improperly provided assistance to IMI, a new
entrant into the MRI services market, which resulted in MRIA facing increased competition from
IMI and a diversion of business from MRIA to IMI. Or, as MRIA puts it in its brief to this Cout1,
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"in this case competition was the actionable conduct." (MRIA Br. at 45 n.30 (emphasis in
original).) Whatever the merits of these allegations as a matter of contract and tort law, however,
"competition []as the actionable conduct" does not remotely violate the antitrust laws, which are
designed to promote and protect competition. This flat inconsistency between MRIA's
allegations and the objectives of the antitrust laws illustrates why MRIA failed to sustain its
burden of proof on critical elements of its claims for attempted monopolization of and conspiracy
to monopolize, and why the district court's grant of summary judgment on those claims should
now be affirmed both for the reasons set forth by the district court and on several other
independent grounds. See McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 663, 851 P.2d 953, 959
(1993) ("this Court can affirm the district court on a theory that was not relied upon below").
1.

Saint Alphonsus's Alleged Antitrust Violations Rest On Actions To
Increase Competition Rather Than Any Exclusionary Or
Anticompetitive Conduct

Conduct that benefits consumers and is consistent with competition on the merits does
.. notconstiiute ai1ticompetitive conduct suffiCietitto provide the factual predicate for a
monopolization offense; indeed, even aggressive or vigorous competition is encouraged despite
the effect such conduct can have on competitors. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands

Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985); Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691
F.2d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Anticompetitive conduct is conduct designed to destroy
competition, not just to eliminate a competitor."). Moreover, even unfair or disreputable conduct
can be deemed anticompetitive only when it has no legitimate purpose and would not make
business sense apart from any effect it has on excluding competition on the merits. See, e.g.,
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Gen. Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 804 (8th Cir. 1987); Gordon v.
Lewiston Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 215 (3d Cir. 2005).
"[I]n this case," MRIA concedes, "competition was the actionable conduct." (MRIA Br.
at 45 n.30.) Specifically, the very conduct alleged to be wrongful-Saint Alphonsus's support of
IMI's new imaging center--clearly promoted competition and benefited consumers by creating
new options for referring physicians and patients seeking MRI services. (See, e.g., MRIA Br. at
9 (contending that Saint Alphonsus's investment in new technology for IMI "provided IMI a
huge competitive advantage" over MRIA); id. at 10-11 (describing efforts by IMI to compete
with MRIA).) As the district court properly determined, "[t]he only evidence before the Court is
that [IMI] attempted to further its competitive interest by setting up a competing imaging center[,]
which they had every right to do" as far as the antittust laws are concerned. (R., Vol. V, p. 868.)
To be sure, MRIA contends that Saint Alphonsus violated its contractual and fiduciary duties to
MRIA by helping IMI compete with MRIA in the market for MRI services. But whether or not
this was so, such assistance categorically did not violate the antitrust laws. Consumers of MRI
services-radiologists, referring physicians and patients-had more options, not fewer, once IMI
entered the market and began competing with MRIA.
MRIA's alleged evidence that Saint Alphonsus attempted to harm MRIA by, for example,
disparaging MRIA's business, does not change the result. It is well established that business
torts or similar conduct do not provide a basis for a finding of anticompetitive conduct except in
''rare gross cases" where the conduct has a significant and lasting effect on competition, and not
merely on a competitor. Conwood Co., L.P. v. US. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783-84 {6th Cir.
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2002); see also Am. Prof! Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof/
Publ'ns, Inc., 108 F.3d 1147, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 1997); Spanish Broad. Sys. v. Clear Channel
Comm 'ns, Inc., 376 F.3d l 065, 1076 (11th Cir. 2004). MRIA presented no evidence of such
harmful effects here. Similarly, while MRIA contends that Saint Alphonsus shared new
technology with IMI that it did not also share with MRIA (MRIA Br. at 9), MRIA concedes that
this new technology was pro-competitive (id. ), and the antitrust laws impose no requirement that
Saint Alphonsus or IMI share their innovative new technologies with MRIA. See, e.g., Olympia

Equip. Leasing Co. v. W Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375-79 (7th Cir. 1986); Berky Photo Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 286 (2d Cir. 1979) ("any firm, even a monopolist, may
bring its products to market whenever and however it chooses"). 25
In sum, MRIA's allegations do not state a claim under the antitrust laws because, as
MRIA concedes, the alleged "actionable conduct" was "competition." (MRIA Br. at 45 n.30.)

2.

MRIA's Claimed Losses Do Not Amount To Antitrust Injury Because
They Are The Result Of Increased Competition

MRIA also failed, as the district court concluded, to create a genuine issue for trial on the
question whether it had suffered antitrust injury.
In order to have standing to maintain an antitrust claim, a plaintiff must present sufficient
evidence to establish what is known as "antitrust injury," that is, "injury of the type the antitrust

25

Such an obligation may exist in the case of an "essential facility," but the district court
correctly dismissed MRIA's claim that it was denied access to an essential facility (R., Vol. II,
pp. 404-05), and MRIA does not appeal this ruling (MRIA Br. at 70). See Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1413 (7th Cir. 1995) (access to defendant
clinic not essential because it controls less than 50% of any relevant market).

~
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laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful."

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,489 (1977). "The injury should
reflect the anticompetitive effect of either the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible
by the violation." /d. This longstanding requirement underscores the fundamental tenet that the
antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of'"competition, not competitors." /d. (emphasis
added), see also Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1994); Korshin v. Benedictine

Hosp., 34 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
In Brunswick, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had not suffered antitrust injury
because their theory was "'designed to provide them with the profits they would have realized
had competition been reduced," and was therefore "inimical to the purposes of these [antitrust]
laws." 429 U.S. at 488. Subsequent decisions have reinforced the notion that a private plaintiff
can only recover on an antitrust claim where the claimed injury "stems from a competitionM
reducing aspect or effect of the defendant's behavior." At/. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co.,
495

u.s. 328, 344 (1990).
As the district court correctly concluded in granting summary judgment to Saint

Alphonsus, "the record in this case is devoid of any evidence establishing any adverse effects on
the price, quality, or output ofMRI services in the relevant market." (R., Vol. XI, p. 2079.)
Rather, MRIA' s alleged damages are based on the theory that MRIA should never have faced
competition from IMI, and that MRIA is therefore entitled to recover the profits from business
lost to IMI. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2784, L. 21 to p. 2786, L. 19.) MRIA, in short, sought to step into
IMI's shoes and claim IMI's profits as its own. Much like the unsuccessful bowling alley
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operators in the Brunswick case, MRIA is disappointed that its profits suffered after IMI entered
the market and began competing for MRI scan business. But the U.S. Supreme Court made clear
in that case that such a claim does not sound in antitrust. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488. As the
district court reasoned, MRIA is instead required "to demonstrate an actual market-wide adverse
effect on competition resulting from Saint Alphonsus' conduct. Harm to one competitor does
not in and of itself suffice in establishing injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent." (R., Vol. XI, p. 2081.) Having failed to produce any evidence of market-wide injury,
MRIA cannot satisfy the antitrust injury requirement, and the district court's decision granting
summary judgment on that basis should be affirmed. See also Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth.,
921 F.2d 1438, 1453-54 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding lack of antitrust standing where plaintiff doctor
sought damages "equal [to] the profits he would have garnered had he been able to share a part
of the radiologists' supercompetitive, or monopoly, profits").26

3.

MRIA Had No Evidence of Market Power

The grant of summary judgment on MRIA' s fanciful antitrust claims must also be
affirmed because no reasonable juror could conclude that Saint Alphonsus or IMI had any ability
to achieve monopoly power in the provision ofMRI services. The undisputed evidence

26

New York Medscan LLC v. New York University School ofMedicine, on which MRIA
heavily relies (MRIA Br. at 71-72), is not to the contrary. That case was decided on a motion to
dismiss with the plaintiffs' allegations of market-wide injuries accepted as true. See 430 F. Supp.
2d 140, 146-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Here, MRIA appeals from a grant of summary judgment, and,
as discussed, the record is devoid of evidence of antitrust injury. Tellingly, in contending that
Saint Alphonsus and IMI reduced patient care and the output of medical imaging, MRIA relies
not on record evidence but on allegations contained in its Second Amended Counterclaim. (See
MRIA Br. at 72-74 (citing R., Vol. V., pp. 905-46).)
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establishes that IMI has nowhere close to the share of the market needed to raise an inference of
monopoly power, and that the market for MRI services exhibits all the characteristics of a highly
competitive market, including the presence of numerous competitors, low barriers to entry,
excess capacity and recent successful entry.
A plaintiff asserting a claim for attempted monopolization must prove that the defendant
had a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power. See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997). Monopoly power is the power to
exclude competition or control prices in a relevant antitrust market. See United States v.
Grinnell C01p., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). To demonstrate monopoly power circumstantially, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant possesses a dominant share of a relevant market, that there
are significant barriers to entry, and that existing competitors lack the capacity to increase their
output in the short run. See id.; Am. Prof'/ Testing Serv., 108 F.3d at 1154 (9th Cir. 1997);
SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan, 88 F.3d 780, 783 n.2 (9th Cir. 1996).
In the proceedings below, MRIA failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine
issue as to whether IMI could plausibly acquire monopoly power. For one thing, MRIA' s
economic expert, Ed Whitelaw, conceded that IMI's percentage of the market ranged from the
low 20s in 2002 to the mid-40s in 2006. (Exhibit toR. #104, Ex. G, p.l2.) However, absent a
showing of high entry barriers and constraints on excess capacity, such a market share is legally
insufficient to establish the dangerous probability element of an attempted monopolization claim.
See Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1438 n.IO (9th Cir. 1995) (44%
insufficient absent barriers to entry); Ford v. Stroup, 113 F.3d 1234, 1997 WL 201560, at *2 (6th
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Cir. 1997) (unpublished table opinion) (50-55% share insufficient); U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v.
Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 1001 (11th Cir. 1993) (under 50% share insufficient); Smith
Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18078 (E. D. Tenn. 2005) (56%
share insufficient where entry barriers are low and capacity exists). This is so because, in the
absence of significant entry barriers, any attempt to charge supra-competitive prices will simply
lure new competitors into the market at lower prices, and thereby prevent any harm to consumers
or the competitive process. See, e.g., Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons
v. Am. Bd. ofPodiatric Surgery, Inc., 185 F.3d 606, 623 (6th Cir. 1999); Natsource LLC v. GFI
Group, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 626, 635-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Whitelaw conceded that he failed to even consider barriers to entry or any other factor
that might have permitted IMI to exercise monopoly power in the relevant market. (Exhibit to R.
#104, Ex. D, pp. 66-69.) By contrast, Saint Alphonsus presented detailed and unrebutted
evidence which establishes the impossibility of IMI acquiring or exercising monopoly power in
this market, including:
•

the existence of more than ten different providers of MRI services currently operating in
the market (Exhibit toR. #104, Ex. H, pp. 20-21);

•

competitive entry by no less than five new MRI providers in the prior three years (Exhibit
toR. #104, Ex. H, pp. 23-24; see also Tr., Vol. II, p. 2818, L. 3-11 (conceding that there
were approximately ten to fifteen different MRI facilities in the area, some of which
opened in recent years));

•

an increase from 8% to 24% in the market share possessed by St. Luke's-a major MRI
provider described as a "formidable competitor" by MRIA's damages expert Bruce
Budge (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2790, L. 4-14)-over the same time period (Exhibit to R. #1 04,
Ex. H, at Table 1);
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•

the absence of any significant barriers to entry (Exhibit to R. #1 04, Ex. H, pp. 22-24); and

•

the existence of significant unused and spare capacity for MRI scans in the relevant
market (Exhibit toR. #104, Ex. H, p. 3; Exhibit toR. #104, Ex. B, p. 9).
Faced with this overwhelming evidence that the MRI services market was highly

competitive, MRIA attempted to manufacture the appearance of a genuine issue of material fact
through the submission of a "pricing" analysis from Whitelaw purporting to show direct
evidence ofiMI's exercise of monopoly power. According to Whitelaw, IMI has historically
been paid more on average than other MRI providers, while its market share has continued to
increase.
Whitelaw's analysis does not create a genuine issue of material fact. For one thing, no
legal precedent supports the proposition that, even if deemed reliable, evidence of high prices
can establish monopoly power where, as here, it is undisputed that the structure of the market
makes the exercise of market power implausible. See. e.g., Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d
1467, 1476 (9th Cir. 1997) (evidence that a firm charged higher prices and reaped substantial
profits insufficient to prove market power without evidence that output had been restricted), affd

on other grounds, 525 U.S. 299 (1999). To the contrary, given the evidence of market structure
discussed above, Whitelaw's assertion that that high prices are indicative of monopoly power (as
opposed to, say, better or more convenient services) "simply makes no economic sense."

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Moreover, Whitelaw's analysis fails on its own terms. It says nothing about actual prices
charged to consumers by IMI or any other MRI provider, and unjustifiably excludes data
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showing that another market participant, St. Luke's, was getting paid more than IMI. (See
Exhibit toR. #104, Ex. G, p. 13.) Indeed, the district court concluded that the evidentiary record
was ''devoid of any evidence establishing any adverse effects on the price, quality, or output of
MRI services in the relevant market." (R., Vol. XI, p. 2079.) Accordingly, because Whitelaw's
pricing analysis ignores market realities and other undisputed facts which render it wholly
unreliable, his expert testimony cannot create a fact issue precluding summary judgment. See

Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1436.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein and in Appellants' Brief, the Court should enter judgment
for Saint Alphonsus as set forth at pages 60---62 of Appellants' Brief, and should also affirm the
rulings below as to each of the issues raised in MRIA's cross~appeal.
Dated: December 22, 2008

Respectfully Submitted,

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
JONES DAY

51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Patrick J. Miller
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

601 W. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720

Attorneys for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of December, 2008, two true and correct copies of
the foregoing COMBINED REPLY AND RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPEAL were served upon
the following counsel for Respondent/Cross-Appellant by hand delivery:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI, WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
802 W. Bannock, Suite 700
Boise, ID 83702
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LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

OF
MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
THIS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT of MRI LIMITED
(the ~artnership") has been entered into effective
this Z-.ii day of fii/bUST
, l9BS, by and among the persons and
entitres-whose names appear on Exhibit A hereto as the General
Partner and as the Limited Partners respectively.
PARTNER~IP

The parties hereto hereby form a limited partnership
pursuant to the Idaho Limited Partnership Act. The parties agree
that the conduct of the Partnership shall be in accordance with
the terms and provisions herein set forth.
ARTICLE 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1.1

Effective Date and Term. The effective date of
and the Partnership shall be the date that the
Certificate of Limited Partnership is filed with the office of
the Idaho Secretary of State on behalf of the Partnership. The
Partnership shall continue from the effective date through
December 31, 2015, unless earlier dissolved in accordance with
the provisions of Article 6 hereof.
this

~greement

Section 1.2
Offices; Registered Agent. The office of the
Partnership shall be maintained in the City of Boise, County of
Ada, State of Idaho, and such other locations in the State of
Idaho as may be selected by the General Partner. The registered
agent of the Partnership for service of process shall be such
individual or corporation as shall be selected by the General
Partner.
Section 1.3

Partners.

1.3.1 The term "Partnersn shall refer, collectivelf and
individually, to those persons and entities who are part1es
to this Agreement and those persons and entities hereafter
admitted to partner status, excluding those whose status as a
Partner has been terminated as provided in Article 5.
1.3.2 The term "General Partner" shall refer to MRI
ASSOCIATES, an Idaho general partnership.

1.3.3

The term "Limited

Partners~

shall refer

individually and collectively to those persons and entities
whose names appear on Exhibit A hereto as Limited Partners

009940
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APPENDIX TO REPLY/CROSS~RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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EXHIBITS FILED BY MRI ASSOCIATES
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otherwise determined by the General Partner, and shall be kept at
the offices of the Partnership. Within 75 days after the close
of each fiscal year of the Partnership, the General Partner shall
furnish to each Limited Partner all the information necessary for
the preparation of his federal, state, local or other tax
returns. Within 120 days after the close of each fiscal year of
the Partnership, the General Patner shall furnish to each Limited
Partner audited financial statements prepared in accordance with
then generally accepted accounting principles by the independent
certified public accountants of the Partnership. All financial
statements shall be accurate in all material respects and shall
present fairly the financial position and results of the
operations of the Partnership.
Section g.3
Other Restrictions. No Partner shall become a
surety, guarantor or accommodation party as a Partner or in such
manner as would impose an obligation thereunder upon the
Partnership or the remaining Partners.
Section 8.4
Notice. Any notice required or permitted to be
delivered hereunder shall be deemed received when personally
delivered or when deposited in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, registered or certified with return receipt requested,
or sent by telegram or mailgram, or by recognized courier
delivery (i.e., Federal Express, Airborne, Burlington, etc.),
addressed to the Partners as the case may be, at the address set
forth on Exhibit A, or at such other addresses as a Partner
subsequently designates by written notice given in the manner
provided in this section.
ARTICLE 9
AMENDMENT--SEVER~BILITY

Section 9.1
Amendments. This Agreement may be amended only
through written instrument executed by the General Partner and
the Limited Partners owning 75% of the outstanding Units.
section 9.2
Severability. It is agreed that the invalidi~y.or
unenforceability of any Article, Section, paragraph or prov1s1on
of shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any one or
more of the other Articles, Sections, paragraphs or prov1sions
thereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Limited Partnership Agreement

has been executed the day and year herein first above written.

GENERAL PARTNER:

~:~ITED

MRI Associates

PARTNERSHI? AGREEMENT 009952
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From:

To:
Date:

Subject:

<allen.hahn@us.pwcglobal.com>
SARMC .PO-SARMC(SARABRAT)
Wed, Jan 5, 2000 2:40 PM
Engagement Documents

Attached are the documents requested by Cindy and Ken. The report on the IMI
joint venture Is draft; please have Cindy/Helen review and call w/any comments.
We will send a final copy after suggested edits are Incorporated. Also Is
"Scenario 5" which Ken requested based on our reading of the relevant
partnership documents. A FEDEX will arrive tomorrow with draft copies of both
documents. Please call if either Ken or Cindy would like to discuss.
regards
(See attached file: Report_IMI_9_1._99_final.doc)(See attached file: Scenario
S.doc)
The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to which

It Is addressed and may contain conficJen!laf and/or privileged material. Any
review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action
in reliance upon, this information by persons or entitles other than the
intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this In error, please
contact the sender and delete the material from any computer.

P-1029
SARMC08047
Office of the CFO
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DRAFT- FOR DISCUSSION

January 5, 2000
CONFIDENTIAL
Ms. Cindy Schamp
Chief Operating Officer
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
1055 North Curtis Road
Boise, Idaho 83706-1370
Subject:

Valuation of 50 Percent Interest in Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC

Deal" Ms. Schamp:
At your request, we have estimated the fair market value of Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center's ("SARMC") 50 percent.interest in Intennountain Medical Imaging LLC ("IMI." or "the
Center''), a joint venture between SARMC and Saint Alphonsus Radiology Group ("SARG"), as
of September 1, 1999 (the ''valuation date") on a going-concern basis. We understand that the
purpose of this analysis is to assist SARMC's management in its decision concerning the
valuation of its ownership interest in connection with the formation of the Center. Our valuation
analysis may not be used for any other purpose nor distributed to any third parties without the
prior written consent ofPricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (''PwC" or "PricewaterhouseCoopers").
Based on the assumptions and limiting conditions as described in tllis report, as well as the facts
and circumstances as presented to us by SARMC's management for the valuation date, we
estimate SARMC's 50 percent interest in Th1I to be approximately book value, or no greater than
SARMC's cash contribution of approximately:
$622,000

This report describes the principles, assumptions, and procedures that were applied in our
valuation analysis of the aforementioned equity interest. The findings stated in this analysis arc
based on data obtained directly from SARMC's management and from sources of publicly
available information. In addition, certain information in our report is based on our interviews
with representatives of SARMC. Management has advised us that they consider the data used to
be accurate, and that no information known to U1em conflicts with the data or resulting use of
such data in this analysis.
This letter and repo1t should not be used, quoted or circulated in whole or in part for any other
purpose other than that stated above. The PricewaterhouseCoopers name may not be used or
referenced in connection with this letter and report in any public or private offerings including,
but not limited to, those filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission or other government
agencies. In addition, our findings are subject to the Statement of Assumptions and Limiting
Conditions shown in Appendix I.
SARMC08048
Office of the CFO
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Confidential Draft for Discussion

Restt·ucturing of MRI Associates General Partnership
Scenario 5
SARMC withdraws from MRI Associates to provide flexibility to fonn potentially
competing ventures
Considerations

1)

The Partnership Agreeme1tt restricts the ability of Hospital Partners to
withdraw from MRI Associates. A Hospital Partner may withdraw at any .
time if, in the Hospital Patiner's reasonable judgement, continued
participation in MIU Associates:
• jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of the Hospital Partner;

2)

•

jeopardizes medicare/medicaid
participations;

or insurance

reimbursements

or

•

if the business activities of MR1 Associates are contrary to the ethical
principles of the Roman Catholic Church; or

•

is or may be in violation of any local, state or federal laws, rules or
regulations (Articles of Partnership, Section 6.1)

SARMC would be restricted for a period of one year after becoming a
Terminated Partner from engaging in any Competitive Activity (Third
Amendment to Articles ofPartnership, Section 8.1)

3)

A favorable vote of all current members of the Board of Partners can waive
the Partnership's rights with respect to any particular activity and Restricted
Party (Articles ofPartnership, Section 9.4)

4)

The appearance of shifting referrals may potentially result in legal
challenges from GP and LP interest holders, and investigations from State
and Federal authorities

5)

Unless otherwise agreed, SARMC would receive the balance of its .
Patiner's capital account at the time of withdrawal (Articles. of Partnership,
Section 6.1)

6)

Withdrawal would not relieve SARMC from any contingent liability in
existence at the time of withdrawal (Articles ofPartnership. Section 6.3)

7)

SARMC would retain limited partnership interests in Idaho and Mobile
SARMC08062
Office of ·the CFO
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EXHIBIT A

AFFIDA VlT OF G.REY REINHARDT IN SUPPORT OF Ol,POSITION TO MOTION TO
STRIKE REFERENCES TO PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS- Page 5
{190601}

Reply App. 6
004396

0912212006 FlU l.6: 32

@1001/()05

flAX 2083881300 3._Color

I~
GIVENS PURSLEY
\.AW OFFICC$

217 NOIIh 6111 SlttDI. SlfoloZOO
PO eo~ nzo. 8o11o. l~t)o 63701
Yt:ILCI"U(JftQI 209 38-{f.l20l)
TAC'"Itfi'-.C\ 208 3f8•JJ08

u.P

0. MOII\~11'

GN)'O.A!I,.
Q\4ilCopbHJ.IItUcfl

Otvld ft.lodn1di

Ju4JOII

o.o.~~~"~''·"·

An;el4 K. NehOft

Ml<hlll c. e«·~··
ltiOMtttOwl!lsl:
AoyltwliF a,wtn

r;,¥i~tMilUR4r

J•tflutltnclrlltttt\lkfl

1i""l"tP.r..t-.lldo
JolrloY e.h<tllor

Ki<ob01lyO. MOI""''

W. 11•11' O"RID16t1
KoM~UI\.t\I'Uity

J'.Ain M. Mtuhalt

\'if91risl.S\Ulff

KlllntU\ ll.

t'ollltYW"d

Mctfwt

Ktll1 GrtCM M<CoM~«

A«MMe L. Xn·t1n1
I::IIIT.tl;ltln.

Cfntb~ A. Meli~o
th:CI$,opftU k. MtyH
ttrocl•lll.Mnltt

OaboiJ )\. KfiSL!Iru~n
h~4~rQ0. Lu

f'lC•ic:lJ..Mtllar

I.Cifw.,dl.il~••

S'•P'IIf(i& t. Vtuw.,.tJr(
Robt" 8. Whitt
llor~~oMO.Gin••

JernoJ.A,tdc.CMt
0r'C4VIII.(I,

June 14, 2001

Via Federal Express
Michael Hammond
Shattuckf.Hammond, PWC
630 Fifth Ave., Ste. 2950
New York, NY 10111

Re:
File:

Retention Letter
337-988

Dear Mr. Hammond:
Please let this letter confirm that Shattuck Hammond has agreed to act as a consultant to
Givens Pursley LLP in connection with our evaluation of Saint AJphonsus Regional Medical
Center's options with respect to the general and limited partnership interest Saint Alphonsus
holds in "MR! Associates" and related limited partnerships. More specifically, this firm has
been retained to assist Saint Alphonsus in evaluating what legal rights or options it may have
with respect to its partnership interest. Included as part of that analysis will be the financial
valuation issues.
In assisting us in evaluating the overall legal and financial viability of its various options,
we understand you will be in direct contact with representatives of Saint Alphonsus. You have
agreed, however, that any conclusions, preliminary or .final, will be addressed to this ftrm and
used by this firm in connection wlth our renderlng ortega! advice to Saint Alphonsus.
Background on the venture as described to me by Cindy Schamp is attached. I am also
providing to you a summary memo I previously prepared outlining some of my preliminary
thoughts. The documents arc obviously extremely confidential and should not be shared with
others.

P-180
SARMC08171
Office of the CFO
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Michael Hammond
June 14, 2001
Page2

We further understand that you will be forwarding your statements for services rendered
directly to Saint Alphonsus and that such statements will be paid by Saint AJphonsus.
I look fotward to working with you on this endeavor.
Ve~y yours,

,..-

fi~/f7?1~L

' Patrick J. ~ller
PJM:nff

cc:

Cindy Schamp ~
Step~anie Westermeier

S:\di<<IU\U1113ll<cmi8~•U>Xl: lh•..,.ol>i ~.,. PIM ~'-ll-01.60<
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EXHIBIT C

AFFIDAVIT OJ'i' G.RRY REINHARDT IN SUI>PORT OF OJ>l>OSITION TO MOTION TO
STRIKE REFERENCES TO PRIVJLEGIW DOCUMENTS - Page 7
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Jone26, 2001

Cindy K. Scllamp
Cl1ief Op~ratillg Offieer
Salol Alphoosus Rogiunal Medical C~ntt~r
lOSS NQtth.Cmti& Road
Boi~c. lD K3706'

Den.r M~. Sch1.1mp~
W¢ art' plea:~ed wsubmit tl.l y<1u. th.i& letLer agreement (this ~'Engagement L~ttcr'1 wh~h sets forth
the :e:mt PIUS\Wltto which Shattuck Hamnaond Partnl.lrs, a di\rillion ofPxi~wa"Urhou.ser..c,operl!
Sccuritica U..C ("Shat1uck Hammond" or "PwCS''}, aball provide fuulncial advisory atrvices to
Saint Alphonsu11 J.tesional Medical Canter (the "Saint Alphonsm;" or "SARMC') in C<)nneetion with
lhe 11nsogemtmt described hore:in.

1.

Eugace1uent

Saint Alphonsul> hereby engages Shatt\tvk Hanunond as its .fi!lannit\1 advi~or h1 connc(:tion wilh the
!sr.Jvicc~ described below rolatii~B to Saint Alpllattsus' 8<1al ofrr.SJ.mcturing its WrtM.t relat.ionsbiJl
with MlU ..iu!S(tciatoo ("M.RIA·~ e.nd !Is a.ffiliated (:ntities MR.l Center rdaltn, LP ("MRICI") and

nr

MIU tvinbile LP ("M1U Mobile") in order to enablo SARMC 1o achi.,ve its gro\-\1h objcvtiw• in ils
local service area.
~.

Scope 11! Serviees

Sh.aituck Hammond, ·in !u c-apucity ns financiallllivi3CJt w Saint :\lphol.l:lud, wlll provide Sliint
Aiphunsus with tht following uervices:

l. Shattuck Hummoad will pl::l'formlnt~vi(;Ws wilh all rclc1•ant stakeholders associt~tt:d with
MRfA;

2. Witb the ussistanC(l of MRlA nlllnescment and SARMC, Shattnr.k Hammond will. develop

del ailed fivt.,year forecasts ofMR.IA;
3. Sha!Luck Hammond will develop a valuation tcpod for both MRIC[ and h~IU Mobile: and
1. Shutti1ek Hammond will prepare a l:itmtegic Opti<mo A.silc$$\llC:lll ("S()A'j d()~cri\Jing ihe
l'ilriou~ altl.}rul\ti"es avllilable to Saint Alpilom>t:$. Tb.is SOA will be dl'livcred to St
Aiphonsus ou or bllfom Octc•\ler :11, ?..OtllSARMC06542

Office of the CFO
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Giudy Scllllmp
26, '2001

JIUJ()

Pagc2

?..l!Al!!l..l.t..lfii.Oslt(;tion HJ.~!<YUQ~~

lf Saint Alphousus detem:ines to move forward with a unnsacrion associated with it ovmill1lhiil
interest in MRlA. (tbe. ''Txa.usacti.on"), Shattuck 8anmwnti win act M Sain( Al,phOllSU!1' cx.c:lu&ivc
ad\~S01'6 in connection with conswn.'tlatin(rlhe Transac:t.inn. Shattuck Hammond's sen•ice:; will
b~clude

the following:·

'1. Developing a uegotillting stmti>8Y involving a s1akoholders ofMRIA;
2. DcvGloping a term sheet agreed upon by all Stakcholdem (thb "Term Shoot''};

3. Negotiating a dofinitivc. purcltaae agn::cmoms: mui
4. 'Provldinl.l such <Jthl)f fit:rYiccs 115 may from time to time 'be sp~if'ically agreed !lpo;t by
Shauuc.k Hanllnond 1\t\d SARMC.
3.

Fees

J. Saint Alphonsus $hall. pay Shntltlck Thnnntoud an initial mlainer of$25,000 upon Cl(ecution of

this E.ugagetne.nt Letter.
2. Upon thD deliv~ry ofthe SOA and Valuation Il.tpt>lt on or before October 31, 2001, Saint
Alphons\IS shall pay Shattuc~ Hanlrupnd S7S,MO.

1. Saint Alphonsu& shall pay Shattui.-k Hanm'lolld & mun1hly retainer of S! S, 000 until ihil
Tr~nsacthm j, closod ur !hi~ enfl11gement is mminatl)d.
2. Saint Alphml6ua sb"U }lay Shatttu:k Hammond a milegl:one fee of $SO,OOO upon t11e deliv(}ty nF
an11grccd upon Te.im Sheet.

3. Salnt AJphonsus &hall pay Shattuck flatnmond a. S\lccess fee uf S350,00fl net ofrnouthly
reiauu:rs described in B.l. npon olaliP.IJ <)f.ll Tran.suc:dt>n.

Succt:.ss contcmpla1c:-.d iJ1 3.B.3. shall not iuclude ill'J.Y procc:~s that involves an ndvenarid dissoltttion
of the MRIA panttersllip.
SARMC06543
Office of th& CFO
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Cindy Sct111mp
rune 26, 2001
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4.

E:rpenses

Jn additioo\0 any fu~a payable by So.iot Alphoul!us to ShaLtuck Hammond hllnllln.dot, Saint
Alphonsus shnll reimburse Shattuck Hammond for its travel and other reasonabl~ out·DfiJockot
C.'!:JHmsea (itwluding lillY de.taba£e l1£age colt.~~, nonnat md cusi:Qmaty allocated and adminintrativc
ooslll, and llll fic11, disbursements and oilier cllllrges of counsel retained by Shattuck Hammond, All.d
of ony other cousuttnnts 8lld advisors rl)tained by Shattuck Hammond wid1 Saint Alph<lnsus's
wn~ent) incurred in cor.nc:etlon Wfth Shattuck HrunrrHmd'l! activities t•ndor, or conwnrplated by,lhi~
engagement.
tl,

Term and Terminnt!oXJ

. "This Engagoment L~tter and Sba:tt11ck Hammond's engal!tmcn~ hereunder may bo tem)inated by
llttller Saillt A1phonsus M Shattm:l< Hatnmond tlfl:ool.ive upon thirty days' prior wdlton notice
tllllreofto the other parly; providJ:d, llt1wcvvr·, tha.~ (a) U;nninati(')n of Slmttuck Hammond'6 .
tngagc:mont hereunder shall not alfoct Saint Alphonsus 's continuing ohligatlon to indcmlli.t).·
~hattuck .HlUilmond ~nd cortain related persons M provided in tho Sta1\dnrd Tc.rms nnd Conditions,
{\)) notwiU\standing ru1~· such tonnination, Shattuck HaJnmond.shaU be (lntitled to the fee as
provided for in thiil iingagcqncm Letter fur XP!}Iiod oftwelvG< months, and (c) IUly such tc:nnhlation
of Shattuck Hammond's eng~~St~numt h:~rcundr.r shall not a.flbcrl Saint Aip1Hmsus's obUgation lo
cxn11ply wi1h Article lV, Section A. of tile St1u1dard Tem1s and Conditions.
6".

Oth~r Agre"menr.~

T.btl Standard Terms and Conditions attllched hereto which sel forth additional u:rrrur a11d couditions
pert!lilting to S~attuck Hammond 'a engage mont her!mndet are nn integrn1part oftllia Engaao1nent
l..etter and lhc torms thereof are incorporated by rafenw~ hcr~n. This Engagement Letter may b~
el>CC!lttd in CDitnteq>arts. each of W)liCb Wj!Cifler &)tall bt COU.Sidered a sir\gle do<:umellt.
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Cind)' Schamp
Jtwe 26,.2001

Page4
We are pleased to aooept this engasemcnt atld look fbrwar4 to working with Saint Alphonsus,
Plea!!e c-ontiJm tltat tllll forcgolna is in uccorciancc witlt your lll!.dorstandiDg by signing and
rctuming to ·11s tho cnetoaO'i d\1pliC11lus of this E.n,;~gcmcnt Letter and tlHl Sumdard Thm~& and
Condi1ions, whiob shall ilicitU!IOn constitute ll. binding anreement hetweeu Shattuck H.uumond and
So.~int JJpbotssus.
·

SHA'ITOCl<:HAMMOND PARTNERS
Seeu1ities LLC

Pricf.l~'lltc:rhai19~Coopcrs

A

By: .... .. ) \.>4.'1~-c..

.

tA!I ,..........,"'.:9•.<.\C
.:......... -................

Na.tM:

Mielwl Hammond

'il.tlc;

Managing Diroctor

_/(;

..

0~-~~~~-a.n_ili,...e""'rl:-a.,.-in-~Titlu:

Managing Director

ACCI3PTED AND AGRERD TO:

Saint Alpho•nu.s RcgiorJ!.l Medic1.1.l Cenm
lly:

N~c:
Title:
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'flt<l st11ndanl temls aud conditioru (the "Stnndo.rd Ternu o.nd Conditions") set forth be-jow fonn a
put of. tho letter agreement betwe~:n Sbat1uck HttnUllOlul Panners, a div!si(ln of

PricewaterhonseCoopers Secudties LLC ("Siu\tttlck Hammond" or "PwCS") and Saint Alphnn!lns

Rl:gionul Modic:al Center (''Saint Alphall8us'' or "SAR.lvfC"), <lated June 26, 2001 (tllC "Engagement
Lt:ttel"), ll!blthed hcrctl,, '11w pattie.' have iudicaU:d tlu:ir l.lCCepta11e6 of tho St:u1dar<l Tem1s and

Conditions by execution oflhe nngagemt:nt I.t~tler. All Ciipil.alized term~ not defined herein sha.ll
havD t.lt<1 meaningllll.!icribed to suoh terms in ·U1e Eog!lg<:m~nt Lolt~J.

A.

Saint Alphonsus agree$ to indemnify and hold htlrmle~·s PwCS audit.~ partners, pliooipals,
dirccUJrs, officers, ~gents, amployecs 11ml a:fftliAtt:3 (together, th~ :'Jn~mnifi~i!>arties"),
from nnd against ~~ny and a.lllollses, cla)ms, damag<!s or Jip.hilitiea, or aC'.iO.Il.i i.n respeCt
tller~of (collec!ively, ''Damages"} related to nr arising out of anl' transaction con-remplated
by thi~ Agrcon\ent, the ensagement of:PwCS punuant to this Agreement, or tile Rervi.ces
pcrfvnued by PwCS in wnnection thertrWith. Sailtt Alphouats will rcimb\lrsc tho
Ind~!Mified P11r.ties for all e1q>ensea (inolnding rtlallona.b(Q foos and c»qltlllllt! nf coullllol} M
tiley IUe in01med by the Indenmified 'Parties itt c-o1mection with invostigarlny, preparing or
dufending an>' 9Utll uci.ion os· elnims, V.~1cthcr or not in connection ·with pendir.g or
threatened Htl,ga.tion, and whctller or 11ot the Indemnified }\arties Ml parties to sueh flclion,
clauu or ponding or lhrc:atencd litigation. Sahit A.lphomms wm not ba rcspo~~t>iblo for nny
Dlllllagea or expenues !hal are d~:tennined in a final judgement by a court of. cmnpetent
juri~ietion to lmvc rcsultetl primarily and directly ti:om Pv.·CS' m' any otltcr Imlcmnificd
Patty's gross negii,!l;ence or willful misconduct.

ll

Saint .Alphonsu~ thrther ogre us that llO!IIl of the rndc:mnlfied Patties sha.ll have. any liabiiity
(whuth\ll' direct <'lr indirect, in ccntrect or t<lrt or otherwise) to Saint .1\Jphon:ms or to any
othorpen~on claiming through Saint Alpllonsus in cmmcction with any transwtion
IXIntemplnwd lly the Engugesmmt Lbltor, thll cngag~:ment ofPwCS pu!'lluant tJ;J the
lln~Om(;llt I.eher, tlr tl1e servicu~ pcrfum1ed by PwCS in com1ection therewith, except for
any liability for suc\t Damages tJr expenses .h1currtd. by Saiut Alpbousus that result directly
from FwCS' ~oas ncgligouoe or willful misoonduot under clreumsta:lllle5 whtl'e JlwCS' uct
or failure to act was not spccitically rcq11csted or consclltcd to by S!lini Alpltotu;ua. ln no
event ahal.l the J.iabilll.y ofifwCS an<i the lndc:t11nified Pattit;s to Saiu.t A!pbonsul! in
eonnecti<m witn any claim arising out of the Engngement Letter engagement e~ce::d the
tr.ruount uf fel!lii!.Cf.uall~· received by J' wCS from Saint Alpbonsns purrJaut to tile
Iinsageme11t l.<~t.ter.

e.

Iff'(lr any reason Lhe forugoing indemnificatiM is \lltaYailablc to l)wCS or inau.f!icicnl to
lLold it. hamt!e.11a, then Saint AlphonM shall r.ontribute to the atn0\111t paid or pay~tblc by
PwCS U$ a result of sueb loss, claim, damage or lill.bllity i1t proportlcm us is ap]Jroprill.te tp
rcfloot nut ol\ly the relative benefits r~eiv·ed by Saint Alphuruus un the aue lumd and

PwCS Qn the other haud bur. also the l'elative tault of Saint Alphonsus and JlwC.:S, as well II.'!
any other rele\'lltll equiuilil~ COIIfiidaration~. Nowlit}lfil:anding th<1 for.Cfi(tiug, under ru>
\~ircumst.ancos &ball PwC:S' o.P.aregn.t<; comribution tQ «ny losse~. olahna, damBa~~ al\11
expenslls with respect to which contribution is available hereunder exceed lho amount of.

fees actunlly r~eived hereunder.
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D.

'11Lc proviliions of thi11 Ankle r shall not apply to claim& m;sc:It~d,ngeinst PwCS or any of

the nther Indenmificd Partitltl, or any llabi.lity of any oftitc Indemnified Parties, relating 1o
ot urlslng out of audiu pertbrmcd by Pti~waterhou$c:Cu()pors LLP on any of' Saint
Alphon.sus'a fi~ncial9tut~monta or any ()t!ter attert services perfmmed by

Pri<'.ewatr.rhouReCoopers LLP for SaintAiphonsu~:.
!!.

Saiut AlphOIISUS will not settle any litigation relating i:/.1 l'wCS' cngagtmu:nt heretmder
mtlcgs such settlement inr.ludos nn expro~~ rcle:aRo ofPwCS and iu partners, principala,

directora, ntJicen, agents and employees with ttltpect to all clnima ru1sertcd in such
litigntian, &Uob relealie to be set fo11b in an instn!lnent signed by uU plUtil!ll to guch
$Cltlemctlt:

rL
.llirOR~IA'!'rON

A.

Saint AlpboMus .•hallmakt! availalJie to PwCS all information r.cmcerning tbe bu!ioos~.
ass6ts, opemtionfa.nd fin11:ucial condition of Saitlt Alphoi\9\ts that PwCS !ca.&t1nabl,.,
reque!lt5 in couneetion with the service~ to be performed for Saint Alphansus u:1der tlle

E.tlgBg~rntmf r.etter, and r!utl! provide l'wCS with reaaanabla ac~.ess ro Sahrt Alphomus's
employee~~, aC~.~lunl.allt9 and other advi.son aud ll[!Cnts as PwCS shall. clecm appropriate.
Saint Alph/Jnsus re[WCSontS and warrant.~ that all information furnished by it •.n· fJl\ it~ behalf
PwCS durin& lite period ofPwCS' engagement (indnding intom~l'.tion eoutnil}ed ir. any
descriptivt: mate-rial) will bo ti¢Curate and com!)lct.e i11 tl11 materiKl Cl;)llptc~ ~r.t1 not

w

misleading. In IU!dition, PwCS will be using 1md n:l.ying on pubUcly availa.bk inf'onnation
and ou data, matcrial1md oth~ information f.urnish.~d ·to l?wCS by Saint .Alphon&u& and
other pat1ies. Sahtt .Al[)llonRIIS agreos tlmt PwCS may 113Silrne and r~;ly llpon tl\ll .accuracy
aud camplctenesa of. an<! ia not assuming nny resp1maibility for indep~ndent verification uf,
liuch puhlielr U\"dilable infunnatlo~ and Ute oth.~r infonnation sa i'umishcd.

m.
t!EClSION·MAJml(..f
A.

Since l'wCS is acting. mlly u an advisorro Saint Alph01l&t!8 under the terms of the
f.!ugagcmotlt.Letter, PwCS is .not. a!littnting eny resp{msibilily for Saint Alphonsus's

tmdcdying business decision.!! or for nny cconnmi~, £iMn.eilll or other rosult)! which rnlly be
oblained or expc.riem:ed by Saint Alpltonsns as lt result of PwCS' engagement undor the
Engllgement LeU cr.

IV.
QTflliH e.GHEE'MlCN'J:.S
A.

P.wCS bas been retained under ih.e Bns~~gement Letter !Ill an indclpendenl contra.ctor with no
fiduciary or agency relationship with Saint Alpltousus or wuny oilu>r pUtt)•. :\Jl opiniuns
aud advice {oral or wtitteu} l'(}rtdcred by PwCS JlUrsumlt to ti1e Bnga.gement Lctter Ill'~
intended solely for 1he ber.efll and USil ufthe employees, a~ntll and legal a:nc! ·f.inanoial
advison of Saint Alphollstl5 in ooD&idering the ma.uers to which the Ensasemc:1~t l.cttc~
re!att~S, and Saint Alphoruu~ o.grtles thanuch opiniom; und n.dvice may not b~ ~elied upoll
by ru1y ocher pcrsuu, u~ed for ll.ll)' oilier purp•lsc or reproducod, tilssominatecl, quoted or

referred to at tmy time, in ally nuumer 01 for lillY r.urpos~. JHll' shall any llublic n.:fcrence~; tu
PwCS be mad,, h)• Saint Alpbonsus (or sm:h pcr~OJl~). withm1t tltl' prim wriH<.:n coo~cnl of

2
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PwCS. Any t.cnnilll\tion of J.>wCS' ~'l1gagement tmder the Engagemt:nt Letter shallnm
aftbct Sainl Alphonsus's obligation to comply with this aet:ticm.

a.

PwCS' work und11r tl.lc Eagayement I..etwr will not eoMtitme lll'l atte~t service as that lCm1 is

dentte.d by the Atllericnn Instinrte of Certified Publie Accouatants ("AJCPA").

Acoorctiagl)', PwCS doe~ nut express an opinion on any oftlw fitoolcial ot other data.
oonrained in any l1ocument that PwCS might 11dvis" and assist S11int Alphonsus in prepa.dng
or any other report. Any Illl3llcial j)rujlo>cdcmll and the u.nderl)•ing l\S~umplionll wlll bo
propared an~ provided to 'PwCS by Sllinl Alph:msus. PwCS' wot'k witb 'espeut to any
prospeativo 1inancil\l iltfomw.tl<ln will not constitute an e~.:aminr.r.tion, compilation, review or
aQr~·'llpOn proooduros anua~'(lmer.t of u fimmcial f'Oreca~t in accord11nco with sl11.t1dardll
e~~tablished by the AICPA. !Uid PwCS will expro6s no asaurance ofany kind o.n it. PwCS
d<Jcr n)Cng"izc that St. Alpllcmsus will be relying ltpon tl1e Vah111tion Report presented by
Shattuck Hammofnl tlua wiil contain Ute atort:tr.cntioned financi11l prqieciions

c.

Notice given. pursuant 10 1\UY ortlwprovlsians ofthe BttyugClllellt Letter shall be in v.oriting
undshall be mailed or delivered: (11) if to Saint Alphonaus, 11t it.s of.iic::s at lO:iS Ncrth
C1utls ltoad, Boise, ID 831Q6, At1cntkm: Cindy Sclwrrp; and (b} if to PwCS, at ibl offices
at Shll1tuck Hammond .Parin(}T~, 630 Fiflh Avenue, NIWI York, New York 1.0111, Altonllon:
1\iohard Loront!, with a copy to Karco Lewis, E~q., Office of General ('.uunsel,
PrieewatcrhouseCoopers LU.\ 1301 Avenue oflh~ A.merkhs, New York, Ntw1 York .10{136.

D.

Th.c validity and in1ru'Jln.'tr.tlou oftbc Standard Tet111s and Conditions and the EngflgenJont
l.cttec shall lill goy::;rned uy, utld (:OU$!rued and enforced In II.C(:O.rdmct with, t!l(~ laws of:l\C
State of New Y'prk applicabl!7 to aare~n~rls made and to be fully petformed dlerllin
(oN:cludillg tlle conflicts oi'laws rule-s). S~int Alphonsus irrevocably submits to the
exclusive jurilldiotion of the Federal and N~:w York. State (;O\lft' for the purpos~ of nuy suit,
action or uthct !lrocooding a1·ishlg out trfthe Stnndl!rd Terms and Conditions or the
llny-dgem<Snt Letter, or any oftho IIJ!I'eamcnts or trausuctions cunttlmplated her~hy, which is
brought by or against S11int A1phoniius and (i) betehy irrovucal.lly agrees '!hilt <til ciaims in
respect of nn>· SliCh ~ult, ucuon or proceeding may hr. heard a:nd determined in uny such
court~, (ii) ro the e1.tont that Saint Alphonsus has acquired, or hcroaftcr may acquire, any
immunity frmnjurudiction of an}' such courl or from any legal proc<l!s therein, Suint
Alphomoua hereby waivt:!l, to the n1Uest extent permitted by la\V, such inununhy al!d (iii)
tLgreoo not l(l commence uny action, suit or proc:ecdlng rulating to th~ S!.anda.rd Tenns and
Conditions or· tlu: Encagement Letter other 'flum iu such court.\. Saiot Alphumi'l$ her11by
waives, and nsrees not to ~tssort in any sur.b snit. action or proceeding, iu each cu.st:, to the
full~at extunt .(lermilted hl• applir.able law, atly claim U!aL (a) Saint A.lpnon~u~ i~·110t
tWsonaUy aubjoct l:o ·!he jurisdiction of atlY such comts, (b) Saint Alphoums is immune
from any legal process (whether tb.rongh s~rYic~ or notice, utbl.chmenl prior ta jndgmcll1,
attachment in ald of llxecutinu, executio;t or otlll.'JWise) with respect [0 Saint Alpl1onsHS or
its property, M tbut venoe h1such Cl:lllltty is in any wny itrtpropllr, or (d) lhnt 111ly su<1l~ suit,
&ttion or proceoding ill brought in an. inoonveni~nt flWU'In. The pal ties hereby waive any
risht to trial by jury in wnne!Jtion witb any disput6, action or proceeding relntiug to the
Ston.dard Tcnns and Conditions, thtl F..ngngemunf Letter or Ill\)' matter contomplated he.roby.

R

11tc St;mdard Ter!U' ru:d Ccmditiol>S, tug::l.hcr with tbc llnfl.l1s~ntcnt Letter, hu.:mporai.ea th:>
entire undorstllntling of the parties relating to the subje<:t matter hereof, and ~tlpersedes artd
cancels all previou~ llgfl)elllouu, understandings and/or cvmomnic111ions betwe,;nl'wCS and
Saint Alphoosus. Neiclter party me.y, nor shnU have the power to, assign or tra11sier its
dghu or obligl\tions UlldCJ" the l!ugagemcmt Lc!Jer and Sti\ndard Te.ans und Condidons
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.

~·

with(lut the Jlriar wtitten c:unsent of the ,,ther party, GXCGpt 1l1at PwCS may wirbo111 COll.'lent
ll.l!Sign or trans!~ tlle Bngltgllm~llt Letter. nnd Standard 'l'DrnlS and C()ndition9 to a. successor
to 1he busincaY ofPwCS to whi<1h the Eng~~gemcllt Lctt.er rela~s. Neitber the St.at1dard
Tenus 1111tl Conditiow nor '!he Bngagemttnt'l,.ettor .may be amended or rnodifi<ld except in

writins, ex.eeuted by Saint Alphonsug ar.d PwCS. Jhe Standard Terms and Conditions and

1M Engogemont Letter shall be binding 11p011l'wCS, a.nd Saint .Alphonsus IUl;l their
re.~p~tivc su~ces11crs (whether by Wl\y oflnetger ot otlll)rwisc,) and assisns.
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CONFIDENTIAl
MINUTES
GROUP MEETING
MAY13,1998

In attendance: David Giles, Tim Hall, Paul Traughber, Jolm Knochel, Bill Murray, Joe Gobel, Diane
Newton, JeffSeaboum, Rie Abello, Teny Krogstad, Scott Christensen, Paul DeWitt and Kathy Sharpe,
Secretary.

TERRY & SCOTT

I

MEDSPEAK.
A

Dr. Giles feels that the newer MedSpeak system is better and more user friendly. More
Radiologists will begin training on the system.

U

MERIT RAISES.
A.

III

IV

CONSTRUCTION REPORT.

A.

The ER trauma room has been undergoing installation of new equipment. It should be up
and running by Memorial Weekend.

B.

CR is expected to be delivered to the North Tower, as well as Ute ERin July. The GE
equipment in the North Tower is in place ready for CR.

C.

Reading/light room plans are still in progress.

D.

A meeting was held to look at Ute details of the remodeling ofUltrasound, cr and Nucl~
Medicine. Everything looks go_od and Debbie and Laurie appear to be happy with the plans.
The plans will be back in.the department Jtme 3, 1998.

SENIOR MANAGEMENT.
A.

v

The merit increase for employees in the Radjology Department will be coming up soon.
The percentage will depend on the employee's perfonnance, but it was felt that it will be
aronnd3%.

Bob Polk has taken ov..er as the new Vice fresident, Cindy Schamp is the new COO and Pam
Bomley has moved on.

JR.

A.

Mary Glen is the new project manager assigned to the PACS project.
......

. ·Plaintiff's Exhibit
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VI

VD

DEPARTMENT REPORTS AND STAFFING.
A.

Two new positions have been approved for the new CT scanner. These positions will be
filled by two existing "in-house" techs and will be trained on the job. This will leave two
openings in the department. The overall ultrasound staffing problems seem to be improving.

B.

Soott stated· that they are trying to keep all non-essential staff out of the SpeGials room.

C.

As far as general radiology is concerned, there are cummt!y some staffing shortages. It has
been difficult to find good techs, but it is currently being worked on.

D.

Dr. Abello stated that the surgeons are excited about getting a biopsy probe in the further for
Nuclear Medicine.

E.

One monitor bas been installed at the Breast Care Center, which allows viewing of
mammographies on soft copy. T!tings seem to be going well and the numbers are
increasing. Ultrasound will be going to three days a week at the Breast Care Center.

F.

The W!Jman's Center is not making any money and would like to obtain mammography. It
is important for Radiology to maintain control of this.

G.

Dr. Giles is proposing a mobile mammography unit, which would allow Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center to compete with Saint Luke's Regional Medical Center.
Currently, Saint Luke's Regional Medical Center has the only mobile service.

H.

Dr. Traughber is looking into obtaining an ultrasound for bone density.

HOSPITAL COSTS.
A.

VIII

Terry recently attended a leadership coWJcil, which painted a bleak picture of hospital costs.
· There bas been an increase of approximately 7-9% per procedure fi:Om laSt year. A cost
reduction of$7 million has been proposed for next year. Terry will work on
compartmentalizing the oosts of the department for budget cuts.

IMAGING CENTER.
A.

Dr. GileB expressed his feeling of urgency regarding an Independent Imaging Center. It is
felt the hospital will give the Group a ..non-<:ompete" clause within the next six months. If
the Group signs a "non-compete" contract with the hospital, it would ensure stability, but
would also mean losing autonomy. It was unanimously agreed upon by the Group that
control of their future was most important and therefore now was the time to open an
Imaging Center.

B.

The current administrative staff at the hospital is very negative with regards to expansion
and competition. For this reason, is was felt that the Center should be located east by Saint
Luke's Regional Medical Center, which may be seen as less of a threat to Saint Alphonsus
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Regional Medical Center. ldeally, the Group would like to partner with the hospital on this
project perhaps by leasing C(JUipment from them. If the hospital refuses to partner with the
Group on this project and severs all ties, the new Center will continue with a second Center
being built as close to Saint Alph6nsus Regional Medical Center as possible to compete
with them.

IX

C.

Drs. Traughber and Knochel agreed that an MRI.unit is essential to making the Center
successful. Dr. Giles feels that the MRI Board will be favorable to this.

D.

Cash.flow from WBR will help cover expenses of the new Center, which would also help to
alleviate the financial pressure of the Junior Partners. The Radiologists would stop
receiving checks from WBR, as this wiU go to the Center's costs.

E.

Jeff and Paul feel that they can pull together an the demographics needed and therefore a
consultant will not be needed at this time. Paul suggested that the equipment will drive the
space and location. Dr. Knochel suggested visiting other Imaging Centers to look: into what
has proven successful.

F.

Dr. Traughber motioned that the plans for the Imaging Center go forward. The motion was
carried. More on this issue to come.

TVH.
A.

Bob Polk spoke with Dr. Giles about the Group's in~olvem.ent in TVH. Bob Polk stated that
by working with TVH, the Group is perceived as working against Saint Alphonsus Regional

Medical Center.

X

B.

Dr. Knochel raised the question of whether the Group was going to invest in TVH. The
decision was made not to invest there due to the Imaging Center project.

C.

Dr. Murray reminded the Group to continue to be sensitive to the skeletal rotation at TVH.

D.

The status of the contract with TVH is still undecided at this time.

MANPOWER.

A.

A deal has been negotiated with Ian Davey. He will join the Group after his academic year.
A new sentence will be added to his contract with regards to the Imaging Center. Neil
Davey was very well received on his recent visit to the department. Some concern was
raised with regards to having brothers in the Group. It was felt that if they are both partners,
a clause would have to be drafted in their contracts that would exclude them from
monopolizing votes on certain issues that pertain to them. Dr. Knochel expressed concern
over having the Davey brothers here (both as Interventionalists). Dr. Knochel felt that he
would not be utilized as much and would begin to lose his skills.

GSR/0595

Reply App. 20

517-003
004410

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
..
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

)
)

)

v.

)
)

MRl ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership,
Defendant-Respondent

)
)

)
)
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership, on its )
own behalf, and on behalf of MRI Limited, an Idaho limited
)
)
partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited, an Idaho limited partnership,
CounterClaimant-Respondent )
)
v.
)

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit
corporation; SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
INC.
CounterDefendants-Appellants

Supreme Court
Docket No. 34885

)
)
)
)

RESPONDENT'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judi~ial District for Ada County
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin, District Judge, Presiding

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001-21l3
Attorneys for Appellants

Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Attorneys for Appellants

Thomas A. Banducci
Wade L. Woodard
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys for Respondent

Patrick J. Miller
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
Attorneys for Appellants
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Respondent/Cross-Appellant MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), 1 hereby submits its reply
brief in suppot1 of its cross-appeal.

I. ARGUMENT
As indicated in MRIA's opening brief, if SARMC's2 request for a new trial is denied on
appeal, the Court need not address MRIA's cross-appeal. MRIA only seeks to appeal the
following rulings if the Court determines that a new trial is warranted. In the event SARMC is
granted a new trial, the trial com1's denial of MRIA's motion for leave to seek punitive damages
should be reversed as there is overwhelming evidence that (1) SARMC acted in extreme
deviation from reasonable standards of conduct when it willfully and deliberately competed with
its partners in MRIA and that (2) SARMC did so with full knowledge that its conduct would
result in the destruction ofMRIA's business. Additionally, in the event SARMC is granted a
new trial, the trial court's grant of summary judgment on MRIA's antitrust claims should also be
reversed because MRIA sufficiently asserted an antitrust injury and showed that SARMC and
Intermountain Imaging ("IMI") had market power.

A.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied MRIA's Request for Leave
to Seek Punitive Damages.
The overwhelming evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that SARMC, while

still a pat1ner in MRIA, deliberately competed with MRIA in violation of SARMC's contractual
and fiduciary duties. SARMC did so with willful disregard for the consequences of its wrongful
1

References to MRIA also include its business atms: MRI Limited Pat1nership aka MRI Center
of Idaho ("MRICI") and MRI Mobile ("MRIM").
2
References to SARMC include both Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center.
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conduct. As a result, MRIA's business was destroyed. (Trial Ex. 4519.) The evidence further
demonstrates that the trial court's failure to instruct on punitive damages "was so contrary to the
facts of the case as to amount to an abuse of discretion under the deferential standard!' General
Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 825,979 P.2d 1207, 1210 (1999).

1.

Punitive Damages Are Appropriate in a Commercial Context.

SARMC suggests that punitive damages are not warranted because "wrongful
dissociation is no different than a breach of contract, which does not give rise to punitive
damages." (SARMC's Reply Brief at 42.) SARMC, however, is wrong. As this Court held in
Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 95 P.3d 977 (2004), "[i]t is not the nature of

the case, whether tort or contract, that controls the issue of punitive damages." What controls is
whether SARMC's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous. I. C. § 61604(1).
According to this Court, I.C. § 6-1604(1) "requires an intersection oftwo factors: a bad
act and a bad state of mind." Linscott v. Ranier Nat'/ Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 858, 606 P.2d
958, 962 (1980). The CoUli recognized that in the past it had used various terms to describe the
"bad act" requirement such as "deceit," acting "to violate another's legal right," acting "for
purpose of injuring plaintiff," "to oppress," acting "(in) disregard ... of the known property
rights," and "fraud." ld The Court also recognized it had used the following terms to describe a
"bad state of mind": "deliberate," and "gross negligence." Jd; see also Cheney v. Palos Verde

lnv. Cmp., 104 Idaho 897,905, 665 P.2d 661, 669 (1983) (holding the bad state ofmind can be
shown if the act was simply "deliberate or willful"). The Court then noted "[i]n two cases

2
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involving breach of a contract, this court even held that it was proper to award punitive damages
when there was 'other sufficient reason. m Linscott, 100 Idaho at 858, 606 P.2d at 962; see also

Rockefeller v. Grabow,136 Idaho 637,646-47,39 P.3d 577,586-87 (2001) (recognizing a
punitive damages amendment is proper where there is evidence of violations of fiduciary duties);

Cuddy Mountain Concrete Inc. v. Citadel Constr., Inc., 121 Idaho 220,229, 824 P.2d 151, 160
(Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing punitive damages are proper when a party breaches it duty to
act in good faith).
Thus, a breach of contract may give rise to punitive damages where the conduct "show[s]
a lack of professional regard for the consequences of the breach of the contractual agreement."

Cuddy Mountain, 121 Idaho at 229, 824 P.2d at 160. Stated simply, punitive damages are proper
when the conduct is willful or deliberate regardless of the type of claim. Cheney v. Palos Verde

Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897,905,665 P.2d 661,669 (1983). Here, SARMC's actions were willful,
deliberate, and much more egregious than a mere breach of contract. SARMC, in willful
violation of its fiduciary and contractual duties and with conscious disregard for the
consequences of its actions, competed with its partners in MRIA and took other actions which
caused the financial ruin of MRIA.

2.

The Standard of Review for Determining Whether the Trial Court Abused
Its Discretion is Substantial Evidence.

Although SARMC is correct that the decision of whether to submit the issue of punitive
damages to the jury is reviewed under abuse of discretion, "[t]his Court has interpreted the abuse
of discretion standard in the context of punitive damages as whether there was substantial

3
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evidence to support submitting the issue to the jury." Highland Enterprises Inc. v. Baker, 133
Idaho 330, 348, 986 P .2d l 011, 1014 ( 1999) (citing Student Loan Fund of Idaho Inc. v. Duerner,
131 Idaho 45, 52, 951 P .2d 1272, 1279 (1998) ("On appeal, we will not disturb the trial court's
decision unless there was an abuse of discretion, which has been interpreted within the punitive
damages context to mean whether there was substantial evidence to support submission of the
issue to the jury.")); see also Rockefeller v. Grabow,l36 Idaho 637, 647, 39 P.3d 577, 587 (2001)
("In determining whether the tl'ial court abused its discretion this Court will consider whether
substantial evidence supp011s submitting the issue [of punitive damages] to the jury."). Thus,
even though the standard is deferential, the law requires the trial coutt's decision to be reversed
if substantial evidence supported submitting the issue to the jury.

3.

The Issue of Punitive Damages Should Have Been Submitted to the Jury
Because There Was Substantial Evidence that SARMC Committed a "Bad
Act" with a "Bad State of Mind."

In this case, the issue of punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury because
there was clear and convincing (not just substantial) evidence that SARMC '~deliberately" or as
the trial com1 described, "blatantly" (the bad state of mind) competed with its partner MRIA and
"violated [MRIA's] legal right[sr' (the bad act). (TR Vol. III at 4471 :9-17.) The evidence
demonstrates that SARMC's conduct, which the Jury found to be intentional and in bad faith,
was an extreme deviation from the reasonable standard of care and was taken without
professional regard for the consequences of the conduct. (R., Ex. 48 at ,,-r 17-28, attached as Ex.
A to Reply Appendix (Reply App.") attached hereto.) The evidence further demonstrates that
SARMC's wrongful conduct was more egregious than merely breaching a contract, as SARMC

4
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erroneously contends.

a.

SARMC Willfully and Knowingly Breached Its Fiduciary Duties to Its
Partners and Breached tbe MRIA Partnership Agreement.

As fully set forth in prior briefing, SARMC wrongfully withdrew from MRIA on April 1,
2004. (R. Vol. II at 388-96, Vol. III at 538-46.) Moreover, it is not as ifSARMC withdrew for a
benign purpose. Instead, it withdrew because it had joined MRIA's competitor, IMI. (Trial Ex.
4226.) Furthermore, at the time of its wrongful withdrawal from MRIA, SARMC knew that by
dissociating for purposes of competing with MRIA it would be violating the express terms of the
MRIA Partnership Agreement. This knowledge is evidenced by the clear language in the MRIA
Partnership Agreement (including the withdrawal and noncompete provisions), the analysis of
SARMC's consulting firms and the admonitions from SARMC's attorneys.
For example, SARMC was warned by PriceWaterhouseCoopers in January 2000 (over

•

four years before its wrongful withdrawal) that the MRIA Partnership Agreement restricted the
right ofSARMC to withdraw from MRIA. (Trial Ex. 4138. at 16 attached as Reply App. Ex. B;
R. Vol. II at 388-96, Vol. III at 538-46.) SARMC also was reminded by its consultant Shattuck

Hammond that "SARMC ha[d] been advised by counsel that this option [withdrawal from
MRIA] would likely engender litigation with MRIA .... Givens Pursley believes that that there
would likely be litigation as to whether the termination was wrongful. ... " (Trial Ex. 4239 at 2,
11.) The evidence established that SARMC fully understood the legal implications of these
warnings. (TR. Vol. II at 1950:10-15; TR Vol. III at 3594:9-13; 3595:23-3596:6.)
SARMC also knew its involvement in IMI, while still a partner in MRIA, violated

5
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SARMC's fiduciary duties to MRIA. Indeed, SARMC's CEO testified that she understood that
(1) "a partner must not help a third party compete with the partnership", (2) "a pat1ner must not

compete with the pat1nership", (3) "one of a partner's responsibilities to his other partners is not
to exploit his position", (4) "a partner must not profit at the partnership's expense", and (5) "a
pat1ner must not exploit information obtained through his position as a partner." (TR Vol. II at
1686:7-13, 23-25; 1684:2-5; 1680:1-4; 1685: 12-15; 1682:6-18.) Despite this knowledge,
SARMC, under the leadership of its CEO, not only helped a third-party compete with the
partnership, but it also later joined that third-party competitor, competed with the partnership
itself, and ultimately profited at the partnership's expense. Likewise, SARMC's Chief Operating
Officer, Cindy Schamp, admitted that in 2001 she learned from SARMC's consultants that ·
competing with MRIA through IMI could be a breach ofSARMC's fiduciary duties. (TR VoL
III at 3593:21-3594:16.) Similarly, SARMC understood (by no later than 2001) that SARMC's
conduct created "a risk of St. Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary responsibility to [MRICI and

MRI Mobile]." (Trial Ex. 4239 at 11 (emphasis added).) This evidence clearly establishes the
"bad state of mind" requirement.
b.

SARMC Also Wilfully Suppot·ted and Joined a Competitor While Still
a Partner in MRIA with Knowledge of, and Disregard for, the
Consequences to MRIA.

In addition to wrongfully withdrawing, SARMC's willful bad acts, while still a partner in
MRIA, include:
•

Helping IMI establish itself as a MRIA' s competitor;

6
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•

Usurping MRIA's opportunity to partner with GSRIIMe;

•

Formally partnering with IMI and providing IMI with significant financial suppott;

•

Actively joint marketing with IMI to shift referrals from MRIA to IMI;

•

Making IMI its outpatient facility;

•

Condoning conduct by GSR which caused referrals to shift from MRIA to IMI;

•

Refusing to allow MRIA to contract with radiologists other than GSR;

•

Bringing IMI onto SARMC's campus virtually next-door to MRICI; and

•

Issuing a written mandate to all of its employees, including referring physicians, directing
that all patients be sent to the IMI magnet rather than to MRICI.

This conduct, which is described in more detail below, clearly and convincingly demonstrates
that SARMC deliberately competed with MRIA in violation ofSARMC's contractual and
fiduciary duties. SARMC knew or should have known that its conduct would destroy MRIA,
both in terms of lost revenues and the substantial fees and costs that MRIA would have to incur
in order to enforce its legal rights under the partnership agreement. (TR Vol. II at 1690:201691:5; 1871:8-9.) SARMC's knowledge of, and professional disregard for, the consequences of
its wrongful conduct is aptly summarized by SARMC's CEO's testimony: "I was a partner with

3

References to "GSR" include St. Alphonsus Radiology Group nlk/a Gem State Radiology.
GSR was the exclusive reader of SARMC's radiologic images including MRICI's images. (TR
Vol. II at 1446:10-1447:2.
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a competitor. I was supporting myself." (TR Vol. II at 1871 :8-9.) 4

i.

SARMC Supported the Establishment of MRIA's Competitor,
IMI.

While still a partner in MRIA, SARMC knowingly helped IMI become a lethal
competitor of MRIA by investing money and resources into the establishment of I MI.
SARMC's support during IMI's initial start-up included: (1) providing the backing necessary for
IMI to obtain funding; (2) providing SARMC's case volume, database, technical component
charges, staffing costs, and other operational data for IMI' s use in its business plan; (3) linking
IMI to the intranet between SARMC and its physician network; (4) supporting Karen Noyes,
assistant director of the SARMC radiology department, in joining IMI as executive director; and
(5) converting SARMC to the same digital radiography system as IMI. (Trial Ex. 4095 attached
as Reply App. Ex. C; see also Trial Ex. 4074 (showing in February 1999, SARMC was working
on funding for IMI)). In fact, without SARMC's help, IMI likely would not have obtained
financing. (Trial Ex. 545 at 3, attached as Reply App. Ex. D ("[F]inancing [for IMI] was

contingent on a partnership with the hospital." (emphasis added)).
ii.

SARMC's IT Support Provided IMI with a Tremendous
Competitive Advantage.

Although· still a partner in MRIA, SARMC partnered with GSR, from IMI's inception, to
convert IMI's technology from film to digital imaging. SARMC helped bring this "digital
4

The evidence set forth in the proceeding sections was in large pat1 the same evidence submitted
with MRIA's motion for leave to seek punitive damages, which motion was renewed at the close
of the evidence. (SeeR., Ex. 47 at 1-20; R. Ex. 48 at~~ 17-28; R., Exs. 68 & 69.)

8
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revolution to IMI" by initially investing severai hundred thousand dollars in IMI's IT system.
{TR Vol. II at 1505:10-1507:10; Trial Ex. 4095, attached as Reply App. Ex. C.) The investment
by SARMC in "dark fiber" connectivity to IMI, alone, was $780,000. (Trial Ex. 4231at 3
attached as Reply App. Ex. E; TR Vol. II at 1509:6-13.) SARMC also provided technical
resources to IMI, including the formation of a joint IT committee with IMI, which MRIA was
not allowed to join. (/d. at 1619:12-1621 :20; 2437:18-2439:9.) Consequently, this support
provided IMI with an enormous competitive advantage over MRICI. (Ex. 4107, attached as
Reply App. Ex. G; TR Vol. II. 1618:22-1619:3, 1497:15-1502:24.)

iii.

SARMC Usurped MRIA's Opportunity to Partner with
GSRIIMI.

As set forth in MRIA's opening brief, MRIA had an opportunity to partner with GSR in
IMI rather than compete with IMI. In that regard, in June 1999, MRIA asked SARMC's CEO,
Sandra Bruce, to help MRIA close the deal with GSR. (TR Vol. II at 1164:2-1165:16, 1759:241760: 14.) Although Bruce agreed to help, instead of negotiating on MRIA's behalf, she put the
MRIA negotiations on hold and then offered GSR a better deal: a 50% interest in an MR imaging
business rather than the 9% (one-eleventh) interest offered by MRIA. (Id at 1165:8-1166:16,
1760:3-1761:18, 1769:7-10, 1788:19-1790:15, 1786:15-19,2043:24-2044:5,2371:4-10,3702:911, 4171: 13-21; Trial Ex. 4101; Trial Ex. 4191 at 3.) It is not surprising that GSR accepted
SARMC's better offer and partnered with SARMC instead ofMRIA. (Trial Ex. 4226). By this
conduct, SARMC, while still a partner in MRIA, deliberately took for itself an opportunity

9
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belonging to MRIA. 5

iv.

SARMC Formally Partnered with IMI and Provided IMI with
Significant Financial Support.

In June, 2001, while still a partner in MRIA, SARMC formally joined as a pat1ner with
GSR in IMI and received a 50 percent interest in IMI. (Trial Ex. 4226 at 6.) At that time,
SARMC gave IMI $546,146 and assumed almost $1.5 million oflMI's debt. (TR Vol. II at
1557:4-1558:2; 1622:22-1623:8.) This financial suppmt was in addition to SARMC's financial
investment in IMI's IT systems.

v.

SARMC Actively Competed With Its Partners in MRIA by
Joint Maa·keting with IMI to Shift Referrals from MRIA to
IMI.

Even though IMI was MRIA's main competitor and even though SARMC as a pat1ner in
MRIA owed MRIA a duty not to compete, SARMC actively worked with IMI to obtain a
combined market share for magnetic resonance imaging, in direct competition with MRIA. (Trial
Ex. 4248 attached as Reply App. Ex.

F; TR Vol. II at 1643:7-13, 1646:1-7; TR Vol. III at

4169:10-17 .) SARMC and IMI jointly marketed by television, radio, newspapers, letters to
referring physicians and physician-to-physician office visits. (Trial Exs. 4248 & 4107 attached as
Reply App. Exs. F and G; TR Vol. II at 1643:23-1644:22.) This joint marketing caused
confusion among the referring doctors as to which imaging center was affiliated with SARMC.

(ld. at 2420: 11-16; 2428:21-2429:6.) As a result, marketing for MRIA became difficult. (!d.)

5

SARMC, while still a partner in MRIA, also usurped MRIA's opportunity to open an imaging
center in Meridian, Idaho by helping open IMI Meridian (AKA IMI West). (Trial Exs. 4156,
4115,4211 & 4275; TR Vol. II at 1590:11-23; 1613:5-12; 1615:20-23.)
10
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vi.

SARMC Ensured that IMI was Viewed by the Refening
Physicians as SARMC's Imaging Center.

In addition to joint marketing with IMI, SARMC, while still a partner in MRIA, made
IMI SARMC's outpatient facility which ensured that IMI (not MRIA) would be viewed by
referring physicians as SARMC's imaging center. (ld at 1582:10-1583:24.) Because this
development was communicated to the referring doctor community (the source ofMRIA's
business), MRIA lost scans because referring physicians became "used to sending patients to
IMI, not just for CT, but for MRI as well." (/d. at 1583:17-24.)

vii.

SARMC Allowed Its New Partner GSR to Engage in Conduct
Intended to Shift Referrals from MRIA to IMI.

Shm1ly after IMI opened in late 1999, GSR began to reduce its services to MRICI and
otherwise began engaging in conduct detrimental to MRICI. (TR Vol. II at 1176: 19-1180:7.)
Consequently, MRIA requested SARMC to intervene and return radiologist service to its
previous, professional level:
The time has come for SARMC to insist on and provide full, suppm1ive
radiologic coverage of the lab at historica1levels of professionalism and service ..
. . [Such coverage] cannot be allowed to be withdrawn simply because the
radiologists of the lab are now also its competitors. The highest standard of care
for patients is essential and includes having radiologists on site to supervise
studies as needed. We now view as a necessity SARMC's providing the lab with
full, supportive, traditional radiologist coverage or permitting the MRI Center of
Idaho to contract directly with radiologists as a fiduciary responsibility of
SARMC to its other general and limited partners.
(Trial Ex. 4137 at 2 attached as Reply App. Ex. H; see also TR Vol. II at 1176:19-1180:7.)
SARMC, although still a partner in MRIA, never responded to MRIA's request. (TR Vol. II at
1182:9-14.) Indeed, as SARMC's relationship with GSR in IMI intensified, the GSR
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radiologists became bolder in their unfair tactics by (1) unilaterally reducing weekday hours at
MRICI, while increasing IMI's hours of service for its MRI modality, and (2) cancelling all
weekend support to MRICI, except for emergency cases. (See, Trial Ex. 4277 & 4309 at 3A, 2
attached as Reply App. Ex. I and J; TR Vol. II at 1217:11-1219:8; 1653:23-1655:25; 1924:3-20;
2195:2-7; 2392:5-24) Consequently, MRIA lost a substantial portion of its scan volume to IMI.
(TR Vol. II at 2633:8-2634:4; 2742:13-2743:6; 2796:15-2797:1; 2877:25-2878:3; Trial Ex. 4247
at 13, Trial Ex. 4519 attached as Ex. D to the Appendix to MRIA's opening brief.) Again,
SARMC refused to help because by supporting IMI, it was supporting itself. (TR Vol. II at
1871 :8-9.)

viii.

SARMC Refused to Allow MRIA to Contract with Other
Radiologists.

After usurping MRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR in IMI, SARMC then helped
further destroy MRIA's business by forcing MRIA to have its images read by its competitor,
GSR (one ofthe owners ofiMI), thereby allowing MRIA's competitor to interface with MRIA's
referring physicians. (Trial Ex. 4137 at 2, attached as Reply Ex. H; TR Vol. II at 1488:8-1489:3.)
When MRIA requested SARMC's permission to "contract directly with radiologists" who were
not MRIA's competitors, SARMC, although still a partner in MRIA, ignored such requests. (TR
Vol. II at 1175:23-1176:11, 1182:9-14; Trial Ex. 4137, attached as Reply App. Ex. H.)
Essentially, SARMC insisted on using the fox to guard the henhouse.

ix.

SARMC Moved an IMI Magnet Onto Its Campus and
Ordered SARMC Physicians to Use IMI Instead of MRIA.

SARMC delivered a one-two death blow by opening an IMI magnet on its campus next
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to MRICI and by issuing a written mandate to all of its employees, including referring
physicians, directing that all patients be sent to the IMI magnet rather than to MRICI. (TR Vol.
II at 2173:21-24; Trial Ex. 4377, attached as Reply App. Ex. K.) This mandate along with
SARMC's other misconduct, reduced the MRICI business ofMRIA to an almost bankrupt
company. (Trial Ex. 4519, attached as Ex. D to the Appendix to MRIA's opening brief.)

4.

SARMC's "Scorched Earth Scenario."

Among the evidence before the trial court when ruling on MRIA's motion was the
statement by SARMC's consultant that "SARMC has referred to [withdrawal from MRIA] as
their 'scorched earth scenario."' (Trial Ex. 4239 at 11; R. Vol. IX at 2116-18). This "scorched
earth scenario," as demonstrated by the evidence, was the strategy that SARMC ultimately
pursued in its relationship with MRIA. The fact that SARMC referred to the strategy as the
"scorched earth scenario" is very telling concerning SARMC's state of mind. It establishes that
SARMC's withdrawal and competition with its partners was done willfully, deliberately,
maliciously and with the intent to harm MRIA.

5.

6

SARMC's Conduct Constitutes an Extreme Deviation from Normal
Standards of Conduct.

SARMC erroneously asserts that there was no evidence that SARMC's conduct
constituted an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct. Contrary to SARMC's
assertion, the evidence set forth above and set forth more fully in MRIA's opening brief,
6

That the trial court went out of its way to prevent the jury from being prejudiced is
demonstrated by the trial court's decision, after it ruled upon MRIA's motion, to exclude from
the jury any reference to "scorched earth." This fact belies SARMC's arguments that the trial
court allowed MRIA to prejudice the jury.
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demonstrates that SARMC took numerous actions that were extreme deviations from reasonable
standards of conduct. The evidence shows that in addition to its wrongful withdrawal, SARMC
undertook a course of conduct intended to inflict the greatest harm possible on MRIA. Indeed, it
is axiomatic that it was an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct among
partners for a partner like SARMC to breach its contractual and fiduciary duties by competing
with its fellow partners and seeking to run those fellow partners out of business for the purpose
of reaping higher profits for itself. That, however, is exactly what SARMC did in the instant
case.
Furthermore, it must be noted that SARMC objected to MRIA's expert, Professor
Branson, on the grounds that whether SARMC's conduct was an extreme deviation from
reasonable standards of care was not a proper subject for expert testimony. (R., Ex. 73 at 9.)
The trial court agreed and excluded Professor Branson's testimony. (R. Vol. VII at 1317-1323.)
Nevertheless, the trial court had that testimony when it ruled on MRIA's motion. (R., Ex. 48.)
Professor Branson, after reviewing the evidence of SARMC's shocking conduct,
concluded that SARMC's misconduct constituted an extreme deviation from normal standards of
conduct followed by pm1ners, and that the actions of SARMC were taken with a professional
disregard for their consequences to MRIA. (ld

at~~

17-28.) Specifically Professor Branson

opined that:
• SARMC knowingly engaged in conduct that was an extreme deviation
from the standards of conduct partners owe in a partnership in that it
repeatedly served the best interests of competitors (IMI, ICR, and
SARG/GSR) rather than the best interests of the MRIA Partnership, of
which it was a partner.
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• SARMC engaged in a fm1her extreme departure from the applicable
pm1nership standard of conduct by its wrongful dissociation, without any
colorable grounds therefor, and despite warnings from atlthoritative
sources (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Shattuck Hammond Partners) that such
a dissociation would be wrongful.
• SARMC further departed from the applicable partnership standard of
conduct by efforts to dissociate from the partnership in bad faith,
apparently attempting to inflict harm on the MRlA pru1nership and the
other partners therein by, inter alia, wrongfully demanding immediate
payment for its partnership interest; preparing a portable MRI unit pad in
the SARMC parking lot; threatening to restrict MRICI's access to the
SARMC DR server and PACS systems, which required MRICI to build its
own PACS/RIS system; condoning or facilitating the curtailment of
services and availability of SARG/GSR radiologists at MRICI;
simultaneously condoning or facilitating the expansion of services and
availability of SARG/GSR physicians at the competing IMI facilities; and
in general pursuing what it termed a "scorched earth" approach to its
attempted dissociation.
• In addition to having departed from the standards of conduct which govern
partners in a partnership, SARMC violated the express provisions of the
MRIA Partnership Agreement by its attempted withdrawal from the MRIA
Partnership without any colorable grounds, or any grounds at all, therefor.
• SARMC violated the express provisions of the MRIA Prutnership Agreement by
competing, alone and through its affiliate, IMI, with the MRIA Partnership, in
violation of the express covenant not to compete contained in the MRIA
Partnership Agreement.
• SARMC usurped a pru1nership opportunity, and aided and abetted the usurpation
of a partnership opportunity by another, in providing inf01mation technology,
telecommunications, records storage and retrieval, human resources, experienced
personnel and other services, without distinction between MRI and non-MRI
lines of business, to the IMI 9111 and Myttle diagnostic imaging facility in Boise,
Idaho.
• Similarly, SARMC usmped a second partnership oppmtunity, and aided and
abetted the usurpation of a partnership opportunity by another, in providing
information technology, telecommunications, records storage and retrieval,
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human resources, expelienced personnel and other setvices, without distinction
between MRI and non-MRI lines ofbusiness to the diagnostic inlaging facility in
Melidian, Idaho.
(ld.

at~~

17-23.) Professor Branson further found that SARMC engaged in a "radical and

extreme departure from the standards applicable to dealings between or among partners when it
made affirmative misrepresentations, told half-truths, or dissembled, to its fellow partners, either
in response to inquiries fmm its partners, or on its own volition." (!d.

at~

27.) Professor

Branson then testified to the following as examples of such misrepresentations:
• SARMC [represented it] would not support MRI operations at IMI LLC
when in fact it did, over a period of several years.
• SARMC [represented it] had no plans for participation in any Meridian,
Idaho diagnostic imaging facility, when it in fact did have plans.
• SARMC not only failed to disclose but actively concealed its commitment
to pursue a Meridian, Idaho facility in connection with !MI.
• Dissembled regarding the undisclosed service by key SARMC employees
on the boards of managers, or of partners, respectively, of the competing
entitles, IMI and MRIA, in the latter of which SARMC was a partner.
• Failed to disclose to its partners the provision of confidential MRIA
financial information to potential third party investors or putative lenders to
SARMC.
• Misrepresented the affiliate status ofiMI once SARMC had become a
signatory to the IMI Operating Agreement, with 3 of 6 SARMC managers
on the MI Board ofManagers.
• Did not accurately disclose the extent of its $2.1 million investment and the
use (commingling) of the investment in support ofiMI's MRI as well as its
non-MRI lines of business.
(/d.) This testimony supp01ts the strong evidence that MRIA presented which demonstrated that
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SARMC's conduct constituted an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of care.

6.

SARMC's Conduct was at Least as Egregious as Conduct Found by this
Court to be Sufficient to Support a Claim for Punitive Damages.

Despite SARMC's protestation that its conduct was nothing more than a breach of
contract, the totality of the evidence demonstrates that its conduct was much more egregious.
Indeed, the conduct was at least as egregious as conduct found by this Court to be sufficient to
support a claim for punitive damages. For example, in Rockefeller v. Grabow, this Court
sustained an award of punitive damages in a commercial dispute where a realtor was "working
actively against [his clients'] interests" and favored one client to the detriment of another
"thereby violating his fiduciary duty to the Grabows." 136 Idaho 637, 647, 39 P.3d 577, 587
(2001). Here, SARMC's conduct was more egregious in that SARMC not only favored IMI over
its pat1ners in MRIA, it actively conspired to compete against, and ultimately destroy, MRIA
while still a partner in MRIA.
In General Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co.,132 Idaho 849, 854, 979 P.2d 1207,
1212 ( 1999), this Court discussed with approval two Court of Appeals cases affirming punitive
damage awards under less egregious facts. The first case, Cuddy Mountain Concrete Inc. v.
Citadel Constr., Inc., 121 Idaho 220 824 P.2d 151 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) involved a breach of
contract claim between a general contractor (Citadel) and a subcontractor (Cuddy Mountain).
Citadel terminated the contract without giving Cuddy Mountain the required seven-day written
notice. The Court of Appeals "determined that the following behavior by Citadel constituted
oppressive conduct sufficient to support an award of punitive damages: (l) the evidence showed

17

004434

that Citadel's decision to terminate 'was conceived in frustration and consummated in anger' and
there was no evidence that Citadel gave any thought to the consequences of its decision; (2) the
termination in fact caused financial hardship to Cuddy Mountain; (3) Citadel refused to pay the
balance Cuddy Mountain demanded for the work it had performed; and (4) following
termination, Citadel altered certain daily reports which had been prepared prior to the
termination." General Auto Parts,132 Idaho at 854, 979 P.2d at 1212 (citing Cuddy Mountain,
121 Idaho at 227~28, 824 P.2d at 158-59.) Here, SARMes actions were more egregious than
Citadel's. Whereas Citadel's actions were consummated in anger, SARMC's actions were cool,
deliberate and premeditated. Whereas Citadel's actions were taken without regard to the
consequences, SARMC conducted itself with full knowledge of, but with intentional and willful
disregard for, the consequences of its actions, taking a "scorched eat1h" approach.
The second case the Com1 discussed with approval is Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 682
P .2d 1282 (Ct.App.1984). In Davis, the Gages sold real property to the Davises so that Davises
could build a restaurant/tavern. /d. at 737-38, 682 P.2d at 1284-85. As pat1 ofthe sale, the
Gages agreed not to open a competing business on nearby property owned by the Gages. /d.
The Gages, in violation of the noncompete agreement, opened a competing business and tore
down the Davises' billboard advertising their restaurant. Id At trial, the Davises were awarded
nominal damages and punitive damages. The Gage's appealed arguing, among other things, that
punitive damages may not be awarded in a breach of contract case. Id. at 739; 682 P.2d at 1286.
The Com1 of Appeals rejected the argument holding that:
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The district court stated that it could "imagine no clearer case of a
violation of the intent expressed by the noncompetition clause in
the original agreement." Nor can we. The covenant not to compete
was clear and unambiguous. The Gages' conduct was, according to
the district court, "willful, wanton, malicious and the proper
subject for punitive damages."

!d. Likewise, in the instant case, the covenant not to compete was clear and unambiguous and
SARMC's conduct was willful and deliberate. However, the relationship between SARMC and
MRIA was far closer than the relationship between the Gage's and the Davises. When compared
to the Gages conduct against a purchaser, SARMC's conduct was more egregious as it was
aimed at the partners to whom SARMC owed a duty of trust and fidelity. Despite such duty,
SARMC took conscious acts aimed at promoting, establishing and operating a competing
business in violation of the partnership's non-compete agreement and aimed at destroying MRIA
or otherwise hindering MRIA 's ability to compete.
Thus, SARMC's conduct clearly justifies submitting the issue of punitive damages to the
jury as that conduct was at least as, if not more, egregious than conduct found by this Comt to be
sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. SARMC deliberately and with conscious
disregard for the consequences of its actions, competed with its partners in MRIA and took other
actions which caused the destruction of MRIA's business.

7.

The Court Did Not Exercise Reasoned Judgment When It Refused to Submit
the Issue of Punitive Damages to the Jury.

Because there was substantial evidence that SARMC willfully and deliberately violated
its contractual and fiduciary duties with conscious disregard for the legal right of MRIA, the trial
court did not exercise reasoned judgment when it refused to submit the issue of punitive damages
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to the jury. Student Loan Fund ofIdaho Inc. v. Duerner, 131 Idaho 45, 52, 951 P.2d 1272, 1279
(1998). Additionally, the trial court's contradictory statements conceming the evidence
demonstrate that the trial court failed to exercise reason when it refused to submit the issue. It is
true that when MRIA renewed its motion at the close of the evidence, the trial court denied the
motion stating that MRIA did not prove the necessary conduct with clear and convincing
· evidence. (TR Vol. III at 4261: 18-4262:2.) That decision, however, is directly contradicted by
the trial court's comment on the evidence at the hearing on SARMC's motion for a new trial.
But this court listened to overwhelming evidence that the executive
management team at Saint Alphonsus really blatantly ignored the
partnership rights of a patiner. I think the evidence that came in
was clear and convincing. I think that's just what was out there
through the discovery process over many years. It was
demonstrated to this jury that Saint Alphonsus chose to compete
directly/indirectly with a partner. And the jury so found.

(Jd. at 4471:9-17 (emphasis added).) This finding that MRIA proved with "clear and
convincing" evidence that SARMC "blatantly ignored the partnership rights of pattner" by
competing with MRIA supports an award of punitive damages. Furthermore, this finding, which
came after further reflection upon the evidence by the trial comt, is consistent with the
substantial evidence produced at trial as illustrated above and proves that the trial court failed to
exercise reasoned judgment when it refused to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury.
Consequently, the trial court's refusal to submit the issue to the jury should be reversed in the
event the Comt grants SARMC a new trial.

B.

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing MRIA's Antitrust Claims.
The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor ofSARMC dismissing
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MRIA' s antitrust counterclaims. (See R. Vol. V, at 905-946; R. Vol. XI at 2077-81 ). As
previously discussed in MRIA's opening brief, the trial court wrongly held that MRIA lacked
standing because it had not suffered an "antitrust injury." This Court should also reject
SARMC's alternative theories that SARMC's actions increased competition, or that a jury would
be unable to conclude that SARMC had the ability to achieve monopoly power.

1.

Standard of Review.

On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, the Court employs the same
standard used by the district judge originally ruling on the motion. Intermountain Eye and Laser

Centers, P.L.L.C. v.lvfiller, 142 Idaho 218, 222, 127 P.3d 121, 125 (2005). Summary judgment
is proper only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 778, 133 P.3d 1240, 1243 (2006);
I.R.C.P. 56(c). The facts must be liberally construed and all inferences will be drawn in favor of
the non-moving party. Fenn, 142 Idaho at 778, 133 P.3d at 1243. The Court reviews the record
before the district court, including the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, if any, to
determine de novo whether, after construing the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, there exists any genuine issues of material fact. Woodland Furniture, LLC v.

Larsen, 142 Idaho 140, 143, 124 P.3d 1016, 1019 (2005).
2.

Under Idaho Law, MRIA Did Not Need to Show Harm to Competition as a
Whole or Monopoly Power to Assert Its Antitrust Claims.

As noted in MRIA 's opening brief, Idaho law, as set forth in Twin Falls Farm & City

Distributing, Inc. v. D & B Supply Co, 96 Idaho 351,528 P.2d 1286 (1974), does not require a
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showing of"market injury" and "market power" to sustain an antitrust claim. In, Twin Falls, the
Court ultimately held that a fiduciary's breach of loyalty, combined with a third-party's
knowledge of and assistance in that breach, constituted anticompetitive conduct in violation of
Idaho's antitrust laws. The Court did not require a showing of market injury or market power.
The facts of Twin Falls are similar to the facts of the instant case. In Twin Falls, the
manager of the plaintiffs retail store pursued an opportunity to join the defendant's competing
store. Id at 353, 528 P.2d at 1288. During this time, the defendant knew that the manager
worked for the plaintiffs store. /d. The manager assisted the defendant with a lease
opportunity, knowing this would give the defendant a competitive advantage over the plaintiff.

Id The manager was hired to manage the defendant's store, and they worked together to take
over the plaintiffs prime location. /d. As a result, the plaintiff lost its location, a portion of its
customer base, and some of its employees. /d. at 353-354, 528 P.2d at 1288-1289. Overturning
the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Idaho Supreme Comi
determined that the manager breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff and that this breach, with
the defendant's knowledge and assistance, amounted to anticompetitive conduct in violation of
Idaho's antitrust laws. /d. at 356-360,528 P.2d at 1291-1295. ·
As with the manager and defendant in Twin Falls, SARMC's conduct also constitutes a
violation ofldaho's antitrust laws .. Like the manager in Twin Falls, SARMC breached its
fiduciary duties. (R. Vol. XII at 2296.) Like the manager and defendant in Twin Falls, SARMC
and IMI worked together to create a competing entity while disparaging MRIA, (R. Conf. Ex. I
at 7, Exhibit PP thereto), and providing advantages to the competing entity, IMI. (R. Conf. Ex. 1
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at 3, Exhibit Hand at 7, Exhibit 00 thereto.) Consistent with the rationale outlined in Twin

Falls, this conduct not only constitutes a breach of loyalty/fiduciary duty on SARMC's part, but
also constitutes a violation of antitrust laws by both SARMC and IMI.
In Twin Falls this Court did not require the plaintiff to show evidence of a market-wide
injury, as required by the district court in the instant case. Instead, this Court found it sufficient
that the plaintiff was injured by the conspiracy to drive the plaintiff out of business. Twin Falls.
at 359, 528 P.2d at 1294. Here, there was ample evidence presented to the trial court that
SARMC and IMI conspired to drive MRIA out of business. Such evidence is sufficient to
sustain an antitrust claim under this Court's decision in Twin Falls.
Notably, SARMC did not even address Twin Falls in its brief. Instead, SARMC focused
on federal cases and the requirements of federal law. SARMC apparently hopes that this Court
will ignore its prior holding in Twin Falls. The decision in Twin Falls, however, cannot be
ignored because it remains controlling law in Idaho and because MRIA's claim was made under
Idaho, not federal, law. (R., Vol. Vat 905-946.) Therefore, because MRIA's antitrust claims
were sufficient under T·win Falls, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment against
MRIA on those claims.

3.

Even if MRIA Was Required to Show Harm to Competition as Whole,
MRIA Satisfied that Requirement.

Even if the requirements of federal case law are applicable, MRIA has satisfied those
requirements. According to federal case law, a private plaintiff has standing to bring an antitrust
action if, among other things, it asserts an antitrust injury. Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 793,
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797 (2nd Cir. 1994). The purpose of antitrust laws is to protect the public by keeping the
channels of competition free. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Fed Power Com 'n., 193 F.2d
230 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Therefore, it has been said that a plaintiff shows an "antitrust injmy" when
it shows harm to competition as a whole. See New York Medscan LLC v. New York Univ. Sch. of

Med., 430 F. Supp. 2d 140, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A plaintiff shows such harm to competition by
alleging adverse effects on the price, quality, or output of the relevant good or service. See id.
Contrary to the district comt's holding and SARMC's argument, MRIA presented ample
evidence establishing such adverse effects on the local MRI services market.
MRIA alleged facts showing broadly that SARMC's tactics had market-wide effects
beyond merely impacting MRIA's own profits. Compare with Brunswick C01p. v. Pueblo

Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,97 S.Ct. 690 (1977). These tactics, which are more fully
delineated in MRIA's opening brief(Respondent's Brief at 72-74, n. 47), include making
misleading reports to the referring physician community, providing lower levels of service to
MRIA patients, receiving higher prices for comparable goods and services, and directing patients
away from MRIA's facilities. MRIA outlined a number of ways that SARMC's tactics caused
an antitrust injury, including reducing patient care (R. Vol. Vat 905-46 at~~ 40, 68, 127);
increasing price (id.

at~~

66, 127), and decreasing the output of medical imaging (id.

at~

72).

MRIA also submitted an affidavit and report from its economic expert, Edward Whitelaw,
stating a number of ways in which SARMC's actions increased price and harmed competition in
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7

the market. (R., Ex. 144). Whitelaw opined in a similar manner in his deposition. (R., Ex. 104
at Ex. D, p. 50: 14-23; see also R., Ex.ll 0 at Ex. A, p. 2-14; R., Ex. 143 at 2, Ex. A thereto at
8

12). Construing these facts in favor ofMRIA, as the Court must, this evidence is more than
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that an antitrust injury had occun-ed. Contrary
to SARMC's arguments, these facts reflect an injury to the competitive market, not merely to
MRIA as a competitor in the market.
SARMC nevertheless argues that the Court should affitm the summary judgment because
its activities increased competition by causing IMI to join the market. (Cross-Respondent's Brief
at 45-47). The facts and evidence submitted to the trial court establishes that the opposite
actually occurred. As discussed above, MRIA demonstrated that SARMC's activities damaged,
rather than increased, competition in the market. Moreover, SARMC's conduct was "without

1

To the extent that the district court reasoned that Whitelaw's report did not sufficiently show a
"market wide injury," the couti itself hampered MRIA's ability to prove market-wide injury
when it ruled that MRI providers in the relevant market would not be required to produce any
records ofMRI scans. (R. Vol. III at 557-60). That decision prevented MRIA from presenting
relevant evidence concerning harm in the market. (SeeR., Ex. 110, Exhibit A at 2-3). The trial
court cannot complain about lack of evidence when a decision of the trial comi prevented MRIA
from obtaining that evidence. See Vaught v. Dairy/and Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 357, 363,956 P.2d
674, 680 (1998) (recognizing that it may be an abuse discretion to deny the discovery of critical
information unavailable from another source).
8

The fact that SARMC's expert disputed Whitelaw's opinion does not support the trial court's
decision to grant summary judgment because summary judgment is inappropriate when
reasonable minds come to different conclusions. Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v.
Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 870, 993 P .2d 1197, 1201 ( 1999) ("If reasonable minds might come
to different conclusions, summary judgment is inappropriate."); Watts v. Lynn, 125 Idaho 341,
346 870 P.2d 1300, 1305 (1994) (recognizing prior decisions holding that summary judgment is
inappropriate where conflicting testimony from experts is presented).
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legitimate business purpose" for it was only to eliminate competition, and not to increase
competition. Gen. Indus. Cmp. v. Hartz Mountain Cmp., 810 F.2d 795,804 (8th Cir. 1987). As
the Supreme Court has said, "[i]f a firm has been 'attempting to exclude rivals on some basis
other than efficiency,' it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory." Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 472 U.S. 585,605, 105 S.Ct. 2847,2859 (1985) (citation

omitted).
Gen. Indus. Cmp., 810 F.2d 795, is illustrative. In that case, the plaintiff had been a non-

exclusive distributor of the defendant's products for a number of years. !d. at 798. In order to
meet a request made by one of the plaintiffs retail customers, the plaintiffbegan to distribute
competing products as well. !d. at 798-99. These products were of comparable quality for a
lower price. ld. at 798. As a result, the defendant began enforcing a contract provision limiting
credit to the plaintiff, despite years of waiving the provision. !d. at 798-99. The defendant also
began supplying orders that were short-shipped or otherwise inaccurate, causing friction between
the plaintiff and its retail customers. Id. at 799. Ultimately, the defendant terminated the
contract and began heavily advertising on behalf of the plaintiffs closest competitor. !d. The
Court held that these actions were not reasonably gauged to promote competition based upon the
quality of the products or the efficiency of the companies, but instead that the defendant
"invoked its considerable market power to cause superior competing products to fait to reach
retail shelves, preempting any opportunity for the consumer to make a real choice." Id. at 804.
That is precisely what happened in this case. SARMC's tactics, including making
misleading reports to the referring physician community, (R. Conf. Ex. 1 at 7, Exhibit PP
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thereto), providing lower levels of service to MRI Center patients, (R. Conf. Ex. 1 at 7, Exhibit
00 thereto), directing patients away from MRIA's facilities, (R. Conf. Ex. 1 at 7, Exhibit LL and

Ex. 143 at 2, Exhibit B thereto), and preventing SARMC affiliated doctors from having the
ability to digitally review MRIA reports while allowing such doctors access to IMI repmts (Tr.
Vol. II, 2437: 10~ 2439:17); were designed to prevent MRIA's comparable lower-priced servic~s
from reaching the public and preempting any opportunity for the consumer to make a real
choice. 9 The facts and evidence establish that SARMC's conduct with respect to IMI was
predatory and not for a legitimate business purpose to increase competition, as SARMC would
have this Comt believe.

4.

MRIA Has Not Conceded Its Antitrust Argument.

To the extent that SARMC argues that MRIA is precluded from making an antitrust
argument because it "concedes" that competition was the actionable conduct (CrossRespondent's Brief at 46-47), the argument is erroneous and misplaced. SARMC cites to a
footnote in MRIA's opening brief where MRIA discussed SARMC's irrelevant citations to
antitrust cases in a discussion ofMRIA damages for SARMC's breaches of contract and
fiduciary duties. (Respondent's Brief at 45 n. 30). SARMC also notes a portion ofMRIA's brief
where MRIA discussed SARMC's promotion of certain technology for IMI which placed IMI in

9

Because MRIA showed damage to the competitive market, SARMC's argument that its
behavior merely constitutes a "business tort" and not anticompetitive conduct is inapposite.
(Cross-Respondent's Response, at 46-47). See Conwood Co., L.P. v. US. Tobacco Co. 290 F.3d
768, 783 -784 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that business torts do not constitute anticompetitive
conduct absent a "significant and more than a temporat'y effect on competition").
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a better competitive position. (Respondent's Brief at 9). SARMC takes these comments out of
context.
In its opening brief, SARMC argued that there had been no showing that its breaches of
fiduciary duty, breaches of the

non~compete

agreement, tortious interference and bad faith

caused "lost scan" damage to MRIA. (Appellant's Brief at 31-36). Citing to antitrust cases,
SARMC suggested that MRIA was required to prove "what proportion of the scans that migrated
from MRIA to IMI did so as a result of Saint Alphonsus's alleged misconduct, as opposed to
other causes, such as IMI's entry into the competitive marketplace." !d. at 31. MRIA countered
this argument by stating that (1) IMI and SARMC were one in the same, (2) SARMC was a
partner in IMI, (3) IMI entered the market with SARMC's assistance, and that (4) SARMC and
GSR conspired to shift scans from MRIA to IMI. (Respondent Brief at 41-47.)
In the specitic portions of its Respondent's Brief noted above, MRIA further argued that
SARMC was inappropriately conflating antitrust arguments with breach of fiduciary duty/breach
of contract arguments. MRIA explained that in the latter cases, to prove causation a plaintiff
need only show the defendant competed in violation of some agreement or duty and acquired
customers that were historically customers of the plaintiff. Vancil v. Anderson, 7l Idaho 95, 105,
227 P .2d 74, 79 ( 1951) (holding that to prove causation in a non-compete case, the ·evidence
must show that "plaintiff business suffered a loss of profits by reason of its patrons and
customers trading with defendant"). MRIA contrasted this with antitrust cases, where the
plaintiff must show that the damages came from an antitrust injury rather than competition by
itself. Pope, 103 Idaho at 233-34, 646 P.2d at

1004~05

(1982); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of
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Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S~ 104, 116, 107 S.Ct. 484, 492 (1986). MRIA's comments in its brief
that "competition was the actionable conduct" (Respondent's Brief at 45, n. 30) and that
SARMC had given IMI a competitive edge (/d. at 9), merely clarified, contrary to SARMC's
assertions otherwise, that competition is the appropriate source of the damages in breach of
fiduciary duty/breach of contract cases.
Those arguments are not incompatible with MRIA's antitrust claims. SARMC did not
enhance competition by assisting IMI's entry into the market. Instead, SARMC destroyed
competition. As demonstrated in Part I.A.4.b.i through Patt I.A.4.b.ix above, SARMC used its
considerable market power (i.e., its relationship with referring physicians) to destroy MRIA's
business in favor of IMI. SARMC acted "without legitimate business purpose'' to eliminate
competition and it did so through predatory behavior. Gen. Indus. Corp., 810 F.2d at 804; Aspen

Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 605, 105 S.Ct. at 2859. Thus, whereas it was SARMC's competition
with MRIA that caused MRIA damages for purposes ofMRIA's non-antitntst claims, it was the
way that competition was conducted that gives rise to MRIA's antitrust claim and injury. The
claims are not incompatible.

5.

Even if MRIA Was Required to Present Evidence of Market Power to

Sustain its Antitrust Claims, MRIA Satisfied that Requirement.
Although not required for MRIA to proceed on its Idaho law based antitrust claims,
MRIA presented ample evidence that SARMC/IMI had the ability to achieve monopoly power in
the provision ofMRI services. To succeed on an attempted monopolization claim, a plaintiff
must show that there is a dangerous probability that the defendant will achieve "monopoly
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power." Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,456, 113 S.Ct. 884, 891 (1993);

Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 893 (9th Cir. 2008); Pope v.
Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217,229,646 P.2d 988, 1000 (1982). "Monopoly power is
the 'power to control prices or exclude competition' in the relevant market." Image Technical

Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing United States
v. E./. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,391,76 S.Ct. 994, 1005 (1956)).
To determine whether a defendant is dangerously close to obtaining monopoly power, "it
is necessary for the court to measure and evaluate the degree of market power which the
defendant possesses." Pope, 103 Idaho at 229, 646 P.2d at 1000. In determining whether there
is a dangerous probability of monopolization, courts "consider the relevant market and the
defendant's ability to lessen or destroy competition in that market." Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S.
at 456, 113 S.Ct. at 891. "[D]emonstrating the dangerous probability of monopolization in an
attempt case ... requires inquiry into the relevant product and geographic market and the
defendant's economic power in that market." /d. Monopoly power is often referred to as
"market power," and can be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Image Technical

Services, 125 F.3d at 1202.
MRIA presented evidence of market power through the affidavit, report, and deposition
testimony of its economics expert, Mr. Whitelaw. Specifically, MRIA showed that as IMI's
market share was increasing, its prices rose above the market for the same services. (R., Ex. 144
at~

2-4; R., Ex. 110 at Ex. A, p. 2; R., Ex. 104 at Ex. D, p. 50: 1-23). In his affidavit Mr.

Whitelaw presented evidence that:

30

004447

•

"IMI increased its market share while receiving higher payments for patient
seeking similar services of comparable quality." (R., Ex. 144 at ~ 2).

•

"My analysis revealed that IMI's market share steadily increased over time and
will likely continue to increase. (Id. at~ 3).

•

"I concluded that during 2001·2006, IMI received higher payments for providing
services of comparable quality to similar patients relative to those received by
other sellers. Higher payments coupled with increasing market share indicated
that IMI possesses and has exercised market power in the relevant market." (Id.
at~ 4).

In his report, Mr. Whitelaw made the following germane statements:
•

"Based on our analysis ... the market share of the IMI·SADC imaging
pat1nership increased from approximately 21·23 percent in 2001 to approximately
44-53 percent in 2006. Based on these results I conclude that the partnership has
a dangerous probability of achieving a monopoly share of the relevant market, if
they have not already done so. (R., Ex. 110 at Exhibit A, p. 2; see also id. at 7-12
for suppotting data).

•

"I conclude that the IMI·SADC imaging palinership has harmed competition in
the relevant market by receiving higher-than-market rates from taking MRI scans
relative to what these rates would have been in the absence of such
anticompetitive behavior. (/d. at 2; see also id. at 13·14 for supporting data)

Mr. Whitelaw also made these points in his deposition. (R., Ex. l04 at Ex. D, p. 50:1-23.) 10

10

SARMC attacks the strength and reliability ofMr. Whitelaw's analysis and conclusions.
(Cross-Respondent's Brief, p. 52·53). This is an inappropriate argument in the review of a
summary judgment decision~ where the facts must be liberally construed and all inferences will
be drawn in favor ofMRIA, the non-moving party. Fenn, 142 Idaho at 778, 133 P.3d at 1243.
Furthermore, SARMC's contentions are incorrect. SARMC argues that Mr. Whitelaw's
report does not take into account the actual prices charged to consumers. On the contrary, Mr.
Whitelaw's repott indicates that he "calculat[ed] the statistical relationship between the amounts
paid by [an insurance provider] for MRI scans provided by IMI and all other providers." (R., Ex.
104 at Ex. G, p. 13). SARMC also argues that Mr. Whitelaw's report inappropriately excluded
data from another market participant, St. Luke's. On the contrary, Mr. Whitelaw's repott
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a.

Exclusive Output Is Not the Exclusive Fot·m of Direct Evidence to
Prove Market Power.

The combination of the trends of increasing market share and higher prices is dire<?t
evidence that SARMC could and did control prices in the market. SARMC nevertheless argues
that MRIA was required to present evidence of"restricted output, to show direct evidence of
market power. Restricted output refers to circumstances where, by restricting its own output, a
predatot· in the market restricts market-wide output and thereby increases market prices. Rebel
Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). SARMC relies on

Ninth Circuit cases which state that direct proof of market power "may be shown by evidence of
restricted output and supracompetitive prices." Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467,
1475 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). 11 See Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51
F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995).
"The defining characteristic of direct evidence is that it demonstrates actual injury to
competition." In re Abbott Laboratories Norvir Anti-Trust Litigation, 562 F.Supp.2d 1080,
1086 (N.D.Cal. 2008). As such, it is absurd to read the Ninth Circuit cases cited above as
dictating the only type of acceptable direct evidence of the injurious exercise of market power to
indicates that he made his calculation both with St. Luke's data inserted and without, and that
both sets of data indicate that IMI received higher payments. /d. (Indeed, removing the St.
Luke's data is to IMI's benefit, because it suggests that overpayment to IMI was not as
egregious).
11

In Forsyth, the Ninth Circuit stated that a mere increase in price is not sufficient to show that a
defendant has market powet·. Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1476. Unlike Forsyth, however, MRIA has
shown more than an increase in price. It has shown both IMI's increasing market share and a
contemporaneous increase in price as that market share has grown.
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be restricted output. Id. As the United States Supreme Court has said, "'proof of actual
detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output,' can obviate the need for an inquiry into
market power, which is but a 'surrogate for detrimental effects."' F. T C. v. Indiana Federation

of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,460-461, 106 S.Ct 2009,2019 (1986) (citing 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust
Law~

1511, p. 429 ( 1986) (emphasis added).)
This illustrative example by the Supreme Court does not limit the kinds of direct proof

that might exist. While high pl'ices in conjunction with reduced output are one way of showing
market power, it is not the exclusive means of proving actual detrimental effects in the market.
Contrary to SARMC's argument, an increase in prices above the competitive level, as presented
by MRIA, may establish that monopoly power exists. See U.S. v. lvficrosoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,
51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (when evidence shows that firm has in fact profitably raised prices above
competitive level, monopoly power exists); American Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians

and Surgeons v. American Bd of Podiatric Surge1y, Inc., 185 F.3d 606, 623 (6th Cir. 1999)
("The price difference, coupled with the larger market share, supports plaintiffs claim of
monopoly power by [the defendant]." (Emphasis added)); Natsource LLC v. GFI Group, Inc.,
332 F. Supp. 2d 626,635 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Market share is just a way of estimating market
power, which is the ultimate consideration. When there are better ways to estimate market
power, the court should use them. These ways include a contemporaneous rise in price with
increased market share." (Internal citations omitted and emphasis added).)
As noted above, "[m]onopoly power is the 'power to control prices or exclude
competition' in the relevant market." Image Technical Services: Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125
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F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997). The proof presented by MRIA of a contemporaneous rise in
price with increased market share is direct and perfectly appropriate evidence that SARMC and
IMI actually exercised monopoly power.

b.

Circumstantial Evidence Is Also Appropriate to Establish Monopoly
Power.

The Court could alternatively hold that Mr. Whitelaw's affidavit, report, and deposition
testimony showing increasing market share and increasing price provides circumstantial
evidence of monopoly power. To demonstrate market power by circumstantial evidence, a
plaintiff must: "(1) define the relevant market,

12

(2) show that the defendant owns a dominant

share of that market, and (3) show that there are significant barriers to entry and show that
existing competitors lack the capacity to increase their output in the short run." Image Technical

Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Rebel Oil, 51
F.3d at 1434.
"A rising [market] share may show more probability of success of achieving [a
monopoly] than a falling share." M & M Medical Supplies and Service, Inc. v. Pleasant Valley

Hosp., Inc., 981 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1992). As the Idaho Supreme Court has said, there is
"no set degree or percentage of market power which must be possessed in order for a defendant
to be dangerously close to achieving a monopoly." Pope, 103 Idaho at 229, 646 P.2d at 1000.

12

A description of the relevant market is contained in Mr. Whitelaw's report. (R., Ex. 110 at Ex.
A at 3-6.) The parties previously used this is the definition of the market (seeR. Vol. IX at
1619), and there is no disagreement on this point on appeal.
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See Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1438, n. 10 (declining to adopt bright-line market percentage rules).
Instead, "the extent of market power must be evaluated in conjunction with prevailing market
conditions, as well as the business policies and perfmmance of the defendant." Pope, 103 Idaho
at 229; see also Theme Proinotions, Inc. v. News America Marketing FSI, 546 F.3d 991,
1002 (9th Cir. 2008) ("We have determined that a 45-70% market share may be enough to
establish a substantial share of the relevant market where it is accompanied by other factors.").
MRIA showed that IMI had a 40 to SO percent market share that was steadily increasing, well
within the range of the "substantial share ofthe relevant market" required by Idaho comis.
Notwithstanding this, SARMC argues that this percentage is insufficient to show market
power in the absence of evidence showing "barriers to entry." Generally, the ability of new
competitors to enter a market is relevant because, if entry is easy, even a firm holding a
commanding percentage of the market cannot charge a price above the competitive price, for
once it does, competitors will enter the market and undercut the firm's price. See United States

v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659,667 (91h Cir. 1990). Barriers to entry are significant because they
"constrain[] the normal operation of the market to the extent that the problem is unlikely to be
self-correcting." Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1439.
In this case, rather than analysis ofhypothetical barriers to entry, the parties and the court
were in a better position to evaluate any barriers to entry in light of the ex post description of the
relevant market, including IMI's

increasi~g

market share and its persistently higher prices for six

years. Despite any net entry that may have occurred (and, indeed, according to SARMC, which
did occur), this failed to offer enough market discipline to eliminate IMI's combination of
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increasing share and higher prices. Cf Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1440-41 ("Barriers may still be
'significant' if the market is unable to correct itself despite the entry of small rivals."). An
estimation of what may prospectively happen through a "barriers to entry" analysis is no
substitute for examining and analyzing what actually did happen. Here, where MRIA showed
that IMI owned an increasing 40 to 50 percent market share and was able to charge higher prices
than the rest of the market for comparable services regardless of entries into the market, MRIA
has shown market power sufficient to survive summary judgment.

II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the trial court's (1) refusal to submit the issue of punitive
damages to the jury should be reversed in the event the Court grants SARMC a new trial because
MRIA proved, through clear and convincing evidence, conduct sufficient to justify an award of
punitive damages and (2) the dismissal ofMRIA's antitrust claims should be reversed in the
event the Court grants SARMC a new trial because MRIA sufficiently assetted an antitrust claim
under both Idaho and federal law.
Dated: January 29, 2009

Respectfully Submitted,

~-~==~
Thomas A. Banducci
Wade L. Woodard
BANDUCCIWOODARDSCHWARTZMANPLLC
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys tbr Respondent
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GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P .A.

950 W. Batu1ock Street, Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601
Attorneys for
Defendants/Counterclaimantsffhird Party
Plaintiff MRI Associates, LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

v.
:MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership,
Defendant.
Case No. CV OC 0408219D

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership,
CounterClahnant,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation;
1
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SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
CounterDefendants.
NJRl ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
INTERMOUNTAIN MEbiCAL Lv1AGING, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
GEM STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; and IMAGING
CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership,
Third-Party Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF PROFESSOR DOUGLAS M. BRANSON
Douglas M. Branson, being first duty sworn, deposes and says:

1. I am theW. Edward Sell Chair in Business Law at the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law and have occupied that position since September 1, 1996.
2. Prior to September 1, 1996, I was a Professor of Law at Seattle University,
Seattle, Washington. I have also been a visiting professor of law at, inter alia, University
of Oregon, Cornell University, and Washington University (St. Louis, Mo.). I was the
Charles Tweedy Distinguished Visiting Professor in Business Law at the University of
Alabama School of Law in 1993 and again in 2003.

3. I reside at 810 St. James Street, Pittsburgh, Petmsylvania 15213, and at 193 Raft
Island, Gig Harbor, Washington 98335.
4. I am a member of the bars of Ohio, Illinois, \Vashington, and Pennsylvania. I
2
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am also admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court and various federal
circuit courts of appeal and district courts.

5. I teach, lecture continuing legal education groups, and consult extensively in the
area of business organizations, including unincorporated entities, business planning,
corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance, comparative corporate
governance, and securities regulation. From time to time, I have also taught the courses in
agency and partnership, bankruptcy and accounting for lawyers.

6. I received my Bachelor of Arts cum laude (Economics) from the University of
Notre Dame in 1965, my Juris Doctor cum laude from Northwestern University in 1970,
and my Master of Laws from the University of Virginia in 1974, where I ranked first in my
class.
7. I am the author of several books and treatises, including DOUGLAS M.
BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Lexis Law Publishing 1993)(with annual
supplements); DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, PROBLEMS IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (Cathedral Press 1997); DOUGLAS M. BRANSON,
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW (Matthew Bender Co. 1999)(2d ed. 2004 )(with
A. Pinto); QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
(LexisNexis 2004); DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, INSIDE THE BOARDROOM (2003);
and DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE (NYU Press 2007).
8. I am the author of approximately sixty law review articles in the areas of

3

004459

business organizations, governance, mergers and acquisitions, and securities regulation,
including articles in Cornell Law Review, Tulane Law Review (2), Vanderbilt Law
Review (2), Emory Law Journal, Northwestern University Law Review (2), Minnesota
Law Review, Journal of Corporate Law, Nebraska Law Review, Fordham Law Review,
Corporate Practice Commentator (3), Maryland Law Review, University of Pittsburgh
Law Review, Cornell International Law Journal, Case Western Reserve Law Review,
Pepperdine Law Review, University of Cincinnati Law Review, South Carolina Law
Review, Southern Methodist Law Review, \Vake Forest Law Review, Arizona State Law
Journal, Washington University Law Quarterly, Oregon Law Review, Securities
Regulation Law Review, and other legal periodicals and journals.
9. In the last 25 years I have lectured continuing legal education and business
groups on issues, practices, and customs in business organizations (partnerships, limited
liability partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability companies, corporations,
professional service corj,orations) and governance and in mergers and acquisitions in
Hawaii, Alaska, California, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida,
Louisiana, and New York. Overseas, I have lectured groups on governance issues and
practices in, inter alia, Spain, France, Belgium, Gennany, South Africa, the United
Kingdom, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Hong Kong.
10. I hold a pennanent appointment as a Senior Fellow at the School of Law,
University of Melbourne, Australia, where for the last thirteen years I have co-taught the
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graduate law offerings Corporate Governance and the Duties of Directors.
11. From 1976 to 1996, I served on, and actively participated in the affairs of, the
Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) Corporate Law Revision Committee. I also
served on the WSBA Securities Law Committee (1986-1994), the WSBA Limited
Partnership Act Revision Committee (1983-85), the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law
Revision Committee (1979-85), and the WSBA Committee to Evaluate the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act (1995-96).
12. I am an elected member of the American Law Institute. I was elected to
membership in 1981. From 1981 to 1994, I was an active participant in the American Law
Institute Corporate Governance Project and a member of the advisory committee which,
periodically, consulted with the Project's reporters.
13. From 2000-2002, I was a United States State Department consultant to the
Republic of Indonesia on business organizations law, governance, capital markets, and
asset securitization reform In 2000, I was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Gent,
Belgium, lecturing on corporate law and corporate governance. In 2003, I was a State
Department consultant to Ukraine, assisting on projects regarding partnerships and law
firm organization. In 2006, I was the Paul Hastings Distinguished Visiting Professor at the
University of Hong Kong, where I lectured, inter alia, at the Hong Kong Futures and
Exchange Commission and the Asian Development Bank on corporate governance. In
2006, I was a consultant to US Steel Corp., lecturing attorneys and executives from Serbia,
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Slovakia, and the United States on U.S. business law.
14. I am being compensated at $400 per hour.
15. In connection with this case, I have reviewed numerous documents, including
court papers (Complaint, Answer and Counterclaim, Scheduling Order, Court's
Memorandum Opinion Finding, inter alia, Wrongful Dissociation); deposition excerpts
(Christopher Anton, Sandra Bruce, Jeffery Cliff, Jack Floyd, Kenneth Fry, Leslie Kelly
Hall, Cindy Schamp, Jeffrey Seaboum, and Patricia Vandenberg); Agreements and Drafts
of Agreements, including term sheets (MRIA Partnership Agreement and First
Amendment thereto; SARG/GSR Exclusive Services Agreement with S.ARJ.\IIC;
Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC Operating Agreement, including several preliminary
drafts; various Term Sheets outlining the terms upon which SARMC would invest in IMI;
Medical Director Employment Agreement; Information Resources Agreement); minutes of
meetings (llvll, 'NIRIA, MRICI, MRIM, SARG/GSR; ICR); consultants reports (Shattuck
Hammond Partners Preliminary Report by Ivf. Finnerty and "Presentation of Strategic
Options" by Shattuck Hammond Partners); letters from attorney and other independent
contractors (Leo Miller, Esq., to Sister Patricia Vandenberg dated :Niarch 5, 1985; Carl W.
Harder, Esq. to Ms. Sandra Bruce dated January 6, 2000; Patrick 1vliller, Esq., to Joseph
Uberuaga II, Esq., July 13, 2000; memorandum from Patti Harneck to Leslie Kelly Hall
dated January 31,2002, re IMI use ofSARi\tlC DR Server; Memorandum from J. Tim
Hall, W>, to !vfRI Center Scheduling Department re "Mission Creep," and miscellaneous
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(SARMC 1122 application for Certificate ofNeed; US Bank documents reproposed 11vll
loan; Power Point Slide Deck Entitled Intermountain Medical Imaging, A Joint Venture
Partnership Between St. Alphonsus Radiology Group and SARMC, dated Nov. 11, 1999;
PricewaterhouseCoopers outlines of SARJvfC Scenarios Nos. 1-5; Restructuring· of MRI
Associates, Discussion Draft dated Nov. 29, 1999; Health Technology Center, Report on
the Future of Medical Imaging II: PACS, August, 2003); SARMC Withdrawal Letter
dated February 24, 2004, and Demand for Payment Letter, dated March 30, 2004;
SARG/GSR correspondence by Jeffrey Seaboum re termination of GSR services at MRICI
and ofMRICI access to DR/Web Ambassador network, and the subsequent reinstatement
. thereof; email from Jeffrey Cliff to Carl Harder, Esq., listing investments SA.ruvlC had
made in 11\tll prior to August 10, 1999.
16. In addition, on Thursday, December 7, 2006, I spent approximately 9 hours at
the law offices of Greener, Banducci Shoemaker, P .A., Boise, Idaho, reviewing
documents, correspondence and deposition excerpts relevant to this case.
17. Based upon my review ofthe foregoing, in my opinion, SARl\1C knowingly
engaged in conduct that was an extreme deviation from the standards of conduct partners
owe in a partnership in that it repeatedly served the best interests of competitors (IMI,
ICR, and SARG/GSR) rather than the best interests of the MRlA Partnership, of which it
was a partner. As an experienced business law practitioner, I would havt: advised SARMC
that, in every instance, over and above what the partnership agreement expressly provided,
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SAruviC' s duty was to serve the best interests of the MRIA partnership and its fellow
participants in the partnership.
18. In my opinion, SAR.i\1C engaged in a further extreme departure from the
applicable partnership standard of conduct by its wrongful dissociation, without any
colorable grounds therefor, and despite warnings from authoritative sources
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, Shattuck Hammond Partners) that such a dissociation would be
wrongful.
19. In my opinion, SAR.i.\IIC further departed from the applicable partnership
standard of conduct by efforts to dissociate from the partnership in bad faith, apparently
attempting to inflict harm on the MRIA partnership and the other partners therein by, inter

alia, wrongfully demanding inunediate payment for its partnership interest; preparing a
portable 1v1RI unit pad in the SARt\1C parking lot; threatening to restrict MRlCI's access
to the SARMC DR server and P ACS. systems, which required MRICI to build its own
P ACSIRlS system; condoning or facilitating the curtailment of services and availability of
SARG/GSR radiologists at .Mru:CI; simultaneously condoning or facilitating the expansion
of services and availability of SARG/GSR physicians at the competing IMI facilities; and

in general pursuing what it termed a "scorched earth" approach to its attempted
dissociation.
20. In addition to having departed from the standards of conduct which govern
partners in a partnership, SAR1\1C violated the express provisions of the MRlA
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Partnership Agreement by its attempted withdrawal from the :rvtRIA Partnership without
any colorable groilllds, or any grounds at all, therefor.
21. SAR1v1C violated the express provisions of the 'MRIA Partnership Agreement
by competing, alone and through its affiliate, llviT, with the lviRIA Partnership, in violation
of the express covenant not to compete contained in the :MRIA Partnership Agreement.
22. SARlvlC usurped a partnership opportunity, and aided and abetted the
usurpation of a partnership opportunity by another, in providing information technology,
telecommunications, records storage and retrieval, human resources, experienced
personnel and other services, without distinction between MRI and non-MRI lines of
business, to the IMT 9th and Myrtle diagnostic imaging facility in Boise, Idaho.
23. Similarly, SARMC usurped a second partnership opportunity, and aided and
abetted the usurpation of a partnership opportunity by another, in providing information
technology, telecommunications, records storage and retrieval, human resources,
experienced personnel and other services, without distinction between MRI and non-MRI
lines of business to the diagnostic imaging facility in Meridian, Idaho.
24. In support of the opinions expressed, supra paragraphs 17-23, I would note that
SARMC committed the following acts prior to the commencement of business by IMI at
the downtown Boise imaging center:
•

In order to obtain U.S. Bank financing for the IMI fadlity, represented, or
allowed the representation to be made, that SARMC would "partner'' with
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SARG/GSR physicians in forming and operating a new facility.
•

Provided NIRIA and MRICI data, in SAR.J.VfC's possession and control, as to
case volume, technical component charges, staffing levels, and operations
data for use in formulation of the IMI business plan.

•

Linked IMI and its imaging facility to the SARMC intranet and attending
physician network.

•

Converted to another vendor and commenced utilization of DR Systems so
as to become compatible with the IMI computer network.

•

Supported the transfer of key MRICl personnel to a putative competitor,
IMI, including Karen Noyes, assistant director of Radiology, SARMC, to
IMI Executive Director of Operations.

•

Reviewed and approved pro forma projections IlVll prepared.

25. In support of the opinions expressed, supra paragraphs 17-23, I would note
that SARMC committed the following acts from the time at which llVII opened its first
imaging facility (August 1999) and the time at which SARMC formally entered into the
IMI LLC Operating Agreement:
•

Failed to investigate complaints of reduced care/hours of service by
SARG/GSR physicians to MRl Center operations, as well as to p~tients
referred to the center.

•

Insisted t~at SARG/GSR physicians continue to read MRICI images even

10

004466

after SARG/GSR physicians had opened a competing venture (IMI) and a
caution issued by a local health care attorney, Carl Harder, that adherence to
an exclusive services arrangement by competitors ofJYIRIA would result in
breaches of fiduciary duty.
•

Insistence that SARG/GSR physicians provide exclusive services despite
knowledge that physicians had intentionally curtailed hours and levels of
service.

•

Continued to provide infrastructure support (information technology,
including access to $350,000 DR server, telecommunications, transcription,
disaster recovery, down time and other services) without distinction between
MRI and non MRllines of I1vii business.

•

Provided confidentiallYlRIA partners' and partners' relationship information
to IMI.

•

Opposed further growth oLMRI Mobile (MRIM) despite robust growth of
that business.

26. In support of the opinions expressed, supra paragraphs

17~23,

I would note that

SARMC committed the following acts between the time at which it executed the IMI LLC
Operating Agreement (July 1, 2001) and the time at which it attempted to withdraw from
the :rvtR.IA Partnership (LLP as of April2003) by letter dated February 24, 2004, to be
effective April 1, 2004:

11
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•

Executing an agreement to sell one half of:MRIA when SARMC did not
own one half, without disclosing to its l\1R..IA partners details of the
exchange offer to which it had agreed.
Condoning or assisting in disparagement, curtailment of physician services,
and other activities which would drive down the value of partnership
interests in the MRIA Partnership but which SARMC might acquire in the
future.

•

Contributing $546,34 7 in equity capital (which would be commingled with
other 11\11 funds) and as.suming responsibility for $1.6 million in bank loans
without distinction between MRI and non lv1RI lines ofiMI's business.

•

Entering into a 50-SO operating agreement with another 50 percent LLC
member, which made the LLC an "affiliate," thereby contractually
prohibited from the competition in which it was and had for some time been
engaged.

•

Utilizing SA.RJ.\1C employees who had duties and responsibilities to :MRIA
as SARMC's representatives on the IMI Board ofManagers, which managed
all of IMI's activities, without distinction between MRI and non 1viRilines
of business.

•

Farming an IT/PACS committee exclusively of SAR1\1C and IMI
representatives, thereby freezing NIRlA out of discussions regarding
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important PACS developments.
•

Permitting or facilitating dual allegiances, and then the transfer of
allegiances and loyalties, of key independent contractors from :tviRIA to IMI.

•

Making extortionate demands at the time of withdrawal, insisting on
immediate payment despite knowledge that withdrawal was wrongful and
that observance of a one year covenant not to compete was independent of
payment.vel non.

27. In addition, a partner engages in a radical and extreme departure from the
standards applicable to dealings between or among partners when it makes affirmative
misrepresentations, tells half truths, or dissembles, to one or more of its fellow partners,
either in response to inquiries from its partners, or on its own volition. In my opinion, in
the case at bar, SARMC told a number of untruths and made the following
misrepresentations, which constituted independent violations of the standards applicable to
partners in a partnership:
A). SARMC would not support N1RI operations at Ii\11 LLC when in fact it did,
over a period of several years.
B). SARMC had no plans for participation in any Meridian, Idaho diagnostic
imaging facility, when it in fact did have plans.
C). SARi\1C not only failed to disclose but actively concealed its commitment to
pursue a Meridian, Idaho facility in connection with IMI.
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D). Dissembled regarding the undisclosed service by key SARMC employees on
the boards of managers, or of partners, respectively, of the competing entitles, IMI and

:tviRIA, in the latter of which SARMC was a partner.
E). Failed to disclose to its partners the provision of confidential ~ financial
information to potential third party investors or putative lenders to SAR.iviC.
F). Misrepresented the affiliate status ofiMI once SARMC had become a signatory
to the IMI Operating Agreement, with 3 of 6 SARMC managers on the I:rvll Board of
Managers.
G). Did not accurately disclose the extent of its $2.1 million investment and the use
(commingling) of the investment in support ofiMI's MRI as well as its non MRI lines of
business.
H). Falsely asserted, via a court complaint and otherwise, that SARMC was free of
restraints on withdrawal from the 1v1RIA Partnership, when it knew otherwise and had
been so informed by authoritative professionals and consultants.
I). Inferred, or told, untruths regarding the coverage of the covenant not to compete
contained in the partnership agreement, asserting that the covenant would only be effective
ifMRIA bought out SA.RM:C within 120 days, when the agreement contained no such
provisions and provided otherwise (that is, the covenant applied in any event).
28. Partners owe to all participants in a partnership not only a duty of loyalty but a
duty of the "utmost good faith and loyalty" and a "punctilio of an honor the most
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sensitive." In my opinion, the acts of SARMC and those who aided and abetted their
violations of fiduciary duty, including failures to act, represented an extreme deviation
from the standards of conduct partners owe in a partnership and appear to have been
conducted in a wilful and deliberate manner.
,_ot:-···
GIVEN this /6 day ofDecember, 2 0

County of Allegheny

)
)
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania )
Sworn to and subscribed before me on this I51Hday .of December, 2006.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Notarial Seal
~olin~ M Deasy, NotaJy Public
City or Pittsburgh, Allegheny County
My Commission Expres Feb. 12, 2010
Membe,, Pennsylvania Association of Notaries
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· . CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1.,d day ofDecember, 2006, a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
Warren E. Jones
EBERLE BERLIN
300 N. 6th Street, 2nd Floor
Post Office Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701
[Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants]

0
0

0
0

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 344-8542
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Rodney R. Saetrum
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
101 South Capitol Boulevard
Suite 1800
Boise, ID 83702
[Attorneys for Third~Party Defendants]

0 U.S.Mail
[l..Facsimile (208) 336-0448
tJ Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery

JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER
509 West Hayes
Post Office Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
[Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants]

0

U.S. Mail
O,Pacsimile (208) 336-9177
0 Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

Patrick J. Miller
GfVENSPURSLEY,LLP
601 \V. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
[Attorneys for Plaintif.f/Counter-Defendants]

0 U.S.Mail
Q--Facsimile (208) 388~ 1300
tLJ Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery

G. Rey Reinhardt IV
Daniel J. Gordon
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From:
To:
Date:
Subject:

<allen.hahn@us.pwcglobal.com>
SARMC.PO-SARMC(SARABRAT}
Wed, Jan 5, 2000 2:40 PM
Engagement Documents

Attached are the documents requested by Cindy and Ken. The report on the IMI
joint venture Is draft; please have Cindy/Helen review and call w/any comments.
We will send a final copy after suggested edits are Incorporated. Also Is
"Scenario 5" which Ken requested based on our reading of the relevant
partnership documents. A FEDEX will arrive tomorrow with draft copies of both
documents. Please call if either Ken or Cindy would like to discuss.
regards
(See attached file: Report_IMI_9_1_99_flnal.doc)(Sae attached file: Scenario
5.doc)
The Information transmitted Is inti::mded only for the person or entity to which
It Is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. Any
review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of, or laking of any action
in reliance upon, this information by persons or enlitles other lhan !he
intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this In error, please
contact the sender and delete the material from any computer.

P-1029
sARMC08047
Office of the CFO
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DRAFI'- FOR DISCUSSION

January 5, 2000
CONFIDENTIAL

Ms. Cindy Schamp
Chief Operating Officer
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
1055 North Curtis Road
Boise, Idaho 83706~1370
Subject:

Valuation of 50 Percent Interest in Intennountain Medical Imaging LLC

Dear Ms. Schamp:
At your request, we have estimated the fair market value of Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center's ("SARMC") 50 percent. interest in Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC ("IMI," or "the
Center"), a joint venture between SA.RJ.VIC and Saint Alphonsus Radiology Group ("SARG"), as
of September 1, 1999 (the ''valuation date,.) on a going-concern basis. We understand that the
purpose of this analysis is to assist SARl\fC's management in its decision concerning the
valuation of its ownership interest in connection with the formation of the Center. Our valuation
analysis may not be used for any other purpose nor distributed to any third parties without the
prior written consent ofPricewaterhouseCoopers LLP ("PwC" or "PricewaterhouseCoopers").
Based on the asswnptions and limiting conditions as described in this report, as well as the facts
and circumstances as presented to us by SA.&\IfC's management for the valuation date, we
estimate SARlviC' s 50 percent interest in IMI to be approximately book value, or no greater than
SARJ.viC's cash contribution of approximately;
$622,000

This report describes the principles, assumptions, and procedures that were applied in our
valuation analysis of the aforementioned equity interest. The findings stated in this analysis are
based on data· obtained directly from SAR.lVfC's management and from sources of publicly
available information. In addition, certain infmmation in our report is based on our interviews
with representatives of SARMC. Management has advised us that they consider the data used to
be accurate, and that no information known to them conflicts with the data or resulting use of
such data in this analysis.
This letter and report should not be used, quoted or circulated in whole or in part for any other
purpose other than that stated above. The PricewaterhouseCoopers name may not be used or
referenced in connection with this letter and report in any public or private offerings including,
but not limited to, those filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission or other goveniment
agencies. In addition, our findings are subject to the Statement of Assumptions and Limiting
Conditions shown in Appendix I.
SARMC08048
Office of the CFO
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In the course of our analysis, we performed the following:
•

Read the proposed Tenn Sheet for Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC;

•

Read the pending Operating Agreement for the Center and associated exhibits;

•

Read IMI's pro forma fmancinl statements, including maximum, minimltm and anticipated
profit scenarios;

•

Read the Capital Contributions and Debt Schedule of Intermountain Medical Imaging
Center;

•

Read the Market Value Appraisal Report of the real property in which IMI leases space; and

•

Considered the impact of current industry trends and developments on the fair market value
ofiMI.

Because the procedures we perfotmed during this engagement were limited in scope and did not
constitute an attest service as that defined by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, we cannot express an opinion on the financial, statistical or other data included in
our analysis or findings. Our valuation analysis in no way constitutes an opinion of fairness to
any shareholders or an opinion of solvency.
·
According to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the "Code") as amended, all
valuations of the stock of closely held corporations or the stock of corporations where market
quotations are not available must be made in accordance with Revenue RuJing 59-60 for estate
and gift tax purposes. 1 Revenue Ruling 65-192, as superseded by Revenue Ruling 69-609, 19682 C.B. 327, extended the concepts in Revenue 59-60 to income and other tax purposes as well as
to business interests of any type. Closely held corporations are enterprises whose shares are
owned by a relatively limited number of stockholders.
Among other factors, this valuation analysis considers Revenue Ruling 59-60, which, while not
prescribing any formula for concluding on value, provides guidance on how to approach the
valuation of business interests. In accordance with this guidance, the following factors, among
others, have been considered to the extent applicable in our estimate of value for 1\-11:

A.

The U.S. economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of the
industry in which IMI operates, in particular~

B.

The nature of the business and history of the enterprise from its inception;

c.

The book value of IMI and the financial condition of the business including its
need for additional investment funds to realize its business objectives~

1

D.

The earnings capacity ofiMI;

E.

The dividend paying capacity of IMI;
SARMC08049
Office of the CFO

Internal Revenue Service Ruling 59-60 1959-t C.B. 237.

PricewaterhouscCoope1·s LLP
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F.

Whether or not livH has goodwill or possesses any other intangible value;

G.

Recent sales of the stock and the size of the block of stock to be valued;

H.

The market price of publicly traded stock of corporations engaged in industries or
lines of business similar to IMI.

For estimating the value of closely held corporations, Revenue Ruling 59w60 defines fair market
value as," ... the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller when the former is not under any compulsion to buy and the latter is not under any
compulsion to sell, both parties having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts"l, The
hypothetical buyer and seller are assumed to be able, as well as willing, to trade and to be well
informed about the property and concerning the market for such property.
Although SARMC's 50 percent interest in IMI is not a controlling interest, the rights provided do
afford the hospital some elements typically associated with control. According to the proposed
Tenn Sheet, the LLC will have, at least initially, two members, each holding a 50 percent interest
in the Center with equal representation on the Management Committee. Both entities have
contributed an equal amount of capital and wiH share equally in the profits and losses of the
Center. Neither entity has been granted supennajority voting rights nor any other rights which
would result in one entity having more strategic control than does the other. Given these facts,
SARMC does have some ability to influence the Center's strategic decisions. We therefore
consider SAR.i'viC's interest to be a significant non-controlling interest rather than a minority
interest.
The selection of the appropriate premise of value is an important step in defining the appraisal
process. Typically, in controHing interest valuation assignments, the selection of the appropriate
premise of value is a function of the highest and best use of the collective assets of the subject
business enterprise. When appraising a minority interest, the correct premise of value should
reflect business as usual for the subject company. In the unique case of valuing a minority or
nonwcontrolling interest in a start-up company, the tremendous uncertainty about the enterprise
magnifies the importance of choosing the appropriate premise of value; the value conclusions
reached under alternative premises of value, for the same business, may be materially different.
For purposes of this analysis, we considered the fair market value of a 50 percent interest in IMI
under the premises of value as a going-concern.
There are three basic approaches to the valuation of a minority interest in a closely held
company: (1) a "top down" approach where the total enterprise value is computed from direct
comparison with the values of controlling interest transactions of guideline businesses, which is
then reduced by a minority or non-controlling interest discount reflecting its lack of control in
the total entity; (2) a direct comparison approach that estimates the enterprise value of the subject
company using values of minority interests in publicly traded guideline companies, which are
then adjusted for lack of marketability; and (3) a "bottom up" approach which estimates the
benefits the owners will realize over the life of the investment, considering the effects of lack of
marketability if no easily accessible market is available to provide liquidity for the investment.
SARMC08050
2
Federal Estate Tax Regulations, Section 20.2031-1 (b).
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In arriving at our estimate of aggregate value of SAR.l.v!C's 50 percent interest in IMI on a non. controlling interest basis, we have relied upon the "bottom up" approach. A "top down"
approach was considered but rejected due to the early-stage nature of the entity. A direct
comparison with publicly tt·aded guideline companies was not performed because of the life
cycle differences that exist between private ownership of an early stage company and ownership
of an established publicly traded company.
INDUSTRY CONDITION AND OUTLOOK3

'The health care industry (SIC 80) consists of public, private and non-profit institutions. These
institutions include hospitals, offices and clinics of medical doctors, nursing homes, managed
care providers such as health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"), preferred provider
organizations ("PPOs"), independent practice associations, and other specialized health care
facilities. The industry is labor intensive, employing approximately 10 million people in 1996,
of whom more than 650,000 were physicians. National healthcare expenditures are expected to
total $1.3 trillion in 1999, of which $235 billion will be spent for physician services. For
purposes of this report, only the imaging segment of the industry was considered.
Many hospitals and other health care providers require access to diagnostic imaging services to
remain competitive in the health care marketplace. At the same time. regulatory and licensing
requirements in many states may limit access to imaging systems, while health care providers
may lack the financial resources or sufficient patient volume to justify the high expense
associated with the purchase of diagnostic imaging systems. Even if fmancial resources are
available, some health care providers prefer to contract the services for many reasons, including,
among others: to obtain the use of the system without any financial risk; to retain the ability to
switch system types and avoid technological risk; to avoid future uncertainty with regard to
reimbursement; to eliminate the need to recruit, train and manage qualified technologists; or to
provide additional imaging services when patient demand exceeds in-house capability.
The diagnostic imaging segment of the health care industry is highly competitive, with numerous
small facilities and a few large, diversified healthcare companies in each geographic market. In
addition to hospitals that provide on-site imaging services, other competitors include multi-center
imaging companies, local independent diagnostic centers, and imaging centers owned by local
physician groups.
In INti's defined geographic market, Boise already has two major hospitals providing full service
imaging procedures: Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center and St. Luke's Regional Medical
Center. In addition, there are two other imaging centers: Open MRI of Boise, owned by a
publicly traded company, and HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hospital. In the state of Idaho, no
certificate of need ("CON") regulations exist with respect to imaging centers. Consequently,
other healthcare providers face few barriers to entry and may increase the competitive
enviromnent in which the Center currently operates.
SARMC08051
Office of the CFO
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Information is derived from Industrial Forecast: 1998-2000, Richard K. Miller & Associates, p. 35 l-354; Standard
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In general, there is a growing trend for healthcare services 011 an outpatient basis, fueled by
advances in technology, demands for cost-effective care, and concerns for patient comfort and
convenience. However, the healthcare industry in the U.S. is subject to regulation at the federal,
state and local levels. Regulations can affect companies' growth, require licenses and/or
facilities certification, and control the reimbursement to the health care provider for services
provided. Over recent years, as technology has improved and the population has aged, the scope
of imaging procedures provided has widened to include more patients covered by Medicare and
.Medicaid. This has resulted in a small but growing percentage of imaging services revenue
being reimbursed by government programs. Given the uncertainty surrounding govemment
reimbursement and regulation, the ability of health care providers to accurately predict their
financial performance becomes even more difficult.
NATURE AND IDSTORY OF INTERi\-IOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING
General

Intermountain Medical Imaging was formed on September l, 1999 as an Idaho Limited Liability
Company by two members: St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, a local hospital, and Saint
Alphonsus Radiology Group, a physician's group, for the purpose of owning and operating an
Independent Imaging Center in Boise, Idaho. The Center provides medical imaging services in
the following areas: computed tomography ("Cr'), ultrasound, manunography, and radiography,
as well as special procedures. In addition, the Center has a computed radiography and picture
archiving communication system (PACS) that is integrated with SA!UvfC's information systems.
lMI is located in a free-standing imaging center in downtown Boise, Idaho. TI1e Center leases
4,950 sq. ft. from Gem State Radiology and operates five days per week on a regular basis and
six days when necessary, a key factor in the delivery of imaging services.
Capitalization of IMI as of September 1, 1999
The Center is a 50/50 joint venture LLC owned and operated by two members: SAR.iviC and
SARG, both located in Boise, Idaho. As a new business in the diagnostic imaging field,
significant capital requirements were necessary to begin operations. The investment in
equipment for start-up opemtions totalled $3.5 million, while initial working capital
requirements to fund projected losses amounted to $550,000. The investment in equipment was
financed by a long-term loan, the conditions of which required a 20 percent down payment, or
approximately $700,000. In addition to this debt financing totalling approximately $2.8 million,
each member contributed an equal amount of capital in cash to fund working capital
requirements and the equipment loan down payment. Total equity of $1.2 million, combined
with the debt fmancing, brings the total invested capital of the Center to approximately $4.0
million.

SARMCOB052
Office of the CFO
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FINANCIAL REVIEW

Only a fmward-looking financial review of Uvii as of the valuation date is possible using the pro
forma fmancial statement scenarios contemplated by management. Due to the high level of
uncertainty surrounding the assumptions and resulting cash flows of the newly fonned Center, its
projections are not as meaningful as historical operating results of established businesses.
Financial projections of newly established businesses are typically highly uncertain due to
forecasting enors experienced when projecting staffing requirements, overhead costs, and
volume of services, among other variable expenses. Higher scan volumes allow the company to
benefit from the operating leverage due to a high fixed cost expense structure, resulting in
increased profitability. However, the opposite is true of lower scan volumes. As a consequence,
small changes in revenue can greatly affect profitability, leading to above average financial risk.
In addition, IMI has entered a highly competitive environment in which it competes with wellestablished imaging centers associated with existing physician referral networks. Thus, given the
operating and financial risk that IMI faces and the highly competitive market in which it
operates, the achievement of anticipated financial projections is highly uncertain as of the
valuation date.
Discussion of Opening Balance Sheet
IMI's opening balance sheet as of September 1, 1999 is shown in Exhibit I. As of the valuation
date, the Center had total assets of approximately $4.0 million; $3.5 million or 86 percent of
which was classified as fixed assets. Current assets consisted of cash in the amount of $550,000,
or 14 percent of total assets.
Total liabilities as of the valuation date were approximately $2.8 million, which represented the
equipment loan financing used to capitalize the business. In addition, a line of credit is available
to meet working capital needs, but had not yet been drawn upon as of the valuation date. The
long-tenn loan was collateralized by the underlying equipment, while the "line of credit would be
collateralized by accounts receivable if drawn upon. The high leverage results in substantial
financial risk for the Center, as evidenced by its high debt to equity ratio of 2.2: 1. Debt to total
invested capital ratio is 69 percent.
Net Asset Value
The Center's net asset value ("book value") as of the valuation date was approximately $1.2
million. As mentioned above, IMI is capitalized with equal cash contributions fi:om each of the
members as well as the equipment fmancing, for a total of approximately $4.0 miUion. Because
the Center began operations on the valuation date, there was no impact from operations on
retained earnings, nor the net asset value of the Center.
In valuing established companies, book value does not necessarily represent going concern
value, as it is an accounting term, not an appraisal term. Financial statement assets are accounted
for at historical cost, less depreciation, while some assets may be completely written off for
fmuncial reporting purposes. Intangible assets normally do not appear on the balance sheet
unless they were purchased or the actual cost of development is capitalized. Neither contingent
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assets nor contingent liabilities are generally recorded, and liabilities are usually shown at face
value. Therefore, a company's contributed equity capital may not bear an identifiable
relationship to-going concern value for the business as a whole. 4 However, in the case of llvfi,
which has no operating history and highly uncertain future earnings, book value is likely a
reasonable estimate of fair market value. As of the valuation date, IMI began operations. As
such, the assets have not been depreciated nor written down, there are no identifiable intangible
assets or contingent liabilities, and the liabilities' face value approximates fair market value. In a
start-up situation such as this, the net asset value of a company is equivalent to the contributed
equity capital, and is a reasonable estimation of the going concern value for the business as a
whole.
Intangible Assets and Goodwill

An intangible asset is a right or non-physical resource that is preswned to represent an advantage
to the firm in the marketplace. Such assets include copyrights, patents, leases, franchises, and
goodwill, as well as other assets. "Intangible asset~ are the elements, after working capital and
tangible assets, that make the business work and are often the primary contributors to the earning
power of the enterprise. The existence of intangible assets, including goodwill, is dependent on
the presence, or expectation, of earnings. " 5 Goodwill, as defmed by Revenue Ruling 59-60, is
"the customer patronage of a business, name of the business, ownership of a trade name or brand
name, location of the business, and a renewal of successful operations over a prolonged period."
As the evidence of goodwill results from "the measurement of historical or expected earnings in
excess of the normal industry return on all other tangible and intangible assets," 6 ascribing
goodwill to a start~up business with no operating history and highly tmcertain future earnings is
not appropriate in this instance.

Prior Tnnsactions
Revenue Ruling 59-60 lists any previous transactions of stock or recent sale of the entity being
valued as a factor to be considered in arriving at an estimate of its fair market value. Based on
our discussions with management, no transactions in LVU's conunon stock had occurred as of the
valuation date.
VALUATION
Introduction

A Market Approach establishes the value of a privately-held corporation through analysis of
transactions of guideline companies. The information derived from this analysis is used to infer
an opinion of market value for the subject company. In an Income Approach, value is dependent
upon the present value of future economic benefits to be derived from ownership. A price per
4

Shannon Pratt, Valuing a Business (Homewood: Dow-Jones Irvin, 1989) p.29.

s Smith. Gordon V. and Parr, Russell L., Valuation ofintellecn!a.l PrQpertv and Intangible Assets, Second Edition, p.

83.
' Danzig, lawrence H., and Robison, Robert A, The Tax Adviser, January 1980, p. 33.
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· share or interest is then estimated by discounting the net cash flows available for distribution to
their present value at market-based rates of return. The Cost Approach focuses on the present; it
utilizes estimates of the current cost to replace the entity's fixed assets and certain intangible
assets.
A valuation analysis of a statt-up compljlly typically differs from traditional approaches applied
to a more established enterprise. A startwup company has a very limited operating history and, as
such, historical trends and ratios cannot be used to develop financial forecasts. When financial
projections are available, the achievement of projected results is often highly WlCertain and often
differs from actual results attained. Management of SARMC provided us with several financial
projection scenarios due to the Wlcertainty associated with the operations of the entity. For
example, there is no assurance that physicians will refer patients to llvll over other imaging
centers or hospitals in the area, a crucial factor in an imaging center's success. These limitations
and others make it difficult to apply an income approach to valuation, which depends on the
availability of reasonable and reliable management projections.
The application of a market comparable approach to valuation is also difficult. A start-up
company typically has negative earnings and cash flows, while its revenues may be growing very
quickly. Applying guideline company multiples from recent transactions would likely not yield
meaningful results. Moreover, publicly traded guideline companies often are much larger than
the subject start-up company and have achieved stable and somewhat more predictable growth
rates. The multiples paid by investors for established publicly traded companies reflect both an
expectation of lower risk and a different level of future growth, and therefore. may not be an
appropriate benchmark of value for a start-up company.
Asset Accumulation Approach
Based on our analysis and understanding that IJYII began operations on the valuation date, an

asset based valuation apptoach is an appropriate method to estimate the fair market value of
SARN!C's 50 percent interest in llvll. An Asset Accumulation Method essentially restates a
company's balance sheet to fair market. values. This approach involves the identification and
valuation of otherwise unrecorded tangible and intangible assets, if any, as well as the
revaluation of the asset and liability accoWlts already recorded on the company's GAAP balance
sheet. The value of the individually appraised assets less the value of the individually appraised
liabilities represents an estimate of the value of the entity.
The advantage of applying an Asset Accumulation Method, in flvfi's case, stems from its lack of
operating history and uncertain future as of the valuation date. IMI's assets and liabilities,
therefore, had not yet been adjusted and hence, the balance sheet as of the date of formation of
the Center is a reasonable estimation of the fair market value of the equity of IMI as of the
valuation date, or approximately $622,000.
APPLICATION OF DISCOUNTS

SARMC08055
office of the CFO
The value of SARJ.vfC's interest in llvH, as described above, was prior to any consideration for
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

PageS

Financial Advisory Services

9

004482

Confidential Draft

Intermountain Medical Imaging LLC

discounts for lack of marketability or ownership interest transfer restrictions. As with most
closely held enterprises, the factors that may give rise to a discoWlt for lack of marketability
include: a lack of willing buyers for the interest; an uncertain time horizon to complete a
potential sale; the cost of the sale or liquidation, as well as the risk as to the eventual form of
transaction proceeds; restriction on transferability of interest; and the intent of the owners with
regard to the investment. In the case of the Center, there is no public market for its equity as of
the valuation date, nor is a public market anticipated. Transfer of SAR}..!C's ownership interest
is restricted according to the Term Sheet, as SARG maintains a right of first refusal on SAfuvlC's
intere.'lt. However, given the competitive nature of the industry and strong merger and
acquisition activity, it could be reasonably anticipated that liquidity does exit for a 50 percent
ownership interest in the Center as of the valuation date.

The subject of whether or not a discount for lack of marketability should be applied to a
controlling interest has been and is being debated among valuation experts. 7 In our view, lack of
marketability is less of an issue for a controlling interest than for a minority interest, primarily
since a controlling shareholder can effect the sale of a company> cause dividends to be paid, or
cause a repurchase of shares, all of which tends to compensate for lack of liquidity. However,
even controJling interests in private companies can be less readily marketable than public
companies. Reasons for this include difficulties in seJling private companies and the
WlWillingness of private company owners to publicly auction their companies as is typically
required by public companies.
Although SARlvfC does not own a controlling interest in the Center, it does own a significant
non-controlling interest. Its 50 percent interest allows it to greatly influence the strategic
decisions conceming IMI, including the ability to, among others, select management, establish
compensation and benefits, set corporate strategies, acquire or liquidate assets, and liquidate, sell
or recapitalize the Center. Therefore, SARMC's 50 percent ownership interest in the Center
possesses many of the characteristics of a controlling interest.
According to an article published in the Business Valuation Review, 8 Christopher Mercet·
suggests that there are two potential costs, transaction costs and taxes, that should be considered
in the determination of an appropriate lack or marketability discount. Mercer suggests that
transaction costs for smaller businesses can range from 10 percent or more, while for larger
businesses, transaction cost would be much smaller as a percentage of value. He also assumes
that ta."<es will always be paid by the selling shareholders. Depending on the market
capitalization of the subject company, Mercer indicates that the appropriate lack of marketability
discount for a controlling, non-marketable interest ranges from 3 to 20 percent.

As the estimated market capitalization for LvH is $4.0 million, Mercer's guideline would suggest
a lack of marketability discount in the range of 15 to 20 percent, assuming a controlling interest.
However, SARMC does not have the control necessary to cause strategic decisions to be made,
but does have control to suppress strategic decisions, all else being equal. While the
combination of factors present in lMI as of the valuation date suggest the application of
7
Mercer, Z. Chi-fsiopher, "Should Marketability Discounts be Applied to Controlling Interests of Private
Companies," Business Valualion Review, June 1994.
8
SARMC08056
Mercer, Z. Christopher.
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discounts would likely be appropriate in this instance, we have considered the purpose of the
valuation, the intent of the parties, and the operational versus investment interest in the Center.
Evidence suggests that if the parties anticipated selling their interests, we might expect a
discount for lack of marketability. However, given their intent to hold their investment as an
operational investment with a community interest, we have not taken a discount in arriving at our
conclusion.
SUMl\l.lARY A.i''ID CONCLUSION

As discussed above, we have estimated the fair market value of SAR1\1C's 50 percent interest in
IMI as of September 1, 1999 using the Asset Accumulation Approach. We have reFed on the
Asset Accumulation Approach due to the early stage nature of the business. In this instance, the
Center's net asset (book) value is a reasonable proxy for fair market value as the Center
commenced operations as of the valuation date. Thus, we have relied upon infonnation supplied
to us by SARMC concerning the Center's opening balance sheet and its net asset value in
atTiving at our estimate of fair market value, prior to consideration for any discotmts for lack of
marketability. In light of the current industry conditions and the facts and circumstances
surrounding SA.Riv!C's investment in the Center, we have not applied any discounts in this
instance.
Based on the analysis and considerations described in this report, we have estimated the fair
market value of SAR.t\1C's 50 percent interest in IMI on a non-controlling interest basis to be
approximately $622,000.
Should you require any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact Raina Dennison
at (617) 478-9504, Allen D. Hahn at (617) 478-9018 or David A. Spieler at (617) 478-5057 in
our Boston office.
Very truly yours,

ij
I
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Exhibit I

Opening Balance Sheet~ as of September 1, 1999

ASSETS
Cash
Fixed Assets
Total Assets

$550,000
$3,466,673
$4,016,673

LIABILITIES
Long Term Loan
Total Liabilities

$2,773,338
$2,773,338

SHAREHOLDERS'EQlnTY
Capital Contributed
Total Equity

$11243,334
$1,243,334

Total Liabilities and Equity

$4,016,673

SARMC08059
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Statement of Limiting ~onditions
The following Statement of Limiting Conditions applies to valuation services performed by
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP ("PwC").
Valuation reports may contain estimates of future financial performance, or op1mons that
represent management's view of reasonable expectations at a particular point in time, but such
infonnation, estimates, or opinions are not offered as predictions or as assurances that a
particular level of income or profit will be achieved, that events will occur, or that a particular
price will be offered or accepted. Actual results achieved during the period covered by the
prospective financial analyses will vary from those described in om report, and the variations
may be material.
PwC does not, as part of these services, perform an audit, review, or examination (as defined by
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) of any of the historical or prospective
financial information used, and therefore does not express any opinion with regard to same.
Our procedures did not include investigation of, and we assume no responsibility for, the titles
to, or any liens against Intennountain Imaging Center ("IMI'' or "the Center"). Furthermore, we
assume there are no hidden or unexpected conditions that could affect the value of Rvfl and
accept no responsibility for discovering such conditions.
None of our pattners or employees who worked on this engagement has any known financial
interest in the outcome of this valuation. Further, the compensation for this engagement is
neither based nor contingent on the value determined.
Neither the report nor any portions thereof (especially any conclusions as to value, the identity of
the appraisers or PwC, or any reference to recognized appraisal organizations or the designations
they confer) shall be disseminated to the public through public relations media, news media,
advertising media, sales media, any other public means of communication without the prior
written consent and approval of the appraisers and PwC. The date(s) of the valuation to which
the value estimate conclusions apply is set forth in the letter oftransmittal and within the body of
the report. The value is based on the purchasing power of the United States dollar as of that date.

or

fn the absence of competent .teclmical advice to the contrar-;, it is assumed that livii is not
adversely affected by concealed hazards such as, but not limited to asbestos, hazardous or
contaminated substances, toxic waste, or radioactivity.

No opinion is rendered as to property title, which is assumed to be good and marketable. Unless
othenvise stated, no consideration is given to liens or encumbrances against the property.
Sketches, maps, photos, or other graphic aids included in appraisal reports are intended to assist
the reader in ready identification and visualization of the property, and are not intended for
technical purposes.
Ta.-,: positions taken by St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center or IMI, which utilize the results
of our work, are the responsibility of the taxpayer.

SARMC08061
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Restructuring of 1\m.I Associates General Partnership
Scenario 5
SAR.triC withdraws from iYIRI Associates to provide flexibility to form potentially
competing ventures
Considerations
1)

The Partnership Agreemeltt restricts the ability of Hospital Partners to
withdl'aw from iltJRI Associates.. A Hospital Partner may withdraw at any
time if, in the Hospital Partner's reasonable judgement, continued
participation in MRI Associates:
• jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of the Hospital Partner;
• jeopardizes medicare/medicaid
participations;

2)

or

insurance

reimbursements

or

•

if the business activities of Iv1RI Associates are contrary to the ethical
principles of the Roman Catholic Church; or

•

is or may be in violation of any local, state or federal laws, rules or
regulations (Articles ofPartnership, Section 6.1)

SAR.1vfC would be restricted for a period of one year after becoming a
Terminated Partner from engaging in any Competitive Activity (111ird
Amendment to Articles ofPartnershfp, Section 8.1)

3)

A favorable vote of all current members of the Board of Partners can waive
the Partnership's rights with respect to any particular activity and Restricted
Party (Articles ofPartnershfp, Section 9.4)

4)

The appearance of shifting referrals may potentially result in legal
challenges from GP and LP interest holders, and investigations from State
and Federal authorities

5)

Unless otherwise agreed, SARMC would receive the balance of its .
Partner's capital account at the time of withdrawal (Articles. of Partnership,
Section 6.1)

6)

Withdrawal would not relieve SARMC from any contingent liability in
existence at the time of withdrawal (Articles of Part11ershfp, Section 6.3)

7)

SAfuviC would retain limitedpartnership interests in Idaho and Mobile
SARMC06062 .
Office of the CFO
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TREASURE VALU:'l !ID.

The purpose of this fetter is to document the ~:oopcnation between Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical <.:enter, MR1 Associates and lntennountain Medioat Imaging. Final
neaotialioos are proceeding between SARMC, MRI end IMl on SAR...\-!C nnd MRI
oocoming part owners of lite CT and MRt divisions respectively oflMI. Both SARMC

o.nd MRJ reviewed and approved the JM1 budget projections as pan of this process,

. .

"#.-(,~... o I

fl.l 1\(.·-'t../!

The agreement between SAR.l.\.lC and l,.,U IS an Cstlnlllled 60 a;.ys ouy SA ~c ha~ .
al[eady made a numbtlr of tangible investments into IMI, including k tbiJowillg: f
• SARMC provided its caso volume, databuc, t~hnical component cbal'ie:l, staffing
and supply costs, and oth~r operational data for IM! refercnu in developing the lMI
business plan.
• Karen Noyes, assistam director of !he SARlvlC radiology department, is joining lMI
ll$

.

executive director.

• SARMC programmers have inttrwnnected the SARMC and tMJ computers to 'hare
•

•

demographic and case manag~ment data between SARMC and !Ml.
SARMC hms link~ IMt to its inuanel between the hospitaJ and its phy.sir;ian network,
the Cli.nieillll Desktop system.
Subsequent to IMf conCr~~Cting to pucehase the DR. Systems digital radiology sy$1em,
SAR.\1C d!sconti(lu~:~d its n~aotlations witb another vendor and also b~$an wo1kin8
with DR Sy~tem:., so t}lllt SAR.MC and IMI will be: u~ing the same type ofsystema.
This entails a system conversion and investment $evcral hwldred thousand doltars
for SARMC.

or

The Saint AJphonsm Radioloay Group physicians have for 25 years worked closely with
SARMC and conaactc:O with SARMC to provide the professional medical $Crvices fur
the radiology department at SAR.MC. This conuact hasju~t been ell.tended fi'Ve years. In
respect of the SARMC coopctadon and intcmded ownership posjtion i.D. IMI, the
radiologists declined on jointly developing an imagi11g eenter with the Idaho Elks
RebabiJitation Hospital.
The asreemtnt between MRl and l~ll is 60 Ol more days ~ut. An appu\sal is being
completed by Price Waterhouse, Boston. ln. cegacd to the MRl affiliation with lMI, the
following an~ noted:
• Mc:mbcn of the MRI Associates bo~~td have c.ommunieatcd lhcir full support of the
MRI ownership in IMiand IMI ownership in MRJ, and committed their votes in
favor of the cross ownership.
• MRl has offered for lMl to lease employees from its pool of 40 experienced MRJ
technologists on an as needed basis.
• The mll!lllginz p~nner ofJMl is on the beard ofMRJ A3scciate$, and is highly

rc:garded by both groupg_
• IMl and MRl share the same financial manager, Practice Management. In~ .• and other
key profet.e.ional tesource!.

l'h~ SQint Alphon,us Radiology Gtoup physicians have for many yean pcovtded the
professJona.l medical servicu for MRJ. C:iiS('f lll Ml'U Limited, and continue lo do so.
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MINUTES
GROUP MEETING
SEPTEMBER 8, 1999
In attendance: Joe Gobel, David Giles, Paul Traughber, Vic Garabedian, Neil Davey, Ian Davey,
Jeff Seaboum, John Knochel, Jeff Cliff, Paul DeWitt, Karen Noyes and Kathy Sharpe, Secretary.

I

IMAGING CENTER UPDATE
A.

Karen presented a site update (see attacJunent). The exterior on the north side is
nearly complete and the signs should be ready on time. The interior finishing
work is progressing with approximately 90% of the artwork having been hung.

B.

The referring physicians need to be reminded that they need to sign the order form
in order to have the correct ICD·9 codes.

C.

When reading cases from the center, the case needs to be identified as to whether
it is an IMI case or not. The patient's date of birth is currently being used as the
medical record number. Karen requested that if a Radiologist takes an JMI case
back to the hospital, that they let someone at the front desk know so that the case
can be tracked.

D.

The problem with the MRI unit has been fixed. The RF shielding had a leak into
the fire alarm RF filters. These have been sealed and everything is up and
running well and the images look great. Dr. Seabourn would like to have the
missed application· time restored due to the magnet being down. Karen will check
into this.

E.

Karen stated that the repaired Lwnysis system as yet to be delivered. Current'~···
plain film~? cannot be taken without· this system. Karen will check to see if DR
has a Lumysis system with Dr loaded on it. Dr. Knochel motioned to forget the
Lumysis and install the AGFA CR that is in storage and caU DR to see how
quickly they can supple a digitizer that is DR configured. Dr. Gobel seconded the
motion and the motion passed. Karen will follow·up with DR.

F.

Karen presented an Emergency Medication and Treatment Protocol handout for
review. Dr. Gobel stated that ACLS training can be done as a group in three
sessions. Drs. Knochel and Ian Davey are already trained and certified and will
cover the department during these training sessions. Dr. Gobel will set the first
session up for Wednesday, September 15, 1999.

G.

Karen cautioned the Group not to promise too much to referring physicians, as the
center will need to continue to meet the standards of practice and protocols. Dr.
Seabourn would like to see what screening questions other offices are currently
asking patients and see if this can be streamlined.
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nn MANAGEMENT
MINUTES

DATJr:

August l4, 200 l

TIME:
PLACE:

5:30p.m.
Pioneer Room

PRESENT:
Jeff Cliff

EXCUSED:

TimHall,MD
JeffSeabourn, MD
Neil Davey, :lviD

Joe Gobel, MD

RECORDER:
Karen Noyes

Karen Noyes
Ken fry

Mike Ondracek
Leslie Kelly Hatl
Scott Christensen

L

ASSIGNiliENTS
Decision made that Dr. Seabourn would be the !MI Chair, and Ken Fry would
be the SARJviC Vice Chair.
Jeff Cliff wilt be delegated responsibility ofiCR Chair. For Executive
sessions, the Chair will decide if Jeff ClitT should chair that portion of the
hoard meeting.

Motion made to modify the operating ngrccment to include four members
as representutives from ICR and SAR.t'riC instead of three. Motion
approved unanimously.
II.

PHYSICIAN REFERRAL PATTERN
See attached graphs on physician referral pattems and SARMC/IMf split on
referring physicians.

Discussed information regarding St. Luke's opening an outpatient Imaging
Center with PACS system.
IMI West update with time line of May 2002 opening. Cherry Lane target of
October 2002.

IMIRP/000886
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In order to complete the operating agreemeN the hoard needs to execute a
Medical Director Agreement, and Service Level Agreement.
Mike Ondracek will provide Jeff Cliff with some examples of Medical
Director agreements for review by ICR.
Leslie

Kelly~Eiall

will prepare a service level agreement for review by the

board.

IV.

FEES & FINANCE
lMI is covering any negative cash balances in the non~MRJ component with
cash from the MRI component. Board agreed unanimously to charge interest
monthly, at the same rate as our line-of-credit with L'.S. Bank on the negalive
cash balance.

Jeff ClitT presented the current financial statements:

e'rr Cliff reported that the Group bas bee11 approved for t!nancing ofiMI
West. lk Seabourn conveyed a message from US Bank Account VP that
things are looking good; ratio benchmarks are being surpassed when
looking at IMI as a whole.
J

PET Billing discussion
Owned by 1MI; parked at SAR.N1C.
Medicare in-patients must be billed under APC schedule.
\Vhen coach is at IMI West, must bill under the physician fee schedule.
Motion

Motion made to have St. Als "lease" PET from IMI and bill Medicare
patients under Al1 C schedule. Approved unanimously.

SUBCOMITTEE: Mike Ondracek, Ken Fry, and Jeff Cliff will work on
the contract for the lease agreement, reimbursement, etc for ~<o,!edicare.

V.

i,IARKETING
Dr. Neil Davey presented an overview of the history and developmenl of
llv1I's marketing plan.
Background:
Marketing consultant hired.
Continued sponsorship of the Shakespeare Festival.
Focusing on non~MRI component
Medical education event- slated form October 6u' at Grove Hotel
August 13th- Dr. Ed Coleman- Dinner/lecture/educational event. PET
expert frum Duke University will do Grand Ro1.1nds at SARMC.

Physician office visits to continue and upgraded for PET.
IMIRP/000887
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Weh Page- Vendor selection in progress. Go live date of October 2001.
Leslie offered many "tips" when working with marketing web site
vendors, etc. She has also oiTered her assistance in whatever level IMI
would like. The marketing committee will review RFP's from web page
vendors.
Have seen results in the growth of the non-iVfRI numbers in the last 18
months of marketing

VI.

OPERATIONS
Focus on DR and connectivity. Emphasize contribution of Information
Resm:rces as a key component of our success. Need IR to be adeq1.1ately
staffed and funded to grow!
Concern with DR Communicator- Web Base product and not being
"live" after 18 months of operation at IML Leslie reports dark fiber is all
in place ($780,000 investment by SARMC) to IMI West, Cherry Lane,
and Caldwell for connectivity.
DR- Communicator Button
• Firewall completed
• Internet pipe increased by 70%
• Security verified
• Programming done
• DR is working to rc-architect port site to
allow connection to internct/SARMC.
Unknown completion date.

Outstanding DR Issue
• Mt1lti-entity connectivity - not available yet
by DR. Slated for November 2001. This
will allow viewer to mix all entities together
(SAR.!'vfC, IMI, MRICI) or to view
independently/:;eparately.
Laptops- DR
• Exist at about 20 sites now
• Having difficulty getting written "feedback"
from physician offices, but good verbal
feedback
ACTION: Leslie to present a rep01t on the following at each meetiug:
• Physician feedback- DR- response
• Report specific to IMI or calls, response time, etc
• DR communicator update from SAfuviC/DR

IMIRP/000888
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Vll.

PET Site
Cindy Schamp has met with the MRICI group and discussed our use of the
current MRJ Mobile pud at SAR.\lC. MRl is okay wi:h sharing the use of
the pad.
ACTION: JeffCtifflo contact Cindy Schamp to ask MRJCI iflM[ can
share the semi to pull our PET off the pad and park it in the R V parking
lot behind Liberty when they need to utilize the pad.

VIIL

NEXT il-IEETING
Adriana to organize an 1R committee to work on IMI Wt:st co£mectivity.
Meetings will be held once a month for the next six months at 6:00 a.m. Jeff

Clitf to schedule next meetings.

IMIRP/000889
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MARKF.TING COMMITTEE
MlNlJTI~S

November 28,2001
12:00 p.m.
Radiology Conference Room

DATE:
TIME:

PLACE:
PRESENT:

EXCUSED:

Neil Davey, MD
[an Davey, .\<rD
Joe Gobel, MD
Jeff Cliff
Rachel Bergmann

Tim Hall, MD
Karen Noyes

I.

RRCORD~R:

Nicole Lindauer

LUNG CANCER SCREENING

Kim Carley to contact Dr. Neil Davey regarding presentation on channel 2.
II.

IMJ!SARMC MARKETING

Ken Fry is making arrangements to have one of SARJ."\-[C's marketing
members present at llVU Marketing meetings. The committee to look at
splitting IMI marketing and SARMC marketing into two meetings.
Continue to keep IMI brand name in the public to bring in busine~s that we do
not currently have at SARMC. SARfvlC and IMI to work towards a combined
market share. IflMI is full, will transfer patients to SARJ.'viC and vise versa.
TTl.

Ji.EFERRAL NUMBERS

Rachel Bergmann broke out information on each of the events and how t!le
referral numbers looked prior to and after. See attached.
Shakespeare- Use a~ a fundraising venue for Shakespeare.

CME ·-Did not change where physician~ sent their patients, will need to
reevaluate.
IV.

DR STRATEGIC PLANNING

Current PACS Committee consists of Rachel Bergmann, Karen Noyes, Chris
Hayden, Leslie Kelly-Hall, Mark Wenstrom, Scott Christensen, Terry
Krogstad, Dr. Seabourn and occasionally Dis. Knochel and Scales. Continue
to make sure Drs. Seabourn and Scales working on same page as Marketing
Committee.

GSRRP/000661
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Quarterly evaluations on volumes are compared to SARMC, IMI and MRlCI,
having each pay their share for the rollout.
Leslie Kelly-Hall working on getting more support staff to begin office

toltow-cp. Key to success is backup service and follow-up.
The Web Ambassador will not be available over the Internet. Will be usit:g
direct Ambassador software, which has a more secure connection. Already
have the Ambassador software, just need to distribute it. Holdup ls staff, and
may have piOb!e:ns with connectivity due to need for broadband.
Drs. Nell and lat; Davey to look at marketing to the Djernes Group in Nampa.
Rachel Bergmann to contact.

v.

'NEWS/, ETTER

Dr. Scales has made :;:ome changes. After changes made, Rachel will bring
tb.e proof back to Dr. Neil Davey to sign off.

Vl.

WEBSITE
Rachel discussed the maintenance plan with Wire.~tone. Rachel wiil continue
to batch changes or additions tor Wirestone to maintain. The Radiologist;;
m.:t:d to ge! an image library set up, not only to include images of[ of each
modality, but logos, maps, picture of the buildings, etc. Changes to cccur
quarterly.
Wirestone may be able to put in tracking capability to see areas where the site
is getting the most hits.
Working on having the newsletter 011 archive.

V/l.

PET

Discussion of Dr. Sawyer picking days for putients to be scmmcd. Drs. Neil
and Ian Davey to revisit Dr. Sav.yer.
Drs. Neil and Ian Davey and Rachel to meet with Putmonologists. Currently
only getting referrals from Dr. Crowley.
Blue shield, not participating in the reading (professional component). Worth
accepting what's allowable from Rlue Shield on the PC to belp generate
business Oil the TC. Jet!' Cliff to discuss with PMI.
Requisitions coming steadily. With recurrent brcnst cancer and tracking of
treatment, numbers should increase.

Approve~

Da~c:

f\)'-?~

oL

c+-JJ:~~
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C.WE
36 Physidan and Mea!cal :>rovlders attended
··A~erage

monthly refeflal of 152 for the 3 mcmhs J:O~r to the CME

"I 14 tefarrals noted fe< the Month of Oc!cber, will con~nue to 'llonitcr for !1\e ne~l couple of months.

Sl!akespeare

27 Physlo:ans and ~.ed!c:al Providers RSVPd
''Average monthl'f mfeual ol243 for the 3 months pier to Shakespeare
..Average month~/ mferrel of 214 for the 3 month~ after August 4tll

OR
Communicator
26 Physoc'ans and Medical Providers halle 3ccess to Communicator since September
"Av~rage :nond•ly referral of 134 for the 8 months prior to Communicator ce1ng avai1able
"Average mcnthly refetral of 110 a month cor U,e 'ast 2 monthS after Communicatot has been avaiab!e, wll <;<>ntinue to moei!or

c.,municatortP'Iol
1 Physidans have both the Communicator and 'Nira~ess laptops available to them
"Avernge monthly referral of 49 for U1e 2 months prior to Jlllotlnstall
"Average mcnlhly refetre.l of 35 for the mon lh after the p'!o!install
"Average monthly referral of $3 alter lhe CommYni<:ator was avallab:e

Wireless .0 '/ol

68 Phys 1ci2ns and Medfeal Providers na•Ja access to a 'N"llaless laptop
"Averaga monthly re!e;ral ol526 for the 2 months pi'k:t to the pilot instaffs
"Average monthly referral of 578 fot tha 7 montl\s after tile pfct i~stans
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Il\11 MARKETING COi\'L"\fiTTEE REPORT
NOVEMBER 2001
CURRENt' PROJEC'fS :
NEWSLETfER :

January distJ:ibution
Lead articles -lMI Wes:t, Women's imaging
IMI West - Architectural illustration
-Floor plan
-Site photo
Won:en's imaging- role ofMRI in cervical cancer
Biographies ofthc three new IMl Radiologists
Draft of second edition to authors

WEBSITE;
Now online- www.idahoxray.com or www.aboutimi.com

Updated quarterly

CME:
Currently twenty video recordings distributed (1 0 to physicians)

FUTURE PROJECTS :

INn WEST:
Ongoing marketing efforts- Newsletter and website
New marketing efforts- MD to MD office visits (Meridian zip codes)
- Press : Nev'lspaper, TV, Radio (NPR}
- Open house
IDAHO SHAKESPEARE FESTIVAL :
Host the opening night of sponsored play
Six tickets per piny - distributed to staff

GSRRP/000664
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Octcber 4, 1999

QUfPATifNT
RABIOlOGY tllfTEA

Mogr>>lio ao1ooot<<
r.01rpoted fomogiii>'Y

VICKEN GARABEDIAN, MD
1055 N CURTIS RD
BOISE, ID 837C6-1352
RE: Opening of Intermountain Medical Imaging Outpatient Radiology
Center
Dear Dr. GARABEDIAN

BOARD CERTIFIED
MDIQlOCIHS

Ri"nlo R Atsllo. ~.0.
!on C.

Da~y.

M.O.

lleil C OaYBy, M.O.

We are proud to announce the opening of Intermountain Medical Imaging.
This brand new state-of-the-art facility is the first full service culpalient
radio!cgy center in the Treasure Valley. As a physician group, we have
always been committed to providing high quality seiVIce to our valued
dinfcal colleagues. Additionally, we also pride ourselves In staying on the
technological cutting edge of diagnostic imaging. In that tradition, we are
making a paradigm shift away from our current fUm-based system to a
lilmfess image management system. We will be using computers to
display, archive, transmit, and restore images at our facility. This precess
will include all digital imaging modalities: MRI, CT, US, standard x-rays,
fluoroscopy, and special procedures. Mammography will continue lo uHiize
a Him-based medium for the foreseeable future.

'loc< Garabtdian. MJJ.
Qp.td Gilos, 'd. D.
ll .I!Jle;h G<btl. \1.0.

r.

o.

Jo~n

0. Kro<llll, ~1.0.

J. 11a11. M.

This change will have several benefits for you and your patients:

> Lost rerords will be eliminated-all images wiD be permanenb'y
archived in a digital format on CD ROM or DVD discs.
> Images and reports will be available more promptly.

Willi•m l Munay, l.I.O.
Diane It Htwton. M 0.

Jaffnry T. Se1bourn• .\1.0.
ti!a M. Sell!!. M.D.

> A paper image "montage" of lhe Radiologist's key selected
images will be mailed with a final typewritten report sized for your
patients' charts.

> Accass to subspedalty Radiologists will be improved.

Ptu! Tra.q1ber, M.D.

> When fully implemented, you will be able to access imases and
DIRECTOR OF

MEDICAL IMAGIIIQ
Corett 1\uy<S. B.S. a.T..I~I!Cfl

audio report summaries via computer at remote locations such as
the O.R. or in your office. We wal be scheduling office visits to
evaluate your current computer infrastructure so that we may
determine the most affective way to transmit data to you.

> Hazardous waste associated with traditional film and chemicals
will be eliminated.

9?1 III£ST \1YRTLE SlREH (COR!'lER Of 9lH MIO MYRllU 801St:.IO.IHO 83102 3l3·91191Jll·lRAVI TO!t fqE[ 11110,\HO 317-Jll-3729 'IA'A'J.IOAIIO~RA'I.C·JM
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During the upcoming implementation, our staff will be trained to use this
new system. Although we are worr<.ing diligently to ensure a smooth
transition, we anllclpale some growing pains. Our goal is to Improve upon
your current level of service. So, please let us know immediately If you are
inconvenienced in anyway.
OUTPATIENT
IIAOIOlOGY CEltT£~

.\t•gnelic Rtsenaeu
eonJ"'Ie.l r.~"P"t
Olua"•!Cli•!Rr
a~.e Don<iw

Many physicians are accustomed to receiving copies of film to review in
their offices. Our long-term goal is to eliminate film completely, but we will
maintain the capability to produce film copies of exams as well. We would
appreciate you trying our new system which, when fully Implemented, will
improve access to images and reports.

Sc;,oniiiQ

'lait!J la4'llt:leueru tonal

You may review Imaging studies performed at Intermountain Medical
Imaging from an Ambassador computer monitor in the St. Alphonsus file
room. The simple program takes less than five minutes to learn. We are
available to provide orientation at your convenience.

BOAflP C~IITiflED
RADIOLOGISTS

Enclosed please find an infonnaUcnal brochure on our facility as well as an
order pad. If you are unfamiliar with our group of Radiologists cr are
Interested In more detailed Information, we invite you to visit our website at:
www.!dahoxray.com.

Riurdo R. Ahdl>, \1.0.

ian C. Oavoy, \1 0.
Ned C. D"<Y· M.O.

We invite your feedback and open discussion. We look fcrward to seNing
your medlcallmaglng needs.
Warm regards,

0•~14

Gilor. ~to.

R. Jo.<aph 6otoel, .1.1.0.

J.t. H&11,1A.D.
Join Q.

~hoi,

Your Colleagues at lntennountain Medical Imaging

M.D.

'Nilli>ro T. \luuay, M.O.
Oiane R. Na-.. lon, M.O.

Jeffrey T. So•ho""· M.O.

lisa L!. S~les. M.O.

DIRECTOR OE
MEPICALIMAOIIIG
~>reo

u.,...

~.S .. R.'.. IAIIGfl

9l7'NEST MYRll£ SfREET (f.OmiER Of ~-H M~a M'IRflE) BOI&l.IOAI10 83102 3:13·9123 1333·XAAY) lOll fAE~ IN tOAIIO B77-JJ3·912~ WWW!DAitOXMY.COM
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January 4, 2000

Sandi a Bruce
Prcsi<lenl and CEO

Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.
I 055 N. Curtis Road
Boise,ldaho 83706
Dear 3andra,
Dr. Curran and I have reviewed with the other members of Doctors Corp our
impr< ssions of the meeting we attended with you and the radiologists on December 16. 1999.
This letter is intended to communicate our feelings on !hal meeting subsequent to discussions
withil1 Doctors Corp.
It is the opinion of Doctor's Corp that a win-win, cooperative solution to the
probl :m must be found and will require the strong use of your influence as CEO ofSARMC.
Most of the demands of the radiologists could be accomplished over t;rne. The following general
fonn: t could he made to work.
I.

Three General Partnership positions could be rr.ade available for SAR.MC,
MRI Associates or the hospital partners to purchase. These could be held
or resold to the radiologists. Two General Partnership positions would
come from Drs. Giles and Henson and. the third would be newly created.

2.

Dt·s. Curran, Havlina, and Prochaska are not cutTently willing sellers but
would listen lo offers. They have all agreed co:1ceptually to create an
agreement whereby they would be bought out at specific times according
to some mutually agreeable evaluation mechan·sm{s) or formula(s). The
Hospitals might have to establish rights of refusal and possibly commit
some of these lo the radiologists.

3.

The suggestion by the radiologists to split the two companies is not
considered appropriate or desirable at this time It would have to be
acceptable to all the hospital partners and the n·.ajol'ity of Doctors Corp.

The concerns expressed at the meeting regarding the problems of not having a
seam ess department would be present regardless of who the owners ~tre. Any solutions available
to tht radiologists as one of multiple partners could be incorporated under the present ownership.
Any 1alid concerns need to be addressed irmnediaLely and are independent of ownership.

f/lll!ftr.~-' SARMC00640
OFFICE OF THE CFO
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Sand·a Bruce

January 4, 2000
Page 2

The time hus come for SARiviC to insist on and provide full, supportive

radiologic coverage of the lab at historical levels of professionalism and service. These standards
are c ear nationally and in the SA.Rlv1C radiology department. Along with the prolessional
inteq•retalion and supervision of the lab comes the obligation to notify the lab/hospital of all
de fie encies and safety concerns and to make professional recommendations as to departmental
need:, including new equipment and upgrades required to maintain the state of the art. This
comr 1itment is integral to all radiology professional contracts including the SARlvlC main
depa1 tment. It cannot be allowed to be withdrawn simply because the radiologists of the lab are
now .tlso its competitors. The highest standard of care for patients is ~ssential and includes
havirg radiologists on site to supervise studies as needed. We now view as a necessity
SAR vtC's providing the lab with full, supportive, traditional radiologist covemge or pennitting
the rv RJ Center ofldaho to contract directly with radiologists as a fidJciary responsibility of
SAKv1C to its other general and limited partners. We also see it as our responsibility to point
this cut.

The MRl partnership has been a model of cooperative networking among multiple
hospitals and physicians. This has been accomplished by treating entities fairly and by
committing to a win-win approach to networking and problem resolution. The cun·ent position
of tht SARMC contract radiologists creates a real challenge to continuing this tradrtion. It is not
too late to create a mutuaUy workable and beneficial solution. The MRl Center ofldaho has
cstab ished an exemplary and extraordinary, patient-oriented service whose commitment to
excel ence has spread to the mobile operation and has benefited quality patient care throughout
the N JJ1hwest. SAR.i\1C made the decision to provide MRI services t:1rough the mechanism of
this putnership. Your support for the commitments ofSARMC to this partnership will be
clearly needed to resolve the current impasse.
Sincerely,

; '2:?4
:;:_,~~
.... ~~

'/....--

/?:J

--./

James Prochaska, M.D., for Doctors Corp

SARMC00641
OFFICE OF THE
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Gem state

a

Radl. oli. '-~-g· y
•·

37? W Malu Stre~l. Suite o0:3 • 3oise, hlatto 837C2 • td 208.J64.90•.Jtl • fax 208.384.9023

eOhtli)C!\1\'IIflliD
RAll!OUlGISTS

carolyn COffman, M.D.

Cunls H. Coulam, M.D.

August 7, 2002

tan c. Davey. M.D.

To: MR1 Center of Idaho Scheduling Department, Radiology Scheduling Department
From:

Nell C. Davey,

~1.0.

Vlcl< Garabedian, M.().

R. Joseph Gobel, M.O.

J,1:llall,M.D.

John Q. Knocl\el, M.O.

WiUlaot T. Murcay. M.D.

Da!!os D. Peck,

M.o.

Mldtael J. !\'yan, M.O.

RadiologisL~

Re: Scheduling.
There has been a "mission creep" with respect to the scheduling of cases requiring the

administration of intravenous contrast material, and the scheduling of 'after-hours monitored
cases'. In addition, critically ill St Alphonsus house patients are often being examined during
the late night hours.
We are concerned with this process, and want to reiterate that it cannot be assumed that we are
'immediately available' for care in the case of a contrast reaction, or to provide physician
monitoring, for the complicated patients being electively screened afte•· hours. We are aslting
that all contrast cases aft.er hours be restricted to 'emergent basis' only. House cases requiringnursing care, and physician monitoring be performed during normal working hours. Add on
elective cases requiring physician input should appropriately be scheduled at times that we can
realistically be expected to be available. (Monday to Friday, 0700-1900). All cases thai fall
outside of this time frame, {other than routine, non-monitored cases), need to be specifically
approved by the On-call Radiologist as an emergent add-on.
Thank you for your time and consideration in this matter.
We will expect implementation ofthis policy by 8/1912002.

(offrey t Seai><lurn, M.D.

Sincerely,
Usa M. Sca!os. M.D.

Paul Traughber, M.D.

,-H:;

fl<E<:UTIVf. Dll!ECI'O!l

Jeffrey fl. CUff
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MR1 of Idaho Special Meetin&
Date:

September 8, 2003

Present:

Roger CWTan, M.D. Chairman
Thom.ns Henson, M.D.
James Prochaska, M.D
Sandra Bruce, CEO SARlviC
Ken Fry, CFO, SAR.t'AC
Mark Dalley, CEO Holy Rosary Med. Ctr.
Mark Adams, CEO, West Valley Medical Center, Caldwell.
Joseph Messmer, CEO Mercy Medical Center
Randy Hudspeth, Dir. Professional Practice SARI\IIC
Rick Presnell, Chief Accounting Officer, SARMC
Jack Floyd, CEO MRICIIMRI Mobile
Dr. Scott Henson
Michael Cacchillo, Dir, Bus. Dev. IvfRICI/fvfRlM
Kevin West, Gen. Counsel MRICI
Patrick Miller, SARMC Counsel
Stephanie Westermeier, SARMC CoWlsel

Guests:

Absent:

David Giles, M.D. Medical Director
Jack Havlina, M.D
Andrew Fitzgerald, CFO Holy Rosary Med.Ctr

Recording:

Michael Cacchillo
Chairmru1, Roger CwTall opened the special session at 5:09pm,
welcoming Sandra Bruce, Ken Fry and the SARMC Counsels as
well as Kevin West, 1\-t:Rl Gen. Counsel to the meeting.. With the
Radiology agreement discussion as the prlma.ry item, Dr. Curran
recognized Sandra Bruce a11d asked that she share the St.
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center perspective on the proposed
agreement and her positions, insights etc. Sandra produced a single
page agenda (see enclosed document) aimed at addressing tile
current iVIRI Service Agreement and a discussion of the Long
Tetm Relationship Issues. Sbe then gave an overview of services
provided by the radiologists to St. Alphonsus. Ms. Bruce
acknowledged the Radiologists time cutback to 12 hours per day,
(S) five days per week with emergency coverage. The board
brought up the fact that the proposed agreement was for hospital
inpatients and hospital outpatients and the Radiologists were not
doi~g off-hour coverage. This meant that 85% of the volume of

Confidential
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MRJCI was not being addressed directly. Additionally, after hours
Radiologists were not always receptive to handling emergencies.
Ms. Bruce requested data with patient names and days of
occurrences to allow her to address the rads with the issues.
The board indicated that information was being disseminated that
would have local physicians believe that Gem State Radiology/Ii\-II
owned the DR system and could dictate exclusivity of what goes
on the system and who readc; scans. l'vfs. Bruce said she was
unaware of the issues and suggested that a committee be fanned of
representatives from both St. Al's and "MRICI to address the issues.
Initial names from St. Al's would be Ken Fry, Carolyn Corbett, Pat
Miller and one person from IT. These individuals would be joined
by individuals representing MRJ of Idaho.
A discussion ensued on the relationship of the Radiologists,
technologists and misinformation that was being propagated in the
Treasure Valley. (Jack Floyd or Board) sited five items of concem:
L General review of protocols by Rads as the technology has
moved forward but the Radiologists haven't reviewed
capabilities and protocols with the technologists to update
2. Mentoring of the technologists with feedback from the
Radiologists no longer happens, especially to address concerns
by referring physicians
3. The Radiologists periodically express quality concems
rcgar<ling MRlCI systems and coils, but do not document them
for follow-up. In one case, M~J invited and secured a visit by a
GE Vice President to address the purported issues but no one
from GSR carne to meet with him
4. Statements of lv!RICI software being antiquated in light of
purchase and installation of the latest Excite and Quantum
software systems have not been dispelled
5. Alleged technology of MRICI Systems not compatible with
DR because of inadequate software configuration
Sandra suggested that the issues sited actually lead to the second
item on the agenda, that of on-going Long-term relationship issues.
She stated that she felt the Relationship of MRl of Idaho and St.
Alphonsus no longer worked. She saw the future as an integration
effot't with her medical staff and physician ownership the direction
that St. Al's was heading. She felt that the best resolution would be
a St. Al's buy-out of the M:ru: ofldaho business. At this statement,
Sandra produced a document (see enclosure) that she had put
together indicating a suggested timeline for the buyback
negotiation and valuation process and stated if the transaction did
not occur in a timely fashion that one of St. Al's options under the
current agreement would be withdrawal from the partnership. She
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stated that Ken Fry would lead the negotiations for St. Alphonsus
and asked that someone from ~.lRI of Idaho be appointed to
represent itself. It was mutually agreed that the Board needed to
caucus to review the proposal and to select a team to represent the
Center. The special session was brought to a close at 5:39pm and
followed immediately by an abbreviated September Board
~leeting. See September Board Meeting Minutes.

Jack Floyd, CEO
MRICIIMRI Mobile

J. Roger Cun·an, M.D. Chairman,

MRICI/MRl Mobile

Confidential
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September 8, 2003
5:00p.m. to 7:00p.m.
Sister Patricia Room
ATTENDEES:

Andy Fitzgerald~ David Giles, MD; Jack Floyd; Jack Havlina. MD; James Prochaska, MD; Joe Messmer,
Mark Adams; Mark Dalley; Mike Caccbillo; Roger Curran, MD; S. Henson, MD; Thomas Henson, MD;
Randy Hudspeth; Richard Presnell,

GUESTS:

Kevin West, Patrick Miller. Stephanie Westcrmcier, Ken Fry, Sandra Bruce

.~;!A&~i~-\~~l~:,~::;·~/~~,::-\:. ·:~,;.i,~'I)~J;~h"¥'~~~~~l~~']"~~~l:;~::"~trF~li.2.-~i!~:_· :-,(~~:\:· . ,,·:=~,·
1. MRl Service Agreement

I 10 Minutes I N/A

\ Discussion

I Appoint negotiation team to

resolve issues and set timeline for
resolution.
2. Long Term Relationship Issues

45 Minutes I N/A

Discussion I Agreement on next steps.

'
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MRI of Idaho SpeciaJ Meeting

EXHIBITK

EXHIBIT K
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Scott Christensen
BCC; CT; Front Office; Gen Rad Tachs; Nuc Med Group; Nurses; Rad Admin; Rad
Asstistants; Specials; Ullrasound
12/12/05 8:44AM
Data:
Subject:
Fwd: New MRI Service
From:

To:

FYI
Scott E. Christensen B.S., R.T.(R)
Manager, Radiology and Medical Imaging
Saint Alphonsus R.M.C.
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208)-367-6546
FAX:
(208)-367-2989
e-mail: scotchri@SARMC.org
»>Ben Murray 12/11/05 07:48AM»>
Please see the attached memo and post for all staff- on the new Saint Alphonsus MRI service that begins
on Monday, December 19th. More information will be distributed thru the next week.
Also review an earlier email on fnservice programs related t the new monitors and pumps we have
purchased for use In the new MRI.
Ben Murray, RN
Director of Nursing
367·6234 (Office)
855-6908 (Beeper)

#J-~~~~!111-~
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<@>Saint Alphonsus

To:
From:
Re:
Date:

I

INTER OFFICE MEM oRANnuM

Nurse Managers; All Nursing Staff
Ben Murray, RN, MSN, Director of Nursing
New MRI Operations Update
December 11, 2005

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
As many of you are already awareth a new MRI service is beginning operations on
campus on Monday December 19 . As of that date, Saint Alphen sus MRI will
be the sole provider of MRI services for all Saint Alphonsus Inpatient,
outpatient and ED patients. The Mobile MRI will be located at door 56 near
Endoscopy and Preadmission testing. A permanent MRI site is being constructed
off the old mafn lobby, by the former cashiers office, and is expected to be
completed In the Fall of 2006. The same fundamental procedures that have
always been followed when utilizing MRI services will continue. There are a
number of key points that are important for all staff to be aware of:
1) MRI of Idaho will remain on campus as they have a long term lease on their
current space. They will continue to serve non Alphonsus outpatients, but as
of December 191h, they will no longer provide services to Saint

Alphonsus connected patients.
2) Gem State Radiology will continue to be responsible for the interpretation of
all MRI studies and Saint Alphonsus will partner with Intermountain Medical
Imaging In operating the new MRI service.
3) To contact the Mobile MRI regarding ED and Inpatients, staff should call3340
(as of December 19th), Further information about scheduling and contacting
lhe Mobile MRJ will be prominently posted in all areas in the next few days.
When you enter STARS to process orders, the option that appears will be
Saint Alphonsus MRI.
4) Equipment - MRI compatible wheelchairs and gurneys have been purchased
and will be used for transporting patients. We also have MRI compatible
monitors and pumps - see related email of today re. education about the new
equipment.
5) Code Response- The Mobile unit is equipped wilh an emergency code
response button. If there is a code in the Mobile unit, the code team will
respond as usual. The Switchboard will overhead page - "Code Blue, Saint
Alphonsus MRI, Door S6". At this time we will continue to provide code
response for patients In the MRI of Idaho suite. If the switchboard pages a
"Code Blue - MRI Center of Idaho", the code response team should
respond as they always have. AU ED and critical care nursing staff will be
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able to access the MRI unit using their hospitaiiD; proximity to the magnet
will not harm the 10 badge.
'
6) Transport· As per usual, monitored patients will be accompanied by a nurse,
who will remain with the patient throughout the procedure. Pediatric patients
will be accompanied under the standard terms of security for pediatric
patients. If there are any delays at the point of service for critical care
patients, they can be housed In the Ambulatory Surgery Center until final
clearance to enter the MRI unit has been obtained.
7) Anesthesia - During the occasional anesthesia procedures that take
place In MRI, a Saint Alphonsus nurse will accompany and remain with
the patient throughout the procedure. This can be the critical care or ED
nurse who Is always present anyway, the Radiology staff nurses or other
nurses who have been trained In conscious sedation support. MRI staff will
coordinate with the unit and the clinical coordinators to arrange the necessary
and appropriate nursing support for non critical care patients.
8) Facility- The Mobile MRI will have a sheltered canopy/ walkway, with
heat and lights, so that patients do not have to go ~outside" to enter the unit.
The side of the Mobile has a garage door type opening and a lift to bring
wheelchair and gurney bound patients Into the control room.
9) Safety- The same basic safety Issues apply, as always, when In proximity to
the magnet unit Including: staff do not enter the magnet room Itself unless
they have specific clearance from the tech on duty; everyone needs to be
mindful of metal objects such a name tag clips, pens, coins and so on; staff
should make the MRI tachs aware of your own history of pacemaker
presence and other Issues of possible embedded metal; follow aU
Instructions of the tach In regards to safety concerns (see MRI policy
online). Further lnservlce education opportunities will be announced soon.
10) Outpatients- All Saint Alphonsus MRI outpatients will be directed to enter
thru door S2. They will sign in at Registration and be escorted or directed to
the Radiology reception desk. Please assist any visitor who may be searching
for either Saint Alphonsus MRI or the MRI of Idaho office.
11 )More Information will be forwarded to managers and staff In corning
days - please make sure al such announcements are posted In the units for
all staff to see.
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com
BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

CHRISTOPHER D. RiCH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
ISTARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
V.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
CONDUCT DISCOVERY
REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
INCURRED BY SAINT ALPHONSUS

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND COSTS INCURRED BY SAINT ALPHONSUS - 1
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MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership ("Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited
("Mobile") (collectively, "MRIA") hereby moves this Court for leave to conduct discovery
regarding the amount of attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Saint Alphonsus and the rates
charged by Saint Alphonsus's attorneys. This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in
Support of their Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery Regarding the Amount of Attorneys'
Fees and Costs incurred by St. Alphonsus ("St. Al's") and the Rates Charged by St. Al's
Attorneys filed concurrently herewith.
DATED this 21st day of February 2012.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND COSTS INCURRED BY SAINT ALPHONSUS - 2
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..

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of February 2012, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
..
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
CONDUCT DISCOVERY
REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
INCURRED BY SAINT ALPHONSUS

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership ("Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited
("Mobile") (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Memorandum in Support of their Motion for
Leave to Conduct Discovery Regarding the Amount of Attorneys' Fees and Costs incurred by
St. Alphonsus ("St. Al' s") and the Rates Charged by St. Al' s Attorneys.

I. INTRODUCTION
On January 31,2012, MRIA filed its Memorandum of Costs and Fees seeking a little
over $4.6 million in attorneys' fees and costs. On February 14, 2012, St. Al's filed its Motion to
Disallow MRIA's Attorneys' Fees and Costs. In its memorandum in support of that motion,
St. Al's argued the amount of fees and costs sought by MRIA were excessive. Within those
arguments, St. Al's also complained that the hourly rates charged by MRIA attorneys are
excessive. By making these arguments, St. Al's has put the amount of fees and costs it incurred
and the rates charged by its attorneys squarely at issue. In fact, when a party opposes a fees and
costs petition as excessive, courts have held that the amount of fees and costs incurred by the
opposing party are discoverable so that a comparison can be made of the amounts incurred by
both parties. In such instances, courts have held that a comparison of the fees and costs incurred
by both parties and the rates charged by each party's attorneys is relevant to determining the
reasonability of the amounts sought in the fees and costs petition. Consequently, because
St. Al's has objected to the fees and costs sought by MRIA as excessive, MRIA should be
allowed to conduct limited discovery regarding the fees and costs incurred by St. Al's and the
rates charged by St. Al's attorneys.
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II. ARGUMENT
As this Court is well aware, St. Al's had no fewer than eight attorneys in the courtroom
for the second trial of this case. 1 It is unknown how many countless other attorneys from the
Jones Day law firm were working on the case outside ofthe courtroom. Yet despite this army of
lawyers from largest law firm in the United States, 2 St. Al's has the audacity to complain about
the amount of fees charged by MRIA' s local lawyers and the rates charged by those lawyers.
Indeed, MRIA understands from fee petitions filed by Jones Day lawyers in other cases that the
rates of the well-heeled Jones Day attorneys are significantly higher than the allegedly excessive
rates charged by MRIA's attorneys. See WHX Corporation, Case No. 05-11444 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y 2005) (Jones Day fee application ranging from $235 for an associate attorney to $635
for a partner) Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Case No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2005)
(Jones Day fee application ranging from $425 to $700 for a partner; $200 to $565 for an
associate; $195 to $225 for a staff attorney; and $110 to $275 for paralegal work. See also
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/city-337982-legal-outsourcing.html (noting that Jones Day
has charged a city at a rate of $495 an hour to handle a lawsuit that had not yet gone to trial).
Although the cases are split on the discoverability of an opposing party's fees and costs,
"[t]he general principle underlying these divergent results seems to be that whether such
information is discoverable depends on the nature of the objections raised to the fee request."

Mendez v. Radec Corp.,_ F. Supp. _ , 2011 WL 4914717, at *2 (W.D. N.Y. Oct. 17, 2011).
Thus, "[w]here the opposing party challenges the reasonableness of the rate or hours charged by

1

The following attorneys for St. Al's were present in the court room during trial: Peter
Romatowski, Alan Freidman, Donald Ayer, Christian Vergonis, Thomas Davis, Michelle Marks,
Jack Gjording, and Stephanie Westermeier. In addition, MRIA also believes that another
attorney from Jones Day's Los Angeles office was present for Dr. McCarthy's testimony.
2
See http://www.law360.com/articles/135546/jones-day-now-largest-firm-in-us.
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the moving party's counsel, courts are more likely to find that evidence of the nonmoving party's
counsel's fees are relevant and discoverable." /d. (citing State ofNew York v. Microsoft Corp.,
No. 98-1233,2003 WL 25152639, at *2, n.3 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating that "some ofthe cases
explicitly note that '[w]hether discovery is appropriate depends, in part, on the objections raised
by the opponent to the fee petition going to the reasonableness of the fee petition"') (quoting
Murray v. Stucky's Inc., 153 F.R.D. 151, 152-53 (N.D. Iowa 1993). In fact, numerous courts

have held that time and billing records are relevant and discoverable in instances where counsel's
application for fees is opposed or counsel anticipates the application will be opposed. See e.g.,
Henson v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 770 F.2d. 1566, 1574-75 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that it

was an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny plaintiff the discovery of time and billing
records of opposing counsel especially considering the length and contentious nature of the
litigation); Riker v. Distillery, 2009 WL 2486196, at **1-2 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that an
itemized statement of number of hours billed by defendants, fee arrangement, costs, and total
fees paid was relevant and discoverable by plaintiff in anticipation of defendants' opposition to
plaintiffs fee petition); Serricchio v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 258 F.R.D. 43, 46-47 (D. Conn. 2009)
(holding opposing counsel's billing records and expense invoices were relevant and discoverable
where opposing counsel argued that plaintiffs time spent on the action was grossly excessive);
Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Krystal Gas Mktg. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1264-65 (N.D. Okla.

2006) (holding that invoices reflecting hourly rates of opposing counsel were relevant in
determining the reasonableness of counsel's fees); Pollard v. E.I DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
No. 95-3010, 2004 WL 784489, at **2-3 (W.D. Tenn. 2004) (allowing discovery ofthe fees and
costs incurred by the defendant to determine the reasonableness of the plaintiffs fee petition);
Brown v. Miss Elaine, Inc., 2003 WL 21517919 **1-2 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (holding that defendant's
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fee information was "helpful" to determine the reasonableness of plaintiffs fees); Chicago Prof'!

Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'! Basketball Assoc., 1996 WL 66111, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding
that evidence of litigation expenses of defendant were relevant and obtainable by plaintiffs in
anticipation of defendant opposing plaintiffs' fee petition); Ruiz v. WJ Estelle, 553 F. Supp.
567, 584 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (finding that reviewing defendants' fees was appropriate to assist in
determining the reasonableness of plaintiffs' fees); Blowers v. Lawyers Coop. Publishing Co.,
526 F. Supp. 1324, 1327 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (allowing discovery by plaintiff regarding the
"amount of time spent by defendant's attorneys in the case and the amount of costs and
disbursements incurred by them," after finding that this information "may have significant
bearing" on the reasonableness of amount of time spent and amount of costs and disbursements
incurred by plaintiffs attorney); Naismith v.Prof'l Golfers Assoc., 85 F.R.D. 552, 563-64 (N.D.
Ga. 1979) (holding that opposing counsel's time, rates, total fees, and expenses were
discoverable and relevant in support of the reasonableness of plaintiffs' fees and expenses).
Here, St. Al's specifically complains that the rates charged by MRIA's attorneys are
excessive. (See St. Al's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow MRIA's Attorneys'
Fees and Costs at pp. 8-9.) St. Al's also complains that overall amount of fees and costs sought
by MRIA are excessive. (!d. at pp. 9-17.) Consequently, under the law set forth in the cases
cited above, a comparison ofthe rates of St. Al's attorneys and the fees and costs incurred by
St. Al's is relevant to determine the reasonableness of the rates charged by MRIA's attorneys and
the fees and costs incurred by MRIA. Therefore, MRIA should be allowed to conduct limited
discovery regarding the rates charged by St. Al' s attorneys and the total fees and costs incurred
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by St. Al's so that a comparison can be made to determine the reasonability the rates charged by
MRIA's attorneys and the fees and costs sought by MRIA?

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, MRIA should be granted leave to conduct limited discovery
concerning the rates charged by St. Al' s attorneys and the overall fees and costs incurred by
St. Al's in the above-captioned matter.
DATED this 21st day of February 2012.

t

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

3

By this request, MRIA is not seeking information protected by the attorney-client privilege. As
an initial matter, time and billing records are generally not protected by privilege. See, e.g.,
Vingelli v. United States, 992 F.2d 449,453 (2d Cir. 1993); Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 77 F.R.D. 662, 663 (D.C.N.C. 1978); Real v. Continental Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 211, 214
(N.D. Cal. 1986). Moreover, even if they were privileged, for the purposes of this motion,
MRIA is chiefly concerned with knowing the amount of time and rates St. Al's attorneys billed
at, rather than knowing what those attorneys were actually doing during that recorded time.
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day of February 2012, a true and correct copy of
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintifJ!Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintifJ!Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery

D O_y:might Delivery
Macsimile

D U.S. Mail

D Hand Delivery
. D Oyemight Delivery
~acsimile

Brent Bastian
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Donald B. Ayer
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51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP,
Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
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ENFORCE A JUDGMENT
PURSUANT TO RULE 62(b)

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.; and
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COME NOW Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center (collectively "Saint Alphonsus"), by and through the undersigned counsel of
record, Gjording & Fouser, PLLC, and pursuant to Rule 62(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, move this Court for an order staying MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership (collectively, "MRIA") from enforcing judgment, while
Saint Alphonsus's motion for new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict is pending.
This motion is based upon the files and pleadings in this matter as well as the
memorandum and affidavits in support filed concurrently herewith.
DATED this 27th day of February 2012.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of February 2012, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

v
v

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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Saint Alphonsus respectfully requests that the Court issue an order staying MRIA from
enforcing its judgment while Saint Alphonsus's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or new trial is pending.
ARGUMENT
Rule 62(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, "(i]n its discretion and on
such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the
execution of or any proceedings to enforce a judgment pending the disposition of a motion for a
new trial .... or of a motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict
made pursuant to Rule 50 .... " While the Supreme Court has not "had an occasion to address
I.R.C.P. 62(b)" or the factors that a Court should consider in granting such a motion, Obendorfv.

Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892,901-02, 188 P.3d 834, 843-44 (2008), the equities and
the interests of justice favor the entry of a stay here.

First, Saint Alphonsus's motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict
raises several significant issues that have the potential to overturn MRIA's current judgment, or
significantly reduce the amount ofMRIA'sjudgment. A stay ofthe proceedings will ensure that
judgment will not be prematurely executed while the Court is contemplating the pending
motions.

Second, Saint Alphonsus has the financial means to satisfy the judgment after the posttrial and appellate process has been completed, and MRIA is not prejudiced by a stay. The
Supreme Court has already found that "MRIA has not shown that the lack of a bond would have
put at risk MRIA's ability to obtain payment of its judgment," Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care,
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR A STAY OF
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Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 224 P.3d 1068 (2009), and nothing has changed
since. Justice Jones' admonition, that "it would have been prudent for MRIA to agree to forego
collection procedures pending a decision on the appeal" due to the "the substantial number of
contested issues, and the slight possibility that any judgment would prove uncollectible"
continues to ring true. !d. at 502, 224 P.3d at 1091 (J. Jones, J., concurring specially). And
because MRIA is accruing interest on its judgment in excess of current market rates, it is not
prejudiced by a stay of execution. See Houben v. Telular Corp., 309 F .3d 1028, 1040 (7th Cir.
2002) ("both parties should be indifferent from an economic standpoint about the timing of
payment, because when a stay of execution has been entered, the status quo (i.e., the real value of
the judgment) is maintained through use of a Treasury-tied interest rate.").
Third, the Court should stay the execution of judgment because that judgment will be
appealed to the Supreme Court if the post-trial motions are denied. In that case, Saint Alphonsus
will be entitled to an automatic stay of execution pending appeal. 1 See Rule 62(d) ("When an
appeal is taken from the district court to the Supreme Court, the proceedings in the district court
upon the judgment or order appealed from shall be stayed as provided by the Idaho Appellate
Rules."); Idaho R. App. P. 13(a), (b). Given the inevitability that a stay will be entered in this
case, it would serve no purpose to allow MRIA to execute the judgment during the short period

1

To be sure, MRIA could require Saint Alphonsus to post a supersedeas bond as a
condition of the appellate stay, Idaho R. App. P. 13(b)(15), but MRIA could also agree to
alternate security, see id. Saint Alphonsus is currently negotiating alternative security with
MRIA, and the Court should maintain the status quo pending those discussions. At a minimum,
ifMRIA chooses to oppose a stay, then the Court should conditionally stay the judgment while
Saint Alphonsus obtains the supersedeas bond required by Appellate Rule 13(b)(15).
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of time until the Court decides the pending motions.
Should the Court grant Saint Alphonsus's requested stay, the Court should likewise order
a stay of proceedings by Saint Alphonsus to enforce its judgment, if MRIA so desires.
DATED this 27th day of February, 2012.

GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2ih day of February, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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ARGUMENT

In response to Saint Alphonsus's motion to disallow MRIA's requested attorneys' fees
and costs, MRIA has filed a motion seeking discovery of the hourly rates charged by Saint
Alphonsus' s counsel, and the amount of costs and fees Saint Alphonsus has incurred. Mem. at
5-6. MRIA suggests that "a comparison of the rates of St. Al's attorneys and the fees and costs
incurred by St. Al' s is relevant to determine the reasonableness of the rates charged by MRIA' s
attorneys and the fees and costs incurred by MRIA." Mem. at 5. But MRIA's own primary
authority states that courts allowing such discovery do so by reference to "the nature of the
objections raised to the fee request," as when a party "use[s] their own hours and rates as
yardsticks by which to assess the reasonableness of those sought by plaintiffs." Mendez v. Radec

Corp.,_ F. Supp. 2d _, 2011 WL 4914717, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2011). The pending
Motion to Disallow does no such thing, and even a rudimentary review of the grounds raised
therein shows that MRIA' s requested discovery is utterly irrelevant to issues before the Court.

First, Saint Alphonsus challenges MRIA's petition to the extent that it improperly (as
established by the law of this case) requests costs and fees (i) related to issues upon which MRIA
did not prevail and (ii) unrelated to the prosecution of this case. Mem. Supp. Mot. Disallow
("SARMC Mem.") at 1-8. MRIA makes no argument-nor could it-explaining how the billing
rates of Saint Alphonsus's attorneys, or the hours that they incurred, trump the rule that MRIA is
entitled only to costs and fees related to relevant issues upon which it actually prevailed.
Second, Saint Alphonsus challenges MRIA's requested fees as exceeding the prevailing

rates in Boise, Idaho. SARMC Mem. at 8-9. It does so because, in assessing the reasonableness
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of requested attorney's fees, a "court should consider the fee rates generally prevailing in the
pertinent geographic area," Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 750, 185 P.3d 258,262

(2008) (emphasis added), which in this case, as in Lettunich, is the Boise area. Indeed, MRIA's
fee petition is supported by an affidavit claiming that MRIA's claimed rates are the "prevailing
rates ... in the Boise legal community." Aff. of Steven Andersen ~ 8 (emphasis added).
Thus, all agree that the relevant question is whether MRIA' s requested rates are excessive
for Boise. However, the Jones Day attorneys representing Saint Alphonsus are not from Boise-

they are located in that firm's Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles offices, and their rates
therefore have no bearing on the question at hand. (Surely, if Saint Alphonsus were to prevail on
appeal, MRIA would argue that the fees recoverable for the work of the Jones Day attorneys
would be assessed at prevailing Boise rates, not prevailing Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles
rates.) The Washington- and Los Angeles-based billing rates of the Jones Day attorneys could
be $10 per hour or $10,000 per hour, and in neither case would that fact shed any light on the
question of the "rates generally prevailing" for attorneys in Boise. 1
Third, Saint Alphonsus challenges MRIA's costs requests, item by item, because MRIA

does not make the showing required by Idaho Rule 54(d) that "said costs were necessary and
exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the
adverse party," and because the costs requested would not in any event qualify under Idaho law.
1

At best, MRIA might have grounds to ask for the rates charged by Gjording & Fouser,
the Boise firm representing Saint Alphonsus, in support ofMRIA's claim that its requested fee is
not excessive for Boise. As set forth in the attached affidavit of JackS. Gjording, Gjording &
Fouser charged Saint Alphonsus $170 per hour for the appeal and retrial. This rate, for a Boise
partner with 40 years of experience, is much lower than the rate claimed by MRIA's partners.
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SARMC Mem. at 9-17. MRIA cites no argument or authority that it is entitled to disregard the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and the laws of Idaho related to cost awards, based on the
amount of costs incurred by Saint Alphonsus.

*

*

*

Ultimately, MRIA offers no explanation as to how discovery of Saint Alphonsus's fees
and costs will help rebut the legal challenges raised in the motion to disallow. Rather, MRIA's
true argument seems to be that challenges to its fees and costs are "audaci[ous]," regardless of
their impropriety under Idaho law, because MRIA thinks that the "well-heeled" out-of-state
Jones Day firm charges higher rates than the "local" Banducci Woodward Schwartzman firm.
Mem. at 3. MRIA offers no authority that such naked appeals to parochialism suffice as grounds
for the imposition of discovery. Nor could it. MRIA's frivolous request for a fishing expedition
should be denied.
CONCLUSION

MRIA's request for discovery should be denied.
DATED this 28th day ofFebruary, 2012.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
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Via Overnight Delivery
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada
)
I, JACK S. GJORDING, being first duly sworn upon oath, and based upon my own
personal knowledge of the following, am competent to and do testify as follows:
1.

I am a litigator with over 45 years of experience trying cases in Idaho. I have

handled and currently represent clients in a variety of matters, including professional liability and
commercial matters.
2.

I tried the MRIA case in 2007; was involved in the appeal; and retried the case on

remand. My rate for the work on all stages was $170.00 per hour.
3.

In late 2011, I raised my rate to $250 per hour. Based on information and

belief, this rate is within the range of local litigation rates charged by regional firms located and
doing business in Idaho and local firms.
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LEAVE TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY REGARDING SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
ATTORNEYSFEES- -2
004544

FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO be ore me, a Notary Public, this 28TH day of

............._

,

February, 2012.

•••

•

.•. * M A.~ .....
,•' •••••••• o...,-,
T,- -"
~-

_-w...

•

. .
:"'i: c.
:m.
.:

-:;I

'o"

.A.

••

: 'I ••
• :t,. • -..,

~

\

.•::c=.

•• "f.A -

•v:

0,.
~

• -,

•

.. '(!~ ~

\

.

~

•

:. :

< \ :::tl :>:
-~-~
1 ..... 1
.;';
~ "< ·~:
~-1~:~ ••••••• ("\ ....:
qo * ~···

...............

AFFIDAVIT OF JACKS. GJORDING IN OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY REGARDING SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
ATTORNEYSFEES- -3
004545

•

I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of February, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
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802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
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Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
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Deputy

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited (collectively,
"MRIA") hereby file this reply in support of their Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery
Regarding Saint Alphonsus's Attorneys Fees, filed February 21, 2012 (the "Motion for Leave").
This reply responds to the arguments found in St. Al's opposition to that motion, filed February
28, 2012 (the "Opposition").

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Opposition to MRIA' s Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery is short on legal
reasoning. Clearly very defensive about how much it has paid its attorneys, St. Als has chosen to
respond to MRIA's Motion for Leave not with any serious legal analysis, but instead with
unfortunate allegations that MRIA has filed a "frivolous" motion aimed at "naked parochialism."
While no doubt very cathartic for St. Als, its choice to focus on recrimination rather than dealing
with the cases cited by MRIA-all of which allow the exact relief sought in MRIA's Motionhas left this Court with no choice but to grant MRIA's Motion.

II.

A.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

Much in St. Al's Opposition is irrelevant to MRIA 's Motion for Leave
As a preliminary matter, it is clear from the Opposition to MRIA's Motion for Leave that

St. Als is confused as to two procedural points. First, St. Als seems to believe that MRIA's
Motion for Leave is its full "response" to St. Al's Motion to Disallow Fees and Costs.
Opposition, p. 1. It is not. MRIA will file an opposition to that motion which directly refutes the
points made in the Motion to Disallow Fees and Costs within the timeframe required by the
rules. Second, as MRIA made clear in its Motion for Leave, its sole purpose in seeking this
discovery is to compare its attorneys' rates-which St. Als alleges are too high-with those of
St. Al's attorneys. The result of these two points is that many of the contentions made in St. Al's
Opposition, particularly those in its first and third arguments, are irrelevant to MRIA's current
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY ON ATTORNEY FEES2
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Motion for Leave and thus will be left for another day. Instead, MRIA will focus here solely on
St. Al's second argument, which is the only argument relevant to MRIA's Motion for Leave.

B.

St. Als has not bothered to seriously dispute any of the arguments made in MRIA 's
Motion for Leave.
IDAHO R. Clv. P. 54(e)(3) generally governs the reasonableness of attorneys fees. St. Als

has oddly chosen to largely ignore the language of this Rule, both in this current Opposition and
in its Motion to Disallow Fees and Costs. As will be discussed in a subsequent filing, St. Al's
failure to deal with this Rule is generally problematic because St. Als has only dealt with one of
the twelve factors it needs to discuss in order to prevail. But more important for this immediate
Opposition, St. Al's ignoring of the Rule also means that even the one factor it does discuss-the
rates of the fees charged-is not anchored in the relevant language of the Rule. This is critical,
because the analysis here begins with, and is greatly informed by, the Rule's language. In
particular, Rule 54(e)(3)(D) states that this Court must consider the "prevailing charges for like
wor~'

(emphasis added). Thus, the obvious starting place for any discussion of this factor is as

to what constitutes "like work."
Several of the cases cited by MRIA in its Motion for Leave dealt with this exact issue,
though, again, St. Als failed to even mention them in its Opposition. The consensus from these
cases is that the very best comparison for what constitutes "like work" is what the opposing
attorneys did, since, logically, these attorneys would have not just done similar work, but largely
the exact same work as those from the moving party. As one court noted in language that could
just as well be describing the case at hand:
As the parties are well aware, this litigation has been long and complex, involving
both unique facts and novel questions of law. In such circumstances, the
defendant's fees may provide the best available comparable standard to measure
the reasonableness ofplaintiffs' expenditures in litigating the issues of the case .
... Each party in this case had to prepare to question the same witnesses, as well
as review the same evidence and to resolve the same issues. Consequently, while
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY ON ATTORNEY FEES- 3
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not determinative, the discovery of [defendant's] incurred costs appear reasonably
calculated to lead to admissible evidence regarding the reasonableness of the
plaintiffs' attorney's fees.
Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass 'n., 1996 WL 66111, *3
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (emphasis added). See also Naismith v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 85 F.R.D.
552, 563 (D.C. Ga. 1979) (discovery allowed in part because "[e]ach party must prepare to
question the same witnesses, must review the same documents and other evidence, and must
anticipate a presentation by the opposition of a complexity related to the facts in issue."). Put
more simply, then, the similarity of tasks between opposing attorneys makes the rates of the nonmoving party highly relevant (and thus discoverable), even if not "determinative" on their own.
St. Als nonetheless argues that since its Jones Day attorneys are not local, any
information about them is irrelevant. Once again, however, the case law ignored by St. Als flatly
disagrees with this precise argument. For example, Serricchio v. Wachovia Securities, LLC, 258
F.R.D. 43, 44-45 (D. Conn. 2009), which is cited in MRIA's Motion for Leave, is remarkably
similar to the case at hand. There, Wachovia hired the Chicago office of a large Jones Day-like
firm named Seyfarth Shaw to handle a matter in Connecticut. Serricchio was apparently
represented by someone more local, and, after prevailing in the matter asked for his fees. As
here, Wachovia objected to those fees as "excessive," to which Serricchio responded by asking
to see the Seyfarth Shaw billings. Wachovia then made the exact argument St. Al' s makes in its
Opposition: "Wachovia contends that its counsel's billing records simply have no bearing on the
Court's determination of a reasonable fee for Serricchio' s attorneys [since] they practice in
distinct legal markets and serve a client with different interests and incentives than Serricchio."
!d. The Serricchio Court pointedly disagreed, however, noting that practicing in different
markets is an issue that goes only to the weight of the opposing party's fees, not as to their
discoverability: "the better approach is to permit discovery of an opponent's billing records and
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY ON ATTORNEY FEES- 4
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then, in comparing the work performed by each side's attorneys, regard differences in the
parties' burdens and incentives as relevant to the weight of the records, not whether the records
are discoverable." !d. Thus, while St. Als thinks that it is making an argument as to relevance,
the case law makes clear that its points go instead to the weight of the evidence MRIA is trying
to discover. And the latter, of course, is a fight for another day.
St. Als argues finally that Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 750-51 (2008),
somehow stands for the proposition that a case taking place in Boise will always make Boise the
"pertinent geographical area" for prevailing fees. Opposition, p. 2. Yet Lettunich says nothing
of the sort-in fact, it says something far different. In Lettunich, the Idaho Supreme Court was
dealing with the issue of whether a court sitting in Payette County could award a prevailing
party, who was represented by Boise counsel, its fees at Boise rates. !d. The Supreme Court
found that the trial court could do so, since the ''pertinent geographic area is the area from
which it would be reasonable to obtain counsel." !d. (emphasis added).

Thus, contrary to St. Al's argument, the Lettunich Court did not hold that any case taking
place in the Boise area should be awarded Boise rates. Instead, it indicated that rates could be
awarded relevant to any location "from which it would be reasonable to obtain counsel." !d.
Using that logic here, St. Als clearly found it was "reasonable to obtain counsel" from
Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles for a case taking place in Boise, which suggests in tum that
St. Als is unintentionally admitting that purely local rates may not necessarily be the "prevailing
rates" to apply under the language of Lettunich. In short, not only does Lettunich not say what
St. Als represents, its holding actually works against St. Al's argument.
MRIA wants to be clear with this argument that it is not seeking non-local rates. As
MRIA's soon-to-be-filed opposition to the Motion to Disallow Fees and Costs makes clear,
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MRIA is seeking the high end of Boise rates for this exceptional case. What MRIA is arguing,
however, is that nothing in Idaho law-and certainly nothing in Lettunich-suggests that Jones
Day's attorneys' rates are irrelevant to that inquiry simply because they "practice in distinct legal
markets and serve a client with different interests and incentives than" do MRIA's attorneys. See

Serricchio, 258 F.R.D. at 44-45. Indeed, Lettunich seems to hold just the opposite when it
indicates that relevant "prevailing rates" may be as to wherever it would be reasonable to hire
attorneys given the nature of the case.
In sum, and as the multitude of cases cited by MRIA in its Motion for Leave make clear,
Jones Day's rates are highly probative as to the relative reasonableness ofMRIA's rates and are
thus discoverable. See, e.g., id.; Chicago Professional Sports, 1996 WL 66111 at *3; Riker v.

Distillery, 2009 WL 2486196, * 1 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that the opposing party's fees are
discoverable as "at least minimally relevant"); Brown v. Miss Elaine, Inc., 2003 WL 21517919,
**1-2 (E.D. Mo. 2003) ("fees charged to one party by its attorneys is relevant to the
reasonableness of the fees charged to the opposing party by its attorneys.").
MRIA according asks that the Court grant the Motion for Leave and compel discovery of
St. Al's attorneys fees.
DATED this 5th day of March 2012.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Donald B. Ayer
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I.

MRIA FAILED TO PROVE ITS DAMAGES
A.

MRIA Failed To Prove Center's Lost Profits

MRIA' s proof of Center's lost profits is deficient in two independent respects. First, it
does not support MRIA's claim that, between 1999 and 2010, Center "lost" approximately
46,000 scans to IMI, see Ex. 5000 (22,000 scans "lost" to IMI downtown); Ex. 5086 (24,000
scans "lost" to IMI on-campus), because MRI's expert concededly included in that figure
numerous scans that, had IMI never existed, would have gone to other competitors, like St.
Luke's. Mem. at 2-3. Second, even assuming arguendo that Center did lose those scans to IMI,
there is a complete failure of proof as to the Pope requirement that MRIA show what proportion
of this "lost" business was caused by Saint Alphonsus's alleged wrongdoing as opposed to other
factors, such as competition from IMI. Mem. at 3-4.
In response to the first flaw in its proof, MRIA denies that Budge conceded that some of
the "lost" scans would have gone to St. Luke's had they not gone to IMI. Opp'n at 6 n.l. But
the cited testimony merely shows that Budge did not count as lost any scan that actually went to
St. Luke's. Trial Tr. at 4531. Budge subsequently admitted that his model counted IMI scans
that would have gone to St. Luke's (instead of Center) ifiMI had not been around. !d. at 45944600. And this was not some small over-counting at the margins: for the 22,000 scans at IMI
downtown, compare in Exhibit 5000 the large yellow wedge of approximately 18,000 scans,
mostly from physicians with St. Luke's affiliations, see Ex. 987, to the much smaller purple
wedge of approximately 4,000 scans from physicians with only Saint Alphonsus affiliations. It
is no answer to say, as MRIA does, that Budge's "overstatement" oflost scans in the selected
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pool was offset by scans that Budge did not model (Opp'n at 5-6), because that purported
"offset" rests on speculation, not quantitative evidence or analysis. Trial Tr. at 4640-41 (Budge
"never tried to quantify" the overstated or understated scans, "because [he didn't] know how to
do it"). And, with respect to the 24,000 scans purportedly lost to IMI's on-campus facility, there
is no alleged offsetting "understatement": Budge included every scan performed by IMI oncampus, regardless of the identity or affiliation of the referring physician. Id. at 4536.
In response to the second flaw in its proof, MRIA points to liability evidence from which
"a jury could reasonably find that St. Al's caused MRI Center to lose scans to IMI." Opp'n at 3.
But whether a jury could find that Saint Alphonsus's alleged wrongdoing caused some decline in
Center's business is not enough. Under Pope, MRIA was required to offer some distinction
between scans lost on account of wrongdoing and scans that would have gone to IMI anyway as
a new entrant in the competitive marketplace. SADC v. MRJA, 148 Idaho at 498, 224 P.3d at
1087. MRIA made no effort to do this, even by way of approximation: Budge simply included
in damages (i) all of the 22,000 scans that he claims "migrated" from Center to IMI, regardless
of how many of those scans would have gone to IMI anyway in the but-for world, and (ii) all
24,000 scans performed by IMI on-campus, without even the fig leaf of his affiliated-physician
"migration" methodology, see Trial Tr. at 4536 ("[f]or scans that were actually done on the
physical plant of Saint Alphonsus, I did not use an analysis of affiliations of the doctors").
MRIA says Pope was satisfied because Budge claimed damages only for "51% of IMI
scans." Opp'n at 4. But, again, that is not true for the 24,000 scans purportedly lost to IMI's oncampus facility: Budge claimed damage for 100% of those scans. Trial Tr. at 4536 ("I assumed
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that had these various accused acts not occurred, that any scan that was done on the Saint
Alphonsus campus would have been done by the MRI magnet that was on that campus"). And,
with respect to the business purportedly lost to IMI downtown, the 49% of IMI' s scans not
counted by Budge are those that (according to Budge) IMI won from entities other than Center.
Trial Tr. at 4527-29; id. at 4593 ("we assumed that they (the excluded physicians] would not
have made a single referral to MIRA"). Budge thus made a determination that Center lost
approximately 22,000 scans to IMI; Pope required MRIA and Budge to take the additional step
of showing, in some non-speculative manner, what portion of that business loss was due to Saint
Alphonsus's misconduct, and what portion was due to legitimate competition from IMI.
Finally, there is no evidence that IMI "was wrongfully created by St. Al's," such that it
would be proper to assume that "all scans taken from MRI Center by IMI were due to St. Al' s
creating the competitor in the first place." Opp'n at 7. To the contrary, all evidence showed that
the GSR radiologists cemented their plans (including acquiring the building) for IMI without
Saint Alphonsus's knowledge, and planned to go forward with or without its approval. See, e.g.,
Trial Tr. at 3466-67,3477, 3520-21,4262-67,4960, 5215-23, 5369-70. Thus, IMI would have
existed anyway, and a methodology-like Budge's-that fails to take into account the
competitive impact IMI would have had absent misconduct by Saint Alphonsus is a legally and
factually defective analysis that cannot sustain an award of damages.
B.

MRIA Failed To Prove Mobile's Lost Profits

A party claiming lost profits must prove "what its costs and profits would have been,"
and a conclusory assertion that its own volumes, costs, and profits "would have been in the
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vicinity" and "very similar" to the defendant's is insufficient as a matter of law. Trilogy Network
Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 847, 172 P.3d 1119, 1122 (2007). MRIA concedes that

Budge did not present evidence of what MRI Mobile's own scan volumes, profits, and costs
would have been, but rather just "assume[ d]" that Mobile would have had the same volumes,
margins, and profits as IMI Meridian. Opp'n at 8. In other words, Budge "assumed that it would
have been the same center with a different name on the door," Trial Tr. at 4545, later conceding
that this assumption "really overstepped," id. at 4637. MRIA tries to distinguish Trilogy on the
facts, Opp'n at 7-8, but, like Mobile's claim here, Trilogy involved lost-profits damages for
wrongful competition and taking of a business opportunity. 144 Idaho at 846, 172 P .3d at 1121.
MRIA's contention that the failure to comply with Trilogy benefited Saint Alphonsusbecause the evidence was that MRI Center had higher profit margins that IMI Meridian-is
wrong for two reasons. Opp'n at 8. First, it was MRI Mobile, not MRI Center, that allegedly
would have opened in Meridian, and the only record evidence is that MRI Mobile had a
considerably smaller profit margin than IMI Meridian did. Compare Trial Tr. at 1884 & Ex.

4246 at p. 33 (MRI Mobile margins in 2001 to 2006 of28% to 29%) with Exs. 5087 & 5089
(IMI Meridian margins of 51% to 67%). Second, MRIA's contention about Center's margins
ignores that MRIA's proof also fails on the question of scan volume: there simply is no
evidentiary basis for Budge's assumption that an MRI Mobile business in Meridian would have
had the same volume of scans that IMI did, especially since, as Budge conceded, there is no basis
to assume that the GSR radiologists who were so critical in attracting referrals (e.g., Trial Tr. at
5601-03, 5776-78, 5799-5800) would have read scans for MRI Mobile. Trial Tr. at 4635-37.
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C.

MRIA Failed To Prove That Bad Acts Caused Any Loss After Aprill, 2005

MRIA is entitled to damages arising after April 1, 2005, only ifthose damages were
caused by wrongdoing prior to that date. E.g., Trial Tr. at 4363. But MRIA failed to introduce
any evidence that prior bad acts precluded it from competing for business that it allegedly "lost"

to IMI after April1, 2005, or that prior bad acts caused it to lose the additional referrals from
physicians who had remained customers of MRIA throughout the period of alleged wrongdoing.
Mem. at 5-6. Instead, MRIA's expert admitted that his lost-scan estimate "assumes" that all of
the post-April 2005 referral decisions resulted from Saint Alphonsus "not ... be[ing] able to
lawfully compete" after April 2005. Trial Tr. at 4566.
MRIA contends this assumption was justified because Jack Floyd testified that MRIA
was "unable to compete effectively" after the non-compete ended, and thus "was unable to win
back the stolen referrals." Opp'n at 9. But it makes no sense to talk ofMRIA "winning back"
or "regaining" referrals or scans. A referral of a scan is a single commercial transaction
occurring at a discrete point in time, not a source of continuing revenue. What MRIA really
wants to suggest is that MRIA lost customers before April 1, 2005, and could not win them back
after that date. But MRIA knows there is no evidence to support that contention. Rather, the
physicians whose post-2005 referrals are counted in Budge's damages methodology patronized
both MRIA and IMI throughout the period of alleged wrongdoing, and many did not make their
first referral to IMI until after April1, 2005. See Ex. 4566. Since MRIA did not "lose" these

customers during the non-compete period, there was no question of "winning" them back.
Rather, MRIA needed to show how these physicians' post-April 2005 referral decisions were
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influenced by years-old misconduct as opposed to lawful competition. MRIA did not even try to
do so, and therefore is precluded from recovering any damages after April1, 2005. 1

D.

MRIA Failed To Prove Profits Lost To IMI's On-Campus Facility

During the entire period of alleged wrongdoing (i.e., prior to April 1, 2005), Saint
Alphonsus used MRI Center as the exclusive MRI provider for Saint Alphonsus's own inpatients and emergency-room patients. Trial Tr. at 5806-07, 5813. After the non-compete
ended, IMI opened an on-campus facility and Saint Alphonsus began sending its own hospital
patients there. See Trial Tr. at 3724, 5809, 5824-25; Ex. 4377 at 2. MRIA's theory ofpost-2005
damages-that MRIA could not "win back" customers lost during the non-compete period-has
no applicability to Saint Alphonsus's decision where to send its own patients, and MRIA
therefore cannot recover for scans performed at IMI's on-campus facility. Mem. at 7. MRIA
has no persuasive response.
First, MRIA tries to resurrect its wrongful-dissociation claim, arguing that IMI would not

have been on-campus but for "St. Al's concerted and unlawful efforts to [among other things]
supplant MRIA with IMI." Opp'n 11. But Saint Alphonsus had every right to dissociate and,

1

MRIA's argument that the jury could "conclude" that wrongdoing caused post-2005
scan losses simply because scans were lost (Opp'n at 10) is a tautology. Pope compels MRIA to
prove that it lost scans to IMI due to wrongdoing, as opposed to other factors like competition.
MRIA's claim that the jury can speculate as to cause does not satisfy the burden of proof.
Indeed, if anything, MRIA's raw data undermine its claim to post-2005 damages. According to
MRIA, Center suffered a modest 13%-per-year decline in business over the three-year period
2001 to 2004 (from 4,800 to 3,000 scans). Opp'n at 10. Only in the three years after the noncompete expired, and all alleged wrongdoing ended, did Center see the much more precipitous
decline in scan volumes that account for the vast majority of the damages awarded. !d.
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after April 1, 2005, to "supplant MRIA with IMI" as the provider of MRI services to the
hospital's own patients. MRIA cannot claim damages caused by this lawful dissociation and
choice by Saint Alphonsus to take its own business elsewhere.
Second, citing Stark and Anti-Kickback laws, MRIA argues that Saint Alphonsus did not

prove that it had a right to send its own hospital patients to IMI. Opp 'n at 11. This is frivolous:
no law prevented Saint Alphonsus from replacing one facility (Center) with another (IMI) as the
provider of services for the hospital's own patients. See Mot. Directed Verdict Stark Claims at
8-10 (Oct. 18, 2011 ). And again, MRIA tries to reverse the burden of proof. As the claimant, it
was MRIA' s burden to prove that Saint Alphonsus' s act of sending its own hospital patients to
IMI was a tort or contract breach that caused MRI Center damages. MRIA has not done so; in
fact, the Court dismissed MRIA's claims of Stark and Anti-Kickback violations and held that
MRIA could not rely on allegations of post-April 2005 wrongdoing as a basis for liability or
damages. See Trial Tr. at 6365-71.
Third, MRIA argues that it is entitled to all of the claimed damages because Saint
Alphonsus did not prove that the IMI on-campus facility "served only St. Al' s inpatients."
Opp'n at 11 (emphasis added). Again, MRIA reverses the burden of proof. IfMRIA is claiming
(i) that IMI's on-campus facility provided services to non-hospital outpatients as well as to
hospital patients, and (ii) that MRIA is entitled to recover for the scans performed on nonhospital outpatients, then MRIA should have proved what portion of the IMI on-campus scans
related to non-hospital outpatients, and sought damages only for those scans. But MRIA did not
do so. Instead, it counted as lost all scans performed at IMI's on-campus facility, for hospital
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patients and non-hospital outpatients alike. That damages award-which punishes Saint
Alphonsus for the post-noncompete decision to replace MRI Center as the provider of MRI
scanning services for Saint Alphonsus's hospital patients-cannot stand. 2

E.

MRIA's Expert Damages Calculation Inflates Its Actual Loss

In determining damages, MRIA' s experts hypothesized that, in the but-for world, Saint
Alphonsus would not have left MRIA, so that a five-member partnership would have realized the
claimed lost profits; the jury awarded MRIA 100% of those "lost" profits even though the four
remaining partners ofMRIA suffered only about 80% of those losses. Mem. at 7-8. MRIA
argues that Saint Alphonsus was correctly prohibited from introducing evidence on this point
because it already received a buy-out share. Opp'n at 12. But the two issues are unrelated.
Saint Alphonsus is challenging the overcompensation of the remaining partners beyond their
actual losses. To illustrate the point, the jury's award of 100% of the lost profits to MRIA is
equivalent to a situation in which (i) a two-member partnership with an equal share of all profits
lost a $1,000,000 opportunity due to one partner's misdeeds, and (ii) a jury awarded the entire
$1 ,000,000-rather than a single-partner share of $500,000-to the innocent partner.

F.

MRIA Failed To Prove Center's Diminution in Value

MRIA offers no response on this point, other than to incorporate prior briefing. Opp'n at
12-13. The Court should grant JNOV on this issue for the reasons stated in the opening brief.
2

Moreover, to the extent MRIA sought damages for outpatient referrals, MRIA's proof
suffers from the additional errors discussed in Part LA above: rather than try to prove (using his
flawed affiliated-physician methodology or otherwise) which outpatient scans migrated from
Center to IMI on-campus as a result of misconduct by Saint Alphonsus, Budge counted every
scan performed by IMI's on-campus facility as a scan "lost" by Center. Trial Tr. at 4536.
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II.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JNOV OR ORDER A NEW TRIAL ON MRIA'S
CLAIMS FOR DISGORGEMENT AND USURPATION
Saint Alphonsus is entitled to JNOV or a new trial on the disgorgement claims for four

reasons. First, these new and untimely claims should not have been permitted. Mem. at 9-10.
Contrary to MRIA's contention, Opp'n at 13, the Court reopened discovery only "for the limited
purpose of determining what damages would have been given different beginning and end dates
for the lost profit calculations." Order at 4 (Feb. 15, 2011). MRIA's injection of a new
disgorgement claim is plainly outside the scope of the order. And MRIA does not explain how it
was practical or fair for Saint Alphonsus to obtain a new expert, educate him about the case,
obtain an expert report, and hold depositions all after September 27, 2011, midway through trial,
the date the Court allowed MRIA's disgorgement claims.
Second, given that MRIA no longer denies that the alleged usurpation of the opportunity

to partner with GSR occurred in 1999, see Opp'n at 14, this usurpation claim is plainly time
barred. Mem. at 10-11. Judge McLaughlin did not hold otherwise. This claim of usurpation
was not before him-MRIA asserted it for the first time on remand-and since the claim
involves a discrete act of alleged wrongdoing occurring in 1999, its timeliness is not governed by
Judge McLaughlin's ruling that other alleged misconduct constituted a continuing tort.

Third, the usurpation claims are unsupported by the evidence. Mem. at 11-12. MRIA
does not contest that this Court was required to make independent findings of fact on these
claims. Id. On the merits, MRIA contends, without citation, that "St. Al's knowingly 'killed' an
imminent deal between MRIA and GSR," Opp at 14-15, but the documentary record
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unambiguously shows that MRIA and GSR moved farther apart from March to August 1999
because they could not agree to terms, not because of any wrongdoing. Mem. at 11. And MRIA
offers no response to the failures of its Meridian usurpation case: that Saint Alphonsus had no
power to prevent MRIA from going to Meridian, that MRIA chose not to go to Meridian, and
that the opportunity never went away. !d. at 11-12.
Fourth, the disgorgement award must be reduced by Saint Alphonsus' s $11.2 million cost

of investing in IMI. Mem. at 12. MRIA argues that this would be "inappropriate" because St.
Alphonsus still owns an interest in IMI, which it can recoup by selling that interest. Opp'n at 15.
Saint Alphonsus's brief already explained, however, that this is a non sequitur, because Saint
Alphonsus's net benefit through 2015 does not include the hypothetical future sale price ofiMI.

III.

FAULT WAS IMPROPERLY APPORTIONED
Saint Alphonsus presented substantial authority for the proposition that all claims, tort

and contract, should have been apportioned because MRIA alleged a single, joint conspiracy
which gave rise to all its claims. Mem. at 13. MRIA's only response is to try (unpersuasively)
to distinguish one case on the facts, while ignoring the other authority. Opp'n at 15-16. Nor
does MRIA dispute the Court's authority to require the jury to allocate damages among claims,
which would prevented the inconsistent jury apportionments for the exact same acts. Mem. at
13-14. The jury's inconsistent verdicts can be remedied by applying the equal-shares approach
required by Idaho Code § 6-806 and cutting MRIA' s damages in half. Mem. at 13.

IV.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JNOV OR ORDER A NEW TRIAL ON THE
CLAIMS OF CENTER AND MOBILE
MRIA should not have been permitted to join Center and Mobile as plaintiffs. Mem. at
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14-17. MRIA argues that wanted to join those entities but was unable to do so. Opp'n at 17.
This is blatant historical revisionism. Saint Alphonsus argued that MRIA was required to add
Center and Mobile as new parties, and MRIA vigorously opposed doing so. See Reply Supp.
Mot. Leave File 2d Am. Countercl. at 6-10 (Jan. 8, 2007). MRIA also offers no new argument
justifying relation back of Center's and Mobile's untimely claims. Opp'n at 18.
The claims of Center and Mobile are also legally invalid and fail for lack of proof. Mem.
at 15-17. MRIA offers no new argument regarding any ofthese points. Judge McLaughlin's
ruling that Saint Alphonsus owed Center and Mobile fiduciary duties is not law of the case, both
because, contrary to MRIA's contention (Opp'n at 19), Saint Alphonsus did appeal that ruling
(Appellant's Br. at 47-50), and because Judge McLaughlin's ruling was expressly made on the
record before him-and is certainly not supported on the record in this retrial. Mem. at 15-16.
MRIA does not dispute that without proof of a fiduciary duty breach, Center and Mobile's
interference and conspiracy claims necessarily fall as well. Opp'n at 19; Mem. at 16-17.
V.

THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL DUE TO ITS ERRONEOUS
AND UNEVENLY APPLIED "LAW OF THE CASE" RULING
MRIA does not dispute that, contrary to this Court's ruling, the Supreme Court remanded

this case for a "new trial," such that, under Creem v. Northwestern Mutual Fire Ass 'n, the retrial
should have been handled "as though it had never been tried, subject to the condition that it must
be tried in light of rules of law announced by the appellate court." Mem. at 17 (quoting Order re:
motions heard August 5, 2011). For this reason alone, the Court should grant a new trial.
MRIA contends that Saint Alphonsus argued for law-of-the-case on other issues from the
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first trial. Opp'n at 19. MRIA is confusing two distinct issues. Under law-of-the-case doctrine,
legal rulings that are not appealed are binding on remand. But under Creem, if no ruling was
made on an issue, and that issue is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision, then it
may be raised for the first time on retrial. Saint Alphonsus properly requested reinstatement of
prior rulings that MRIA never appealed. But it was improperly denied the right to raise new
issues, such as the hearsay-upon-hearsay challenge, on which Judge McLaughlin had not ruled.
Finally, MRIA does not dispute any of Saint Alphonsus's examples (Mem. at 18-19)
showing that the law-of-the-case ruling was unevenly applied, but contends that the inconsistent
rulings were "inconsequential." Opp'n at 20. That is hardly so: MRIA was allowed to
massively increase its damages claim and add several new parties and theories, contrary to what
the Court's stated ruling would appear to require. Thus, even ifthe Court's law-of-the-case
ruling were correct, a new trial should be awarded with both parties bound equally to that ruling.
VI.

MULTIPLE ERRONEOUS RULINGS REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL
Radiology Services Agreement. The radiology agreement, on its face, provides that

GSR is required to provide services only to "the Medical Center," a defined term that does not
include MRI Center. Mem. at 19-20. MRIA offers nothing new in response, and does not deny
that its invocation of this purported "evidence" of wrongdoing likely impacted the jury's verdict.
Cindy Schamp's Present Recollection of Her Own Prior Statements. MRIA offers no

argument to rebut Saint Alphonsus's showing that Cindy Schamp's live, in-court testimony
recounting what she said to Dr. Curran was not hearsay. Opp'n at 21. MRIA contends that Ms.
Schamp was able to testify about these statements, rendering any error harmless. !d. This is
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wrong. Not a single one ofMRIA's citations involves Ms. Schamp recounting her own
statements to Dr. Curran. Given MRIA's theory that Saint Alphonsus's partnership with IMI
was kept secret, the Court's refusal to allow Ms. Schamp to testify to the contrary-that she did,
in fact, tell Dr. Curran of the IMI affiliation-was highly prejudicial to Saint Alphonsus.
Idaho Business Review Article. MRIA does not contend that the Idaho Business
Review article was properly excluded when offered during Dr. Prochaska's cross. Opp'n at 22.

The Court's ruling as to lack of foundation was error, as a newspaper is self-authenticating.
Idaho Rule 902(6). MRIA's improper objection, sustained by the Court, precluded use of the
evidence when it was most important-rebutting, on cross-examination, Dr. Prochaska's false
statements that Saint Alphonsus kept its partnership with IMI secret. This was prejudicial error.
Books-and-Records Motion. MRIA's only new response is that the denial of the books-

and-records motion was not prejudicial because MRIA did not dispute Jeff Cliffs claim that the
DMR doctors made $15 million between 1985 and 2000. Opp'n at 23. But this fails to dispute
the key point: Mr. Cliff was only able to offer incomplete, partial testimony as to the DMR
doctor's investment, because the complete data from 1985 through 2004 was denied to Saint
Alphonsus despite its right to that information under the partnership statutes. A more complete
presentation of the evidence would have been probative to show DMR's motivations as well as
to show that Saint Alphonsus did not treat its partner unfairly.
Other Prejudicial Rulings. Numerous additional prejudicial rulings, alone and in

combination, predisposed the jury to find Saint Alphonsus was a wrongdoer and bad partner.
Mem. at 22-25. MRIA offers scant response to any of these points.
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First, MRIA appears to agree that the jury should not have been allowed to hear the claim
that lawful dissociation breached fiduciary duties. Opp'n at 23. Yet that is precisely what the
jury was allowed to infer when the Court held that it would not redact language in the Shattuck
Hammond memoranda stating that withdrawal created a "risk of Saint Alphonsus breaching its
fiduciary responsibility." MRIA also appears to agree that "rightful dissociation" is the proper,
statutory term for what Saint Alphonsus did. Opp'n at 23. It claims that Saint Alphonsus was
allowed to tell the jury as much, id., but that is not so: as MRIA's own citation indicates, the
Court only instructed the jury that dissociation was "not a violation" of law, which did not
adequately convey to the jury that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was not just "not a violation,"
but something it had a right to do. Given MRIA's continued attempt to paint the dissociation in
a bad light, even if not "a violation," both these errors were highly prejudicial.

Second, MRIA does not dispute that its own lead counsel all but admitted that the
reference to a "little girl with a brain tumor" was prejudicial. Mem. at 23 n.8. And the objection
was fully preserved: the Court heard it on the merits, overruled the objection, and did not strike
it or admonish the jury to disregard. Trial Tr. at 1209-11.

Third, with respect to Dr. Wilson's statement, MRIA fails to rebut the case law providing
that one cannot "impeach" a failure to remember a statement. See State v. Holm, 93 Idaho 904,
910,478 P.2d 284,290 (1970); Oregon v. Staley, 995 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Ore. Ct. App. 2000).
Wilson's testimony about whether he was given a reason for his termination has nothing to do
with Sandra Bruce's "character," or anything relevant to this case. MRIA similarly fails to
respond to Idaho case law with respect to the similar ruling that third-party testimony could be
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used to "rebut" Jeff Cliff's lack of knowledge. There was no legitimate purpose for allowing
that evidence, regardless of whether its use was limited.
Fourth, MRIA offers no justification for the Court's admonition of Mr. McFeeley in front
of the jury. That was highly prejudicial, and suggested to the jury, through the weight of the
Court, that Saint Alphonsus and GSR were conspiring against MRIA, even during the trial.

VII.

SAINT ALPHONSUS IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF
DISSOCIATION
RUP A entitles Saint Alphonsus to the legal rate of interest (12%) from "from the date of

dissociation to the date of payment." Idaho Code§ 53-3-701(b) & official cmt. 3. MRIA does
not dispute that this is what the statute requires-instead, it claims that the partnership agreement
(which calls for no interest) should control. Opp'n at 25. The Court has already rejected that
proposition, however. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Sept. 21, 2007, at 6.
Given that there is no dispute as to the interest awardable under the statute, the Court should
amend the judgment accordingly.

CONCLUSION
The Court should grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, or in the
alternative, remittitur, as described in its opening memorandum.
DATED this 13th day of March 2012.
GJORDING & FOUSER,

PLLC
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MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited (collectively,
"MRIA") hereby file this qualified opposition to St. Al' s Motion for Stay of Proceedings to
Enforce a Judgment Pursuant to Rule 62(b) (the "Motion").

I.

INTRODUCTION

St. Al's Motion has left MRIA scratching its head. St. Al's has included in it a
misrepresentation of "negotiations" between the parties, a misapprehension of St. Al' s burden
here, and an obvious misreading of the Supreme Court's decision in this matter. Yet what
St. Al's has failed to include is perhaps what MRIA wants to see most: some sort of evidence
that St. Al's has the financial wherewithal to pay the extraordinarily large judgment currently
facing it, or alternatively, a willingness to post a bond. Indeed, MRIA has informally been
asking for such assurance for several weeks now, but St. Al's has curiously been unwilling or
unable to provide it. As such, MRIA states here what it has already stated to St. Al's in private:
if St. Al's will simply provide some reliable evidence of ability to pay (and assurances thereof)
or will post a bond, MRIA will consent to a stay.

II.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

The key flaw in St. Al's Motion is its apparent belief that it need only baldly inform the
Court that it "has the financial means to satisfy the judgment after the post-trial and appellate
process has been completed." Motion, p. 1. St. Al's makes this pivotal claim without any sort of
evidence whatsoever; it includes no affidavit saying as much, no financial statement showing as
much, and no letter of credit or bond guaranteeing as much. Instead, St. Al's asks this Court and
MRIA to simply take its word for it that St. Al's does, in fact, have $52,000,000+ in liquid funds
just sitting around, currently reserved and ready to "satisfy the judgment." Id
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This complete failure to provide any corroborating evidence of St. Al's current financial
ability to pay $52,000,000+ means that the Court cannot grant St. Al's Motion. Under Rule
62(b), this Court cannot enter a stay unless it is satisfied that "security of' MRIA' s judgment is
"proper." But St. Al's has literally provided the Court with nothing to suggest that it has the
"proper" ability or "security" to pay the judgment against it. St. Al's is the moving party
seeking extraordinary relief as it relates to an extraordinary judgment, and yet has done nothing
to even attempt to meet its burden.
Instead, St. Al' s half-heartedly suggests that the Supreme Court has already decided that
St. Al's has the ability to meet this judgment. This is patently false. When the Supreme Court
stated that MRIA had not "shown that [St. Al' s] lack of a bond would have put" payment of the
original judgment at risk, it was rather unremarkably noting that MRIA, as the party moving to
be absolved from an otherwise allowable transfer of fees, had the burden to bring forth proof to
support its allegations. 148 Idaho at 501-02. At that point, those allegations were that MRIA
had reason to be fearful that St. Al's would somehow offload the judgment onto St. Al's
Diversified Care and leave MRIA without recourse. !d. Thus, contrary to St. Al's misleading
comments, the Supreme Court has never conducted an analysis of St. Al' s finances and, by the
language of the decision itself, had no idea whether St. Al' s could have met the prior judgment.

!d. Its only point was that at the time and given the fact that MRIA was the moving party as to
that motion, it was responsible for showing St. Al's alleged inability to pay, but that, in the

Supreme Court's estimation, MRIA failed to do so. !d.
Obviously, the tables have now turned. Because St. AI 'sis now the party moving for a
stay of execution, it is now St. AI 's responsibility to show this Court that it has funds (or some
other plan) sufficient to provide "proper security" ofthis judgment. See IDAHO R. Clv. P. 62(b).
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Though the Idaho Supreme Court has not had opportunity to interpret Idaho's Rule 62(b), several
other courts have interpreted the similarly-worded federal rule and are in agreement that if the
moving party is not going to post a bond, then it has the specific "burden" of showing why
security is either impracticable or not necessary. See, e.g., Lincoln Elec. Co. v. MPM
Technologies, Inc., 2009 WL 3246936, *1 (N.D. Ohio 2009) ("The burden is on the party
requesting a stay to demonstrate why bond should not be required under Rule 62(b). The
defendant must show that, in the absence of standard security, the plaintiff will be properly

secured .... ") (emphasis added); Real View, LLC v. 20-20 Technologies, Inc., 2011 WL 3568022,
*2 (D. Mass. 2011) ("The touchstone ofthis inquiry [under Rule 62(b)] is the need to protect the
interests of the judgment creditor, and the judgment debtor bears the burden of demonstrating a
basis for departing from the general rule requiring security in a bond of the full amount of the
judgment.") (emphasis added); Continental Cas. Co. v. First Financial Employee Leasing, 2010
WL 5421337, *1 (M.D. Fla. 2010) ("Defendant must show that ... Plaintiffs will be properly
secured .... ") (emphasis added). Such statements are in full agreement with the Idaho Supreme
Court's recognition that in motion practice generally, the "moving party usually bears the burden
ofproof." State v. Gurney, ---Idaho---, 2012 WL 555786, *4, n.l (Idaho 2012). 1
It should be noted in this regard that MRIA does not take this position just to

inconvenience St. Al's, as St. Al's seems to intimate in its Motion. Instead, MRIA is gravely
concerned that St. Al's lacks the financial wherewithal to pay this large judgment against it. It
has heard rumors that St. Al's parent company, Trinity, is not willing to help St. Al's if and when
the judgment is affirmed. See the correspondence attached as an Appendix to this Opposition at
1

Moreover, St. Al's statement that "nothing has changed since" the Supreme Court's decision is also demonstrably
fallacious. Even if the Supreme Court had determined St. Al's fmancial ability to pay the original judgment-and it
clearly did not-that determination would have been made three years ago and in relation to a judgment about
$20,000,000 less. Moreover, it would have come prior to the millions St. Al's has presumably paid to its new army
of attorneys. Plainly, there is much that "has changed since" the Supreme Court's decision in 2009.
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Banducci's letter of February 27. MRIA also knows that St. Al's has likely spent several
millions more in attorneys' fees than it did in the last trial, only to lose by about $20-million
more. As such, in spite of St. Al's corporate size, MRIA believes that St. Al's coffers may be
incapable of meeting the obligations of the judgment. And this is especially true given that St.
Al' s has evinced very little serious interest in settlement, 2 in which a deal could be structured
over time, meaning that if and when the judgment comes due, it will come due for the full
amount and all at once. It goes without saying that very few businesses-even large and
successful ones-have the capacity to pay out $52,000,000+ in cash all at once without
becoming insolvent.
Moreover, MRIA's concerns have been greatly exacerbated by the fact that for weeks
prior to the filing of this Motion, MRIA had been asking St. Al's what it planned to do about
security. See Appendix at Banducci's letter of February 27 ("More than two weeks ago, we
asked you to inform us of the means by which SARMC would secure the judgment. We have
not received a response to this inquiry."). St. Al's has gone largely radio silent on this issue,
refusing to discuss the matter with MRIA other than to inform it that it is still mulling the issue
over and that it might try to get back to MRIA at some unspecified time in the future. See
Appendix at Gjording's letter of February 27. (In fn. 1 ofthe Motion, St. Al's euphemistically
describes its mysterious six-week silence in this regard as "negotiations" with MRIA. Clearly,
St. Al's has a different conception of what the term "negotiations" means than does MRIA.)
Indeed, when MRIA received the Motion, it was hopeful and somewhat excited to see what St.
Al's would finally say about the security it would be able to provide. But like the letters in the
Appendix to this Opposition, St. Al' s Motion contained nothing more concerning security than a
2

As the correspondence between the parties makes clear, MRIA has struggled to even get St. Al's to participate in a
post-trial mediation towards the goal of settlement. See Appendix at Woodard's letter of February 22, Gjording's
letter of February 24, and Banducci's letter of February 27.
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sheepish "you'll just have to trust us" response. MRIA accordingly finds itself understandably
unnerved by St. Al's apparent unwillingness or inability to even address the issue.
Nonetheless, MRIA again qualifies this Opposition by stating to the Court what it told
St. Al's weeks ago: if St. Al's can provide some reliable evidence of ability to pay, and
assurances thereof, MRIA will consent to a stay. If, however, St. Al's cannot or will not take
those steps on its own-and it has had multiple opportunities to do so already-then MRIA
believes this Court has no other option but to require a bond.
DATED this 16th day of March 2012.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of March 2012, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintifjlCounterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintifjlCounterdefendant

D l.J-.8. Mail
lWHand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile

~.Mail

D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile

,--/--

I.

/~

·J

9c~

Brent Bastian
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802 w. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, 10 83702
Tel (208) 342-4411
Fax (208) 342-4455
www.bwslawgroup.com

February 22,2012

Via Facsimile 336-9177
Jack Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 West Hays St.
Boise, ID 83701
Re:

St. Alphonsus v. MRIA

Dear Jack,
Yesterday in response to communications regarding MRIA's requests for assurances
from St. Al's concerning its ability to pay the judgment, you suggested that the parties agree to
stay execution pending rulings from the Court on St. Al's motion for new trial and motion for
clients will agree to a mutual stay if your client will agree to engage in a good
JNOV.
faith mediation conducted by a mutually selected professional mediator on a mutually
convenient date in the month of April. Please provide your response by the end of the week.
I look forward to hearing from you.

My

Wade L. Woodard
WLW:jkr
cc:

Jones Day (via facsimile)

BANDUCCI

WOODARD

SCHWARTZMAN
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PLLC

Law Offices

GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
JackS. Gjording
Trudy Hanson Fauser
Julianne S. Hall

509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, lD 83701
(208) 336-9777 telephone
(208) 336-9177 facsimile

Elaine H. Lee
Bobbi K. Dominick
Of Counsel

February 24, 2012

Via Facsimile
Wade L. Woodard
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

Re:

Saint Alphonsus vs. MRI Associates, LLP
Ada Co. Case No. CV OC 0408219D
File No. 15051.001

Dear Wade:
I am writing in response to your letter of February 22. The letter asks whether Saint
Alphonsus will agree to engage in mediation during the month of April in exchange for MRIA's
agreement to stay execution of the judgment pending a ruling on Saint Alphonsus's motion for
JNOV and/or a new trial. Saint Alphonsus believes that mediation would only have the potential
of achieving a resolution if it is appropriately planned for and executed with the active
involvement of a strong mediator who is given the benefit of considered submissions of the
parties that comprehensively illuminate the issues to be decided on appeal. Given this, an April
mediation is simply not feasible. Saint Alphonsus is, however, amenable to begin planning now
(including agreeing to a mediator and a schedule) for a mediation to occur in July or August.
Additionally, as always, Saint Alphonsus is open to a reasonable settlement proposal
from MRIA outside of a mediation setting, in whatever form such a proposal may take.
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Honorable Michael E. Wetherell
February 24, 2012
SiWC v, MIUA, et al

!lage 2

Please let me knO\v whether MRIA wilt agree to a stay of execution of the judgment pending
resolution of the post-trial motions. If I do not hear from you by mid afternoon today. we will
move the court to enter a stay.
Very truly yours,
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

~Gjording
JSG/bc
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Law Offices

GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, lD 83701
(208) 336-'1777 telephone
(208) 336-9177 facsimile

Jack S. Gjording
Trudy Hanson Fouser
Julianne S. Hall
Jaren Wieland
Bobbi K. Dominick
Of Counsel

February 24, 2012

Via Hand Delivery
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

Re:

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care vs. MRI Associates, LLP
Ada Co. Case No. CV OC 0408219D
File No. 15051.001

Dear Tom:
Saint Alphonsus has not decided the most desirable method of securing the judgment
on appeal. I will be in touch regarding this matter.
Very truly yours,
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

JSG/bc

'1
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802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

Tel (208) 342-4411
Fax (208) 342-4455

February 27, 2012

www.bwslawgroup.com

Via Facsimile 336-9177

Jack Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 West Hays St.
Boise, ID 83701
Re:

St. Alphonsus v. MRIA

Dear Jack,
Thank you for your letter of February 24,2012. Upon further consideration, I have the
following observations:

1.
Jones Day's objective is delay. More than two weeks ago, we asked you to
inform us of the means by which SARMC would secure the judgment. We have not received a
response to this inquiry.
2.
Based on information circulating in our community, we are concerned that
SARMC does not have the funds to pay the judgment, and that Trinity will not provide
financial support in this regard. Under these circumstances, we must insist on assurances that
provide our client with the requisite comfort level regarding payment of the judgment.
3.
While MRIA agrees that a strong, capable mediator will be required for
mediation of the case, SARMC's agreement to mediate seems a bit illusory, in that SARMC
seems to be positioning itself to refuse any mediator proposed by MRIA.
MRIA remains willing to stipulate to a stay of execution of the judgment, provided that
SARMC agrees to mediate by no later than mid-June. Should this be acceptable to SARMC we
would insist that the parties (through counsel) execute a written stipulation, to be filed with the
court, reflecting that if the parties cannot agree on a mediator by April 15, each will submit a
list of three acceptable mediators to Judge Wetherell, who will select the mediator.
Please let me know how you would like to proceed

'

TAB:jkr
cc:

Jones Day (via facsimile)

BANDUCCI

WOODARD

SCHWARTZMAN
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PLLC

Fro

183369177

Page: 213

Date: 2127/2012 3

4PM

Law Offices

GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Bo;>c 2837
&ise, ID 83701
(.208) 3'M>-9m teleph01:1e
(208) 336-9177 facsimile

Jack S. Gjonling
Trudy Hanson Fouser
Jul.Wme S. Hall

Jaren Wieland
8obbi K. Dominick
Of Counsel

February 27, 2012

Via Facsimile

Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

Re:

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care vs. MRJ Associates, LLP
Ada Co. Case No. CV OC 04082190
File No. 15051.001

Dear Tom:
Your letter of this morning references the parties' ongoing discussions concerning
mediation and securing the judgment on appeal, and seeks concessions regarding mediation in
exchange for your agreement to a temporary stay pending resolution of the post-trial motions.
Saint Alpbonsus does not believe it is productive to link these unrelated matters in this
way, and therefore intends to move for a stay today. Please let me know whether we should note
.MRIA's consent.
Regarding security for the appeal, I am puzzled by your statement that "Jones Day's
objective is delay". As I explained to you, Saint Alphonsus is, at your request, looking into
alternative ways of securing the judgment on appeal, so that neither side will have to risk bearing
the cost of a supersedeas bond as a taxable cost of the appeal. As you can image, this effort is
taking some time.
Saint Alphonsus is also prepared to commence discussions aimed at identifying terms for
a mediation, as well as a mutually agreeable mediator and schedule. All parties to the mediation
will have scheduling constraints, as will our agreed mediator. Thus we favor deferring
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Fro

183369177

Page: 3/3

Date: 2127/2012 3.

iPM

Thomas A. Banducci
Saint Alphonsu.s Diversified Care v. MRJ Associates, LLP
February '27, 2012
Page2

discussion of scheduling lintil we have agreed to terms~ identified a mediator, and know what his
or her timing constraints may be.

Very truly yours,
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

JSG/bc

This fax was received by GFI FAXmaker fax server. For more information, visit: http://www.gfi.com
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Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

OPPOSITION TO SAINT
ALPHONSUS'S MOTION TO
DISALLOW MRIA'S ATTORNEYS
FEES AND COSTS

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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Defendant/Counter-claimants MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI
Mobile Limited (collectively, "MRIA") submit this Opposition to St. Al's Motion to Disallow
MRIA's Attorneys Fees and Costs (the "Motion").

I.

MRIA IS ENTITLED TO ITS COSTS AND FEES
A.

Law of the Case

In the first trial of this matter, Judge McLaughlin ruled on the attorney fees and costs to
which MRIA was entitled. In a bizarre twist on the law of the case doctrine, St. Al's now argues,
on the one hand, that Judge McLaughlin's order awarding MRIA fees and costs for the first trial
is no longer binding while, on the other, that this Court is still somehow bound to apply the
"principles" set forth in that allegedly no-longer-binding order. (Motion, pp. 1-2.) St. Al's has
the argument backwards. The order awarding fees and costs remains the law of the case because
St. Al's chose not to appeal that ruling. Dopp v. Idaho Com 'n ofPardons and Parole, 144 Idaho
402, 407, 162 P.3d 781, 786 n.3 (Ct. App. 2007).
St. Al's, however, is incorrect in its belief that the "principles" it thinks were espoused in
that order are binding upon future decisions of this Court regarding fees and costs occurring after
the first trial. In particular, St. Al's suggests that this Court is bound to excise any fees related to
theories upon which MRIA did not ultimately prevail. Contrary to St. Al's argument, there is
nothing in Idaho law requiring this Court to apply such "principles" in subsequent proceedings
when such principles are contrary to Idaho law. Indeed, as discussed in more detail below, it is
error to excise fees and costs related to unsuccessful theories when a party prevails overall in the
case. Consequently, this Court should: (1) accept the award of fees and costs for the first trial as
the law of the case; and (2) refuse St. Al's request for the Court to excise fees related to
unsuccessful theories from MRIA's claim for fees incurred after the first trial.

OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISALLOW MRIA'S ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS- 2
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B.

Idaho Courts have Rejected St. Al's Argument that Costs and Fees Should
Be Disallowed on Discrete Theories on which MRIA was Unsuccessful

It is notable that nowhere in St. Al's Motion does it dispute that MRIA was

overwhelmingly the "prevailing party" in this litigation. Nonetheless, St. Al's contends that
MRIA cannot be awarded costs and fees related to the few matters on which it was unsuccessful
during the remand. This argument is directly contrary to Idaho law, which instructs the Court to
consider the overall result of the action in awarding fees and costs, and not to simply assess the
particularized outcome of individual issues or claims. Under Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(B), in
determining who is a prevailing party for costs and fees, the court must "consider the final
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties"
(emphasis added). It is for this reason that, when considering attorney fees, courts must take care
not to distinguish between the success and failure of alternative theories that are related to the
same set of facts. As the Court of Appeals cautioned:
individual theories should not be seen as isolated parts of the case, framed by their
own encapsulated facts, but as different ways to obtain one specific recovery-a
single claim. From this view, we held that when attorney fees are allowed under
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1), either by statute or contract, the amount should not be
calculated based upon individual prevailing theories.
Burns v. County of Boundary, 120 Idaho 623,626, 818 P.2d 327,330 (Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis
added). (This is differentiated from circumstances in which there truly are separable claims,
such as when a party brings a claim for equitable injunctive relief and another for damages. Id)
This doctrine is clearly outlined in the case Nalen v. Jenkins, 113 Idaho 79, 741 P.2d 366
(Ct. App. 1987). In Nalen, the Nalens contracted with Jenkins for the construction of a log
home. The relationship soured, and the Nalens filed suit alleging a claim for relief based upon
theories of violation of the Consumer Protection Act, fraud, unjust enrichment, and breach of
contract. The jury found for the Nalens upon their theories of unjust enrichment and violation of
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the Consumer Protection Act. The judge determined that the Nalens were entitled to attorney
fees only for those claims upon which they had been successful. The Court of Appeals,
however, pointedly disagreed with the trial court's approach-the exact same approach as St.
AI' s urges here-noting that legal theories may draw upon a common nucleus of facts which
give rise to a single claim. The Court therefore held that the amount of attorney fees should not
be not be calculated based upon individual prevailing "theories" but instead whether the party
prevailed on the underlying "claim." !d. at 82, 741 P.2d at 369. Several other cases are in
agreement with this holding. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 191 P.3d 1107 (Ct. App.
2008) (prevailing party entitled to fees without apportionment among its successful and
unsuccessful legal theories); Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho 872, 876, 811 P.2d 48, 52 (Ct. App.
1991) (district court erred in restricting a fee award to the amount attributable only to the specific
theory upon which the party prevailed); Meldco, Inc. v. Hollytex Carpet Mills, 118 Idaho 265,
270-271, 796 P.2d 142, 147-48 (Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting argument that attorney fee award
should reflect the fact that plaintiff did not prevail on all of the claims it alleged); Bubak v.
Evans, 117 Idaho 510, 513, 788 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Ct. App. 1989) (fees should not be apportioned

based upon prevailing theories of recovery).
Clearly, St. Al's argument that work done on various unsuccessful claims and issues
should be deducted from MRIA's attorney fees conflicts with these cases. 1 MRIA brought
multiple theories of recovery to address a single underlying claim that St. Al's actions had been
inappropriate. Indeed, St. Al's admits as much: in its recent briefing on apportioning damages,

1

Indeed, it conflicts with an argument made by St. Al's own counsel in the case Boehner v. McDermott, Case No.
1:98-cv-00594 (D. Columbia) (relevant portions ofwhich are attached hereto as an Appendix), where counsel noted
that its client "is entitled to fees ... because he obtained full relief and again, '[t]he result is what matters.' ...
Here, even assuming Boehner somehow lost a claim, he nevertheless 'won substantial relief in 'comparison to the
scope of the litigation as a whole' and therefore a 'reduced fee award' would not be 'appropriate.'" Boehner v.
McDermott, Case No. 1:98-cv-00594 (D. Columbia), Doc. No. 99 (citation omitted), p. 10. Such is the case here as
well.
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it specifically acknowledged that there is largely one undifferentiated set of facts that supports
MRIA's several causes of action. (Memorandum in Support of St. Al's Motion for New Trial,
pp. 12-14.) That MRIA was not permitted to present its wrongful dissociation claim to the jury
does not change the fact that the jury found entirely for MRIA on each of the other claimsclaims that were based on the same set facts as the wrongful dissociation claim-nor did it stop
the jury from awarding damages to MRIA in the full amounts presented. Put another way,
MRIA did not end up needing its "unsuccessful" causes of action to get its full amount of
damages. It would therefore be error for the Court to reduce the fees and costs for "theories" on
which MRIA was not successful.

C.

MRIA is Entitled to Fees and Costs from the First Trial as Awarded by
Judge McLaughlin

With regard to the fees and costs related to the first trial of this matter, MRIA has asked
the Court to reinstate Judge McLaughlin's decisions on fees and costs ofNovember 19, 2007,
and January 28, 2008. St. Al's argues in response that any time a case is remanded, the fees and
costs are to be determined "anew." It cites to only one case for this proposition, Puckett v.

Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 158 P.3d 937 (2007), in which the Court held that a costs award would
be vacated and recalculated if the appellant chose an option offered by the Court for a new trial
specific to damages. This is a highly fact specific ruling in an unusual circumstance, and is not a
holding that fees and costs must always be recalculated on remand. Again, St. Al's did not
appeal Judge McLaughlin's decisions and thus has waived any argument that they were in error.

Dopp, 144 Idaho at 407. As such, this Court should simply reinstate Judge McLaughlin's ruling,
as it has done for a number of other matters in this case.
That said, if the Court is inclined to make its own examination of the fees and costs from
the prior trial, MRIA asks that this Court review MRIA' s earlier briefing and affidavits related to
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its attorney fees from the first trial, and reconsider several rulings made by Judge McLaughlin,
including rulings that MRIA was not entitled to its attorney fees for its unsuccessful or
withdrawn theories of antitrust, trade secrets, spoliation, and conversion. (Order, Nov. 19,2007,
pp. 24-25.) As described in detail above, this parsing oflegal theories related to a claim for a
unified course of conduct was error, Nalen, 113 Idaho 79, and if the Court is going to revisit
Judge McLaughlin's order, it must also correct this error.
St. Al's also argues that attorney fees from Judge McLaughlin's order related to wrongful
dissociation, the purchase price theory of damages, and damages after 2015 must be excised in
light of the appeal and this trial. As described in detail above, this compartmentalization is
directly contrary to Idaho law. And even if it were not, St. Al's argument that all attorney fees
from the first trial should be disallowed is simply absurd. 2 While the verdict from the first trial
was overturned, the vast majority the effort MRIA expended in the first trial in discovery, motion
practice, trial, and the like was all used to win in this most recent trial. That is, the fact that that
verdict was remanded does not mean that all of that prior effort was for naught, given that the
evidence was largely the same as before and that MRIA won again on that same evidence.
Moreover, as noted above, in its recent briefing on apportionment, St. Al's acknowledges that
there is largely one undifferentiated set of facts that supports MRIA' s several causes of action.
As such, St. Al' s also acknowledges that MRIA would not have developed the record in any
meaningfully different way-and that therefore there would have been no serious difference in
fees-if MRIA had pled only the causes of action that it ultimately prevailed upon.
The error of St. Al' s argument that fees and costs be disallowed from the first trial (or in
some manner be excised related to ultimately unsuccessful causes of action) is demonstrated by
2

Contrary to St. Al's assertion otherwise, the breakdown of the specific billings in the first trial are part of the
record; they were submitted to Judge McLaughlin in the petition for fees and costs from the first trial, and
amendments thereto.
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the Puckett case, which St. Al's itself cites approvingly. In that case, a first trial resulted in a
mistrial. A second trial then took place, and the jury found for the plaintiff. The court ultimately
awarded costs to the plaintiff related to the first trial. As here, the defendant argued that costs
should not be allowed to the plaintiff for the first trial. The Supreme Court disagreed, saying:
the language of [Rule 54(d)(1)] looks to the end result of the entire course of
litigation rather than compartmentalizing the determination of a prevailing party
into separate proceedings. Indeed, in determining who prevailed and, thus, is
entitled to costs, the court must consider, among other things, the extent to which
each party prevailed relative to the final judgment or result. . . . [S]ubstantial
groundwork for the result of the second trial was laid in the preparation for the
first trial. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
[Plaintiff] prevailed below and was entitled to discretionary costs.

Puckett, 144 Idaho at 169 (citations and quotations omitted, emphasis added). Thus, the
Supreme Court has specifically held that the "compartmentalization" urged by St. Al's here is
inappropriate. The Court recognized that costs and fees from an earlier trial--even a trial where
(unlike the present case) the party was unsuccessful-are appropriate if that party subsequently
prevails as to the "end result." Moreover, as in Puckett, the fees and costs that MRIA expended
in the first trial provided the groundwork for its latest success. Because the Supreme Court has
specifically rejected St. Al's argument, this Court should hold that the costs and fees from the
first trial are awardable in full. 3

D.

MRIA is Entitled to Appeal-Related Fees

Similar to its argument concerning fees from the prior trial, St. Al's also argues that
MRIA is not entitled to the attorney fees 4 related to the appeal either, arguing that MRIA's
appellate-related fees should be disallowed in full, or that MRIA be required to omit all billings
3

St. Al's cites to the case Idaho Cardiology Associates, P.A. v. Idaho Physicians Network, Inc., 141 Idaho 223,
228, 108 P.3d 370, 375 (2005) for the premise that a district court's order on fees and costs is related only to those
claims on which a party prevailed. This case does not stand for that proposition. Rather, in Idaho Cardiology, the
Supreme Court flipped a summary judgment order and held that the opposing party was in fact the victor on all the
litigated claims. As the identity of prevailing party had changed, the Court noted that it was necessary to vacate the
award of attorney fees. Obviously, those are not the facts at issue in this case.
4
MRIA is not seeking its appellate-related costs.
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related to matters on which it did not prevail on appeal. Yet these arguments ignore the specific
direction from the Supreme Court in this very case about what to do with the appellate fees after
retrial. During the appeal, both St. Al' s and MRIA had requested an award of attorney fees on
appeal. The Supreme Court declined to do so, saying:
Both St. Alphonsus and MRIA request an award of attorney fees on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Because we are vacating the judgment and
remanding this case, there is not yet a prevailing party. Once there is a final
judgment, the district court can consider attorney fees incurred on appeal in
making its award of a reasonable attorney fee to the prevailing party.
148 Idaho 479, 501, 224 P.3d 1068, 1090 (2009) (emphasis added). On a request for rehearing,
the Supreme Court cited and discussed the case Paloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 99
Idaho 740, 588 P.2d 939 (1978). In Paloukos, a party had prevailed on appeal, but the case was
remanded to determine whether the party would ultimately prevail on his cause of action for
breach of contract. The Supreme Court noted:
A prerequisite to an award of attorney fees under that section is that the party
prevail. ... Should Paloukos ultimately prevail and satisfy the other requirements
of I.C. § 12-120 for an award of attorney fees, the district court, in fixing the
award, should of course consider the fees incurred in bringing this appeal.
Paloukos, 99 Idaho at 746, 588 P.2d at 945 (emphasis added). See also Western Seeds, Inc. v.
Bartu, 109 Idaho 70, 72, 704 P.2d 974, 976 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Because it is unsettled at this point
which party will prevail, we direct the trial court-when making the ultimate attorney fee
award-to take into account the legal services provided on this appeal.")
St. Al's argues that in Paloukos, it was significant that the awarded fee referenced was
for a party that prevailed both on the appeal and on the remand, implying that it is impossible for
a party to collect its appellate-related fees if that party loses on appeal, even if it later prevails in
the action on remand. Yet if the Supreme Court had intended such a result here, it would have
stated that the issue of appellate fees should be considered only if St. Al' s prevailed on remand.
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Such a statement would have made clear that MRIA could not recover its appellate fees even if it
prevailed on remand. Yet this is not what the Supreme Court said. Rather, it held that the
appellate-related fees were to be considered for the "prevailing party" of the action, whether that
was St. Al's or MRIA. See also Young v. Scott, 108 Idaho 506, 700 P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1985)
("the district court, when determining the prevailing party on remand, may take this appeal into
consideration when fixing the amount of any additional attorney fees awarded.").
Thus, the only logical reading [of] the Supreme Court's comments in this very case is that
the question of the appellate fees is not a discrete matter which should be parsed out after retrial,
but rather held that it was a matter which should be considered in the context of the overall
analysis of awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party. Such statements agree with the
Supreme Court's past pronouncements. For example, in Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc.,
146 Idaho 613, 200 P.3d 1162 (2009), the Supreme Court expressly rejected an attempt to
separate fees into the boxes urged by St. Al's here (i.e., those from an earlier trial, those from an
appeal, and those incurred after remand), and instead directed that the case be viewed as a whole
effort on the part of plaintiffs to redress their grievances. Likewise, in Hale v. Walsh, 113 Idaho
759, 747 P.2d 1288 (Ct. App. 1987), the Court of Appeals held that the "extent to which" the
plaintiff was the prevailing party, and thus would be entitled to its appellate-related fees, would
be determined by the result of the remand. Notably, St. Al's cites to no case law for the
proposition that the results ofthe appeal should in any way require the apportionment of appealrelated fees among the various issues upon which the ultimate prevailing party was or was not
successful during appeal. Rather, the cases make it clear that it is the result of the remand, not
the result of the appeal, which dictates a party's entitlement to appeal-related fees.
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Many other courts are in agreement. For example, in Peterson v. County School Bd. of
Hanover County, 641 F.Supp.2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2009), a party won the initial action, lost on

appeal, and then won again on remand. The issue in Peterson was thus the same as it is here:
whether it was appropriate to award the overall prevailing party its appellate-related fees even
though it "lost" the appeal. The Court determined that such an award was appropriate, noting
that "it was necessary for the Plaintiffs to defend the appeal in order to secure the fruits of their
original victory, which they now have done on remand." !d. at 511-12. Another similar case is
Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 2000). In that case, a party (Farmers) lost an

interlocutory appeal, but later prevailed on his claims. Farmers was awarded fees for the work
on the unsuccessful appeal. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, noting:
Farmers was a prevailing party in this litigation. Although it did not prevail on its
interlocutory appeal, it was ultimately successful.. .. [E]ntitlement to fees for one
aspect of a protracted litigation does not tum narrowly on whether the party
prevailed on that particular matter, but whether a separate claim or, as here, a
separate proceeding is so unrelated as to justify treating it as a "separate lawsuit."
... The district court found that Farmers' pursuit of interlocutory relief was related
to the case in chief, and that, therefore, Farmers was entitled to its attorneys' fees
for this work. Its decision in this regard was not an abuse of discretion.
!d. at 163 (citation and quotations omitted). See also Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.,

478 F.3d 183, 188-89 (4th Cir. 2007) (a party that ultimately prevailed on the merits was
properly awarded attorney fees for services involved in a losing effort on appeal).
The reasoning of these cases is consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's instruction in
this very case, as well as a paramount principle articulated in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
that determination of who the prevailing party is in an action turns upon "the final judgment or
result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties." IDAHO R. Clv. P.
54(d)(l) (emphasis added). Here, where MRIA's victory as it relates to the "final judgment" has
been indisputably overwhelming, it should be awarded its appellate fees.
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E.

The Fees Requested by MRIA are Related to the Prosecution of the Case

St. Al's next challenges several categories of fees, contending that these billings were not
directly related to the prosecution of this lawsuit. MRIA addresses each these arguments in tum.
Property Purchases and Conference Calls: St. Al's objects to billings related to certain

transactions which it characterizes as "property purchases," as well as various conference calls
between counsel and Barbara Nay, Margaret Kushner, Tim Gorman, and Wendy Engels. Each
of these billings is directly related to the prosecution of this litigation because:
•

During the litigation, St. Al's parent company, Trinity, purchased certain healthcare

facilities in the Treasure Valley and eastern Oregon, including MRIA partners Mercy
Medical Center (Nampa) and Holy Rosary (Ontario, Oregon). (Affidavit of Counsel in
Opposition to St. Al's Motion to Disallow MRIA's Attorney Fees and Costs ("Banducci
Opp. Aff.") at ,-r 3(a)); see also, Tr., 2618-20, 3675. Since this acquisition meant that St. Al's
parent company was essentially purchasing two of the litigants in this matter, MRIA sought
advice from counsel relative to the potential impact on MRIA's rights in the litigation. This
is the purpose of the communications concerning the "property purchases." (/d.)
•

Tim Gorman is in-house counsel for CHI, the former owner of Mercy and Holy Rosary

prior to their purchase by Trinity. (/d. at ,-r 3(b).) Counsel reported to Mr. Gorman on case
status and settlement issues. (/d.)
•

MRIA made numerous attempts to settle the litigation. During one attempt, in-house

counsel for St. Al's, Ms. Westermeier, indicated that she was uncomfortable discussing this
possible settlement directly with Thomas Banducci, and thus MRIA's transactional attorney,
Margaret Kushner of the firm Stoel Rives, acted as an intermediary between the parties to
facilitate these settlement negotiations. (/d. at ,-r 3(c).) Ms. Kushner's partner, Barbara Nay,
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was included in several discussions to obtain her perspective on how Ms. Kushner might be
deployed to discuss settlement issues. (Jd)
•

Another settlement negotiation concerned the potential purchase of MRI Center by

St. Al's. Wendy Engels is a representative of Mercer, a broker who valued the assets of
MRIA and the limited partnerships for purposes of settlement discussions. (Jd

at~

3(d).)

Counsel conferred with Ms. Engels on this point. (Id)
These billings are therefore clearly related to the prosecution of this lawsuit, and should be
reimbursed in the attorney fee award.
Entries not charged to client: There are a few billings where, for one reason or another,

counsel chose not to charge those billings to the client. These billings are clearly related to the
litigation, as they involve conferences with the clients and its employees related to the appeal and
retainer agreements. Entitlement to attorney fees does not turn on whether fees are actually
charged to the client. If this were the case, attorney fees could never be awarded in contingency
fee cases, for example. See Futrell v. Martin, 100 Idaho 473, 479, 600 P.2d 777, 783 (1979)
(awarding fees to party who had been represented by attorney at no cost); Decker v. Homeguard
Systems, 105 Idaho 158, 163, 666 P.2d 1169, 1174 (Ct. App. 1983) (allowing recovery of fees in

excess of the amount which the prevailing party had contracted). The fact that counsel decided
to carry these charges does not alter the entitlement to reimbursement for these fees.
Bob Burton Estate, Blue Cross Accreditation, and the MRI Call Center: St. Al's makes a

decidedly petty challenge to these several billings, which in the aggregate total no more than a
paltry 1.4 hours. Though these billings did apply to this litigation, for purposes of efficiency,
MRIA will simply withdraw its claim to entitlement to these comparatively insignificant charges.
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MRI Board Meetings: St. Al's objects to billings where counsel attended MRIA board
meetings. Counsel for MRIA is not general counsel for MRIA, but litigation counsel. (Banducci
Opp. Aff.

at~

4.) Thus, each time counsel for MRIA attended an MRIA Board Meeting, it was

for the sole purpose of reporting on litigation issues to the Board, and receiving instruction from
the Board on how to proceed with certain litigation-related matters. (!d.) As these are
attorney/client communications directly related to the prosecution of this litigation, they are
clearly appropriate for reimbursement in the attorney fee award.
Appellate cost judgment: St. Al's argues that the work concerning the payment ofthe
appellate cost judgment is not litigation-related. To the contrary, the judgment arose out of this
lawsuit and the payment of the cost judgment was specifically discussed in the opinion of the
Supreme Court. 148 Idaho at 501-02. As such, this work is clearly related to the litigation.
St. Al's also generally argues that the Court should prohibit other categories of fees,
without any discussion as to precisely what billings are objectionable. As such, MRIA is unable
to respond to this vague argument, and the Court should likewise decline to make a broad order
without reference to specific billings.

II.

THE HOURLY RATES REQUESTED BY MRIA ARE APPROPRIATE
St. Al's next argues that the hourly rates charged by MRIA's attorneys and paralegals are

excessive. The reasonableness of an attorney fee award is based on the trial court's
consideration ofthe factors in IDAHO R. Clv. P. 54(e)(3). These factors (all but one of which St.
Al's does not even bother to discuss) are: (A) the time and labor required; (B) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions; (C) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law; (D) the prevailing charges for
like work; (E) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (F) the time limitations imposed by the
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client or the circumstances of the case; (G) the amount involved and the results obtained; (H) the
undesirability of the case; (I) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client; (J) awards in similar cases; (K) the reasonable cost of automated legal research, ifthe
court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case; and (L) any other factor
which the court deems appropriate in the particular case. Id "[T]he court need not specifically
address all ofthe[se] factors ... in writing, so long as the record clearly indicates that the court
considered them all." Mihalka v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547, 553, 181 P.3d 473, 479 (2008).
However, no one element is to be given undue weight or emphasis. Nalen, 113 Idaho at 81.
St. Al's compares the rates ofMRIA's attorneys to those in a number of federal cases
from the District of Idaho, without reference to any of the other factors in 54(e)(3), and then
argues only that the rate charged by MRIA's attorneys must be unreasonable because it is higher
than the amounts charged in these particular cases. This gives undue weight to the element of
the prevailing charge. Again, the amount of a reasonable attorney fee is a question for the
determination of the court, taking into account all the factors of Rule 54(e)(3). It is not even
necessary that the Court hear evidence about what a "reasonable" rate might be. Smith v. Great
Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266,281,561 P.2d 1299, 1314 (1977).
With respect to the cases cited by St. Al's, it is telling that St. Al's has taken no effort to
explain the complexity, effort, or amount at stake in these cases even though these are factors
that this Court must consider under Rule 54(e)(3). Moreover, the rates in these cases vary
wildly, with one suggesting that the fee for a lawyer like Mr. Banducci should be $180 an hour
and another saying that this exact same lawyer should bill at $315-nearly twice as much.
Compare Brasley v. Fearless Farris Service Stations, Inc., 2010 WL 4867359, *5 (D. Idaho
201 0) ($315 appropriate) and In re Charterhouse Boise Downtown Properties, LLC, 2010 WL
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1049968, *4 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 2010) ($180 appropriate). Such a marked disparity should be
read to suggest that none of the cases cited can rightly be called a definitive pronouncement on
fees in the Boise area, but rather that they each represent an anecdotal guess at what might be
reasonable in that case before that judge at that time.
Moreover, St. Al's also conveniently ignores other Idaho case law from the exact same
time frame as the cases it cites, such as Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 777, 203 P .3d 702, 708
(2009), wherein the Idaho Supreme Court agreed with a trial court that the prevailing charges for
cases in the Boise area which go to trial is $400 per hour-about what Mr. Banducci charged.
St. Al's also simply closes its eyes to the affidavit of long-time Boise litigator Steve Andersen,
who testified that the rates charged by MRIA's attorneys are within the range of standard,
customary, and prevailing rates charged by other firms and professions with the same or similar
levels of experience and expertise in the Boise legal community.
In addition, it is notable that St. Al's itself chose to hire decidedly non-local counsel, the
international firm of Jones Day, and its attorneys from Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles,
suggesting that the "prevailing charge for like work," as per Rule 54(e)(3), may not be local
rates. It is for this reason that MRIA has requested discovery into the rates charged by St. Al's
attorneys. Such discovery is permissible and relevant when a party challenges the legal rate
charged by the other party's attorneys, even if St. Al' s attorneys bill at rates higher than Boise
attorneys. See Serricchio v. Wachovia Securities, LLC, 258 F.R.D. 43, 44-45 (D. Conn. 2009).
Moreover, publically available records demonstrate that it is very likely that counsel for
St. Al's charged rates far in excess of those charged by MRIA's attorneys. For example, in a
2005 Bankruptcy case called In re WHX Corporation, Case No. 05-11444 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2005), Jones Day submitted a fee application requesting fees ranging from $235 for a mere law
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school graduate who had not yet been admitted to the practice oflaw to $635 for a partner, as
well as fees up to $200 for paralegal work. (Banducci Opp. Aff.

at~

5, Ex. C.) In the case In re

Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Case No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005), Jones Day

submitted a fee application with attorney fees rates for 2009 ranging from $425 to $700 for a
partner; $200 to $565 for an associate; $195 to $225 for a staff attorney; and $110 to $275 for
paralegal work. (!d. at Ex. D.) See also http://www.ocregister.com/articles/city-337982-legaloutsourcing.html (noting that Jones Day has charged a city at a rate of $495 an hour to handle a
lawsuit that had not yet gone to trial) (!d. at Ex. E). Thus, regardless of whether the Court
permits discovery into the billing of St. Al' s counsel, these cases suggest that that rates charged
by MRIA's counsel are much lower than the rates charged by Jones Day.
In addition, the other Rule 54(e)(3) factors, which St. Al's entirely neglects to discuss,
strongly support the rate charged by MRIA's attorneys. A comprehensive discussion of each of
these factors is outlined in the Amended Affidavit of Counsel regarding Rule 54(e)(3) Criteria
for Awarding Attorney Fees, filed with MRIA's Memorandum of Costs (the "Rule 54(e)(3)
Aff."). That Affidavit will not be repeated here; suffice it to say that in over eight years of
litigation, counsel has conducted extensive discovery, briefed questions of first impression in this
state, tried (and won) the case twice in multi-month trials, and defended a vigorous appeal. This
case was among the most high-stakes cases the state has seen. Indeed, to MRIA' s knowledge,
only one case in Idaho history has resulted in higher money damages. The factors oftime, labor,
novelty, difficulty, skill, the large amount at issue, and the result achieved, as discussed in detail
in Mr. Banducci's affidavit, demonstrate the reasonableness of the rate charged by counsel.
In addition, one of the factors that the Court must consider is that the fee agreement
between MRIA and its attorneys is contingent. MRIA paid its attorney fees at an hourly rate
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until the end ofthe first trial. As noted in MRIA's Petition for Fees and Costs, because St. Al's
had largely destroyed MRIA's business, MRIA became unable to pay an hourly rate after that
point, and MRIA came to a contingency fee agreement with its attorneys, who have fronted the
cost of this litigation since that time. Under the contingency fee agreement, MRIA's attorney
fees are in excess of $17 million. This is critical, since the Supreme Court has approved
decisions finding that a contingency agreement is a reasonable manner to calculate attorney's
fees where the case was exceptional and exceptional hours were required to litigate it. Winder v.
Canyon Vista Family Ltd, 148 Idaho 718, 730, 228 P.3d 985, 997 (2010); Brinkman v. Aid Ins.
Co., 115 Idaho 346, 351, 766 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1988) (overturned on other grounds). In the case
at hand, this means that although MRIA could have asserted entitlement to attorney fees of $17
million in this exceptional and extensive case, it instead is only seeking the relatively modest
amount of $1,844,491.00 for what would be the "fixed" rate of its counsel's services. When the
much higher contingency fee amount is considered, it is clear that the amount actually sought by
MRIA is not merely justifiable, but in fact highly reasonable.
In sum, when all of the factors of Rule 54(e)(3) are fully considered, they clearly
demonstrate that the attorney fees requested by MRIA are a reasonable amount. For all the
reasons discussed above and in its earlier briefing and affidavits, MRIA therefore asks the Court
to award attorney fees in the full amount that it has requested.

III.

MRIA'S COST REQUESTS ARE APPROPRIATE

Finally, St. Al's objects to the discretionary costs requested by MRIA. Specifically, it
argues that MRIA did not specifically explain why each particular cost was exceptional. Yet
neither Rule 54 nor Idaho case law require such atomization. Instead, the Puckett case, cited
above, describes the appropriate analysis. In Puckett, the district court awarded discretionary
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costs for expert testimony, noting that the expert testimony was necessary in the context of a
medical malpractice case. As here, the defendant in Puckett argued that the district court had not
adequately considered why each particular cost was exceptional and necessary. The Supreme
Court flatly disagreed with this approach, stating:
[Defendant] argues that the district court abused its discretion by not considering
whether each individual discretionary cost claimed was necessary and
exceptional. We have held that express findings as to the general character of
requested costs and whether such costs are necessary, reasonable, exceptional,
and in the interests of justice is sufficient to comply with this requirement ....
Thus, the district court need not evaluate the requested costs item by item .... The
district court's express findings as to the general character of the travel expenses,
expert witness fees and other litigation costs were sufficient.
Puckett, 144 Idaho at 169-70, 158 P .3d at 945-46 (citation and quotations omitted).

Moreover, contrary to St. Al's argument that each fee must be found to be in and of itself
"exceptional," Idaho law is abundantly clear that all costs in a case can be found "exceptional" if
the case itself was exceptional in magnitude and nature. Id; Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist.

v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005). That is, the Idaho Supreme Court "has
always construed the requirement that a cost be 'exceptional' under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) to
include those costs incurred because the nature of the case was itself exceptional." !d. (emphasis
added). Thus, "[a] court may evaluate whether costs are exceptional within the context of the
nature of the case"-it need not find that each particular cost was exceptional on its own. City of
McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 588-89, 130 P.3d 1118, 1126-27 (2006); Alcorn, 141 Idaho at

314. As a result, when St. Al' s alleges that MRIA said nothing concerning the exceptional
nature of the costs, it is plainly incorrect; MRIA's counsel explained in detail the factors that
made the overall case novel, complex, and exceptional, and that is all that is needed to award all
discretionary costs. Id (See Rule 54(e)(3) Aff., ~~ 1-7.)
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The result of the forgoing is that MRIA has demonstrated why its discretionary costs are
necessary and exceptional in the context of this lengthy and complex case. St. Al's nevertheless
challenges several specific categories of costs. Though these arguments are irrelevant in light of
cases like Alcorn, in an abundance of caution, MRIA will address them below.

A.

Copying Charges

MRIA has requested as discretionary costs those copying charges over and above the
amount permitted as a matter of right. St. Al' s argues that copying charges can be related only to
those matters admitted into evidence. St. Al's fails to recognize that this standard is applicable
only to copying costs as a matter of right; MRIA's request is that these additional copying costs
be permitted as discretionary costs under 54(d)(l)(D), the only standard for which is a showing
of necessity and exceptionality, as described above. The Idaho Supreme Court has explicitly
noted that photocopying may be included in discretionary costs. Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 313.
St. Al's also argues that MRIA must in some matter justify each particular copy as
exceptional. As noted above, this level of specificity is not required, but even if it was, there can
be no doubt that his was an unusually document-intensive case, a fact which this Court itself has
already recognized. Tr., 2410. There were approximately 1200 exhibits identified in this matter,
and two rounds of discovery prior to each trial. Moreover, as described in the Rule 54(e)(3) Aff.,
the case involved review of documents over the course of a 20 year partnership and documents
internal to no fewer than five organizations (MRIA, MRI Center, MRI Mobile, St. Al's, and
Intermountain Medical Imaging). Counsel for MRIA was presented with the daunting task of
explaining terminology, partner relationships/obligations, and the course of SARMC's conduct
over a period of twenty years to two different juries. This is very different from cases cited by
St. Al's where copying charges were disallowed, such as !nama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 973
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P.2d 148 (1999), a straightforward six-figure personal injury case. See Nightengale v. Timme!,
256 P.3d 755, 763 (2011) (noting that personal injury cases are generally not exceptional enough
to justify copying charges). As this case was exceptional in magnitude and nature, these copying
charges should be allowed.

B.

Miscellaneous Costs

MRIA asked for costs related to moving 30 boxes from storage. Given that this was the
retrial of this case, it was impossible for counsel to store all of the voluminous hard copy
documents from this matter at its office, and so after the first trial many matters were placed in a
storage facility. (Banducci Opp. Aff.

at~

6.) This case, exceptional in both size and the fact that

it was on retrial, necessitated the costs to transport these documents from storage so that they
would be available during trial.
St. Al's also objects to "focus group" costs. These costs are related to convening two
mock juries. It is MRIA's counsel's practice to convene mock juries in complex and factually
dense cases such as this one to ensure that the necessary facts are clearly and comprehensibly
communicated to the actual jury. (Banducci Opp. Aff.

at~

7.) Though St. Al's suggests that

these charges are extraordinary, the truth is that many courts have awarded expenses for the costs
of a "mock jury" or similar exercise. See, e.g., Abrams v. Van Kampen Funds, 2006 WL 452419
(N.D. Ill. 2006); Confederated Tribes ofSiletz Indians v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 2003 WL
23715982, at *8 n.12 (D. Or. 2003) (collecting cases) (vacated on other grounds). Again, as
discussed above, as this case was exceptional in magnitude and nature, these costs are justified.

C.

Federal Express Charges

St. Al's objects to Federal Express charges. These are related to sending documents to
MRlA's experts after this court reopened discovery, on St. Al's motion. (Banducci Opp. Aff. at
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8.) As these expenses would not have been incurred if St. Al's had not insisted upon reopening

discovery (a motion which MRIA opposed), these were expenses incurred because of St. Al's
own decisions, and should be awarded. See, e.g. Cho v. Koam Medical Services P.C., 524 F.
Supp.2d 202, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (reimbursing plaintiff for costs related to Federal Express and
postage). Moreover, as discussed below, the expenses relating to MRIA's experts were
necessary and exceptional in this case.

D.

Meal Expenses

St. Al's objects to meal expenses. These meal expenses involved meals for the mock
juries, meals during attorney/client meetings, and meals for the attorneys and witnesses during
trial. (Banducci Opp. Aff.

at~

9.) Given the nature and complexity of this case, counsel and

MRIA's witnesses often worked during meals and lunch break at trial. Again, as this case was
exceptional in both magnitude and nature, these costs are justified.
E.

Parking

St. Al's objects to parking expenses. These are the expenses incurred by counsel for
parking at the Ada County Courthouse for hearings and trial. (Banducci Opp. Aff.

at~

10.) As

this case was exceptional in both magnitude and nature, these costs are justified.

F.

Witness Location

St. Al's objects to the cost of witness location. Counsel's staff used paid online personlocator services in order to discover the location at which certain third-party witnesses could be
served subpoenas to secure their testimony. (Banducci Opp. Aff.

at~

11.) As this case was

exceptional in both magnitude and nature, these costs are justified.
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G.

Travel

St. Al's objects to the costs incurred by counsel in traveling to take and defend various
depositions. The Idaho Supreme Court has explicitly noted that travel may be included in
discretionary costs. Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 313. St. Al's expert, Dr. Thomas McCarthy, resides in
Los Angeles; MRIA's experts live in Portland and Seattle. (Banducci Opp. Aff.

at~

12.) The

parties simply agreed to take the depositions of one another's experts where those experts live.

(Id) As this case was exceptional in both magnitude and nature, these costs are justified.

H.

Westlaw Charges

MRIA has requested its Westlaw charges as part of the discretionary costs award. As
outlined in the various affidavits, this case contained many novel and difficult legal issues,
several of which were matters of first impression in Idaho or with limited Idaho authority. To
name just a few, there were novel issues concerning: wrongful dissociation; the applicability of
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act to a partnership agreement existing before the Act's
implementation; fiduciary duty law in the context of general and limited partnerships; Daubert
challenges to expert testimony; unique attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine
issues; damages issues; apportionment issues; and statutes of limitation issues. These costs were
necessary to address these issues, and as this case was exceptional in both magnitude and nature,
these costs are justified. Alternatively, MRIA requests that these costs be awarded not as
discretionary costs, but included as a part of the attorney fee award pursuant to Rule 54(e)(3),
which provides that the attorney fee award include the reasonable costs of automated legal
research if such costs were reasonably necessary in preparing the case.
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I.

Expert Fees

Finally, St. Al's objects to the expert fees. Again, it erroneously cites the standard for
those expert fees awarded as a matter of right; MRIA is requesting the balance of the significant
expert fees incurred in this case as a part of the discretionary fees, and again, the only standard
for discretionary fees is necessity and exceptionality. The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly
found that additional costs for expert witnesses may be included in discretionary costs. Alcorn,
141 Idaho at 313; Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681,688-89, 39 P.3d 621, 628-29 (2001)
(award of discretionary costs for motorcyclist's expert witness fees was appropriate); Beale v.
Speck, 127 Idaho 521, 903 P.2d 110 (Ct. App. 1995) (trial court properly awarded discretionary

costs for defendant's two medical experts where court found that experts were necessary to rebut
plaintiffs' contentions regarding extent of injuries); Puckett, 144 Idaho 161 (award of $120,714
in expert costs appropriate given the long course of litigation and complexity of case).
Expert Fees for Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite: St. Al's argues that the expert fees ofMr.

Budge and Mr. Wilhoite, MRIA's damages experts, should not been allowed. 5 As this Court
well knows, one of the focal points of this new trial, and the only discovery that was re-opened,
was as to damages. St. Al' s argues that the new work done by Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite was
superfluous, since, according to St. Al's, all they did was testify the same as they did previously.
This is demonstrably false. Indeed, Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite were required to do
significantly more work in this case as a direct result of the fact that St. Al's successfully
reopened discovery as to damages. Notably, in stark contrast to its current argument, in its
Motion for New Trial, St. Al's explicitly recognized (and indeed, complained) that MRIA was
5

St. Al's also argues that the damages testimony should have been accomplished with only one expert. However,
each expert had significantly different roles, which involved significantly different skill sets and expertise. Mr.
Budge's role was to examine the data to determine the number of scans that had been lost as a result of St. Al' s
wrongful conduct, i.e., to calculate "past" damages. Mr. Wilhoite then applied economic principles to project these
damages forward and calculate "future" damages.
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allowed to update its damages theories and numbers, all of which obviously took significant
additional and new work by MRIA' s damages experts. (See Memorandum in Support of St. Al' s
Motion for New Trial, pp. 18-19.) Clearly, those two experts had to update their reports
considerably, examine new evidence, calculate (and defend) a new damages number, counter the
opinions of St. Al's new expert, Dr. McCarthy, and the like. Given the exceptional magnitude of
this eight-figure damages case, these expert fees were necessary and justified.
Expert Fees for Mr. Bell: St. Al's argues that the expert fees ofMr. Bell, MRIA's expert

concerning MRI machines, should not been allowed because it believes that his testimony was
not relevant. Putting to one side the fact that St. Al's neglected to object to Mr. Bell's testimony
at trial on this ground, it is worth noting that prior to this litigation, St. Al' s took the position
numerous times that the reason that it no longer wanted to be a part of MRIA, or the reason that
MRIA was losing referrals, was because of the poor quality ofMRIA's equipment. (See Ex.
4280 at p. 2; Ex. 4309 at p. 2; Tr. at pp. 366-68, 412-417, 3752, 3758-59, 3946-52, 4018-22, and
4284-88.) Even if St. Al's disavowed at trial that it did not leave MRIA for this reason, at the
time of dissociation St. Al' s clearly used the alleged poor quality of the machines as pretext to
leave and to explain why IMI was achieving a better result in the marketplace. !d. This provides
more than enough justification for Mr. Bell's testimony. This also lends credibility to MRIA's
position at trial that while St. Al's was paying lip service to numerous other excuses for leaving
the MRIA partnership, St. Al's true reason was a motivation for profit.
Expert Fees for Grant Thornton, LLP: St. Al's asserts that the expert fees related to

Grant Thornton, LLP, are unrelated to the case. When Mr. Budge prepared his expert opinion
for the first trial of this matter, he was assisted by an associate at his firm, FTI, named Drew
Voth. (Banducci Opp. Aff.

at~

13.) Between the first and second trial, Mr. Voth left FTI and
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joined Grant Thornton, LLP. (/d.) When Mr. Budge updated his opinion for purposes of retrial,
he advised that MRIA could either spend significant costs for a new FTI associate to become
familiar with the case, or MRIA could spend less money and hire Drew Voth at Grant Thornton,
who already had extensive knowledge of the case, to again assist Mr. Budge. (/d.) MRIA
obviously chose this more cost-effective strategy, and billings for Mr. Voth's time were
submitted by his new employer, Grant Thornton, LLP. There is no significant difference
between this arrangement and Mr. Voth billing his time in assisting Mr. Budge as an associate of
FTI, as he did in the first trial. For the same reasons that MRIA is entitled to reimbursement for
Mr. Budge's expert services, MRIA should likewise be reimbursed for all of the assistance
rendered in formulating that opinion.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, and its MRIA's Petition for Fees and Costs and

accompanying affidavits, MRIA asks that the Court award fees and costs in the amounts
requested by MRIA.
DATED this 16th day ofMarch, 2012.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

JOHN A. BOEHNER,
Plaintiff,

v.
JAMES A. McDERMOTT,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civ. No. 98-0594 (TFH)

PLAINTIFF JOHN A. BOEHNER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
IDS REVISED MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS, AND INTEREST
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"sensitive confidential position[]" with a "special dut[y] of nondisclosure," United States v.
Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995); (2) he had not "lawfully obtained" the tape because he was
directly involved with, and aided and abetted, the interceptors' disclosure ofthe tape; and (3)
Boehner would prevail under the Bartnicki balancing test for both ofthose reasons, as well as the
fact that the intercepted speech was protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.

ARGUMENT
I.

BOEHNER ACIDEVED TOTAL VICTORY IN TIDS CASE, ENTITLING HIM
TO RECOVER THE FULL SUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES REASONABLY
EXPENDED IN PURSUIT OF THAT VICTORY.
The fees incurred by Boehner on the federal claim were concededly reasonable and,

because Boehner fully prevailed on that claim, no reduction is even potentially warranted.
Furthermore, even if a reduction could be considered, McDermott is wrong in asserting that
Boehner "lost" on an issue that the en bane Court did not and could not reach once it had ruled in
Boehner's favor on other grounds. Even assuming that Boehner "lost" on the "lawfully
obtained" issue, it is well settled that no fee reduction is warranted for a "loss" on an alternative
argument in support of a claim on which the plaintiff prevailed.

A.

The Fee Award Should Not Be Reduced Because Boehner Is A Fully
Prevailing Plaintiff.

As the cases cited by McDermott himself plainly establish, the award to a prevailing
plaintiff like Boehner can be reduced below the amount for hours reasonably expended if, and
only if, '"a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success."' (Defendant James A.
McDermott's Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Revised Motion For Attorneys' Fees,
Costs, And Interest ("Br.") at 7) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)). In
such circumstances, "'the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole
times reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount.'" !d. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at
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436). In contrast, where the plaintiff has obtained "essentially complete relief," Hensley, 461
U.S. at 431, or otherwise "excellent results, his attorney fees should be 'fully compensatory' for
the hours worked." Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d 796, 801-02 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Hensley,
461 U.S. at 435-36).
Accordingly, Hensley established a two-part test for determining whether the award
should be less than fees for the hours reasonably expended. "First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail
on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded?" Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
If this threshold criterion for potential fee reduction is satisfied, the question then becomes
"whether a partially prevailing plaintiff may recover an attorney's fee for legal services on
unsuccessful claims," which turns on whether "the plaintiff achieve[d] a level of success that
makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award." Id. at 426,
434. Even when the court has rejected some of plaintiff's claims, "a plaintiff who has won
substantial relief should not have his attorney's fees reduced simply because the district court did
not adopt each contention raised." Id. at 440. As the Court explained, "[l]itigants in good faith
may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the court's rejection of or failure
to reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing the fee." Id. at 435. Since "[t]he
result is what matters," a full fee award is required for plaintiffs who have achieved substantial
relief"in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole." Id. at 440.
Although McDermott correctly notes that he must show that Boehner achieved only
"partial or limited" success to reduce the fee award, he does not even attempt to satisfy the
standard because he does not and cannot contend that the lawsuit produced anything less than
what Boehner sought. Save for the Florida state law claim for which fees are not sought, see
supra, Boehner did not "fail to prevail" on any claim and did plainly obtain "substantial"-
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indeed, complete-"relief." Plaintiffs sole federal claim was that McDermott was liable under
the wiretapping statute. He prevailed on this claim and obtained every type ofreliefhe sought.
Accordingly, McDermott wholly fails to satisfy the threshold showing required under

Hensley, i.e., lack of success on a claim. In this litigation, no court has rejected any aspect of
Boehner's statutory claim or reduced the relief he sought to any degree. He is therefore not a

partially prevailing plaintiff under Hensley, but a fully prevailing one who is entitled to fully
compensatory fees.
McDermott seeks to gloss over this glaring, fatal deficiency by contending that Boehner
did not "prevail on the core First Amendment question" presented. (Br. at 8.) But, of course,
Boehner did not bring any First Amendment claim. McDermott raised the First Amendment as a
defense and that defense was rejected. Accordingly, Boehner plainly prevailed on his sole
federal statutory claim and McDermott just as plainly lost on his First Amendment defense.
Thus, Boehner's success cannot be characterized as "partial or limited" under any rational
conception of those terms.
Boehner's success is in no way affected by the fact that McDermott's First Amendment
defense was rejected on one of the three potential grounds offered, rather than all three. This
resolution did not reduce the monetary relief by a penny, did not otherwise affect the outcome of
the case in any way, and certainly did not constitute a "fail[ure] to prevail on [a] claim[]" of the
sort required by Hensley. McDermott cannot cite a single case reducing fees where a plaintiff
has prevailed on all claims and obtained the relief sought. Rather, in every case cited, plaintiffs
achieved only "partial or limited success" under Hensley. 461 U.S. at 436.
For example, the principal case relied on by McDermott-Gratz v. Bollinger, 353 F.
Supp. 2d 929 (E.D. Mich. 2005)-involved partially prevailing plaintiffs whose fees were

-5-
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reduced precisely "because [they] only achieved partial or limited success." /d. at 938. There,
plaintiffs claimed that defendants violated the Constitution and civil rights laws "by considering
race as a factor in the [university's] admission policies," and their "primary purpose in bringing
their lawsuit was to invalidate the consideration of an applicant's race in college admission
decisions." !d. at 932, 938. Plaintiffs failed to achieve this "color blind" result or secure any
such relief, but received only a limited judgment that the defendant's overbroad quota was not
sufficiently "narrowly tailored" (relief which may not have even benefited the named plaintiffs
or other potential class members). Id. at 938.
The other cases cited by McDermott are likewise irrelevant because they all involve
partially prevailing plaintiffs who achieved only limited success and less than full relief. See
Raton Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 891 F.2d 323,330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Br. at 8) (plaintiff
failed to prevail on blanket challenge to filing fees, while prevailing on challenge to the specific
fee at issue); Fine v. Ryan Int'l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 757 (7th Cir. 2002) (Br. at 11) (fees
reduced by 10% where plaintiffs "discrimination claim" was "unsuccessful" and she was denied
reinstatement, prevailing only on a retaliation claim); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Barton, 223 F.3d
770,771-72 (8th Cir. 2000) (Br. at 9) (plaintiffprevailed on only one of six claims under Title
VII and state law); Jason D. W by Mr. & Mrs. Douglas W v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d
205, 210 (5th Cir. 1998) (Br. at 10) (plaintiff failed to achieve the "primary objective" ofhis case
under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, namely, "to secure placement at another
school"); Rendon v. AT&T Techs., 883 F.2d 388, 399 (5th Cir. 1989) (Br. at 10) (plaintiffs
"fail[ed] to prove discrimination in hiring and termination practices"); Thomas ex rei. A. T v.
Dist. ofColumbia, No. 03-1791,2007 WL 891367, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2007) (Br. at 9)
("Plaintiff ultimately succeeded on only two often claims [raised] in her Complaint."); Martini
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v. Fed. Nat'/ Mortgage Ass'n, 977 F. Supp. 482,484,489-90 (D.D.C. 1997) (Br. at 11) (plaintiff

prevailed on Title VII claims but lost on common law tort claims); Atlanta Journal &
Constitution v. City ofAtlanta Dep 't ofAviation, 347 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2004)

(Br. at 8) (plaintiffs failed to obtain injunction prohibiting defendants from charging cost-based
airport "newsrack" fees), aff'd, 442 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2006); Carroll v. Blinken, 899 F. Supp.
1214, 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Br. at 8) (plaintiffs were "the prevailing party only on [a] separate
and obviously minor issue" and "not on the major and important issue which sparked this
litigation"), aff'd, 105 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1997); Ryan v. Raytheon Data Sys. Co., 601 F. Supp. 243,
252, 255-56 (D. Mass. 1984) (Br. at 10) (plaintiff prevailed on claim that she was terminated on
the basis of sex, but lost on claim that she was discriminated against in her severance benefits).
By contrast, Boehner achieved complete success on his only objective-a judgment and full
relief on his claim under the federal wiretapping statute.
Thus, McDermott completely fails to satisfy the first prong of the Hensley test, and this
failure renders inapposite all the cases adjudicating whether plaintiffs who actually lost a claim
or were denied relief nevertheless achieved sufficiently "substantial relief' to warrant full fees.
McDermott's position, moreover, is at war with common sense. It simply does not matter
whether a defendant's affirmative defense fails on one ground or on a multitude of grounds. In
either event, the degree of plaintiffs success is the same and the relief entered against the
defendant is the same, which is why courts rarely even reach such hypothetical issues that do not
affect the "case or controversy" being adjudicated.
Even engaging in the counter-intuitive assumption that McDermott somehow derived
some psychic satisfaction because he lost his First Amendment defense on the ground that he had
violated his sacred obligations as a member ofthe House Ethics Committee, rather than because
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he did not "lawfully obtain" the tape, this psychic "benefit" has no relevance to the liability or
relief being adjudicated. Since it has no effect on the plaintiffs success, it provides no grounds
for treating Boehner differently than other successful plaintiffs. Where the plaintiff has prevailed
on a claim, he is not seeking to '"piggyback' fees for unsuccessful claims upon unrelated,
successful claims," but is seeking only to collect directly on the successful claim. Sierra Club,
769 F.2d at 801. Indeed, even in cases where plaintiffs have lost claims, they nevertheless
receive full fee awards if the loss did not diminish the relief awarded because, as noted, the

"result is what matters" under Hensley. 461 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added).
In sum, a potential fee reduction under Hensley is plainly not available because Boehner
did not lose a claim or secure less-than-complete relief.

B.

Even If Boehner Was Only A Partially Prevailing Plaintiff, He Is Still
Entitled To Full Fee Recovery.

The foregoing establishes that the threshold inquiry under Hensley precludes fee
reduction because this is not a case where the "plaintifffail[ed] to prevail on [any] claims." 461
U.S. at 434. We nevertheless note parenthetically that, even ifBoehner had failed to succeed on
a claim, he would still be entitled to a full fee award under the standards established for "partially
prevailing plaintiffs" in Hensley, for a number of reasons.

First, even if McDermott's First Amendment defense were (wrongly) equated with a
claim brought by a plaintiff, Boehner did not lose any claim or issue under the First Amendment.
Rather, the en bane court simply did not resolve whether McDermott had "lawfully obtained" the
tape (what McDermott refers to as the "Bartnicki issue"). Instead, the Court ruled that the First
Amendment did not provide a viable defense because McDermott was in a "'sensitive
confidential position[]"' with "'special duties of non-disclosure."' Boehner v. McDermott, 484
F.3d 573, 579 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 606). Since the Court rejected
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McDermott's defense on this threshold ground, as Judge Griffith correctly recognized, "the
Court does not and need not reach the Bartnicki issue to resolve the matter before us." !d. at 581
(Griffith, J., concurring) (emphasis added). That being so, no fee reduction is possible because it
is clear that "a court's 'failure to reach' an issue is not grounds to reduce a fee award."

Kennecott Corp. v. EPA, 804 F.2d 763, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435).
That Judge Griffith thought it "worth noting" how he "would have" resolved the "lawfully
obtained" issue

if it was presented, does not change the fact that the Court (including Judge

Griffith) did "not reach" that question. 3 484 F.3d at 581 (Griffith, J., concurring).

Second, even assuming the Court had rejected Boehner's "lawfully obtained" argument,
this does not mean that he lost on his First Amendment "claim"; he just lost one alternative
argument proffered to obtain the desired result. The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly held that a
"court's rejection of [an] alternative" argument designed to achieve the result actually obtained
through another argument "provides no grounds for reducing the fee." Kennecott Corp., 804
F.2d at 766. In Kennecott, the plaintiffs proposed two grounds for invalidating the EPA's
"financial eligibility test," one of which-the "State power" argument-the district court rejected
as "without merit." !d. at 765. Even though the court had rejected this "second line of
argument," this provided "no grounds for reducing the fee" because the plaintiffs were
"completely successful on their challenge to the financial eligibility test" through their first
argument. !d. at 766.
Similarly, in American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 72 F.3d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("APF'),
the Court rejected two of the "five grounds [advanced by plaintiffs] for the invalidity of the

3

Indeed, Judge Griffith's dicta does not even provide insight into how a majority of the D.C. Circuit would
decide future cases on these facts because, even counting Judge Griffith, only five judges "rejected" the Bartnicki
argument and there are currently ten judges on the D.C. Circuit, with two seats vacant. (Judge Kavanaugh was
recused from this case on appeal.)

- 9-
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regulation." !d. at 911. But the Court held that Hensley's rule for partially prevailing plaintiffs
"simply has no application to the present case," because the plaintiffs prevailed on their claim of
invalidity, even ifthey lost on some theories offered in support ofthat claim. Id. at 911-12. As
the Court explained:
Petitioners did not raise any claims distinct and separate from the
one on which they prevailed. They pursued only one claim for
relief--the invalidity of the regulation at issue. They argued five
defensible bases for that invalidity ... [b]ut there were no fourth or
fifth claims. There were only fourth or fifth arguments for the one
claim .... As there are no "separate claims," but only separate
arguments in support of the same claim, Hensley v. Eckerhart has
no applicability.

!d. Consequently, since Boehner prevailed on one argument relating to his First Amendment
"claim," the alleged lack of success on the other arguments in support of that claim does not
provide a basis for reducing fees under Hensley.

Third, and most obviously, Plaintiff is entitled to full fees under the second prong of
Hensley because he obtained full relief and, again, "[t]he result is what matters." 461 U.S. at
435. Here, even assuming Boehner somehow lost a claim, he nevertheless "won substantial
relief' in "comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole" and therefore a "reduced fee
award" would not be "appropriate." !d. at 440.
For all these reasons, Boehner's alleged lack of success, however analyzed, provides no
basis for reducing the fees under Hensley. Nor is there any contention, or any plausible basis for
contending, that the hours spent by Boehner in this litigation were not "reasonably expended."

!d. at 433; see id. at 434 (hours that are "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" may be
unreasonable). Needless to say, it was fully prudent to vigorously pursue the "lawfully obtained"
argument, and it was certainly not one "so frivolous that all time spent on it was unreasonable."

API, 72 F.3d at 912. The "lawfully obtained" argument was the basis upon which the First
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Amendment issue was favorably resolved both in this Court and in the D.C. Circuit panel
opinion. See Boehner v. McDermott, 332 F. Supp. 2d 149, 169 (D.D.C. 2004); Boehner v.
McDermott, 441 F.3d 1010, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Perhaps more important, the "lawfully
obtained" argument was essential to Boehner's victory in this Court, and to his appellee status on
appeal, because this Court accepted that argument but rejected the Aguilar "sensitive
confidential position" contention. All told, five ofthe ten judges to hear this case agreed with
the "lawfully obtained" argument. Standing alone, this demonstrates beyond peradventure that
pursuing this argument was not only reasonable, but mandatory for any attorney interested in
vindicating his client's interests.
In all events, McDermott's bizarre assertion that a substantial amount of fees could have
been avoided if "Rep. Boehner [had] conceded that the First Amendment applied to Rep.
McDermott's disclosure (particularly in light of the Bartnicki decision)," is completely beside
the point. (Br. at 10.) As noted, it is black-letter law that fully compensatory fees are awarded
when a plaintiff prevails on all its claims and achieves the desired result. Courts are not
authorized to reduce fees by engaging in "20/20 ... hindsight" to determine which of the
plausible claims presented was the basis for the victory-particularly where as here, the court did
not even reach the other issues. API, 72 F.3d at 912. Indeed, under McDermott's skewed logic,
he is entirely responsible for virtually all fees in this case because he did not "concede that the
First Amendment" did not apply to his disclosure since, like Judge Aguilar, he had a special duty
of nondisclosure. But just as McDermott was not required to abandon his potentially plausible
(albeit losing) distinction of Aguilar, Boehner was not obliged to abandon his "lawfully
obtained" distinction of Bartnicki.

- 11 -
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Finally, although this minutiae is completely irrelevant, we do note that McDermott
distorts the actual course of this litigation. Far from being an eleventh-hour addition, the
"sensitive confidential position" argument was made from the outset of the litigation and was the

first argument presented on remand from the Supreme Court to the D.C. Circuit. See Supp. Br.
for Appellant at 6-15, Boehnerv. McDermott, No. 98-7156 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 30, 2001) (attached
hereto as Exhibit A). Moreover, the Ethics Committee report criticizing McDermott in
December, 2006 was not some deus ex machina that saved the Aguilar argument. That Report
merely confirmed the otherwise obvious point that McDermott had a duty of nondisclosure at
least equivalent to Judge Aguilar's. No member of the en bane court hinted that the result would
have been different absent the Report's confirmation of the obvious. At most, it simply
eliminated the need for examining the Committee's nondisclosure rules de novo. Any suggestion
about how that de novo review would have turned out is nothing but rank speculation. Indeed,
McDermott is currently vigorously arguing to the Supreme Court (as he did when he brought the
Committee Report to the en bane court's attention) that the Report is exculpatory.
Moreover, if the December, 2006 Report really were the key to Boehner's victory, this
further confirms the wisdom of pursuing his "lawfully obtained" argument. If the Report were
essential to the success on the Aguilar argument, then Boehner's only hope of prevailing before
the initial panel was the "lawfully obtained" argument, since he would have lost on Aguilar
without the Report. Thus, absent the "lawfully obtained" argument, Boehner would have lost in
front of the panel on March 28, 2006, and it is extraordinarily unlikely that the case would have
still been pending in the D.C. Circuit in December of2006. Under this alternative hypothetical,
then, the only reason that Boehner prevailed was because he utilized the "lawfully obtained"
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CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, Plaintiff John A. Boehner respectfully requests that this Court
grant his Revised Motion, and award attorneys' fees and other litigation costs in the amount of
approximately $865,040.53, plus interest in the amount of approximately $35,298.33, for a total
of approximately $900,338.76, and such other relief as this Court deems just and appropriate.
Dated: October 5, 2007

Respectfully submitted,

Is/ Michael A. Carvin
Michael A. Carvin (D.C. Bar. No. 366784)
Louis K. Fisher (D.C. Bar No. 475502)
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 879-3939
Counsel for PlaintiffJohn A. Boehner
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County of Ada

)
): ss
)

State of Idaho

Thomas A. Banducci, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney for MRIA in the above captioned case.

2.

I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge. This affidavit responds to

several discrete issues raised by Saint Alphonsus in its Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and
Costs.
3.

Saint Alphonsus objects to certain billings related to transactions which it

characterizes as "property purchases," as well as various conference calls between counsel and
Barbara Nay, Margaret Kushner, Tim Gorman, and Wendy Engels. Each of these billings is
related to the prosecution of this litigation because:
a.

During the litigation, Saint Alphonsus's parent company, Trinity,

purchased certain healthcare facilities in the Treasure Valley and eastern Oregon, including
MRIA partners Mercy Medical Center (Nampa) and Holy Rosary (Ontario, Oregon). MRIA
sought counsel from me relative to the potential impact these acquisitions might have on MRIA's
rights in the litigation.
b.

Tim Gorman is in-house counsel for CHI, the former owner of Mercy and

Holy Rosary prior to their purchase by Trinity. I reported to Mr. Gorman on case status and
settlement issues.
c.

In addition, MRIA made numerous attempts to settle the litigation.

During one attempt, in-house counsel for Saint Alphonsus, Ms. Westermeier, indicated that she
was uncomfortable discussing settlement directly with me, and thus attorney Margaret Kushner
of the firm Stoel Rives acted as an intermediary between the parties to facilitate these settlement
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negotiations. See Exhibits A and B, which are true and correct copies of correspondence that
reflect Ms. Kushner's role as an intermediary. Barbara Nay is Ms. Kushner's partner, and was
included in discussions with Ms. Kushner and myself to obtain her perspective on how
Ms. Kushner might be deployed to discuss settlement issues with Ms. Westermeier.
d.

Wendy Engels is a representative of Mercer, a broker who valued the

assets of MRIA and the limited partnerships. At one point, settlement discussions touched on the
possibility that MRIA would sell the assets of MRI Center to Saint Alphonsus as a part of a
settlement. I conferred with Ms. Engels on this point.
These billings are therefore clearly related to the prosecution of this lawsuit, and should
be reimbursed in the attorney fee award.
4.

Saint Alphonsus objects to billings where attorneys from my firm attended MRIA

board meetings. My firm is not general counsel for MRIA, but litigation counsel. Each time we
attended an MRIA Board Meeting, it was for the sole purpose of reporting on litigation issues to
the Board, and receiving instruction from the Board on how to proceed with litigation-related
matters. As these are attorney/client communications directly related to the prosecution of this
litigation, they are clearly appropriate for reimbursement in the attorney fee award.
5.

I have directed members of my staffto examine publically available records, to

determine what fees Jones Day has asked for in its litigation over the last ten years. Attached
hereto as Exhibits C, D, and E are true and correct copies of the relevant portions of the Fee
Petition submitted by Jones Day in WHX Corporation, Case No. 05-11444 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y
2005); the Fee Petition submitted by Jones Day in Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Case No. 0813555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2005); and an article about fees charged by Jones Day available at
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http://www.ocregister.com/articles/city-337982-legal-outsourcing.html as accessed on February
21, 2012.
6.

Saint Alphonsus objects to costs related to moving 30 boxes from storage. It

would have been impossible to store all of the voluminous hard copy documents from this matter
at our office, and so after the first trial many documents were placed in a storage facility. After
the remand, it was then necessary to transport these documents from storage so that they would
be available during retrial.
7.

Saint Alphonsus also objects to "focus group" costs. These costs are related to

convening two mock juries. It is my practice to convene mock juries in complex and factually
dense cases, such as this one, to ensure that the necessary facts are clearly and comprehensibly
communicated to the actual jury. I have found that this is an invaluable tool, and particularly
necessary in complex litigation.
8.

Saint Alphonsus objects to Federal Express charges. These are related to sending

documents to MRIA's experts after this court reopened discovery, on Saint Alphonsus's motion.
9.

Saint Alphonsus objects to meal expenses. These meal expenses involved meals

for the mock juries, meals during attorney/client meetings, and meals for the attorneys and
witnesses during trial. Given the nature and complexity of this case, counsel and MRIA's
witnesses often worked during meals and lunch break at trial.
10.

Saint Alphonsus objects to parking expenses. These are the expenses incurred by

counsel for parking at the Ada County Courthouse for hearings and trial.
11.

Saint Alphonsus objects to the cost of witness location. I directed my staff to use

paid online person-locator services in order to discover the location at which certain third-party
witnesses could be served subpoenas to secure their testimony.
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12.

Saint Alphonsus objects to the costs incurred by counsel in traveling to take and

defend various depositions. Saint Alphonsus's expert, Dr. Thomas McCarthy, resides in Los
Angeles; MRIA's financial experts live in Seattle and Portland. The parties simply agreed to
take the depositions of one another's experts where those experts live.
13.

Saint Alphonsus objects to the expert fees related to Grant Thornton, LLP. When

Mr. Budge prepared his expert opinion for the first trial of this matter, he was assisted by an
associate at his firm, FTI, named Drew Voth. Between the first and second trial, it is my
understanding that Mr. Voth left FTI and joined Grant Thornton, LLP. When Mr. Budge
updated his opinion for purposes of retrial, he advised that MRIA could either spend significant
costs for a new FTI associate to become familiar with the case, or MRIA could spend less money
and hire Drew Voth, who already had extensive knowledge of the case, to again assist
Mr. Budge. MRIA obviously chose this more cost-effective strategy, and billings for Mr. Voth's
time were submitted by his employer, Grant Thornton, LLP.

/') Jf(
DATED this Z_tday of February 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

m

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __i_Lt_ day of
OJv..h
copy of the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintijjlCounterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintijjlCounterdefendant

2012, a true and correct

0 U:,S. Mail
lil-1fand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
0 Facsimile

w6'~. Mail

0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
0 Facsimile

1Juwr-~
Brent Bastian
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EXHIBIT A
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Wade Woodard
From:

Sent:
To:
Cc:

Subject:

Kushner, Margaret <MBKUSHNER@stoel.com>
Monday, March 21, 2011 5:55 PM
Wade Woodard; 'Jim Prochaska'
Thomas Banducci
RE: MRIA/Saint Alphonsus litigation

Thanks, Wade.
Margaret
From: Wade Woodard [mailto:WWoodard@BWSLawGroup.com]
Sent: Monday, March 21,2011 4:55PM
To: Kushner, Margaret; 'Jim Prochaska'
Cc: Thomas Banducci
Subject: RE: MRIA/Saint Alphonsus litigation

No response is necessary.
From: Kushner, Margaret [mailto:MBKUSHNER@stoel.com]
Sent: Monday, March 21,2011 5:13PM
To: 'Jim Prochaska'; Wade Woodard
Subject: FW: MRIA/Saint Alphonsus litigation

FYI, just received this email from Stephanie Westermeier.
If you want me to respond to her in any way, please let me know.
Margaret
From: Stephanie Westermeier [mailto:STEPWEST@sarmc.org]
Sent: Monday, March 21,2011 4:11PM
To: Kushner, Margaret
Cc: Judith Puckett
Subject: RE: MRIA/Saint Alphonsus litigation

Hi Margaret - I am just checking in to tell you thank you for promptly following up and getting back to me in
response to my phone call earlier this month. Since MRIA could not secure the bond for the appeal costs,
the issue is being pursued by Tom Dvorak with Wade Woodard and hopefully Saint Alphonsus will be
receiving prompt payment(s). As to the discussion of settlement of the entire matter, I thought that it was
possible that MRIA may wish to present an offer that would be more reasonable than its last offer (in short, all
that Saint Alphonsus had offered plus $12.5 million). Since that does not appear to be the case, Saint
Alphonsus will not be making a counter-offer. However, I sincerely appreciated the opportunity to talk to you
about the circumstances and raise the settlement possibility. Saint Alphonsus remains open to such future
discussions. Thank you again for your courtesies, Margaret. Stephanie

1
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Stephanie C. Westermeier
Managing Counsel, Trinity Health
General Counsel, Saint Alphonsus Health System
1055 N. Curtis Rd.
Boise, ID 83 706
(208) 367-6325
stepwest@sarmc.org
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail contains confidential information that may be protected by the
attorney-client and/or work product privilege. It is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named as
recipients. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, please notify the sender, and please do not
deliver, distribute or copy this e-mail, or disclose its contents or take any action in reliance on the information it
contains.

>>>"Kushner, Margaret" <MBKUSHNER(@,stoel.com> 3/11/2011 2:49PM>>>
Hi, Stephanie- Thanks for your call yesterday. To follow up on our conversation yesterday, I have checked in
with MRIA and have also talked briefly with Wade Woodard.
With respect to the points you raised yesterday, I have been asked to respond to you as follows:
MRIA would be willing to entertain a counter-offer from St. Alphonsus to MRIA's last settlement offer if St.
Alphonsus is interested in making such a counter-offer to MRIA at this time.
With respect to the cost judgment, Wade Woodard plans to respond to your local counsel on this on Monday.
Thanks again for your call,
Margaret
Margaret B. Kushner I Partner
Stoel Rives LLP 1900 SW Fifth Ave., Suite 2600 I Portland, OR 97204-1268
Direct: (503) 294-9329 I Fax (503) 220-2480 I mbkushner@stoel.com I www.stoel.com
IRS Circular 230 notice: Any tax advice contained herein was not intended or written to be used, and cannot be
used, by you or any other person (i) in promoting, marketing or recommending any transaction, plan or
arrangement or (ii) for the purpose of avoiding penalties that may be imposed under federal tax law.

From: Stephanie Westermeier [mailto:STEPWEST@sarmc.org]
Sent: Thursday, March 10,2011 3:35PM
To: Kushner, Margaret
Cc: Judith Puckett
Subject: MRIA/Saint Alphonsus litigation

2

004634

Confidential, settlement communication
Margaret, once again, thank you for your time, quite "off the cuff'' today to talk to me briefly about this
matter. Although the parties were unable to resolve the litigation through the discussions you and I had some
months ago, I had indicated that if there was an opportunity in the course of the case to talk again in the future,
Saint Alphonsus would be open to doing so. Like I said today, it seems that we are at such a point in the case
and that was the reason for my call to you.
As I said, Saint Alphonsus needs to protect its rights to the cost judgment which the Idaho Supreme Court
awarded to it. Since early February, our outside counsel retained to protect Saint Alphonsus' rights with regard
to this issue, Tom Dvorak, has been talking to Tom Banducci about this matter. Ultimately, Mr. Banducci
proposed that Saint Alphonsus should accept a bond rather than payment from MRIA in the amount of the cost
judgment and Saint Alphonsus agreed to do so. However, as I told you, Mr. Banducci has now recently
communicated that MRIA is potentially unable to secure a bond. We are awaiting confirmation of whether that
in fact is the case, as the attached letter reflects. However, ifMRIA is unable to secure a bond, then Saint
Alphonsus will have to protect its interest in the cost judgment and will proceed with steps to execute on the
judgment. However, the reason for my call was again, to see ifMRIA is desirous of expeditiously opening up
direct negotiations through you and me, and making a reasonable settlement offer to resolve the litigation,
which could obviate the need to execute on the costs judgment.
I appreciate your willingness to find out if this is a possibility or not, Margaret. Let me know if you have any
questions and thank you again.

Stephanie C. Westermeier
Managing Counsel, Trinity Health
General Counsel, Saint Alphonsus Health System
1055 N. Curtis Rd.
Boise, ID 83 706
(208) 367-6325
stepwest@sarmc.org
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail contains confidential information that may be protected by the
attorney-client and/or work product privilege. It is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named as
recipients. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, please notify the sender, and please do not
deliver, distribute or copy this e-mail, or disclose its contents or take any action in reliance on the information it
contains.

No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG- www.avg.com
Version: 10.0.1204 I Virus Database: 1498/3521- Release Date: 03/21/11
!SIG:4d87e54d3341512721727!
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EXHIBIT B
004636

LAW OFFICES
601 W. Bannock Street
PO Box 2720, Boise, Idaho 63701
TELEPHONE: 208 388-1200
FACSIMILE: 208 388-1300
WEBSITE: www.givenspursley.com

EMAIL: ted@glvenspursley.com

Gary G. Allen
Peter G. Barton
Christopher J. Beeson
CUnt R Botinder
Erik J. BoUnder
Jeremy C. Chou
William C. Cole
Michael C. Creamer
Amber N. Dina
Elizabeth M. Donick
Kristin Bjorkman Dunn
Thomas E. Dvorak
Jeffrey C. Fereday
Justin M. Fredin
Martin C. Hendrickson

Steven J. Hippler
Donald E. Knicl<rehm
Debora K. Kristensen
Anne C. Kunkel
Michael P. lawrence
Franklin G. Lee
David R. Lombardi
Emily L. McClure
Kenneth R. McClure
Kelly Greene McConnell
Cynthia A. Melillo
Christopher H. Meyer
L. Edward Miller
Patrick J. Miller
Judson B. Montgomery

Deborah E. Nelson
Kelsey J. Nunez
W. Hugh O'Riordan, LL.M.
Mgeta M. Reed
Justin A. Steiner
Robert B. Whlte

Of Counsel
Conley E. Ward
Retired
Kenneth L PUt$ley
James A. McClure
Raymond D. Givens (1917-2008)

March 4, 2011

Via Facsimile
Wade L. Woodard
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman, PLLC
802 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 500
Boise, ID 83702
Re:
Our File:

Enforcement of Judgment for Costs SARMC v. MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP,
Case No. CV OC 0408219D
337-1831

Dear Wade:
This follows up on my telephone conversation with Tom Banducci last Friday. As I am
sure Tom has told you, I have been retained solely as counsel for Saint Alphonsus Diversified
Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively "SARMC") either (a) to
collect upon the $440,000 Judgment entered in favor of SARMC approximately one year ago or
(b) to ensure that future payment of the judgment is otherwise secured in a reasonable manner
acceptable to SARMC.
Tom called before he was headed out of the country to respond and update me on the
ongoing efforts of MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA") to obtain a bond and provide security for
payment to SARMC. Tom indicated you would be handling the efforts to obtain a bond issue in
his absence and you would keep me informed. This bond was Tom's suggestion, and if an
acceptable bond is put in place, SARMC will accommodate MRIA's request to avoid enforcing
the Judgment. Tom indicated that MRIA was having a hard time meeting the "security
requirements" of the bonding company and that the bond application process was taking some
time.
The expressed difficulty your client is having in satisfying the bonding company concerns
SARMC. If the bonding company is not eager to be MRIA's creditor on the bond, then SARMC
also is concerned whether it should continue to be MRIA's creditor on the Judgment. SARMC
004637

March 4, 2011
Page2
has refrained from taking collection action and entertained discussion of a bond in reliance on
Tom Banducci's representations that a bond could be obtained and that it would provide
sufficient security to SARMC so that SARMC could forgo enforcing the judgment at this time.
However, if a bond cannot be timely obtained, then that is a difierent matter entirely.
Therefore, in order to protect its right to be paid under the Judgment, SARMC must now
insist that a formal, written response advising as to the state of securing the bond be received by
my office by March 14, 2011. If a response indicating significant progress towards a bond is not
received by that time, SARMC will need to take appropriate action to protect its interests.
Finally, as I told Tom I would do, I related to Stephanie Westermeier, Saint Alphonsus
Health System General Counsel, his statement that the MRIA Board took offense at comments
that SARMC remained open to a "reasonable" settlement offer, because the MRIA Board
perceived MRIA did make a reasonable counteroffer in this matter. SARMC does not agree that
the counteroffer of a $12.5 million payment to MRIA, coupled with all the other components of
SARMC's offer to settle, is reasonable under the current circumstances of this case, including the
ruling that SARMC lawfully dissociated from MRIA. However, Ms. Westermeier wanted to
communicate and reiterate again that she was encouraged during the course of her past
productive discussions with Margaret Kushner that led up to MRIA's counteroffer, and that
SARMC remains open to such settlement discussions. Additionally, the need for MRIA to
immediately secure a bond could be alleviated if such settlement discussions were to be promptly
·recommenced in a reasonable range.
Please communicate to me the status of your efforts to obtain the bond as soon as
possible.
Sincerely,

~~
Thomas E. Dvorak

TED:slc
cc:
Stephanie Westermeier
1102122_1
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EXHIBIT C
004639

JONES DAY
222 East 41st Street
New York, New York 10017
Telephone: (212) 326-3939
Facsimile: (212) 755-7306
Richard H. Engman, Esq. (RE- 7861)
Veerle Roovers, Esq. (VR- 5777)
Attorneys for Reorganized Debtor

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

---------------------------------------------------------------]{

In re

WHX CORPORATION

Chapter 11 Case No.
05-11444 (ALG)

Reorganized Debtor.

---------------------------------------------------------------]{
FIRST AND FINAL FEE APPLICATION OF JONES DAY,
COUNSEL FOR THE DEBTOR, FOR ALLOWANCE OF COMPENSATION
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED AND FOR
REIMBURSEMENT OF ACTUAL AND NECESSARY EXPENSES
INCURRED FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 7, 2005 THROUGH JULY 29, 2005
Name of Applicant:

Jones Day

Authorized to Provide
Professional Services to:

Debtor and Debtor in Possession

Date of Retention:

March 11, 2005 (Interim); March 31, 2005 (Final)

Period for Which Compensation
and Reimbursement is Sought:

March 7, 2005 through July 29, 2005

Amount of Compensation Requested:

$967,214.50

Amount of Expense Reimbursement
Requested: 1

$61,353.28

Total Compensation and Expenses
Previously Requested and Awarded:

None

1

Expense amount subject to modification prior to the hearing on this Application to reflect delayed charges
processed by third parties.

NYI-2219169v2
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PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED BY
JONES DAY ON BEHALF OF THE DEBTOR
MARCH 7, 2005 TO JULY 29, 2005

NAME OF
PROFESSIONAL
PARTNERS:
Bennett, Steven C.
Cornell, John R.
Ellman, Jeffrey B.
Engman, Richard H.
Jenks, Carl M.
Kosnik, Richard M.
Ridgway, Candace A.
Shaw, Richard F.

YEAR
ADMITTED

DEPT.

1985
1969
1991
1997
1982
1983
1988
1986

L
E
B
B
T

HOURLY
RATE

TOTAL HOURS
BILLED

$635.00
725.00
595.00
505.00
650.00
675.00
550.00
425.00

c
T
LE

131.70
21.10
0.20
634.20
6.50
11.60
99.00
2.70
907.00

Total Partners
NAME OF
PROFESSIONAL
COUNSEL:

I ADMITTED
YEAR
I

Bergman, Marla S.K.

I
I

Total Staff Attorney

1988

I
I

DEPT.

PL

NAME OF
PROFESSIONAL
ASSOCIATES:

YEAR
ADMITTED

DEPT.

Alam, Tanvir
Barr, Ross S.
Cosentino, Matthew
Ferrer, Monica
Freer, Christy L.
Friedman, Scott J.
Hemenway, Bonnie L.
Israeli, A vi B.
Laduzinski, Colleen E.
Nessan, Micah D.
O'Brien, Patrick B.
Reiss, S. R.
Roovers, Veerle
Rothman, L. G.
Silberfarb, Michael D.
Sockol, Andrew J.
Stoer, Michael F.
Szwajkowski, M. E.
Tunney, Christopher

2003
2004
Pending
1996
2005
1998
1997
Pending
2001
Pending
2004
2001
1994
2001
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending

B
B
L

HOURLY
RATE

I
I
I

$44o.oo

HOURLY
RATE
$300.00
260.00
240.00
430.00
260.00
430.00
430.00
240.00
350.00
280.00
240.00
215.00
380.00
370.00
240.00
260.00
280.00
240.00
240.00

c

T
B
L
T

c
B
E
L
L
L
L
L

Total Associates

2
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TOTAL
COMPENSATION
$83,629.50
15,297.50
119.00
320,271.00
4,225.00
7,830.00
54,450.00
1,147.50
$486,969.50

HOURS I
TOTAL
J TOTAL
BILLED
COMPENSATION

I
I

58.40
58.40

TOTAL HOURS
BILLED
49.00
34.90
36.40
0.30
0.30
6.00
34.80
37.80
127.20
0.30
29.80
4.50
337.70
44.30
66.10
37.50
206.00
16.00
18.80
1,087.70

I
I

$25,696.00
$25,696.00

TOTAL
COMPENSATION
$14,700.00
9,074.00
8,736.00
129.00
78.00
2,580.00
14,964.00
9,072.00
44,520.00
84.00
7,152.00
967.50
128,326.00
16,391.00
15,864.00
9,750.00
57,680.00
3,840.00
4,512.00
$348,419.50
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NAME OF
PROFESSIONAL
STAFF ATTORNEY:
Edwards, Lisa S.
Total Staff Attorney

I ADMITTED
YEAR
I
I
I

Pending

L
I

DEPT.

PL

NAME OF
YEAR
ADMITTED
PROFESSIONAL
SUMMER ASSOCIATE:
Grossman, Benjamin
N/A
N/A
Pollack, Lee M.
Schwartzwald Alan D.
N/A
Total Summer
Associate

DEPT.

NAME OF
YEAR
PROFESSIONAL
ADMITTED
PARAPROFESSIONALS:
Barry, Thomas J.
N/A
Brettler, Carolyn E.
N/A
Farrington, Alicia C.
N/A
Fishelman, Benjamin
N/A
lgnomirello, Savino D.
N/A
Leatherwood, Evan W.
N/A
Nicolaescu, Catalin
N/A
Petrone, Allison B.
N/A
Pistilli, James A.
N/A
Salemmo, Alex J.
N/A
Sciabarassi, Denise M.
N/A
Yakovich, Betty J.
N/A
Total
Paraprofessionals

DEPT.

PROFESSIONALS

I

HOURLY
RATE

I
I

$235.00

I
I

I
HOURLY
RATE

NIA
N/A
N/A

$195
195
195

HOURLY
RATE
$175.00
185.00
190.00
175.00
200.00
120.00
100.00
180.00
195.00
55.00
205.00
145.00

L
L
B
L
B
L
TS
L
B
X
B
B

BLENDED RATE

Partners
Counsel
Associates
Staff Attorney
Summer Associate
Paraprofessionals
Grand Total

536.90
440.00
320.33
235.00
195.00
194.78
373.11

TOTALHOURS
BILLED
26.80
26.80

TOTAL HOURS
BILLED
45.30
50.90
28.00
124.20

TOTAL HOURS
BILLED
23.40
3.80
5.10
3.30
311.40
7.00
2.50
13.70
3.00
1.20
13.00
0.80
388.20

TOTAL HOURS
907.00
58.40
1,087.70
26.80
124.20
388.20
2,592.30

I
I
I

TOTAL
COMPENSATION
$6,298.00
$6,298.00

TOTAL
COMPENSATION
$8,833.50
9,925.50
5,460.00
$24,219.00

TOTAL
COMPENSATION
$4,095.00
703.00
969.00
577.50
62,280.00
840.00
250.00
2,466.00
585.00
66.00
2,665.00
116.00
$75,612.50

TOTAL
COMPENSATION
$486,969.50
25,696.00
348,419.50
6,298.00
24,219.00
75,612.50
$967,214.50

B - Business Restructuring and Reorganization Practice; C - Corporate Finance Practice; E - Employee Benefits;
G - Government Regulation; L - Litigation; LE - Labor & Employment Practice; PL - Product Liability &
Regulation Practice; T - General Tax Practice; TS - Technology Support Services; X - Library

3
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JONES DAY
222 East 41st Street
New York, New York 10017
Telephone: (212) 326-3939
Facsimile: (212) 755-7306
Richard H. Engman, Esq. (RE- 7861)
Veerle Roovers, Esq. (VR- 5777)
Attorneys for Reorganized Debtor

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

---------------------------------------------------------------)(

In re

WHX CORPORATION

Chapter 11 Case No.
05-11444 (ALG)

Reorganized Debtor.

---------------------------------------------------------------)(

FIRST AND FINAL FEE APPLICATION OF JONES DAY,
COUNSEL FOR THE DEBTOR, FOR ALLOWANCE OF COMPENSATION
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED AND FOR
REIMBURSEMENT OF ACTUAL AND NECESSARY EXPENSES
INCURRED FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 7, 2005 THROUGH JUNE 29, 2005

TO THE HONORABLE ALLAN L. GROPPER,
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE:
Jones Day, counsel for the WHX Corporation as debtor and debtor in possession (the
"Debtor") submits this first and final application (the "Application") for allowance of
compensation for professional services rendered, and reimbursement of actual and necessary
expenses incurred, by Jones Day during this chapter 11 case (the "Compensation Period"), i.e.,
from March 7, 2005 (the "Petition Date") through July 29, 2005, the effective date of the
Debtor's chapter 11 plan of reorganization (the "Effective Date"), pursuant to section 330(a) of
title 11 ofthe United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), Rule 2016 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules"), the United States Trustee Guidelines for
Reviewing Applications for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Filed Under 11
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U.S.C. § 330, adopted on January 30, 1996 (the "UST Guidelines"), General Order M-151,
Amended Guidelines for Fees and Disbursements for Professionals in Southern District of New
York Bankruptcy Cases (the "Local Guidelines"), and the Administrative Order Pursuant to
Sections 105(a) and 331 ofthe Bankruptcy Code Establishing Procedures for Monthly
Compensation of Professionals, entered in this case on March 31, 2005 (the "Administrative
Order" and, collectively with the UST Guidelines and the Local Guidelines, the "Guidelines").
In support of this Application, Jones Day respectfully represents as follows:
Relief Requested
1. Jones Day hereby seeks allowance of compensation for professional services rendered
during the Compensation Period in the aggregate amount of$967,214.50 and reimbursement of
expenses incurred in connection with such services in the aggregate amount of$61,353.28. 1
During the Compensation Period, Jones Day attorneys and paraprofessionals expended a total of
2,592.30 hours for which compensation is requested.
2. Prefixed to this Application is the cover sheet required by the UST Guidelines, which
includes a schedule setting forth the names of all Jones Day professionals and paraprofessionals
who have performed services for which compensation is sought, the person's position in the
firm, and the year each attorney was first admitted to practice law. In addition, the schedule sets
forth for each person (a) their hourly rate(s) during the Compensation Period, (b) the total hours
billed for which compensation is sought, and (c) the total compensation for such hours.
3. Annexed hereto as Exhibit "A" is a summary of the services rendered by Jones Day
for which compensation is sought by project category. Annexed hereto as Exhibit "B" is a
listing of the detailed time entries of Jones Day professionals and paraprofessionals, by project
1

The expense amount is subject to modification prior to the hearing on this Application to reflect delayed
charges processed by third parties (the "Supplemental Expenses").
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category, with respect to the compensation requested. Annexed hereto as Exhibit "C" is a
summary of the types of expenses for which reimbursement is sought. Annexed hereto as
Exhibit "D" is a detailed itemization of such expenses. Annexed hereto as Exhibit "E" is a
proposed form of order granting the Application. Annexed hereto as Exhibit "F" is the
certification of Richard H. Engman with respect to the Application pursuant to the Local
Guidelines. To the best of Jones Day's knowledge, all quarterly fees owing by the Debtor to the
United States Trustee have been paid by the Debtor, and all required monthly operating reports
to the United States Trustee have been filed by the Debtor.

Case Status
4. On March 7, 2005 (the "Petition Date"), the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for
relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code as well as a proposed chapter 11 plan of
reorganization (the "Plan") and related proposed disclosure statement. No chapter 11 case has
been commenced for any of the Debtor's direct or indirect subsidiaries (collectively with the
Debtor, the "WHX Group"), each of which continues to operate outside of bankruptcy in the
ordinary course of its business.
5. That plan was subsequently modified by the First Amended Plan of Reorganization
dated June 7, 2005 (the "First Amended Plan"), proposed by the Debtor. The second amended
disclosure statement with respect to the First Amended Plan (the "Disclosure Statement") was
approved by the Court on June 9, 2005 and thereafter disseminated to creditors and parties in
interest.
6. On July 21, 2005, a hearing to consider confirmation of the Plan (the "Confirmation
Hearing") was held and the Court entered an Order Confirming the First Amended Plan of
Reorganization of the WHX Corporation (the "Confirmation Order"). The First Amended Plan
subsequently became effective on July 29, 2005.
3
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'•

Jones Day's Retention and Services Provided
Jones Day's Retention
7. On March 11, 2005, the Court entered an interim order pursuant to which Jones Day
was retained as general restructuring counsel to the Debtor pursuant to section 327 ofthe
Bankruptcy Code. That order was made final by the Court on March 31, 2005. Jones Day's fees
in this case are based on its ordinary and customary hourly rates, and are billed in accordance
with Jones Day's existing billing rates and procedures in effect during the Compensation Period.
The rates Jones Day charges for services rendered by its professionals and paraprofessionals in
this chapter 11 case are the same rates Jones Day charges for professional and paraprofessional
services rendered in comparable non-bankruptcy
matters.
---Context in Which Jones Day's Services Were Provided
8. The Debtor commenced this case and filed its Plan because it believed that chapter 11
relief was necessary to implement its business strategy to grow its core businesses, improve
profit margins, and maximize value for its stakeholders.

Jones Day's Services
9. The following is a brief description of the principal activities of Jones Day
professionals and paraprofessionals during the Compensation Period, listed by project category
in order of magnitude of fees incurred. A detailed description of each individual's activities is
found in the time records annexed hereto as Exhibit "B".
(a)
•

Plan of Reorganization/Disclosure Statement
Participated in negotiations with all parties concerning the Plan for the Debtor, prepared
numerous drafts of the Plan and related enabling documents, coordinated extensive
comments from several parties in interest, including the Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditor (the "Creditors Committee"), the Ad Hoc Committee of Preferred Equity Holders
(the "Equity Committee"), certain ofthe holders ofthe series A convertible preferred stock
and series B convertible preferred stock (the "Preferred Shareholders"), and certain of the
holders of the Debtor's 10 1/2% senior notes due April15, 2005 (the "Senior Notes").
4
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•

Drafted and revised the Disclosure Statement, including the review of the comments thereto
received from various parties in interest, including the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(the "PBGC"), the Equity Committee.

•

Prepared and analyzed a strategy for formulation of the Plan, including valuation of the
Debtor, distributions to creditors, and potential investor issues regarding net operating losses
("NOLs").

•

Communicated with the Preferred Shareholders, the holders of the Senior Notes (the
"Noteholders"), and other parties in interest regarding the hearing on the confirmation of the
Plan (the "Confirmation Hearing"). Communicated with those parties regarding the notice of
the Confirmation Hearing.

•

Reviewed projections and other financial and valuation information and discussed that
information with the Debtor's financial advisors, Jefferies & Co., Inc. ("Jefferies").

•

Coordinated the solicitation of and voting on the First Amended Plan. Communicated with
various parties in interest to educate them on the voting process.

•

Coordinated the publication of the notice of the Confirmation Hearing in the NY Times.

•

Researched, drafted, revised, and filed a confirmation brief and proposed order.

•

Responded to the objections of certain Preferred Shareholders to the First Amended Plan.
Researched the standing of those parties to object separately from the Equity Committee.

•

Represented the Debtor at the Confirmation Hearing.

(b) Financing and Investment
•

Assisted Jefferies in its efforts to find investors and drafted and negotiated proposed term
sheets from potential investors. Communicated with the Debtor regarding such efforts.

•

Contacted interested investors regarding proposals for investment in the Debtor.

(c) Valuation Dispute
•

Communicated with the Equity Committee and other parties regarding their objections to the
valuation of the Debtor as used in the Plan.

•

Engaged in discovery with the Equity Committee regarding that valuation. Prepared
witnesses for depositions. Took and defended depositions of valuation experts. Facilitated
compliance with subpoenas and requests for information.

•

Met with legal and financial advisors to various parties in interest, the Creditors Committee,
the Equity Committee, the Debtor, and Jefferies regarding valuation to negotiate a settlement
with respect to the valuation dispute.
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•

Researched issues regarding the different valuation techniques used to value an entity in
chapter 11 and reviewed expert valuation reports.

•

Developed litigation strategy in case the valuation issue had been litigated.

(d) Employee Matters
•

Assisted the Debtor in the formulation of its supplemental executive retention plan (the
"SERP") and other employment agreements and communicated with various parties,
including the Debtor's management, regarding those agreements' provisions.

•

Reviewed the Debtor's pension plan and communicated with various parties, including the
Debtor's management and the PBGC, regarding the plan's provisions.

•

Researched issues regarding the Debtor's compliance with the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").

•

Advised the Debtor regarding its director and officer liability insurance and other various
insurance plans.

(e) Case Administration
•

Reviewed "first day" pleadings, finalized proposed orders approving such pleadings, and
prepared for the hearing on such pleadings. Attended the first day hearing and engaged in
conversations with various parties regarding the hearing.

•

Monitored the bankruptcy docket and all email traffic to ensure timely responses to all
developments in this case, and prepared and filed motions, applications, notices, and
affidavits necessary to the day to day administration of the Debtor's estate. Reviewed proofs
of claims filed in the chapter 11 case and filed objections thereto, as appropriate.

•

Participated in and prepared for the organizational meeting of creditors and assisted the
office of the United States Trustee in the formation of the Creditors Committee.

•

Communicated with this Court, the Office ofthe United States Trustee, the Equity
Committee, the Creditors Committee, certain of the Preferred Shareholders, certain of the
Noteholders, and other various parties in interest seeking information about the chapter 11
case.

•

Convened regular conference calls with the Debtor's management and with its other
professional advisors to closely coordinate all activities in these case, provide constant
updates regarding the progress of the case, and the strategy with respect thereto.

•

Maintained a detailed work in process report to track all pending projects and keep the client
and its other professional advisors informed about all of Jones Day's efforts and tasks.
Prepared a monthly calendar of upcoming events in the chapter 11 case and monthly
operating reports of the Debtor.
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•

Reviewed fee statements of various professionals employed during the Debtor's chapter 11
case.

(f) Tax Advice

•

Advised the Debtor with respect to complex tax issues related to the formulation of the Plan,
including options for the preservation of approximately $100,000,000 worth of the Debtor's
tax attributes. Drafted and prosecuted a motion for an injunction against certain claims
trading in order to preserve the Debtor's tax attributes (the "Claims Trading Motion").
Drafted a notice regarding claims trading for publication in the Wall Street Journal and
Bloomberg newswire service. Communicated with the Creditors Committee regarding the
Claims Trading Motion.

•

Researched ownership interests in the Debtor's equity and prepared charts to demonstrate
and analyze such holdings as they concerned the Claims Trading Motion and the Disclosure
Statement.

•

Advised the Debtor regarding the payment and priority of federal and state taxes in
bankruptcy.

(g) Other Project Categories

•

Reviewed Jefferies Investor offering memo.

•

Prepared the Debtor's response to the Creditors Committee's objection to Jefferies' retention
application and communicated with various parties regarding that objection.

•

Provided general counseling to the Debtor with respect to its duties and obligations while
operating in chapter 11, and assisted the Debtor in addressing general chapter 11 issues.

•

Assisted the Debtor in preparing its schedules and statements of financial affairs, in setting a
bar date, and in establishing the claims administration process.

•

Responded to numerous inquiries from creditors, certain of the Preferred Shareholders, the
Creditors Committee, the Equity Committee, and other parties in interest.

•

Assisted the Debtor's management regarding the creation of constitutional documents for the
reorganized WHX Corporation.

Expenses Incurred By Jones Day
10. Section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes "reimbursement for actual, necessary
expenses" incurred by professionals employed in a chapter 11 case. Accordingly, Jones Day
seeks reimbursement for expenses incurred in rendering services to the Debtor during the
Compensation Period. Excluding the Supplemental Expenses, the total amount of the expenses
7
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is $61,353.28 for the Compensation Period, as detailed in the attached Exhibit "D." Prior to the
hearing on this Application, Jones Day will provide the Court, the Office of the United States
Trustee for the Southern District of New York (the "US Trustee"), and the Creditors Committee
with the Supplemental Expenses and the records that form the basis for the additional charges.
11. In accordance with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules,
and the Guidelines, Jones Day maintains the following policies with respect to expenses for
which reimbursement is sought herein:
(a)

No amortization ofthe cost of any investment, equipment, or capital outlay is
included in the expenses. In addition, for those items or services that Jones Day
purchased or contracted from a third party (such as outside copy services), Jones
Day seeks reimbursement only for the exact amount billed to Jones Day by the
third party vendor and paid by Jones Day to the third party vendor.

(b)

Photocopying by Jones Day was charged at 30 cents per page. To the extent
practicable, Jones Day utilized less expensive outside copying services.

(c)

Charges for outgoing facsimiles were assessed no fee per page for local calls and
$1.00 per page for long distance calls. No other long distance telephone charges
for outgoing facsimiles were charged. No charge was imposed for incoming
facsimiles.

(d)

Meals charged to the Debtor for Jones Day personnel were associated with out of
town travel, meetings with the Debtor or other parties in this chapter 11 case, or
dinner for Jones Day professionals working past 8:00p.m.

(e)

The time pressures associated with the services rendered by Jones Day frequently
required Jones Day's professionals and paraprofessionals to devote substantial
amounts of time during the evenings and on weekends. Jones Day has charged
the Debtor for secretarial and other staff overtime expense that is directly
associated with such after-hours work and is absolutely necessary. Jones Day
does not consider these to be part of its ongoing overhead expenses because they
are special incremental expenses arising from the specific services being provided
to the Debtor.
The Requested Compensation Should Be Allowed

12. Section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the Court may award a
professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code:
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(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by the
trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney and by any paraprofessional
person employed by any such person; and
(B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1). Section 330(a)(3)(A) further provides the following standards for the
Court's review of a fee application:
In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded, the court
shall consider the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, taking into
account all relevant factors, including-(A)the time spent on such services;
(B) the rates charged for such services;
(C) whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or
beneficial at the time the service was rendered toward the
completion of, a case under this title;
(D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable
amount of time commensurate with the complexity,
importance, and nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed;
and
(E) whether the compensation is reasonable, based on the
customary compensation charged by comparably skilled
practitioners in cases other than cases under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(A).
13. Jones Day respectfully submits that it has satisfied the requirements for the allowance
of the compensation and reimbursement of expenses sought herein. The services described
above were necessary to the administration ofthe Debtor's chapter 11 case and were beneficial
to the Debtor and parties in interest in this case. Jones Day's services have enabled the Debtor to
confirm a consensual plan of reorganization resolving a multitude of complex issues and
disputes, a mere five months after the commencement of this chapter 11 case. Even with the
gripes of the Equity Committee regarding the valuation of the Debtor as used in the Plan, Jones
Day's services were performed in a timely manner, commensurate with the complexity of the
9
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issues facing the Debtor, the importance of a resolution of the various impediments to a plan of
reorganization, and the nature of the problems, issues, and tasks. Furthermore, the compensation
sought by Jones Day is reasonable because it is based on the customary compensation charged
by comparably skilled practitioners outside ofbankruptcy.
Statements of Jones Day Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2016(a)
14. In accordance with the procedures set forth in the Administrative Order, Jones Day
has prepared monthly statements (the "Monthly Statements") of its fees and expenses incurred,
and provided copies of such statements to the Debtor, the United States Trustee, the Creditors
Committee, and the other parties entitled to receive copies of such statements pursuant to such
order. As of the date hereof, and pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Administrative
Order, Jones Day has received payments from the Debtor on account of the Monthly Statements
for the period March 7, 2005 through July 29, 2005 in the amount of$$967,214.50 for
professional services rendered and $61,353.28 for reimbursement of 100% of expenses invoiced
for such months.
15. No agreement or understanding exists between Jones Day and any third person for the
sharing of compensation, except as allowed by section 504(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and
Bankruptcy Rule 2016 with respect to the sharing of compensation between and among partners
of Jones Day. All of the services for which compensation is sought in this Application were
rendered at the request of, and solely on behalf of, the Debtor, and not at the request of, or on
behalf of, any other person or entity.
Waiver of Memorandum of Law
16. Pursuant to Local Rule 9013-1(b), because there are no novel issues oflaw presented
herein, Jones Day respectfully requests that the Court waive the requirements that Jones Day file
a memorandum of law in support of this Application.
10
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Notice
17. Pursuant to the Court's order dated March 31, 2005 establishing notice procedures in
this chapter 11 case, notice of this Application will be given to (a) the Debtor; (a) the US
Trustee; (c) the indenture trustee under the Senior Notes; (d) Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal
LLP, counsel to the Creditors Committee; (e) Andrews & Kurth, counsel to the Equity
Committee; (f) the Debtor's ten largest creditors; (g) those persons who have formally appeared
and requested service in this case pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2002; and (h) government
agencies to the extent required by the Bankruptcy Rules and Local Rules. Jones Day respectfully
submits that no other or further notice is required.

11
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WHEREFORE, Jones Day respectfully requests that the Court enter an order,
substantially in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit "E" (a) granting this Application; (b)
allowing on a final basis compensation in the amount of$967,214.50 for services rendered in
connection with this chapter 11 case during the Compensation Period; (b) allowing
reimbursement ofthe expenses in the amount of$61,353.28 plus the Supplemental Expenses
incurred in connection with such services; (c) authorizing and directing the Debtor to pay the
unpaid balance of all approved fees and expenses, including the Supplemental Expenses, to
Jones Day; and (d) granting such other and further relief as is just.
Dated:

New York, New York
September 12, 2005

Respectfully submitted,

Is/ Richard H. Engman
Richard H. Engman, Esq. (RE- 7861)
JONES DAY
222 East 41st Street
New York, New York 10017
Telephone: (212) 326-3939
Facsimile: (212) 755-7306
ATTORNEYS FOR REORGANIZED
DEBTOR
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EXHIBIT A
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED BY
JONES DAY ON BEHALF OF THE DEBTOR
MARCH 7, 2005 TO JULY 29,2005
NAME OF
PROFESSIONAL
PARTNERS:

YEAR
ADMITTED

DEPT.

Bennett, Steven C.
Cornell, John R.
Ellman, Jeffrey B.
Engman, Richard H.
Jenks, Carl M.
Kosnik, Richard M.
Ridgway, Candace A.
Shaw, Richard F.

1985
1969
1991
1997
1982
1983
1988
1986

L
E
B
B
T

HOURLY
RATE
$635.00
725.00
595.00
505.00
650.00
675.00
550.00
425.00

c
T
LE

I ADMITTED
YEAR
I

Bergman, Marla S.K.

I
I

Total Staff Attorney

1988

I
I

DEPT.

PL

YEAR
ADMITTED

DEPT.

Alam, Tanvir
Barr, Ross S.
Cosentino, Matthew
Ferrer, Monica
Freer, Christy L.
Friedman, Scott J.
Hemenway, Bonnie L.
Israeli, A vi B.
Laduzinski, Colleen E.
Nessan, Micah D.
O'Brien, Patrick B.
Reiss, S. R.
Roovers, Veerle
Rothman, L. G.
Silberfarb, Michael D.
Sockol, Andrew J.
Stoer, Michael F.
Szwajkowski, M. E.
Tunney, Christopher

2003
2004

B
B
L

Total Associates
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1996
2005
1998
1997

c
T
B
L

Pendin~

2001

Pending
2004
2001
1994
2001
Pendin~

Pending
Pendin~

Pending
Pendin~

I

HOURLY
RATE
$44o.oo

1

NAME OF
PROFESSIONAL
ASSOCIATES:

Pending

I

T

c
B
E
L
L
L
L
L

HOURLY
RATE
$300.00
260.00
240.00
430.00
260.00
430.00
430.00
240.00
350.00
280.00
240.00
215.00
380.00
370.00
240.00
260.00
280.00
240.00
240.00

$83,629.50
15,297.50
119.00
320,271.00
4,225.00
7,830.00
54,450.00
1,147.50
$486,969.50

131.70
21.10
0.20
634.20
6.50
11.60
99.00
2.70
907.00

Total Partners
NAME OF
PROFESSIONAL
COUNSEL:

TOTAL
COMPENSATION

TOTAL HOURS
BILLED

I
I
I

TOTAL HOURS
BILLED
58.40
58.40

TOTAL HOURS
BILLED
49.00
34.90
36.40
0.30
0.30
6.00
34.80
37.80
127.20
0.30
29.80
4.50
337.70
44.30
66.10
37.50
206.00
16.00
18.80
1,087.70

I
I
I

TOTAL
COMPENSATION
$25,696.00
$25,696.00

TOTAL
COMPENSATION
$14,700.00
9,074.00
8,736.00
129.00
78.00
2,580.00
14,964.00
9,072.00
44,520.00
84.00
7,152.00
967.50
128,326.00
16,391.00
15,864.00
9,750.00
57,680.00
3,840.00
4,512.00
$348,419.50
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NAME OF
PROFESSIONAL
STAFF ATTORNEY:
Edwards, Lisa S.
Total Staff Attorney

I ADMITTED
YEAR
I
I

PendinR

I

I

DEPT.

PL

I

HOURLY
RATE

I

$235.oo

I

NAME OF
YEAR
PROFESSIONAL
ADMITTED
SUMMER ASSOCIATE:
Grossman, Benjamin
N/A
Pollack, Lee M.
N/A
Schwartzwald Alan D.
N/A
Total Summer
Associate

DEPT.

NAME OF
YEAR
PROFESSIONAL
ADMITTED
PARAPROFESSIONALS:
Barry, Thomas J.
N/A
Brettler, Carolyn E.
N/A
Farrington, Alicia C.
N/A
Fishelman, Benjamin
N/A
lgnomirello, Savino D.
N/A
Leatherwood, Evan W.
N/A
Nicolaescu, Catalin
N/A
Petrone, Allison B.
N/A
Pistilli, James A.
N/A
Salemmo, Alex J.
N/A
Sciabarassi, Denise M.
N/A
Yakovich, Betty J.
N/A
Total
Paraprofessionals

DEPT.

PROFESSIONALS

I

I
1

I
HOURLY
RATE

N/A
N/A
N/A

$195
195
195

HOURLY
RATE
$175.00
185.00
190.00
175.00
200.00
120.00
100.00
180.00
195.00
55.00
205.00
145.00

L
L
B
L
B
L
TS
L
B
X
B
B

BLENDED RATE

Partners
Counsel
Associates
Staff Attorney
Summer Associate
Paraprofessionals
Grand Total

536.90
440.00
320.33
235.00
195.00
194.78
373.11

TOTALHOURS
BILLED
26.80
26.80

TOTAL HOURS
BILLED
45.30
50.90
28.00
124.20

TOTAL HOURS
BILLED
23.40
3.80
5.10
3.30
311.40
7.00
2.50
13.70
3.00
1.20
13.00
0.80
388.20

TOTAL HOURS
907.00
58.40
1,087.70
26.80
124.20
388.20
2,592.30

I
I
I

TOTAL
COMPENSATION
$6,298.00
$6,298.00

TOTAL
COMPENSATION
$8,833.50
9,925.50
5,460.00
$24,219.00

TOTAL
COMPENSATION
$4,095.00
703.00
969.00
577.50
62,280.00
840.00
250.00
2,466.00
585.00
66.00
2,665.00
116.00
$75,612.50

TOTAL
COMPENSATION
$486,969.50
25,696.00
348,419.50
6,298.00
24,219.00
75,612.50
$967,214.50

B - Business Restructuring and Reorganization Practice; C - Corporate Finance Practice; E - Employee Benefits;
G - Government Regulation; L - Litigation; LE - Labor & Employment Practice; PL - Product Liability &
Regulation Practice; T- General Tax Practice; TS- Technology Support Services; X- Library
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EXHIBITC
ACTUAL AND NECESSARY DISBURSEMENTS INCURRED
BY JONES DAY ON BEHALF OF THE DEBTOR
MARCH 7, 2005 TO JULY 29,2005

EXPENSES
Certified Document Charges
Computerized Research Services
Conference Call Charges

AMOUNTS
$36.20
8,060.20
240.65

Courier Service

1,915.52

Court Reporting Fees

1,950.40

Duplication Charges
Facsimile Charges
Federal Express Charges

20,454.66
11.23
977.77

Long Distance

29.29

Printing Charges

60.00

Postage Charges

162,01

Publication Expenses
Staff Overtime Charges
Travel -Air Fare
Travel- Food & Beverage Expenses

14,852.50
6,290.83
816.86
1,526.52

Travel - Hotel Charges

331.88

Travel - Other Costs

120.53

Travel- Taxi Charges
Video and Electronic Expenses

Total
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3,251.23
265.00

$61,353.28
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EXHIBIT "E" - FORM OF ORDER
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

---------------------------------------------------------------)(

In re

WHX CORPORATION

Chapter 11 Case No.
05-11444 (ALG)

Reorganized Debtor.

---------------------------------------------------------------)(

ORDER APPROVING FIRST AND FINAL FEE APPLICATION OF
JONES DAY, COUNSEL FOR THE DEBTOR, FOR ALLOWANCE OF
COMPENSATION FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED AND
FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF ACTUAL AND NECESSARY EXPENSES
INCURRED FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 7, 2005 THROUGH JULY 29, 2005

Upon the first and final application (the "Application") 1 of Jones Day as counsel for the debtor
and debtor in possession in the above-captioned case (the "Debtor") for allowance of compensation for
professional services rendered and reimbursement of actual and necessary expenses incurred for the
period March 7, 2005 through July 29, 2005; and upon the certification by Richard H. Engman;
IT IS HEREBY FOUND AND DETERMINED THAT:
(A) The Court has jurisdiction over the Application pursuant to sections 157 and 1334 oftitle
28 ofthe United States Code (the "Judicial Code");
(B) This is a core proceeding pursuant to section 157(b)(2) of the Judicial Code;
(C) Venue for proceedings on the Application is proper in this district pursuant to section 1409
of the Judicial Code;
(D) Notice ofthe Application was sufficient;
(E) Cause exists for the granting of the relief requested in the Application; and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

The Application is granted.

1

Unless otherwise defined herein, all capitalized terms used herein shall have the meanings set forth in the
Application.
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2.

Jones Day is awarded on a final basis compensation for professional services rendered

during the Compensation Period in the amount of$967,214.50 and reimbursement for actual and
necessary expenses incurred by Jones Day during the Compensation Period in the amount of
$61,353.28.
3.

The Debtor is authorized and directed to pay Jones Day promptly such sums, to the extent

that such amounts have not previously been paid.
4.

The Debtor is also authorized and directed to pay Jones Day any additional fees and

expenses incurred for services rendered in connection with this chapter 11 case through the date of this
Hearing without further leave or notice of the Court.
Dated: New York, New York
September 12, 2005
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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EXHIBIT "F"
JONES DAY
222 East 41st Street
New York, New York 10017
Telephone: (212) 326-3939
Facsimile: (212) 755-7306
Richard H. Engman, Esq. (RE- 7861)
Veerle Roovers, Esq. (VR- 5777)
Attorneys for Reorganized Debtor

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------)(
In re
WHX CORPORATION

Chapter 11 Case No.
05-11444 (ALG)

Reorganized Debtor.
---------------------------------------------------------------)(
CERTIFICATION OF RICHARD H. ENGMAN
I, Richard H. Engman, certify as follows:
1.

I am a partner in the law firm of Jones Day. I submit this certification with respect

to application (the "Application" 1) of Jones Day, attorneys for the debtor and debtor in
possession in the above-captioned case (the "Debtor"), for final allowance of compensation for
professional services rendered, and reimbursement of actual and necessary expenses incurred, for
the period March 7, 2005 through July 29, 2005.
2.

I make this certification in accordance with General Order M-151, the Amended

Guidelines for Fees and Disbursements for Professionals in Southern District ofNew York
Bankruptcy Cases, adopted by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York on April 19, 1995 (the "Local Guidelines").
1

Unless otherwise defined herein, all capitalized terms used herein shall have the meanings set forth in the
Application.

NYI-2219169v2
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3.

In connection therewith, I hereby certify that

(a)

I have read the Application;

(b)

to the best of my knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable

inquiry, the fees and disbursements sought in the Application fall within the Local Guidelines
and the United States Trustee Guidelines for Reviewing Applications for Compensation and
Reimbursement ofExpenses Filed Under 11 U.S.C. § 330, adopted on January 30, 1996 (the
"UST Guidelines") except as specifically noted herein;
(c)

except to the extent that fees or disbursements are prohibited by the Local

Guidelines or the UST Guidelines, the fees and disbursements sought are billed at rates
customarily employed by Jones Day and generally accepted by Jones Day's clients;
(d)

in providing a reimbursable service, Jones Day does not make a profit on that

service, whether the service is performed by Jones Day in house or through a third party; and
(e)

pursuant to the Local Guidelines, the Debtor and the chairs of the Creditors

Committee and the Equity Committee will each be provided with a copy of the Application
simultaneously with the filing thereof, and will have at least 10 days to review such Application
prior to any objection deadline with respect thereto.
Dated: New York, New York
September 12, 2005

Is/ Richard H. Engman
Richard H. Engman, Esq. (RE -7861)
JONES DAY
222 East 41st Street
New York, New York 10017
Telephone: (212) 326-3939
Facsimile: (212) 755-7306
ATTORNEYS FOR REORGANIZED
DEBTOR

2
NYI-2219169v2
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08-13555-jmp

Doc 3

Filed 04/09/09 Entered 04/09/09
Po 1 of 144

6:32

Main Document

Ifearing Date and Time: May 13, 2009 at 10:00 am (EDT)

JONES DAY
Ross S. Barr
222 East 41st Street
New York, New York 10017
Telephone: (212) 326-3939
Facsimile: (212) 755-7306
JONES DAY
Simon D. Powell
29th Floor, Edinburgh Tower
The Landmark
15 Queen's Road Central
Hong Kong
Telephone: (852) 2526-6895
Facsimile: (852) 2868-5871
Special Counsel to Debtors in Possession

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

----------------------------------------------------------------------x
In re

Chapter 11 Case No.

LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC., et at.,

08-13555 (JMP)

Debtors.

(Jointly Administered)

----------------------------------------------------------------------X
FIRST INTERIM APPLICATION OF JONES DAY,
SPECIAL COUNSEL TO THE DEBTORS AND DEBTORS IN POSSESSION,
SEEKING ALLOWANCE AND PAYMENT OF INTERIM COMPENSATION AND
REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES UNDER 11 U.S.C. SECTIONS 330 AND 331
Name of Applicant:

Jones Day

Authorized to Provide Professional Services to:

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.
and its affiliated debtors

Date oflnterim Retention Order:

February 25, 2009
(effective nunc pro tunc to the
Engagement Dates, as defined in
the Retention Application (as such
term is defined below))

Period for Which Compensation and Reimbursement are Sought

From the Engagement Dates to
January 31, 2009

Amount of Professional Fees Sought as Actual, Reasonable, and
Necessary:

$1,258,056.00

- 1HKI-2J5003vJO
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08-13555-jmp

Doc 3

Filed 04/09/09 Entered 04/09/09
Pg 2 of 144

6:32

1

Amount of Expense Reimbursement Sought as Actual,
Reasonable, and Necessary:

$10,425.76

Total Amount Sought:

$1.268,481.76

This is an/a:

X Interim

_

Main Document

Final Application.

Aggregate Amounts Paid to Date:

-2HKI-2!5003vl0
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08-13555-jmp

Doc 3

Filed 04/09/09 Entered 04/09/09
Pg 3 of 144

6:32

Main Document

COMPENSATION PERIOD
ENGAGEMENT DATES THROUGH JANUARY 31, 2009

Name

Com~ensation

Rate

Year

Period Hours

Com,l!ensation
Period Fees

2008

2009

1991
1992
1996
1984
1975
1987
1974
1992
1989
1992
1984
1993

650
600
400
575
675
575
745
525
700
575
550
525

700
625
425
640
750
640
775
590
800
640
575
590

7.80
70.70
65.90
132.00
4.00
5.00
132.10
113.40
138.10
1.20
59.20
68.40

5,170.00
42,520.00
26,770.00
79,267.00
2,700.00
2,875.00
100,031.50
61,108.00
100,190.00
768.00
32,765.00
36,807.00
490,971.50

2002
2007
2008
2007
2008
2009
2004
2007
2007
2000
2001
2006
1997
2001
1997
2005
1984
2006
2004
1994
1998

375
N/A
N/A
175
200
200
280
240
240
340
N/A
250
475
325
310
170
565
250
450
525
475

400
250
325
200
225
225
330
280
280
375
525
300
530
390
350
200
565
300
525
550
500

8.80
2.30
42.40
35.00
1.50
24.80
18.90
161.70
15.50
43.40
2.00
161.50
243.80
269.60
91.50
6.30
241.50
0.50
37.95
24.70
2.60

3,520.00
575.00
13,780.00
6,377.50
300.00
5,035.00
5,292.00
39,740.00
3,720.00
14,756.00
1,050.00
46,150.00
117,477.00
92,176.50
29,909.00
1,071.00
136,447.50
125.00
18,322.50
13,242.50
1,235.00

Partners
AKO
CJ AHERN
CPLIU
EWSEDLAK
JCROEBUCK
KUMINO
PJBENVENUTTI
RSATO
SDPOWELL
TYAMADA
WE BRYSON
YMORI
Partners Total:
Associates
ACHIU
AM JUREWICZ
CCEGAN
C SEETOO
E J MARSHBAUM
HE MILLS
HTAKASE
HYOSHIOKA
KKATAHIRA
LYLIU
MHCORREA
MITO
MNISHI
MONOGI
MWLO
MZHU
P JCROSBY
RHASHIMOTO
RSBARR
SCLAM
SYLAM

- 3HKI-215003vl0
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08-13555-jmp

Doc~

Name

Filed 04/09/09 Entered 04/09/09
Pg 4 of 144

Rate

Year

2008

Coml!ensation
Period Hours
6.50
287.30
0.80

1,755.00
73,312.00
200.00
625,568.50

2006
2007
1996

170
170
200

200
190
225

2.30
5.00
57.90

391.00
850.00
11,692.50
12,933.50

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
2007j
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

225
120
225
205
225
250
200
310
200
275
200
160
200
175
175
100

275
120
250
240
275
275
230
320
230
275
220
170
230
210
210
110

8.00
102.60
4.50
37.00
9.50
1.00
1.90
28.75
11.00
130.60
1.00
75.00
120.60
25.50
56.50
10.50

1,800.00
12,312.00
1,125.00
7,840.50
2,612.50
275.00
401.00
8,940.00
2,200.00
35,915.00
200.00
12,000.00
26,259.00
4,462.50
11,095.00
1,145.00
128,582.50

Paraprofessionals L
A MCHAN
A YANG
CPMA
CTRATHBONE
DKKAN
DMHIRTZEL
HNAKAO
JCHU
KOSADA
MB STONE
PSKO
RLOK
RKIMURA
RSHINOZAKI
YISHIHARA
S ISHIWATA
Paraprofessionals Total:

_1

GRAND TOTAL

2
3

Coml!ensation
Period Fees

240
250

Staff Attorneys
CCHIU
EKAO
LCFISCHER
Staff Attorneys Total:

1

Main Document

2009
270
280
300

2008
2007
2006

TFUNO
YTAKATAMA
YYOSHIDA
Associates Total:

16:32

1,258,056.00

T Funo was not with Jones Day in 2008.
"Paraprofessionals" include paralegals, trainee solicitors, translators and judicial scriveners.
Admitted in Japan as Shilw Shoshi (i.e. judicial scriveners).

-4HKI-215003v!O

004666

.. .

EXHIBIT E
004667

;,j

'

•

G,osta Mesa outsourcing leg'

sts: $400,000 and rising I city, legal, o

REAL ESTATE

PLACE AN AD

SIGN-IN/SIGN-UP

NEWS
HOME

NEWS

SPORTS

BUSINESS

ENTERTAINMENT

'urcing- News.. . Page 1 of 4

SUBSCRIBE

E·REGISTER

CUSTOMER SERVICE

SURF REPORT/CAMS 155.0•F in Santa Ana

LIFE

TRAVEL

TODAY"S PAPER

I LIVE TRAFFIC

OPINION

Slogs I California I City-by-City News I Columns I Crime and Courts 1 Data Central 1 Education 1 Elections !Immigration 1 Military 1 Nation 1 Obituaries 1 OC
Watchdog 1 Photos 1 Politics and Government 1 Science 1 Technology 1 Videos 1 World
Text: m:::::@J

Costa Mesa outsourcing legal costs: $400,000
and rising
7 people recommend this. Be the first of your
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More from this story
SLIDE SHOW:
Costa Mesa outsourcing
legal costs: $400.000 and
rising
7 Photos »

GRAPHIC:
Costa Mesa legal
expenses

By SEAN GREENE I FOR THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER
• Judge rules against Costa Mesa·s outsourcing
plan

COSTA MESA- The legal battle over the City Council's outsourcing plan has cost the city more than $400,000
-almost doubling the total legal fees so far this fiscal year- and there's no end in sight.

CHART: Costa Mesa legal expenses

High-level attorney firm Jones Day has charged the city $390,701 at $495 an hour to handle a lawsuit from the
Costa Mesa City Employees Association that seeks to stop the City Council's plan to lay off more than 200 of
its workers. Employees allege that the council acted illegally in its pursuit to explore the viability of outsourcing
city services .

• Costa Mesa kicks off outsouring process
• Costa Mesa could outsourcing fire services to
county

After the trial begins in April, an unknown number
of motions and appeals could be filed , potentially
drawing out the process- and attorney fees
along with it.
Residents and union leaders have voiced
concern at meetings and public forums that the
seemingly limitless cost of the lawsuit could
exceed the savings the council hopes to attain
from outsourcing .

• Costa Mesa looks at charter city status as
outsourcing aid

More from Costa Mesa
Rep. Rohrabacher wants citizenship for Bin
Laden infom1ant
37 minutes ago
Man robs cab driver, fiees on skateboard
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The city could not put a dollar limit in its contract
with Jones Day, which is mounting a "vigorous"
legal defense, city spokesman Bill Lobdell said.
"In litigation, you can't have a cap because when
you hit that cap what are you going to do?"
Lobdell said. "\Nhen you're being sued, there's no
choice."

Councilman Jim Righeimer gets say on personal
legal bills

Recommended for You

The city's total legal fees through November
amount to $1.05 million. Jones Day has not billed
the city for work done in December and January.
The city has also paid $18,286 to Jones and
Mayer, the attorney firm the city contracts for
general legal counsel, for costs regarding the
litigation since it started last year.
"We don't budget for being sued by our
employees," said Councilman Jim Righeimer, the
catalyst behind the outsourcing plan and the
proposed city charter.

Trade in your current
loan for a better loan.

"Nobody wants to pay for litigation," he said. "But the citizens of the community aren't going to want the council
to just roll over if it's getting sued by its employees and not do what it was elected to do, which was get the
city's finances in order."
The funds used to pay for the city's legal defense come from a self-insurance fund, up to $2 million set aside
from the general fund by the city for potential settlements, litigation and other legal issues, Lobdell said.
\Nhile the council's goal in outsourcing is to save money on future pension expenses, critics have questioned
the plan's net savings after all the legal bills are paid.
'We wouldn't have to go to court if they would have followed the law," said Jennifer Muir, spokeswoman for the
Orange County Employees Association. "Taxpayers should be furious because this is just a waste. Instead (the
council majority) wanted to make a political statement in Costa Mesa."
Muir said the city is paying 400 percent more on the lawsuit than what the association is paying, but would not
provide an exact amount.
"We're no where near what the city is paying to advance this outsourcing scheme," she said.
The city does not yet have a complete figure reflecting the total potential savings from outsourcing. Once city
staff completes an analysis of bids received on 19 city services, a clearer picture of the potential savings will
emerge.
On jail services alone, Righeimer said, the city could save $600,000 a year if it contracted out. Staff recently
completed interviews with an organization that responded to a request for proposal on jail operations.
Councilwoman Wendy Leece, who has opposed the outsourcing process from the beginning, said the

$400,000 legal bill could have been avoided if the city had asked its employees to pay more toward their
retirement before the process began.
"All these legal fees would have been unnecessary if we had gone back to the table and met with our general
employees to achieve more savings and talk about efficiencies in outsourcing," Leece said.
Related:
Judge rules against Costa Mesa's outsourcing plan
CHART: Costa Mesa legal expenses
Costa Mesa kicks off outsouring process
Costa Mesa could outsourcing fire services to county
Costa Mesa looks at charter city status as outsourcing aid
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6 comments

Greg Ridge ·

Subscribe ·

Top Commenter · t<Jguna Hills High

The sad thing Is, ... this doesn't include the hundreds of thousands spent on consultants that were
hired to provide the outsourcing. Originally the City Attorney Kim Barlow advised that this oouncil was
going down the wrong road but they just replaced her w~h the more pliant Torn Duarte , and now he's
giving his firm a banner year. Not too mention the other two Law firms that were hired. I want to see
what the TOTAL number is that these c~ Council members have wasted on this stupid scheme. I
know the devastating effects i~s had on the service levels we pay for.
Reply ·

7 · Like · Follow Post· January 30 at 1:20pm

John Stephens
Respectfully, Bill Lobdell is incorrect. The Council does have a choice. It can make decisions that do
not result in litigation and a prelimary injunction against the C~. It can work with the employees in a
spir~ of cooperation and respect with a long-term view. It can stop making hasty, drastic decisions
with short-term implications that force those Impacted to turn to the law and the courts for protection.
The Council Is in a hole and ~ needs to stop digging or else, ironically, its efforts to save the City
money will bankrupt us.
Reply ·

4 · Like · Follow Post · February 2 at 10: 52.am
Kenny Marks · Works at Self employed
Why the "respectfully" part?
Reply · Like · February 2 at !0:53am
John Stephens
I do respect Bill. He's doing his job. He's a good person and a Facebook friend.
Reply · Like · February 2 at ll:OOam
Kenny Marks · works at Self employed
Ah.
Reply · Like · February 2 at 11:43am

View 7 more
Kim Neugebauer ·

Subscribe · Works at ProCare One

Lawyers love these guys ... and OUR money!
Reply ·

3 · Like · Follow Post ·January 30 at 7:24pm
Reggie Mundekis
How many jobs is $400,000?
Reply ·

Cliff Flaro ·

1 · Like · January 30 at 7:25pm

Top Commenter

Costa Mesa seriously screwed up, they would have been so much better off keeping the current
employees & working with the union. It have been shown over & over again that outsourcing is a
short term cost savings with long term expense that exceeds the costs of keeping a regular city
employee. In this case CM is not saving ANY money ... .dumb move CM!
Reply ·

2 · Like · Follow Post · January 30 at 7:41pm

Tina Wilcox · London Opera Centre
When you knowingly break a contract, you have to expect that lawyers are the winners in the long

nun.
Reply·

2 · Like · Follow Post· January 30 at 3:00pm
View 1 more
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Costa Mesa legal expenses
Costa Mesa spent $1.05 million on legal
expenses from the start of the fiscal year
in July through November 2011.

Redevelopment
legal expenses
Various firms
$10,720

Non-litigation
legal expenses
Jones and Mayer

Jones Day
Jones and Mayer
$336,823
$390,701
$229,998
Other firms _ _ ___, Jones and Mayer .----~ Other firms_,.,.~
$53,073
$12,273
$16,796
Source: Costa Mesa
The Register
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MAR 20 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP,
Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION FOR A STAY OF
PROCEEDINGS TO
ENFORCE A JUDGMENT
PURSUANT TO RULE 62(b)

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.; and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR A STAY OF
PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE A JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 62(b)

004672

Saint Alphonsus's opening brief set forth three propositions: (i) MRIA should not be able
to "jump the gun" and execute on a judgment while this Court is deciding whether that judgment
should be vacated or reversed; (ii) MRIA is not prejudiced by a stay since interest is accruing on
its judgment at above-market rates; and (iii) since Saint Alphonsus will inevitably be entitled to a
stay on appeal, the Court should at a minimum grant a stay conditioned upon Saint Alphonsus
obtaining a supersedeas bond. MRIA does not actually dispute any of these points, but instead
has filed a brief offering unsubstantiated rumors of Saint Alphonsus's alleged insolvency and a
misleading picture of the parties' recent discussions. 1
Given MRIA' s inability to show how it will be harmed by a stay of execution while this
Court decides the post-trial motions, the Court should grant Saint Alphonsus's motion.
DATED this 20th day of March 2012.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

1

The correspondence attached by MRIA speaks for itself: on MRIA's initiative, the
parties had been discussing alternatives to a supersedeas bond for securing the judgment pending
appeal. When Saint Alphonsus asked MRIA to agree to a stay in this Court pending resolution
of the post-trial motions, MRIA sought to condition its agreement on the unrelated matter of the
terms and timing of a mediation.
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR A STAY OF
PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE A JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 62(b)- 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 20th day ofMarch 2012, a true and correct copy ofthe
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

D
D

~

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR A STAY OF
PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE A JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 62(b)- 2
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MAR 20 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VI OAK
DEPUTY

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP,
Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISALLOW
MRIA'S ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND COSTS

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.; and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW MRIA'S
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
004675

_

I.

MRIA ADMITTEDLY FAILED TO APPEAL JUDGE MCLAUGHLIN'S
RULING APPORTIONING MRIA'S ATTORNEY FEES, WHICH IS LAW OF
THE CASE AND IN ANY EVENT A PROPER EXERCISE OF DISCRETION

MRIA's request in this Court for are-award of its first trial fees rests entirely on the
premise that Judge McLaughlin's award is law of the case, and thus MRIA made no effort to
justify those costs anew. See MRIA Mem. in Support of Fees at 7. But if Judge McLaughlin's
ruling is law of the case, then MRIA must take the bitter with the sweet: Judge McLaughlin also
ruled that MRIA is entitled to attorneys' fees only for claims upon which MRIA prevailed. See
Mem. Decision, Nov. 19,2007, at 23-25. Because Judge McLaughlin's fee award included fees
related to claims that have since been rejected, MRIA's request to reinstate the old fee award in
full must be rejected. Saint Alphonsus Mem. in Support of Mot. to Disallow Fees at 5-6.

In response, MRIA concedes that Judge McLaughlin ruled that MRIA is not entitled to
recover fees for its dismissed claims, Opp'n at 6, and does not dispute that MRIA failed to
appeal this ruling. 1 Instead, MRIA claims that Judge McLaughlin's ruling was erroneous and
that this Court should change that ruling. !d. This argument comes too late. Under "the 'law of
the case' principle, on a second or subsequent appeal the courts generally will not consider errors
which arose prior to the first appeal and which might have been raised as issues in the earlier

1

By contrast, Saint Alphonsus did appeal Judge McLaughlin's decision to award fees to
MRIA in the first instance, and the Supreme Court vacated the fee judgment. See, e.g., Saint
Alphonsus's Appellate Br. at 60, available at 2008 WL 4522999 ("the district court's award of
fee and costs for MRIA should be vacated along with the judgment for MRIA"); Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 501, 224 P.3d 1068, 1090 (2009)
("SADC") (vacating judgment and ordering court to issue fee award after prevailing party
determined on remand). MRIA's repeated claim that Saint Alphonsus did not appeal the award
of fees, and thus is bound by that award, is as puzzling as it is baseless.
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW MRIA'S
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS- 1
004676

appeal." Bouten Constr. Co. v. HF. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 762, 992 P.2d 751, 757
(1999); see also Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 517, 5 P.3d 973, 978 (2000) (holding that
since party did not "appeal[] the trial court's ruling on [an] issue, we hold that the "law of the
case" doctrine precludes him from reopening the issue at this time"). Judge McLaughlin's ruling
should be reapplied now, and MRIA's fee request should be disallowed with respect to all claims
upon which it has lost.
Even if the Court somehow had the authority to revisit Judge McLaughlin's decision
despite the law-of-the-case doctrine, it should not do so. MRIA contends that a Court should not
disallow fees incurred for unsuccessful theories underlying a single claim. See Opp'n at 3-4.
But MRIA ignores that a Court "possesses considerable discretion in determining ... whether
attorney fees should be apportioned when neither [party] was successful in all of its claims or
defenses." Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 194, 191 P.3d 1107, 1114 (Ct. App. 2008). In Burns
v. County of Boundary, 120 Idaho 623, 625, 818 P.2d 327, 329 (Ct. App. 1990), the Court

distinguished MRIA's authorities. When a party "advance[s] alternative theories relating to an
alleged set of facts," that is, "different ways to obtain one specific recovery," then fees should
not be disallowed for unsuccessful theories. !d. But when there are not "two separate theories
supporting a single claim for relief, but ... two entirely separate claims," then "it [is] proper for
the court to consider claims separately in awarding attorney fees." !d.
MRIA's argument that Judge McLaughlin improperly excluded "theories" is wrong.
Judge McLaughlin's order distinguished between "theories" and "claims," and disallowed fees
for those "claims" that were unsuccessful. Mem. Decision, Nov. 19, 2007, at 23-25. That order
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was a reasonable exercise of discretion. The claims on which the Court disallowed feesantitrust, trade secret violations, conversion, and spoliation-rested on different legal and factual
bases than the non-compete and fiduciary-duty breaches MRIA brought to trial. Indeed, no such
"evidence" of alleged antitrust, trade-secret theft, conversion, or spoliation violations were
offered on retrial, which would be expected if they were part of the same nucleus of common
facts that would support a breach-of-contract or fiduciary-duty claim. Judge McLaughlin's
interpretation of these matters as separate "claims," and disallowing fees for those unsuccessful
claims, was not an abuse of discretion.
In the same vein, Judge McLaughlin's denial of recovery for losing claims should apply
equally to MRIA' s attempt to recover fees related to wrongful dissociation. In order to prove
wrongful dissociation, MRIA needed to establish a distinct set of facts: Saint Alphonsus's
withdrawal from the partnership in violation of either an express contractual restriction or prior
to the expiration of a definite term of years. Wrongful dissociation did not turn on whether or
not Saint Alphonsus conspired with GSR, competed with MRIA, or assisted IMI, or on any of
the other allegations actually brought to trial. And notably, MRIA did not claim that wrongful
dissociation was an alternative basis for its claim to lost profits; rather, MRIA offered an entirely
distinct theory of wrongful-dissociation damages. Since wrongful dissociation was a distinct
claim, and MRIA lost on that claim, fees for that claim should be disallowed.
Further, MRIA does not appear to dispute that other issues-like the antitrust claims that
it raised on appeal and Saint Alphonsus's own successful claim for its departing partner shareare distinct claims. As set forth in Saint Alphonsus's motion, all ofMRIA's incurred fees for
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these unsuccessful claims, be it from the first trial, on appeal, or on remand, should be
disallowed. The Court should require MRIA to submit a new fee petition, excluding all such
billings? If it cannot or will not do so, the Court should disallow MRIA' s fee petition.

II.

MRIA'S HOURLY RATE SHOULD BE REDUCED
Saint Alphonsus has not challenged the amount of hours incurred by MRIA's attorneys

on the claims on which MRIA prevailed on retrial. But MRIA has requested that the amount of
hours it incurred be multiplied by a billing rate that appears excessive for Boise practitioners as a
whole, and significantly higher than the $170 to $250 hourly rates charged by the undersigned, a
Boise litigator with forty-plus years of experience, during the timeframe of the appeal and
remand. See Aff. of JackS. Gjording in Opp'n to MRIA's Mot. for Leave to Conduct Discovery
Regarding Saint Alphonsus's Attorney Fees~~ 2-3. The reasonableness ofMRIA's hourly-rate
request is the only relevant factor here. To the extent that MRIA is arguing that it is entitled to a
higher rate because (i) other Jones Day lawyers charged higher rates in other cases, or (ii)
because MRIA claims this was a novel matter, it is wrong. The allowable billing rate is defined
by "prevailing charges in a geographic context, rather than in a strata context. That is, the court
should consider the fee rates generally prevailing in the pertinent geographic area, rather than
2

MRIA's new fee petition must also exclude: (i) all billings related to Trinity's
acquisition of health-care facilities, (ii) those entries that MRIA has conceded it will withdraw,
see Opp'n at 12-13, (iii) fees incurred in satisfying Saint Alphonsus's appellate cost judgment;
and (iv) any claims for matters disallowed by Judge McLaughlin's November ruling not already
discussed. With respect to these matters, MRIA continues to seek fees for transactional, (not
litigation) work and/or for claims on which it lost and that are not relevant to the retrial.
As to the other objected-to fee entries, see Mem. in Support of Mot. to Disallow at 7-8,
Saint Alphonsus withdraws its objection now that MRIA has identified the unknown parties and
explained the purpose of the board meetings.
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what any particular segment of the legal community may be charging," such as "the largest of
Idaho firms." Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 750, 185 P.3d 258,262 (2008).
Here, MRIA's counsel comes from Boise and seeks to justify their rates as appropriate
for Boise. Aff. of Steve Andersen~ 8. Saint Alphonsus is not challenging the reasonableness of
hiring Boise litigators. But the Court should consider the prevailing rates for Boise litigators,
and not simply award MRIA the "top of the market range" in Boise, as MRIA seems to suggest
is appropriate. See Opp'n at 14-15; Aff. of Steve Andersen~ 6. Notably, MRIA does not claim
that the rates for other Boise litigators set forth in Saint Alphonsus' s opening brief are
unrepresentative of prevailing rates. Instead, MRIA feels an entitlement to the highest rate. But
that is not the law. Since MRIA's claimed rates are excessive for Boise, the Court should
exercise its discretion to lower that fee rate.
III.

MRIA HAS FAILED TO JUSTIFY THE COSTS INCURRED DURING THIS
PARTNERSHIP DISPUTE AS "EXCEPTIONAL"
MRIA seems to suggest that it need not justify its costs as "exceptional" to recover them.

Opp'n at 17-18. This is wrong: Rule 54(d)(l)(D) expressly provides that excessive or additional
costs "may be allowed upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs
reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party."
See also, e.g., Auto. Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 881, 865 P.2d 965, 972 (1993)
("Nowhere in the record do the cross-appellants attempt to explain why these charges were
necessary and exceptional, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse
party. They thus failed to make the required showing under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D)."); Swallow v.
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Emer. Med. of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589,598,67 P.3d 68,77 (2003) (holding trial court abused
discretion in awarding costs when the requesting party did not present any evidence or make any
argument in support of the Rule 54(d)(1)(D) requirements). MRIA's only authority to the
contrary states that the district court need not address each cost line-by-line in its order. Puckett
v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 169-70, 159 P.3d 937,946-46 (2007). That the district court does not
have to justify every cost does not relieve MRIA of its statutory burden to do so.
Here, MRIA' s justification of its costs is utterly perfunctory: it claimed that its costs
were "necessary and exceptional" because "this was a novel, complex, and difficult case."
Amended Aff. of Counsel regarding Rule 54(e)(3), p. 8, ~ 7; accord Mem. in Support of Costs
and Fees at 9 (saying only that "these exceptional costs incurred by MRIA were reasonable and
necessary, especially in light of the complexity and length of this case, and the amount
recovered"). MRIA's opposition brief claims that by simply incanting the magic words "this
case was exceptional," MRIA is relieved from offering any justification for such routine,
pedestrian, and commonplace litigation expenses such as attorney meals, postage, and
courthouse parking. See, e.g., Opp'n at 19-22. But that is not the law-MRIA is not entitled to
carte blanche in cost recovery just because it made a lot of photocopies, hired experts, or
recovered a large judgment. Indeed, in Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho
307, 109 P.3d 161 (2005)-the very case MRIA cites in support of its claim that it need only
claim this case is "exceptional" to receive all of its costs-the Supreme Court affirmed the denial
of expert witness fees even though the case involved "complex business litigation" with an
"outcome [that] could affect over one thousand local businesses and involve potential damages
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of over $50,000,000.00." !d. at 314, 109 P.3d at 168. The Supreme Court concluded that despite
the "magnitude" of the case, "the district court found the need for expert witnesses an essential
but ordinary part of such litigation," and was within its discretion to deny expert costs. !d.
This case is no different. Although MRIA received a large judgment, at the end of the
day, this was business litigation that was tried on breach-of-contract and breach-of-fiduciaryduty grounds, seeking lost profits. There is nothing exceptional about using expert witnesses to
prove lost profits in business cases, and just as in Hayden Lake, those costs should not be
awarded. Nor is there anything special about this case which should lead this Court to find that
MRIA's counsel's meals, postage, parking, copying, and other routine overhead expenses are
"exceptional," as opposed to something those counsel incur in every case they try. See Total
Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688, 694, 227 P.3d 942, 948
(Ct. App. 201 0) (disallowing "routine cost[ s] associated with modern litigation overhead").
Thus, for the reasons set forth in the opening brief, MRIA's costs should be disallowed.
CONCLUSION

MRIA's petition for fees and costs should be disallowed as set forth in the opening brief.
DATED this 20th day of March, 2012.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

APR 2 5 2012

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF AOIRISTOF~i~;;>R o. RICH Cl
By DIAi~E OATMAN ' erk
Depu1y

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Defendant.

_____________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
OR NEW TRIAL

)

Presently before the Court is Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict or New Trial. The Court heard argument on March 23, 2012, and took the matter
under advisement as ofMarch 26,2012, at 9:00AM. The Court now issues the following
op1ruon.
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict must be granted where there is not
"evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a
similar conclusion to that of the jury." Bridge Tower Dental v. Meridian Computer Center, 2012
Opinion 46, at *4 (Idaho March 5, 2012).

When deciding whether to grant judgment

notwithstanding the verdict, ''the court may not reweigh evidence, consider witness credibility, or
compare its factual findings to that of the jury. The court reviews the facts as if the moving party
had admitted any adverse facts, drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party."

!d.
On the other hand, a new trial may be granted for "1) Irregularity in proceedings . . . or
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any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a
fair trial. ... 5) Excessive damages .... 6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict ...
or that it is against the law.... [or] 7) Error occurring at trial. ..." I.R.C.P. 59(a). When
determining whether to grant a motion for new trial, the court "has wide discretion to grant or
refuse to grant a new trial." Bridge Tower Dental, 2012 Opinion 46, at *5. However, "where
prejudicial errors of law have occurred, the district court has a duty to grant a new trial, even
though the verdict is supported by substantial and competent evidence.'' However, there is a
strong presumption that "error may not be predicated upon a ruling that admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.'' I.R.E. 103(a); Read v. Harvey, 147
Idaho 364,209 P.3d 661 (2009).
In support of its motion, Saint Alphonsus argues that 1) MRIA failed to prove damages;
2) the disgorgement damages were improperly awarded; 3) fault should have been apportioned
on MRIA's contract claims; 4) MRI Center and MRI Mobile should not have been allowed to be
joined as counterclaimants; 5) the Court erroneously applied the law of the case; 6) the Court
made various errors that had the cumulative effect of prejudicing Saint Alphonsus; and 7) Saint
Alphonsus is entitled to 12% interest on its departing partner's share. The Court will address
these arguments in turn.

I. MRI Entities' Damages Proof
Saint Alphonsus argues that it is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new
trial, or remittitur relating to damages because 1) MRIA failed to prove that Saint Alphonsus
caused MRIA's lost profits; 2) MRIA's lost profits evidence was legally insufficient; 3) MRIA
failed to prove that post April 1, 2005, damages were related to pre April 1, 2005, conduct; 4)
MRIA may not recover profits lost to IMI On Campus; 5) MRIA's damages were overstated
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because it failed to account for profits that would have been due to Saint Alphonsus had it not
dissociated; and 6) MRIA may not recover for MRI Center's diminution in value.
A. MRIA did not fail to prove that Saint Alphonsus caused its lost profits
Saint Alphonsus contends that MRIA' s damage award fails because it failed to provide
any evidence showing that Saint Alphonsus's conduct caused MRlA to lose scans. MRIA's
experts made their lost profits calculations based on the number of scans diverted from the MRI
entities to IMI. To arrive at its diverted scans number, MRIA's experts counted referrals to IMI
from doctors who either 1) had privileges at Saint Alphonsus but not Saint Luke's; or 2) had
referred scans to the MRI entities in the past. MRIA's experts did not attempt to quantify the
business lost to IMI from doctors who did not fall into either of those categories.

Saint

Alphonsus contends that this methodology is insufficient to support the award of damages to
MRIA.
Evidence is sufficient to support a damage award where "the fact of injury [is] established
with reasonable certainty ..." Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 233, 646 P.2d
988, 1004 (1982). However, once the fact of injury has been adequately established, "[i]t will be
enough if the evidence shows the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable
inference, although the result be only approximate." !d. at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005 (quoting Story
Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563, 51 S.Ct. 248, 250, 75
L.Ed. 544, _ (1931)). The factfmder may not rely on speculation or guesswork; the evidence
must establish a foundation "from which the factfinder can calculate the amount of damages."
!d.
Here, the evidence was sufficient to remove the damages figures from the realm of
speculation or guesswork and provides a reasonable foundation from which the factfinder can
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calculate damages. MRIA introduced expert testimony approximating the volume of lost scans,
and then showed the approximate amount of profits MRIA would have realized from those scans.
Though the lost scans has never been offered as the precise number of scans lost to IMI, MRIA' s
expert testified that his methodology was conservative.

Here, The Court cannot find that

MRIA's expert's approach was speculative. The mere fact that the damages cannot be
ascertained with absolute certainty is not a bar to admissibility of the expert's opinion. It goes to
the weight the factfinder gives to that opinion. Here, the opinions have cleared the bar. This was
a matter of argument to the jury, not of admissibility.

Clearly Saint Alphonsus lost that

argument. Clearly the jury found the testimony of MRIA's experts more credible than that of
Saint Alphonsus's experts. Credibility determinations are for the jury and are not to be secondguessed by the Court. Thus, the Court finds that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's
finding and further finds that there was no error in allowing MRIA' s experts to testify as they
did.
B. MRI Mobile's lost profits evidence is not insufficient under Trilogy Networks
Saint Alphonsus contends that MRIA' s use of IMI' s costs and margins causes its
damages to be insufficient as a matter of law. Saint Alphonsus cites to Trilogy Network Systems,
Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119 (2007), for the proposition that, in the context of

non-competition clause litigation, a plaintiff must use its own costs and margins rather than
relying on the defendant's costs and margins. Thus, Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA's use of
IMI's cost structure and margins is error. The Court is not persuaded.
Saint Alphonsus misstates the holding of Trilogy.

Trilogy expressly states that "the

profits realized by the defendant may be considered by the trier-of-fact if shown to correspond
with the loss of the plaintiff." !d. at 846, 172 P.3d at 1121. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's
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decision in Trilogy is expressly based on the trial court's finding that Trilogy had failed to show
its damages because it had not presented any comparison between "its costs and the costs to [the
defendant]." Id at 845, 172 P.3d at 1122. Reviewing the trial court's findings of fact for clear
error, the Supreme Court stated "Trilogy failed to persuade the district court of any
correspondence between what its profit would have been and Johnson's actual profit, and thus
failed to take the measure of its damages out ofthe realm of speculation." Id
Here, MRIA's experts chose not to use MRIA's cost structure to calculate MRI Mobile's
lost profits because it would have led to inaccurate numbers. MRIA's expert testified that absent
Saint Alphonsus's bad acts, it was possible that MRI Mobile could have opened a facility in
Meridian earlier than the IMI facility was opened, thus entitling MRIA several years' more
profits. (Tr. 4548). However, MRIA's expert found that the most conservative thing to do was
to assume that IMI-Meridian's cost structure and opening date would have been the same as
MRIA's Meridian facility. (Tr. 4547-48). Furthermore, MRIA's actual cost structure, which was
introduced at trial, had higher margins than IMI-Meridian in every year except 2002, at which
time the two entities had roughly comparable margins. Compare Exh. *-5084 with Exh. *-5088.
Thus, had MRIA's experts used MRIA's actual margins, it would have resulted in a higher
damages figure than what MRIA's experts presented at trial. Once again, the issue goes to the
weight the jury gives to such evidence, not to its admissibility. Strong cross-examination and
argument occurred on this issue, and the jury was fully aware of the differing approaches of the
experts for Saint Alphonsus and MRIA. Consequently, the Court finds that there is adequate
evidence in the record to show that IMI-Meridian's margins correspond to the hypothetical
MRIA-Meridian's margins. Thus, there is no error.
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C. MRIA did not fail to prove splash forward damages and may recover for the scans lost to
IMI on-campus
Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA' s damages calculations were premised on Saint
Alphonsus's post-April 1, 2005, being wrongful.

Furthermore, MRIA failed to offer any

evidence connecting any one particular lost scan to pre-April 1, 2005, conduct. So, the argument
goes, MRIA's damages must be reduced by any damages that occurred after April 1, 2005. The
Court disagrees.
MRIA' s entire theory of the case was that Saint Alphonsus' s wrongful acts effectively
destroyed MRIA as a business. MRIA presented substantial evidence to this effect upon which a
reasonable factfinder could determine that the relative market positions of MRIA and IMI were
caused by Saint Alphonsus's pre-April 1, 2005, actions, and that these actions constituted bad
acts. If the factfinders found that Saint Alphonsus' s had committed the alleged bad acts and that
they occurred prior to April 1, 2005, they could clearly find the bad acts caused MRIA to cease
being a viable market competitor, and they could then reasonably infer that the an appropriately
proven share of the scans going to IMI (both downtown and on-campus) would have gone to
MRIA if it were still a viable competitor. The jury was fully instructed on these issues. The
Court will not assume they did not follow the clearly articulated law governing the case. Thus,
the Court finds no error in the award ofpost-April1, 2005, damages.
D. MRIA's damage award should not be further reduced based upon Saint Alphonsus's
profits if it had still been a partner in MRIA
Saint Alphonsus argues that it is entitled to a reduction in damages by its 25% interest it
would have had in MRIA if it hadn't withdrawn. The Court ruled on this matter on October 12,
2011. The Court has reviewed its October 12, 2011 ruling on this matter, and finds no error.
Thus, there are no grounds for a grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, or
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remittitur.
E. MRIA may recover damages based upon diminution in MRI Center's value
Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA may not recover for MRI Center's diminution in value
because 1) MRIA abandoned the damage theory and failed to disclose that it was pursuing the
theory in this case; and 2) the evidence supporting the theory was legally deficient
The Court addressed the first issue at length in its September 27, 2011, Order re: Motion
to Exclude Damages Theories. The Court has reviewed that decision and finds no error in it. As
to the second issue, as the Court explained above, Pope only requires that a party show the fact of
damages with reasonable certainty, and once that is done the party must merely provide a
reasonable basis from which the factfinder can calculate damages. See § lA, supra. As stated
above, there was substantial evidence that MRIA had lost its market position because of Saint
Alphonsus's bad conduct. From there, a factfinder may reasonably infer that MRI Center lost
value in conjunction with its lost market position. Thus, there is no error in the diminution in
value finding. Thus, there are no grounds for a grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
new trial, or remittitur.
II. U surpation/Disgorgement

Saint Alphonsus argues that the award of disgorgement damages is inappropriate because:
1) MRIA's disgorgement theory was untimely disclosed; 2) the 1999 usurpation theory was timebarred; 3) the usurpation claim is not supported by the evidence; and 4) the damages amount is
overstated by $11.2 million.
A. MRIA's disgorgement theory was not untimely disclosed and is not time-barred.
The Court addressed the arguments that the usurpation and disgorgement theories were
not properly in the case at length in its September 27, 2011, Order re: Motion to Exclude
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Damages Theories. The jury also found that the usurpation theory was not time-barred as a
matter of fact. The Court has reviewed its decision again and finds no error in its decision or the
jury's finding. Consequently, the Court will not grant a new trial or judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.
B. MRIA's disgorgement theory is supported by evidence.

MRIA presented substantial, credible evidence to show that Saint Alphonsus usurped
MRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR. See, e.g., Exh. *-4101. That is why the Court adopted
the jury's advisory finding that Saint Alphonsus usurped the opportunity to partner with GSR. 1
The Court finds no error in its finding of liability for usurpation of a partnership opportunity.
C. The disgorgement figure should not be reduced by $11.2 million
The Court addressed this issue in its January 17,2012, Findings ofFact and Conclusions
of Law. The benefit received by Saint Alphonsus for usurping the opportunity to partner with the
radiologists is the profits it receives as well as the value of the investment in IMI, which it still
owns. MRIA, however, sought only the profits Saint Alphonsus received up until 2015, and did
not seek the value of its investment in IMI.

If MRIA were awarded the value of Saint

Alphonsus's investment, then an offset would be appropriate. However, MRIA was not awarded
the value of Saint Alphonsus' s asset, and thus the disgorgement amount should not be reduced by
Saint Alphonsus's initial investment in IMI, $11.2 million.
Ill. Apportionment of Fault

Saint Alphonsus argues, as to apportionment of fault, that: 1) this Court should have
apportioned damages on MRIA's contract claims; 2) the Court reversed itself on the issue after

1

Contrary to Saint Alphonsus's contention that the Court summarily adopted the jury's fmdings, the Court found that
the jury erred in its advisory damages fmding, which the Court did not adopt at all.
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the close of evidence, thus prejudicing Saint Alphonsus; 3) the Court should have reduced the
damages by 50%, rather than through apportionment of fault; and 4) if the Court did not reduce
the damage award by 50%, it should be reduced by the jury's greatest apportionment of fault, or
20%.
As to the issues of whether the Court should have reduced the contract claims as well as
the tort claims and whether the Court should have reduced the damages award by 50% rather
than apportioning fault, the Court addressed this issue in its June 17, 2011, Order re: Motions for
Summary Judgment heard May 18, 2011. The Court has reviewed that decision and finds no
error, much less error warranting a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
As to the issue of whether the Court reversed itself, prejudicing Saint Alphonsus, Saint
Alphonsus argues that the Court's June 17, 2011, Order clearly provides that Saint Alphonsus is
"entitled to a reduction in any damages awarded against it." Saint Alphonsus argues that it took
this to mean that it was entitled to a reduction in damages awarded via apportionment of fault on
contract claims as well as on tort claims. The Court finds Saint Alphonsus's argument specious.
Saint Alphonsus' s argument fails to take into account the context of the sentence it quotes
back to the Court. The section of the Order it is quoting comes toward the end of a section
discussing the apportionment of fault among tortfeasors. A plain reading of the sentence in
context shows that the sentence refers to the apportionment of fault as to the tort claims, and not
the contract claims. If there was confusion about the Court's order, Saint Alphonsus should have
filed a motion for clarification.
Furthermore, even if it should be found that the Court did reverse itself, Saint Alphonsus
suffered no prejudice as a result. Saint Alphonsus argues that it was prejudiced by the fact that it
could not adapt its trial strategy to argue that it was liable on the tort claims, but not the contract
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claims. However, even assuming it adopted such a trial strategy, Saint Alphonsus was found to
be 100% liable on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Thus, even assuming it was not found
liable on the contract claims, its damages would have been the same. This is precisely why,
following the decision of the Supreme Court, this Court broke out each claim separately for
consideration by the jury-a procedure that Saint Alphonsus agreed to, as the Court recalls.
Finally, Saint Alphonsus argues that the damages awarded against it should be reduced by
20%, the percentage GSR was found to be at fault on the civil conspiracy count. In this case, the
jury found Saint Alphonsus 80% responsible for the civil conspiracy, 90% responsible for
tortuous interference with contract, and 100% responsible for breach of fiduciary duty. As the
Court recognized in its November 16, 2010, Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs
Motions for Summary Judgment, civil conspiracy claims are reliant on underlying tort claims.
Since the civil conspiracy claim is dependent on the findings of liability on the other torts, the
jury's apportionment of fault is logically inconsistent.
The finding of 100% fault for the breach of fiduciary duty claim is clear enough-the jury
rejected the idea that Saint Alphonsus acted in concert with any other entity to breach its
fiduciary duty. Thus, the jury must have found that the conspiracy related only to the tortuous
interference with contract. Thus, it is inconsistent for the jury to find 80% liability on the civil
conspiracy count and 90% liability on the tortuous interference with contract count. Thus, the
Court will reduce the damages awarded on the tortuous interference with contract to reflect a
finding of 80% liability. The finding of 100% liability on the breach of fiduciary duty claim will
not be disturbed.
IV. MRI Center and MRI Mobile's Claims
Saint Alphsonsus argues that it is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
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claims of MRI Center and MRI Mobile because: 1) the joinder of Center and Mobile runs
contrary to the law of the case; 2) the claims of Center and Mobile are time-barred; and 3)
Center's and Mobile's claims are legally invalid and fail for lack of proof.
A. The law of the case does not preclude the joinder of MRI Center and MRI Mobile
Saint Alphonsus's first argument, that the law of the case precluded the joinder of MRI
Center and MRI Mobile, is not well taken. The law-of-the-case issues are more fully dealt with
below. However, the Court held that "[t]his matter needs to be retried before a new jury with the
errors found by the Supreme Court corrected, but otherwise the previous proceedings stand."
Order re: Motions Heard August 5, 2011. One of the errors found by the Supreme Court was the
decision that allowed MRIA to sue on behalf of MRI Center and MRI Mobile without joining
them as parties. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, 148 Idaho 479, 497,
224 P.3d 1068, 1086. The Court allowed that error to be corrected on retrial by the joinder of
MRI Center and MRI Mobile. In fact, the joinder of MRI Center and MRI Mobile was dictated
by the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court so damages could be properly apportioned among the
parties if damages were awarded by the jury. If the direction of the Supreme Court is in this very
case is not law of the case, this Court does not know what would be. Thus, the Court cannot find
that allowing the joinder ofMRI Center and MRI Mobile constitutes error.
B. The claims ofMRI Center and MRI Mobile are not time-barred

The Court decided this matter in its November 16, 2010 Memorandum Decision and
Order on Plaintiffs Motions of Judgment on Pleadings and Motions for Summary Judgment.
The Court has reviewed that decision and finds no error. Consequently, the Court will not grant
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial.
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C. The claims ofMRI Center and MRI Mobile are not legally deficient
Saint Alphonsus argues that the claims of MRI Center and MRI Mobile are legally
deficient. The Court will address Saint Alphonsus's arguments by cause of action.
1. Contract Claims

Saint Alphonsus argues that the contract claims leveled by MRI Center and MRI Mobile
fail because MRI Center and MRI Mobile are not third-party beneficiaries. The Court addressed
this issue in its Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May 18, 2011. The Court has
reviewed that decision and finds no error.
2. Fiduciary Duty
Saint Alphonsus argues that Judge McLaughlin's ruling at the close of the first trial, that
no reasonable jury could conclude that Saint Alphonsus did not owe MRI Center and MRI
Mobile a fiduciary duty, should not have stood in the second trial. For the Court to agree with
Saint Alphonsus's argument, it would have to find its law-of-the-case decision in error. As is
discussed more fully below, the Court finds no error in its application of the law-of-the-case
doctrine. Consequently, the Court will not grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new
trial.
3. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations & Conspiracy
Saint Alphonsus' s arguments regarding intentional interference with contract are all
premised on the breach of fiduciary duty and contract claims being legally deficient. Because the
Court finds that the contract or breach of fiduciary duty claims are not deficient, the Court will
not grant new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
V. Law of the Case
Saint Alphonsus argues that this Court's decision that the rulings surrounding the prior
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trial would stand except for the issues addressed prior to remand is error that would require a
new trial. The Court addressed this issue in its August 23, 2011, Order. The Court has reviewed
that Order and finds no error.
However, Saint Alphonsus also argues that the Court favored MRIA by binding Saint
Alphonsus to its prior trial strategy while allowing MRIA to "change the posture of the case." In
support of this contention, Saint Alphonsus cites to the fact that the parties were held to their
stipulation regarding the admission of certain exhibits and prevented from referencing its nonprofit status and its departing partner's share, while MRIA was allowed to join MRI Center and
MRI Mobile, and change its posture as to damages.
As to the issue of the stipulation, the Court addressed that issue in its August 23, 2011,
Order and finds no error. As to the issue of Saint Alphonsus's non-profit status, the issue was
never framed as an issue of law-of-the-case and the Court did not perceive it that way. However,
the Court does not see any prejudice by Saint Alphonsus being constrained to describe itself as a
Catholic charitable hospital rather than a non-profit organization.

Finally, the issue of the

departing partner's share was rendered irrelevant by Judge McLaughlin's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and this Court's June 17, 2011, Order, which held that Judge McLaughlin's
fmding as to the departing partner's share would stand in this trial. In other words, a change in
the circumstances between the first and second trial-the order determining the amount of the
departing partner's share-rendered the issue of the departing partner's share irrelevant.
As to the claims that MRIA was allowed to change the posture of the case, the Court
found that the joinder of MRI Center and MRI Mobile was allowed under the changed
circumstances following appeal. As to the additional damages, the Court notes that both parties
changed their damages calculations between the first and second trials. As to the addition of
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damages theories, the Court addressed this in section II, above. The Court will not grant new
trial based upon its rulings regarding the law of the case.

VI. Miscellaneous Assignments of Error
A. The Court did not err by denying directed verdict as to the radiology services agreement
The Court addressed this issue on October 25, 2011. The Court has reviewed its decision
and finds no error.

B. The Court's ruling that Cindy Schamp could not testify about her statements to Roger
Curran was error, but did not affect the substantial rights of Saint Alphonsus
Saint Alphonsus argues that the Court's September 26, 2011, preliminary ruling that
Cindy Schamp could not testify about her communications with Roger Curran was error that
prejudiced Saint Alphonsus. Saint Alphonsus argues that the decision was error because the
excluded statements were not hearsay. Saint Alphonsus argues that it was prejudiced because
Ms. Schamp's statements to Dr. Curran would have rebutted the argument that Saint Alphonsus
had acted wrongfully by keeping its dealings with IMI secret.
As to the issue of whether the ruling was error, the Court agrees with Saint Alphonsus.
Hearsay "is a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.R.E. 801 (d)( 1). Here,
the statements discussed during the argument on this motion in limine were Cindy Schamp's
statements that she communicated certain information to Roger Curran.

These statements,

however, were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; they were offered to show that the
statements were made, thus rebutting the argument that Saint Alphonsus was hiding something
from MRIA. The Court's ruling, on its face, barred Cindy Schamp from testifying about her past
communications to Roger Curran, which was error.
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The effect of the Court's ruling, however, was to prevent Cindy Schamp from injecting
her own non-responsive recollection of what she told Roger Curran into her examination by
MRIA. Cindy Schamp, in fact, testified fairly extensively regarding her communications to
Roger Curran when examined by Saint Alphonsus on September 27, 2011. Since Ms. Schamp
was allowed to testify regarding her past statements to Dr. Curran in spite of the Court's ruling,
the Court cannot find that Saint Alphonsus's substantial rights were affected by the Court's
ruling.
C. The Court's preliminary ruling that the Idaho Business Review article could not be
admitted was not error
Saint Alphonsus argues that the Court's ruling that the Idaho Business Review article
(Exh. *-0792) could not be admitted on September 16, 2011, was error because the article was
not hearsay and was self-authenticating. At the outset, the Court notes that the Court did not
hold that it was hearsay.
Furthermore, the fact that a document is self-authenticating does not mean it is
automatically admissible. A self-authenticating document may be inadmissible for reasons such
as the best evidence rule, the hearsay rule, or privilege. See United States v. Bellucci, 995 F.2d
157, 160 (9th Cir. 1993) (interpreting the Federal Rule of Evidence identical to the Idaho Rule of
Evidence 902(6)). Furthermore, the Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee stated:
Rules 901 through 903 treat only of [sic] authentication and identification, which
is considered to be a special aspect of relevancy, and itself only one aspect of
admissibility. When genuineness of the evidence is established by extrinsic proof
or self-authentication, other conditions of admissibility for substantive purposes
must still be satisfied. It must be shown to be the best evidence (see Article X),
that it is relevant and not specially excluded (see Article IV) or privileged (see
article V), and because writings and evidence of conversations are by their very
nature hearsay, that it is excepted from the rule against hearsay (see Article VIII).
Questions of prejudice outweighing probative value are considered an aspect of
relevancy under Article IV.
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Report of the Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee, Dec. 16, 1983, introductory comment to
Article IX Authentication and Identification, at p. 2.
Furthermore, the Court points out that it did not absolutely bar admission of the
document, but merely indicated that it would await further foundation after Dr. Seaborn testified
and would address the issue again without prejudice to Saint Alphonsus' s to argue at that time
the admissibility of the newspaper article.
As is clear from the rule and case law, the fact a document need not be autheniticated
under the rule does not make the document automatically admissible.

After Dr. Seaborn

testified, the article was, in fact, admitted into evidence and was argued by Saint Alphonsus to
the jury during closing argument.
By no stretch of the imagination does this alleged error, it if is indeed found to be error,
reach the standard required to grant a new trial.
D. The Court's denial of Saint Alphonsus's motion to compel compliance with its statutory
right to inspect the books and records of MRIA was not error
The Court ruled on this issue on July 20, 2011, holding that it would be inappropriate for
this Court to compel compliance with a right unrelated to the litigation. The Court held that
compelling compliance with the right of Saint Alphonsus to inspect the MRI entities' books
would frustrate the purpose of discovery. The Court finds no error in its July 20, 2011, ruling.
E. The Court did not prejudicially dispose the jury to infer that Saint Alphonsus acted in bad
faith
Saint Alphonsus argues that six other rulings prejudicially disposed the jury to find Saint
Alphonsus acted in bad faith. The Court will address them in tum.

Order re: Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial 16

004699

1. Redaction of the Shattuck Hammond memorandum
Saint Alphonsus argues that the Court's redaction of the Shattuck Hamond memorandum
unfairly prejudiced it because it left the impression that Saint Alphonsus could have breached its
fiduciary duty to MRIA by dissociating. The Court addressed this issue in its August 23, 2011,
Order. The Court has reviewed that decision and finds no error.
2. Saint Alphonsus being precluded from describing its dissociation as "rightful"
Saint Alphonsus argues that it was prejudiced by not being allowed to refer to its
dissociation as rightful.

This Court ruled in its June 9, 2011, that the rightfulness or

wrongfulness of Saint Alphonsus's withdrawal was not relevant. The Court finds that its ruling
was not in error. Furthermore, even if the ruling were found to be error, the Court cannot find
that any prejudice resulted from the ruling; the Court reminded the jury on several occasions that
Saint Alphonsus had the right to withdraw.
3. MRIA's hypothetical "little girl with a brain tumor"
Saint Alphonsus argues that the Court should have, sua sponte,2 prevented MRIA from
referencing the "little girl with a brain tumor." The Court denied Saint Alphonsus's belated
objection lodged at first break following MRIA's reference to the girl with the brain tumor on the
ground that it was not argumentative. The Court finds that its ruling was not error. Furthermore,
even if it were error, the Court finds that no prejudice resulted from it because the girl with the
brain tumor was only referenced once more-in closing when MRIA's counsel admitted that he
"got a little carried away" with the example.

2

The Court can only assume that this is what Saint Alphonsus is arguing because counsel did not object at the time
of the reference.
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4. Rebuttal testimony of Stephen Wilson
Saint Alphonsus argues that the impeachment testimony offered by Steven Wilson was
improper because the testimony impeached an "I don't remember" response from Sandra Bruce.
However, in Idaho "[t]estimony by a witness that he or she cannot remember is sufficient to
complete the foundation for impeachment with a prior consistent or inconsistent statement."

Pruess v. Thomson, 112 Idaho 169, 171, 730 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Ct. App. 1986). Thus, Sandra
Bruce's statement that she didn't remember was properly rebutted by Stephen Wilson's
testimony.
5. Rebuttal testimony of David Giles
Saint Alphonsus argues that the impeachment testimony offered by David Giles was
improper because the testimony impeached an "I don't remember" response from Jeff Cliff. For
the same reasons that the testimony of Stephen Wilson was not permitted in error, the testimony
of David Giles was not permitted in error.
6. Admonition ofNeil McFeely
Saint Alphonsus argues that the Court's reminder to the attorney for GSR, Neil McFeely,
that there was an order in place restricting communications with witnesses who have not yet
testified prejudiced the jury against Saint Alphonsus. At the outset, the Court notes that the
reminder was necessary because Mr. McFeely was unaware of the order.

(Tr. 4182).

Furthermore, following the Court's reminder, Mr. McFeely indicated in front of the jury that he
would follow the order. The Court finds that the exchange between Mr. McFeely and the Court
does not warrant a new trial.

VII. Interest on Departing Partner's Share
Saint Alphonsus renews its argument that it is entitled to 12% interest on its departing
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partner's share from April 1, 2004. The RUPA provides that following dissociation "[i]nterest
shall be paid from the date of dissociation to the date of payment."

I.C. § 53-3-701(b).

However, section 53-3-701(b), Idaho Code, applies only to the extent that the partnership
agreement is silent on the issue of interest. See I.C. §§ 53-3-103(a); 53-3-701, cmt 3. Section
6.2 of the partnership agreement provides that no interest will be paid to dissociating hospital
partners on their partnership shares, thus the agreement is not silent on the issue of interest, and
the RUPA default provision does not apply.
Once judgment is entered, however, the judgment rate of interest applies. I. C. § 28-22104(2). Thus, when the judgment was entered on July 21, 2007, the judgment rate of interest of
10.00% applied to the judgment.

Thus, the Court will not reconsider or grant judgment

notwithstanding the verdict on the issue or pre-judgment interest.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Saint Alphonsus's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or new trial is GRANTED to the extent that the apportionment of fault requires
correction. Saint Alphonsus's motion is DENIED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED AND DATED thisA!'1ay of April, 2012.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

APR 3 0 Z01Z

--

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ~ISTOPdcR o. RiCH. CIEn
By DIANE OATMAN

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
)
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership,
)
)
)
Defendant.
)

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219

AMENDED JUDGMENT

___________________________ )
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED, an Idaho )
limited partnership; MRI MOBILE LIMITED,)
an Idaho limited partnership,
)
)
)
Counter-claimants,
)
)
vs.
)
)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,)
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)
Counter-defendants.
)

___________________________ )
This action having come for jury trial, and the issues having been duly tried and a verdict

having been rendered by the jury on October 31, 2011, IT IS SO ORDERED THAT MRI
Associates, LLP (MRIA), MRI Limited (MRI Center), and MRI Mobile Limited (MRI Mobile)
(collectively MRI Entities) may execute on any one of the following alternatives:
1.

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care (SADC)

Amended Judgment I
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and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (SARMC) (collectively "Saint
Alphonsus") breached the Partnership Agreement by breaching the non-competition
clause found therein, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:
2.

$25,420,000

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:
3.

$25,420,000

As to the claims ofMRl Center and MRI Mobile that Saint Alphonsus intentionally

interfered with their prospective contractual relations, the following damages are awarded
in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,125,070
MRI Center: $20,662,566
MRI Mobile: $17,879,973
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:
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4.

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary

duty owed to the MRI Entities, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:

$25,420,000

Disgorgement:
MRIA:
5.

$21,358,838

As to the claim of the MRI entities that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil

conspiracy, the following damages are awarded:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,125,070
MRI Center: $20,662,566
MRI Mobile: $17,879,973
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:

$20,336,000

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amount executed upon by the MRI entities will
bear interest at the judgment rate of 5.375% per annum until paid in full.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Saint Alphonsus is awarded $4,600,000 against MRI
Associates, bearing interest at the judgment rate of 10% per annum, calculated from September
21, 2007, until paid in full.
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Clerk of the District

By

Amended Judgment 4

004707

~~-:

;i

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 1\:PA

MAy O0

1~~

.,,.,

·HI·
,
·

'•C

)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership,
)
)
)
Defendant.
)
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Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT

___________________________ )
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED, an Idaho )
limited partnership; MRI MOBILE LIMITED, )
an Idaho limited partnership,
)
)
)
Counter-claimants,
)
)
vs.
)
)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,)
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)
Counter-defendants.
)

____________________________ )
This action having come for jury trial, and the issues having been duly tried and a verdict

having been rendered by the jury on October 31, 2011, IT IS SO ORDERED THAT MRI
Associates, LLP (MRIA), MRI Limited (MRI Center), and MRI Mobile Limited (MRI Mobile)
(collectively MRI Entities) may execute on any one of the following alternatives:
1.

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care (SADC)
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and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (SARMC) (collectively "Saint
Alphonsus") breached the Partnership Agreement by breaching the non-competition
clause found therein, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
MRl Center: $25,828,208
MRl Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRl Center:
2.

$25,420,000

As to the claims of the MRl Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
MRl Center: $25,828,208
MRl Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRl Center:
3.

$25,420,000

As to the claims ofMRl Center and MRI Mobile that Saint Alphonsus intentionally

interfered with their prospective contractual relations, the following damages are awarded
in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRI Center: $22,337,910
MRI Mobile: $19,329,701
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:

$20,336,000
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4.

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary

duty owed to the MRI Entities, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967

Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center: $25,420,000
Disgorgement:
MRIA:

5.

$21,358,838

As to the claim of the MRI entities that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil

conspiracy, the following damages are awarded:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,125,070
MRI Center: $20,662,566
MRI Mobile: $17,879,973

Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:

$20,336,000

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amount executed upon by the MRI entities will
bear interest at the judgment rate of 5.375% per annum until paid in full.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Saint Alphonsus is awarded $4,600,000 against MRI
Associates, bearing interest at the judgment rate of 10% per annum, calculated from September
21, 2007, until paid in full.
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DATED this 2•,1day ofMay, 2012.
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Amended Judgment 4

004711

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT MAY

l.Ef2012

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ~TOPHER o. RICH, Clerk
By DIANE OATMAN
Otpuly

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219

)

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

)
)
)
)

ORDER RE: COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES

)
)

Defendant.

)

___________________________ )
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
)
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
)
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership;)
and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho
)
limited partnership,
)
)

Counterclaimants,

)
)

vs.

)
)

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER,

)
)
)
)
)

Counter-defendants.

)

___________________________ )
Presently before the Court is the MRI Entities' Petition for Attorney Fees and Saint
Alphonsus's Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs.

The Court held hearing on the

afternoon of March 23, 2012, and took the matter under advisement as of 9:00AM March 26,
2012. The Court now issues the following opinion.
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BACKGROUND
On January 26, 2008, the Honorable Judge McLaughlin entered judgment in this case in
favor of MRI Associates. Judge McLaughlin subsequently awarded costs and fees to MRIA,
including discretionary costs for copying, but excluding fees associated with MRIA's dismissed
claims for spoliation, anti-trust violations, trade secret misappropriation, and conversion. Saint
Alphonsus successfully appealed, and this case was remanded for a second trial.
Prior to the second trial, this Court dismissed MRI Associates', MRI Center's, and MRI
Mobile's (collectively ''the MRI Entities") wrongful dissociation theories, both statutory and
common law. Furthermore, the Court determined, over the MRI Entities' objections, that the
Supreme Court's decision on appeal had changed the underlying assumptions relating to damages
in the case, including the underlying theories that could be pursued and the apportionment of
damages among the MRI Entities, and that this required that discovery be reopened. At trial,
both parties presented revised damages theories, with Saint Alphonsus using an entirely new
expert with a differing damages analysis and the MRI Entities using the same experts they used
during the first trial. Following two months of trial, on October 31, 2011, the jury rendered a
verdict in favor of the MRI Entities following the second trial of this case, awarding
approximately $50,000,000 in damages. The MRI Entities now petition this Court for attorney
fees and costs, and Saint Alphonsus moves this Court to disallow the award of attorney fees and
costs in part.
DISCUSSION
Saint Alphonsus moves this Court: 1) to disallow entirely certain parts of the MRI
Entities' requests for attorney fees and costs; 2) award less than what is requested by the MRI
Entities due to counsel's excessive hourly rate; and 3) to disallow costs beyond the caps provided
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for in the Rules of Civil Procedure.

I.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OBJECTIONS TO PORTIONS OF REQUESTED FEES
In Idaho, attorney fees and costs may be awarded to the prevailing party in lawsuits arising

from commercial transactions. I.C. § 12-120(3). The Court notes that this action has already been
determined to involve a "commercial transaction" within the meaning of section 12-120, Idaho
Code. Memorandum Decision, Nov. 19,2007, at p. 23. The guidance for determining the
prevailing party issue is supplied by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(2) which provides that:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part
and did not prevail in part, and upon so fmding may apportion the costs between
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained.
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(2). The determination of who prevailed is committed to the discretion of the trial
court. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538,224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010). Because the MRI
Entities succeeded on every claim presented to the jury and received most of the money it claimed as
damages, this Court finds that the MRI Entities are clearly the prevailing parties as contemplated by
the rule.
Once the Court has determined that a party has prevailed, to determine the amount of the
attorney fees to be awarded, the Court must consider:
(A) The time and labor required.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience
and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law.
(D) The prevailing charges for like work.
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case.
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained.
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(H) The undesirability of the case.
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(J) Awards in similar cases.
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal
Research), if the court finds that it was reasonably necessary in preparing a
party's case.
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case.
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).
The Court has discretion to decide what constitutes a reasonable fee and is to be guided by
the above criteria. Sanders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823 (Ct. App. 2000). No one factor
should be given more weight than the others. Electric. Wholesale Supply Co. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho
814, 827, 41 P.3d 242, 255 (2001). "Rule 54(e)(3) does not require the district court to make specific
findings in the record, only to consider the stated factors in determining the amount of the fees.
When considering the factors, courts need not demonstrate how they employed any of those factors
in reaching an award amounC' Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 749, 185 P.3d 258, 261
(2008).
Saint Alphonus argues that various portions of the MRI Entities' fees petition must be
denied based on Judge McLaughlin's rulings in the prior proceedings. Judge McLaughlin ruled
that MRIA (then, just MRIA was party to the suit) may only recover "attorney fees relating to the
claims that MRIA ultimately prevailed on at trial," and disallowed MRIA from recovering fees
and costs on claims that were dismissed prior to trial. Memorandum Decision, Nov. 19, 2007, at
p. 23-25. Furthermore, the Court notes that Judge McLaughlin's ruling does find a basis in Idaho
law. See, e.g., Burns v. County of Boundary, 120 Idaho 623, 626, 818 P.2d 327, 330 (Ct. App.
1990). Since Judge McLaughlin's decision was not error, and was not appealed! the Court finds

1

Saint Alphonsus does mention that as part of the relief requested from the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
should award attorney fees to Saint Alphonsus. This does not constitute an appeal from Judge McLaughlin's award
of attorney fees.
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that it remains law of the case binding on this Court as to this issue.
Saint Alphonsus argues that Judge McLaughlin's ruling requires the MRI Entities to
excise from their claim of fees and costs any claim based on an issue on which they did not
prevail. Specifically, Saint Alphonsus argues that any fees related to wrongful dissociation must
be excised. The Court disagrees with such a broad reading of Judge McLaughlin's ruling.
In Burns v. County of Boundary, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision to award costs and fees on the plaintiff's claim for equitable relief, which he obtained,
but not on his claim for damages, for which he obtained only a nominal amount. !d. In deciding
the case, the Court of Appeals distinguished between theories, which are "different ways to
obtain one specific recovery," and claims, which are the "specific recovery." Id The Court of
Appeals ultimately held that an attorney fees award should not be "based upon individual
prevailing theories," but may properly be based on separate prevailing claims. Id. Thus, whether
a particular portion should be excised from the total attorney fees sought by the MRI Entities
turns on whether the portion is related to a "claim" or a "theory" - that is, whether the portion is
related to a legal hook to obtain a specific recovery, or whether it is based on an entirely different
set of facts from the prevailing theories.
The Court finds that wrongful dissociation is a theory, not a claim, and thus attorney fees
related to pursuing it are awardable. The fact that the jury at the second trial awarded damages
on different theories from the jury in the first trial does not change the fact that the MRI Entities
prevailed in their claim. In Judge McLaughlin's November 19, 2007, Memorandum decision, he
ordered billings related to antitrust claims, trade secret misappropriation, spoliation, and
conversion excised from MRIA' s claim for attorney fees. Each of these claims was separately
pled and sought separate damages from any claim that ultimately prevailed at trial. See Second
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Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party Complaint, at pp. 30-38. The claims
Judge McLaughlin ordered excised are distinguishable from the theory of wrongful dissociation,
which has always been pled alongside breach of contract, seeking the same damages as several
other theories. Compare Second Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint with Third
Amended Counterclaim. Thus, wrongful dissociation is a theory that may not be excised from
the MRI Entities' claimed attorney fees.
A. Appellate Costs and Fees
Saint Alphonsus argues that the MRI Entities are not entitled to fees and costs related to
the appeal to the Supreme Court following the first trial of this case. At the outset, the Court
notes that the MRI Entities are not seeking costs on appeal, and thus none will be awarded.
However, Saint Alphonsus specifically argues that the MRI Entities are not entitled to appellate
costs and fees because the Supreme Court found in its favor on the issues of: 1) wrongful
diss'ociation; 2) MRIA's claim for damages after 2015; 3) the purchase price damages theory; 4)
MRIA's standing to recover for Center and Mobile; 5) MRIA's cross appeals on its anti-trust
claims and punitive damages claims; and 6) the award of appellate costs.
As stated above, the MRI Entities' attorney fees claim relating to its wrongful
dissociation theory should not be excised. Furthermore, the Court finds that the appellate fees
related to MRIA's claim for damages after 2015, the purchase price theory of damages, MRIA's
standing to recover for Center and Mobile should not be excised from the MRI Entities' petition
for attorney fees.
However, billings related to MRIA's cross appeals and the Supreme Court's award of
costs must be excised. Clearly, on appeal, the MRI Entities did not prevail. It would be unjust,
therefore, to award fees and costs to the MRI Entities for their cross appeal, as Saint Alphonsus
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prevailed on these issues.
B. Post-Appeal Costs and Fees
Saint Alphonsus argues that the MRI Entities are not entitled to post-appeal costs and fees
related to their wrongful dissociation theories and revisiting Saint Alphonsus's departing
partner's share. As explained above the wrongful dissociation theories, whatever, clothes they
wear-statutory or common law-are theories that need not be excised from the MRI Entities
petition for fees and costs. However, the Court agrees that the MRI Entities did not prevail on its
claim regarding Saint Alphonsus's departing partner's share. Thus, the MRI Entities will need to
excise their post-appeal costs and fees claims relating to Saint Alphonsus's departing partner's
share.
C. First-Trial Costs and Fees
Saint Alphonsus argues that the Court should not reinstate Judge McLaughlin's ruling
regarding attorney fees and costs from the first trial.

The Court finds this position wholly

inconsistent with Saint Alphonsus's other arguments on fees and costs, which rely so heavily on
Judge McLaughlin's rulings. This Court will reinstate Judge McLauglin's prior award of costs
and fees because nothing in the changed posture of this case require it to be revisited.
Saint Alphonsus argues that Judge McLaughlin's award should be vacated because it was
premised on 1) wrongful dissociation, 2) the purchase price theory, and 3) the damages sought
after 2015, being valid claims. As explained above, those purported "claims" are theories, and
consequently, the costs and fees associated with them do not need to be excised from the MRI
Entities' costs and fees petition. Thus, the Court will reinstate Judge McLaughlin's prior award
of attorney fees in its entirety.
D. Fees Unrelated to the Prosecution of the Case
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Saint Alphonsus objects to several billings being awarded to the MRI Entities as
unrelated to the prosecution of this case. Specifically, Saint Alphonsus objects to:
1. Entries that were not charged to the client
2. Billings for Bob Burton's estate
3. Billings for Blue Cross accreditation
4. Billings related o MRI Center's call center
5. Billings related to MRIA' s attempts to avoid paying the appellate costs judgment
Saint Alphonsus further objects to billings related to "billing issues" and "public relations" as
barred by the law of the case.
As to the first issue, this Court will not bar the recovery of attorney fees simply because
the client was not billed. Counsel for the MRI Entities had a contingency fee arrangement with
their client, thus a great deal of the work they performed was not billed to the client.
As to the issues of the billings related to Bob Burton's estate, Blue Cross accreditation,
and the MRI Center call center, the .MRI Entities have withdrawn those requests for fees. Thus,
the Court will not award fees for those items.
As to the issue of fees for attempting to avoid payment of the costs on appeal, the Court
finds that those fee requests are related to the prosecution of this case, but are related to a claim
on which MRIA ultimately did not prevail. Thus the MRI Entities must excise those billings
from their petition.

II.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OBJECTION TO COUNSEL'S HOURLY RATE
Saint Alphonsus argues that the hourly rates claimed by the MRI Entities counsel are

excessive in light of the prevailing rates in Boise, Idaho. While the Court agrees that the MRI
Entities' counsel charged a higher rate than other, similarly situated attorneys in Boise, the rate is
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not excessive in this case. As stated above, the Court must consider eleven different factors in
determining an appropriate attorney fee award.

See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Aside from "[t]he

prevailing charges for like work," the court must also consider, among other things, "[t]he
novelty and difficulty of the questions ... , [w]hether the fee is fixed or contingent ... , [t]he
amount involved and the results obtained ...." Id
This case was an extremely complicated and labor-intensive case that was taken on
contingency by the MRI Entities' counsel on the second trial.

The case involved an enormous

amount of money in controversy, most of which was ultimately awarded to the MRI Entities. In
spite of the fact that the prevailing rate in Boise may be lower than what is claimed by the MRI
Entities' counsel, the Court finds it reasonable due to the enormous risk taken by counsel in
taking such a labor-intensive case on contingency. The MRI Entities' counsel's hourly rate is
reasonable and far less than the a contingency fee would amount to on such a substantial award
of damages. Thus, the Court will not reduce the MRI Entities' claimed attorney fees because the
claimed hourly rate is excessive.

III.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OBJECTION TO THE MRI ENTITIES' REQUESTED
DISCRETIONARY COSTS
In addition to attorney fees, the court may award costs to the prevailing party. I.R.C.P.

54(d)(l )(C) provides a list of costs that a prevailing party may recover as a matter of right as
follows:
1. Court filing fees.
2. Actual fees for service of any pleading or document in the action whether served
by a public officer or other person.
3. Witness fees of$20.00 per day for each day in which a witness, other than a party
or expert, testifies at a deposition or in the trial of an action.
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4. Travel expenses of witnesses who travel by private transportation, other than a
party, who testify in the trial of an action, computed at the rate of $.30 mile, one
way, from the place of residence, whether it be within or without the state of
Idaho; travel expenses of witnesses who travel other than by private
transportation, other than a party, computed as the actual travel expense of the
witness not to exceed $.30 per mile, one way, from the place of residence of the
witness, whether it be within or without the state of Idaho.
5. Expenses or charges of certified copies of documents admitted as evidence in a
hearing or the trial of an action.
6. Reasonable costs of the preparation of models, maps, pictures, photographs, or
other exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits in a hearing or trial of an action,
but not to exceed the sum of $500 for all such exhibits of each party.
7. Costs of all bond premiums.
8. Reasonable expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a deposition or at a
trial of an action not to exceed the sum of $2,000 for each expert witness for all
appearances.
9. Charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in preparation for
trial of an action, whether or not read into evidence in the trial of an action.
10. Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition taken by any of the parties to the
action in preparation for trial of the action.
Notwithstanding the determination that a particular party is entitled to costs as a
matter of right under this subparagraph (C) in an action, the trial court in its sound
discretion may, upon proper objection, disallow any of the above described costs
upon a finding that said costs were not reasonably incurred; were incurred for the
purpose of harassment; were incurred in bad faith; or were incurred for the purpose
of increasing the costs to any other party. The mere fact that a deposition is not used
in the trial of an action, either as evidence read into the record or for the purposes of
impeachment, shall not indicate that the taking of such deposition was not
reasonable, or that a copy of a deposition was not reasonably obtained, or that the
cost of the deposition should otherwise be disallowed, so long as its taking was
reasonable in the preparation for trial in the action.
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C).
In addition to costs as a matter of right, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) provides for the award of
discretionary costs as follows:
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Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that
listed in [I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l(C)], may be allowed upon a showing that said costs
were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the
interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling
upon objections to such discretionary costs contained in the memorandum of
costs, shall make express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary
cost should or should not be allowed. In the absence of any objection to such an
item of discretionary costs, the court may disallow on its own motion any such
items of discretionary costs and shall make express findings supporting such
disallowance.
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). The decision to award discretionary costs is committed to the discretion ofthe
trial court and the decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. See, e .g., Fish v.
Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 493, 960 P.2d 175, 176 (1998)
However, as the rule provides, the trial court will only award discretionary costs if the
prevailing party showed that they were necessary, reasonably incurred, exceptional, and assessable
against the adverse party in the interests of justice. !nama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 384, 973 P.2d
148, 155 (1999). The prevailing party has the initial burden to make an adequate showing that such
costs are necessary and reasonably incurred, exceptional and that the award of such costs would be
in the interest of justice. Beco Const. Co., Inc. v. Harper Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 11, 936
P.2d 202, 209 (Ct. App. 1997). In making its determination, the trial court is not required to evaluate
costs item by item, but instead may make express findings with regard to the general character of the
requested costs. !nama, 132 Idaho at 384, 973 P.2d at 155.
At the outset Saint Alphonsus objects to the MRI Entities' fees petition as lacking the
necessary specificity to award any costs beyond the costs as a matter of right. Specifically, Saint
Alphonsus argues that the MRI Entities have not made an adequate showing to justify an award
of costs beyond the costs as a matter of right because the MRI Entities did not argue each
expense. However, discretionary costs may be awarded where ''the nature of the case was itself
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exceptional." Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,314, 109 P.3d
161, 168 (2005). Thus, a party seeking costs need only make a showing sufficient for the Court
to find that the case itself was exceptional.
The Court finds that this case was itself exceptional. This was a factually complex case
that involved thousands of documents and several experts. It was also a legally complex case
that involved numerous filings with this Court, many concerning issues of first impression in this
state, including the interpretation of a newly enacted partnership act. Furthermore, there was a
great deal at stake-with a claim of $70,000,000 and an award of approximately $50,000,000.
However, the Court's finding does not give it carte blanche to award any amount of claimed
costs. Thus, the Court will examine each of Saint Alphonsus' s objections in the context of the
exceptional nature of this case.
A. Copying Charges
Saint Alphonsus argues that the copying charges sought by the MRI Entities should be
disallowed beyond the "as a matter of right" cap of $500 because they are not necessary,
exceptional, or awardable in the interest of justice. However, the copying charges in this case
have already been found by Judge McLaughlin to be awardable as necessary, exceptional, and
awardable in the interest of justice. The Court finds that Judge McLaughlin's decision was
correct-this was an exceptionally document-intensive case. Thus, this Court will award the
MRI Entities' claimed copying charges in the amount claimed.
B. "Miscellaneous Fees"
Saint Alphonsus objects to the MRI Entities' claim of costs for moving file boxes from
storage and to court, and the MRI Entities' claim of costs for two mock juries. The Court cannot
find that the moving of file boxes is exceptional. Furthermore, the Court cannot find that the use
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of mock juries is necessary or awardable in the interest of justice. Thus, the Court will not award
the costs for the mock juries or the moving of boxes of documents in and out of storage.
C. Federal Express Charges
Saint Alphonsus objects to the inclusion of a request for Federal Express charges, which
were incurred by the MRI Entities in sending documents too large to be emailed to their experts.
Given the enormous volume of documents in this case, which necessitated the use of Federal
Express to send the documents, the Court finds the Federal Express charges to be exceptional,
necessary, and reasonably incurred. Thus, the Court will award the Federal Express charges.
D. Meal Expenses
Saint Alphonsus objects to the MRI Entities' claims for meal expenses, many of which
were for the mock juries. As stated above, the Court finds that the mock juries were not
necessary under the rule (though they might well have been helpful to counsel for the MRI
Entities), and thus their meal expenses must be removed. Furthermore, the Court cannot find that
the meal expenses for attorney-client meetings are exceptional expenses. The Court will not
award meal expenses.
E. Parking
Similar to the meals claimed by the MRI Entities, parking during trial is not an
exceptional cost. The Court will not award the MRI Entities' claim for parking costs.
F. Witness Location
Saint Alphonsus objects to the cost of using a paid online service to find third-party
witnesses who needed to be subpoenaed. The Court finds nothing exceptional about having to
fmd and serve third-party witnesses. Thus, the Court will not award the MRI Entities' claim for
locating third-party witnesses.
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G. Travel
Saint Alphonsus objects to the request for travel costs associated with deposing the
experts in this case. The Court notes that neither party found an expert in Idaho to be suitable to
testify in this case. Furthermore, the Court finds that the hiring of out-of-state experts was
reasonable in this case. Since the hiring of out-of-state experts was reasonable, so too is the
award of travel costs to depose those experts. Thus, the Court will award travel costs to the MRI
Entities.
H. Westlaw Charges
Saint Alphonsus objects to the award ofWestlaw charges to the MRI Entities. The Court
notes that computer assisted legal research is not recoverable as a cost, but is provided for as a
portion of attorney fees. See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(K). Furthermore, the Court finds that, just as a
firm may not pass on the depreciation of its books as part of an attorney fees award, a law firm
may not recover for its use of a legal database without some showing beyond that the database
was used. However, given the unusually complex nature of this case-the fact that it involved
several issues of first impression in Idaho, thus requiring research in databases beyond Idahothe Court will award the Westlaw charges as attorney fees in this case, finding them reasonable
and necessary in this case.
I. Expert Fees
Saint Alphonsus objects to the MRI Entities' claim of witness fees. Generally, Saint
Alphonsus argues that the fees here are not awardable because there is nothing exceptional about
the use of financial experts in a lost-profits case. Specifically, it objects to any award relating to
the MRI Entities' expert Grant Thornton LLP, because no one from that firm testified, and to Dr.
Robert Bell because his testimony was not necessary.
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The Court agrees as to Grant Thornton, LLP. The rules specifically provide for an award
of costs for an expert who testifies. No one from Grant Thornton, LLP testified in this case, and
thus the Court cannot award costs relating to Grant Thornton, LLP.
As to Dr. Bell's testimony related to the operation of MRI machines, testimony from
Saint Alphonsus's witnesses put at issue the operation of the MRI Entities' machines. Claims
were made that the scans produced by the MRI Entities were somehow substandard. Thus it was
proper for the MRI Entities to counter this by explaining the machines and the certification
process. Thus, the Court will allow the costs as a matter of right as to Dr. Bell.
The Court also disagrees with Saint Alphonsus as to the remaining expert witness fees.
Saint Alphonsus's argument-that the use of financial experts in a lost-profits case is not
exceptional-is specious. In any case where an expert is necessary, an advocate can narrowly
define the nature of the case to argue that the use of an expert is not exceptional-for example,
an accident reconstructionist is not exceptional in auto accident cases with no witnesses--or
broadly define the nature of the case to argue that the use of the expert is exceptional-the use of
an accident reconstructionist may be exceptional in a negligence/personal injury case. However,
in this case, a breach of contract/breach of fiduciary duty case, with complicated lost profits
damages being argued by both sides, the Court finds that the complexity of the case made the use
of the remaining experts both necessary and exceptional. Furthermore, as it was Saint Alphonsus
that sought, over the objections of the MRI Entities, to reopen discovery on retrial and
subsequently call a new expert with a damages theory significantly at odds with Saint
Alphonsus's position on damages in the first trial, the Court finds that it is just to award the
expert witness fees to the MRI Entities. Thus, the Court will award expert witness fees for
Messrs. Budge and Willhoite.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the MRI Entities are hereby ordered to submit a new affidavit
of fees and costs that excludes:
1. Billings related to MRIA' s cross appeal;
2. Billings related to MRIA's challenge to appellate costs;
3. Costs and fees relating to the MRI Entities' challenge to the award of the departing
partner's share;
4. Billings related to Bob Burton's estate, Blue Cross Accreditation, and the MRI Center
call center;
5. Billings related avoiding payment of appellate costs;
6. The cost of storing and moving boxes of documents;
7. The cost of the mock juries, including their meals;
8. The claimed cost of meals;
9. The cost of parking;
10. The costs ofthe witness location service;
11. Costs relating to Grant Thornton, LLP; and
12. Discretionary costs relating to Dr. Robert Bell.
The MRI Entities have fourteen (14) days to submit a new petition. Saint Alphonsus has
fourteen (14) days following the MRI Entities' new submission to object to any line item it views
as a violation of this order. Though the Court is requesting a new submission of documentation,
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COME NOW MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited
and hereby move this Court for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
60(a). Specifically, MRIA asks this Court to correct the "oversight or omission" of not setting
off the judgments between it and Saint Alphonsus, as per Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b ).
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support filed concurrently herewith.
DATED this 22nd day of May 2012.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC
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Partnership, and MRJ Mobile Limited Partnership
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MRl Associates, LLP, MRl Limited Partnership and MR1 Mobile Limited hereby file this
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Relief Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
60(a). Specifically, MRJA asks this Court to correct the "oversight or omission" of not setting
off the judgments between it and Saint Alphonsus, as per Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b ).
Rule 60(a) states that "clerical mistakes in judgments ... and errors stated therein arising
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on
the motion of any party...." In this case, such a mistake has occurred. In specific, Rule 54(b)
states that "[i]f any parties to an action are entitled to judgments against each other such as on a
claim and counterclaim, or upon cross-claims, such judgments shall be offset against each other
and a single judgment for the difference between the entitlements shall be entered in favor of the
party entitled to the larger judgment." In the Second Amended Judgment, which is attached
hereto as Appendix A, this Court awarded two judgments related to the relationship between
MRl Associates alone (i.e., not including MRl Mobile and MRl Center) and Saint Alphonsus. In
particular, it awarded: (1) $3.9MM in favor ofMRIA against Saint Alphonsus; and (2) Saint
Alphonsus's departing share against MRlA. See Appendix A. According to Rule 54(b), then,
these two amounts should have been "offset against each other and a single judgment for the
difference" should have been entered. See Rule 54(b).
This error of omission constitutes an error that can be remedied by Rule 60(a). The
difference between mistakes that can be cured by Rule 60(a) and those that cannot "is that the
former consist of 'blunders in execution' whereas the latter consist of instances where the court
changes its mind, either because it made a legal or factual mistake in making its original
determination, or because on second thought it has decided to exercise its discretion in a manner
different from the way it was exercised in the original determination." Silsby v. Kepner, 140
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Idaho 410, 412, 95 P.3d 28, 30 (2004) (emphasis in original). In this Motion, MRIA is not
asking this Court to "change its mind" in any manner 1-the amounts of the judgments will stay
the same and what the parties owe each other will not change. It is simply asking the Court to
follow Rule 54(b)' s requirement to take those two amounts and set them off against one another.
This is a simple ministerial and mathematical computation which does not require the Court to
"exercise its discretion" in any legal manner. 2
Alternatively, in the unlikely event that this Court finds that this is not an error that can
be corrected as per Rule 60(a), MRIA respectfully requests that this Court do so pursuant to Rule
60(b), which allows this Court, among other things, to amend its judgment for any "reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Again, the amounts are required by rule to
be set off against one another, which would seem sufficient enough reason "justifying relief."
DATED this 22nd day of May 2012.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~13nr~-

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

1

Obviously, this statement is limited solely to the arguments in the Motion. MRIA makes this argument without
waiver of any arguments it may have on appeal as to the propriety or amount ofthe departing partner share.
2

The math here is as simple as taking the departing partnership share of$4.6MM, adding the interest rate this Court
has already determined of 10% from September 2007 until January 2012 (the date of the offsetting judgment) and
subtracting MRIA's $3.9MM.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22nd day of May 2012, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
ty(acsimile

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for P laintiff/Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 O~rnight Delivery
q)'acsimile

Brent Bastian
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

·
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
)
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, )
)

Plaintiff,

)

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219

)

vs.

)
)

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

)
)

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT

)
)

Defendant.
)
___________________________
)

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP ., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED, an Idaho )
limited partnership; MRI MOBILE LIMITED, )
an Idaho limited partnership,
)
)
)

Counter-claimants,

)
)

ft.

)

)

SAINT ALPHO:NSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,)
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)

Counter-defendants.
)
___________________________
)
This action having come for jury trial, and the issues having been duly tried and a verdict
having been rendered by the jury on October 31, 2011, IT IS SO ORDERED THAT MRI
Associates, LLP (MRIA), MRI Limited (MRI Center), and MRI Mobile Limited {MRI Mobile)
(collectively MRI Entities) may execute on any one of the following alternatives:
1.

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care (SADC)

Amended Judgment 1

/
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and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (SARMC) (collectively "Saint
Alphonsus") breached the Partnership Agreement by breaching the non-competition
clause found therein, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:

MRJA:

$3,906,338
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967

Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center: $25,420,000
2.

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached the covenant of

good faith atid fair dealing, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center: $25,420,000
3.

As to the claims ofMRI Center and MRI Mobile that Saint Alphonsus intentionally

interfered with their prospective contractual relations, the following damages are awarded
in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRI Center: $22,337,910
MRI Mobile: $19,329,701
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center: $20,336,000

Amended Judgment 2
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4.

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary.

duty owed to the MRI Entities, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:

MRIA:
$3,906,338
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center: $25,420,000
Disgorgement:
MRIA:

5.

$21 ,3 58,83 8

As to the claim of the MRI entities that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil

conspiracy, the following damages are awarded:
Lost Profit Damages:
$3,125,070
MRIA:
MRI Center: $20,662,566
MRI Mobile: $17,879,973
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center: $20,336,000
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amount executed upon by the MRI entities will
bear interest at the judgment rate of 5.375% per annum until paid in full.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Saint Alphonsus is awarded $4,600,000 against MRI
Associates, bearing interest at the judgment rate of 10% per annum, calculated from September
21, 2007, until paid in full.

Amended Judgment 3

004739

"'

1

'

..

DATED

tbis2• 1day ofMay, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILr.NG

L

I hereby certify that on this ~ day of May, 2012, I mailed
(served) a true and correct copy of the within instrument to:
JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
PO BOX 2837
BOISE, ID 83701
DONALD AYER
JONES DAY
51 LOUSIANA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST., STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
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NO.=----,~~...,.._..
~'Leo 2
A.M. _ _ _ _P.M.

ORIG\NAL

...,xS(p =

MAY 2 4 2012

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)

By JERI HEATON

wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

DEPUTY

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE
,.
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
V.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

MRIA'S AMENDED MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
PURSUANT TO RULE 60(a) OR
RULE 60(b)

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

j

MRIA'S AMENDED MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ruDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 60(a) OR 60(b)- I
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MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited hereby amends
its Motion for Relief Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) that was filed on May 22,
2012. Specifically, MRIA asks this Court to correct the "oversight or omission" of not setting
off the judgments between it and Saint Alphonsus, as per Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
This amended motion asks this Court to instead make this correction as to the highest
judgment in favor ofMRIA ($21,358,838), so that a true set off between these parties' judgments
can be completed.
This amended Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Amended Motion
for Relief filed concurrently herewith.
DATED this 24th day of May 2012.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 24th day of May 2012, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff!Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff!Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 Qvemight Delivery
M'acsimile

0 Hand Delivery
0 07emight Delivery
ij.Facsimile

/

~JSc.'b~Brent Bastian
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A.M. _ _ _ _F_IL;,~.

ORIGINAL

Wl

MAY 2 4 2012

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)

CHRJSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com

By JERI HEATON
DEPUTY

WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF :r'HE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
V.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MRIA'S AMENDED MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
PURSUANT TO RULE 60(a) OR
RULE 60(b)

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
RULE 60(a) OR 60(b)- 1
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MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited hereby file this
Memorandum in Support of its Amended Motion for Relief Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(a). Specifically, MRIA asks this Court to correct the "oversight or omission" of
not setting off the judgments between it and Saint Alphonsus, as per Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b).
On May 22, 2012, MRIA filed a Rule 60(a) or, alternatively, a 60(b) motion, asking this
Court to amend the judgment to correct an error related to Rule 54(b). That motion, however,
asked for this correction as to a lesser judgment in favor ofMRIA ($3.9MM). This amended
motion asks for this Court to instead make this correction as to the highest judgment in favor of
MRIA ($21,358,838), so that a true setoff between these parties' judgments can be completed.

A. Rule 60(a) allows this Court to amend its judgment.
Rule 60(a) states that "clerical mistakes in judgments ... and errors stated therein arising
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on
the motion of any party .... " In this case, such a mistake has occurred. In specific, Rule 54(b)
states that "[i]f any parties to an action are entitled to judgments against each other such as on a
claim and counterclaim, or upon cross-claims, such judgments shall be offset against each other
and a single judgment for the difference between the entitlements shall be entered in favor of the
party entitled to the larger judgment." In the Second Amended Judgment, which is attached
hereto as Appendix A, this Court awarded a judgment to MRI Associates alone (i.e., not
including MRI Mobile and MRI Center). In particular, it awarded $21,358,838 in favor of
MRIA against Saint Alphonsus. See Appendix A. In return, this Court also awarded Saint
Alphonsus's departing share against MRIA in the amount of$4.6MM, plus interest. See id.
According to Rule 54(b), then, the amounts due to MRIA and Saint Alphonsus in these claims

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
RULE 60(a) OR 60(b)- 2
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against one another should have been "offset against each other and a single judgment for the
difference" should have been entered. See Rule 54(b).
This error of omission constitutes an error that can be remedied by Rule 60(a). The
difference between mistakes that can be cured by Rule 60(a) and those that cannot "is that the
former consist of 'blunders in execution' whereas the latter consist of instances where the court
changes its mind, either because it made a legal or factual mistake in making its original

determination, or because on second thought it has decided to exercise its discretion in a manner
different from the way it was exercised in the original determination." Silsby v. Kepner, 140
Idaho 410, 412, 95 P.3d 28, 30 (2004) (emphasis in original). In this Motion, MRIA is not
asking this Court to "change its mind" in any manner 1-the amounts of the respective judgments
will stay the same and what the parties owe each other will not change. It is simply asking the
Court to follow Rule 54(b)' s requirement to set off Saint Alphonsus departing partner share
against MRIA against the $21 MM judgment in favor of MRIA. This is a simple ministerial and
mathematical computation which does not require the Court to "exercise its discretion" in any
legal manner.

B. Alternatively, Rule 60(b) allows this Court to amend its judgment.
Alternatively, in the unlikely event that this Court finds that this is not an error that can
be corrected as per Rule 60(a), MRIA respectfully requests that this Court do so pursuant to Rule
60(b), which allows this Court, among other things, to amend its judgment for any "reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Again, the amounts are required by rule to
be set off against one another, which would seem sufficient enough reason "justifying relief."

1

Obviously, this statement is limited solely to the arguments in the Motion. MRIA makes this argument without
waiver of any arguments it may have on appeal as to the propriety or amount ofthe departing partner share.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
RULE 60(a) OR 60(b)- 3
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C. Rationale behind filing this Motion.

So that the record is clear, MRIA files this amended motion because it is confused as to
how much of a bond to post for the appeal of this matter, if any. Saint Alphonsus has indicated
in no uncertain terms that it will require a bond of MRIA during the appeal, even though MRIA
has indicated that it would not require one from Saint Alphonsus if it could show MRIA proof of
ability to pay. See the correspondence attached hereto at Appendix B. As a result of this
correspondence, MRIA has explored how much of a bond it should obtain, but given that the
$21MM it obtained from Saint Alphonsus in the Second Amended Judgment far outstrips the
$4MMjudgment for Saint Alphonsus's departing partner share, MRIA does not believe it should
have to post any bond, since Rule 54(b) states that these two amounts should have been offset to
begin with. MRIA accordingly asks the Court to use either Rule 60(a) or 60(b) and do so now.
Moreover, in filing this Motion, MRIA makes clear that neither it nor Mobile or Center
are making any election of remedies; these entities fully intend to defend all of the multiple
judgments in their favor, should they be appealed, and will collect on the judgment in the highest
amount left at the end of the appeal, if any. Instead, MRIA is simply asking the Court to correct
its mathematical mistake and follow the mandatory language of Rule 54(b).
DATED this 24th day of May 2012.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 24th day of May 2012, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintifflCounterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 ~emight Delivery
191'acsimile

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintifflCounterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 ,0vemight Delivery
~Facsimile

~t ~t;.-..__k_,
Brent Bastian
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDIC~L DISTRICT

MAY (j 2 lOll

OF THE STATE OF IDAHOt IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF A'P.A .... ~Hr--·

···! •· • 0. ~301i C'b...o.
'•: '··. ··~ OA'i"M , •otfl;
~·;;<!r"
AN

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFffiD
)
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, )
)

Plaintiff,

)

Case No.

CV-OC~2004-08219

)

vs.

)
)
MRl ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership,
)

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT

)
)

Defendant.

)

---------------------~-----)
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED, an Idaho )
limited partnership; M1U MOBILE LIMITED,)
an Idaho limited partnership,
)
)
)

Counter-claimants,

)
)
vs.
)
)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,)
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)
Counter-defendants.
)

___________________________ )
This action having come for jury trial, and the issues having been duly tried and a verdict

having been rendered by the jury on October 31, 2011, IT IS SO ORDERED THAT MR1
Associates, LLP (MRIA), MRI Limited (MRI Center), and MRI Mobile Limited (MRI Mobile)
(collectively MRI Entities) may execute on any one of the following alternatives:
1.

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care (SADC)
004750

and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (SARMC) (collectively "Saint
Alphonsus") breached the Partnership Agreement by breaching the non-competition
clause found therein, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit pamages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRl Center: $25A20,000

2.

As to the claims of the :MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached the covenant of

good faith

and fair dealing, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:

Lost Profit Damages:
$3,906,338
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967

MRJA:

Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center: $25,420,000
3.

As to the claims ofMRI Center and MRI Mobile that Saint Alphonsus intentionally

interfered with their prospective contractual relations, the following damages are awarded
in the alternative:

Lost Profit Damages:

MRI Center: $22,337,910
MRI Mobile: $19,329,701
Lost Value Damages:

MRI Center: $20,336,000

Amended'Judgment 2
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4.

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary.

duty owed to the MRI Entities, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MR.IA!
$3~906,338
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967

Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center: $25A20,000

Disgorgement:
MRIA:

5.

$21,358,838

As to the claim of the MRl entities 1hat Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil

conspiracy, the following damages are awarded:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,125,070
MRI Center: $20,662,566
lMRI Mobile: $17,879,973
Lost Value Damages:

MRI Center: $20,336,000
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amount executed upon by the MRl entities will
bear interest at the judgment rate of 5.37 5% per annum until paid in full.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Saint Alphonsus is awarded $4,600,000 against :MR.I
Associates, bearing interest at the judgment rate of 10% per annum. calculated from September
21, 2007, until paid in full.

004752
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DATED this 'Z",Iday ofMay, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF

MA~NG

I hereby certify that on this ~ day of May, 2012, I mailed
{served) a true and correct copy of the within instrument to:
JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
PO BOX 2837
BOISE, ID 83701
DONALD AYER
JONES DAY
51 LOUSIANA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST., STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
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802W.Bannock,Sulte 500
Boise, ID 83702

Tel (208}342·4411
Fax (20S} 342·4455

May2, 2012

www.bwslawgroup.com

Via Facsimile 336-9177
Jack Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
509 West Hays St.
Boise, ID 83701
Re:

St. Alphonsus v. MRIA

Dear Jack,

1 am writing regarding our telephone call yesterday where we discussed whether your
clients would post a bond to stay execution pending the forthcoming appeal. You asked
whether MRIA was going to insist on a bond for the full amount of the judgment or whether it
would waive part or all of the bond requirement. I responded that MRIA has for months
indicated its willingness to be flexible concerning the posting of a bond as long as MRIA is
provided with adequate assurance that St. AI' s has liquid funds available to pay the judgment
That remains MRIA's position.
Accordingly, MRIA is willing to waive the bond requirement, or is willing to negotiate
a bond for less than the full amount of the judgment, if St. Al' s will provide MRlA with
adequate assurances of its ability to pay. Such assurances most likely would include a
guarantee from Trinity that it will pay the judgment if St. Al's is unable to immediately do so.
Additionally, as a condition to any waiver of the bond by MRlA, the parties must agree to
mediate before a mutually acceptable mediator within 60 days ofthis letter. ·
As St. Al' s has had several months to work on this issue, we are not interested in
delaying the issue any further. Consequently, please provide us with adequate assurances and
an agreement to mediate by the close of business on May 11, 2012, or post a bond for the full
amount of the judgment.

I look forward to hearing from you.
Very truly yours,

Wade L. Woodard
WLW:jkr
cc:

Jones Day (via facsimile)

BANDUCCI

WOODARD

SCHWAR'TZMAN
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PLLC

'

.

GJORDING

I FOUSER

JackS. Gjording

May 10,2012

By Facsimile
Wade L. Woodard
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

RE:

Saint Alphonsus vs. MRI Assoclt~tes, LLP
Ada Co. Case No. CV OC 04082190

GF File No.: 15051.001
Dear Wade:
In response to your May 21 2012 letter, we still do not believe the conditions demanded by
MRIA in exchange for waiving the supersedeas bond requirement are reasonable or
appropriate (specifically, your Insistence that a non-party to the litigation provide a guarantee
and that Saint Alphonsus agree to mediate the dispute by a date certain). Accordingly, Saint
Alphonsus will secure a stay of the judgment pending appeal by posting a supersedeas bond.
Similatly1 if you intend to appeal the judgment against MRIA on Saint Alphonsus's claim for its
departing partner share and wish to secu're a stay, please be advised that MRIA will also be
required to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of that judgment (plus 36% of such
amount) pursuant to I.A.R. 13(b)(15}.

Sincerely,
GJORDING FOUSER
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com
BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
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MAY 2 9 2012
CH;::;;s 'Uh·h::R o. RICH

By ~LYSHIA HOLMES'
OEPUTY

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRl Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, aiJ Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
·

AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF
COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF THE
MRIA ENTITIES' MEMORANDUM
OF COSTS AND FEES

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF THE MRIA ENTITIES' OF
COSTS AND FEES - 1
004757

Clerk

•
STATE OF IDAHO )
ss.
County of Ada
)

•

I, Thomas A. Banducci, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am a partner with the firm of Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC, attorneys

of record for the above-captioned Counter-Claimants (collectively, "MRIA"). I submit this
amended affidavit in support ofMRIA's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. I have personal
knowledge of the facts relevant to Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC's legal representation
of MRIA and of the attorney fees and other costs that have been incurred in this case.
I.

ATTORNEY FEES

2.

From January 2008 through December 2011, MRIA incurred more than

$1,747,468.00 in attorney fees to defend against Saint Alphonsus's claims and prosecute its own
claims in this lawsuit. Therefore, the amount for which MRIA seeks an award herein is
$1,74 7,468.00 plus the previous award of attorney fees made by Judge McLaughlin for the time
spent prior to January 2008 and affirmed by this Court.
3.

The Attorney fees from January 2008 through December 2011 were calculated by

multiplying the time for each attorney and paralegal who worked on the case by his or her
billable hourly rate.
4.

Attached as Exhibit "A" is a true, complete, and detailed itemization of the fees

for which MRIA seeks an attorney fee award. Exhibit "A" shows: (a) the date on which the legal
services were performed; (b) the identity of the timekeeper who performed the services; (c) a
description of the services performed; and (d) the amount of time spent on the services
performed.
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The following people are the timekeepers who have provided legal services on

behalf ofMRIA for the firm of Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC since January 2008.
These persons are identified on Exhibit "A" as listed below:
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC
A.

Thomas A. Banducci, Partner
Timekeeper reference: TAB
Hours billed for this Application: 230.30
2008 Rate: $325.00
Total billed for this Application: $74,847.50
Timekeeper reference: TAB
Hours billed for this Application: 57.90
2009 Rate: $350.00
Total billed for this Application: $20,265.00
Timekeeper reference: TAB
Hours billed for this Application: 93.9
2010 Rate: $375.00
Total billed for this Application: $35,212.50
Timekeeper reference: TAB
Hours billed for this Application: 1032
2011 Rate: $425.00
Total billed for this Application: $438,600.00

B.

WadeL. Woodard, Partner
Timekeeper reference: WLW
Hours billed for this Application: 386.80
2008 Rate: $290.00
Total billed for this Application: $112,172.00
Timekeeper reference: WL W
Hours billed for this Application: 29.80
2009 Rate: $300.00
Total billed for this Application: $8,940.00
Timekeeper reference: WL W
Hours billed for this Application: 238.20
2010 Rate: $320.00
Total billed for this Application: $76,224.00
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Timekeeper reference: WL W
Hours billed for this Application: 952.80
2011 Rate: $340.00
Total billed for this Application: $323,952.00

C.

Benjamin A. Schwartzman, Partner
Timekeeper reference: BAS
Hours billed for this Application: 4.1
2008 Rate: $290.00
Total billed for this Application: $1189.00
Timekeeper reference: BAS
Hours billed for this Application: 2.0
2009 Rate: $300.00
Total billed for this Application: $600.00
Timekeeper reference: BAS
Hours billed for this Application: 5.7
2011 Rate: $340.00
Total billed for this Application: $1938.00

D.

Dari Huskey, Former Associate
Timekeeper reference: DMH
Hours billed for this Application: 30.6
2008 Rate: $220.00
Total billed for this Application: $6,732.00

E.

Brian Knox, Former Associate
Timekeeper reference: BDK
Hours billed for this Application: 77.1
2008 Rate: $220.00
Total billed for this Application: $16,962.00

F.

BrentS. Bastian, Associate
Timekeeper reference: BSB
Hours billed for this Application: .1
2009 Rate: $240.00
Total billed for this Application: $24.00
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Timekeeper reference: BSB
Hours billed for this Application: 66.70
2010 Rate: $250.00
Total billed for this Application: $16,675.00
Timekeeper reference: BSB
Hours billed for this Application: 897.40
2011 Rate: $265.00
Total billed for this Application: $237,811.00

G.

Dara Labrum Parker, Associate
Timekeeper reference: DLP/DL
Hours billed for this Application: 106.00
2008 Rate: $200.00
Total billed for this Application: $21,200.00
Timekeeper reference: DLP/DL
Hours billed for this Application: 31
2009 Rate: $220.00
Total billed for this Application: $6,820.00
Timekeeper reference: DLP/DL
Hours billed for this Application: 95.70
2010 Rate: $230.00
Total billed for this Application: $22,011.00
Timekeeper reference: DLP/DL
Hours billed for this Application: 607.80
2011 Rate: $240.00
Total billed for this Application: $145,872.00

H.

Kathy A. Savell, Paralegal
Timekeeper reference: KAS
Hours billed for this Application: 151.70
2008 Rate: $125.00
Total billed for this Application: $18,962.50
Timekeeper reference: KAS
Hours billed for this Application: 16.2
2009 Rate: $130.00
Total billed for this Application: $2,106.00
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Timekeeper reference: KAS
Hours billed for this Application: 45.10
2010 Rate: $135.00
Total billed for this Application: $6,088.50
Timekeeper reference: KAS
Hours billed for this Application: 706.60
2011 Rate: $140.00
Total billed for this Application: $98,924.00

I.

Lauren Blaesing, Former Paralegal
Timekeeper reference: LFB
Hours billed for this Application: 151.90
2008 Rate: $125.00
Total billed for this Application: $18,987.50

J.

Shannon E. Smith, Former Paralegal
Timekeeper reference: SES
Hours billed for this Application: 2.1 0
2008 Rate: $125.00
Total billed for this Application: $262.50
Timekeeper reference: SES
Hours billed for this Application: 94.50
2011 Rate: $140.00
Total billed for this Application: $13,230.00

K.

Luke Howarth, Law Clerk
Timekeeper reference: LH
Hours billed for this Application: 149
2011 Rate: $140.00
Total billed for this Application: $20,860.00
Discretionary Costs

6.

Attached as Exhibit "B" is a revised true and complete statement of discretionary

costs incurred by MRIA in this matter since January 2008.
7.

All of these costs were incurred by Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC on

behalf ofMRIA directly.
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The majority of these costs were expert witness fees. All the experts filed their

own reports in this litigation, and those reports provide the evidence for the skill, diligence,
expertise, and knowledge of each expert. Pursuant to this Court's Order, we have removed the
fees associated with Grant Thornton and the fees of Robert Bell in excess of the statutory costs
as a matter of right. Total fees in excess ofthe amounts allowed as a matter of right is
$140,708.33.
9.

Total costs for Automated (Westlaw) Legal Research were incurred in the amount

of$7,828.54. Automated research was essential in this matter, given the paucity oflaw in Idaho
on many of the issues litigated.
10.

There were approximately 1200 exhibits identified in this matter, in addition to

expanded discovery. Copy and scanning charges were incurred in the amount of $22,179.95 in
excess of the $500.00 for costs as a matter of right.
11.

The total amount of discretionary costs incurred since January 2008 is

$174,472.93. The previous amount submitted was $551,425.10, which was an inaccurate total of
the discretionary costs caused by a clerical error.
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

II.

COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, PURSUANT TO RULE 54(d)(l)(C) I.R.C.P.
1. Court Filing Fees

2. Costs of Exhibits/Models
(See, Exhibit B attached hereto)
3. Expert Fees

$0.00
$500.00

$6,000.00
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4. Fees for the service provided by a public officer or other person

$235.80

5. Witness Fees/Mileage - Trial Testimony

$573.25

6. Witness Travel Expenses

$1,758.96

AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF THE MRIA ENTITIES' OF
COSTS AND FEES - 8
004764

•

•

7. Charges for Reporting and Transcribing of a Deposition

8. Transcripts

TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT:
III.

$5,669.17

$32,939.84

$47,677.02

STATEMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES:
Defendant requests that the Court award the following as reasonable attorney fees

necessarily incurred in the pursuit ofthis action, pursuant to Rule 54(e)(1), Idaho Rules ofCivil

Procedure, and Idaho Code§ 12-120 and, alternatively, and Idaho Code§§ 12-121. A copy of
the itemizations of said attorney fees is attached hereto.

TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES, PURSUANT TO RULE 54(e)(1)
IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:

$1,747,468.00
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PRIOR AWARD
On February 26, 2008, the Court awarded MRIA attorney fees and costs from the prior

proceeding in the amount of $2,172,677.63 and affirmed by this Court.
PRIOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS PER
FEBRUARY 26,2008 JUDGMENT
TOTAL DISCRETIONARY COSTS SINCE JANUARY 2008,
PURSUANT TO RULES 54(d)(1) and 54(e)(1), IDAHO
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT:

$2,172,677.63

$174,472.93
$47,677.02

TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED SINCE JANUARY
2008, PURSUANT TO RULE 54(e)(1),
IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:

$1,747,468.00

GRAND TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT,
DISCRETIONARY COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES:

$4.142.295.58

I believe the fees and costs incurred were reasonable and commensurate with charges in
like cases. In my opinion, the sum of $4,142,295.5 8 constitutes necessary fees and costs
incurred in defending and prosecuting this case through two jury trials and an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Idaho. In addition, I believe that the costs and fees reflect the adjustments
required by this Court in its Order dated May 15,2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of May 2012, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
509 West Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

IJ U.S. Mail

0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
!]'Facsimile: 336-9177

IJ U.S. Mail

0 Hand Delivery
IJ _overnight Delivery

r1'Facsimile: 202-626-1700
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EXHIBIT A
Date

I

Staff

I

HRS

Description

Telephonic conference with Jim Prochaska regarding possible MRI partner purchase of competing imaging center; telephonic
conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; factual research regarding same.
------~----~---+---------------------Formulate strategy and arguments for appellate brief, including arguments regarding court's ruling on summary judgment of
10/9/2008 I BAS 10.4
wrongful dissociation.
W24/2008JBAs 1.1
Review and edit appellate response brief sections.
~~---------------------------------------10/30/20081 BAS 0.8
Draft, edit and revise motion for extension of time, and affidavit in support thereof.
11/13/iOOBI BAS 0.3 Conference with Wade Woodard regarding distinguishing cited authority_o_f_S_A_R_M_C_r_e_g--ar-d-in_g_p_r__o_o_f-of_d_a_m_a--ges from
4/24/2008 I BAS

I

0.8

____
~~violation of non-compete; legal research regarding same.
11/24/2008 BAS _ 0.7
Review and edit appellate brief.
___________________________
1

c--'r---

8/17/2009 BAS
8/18/2009 BAS
10/23/2009 BAS

--I

1~4.1;
0.7
0.7
0.6

Strategic conference regarding appellate argument.
Conference regarding strategy for oral argument on appeal.
I Review and analyze supreme court opinion and effec-t~s~o-fc_o_s__
t_a_w_a-rd-.--------------------------------------------1

•

2
11/9/2011 I BAS
11/10/2011 BAS
11/11/2011 BAS

'2.8
1.8
1.1
5.7

1/4/2008

lBDK

12.1

BDK

1.5

2/20/2008

I

Analyze appellate and settlement strategy.
Strategic analysis of settlement and appeal approaches.
Analyze settlement and appellate strategy.

--~------------------------------------------------------

~esearch appellate rules to determine additional deadlines

. -Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding evidentiary rules affecting appeal issue no. 4 in SARMC's
notice of appeal; research regarding use of settlement offers in evidence at trial or otherwise

[

2/21/~~~ I

'
2/22/2008
2/25/2008

5.5
6.7

004768

2/26/2008 I BDK 13

f--2/27/2008

I BDK

Research General rules regarding admission of settlement offers; research continuing objections and nature of the objection
entered by opposing counsel to the admission oft he letter sent to St. Al's; review trial transcripts from various members of
MRI regarding the trial exhibit (alleged settlement offer)
I Research ability to use settlement offers and agreement documents at trial; draft research memorandum
I Research case law and secondary sources regarding settlement agreement/offer introduction into evidence at trial; draft
research memorandum on the issues
Review pleadings regarding partners' fiduciary duty in Idaho to the partnership in general- common law fiduciary duty versus
~tory duty
I:in ish review of all pleadings dealing with the fiduciary duty owed between partners; research Idaho and other jurisdictions'
11aw on fiduciary duty, both statutory and common law duties
1

16.6
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Description

\Staff HRS

2/28/2008

BDK

3/3/2008

BDK 13.2-

3/4/2008

\.3.9

BDK

4.2

3/16/2008

BDK

1.9

3/20/2008

BDK

7.2

I

I

Research common law fiduciary duty in Idaho and other jurisdictions to bolster argument before ld. Supreme Court regarding
District Court's decision to not rule as a matter of law that SADC/SARMC had no fiduciary duty to MRIM and MRCIC
research case law regarding common law recognition of fiduciary duty in absence of statutory imposition of duty
research case law regarding common law recognition of fiduciary duty in absence of statutory imposition of duty; begin draft
of memorandum including language to be used in answer to notice of appeal
Research secondary sources regarding fiduciary duty matter for upcoming response brief to the court; draft portion of
response brief.
Research under what theory we pled the common law fiduciary duty of SARMC to MRIM & MRICI; Research notice pleading
requirements in Idaho and whether court was correct in its initial ruling by holding that SARMC had a common law fiduciary
duty to MRIM & MRICI; research standard for reversal in such a case; review pleadings for each instance in which MRIA pled
elements that support the argument that SARMC had a common law fiduciary duty to MRIM & MRICI

~Review

3/24/20081 BDK
I

3/25/2008~DK

2.1

I

research materials on notice pleading requirements; analysis of facts and allegations pled in initial and amended
pleading to determine whether notice pleading requirements were met regarding common law fiduciary duty of SARMC to
~ M RIM & M RICI; add itiona I research in other jurisdictions
Research additional case law regarding notice pleading in IdahO; review of pleadings to support court's initial decision____
regarding common law fiduciary duty.
I

BD~~rephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding additional strategy for research and analysis of judge's decision;

3/25/2008

3/31./20081 BDK

7.5

review judge's decision regarding fiduciary duty; research whether judge was correct in holding that there is no statutory
fiduciary duty between SARMC and MRIM and MRICI.
Conference with Wade l. Woodard regarding notice pleading research; additional research regar<Jing notice pleading in Idaho'
and other jurisdictions; review pleadings to determine whether SARMC effectively objected to sufficiency of pleadings prior
to the matter going to the jury; draft research memorandum regarding notice pleading.

--

4/14/2008
4/15/2008

•

BDK
BDK

----'-------'

004769

j

d;;

0.8
7.2
77.1

11/20/2009 i BSB l0.1
1

o.1

Draft memorandum in response to fiduciary matters brought up in SARMC notice of appeal.
Research issues regarding fiduciary duties and whether judge was correct in ruling that SARIVIC did not owe a statutory duty
to MRIM and MRICI; draft memorandum.

~~CO~fe~Once

·-

·---

__ _____
"

with Tom Banducci concerning status of case:-
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jStaff HRS

Date

I

Description

1/13/2010 r--------+--0_.2_-{Analysis
BSB
of decision allowing costs from Supreme Court.
------··-------IBSB
--+--0_.6 __ Research concerning dissociation based on a definite term.
8/2/2010
BSB 0.2
Review previous summary judgment motions concerningdefinite terms.
8/3/2010
---1----'----I Analysis of several pleadings, motions, and decisions concerning breach of operating agreement for a definite term;
BSB 4.1
8/5/2010

f-

_ c _ __ _ _I,

1

1

1

,- Iconferences with Thomas A. Banducci concerning same; factual and legal research concerning same.

1

Conference with Thomas A. Ba!lducci concerning strategy for summary judgment re~ponse.
5.5
Analysis of motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning arguments made in same; draft of outline of
opposition; begin draft of opposition; conference with WadeL. Woodard concerning same.
-------------2.9
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; research of issues arising in S~_l!l_e_.___________---l
Continue draft of opposition; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with Wade L. Woodard concerning
3.9
same.
-3-.-2--+--C-o-nt-in_u_e_d__r_a_ft_o_f_o__p_p_o_si-ti-o·n-to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with--1

1_B_S_B--+10.2
1

?/6/2010
8/9/2010

BSB
BSB

8/10/2010

I

&Jii/2010

IBSB

8/12/lCJlO

BSB

I

Tom A. Banducci concerning same.
Conferences with Wade L. Woodard concerning motion for summary judgment; continue draft of same.
Analysis and edits to motion for summary judgment.
~~-------------------------Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; fa~tual and legal research concerning same; conferences withh
Wade L. Woodard and Tom A. Banducci concerning same.
-------------------Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same.

I

l01BSB
8/16/2010 I BSB
8/18/2010 BSB
S/19/2010 .BSB

0.3
0.2
4.3
18.5

l8f20/2010 IBSB
8/23/2010 IBSB

I9. 9

8/24/2010 BSB
8/25/20H5l-BsB

5.9
0.4

I 2.6

8/26/2010 I BSB

1.6

1

Conlin ue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; continue factual and legal research concerning sa me.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same.
Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; legal research concerning same.
-----j

Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same, especially as to

=jamendments to the partnership agreements; highlight evidentiary issues for support staff to correctly cite.

8/27/.2010

8/30fl010

BS--

1_

lRI
BSB

~~:eivise o.pp~sition ~o motion fa~ summary judgment; double check citations to evidence; factual and legal research

j3.4

BS~0.2_

9/14/2010
9/15/2010

BSB
BSB

004770

9/13/2010

I

l-9/_1_6-/2-~

0.2
11.6
.

12.4-

---1

concernmg 1ssues m same.
Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning estoppel and ratification;
coordination of filing opposition; revise tabs for binder.
Analysis of response to oppositTcmt~~~ for summa_ry_j_u-dg_m_e-nt-.---------________ _

I

1

•

Review of reply to opposition to motion for summary judgment.
------------------------Analysis of reply to opposition to motion for summary judgment; begin draft of outline of response to same; factual and legal
research concerning same.
IDraft of outline respo_n_s_e-to_r_e_p-ly_t_o_opposition to motion f~r summary judgment; factual and legal research concernin_g_ _
I

same; conference with Thomas A. Banducci concerning same.
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Description

9/30/2010
10/1/2010

BSB
BSB

0.2
2.5

Conference with Tom Banducci concerning integration clauses.
Legal research concerning applicability of RUPA; conference with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning same; draft

~~e-mail
to Wade Woodard concerning same.
--

- -f-

-

6

--

-

BSB

Review motion for summary judgment on damages; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with Tom
Banducci concerning same.
-··--··Continue research concerning motion for summary judgment; conference with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning
4/13/2011 BSB 9
same; draft of outline for same.
4/18/2011 BSB 10.7 Draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment on "pro rata" issue; factual and legal research concerning same;
with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning
same.
conference
----4/19/2011 BSB 12.3 Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with
Wade Woodard concerning s~me.
I
7
Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same.
4/20/2011 IBSB
-7.2
Continue revisions to opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same; conference
4/21/2011
IBSB
with Dara Labrum concerning same.
-Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same; conferences with Tom
4/22/2011 BSB 5.8
Banducci concerning same.
--Revise opposition; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same; coordination of filing_same.
4/25/2011 BSB 0.5
In-depth review of reply to opposition to motion for summary judgment; research concerning same; draft of short outline
5/12/2011 IBSB 1.6
I
concerning same; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same.
Conference with Tom Banducci to discuss major flaws in arguments in response to opposition to motion for summary
5/17/2011 BSB 0.5
judgment.
-----5/18/2011 jBS_~ ~ttend hearing concerning second affirmative defense.
Research concerning independent rights to documents during discovery; analysis of motion to compel; analysis of motion to
6/10/2011 IBSB 3.8
~shorten
time; draft of outline of response to same.
r---IBsB
-13.1 Draft of opposition to motion to shorten time; research concerning same; revise affidavit in support of same; coordination of
6/13/2011
filing same; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same; analysis of court order concerning same; draft of opposition
to motion to reopen discovery; research concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
4/12/2011

6

•

~-

--

--

004771

6/14/2011 iBSB
I
6/15/2011 I BSB

8.8
--

4.8

I

Continue draft of opposition to motion to compel; continue research concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard
concerning same.
Revise draft of opposition to motion to compel; coordination of filing same; research concerning same; conference with
Wade Woodard concerning same; analysis of opposition to opposition to motion for orders concerning Sandra Bruce.

f-----

6/16/2011

BSB

0.3

Analysis of orders from court; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
Page 4 of 62

•

EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff HRS

Description

6/21/2011

BSB

Review of reply in support of motion to compel; research concerning same; draft of short outline concerning

0.9

sB

:l

6/22

f----

4.3

--

counterarguments to same; review of court order on motion for summary judgment.
Review of argument in reply in support of motion to compel; research concerning cases in same; draft of outline for
responses to same; conference with Tom Banducci concerning hearing; travel to hearing; participate in hearing; travel from
hearing.
hearing; research concerning cases cited-at
-----""----------------------------·-------

6/30/201~1BSB

1.7

Analysis of brief regarding implications of certain case; research concerning same; begin draft of response to same.

BSB
BSB
r
BSB
BSB
BSB

2.1
1
0.5
0.1
4.2

Revise draft of response to brief concerning Summit County case.
Revise draft of response to Summit County argument; coordination of filing same.
----------~-------------------------Conference with co-attorneys concerning witnesses at trial; coordination concerning same.
Review of hearing transcript to ensure representations in motion were aptly stated.
Review of deposition transcript and trial transcript of Robert Bell in preparation for trial; conference with Wade Woodard and
Tom Banducci concerning same. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Review deposition and trial transcripts of Mark Dalley; conferences with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning same;
analysis of major claims remaining in matter; analysis of testimony of Mark Dalley in regards to same; prepare for trial.

7/1/2011
7/5/2011
1-----7/6/2011
7/7/2011
7/18/2011

7/19/2011 ! BSB
I

7

7/20/2011 BSB
7/21/2011 .BSB

0.5
3.2

Review trial transcript of Chris Anton; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
Continue preparation for trial; analysis of trial transcript and deposition transcript of Chris Anton; conference with Wade
Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning same.
--4--+--~-------7/22/2011 BSB 0.5
Conference with Tom Banducci concerning trial issues and Dalley.
~.
~---------------------------7/26/2011 BSB 17
Conference with co-counsel in preparation for trial; draft of motion to have deemed admitted all documents admitted in
previous trial; factual and legal research concerning same.
--------+--~--~
------~~--------------------------------7/27/2011 BSB 4.1
Draft of motion in limine concerning term "non-profit"; factual and legal research concerning same; revise draft of motion to

. -~4

have deemed admitted exhibits admitted in previous trial; conference with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning
trial strategy; meeting with Mark Dalley in preparation for trial.
Draft of response to motion to exclude hearsay within hearsay; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with

~

Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning same; revise other motions in limine to be filed; coordination of filing same.

I
~

t-7-/2_8_/_2-011

7/30/2011
8/2/2011

004772

8/3/2011

1

BSB
BSB

1.4
3.3

Attend mock trial; conference with co-counsel concerning issues arising in same.
Analysis of va. rio us motion responses filed; prepare for direct exam in. ation of Bob Bell; draft of outline for testimony

~~ncerning same; analysis of prior deposition and trial testimo_n~y_o__f__B__o_b_B_e_l_l.__________

BSB

1

7.

ontinue draft of outline of direct examination of Bob Bell; analysis of file concerning same; analysis of entire expert report
Bob Bell; research concerning same; prepare for direct examination of Mark Dalley; research concerning same; analysis of
flle concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci concerning same; analysis of responses and
l replies to motions in limine.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

8/4/2011

BSB

1.1

Analysis of several pieces of correspondence from Tom Banducci concerning trial strategy; analysis of deposition transcripts

8/5/2011
8/15/2011

BSB
BSB

0.4
3.2

-

-

8/16/2011

BSB

4.9

concerning same.
--Telephonic conference with Wade Woodard concerning hearing strategy.
---Review of several pleadings and arguments from previous week; prepare for direct examination of Mark Dailey; conference
with Tom Banducci and Wade Woodard concerning same.
Conference with co-counsel in preparation for trial; review of trial transcript of Grant Chamberlain; research concerning
same; draft of outline memorandum concerning same; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same.
-

BSB

8/17/2011

4.5

··-

Review of testimony of Grant Chamberlain for designation; review of court orders concerning exhibits used in deposition of
Grant Chamberlain; begin draft of new designations; review of research concerning conspiracy; conferences with Dara Parker
and Tom Banducci concerning same; research concerning same.

8/18/2011

IBSB

7.8

Continue designation of Grant Chamberlain's testimony; factual and legal research concerning same; review of deposition of
same; continue draft of direct examination of Chris Anton; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same.

8/19/2011

BSB

6.6

Continue preparation for Anton direct; factual research concerning same; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same;
revise direct of Mark Dailey; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same; conference with client and co-counsel

BSB

8/22/2011

4.5

•

concerning demonstratives for computer systems.
Revise outlines for direct examinations of Chris Anton, Mark Dailey, and Bob Bell; coordination with staff concerning exhibits
to use in same; factual research of the record concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.

-

·-

7.1

BSB

8/23/2011
r--

8/24/2011

BSB

~4.5

---

8/25/2011

BSB

1.3

8/26/2011
8/29/2011

BSB
BSB

4.3

- - - - - -

004773

8/30/2011

l
II

BSB

I

9

direct examination; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same; review of order from court; analysis of materials
associated with Bob Bell's deposition.
---------Review of Bob Bell's deposition file.
Research concerning referring doctor testimony; research concerning IMI's desire to partner with MRIA.
Prepare for trial; research of IMI minutes concerning sundry issues related to Dr. Giles and IMI's potential partnership with

I

!7.1
I
I

I

I

research concerning direct examinations; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
Revise outline of questions for direct examinations of Anton, Bell, and Dailey; conference with Chris Anton to prepare him for

MRIA; research of Dr. Prochaska and Chris Anton's testimony concerning board of partners; revise outline of Bob Bell's direct.

!
-------------'---

8/31/2011

Revise direct examinations of Chris Anton, Bob Bell, and Mark Dailey; meeting with co-counsel concerning trial preparation;

7.5

BSB
I

Prepare for trial; legal research concerning CV being hearsay; draft of business records questions for Bob Bell; conferences
with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning sundry trial issues; review and comment on several pocket briefs drafted
by Dara Parker; research concerning Harder documents.
I Review juror questionnaires; recommend strikes as to same; conference with Wade Woodard as to same; analysis of prior

voir dire questions; create list of same; revise direct of Bob Bell; research concerning same; prepare for trial.

I

-

I

I

- -

- -

-

-
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Date

9/1/2011
9/2/2011

I:J

HRS

Description

1.2

Review transcript of Bob Bell; revise direct examination of same; review new CV of Bob Bell; conference with Kathy Savell
concerning same; analysis of fiduciary duty jury instruction.

IBSB

7.1

Review most recent pleadings and motions in limine; research concerning same; research of testimony of Sandra Bruce;
conference with Tom Banducci concerning same; prepare for "hanging chads" hearing; attend same; conference with Tom
Banducci and Wade Woodard concerning same; review of pleadings to ascertain our preliminary instruction on fiduciary

Staff

9/3/2011 -+BSB

7.7

I

duty; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same.
Prepare for trial; review of deposition transcripts in preparation for same; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same.

·-

BSB
9/4/2011
BSB
9/5/2011
BSB
9/6/2011
r-BSB
9/7/2011
BSB
9/8/2011
9/9/2011 ,BSB
9/10/2011 BSB
9/11/2011 BSB
9/12/2011 BSB
9/13/2011 BSB
9/14/2011 BSB
9/15/2011 BSB

3.3
9.8
11.5
10.3
11.1
12
10.3
3.5
11.2
12.1
10.5
9.2

Prepare for trial; review of deposition transcripts concerning same.
Prepare for trial.
-Attend trial; conference with clients.

•

----

Attend trial; prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial; research for same; analysis of file for same.
Attend trial; prepare for trial; research concerning same.
Prepare for trial; research for issues in same; telephone calls related to same.
Prepare for trial; review of record in relation to same.
Prepare for trial; attend trial.

-

Prepare for trial; attend trial; research concerning issues arising at same.
t------'-_Attendtrial~prepare for trial; meet with clients in preparation for trial.
Prepare for trial; prepare witnesses for trial; revise questions for witnesses at trial; research concerning same.

·---- -

----------

I

--

BSB
BSB
BSB

9/16/2011
9/17/2011
9/19/2011
9/20/2011
9/21/2011
9/22/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB

Attend trial; prepare witness; prepare for trial.
11
-4.8
Prepare for trial; review of prior transcripts.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; revise questions for direct of Chris Anton.
9.6
9.8
Prepare for trial; attend trial.
-10.2 Attend trial; prepare for trial; conference with co-counsel concerning trial st~ategy.
Attend trial meeting; conference with co-counsel concerning same; drafts of e-mail to Mark Dalley concerning testimony;
5.4
Jtelephonic conference with Chris Anton; revise outlines for direct examination of Bob Bell, Mark Dailey, and Chris Anton;

·--

research concerning mistrial for use of the term "prior trial"; conference with Dara Parker concerning same.

I

_ _j_
004774

9/23/2011 BSB
9/24/2011 BSB
9/26/2011 BSB
9/27/2011 IBSB
9/28/2011 1BSB

11.1
4.9
12.6
11.1
9.6

Attend trial; prepare for trial; research of file and law _concerning issues arising in same.
Prepare outline for cross examinations of referring doctors; research concerning same; analysis of Hahn depo.

--

Prepare for trial; attend trial; prepare argument; prepare exams.
~ttend trial; prepare for trial; factual and legal research conc~rning same; prepare exams for same.
··--·----Prepare for trial; attend trial; help prepare Dr. Giles for testimony; telephone conference with Mark Dailey; prepare exams.

I
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

9/29/2011

BSB

9.4

Prepare for trial; help prepare witnesses for trial; revise exams; prepare for oral argument; search for testimony.

9/30/2011
10/1/2011

BSB
BSB

12
10.1

10/2/2011

BSB

8.8

10/3/2011

BSB

112.9

Prepare for trial; attend trial; revise opposition to quash; research concerning same.
-Prepare for trial; draft of motion to strike answer; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with Tom Banducci
concerning same; research of transcripts for Giles' direct; prepare examinations.
I
Prepare for trial; draft of motion to strike answer; research concerning same; revise opposition to motion to quash; prepare
for argument; conference with Tom Banducci concerning several research topics; prepare for examination; telephone
conference with Chris Anton.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; prepare for argument; deliver argument; revise opposition to motion to quash; revise motion to
exclude exhibits 802-803; draft of jury instruction; coordinate communication with witnesses; communicate with witnesses;
meeting concerning strategy and order of witnesses.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; prepare witness for examination; prepare argument; prepare documents to be distributed at
argument.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; prepare examinations; review of transcript of Joe Messmer in preparation for Mark Dalley; draft
of outline for same; research of file concerning Mark Dalley's examination; revise examination of Chris Anton; telephone
conference with accountant Drury; telephone conference with Karen Marler; draft of correspondence to Bob Bell.

--~----

f--------------

l0/4/2011

isss

--

11.1

i

10/5/2011 IBSB

10/6/2011
10/7/2011
10/8/2011
10/9/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

13

9.7
11.2
6.7
4.5

10/10/2011 rssl8.6
10/11/2011 BSB
r---:
10/13/2011 BSB

11.8
10.8

'-----

004775

10/13/2011
10/14/2011
10/15/2011
10/16/2011
10/17/2011
10/18/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

10.5
11.3
6.7
5.4
15
114.1

Prepare for trial; prepare witness for testimony; revise outlines of question; research concerning same.
----Prepare for trial; attend trial; prepare witnesses for trial; conference with court after trial.
----Prepare for trial; help prepare witnesses for trial; draft of motion in limine; research concerning same.
Prepare for trial; draft of motion in limine; research concerning same; draft of e-mail to Dara Parker concerning another
motion in limine; research concerning same; review of transcript for certain admissions; conference with Tom Banducci
concerning same.
Prepare for trial; prepare examinations; research concerning same; revise motion in limine to exclude questions concerning
the reasonableness of factual assumptions; research concerning same; conference with Dara Parker concerning other
motions in limine; revise same; prepare all for filing.
Prepare motions for court; prepare for trial; attend trial.
Prepare for trial; prepare for argument; deliver argument; attend trial; brainstorm closing; research concerning same; draft of
memorandum concerning same.
-Prepare for trial; continue preparation for ~osing argument.
Prepare for trial; attend trial.
Prepare for trial; research concerning tortious interference.
..
------Prepare for trial; help prepare witnesses for trial; research concerning same.
--Prepare for trial; attend trial; review of several transcripts.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; analysis of directed verdig_motions; begin research and response to §me.

- ---

-
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Staff IHRS

Date

10/19/2011 BSB

15.2

10/20/2011 BSB

17

10/21/2011
10/22/2011
10/23/2011
10/24/2011
10/25/2011
1--'---10/26/2011

11.2
7.4
8.4
15.4
13.1
15.2

1

Description

Draft of oppositions to motions for directed verdict; research concerning same; conferences with co-counsel concerning
same.
Draft of oppositions to motions for directed verdict; research concerning same; conferences concerning same; prepare for
trial.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; revise oppositions; coordination of filing same.
Prepare for trial; prepare for examination; review jury instructions.
Prepare for trial; prepare examination; review jury instructions; research concerning same.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; revise jury instructions; prepare for argument on directed verdict motions.
Prepare for hearings; prepare for trial; attend hearings; attend trial; review jury instructions; edits to same.
Prepare for jury instruction conference; attend jury instruction conference; research concerning same; assist in preparation
for closing argument; review of transcripts for same.
Help prepare T. Banducci for closing argument; review of jury instruction changes; review of testimony from trial; conference
with co-counsel concerning closing.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; conference with co-counsel concerning strategy for exhibits.
Trade e-mails concerning exhibit issues; research concerning same.
Trade several e-mails with opposing counsel concerning demonstratives; research of file concerning issues arising as to same;
review of "Eagle adjusted" demonstratives; conference with Tom Banducci concerning timelines.
---~-

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

'--------------

10/27/2011 BSB

9.4

10/28/2011 BSB
10/29/2011 BSB
10/30/2011 BSB

12.4
3.1
13.6
I

I

•

-

10/31/2011 BSB

7.3

Prepare for post-trial hearing; attend post-trial hearing; review of Saint Alphonsus' demonstrative exhibits; conference with
court and opposing counsel concerning same; review of jury verdict form; research concerning attorneys' fees; attend
announcement of jury decision; conference with co-counsel concerning strategy in lieu of same.

BSB

1.3
3.2

Trade several e-mails concerning form of judgment; review draft of same.
Review of proposed order; edits to same; research concerning possibility of pre-judgment interest; conference with Wade
Woodard concerning response to disgorgement advisory verdict; research concerning same.

BSB
BSB

0.5
1.5

BSB

3.3

11/8/2011

BSB

2.2

11/9/2011

BSB

7.6

Review e-mails with co-counsel concerning judgment.
Review of proposed judgment; research concerning disgorgement; review of decision concerning pre-judgment interest; draft
of e-mail to co-counsel concernjng same.
Revise proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; conference with Dara Parker, Tom Banducci, and Wade Woodard
concerning same; review of transcript for relevant evidence for same; research concerning attorneys' fees; trade several emails with Kathy Savell concerning same.
--Conference with co-counsel concerning draft of proposed judgment; research concerning same; edits to same; review of
Saint Alphonsus's proposed judgment; research concerning same.
Draft motion for attorneys fees and costs; factual and legal research for same; respond to Saint Alphonsus's request for
response.
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Date

Staff

11/10/2011 BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

11/11/2011
11/14/2011
11/15/2011
11/16/2011
11/17/2011
----11/18/2011

~1/2~201tSB

HRS

Description

7.5

Continue draft of motion for attorneys' fees; factual and legal research concerning same; research of deadlines for filing
same; draft of e-mail memorandum to co-counsel concerning same; review of court order.
Revise motion for attorneys' fees and costs; revise affidavit in support; research concerning same.
Revise fees motion; review response to objection to judgment; discuss comments to same with Dara Parker.
Analysis of response to proposed judgment; research concerning same; begin draft of reply to same.
Continue draft of reply to response to proposed judgment; research concerning same.
Continue draft of reply to response to proposed judgment; factual and legal res~arch concerning same.
Continue draft of reply to response to proposed judgment; research concerning same; conference with co-counsel
concerning same.
Revise reply in support of proposed judgment; research concerning same; coordination with staff concerning filing and
serving same.
Revise motion for attorneys' fees and costs; revise affidavit of Tom Banducci in support of same.
Revise motion for attorneys' fees; research same; conference with co-counsel concerning same.
Revise attorneys' fees motion; research concerning same; analysis of file concerning same; conference with co-counsel
concerning same; conference with co-counsel concerning fees; prepare for hearing on "form of the judgment"; review of
reply from SARMC concerning same.
Prepare for "form of judgment" hearing; research concerning same; draft of outline concerning same; conferences with cocounsel concerning same.
Continue preparation for hearing; revise outline for same; conference with co-counsel concerning same; travel to
courthouse; present argument; travel to office; debrief co-counsel on hearing; research concerning attorneys' fees.

3.3
0.7
1.1
8.7
11.5
5.7
2.2

11/29/2011 BSB 2.8
11/30/2011 BSB- - 2
12/7/2011 BSB 3

BSB

9.6

BSB

9.9

12/12/2011 BSB

3.8

12/8/2011
12/9/2011

I

I

~----~1
~

~---

•

~------

12/13/2011 BSB

3.8

12/14/2011 BSB

2.1

Revise motion for attorneys' fees; research concerning same; revise affidavit of Tom Banducci in support of motion for
attorneys' fees; research concerning same; draft of affidavit in support of motion for attorneys' fees; research concerning
same.
Revise affidavit in support of attorney fees; revise affidavit of Tom Banducci; revise motion for attorneys' fees and costs;
research concerning same.
Research concerning appealable issues; conference with co-counsel concerning same; calculate deadlines for same.

12/15/2011 I BSB

3

Continue research concerning grounds for appeal; draft of outline of same; review of orders from court regarding same.

I
~---

004777

9/4/2008
9/5/2008
9/8/2008
9/9/2008

897.4
DL
DL
DL
DL

0.3
0.3
1
0.4

----------

Work on memorandum regard Prochaska deposition testimony for use in appellate brief.
Write background section from Prochaska deposition for appellate ~rief.
Review transcript of Jim Prochaska; draft background section of appellate brief.
Review Prochaska transcript for fact section of appellate brief.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

9/11/2008
9/12/2008
9/17/2008

DL
DL
DL

2
5.7
3.4

9/18/2008

DL

7.2

9/19/2008
9/22/2008
9/23/2008

DL
DL
DL

6.3
6.5
6.7

Review deposition testimony for factual section of appellate brief.
-----Prepare fact section for appellate brief.
Meeting with W. Woodard about issues that need to be addressed in appellate brief; preparation of fact section for appellate
brief.
Work on fact section of appellate brief; work on legal analysis of claimed evidentiary error in permitting Hammond
memorandum for appellate brief.
Work on countering Shattuck Hammond memorandum argument for appellate brief.
Research regarding Shattuck Hammon memorandum and special verdict form for appellate brief.
Research and drafting of appellate brief on issues of attorney/client privilege and alleged deficiency in verdict form.

9/24/2008 DL
1
9/25/2008 DL
9/26/2008 DL
9/29/2008 DL
9/30/2008 DL
10/1/2008 DL

7.8
6.6
5.2
6.9
7.1
5

Research and drafting of appellate brief on issue of sustaining damages award to MRI Center and Mobile.
Research and drafting of various issues for appellate brief; meeting with T. Banducci regarding the same.
Work on various issues for appellate brief; meetings with T. Banducci regarding the same.
Work on research and drafting of appellate brief regarding damages award.
Research and drafting of appellate brief.
-·-Research and drafting of appellate brief regarding wrongful dissociation; meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L.
Woodard regarding the same.

10/2/2008
10/3/2008
10/6/2008
10/7/2008

DL
DL
DL
DL

5.6
6.7
0.2
2.4

10/15/2008
10/29/2008
10/30/2008
11/5/2008
11/19/2008
11/20/2008
11/22/2008
-12/22/2008

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

1.6
4.5
2.4
1.3
0.3
1.5
0.5
0.6
106

Drafting and research of appellate brief, with emphasis on damages and wrongful dissociation.
Draft section for appellate brief on wrongful dissociation.
Review research regarding wrongfully dissociation.
--··Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding appellate brief; research regarding effect of remittitur for
appellate brief.
Research for appellate brief regarding motions in limine and preservation of objections.
Research, editing, and drafting on various portions of appellate brief.
Research and drafting of "scorched earth" portion of appellate brief.
Phone meeting with C. Lewis and W. Woodard regarding appellate brief; editing of brief.
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade Woodard regarding appellate brief.
Telephone call with Craig Lewis regarding edits for appellate brief.
Review rules for appellate brief format.
Read SARMC's reply brief.

DL

0.1

Conversation with Thomas A. Banducci regarding response to opposing party's motion to strike portions of brief.

2/11/2009 DL
2/13/2009 .DL

0.2
5.2

Discuss status of case and response to motion to strike.
Draft opposition to motion to strike.
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'

Date
2/17/2009
4/10/2009
8/17/2009

Staff HRS
DL
DL
DL

8/18:::::~ :~
8/19/2009

1.1
0.4
5.1

r

Description
Edit and review response to motion to strike.
Draft response letter to Idaho Supreme Court regarding hearing dates.
Review briefs; research discrete queries by Thomas A. Banducci as he prepares for oral argument.

-·

·------------~----------

---~--

.5

Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci, Wade l. Woodard and Kathy A. Savell to assist Thomas A. Banducci in prep aring for oral
argument; legal and factual research on a variety of discrete issues to assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for oral
argument.
Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for oral argument by researching discrete legal and factual issues; attend oral

~:~ist

DL

~

l.S
4.1

argument.
Read decision on appeal from Idaho Supreme Court.
Research discrete questions from Thomas A. Banducci regarding procedure for remand, etc.
Research various projects In preparation for post-appeal actions.
Research regarding joining limited partnerships to the lawsuit in retrial; discuss the same with ThomasA. Banducci.

0.9
0.5

Discuss post-appeal strategy with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci.
Draft letter to Moffatt Thomas in response to letter sent to Thomas A. Banducci .

I
1,0.8

10/21/20

10/22/2009~fL

10/26/2009 DL
l0/27/2009 DL-

1

•

1
--

10/28/2009 DL
12/10/2009 DL

-

--

·-···----

12/11/2009 DL

0.1
31

I Review and send letter to Moffatt Thomas on Thomas A. Banducci behalf.

·------

-

--

1/13/2010 'DL
1/25/2010 DL
1/28/2010 DL
DL
2/5/2010
DL
3/1/2010

0.3
0.1
0.9
0.1
0.1

~S/2:1L
DL
3/8/2010

2.6
4.1

-'

Review and analyz~Supreme Court's decision on rehearing; email Wade L. Woodard regarding the same.
Review status of upcoming projects and deadlines.
Research implications on request to consent to release the appeal bond.
Review stipulation to vacate supercedes bond.
Review status of the case with the partners.
Research joiner of limited partnerships.
Research regarding likelihood of success and objections to a motion to add the limited partnerships as real parties in interest.

--- 6t-~~:~

Research on joining/substituting limited partnerships.
Reformat PDF version of Second Amended Counterclaim so that it can be amended; draft red line version of Third Amended
Counterclaim; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci.
Draft and proofread third amended counterclaim.
3/22/20~L -04/19/2010 I DL - - 1
Legal and factual research on SARMC's motion to "strike as irrelevant" portions of the complaint.
0.2
Review status of case, upcoming projects, and deadlines.
4/22/2010 ! DL
0.2
Discuss status of case and upcoming projects with Thomas A. Banducci.
4/26/2010 DL
5/7/2010
DL__j0.3 _j Discuss status of case and upco~ng projects with WadeL. Woodard.
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Date

Staff
1

HRS

Description

0.2

Review email from Wade L. Woodard to experts regarding updating expert reports; re-read Pope case and Supreme Court
decision regarding damages.
Staff meeting to discuss strategy and deadlines.
Legal and factual research on SARMC's motion to strike.
·Research regarding SARMC's Motion to Strike Immaterial Matters.
Research regarding Rule 12(f) motion to strike.
Research regarding SARMC's Motion to Strike Immaterial matters and memorandum to Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L.
Woodard regarding the same.
Discuss opposition to motion to strike with Thomas A. Banducci and begin drafting the s~_me.
Begin drafting opposition to motion to strike.
Draft opposition to motion to strike.
Draft opposition to motion to strike.
Discuss motion to strike with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci; amend opposition to the same.
Research for and editing of opposition to motion to stri~e.
Edit opposition to motion to strike immaterial matters; discuss the same with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci.

5/10/2010

DL

5/13/2010
6/1/2010
6/11/2010
6/15/2010
6/18/2010

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

0.1
1.4
2.7
3.3
1.4

6/21/2010
6/23/2010
6/24/2010
6/25/2010
6/29/2010
6/30/2010
7/1/2010

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

0.7
0.6
6.5
3.6
2.6
1.2
1.4

---- -

~~

7/2/2010
7/6/2010
7/7/2010

DL

10.9

,DL

2

I
I

DL
DL

1
2.3

7/19/2010

DL

0.1

7/20/2010
7/21/2010
7/22/2010
7/23/2010
7/26/2010

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

2.2
0.3
1.3
0.3
0.8

7/27/2010
7/29/2010

DL
DL

0.4
0.2

DL

0.2

004780

7/8/2010
7/9/2010

~-

l
7/30/2010

I

-

•

Edit opposition to motion to strike.
Read St. Al's reply regarding motion to strike; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci and WadeL. Woodard; research to
rebut arguments in the same.
Legal research regarding common law contract claim in response to St. Al's reply on its motion to strike; assist Thomas A.
Banducci in preparing for hearing on the same.
Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for hearing on motion to strike immaterial matters.
Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for hearing on motion to strike immaterial matters and attend the same.
Review deadlines and plan upcoming projects, including motion to amend complaint and deadline for upcoming motions
ordered by Court.
Edit complaint; discuss case projects and strategy with Thomas A. Banducci and WadeL. Woodard.
Review "Pope" issues and discuss the same with Wade L. Woodard.
Draft motion to amend scheduling order; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard.
Edit motion to amend order.
Amend counterclaim and draft letter regarding the same; amend motion for page limit; discuss striking any Pope motion for
summary judgment with Wade L. Woodard and BrentS. Bastian
Amend counterclaim and letter regarding the same.
Review letter from Ayers regarding 4th Amendment Counterclaim, and discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci.
-

Draft letter to opposing counsel clarifying position on 4th Amended Counterclaim.
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

8/2/2010
8/4/2010

IDL
IDL

0.2
2

DL
8/5/2010
DL
8/7/2010
8/10/2010 DL
8/13/2010 DL
8/14/2010 DL
8/17/2010 DL
8/18/2010 DL
8/19/2010 DL
B/20/2010 I DL

0.6
0.7
0.1
4.7
2.7
0.9
5.3
4.1
4.2

Description

8/23/2010
8/24/2010

DL

3.3

8/25/2010

DL

0.4

Review upcoming projects and deadlines; read SARMC's response to motion to remove page limitation.
Prepare for and attend hearing on motion for longer page limit; report to Thomas A. Banducci and staff regarding the same
and the procedure for filing appendix on upcoming motions.
Begin drafting motion to amend.
Email motions and briefing filed by SARMC.
Discuss response to motion for summary judgment on "definite term" with BrentS. Bastian.
Draft brief in opposition to Motion for Judgment on claims of the Limited Partnerships.
Draft Memorandum in opposition to Motion for Judgment on claims of Limited Partnerships.
Continue drafting brief in opposing to motion for judgment on the claims of the limited partnerships.
Draft memorandum in opposition to motion for judgment on claims of the limited partnerships.
Continue drafting brief in opposition to motion to dismiss the claims of the limited partnerships.
Continue drafting opposition to motion for judgment on claims of the limited partnerships.
Edit brief in opposition to judgment on the claims of the limited partnerships.
---Discuss opposition to motion regarding limited partnerships with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard; edit brief
regarding the same.
-Edit brief in opposition to motion on claims of limited partnerships.

8/26/2010
8/27/2010

DL
DL

1.7
1

Continue working on brief in opposition to motion for judgment on the claims of the limited partnerships.
Edit brief in opposition to motion for judgment on claims of the limited partnerships.

DL~.7

I

8/30/2010 Dl

-

3.5~nd

10/18/2010 DLP

0.2
2.7
0.2
0.2

finalize memorandum in opposition to motion for judgment on the claims of the limited partnerships; proofread
memorandum regarding conspiracy claim.
Review status of case and recent emails regarding the same.
Research regarding SARMC's reply arguments on relation back of the claims of the Limited Partnerships.
Discuss hearing with Wade L. Woodard.
Review emails sent while away and case status.

11/17/2010 DLP
12/15/2010 DLP
12/15/2010 DLP

0.3
0.1
0.1

Review court's order.
Review status of case.
Review status of case and emails.

1

9/22/2010
9/29/2010
----

DL
DL

10/1/201~or

•

004781

---

·----

95.7
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EXHIBIT A
Staff

HRS

Description

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

0.4
0.9
2.7
5.4
0.1
0.6
17.3

Letter to Court about response to SARMC's motion to reopen discovery.___
Begin drafting opposition to motion to reopen discovery.
Research for opposition to motion to reopen discovery.
Legal and factual research for, and drafting of, opposition to motion to reopen expert discovery.
Review motions filed by St. Alphonsus in the last week.
Draft response to motion to reopen discovery.
Draft opposition to motions to reopen; meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding the same.

1/19/201l+DLP
1/20/2011 DLP
1/21/2011 DLP
1/27/2011 DLP
1/28/2011 DLP

5.8
5.5
3.1
4.9
]6.4

1/31/2011

\7.8

Date

---

!------------

1/4/2011
f--'---'-1/5/2011
1-1/6/2011
1/7/2011
--1/14/2011
1/17/2011
1/18/2011

DLP

2~112011 1 o~6

2/2/201~ ~:--'2
i/9/20~ IDLP

2/s/2011

DLP

4.7

3

------=l

Research for and drafting of opposition to motion to reopen damages and set trial schedule.
Draft opposition to motion to reopen discovery.
Draft opposition to motion to reopen discovery.
Draft opposition to motion to reopen discovery.
Legal research for and drafting of opposition to motion to reopen discovery and set briefing schedule.
Draft and edit opposition to motion to reopen discovery and opposition to motion to set scheduling order; discuss the same
with WadeL. Woodard.
Draft and edit opposition to motion to reopen discovery and set scheduling order; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci.

---

Draft, finalize, and file opposition to motion to reopen discovery and set scheduling order.
Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for hearing tomorrow on reopening expert discovery and motions practice; meeting
with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding the same.
-··-----Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for hearing, attend hearing, draft follow up letter to the Court; draft report for clients.
-

DLP
DLP
DLP

2/24/2011

DLP

----

3/7/2011
3/8/2011

DLP
DLP

0.1
10.2
0.1
2.5
0.2
1.2

3/10/2011

DLP

1

3/11/2011
3/14/2011

DLP
DLP

1.7
3.2

DLP

5.2

004782

2/11/2011
2/14/2011
2/22/2011

1
-

--

~-

3/15/2011

•

Check status of deadlines and projects.
Discuss case and upcoming projects with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci.
Discuss drafting motion to clarify with Wade L. Woodard. Draft motion to clarify; review transcript of hearing.
Review email correspondence and filings related to case filed during previous week.
Review order from Court on deadlines; review motions for summary judgment filed by SARIVIC; review discovery filed by
SARMC; instruct staff regarding the same; discuss case with Wade L. Woodard.
Review SARMC motion for summary judgment; email correspondence with Karen Marler concerning production of
documents.
Begin working on response to SARMC's motion for summary judgment.
-Discuss discovery and motion to compel with Wade L. Woodard; phone call and email correspondence with Karen Marler
regarding discovery productio~; work on response to motion for summary judgment.
Draft and research opposition to motion for summary judgment.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

3/16/2011

DLP

8.2

3/17/2011
3/18/2011

DLP
DLP

5.4
5

Draft opposition to motion for summary judgment regarding breach of contract theory of wrongful dissociation; begin
drafting motion to compel discovery regarding IMI Eagle.
Edit and proofread opposition to motion for summary judgment; draft motion to compel.
----·-·-------·--Draft and edit motion to compel and opposition to motion for summary judgment; discuss the same with Wade L. Woodard.

3/21/2011
3/23/2011
3/24/2011
3/25/2011
3/28/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

5.6
0.5
3.2
1.8
2.4

3/29/2011
3/30/2011
3/31/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

3.2
0.3
4.9

f---

r--'--

--··--

Edit opposition to motion for summary judgment; draft motion for clarification.
---Review discovery; discussions with Thomas A. Banducci about future discovery.
Draft discovery.
Review motion to compel; draft letter to opposing counsel regarding the same; review discovery requests.
Finalize opposition to motion for summary judgment; begin drafting motion in limine regarding reference to "lawful"
withdrawal.
Draft motion in limine regarding "lawful dissociation".
Email correspondence with experts; phone message from MRIA regarding discovery answers.
Draft various motions in limine; telephone conference and email with expert Drew Voth; telephone conference with MRIA
representative regarding production of documents responsive to SARMC's discovery requests.

•

I

I

4/1/2011
4/4/2011

1.2
I DLP
-IDep-- 4.8

4/5/2011
4/6/2011
---'-4/7/2011

~~

- - -

DLP
DlP
--

f

1.4

f-----

DLP

2.1

4/12/2011 DLP
4/13/2011 DLP
4/14/2011 DLP
4/18/2011 DLP
4/19/2011 DLP
f----'-4/20/2011 DLP
4/21/2011
4/22/2011 IDLP

3.8
2.9
0.5
3.2
3.4
3

4/11/2011

--

004783

D~
:4.2

Draft 4th requests for production; letter to opposing counsel following up on discovery.
Email correspondence with Karen Marler regarding discovery documents; draft and edit motions to file; discuss the same
with WadeL. Woodard.
Edit motions in limine.
Edit discovery answers; edit briefs and supporting material for motions in limine.

IReview our discovery answers and production; review letter from opposing counsel regarding discovery; email to Drew Voth
regarding the same.
Review documents recently produced; email correspondence with Drew Voth regarding the same; draft letter to Gjording
regarding the same.
Draft response to SARMC's motions in limines; discuss the same with Wade L. Woodard and BrentS. Bastian.
Draft responses to motions filed by SARMC.
Email correspondence with experts.
-----Draft opposition to various motions filed by SARMC.
Draft and edit opposition to various motions file~_by SARMC.
-----Draft and edit opposition to various motions filed ~y SARMC.
Draft and edit responses to motions filed by SARMC.
Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for, and attend, hearing on motion for summary judgment regarding contractual
I wrongful withdrawal; draft and edit brief on various motions filed by SARMC.
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

4/25/2011

DLP

2.3

Finalize briefs in opposition to SARMC motions and discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard; begin

DLP

2.3

DLP

5.2

drafting reply in support of MRIA's motions.
Begin drafting replies to MRIA's motions in limine.
Draft replies to MRIA's motion; review discovery forwarded by SAMRC; draft letter to SARMC attorney regarding missing

4/26/2011
4/27/2011

Description

4/28/2011

DLP

1.2

4/29/2011
5/2/2011

3
0.5

5/3/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

documents.
Edit replies to MRIA's motions in limine; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard.
Edit replies to MRIA's motions; review and edit Budge report; meeting with Mr. Budge.
Finalize replies in support of MRIA's motions; review supplemental report of Charles Wilhoite.

4.2

Draft motion to strike Gjording affidavit; review SARMC discovery non-answers for possible meet and confer letter.

5/5/2011

DLP

0.1

5/6/2011
5/9/2011

DLP
DLP

6.6
1.5

Review SARMC's motion to disqualify judge.
Draft opposition to motion to disqualify court.
Edit opposition to motion to strike; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci; telephone conference with Jim Prochaska and
Thomas A. Banducci; review court's order on summary judgment on contract theory of wrongful dissociation and discuss the

5/10/2011

DLP
DLP

1.6
0.6

DLP

5.5

same with Thomas A. Banducci.
Edit opposition to motion to recuse Judge Wetherell.
Finalize and file opposition to motion to recuse.
Draft reply in support of motion to strike; meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard on discovery and motions

-·-··-----

---------------··

•

--

5/11/2011
5/12/2011

----

-

to bring.

-----

'-----

- -

DLP
DLP

0.9
2

Edit and finalize reply in support of motion to strike Gjording affidavit.
Draft letter to Gjording regarding his previous letters; draft motion for preservation deposition of Sandra Bruce.

5/18/2011
5/19/2011

DLP
DLP

Letter to Gjording regarding witnesses; draft motion regarding Sandra Bruce as a witness.
Edit motion regarding Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp.

5/25/2011

I DLP

1.6
0.3
1.6

5/26/2011

0.4

Edit discovery answers.

6/1/2011
6/2/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

1.1
0.2

Review documents forwarded by Karen Marler; edit discovery responses.
Edit discovery responses.

6/20/2011

DLP

2.6

Strategy meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard; draft reply in support of motion regarding Schamp and
Bruce.

6/21/2011

DLP

2.1

Finish reply regarding witnesses Bruce and Schamp; begin reading SARMC expert report; read Gjording closing to search for
admissions made on the record.

6/23/2011

DLP

3

Work on jury instructions; read Gjording's closing to look for things to use against SARMC.
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Draft discovery responses; email correspondence with Charles Wilhoight and Karen Marler regarding the same.
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

Description

6/24/2011
6/27/2011

DLP
DLP

0.6
1.7

Research regarding using opposing counsel's statements at previous trial against SARMC in new trial.
Draft jury instructions.

6/28/2011 DLP
DLP
7/1/2011
DLP
7/5/2011
DLP
7/6/2011
DLP
7/7/2011
DLP
7/8/2011
7/12/2011 DLP
7/13/2011 DLP
7/14/2011 DLP
7/18/2011 ,DLP
7/19/2011 DLP
7/20/2011 DLP

0.2
1.5
0.4
4.7
5.8
2.8
2.7

Discuss briefing with BrentS. Bastian.
Draft proposed jury instructions.
-·
Telephone conference with Bruce Budge and Drew Voth regarding rebuttal report.
Draft jury instructions; trial team meeting.
Draft jury instructions.
Draft jury instructions.
Trial team meeting; draft jury instructions; edit mock jury form.
Draft jury instructions and discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard.
Finalize proposed jury instructions.
Review SARMC jury instructions and begin drafting objections to the same.
Trial team preparation meeting; discuss case with BrentS. Bastian.
Research questions posed by Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard with respect to causes of action and hearsay.

-

·----·-

3.8
0.3
3.8
1
2.6

•
-----

-·

7/21/2011

-·----

DLP

5

Research questions and issues raised by Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci; draft supplemental discovery answer;
edit mock jury instructions.
Create "cast of characters" list; review mock jury instructions.
-·Edit mock jury instructions; draft supplemental instructions; review whether Rule 56( b) certification filed with respect to
motion for summary judgment.
---Trial preparation meeting; edit mock jury instructions; draft motion to exclude expert testimony of McCarthy.
-·-Edit mock jury instructions; draft and research motion to exclude McCarthy.
Draft motion to exclude McCarthy; edit mock jury instructions.
Draft and edit brief to exclude McCarthy; read McCarthy deposition.
Draft motions in limine; draft objections to jury instructions.
Draft opposition to SARMC jury instructions.
Object to SARMC jury instructions.
Finalize opposition to jury instructions; draft replies to our motions in limines.
Draft pocket memorandum on fiduciary duty.
Pocket brief on fiduciary duty; research whether dissociation breaches fiduciary duty; begin drafting motion for directed
verdict on affirmative defenses.
Draft motion for exhibit list order; draft memorandum on SARMC affirmative defenses; review mock jury instructions.
-.

2
2.6

7/22/201ilP
DLP

7/26/2011
7/27/2011
7/28/2011
7/29/2011
8/1/2011
8/2/2011
8/3/2011
8/4/2011
8/5/2011
8/8/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

8/9/2011

DLP

8/10/2011

DLP

004785

7/25/2011

9.2
8
8
7.7
6.8
6.7
6.3
6.4
3.5
6

I

2

i
0.8

Work on pocket briefs; review jury questionnaires.
Page 18 of 62

•

EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

Description

8/11/2011
8/13/2011
8/15/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

0.2
6.1
5.6

Review emails sent by Thomas A. Banducci and upcoming projects.
Attend mock trial.
Research telling jury about effect of apportionment; research excluding statements made by dead MRIA agent.

effect~~

8/16(1011 jDLP 1-rlAttend trial preparation meeting; pocket briefs on fiduciary duties and
apportionment; research regarding
consp1racy
cla1m.
--------1-------·--------3.2
Research
regarding
consequences
of
conspiracy
claim;
pocket
brief
on
affirrt:~ative defenses.
8/17/2011 DLP
--DLP
6.1
Draft
motion
to
strike;
research
and
drafting
of
reply
to
SARMC
opposition
to
several
of
our
witnesses.
8/18/2011
- - - - - - 1-----Research memorandum on objections to witnesses; work with Holly Wallace regarding IT timeline; begin review of
8/19/2011 DLP 7.9
documents critical for IT timeline testimony.
Review IT documents; meet with Holly Wallace.
8/22/2011 DLP 8.3
Review documents for IT timeline.
8/23/2011 DLP 7.6
8/26/2011 DLP 2.6
Review Prochaska deposition.
Research antikickback; draft motion in limine regarding Harder/Giles misconduct.
8/29/2011 DLP 7.4
-Trial preparation meeting; finalize Harder/Giles brief; draft second Harder brief; review jury list.
8/30/2011 DLP 5.9
Finalize supplemental Harder memorandum; review juror questionnaire answers; discuss research projects with Thomas A.
8/31/2011 DLP 7.6
Banducci.
9/1/2011~ 6.6 Draft opposition to motion to exclude demonstrative exhibits; draft reply in support of motion to prevent argument that
Giles/Harder engaged in improper conduct; research business records hearsay exception.
Assist in trial preparation; research business records exception; begin working on opposition to SARMC damages motion.
9/2/2011
DLP 4.1
--

I

•

- -

l

I

----

9/6/2011
9/7/2011
9/8/2011
9/9/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

8.5
7.4
8
6.3

Draft opposition to motion to exclude damages; discuss case and upcoming projects with trial team.
Research use of opening statement; draft opposition to motion to exclude damages testimony.

--

Draft opposition to motion to exclude MRIA damage theories.
-Attend opening statement; read deposition transcripts of Wilhoite and Budge; edit opposition to SARMC motion on damage;
discuss trial strategy with trial team.
Draft memorandum of law regarding use of attorney opening/closing statements; read Wilhoite deposition; edit opposition
to SARMC motion to exclude damages theories.

-- r - - - -

DLP

7.6

9/13/2011 I DLP

17.5

Draft motion about damages based on market value loss; edit motion on damages; discuss the same with trial team.

9/14/2011 i DLP
9/15/2011 DLP
9/16/2011 IDLP
9/17/2011 DLP
9/19/2011 DLP

7.9
5.7
2.3
1.7
5.3

Draft "Bushi" related motion; draft damages opposition regarding "diminution in value".
Research for motion regarding damages theories; research regarding Bushi decision.
Draft opposition regarding damages theories.
Draft response to SARMC's supplemental brief regarding damages theories.

9/12/2011

004786

I

Edit motion regarding damages and supporting documents. _ _ _ _
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EXHIBIT A
Date

9/21/2011

1

Staff

HRS

Description

DLP

1.8

Assist WadeL. Woodard in preparing for hearing on damages; research for motion in limine regarding Cindy Schamp hearsay.

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

5.9
5.8
4.8
1.5
1.7

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

0.2
0.3
0.4
0.1
4.1
0.6
0.1
2.8
0.2
1.8
3.8
8.7
7.9
4.8
3.5

10/25/2011 DLP

12.2

Draft motion regarding Schamp hearsay; draft motion regarding inadvertent reference to "prior trial".
Attend trial; draft objection to motions for mistrial (based on reference to "Prior Trial").
Draft motion regarding mistrial; draft motion regarding Ex. 4332.
Finalize motions; discuss case with trial team.
Edit motion; discuss motions in limine with BrentS. Bastian.
Draft motion regarding impeachment, conversation in restaurant, and lawsuit threatened by doctor.
Draft response to motion to quash subpoena.
Draft reply in support of notice of intent to impeach.
Draft motion in limine regarding Giles "bad acts"; draft motion in limine regarding Exhibits 802 and 803.
Review status of motions.
Edit Giles motion in limine.
Edit Giles motion in limine.
Discuss projects with trial team.
Draft motion in limine regarding ownership interest as offset.
Look to see whether disgorgement jury instruction drafted; review motion filed by SARMC late last night.
Discuss case and projects with trial team.
Identify "laptop" and "Leslie Kelly Hall" exhibits.
Look at mitigation of damages.
Review discovery answers concerning tortious interference; discuss upcoming projects with BrentS. Bastian.
Begin drafting opposition to motion for directed verdict on damages.
----Work on directed verdict concerning damages.
Research, draft, and edit opposition to motion for directed verdict on damages.
Edit directed verdict; review jury instructions
-·
Review research on attorney statements as party admissions; edit court's jury instructions; assist Thomas A. Banducci in
finding AICPA standards for cross examination.
Find statute of limitation brief from prior proceeding and email to court; review SARMCs Red line Jury Instructions.

10/26/2011 DLP

8.9

Attend jury instruction conference; write memorandum of law regarding lost profits for breach of fiduciary duty.

10/27/2011 DLP

6.9

10/31/2011 DLP
11/1/2011 DLP
11/2/2011 DLP

1.3
3.1
1.9

Draft memorandum regarding apportionment of damages between claims; review transcripts for impeachment; assist in
preparation of closing argument.
Discuss case with Thomas A. Banducci and BrentS. Bastian; attend reading of verdict.
Draft proposed judgment.
Edit proposed judgment.
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9/22/2011
9/23/2011
9/26/2011
9/27/2011
9/28/2011
9/29/2011
9/30/2011
10/2/2011
10/3/2011
10/4/2011
10/5/2011
10/6/2011
10/7/2011
10/10/2011
10/11/2011
10/12/2011
10/13/2011
10/14/2011
10/17/2011
10/18/2011
10/19/2011
10/20/2011
10/21/2011
10/24/2011

~--

-

------ ----

2.3
5
2.4
7.2

---
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

11/7/2011
11/8/2011
11/9/2011
11/10/2011
11/11/2011
11/14/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
.DLP
DLP

4.5
5
0.4
2
1.7
3.5

11/15/2011
11/16/2011
11/17/2011
!---11/18/2011
11/29/2011
1--12/9/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

1
4.6
4.5
1.9
0.3
0.5

Draft and edit proposed findings regarding disgorgement.
Draft and edit documents relating to disgorgement theory of damages findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Research regarding contingency fees.
Begin drafting response to SARMC's objection to proposed judgment.
Draft response to SARMC objection to proposed judgment.
Edit response to SARMC's opposition to judgment; conversations with Thomas A. Banducci and WadeL. Woodard regarding
the same.
Edit response to objections to proposed judgment; review SARMC's response to additional proposed findings.
Draft reply in support of proposed judgment.
Draft reply in support of proposed judgment.
Edit reply in support of judgment.
Organize notes for eventual appeal.
Assist BrentS. Bastian in preparing for hearing, with particular attention on SARMC argument against Wilhoite formula.

~-

12/14/2011 DLP
I

I

0.2
Discuss appeal issues with BrentS. Bastian and WadeL. Woodard
607.8

2/21/2008 IIDMH 3.4

I

I

•

----

2/28/2008

DMH 3.4

Conference with W. Woodard and Lauren concerning issues on appeal; review of exhibits and trial testimony in preparation
of drafting analysis regarding exhibit 4145.
Conferences with W. Woodard, T. Banducci and Lauren regarding appeal and exhibit 4145; research regarding hearsay and
hearsay requirements; reviewing transcripts.
Research and analysis in preparation for appellate brief on the issue of exhibit 4154 and the business record exception to the
hearsay rule.
Research and analysis in preparation of appellate brief on the issue of exhibit 4154 and its admissibility as a business record
and as an admission of a party opponent.
Research and analysis in preparation of appellate brief on issue of exhibit 4154 and its admissibility as an admission of a party

2/29/2008

.G
DMH 1.

~~~ponent
eparation of analysis, in anticipation of appellate brief, regarding exhibit 4154 and admissions of a party opponent.

3/3/2008

DMH 2.1

Research and analysis for appellate brief concerning exhibit 4154 and whether or not SARMC waived its objection.

IDMH 1
DMH 0.1

Research and analysis for appellate brief concerning exhibit 4154 on issues of waiver and harmless error.
Research and analysis for appellate brief regarding exhibit 4154 and the harmless error rule
Preparation of CLE case summaries for W. Woodard.
--··
Conference with BWS attorneys on status of case.

I

2/22/2008

DMH 0.9

2/26/2008

DMH 3.8

2/27/2008

IDMH

3.8

004788

3/4/200~ ~-13.1
IDM~2.7

3/6/2008
3/6/2008
4/1/2008

--
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HRS

Description

Date

Staff

6/12/2008

DMH 1.2

Research regarding conflicting expert opinions creating a material issue of fact, thus precluding summary judgment.

6/13/2008
7/24/2008

DMH 1.5
tDMH 2

Research regarding conflicting expert opinion precluding summary judgment.
Research for Tom concerning possible employment claim for retaliation and/or interference with a perspective business

---

'

~ship

~~---=±

30.6

~
::~

7/3/2008

KAS

3

Meet with W. Woodard regarding case status; review briefing and begin revising citations to the record for appeal.

7/7/2008
7/10/2008
7/21/2008
7/22/2008

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

4.1
2.4
0.5
1.6

8/6/2008
8/7/2008

IKAS

2.7
4.5

Review of briefing and replacing citations to appeal record for use in briefing.
Review transcript and continue citing same to briefing for appeal.
Continue inserting citations to official record in briefing.
Continue review and revisions of citations to the trial transcript; telephone conference with Kristen at Judge Mclaughlin's
chambers regarding record.
Continue checking cites to the trial transcript for use in appeal briefing.
Prepare records to be sent to expert witness; telephone call to C. Lewis; continue inserting citations to official trial transcript
in brief for use in appeal.
Continue insertion of trial transcript citations into brief for use in appeal.
Continue revising briefing to reflect citations to the trial transcript for use in appeal brief.
Continue revisions to brief to include citations to trial transcript for use in appeal brief.
---Continue citations to t~e record for use in appeal brief.
Continue review of trial transcript and citations to the record for use in appeal brief.
Finalize citations to trial transcript for use in appeal brief.
-Telephone conference with Supreme Court clerk regarding briefing schedule.
Review appellate rules regarding briefing schedule.
Review rules regarding objection to oversize brief; research regarding response deadlines; review additions to the record.

IKAS
I

8/11/2008 KAS
8/12/2008 KAS
8/13/2008 KAS
8/14/2008 KAS
8/15/2008 KAS
8/18/2008 KAS
KAS
9/9/2008
- - - - - '----KAS
9/11/2008
9/12/2008 KAS

6.6
5.4
1.7
2.1
2.7
2
0.2
0.3
1.5

-~-

I

9/15/2oos IKAS

4.8

--

Letter to Dr. Prochaska; letter to C. Lewis; work on motion for extension of time; review appendix to briefing; update clerk's
record; work on affidavit for extension of time; email brief to C. Lewis.
-Review pleadings regarding clerk's record.
-Telephone conference with Supreme Court clerk regarding pending appeal and stay of briefing schedule.
Continue to revise citations to brief to include exhibits. -Review clerk's record; research regarding database of transcript and exhibits; review trial testimony for summarizing.

1.2
0.2
1.6
3.5

9/24/2008
9/25/2008

14.1- Work on Clerk's record; review trial transcript; prepare documents for use in respondent's brief.

004789

9/16/2008 KAS
9/17/2008 KAS
9/18/2008 ! KAS
9/22/2008 TKAS

r----

KAS
KAS

6.8

•

.

--

Research and review record and transcript for citations to use in respondent's briefing_.__
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

Description

9/26/2008
9/29/2008

KAS
KAS

5.9
5.9

9/30/2008
10/1/2008
10/2/2008
10/3/2008

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

1.2
1.5
1.2
0.5

Continue work on appeal including review of testimony and record for use in respondent's brief.
Letter to C. Lewis enclosing relevant documents; continue review of record and transcript for use in respondent's brief;
telephone conference with Felicia at Gjording's office regarding extension of time; revise motion for extension and begin
working on revised affidavit.
Continue record and transcript review for use in respondent's brief.
Revise motion for extension of time and affidavit; prepare motion and affidavit for oversized brief.
Review transcript and record for use in respondent brief.
Revise affidavits for extension of time and oversized briefing; file same with Supreme Court and serve upon counsel.

10/6/2008
10/9/2008
10/10/2008
10/13/2008
10/14/2008

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

1.9
1.2
0.9
2.1
3.6

10/15/2008
10/16/2008
10/17/2008
10/22/2008
10/23/2008
10/24/2008
10/27/2008
10/28/2008
10/29/2008

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

0.9
3.2
1.8
0.7
1.9
1.5
1.6
0.9
1.6

10/30/2008 KAS

2.3

Continue review of record and transcript for use in Respondent's brief; finalize motion for extension and affidavit in support;

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

0.8
2.8
1.1
1.2
1.6
1.2
1.9
2.4

Continue review of record and transcript regarding citations to the record for use in brief.
Review record and transcript for use in respondent's brief.
Prepare admitted exhibits for review.
Review record and transcript regarding citations to the record for respondent's brief.
Review record and transcript for use in respondent's brief.
Review records and transcript for respondent's brief.
Review transcript and record for use in statement of facts.
Review transcript regarding citations to the record for use in respondent's brief.
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10/31/2008
11/3/2008
11/7/2008
11/10/2008
11/11/2008
11/12/2008
11/13/2008
11/17/2008

Review record regarding Hammond motions in limine; review transcript regarding Dr. Prochaska testimony.
Review transcript regarding bad acts.
Work on citations to the record for brief.
Prepare citations to the record for respondent's brief; research regarding citations to record.
Review record for use in respondent's brief, in particular, motions regarding standing, deposition testimony and transcript
citations.
Research regarding citations to record and transcript for use in briefing.
Research record and transcript regarding citations for respondent's brief.
Continue review and research on transcript and record.
Review transcript for citations to record in respondent's brief.
Review record and transcript regarding exhibit 4333 stipulations.
Review record and transcript for documents and citations to be used in respondent's briefing.
Review transcript and record for citations for respondent's brief.
Review transcript and record for citations in Respondent's brief;
Telephone conference with S. Kenyon regarding extension (x2); Telephone conference with Jack Gjording assistant regarding
extension; revise motion for extension; revise affidavit in support of motion for extension;

•
e

EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

Description

11/19/2008
11/20/2008
11/21/2008
11/22/2008
11/24/2008

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

3.1
7.5
7.3
6.8
7.2

12/22/2008 KAS

0.7

Review Respondent's brief and insert citations to the record and transcript.
Revise respondent's brief to reflect citations to the record and transcript.
Revise respondent's brief; continue insertion of citations to the record.
Revise brief; work on citations to the record.
Finalize respondent's brief; prepare motion and affidavit for additional pages; telephone conference supreme court (x2);
telephone conference with Felicia at J. Gjording's office.
Telephone conference with J. Gjording's office; telephone conference with P. Miller's office; prepare brief for distribution.

12/23/2008 KAS

0.3
Telephone conference with Dr. Prochaska; email brief; review file regarding recipients for brief.
151.7

------

4.5
7.6

•

8/17/2009
8/18/2009

KAS
KAS

8/19/2009

IKAS
r--

2/3/2010
5/18/2010
7/2/2010
7/8/2010
7/9/2010
7/22/2010
7/27/2010
7/29/2010
8/2/2010

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

0.5
0.3
0.5
0.6
2.3
1.2
1.2
1.1
1.3

Review exhibits for minutes regarding 2023 extension; email same to M. Kushner.
·---Telephone conference with court regarding potential status conference.
·---------Finalize opposition to motion to strike and serve the same.
Work on PowerPoint presentation for hearing.
Attend hearing and assist with computer technology at same.
Review record to determine status of expert reports and testimony.
Review record regarding damages for use in briefing.
-Review record for relevant briefing and affidavits.
Prepare documents for review by B. Bakkes; review record regarding "definite term" for use in response briefing.

KAS
8/9/2010
8/16/2010 KAS
8/17/2010 KAS
8/18/2010 IKAS
8/20/2010 KAS
8/23/2010 KAS
8/24/2010 ! KAS
8/25/2010 KAS
8/27/2010 KAS

3.7
1.3
0.9
1.1
3.7
6.2
1.8
2.9

Review trial transcript for citations to brief.
Review record for citations for briefing; review transcript regarding the same.
Review records and provide additional citations for briefing.
Work on citations to the record for briefing.
Review brief regarding insufficiency; revise cites to the record; begin assembly of appendix.
Work on citations and appendix for briefs to be filed.
Continue working of citations for all briefing.
Work on citations for briefing and record review regarding the same.
Work on citations to briefing.
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4.1
16.2

[----

Pull relevant case law for preparation of Supreme Court arguments; review exhibits for use at argument.
Assist in preparation for oral argument including pulling relevant case law; preparing exhibits for use at hearing and
additional information to be used at argument.
Prepare for and attend oral argument at Supreme Court.

---
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EXHIBIT A

Date

Staff HRS

Description

8/30/2010
9/14/2010
9/15/2010
9/28/2010
9/29/2010

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

4.1
0.3
0.5
0.8
1.1
2.4
4.3
45.1

Finalize briefing and appendix to briefs.
Review regarding MRI Agreement; email to K. Marler regarding same.
Review exhibits regarding Code Blue issues and email documents to client.
Review exhibits for use at hearing on pending motions.
Research and obtain case law for use at hearing.
Work on presentation for hearing on pending motions.
Prepare for and attend hearing on pending motions.

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

1.5
0.3
0.7
1.8
0.3
0.5
0.5
0.6

3/29/2011 KAS
KAS
4/8/2011
KAS
4/13/2011
--------4/19/2011 KAS
KAS
5/6/2011
5/12/2011 KAS
--5/19/2011 KAS
KAS
6/3/2011
KAS
6/7/2011
6/15/2011 KAS
6/17/2011 KAS
6/20/2011 KAS

0.6
0.4
0.2
1.2
0.8
0.3
0.8
0.9
0.9
0.5
3.2
6.2

Review testimony and discovery regarding M. Steiner.
Review and forward relevant discovery motions to Thomas A. Banducci.
Review records regarding Steiner Expert Report.
Pull previous trial records and reorganize same.
Telephone conference with Bond Agent regarding same.
Research regarding previous agreements as to witness disclosures.
Review records for relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Telephone conference with J. Gjording assistant regarding production; letter to Budge; letter to Voth; prepare copies of
SARMC production for experts.
Convert documents provided by SARMC and forward same to experts.
Prepare document production; forward additional documents to experts.
Review file regarding previous settlement with Radiologists.
-------·--·
Review record and obtain copies of relevant filings for summary judgment motions.
Research regarding Henson and conflicts.
Re:cord review to obtain copy of juror questionnaire.
Pull relevant witness disclosures for MRIA and SARMC.
Prepare documents for production.
Update database with additional records.
Prepare documents for client review.
Review file; begin organization for trial.
Meet with counsel regarding strategy; draft assignment list; organization of war room and logistics; research witness
locations.
Telephone conference with Robert Bell regarding trial.
Draft retention letter to R. Bell.
Review filings from previous trial and locate witness preparation notebooks; relevant settlement agreement; revise trial
status sheet.

9/30/2010 I KAS
10/1/2010 KAS

r----

1/4/2011
1/5/2011
1/11/2011
1/31/2011
2/23/2011
3/21/2011
3/23/2011
3/28/2011

004792

6/21/2011
6/22/2011
7/5/2011

---~--

-

-----

----

KAS
KAS
KAS

0.5
0.4
2.1

- -

- -

-

- -
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

Description

7/6/2011

KAS

2.1

7/7/2011

KAS

5.8

KAS

7.2

letter to McFeeley regarding Agreement and Subpoenas; letter to Gjording regarding subpoenas; email trial testimony to B.
Bell; attend trial strategy meeting; work on trial preparation.
Prepare packages for witness preparation; draft letter to Gjording regarding exhibits and jury instructions; work on exhibits
and trial preparation; begin drafting subpoenas.
Work on trial preparation and witness location; review exhibits and lists to update same; telephone conference with court
clerk regarding exhibits.
,.---Work
on
trial
preparation
and
exhibit
organization
for
use
at
trial.
[----.
Work on trial preparation, exhibit review; review testimony at first trial; review deposition testimony; locate specific issue
exhibits;
Work on trial preparation; attend strategy meeting; work on trial subpoenas;
Revise and final motion to release exhibits; assist with transcript projects for trial; work on service of subpoenas; letter to
McFeeley regarding subpoenas; draft letters to Hopkins and Wallace regarding deposition and trial testimony; review
possible additional exhibits.
Work on trial preparation; exhibit review; review videos; prepare witness packages.
Work on trial preparation; review testimony; work on exhibits; work on witness location.
Prepare for McCarthy deposition; assemble relevant exhibits; telephone conference with Judge's clerk regarding original
exhibits; draft letter to J. Gjording regarding same; telephone confer_ence toP. Harneck;
Work on exhibits; sanction files; finalize subpoenas and draft letters to potential witnesses; arrange for service; revise witness
list; telephone conference with clerk regarding releasing exhibits from first trial; work witness binders; prepare records for
Dr. Giles' review; work on scheduling issues; letters to Anton and Wallace regarding meetings.

-·-

7/8/2011

-

7/9/2011
7/11/2011

KAS
KAS

2.5
7.1

7/12/2011
7/13/2011

KAS
KAS

6.2
7.3

7/14/2011
7/18/2011
7/19/2011

KAS
KAS
KAS

3
6.1
6.6

~-

--~

7/20/201~, ~j .1

7/21/2011 KAS
7/22/2011 KAS
7/25/201__!__LAS
7/26/2011 KAS

7.4
0.8
6.8
7.3

Continue trial preparation; exhibit updates and revisions to lists.
Work on exhibits and trial preparation.
Email experts; revise subpoenas; work on trial preparation; review and revise exhibits.
Work on trial preparation; revision to exhibits; revise witness list; work on witness locations; draft letter to J. Gjording.

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

7.1
8.1
8.1
7.2
8.2
6.1
7.4
7.8
8.4
1.2

Test equipment; prepare for trial; work on exhibits and witness list updates.
Review and redact exhibits; work on opening statements.
Prepare exhibits and revise timelines; preparation for focus group.
Prepare for and assist with focus group.
Work on exhibits; trial preparation and witness lists.
Work on exhibits and trial preparation.
Work on exhibits and trial preparation.
Finalize exhibits and witness lists; work on trial preparation.
Work on exhibits/witness lists; attend pretrial.
Work on trial preparation and exhibit revision.
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7/27/2011
7/28/2011
7/29/2011
7/30/2011
8/1/2011
8/2/2011
8/3/2011
8/4/2011
8/5/2011
8/8/2011

•
•

EXHIBIT A
Date

I

HRS

staff

Description

8/10/2011 I KAS

16.9

8/11/2011
8/12/2011

17.2
7.3
7.3
8.2

Work on power points and document retrieval for experts.
Work on trial preparation and mock jury issues.
Work on trial preparation; telephone conference with Dr. Henson; work on _opening.
Work on trial preparation; exhibits; and mock jury.
Attend and assist with mock jury presentation.
Work on exhibits; witness preparation; meet with Dr. Henson.

8.1

Work revisions to exhibit list; assist with witness preparation; work on demonstratives; attend trial strategy meeting.

I
8/17/2011 IKAS

0

8/18/2011 I KAS

9.2

Letter to J. Gjording; revise exhibit list; work on trial preparation; work on demonstratives; telephone conference to
Marshall's office regarding arrangements.
Draft letter to K. Duke regarding Jones Day; meet with counsel regarding strategy; prepare additional exhibits; work on

8/9/2011

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

8/13/2011
8/15/2011
8/16/2011 IKAS

!0.9

I

8/19/2011

KAS

8/20/2011

KAS
KAS

8/22/2011

8/24/2011 'KAS
8/25/2011 KAS
8/26/2011 KAS
8/27/2011 KAS
8/29/2011 KAS

r--·

-

6.9
1

5.3
9.1

--

witness preparation and assist with trial preparation.
Work on juror questionnaire; letter to counsel regarding the same; work on exhibits and trial preparation; telephone
conference with experts.
Work on electronic trial presentation.
Work on exhibits; work on trial preparation; assist clients with document review; meet with counsel regarding trial strategy;
letter to Judge Wetherell regarding questionnaire.

6.8
10.5
9.3

Revise McFeeley and Gjording letter; work on additional exhibits and document review.
Work on trial preparation._ Work on demonstratives.
Work on demonstratives; work on exhibits; prepare for trial.
Work on presentation documents; work on videos.
Work on trial preparation.

8/30/2011

KAS

4.3
8.2
9.4

8/31/2011
9/1/2011

KAS
KAS
KAS

9.9
9.8
9.6

Work on trial preparation, exhibits and witness scheduling.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial.

IKAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

3.2
7.4
9.4
11.1

Prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial; work on opening.
Work on trial preparation and opening statement.
Prepare for and attend trial.

KAS
KAS
,KAS

9.1
8.2

Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial.

10.2
3.8
11.1

Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.

--------

Work on trial preparation; attend meeting with all counsel regarding exhibits; meet with trial team regarding strategy.
-

9/2/2011
9/3/2011
9/4/2011
9/5/2011

004794

9/6/2011
9/7/2011

9/8/2011
9/9/2011
-9/11/2011
9/12/2011

KAS
KAS

~
___j

--·
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Date

Staff

9/13/2011 KAS
9/14/2011 KAS
9/15/2011 KAS
9/16/2011 KAS
9/18/2Q!!_j KAS
9/19/2011 KAS
9/20/2011 KAS
9/21/2011 KAS
9/22/2011 KAS
9/23/2011 KAS
9/25/2011 KAS

~---~

004795

9/26/2011
9/27/2011
9/28/2011
9/29/2011
9/30/2011
10/2/2011
10/3/2011
10/4/2011
~10/5/2011
10/11/2011
10/12/2011
10/13/2011
10/14/2011
10/17/2011
10/18/2011
10/19/2011
10/20/2011
10/21/2011
10/24/2011
10/25/2011
10/26/2011
10/27/2011
10/28/2011
10/30/2011
10/31/2011

I

KAS

I KAS

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

HRS

Description

10.3
8.2
7.6
10.7
2.4
6.2
10.7
8.3
4.1
11.2
1.8
10.7
10.2
6.1
2.1
10.7
3.1
11.2
10.3
3.7
12.2
8.2
8.6
11.2
11.1
10.9
8.2
3.2
11.1
11.2
10.6
8.2
6.2
13
2
0.5

Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on juror notebooks.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
-·
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Attend strategy meeting; prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare subpoena; prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Work on trial preparation and potential witness location.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Work on trial preparation.
--··
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; prepare for next witnesses.
Prepare for trial.
Preparefor and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on preparation for closing.
Prepare for closing arguments.
Prepare for and attend trial for closing arguments.
Revise exhibits for use in deliberations as to Eagle revisions.
Attend jury verdict.
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EXHIBIT A
Date

HRS

Staff

11/7/2011 KAS
11/10/2011 KAS
11/21/2011 KAS
f----

Description

Work on attorney fees and costs calculations.
6.5
Continue review of charges, expenses for use in attorney fees and costs affidavit.
6.2
2.1
Research juror locations.
706.6

1/3/2008

LFB

0.5

1/6/2008

LFB

4.5

1/7/2008

LFB

0.8

------------

Review St. Al's objections to revised fees and costs; draft email to Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard re: same;
phone call to F. Edwards re: color copy of objections.
Review Court's Register of Actions and analyze in comparison to records requested in SARMC's notice of appeal; attend
hearing on attorneys' fees and costs.
Compile documents for Thomas A. Banducci to review in preparation for the hearing re: revised fees and costs; compile posttrial motions hearing binders and Wade L. Woodard working copies for storage; phone call to Judge Mclaughlin's chambers
re: requesting a copy of the Court's motions index; email K. Brown in Judge's office re: same

I

LFB

1/9/2008

2

I

I
I

1/10/2008 ILFB
I

5.4

I
I
I
I

1/11/2008
1/14/2008
1/18/2008
1/21/2008
1/25/2008
1/28/2008

LFB
LFB
LFB
LFB
LFB
LFB

0.4
0.6
0.3
0.5
0.3
1.7

1/29/2008
1/30/2008

LFB
LFB

2.5
5

f--'---- -

Review Idaho Appellate Rules 25-28 re: transcripts and clerk's record; email correspondence with Court reporter regarding
request listing of hearing transcripts; compile and prepare color copy ofThomas A. Banducci's Affidavit of revised costs and
fees for J. Gjording
Compile and prepare color copy of Thomas A. Banducci's affidavit of revised costs and fees for J. Gjording; review email from
court reporter re: hearing transcripts and appeals record; continue reviewing St. Al's requests of the record and assist
Thomas A. Banducci with identifying counter requests per Rule 19; draft respondent's request for additional transcripts and
records
Draft letter to S. Kenyon- Clerk of Supreme Court re: appellate settlement conference
Review and sort filing boxes to be placed in storage
Draft letter to S. Kenyon- Clerk of the Supreme Court- re: response requesting appellate conference
Begin drafting request for appellate settlement conference form
Draft request for settlement conference form to the Supreme Court
Review Court's Memorandum Decision regarding revised fees and costs; Review previous ruling regarding Costs as a IVIatter
of Right and phone conference with Kristin and Shary in Judge's office re: clarification of exclusion regarding copies of
deposition transcripts; Draft letter to court re: same; compile versions of judgment for Wade L. Woodard to revise

004796

Revise calculations for costs as a matter of right per memorandum decisions
Review Court's clarification regarding attorneys fees and costs; revise costs as a matter of right in accordance with the
clarification; draft affidavit of Thomas A. Banducci in support of award of costs as a matter of right
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

2/6/2008

lFB

3.1

Office conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding St. Al's objections to the second amended judgment and Cindy Schamp
deposition testimony; draft [second proposed] second amended judgment and supporting affidavit; draft letter to Judge
Mclaughlin regarding second amended judgment; phone call to Kristin in Judge Mclaughlin's office regarding depositions

~:ished into the record; phone conference with J. Prochaska re: setting-up meeting with Thomas A. Banducci.
lFB

2/6/2008

2ju/20081LFB

0
1
I

----------

2/12/2008 lFB
2/14/2008 lFB
f-------'--- - ·
2/14/2008 lFB

0.1
0.2
0.4

lFB

3.4

2/19/2008 ILFB

2.2

2/16/2008

I

ail communication with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci regarding Schamp video deposition trial testimony;
Review St. Al's objections to proposed second amended judgment.
Phone conference with District Court clerk regarding status of Schamp deposition and clerk's exhibit/witness list produced for
Supreme Court; review Schamp trial testimony for references to published depositions.
Email court reporter regarding Cindy Schamp video transcript.
Review Court's exhibit and witness list.
Review St. Al's request for additional records, notice of hearing regarding second amended judgment, and alternative
proposed second amended judgment; email correspondence with K. Brown at District Court regarding St. Al's objection to
second amended judgment and hearing.
Email communication with court reporter regarding transcription of Schamp video deposition; compile exhibits and transcript
for same; review incoming correspondence; compile and organize electronic copies of depositions, hearing, and trial
transcripts.
------Continue organizing electronic copies of trial and hearing transcripts; email court reporters requesting copies in ptx format;
create cd for court reporter with Cindy Schamp's video testimony; phone and email communication with Associated
Reporting regarding conversion of ASCII trial transcripts into ptx format; organize electronic copies of trial exhibits.

•

··-

lFB

6

lFB

5.1

2/21/201LFB

3.7
I

2/25/2008 ILFB

5.3

2/26/2008 iLFB

4.7

2/20/2008

--

2/21/2008

004797

L__

I

Email correspondence with Associated Reporting regarding conversion of ASCII transcripts in ptx format; compile electronic
files for same; email correspondence with trial court reporters regarding electronic transcripts; compile exhibits for Brian D.
Knox's appeal research regarding settlement communications and hearsay; review trial notes and transcripts to create trial
log spreadsheet.
Continue review of trial transcripts and creation of tracking log; review testimony references to exhibits 4332 and 4154;
office conferences with Dari M. Huskey and Brian D. Knox regarding same.
Organize electronic trial transcripts; office conference with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding possible
settlement discussions; continue review of trial transcripts and creation of log; email court reporter regarding extension.
Continue review of trial transcripts and creation of trial log; compile testimony transcripts for Brian D. Knox regarding exhibit
4332.
Compile pleadings and transcripts for Brian D. Knox to review regarding various appeals issues; continue review of trial
transcripts and creation of trial summary log._
-
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

2/27/2008

LFB

1.6

Email Associated Reporting regarding conversion and consolidation of Schamp trial transcripts into a ptx file; review clerk's
register of actions against MRIA and SARMC's requests for clerk's record (regarding the omission of the July 13, 2007
memorandum decision); draft second supplemental request for additional clerk's record; compile pleadings for Brian D. Knox.

2/28/2008
2/29/2008
3/4/2008
3/6/2008
3/7/2008

LFB
LFB
LFB

0.5
0.4
0.3

LFB
LFB

1.5
3.5

Review trial testimony of Jeff Cliff relevant to discussions with C. Schamp.
Continue review of trial transcripts and creating of trial exhibit log.
Compile summary judgment briefing for Brian D. Knox's research on appeals issues.
Continue review of trial transcripts and creation of trial log spreadsheet; direction to runner regarding files.
Continue review of trial transcripts and creation of tracking log spreadsheet; direction to runner regarding updating files.

LFB

5.3

3/11/2008

LFB

0.3

3/24/2008
3/28/2008

LFB
LFB

0.6
1.9

3/31/2008
4/1/2008

LFB
LFB

0.5
0.6

4/4/2008

LFB

1

Office conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding clerk's record and page limit rules for appeals briefing; telephone call to
appeals clerk regarding rule clarification; continue drafting third supplemental request for clerk's record.

4/7/2008

LFB

0.6

4/23/2008

LFB

2.6

4/28/2008

LFB

1.1

4/30/2008

LFB

0.4

lLFB

0.2

Office conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding clerk's record; finish drafting third supplemental request for clerk's
record; revise working copy of clerk's register of actions to reflect all record requests.
Review trial exhibit database; compile missing exhibits and create descriptive placeholders for demonstrative exhibits; review
Manfred Steiner testimony regarding exhibit no. 594.
Load missing trial exhibits into Concordance database; review and analysis of same; review St. Al's request for additional
transcripts.
Review notices from Supreme Court regarding deadlines to file clerk's record and transcript; telephone call to clerk regarding
same; email attorneys with update regarding same:
Email Tammy Hohenleitner regarding Cindy Schamp video deposition designations and related exhibits.

--·-----

3/10/2008
c------

-------

004798

5/5/2008

Compile additional transcripts for Brian D. Knox relevant to Exhibit 4332; conference with Brian D. Knox regarding same;
review trial transcripts and finish updating trial tracking log.
Review memo. from Karen Marler regarding St. Al's CDweb; phone call to Karen Marler to set up telephone conference with
Thomas A. Banducci.
Review email correspondence and client memos regarding CD Web issues; compile same for file.
-Create outline of case and key entities, persons, and facts for S. Smith; conference with S. Smith to discuss case background
and summary of trial proceedings.
---Compile background documents and pleadings for S. Smith to review.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci regarding appeals issues; review District Court clerk's witness
and deposition list and check against trial log spreadsheet; draft third supplemental request for additional clerk's records.
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Date

Staff

HRS

5/8/2008

LFB

0.8

Review Supreme Court Clerk's order suspending record and transcript due date; telephone call with Dorothy Beaver at
Supreme Court Clerk's office regarding same and new deadline schedule for the record and transcript; conference with
Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding same; update docket calendar; begin reviewing Prochaska testimony
and drafting insert for briefing regarding formation of MRIA.
-0.9
Review appellate rule 34 regarding briefing deadlines; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding same; telephone call to
Supreme Court Clerk's office regarding same; calendar briefing schedule and prepare list of deadlines for distribution.

I

5/12/2008

Description

LFB

·-

1-----

5/16/2008
5/28/2008

LFB
LFB

0.3
2

LFB
LFB

1.5
3.1

LFB
LFB

1.5
0.7
0.3

f---------

5/31/2008
6/2/2008
-

6/4/2008
6/5/2008
6/10/2008

c---

ILFB

6/11/20081LFB-

2.4

6/16/2008- tLFB

0.8

004799

6/25/2008
6/26/2008

•

2.5 t:ntinue review of pre-trial hearing transcripts for objections and corrections; telephone call to Dorothy Beaver at Supreme

I
6/12/2008 ILFB

6/24/2008

Compile proposed jury instructions and related transcripts for Wade L. Woodard.
Call Ed Whitelaw's office to schedule telephone conference; compile and email documents to Whitelaw regarding same;
continue reviewing Prochaska testimony.
---·
Review hearing transcripts for objections and corrections.
Review appeal transcript indexes; review appellate rules regarding objections and corrections to the clerk's record and
transcripts; direction to Bridge City regarding printing transcript and organization into binders.
Continue review of hearing transcripts and related memorandum decisions for objections and corrections.
Compile briefing for Brian D. Knox regarding spoliation claim.
Telephone call to ECONorthwest regarding telephone conference with Ed Whitelaw; telephone call to Brad Thies at the
District Court clerk's office regarding the record; conference with WadeL. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.

LFB

4

LFB
LFB

2.2
3.6

_j

Court clerk's office regarding District Court's motion for extension of time on the record; draft email memorandum to office
regarding same.
__
Continue review of pre-trial hearing transcripts for objections and corrections; telephone conference with Ed Whitelaw, Ed
McMullan, Bryce Ward, Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard; compile ECONorthwest reports and related subpoenas
for Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard to review.
Review correspondence from Jack Gjording regarding brief deadline extension; review files for conformed copies of MRIA's
opposition to motion in limine regarding Shattuck Hammond and motion in limine regarding purchase price damage theory
as requested by Felicia Edwards; telephone call to Felicia Edwards regarding same; telephone call to Brad Thies at District
Court regarding same; email conformed copies of opposition briefs to Brad Thies; finalize and return new contract with
ECONorthwest.
Telephone call to Supreme Court Clerk's office regarding extension of time for the record; revise briefing schedule, docket,
and draft email to Thomas A. Banducci and WadeL. Woodard regarding same; continue compiling working copy of trial
transcript and reviewing transcript for objections and corrections.
Continuereview of transcript, creation of working copy.
Review electronic appeal transcript received from Tammy Hohenleitner; direction to Bridge City regarding printing and
compiling transcript volumes into working copy for WadeL. Woodard; finish reviewing appeal transcript and drafting list of
corrections; begin reviewing record from District Court.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

6/27/2008

LFB

4

Review record from district court and cross-check against records requests; conference with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas
A. Banducci regarding same; telephone call to Felicia Edwards at Gjording Fauser regarding organization of record; telephone
call to Brad Thies at district court regarding same.
------Office conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding appeal record and transcript; review exhibit to appeal record regarding
affidavits and memoranda and cross reference with requests for portions of the record; compile working copies of appeal
transcript for WadeL. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci.
Continue review of exhibits to the appeal record and cross check against record requests; review District Court list of
admitted exhibits and cross check against Concordance database and court reporter's list of admitted exhibits; telephone call
to Brad Thies at District Court regarding omission of Court's draft jury instructions from the record; office conference with
Aaron Flake from Bridge City regarding copying the appeal record into binders for attorneys' use; begin compiling pleadings
designated as "exhibits to the record."

'

6/30/2008

LFB

5

LFB

5

-------

·----~

7/1/2008

I

LFB

2
3
0.3
5

7;8/2008

ILFB

1

7/9/2008

LFB

1.2

7/10/2008

LFB

1

7/11/2008

LFB

2

7/14/2008

LFB

3.5

7/15/2008

LFB

2.3

7/2/2008
7/3/2008
7/3/2008
7/7/2008

LFB
LFB
LFB
I

Continue compiling pleadings designated as "exhibits to the record."
Continue compiling pleadings designated as "exhibit to the appeal record."
Telephone call to Margaret Kushner regarding judgment and remitter; compile documents for her to review.
Continue compiling pleadings and documents designated in the "certificate of exhibits" to the appeal record; direction to
Bridge City vendor regarding same.
-·--Continue compiling documents designated as exhibits to the appeal record; email and phone communication with Bridge City
regarding same; telephone to Brad Thies at District Court regarding obtaining copies of records that we are unable to locate;

•

--

-----

004800

I

Continue compiling documents marked as exhibits to the appeal record; telephone calls to Bridge City regarding copying and
assembling working copies of same.
Finish drafting notes regarding objections and correction to the appeal transcript and record; office conference with Wade L.
Woodard regarding same.
--Begin drafting stipulation for additions and corrections to the record and transcript; review trial transcript regarding
admission of Finnerty memo.
Continue working on stipulation for corrections and additions to the appeal transcript and clerk's record; review working
copies of exhibits to the record and correct missing and incorrect pleadings; review St. Al's objections to the clerk's record.
Continue reviewing St. Al's objections and additions to the record; continue drafting stipulations for additions and corrections
to the appellate record and transcript; draft letter to Jack Gjording regarding same; finish reviewing working copy binders of
exhibits to the record.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

7/16/2008

LFB

3.5

Telephone communication with Brad Thies regarding augmentation to record; review new Plaintiff exhibit list being
augmented to the record and compare to previous version; telephone call to Kristin Brown (Judge Mclaughlin's clerk)
regarding Plaintiff exhibit list; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding stipulation for additions and corrections to
-~ord;

7/17/2008

LFB

------

_j

3

=-- _r_
LFB

7/18/2008

draft letter to Jack Gjording regarding same and fax revised version; index Thomas A. Banducci and WadeL.
oodard's working copies of the appeal transcript.
-, ntinue indexing Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard's working copies of appeal transcript; draft objection to
reporter's transcript and request for additional items; draft affidavit of Wade L. Woodard in support of objection; conference
with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; prepare filing and exhibits to affidavit.
Email communication with Tammy Hohenleitner regarding objection to transcript; finish indexing Thomas A. Banducci's
working copy of appeal transcript.

0.6

I

I

151.9

--

1

--

LH
7/6/2011
LH
7/7/2011
LH
7/8/2011
7/11/2011 LH
7/12/2011 ILH
7/13/2011 LH
7/18/2011 LH
7/19/2011 LH
7/20/2011 LH
-----

LH

7/21/2011

r

3 -t::~ished contacts for focus juries; meeting discussing responsibilities going forward.
2
Established contacts for focus juries; conversion of trial transcripts to outlines for September trial.
6
Established contacts for focus juries; converted trial transcripts to preparation outlines for September trial.
Converted trial transcripts into outlines for use at September trial; developed contacts for focus juries.
8
Developed contacts for focus juries.
3
Developed contacts for focus juries.
2
7
Compiled exhibit lists and binders for use in depositions and at trial.
----1
Compiled exhibit binders for use at trial; created questioning transcripts for use in examinations.
7
7
Compiled exhibit binders for use at trial; created questioning transcripts for use in examinations; compiled and narrowed
down members for July 30 focus jury.
9
Created deposition summary for use in examinations; made selections and communications with members of first focus jury. 1
7

LH
LH

2
7

LH

6.5

7/28/2011 ILH

16.5

r--

004801

7/27/2011

I

7/29/2011 i LH

•

·-----

7/fi/2011 LH
7/25/2011
7/26/2011

-------

6.5

Created deposition summary for use in examinations; made selections and communications with members of first focus jury;
prepared documents for use in mock trials.
Organized potential members of August 13 focus jury and made contacts.
Attended weekly meeting; reviewed answer to third amended counterclaim for analysis of affirmative defenses; reviewed
depositions for compiling witnesses.
Reviewed depositions to prepare for upcoming depositions and trial examinations; maintained contacts with focus jury
members.
Reviewed depositions to prepare for upcoming depositions and examinations; drafted and sent out final notice to all focus

ljury members.
Finalized forms and contacts for July 30 focus jury; reviewed depositions to prepare for upcoming depositions and
1examinations.
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Staff

HRS

Description

8/1/2011

LH

6

8/2/2011

LH

7

8/3/2011

LH

7

8/4/2011

LH

6.5

8/8/2011
8/9/2011
8/10/2011

LH
LH
LH

6.5
5
7

LH
LH

7
7.5

Reviewed depositions to prepare for upcoming depositions and examinations; researched past exhibits in preparation for
trial.
Reviewed trial transcript for exhibit admission and stipulations; summarized findings of focus jury; followed up with potential
August 13 focus jury participants.
Drafted letter to opposing council regarding exhibit stipulations; reviewed and summarized depositions for upcoming
examinations; followed up with focus jury participants and analyzed feedback.
Drafted memorandum regarding admissibility of statements made by settling party; reviewed and summarized depositions in
preparation for upcoming examinations.
Corresponded with August 13 focus jurors; summarized deposition for use in upcoming examination.
Corresponded with August 13 focus jurors; summarized deposition to prepare for upcoming examination.
Corresponded with August 13 focus jurors and other attendees; summarized deposition to prepare for upcoming
examination.
Corresponded with focus jurors; summarized depositions to prepare for upcoming examinations.
Corresponded with focus jurors; set up and preparation for focus jury; summarized depositions to prepare for upcoming
examinations.

I

8/11/2011
8/12/2011
i

•

149
f---

3/28/2008
4/1/2008

f--

r--

004802

8/22/2011
8/23/2011
8/29/2011
8/30/2011
8/31/2011
9/1/2011
9/2/2011
9/3/2011
9/4/2011
9/5/2011
9/10/2011
9/19/2011
9/20/2011
--'-10/7/2011
10/10/2011

SES
SES

1.5
0.6
2.1

Meeting with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding SARMC v. MRIA case background and trial.
Review second amended complaint.

SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES

6.2
5.7
6.2
7.2
6.9
5.2
6.4
7.5
8.3
9.2
3.2
6.8
5.5
8
2.2

Search for documents to be included as exhibits.
Search for exhibits.
Various tasks for trial preparation.
Various tasks for trial preparation.
Various trial preparations.
Assist with trial preparations.
Trial preparation.
Jury research.
Jury research.
Juror research; meet with trial team.
Trial preparation.
Trial preparation and attendance.
Trial preparation and attendance.
Attend trial in Kathy A. Savell's place
Search for documents relevant to Havlina's testimony.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

94.5

---------- - - - - - -

--

------

--

1/3~2008

ITAB

1/4/2008

TAB

1

1/8/2008

TAB

2.1

Telephone conference Jack Gjording regarding hearing and review notice of hearing. review research on suprsedeas bond an~
conditional appeal.
_
Prepare for and attend hearing on stay and hearing on objections to fees and costs. Review transmittals from court.

1/9/2008

TAB

1.1

Review notice of appeal and check the rules regarding record designation. Call from Gjordi ng regarding stipulated amo unt.1

1/10/2008

TAB

2

1/15/2008
1/24/2008

TAB

2.5

Review designated record on appeal. Supplement record and transcript. Telephone conference with Jack Gjording regarding
supersedeas bond amount.
Conference with Joe Messmer rearrangements for appeal. NO CHARGE

TAB
TAB

0.3
1.5

Conference with Havlina regarding status of appeal.
Review court order on costs and fees. Conference with WadeL. Woodard and Lauren F. Blaesing regarding final judgment and
costs as a matter of right. Call to L.C. Trout. Edit letter to court regarding deposition copy costs.

TAB

0.8

Telephone conference with Jim Prochaska. Telephone conference with J. Mclaughlin regarding costs as a matter of right.
Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding same.
Review court order and conferences with Lauren F. Blaesing and Wade L. Woodard regarding affidavits and final judgment

1/28/2008

1.5

Telephone conference with Aaron Katz (Credit Suisse). Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding SARMC's objection to
acceptance of remittitur. Telephone conference with Jack Gjording

I

•

--

I

I

1/29/2008

I

1/30/2008

TAB

0.7

2/1/2008

TAB

1.2

2/4/2008

TAB

0.6

2/5/2008

TAB

1.8

--·--

---

2/11/2008

TAB

0.7

-·----

004803

2/12/2008

2/13/2008

TAB

3.2

Conferences Lauren F. Blaesing regarding affidavit-for fees; edit affidavit; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing and Wade L.
Woodard regarding supplementation of record raised by augmentation requested by SARMC.
Telephone conferences with Lauren F. Blaesing and Wade L. Woodard regarding judgment and affidavit in support of motion
for costs.
Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding amended judgment and transcript; conference regarding Schamp testimony;
review correspondence from the court; edit letter to court; work on retainer agreement.
Edit retainer agreement and email to Prochaska; review order signed by court to stay execution and email to Wade L.
Woodard.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding order of stay and telephone call to Gjording; meeting with client and Harad.
Calls to Gjording; email to Wade L. Woodard and Lauren F. Blaesing regarding hearing on objection to second amended
judgment.
·-------

TAB

0.9

Telephone conference with Jack Gjording regarding supersedeas bond and hearing on the judgment; conference with Wade
L. Woodard regarding post judgment interest and review objection to judgment proposed by Gjording.
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HRS

Description

2/15/2008
2/16/2008

TAB

13

NO CHARGE-Conference with Jim Prochaska.
NO CHARGE- conference with Wade L. Woodard and edit retainer agreement and telephone conference with Jim Prochaska.

2/18/2008
2/20/2008

TAB
TAB

1.8
2

Conference with consultants and telephone conference with Pulliam regarding footnote.
I
Review case on RUPA (first case on RUPA from ld. Supreme Court); conference with Prochaska regarding various issues on
appeal; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding Sam Gibson testimony; telephone conference with court clerk regarding
rescheduling hearing; calls to identify cost of supersedeas bond; call to Gjording; conference regarding harmless error;
admissibility of settlement agreements.

,Yl}/2008 ITAB

2.4

TAB

1.7

Correspondence and order resetting hearing; meeting with Gjording.
Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing and Wade L. Woodard regarding meeting with Gjording and telephone conference with

TAB

1.8

··-

2/22/2008

2/26/2008

~TAB

2/28/2008
2/28/2008

client (Prochaska) regarding meeting with Gjording. Review court notice and schedule order.
0.8

TAB

0.3

TAB

0.4
0.5

2/29/2008lTAB
I

3/4/2008
3/13/2008
3/14/2008
3/17/2008
3/22/2008
3/25/2008
4/14/2008

Voice mail from Gjording, correspondence from Gjording and email with court regarding hearing; telephone conference with
Prochaska and email to Drury.
Telephone conference with Dave Giles regarding S. Bruce.
-·-Telephone conference with Karen Marler.
--~-----

Review supersedeas bond. Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing; telephone conference with Giles regarding contacting
Messmer regarding S. Bruce.

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

0.2
0.2
0.2
1
0.2

Telephone conference with Joe Messmer
Review orders from court regarding record and transcript.

TAB

0.7

Conference with Brian D. Knox regarding duty owed to Limited Partnership.
Email exchange with Prochaska regarding status; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding retention of Schroeder.

TA~0.3

-

Conference wi_t_h_Lauren F. Blaesing regarding supplementation of record.
Presentation to MRIA employees regarding trial and appeal.
Review emails regarding transcript and record.

--

-----

4/17/2008
5/12/2008
- -

TAB

10.4

TAB

0.4

Telephone conference with Prochaska; review minutes.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding briefing deadlines and research on harmless error in instructions.

1--

TAB
TAB

0.8
0.5

6/10/2008 ITAB
I

1.3

6/13/2008

0.4
0.9

Telephone conference with Gjording regarding briefing schedule.
Telephone conference with Prochaska and attend board meeting.

0.7

Telephone conference with Barbara Nay and Margaret Kushner.
Page 37 of 62

004804

5/21/2008
5/28/2008

lr

AB

6/17/2008 ITAB
6/27/200SITAB

•

Conference with Prochaska regarding law firm selection for deal; telephone conference with Barbara Nay.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard and telephone conference with Ed Whitelaw.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard and call to Gjording regarding briefing schedule. Review of materials prepared by Wade L.
Woodard on issues for appeal.

__

__

- -

- -

-

-

-

•

EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff HRS

7/8/2008
7/14/2008
c---cc--7/17/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB

1.3
3.3
0.5

Telephone conference with Kushner and Nay
Review transcript.
Telephone conferences with Jack Gjording and conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding missing instructions.

7/20/2008
9/9/2008
9/10/2008
9/11/2008
9/15/2008
9/20/2008
9/22/2008
9/23/2008
9/24/2008
9/25/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

2
6.2
3.5
5
1.1
2
3.2
2.2
3.9
4.1

TAB

3.8

Review transcript.
Transcript review.
Review transcript.
Review transcript.
Review record and brief; conference Wade L. Woodard and telephone conference Prochaska.
Review SARMC's brief.
Review brief and conference with Wade L. Woodard and telephone conference with Craig Lewis.
Work on brief; conference with Wade L. Woodard.
Review prior filed motion for summary judgment briefing on wrong_ful dissociatio~; work on appellate brief.
-Review jury instructions, conference Wade L. Woodard; review jury instruction conferences; develop arguments regarding
lost profits and MRIA's right to recover lost profits.
I
Conference with K. Savell and Dara Labrum regarding arguments and support for arguments that MRIA entitlement for lost
profits is supported by the record and not raised as an issue until appeal; draft outline for argument.

9/27/2008
9/28/2008
9/29/2008
10/1/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

3.7
3.4
2.6
1.2

Work on brief. Work on brief.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding brief organization.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding wrongful dissociation arguments and stipulation for extension of time.

10/2/2008
10/3/2008

TAB
TAB

6.8
2.8

10/4/2008
10/5/2008
10/6/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB

3.2
4.6
3.7

10/7/2008
10/8/2008
10/9/2008
10/10/2008
-10/11/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

2.8
1.4
4.2
1.9
2.6

Work on summary of facts and conferences with Wade L. Woodard.
Conference Wade L. Woodard regarding brief organization; "taint" argument and motion to extend time and length of brief;
review transcript and work on outline for fact section.
Work on summary of facts
Work on summary of facts and review transcript.
Conference Wade L. Woodard regarding SBB's admission regarding restrictive covenants; review Lewis outline; transcript
review and emails with WadeL. Woodard.
-Review transcript and conferences with Wade L. Woodard regarding new trial standard and remittitur.
Review transcript and conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding brief.
Review transcript and work on brief outline.
Review dissociation arguments drafted by Wade L. Woodard; continue work on brief.
Review Wade L. Woodard's draft of initial sections of brief and comment/edit; review of causation evidence and argument.

f----

9/26/2008

Description

=J

=---==

r----------

•

-

004805

- -
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Date

Staff HRS

004806

10/12/2008 TAB
10/13/2008 TAB
1---10/14/2008 TAB
10/14/2008 TAB
TAB
10/20/2008
------'-----10/21/2008 TAB
-'
10/22/2008 TAB
10/23/2008 TAB
r------10/25/2008 TAB
10/27/2008 TAB
TAB
11/2/2008 1---11/3/2008 TAB
11/4/2008 TAB
11/5/2008 TAB
11/6/2008 TAB
11/8/2008 TAB
11/10/2008 TAB
11/11/2008 TAB
11/13/2008 TAB
11/14/2008 TAB
11/15/2008 TAB
11/16/2008 TAB
11/17/2008 TAB
11/18/2008 TAB
11/19/2008 TAB
11/20/2008 TAB
11/21/2008 TAB
11/22/2008 TAB
11/23/2008 TAB
11/24/2008 TAB
12/23/2008 TAB

1/3/2009
1/8/2009

1

TAB
TAB

Description

3.7
0.9
1.2
1.1
1.7
2.2
0.3
2.9
4.1
2.4
3.9
2.5
0.9
1.3
1.6
6.1
2.4
5.5
4.7
2.9
5.2
4.7
1.9
2.8
4.6
5.7
5.2
4.7
3.8
5.9
1.7
230.3

Review transcript and work on damages argument.
Conference Wade L. Woodard regarding brief organization and edit arguments.
Review Wilhoite testimony; conference K. Savell regarding motions concerning real party in interest.
Telephone conferences with Wendy Engels (Mercer), Nay and Kushman.
Transcript review.
Review transcript and telephone conference with Wade L. Woodard.
Conference Wade L. Woodard regarding brief.
Review draft of settlement letter argument; conference with Prochaska; work on introduction to brief.
Work on brief and conference with WadeL. Woodard.
Conference with Prochaska regarding status of brief; conference with Wade L. Woodard and work on brief
Work on brief.
Conferences with WadeL. Woodard regarding disgorgement; work on brief.
Work on brief and telephone conference with Wade L. Woodard.
Work on brief.
Work on brief
Work on brief.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard; work on brief.
Work on brief and conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding same.
Work on brief.
Work on brief.
Work on brief.
Work on brief.
Work on brief and conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding causation arguments.
Work on brief and Board meeting discussion.
Work on brief.
·Work on brief.
Work on brief.
Work on brief.
Work on brief.
Finalize and serve brief.
Review brief and conference with Wade L. Woodard

2.1
0.5

Review and comment on brief.
Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner; email to Kushner and Prochaska after review of Mercer reports.

·--------

----

~··---

•
------

I
I
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I

Staff HRS

Description

I

I

1/25/2009 ITAB

11.1

IReview brief.

1/30/2009 [TAB
TAB
-2/9/2009
12/20/2009 TAB
8/12/2009 . TAB
8/14/2009 TAB
8/15/?:_009 TAB
8/16/2009 TAB
8/17/2009 TAB
8/18/2009 TAB
8/19/2009 TAB

'0.6
0.3
0.5
4.4
4.7
4
4.5
8
112
6

Review brief
Conference wi~h Dara Labrum regarding response to motion to strike
Review response to objection.
Prepare for appeal
Prepare for oral argument.
Prepare for oral argument
Prepare for oral argument.
Prepare for oral argument
Prepare for oral argument
Prepare for and attend Supreme Court hearing and meeting with clients.

8/24/2009 fAB
10/21/2009 TAB

0.5
2.5

Telephone conference with in house counsel (CHI) regarding oral argument.
Review appeal; telephone conference with James Prochaska M.D. and conference with Benjamin A. Schwartzman.

I

I--

10/22/2009 TAB
10/27/2009 TAB
11/3/2009 TAB

2.5
3.2
0.5
57.9

1

1

1/11/2010

TAB

1/18/2010

TAB

0.6
1
1

1/20/2~TAB

1/20/2010

1.1
3.9

TAB

1/25/2010 TAB ~
1/28/2010 .TAB 0.9
1/28/2010

TAB

3

=I
____ _

----~-------------------------------------

I

---1

Review decision and conference with Dara Labrum.
Prepare for and attend meeting with board- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner regarding MRIM.

f-----------

~---=---------------------

··I
I

TelephOne conTe;:ence Tim Borton (CHI) regarding appeal.

---------

Telephone conference with Tim Gorman {CHI) and counsel for CHI regarding status of appeal and sale of Mercy and HR to
Trinity.
Meet with M RIA juror.
Review chart from Kushner and transfer restrictions memorandum; meeting with Prochaska and call to B. Nay.
Telephone conferences with Prochaska; review materials from Prochaska.
Telephone conference client and conference Wade L. Woodard regarding judge; review law on release of bond.
Telephone conference with Kushner regarding CHI/Trinity transaction; telephone conference with client.
Conference with Margaret Kushner and review transfer restrictions and email regarding lease extensions
--------------------------------=---~~- ------------------------1
Telephone conference with Gjording and Ayers; check on Wetherell's background

11/29/2010 ITAB 0.6
1/29/2010 TAB 1.5
2/1/2010
TAB 11.2
~
"-------+------+------+-T_e_lephone
conference with Margaret Kushner and Tim Gorman.
1--------'-cReview materials from Kushner; email exchange with Kushner and conference with Wade L. Woodard.
2/3/2010
'1TAB 10.5
----+-ITAB 12
Telephone conference with Gjording and Ayers; telephone conference Budge and Wilhoite and conference with Kathy A.
2/3/2010
_
~veil regarding materials to be sent.
------------------------------------------------2/16/2010 ITA812 IMeeting with Board.
2/17/2010 TA~3 I Prep~re for and attend status conference.
-------t
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

Description

3/9/2010
3/10/2010
3/15/2010

TAB
TAB
TAB

0.3
0.9
0.9

Correspondence with Margaret Kushner.
Review correspondence from Kushner and telephone conference Gorman and Prochaska.
Review emails and telephone conference with Prochaska regarding his call with Gorman and email exchange with Kushner.

3/16/2010
3/16/2010
3/17/2010

TAB
TAB
TAB

0.8
3.5
0.7

Review memorandum by Dara Labrum regarding amending counterclaim.
Telephone conferences with Kushner and Prochaska; attend MRIA board meeting.
Review materials from Kushner and telephone conference Prochaska.

3/18/2010
3/19/2010
4/19/2010
5/5/2010
!----5/11/2010
5/12/2010

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

0.3
0.2
0.6
0.6

Telephone conference with Gjording and email to Prochaska regarding judgment on costs.
Review email from Messmer and Prochaska.
Review letters from Gorman; email to B. Nay.

-'

TAB
TAB

0.5
1.2
1.2

TAB

0.3

TAB

0.9

6/11/2010
6/15/2010
6/21/2010
7/1/2010

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

0.5
0.3

7/5/2010

TAB
TAB

1
1
2.1

5/18/2010
5/19/2010
5/24/2010

7/6/2010
7/7/2010
7/8/2010
7/9/2010
7/15/2010
7/15/2010

I

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

1.2
1.5

2.5
3
1
0.5
1

7/21/2010

TAB

2.5

004808

7/20/2010

TAB
TAB

~
wi:...

Conference with WadeL. Woodard regarding status conference.
~:nConference with Wade L. Woodard and Prochaska regarding status.
Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner.
Telephone conference with Ayers and review correspondence from Ayers regarding scheduling order; respond with letter to
Ayers.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding status and experts.
Telephone conference Prochaska regarding confidentiality agreement and telephone conference Kushner and Prochaska;
review confidentiality stipulation.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard and edit letter to Ayer.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding meeting with board.
Conference with Dara Labrum regarding motion filed by SARMC and telephone conference Gjording.
Review brief in opposition to motion to strike; conference with WadeL. Woodard and Dara labrum; telephone confer~ I
Gjording's office
Draft discovery for SARMC
Conference with Dara Labrum and Wade L. Woodard regarding reply to SARM's reply brief
Telephone conference Bruce Budge; edit discovery requests; conference with Dara Labrum regarding PowerPoint for Friday's
hearing; conference with W. Woodard
Prepare for hearing on motion to strike
Prepare for and attend hearing
Meeting with Giles regarding Mercy Hospital issues
Meeting with Giles
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding briefing schedule; review discovery draft and review briefing on damages for
discussion with experts and W. Woodard
Review materials relative to damages; telephone conference Prochaska and conference Wade L. Woodard regarding briefing
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

7/23/2010

TAB

2.5

7/27/2010
7/30/2010

TAB

0.4

Telephone conference Kushner; edit 4th Am. Complaint; conference with Dara Labrum; review motion to amend scheduling
order; and edit written discovery; call to Bob Bakes
Telephone conference Bob Bakes and conference with Dara Labrum regarding filing various motions
--Conferences Wade L. Woodard regarding damages briefing and email to Dara Labrum regarding motion to amend;
correspondence with Kushner regarding settlement discussions
Meeting with Bakes and conference with Wade L. Woodard.
Conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding briefing on partnership for term; email to Dara Labrum regarding motion to
amend and follow-up on meeting schedule with experts.
Briefing from SARMC.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding briefing on conspiracy and telephone conference Prochaska; review email from
Kushner.
Review and edit memorandum regarding lost profits
Conference with Dara Labrum and Wade L. Woodard regarding briefs and review email from Bakes.
Attend board meeting; review briefs.
Meeting with Bakes; review and edit arguments.
Review briefs.
Begin review of briefing for argument.
Review briefing and prepare for oral argument; call to Gjording.
Prepare for oral argument
Final preparation and oral argument.
Meeting with Bakes.

TA~{;_
TAB
TAB

1.5
0.3

TAB
TAB

2.1
1

8/22/2010
8/24/2010
8/25/2010
8/26/2010
8/27/2010
9/28/2010
9/29/2010
9/30/2010
10/1/2010
10/7/2010
---

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
I TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

3.2
1.1
3.9
2.5
1.7
1.5
3.2
8.5
5.9
1
93.9

1/5/2011
1/11/2011

TAB

1

TAB

3.3 -h~ deposition testimony, discovery responses and trial testimony of Steiner and review motion to compel discovery.

1/12/2011

TAB

11.4

1/14/2011
1/18/2011
1/20/2011
1/21/2011
1/22/2011
1/27/2011
2/1/2011

TAB 0.2
TAB 1.3
TAB 0.4
- - - --·
TAB 0.4
TAB 1.1
- - - r-TAB 0.3
TAB 1.8

8/2/2010
8/5/2010
8/9/2010
8/20/2010
----

--

-···

Review of discovery motion.

004809

Conference with Wade l. Woodard regarding scheduling order requested by SARMC; review Steiner report; and deposition
testimony.
Telephone conference with Gjording's office regarding hearing date
Meeting with Dara L. Parker and Wade L. Woodard regarding motion to reopen discovery.
Telephone conference with Dvorak regarding collection of costs.
Telephone conference with Prochaska regarding recovery of costs.
Reviewmemorandum to oppose reopening discovery.
Draft response to Dvorak letter for client.
··-------Review and edit briefing; conference with Dara Parker; telephone conference with Prochaska and send letter to Dvorak.
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Staff

Date

TAB
2/8/2011
TAB
2/9/2011
TAB
2/14/2011
f--'------'-2/21/2011 TAB
2/22/2011 TAB
2/23/2011 TAB
2/24/2011 TAB
f----'2/25/2011 TAB

~---

TAB

3/30/2011

HRS

Description

1.7
2.7
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.8
1.1
0.9

Meet with Wade L. Woodard and Dara Parker regarding hearing and review our briefing.
Prepare for and attend hearing.

9

I
I

TAB

4/2/2011
4/6/2011
-4/11/2011

2.4
1.4
1.1

TAB
TAB
'

:12/20:_[TAB 2.2
4/13/2011

~AB

4/W2011

ITA~~-:

4/21/2011 ITAB
4/22/2011 ,TAB
I

1.3

1.3

'I

004810

4/26/2011
4/27/2011

4/29/2011

TAB
TAB

------

Telephone conference with Gjording and review letter from Gjording.
Attend MRIA Board meeting to discuss status of SARMC v. MRIA case.
Meet with Bruce Budge and Charles Wilhoite regarding damages.
Telephone conference with SARMC counsel and conference with WadeL. Woodard regarding various discovery issues.

------------~--------------

-------·--

Review and edit motion for summary judgment response; conference with WadeL. Woodard regarding same; review
discovery from SARMC, and conference Dara Parker regarding responses; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding
Kushner's' settlement discussion with Westermeier; Develop to do list for case; Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding
correspondence compelling Bruce and scamp attendance at trial; conference with Dara Parker regarding Eagle facility info;
begin review of transcript
Review of trial record.

4.9
2.2

Parker regarding same.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding hearing on Friday; telephone conference Prochaska; review memorandum in
response to SARMC's Motion in Limine's.
Telephone conferences with experts and meeting with Prochaska and Giles.
Telephone conference with Voth and Budge; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding usurping partnership opportunity;
conference with Kathy A. Savell; review of correspondence regarding witnesses; work on letter to Ayers and Gjording

I

•

Telephone conference Kushner and Wade L. Woodard.
Telephone conference Gjording regarding dates; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding motions; conferences with
Dara Parker regarding same.
Conference with WadeL. Woodard and BrentS. Bastian regarding motions in limine and motion for summary judgment
regarding Peirringer release.
Conference with BrentS. Bastian and review issues related to pro rata argument.

TAB

1.8

Review and edit materials and conference W. Woodard meeting with Budge and telephone conference Wilhoite

TAB

1

Telephone conference Wade L. Woodard regarding motion to recuse and consideration of response
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5/5/2011

--

Review briefing from SARMC; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding same; conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding
opposition to pro rata argument.
Prepare for hearing.
jl.5 -- !---------'-Prepare for and attend motion for summary judgment hearing; review briefs conferences with BrentS. Bastian and Dara
13.2
,

4/25/2011 ITAB

Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding update on hearing and matters gain~ forward.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding discovery and expert reports

•

EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

Description

5/6/2011
5/9/2011

TAB
TAB

0.9
2.4

Emails to Wade L. Woodard and Dara Parker regarding response to motion to recuse and review motion.
Conference with Dara Parker and Wade L. Woodard regarding motion to recuse; telephone conference with Dr. Prochaska
regarding news release relative to Eismann; review order on motion for summary judgment; review and respond to

I

correspondence from Gjording.

5/11/2011
5/12/2011

TAB
TAB

0.5
2.9

TAB

6.5
0.5
0.5
0.3
1.5

--

5/18/2011
5/19/2011
6/6/2011
6/10/2011
6/16/2011

- - - - - -

TAB
TAB
-TAB
TAB

6/17/2011 ~~AB

1

6/20/2011

1.9

TAB

Conference Wade L. Woodard regarding motions to be heard and letter to Gjording.
Email from Prochaska, call to Kelly (bankruptcy counsel), review SARMC discovery; conference with Wade L. Woodard
regarding status and go forward plan
Prepare for and attend hearing; attend MRIA board meeting.
Telephone conference with Drew Voth; review correspondence from Prochaska; review materials from Voth.
Review brief on depositions of Bruce and Schamp.
Conference regarding motions and pro hac vice.
Re_view filings of SARMC.
Telephone conference Gjording; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding expert report and to do; correspondence with
experts regarding deposition dates.
Mee_ting regarding to-do; call to Gjording

•

Review report of McCarthy and telephone conference Prochaska, review decision and conference with Wade L. Woodard.

6/22/2011

TAB

TAB

5.9

0.3

Review McCarthy report and assign matter to Kathy A. Savell; meet with Prochaska; attend motion to compel; and attend
board meeting; telephone conference with Gjording regarding depositions of experts; conference with opposing counsel
regarding stipulation.
-Review email from Dara Parker regarding closing argument of Gjording and further review of McCarthy.
Telephone conferences with Jack Gjording; conference with Wade L. Woodard and Dara Parker regarding rebuttal opinions.

6/23/2011
7/1/2011

TAB

(.9

7/4/2011
7/5/2011

TAB
TAB

2
4.6

7/6/2011

TAB

3.3

Review trial transcript and meeting with trial team; telephone conference with Budge regarding regression analysis.

TAB
TAB

5.4
7.9
5.3
4.9
7.2
6.8

Review trial transcript; telephone conference with Prochaska; letter to Ayers regarding settlement offer.
Prepare for trial--review of exhibits and trial testimony.

__c__c

- - - - - - - r---

1Review trial transcript.
Telephone conference with Gjording; review McCarthy report; telephone conference with Budge regarding rebuttal;
telephone conference with Prochaska; email to Board regarding settlement offer; begin review of Prochaska testimony.

--

004811

7/7/2011
7/8/2011
7/9/2011
7/10/2011
7/11/2011
7/12/2011

TAB
I

TAB
TAB
TAB

Prepare for trial--review exhibits and witness testimony.
Prepare for trial-review exhibits.
Meet with Dave Giles; review exhibits.
Team meeting; telephone conference with experts and Floyd; meet with Giles; prepare for trial; review jury instructions.
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HRS

Date

Description

Conference with WadeL. Woodard regarding damages; meet with Dara Parker and WadeL. Woodard regarding instructions
and telephone conference with Budge; meeting with Henson; review of exhibits.
·-------~--4-----~----~-Prepare for trial; meet with Giles; begin preparation for McCarthy deposition.
7/14/2011 _!AB 14.~
_
Prepare for deposition of McCarthy; conference with Giles; review correspondence from opposing counsel.
7/18/2011 TAB 3.7
-4~
---=--------------------1
7/19/2011 ITAB 110.6 _Prepare for McCarthy deposition and team meeting; letters to Gjording; travel to LA and further preparation.
4.2

7/13/2011

7/20/2011_ _IAB -f¥?:·5
7/21/2011
TAB 6.7
--------

IPrepare for and attend McCarthy deposition. __________________________
Work on timeline; prepare for trial; conference with Giles; return from LA.

------------------------

;J./23/2011 _FAB
7/25/2011 TAB

8.5
I Work on trial preparation and mock trial.
5.9 ~ark on timeline; meeting with Giles; work with Kathy A. Savell regarding time line and subpoenas; telephone conference
______J_
with Drew Voth and Budge.
7/26/2011 TAB 17
Team meeting; conference with_c_l_ie-n-ts-;-te-1-ep_h_o_n_e_c_o__n_fe_r_e_nc_e_w_it_h_e_xp_e_rt_s_;_te_l_e--ph_o_n_e__c_o_n-fe-r-ence with opposing counsel;
review brief in opposition to motion in limine.
Prepare for trial; conferences with WadeL. Woodard and Dara Parker.
Prepare for trial.

-+-------t----

7/27/2011
7/28/2011
7/29/2011
7/30/2011

1

TAB
TAB

7.2
8.5

(TA~6.2

7/31/2011

TAB
TAB

9

8/1/2011

TAB

6

2.5

Deposition of Jeffcoat; prepare for mock trial.
_
Mock trial.
IPrep-a-re_f_o_r_tr-ia-l-(d_e_p_o_o_f_H_a_l_l_a_n_d_S_e_a_b__
ou_r_n_t-es-t-im-o-ny_)-.-----------------------------Review jury instructions and various motions; commence exam preparation; meet with Kathy A. Savell regarding new exhibits
to list.

•

_Ji~lephone

004812

'8/13/2011 ITAB
/14/2011 TAB
I.

14.3
17.7
18.5
13.9

•

conference with WadeL. Woodard and Budge; work on exams and timeline.
I Telephone conferences with Budge and WadeL. Woodard; work on exams of Cliff and Schamp.
!Meeting with Messmer; prepare for mock trial.
IMock trial.
I Final draft on Bruce exam.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

8/17/2011

TAB

5.5

Prepare for trial

11.1
10.9
12.2
9.9
14.3
10.8
12.9

Prepare for trial; and prepare Henson
·-Prepare for trial; meeting with Prochaska
Prepare for trial and review of Giles deposition
-Prepare for trial, and work on exams
Meeting with Giles and work on exams
Continued preparation of Giles, and prepare other exams
Meeting with Chris Anton; conferences with BrentS. Bastian and meetings with WadeL. Woodard regarding order of proof.
Prepare for trial.
-f------'
Meet with Messmer; prepare exams and conference with Wade L. Woodard
Work on exams and other trial preparation
Prepare for trial
Prepare for trial and work on time lines
Work on exams and meetings with trial team regarding witness order and scheduling
----

8/18/2011
8/19/2011
8/20/2011
8/21/2011
8/22/2011
8/23/2011
8/24/2011

I
TAB

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

f------ - - - ----

8/25/2011
8/26/2011
8/27/2011
8/28/2011
8/29/2011
8/30/2011
8/31/2011
9/1/2011
9/2/2011
9/3/2011
9/4/2011
9/5/2011
9/6/2011
9/7/2011
9/8/2011
-9/9/2011
9/10/2011
9/11/2011
9/12/2011
~-.

- -

004813

9/13/2011
9/14/2011
9/15/2011
9/16/2011
9/17/2011
9/18/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

11.2
7
12.6
10.5
8.4
10
11
9.5
11
12.5
10.1
14.2
12.7
13.2
12.1
12.3
10.1
6.1
11.5
10.2
7.1
11.4
12.1
5.5
11.1

M_~eting

of counsel and hearing; prepare for trial
-----··
Work on questionnaire, exhibit stipulations and work on voir dire. Prepare for trial
Prepare for trial
Review motions, assign work to team and prepare for trial
Work on opening statement; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding same; work on voir dire
Prepare for trial
Opening statement, timelines, prepare fro trial
Trial and work on exams
Trial and work with Prochaska
Prepare for and attend trial
Prepare for and attend trial
Work on exams; prepare for trial and telephone conference with experts
-·
Work on exams and other trial preparatio~_
Prepare for and attend trial
Prepare for and attend trial
Trial and work on exams
Work on exam of Bruce
Attend trial and prepare for Cliff
Work on exhibits for Bruce exam
Finalize exam of Bruce
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Staff

HRS

Description

9/19/2011
9/20/2011
9/21/2011
9/22/2011
9/23/2011
9/24/2011
9/25/2011
9/26/2011
--'-9/27/2011
9/28/2011
9/29/2011
9/30/2011
10/1/2011
10/2/2011
10/3/2011
10/4/2011
10/5/2011
10/6/2011
10/7/2011
10/8/2011
10/10/2011
f------'------'
10/11/2011
10/12/2011
10/13/2011
10/14/2011
10/15/2011
10/16/2011
10/17/2011
10/18/2011
10/19/2011
10/20/2011
10/21/2011
10/22/2011
10/23/2011
------'------10/24/2011
-10/25/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

10.2
8.5
9.2
4.8
11.1
9.2
7.7
9.2
11.1
9.9
9.3
9.2
8.8
5.4
9.9
11
5.1
4.4
10.3
7.7
6.6
10.2
9.1
8.9

Attend trial and work on exam
Attend trial and work on exam of Bruce
Attend trial; gather exhibits for further exam of Bruce and Schamp
Prepare for trial
Attend trial and meet with witnesses
Prepare for Schamp exam
Prepare for Schamp exam
Attend trial and meet with trial team after trial
Meet with witnesses and attend trial
Meetings with Wade L. Woodard and BrentS. Bastian regarding witness exams and attend trial
Work with WadeL. Woodard on his exams and Prepare further exam of J. Cliff.
Attend trial
Meetings with Wade L. Woodard regarding motion practice and get ready for other witness exams
Work on trial preparation; meet with witnesses
Attend trial; meet with team regarding witness preparation
Prepare for and attend trial
Attend trial and meet with witness
Prepare for Friday witnesses (Traughber, Hopkins, etc)
Prepare for and attend trial
Meetings with experts and get ready for exams on Tuesday (Giles, Jeffcoat, Havlina)
Prepare for trial
Prepare for and attend trial
Attend trial and work on direct exams
Get ready for expert examination
Prepare for and attend trial
Prepare for Chamberlain
Meeting with expert and work on exams
Attend trial
Prepare for and attend trial
Prepare for and attend trial
Prepare for trial and cross exam
Attend trial a!ld prepare cross
Work on cross for McCarthy
Prepare for trial (work on cross exams)
Attend trial; prepare for McCarthy
Attend trial; work on jury instructions
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Date

10.7
3.3
5.9
8.8
10.8
7.2
12.8
11.1
10.7
5.9
14.9
10.1

~-=l

•

-

-··-

•
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

Description

10/26/2011
10/27/2011
10/28/2011
10/31/2011
11/8/2011

1TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

10.7
12.8
12
1.5
12.5

11/9/2011

TAB

1.4

Jury instruction conference; work on closing
Work on closing
Finalize closing argument and attend trial
--·
Attend verdict andrespond to questions from court
Review brief regarding disgorgement and conference with Wade L. Woodard and Dara Parker; review findings and
conclusions conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding various post trial issues.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding post-trial matters and disgorgement; conference regarding interview of jurors.

11/14/2011 TAB
11/15/2011 TAB

1.5
1.4

-

l

--·

!-----

2.9

11/16/2011 TAB
r-----·

TAB

12/8/2011

0.7
1032

Review brief on judgment; conference with Wade L. Woodard and Dara Parker regarding interest.
Conference with WadeL. Woodard regarding correspondence to SARMC board and recommendations to MRIA board
regarding mediation; final edits on memorandum.
Board meeting; telephone conference with Gjording regarding mediation; conference with BrentS. Bastian and Wade L.
Woodard regarding disgorgement.
- - Conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding argument on judgment/disgorgement award

•

I

1/2/2008

WLW f·3

Work on issues and strategies re objection to acceptance of remittitur; conference with Thomas A. Banducci re same.

1/22/2008
1/28/2008

WLW 0.2
WLW 0.6

1/30/2008

:r

Conference with Mark Dalley reappeal
Review order regarding costs and fees; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; telephone call to Dr. Prochaska
regarding same; work on amended judgment
Work on issues regarding calculation of costs, affidavit regarding same and amended judgment; conferences with Lauren
Blaesing and Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; review revised order from court regarding same

-----

------

2/1/2008

WLW 1.8

2/4/2008

WLW 0.4

2/5/2008

WLW 4.1

- ·

004815

2/6/2008

I

WLW 1.9

2/13/2008

WLW 3.4

2/14/2008

WLW 0.7

Prepare Second Amended Judgment; work on affidavit regarding costs and fees; conferences with Lauren Blaesing regarding
same; work on appeal issues and research regarding same
Finalize amended judgment; work on affidavit regarding costs; work on issues regarding amending the record for appeal;
Work on issues regarding supplemental record; research regarding various standards of review for appeal and draft brief
sections regarding standards
Work on appeal; research regarding same; review objection to judgment; work on response to same; conferences with
Lauren F. Blaesing regarding same
Research regarding post-judgment interest when a remittitur is entered; prepare objection to SARMC's proposed judgment
Work on issues regarding appellate record and confirming accuracy of the record; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing
regarding same; research regarding appeal
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Staff HRS

2/19/2008 IWLW 0.7
2/20/2008 WLW 0.8

Description
Research regarding appeals issues; conference with Brian Knox- regarding same

--

-----

Work on issues regarding appeal; conference with TAB regarding same; conferences with Thomas A. Banducci and Brian Knox
regarding research projects and regarding admissibility of March 28 offer to sell letter; research regarding appeal issues
---

2/22/2008 IWLW 0.9

Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding settlement negotiations with Jack Gjording; research regarding alleged errors
in admitting certain exhibits; conference with Dari Huskey regarding Giles notes

2/28/2008
3/18/2008
3/18/2008

WLW 0.8
WLW 1.2
WLW 1.5
WLW 1.2
WLW 0.3

3/19/2008

WLW 0.5

Work on issues related to CDweb.
Work on issues related to CDweb; review proposed letter to St. Al's; telephone conference with Jim Prochaska; analyze

3/31/2008

WLW 0.7

message from St. Al's regarding same.
Conference with Brian Knox regarding fiduciary duty research; work on matters regarding appellate issues and research

4/1/2008

WLW 0.5

Research regarding appeal issues; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding appeal issues; conference with Lauren F.

2/26/2008
2/27/2008

Research regarding appeal issues; conference with Brian Knox regarding same
Work on issues regarding supplementing records; research regarding various appeal issues
Research regarding appeal issues.
Prepare for and attend Board meeting.

•

Blaesing regarding record.
4/3/2008

WLW 0.4

4/10/2008
4/28/2008
5/12/2008
5/13/2008
f-'-5/15/2008

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

1.9
0.3
2.3

5/19/2008
5/20/2008
6/10/2008

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

7.2
4.3

6/13/2008
6/23/2008
6/27/2008
-6/30/2008

WLW
WLW
WLW

0.7
0.5

1.3
0.1
0.2
0.6
0.7
0.9

Work on issues regarding record
Work on appeal
Work on issues regarding objection to ~ecord
Work on issues regarding appeal and record; conferences with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding same
Review transcripts for appeal

004816

WLW 0.6

--

Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding appeal; review trial transcripts
Work on appeal issues
Research regarding failure to object to Jury Instructions
Research regarding various appeal issues
Research regarding appeal issues
work on appeal research

7/11/2008 WLW
7/14/2008 IWLW 0.3
7/15/2008

Research regarding appeal.
Review trial transcript of Sandra Bruce.
Work on issues regarding record; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding same; work on brief.

I

Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding objections to record; review SARMCs objections; work on matters regarding
same
Work on appeal; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding organizing the record; telephone conference with Jim
Prochaska regarding status of appeal
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I

Staff

I

HRS

I

Description

1
7/15/2008 IWL:E
0.3__ Work on objections to record; letter to Jack Gjording regarding same; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding same__
·8 IWLW 0.5
,____

I

7/17/2008WLW 1.11
7/18/2008
7/22/2008
7/24/2008
;!J30/_2.008
7/31/2008

IW l W

0.3

WLW

IWlW I0.2

Telephone conference with Jack Gjording regarding objections to record; revise stipulation; telephone call with Jack Gjording I

J

1Q.3
1

I

regarding same. _
_
/
Work on objections to record; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; work on strategies rega. rding same;
telephone calls with Jack Gjording regarding stipulation.
~---~~-------------------------------------------------------~
IConfere nee Tho mas A. Banducci regarding appeal and hiring Craig Lewis; work on appeal.
Telephone calls from and to Jack Gjording regarding hearing on objection to record; work on matters regarding same.
IWork on issues regarding appeal and regarding retaining Craig Lewis

WLW 1.~
IPrepare for and attend hearing; meeting with Jack Gjording regarding stipulation
.
WLW ~~-----tieview and revise stipulation regarding record; telephone conference Jack Gjording rega_r_d-in_g_s_a_m_e_

8/19/2008 _WLW ~~eview trial transcripts for appeal arguments.
9/1/2008
WLW 12.6---rReview transcripts.
9/2/2008
IWLW O.l~~ew trial tran-sc-ri-p-ts-.---

Review trial transcripts.
----~------------------------Review transcripts.
IWLW 0.6
Telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding strategies for appeal.
--~---------------------19/15/200~~w 3.4
Work on response to appellant's brief; telephone conference Jim Prochaska; email with Craig Lewis.
9/16/2008 WLW 0.7
Work on response brief.
9/17/2008 IWLW 2.7
IConference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding strategies for response brief; work on same.
1
9/18/2008 WLW 0.7
1Work on response brief.
9/22/2008 WLW 3.5
I Work on appeal brief; telephone conference with Craig Lewis regard_i~ng~s_a_m_e_.______________________ _
9/23/2008 WLW 4.5
Work on appeal brief; conferences with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
9/24/2008 WLW 0.2
Emails with Angie Driessen regarding settlement; emails from Mark Geston regarding same.
--~--~--------------------------~
9/24/2008 WLW 5.3
Work on arguments regarding wrongful dissociation; review transcripts.
~------------------------9/25/2008 WLW ~ Work on appeal brief.
9/26/2008 lwLW 16.1
Work on appeal.
9/27/2008 1WLW 12.2
Work on appeal brief; telephone conferences with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
9/29/2008 WLW 7
Work on appeal brief; meetings with Thomas A. Banducci regarding strategies.
~
----9/30/2008 WLW 6.2 ~ark on appeal brief
10/1/2008 IWLW 17.2
~~~rk on appeal brief; telephone conference with Jack Gjording regarding extension; conference with Thomas A. Banducci
~
regarding appeal strategies.
Iwork on appeal brief.
------10/2/2008 IWLW 16.9

•

9/3/2008
9/4/2008
9/9/2008

1

004817

1

10/3/2008 IWLW 13.3
10/6/2008 lwLW 17.5

1

IWork on appeal brief.
IWork on appeal brief.
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10/7/2008 WLW
10/8/2008 WLW
10/9/2008 jWLW
10/10/2008 WLW
10/13/2008 WLW
10/14/2008 WLW
10/15/2008 WLW
10/16/2008 WLW
10/17/2008 WLW
WLW
10/20/2008 1-WLW
10/21/2008
f------'-----10/22/2008 WLW
10/23/2008 WLW
10/24/2008 WLW
10/25/2008 WLW
10/27/2008 WLW
10/28/2008
WLW
f-----C-

7.2
5.4
6.8
5.6
1.8
6.9
8.4
7.3

Description

Work on appeal.
Work on appeal.
on appeal.
Work
-Work on appeal.
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal.
13.6
7.2
Work on appeal.
7.2
Work on appeal brief.
4.3
Work on appeal brief.
f--6.2
Work on appeal brief.
8
Work on appeal brief.
7
Work on appeal brief.
4.7
Work on appeal brief.
Work on brief
8.1

-·-----~-~

···----

--

~--

--

--

---------

~----

---~-

-

10/29/2008 WLW 16.4
10/30/2008IWLW ~1

-·--

Work on appeal
Work on appeal brief

·------------------~--~~--

8.6. -~~;ton appeal brief
2.5
Work on appeal brief.
8.3
Work on appeal brief.
6.2
Work on appeal brief.
6.6
Work on appeal brief
7.2
Work on appeal brief
9.3
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
6.6
Work on appeal brief.
,11,'11/20081WLW 4.1
Work on response brief.
11/12/2008 WLW 5.2
Work on appeal brief.
11/13/2008 WLW 8
WLW
2.9
Work
on brief.
11/14/2008
__.___.
Work on brief.
11/15/2008 WLW 0.6
Work
on appeal brief.
~1/17/2008 iWLW 8.3
9.2
Work on appeal brief.
11/18/2008 WLW
-f-11/19/2008 iWLW 10.7 Work on appeal brief.
------'--11/20/2008 WLW 10.2 Work on appeal brief.
10/31/2008
11/1/2008
11/3/2008
11/4/2008
--11/5/2008
11/6/2008
11/7/2008
11/10/2008

•

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

-~

-----

-

-

1

-

004818

-~

- -

-----

C---
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Staff

HRS

Description

I

Work on appeal brief.
11/21/2008 WLW 9.8
Work on appeal brief.
11/22/2008 WLW 7.5
11/24/2008
WLW
5.2
Work
on appeal.
-----+---12/15/20081WLW 0.2
Follow up on issues regarding SARMC's reply

386~1,.;-:

----·---··----··----

------·-

----

1
_!£31/2009
2/16/2009
2/17/2009
2/20/2009
4/1/2009
f--'---'-- --4/2/2009
5/14/2009
6/29/2009
8/6/2009

WLW 0.2
WLW 3.8
WLW 0.3
WLW
0.9
- - rWLW 0.2
WLW 0.1
WLW 0.3
WLW 0.2

8/17/2009
8/18/2009
8/19/2009
9/2/2009
10/26/2009
10/27/2009

IWLW 14.4
WLW 9
WLW 6
IWLW 0.2
WLW 2.2
WLW 0.6

~----

~-

WLW \0.3

10/29/2009 WLW 10.5
0.6
12/17/2009 WLW f---f----C---29.8
- -

-------

--

Emails with Jim Prochaska regarding briefing and hearing
- Work on and revise opposition to motion to strike.
Finalize opposition to motion to strike; telephone conference with Jim Prochaska regarding status of case.
Finalize response to motion to strike.
Review order from Supreme Court regarding motion to strike.
Correspondence from Supreme Court regarding hearing.
Telephone conference with Joe Messmer regarding status of case.
Draft letter to limited partners regarding appeal
Review Supreme Court press release; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same and regarding preparing for
hearing.
------Prepare for oral argument.
------------Prepare for _oral argument.
·-----Prepare for and attend oral argument; meeting with clients regarding same.
-·----Emails from Jim Prochaska regarding St. Al's purchase of Mercy; work on issues regarding same.
Review decision and order and work on strategies regarding same.
Review opinion; work on strategies regarding same; telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner regarding MRIM transaction.
Work on strategies regarding claiming damages for the limiteds.

•

--

- - - - - -----

WLW 2

1/20/2010
1/25/2010
t---·-·

004819

1/27/2010

1/28/2010
1/28/2010
1/29/2010
2/3/2010

I

Meeting with juror from first trial; meeting with Jim Prochaska regarding settlement issues.

WLW 0.3
-

'Telephone conference with Jim Prochaska regarding Stoel Rives conflict issue; co nfe renee with Thomas A. Banducci regarding
same.
0.2 ~phone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding disqualifying Judge Neville; telephone conference to Jim Prochaska

~.}

WL
WLW 3.2
WLW 0.3
WLW 1.5

•

regarding same.
Work on issues regarding whether to strike Judge Wetherell.
Telephone conference with counsel from Stoel Rives regarding CHI/Trinity transaction.
Work on strategies regarding striking Judge Wetherell.
Telephone conference with Don Ayers and Jack Gjording; work on issues regarding damages under Pope._ _
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Staff

HRS

WLW 0.4
2/3/2010
2/4/2010
IWLW 0.3
WLW 0.4
2/4/2010
3/22/2010 WLW 2.1
4-/13/2010 I WL w 2.1

t---·

WLW 1.2
WLW 0.5
WLW 0.2

4/14/2010
4/20/2010
4/27/2010
5/5/2010

Description

Emails with Margaret Kushner regarding issues regarding extension of the lease.
Work on strategies for extending the partnership term of the limiteds.
Correspondence with Margaret Kushner regarding partnership term issue; research regarding same.
Work on 3rd amended counterclaim.
Review memorandum regarding joinder of limiteds; research regarding same; work on strategies regarding same.
Research regarding Pope requirements and testimony at the first trial.
Review motion to strike; conference with Dara Labrum regarding strategies regarding same.
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding status conference.
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding status conference and strategies for same.

5/7/2010
5/10/2010

WLW 0.4
WLW 3.6
WLW 2.1

5/11/2010
5/19/2010

WLW '---1.8
WLW 0.6

Work on dealing with the Pope decision and its affect on MRIA's damages analysis.
Telephone conference with Bruce Budge regarding damages issues; analyze Pope and work on matters regarding same.

5/21/2010

WLW 3.1

Prepare for meeting with Bruce Budge; review issues regarding Pope and evidence regarding same; meeting with Bruce
Budge regarding revising expert reports; meeting with Jim Prochaska regarding status of case and case strategies.

6/11/2010
6/15/2010

WLW 0.4
WLW 1.5

Review letter from Don Ayers; draft response to same.
Correspondence from Don Ayers; emails with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; prepare for and attend MRIA board
meeting.

6/29/2010
7/1/2010
7/2/2010

WLW 0.6
WLW lo.s

Work on response to motion to strike; conference with Dara Labrum regarding same.
Work on response to motion to strike; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Revise response to motion to strike.

7/6/2010

WLW 0.9

--'---

Prepare for and attend hearing; work on related matter; work on expert issues regarding Pope.
Correspondence with Charles Wilhoite and Bruce Budge regarding the effects of Pope on their reports; work on strategies for
dealing with Pope; email to Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; review opinion and Pope as well as expert reports.

•

---

i

r-----

WLW 0.8

7/12/2010

WLW 0.9
WLW 0.3
WLW 0.2

7/13/2010
7/20/2010

WLW 0.2
WLW 1.1

7/7/2010
7/8/2010

004820

7/21/2010 WLW 4.2
7/22/2010 1WLW 1.1

-

Review SARMC reply ISO motion to strike; research regarding new arguments raised in same; conference with Dara Labrum
and Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Prepare for hearing and research regarding same; provide input on discovery requests; work on Pope issue.
Assist in preparing for hearing.
Conference with Dara Labrum regarding hearing and schedulin~ issues; work on same.
Review order; work on issues regarding briefing schedule.
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding case strategies; work on Pope issues; telephone call from Jim Prochaska
regarding meeting.
----Research regarding Pope issues.
Work on Pope issue_s.__

- -

-

-

-
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Staff

7/26/2010 WLW
7/27/2010 WLW
7/28/2010 WLW
7/29/2010 WLW
7/30/2010 WLW
-rWLW
8/2/2010
WLW
8/6/2010

- -

HRS

Description

4.2
5.5
3.3
3.9
6.9
5.8
2.3

Work on Pope issues.
Research regarding Pope issues.
Work on Pope issues.
Work on Pope issues.
Work on Pope issues.
Work on Pope issues.
Work on Pope issues; conference with BrentS. Bastian and Thomas A. Banducci regarding partnership for term issues.

8/7/20~~WLW 2.2
WLW 7.2
WLW 8.3
WLW 8.5
-t---WLW 6.6
WLW 9.2
WLW 6.2
WLW 0.8

8/9/2010
8/10/2010
8/11/2010
8/12/2010
8/13/2010
8/14/2010
8/15/2010
~--

Review motions for summary judgment; wor~ on strategie~ for responses to same.
Work on response to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment
Telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding motions for summary judgment; work on responses to same;

- -

•

···-

--

-"--~~··-

8/16/2010

WLW 5.5

8/17/2010
8/18/2010
;-------8/19/2010

WLW 7.7
WLW 7
WLW 8.4
--

004821

8/20/2010
8/21/2010
8/23/2010
f-'-8/24/2010
8/25/2010
8/26/2010
8/27/2010
8/28/2010
8/30/2010
9/3/2010
9/17/2010
t-----------9/21/2010
1---9/27/2010

--

'

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

5.5
7
8.2
6.9
4.2
8.1
7.6
2.8
7.1
0.3
1.1
0.6
0.8

Work on responses to motions for summary judgment; meeting with Bob Bakes; meeting/telephone conference with
experts.
Work on responses to motion for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motion for summary judgment.
-Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner and Jim Prochaska regarding settlement; work on responses to motions for
summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Finalize oppositions to motions for_ summary judgment.
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci with settlement; work on issues regarding $4.6 million.
Prepare for hearing; conferences with BrentS. Bastian regarding same.
--Prepare for hearing.
Prepare for hearing
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9/28/2010
9/29/2010
9/30/2010
10/1/2010

WLW 6.3
WLW 6.8
WLW
WLW

10/4/2010 WLW
10/11/2010 WLW

Description

Prepare for hearing
Prepare for hearing
Prepare
for hearing; meeting with Bob Bakes
7.6 - - _
.
5.8
Prepare for and attend hearing on motions for summary judgment; research regarding supplemental briefing requested by
the Court.
Research regarding issues raised by court at hearing regarding applicability of the old statute vs. RUPA.
1.2
0.6
Review new case regarding law of case; work on strategies regarding whether to submit supplemental authorities.

12/28/2010 WLW 0.4
12/30{2010 rLW o,s
-- ----+238.2
1/6/2011 lwLw lo.5
1/10/2011 rWLW 1.9
1/11/2011 IIWLW 2.9

-

Review motion regarding discovery and experts; conference with Dara Parker regarding response to same.
Work on issues regarding settlement strategies and response to motion for discovery.

Work on issues regarding scheduling of trial; work on response to motion for discovery.

--

Work on opposition to motion for discovery.
Review transcripts for response to motion seeking discovery; work on response; review SARMC's proposed scheduling order.

•

i

1/12/2011 WLW 2.2
1/18/2011 \WLW 2.1
1/20/2011 WLW 0.4
1/26/2011 WLW 0.5
1/27/2011 IWLW 0.4
1/28/2011 WLW 0.9

~1/2011 ~~~

Review record for evidence regarding damages to oppose motion for discovery; draft Prochaska affidavit.
Work on responses to motions for discovery and scheduling order.
Work on opposition to motion regarding discovery.
Revise opposition to motion for discovery.
Work on opposition to motion for discovery.
Telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding letter from SARMC; telephone conference with Jim Prochaska
regarding same; work on response to motion for fees.
Research regarding authority of court on remand; revise objection to scheduling order

t--

2/2/2011
WLW 4.2
Revise and finalize opposition briefs.
WLW
0.8
Review
SARMC's reply in support of motion for discovery; prepare for hearing.
2/7/2011
-----·2/8/2011
WLW
1.5~~are for hearing; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
----2/9/2011
WLW 0.7
Prepare for hearing; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
2/14/2011 IWLW 1.1
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding hearing and going forward strategies; work on matters regarding same

004822

2/15/2011
2/16/2011

WLW 0.2
WLW 0.3

Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding bond issues.
Review scheduling order; work on issues regarding same; conference with Dara Parker regarding moving for clarification.

I

.
. .
Work on issues regarding motion for cia rification.
Work on strategies regarding experts; research regarding time limitation cut-off; correspondence with Charles Wilhoite
regarding expert reports.
Page 55 of 62

1-!

2/17/2011 IWL
2/18/2011 WLW 1.4

e

EXHIBIT A
HRS

Date

Staff

2/21/2011

WLW 3.1
I

Description

Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding expert opinions and strategies regarding same; research regarding alternative
damages theories; prepare new discovery requests; draft letter to Jack Gjording regarding discovery issues.

I

--

2/24/2011

WLW 1

2/25/2011

WLW 0.9

Prepare for and attend meeting with Bruce Budge and Charles Wilhoite regarding damages; correspondence regarding same;
telephone call to Jack Gjording regarding scheduling issues.
Prepare for telephone conference; telephone conference with SARMC's counsel regarding scheduling; conference with
Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; correspondence from experts; work on issues regarding bond.

--

3/2/2011

WLW 0.6

3/3/2011
3/4/2011
3/7/2011
3/7/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

0.9
0.3
0.4
3.7

I

Telephone conference from Bruce Budge and Drew Voth regarding expert report; email to Jim Prochaska regarding same;
correspondence with Chris Vergonis regarding revising stipulation; revise stipulation.
Meeting with Jim Prochaska.
Letter from Tom Dvorak; email to Jim Prochaska regarding same.
Letter from Chris Vergonis; work on issues regarding same.
-Prepare for and attend meeting with Mike Rowe, Jim Prochaska, David Giles and Jack Floyd; prepare response to Tom Dvorak
regarding collection efforts.
Correspondence with Jim Prochaska and others regarding bond and payment of judgment.
Prepare letter to Chris VergonisEegarding discovery; work on issues regarding Eagle facility.
Telephone conference with Jim Prochaska regarding Westermeirer email; telephone conference with Margaret Kushner and
Jim Prochaska regarding same; revise email to Westermeier regarding same; email to Jim Prochaska regarding Dara Parker.
-

•

--

3/9/2011
3/10/2011
3/11/2011

WLW 0.2
WLW 0.5
WLW 1.2
I

3/14/2011
3/15/2011
3/16/2011

WLW 0.5
WLW 0.4
WLW 0.6

3/17/2011
3/17/2011

WLW 0.4
WLW 0.5

Finalize letter to Dvorka; work on new discovery requests.
Work on discovery requests.
-Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding discovery issues; work on same; telephone call to Dara Parker regarding
same; telephone call from Tom Dvorak.
Work on discovery responses.
Review and revise stipulation regarding stay of execution; telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same;
telephone conference with Jim Prochaska regarding same; telephone call from Jack Floyd regarding same.

j_
3/18/2011
3/18/2011

004823

3/21/2011
3/21/2011
f--'-3/22/2011
3/23/2011
3/24/2011

WLW 0.4
WLW 2.1
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

1.2
0.5
2.4
4
1.5

Finalize stipulation regarding judgment; letter to Tom Dvorak regarding same.
Work on motion to compel; review and revise motion response to motion for summary judgment; conference with Thomas
A. Banducci regarding case strategies.
Meeting with Giles, Prochaska and Floyd regarding case strategies; work on discovery issues.
Revise stipulation; correspondence with Tom Dvorka regarding same.
---Revise response regarding motion for summary judgment.
-Work on response to motion for summary judgment.
Finalize response to motion for summary judgment.
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Date

Staff

3/25/2011

WLW 2.1

3/30/2011
4/1/2011
4/4/2011
4/8/2011
f-'
4/11/2011
4/12/2011
4/13/2011
4/14/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

4/15/2011
4/18/2011

WLW 3.7
WLW 2.8

Description

Revise response to motion for summary judgment; strategies regarding possible motions in limine; conferences with Thomas
A. Banducci regarding same.
_____ ______
Work on discovery issues.
Work on discovery responses.
--Revise motions in limine.
Work on discovery matters.
Finalize motions; work on expert reports.
Work on strategies for responding to the motions for summary judgment and in limine filed by St. Al's.
Work on responses to motions filed by SARMC.
Work on responses to motions; work on expert report issues; correspondence with Drew Voth regarding same.
,

~-

0.2
0.3
0.9
0.7
0.6
2.9
4.5
4.6

Work on responses to motions.
Work on responses to motions in limine and motions for summary judgment; prepare affidavit of Jim Prochaska.

•

-

5.1
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment and motions in limine.
-----responses
to
motions.
Work on
4.4 --r--..
4.1
Finalize responses to motions.
5.1
Work on issues regarding expert reports; research regarding fiduciary duty claims.
work on damages strategies; telephone conference with Experts regarding same; separate telephone conference with Drew
3.3
I
Voth
regarding usurping corporate opportunities; research regarding same
-Work on reply briefs; work on discovery issues; work with experts on reports
4/28/2011 WLW 3.5
-3.9
Finalize expert reports; meetings and telephone conferences with experts regarding same
4/29/2011 WLW
5/2/2011
WLW 3.9
Finalize and serve expert reports.
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

4/19/2011
4/20/2011
4/25/2011
4/26/2011
4/27/2011

r--·-

5/3/2011

IWLW '0 .9

-iw'

5/3/2011

WLW I0.5

5/4/2011

LW 1.3

5/5/2011

WLW 2.2

004824

5/6/2~~WLW 12.4

5/9/2011

I

IWLW 10.7
'I

Revise motion to strike; work on strategies regarding damage theories; email from Thomas A. Banducci regarding sa me;
telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
IReview reply briefs; correspondence with Dara Parker regarding motion to compel; review Gjo rd ing Affidavit and work on
strategies regarding motion to strike.
Review discovery responses; correspondence with Dara Labrum regarding meet and confer; correspondence and telephone
conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; work on damage theories;
Work on issues regarding inadequate discovery responses; work on damages strategies; review motion to recuse and work
on issues regarding same
Review motion to disqualify; correspondence with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; work on strategies regarding
response to same
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding discovery issues; correspondence regarding same; correspondence with
experts and telephone call from Bruce Budge; review ruling on motion for summary judgment.

I
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5/10/2011

WLW 0.7

-----------

5/11/2011
5/12/2011

WLW

HRS

lo.S --

WLW 12.8

,----

5/13/2011
5/16/2011

WLW 2.6
WLW 4.3

5/17/2011

WLW 4.2

5/18/2011 WLW 5.8
5/19/2011 WLW 0.4
r-6/2/2011
IWLW 0.5
6/7/2011
.2
6/8/2011
WLW 0.3
6/9/2011
:------·
6/10/2011 WLW 0.9
--------·
6/13/2011 WLW 1.8
6/14/2011 WLW

~3

~--------

10.7

6/15/2011
6/20/2011

WLW 0.7
WLW 2.2

6/21/2011

WLWI1.2

6/22/2011

WLW 3.1

6/23/2011
7/1/2011

WLW 0.4
WLW 0.7

004825

I

7/2/2011
c--:-7/5/2011

WLW 0.5
WLW 0.5

7/6/2011

WLW 1

Description

I
Telephone conference with Charles Wilhoite regarding damages; work on issues regarding themes; conference with Thomas
A. Banducci regarding same; work on discovery issues and responses regarding same; review and revise letter to court
regarding appeal.
r-.
---____
Review and revise opposition to recusal.
Review discovery responses; work on issues regarding objections; review new discovery requests; work on responses;
I
conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding case strategies; prepare for hearing.
Work on discovery responses; prepare for hearing.
Prepare for hearing; telephone conference with Drew Voth regarding supplement to report; emails with Jim Prochaska
regarding same.
Telephone call from Drew Voth regarding changes to report; emails from client regarding hearing; prepare for hearing.

~

Prepare for and attend hearing; work on issue raised at hearing.
Work on supplement to expert report.
Work on discovery responses.
Work on discovery issues.
Follow up on status of discovery responses .
Conference with Jeri regarding SARMC's motion to compel and work on issues regarding same.
Work on issues regarding motion to compel and SARMC's request to change our hearing date.
to motion to shorten time and motion to compel.Work on responses
.
Conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding response to motion to compel; work on issues regarding same; work on strategies
regarding replyr~garding witnesses. ----------Review and revise reply brief.
Strategy meeting with Thomas A. Banducci; work on reply regarding witnesses; work on issues regarding motion to compel.
Review rulings on motions; work on issues regarding same; telephone conference with Jim Prochaska; review McCarthy
report.
---Review SARMC's expert report; work on issues regarding same; prepare for meeting with clients; attend MRIA board
meeting.
Work on jury instructions; telephone call from Tom Henson.
Work on issues regarding rebuttal expert report; telephone call from Bruce Budge regarding same; telephone conference
with Jack Gjording regarding depositions; review letter regarding settlement; work on issues regarding same.

----

Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding SARMC's settlement offer; work on settlement strategies.
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding settlement and regarding case strategies; revise letter to clients regarding
settlement; work on issues regarding case strategies.
Trial meeting; prepare for trial.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

7/7/2011
7/8/2011
7/9/2011
7/11/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

0.9
0.6
1
0.7

7/12/2011
7/13/2011
7/14/2011
7/18/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

1.5
1.3
0.8
3.9

Work on settlement and case strategies; conferences with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Work on causation strategies.
Prepare for mock trial; meeting with Banducci's.
-Meeting with David Giles; work on trial strategies; correspondence and conferences with Thomas A. Banducci regarding
same.
Trial strategy meeting; prepare for trial.
Work on jury instructions.
Prepare for trial.
- - Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding order of proof; review SARMC's proposed instructions; work on objections to
same; review transcripts.
Attend strategy meeting; review transcripts.
Review transcripts; work on evidentiary issues; work on damages issue and rebuttal.
Prepare for trial.
Review transcripts; work on rebuttal report; prepare for mock jury.
Prepare for mock jury.
Work on supplemental expert reports; attend trial strategy meeting; attend telephone conference with opposing counsel
regarding exhibits and witnesses; meeting with clients; telephone conferences with experts; prepare for trial.

7/19/2011 WLW
-r--7/20/2011 WLW
7/21/2011 WLW
7/22/2011 WLW-7/23/2011 WLW
7/26/2011 WLW

6.6
7
7.2
6.1
5
7.5

•

--~---

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

8/2/2011
8/3/2011
8/4/2011

WLW 6.1
WLW 5.6
WLW 6.4

8/5/2011
8/8/2011
8/9/2011

WLW 8.3
WLW 7.6
WLW 14.2

8/10/2011
8/11/2011
r--8/12/2011

WLW 7.4
WLW 8.1
WLW 6.2

004826

7/27/2011
7/28/2011
7/29/2011
7/30/2011
8/1/2011

7.1
8
9.2
7.8
6.6

Prepare for trial.
Work on expert issues; prepare for mock trial.
Finalize expert reports; work on exams; prepare for mock trial; work on causation issues.
Prepare for and attend mock trial.
Deposition preparation with Wilhoite; telephone conference with Drew Voth and correspondence; work on Floyd
examination; work on exhibit issues; work on Illustrative exhibits; review objection from St. Al's.
Review transcripts; prepare exams.
Review St. Al's proposed stipulations; work on response to same; work on witness exams.
Telephone conference with Charles Wilhoite; prepare for depositions; meeting with Holly Wallace and Jack Floyd; prepare for
hearings.
Prepare for hearings on motions; attend hearings; prepare witness exams.
Prepare for depositions; telephone conference with Charles Wilhoite.
Travel to Portland; meet with Charles Wilhoite; defend deposition of Charles Wilhoite; travel to Seattle; prepare for
deposition of Bruce Budge.
Prepare for deposition of Bruce Budge; meet with Bruce Budge and Drew Voth; review transcripts.
Prepare for and defend deposition of Bruce Budge; travel to Boise; prepare for mock trial.
Prepare for meeting with Joe Messmer; meeting with Joe Messmer; prepare for mock trial; work on damages issues.
- -
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Date

Staff

HRS

8/13/2011 IWLW 7
8/15/2011 lwLW 6.5
8/16/2011 WLW 7
8/22/2011
8/23/2011
8/24/2011
8/25/2011
8/26/2011
8/27/2011
8/29/2011
8/30/2011
8/31/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

7.9
7.3
9.1
7.8
8.7
7.7
8.3
9.3
9.9

Description

Participate in mock trial.
Meeting with Jack Floyd and Holly Wallace; review exhibits.
-Prepare for trial; meeting with Jim Prochaska; letter to Jack Gjording; email to experts regarding demonstratives; work in
exams.
Meet with witnesses; prepare for trial.
Meeting with Holly Wallace; work on demonstrative exhibits; telephone conference with Charles Wilhoite.
Work on exams; work on demonstratives; review order regarding motions.
Work on timelines; objections to exhibits; interview of Joe Messmer.
Meeting with Holly Wallace and Jack Floyd; work on timelines; objections to exhibi~s and witness exams.
Review St. Al's demonstrative; work on expert issues; work on witness exams and ITtimeline.
Prepare exams; research regarding stark and antikickback; work with experts on damages.
Attend questionnaire hearing; attend meeting of counsel regarding stipulations; prepare for trial.
Work on jury questionnaire and conference with opposing counsel regarding same; work on exhibit stipulations and letter
regarding same; prepare witness exams; work on voir dire questions; review motion filed by St. Al's.

- - - -

•

·--

004827

WLW 6.9
9/1/2011
WLW 8.8
9/2/2011
1----WLW 8.3
9/3/2011
9/4/2011
WLW 4.9
'WLW 5
9/5/2011
WLW 10.8
9/6/2011
WLW 11.2
9/7/2011
WLW 9.8
9/8/2011
WLW 11.1
9/9/2011
9/10/2011 WLW 6.7
9/11/2011 WLW 5.6
9/12/2011 WLW 11.4
9/13/2011 WLW 12.3
9/14/2011 WLW 0.6
9/14/2011 WLW 10.9
9/15/2011 WLW 1.7
9/16/2011 WLW 10.2
9/17/2011 WLW 5.2
9/18/2011 WLW 3.3
9/19/2011 WLW 9.2
r---9/20/2011 WLW 11.9

Prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial; prepare for and attend hearing; review new motions filed by SARMC.
Prepare for trial.
--·
Prepare for trial.
----·
Work on opening statements; work voir dire.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; interview with potential witnesses.
Interview witnesses; work on opening; prepare exams.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial; telephone calls with experts; work on exams.
Witness preparation with Jack Floyd.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on strategies regarding Bushi.
Prepare for mediation.
Prepare for and attend trial; work with witnesses.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial.
Work on opposition to exclude damage theories.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on damages opposition and prepare for hearing.
Prepare for and attend trial; prepare for hearing on experts.
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HRS

Date

Staff

9/21/2011

WLW 9.5

004828

9/22/2011 WLW
9/23/2011 WLW
9/24/2011 WLW
9/25/2011 WLW
9/26/2011 WLW
9/27/2011 WLW
9/28/2011 WLW
-'
9/29/2011 WLW
9/30L2011 jwLw
10/1/2011 WLW
10/2/2011 WLW
10/3/2011 WLW
10/4/2011 WLW
10/5/2011 WLW
10/6/2011 WLW
10/7/2011 WLW
10/8/2011 WLW
10/9/2011 WLW
10/10/2011 WLW
10/11/2011 WLW
10/12/2011 WLW
10/13/2011 WLW
10/14/2011 WLW
10/15/2011 WLW
WLW
10/16/2011
----10/17/2011 WLW
10/18/2011 WLW
r--------10/19/2011 WLW
f-----10/20/2011 WLW
10/21/2011 WLW
10/21/2011 WLW
10/23/2011 WLW
10/24/2011 WLW
10/25/2011 WLW

4.5
10
4.5
2
10.9
12.5
9.7
9.3
10.3
7
5.8
13
10.9
11.1
7
10.2
6.6
4.1
10.4
13.1
8.5
8.8
11
7
7.3
14.5
11.8
9.6
5.8
6.5
11
4.5
13.5
10.5

Description

-

Prepare for and attend trial; prepare for and attend hearing regarding damages experts; work on issues regarding research
regarding mistrial.
--·Attend trial meeting; work on witness exams.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Work with witnesses.
Work on witness exams.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; meetings with witnesses.
-Prepare for and attend trial; work on motion in limine; work on witness exams
Prepare witnesses; work on expert issues
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial; work on motions.
Prepare for trial; work on motions.
Prepare for and attend trial; work with witnesses.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on expert issues; prepare witness exams.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Meeting with Bruce Budge; work on witness exams; telephone conference with Charles Wilhoite.
Prepare for trial; work on motions in limine.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; prepare for following day.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on expert issues.
Work on expert issues; meet with experts.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare cross exams.
Prepare cross exams.
----Prepare for and attend trial; work on cross-examinations.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
--Prepare for trial.
Prepare cross of Leslie Kelly Hall.
--Prepare for and attend trial.
------Prepare for trial.

•

•

--

- -

--

--

Prepare for and attend trial; work on jury instructions; prepare for oral argument regarding directed verdict.
Prepare for and attend trial;
Page 61 of 62
- -

--------

•

EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

10/26/2011 WLW 10.3
10/27/2011 WLW 9.5
11.5
0.5
0.5
3.9

10/28/2011
10/29/2011
10/30/2011
10/31/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

11/2/2011
11/7/2011
11/8/2011

WLW 1.9
WLW 3.3
WLW 3.5
WLW 3

11/9/2011
I
I

11/l0/201111wLw 11.1
I
11/ll/201l iWLW 2.4
11/14/201liWLW 2.7
11/15/2011 WLW 2.2
11/16/2011 WLW 3.4
I

11/17/2011 IWLW 2.2
11/18/2011
11/28/2011
11/29/2011
11/30/2011
12/9/2011
12/13/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

004829

11.5
0.3
0.6
0.3
0.6
0.6
952.8

Description

Prepare for and attend jury instruction conference; research regarding issues regarding same; work on closing argument
issues.
Work on verdict form and jury instructions; work on briefs regarding same; review transcript for closing arguments and
otherwise prepare for closing arguments.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Correspondence regarding exhibits.
Correspondence regarding exhibits; work on issues regarding same.
1Work on issues regarding exhibits; work on post trial matters; work on attorneys fees; attend hearing for jury verdict

----

•

Work on issues regarding judgment; telephone calls from reporters; work on prejudgment interest issue.
Work on findings of fact regarding disgorgement.
Work on attorneys fees motion; revise findings of fact regarding disgorgement; meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding
same
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding strategies for settlement; review opposition to judgment; work on issues
regarding same; work on attorneys fees issues.

I

Work on attorneys' fees motion; conference with Dara Parker regarding strategies for responding to objections to findings of
fact.
Work on objections to St. Al's request for offset and prejudgment interest.
Work on objection to offset and prejudgment interest; work on attorneys fees petition.
Work on settlement strategies; finalize response brief regarding judgment;
Work on response brief regarding judgment and disgorgement; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding settlement
strategies; attend board meeting.
Work on response to judgment motion; work on issues regarding settlement; telephone call from David Giles regarding
same; telephone conference with reporter from Lawyers USA.
Work on response regarding disgorgement.
Review replies regarding judgment.
Work on attorney's fees petition; conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding same.
Work attorneys' fees issues; conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding same.
Review briefs; conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding hearing
Work on motion for fees
--
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Date

Total Our

Rate/Price

•

Amt

EXHIBIT B

1

I

Description

•

Copies

2/29/2008!
0.11 $
120.00
$12.00 Copy Charges- February
l--..:__~-+---~-'--------+----------1-"-'----=------'----------- . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - j
4/28/2008!
11 $
3.96 ~--~------~~--'
$3.96 Document scanning and OCR
.......
1--..:__-'---+---~-'------5/29/2008
1' $
105.66
$105.66 Copy Charges
6/30/2008
1 $ _ _ _265.08
$265.08
1---'----'----+-----+___c_
___________
_ _ _ _Imaging blowbacks and binders
------------1
7/14/2008
1 $
3,520.42
$3,520.421 Copy Charges and bindering and trial transcripts
7/18/2008
1 $
177.90
$177.90 Imaging blowbacks with autofeed
~~-'----+---~-'------------------·-------!--·
9/17/2008 ... - - · · -1- f
$ - - ' - -56.40
$56.40 Copy Charges and bindering
- - - - - - - - - - - .. ···-·-··-··--··---------

------~------

~~~------~--------------------

~~~-+---~--~

...

-

------

I--1_0,_/1_._/_20_0_8.L___4_2_2_j_i-'-$____0_.1_5_ _ _ _ ___:_$6_3_.3_0-+-Copy Charges
____ ____ ..... ___ ........... _______
12/1/200~-----1~:_._$____2_35_.8_0-+-,_ _ _ ___,_$2_3_5_.80_+-Co__.P,_.Y'-C_h_a_..rg.._e_s_-_Li_tig..._a_t_io_n_c_o._,py._in_..g.._a_n_d_b_in_d_e_r
_
_c_r_e_at_io_n_.______
1/5/2009
1 $
41.20 I
$41.20 Copy S_~ar~~~::__Litigation copying and binding
___________
3/6/2009
1 $
0.20
$0.201Copy Charges
1--_.8/._4_._/2_0_0_9~!_ _1_0_3_1__$

8/31/2009

1

2493, $

________0_._2_0-+--0.20

$206.20 i Copy char~~-s-~_J_(Jiy ______________________________ _
$498.60,Copy Charges August

1-1_0_._/_30_._/_2_00_9-+'-- 31 $
0.20 c----$6.2o:copy charges for October
___ - - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - 1-1_1_._/3_0_,_/_20_0_9+!-~ 506, $
0.20 1
$101.20iCopy charges for '!l_~_!l_th of_~_~v_e_m_b_e_r__------~r--=2=--/=-28=---/-=2=-01=-0=-+II___=ffi$_6_6-+--"$_ _ _ _0_.2_0__:_ _______._$_13_._20_i'-C_o._,py._c_h_a_..rg.._e_s_fo_r_F_e_br_u_ar_._y___________~------4/1/2010
5061 $
0.20
$101.20 Copy charges for Marc~ __________ -----------~
5/1/20101
461 $
0.20
$9.20!Copy charges for April
5/31/2010
281 $
0.20
$5.60 Copy charges for May
I--6_._/_30_._/_20_1_0-+
26_1-+'-'Sc--_ _ _0_.2_0-t-_ _ _ ___._$_52_._20-+-C_o._py._c_h_a_..rg.._e_s_fo_r_J_un_e_ _ _ _ _ _ _ -········ ---·-·---- -~----7
/31/2010
568,
$ _ _ _0.20
$113.60
Copy charges
for
July
1--_.__-'--+-----+___c_
__,__ _ _ _ __.__
_ _f--._._
_ _....__
_
8/31/2010 __1_2_2_6+-l$_ _ _ _0_.2_0_,________ $245.20 Copy Charges for August
1_ _ _

_.!.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

----

.............. ----~---··---

9/30/2010
70 I $
0.20
___$.:_1_4_.0_0TC_o_._p_._y_Se_.p_t_em_be_r_______________ .......... --·--·- _------· __ _
1/31/2_~ _____5_6_3+1_:_$_ _ _ _
0._2_0+------'-$_1_12_.6_0-+-.
Copy Charges for January
2/28/2011
938 $
0.20
$187.60ICopy charges - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1---..:__-'-----~·--·-----+·-'--------t------'-3/31/2011
574! $
0.20 !
$114.80 Copy charges for March 2011
4/22/2011,
$ - . : _ _72.39
,
$72.39 Electronic Conversion and Bates numbering
--------,---------+------------I--.__.:__
_ _;___ _-11- +
1

4/3_0/?_0_1__1____
24_7_7-"--i_S_________o_.~J
5/31/2011•
770 $
0.20

$495.40 Copy Print charges fo_r_A_._p_ril___________________ _
$154.00 Copy charges ___________________________----j
I--6_._/2_2_._/_20_1_1~·_ _ _5+-$_ _ _ _1_.0_Q_r-------$~5_.0_0+IC_o_._p_._y_in=g_C_ha_r..._ge_s_-_C_o_lo_r ---------------~
6/30/2011
975 $
0.20
$195.00iCopy charges for June
1--..:__-'----,------t-'-------+------~---t----"-'----=------------------------------------l
1---'---~-----t--'-------+-------'---+---'-.____...__

I

----+----

I

1---7'-/8_._/_20_1_1_._ _ _-+·---$87.011Eiectronic Conversi()~_of_D()cuments for Trial Presentati_o_n_---l
7/31/2011
130401 $
0.20_~---$2,608.00 I Copy charges for July
____________,
8/16/2011
$128.88
Copies
of
Exhibits
..... · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · · - - 1---_.___.___+-----+----------~8_._/3_1_._/_20_1_1+---~-------+i______ $2,317.05 ~~ectronic Conversion of Doc~J__men~_!_~ Trial_!>l"_~senta_!ion ----~

8/31/2_0_1_1+-1---~------+-'_ _ ____.$_2_._,5_0_2__
.4_0+C_o_._p_ie_s_o~f~_xh_ib_i_ts_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~----------~
9/14/2011
•
$3,116.50 Illustrative Exhibits for Trial
-·----------- _, _____ _
9/30/2011
13772
i $
0.20
,
$2,754.40
Copy charges for September
1---'---'---+-----t_.___ _ _ _+ - - - - - - ' - - " - - - - j - - - ' " - ' - - - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------....

....

10/31/2011f-----9439j $
0.20 i
~!!~~.80 Copy charges for October
·---···-···· ----·----------11/30/2011
439!
$
0.20
$87.80
Copy
charges
for
November
l--_.__-'----+------+_.___ _ _ _-+-_ _ _ ___.___- - + - - - ' " - ' - - - - = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · · · · · · · - · · - - · - - - - - - -$500.00 Costs as Matter of Right
!

1
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EXHIBIT B

$22,179.95.

-------~

i

-

I
I

I

--

---

I

-

-------

!

1
1
1
1
1

--

-- ·-------------.---- ·-·-

!

8/27/2008
9/29/2008
2/26/2009!
11/30/2009
r--4/30/2011

-·~~·----·-------··· ~-

·-------.~--····

+=

i

-··--·-·-----

--

--·-

--·------

----~---------

--

-------------·---

FEDERAL EXPRESS CHARGES$84.80i Fed Ex charges for July and August
$33.09 Fed Ex $51.65 FedEx February
$27.98 Fed Ex- November
$62.28 Fed Ex charges- April
I

$
$
$
$
$

84.80;
33.09.
51.65
27.98
62.28

!

i
I
I

_i

·-·---·-· · - ·-·

-

-------

-------~--------------

----------

------------------

--·---------

$259.80

----.

"-----

-·

--

-- --

----

----------------

--:---- 181-1~~5.48

7/19/2011
7/21/2011:
7/21/2011
7/22/20111

I

1

I

:

1; $

7.40 ;

11 $

52.50

11 $

442.27

!TRAVEL

-

__

,,_

--------

!Travel- Airfare for Thomas A. Banducci to LA for deposition of
$395.48 i Dr. Thomas McCarthy
-----------'

$7.40 ITravel- Meal for Thomas A. Banducci in LA during deposition
$52.50 Travel- Taxi for Thomas A. Banducci in Los Angeles
Travel- Lodging in LA for Thomas A. Banducci for deposition of
"

!

"

·-·----------·-----

$442.271 Dr. Thomas McCarthy
!

I

50.40.

7/22/2011!

1 $

49.50!

8/1/2011
8/3/2011

1 $

541.23 •
20.95
·- -------------

in LA for Thomas A. Banducci during deposition- $50.40 Travel- Meals
Travel- Parking at Boise airport for Thomas A. Banducci during
deposition
$23.00
------------------·---Travel- Taxi in LA for Thomas A. Banducci for deposition of Dr.
$49.50 1Thomas McCarthy
__ -- - - · - - - I Travel- Airfare for Wade L. Woodard to Portland and Seattle
$541.23jfor Budge and Wilhoite depositions
$20.95ITravel
insurance for deposition travel
---+-------·-·----

360.04

$360.04!Travel- Lodging for Vlf~-~~~.:.~~()dard in Seattle for depositions

7/22/2011

11 $

7/22/2011

11 $

'

23.00

1

~-

I
I

..

I

1. $

8/11/2011

11 $

---·

I

I
I

'

1[ $

8/11/2011

142.68 )
I
I

8/11/20111
I

i

8/11/20111

f---'----

11 $

34.5QJ__

I
I

1i $

168.00

i

'

i

1j $

--

-----

I

i

8/31/2011

$142.68 !Travel- Meals for WadeL.
Woodard in Portland and Seattle
------------·
!Travel- Parking for WadeL. Woodard at Boise airport during
$34.50 I depositions

345.18

$168.QQj_Travel- Taxis in Portland and Seattle for WadeL. Woodard
Travel- WadeL. Woodard- Taxi, Meals, Parking- Portland &

---

$345.18 Seattle--·
Travel -Wade L. Woodard -Airline Travel & Lodging for Portland
$863.18 & Seattle
..

·-·-·-----""----

i

8/31/2011

1] $

863.18 '

----------.

$3,496.311

i
---+------

-----

------·----···-

-·-------

I

--

I
I

-----

---------

WESTLAW

2

004831

•

141

~

)

•

..

12/1/200~+

•

EXHIBITS

1 $
$600.92 Westlaw research, November
600.92 .
1 $
12/17/2007-l600.921'
$600.92:Westlaw charges November, 2007 ~--------- __________j
10/15/2008.
1 $ ___
200.47
,
$200.47;Westlaw legal research for
1--_.___.__
_ _,___ _____,___:_
_ _-+-----------_ September
11/20/2008 i
1 $ ___ 567.16 i
$567.16 Westlaw legal research charges- October _______________
1 $
1/6/2009 --------+----126.05
I
$126.05!VIf~~~w legal research charges- Dece~_~_er____
_ ___ _
1/6/2009. ----------i----'--------1_2_4_._05---'---11 $
$124.05 Westlaw legal research charges- November ____________
-·
1,$
2/9/20091
1----"--"---~------+-'--_ _2_1~.58 :
$210.58 Westlaw legal research charges for January ______ _
3/5/2009
1: $
7 6 . 1 i j - - = $76.10 Westlaw legal research fees- February
11 $
9/14/2009
1---_.___.__
_____---+-'---~-1_5_8.58
__ }158.581Westlaw legal research charges- August
1
11/1/20091
$
------+---4_6_.51
$46.511Westlaw legal research October
__________________
1
$
12/1/20091
1----"--"----'--------+-'-----6_2_.5_4-r:_______ $62.54 Westlaw Legal Research Novemb~--- -------------~-1' $
2/1/20101
3.831.
$3.83 .Westlaw Legal Research January
1 $
3/1/2010
1.25
$1.25 West law legal research
________________ .
4/1/2010i
1: $ _ _ _
l-----"--"----------l_:__
34.00
$34.00 'West law charges for March
__
________,
6/1/2010:
2.87 :
$2.87
i West law charges for May
1~ $
-----------------------r-1 $
7/1/2010
200.58
$200.58 Westlaw charges for June
1 $
57.57
$57.57 Westlaw charges for July
8/5/2010
l-----"--"----+--------+_:__--------------'---~--1
9/22/2010
$412.66 Westlaw charges for August
412.66 :
$
10/30/2010'
1 $
$50.571 West law charges for September
50.57
----------------- -----------------'---:------2/28/2011 --"·$8.56 'West law charges for February
1' $
8.56'
----$-2-26-.-89--,-iWestlaw charges
--- --------- ---------- ----1 $ -----·---+-----226.89
4/30/20111
- - - - - - - - -- --1 $
5/31/2011
376.86
$376.86IWestlaw Charges
___________
---- -~--------------+-6/30/2011]
1 $
43.73
$43.73 Westlaw Charges for May
1: $
7/31/2011
158.00
$158.00 Westlaw Charges for June
---------'-----~-----8/31/2011
$122.79, Westlaw Charges -for
July
1.i -$- ' - - - 122.79
----f--------''--------'--------·····---------- ---------------9/30/2011
1,567.4__1--+1-----$1,567.41 Westlaw Charges for the month of August
10/31/2011
738.51 ,
$_!~~_.511 West law charges for SeJ)te_m__b__
er______ _
1,048.58 :
$1,048.58 Westlaw--charges for October
11/30/20111
f--·
$7,828.54
1-----+--------------+----_:__::----+------------------------------____j
__:_~-~----------------1

1

---------·-----

!

...

-.

!

!

------

-~------------------------

-------------

1

--ij
--~----j

-------------

i

------------------------------1----------~+----------

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - . - -i

-----

EXPERT FEES

1 - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - c - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - t - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - · ---------~-- ----· --------12/16/2007:
1 $ _ _980.00
Consulting Charges
$980.00 -FTI
1--"----"----+------+_.__
_ _ _ _ _ _ __:___
--------=-----=-----------------1 $
1,732.50
3/21/2011
$1,732.50 FTI Consulting, Inc. February
- - - - - - - - - - - - .... ----------1912.50 :
1 $
4/18/2011 $912.50, FTI Consulting March
------------------1 $
742.50 - - - - - $742.50 i FTI Consulting April -----------·- ---5/18/20111
1 $
6,435.00 I
$6,435.00 IFTI Consulting for May services
6/22/2011.
1 $
8/16/2011
FTI
9,307.SO I
___ $9,307.501
___
_Consulting
_ _ _ July
_ _.___ --------------- .
1 $
9/20/2011 -·--·
$11,904.17 i FTI Consulting August invoice
11,904.17 '
.
--11/28/2011
1 $
29,458.21
$29,458.21.
FTI
Con~~ltingStatement
Through
10/31/2~}1
·----------

----

-----------

_:__:___

~

--------~-~-----------------

-------

------

...

- - - - - -

I

~-~----------+------~----+---------------------

-- - ----------

12/16/2007
2/25/2011!
3/21/20111

4,460.00
$4,460.00, Willamette Management Expert Fees
1! $
-7,500.00
1
$
$7,500.00iWillamette
Management Associates
~----+--'----_.__--+---------=---'--~-------------------1,154.40 -1 $
$1,154.40 Willamette Management Associates.
----------·------------1

4/15/2011
5/10/2011

936.00
11 $ -----+---~---=-$9_3
__6_.0_0+W_il_la_m_e_tt__
e _JIVlanagement Associates invoice through 4/15/11____
-----j-1' $
25,001.60
$25,001.60 Willamette Management April invoice

·--

---------

i
.
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1
1
1
1:

5/29/2011
7/12/2011
7/26/2011
8/9/2011

$
$
$
$

•

6,650.091
215.87
3,042.00
9,505.60

--···

··---~--

I

•

EXHIBIT B

$6,650.09 Willamette Management Associates- May
$215.87 i Willamette Management Associates June invoice
$3,042.00 I Willamette Management Assoc~!es July invoice
$9,505.601 Willamette Managem~_rlt ~~S<?C!~tes 7/31/11 invoice

------

i

I

8/23/2011
8/31/2011
9/15/2011
-10/12/2011_

f----~~

-~

11 $

--+

1' $

11 $
11 $

7,388.41....
2,106.00
62.49
1,872.00

$7,388.41! Willamette Management Associates invoice through 8/15/11
$2,106.00:Willamette .. Management Associates 8/31/11 invoice
$62.49 Willamette Management Associates 9/15/11 invoice
$1,872.00 Willamette Management invoice through 9/30/11
~

·-··

1 $

11,450.31

1 $

1,891.18

~~---

~--------'---~---

~··~

~-~-~-

~--

~

~-

~-~-~-----

~

-~~

~----

--~----

·-~-----

10/31/2011

~~~--

-

-~

~~

~--~

-

-~-----~~--·-

Mgmt- Statement for Period Through 10/15/2011
$11,450.31 Willamette
- ----- ------------

I
!

11/30/20111

$1,891.18 Willamette Management- Statement through 10/31/2011
-$4,000.00 Costs for Experts as a matter of right
------$140,708.33
·-·· ··---··-·-··--·--··-··· ---- ---------------

·--~--

--

--

'-----

--·-·····-

-------------~-----------

-

---- ----------------+
i
I

---

'

··-···-------------------- ...

$174,472.93
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D. RlCH, Clerk

t:ly :2::...YSHIA HOLMES
DEPUTY

Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants/Appellants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Fee Category L.4 $101.00

Defendant-Respondent.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
CounterClaimants-Respondents,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
CounterDefendants-Appellants.
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho Limited
Limited Liability Partnership, MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership, and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited Partnership, AND THE
PARTIES' ATTORNEYS, BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC, 802
West Bannock St., Suite 500, Boise, ID 83702, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE
ENTITLED COURT:
Plaintiff-CounterDefendant Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and

CounterDefendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 17, hereby give notice of appeal as follows:

A.

DESIGNATION OF APPEAL: The above-named Appellants, Saint Alphonsus

Diversified Care, Inc. ("SADC") and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("SARMC")
(collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), appeal against the above-named Respondents MRI Associates,
LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership (collectively, "MRIA") to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment (entitled "Second Amended Judgment"),
entered in the above-entitled action on the 2nd day of May 2012 (the Honorable Michael
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Wetherell, District Judge presiding). Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(1), this Notice of
Appeal shall be deemed to include and present on appeal (A) all interlocutory judgments and
orders entered prior to the judgment, order or decree appealed from; (B) all final judgments and
orders entered prior to the judgment or order appealed from for which the time for appeal has not
expired; and (C) all interlocutory or final judgments and orders entered after the judgment or
order appealed from, including, without limitation, (i) the District Court's January 17, 2012
Judgment, (ii) the District Court's January 17, 2012 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
(iii) the District Court's April25, 2012 denial of Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial, (iv) the District Court's April30, 2012 Amended
Judgment, and (v) the District Court's May 15, 2012 Order re: Costs and Attorneys' Fees.
B.

AUTHORITY FOR APPEAL: Saint Alphonsus has the right to appeal to the

Idaho Supreme Court the judgments and orders described or incorporated herein pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rules 11(a)(1), (5), (6), and (7).
C.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL: The following

list of issues on appeal is preliminary in nature and is based upon such preliminary research and
legal analysis as could reasonably be conducted to date. Saint Alphonsus therefore reserves its
right to assert other issues on appeal.
1.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial, in its order dated April25,
2012, on the following grounds raised by Saint Alphonsus:
a. That MRIA failed to prove lost profits caused by Saint Alphonsus;
b. That MRIA's proof of profits allegedly lost by MRI Mobile Limited was
insufficient as a matter of law;
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c. That MRIA was not entitled to recover damages for profits lost after April
1, 2005, and otherwise failed to prove that any losses suffered after Aprill,
2005, were based on wrongful acts as opposed to Saint Alphonsus's
rightful post-dissociation competition;
d. That MRIA was not entitled to recover damages for profits allegedly lost
to the Intermountain Medical Imaging facility located on the Saint
Alphonsus hospital campus;
e. That the jury's award overstated MRIA's damages because it included
amounts that would have been earned by Saint Alphonsus absent the
alleged misconduct;
f.

That MRIA was not entitled to recover damages for the alleged diminution
in value of MRI Limited Partnership because MRIA affirmatively
abandoned this claim prior to the first trial and its reassertion of the claim
during the second trial was untimely;

g. That MRIA failed to prove the asserted diminution in value or that such
diminution in value was caused by Saint Alphonsus;
h. That MRIA's claim for disgorgement was improperly and untimely pled;
1.

That MRIA's claim for usurpation was time-barred;

J.

That the District Court improperly failed to make independent findings of
fact and conclusions of law on the equitable issue of usurpation;

k. That MRIA's usurpations claims are not supported by substantial evidence
and are against the clear weight of the evidence;
1. That MRIA's disgorgement-of-profits award was overstated by $11.2
million as a matter of law because it failed to account for the costs that
Saint Alphonsus incurred in order to obtain its profits;
m. That the District Court erred in failing to require that damages be
apportioned between Saint Alphonsus and the third-party defendants for
MRIA's breach-of-contract claims, contrary to the requirements of Idaho
law and the court's own prior ruling that "Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a
reduction in any damages awarded against it";
n. That the District Court erred in holding that apportionment of damages
should be decided by the jury rather than on a pro rata, 50%-50% basis;
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o. That, in the alternative, the district court erred in requiring the jury to
determine relative fault separately for each cause of action (rather than
once for the body of joint wrongdoing) and in not requiring the jury to
allocate damages among the various causes of action asserted by MRIA;
p. That the District Court erred in allowing MRIA to amend its complaint to
add MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership as
parties following remand;
q. That the claims of MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited
Partnership were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations;
r.

That the claims of MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited
Partnership were not supported by legally sufficient evidence;

s. That the District Court's order regarding the application of the law-of-thecase doctrine following the Supreme Court remand was erroneous and
unevenly applied to the parties, to Saint Alphonsus's prejudice;
t.

That the District Court erred in allowing the jury to determine the meaning
ofthe unambiguous 1997 and 2011 Radiology Services Agreements
between Saint Alphonsus and Gem State Radiology and to base its
liability findings on an incorrect interpretation of those agreements;

u. That the District Court erred in concluding that its erroneous exclusion (as
hearsay) of Cindy Schamp's testimony regarding her own prior statements
to MRIA witnesses was harmless error;
v. That the District Court erred in precluding Saint Alphonsus from
introducing, during the cross-examination of a witness, an Idaho Business
Review article that contradicted that witness's direct testimony;
w. That the District Court erred in holding, in an order dated July 20, 2011,
that Saint Alphonsus could not enforce its statutory right to examine the
books and records of MRIA, thus preventing Saint Alphonsus from
offering relevant evidence of MRIA' s financial bias at trial;
x. That the District Court erred in refusing to exclude prejudicial language in
two memoranda by consultant Shattuck Hammond (Trial Exhibits 4234
and 4239);
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y. That the District Court erred in precluding Saint Alphonsus from telling
the jury that its dissociation from MRIA was "rightful" under Idaho law,
per its order of June 13, 2011;
z. That the District Court erred in overruling Saint Alphonsus's objection,
made during trial on September 20, 2011, to MRIA's counsel's
inflammatory argument that Saint Alphonsus would preclude care for a
hypothetical "little girl with a brain tumor";
aa. That the District Court erred in allowing MRIA to offer "rebuttal"
testimony by Dr. Stephen Wilson;
bb. That the District Court erred in allowing MRIA to introduce, on October
15, 2011, a double-hearsay statement into evidence as a means to
"impeach" Saint Alphonsus witness Jeff Cliffs inability to remember an
out-of-court statement made by another witness;
cc. That the District Court erred, on October 11, 2011, by admonishing Gem
State Radiology's attorney in front of the jury, to the prejudice of Saint
Alphonsus;
dd. That the District Court erred in issuing a judgment that did not award
Saint Alphonsus interest on its counterclaim at the 12% legal rate of
interest, running from the date of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation to the
date of payment.
Saint Alphonsus also appeals from all of the underlying decisions, orders, and
rulings referenced in its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or
new trial.
2.

Whether the District Court erred, in its April25, 2012 order, when it declined
to order a new trial based on individual and cumulative prejudicial errors;

3.

Whether the District Court erred in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, dated January 17, 2012, when it summarily adopted the advisory jury
finding on usurpation liability, even though those findings were not supported
by the evidence, and declined to subtract Saint Alphonsus's initial investment
from the total amount of disgorgement sought.

4.

Whether the District Court erred in declining to provide the jury with Saint
Alphonsus's proposed jury instructions and special verdict form dated July 15,
2011, or in the alternative, Saint Alphonsus's Redline of the Court's Proposed
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Post-Evidence Instructions and Proposed Special Verdict Form, filed October
25, 2011, or the jury instructions proposed during the conference of October
26, 2011;
5.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus's October 17,
2011 Motion to Direct a Verdict on Claims Related to Enforcement of the
Radiology Services Contract;

6.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus's October 17,
2011 Motion to Direct a Verdict on MRIA' s Damages and Disgorgement
Theories;

7.

Whether the District Court erred, in its order dated September 27, 2011, by
denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Exclude Damages Theories;

8.

Whether the District Court erred, in its Consolidated Order re: Motions Heard
August 5, 2011 (August 24, 2011), by:
a. Granting MRIA's Motion for Clarification re: Contentions that MRIA
Breached Fiduciary Duties;
b. Granting MRIA's Motion to Preclude Reference to Departing Partner's
Share;
c. Granting, in part, MRIA's motion to have the exhibits from the first trial
deemed admitted under law-of-the-case principles;
d. Granting MRIA's Motion to Exclude Mention of Saint Alphonsus's Nonprofit Status;
e. Granting MRIA's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Thomas McCarthy
in part;
f.

9.

Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Reconsider, in part, the Court's
June 13, 2011 Consolidated Order re: Motions in Limine regarding Saint
Alphonsus's ability to refer to its dissociation as "lawful," and to redact
portions of Trial Exhibits 4234 and 4239.

Whether the District Court erred in denying, in an order dated July 20, 2011,
Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Compel Compliance with its Statutory Right to
Inspect MRIA' s Books and Records;
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10.

Whether the District Court erred, in its Consolidated Order of June 17, 2011
re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May 18,2011, by:
a. Holding that, as a matter of law, Idaho Code § 6-805(1) requires a jury to
apportion damages rather than apportioning damages equally among
defendants and settling co-defendants;
b. Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's
Third-Party Beneficiary Claims;

11.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Recusal, as memorialized in the Court's June 13, 2011 Memorandum of
Actions Taken at May 18,2011 Hearing;

12.

Whether the District Court erred, in its June 13, 2011 Consolidated Order re:
Motions in Limine Heard May 18, 2011, by:
a. Granting MRIA's Motion precluding comment regarding the lawfulness of
Saint Alphonsus's dissociation;
b. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion to exclude portions of Trial Exhibits
4234 and 4239;
c. Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of Saint
Alphonsus's competition after April1, 2005;

13.

Whether the District Court erred, in its November 16,2010 Memorandum
Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Motions for Judgment on Pleadings and
Motions for Summary Judgment by:
a. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion to dismiss MRIA's civil conspiracy
claim;
b. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment on the legal
insufficiency of MRIA' s evidence of lost profits;
c. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion for judgment on the pleadings
regarding the claims of the limited partnerships;

14.

Whether the District Court erred in its May 15, 2012 order denying in part
Saint Alphonsus's request to disallow MRIA's requested attorneys' fees and
costs.
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D.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT: Saint Alphonsus requests an entire standard

transcript of the trial proceedings in electronic format in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rules
17(h), 25(c) and 26(m). In addition, Saint Alphonsus requests transcripts of the following
proceedings:
1.

February 21, 2006 transcript of hearing on MRIA's Motion for Leave to File
First Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

2.

June 6, 2006 transcript of hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Dismiss;

3.

October 24, 2006 transcript of hearing on all pending motions;

4.

November 13,2006 transcript of Status Conference re: Trial Setting;

5.

January 11, 2007 transcript of Hearing on Motion to Allow Punitive Damages,
and Motion to Strike Shattuck Hammond Report; Motion to Strike Affidavit
of Professor Branson; Motion to Amend First Amended Counterclaim and
Third Party Complaint;

6.

April17, 2007 transcript of Hearing on Third Party Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and Hearing Regarding Order of Proof;

7.

July 2, 2007 transcript of Hearing on all pending Motions for Summary
Judgment and Motions in Limine;

8.

August 1, 2007 transcript of all proceedings before the Court;

9.

August 2, 2007 transcript of Hearing on MRIA's Motion for Clarification;

10.

Transcript of all Opening Statements from the 2007 trial;

11.

Transcript of all Closing Arguments from the 2007 trial;

12.

Transcripts, from the 2007 trial, of all conferences on jury instructions, the
objections of the parties to the instructions, and the court's ruling thereon; and

13.

October 31,2007 transcript ofthe Hearing on SADC/SARMC's Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial.

NOTICE OF APPEAL-9-

004842

..

14.

February 17, 2010 transcript of initial hearing following Supreme Court
remand;

15.

May 7, 201 0 transcript of scheduling hearing;

16.

July 9, 2010 transcript of hearing on Motion to Strike Third Amended
Counterclaim;

17.

August 4, 2010 transcript ofhearing;

18.

October 1, 2010 transcript ofhearing on motions for summary judgment and
motions to dismiss;

19.

February 9, 2011 transcript of hearing on motions related to reopening of
discovery and filing of motions in limine;

20.

April22, 2011 transcript ofhearing on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

21.

May 18, 2011 transcript of hearing on motions in limine and motions for
summary judgment;

22.

June 21, 2011 transcript ofhearing on Motion to Compel Access to Books and
Records;

23.

August 5, 2011 transcript of hearing on pre-trial motions;

24.

August 9, 2011 transcript of pre-trial conference;

25.

September 2, 2011 transcript of pre-trial conference;

26.

September 6, 2011 transcript of all proceedings before the Court;

27.

Transcript of all opening statements;

28.

Transcript of all closing arguments;

29.

Transcript of all conferences on jury instructions, the objections of the parties
to the instructions, and the court's rulings thereon;

30.

October 1, 2011 transcript of hearing on Saint Alphonsus's Motions for
Summary Judgment
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31.

December 9, 2011 transcript of hearing regarding objections to the form and
contents of the judgment;

32.

March 23, 2012 transcript ofhearing on Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial, and motions regarding
award of attorneys' fees.

E.

CLERK'S RECORD: Saint Alphonsus requests that in addition to all

documents automatically included in the record pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28, the
following additional documents be included, which are most generally described in the terms
used in the clerk's Register of Actions: 1
1.

July 29, 2005 Scheduling Order;

2.

January 31,2006 Motion for Leave to File First Amended Counterclaim and
Third-Party Complaint;

3.

January 31,2006 Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Leave to File First
Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

4.

February 14,2006 Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant/Counterclaimant's Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

5.

February 21, 2006 Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Counterclaim;

6.

March 7, 2006 Memorandum Decision on Defendant/Counterclaimant's
Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

7.

March 20, 2006 Amended Scheduling Order;

8.

March 20,2006 MRIA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

1

Items # 1 through #3 72 on this list were part of the record prepared in the first appeal of
this matter.
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9.

March 21,2006 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

10.

March 21,2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Motion
for Summary Judgment;

11.

March 21,2006 Affidavit ofThomas E. Henson, M.D., in Support ofMRIA's
Motion for Summary Judgment;

12.

April17, 2006 Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motions to Compel,
Motion to Quash Subpoenas and Motion for Protective Order;

13.

May 3, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order;

14.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Strike;

15.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

16.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

17.

May 5, 2006 Memorandum in Support of Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment;

18.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment;

19.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus' Notice ofErrata Re: Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

20.

May 23, 2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

21.

May 23,2006 Affidavit of Thomas E. Henson, M.D., in Support of
Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

22.

May 23,2006 Memorandum in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment;

23.

May 26,2006 MRIA's Notice of Errata Re: Memorandum in Support of
MRIA's Motion for Summary Judgment;

24.

May 26, 2006 Supplemental Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of
MRIA's Motion for Summary Judgment;
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25.

May 30, 2006 Motion to Strike in Connection with Summary Judgment
Proceedings;

26.

May 30,2006 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

27.

May 30, 2006 Affidavit ofDaniel J. Gordon in Support of Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion to Strike;

28.

May 30,2006 Memorandum in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to
Strike;

29.

May 30,2006 Reply Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

30.

June 2, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Strike;

31.

June 5, 2006 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike;

32.

July 24, 2006 Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motions to Strike, CrossMotions for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss;

33.

August 7, 2006 Motion for Reconsideration or for Permission to Appeal;

34.

August 7, 2006 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration or for Permission to Appeal;

35.

August 25, 2006 MRIA's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration;

36.

August 25, 2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;

37.

August 30,2006 Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration or, in the Alternative, for Permission to Appeal;

38.

October 10, 2006 Motion to Compel MRIA Financial Statements;

39.

October 10,2006 Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Compel MRIA
Financial Statements;

40.

October 10, 2006 Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording;
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41.

October 18, 2006 MRIA's Opposition to Motion to Compel MRIA Financial
Statements;

42.

October 20, 2006 Affidavit of Jeremy G. Ladle in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Motion to Compel MRIA Financial Statements;

43.

October 20,2006 Reply Memorandum in Support of Saint Alphonsus' Motion
to Compel MRIA Financial Statements;

44.

November 2, 2006 Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's Motions to Compel;
Defendant's Motion to Extend Pretrial Deadlines; Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration; Third-Party Defendant's Motion to Compel Answers to
Interrogatories and Produce Documents; Third-Party Defendant's Motion to
Strike MRIA's Objection to Producing Moffatt Thomas Documents;

45.

November 22,2006 Memorandum Decision and Order to Reset Trial Dates;

46.

December 20, 2006 Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim
and First Amended Third-Party Complaint;

47.

December 20,2006 Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages;

48.

December 20,2006 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Leave to
File Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
Complaint;

49.

December 20,2006 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion to Amend to
Seek Punitive Damages;

50.

December 20, 2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of
Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive
Damages (document sealed);

51.

December 20, 2006 Affidavit of Douglas M. Branson;

52.

December 20, 2006 Notice of Hearing;

53.

December 21,2006 Motion to Seal Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's
Motion to Amend First Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

54.

December 21, 2006 Errata Sheet Re: Affidavit of Professor Douglas M.
Branson;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-14-

004847

55.

December 28,2006 Order to Seal Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Amend First Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

56.

December 28, 2006 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

57.

December 28, 2006 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Re: Lease Term;

58.

December 28,2006 Affidavit ofPatrick J. Miller in Support of Saint
Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

59.

January 4, 2007 Motion to Strike Affidavit of Professor Douglas M. Branson;

60.

January 4, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

61.

January 4, 2007 Motion to Strike References to Privileged Documents;

62.

January 4, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller;

63.

January 4, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording;

64.

January 4, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

65.

January 4, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages;

66.

January 4, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Memorandum;

67.

January 4, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended
Third-Party Complaint;

68.

January 4, 2007 Motion for Summary Judgment;

69.

January 4, 2007 Third Party Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment;

70.

January 4, 2007 Third Party Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to
MRIA's Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages;

71.

January 4, 2007 Third Party Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to
MRIA's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim and First
Amended Third Party Complaint;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-15-
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72.

January 9, 2007 Motion to Strike SARMC's Motion to Strike References to
Privileged Documents;

73.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Strike;

74.

January 9, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

75.

January 9, 2007 Reply in Support of Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive
Damages Against SARMC;

76.

January 9, 2007 Reply In Support of Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive
Damages Against GSR/SARG;

77.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Reply
Briefs in Support of Motion;

78.

January 9, 2007 MRIA's Memorandum in Opposition to SARMC's Motion to
Strike Affidavit of Professor Douglas M Branson;

79.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit of Yvonne Vaughan in Support ofMRIA's
Memorandum in Opposition ofSARMC's Motion to Strike Affidavit;

80.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit of Douglas M. Branson in Support of Opposition to
SARMC's Motion to Strike Affidavit;

81.

January 9, 2007 Reply Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Leave
to File 2nd Amended Counterclaim and First Amended 3rd Party Complaint;

82.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of Reply
Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Leave to File 2nd Amended
Counterclaim and 1st Amended 3rd Party Complaint;

83.

January 10,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Memorandum in
Opposition to SARMC's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Professor Douglas M.
Branson;

84.

January 10, 2007 Opposition to Motion to Strike References to Privileged
Documents;

85.

January 10, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;

86.

January 23, 2007 Stipulated Protective Order;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-16-

004849

87.

February 1, 2007 Motion for Leave to Supplement Briefing on Motion for
Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
Complaint;

88.

February 26,2007 Memorandum Decision on MRIA's Motion to Amend the
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint to Seek Punitive Damages and to
File a Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
Complaint; Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike References to Privileged
Documents and Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Professor
Douglas M. Branson;

89.

February 12, 2007 Notice of Withdrawal of Third Party Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment;

90.

February 13, 2007 Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
Lease Term;

91.

February 13,2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;

92.

February 20, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

93.

February 20, 2007 Second Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Saint
Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

94.

March 2, 2007 Order on MRIA's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Counterclaim and First Amended Third Party Complaint;

95.

March 7, 2007 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against MRIA on
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim;

96.

March 7, 2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

97.

March 7, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

98.

March 23, 2007 Motion in Limine Re: Douglas M. Branson;

99.

March 23, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Motion in Limine;

100.

March 23,2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Support;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-17-

004850

101.

April3, 2007 Opposition to Third Party Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

102.

April 3, 2007 Affidavit of Julli Hopkins;

103.

April3, 2007 Affidavit ofDavid Giles, M.D.;

104.

April 3, 2007 Affidavit of Shawn P. Bailey;

105.

April10, 2007 Response to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

106.

April 10, 2007 Affidavit Re: Motion for Summary Judgment;

107.

April13, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
the Fourth Claim for Relief in Second Amended Counterclaim;

108.

April 13, 2007 Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording in Support of Saint Alphonsus
Summary Judgment;

109.

April13, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion;

110.

April23, 2007 Third Party Defendants' Expert Witness Disclosure Pursuant
to Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) ofthe IRCP;

111.

April26, 2007 Third Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Defamation Cause of Action;

112.

April26, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Motion to Exclude Witnesses;

113.

April26, 2007 Third Party Defendants' Memorandum in Support ofMotion
for Partial Summary Judgment on Defamation Cause of Action;

114.

April26, 2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones in Support of Third Party
Defendants' Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

115.

April26, 2007 Affidavit ofNeil D. McFeeley in Support of Third Party
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Defamation Cause of Action;

116.

April26, 2007 Affidavit of Jeffery T. Seabourn, M.D. in Support of Third
Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defamation
Cause of Action;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-18-
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117.

April26, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Objection to MRIA's Expert Witness
Disclosures for Charles A. Wilhoite and Bruce P. Budge;

118.

April 26, 2007 Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Objection;

119.

May 1, 2007 Opposition to Motion in Limine Motion to Shorten Time;

120.

May 2, 2007 Motion for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Depositions of
Grant Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp;

121.

May 2, 2007 Affidavit In Support Of Motion for Protective Order Regarding
Discovery Depositions of Grant Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp;

122.

May 2, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Order
Regarding Discovery Depositions of Grant Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp
and in Opposition of Motion to Compel Date Certain for Depositions of Grant
Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp;

123.

May 3, 2007 Jury Instructions Filed;

124.

May 3, 2007 Joinder in Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

125.

May 3, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's
Motion in Limine Re: Douglas M. Branson;

126.

May 4, 2007 Objection to the Expert Witness Disclosure;

127.

May 4, 2007 Notice Of Hearing (05/19/07@ 3:30pm);

128.

May 8, 2007 Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure;

129.

May 8, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

130.

May 8, 2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones;

131.

May 8, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Third Party Defendant's Motion;

132.

May 8, 2007 Notice Of Hearing (06/05/07@ 4:00pm);

133.

May 11, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment
Dismissing MRIA's First Amended Third Party Complaint on the Basis that
No Damages have been Proven;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-19-
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134.

May 11,2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment;

135.

May 11, 2007 Third Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on Idaho Consumer Protection Act Cause of Action;

136.

May 11, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

137.

May 14,2007 Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the
Interference with Prospective Contractual Relationship Cause of Action;

138.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit In Support Of Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Interference with Prospective Contractual
Relationship Cause of Action;

139.

May 14,2007 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Interference with Prospective Contractual
Relationship Cause of Action;

140.

May 14, 2007 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Civil Conspiracy
Cause of Action;

141.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit In Support Of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
of Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;

142.

May 14,2007 Memorandum in Support of for Partial Summary Judgment of
Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;

143.

May 14, 2007 Third Party Defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

144.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit of Jeffrey R. Cliff;

145.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit of Jeffrey T. Seabourn;

146.

May 14,2007 Affidavit of J. Timothy Hall MD;

147.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones;

148.

May 14, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

149.

May 16, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-20-
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150.

May 16,2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

151.

May 16, 2007 Affidavit of J. Will Varin;

152.

May 16, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Statement of Material Facts;

153.

May 16, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Statement ofUndisputed Facts in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Antitrust Claims;

154.

May 18,2007 Motion for Summary Judgment;

155.

May 18,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;

156.

May 18, 2007 Statement ofUndisputed Facts in Support ofMotion;

157.

May 18, 2007 Affidavit ofPatrick J. Miller;

158.

May 18,2007 Statement ofUndisputed Facts in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Motion;

159.

May 18,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
Interference with Prospective Contractual Relationship or Business
Expectations;

160.

May 18, 2007 Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

161.

May 18, 2007 Objection to Amended Notice of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center;

162.

May 18,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Misappropriation of Trade Secret Confidential Information Cause of Action;

163.

May 18, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller;

164.

May 21,2007 Memorandum Decision on Third Party Defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Against MRIA on Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Claim;

165.

May 21, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus' Motion in Limine
Re: Douglas M. Branson;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-21-
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166.

May 21,2007 Motion to Dismiss MRIA's Twentieth Claim for Relief(Re:
Spoliation);

167.

May 21, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss;

168.

May 22,2007 Opposition to SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the Fourth Claim for Relief on the Second Amended
Counterclaim;

169.

May 22,2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt In Support Of Opposition to
SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Fourth Claim for
Relief on the Second Amended;

170.

May 22, 2007 Opposition to Third Party Defendant's Motion to Exclude
Expert Witnesses;

171.

May 22,2007 Opposition to SARMC's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

172.

May 22, 2007 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

173.

May 22, 2007 Opposition to Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure ofEd
Whitelaw;

174.

May 22, 2007 Affidavit of Ed Whitelaw in Support of Opposition to
SARMC's Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw;

175.

May 22, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of Opposition to
SARMC's Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw;

176.

May 23, 2007 MRIA's Supplemental Disclosure of Witnesses;

177.

May 24, 2007 Report of Discovery Master Re: Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Protective Order Re: MRIA Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition;

178.

May 24, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's
Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure ofEd Whitelaw;

179.

May 25, 2007 Third-party Defendants' Memorandum Joining Saint
Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof of
Damages Causation;

180.

May 25, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on Damage Causation;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-22-
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181.

May 25,2007 Third-Party Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Exclude MRlA's Expert Witnesses;

182.

May 29,2007 Reply Memorandum Regarding Motion to Exclude Expert
Witnesses;

183.

May 29,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment on MRlA's Fourth Claim for Relief(Re: Fiduciary Duty
to Limited Partnerships);

184.

June 1, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Supplemental Disclosure of Lay Witnesses;

185.

June 5, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Joinder in Objection to the Expert
Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw;

186.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus' Objection to
MRlA's Expert Witness Disclosures for Charles A. Wilhoite and Bruce P.
Budge and Third-Party Defendants' Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

187.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Shattuck Hammond
Memorandum;

188.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

189.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Renewed Motion in Limine Re: Lease and
Partnership Term;

190.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage
Theory;

191.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Purchase
Price Damage Theory;

192.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Dissociation;

193.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion in Limine Re: Dissociation;

194.

June 5, 2007 MRlA's Motion in Limine Prohibiting SARMC from
Introducing Evidence of its Intent Re: Term of the MRlA Partnership;

195.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRlA's Motion in Limine;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-23-
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196.

June 5, 2007:MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to Purchase MRIA
and/or MRICI;

197.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to
Purchase MRIA and/or MRICI;

198.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Communications Between
SARMC and MRIA about the Purchase ofMRIA and/or MRICI;

199.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Communications Between SARMC and MRIA about the Purchase ofMRIA
and/or MRICI;

200.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Justification for Withdrawal;

201.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Justification for Withdrawal;

202.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Admissibility of Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

203.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Admissibility of Shattuck Hammond Memorandum;

204.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC Promotion of its Own
Best Interests as a Defense to IT Fiduciary Duty Breaches;

205.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support MRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
SARMC Promotion of its Own Best Interests as a Defense to IT Fiduciary
Duty Breaches;

206.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Purported Breaches by MRIA of
Fiduciary Duties;

207.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Purported Breaches by MRIA of Fiduciary Duties;

208.

June 5, 2007 Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's Status
as a Former Catholic Nun;

209.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-24-
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210.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Beliefs About
Legality of Withdrawal from MRIA;

211.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
SARMC's Beliefs About Legality of Withdrawal from MRIA;

212.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Referring Physicians Designated
by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

213.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Referring
Physicians Designated by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

214.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Reliance on Advice of
Counsel;

215.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion in Limine Re: SARMC's
Reliance on Advice of Counsel;

216.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Inadvertently Disclosed
Privileged Document;

217.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion in Limine Re: Inadvertently
Disclosed Privileged Document;

218.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members of
DMR;

219.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Investments by Members ofDMR;

220.

June 5, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Motions in
Limine;

221.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion to Strike IMI's Joinder in SARMC's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof of Damages Causation;

222.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion to Strike IMI's
Joinder in SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof
of Damages Causation;

223.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Re: Damage Causation or, in the Alternative, Motion in Limine;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-25-
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224.

June 5, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Damage Causation
or, in the Alternative, Motion in Limine;

225.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to IMI's Motion for Summary Judgment
Dismissing MRIA's 1st Amended Third Party Complaint on the Basis that No
Damages Have Been Proven and SARMC's Joinder Thereto;

226.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by
Third Party Defendants on the "Interference with Existing Contractual
Relationship" Claim;

227.

June 5, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Third Party Defendants on the
"Interference with Existing Contractual Relationship" Claim;

228.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to Third Party Defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action and
SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Cause
of Action (MRIA's 16th Claim for Relief);

229.

June 12, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion to Dismiss Spoliation
Claim;

230.

June 12, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation;

231.

June 12, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Renewed Motion in Limine
Re: Lease and Partnership Term;

232.

June 12, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Shattuck Hammond Memorandum;

233.

June 12, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Purchase Price Damage Theory;

234.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Charles Wilhoite in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

235.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-26-
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236.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss Spoliation Claim;

237.

June 12, 2007 Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Reliance on Advice of
Counsel;

238.

June 12,2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Motion in Limine;

239.

June 12,2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Strike
Gregory Vistnes;

240.

June 12, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re:
Damage Causation;

241.

June 12, 2007 Report of Discovery Master Re: Motion to Compel Responses
to Fifth Set oflnterrogatories and Fourth Set of Request for Admissions;

242.

June 12,2007 Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Beliefs
about Legality of Withdrawal from MRIA;

243.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Reply Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Damage Causation;

244.

June 12,2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: SARMC Promotion of its
Own Best Interests as a Defense to its Fiduciary Duty Breaches;

245.

June 12, 2007 Response to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;

246.

June 12, 2007 Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members
ofDMR;

247.

June 12,2007 Response to Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Re:
Antitrust;

248.

June 12, 2007 Reply to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
by Third Party Defendants on "Interference with Existing Contractual
Relationship" Claim;

249.

June 12, 2007 Response to MRIA's Motion to Strike IMI's Joinder in
SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof of
Damages Causation;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-27-
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250.

June 12, 2007 Response To MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Damages Causation;

251.

June 12, 2007 Objection to Motion in Limine Re: Referring Physicians
Designated by SARMC/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

252.

June 12, 2007 Objection to Motion in Limine Re: Admissibility of Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

253.

June 12, 2007 Reply to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

254.

June 12, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

255.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Strike Exhibits;

256.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Justification for Withdrawal;

257.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support ofResponse to Opposition to SARMC's
Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Damages Causation;

258.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Referring Physicians
Designated by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

259.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Admissibility of Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

260.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Response to Admissibility of Shattuck Hammond
Memorandum;

261.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Purported Breaches by
MRIA of Fiduciary Duties;

262.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Response to Motion in Limine Re:
Purported Breaches by MRIA of Fiduciary Duties;

263.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of Patricia
Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun;

264.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Response to Motion in Limine Re:
Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-28-
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265.

June 12,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Joinder in Third Party Defendant's Reply
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Civil Conspiracy
Cause of Action;

266.

June 12,2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to Purchase MRlA;

267.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller;

268.

June 12,2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members;

269.

June 12,2007 Response to MRlA's Motion in Limine Re: Communications;

270.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Term of the Partnership;

271.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment re: Damages Causation

272.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller re: Breaches of Fiduciary Duty by
MRlA;

273.

June 13, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on the Fourth Claim for Relief in Second
Amended Counterclaim;

274.

June 14, 2007 Reply to MRlA's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Spoliation
Claim;

275.

June 14, 2007 MRlA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price
Damage Theory;

276.

June 14,2007 Reply to MRlA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation;

277.

June 14, 2007 Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Shattuck
Hammond Memo;

278.

June 14,2007 Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Lease &
Partnership Term;

279.

June 14, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support ofMR1 's Opposition
to Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

280.

June 15, 2007 All Replies in Support of Motion in Limine (12 in number);

NOTICE OF APPEAL-29-
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281.

June 15, 2007 Affidavit of James M. Prochaska;

282.

June 15, 2007 Motion to Strike;

283.

June 18, 2007 Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Charles Wilhoite in
Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

284.

June 19,2007 MRIA's Reply in Support ofMotion in Limine Re: Referring
Physicians Designated by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

285.

June 19,2007 MRIA's Reply in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Admissibility of Shattuck Hammond Memorandum;

286.

June 19, 2007 MRIA's Response to Third Party Defendants' Objection to
Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members ofDMR;

287.

June 21, 2007 Response to Erroneous Statement;

288.

June 25, 2007 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Strike the Affidavit
of Charles Wilhoite;

289.

June 25, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon;

290.

June 27, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment;

291.

June 28, 2007 Order on Oral Argument Presentation on Motions for July 2nd
2007;

292.

July 3, 2007 Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording Re: documents to be Submitted In
Camera;

293.

July 12, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Witness List;

294.

July 18, 2007 Plaintiffs Trial Brief;

295.

July 18, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Third Party Defendant
Settlement;

296.

July 18,2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion;

297.

July 18, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Purported Breaches of Fiduciary
Duties and Wrongful Conduct by MRIA, DMR, and Dr. Giles;

NOTICE OF APPEAL-30-
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298.

July 18,2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion;

299.

July 18,2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Third Party Defendants Expert
Witnesses;

300.

July 18,2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion MRIA's Trial
Brief;

301.

July 18, 2007 Pre-Trial Memorandum;

302.

July 20, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;

303.

July 20, 2007 Stipulation for Dismissal of Third Party Defendants With
Prejudice;

304.

July 25, 2007 Motion to Compel Production of Discovery;

305.

July 25,2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Production of
Discovery;

306.

July 25, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Motion to Compel;

307.

July 26, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion in Limine Re: Third Party Defendant Settlement;

308.

July 26,2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion in Limine re Third Party Defendants Expert Witnesses;

309.

July 26,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion in Limine re Conduct by MRIA, DMR and Dr. Giles;

310.

July 26, 2007 Affidavit of J. Will Varin;

311.

July 30, 2007 Order for Dismissal of Third Party Defendants With Prejudice;

312.

July 30, 2007 Memorandum Decision On Saint Alphonsus' Motion In Limine
Re: Shattuck Hammond Memorandum; Saint Alphonsus' Renewed Motion In
Limine Re: Lease and Partnership Term; Saint Alphonsus' Motion In Limine
Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory; Saint Alphonsus' Motion In Limine Re:
Dissociation; MRIA's Motion In Limine Prohibiting SARMC From
Introducing Evidence of its Intent Re: Term ofthe MRIA Partnership;
MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to Purchase MRIA and/or MRICI;
MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Communications Between SARMC and MRIA
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About the Purchase ofMRIA and/or MRICI; MRIA's Motion In Limine Re:
Justification for Withdrawal; MRIA's Motion In Limine Re: Admissibility of
Shattuck Hammond Memorandum; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's
Promotion of its Own Best Interests; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Purported
Breaches By MRIA of Fiduciary Duties; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun; MRIA's
Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Beliefs About Legality of Withdrawal from
MRIA; MRIA's Motion to Strike Gregory S. Vistness; MRIA's Motion in
Limine Re: Referring Physicians Designated By SARG/GSR as Expert
Witnesses; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Reliance on Advice of
Counsel; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Inadvertently Disclosed Privileged
Documents; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Investments By Members of
DMR; Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Charles Wilhoite in
Opposition to SARMC's Motion In Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage
Theory; MRIA's Motion to Strike Supplemental Affidavit Of Gregory S.
Vistness, Ph.D.;
313.

August 1, 2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Request for
Clarification;

314.

August 3, 2007 MRIA's Request for Clarification/Reconsideration of Motion
in Limine Re: Shattuck Hammond Memorandum and MRIA's Request for
Pre-evidentiary Jury Instruction Re: Duty of Loyalty;

315.

August 3, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Use ofDeposition
Testimony in Opening Statements;

316.

August 3, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion;

317.

August 3, 2007 SARMC's Motion in Limine Re: Use of Shattuck Hammond
Documents in Opening Statement;

318.

August 6, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Compel
Re: SARMC's Failure to Provide Foundational Objections to MRIA's
Exhibits;

319.

August 6, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion in
Limine Re: Use of Shattuck Hammond Documents in Opening Statements;

320.

August 10, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Motion in Limine Re: Dissociation
Damages;
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321.

August 10,2007 Affidavit in Support ofMotion in Limine Re: Dissociation
Damages;

322.

August 10, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation Damages;

323.

August 14, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation Damages;

324.

August 20, 2007 MRIA Motion in Limine;

325.

August 20,2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion;

326.

August 20,2007 Affidavit of WadeL. Woodard in Support of Motion in
Limine;

327.

August 23, 2007 Court's draft Jury Instructions;

328.

August 27, 2007 MRIA's Response to Statute of Limitations Argument;

329.

August 28, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Grant Chamberlain
Testimony and Supporting Memorandum;

330.

August 28,2007 Affidavit in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Grant
Chamberlain Testimonial and Supporting Memorandum;

331.

August 29, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Objections and Proposed Additional Jury
Instructions;

332.

August 29, 2007 Court's draft Jury Instructions;

333.

August 30, 2007 Court's draft Jury Instructions;

334.

August 30, 2007 Jury Instructions filed;

335.

August 30, 2007 Jury Verdict;

336.

September 4, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Objection to MRIA's Proposed
Judgment;

337.

September 10, 2007 MRIA's Response to Saint Alphonsus's Objection to
MRIA's Proposed Judgment;
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338.

September 10, 2007 MRIA's Proposed Findings ofFact and Conclusions of
Law Re: Withdrawing Partners Interest in the Partnership;

339.

September 10, 2007 SADC's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Regarding Plaintiff SADC's Claim for its Partnership Equity;

340.

September 21, 2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment;

341.

October 3, 2007 Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and
Motion for New Trial;

342.

October 3, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

343.

October 3, 2007 Affidavit Re: Settlement Offer;

344.

October 9, 2007 Motion for Costs and Fees;

345.

October 9, 2007 Affidavit of Thomas A. Banducci in Support ofMRIA's
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs;

346.

October 9, 2007 Affidavit of Counsel Re: Criteria for Awarding Attorney Fees;

347.

October 9, 2007 MRIA's Memorandum in Support ofMemorandum of Costs
and Fees;

348.

October 9, 2007 MRIA's Motion for Reconsideration ofFindings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment;

349.

October 9, 2007 MRIA's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law and Judgment;

350.

October 9, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Application for Attorney Fees Relative to
Antitrust and Equity Claims;

351.

October 9, 2007 Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees;

352.

October 9, 2007 Affidavit of Stephanie C. Westermeier;

353.

October 22,2007 MRIA's Objection to Verified Memorandum of Costs and
Attorneys' Fees;

354.

October 23, 2007 Motion to Disallow MRIA's Request for Costs and Fees;
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355.

October 23, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees;

356.

October 23,2007 Memorandum in Support of Opposition to Attorney Fees
and Costs;

357.

October 24, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

358.

October 24, 2007 Affidavit in Support ofMRIA's Opposition to Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

359.

October 24,2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Motion for
Reconsideration of Findings of Fact;

360.

October 24, 2007 Affidavit of Jack Gjording in Opposition to Motion for
Prejudgment Interest;

361.

October 26, 2007 Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment;

362.

October 26, 2007 Reply in Support of Motion for Prejudgment Interest;

363.

October 26, 2007 MRIA's Verified Reply in Support of Motion for Costs and
Fees;

364.

October 29, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

365.

October 29,2007 Affidavit ofPatrick J. Miller in Support of Saint
Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

366.

November 19, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus' Application
for Attorney Fees Relative to Antitrust and Equity Claims; Saint Alphonsus'
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict; Saint Alphonsus' Motion
for New Trial; MRIA's Motion for Prejudgment Interest; MRIA's Motion for
Reconsideration; MRIA's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs;

367.

December 7, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Attorney Costs and Fees;

368.

December 10, 2007 Acceptance ofRemittitur;
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369.

December 20, 2007 Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care and Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center Objection to Acceptance of Remittitur;

370.

December 21, 2007 Objection to Revised Fees and Costs;

371.

December 21, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Objection to Revised Fees and
Costs;

372.

December 27,2007 Notice of Appeal;

373.

January 3, 2008 Amended Judgment;

374.

January 3, 2008 Response to Objection to Acceptance of Remittitur;

375.

January 4, 2008 Motion for Stay of Execution;

376.

January 4, 2008 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Motion for Stay
of Execution;

377.

January 17, 2008 Notice Of Cross-Appeal;

378.

January 28,2008 Memorandum Decision on MRIA's Revised Motion for
Attorneys Fees and Costs;

379.

January 29, 2008 Order Clarifying the Court's Memorandum Decision on
MRIA's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Issued by the Court on January
28th, 2008;

380.

February 4, 2008 Affidavit of WadeL Woodard in Support of Award of Costs
as a Matter of Right and Second Amended Judgment;

381.

February 6, 2008 Objection to Proposed Second Amended Judgment;

382.

February 8, 2008 Order Staying Execution;

383.

February 8, 2008 Affidavit of Thomas A Banducci;

384.

February 11, 2008 Supplemental Request for Additional Clerk's Record;

385.

February 13,2008 MRIA 's Objection to Proposed 2nd Amended Judgment
and Motion for Fees;

386.

February 26, 2008 Second Amended Judgment;
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387.

July 31, 2008 Stipulation for Corrections and Additions to the Transcript and
Record;

388.

August 1, 2008 Order for Corrections and Additions to the Transcript and
Record;

389.

October 22, 2009 Opinion- Supreme Court Docket No. 34885;

390.

March 22,2010 Third Amended Counterclaim;

391.

April16, 2010 Answer to Third Amended Complaint;

392.

April16, 2010 Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter from the Third Amended
Complaint;

393.

July 2, 2010 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Strike Immaterial
Matter from Third Amended Counterclaim;

394.

July 2, 2010 Affidavit of Tom Banducci in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's
Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter from Third Amended Counterclaim;

395.

July 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of its Motion to Strike
Immaterial Matter from the Third Amended Counterclaim;

396.

July 9, 2010 Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions From the Parties and
Briefing Schedule;

397.

July 26,2010 Motion To Amend Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions;

398.

July 30, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Motion to Amend
Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions;

399.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment Based on
the Legal Insufficiency of MRIA' s Evidence of Lost Profits;

400.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for
Summary Judgment Based on the Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's Evidence of
Lost Profits;

401.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment on the Claims of the
Limited Partnerships;
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402.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for
Judgment on the Claims of the Limited Partnerships;

403.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment on the Civil
Conspiracy Claim;

404.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for
Judgment on the Civil Conspiracy Claim;

405.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on
MRIA's Claim for Wrongful Dissociation;

406.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for
Summary Judgment on MRIA's Claim for Wrongful Dissociation;

407.

August 6, 2010 Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Amend Order Re:
Scheduling Preliminary Motions;

408.

August 30,2010 Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim for
Wrongful Dissociation;

409.

August 30, 2010 Opposition to Motion for Judgment on the Claims of the
Limited Partnerships;

410.

August 30,2010 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment Based on MRIA's Civil Conspiracy Claim;

411.

August 30,2010 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment Based on the Alleged Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's Evidence of
Lost Profits;

412.

September 13, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment on Claims of the Limited Partnerships;

413.

September 13,2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Claim for Wrongful Dissociation;

414.

September 13,2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Claim;

415.

September 13, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's
Evidence of Lost Profits;
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416.

September 27, 2010 Order Granting Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter From
the Third Amended Counterclaim;

417.

November 16, 2010 Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Motions
for Judgment on Pleadings and Motions for Summary Judgment;

418.

December 23, 2010 Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery;

419.

January 10, 2011 Motion to Set a Scheduling Order;

420.

February 2, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Reopen Face and Expert Discovery;

421.

February 2, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Set Scheduling Order;

422.

February 2, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Motion to Reopen
and In opposition to Motion to Set Scheduling Order;

423.

February 4, 2011 Reply in Support of Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert
Discovery;

424.

February 15, 2011 Order Reopening Discovery and Setting Schedule;

425.

March 2, 2011 Joint Motion to Amend Discovery Schedule;

426.

March 7, 2011 Order Granting Joint Motion to Amend Discovery Schedule;

427.

March 7, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion For Summary Judgment On
MRIA's Unpled Breach Of Contract Theory ofWrongful Dissociation;

428.

March 7, 2011 Memorandum In Support Of Saint Alphonsus's Motion For
Summary Judgment On MRIA's Unpled Breach Of Contract Theory of
Wrongful Dissociation;

429.

March 8, 2011 Notice of Errata re: St Alphonsus Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment;

430.

March 22, 2011 Stipulation and Covenant Not to Execute;

431.

March 23, 2011 Order re: Stipulation and Covenant Not to Execute;

432.

March 28, 2011 MRIA's Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment On
Breach Of Contract Theory of Wrongful Withdrawal;
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433.

April11, 2011 MRIA's Motion for Clarification Regarding Withdrawing
Partner's Share;

434.

April11, 2011 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Clarification
Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share;

435.

April11, 2011 MRIA's Motion In Limine to Preclude Saint Alphonsus from
Referencing the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Regarding the Appeal of this
Case

436.

April11, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Motion In Limine to Preclude
Saint Alphonsus from Referencing the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion
Regarding the Appeal of this Case;

437.

April11, 2011 MRIA's Motion In Limine to Preclude Argument of Lawful
Dissociation;

438.

April11, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Motion In Limine to Preclude
Argument of Lawful Dissociation;

439.

April11, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMRIA Motions Filed April
11, 2011;

440.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment on
MRIA's Unpled "Breach of Contract" Theory of Wrongful Dissociation;

441.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus' s Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of
Competition Following Lawful Dissociation;

442.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in
Limine Re: Evidence of Competition Following Lawful Dissociation;

443.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its
Second Affirmative Defense;

444.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment on its Second Affirmative Defense;

445.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and
Argument that St Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew from MRIA;
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446.

:April11, 2011 Saint :Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in
Limine to Exclude Evidence and :Argument that Saint :Alphonsus Improperly
Withdrew from MRI:A;

447.

April11, 2011 Saint :Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Prior Evidentiary
Rulings from the First Trial;

448.

:April11, 2011 Saint :Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion in
Limine Re: Prior Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial;

449.

:April11, 2011 Saint :Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its
Claim for its Partnership Interest;

450.

:April11, 2011 Saint :Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment on its Claim for its Partnership Interest;

451.

:April11, 2011 Saint :Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRI
Center and MRI Mobile's Third Party Beneficiary Claims;

452.

:April11, 2011 Saint :Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment on MRI Center's and MRI Mobile's Third Party
Beneficiary Claims;

453.

:April11, 2011 Saint :Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to Exclude Claims of
Misappropriation, Defamation or Wrongful Dissociation;

454.

:April11, 2011 Saint :Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion in
Limine to Exclude Claims of Misappropriation, Defamation or Wrongful
Dissociation;

455.

:April11, 2011 Saint :Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: References to the
Jury's Finding of Liability in the First Trial;

456.

:April11, 2011 Saint :Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in
Limine Re: References to the Jury's Finding of Liability in the First Trial;

457.

:April11, 2011 Saint :Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRI:A's
Second Claim of Relief;

458.

:April11, 2011 :Affidavit of JackS. Gjording;

459.

:April11, 2011 Saint :Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment ofMRI:A's Second Claim ofRelief;
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460.

April25, 2011 MRIA's Notice ofNon-Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion
. for Summary Judgment on MRIA's 2nd Claim for Relief;

461.

April25, 2011 MRIA's Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary
Judgment on Its Claim for Its Partnership Interest;

462.

April25, 2011 MRIA's Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary
Judgment on Its 2nd Affirmative Defense;

463.

April25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary Judgment
on MRI Center and MRI Mobile's 3rd-Party Beneficiary Claims;

464.

April25, 2011 Response to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine re Prior
Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial;

465.

April 25, 2011 MRIA's Notice ofNon-Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion
In Limine re Reference to Jury's Finding of Liability in the 1st Trial;

466.

April25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine re Evidence
of Competition Following Dissociation;

467.

April25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine to Exclude
Evidence & Argument That St. Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew From MRIA;

468.

April25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine to Exclude
Claims of Misappropriation, Defamation or Wrongful Dissociation;

469.

April25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine to
Preclude Reference to the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in this Case;

470.

April25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to Motion in Limine to
Preclude Argument that Dissociation was Lawful;

4 71.

April 25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus' s Opposition to MRIA' s Motion for
Clarification Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share;

472.

April25, 2011 Affidavit of Dr. James Prochaska in Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRI Center and MRI
Mobile's 3rd Party Beneficiary Claims;

473.

May 2, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Oflts Motion For Clarification
regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share;
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474.

May 2, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Oflts Motion In Limine To Preclude
Argument That Dissociation Was Lawful;

475.

May 2, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Oflts Motion In Limine To Preclude
Reference To The Idaho Supreme Court Opinion;

476.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum In Support Oflts
Motion For Summary Judgment On Its Claim For Its Partnership Interest;

477.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum In Support Oflts
Motion For Summary Judgment On Its Second Affirmative Defense

478.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply In Support Oflts Motion For
Summary Judgment On MRI Centers And MRI Mobiles Third-Party
Beneficiary Claims;

479.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Consolidated Reply In Support oflts Motions
In Limine;

480.

May 02, 2011 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording;

481.

May 03, 2011 Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of JackS. Gjording and
Memorandum in Support;

482.

May 05, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Recusal by the Court Based on
Relationship with Dir. Henson

483.

May 06,2011 Order Re: St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary Judgment;

484.

May 06, 2011 Partial Summary Judgment;

485.

May 06, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Strike;

486.

May 11, 2011 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Recusal;

487.

May 11, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's
Motion for Recusal;

488.

May 13, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply In Support Of Motion For Recusal By
the Court Based On Relationship With Dr. Henson;

489.

May 13, 2011 Affidavit Of JackS. Gjording In Support Of Reply In Support
Of Motion For Recusal;
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490.

May 13, 2011 Reply in Support to Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of
Jack Gjording;

491.

May 16, 2011 Order Withdrawing Rule 54(b) Certification;

492.

June 7, 2011 Motion and Memorandum for Orders Concerning Potential
Witnesses;

493.

June 7, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel;

494.

June 10, 2011 Response To MRI Motion Concerning Potential Witnesses;

495.

June 10, 2011 Motion To Compel Compliance with Statutory Rights to
Inspect Partnership Books and Records;

496.

June 10, 2011 Affidavit Of Jack Gjording In Support Of Motion to Compel;

497.

June 10,2011 Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Compel Compliance
with Statutory Rights to Inspect Partnership Books and Records;

498.

June 13,2011 Memorandum of Actions Taken at May 18 Hearing;

499.

June 13, 2011 Consolidated Order Re: Motions in Limine;

500.

June 15, 2011 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus Motion to Compel Compliance
with Statutory Rights to Inspect Partnership Books and Records;

501.

June 17, 2011 Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Compliance with
Statutory Rights to Inspect Partnership Books and Records

502.

June 17, 2011 Consolidated Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment
Heard May 18, 2011;

503.

June 21, 2011 MRIA's Reply in Support of its Motion Concerning Potential
Witnesses Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp;

504.

June 22, 2011 Order Re: Availability at Trial of Witnesses Sandra Bruce,
Cindy Schamp and Dr. Thomas Henson;

505.

June 29, 2011 Briefre Motion to Compel Compliance Regarding Relevance
of Gilbert v. Summit County;

506.

July 05, 2011 Response to Brief Concerning Gilbert v. Summit County;
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507.

July 13, 2011 Motion to Release Original Exhibits;

508.

July 14, 2011 Order Releasing Exhibits;

509.

July 14, 2011 MRIA's Proposed Jury Instructions;

510.

July 15, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Requested Jury Instructions and Special
Verdict Form;

511.

July 20, 2011 Order Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Compel
Compliance with Statutory Right to Inspect MRIA's Books and Records;

512.

July 25, 2011 Motion In Limine To Exclude Hearsay Within Hearsay In
Business Records;

513.

July 25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion For Reconsideration In Part Of June
13 2011 Consolidated Order RE: Motions In Limine;

514.

July 25, 2011 Affidavit Of JackS. Gjording;

515.

July 25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum In Support Of Motion In
Limine To Exclude Hearsay Within Hearsay In Business Records;

516.

July 28,2011 Motion To Have Deemed Admitted The Exhibits Admitted In
The Previous Trial;

517.

July 28, 2011 Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Motion To Have Deemed
Admitted The Exhibits Admitted In The Previous Trial;

518.

July 28,2011 Memorandum In Support OfMRIA's Motion To Have Deemed
Admitted The Exhibits Admitted In The Previous Trial;

519.

July 28,2011 MRIA's Motion In Limine To Exclude Mention Of Saint
Alphonsus's Status As A Non-Profit Entity;

520.

July 28,2011 Memorandum In Support OfMRIA's Motion In Limine To
Exclude Mention Of Saint Alphonsus's Status As A Non-Profit Entity;

521.

July 28, 2011 MRIA's Opposition To Saint Alphonsus's Motion In Limine
To Exclude "Hearsay Within Hearsay" In Business Records;

522.

July 29,2011 Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Exclude the Expert
Testimony of Thomas R McCarthy PhD;
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523.

July 29, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion;

524.

July 29,2011 Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony ofThomas R
McCarthy, Ph.D.;

525.

August 01,2011 Motion and Memorandum in Support to Preclude Reference
to Saint Alphonsus's Departing Partners Share;

526.

August 01, 2011 Motion and Memorandum for Clarification that Saint
Alphonsus May Not Contend that MRIA Breached Fiduciary Duties;

527.

August 01, 2011 Objection to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Reconsideration
in Part of June 13 2011 Consolidated Order ReMotions in Limine;

528.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Have
Deemed Admitted Exhibits From First Trial

529.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Preclude Reference to Saint Alphonsus's Departing Partner Share;

530.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Exclude Mention of Saint Alphonsus's Status as a Non-Profit Entity;

531.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion for
Clarification re: Contentions That MRIA Breached Fiduciary Duties;

532.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of its Motion in Limine
to Exclude Hearsay Within Hearsay From Business Records;

533.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Reconsideration in
Part of June 13 2011 Consolidated Order reMotions in Limine;

534.

August 03, 2011 Memorandum Addressing Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to
MRIA's Motion to Shorten Time;

535.

August 04, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To MRI's Motion To Exclude
The Expert Testimony Of Thomas R McCarthy PhD;

536.

August 04, 2011 Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Opposition;

537.

August 04, 2011 Objections to Saint Alphonsus's Requested Jury Instructions
and Special Verdict Form;
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538.

August 04, 2011 MRI's 1st Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions;

539.

August 04,2011 Reply in Support ofMotion to Have Deemed Admitted
Exhibits from the First Trial;

540.

August 04, 2011 Reply in Support of Motion to Exclude Mention of Saint
Alphonsus's Status as a Non-Profit Entity;

541.

August 05, 2011 Defendant's Witness List;

542.

August 05, 2011 Defendant's Exhibit List;

543.

August 09, 2011 Motion for Order Setting Deadline for Production of Exhibit
List and Motion to Shorten Time;

544.

August 16, 2011 Order Rescheduling Jury Questionnaire;

545.

August 17, 2011 Defendant/Counterclaimants' Proposed Amended Exhibit
List;

546.

August 17, 2011 Plaintiff/Counterdefendants Saint Alphonsus's Proposed
Exhibit List;

547.

August 17, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Witness Designations;

548.

August 17, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Objection To MRIA's Designations Of
Manfred Steiner, Alan Hahn And Stephanie Westermeier As Witnesses;

549.

August 17, 2011 Supplemental Brief in Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Exclude Expert Testimony of Dr. Thomas McCarthy;

550.

August 18, 2011 Motion to Strike Saint Alphonsus's Supplemental Brief in
Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Dr. Thomas
McCarthy

551.

August 19,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Proposed Juror Questionnaire;

552.

August 23,2011 Consolidated Order RE: Motions Heard August 5, 2011;

553.

August 25, 2011 Defendant/Counterclaimants' Deposition Designation;

554.

August 26, 2011 Defendant/Counterclaimant's Proposed Amended Exhibit
List;
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555.

August 29,2011 Memorandum Addressing Communication From Counsel;

556.

August 30, 2011 Motion in Limine re: Conduct by Dr. David Giles and Carl
Harder;

557.

August 31,2011 Supplemental Motion in Limine to Prevent Saint Alphonsus
From Arguing that Attorney Carl Harder Engaged in Inappropriate Conduct;

558.

August 31, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Exclude Additional MRIA
Demonstratives;

559.

August 31,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motions in
Limine to Prevent Argument that Giles and Harder Engaged in Inappropriate
Conduct;

560.

September 01, 2011 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Exclude
Additional MRIA Demonstratives;

561.

September 01, 2011 Reply in Support ofMRIA's Motions In Limine;

562.

September 02,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude MRIA's New
And Improper Damages Theories;

563.

September 02, 2011 Affidavit Of Jack Gjording In Support Of Saint
Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude MRIA's New And Improper Damages
Theories;

564.

September 02,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum In Support OfMotion
To Exclude MRIA's New And Improper Damages Theories;

565.

September 02,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Preclude MRIA From
Using Excluded Carl Harder Letter and Related Drafts;

566.

September 02, 2011 Juror Questionnaire;

567.

September 08, 2011 Motion to Prevent Saint Alphonsus from Referring to
Extension of Term to 2023;

568.

September 09, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Revised Exhibit List;

569.

September 13, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Prevent Saint Alphonsus's From Referring to Extension of Term to 2023;
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570.

September 13, 2011 Objection To Jury Instruction Regarding Consultant
Estimate;

571.

September 16, 2011 Saint Alphonsus' s Supplemental Memorandum In
Support Oflts Motion To Exclude MRIA's New And Improper Damages
Theories;

572.

September 19,2011 Affidavit Of Counsel In Opposition To Saint
Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude MRIA's Damages Theories;

573.

September 19, 2011 Opposition To Saint Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude
MRIA's Damages Theories;

574.

September 20, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support oflts Motion to
Exclude MRIA's New and Improper Damages Theories;

575.

September 22, 2011 Motion in Limine Concerning Out of Court Statements
of Cindy Schamp;

576.

September 23, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA'S Motion in
Limine Concerning Out of Court Statements of Cindy Schamp;

577.

September 27, 2011 Motion for Leave to Offer Prior Trial Exhibit 4332 Into
Evidence;

578.

September 27, 2011 Order Re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories;

579.

September 28, 2011 Objection to Saint Alphonsus Motions for Mistrial;

580.

September 29, 2011 Notice oflntent to Impeach;

581.

September 29, 2011 Motion in Limine to Prevent Saint Alphonsus's from
Presenting Evidence about "Arid Club" Conversation Unless Court First
Determines It Is Admissible;

582.

September 29, 2011 Motion in Limine Regarding Lawsuit Threatened by Dr.
Knochel;

583.

September 30, 2011 Motion to Quash Trial Subpoena of Jan Hove;

584.

October 03, 2011 Reply in Support ofMRIA's Notice oflntent to Impeach;
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585.

October 03, 2011 Notice ofNon Opposition to Proposed Instruction NO. 16
and Proposal for Putting the Parties "On the Clock";

586.

October 03, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Quash Subpoena of Jan Hove;

587.

October 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Response To MRIA's Notice oflntent to
Impeach;

588.

October 04, 2011 MRI Motion to Exclude Exhibits 802 and 803;

589.

October 04, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Admissibility ofExhibits 802
and 803 (Dr. Currans Handwritten notes);

590.

October 06, 2011 Motion to Exclude Alleged Misconduct of Dr. Giles;

591.

October 11, 2011 Motion in Limine to Prevent Argument and Evidence that
Saint Alphonsus is Entitled to an Offset Based on its Ownership of the MRI
Entities;

592.

October 11, 2011 Motion in Limine to Preclude Questioning ofMRIA'S
Experts Concerning the Reasonableness of Non-Technical Factual
Assumptions;

593.

October 11, 2011 Affidavit in Support ofMotion in Limine to Preclude
Questioning ofMRIA's Experts Concerning the Reasonableness ofNonTechnical Factual Assumptions;

594.

October 11, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to Preclude
Questioning ofMRIA'S Experts Concerning the Reasonableness ofNonTechnical Factual Assumptions;

595.

October 11, 2011 Motion to Quash/Modify Subpoenas or Otherwise Preclude
MRIA from Calling Witnesses Without Adequate Notice;

596.

October 12, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To MRIA's Motion To
Preclude Questioning About Reasonableness Of Experts' Factual
Assumptions;

597.

October 12, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To Motion In Limine To
Prevent Argument And Evidence That Saint Alphonsus is Entitled To An
"Offset" Based On Its Ownership Of The MRI Entities;
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598.

October 18, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a Verdict on Claims
Related to Enforcement of the Radiology Services Contract;

599.

October 18, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a Verdict or Otherwise
Preclude MRIA's Tort Claims Alleging Stark and Anti-Kickback Violations;

600.

October 18, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a Verdict on MRIA's
Damages and Disgorgement Theories;

601.

October 21, 2011 MRIA'S Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Directed Verdict on Violations of the Stark and Anti-Kickback Statutes;

602.

October 21, 2011 Affidavit of BrentS. Bastian in Support of Opposition to
Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Directed Verdict on Violations of the Stark and
Anti-Kickback Statutes;

603.

October 21, 2011 MRIA'S Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Directed Verdict on Claims Related to Enforcement of Radiology Services
Contract;

604.

October 21, 2011 MRIA'S Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Directed Verdict on MRIA'S Damages and Disgorgement Theories;

605.

October 24, 2011 Reply in Support of Directed Verdict Motions Filed
October 18, 2011;

606.

October 25, 2011 MRIA'S Requested Changes to Proposed Jury Instructions;

607.

October 25,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Redline of Court's Proposed PostEvidence Instructions and Proposed Special Verdict Form;

608.

October 27, 2011 Order Denying Request from St. Alphonsus;

609.

October 27, 2011 Response to Notice of Authority RE: Allocation of
Damages Among Different Causes of Action;

610.

October 27, 2011 Objection to Language of Proposed Jury Instruction No. 56;

611.

October 28, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Notice of Authority Re: Allocation of
Damages and Reply to MRIA's Counter-Notice;

612.

October 31, 2011 Plaintiffs Exhibit List;
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613.

October 31,2011 Defendant's Exhibit List;

614.

October 31, 2011 Jury Verdict;

615.

October 31,2011 Jury Instructions;

616.

November 02,2011 Order Re: Proposed Judgment;

617.

November 02, 2011 Submission of Proposed Judgment;

618.

November 08,2011 Memorandum in Support ofProposed Findings ofFact
and Conclusion of Law Concerning Disgorgement;

619.

November 08, 2011 Saint Alphonsus Objections and Response to MRIA's
Proposed Judgment;

620.

November 09, 2011 Saint Alphonsus Motion to Set Date for Response to
MRIA's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;

621.

November 15, 2011 Response To Saint Alphonsus's Objections and
Response to MRIA'S Proposed Judgment;

622.

November 15, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Response to Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Usurpation and Disgorgement;

623.

November 21, 2011 Saint Alphonsus Reply in Support of Objections to
MRIA's Proposed Judgment;

624.

November 21, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Of Proposed Findings of Fact
And Conclusion Of Law Concerning Disgorgement;

625.

January 18, 2012 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;

626.

January 18, 2012 Judgment;

627.

January 31, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict or New Trial;

628.

January 31, 2012 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording In Support Of Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial;

629.

January 31,2012 Memorandum In Support Of Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial;
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630.

January 31,2012 MRIA Entities Petition for Costs and Fees;

631.

January 31, 2012 Amended Affidavit of Counsel regarding 54(e)(3) criteria
for Awarding Attorneys Fees;

632.

January 31,2012 Memorandum in Support ofthe MRIA Entities Petition for
Costs and Fees;

633.

January 31,2012 Affidavit of Steven Andersen;

634.

January 31, 2012 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of The MRIA Entities
Memo of Costs and Fees;

635.

February 14, 2012 MRIA's Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Summary Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial;

636.

February 14,2012 Saint Alphonsus Motion to Disallow MRIAs Attorneys
Fees and Costs;

637.

February 14, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Memorandum in Support of Motion;

638.

February 14, 2012 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Motion;

639.

February 21,2012 Motion For Leave To Conduct Discovery Regarding The
Amount Of Attorney's Fees And Costs Incurred By Saint Alphonsus;

640.

February 21,2012 Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Leave To
Conduct Discovery Regarding The Amount Of Attorney's Fees And Costs
Incurred By Saint Alphonsus;

641.

February 27, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Motion For A Stay OfProceedings To
Enforce A Judgment Pursuant To Rule 62(b);

642.

February 27,2012 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum In Support Oflts Motion
For A Stay Of Proceedings To Enforce A Judgment Pursuant To Rule 62(b);

643.

February 28, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Opposition to MRIA's Motion for Leave
to Conduct Discovery Regarding Saint Alphonsus Attorneys Fees;

644.

February 28, 2012 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery Regarding Saint Alphonsus
Attorneys;
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645.

March 05,2012 Reply to Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery Regarding
Saint Alphonsus Attorney Fees;

646.

March 13, 2012 Reply In Support Of Saint Alphonsus's Motion For
Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict Or New Trial;

647.

March 16, 2012 Qualified Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Stay
of Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment;

648.

March 16, 2012 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Disallow
MRIA's Attorneys Fees and Costs;

649.

March 16, 2012 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's
Motion to Disallow MRIA's Attorney Fees and Costs;

650.

March 20, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Reply in Support of its Motion for a Stay of
Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment

651.

March 20, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Reply in Support ofMotion to Disallow
MRIA's Attorneys Fees and Costs

652.

April25, 2012 Order Re: Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
or New Trial;

653.

April30, 2012 Amended Judgment;

654.

May 02,2012 Second Amended Judgment;

655.

May 15, 2012 Order Re: Costs and Attorneys' Fees.

SEALED RECORD: Portions of the record in this matter have been submitted

under seal, specifically the records submitted to the Court for in camera review on July 3, 2007,
noted above (item number 292). Saint Alphonsus requests that these documents remain sealed
and subject only to in camera review by the Court.

G.

REPRODUCTION OF EXHIBITS: Pursuant to Appellate Rule 170), Saint

Alphonsus requests that copies of all documents, charts, and pictures offered or admitted as
exhibits at trial be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
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H.

I CERTIFY:
a.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the court reporter
of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set
out below:
Nicole Julson
Court Reporter
2414 N. McKinney
Boise, Idaho 83704

b.

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript;

c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20.

DATED this 30th day of May 2012.
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 30th day of May 2012, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702
Nicole Julson, Court Reporter
2414 N. McKinney
Boise, ID 83704
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

004889

JUN 0 5 2012
CHRJSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No.
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

By JERI HEATON
DEPUTY

6312)

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
ISTARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff/Respondent
NOTICE OF APPEAL

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant/Appellant

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC.; ITS ATTORNEYS, JACKS. GJORDING, GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC, 121 NORTH
9TH STREET, SUITE 600 P.O. BOX 2837, BOISE, ID 83701, AND DONALD B. AYER,
CHRISTIAN G. VERGONIS, PETER J. ROMATOWSKI, MICHELLE L. MARKS, AND
THOMAS DAVIS OF JONES DAY, 51 LOUISIANA AVENUE NW WASHINGTON, D.C.
20001-2113; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named appellant, MRI Associates, LLP ("Appellant"), appeals against

the above-named respondent, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("Respondent") to the
Idaho Supreme Court from a portion of the district court's "Consolidated Order re: Motions for
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Summary Judgment Heard May 18, 2011," which was filed on June 17, 2011; and a portion of
the district court's "Second Amended Judgment" of May 2, 2012, entered in the above entitled
action, Honorable Judge Michael E. Wetherell presiding.
2.

That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
IAR ll(a).

3.

Reserving the right to assert other issues on appeal (see IAR 17(f)), Appellant

makes the following preliminary statement of issues on appeal:
a.

The district court (Judge Wetherell) erred in holding that the Supreme

Court's decision in the first appeal of this case 1 did not affect a prior decision rendered by
the prior district court (Judge McLaughlin) as to Saint Alphonsus's share upon
dissociation from MRIA.
b.

The district court erred in awarding Respondent a judgment of $4,600,000

against MRI Associates, bearing interest at the judgment rate of 10% annum, calculated
from September 21, 2007.
4.

No relevant portions of the requested record have been sealed.

5.

Appellant waives the preparation of the standard transcript and requests the

preparation of the following portions of the reporter's transcript in both hard copy and electronic
format:
a.

Trial Transcript, 2007 Trial (Aug. 1, 2007; Aug. 6, 2007; Aug. 8, 2007;

August 13-16, 2007; Aug. 20-24, 2007; Aug. 27-30, 2007; Oct. 31, 2007); 2
b.

1
2

Motion Hearing Transcript of May 18, 2011;

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,224 P.3d 1068 (2009).
This transcript has already been prepared in the context of the first appeal of this action.
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c.
6.

Motion Hearing Transcript of December 9, 2011.

Appellant waives the preparation of the standard clerk's record under IAR 28 and

requests that the following documents be included in the clerk's record:
a.

the Register of Actions;

b.

the original and any amended complaint(s);

c.

the original and any amended answer(s) to any complaint(s);

d.

the original and any amended counterclaim, third-party claim, or cross-

e.

the original and any amended answer(s) or response(s) to a counterclaim;

f.

notice of appeal and cross-appeal;

g.

any request for additional reporter's transcript or clerk's record;

h.

a court reporter's notice of lodging with the district court;

1.

table of contents and index;

J.

"MRI Associate's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment," filed March

claim;

21, 2006.

k.

"Memorandum in Support ofMRI Associate's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment," filed March 21,2006.
1.

"Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRI Associate's Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment," filed March 21, 2006.
m.

"Affidavit of Thomas E. Henson in Support ofMRI Associate's Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment," filed March 21, 2006.
n.

"MRIA's Notice of Errata RE: Memorandum In Support OfMRIA's

Motion for Summary Judgment," filed May 26, 2006.
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o.

"Supplemental Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt In Support OfMRI

Associate's Motion for Summary Judgment," filed May 26, 2006.
p.

"Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment," filed May 5, 2006.
q.

"Reply Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment," filed May 30, 2006.
r.

"Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motions to Strike, Cross-Motions

for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Motion to Dismiss," filed
July 24, 2006;
s.

"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment," filed September

21, 2007:
t.

"Motion for Clarification Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share," filed

April 11, 2011;
u.

"Memorandum in Support of Motion for Clarification Regarding

Withdrawing Partner's Share," filed April11, 2011;
v.

"Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMRIA Motions Filed April11, 2011,"

and exhibits thereto, filed April 11, 2011.
w.

"Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Claim for its

Partnership Interest," filed April 11, 2011 ;
x.

"Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary

Judgment on its Claim for its Partnership Interest," filed April 11, 2011;
y.

"Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion for Clarification

Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share," filed April25, 2011;
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z.

"MRIA's Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment

on its Claim for its Partnership Interest," filed April 25, 2011;
aa.

"MRIA's Reply in Support of its Motion for Clarification Regarding

Withdrawing Partners Share," filed May 2, 2011;
bb.

"Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for

Summary Judgment on its Claim for its Partnership Interest," filed May 2, 2011;
cc.

"Consolidated Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May 18,

2011," filed June 17, 2011;
dd.

"Submission of Proposed Judgment" and "Proposed Judgment," filed Nov.

2, 2011;
ee.

"Saint Alphonsus's Objection and Response to MRIA's Proposed

Judgment," filed Nov. 8, 2011;
ff.

"Response to Saint Alphonsus' Objection and Response to MRIA's

Proposed Judgment," filed Nov. 15, 2011;
gg.

"Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Objections to MRIA's Proposed

Judgment," filed Nov. 21, 2011; and
hh.

"Second Amended Judgment" filed May 2, 2012, and any amended

judgment hereinafter filed.
7.

Appellant does not request that any other documents, charts, or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
8.

I certify:

a.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the following:
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Nicole Julson
Court Reporter
2414 N. McKinney
Boise, ID 83704

b.

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript.
c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to IAR 20.
DATED THIS 5th day of June, 2012.

BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of June, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for PlaintifflCounterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1 700
Attorneys for PlaintifflCounterdefendant

ri.s. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile

~S.Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

D Facsimile

Brent Bastian
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No.
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

6312)

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com
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c::t:

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
·
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Supreme Court Docket: 40012-2012
Ada County Docket No. 2004-11388

Plaintiff/Appellant
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORDS

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant/Respondent

TO:
THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC.; ITS ATTORNEYS, JACKS. GJORDING, GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC, 121 NORTH
9TH STREET, SUITE 600 P.O. BOX 2837, BOISE, ID 83701, AND DONALD B. AYER,
CHRISTIAN G. VERGONIS, PETER J. ROMATOWSKI, MICHELLE L. MARKS, AND
THOMAS DAVIS OF JONES DAY, 51 LOUISIANA A VENUE NW WASHINGTON, D.C.
20001-2113; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORDS - I
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent in in the above entitled proceeding,
MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA), hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the
following material in the reporter's transcript and the clerk's record in addition to that required to
be included by the I.A.R. and the notice of appeal. Such records and transcripts are requested in
response to the records and transcripts designated by Appellant's Notice of Appeal. Additional
transcripts and records may be designated on Cross Appeal.

1. Reporter's transcript: MRIA does not request any additional transcripts at this time.
2. Clerk's Record: MRIA requests that in addition to all documents automatically included
in the record pursuant to Rule 28, I.A.R., the following additional documents be included,
which are most generally described in the terms used in the clerk's Register of Action:
a.

April16, 2010 Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter from the Third Amended

Complaint;
b.

July 19, 2011, Stipulation to Amend Discovery Schedule;

c.

July 26, 2011, Order Setting Deadline for Non-Dispositive Motions;

d.

October 4, 2011, Memorandum in Support of Admissibility (if the same is a

different document that the one listed on the same date and identified as "Memorandum in
Support of Admissibility of Exhibits 802 and 803 (Dr. Curran's Notes)";
e.

May 22,2012, Motion for Relief from Judgment;

f.

May 22,2012, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief from Judgment;

g.

May 24,2012, MRIA's Amended Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to

Rule 60(a) or 60(b); and
h.

Amended Affidavit of Counsel in Support of the MRIA Entities' Memorandum of

Costs and Fees.
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DATED THIS 12th day of June, 2012.

BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

~~br.:-.

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Jack S. Gjording
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121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
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Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
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D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
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Washington, DC 20001-2113
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

Plaintiff,

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
OBJECTIONS TO MRIA'S
AMENDED FEE PETITION

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP,

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED,

Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.; and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,

Counter-Defendants.
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Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
(collectively "Saint Alphonsus") submit these objections to MRIA's Amended Affidavit of
Counsel in Support of the MRIA Entities' Costs and Fees (May 29, 2012), filed in response to
the Court's May 15, 2012 order requiring the submission of a new petition excluding certain
categories ofbillings. 1 MRIA seeks certain fees and costs that are inconsistent with the Court's
May 15, 2012 Order. MRIA also seeks costs that cannot be proved as consistent with the
Court's order, due to imprecise time entries. The improper time entries should be disallowed or
reasonably reduced to avoid compensating MRIA for billings inconsistent with the Court's order.

A.

MRIA Seeks Fees Related to Cross-Appeal Issues

The Court's May 15, 2012 order excluded billings related to MRIA's cross-appeal issues.
MRIA's amended affidavit does not comply with the order. Here, MRIA's opening cross-appeal
briefwas combined with its appellee's response brief and filed on November 24,2008. Saint
Alphonsus filed a reply/response brief on December 22, 2008, and MRIA then filed a reply,
solely dedicated to its cross-appeal issues, on January 29, 2009.
While MRIA appears to have deleted all time entries for working on appellate briefs after
December 22, 2008-which necessarily would have been work on cross-appellate issuesMRIA still requests fees for a significant number of time entries during the period of time when
MRIA's opening cross-appeal brief was being drafted. The time entries cited by MRIA do not
specify which issues were being worked on, and thus MRIA has not shown whether those
1

By offering these limited objections per the Court's May 15, 2012 ruling, Saint Alphonsus does
not waive its challenges to other categories of costs and fees which it sought to exclude in its February
14, 2012 Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees, but which the Court held were nonetheless awardable to
MRIA. Saint Alphonsus renews its objection to those costs and fees, but in light of the Court's
admonition that its May 15, 2012 order was "not an invitation for new argument," Saint Alphonsus
merely incorporates those arguments by reference herein.
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billings related to response-brief issues or cross-appeal issues. As MRIA should not be entitled
to smuggle fees for its cross-appeal into the final award through imprecise time entries, the Court
should reduce those questionable time entries by a reasonable amount. See, e.g., Fischer v. SJB-

P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that courts may reduce attorneys' fee to
account for inadequate documentation); cf e.g., Med Recovery Servs., LLC v. Jones, 175 OP.3d
795, 799 (Ct. App. 2007) ("a court ... may disallow fees that were unnecessarily and
unreasonably incurred," with fees "to be evaluated under a standard of reasonableness.") ..
Here, a reasonable reduction would be 10%, roughly the percentage of the combined
response/opening brief dedicated to the cross-appeal. 2 The following entries are implicated:
•

The time entry by BAS on October 9, 2008 and November 24, 2008 related to the
"appellate brief' (Ex. A, p. 1) ( 1.1 hours);

•

The time entries by DL on September 25, 26, and 30, 2008; October 29, 2008;
and November 5 through November 22, 2008, all of which refer generically to
work on the "appellate brief' (Ex. A, p. 11) (27 hours);

•

The time entries by TAB from September 22-28, 2008; and between November 2,
2008, and November 24, 2008, referring generically to "work on brief' (Ex. A, p.
38-39) (92.7 hours);

•

The time entries by WL W between September 22, 2008, and November 24, 2008,
that refer generically to work on the "appeal," "appeal brief' or "brief' (but not
entries specifying work on the "response brief') (Ex. A, pp. 50-52) (309.8 hours).

The Court should reduce the hours request for each of these timekeepers by 10% of the totals
noted above, to account for the time spent on cross-appeal work.
In addition, there are other line items found in Exhibit A that relate to the cross-appeal
and should also be disallowed:

2

MRIA's combined response/opening cross-appeal brief was seventy-five pages, with seven
pages dedicated to the cross-appeal issues.
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•

The January 4, 2008 BDK entry related to research of"appellate rules to
determine additional deadlines." (Ex. A, p. 1) (2.1 hours). The deadlines referred
to were MRIA' s cross-appeal deadlines, as other entries by the same timekeeper
in the days before and after January 4, 2008-and omitted from MRIA's
Amended Affidavit-make clear. Compare id. with MRIA's Affidavit in
Support, Ex. A, p. 1 (Jan. 31, 2012).

•

The March 25, 2008 entry referencing "whether judge was correct in holding that
there is no statutory fiduciary duty between SARMC and MRIM and MRICI."
(Ex. A, p. 2) (2.8 hours). This is research into a potential cross-appeal issue.

These 4.9 hours should be disallowed in their entirety.

B.

MRIA Seeks Fees Related to its Challenge to Appellate Costs

The Court's May 15, 2012 order also excluded billings related to attempting to avoid the
appellate cost award. The October 23, 2009 BAS entry related to the "Supreme Court opinion
and effects of cost awards" runs afoul of this portion of the order. (Ex. A, p. 1) (0.6 hours).

C.

MRIA Seeks Fees Related to the Departing Partner Share.

The Court also excluded costs and fees related to MRIA's challenge to the awarding of
the departing partners' share. MRIA has again sought to recover billings that were incurred in an
attempt to preclude Saint Alphonsus from recovering its departing partner share, hidden among
generic entries related to MRIA's oppositions to "summary judgment" or other motions.
1.

Billings Related to MRIA's April25, 2011 Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on Departing Partner Share

The first example arises with respect to Saint Alphonsus's April11, 2011 motion for
summary judgment regarding its departing partner share. MRIA filed its opposition to that
motion on April25, 2011. Despite this, and taking advantage of imprecise recordkeeping, MRIA
includes several time entries between April11, 2011, and April25, 2011, that relate to MRIA's
summary judgment opposition regarding "damages," which necessarily refers to Saint
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Alphonsus's departing-partner-share motion, which was the only summary judgment motion
relating to damages being briefed at that time. These entries should be disallowed in full:
•

The time entries by BSB on April12 and 13,2011 related to "review [of] motion
for summary judgment on damages," "research concerning same," and
"continu[ing]" such research." (Ex. A, p.4) (15.6 hours);

Other entries from the same time period refer only to MRIA's opposition to summary
judgment. Here, MRIA's imprecise recordkeeping makes it impossible to tell which one of the
three opposition briefs MRIA's attorney was working on. 3 Given this imprecision, it would be
reasonable for the Court to deduct one-third of these hours, to account for billings related to
MRIA's opposition to Saint Alphonsus's departing-partner share summary judgment motion:
•

The time entries by BSB on April20-22, 2011 and April25, 2005, which relate to
MRIA's "opposition to motion for summary judgment" (Ex. A, p. 4) (20.5 hours);

•

The April13, 2011 DLP entry regarding "responses to motions filed by SARMC"
(Ex. A, p. 16) (2.9 hours);

•

The April19, 2011 KAS entry involving "obtain[ing] copies of relevant filings
for summary judgment motions," (Ex. A, p. 25) (1.2 hours);

Each of these timekeepers' entries for these matters should be reduced by 33%, to account for
the time spent on the departing partner share issue.
Finally, MRIA also has several billings referring to responses to "motions" generically:
•

The time entries by DLP on April18-22, 2011 and April25, 2011, which all
relate to "opposition to various motions filed by SARMC," or editing and filing
those "briefs in opposition to SARMC motions" (Ex. A, p. 16-17) (20.2 hours);

3

Saint Alphonsus filed four summary judgment motions on Aprilll, but MRIA only opposed
three, and filed a single-paragraph non-opposition to the fourth. See MRIA's Notice ofNon-Opposition
to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding MRIA's Second Claim for Relief(April
25, 2011).
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The time entries by WLW on April12-15, 2011; April18-20, 2011; and April25,
2011 related to "strategies" and "work on responses to motions filed by SARMC"
(Ex. A, p. 57) (32.1 hours).

Here, as MRIA filed seven response briefs to "motions" filed during this period; a reasonable
reduction for each of these timekeepers' hours by 1/7th (or 14%) of the total would account for
work related to the departing-partner share issue.
2.

Billings related to MRIA's November 14, 2011 Response to Saint
Alphonsus's Objections and Response to MRIA's Proposed Judgment.

MRIA also improperly includes costs related to the departing partner share by seeking
billings related to its November 14, 2011 Response to Saint Alphonsus's Objections and
Response to MRIA's Proposed Judgment. On November 8, 2011, Saint Alphonsus objected to
MRIA's proposed judgment, which did not address or offset Saint Alphonsus's departing partner
share. Although this Court had already granted summary judgment on that issue, MRIA's brief
argued that Saint Alphonsus should be deprived of its countervailing judgment. As another
attempt to re-argue the departing partner share issue, these billings are disallowed by the Court's
order. MRIA should not be entitled to those billings:
•

The time entries by BSB on November 14-15, 2011 related to "response to
objection to judgment" (Ex. A, p. 10) (1.8 hours);

•

The time entries by DLP on November 10-11, 2011 related to "response to
SARMC's objection to proposed judgment," (Ex. A, p. 21) (3.7 hours);

•

The November 14, 2011 TAB entry regarding "review [of] brief on judgment,"
(Ex. A, p. 48) (1.5 hours);

•

The time entries by WLW on November 11, 2011 and November 14, 2011
including reference to "work on objections to St. Al's request for offset" (Ex. A.,
p. 62) (5.1 hours).
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D.

MRIA Seeks Fees Related to Mock Juries.

The Court also disallowed costs related to mock juries. The following line-items found
in Exhibit A to MRIA's Amended Affidavit relate to mock juries, in whole or in part, and should
be disallowed or else have the hours reduced:
•

The time entries for LH for July 6-8, 2011; July 11-13, 2011; July 20-22, 2011;
July 25, 2011; July 27-July 29, 2011; August 2-3, 2011; and August 8-12, 2011
referencing "focus juries" (Ex. A, pp. 34-35) (115.5 hours);

•

The time entries for WLW for July 9, 2011; July 23, 2011; July 28-30, 2011; and
August 13, 2011 related to "mock jury" or "mock trial" (Ex. A, p. 59-60) (31
hours).
CONCLUSION

The Court should disallow MRIA' s requested fees and as described herein.
DATED this 12th day of June, 2012.
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC
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MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited (collectively,
"MRIA'') hereby file this response to Saint Alphonsus's Objections to MRIA's Amended Fee
Petition (the "Objection'').
I.

INTRODUCTION

In its order of May 15,2012, this Court ordered MRIA to submit an amended affidavit as

to attorney fees and costs, and for Saint Alphonsus to then file objections. However, this Court
was clear that this was not "an invitation for new argwnent" from Saint Alphonsus. See Order
Re: Costs and Attorneys Fees, May 15,2012 e'Order''), p. 16. MRIA followed the Order and
filed an "Amended Affidavit" on May 29, 2012, which fully complied with the Court's ruling.
In response, however, Saint Alphonsus has filed an Objection which patently violates this
Court's prohibition on "new arguments/' and which surprisingly asks this Court to assume that
MRIA's counsel is lying to it in the Amended Affidavit. More importantly, however, in almost
every case, MRIA' s Amended Affidavit has already addressed the exact concern Saint
Alphonsus raises in its Objection. MRIA accordingly files this short memorandum to address
these issues.
II.

A.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

MRL4 does not seek fees related to croa$-appeal issues.
Saint Alphonsus starts by accusing MRIA of "smuggling" cross-appeal issues into its fee

and cost bill by only deleting time entries related to the cross-appeal after December 22, 2008.
Objection, pp. 2-4. In essence, Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA
must have done some cross,
appeal work during the timeframe when MRIA indicates that it was instead only doing direct
appeal work, and that therefore MRIA was trying to mislead the Court when it did not disturb
any of its direct appeal billings. This is categorically false, and curiously ignores the hours and
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hours of deletions of time related to the cross-appeal which MRIA made in the Amended
Affidavit prior to December 22, 2008.
In particular, MRIA's cross-appeal was limited to two discrete issues: punitive damages
and anti..trust. See MRIA's Response and Cross-Appeal, filed Nov. 24, 2008, pp. 68-74. As
such, when MRIA's counsel worked on the cross-appeal, they specifically indicated as much in
their time entries by using the verbiage of~'anti-trust" or "punitives," and occasionally simply
'~cross-appeal."

Moreover, because these were arguments MRIA could make irrespective of

what Saint Alphonsus was going to write in its opening brief, MRIA largely had them researched
and drafted months before they were due. Thus, when this Court informed :MRIA that it must
excise billings for the cross-appeal, MRIA simply went in and deleted numerous time entries
(most of which were from early to mid 2008) related to "anti..trust" and "punitive damage"
research and briefing, as well as those generically referencing a ~'oross-appeal,, 1 For example,
Wade Woodard's several time entries in which he stated that he worked on the "punitive damage
portion of brief' or that he 44Work[ed] on cross..appeal brief" in spring of2008~which is when
the cross-appeal brief was largely drafted-were all carefully excised.2 Indeed, MRIA estimates
that it deleted at least 138.9 hours of time related to the crosswappeal prior to December 22,
2008.3 As a result, MRIA did not need to disturb the billing referencing the direct appeal,
because none of those billings were related to the cross-appeal, which was mostly completed
1

As to anti-trust, compare the original Affidavit, Ex. A, at pp. 11·12, 22,32-33, 38-39, 50-Sl with the Amended
Affidavit, Ex. A, at pp. 11, 21-22, 31-32, 37,48-49. MRIA estimates that it excised at least 67.1 houn of time in its
Amended Affidavit related solely to anti-trust researoh and briefmg prior to December 22, 2008. As to punitive
damages, compare the Original Affidavit, Ex. A, at pp. 32, 35, 36, 49, SO-S 1 with the Amended Affidavit, Ex. A, at
pp. 31, 3S, 37, 48-49. MRIA estimates that it excised at least 30.5 hours of time in its Amended Affidavit related
solely to punitive damages research and briefing prior to December 22, 2008. As to generic cross-appeal billings,
compars the original Affidavit, Ex. A, at pp. 1, 29-31, 33, 37,49 with the Amended Affidavit, Ex. A, at pp. 1, 29-30,
32, 36, 48-49. MRlA estimates that it excised at least 41.3 hours of time in its Amended Affidavit related solely to
generic cross-appeal research and briefing prior to December 22, 2008.
2
Sse id.
3

SIB id
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several months earlier. Put another way, the problem here is not MRIA trying to engage in
"smuggling;' but in Saint Alphonsus choosing to ignore MRlA's germane deletions.

B.

MRIA does not seek feu related to appellate costs.
In a truly unimportant argument, Saint Alphonsus argues that the 0. 6 hours Benjamin

Schwartzman spent reviewing the Supreme Court's decision should be excised because he
mentions that he also read and analyzed the portions of the opinion related to cost awards.
Objection, p. 4. It is notable that Mr. Schwartzman does not indicate that he was formulating a
plan for circumventing that opinion as it relates to the cost award~ only that he read the opinion
and analyzed the effect. As such, this entry is fully compliant with this Court's order.
C.

MRIA does not seek fees related to Saint Alphonsus 's departing-partner share.
1.

Apri12011 Motions.

In a continuation of its ''smuggling" argument, Saint Alphonsus next argues that MRIA
failed to excise its billings related to the departing-partner-share briefing in April of2011. Saint
Alphonsus starts by stating that 36 hours billed by Brent Bastian (BSB) between April12-25,
2011, should be disallowed, since his billing refers to a "summary judgment on damages," and
according to Saint Alphonsus, the departing partner share motion "was the only summary
judgment motion relating to damages being briefed at that time." Objection, pp. 4-5. This is
demonstrably untrue. In addition to the departing-partner-share motion, Saint Alphonsus also
filed its Motion for Sununary Judgment on its Second Affirmative Defense on April 11, 2011.
This second motion, according to Saint Alphonsus itself, asked this Court to hold that "Saint
Alphonsus may not be held liable for more than its pro rata share of 50% of any damages MRIA
might prove at trial" because of a previous settlement with GSR (p. 2, emphasis added). It would
accordingly be difficult to know what this motion is, if it is not a 11motion relating to damages."
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But more to the point, this is the "damages•' issue Mr. Bastian was investigating and
briefing in April2011, a fact that becomes obvious when the billing around this time is
examined. On Aprill8, 2011, for example Mr. Bastian has an entry which uses the tenn ''pro
rata" instead, clearly indicating that his research before that time was leading up to this ''pro
rata" question and that his briefing after was addressing it Amended Affidavit, Ex. A., p. 4.
Saint Alphonsus next argues that MRIA failed to discount the billings made by Wade
Woodard (WLW) and Dara Parker (DLP) on the departing-partner-share motions in April of
2011. Objection, pp. 5-6. Once again, however, Saint Alphonsus is simply choosing to ignore
the deletions in the Amended Affidavit. MRIA took great care in the Amended Affidavit to
specifically discount the time these two attorneys spent in April 2011 on the departing-partner..
share motions (and associated responses) so that the time for this issue would be accounted for.
It is for this reason that the time spent by Ms. Parker-who did the lion's share of work on this

issue-was reduced by at least 15.4 hours in this timeframe and Mr. Woodard's was reduced by
at least 9 hours. 4 Put another way, the discount Saint Alphonsus seeks has already occurred, a
fact which Saint Alphonsus should have been already aware, given its purposefully in-depth
scrutiny of MRlA' s bills.
2.

Post-Trial Briefing.

In addition, Saint Alphonsus argues that MRIA is attempting to bill for the departingpartner-share issue in its post-trial briefing when it included its billings for work on the
i'objection to judgment" and "request for offset•' in November 2011. Objection, p. 6. Yet this
tells less than the whole story. Saint Alphonsus is correct that it filed an objection to judgment
which contained a small statement on having its departing partner share included in the
judgment See the Objection to Judgment, filed Nov. 8, 2011. But Saint Alphonsus then spent
4

Compare the original Affidavit, Ex. A, pp. 17, 59 with the Amended Affidavit, Ex. A, pp. 16-17, 57.
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the majority of its time in that brief arguing for a much higher interest rate than it was entitled,
and for that interest to start accruing years earlier than allowed by law. See generally id.
Moreover, it also asked this Court to rule that the jury's disgorgement findings were erroneous
and that the form of the judgment should be in a particular manner. ld.
As a result, while MRIA's response did briefly address whether Saint Alphonsus should

be entitled to its departing-partner share, it spent the vast majority of its time (all but a page or
two in its brief) responding to Saint Alphonsus' s arguments on the interest rate, the date of
accrual of interest, the disgorgement proof, and the form of the judgment. See generally
Response to Saint Alphonsus's Objections to Proposed Judgment, filed Nov. l 5, 2011. Notably,
Saint Alphonsus ended up losing on all of these other arguments.
MRIA accordingly does not know how to reduce its time as it relates to the response to
Saint Alphonsus's Objection. It was Saint Alphonsus itself that chose to intertwine these issues
such that MRlA had to respond to all of them in the same briefing and at the same time. MRIA
was largely successful on its arguments. MRIA thus believes that asking it to guess at how much
of the 12 disputed hours expended on this one issue is unfair.

D.

MRIA does not seek any costs related to mock juries.
Saint Alphonsus ends its objection by arguing that MRIA has done something wrong by

including the attorneys foes related to the mock jury in its Amended Affidavit. Objection, p. 7.
But as Saint Alphonsus itself recognizes, this Court only disallowed the costs of the mock jury in
its order, not the fees. Id; see also this Court's Order of May 15, 2012, at pp. 12, 16. And this
Court did so in response to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Disallow, in which Saint Alphonsus
itself objected only to the costs of the mock jury, saying nothing of the fees. s

3

In particular, in its Motion to Disallow (filed Feb. 14, 2012), Saint Alphonsus's only objection as to the "focus
group" is found on p. 12, in which it solely states that the "costs" related to a ''focus group"~which it indicates can
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Thus, while MRIA believes that there are very good reasons to approach the costs and
fees related to the mock jury differently, the 1ruth of the matter is that those argwnents no longer

matter. The time for complaining about fees has long since passed. As this Court has
unambiguously stated, it does not want to hear new arguments about costs and fees, and this is
clearly a new argument, having never been raised before. See the Order, p. 16. And even were
that not true, the Idaho Rules are explicit that the failure to object within 14 days of service of the
memorandum of attorneys fees constitutes a waiver to contest those fees. Idaho R. Civ. P.
54(e)(6); Lowery v. Ada County, 115 Idaho 64, 68, 764 P.2d 431,435 (Ct. App., 1988) ("Failure
to timely object to a memorandum of costs and attorney fees constitutes a waiver of the right to
contest the entitlement to the costs or fees''). This means that Saint Alphonsus needed to raise
this argument by February 14, 2012, but f~led to do so until June 12,2012. Its argument has
been waived.
lll.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, MRIA respectfully requests that this Court reject the
argwnents found in Saint Alphonsus's Objection.
DATED this 14th day of June 2012.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRl Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

be found at the "Costs Aff., Ex. B, p. 2"-should be disallowed. The "Costs Aff., Ex. B, p. 2" Saint Alphonsus
references only details the costs related to the mock jury, not the fees.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP,
Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S
AMENDED RULE 60
MOTION

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.; and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
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In the guise of asking this Court to correct a "mathematical mistake" under Rule 60(a),
MRIA seeks an amendment of the judgment that, by MRIA's own admission, is intended to
deprive Saint Alphonsus of its right to obtain security for its judgment pending appeal. Mem.
Supp. MRIA's Am. Mot. Relief from J. at 4 ("Mem."). But there is no mathematical error here.
Rather, MRIA specifically requested-over Saint Alphonsus's objection-the particular format
of the judgment at issue, and the Court adopted MRIA's proposed format. Moreover, because
the judgment contains-again, at MRIA's request-multiple, alternative awards, the offset
provision ofl.R.C.P. 54(b)-which requires that any offset result in a "single judgment ... in
favor of the party entitled to the larger judgment"-does not apply. Because Rule 60(a) allows
neither correction of mistakes by a party's attorney nor correction of alleged legal "errors,"
MRIA cannot rely on the Rule here.
Even if this Court could offset Saint Alphonsus's judgment against MRIA's, it certainly
should not do so in the manner MRIA proposes. As this Court is aware, all three of the MRIA
claimants (MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile) obtained judgments against Saint Alphonsus,
while Saint Alphonsus in tum obtained a judgment only against MRIA. MRIA claims a right to
collect the highest total amount ($52 million) awarded to all three claimants, yet asks the Court
to offset Saint Alphonsus's judgment against the much smaller alternative award for
disgorgement ($21 million) that would all go to MRIA. According to MRIA, this would result in
a net amount due to MRIA and relieve MRIA of the obligation of posting a bond. Mem. at 4.
But if the MRIA entities in fact are able to collect, as they hope to do, on the larger award of $52
million, there would be a net amount due from MRIA to Saint Alphonsus, because the portion of
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the $52 million awarded to MRIA ($3.9 million) is smaller than the amount awarded to Saint
Alphonsus against MRIA ($4.6 million plus accrued interest).

1

MRIA would therefore owe Saint Alphonsus several million dollars if the Supreme Court
affirms the status quo. Thus, if the parties are required to post bonds pending appeal, MRIA
needs to post a bond to secure the amount that Saint Alphonsus would be entitled to collect in the
event of that possible outcome. Otherwise, MRI Center and MRI Mobile will have security for
the amounts that may be owed to them by Saint Alphonsus, but Saint Alphonsus will lack
security for the amount that may be owed to it by MRIA.
There is, of course, another alternative. Saint Alphonsus has communicated that if MRIA
agrees not to require Saint Alphonsus to post a bond, then Saint Alphonsus would offer the same
courtesy to MRIA in return. See Gjording Aff. Exs. A-C. Certainly, that would be the most
reasonable resolution of this issue. But if MRIA does not agree to such a resolution, then both
sides will need to post an appropriate bond.

I.

MRIA Is Not Entitled to Rule 60(a) Relief From Its Own Decision to Seek
Alternative, Non-Offsetting Judgments
It is well understood that "Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a), is strictly limited to the

correction of clerical errors, as opposed to judicial or legal errors." State v. Moore, 268 P.3d 471,
473 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011). Only "mistakes or omissions" that are "mechanical in nature" may
be corrected, while errors involving a "legal decision" or "judgment by an attorney" may not.
1

MRIA contends that Saint Alphonsus'sjudgment against MRIA may be offset only
against the award to MRIA, and cannot be offset against the awards to MRI Center and MRI
Mobile. For purposes of this motion, Saint Alphonsus assumes arguendo that MRIA is correct.
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Silsby v. Kepner, 140 Idaho 410, 411, 95 P.3d 28, 29 (2004); accord Dursteler v. Dursteler,
112 Idaho 594,597-98,733 P.2d 815, 818-19 (Ct. App. 1987) ("Rule 60(a) is not a vehicle ...
to change what has been deliberately done" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the
Court's issuance of a judgment without an "offset" was not a clerical error by the Court. It was
the result of a deliberate decision by MRIA's counsel to request alternative awards not amenable
to offset. At best, the determination whether and how to apply an offset in the context of a
judgment containing multiple, alternative awards is a legal decision not subject to alteration
under Rule 60(a).
First, the form of the judgment is attributable to MRIA. On November 2, 2011, MRIA
filed a proposed judgment that set forth multiple alternative recoveries, none of which sought to
offset Saint Alphonsus' s judgment. See MRIA Proposed Judgment at 2-4. Saint Alphonsus
opposed this proposed judgment, arguing that there should be a single judgment in the amount of
the highest verdict total so that the "obligations of the parties" would be clearly defined, see
Objections & Resp. to MRIA's Proposed Judgment at 4 (Nov. 8, 2011), and specifically
proposing language that accommodated an offset, see id. at 3-4 & n.1. MRIA argued that its
proposed judgment did make clear who owed what, and "provides for the award of the highest of
these numbers," with the others merely being alternatives if the Supreme Court rejected the
highest number. Resp. to Saint Alphonsus's Objections at 8. The Court agreed with MRIA,
issuing a judgment that reflected MRIA's proposed judgment almost verbatim, while also adding
a separate (non-offsetting) award in favor of Saint Alphonsus against MRIA.
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Given this sequence of events, MRIA's contention that the Court's failure to offset the
respective awards resulted from a clerical error is incorrect, as is its argument that this putative
clerical error extended to only one ofMRIA's multiple alternative recoveries. MRIA's proposed
judgment did not ask for offset for any judgment, and MRIA affirmatively resisted Saint
Alphonsus's offset-accommodating approach. MRIA certainly did not ask for a partial offset of
only the lower-total-value disgorgementjudgment. Indeed, MRIA's proposed judgment was
supposed to give the highest award with the others as backups-if anything, any "offset" should
have been applied to the highest award. And the Court issued a judgment in the form that MRIA
requested. Whether deliberate or based on legal error, MRIA' s receipt of a judgment in the form
it requested is attributable to its counsel, and is not subject to editing through Rule 60(a).
Second, whether (and, if so, how) the respective awards should be offset under these
circumstances is a question that requires the exercise of legal reasoning, and hence the Court's
failure to apply an offset, even if mistaken, is not a mechanical error that can be corrected under
Rule 60(a). Moreover, the Court's approach was entirely appropriate. MRIA contends (Mem. at
4) that the Court is required to offset the amounts due to MRIA and Saint Alphonsus under
I.R.C.P. 54(b), which provides that
[i]f any parties to an action are entitled to judgments against each
other such as on a claim and counterclaim, or upon cross-claims,
such judgments shall be offset against each other and a single
judgment for the difference between the entitlements shall be
entered in favor of the party entitled to the larger judgment.
But contrary to MRIA' s assertion, this rule does not automatically apply in all cases. In
Walborn v. Walborn, the Supreme Court held that Rule 54(b)'s offset provision is "appropriate"
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only when there is a "single judgment in which conflicting claims are offset and only the
difference between the two judgments paid." 120 Idaho 494, 499, 817 P .2d 160, 165 (1991 ).
Because the two parties' judgments in Walborn did not fit that paradigm, the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded for the entry of separate judgments. See id.
The judgment entered in this case likewise does not fall within the framework
contemplated by Rule 54. Over Saint Alphonsus's objection, MRIA sought and received a
judgment setting forth multiple alternative forms of recovery, with various different awards to
MRIA, MRI Center, and MRI Mobile. The Court's judgment also recites a single award of $4.6
million (plus 10% interest from 2007) in favor of Saint Alphonsus and against MRIA. Critically,
most of the alternative awards for the MRIA entities include an award for MRIA that is less than
the award against MRIA, although one of those alternatives (for disgorgement) includes an
award for MRIA greater than the award against it. As a result, there is no way for the Court to
simply offset Saint Alphonsus's award against MRIA's award, such that there results a "single
judgment for the difference between the entitlements ... in favor of the party entitled to the
larger judgment." I.R.C.P. 54(b). There are different offsets for different alternatives, most of
which result in a net amount due from MRIA to Saint Alphonsus.
MRIA recognizes this, but instead of grappling with the question of whether and how
Rule 54(b) can be applied to offset multiple alternative awards, MRIA simply asks this Court to
selectively apply an offset only to the disgorgement alternative, i.e., only where the offset results
in a net amount due to MRIA. Mem. at 4. Only this award should be offset, MRIA contends,
even though MRIA "fully intend[ s]" to execute on a different award (and thus has no intention of
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actually executing on the disgorgement award). Id. Moreover, according to MRIA, the
theoretical possibility that MRIA could execute on disgorgement award relieves MRIA of its
obligation to obtain security pending appeal for the judgment against it-and hence strips Saint
Alphonsus of its ability to protect that judgment-even though there is a net amount to due Saint
Alphonsus in connection with the award that MRIA "fully intend[s]" to execute. Id. Nothing in
the text or purpose of Rule 54(b) supports this approach.
In addition to being completely unsupported by Rule 54, a fundamental problem with
MRIA's approach is that it appears to eliminate entirely any judgment in favor of Saint
Alphonsus in the event MRIA executes (as it "fully intend[s]") on any of the other alternative
awards. Specifically, if the disgorgement alternative is used to reduce the award in favor of Saint
Alphonsus to $0, then Saint Alphonsus will have no award in its favor if and when the MRI
entities enforce any of the other alternative awards, despite those alternative awards not having
been reduced to compensate for the elimination of the award to Saint Alphonsus. This result
does not appear to be MRIA's intention-it contends (Mem. at 3) that under its approach "what
the parties owe each other will not change"-but the result nevertheless appears to be the
consequence ofMRIA's request to use one alternative to zero out the award to Saint Alphonsus
without making any corresponding adjustments to the other alternatives.
Moreover, even if the Court could somehow apply MRIA's proposed amendment only
for the limited purpose of determining the size ofMRIA's appellate bond, MRIA's approach is
still improper. The bond requirement is intended to preserve the status quo, so that if the
Supreme Court affirms this Court's judgment, the prevailing party will not be deprived of its
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ability to collect upon the judgment should the party owing on the judgment lose the ability to
pay in the interim. Thus, if the parties were to execute on the judgment today-specifically on
the alternative that the MRIA entities "fully intend" to enforce-Saint Alphonsus would have to
pay approximately $48 million to MRI Center and MRI Mobile, but would be entitled to collect
a net amount of approximately $2.7 million from MRIA. See infra note 2 (explaining how to
calculate the amount due to Saint Alphonsus as of the date of the judgment). Under MRIA's
offset proposal, however, only the $48 million that Saint Alphonsus owes to MRI Center and
MRI Mobile would be secured for the duration of the appeal. The net amount of $2.7 million
that MRIA owes Saint Alphonsus would be unsecured, meaning that Saint Alphonsus would lose
the ability to collect if during the course of the appeal MRIA loses the ability to pay. This is

precisely the situation that the bond requirement is intended to avoid.
MRIA's proposal is therefore plainly improper. At a minimum, any legal uncertainty
about the propriety of the proposal is fatal to MRIA's Rule 60(a) motion, because the very fact
that the Court would need to exercise legal judgment in ruling upon the proposal means that Rule
60(a) is inapplicable. Silsby, 140 Idaho at 411, 95 P.3d at 29; cf Holcomb v. United States,
622 F.2d 937, 943-44 (7th Cir. 1980) ("district court erred in allowing [a] full offset," but
because question whether offset applied was "arguable" and "required judicial decision on the
basis of the record," the error was not "a clerical, mathematical, or other clearly demonstrable
mistake, oversight, or omission, subject to correction under Rule 60(a)").

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S AMENDED RULE 60 MOTION- 8
004924

II.

MRIA Is Not Entitled to Idaho Rule 60(a) Relief From Its Own Decision to Seek
Alternative, Non-Offsetting Judgments
MRIA's alternative argument-that the Court should correct the "error" under Rule

60(b)-should also be rejected. Rule 60(b)(6) allows the Court to modify a judgment for "any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Mem. at 3. But a Rule 60(b)( 6)
motion may be granted "only on a showing of unique and compelling circumstances justifying
relief." Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 380 234 P.3d 699, 704 (2010). It
may not be used as a substitute for a timely motion to amend the judgment under Rule 59(e).
Ross v. State, 141 Idaho 670, 672, 115 P.3d 761, 763 (Ct. App. 2005).
Here, MRIA does not even cite this standard, let alone explain how the Court's failure to
sua sponte selectively offset a single alternative award constitutes a unique or compelling
circumstance justifying relief. Nor could it. As explained above, Rule 54(b) cannot be read to
permit selective offset in the manner MRIA requests. And even if it could, MRIA does not
explain why it did not timely request relief under Rule 59(e) within fourteen days of the issuance
of the judgment nearly five months ago. MRIA also fails to show that it is prejudiced by the
judgment as it now stands-nor could it, since the lack of an offset does not change the net
amount that would ultimately be due to each of the parties upon execution of the judgment.

III.

If the Court Grants Relief, It Should Issue an Amended Judgment with a Single
Award or Else Apply the Offset to All Alternative Awards

The form of the judgment should not be altered. But if the Court concludes that it should
amend the judgment to reflect an offset, then the Court should reject MRIA' s proposed form of
judgment for the reasons set forth above, see supra pp. 6-8, and instead adopt one of the
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following approaches.

First, because Rule 54(b) expressly provides that offset should result in a "single
judgment"-not multiple alternative judgments-the Court could issue an amended judgment in
an amount reflecting the highest total award to the MRIA entities (Option 1, Lost Profit
Damages), which is the award that MRIA says it "fully intends" to enforce. Such a judgment
would include, as Option 1 now reflects, (i) an award for MRI Center against Saint Alphonsus of
$25,828,208, to bear interest at the judgment rate of 5.375% per annum until paid in full, and
(ii) an award for MRI Mobile against Saint Alphonsus of $22,349,967, to bear interest at the
judgment rate of 5.375% per annum until paid in full. The judgment would also include (iii) an
award for Saint Alphonsus against MRIA of $2,682,3 74, to bear interest at the judgment rate of
10% per annum until paid in full. The latter figure reflects the difference between the amount
awarded to Saint Alphonsus, including interest through January 17, 2012 (the date of the
judgment), of$6,588,712, 2 and the amount awarded to MRIA of$3,906,338. Absent agreement
by the parties, MRIA would need to post security in this amount to stay execution pending
appeal.

2

As MRIA conceded in its original memorandum, determining an accurate offset
requires the Court to calculate the interest accrued on Saint Alphonsus's award as of the date of
the judgment. See Mem. Supp. Mot. Relief from Judgment at 3 n.2 (May 22, 2012). This is
necessary because the amount awarded to Saint Alphonsus is accruing interest at a different rate
and from a earlier point in time than the amount awarded to MRIA. Specifically, the Court
awarded 10% interest on $4.6 million-i.e., $460,000 per year-running from September 21,
2007. As of the judgment date of January 17, 20 12-four years and 118 days later-accrued
interest totaled $1,988,712. Adding this amount to the base award of $4.6 million results in an
amount due to Saint Alphonsus as of the judgment date of $6,588,712.
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Second, and alternatively, the Court could retain a judgment with multiple, alternative
awards, while applying an appropriate offset to each of the alternatives. Thus, Options 1 and 2
(which are identical) would each recite the award set forth above: (i) an award for MRI Center
against Saint Alphonsus of $25,828,208, to bear interest at the judgment rate of 5.375% per
annum until paid in full; (ii) an award for MRI Mobile against Saint Alphonsus of $22,349,967,
to bear interest at the judgment rate of 5.375% per annum until paid in full; and (iii) an award for
Saint Alphonsus against MRIA of $2,682,374, to bear interest at the judgment rate of 10% per
annum until paid in full.
Option 3 awards damages to MRI Center and MRI Mobile, but does not award any
damages to MRIA. Thus, Option 3 would recite the following: (i) an award for MRI Center
against Saint Alphonsus of $22,337,910, to bear interest at the judgment rate of 5.375% per
annum until paid in full; (ii) an award for MRI Mobile against Saint Alphonsus of$19,329,701,
to bear interest at the judgment rate of 5.375% per annum until paid in full; and (iii) an award for
Saint Alphonsus against MRIA of$6,588,712, to bear interest at the judgment rate of 10% per
annum until paid in full.
The award of Lost Profit Damages in Option 4 would be the same as in Options 1 and 2.
The alternative Disgorgement award in Option 4 would recite a net award to MRIA of
$14,770,126, which represents the difference between the amount awarded to MRIA under this
alternative and the amount awarded to Saint Alphonsus.
Finally, Option 5, which awards lesser amounts to the three MRIA entities, would recite
the following: (i) an award for MRI Center against Saint Alphonsus of $20,662,566, to bear
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interest at the judgment rate of 5.375% per annum until paid in full; (ii) an award for MRI
Mobile against Saint Alphonsus of $17,879,973, to bear interest at the judgment rate of 5.375%
per annum until paid in full; and (iii) an award for Saint Alphonsus against MRIA of $3,463,642,
to bear interest at the judgment rate of 10% per annum until paid in full?
With the multiple alternative awards set forth in this manner, Saint Alphonsus would
have a right to demand that MRIA post a bond sufficient to secure the highest judgment against
it, just as the MRIA entities are demanding that Saint Alphonsus post a bond to secure the
highest total award against it. 4

3

All five Options include an alternative award of "Lost Value Damages" to MRI Center.
The enumeration of alternative awards in any amended judgment should also reflect Saint
Alphonsus's right to enforce its award against MRIA in the event that MRIA elects to execute
upon one ofthe "Lost Value Damages" alternatives.
4

By proposing these alternative forms of judgment, Saint Alphonsus of course does not
withdraw, waive, or otherwise relinquish any challenge or objection to, or appeal of, the
judgment.
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CONCLUSION
MRIA's motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b) should be
denied. In the alternative, any amendment of the judgment for the purpose of offsetting the
awards for and against MRIA should take the form of one of the two alternatives set forth herein.
DATED this 15th day of June 2012.
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
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STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
)
County of Ada
JACK S. GJORDING, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that he is one
of the attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") in the above-entitled
matter and makes this affidavit having personal knowledge of the facts contained herein.
1.

This affidavit is filed in support of Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's

Amended Rule 60 Motion.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of a letter sent from Jack S. Gjording to

Brent Bastian dated June 1, 2012.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a copy of a letter from Thomas A. Banducci to

JackS. Gjording, dated June 6, 2012.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a copy of a letter from Jack S. Gjording to

Thomas A. Banducci, dated June 11, 2012 ..
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public, this 15 1h day of June
2012.

~Q.~
ota Public for Idaho
Residing at Meridian, Idahq
My Commission Expires: ~1 b
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GJORDING

I FOUSER

Jack 5. Gjording

June 1, 2012

By Facsimile
Mr. Brent Bastian
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

RE:

Saint Alphonsus vs. MRI Associates1 LLP
Ada Co. Case No. CV OC 04082190
GF File No.: 15051.001

Dear Brent:
Your letter of May 29 misconstrues Saint Alphonsus's position regarding a supersedeas bond.
Saint Alphonsus certainly would like to avoid the costs of such a bond, which is why I asked
Wade Woodard whether MRIA would be willing to waive the bond requirement pursuant to
Appellate Rules 16 and 40(b)(5). Mr. Woodard's two subsequent demands-- that non-party
Trinity guarantee that it will pay the judgment and that the parties agree to mediate within
sixty days-- were unacceptable, as I explained in my letter of May 10.
You now take the position that MRIA is willing to waive the bond requirement if we can provide
"assurances of some sort" of Saint Alphonsus's ability to pay the judgment. As MRIA surely
knows-- and as both the Supreme Court (see 224 P.3d at 1091) and Judge Wetherell (see March
23, 2012, Hr'g Tr. at 120) have observed --Saint Alphonsus plainly has sufficient assets to
ensure that the lack of a bond will not put at risk MRIA's ability to obtain payment of the
judgment should MRIA prevail on appeal. Indeed, MRIA itself recognized in its petition for
rehearing before the Supreme Court (at p. 5) that Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
possessed assets to cover the sizable judgment following the first trial.
The same remains true today. Saint Alphonsus's publicly available tax filings, in particular the
I.R.S. Forms 990 of Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, show a financially healthy
company with net assets substantially in excess of the judgment amount, and thus provide all
the assurances necessary of Saint Alphonsus's ability to satisfy the judgment. As a courtesy to
your clients, I am providing with this letter a copy of SARMC's most recent Form 990. In light of
these assurances, please provide us by June 6 with an agreement in writing, pursuant to
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Appellate Rule 16(b), that MRIA will not execute on the judgment pending appeal. If you
provide such an agreement, Saint Alphonsus would, of course, similarly agree not to execute on
its judgment against MRIA, thereby likewise obviating MRIA's need to post a bond pending
appeal.
Finally, I should mention that you have also misunderstood Saint Alphonsus's position on
mediation and settlement. As stated on numerous occasions, Saint Alphonsus is very
interested in attempting to negotiate a settlement of this matter. Saint Alphonsus simply
objected to Mr. Woodard's demand that it agree to mediate on MRIA's terms as a condition for
MRIA's waiver of supersedeas bond. We continue to believe that the two matters should be
addressed separately. In that regard, contemporaneously with this letter, I am writing to Tom
Banducci to propose a procedure for initiating mediation of the dispute.
Sincerely,
GJORDING FOUSER PLLC

r-jording
Enclosure
cc
Jones Day (w/o enc.)

004935

Form

990

Internal Revenue Service

Check if
applicable:

2010

Under section 501(c), 527, or 4947(a)l1) of the Internal Revenue Code (except black lung
benefit trust or private foundation)
.... The organization may have to use a copy of this return to satisfy state reporting requirements.

Department of the Treasury

B

OMB No. 1545-0047

Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax

D Employer identification number

C Name of organization

82-0200895
Room/suite E Telephone number

G

0

208 367-2121
5

Gross receipts $

if the organization discontinued Its oparations or disposed of more than 25% of its net assets.

2

Check this box ...

3

Number of voting members of the governing body (Part VI, Hne 1a)

4

Number of independent voting members of the governing body (Part VI, line 1b)

. _____ .. __ ... _.... ____

1-4--=4------...,n-T

5

Total number of Individuals employed in calendar year 2010 (Part V, line 2a) __ ... __ . ___ _ _______ ........ _____ _

1-5~------r-rr-r

.......... ___ ...... _. _____ .... _................... __ __ _ t-3"'--f-------":i1,..3

1-6=-+-----,,..,..___,,.,r-,~
7a

6 Total number of volunteers (estimate if necessary) .....

___ .. ... .... .............................. ___ --·-·····
7 a Total unrelated business revenue from Part VIII, column (C), Nne 12
b Net unrelated business taxable income from Form 990-T,Iine 34

8
9

Contributions and grants (Part VIII, line 1h)

____ _

Program service revenue (Part VIII, line 2g)

_... _

7b

10 Investment income (Part VIII, column (A), lines 3, 4, and 7d) ....
11 Other revenue (Part VIII, column (A), lines 5, 6d, 8c, 9c, 10c, and 11e)
12

~

5i

13

Grants and similar amounts paid (Part IX, column (A), lines 1-3)

14

Benefits paid to or for members (Part IX, column (A), line 4)

15 Salaries, other compensation, employee benefits (Part IX, column (A), lines 5-10) •.....
16a Professional fundraising fees (Part IX, column (A), line 11e) _____ _

~

w

b Total fundraising expenses (Part IX, column (D), line 25)
17

.... _ __,__ _,__...;_.___

Other expenses (Part IX, column (A), lines 11a-11d, 11f-24f)

18 Total expenses. Add lines13-17 (must equal Part IX, column (A), line 25)
19

Revenue less ex enses. Subtract line 18 from line 12

20

Total assets (Part X, line 16)

21

Total liabilities (Part X, line 26)

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is
true, correct, and complete. Declaration of preparer {other than officer) is based on all information of which preparer has any knowledge
Sign
Here

~

:srgnature 01 omcer

~

Type or pnni name anil tfile

Date

BLAINE PETERSON, CFO, ST ALPHONSUS HEALTH SYSTM

PrinVType preparer's name
Paid

..

Preparer

Firm's name

Use Only

Firm's address ~

[ Preparer's signature

I

Ireck LJ

uate

~It-employed 1

PllN

Firm'sEIN ..
Phone no.

Mal£ the IRS discuss this return with the PI'QD8l8r shown above? {see instructi~ , ... 1" ........... .,! ........ .
ro2oo1 02-22-11
LHA For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see the separate instructions.

---~·

..... --· ............. ..

L

Jves L JNo
Form 990 (201 0)
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Check if Schedule 0 contains a response to any question in this Part Ill . .................. ............. ..................... ............ .................
Briefly describe the organization's mission:

1

2

D

HEALTHCARE SERVICES - SEE LINE 4 AND SCHEDULE H FOR ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION
2

3
4

4a

Did the organization undertake any significant program services during the year which were not listed on
the prior Form 990 or 990·EZ?
If "Yes, • describe these new services on Schedule 0.
Did the organization cease conducting, or make significant changes in how it conducts, any program services? ......... .
If "Yes,' describe these changes on Schedule 0.
Describe the exempt purpose achievements for each of the organization's three largest program services by expenses.
Section 501{c}(3) and 501 (c}(4} organizations and section 4947{a}(1) trusts are required to report the amount of grants and
allocations to others the total
rted.
(Code:
) (Expenses$
426,650,799. including grants of$
9
, 155. )(Revenue$

Dves 00 No
Dves

OONo

496,412,518. )

SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, A NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION,
OWNS AND OPERATES AN ACUTE CARE HOSPITAL IN BOISE, IDAHO. THE HOSPITAL
PROVIDES SERVICES TO RESIDENTS OF THE LOCAL GEOGRAPHIC REGION. THE
HOSPITAL IS A MEMBER OF TRINITY HEALTH, AN INDIANA NOT-FOR-PROFIT
CORPORATION SPONSORED BY CATHOLIC HEALTH MINISTRIES, A PUBLIC JURIDIC
PERSON OF THE HOLY ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. FOR MORE INFORMATION ON
SPECIFIC SERVICES PROVIDED, PLEASE SEE SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER'S WEBSITE AT WWW.SARMC.ORG.
THE MISSION STATEMENT OF THE HOSPITAL IS AS FOLLOWS:
WE SERVE TOGETHER IN TRINITY HEALTH
IN THE SPIRIT OF THE GOSPEL
4b

(Code:

) (Expenses$

including grants o f $ - - - - - - - ) (Revenue$-------

TO HEAL BODY, MIND, AND SPIRIT
TO IMPROVE THE HEALTH OF OUR COMMUNITIES
AND TO STEWARD THE RESOURCES ENTRUSTED TO US.

4c

(Code: - - - - - ) (Expenses$------- including grants o f $ - - - - - - - ) (Revenue$-------

4e

Total program service expenses....

) (Revenue$

032002
12-21-10

10270511 794151 4000

6 , 65 0 , 7 99 •
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1Part VIII 1 Statement of Revenue
(B)
Related or
exempt function
revenue

(A)
Total revenue

,flcn

1 a Federated campaigns

i'l:

,_:I

b Membership dues

QlO

-E

t;;!§

c

ii8i..C"'

...............

381,961.
174,612.
859,053.

1c

•••••·•·•••••••••on

d Related organizations

(D)
Revenue
excluded from
tax under
sections 512,
513,or514

1a
1b

..... , ...........

.......................

Fundraising events ___

(C)
Unrelated
business
revenue

1d

._

e Government grants (contributions)
All other contributions, gifts, grants, and

1e

similar amounts not included above

1f

f

g

1260991.
67,536 •

Noncash contributions included in lines 1a-1f: $

h Total. Add lines 1a-1f

....

···········

2676617 .

Business Code
Ql

2 a

u

-~ Ql

b

II)~
E~

NET PATIENT SVC REV
INTERCO. ALLOCATION

900099
900099

486,621,627.

486,621,627.

5364252.

5364252.

....

491,985,879,

....
....
....

3401719.

3. 401,719 •

362,809.

362,809 •

5331652.

5,331,652 •

c
d

~

e

...
0

Q.

f

All other program service revenue -------------·

g Total. Add lines 2a·2f ______________

........... "". -----

3

Investment income {including dividends, interest, and

4

othersimilaramounts)_ ------------- _
........
--- --Income from investment of tax-exempt bond proceeds

5

Royalties

---· .. ,

---·-·.

"

,,

,

.........

..

(B) Personal

(i)Real

Sa Gross Rents
b Less: rental expenses __

362809.

.....
... ,.

c Rental income or (loss) ., ....
d Net rental income or (loss) --7 a Gross amount from sales of
assets other than inventory
b Less: cost or other basis
and sales expenses
--- .. ,,
c Gain or (loss) ... . .. --

362809.
········-········-····-···············

70,008.

'

403466.
5,665,110.

-333,458.

d Net gain or Ooss)

.....
..... . ....•.... ' ..... ......
8a Gross income from fundraising events (not
including$
of

Ql

:I

....

OQ Other

(I) Securities
5 665 ,110.

·--

....

381,961.

c

~
a:

I
I

contributions reported on line 1c). See
Part IV, line 18

419495.
376910.

.......... ,............. ,
b Less: direct expenses_ ....... --------------·--- _ b
c Net income or (loss) from fundraising events

~
.c

0

..... .... a

9a Gross income from gaming activities. See
Part IV, line 19
...... ..................... ... -

....

and allowances

............
,_,

b

..

c Net Income or (lOS$} from sales of lnventorv
Miscellaneous Revenue
11 a

b
c

·-

--

--

12·21·10
""""'"'

10270511 794151 4000

10,223 •

---·- .......

......

900099
IHlUUU

900099

e Total. Add lines 11a-11d
....
........... ........
-Total revenue. See instructions. ········ ......
12
" ' ' ' ........
••«

....

Business Code

CAFETERIA REVENUE
BIO-MEDICAL REPAIR

d All other revenue

10,223.

100.

a

. ...
.

42,585 .

10,323.

a

b Less: direct expenses . ...... ..... ....... b
c Net income or (loss) from gaming activities •···
10 a Gross sales of inventory, less returns
b Less: cost of goods sold

42,585.

....
....

1525387.
19,!>1B.

1,525,387.

19,518.

4426279.
5971184 .

4426279.

509,782,668 •

496,412,158.

19,518.

10,674,375.
Form 990 (2010)
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[Part IX) statement of Functional Expenses
Section 501 (c)(3) and 501 (c)(4) organizations must complete all columns.
All other organizations must complete column (A) but are not required to complete columns (B), (C), and (D).
Do not include amounts reported on lines 6b,
7b, Sb, 9b, and 10b of Part VIII.

1
2
3

4
5
6

7
8

Total !:lenses

Grants and other assistance to governments and
organizations in the U.S. See Part IV, line 21 ······
Grants and other assistance to individuals In
the U.S. See Part IV, line 22 ........................
Grants and other assistance to governments,
organizations, and individuals outside the U.S.
See Part IV, lines 15 and 16 ........... ...........
Benefits paid to or for members
.... ' .....•...
Compensation of current officers, directors,
trustees, and key employees ....................
Compensation not included above, to disqualified
persons (as defined under section 4958(f)(1)) and
persons described in section 4958(c)(3)(B)
Other salaries and wages
.....
.....
Pension plan contributions (include section 401(k)
and section 403(b) employer contributions)

'"'""''

9
10
11

Other employee benefits ..........................
Payroll taxes . .. ... .. .. .. ................. ... ., ......
Fees for services (non-employees):

a Management .............
b Legal ......................
c Accounting .

............ '" ...

------···········<>

.. ..

""

···-·--··-··

..........

-

.. -- .........

d Lobbying ....... .... ,. ............... ,. .........
e Professional fundraising services. See Part IV, line 17
f Investment management fees "' .. ., .. ,,. . .. .
g Other .......
..
12 Advertising and promotion · ' . .... . .... ... -.. ..
-~

•«

'"

...

~

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24

a

b
c
d

e
f

25
26

Office expenses ........... ..... ., ..... , ................
Information technology ····--······--····-··•«• .. ·--··

Royalties ..... ...... ., .. ....... , .. ". '"' _,., ........ "' .
Occupancy ... ,..
"·-Travel ....... ...... ... ..... .. . ..... -... ' ...
Payments of travel or entertainment expenses
for any federal, state, or local public officials
Conferences, conventions, and meetings
Interest
' •.•...•.• - ... '
.. .... " "
""''.,"
Payments to affiliates ... . . . . ···•••<> • .. ...... .....
Depreciation, depletion, and amortization .....
Insurance
...................
·················Other expenses. Itemize expenses not covered
above. (List miscellaneous expenses in line 24f. If line
24f amount exceeds 10% of line 25, column (A)
amount, list line 24f expenses on Schedule 0.) ....
'

._

MEDICAL SUPPLIES
BAD DEBT
INTERCO. PURCHASED svcs
CONTRACT LABOR EXPENSE
HOSPITAL PROVIDER TAX

All other expenses
Total functional expenses. Add lines 1through 24f
Joint costs. Check here ~ LJ if following SOP
98-2 (ASC 958-720). Complete this line only if the
organization reported in column (B) joint costs from a
combined educational campaign and fundraising
solicitation .. - ... - ........... .. - .-" ". ......... .. -..
~

'

032010 12·21-10

10270511 794151 4000

'

Progra~ 1service
expenses

829,083.

8291083.

741072.

741072.

311181708.
541640.
185849133.

Mana~~ent and

aeneral excenses

Fun~~ising
expenses

311181708.
54,640.
17347~.

T210471571.

327,972.

1310961611. 1213261452.
13,973,536. 12,956,508.
121496,141. 111091,966.

7461847.
992,513.
113801722.

231312.
24,515.
23,453.

1,377,827.
1961456.
4,250.

28,473.
1,218,695.
621176.
601549.

5010321811. 4511261 021.
215211539.
6191959.
7,671,812.
418571996.
2016701114.
391, 93J.

31991,986.
11851,053.
21543,820.
-zlr~7n,T81.

917341991.
114121520.

91549,821.
888,235.

1801055.
4701441.

5,115.
53,844.

111931130.

7,7931130.
41~1874.

433.

114061300.
1,4151151.
661426.
601549.

281313,520. 241 213 1 2r3 o
319331956.
6651 361.

314,804.
50,527.
269,996.

31268,595.

83,953,333. 83,9531333.
20,3041902. 201304 19o-z o
81430,470. 11088,932. 7,341,538.
7,792,609.
1,23514lrl. 6,5571208.
6,4761995.
6,476,995.
71 0121521.
614401723.
5381521.
4984~S573.
426650799. 70,717,526.

33,277.
11127,2~8.

-~-
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Pa

e11

(A)
Beginning of year
1

Cash · non-interest-bearing . . .. .. . . . .. .. ..

2

Savings and temporary cash investments

3

Pledges and grants receivable, net ....... .

4
5

Accounts receivable, net .......................................................... .
Receivables from current and former officers, directors, trustees, key
employees, and highest compensated employees. Complete Part II

5

of Schedule L
6

20,000.

Receivables from other disqualified persons (as defined under section
4958(f)(1)), persons described in section 4958(c)(3)(B), and contributing
employers and sponsoring organizations of section 501 (c)(9) voluntary
employees' beneficiary organizations (see instructions) ......... .

Ill

'&Illi

7

Notes and loans receivable, net .. .. . ..

<

8

Inventories for sale or use ...

9

Prepaid expenses and deferred charges

Ill

............. .

10a Land, buildings, and equipment: cost or other
basis. Complete Part VI of Schedule D

b Less: accumulated depreciation

11
12
13
14

Investments · publicly traded securities
Investments · other securities. See Part IV, line 11
Investments · program-related. See Part IV, line 11
Intangible assets

.

15

16
17

Ill

Gl

:e

:sca

Accounts payable and accrued expenses .. .

18

Grants payable ... ... .. . .. .. .. .. .. . . . . . . .. . .. . ............ .

19

Deferred revenue

20
21
22

Tax-exempt bond liabilities . . .... . . . ... .. . . . ....... .
Escrow or custodial account liability. Complete Part IV of Schedule D

.. . . ... ... ... . ................ .

highest compensated employees, and disqualified persons. Complete Part II

:J

of Schedule L

22

23
24
25

Other liabilities. Complete Part X of Schedule D .

26

Total liabilities. Add lines 17 throu h 25 ........... ..........

Secured mortgages and notes payable to unrelated third parties
Unsecured notes and loans payable to unrelated third parties
. ........... .

Organizations that follow SFAS 117, check here ....

:3
::!ca

21

Payables to current and former officers, directors, trustees, key employees,

. ...........•.....

X

and complete

lines 27 through 29, and lines 33 and 34.
27

Unrestricted net assets

~

28

Temporarily restricted net assets .......... .

-g

29

Permanently restricted net assets

ar

Organizations that do not follow SFAS 117, check here ......

S

complete lines 30 through 34.

0

an.d

30

Capital stock or trust principal, or current funds

30

31
32

Paid-in or capital surplus, or land, building, or equipment fund .......

31

33

Total net assets or fund balances

34

Total liabilities and net assets/fund balances

Retained earnings, endowment, accumulated income, or other funds

032011 12·21-10
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SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

p

12

Check if Schedule 0 contains a response to any question in this Part XI __ ................... .
1

Total revenue (must equal Part VIII, column (A), line 12)

2

Total expenses (must equal Part IX, column (A), line 25)

3

Revenue less expenses. Subtract line 2 from line 1 .... ... ...... ......
. ..................... ..
Net assets or fund balances at beginning of year (must equal Part X, line 33, column (A))

4

Other changes in net assets or fund balances (explain in Schedule 0) ........................ ..
Net assets or fund balances at end of ear. Combine lines 3, 4, and 5 must

5

6

art

Financial Statements and Reporting
Check if Schedule 0 contains a respcmse to any question in this Part XII .........

... ... .... .. . . .

.

... ,.
Yes

1

Accounting method used to prepare the Form 990:

D

Cash

00 Accrual D

No

Other

If the organization changed its method of accounting from a prior year or checked "Other,· explain in Schedule 0.

X

2a Were the organization's financial statements compiled or reviewed by an independent accountant? ............................ ..

2a

b Were the organization's financial statements audited by an independent accountant? ..... ............... . ... ... .. .... .. ..... .
c If "Yes" to line 2a or 2b, does the organization have a committee that assumes responsibility for oversight of the audit,

2b

X

2c

X

3a

X

3b

X

review, or compilation of its financial statements and selection of an independent accountant? ......................................... .
If the organization changed either its oversight process or selection process during the tax year, explain in Schedule 0.
d If "Yes" to line 2a or2b, check a box below to indicate whether the financial statements for the year were issued on a
separate basis, consolidated basis, or both:

D

Separate basis

CXJ Consolidated basis D

Both consolidated and separate basis

3a As a result of a federal award, was the organization required to undergo an audit or audits as set forth in the Single Audit
Act and OMB Circular A·133?
b If "Yes," did the organization undergo the required audit or audits? If the organization did not undergo the required audit
or audits explain why in Schedule 0 and describe any steps taken to underao such audits.................. .

Form 990 (201 0)
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B.

cc1

Wooaward & Swartzman

No. 0246

P. 112

BANDUCCI : WOOOARO : SCHWARTZMAN i PLLC

DATE: JUNE 6, 2012
TO:

Jack Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, llP

Fax No. 336-9177

CC:

Donald B. Ayer/Peter J. Romatowski/Michelle L.
Marks/Christian C. Vergonis/Thomas Davis
JONES DAY

Fax No. 202-626-1700

Number of Pages; Including Cover:

Ct URGENT

0 REPLY ASAP

FROM:

Thomas A. Banducci

2

0 PLEASE COMMENT Ct PLEASE REVIEW 0 FOR YOUR INFORMATION

Re:

SARMC v. MRlA

COMMENT: Please see attached correspondence.

fax cover
tel. 208.342.4411
fax 208.342.4455

802 W. Bannock; Suite 500
Boise, 10 83702

PAGE 112 *RCVD AT 61612012 2:22:46 PM ~astern Daylight TimeJ *SVR:NAFX02MS/18 *DNIS:60583 *CSID:208 342 4411 *DURATION (mm-ss):00-40

004943

6. 2012 11:19AM

cc1

Woodward

&Swartzman

No. 0246

P. 2/2

802 W. Bannock, Suite soo
Bolse,ID 83702

June 6, 2012

Tel (208) 342-441 1
Fax (208) 342-4455

www.bwslawgroup.com

Via Facsimile 336-9177

Jack Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
121 9th St.
Boise, ID 83702
Re:

St. Alphonsus v. MRIA

Dear Jack,
We are in receipt of your correspondence dated Jwte 1, 2012 concerning the bond issues
on appeal. We do not believe we misconstrued your previous correspondence. That said, we
believe that we can agree to a mutually-beneficial temporary arrangement, which may obviate
the need for a bond from your client altogether.
In particular, your production of the 990 form has been informative for us, but we
believe that it may be providing us with an incomplete picture of your client's financial
condition. We accordingly find ourselves in need of more time to complete due diligence on
your client's fmancial situation. We therefore will stipulate to not require a bond and not
execute on your client's assets until such time as we are able to ascertain-one way or
another~whether we are in need of a bond (or some other assurances regarding ability to pay).
At the conclusion of that due diligence, if we come to the determination that we do require a
bond, we will give you 14-days notice so that you are able to get one in place. Alternatively, if
we decide that no bond is necessary, obviously we will let you know. Given the offer in your
letter to not require a bond of our clients if we do not require one of yours, our clients would
obviously not post a bond until the close of our due diliaence, and would only do so if required.
We believe that the above provides an excellent solution to our current challenges as it
relates to the bonding issues between us. Please let us know at your earliest convenience
whether this is an acceptable proposal.

TAB:jkr
cc:

Jones Day (via facsimile)
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EXHIBIT
C
004945

GJORDING

I FOUSER

JackS. Gjording

June 11, 2012

By Facsimile
Mr. Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

RE:

Saint Alphonsus vs. MRI Associates, LLP
Ada Co. Case No. CV OC 04082190
GF File No.: 15051.001

Dear Tom:
Thank you for your letter of June 6. We would be happy to give MRIA additional time to
conduct "due diligence" on the question whether to waive the bond requirement, provided that
you agree to reschedule or continue the hearing on your motion to amend the judgment until
after the parties have reached final agreement on the bonding issues. MRIA filed that motion
"because it is confused as to how much of a bond to post for the appeal of this matter, if any."
Mem. Supp. Am. Mot. at 4. It will be unnecessary to resolve that question if the parties are not
requiring bonds of each other, and I'm sure you'll agree that we should not burden the parties
or the court with the time and expense of unnecessary motion practice.
Please let me know whether this is acceptable. I'd be happy to take the lead in preparing a joint
motion to the court regarding a revised schedule for your motion.
Sincerely,
GJORDING FOUSER
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NOTE: If you do not receive the total number of pages indicated, please contact our
office at 208.336.9777.

Attached is my June 11, 2012 correspondence in this matter. Thank you.

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE

This facsimile transmission, and/or the documents accompanying it, may contain confidential information
belonging to the sender which is protected by the attorney/client privilege. The information is intended only for
the use of the individual or entity named above. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that
any disclosure, copying, distribution, or the taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this information is
strictly prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please notify us immediately by telephone to
arrange for the return of the documents.

004947

Fax Send Retx>rt
Date/Time
Fax Number
Fax Name
Model Name

No.

JUN-11-2012 01:01PM MON
2083369177
Gjording & Fouser
CLX-3170 series

Name/Number

352 3424455

StartTime

Time Mode

Page

06-1112:59PM

01'11 G3

002/002 O.K

Result

(,JORDING I f-'OUSEP
lllli

~ ~• •

s..

600

P.0 . -2137
lloiM, ID 13701
201.!36.9777

fax tirinsmitta/
To:

2011.ll6.91n loa

Mr. Thomes A. Banducci

Fill

342-4455

-

6/11/11)12

BANDUCCI WOOOAAD SQIWMTZMAN

,_, JKI< 5. GJordln&

Re:

SolniAip/Jomusv. l l l l t l - . IJI'
Ado Co. CoD No. CVOC04012Jll0
GF File No. : lSDSJ.OOl

NOT£11f you do not receive the tolal number of poaes indlcotcd. ploaso contact our
offtcoot208.l36.9777.

9M'PQaW«!"P'R

-~ -...,.,,. -... ....,_.-Me lr, ......,..,,.IM_...,Idl
&-loyiM.....,.,.,._r,.-,.. ,.,.........
lft{omlo~
ffOftiJ _ _~
..,.,/ol

MlloWII/,_
.,,.,.IIIOittH...,.,.,
1/JIOU
1111
,ouorrkfl'6rr ttOti/fefl Mer
..,.
___
_ .,,.._o/..,.oc_
l l _ .. ,,.. .........
oi..,.INI>m*,..ll
~

If,.•-or"'•Jor r.w,..,., w IIM.tHfwnu.

,~,.,.._.

0/

~~W.wr

inletttlftl~

IIIIo ~- ~~~ "'"'· ,..."IIOif\> ..-lmmollolll!lbt ,...,....,.

004948

ORIGit~AL
JUN
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CHFiiv, .., . .-.... n ~. H~H. Clark
By KATHY BIEHL
Deputy

Plaza One Twenty One
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff!Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

Plaintiff,

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP,
Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
OBJECTIONS TO MRIA'S
AMENDED FEE PETITION

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED,
Counter-Claimants,

vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.; and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.
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SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIONS TO MRIA'S AMENDED FEE PETITION1

MRIA, as the party seeking attorney fees, has the burden of proving its fees. See Idaho
Rule 54(e)(5) (requiring proponent to establish its fees); Crea v. FMC Corp., 135 Idaho 175,
181, 16 P .3d 272, 278 (Idaho 2000) (holding that it "is incumbent on the moving party" to prove
attorney fees, including providing an "affidavit from which the Court could establish the basis of
an award of attorney fees"). This Court held that certain categories of fees must be excised from
MRIA's petition. Given this ruling, and the burden of proof on this issue, Saint Alphonsus
objected to those time entries that, on their face, cover work on briefing related to the disallowed
fees. Further, although it might have asked that these ambiguous entries be disallowed in their
entirety, Saint Alphonsus sought only a reasonable reduction in those questionable hours.
MRIA's response to the objections is that it should be entitled to all fees where Saint
Alphonsus cannot disprove that the billings at issue related to disallowed claims. See, e.g., Opp.
at 6 (claiming that it is "unfair" to disallow attorneys' fees for briefing improper claims, where
MRIA admits that it cannot prove the allocation of fees to specific issues). But this turns the
burden of proof on its head. The uncertainty in the recordkeeping cuts against MRIA.
MRIA also suggests that it should be allowed all its requested fees because it deleted
some time entries containing specific reference to disallowed claims. Opp. at 3-4, 5. But it does
not logically follow that all of the unspecific time entries must be for allowable claims. Rather,
the lack of specificity in the challenged time entries makes it impossible to tell what issues
MRIA's attorneys were working on and that uncertainty must cut against MRIA as the party with
the burden of proof. Saint Alphonsus's request for a reduction ofhours based on the uncertainty
in MRIA's records is certainly reasonable. See Br. at 3 (citing precedent).

004950
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIONS TO MRIA'S AMENDED FEE PETITION2

Finally, MRIA argues that, even though this Court categorically rejected charging Saint
Alphonsus for the costs of a mock jury that MRIA should nonetheless be entitled to bill Saint
Alphonsus for hundreds of hours of mock jury work because they are "fees" and not costs. Opp.
6-7. But attorneys' fees awardable by statute are costs. 1 See Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(5)
("Attorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, shall be deemed as costs in an action and
processed in the same manner as costs .... "); Estate of Holland v. Metro. Property & Cas. Ins.
Co., No. 38157-2010, --Idaho--,-- P.3d --, 2012 WL 1918409, at *9 (Idaho May 29, 2012)

("attorney fees are deemed as costs"). The Court's order found that costs of the mock jury were
not properly charged to Saint Alphonsus and they should be disallowed now.

CONCLUSION
The Court should disallow MRIA's requested fees as described in its Objection to
MRIA's Amended Fee Petition.
DATED this 19th day of June, 2012.
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

1

Here, Idaho Code§ 12-120.

004951
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIONS TO MRIA'S AMENDED FEE PETITION3

.

.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 19th day of June, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

D

D
D
·~

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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ORrGr~rAL

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com

WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
Plaintiff,
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388
v.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MRIA'S
AMENDED MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
RULE 60(a) OR RULE 60(b)

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
I

Counter-claimants,
v.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE
60(a) OR 60(b)- 1
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MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), MRI Limited Partnership ("MRI Center") and MRI
Mobile Limited ("Mobile") (all three entities are hereinafter referred to collectively as the "MRI
Entities") hereby file this Reply in Support of its Amended Motion for Relief Pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) and 60(b).

I. INTRODUCTION
St. Al's objection to this motion is based on a revisionist view of the history of this case.
It was St. Al' s that requested that MRIA be included on the verdict form for claims other than

disgorgement, the only direct claim by MRIA that was submitted to the jury. St. Al has made
this request specifically so that there would be an offset. Having won on that issue, St. Al's now
objects to the Court performing the offset that St. Al's, itself, requested. St. Al's, therefore,
should be estopped from objecting to the Court amending the judgment to reflect an offset for
each of the alternative judgments in favor of MRIA. Once those offsets are performed, it should
be determined that MRIA is not required to post a bond to stay execution because the largest
alternative judgment in favor of MRIA is greater than the judgment in favor of St. Al' s.

II. ARGUMENT
On October 18, 2011, St. Al' s filed a motion for directed verdict on damages. On pages
17 and 18 ofthe memorandum in support of that motion, St. Al's argued that:
Saint Alphonsus is concerned that MRIA structured its damages claim this way in
order to prevent Saint Alphonsus from setting off its departing partner share
(approximately $4.5 million plus interest running from the date of dissociation)
from any judgment in MRI Center and MRI Mobile's favor, on the theory that
MRI Associates owes the buyout judgment but claims none of the awarded
damages. Whether, at this late date, MRIA should be entitled to simply re-assert
a claim for that 7.5% of damages to MRI Associates is a matter for the Court's
discretion. But whatever the Court's resolution, MRIA should not permitted be
able to [sic] overcompensate Center and Mobile in order to place roadblocks in
the way of Saint Alphonsus' s recovery of its countervailing judgment.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE
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(Emphasis added.) MRIA, in its October 21, 2011, opposition brief on page 22, responded that
MRIA's 7.5% management fee was a contractual matter between MRIA and MRI Center and
Mobile and not a matter to be decided by the jury. St. Al's replied on pages 19-20 of its October
22, 2011 reply brief that:
[w]hat is more troubling is that MRIA does not dispute that its "simplifying the
math" has the effect of zeroing-out MRI Associates' own damages, thus
precluding Saint Alphonsus from offsetting its departing partner share against any
award of damages to MRIA. Rather, MRIA suggests that this is their intent, and
that Saint Alphonsus will have to sue to enforce its judgment separately. The
Court should prevent such gamesmanship. At a minimum, MRI Center and MRI
Mobile's damages must be reduced by 7.5%, with that 7.5% being reassigned as
MRIA damages.
(Emphasis added.) Then at the jury instruction conference, St. Al's argued that
Our concern, what we raised in the brief, was that by doing so, by not allocating
the damages accurately, which would have been 7.5 percent to MRIA and the
remainder to the limiteds, is that when we come to the end, if there is any
damages, our damage -- not our damage -- our share of -- our partner share is
owed by MRIA and not the limiteds, and we would be in a situation where they
would claim we are not able to offset our award against theirs.
(TR Oct. 26, 2011 at 6443:20-6444:4 (emphasis added).) Based, on St. Al's argument seeking an
offset, the Court ordered on October 28, 2012 that the verdict form would, for those claims
brought by MRI Center and Mobile, require the jury to reduce any amount awarded to those two
entities by 7.5% and then give that amount to MRIA. (TR Oct. 28, 2011, at 6069-6071.)
Therefore, it was St. Al' s that requested that the verdict form for damages to MRI Center
and Mobile contain a line awarding MRIA 7.5% ofMRI Center's and Mobile's damages so that
St. Al's could offset those amounts against its judgment for the departing partner share. The
judgment proposed by MRIA simply conformed to the verdict form specifically requested by
St. Al's. That form, however, did not include St. Al'sjudgment. The Court later added St. Al's
departing partner share award to the proposed judgment so that there would be one judgment,
presumably to make the judgment conform to Rule 54(b). But the Court did not offset that
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE
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judgment from MRIA's alternative judgments. Even though Rule 54(b) requires that an offset be
made, St. Al's inexplicably does not want to offset its award from MRIA's award even though it
requested that MRIA be given a separate award so that such an offset could be performed.
Having won on its argument, St. Al's is now estopped from objecting to an offset.

A.

Amending the Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) is Proper Under the
Circumstances.
As set forth in the opening brief, Rule 60(a) provides that "clerical mistakes in judgments

... and errors stated therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at
any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party.... " Here, the Court has entered
judgments in favor of both MRIA and St. Al' s. Pursuant to Rule 54(b) those judgments must be
offset against each other. Making that offset is a purely mathematical computation. Contrary to
St. Al' s argument, it does not require any legal reasoning.
The offset should be performed for each alternative award in favor ofMRIA. For
example, as to breach of the non-competition clause claim, breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing claim, and breach of fiduciary duty claim, MRIA has ajudgment of$3,906,338
which, as St. Al's originally requested, should be offset against St. Al's departing partner share
judgment of$4,600,000, leaving a judgment of$693,662 in favor of St. Al's. That is a simple
mathematical calculation. Likewise, MRIA'sjudgment for $3,125,070 for conspiracy should be
offset against St. Al's $4,600,000 judgment, leaving a judgment in favor of St. Al's in the
amount of $1,4 74,930 and MRIA' s judgment for $21,358,838 for disgorgement should be offset
against St. Al's $4,600,000 judgment, leaving a judgment in favor ofMRIA in the amount of
$16,758,838. Again, this only requires simple mathematical calculations, which are clerical
functions. Accordingly, the judgment should be amended to reflect these calculations.
Moreover, doing so is necessary to conform to Rule 54(b)'s requirement that when parties "are

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE
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entitled to judgments against each other such as on a claim and counterclaim, or upon crossclaims, such judgments shall be offset against each other and a single judgment for the difference
between the entitlements shall be entered in favor of the party entitled to the larger judgment."

B.

Amending the Judgment Under Rule 60(b) is also Proper.
As set forth in the opening brief, in the unlikely event that this Court finds that this is not

an error that can be corrected as per Rule 60(a), the Court can amend the judgment under Rule
60(b) as that rule allows the Court to amend the judgment for any "reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment." Again, Rule 54(b) requires that St. Al' s judgment be offset
against MRIA's judgment and St. Al's cannot complain because it specifically requested that
MRIA have a separate award from its limited partnerships for the sole purpose of offsetting that
award. Therefore, St. Al's judgment should be offset against MRIA's alternative judgments as
set forth above.

C.

The Amount of the Bond Should be Based on the Largest Award to MRIA.
Upon reading St. Al's Opposition to MRIA's Amended Rule 60 Motion, MRIA

recognizes that its motion was not a model of clarity as to the relief it seeks. St. Al' s complains
that MRIA only seeks to offset St. Al'sjudgment against MRIA'sjudgment for disgorgement.
To be clear, as set forth above, because the judgment in favor of the MRI Entities contains
multiple alternative judgments based on differing theories of recovery, St. Al's judgment should
be offset by the judgment in favor of MRIA on each of those theories. In sum, there should be
an offset for each of the alternative judgments.
Determination of the amount of the bond required to stay execution, however, is not a
Rule 54(b) issue. Rule 54(b) simply requires an offset. Idaho Appellate Rule 13 governs stays
of execution during the pendency of an appeal. In particular, I.A.R 13 provides that during the
pendency of an appeal, the district court retains jurisdiction to determine the matters listed in the
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ruDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE
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rule. One of the matters retained by the district court is the power to stay execution of a money
judgment. I.A.R. 13(b)(15). Here, because there are various alternative judgments, the question
becomes, what should be the amount of the bond? This is the issue that appears to be troubling
St. AI' s the most.
St. Al's complains that "MRIA's proposed judgment was supposed to give the highest
award with the others as backups-if anything, any 'offset' should have been applied to the
highest award." (St. Al's Opp. at 5.) While the highest award for MRI Center and MRI Mobile
is for lost profits, the highest award for MRIA is for disgorgement. Indeed, the only direct award
for MRIA is disgorgement. With that said, it is unknown which of the various awards the
Supreme Court will uphold on appeal. MRIA, however, should have the benefit of the highest
award for purposes of the bond. Because that award is greater than St. AI' s judgment, MRIA
requests the Court to determine that MRIA need not post a bond to stay execution during the
pendency of the appeal.
DATED this 19th day of June 2012.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of June 2012, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gj ording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 Q)remight Delivery
~acsimile: 336-9177

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 O;v6might Delivery
QIPacsimile: 202-626-1700

~~
Brent Bastian
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Fl'i~.:Jor.,

NO.

A.M.,----

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

JUN 2 0 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

Plaza One Twenty One
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

By ANNAMARIE MEYER

DEPUTY

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintifJ!Counter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

Plaintiff,

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP,
Defendant.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S
RESPONSE TO MRIA'S NEW
CLAIMS REGARDING
OFFSET RAISED FOR THE
FIRST TIME IN ITS REPLY
BRIEF

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED,
Counter-Claimants,

vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.; and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-Defendants.

/

:

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE TO MRIA'S NEW CLAIMS REGARDING OFFSET RAISED FOR
THE
004960
FIRST TIME IN ITS REPLY BRIEF - 1

MRIA's reply brief raises two new arguments not set forth in its opening brief. These
arguments are waived, see State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763, 864 P.2d 596, 601 (1993),
but in all events the Court should reject both arguments. 1
First, MRIA now concedes that any offset must be applied to each of the alternative

awards. But MRIA now contends that the offsets be calculated in a manner that deprives Saint
Alphonsus of the interest that has accrued since 2007 on its departing partner share. Reply Br. at
4. This is improper, and contrary to MRIA's original brief on this motion, which acknowledged
that any offset would need to take into account the interest that had accrued on Saint Alphonsus's
departing-partner-share award from September 21, 2007, to January 17,2012 (the date of the
judgment in this case). See MRIA Mem. Supp. Mot. Relief from Judgment at 3 n.2 (May 22,
2012) ("The math here is as simple as taking the departing partnership share of$4.6MM, adding
the interest rate this Court has already determined of 10% from September 2007 until January
2012 (the date ofthe offsetting judgment) and subtracting MRIA's $3.9MM"). The amount ofthe
accrued simple interest for those four years and 118 days is $1,988,712. See Saint Alphonsus's
Opp'n at 10 n.2. Adding this amount to the base award of $4.6 million results in an amount due
to Saint Alphonsus as of the judgment date of$6,588,712. Thus, if the Court were to apply an
offset to every alternative, the offsets would be as follows:

1

MRIA's reply brief also argues historical events that relate to the allocation of damages among
the various counterclaimants, but which have no bearing on the matter at issue here: Saint Alphonsus
asked for a single judgment amenable to offset, while MRIA opposed it and invited the judgment in its
present form. Saint Alphonsus rests on its prior filing to explain why MRIA's Rule 60 motion to change
the judgment remains procedurally improper.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE TO MRIA'S NEW CLAIMS REGARDING OFFSET RAISED FOR
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Alternative 1

Judgment for MRIA
Against SARMC

Judgment for SARMC
Against MRIA

Net Amount Due From MRIA
2
to SARMC After Offset

$3,906,338

$6,588,712

$2,682,374

$3,906,338

$6,588,712

$2,682,374

$0

$6,588,712

$6,588,712

$3,906,338

$6,588,712

$2,682,374

$21,358,838

$6,588,712

($14,770,126)

$3,125,070

$6,588,712

$3A63,642

$0

$6,588,712

$6,588,712

(Lost Profits)
Alternative 2
(Lost Profits)
Alternative 3
(Lost Profits)
Alternative 4
(Lost Profits)
Alternative 4
(Disgorgement)
Alternative 5
(Lost Profits)
All Alternatives
(Lost Value)

Second, MRIA now makes clear that its real purpose behind this motion is not to fix a
clerical "error" but rather to obtain a ruling that it need not post an appellate bond. MRIA argues
that this is so because one of the alternatives - one that it has no intention of trying to collectcontains a net judgment due to MRIA. Reply Br. at 5-6. But MRIA cannot have it both ways,
requiring Saint Alphonsus to secure a bond for the largest award against it, while avoiding a
countervailing duty to do the same.
2

The net amounts due to Saint Alphonsus should bear interest from the date of the judgment at
the judgment rate of 10% per annum until paid in full. The net amount due from Saint Alphonsus to
MRIA under alternative #4 ( disgorgement) should bear interest from the date of judgment at the judgment
rate of5.375% per annum until paid in full.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE TO MRIA'S NEW CLAIMS REGARDING OFFSET RAISED FOR
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Here, all of the other alternative awards, including MRIA's preferred award in alternative
# 1, requires a net balance due to Saint Alphonsus from MRIA. Since it is impossible to predict
how the appeal will be resolved, absent an agreement by the parties to waive the bonding
requirement, 3 both sides should be required to secure the largest award among the alternative
judgments for which they may be liable (which, for MRIA, is alternative #3). At a minimum,
because the purpose of the bond requirement is to preserve the status quo, MRIA should have to
post a bond to secure the amount it would owe if the Supreme Court affirms the entire judgment.
That is the amount set forth in alternative #1, which MRIA has stated it "fully intends" to enforce
if the judgment is affirmed. Otherwise, the appeal may well be resolved in a manner that leaves
Saint Alphonsus with a judgment, but absolutely no security from MRIA that it will ever be paid.

CONCLUSION
The Court should disallow MRIA's motion to amend the judgment, or, in the alternative,
it should reissue the judgment with offsets as described herein, and rule that each party must
obtain security for the highest unfavorable award against it.
DATED this 20th day of June, 2012.
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

3

And again, Saint Alphonsus has provided MRIA with financial documentation proving that
SARMC's net value is more than ten times higher than the judgment owed to MRI Center and Mobile,
and has agreed that it will waive MRIA's requirement to post a bond ifMRIA, Center, and Mobile
reciprocate. Despite Saint Alphonsus's plain ability to satisfy the judgment, MRIA has inexplicably
refused to waive the bond requirement.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of June, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702

D
D

~

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
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tl1t?ILg,~-JUN 2 0 2012

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com

By JOANNA ORTEGA

WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)

DEPUTY

wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff/Cross-Respondent,

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant/Cross-A ellant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants/Cross-Appellants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants/Cross-Res ondents.

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 60(a) OR 60(b)- 1
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC.; ITS ATTORNEYS, JACKS. GJORDING, GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC, 121 NORTH
9TH STREET, SUITE 600 P.O. BOX 2837, BOISE, ID 83701, AND DONALD B. AYER,
CHRISTIAN G. VERGONIS, PETER J. ROMATOWSKI, MICHELLE L. MARKS, AND
THOMAS DAVIS OF JONES DAY, 51 LOUISIANA AVENUE NW WASHINGTON, D.C.
20001-2113; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Cross-Appellants, MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited

Partnership, LP, and MRI Mobile Limited, LP (collectively, "Cross-Appellants"), cross-appeal
against the above-named respondents, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively, "Cross-Respondents") to the Idaho Supreme
Court from a portion of the district court's: (1) "Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs
Motions for Judgment on Pleadings and Motions for Summary Judgment," dated November 16,
2010; (2) "Order Re: Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on Contract Theory of
Wrongful Withdrawal," dated May 6, 2011; and (3) a portion of the district court's "Second
Amended Judgment" of May 2, 2012, entered in the above entitled action, Honorable Judge
Michael E. Wetherell presiding.
2.

That Cross-Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
IAR ll(g).
3.

Reserving the right to assert other issues on appeal (see IAR 17(f)), Appellant

makes the following preliminary statement of issues on appeal:
a.

Whether the District Court erred when it found on summary judgment that

the relevant partnership was not for a term and/or a particular undertaking.
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b.

Whether the District Court erred when it found on summary judgment that

Counter-Respondents could not have wrongfully dissociated under some other theory
other than a violation of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act.
c.

Whether the District Court erred when it excluded the damages related to

Counter-Respondents' entry into the Eagle, Idaho market.
4.

No relevant portions of the requested record have been sealed.

5.

Cross-Appellant does not request any additional transcripts other than the entire

reporter's standard transcript in compressed format in accordance with Rules 25(c) and 26(m)
and those transcripts designated by the appellant in the initial notice of appeal and the transcripts
designated in the respondent's request for additional transcripts:
6.

Cross-Appellant does not requests any additional documents to be included in the

clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. and those
designated by the appellant in the initial notice of appeal and in the respondent's request for
additional records.
7.

Appellant does not request that any other documents, charts, or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
8.

I certify:

a.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the following:

Nicole Julson
Court Reporter
2414 N. McKinney
Boise, ID 83 704
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b.

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript.
c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

d.

That the cross-appellate filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to IAR 20.
DATED THIS 20th day of June, 2012.

BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 20th day of June, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff!Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1 700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery

D O~might Delivery
rWacsimile

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery

D O~ht Delivery
CHacsimile

Brent Bastian
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock, Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

AUG 1 D 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JAMIE RAND.4LL
DEPUTY

Attorneys MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 408219D
MRIA ENTITIES' PETITION FOR POSTJUDGMENT COSTS AND FEES

V.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership; and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an
Idaho Limited Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited (collectively,
"MRIA") hereby petition this Court for Post-Judgment Costs and Fees. This motion is supported
by the accompanying Memorandum in Support and Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMRIA's
Petition for Post-Judgment Costs and Fees, as well as the affidavits submitted in support of
MRIA's request for pre-judgment fees.
DATED this 1Oth day of August 2012.

Brent S. Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the lOth day of August 2012, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

IJ U.S. Mail
IJ Hand Delivery

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

IJ U.S. Mail

0 qvemight Delivery
o-~F'acsimile

0 Hand Delivery
0 Oyemight Delivery
Q....Facsimile

~ ---~-BrentS. Bastian
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com

WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)

AUG 10 2012

wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

By JAMIE RANDALL

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

DEPlJTY

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM CONCERNING
AMOUNT OF OFFSET

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA") hereby files this memorandum concerning the amount
of the offset between it and St. Al 's.

I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 22, 2012, this Court held a hearing on the question of whether an offset should
have been made as between the judgments for MRIA and St. Al's. This Court stated at that
hearing that it should have rendered an offset as between these two parties, but that it neglected
to do so. That said, the Court also stated that prior to effectuating that offset, it wanted another
hearing to discuss the manner in which the offset should be calculated, since the bulk of the
briefing leading to the hearing was concerned with whether an offset should be made, not with
how the offset should be made. This memorandum addresses that calculation.

II.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

The discussion at the June 22 hearing suggests that there are at least two issues of
possible dispute related to the manner in which to calculate the offset. The first is whether the
attorneys fees and costs due to MRIA should be calculated as part of the offset. The second is
whether the offset should be made before or after the accrual of post-judgment interest. This
memorandum addresses these questions in tum.

A.

Any offset should include the attorneys' fees awarded to MRIA.
Under the plain language of the Idaho Rules, any offset this Court renders must include

the amounts awarded to MRIA as attorney fees and costs. Specifically, Idaho R. Civ. P.
54(d)( 1)(F) makes clear that any attorney fees and costs awarded to the prevailing party are
"automatically" part ofthe underlying judgment itself: "[a]ll costs and attorney fees approved by
the court ... shall be deemed automatically added to the judgment as costs ... " (emphasis added).
This is key, since, as this Court knows, Rule 54(b) states that a "judgment" a party may receive
must be set off against the "judgment" of the opposing party: "If any parties to an action are
MEMORANDUM CONCERNING AMOUNT OF OFFSET- 2
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entitled to judgments against each other ... such judgments shall be offset against each
other. ... " The result, then, is that attorney fees and costs that this Court may award to MRIA
will be by rule "automatically" part of the judgment, and then that judgment-which would then
include the attorney fees and costs awarded-must be set off against St. Al's judgment against
MRIA. Any other interpretation would violate the clear language of both of these Rules.
Though the quoted language of the Idaho Rules appears to be unique, it is notable that
other jurisdictions agree with this approach even without a rule compelling it. For example, in
Schmidtv. Cornerstone Investments, Inc., 115 Wash.2d 148, 164,795 P.2d 1143, 1150 (1990),
the Washington Supreme Court found that the appropriate manner in which to determine an
offset was to first add the attorneys fee award to the judgment of the prevailing party and then set
off the other party's judgment: "We find the trial court properly offset the judgment against [the
defendant] after calculating the appropriate attorney fees and costs to which plaintiffs were
entitled" (emphasis added). And in Roberts v. Grande, 868 S.W.2d 956, 962 (Tex.App.-Hous.
[ 14 Dist.] 1994), a Texas court of appeals court noted that " ... we conclude the [trial] court
properly calculated attorney's fees before applying the offset" (emphasis added).
While the exact amount of attorneys' fees and costs which will be awarded to MRIA
alone is not presently known, what is certain is that MRIA itself was the only counter-claimant in
both the previous trial and the appeal; as this Court well knows, Center and Mobile were not yet
parties at that point. This is important, because this Court stated in its May 15, 2012, Order that
it was reinstating in full the attorneys' fee award for MRIA from the first trial, and that it would
also be awarding MRIA most of its fees related to the appeal. See Order re: Attorney Fees and
Costs, May 15, 2012, pp. 6-7. The attorneys' fees and costs reinstated from the first trial were
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approximately $2,172,677.63. 1 And, assuming the Court agrees that MRIA has complied with
the May 15, 2012, Order and excised all objectionable fees and costs, the allowable fees incurred
on appeal were approximately $306,814.00. (MRIA has argued, and continues to believe, that
the attorneys fees and costs from the most recent trial should be split by Center and Mobile in
amounts of 54% and 46%, respectively, since these were the proportions in which they recovered
in the second trial.) Thus, at least $2,479,491.63 should be added to the judgments in favor of
MRIA prior to an offset being rendered.

B.

The offset must be calculated prior to post-judgment interest being awarded.
As this Court is aware, the current judgment awards St. Al's its departing partner share

and interest accruing since 2007. Thus, the question becomes whether the offset should be made
before or after the interest attaches-that is, should the post-judgment interest be applied to
St. Al's full $4.6MM judgment since 2007, and then an offset be effectuated, or should the
$4.6MM be decreased by the offset, and then interest from 2007 be applied to that net amount?
Fortunately, this question is easily answered because the law is clear that the offset must
be calculated before awarding any post-judgment interest. This conclusion is compelled by the
nature of post-judgment interest itself. In specific, it is black-letter law that the "purpose of
postjudgment interest is to compensate a successful plaintiff for being deprived of compensation
for his or her loss during the time between ascertainment of the damage and payment by the
defendant." CJS INTEREST§ 110 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno,
494 U.S. 827, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 108 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1990)). As a result, if a plaintiffs award is
subject to an offset, the interest can only be calculated on the net (rather than gross) amount,
since otherwise, the plaintiff would be "compensate[ed] for being deprived of compensation"

1

See Second Amended Judgment, Feb. 26, 2008; Memorandum Decision on MRIA's Revised Motion for Attorneys
Fees and Costs, Jan. 28, 2008, pp. 2-3.
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which it was never actually entitled to in the first place. As the Supreme Court of Maine noted in
the related context of recoupment, the opposing claims "must be subtracted before interest is
applied. Otherwise, the plaintiff would collect interest on the part of the judgment the court has
determined should not be awarded to him or her." Yim K Cheung v. Wing Ki Wu, 955 A.2d 746,
747 (Me. 2008); see also, e.g., City ofAberdeen v. Rich, 658 N.W.2d 775, 781,783 (S.D. 2003)
(" ... we find that the set-off should be deducted from the award of gross-profits before ... postjudgment interest is calculated.").
One particularly illustrative case in this regard is Thomas & Betts Co., Inc. v. A & A

Mechanical, 2008 WL 2696877 (Ky. App. 2008). In that case, the plaintiff, A & A, obtained a
judgment against Thomas & Betts, but that judgment was overturned by an appeals court, partly
because the appeals court believed that an offset was in order. Id at *2. As such, the matter was
remanded to the trial court for a new trial. As in the case at hand, this remand process apparently
took some time-it was about five years before the matter was heard again. In the second trial,
the trial court addressed the errors described by the appeals court and issued a final judgment for
A & A. Id As suggested by the appeals court, it also awarded a substantial offset in favor of
Thomas. Id However, prior to effectuating that offset, it first awarded A & A its post-judgment
interest for the five years between the first and second trial, meaning that A & A essentially
received five years of interest on its gross judgment of $366,000, even though it was only being
awarded a net judgment of $196,000. Id
The appeals court reversed that ruling, however, finding that even though the two
judgments were rendered several years apart, they should be set off against one another prior to
any post-judgment interest accruing. Id at **2-3. In particular, the Court stated that there is a
"well-established legal principle that a judgment entered after remand should place each party in
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the position it would have been in had the trial court's original action been correct." !d. As
such, the Court found that:
it was an error for the trial court to grant post-judgment interest on the original
erroneous judgment .... Instead, in order to place the parties in the position they
would have been if the trial court had not erred, [the original judgment] should
have been offset. .. by the amount due on the purchase order to Thomas & Betts
before attaching post-judgment interest.

!d. (emphasis added).
The case at hand is similar. The judgments belonging to both St. Al's and MRIA relate
to the same nucleus of fact-i. e., the former partnership between them. And as in Thomas &

Betts, the only reason for the five-year delay between these two judgments was due to errors at
the first trial. It is accordingly both illogical and unfair to give St. Al's approximately five years
of post-judgment interest on its entire gross judgment before applying the offset, since the offset
is, by definition, proof positive that St. Al's was never entitled to the gross amount to begin with.
Consequently, as in Thomas & Betts, St. Al's original judgment should be offset "by the amount
due" to MRIA "before attaching post-judgment interest."

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, MRIA requests that when the Court renders the offset, it
do so: (1) with MRIA's attorneys fees as part of its judgment; and (2) prior to any post-judgment
interest accruing.
DATED this lOth day of August 2012.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~day of August 2012, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
IJ Hand Delivery
0 Oyemight Delivery
Macsimile

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
~ 9vemight Delivery
LlYl'acsimile

Brent Bastian
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ANNAMARIE MEYER
DEPUTf

JackS. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

Plaza One Twenty One
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2113
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for PlaintifflCounter-Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Plaintiff,
vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Case No CV OC 04-08219D
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION
TO MRIA'S MOTION SEEKING
POST-JUDGMENT ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS

Defendant.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,

Counter-Defendants.

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
(collectively "Saint Alphonsus") submit this Memorandum in Support of their Motion to
Disallow MRIA's Attorneys' Post-Judgment Attorney Fees and Costs.

I.

THERE IS NO STATUTORY OR LEGAL BASIS FOR MRIA'S REQUEST FOR
POST-JUDGMENT ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS UNDER I.C. § 12-120(5)
UNRELATED TO ACTUAL ATTEMPTS TO COLLECT ON A JUDGMENT.
In Allison v. John M Biggs, Inc., 121 Idaho 567, 567 826 P.2d 916, 916 (1992), the Idaho

Supreme Court expressly held that "post-judgment attorney fees are not authorized under [Idaho]
statute or rules." In reaching its decision, the Court noted that it "is well established that attorney
fees and costs cannot be awarded unless they are authorized by statute or by contract," and that
"the legislature has authorized an award of attorney fees in limited circumstances." 121 Idaho at
568, 826 P.2d at 917. It emphasized that under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3}--the provision under
which MRIA sought its original fees here-the "statutory right to an award of attorney fees is
limited" and that because (pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure) fees may only be
sought in a "memorandum of costs ... filed fourteen days after the entry of judgment," only
SAINT ALPHONSUS'S OPPOSITION TO MRIA'S MOTION SEEKING POST-JUDGMENT ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS, P. 2
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those "costs and fees requested within the fourteen-day time limit" are recoverable. 121 Idaho at
568-69, 826 P.2d at 917-18; see also I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) & 54(e)(5). Because MRIA's latest
motion seeks fees and costs incurred after entry of the judgment on January 17,2012, and was
filed more than fourteen days (indeed, more than six months) after entry of judgment, it is plainly
improper under§ 12-120(3) and Rule 54.
MRIA nonetheless contends that it is entitled to post-judgment attorney fees under a
different provision, Idaho Code§ 12-120(5), which was enacted two years after Allison was
decided. See 1994 Idaho Laws Ch. 353 (H.B. 687). 1 That provision, however, is very limited
and allows the recovery only of "fees and costs incurred in attempting to collect on the
judgment." I.C. § 12-120(5). None ofMRIA's requested costs and fees relate to collection
efforts, so by its plain terms,§ 12-120(5) provides no basis for MRIA's latest motion.
MRIA contends, however, that§ 12-120(5) has been interpreted broadly to cover any
situation where a party is "simply defend[ing] its judgment from attack by the opposing party."
MRIA Mem. Supp. Pet'n for Post-Judgment Costs & Fees ("Mem.") at 2-3. This is simply
wrong. In every case that MRIA cites to support this reading of§ 12-120(5), the fees awarded
under 12-120(5) flowed directly from the moving party's attempt to collect on the judgment.
In Post v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 135 Idaho 475, 476, 20 P.3d 11, 12 (2001), the plaintiffs
in a prior lawsuit (the Corders) had obtained a judgment against Farmway. "To collect on their
judgment, the Corders attempted to garnish" lease payments being made to Farmway by thirdparty lessees. Id at 476, 476 P.3d at 12. After receiving conflicting instructions on whom to
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pay, the lessees filed an interpleader action, which the court resolved by holding that the Corders
were entitled to the lease payments. !d. at 476-77,476 P.3d at 12-13. In that situation, the
Supreme Court held that because the Corders' "participation in this interpleader action is a result
of their attempt to collect on the judgment in their original suit against Farmway," they "are

entitled to their attorney fees incurred as a result of this appeal" under§ 12-120(5). 135 Idaho at
479, 20 P.3d at 15 (emphasis added). Post therefore provides no support for MRIA's contention
that§ 12-120(5) permits costs and fees for the non-collection-related post-judgment expenditures
made by MRIA in this case.
Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Seele, 138 Idaho 753, 69 P.3d 173 (Ct. App. 2003)
("Action Collection !"), involved an effort by the plaintiff "to enforce its judgment by garnishing

[the defendant's] wages," so the fees awarded in that case plainly related to an attempt to collect
the prior judgment. !d. at 754, 69 P.3d at 174. The same is true of Action Collection Service,
Inc. v. Bigham, 146 Idaho 286, 288, 192 P.3d 1110, 1112 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Action Collection

!!"), where the plaintiff sought "costs incurred for the service of writs of garnishment and ...
attorneys fees incurred in attempting to collect on the judgment." Those costs and fees were
recoverable, the court explained, because§ 12-120(5) "provides a basis for an award of
reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred during post-judgment attempts to collect on the

1

MRIA says that this subsection was written "ostensibly in reaction" to Allison, but the bill's
statement of purpose does not reference Allison. See Idaho Laws Ch. 353 (H.B. 687). Allison has never
been overturned by the Supreme Court.
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judgment if the party was entitled to attorney fees and costs under the statute in the underlying
proceeding that resulted in the judgment." Id. at 289, 192 P .3d at 1113 (emphasis added)). 2
These three cases also involved costs awarded on appeat,3 and MRIA attempts to
analogize appellate proceedings to the post-judgment proceedings for which it now seeks costs
and fees. Mem. at 4. MRIA's analogy fails for two reasons. First, appeals relating to
garnishment proceedings and other collection efforts are themselves "reasonable, post-judgment
attempts to collect on the judgment," and, thus, unlike the post-judgment proceedings for which
MRIA seeks fees and costs, fall directly within the terms of§ 12-120(5). Action Collection II,
146 Idaho at 291, 192 P.3d at 1115.
Second, "[t]he mandatory attorney fee provisions ofi.C. § 12-120 govern on appeal as in
the trial court," Action Collection II, 146 Idaho at 291, 192 P.3d at 1115, with courts applying the
Idaho Appellate Rules to determine the procedural propriety of a request for costs on fees on
appeal, see Action Collection I, 138 Idaho at 759, 69 P.3d at 179 (applying I.A.R. 41). That the
statute authorizes a prevailing party, under appropriate circumstances and when in compliance
with a different set of procedural rules, to recover costs and fees incurred in an appeal tells us
nothing about the circumstances under which costs and fees are recoverable from a trial court

2

MRIA also cites another § 12-120(5) case, Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho v. Lecheminant, 149
Idaho 467,235 P.3d 1188 (2010), albeit not in support ofMRIA's contention that anything "related to a
judgment" is allowed under that statute. With good reason: Lecheminant, a case involving an attempt to
collect a judgment via garnishment, confirms that§ 12-120(5) allows fees only for "post-judgment
attempts to collect on the judgment." !d. at 473, 235 P.3d at 1194.
3

Post involved the question of attorney fees incurred during the Supreme Court appeal itself.
135 Idaho at 479, 20 P.3d at 15. Both Action Collection I and Action Collection II involved fees awarded
by the district court while it was acting in an intermediate appellate capacity over a magistrate's decision.
Action Collection I, 138 Idaho at 754, 69 P.3d at 174; Action Collection II, 146 Idaho at 288, 192 P.3d at
1112.
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decision. It certainly lends no support to MRIA's contention that a party can seek costs and fees
incurred months after a judgment has been entered. Rather, Allison and the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure-which have long co-existed with the rule allowing fees on appeal-make clear that,
in a trial-court proceeding, only those "costs and fees requested within the fourteen-day time
limit" are recoverable. Allison, 121 Idaho at 568-69, 826 P.2d at 917-18; see also I.R.C.P.
54(d)(5) & 54(e)(5) (fourteen-day time limit).
Thus, contrary to MRIA's assertion, there is no authority for the proposition that Idaho
Code§ 12-120(5) broadly covers any fees incurred "related to a judgment." Rather, as the
Supreme Court emphasized in yet another case involving§ 12-120(5), that provision allows for
recovery of fees "'incurred in attempting to collect on the judgment.'" Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean
Co., 138 Idaho 315,63 P.3d 441,449 (2003) (emphasis in original). MRIA has not attempted to

collect on its judgment against Saint Alphonsus, and its requested post-judgment fees are
therefore not authorized under§ 12-120(5). Absent any other provision allowing for postjudgment attorney fees, MRIA is not entitled to recover such fees. Allison, 121 Idaho at 568-69,
826 P.2d at 917-18.
MRIA also argues that it is entitled to attorney fees incurred in determining the amount of
its attorney fees under BECO Construction Co v. J-U-B- Engineers Inc., 149 Idaho 294, 298, 233
P.3d 1216, 1220 (2010). BECO does not rely on§ 12-120(5), but rather involves the distinct
question of the recovery of attorney fees on remand following an appeal. /d. at 298,233 P.3d at
1220-21. At best, BECO suggests that MRIA will be able to seek its fees incurred in obtaining
reasonable attorney fees if it is successful at the appellate stage. See id. But BECO certainly
does not contract either Allison or Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), which limits the initial
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award of attorney fees at the trial-court level to those included in the memorandum of costs filed
fourteen days after the judgment. Nor does BECO support the award of any other fees that were
not incurred defending a party's memorandum of costs. 4

II.

IN ALL EVENTS, IT IS NOT REASONABLE FOR MRIA TO RECOVER FEES
THAT WERE NOT INCURRED IN DEFENSE OF ITS JUDGMENT, SUCH AS
ITS MOTIONS INTENDED TO AVOID POSTING AN APPELLATE BOND.
Even if MRIA were entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees incurred in defense of its

judgment-and there is no statutory authority to do so---MRIA's post-judgment fees request is
not so precise. Instead, MRIA has opted for the "kitchen-sink" approach, asking for fees related
to everything MRIA has done since this Court issued its judgment. Whatever a "reasonable" fee
would be, it certainly should not be viewed as a license for churning, and for forcing the losing
party to subsidize all of its opponents' post-triallegal work, no matter its subject or purpose. See
Action Collection II, 146 Idaho at 290, 192 P.3d at 1114 ("An attorney cannot spend his or her
time extravagantly and expect to be compensated by the party who loses. Hence, a court may
disallow fees that were unnecessarily and unreasonably incurred or that were the product of
attorney 'churning."') (internal citations omitted).
Here, several motions for which MRIA seeks attorneys' fees are unnecessary or
unreasonable, or have nothing to do with protecting MRIA's judgment. These include:
•

MRIA's Motion For Leave To Conduct Discovery Regarding The Amount Of
Attorneys' Fees And Costs Incurred By Saint Alphonsus. (See, e.g., Mem. Ex. A,
p.2, entry for 2/20/2012). This Court quickly rejected MRIA's motion, holding

4

Further, even ifMRIA were somehow entitled to post-judgment costs, its current motion would
be premature. Post-judgment proceedings in this Court have not ended and MRIA is presumably
continuing to incur costs. Either this Court should hold this motion in abeyance until it has decided all
outstanding post-judgment issues, or else it should rule that MRIA may not file any further motions for
subsequently incurred post-judgment costs and fees.
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that "[o]ur Supreme Court has held that what the other side charges and what the
other side's fees are irrelevant to the determination of reasonable attorneys' fees;
and thus, this Court would be abusing its discretion to grant discovery with regard
to whatever attorneys; fees the other side charged." Hr'g Tr. at 3 (Mar. 23, 2012).
MRIA's fees incurred in preparing this motion was not necessary, reasonable, or
undertaken in a reasonable, good-faith effort to protect its judgment.
•

MRIA's Qualified Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion For Stay Of
Proceedings To Enforce A Judgment Pursuant To Rule 62(B). (See, e.g., Mem.
Ex. A, p. 2, entry for 3114/2012). MRIA's opposition to Saint Alphonsus's request
for a stay of execution of judgment while this Court decided the JNOV/New Trial
motion had nothing to do with protecting MRIA's judgment; it affected only the
timing of when MRIA would be able to execute on the judgment. Moreover,
MRIA dropped its opposition and consented to the stay. Saint Alphonsus should
not be required to pay for the costs incurred on this unnecessary motion.

•

MRIA's Motion For Relief From Judgment Pursuant To Rule 60(a) Or Rule
60(b). (See, e.g., Mem. Ex. A, p.3, entry for 6115/2012). This motion, again, has
nothing to do with defending MRIA's judgment. Rather, it was filed offensively
by MRIA in an attempt to fix what it perceived as an error in the judgment that
MRIA itself requested, so that MRIA might avoid having to post an appellate
bond. Saint Alphonsus should not be required to subsidize MRIA's efforts to
avoid paying Saint Alphonsus's countervailing judgment.

•

MRIA's Memorandum Concerning Amount of Offset. (See, e.g., Mem. Ex. A, p.
3, entry for 6/25112). Again, MRIA is attempting to recover fees on a motion that
it initiated, asking for an offset so that it might reduce the amount it owes to Saint
Alphonsus on the countervailing judgment. This motion has nothing to do with
defending MRIA's judgment against attack, and Saint Alphonsus should not be
required to pay for it.

MRIA should not be allowed to recover any fees or costs related to these motions, even if there
were some provision allowing for recovery of post-judgment fees. Should the Court find that
any post-judgment fees may legally be awarded, MRIA should be required to file a new
memorandum excluding all billings related to the above motions.
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CONCLUSION
MRIA's petition for post-judgment fees and costs should be disallowed.
DATED this

~7

day of August, 2012.
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC
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Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
(collectively "Saint Alphonsus") submit this Response to MRIA's Brief Regarding Offset.

I.

SAINT ALPHONSUS IS ENTITLED TO HAVE ITS INTEREST ADDED TO ITS
AWARD BEFORE ANY OFFSET IS PERFORMED.
MRIA argues for the first time in a supplemental brief that, although Saint Alphonsus

was awarded its departing partner share in September 2007 and this Court has already held that
post-judgment interest runs from that date, Saint Alphonsus is not entitled to receive over four
years of accrued interest based on MRIA' s recent judgment. 1 MRIA has waived this argument,
both by failing to raise it in a timely post-trial motion and by conceding in its original opening
brief that any offset should be calculated by "taking the departing partnership share of $4.6MM,
adding the interest rate this Court has already determined of 10% from September 2007 until
January 2012 (the date ofthe offsettingjudgment) and subtracting MRIA's" award. Mem. Supp.
Mot. Relief from Judgment at 3 n.2 (May 22, 2012).
Moreover, MRIA's new position is incorrect. Offsets are intended to ensure that the
"demands of mutually indebted parties be set off against each other and that only the balance be
recovered." 20 Am. Jur. 2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, & Setoff§ 6. Thus, where one party has
a debt that has accrued interest, a subsequent judgment that is to be set off against that debt must
take into account the full value of the debt: principal plus already-accrued interest.
For instance, in Wm. R. Clarke Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 78 Cal. App. 4th 355, 357
(2000), subcontractor Clarke had, in 1993, obtained a judgment of$837,000 plus post-judgment
1

In responding to MRIA' s argument, Saint Alphonsus does not waive or otherwise abandon its
earlier contention that it is entitled to statutory interest on its departing partner share from the date of
dissociation (April 1, 2004).
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interest against Safeco (the contractor's bond company) for an unpaid job. Clarke, however,
owed its suppliers $208,000 for the same job--and those suppliers assigned their claims to
Safeco. ld. Safeco, now holding offsetting claims against Clarke, paid the outstanding judgment
by first subtracting its offset from the judgment's principal, and then calculating post-judgment
interest on the remainder. ld. at 357-58. Both the district court and the appellate court found
that this was erroneous. ld. at 357. They explained that Clarke's right to recover against Safeco
had accrued in 1993, when the judgment was originally awarded, while Safeco's "right to claim
the amounts as offset was not adjudicated until" 1998, and held that Clarke was therefore entitled
to the accrued interest from 1993 through the time of the application of the offset. Id. at 360.
Likewise, in Cardinell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 302 A.D.2d 772, 773 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003), the plaintiffCardinell obtained a judgment for lost wages totaling $41,000, which had
legally been due to him for nearly ten years. With accrued interest, that award totaled nearly
$400,000. ld. Allstate obtained a countervailing $50,000 judgment against Cardinell, and
argued that its judgment should have been offset against Cardinell's recovery before accrued
interest was calculated. ld. The appellate court disagreed. It found that because the Allstate's
"obligation to pay interest accrued before" its right to recover from Cardinell did, the trial court
correctly added the accrued interest to Cardinell's judgment before applying an offset. ld. at
773-774. Many other cases apply this principle and add already-accrued interest before applying
offset. Malot v. Hadley, 794 P.2d 833, 834-35 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (where interest had already
legally accrued on promissory note by time offsetting judgment obtained, party entitled to both
principal and accrued interest); West v. Sunbelt Enters., 530 So. 2d 433, 437 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988)
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(party "entitled to an offset by the amount of any interest accrued"); Acco Constructors, Inc. v.

Nat'! Steel Prods. Co., 733 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (party is "entitled to offset ...
accrued interest").
MRIA, by contrast, does not offer a single authority in which already-accrued interest
was erased by application of a subsequently determined right to an offset. The first two cases
MRIA cites both involve the situation where the plaintiffs right to recovery and the defendant's
right to offset occurred simultaneously, such that neither side had accrued interest. See Cheung
v. Wu, 919 A.2d 619, 622 (Me. 2007), subsequent appeal at 955 A.3d 746, 747 (2008)

(simultaneous offset after trial where both plaintiff and defendant proved damages from each
other's violations of same contract); City ofAberdeen v. Rich, 658 N.W.2d 775,777-78, 781
(S.D. 2003) (same, where parties "agreed to set-off the damages award [for fraudulent land
transfer] by the amount expended by the defendants in [improving] the property").
The third case, Thomas & Betts Corp. v. A&A Mechanical, Inc., 2008 WL 2696877 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2008) is no different. There, a jury awarded the plaintiff $366,000 for breach of
warranty related to some HV AC units, but the trial court refused to award the defendant an
offsetting $170,000 that the plaintiffs still owed on the same equipment. 2008 WL 2696877 at

*1-2.

On a first appeal, the appellate court held that the trial court should have awarded the

defendant judgment on its counterclaim as a matter of law, and should have performed an offset.

Id On a second appeal, the appellate court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the interest
that had accrued during the period of time between the original judgment and the remand,
because if the trial court had made the correct legal decision the first time, both plaintiffs and
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defendants would have had a simultaneous judgment, and there would have been no accrued
interest on either side. !d. at *3. In other words, the first appellate decision had corrected a legal
error in the original judgment, and the second appellate decision offset the awards in the manner
that they would have been offset "had the trial court's original action been correct." !d.
None of these cases are applicable here, since Saint Alphonsus's right to its recovery was
established more than four years before MRIA's right to its countervailing recovery. As this
Court already held, Saint Alphonsus established its right to its departing partner share of $4.6
million on September 21, 2007, when Judge McLaughlin issued findings of fact and conclusions
of law awarding that amount to Saint Alphonsus, and entered judgment on the same. MRIA did
not appeal from that ruling, and "Judge McLaughlin's decision regarding the share of the
partnership to which Saint Alphonsus is entitled stands and remains the law of the case." Order
re: Motions for Summ. J. Heard May 18, 2011, at 4 (June 17, 2011). By contrast, MRIA's right
to recovery did not accrue until this Court's 2012 judgment, as MRIA's first verdict was vacated
by the Supreme Court because it was erroneously obtained.
MRIA's attempt to analogize its situation to Thomas & Betts thus fails. MRIA's current
judgment does not result from a legal ruling that MRIA was entitled to this particular judgment
in 2007, such that MRIA should have had a simultaneous offsetting judgment against Saint
Alphonsus at that time. Rather, the judgment that MRIA obtained in 2007 is a legal nullity, and
MRIA did not prove its legal entitlement to any money until the second jury issued a verdict, and
this Court entered judgment on that verdict. Moreover, unlike the.cases MRIA cites, Saint
Alphonsus's right to dissociate and recover its departing partner share was independent of the
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alleged contract and tort breaches on which MRIA later obtained a recovery. There is no basisand MRIA has cited no authority-by which the Court should allow this subsequent, unrelated
judgment to offset Saint Alphonsus's recovery, earned over four years prior, without taking into
account the significant interest that has accrued during the interim. Indeed, to do so would have
the effect of holding that MRIA is entitled to post-judgment interest running from 2007, which is
both legally and factually impossible given that there is no 2007 judgment in favor of MRIA.
Thus, if this Court performs an offset, it should first credit Saint Alphonsus with the interest that
has accrued since 2007. See also Saint Alphonsus Opp'n to MRIA's Rule 60 Mot. at 10 n.2
(setting forth how to calculate interest on Saint Alphonsus's award).

II.

THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD IS NOT ADDED TO THE JUDGMENT PRIOR
TO OFFSET, AND IS IRRELEVANT TO THE SIZE OF ANY APPEAL BOND.
MRIA also claims that this Court is required to add its attorney fee award to MRIA's

judgment before performing any offset. Mem. at 1-3. As support, it cites a truncated quotation
from I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(F). But the full provision shows that MRIA is incorrect, and that the
judgment as issued by the Court does not include cost and fees.
Rule 54(d)(l)(F), in full, provides as follows:
All costs and attorney fees approved by the court and fees for the
service of the writ of execution upon a judgment shall be deemed
automatically added to the judgment as costs and collected by the
sheriff in addition to the amount of the judgment and other allowed
costs. In the event the return of the sheriff upon a writ of execution
indicates that the service costs were not obtained through the
service of the writ, the clerk of the court shall automatically add
the uncollected service fees to the judgment as additional costs.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE TO MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF REGARDING OFFSET- 5004994

•
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(F) (emphasis added). As the italicized language makes clear, costs and
attorney fees are not a part of the judgment. The rule expressly distinguishes "costs and attorney
fees" as different and separate from the "amount of the judgment." Moreover, by providing that
costs and fees must be "deemed" as added to the judgment for purposes of a writ of execution,
the rule expressly indicates they are not actually part of the judgment. The word "deem" means
"[t]o treat (something) as if (1) it were really something else, or (2) it has qualities that it does
not have," and "[d]eem has been traditionally considered to be a useful word when it is necessary
to establish a legal fiction ... by 'deeming' something to be what it is not." Black's Law
Dictionary 4 77-78 (9th ed. 2009). Indeed, were MRIA correct that the trial court is required to
add attorney fees to the judgment, then Rule 54(d)(l )(F) would be entirely superfluous. There
would be no need to "deem" costs and fees as part of the judgment at the execution stage, and
then to add those costs and fees to the "amount of the judgment," because they would already be
part of the judgment.

Other provisions of the Idaho rules likewise make clear that costs and fees are not
automatically part ofthe final judgment. The very rule MRIA seeks to invoke to obtain offset,
Rule 54(b), provides for the entry of a "final judgment" (including offsets for counterclaims),
while Rule 54(d)(l) expressly states that costs can only be obtained post-judgment, and are
awarded by the court only after "consider[ation] ofthe final judgment." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l).
Likewise, a judgment is final and appealable regardless of any outstanding cost motions. See
Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) (fee motions do not alter time limit for appealing final judgment).
Taken together, the rules state what is commonplace: the court sets a final judgment, and later
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issues an order awarding costs. While that cost award is collectible as if it were part of the final
judgment, it is not a part of the final judgment. As it is not a part of the final judgment, it is not
subject to offset.
Of course, this is not to say that a court lacks the ability to issue a final judgment
including a cost award-it can. Student Loan Fund ofIdaho v. Duerner, 131 Idaho 45, 55, 951
P.2d 1272, 1281-82 (1997). But it is certainly not "automatic," as MRIA suggests. Here, the
Court has already issued a final judgment, which has been timely appealed, and that judgment
does not include attorney fees. MRIA's current motion before the Court asks it to correct the
alleged "clerical mistake" of not applying offsets to the existing judgment. But that existing
judgment does not include costs and attorney fees, and therefore any clerical "correction" to that
judgment would likewise not include costs and attorney fees. To the extent that MRIA's
supplemental brief is asking for new relief-for the Court to exercise its discretion to issue an
entirely new final judgment that adds attorney fees-then it is no longer asking for a correction
to the judgment under Rule 60(a). Any such request is untimely and not authorized by the rule.
In any event, even if there were authority for the Court to issue a new final judgment
including attorney fees (as opposed to the standard practice of issuing a final judgment followed
by a separate cost order), this would not change the amount of appellate bond that MRIA will be
required to file. "In calculating the required bond for staying execution of a judgment pending
appeal, the trial court should look to the amount of the judgment as of the time the notice of
appeal was filed because that is the time at which the bond is set." Student Loan Fund, 131
Idaho at 55, 951 P.2d at 1281-82. Here, Saint Alphonsus filed its Notice of Appeal on May 30,
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2012, and MRIA filed its Notice of Appeal on June 5, 2012, and so any bonds would be set by
reference to the judgment as it existed on those dates.
Further, even were this Court to award costs in a new judgment, that subsequent cost
award would not subject to bonding, as the Supreme Court made clear in BECO Constr. Co. v. JU-B Engineers, Inc., 149 Idaho 294,299 n.1, 233 P.3d 1216, 1221 n.1 (2010). There, a party

appealing an adverse cost determination filed an appellate bond, but the Court held that this had
been unnecessary, explaining that the appealing party "need not have previously posted the cash
bond" and citing Idaho Appellate Rule 16(a) for the proposition that "[n]o undertaking on appeal
for costs shall be required." !d. MRIA's efforts to add attorney fees to the judgment will
therefore have no effect on the size of the bonds that need to be posted, and so the Court should
simply decline MRIA's request. Instead, the Court should issue a separate cost order as is
standard practice.
CONCLUSION

As MRIA previously conceded, any offset must take into account the interest that accrued
on the $4.6 million award to Saint Alphonsus between September 21, 2007 (when the judgment
in favor of Saint Alphonsus was entered) and January 17, 2012 (when the judgment in favor of
MRIA was entered). Further, any offset should not include costs and attorneys fees awarded to
MRIA; those costs and fees should simply be reflected in a separate order of costs.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S RESPONSE TO MRIA'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF REGARDING OFFSET- 8004997

•
DATED this 20th day of August, 2012.
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MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA") hereby files this reply to Saint Alphonsus's response
(the "Response") to MRIA's Memorandum Concerning the Amount of the Offset between it and
Saint Alphonsus.

I.
A.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

Saint Alphonsus's argument concerning when to assess interest is based on statutes
and rationales not relevant here.
In its original Memorandum, MRIA pointed out that the entire "purpose of postjudgment

interest is to compensate a successful plaintiff for being deprived of compensation for his or her
loss during the time between ascertainment of the damage and payment by the defendant." CJS
INTEREST§ 110 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 110
S. Ct. 1570, 108 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1990)). Thus, MRIA argued that the offset should be computed
before applying interest, since the offset is, by definition, proof positive that Saint Alphonsus
was never entitled to the gross amount to begin with.
Against this persuasive logic, Saint Alphonsus argues that a couple of cases involving
very disparate facts from those at issue here should control instead. Neither need detain the
Court for long. For example, Saint Alphonsus cites Wm. R. Clarke Co. v. Safeco Ins., 78 Cal.
App. 4th 355 (2000), for the proposition that Saint Alphonsus should receive interest before the
offset is completed. Yet that case, by its very language, turned on a California statute which
appears to compel interest being applied first: "Clarke's analysis is supported by section
695.220 which provides, as relevant, that ' [m ]oney received in satisfaction of a money judgment
... is to be credited ... against the accrued interest that remains unsatisfied,' and it is only the
'remaining money' that can then be 'credited against the principal amount of the judgment. .. "'
/d. at 360. No such similarly worded statute exists in this case.
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Perhaps more important, however, is the fact that, unlike the case at bar, the offset in
Clarke was a result of an insurance company waiting for some time to bring up its offsetting
rights because in order to do so, it would have had to have taken contradictory positions before
the court, and it wanted to see whether its first position would result in a better outcome. !d. at
357-60 ("[O]ne can't really have it both ways and hold out the prospect of collection by Safeco
[by way of Keller's suit against Clarke's surety] and yet say that there is an existing offset."). As
such, it apparently sat on its hands for some time, which clearly irked the Court. !d. ("a surety
who pays the debt 'must actively assert his equitable right thereto' in order to gain a right of
subrogation."). Indeed, according to the Court, the application of interest before offset in this
case was ultimately made as a quasi-punishment for the insurer's failure to act in good faith
throughout the litigation: "we agree with the trial court that the manner in which Safeco
exercised its right to an offset was not equitable. It follows that we find no abuse of discretion
by the trial court [applying interest before the offset]." !d. at 361.
The other case discussed by Saint Alphonsus, Cardinell v. Allstate Insurance, 302
A.D.2d 772, 773 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003), is similar. In Cardinell, like Clarke, the case turned on
the intent and language of a statute which has no application here-one which once again was
meant to impel insurers to pay valid claims in a timely manner. Indeed, the Cardinell Court, just
as the Clarke Court, expressed obvious agitation that the insurer had waited so long to pay its
claim, noting that the statute involved required quick reimbursement. !d. As a result, it found
that interest should be applied before the offset so as to act as a "punitive" measure against such
dilatory acts by the insurer:
In our view, both the language of Insurance Law § 5106 (a) and II NYCRR 65.15
(h) (I) and the underlying rationale behind same compel the conclusion that
Supreme Court appropriately applied the setoff after calculating interest. First,
under the express terms of the statute, the failure to pay benefits within 30 days
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renders benefits "overdue" and all overdue payments incur interest at the rate of
2% per month .... More importantly, ... the statute and regulation are punitive,
with severe penalties, to encourage prompt adjustments of claims. Here, applying
the setoff before calculating interest, thereby eliminating any recovery whatsoever
to plaintiff, would frustrate this essential purpose.

ld at 773-74 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
As is obvious, neither the facts nor the law at issue in either Clarke or Cardinell are
extant here. Unlike these two cases, the case at hand involves no statute mandating that the
offset take place after the interest accrued. Moreover, none of the underlying policy questions at
issue in Clarke and Cardinell are relevant here, both of which revolved around insurance
companies trying to skirt their legal duties, and courts looking for reasons to act "punitively"
towards them as a result. In sum, neither case is particularly instructive here.
To the contrary, the case most similar by far to the one at hand is Thomas & Betts Co.,
Inc. v. A & A Mechanical, 2008 WL 2696877 (Ky. App. 2008). As explained in detail in the
original memorandum, that case is extraordinarily similar to the one at hand, in that it:
(1) involved an appeal; (2) involved a remand; (3) involved the same two parties; (4) involved a
re-trial; and (5) involved two judgments based on the same nucleus of common fact, rendered
years apart due only to the fact of the appeal. As this Court well knows, all of these facts are
present in this case as well. Conversely, neither of the two cases made the centerpiece of Saint
Alphonsus's Response come anywhere close to this. Specifically: (1) neither Clarke nor
Cardinell involved an appeal that resulted in a remand; (2) the judgments in Clarke were not
even between the same two parties; (3) neither Clarke nor Cardinell involved a re-trial; and
(4) in neither Clarke nor Cardinell were there judgments separated by a large amount of time due
to an appeal. And again, Clarke and Cardinell were apparently the best cases Saint Alphonsus
could find.
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Of course, Saint Alphonsus makes some perfunctory efforts to distinguish Thomas &
Betts factually from the case at hand, implicitly recognizing the damage this case does to its
position. Yet its explanation for that case is confusing at best. In particular, Saint Alphonsus
argues that the case at hand is different than Thomas & Betts, since "MRIA did not prove its
legal entitlement to any money until" the second trial. Response, p. 4. Yet this is misleading:
MRIA proved a legal entitlement in the first trial, and as a result obtained an offset in 2007, but
the resulting judgment was reversed due to putative errors by the trial court. This is critical,
since as Thomas & Betts makes clear, it is a "well-established legal principle that a judgment
entered after remand should place each party in the position it would have been in had the trial
court's original action been correct." !d. at **2-3. Saint Alphonsus's attempts at distinguishing
this highly germane case accordingly fail.

B.

Saint Alphonsus's interpretation of Rule 54(d)(l)(F) is nonsensical, and its reliance on
Student Loan Fund is misplaced.
Saint Alphonsus starts its discussion concerning whether attorneys fees should be added

to the judgment with the odd argument that Rule 54(d)(l )(F) does not mean what it actually says.
In particular, Saint Alphonsus argues that when the Rule states that costs and fees are to "be
deemed automatically added to the judgment," that somehow means something different than
that the costs and fees are "deemed automatically added to the judgment." Response, pp. 5-7.
To get to that perplexing non sequitur, Saint Alphonsus engages in a lengthy and frankly
bewildering discussion of what the word "deem" really means, which brings to mind Clintonesque machinations about how one defines what "is" is.
In any event, the language of the statute is clear: once costs and fees are awarded, they
are "deemed automatically" part of the judgment. MRIA is simply asking that once those fees
are awarded here-as the Court has already indicated that it is likely to do-that they be made
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part of the offset, since, as per the plain language of the rule, they will already be part of the
judgment.
Saint Alphonsus also contends that custom is generally to render a separate order for
costs and fees. MRIA is not opposed to this, and does not understand why this seems to be an
insurmountable obstacle for an offset. In particular, MRIA is not opposed to having the costs
and fees on a separate order so long as the amount due to Saint Alphonsus is decreased
accordingly, so that the bond can also be decreased.
To this, Saint Alphonsus counters that Student Loan Fund ofIdaho v. Duerner, 131 Idaho
45, 951 P.2d 1272 (1997), makes this issue moot, since Saint Alphonsus's reading of that case is
that the bond in this matter is set at the time of the notice of appeal. Response, pp. 7-8. In that
regard, two things should be noted. First, the offset and the bond are two different things. They
are related in the context of this case, but whether the offset ultimately affects the amount of the
bond does not affect whether an offset should be rendered. Instead, Rule 54(b) requires an offset
as a matter of course, without discussion of what that might do to other issues.
Secondly, Saint Alphonsus is clearly reading Student Loan Fund out of context. In that
case, a party had obtained both a judgment and an award of attorneys fees before the case was
appealed, and the question became whether the judgment debtor should bond for the amount of
the original judgment, or whether the attorneys fees and costs (having been "automatically"
added) should also be part ofthe bond. 131 Idaho at 55. In other words, the issue was if a
judgment-debtor would be justified in posting a smaller bond than what the judgment-creditor
was owed-i.e., one without the attorneys fees-given that in many cases, an attorneys fees
decision would not be rendered after the notice of appeal. ld. To this predicament, the Court
responded that "the trial court should look to the amount of the judgment as of the time of the
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notice of appeal," meaning that only if the costs and fees were awarded before the notice of
appeal would they then be included to increase the amount of the necessary bond for the
judgment-debtor to post. Id
In its Response, however, Saint Alphonsus takes this logic and twists it past recognition.
While the Student Loan Fund decision was clearly intended to cover situations in which a
judgment-debtor's bond obligation might increase with a decision about attorneys fees, in this
case, the question is whether the judgment-debtor's (MRIA) obligation will decrease with a
decision about attorneys fees. Thus, Saint Al phonsus' s argument is that even if its judgment
against MRIA is reduced significantly, Saint Alphonsus should still be entitled to a bond which
vastly oversecures it, simply because it filed its appeal before the Court reached its decision on
attorneys fees. Indeed, by Saint Alphonsus's perverted logic, its judgment against MRI
Associates could be reduced to zero in this process, and yet MRI Associates would still have to
post millions of dollars in bonds for Saint Alphonsus's protection of its non-existent judgment
during the appeal. This is not the fact pattern which Student Loan Fund had in front of it, and it
is absurd to believe that the language of that case should apply in this vastly disparate situation.
Similarly, Saint Alphonsus's argument concerning BECO Constr. Co. v. J-U-B
Engineers, 149 Idaho 294, 233 P.3d 1216 (2010), is erroneous. Saint Alphonsus argues that any

costs awarded to MRIA would "not be subject to bonding." Response, p. 8. But MRIA is not
looking to "subject" its costs "to bonding" in the first place; that language would only apply if
Saint Alphonsus was being asked to post a bond on MRIA's costs. Instead, MRIA is simply

looking to decrease Saint Alphonsus's judgment against MRI Associates generally, which will
then have the residual effect oflowering the amount of the bond it will eventually have to post.
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II.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, MRIA requests that when the Court renders the offset, it
do so: (1) with MRIA 's attorneys fees as part of its judgment; and (2) prior to any post-judgment
interest accruing.
DATED this 21st day of August 2012.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited (collectively,
"MRIA") submit this Reply in Support of their Petition for Post-Judgment Costs and Fees.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Petition for Post-Judgment Costs and Fees (the
"Opposition") ignores clear Idaho law and baselessly accuses MRIA's attorneys of"chuming."
MRIA accordingly files this Reply.

II.

A.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

Saint Alphonsus's self-serving interpretation of I. C.§ 12-120(5) is squarely
contradicted by Idaho law.
Saint Alphonsus's interpretation ofi.C. § 12-120(5) is apparently that it only applies to

efforts at garnishment and levying, and nothing else. Opposition, pp. 2-6. This is false. Indeed,
as MRIA noted in its original Motion, there are several cases which flatly disagree with this
interpretation. And though Saint Alphonsus has put forth a fleeting effort in distinguishing those
cases from the one at hand, the truth is that they simply cannot be squared with Saint
Alphonsus's self-interested position.
Nowhere is that more clear than in the case of Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Seele,
138 Idaho 753, 69 P.3d 173 (Ct. App. 2003). The facts of that case are illustrative. There, a
party named Action Collection obtained a judgment against Seele from a magistrate court. !d. at
754. Thereafter, Seele moved to vacate this judgment. !d. The magistrate denied that motion,
and Seele appealed her case up to the district court, arguing things like personal jurisdiction,
timeliness, and due process. !d. The district court agreed with the magistrate, however, and
affirmed. !d. Thereafter, Seele again appealed, this time to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in tum, also largely affirmed the district court's decision and ruled in favor of Action
Collection. !d. Critically, the Court of Appeals then ruled that Action Collection was entitled to
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its fees based on I.C. § 12-120(5) and stated that this action-wherein Action Collection did

nothing else besides passively defending its judgment from attack-was an "attempt[] to collect
on its judgment." !d. at 760.
Such is the case here as well. MRIA's request for fees is largely tied up in defending the
January 18,2012, Judgment from Saint Alphonsus's largely futile attacks. Thus, like Seele, it is
therefore an "attempt to collect on its judgment."
Saint Alphonsus offers little in response to these difficult facts, contending only that in
addition to challenging the decision of the magistrate as to issues like due process and personal
jurisdiction, Seele had also contested the propriety of some garnishment actions. Motion, p. 4.
In particular, Saint Alphonsus argues cursorily that the fact that garnishment was involved in that
case must be how the Court of Appeals was able to implicate § 12-120( 5). Yet this argument is
illogical. According to Seele, the Court of Appeals awarded the attorneys fees and costs incurred
by Action Collection for defending its judgment from all of Seele's arguments, most of which
had nothing to do with garnishment as such. See generally Seele, 138 Idaho 753. And in order
for Saint Alphonsus's argument to make any sense, the Court would have had to only award
Action Collection its fees for the time it spent arguing about garnishment. But it did not.
Instead, it awarded Action Collection all of its fees and costs, including those incurred for
defending its judgment on issues related to the merits of the judgment. !d. at 760. This Court
should do so here as well.
This principle is further affirmed in Griffv. Curry Bean Co., 138 Idaho 315, 63 P.3d 441
(2003), which Saint Alphonsus paradoxically cites in its brief as a reason to deny MRIA's
motion. Opposition, p. 6. While it is true that the Griff decision eventually results in a party
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being denied fees under§ 12-120(5), the verbiage Griff uses to arrive at that conclusion is
absolutely deleterious to Saint Alphonsus's position here.
In that case, Griff won a judgment against Curry Bean. Id. After that judgment, it then
filed a regulatory claim with the state of Idaho, known as a "ClAP" claim, which would allow it
to recover on certain warehousing bonds through regulatory channels, and sought post-judgment
costs and fees for so doing pursuant to§ 12-120(5). ld. at 319,323. However, the Supreme
Court disallowed the fees related to that ClAP action, stating that it would not award postjudgment fees for this action solely because Griff did not need a judgment in order to pursue it:
The ClAP [action] ... does not require a judgment against the warehouse, instead,
the ClAP has its own administrative procedure to determine validity and value of
claims .... The ClAP, however, could have valued the claim independently of the
jury's verdict. Therefore, Griffs ClAP action was independent, as opposed to
derivative, of recovery on the judgment in this case.

Id. at 323-24 (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court held that if an action is independent of
the judgment-i.e., if a judgment is not "required" in order to prosecute the post-trial actionthen postjudgment fees are not allowable under § 12-120(5). But that being the case, the inverse
would also have to be true: where a postjudgment action does "require a judgment" in order to
be filed, or is not "independent" of the judgment, or is "derivative" to the judgment in some
manner, postjudgment fees can and should be awarded.
Obviously, in this case, MRIA could not have filed any of the motions it did, or taken any
of the actions it did, without there first being a judgment. For example, MRIA's requests for
attorneys fees and costs were based first on it winning a judgment, since it would not have been
entitled to them without one. Similarly, MRIA's defensive actions against the motions to vacate
the judgment were, obviously, based on protecting its judgment. Moreover, MRIA' s motions to
modify the judgment all necessarily depended on there first being a judgment to modify. As
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such, all of its acts first "require[ d]" the existence of a judgment in this matter in order to be
filed. As a result, Griff clearly allows for the costs and fees for these actions to be recompensed
under§ 12-120(5). Put another way, not only does Griff not stand for the proposition Saint
Alphonsus wished it did, it actually strongly affirms MRIA's arguments.
Saint Alphonsus next argues that the fact that cases like Seele were on appeal should
make a difference, contending that the case at hand is somehow distinguishable because the fees
and costs sought by MRIA are still from this district court. Opposition, pp. 5-6. Yet the
language of the statute disagrees. It says nothing about an appeal whatsoever, and instead
merely requires the efforts to be incurred "postjudgment." I.C. § 12-120(5). There can be no
argument here that efforts here have not come "postjudgment."
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, MRIA notes that every hour and every task
referenced in the affidavit of counsel-the postjudgment motions, the motions related to
attorneys fees and costs, and the efforts to make the judgment conducive to Rule 54(b}-were all
performed in order for MRIA to "collect" on its judgment from Saint Alphonsus. That is, the
first step in collecting MRIA' s judgment is to ensure that this judgment is as enforceable and
large as possible. Thus, defending the judgment from attack from a motion for JNOV or making
sure the judgment conforms with the Idaho Rules are all part of trying to collect from Saint
Alphonsus-even if those efforts may not bear fruit for some time to come. Similarly, asserting
a motion for attorneys' fees is a necessary first step to make the collection efforts as profitable as
possible. Put another way, why else would MRIA be asserting these motions/oppositions, if not
in an attempt to collect money from Saint Alphonsus?
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B.

Saint Alphonsus's attempts to limit BECO Construction conflict with its plain
language.
Saint Alphonsus next contends that BECO Construction v. J-U-B Engineers, 149 Idaho

294, 233 P.3d 126 (201 0), is only applicable to post-appeals questions and therefore cannot be
used to allow post-trial fees here. Opposition, pp. 6-7. There are two fundamental problems
with this argument. First, even if Saint Alphonsus was correct, it would not matter. The
attorneys fees and costs sought are justified by the § 12-120(5) all on its own, as explained
above.
Secondly, Saint Alphonsus's argument conflicts with the plain language of BECO. While
MRIA agrees that the context of the BECO decision was in a situation taking place after an
appellate dispute about fees, the Supreme Court affirmatively did not limit its holding to
appellate disputes. /d. at 298. Instead, it held "that the prevailing party [is] entitled to an award
of attorney fees incurred in the continuation of the litigation in order to determine the amount
that he is entitled to be awarded in attorney fees," and that the "litigation over the amount of the
attorney fee award is also part ofthe legal action for which he is entitled to an award of attorney
fees." /d. (emphasis added; internal citations and quotations omitted). Obviously, MRIA's posttrial motions have been in "the continuation of the litigation." The fact that they have not yet
been on appeal is irrelevant to this clear verbiage.
C.

There is no evidence that MRIA 's attorneys have engaged in "churning."
Saint Alphonsus next makes the argument that MRIA's attorneys have engaged in

"churning." Motion, pp. 7-8. Unfortunately, however, Saint Alphonsus cites to no evidence to
back up this serious allegation. 1 Instead, it merely points to couple of the motions which Saint

1

Nor is it the first time Saint Alphonsus has haphazardly thrown these grave types of allegations around. For
example, in its Objection to MRIA's Amended Fee Petition, filed June 6, 2012, Saint Alphonsus accused MRIA's
counsel of"smuggling" unallowable fees into its fee affidavit, which is tantamount to accusing them oflying.
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Alphonsus believes MRIA was unsuccessful on or which Saint Alphonsus does not think are
related to "protecting the judgment."
There are obvious problems with Saint Alphonsus's arguments. First, as discussed in
some detail in the Motion for Post-Judgment Costs and Fees, whether MRIA was successful with
the motions and oppositions referenced in the Opposition is entirely beside the point: "Unlike
other sections that expressly require a party to prevail in order to be awarded attorney fees and
costs, I.C. § 12-120(5) includes no such requirement." Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc. v.
Lecheminant, 149 Idaho 467,473,235 P.3d 1188, 1194 (2010). The only question, then, is if
MRIA's actions were dependent on the existence of the judgment so as to implicate§ 12-120(5).
Griff, 138 Idaho at 323-24. And in this case, as explained above, all of the relevant actions
depended on there first being a judgment, and were derivative thereof.
Similarly, Saint Alphonsus argues that any action related to the offset is irrelevant and
therefore cannot be recompensed. Yet that argument makes no sense: again, MRIA cannot have
asked for a modification of the judgment to include the required offset if there was not first a
judgment to modify. Thus, as per Griff, all of these acts "require[d] a judgment," and are
therefore should be recompensed. 138 Idaho at 323-24.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, MRIA requests that its Motion for Post-Judgment Attorneys
Fees and Costs be granted.
DATED this 21st day of August 2012.

BrentS. Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

S£P 2 4 ZOlZ

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, "'"-rk
S, OWE QUIMH "''V
)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, )
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership,
)
)
)
Defendant.
)

.....

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: MOTIONS HEARD
AUGUST 24, 2012

___________________________ )
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED, an Idaho )
limited partnership; MRI MOBILE LIMITED,)
an Idaho limited partnership,
)
)
)
Counter-claimants,
)
)
vs.
)
)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,)
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)
Counter-defendants.
)

___________________________ )
Pending before the Court are several motions heard at oral argument on August 24, 2012.
First is the MRIA entities' amended prejudgment costs and fees petition, along with St. Al's
objections. Second, MRI Associates, LLP (MRIA), MRI Limited LP, and MRI Mobile Limited
LP (collectively, the "MRIA entitites") petition for their postjudgment costs and fees under Idaho
Code Section 12-120(5). Third is the MRIA entities' motion for relief from judgment pursuant
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'
to Rule 60 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, per their amended motion filed May 24, 2012.
The Court has read and fully considered the motions and related materials, and, as indicated
above, heard oral argument on the motions on August 24, 2012. Accordingly, the Court now
issues the following memorandum decision and order.

BACKGROUND
The factual and procedural history of this matter is lengthy and complex, and need not be
recited in detail here. For purposes of the present motions, the relevant background is as follows.
On January 26, 2008, the Honorable Judge McLaughlin entered judgment in this case in
favor ofMRI Associates following a jury trial. Saint Alphonsus (St. Al's) successfully appealed,
and this case was remanded for a second jury trial before this Court. Following a two month
trial, on October 31, 2011, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the MRIA entities, awarding
approximately $50,000,000 in total damages. Accordingly, judgment was entered for the entities
on January 18, 2012. The judgment, as amended, sets forth various alternatives among which the
MRIA entities could separately choose to recover the amounts awarded by the jury, based upon
the causes of action and theories of recovery asserted and argued at trial. In addition, the Court
awarded St. Al's $4.6M against MRIA, representing St. Al's departing partner share, with
interest calculated from September 21, 2007 until paid in full. 1
As indicated above, the parties continue their previous disagreement over the MRIA
entities' memorandum of prejudgment costs and fees. The Court, by its order dated May 15,
2012, ordered the entities to excise or reduce certain entries, and an amended fee petition was
submitted accordingly. Here, St. Al's argues that the MRIA entities have not fully complied with

1

This award was originally ordered by Judge McLaughlin in the original case, and was
not overturned on appeal.
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the order in the amended petition.
Separately, the parties dispute whether postjudgment costs and fees are available to the
MRIA entities under I. C. section 12-120(5), for the particular kind of activities undertaken by the
MRIA entities for which costs and fees are being sought. In particular, the parties disagree as to
the meaning and application of the phrase "fees and costs incurred in attempting to collect on the
judgment," which describes the post-judgment fees and costs recoverable under that subsection.
I d.

Finally, the parties dispute the proper method of offsetting the judgments entered in this
case for St. Al's and MRIA. The Court has previously found that it erred in failing to offset St.
Al's departing partner share award against the judgment in favor of MRIA, as required by Rule
54(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the parties differ as to whether and how
such offset should be performed, given the form of the judgment and the issues of post-judgment
interest, pre-judgment attorney's fees and costs, and the provisions of Rule 60 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
DISCUSSION
I.

THE MRIA ENTITIES' AMENDED PRE-JUDGMENT COSTS AND FEES PETITION

The legal standards governing an award of pre-judgment costs and fees in a civil action of
this nature are well settled, and are as stated in the Court's previous order regarding costs and
fees, dated May 15, 2012, which forms the basis for St. Al's challenge to the MRIA entities'
amended fee petition.

As the Court is merely being asked to review the MRIA entities'

compliance with its previous order, rather than to conduct a de novo reasonableness analysis
under Idaho Code section 12-120(3) on any new costs or fees allegedly owed, those standards
need not be repeated here. Instead, the Court will directly address the concerns raised by St. Al's
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in its objection to the amended fee petition.
1.

First, St. Al's argues that the MRlA entities are still seeking fees related to
cross-appeal issues, in contravention of the Court's order, by failing to separately
account for time spent on those issues while preparing a combined appellate
response brief and cross-appeal brief, and in two other entries. Accordingly, St.
Al' s seeks a 10% reduction in the hours claimed with respect to the combined
appellate brief, and complete elimination of the other entries alleged to relate to
the cross appeal (amounting to 4.9 hours). MRlA denies that the challenged
entries relate to cross-appeal issues.
The Court concludes that St. Al' s objections are unwarranted.

Having

reviewed both the original fee petition and the amended petition, the Court
concludes that the MRlA entities, with only minor exceptions herein noted,
generally culled their petition in conformance with the Court's order. Given the
immense amount of hours billed on the issues between the parties over the past
years, and the hundreds of hours excised from the petition by MRlA entities per
the order, the Court declines to speculate that each entry that is somewhat
ambiguously labeled fails to comply with the order. The Court further notes that
counsel for the MRJA entities has certified by sworn affidavit, and as officers of
the court, that the fees stated were incurred as to matters allowed by the Court's
order. Under these circumstances, the Court presumes compliance unless a clear
and specific allegation of non-compliance as to a specific entry is made and
proven.
2.

Second, St. Al's argues that an October 3, 2009 entry, amounting to 0.6 hours
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of time, relates to the MRIA entities' failed challenge to appellate costs. The
Court finds that the entry does appear to relate to this issue, and that the MRIA
Entities have not effectively explained why it is not in violation of the Court's
order. Therefore, the MRlA entities will excise this entry from its affidavit of
costs and fees.
3.

Third, St. Al 's argues, in effect, that the MRIA entities have failed to excise or
discount entries related to their failed attempt to challenge the award to St. Al's of
its departing partner share. Here, St. Al' s argument is similar to its argument
under number one above; that is, that the MRIA entities are purposefully or nonpurposefully smuggling in forbidden fees in the guise of ambiguously or
generically-labeled timekeeping entries. With respect to these entries, the Court
answers as it did under number one. However, St. Al's does challenge four
distinct entries made in November of 2011, totaling 12.1 hours, as to which the
entities conceded at oral argument that they relate, in some proportion, to a
response brief containing a page or two of argument on the departing-partner
share issue. Given this concession, the MRIA entities will reduce the 12.1 hours
in question by 2.1 hours, an amount which the Court concludes reflects the
proportion of the brief concerned with the departing partner share issue.

4.

Fourth, St. Al' s argues that the MRIA entities are inappropriately seeking fees
relating to their use of mock juries, in contravention of the Court's order, to the
tune of 146.5 hours. The entities argue that the Court's order only referred to
costs associated with mock juries, and made no mention of fees. The Court agrees

with the MRlA entities that its order explicitly, and purposefully, covered only
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costs associated with the use of mock juries, and did not address the issue of fees.
Further, the use ofmockjuries in cases of this complexity is hardly unexpected or
unforeseeable. For these reasons, the entities need not disturb these entries.
II. MRIA ENTITIES' PETITION FOR POST -JUDGMENT COSTS AND
FEES

A.

Legal Standard for Postjudgment Costs and Fees

The MRIA entities move, under Idaho Code section 12-120(5), for their costs and
fees associated with the litigation between the parties subsequent to the entry of judgment
on January 17, 2012. The relevant portion of the text of section 12-120(5) reads as
follows:

"In all instances where a party is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs
under subsection (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this section, such party shall also be entitled
to reasonable postjudgment attorney's fees and costs incurred in attempting to
collect on the judgment."

Id. 2 The parties do not disagree that the MRIA entities are a party entitled to fees and
costs under subsection (3) of the civil costs and fees statute. Rather, the heart of their dispute
concerns the proper application of the limiting phrase "incurred in attempting to collect on the
judgment." Id.
The Court begins its analysis of this issue by taking note of the obvious: virtually every
action taken in a lawsuit by a prevailing party after entry of judgment can be characterized, by an
attorney of even minimal competence, as an attempt to collect the judgment. However, just as

2

It is well-established that there is no separate "prevailing party" requirement in
section 12-120(5). Action Collection Svcs., Inc., v. Bigham, 146 Idaho 286, 291, 192
P.3d 1110, 1115 (Ct. App. 2008). Rather, the extent of the costs and fees awardable
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obviously, not every piece of litigation that occurs, chronologically speaking, post judgment, is a
"postjudgment fee[] [or] cost[] incurred in attempting to collect on the judgment" under section
12-120(5). Id. If this were not so, the phrase in question would be mere surplusage, and the only
limit on what fees and costs a prevailing party could seek post-judgment would come from the
requirement that the fees and costs be "reasonable." The Court knows of no authority reaching
that result, and the cases cited by the parties do not so hold.
Rather, post-judgment litigation can be classified in three ways: (1) as a mere
continuation of pre-judgment issues, which happens to occur after a judgment is entered; (2) as
litigation involving new issues which were not previously raised pre-judgment, or which did not
exist pre-judgment, but which do not constitute an attempt to "collect on the judgment;" or, (3)
as a bona fide attempt to collect on the judgment, within the meaning of the statute, justifying an
award of reasonable costs and fees under section 12-120(5).
Postjudgment costs and fees falling under the first of these categories can easily be
identified by determining whether the costs and fees sought merely continue an unresolved
prejudgment issue. However, the determination whether an item of costs or fees not covered
under category one should fall under category two or three suggests the question in issue here:
what kind of new post-judgment litigation constitutes an attempt to "collect on the judgment?"
Lacking a statutory definition, the Court turns to the relatively small number of published cases
construing section 12-120(5), most ofwhich were cited by the parties. 3

under this section is defined by the substance of the activity for which fees are
sought, and by what is "reasonable under the circumstances." Id.
3
For the record, these cases are Post v. Farmway, Inc., 135 Idaho 475, 20 P.3d 11
(2001}; Action Collection Svcs., Inc., v. Seele, 138 Idaho 753, 69 P.3d 173 (Ct. App.
2003} (henceforth "ACS 1"}; Action Collection Svcs., Inc., v. Bigham, 146 Idaho 286,
192 P.3d 1110 (Ct. App. 2008} (henceforth "ACS 2"}; Griff, Inc., v. Curry Bean Co.,
138 Idaho 315, 63 P.3d 441 (2003}; Medical Recovery Svcs., LLC v. Carnes, 148 Idaho
868, 230 P.3d 760 (Ct. App. 2010}; and Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc., v.
Lecheminant, 149 Idaho 467, 235 P.3d 1188 (2010}.
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Notably, all of these cases except two involve attempts to collect postjudgment costs and
fees incurred either exclusively or primarily as a result of a garnishment attempt by a prevailingparty creditor. The two cases not involving a garnishment (Griff and Carnes) involve a judgment
creditor's use of a debtor's examination (Carnes) and the use of a separate administrative
procedure designed to allow recovery on certain kinds of claims ( Grif}). Postjudgment costs and
fees were denied in only one of these cases, the Griff case, on the ground that the costs and fees
involved in the administrative procedure were not incurred in an attempt to collect the judgment
obtained by the creditor in the trial court, because the procedure was wholly independent of, and
distinct from, the action in the trial court in which the creditor was the prevailing party. Griff,
Inc., v. Curry Bean Co., 138 Idaho 315,323-24,63 P.3d 441,449-450 (2003). Because the issue
here does not involve an attempt to collect costs and fees incurred in a proceeding independent of
the case in which the MRIA entities prevailed, the major holding in Griffis inapplicable here.
Excluding the holding in Griff, as a whole these decisions are not concerned with
divining the boundaries of the phrase "attempting to collect on the judgment," and, hence, they
can provide the Court with relatively little direct guidance in determining which of the MRIA
entities' costs and fees requests qualify, given that there has not been a garnishment or similar
direct action on the judgment by the MRIA entities to this point. However, a few of these
decisions do merit special attention for what they fairly imply on the subject ofpostjudgment
motion practice, including defensive practice by a prevailing party, and postjudgment litigation
over pre- and -postjudgment costs and fees.
The first of these cases is Action Collection Svcs., Inc., v. Seele (ACS 1). In ACS 1, a
judgment debtor appealed a trial court's decision affirming a magistrate's denial of her motions
to vacate and set aside the judgment, and to quash a continuing garnishment of her wages. 138
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Idaho 753, 753, 69 P.3d 173, 173 (Ct. App. 2003). ACS 1 is notable because the issues raised on
appeal by the debtor include not those arising from the garnishment, but also issues arising from
the losing party's attacks upon the judgment itself, in the form of its motion to vacate and set
aside the judgment on jurisdictional and due process grounds. /d. The Court of Appeals awarded
the prevailing party-creditor "costs and attorney fees incurred on this appeal pursuant to ... I.C. §
12-120(5)," without distinguishing between the issues raised on appeal that were directly
concerned with the garnishment, and those which involved freestanding attacks upon the
underlying judgment. /d. at 760, 69 P .3d at 180. Of course, this Court does not have the benefit
of the creditor's fee petition on appeal, and the Court of Appeals simply awarded fees without
any separate analysis of the individual fees sought. However, the Court concludes that a fair
reading of ACS 1 supports the proposition that a prevailing party can recover postjudgment costs
and fees associated with defending direct attacks on its whole judgment under section 12-120(5),
and is not limited to its costs and fees incurred in the process of obtaining and defending
garnishments, debtor's examinations, and the like. This holding is further compelled by the fact
that one can hardly collect a judgment unless there is a judgment to collect, and by the evident
desire of the legislature to discourage a losing party from running up the winner's costs postjudgment by hindering and delaying a party from collection.
The second case bearing particularly on the present issue is BECO Const. Co. v. J-U-B
Engineers, Inc. 149 Idaho 294,233 P.3d 1216 (2010). BECO did not involve a fee request

under section 12-120(5), but rather addressed the question whether prejudgment costs and fees
incurred by a prevailing party in litigating the proper amount of prejudgment costs and fees were
recoverable as part of any award given under section 12-120(3). The Supreme Court answered in
the affirmative, overruling a line of authority to the contrary from the Court of Appeals. /d. at
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298, 233 P.3d at 1220. Notably, the Supreme Court described such postjudgment efforts to
determine costs and fees owed to the prevailing party in the underlying action as "the
continuation of the litigation in order to determine the amount that [the prevailing party] is
entitled to be awarded in attorney fees." Id. (internal citations and quotations marks omitted;
emphasis added). This description comports with this Court's understanding of the nature of
posijudgment litigation over prejudgment costs and fees; that is, such litigation is not properly
viewed as a fresh attempt to "collect a judgment," but rather as the continuation of a prejudgment
determination that happens to extend in time beyond the issuance of the judgment.
Of course, neither BECO, nor the Court's interpretation of it, stands for the proposition
that costs and fees incurred in a prevailing party's postjudgment efforts to determine the amount
ofpostjudgment costs and fees owing are not recoverable under section 12-120(5). Indeed,
BECO seems to state the opposite -that there is no "principled basis" for precluding a party from

seeking its fees incurred in obtaining its fees as part of its postjudgment fee petition, where such
"fees incurred seeking fees" relate to a party's attempts to "collect on the judgment." Id.
Finally, BECO also supports the Court's belief that the 14-day window set forth in Rule
54(d)(5) does not prevent a party from seeking its "fees incurred seeking fees" which arise after
the window has closed. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5). If this were not the case, the holding in BECO would
be a dead letter in the vast majority of cases in which it would apply, because the "continuation
of litigation" over prejudgment costs and fees necessarily will extend far beyond fourteen days
after the entry of judgment. Clearly, too, Rule 54(d)(5) is intended to require a party seeking its
fees in the underlying action to timely document said fees and costs, to the extent they have
already been incurred; it does not purport to require a party entitled to fees to predict the amount
of fees that will be required to litigate a timely-filed fee petition. The Rules of Civil Procedure
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need not be read in a vacuum or in total disregard of common sense. I.R.C.P. l(a) ("These rules
shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.")
To summarize, then, the Court finds as follows regarding the proper application of
section 12-120(5): first, that the phrase "attempting to collect on the judgment" encompasses not
only garnishments and debtor's examinations, and litigation and appeals arising thereunder, but,
at least, a prevailing party's postjudgment defensive efforts against direct attacks on the
judgment; and, second, that a trial court may properly award reasonable postjudgment costs and
fees incurred by a prevailing party in litigating the amount of postjudgment costs and fees owed,
although postjudgment litigation over prejudgment fees and costs must be sought in the original
fee petition filed under section 12-120(1)-(4). As to the latter, the Court finds that a prevailing
party is allowed to amend such original fee petition to include these costs, if reasonable, despite
the closing of the 14-day window set forth in Rule 54 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
B.

Application of Section 12-120(5) to the Postjudgment Fee Petition of the MRIA Entities

Based upon the foregoing legal standards, and the Court's determinations regarding the
proper scope of section 12-120(5), the Court hereby makes the following findings and issues the
following guidance to the MRIA entities regarding the preparation of an amended petition for
postjudgment costs and fees:
1)

The MRlA entities are a prevailing party under I.C. § 12-120(3) in the underlying
action, and are entitled to reasonable postjudgment costs and attorney fees incurred in
attempting to collect on the judgment.

2)

Under Idaho law, a prevailing party's defense of its adversary's direct attacks on the
judgment as a whole, such as via a motion to vacate and to set aside a judgment, is an
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attempt to collect on the judgment for purposes of section 12-120(5).
3)

Defenses of indirect attacks on the judgment, such as a motion to stay execution, or
motions by either party relating to the form of the judgment or the amount of any
appellate bond, are not attempts to collect on the judgment. 4 The same is true of
motions by either party seeking correction of errors in any judgment as to its form or
amount, including issues relating to offsetting the judgment, whether such errors are
termed "clerical," "legal," or otherwise.

4)

Attorney fees and costs associated with litigating a postjudgment fee award are
awardable under section 12-120(5).

5)

Attorney fees and costs incurred postjudgment, but related to the determination of
the amount of prejudgment fees awardable, are not properly sought in a petition for
postjudgment fees. The MRIA entities will be permitted to amend their petition for
prejudgment costs and fees to include reasonable costs and fees incurred
postjudgment to determine the proper amount of prejudgment costs and fees.

6)

Postjudgment costs and fees sought in accordance with these instructions must, of
course, be "reasonable," by the standards applicable to fees sought under section 12120 generally.

III. THE MRIA ENTITIES' RULE 60 MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
The MRIA entities' May 24, 2012 motion for relief from judgment asks the Court to
correct the "oversight or omission" of not setting off the judgments between MRIA and St. AI' s

4

Were this not so, a manifest injustice could occur in this case, for St. Al's might
then be compelled to pay the MRIA entities its costs and fees arising from the Court's
mistake in failing to offset the judgments.
Further, a prevailing party could easily
"churn" for fees only tangentially related to any attempt to collect on the judgment.
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as required by Rule 54(b)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That Rule states, in relevant
part, that "[i]f any parties to an action are entitled to judgments against each other ... such
judgments shall be offset against each other and a single judgment for the difference between the
entitlements shall be entered in favor of the party entitled to the larger judgment." I.R.C.P.
54(b)(l). The Court has acknowledged on the record that it erred in not performing the required
offset in the judgment. However, the parties disagree as to whether the Court is permitted to use
Rule 60 to revisit the judgment in order to perform the offset, or whether the appropriate vehicle
is, in fact, Rule 59(e), in which case the offset cannot be performed, since the time for a motion
to amend the judgment under that rule has long expired. I.R.C.P. 59(e). The parties further
disagree as to whether the Court should offset the judgments before, or after, adding on
postjudgment interest and (prejudgment) attorney fees and costs, and as to the issue of appellate
bonds. The Court will address each issue in tum.

A.

Whether the Court can offset the judgments under Rule 60

As indicated above, the Court has conceded it erred in failing to offset the judgments
entered for St. Al's and MRIA. However, St. Al's argues either that there was no error, because
the Rule 54(b)(l) offset provision is inapplicable to the form of judgment used by the Court, or,
ifthere was an error, that it is not ofthe kind referred to by Rule 60(a) and (b). Moreover, St.
Al' s argues that MRIA is improperly utilizing the Rule 60 process to manipulate the amount of
any appeal bond in its favor.
Idaho courts have spoken on the subject of the proper basis for a Rule 60(a) motion. In
Silsby v. Kepner, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he basic distinction between 'clerical

mistakes' and mistakes that cannot be corrected pursuant to Rule 60(a) is that the former consist
of 'blunders in execution' whereas the latter consist of instances where the court changes its
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mind, either because it made a legal or factual mistake in making its original determination, or
because on second thought it has decided to exercise its discretion in a manner different from the
way it was exercised in the original determination." 140 Idaho 410, 412, 95 P.3d 28, 30 (2004)
(internal citations omitted).
The sole authority cited by St. Al's for the proposition that there was no error at all is
inapposite. In Walborn v. Walborn, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the magistrate's
decision to offset one party's child support obligation against another's award of retirement pay
was inappropriate, because one of the awards involved payments "into the future, which can vary
and change," rendering the Ru1e 54(b) offset provision inappropriate in light of the need for the
court's continued involvement. 120 Idaho 494, 499-500, 817 P.2d 160, 165-66 (1991). No such
issue is present here. The fact that in this case the single judgment issued by the Court is stated
in alternatives does not raise the spectre of continued involvement by the Court or prevent the
Court from performing an offset. Rather, it merely requires that each potential award to MRIA
be offset by the amount of the judgment for St. Al's, so that the single alternative executed upon
(whether by MRIA or St. Al's) will function as a "single judgment for the difference between the
entitlements" per the Ru1e. I.R.C.P. 54(b)(1).
As to St. Al's argument that any error respecting the failure to offset was not of the
"clerical" kind referred to in Rule 60(a), the Court disagrees, and holds that an inadvertent failure
to offset opposing judgments is a clerical error correctable under that provision. The authorities
cited by St. Al's do not support the proposition that if there is any legal uncertainty surrounding
issues collateral to the need to offset, such as determining the proper amount of any subsequent
appellate bond, then the error is not "clerical." Rather, per the Supreme Court guidance in Silsby,
the issue is whether the failure to offset was a simple "blunder in execution" rather than a
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purposeful decision by the Court. This Court has always maintained that the failure to offset the
judgments was inadvertent, rather than deliberate. Simply put, in the clear, simple, and
understandable (although painful) language used by the Supreme Court, this Court "blundered"
in preparing the judgment by failing to include the mandatory offset. Therefore, the Court
concludes that Rule 60(a) is an appropriate vehicle through which to revisit the judgment for
purposes of conforming it to Rule 54(b)(1). 5 Accordingly, the Court will amend the judgment so
as to offset each alternative award for MRIA by the amount of the award to St. Al's.

B.

Order of operations concerning the offset - prejudgment fees and costs

The parties differ as to whether the pending award of prejudgment attorney fees and costs
to the MRIA entities should be added to the judgment before or after the aforementioned offset is
performed. The entities argue that fees and costs are automatically part of the "judgment" by the
operation of Rule 54(d)(l )(F) and hence must be added to the judgment prior to offset, and cite to
two out-of-state cases in which such was the approved order of operations in the trial court.
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(F).
The Court finds that Idaho law does not require prejudgment attorney fees and costs to be
added to a party's judgment prior to the offset required by Rule 54(b)(l), and that the cases cited
by the MRIA entities are not analogous (and, in any case, do not bind this Court). Rule 54(b)(l)
does not mention attorney fees and costs, and rule 54(d)(l)(F), contrary to the entities' assertion,
speaks only to the addition of already-approved costs and fees to a party's judgment in the
context of execution. In fact, that provision suggests the result the Court reaches today -that is,

5
Even if Rule 60(a) were somehow inapplicable, the Court finds that Rule 60(b) would
also permit its amendment of the judgment to perform the required offset, as an
instance of "mistake [or] inadvertence" or for other "reason[s] justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment." I.R.C.P. 60(b). Therefore, the Court also grounds its
decision, in the alternative, on Rule 60(b).
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that a ''judgment" is a construct distinct from an award of fees and costs, although, depending
upon the facts and the context in which the term is used, a "judgment" might include fees and
costs already ordered by the Court. More importantly, because neither the Court's ability to enter
judgment in a case, nor its obligation to offset a judgment per Rule 54, are conditioned in any
way upon the Court first resolving the issue of prejudgment attorney fees and costs, this Court
will not find that trial courts are always required to add prejudgment attorney fees and costs to
the judgment prior to any offset. Indeed, Rule 54(d)(5) explicitly allows for the submission of
memoranda of costs within fourteen days after entry of judgment, and Rule 54(d)(6) grants
adverse parties an additional fourteen days to oppose the motion for costs. Read together, the
offset requirement ofRule 54(b)(l) and the attorney fees and costs provisions of Rule 54(d)
suggest that trial courts are not required (and will often be unable) to add costs and fees to a
prevailing party's judgment prior to offsetting against it.
Of course, it does not follow that, because no such requirement exists, a trial court should
not or cannot add costs and fees already awarded to a party's judgment prior to an offset. In fact,
as indicated above, no Idaho law appears to speak to that issue either way, perhaps because
(mathematically speaking) it should not make any difference whether a given sum is added to a
judgment prior to an offset, or afterward. Here, however, no costs or fees were awarded to either
party in the judgment as amended. Because the omission of any costs and fees award in the
judgment was deliberate, rather than inadvertent, the Court cannot revisit it in the context of the
present motions, and has no reason to revisit it in any event. Therefore, the Court will perform
the offsets to the alternative judgments without regard to prejudgment costs and fees.

C.

Order of operations concerning the offset- postjudgment interest

St. Al's argues that the Court should calculate the amount ofpostjudgment interest
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accrued on its $4.6Mjudgment against MRIA in the period between September 21,2007, and
January 18, 2012 (the date on which the offset should have been performed) and add the amount
so determined to the base amount of St. Al' s judgment prior to performing the offset. The
difference here is more than academic, as under every alternative judgment in which an offset is
required, the final amount of each judgment, and the identity of the party entitled to payment,
will vary depending upon the order of operations used by the Court.
It is widely acknowledged that the purpose of allowing postjudgment interest is to help

ensure that a successful plaintiffwill receive prompt payment ofhisjudgment, and to remove any
incentive of a defendant to profit by withholding amounts due. 4 7 C.J.S. § 61 (Nature of Interest
on Judgment). To this end, a defendant can stop the accrual ofpostjudgment interest by
tendering the amount of judgment. I. C. § 10-1115, Weaver v. Searle Bros., 131 Idaho 610, 613,
962 P.2d 381, 384 (1998).
The MRIA entities cite to the general purpose statement in the CJS and to an unpublished
Kentucky court of appeals case, Thomas & Betts Co. v. A & A Mechanical, 2008 WL 2696877
(Ky. App. 2008), in support of their argument that the Court should conduct the offset in issue
prior to calculating any postjudgment interest accruing on the $4.6M award to St. Al's. St. Al's,
in tum, cites to a number of out-of-state cases reaching the opposite result. St. Al's argues that
the critical difference between the cases cited by MRIA and itself is that the MRIA cases involve
situations in which the offsetting judgment arose simultaneously with the judgment on which
interest is being sought. In such situations, St. Al' s acknowledges that the offset should be
performed prior to the calculation of postjudgment interest, since no such interest would have
accrued at the point when the respective judgments arose. St. Al's argues that the present case is
not analogous because here, MRIA's judgment originated several years after that of St. Al's.
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The Court agrees with St. Al's that the dates upon which the parties' respective
entitlements arose is dispositive, and mandates the calculation of postjudgment interest before
the offset. St. Al's entitlement to its departing partner share, in the amount of$4.6 million
dollars, was determined by Judge McLaughlin on September 21, 2007, in his findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Critically, the portion of the resulting judgment awarding such amount to St.
Al's was never appealed, and, as this Court stated in its June 17, 2011 Order, the entitlement
"stands and remains the law of the case." Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May
18, 2011, at p. 4. Therefore, postjudgment interest began accruing in favor of St. Al's on

September 21, 2007, at the then-prevailing judgment rate of interest, 10 percent. Meanwhile, the
MRIA entities' entitlement was not adjudicated until January 18, 2012, the date upon which the
offset should have been done, and by which time St. Al' s had already accrued well over four
years of interest on its judgment.
The Court recognizes that both trials involved the same nucleus of operative facts, and
thus MRIA understandably feels that the procedure in this case has worked to its disadvantage on
this issue. However, the Court cannot rewrite the history of the case in order to hold, contrary to
the facts in the record, that the MRIA entities' entitlements arose simultaneously with that of St.
Al' s. Where postjudgment interest has actually accrued for a party prior to the adjudication of an
offsetting judgment, the Court holds that such interest should be added to the party's judgment
prior to the offset.

D.

The amount of the appellate bonds.

The authority of a trial court to stay execution of a money judgment pending appeal is
provided in Idaho Appellate Rule 13. The exercise of such authority is conditioned on the
"posting of a cash deposit or supersedeas bond ... in the amount of the judgment or order, plus
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36% of such amount." I.A.R. 13(b)(15). The "amount ofthejudgment" is determined by taking
the total judgment as it existed when the notice of appeal was filed. Student Loan Fund of Idaho,
Inc., v. Duerner, 131 Idaho 45, 55, 951 P.2d 1272, 1282 (1997). The notice of appeal in this case

was filed on May 30, 2012.
The Court has not been asked by either party to stay execution on any judgment pending
the appeal, but they have sought guidance on the issue of determining the proper amount of the
appeal bonds required to stay execution, given the form of the judgment. 6 As the Court has
indicated, it will issue an amended judgment concurrently with this order, in which each
alternative award in favor of MRIA will be offset by the judgment in favor of St. Al' s. The
parties are advised that to stay execution on all possible judgments pending appeal, the amount of
the respective appeal bonds, per Rule 13(b)(15), should be 136% of the sum of the largest
judgments simultaneously achievable by all of its adversaries as ofMay 30, 2012, as set forth in
the amended judgment filed with this order. I.A.R. 13(b)(15). In short, if seeking a stay of all
attempts to execute on the judgment, bond should be calculated with regard to the worst case
scenario for the party posting bond. Additionally, the parties are reminded that their respective
bonds should account for their adversary's accrued postjudgment interest up to May 30, 2012
(starting from September 21, 2007, for St. Al's, and from January 18, 2012, for the MRIA
entities). Attorney fees and costs had not been awarded to either party on May 30, 2012, and so
should not be counted in determining the amount of the judgment for purposes of determining

6

Notably, the issue of appeal bonds, and the parties' failure to settle the issue between themselves to their mutual advantage,
has plagued these parties before, drawing mention from Justice Jones in his special concurrence to the opinion of the Idaho
Supreme Court in the original appeal. St. Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 502-03, 224
P.3d 1068, 1091-92.
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..the required appeal bond. Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. at 55,951 P.2d at 1282.

CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby declares and orders as follows:

AS TO THE MRIA ENTITIES' MEMORANDUM OF PREJUDGMENT COSTS AND FEES:

1) The MRIA entities shall submit an amended memorandum of prejudgment costs and fees,
excising those entries indicated by the Court in Part I of this order, supra.
2) Further, the MRIA entities will excise or modify, as appropriate, all entries in their
memorandum of postjudgment costs and fees related to determining the amount of
prejudgment costs and fees, and transfer such excised costs and fees into their
memorandum of prejudgment costs and fees.
3) The Court will rule on the amended memorandum of prejudgment costs without a further
hearing. St. Al's will submit any objection to the amended petition within 14 days of
service of the amended petition, and will limit its objections, if any, to the entries referred
to in paragraph two, above.
AS TO THE MRIA ENTITIES' MEMORANDUM OF POSTJUDGMENT COSTS AND FEES:

4) The MRIA entities will excise or adjust, from its memorandum ofpostjudgment costs and
fees, those entries referred to in paragraph two, above, as therein directed.
5) Further, the MRIA entities will excise or adjust, as needed, any and all entries insofar as
they arose in whole or in part from the entities' Ru1e 60 motion.
6) The MRIA entities are entitled to their costs and fees incurred in defending against direct
attacks on the whole judgment, such as those arising from St. Al's motion to vacate and
set aside the judgment.
7) The MRIA entities are entitled to their costs and fees incurred in litigating the amount of
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postjudgment costs and fees incurred with respect to their efforts to defend against St.
Al's direct attacks on the whole judgment, per paragraph six.
8) The MRIA entities will excise any other entries not arising from an attempt to collect on
the judgment, in accordance with the guidance provided in this order.
AS TO THE MRIA ENTITIES' RULE 60 MOTION:
9) The Court will issue a third amended judgment, contemporaneously with this order,
offsetting the alternative awards to MRIA by the amount of the award to St. Al's.
10) As with the previous amended judgments, this amended judgment is effective as of
January 18, 2012, the date of the original judgment.
11) Costs and fees will not be awarded to any party in this judgment, and so will not be
calculated as part of the offsets.
12) Postjudgment interest accrued on St. Al' s judgment from September 21, 2007, through
January 18, 2012, the date the offset should have been performed. Therefore, the Court
will add $1,992,486.87 in postjudgment interest to St. Al's $4.6Mjudgment prior to
performing each offset. The amount of postjudgment interest was calculated by applying
the judgment rate of interest in effect in September of 2007 (1 0%) to the judgment, and
dividing the resulting amount by 365 days, to produce a daily rate of accrual of interest of
$1260.27, over 1,581 days.

¢
SO ORDERED AND DATED thisZ/:__ day of September, 2012.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA SEP

2 4 2012

QW/ll$iOPHEA D. fUCH. Qllk

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
)
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership,
)
)
)
Defendant.
)

~~Oiil'MAN

Case No. CV -OC-2004-08219

THmDAMENDEDJUDGMENT

_____________________________ )
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP ., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED, an Idaho )
limited partnership; MRI MOBILE LIMITED,)
an Idaho limited partnership,
)
)
)
Counter-claimants,
)
)
vs.
)
)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,)
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)
Counter-defendants.
)

___________________________ )
This action having come for jury trial, and the issues having been duly tried and a verdict

having been rendered by the jury on October 31, 2011, IT IS SO ORDERED THAT MRI
Associates, LLP (MRIA), MRI Limited (MRI Center), and MRI Mobile Limited (MRI Mobile)
(collectively MRI Entities) may separately execute on any one of the alternatives stated in
paragraphs 1-5 of this judgment, with the exception of disgorgement. The choice of any entity to
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elect to recover under a particular paragraph will not bind the others to the alternatives contained
within that same paragraph. Provided, however, that each entity may recover only once. Further,
although collectable only by MRIA, the remedy of disgorgement may only be elected by the
combined decision of the MRI entities, since by its nature disgorgement is an alternative to all
other measures of damages suffered by all the MRIA entities.
1.

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care (SADC)

and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (SARMC) (collectively "Saint
Alphonsus") breached the Partnership Agreement by breaching the non-competition
clause found therein, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
St. Alphonsus: $6,592,486.87 (OFFSETTING JUDGMENT)
$2,686,148.87 in favor of St. Alphonsus
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:
2.

$25,420,000

As to the claims ofthe MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
St. Alphonsus: $6,592,486.87 (OFFSETTING JUDGMENT)
$2,686,148.87 in favor of St. Alphonsus
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
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MRI Center:
3.

$25,420,000

As to the claims of MRI Center and MRI Mobile that Saint Alphonsus intentionally

interfered with their prospective contractual relations, the following damages are awarded
in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRI Center: $22,337,910
MRI Mobile: $19,329,701
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:
4.

$20,336,000

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary

duty owed to the MRI Entities, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
St. Alphonsus: $6,592,486.87 (OFFSETTING JUDGMENT)
$2,686,148.87 in favor of St. Alphonsus
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:

$25,420,000

Disgorgement:
MRIA:
$21,358,838
St. Alphonsus: $6,592,486.87 (OFFSETTING JUDGMENT)
$14,766,351.87 in favor ofMRIA

5.

As to the claim of the MRI entities that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil

conspiracy, the following damages are awarded:
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Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,125,070
St. Alphonsus: $6,592,486.87 (OFFSETTING JUDGMENT)
$3,467,416.87 in favor of St. Alphonsus
MRI Center: $20,662,566
MRI Mobile: $17,879,973
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center: $20,336,000
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amounts executed upon by the MRI entities will
bear interest at the judgment rate of 5.375% per annum until paid in full.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Saint Alphonsus is awarded $4,600,000 against MRI
Associates, bearing interest at the judgment rate of 10% per annum, calculated from September
21, 2007, until paid in full. In accordance with Rule 54(b)(1 ), the Court has offset the awards
(including accrued postjudgment interest where applicable) of MRIA and St. Alphonsus in each
alternative in which such an offset applies.

s+

DATED this~l day of September, 2012.
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Liability Partnership,
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Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
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STATE OF IDAHO )
ss.
)
County of Ada
I, WadeL. Woodard, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am a partner with the firm of Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC, attorneys

of record for the above-captioned Counter-Claimants (collectively, "MRIA"). I submit this
affidavit in support ofMRIA's Memorandum for Post-Judgment Attorney Fees and Costs. I
have personal knowledge of the facts relevant to Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC's legal
representation ofMRIA and of the attorney fees and other costs that have been incurred post-trial
in this case. This amended affidavit is being submitted in conformance with this Court's Order
of September 21, 2012
ATTORNEY FEES

2.

From January 18, 2012, through today, MRIA incurred more than $53,830.00 in

attorney fees.
3.

The attorney fees for this period were calculated by multiplying the time for each

attorney and paralegal who worked on the case by his or her billable hourly rate.
4.

Attached as Exhibit "A" is a true, complete, and detailed itemization of the fees

for which MRIA seeks a post-judgment attorney fee award. Exhibit "A" shows: (a) the date on
which the legal services were performed; (b) the identity of the timekeeper who performed the
services; (c) a description of the services performed; and (d) the amount of time spent on the
services performed.
5.

The following people are the timekeepers who have provided legal services on

behalf ofMRIA for the firm of Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC since January 18, 2012.
These persons are identified on Exhibit "A" as listed below:
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A.

Thomas A. Banducci, Partner
Timekeeper reference: TAB
Hours billed for this Application: 4.5
Rate: $425.00
Total billed for this Application: $1,912.50

B.

Wade L. Woodard, Partner
Timekeeper reference: WL W
Hours billed for this Application: 64.7
Rate: $340.00
Total billed for this Application: $21,998.00

C.

Brent S. Bastian, Partner
Timekeeper reference: BSB
Hours billed for this Application: 97.9
Rate: $265.00
Total billed for this Application: $25,943.50

D.

Dara Labrum Parker, Associate
Timekeeper reference: DLP
Hours billed for this Application: 15.4
Rate: $240.00
Total billed for this Application: $3,696.00

E.

Kathy A. Savell, Paralegal
Timekeeper reference: KAS
Hours billed for this Application: 2
Rate: $140.00
Total billed for this Application: $280.00

COSTS
6.

MRIA incurred the following costs in this matter since January 18, 2012:
A.

Westlaw charges:

$ 944.86

B.

Transcript of Hearing 3/23/12

$ 363.00

TOTAL

$1,307.86
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7.

All of these costs were incurred by Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC on

behalf ofMRIA directly.
I believe the fees and costs incurred were reasonable and commensurate with charges in
like cases. In my opinion, the sum of $53,830.00 constitutes necessary post-judgment fees and
costs incurred in defending and prosecuting post-judgment matters.

WadeL. Woodard
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2nd day of October 2012 .
............
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

...•, ....f'flEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of October 2012, a true and correct copy ofthe
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

0 U.S. Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 9¥emight Delivery
if'Facsimile: 336-9177

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

IJ U.S. Mail

0 Hand Deli very
0 ()(emight Delivery
~acsimile: 202-626-1700

Brent Bastian
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

Total Our Description

Research concerning apportionment of damages for breach of contract when a claim for conspiracy exists; conference with Dara Labrum
4.1 concerning same.
Review of findings of fact and conclusions of law; review of judgment; conference with co-counsel concerning same; research concerning
2.6 deadlines.
1.7 Research concerning requirements and deadlines for motion for new trial; conference with co-counsel concerning same.

1/18/2012

BSB

1/19/2012
1/25/2012

BSB
BSB

1/31/2012
2/1/2012
2/2/2012
2/3/2012
2/6/2012

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

2/7/2012

BSB

2/8/2012

BSB

2/9/2012
2/10/2012

BSB
BSB

2/13/2012

BSB

6.7 Continue draft of opposition to motion for new trial; factual and legal research concerning same; draft of e-mail to co-counsel concerning same.

2/14/2012

BSB

2.7 Revise opposition to motion for new trial; research concerning same; conference with co-counsel concerning same; coordination of filing same.

2/21/2012
2/22/2012

BSB
BSB

3/1/2012
3/5/2012
3/7/2012

BSB
BSB
BSB

0.2 Coordination with staff concerning setting several motions for hearing; conference with co-counsel concerning strategy for several motions.
0.2 Coordination of setting multiple motions for hearings; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
Revise opposition to motion to move hearing; research concerning same; draft of e-mails concerning same; execution of same; coordination of
4 filing same.
0.4 Conferences with Wade Woodard concerning various motions and strategy for same.
0.3 Review of order from court; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same; revise calendar concerning same.

2 Review of motion for new trial; begin draft of response to same; conference with Dara Parker concerning same; research concerning same.
7.3 Continue draft of response to motion for new trial; research concerning same; conferences with co-counsel concerning same.
6.3 Continue draft of response to motion for new trial; research of file and law concerning same.
3.6 Continue draft of response to motion for new trial; research concerning same.
3.5 Continue draft of opposition to motion for new trial; research concerning same; conference with Dara Parker concerning same.
Revise opposition to motion for new trial; legal research concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same; research of file
4.7 concerning past orders on "Pope" issue.
Revise draft of opposition to motion for new trial; research concerning same; conference with co-counsel concerning same; research of record
for
evidence in support of positions.
1.6
Revise opposition to motion for new trial; research concerning same; conference with co-counsel concerning same; search of record for
6.3 citations for same.

-

7.4 Revise draft of opposition to motion for new trial; research concerning same; continue locating citations for same.
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3/14/2012
3/20/2012

BSB
BSB

1.7
3.3

3/22/2012
3/23/2012
3/26/2012
3/27/2012
4/13/2012

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

4.9
1.9
0.6
0.5
0.8

Extract decision cites from briefs to give to staff to gather for hearing; review of reply in support of motion JNOV; draft notes responding to
same; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
Prepare Wade Woodard for hearing; review cases cited in several briefs; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
Research concerning several questions raised by Wade Woodard in preparation for hearing; conferences with Wade Woodard concerning same;
review of file concerning same.
Research several issues for hearing; conferences with Wade Woodard concerning same.
Conference with Wade Woodard concerning debrief of hearing; research concerning topics raised in same.
Conference with Wade Woodard concerning damages issues; review of file in connection with same.
Review of transcript of Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict hearing; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
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Staff

4/27/2012 BSB
7/19/2012
7/20/2012
7/23/2012
7/24/2012
7/25/2012
7/26/2012
7/27/2012
7/30/2012

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

7/31/2012 BSB
8/2/2012 BSB
8/6/2012 BSB

Total Our Description

Review of court order concerning motion for new trial; factual and legal research concerning assertions same; draft of e-mails to co-counsel
1.4 concerning same; conference with co-counsel concerning same.
Research concerning obtaining attorneys fees after judgment is entered; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same; review of time
2.8 spent since judgment.
0.5 Continue research concerning motion new costs.
1.2 Begin preparation for motion for post-judgment attorneys fees.
0.2 Review of time in preparation for motion for post-judgment fees; research concerning same.
1.3 Continue work on new fees research and memorandum.
2.9 Draft of motion for new attorneys' fees; research concerning same.
4.8 Continue draft of motion for post-judgment fees; research concerning same.
0.3 Revise motion for post-judgment fees; research concerning same.
Revise motion for post-judgment attorneys fees; research concerning same; coordination with staff concerning motions to file; revise affidavit
2.8 of counsel in support of motion; coordination with staff concerning same.
0.2 Review of motions to be filed; edits to same.
0.2 Revise motion concerning postjudgment attorneys fees.

-

97.9
1/19/2012
1/31/2012
2/1/2012
2/6/2012
2/8/2012
2/9/2012
2/14/2012
4/27/2012
4/30/2012

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

0.4
1.2
2.3
4.6
2.5
3.2
0.6
0.2
0.4

Review order and judgment from court.
Review SARMC motion for new triai/JNOV and discuss the same with BrentS. Bastian; begin drafting response.
Draft opposition to Judgment Notwithstanding of Verdict.
Draft opposition to motion for new trial.
Draft opposition to JNOV.
Draft opposition to JNOV.
Proofread brief in opposition to motion for new trial.
Review court's decision on motion for new trial.
Re-read court's decision on Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and jury's verdict.

15.4
3/23/2012 KAS

2 Prepare for and attend hearing.
2

2/13/2012 TAB
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2/14/2012 TAB
2/23/2012 TAB
3/21/2012 TAB

2 Review materials associated with motion for new trial and judgment notwithstanding of verdict.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding response briefing on judgment notwithstanding of verdict and new trial motion; edit and
1.8 comment.
0.4 Conferences with Wade L. Woodard regarding post trial motions.
0.3 Telephone conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding hearing.
4.5
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WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

1.1
0.4
3.2
5.8
7.8
8.3

WLW
WLW
2/13/2012 WLW
2/14/2012 WLW
3/5/2012 WLW
3/6/2012 WLW
3/7/2012 WLW
3/16/2012 WLW
3/20/2012 WLW
3/21/2012 WLW
3/22/2012 WLW
3/23/2012 WLW
4/27/2012 WLW
5/16/2012 WLW
7/30/2012 WLW

6.2
8.2
7.2
6.2

1/19/2012
1/20/2012
2/1/2012
2/6/2012
2/7/2012
2/8/2012
2/9/2012
2/10/2012

I

Review findings of fact; work on issues regarding same; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; review judgment; work on issues
regarding same; telephone conferences with clients.
Telephone conferences with clients.
Work on response to motion for new trial.
Work on opposition to motion for new trial.
Work on response to motion for new trial.
Review transcripts.
Work on response to motion for new trial.
Work on response to Judgment Notwithstanding of Verdict motion.
Work on response to motion for new trial.
Finalize response to motion for new trial.

1.5 Revise opposition to motion to move hearing.
0.2 Prepare for hearing.
0.1 Review order from court; work on issues regarding hearing.
0.1 Work on issues regarding hearing.
0.2 Prepare for hearing.
0.1 Prepare for hearing.
3 Prepare for hearing.
3.1 Prepare for and attend hearings.
0.9 Review order regarding motion for new trial; work on issues and strategies regarding same; correspondence with clients regarding same.
0.8 Review transcripts.
0.3 Review and revise motion for post-trial fees.

-

64.7

e
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com
BrentS. Bastian {ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
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v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
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OF COSTS AND FEES

Defendant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
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MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants,

v.
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INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants.
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STATEOFIDAHO )
ss.
County of Ada
)

•

•

I, Thomas A. Banducci, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am a partner with the firm of Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC, attorneys

of record for the above-captioned Counter-Claimants (collectively, "MRIA"). I submit this
amended affidavit in support ofMRIA's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. I have personal
knowledge of the facts relevant to Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC's legal representation
of MRIA and of the attorney fees and other costs that have been incurred in this case. This
second amended affidavit is meant to comply with this Court's Order of September 21, 2012.
I.

ATTORNEY FEES

2.

From January 2008 through present, MRIA incurred more than $1,798,115.50 in

attorney fees to defend against Saint Alphonsus's claims and prosecute its own claims in this
lawsuit. Therefore, the amount for which MRIA seeks an award herein is $1,798,115.50 plus the
previous award of attorney fees made by Judge McLaughlin for the time spent prior to January
2008 and affirmed by this Court.
3.

The Attorney fees from January 2008 were calculated by multiplying the time for

each attorney and paralegal who worked on the case by his or her billable hourly rate.
4.

Attached as Exhibits "A" and "B" are true, complete, and detailed itemization of

the fees for which MRIA seeks an attorney fee award. Exhibits "A" and "B" show: (a) the date
on which the legal services were performed; (b) the identity of the timekeeper who performed
the services; (c) a description of the services performed; and (d) the amount of time spent on the
services performed.
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•

The following people are the timekeepers who have provided legal services on

behalf of MRIA for the firm of Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC since January 2008.
These persons are identified on Exhibits "A" and "B" as listed below:
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC

A.

Thomas A. Banducci, Partner
Timekeeper reference: TAB
Hours billed for this Application: 230.30
2008 Rate: $325.00
Total billed for this Application: $74,847.50
Timekeeper reference: TAB
Hours billed for this Application: 57.90
2009 Rate: $350.00
Total billed for this Application: $20,265.00
Timekeeper reference: TAB
Hours billed for this Application: 93.9
2010 Rate: $375.00
Total billed for this Application: $35,212.50
Timekeeper reference: TAB
Hours billed for this Application: 1031
2011 Rate: $425.00
Total billed for this Application: $438,175.00
Timekeeper reference: TAB
Hours billed for this Application: 4.3
2012 Rate: $425.00
Total billed for this Application: $1,827.50

B.

WadeL. Woodard, Partner
Timekeeper reference: WL W
Hours billed for this Application: 386.80
2008 Rate: $290.00
Total billed for this Application: $112,172.00
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Timekeeper reference: WL W
Hours billed for this Application: 29.80
2009 Rate: $300.00
Total billed for this Application: $8,940.00
Timekeeper reference: WL W
Hours billed for this Application: 238.20
2010 Rate: $320.00
Total billed for this Application: $76,224.00
Timekeeper reference: WL W
Hours billed for this Application: 951.7
2011 Rate: $340.00
Total billed for this Application: $323,578.00
Timekeeper reference: WL W
Hours billed for this Application: 44.4
2012 Rate: $340.00
Total billed for this Application: $15,096.00

C.

Benjamin A. Schwartzman, Partner
Timekeeper reference: BAS
Hours billed for this Application: 4.1
2008 Rate: $290.00
Total billed for this Application: $1189.00
Timekeeper reference: BAS
Hours billed for this Application: 1.4
2009 Rate: $300.00
Total billed for this Application: $420.00
Timekeeper reference: BAS
Hours billed for this Application: 5.7
2011 Rate: $340.00
Total billed for this Application: $1938.00

D.

Dari Huskey, Former Associate
Timekeeper reference: DMH
Hours billed for this Application: 30.6
2008 Rate: $220.00
Total billed for this Application: $6,732.00
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E.

Brian Knox, Former Associate

•

Timekeeper reference: BDK
Hours billed for this Application: 77.1
2008 Rate: $220.00
Total billed for this Application: $16,962.00
F.

Brent S. Bastian, Associate
Timekeeper reference: BSB
Hours billed for this Application: .1
2009 Rate: $240.00
Total billed for this Application: $24.00
Timekeeper reference: BSB
Hours billed for this Application: 66.70
2010 Rate: $250.00
Total billed for this Application: $16,675.00
Timekeeper reference: BSB
Hours billed for this Application: 897.40
2011 Rate: $265.00
Total billed for this Application: $237,811.00
Timekeeper reference: BSB
Hours billed for this Application: 93.9
2012 Rate: $265.00
Total billed for this Application: $24,883.50

G.

Dara Labrum Parker, Associate
Timekeeper reference: DLP/DL
Hours billed for this Application: 106.00
2008 Rate: $200.00
Total billed for this Application: $21,200.00
Timekeeper reference: DLP/DL
Hours billed for this Application: 31
2009 Rate: $220.00
Total billed for this Application: $6,820.00
Timekeeper reference: DLP/DL
Hours billed for this Application: 95.70
2010 Rate: $230.00
Total billed for this Application: $22,011.00

SECOND AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF THE MRIA
ENTITIES' OF COSTS AND FEES - 5

005053

•

•

Timekeeper reference: DLP/DL
Hours billed for this Application: 607.80
2011 Rate: $240.00
Total billed for this Application: $145,872.00
Timekeeper reference: DLP/DL
Hours billed for this Application: 30.3
2012 Rate: $240.00
Total billed for this Application: $7,272.00

H.

Kathy A. Savell, Paralegal
Timekeeper reference: KAS
Hours billed for this Application: 151.70
2008 Rate: $125.00
Total billed for this Application: $18,962.50
Timekeeper reference: KAS
Hours billed for this Application: 16.2
2009 Rate: $130.00
Total billed for this Application: $2,106.00
Timekeeper reference: KAS
Hours billed for this Application: 45.1 0
2010 Rate: $135.00
Total billed for this Application: $6,088.50
Timekeeper reference: KAS
Hours billed for this Application: 706.60
2011 Rate: $140.00
Total billed for this Application: $98,924.00
Timekeeper reference: KAS
Hours billed for this Application: 18.2
2012 Rate: $140.00
Total billed for this Application: $2,548.00

I.

Lauren Blaesing, Former Paralegal
Timekeeper reference: LFB
Hours billed for this Application: 151.90
2008 Rate: $125.00
Total billed for this Application: $18,987.50
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J.

Shannon E. Smith, Former Paralegal

Timekeeper reference: SES
Hours billed for this Application: 2.1 0
2008 Rate: $125.00
Total billed for this Application: $262.50
Timekeeper reference: SES
Hours billed for this Application: 94.50
2011 Rate: $140.00
Total billed for this Application: $13,230.00
K.

Luke Howarth, Law Clerk

Timekeeper reference: LH
Hours billed for this Application: 149
2011 Rate: $140.00
Total billed for this Application: $20,860.00
Discretionary Costs
6.

Attached as Exhibit "C" is a revised true and complete statement of discretionary

costs incurred by MRIA in this matter since January 2008.
7.

All of these costs were incurred by Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC on

behalf ofMRIA directly.
8.

The majority of these costs were expert witness fees. All the experts filed their

own reports in this litigation, and those reports provide the evidence for the skill, diligence,
expertise, and knowledge of each expert. Pursuant to this Court's Order, we have removed the
fees associated with Grant Thornton and the fees of Robert Bell in excess of the statutory costs
as a matter of right. Total fees in excess of the amounts allowed as a matter of right is
$140,708.33.
9.

Total costs for Automated (Westlaw) Legal Research were incurred in the amount

of$7,828.54. Automated research was essential in this matter, given the paucity of law in Idaho
on many of the issues litigated.
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•

There were approximately 1200 exhibits identified in this matter, in addition to

expanded discovery. Copy and scanning charges were incurred in the amount of $22,179.95 in
excess of the $500.00 for costs as a matter of right.
11.

The total amount of discretionary costs incurred since January 2008 is

$174,472.93. The previous amount submitted was $551,425.10, which was an inaccurate total of
the discretionary costs caused by a clerical error.
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

II.

COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, PURSUANT TO RULE 54(d)(l)(C) I.R.C.P.
1. Court Filing Fees
2. Costs of Exhibits/Models
(See, Exhibit B attached hereto)
3. Expert Fees

$0.00
$500.00

$6,000.00

4. Fees for the service provided by a public officer or other person

$235.80

5. Witness Fees/Mileage - Trial Testimony

$573.25
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6. Witness Travel Expenses

$1,758.96

$603.63

7. Charges for Reporting and Transcribing of a Deposition

8. Transcripts

$5,669.17

$32,939.84
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TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT:
III.

$47,677.02

STATEMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES:
Defendant requests that the Court award the following as reasonable attorney fees

necessarily incurred in the pursuit ofthis action, pursuant to Rule 54(e)(1), Idaho Rules ofCivil

Procedure, and Idaho Code§ 12-120 and, alternatively, and Idaho Code §§12-121. A copy of
the itemizations of said attorney fees is attached hereto.
TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES, PURSUANT TO RULE 54(e)(1)
IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
IV.

$1,798,115.50

PRIOR AWARD
On February 26, 2008, the Court awarded MRIA attorney fees and costs from the prior

proceeding in the amount of $2,172,677.63 and affirmed by this Court.
PRIOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS PER
FEBRUARY 26, 2008 JUDGMENT
TOTAL DISCRETIONARY COSTS SINCE JANUARY 2008,
PURSUANT TO RULES 54(d)(1) and 54(e)(l), IDAHO
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT:
TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED SINCE JANUARY
2008, PURSUANT TO RULE 54(e)(1),
IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:

$2,172,677.63

$174,472.93
$47,677.02

$1,798,115.50

GRAND TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT,
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DISCRETIONARY COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES:

•

$4.192.943.08

I believe the fees and costs incurred were reasonable and commensurate with charges in
like cases. In my opinion, the sum of$4,192,943.08 constitutes necessary fees and costs
incurred in defending and prosecuting this case through two jury trials and an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Idaho. In addition, I believe that the costs and fees reflect the adjustments
required by this Court in its Orders dated May 15,2012 and September 21, 2012.

~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2nd day of October 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

•

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of October 2012, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D <premight Delivery
iiJ"Pacsimile: 336-9177

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

IJ U.S. Mail
IJ Hand Delivery
IJ O~might Delivery

o..Yacsimile: 202-626-1700

~b~
Brent Bastian
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

Description

4/24/2008

BAS

0.8

10/9/2008

BAS

0.4

10/24/2008 BAS
10/30/2008 BAS
11/13/2008 BAS

1.1
0.8
0.3

11/24/2008 BAS

0.7
4.1

Telephonic conference with Jim Prochaska regarding possible MRI partner purchase of competing imaging center; telephonic
conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; factual research regarding same.
Formulate strategy and arguments for appellate brief, including arguments regarding court's ruling on summary judgment of
wrongful dissociation.
Review and edit appellate response brief sections.
Draft, edit and revise motion for extension of time, and affidavit in support thereof.
Conference with Wade Woodard regarding distinguishing cited authority of SARMC regarding proof of damages from
violation of non-compete; legal research regarding same.
Review and edit appellate brief.

BAS
BAS

0.7
0.7
1.4

Strategic conference regarding appellate argument.
Conference regarding strategy for oral argument on appeal.

11/9/2011 BAS
11/10/2011 BAS
11/11/2011 BAS

2.8
1.8
1.1
5.7

Analyze appellate and settlement strategy.
Strategic analysis of settlement and appeal approaches.
Analyze settlement and appellate strategy.

1/4/2008
2/20/2008

BDK
BDK

2.1
1.5

2/21/2008

BDK

7

2/22/2008
2/25/2008

BDK
BDK

5.5
6.7

2/26/2008

BDK

3

2/27/2008

BDK

6.6

2/28/2008

BDK

3.9

Research appellate rules to determine additional deadlines
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding evidentiary rules affecting appeal issue no. 4 in SARMC's
notice of appeal; research regarding use of settlement offers in evidence at trial or otherwise
Research General rules regarding admission of settlement offers; research continuing objections and nature of the objection
entered by opposing counsel to the admission of the letter sent to St. Al's; review trial transcripts from various members of
MRI regarding the trial exhibit (alleged settlement offer)
Research ability to use settlement offers and agreement documents at trial; draft research memorandum
Research case law and secondary sources regarding settlement agreement/offer introduction into evidence at trial; draft
research memorandum on the issues
Review pleadings regarding partners' fiduciary duty in Idaho to the partnership in general- common law fiduciary duty versus
statutory duty
Finish review of all pleadings dealing with the fiduciary duty owed between partners; research Idaho and other jurisdictions'
law on fiduciary duty, both statutory and common law duties
Research common law fiduciary duty in Idaho and other jurisdictions to bolster argument before ld. Supreme Court regarding
District Court's decision to not rule as a matter of law that SADC/SARMC had no fiduciary duty to MRIM and MRCIC

8/17/2009
8/18/2009

--

•
- - - - -
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

3/3/2008
3/4/2008

·-·

BDK
BDK

3.2
4.2

3/16/2008

BDK

1.9

3/20/2008

BDK

7.2

3/24/2008

BDK

3.9

research case law regarding common law recognition of fiduciary duty in absence of statutory imposition of duty
research case law regarding common law recognition of fiduciary duty in absence of statutory imposition of duty; begin draft
of memorandum including language to be used in answer to notice of appeal
Research secondary sources regarding fiduciary duty matter for upcoming response brief to the court; draft portion of
response brief.
Research under what theory we pled the common law fiduciary duty of SARMC to MRIM & MRICI; Research notice pleading
requirements in Idaho and whether court was correct in its initial ruling by holding that SARMC had a common law fiduciary
duty to MRIM & MRICI; research standard for reversal in such a case; review pleadings for each instance in which MRIA pled
elements that support the argument that SARMC had a common law fiduciary duty to MRIM & MRICI
Review research materials on notice pleading requirements; analysis of facts and allegations pled in initial and amended

3/25/2008

BDK

2.1

3/25/2008

BDK

2.8

3/31/2008

BDK

7.5

4/14/2008
4/15/2008

BDK
BDK

0.8
7.2

pleading to determine whether notice pleading requirements were met regarding common law fiduciary duty of SARMC to
MRIM & MRICI; additional research in other jurisdictions
Research additional case law regarding notice pleading in Idaho; review of pleadings to support court's initial decision
regarding common law fiduciary duty.

Telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding additional strategy for research and analysis of judge's decision;
review judge's decision regarding fiduciary duty; research whether judge was correct in holding that there is no statutory
fiduciary duty between SARMC and MRIM and MRICI.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding notice pleading research; additional research regarding notice pleading in Idaho
and other jurisdictions; review pleadings to determine whether SARMC effectively objected to sufficiency of pleadings prior
to the matter going to the jury; draft research memorandum regarding notice pleading.
Draft memorandum in response to fiduciary matters brought up in SARMC notice of appeal.
Research issues regarding fiduciary duties and whether judge was correct in ruling that SARMC did not owe a statutory duty
to MRIM and MRICI; draft memorandum.

77.1
11/20/2009 BSB

0.1
0.1

1/13/2010
8/2/2010
8/3/2010
8/5/2010

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

0.2
0.6
0.2
4.1

8/6/2010

BSB

Conference with Tom Banducci concerning status of case.

·--·
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Analysis of decision allowing costs from Supreme Court.
Research concerning dissociation based on a definite term.
- - rReview previous summary judgment motions concerning definite terms.
Analysis of several pleadings, motions, and decisions concerning breach of operating agreement for a definite term;
conferences with ·rhomas A. Banducci concerning same; factual and legal research concerning same.
0.2
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci concerning strategy for summary judgment response.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

8/9/2010

BSB

5.5

8/10/2010
8/11/2010

BSB
BSB

2.9
3.9

8/12/2010

BSB

3.2

8/13/2010
8/16/2010
8/18/2010
8/19/2010

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

0.3
0.2
4.3
8.5

8/20/2010
8/23/2010
8/24/2010
8/25/2010
8/26/2010

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

2.6
9.9
5.9
0.4
1.6

Analysis of motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning arguments made in same; draft of outline of
opposition; begin draft of opposition; conference with Wade L. Woodard concerning same.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; research of issues arising in same.
Continue draft of opposition; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with Wade L. Woodard concerning
same.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with
Tom A. Banducci concerning same.
--Conferences with Wade L. Woodard concerning motion for summary judgment; continue draft ofsame.
Analysis and edits to motion for summary judgment.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same; conferences with
Wade L. Woodard and Tom A. Banducci concerning same.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; continue factual and legal research concerning same.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same.
Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; legal research concerning same.
Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same, especially as to
amendments to the partnership agreements; highlight evidentiary issues for support staff to correctly cite.
Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; double check citations to evidence; factual and legal research
concerning issues in same.
Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning estoppel and ratification;
coordination of filing opposition; revise tabs for binder.
Analysis of response to opposition to motion for summary judgment.
--Review of reply to opposition to motion for summary judgment.
Analysis of reply to opposition to motion for summary judgment; begin draft of outline of response to same; factual and legal
research concerning same.
Draft of outline response to reply to opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning
same; conference with Thomas A. Banducci concerning same.
Conference with Tom Banducci concerning integration clauses.
Legal research concerning applicability of RUPA; conference with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning same; draft
of e-mail to Wade Woodard concerning same.

--

---------

8/27/2010

BSB

1.7

8/30/2010

BSB

3.4

9/13/2010
9/14/2010
9/15/2010

BSB
BSB
BSB

0.2
0.2
1.6

9/16/2010

BSB

2.4

BSB
BSB

0.2
2.5

--

9/30/2010
10/1/2010
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4/12/2011

66.7
BSB

6.6

Review motion for summary judgment on damages; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with Tom
Banducci concerning same.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

4/13/2011

BSB

9

4/18/2011

BSB

10.7

4/19/2011

BSB

12.3

4/20/2011
4/21/2011

BSB
BSB

7
7.2

4/22/2011

BSB

5.8

4/25/2011
5/12/2011

BSB
BSB

0.5
1.6

•

5/17/2011

BSB

0.5

BSB
BSB

1
3.8

6/13/2011

BSB

13.1

Continue research concerning motion for summary judgment; conference with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci
concerning same; draft of outline for same.
Draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment on "pro rata" issue; factual and legal research concerning same;
conference with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning same.
Continue draft of opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with
Wade Woodard concerning same.
Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same.
------------Continue revisions to opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same; conference
with Dara Labrum concerning same.
--------Revise opposition to motion for summary judgment; factual and legal research concerning same; conferences with Tom
Banducci concerning same.
---------Revise opposition; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same; coordination of filing same.
In-depth review of reply to opposition to motion for summary judgment; research concerning same; draft of short outline
concerning same; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same.
Conference with Tom Banducci to discuss major flaws in arguments in response to opposition to motion for summary
judgment.
---Attend hearing concerning second affirmative defense.
Research concerning independent rights to documents during discovery; analysis of motion to compel; analysis of motion to
shorten time; draft of outline of response to same.
Draft of opposition to motion to shorten time; research concerning same; revise affidavit in support of same; coordination of
filing same; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same; analysis of court order concerning same; draft of opposition
to motion to reopen discovery; research concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.

6/14/2011

BSB

8.8

6/15/2011

BSB

4.8

Continue draft of opposition to motion to compel; continue research concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard
concerning same.
--------·-·-····---Revise draft of opposition to motion to compel; coordination of filing same; research concerning same; conference with
Wade Woodard concerning same; analysis of opposition to opposition to motion for orders concerning Sandra Bruce.

•

6/16/2011
6/21/2011

BSB
BSB

0.3
0.9

6/22/2011

BSB

4.3

6/30/2011
7/1/2011

BSB
BSB

1.7
2.1

-

5/18/2011
6/10/2011
~-~-
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Analysis of orders from court; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
Review of reply in support of motion to compel; research concerning same; draft of short outline concerning
counterarguments to same; review of court order on motion for summary judgment.
Review of argument in reply in support of motion to compel; research concerning cases in same; draft of outline for
responses to same; conference with Tom Banducci concerning hearing; travel to hearing; participate in hearing; travel from
hearing; research concerning cases cited at hearing.
Analysis of brief regarding implications of certain case; research concerning same; begin draft of response to same.
Revise draft of response to brief concerning Summit County case.
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Staff

HRS

Description

7/5/2011
7/6/2011
7/7/2011
7/18/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

1
0.5
0.1
4.2

7/19/2011

BSB

7

Revise draft of response to Summit County argument; coordination of filing same.
------Conference with co-attorneys concerning witnesses at trial; coordination concerning same.
Review of hearing transcript to ensure representations in motion were aptly stated.
Review of deposition transcript and trial transcript of Robert Bell in preparation for trial; conference with Wade Woodard and
Tom Banducci concerning same.
-Review deposition and trial transcripts of Mark Dalley; conferences with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning same;
analysis of major claims remaining in matter; analysis oftestimony of Mark Dalley in regards to same; prepare for trial.

7/20/2011
7/21/2011

BSB
BSB

0.5
3.2

7/22/2011
7/26/2011

BSB
BSB

0.5
7

7/27/2011

BSB

4.1

7/28/2011

BSB

4

BSB
BSB

5.4
3.3

8/3/2011

BSB

7.3

8/4/2011

BSB

8/5/2011
8/15/2011

BSB
BSB

0.4
3.2

8/16/2011

BSB

4.9

---

- -

---~-

--

Review trial transcript of Chris Anton; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
Continue preparation for trial; analysis of trial transcript and deposition transcript of Chris Anton; conference with Wade
Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning same.
----Conference with Tom Banducci concerning trial issues and Dalley.
Conference with co-counsel in preparation for trial; draft of motion to have deemed admitted all documents admitted in
previous trial; factual and legal research concerning same.
Draft of motion in limine concerning term "non-profit"; factual and legal research concerning same; revise draft of motion to
have deemed admitted exhibits admitted in previous trial; conference with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning
trial strategy; meeting with Mark Dalley in preparation for trial.
--Draft of response to motion to exclude hearsay within hearsay; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with
Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning same; revise other motions in limine to be filed; coordination of filing same.
--~-

•

~-

------

7/30/2011
8/2/2011
--

--- --

- --

1.1
---~--

005066

Attend mock trial; conference with co-counsel concerning issues arising in same.
---Analysis of various motion responses filed; prepare for direct examination of Bob Bell; draft of outline for testimony
concerning same; analysis of prior deposition and trial testimony of Bob BelL
Continue draft of outline of direct examination of Bob Bell; analysis of file concerning same; analysis of entire expert report
of Bob Bell; research concerning same; prepare for direct examination of Mark Dalley; research concerning same; analysis of
file concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci concerning same; analysis of responses and
replies to motions in limine.
--Analysis of several pieces of correspondence from Tom Banducci concerning trial strategy; analysis of deposition transcripts
concerning same.
Telephonic conference with Wade Woodard concerning hearing strategy.
Review of several pleadings and arguments from previous week; prepare for direct examination of Mark Dalley; conference
with Tom Banducci and Wade Woodard concerning same.
Conference with co-counsel in preparation for trial; review of trial transcript of Grant Chamberlain; research concerning
same; draft of outline memorandum concerning same; conference with _I om Banducci concerning sam~
-~--
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

8/17/2011

BSB

4.5

8/18/2011

BSB

7.8

Review of testimony of Grant Chamberlain for designation; review of court orders concerning exhibits used in deposition of
Grant Chamberlain; begin draft of new designations; review of research concerning conspiracy; conferences with Dara Parker
and Tom Banducci concerning same; research concerning same.
Continue designation of Grant Chamberlain's testimony; factual and legal research concerning same; review of deposition of
same; continue draft of direct examination of Chris Anton; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same.

8/19/2011

BSB

6.6

8/22/2011

BSB

4.5

8/23/2011

BSB

7.1

8/24/2011

BSB

4.5

8/25/2011
8/26/2011
8/29/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB

1.3
4.3
9

8/30/2011

BSB

7.1

BSB

7.5

9/1/2011

BSB

1.2

9/2/2011

BSB

7.1

9/3/2011

BSB

7.7

9/4/2011

BSB

3.3

-~

Continue preparation for Anton direct; factual research concerning same; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same;
revise direct of Mark Dalley; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same; conference with client and co-counsel
concerning demonstratives for computer systems.
Revise outlines for direct examinations of Chris Anton, Mark Dalley, and Bob Bell; coordination with staff concerning exhibits
to use in same; factual research of the record concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.

l

Revise direct examinations of Chris Anton, Bob Bell, and Mark Dalley; meeting with co-counsel concerning trial preparation;
research concerning direct examinations; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
Revise outline of questions for direct examinations of Anton, Bell, and Dalley; conference with Chris Anton to prepare him for
direct examination; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same; review of order from court; analysis of materials
associated with Bob Bell's deposition.
Review of Bob Bell's deposition file.
Research concerning referring doctor testimony; research concerning IMI's desire to partner with MRIA.
Prepare for trial; research of IMI minutes concerning sundry issues related to Dr. Giles and IMI's potential partnership with
MRIA; research of Dr. Prochaska and Chris Anton's testimony concerning board of partners; revise outline of Bob Bell's direct.
--~-~-

•

.

--

-··

8/31/2011
- ·
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Prepare for trial; legal research concerning CV being hearsay; draft of business records questions for Bob Bell; conferences
with Wade Woodard and Tom Banducci concerning sundry trial issues; review and comment on several pocket briefs drafted
by Dara Parker; research concerning Harder documents.
Review juror questionnaires; recommend strikes as to same; conference with Wade Woodard as to same; analysis of prior
voir dire questions; create list of same; revise direct of Bob Bell; research concerning same; prepare for trial.
Review transcript of Bob Bell; revise direct examination of same; review new CV of Bob Bell; conference with Kathy Savell
concerning same; analysis of fiduciary duty jury instruction.
Review most recent pleadings and motions in limine; research concerning same; research of testimony of Sandra Bruce;
conference with Tom Banducci concerning same; prepare for "hanging chads" hearing; attend same; conference with Tom
Banducci and Wade Woodard concerning same; review of pleadings to ascertain our preliminary instruction on fiduciary
duty; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same.
Prepare for trial; review of deposition transcripts in preparation for same; conference with Tom Banducci concerning same.
Prepare for trial; review of deposition transcripts concerning same.
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Staff

HRS

Description

9/5/2011
9/6/2011
9/7/2011
9/8/2011
9/9/2011
9/10/2011
9/11/2011
9/12/2011
9/13/2011
9/14/2011
9/15/2011
9/16/2011
9/17/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

9.8
11.5
10.3
11.1
12
10.3
3.5
11.2
12.1
10.5
9.2
11
4.8
9.6
9.8
10.2
5.4

Prepare for trial.
Attend trial; conference with clients.
Attend trial; prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial; research for same; analysis of file for same.
Attend trial; prepare for trial; research concerning same.
-Prepare for trial; research for issues in same; telephone calls related to same.
Prepare for trial; review of record in relation to same.
Prepare for trial; attend trial.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; research concerning issues arising at same.
Attend trial; prepare for trial; meet with clients in preparation for trial.
Prepare for trial; prepare witnesses for trial; revise questions for witnesses at trial; research concerning same.
Attend trial; prepare witness; prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial; review of prior transcripts.
-Prepare for trial; attend trial; revise questions for direct of Chris Anton.
Prepare for trial; attend trial.
Attend trial; prepare for trial; conference with co-counsel concerning trial strategy.
Attend trial meeting; conference with co-counsel concerning same; drafts of e-mail to Mark Dailey concerning testimony;
telephonic conference with Chris Anton; revise outlines for direct examination of Bob Bell, Mark Dalley, and Chris Anton;
research concerning mistrial for use of the term "prior trial"; conference with Dara Parker concerning same.

9/23/2011
9/24/2011
9/26/2011
9/27/2011
9/28/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

11.1
4.9
12.6
11.1
9.6

Attend trial; prepare for trial; research of file and law concerning issues arising in same.
Prepare outline for cross examinations of referring doctors; research concerning same; analysis of Hahn depo.
----Prepare for trial; attend trial; prepare argument; prepare exams.
--Attend trial; prepare for trial; factual and legal research concerning same; prep~re exams for same.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; help prepare Dr. Giles for testimony; telephone conference with Mark Dalley; prepare exams.

9/29/2011
9/30/2011
10/1/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB

9.4
12
10.1

10/2/2011

BSB

8.8

10/3/2011

BSB

12.9

Prepare for trial; help prepare witnesses for trial; revise exams; prepare for oral argument; search for testimony.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; revise opposition to quash; research concerning same.
Prepare for trial; draft of motion to strike answer; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with Tom Banducci
concerning same; research of transcriptsfor Giles' direct; prepare examinations.
Prepare for trial; draft of motion to strike answer; research concerning same; revise opposition to motion to quash; prepare
for argument; conference with Tom Banducci concerning several research topics; prepare for examination; telephone
conference with Chris Anton.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; prepare for argument; deliver argument; revise opposition to motion to quash; revise motion to
exclude exhibits 802-803; draft of jury instruction; coordinate communication with witnesses; communicate with witnesses;
meeting concerning strategy and order of witnesses.
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

Description

10/4/2011

BSB

11.1

10/5/2011

BSB

13

Prepare for trial; attend trial; prepare witness for examination; prepare argument; prepare documents to be distributed at
argument.
---Prepare for trial; attend trial; prepare examinations; review of transcript of Joe Messmer in preparation for Mark Dalley; draft
of outline for same; research of file concerning Mark Dalley's examination; revise examination of Chris Anton; telephone
conference with accountant Drury; telephone conference with Karen Marler; draft of correspondence to Bob Bell.

10/6/2011
10/7/2011
10/8/2011
10/9/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

9.7
11.2
6.7
4.5

10/10/2011 BSB

8.6

10/11/2011 BSB
10/13/2011 BSB

11.8
10.8

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

10.5
11.3
6.7
5.4
15
14.1
15.2

10/13/2011
10/14/2011
10/15/2011
10/16/2011
10/17/2011
10/18/2011
r-10/19/2011

10/20/2011 BSB

005069

10/21/2011
10/22/2011
10/23/2011
10/24/2011
10/25/2011
10/26/2011

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

17
11.2
7.4
8.4
15.4
13.1
15.2

Prepare for trial; prepare witness for testimony; revise outlines of question; research concerning same.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; prepare witnesses for trial; conference with court after trial.
Prepare for trial; help prepare witnesses for trial; draft of motion in limine; research concerning same.
Prepare for trial; draft of motion in limine; research concerning same; draft of e-mail to Dara Parker concerning another
motion in limine; research concerning same; review of transcript for certain admissions; conference with Tom Banducci
concerning same.
Prepare for trial; prepare examinations; research concerning same; revise motion in limine to exclude questions concerning
the reasonableness of factual assumptions; research concerning same; conference with Dara Parker concerning other
motions in limine; revise same; prepare all for filing.
Prepare motions for court; prepare for trial; attend trial.
Prepare for trial; prepare for argument; deliver argument; attend trial; brainstorm closing; research concerning same; draft of
memorandum concerning same.
Prepare for trial; continue preparation for closing argument.
Prepare for trial; attend trial.
Prepare for trial; research concerning tortious interference.
Prepare for trial; help prepare witnesses for trial; research concerning same.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; review of several transcripts.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; analysis of directed verdict motions; begin research and response to same.
Draft of oppositions to motions for directed verdict; research concerning same; conferences with co-counsel concerning
same.
Draft of oppositions to motions for directed verdict; research concerning same; conferences concerning same; prepare for
trial.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; revise oppositions; coordination of filing same.
Prepare for trial; prepare for examination; review jury instructions.
Prepare for trial; prepare examination; review jury instructions; research concerning same.
Prepare for trial; attend trial; revise jury instructions; prepare for argument on directed verdict motions.
Prepare for hearings; prepare for trial; attend hearings; attend trial; review jury instructions; edits to same.
Prepare for jury instruction conference; attend jury instruction conference; research concerning same; assist in preparation
for closing argument; review of transcripts for same.
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Date

HRS

Description

10/27/2011 BSB

9.4

10/28/2011 BSB
10/29/2011 BSB
10/30/2011 BSB

12.4
3.1
3.6

Help prepare T. Banducci for closing argument; review of jury instruction changes; review of testimony from trial; conference
with co-counsel concerning closing.
Preparefor trial; attend trial; conference with co-counsel concerning strategy for exhibits.
Trade e-mails concerning exhibit issues; research concerning same.
·----Trade several e-mails with opposing counsel concerning demonstratives; research of file concerning issues arising as to same;
review of "Eagle adjusted" demonstratives; conference with Tom Banducci concerning timelines.
Prepare for post-trial hearing; attend post-trial hearing; review of Saint Alphonsus' demonstrative exhibits; conference with
court and opposing counsel concerning same; review of jury verdict form; research concerning attorneys' fees; attend
announcement of jury decision; conference with co-counsel concerning strategy in lieu of same.
Trade several e-mails concerning form of judgment; review draft of same.
Review of proposed order; edits to same; research concerning possibility of pre-judgment interest; conference with Wade
Woodard concerning response to disgorgement advisory verdict; research concerning_ same.
-----Review e-mails with co-counsel concerning judgment.
--···
Review of proposed judgment; research concerning disgorgement; review of decision concerning pre-judgment interest;
draft of e-mail to co-counsel concerning same.
Revise proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; conference with Dara Parker, Tom Banducci, and Wade Woodard
concerning same; review of transcript for relevant evidence for same; research concerning attorneys' fees; trade several emails with Kathy Savell concerning same.
--Conference with co-counsel concerning draft of proposed judgment; research concerning same; edits to same; review of
Saint Alphonsus's proposed judgment; research concerning same.
Draft motion for attorneys fees and costs; factual and legal research for same; respond to Saint Alphonsus's request for
response.
· Continue draft of motion for attorneys' fees; factual and legal research concerning same; research of deadlines for filing
same; draft of e-mail memorandum to co-counsel concerning same; review of court order.
Revise motion for attorneys' fees and costs; revise affidavit in support; research concerning same.
Revise fees motion; review response to objection to judgment; discuss comments to same with Dara Parker.
Analysis of response to proposed judgment; research concerning same; begin draft of reply to same.
Continue draft of reply to response to proposed judgment; research concerning same.
Continue draft of reply to response to proposed judgment; factual and legal research concerning same.
Continue draft of reply to response to proposed judgment; research concerning same; conference with co-counsel
concerning same.
Revise reply in support of proposed judgment; research concerning same; coordination with staff concerning filing and
serving same.
---Revise motion for attorneys' fees and costs; revise affidavit of Tom Banducci in support of same.
. ------------Revise motion for attorneys' fees; research same; conference with co-counsel concerning same.

Staff

----

----

- -

10/31/2011 BSB

17.3

'---

11/1/2011
11/2/2011

BSB
BSB

1.3
3.2

-----

11/3/2011
11/4/2011

BSB
BSB

0.5
1.5

11/7/2011

BSB

3.3

11/8/2011

BSB

2.2

11/9/2011

BSB

7.6

11/10/2011 BSB

7.5

11/11/2011
11/14/2011
11/15/2011
11/16/2011
11/17/2011
11/18/2011

3.3
0.7
1.1
8.7
11.5
5.7

~-

-~-

--

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
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11/21/2011 BSB

2.2

11/29/2011 BSB
11/30/2011 BSB

2.8
2
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

12/7/2011

BSB

3

12/8/2011

BSB

9.6

12/9/2011

BSB

9.9

12/12/2011 BSB

3.8

Revise attorneys' fees motion; research concerning same; analysis of file concerning same; conference with co-counsel
concerning same; conference with co-counsel concerning fees; prepare for hearing on "form of the judgment"; review of
reply from SARMC concerning same.
----Prepare for "form of judgment" hearing; research concerning same; draft of outline concerning same; conferences with cocounsel concerning same.
Continue preparation for hearing; revise outline for same; conference with co-counsel concerning same; travel to
courthouse; present argument; travel to office; debrief co-counsel on hearing; research concerning attorneys' fees.
-Revise motion for attorneys' fees; research concerning same; revise affidavit of Tom Banducci in support of motion for
attorneys' fees; research concerning same; draft of affidavit in support of motion for attorneys' fees; research concerning
same.
--Revise affidavit in support of attorney fees; revise affidavit of Tom Banducci; revise motion for attorneys' fees and costs;
research concerning same.
Research concerning appealable issues; conference with co-counsel concerning same; calculate deadlines for same.
Continue research concerning grounds for appeal; draft of outline of same; review of orders from court regarding same_.__

--

r-----

12/13/2011 BSB

3.8

12/14/2011 BSB
12/15/2011 BSB

2.1
3
897.4

--

•

------

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

0.3
0.3
1
0.4
2
5.7
3.4

9/18/2008

DL

7.2

9/19/2008
9/22/2008
9/23/2008
9/24/2008
9/25/2008
9/26/2008
9/29/2008
9/30/2008
10/1/2008

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

6.3
6.5
6.7
7.8
6.6
5.2
6.9
7.1
5

9/4/2008
9/5/2008
9/8/2008
9/9/2008
9/11/2008
9/12/2008
c----9/17/2008
r----

005071

Work on mel!'orandum regard Prochaska deposition testimony for use in appellate brief.
----Write background section from Prochaska deposition for appellate brief.
Review transcript of Jim Prochaska; draft background section of appellate brief.
Review Prochaska transcript for fact section of appellate brief.
Review deposition testimony for factual section of appellate brief.
Prepare fact section for appellate brief.
Meeting with W. Woodard about issues that need to be addressed in appellate brief; preparation of fact section for appellate
brief.
Work on fact section of appellate brief; work on legal analysis of claimed evidentiary error in permitting Hammond
memorandum for appellate brief.
Work on countering Shattuck Hammond memorandum argument for appellate brief.
Research regarding Shattuck Hammon memorandum and special verdict form for appellate brief.
Research and drafting of appellate brief on issues of attorney/client privilege and alleged deficiency in verdict form.
Research and drafting of appellate brief on issue of sustaining damages award to MRI Center and Mobile.
Research and drafting of various issues for appellate brief; meeting with T. Banducci regarding the same.
Work on various issues for appellate brief; meetings with T. Banducci regarding the same.
·-·-·Work on research and drafting of appellate brief regarding damages award.
Research and drafting of appellate brief.
Research and drafting of appellate brief regarding wrongful dissociation; meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L.
Woodard regarding the same.
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Date

Staff HRS

10/2/2008 DL
10/3/2008 DL
10/6/2008 DL
- - - - - - - r---10/7/2008 DL

Description
Drafting and research of appellate brief, with emphasis on damages and wrongful dissociation.
-----~-----~
Draft section for appellate brief on wrongful dissociation.
-···--------Review research regarding wrongfully dissociation.
---Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding appellate brief; research regarding effect of remittitur for
appellate brief.
Research for appellate brief regarding motions in limine and preservation of o~jections.
___
Research, editing, and drafting on various portions of appellate brief.
Research and drafting of "scorched earth" portion of appellate brief.
--Phone meeting with C. Lewis and W. Woodard regarding appellate brief; editing of brief.
-Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade Woodard regarding appellate brief.
-----------·--Telephone call with Craig Lewis regarding edits for appellate brief.
-------Review rules for appellate brief format.
Read SARMC's reply brief.

5.6
6.7
0.2
2.4

--

10/15/2008
10/29/2008
10/30/2008
11/5/2008
11/19/2008
11/20/2008
11/22/2008
12/22/2008

--

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

- - - -

]

1.6
4.5
2.4
1.3
0.3
1.5
0.5
0.6
106

2/9/2009
2/11/2009
2/13/2009
2/17/2009
4/10/2009
8/17/2009
8/18/2009

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

0.1
0.2
5.2

8/19/2009

DL

2.9

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

0.8
0.6
1.5
4.1
0.9
0.5

12/11/2009 DL

0.1
31

--~---

1.1
0.4
5.1
7.5

1--
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10/21/2009
10/22/2009
10/26/2009
10/27/2009
10/28/2009
12/10/2009

-

Conversation with Thomas A. Banducci regarding response to opposing party's motion to strike portions of brief.
Discuss status of case and response to motion to strike.
Draft opposition to motion to strike.
Edit and review response to motion to strike.
-··Draft response letter to Idaho Supreme Court regarding hearing dates.
Review briefs; research discrete queries by Thomas A. Banducci as he prepares for oral argument.
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci, Wade L. Woodard and Kathy A. Savell to assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for oral
argument; legal and factual research on a variety of discrete issues to assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for oral
argument.
--Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for oral argument by researching discrete legal and factual issues; attend oral
argument.
Read decision on appeal from Idaho Supreme Court.
---Research discrete questions from Thomas A. Banducci regarding procedure for remand, etc.
Research various projects in preparation for post-appeal actions.
----------------1-----Research regarding joining limited partnerships to the lawsuit in retrial; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci.
Discuss post-appeal strategy with vyade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci.
Draft letter to Moffatt Thomas in response to letter sent to Thomas A. Banducci .

--

·--~

Review and send letter to Moffatt Thomas on Thomas A. Banducci behalf.
- -
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

1/13/2010
1/25/2010
1/28/2010
2/5/2010
3/1/2010
3/5/2010
3/8/2010

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

0.3
0.1
0.9
0.1
0.1
2.6
4.1

Review and analyze Supreme Court's decision on rehearing; email Wade L. Woodard regarding the same.
Review status of upcoming projects and deadlines.
--Research implications on request to consent to release the appeal bond.
Review stipulation to vacate supercedes bond.
Review status of the case with the partners.
Research joiner of limited partnerships.
Research regarding likelihood of success and objections to a motion to add the limited partnerships as real parties in interest.

3/9/2010
3/19/2010

DL
DL

1.1
5.3

3/22/2010
4/19/2010
4/22/2010
4/26/2010
5/7/2010
r----5/10/2010

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

0
1
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.2

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

0.1
1.4
2.7
3.3
1.4

Research on joining/substituting limited partnerships.
·---Reformat PDF version of Second Amended Counterclaim so that it can be amended; draft red line version of Third Amended
Counterclaim; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci.
Draft and proofread third amended counterclaim.
Legal and factual research on SARMC's motion to "strike as irrelevant" portions of the complaint.
Review status of case, upcoming projects, and deadlines.
Discuss status of case and upcoming projects with Thomas A. Banducci.
···-Discuss status of case and upcoming projects with WadeL. Woodard.
Review email from Wade L. Woodard to experts regarding updating expert reports; re-read Pope case and Supreme Court
decision regarding damages.
-Staff meeting to discuss strategy and deadlines.
Legal and factual research on SARMC's motion to strike.
-·Research regarding SARMC's Motion to Strike Immaterial Matters.
Research regarding Rule 12(f) motion to strike.
Research regarding SARMC's Motion to Strike Immaterial matters and memorandum to Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L.
Woodard regarding the same.
Discuss opposition to motion to strike with Thomas A. Banducci and begin drafting the same.
Begin drafting opposition to motion to strike.
Draft opposition to motion to strike.
--Draft opposition to motion to strike.
Discuss motion to strike with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci; amend opposition to the same.
Research for and editing of opposition to motion to strike.
Edit opposition to motion to strike immaterial matters; discuss the same with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci.

r---

5/13/2010
6/1/2010
1--6/11/2010
6/15/2010
6/18/2010
1--

0.7
6/21/2010 DL
6/23/2010 DL
0.6
6.5
6/24/2010 DL
3.6
6/25/2010 DL
r - - - - r---2.6
6/29/2010 DL
1.2
6/30/2010 DL
DL
1.4
7/1/2010

_:__

--

005073

7/2/2010
7/6/2010

DL
DL

1.8
0.9

•

- -

Edit opposition to motion to strike.
·---Read St. Al's reply regarding motion to strike; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard; research to
rebut arguments in the same.
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HRS

Description

7/7/2010

DL

2

DL
DL
DL

1
2.3
0.1

7/20/2010
7/21/2010
7/22/2010
7/23/2010
7/26/2010

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

2.2
0.3
1.3
0.3
0.8

7/27/2010
7/29/2010
7/30/2010
8/2/2010
8/4/2010

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

0.4
0.2
0.2
0.2
2

8/5/2010
8/7/2010
8/10/2010
8/13/2010
---'-8/14/2010
r---8/17/2010
8/18/2010
8/19/2010
8/20/2010
8/23/2010
8/24/2010

DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL
DL

0.6
0.7
0.1
4.7
2.7
0.9
5.3
4.1
4.2
0.7
3.3

Legal research regarding common law contract claim in response to St. Al's reply on its motion to strike; assist Thomas A.
Banducci in e_r:~paring for hearing on the same.
Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for hearing on motion to strike immaterial matters.
Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for hearing on motion to strike immaterial matters and attend the same.
Review deadlines and plan upcoming projects, including motion to amend complaint and deadline for upcoming motions
ordered by Court.
Edit complaint; discuss case projects and strategy with Thomas A. Banducci and yvade L. Woodard.
Review "Pope" issues and discuss the same with WadeL. Woodard.
Draft motion to amend scheduling order; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard.
Edit motion to amend order.
Amend counterclaim and draft letter regarding the same; amend motion for page limit; discuss striking any Pope motion for
summary judgment with Wade L. Woodard and Brent S. Bastian
Amend counterclaim and letter regarding the same.
Review letter from Ayers regarding 4th Amendment Counterclaim, and discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci.
Draft letter to opposing counsel clarifying position on 4th Amended Counterclaim.
Review upcoming projects and deadlines; read SARMC's response to motion to remove page limitation.
Prepare for and attend hearing on motion for longer page limit; report to Thomas A. Banducci and staff regarding the same
and the procedure for filing appendix on upcoming motions.
Begin drafting motion to amend.
Email motions and briefing filed by SARMC.
Discuss response to motion for summary judgment on "definite term" with BrentS. Bastian.
Draft brief in opposition to Motion for Judgment on claims of the Limited Partnerships.
Draft Memorandum in opposition to Motion for Judgment on claims of Limited Partnerships.

8/25/2010

DL

0.4

Continue drafting brief in opposing to motion for judgment on the cla~ms of the limited partnershi~-----"~--"Draft memorandum in opposition to motion for judgment on claims of the limited partnerships.
Continue drafting brief in opposition to motion to dismiss the claim~ of the limited partnerships.
Continue drafting opposition to motion for judgment on claims of the limited partnerships.
Edit brief in opposition to judgment on the claims of the limited partnerships.
Discuss opposition to motion regarding limited partnerships with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard; edit brief
regarding the same.
"Edit brief in opposition to motion on claims of limited partnerships.

8/26/2010

DL

1.7

Continue working on brief in opposition to motion for judgment on the claims of the limited partnerships.

-~

7/8/2010
7/9/2010
7/19/2010
I

" - -

~·"

•

·-----·"-------~

"~-"

~

-~---··

~
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

8/27/2010

DL

1

Edit brief in opposition to motion for judgment on claims of the limited partnerships.

8/30/2010

DL

3.5

DL
DL
DL
DLP

0.2
2.7
0.2
0.2

Edit and finalize memorandum in opposition to motion for judgment on the claims of the limited partnerships; proofread
memorandum regarding conspiracy claim.
Review status of case and recent emails regarding the same.
Research regarding SARMC's reply arguments on relation back of the claims of the Limited Partnerships.
Discuss hearing with WadeL. Woodard.
Review emails sent while away and case status.

11/17/2010 DLP
12/15/2010 DLP
12/15/2010 DLP

lo.3
0.1
0.1

Review court's order.
Review status of case.
Review status of case and emails.

----

9/22/2010
9/29/2010
10/1/2010
10/18/2010

l

•

95.7

---

005075

DLP
1/4/2011
:-DLP
1/5/2011
DLP
1/6/2011
DLP
1/7/2011
1/14/2011 DLP
1/17/2011 DLP
1/18/2011 DLP
1/19/2011 DLP
-1/20/2011 DLP
1/21/2011 DLP
_,
1/27/2011 DLP
---"-----'--1/28/2011 DLP
f---'--1/31/2011 DLP

0.4
0.9
2.7
5.4
0.1
0.6
7.3
5.8
5.5
3.1
4.9
6.4
7.8

'------

2/1/2011

DLP

6

2/2/2011

DLP

2

Letter to Court about response to SARMC's motion to reopen discovery.
Begin drafting opposition to motion to reopen discovery.
Research for opposition to motion to reopen discovery.
Legal and factual research for, and drafting of, opposition to motion to reopen expert discovery.
-·-----Review motions filed by St. Alphonsus in the last week.
Draft response to motion to reopen discovery.
·-Draft opposition to motions to reopen; meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding the same.
Research for and drafting of opposition to motion to reopen damages and set trial schedule.
Draft opposition to motion to reopen discovery.
Draft opposition to motion to reopen discovery.
Draft opposition to motion to reopen discovery.
Legal research for and drafting of opposition to motion t()_reopen disc~very and set briefing schedule.
-··Draft and edit opposition to motion to reopen discovery and opposition to motion to set scheduling order; discuss the same
with WadeL. Woodard.
Draft and edit opposition to motion to reopen discovery and set scheduling order; discuss the same with Thomas A.
Banducci.
-Draft, finalize, and file opposition to motion to reopen discovery and set scheduling order.
-
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

2/8/2011

DLP

4.7

2/9/2011

DLP

3

Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for hearing tomorrow on reopening expert discovery and motions practice; meeting
with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding the same.
Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for hearing, attend hearing, draft follow up letter to the Court; draft report for clients.

2/11/2011
2/14/2011
2/22/2011
2/24/2011
3/7/2011
3/8/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

0.1
0.2
0.1
2.5
0.2
1.2

3/10/2011

DLP

1

3/11/2011
3/14/2011

DLP
DLP

1.7
3.2

3/15/2011
3/16/2011

DLP
DLP

5.2
8.2

3/17/2011
3/18/2011

DLP
DLP

5.4
5

3/21/2011
3/23/2011
3/24/2011
3/25/2011
3/28/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

5.6
0.5
3.2
1.8
2.4

3/29/2011
3/30/2011
3/31/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

3.2
0.3
4.9

4/1/2011

DLP

1.2

..

--

Check status of deadlines and projects.
Discuss case and upcoming projects with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci.
..
Discuss drafting motion to clarify with Wade L. Woodard.
Draft motion to clarify; review transcript of hearing.
Review email correspondence and filings related to case filed during previous week.
Review order from Court on deadlines; review motions for summary judgment filed by SARMC; review discovery filed by
SARMC; instruct staff regarding the same; discuss case with Wade L. Woodard.
Review SARMC motion for summary judgment; email correspondence with Karen Marler concerning production of
documents.
..
Begin working on response to SARMC's motion for summary judgment.
Discuss discovery and motion to compel with Wade L. Woodard; phone call and email correspondence with Karen Marler
regarding discovery production; work on response to motion for summary judgment.
..
·--Draft and research opposition to motion for summary judgment.
·Draft opposition to motion for summary judgment regarding breach of contract theory of wrongful dissociation; begin
drafting motion to compel discovery regarding IMI Eagle.
Edit and proofread opposition to motion for summary judgment; draft motion to compel.
Draft and edit motion to compel and opposition to motion for summary judgment; discuss the same with Wade L. Woodard.

•

---

005076

Edit opposition to motion for summary judgment; draft motion for clarification.
Review discovery; discussions with Thomas A. Banducci about future discovery.
Draft discovery.
Review motion to compel; draft letter to opposing counsel regarding the same; review discovery requests.
Finalize opposition to motion forsummary judgment; begin drafting motion in limine regarding reference to "lawful"
withdrawal.
Draft motion in limine regarding "lawful dissociation".
Email correspondence with experts; phone message from MRIA regarding discovery answers.
···---···Draft various motions in limine; telephone conference and email with expert Drew Voth; telephone conference with MRIA
representative regarding production of documents responsive to SARMC's discovery requests.

Draft 4th requests for production; letter to opposing counsel following up on discovery.
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Staff

HRS

4/4/2011

DLP

4.8

DLP
4/5/2011
DLP
4/6/2011
r-------DLP
4/7/2011

0.5
1.4
1.1

4/11/2011

DLP

2.1

4/12/2011
4/13/2011
4/14/2011
4/18/2011
4/19/2011
4/20/2011
4/21/2011
4/22/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

3.8
2.9
0.5
3.2
3.4
3
4.1
4.2

4/25/2011

DLP

2.3

4/26/2011
4/27/2011

DLP
DLP

2.3
5.2

4/28/2011
4/29/2011
5/2/2011
5/3/2011
5/5/2011
5/6/2011
5/9/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

1.2
3
0.5
4.2
0.1
6.6
1.5

DLP
DLP

1.6
0.6

005077

Date-

5/10/2011
5/11/2011

Description

Email correspondence with Karen Marler regarding discovery documents; draft and edit motions to file; discuss the same
with WadeL. Woodard.
--------·-·--------Edit motions in limine.
Edit discovery answers; edit briefs and supporting material for motions in limine.
-·
Review our discovery answers and production; review letter from opposing counsel regarding discovery; email to Drew Voth
regarding the same.
Review documents recently produced; email correspondence with Drew Voth regarding the same; draft letter to Gjording
regarding the same.
Draft response to SARMC's motions in limines; discuss the same with Wade L. Woodard and Brent 5. Bastian.
-------------Draft responses to motions filed by SARMC.
·------····Email correspondence with experts.
Draft opposition to various motions filed by SARMC.
------Draft and edit opposition to various motions filed by SARMC.
Draft and edit opposition to various motions filed by SARMC.
-Draft and edit responses to motions filed by SARMC.
Assist Thomas A. Banducci in preparing for, and attend, hearing on motion for summary judgment regarding contractual
wrongful withdrawal; draft and edit brief on various motions filed by SARMC.
Finalize briefs in opposition to SARMC motions and discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard; begin
drafting reply in support of MRIA's motions.
Begin drafting replies to MRIA's motions in limine.
---Draft replies to MRIA's motion; review discovery forwarded by SAMRC; draft letter to SARMC attorney regarding missing
documents.
--Edit replies to MRIA's motions in limine; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard.
Edit replies to MRIA's motions; review and edit Budge report; meeting with Mr. Budge.
Finalize replies in support of MRIA's motions; review supplemental report of Charles Wilhoite.
Draft motion to strike Gjording affidavit; review SARMC discovery non-answers for possible meet and confer letter.
Review SARMC's motion to disqualify judge.
Draft opposition to motion to disqualify court.
I Edit opposition to motion to strike; discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci; telephone conference with Jim Prochaska and
Thomas A. Banducci; review court's order on summary judgment on contract theory of wrongful dissociation and discuss the
same with Thomas A. Banducci.
Edit opposition to motion to recuse Judge Wetherell.
Finalize and file opposition to motion to recuse.
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Date

Staff HRS

Description

5/12/2011

DLP

Draft reply in support of motion to strike; meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard on discovery and motions

5.5

to bring.

--------·-·---------

-----· .

5/13/2011
5/17/2011
5/18/2011
5/19/2011
5/25/2011
5/26/2011
_,
6/1/2011
6/2/2011
6/20/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

0.9
2
1.6
0.3
1.6
0.4
1.1
0.2
2.6

Edit and finalize reply in support of m~!ion to strike Gjording affidavit. ----Draft letter to Gjording regarding his previous letters; draft motion for pres':rvation deposition of Sandra Bruce.
Letter to Gjording regarding witnesses; draft motion regarding Sandra Bruce as a witness.
Edit motion regarding Sandra Bruce andCindy Schamp.
Draft discovery responses; email correspondence with Charles Wilhoight and Karen Marler regarding the same.
Edit discovery answers.
--~----

Strategy meeting with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard; draft reply in support of motion regarding Schamp and
Bruce.
Finish reply regarding witnesses Bruce and Schamp; begin reading SARMC expert report; read Gjording closing to search for
admissions made on the record.

6/21/2011

DLP

2.1

6/23/2011
6/24/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

Work on jury instructions; read Gjording's closing to look for things to use against SARMC.
3
0.6- - Research regarding using opposing counsel's statements at previous trial against SARMC in new trial.
1.7
Draft jury instructions.

DLP

0.2

Discuss briefing with BrentS. Bastian.

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

1.5

Draft proposed jury instructions.

0.4
4.7
5.8
2.8
2.7

Telephone conference with Bruce Budge and Drew Voth regarding rebuttal repo~t.
Draft jury instructions; trial team meeting.
Draft jury instructions.
Draft jury instructions.

---·

6/27/2011

=--=-

Review documents forwarded by Karen Marler; edit discovery responses.
Edit discovery responses.

I

•

-1

-

6/28/2011
7/1/2011
---'------'---7/5/2011
7/6/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

7/19/2011
7/20/2011
7/21/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

005078

7/7/2011
7/8/2011
7/12/2011
7/13/2011
7/14/2011
7/18/2011

DLP

I
··---

Trial team meeting; draft jury instructions; edit mock jury form.
Draft jury instructions and discuss the same with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard.
Finalize proposed jury instructions.
·--·

3.8
Review SA~I\:'IC jury instructions and begin drafting objections to the same.
1 - - Trial team preparation meeting; discuss case with BrentS. Bastian.
2.6
Research questions posed by Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard with respect to causes of action and hearsay.
Research questions and issues raised by Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci; draft supplemental discovery answer;
5
edit mock jury instructions.
2
Create "cast of characters" list; review mock jury instructions.
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Date

Staff

I

HRS

I

Description

7/25/2011

DLP
DLP
-~

DLP ~
DLP

----

DLP

Dlq6:4

-

3.5
-

DLP

6

DLP

8/8/2011

Finalize opposition to jury instructions; draft replies to our motions in limines.

-~J--~--1-~------i-D_r~ft
motion for exhibit list order; draft memorandum on SARMC affirmative defenses; review mock jury instructions.
8/9/2011
I DLP 12
8/10/2011 DLP 10.8
Work on pocket briefs; ~eview jury questionnaires.
____ _
f---"-:Review emails sent by Thomas A. Banducci and upcoming projects.
8/11/2011 DLP 0.2
~--~-~---+---DLP
6.1
Attend mock trial.
8/13/2011
DLP 5.6
8/15/2011
--+---+----+_R_es_e
__a_rc_h_t_elling jury about effect of apportionment; research excluding statements made by dead MRIA agent.
Attend trial preparation meeting; pocket briefs on fiduciary duties and effect of apportionment; research regarding
8/16/2011 I DLP 16.3
------------------

-

8/17/2011
8/18/2011
8/19/2011

L8/22/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

3.2
6.1
7.9

---1

~-~---~----------

Draft pocket memorandum on fiduciary duty.
Pocket brief on fiduciary duty; research whether dissociation breaches fiduciary duty; begin drafting motion for directed
verdict on affirmative defenses.

----------

---

I, conspiracy_ claim.
Research regarding consequences of conspiracy claim; pocket brief on affirmative defenses.
-Draft motion to strike; research and drafting of reply to SARMC opposition to several of our witnesses.
Research memorandum on objections to witnesses; work with Holly Wallace regarding IT timeline; begin review of
documents critical for IT timeline testimony.
Review IT documents; meet with Holly Wallace.
Review documents for IT timeline.
Review Prochaska deposition.

---!----~--+--~

8/23/2011
8/26/2011
8/29/2011
8/30/2011
8/31/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

--

DLP
DLP

18.3
7.6
2.6
7.4

1--

15.9
7.6

005079

9/1/2011 fclP 16.6

L
- 9/2/2011

DLP

14.1

L-9/6/2011

IDLP

1,8.5

---1

-

Research antikickback; draft motion in limine regarding Harder/Giles misconduct.
Trial preparation meeting; finalize Harder/Giles brief; draft second Harder brief; review jury list.
-----~

Finalize supplemental Harder memorandum; review juror questionnaire answers; discuss research projects with Thomas A.
Banducci.
Draft opposition to motion to exclude demonstrative exhibits; draft reply in support of motion to prevent argument that
_Giles/Harder engaged in improper conduct; research business records hearsay exception.
Assist in trial preparation; research business records exception; begin working on opposition to SARMC damages motion.
Draft opposition to motion to exclude damages; discuss case and upcoming projects with trial team.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

9/7/2011
9/8/2011
9/9/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP

7.4
8
6.3

9/12/2011

DLP

7.6

9/13/2011
9/14/2011
9/15/2011
9/16/2011
9/17/2011
9/19/2011
9/21/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
---DLP
DLP
DLP

7.5
7.9
5.7
2.3
1.7
5.3
1.8

Research use of opening statement; draft opposition to motion to exclude damages testimony.
Draft opposition to motion to exclude MRIA damage theories.
---Attend opening statement; read deposition transcripts of Wilhoite and Budge; edit opposition to SARMC motion on damage;
discuss trial strategy with trial team.
-Draft memorandum of law regarding use of attorney opening/closing statements; read Wilhoite deposition; edit opposition
to SARMC motion to exclude damages theories.
Dra!t motion about damages based on market value loss; edit motion on damages; discuss the same with trial team.
Draft "Bushi" related motion; draft damages opposition regarding "diminution in value".
--Research for motion rE:!garding damages theories; research regarding Bushi decision.
Draft opposition regarding damages theories.
··-Draft response to SARMC's supplemental brief regarding damages theories.
Edit motion regarding damages and supporting documents.
Assist Wade L. Woodard in preparing for hearing on damages; research for motion in limine regarding Cindy Schamp hearsay.

9/22/2011
9/23/2011
9/26/2011
9/27/2011
9/28/2011
9/29/2011
9/30/2011
10/2/2011
10/3/2011
10/4/2011
10/5/2011
10/6/2011
10/7/2011
10/10/2011
10/11/2011
10/12/2011
10/13/2011
10/14/2011
10/17/2011
10/18/2011
10/19/2011
------10/20/2011

DLP 5.9
DLP 5.8
DLP 4.8
DLP 1.5
DLP 1.7
DLP 2.3
DLP 5
DLP 2.4
DLP 7.2
DLP 0.2
DLP 0.3
DLP 0.4
DLP 0.1
DLP 4.1
DLP· - 0.6
DLP 0.1
DLP 2.8
DLP 0.2
DLP 1.8
DLP 3.8
DLP 8.7
DLP 7.9

~----

-----·-

005080

Draft motion regarding Schamp hearsay; draft motion regardin~ inadvertent reference to "prior trial".
Attend trial; draft objection to motions for mistrial (based on reference to "Prior Trial").
Draft motion regarding mistrial; draft motion regarding Ex. 4332.
---Finalize motions;
discuss case with - trial team.
-Edit motion; discuss motions in limine with BrentS. Bastian.
·----Draft motion regarding impeachment, conversation in restaurant, and lawsuit threatened by doctor.
Draft response to motion to quash subpoena.
----·--Draft reply in support of notice- of intent
to
impeach.
-·
Draft motion in limine regarding Giles "bad acts"; draft- motion in limine
regarding·Exhibits
802 and 803.
------···--·-----Review status of motions.
Edit Giles motion in limine.
-Edit Giles motion in limine.
----------------Discuss projects with trial team.
·------------·----------·-----·--··
Draft motion in limine regarding ownership interest as offset.
-----·
Look to see whether disgorgement jury instruction drafted; review motion filed by SARMC
late last night.
-----------·--·-----Discuss case and projects with trial team.
-Identify "laptop" and "Leslie Kelly Hall" exhibits.
·Look at mitigation of damages.
Review discovery answers concerning tortious interference; discuss upcoming projects with BrentS. Bastian.
----·-Begin drafting opposition to motion for directed verdict on damages.
Work on directed verdict concerning damages.
-Research, draft, and edit opposition to motion for directed verdict on damages.
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Date

Staff

10/21/2011 DLP
10/24/2011 DLP

HRS

Description

4.8
3.5

Edit directed verdict; review jury instructions
-Review research on attorney statements as party admissions; edit court's jury instructions; assist Thomas A. Banducci in
finding AICPA standards for cross examination.
Find statute of limitation brief from prior proceeding and email to court; review SARMCs Red line Jury Instructions.
Attend jury instruction conference; write memorandum of law regarding lost profits for breach of fiduciary duty.
Draft memorandum regarding apportionment of damages between claims; review transcripts for impeachment; assist in
preparation of closing argument.
Discuss case with Thomas A. Banducci and BrentS. Bastian; attend reading of verdict.
Draft proposed judgment.
-----Edit proposed judgment.
Draft and edit proposed findings regarding disgorgement.
Draft and edit documents relating to disgorgement theory of damages findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Research regarding contingency fees.
Begin drafting response to SARMC's objection to proposed judgment.
Draft response to SARMC objection to proposed judgment.
Edit response to SARMC's opposition to judgment; conversations with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding
the same.
-Edit response to objections to proposed judgment; review SARMC's response to additional proposed findings.
---Draft reply in support of proposed judgment.
--Draft reply in support of proposed judgment.
--Edit reply in support of judgment.
-Organize notes for eventual appeal.
-------Assist BrentS. Bastian in preparing for hearing, with particular attention on SARMC argument against Wilhoite formula.
Discuss appeal issues with BrentS. Bastian and Wade L. Woodard

~-

10/25/2011 DLP
10/26/2011 DLP
-10/27/2011 DLP

2.2
8.9
6.9

10/31/2011
11/1/2011
11/2/2011
11/7/2011
11/8/2011
11/9/2011
11/10/2011
11/11/2011
11/14/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

1.3
3.1
1.9
4.5
5
0.4
2
1.7
3.5

11/15/2011
11/16/2011
11/17/2011
11/18/2011
11/29/2011
12/9/2011
12/14/2011

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

1
4.6
4.5
1.9
0.3
0.5
0.2
607.8
--

_______:_

---

DMH 3.4

2/21/2008
--

DMH 0.9

2/26/2008

DMH 3.8

005081

2/22/2008

f--------

2/27/2008

DMH 3.8

----

2/28/2008

DMH 3.4

---

-·-·

---

Conference with W. Woodard and Lauren concerning issues on appeal; review of exhibits and trial testimony in preparation
of drafting analysis regarding exhibit_4145.
-Conferences with W. Woodard, T. Banducci and Lauren regarding appeal and exhibit 4145; research regarding hearsay and
hearsay requi_rements; reviewing transcripts.
-Research and analysis in preparation for appellate brief on the issue of exhibit 4154 and the business record exception to the
hearsay rule.
Research and analysis in preparation of appellate brief on the issue of exhibit 4154 and its admissibility as a business record
and as an admission _of a party opponent.
----Research and analysis in preparation of appellate brief on issue of exhibit 4154 and its admissibility as an admission of a party
opponent.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

2/29/2008
3/3/2008
3/4/2008
3/6/2008
3/6/2008
4/1/2008
6/12/2008
6/13/2008
7/24/2008

DMH
DMH
DMH
DMH
DMH
DMH
DMH
DMH
DMH

1.6
2.1

Preparation of analysis, in anticipation of appellate brief, regarding exhibit 4154 and admissions of a party opponent.
Research and analysis for appellate brief concerning exhibit 4154 and whether or not SARMC waived its objection.
Research and analysis for appellate brief concerning exhibit 4154 on issues of waiver and harmless error.
Research and analysis for appellate brief regarding exhibit 4154 and the harmless error rule
Preparation of CLE case summaries for W. Woodard.
Conference with BWS attorneys on status of case.
Research regarding conflicting expert opinions creating a material issue of fact, thus precluding summary judgment.
Research regarding conflicting expert opinion precluding summary judgment.
Research for Tom concerning possible employment claim for retaliation and/or interference with a perspective business
relationship.

3.1
2.7
1..
0.1
1.2
1.5
2

-------

---·

·--

30.6
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

3
4.1
2.4
0.5
1.6

8/6/2008
8/7/2008

KAS
KAS

2.7
4.5

8/11/2008
8/12/2008

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

6.6
5.4
1.7
2.1
2.7
2
0.2
0.3
1.5

9/15/2008

KAS

4.8

9/16/2008

KAS

9/17/2008
9/18/2008

KAS
KAS

7/3/2008
7/7/2008
7/10/2008
7/21/2008
7/22/2008
----

8/13/2008
8/14/2008
8/15/2008
8/18/2008
9/9/2008
9/11/2008
9/12/2008

t---

Meet with W. Woodard regarding case status; review briefing and begin revising citations to the record for appeal.
Review of briefing and replacing citations to appeal record for use in briefing.
Review transcript and continue citing same to briefing for appeal.
-Continue inserting citations to official record in briefing.
Continue review and revisions of citations to the trial transcript; telephone conference with Kristen at Judge Mclaughlin's
chambers regarding record.
Continue checking cites to the trial transcript for use in appeal briefing.
Prepare records to be sent to expert witness; telephone call to C. Lewis; continue inserting citations to official trial transcript
in brief for use in appeal.
--------Continue insertion of trial transcript citations into brief for use in appeal.
Continue revising briefing to reflect citations to the trial transcript for use in appeal brief.
--------·---··-··------Continue revisions to brief to include citations to trial transcript for use in appeal brief.
Continue citations to the record for use in appeal brief.
Continue review of trial transcript and citations to the record for use in appeal brief.
--------Finalize citations to trial transcript for use in appeal brief.
-Telephone conference with Supreme Court clerk regarding briefing schedule.
Review appellate rules regarding briefing schedule.
Review rules regarding objection to oversize brief; research regarding response deadlines; review additions to the record.
----

005082

---·--

Letter to Dr. Prochaska; letter to C. Lewis; work on motion for extension of time; review appendix to briefing; update clerk's
record;
work on affidavit for extension of time; email brief to C. Lewis.
----·
- - - - ..· · - - · - - 1.2
Review pleadings regarding clerk's record.
-----

0.2
Telephone conference with Suprer11e Court clerk regarding pending appeal and stay of briefing scbedule_.______
-1.6
Continue to revise citations to brief to include exhibits.
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Staff

HRS

9/22/2008

KAS
KAS
KAS

3.5
4.1
6.8

I

Description

Review clerk's record; research regarding database of transcript and exhibits; review trial testimony for ~mmarizing.
Work on Clerk's record; review trial transcript; prepare documents for use in respondent's brief.
-----------------Research and review record and transcript for citations to use in respondent's briefing.

9/24/2008
9/25/2008
---'--------+----+-~
9/26/2008 KAS ~_5._9_ Continue work on appeal including review of testimony and record for use in respondent's brief.
I Letter to C. Lewis enclosing relevant documents; continue review of record and transcript for use in respondent's brief;
9/29/2008 KAS 5.9
telephone conference with Felicia at Gjording's office regarding extension of time; revise motion for extension and begin
~----,_--~---

..
-i

___c__ _ _ _, __ _

~
_
working on revised affidavit.
Continue
record
and
transcript
review
for
use
in
respondent's
brief.
9/30/2008
---'--------4-----+-----+Revise motion for extension of time and affidavit; prepare motion and affidavit for oversized brief.
10/1/2008 KAS- - - 1.5
f-1.2
__
Review transcript and record for use in respondent brief.
10/2/2008 KAS
---+R_e_vise
affidavits
for
extension
of
time
and
oversized
briefing;
file
same
with
Supreme
Court
and
s~~e upon counsel.
10/3/2008 KAS 0.5
-Review record regarding Hammond motions in limine; review transcript regarding Dr. Prochaska testimony.
10/6/2008 KAS ~
---I-Review transcript regarding bad acts.
10/9/2008 KAS 1.2
--------~----,_----~----Work on citations to the record for brief.
10/10/2008 KAS 0.9
2.1
Prepare citations to the record for respondent's brief; research regarding citations to record.
10/13/2008 KAS

K~

10/14/2008 KAS

3.6

-------

------~--------------------------------------------

•

Review record for use in respondent's brief, in particular, motions regarding standing, deposition testimony and transcript
citations.

Research regarding citations to record and transcript for use in briefing.
10/15/2008 KAS 0.9
Research record and transcript regarding citations for respondent's brief.
10/16/2008 KAS 3.2
Continue review and research on transcript and record.
1.8
10/17/2008 KAS
---'------~----4-----~----Review transcript for citations to record in respondent's brief.
10/22/2008 KAS 0.7
1.9
Review record and transcript regarding exhibit 4333 stipulations.
10/23/2008 KAS

--

·--~--

----~----------------------

1.5
Review record and transcript for documents and citations to be used in respondent's briefing.
10/24/2008 KAS
-----+---~-----r1.6
10/27/2008 KAS
________,
Review transcript and record for citations for respondent's brief.
10/28/2008 KAS 0.9
Revi'=w
transcript
and
record
for
citations
in
Respondent's
brief;
____ __
1.6
Telephone conference with S. Kenyon regarding extension (x2); Telephone conference with Jack Gjording assistant regarding
10/29/2008 KAS
---'------~----,_

10/30/2008 I KAS

12.3

~

extension; revise motion for extension; revise affidavit in support of motion for extension;
Continue review of record and transcript for use in Respondent's brief; finalize motion for extension and affidavit in support;
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Continue review of record and transcript regarding citations to the record for use in brief.
10/31/2008 KAS 0.8
2.8
Review record and transcript for use in respondent's brief.
11/3/2008 KAS
~----~---+----+-------Prepare admitted exhibits for review.
11/7/2008 KAS
1.1
Review record and transcript regarding citations to the record for respondent's brief.
11/10/2008 KAS 1.2
1----'---1.6
Review record and transcript for use in respondent's -brief.
11/11/2008 KAS
-----------------------1.2
11/12/2008 KAS
Review records and transcript for respondent's brief.
r------:---+-----r11/13/2008 KAS 11.9
Review transcript and record for use in statement of facts.
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Date

Staff

HRS

11/17/2008
11/19/2008
11/20/2008
11/21/2008
11/22/2008
f--"
11/24/2008

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

2.4
3.1
7.5
7.3
6.8
7.2

12/22/2008 KAS

0.7

Description

Review transcript regarding citations to the record for use in respondent's brief.
Review Respondent's brief and insert citations to the record and transcript_._"_"___ "
-"
Revise respondent's brief to reflect citations to the record and transcript.
_ " _ " ______
Revise respondent's brief; continue insertion of citations to the record.
Revise brief; work on citations to the record.
" - - - - - · · - - - " " ___ _____
Finalize respondent's brief; prepare motion and affidavit for additional pages; telephone conference supreme court (x2);
telephone conference with Felicia at J. Gjording's office.
Telephone conference with J. Gjording's office; telephone conference with P. Miller's office; prepare brief for distribution.

--

"

"

"~

--

12/23/2008 KAS

8/17/2009
8/18/2009
f--

8/19/2009

0.3
Telephone conference with Dr. Prochaska; email brief; review file regarding recipients for brief.
151.7

KAS
KAS

4.5
7.6

KAS

4.1
16.2

Pull relevant case law for preparation of Supreme Court arguments; review exhibits for use at argument.
____ ___
Assist in preparation for oral argument including pulling relevant case law; preparing exhibits for use at hearing and
additional information to be used at argument.
----------Prepare for and attend oral argument at Supreme Court.
"

"

•

·-"-

·------
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2/3/2010
5/18/2010
7/2/2010
7/8/2010
f--'---'-7/9/2010
7/22/2010
7/27/2010
7/29/2010
8/2/2010
8/9/2010
8/16/2010
---"8/17/2010
8/18/2010
8/20/2010
8/23/2010
8/24/2010
8/25/2010
8/27/2010

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

0.5
0.3
0.5
0.6
2.3
1.2
1.2
1.1
1.3
3.7
1.3
0.9
1.1
3.7
6.2
1.8
2.9
1

Review exhibits for minutes regarding 2023 extension; email same to M. Kushner.
Telephone conference with court regarding potential status conference.
--Finalize opposition to motion to strike and serve the same.
_____ _____
"-"Work on PowerPoint presentation for hearing.
----Attend hearing and assist with computer technology at same.
-Review record to determine status o! expert reports and testimony.
Review record regarding damages for use in briefing.
Review record for relevant briefing and affidavits.
Prepare documents for review by B. Bakkes; review record regarding "definite term" for use in response briefing.
Review trial transcript for citations to brief.
Review record for citations for briefing; review transcript regarding the same.
Review records and provide additional citations for briefing.
·Work on citations to the record for briefing.
--"
Review brief regarding insufficiency; revise cites to the record; begin assembly of appendix.
Work on citations and appendix for briefs to be filed.
Continue working of citations for all briefing.
Work on citations for briefing and record review regarding the same.
Work on citations to briefing.
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Date

Staff HRS

Description

8/30/2010
9/14/2010
9/15/2010
9/28/2010
9/29/2010
-9/30/2010
10/1/2010

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

4.1
0.3
0.5
0.8
1.1
2.4
4.3
45.1

Finalize briefing and appendix to briefs.

1/4/2011
1/5/2011
1/11/2011
1/31/2011
2/23/2011
3/21/2011
3/23/2011
3/28/2011

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

1.5
0.3
0.7
1.8
0.3
0.5
0.5
0.6

KAS
KAS

0.6
0.4
0.2
1.2
0.8
0.3
0.8
0.9
0.9
0.5
3.2
6.2

~-

l
I

··-------~

~-

Review regarding MRI Agreement; email to K. Marler regarding same.

----·

--

Review exhibits regarding Code Blue issues and email documents to clien_!_·---------~--------~- ~-Review exhibits for use at hearing on pending motions.
____
Research and obtain case law for use at hearing.
Work on presentation for hearing on pending motions.
_,_
Prepare for and attend hearing on pending motions.
-----·-··

----- - - - -

----~

--

3/29/2011
4/8/2011

•

~----·--·-

4/13/20H-tKAS
4/19/2011 KAS
KAS
5/6/2011
5/12/2011 KAS
___:___:
5/19/2011 KAS
KAS
6/3/2011
KAS
6/7/2011
6/15/2011 KAS
6/17/2011 KAS
6/20/2011 KAS

005085

6/21/2011
-6/22/2011
7/5/2011

Review testimony and discovery regarding M. Steiner.
Review and forward relevant discovery motions to Thomas A. Banducci.
Review records regarding Steiner Expert Report.
_, __
---Pull previous trial records and reorganize same.
----Telephone conference with Bond Agent regarding same.
Research regarding previous agreements as to witness disclosures.
-Review records for relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Telephone conference with J. Gjording assistant regarding production; letter to Budge; letter to Voth; prepare copies of
SARMC production for experts.
Convert documents provided by SARMC and forward same to experts.
-

Prepare document production; forward additional documents to exp~rts. --~----~
Review file regarding previous settlement with Radiologists.
--------------Review record and obtain copies of relevant filings for summary judgment motions.
-------------Research regarding Henson and conflicts.
Record review to obtain copy of juror questionnaire.
Pull relevant witness disclosures for MRIA and SARMC.
Prepare documents for production.
Update database with additional records.
--Prepare documents for client review.
-Review file; begin organization f()r trial.
---·Meet with counsel regarding strategy; draft assignment list; organization of war room and logistics; research witness
locations.
Telephone conference with Robert Bell regarding trial.
Draft retention letter to R. Bell.
Review filings from previous trial and locate witness preparation notebooks; relevant settlement agreement; revise trial
status sheet.
~----

- - c---~

------------~----------

-~

~----~

~-----

KAS
KAS
KAS

0.5
0.4
2.1
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

7/6/2011

KAS

2.1

7/7/2011

KAS

5.8

Letter to McFee ley regarding Agreement and Subpoenas; letter to Gjording regarding subpoenas; email trial testimony to B.
Bell; attend trial strategy r:neeting; work on trial preparation.
-·
Prepare packages for witness preparation; draft letter to Gjording regarding exhibits and jury instructions; work on exhibits
and trial preparation; begin drafting subpoenas.
·-----------Work on trial preparation and witness location; review exhibits and lists to update same; telephone conference with court
clerk regarding exhibits.
---- --·-·-----------Work on trial preparation and exhibit organization for use at trial.
---------Work on trial preparation, exhibit review; review testimony at first trial; review deposition testimony; locate specific issue
exhibits;
-Work on trial preparation; attend strategy meeting; work on trial subpoenas;
Revise and final motion to release exhibits; assist with transcript projects for trial; work on service of subpoenas; letter to
McFeeley regarding subpoenas; draft letters to Hopkins and Wallace regarding deposition and trial testimony; review
possible additional exhibits.
Work on trial preparation; exhibit review; review videos; prepare witness packages.
Work on trial preparation; review testimony; work on exhibits; work on witness location.
Prepare for McCarthy deposition; assemble relevant exhibits; telephone conference with Judge's clerk regarding original
exhibit~; draft letter to J. Gjording regarding same; telephone conference to P. Harneck;
------Work on exhibits; sanction files; finalize subpoenas and draft letters to potential witnesses; arrange for service; revise
witness list; telephone conference with clerk regarding releasing exhibits from first trial; work witness binders; prepare
records for Dr. Giles' review; work on scheduling issues; letters to Anton and Wallace regarding meetings.
--- Continue trial preparation; exhibit updates and revisions t_o lists.
----------Work on exhibits and trial preparation.
-----------Email experts; revise subpoenas; work on trial preparation; review and revise exhibits.
---Work on trial preparation; r~vision to exhibits; revise witness list; work on witness locations; draft letter to J. Gjording.
------Test equipment; prepare for trial; work on exhibits and witness list updates.
·---------Review and redact exhibits; work on opening statements.
Prepare exhibits and revise timelines; preparation for focus group.
Prepare for and assist with focus group.
Work on exhibits; trial preparation and witness lists.
Work on exhibits and trial preparation.
Work on exhibits and trial preparation.
Finalize exhibits and witness lists; work on trial preparation.
Work on exhibits/witness lists; attend pretrial.
Work on trial preparation and exhibit revision.
Work on power points and document retrieval for experts.
--Work on trial preparation and mock jury issues.
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7/8/2011

KAS

7.2

7/9/2011
7/11/2011

KAS
KAS

2.5
7.1

7/12/2011
7/13/2011

KAS
KAS

6.2

7/14/2011
7/18/2011
7/19/2011

KAS
KAS
KAS

3
6.1
6.6

7/20/2011

KAS

7.1

7/21/2011
7/22/2011
7/25/2011
7/26/2011
7/27/2011
7/28/2011
7/29/2011
7/30/2011
r------8/1/2011
8/2/2011
8/3/2011
8/4/2011
8/5/2011
8/8/2011
8/9/2011
8/10/2011

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

7.4
I-0.8
6.8
7.3
7.1
8.1
8.1
7.2
8.2
6.1
7.4
7.8
8.4
1.2
0.9
6.9

-~-----------------~--.

7.3

•

----- - - - -

----~-~-

----------

•
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

Description

8/11/2011
8/12/2011
8/13/2011
8/15/2011
8/16/2011
8/17/2011

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

7.2
7.3
7.3
8.2
8.1
0

8/18/2011

KAS

9.2

8/19/2011

KAS

6.9

8/20/2011
8/22/2011

KAS
KAS

5.3
9.1

Work on trial preparation; telephone conference with Dr. Henson; work on opening.
Work on trial preparation; exhibits; and mock jury.
Attend and assist with mock jury presentation.
--Work on exhibits; witness preparation; meet with Dr. Henson.
Work revisions to exhibit list; assist with witness preparation; work on demonstratives; attend trial strategy meeting.
Letter to J. Gjording; revise exhibit list; work on trial preparation; work on demonstratives; telephone conference to
Marshall's office regarding arrangements.
Draft letter to K. Duke regarding Jones Day; meet with counsel regarding strategy; prepare additional exhibits; work on
witness preparation and assist with trial preparation.
--------Work on juror questionnaire; letter to counsel regarding the same; work on exhibits and trial preparation; telephone
conference with experts.
Work on electronic trial presentation.
Work on exhibits; work on trial preparation; assist clients with document review; meet with counsel regarding trial strategy;
letter to Judge Wetherell regarding questionnaire.
Revise McFeeley and Gjording letter; work on additional exhibits and document review.
·------Work on trial preparation. Work on demonstratives.
·-Work on demonstratives; work on exhibits; prepare for trial.

r----

r----

--~-

•

~

8/24/2011 KAS
8/25/2011 KAS
8/26/2011 KAS
8/27/2011 KAS
KAS
8/29/2011 ·
8/30/2011 KAS
8/31/2011 KAS
KAS
9/1/2011
KAS
9/2/2011
KAS
9/3/2011
KAS
9/4/2011
KAS
9/5/2011
KAS
9/6/2011
KAS
9/7/2011
KAS
9/8/2011
KAS
9/9/2011
9/11/2011 KAS
9/12/2011 KAS
9/13/2011 KAS
9/14/2011 KAS
- - - - - - r--9/15/2011 KAS
9/16/2011 KAS

r------~

6.8
10.5
9.3

-----~~

4.3
8.2
9.4
9.9
9.8
9.6
3.2
7.4

005087

9.4
11.1
9.1
8.2
10.2
3.8
11.1
10.3
8.2
7.6
10.7

Work on presentation documents; work on videos.
Work on trial preparation.

.

-

--~----

Work on trial preparation; attend meetin&_with all counsel regarding exhibit~; meet with trial team regarding strat~~y_._______
Work on trial preparation, exhibits and witness scheduling.
-Prepare for trial.
·--·
Prepare for trial.
-···--Prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial; work on opening.
------Work on trial preparation and opening statement.
Prepare for and attend trial.
-----Prepare for and attend trial.
··---Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
·-------Prepare for trial.
·--------··
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
-------·
Prepare for and attend trial; work on juror notebooks.
-------------Prepare for trial.
-------Prepare for and attend trial.
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Staff

HRS

Description

9/18/2011
9/19/2011
9/20/2011
9/21/2011
9/22/2011
9/23/2011
9/25/2011
9/26/2011
9/27/2011
9/28/2011
9/29/2011
9/30/2011
10/2/2011
10/3/2011
10/4/2011
10/5/2011
10/11/2011
10/12/2011
10/13/2011
10/14/2011
10/17/2011
10/18/2011
10/19/2011
10/20/2011
10/21/2011
10/24/2011
10/25/2011
10/26/2011
10/27/2011
10/28/2011
10/30/2011
10/31/2011
f--'
11/7/2011
11/10/2011
1--11/21/2011

KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS
KAS

2.4
6.2
10.7
8.3
4.1
11.2
1.8 -10.7
10.2
6.1
2.1
10.7
3.1
11.2
10.3
3.7
12.2
8.2
8.6
11.2
11.1
10.9
8.2
3.2
11.1
11.2
10.6
8.2
6.2
13
2
0.5
6.5
6.2
2.1
706.6

Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Attend strategy meeting; prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare subpoena; prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Work on trial preparation and potential witness location.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Work on trial preparation.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
-Prepare for and attend trial; prepare for next witnesses.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on preparation for closing.
Prepare for closing arguments.
Prepare for and attend trial for closing arguments.
Revise exhibits for use in deliberations as to Eagle revisions.
Attend jury verdict.
Work on attorney fees and costs calculations.
Continue review of charges, expenses for-use
in attorney fees and costs affidavit.
------Research juror locations.

005088

Date
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----------~---·----·--·-----

--

•

---------

--~~
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

Description

lFB

0.5

1/6/2008

lFB

4.5

1/7/2008

lFB

0.8

1/9/2008

lFB

2

1/10/2008

lFB

5.4

1/11/2008
1/14/2008
1/18/2008
1/21/2008
1/25/2008
1/28/2008

lFB
lFB
lFB
lFB
lFB
lFB

0.4
0.6
0.3
0.5
0.3
1.7

Review St. Al's objections to revised fees and costs; draft email to Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard re: same;
ph~ne call to F. Edwards re: color copy of objections.
Review Court's Register of Actions and analyze in comparison to records requested in SARMC's notice of appeal; attend
hearing on attorneys' fees and costs.
-----Compile documents for Thomas A. Banducci to review in preparation for the hearing re: revised fees and costs; compile posttrial motions hearing binders and Wade L. Woodard working copies for storage; phone call to Judge Mclaughlin's chambers
re: requesting a copy of the Court's motions index; email K. Brown in Jud~e's office re: same
Review Idaho Appellate Rules 25-28 re: transcripts and clerk's record; email correspondence with Court reporter regarding
request listing of hearing transcripts; compile and prepare color copy of Thomas A. Banducci's Affidavit of revised costs and
fees for J. Gjording
Compile and prepare color copy of Thomas A. Banducci's affidavit of revised costs and fees for J. Gjording; review email from
court reporter re: hearing transcripts and appeals record; continue reviewing St. Al's requests of the record and assist
Thomas A. Banducci with identifying counter requests per Rule 19; draft respondent's request for additional transcripts and
records
Draft letter to S. Kenyon - Clerk of Supreme Court re: appellate settlement conference
Review and sort filing boxes to be placed in storage
····----Draft letter ~o S. Kenyon- Clerk of the Supreme Court- re: response requesting appellate conference
Begin drafting request for appellate settlement conference form
Draft request for settlement conference form to the Supreme Court
Review Court's Memorandum Decision regarding revised fees and costs; Review previous ruling regarding Costs as a Matter
of Right and phone conference with Kristin and Shary in Judge's office re: clarification of exclusion regarding copies of
deposition transcripts; Draft letter to court re: same; compile versions of judgment for Wade L. Woodard to revise

1/29/2008
1/30/2008

lFB
lFB

2.5
5

2/6/2008

lFB

3.1

2/6/2008

lFB

0.3

2/11/2008

lFB

1

--

1/3/2008
----"

•

--~

---·-------
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Revise calculations for costs as a matter of right per memorandum decisions
Review Court's clarification regarding attorneys fees and costs; revise costs as a matter of right in accordance with the
clarification; draft affidavit of Thomas A. Banducci in support of award of costs as a matter of right
Office conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding St. Al's objections to the second amended judgment and Cindy Schamp
deposition testimony; draft [second proposed] second amended judgment and supporting affidavit; draft letter to Judge
Mclaughlin regarding second amended judgment; phone call to Kristin in Judge Mclaughlin's office regarding depositions
published into the record; phone conference with J. Prochaska re: setting-up meeting with rhomas A. Banducci.
Email communication with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci regarding Schamp video deposition trial testimony;
Review St. Al's objections to proposed second amended judgment.
Phone conference with District Court clerk regarding status of Schamp deposition and clerk's exhibit/witness list produced for
Supreme Court; review Schamp trial testimony for references to published depositions.
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Date

Staff

HRS

2/12/2008
2/14/2008
2/14/2008

LFB
LFB
LFB

0.1
0.2
0.4

2/16/2008

LFB

2/19/2008

LFB

2/20/2008

LFB

6

2/21/2008

LFB

5.1

LFB

3.7

Description

Email court reporter regarding Cindy Schamp video transcript.
-Review Court's exhibit and witness list.
-----Review St. Al's request for additional records, notice of hearing regarding second amended judgment, and alternative
proposed second amended judgment; email correspondence with K. Brown at District Court regarding St. Al's objection to
second amended judgment and hearing.
--3.4
Email communication with court reporter regarding transcription of Schamp video deposition; compile exhibits and transcript
for same; review incoming correspondence; compile and organize electronic copies of depositions, hearing, and trial
transcripts.
____
2.2
Continue organizing electronic copies of trial and hearing transcripts; email court reporters requesting copies in ptx format;
create cd for court reporter with Cindy Schamp's video testimony; phone and email communication with Associated
Reporting regarding conversion of ASCII trial transcripts into ptx format; organize electronic copies of trial exhibits.
,

--

- -

--

--

2/21/2008

~-

•

---~-

Email correspondence with Associated Reporting regarding conversion of ASCII transcripts in ptx format; compile electronic
files for same; email correspondence with trial court reporters regarding electronic transcripts; compile exhibits for Brian D.
Knox's appeal research regarding settlement communications and hearsay; review trial notes and transcripts to create trial
log spreadsheet.
Continue review of trial transcripts and creation of tracking log; review testimony references to exhibits 4332 and 4154;
office conferences with Dari M. Huskey and Brian D. Knox regarding same.
Organize electronic trial transcripts; office conference with Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding possible
settlement discussions; continue review of trial transcripts and creation of log; email court reporter regarding extension.

I

LFB

5.3

2/26/2008

LFB

4.7

2/27/2008

LFB

1.6

2/28/2008
2/29/2008 3/4/2008
3/6/2008
3/7/2008
3/10/2008

LFB
LFB
LFB
LFB
LFB
LFB

0.5
0.4
0.3
1.5
3.5
5.3

005090

2/25/2008

Continue review of trial transcripts and creation of trial log; compile testimony transcripts for Brian D. Knox regarding exhibit
4332.
-Compile pleadings and transcripts for Brian D. Knox to review regarding various appeals issues; continue review of trial
transcripts and creation of trial summary log.
Email Associated Reporting regarding conversion and consolidation of Schamp trial transcripts into a ptx file; review clerk's
register of actions against MRIA and SARMC's requests for clerk's record (regarding the omission of the July 13, 2007
memorandum decision); draft second supplemental request for additional clerk's record; compile pleadings for Brian D. Knox.
Review trial testimony of Jeff Cliff relevant to discussions with C. Scha_~_p.
Continue review of trial transcripts and creating of trial exhibit log.
Compile summary judgment briefing for Brian D. Knox's research on appeals issues.
- ------Continue review of trial transcripts and creation of trial log spreadsheet; direction to runner regarding files.
Continue review of trial transcripts and creation of tracking log spreadsheet; direction to runner regarding updating files.
Compile additional transcripts for Brian D. Knox relevant to Exhibit 4332; conference with Brian D. Knox regarding same;
review trial transcripts and finish updating trial tracking log.
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Date

Staff HRS

3/11/2008

LFB

Description

0.3

Review memo. from Karen Marler regarding St. Al's CDweb; phone call to Karen Marler to set up telephone conference with
Thomas A. Banducci.
-------+-----+--+----------3/24/2008 LFB
0.6
Review email correspondence and client memos
regarding CD Web issues; compile same for file.
--3/28/2008 LFB
1.9
Create outline of case and key entities, persons, and facts for S. Smith; conference with S. Smith to discuss case background
and summary of trial proceedings.
3/31/2008 LFB
0.5
Compile background documents and pleadings for S. Smith to review.
-~~--~---+------~-4/1/2008
LFB
0.6
Conference with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci regarding appeals issues; review District Court clerk's witness
and deposition list and check against trial log spreadsheet; draft third supplemental request for additional clerk's records.
---~

----~

--------t-----t-------t------~-----'-----=----------------------------------·------------

l-----------t--------l-----+-------·-----------------------------------------------------4/4/2008
LFB
1
Office conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding clerk's record and page limit rules for appeals briefing; telephone call to
appeals clerk regarding rule clarification; continue drafting third supplemental request for clerk's record. _________ _
LFB
0.6
Office conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding clerk's record; finish drafting third supplemental request for clerk's
4/7/2008
record; revise working copy of clerk's register of actions to reflect all record requests.
1-----~-~~-------~--~--4/23/2008 LFB
2.6
Review trial exhibit database; compile missing exhibits and create descriptive placeholders for demonstrative exhibits; review
4/28/2008

LFB

•

___________________ _
Manfred Steiner testimony regarding exhibit no. 594.
Load missing trial exhibits into Concordance database; review and analysis of same; review St. Al's request for additional

1.1

1-----------t-----,r------+--t_ra_n_sc_r_~ip_t_s.___
______
4/30/2008 LFB
0.4
Review notices from Supreme Court regarding deadlines to file clerk's record and transcript; telephone call to clerk regarding

same; email attorneys with update regarding same.
·----------Email Tammy Hohenleitner regarding Cindy Schamp video deposition designation~ and related~xhibits.
_- - - - Review Supreme Court Clerk's order suspending record and transcript due date; telephone call with Dorothy Beaver at
Supreme Court Clerk's office regarding same and new deadline schedule for the record and transcript; conference with
Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding same; update docket calendar; begin reviewing Prochaska testimony
and drafting insert for briefing regarding formation of MRIA.
Review appellate rule 34 regarding briefing deadlines; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding same; telephone call to

1-------+----,'------+----~-----~------"-------=----'---------------

5/5/2008
5/8/2008

LFB
LFB

0.2
0.8

5/12/2008

LFB

0.9

j

1-------+------'1----~S_u_.__p_re_m_e_Co_u_rt Clerk's office regarding same;_ calendar briefing schedule and prepare list of deadlines for distribution.

____ _
__

LFB
LFB

0.3
2

5/31/2008
6/2/2008

LFB
LFB

1.5
3.1

Compile proposed jury instructions and related transcripts for Wade L. Woodard.
Call Ed Whitelaw's office to schedule telephone conference; compile and email documents to Whitelaw regarding same;
continue reviewing Prochaska testimony.
Review hearing transcripts for objections and corrections.
Review appeal transcript indexes; review appellate rules regarding objections and corrections to the clerk's record and

6/4/2008
6/5/2008

LFB
LFB

1.5
0.7

transcripts; direction to Bridge City regarding printing transcript and organization into~inders_._______________ _
Continue review of hearing transcripts and related memorandum decisions for objections and corrections.
Compile briefing for Brian D. Knox regarding spoliation cla_i_r!l_._
___
__
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5/16/2008
5/28/2008

I
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

Description

6/10/2008

LFB

0.3

Telephone call to ECONorthwest regarding telephone conference with Ed Whitelaw; telephone call to Brad Thies at the
District Court clerk's office regarding the record; conference with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.

6/11/2008

LFB

2.5

Continue review of pre-trial hearing transcripts for objections and corrections; telephone call to Dorothy Beaver at Supreme
Court clerk's office regarding District Court's motion for extension of time on the record; draft email memorandum to office
regarding same.
----Continue review of pre-trial hearing transcripts for objections and corrections; telephone conference with Ed Whitelaw, Ed
McMullan, Bryce Ward, Thomas A. Banducci and WadeL. Woodard; compile ECONorthwest reports and related subpoenas
for Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard to review.
Review correspondence from Jack Gjording regarding brief deadline extension; review files for conformed copies of MRIA's
opposition to motion in limine regarding Shattuck Hammond and motion in limine regarding purchase price damage theory
as requested by Felicia Edwards; telephone call to Felicia Edwards regarding same; telephone call to Brad Thies at District
Court regarding same; email conformed copies of opposition briefs to Brad Thies; finalize and return new contract with
ECONorthwest.
-Telephone call to Supreme Court Clerk's office regarding extension of time for the record; revise briefing schedule, docket,
and draft email to Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard regarding same; continue compiling working copy of trial
transcript and reviewing transcript for objections and corrections.
--Continue review of transcript, creation of working copy.
-------·
Review electronic appeal transcript received from Tammy Hohenleitner; direction to Bridge City regarding printing and
compiling transcript volumes into working copy for Wade L. Woodard; finish reviewing appeal transcript and drafting list of
corrections; begin reviewing record from District Court.
--------------Review record from district court and cross-check against records requests; conference with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas
A. Banducci regarding same; telephone call to Felicia Edwards at Gjording Fauser regarding organization of record; telephone
call to Brad Thies at district court regarding same.
---Office conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding appeal record and transcript; review exhibit to appeal record regarding
affidavits and memoranda and cross reference with requests for portions of the record; compile working copies of appeal
transcript for Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci.
Continue review of exhibits to the appeal record and cross check against record requests; review District Court list of
admitted exhibits and cross check against Concordance database and court reporter's list of admitted exhibits; telephone call
to Brad Thies at District Court regarding omission of Court's draft jury instructions from the record; office conference with
Aaron Flake from Bridge City regarding copying the appeal record into binders for attorneys' use; begin compiling pleadings
designated as "exhibits to the record."
Continue compiling pleadings designated as "exhibits to the record."
Continue compiling pleadings designated as "exhibit to the appeal record."
Telephone call to Margaret Kushner regarding judgment and remitter; compile documents for her to review.

----------·---·--

---~--

f--

LFB

2.4

6/16/2008

LFB

0.8

6/24/2008

LFB

4

6/25/2008
6/26/2008

LFB
LFB

2.2
3.6

6/12/2008

-------

~-

6/27/2008 ILFB

4

·--·

6/30/2008

LFB

5

LFB

5

LFB
LFB
LFB

2
3
0.3

---

7/1/2008
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7/2/2008
7/3/2008
7/3/2008
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

7/7/2008

LFB

5

7/8/2008

LFB

1

Continue compiling pleadings and documents designated in the "certificate of exhibits" to the appeal record; direction to
Bridge City vendor regarding same.
··Continue compiling documents designated as exhibits to the appeal record; email and phone communication with Bridge City
regarding same; telephone to Brad Thies at District Court regarding obtaining copies of records that we are unable to locate;

7/9/2008

LFB

1.2

7/10/2008

LFB

1

7/11/2008

LFB

2

7/14/2008

LFB

3.5

7/15/2008

LFB

2.3

7/16/2008

LFB

3.5

7/17/2008

LFB

3

7/18/2008

LFB

0.6

-----

Continue compiling documents marked as exhibits to the appeal record; telephone calls to Bridge City regarding copying and
assembling working copies of same.
---Finish drafting notes regarding objections and correction to the appeal transcript and record; office conference with WadeL.
Woodard regarding same.
... Begin drafting stipulation for additions and corrections to the record and transcript; review trial transcript regarding
admission of Finnerty memo.
----·
··---Continue working on stipulation for corrections and additions to the appeal transcript and clerk's record; review working
copies of exhibits to the record and correct missing and incorrect pleadings; review St. Al's objections to the clerk's record.
- - -

r----

------

r-----
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7/6/2011
7/7/2011
7/8/2011
-7/11/2011
7/12/2011
7/13/2011
7/18/2011

-----

Continue reviewing St. Al's objections and additions to the record; continue drafting stipulations for additions and corrections
to the appellate record and transcript; draft letter to Jack Gjording regarding same; finish reviewing working copy binders of
exhibits to the record.
--------Telephone communication with Brad Thies regarding augmentation to record; review new Plaintiff exhibit list being
augmented to the record and compare to previous version; telephone call to Kristin Brown (Judge Mclaughlin's clerk)
regarding Plaintiff exhibit list; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding stipulation for additions and corrections to
record; draft letter to Jack Gjording regarding same and fax revised version; index Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L.
Woodard's wo~king copies of the appeal transcript.
·---Continue indexing Thomas A. Banducci and Wade L. Woodard's working copies of appeal transcript; draft objection to
reporter's transcript and request for additional items; draft affidavit of Wade L. Woodard in support of objection; conference
with Wade L. Woodard and Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; prepare filing and exhibits to affidavit.
Email communication with Tammy Hohenleitner regarding objection to transcript; finish indexing Thomas A. Banducci's
working copy of appeal transcript.

151.9

--

-

LH
LH
LH
LH
LH
LH
LH

3
2
6
8
3
2
7

•

----·

Established contacts for focus juries; meeting discussing responsibilities going forward. _______________
Established contacts for focus juries; conversion of trial transcripts to outlines for September tri~L
Established contacts for focus juries; converted trial transcripts to preparation outlines for September trial.
----Converted trial transcripts into outlines for use at September trial; developed contacts for focus juries.
Developed contacts for focus juries.
-Developed contacts for focus juries.
·---------Compiled exhibit lists and binders for use in depositions and at trial.
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Date

Staff HRS

Description

7/19/2011
7/20/2011

LH
LH

7
7

7/21/2011

LH

9

Compiled exhibit binders for use at trial; created questioning transcripts for use in examinations.
Compiled exhibit binders for use at trial; created questioning transcripts for use in examinations; compiled and narrowed
down members for July 30 focus jury.
Created deposition summary for use in examinations; made selections and communications with members of first focus jury.

7/22/2011

LH

7

7/25/2011
7/26/2011

LH
LH

2
7

7/27/2011

LH

6.5

7/28/2011

LH

6.5

7/29/2011

LH

6.5

8/1/2011

LH

6

LH

7

8/3/2011

LH

7

8/4/2011

LH

6.5

8/8/2011
8/9/2011
8/10/2011

LH
LH
LH

6.5
5
7

8/11/2011
8/12/2011

LH
LH

7
7.5

-·--·-

-----

8/2/2011
-----

Created deposition summary for use in examinations; made selections and communications with members of first focus jury;
prepared documents for use in mock trials.
-----Organized potential members of August 13 focus jury and made contacts.
----------Attended weekly meeting; reviewed answer to third amended counterclaim for analysis of affirmative defenses; reviewed
depositions for compiling witnesses.
-----Reviewed depositions to prepare for upcoming depositions and trial examinations; maintained contacts with focus jury
members.
·--Reviewed depositions to prepare for upcoming depositions and examinations; drafted and sent out final notice to all focus
jury members.
---Finalized forms and contacts for July 30 focus jury; reviewed depositions to prepare for upcoming depositions and
examinations.
----Reviewed depositions to prepare for upcoming depositions and examinations; researched past exhibits in preparation for
trial.
--Reviewed trial transcript for exhibit admission and stipulations; summarized findings of focus jury; followed up with potential
August 13 focus jury participants.
-----Drafted letter to opposing council regarding exhibit stipulations; reviewed and summarized depositions for upcoming
examinations; followed up with focus jury participants and analyzed feedback.
----- -- Drafted memorandum regarding admissibility of statements made by settling party; reviewed and summarized depositions in
preparation for upcoming examinations.
Co~~~sponded with August 13 focus jurors; summarized deposition for use in upcoming examination.
---------- ---- · - - - - - Corresponded with August 13 focus jurors; summarized deposition to prepare for upcoming examination.
-------------------Corresponded with August 13 focus jurors and other attendees; summarized deposition to prepare for upcoming
examination.
Corresponded with focus jurors; summarized dE!positions to prepare for upcoming examinations.
-----Corresponded with focus jurors; set up and preparation for focus jury; summarized depositions to prepare for upcoming
examinations.
--·--

•

--- - - -

-----~-----
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--

r---~··-·-···--·

------------

149
··-

· -

3/28/2008
4/1/2008

-

SES
SES

1.5
0.6
2.1

Meeting with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding SARMC v. MRIA case background and trial.
Review second amended complaint.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

8/22/2011
----'--'
8/23/2011
8/29/2011
---'---"'-8/30/2011
8/31/2011
9/1/2011
9/2/2011
9/3/2011
9/4/2011
9/5/2011
9/10/2011
9/19/2011
9/20/2011
10/7/2011
10/10/2011

SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES
SES

6.2
5.7
6.2
7.2
6.9
5.2
6.4
7.5
8.3
9.2
3.2
6.8
5.5
8
2.2
94.5

Search for documents
to be included as exhibits.
---Search for exhibits.
Various tasks for trial preparation.
Various tasks for trial preparation.
Various trial preparations.
Assist with trial preparations.
Trial preparation.
Jury research.
Jury research.
Juror research; meet with trial team.
Trial preparation.
Trial preparation and attendance.
Trial preparation and attendance.
Attend trial in Kathy A. Savell's place
Search for documents relevant to Havlina's testimony.

TAB

1.5

1/4/2008

TAB

1

1/8/2008
1/9/2008

TAB
TAB

2.1
1.1

Telephone conference with Aaron Katz {Credit Suisse). Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding SARMC's objection to
acceptance of remittitur. Telephone conference wi!h Jack Gjording
Telephone conference Jack Gjording regarding hearing and review notice of hearing. review research on suprsedeas bond
and conditional appeal.
-Prepare for and attend hearing on stay and hearing on objections to fees and costs. Review transmittals from c~_urt.
Review notice of appeal and check the rules regarding record designation. Call from Gjording regarding stipulated amount.

1/10/2008

TAB

2

1/15/2008
1/24/2008
1/28/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB

2.5
0.3
1.5

1/29/2008

TAB

0.8

1/30/2008

TAB

0.7

-""

'----

- -

----·

-

-------"

""-----·-------·---

-------------

"-"

"I

"-

----

•

--~------

----"-"

--·-

---"

1/3/2008
r-----

005095

----

Review designated record on appeal. Supplement record and transcript. Telephone conference with Jack Gjording regarding
supersedeas bond amount.
- - Conference with Joe Messmer rearrangements for appeal. NO CHARGE
------Conference Vllith Havlina regarding status of appeal.
----------------Review court order on costs and fees. Conference with WadeL. Woodard and Lauren F. Blaesing regarding final judgment
and costs as a matter of right. Call to L.C. Trout. Edit letter to court regarding deposition copy costs.
Telephone conference with Jim Prochaska. Telephone conference with J. Mclaughlin regarding costs as a matter of right.
Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding same.
Review court order and conferences with Lauren F. Blaesing and Wade L. Woodard regarding affidavits and final judgment
"--"
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Date

Staff

HRS

2/1/2008

TAB

1.2

2/4/2008

TAB

0.6

2/5/2008

TAB

1.8

2/11/2008

TAB

0.7

2/12/2008

TAB

3.2

r----

~---------

~-·

-··--

2/13/2008

TAB

0.9

2/15/2008
2/16/2008

TAB
TAB

3
1.8

TAB
TAB

1.8
2

r----

2/18/2008
2/20/2008

I

2/21/2008 TAB
- - - - -- 2/22/2008 TAB

2.4
1.7

2/26/2008 -tTAB

10.8

TAB
TAB
TAB

0.3
0.4
0.5

TAB
3/4/2008
3/13/2008 TAB
3/14/2008 TAB
3/17/2008 TAB
-----r-3/22/2008 TAB
3/25/2008 TAB
__._____._

0.2
0.2
0.2
1
0.2

2/28/2008
2/28/2008
2/29/2008

Description

Conferences Lauren F. Blaesing regarding affidavit for fees; edit affidavit; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing and Wade L.
Woodard regardin~ supplementation of record raised by augmentation requested by ~~RMC.
Telephone conferences with Lauren F. Blaesing and Wade L. Woodard regarding judgment and affidavit in support of motion
for costs.
----Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding amended judgment and transcript; conference regarding Schamp testimony;
review correspondence from the court; edit letter to court; work on retainer agreement.
Edit retainer agreement and email to Prochaska; review order signed by court to stay execution and email to Wade L.
Woodard.
----Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding order of stay and telephone call to Gjording; meeting with client and Harad.
Calls to Gjording; email to WadeL. Woodard and Lauren F. Blaesing regarding hearing on objection to second amended
judgment.
Telephone conference with Jack Gjording regarding supersedeas bond and hearing on the judgment; conference with Wade
L. Woodard regarding post judgment interest and review objection to judgment proposed by Gjording.
---·-NO CHARGE-Conference with Jim Prochaska.
________ _____
-NO CHARGE- conference with WadeL. Woodard and edit retainer agreement and telephone conference with Jim Prochaska.
.,

Conference with consultants and telephone conference with Pulliam regarding footnote.
- ---Review case on RUPA (first case on RUPA from ld. Supreme Court); conference with Prochaska regarding various issues on
appeal; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding Sam Gibson testimony; telephone conference with court clerk regarding
rescheduling hearing; calls to identify cost of supersedeas bond; call to Gjording; conference regarding harmless error;
admissibilityof settlement agreements.
-·--Correspondence and order resetting hearing; meeting with Gjording.
Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing and Wade L. Woodard regarding meeting with Gjording and telephone conference with
client (Prochaska) regarding meeting with Gjording. Review court notice and schedule order.
Voice mail from Gjording, correspondence from Gjording and email with court regarding hearing; telephone conference with
Prochaska and email to Drury.
·---Telephone conference with Dave Giles regarding S. Bruce.
Telephone conference with Karen Marler.
----Review supersedeas bond. Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing; telephone conference with Giles regarding contacting
Messmer regarding S. Bruce.
Telephone conference with Joe Messmer
--·
Review orders from court regarding record and transcript.
---Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding supplementation of record.
----------Presentation to MRIA employees regarding trial and appeal.
Review emails regarding transcript and record.
I Conference with Brian _Q._ Knox regarding duty owed to Limited Partnership.
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

Description

4/14/2008
4/17/2008
5/12/2008
5/21/2008
5/28/2008
6/10/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

0.3
0.4
0.4
0.8
0.5
1.3

6/13/2008
-6/17/2008
6/27/2008
7/8/2008
7/14/2008
1---7/17/2008
7/20/2008
9/9/2008
9/10/2008
9/11/2008
9/15/2008
9/20/2008
r----9/22/2008
9/23/2008
9/24/2008
9/25/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

0.4
0.9
0.7
1.3
3.3
0.5
2
6.2
3.5
5
1.1
2
3.2
2.2
3.9
4.1

Email exchange with Prochaska regarding status; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding retention of Schroeder.
Telephone conference with Prochaska; review minutes.
·--·-··
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding briefing deadlines and research on harmless error in instructions.
Conference with Prochaska regarding law firm selection for deal; telephone conference -.yith Barbara Nay.
·--·--Conference with WadeL. Woodard and telephone conference with Ed Whitelaw.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard and call to Gjording regarding briefing schedule. Review of materials prepared by Wade L.
Woodard on issues for appeal.
-·
Teleehone conference with Gjording regarding briefing schedule.
-Telephone co~ference with Prochaska and attend board meeting.
---------Telephone conference with Barbara Nay and Margaret Kushner.
Telephone conference with Kushner and Nay
------·Review transcript.
Telephone co~ferences with Jack Gjording and conference with Lauren F. Blaesing_ regarding missing instructions.
Review transcript.
--·
-·
Transcript review.
Review transcript.
Review transcript.
·-------------

9/26/2008

TAB

3.8

9/27/2008
9/28/2008
9/29/2008
10/1/2008
10/2/2008
f----'--·
10/3/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

3.7
3.4
2.6
1.2
6.8
2.8

10/4/2008
10/5/2008

TAB
TAB

3.2
4.6

-

-------

005097

r-----

- -

--

-~---····

-~--

Review record and brief; conference Wade L. Woodard and telephone conference Prochaska.
Review SARMC's brief.
I
Review brief and conference with Wade L. Woodard and telephone conference with Craig Lewis.
Work on brief; conference with Wade L. Woodard.
Review prior filed motion for summary judgment briefing on wrongful dissociation; work on appellate brief.
Review jury instructions, conference Wade L. Woodard; review jury instruction conferences; develop arguments regarding
lost profits and MRIA's right to recover lost profits.
·-----Conference with K. Savell and Dara Labrum regarding arguments and support for arguments that MRIA entitlement for lost
profits is supported by the record and not raised as an issue until appeal; draft outline for argument.
Work on brief.
-Work on brief.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding brief organization.
----Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding wrongful dissociation arguments and stipulation for extension of time.
Work on summary of facts and conferences with Wade L. Woodard.
Conference Wade L. Woodard regarding brief organization; "taint" argument and motion to extend time and length of brief;
review transcript and work on outline for fact section.
-Work on summary of facts
Work on summary of facts and review transcript.
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Staff

HRS

Description

10/6/2008

TAB

3.7

Conference Wade L. Woodard regarding SBB's admission regarding restrictive covenants; review Lewis outline; transcript
review and emails with WadeL. Woodard.
--------

10/7/2008
10/8/2008
10/9/2008
10/10/2008

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

2.8
1.4
4.2
1.9
2.6

Review transcript and conferences with Wade L. Woodard regarding new trial st~_ll_dard and rell'ljttit~----------~---Review transcript and conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding brief.
Review transcript and work on brief outline.
--Review dissociation arguments drafted by Wade L. Woodard; continue work on brief. - - - - · · - - - - · · · · - - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - - - - - - Review Wade L. Woodard's draft of initial sections of brief and comment/edit; review of causation evidence and argument.

10/11/2008

~:B

---

---·-----~---------------------

---~----

10/12/2008
10/13/2008
10/14/2008
-10/14/2008
10/20/2008
10/21/2008
10/22/2008
10/23/2008
10/25/2008
10/27/2008
11/2/2008
11/3/2008
11/4/2008
11/5/2008
11/6/2008
11/8/2008
11/10/2008
11/11/2008
11/13/2008
------"-11/14/2008
11/15/2008
11/16/2008
-11/17/2008
11/18/2008
11/19/2008
-11/20/2008
11/21/2008
11/22/2008
-----

--

-~---

- -

005098

~-

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
····-TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

- - -

3.7
Review transcript and work on damages argument.
0.9
Conference Wade L. Woodard regarding brief organization and edit arguments.
----·--------·-----------------····----1.2
Review Wilh?ite testimony; conference K. Savell regarding motions concerning real party in interest.
1.1
Telephone conferences with Wendy Engels (Mercer), Nay and Kushman.
---f------ - Transcript review.
1.7
2.2
Review transc~ipt and telephone conference with Wade L. Woodard.
0.3 - -Conference
Wade L. Woodard regarding brief.
2.9
Review draft of settlement letter argument; conference with Prochaska; work o~_J__Il~roduction to brief_.__
----Work on brief and conference with Wade L. Woodard.
4.1
2.4
Conference with Prochaska regarding status of brief; conference with Wade L. Woodard and work on brief
3.9
Work on brief.
--2.5
Conferences with Wade L. Woodard regarding disgorgement; work on brief.
0.9
Work on
brief and telephone
conference with Wade L. Woodard.
-·
.
-Work on brief.
1.3
--- ..-1.6
Work on brief
------6.1
Work on brief.
-----2.4
Conference with Wade L. Woodard; work on brief.
5.5
Work on brief and conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding same.
4.7
Work on brief.
2.9
Work on brief.
5.2
Work on brief.
··~
Work on brief.
4.7
1.9
Work on brief and conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding causation arguments.
2.8
Work on brief and Board meeting discussion.
4.6
Work on brief.
--------··---------------~----1
5.7
Work on brief.
5.2
Work on brief.
4.7_ Work on brief.
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

11/23/2008 TAB
TAB
11/24/2008
-12/23/2008 TAB

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

HRS

Work on brief.
3.8
5.9
Finalize and serve brief. 1.7
Review brief and conference with Wade L. Woodard
230.3
2.1

1/3/2009
1/8/2009
1/25/2009
-------1/30/2009
2/9/2009
2/20/2009
8/12/2009
8/14/2009
8/15/2009
8/16/2009
8/17/2009
8/18/2009
8/19/2009
8/24/2009
10/21/2009
10/22/2009
10/27/2009
11/3/2009

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
--TAB
TAB

1/11/2010
1/18/2010

TAB
TAB

0.6
1

1/20/2010 TAB
1/20/2010 TAB
1/25/2010 TAB
1/28/2010 -- TAB
1/28/2010 TAB
1/29/2010 TAB
1/29/2010 TAB
TAB
2/1/2010

1.1
3.9
1.5
0.9
3
0.6
1.5
1.2

r----

Description

0.5
1.1
0.6
0.3
0.5
4.4
4.7
4
4.5
8
12
6
0.5
2.5
2.5
3.2
0.5
57.9

----

-·-------~

-------

-------

Review and comment on brief.
Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner; email to Kushner and Prochaska after review of Mercer reports.
Review brief.
--·----Review brief
-··
Conference with Dara Labrum regarding response to motion to strike.
--------- --Review response to objection.
-----Prepare for appeal
---------Prepare for oral argument.
-Prepare for oral argument
Prepare for oral argument.
------······-Prepare for oral argument
Prepare for oral argument
··-·-·
·Prepare for and attend Supreme Court hearing and meeting with clients.
-·
Telephone conference with in house counsel (CHI) regarding oral argument.
Review appeal; telephone conference with James Prochaska M.D. and confere~ce with Benjami~~· Schwartzman.
Labrum.
Review
decision and conference with Dara
-------Prepare for and attend meeting with board
Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner regarding MRIM.
-----

-

---------------------~-

•

-------

---------···---------

005099

Telephone conference Tim Borton (CHI) regarding appeal.
Telephone conference with Tim Gorman (CHI) and counsel for CHI regarding status of appeal and sale of Mercy and HR to
Trinity.
--------Meet with MRIA juror.
---------·-·Review chart from Kushner and transfer restrictions memorandum; meeting with Prochaska and cal! to B. Nay. -------Telephone conferences with Prochaska; review materials from Prochaska.
Telephone conference client and conference Wade L. Woodard regarding judge; review law on release of bond.
Telephone conference with Kushner regarding CHI/Trinity transaction; telephone conference with client.
Conf('!_~ence with Margaret Kushner and review transfer restrictions and email regarding lease extensions
-----Telephone conference with Gjording and Ayers; check on Wetherell's background
Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner and Tim Gorman.
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

2/3/2010
2/3/2010

TAB
TAB

0.5
2

2/16/2010
2/17/2010
3/9/2010
3/10/2010
3/15/2010

TAB
TAB
TAB
--TAB
TAB

2
1.3
0.3
0.9
0.9

Review materials from Kushner; email exchange with Kushner and conference with Wade L. Woodard.
·--··-Telephone conference with Gjording and Ayers; telephone conference Budge and Wilhoite and conference with Kathy A.
Savell regarding materials to be sent.
-Meeting with Board.
·--------··-Prepare for and attend st~tus conference.
-------------Correspondence with Margaret Kushner.
----·Review correspondence from Kushner and telephone conference Gorman and Prochaska.
Review emails and telephone conference with Prochaska regarding his call with Gorman and email exchange with Kushner.

3/16/2010
r---3/16/2010
f---'----··-3/17/2010
3/18/2010
3/19/2010
4/19/2010
5/5/2010
5/11/2010
5/12/2010
5/18/2010

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

0.8
3.5
0.7
0.3
0.2
0.6
0.6
0.5
1.2
1.2

5/19/2010
5/24/2010

TAB
0.3
--TAB 0.9

6/11/2010
!---'-----6/15/2010
6/21/2010
7/1/2010

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

0.5
0.3
1.2
1.5

TAB
TAB
TAB

1
1
2.1

TAB
7/8/2010
TAB
7/9/2010
t---7/15/2010 TAB
7/15/2010 TAB

2.5

---~-----

--~

---

----

---~-

Review memorandum by Dara Labrum regarding amending counterclaim.
------Telephone conferences with Kushner and Prochaska; attend MRIA board meeting.
-------Review materials from Kushner and telephone conference Prochas~a.
Telephone conference with Gjording and email to Prochaska regarding judgment on costs.
Review email from Messmer and Prochaska.
---------------Review letters from Gorman; email to B. Nay.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding status conference.
-Conference with Wade L. Woodard and Prochaska regarding status.
-----------Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner.
Telephone conference with Ayers and review correspondence from Ayers regarding scheduling order; respond with letter to
Ayers.
-·-------·-·Conference
with
WadeL.
Woodard
regarding
status
and
experts.
----------------~1
Telephone conference Prochaska regarding confidentiality agreement and telephone conference Kushner and Prochaska;
review confidentiality
stipulation.
.
--- Conference with Wade L. Woodard and edit letter to Ayer.
---·
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding meeting with board.
--·----· ------Conference with Dara Labrum regarding motion filed by SARMC and telephone conference Gjording.
Review brief in opposition to motion to strike; conference with Wade L. Woodard and Dara Labrum; telephone conference
Gjording's office
-------------Draft discovery for SARMC
Conference with Dara Labrum and Wade L. Woodard regarding reply to SARM's reply brief
Telephone conference Bruce Budge; edit discovery requests; conference with Dara Labrum regarding PowerPoint for Friday's
hearing; conference with W. Woodard
--------------·----Prepare for hearing on motion to strike
----------------Prepare for and attend hearing
--------··---------Meeting with Giles regarding Mercy Hospital issues
---Meeting with Giles
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

Description

7/20/2010

TAB

1

TAB

2.5

Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding briefing schedule; review discovery draft and review briefing on damages for
discussion with experts and W. Woodard
Review materials relative to damages; telephone conference Prochaska and conference Wade L. Woodard regarding briefing

TAB

2.5

--

7/21/2010

Telephone conference Kushner; edit 4th Am. Complaint; conference with Dara Labrum; review motion to amend scheduling
order; and edit written discovery; call to Bob Bakes
_" ___
Telephone conference Bob Bakes and conference with Dara Labrum regarding filing various motions
7/27/2010 TAB 0.4
Conferences Wade L. Woodard regarding damages briefing and email to Dara Labrum regarding motion to amend;
7/30/2010 TAB 1.5
correspondence with Kushner regarding settlement discussions
TAB
Meeting with Bakes and conference with WadeL. Woodard.
1.5
8/2/2010
TAB 0.3
Conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding briefing on partnership for term; email to Dara Labrum regarding motion to
8/5/2010
amend and follow-up on meetin~ schedule with experts.
-·------ -TAB 2.1
Briefing from SARMC.
8/9/2010
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding briefing on conspiracy and telephone conference Prochaska; review email from
8/20/2010 TAB 1
Kushner.
----Review and edit memorandum regarding lost profits
8/22/2010 TAB 3.2
Conference with Dara Labrum al'ld WadeL. Woodard regarding briefs and review email from Bakes.
8/24/2010 TAB 1.1
TAB
3.9
Attend
board meeting; review briefs.
8/25/2010
TAB
2.5
Meeting with Bakes; review and edit arguments.
8/26/2010 -------· - - · - - - -- ---------------Review briefs.
8/27/2010 TAB 1.7
1.5
Begin review of briefing for argument.
9/28/2010 TAB
---------- - - - - - --=-.
Review briefing and prepare for oral argument; call to Gjording.
9/29/2010 TAB 3.2
r-c
Prepare for oral argument
9/30/2010 TAB 8.5
---------------··--Final preparation and oral argument.
10/1/2010 TAB 5.9
1
Meeting with Bak~s.
10/7/2010 TAB
- - - r-----·------------93.9
-7/23/2010

··-----

•

-----

--·----

-

------·--~

--

-------~-----------·-

TAB
TAB

1
3.3

Review of discovery motion.
·-------Review deposition testimony, discovery responses and trial testimony of Steiner and review motion to compel discovery.

1/12/2011

TAB

1.4

1/14/2011
1/18/2011
1/20/2011
1/21/2011

TAB 0.2
TAB 1.3
TAB 0.4
f---- f---TAB 0.4

Conference with WadeL. Woodard regarding scheduling order requested by SARMC; review Steiner report; and deposition
testimony.
Telephone conference with Gjording's office rega~ding hearing date - - - - - - - ---------Meeting with Dara L. Parker and WadeL. Woodard regarding motion to reopen discovery. __
Telephone conference with Dvorak regarding collection of costs.
----------Telephone conference with Prochaska regarding recovery of costs.
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Date

Staff

HRS

1/22/2011
1/27/2011
2/1/2011
2/8/2011
2/9/2011
2/14/2011
2/21/2011
2/22/2011
2/23/2011
2/24/2011
2/25/2011
3/30/2011

TAB 1.1
TAB ---0.3
TAB 1.8
TAB 1.7
TAB 2.7
TAB 0.5
TAB 0.5
TAB 0.5
TAB 1.8
TAB 1.1
TAB 0.9
TAB 9

4/2/2011
4/6/2011
4/11/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB

2.4
1.4
1.1

4/12/2011

TAB

2.2

4/13/2011

TAB

1.3

4/14/2011

TAB

1.5

4/21/2011
4/22/2011

TAB
TAB

1.5
3.2

TAB

1.3

4/26/2011
4/27/2011

TAB
TAB

4.9
2.2

4/29/2011

TAB

1.8

Description

Review memorandum to oppose reopening discovery.
Draft response to Dvorak letter for client.

·-~-

I

-----~--

Review and edit briefing; conference with Dara Parker; telephone conferen_ce wi!b!rE~b-~~~~and send letter to Dvorak.
Meet with Wade L. Woodard and Dara Parker regarding hearing and review our briefing.
Prepare for and attend hearing.
-Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding update on hearing and matters going forward.
-Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding discovery and exp~rt reports
-Telephone
conference
with
Gjording
and
review
letter
from
Gjording.
---- - ---------Attend MRIA Board meeting to discuss status of SARMC v. MRIA case.
--·Meet with Bruce Budge and Charles Wilhoite regarding damages.
Telephone conference with SARMC counsel and conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding various discovery issues.
Review and edit motion for summary judgment response; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding same; review
discovery from SARMC, and conference Dara Parker regarding responses; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding
Kushner's' settlement discussion with Westermeier; Develop to do list for case; Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding
correspondence compelling Bruce and scamp attendance at trial; conference with Dara Parker regarding Eagle facility info;
begin review of transcript
Review of trial record.
---·-·-·------------------- ·--------·--- -·-·
Telephone conference Kushner and Wade L. Woodard.
Telephone conference Gjording regarding dates; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding motions; conferences with
Dara Parker regarding same.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard and BrentS. Bastian regarding motions in limine and motion for summary judgment
regarding Peirringer release.
----Conference with BrentS. Bastian and review issues related to pro rata argument.
-

-----

--··--·-

4/25/2011

-------~--

Review briefing from SARMC; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding same; conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding
oppo~ition to pro rata argument.
---Prepare for hearing.
- ------·· -- ---------------Prepare for and attend motion for summary judgment hearing; review briefs conferences with BrentS. Bastian and Dara
Parker regarding same.
------------------··
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding hearing on Friday; telephone conference Prochaska; review memorandum in
response to SARMC's Motion in Limine's.
-------Telephone conferences with experts
and meeting
with Prochaska and Giles.
Telephone conference with Voth and Budge; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding usurping partnership opportunity;
conference with Kathy A. Savell; review of correspondence regarding witnesses; work on letter to Ayers and Gjording
-

---

•

005102

---·····-----·---------~--------

Review and edit materials and conference W. Woodard meeting with Budge and telephone conference Wilhoite
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

5/5/2011
5/6/2011
5/9/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB

1
0.9
2.4

-r:~lephone

5/11/2011
5/12/2011

TAB
TAB

0.5
2.9

5/18/2011 TAB
5/19/2011 TAB
TAB
6/6/2011
~-----~-~---6/10/2011 TAB
r---6/16/2011 TAB
1---6/17/2011 TAB

6.5
0.5
0.5
0.3
1.5
1

6/20/2011
6/21/2011

TAB
TAB

1.9
2.2

6/22/2011

TAB

5.9

6/23/2011
7/1/2011

TAB
TAB

0.3
0.9

7/4/2011
7/5/2011

TAB
TAB

2
4.6

TAB
TAB
TAB

3.3
5.4
7.9

conference Wade L. Woodard regarding motion to recuse and consideration of response
-------·-E~n::!ails to Wade L. Woodard and Dara Parker regarding response to motion to recuse and review motion.
-···-·-·-·Conference with Dara Parker and Wade L. Woodard regarding motion to recuse; telephone conference with Dr. Prochaska
regarding news release relative to Eismann; review order on motion for summary judgment; review and respond to
correspondence from Gjording.
Conference Wade L. Woodard rega~ding motions to be heard and letter to Gjording.
Email from Prochaska, call to Kelly (bankruptcy counsel), review SARMC discovery; conference with Wade L. Woodard
regarding status and go forward plan
Prepare for and attend hearing; attend MRIA board meeting.
Telephone conference with Drew Voth; review
correspondence from Prochaska; review materials
from Voth.
------Review brief on depositions of Bruce and Schamp.
Conference regarding motions and pro hac vice.
Review filings of SARMC.
··-Telephone conference Gjording; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding expert report and to do; correspondence with
experts regarding deposition dates.
Meeting regarding to-do; call to Gjording
----------Review report of McCarthy and telephone conference Prochaska, review decision and conference with Wade L. Woodard.
----

c----

--------·-

--

-

•

---

Review McCarthy report and assign matter to Kathy A. Savell; meet with Prochaska; attend motion to compel; and attend
board meeting; telephone conference with Gjording regarding depositions of experts; conference with opposing counsel
regarding stipulation.
Review email from Dara Parker regarding closing argument of Gjording and further review of McCarthy.
Telephone conferences with Jack Gjording; conference with Wade L. Woodard and Dara Parker regarding rebuttal opinions.

-~

-~------

7/6/2011
7/7/2011
7/8/2011
7/9/2011
7/10/2011
7/11/2011
7/12/2011
7/13/2011

1---

--

005103

TABTs.3
TAB 4.9
TAB 7.2
TAB 6.8
TAB 4.2

Review trial transcript.
Telephone conference with Gjording; review IVIcCarthy report; telephone conference with Budge regarding rebuttal;
telephone conference with Prochaska; email to Board regarding settlement offer; begin review of Prochaska testimony.
Review trial transcript and meeting with trial team; telephone conference with Budge regarding regression analysis.
~
Review trial transcript; telephone conference with Prochaska; letter to Ayers regarding settlement offer.
Prepare for trial--review of exhibits and trial testimony.
Prepare for trial--review exhibits and witness testimony.
Prepare for trial-review exhibits.
---Meet with Dave Giles; review exhibits.
--Team meeting; telephone conference with experts and Floyd; meet with Giles; prepare for trial; review jury instructions. . -·---Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding damages; meet with Dara Parker and Wade L. Woodard regarding instructions
and telephone conference with Budge; meeting with Henson; review of exhibits.
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Staff

HRS

7/14/2011
7/18/2011
7/19/2011
7/20/2011
1-'
7/21/2011
7/23/2011
7/25/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

4.4
3.7
10.6
10.5
6.7
8.5
5.9

7/26/2011

TAB

7

---·

7/27/2011 TAB - - 7.2
7/28/2011 TAB 8.5
7/29/2011- - TAB 6.2
7/30/2011 TAB 9
7/31/2011 TAB 2.5
TAB 6
8/1/2011

005104

8/3/2011
8/4/2011
8/5/2011
8/6/2011
8/7/2011
8/8/2011
8/9/2011
8/10/2011
8/11/2011
8/12/2011
8/13/2011
8/14/2011
8/15/2011
8/16/2011

Description

Prepare for trial; meet with Giles; begin preparation for McCarthy deposition.
------- .... --- ---Prepare for deposition of McCarthy; conference with Giles; review correspondence from opposing counsel.
---Prepare for McCarthy deposition and team meeting; letters to Gjording; travel to LA and further !?reparation.
Prepare for and attend McCarthy deposition.
Work on timeline; prepare for trial; conference with Giles; return from LA. ·Work on trial preparation and mock trial.
-------------------Work on timeline; meeting with Giles; work with Kathy A. Savell regarding timeline and subpoenas; telephone conference
with Drew Voth and Budge.
--------------·---Team meeting; conference with clients; telephone conference with experts; telephone conference with opposing counsel;
review brief in opposition to motion in limine.
-----------·-··---t-Prepare
for
trial;
conferences
with
Wade
L.
Woodard
and
Dara
Parker.
---------t-----'--Prepare for trial.
------Deposition of Jeffcoat; prepare for mock trial.
. ·-Mock trial.
-·
Prepare for trial (depo of Hall and Sea bourn testimony).
. ------··-------------·---Review jury instructions and various motions; commence exam preparation; meet with Kathy A. Savell regarding new exhibits
to list.
·----~-

Prepare for trial. (Exam of_~~ff) (Exam of S~~)
Meeting with Giles, Floyd and Wallace; work on examinations.

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

5.2
7.8
8.8
3.7
1
4.7

Prepare for and attend motion hear~~! prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial; exams of Cliff and Bruce; work on timeline.
Work on timeline.
Work on exams; telephone conference with Wade L. Woodard and Wilhoite.

6.6
5.4
4.3
7.7
8.5
3.9
5.5
9.5

Prepare for ~nd attend pretrial; work on exams.
Telephone conference with Wade L. Woodard and Budge; wo~k on exams and timeline.
Telephone conferences with Budge and Wade L. Woodard; work on exams of Cliff and Schamp.
~eeting with Messmer; prepare for mock trial.
Mock trial.
Final draft on Bruce exam.
Work on Bruce exam; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding IT issues.
Prepare for trial; meeting with Prochaska.

TAB

5.5

Prepare for trial

TAB

11.1

Prepare for trial; and prepare Henson

---------

8/17/2011

·---

-----

8/18/2011

-------··-·-

--

-------------

----------
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Staff

HRS

Description

8/19/2011
---------·---8/20/2011
8/21/2011
8/22/2011
8/23/2011
8/24/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

10.9
12.2
9.9
14.3
10.8
12.9

Prepare for trial; meeting with Prochaska
------Prepare for trial and review of Giles deposition
and work on exams
Prepare for trial,
------·--------Meeting with Giles and work on exams
Continued preparation of Giles, and prepare other exams
Meeting with Chris Anton; conferences with BrentS. Bastian and meetings with Wade L. Woodard regarding order of proof.

8/25/2011
8/26/2011
8/27/2011
8/28/2011
8/29/2011
8/30/2011
8/31/2011
9/1/2011
9/2/2011
f-----'-9/3/2011
9/4/2011
9/5/2011
------9/6/2011

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

11.2
7
12.6
10.5
8.4
10
11
9.5
11
12.5
10.1
14.2
12.7
13.2
12.1
12.3
10.1
6.1
11.5
10.2
7.1
11.4
12.1
5.5
11.1
10.2
8.5
9.2
4.8

--~-

-~---

005105

9/7/2011
9/8/2011
9/9/2011
9/10/2011
9/11/2011
9/12/2011
9/13/2011
9/14/2011
9/15/2011
9/16/2011
9/17/2011
9/18/2011
9/19/2011
9/20/2011
-- ---------------.
9/21/2011
--------------9/22/2011

~----

TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB
TAB

Prepare fort~~!~---Meet with Messmer; prepare exams and conference with Wade L. Woodard
Work on exams
and other trial preparation
- -----Prepare
for
trial
-----------Prepare for trial and work on timelines
Work on exams and meetings with trial team regarding witness order and scheduling
Meeting of counsel and heari~g; prepare for trial
Work on questionnaire, exhibit stipulations and work on voir dire. Prepare for trial
Prepare for trial
Review motions, assign work to team and prepare for trial
Work on opening statement; conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding same; wor_k_~n voir dire
Prepare for trial
Opening statement, timelines, prepare fro trial
-----Trial and work on exams
Trial and work with----Prochaska
Prepare for and attend trial

---------------------------------------

-

Prepare for and attend trial
Work on exams; prepare for trial and telephone conference with experts
Work on exams and other trial preparation
Prepare for and attend trial
Prepare for and attend trial
Trial and work on exams
Work on exam of Bruce
Attend trial and prepare for Cliff
--·
Work on exhibits for Bruce exam
Finalize exam of Bruce
Attend trial and work on exam
Attend trial and work on exam of Bruce
further exam of Bruce and Schamp
Attend trial; gather exhibits for -----------------Prepare for trial
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005106

9/23/2011 TAB
9/24/2011 TAB
9/25/2011 TAB
9/26/2011 -- TAB
9/27/2011 TAB
9/28/2011 TAB
9/29/2011 TAB
9/30/2011 TAB
10/1/2011 TAB
-----10/2/2011 TAB
10/3/2011 TAB
10/4/2011 TAB
10/5/2011 TAB
10/6/2011 TAB
10/7/2011 TAB
10/8/2011 TAB
10/10/2011 TAB
10/11/2011 TAB
10/12/2011 TAB
10/13/2011 TAB
TAB
10/14/2011
------10/15/2011 TAB
10/16/2011 TAB
10/17/2011 TAB
10/18/2011 TAB
10/19/2011 TAB
------10/20/2011 TAB
10/21/2011 TAB
---·
10/22/2011 TAB
10/23/2011 TAB
10/24/2011 TAB
10/25/2011 TAB
10/26/2011 TAB
10/27/2011 TAB
10/28/2011 TAB
10/31/2011 TAB

HRS

Description

11.1 Attend trial and meet with witnesses
-------------9.2
Prepare for Schamp exam
7.7
Prepare for Schamp exam
---------·Attend trial and meet with trial team after trial
9.2
11.1 ---- -Meet with witnesses and attend trial
9.9 -------- _Meetings with Wade L. Woodard and BrentS. Bastian regarding witness exams and attend trial
--------------Work with Wade L. Woodard on his exams and Prepare further exam ()f J._ Cliff.
9.3
9.2
Attend trial
-----------Meetings with Wade L. Woodard regarding motion practice and get re_ady for other witness exams
8.8
Work on trial preparation; meet with witnesses
5.4
Attend trial; meet with team regarding witness preparation
9.9
-- ---·- ------ --- -----------Prepare for and attend trial
11
------------------5.1
Attend trial and meet with witness
--------Prepare for Friday witnes~es (Traughber, Hopkins, etc)
4.4
10.3 Prepare for and attend trial
----7.7
Meetings with experts and get ready for exams on Tuesday (Gil~s, Jeffcoat, Havlina)
Prepare for trial
6.6
10.2 Prepare for and attend trial
- -------------------Attend trial and work on direct exams
9.1
8.9
Get ready for expert examination
---10.7 Prepare for and attend trial
-------3.3
Prepare for Chamberlain
5.9
Meeting with expert and work on exams
-----.
8.8
Attend trial
---------------------·
10.8 Prepare for and attend trial
-------7.2
Prepare for and attend trial
---12.8 Prepare for trial and cross exam
-11.1 Attend trial and prepare cross
-----10.7 Work on cross for McCarthy
-----------Prepare for trial (work on cross exams)
5.9
------14.9 Attend trial; prepare for McCarthy
----··-- ------10.1 Attend trial; work on jury instructions
--·-10.7 Jury instruction conference; work on closing
------12.8 Work on closing
·---12
Finalize closing argument and attend trial
----------1.5
Attend verdict and respond to questions from court
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HRS
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11/8/2011

TAB

2.5

11/9/2011

TAB

1.4

Review brief regarding disgorgement and conference with Wade L. Woodard and Dara Parker; review findings and
conclusions conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding various post trial issues.
Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding post-trial matters and disgorgement; conference regarding interview of jurors.

11/15/2011 TAB

1.4

11/16/2011 TAB

2.9

-~--

--

Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding correspondence to SARMC board and recommendations to MRIA board
regarding mediation; final edits on memorandum.
Board meeting; telephone conference with Gjording regarding mediation; conference with BrentS. Bastian and Wade L.
Woodard regarding disgorgement.

--

12/8/2011

TAB

--------------- - -

--

0.7 - - Conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding argument on judgment/disgorgement award
1031

"----------~------

--~~-

1/2/2008
1/22/2008
1/28/2008
1/30/2008

Work on issues and strategies re objection to acceptance of remittitur; conference
with Thomas A. Banducci re same.
WLW 0.3
- - -1---WLW 0.2
Conference with Mark Dailey reappeal
WLW 0.6
Review order regarding costs and fees; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; telephone call to Dr. Prochaska
regarding same; work on amended judgment
WLW 0.6
Work on issues regarding calculation of costs, affidavit regarding same and amended judgment; conferences with Lauren
Blaesing and Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; review revised order from court regarding same

2/1/2008

•

----

WLW 1.8

Prepare Second Amended Judgment; work on affidavit regarding costs and fees; conferences with Lauren Blaesing regarding
same; work on appeal issues and research regarding same

WLW 0.4

Finalize amended judgment; work on affidavit regarding costs; work on issues regarding amending the record for

WLW 4.1

Work on issues regarding supplemental record; research regarding various standards of review for appeal and draft brief
sections regarding standards
--------Work on appeal; research regarding same; review objection to judgment; work on response to same; conferences with

~---

2/4/2008
2/5/2008
--~---

----

~-

2/6/2008

WLW 1.9

2/13/2008

WLW 3.4

2/14/2008

WLW 0.7

Lauren F. Blaesing regarding same
_____ ____
Research regarding post-judgment interest when a remittitur is entered; prepare objection to SARMC's proposed judgment
,

-

--

----

Work on issues regarding appellate record and confirming accuracy ofthe record; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing
regarding

2/19/2008
1--'--2/20/2008

appeal;_~

WLW 0.7
WLW 0.8

sa~e;

research regarding appeal

- - - - - - - - - - -

Research regarding appeals issues; conference with Brian Knox regarding sam~
------Work on issues regarding appeal; conference with TAB regarding same; conferences with Thomas A. Banducci and Brian Knox

005107

regarding research projects and regarding admissibility of March 28 offer to sell letter; research regarding appeal issues

t--------

2/22/2008

WLW 0.9

-~J

2/26/2008 WLW 0.8
2ii7/l.oo8 '1WLW 1.2

Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding settlement negotiations with Jack Gjording; research regarding alleged errors
in admitting certain exhibits; conference with Dari Huskey regarding Giles notes
Research regarding appeal issues; conference with Brian Knox regarding same
Work on issues regarding supplementing records; research regarding various appeal issues
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2/28/2008
3/18/2008
3/18/2008
3/19/2008

WLW 1.5
WLW 1.2
WLW 0.3
WLW 0.5

3/31/2008
4/1/2008

WLW 0.7
WLW 0.5

---

4/3/2008
4/10/2008
4/28/2008
5/12/2008
_,
5/13/2008
5/15/2008
5/19/2008
____
5/20/2008

__:__

6/10/2008
6/13/2008
6/23/2008
6/27/2008

HRS

--

WLW 0.4
WLW 1.9
WLW 0.3
WLW 2.3
WLW 0.7
WLW 0.5

Description

Research regardingappeal issues.

I
I

--

Prepare for and attend Board meeting.
----------------Work on issues related to CDweb.
-Work on issues related to CDweb; review proposed letter to St. Al's; telephone conference with Jim Prochaska; analyze
message from St. Al's regarding same.
Conference with Brian Knox regarding fiduciary duty research; work on matters re~arding appellate issues and research
Research regarding appeal issues; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding appeal issues; conference with Lauren F.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

----~

Blaesing regarding record.
Research regarding appeal.

---

·-

-

~~-

Research regarding failure to object to Jury Instructions
Research regarding various appeal issues
Research regarding appeal issues
work on appeal research
Work on issues regarding record

WLW 7.2
WLW 4.3
WLW 1.3
WLW 0.1
WLW 0.2
WLW 0.6

Work on issues regarding objection to record

WLW 0.7
WLW 0.9
WLW 0.3

Work on issues regarding appeal and record; conferences with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding sarT1~
Review transcripts for appeal
Conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding objections to record; review SARMCs objections; work on matters regarding

-

-----

Work on appeal
-~---

same
7/15/2008

WLW 0.6

Work on appeal; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding organizing the record; telephone conference with Jim
Prochaska regarding status of appeal

7/15/2008

WLW 0.3

Work on objections to record; letter to Jack Gjording regarding same; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding same

7/16/2008

WLW 0.5

Telephone conference with Jack Gjording regarding objections to record; revise stipulation; telephone call with Jack Gjording
regarding same.

---·--

--~---------

r--------

005108

7/17/2008

c-----

7/18/2008
7/22/2008
7/24/2008
7/30/2008

---

WLW 1.1
-----

WLW 0.3
WLW 0.3
WLW 0.2
WLW 1.8

•

----~-~-----

~-----

6/30/2008
7/11/2008
7/14/2008

---

Review trial transcript of Sandra Bruce.
Work on issues regarding record; conference with Lauren F. Blaesing regarding same; work on brief.
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding appeal; review trial transcripts
Work on appeal issues

--

Work on objections to record; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; work on strategies regarding same;
telephone calls with Jack Gjording regarding stipulation.
Conference Tho111as A. Banducci regarding appeal and hiring Craig Lewis; work on appeal.
---·-·-···--------·-

Telephone calls from and to Jack_ Gjording regarding hearing on o_bjection to rec_ord; work on matters regarding same.
Work on issues regardi_l!_~~_ppeal and regarding retaining Craig Lewis
Prepare for and attend hearing; meeting with Jack Gjording regarding stipulation
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

7/31/2008
8/19/2008
9/1/2008
9/2/2008
9/3/2008
f--'-9/4/2008
9/9/2008
9/15/2008
9/16/2008
9/17/2008
9/18/2008
9/22/2008
9/23/2008
9/24/2008
9/24/2008
9/25/2008
9/26/2008
9/27/2008
9/29/2008
9/30/2008
10/1/2008

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

0.3
2.6
2.6
0.7
1.3
0.6
0.6
3.4
0.7
2.7
0.7
3.5
4.5
0.2
5.3
2.4
6.1
2.2
7
6.2
7.2

10/2/2008
10/3/2008
10/6/2008
10/7/2008
10/8/2008
10/9/2008
10/10/2008
10/13/2008
10/14/2008
---------10/15/2008
10/16/2008
10/17/2008
-···
10/20/2008
-10/21/2008

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
---WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

6.9
3.3
7.5
7.2
5.4
6.8
5.6
1.8
6.9
8.4
7.3
3.6
7.2
7.2

Review and revise stipulation regarding record; telephone conference Jack Gjording regarding sa~e
··--Review trial transcripts for appeal arguments.
--------·
Review transcripts.
- - - - - · - · - · - - - - - - T - - ---------.
--·
Review trial transcripts.
Review trial transcripts.
-------------··-·
Review transcripts.
-----Telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding strategies for appeal.
Work on response to appellant's brief; telephone conference Jim Prochaska; email with Craig Lewis.
Work on response brief.
--~~-~
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding strategies for response brief; work on sa_me.
Work on response brief.
Work on appeal brief; telephone conference with Craig Lewis regarding same.
Work on appeal brief; conferences with Thomas A. Banducci regardi~_~ame.
Emails with Angie Driessen regarding settlement; emails from Mark Geston regarding same.
Work on arguments regarding wrongful dissociation; review transcripts.
··---------·Work on appeal brief.
··-----Work on appeal.
Work on appeal brief; telephone conferences with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Work on appeal brief; meetings with Thomas A. Banducci regarding strategies.
----Work on appeal brief
Work on appeal brief; telephone conference with Jack Gjording regarding extension; conference with Thomas A. Banducci
regarding appeal strategies.
Work on appeal brief.
---Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
·Work on appeal.
"--------·-····-Work on appeal.
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal.
-----------····--Work on appeal brief.
--r--·
-Work on appeal.
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal. --·
Work on appeal.
Work on appeal brief.
Page 48 of60

r---~~-

~--

I

- -

•

-~-

005109

··-~----

•

EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

HRS

10/22/2008
10/23/2008
10/24/2008
10/25/2008
10/27/2008
10/28/2008
10/29/2008
10/30/2008
10/31/2008
11/1/2008
11/3/2008
11/4/2008
11/5/2008
11/6/2008
1----11/7/2008
11/10/2008
11/11/2008
11/12/2008
11/13/2008
11/14/2008
11/15/2008
11/17/2008
11/18/2008
11/19/2008
11/20/2008
1-------'---11/21/2008
1---"---·
11/22/2008
11/24/2008
1-----"12/15/2008

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

4.3
6.2
8
7
4.7
8.1
6.4
9.1
8.6
2.5
-8.3
6.2
6.6
7.2
9.3
6.6
4.1
5.2
8
2.9
0.6
8.3
9.2
10.7
10.2
9.8
7.5
5.2
0.2
386.8

.

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

Work on appeal brief.
IJI.IErk
Work
Work
Work
Work
Work

on
on
on
on
on
on

appeal
appeal
appeal
appeal
brief
appeal

brief.
brief.
brief.
brief.

-·
·-·

------

-----------------~~------·---

-----

~-----

---··---------------

---------------·

-··

-

-----

Work on appeal brie!__
Work on appeal brief
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief
Work on appeal brief
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on response brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on brief.
Work on brief.
·Work on appeal brief:_
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal brief.
Work on appeal.
Follow up E_~__ issues regarding SARMC's reply

005110

0.2
3.8
0.3
0.9
0.2

_, __________________

--·-·-

-

--------

-------

·--

-

----~-------·-

-·-

-

..· - · · - - · - - -

---·-----

---

--------

•

---~·

·--

-~

- ·---- ----------

-------------------------

- -

-------------------

----

------

·-·

-------------------·-··

---

-

--·-----

,

·-

1/31/2009 WLW
WLW
2/16/2009 -2/17/2009 WLW
2/20/2009 WLW
·------WLW
4/1/2009

Description

______

Emails with Jim Prochaska regarding briefing and hearing
--·
Work on and revise opposition to motion to strike.
Finalize opposition to motion to strik~; telephone conference with Jim Prochaska regarding status of case.
Finalize response to motion to strike.
Review order from Supreme Court regarding motion to strike.
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Date

Staff

HRS

4/2/2009 -- WLW 0.1
t---WLW 0.3
5/14/2009 t------6/29/2009 WLW 0.2
--'---WLW 0.3
8/6/2009
----~

Description

Correspondence from Supreme Court regarding hearing.
" - - - - - - - - - - - - - " "___ __ - - - · - · - regarding status of case.
Telephone conference with Joe Messmer
-Draft letter to limited partners regarding appeal
"--------Review Supreme Court press release; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same and regarding preparing for
hearing.
Prepare for oral argument.
-"-------Prepare for oral argument.
--"
Prepare for and attend oral argument; meeting with clients regardin_g same.
Emails from Jim Prochaska regarding St. Al's purchase of ~ercy; work on issues regarding same.
Review deci~ion and order and work on strategies regarding same.
Review opinion; work on strategies regarding same; telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regardin[_sam':_·____
Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner regarding MRIM transaction.
-------"-Work on strategies regarding claiming damages for the limiteds.
_" _________________
"

~--

--"·----"---------"-~--"---

--

--

8/17/2009 WLW
8/18/2009 WLW
-----8/19/2009 WLW
WLW
9/2/2009
- - - - - --10/26/2009 WLW
10/27/2009 WLW
10/29/2009 WLW
---12/17/2009 WLW

4.4
9
6
0.2
2.2
0.6
0.5
0.6
29.8

--~

-

•

-------~---------"-

--------

---"-""

Meeting with juror from first trial; meeting with Jim Prochaska regarding settlement issues.
Telephone conference with Jim Prochaska regarding Stoel Rives conflict issue; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding
same.
-"-Telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding disqualifying Judge Neville; telephone conference to Jim Prochaska
/2010[ WLW 0.2
regarding same.
r-------------" - - - " - ! - - - " " - - - - - - - " - - - - " - - Work on issues regarding whether to strike Judge Wetherell.
1/28/2010 WLW 0.3
Telephone conference
with counsel from Stoel Rives regarding CHI/Trinity transaction.
1/28/2010 WLW 3.2
r-WLW
Work
on
strategies
regarding
striking Judge Wetherell.
0.3
1/29/2010
--WLW 1.5
Telephone conference with Don Ayers and Jack Gjording; work on i~sues regarding damage~ un~r Pope.
2/3/2010
-------with
Margaret
Kushner
regarding
issues
regarding
extension
of
the
lease.
Emails
WLW
0.4
2/3/2010
f---'--'----WLW 0.3
Work on strategies for extending the partnership term of the limiteds.
2/4/2010
Correspondence with Margaret Kushner regarding partnership term issue; research regarding same.
WLW 0.4
2/4/2010
"----Work on 3rd amended counterclaim.
3/22/2010 WLW 2.1
Review memorandum regarding joinder of limiteds; research regardingsame; work on strate~ies_!:_~garding same. - - - - - "
4/13/2010 WLW 2.1
Research regarding Pope requirements and testimony at the first !rial.
4/14/2010 WLW 1.2
-----""WLW
0.5
Review motion to strike; conference with Dara Labrum regarding strategies regarding same.
4/20/2010
"------"--""-Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding status conference.
4/27/2010 WLW 0.2
WLW 0.4
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding status conference and strategies for same. - - - - 5/5/2010
Prepare for and attend hearing; work on related matter; work on expert issues regarding Pope.
WLW 3.6
5/7/2010
1/20/2010
1/25/2010

WLW 2
WLW 0.3

+----

------------~----

l;i7

----

" - - - -

"

~-

"--

005111

-----~----
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HRS

Date

Staff

5/10/2010

WLW 2.1

--

Correspondence with Charles Wilhoite and Bruce Budge regarding the effects of Pope on their reports; work on strategies for
dealing with Pope; email to Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; review opinion and Pope as well as expert reports.
-'---

5/11/2010 WLW 1.8
c--------5/19/2010 WLW 0.6
5/21/2010 WLW 3.1
6/11/2010
6/15/2010

Description

WLW 0.4
WLW 1.5

1-------

--

_ _ _ _________
"

J

Work on dealing with the Pope decision and its affect on MRIA's damages analysis.
--Telephone conference with Bruce Budge regarding damages issues; analyze Pope and work on matters regarding same_._ _
Prepare for meeting with Bruce Budge; review issues regarding Pope and evidence regarding same; meeting with Bruce
Budge regarding revising expert reports; l!l_~~ting with Jim Prochask~_regardin~ status of c~se a~d case_ strategies.
Review letter from Don Ayers; draft response to same.
------Correspondence from Don Ayers; emails with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; prepare for and attend MRIA board
meeting. -------------------

j

-··----~----

6/29/2010
7/1/2010
7/2/2010
7/6/2010

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

7/7/2010
7/8/2010
7/12/2010
7/13/2010
7/20/2010

WLW 0.9
WLW 0.3
WLW 0.2
WLW 0.2
WLW 1.1

0.6
0.5
0.8
0.9

Work on response to motion to strike; conference with Dara Labru~ regarding sa !_!I~-------------------------Work on response to motion to strike; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regardi_ng same.
----Revise response to motion to strike. - - ··------------------Review SARMC reply ISO motion to strike; research regarding new arguments raised in same; conference with Dara Labrum
and Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
Prepare for hearing and research regarding same; provide input on discovery requests; work on Pope issue.
--Assist in preparing for hearing.
-------------Conference with Dara Labrum regarding hearing and scheduling issues; work on same.
-Review order; work on issues regarding briefing schedule.
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding case strategies; work on Pope issues; telephone call from Jim Prochaska
regarding meeting.
---------------------------------Research regarding Pope issues.
-----------Work on Pope issues.
Work on Pope issues.
--Research regarding Pope issues.
··-----------Work on Pope issues.
Work on Pope issues.
-Work on Pope issues.
-------------··
Work on Pope issues.
-----Work on Pope issues; conference with BrentS. Bastian and Thomas
A. Banducci regarding partnership for term issues.
Review motions for SUf!1mary judgment; work on strategies for responses to same.
Work on response to motions forsummary judgment.
------------Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
______________ ________
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
·----Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
-Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
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7/21/2010 WLW
7/22/2010 WLW
!------7/26/2010 WLW
7/27/2010 WLW
f---'-7/28/2010 WLW
7/29/2010 WLW
7/30/2010 WLW
WLW
8/2/2010
----WLW
8/6/2010
WLW
8/7/2010
----WLW
8/9/2010
8/10/2010 WLW
r--------

14.2

005112

1.1
4.2
5.5
3.3
3.9
6.9
5.8
2.3
2.2
7.2
8.3
8/11/2010 IWLW 8.5
8/12/2010 WLW 6.6
8/13/2010 WLW 9.2

--------~---

-

--------

------------

-~------

,_,
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HRS

Date

Staff

8/14/2010
8/15/2010
8/16/2010

WLW 6.2
WLW 0.8
WLW 5.5

8/17/2010
-8/18/2010
8/19/2010

WLW 7.7
WLW 7
WLW 8.4

Description

Work on responses to motions for sum~ary judgment
Telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding motions for summary judgment; work on resp~rlses to same;
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment; meeting with Bob Bakes; meeting/telephone conference with
experts.
-··-·
Work on responses to motion for summary judgment.
·--·--··--·Work on responses to motion for summary judgment.
·-----·
-----Telephone conference with Margaret Kushner and Jim Prochaska regarding settlement; work on responses to motions for
summary judgment.
----Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
---Work on responses to motions for summary j~dgment
----Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
-----·
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
·------·
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
··-------- --··Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
_____ _____________
---Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
--·
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment.
Finalize oppositions to motions for summary judgment.
------------Conference with Thomas A. Banducci with settlem~nt; work on issues regarding $4.6 million.
------------Prepare for hearing; conferences with B~ent 5. Bastian regarding same.
-------Prepare for hear~ng.
---Prepare for hearing
---------------Prepare for hearing.
__
-------r--Prepare for hearing
------------------Prepare for hearing; m_eeting with Bob Bakes
-----Prepare for and attend hearing on motions for summary judgment; research regarding supplemental briefing requested by
the Court.
Research reg_arding issues raised by court at hearing regarding applicability of the old statute vs. RUPA.
Review new case regarding law of case; war~ on strategies regarding whether to submit supplem~~t~ authorities.
Review motion regarding discovery and experts; conference with Dara Parker regarding response to same.
- ---------Work on issues regardin~settlement strategies and response to motion for discovery. --------------------~---------

8/20/2010 WLW
8/21/2010 WLW
8/23/2010 WLW
8/24/2010 WLW
f---8/25/2010 WLW
f---'--8/26/2010 WLW
8/27/2010 WLW
8/28/2010 WLW
8/30/2010 WLW
WLW
9/3/2010
9/17/2010 WLW
9/21/2010 WLW
9/27/2010 WLW
9/28/2010 WLW
----···--9/29/2010 WLW
9/30/2010 WLW
10/1/2010 WLW

!---

5.5
7
8.2
6.9
4.2
8.1
7.6
2.8
7.1
0.3
1.1
0.6
0.8
6.3
6.8
7.6
f----5.8

·----

--

10/4/2010
10/11/2010
12/28/2010
----'--12/30/2010

f--

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

005113

1.2
0.6
0.4
0.5
238.2

·-·

--

,.

----~---------

_,_

---------

-----·--

------------

WLW 0.5
1/6/2011
1/10/2011--- WLW 1.9
1/11/2011 WLW 2.9

•

---

Wo~~-<:>n

-·-

issues regarding scheduling of trial; work on response to motion for disc:;overy.
Work on opposition to motion for discovery.
-------------Review transcripts for response to motion seeking discovery; work on response; review SARMC's proposed scheduling order.
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Staff

1/12/2011 WLW
r--1/18/2011 WLW
1/20/2011 WLW
1/26/2011 WLW
1/27/2011 WLW
1/28/2011 WLW

HRS

Description

2.2
2.1
0.4
0.5
0.4
0.9

Review record for evidence regarding damages to oppose motion for discovery; draft Prochaska affidavit.
Work on responses to motions for ~iscovery and scheduling order.
Work on opposition to motion regarding discovery.
---·------Revise opposition to motion for discovery.
-------Work on opposition to motion for discovery.
Telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding letter from SARMC; telephone conference with Jim Prochaska
I
regarding same; work on response to motion for fees.
--Research regarding authority of court on remand; revise objection to scheduling order
----------Revise and finalize opposition briefs.
Review SARMC's reply in support of motion for discovery; pre~re for hearing.
Prepare for hearing; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.
----------------------Prepare for hearing; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regardingsame.

1/31/2011 WLW 2.6
WLW 4.2
2/2/2011
2/7/2011
iWLW 0.8
2/8/2011
WLW
1.5
-WLW 0.7
2/9/2011
2/14/2011 WLW 1.1
WLW 0.2
2/15/2011
2/16/2011 WLW 0.3

_:__

-----~------------

-------------------~-------

Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding hearing and going forward strategies; work o~ m~!!_~~':_~~_r:_<:!i!l_~ same
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding bond issues.
------------Review scheduling order; work on issues regarding same; conference with Dara Parker regarding moving for clarification.
----------

----------------~-

2/17/2011
_______ _________
2/18/2011

.

,

WLW 0.5
WLW 1.4

-----

2/21/2011

WLW 3.1

-----

2/24/2011

WLW 1

Work on issues regarding motio!l_f~cl~rification.
Work on strategies regarding experts; research regarding time limitation cut-off; correspondence with Charles Wilhoite
regarding expert reports.
------···
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding expert opinions and strategies regarding same; research regarding alternative
damages theories; prepare new discovery requests; draft letter to Jack Gjording regarding discovery issues.
--Prepare for and attend meeting with Bruce Budge and Charles Wilhoite regarding damages; correspondence regarding same;
telep_~~_!le ca~~o

-----

Jack Gjording regarding scheduling_ issues.
-----.Prepare for telephone conference; telephone conference with SARMC's counsel regarding scheduling; conference with
Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; correspondence from experts; work on issues regarding bond.
Telephone conference from Bruce Budge and Drew Voth regarding expert report; email to Jim Prochaska regarding same;
corre_spondence with Chris Vergonis regarding revising stipulation; revise stipulation.
---------------------Meeting with Jim Prochaska.
Letter from Tom Dvorak; email to Jim Prochaska regarding same.
------ ·---------------~---

2/25/2011

WLW 0.9

3/2/2011

WLW 0.6

3/3/2011
3/4/2011
3/7/2011
3/7/2011

WLW 0.9
WLW 0.3
WLW 0.4
Letter from Chris Vergonis; work on issues re~ar~J-~~~a_'!l~--=--------WLW 3.7
Prepare for and attend meeting with Mike Rowe, Jim Prochaska, David Giles and Jack Floyd; prepare response to Tom Dvorak
regarding collection efforts.
----------WLW 0.2
Correspondence with Jim Prochaska and others regarding bond and payment of judgment.
WLW 0.5
Prepare letter to Chris Vergonis regarding discovery; work on issues regarding Eagle facility.

----------------------------~

005114

--

3/9/2011
r-3/10/2011

•

-

.
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HRS

Date

Staff

3/11/2011

WLW 1.2

Description

Telephone conference with Jim Prochaska regarding Westermeirer email; telephone conference with Margaret Kushner and
Jim Prochaska regarding same; revise email to Westermeier regarding same; email to Jim Prochaska regarding Dara Parker.

·----=::J

Finalize letter to Dvorka; work on new discovery requests.
3/14/2011 WLW 0.5
WLW
0.4
Work
on discovery requests.
3/15/2011
c - - - - - - - - -- ·
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding discovery issues; work on same; telephone call to Dara Parker regarding
3/16/2011 WLW 0.6
same; telephone call from Tom Dvorak.
------···
Work on discovery responses.
3/17/2011 WLW 0.4
Review and revise stipulation regarding stay of execution; telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same;
3/17/2011 WLW 0.5
telephone conference with Jim Prochaska regarding same; telephone call from Jack Floyd regarding same.
r---Finalize stipulation regarding judgment; letter to Tom Dvorak regarding same.
3/18/2011 WLW 0.4
Work on motion to compel; review and revise motion response to motion for summary judgment; conference with Thomas
3/18/2011 WLW 2.1
A. Banducci regarding case strategies.
·---·-f---Meeting with Giles, Prochaska and Floyd regarding case strategies; work on discovery issues.
3/21/2011· · - WLW 1.2
r--Revise stipulation; correspondence with Tom Dvorka regarding same.
3/21/2011 WLW 0.5
2.4
Revise response regarding motion for summary judgment.
WLW
3/22/2011
Work on response to motion for summary judgment.
3/23/2011 WLW 4
Finalize response to motion for summary judgment.
3/24/2011 WLW 1.5
-Revise response to motion for summary judgment; strategies regarding possible motions in limine; conferences with Thomas
3/25/2011 WLW 2.1
A. Banducci regarding same .
Work on discovery issues.
3/30/2011 WLW 0.2
WLW 0.3
Work on discovery responses.
4/1/2011
Revise motions in limine.
WLW 0.9
4/4/2011
..
-.
WLW
0.7
Work
on
discovery
matters.
4/8/2011
-'---'-----Finalize motions; work on expert reports.
4/11/2011 WLW 0.6
··Work on strategies for responding to the motions for summary judgment and in limine filed by St. Al's.
4/12/2011 WLW 2.9
··--Work on responses to motions filed by SARMC.
4/13/2011 WLW 4.5
Work on responses to motions; work on expert report issues; correspondence with Drew Voth regarding same. - - - - - - - · - · 4/14/2011 WLW 4.6
Work on responses to motions.
4/15/2011 WLW 3.7
··---·----·
Work on responses to motions in limine and motions for summary judgment; prepare affidavit of Jim Prochaska.
4/18/2011 WLW 2.8
Work on responses to motions for summary judgment ~nd motions in limine.
4/19/2011 WLW 5.1
----·---·-Work on responses to motions.
4/20/2011 WLW 4.4
----Finalize responses to motions.
4/25/2011 WLW 4.1
.....C.----···-----··--·---Work on issues regarding expert_!eports; research regardingfiduciary duty claims. - - - - - - - - - - - 4/26/2011 WLW 5.1
-···----------4/27/2011 WLW 3.3
work on damages strategies; telephone conference with Experts regarding same; separate telephone conference with Drew
Voth regarding usurping corporate opportunities; research regarding same
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Staff

4/28/2011 WLW
4/29/2011 WLW
r---5/2/2011- - WLW
~----WLW
5/3/2011
~-----~------

HRS

Description

3.5
3.9
3.9
0.9

Work on reply briefs; work on discovery issues; work with experts on reports

--·

Finalize expert reports; meet!ngs and telephone conferences with experts regarding same_
Finalize and serve expert reports.

· - - - - ·..· - -

---------------

-----------~--

---

Revise motion to strike; work on strategies regarding damage theories; email from Thomas A. Banducci regarding same;
telephone conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same.

- - --------

·---------

5/3/2011

WLW 0.5

5/4/2011

WLW 1.3

Review discovery responses; correspondence with Dara Labrum regarding meet and confer; correspondence and telephone

WLW 2.2

Work on issues regarding inadequate discovery responses; work on damages strategies; review motion to recuse and work

Review reply briefs; correspondence with Dara Parker regarding motion to compel; review Gjording Affidavit and work on
strategies regarding motion to strike.

·-----

--~~

co~ference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; work on damage theories;

---·--

5/5/2011

on issues regarding same

5/6/2011

--

WLW 2.4

Review motion to disqualify; correspondence with Thomas A. Banducci regarding same; work on strategies regarding

WLW 0.7

responseto sa"!le
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding discovery issues; correspondence regarding same; correspondence with

WLW 0.7

experts and telephone call from Bruce Budge; review ruling on motion for summary judgment.
Telephone conference with Charles Wilhoite regarding damag-~~ work on issues regarding theme;; conference with Thom-~0

- -

-----~-

5/9/2011
- -

5/10/2011

•

A. Banducci regarding same; work on discovery issues and responses regarding same; review and revise letter to court
regarding appeal.

I

--

----

5/11/2011
5/12/2011

WLW 0.5

Review and revise opposition to recusal.

WLW 2.8

Review discovery responses; work on issues regarding objections; review new discovery requests; work on responses;

5/13/2011
5/16/2011

WLW 2.6

Work on discovery responses; prepare for hearing.

WLW 4.3

Prepare for hearing; telephone conference with Drew Voth regarding supplement to report; emails with Jim Prochaska

--

conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding case strategies; prepare for hearing.

---

--

regarding same.

005116

5/17/2011
5/18/2011
5/19/2011
-6/2/2011
6/7/2011
-6/8/2011
6/9/2011
6/10/2011

r---_6/13/2011

----

WLW 5.8

Telephone ~all from Drew Voth re&arding changes to report; emails from client regarding hearing; prepare for hearing.
Prepare for and attend hearing; work on issue raised at hearing.

WLW 0.4

Work on supplement to expert report.

WLW 0.5

Work on discovery responses.

WLW 0.3

Work on discovery issues.

WLW 0.2

Follow up on status of discovery responses.

WLW 4.2

----·

-

-~

WLW 0.3
WLW 0.9

Conference with Jeri regarding_SARMC's motion to compel and work on issues regarding same.
Work on issues regarding motion to compel and SARMC's request to change our hearing date.
~---------

IWLW 1.8
6/14/2011 WLW 0.7

Work on responses to motion ~o shorten time and motion to compel.

I
6/15/2011 WLW 0.7

regarding reply regarding witnesses.

-

Conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding response to motion to compel; work on issues regarding same; work on strategies
-

Review and revise reply brief.
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EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

6/20/2011

WLW 2.2

----

HRS

Description

Strategy meeting with Thomas A. Banducci; work on reply regarding witnesses; work on issues regarding motion to compel.

··- --·

6/21/2011

WLW 1.2

6/22/2011

WLW 3.1

-----·

WLW 0.4
6/23/2011
- - - - - - -- - - WLW
0.7
7/1/2011
--

7/2/2011
7/5/2011

WLW 0.5
WLW 0.5

7/6/2011
7/7/2011
7/8/2011
7/9/2011
7/11/2011

WLW 1
WLW 0.9
WLW 0.6
WLW 1
WLW 0.7

Review rulings on motions; work on issues regarding same; telephone conference with Jim Prochaska; review McCarthy
report.
Review SARMC's expert report; work on issues regarding same; prepare for meeting with clients; attend MRIA board
meeting.
--·
Work on jury instructions; telephone call from Tom_Henson.
Work on issues regarding rebuttal expert report; telephone call from Bruce Budge regarding same; telephone conference
with Jack Gjording regarding depositions; review letter regarding settlement; work on issues regarding same.
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding SARMC's settlement offer; work on settlement strategies.
Conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding settlement and regarding case strategies; revise letter to clients regarding
settlement; work on issues regarding case strategies.
-Trial meeting_; prepare for trial.
Work on settlement and case strategies;_ conferences with ThomasA. Banducci regardin& same.
Work on causation strategies.
-·--Prepare for !!lock trial; meeting with Banducci's.
·--------Meeting with David Giles; work on trial strategies; correspondence and conferences with Thomas A. Banducci regarding
same.
Trial strategy meeting; prepare for trial.
Work on jury instructions.
Prepare for trial.
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding order of proof; review SARMC's proposed instructions; work on objections to
same; review transcripts.
-Attend strategy meeting; review transcripts.
------··---Review transcripts; work on evidentiary i~sues; work on damages issue and rebuttal.
----Prepare for trial.
Review transcripts; work on rebuttal report; prepare for mock jury.
----Prepare for mock jury.
Work on supplemental expert reports; attend trial strategy meeting; attend telephone conference with opposing counsel
regarding exhibits and witnesses; meetin~ with clients; telephone conferences with experts; prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial.
--------Work on expert issues; prepare for mock trial.
Finalize expert reports; work on exams; prepare for mock trial; work on causation issues.
----Prepare for and attend mock trial.
Deposition preparation with Wilhoite; telephone conference with Drew Voth and correspondence; work on Floyd
examination; work on exhibit issues; work on illustrative exhibits; review objection from St. Al's.
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WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

1.5
1.3
0.8
3.9

7/19/2011 WLW
7/20/2011 WLW
r--7/21/2011 WLW
7/22/2011 WLW
7/23/2011 WLW
---7/26/2011 WLW

6.6
7
7.2

7/27/2011
7/28/2011
7/29/2011
7/30/2011
8/1/2011

17.1
8
9.2
7.8
6.6

7/12/2011
7/13/2011
7/14/2011
7/18/2011

-

-----------

·-·-~"·----

- - - - - - - - - -
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WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

6.1
5
7.5

•

--------

•

EXHIBIT A
Date

Staff

8/2/2011

WLW 6.1
WLW 5.6
·-·
WLW 6.4

8/3/2011
8/4/2011

HRS

Description

Review transcripts; prepare ex~!!!~:__
__ _ _ _
Review St. Al's proposed S!ipulations; work on response to same; work onwitness exams.
___________________ _
Telephone conference with Charles Wilhoite; prepare for depositions; meeting with Holly Wallace and Jack Floyd; prepare for

hearings.
______________________ _
Prepare for hearings on motions; attend hearings;
prepare witness exams.
!¥S/20~.!_~LW
18.3
----+-------+---- - - - - - - - ····-------------8/8/2011 -+--+----1-Prepare
,WLW 17.6
for depositions; telephone conference with Charles Wilhoit~_:----------~---·
_______ _
1------·
IWLW 114.2 Travel to Portland; meet with Charles Wilhoite; defend deposition of Charles Wilhoite; travel to Seattle; prepare for
8/9/2011
deposition of Bruce Budge.
meet with Bruce Budge
and Drew Voth; review transcripts.
Prepare for deposition of Bruce Budge;
8/10/2011 ~LW 17.4 ___ \.
Prepare for and ~efend deposition of~_ruce Budge; ~ravel to Boise; prepare for mock t~ial.
~/11/2011 WLW 8.1
.
Prepare
for meeting with
for mock trial;-------work on damages issues.
WLW
6.2
8/12/2011
---+
-- Joe Messmer; meeting with Joe Messmer; prepare
--·
·-··---in mock trial.
WLW
7- - - - -Participate
8/13/2011
t
+
t
·
·
----f---'6.5
__
Meeting
with
Jack
Floyd_
and
Holly
Wa_llace;
review
exhibits.
8/15/2011
------------------1
Prepare for trial; meeting with Jim Prochaska; letter to Jack Gjording; email to experts regarding demonstratives; work in
8/16/2011
exams.
18/22/2011
IWLW 17.9
Meet with witnesses; prepare for trial.
---~---+
. -~----------------------------------Meeting with Holly Wallace; work on demonstrative exhibits; telephone conferenc_e with Charles Wilhoite.
~/23/2~WLW I_?~
8/24/2011 WLW 9.1
Work on exams; work on demonstratives; review order regarding motions.
--+----+-----Work
on timelines; objections to exhibits; interview of Joe Messmer.
8/2S/2Q!!_lwLw ~7~
8/26/2011 WLW 8.7
F~~ting with Holly Wallace and Jack Floyd; work on timelines; objections to exhibits and_witness exam~~
---····
8/27/2011 WLW 7.7
___________
Review St. Al's demonstrative; work on expert issues; work on witness exams and IT timeline.
Prepare
exams;
research
regarding
stark
and
antikickback;
work
with
experts
on
damages.
WLW
8.3
8/29/2011
-------'---······-------I
Attend ques!ionnaire hearing; attend meeting of counsel regarding stipulations; prepare for trial. _ __
8/30/2011 WLW f9.3
1----'-------Work on jury questionnaire and conference with opposing counsel regarding same; work on exhibit stipulations and letter
8/31/2011 WLW 9.9
.

-----

.

•

--~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~----~~--

--+-LWJB.

regarding sam_~; prepare witness exams; work on voir dire questions~ review motion filed ~y St. Al's.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare for trial; prepare for and attend hearing; review new motions filed by SARMC.
Prepare for trial.

----

005118

WLW.
9/1/2011
9/2/2011
WLW
----~9/3/2011
WLW
9/4/2011
WLW
!---'--9/5/2011
WLW
WLW
9/6/2011
WLW
@[7/2011
WLW
9/8/2011

6.9

f--

8.8
8.3
14.9
5
10.8
11.2
9.8

------~~---------~-----

--r-1P_re~pare for trial.

111,1

9/9/2011_flfJLW
9/10/2011 WLW 6.7
9/11/2011 lwLW 15.6

Work on o_pening statements; work voir dire.
P_repare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial; interview _witb potential witnesses.___________
Interview witnesses; work on opening; prepare exams.
1P~epare for and attend trial.
Prepare
for trial; - telephone calls with experts; work on exams.
Witness preparation with Jack Floyd.
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Date

Staff

9/12/2011
.
9/13/2011
9/14/2011
9/14/2011
--9/15/2011
9/16/2011
·---9/17/2011
9/18/2011
9/19/2011
9/20/2011
.
9/21/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
-WLW

----'---'·

--

-

9/22/2011
9/23/2011
'--'--'
9/24/2011
9/25/2011
9/26/2011
9/27/2011
9/28/2011
r----9/29/2011
9/30/2011
----·
10/1/2011
------10/2/2011
10/3/2011
f-10/4/2011
10/5/2011
10/6/2011
10/7/2011
110/8/2011
10/9/2011
r---·
10/10/2011
10/11/2011
~-

005119

10/12/2011
10/13/2011
10/14/2011
---···
10/15/2011

- - - - - -

HRS

Description

I

Prepare for and attend ~rial.
--Prepare for and attend trial; work on strategies regarding Bushi.
-····-----------Prepare for mediation.
Prepare for and attend trial; work with witnesses.
Prepare for trial.
-- · · - - - - · - - · - - - .
Prepare for and attend trial.
------------Prepare for trial.
...
Work on opposition to exclude damage theories.
----------Prepare for and atte~d trial; work ondamages opposition and prepare for hearing.
..
-·-··---Prepare for and attend trial; prepare_for hearing on experts.
----Prepare for and attend trial; prepare for and attend hearing regarding damages experts; work on issues regarding research
regarding mistrial.
1------- --=WLW 4.5
Attend trial meeting; work on ~itness exams: ___
-·-----·
WLW 10
Prepare for and attend trial.
______
WLW 4.5
Work with witnesses.
..
WLW 2
Work on witness exams.
----WLW ---10.9 Prepare for and attend trial.
WLW 12.5 Prepare for and attend trial; meetings with witnesses.
--WLW 9.7
Prepare for and attend trial; work on motion in limine; work on witness exams
·------Prepare witnesses; work on expert issues
WLW 9.3
----·
-------------·
WLW 10.3 Prepare for and attend trial.
...
. ----------------------WLW 7
Prepare for trial; work on motions.
---------WLW 5.8
Prepare for trial; work on motions.
·--·
---------·
Prepare for and attend trial; work with witnesses.
WLW 13
------------WLW 10.9 Prepare for and attend trial.
WLW 11.1 Prep~re for and attend trial; work on expert issues; prepare witness exams.
·-------------WLW 7 - Prepare for trial.
-----WLW 10.2 Prepare for and attend trial.
·WLW 6.6
Meeting with Bruce
Budge;
work
on
witness
exams;
telephone
conference
with
Charles
Wilhoite.
--·-·
··--·----------------motions in limine.
WLW - -4.1
Prepare- for trial; work on
-....
··--WLW 10.4 Prepare for trial.
··-----------·-··WLW 13.1 Prepare for and attend trial; prepare for following day.
WLW 8.5
trial; work- on expert issues.
Prepare for and attend
.
-·--·--------------WLW 8.8
~ork on expert issues; meet with_~xperts.
WLW 11
Prepare fo~ and attend trial.
---WLW 7
Prepare cross exams.
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HRS

Date

Staff

10/16/2011
10/17/2011
10/18/2011
----·
10/19/2011
10/20/2011
10/21/2011
10/21/2011
10/23/2011
10/24/2011
10/25/2011
--------10/26/2011

WLW 7.3

--~---

~-----··

10/27/2011
10/28/2011
10/29/2011
10/30/2011
10/31/2011
11/2/2011
11/7/2011
------11/8/2011

----'-----~-

----···

11/9/2011
-·

·--~---------

----~----

-------·~~--~---

··-----

----

--~--

--~-------·

•

-----~---

------~-------

-~-~---------·

.

- --·

1--·

.

------~----~---·

···------~-------

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

1.3
2.7
2.2
3.4

005120

11/17/2011 WLW 2.2
11/18/2011 WLW 1.5
11/28/2011 WLW 0.3

··---------1

Work on attorneys' fees motion; conference with Dara Parker regarding strategies for responding to objections to findings of
fact.
·---~~-

f---

c----··

Prepare cross exams.
Prepare for and attend trial; work on cross-examinations.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial.
Prepare cross of Leslie Kelly Hall.
Prepare for and attend trial.
Prepare for trial.

WLW 14.5
WLW 11.8
------------.
·WLW 9.6
WLW
5.8
- - - r---WLW 6.5
WLW 11
-------------WLW 4.5
----[----·
WLW 13.5 ___Prepare f~~_nd attend trial; work on jury instructions; prepare for oral argument regarding directed verdic!: ________
WLW 10.5 -- Prepare for and attend trial;
r--WLW 10.3 Prepare for and attend jury instruction conference; research regarding issues regarding same; work on closing argument
issues.
WLW 9.5
Work on verdict form and jury instructions; work on briefs regarding same; review transcript for closing arguments and
for closing arguments.
otherwise
prepare
..
-- --.
---------WLW 11.5 Prepare for and attend trial.
WLW 0.5
Correspondence regarding exhibits.
--------WLW 0.5
Correspondence regarding exhibits; work on issues regarding same.
WLW 3.9
Work on issues regarding exhibits; work on post trial matters; work on~ttorneys fees; attend hearing for jury verdict - - - - - - - WLW 1.9
Work on issues regarding judgme~t; telephone calls from reporters; work on prejudgmen~ interest issue. ____________
WLW 3.3
Work on findings of fact regarding disgorgement:_ ____
WLW 3.5
Work on attorneys fees motion; revise findings of fact regarding disgorgement; meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding
same
WLW 3
Meeting with Thomas A. Banducci regarding strategies for settlement; review opposition to judgment; work on issues
regarding same; work on attorneys fees issues.

11/10/2011 WLW 1.1
11/11/2011
11/14/2011
11/15/2011
f-----'-11/16/2011

Description

------------~-

Work on objections to St. Al's request for offset and prejudgment interest.
..
Work on objection to offset and prejudgment interes!;_~ork on attorneys fees petition.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ---Work on settlement strategies_; finalize response brief regarding judgment;
..
-- --Work on response brief regarding judgment and disgorgement; conference with Thomas A. Banducci regarding settlement
strategies; attend board meeting.
..
---Work on response to judgment motion; work on issues regarding settlement; telephone call from David Giles regarding
sar:ne; telephone conference with reporter from Lawyers USA.
Work on response regarding disgorgement.
.
-----Review replies regarding judgment.
·-

.

, __

------~~-~-

----------

--~---~~--------
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Date

Staff

HRS

Description

11/29/2011
11/30/2011
12/9/2011
12/13/2011

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

0.6
0.3
0.6
0.6
951.7

Work on attorney's fees petition; conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding same.
Work attorneys' fees issues; conference _with BrentS. Bastian regarding same.
Review briefs; conference with BrentS. Bastian regarding hearing
Work on motion for fees

~'----

--

f---

·-·~-

~---

--··~-

---·-

•
•
005121
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EXHIBIT B
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EX. B: POST-TRIAL FEES INCURRED IN EFFORTS TO SECURE PRE-TRIAL FEES
Date

Staff Total Our Description
0.4 Revise draft of motion for attorneys fees and affidavits in support.
Meeting with co-counsel concerning attorneys' fees motion and affidavits; research of rules concerning deadlines and requirements for same;
1.8 conference with staff concerning attorneys' fees and costs.
3 Revise attorneys fees memorandum; revise affidavits in support; research concerning same.
2.9 Revise motion for attorneys' fees; revise affidavits and exhibits in support of same; conferences with staff concerning same.
Revise motion for attorneys' fees; conference with counsel concerning affidavit of counsel; revise same; revise other affidavits; conferences with
5.4 co-counsel concerning same.
Revise memorandum in support of attorneys' fees motion; research concerning same; revise affidavits in support of attorneys' fee motion;

1/20/2012 BSB
1/24/2012 BSB
1/25/2012 BSB
1/26/2012 BSB
1/27/2012 BSB

2.5 research concerning same; telephone conferences concerning same.
Revise motion for attorneys' fees; research concerning same; revise affidavits in support; execution of same; coordination of filing and serving
2.2 same.

1/30/2012 BSB
1/31/2012 BSB
2/13/2012 BSB

--

2 Research concerning attorneys' fees; conference with Dara Parker concerning same.

2/14/2012 BSB

7.5

2/15/2012 BSB
2/16/2012 BSB

2.1
0.3

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

7.1
2
5
5
4

2/20/2012
2/21/2012
2/22/2012
2/23/2012
2/28/2012

2/29/2012 BSB
3/1/2012 BSB
3/2/2012 BSB
3/5/2012 BSB
3/6/2012 BSB
3/8/2012 BSB
3/9/2012 BSB

005123

'

3/12/2012 BSB
3/13/2012 BSB
3/15/2012 BSB

Conference with Dara Parker concerning attorneys' fees issues and research concerning same; review of St. Alphonsus's opposition to MRIA's
motion for attorneys' fees; research of case law and file concerning same; draft of memorandum explaining arguments against same.
Legal research concerning arguments made in opposition to motion for attorneys' fees; draft of correspondence concerning same; telephone
conferences concerning same.
Telephone conference with Dara Parker concerning opposition to attorneys' fees motion.
Revise draft of motion to conduct discovery; research concerning same; revise draft of opposition to motion to disallow fees; research
concerning same; conference with co-counsel concerning same.
Revise opposition to motion to disallow fees; research concerning deadline for responding to same.
Revise opposition to motion to disallow fees and costs; legal research concerning same; review of file concerning same.
Revise draft of opposition to motion to disallow fees; factual and legal research concerning same.
Revise opposition to motion to disallow fees; research concerning same.
Revise draft of opposition to motion to disallow fees; review St. Al's motion to move hearing; draft of opposition to same; research concerning

9 same; review of St. Al's opposition to motion to open discovery as to fees and costs; research concerning same.
2.2 Research concerning opposition to motion to re-open discovery; begin draft of response to same.
4.9 Revise reply to motion for leave to conduct discovery; research concerning same.
Revise reply to motion for leave to conduct discovery; research concerning same; coordination with staff concerning filing same; revise
to motion to disallow fees; research concerning same.
opposition
1.8
Revise opposition to motion to disallow costs and fees; research concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard concerning strategy for
0.8 same; analysis of correspondence from court concerning moving hearing dates.
0.2 Review of case law cited in opposition to motion to disallow fees.
1.2 Revise draft of opposition to motion to disallow fees; research concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
Revise opposition to motion to disallow fees; factual and legal research concerning same; conference with staff concerning preparing same for
1.7 filing.
Revise opposition to motion to disallow fees; research concerning same; coordination with staff concerning same; arrange exhibits in
1 preparation for filing same.
0.7 Revise opposition to motion to disallow fees; coordination with staff concerning filing same.
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EX. B: POST-TRIAL FEES INCURRED IN EFFORTS TO SECURE PRE-TRIAL FEES
Date

3/20/2012
5/16/2012
5/17/2012
6/12/2012
6/13/2012

Staff Total Our Description

BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB
BSB

6/14/2012 BSB
6/19/2012 BSB
7/18/2012 BSB

2/14/2012
2/15/2012
2/16/2012
2/17/2012
2/20/2012
2/21/2012
2/23/2012
3/2/2012
5/16/2012
5/17/2012

DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP
DLP

1 Review of reply in support of motion to disallow; research concerning same; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same.
4.8 Review of order on costs and fees; calculate effect on cost bill; revise cost bill.
0.2 Conference with staff concerning revised fee affidavit.
1.5 Draft of response to objections to revised fee affidavit.
7.8 Continue draft of response to objection to amended affidavit of fees and costs; research concerning same.
Revise response to objections to fee affidavit; research concerning same; execution of same; conference with Wade Woodard concerning same;
1 coordination of filing same.

I

0.4 Review of reply in support of objections to fees; research concerning same.
0.5 Conference with Wade Woodard concerning amended fee petition; research concerning same; draft of e-mail to Kathy Savell concerning same.
93.9
0.6
5.1
7.3
5.1
3.9
6.9
0.9
0.1
0.3
0.1

Review SARMC response to attorney fees.
Research for and drafting of opposition to motion to disallow attorney fees and costs.
Draft opposition to motion to disallow fees and costs.
Research for and drafting of opposition to motion to disallow fees and costs.
Draft and edit opposition to motion to disallow fees and costs.
Draft opposition to SARMC's motion to disallow fees and costs; draft Thomas A. Banducci affidavit regarding the same.
Edit brief in opposition to motion to disallow fees/costs.
Review cost/fees motion.
Review order from court on attorney fees and costs.
Review calculation of new attorney fees for affidavit.

•

30.3
1/24/2012
1/26/2012
1/27/2012
1/30/2012

KAS

005124

KAS
KAS
KAS
3/23/2012 KAS
5/16/2012 KAS
5/18/2012 KAS
5/24/2012 KAS
5/25/2012 KAS
5/29/2012 KAS
7/19/2012 KAS

2/14/2012 TAB
2/16/2012 TAB

1.1
1.3
1.2
2.2
2.5
0.9
1.5
2.4
3.1
1.1
0.9
18.2

Work on attorney fees and costs affidavit and calculations.
Work on attorney fees and costs affidavit and calculations.
Work on attorney fees and costs affidavit; memorandum and calculations.
Work on attorney fees and costs calculations and affidavit.
Prepare for and attend hearing.
Review decision; revise costs per order.
Work on revising attorney fee exhibits.
Revise attorney fees and costs spreadsheet to reflect changes per court order.
Revise attorney fee affidavit and recalculate amounts due.
Revise exhibits to amended affidavit in support of attorney fees and costs; revise affidavit.
Calculate fees for JNOV and Motions to include in amended Motion for attorney fees.
-·

1.8 Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding petition for fees; edit and comment.
2.5 Conference with Wade L. Woodard regarding fee issue and review decisions for Jones Day fee petition.
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Date

Staff Total Our Description
4.3

1/30/2012
2/15/2012
2/16/2012
2/17/2012
2/20/2012
2/21/2012
2/22/2012
2/23/2012
3/5/2012

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW

WLW
WLW
WLW
WLW
3/6/2012 WLW
3/7/2012 WLW
3/16/2012 WLW
3/20/2012 WLW
3/21/2012 WLW
3/22/2012 WLW
3/23/2012 WLW
5/16/2012 WLW
5/17/2012 WLW
5/18/2012 WLW
6/12/2012 WLW

-

Review and revise attorneys' fees application.
Research regarding attorneys fees issues.
Research regarding motion to open discovery.
Work on response to motion to disallow fees.
Prepare motion for to take discovery; work on response to motion to disallow costs.
Finalize motion regarding discovery of rates; work on response to motion to disallow.
3.2 Revise response to motion to disallow.
0.4 Finalize opposition to motion to disallow.
2.5 Revise opposition to motion to disallow; revise reply regarding discovery of Jones Day rates.
0.2 Prepare for hearing.
0.1 Review order from court; work on issues regarding hearing.
0.1 Work on issues regarding hearing.
0.3 Prepare for hearing.
0.3 Prepare for hearing.
4 Prepare for hearing.
4 Prepare for and attend hearings.
4.3 Review transcripts; review order regarding fees; work on excising fees and costs to comply with order.

1.6
6.5
5.9
3.2
5.8
1

•

0.2 Work on revisions to requests for fees.
0.2 Work on revisions to attorneys fees request.
0.6 Work on issues regarding objection to amended fee request.
44.4

•
005125
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EXHIBIT C
005126

Date

Total Our

Rate/Price

•

EXHIBIT C
Description

Amt

•

Copies

2/29/2008
4/28/2008
5/29/2008
6/30/2008
7/14/2008
7/18/2008
9/17/2008
10/1/2008
12/1/2008
1/5/2009
3/6/2009
5/1/2009
8/4/2009
8/31/2009
10/30/2009
11/30/2009
2/28/2010
4/1/2010
5/1/2010
5/31/2010
6/30/2010

0.1
1
1
1
1
1
1
422
1
1
1
25
1031
2493
31
506
66
506
46
28
261

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

120.00
3.96
105.66
265.08
3,520.42
177.90
56.40
0.15
235.80
41.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20

7/31/2010
8/31/2010
9/30/2010
1/31/2011
2/28/2011
3/31/2011
4/22/2011
4/30/2011
5/31/2011
6/22/2011
6/30/2011
7/8/2011
7/31/2011
8/16/2011
8/31/2011
8/31/2011
9/14/2011
9/30/2011
10/31/2011
11/30/2011

568
1226
70
563
938
574
1
2477
770
5
975

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
72.39
0.20
0.20
1.00
0.20

13040 $

0.20

13772· $
9439 $
439 $

0.20
0.20
0.20

$12.00
$3.96
$105.66
$265.08
$3,520.42
$177.90
$56.40
$63.30
$235.80
$41.20
$0.20
$5.00
$206.20
$498.60
$6.20
$101.20
$13.20
$101.20
$9.20
$5.60
$52.20
$113.60
$245.20
$14.00
$112.60
$187.60
$114.80
$72.39
$495.40
$154.00
$5.00
$195.00
$87.01
$2,608.00
$128.88
$2,317.05
$2,502.40
$3,116.50
$2,754.40
$1,887.80
$87.80
-$500.00

Copy Charges - February
Document scanning and OCR
Copy Charges
Imaging blowbacks and binders
Copy Charges and bindering and trial transcripts
Imaging blowbacks with autofeed
Copy Charges and bindering
Copy Charges
Copy Charges - Litigation copying and binder
Copy Charges - litigation copying and binding
Copy Charges
Copy charges- April
Copy charges- July
Copy Charges August
Copy charges for October
Copy charges for month of November
Copy charges for February
Copy charges for March
Copy charges for April
Copy charges for May
Copy charges for June
Copy charges for July
Copy Charges for August
Copy September
Copy Charges for January
Copy charges
Copy charges for March 2011
Electronic Conversion and Bates numbering
Copy Print charges for April
Copy charges
Copying Charges -Color
Copy charges for June
Electronic Conversion of Documents for Trial
Copy charges for July
Copies of Exhibits
Electronic Conversion of Documents for Trial
Copies of Exhibits
Illustrative Exhibits for Trial
Copy charges for September
Copy charges for October
Copy charges for November
Costs as Matter of Right

$22,179.95

1

005127

•
8/27/2008
9/29/2008
2/26/2009
11/30/2009
4/30/2011

1
1
1
1
1

$
$
$
$

$

84.80
33.09
51.65
27.98
62.28

EXHIBIT C

$84.80
$33.09
$51.65
$27.98
$62.28

•

FEDERAL EXPRESS CHARGES
Fed Ex charges for July and August
Fed Ex
FedEx February
Fed Ex- November
Fed Ex charges- April

$259.80

7/19/2011
7/21/2011
7/21/2011

1
1
1

$
$
$

395.48
7.40
52.50

$395.48
$7.40
$52.50

7/22/2011

1

$

442.27

$442.27

7/22/2011

1

$

50.40

$50.40

7/22/2011

1

$

23.00

$23.00

7/22/2011

1 $

49.50

$49.50

8/1/2011
8/3/2011

1 $
1 $

541.23
20.95

$541.23
$20.95

8/11/2011
8/11/2011

1
1

$
$

360.04
142.68

$360.04
$142.68

8/11/2011
8/11/2011

1
1

$
$

34.50
168.00

$34.50
$168.00

8/31/2011

1

$

345.18

$345.18

8/31/2011

1

$

863.18

$863.18

TRAVEL
Travel -Airfare for Thomas A. Banducci to LA for
deposition of Dr. Thomas McCarthy
Travel - Meal for Thomas A. Banducci in LA during
Travel -Taxi for Thomas A. Banducci in Los Angeles
Travel - Lodging in LA for Thomas A. Banducci for
deposition of Dr. Thomas McCarthy
Travel - Meals in LA for Thomas A. Banducci during
deposition
Travel - Parking at Boise airport for Thomas A.
Banducci during deposition
Travel -Taxi in LA for Thomas A. Banducci for
deposition of Dr. Thomas McCarthy
Travel -Airfare for Wade L. Woodard to Portland
and Seattle for Budge and Wilhoite depositions
Travel insurance for deposition travel
Travel - Lodging for Wade L. Woodard in Seattle for
depositions
Travel- Meals for Wade L. Woodard in Portland
Travel- Parking for Wade L. Woodard at Boise
airport during depositions
Travel -Taxis in Portland and Seattle for Wade L.
Travel -Wade L. Woodard -Taxi, Meals, ParkingPortland & Seattle
Travel -Wade L. Woodard -Airline Travel & Lodging
for Portland & Seattle

$3,496.31

12/1/2007
12/17/2007
10/15/2008
11/20/2008
1/6/2009
1/6/2009

1
1
1
1
1
1

$
$
$
$
$
$

600.92
600.92
200.47
567.16
126.05
124.05

$600.92
$600.92
$200.47
$567.16
$126.05
$124.05

2

WESTLAW
Westlaw research, November
Westlaw charges November, 2007
Westlaw legal research for September
Westlaw legal research charges- October
Westlaw legal research charges - December
Westlaw legal research charges- November

005128

2/9/2009
3/5/2009
9/14/2009
11/1/2009
12/1/2009
2/1/2010
3/1/2010
4/1/2010
6/1/2010
7/1/2010
8/5/2010
9/22/2010
10/30/2010
1---2/28/2011
4/30/2011
5/31/2011
6/30/2011
7/31/2011
8/31/2011
9/30/2011
10/31/2011
11/30/2011

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

•

210.58
76.10
158.58
46.51
62.54
3.83
1.25
34.00
2.87
200.58
57.57
412.66
50.57
8.56
226.89
376.86
43.73
158.00
122.79
1,567.41
738.51 I
1,048.58

EXHIBITC

$210.58
$76.10
$158.58
$46.51
$62.54
$3.83
$1.25
$34.00
$2.87
$200.58
$57.57
$412.66
$50.57
$8.56
$226.89
$376.86
$43.73
$158.00
$122.79
$1,567.41
$738.51
$1,048.58

•

Westlaw legal research charges for January
Westlaw legal research fees - February
Westlaw legal research charges- August
Westlaw legal research October
Westlaw Legal Research November
Westlaw Legal Research January
Westlaw legal research
Westlaw charges for March
Westlaw charges for May
Westlaw charges for June
Westlaw charges for July
Westlaw charges for August
Westlaw charges for September
Westlaw charges for February
Westlaw charges
Westlaw Charges
Westlaw Charges for May
Westlaw Charges for June
Westlaw Charges for July
Westlaw Charges for the month of August
Westlaw charges for September
Westlaw charges for October

$7,828.54

12/16/2007
3/21/2011
4/18/2011
5/18/2011
6/22/2011
8/16/2011
9/20/2011
11/28/2011

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

980.00
1,732.50
912.50
742.50
6,435.00
9,307.50
11,904.17
29,458.21

$980.00
$1,732.50
$912.50
$742.50
$6,435.00
$9,307.50
$11,904.17
$29,458.21

12/16/2007
2/25/2011
3/21/2011
f-------'4/15/2011
5/10/2011
5/29/2011
7/12/2011
7/26/2011
8/9/2011
8/23/2011
8/31/2011
9/15/2011

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

4,460.00
7,500.00
1,154.40
936.00
25,001.60
6,650.09
215.87
3,042.00
9,505.60
7,388.41
2,106.00
62.49

$4,460.00
$7,500.00
$1,154.40
$936.00
$25,001.60
$6,650.09
$215.87
$3,042.00
$9,505.60
$7,388.41
$2,106.00
$62.49
3

EXPERT FEES
FTI Consulting Charges
FTI Consulting, Inc. February
FTI Consulting March
FTI Consulting April

FTI
FTI
FTI
FTI

Consulting for May services
Consulting July
Consulting August invoice
Consulting- Statement Through 10/31/2011

--

- -

Willamette Management Expert Fees
Willamette Management Associates
Willamette Management Associates.
Willamette Management Associates invoice
Willamette Management April invoice
Willamette Management Associates- May
Willamette Management Associates June invoice
Willamette Management Associates July invoice
Willamette Management Associates 7/31/11
Willamette Management Associates invoice
Willamette Management Associates 8/31/11
Willamette Management Associates 9/15/11

005129

•

10/12/2011

1 $

1,872.00

10/31/2011
11/30/2011

1 $
1 $

11,450.31
1,891.18

--

EXHIBITC

•

$1,872.00 Willamette Management invoice through 9/30/11
Willamette Mgmt- Statement for Period Through
$11,450.31 10/15/2011
$1,891.18 Willamette Management- Statement through
-$4,000.00 Costs for Experts as a matter of right

$140,708.33

$174,472.93

4
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OCT 03 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By BRADLEY J. THIES
DEPUTY

Stephen W. Kenyon
Clerk of Supreme Court
451 W State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720

In re: Saint Alphonsus v. MRI -Appeal, Docket No. 40012

Notice is hereby given that on Wednesday, September 26, 2012, I
lodged a transcript of 7, 788 pages in length for the above-referenced
appeal with the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial
District.
The following files were lodged:
02-09-10,02-17-10,05-07-10,07-09-10,08-04-10, 10-01-10,04-22-11,
05-18-11' 06-22-11, 08-05-11, 08-09-11' 08-30-11, 09-02-11, 09-09-11,
09-12-11 ' 09-13-11 ' 09-14-11 ' 09-16-11 ' 09-19-11 , 09-20-11 ' 09-21 ' 11 '
09-23-11 ' 09-26-11 ' 09-27-11 ' 09-28-11 ' 09-30-11 , 10-03-11 ' 10-04-11 ,
10-05 11 10-07-11 10-11-11 10-12 11 10-14 11 10-17-11 10-18-11
10-19-11, 10-21-11, 10-24-11, 10-25-11, 10-26-11, 10-28-11, 10-31-11,
03-23-12 , 08-24-12
1

'

,

'

'

'

'

,

,

'

Please apply all pages to Nicole Julson.

David Cromwell
Tucker & Associates
cc: kloertscher@idcourts. net
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court
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TO:

2

CLERK OF THE COURT, IDAHO SUPREME COURT
451 WEST STATE STREET, BOISE, IDAHO
FAX
( 2 0 8 ) 3 3 4-2 61 6

ocr OJ
CHRISTOPHER D. R
By BRADLEY J.

3

DEPUTY

ST. ALS DIVERSIFIED CARE,

Docket No.

40012-2012

4

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. CVOC-2004-11388

5

vs.

NOTICE OF LODGING

6

MRI ASSOCIATES,
7

Defendant-Respondent.
8

9

10

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT(S)

LODGED

11

12

Notice is hereby given that on August 30,

13

I lodged one

(1)

transcript,

totaling 68 pages,

14

the following dates/proceedings:

2012,
for

15
12-09-11

Motion Hearing

16
17
18

for the above-referenced appeal with the District Court

19

Clerk for Ada County,

in the Fourth Judicial District.

20
21

22

RPR,

CSR No.

72

23
24
25

005132

Clerk

ORIGit~AL

NO._=-~i'liilr".J-.J._LI..__£

AM. _ _

_,~iJYY::

ocr o• 2o12
CHRISTOPHER 0

By JAMIE RAN~H,

Clerk

0~

Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants/Appellants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,
Defendant-Respondent.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL- 1
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
CounterClaimants-Respondents,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
CounterDefendants-Appellants.
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho Limited
Limited Liability Partnership, MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership, and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited Partnership, AND THE
PARTIES' ATTORNEYS, BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC, 802
West Bannock St., Suite 500, Boise, ID 83702, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE
ENTITLED COURT:
Plaintiff-CounterDefendant Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and

CounterDefendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 17, hereby give notice of appeal as follows:

A.

DESIGNATION OF APPEAL: The above-named Appellants, Saint Alphonsus

Diversified Care, Inc. ("SADC") and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("SARMC")
(collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), appeal against the above-named Respondents MRI Associates,
LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership (collectively, "MRIA") to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment (entitled "8eeoaa Third Amended Judgment"),
entered in the above-entitled action on the~ 21st day of May September 2012 (the Honorable

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
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Michael Wetherell, District Judge presiding). Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(1), this
Notice of Appeal shall be deemed to include and present on appeal (A) all interlocutory
judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment, order or decree appealed from; (B) all final
judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment or order appealed from for which the time for
appeal has not expired; and (C) all interlocutory or final judgments and orders entered after the
judgment or order appealed from, including, without limitation, (i) the District Court's January
17,2012 Judgment, (ii) the District Court's January 17, 2012 Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, (iii) the District Court's April25, 2012 denial of Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial, (iv) the District Court's April30, 2012
Amended Judgment, aBd (v) the District Court's May 15, 2012 Order re: Costs and Attorneys'
Fees; (vi) the District Court's May 2, 2012 Second Amended Judgment; and (vii) the District
Court's September 21.2012 Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motions Heard August 24,
2012.
B.

AUTHORITY FOR APPEAL: Saint Alphonsus has the right to appeal to the

Idaho Supreme Court the judgments and orders described or incorporated herein pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rules 11(a)(l), (5), (6), and (7).
C.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL: The following

list of issues on appeal is preliminary in nature and is based upon such preliminary research and
legal analysis as could reasonably be conducted to date. Saint Alphonsus therefore reserves its
right to assert other issues on appeal.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
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1.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial, in its order dated April25,
2012, on the following grounds raised by Saint Alphonsus:
a. That MRIA failed to prove lost profits caused by Saint Alphonsus;
b. That MRIA' s proof of profits allegedly lost by MRI Mobile Limited was
insufficient as a matter of law;
c. That MRIA was not entitled to recover damages for profits lost after April
1, 2005, and otherwise failed to prove that any losses suffered after April 1,
2005, were based on wrongful acts as opposed to Saint Alphonsus's
rightful post-dissociation competition;
d. That MRIA was not entitled to recover damages for profits allegedly lost
to the Intermountain Medical Imaging facility located on the Saint
Alphonsus hospital campus;
e. That the jury's award overstated MRIA's damages because it included
amounts that would have been earned by Saint Alphonsus absent the
alleged misconduct;
f.

That MRIA was not entitled to recover damages for the alleged diminution
in value of MRI Limited Partnership because MRIA affirmatively
abandoned this claim prior to the first trial and its reassertion of the claim
during the second trial was untimely;

g. That MRIA failed to prove the asserted diminution in value or that such
diminution in value was caused by Saint Alphonsus;
h. That MRIA's claim for disgorgement was improperly and untimely pled;
1.

That MRIA's claim for usurpation was time-barred;

J.

That the District Court improperly failed to make independent findings of
fact and conclusions of law on the equitable issue of usurpation;

k. That MRIA's usurpations claims are not supported by substantial evidence
and are against the clear weight of the evidence;

1. That MRIA 's disgorgement-of-profits award was overstated by $11.2
million as a matter of law because it failed to account for the costs that
Saint Alphonsus incurred in order to obtain its profits;

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
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m. That the District Court erred in failing to require that damages be
apportioned between Saint Alphonsus and the third-party defendants for
MRIA's breach-of-contract claims, contrary to the requirements ofldaho
·law and the court's own prior ruling that "Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a
reduction in any damages awarded against it";
n. That the District Court erred in holding that apportionment of damages
should be decided by the jury rather than on a pro rata, 50%-50% basis;
o. That, in the alternative, the district court erred in requiring the jury to
determine relative fault separately for each cause of action (rather than
once for the body of joint wrongdoing) and in not requiring the jury to
allocate damages among the various causes of action asserted by MRIA;
p. That the District Court erred in allowing MRIA to amend its complaint to
add MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership as
parties following remand;
q. That the claims ofMRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited
Partnership were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations;
r. That the claims of MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited
Partnership were not supported by legally sufficient evidence;
s. That the District Court's order regarding the application of the law-of-thecase doctrine following the Supreme Court remand was erroneous and
unevenly applied to the parties, to Saint Alphonsus's prejudice;
t.

That the District Court erred in allowing the jury to determine the meaning
of the unambiguous 1997 and 2011 Radiology Services Agreements
between Saint Alphonsus and Gem State Radiology and to base its
liability findings on an incorrect interpretation of those agreements;

u. That the District Court erred in concluding that its erroneous exclusion (as
hearsay) of Cindy Schamp's testimony regarding her own prior statements
to MRIA witnesses was harmless error;
v. That the District Court erred in precluding Saint Alphonsus from
introducing, during the cross-examination of a witness, an Idaho Business
Review article that contradicted that witness's direct testimony;
w. That the District Court erred in holding, in an order dated July 20, 2011,
that Saint Alphonsus could not enforce its statutory right to examine the
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
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books and records of MRIA, thus preventing Saint Alphonsus from
offering relevant evidence ofMRIA's financial bias at trial;
x. That the District Court erred in refusing to exclude prejudicial language in
two memoranda by consultant Shattuck Hammond (Trial Exhibits 4234
and 4239);
y. That the District Court erred in precluding Saint Alphonsus from telling
the jury that its dissociation from MRIA was "rightful" under Idaho law,
per its order of June 13, 2011;
z. That the District Court erred in overruling Saint Alphonsus's objection,
made during trial on September 20,2011, to MRIA's counsel's
inflammatory argument that Saint Alphonsus would preclude care for a
hypothetical "little girl with a brain tumor";
aa. That the District Court erred in allowing MRIA to offer "rebuttal"
testimony by Dr. Stephen Wilson;
bb. That the District Court erred in allowing MRIA to introduce, on October
15, 2011, a double-hearsay statement into evidence as a means to
"impeach" Saint Alphonsus witness Jeff Cliffs inability to remember an
out-of-court statement made by another witness;
cc. That the District Court erred, on October 11, 2011, by admonishing Gem
State Radiology's attorney in front of the jury, to the prejudice of Saint
Alphonsus;
dd. That the District Court erred in issuing a judgment that did not award
Saint Alphonsus interest on its counterclaim at the 12% legal rate of
interest, running from the date of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation to the
date of payment.
Saint Alphonsus also appeals from all of the underlying decisions, orders, and
rulings referenced in its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or
new trial.
2.

Whether the District Court erred, in its April 25, 2012 order, when it declined
to order a new trial based on individual and cumulative prejudicial errors;

3.

Whether the District Court erred in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, dated January 17, 2012, when it summarily adopted the advisory jury
finding on usurpation liability, even though those findings were not supported
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by the evidence, and declined to subtract Saint Alphonsus's initial investment
from the total amount of disgorgement sought.
4.

Whether the District Court erred in declining to provide the jury with Saint
Alphonsus's proposed jury instructions and special verdict form dated July 15,
2011, or in the alternative, Saint Alphonsus's Redline of the Court's Proposed
Post-Evidence Instructions and Proposed Special Verdict Form, filed October
25, 2011, or the jury instructions proposed during the conference of October
26, 2011;

5.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus's October 17,
2011 Motion to Direct a Verdict on Claims Related to Enforcement ofthe
Radiology Services Contract;

6.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus's October 17,
2011 Motion to Direct a Verdict on MRIA's Damages and Disgorgement
Theories;

7.

Whether the District Court erred, in its order dated September 27, 2011, by
denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Exclude Damages Theories;

8.

Whether the District Court erred, in its Consolidated Order re: Motions Heard
August 5, 2011 (August 24, 2011), by:
a. Granting MRIA's Motion for Clarification re: Contentions that MRIA
Breached Fiduciary Duties;
b. Granting MRIA's Motion to Preclude Reference to Departing Partner's
Share;
c. Granting, in part, MRIA's motion to have the exhibits from the first trial
deemed admitted under law-of-the-case principles;
d. Granting MRIA's Motion to Exclude Mention of Saint Alphonsus's Nonprofit Status;
e. Granting MRIA's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Thomas McCarthy
in part;
f.

Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Reconsider, in part, the Court's
June 13, 2011 Consolidated Order re: Motions in Limine regarding Saint
Alphonsus's ability to refer to its dissociation as "lawful," and to redact
portions of Trial Exhibits 4234 and 4239.
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9.

Whether the District Court erred in denying, in an order dated July 20, 2011,
Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Compel Compliance with its Statutory Right to
Inspect MRIA's Books and Records;

I 0.

Whether the District Court erred, in its Consolidated Order of June 17, 20 II
re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May 18, 20 II, by:
a. Holding that, as a matter oflaw, Idaho Code§ 6-805(1) requires a jury to
apportion damages rather than apportioning damages equally among
defendants and settling co-defendants;
b. Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's
Third-Party Beneficiary Claims;

II.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus 's Motion for
Recusal, as memorialized in the Court's June 13, 2011 Memorandum of
Actions Taken at May 18, 20 II Hearing;

12.

Whether the District Court erred, in its June 13, 20II Consolidated Order re:
Motions in Limine Heard May I8, 20Il, by:
a. Granting MRIA's Motion precluding comment regarding the lawfulness of
Saint Alphonsus's dissociation;
b. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion to exclude portions ofTrial Exhibits
4234 and 4239;
c. Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of Saint
Alphonsus's competition after April I, 2005;

13.

Whether the District Court erred, in its November 16,2010 Memorandum
Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Motions for Judgment on Pleadings and
Motions for Summary Judgment by:
a. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion to dismiss MRIA's civil conspiracy
claim;
b. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment on the legal
insufficiency of MRIA's evidence of lost profits;
c. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion for judgment on the pleadings
regarding the claims of the limited partnerships;
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14.

Whether the District Court erred in its May 15, 2012 order denying in part
Saint Alphonsus's request to disallow MRIA's requested attorneys' fees and
costs.

15.

Whether the District Court erred in its September 21, 2012 order denying in
part Saint Alphonsus's request to disallow MRIA's requested attorney fees
and costs.

D.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT: Saint Alphonsus requests an entire standard

transcript of the trial proceedings in electronic format in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rules
17(h), 25(c) and 26(m). In addition, Saint Alphonsus requests transcripts of the following
proceedings:
1.

February 21, 2006 transcript ofhearing on MRIA's Motion for Leave to File
First Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

2.

June 6, 2006 transcript of hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Dismiss;

3.

October 24, 2006 transcript of hearing on all pending motions;

4.

November 13, 2006 transcript of Status Conference re: Trial Setting;

5.

January 11, 2007 transcript of Hearing on Motion to Allow Punitive Damages,
and Motion to Strike Shattuck Hammond Report; Motion to Strike Affidavit
ofProfessor Branson; Motion to Amend First Amended Counterclaim and
Third Party Complaint;

6.

April 17, 2007 transcript of Hearing on Third Party Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and Hearing Regarding Order of Proof;

7.

July 2, 2007 transcript of Hearing on all pending Motions for Summary
Judgment and Motions in Limine;

8.

August 1, 2007 transcript of all proceedings before the Court;

9.

August 2, 2007 transcript of Hearing on MRIA's Motion for Clarification;

10.

Transcript of all Opening Statements from the 2007 trial;
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II.

Transcript of all Closing Arguments from the 2007 trial;

12.

Transcripts, from the 2007 trial, of all conferences on jury instructions, the
objections of the parties to the instructions, and the court's ruling thereon; and

13.

October 31, 2007 transcript of the Hearing on SADC/SARMC's Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial.

14.

February 17, 2010 transcript of initial hearing following Supreme Court
remand;

15.

May 7, 20 10 transcript of scheduling hearing;

16.

July 9, 2010 transcript of hearing on Motion to Strike Third Amended
Counterclaim;

17.

August 4, 2010 transcript of hearing;

18.

October 1, 2010 transcript of hearing on motions for summary judgment and
motions to dismiss;

19.

February 9, 2011 transcript of hearing on motions related to reopening of
discovery and filing of motions in limine;

20.

April 22, 2011 transcript of hearing on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

21.

May 18, 2011 transcript of hearing on motions in limine and motions for
summary judgment;

22.

June 21,2011 transcript of hearing on Motion to Compel Access to Books and
Records;

23.

August 5, 2011 transcript of hearing on pre-trial motions;

24.

August 9, 2011 transcript of pre-trial conference;

25.

September 2, 2011 transcript of pre-trial conference;

26.

September 6, 2011 transcript of all proceedings before the Court;

27.

Transcript of all opening statements;

28.

Transcript of all closing arguments;
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29.

Transcript of all conferences onjury instructions, the objections of the parties
to the instructions, and the court's rulings thereon;

30.

October 1, 2011 transcript of hearing on Saint Alphonsus's Motions for
Swnmary Judgment

31.

December 9, 2011 transcript of hearing regarding objections to the form and
contents of the judgment;

32.

March 23, 2012 transcript of hearing on Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial, and motions regarding
award of attorneys' fees.

33.

June 22, 2012 transcript of hearing regarding MRIA's request to amend the
judgment and motions related to the award of attorney fees and costs.

34.

August 24, 2012 transcript of hearing regarding MRIA's request to amend the
judgment and motions related to the award of attorney fees and costs.

E.

CLERK'S RECORD: Saint Alphonsus requests that in addition to all

documents automatically included in the record pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28, the
following additional documents be included, which are most generally described in the terms
used in the clerk's Register of Actions: 1
1.

July 29, 2005 Scheduling Order;

2.

January 31, 2006 Motion for Leave to File First Amended Counterclaim and
Third-Party Complaint;

3.

January 31,2006 Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Leave to File First
Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

4.

February 14, 2006 Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant/Counterclaimant's Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

1

Items #1 through #372 on this list were part ofthe record prepared in the first appeal of
this matter.
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5.

February 21, 2006 Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Counterclaim;

6.

March 7, 2006 Memorandum Decision on Defendant/Counterclaimant's
Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

7.

March 20, 2006 Amended Scheduling Order;

8.

March 20, 2006 MRIA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

9.

March 21,2006 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

10.

March 21,2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Motion
for Summary Judgment;

11.

March 21, 2006 Affidavit of Thomas E. Henson, M.D., in Support ofMRIA's
Motion for Summary Judgment;

12.

April 17,2006 Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motions to Compel,
Motion to Quash Subpoenas and Motion for Protective Order;

13.

May 3, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order;

14.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Strike;

15.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

16.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

17.

May 5, 2006 Memorandum in Support of Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment;

18.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment;

19.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus' Notice of Errata Re: Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

20.

May 23, 2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;
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21.

May 23, 2006 Affidavit of Thomas E. Henson, M.D., in Support of
Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

22.

May 23, 2006 Memorandum in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment;

23.

May 26,2006 MRIA's Notice of Errata Re: Memorandum in Support of
MRIA's Motion for Summary Judgment;

24.

May 26, 2006 Supplemental Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of
MRIA's Motion for Summary Judgment;

25.

May 30, 2006 Motion to Strike in Connection with Summary Judgment
Proceedings;

26.

May 30, 2006 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

27.

May 30, 2006 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion to Strike;

28.

May 30, 2006 Memorandum in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to
Strike;

29.

May 30, 2006 Reply Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

30.

June 2, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Strike;

31.

June 5, 2006 Memorandum i~ Opposition to Motion to Strike;

32.

July 24, 2006 Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motions to Strike, CrossMotions for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss;

33.

August 7, 2006 Motion for Reconsideration or for Permission to Appeal;

34.

August 7, 2006 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration or for Permission to Appeal;

35.

August 25, 2006 MRIA's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration;
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36.

August 25, 2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;

37.

August 30,2006 Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration or, in the Alternative, for Permission to Appeal;

38.

October 10, 2006 Motion to Compel MRIA Financial Statements;

39.

October 10,2006 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel MRIA
Financial Statements;

40.

October 10, 2006 Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording;

41.

October 18, 2006 MRIA' s Opposition to Motion to Compel MRIA Financial
Statements;

42.

October 20, 2006 Affidavit of Jeremy G. Ladle in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Motion to Compel MRIA Financial Statements;

43.

October 20, 2006 Reply Memorandum in Support of Saint Alphonsus' Motion
to Compel MRIA Financial Statements;

44.

November 2, 2006 Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motions to Compel;
Defendant's Motion to Extend Pretrial Deadlines; Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration; Third-Party Defendant's Motion to Compel Answers to
Interrogatories and Produce Documents; Third-Party Defendant's Motion to
Strike MRIA's Objection to Producing Moffatt Thomas Documents;

45.

November 22, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order to Reset Trial Dates;

46.

December 20, 2006 Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim
and First Amended Third-Party Complaint;

47.

December 20, 2006 Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages;

48.

December 20,2006 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Leave to
File Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
Complaint;

49.

December 20,2006 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion to Amend to
Seek Punitive Damages;
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50.

December 20, 2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of
Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive
Damages (document sealed);

51.

December 20, 2006 Affidavit of Douglas M. Branson;

52.

December 20, 2006 Notice of Hearing;

53.

December 21, 2006 Motion to Seal Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's
Motion to Amend First Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

54.

December 21, 2006 Errata Sheet Re: Affidavit of Professor Douglas M.
Branson;

55.

December 28, 2006 Order to Seal Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Amend First Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

56.

December 28, 2006 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

57.

December 28, 2006 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Re: Lease Term;

58.

December 28, 2006 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Saint
Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

59.

January 4, 2007 Motion to Strike Affidavit of Professor Douglas M. Branson;

60.

January 4, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

61.

January 4, 2007 Motion to Strike References to Privileged Documents;

62.

January 4, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller;

63.

January 4, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording;

64.

January 4, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

65.

January 4, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages;

66.

January 4, 2007 Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording in Support of Memorandum;
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67.

January 4, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended
Third-Party Complaint;

68.

January 4, 2007 Motion for Summary Judgment;

69.

January 4, 2007 Third Party Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment;

70.

January 4, 2007 Third Party Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to
MRIA's Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages;

71.

January 4, 2007 Third Party Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to
MRIA' s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim and First
Amended Third Party Complaint;

72.

January 9, 2007 Motion to Strike SARMC's Motion to Strike References to
Privileged Documents;

73.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Strike;

74.

January 9, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

75.

January 9, 2007 Reply in Support of Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive
Damages Against SARMC;

76.

January 9, 2007 Reply In Support of Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive
Damages Against GSR/SARG;

77.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Reply
Briefs in Support of Motion;

78.

January 9, 2007 MRIA's Memorandum in Opposition to SARMC's Motion to
Strike Affidavit of Professor Douglas M Branson;

79.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit of Yvonne Vaughan in Support of MRIA's
Memorandum in Opposition ofSARMC's Motion to Strike Affidavit;

80.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit of Douglas M. Branson in Support of Opposition to
SARMC's Motion to Strike Affidavit;

81.

January 9, 2007 Reply Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Leave
to File 2nd Amended Counterclaim and First Amended 3rd Party Complaint;
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82.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of Reply
Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Leave to File 2nd Amended
Counterclaim and 1st Amended 3rd Party Complaint;

83.

January 10,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Memorandum in
Opposition to SARMC's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Professor Douglas M.
Branson;

84.

January 10, 2007 Opposition to Motion to Strike References to Privileged
Documents;

85.

January 10, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;

86.

January 23, 2007 Stipulated Protective Order;

87.

February 1, 2007 Motion for Leave to Supplement Briefing on Motion for
Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
Complaint;

88.

February 26,2007 Memorandum Decision on MRIA's Motion to Amend the
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint to Seek Punitive Damages and to
File a Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
Complaint; Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike References to Privileged
Documents and Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Professor
Douglas M. Branson;

89.

February 12, 2007 Notice of Withdrawal of Third Party Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment;

90.

February 13,2007 Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
Lease Term;

91.

February 13,2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;

92.

February 20,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

93.

February 20, 2007 Second Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Saint
Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

94.

March 2, 2007 Order on MRIA's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Counterclaim and First Amended Third Party Complaint;
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95.

March 7, 2007 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against MRIA on
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim;

96.

March 7, 2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

97.

March 7, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Plaintitrs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

98.

March 23, 2007 Motion in Limine Re: Douglas M. Branson;

99.

March 23, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Motion in Limine;

100.

March 23, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Support;

101.

April3, 2007 Opposition to Third Party Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

102.

April 3, 2007 Affidavit of Julli Hopkins;

103.

April 3, 2007 Affidavit of David Giles, M.D.;

104.

April 3, 2007 Affidavit of Shawn P. Bailey;

105.

April 10,2007 Response to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

106.

April 10, 2007 Affidavit Re: Motion for Summary Judgment;

107.

April13, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
the Fourth Claim for Relief in Second Amended Counterclaim;

108.

April 13, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Saint Alphonsus
Summary Judgment;

109.

April13, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion;

110.

April23, 2007 Third Party Defendants' Expert Witness Disclosure Pursuant
to Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the IRCP;

111.

April26, 2007 Third Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Defamation Cause of Action;
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112.

April26, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Motion to Exclude Witnesses;

113.

April26, 2007 Third Party Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on Defamation Cause of Action;

114.

April26, 2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones in Support of Third Party
Defendants' Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

115.

April 26, 2007 Affidavit ofNeil D. McFeeley in Support ofThird Party
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Defamation Cause of Action;

116.

April26, 2007 Affidavit of Jeffery T. Seaboum, M.D. in Support of Third
Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defamation
Cause of Action;

117.

April 26, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Objection to MRIA's Expert Witness
Disclosures for Charles A. Wilhoite and Bruce P. Budge;

118.

April 26, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Objection;

119.

May 1, 2007 Opposition to Motion in Limine Motion to Shorten Time;

120.

May 2, 2007 Motion for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Depositions of
Grant Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp;

121.

May 2, 2007 Affidavit In Support Of Motion for Protective Order Regarding
Discovery Depositions of Grant Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp;

122.

May 2, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Order
Regarding Discovery Depositions of Grant Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp
and in Opposition of Motion to Compel Date Certain for Depositions of Grant
Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp;

123.

May 3, 2007 Jury Instructions Filed;

124.

May 3, 2007 Joinder in Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

125.

May 3, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's
Motion in Limine Re: Douglas M. Branson;

126.

May 4, 2007 Objection to the Expert Witness Disclosure;
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127.

May 4, 2007 Notice Of Hearing (05/19/07@ 3:30pm);

128.

May 8, 2007 Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure;

129.

May 8, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

130.

May 8, 2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones;

131.

May 8, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Third Party Defendant's Motion;

132.

May 8, 2007 Notice Of Hearing (06/05/07@ 4:00pm);

133.

May 11, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment
Dismissing MRIA's First Amended Third Party Complaint on the Basis that
No Damages have been Proven;

134.

May 11, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;

135.

May 11,2007 Third Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on Idaho Consumer Protection Act Cause of Action;

136.

May 11,2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

137.

May 14, 2007 Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the
Interference with Prospective Contractual Relationship Cause of Action;

138.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit In Support Of Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Interference with Prospective Contractual
Relationship Cause of Action;

139.

May 14, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Interference with Prospective Contractual
Relationship Cause of Action;

140.

May 14, 2007 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Civil Conspiracy
Cause of Action;

141.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit In Support Of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
of Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;

142.

May 14, 2007 Memorandum in Support of for Partial Summary Judgment of
Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;
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143.

May 14, 2007 Third Party Defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

144.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit of Jeffrey R. Cliff;

145.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit of Jeffrey T. Seaboum;

146.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit of J. Timothy Hall MD;

147.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones;

148.

May 14, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

149.

May 16, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

150.

May 16,2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

151.

May 16, 2007 Affidavit of J. Will Varin;

152.

May 16, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Statement of Material Facts;

153.

May 16, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Antitrust Claims;

154.

May 18, 2007 Motion for Summary Judgment;

155.

May 18, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;

156.

May 18, 2007 Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion;

157.

May 18, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller;

158.

May 18,2007 Statement ofUndisputed Facts in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Motion;

159.

May 18,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
Interference with Prospective Contractual Relationship or Business
Expectations;

160.

May 18, 2007 Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;
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161.

May 18,2007 Objection to Amended Notice of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center;

162.

May 18,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Misappropriation of Trade Secret Confidential Information Cause of Action;

163.

May 18,2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller;

164.

May 21,2007 Memorandum Decision on Third Party Defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Against MRIA on Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Claim;

165.

May 21,2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus' Motion in Limine
Re: Douglas M. Branson;

166.

May 21,2007 Motion to Dismiss MRIA's Twentieth Claim for Relief(Re:
Spoliation);

167.

May 21, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss; ·

168.

May 22, 2007 Opposition to SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the Fourth Claim for Relief on the Second Amended
Counterclaim;

169.

May 22,2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt In Support OfOpposition to
SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Fourth Claim for
Relief on the Second Amended;

170.

May 22, 2007 Opposition to Third Party Defendant's Motion to Exclude
Expert Witnesses;

171.

May 22, 2007 Opposition to SARMC' s Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

172.

May 22, 2007 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

173.

May 22, 2007 Opposition to Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure of Ed
Whitelaw;

174.

May 22, 2007 Affidavit of Ed Whitelaw in Support of Opposition to
SARMC's Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw;

175.

May 22, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of Opposition to
SARMC's Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw;
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176.

May 23, 2007 MRIA's Supplemental Disclosure of Witnesses;

177.

May 24, 2007 Report of Discovery Master Re: Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Protective Order Re: MRIA Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition;

178.

May 24, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's
Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw;

179.

May 25, 2007 Third-party Defendants' Memorandum Joining Saint
Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof of
Damages Causation;

180.

May 25, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on Damage Causation;

181.

May 25, 2007 Third-Party Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Exclude MRIA's Expert Witnesses;

182.

May 29, 2007 Reply Memorandum Regarding Motion to Exclude Expert
Witnesses;

183.

May 29, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment on MRIA's Fourth Claim for Relief (Re: Fiduciary Duty
to Limited Partnerships);

184.

June 1, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Supplemental Disclosure of Lay Witnesses;

185.

June 5, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Joinder in Objection to the Expert
Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw;

186.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus' Objection to
MRIA's Expert Witness Disclosures for Charles A. Wilhoite and Bruce P.
Budge and Third-Party Defendants' Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

187.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Shattuck Hammond
Memorandum;

188.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

189.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Renewed Motion in Limine Re: Lease and
Partnership Term;
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190.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage
Theory;

191.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Purchase
Price Damage Theory;

192.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Dissociation;

193.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Dissociation;

194.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Prohibiting SARMC from
Introducing Evidence of its Intent Re: Term ofthe MRIA Partnership;

195.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine;

196.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to Purchase MRIA
and/or MRICI;

197.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to
Purchase MRIA and/or MRICI;

198.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Communications Between
SARMC and MRIA about the Purchase of MRIA and/or MRICI;

199.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Communications Between SARMC and MRIA about the Purchase of MRIA
and/or MRICI;

200.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Justification for Withdrawal;

201.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Justification for Withdrawal;

202.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Admissibility of Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

203.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Admissibility of Shattuck Hammond Memorandum;

204.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC Promotion of its Own
Best Interests as a Defense to IT Fiduciary Duty Breaches;
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205.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support MRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
SARMC Promotion of its Own Best Interests as a Defense to IT Fiduciary
Duty Breaches;

206.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Purported Breaches by MRIA of
Fiduciary Duties;

207.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Purported Breaches by MRIA of Fiduciary Duties;

208.

June 5, 2007 Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's Status
as a Former Catholic Nun;

209.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun;

210.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Beliefs About
Legality of Withdrawal from MRIA;

211.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
SARMC's Beliefs About Legality of Withdrawal from MRIA;

212.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Referring Physicians Designated
by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

213.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Referring
Physicians Designated by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

214.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Reliance on Advice of
Counsel;

215.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's
Reliance on Advice of Counsel;

216.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Inadvertently Disclosed
Privileged Document;

217.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Inadvertently
Disclosed Privileged Document;

218.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members of
DMR;
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219.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Investments by Members of DMR;

220.

June 5, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Motions in
Limine;

221.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion to Strike IMI's Joinder in SARMC's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof of Damages Causation;

222.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion to Strike IMI's
Joinder in SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof
of Damages Causation;

223.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Re: Damage Causation or, in the Alternative, Motion in Limine;

224.

June 5, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Damage Causation
or, in the Alternative, Motion in Limine;

225.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to IMI's Motion for Summary Judgment
Dismissing MRIA's 1st Amended Third Party Complaint on the Basis that No
Damages Have Been Proven and SARMC's Joinder Thereto;

226.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by
Third Party Defendants on the "Interference with Existing Contractual
Relationship" Claim;

227.

June 5, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Third Party Defendants on the
"Interference with Existing Contractual Relationship" Claim;

228.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to Third Party Defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action and
SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Cause
of Action (MRIA's 16th Claim for Relief);

229.

June 12, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion to Dismiss Spoliation
Claim;

230.

June 12, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation;
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231.

June 12, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Renewed Motion in Limine
Re: Lease and Partnership Term;

232.

June 12,2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Shattuck Hammond Memorandum;

233.

June 12, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Purchase Price Damage Theory;

234.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Charles Wilhoite in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

235.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

236.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss Spoliation Claim;

237.

June 12, 2007 Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Reliance on Advice of
Counsel;

238.

June 12, 2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Motion in Limine;

239.

June 12, 2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Strike
Gregory Vistnes;

240.

June 12, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re:
Damage Causation;

241.

June 12, 2007 Report of Discovery Master Re: Motion to Compel Responses
to Fifth Set of Interrogatories and Fourth Set of Request for Admissions;

242.

June 12, 2007 Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Beliefs
about Legality of Withdrawal from MRIA;

243.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Reply Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Damage Causation;

244.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: SARMC Promotion of its
Own Best Interests as a Defense to its Fiduciary Duty Breaches;

245.

June 12, 2007 Response to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;
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246.

June 12, 2007 Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members
ofDMR;

247.

June 12, 2007 Response to Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Re:
Antitrust;

248.

June 12, 2007 Reply to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
by Third Party Defendants on "Interference with Existing Contractual
Relationship" Claim;

249.

June 12, 2007 Response to MRIA's Motion to Strike IMI's Joinder in
SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof of
Damages Causation;

250.

June 12, 2007 Response To MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Damages Causation;

251.

June 12, 2007 Objection to Motion in Limine Re: Referring Physicians
Designated by SARMC/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

252.

June 12, 2007 Objection to Motion in Limine Re: Admissibility of Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

253.

June 12, 2007 Reply to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

254.

June 12, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

255.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Strike Exhibits;

256.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Justification for Withdrawal;

257.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Response to Opposition to SARMC's
Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Damages Causation;

258.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Referring Physicians
Designated by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

259.

June 12,2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Admissibility of Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

260.

June 12,2007 Affidavit in Response to Admissibility of Shattuck Hammond
Memorandum;
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261.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Purported Breaches by
MRIA of Fiduciary Duties;

262.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Response to Motion in Limine Re:
Purported Breaches by MRIA of Fiduciary Duties;

263.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of Patricia
Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun;

264.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Response to Motion in Limine Re:
Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun;

265.

June 12, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Joinder in Third Party Defendant's Reply
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Civil Conspiracy
Cause of Action;

266.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to Purchase MRIA;

267.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller;

268.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members;

269.

June 12,2007 Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Communications;

270.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Term of the Partnership;

271.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment re: Damages Causation

272.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller re: Breaches of Fiduciary Duty by
MRIA;

273.

June 13, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on the Fourth Claim for Relief in Second
Amended Counterclaim;

274.

June 14, 2007 Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Spoliation
Claim;

275.

June 14, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price
Damage Theory;
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276.

June 14, 2007 Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation;

277.

June 14, 2007 Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Shattuck
Hammond Memo;

278.

June 14, 2007 Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Lease &
Partnership Term;

279.

June 14, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support ofMR1 's Opposition
to Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

280.

June 15,2007 All Replies in Support of Motion in Limine (12 in number);

281.

June 15, 2007 Affidavit of James M. Prochaska;

282.

June 15, 2007 Motion to Strike;

283.

June 18,2007 Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Charles Wilhoite in
Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

284.

June 19,2007 MRIA's Reply in Support ofMotion in Limine Re: Referring
Physicians Designated by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

285.

June 19, 2007 MRIA's Reply in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Admissibility of Shattuck Hammond Memorandum;

286.

June 19,2007 MRIA's Response to Third Party Defendants' Objection to
Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members ofDMR;

287.

June 21, 2007 Response to Erroneous Statement;

288.

June 25, 2007 Opposition to Saint A1phonsus's Motion to Strike the Affidavit
of Charles Wilhoite;

289.

June 25, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon;

290.

June 27, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment;

291.

June 28, 2007 Order on Oral Argument Presentation on Motions for July 2nd
2007;
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292.

July 3, 2007 Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording Re: documents to be Submitted In
Camera;

293.

July 12, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Witness List;

294.

July 18, 2007 Plaintiffs Trial Brief;

295.

July 18, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Third Party Defendant
Settlement;

296.

July 18, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion;

297.

July 18,2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Purported Breaches of Fiduciary
Duties and Wrongful Conduct by MRIA, DMR, and Dr. Giles;

298.

July 18,2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion;

299.

July 18, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Third Party Defendants Expert
Witnesses;

300.

July 18,2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion MRIA's Trial
Brief;

301.

July 18,2007 Pre-Trial Memorandum;

302.

July 20, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;

303.

July 20, 2007 Stipulation for Dismissal of Third Party Defendants With
Prejudice;

304.

July 25, 2007 Motion to Compel Production of Discovery;

305.

July 25, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Production of
Discovery;

306.

July 25, 2007 Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording in Support of Motion to Compel;

307.

July 26, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion in Limine Re: Third Party Defendant Settlement;

308.

July 26, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion in Limine re Third Party Defendants Expert Witnesses;
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309.

July 26,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion in Limine re Conduct by MRIA, DMR and Dr. Giles;

310.

July 26, 2007 Affidavit of J. Will Varin;

311.

July 3 0, 2007 Order for Dismissal of Third Party Defendants With Prejudice;

312.

July 30, 2007 Memorandum Decision On Saint Alphonsus' Motion In Limine
Re: Shattuck Hammond Memorandum; Saint Alphonsus' Renewed Motion In
Limine Re: Lease and Partnership Term; Saint Alphonsus' Motion In Limine
Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory; Saint Alphonsus' Motion In Limine Re:
Dissociation; MRIA' s Motion In Limine Prohibiting SARMC From
Introducing Evidence of its Intent Re: Term of the MRIA Partnership;
MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to Purchase MRIA and/or MRICI;
MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Communications Between SARMC and MRIA
About the Purchase ofMRIA and/or MRICI; MRIA's Motion In Limine Re:
Justification for Withdrawal; MRIA's Motion In Limine Re: Admissibility of
Shattuck Hammond Memorandum; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's
Promotion of its Own Best Interests; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Purported
Breaches By MRIA of Fiduciary Duties; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun; MRIA's
Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Beliefs About Legality of Withdrawal from
MRIA; MRIA's Motion to Strike Gregory S. Vistness; MRIA's Motion in
Limine Re: Referring Physicians Designated By SARG/GSR as Expert
Witnesses; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Reliance on Advice of
Counsel; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Inadvertently Disclosed Privileged
Documents; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Investments By Members of
DMR; Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Charles Wilhoite in
Opposition to SARMC's Motion In Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage
Theory; MRIA's Motion to Strike Supplemental Affidavit Of Gregory S.
Vistness, Ph.D.;

313.

August 1, 2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA' s Request for
Clarification;

314.

August 3, 2007 MRIA's Request for Clarification/Reconsideration of Motion
in Limine Re: Shattuck Hammond Memorandum and MRIA's Request for
Pre-evidentiary Jury Instruction Re: Duty of Loyalty;

315.

August 3, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Use of Deposition
Testimony in Opening Statements;

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

-32-

005164

.

•

316.

August 3, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion;

317.

August 3, 2007 SARMC's Motion in Limine Re: Use of Shattuck Hammond
Documents in Opening Statement;

318.

August 6, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Compel
Re: SARMC's Failure to Provide Foundational Objections to MRIA's
Exhibits;

319.

August 6, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion in
Limine Re: Use of Shattuck Hammond Documents in Opening Statements;

320.

August 10, 2007 Saint A1phonsus' Motion in Limine Re: Dissociation
Damages;

321.

August 10, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Dissociation
Damages;

322.

August 10, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation Damages;

323.

August 14, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation Damages;

324.

August 20, 2007 MRIA Motion in Limine;

325.

August 20, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion;

326.

August 20,2007 Affidavit of WadeL. Woodard in Support of Motion in
Limine;

327.

August 23, 2007 Court's draft Jury Instructions;

328.

August 27, 2007 MRIA's Response to Statute of Limitations Argument;

329.

August 28, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Grant Chamberlain
Testimony and Supporting Memorandum;

330.

August 28, 2007 Affidavit in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Grant
Chamberlain Testimonial and Supporting Memorandum;

331.

August 29, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Objections and Proposed Additional Jury
Instructions;
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332.

August 29, 2007 Court's draft Jury Instructions;

333.

August 30, 2007 Court's draft Jury Instructions;

334.

August 30, 2007 Jury Instructions filed;

335.

August 30, 2007 Jury Verdict;

336.

September 4, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Objection to MRIA's Proposed
Judgment;

337.

September 10,2007 MRIA's Response to Saint Alphonsus's Objection to
MRIA' s Proposed Judgment;

338.

September 10,2007 MRIA's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Re: Withdrawing Partners Interest in the Partnership;

339.

September 10,2007 SADC's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Regarding Plaintiff SADC's Claim for its Partnership Equity;

340.

September 21, 2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment;

341.

October 3, 2007 Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and
Motion for New Trial;

342.

October 3, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

343.

October 3, 2007 Affidavit Re: Settlement Offer;

344.

October 9, 2007 Motion for Costs and Fees;

345.

October 9, 2007 Affidavit of Thomas A. Banducci in Support ofMRIA's
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs;

346.

October 9, 2007 Affidavit of Counsel Re: Criteria for Awarding Attorney Fees;

347.

October 9, 2007 MRIA's Memorandum in Support of Memorandum of Costs
and Fees;

348.

October 9, 2007 MRIA's Motion for Reconsideration of Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment;
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349.

October 9, 2007 MRlA's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law and Judgment;

350.

October 9, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Application for Attorney Fees Relative to
Antitrust and Equity Claims;

351.

October 9, 2007 Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees;

352.

October 9, 2007 Affidavit of Stephanie C. Westermeier;

353.

October 22,2007 MRlA's Objection to Verified Memorandum of Costs and
Attorneys' Fees;

354.

October 23, 2007 Motion to Disallow MRlA's Request for Costs and Fees;

355.

October 23, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Disallow ~osts and Fees;

356.

October 23, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Opposition to Attorney Fees
and Costs;

357.

October 24, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

358.

October 24, 2007 Affidavit in Support of MRlA's Opposition to Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

359.

October 24, 2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRlA's Motion for
Reconsideration of Findings of Fact;

360.

October 24, 2007 Affidavit of Jack Gjording in Opposition to Motion for
Prejudgment Interest;

361.

October 26, 2007 Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment;

362.

October 26, 2007 Reply in Support of Motion for Prejudgment Interest;

363.

October 26, 2007 MRIA's Verified Reply in Support of Motion for Costs and
Fees;

364.

October 29, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;
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365.

October 29,2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Saint
Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

366.

November 19, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus' Application
for Attorney Fees Relative to Antitrust and Equity Claims; Saint Alphonsus'
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict; Saint Alphonsus' Motion
for New Trial; MRIA's Motion for Prejudgment Interest; MRIA's Motion for
Reconsideration; MRIA' s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs;

367.

December 7, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Attorney Costs and Fees;

368.

December 10,2007 Acceptance ofRemittitur;

369.

December 20, 2007 Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care and Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center Objection to Acceptance of Remittitur;

370.

December 21,2007 Objection to Revised Fees and Costs;

371.

December 21,2007 Affidavit in Support of Objection to Revised Fees and
Costs;

372.

December 27, 2007 Notice of Appeal;

373.

January 3, 2008 Amended Judgment;

374.

January 3, 2008 Response to Objection to Acceptance of Remittitur;

375.

January 4, 2008 Motion for Stay of Execution;

376.

January 4, 2008 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Motion for Stay
of Execution;

377.

January 17, 2008 Notice Of Cross-Appeal;

378.

January 28,2008 Memorandum Decision on MRIA's Revised Motion for
Attorneys Fees and Costs;

379.

January 29, 2008 Order Clarifying the Court's Memorandum Decision on
MRIA's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Issued by the Court on January
28th, 2008;
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380.

February 4, 2008 Affidavit of WadeL Woodard in Support of Award of Costs
as a Matter of Right and Second Amended Judgment;

381.

February 6, 2008 Objection to Proposed Second Amended Judgment;

382.

February 8, 2008 Order Staying Execution;

383.

February 8, 2008 Affidavit of Thomas A Banducci;

384.

February 11, 2008 Supplemental Request for Additional Clerk's Record;

385.

February 13,2008 MRIA 's Objection to Proposed 2nd Amended Judgement
and Motion for Fees;

386.

February 26, 2008 Second Amended Judgment;

387.

July 31, 2008 Stipulation for Corrections and Additions to the Transcript and
Record;

388.

August 1, 2008 Order for Corrections and Additions to the Transcript and
Record;

389.

October 22, 2009 Opinion- Supreme Court Docket No. 34885;

390.

March 22, 2010 Third Amended Counterclaim;

391.

April 16, 2010 Answer to Third Amended Complaint;

392.

April16, 2010 Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter from the Third Amended
Complaint;

393.

July 2, 2010 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Strike Immaterial
Matter from Third Amended Counterclaim;

394.

July 2, 2010 Affidavit of Tom Banducci in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's
Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter from Third Amended Counterclaim;

395.

July 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of its Motion to Strike
Immaterial Matter from the Third Amended Counterclaim;

396.

July 9, 2010 Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions From the Parties and
Briefing Schedule;
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397.

July 26, 2010 Motion To Amend Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions;

398.

July 30, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Motion to Amend
Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions;

399.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment Based on
the Legal Insufficiency of MRIA' s Evidence of Lost Profits;

400.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for
Summary Judgment Based on the Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's Evidence of
Lost Profits;

401.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment on the Claims of the
Limited Partnerships;

402.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for
Judgment on the Claims of the Limited Partnerships;

403.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment on the Civil
Conspiracy Claim;

404.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for
Judgment on the Civil Conspiracy Claim;

405.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on
MRIA's Claim for Wrongful Dissociation;

406.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for
Summary Judgment on MRIA's Claim for Wrongful Dissociation;

407.

August 6, 2010 Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Amend Order Re:
Scheduling Preliminary Motions;

408.

August 30, 2010 Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim for
Wrongful Dissociation;

409.

August 30,2010 Opposition to Motion for Judgment on the Claims ofthe
Limited Partnerships;

410.

August 30,2010 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment Based on MRIA's Civil Conspiracy Claim;
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411.

August 30, 2010 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment Based on the Alleged Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's Evidence of
Lost Profits;

412.

September 13, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support ofMotion for
Summary Judgment on Claims of the Limited Partnerships;

413.

September 13,2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Claim for Wrongful Dissociation;

414.

September 13, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Claim;

415.

September 13, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's
Evidence of Lost Profits;

416.

September 2 7, 201 0 Order Granting Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter From
the Third Amended Counterclaim;

417.

November 16,2010 Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motions
for Judgment on Pleadings and Motions for Summary Judgment;

418.

December 23, 2010 Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery;

419.

January 10, 2011 Motion to Set a Scheduling Order;

420.

February 2, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Reopen Face and Expert Discovery;

421.

February 2, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Set Scheduling Order;

422.

February 2, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Motion to Reopen
and In opposition to Motion to Set Scheduling Order;

423.

February 4, 2011 Reply in Support of Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert
Discovery;

424.

February 15, 2011 Order Reopening Discovery and Setting Schedule;

425.

March 2, 2011 Joint Motion to Amend Discovery Schedule;

426.

March 7, 2011 Order Granting Joint Motion to Amend Discovery Schedule;
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427.

March 7, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion For Summary Judgment On
MRIA's Unpled Breach Of Contract Theory of Wrongful Dissociation;

428.

March 7, 2011 Memorandum In Support Of Saint Alphonsus's Motion For
Summary Judgment On MRIA's Unpled Breach Of Contract Theory of
Wrongful Dissociation;

429.

March 8, 2011 Notice of Errata re: St Alphonsus Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment;

430.

March 22, 2011 Stipulation and Covenant Not to Execute;

431.

March 23, 2011 Order re: Stipulation and Covenant Not to Execute;

432.

March 28,2011 MRIA's Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment On
Breach Of Contract Theory of Wrongful Withdrawal;

433.

April11, 2011 MRIA's Motion for Clarification Regarding Withdrawing
Partner's Share;

434.

April11, 2011 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Clarification
Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share;

435.

April11, 2011 MRIA's Motion In Limine to Preclude Saint Alphonsus from
Referencing the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Regarding the Appeal of this
Case

436.

April11, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Motion In Limine to Preclude
Saint Alphonsus from Referencing the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion
Regarding the Appeal of this Case;

437.

Aprill1, 2011 MRIA's Motion In Limine to Preclude Argument of Lawful
Dissociation;

438.

April11, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Motion In Limine to Preclude
Argument of Lawful Dissociation;

439.

April 11, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMRIA Motions Filed April
11,2011;

440.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment on
MRIA's Unpled "Breach of Contract" Theory of Wrongful Dissociation;
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441.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of
Competition Following Lawful Dissociation;

442.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in
Limine Re: Evidence of Competition Following Lawful Dissociation;

443.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its
Second Affirmative Defense;

444.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment on its Second Affirmative Defense;

445.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and
Argument that St Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew from MRIA;

446.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in
Limine to Exclude Evidence and Argument that Saint Alphonsus Improperly
Withdrew from MRIA;

447.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Prior Evidentiary
Rulings from the First Trial;

448.

April 11,2011 Saint A1phonsus's Memorandum in Support ofMotion in
Limine Re: Prior Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial;

449.

April 11,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its
Claim for its Partnership Interest;

450.

April 11,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment on its Claim for its Partnership Interest;

451.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRI
Center and MRI Mobile's Third Party Beneficiary Claims;

452.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment on MRI Center's and MRI Mobile's Third Party
Beneficiary Claims;

453.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to Exclude Claims of
Misappropriation, Defamation or Wrongful Dissociation;
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454.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion in
Limine to Exclude Claims of Misappropriation, Defamation or Wrongful
Dissociation;

455.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: References to the
Jury's Finding of Liability in the First Trial;

456.

April 11,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in
Limine Re: References to the Jury's Finding of Liability in the First Trial;

457.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's
Second Claim of Relief;

458.

April 11, 2011 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording;

459.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment ofMRIA's Second Claim of Relief;

460.

April25, 2011 MRIA's Notice ofNon-Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion
for Summary Judgment on MRIA's 2nd Claim for Relief;

461.

April25, 2011 MRIA's Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary
Judgment on Its Claim for Its Partnership Interest;

462.

April25, 2011 MRIA's Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary
Judgment on Its 2nd Affirmative Defense;

463.

April25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary Judgment
on MRI Center and MRI Mobile's 3rd-Party Beneficiary Claims;

464.

April25, 2011 Response to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine re Prior
Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial;

465.

April25, 2011 MRIA's Notice ofNon-Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion
In Limine re Reference to Jury's Finding of Liability in the 1st Trial;

466.

April 25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine re Evidence
of Competition Following Dissociation;

467.

April25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine to Exclude
Evidence & Argument That St. Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew From MRIA;
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468.

April25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine to Exclude
Claims of Misappropriation, Defamation or Wrongful Dissociation;

469.

April25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine to
Preclude Reference to the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in this Case;

470.

April25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to Motion in Limine to
Preclude Argument that Dissociation was Lawful;

471.

April25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion for
Clarification Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share;

472.

April25, 2011 Affidavit of Dr James Prochaska in Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRI Center and MRI
Mobile's 3rd Party Beneficiary Claims;

473.

May 2, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Of Its Motion For Clarification
regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share;

474.

May 2, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Of Its Motion In Limine To Preclude
Argument That Dissociation Was Lawful;

475.

May 2, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Of Its Motion In Limine To Preclude
Reference To The Idaho Supreme Court Opinion;

476.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum In Support Of Its
Motion For Summary Judgment On Its Claim For Its Partnership Interest;

477.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum In Support Of Its
Motion For Summary Judgment On Its Second Affirmative Defense

478.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply In Support Of Its Motion For
Summary Judgment On MRI Centers And MRI Mobiles Third-Party
Beneficiary Claims;

479.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus' s Consolidated Reply In Support of Its Motions
In Limine;

480.

May 02, 2011 Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording;

481.

May 03, 2011 Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of JackS. Gjording and
Memorandum in Support;
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482.

May 05, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Recusal by the Court Based on
Relationship with Dr Henson

483.

May 06, 2011 Order Re: St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary Judgment;

484.

May 06, 2011 Partial Summary Judgment;

485.

May 06, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Strike;

486.

May 11, 2011 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Recusal;

487.

May 11, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's
Motion for Recusal;

488.

May 13, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply In Support OfMotion For Recusal By
the Court Based On Relationship With Dr Henson;

489.

May 13, 2011 Affidavit Of JackS. Gjording In Support Of Reply In Support
Of Motion For Recusal;

490.

May 13, 2011 Reply in Support to Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of
Jack Gjording;

491.

May 16, 2011 Order Withdrawing Rule 54(b) Certification;

492.

June 7, 2011 Motion and Memorandum for Orders Concerning Potential
Witnesses;

493.

June 7, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel;

494.

June 10, 2011 Response To MRI Motion Concerning Potential Witnesses;

495.

June 10, 2011 Motion To Compel Compliance with Statutory Rights to
Inspect Partnership Books and Records;

496.

June 10, 2011 Affidavit Of Jack Gjording In Support Of Motion to Compel;

497.

June 10, 2011 Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Compel Compliance
with Statutory Rights to Inspect Partnership Books and Records;

498.

June 13, 2011 Memorandum of Actions Taken at May 18 Hearing;

499.

June 13, 2011 Consolidated Order Re: Motions in Limine;
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500.

June 15, 2011 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus Motion to Compel Compliance
with Statutory Rights to Inspect Partnership Books and Records;

501.

June 17,2011 Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Compliance with
Statutory Rights to Inspect Partnership Books and Records

502.

June 17,2011 Consolidated Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment
Heard May 18, 2011;

503.

June 21, 2011 MRIA's Reply in Support of its Motion Concerning Potential
Witnesses Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp;

504.

June 22, 2011 Order Re: Availability at Trial of Witnesses Sandra Bruce,
Cindy Schamp and Dr. Thomas Henson;

505.

June 29, 2011 Briefre Motion to Compel Compliance Regarding Relevance
of Gilbert v. Summit County;

506.

July 05, 2011 Response to Brief Concerning Gilbert v. Summit County;

507.

July 13, 2011 Motion to Release Original Exhibits;

508.

July 14, 2011 Order Releasing Exhibits;

509.

July 14, 2011 MRIA's Proposed Jury Instructions;

510.

July 15,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Requested Jury Instructions and Special
Verdict Form;

511.

July 20, 2011 Order Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Compel
Compliance with Statutory Right to Inspect MRIA's Books and Records;

512.

July 25,2011 Motion In Limine To Exclude Hearsay Within Hearsay In
Business Records;

513.

July 25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion For Reconsideration In Part Of June
13 2011 Consolidated Order RE: Motions In Limine;

514.

July 25, 2011 Affidavit Of JackS. Gjording;

515.

July 25,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum In Support OfMotion In
Limine To Exclude Hearsay Within Hearsay In Business Records;
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516.

July 28,2011 Motion To Have Deemed Admitted The Exhibits Admitted In
The Previous Trial;

517.

July 28,2011 Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Motion To Have Deemed
Admitted The Exhibits Admitted In The Previous Trial;

518.

July 28,2011 Memorandum In Support OfMRIA's Motion To Have Deemed
Admitted The Exhibits Admitted In The Previous Trial;

519.

July 28, 2011 MRIA's Motion In Limine To Exclude Mention Of Saint
Alphonsus's Status As A Non-Profit Entity;

520.

July 28, 2011 Memorandum In Support OfMRIA's Motion In Limine To
Exclude Mention Of Saint Alphonsus's Status As A Non-Profit Entity;

521.

July 28,2011 MRIA's Opposition To Saint Alphonsus's Motion In Limine
To Exclude "Hearsay Within Hearsay" In Business Records;

522.

July 29, 2011 Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Exclude the Expert
Testimony of Thomas R McCarthy PhD;

523.

July 29, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion;

524.

July 29, 2011 Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony ofThomas R
McCarthy, Ph.D;

525.

August 01,2011 Motion and Memorandum in Support to Preclude Reference
to Saint Alphonsus's Departing Partners Share;

526.

August 01, 2011 Motion and Memorandum for Clarification that Saint
Alphonsus May Not Contend that MRIA Breached Fiduciary Duties;

527.

August 01,2011 Objection to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Reconsideration
in Part of June 13 2011 Consolidated Order ReMotions in Limine;

528.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Have
Deemed Admitted Exhibits From First Trial

529.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Preclude Reference to Saint Alphonsus's Departing Partner Share;

530.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Exclude Mention of Saint Alphonsus's Status as a Non-Profit Entity;
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531.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion for
Clarification re: Contentions That MRIA Breached Fiduciary Duties;

532.

August 03,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of its Motion in Limine
to Exclude Hearsay Within Hearsay From Business Records;

533.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Reconsideration in
Part of June 13 2011 Consolidated Order reMotions in Limine;

534.

August 03, 2011 Memorandum Addressing Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to
MRIA's Motion to Shorten Time;

535.

August 04, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To MRI's Motion To Exclude
The Expert Testimony Of Thomas R McCarthy PhD;

536.

August 04,2011 Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Opposition;

537.

August 04, 2011 Objections to Saint A1phonsus's Requested Jury Instructions
and Special Verdict Form;

538.

August 04, 2011 MRI' s 1st Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions;

539.

August 04, 2011 Reply in Support of Motion to Have Deemed Admitted
Exhibits from the First Trial;

540.

August 04, 2011 Reply in Support of Motion to Exclude Mention of Saint
Alphonsus's Status as a Non-Profit Entity;

541.

August 05, 2011 Defendant's Witness List;

542.

August 05, 2011 Defendant's Exhibit List;

543.

August 09,2011 Motion for Order Setting Deadline for Production of Exhibit
List and Motion to Shorten Time;

544.

August 16, 2011 Order Rescheduling Jury Questionnaire;

545.

August 17, 2011 Defendant/Counterclaimants' Proposed Amended Exhibit
List;

546.

August 17, 2011 Plaintiff/Counterdefendants Saint Alphonsus's Proposed
Exhibit List;
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547.

August 17, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Witness Designations;

548.

August 17, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Objection To MRIA's Designations Of
Manfred Steiner, Alan Hahn And Stephanie Westermeier As Witnesses;

549.

August 17, 2011 Supplemental Briefin Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Exclude Expert Testimony of Dr Thomas McCarthy;

550.

August 18, 2011 Motion to Strike Saint Alphonsus's Supplemental Brief in
Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony ofDr. Thomas
McCarthy

551.

August 19, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Proposed Juror Questionnaire;

552.

August 23, 2011 Consolidated Order RE: Motions Heard August 5, 2011;

553.

August 25, 2011 Defendant/Counterclaimants' Deposition Designation;

554.

August 26, 2011 Defendant/Counterclaimant's Proposed Amended Exhibit
List;

555.

August 29, 2011 Memorandum Addressing Communication From Counsel;

556.

August 30, 2011 Motion in Limine re: Conduct by Dr. David Giles and Carl
Harder;

557.

August 31, 2011 Supplemental Motion in Limine to Prevent Saint Alphonsus
From Arguing that Attorney Carl Harder Engaged in Inappropriate Conduct;

558.

August 31, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Exclude Additional MRIA
Demonstratives;

559.

August 31, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motions in
Limine to Prevent Argument that Giles and Harder Engaged in Inappropriate
Conduct;

560.

September 01, 2011 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Exclude
Additional MRIA Demonstratives;

561.

September 01, 2011 Reply in Support ofMRIA's Motions In Limine;

562.

September 02, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude MRIA's New
And Improper Damages Theories;
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563.

September 02,2011 Affidavit Of Jack Gjording In Support Of Saint
Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude MRIA's New And Improper Damages
Theories;

564.

September 02,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum In Support Of Motion
To Exclude MRIA's New And Improper Damages Theories;

565.

September 02, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Preclude MRIA From
Using Excluded Carl Harder Letter and Related Drafts;

566.

September 02, 2011 Juror Questionnaire;

567.

September 08, 2011 Motion to Prevent Saint Alphonsus from Referring to
Extension of Term to 2023;

568.

September 09, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Revised Exhibit List;

569.

September 13, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Prevent Saint Alphonsus's From Referring to Extension of Term to 2023;

570.

September 13, 2011 Objection To Jury Instruction Regarding Consultant
Estimate;

571.

September 16, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Supplemental Memorandum In
Support Oflts Motion To Exclude MRIA's New And Improper Damages
Theories;

572.

September 19, 2011 Affidavit Of Counsel In Opposition To Saint
Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude MRIA's Damages Theories;

573.

September 19, 2011 Opposition To Saint Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude
MRIA's Damages Theories;

574.

September 20, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Its Motion to
Exclude MRIA's New and Improper Damages Theories;

575.

September 22, 2011 Motion in Limine Concerning Out of Court Statements
of Cindy Schamp;

576.

September 23, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA'S Motion in
Limine Concerning Out of Court Statements of Cindy Schamp;
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577.

September 27, 2011 Motion for Leave to Offer Prior Trial Exhibit 4332 Into
Evidence;

578.

September 27, 2011 Order Re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories;

579.

September 28, 2011 Objection to Saint Alphonsus Motions for Mistrial;

580.

September 29, 2011 Notice of Intent to Impeach;

581.

September 29, 2011 Motion in Limine to Prevent Saint Alphonsus's from
Presenting Evidence about "Arid Club" Conversation Unless Court First
Determines It Is Admissible;

582.

September 29, 2011 Motion in Limine Regarding Lawsuit Threatened by Dr.
Knochel;

583.

September 30, 2011 Motion to Quash Trial Subpoena of Jan Hove;

584.

October 03, 2011 Reply in Support ofMRIA's Notice of Intent to Impeach;

585.

October 03, 2011 Notice ofNon Opposition to Proposed Instruction NO. 16
and Proposal for Putting the Parties "On the Clock";

586.

October 03, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Quash Subpoena of Jan Hove;

587.

October 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Response To MRIA's Notice of Intent to
Impeach;

588.

October 04, 2011 MRI Motion to Exclude Exhibits 802 and 803;

589.

October 04, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Admissibility ofExhibits 802
and 803 (Dr Currans Handwritten notes);

590.

October 06, 2011 Motion to Exclude Alleged Misconduct of Dr Giles;

591.

October 11, 2011 Motion in Limine to Prevent Argument and Evidence that
Saint Alphonsus is Entitled to an Offset Based on its Ownership of the MRI
Entities;

592.

October 11, 2011 Motion in Limine to Preclude Questioning ofMRIA'S
Experts Concerning the Reasonableness of Non-Technical Factual
Assumptions;
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October 11, 2011 Affidavit in Support of Motion in Limine to Preclude
Questioning ofMRIA's Experts Concerning the Reasonableness ofNonTechnical Factual Assumptions;

594.

October 11, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to Preclude
Questioning ofMRIA'S Experts Concerning the Reasonableness ofNonTechnical Factual Assumptions;

595.

October 11, 2011 Motion to Quash/Modify Subpoenas or Otherwise Preclude
MRIA from Calling Witnesses Without Adequate Notice;

596.

October 12, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To MRIA's Motion To
Preclude Questioning About Reasonableness Of Experts' Factual
Assumptions;

597.

October 12, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To Motion In Limine To
Prevent Argument And Evidence That Saint Alphonsus is Entitled To An
"Offset" Based On Its Ownership Of The MRI Entities;

598.

October 18,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a Verdict on Claims
Related to Enforcement of the Radiology Services Contract;

599.

October 18, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a Verdict or Otherwise
Preclude MRIA's Tort Claims Alleging Stark and Anti-Kickback Violations;

600.

October 18, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a Verdict on MRIA's
Damages and Disgorgement Theories;

601.

October 21,2011 MRIA'S Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Directed Verdict on Violations ofthe Stark and Anti-Kickback Statutes;

602.

October 21, 2011 Affidavit of Brent S. Bastian in Support of Opposition to
Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Directed Verdict on Violations ofthe Stark and
Anti-Kickback Statutes;

603.

October 21,2011 MRIA'S Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Directed Verdict on Claims Related to Enforcement of Radiology Services
Contract;

604.

October 21,2011 MRIA'S Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Directed Verdict on MRIA'S Damages and Disgorgement Theories;
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605.

October 24, 2011 Reply in Support of Directed Verdict Motions Filed
October 18, 2011;

606.

October 25, 2011 MRIA'S Requested Changes to Proposed Jury Instructions;

607.

October 25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Redline of Court's Proposed PostEvidence Instructions and Proposed Special Verdict Form;

608.

October 27, 2011 Order Denying Request from St. Alphonsus;

609.

October 27, 2011 Response to Notice of Authority RE: Allocation of
Damages Among Different Causes of Action;

610.

October 27, 2011 Objection to Language of Proposed Jury Instruction No. 56;

611.

October 28, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Notice of Authority Re: Allocation of
Damages and Reply to MRIA's Counter-Notice;

612.

October 31, 2011 Plaintiffs Exhibit List;

613.

October 31,2011 Defendant's Exhibit List;

614.

October 31, 20 11 Jury Verdict;

615.

October 31,2011 Jury Instructions;

616.

November 02, 2011 Order Re: Proposed Judgment;

617.

November 02, 2011 Submission of Proposed Judgment;

618.

November 08,2011 Memorandum in Support ofProposed Findings ofFact
and Conclusion of Law Concerning Disgorgement;

619.

November 08, 2011 Saint Alphonsus Objections and Response to MRIA's
Proposed Judgment;

620.

November 09, 2011 Saint Alphonsus Motion to Set Date for Response to
MRIA's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;

621.

November 15, 2011 Response To Saint Alphonsus's Objections and
Response to MRIA'S Proposed Judgment;
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622.

November 15, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Response to Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Usurpation and Disgorgement;

623.

November 21, 2011 Saint Alphonsus Reply in Support of Objections to
MRIA's Proposed Judgment;

624.

November 21, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Of Proposed Findings of Fact
And Conclusion Of Law Concerning Disgorgement;

625.

January 18, 2012 Findings ofF act and Conclusions of Law;

626.

January 18, 2012 Judgment;

627.

January 31, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict or New Trial;

628.

January 31,2012 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording In Support Of Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial;

629.

January 31,2012 Memorandum In Support Of Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial;

630.

January 31,2012 MRIA Entities Petition for Costs and Fees;

63 1.

January 31, 20 12 Amended Affidavit of Counsel regarding 54(e)(3) criteria
for Awarding Attorneys Fees;

632.

January 31,2012 Memorandum in Support ofthe MRIA Entities Petition for
Costs and Fees;

633.

January 31, 2012 Affidavit of Steven Andersen;

634.

January 31, 2012 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of The MRIA Entities
Memo of Costs and Fees;

635.

February 14, 2012 MRIA's Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Summary Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial;

636.

February 14, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Motion to Disallow MRIAs Attorneys
Fees and Costs;

637.

February 14, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Memorandum in Support of Motion;
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638.

February 14, 2012 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Motion;

639.

February 21, 2012 Motion For Leave To Conduct Discovery Regarding The
Amount Of Attorney's Fees And Costs Incurred By Saint Alphonsus;

640.

February 21,2012 Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Leave To
Conduct Discovery Regarding The Amount Of Attorney's Fees And Costs
Incurred By Saint Alphonsus;

641.

February 27, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Motion For A Stay Of Proceedings To
Enforce A Judgment Pursuant To Rule 62(b);

642.

February 27, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum In Support Oflts Motion
For A Stay Of Proceedings To Enforce A Judgment Pursuant To Rule 62(b);

643.

February 28, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Opposition to MRIA's Motion for Leave
to Conduct Discovery Regarding Saint Alphonsus Attorneys Fees;

644.

February 28, 2012 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery Regarding Saint Alphonsus
Attorneys;

645.

March 05, 2012 Reply to Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery Regarding
Saint Alphonsus Attorney Fees;

646.

March 13,2012 Reply In Support Of Saint Alphonsus's Motion For
Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict Or New Trial;

647.

March 16, 2012 Qualified Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Stay
of Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment;

648.

March 16, 2012 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Disallow
MRIA's Attorneys Fees and Costs;

649.

March 16, 2012 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's
Motion to Disallow MRIA's Attorney Fees and Costs;

650.

March 20, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Reply in Support of its Motion for a Stay of
Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment

651.

March 20,2012 Saint Alphonsus Reply in Support of Motion to Disallow
MRIA's Attorneys Fees and Costs
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652.

April25, 2012 Order Re: Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
or New Trial;

653.

April30, 2012 Amended Judgment;

654.

May 02,2012 Second Amended Judgment;

655.

May 15, 2012 Order Re: Costs and Attorneys' Fees;

656.

May 22, 2012 MRIA Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a)
or Rule 60(b);

657.

May 22,2012 MRIA Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief from
Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);

658.

May 24,2012 MRIA Amended Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to
Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);

659.

May 24,2012 MRIA Memorandum in Support of Amended Motion for Relief
from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);

660.

June 12. 2012 Saint A1phonsus's Objections to MRIA's Amended Fee
Petition;

661.

June 12. 2012 Affidavit of Counsel JackS. Gjording in Support of Saint
Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Amended Rule 60 Motion;

662.

June 14. 2012 MRIA Response To Saint Alphonsus's Objections To
Amended Fee Petition;

663.

June 15,2012 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To MRIA's Amended Rule 60
Motion:

664.

June 19,2012 Reply In Support OfMRIA's Amended Motion For Relief
From Judgment Pursuant To Rule 60(a) Or Rule 60(b);

665.

June 19, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Reply In Support Of Objections To MRIA's
Amended Fee Petition;

666.

June 20. 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Response To MRIA's New Claims
Regarding Offset Raised For The First Time In Its Reply Brief;

667.

August 10, 2012 MRIA Memorandum Concerning Amount of Offset;
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668.

August 10. 2012 MRIA Entities' Petition for Post-Judgment Costs and Fees;

669.

August 17, 2012 Saint A1phonsus's Opposition To MRIA's Motion Seeking
Post -Judgment Attorney Fees And Costs;

670.

August 20. 2012 Saint A1phonsus's Response to MRIA's Supplemental Brief
Regarding Offset;

671.

August 21. 2012 Reply In Support Of The MRIA Entities' Petition For PostJudgment Costs And Fees;

672.

August 21.2012 Reply In Support Of Memorandum Concerning Amount Of
Offset;

673.

September 21.2012 Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Motions Heard
August 24. 2012;

674.

September 21, 2012 Third Amended Judgment.

SEALED RECORD: Portions of the record in this matter have been submitted

under seal, specifically the records submitted to the Court for in camera review on July 3, 2007,
noted above (item number 292). Saint Alphonsus requests that these documents remain sealed
and subject only to in camera review by the Court.
G.

REPRODUCTION OF EXHIBITS: Pursuant to Appellate Rule 170), Saint

Alphonsus requests that copies of all documents, charts, and pictures offered or admitted as
exhibits at trial be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
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H.

I CERTIFY:
a.

That a copy of this amended notice of appeal has been served on the
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the
address set out below:
Nicole Julson
Court Reporter
2414 N. McKinney
Boise, Idaho 83704

b.

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript;

c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20.

£

That pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(m), this amended notice of
appeal requests approximately 85 additional transcript pages. This
amended notice has been served on each reporter of whom a request for
additional transcript is made.

DATED this 4th day of October 2012.
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

ter-Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of October 2012, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:

0

Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83 702

{~

Nicole Julson, Court Reporter
2414 N. McKinney
Boise, ID 83 704

~
0

0

0
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Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile
Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
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No, _ _ _
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cr:·:· o5 2012
Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)

CHRISTOPHER D Rl

By CHRISTINE 'sw~:+·

tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com
WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

C/e

DEPVr·f

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
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Plaintiff/Respondent
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant/Appellant

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC.; ITS ATTORNEYS, JACKS. GJORDING, GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC, 121 NORTH
9TH STREET, SUITE 600 P.O. BOX 2837, BOISE, ID 83701, AND DONALD B. A YER,
CHRISTIAN G. VERGONIS, PETER J. ROMATOWSKI, MICHELLE L. MARKS, AND
THOMAS DAVIS OF JONES DAY, 51 LOUISIANA A VENUE NW WASHINGTON, D.C.
20001-2113; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
I.

The above-named appellant, MRI Associates, LLP ("Appellant"), appeals against

the above-named respondent, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("Respondent") to the
Idaho Supreme Court from a portion of the district court's "Consolidated Order re: Motions for
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Summary Judgment Heard May 18, 2011 ,"which was filed on June 17, 2011; and a portion of
the district court's "Seeoad Third Amended Judgment" ofMay 2, September 21, 2012, entered
in the above entitled action, Honorable Judge Michael E. Wetherell presiding.
2.

That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
IAR 11(a).
3.

Reserving the right to assert other issues on appeal (see IAR 17(f)), Appellant

makes the following preliminary statement of issues on appeal:
a.

The district court (Judge Wetherell) erred in holding that the Supreme

Court's decision in the first appeal of this case 1 did not affect a prior decision rendered by
the prior district court (Judge McLaughlin) as to Saint Alphonsus's share upon
dissociation from MRIA.
b.

The district court erred in awarding Respondent a judgment of $4,600,000

against MRI Associates, bearing interest at the judgment rate of 10% annum, calculated
from September 21,2007.
c.

The district court erred in the manner it calculated and applied the offset in

the Third Amended Judgment.
4.

No relevant portions of the requested record have been sealed.

5.

Appellant waives the preparation of the standard transcript and requests the

preparation of the following portions of the reporter's transcript in both hard copy and electronic
format:

1

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MR/ Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,224 P.3d 1068 (2009).
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a.

Trial Transcript, 2007 Trial (Aug. 1, 2007; Aug. 6, 2007; Aug. 8, 2007;

August I3-16, 2007; Aug. 20-24, 2007; Aug. 27-30, 2007; Oct. 3I, 2007); 2

6.

b.

Motion Hearing Transcript of May 18, 20 II;

c.

Motion Hearing Transcript of December 9, 20Il;

d.

Motion Hearing Transcript of June 22, 20 12;

e.

Motion Hearing Transcript of August 24, 2012.

Appellant waives the preparation ofthe standard clerk's record under IAR 28 and

requests that the following documents be included in the clerk's record:
a.

the Register of Actions;

b.

the original and any amended complaint(s);

c.

the original and any amended answer(s) to any complaint(s);

d.

the original and any amended counterclaim, third-party claim, or cross-

e.

the original and any amended answer(s) or response(s) to a counterclaim;

f.

notice of appeal and cross-appeal;

g.

any request for additional reporter's transcript or clerk's record;

h.

a court reporter's notice of lodging with the district court;

I.

table of contents and index;

j.

"MRI Associate's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment," filed March

claim;

21,2006.

k.

"Memorandum in Support ofMRI Associate's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment," filed March 21, 2006.

2

This transcript has already been prepared in the context of the first appeal of this action.
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l.

"Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRI Associate's Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment," filed March 21, 2006.
m.

"Affidavit ofThomas E. Henson in Support ofMRI Associate's Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment," filed March 21, 2006.
n.

"MRIA's Notice of Errata RE: Memorandum In Support OfMRIA's

Motion for Summary Judgment," filed May 26, 2006.
o.

"Supplemental Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt In Support OfMRI

Associate's Motion for Summary Judgment," filed May 26, 2006.
p.

"Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment," filed May 5, 2006.
q.

"Reply Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment," filed May 30, 2006.
r.

"Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motions to Strike, Cross-Motions

for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Motion to Dismiss," filed
July 24, 2006;
s.

"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment," filed September

21, 2007:
t.

"Motion for Clarification Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share," filed

April11, 2011;
u.

"Memorandum in Support of Motion for Clarification Regarding

Withdrawing Partner's Share," filed April11, 2011;
v.

"Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMRIA Motions Filed April11, 2011,"

and exhibits thereto, filed April 11, 2011.
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w.

"Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Claim for its

Partnership Interest," filed April11, 2011;
x.

"Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary

Judgment on its Claim for its Partnership Interest," filed April 11, 2011;
y.

"Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion for Clarification

Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share," filed April25, 2011;
z.

"MRIA's Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment

on its Claim for its Partnership Interest," filed April25, 2011;
aa.

"MRIA' s Reply in Support of its Motion for Clarification Regarding

Withdrawing Partners Share," filed May 2, 2011;
bb.

"Saint Alphonsus' s Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for

Summary Judgment on its Claim for its Partnership Interest," filed May 2, 2011;
cc.

"Consolidated Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May 18,

2011," filed June 17, 2011;
dd.

"Submission of Proposed Judgment" and "Proposed Judgment," filed Nov.

2, 2011;
ee.

"Saint Alphonsus's Objection and Response to MRIA's Proposed

Judgment," filed Nov. 8, 2011;
ff.

"Response to Saint Alphonsus' Objection and Response to MRIA's

Proposed Judgment," filed Nov. 15, 2011;
gg.

"Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Objections to MRIA's Proposed

Judgment," filed Nov. 21, 2011; and
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hh.

"Second Amended Judgment" filed May 2, 2012, and any amended

judgment hereinafter filed.
11.

May 24,2012 MRIA Amended Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant

to Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);
11.

May 24, 2012 MRIA Memorandum in Support of Amended Motion for

Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);
kk.

June 12, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Objections to MRIA's Amended Fee

Petition;
11.

June 12,2012 Affidavit of Counsel JackS. Gjording in Support of Saint

Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Amended Rule 60 Motion;
mm.

June 14, 2012 MRIA's Response To Saint Alphonsus's Objections To

Amended Fee Petition;
nn.

June 15,2012 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To MRIA's Amended Rule 60

Motion;
oo.

June 19,2012 Reply In Support OfMRIA's Amended Motion For Relief

From Judgment Pursuant To Rule 60(a) Or Rule 60(b);
pp.

June 19,2012 Saint Alphonsus's Reply In Support Of Objections To

MRIA's Amended Fee Petition;
qq.

June 20, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Response To MRIA's New Claims

Regarding Offset Raised For The First Time In Its Reply Brief;
rr.

August 10, 2012 MRIA Memorandum Concerning Amount of Offset;

ss.

August 10, 2012 MRIA Entities' Petition for Post-Judgment Costs and
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tt.

August 17. 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To MRIA' s Motion

Seeking Post-Judgment Attorney Fees And Costs;
uu.

August 20, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Supplemental

Brief Regarding Offset;
vv.

August 21. 2012 Reply In Support Of The MRIA Entities' Petition For

PostJudgment Costs And Fees;
ww.

August 21.2012 Reply In Support Of Memorandum Concerning Amount

Of Offset;
xx.

September 21. 2012 Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Motions

Heard August 24. 20 12;
yy.
7.

September 21, 2012 Third Amended Judgment.

Appellant does not request that any other documents, charts, or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
8.

I certify:

a.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the following:

Nicole Julson
Court Reporter
2414 N. McKinney
Boise, ID 83704

b.

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript.
c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
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e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to IAR 20.
f.

That pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(m). this amended notice of

appeal requests approximately 85 additional transcript pages. This amended notice has
been served on each reporter of whom a request for additional transcript is made.

DATED THIS 5th day of October, 2012.

BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that onthe 5th day of October, 2012, a true and correct copy ofthe
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
Jack S. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

~S.Mail
0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
0 Facsimile

~.Mail

0 Hand Delivery
0 Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile

~~·
Brent Bastian
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com

WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)

ocr os 20t2

wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

CHRISTOPHER D

Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177)

By CHRiSTiNE s~CH, Clerk

dparker@bwslawgroup.com

DEPUTY

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)

EET

bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff/Cross-Respondent,
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSSAPPEAL

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
-~

Defendant/Cross-A ellant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants/Cross-Appellants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants/Cross-Respondents.
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TO:
THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC.; ITS ATTORNEYS, JACKS. GJORDING, GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC, 121 NORTH
9TH STREET, SUITE 600 P.O. BOX 2837, BOISE, ID 83701, AND DONALD B. AYER,
CHRISTIAN G. VERGONIS, PETER J. ROMATOWSKI, MICHELLE L. MARKS, AND
THOMAS DAVIS OF JONES DAY, 51 LOUISIANA AVENUE NW WASHINGTON, D.C.
20001-2113; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
I.

The above-named Cross-Appellants, MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited

Partnership, LP, and MRI Mobile Limited, LP (collectively, "Cross-Appellants"), cross-appeal
against the above-named respondents, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively, "Cross-Respondents") to the Idaho Supreme
Court from a portion of the district court's: (1) "Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs
Motions for Judgment on Pleadings and Motions for Summary Judgment," dated November 16,
2010; (2) "Order Re: Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on Contract Theory of
Wrongful Withdrawal," dated May 6, 2011; and (3) a portion of the district court's "Seeond
Third Amended Judgment" of May 2, September 21, 2012, entered in the above entitled action,
Honorable Judge Michael E. Wetherell presiding.
2.

That Cross-Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph I above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
IAR ll(g).
3.

Reserving the right to assert other issues on appeal (see IAR 17(f)), Appellant

makes the following preliminary statement of issues on appeal:
a.

Whether the District Court erred when it found on summary judgment that

the relevant partnership was not for a term and/or a particular undertaking.
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b.

Whether the District Court erred when it found on summary judgment that

Counter-Respondents could not have wrongfully dissociated under some other theory
other than a violation of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act.
c.

Whether the District Court erred when it excluded the damages related to

Counter-Respondents' entry into the Eagle, Idaho market.
4.

No relevant portions ofthe requested record have been sealed.

5.

Cross-Appellants do not request any additional transcripts other than the entire

reporter's standard transcript in compressed format in accordance with Rules 25( c) and 26(m)
and those transcripts designated by the appellant in the initial and amended notice~ of appeal and
the transcripts designated in the respondent's request for additional transcripts:
6.

Cross-Appellants do not request any additional documents to be included in the

clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R., and those
designated by the appellant in the initial and amended notice~ of appeal and in the respondent's
request for additional records.
7.

Cross-Appellant does not request that any other documents, charts, or pictures

offered or admitted as exhibits be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
8.

I certify:

a.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the following:

Nicole Julson
Court Reporter
2414 N. McKinney
Boise, ID 83 704
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b.

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript.
c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

d.

That the cross-appellate filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to IAR 20.
f.

That pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(m), this amended notice of

cross-appeal requests no additional transcript pages.

DATED THIS 5th day of October, 2012.

BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of October, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
Donald B. Ayer ·
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

~S.Mail
IJ Hand Delivery
IJ Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile

B1i.s. Mail
D Hand Delivery
IJ Overnight Delivery
D Facsimile

Brent Bastian
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A.M--
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

012

• --~

CHRIST(:;-::
,,
By i:;t:,c,f',!E oft..f"Mi:;~-1. Clerk
< ''·"··

l:lcpw.....

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
)
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP ., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership,
)
)
Defendant.
)

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219

ORDER re: DEFENDANT'S!
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' PETITION
FOR COSTS AJ'ID FEES

___________________________ )
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED, an Idaho)
limited partnership; MRI MOBILE LIMITED, )
an Idaho limited partnership,
)
)
)
Counter-claimants,
)
)
vs.
)
)
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,)
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)
Counter-defendants.
)

_____________________________ )
Currently before this Court is the Defendant's/Counterclaimants' request for costs and
fees. The time for objection has passed with no filings by the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant. The
Plaintiff's supporting affidavit and documentation appear complete. Accordingly, the request is
GRANTED.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant/Counterclaimants (MRI Associates, LLP,

Order re: MRIA Entities' Petition for Costs and Fees I
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MRI LIMITED, and MRI Mobile Limited) are entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs in the
amount of $4,192,943 .08, plus the Judgment amount previously awarded by the Court on
September 24, 2010. The Court has issued a fourth amended judgment reflecting this award.

DATEDthis~ofOctober,2012.

~

~

~~

.

District Judge
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I hereby certify that on this~ day of October, 2012, I
mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the within instrument
to:
JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
PO BOX 2837
BOISE, ID 83701
DONALD AYER
JONES DAY
51 LOUSIANA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST., STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702

.......,,.,,

,

Christopher Rich
~··'' 't\~_,:1 ~r., ~· .r; ''•,,
Clerk of the District ~lift•••••••• ll<r'•-.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL

NO.•••~--A.M_
-.ffl'"ILEEo>::"--DISTRICT, ..., .. P.Ma;,_f-\\_ _-_

-

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA OCT

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
)
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership,
)
)
)
Defendant.
)

d G2012

.
Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219

FOURTH AMENDED JUDGMENT

_____________________________ )
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED, an Idaho)
limited partnership; MRI MOBILE LIMITED,)
an Idaho limited partnership,
)
)
)
Counter-claimants,
)
)
vs.
)
)
SATI'fT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,)
11\fC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)
Counter-defendants.
)

___________________________ )
This action having come for jury trial, and the issues having been duly tried and a verdict

having been rendered by the jury on October 31, 2011, IT IS SO ORDERED THAT MRI
Associates, LLP (MRIA), MRI Limited (MRI Center), and MRI Mobile Limited (MRI Mobile)
(collectively MRI Entities) may separately execute on any one of the alternatives stated in
paragraphs 1-5 of this judgment, with the exception of disgorgement. The choice of any entity to
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elect to recover under a particular paragraph will not bind the others to the alternatives contained
within that same paragraph. Provided, however, that each entity may recover only once. Further,
although collectable only by MRIA, the remedy of disgorgement may only be elected by the
combined decision of the MRI entities, since by its nature disgorgement is an alternative to all
other measures of damages suffered by all the MRIA entities.
1.

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care (SADC)

and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (SARMC) (collectively "Saint
Alphonsus") breached the Partnership Agreement by breaching the non-competition
clause found therein, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
St. Alphonsus: $6,592,486.87 (OFFSETTING JUDGMENT)
$2,686,148.87 in favor of St. Alphonsus
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:
2.

$25,420,000

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
St. Alphonsus: $6,592,486.87 (OFFSETTING WDGMENT)
$2,686,148.87 in favor of St. Alphonsus
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:

Fourth Amended Judgment 2
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MRI Center:
3.

$25,420,000

As to the claims ofMRI Center and MRI Mobile that Saint Alphonsus intentionally

interfered with their prospective contractual relations, the following damages are awarded
in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRI Center: $22,337,910
MRI Mobile: $19,329,701
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:
4.

$20,336,000

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint A1phonsus breached a fiduciary

duty owed to the MRI Entities, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
$3,906,338
MRIA:
St. Alphonsus: $6,592,486.87 (OFFSETTING illDGMENT)
$2,686,148.87 in favor of St. Alphonsus
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center: $25,420,000
Disgorgement:
MRIA:
$21,358,838
St. Alphonsus: $6,592,486.87 (OFFSETTING JUDGMENT)
$14,766,351.87 in favor ofMRIA

5.

As to the claim of the MRI entities that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil

conspiracy, the following damages are awarded:

Fourth Amended Judgment 3
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Lost Profit Damages:

=

MRIA:
$3,125,070
St. Alphonsus: $6,592,486.87 (OFFSETTING JUDGMENT)
$3,467,416.87 in favor of St. Alphonsus
MRI Center: $20,662,566
MRI Mobile: $17,879,973

Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:

$20,336,000

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amounts executed upon by the MRI entities will
bear interest at the judgment rate of 5.375% per annum until paid in full.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Saint Alphonsus is awarded $4,600,000 against MRI
Associates, bearing interest at the judgment rate of 10% per annum, calculated from September
21, 2007, until paid in full. In accordance with Rule 54(b)(1), the Court has offset the awards
(including accrued postjudgment interest where applicable) of MRIA and St. Alphonsus in each
alternative in which such an offset applies.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the MRI entities are entitled to recover attorney fees
and costs in the amount of $4,192,943.08 in addition to the judgment.
DATED

thi~ay of October, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF

MA~ING

I hereby certify that on this ~ day of October, 2012, I
mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the within instrument
to:
JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
PO BOX 2837
BOISE, ID 83701
DONALD AYER
JONES DAY
51 LOUSIANA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST., STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
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•

NO. _____
;:;,,Li"F:eon---4)~.2·
Ll_
A.M,
______
I
P.M.----.~-

•

NOV 0 1 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH C/ k
By JERI HEATON
DEPUTY

Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants/Appellants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

vs.

SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF
APPEAL

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Fee Category L.4 $101.00

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Defendant-Respondent.
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
CounterClaimants-Respondents,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
CounterDefendants-Appellants.
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho Limited
Limited Liability Partnership, MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership, and MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited Partnership, AND THE
PARTIES' ATTORNEYS, BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC, 802
West Bannock St., Suite 500, Boise, ID 83702, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE
ENTITLED COURT:
Plaintiff-CounterDefendant Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and

CounterDefendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 17, hereby give notice of appeal as follows:

A.

DESIGNATION OF APPEAL: The above-named Appellants, Saint Alphonsus

Diversified Care, Inc. ("SADC") and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("SARMC")
(collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), appeal against the above-named Respondents MRI Associates,
LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership (collectively, "MRIA") to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment (entitled "Seeond Third Fourth' Amended

1

Changes from the original notice of appeal (as set forth in the Amended Notice of Appeal) are underlined.
Additional changes made in the Second Amended Notice of Appeal are double underlined. See Idaho Appellate
Rule 17(m).
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Judgment"), entered in the above-entitled action on the~~ 30th day of May September
October 2012 (the Honorable Michael Wetherell, District Judge presiding). Pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 17(e)(l), this Notice of Appeal shall be deemed to include and present on appeal
(A) all interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment, order or decree
appealed from; (B) all final judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment or order appealed
from for which the time for appeal has not expired; and (C) all interlocutory or final judgments
and orders entered after the judgment or order appealed from, including, without limitation, (i)
the District Court's January 17, 2012 Judgment, (ii) the District Court's January 17, 2012
Findings ofFact and Conclusions of Law, (iii) the District Court's April25, 2012 denial of Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial, (iv) the District
Court's April30, 2012 Amended Judgment, ami (v) the District Court's May 15,2012 Order re:
Costs and Attorneys' Fees; (vi) the District Court's May 2, 2012 Second Amended Judgment;
ami (vii) the District Court's September 21, 2012 Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motions
Heard August 24, 2012: and (viii) the District Court's September 21. 2012 Third Amended
Judgment.
B.

AUTHORITY FOR APPEAL: Saint Alphonsus has the right to appeal to the

Idaho Supreme Court the judgments and orders described or incorporated herein pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rules 11(a)(l), (5), (6), and (7).
C.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL: The following

list of issues on appeal is preliminary in nature and is based upon such preliminary research and
legal analysis as could reasonably be conducted to date. Saint Alphonsus therefore reserves its
right to assert other issues on appeal.
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Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial, in its order dated April25,
2012, on the following grounds raised by Saint Alphonsus:
a. That MRIA failed to prove lost profits caused by Saint Alphonsus;
b. That MRIA's proof of profits allegedly lost by MRI Mobile Limited was
insufficient as a matter of law;
c. That MRIA was not entitled to recover damages for profits lost after April
1, 2005, and otherwise failed to prove that any losses suffered after April 1,
2005, were based on wrongful acts as opposed to Saint Alphonsus's
rightful post-dissociation competition;
d. That MRIA was not entitled to recover damages for profits allegedly lost
to the Intermountain Medical Imaging facility located on the Saint
Alphonsus hospital campus;
e. That the jury's award overstated MRIA's damages because it included
amounts that would have been earned by Saint Alphonsus absent the
alleged misconduct;
f.

That MRIA was not entitled to recover damages for the alleged diminution
in value of MRI Limited Partnership because MRIA affirmatively
abandoned this claim prior to the first trial and its reassertion of the claim
during the second trial was untimely;

g. That MRIA failed to prove the asserted diminution in value or that such
diminution in value was caused by Saint Alphonsus;
h. That MRIA's claim for disgorgement was improperly and untimely pled;
1.

That MRIA's claim for usurpation was time-barred;

J.

That the District Court improperly failed to make independent findings of
fact and conclusions of law on the equitable issue of usurpation;

k. That MRIA' s usurpations claims are not supported by substantial evidence
and are against the clear weight of the evidence;

1. That MRIA's disgorgement-of-profits award was overstated by $11.2
million as a matter of law because it failed to account for the costs that
Saint Alphonsus incurred in order to obtain its profits;
m. That the District Court erred in failing to require that damages be
apportioned between Saint Alphonsus and the third-party defendants for
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL -4-

005216

•

''

•

MRIA's breach-of-contract claims, contrary to the requirements of Idaho
law and the court's own prior ruling that "Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a
reduction in any damages awarded against it";
n. That the District Court erred in holding that apportionment of damages
should be decided by the jury rather than on a pro rata, 50%-50% basis;
o. That, in the alternative, the district court erred in requiring the jury to
determine relative fault separately for each cause of action (rather than
once for the body of joint wrongdoing) and in not requiring the jury to
allocate damages among the various causes of action asserted by MRIA;
p. That the District Court erred in allowing MRIA to amend its complaint to
add MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership as
parties following remand;
q. That the claims of MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited
Partnership were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations;
r.

That the claims ofMRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited
Partnership were not supported by legally sufficient evidence;

s. That the District Court's order regarding the application of the law-of-thecase doctrine following the Supreme Court remand was erroneous and
unevenly applied to the parties, to Saint Alphonsus's prejudice;

t.

That the District Court erred in allowing the jury to determine the meaning
ofthe unambiguous 1997 and 2011 Radiology Services Agreements
between Saint Alphonsus and Gem State Radiology and to base its
liability findings on an incorrect interpretation of those agreements;

u. That the District Court erred in concluding that its erroneous exclusion (as
hearsay) of Cindy Schamp's testimony regarding her own prior statements
to MRIA witnesses was harmless error;
v. That the District Court erred in precluding Saint Alphonsus from
introducing, during the cross-examination of a witness, an Idaho Business
Review article that contradicted that witness's direct testimony;
w. That the District Court erred in holding, in an order dated July 20, 2011,
that Saint Alphonsus could not enforce its statutory right to examine the
books and records ofMRIA, thus preventing Saint Alphonsus from
offering relevant evidence ofMRIA's financial bias at trial;
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x. That the District Court erred in refusing to exclude prejudicial language in
two memoranda by consultant Shattuck Hammond (Trial Exhibits 4234
and 4239);
y. That the District Court erred in precluding Saint Alphonsus from telling
the jury that its dissociation from MRIA was "rightful" under Idaho law,
per its order of June 13, 2011;
z. That the District Court erred in overruling Saint Alphonsus's objection,
made during trial on September 20, 2011, to MRIA's counsel's
inflammatory argument that Saint Alphonsus would preclude care for a
hypothetical "little girl with a brain tumor";
aa. That the District Court erred in allowing MRIA to offer "rebuttal"
testimony by Dr. Stephen Wilson;
bb. That the District Court erred in allowing MRIA to introduce, on October
15, 2011, a double-hearsay statement into evidence as a means to
"impeach" Saint Alphonsus witness Jeff Cliff's inability to remember an
out-of-court statement made by another witness;
cc. That the District Court erred, on October 11, 2011, by admonishing Gem
State Radiology's attorney in front of the jury, to the prejudice of Saint
Alphonsus;
dd. That the District Court erred in issuing a judgment that did not award
Saint Alphonsus interest on its counterclaim at the 12% legal rate of
interest, running from the date of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation to the
date of payment.
Saint Alphonsus also appeals from all of the underlying decisions, orders, and
rulings referenced in its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or
new trial.
2.

Whether the District Court erred, in its Apri125, 2012 order, when it declined
to order a new trial based on individual and cumulative prejudicial errors;

3.

Whether the District Court erred in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, dated January 17, 2012, when it summarily adopted the advisory jury
finding on usurpation liability, even though those findings were not supported
by the evidence, and declined to subtract Saint Alphonsus's initial investment
from the total amount of disgorgement sought.

4.

Whether the District Court erred in declining to provide the jury with Saint
Alphonsus's proposed jury instructions and special verdict form dated July 15,
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2011, or in the alternative, Saint Alphonsus' s Redline of the Court's Proposed
Post-Evidence Instructions and Proposed Special Verdict Form, filed October
25, 2011, or the jury instructions proposed during the conference of October
26, 2011;
5.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus's October 17,
2011 Motion to Direct a Verdict on Claims Related to Enforcement of the
Radiology Services Contract;

6.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus's October 17,
2011 Motion to Direct a Verdict on MRIA's Damages and Disgorgement
Theories;

7.

Whether the District Court erred, in its order dated September 27, 2011, by
denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Exclude Damages Theories;

8.

Whether the District Court erred, in its Consolidated Order re: Motions Heard
August 5, 2011 (August 24, 2011), by:
a. Granting MRIA's Motion for Clarification re: Contentions that MRIA
Breached Fiduciary Duties;
b. Granting MRIA's Motion to Preclude Reference to Departing Partner's
Share;
c. Granting, in part, MRIA's motion to have the exhibits from the first trial
deemed admitted under law-of-the-case principles;
d. Granting MRIA's Motion to Exclude Mention of Saint Alphonsus's Nonprofit Status;
e. Granting MRIA's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Thomas McCarthy
in part;
f.

Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Reconsider, in part, the Court's
June 13, 2011 Consolidated Order re: Motions in Limine regarding Saint
Alphonsus's ability to refer to its dissociation as "lawful," and to redact
portions of Trial Exhibits 4234 and 4239.

9.

Whether the District Court erred in denying, in an order dated July 20,2011,
Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Compel Compliance with its Statutory Right to
Inspect MRIA's Books and Records;

10.

Whether the District Court erred, in its Consolidated Order of June 17, 2011
re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May 18,2011, by:
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a. Holding that, as a matter oflaw, Idaho Code§ 6-805(1) requires a jury to
apportion damages rather than apportioning damages equally among
defendants and settling co-defendants;
b. Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's
Third-Party Beneficiary Claims;
11.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Recusal, as memorialized in the Court's June 13, 2011 Memorandum of
Actions Taken at May 18, 2011 Hearing;

12.

Whether the District Court erred, in its June 13, 2011 Consolidated Order re:
Motions in Limine Heard May 18, 2011, by:
a. Granting MRIA' s Motion precluding comment regarding the lawfulness of
Saint A1phonsus's dissociation;
b. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion to exclude portions of Trial Exhibits
4234 and 4239;
c. Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of Saint
Alphonsus's competition after April 1, 2005;

13.

Whether the District Court erred, in its November 16, 2010 Memorandum
Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Motions for Judgment on Pleadings and
Motions for Summary Judgment by:
a. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion to dismiss MRIA's civil conspiracy
claim;
b. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment on the legal
insufficiency ofMRIA's evidence oflost profits;
c. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion for judgment on the pleadings
regarding the claims of the limited partnerships;

14.

Whether the District Court erred in its May 15,2012 order denying in part
Saint Alphonsus's request to disallow MRIA's requested attorneys' fees and
costs.

15.

Whether the District Court erred in its September 21. 2012 order denying in
part Saint Alphonsus's request to disallow MRIA's requested attorney fees
and costs.
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REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT: Saint Alphonsus requests an entire standard

transcript of the trial proceedings in electronic format in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rules
17(h), 25(c) and 26(m). In addition, Saint Alphonsus requests transcripts of the following
proceedings:
1.

February 21, 2006 transcript of hearing on MRIA's Motion for Leave to File
First Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

2.

June 6, 2006 transcript of hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Dismiss;

3.

October 24, 2006 transcript of hearing on all pending motions;

4.

November 13, 2006 transcript of Status Conference re: Trial Setting;

5.

January 11, 2007 transcript of Hearing on Motion to Allow Punitive Damages,
and Motion to Strike Shattuck Hammond Report; Motion to Strike Affidavit
of Professor Branson; Motion to Amend First Amended Counterclaim and
Third Party Complaint;

6.

Aprill7, 2007 transcript ofHearing on Third Party Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and Hearing Regarding Order of Proof;

7.

July 2, 2007 transcript of Hearing on all pending Motions for Summary
Judgment and Motions in Limine;

8.

August 1, 2007 transcript of all proceedings before the Court;

9.

August 2, 2007 transcript of Hearing on MRIA's Motion for Clarification;

10.

Transcript of all Opening Statements from the 2007 trial;

11.

Transcript of all Closing Arguments from the 2007 trial;

12.

Transcripts, from the 2007 trial, of all conferences on jury instructions, the
objections of the parties to the instructions, and the court's ruling thereon; and

13.

October 31, 2007 transcript ofthe Hearing on SADC/SARMC's Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial.

14.

February 17, 2010 transcript of initial hearing following Supreme Court
remand;
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15.

May 7, 2010 transcript of scheduling hearing;

16.

July 9, 2010 transcript of hearing on Motion to Strike Third Amended
Counterclaim;

17.

August 4, 2010 transcript of hearing;

18.

October 1, 2010 transcript ofhearing on motions for summary judgment and
motions to dismiss;

19.

February 9, 2011 transcript of hearing on motions related to reopening of
discovery and filing of motions in limine;

20.

April22, 2011 transcript of hearing on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

21.

May 18, 2011 transcript of hearing on motions in limine and motions for
summary judgment;

22.

June 21,2011 transcript ofhearing on Motion to Compel Access to Books and
Records;

23.

August 5, 2011 transcript of hearing on pre-trial motions;

24.

August 9, 2011 transcript of pre-trial conference;

25.

September 2, 2011 transcript of pre-trial conference;

26.

September 6, 2011 transcript of all proceedings before the Court;

27.

Transcript of all opening statements;

28.

Transcript of all closing arguments;

29.

Transcript of all conferences on jury instructions, the objections ofthe parties
to the instructions, and the court's rulings thereon;

30.

October 1, 2011 transcript of hearing on Saint Alphonsus's Motions for
Summary Judgment

31.

December 9, 2011 transcript of hearing regarding objections to the form and
contents of the judgment;

32.

March 23, 2012 transcript of hearing on Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial, and motions regarding
award of attorneys' fees.
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33.

June 22, 2012 transcript ofhearing regarding MRIA's request to amend the
judgment and motions related to the award of attorney fees and costs.

34.

August 24, 2012 transcript of hearing regarding MRIA's request to amend the
judgment and motions related to the award of attorney fees and costs.

E.

CLERK'S RECORD: Saint Alphonsus requests that in addition to all

documents automatically included in the record pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28, the
following additional documents be included, which are most generally described in the terms
used in the clerk's Register of Actions: 2
1.

July 29, 2005 Scheduling Order;

2.

January 31, 2006 Motion for Leave to File First Amended Counterclaim and
Third-Party Complaint;

3.

January 31,2006 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

4.

February 14, 2006 Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant/Counterclaimant' s Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

5.

February 21, 2006 Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Counterclaim;

6.

March 7, 2006 Memorandum Decision on Defendant/Counterclaimant's
Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

7.

March 20,2006 Amended Scheduling Order;

8.

March 20,2006 MRIA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

9.

March 21,2006 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

10.

March 21, 2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Motion
for Summary Judgment;

2

Items #1 through #372 on this list were part of the record prepared in the first appeal of
this matter.

SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL-11-

005223

•

'.

•

11.

March 21, 2006 Affidavit of Thomas E. Henson, M.D., in Support ofMRIA's
Motion for Summary Judgment;

12.

April17, 2006 Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motions to Compel,
Motion to Quash Subpoenas and Motion for Protective Order;

13.

May 3, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order;

14.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Strike;

15.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

16.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

17.

May 5, 2006 Memorandum in Support of Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment;

18.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment;

19.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus' Notice ofErrata Re: Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

20.

May 23, 2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

21.

May 23, 2006 Affidavit of Thomas E. Henson, M.D., in Support of
Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

22.

May 23, 2006 Memorandum in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment;

23.

May 26,2006 MRIA's Notice of Errata Re: Memorandum in Support of
MRIA's Motion for Summary Judgment;

24.

May 26, 2006 Supplemental Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of
MRIA's Motion for Summary Judgment;

25.

May 30, 2006 Motion to Strike in Connection with Summary Judgment
Proceedings;

26.

May 30,2006 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

27.

May 30, 2006 Affidavit ofDaniel J. Gordon in Support of Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion to Strike;
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28.

May 30, 2006 Memorandum in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to
Strike;

29.

May 30,2006 Reply Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

30.

June 2, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Strike;

31.

June 5, 2006 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike;

32.

July 24, 2006 Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's Motions to Strike, CrossMotions for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss;

33.

August 7, 2006 Motion for Reconsideration or for Permission to Appeal;

34.

August 7, 2006 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration or for Permission to Appeal;

35.

August 25, 2006 MRIA's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration;

36.

August 25, 2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;

37.

August 30, 2006 Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration or, in the Alternative, for Permission to Appeal;

38.

October 10, 2006 Motion to Compel MRIA Financial Statements;

39.

October 10,2006 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel MRIA
Financial Statements;

40.

October 10, 2006 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording;

41.

October 18, 2006 MRIA's Opposition to Motion to Compel MRIA Financial
Statements;

42.

October 20, 2006 Affidavit of Jeremy G. Ladle in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Motion to Compel MRIA Financial Statements;

43.

October 20, 2006 Reply Memorandum in Support of Saint Alphonsus' Motion
to Compel MRIA Financial Statements;

44.

November 2, 2006 Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's Motions to Compel;
Defendant's Motion to Extend Pretrial Deadlines; Defendant's Motion for
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Reconsideration; Third-Party Defendant's Motion to Compel Answers to
Interrogatories and Produce Documents; Third-Party Defendant's Motion to
Strike MRIA's Objection to Producing Moffatt Thomas Documents;
45.

November 22, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order to Reset Trial Dates;

46.

December 20, 2006 Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim
and First Amended Third-Party Complaint;

47.

December 20,2006 Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages;

48.

December 20,2006 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Leave to
File Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
Complaint;

49.

December 20,2006 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion to Amend to
Seek Punitive Damages;

50.

December 20, 2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of
Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive
Damages (document sealed);

51.

December 20,2006 Affidavit ofDouglas M. Branson;

52.

December 20, 2006 Notice of Hearing;

53.

December 21,2006 Motion to Seal Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's
Motion to Amend First Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

54.

December 21, 2006 Errata Sheet Re: Affidavit of Professor Douglas M.
Branson;

55.

December 28,2006 Order to Seal Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Amend First Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

56.

December 28,2006 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

57.

December 28,2006 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Re: Lease Term;

58.

December 28, 2006 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Saint
Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

59.

January 4, 2007 Motion to Strike Affidavit of Professor Douglas M. Branson;

60.

January 4, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;
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61.

January 4, 2007 Motion to Strike References to Privileged Documents;

62.

January 4, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller;

63.

January 4, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording;

64.

January 4, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

65.

January 4, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages;

66.

January 4, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Memorandum;

67.

January 4, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended
Third-Party Complaint;

68.

January 4, 2007 Motion for Summary Judgment;

69.

January 4, 2007 Third Party Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment;

70.

January 4, 2007 Third Party Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to
MRIA's Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages;

71.

January 4, 2007 Third Party Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to
MRIA's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim and First
Amended Third Party Complaint;

72.

January 9, 2007 Motion to Strike SARMC's Motion to Strike References to
Privileged Documents;

73.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Strike;

74.

January 9, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

75.

January 9, 2007 Reply in Support of Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive
Damages Against SARMC;

76.

January 9, 2007 Reply In Support of Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive
Damages Against GSR/SARG;

77.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Reply
Briefs in Support of Motion;
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78.

January 9, 2007 MRIA's Memorandum in Opposition to SARMC's Motion to
Strike Affidavit of Professor Douglas M Branson;

79.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit of Yvonne Vaughan in Support ofMRIA's
Memorandum in Opposition ofSARMC's Motion to Strike Affidavit;

80.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit of Douglas M. Branson in Support of Opposition to
SARMC's Motion to Strike Affidavit;

81.

January 9, 2007 Reply Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Leave
to File 2nd Amended Counterclaim and First Amended 3rd Party Complaint;

82.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit ofDaniel J. Gordon in Support of Reply
Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Leave to File 2nd Amended
Counterclaim and 1st Amended 3rd Party Complaint;

83.

January 10,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Memorandum in
Opposition to SARMC's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Professor Douglas M.
Branson;

84.

January 10, 2007 Opposition to Motion to Strike References to Privileged
Documents;

85.

January 10, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;

86.

January 23, 2007 Stipulated Protective Order;

87.

February 1, 2007 Motion for Leave to Supplement Briefing on Motion for
Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
Complaint;

88.

February 26, 2007 Memorandum Decision on MRIA's Motion to Amend the
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint to Seek Punitive Damages and to
File a Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
Complaint; Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike References to Privileged
Documents and Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Professor
Douglas M. Branson;

89.

February 12, 2007 Notice of Withdrawal of Third Party Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment;

90.

February 13, 2007 Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
Lease Term;

91.

February 13, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;
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92.

February 20, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRlA's Opposition to Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

93.

February 20, 2007 Second Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Saint
Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

94.

March 2, 2007 Order on MRlA's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Counterclaim and First Amended Third Party Complaint;

95.

March 7, 2007 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against MRlA on
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim;

96.

March 7, 2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones in Support ofMotion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

97.

March 7, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

98.

March 23, 2007 Motion in Limine Re: Douglas M. Branson;

99.

March 23, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Motion in Limine;

100.

March 23,2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion in Support;

10 1.

April 3, 2007 Opposition to Third Party Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

102.

April 3, 2007 Affidavit of Julli Hopkins;

103.

April3, 2007 Affidavit ofDavid Giles, M.D.;

104.

Apri13, 2007 Affidavit of Shawn P. Bailey;

105.

April10, 2007 Response to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

106.

April 10, 2007 Affidavit Re: Motion for Summary Judgment;

107.

April 13, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
the Fourth Claim for Relief in Second Amended Counterclaim;

108.

April 13, 2007 Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording in Support of Saint Alphonsus
Summary Judgment;

109.

April13, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support ofMotion;
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110.

April23, 2007 Third Party Defendants' Expert Witness Disclosure Pursuant
to Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) ofthe IRCP;

111.

April26, 2007 Third Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Defamation Cause of Action;

112.

April26, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Motion to Exclude Witnesses;

113.

April26, 2007 Third Party Defendants' Memorandum in Support ofMotion
for Partial Summary Judgment on Defamation Cause of Action;

114.

April26, 2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones in Support of Third Party
Defendants' Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

115.

April26, 2007 Affidavit ofNeil D. McFeeley in Support of Third Party
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Defamation Cause of Action;

116.

April26, 2007 Affidavit of Jeffery T. Seabourn, M.D. in Support of Third
Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defamation
Cause of Action;

117.

April26, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Objection to MRIA's Expert Witness
Disclosures for Charles A. Wilhoite and Bruce P. Budge;

118.

April 26, 2007 Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Objection;

119.

May 1, 2007 Opposition to Motion in Limine Motion to Shorten Time;

120.

May 2, 2007 Motion for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Depositions of
Grant Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp;

121.

May 2, 2007 Affidavit In Support OfMotion for Protective Order Regarding
Discovery Depositions of Grant Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp;

122.

May 2, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Protective Order
Regarding Discovery Depositions of Grant Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp
and in Opposition of Motion to Compel Date Certain for Depositions of Grant
Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp;

123.

May 3, 2007 Jury Instructions Filed;

124.

May 3, 2007 Joinder in Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

125.

May 3, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's
Motion in Limine Re: Douglas M. Branson;
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126.

May 4, 2007 Objection to the Expert Witness Disclosure;

127.

May 4, 2007 Notice Of Hearing (05/19/07@ 3:30pm);

128.

May 8, 2007 Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure;

129.

May 8, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

130.

May 8, 2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones;

131.

May 8, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Third Party Defendant's Motion;

132.

May 8, 2007 Notice Of Hearing (06/05/07 @ 4:00pm);

133.

May 11, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment
Dismissing MRIA's First Amended Third Party Complaint on the Basis that
No Damages have been Proven;

134.

May 11,2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment;

135.

May 11, 2007 Third Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on Idaho Consumer Protection Act Cause of Action;

136.

May 11, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

137.

May 14, 2007 Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the
Interference with Prospective Contractual Relationship Cause of Action;

138.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit In Support OfDefendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Interference with Prospective Contractual
Relationship Cause of Action;

139.

May 14, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Interference with Prospective Contractual
Relationship Cause of Action;

140.

May 14, 2007 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Civil Conspiracy
Cause of Action;

141.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit In Support OfMotion for Partial Summary Judgment
of Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;

142.

May 14,2007 Memorandum in Support of for Partial Summary Judgment of
Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;
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143.

May 14, 2007 Third Party Defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

144.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit of Jeffrey R. Cliff;

145.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit of Jeffrey T. Seabourn;

146.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit of J. Timothy Hall MD;

147.

May 14,2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones;

148.

May 14,2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

149.

May 16, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

150.

May 16,2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

151.

May 16,2007 Affidavit of J. Will Varin;

152.

May 16,2007 Saint Alphonsus's Statement of Material Facts;

153.

May 16, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Statement ofUndisputed Facts in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Antitrust Claims;

154.

May 18, 2007 Motion for Summary Judgment;

155.

May 18, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;

156.

May 18, 2007 Statement ofUndisputed Facts in Support of Motion;

157.

May 18, 2007 Affidavit ofPatrick J. Miller;

158.

May 18, 2007 Statement ofUndisputed Facts in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Motion;

159.

May 18,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
Interference with Prospective Contractual Relationship or Business
Expectations;

160.

May 18,2007 Statement ofUndisputed Facts in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

161.

May 18,2007 Objection to Amended Notice ofRule 30(b)(6) Deposition of
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center;
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162.

May 18, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Misappropriation of Trade Secret Confidential Information Cause of Action;

163.

May 18, 2007 Affidavit ofPatrick J. Miller;

164.

May 21, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Third Party Defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Against MRIA on Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Claim;

165.

May 21, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus' Motion in Limine
Re: Douglas M. Branson;

166.

May 21,2007 Motion to Dismiss MRIA's Twentieth Claim for Relief(Re:
Spoliation);

167.

May 21, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Dismiss;

168.

May 22,2007 Opposition to SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the Fourth Claim for Relief on the Second Amended
Counterclaim;

169.

May 22,2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt In Support Of Opposition to
SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Fourth Claim for
Relief on the Second Amended;

170.

May 22, 2007 Opposition to Third Party Defendant's Motion to Exclude
Expert Witnesses;

171.

May 22, 2007 Opposition to SARMC's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

172.

May 22, 2007 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

173.

May 22, 2007 Opposition to Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure of Ed
Whitelaw;

174.

May 22, 2007 Affidavit of Ed Whitelaw in Support of Opposition to
SARMC's Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw;

175.

May 22, 2007 Affidavit ofDaniel J. Gordon in Support of Opposition to
SARMC's Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw;

176.

May 23, 2007 MRIA's Supplemental Disclosure ofWitnesses;

177.

May 24, 2007 Report of Discovery Master Re: Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Protective Order Re: MRIA Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition;
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178.

May 24, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's
Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw;

179.

May 25, 2007 Third-party Defendants' Memorandum Joining Saint
Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof of
Damages Causation;

180.

May 25, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on Damage Causation;

181.

May 25, 2007 Third-Party Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Exclude MRIA's Expert Witnesses;

182.

May 29, 2007 Reply Memorandum Regarding Motion to Exclude Expert
Witnesses;

183.

May 29,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment on MRIA's Fourth Claim for Relief (Re: Fiduciary Duty
to Limited Partnerships);

184.

June 1, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Supplemental Disclosure of Lay Witnesses;

185.

June 5, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Joinder in Objection to the Expert
Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw;

186.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus' Objection to
MRIA's Expert Witness Disclosures for Charles A. Wilhoite and Bruce P.
Budge and Third-Party Defendants' Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

187.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Shattuck Hammond
Memorandum;

188.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

189.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Renewed Motion in Limine Re: Lease and
Partnership Term;

190.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage
Theory;

191.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Purchase
Price Damage Theory;

192.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Dissociation;
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193.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Dissociation;

194.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Prohibiting SARMC from
Introducing Evidence of its Intent Re: Term of the MRIA Partnership;

195.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine;

196.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to Purchase MRIA
and/or MRICI;

197.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to
Purchase MRIA and/or MRICI;

198.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Communications Between
SARMC and MRIA about the Purchase ofMRIA and/or MRICI;

199.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of MRIA' s Motion in Limine Re:
Communications Between SARMC and MRIA about the Purchase of MRIA
and/or MRICI;

200.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Justification for Withdrawal;

201.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Justification for Withdrawal;

202.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Admissibility of Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

203.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Admissibility of Shattuck Hammond Memorandum;

204.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC Promotion of its Own
Best Interests as a Defense to IT Fiduciary Duty Breaches;

205.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support MRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
SARMC Promotion of its Own Best Interests as a Defense to IT Fiduciary
Duty Breaches;

206.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Purported Breaches by MRIA of
Fiduciary Duties;

207.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Purported Breaches by MRIA of Fiduciary Duties;

208.

June 5, 2007 Motion in Limine Re: Evidence ofPatricia Vandenberg's Status
as a Former Catholic Nun;
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209.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun;

210.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Beliefs About
Legality of Withdrawal from MRIA;

211.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
SARMC's Beliefs About Legality of Withdrawal from MRIA;

212.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Referring Physicians Designated
by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

213.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Referring
Physicians Designated by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

214.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Reliance on Advice of
Counsel;

215.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion in Limine Re: SARMC's
Reliance on Advice of Counsel;

216.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Inadvertently Disclosed
Privileged Document;

217.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Inadvertently
Disclosed Privileged Document;

218.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members of
DMR;

219.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Investments by Members of DMR;

220.

June 5, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Motions in
Limine;

221.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion to Strike IMI's Joinder in SARMC's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof of Damages Causation;

222.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion to Strike IMI's
Joinder in SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof
of Damages Causation;

223.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Re: Damage Causation or, in the Alternative, Motion in Limine;
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224.

June 5, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Damage Causation
or, in the Alternative, Motion in Limine;

225.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to IMI's Motion for Summary Judgment
Dismissing MRIA's 1st Amended Third Party Complaint on the Basis that No
Damages Have Been Proven and SARMC's Joinder Thereto;

226.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by
Third Party Defendants on the "Interference with Existing Contractual
Relationship" Claim;

227.

June 5, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Third Party Defendants on the
"Interference with Existing Contractual Relationship" Claim;

228.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to Third Party Defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action and
SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Cause
of Action (MRIA's 16th Claim for Relief);

229.

June 12, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion to Dismiss Spoliation
Claim;

230.

June 12,2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation;

231.

June 12,2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Renewed Motion in Limine
Re: Lease and Partnership Term;

232.

June 12,2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Shattuck Hammond Memorandum;

233.

June 12,2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Purchase Price Damage Theory;

234.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Charles Wilhoite in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

235.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

236.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit ofDaniel J. Gordon in Support of Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss Spoliation Claim;
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237.

June 12,2007 Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Reliance on Advice of
Counsel;

238.

June 12,2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Motion in Limine;

239.

June 12, 2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Strike
Gregory Vistnes;

240.

June 12,2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re:
Damage Causation;

241.

June 12, 2007 Report of Discovery Master Re: Motion to Compel Responses
to Fifth Set of Interrogatories and Fourth Set of Request for Admissions;

242.

June 12, 2007 Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Beliefs
about Legality of Withdrawal from MRIA;

243.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Reply Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Damage Causation;

244.

June 12,2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: SARMC Promotion of its
Own Best Interests as a Defense to its Fiduciary Duty Breaches;

245.

June 12, 2007 Response to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;

246.

June 12, 2007 Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members
ofDMR;

247.

June 12,2007 Response to Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Re:
Antitrust;

248.

June 12, 2007 Reply to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
by Third Party Defendants on "Interference with Existing Contractual
Relationship" Claim;

249.

June 12, 2007 Response to MRIA's Motion to Strike IMI's Joinder in
SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof of
Damages Causation;

250.

June 12,2007 Response To MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Damages Causation;

251.

June 12, 2007 Objection to Motion in Limine Re: Referring Physicians
Designated by SARMC/GSR as Expert Witnesses;
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252.

June 12, 2007 Objection to Motion in Limine Re: Admissibility of Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

253.

June 12, 2007 Reply to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

254.

June 12, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

255.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Strike Exhibits;

256.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Justification for Withdrawal;

257.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support ofResponse to Opposition to SARMC's
Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Damages Causation;

258.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Referring Physicians
Designated by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

259.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Admissibility of Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

260.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Response to Admissibility of Shattuck Hammond
Memorandum;

261.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Purported Breaches by
MRIA of Fiduciary Duties;

262.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Response to Motion in Limine Re:
Purported Breaches by MRIA of Fiduciary Duties;

263.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of Patricia
Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun;

264.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Response to Motion in Limine Re:
Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun;

265.

June 12, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Joinder in Third Party Defendant's Reply
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Civil Conspiracy
Cause of Action;

266.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to Purchase MRIA;

267.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller;

268.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members;

269.

June 12, 2007 Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Communications;
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270.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Term of the Partnership;

271.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment re: Damages Causation

272.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit ofPatrick J. Miller re: Breaches of Fiduciary Duty by
MRIA;

273.

June 13,2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on the Fourth Claim for Relief in Second
Amended Counterclaim;

274.

June 14, 2007 Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Spoliation
Claim;

275.

June 14, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price
Damage Theory;

276.

June 14, 2007 Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation;

277.

June 14, 2007 Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Shattuck
Hammond Memo;

278.

June 14, 2007 Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Lease &
Partnership Term;

279.

June 14, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support ofMR1 's Opposition
to Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

280.

June 15, 2007 All Replies in Support of Motion in Limine (12 in number);

281.

June 15,2007 Affidavit of James M. Prochaska;

282.

June 15, 2007 Motion to Strike;

283.

June 18, 2007 Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Charles Wilhoite in
Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

284.

June 19, 2007 MRIA's Reply in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Referring
Physicians Designated by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

285.

June 19,2007 MRIA's Reply in Support ofMotion in Limine Re:
Admissibility of Shattuck Hammond Memorandum;
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286.

June 19, 2007 MRIA's Response to Third Party Defendants' Objection to
Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members of DMR;

287.

June 21, 2007 Response to Erroneous Statement;

288.

June 25, 2007 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Strike the Affidavit
of Charles Wilhoite;

289.

June 25, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon;

290.

June 27, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment;

291.

June 28, 2007 Order on Oral Argument Presentation on Motions for July 2nd
2007;

292.

July 3, 2007 Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording Re: documents to be Submitted In
Camera;

293.

July 12, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Witness List;

294.

July 18, 2007 Plaintiffs Trial Brief;

295.

July 18, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Third Party Defendant
Settlement;

296.

July 18,2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion;

297.

July 18, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Purported Breaches of Fiduciary
Duties and Wrongful Conduct by MRIA, DMR, and Dr. Giles;

298.

July 18, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion;

299.

July 18, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Third Party Defendants Expert
Witnesses;

300.

July 18, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion MRIA's Trial
Brief;

301.

July 18,2007 Pre-Trial Memorandum;

302.

July 20, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;

303.

July 20, 2007 Stipulation for Dismissal of Third Party Defendants With
Prejudice;
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304.

July 25, 2007 Motion to Compel Production of Discovery;

305.

July 25, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Production of
Discovery;

306.

July 25, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Motion to Compel;

307.

July 26, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion in Limine Re: Third Party Defendant Settlement;

308.

July 26, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion in Limine re Third Party Defendants Expert Witnesses;

309.

July 26, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion in Limine re Conduct by MRIA, DMR and Dr. Giles;

310.

July 26, 2007 Affidavit of J. Will Varin;

311.

July 30,2007 Order for Dismissal ofThird Party Defendants With Prejudice;

312.

July 30, 2007 Memorandum Decision On Saint Alphonsus' Motion In Limine
Re: Shattuck Hammond Memorandum; Saint Alphonsus' Renewed Motion In
Limine Re: Lease and Partnership Term; Saint Alphonsus' Motion In Limine
Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory; Saint Alphonsus' Motion In Limine Re:
Dissociation; MRIA's Motion In Limine Prohibiting SARMC From
Introducing Evidence of its Intent Re: Term ofthe MRIA Partnership;
MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to Purchase MRIA and/or MRICI;
MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Communications Between SARMC and MRIA
About the Purchase ofMRIA and/or MRICI; MRIA's Motion In Limine Re:
Justification for Withdrawal; MRIA's Motion In Limine Re: Admissibility of
Shattuck Hammond Memorandum; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's
Promotion of its Own Best Interests; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Purported
Breaches By MRIA of Fiduciary Duties; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun; MRIA's
Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Beliefs About Legality of Withdrawal from
MRIA; MRIA's Motion to Strike Gregory S. Vistness; MRIA's Motion in
Limine Re: Referring Physicians Designated By SARG/GSR as Expert
Witnesses; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Reliance on Advice of
Counsel; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Inadvertently Disclosed Privileged
Documents; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Investments By Members of
DMR; Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Charles Wilhoite in
Opposition to SARMC's Motion In Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage
Theory; MRIA's Motion to Strike Supplemental Affidavit Of Gregory S.
Vistness, Ph.D.;
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313.

August 1, 2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Request for
Clarification;

314.

August 3, 2007 MRIA's Request for Clarification/Reconsideration ofMotion
in Limine Re: Shattuck Hammond Memorandum and MRIA's Request for
Pre-evidentiary Jury Instruction Re: Duty of Loyalty;

315.

August 3, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Use of Deposition
Testimony in Opening Statements;

316.

August 3, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion;

317.

August 3, 2007 SARMC 's Motion in Limine Re: Use of Shattuck Hammond
Documents in Opening Statement;

318.

August 6, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Compel
Re: SARMC's Failure to Provide Foundational Objections to MRIA's
Exhibits;

319.

August 6, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' s Reply to MRIA' s Opposition to Motion in
Limine Re: Use of Shattuck Hammond Documents in Opening Statements;

320.

August 10, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Motion in Limine Re: Dissociation
Damages;

321.

August 10, 2007 Affidavit in Support ofMotion in Limine Re: Dissociation
Damages;

322.

August 10,2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation Damages;

323.

August 14, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation Damages;

324.

August 20, 2007 MRIA Motion in Limine;

325.

August 20,2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion;

326.

August 20, 2007 Affidavit of WadeL. Woodard in Support of Motion in
Limine;

327.

August 23, 2007 Court's draft Jury Instructions;

328.

August 27, 2007 MRIA's Response to Statute of Limitations Argument;
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329.

August 28, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Grant Chamberlain
Testimony and Supporting Memorandum;

330.

August 28, 2007 Affidavit in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Grant
Chamberlain Testimonial and Supporting Memorandum;

331.

August 29, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Objections and Proposed Additional Jury
Instructions;

332.

August 29, 2007 Court's draft Jury Instructions;

333.

August 30, 2007 Court's draft Jury Instructions;

334.

August 30, 2007 Jury Instructions filed;

335.

August 30, 2007 Jury Verdict;

336.

September 4, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Objection to MRIA's Proposed
Judgment;

337.

September 10, 2007 MRIA's Response to Saint Alphonsus's Objection to
MRIA's Proposed Judgment;

338.

September 10, 2007 MRIA's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Re: Withdrawing Partners Interest in the Partnership;

339.

September 10, 2007 SADC's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Regarding Plaintiff SADC's Claim for its Partnership Equity;

340.

September 21, 2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment;

341.

October 3, 2007 Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and
Motion for New Trial;

342.

October 3, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

343.

October 3, 2007 Affidavit Re: Settlement Offer;

344.

October 9, 2007 Motion for Costs and Fees;

345.

October 9, 2007 Affidavit of Thomas A. Banducci in Support ofMRIA's
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs;

346.

October 9, 2007 Affidavit of Counsel Re: Criteria for Awarding Attorney Fees;
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347.

October 9, 2007 MRIA's Memorandum in Support ofMemorandum of Costs
and Fees;

348.

October 9, 2007 MRIA's Motion for Reconsideration of Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment;

349.

October 9, 2007 MRIA's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration and Findings of Fact, Conclusions oflaw and Judgment;

350.

October 9, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Application for Attorney Fees Relative to
Antitrust and Equity Claims;

351.

October 9, 2007 Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees;

352.

October 9, 2007 Affidavit of Stephanie C. Westermeier;

353.

October 22,2007 MRIA's Objection to Verified Memorandum of Costs and
Attorneys' Fees;

354.

October 23, 2007 Motion to Disallow MRIA's Request for Costs and Fees;

355.

October 23, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees;

356.

October 23,2007 Memorandum in Support of Opposition to Attorney Fees
and Costs;

357.

October 24, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

358.

October 24, 2007 Affidavit in Support ofMRIA's Opposition to Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

359.

October 24, 2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Motion for
Reconsideration of Findings of Fact;

360.

October 24, 2007 Affidavit of Jack Gjording in Opposition to Motion for
Prejudgment Interest;

361.

October 26, 2007 Reply in Support ofMotion for Reconsideration of Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment;

362.

October 26, 2007 Reply in Support of Motion for Prejudgment Interest;

363.

October 26, 2007 MRIA's Verified Reply in Support ofMotion for Costs and
Fees;
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364.

October 29, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

365.

October 29, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Saint
Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

366.

November 19, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus' Application
for Attorney Fees Relative to Antitrust and Equity Claims; Saint Alphonsus'
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict; Saint Alphonsus' Motion
for New Trial; MRIA's Motion for Prejudgment Interest; MRIA's Motion for
Reconsideration; MRIA's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs;

367.

December 7, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Attorney Costs and Fees;

368.

December 10, 2007 Acceptance ofRemittitur;

369.

December 20, 2007 Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care and Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center Objection to Acceptance of Remittitur;

370.

December 21, 2007 Objection to Revised Fees and Costs;

371.

December 21,2007 Affidavit in Support of Objection to Revised Fees and
Costs;

372.

December 27, 2007 Notice of Appeal;

373.

January 3, 2008 Amended Judgment;

374.

January 3, 2008 Response to Objection to Acceptance of Remittitur;

375.

January 4, 2008 Motion for Stay of Execution;

376.

January 4, 2008 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Motion for Stay
of Execution;

377.

January 17, 2008 Notice Of Cross-Appeal;

378.

January 28,2008 Memorandum Decision on MRIA's Revised Motion for
Attorneys Fees and Costs;

379.

January 29, 2008 Order Clarifying the Court's Memorandum Decision on
MRIA's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Issued by the Court on January
28th, 2008;
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380.

February 4, 2008 Affidavit of WadeL Woodard in Support of Award of Costs
as a Matter of Right and Second Amended Judgment;

381.

February 6, 2008 Objection to Proposed Second Amended Judgment;

382.

February 8, 2008 Order Staying Execution;

383.

February 8, 2008 Affidavit of Thomas A Banducci;

384.

February 11, 2008 Supplemental Request for Additional Clerk's Record;

385.

February 13, 2008 MRIA 's Objection to Proposed 2nd Amended Judgement
and Motion for Fees;

386.

February 26,2008 Second Amended Judgment;

387.

July 31, 2008 Stipulation for Corrections and Additions to the Transcript and
Record;

388.

August 1, 2008 Order for Corrections and Additions to the Transcript and
Record;

389.

October 22, 2009 Opinion- Supreme Court Docket No. 34885;

390.

March 22, 2010 Third Amended Counterclaim;

391.

April16, 2010 Answer to Third Amended Complaint;

392.

April 16, 2010 Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter from the Third Amended
Complaint;

393.

July 2, 2010 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Strike Immaterial
Matter from Third Amended Counterclaim;

394.

July 2, 2010 Affidavit of Tom Banducci in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's
Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter from Third Amended Counterclaim;

395.

July 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of its Motion to Strike
Immaterial Matter from the Third Amended Counterclaim;

396.

July 9, 2010 Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions From the Parties and
Briefing Schedule;

397.

July 26, 2010 Motion To Amend Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions;
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398.

July 30, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRlA's Motion to Amend
Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions;

399.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment Based on
the Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's Evidence of Lost Profits;

400.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for
Summary Judgment Based on the Legal Insufficiency ofMRlA's Evidence of
Lost Profits;

401.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment on the Claims ofthe
Limited Partnerships;

402.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for
Judgment on the Claims of the Limited Partnerships;

403.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment on the Civil
Conspiracy Claim;

404.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for
Judgment on the Civil Conspiracy Claim;

405.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on
MRIA's Claim for Wrongful Dissociation;

406.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for
Summary Judgment on MRlA's Claim for Wrongful Dissociation;

407.

August 6, 2010 Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Amend Order Re:
Scheduling Preliminary Motions;

408.

August 30, 2010 Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim for
Wrongful Dissociation;

409.

August 30,2010 Opposition to Motion for Judgment on the Claims ofthe
Limited Partnerships;

410.

August 30,2010 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment Based on MRlA's Civil Conspiracy Claim;

411.

August 30, 2010 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment Based on the Alleged Legal Insufficiency ofMRlA's Evidence of
Lost Profits;

412.

September 13,2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support ofMotion for
Summary Judgment on Claims ofthe Limited Partnerships;
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413.

September 13, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Claim for Wrongful Dissociation;

414.

September 13, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Claim;

415.

September 13,2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's
Evidence of Lost Profits;

416.

September 27, 2010 Order Granting Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter From
the Third Amended Counterclaim;

417.

November 16, 2010 Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motions
for Judgment on Pleadings and Motions for Summary Judgment;

418.

December 23, 2010 Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery;

419.

January 10, 2011 Motion to Set a Scheduling Order;

420.

February 2, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Reopen Face and Expert Discovery;

421.

February 2, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Set Scheduling Order;

422.

February 2, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Motion to Reopen
and In opposition to Motion to Set Scheduling Order;

423.

February 4, 2011 Reply in Support of Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert
Discovery;

424.

February 15, 2011 Order Reopening Discovery and Setting Schedule;

425.

March 2, 2011 Joint Motion to Amend Discovery Schedule;

426.

March 7, 2011 Order Granting Joint Motion to Amend Discovery Schedule;

427.

March 7, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion For Summary Judgment On
MRIA's Unpled Breach Of Contract Theory of Wrongful Dissociation;

428.

March 7, 2011 Memorandum In Support Of Saint Alphonsus's Motion For
Summary Judgment On MRIA's Unpled Breach Of Contract Theory of
Wrongful Dissociation;

429.

March 8, 2011 Notice of Errata re: St Alphonsus Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment;
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430.

March 22, 2011 Stipulation and Covenant Not to Execute;

431.

March 23, 2011 Order re: Stipulation and Covenant Not to Execute;

432.

March 28, 2011 MRIA's Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment On
Breach Of Contract Theory of Wrongful Withdrawal;

433.

April 11, 2011 MRIA's Motion for Clarification Regarding Withdrawing
Partner's Share;

434.

April11, 2011 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Clarification
Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share;

435.

April 11, 2011 MRIA's Motion In Limine to Preclude Saint Alphonsus from
Referencing the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Regarding the Appeal of this
Case

436.

April 11, 2011 Memorandum in Support ofMotion In Limine to Preclude
Saint Alphonsus from Referencing the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion
Regarding the Appeal of this Case;

437.

April11, 2011 MRIA's Motion In Limine to Preclude Argument of Lawful
Dissociation;

438.

April11, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Motion In Limine to Preclude
Argument of Lawful Dissociation;

439.

April11, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMRIA Motions Filed April
11' 2011;

440.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment on
MRIA's Unpled "Breach of Contract" Theory of Wrongful Dissociation;

441.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of
Competition Following Lawful Dissociation;

442.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in
Limine Re: Evidence of Competition Following Lawful Dissociation;

443.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its
Second Affirmative Defense;

444.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment on its Second Affirmative Defense;
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445.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and
Argument that St Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew from MRIA;

446.

Aprilll, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in
Limine to Exclude Evidence and Argument that Saint Alphonsus Improperly
Withdrew from MRIA;

447.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Prior Evidentiary
Rulings from the First Trial;

448.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion in
Limine Re: Prior Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial;

449.

Aprilll, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its
Claim for its Partnership Interest;

450.

Aprilll, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment on its Claim for its Partnership Interest;

451.

Aprilll, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRI
Center and MRI Mobile's Third Party Beneficiary Claims;

452.

Aprilll, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment on MRI Center's and MRI Mobile's Third Party
Beneficiary Claims;

453.

Aprilll, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to Exclude Claims of
Misappropriation, Defamation or Wrongful Dissociation;

454.

Aprilll, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support ofMotion in
Limine to Exclude Claims ofMisappropriation, Defamation or Wrongful
Dissociation;

455.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: References to the
Jury's Finding of Liability in the First Trial;

456.

Aprilll, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in
Limine Re: References to the Jury's Finding of Liability in the First Trial;

457.

Aprilll, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's
Second Claim of Relief;

458.

April 11, 2011 Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording;

459.

Aprilll, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support ofMotion for
Summary Judgment ofMRIA's Second Claim of Relief;
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460.

April25, 2011 MRIA's Notice ofNon-Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion
for Summary Judgment on MRIA's 2nd Claim for Relief;

461.

April 25, 2011 MRIA's Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary
Judgment on Its Claim for Its Partnership Interest;

462.

April25, 2011 MRIA's Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary
Judgment on Its 2nd Affirmative Defense;

463.

April25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary Judgment
on MRI Center and MRI Mobile's 3rd-Party Beneficiary Claims;

464.

April25, 2011 Response to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine re Prior
Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial;

465.

April25, 2011 MRIA's Notice ofNon-Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion
In Limine re Reference to Jury's Finding of Liability in the 1st Trial;

466.

April25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine re Evidence
of Competition Following Dissociation;

467.

April25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine to Exclude
Evidence & Argument That St. Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew From MRIA;

468.

April 25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine to Exclude
Claims of Misappropriation, Defamation or Wrongful Dissociation;

469.

April25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine to
Preclude Reference to the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in this Case;

470.

April25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to Motion in Limine to
Preclude Argument that Dissociation was Lawful;

471.

April25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion for
Clarification Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share;

472.

April25, 2011 Affidavit ofDr James Prochaska in Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRI Center and MRI
Mobile's 3rd Party Beneficiary Claims;

473.

May 2, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Oflts Motion For Clarification
regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share;

474.

May 2, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Oflts Motion In Limine To Preclude
Argument That Dissociation Was Lawful;
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475.

May 2, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Oflts Motion In Limine To Preclude
Reference To The Idaho Supreme Court Opinion;

476.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum In Support Oflts
Motion For Summary Judgment On Its Claim For Its Partnership Interest;

477.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum In Support Oflts
Motion For Summary Judgment On Its Second Affirmative Defense

478.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply In Support Oflts Motion For
Summary Judgment On MRI Centers And MRI Mobiles Third-Party
Beneficiary Claims;

479.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Consolidated Reply In Support oflts Motions
In Limine;

480.

May 02, 2011 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording;

481.

May 03, 2011 Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of JackS. Gjording and
Memorandum in Support;

482.

May 05, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Recusal by the Court Based on
Relationship with Dr Henson

483.

May 06,2011 Order Re: St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary Judgment;

484.

May 06, 2011 Partial Summary Judgment;

485.

May 06, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Strike;

486.

May 11, 2011 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Recusal;

487.

May 11, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's
Motion for Recusal;

488.

May 13, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply In Support Of Motion For Recusal By
the Court Based On Relationship With Dr Henson;

489.

May 13, 2011 Affidavit Of JackS. Gjording In Support OfReply In Support
Of Motion For Recusal;

490.

May 13, 2011 Reply in Support to Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of
Jack Gjording;

491.

May 16, 2011 Order Withdrawing Rule 54(b) Certification;
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492.

June 7, 2011 Motion and Memorandum for Orders Concerning Potential
Witnesses;

493.

June 7, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel;

494.

June 10, 2011 Response To MRI Motion Concerning Potential Witnesses;

495.

June 10, 2011 Motion To Compel Compliance with Statutory Rights to
Inspect Partnership Books and Records;

496.

June 10, 2011 Affidavit Of Jack Gjording In Support Of Motion to Compel;

497.

June 10,2011 Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Compel Compliance
with Statutory Rights to Inspect Partnership Books and Records;

498.

June 13,2011 Memorandum of Actions Taken at May 18 Hearing;

499.

June 13, 2011 Consolidated Order Re: Motions in Limine;

500.

June 15, 2011 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus Motion to Compel Compliance
with Statutory Rights to Inspect Partnership Books and Records;

501.

June 17, 2011 Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Compliance with
Statutory Rights to Inspect Partnership Books and Records

502.

June 17,2011 Consolidated Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment
Heard May 18, 2011;

503.

June 21, 2011 MRIA's Reply in Support of its Motion Concerning Potential
Witnesses Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp;

504.

June 22, 2011 Order Re: Availability at Trial of Witnesses Sandra Bruce,
Cindy Schamp and Dr. Thomas Henson;

505.

June 29, 2011 Briefre Motion to Compel Compliance Regarding Relevance
of Gilbert v. Summit County;

506.

July 05, 2011 Response to Brief Concerning Gilbert v. Summit County;

507.

July 13, 2011 Motion to Release Original Exhibits;

508.

July 14, 2011 Order Releasing Exhibits;

509.

July 14, 2011 MRIA's Proposed Jury Instructions;
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510.

July 15, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Requested Jury Instructions and Special
Verdict Form;

511.

July 20, 2011 Order Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Compel
Compliance with Statutory Right to Inspect MRIA's Books and Records;

512.

July 25, 2011 Motion In Limine To Exclude Hearsay Within Hearsay In
Business Records;

513.

July 25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion For Reconsideration In Part Of June
13 2011 Consolidated Order RE: Motions In Limine;

514.

July 25, 2011 Affidavit Of JackS. Gjording;

515.

July 25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum In Support OfMotion In
Limine To Exclude Hearsay Within Hearsay In Business Records;

516.

July 28, 2011 Motion To Have Deemed Admitted The Exhibits Admitted In
The Previous Trial;

517.

July 28, 2011 Affidavit Of Counsel In Support OfMotion To Have Deemed
Admitted The Exhibits Admitted In The Previous Trial;

518.

July 28,2011 Memorandum In Support OfMRIA's Motion To Have Deemed
Admitted The Exhibits Admitted In The Previous Trial;

519.

July 28, 2011 MRIA's Motion In Limine To Exclude Mention Of Saint
Alphonsus's Status As A Non-Profit Entity;

520.

July 28,2011 Memorandum In Support OfMRIA's Motion In Limine To
Exclude Mention Of Saint Alphonsus's Status As A Non-Profit Entity;

521.

July 28, 2011 MRIA's Opposition To Saint Alphonsus's Motion In Limine
To Exclude "Hearsay Within Hearsay" In Business Records;

522.

July 29, 2011 Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Exclude the Expert
Testimony of Thomas R McCarthy PhD;

523.

July 29,2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMotion;

524.

July 29, 2011 Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony ofThomas R
McCarthy, Ph.D;

525.

August 01, 2011 Motion and Memorandum in Support to Preclude Reference
to Saint Alphonsus's Departing Partners Share;
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526.

August 01, 2011 Motion and Memorandum for Clarification that Saint
Alphonsus May Not Contend that MRIA Breached Fiduciary Duties;

527.

August 01,2011 Objection to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Reconsideration
in Part of June 13 2011 Consolidated Order ReMotions in Limine;

528.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Have
Deemed Admitted Exhibits From First Trial

529.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Preclude Reference to Saint Alphonsus's Departing Partner Share;

530.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Exclude Mention of Saint Alphonsus's Status as a Non-Profit Entity;

531.

August 03,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion for
Clarification re: Contentions That MRIA Breached Fiduciary Duties;

532.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of its Motion in Limine
to Exclude Hearsay Within Hearsay From Business Records;

533.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Reconsideration in
Part of June 13 2011 Consolidated Order reMotions in Limine;

534.

August 03, 2011 Memorandum Addressing Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to
MRIA's Motion to Shorten Time;

535.

August 04, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To MRI's Motion To Exclude
The Expert Testimony Of Thomas R McCarthy PhD;

536.

August 04, 2011 Affidavit Of Counsel In Support OfOpposition;

537.

August 04, 2011 Objections to Saint Alphonsus's Requested Jury Instructions
and Special Verdict Form;

538.

August 04, 2011 MRI's 1st Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions;

539.

August 04,2011 Reply in Support ofMotion to Have Deemed Admitted
Exhibits from the First Trial;

540.

August 04, 2011 Reply in Support ofMotion to Exclude Mention of Saint
Alphonsus's Status as a Non-Profit Entity;

541.

August 05, 2011 Defendant's Witness List;

542.

August 05, 2011 Defendant's Exhibit List;
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543.

August 09, 2011 Motion for Order Setting Deadline for Production of Exhibit
List and Motion to Shorten Time;

544.

August 16, 2011 Order Rescheduling Jury Questionnaire;

545.

August 17, 2011 Defendant/Counterclaimants' Proposed Amended Exhibit
List;

546.

August 17, 2011 Plaintiff/Counterdefendants Saint Alphonsus's Proposed
Exhibit List;

547.

August 17, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Witness Designations;

548.

August 17, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Objection To MRIA's Designations Of
Manfred Steiner, Alan Hahn And Stephanie Westermeier As Witnesses;

549.

August 17, 2011 Supplemental Brief in Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Exclude Expert Testimony of Dr Thomas McCarthy;

550.

August 18,2011 Motion to Strike Saint Alphonsus's Supplemental Brief in
Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Dr. Thomas
McCarthy

551.

August 19, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Proposed Juror Questionnaire;

552.

August 23, 2011 Consolidated Order RE: Motions Heard August 5, 2011;

553.

August 25, 2011 Defendant/Counterclaimants' Deposition Designation;

554.

August 26, 2011 Defendant/Counterclaimant's Proposed Amended Exhibit
List;

555.

August 29,2011 Memorandum Addressing Communication From Counsel;

556.

August 30, 2011 Motion in Limine re: Conduct by Dr. David Giles and Carl
Harder;

557.

August 31, 2011 Supplemental Motion in Limine to Prevent Saint Alphonsus
From Arguing that Attorney Carl Harder Engaged in Inappropriate Conduct;

558.

August 31,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Exclude Additional MRIA
Demonstratives;

559.

August 31, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motions in
Limine to Prevent Argument that Giles and Harder Engaged in Inappropriate
Conduct;
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560.

September 01, 2011 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Exclude
Additional MRIA Demonstratives;

561.

September 01, 2011 Reply in Support ofMRIA's Motions In Limine;

562.

September 02, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude MRIA's New
And Improper Damages Theories;

563.

September 02, 2011 Affidavit Of Jack Gjording In Support Of Saint
Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude MRIA's New And Improper Damages
Theories;

564.

September 02, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum In Support Of Motion
To Exclude MRIA's New And Improper Damages Theories;

565.

September 02, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Preclude MRIA From
Using Excluded Carl Harder Letter and Related Drafts;

566.

September 02, 2011 Juror Questionnaire;

567.

September 08, 2011 Motion to Prevent Saint Alphonsus from Referring to
Extension of Term to 2023;

568.

September 09, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Revised Exhibit List;

569.

September 13, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Prevent Saint Alphonsus's From Referring to Extension of Term to 2023;

570.

September 13, 2011 Objection To Jury Instruction Regarding Consultant
Estimate;

571.

September 16, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Supplemental Memorandum In
Support Oflts Motion To Exclude MRIA's New And Improper Damages
Theories;

572.

September 19,2011 Affidavit Of Counsel In Opposition To Saint
Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude MRIA's Damages Theories;

573.

September 19, 2011 Opposition To Saint Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude
MRIA's Damages Theories;

574.

September 20, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support oflts Motion to
Exclude MRIA's New and Improper Damages Theories;

575.

September 22, 2011 Motion in Limine Concerning Out of Court Statements
of Cindy Schamp;
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576.

September 23, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA'S Motion in
Limine Concerning Out of Court Statements of Cindy Schamp;

577.

September 27, 2011 Motion for Leave to Offer Prior Trial Exhibit 4332 Into
Evidence;

578.

September 27, 2011 Order Re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories;

579.

September 28, 2011 Objection to Saint Alphonsus Motions for Mistrial;

580.

September 29, 2011 Notice oflntent to Impeach;

581.

September 29, 2011 Motion in Limine to Prevent Saint Alphonsus's from
Presenting Evidence about "Arid Club" Conversation Unless Court First
Determines It Is Admissible;

582.

September 29, 2011 Motion in Limine Regarding Lawsuit Threatened by Dr.
Knochel;

583.

September 30, 2011 Motion to Quash Trial Subpoena of Jan Hove;

584.

October 03, 2011 Reply in Support ofMRIA's Notice oflntent to Impeach;

585.

October 03,2011 Notice ofNon Opposition to Proposed Instruction NO. 16
and Proposal for Putting the Parties "On the Clock";

586.

October 03, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Quash Subpoena of Jan Hove;

587.

October 03,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Response To MRIA's Notice oflntent to
Impeach;

588.

October 04, 2011 MRI Motion to Exclude Exhibits 802 and 803;

589.

October 04, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Admissibility of Exhibits 802
and 803 (Dr Currans Handwritten notes);

590.

October 06, 2011 Motion to Exclude Alleged Misconduct of Dr Giles;

591.

October 11, 2011 Motion in Limine to Prevent Argument and Evidence that
Saint Alphonsus is Entitled to an Offset Based on its Ownership of the MRI
Entities;

592.

October 11, 2011 Motion in Limine to Preclude Questioning ofMRIA'S
Experts Concerning the Reasonableness of Non-Technical Factual
Assumptions;
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593.

October 11, 2011 Affidavit in Support of Motion in Limine to Preclude
Questioning ofMRIA's Experts Concerning the Reasonableness ofNonTechnical Factual Assumptions;

594.

October 11, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to Preclude
Questioning ofMRIA'S Experts Concerning the Reasonableness ofNonTechnical Factual Assumptions;

595.

October 11, 2011 Motion to Quash/Modify Subpoenas or Otherwise Preclude
MRIA from Calling Witnesses Without Adequate Notice;

596.

October 12, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To MRIA's Motion To
Preclude Questioning About Reasonableness Of Experts' Factual
Assumptions;

597.

October 12, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To Motion In Limine To
Prevent Argument And Evidence That Saint Alphonsus is Entitled To An
"Offset" Based On Its Ownership Of The MRI Entities;

598.

October 18,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a Verdict on Claims
Related to Enforcement of the Radiology Services Contract;

599.

October 18,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a Verdict or Otherwise
Preclude MRIA's Tort Claims Alleging Stark and Anti-Kickback Violations;

600.

October 18, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a Verdict on MRIA's
Damages and Disgorgement Theories;

601.

October 21,2011 MRIA'S Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Directed Verdict on Violations of the Stark and Anti-Kickback Statutes;

602.

October 21,2011 Affidavit ofBrent S. Bastian in Support of Opposition to
Saint A1phonsus's Motion for Directed Verdict on Violations of the Stark and
Anti-Kickback Statutes;

603.

October 21,2011 MRIA'S Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Directed Verdict on Claims Related to Enforcement of Radiology Services
Contract;

604.

October 21,2011 MRIA'S Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Directed Verdict on MRIA'S Damages and Disgorgement Theories;

605.

October 24, 2011 Reply in Support of Directed Verdict Motions Filed
October 18, 2011;

606.

October 25, 2011 MRIA'S Requested Changes to Proposed Jury Instructions;
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607.

October 25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Redline of Court's Proposed PostEvidence Instructions and Proposed Special Verdict Form;

608.

October 27,2011 Order Denying Request from St. Alphonsus;

609.

October 27, 2011 Response to Notice of Authority RE: Allocation of
Damages Among Different Causes of Action;

610.

October 27, 2011 Objection to Language of Proposed Jury Instruction No. 56;

611.

October 28, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Notice of Authority Re: Allocation of
Damages and Reply to MRIA's Counter-Notice;

612.

October 31, 2011 Plaintiff's Exhibit List;

613.

October 31, 2011 Defendant's Exhibit List;

614.

October 31, 2011 Jury Verdict;

615.

October 31, 2011 Jury Instructions;

616.

November 02, 20 11 Order Re: Proposed Judgment;

617.

November 02, 2011 Submission of Proposed Judgment;

618.

November 08, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusion of Law Concerning Disgorgement;

619.

November 08,2011 Saint Alphonsus Objections and Response to MRIA's
Proposed Judgment;

620.

November 09, 2011 Saint Alphonsus Motion to Set Date for Response to
MRIA's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;

621.

November 15, 2011 Response To Saint Alphonsus's Objections and
Response to MRIA'S Proposed Judgment;

622.

November 15, 2011 Saint A1phonsus's Response to Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Usurpation and Disgorgement;

623.

November 21,2011 Saint Alphonsus Reply in Support of Objections to
MRIA's Proposed Judgment;

624.

November 21, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Of Proposed Findings of Fact
And Conclusion Of Law Concerning Disgorgement;
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625.

January 18,2012 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;

626.

January 18, 2012 Judgment;

627.

January 31, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict or New Trial;

628.

January 31, 2012 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording In Support Of Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial;

629.

January 31,2012 Memorandum In Support Of Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial;

630.

January 31,2012 MRIA Entities Petition for Costs and Fees;

631.

January 31, 2012 Amended Affidavit of Counsel regarding 54(e)(3) criteria
for Awarding Attorneys Fees;

632.

January 31, 2012 Memorandum in Support of the MRIA Entities Petition for
Costs and Fees;

633.

January 31, 2012 Affidavit of Steven Andersen;

634.

January 31, 2012 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of The MRIA Entities
Memo of Costs and Fees;

635.

February 14, 2012 MRIA's Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Summary Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial;

636.

February 14, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Motion to Disallow MRIAs Attorneys
Fees and Costs;

637.

February 14, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Memorandum in Support of Motion;

638.

February 14, 2012 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Motion;

639.

February 21, 2012 Motion For Leave To Conduct Discovery Regarding The
Amount Of Attorney's Fees And Costs Incurred By Saint Alphonsus;

640.

February 21,2012 Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Leave To
Conduct Discovery Regarding The Amount Of Attorney's Fees And Costs
Incurred By Saint Alphonsus;

641.

February 27, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Motion For A Stay OfProceedings To
Enforce A Judgment Pursuant To Rule 62(b);
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642.

February 27, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum In Support Oflts Motion
For A Stay Of Proceedings To Enforce A Judgment Pursuant To Rule 62(b);

643.

February 28, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Opposition to MRIA's Motion for Leave
to Conduct Discovery Regarding Saint Alphonsus Attorneys Fees;

644.

February 28, 2012 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery Regarding Saint Alphonsus
Attorneys;

645.

March 05, 2012 Reply to Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery Regarding
Saint Alphonsus Attorney Fees;

646.

March 13, 2012 Reply In Support Of Saint Alphonsus's Motion For
Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict Or New Trial;

647.

March 16, 2012 Qualified Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Stay
of Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment;

648.

March 16, 2012 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Disallow
MRIA's Attorneys Fees and Costs;

649.

March 16, 2012 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's
Motion to Disallow MRIA's Attorney Fees and Costs;

650.

March 20,2012 Saint Alphonsus Reply in Support of its Motion for a Stay of
Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment

651.

March 20,2012 Saint Alphonsus Reply in Support ofMotion to Disallow
MRIA's Attorneys Fees and Costs

652.

April25, 2012 Order Re: Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
or New Trial;

653.

April30, 2012 Amended Judgment;

654.

May 02,2012 Second Amended Judgment;

655.

May 15,2012 Order Re: Costs and Attorneys' Fees;

656.

May 22,2012 MRIA Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a)
or Rule 60(b);

657.

May 22,2012 MRIA Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief from
Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);
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658.

May 24,2012 MRIA Amended Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to
Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);

659.

May 24,2012 MRIA Memorandum in Support of Amended Motion for Relief
from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);

660.

June 12, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Objections to MRIA's Amended Fee
Petition;

661.

June 12,2012 Affidavit of Counsel JackS. Gjording in Support of Saint
Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Amended Rule 60 Motion;

662.

June 14, 2012 MRIA Response To Saint Alphonsus's Objections To
Amended Fee Petition;

663.

June 15, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To MRIA's Amended Rule 60
Motion;

664.

June 19, 2012 Reply In Support OfMRIA's Amended Motion For Relief
From Judgment Pursuant To Rule 60(a) Or Rule 60(b);

665.

June 19,2012 Saint Alphonsus's Reply In Support Of Objections To MRIA's
Amended Fee Petition;

666.

June 20, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Response To MRIA's New Claims
Regarding Offset Raised For The First Time In Its Reply Brief;

667.

August 10, 2012 MRIA Memorandum Concerning Amount of Offset;

668.

August 10, 2012 MRIA Entities' Petition for Post-Judgment Costs and Fees;

669.

August 17, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To MRIA's Motion Seeking
Post -Judgment Attorney Fees And Costs;

670.

August 20, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Supplemental Brief
Regarding Offset;

671.

August 21, 2012 Reply In Support Of The MRIA Entities' Petition For PostJudgment Costs And Fees;

672.

August 21,2012 Reply In Support OfMemorandum Concerning Amount Of
Offset;

673.

September 21,2012 Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Motions Heard
August 24, 2012;
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674.

September 21. 2012 Third Amended Judgment.

675.

October 2. 2012 Second Amended Affidavit of Counsel in Support of the
MRIA Entities' Memorandum of Costs and Fees

676.

October 2. 2012 Amended Affidavit of Counsel in Support of the MRIA
Entities' Petition for Post-Judgment Costs and Fees.

677.

October 30. 2012 Order re Defendants/Counterclaimants' Petition for Costs
and Fees.

678.

October 30.2012 Fourth Amended Judgment

SEALED RECORD: Portions of the record in this matter have been submitted

under seal, specifically the records submitted to the Court for in camera review on July 3, 2007,
noted above (item number 292). Saint Alphonsus requests that these documents remain sealed
and subject only to in camera review by the Court.

G.

REPRODUCTION OF EXHIBITS: Pursuant to Appellate Rule 170), Saint

Alphonsus requests that copies of all documents, charts, and pictures offered or admitted as
exhibits at trial be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.

H.

I CERTIFY:
a.

That a copy of this second amended notice of appeal has been served on
the reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at
the address set out below:
Nicole Julson
Court Reporter
2414 N. McKinney
Boise, Idaho 83704

b.

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript;

c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
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e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20.

L

That pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(m), this amended notice of
appeal requests approximately 85 additional transcript pages. This
amended notice has been served on each reporter of whom a request for
additional transcript is made.

g

That pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(m). this second amended notice
of appeal does not request any additional transcript pages.

DATED this 1st day ofNovember 2012.
GJORDING FOUSEK, PLLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 1st day ofNovember 2012, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise. ID 83 702
Nicole Julson. Court Reporter
2414 N. McKinney
Boise. ID 83704

D

)!(_
D
D

~
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NO. _ _ _
A.M. _ _ _ _ _,

NQV 0 7 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)

By JERI HEATON

tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com

DEPUTY

WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff/Cross-Respondent,
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF
CROSS-APPEAL

v.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant/Cross-A ellant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants/Cross-Appellants,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants/Cross-Respondents.
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TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC.; ITS ATTORNEYS, JACKS. GJORDING, GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC, 121
NORTH 9TH STREET, SUITE 600 P.O. BOX 2837, BOISE, ID 83701, AND DONALD
B. A YER, CHRISTIAN G. VERGONIS, PETER J. ROMATOWSKI, MICHELLE L.
MARKS, AND THOMAS DAVIS OF JONES DAY, 51 LOUISIANA A VENUE NW
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001-2113; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
COURT

NOTE: In addition to this cross-appeal, MRI Associates, LLP had also timely filed a
notice of appeal on June 5, 2012. However, it appears to the MRI Entities that the Supreme
Court is treating both that direct appeal and this cross-appeal as de {acto cross-appeals, given that
the notices for both came after Saint Alphonsus' s notice of appeal. As such, in an attempt to
minimize confusion, the MRI Entities consolidate the information found in both notices into one
notice of cross-appeal, as described herein. 1
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Cross-Appellants, MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited

Partnership, LP, and MRI Mobile Limited, LP (collectively, "Cross Appellants" the "MRI
Entities"), cross-appeal against the above-named respondents, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care,
Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively, "Cross Respondents" "Saint
Alphonsus") to the Idaho Supreme Court from a portion of the district court's:
(1) "Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Motions for Judgment on Pleadings and
Motions for Summary Judgment," dated November 16, 2010; (2) "Order Re: Saint Alphonsus's
Motion for Summary Judgment on Contract Theory of Wrongful Withdrawal," dated May 6,
2011; (3) a portion of the district court's "Consolidated Order re: Motions for Summary
Judgment Heard May 18, 2011," which was filed on June 17, 2011;

and~

ffi a portion ofthe

1

IAR 17(m) reguires underlining and strikethroughs to reflect changes. Where this is the third
version of this document submitted by the MRI Entities, it will reflect the changes from the
Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal to this Second Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal, rather than
from the Notice of Cross-Appeal to this Second Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal. The MRI
Entities believe this best meets the intent of the Rule, which does not appear to deal with what to
do with more than one amendment. That said, the MRI Entities are happy to submit this notice
differently if the Court so indicates.
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district court's "+ffiffi Fourth Amended Judgment" of September 21, October 30,2012, entered
in the above entitled action, Honorable Judge Michael E. Wetherell presiding.
2.

That Cross Appellants the MRI Entities have a right to appeal to the Idaho

Supreme Court, and the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable
orders under and pursuant to IAR 11 (a) and (g).
3.

Reserving the right to assert other issues on appeal (see IAR 17(f)), Appellant the

MRI Entities makes the following preliminary statement of issues on appeal:l.
a.

Whether the District Court (Judge Wetherell) erred in holding that the

Supreme Court's decision in the first appeal of this case 3 did not affect a prior decision
rendered by the prior district court (Judge McLaughlin) as to Saint Alphonsus's share
upon dissociation from MRIA.
b.

Whether the District Court erred in awarding Saint Alphonsus a judgment

of $4,600,000 against MRI Associates, bearing interest at the judgment rate of 10% per
annum, calculated from September 21 , 2007.
c.

Whether the District Court erred in the manner it calculated and applied

the offset in the Fourth Amended Judgment.

a:-A

Whether the District Court erred when it found on summary judgment that

the relevant partnership was not for a term and/or a particular undertaking.
2

As noted above, two previous notices of appeal are being consolidated into this Second
Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal. Thus, while mi 3, 5, and 6 herein are being modified
substantially to reflect that consolidation, all of the issues designated and all but one of the
documents and transcripts designated have already been designated previously in either the
notice of appeal or the notice of cross-appeal. The only new document not previously identified
in any of the MRI Entities' notices is the recently-issued Fourth Amended Judgment, issued
October 30, 2012.
3

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care. Inc. v. MRI Associates. LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 224 P.3d
1068 (2009).
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lr. e.

Whether the District Court erred when it found on summary judgment that

Cowl-ter Respondents Saint Alphonsus could not have wrongfully dissociated under some
other theory other than a violation of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act.
&.-

f:.

Whether the District Court erred when it excluded the damages related to

Cowl-ter Respondents' the MRI Entities' entry into the Eagle, Idaho market.
4.

No relevant portions ofthe requested record have been sealed.

5.

Cross Appellants do not request any additional transcripts other than the entire

reporter's standard transcript in compressed format in accordance with Rules 25(c) and 29(m)
and those transcripts designated by the appellant in the initial and amended notices of appeal and
the transcripts designated in the respondent's request for additional transcripts:
5.

The MRI Entities waive the preparation of the standard transcript and request the

preparation of the following portions ofthe reporter's transcript in both hard copy and electronic
format:
a.

Trial Transcript, 2007 Trial (Aug. 1, 2007; Aug. 6, 2007; Aug. 8, 2007;

August 13-16, 2007; Aug. 20-24, 2007; Aug. 27-30, 2007; Oct. 31. 2007);

e.

b.

Motion Hearing Transcript ofMay 18, 2011;

c.

Motion Hearing Transcript of December 9, 2011;

d.

Motion Hearing Transcript of June 22, 2012;

e.

Motion Hearing Transcript of August 24, 2012.

Cross t\ppellants do not request any additional documents to be included in the

clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R., and those
designated by the appellant in the initial and amended notices of appeal and in the respondent's
request for additional records.
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6.

Appellant waives the preparation of the standard clerk's record under IAR 28 and

requests that the following documents be included in the clerk's record:
a.

the Register of Actions;

b.

the original and any amended complaint(s);

c.

the original and any amended answer(s) to any complaint(s);

d.

the original and any amended counterclaim, third-party claim, or cross-

e.

the original and any amended answer(s) or response(s) to a counterclaim;

f.

notice of appeal and cross-appeal;

g.

any request for additional reporter's transcript or clerk's record;

h.

a court reporter's notice oflodging with the district court;

1.

table of contents and index;

I.

"MRI Associate's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment," filed March

claim;

21.2006.
k.

"Memorandum in Support ofMRI Associate's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment," filed March 21, 2006.
I.

"Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRI Associate's Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment," filed March 21, 2006.
m.

"Affidavit of Thomas E. Henson in Support ofMRI Associate's Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment," filed March 21, 2006.
n.

"MRIA's Notice ofErrata RE: Memorandum In Support OfMRIA's

Motion for Summary Judgment," filed May 26, 2006.
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o.

"Supplemental Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt In Support Of MRI

Associate's Motion for Summary Judgment," filed May 26, 2006.
p.

"Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment," filed May 5, 2006.
g.

"Reply Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment," filed May 30, 2006.
r.

"Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motions to Strike, Cross-Motions

for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Motion to Dismiss," filed
July 24, 2006;
s.

"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment," filed September

21,2007:
t.

"Motion for Clarification Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share," filed

April 11, 2011;
u.

"Memorandum in Support of Motion for Clarification Regarding

Withdrawing Partner's Share," filed April1l, 2011;
v.

"Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMRIA Motions Filed April11, 2011,"

and exhibits thereto, filed April 11, 2011.
w.

"Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Claim for its

Partnership Interest," filed April 11, 2011;
x.

"Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary

Judgment on its Claim for its Partnership Interest," filed April 11, 2011;
y.

"Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion for Clarification

Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share," filed April 25, 2011;
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z.

"MRIA's Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment

on its Claim for its Partnership Interest," filed April 25, 2011;
aa.

"MRIA's Reply in Support of its Motion for Clarification Regarding

Withdrawing Partners Share," filed May 2, 2011;
bb.

"Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for

Summary Judgment on its Claim for its Partnership Interest," filed May 2, 2011;
cc.

"Consolidated Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May 18,

20ll,"filedJune 17,2011;
dd.

"Submission of Proposed Judgment" and "Proposed Judgment," filed Nov.

2, 2011;
ee.

"Saint Alphonsus's Objection and Response to MRIA's Proposed

Judgment," filed Nov. 8, 2011;
ff.

"Response to Saint Alphonsus' Objection and Response to MRIA's

Proposed Judgment," filed Nov. 15, 20 11 ;
gg.

"Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Objections to MRIA's Proposed

Judgment," filed Nov. 21, 2011; and
hh.

"Second Amended Judgment" filed May 2, 2012, and any amended

judgment hereinafter filed.
n.

May 24,2012 MRIA Amended Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant

to Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);
11.

May 24,2012 MRIA Memorandum in Support of Amended Motion for

Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);
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kk.

June 12, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Objections to MRIA's Amended Fee

Petition;
II.

June 12,2012 Affidavit of Counsel JackS. Gjording in Support of Saint

Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Amended Rule 60 Motion;
mm.

June 14, 2012 MRIA's Response to Saint Alphonsus's Objections to

Amended Fee Petition;
nn.

June 15, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Amended Rule 60

Motion;
oo.

June 19,2012 Reply in Support ofMRIA's Amended Motion for Relief

from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);
pp.

June 19,2012 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Objections to

MRIA's Amended Fee Petition;
qq.

June 20, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's New Claims

Regarding Offset Raised for the First Time In Its Reply Brief;
rr.

August 10,2012 MRIA Memorandum Concerning Amount of Offset;

ss.

August 10, 2012 MRIA Entities' Petition for Post-Judgment Costs and

tt.

August 17, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA' s Motion

Seeking Post-Judgment Attorney Fees and Costs;
uu.

August 20, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Supplemental

Brief Regarding Offset;
vv.

August 21, 2012 Reply in Support of the MRIA Entities' Petition for

PostJudgment Costs and Fees;
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ww.

August 21,2012 Reply in Support ofMemorandum Concerning Amount

of Offset;
xx.

September 21,2012 Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions Heard

August 24, 20 12;

7.

yy.

September 21, 2012 Third Amended Judgment; and

zz.

October 30, 2012 Fourth Amended Judgment.

Cross Appellant does The MRI Entities do not request that any other documents,

charts, or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
8.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the following:
Nicole Julson,
Court Reporter
2414 N. McKinney
Boise, ID 83704

b.

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript.
c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

d.

That the relevant appellate and cross-appellate filing

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

fee~

has have been

paid.

pursuant to IAR 20.
f.

That pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(m), this second amended notice

of cross-appeal requests no additional transcript pages not already requested.
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DATED THIS 7th day ofNovember 2012.

BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7th day ofNovember, 2012, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
121 North 91h Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83 701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. V ergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana A venue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

["1}11acsimile

rWacsimile

~J3~__:__·
Brent Bastian
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NO._

A.M._o_1Jt/(J _011 ~'!'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
. . ··----r r:
.•
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADJ\' '·. . . X(.if(.
~-.,

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
)
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, )
)

Plaintiff,

)

Case No. CV-OC-2004-08219

)

vs.

)
)

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

)
)
)

Defendant.

AME.'NDED ORDER re: DEFENDANT'S!
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' PETITION
FOR COSTS AND FEES

)

____________________________ )
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP ., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED, an Idaho )
limited partnership; MRI MOBILE LIMITED,)
an Idaho limited partnership,
)
)
)

Counter-claimants,

)
)

vs.

)
)

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,)
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)

Counter-defendants.

)

___________________________ )
Currently before this Court is the Defendant's/Counterclaimants' request for costs and
fees.

On October 2, 2012, the Defendant/Counterclaimants (collectively, the MRIA entities)

submitted their amended affidavits in support of their request for costs and fees, in response to
the Court's order of September 24, 2012. The time for objection has passed with no filings by
the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant. The MRIA entities' supporting affidavits and documentation

Order re: MRIA Entities' Petition for Costs and Fees I
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appear complete. Accordingly, the request is GRANTED as to both the prejudgment costs and
fees and the postjudgment costs and fees sought, as set forth in the respective affidavits of
counsel filed October 2, 2012.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant/Counterclaimants (MRI Associates, LLP,
MRI LIMITED, and MRI Mobile Limited) are entitled to recover prejudgment attorney fees and
costs in the amount of $4,192,943.08, as well as postjudgment attorney fees and costs in the
amount of $53,830.00, plus the Judgment amount previously awarded by the Court on September
24, 2010.

The Court previously issued a fourth amended judgment reflecting the award of

prejudgment costs and fees. Subsequently, it was discovered that the Court had neglected to
address the MRIA entities' amended affidavit of postjudgment costs and fees. This amended
order, and accompanying Fifth Amended Judgment, corrects that oversight. See I.R.C.P. 60(a).
DATED thisH.!day ofNovember, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

~day

I hereby certify that on this
of November, 2012, I
mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the within instrument
to:

JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
PO BOX 2837
BOISE, ID 83701
DONALD AYER
JONES DAY
51 LOUSIANA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST., STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL

DI~-- .. ,

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUl\fTY OF ADA:J~.- ~- --

!J12

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED
)
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, )
)

Plaintiff,

)

Case No. CV -OC-2004-08219

)

vs.

)
)

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

)
)

FIFTH AMENDED JUDGMENT

)
)

Defendant.

)

___________________________ )
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited )
liability partnership; MRI LIMITED, an Idaho )
limited partnership; MRI MOBILE LIMITED,)
an Idaho limited partnership,
)
)
)

Counter-claimants,

)
)

vs.

)
)

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,)
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT )
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
)
CENTER,
)
)

Counter-defendants.

)

___________________________ )
This action having come for jury trial, and the issues having been duly tried and a verdict
having been rendered by the jury on October 31, 2011, IT IS SO ORDERED THAT MRI
Associates, LLP (MRIA), MRI Limited (MRI Center), and MRI Mobile Limited (MRI Mobile)
(collectively MRI Entities) may separately execute on any one of the alternatives stated in
paragraphs 1-5 of this judgment, with the exception of disgorgement. The choice of any entity to

~
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elect to recover under a particular paragraph will not bind the others to the alternatives contained
within that same paragraph. Provided, however, that each entity may recover only once. Further,
although collectable only by MRJA, the remedy of disgorgement may only be elected by the
combined decision of the MRl entities, since by its nature disgorgement is an alternative to all
other measures of damages suffered by all the MRJA entities.
1.

As to the claims of the MRl Entities that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care (SADC)

and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (SARMC) (collectively "Saint
Alphonsus") breached the Partnership Agreement by breaching the non-competition
clause found therein, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRJA:
$3,906,338
St. Alphonsus: $6,592,486.87 (OFFSETTING JUDGMENT)
$2,686,148.87 in favor of St. Alphonsus
MRJ Center: $25,828,208
MRJ Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRl Center:
2.

$25,420,000

As to the claims of the MRl Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:

=

MRJA:
$3,906,338
St. Alphonsus: $6,592,486.87 (OFFSETTING JUDGMENT)
$2,686,148.87 in favor of St. Alphonsus
MRl Center: $25,828,208
MRl Mobile: $22,349,967

Lost Value Damages:

Fifth Amended Judgment 2
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J

MRI Center:
3.

$25,420,000

As to the claims ofMRI Center and MRI Mobile that Saint Alphonsus intentionally

interfered with their prospective contractual relations, the following damages are awarded
in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRI Center: $22,337,910
MRI Mobile: $19,329,701
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:
4.

$20,336,000

As to the claims of the MRI Entities that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary

duty owed to the MRI Entities, the following damages are awarded in the alternative:
Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,906,338
St. Alphonsus: $6,592,486.87 (OFFSETTING JUDGMENT)
$2,686,148.87 in favor of St. Alphonsus
MRI Center: $25,828,208
MRI Mobile: $22,349,967
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:

$25,420,000

Disgorgement:
MRIA:
$21,358,838
St. Alphonsus: $6,592,486.87 (OFFSETTING JUDGMENT)
$14,766,351.87 in favor of MRIA

5.

As to the claim of the MRI entities that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a civil

conspiracy, the following damages are awarded:

Fifth Amended Judgment 3
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•'

Lost Profit Damages:
MRIA:
$3,125,070
St. Alphonsus: $6,592,486.87 (OFFSETTING JUDGMENT)
$3,467,416.87 in favor of St. Alphonsus
MRI Center: $20,662,566
MRI Mobile: $17,879,973
Lost Value Damages:
MRI Center:

$20,336,000

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amounts executed upon by the MRI entities will
bear interest at the judgment rate of 5.375% per annum until paid in full.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Saint Alphonsus is awarded $4,600,000 against MRI
Associates, bearing interest at the judgment rate of I 0% per annum, calculated from September
21, 2007, until paid in full. In accordance with Rule 54(b )( 1), the Court has offset the awards
(including accrued postjudgment interest where applicable) of MRIA and St. Alphonsus in each
alternative in which such an offset applies.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the MRI entities are entitled to recover, as prejudgment
attorney fees and costs, the amount of $4,192,943.08 in addition to the judgment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the MRI entities are entitled to recover, as
postjudgment attorney fees and costs, the amount of $53,830.00.
DATED thisn!day ofNovember, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

!~day

I hereby certify that on this
of November, 2012, I
mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the within instrument
to:
JACK GJORDING
GJORDING & FOUSER
PO BOX 2837
BOISE, ID 83701
DONALD AYER
JONES DAY
51 LOUSIANA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-2113
THOMAS BANDUCCI
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. BANNOCK ST., STE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
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NOV 2 6ZOt2
Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453)

CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk

tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com

By ANNAMARIE MEYER

WadeL. Woodard (ISB No. 6312)

DEPUTY

wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com

BrentS. Bastian (ISB No. 8071)
bbastian@bwslawgroup.com

Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455

Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited Partnership,
and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No. CV OC 2004-008219
!STARS No. CV-OC-2004-11388

Plaintiff/Cross-Respondent,

THIRD AMENDED NOTICE OF
CROSS-APPEAL

v.

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
Defendant/Cross-Ap ellant.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership; MRI LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited Partnership; and
MRI MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited
Partnership,
Counter-claimants/Cross-Appellants,
V.

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.,
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Counter-defendants/Cross-Respondents.

005286

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENT~, SAINT ALPHONSUS
DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC. AND SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER; I+S THEIR ATTORNEYS, JACK S. GJORDING, GJORDING & FOUSER,
LLC, 121 NORTH gTH STREET, SUITE 600 P.O. BOX 2837, BOISE, ID 83701, AND
DONALD B. A YER, CHRISTIAN G. VERGONIS, PETER J. ROMA TOWSKI,
MICHELLE L. MARKS, AND THOMAS DAVIS OF JONES DAY, 51 LOUISIANA
AVENUE NW WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001-2113; AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

NOTE: In addition to this cross-appeal, MRI Associates, LLP had also timely filed a notice of
appeal on June 5, 2012. However, it appears to the MRI Entities that the Supreme Court is
treating both that direct appeal and this cross-appeal as de facto cross-appeals, given that the
notices for both came after Saint Alphonsus's notice of appeal. As such, in an attempt to
minimize confusion, the MRI Entities consolidate the information found in both notices into one
notice of cross-appeal, as described herein. 1
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Cross-Appellants, MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited

Partnership, LP, and MRI Mobile Limited, LP (collectively, the "MRI Entities"), cross-appeal
against the above-named respondents, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") to the Idaho Supreme
Court from a portion of the district court's: (1) "Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs
Motions for Judgment on Pleadings and Motions for Summary Judgment," dated November 16,
2010; (2) "Order Re: Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on Contract Theory of
Wrongful Withdrawal," dated May 6, 2011; (3) a portion of the district court's "Consolidated
Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May 18, 2011 ," which was filed on June 17,
2011; and (4) a portion of the district court's "Fourth Fifth Amended Judgment" of Oetober 30

1

IAR 17(m) requires underlining and strikethroughs to reflect changes. Where this is the third
fourth version of this document submitted by the MRI Entities, it will reflect the changes from
the Second Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal to this Seeond Third Amended Notice of CrossAppeal, rather than from the Notice of Cross-Appeal to this Seeond Third Amended Notice of
Cross-Appeal. The MRI Entities believe this best meets the intent of the Rule, which does not
appear to deal with what to do with more than one amendment. That said, the MRI Entities are
happy to submit this notice differently if the Court so indicates.
THIRD AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 2
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•
November 14, 2012, entered in the above entitled action, Honorable Judge Michael E. Wetherell
presiding.
2.

That the MRI Entities have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
IAR 11(a) and (g).
3.

Reserving the right to assert other issues on appeal (see IAR 17(f)), the MRI

Entities makes the following preliminary statement of issues on appeal:~
a.

Whether the District Court (Judge Wetherell) erred in holding that the

Supreme Court's decision in the first appeal of this case 3 did not affect a prior decision
rendered by the prior district court (Judge McLaughlin) as to Saint Alphonsus's share
upon dissociation from MRIA.
b.

Whether the District Court erred in awarding Saint Alphonsus a judgment

of $4,600,000 against MRI Associates, bearing interest at the judgment rate of 10% per
annum, calculated from September 21, 2007.
c.

Whether the District Court erred in the manner it calculated and applied

the offset in the Fol:lrth Fifth Amended Judgment.
d.

Whether the District Court erred when it found on summary judgment that

the relevant partnership was not for a term and/or a particular undertaking.
2

A.s noted above, two previol:ls notices of appeal are being consolidated into this Second
Amended Notice of Cross Appeal. Thl:ls, while ,- 3, 5, and 6 herein are being modified
sl:lbstantially to reflect that consolidation, all of the issl:les designated and all bHt one of the
documents and transcripts designated h~ve already been designated previoHsly in either the
notice of appeal or the notice of cross appeal. The only new docl:lment not previol:lsly identified
in any of the MRI Entities' notices is the recently issl:led Fol:ll1h Amended JHdgment, issl:led
October 30, 2012.
3

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 224 P.3d
1068 (2009).
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e.

Whether the District Court erred when it found on summary judgment that

Saint Alphonsus could not have wrongfully dissociated under some other theory other
than a violation of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act.
f.

Whether the District Court erred when it excluded the damages related to

the MRI Entities' entry into the Eagle, Idaho market.
4.

No relevant portions of the requested record have been sealed.

5.

The MRI Entities request no new transcripts other than those previously

designated in Saint Alphonsus's Second Amended Notice of Appeal, the MRI Entities' Request
for Additional Transcripts and Records, filed June 12, 2006, and the "Appeal Record" from the
previous appeal, as detailed in the Supreme Court's Order Augmenting Appeal, filed June 4,
2012. waive the preparation of the staadard transeript and req\iest the preparation of the
following portions ofthe reporter's transeript in both hard eopy and eleetronie format:
a.

Trial Transeript, 2007 Trial (Alig. 1, 2007; Alig. 6, 2007; Alig. 8, 2007;

Aliglist 13 16, 2007; Alig. 20 24, 2007; Alig. 27 30, 2007; Oet. 31, 2007);

6.

b.

Motion Hearing Traaseript ofMay 18, 2011;

e.

Motion Hearing Traaseript ofDeeember 9, 2011;

d.

Motion Hearing Traaseript ofJline 22, 2012;

e.

Motion Hearing Transeript of Aliglist 24, 2012.

Appellant The MRI Entities waives the preparation of the standard clerk's record

under JAR 28 and requests that the following documents be included in the clerk's record:
a.

the Register of Actions;

b.

the original and any amended complaint(s);

c.

the original and any amended answer(s) to any complaint(s);

THIRD AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 4

005289

d.

the original and any amended counterclaim, third-party claim, or cross-

e.

the original and any amended answer(s) or response(s) to a counterclaim;

f.

notice of appeal and cross-appeal;

g.

any request for additional reporter's transcript or clerk's record;

h.

a court reporter's notice oflodging with the district court;

1.

table of contents and index;

J.

"MRI Associate's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment," filed March

claim;

21, 2006.

k.

"Memorandum in Support ofMRI Associate's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment," filed March 21, 2006.

1.

"Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRI Associate's Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment," filed March 21, 2006.
m.

"Affidavit of Thomas E. Henson in Support ofMRI Associate's Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment," filed March 21, 2006.
n.

"MRIA's Notice of Errata RE: Memorandum In Support OfMRlA's

Motion for Summary Judgment," filed May 26, 2006.
o.

"Supplemental Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt In Support OfMRI

Associate's Motion for Summary Judgment," filed May 26, 2006.
p.

"Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment," filed May 5, 2006.
q.

"Reply Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment," filed May 30, 2006.
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r.

"Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motions to Strike, Cross-Motions

for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Motion to Dismiss," filed
July 24, 2006;
s.

"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment," filed September

21,2007:
t.

"Motion for Clarification Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share," filed

April11, 2011;
u.

"Memorandum in Support of Motion for Clarification Regarding

Withdrawing Partner's Share," filed April 11, 2011;
v.

"Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMRIA Motions Filed April11, 2011,"

and exhibits thereto, filed April 11, 2011.
w.

"Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Claim for its

Partnership Interest," filed April 11, 2011;
x.

"Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary

Judgment on its Claim for its Partnership Interest," filed April 11, 2011;
y.

"Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion for Clarification

Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share," filed April25, 2011;
z.

"MRIA's Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment

on its Claim for its Partnership Interest," filed April 25, 2011;
aa.

"MRIA' s Reply in Support of its Motion for Clarification Regarding

Withdrawing Partners Share," filed May 2, 2011;
bb.

"Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for

Summary Judgment on its Claim for its Partnership Interest," filed May 2, 2011;

THIRD AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL- 6

005291

cc.

"Consolidated Order re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May 18,

2011 ,"filed June 17, 2011;
dd.

"Submission of Proposed Judgment" and "Proposed Judgment," filed Nov.

2, 2011;
ee.

"Saint Alphonsus's Objection and Response to MRIA's Proposed

Judgment," filed Nov. 8, 2011;
ff.

"Response to Saint Alphonsus' Objection and Response to MRIA's

Proposed Judgment," filed Nov. 15, 2011;
gg.

"Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Objections to MRIA's Proposed

Judgment," filed Nov. 21, 2011; and
hh.

"Second Amended Judgment" filed May 2, 2012, and any amended

judgment hereinafter filed.
n.

May 24, 2012 MRIA Amended Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant

to Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);
JJ.

May 24, 2012 MRIA Memorandum in Support of Amended Motion for

Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);
kk.

June 12, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Objections to MRIA's Amended Fee

Petition;
ll.

June 12, 2012 Affidavit of Counsel Jack S. Gjording in Support of Saint

Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Amended Rule 60 Motion;
mm.

June 14, 2012 MRIA's Response to Saint Alphonsus's Objections to

Amended Fee Petition;
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nn.

June 15, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Amended Rule 60

Motion;
oo.

June 19, 2012 Reply in Support ofMRIA's Amended Motion for Relief

from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);
pp.

June 19, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Objections to

MRIA's Amended Fee Petition;
qq.

June 20, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's New Claims

Regarding Offset Raised for the First Time In Its Reply Brief;
rr.

August 10,2012 MRIA Memorandum Concerning Amount of Offset;

ss.

August 10, 2012 MRIA Entities' Petition for Post-Judgment Costs and

tt.

August 17, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA' s Motion

Fees;

Seeking Post-Judgment Attorney Fees and Costs;
uu.

August 20, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Supplemental

Brief Regarding Offset;
vv.

August 21, 2012 Reply in Support of the MRIA Entities' Petition for

PostJudgment Costs and Fees;
ww.

August 21, 2012 Reply in Support ofMemorandum Concerning Amount

of Offset;
xx.

September 21,2012 Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions Heard

August 24, 2012;
yy.

September 21,2012 Third Amended Judgment; fHlEl

zz.

October 30, 2012 Fourth Amended Judgment:-; and
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aaa.

November 14, 2012 Fifth Amended Judgment.

In addition, the MRI Entities designate all documents requested in Saint Alphonsus's Second
Amended Notice of Appeal, the documents designated in the MRI Entities' Request for
Additional Transcripts and Records, filed June 12, 2006, and the "Appeal Record" from the
previous appeal, as detailed in the Supreme Court's Order Augmenting Appeal, filed June 4,

7.

The MRI Entities do not request that any other documents, charts, or pictures

offered or admitted as exhibits be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
8.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the following:
Nicole Julson,
Court Reporter
2414 N. McKinney
Boise, ID 83 704

b.

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript.
c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

d.

That the relevant appellate and cross-appellate filing fees have been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to IAR 20.
f.

That pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(m), this seeond third amended

notice of cross-appeal requests no additional transcript pages not already requested.
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DATED THIS .J'rth day ofNovember, 2012.
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC

Brent Bastian
Attorneys for MRI Associates, LLP, MRI Limited
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

c-'6

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day ofNovember, 2012, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served as follows:
JackS. Gjording
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax Number: 208-336-9177
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Oyemight Delivery

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Peter J. Romatowski
Michelle L. Marks
Thomas Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
Fax Number: 202-626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery

~acsimile

D O_yemight Delivery
q)l'acsimile

Brent Bastian
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: ____"~ thr.;. :

ORIGit~AL

NOV 2 6 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ANNAMARIE MEYER
DEPUTY

Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105
GJORDil'l"G FOUSER, PLLC
121 North 9th Street, Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, Idaho 83 70 1
Telephone: (208) 336-9777
Facsimile: (208) 336-9177
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas J. Davis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Telephone: (202) 879-3939
Facsimile: (202) 626-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants/Appellants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation,

Case No CV OC 0408219D

vs.

THIRD AMENDED NOTICE OF
APPEAL

MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership,

Fee Category L.4 $101.00

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Defendant-Respondent.
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MRl ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; MRl LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership; and
MRl MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho limited
partnership,
CounterClaimants-Respondents,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
CounterDefendants-Appellants.
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, MRl ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho Limited
Limited Liability Partnership, MRl LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho Limited
Partnership, and MRl MOBILE LIMITED, an Idaho Limited Partnership, AND THE
PARTIES' ATTORNEYS, BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC, 802
West Bannock St., Suite 500, Boise, ID 83702, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE
ENTITLED COURT:
Plaintiff-CounterDefendant Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and

CounterDefendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 17, hereby give notice of appeal as follows:
A.

DESIGNATION OF APPEAL: The above-named Appellants, Saint Alphonsus

Diversified Care, Inc. ("SADC") and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("SARMC")
(collectively, "Saint Alphonsus"), appeal against the above-named Respondents MRI Associates,
LLP, MRI Limited Partnership, and MRl Mobile Limited Partnership (collectively, "MRlA") to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment (entitled "Seeoad Th.ird Fourth. Fifth 1
1

Changes from the original notice of appeal (as set forth in the Amended Notice of Appeal and Second
Amended Notice of Appeal) are underlined. Additional changes made in the Third Amended Notice of Appeal are
double underlined. See Idaho Appellate Rule 17(m).
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Amended Judgment"), entered in the above-entitled action on the ~ U-st ~ 14th day of Mey
8ef)tember Oetober November 2012 (the Honorable Michael Wetherell, District Judge presiding).
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(l), this Notice of Appeal shall be deemed to include and
present on appeal (A) all interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment, order
or decree appealed from; (B) all final judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment or
order appealed from for which the time for appeal has not expired; and (C) all interlocutory or
final judgments and orders entered after the judgment or order appealed from, including, without
limitation, (i) the District Court's January 17, 2012 Judgment, (ii) the District Court's January 17,
2012 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (iii) the District Court's April25, 2012 denial of
Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial, (iv) the
District Court's April30, 2012 Amended Judgment, aftEl (v) the District Court's May 15, 2012
Order re: Costs and Attorneys' Fees; (vi) the District Court's May 2, 2012 Second Amended
Judgment; aftEl (vii) the District Court's September 21, 2012 Memorandum Decision and Order
re: Motions Heard August 24, 2012; aftEl (viii) the District Court's September 21, 2012 Third
Amended Judgment: and Cix) the District Court's October 30. 2012 Fourth Amended Judgment.
B.

AUTHORITY FOR APPEAL: Saint Alphonsus has the right to appeal to the

Idaho Supreme Court the judgments and orders described or incorporated herein pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rules ll(a)(l), (5), (6), and (7).

C.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL: The following

list of issues on appeal is preliminary in nature and is based upon such preliminary research and
legal analysis as could reasonably be conducted to date. Saint Alphonsus therefore reserves its
right to assert other issues on appeal.
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1.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus' s motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial, in its order dated April 25,
2012, on the following grounds raised by Saint Alphonsus:
a. That MRIA failed to prove lost profits caused by Saint Alphonsus;
b. That MRIA's proof of profits allegedly lost by MRI Mobile Limited was
insufficient as a matter of law;
c. That MRIA was not entitled to recover damages for profits lost after April
1, 2005, and otherwise failed to prove that any losses suffered after April 1,
2005, were based on wrongful acts as opposed to Saint Alphonsus's
rightful post-dissociation competition;
d. That MRIA was not entitled to recover damages for profits allegedly lost
to the Intermountain Medical Imaging facility located on the Saint
Alphonsus hospital campus;
e. That the jury's award overstated MRIA's damages because it included
amounts that would have been earned by Saint Alphonsus absent the
alleged misconduct;
f.

That MRIA was not entitled to recover damages for the alleged diminution
in value of MRI Limited Partnership because MRIA affirmatively
abandoned this claim prior to the first trial and its reassertion of the claim
during the second trial was untimely;

g. That MRIA failed to prove the asserted diminution in value or that such
diminution in value was caused by Saint Alphonsus;
h. That MRIA's claim for disgorgement was improperly and untimely pled;
1.

That MRIA's claim for usurpation was time-barred;

J.

That the District Court improperly failed to make independent findings of
fact and conclusions of law on the equitable issue of usurpation;

k. That MRIA's usurpations claims are not supported by substantial evidence
and are against the clear weight of the evidence;
1.

That MRIA's disgorgement-of-profits award was overstated by $11.2
million as a matter of law because it failed to account for the costs that
Saint Alphonsus incurred in order to obtain its profits;
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m. That the District Court erred in failing to require that damages be
apportioned between Saint Alphonsus and the third-party defendants for
MRIA's breach-of-contract claims, contrary to the requirements of Idaho
law and the court's own prior ruling that '"Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a
reduction in any damages awarded against it";
n. That the District Court erred in holding that apportionment of damages
should be decided by the jury rather than on a pro rata, 50%-50% basis;
o. That, in the alternative, the district court erred in requiring the jury to
determine relative fault separately for each cause of action (rather than
once for the body of joint wrongdoing) and in not requiring the jury to
allocate damages among the various causes of action asserted by MRIA;
p. That the District Court erred in allowing MRIA to amend its complaint to
add MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership as
parties following remand;
q. That the claims ofMRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited
Partnership were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations;
r.

That the claims of MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited
Partnership were not supported by legally sufficient evidence;

s. That the District Court's order regarding the application of the law-of-thecase doctrine following the Supreme Court remand was erroneous and
unevenly applied to the parties, to Saint Alphonsus's prejudice;

t.

That the District Court erred in allowing the jury to determine the meaning
of the unambiguous 1997 and 2011 Radiology Services Agreements
between Saint Alphonsus and Gem State Radiology and to base its
liability findings on an incorrect interpretation of those agreements;

u. That the District Court erred in concluding that its erroneous exclusion (as
hearsay) of Cindy Schamp's testimony regarding her own prior statements
to MRIA witnesses was harmless error;
v. That the District Court erred in precluding Saint Alphonsus from
introducing, during the cross-examination of a witness, an Idaho Business
Review article that contradicted that witness's direct testimony;
w. That the District Court erred in holding, in an order dated July 20, 2011,
that Saint Alphonsus could not enforce its statutory right to examine the
books and records of MRIA, thus preventing Saint Alphonsus from
offering relevant evidence ofMRIA's financial bias at trial;
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x. That the District Court erred in refusing to exclude prejudicial language in
two memoranda by consultant Shattuck Hammond (Trial Exhibits 4234
and 4239);
y. That the District Court erred in precluding Saint Alphonsus from telling
the jury that its dissociation from MRIA was "rightful" under Idaho law,
per its order of June 13, 2011;
z. That the District Court erred in overruling Saint Alphonsus's objection,
made during trial on September 20, 2011, to MRIA' s counsel's
inflammatory argument that Saint Alphonsus would preclude care for a
hypothetical "little girl with a brain tumor";
aa. That the District Court erred in allowing MRIA to offer "rebuttal"
testimony by Dr. Stephen Wilson;
bb. That the District Court erred in allowing MRIA to introduce, on October
15, 2011, a double-hearsay statement into evidence as a means to
"impeach" Saint Alphonsus witness Jeff Cliff's inability to remember an
out-of-court statement made by another witness;
cc. That the District Court erred, on October 11, 2011, by admonishing Gem
State Radiology's attorney in front of the jury, to the prejudice of Saint
Alphonsus;
dd. That the District Court erred in issuing a judgment that did not award
Saint Alphonsus interest on its counterclaim at the 12% legal rate of
interest, running from the date of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation to the
date of payment.
Saint Alphonsus also appeals from all of the underlying decisions, orders, and
rulings referenced in its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or
new trial.
2.

Whether the District Court erred, in its April 25, 2012 order, when it declined
to order a new trial based on individual and cumulative prejudicial errors;

3.

Whether the District Court erred in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, dated January 17, 2012, when it summarily adopted the advisory jury
finding on usurpation liability, even though those findings were not supported
by the evidence, and declined to subtract Saint Alphonsus's initial investment
from the total amount of disgorgement sought.

4.

Whether the District Court erred in declining to provide the jury with Saint
Alphonsus's proposed jury instructions and special verdict form dated July 15,
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2011, or in the alternative, Saint Alphonsus's Redline ofthe Court's Proposed
Post-Evidence Instructions and Proposed Special Verdict Form, filed October
25, 2011, or the jury instructions proposed during the conference of October
26, 2011;
5.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus's October 17,
20 11 Motion to Direct a Verdict on Claims Related to Enforcement of the
Radiology Services Contract;

6.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus's October 17,
2011 Motion to Direct a Verdict on MRIA's Damages and Disgorgement
Theories;

7.

Whether the District Court erred, in its order dated September 27, 2011, by
denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Exclude Damages Theories;

8.

Whether the District Court erred, in its Consolidated Order re: Motions Heard
August 5, 2011 (August 24, 2011), by:
a. Granting MRIA's Motion for Clarification re: Contentions that MRIA
Breached Fiduciary Duties;
b. Granting MRIA's Motion to Preclude Reference to Departing Partner's
Share;
c. Granting, in part, MRIA's motion to have the exhibits from the first trial
deemed admitted under law-of-the-case principles;
d. Granting MRIA's Motion to Exclude Mention of Saint Alphonsus's Nonprofit Status;
e. Granting MRIA's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Thomas McCarthy
in part;
f.

Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Reconsider, in part, the Court's
June 13, 2011 Consolidated Order re: Motions in Limine regarding Saint
Alphonsus's ability to refer to its dissociation as "lawful," and to redact
portions of Trial Exhibits 4234 and 4239.

9.

Whether the District Court erred in denying, in an order dated July 20,2011,
Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Compel Compliance with its Statutory Right to
Inspect MRIA' s Books and Records;

10.

Whether the District Court erred, in its Consolidated Order of June 17, 2011
re: Motions for Summary Judgment Heard May 18,2011, by:
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a. Holding that, as a matter of law, Idaho Code§ 6-805(1) requires a jury to
apportion damages rather than apportioning damages equally among
defendants and settling co-defendants;
b. Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's
Third-Party Beneficiary Claims;
11.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Recusal, as memorialized in the Court's June 13, 2011 Memorandum of
Actions Taken at May 18, 2011 Hearing;

12.

Whether the District Court erred, in its June 13, 2011 Consolidated Order re:
Motions in Limine Heard May 18, 2011, by:
a. Granting MRIA's Motion precluding comment regarding the lawfulness of
Saint Alphonsus's dissociation;
b. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion to exclude portions of Trial Exhibits
4234 and 4239;
c. Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of Saint
Alphonsus's competition after April1, 2005;

13.

Whether the District Court erred, in its November 16, 2010 Memorandum
Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Motions for Judgment on Pleadings and
Motions for Summary Judgment by:
a. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion to dismiss MRIA's civil conspiracy
claim;
b. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment on the legal
insufficiency of MRIA' s evidence of lost profits;
c. Denying Saint Alphonsus's motion for judgment on the pleadings
regarding the claims of the limited partnerships;

14.

Whether the District Court erred in its May 15, 2012 order denying in part
Saint Alphonsus's request to disallow MRIA's requested attorneys' fees and
costs.

15.

Whether the District Court erred in its September 21, 2012 order denying in
part Saint Alphonsus's request to disallow MRIA's requested attorney fees
and costs.
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D.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT: Saint Alphonsus requests an entire standard

transcript of the trial proceedings in electronic format in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rules
17(h), 25(c) and 26(m). In addition, Saint Alphonsus requests transcripts of the following
proceedings:
1.

February 21, 2006 transcript ofhearing on MRIA's Motion for Leave to File
First Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

2.

June 6, 2006 transcript of hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Dismiss;

3.

October 24, 2006 transcript of hearing on all pending motions;

4.

November 13, 2006 transcript of Status Conference re: Trial Setting;

5.

January 11, 2007 transcript of Hearing on Motion to Allow Punitive Damages,
and Motion to Strike Shattuck Hammond Report; Motion to Strike Affidavit
of Professor Branson; Motion to Amend First Amended Counterclaim and
Third Party Complaint;

6.

April 17, 2007 transcript of Hearing on Third Party Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and Hearing Regarding Order of Proof;

7.

July 2, 2007 transcript of Hearing on all pending Motions for Summary
Judgment and Motions in Limine;

8.

August 1, 2007 transcript of all proceedings before the Court;

9.

August 2, 2007 transcript of Hearing on MRIA's Motion for Clarification;

10.

Transcript of all Opening Statements from the 2007 trial;

11.

Transcript of all Closing Arguments from the 2007 trial;

12.

Transcripts, from the 2007 trial, of all conferences on jury instructions, the
objections of the parties to the instructions, and the court's ruling thereon; and

13.

October 31,2007 transcript ofthe Hearing on SADC/SARMC's Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial.

14.

February 17, 2010 transcript of initial hearing following Supreme Court
remand;
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15.

May 7, 2010 transcript of scheduling hearing;

16.

July 9, 2010 transcript of hearing on Motion to Strike Third Amended
Counterclaim;

17.

August 4, 201 0 transcript of hearing;

18.

October 1, 2010 transcript ofhearing on motions for summary judgment and
motions to dismiss;

19.

February 9, 2011 transcript of hearing on motions related to reopening of
discovery and filing of motions in limine;

20.

April22, 2011 transcript of hearing on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

21.

May 18, 2011 transcript of hearing on motions in limine and motions for
summary judgment;

22.

June 21, 2011 transcript of hearing on Motion to Compel Access to Books and
Records;

23.

August 5, 2011 transcript of hearing on pre-trial motions;

24.

August 9, 2011 transcript of pre-trial conference;

25.

September 2, 2011 transcript of pre-trial conference;

26.

September 6, 2011 transcript of all proceedings before the Court;

27.

Transcript of all opening statements;

28.

Transcript of all closing arguments;

29.

Transcript of all conferences onjury instructions, the objections ofthe parties
to the instructions, and the court's rulings thereon;

30.

October 1, 2011 transcript of hearing on Saint Alphonsus's Motions for
Summary Judgment

31.

December 9, 2011 transcript of hearing regarding objections to the form and
contents of the judgment;

32.

March 23, 2012 transcript ofhearing on Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial, and motions regarding
award of attorneys' fees.
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33.

June 22, 2012 transcript of hearing regarding MRIA's request to amend the
judgment and motions related to the award of attorney fees and costs.

34.

August 24, 2012 transcript of hearing regarding MRIA's request to amend the
judgment and motions related to the award of attorney fees and costs.

E.

CLERK'S RECORD: Saint Alphonsus requests that in addition to all

documents automatically included in the record pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28, the
following additional documents be included, which are most generally described in the terms
used in the clerk's Register of Actions: 2
1.

July 29, 2005 Scheduling Order;

2.

January 31, 2006 Motion for Leave to File First Amended Counterclaim and
Third-Party Complaint;

3.

January 31, 2006 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

4.

February 14,2006 Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant/Counterclaimant's Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

5.

February 21, 2006 Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Counterclaim;

6.

March 7, 2006 Memorandum Decision on Defendant/Counterclaimant' s
Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

7.

March 20,2006 Amended Scheduling Order;

8.

March 20, 2006 MRIA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

9.

March 21,2006 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

2

Items #1 through #372 on this list were part of the record prepared in the first appeal of
this matter.

THIRD AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL -11-

005306

'

•

I

10.

March 21,2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Motion
for Summary Judgment;

11.

March 21,2006 Affidavit of Thomas E. Henson, M.D., in Support ofMRIA's
Motion for Summary Judgment;

12.

April17, 2006 Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motions to Compel,
Motion to Quash Subpoenas and Motion for Protective Order;

13.

May 3, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order;

14.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Strike;

15.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

16.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

17.

May 5, 2006 Memorandum in Support of Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment;

18.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment;

19.

May 5, 2006 Saint Alphonsus' Notice of Errata Re: Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

20.

May 23, 2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

21.

May 23, 2006 Affidavit of Thomas E. Henson, M.D., in Support of
Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

22.

May 23, 2006 Memorandum in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment;

23.

May 26,2006 MRIA's Notice of Errata Re: Memorandum in Support of
MRIA's Motion for Summary Judgment;

24.

May 26, 2006 Supplemental Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of
MRIA's Motion for Summary Judgment;

25.

May 30, 2006 Motion to Strike in Connection with Summary Judgment
Proceedings;

THIRD AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL -12-

005307

'

•

I

26.

May 30, 2006 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

27.

May 30,2006 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion to Strike;

28.

May 30, 2006 Memorandum in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to
Strike;

29.

May 30,2006 Reply Memorandum in Support ofMRlA's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

30.

June 2, 2006 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Strike;

31.

June 5, 2006 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike;

32.

July 24, 2006 Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motions to Strike, CrossMotions for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss;

33.

August 7, 2006 Motion for Reconsideration or for Permission to Appeal;

34.

August 7, 2006 Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration or for Permission to Appeal;

35.

August 25, 2006 MRlA's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration;

36.

August 25, 2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;

37.

August 30, 2006 Reply Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration or, in the Alternative, for Permission to Appeal;

38.

October 10, 2006 Motion to Compel MRlA Financial Statements;

39.

October 10, 2006 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel MRlA
Financial Statements;

40.

October 10, 2006 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording;

41.

October 18, 2006 MRlA's Opposition to Motion to Compel MRlA Financial
Statements;
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42.

October 20, 2006 Affidavit of Jeremy G. Ladle in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Motion to Compel MRIA Financial Statements;

43.

October 20, 2006 Reply Memorandum in Support of Saint Alphonsus' Motion
to Compel MRIA Financial Statements;

44.

November 2, 2006 Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motions to Compel;
Defendant's Motion to Extend Pretrial Deadlines; Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration; Third-Party Defendant's Motion to Compel Answers to
Interrogatories and Produce Documents; Third-Party Defendant's Motion to
Strike MRIA's Objection to Producing Moffatt Thomas Documents;

45.

November 22, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order to Reset Trial Dates;

46.

December 20, 2006 Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim
and First Amended Third-Party Complaint;

47.

December 20, 2006 Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages;

48.

December 20,2006 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Leave to
File Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
Complaint;

49.

December 20,2006 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion to Amend to
Seek Punitive Damages;

50.

December 20, 2006 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of
Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive
Damages (document sealed);

51.

December 20, 2006 Affidavit of Douglas M. Branson;

52.

December 20, 2006 Notice of Hearing;

53.

December 21,2006 Motion to Seal Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's
Motion to Amend First Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

54.

December 21, 2006 Errata Sheet Re: Affidavit of Professor Douglas M.
Branson;

55.

December 28, 2006 Order to Seal Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Amend First Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint;

56.

December 28,2006 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;
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57.

December 28, 2006 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Re: Lease Term;

58.

December 28, 2006 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Saint
Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

59.

January 4, 2007 Motion to Strike Affidavit of Professor Douglas M. Branson;

60.

January 4, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

61.

January 4, 2007 Motion to Strike References to Privileged Documents;

62.

January 4, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller;

63.

January 4, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording;

64.

January 4, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

65.

January 4, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRlA's
Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages;

66.

January 4, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Memorandum;

67.

January 4, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRlA's
Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended
Third-Party Complaint;

68.

January 4, 2007 Motion for Summary Judgment;

69.

January 4, 2007 Third Party Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment;

70.

January 4, 2007 Third Party Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to
MRlA's Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages;

71.

January 4, 2007 Third Party Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to
MRlA's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim and First
Amended Third Party Complaint;

72.

January 9, 2007 Motion to Strike SARMC's Motion to Strike References to
Privileged Documents;

73.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit In Support OfMotion to Strike;

74.

January 9, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;
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January 9, 2007 Reply in Support of Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive
Damages Against SARMC;

76.

January 9, 2007 Reply In Support of Motion to Amend to Seek Punitive
Damages Against GSR/SARG;

77.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Reply
Briefs in Support ofMotion;

78.

January 9, 2007 MRIA's Memorandum in Opposition to SARMC's Motion to
Strike Affidavit of Professor Douglas M Branson;

79.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit of Yvonne Vaughan in Support ofMRIA's
Memorandum in Opposition ofSARMC's Motion to Strike Affidavit;

80.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit ofDouglas M. Branson in Support of Opposition to
SARMC's Motion to Strike Affidavit;

81.

January 9, 2007 Reply Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Leave
to File 2nd Amended Counterclaim and First Amended 3rd Party Complaint;

82.

January 9, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of Reply
Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Leave to File 2nd Amended
Counterclaim and 1st Amended 3rd Party Complaint;

83.

January 10,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Memorandum in
Opposition to SARMC's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Professor Douglas M.
Branson;

84.

January 10, 2007 Opposition to Motion to Strike References to Privileged
Documents;

85.

January 10,2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;

86.

January 23, 2007 Stipulated Protective Order;

87.

February 1, 2007 Motion for Leave to Supplement Briefing on Motion for
Leave to File Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
Complaint;

88.

February 26,2007 Memorandum Decision on MRIA's Motion to Amend the
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint to Seek Punitive Damages and to
File a Second Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party
Complaint; Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike References to Privileged
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Documents and Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Professor
Douglas M. Branson;
89.

February 12, 2007 Notice of Withdrawal of Third Party Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment;

90.

February 13, 2007 Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
Lease Term;

91.

February 13, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;

92.

February 20, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

93.

February 20, 2007 Second Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Saint
Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

94.

March 2, 2007 Order on MRIA's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Counterclaim and First Amended Third Party Complaint;

95.

March 7, 2007 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against MRIA on
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim;

96.

March 7, 2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

97.

March 7, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term;

98.

March 23,2007 Motion in Limine Re: Douglas M. Branson;

99.

March 23, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Motion in Limine;

100.

March 23, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Support;

101.

April 3, 2007 Opposition to Third Party Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;

102.

April 3, 2007 Affidavit of Julli Hopkins;

103.

April 3, 2007 Affidavit of David Giles, M.D.;

104.

April3, 2007 Affidavit of Shawn P. Bailey;

105.

April 10, 2007 Response to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;
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106.

April 10, 2007 Affidavit Re: Motion for Summary Judgment;

107.

April13, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
the Fourth Claim for Relief in Second Amended Counterclaim;

108.

April13, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Saint Alphonsus
Summary Judgment;

109.

April13, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion;

110.

April23, 2007 Third Party Defendants' Expert Witness Disclosure Pursuant
to Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) ofthe IRCP;

111.

April26, 2007 Third Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Defamation Cause of Action;

112.

April26, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Motion to Exclude Witnesses;

113.

April26, 2007 Third Party Defendants' Memorandum in Support ofMotion
for Partial Summary Judgment on Defamation Cause of Action;

114.

April26, 2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones in Support ofThird Party
Defendants' Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

115.

April26, 2007 Affidavit ofNeil D. McFeeley in Support ofThird Party
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Defamation Cause of Action;

116.

April26, 2007 Affidavit of Jeffery T. Seaboum, M.D. in Support of Third
Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defamation
Cause of Action;

117.

April26, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Objection to MRIA's Expert Witness
Disclosures for Charles A. Wilhoite and Bruce P. Budge;

118.

April26, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Objection;

119.

May 1, 2007 Opposition to Motion in Limine Motion to Shorten Time;

120.

May 2, 2007 Motion for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Depositions of
Grant Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp;

121.

May 2, 2007 Affidavit In Support Of Motion for Protective Order Regarding
Discovery Depositions of Grant Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp;
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122.

May 2, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Order
Regarding Discovery Depositions of Grant Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp
and in Opposition of Motion to Compel Date Certain for Depositions of Grant
Chamberlain and Cindy Schamp;

123.

May 3, 2007 Jury Instructions Filed;

124.

May 3, 2007 Joinder in Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

125.

May 3, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's
Motion in Limine Re: Douglas M. Branson;

126.

May 4, 2007 Objection to the Expert Witness Disclosure;

127.

May 4, 2007 Notice Of Hearing (05/19/07@ 3:30pm);

128.

May 8, 2007 Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure;

129.

May 8, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

130.

May 8, 2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones;

131.

May 8, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Third Party Defendant's Motion;

132.

May 8, 2007 Notice Of Hearing (06/05/07@ 4:00pm);

133.

May 11, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment
Dismissing MRIA's First Amended Third Party Complaint on the Basis that
No Damages have been Proven;

134.

May 11,2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment;

135.

May 11, 2007 Third Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on Idaho Consumer Protection Act Cause of Action;

136.

May 11, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

137.

May 14, 2007 Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the
Interference with Prospective Contractual Relationship Cause of Action;

138.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit In Support Of Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Interference with Prospective Contractual
Relationship Cause of Action;
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139.

May 14,2007 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Interference with Prospective Contractual
Relationship Cause of Action;

140.

May 14,2007 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Civil Conspiracy
Cause of Action;

141.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit In Support Of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
of Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;

142.

May 14,2007 Memorandum in Support of for Partial Summary Judgment of
Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;

143.

May 14, 2007 Third Party Defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

144.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit of Jeffrey R. Cliff;

145.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit of Jeffrey T. Seaboum;

146.

May 14,2007 Affidavit of J. Timothy Hall MD;

147.

May 14, 2007 Affidavit of Warren E. Jones;

148.

May 14, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

149.

May 16, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

150.

May 16,2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Partial Summary
Judgment;

151.

May 16,2007 Affidavit of J. Will Varin;

152.

May 16, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Statement of Material Facts;

153.

May 16, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Statement ofUndisputed Facts in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Antitrust Claims;

154.

May 18, 2007 Motion for Summary Judgment;

155.

May 18,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;

156.

May 18,2007 Statement ofUndisputed Facts in Support ofMotion;

157.

May 18,2007 Affidavit ofPatrick J. Miller;
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158.

May 18,2007 Statement ofUndisputed Facts in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Motion;

159.

May 18,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
Interference with Prospective Contractual Relationship or Business
Expectations;

160.

May 18,2007 Statement ofUndisputed Facts in Support of Saint Alphonsus'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

161.

May 18, 2007 Objection to Amended Notice of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center;

162.

May 18,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Misappropriation of Trade Secret Confidential Information Cause of Action;

163.

May 18, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller;

164.

May 21,2007 Memorandum Decision on Third Party Defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Against MRIA on Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Claim;

165.

May 21,2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus' Motion in Limine
Re: Douglas M. Branson;

166.

May 21, 2007 Motion to Dismiss MRIA's Twentieth Claim for Relief (Re:
Spoliation);

167.

May 21, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss;

168.

May 22,2007 Opposition to SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the Fourth Claim for Relief on the Second Amended
Counterclaim;

169.

May 22,2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt In Support Of Opposition to
SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Fourth Claim for
Relief on the Second Amended;

170.

May 22, 2007 Opposition to Third Party Defendant's Motion to Exclude
Expert Witnesses;

171.

May 22, 2007 Opposition to SARMC's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

172.

May 22, 2007 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;
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173.

May 22, 2007 Opposition to Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure of Ed
Whitelaw;

174.

May 22, 2007 Affidavit of Ed Whitelaw in Support of Opposition to
SARMC's Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw;

175.

May 22, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of Opposition to
SARMC's Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw;

176.

May 23, 2007 MRIA's Supplemental Disclosure of Witnesses;

177.

May 24,2007 Report of Discovery Master Re: Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Protective Order Re: MRIA Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition;

178.

May 24, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply to MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's
Objection to Expert Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw;

179.

May 25, 2007 Third-party Defendants' Memorandum Joining Saint
Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof of
Damages Causation;

180.

May 25, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on Damage Causation;

181.

May 25, 2007 Third-Party Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Exclude MRIA's Expert Witnesses;

182.

May 29, 2007 Reply Memorandum Regarding Motion to Exclude Expert
Witnesses;

183.

May 29,2007 Saint Alphonsus' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment on MRIA's Fourth Claim for Relief(Re: Fiduciary Duty
to Limited Partnerships);

184.

June 1, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Supplemental Disclosure of Lay Witnesses;

185.

June 5, 2007 Third Party Defendant's Joinder in Objection to the Expert
Witness Disclosure of Ed Whitelaw;

186.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus' Objection to
MRIA' s Expert Witness Disclosures for Charles A. Wilhoite and Bruce P.
Budge and Third-Party Defendants' Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses;

187.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Shattuck Hammond
Memorandum;
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188.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

189.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Renewed Motion in Limine Re: Lease and
Partnership Term;

190.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage
Theory;

191.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion in Limine Re: Purchase
Price Damage Theory;

192.

June 5, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Dissociation;

193.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMotion in Limine Re: Dissociation;

194.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Prohibiting SARMC from
Introducing Evidence of its Intent Re: Term ofthe MRIA Partnership;

195.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine;

196.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to Purchase MRIA
and/or MRICI;

197.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to
Purchase MRIA and/or MRICI;

198.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Communications Between
SARMC and MRIA about the Purchase of MRIA and/or MRICI;

199.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Communications Between SARMC and MRIA about the Purchase of MRIA
and/or MRICI;

200.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Justification for Withdrawal;

201.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Justification for Withdrawal;

202.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Admissibility of Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

203.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Admissibility of Shattuck Hammond Memorandum;
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204.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC Promotion of its Own
Best Interests as a Defense to IT Fiduciary Duty Breaches;

205.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support MRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
SARMC Promotion of its Own Best Interests as a Defense to IT Fiduciary
Duty Breaches;

206.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Purported Breaches by MRIA of
Fiduciary Duties;

207.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Purported Breaches by MRIA of Fiduciary Duties;

208.

June 5, 2007 Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's Status
as a Former Catholic Nun;

209.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun;

210.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Beliefs About
Legality of Withdrawal from MRIA;

211.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
SARMC's Beliefs About Legality of Withdrawal from MRIA;

212.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Referring Physicians Designated
by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

213.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Referring
Physicians Designated by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

214.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Reliance on Advice of
Counsel;

215.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's
Reliance on Advice of Counsel;

216.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Inadvertently Disclosed
Privileged Document;

217.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Inadvertently
Disclosed Privileged Document;

218.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members of
DMR;
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219.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Investments by Members ofDMR;

220.

June 5, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Motions in
Limine;

221.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Motion to Strike IMI's Joinder in SARMC's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof of Damages Causation;

222.

June 5, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion to Strike IMI's
Joinder in SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof
of Damages Causation;

223.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Re: Damage Causation or, in the Alternative, Motion in Limine;

224.

June 5, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Damage Causation
or, in the Alternative, Motion in Limine;

225.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to IMI's Motion for Summary Judgment
Dismissing MRIA's 1st Amended Third Party Complaint on the Basis that No
Damages Have Been Proven and SARMC's Joinder Thereto;

226.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by
Third Party Defendants on the "Interference with Existing Contractual
Relationship" Claim;

227.

June 5, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Third Party Defendants on the
"Interference with Existing Contractual Relationship" Claim;

228.

June 5, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to Third Party Defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action and
SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Cause
of Action (MRIA's 16th Claim for Relief);

229.

June 12, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion to Dismiss Spoliation
Claim;

230.

June 12, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation;

231.

June 12, 2007 MRIA' s Opposition to SARMC' s Renewed Motion in Limine
Re: Lease and Partnership Term;
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232.

June 12,2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Shattuck Hammond Memorandum;

233.

June 12, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Purchase Price Damage Theory;

234.

June 12,2007 Affidavit of Charles Wilhoite in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

235.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit ofDaniel J. Gordon in Support ofMRIA's Opposition
to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

236.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss Spoliation Claim;

237.

June 12, 2007 Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Reliance on Advice of
Counsel;

238.

June 12, 2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Motion in Limine;

239.

June 12, 2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Strike
Gregory Vistnes;

240.

June 12, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re:
Damage Causation;

241.

June 12, 2007 Report ofDiscovery Master Re: Motion to Compel Responses
to Fifth Set of Interrogatories and Fourth Set of Request for Admissions;

242.

June 12,2007 Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Beliefs
about Legality of Withdrawal from MRIA;

243.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Reply Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Damage Causation;

244.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: SARMC Promotion of its
Own Best Interests as a Defense to its Fiduciary Duty Breaches;

245.

June 12, 2007 Response to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Cause of Action;

246.

June 12, 2007 Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members
ofDMR;
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247.

June 12,2007 Response to Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Re:
Antitrust;

248.

June 12,2007 Reply to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
by Third Party Defendants on "Interference with Existing Contractual
Relationship" Claim;

249.

June 12, 2007 Response to MRIA's Motion to Strike IMI's Joinder in
SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof of
Damages Causation;

250.

June 12, 2007 Response To MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Damages Causation;

251.

June 12,2007 Objection to Motion in Limine Re: Referring Physicians
Designated by SARMC/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

252.

June 12, 2007 Objection to Motion in Limine Re: Admissibility of Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

253.

June 12, 2007 Reply to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

254.

June 12, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike;

255.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Strike Exhibits;

256.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Justification for Withdrawal;

257.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Response to Opposition to SARMC's
Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Damages Causation;

258.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Referring Physicians
Designated by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

259.

June 12,2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Admissibility of Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum;

260.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Response to Admissibility of Shattuck Hammond
Memorandum;

261.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Purported Breaches by
MRIA of Fiduciary Duties;

262.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Response to Motion in Limine Re:
Purported Breaches by MRIA of Fiduciary Duties;
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263.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Evidence ofPatricia
Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun;

264.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Response to Motion in Limine Re:
Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun;

265.

June 12, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Joinder in Third Party Defendant's Reply
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Civil Conspiracy
Cause of Action;

266.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to Purchase MRIA;

267.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller;

268.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members;

269.

June 12, 2007 Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Communications;

270.

June 12, 2007 Response to Motion in Limine Re: Term of the Partnership;

271.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment re: Damages Causation

272.

June 12, 2007 Affidavit ofPatrick J. Miller re: Breaches of Fiduciary Duty by
MRIA;

273.

June 13, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on the Fourth Claim for Relief in Second
Amended Counterclaim;

274.

June 14, 2007 Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Spoliation
Claim;

275.

June 14, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price
Damage Theory;

276.

June 14, 2007 Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation;

277.

June 14, 2007 Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Shattuck
Hammond Memo;

278.

June 14, 2007 Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Lease &
Partnership Term;
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279.

June 14,2007 Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support ofMR1's Opposition
to Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

280.

June 15, 2007 All Replies in Support of Motion in Limine (12 in number);

281.

June 15, 2007 Affidavit of James M. Prochaska;

282.

June 15, 2007 Motion to Strike;

283.

June 18, 2007 Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Charles Wilhoite in
Opposition to Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory;

284.

June 19,2007 MRIA's Reply in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Referring
Physicians Designated by SARG/GSR as Expert Witnesses;

285.

June 19, 2007 MRIA's Reply in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Admissibility of Shattuck Hammond Memorandum;

286.

June 19,2007 MRIA's Response to Third Party Defendants' Objection to
Motion in Limine Re: Investments by Members of DMR;

287.

June 21, 2007 Response to Erroneous Statement;

288.

June 25, 2007 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Strike the Affidavit
of Charles Wilhoite;

289.

June 25, 2007 Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon;

290.

June 27, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment;

291.

June 28, 2007 Order on Oral Argument Presentation on Motions for July 2nd
2007;

292.

July 3, 2007 Affidavit of Jack S. Gjording Re: documents to be Submitted In
Camera;

293.

July 12, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Witness List;

294.

July 18, 2007 Plaintiffs Trial Brief;

295.

July 18, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Third Party Defendant
Settlement;

296.

July 18, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion;
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297.

July 18,2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Purported Breaches of Fiduciary
Duties and Wrongful Conduct by MRIA, DMR, and Dr. Giles;

298.

July 18, 2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion;

299.

July 18, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Third Party Defendants Expert
Witnesses;

300.

July 18,2007 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion MRIA's Trial
Brief;

301.

July 18, 2007 Pre-Trial Memorandum;

302.

July 20, 2007 Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt;

303.

July 20, 2007 Stipulation for Dismissal of Third Party Defendants With
Prejudice;

304.

July 25, 2007 Motion to Compel Production ofDiscovery;

305.

July 25, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Production of
Discovery;

306.

July 25, 2007 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Motion to Compel;

307.

July 26, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion in Limine Re: Third Party Defendant Settlement;

308.

July 26, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion in Limine re Third Party Defendants Expert Witnesses;

309.

July 26, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion in Limine re Conduct by MRIA, DMR and Dr. Giles;

310.

July 26, 2007 Affidavit of J. Will Varin;

311.

July 30, 2007 Order for Dismissal of Third Party Defendants With Prejudice;

312.

July 30, 2007 Memorandum Decision On Saint Alphonsus' Motion In Limine
Re: Shattuck Hammond Memorandum; Saint Alphonsus' Renewed Motion In
Limine Re: Lease and Partnership Term; Saint Alphonsus' Motion In Limine
Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory; Saint Alphonsus' Motion In Limine Re:
Dissociation; MRIA's Motion In Limine Prohibiting SARMC From
Introducing Evidence of its Intent Re: Term ofthe MRIA Partnership;
MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Attempts to Purchase MRIA and/or MRICI;
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MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Communications Between SARMC and MRIA
About the Purchase ofMRIA and/or MRICI; MRIA's Motion In Limine Re:
Justification for Withdrawal; MRIA's Motion In Limine Re: Admissibility of
Shattuck Hammond Memorandum; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's
Promotion of its Own Best Interests; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Purported
Breaches By MRIA of Fiduciary Duties; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re:
Evidence of Patricia Vandenberg's Status as a Former Catholic Nun; MRIA's
Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Beliefs About Legality of Withdrawal from
MRIA; MRIA's Motion to Strike Gregory S. Vistness; MRIA's Motion in
Limine Re: Referring Physicians Designated By SARG/GSR as Expert
Witnesses; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC's Reliance on Advice of
Counsel; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Inadvertently Disclosed Privileged
Documents; MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Investments By Members of
DMR; Saint Alphonsus' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Charles Wilhoite in
Opposition to SARMC's Motion In Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage
Theory; MRIA's Motion to Strike Supplemental Affidavit Of Gregory S.
Vistness, Ph.D.;
313.

August 1, 2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA' s Request for
Clarification;

314.

August 3, 2007 MRIA's Request for Clarification/Reconsideration of Motion
in Limine Re: Shattuck Hammond Memorandum and MRIA's Request for
Pre-evidentiary Jury Instruction Re: Duty of Loyalty;

315.

August 3, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' s Motion in Limine Re: Use of Deposition
Testimony in Opening Statements;

316.

August 3, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion;

317.

August 3, 2007 SARMC's Motion in Limine Re: Use of Shattuck Hammond
Documents in Opening Statement;

318.

August 6, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Compel
Re: SARMC's Failure to Provide Foundational Objections to MRIA's
Exhibits;

319.

August 6, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Reply to MRIA's Opposition to Motion in
Limine Re: Use of Shattuck Hammond Documents in Opening Statements;

320.

August 10, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Motion in Limine Re: Dissociation
Damages;

321.

August 10,2007 Affidavit in Support ofMotion in Limine Re: Dissociation
Damages;
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August 10, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation Damages;

323.

August 14, 2007 MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's Motion in Limine Re:
Dissociation Damages;

324.

August 20, 2007 MRIA Motion in Limine;

325.

August 20, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Motion;

326.

August 20,2007 Affidavit of WadeL. Woodard in Support of Motion in
Limine;

327.

August 23, 2007 Court's draft Jury Instructions;

328.

August 27, 2007 MRIA's Response to Statute of Limitations Argument;

329.

August 28, 2007 MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Grant Chamberlain
Testimony and Supporting Memorandum;

330.

August 28,2007 Affidavit in Support ofMRIA's Motion in Limine Re: Grant
Chamberlain Testimonial and Supporting Memorandum;

331.

August 29, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Objections and Proposed Additional Jury
Instructions;

332.

August 29, 2007 Court's draft Jury Instructions;

333.

August 30, 2007 Court's draft Jury Instructions;

334.

August 30, 2007 Jury Instructions filed;

335.

August 30, 2007 Jury Verdict;

336.

September 4, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Objection to MRIA's Proposed
Judgment;

337.

September 10, 2007 MRIA's Response to Saint Alphonsus's Objection to
MRIA's Proposed Judgment;

338.

September 10,2007 MRIA's Proposed Findings ofFact and Conclusions of
Law Re: Withdrawing Partners Interest in the Partnership;

339.

September 10,2007 SADC's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Regarding Plaintiff SADC's Claim for its Partnership Equity;
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September 21, 2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLaw and Judgment;

341.

October 3, 2007 Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and
Motion for New Trial;

342.

October 3, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

343.

October 3, 2007 Affidavit Re: Settlement Offer;

344.

October 9, 2007 Motion for Costs and Fees;

345.

October 9, 2007 Affidavit of Thomas A. Banducci in Support ofMRIA's
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs;

346.

October 9, 2007 Affidavit of Counsel Re: Criteria for Awarding Attorney Fees;

347.

October 9, 2007 MRIA's Memorandum in Support of Memorandum of Costs
and Fees;

348.

October 9, 2007 MRIA's Motion for Reconsideration of Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment;

349.

October 9, 2007 MRIA's Memorandum in Support ofMotion for
Reconsideration and Findings of Fact, Conclusions oflaw and Judgment;

350.

October 9, 2007 Saint Alphonsus' Application for Attorney Fees Relative to
Antitrust and Equity Claims;

351.

October 9, 2007 Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees;

352.

October 9, 2007 Affidavit of Stephanie C. Westermeier;

353.

October 22, 2007 MRIA's Objection to Verified Memorandum of Costs and
Attorneys' Fees;

354.

October 23, 2007 Motion to Disallow MRIA's Request for Costs and Fees;

355.

October 23, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees;

356.

October 23, 2007 Memorandum in Support of Opposition to Attorney Fees
and Costs;

357.

October 24,2007 MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;
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358.

October 24, 2007 Affidavit in Support ofMRIA's Opposition to Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

359.

October 24,2007 Memorandum in Opposition to MRIA's Motion for
Reconsideration of Findings of Fact;

360.

October 24, 2007 Affidavit of Jack Gjording in Opposition to Motion for
Prejudgment Interest;

361.

October 26, 2007 Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment;

362.

October 26, 2007 Reply in Support of Motion for Prejudgment Interest;

363.

October 26, 2007 MRIA's Verified Reply in Support of Motion for Costs and
Fees;

364.

October 29, 2007 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

365.

October 29,2007 Affidavit ofPatrick J. Miller in Support of Saint
Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial;

366.

November 19, 2007 Memorandum Decision on Saint Alphonsus' Application
for Attorney Fees Relative to Antitrust and Equity Claims; Saint Alphonsus'
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict; Saint Alphonsus' Motion
for New Trial; MRIA's Motion for Prejudgment Interest; MRIA's Motion for
Reconsideration; MRIA's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs;

367.

December 7, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Attorney Costs and Fees;

368.

December 10, 2007 Acceptance of Remittitur;

369.

December 20, 2007 Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care and Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center Objection to Acceptance of Remittitur;

370.

December 21, 2007 Objection to Revised Fees and Costs;

371.

December 21, 2007 Affidavit in Support of Objection to Revised Fees and
Costs;

372.

December 27, 2007 Notice of Appeal;

373.

January 3, 2008 Amended Judgment;
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374.

January 3, 2008 Response to Objection to Acceptance of Remittitur;

375.

January 4, 2008 Motion for Stay of Execution;

376.

January 4, 2008 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Motion for Stay
of Execution;

377.

January 17, 2008 Notice Of Cross-Appeal;

378.

January 28,2008 Memorandum Decision on MRIA's Revised Motion for
Attorneys Fees and Costs;

379.

January 29, 2008 Order Clarifying the Court's Memorandum Decision on
MRIA's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Issued by the Court on January
28th, 2008;

380.

February 4, 2008 Affidavit of WadeL Woodard in Support of Award of Costs
as a Matter of Right and Second Amended Judgment;

381.

February 6, 2008 Objection to Proposed Second Amended Judgment;

382.

February 8, 2008 Order Staying Execution;

383.

February 8, 2008 Affidavit of Thomas A Banducci;

384.

February 11, 2008 Supplemental Request for Additional Clerk's Record;

385.

February 13, 2008 MRIA 's Objection to Proposed 2nd Amended Judgement
and Motion for Fees;

386.

February 26,2008 Second Amended Judgment;

387.

July 31, 2008 Stipulation for Corrections and Additions to the Transcript and
Record;

388.

August 1, 2008 Order for Corrections and Additions to the Transcript and
Record;

389.

October 22, 2009 Opinion- Supreme Court Docket No. 34885;

390.

March 22, 2010 Third Amended Counterclaim;

391.

April16, 2010 Answer to Third Amended Complaint;

392.

April16, 2010 Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter from the Third Amended
Complaint;
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393.

July 2, 2010 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Strike Immaterial
Matter from Third Amended Counterclaim;

394.

July 2, 2010 Affidavit ofTom Banducci in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's
Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter from Third Amended Counterclaim;

395.

July 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of its Motion to Strike
Immaterial Matter from the Third Amended Counterclaim;

396.

July 9, 2010 Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions From the Parties and
Briefing Schedule;

397.

July 26, 2010 Motion To Amend Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions;

398.

July 30, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Motion to Amend
Order Re: Scheduling Preliminary Motions;

399.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment Based on
the Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's Evidence of Lost Profits;

400.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for
Summary Judgment Based on the Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's Evidence of
Lost Profits;

401.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment on the Claims of the
Limited Partnerships;

402.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for
Judgment on the Claims of the Limited Partnerships;

403.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment on the Civil
Conspiracy Claim;

404.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for
Judgment on the Civil Conspiracy Claim;

405.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on
MRIA's Claim for Wrongful Dissociation;

406.

August 6, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support oflts Motion for
Summary Judgment on MRIA's Claim for Wrongful Dissociation;

407.

August 6, 2010 Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Amend Order Re:
Scheduling Preliminary Motions;
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408.

August 30, 2010 Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim for
Wrongful Dissociation;

409.

August 30, 2010 Opposition to Motion for Judgment on the Claims of the
Limited Partnerships;

410.

August 30,2010 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment Based on MRIA's Civil Conspiracy Claim;

411.

August 30, 2010 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment Based on the Alleged Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's Evidence of
Lost Profits;

412.

September 13,2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment on Claims of the Limited Partnerships;

413.

September 13, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Claim for Wrongful Dissociation;

414.

September 13, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Claim;

415.

September 13, 2010 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Legal Insufficiency ofMRIA's
Evidence of Lost Profits;

416.

September 27, 2010 Order Granting Motion to Strike Immaterial Matter From
the Third Amended Counterclaim;

417.

November 16, 2010 Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Motions
for Judgment on Pleadings and Motions for Summary Judgment;

418.

December 23, 2010 Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery;

419.

January 10, 2011 Motion to Set a Scheduling Order;

420.

February 2, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Reopen Face and Expert Discovery;

421.

February 2, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Set Scheduling Order;

422.

February 2, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Motion to Reopen
and In opposition to Motion to Set Scheduling Order;

423.

February 4, 2011 Reply in Support of Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert
Discovery;
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February 15,2011 Order Reopening Discovery and Setting Schedule;

425.

March 2, 2011 Joint Motion to Amend Discovery Schedule;

426.

March 7, 2011 Order Granting Joint Motion to Amend Discovery Schedule;

427.

March 7, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion For Summary Judgment On
MRIA's Unpled Breach Of Contract Theory of Wrongful Dissociation;

428.

March 7, 2011 Memorandum In Support Of Saint Alphonsus's Motion For
Summary Judgment On MRIA's Unpled Breach Of Contract Theory of
Wrongful Dissociation;

429.

March 8, 2011 Notice of Errata re: St Alphonsus Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment;

430.

March 22, 2011 Stipulation and Covenant Not to Execute;

431.

March 23, 2011 Order re: Stipulation and Covenant Not to Execute;

432.

March 28, 2011 MRIA's Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment On
Breach Of Contract Theory of Wrongful Withdrawal;

433.

April 11, 2011 MRIA's Motion for Clarification Regarding Withdrawing
Partner's Share;

434.

April 11, 2011 Memorandum in Support ofMRIA's Motion for Clarification
Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share;

435.

April 11, 2011 MRIA's Motion In Limine to Preclude Saint Alphonsus from
Referencing the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Regarding the Appeal of this
Case

436.

April 11, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Motion In Limine to Preclude
Saint Alphonsus from Referencing the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion
Regarding the Appeal of this Case;

437.

April11, 2011 MRIA's Motion In Limine to Preclude Argument ofLawful
Dissociation;

438.

April 11, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Motion In Limine to Preclude
Argument of Lawful Dissociation;

439.

April 11, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of MRIA Motions Filed April
11,2011;
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440.

April 11,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment on
MRIA's Unpled "Breach of Contract" Theory of Wrongful Dissociation;

441.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of
Competition Following Lawful Dissociation;

442.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in
Limine Re: Evidence of Competition Following Lawful Dissociation;

443.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its
Second Affirmative Defense;

444.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment on its Second Affirmative Defense;

445.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and
Argument that St Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew from MRIA;

446.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in
Limine to Exclude Evidence and Argument that Saint Alphonsus Improperly
Withdrew from MRIA;

447.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: Prior Evidentiary
Rulings from the First Trial;

448.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion in
Limine Re: Prior Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial;

449.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on its
Claim for its Partnership Interest;

450.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment on its Claim for its Partnership Interest;

451.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRI
Center and MRI Mobile's Third Party Beneficiary Claims;

452.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment on MRI Center's and MRI Mobile's Third Party
Beneficiary Claims;

453.

April11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine to Exclude Claims of
Misappropriation, Defamation or Wrongful Dissociation;
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454.

April II, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion in
Limine to Exclude Claims of Misappropriation, Defamation or Wrongful
Dissociation;

455.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion in Limine Re: References to the
Jury's Finding of Liability in the First Trial;

456.

April 11, 2011 Saint Alphonsus' s Memorandum in Support of its Motion in
Limine Re: References to the Jury's Finding of Liability in the First Trial;

457.

April II, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's
Second Claim of Relief;

458.

April II, 2011 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording;

459.

April II, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment ofMRIA's Second Claim ofRelief;

460.

April25, 2011 MRIA's Notice ofNon-Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion
for Summary Judgment on MRIA's 2nd Claim for Relief;

461.

April25, 2011 MRIA's Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary
Judgment on Its Claim for Its Partnership Interest;

462.

April25, 2011 MRIA's Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary
Judgment on Its 2nd Affirmative Defense;

463.

April25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary Judgment
on MRI Center and MRI Mobile's 3rd-Party Beneficiary Claims;

464.

April25, 2011 Response to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine re Prior
Evidentiary Rulings from the First Trial;

465.

April 25, 2011 MRIA's Notice ofNon-Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion
In Limine re Reference to Jury's Finding of Liability in the 1st Trial;

466.

April25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine re Evidence
of Competition Following Dissociation;

467.

April25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine to Exclude
Evidence & Argument That St. Alphonsus Improperly Withdrew From MRIA;

468.

April 25, 2011 Opposition to St. Alphonsus' Motion In Limine to Exclude
Claims of Misappropriation, Defamation or Wrongful Dissociation;

THIRD AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL -40-

005335

'

.

•
469.

April25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine to
Preclude Reference to the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in this Case;

470.

April 25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to Motion in Limine to
Preclude Argument that Dissociation was Lawful;

471.

April25, 2011 Saint A1phonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion for
Clarification Regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share;

472.

April25, 2011 Affidavit ofDr James Prochaska in Opposition to Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Summary Judgment on MRI Center and MRI
Mobile's 3rd Party Beneficiary Claims;

473.

May 2, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Oflts Motion For Clarification
regarding Withdrawing Partner's Share;

474.

May 2, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Oflts Motion In Limine To Preclude
Argument That Dissociation Was Lawful;

475.

May 2, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Oflts Motion In Limine To Preclude
Reference To The Idaho Supreme Court Opinion;

476.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum In Support Of Its
Motion For Summary Judgment On Its Claim For Its Partnership Interest;

477.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply Memorandum In Support Oflts
Motion For Summary Judgment On Its Second Affirmative Defense

478.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply In Support Oflts Motion For
Summary Judgment On MRI Centers And MRI Mobiles Third-Party
Beneficiary Claims;

479.

May 2, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Consolidated Reply In Support of Its Motions
In Limine;

480.

May 02, 2011 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording;

481.

May 03, 2011 Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of JackS. Gjording and
Memorandum in Support;

482.

May 05, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Recusal by the Court Based on
Relationship with Dr Henson

483.

May 06, 2011 Order Re: St. Alphonsus' Motion for Summary Judgment;
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484.

May 06, 2011 Partial Summary Judgment;

485.

May 06, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Strike;

486.

May 11, 2011 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Recusal;

487.

May 11,2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's
Motion for Recusal;

488.

May 13, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply In Support Of Motion For Recusal By
the Court Based On Relationship With Dr Henson;

489.

May 13, 2011 Affidavit Of JackS. Gjording In Support Of Reply In Support
Of Motion For Recusal;

490.

May 13, 2011 Reply in Support to Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of
Jack Gjording;

491.

May 16, 2011 Order Withdrawing Rule 54(b) Certification;

492.

June 7, 2011 Motion and Memorandum for Orders Concerning Potential
Witnesses;

493.

June 7, 2011 Affidavit of Counsel;

494.

June 10, 2011 Response To MRI Motion Concerning Potential Witnesses;

495.

June 10, 2011 Motion To Compel Compliance with Statutory Rights to
Inspect Partnership Books and Records;

496.

June 10, 2011 Affidavit Of Jack Gjording In Support Of Motion to Compel;

497.

June 10,2011 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Compliance
with Statutory Rights to Inspect Partnership Books and Records;

498.

June 13,2011 Memorandum of Actions Taken at May 18 Hearing;

499.

June 13, 2011 Consolidated Order Re: Motions in Limine;

500.

June 15, 2011 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus Motion to Compel Compliance
with Statutory Rights to Inspect Partnership Books and Records;

501.

June 17, 2011 Reply in Support ofMotion to Compel Compliance with
Statutory Rights to Inspect Partnership Books and Records
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502.

June 17, 2011 Consolidated Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment
Heard May 18, 2011;

503.

June 21,2011 MRIA's Reply in Support of its Motion Concerning Potential
Witnesses Sandra Bruce and Cindy Schamp;

504.

June 22, 2011 Order Re: Availability at Trial of Witnesses Sandra Bruce,
Cindy Schamp and Dr. Thomas Henson;

505.

June 29, 2011 Briefre Motion to Compel Compliance Regarding Relevance
of Gilbert v. Summit County;

506.

July 05, 2011 Response to Brief Concerning Gilbert v. Summit County;

507.

July 13, 2011 Motion to Release Original Exhibits;

508.

July 14, 2011 Order Releasing Exhibits;

509.

July 14, 2011 MRIA's Proposed Jury Instructions;

510.

July 15, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Requested Jury Instructions and Special
Verdict Form;

511.

July 20, 2011 Order Denying Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Compel
Compliance with Statutory Right to Inspect MRIA's Books and Records;

512.

July 25, 2011 Motion In Limine To Exclude Hearsay Within Hearsay In
Business Records;

513.

July 25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion For Reconsideration In Part Of June
13 2011 Consolidated Order RE: Motions In Limine;

514.

July 25, 2011 Affidavit Of JackS. Gjording;

515.

July 25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum In Support Of Motion In
Limine To Exclude Hearsay Within Hearsay In Business Records;

516.

July 28, 2011 Motion To Have Deemed Admitted The Exhibits Admitted In
The Previous Trial;

517.

July 28, 2011 Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Motion To Have Deemed
Admitted The Exhibits Admitted In The Previous Trial;

518.

July 28,2011 Memorandum In Support OfMRIA's Motion To Have Deemed
Admitted The Exhibits Admitted In The Previous Trial;
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519.

July 28,2011 MRIA's Motion In Limine To Exclude Mention Of Saint
Alphonsus's Status As A Non-Profit Entity;

520.

July 28,2011 Memorandum In Support OfMRIA's Motion In Limine To
Exclude Mention Of Saint Alphonsus's Status As A Non-Profit Entity;

521.

July 28, 2011 MRIA's Opposition To Saint Alphonsus's Motion In Limine
To Exclude "Hearsay Within Hearsay" In Business Records;

522.

July 29, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Exclude the Expert
Testimony of Thomas R McCarthy PhD;

523.

July 29,2011 Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMotion;

524.

July 29, 2011 Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Thomas R
McCarthy, Ph.D;

525.

August 01, 2011 Motion and Memorandum in Support to Preclude Reference
to Saint Alphonsus's Departing Partners Share;

526.

August 01, 2011 Motion and Memorandum for Clarification that Saint
Alphonsus May Not Contend that MRIA Breached Fiduciary Duties;

527.

August 01, 2011 Objection to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Reconsideration
in Part of June 13 2011 Consolidated Order ReMotions in Limine;

528.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Have
Deemed Admitted Exhibits From First Trial

529.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Preclude Reference to Saint Alphonsus's Departing Partner Share;

530.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Exclude Mention of Saint Alphonsus's Status as a Non-Profit Entity;

531.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motion for
Clarification re: Contentions That MRIA Breached Fiduciary Duties;

532.

August 03,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of its Motion in Limine
to Exclude Hearsay Within Hearsay From Business Records;

533.

August 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support of Reconsideration in
Part of June 13 2011 Consolidated Order reMotions in Limine;
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August 03, 2011 Memorandum Addressing Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to
MRIA's Motion to Shorten Time;

535.

August 04, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To MRI's Motion To Exclude
The Expert Testimony Of Thomas R McCarthy PhD;

536.

August 04,2011 Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Opposition;

537.

August 04, 2011 Objections to Saint Alphonsus's Requested Jury Instructions
and Special Verdict Form;

538.

August 04, 2011 MRI's 1st Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions;

539.

August 04, 2011 Reply in Support of Motion to Have Deemed Admitted
Exhibits from the First Trial;

540.

August 04, 2011 Reply in Support of Motion to Exclude Mention of Saint
Alphonsus's Status as a Non-Profit Entity;

541.

August 05, 2011 Defendant's Witness List;

542.

August 05, 2011 Defendant's Exhibit List;

543.

August 09, 2011 Motion for Order Setting Deadline for Production of Exhibit
List and Motion to Shorten Time;

544.

August 16, 2011 Order Rescheduling Jury Questionnaire;

545.

August 17, 2011 Defendant!Counterclaimants' Proposed Amended Exhibit
List;

546.

August 17, 2011 Plaintiff/Counterdefendants Saint Alphonsus's Proposed
Exhibit List;

547.

August 17, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Witness Designations;

548.

August 17, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Objection To MRIA's Designations Of
Manfred Steiner, Alan Hahn And Stephanie Westermeier As Witnesses;

549.

August 17,2011 Supplemental Brief in Opposition to MRIA's Motion to
Exclude Expert Testimony of Dr Thomas McCarthy;

550.

August 18, 2011 Motion to Strike Saint Alphonsus's Supplemental Brief in
Opposition to MRIA's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Dr. Thomas
McCarthy
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551.

August 19, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Proposed Juror Questionnaire;

552.

August 23, 2011 Consolidated Order RE: Motions Heard August 5, 2011;

553.

August 25, 2011 Defendant/Counterclaimants' Deposition Designation;

554.

August 26, 20 11 Defendant/Counterclaimant's Proposed Amended Exhibit
List;

555.

August 29, 2011 Memorandum Addressing Communication From Counsel;

556.

August 30, 2011 Motion in Limine re: Conduct by Dr. David Giles and Carl
Harder;

557.

August 31, 2011 Supplemental Motion in Limine to Prevent Saint Alphonsus
From Arguing that Attorney Carl Harder Engaged in Inappropriate Conduct;

558.

August 31, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Exclude Additional MRIA
Demonstratives;

559.

August 31,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Motions in
Limine to Prevent Argument that Giles and Harder Engaged in Inappropriate
Conduct;

560.

September 01, 2011 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Exclude
Additional MRIA Demonstratives;

561.

September 01,2011 Reply in Support ofMRIA's Motions In Limine;

562.

September 02, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude MRIA's New
And Improper Damages Theories;

563.

September 02, 2011 Affidavit Of Jack Gjording In Support Of Saint
Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude MRIA's New And Improper Damages
Theories;

564.

September 02, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum In Support OfMotion
To Exclude MRIA's New And Improper Damages Theories;

565.

September 02, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Preclude MRIA From
Using Excluded Carl Harder Letter and Related Drafts;

566.

September 02, 2011 Juror Questionnaire;
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567.

September 08, 2011 Motion to Prevent Saint Alphonsus from Referring to
Extension of Term to 2023;

568.

September 09, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Revised Exhibit List;

569.

September 13, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRlA's Motion to
Prevent Saint Alphonsus's From Referring to Extension of Term to 2023;

570.

September 13, 2011 Objection To Jury Instruction Regarding Consultant
Estimate;

571.

September 16, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Supplemental Memorandum In
Support Of Its Motion To Exclude MRlA's New And Improper Damages
Theories;

572.

September 19, 2011 Affidavit Of Counsel In Opposition To Saint
Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude MRlA's Damages Theories;

573.

September 19,2011 Opposition To Saint Alphonsus's Motion To Exclude
MRIA's Damages Theories;

574.

September 20, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Reply in Support oflts Motion to
Exclude MRlA' s New and Improper Damages Theories;

575.

September 22, 2011 Motion in Limine Concerning Out of Court Statements
of Cindy Schamp;

576.

September 23, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition to MRlA'S Motion in
Limine Concerning Out of Court Statements of Cindy Schamp;

577.

September 27, 2011 Motion for Leave to Offer Prior Trial Exhibit 4332 Into
Evidence;

578.

September 27, 2011 Order Re: Motion to Exclude Damages Theories;

579.

September 28, 2011 Objection to Saint Alphonsus Motions for Mistrial;

580.

September 29, 2011 Notice oflntent to Impeach;

581.

September 29, 2011 Motion in Limine to Prevent Saint Alphonsus's from
Presenting Evidence about "Arid Club" Conversation Unless Court First
Determines It Is Admissible;

582.

September 29, 2011 Motion in Limine Regarding Lawsuit Threatened by Dr.
Knochel;
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583.

September 30, 2011 Motion to Quash Trial Subpoena of Jan Hove;

584.

October 03, 2011 Reply in Support ofMRIA's Notice oflntent to Impeach;

585.

October 03,2011 Notice ofNon Opposition to Proposed Instruction NO. 16
and Proposal for Putting the Parties "On the Clock";

586.

October 03, 2011 Opposition to Motion to Quash Subpoena of Jan Hove;

587.

October 03, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Response To MRIA's Notice oflntent to
Impeach;

588.

October 04, 2011 MRI Motion to Exclude Exhibits 802 and 803;

589.

October 04, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Admissibility ofExhibits 802
and 803 (Dr Currans Handwritten notes);

590.

October 06, 2011 Motion to Exclude Alleged Misconduct ofDr Giles;

591.

October II, 20 II Motion in Limine to Prevent Argument and Evidence that
Saint Alphonsus is Entitled to an Offset Based on its Ownership of the MRI
Entities;

592.

October 11, 2011 Motion in Limine to Preclude Questioning ofMRIA'S
Experts Concerning the Reasonableness ofNon-Technical Factual
Assumptions;

593.

October II, 2011 Affidavit in Support of Motion in Limine to Preclude
Questioning ofMRIA's Experts Concerning the Reasonableness ofNonTechnical Factual Assumptions;

594.

October 11, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to Preclude
Questioning ofMRIA'S Experts Concerning the Reasonableness ofNonTechnical Factual Assumptions;

595.

October 11, 2011 Motion to Quash/Modify Subpoenas or Otherwise Preclude
MRIA from Calling Witnesses Without Adequate Notice;

596.

October 12, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To MRIA's Motion To
Preclude Questioning About Reasonableness Of Experts' Factual
Assumptions;

597.

October 12, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To Motion In Limine To
Prevent Argument And Evidence That Saint Alphonsus is Entitled To An
"Offset" Based On Its Ownership Of The MRI Entities;
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598.

October 18, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a Verdict on Claims
Related to Enforcement of the Radiology Services Contract;

599.

October 18, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a Verdict or Otherwise
Preclude MRIA's Tort Claims Alleging Stark and Anti-Kickback Violations;

600.

October 18,2011 Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Direct a Verdict on MRIA's
Damages and Disgorgement Theories;

601.

October 21, 2011 MRIA'S Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Directed Verdict on Violations of the Stark and Anti-Kickback Statutes;

602.

October 21, 2011 Affidavit ofBrent S. Bastian in Support of Opposition to
Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Directed Verdict on Violations of the Stark and
Anti-Kickback Statutes;

603.

October 21, 2011 MRIA'S Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Directed Verdict on Claims Related to Enforcement of Radiology Services
Contract;

604.

October 21, 2011 MRIA'S Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Directed Verdict on MRIA'S Damages and Disgorgement Theories;

605.

October 24, 2011 Reply in Support ofDirected Verdict Motions Filed
October 18, 20 11;

606.

October 25, 2011 MRIA'S Requested Changes to Proposed Jury Instructions;

607.

October 25, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Redline of Court's Proposed PostEvidence Instructions and Proposed Special Verdict Form;

608.

October 27, 2011 Order Denying Request from St. Alphonsus;

609.

October 27, 2011 Response to Notice of Authority RE: Allocation of
Damages Among Different Causes of Action;

610.

October 27, 2011 Objection to Language of Proposed Jury Instruction No. 56;

611.

October 28, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Notice of Authority Re: Allocation of
Damages and Reply to MRIA's Counter-Notice;

612.

October 31, 2011 Plaintiffs Exhibit List;

613.

October 31, 2011 Defendant's Exhibit List;
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614.

October 31, 2011 Jury Verdict;

615.

October 31, 2011 Jury Instructions;

616.

November 02, 2011 Order Re: Proposed Judgment;

617.

November 02, 2011 Submission of Proposed Judgment;

618.

November 08, 2011 Memorandum in Support of Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusion of Law Concerning Disgorgement;

619.

November 08,2011 Saint Alphonsus Objections and Response to MRIA's
Proposed Judgment;

620.

November 09, 2011 Saint Alphonsus Motion to Set Date for Response to
MRIA's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;

621.

November 15, 2011 Response To Saint Alphonsus's Objections and
Response to MRIA'S Proposed Judgment;

622.

November 15, 2011 Saint Alphonsus's Response to Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Usurpation and Disgorgement;

623.

November 21,2011 Saint Alphonsus Reply in Support of Objections to
MRIA's Proposed Judgment;

624.

November 21, 2011 MRIA's Reply In Support Of Proposed Findings of Fact
And Conclusion Of Law Concerning Disgorgement;

625.

January 18,2012 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;

626.

January 18, 2012 Judgment;

627.

January 31, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict or New Trial;

628.

January 31, 2012 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording In Support Of Saint
Alphonsus's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial;

629.

January 31,2012 Memorandum In Support Of Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial;

630.

January 31, 2012 MRIA Entities Petition for Costs and Fees;

631.

January 31, 2012 Amended Affidavit of Counsel regarding 54(e)(3) criteria
for Awarding Attorneys Fees;
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632.

January 31, 2012 Memorandum in Support ofthe MRIA Entities Petition for
Costs and Fees;

633.

January 31, 2012 Affidavit of Steven Andersen;

634.

January 31, 2012 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of The MRIA Entities
Memo of Costs and Fees;

635.

February 14, 2012 MRIA's Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion for
Summary Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial;

636.

February 14, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Motion to Disallow MRIAs Attorneys
Fees and Costs;

637.

February 14, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Memorandum in Support ofMotion;

638.

February 14, 2012 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Support of Motion;

639.

February 21, 2012 Motion For Leave To Conduct Discovery Regarding The
Amount Of Attorney's Fees And Costs Incurred By Saint Alphonsus;

640.

February 21,2012 Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Leave To
Conduct Discovery Regarding The Amount Of Attorney's Fees And Costs
Incurred By Saint Alphonsus;

641.

February 27, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Motion For A Stay Of Proceedings To
Enforce A Judgment Pursuant To Rule 62(b);

642.

February 27, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Memorandum In Support Oflts Motion
For A Stay Of Proceedings To Enforce A Judgment Pursuant To Rule 62(b);

643.

February 28, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Opposition to MRIA's Motion for Leave
to Conduct Discovery Regarding Saint Alphonsus Attorneys Fees;

644.

February 28, 2012 Affidavit of JackS. Gjording in Opposition to MRIA's
Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery Regarding Saint Alphonsus
Attorneys;

645.

March 05, 2012 Reply to Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery Regarding
Saint Alphonsus Attorney Fees;

646.

March 13,2012 Reply In Support Of Saint Alphonsus's Motion For
Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict Or New Trial;
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March 16, 2012 Qualified Opposition to Saint Alphonsus' s Motion for Stay
of Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment;

648.

March 16, 2012 Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's Motion to Disallow
MRIA's Attorneys Fees and Costs;

649.

March 16, 2012 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus's
Motion to Disallow MRIA's Attorney Fees and Costs;

650.

March 20, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Reply in Support of its Motion for a Stay of
Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment

651.

March 20, 2012 Saint Alphonsus Reply in Support of Motion to Disallow
MRIA's Attorneys Fees and Costs

652.

April25, 2012 Order Re: Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
or New Trial;

653.

April30, 2012 Amended Judgment;

654.

May 02,2012 Second Amended Judgment;

655.

May 15, 2012 Order Re: Costs and Attorneys' Fees;

656.

May 22, 2012 MRIA Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a)
or Rule 60(b);

657.

May 22,2012 MRIA Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief from
Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);

658.

May 24,2012 MRIA Amended Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to
Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b );

659.

May 24,2012 MRIA Memorandum in Support of Amended Motion for Relief
from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b);

660.

June 12, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Objections to MRIA's Amended Fee
Petition;

661.

June 12, 2012 Affidavit of Counsel JackS. Gjording in Support of Saint
Alphonsus's Opposition to MRIA's Amended Rule 60 Motion;

662.

June 14, 2012 MRIA Response To Saint Alphonsus's Objections To
Amended Fee Petition;
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663.

June 15, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To MRIA's Amended Rule 60
Motion;

664.

June 19,2012 Reply In Support OfMRIA's Amended Motion For Relief
From Judgment Pursuant To Rule 60(a) Or Rule 60(b);

665.

June 19,2012 Saint Alphonsus's Reply In Support Of Objections To MRIA's
Amended Fee Petition;

666.

June 20, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Response To MRIA's New Claims
Regarding Offset Raised For The First Time In Its Reply Brief;

667.

August 10, 2012 MRIA Memorandum Concerning Amount of Offset;

668.

August 10, 2012 MRIA Entities' Petition for Post-Judgment Costs and Fees;

669.

August 17, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Opposition To MRIA's Motion Seeking
Post -Judgment Attorney Fees And Costs;

670.

August 20, 2012 Saint Alphonsus's Response to MRIA's Supplemental Brief
Regarding Offset;

671.

August 21, 2012 Reply In Support Of The MRIA Entities' Petition For PostJudgment Costs And Fees;

672.

August 21,2012 Reply In Support OfMemorandum Concerning Amount Of
Offset;

673.

September 21,2012 Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Motions Heard
August 24, 2012;

674.

September 21, 2012 Third Amended Judgment.

675.

October 2, 2012 Second Amended Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofthe
MRIA Entities' Memorandum of Costs and Fees

676.

October 2, 2012 Amended Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofthe MRIA
Entities' Petition for Post-Judgment Costs and Fees.

677.

October 30, 2012 Order re Defendants/Counterclaimants' Petition for Costs
and Fees.

678.

October 30, 2012 Fourth Amended Judgment
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679.

November 14. 2012 Amended Order re: Defendants/Counterclaimants'
Petition for Costs and Fees

680.

November 14.2012 Fifth Amended Judgment

SEALED RECORD: Portions of the record in this matter have been submitted

under seal, specifically the records submitted to the Court for in camera review on July 3, 2007,
noted above (item number 292). Saint Alphonsus requests that these documents remain sealed
and subject only to in camera review by the Court.

G.

REPRODUCTION OF EXHIBITS: Pursuant to Appellate Rule 170), Saint

Alphonsus requests that copies of all documents, charts, and pictures offered or admitted as
exhibits at trial be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.

H.

I CERTIFY:
a.

That a copy of this third amended notice of appeal has been served on the
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the
address set out below:
Nicole Julson
Court Reporter
2414 North McKinney
Boise, Idaho 83704.

b.

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript;

c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20 .

.f:.

That pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(m), this amended notice of
appeal requests approximately 85 additional transcript pages. This
amended notice has been served on each reporter of whom a request for
additional transcript is made.
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That pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(m), this second amended notice
of appeal does not request any additional transcript pages.
That pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(m). this third amended notice
of appeal does not request any additional transcript pages.
DATED this 28th day ofNovember 2012.
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

:z.."a'"ti-.
I hereby certify that on the-+st day ofNovember 2012, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, ID 83702
Nicole Julson, Court Reporter
2414 N. McKinney
Boise, ID 83704

D

~
D

Via U.S. Mail
Via Hand-Delivery
Via Overnight Delivery
Via Facsimile

~
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JAN 14 2013
Stephen W. Kenyon
Clerk of Supreme Court
451 W State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By BRADLEY J. THIES
DEPUTY

In re: Saint Alphonsus v. MRI -Appeal, Docket No. 40012

Notice is hereby given that on Friday, December 7, 2012, I lodged a
transcript of 38 pages in length for the above-referenced appeal with
the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District.
The following files were lodged:
Proceeding 06/22/2012

David Cromwell
Tucker & Associates
cc: kloertscher@idcourts.net
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an Idaho
nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No. 40012-2012
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, an
Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counterdefendant-Appellant,

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited liability partnership;
MRI LIMITED, an Idaho limited partnership; MRI MOBILE
LIMITED, an Idaho limited partnership,
Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents-Cross Appellants.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being
forwarded to the Supreme Court on AppeaL It should be noted, however, that the following
exhibits will be retained at the District Court clerk's office and will be made available upon
request.
1. State's Exhibit 741 -large paper chart.
2. State's Exhibit 786 -large paper chart.
3. State's Exhibit 787 A, B & C -large paper charts.
4. State's Exhibit 788 -large paper chart.
5. State's Exhibit 975 -large paper chart.
6. State's Exhibit 976 -large paper chart.
7. State's Exhibit 977 -large paper chart.
8. Defendant's Exhibit 5011 - posterboard.
9. Defendant's Exhibit 5012B- posterboard.
10. Defendant's Exhibit 5027- posterboard.
11. Defendant's Exhibit 5043 - posterboard.
12. Defendant's Exhibit 5044- posterboard.
13. Defendant's Exhibit 5060- posterboard.
14. Defendant's Exhibit 5061- posterboard.
15. Defendant's Exhibit 5062- posterboard.
16. Defendant's Exhibit 5063 -large paper chart.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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17. Defendant's Exhibit 5064 - large paper chart.
18. Defendant's Exhibit 5065- posterboard.
19. Defendant's Exhibit 5092- posterboard.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 15th day of January, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN TBB DISTRICT COURT OF TBB POURTB JUDICLAL DISTRICT
TBB STAB OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TBB COOH'rY 01' ADA

or

SAINT ALPHONSUS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. CVOC0408219
Plainti~~'• Bxhibit
List

. MRI ASSOCIATES,
Defendant.
JUDGE: Mike Wetherell
CLERK: Kathy Johnson/Diane Oatman
CT REPTR: Nicole Omsberg/Patty Terry

Plaintiffs: Jack Gjording, Stephanie Westermier
Gjording & Fouser
PO BOX 2837
Boise ID 83701
Defendants: Thomas Banducci, Wade Woodard
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman
802 W Bannock St Ste 500
Boise ID 83702
Plaintiff's Exhibits
1
2
3

SARG Agreement

9/13/11

Letter to Prospective Partner

10/7/11

4

5
6
7

8
9

1
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1

St Als -v- MRI
CVOC04-8219
10
11
12

Letter for L Ed Mill

prev admitted

13

Articles of Partnership

prev admitted

20

Building Lease Agreement

prev admitted

21

Ground Lease

prev admitted

Limited Partnership Agreement

prev admitted

IMI Partnership Agreement

10-12-11

14
15
16
17
18
19

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

2

005355

•
St Als -v- MRIA
CVOC04-8219
29
30

SARMC/SARG Agreement

prev admitted

31

ICR Partnership Agreement

prev admitted

32

SBB·Notes

prev admitted

33
34
35

36

~

37
38

-~
prev admitted

Memo from T Henson

39

3
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipullllions

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Evidence

..

Date

Description

Kurtz Letter to A. Hahn (SARMC I0596 • I0597 Office of
Pres.)

21511999

Email re: MRIA.SARG Proposal from C. Harder to Dr.
Prochaska w/ attachments (898-903) (corrected- prior exhibit
contained wrong document)

2/IS/1999

PWC LcUcr to C. Schamp (SARMCI745 • 1752 CFO)

2/16/1999

C. Harder letter to J. Cliff (CHOO 1815)

412211999

A. Hahn visit agenda (SARMC 00934 Office of CFO)

7116/1999

PWC FMV Assessment of20% Partnenhip Interest
(Draft)(SARMC 07445.07494 Office ofCFO)

7/31/1999

A. Hahn email to S. Bratley (SARMC 7429 • 7430 Office of
CFO)

8/411999

47

USB Business Loan Transmittal (USB00979 • 981)

81511999

48

USB Application for Approval (USB00982)

8/5/1999

49

Fax to C. Harder from J. Oiff(33756)

8/1011999

50

ICRIIMI Lease Agreement (Giles 00020-38)

8116/1999

USB/ICR Loan Agreement(USBIOI9- 1041)

8/18/1999

USBIIMVICR Loan Agreement (USBI63 • 196)

8/18/1999

Promissory Note-ICR to USB ($908,000XUSBOO 177 • 178)

8/18/1999

54

Promissory Note-ICR to USB (S960,000)(USBOO 179-180)

8/18/1999

55

Commercial Security Agrecment·USBIICR (USB210·213)

8/18/1999

56

Commercial Guarantce-USB/ICR-Wm. T. MulTI)', Guarantor
(USB00378 ·380)

8/1811999

57

USB/ICR Deed ofTrust (USB 183-188)

8/1811999

58

Business Loan Agreement USB/Wm T. MulTI)' et al (USBI91
·195)

8/18/1999

59

Construction Loan Agreement USB/ICR (USB369 • 375)

8/18/1999

40

41

••

42

43

X

X

44

•• J

45

46

X

4111

51
52

53

X

X

X

/~
4102

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**'') denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation dwing the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted dwing the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.
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SA No.

Date

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Offered

Authenticity

60

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence
Promissory Note USBflCR (3,600,000)(USB003S7)

8/1811999

61

.

Operating Agreement of lntcnnountain Medical Imaging LLC
(Giles 003SI·S4)

812011999

62

••

Dr. Gilcs/IMI Letter toR. Denning (GSRRPI S9S • I598),
with double hearsay redacted

812411999

63

••

PWC Valuation of SO Percent Interest in lntcnnountain
Medical Imaging LLC (SARMCOI321·1336 Office of the
CFO)

9/1/1999

Letter rc: opening of IMI (GSRRP/000218-219)

10/4/1999

65

••
••

66

••

67

••

64

~

'

PWC letter to C. Schamp rc: financial advisory services
1JARMCI822 • 1836 CFO)

10125/1999

Memo to SBB and C. Schamp from R. Curran (SARMC
07417 Office ofCFO)

10127/1999

Memo rc: Joint Venture Imaging Ccn1cr (SARMC 06847-48
Office of Pres.)

II/UJI999

Power Point Pres. Re: lMI Joint Venture (SARMC 068496866 Office of Pres.)

11/11/1999

Restructuring ofMRIA General Partnership (SHI551 • 1562)

11129/1999

69

••
••

70

••

Dr. Henson Memo to SBB (032441)

12/6/1999

71

••

Email from R. Abello to SBB (SARMC 9200 Office of Pres.)

12/14/~999

SBB Notes (SARMC 09913-15 Office of Pres.)

12/16/1999

Email from D. Giles to J. Prochaska ct al (001365)

12/1811999

68

73

••
••

74

•• j

Email from D. Giles to I. Pochaska(001364)

12/19/1999

75

••

Doctors Corp. letter to Sandra Bruce dated 1/412000
(SARMC9910-9911 Office of Pres.)

1/412000

72

Draft ofDocton Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (1431-1432)

76

n
78

X

Draft ofDocton Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (1436)

Draft ofDocton Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (1444-1448)

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings; per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.
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SA No.

Dale
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Description

Date

In
Evidence

79

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce ( 1468)

80

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce {14876)

81

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce {24635)

82

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce {24646)

83

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (35281·35282)

84

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce {38758-38759)

85

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce {38760-38761)

86

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce (38762-38763)

87

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce {32367)

88

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce {32445-32446)

89

Draft of Doctors Corp letter to Sandra Bruce {SARMC9925·
9926 Office of the Pres.)

Reserved

90

••
tb-»--11

Agenda for meeting with J. Cliff {SARMC 01239 Office of
CFO)

l/2612000

Email from D. Giles toR. Curran {011962)

112912000

Email to D. Giles from R. Curran {011963)

1/3112000

94

Application of Retainer pd. By MRI Center of Idaho w/
attached invoices {CHOO 1800, CH004687,004862,000600)

21112000

95

Email from K. Sands to S. Bratley {SARMC 07991 Office of
CFO)

21812000

Memo from K. Sands to C. Schamp {SARMC 07984-07986
Office ofCFO)

2/18/2000

Memo from T. Henson to SBB (032432)

212312000

Draft Agenda for Discussion {SARMC 01211 Office ofCFO)

31812000

M. Czech letter toR. Curran {012421·28)

411012000

91
92

X

X

X

3149

93
.

•• I

96

97

X

98

X

99

X

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("•*") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated./d.
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SA No.

II

~

Date
Offered

Date

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Evidence

X

X

X

,rJ

Date

Description

Admitted

Email from C. Schamp to T. Hall (GSROJS7)

S/S/2000

Letter to C. Schamp from PWC re: Assessment of FMV of
MRIM (SARMC 07766-7775 Office ofCFO) (corrected to
include full copy of document)

S/1612000

J. Cliff letter toR. Curran (014909-14910)

711712000

Letter from J. Cliff toR. Curran (022512-13)

711712000

Idaho Sec. Of State receipt w/ auachments {CHOOOOOB-12)

8/1812000

105

Amendment to Loan Agreement between ICR et at &: USB
(Giles 00285-86) ·

812012000

106

Amend. And Restated Cert. Of Limited Partnership-MRI
Limited {24755)

812212000

107

Amend. And Restated Cert. Of Limited Partnership-MRI
Mobile {24903)

812212000

108

C. Harder invoice for professional services (CH00003)

91112000

Release and Reaffinnation Agreement between Mumy et al
and USB {Giles 00283-84)

1011812000

Notice of Offer to Purchase {027670)

I 112712000

Letter from A. Curran to J. Curran (027660)

I 112712000

C. Harder Letter to D. Giles {Giles 00276-277)

3/812001

Memo from T. Henson to DMR (033023-33025)

4/S/2001

100

••

101

103

••
••

104

3523

102

••

109
110

X

111

X

X

r

112
113

X

X

X

~

IMI Operating Agreement (IMI0007-89)

71112001

115

••
••

Professional Services Agreement (Radiology Services)
(SARMC 00591-00641 Corporate Development)

71112001

116

••

Letter from J. Floyd to K. Fry {SARMC 00182-183 Office of
CFO)

8/112001

USB Credit Approval {USB00009-1 5)

8/612001

Notes re: meetings with MRlA stake holders {SH0089 - 90)

911812001

G. Chamberlain handwritten option I (SHI562)

I 1/112001

114

117
118
119

••
••

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("..") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated./d.
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i

•

•

~

Date
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SA No ..

Date
Admitted
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Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

••

Shattuck Hammond Presenlation of Strategic Options
(SARMCI0728-10766 Office of the Pres)

11/612001

••

Shattuck Hammond Presentation of Valuation ofMRIA
(SARMCI0767-108010ff"JCC ofthe Pres)

11/612001

122

••

Request for Financing Proposals prepared by Shattuck
Hammond (SARMC06752 -6756 Office ofCFO)

12'1112001

123

.. J

Memo to Leslie Kelly Hall ftom Patti Hameck (SARMC1847.
-1849CIO)

112312002

124

••

Memo to K. fry ftom G. Chamberlain (SARMC 06764 Office
ofCFO)

211212002

125

••

Email from G. Chamberlain toP. Miller and Ken Fry
(SH1202)

419/2002

••
••

G. Chamberlain discussion outline with Dr. Curran w/ GC
handwritten note (SHI201)

419/2002

Letter from T. Hall to MRICT Scheduling Dept. (016331)

sn12oo2

Letter fi"om T. Henson toM. Dalley (039265)

8/1112002

Email fi"om Mart Lawrence to David Giles et al (000061)

8/1912002

Dr. Curran Handwritten Notes (027235)

10/912002

USB Standard Credit Display Exec. Summary {USB00781792)

111312003

120

121

'

126
127
128

X

••

129
130

X

X

••

131

132

X

Email ftom R. Curran to Henson, Prochaska, Giles, Havlina
(037453)

111312003

133

X

Curran Memo to Fellow Board Members of MRIA (013864013866)

111412003

134

Email ftom R. Curran toM. Kutsurelis et al (037643)

211912003

135

M. Panattoni letter toP. DeWitt (002747)

4/312003

Reterved

136
137
138
139

3297 /

Email &om Dr. Havlina to Dr. Curran et al (037250)

51512003

Reserved
0. Karame letter to J. Floyd (034315)

S/2312003

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. Id
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005361

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

140

Amend. To Limited Partnership Agreement of MRI Mobile
(SARMC00601 • 00605 Accounting)

6/1712003

141

IT Service Level Agreement (01 5307-15312)

7/112003

Email ftom T. Henson to J. Floyd (036222)

7/18/2003

0. Karame letter to J. Floyd (034316)

8/1912003

Agenda for MRJCI and SARMC Meeting (014333)

912312003

CEO Report (SARMC 07043-07044 Office of Pres.)

9/3012003

D. Giles handwritten notes re: DMR meeting (014187)

10/1412003

Email from J. Floyd to D. Giles ct al re Meeting with D.
Carmona (0361 SO)

1012712003

Shattuck Hammond Power Point re: Overview of
RestrUcturing ofMRIA and Simultaneous Merger ofMRICI
and IMI (SARMC 06777-06786 Office ofCFO)

10/3012003

Memo from D. Giles to M. Brandt re: MRI reading
Opportunity (01 51 59)

121512003

Email from P. Hamick to J. Floyd (025617-25618)

12/812003

Letter from P. Miller to T. Banducci (025 I 53)

12122/2003

Agrccmcnt for MRI Services (SARMC 00241 ~256 Patient
Care Services)

1/112004

Email from Dr. Havlina to Dr. Giles ct al (035919)

1/12/2004

Letter from J. Currm to C. Corbett (SARMCOOS I0 Patient
Care Services)

211012004

SBB letter to Dr. Cunan (003016-17)

2/2412004

Memo from J. Floyd to D. Giles ct al (014861)

3/412004

142

X

143
144

X

••

145
146
147

X

X

••

148

149

X

150

X

X

••

151
152
153

X

X

154
155
156
157

X

X

~
••
••

X

,

~ ~

156

Letter from S. Kim to C. Corbett (SARMC 00235-36 Patient
Care Services)

81212004

159

Letter from S. Scales to J. Hopkins (SARMC 00237 Patient
Care Services)

81312004

,•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk{" .. ") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
·
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated./d
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J

•

•

"

SA No.

Date

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Offered
Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

160

Handwritten notes (SARMC 00238 Patient Care Services)

81912004

Meeting notes (SARMC 01940 Office of CIO)

I 111512004

Letter from MRI Center to S. Bruce (025045)

121312004

163

••
••
••

Letter J. Seaborn to J. Floyd (SARMC00174 Patient Care
Services)
·

121812004

164

••

Letter from C. Corbett to J. Gobel (SARMC 00180 Patient
Care Services)

121812004

165

••

Memo re: MRI from SBB (SARMC 00175 Patient Care
Services)

1212012004

Agreement for MRI Services (SARMC 00 I58-00172 Patient
Care Services)

1/312005

Email from D. Seaborn to C. Colbct el al (SARMC 01036
Patient Care Services)

1/1012005

A Repon to the Dept. of Radiology and Radiology
Administration on Strategic Conversations with Customers
(SARMC62S- 63S Patient Care Services)

'312912005

First Amendment to Operating Agreement of Intermountain
Medical Imaging (SARMC244 - 252 OGC)

1219/lOOS

170

Agreement for MRI Services (IMIRP/00 1719-36)

121912005

171

Cwriculum Vitae of Dennis Reinstein

N/A

172

Opinions 1-4 of Budge's Repon contained in Reinstein's
Expen Report

412312007

173

Opinions 1-7 of Wilhoite Report contained in Reinstein's
Expen RcpoJt

412312007

174

Cwriculuin Vitae of Dr. Mary River

175

Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Bruce Anderson

176

Cwriculum Vitae of Dr. Peter Reedy

1n

Cwriculum Vitae of Dr. Samuel Gibson

178

Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Mart Maier

161
162

166

167

••

168

169

••

.. Exhibits marked with a double asterisk (" .. ") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.
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SA No.

..

4

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

179

Curriculum Vitae of Manfred Steiner

180

Any chart or diagram in the Wellspring report dated as of
April I, 2004 from pp. 3-20,36-47, S3-S7, 64-73,77-79,8291.

181

Tables I&. 2, Fig. 1-3, App. 2 to Expen report of G. Vistnes
Ph.D

182

Curriculum Vitae of Greg Vistnes, Ph.D

183

Curriculum Vitae of all witnesses to be called by Saint
Alphonsus to the extent sud! CVs have been produced.

184

Proposal for obtaining mobile MRl (032280-32284)

unknown date

Memo re: issues imaging center joint venture (00 1142-44)

unknown dille

SARGIMRIA Joint Venture Proposals Nos. 6&.7 (000931)

unknown date

**
"'*

185
186
187

X

Memo re: Radiology Imaging Center (0 145 12)

unknown date

187A

X

Memo re: Radiology Imaging Center (028432)

3/IS/99

188

X

Memo entitled: "Some thoughts after talking to Roger•
(35394-35395)

unknown date

l

Memo re: Project to Maintain/Achieve Competitive Quality
(021621-23)

unknown date

Buy-Sell of DR's Corp (26614-26615)

unknown date

191

J. Floyd Volume projections (016230)

unknown date

192

Memo re: Advent ofiMI (016323)

unknown date

193

Memo re: Thoughts on Radiology Issues at MRICI (0161 5216153)

unknown date

194

J. CUrran Memo re: Considerations Regarding Purchase of
New MRI (023072-23073)

unknown date

Letter from J. Hall to SBB (IMIOS21)

unknown date

Videotape ofMRIM mobile magnet

unknown dale

189
190

195
196

X

"'*

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted dwing the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST· Jf
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Date
Offered

SANol

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In

Evidence

197 .

••

First Amendment to Articles of Partnership ofMRIA
{SARMCOIOSS- 1061 Office ofCFO)

8125/1988

198 :

••

Second Amendment to Articles of Partnership of MRIA
{SARMCI062-1067 Office of the CFO)

S/1/1991

199

••

Third Amendment to Articles of Partnership of MRIA
{SARMC I 068-1080 Office of the CFO)

4/2111995

200 .

••

Fourth Amendment to Articles of Partnership of MRIA
(SARMC53S4-53S9 Office of the CFO)

7115/1998

••

Fifth Amendment to Articles of P~hip of MRIA (391 08 39114)

81112002

••

Sixth Amendment to Articles of Partnership of MRIA (3911639129)

4/IS/2003

Draft of Articles ofMRIA Partnership No. I (5977-5996)

unknown date

J

_j

'
I

201

I

202

i
1

203

~

X

X

X

X

~b

Draft of Articles of MRIA Partnership No.-2 (5814-5838)

113011985

X

X

r\D

Draft of Articles ofMRIA Partnership No.3 (6430- 6455)

2/13/1985

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC08022-8032 Office of the Pres.)

12/16/1983

SARMC Board ofTrustees/Subcommittee ~s
(SARMC6928-6939 Office of the Pres.)

3122/1984

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC8532-8538 Office of the Pres.)

3130/1984

SARMC Board ofTrustces/Subcommittee Minutes
{SARMC7319-7329 & 7401 Office of the Pres.)

4/6/1984'

210

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7144-7157& 7248-7255 Office of the Pres.)

711311984

211

SARMC Board ofTrustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7557-7566 Office of the Pres.)

10/1/1984

212

SARMC Board ofTrustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC07262 -7271 & SARMC7219-7232 Office of the
Pres.)

10/1911984

213

SARMC Board ofTrustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC9S4S-9S47 Office of the Pres.)

1112/1984

,
I

204
205

i

i
i

I

206
I

207

:

X

'

208
i

209

I
i
I

I

X

X

..

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("* *") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exlubits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. ld
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J
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'

Date
Offered

SANoi
!

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Eviden<:e
SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMCI39-143 Office of the Pres.)

1/11/1985

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcomminee
Minutcs(SARMC7094-71 03 OffiCe of the Pres.)

4/14/1989

SARMC Board ofTrustces/Subcomminee Minutes
(SARMC7090-7093 & 7077-7089 Office of the Pres.)

7/21/1989

••

SARMC Board ofTrustees/Subcomminee Minutes
(SARMC7067 -7076 & 12722-12745 Office of the Pres.)

8/18/1999

••

Map of Existing and Potential MRI Mobile Sites (Excerpted
ftom Saint Alphonsus Exhibit217 (SARMC07073))

8/18/1999

••

Map- 499 Mile Radius (Excerpted ftom Saint Alphonsus
Exhibit 217 (SARMC07074))

8/18/1999

SARMC Board ofTrustces!Subcomminee Minutes
(SARMC6835-6840 Office of the CFO &SARMCI288712892 Office ofthe Pres.)

3/1612000

••

SARMC Board of Trustees/Subcommittee Minutes
(SARMC7043 -7044 Office of the Pres.)

9/30/2003

••

SARMC Board ofTrustees/Subcomminee Minutes
(SARMC7053 • 7055 Office of the Pres.)

3/15/2004

••
•••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••

SARMC Board ofTrustees/Subcomminee Minutes
(SARMC7038-7042 Office of the Pres.)

11/18/2003

SARMC Board ofTrustees/Subcommittec: Minutes
(SARMC7049-7052 Office of the Pres.)

3/15/2004

DR Rollout Minutes (GSRRP670- 671)

3/612001

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP502 - 503)

2120/2001

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP504-50S)

3/21/2001

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP508-5 I0)

4/18/2002

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRPS 11·5 12)

513/2001

Finance & Fees Comminee Minutes (GSRRP513-5 14)

5/15/2001

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP515)

616/2001

214
'

215

Date

Description

l
'

'
216

i
1.

217

i

I

217A ~
2178

'

i

218

219

220

;

221

I

222

!

223
224

I
I

I
I

225
'

226

I

227
228
229

• • Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("* *") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
'proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.
1
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005366

..

..

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Evidence

232

••
••
....

233

••

230
231

234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
24-4
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252

Date

Description

••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP5 16·518)

612612001

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP5 19-520)

7/3112001

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP521)

813112001

Finance& Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP522-523)

9/1312001

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP524-525)

I 01512001

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP526-527)

10/1712001

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRPS28-531 R)

t1n12001

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRPS32-S33)

1111912001

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRPS34-S3SR)

1211712001

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP72S)

11212002

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP726)

21412002

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP727-728)

212012002

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP729)

3/S/2002

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP730 -733R)

4/1212002

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP734-73SR)

413012002

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP737-738R)

S/1312002

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP739-740R)

512912002

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP741-742R)

6/10/2002

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP743-744)

712912002

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP74S)

912512002

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP746-747)

9/1012002

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP748-749)

1112012002

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP79S-796R)

1/3012002.

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. ld
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SA No.

.

Dale
Offered

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date
Admitted

Dale

Description

In
Evidence

253

••

Finance & Fees Committee MinllkS (GSRRP797-798}

211912002

254

••

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP799}

3/612002

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP860-861}

1/1612003

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP862-863}

4/812003

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP864-865R}

5/1312003

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP866}

6/412003

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP867}

8/1212003

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes(GSRRP873-874}

711512003

Finance & Fees Commitlec Minutes (GSRRP875-876}

91212003

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP877-879}

10/112003

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP880-881}

1012712003

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP882-883}

1111412003

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP884-887}

121112003

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP970-971}

111212004

Finance & Fees Commiuec Minutes (GSRRP972-974}

4/512004

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP97S}

61312004

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP976}

711412004

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP977-978)

812412004

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP979-980)

9/1412004

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP981-982)

1012112004

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP983-984}

11/812004

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP98S)

1112912004

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRPIIS7-IIS8}

I/311200S

256

••
••

257

••

255

259

••
••

260

••

258

261
262
263
264
265
266

267
268
269
270

••
••
••
••
••
••

••
••
••
••

272

••
••

273

••

271

274
275

••
••

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation dwing the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was idmitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indica~d. Jd
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005368

A

._

SA No.

'

Date
Offered
Authenticity

276
277
278
279
280

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Foundation

In
Eviden~

••
••
••
••
••

281
282
283

284
285
286
287
288
289

Date

Description

••

..
••

••
••
••
••
••

/

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRPII 59-1160R)

2/14/2005

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRP 1161)

3/21/2005

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRPII62)

414/2005

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRPII63)

6/13/2005

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRPII64R)

7/5t2005

Finance & Fees Committee Minutes (GSRRPII65R)

8/12/2005

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPS06)

3/23/2001

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP507)

41212001

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP665-667)

1/16/2001

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP668-669)

218f200l

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP674)

4/16/2001

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP675)

5/4/2001

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP676)

5/17f2001

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP677-678)

7/20f2001

290

••

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP679-680)

101212001

291

3708

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP681-683)

lll5f200l

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP800-801R)

41212002

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP802-803)

4/16/2002

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP804-805)

8/20f2002

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP806-807)

9/25t2002

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPBOB-809)

11/12/2002

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP914-91 5)

1/15/2003

Opentions Committee Minutes (GSRRP916-918)

2125/2003

293

••
••

294

••

292.

295
296
297
298

••
••
••
••

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.
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A.

...

SA No.

•

•

Date

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Offered

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

319

••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••

320

••

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPIIOR-1110)

3129/2004

321

••

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP111 H 112)

5/19/2004

299
300

301
302

303
304

305
306

307

308
309

310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP919-920)

3/1312003

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP928-931)

4/3012003

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP934-935)

5/1212003

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP93B-939)

612/2003

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP940·941)

612012003

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP946)

712/2003

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP947-948)

7/1612003

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP949)

7/3012003

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP957-958)

9/5/2003

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP9,9-960)

9/3012003

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP961-962R)

1012812003

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP963-964)

12/1012003

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP965-966)

1212412003

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI070-1072)

111012005

Operations Committee Minutes (OSRRPIOR4-1085)

9nl2004

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1086-IOB7)

912912004

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1091-1092)

11/312004

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI093)

11/3012004

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPII03)

1/13/2004

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP II 04-1 I05)

2/612004

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPII06-1107)

3/312004

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated./d
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...

.
.

SA No.

..

..

Date

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Offered
Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

322

••

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPII13-1114)

6/1612004

323

**

Opendions Committee Minutes (GSRRPII15-1116)

7/1212004

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPJII9-1120)

81312004

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPJ204-1206)

1/10/2005

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPJ207-1208)

212212005

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI209)

3/15/2005

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI210)

.3/29/2005

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI211)

4/5/2005

Operations Technical Committee Minutes (GSRRPJ2281229)

412512005

Operations Technical Committee Minutes (GSRRP1230)

5/17/2005

Opendions Technical Committee Minutes (GSRRP 12241225)

6/10/2005

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI212-1213)

6/14/2005

Opendions Committee Minutes (GSRRPI214-1215R)

7/612005

Opendions Technical Committee Minutes (GSRRP1226)

7/11/2005

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRPI216-1217R)

8/1/2005

Opendions Technical Minutes (GSRRPI227)

81212005

Opendions Committee Minutes (GSRRPI218-1221)

9/2612005

Opendions Technical Committee Minutes (GSRRPI2311232)

10/612005

Operations Committee Minutes (GSRRP1222-1223)

10/10/2005

325

••
••

326

**

324

327
328
329
330

. 331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340

••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••

341

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit I (42584 - 42596)

342

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 3 (34172)

343

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 4 (42139)

.. Exhibits marked with a double asterisk (" ..") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. ld

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST- Jl-

005371

-0.

•

•

•

SA No.

Date
Offered

·Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Evidence
Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 5 (33569)

344

Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit6 (SARMC10643 Office of

345

Pres.)
Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 7 (42146)

346

347
348
349
350

354

••

355
356

.

!fA~

(

'

.i

i

••

353

352

...

.

••
••
••
••
••

351

)lie Hopkins Deposition ExhibitS (34173)
Julie Hopkins Deposition Exhibit 16 (34325)
Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 7 (1468)
Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 8 (1444)

{

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 9 (1436)
Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 10 (1447)

)

'

I

I

••
••

~

f

I

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit II (1446)
Prochaska Deposition Exhibitll (1448)
Prochaska Deposition Exhibit 14 (1440- 1442)
Prochaska Deposition Exhibit I 5 (1437-1439)
_j

Ex,ibit Nos. 357-58 Reserved

••

359

••
••

360
361

••
••
••

362
363
364

365

ND

Prochaska Deposition Exhibit21 (1366-1367)
S. Berger Deposition Exhibit7(40229-40241)
S. Berger Deposition Exhibit9(40220-40228)
R. Cioffi Deposition Exhibit 2
R. Cioffi Deposition Exhibit 6 (40220-40228)
J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit3 (33603)
J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit4 (36150)

366
367

Date

Description

.

••
••

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 7 (33607)
"MRI Volumes" for Center and Mobile; J. Floyd Deposition
Exhibit 9 (40055-40060)

•• Exhibits mmed With a double astensk (" ..") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. ld

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST

/q

005372

SA No.

Dale
Offered

Dale
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Dale

Description

In
Evidence

368

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 13

369

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit IS (SARMC3089 Office ofCFO)

370

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit I 7 (33329)

371

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 18 (34315)

372

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 19 (34316)

373

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 20 (34313 • 34314)

374

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 21 (MT00127S·I276)

375

J. Floyd Deposition Exhibit 22 (MT001011·1042)

••
••
••

376
377
378

••

379

MR1 Mobile Financial Stlllements (10393-10402)

1211990-1991

MR1 Limited Financial Statements (10227-10236)

1211990-1991

MR1 Mobile Financial Stlllements (SARMC380-3910ffice of
the Pres.)

1211996-1997

MRI Limited Financial Stlllements (32190-32199)

1211996-1997

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (SARMC9942-9953 Office
of the Pres.)

1211997-1998

MR1 Limited Financial Stlllements (321 54-32162)

1211997-1998

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (12062-12071)

1211998-1999

MRI Limited Financial Stlllements (12052-12061)

1211998-1999

MRI Mobile Financial Stlllements (SARMC779-789 Office of
theCFO)

1211999-2000

MRI Limited Financial Stlllements (32113-32120)

1211999-2000

MR1 Mobile Financial Stlllements (13090-13099)

1212000-200 I

MRI Limited Financial Stlllements (SARMCI37-142 Office
oftheCFO)

1212000-2001

MRI Limited Financial Stlllements (32017-32024)

1212001-2002

.

381

••
••

382

••

380

386

••
••
••
••

387

•••

388

••

383
384
385

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("..") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. Id

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST-~-

005373

..
SA No.

e.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
· Evidence

••
••
••
••
••
••
••
•• -1
••
••
••

389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (32028-32035)

12/2001-2002

MRI Limited Financial Stlllefnents (21428-21437)

12/2002-2003

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (21439-21448)

12/2002-2003

MRI Limited Financial Statements (40197-40207)

12/2003-2004

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (40208-40218)

12/2003-2004

MRI Limited Financial Statements (42191-42200)

12/2004-2005

MRI Mobile Financial Statements (42181-42190)

12/2004-2005

R. Cumn email to D. Giles re: PAC with SARMC (3368633687)

9/10/1999

Leslie Kelly Hall email re: MRI Connectivity (33688)

9/13/1999

Sarah Bratley email to R. Curran re Update (33689)

918/1999

Leslie Kelly Hall memo to Lyndce Chatterton re:
SARMCIMRICI Networking Interface (33691)

6/4/1999

400

,, -1,.1 (

Lyndce Chatterton memo to Mike Czech re MRICI/SARMC
Networking Link (33697)

12/29/1998

401

ll>-S"",Il.

Sandra Bruce email to Cindy Schamp re SARMCIMRICI
Phase II (33698)

116/1999

402

1o..~tl.

Review of 5-ARMCIMRI Meeting (33702-33704)

218/1999

403

Rachel Rorer memo to Lyndee Chatterton re Summer plan
(33705)

unknown date

404

Leslie Kelly Hall email to R. Curran re computer start date
(33706)

7/28/1999

405

Meeting notes re Interface (33708)

6/15/1999

Leslie Kelly Hall email to L. Chatterton re MRI (33711)

7/2911999

Patti Hameck to C. Schamp re MRI Clinical Desktop (33712)

8/19/1999

Lyndee Chatterton email to L. Kelly Hall re MRICI (33724)

7/29/1999

406

X

X

X

407

X

X

X

408

~~

~

io-1--11

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. Jd

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LISl ,) f

·

005374

..

~

•
SA No.

409

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Evidence

X

X

X

~

Date

Description

Leslie Kelly Hall email to L. Chatterton re MRICI
CoMectivity (33729)

9/8/1999

410

••

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRWSARG ( 3401934023)

unknown date

411

••

Draft of Jqint Operations Proposal for MRWSARG (3391 033915)

unknown date

412

••

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG
(SARMCI0824-10829 Office oflhe Pres.)

unknown date

413

••

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG (I 0781083)

unknown date

414

•• I

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG (3395633961)

4/13/1999

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG (1450614511)

S/3/1999

415

.. .;

416

••

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG (33918·
33923)

5/1811999-

417

••

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRWSARG (2405924064)

unknown date

418

••

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIA/SARG (3388733892)

9/15/1999

419

••

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRWSARG (3386933875)

9/1711999

420

••

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG (3387933885)

9/1711999

421

••

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRWSARG (3386133865)

9/30/1999

422

••

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG (3385433860)

9/30/1999

423

••

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRWSARG
(SARMCI379A·I379E Office ofthc CFO)

1012711999

••
••

Draft of Joint Operations Proposal for MRIAISARG
(SARMC6625-6629 Office of the Pres.)

10/1811999

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11210-11212)

112/1985

424
425

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST

)~

005375

.

SA No.

.
Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations
Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

434

••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••

435

••

MR1 Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC4060-4063 Office of
the Pres.)

5/15/1991

436

••

MRICI Board meeting minutes (SARMC3993-3996 Office of
the Pres.)

8/12/1991

437

••

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC3881-3883 Office of
the Pres.)

11/1811991

438

••

Pres.)

439

••

MRICI Board meeting minutes (SARMC4998-5000 Office of
the Pres.)

440

••

MRIA meeting minutes (SARMC4993-4994 Office of the

441

••

MRICI Board meeting minutes (SARMC4565-4566 Office of
the Pres.)

819/1995

442

••

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC4567-4568 Office of
the Pres.)

819/1995

443

••

444

••

426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433

J

Pre-organization meeting m~utes ofMRI (11213-11215)

118/1985

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11234-11235)

. 2121/1985

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11208-11209)

2/2811985

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11236-11238)

3n/1985

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRJ (11244-11246)

3/27/1985

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11300-11301)

6/5/1985

MR1C1 Board meeting minutes (4488-4490)

4/25/1988

MRIC1 Board meeting minutes (4481-4484)

7/25/1988

MRICI Board meeting minutes (SARMC4064-1067 Office of
the Pres.)

511511991

MRIA meeting minutes (SARMCS094-5096 Office of the

10/13/1994

I 112211994

Pres.)

../

11121/1994

MRlA meeting minutes (SARMC4S08-4509 Office of the
Pres.)

11/16/1995

MRICI Board meeting minutes (SARMC4506-4S07 Office of
the Pres.)

11/16/1995

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document
admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated./d

was

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST -lJ-

005376

.

.

SA No.

..
Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

••

MRICI meeting minutes (SARMC6339-6340 Office of the
CFO)

11125/1996

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC6341-6342 Office of
theCFO)

11125/1996

447

••
••

Any response to Requests for Admission or Interrogatories

various

448

••

Pre-organization meeting minutes ofMRI (11296-11297)

6/19/1985

MRI Board meeting minutes (4488-4490)

4125/1988

MRI Board meeting minutes (7214-7216)

5125/1988

MR1 Board meeting minutes (669-671)

7/16/1998

MRI Board meeting minutes (20943-20945)

10122/1998

MR1 Board meeting minutes (1412-1413)

12115/1999

MR1 Mobile meeting minutes (1414-141 5)

12115/1999

MR1 Mobile meeting minutes (1494-1495)

1/1912000

MRI Board meeting minutes (28366-28367)

1/1912000

MR1 Board meeting minutes (1472-1473)

211612000

MR1 Mobile meeting minutes (1474-1476)

211612000

MRI Board meeting minutes (1525-1527)

3/1512000

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (1528-1530)

3/1512000

445

446

454

•••
••
••
••
••
••

455

••

449
450
451
452
453

456
457
458
459
460

461
462
463
464

••
••
••

••
••
••
••
•• J

· MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC9112-9113 Office of
the Pres.)

412112000

MRI Board meeting minutes - executive session (9116-9117)

412112000

MR1 Board meeting minutes (28344-28347)

612112000

••

MR1 Board meeting minutes (SARMC9053-9055 Office of
the Pres.)

7/1912000

n Exhibits marked with a double asterisk (" ..") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated.ld

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST ;~_'f

005377

•

SA No.

Date

Date

Stipulations

Offered
Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

Admitted
In
Evidence

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC90S6-9060 Office of
the Pres.)

7119/2000

MRI Board meeting minutes (1692-169S)

8116/2000.

467

••
••
••

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC9023-9028 Office of
the Pres.)

8116/2000

468

••

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC90 11-901 S Office of
the Pres.)

9/20/2000

. 469

••

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC9004-9010 Office of
the Pres.)

9/20/2000

470

••

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC8980-898S Office of
the Pres.)

10/1812000

471

••

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC8986-8988 Office of
the Pres.)

10/1812000

472

••

MRl Board meeting minutes (SARMC8967-8968 Office of
the Pres.)

11/IS/2000

'
473

••

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC8S4S-8S48 Office of
the Pres.)

111712001

474

••

MRl Board meeting minutes (SARMC8S60-8S61 Office of
the Pres.)

2116/2001

475

••

MRIC1 and Mobile Strategic Planning Meeting
(SARMC8S62-8S66 Office of the Pres.)

2116/2001

476

••

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC8610-8614 Office of
the Pres.)

411812001

••
••
••
••

MRl Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC862S-8629 Office of
the Pres.)

S/1612001

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (12404-12407)

711812001

MRI Board meeting minutes (21 SS-21 S9)

911912001

MRI Board meeting minutes (2209-221 0)

10/17/2001

465

466

4n
478
479
480
481

3508

MRl Mobile meeting minutes (2271-2273)

12119/2001

482

••

MRI Board meeting minutes (2343-2345)

212012002

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated./d

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST,)!"

005378

.

..
SA No.

..

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

••

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (28183-28185)

312012002

MRI Board meeting miriutes (2419-2421)

411712002

MRl Board meeting miriutes (28169-28172)

512112002

MRl Board meeting minutes (2472-2474)

6/1812002

MRl Board meeting minutes (2522-2524)

711612002

••
••
••
••

MRI Board and Executive Session meeting minutes (25602563)

81112002

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (14149-14151)

9/1712002

MRl Board meeting minutes (14111-14113)

911712002

MRl Board meeting miriutes (SARMC00471-472
Accounting)

11/1912002

••

MRI Mobile meeting minutes (SARMC00800-802
Accounting)

1211712002

493

••

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC00262-264
Accounting)

112112003

494

••

MRI Board meeting minutes with Summary Forecast (281 0928111 & SARMCJS4 Hudspeth)

211812003

495

••

MRl Board meeting minutes (SARMCOOI95-198
Accounting)

3/1812003

496

•• I

MRl Board meeting miriutes (SARMCOOS IS-S 18
Accounting)

4/IS/2003

497

•• J

MRI Board meeting minutes (SARMC00523-S26
Accounting)

S/2012003

498

••

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/4375-4382

512911997

IMI Executive meeting minutes (IMIRP/4438-4440)

S/16/1997

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/4817)

6/111998

IMI Group meeting minutes (IM~/4748-4750)

111911999

483

••
••

484

..

485
486

3510

487
488

489
490
491

492

499
500

501

./

.

••
••
••

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("• •") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated./d

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST

J..1t,

005379

.

. ..

SA No.

Date
Offered
Authenticity

502
503
504

505
506

507
508

509

510
511
512
513
514
515
518
517
518
519
520
521
522

Date
Admitted

Stipulations
Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••

IMI Group meeting minu1CS (IMIRP/4956-4958)

7n/1999

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/772-775)

8/4/1999

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/811-812),

8/2411999

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/815-819)

9/22/1999

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/886-889)

8/14/2001

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/898-901)

9/2612001

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP932 & 945)

11/28/2001

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRP/993-994)

4/30/2002

IMI Group meeting minutes (IMIRPI046)

5/19/2003

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSREX265-268)

1/14/1998·

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREXII-13)

2/2/1998

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREXI6-17)

2/16/1998

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR585-588)

3/11/1998

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR589-592)

4/8/1998

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX36-39), as rediCted
11! rs:mon dogbk bUlBI

5/11/1998

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR593-600)

5/13/1998

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR60 1-604)

6/16/1998

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR605-608)

6/29/1998

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX44-52)

7/6/1998

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR609-611)

7n/1998

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX56-64)

7/20/1998

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated./d

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST-

)l

005380

.

-- ..

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations
Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

524

••
••

525

••

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR619-632)

81511998

526

••

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX67-69)

8/3111998

527

••

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR638-644)

91911998

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX70-71)

9/14/1998.

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX72)

912111998

523

/

528
529

530
531
532

••
••
••
••
••

540

••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••

541

••

533
534
535
536
537
538
539

542
543

712711998

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR616-618)

7/30/1998

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX73·74)

1018/1998

-

J

.. ./
••

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR612-61 S)

GSR Equipment meeting minutes (GSREX7S)

10/S/1998

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX76-78)

10/1211998

GSR Group meeting minutes (OSR647-6S3)

1011411998

Radiology Department meeting minutes (GSR6S4-6SS)

1012111998

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR656-662)

1012811998

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR663-664)

11/3/1998

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR66S-666)

1119/1998

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR667-672)

11/11/1998

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR673-68 I)

1219/1998

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREXI36-138)

21811999

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSR700-706)

2110/1999

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX259-260)

6121/1999

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSREX261-264)

6128/1999

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk(".. ") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. Jd

SAINT ALPHONSUS,S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST·

J{

005381

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In

Evidence

I

••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••

544

545
546

547
548

549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561

562

X

X

X

563

X

X

X

F

f!JJJ

~

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP 184-186)

8123/1999

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRPI22-126)

918/1999

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRS9)

10125/1999

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRPIS3-IS6)

11/10/1999

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP262)

11/22/1999

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP267-268)

12120/1999

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP269-270R)

12127/1999

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP273-277)

1/1212000

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP288-291)

112612000

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP441)

3/1312000

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP336-340R)

818/2000

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP46S-468)

813012000

GSR Executive meeting minutes (GSRRP-469471)

9/612000

GSR Executive meeting mintues (GSRRP400-403

9/19f2000

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRP64S)

212212001

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRRPS68-S71)

SJ91200l

GSR Group meeting minutes (GSRI29)

12/1812001

Marketing Committee Meeting (GSRRPl 040-1 041)

3/1012004

Sandra Bruce letter toM. Adams, M. Dalley and J. Messmer
re Saint Alphonsus Withdrawal (SARMC\0646-10647 Office
of the Pres)

311012004

PACS presentation materials (SARMCO 1796-1818 Office of
the Pres.)

9116/1999

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. ld

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST
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005382

•

SA No.

•

Date
Offered
Authenticity

564

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

X

Foundation

X

Date

Description

In
Evidence

X

~
•

I

D. Giles email toR. Curran re: PAC with SARMC (24023·
24024)

9110/1999

565

3082

D. Giles email toR. Curran re: PAC with SARMC (2843328434)

9/10/1999

566

1304

Pie chart re: Overview ofMRIA Ownership Interests

NA

Counter Designations from Ms. Schamps's Trial Deposition
Testimony Read into the Record by SADC

NA

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0020-0023)

312/1998

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0024- 0025)

31911998

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0040-0041)

5129/1998

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0053-00S5)

7/13/1998

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0065-0066)

811711998

GSR Limited Group Meeting Minutes (GSR0636-0637)

811911998

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREXOI39-0142)

2/1511999

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0174- 0 180)

318/1999

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0181-0182)

311511999

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0181-0182)

311511999

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0183- 0185)

3122/1999

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0188-0199)

312911999

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0203 - 0204)

411211999

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX021 5 -0217)

412611999

567
568

569
570
571
572
573
574
. 575
576
577
578
579
580

.

581

••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••

"

582

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0221 - 0223)

51311999

583

**

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSREX0244- 0245)

512411999

• • Exhibits marked with a double asterisk (" ..") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST· jO

005383

.

SA No.

.
DI!C
otfcrcd

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

. Authenticity

Foundation

Dale

Description

In
Evidence

\

••

584

••
••
••
••

585
586

587
588

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (0SREX0246- 0248)

617/1999

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (GSRRPI9S- 200)

9/13/1999

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (0SRRPI38-140)

10/13/1999

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (0SRRP2S I - 253)

10/18/1999

GSR Executive Meeting Minutes (~SRRP260)

11/1/1999

Exhibit Nos. 589-98 Reserved

2908

591

412107

Handwritten Nota Prepared by Charles Wilhoite
I

Exhibit Nos. 592-93 Raerved
Demonstrative re: Correlation of Value&: Other
Consiclendions (from Steiner's report)

594

NA

Exhibit Nos. 595-96 Reserved

Letter from Referring Physicians from Seaboum Correcting
the Issue of Availablilty of MRI Scans on PACS System. OS~
lSI

?

597

~.....

1126/0S

Exhibit Nos. 591-99 Reserved

600

X

X

X

601

X

X

X

602

X

X

X

603

X

X

X

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1985 (010028·
35)

12131/85

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1986 (0 I001622)

12131/86

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1987 (010007IS)

12131/87

MRJ LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1988 and 1987
(009994-1 0002)

12131188

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1989 and 1988
(009984-93)

12131/89

\

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1990 and 1989
(010046-55)

12131/90

~

MRI LP Financill Statements, December 31, 1991 and 1990
(010227-36)

12131/91

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1992 and 1991
(010999-1008)

12131/92

I~

( I
\)
I

I

I
604

X

X

X

605

X

X

X

608

X

X

X

807

X

X

X

1\
J

'

I

~

u

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk (" ..") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted dwing the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated./d
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005384

-·

..

Dite
Offered

SA No.

•
Date
Admitted

Stipulllions

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Evidence

808

X

X

X

609

X

X

X

610

X

X

X

611

X

X

X

I~
v
r

Dite

Description

MRJ LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1993 and 1992
(008853-62)

121311'93

MRJ LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1994 and 1993
(SARMC00477-87)

12131194

MRJ LP Finmcial Statements, December 31, 1995 and 1994
(021809-19)

12131195

MRI LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1996 and 1995
(032200-12)

12131196

612

Reaerved

813

Reaerved

614

Reserved

615

Reaerved
Exlllbit Nos. 61U24 Reserved

12131190

MRl Mobile LP Finmcial Statements, December 31, 1992
IIIII 1991 011009-19)

12131192

X

MRJ Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1993
and 1992 (008863-73)

12131193

X

X

MRJ Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1994
and 1993 (021797-808)

12131194

X

X

X

MRJ Mobile LP Fin~~~eial Statements, December 31, 1995
IIIII 1994 (SARMC00443-53)

12131195

X

X

X

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1996
IIIII 1995 (020888-99)

12131196

X

X

X

628

X

X

X

X

X

628

X

628
630

827

831

.

:vI~

MRI Mobile LP Financial Statements, December 31, 1990
and 1989 (007647-SS)

625

\

I~
v

Reaerved

632

Reaerved

633

Reaerved

634

Reaerved

635

Reserved

'

Exlllbit Nos. 636-649 Raened

stipulation~uring

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by
the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST- 3)-

005385

•

SA No.

..

~

Date

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Offered

Date

Description

In

Authenticity

Foundation

650

X

X

651

X

X

/D-3-11 (~I Center and Mobile minutes (000572-73, 000589-90)

652

X

X

JO ...J-tlv

MRI Center. MRI Mobile, and MRIA Board minutes
(000599-606)

5120198

653

X

X

ltJ. 31 \

MRJ Center, MRI Mobile, and MRIA Board minutes
(000625-631)

6/17198

654

X

X

/O- c.J-l\

MRJ Center, MRI Mobile, and MRIA Board minutes
(000767-772)

9/10198

655

X

X

MRI Centcr/MRI Mobile Executive Meeting Minutes
(025396)

12/17/02

Evidence
X

--=-

MRI Center, MRI Mobile, and MRIA Board minutes
(013916-18, 021235-37, 013933-34)

1&-J'/( v

tl

I '"11 (

656

3118198
4/15198

Reserved

657

Reserved

658

Reserved

659

Reserved

660

Reserved
Exbiblt Nos. 661-674 Reserved

675

X

X

676

X

X

677

X

676
679

GSR Executive Committee minutes (GSREX/0020-23)

312198

GSR Executi-ve Committee minutes (GSREX/0024-25)

319198

X

GSR Executive Committee minutes (GSREX/0030-33)

4/6198

X

X

GSR Executive Committee minutes (GSREX/0040-41)

S/29198

X

X

GSR Imaging Center minutes (IMIRP/004817)

6/1198

X

X

~

f~J~

~

,.

680

Reserved

681

Reserved

682

Reserved

683

Reserved

• • Exhibits marked with a double asterisk (" ..") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. Id
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...

~
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SA No.

Date

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Offered
'

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

684

Reserved

685

Reserved

Eshlblt Nos. 686-699 Raervcd

700

X

SARMC Trustc:cs Executive Committee minutes (Office of
President SARMC07953-91)

3126184

701

X

Giles Handwritten notes (Giles Dep. Ex. 4) {005917)

undated

702

X

Gill letter to Newhouse {005342)

12112184

703

X

Gill letter to Newhouse {CH000279-82)

1/14/SS

704

X

Newhouse letter to CIDTan, Giles, Havlina, Henson, Prochaska
re: MRI Associates Limited Partnership (005975)

318/85

705

X

MRllimited schedule of investor payments {Office of CFO
SARMC03648-49)

7123/85

706

X

Certificate of Limited Partnership of MRI Limited Pll'lnerShip
{024740-48)

812185

707

X

4!f ..

MRllimitcd schedule of investor payments {Office of CFO
SARMC03650-51)

819185

708

X

J'} ()

MR1 Limited Partnership Private Placement Memorandum
{012779-890)

5124185

709

X

MRI Limited Partners (CHOOI 075-76)

6/1/87

710

X

X

MRI Mobile Limited Partnership Private Placement
Memorandum {020349-506}

9/6188

711

X

X

Certificate of Limited Partnership of MR1 Mobile - Limited
Partnership {024893-99)

10/17/88

712

X

MRI Ltd, DBA MRI Center of Idaho Ownership and MRI
Mobile, L.P. Ownership Before Buyout and After Buyout
{SARMC04899-900)

Undated

713

X

MRICI- Limited Partnership Units I MRI Mobile Limited
Partnership Units {SARMCOIOJ9)

Undated

X

X

X

X

X

F,a..-t'

~
v

714

Reserved

715

Reserved

716

Reserved

717

Reserved

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipu1ation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. ld
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..

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence
Reserved

718

Ellbiblt Nos. 719-7:M Reserved

725

DVI Financial letter to Chamberlain (SH 1513-16)

1217/01

726

/0"'11"' I

GE Financial Healthean:: letter to Chamberlain (SH 1517-21)

12/7/01

727

t•-11"''

DVI email to Chamberlain with proposal letter (SH 1782-85)

1217/01

728

MRIA ownership stnacture percentages (SH 2021)

8115/01

729

Volume and Revenue Summary MRICI (SH 0139)

2000

MRICI, MRI Mobile LP spreadsheets, Ownership Allocation
at July 31, 1999, and Cash Flow Analysis for Possible Trade
(SH 0141-47)

Undated

Floyd email to Giles et al., etc. re Confidentiality Agreement
and Engagement Jetter (03236Ui3)

I 0110103

~tA

.,3,.,

,7i~t.
?..J:-.tJC
31

X

X

X

732

X

X

X

733

X

734

X

X

I~

~V'~

,v ~).J'-'"
I

Curran email to Prochaska eta!. re Reminder (037607)

. 10113/03

~

Board Agenda (027980)

10114/03

X

West email to Miller re Shattuck Hammond Ltr (NEW
REDLINE 10-14-03) (016406-13)

10114/03

735

X

West email to Miller re Shattuck Hammond Ltr (NEW
REDLINE 10-14-03) with h/w note "Rec'd 10114" (03234961)

10114/03

736

X

Voice Mail of J. Kevin West Transcribed on October 16, 2003
(SARMC 01549 Givens Pursley)

10116/03

737

X

Miller e-mail to Chamberlain eta!. re FW: Shattuck
Hammond Ltr (NEW REDLINE 10-14-03) (SH 1699-1711)

1114/03

738

X

Miller e-mail to Chamberlain re 9-12-03 Confidentiality
Agreement (SH 1727-40)

11113/03

739

X

Miller e-mail to Chamberlain et al. re FW: Confidentiality
Agreement and Engagement Letter (SH 1741-50)

11113/03

740

X

Miller letter to VanValkenburg and Banducci re: MRI
Associates (SARMC 0 I 526-34 Givens Pursley)

12/5/03

741
742
743

.~

;o ..-11--1 I ~ ?t.J- t~ ,_J,Aw •A~
0
Reserved
Reserved

-

** Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. ld
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•

•
SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

744

Reserved

745

Reserved
Exblblt Nos. 746-749 Reserved

750

X

X

Employment Agreement- David Giles and DMR (03437476)

12117/2002

751

X

X

Employment Agreement- Jack Havlina and DMR (034377·
79)

12117/2002

752

X

X

Employment Agreement -Thomas Henson and DMR
(034364-67)

12117/2002

753

X

X

Employment Agreement- James Prochaska and DMR
(034371-73)

12117/2002

754

X

X

Consent of Shareholders and Directors of DMR, Inc. in Lieu
of Meeting re: Annual Meetings 1986-2001 (034354-55)

12117/2002

755

X

X

Consents of Shareholders/Directors of DMR in Lieu of
Meeting re: Annual Meeting 2002 (034357-62)

12117/2002

756

X

X

Minutes of Annual Meeting of Shareholders/Directors of
DMR for 2003 (034432-36)

3/17/2003

757

X

X

Consent of Shareholders and Directors of DMR in Lieu of
Meeting re: Reverse Stock Split and Amended and Restated
Shareholders
t (034438-62)

5/2012003

758

X

X

Doctors Magnetic Resonance Inc. (DMR) Cash receipts YTD
2003 (013406)

March2003

759

X

X

Doctors Magnetic Resonance Inc. (DMR) Schedule of
Compensation and Distributions to Shareholders 1• Quarter
2003- (002916-17)

3/31/03

760

X

X

Consent of Directors of DMR in Lieu of Meeting- Capital
Distribution for Ist Quarter

4fl/03

761

X

X

Doctors Magnetic Resonance Inc. (DMR) I005 - Cash in
Gcncral Chcclcing (013404-05)

4/18103

762

X

X

Doctors Magnetic Resonance Inc. (DMR) Schedule of
Compensation and Distributions to Shareholders 21111 Quarter
2003- (002918-19)

711/03

763

X

X

MRI Mobile - Distribution of Earnings 2003 (032661)

8123/03

764

X

X

Doctors Magnetic Resonance Inc. (DMR) Schedule of
Compensation and Distributions to Shareholders 3nd Quarter
2003-(002804)

10/1/03

765

X

X

MRI Associates Management Fees and Partner Distributions
From MRJC and MRIM, etc. (SARMCOOIII-13)

12131//2003

766

X

X

MRJ Limited Partnership List of Investors/Transfer Ledger
Commencing at January I, 2003 (024886-88)

1/1/03

'

~-#~'"'''

X

"
767

j

~
~

Reserved

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. ld
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• •

•
-

• .Ao}

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

768

Reserved

769

Reserved

770

Reserved
Exhibit Nos. 771-774 Reserved

ns

X

ne

X

n1

X

na

X

X

n9

X

X

780

X

781

X

X

X

ltJ-3 ... 11

MRI Mobile Operations Assessment (000608-IS)

6198

~

Denning letter to Cliff and Giles (Denning Dep. Ex. 7)

7!28199

Draft letter Sands to Schamp re PWC engagement (Office of
CFO SARMCOI081-90) (Hahn Dep. Ex 7)

11/9199

Outline for Discussion Presentation by Cindy Schamp
February I, 2000 Purchase/Restructuring Options for MRI
Associates (Office of the CFO SARMCOI240-42)

2/1100

Bylaws of the Medical Staff of Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center

10114/97

Top Referring Physician Group Analysis Y-T-D 2001
(002023-24)

2001

An Introduction to MRI Associates Legal Ownership of the
Partnerships ( Office of the CFO SARMC00964-73)

undated

v

X

X

X

~
v

~
~

781R

Redacted version of An Introduction to MRl Associates
Legal Ownership of the Partnerships ( Office of the CFO
SARMC00964-73).

,X

X

undated

Redacted to remove irrelevant , prejudicial, and confusing
language stating an incorrect legal conclusion .

to ... r4;'

\
44fr,ff

782
783

tr~
I

bJ 4.-1(.-111

784

I

Z85

~()~.. (\I

786

11tt,.,.,

10-~-1

~

f'_i •

800

X

801

X

i ~

IO·~t

.J,.....

X

tf -1tl . . t1

Curran email to Prochaska re Hitachi (037938)

6/17199

Curran tina! report as CEO to MRICVMRIM Board (03261 S18)

6!2000

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. Jd
S~
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Evidence

Date

Description

i

802

X

1~3"/i

Curran Handwritten Notes rc: PMI (042118-21)

7/12100

803

X

IO~tf' I (

Curran Handwritten Notes rc: War? (042122-26)

undated

804

X

Matters for Thought and Discussion ( 027311-13)

undlted

805

X

Curran Handwritten notes (025 140)

undated

Curran email to Prochska rc: Trip (037676)

617/99 .

806

X

X

X

...

"-

~

rid.~

807

Reserved

808

Reserved

809

Reserved

810

Reserved
Exblblt Nos. 811-819 Reserved

820

X

X

821

X

X

822
823

Dr. Oiles Funds received from DMR before DMR expenses,
etc. (014391-93)

2003

MRI Buyout (014409-10)

Undated

X

Giles fax to Harder, Draft Outline of Letter of Intent, etc.
(GSRRPOOISOS-07)

11/11198

X

Giles letter to Ridgley Denning (GSRRPOO 1602-04)

8/19/99

824

Reserved

825

Reserved

826

Reserved

827

Reserved

828

Reserved

829

Reserved

• • Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("• •") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated./d

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S REVISED EXHIBIT LIST- 38-

005391

SA No.

Date
Offered

Date

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

Admitted
In
Evidence:

830

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to lntennountain Medical Imaging.
LLP (GSRRPOOISOI)

11130/98

831

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (CHOO 1823)

111199

832

X

Letter from Carl W. Harder to David J. Giles, M.D.
(GSRRP002621)

1121199

833

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MR1 Associates (033766)

211199

834

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRPOO I524)

3/1199

835

X

Letter from Carl W. Harder to Jeffiey R. Clitrre: February
MR1 Statements (CH001816)

318/99

836

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (033763)

411199

837

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRPOOIS17)

411199

838

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(re: SaintAlphonsus RMC) (GSRRP001736)

S/1199

839

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(re: Partnership) (GSRRPOOJS12)

S/1199

840

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRP001734)

6/1199

841

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (040458)

7/1199

842

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRPOO 1733)

7/1199

843

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (CH003870).

811199.

844

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRP001732)

811199

845

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MR1 Associates (CH003869)

911199

846

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Intermountain Medical Imaging.
LLC (GSRRP001S94)

911199

847

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRPOOIS09)

911199

848

X

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRl Associates (033754)

10/1199

849

X

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to MRI Associates (040477)

11/1199

850

X

Carl W. Harder invoice to Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP
(GSRRPOO 1731)

1211/99

X

X

X

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. Id.
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SA No.

Date
Offered

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity··

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

851

X

Letter from Carl W. Harder to Jeffrey R. Cliffre: July through
November Radiology Statements (GSRRP002741)

12/17/99

852

X

Letter from Carl W. Harder to J. Roger Curran re: Statements
for 1999 Legal Fees and Related Retainer (CHOOIBOI-02)

812100

853

Reserved

854

Reserved

'855

Reserved

856

Reserved

857

Reserved

858

Reserved

859

Reserved

860

X

"G.P. Dist" and "L.P. Dist" and "Dist per Unit" 1986-2001
(038606)

Undated

861

X

The Basics of the Deal (038790-92)

Undated

862

X

JP Notes Meeting with Sandra & her team. (000044-48)

Undated

863

Reserved

864

Reserved

865

Reserved

Exhibit Nos. 86~79 Raerved

I

880

X

Request

881

X

X

X

882

X

X

X

883

X

X

Expert Report of Thomas R. McCarthy, Ph.D. with Exhibits

~

~~
l

Cumcullllfl Vitae of Thomas R. McCarthy (Expert Report

6115111

Ex. I)

6115111

Materials Considered by Thomas R. McCarthy (Expert Report
Ex.2)

6115/11

Exhibits 3 to 26A of Expert Report of Thomas R. McCarthy,
Ph.D.

615111

•• Exhibits marked with a double asterisk ("**") denote exhibits deemed admitted by stipulation during the 2007
proceedings, per the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Exhibits marked with a page number indicate that the
document was admitted during the 2007 proceedings at the transcript page indicated. /d.
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SA No.

•

~

Date

884

Authenticity

Foundation

In
Evidence

X

No
position

No
position

yet

yet

No
position
yet

No
position

No

No
position

X

885
888·

X

887

X

888

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Offered

X

position
yet
No
position

yet

vet
No
position

yet

yet

No
position

No
position

yet

yet

889

X

X

X

889R

X

X

X

................
IT_,_

.t

IF

CD-ROM containing electronic tiles of PM !-generated IMI
scan data and IMI financial statements relied upon by Thomas
R. McCarthy and oroduced by him at his deooSition

undated

Electronic file produced by MRlA cntided IMI Data with
Affiliations and Prior MRlA Referral. xis

undated

Electronic file produced by MRlA cntided MRI Center Exams
2001 - Currcntxls

undated

Electronic file produced by MRIA cntided MRI 2007PrcscntSARMCvsMRIA.xls

undated

Electronic file produced by MRlA cntided IMI Scan Data
2006 -2010.xlsx

undated

Chart2 (at page 13) of the Supplemental Expert Report of
· ~ P. Budge, as modified by Mr. Budge at his deposition
Ex. I)

8/11111

Redacted version of Exhibit 889

890

Reserved

891

Reserved

892

Reserved

893

Reserved

894

Reserved

t'tc(

Date

Description

8/11111

Exhibit Nos. 1195-999 Reserved

'6q~

Any Exhibit used at any deposition taken in this case.

Various

'6'1 1

Any Exhibit identified by MRIA in this case.

Various

rttg

Any document disclosed in discovery for the purposes of
impeachment or rebuttal

Various

t'l1

All Radiology Group & Executive Committee minutes
produced by GSR in discovery

Various

AIIIMI meeting minutes and subcommittees thereof produced
in discovery

various

All MRIA, MRI Limited, and MRI Mobile meeting minuteS,
including MRIA executive meeting and executive session

various
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Date
Offered

SA No.

Date
Admitted

Stipulations

Authenticity

Foundation

Date

Description

In
Evidence

;

Red•cted Venlou ofMRIA Exhibits Ordered I Proposed to Be Used iu Lieu ofOrlaluls:

I

4138R

With redactions per Court's 619/11 order
Redacted to remove irrelevant , prejudicial, and confusing
lansuage stating an incorrect legal conclusion .

4147R

Redacted to remove irrelevant , prejudicial, and confusing
language stating an incorrect legal conclusion .

..

4149R

4150R

Redacted to remove irrelevant , prejudicial, and confusing
language stating an incorrect legal conclusion .

4234R

Redacted per Court's 619/11 and 819/11 Orders

4239R

Redacted per Court's 619/11 and 819/11 Orders

tl

~
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903
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•
St Als -v- MRI
CVOC04-8219

v'
11
\j

97 5
97 6
977

drawing
drawing
drawing

10-14-11
10-14-11
10-14-11

Chart

10-24-11
10-24-11

978
979
980
981
982
1

984
985
986

Chart-~

987
988

jtJ·X· II
,,.~,,

10-24-11
10-24-11

989
99o

~ cr·" r'\.A-~

·

LtJ ·~I I

991
~...__-;e
992
~-·
993a and b
.
·
994 G..( b
995 A..~b
~
996a and b
~

10-24-11
10-24-11
10-24-11
10-24-11
10-24-11
10-24-11

,,,.~_,,

997
998
999 "'~I.
1000
1001
10()~

(00~

,. .

~-1,

f6 -(!!"'-I\

10-24-11
JO-~ ·I I

Summary. of damages

~~

-M'"'- I I
tu .JC f1
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OCl 312011

ca.-o:o.~ ~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRI<i ~

-

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA(·
-

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corpontion,
,r

All!-

Case No.

-

4tJ_

I ~1

cv

c0408219D

DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S EXHIBIT
LIST

Plaintiff,

v.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnenhip,
-Defendant.
Presiding Judge:

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Hononble Miehael WethereU

JackS.
Gjording
Donald B. Ayer
Christian G.
,
Vergonis

Trial Date:
PIf.

Dof.

No.

No. ·
4000

court Reporter: Nicole
Omsberg

September 6, 2011
Admitted

400i

;J
0'

..
4002

4003
'

Description

SARMC
Planning/Finance
Charter and
Objectives; ,not dated
Vision PowerPoint
slide; not dated

4004
',

Radiology Imaging
Center· not dated
SARGIMRIA JV
Proposals #6 & 7; not
dated
Issues Imaging Center
Joint Venture; not

Defendant's
Attorney:

ThomasA.
Banducci
WadeL.
Woodard
BrentS.
Bastian
Courtroom
Deputy: Diane
Oatman/Kathy
Johnson
Bates No.
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08896;
RcUiyEx41
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08719;
Reilly Ex29
014512; Giles Ex
18
000931; Giles Ex
17

001142-4: Giles
Ex 16

dated
400S-

I'

·SARMC IT System
Support for IMI; not
dated

IMIRP/000892;
Kelly Hall Ex 13

005397

•

•

4m)

4007

4(D

400)

4010

t•~HI

4011

Admit

4012

Admit

4013.

Admit

DR lnvc5tment List.
MRICI AP Ledger;
various dates
Radiologist Schedules
Produced at
Deposition of Jeffrey
Seaboum
(280 pages), various
dates
Radiologist/Hospital
Imaging Center !oint
Venture· not dated
Handwritten notes re:
DR Investment; not
dated
Handwritten notes and
charts re: analysis
given to Ken Fry on
negative movement of
patients from
MRI/SARMC to IMI;
not dated
Health Planning
Committee SARMC
Board of Trustees
Meeting Minutes;
March 22, 1984
Executive Committee
SARMC Board of
Trustees Meeting
Minutes; March 26,
1984
Executive Committee ·
SARMC; October 1,
1984

4014

Admit J Executive Committee
SARMC Board of
Trustees; December
20, 1984

4015

Admit

4016

.Admit

4017

Admit

4018

Admit

.Letter to Chris Anton
from J. Roger Curran;
November 2 I, 1984
Letter to J. Roger
Curran from Sister
Patricia Vandenberg;
December 27t 1984
Health Planning
Committee SARMC
Board of Trustees
Meeting Minutes;
December 28 1984
Board ofTrustees
SARMC Executive
Committee Report
Minutes; January II,
1985

040220-8; Berger
Ex 9; Floyd Ex
23
Seaboum Ex. No.
21

GSR/00910093, Seaboum
Ex. No.10
0898?; Cioffi Ex
9
034104-7,
034109, 034112

Office of the
President
SARMC0692839; Vandenberg
Ex2
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0271~

20; Vandenberg
Ex3
Givens Pursley
SARMCOOI6~

72; Vandenberg
Ex5
Office of the
President
SARMC0814655; Vandenberg
Ex4
Giles Ex 5
Office of the
President
SARMC09462;
Vandenbeg Ex 6
Givens Pursley
SARMCOOI46-8;
Vandenberg Ex 7
Givens Pursley
SARMC0013943; Vandenberg
Ex8

2

005398

•
4019

Letter to Jon Miller
and E.E. Gilbertson
from Sister Patricia
Vandenberg and James
E. Bruce; January 14,
198S
Letter to Sister Patricia
Vandenberg from Leo
Edward Miller; March
S, 198S
Admit
MRI, Ltd. Meeting
Minutes; March 27,
198S
Admit.;' 1122 Application;

4020

4021
'4022

4023

Admit

4024

Admit
'

4025

Admit

4026

Admit

40Z7

Admit

4028

Admit

4029

Admit

4030.

Admit

4031

v'

Office of the
President
SARMC09403-4;
Vandenberg Ex 9
039488-90;
Vandenberg Ex
10
011244-6; Giles
Ex9
004139-42

April~1985

Articles of Partnership
ofMRIA; April26,
198S
Limited Partt:Jership
Agreement of MRI
Limited Partnership;
Au~st 2, 1985
SARMC and Saint
Alphonsus Building
Company, Inc. Ground
Lease; September 19,
198S
First Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
of MRI Associates;
May2S, 1988
Agreement for
Provision of Medical .
Services; August I,
1988
Limited Partnership
Agreement of MRI
Mobile Limited
Partnership; October
17, 1988
Second Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
of MRI Associates;
May 16, 1991
MRICI Minutes; April
27, 1992
Letter to DMR from
SADC, MedNow, and
West Valley Medical
Center; August 24,

019991-20013;
Bruce Ex 1;
Fisher Ex5
009940-52;
Bruce Ex 2
028914-20

01402-8

Givens Pursley
SARMCOI917·
39; Anton Ex 2
026877-91

029706-11

Office of the
President
SARMC058S 1-3;
Anton Ex I
011486

1992

4032

Admit

Third Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
ofMRI Associates;
January I, 1995

024996-25008

3

005399

•
4033

Admit./ SARMC Medical
Services Agreement Radiology; May l,
1997

Cfo'~~ ~

~JA.~
~

4-~,f(

4034

Admit

403S

Admit

4036

4037

Admit

4038

Admit

4039

Admit

4040

Admit

4041

Admit

4042

4043

trMHI

4044

Admit

4045

~bc:.rt~
IMI Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; June 16.
1997
MRICI Minutes;
October 21, 1997
Letter to SARG from
Sandra Bruce, Fax
from Mike Czech to
Sandra Bruce; October
31, 1997
Letter to MRIA
Boardmembers from
Mike Czech;
November 10 1997
IMI Group Meeting
Minutes; November
12, 1997
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from IMI; November
13, 1997
Letter to Paul
Traughber, William
Murray, Jeffrey
Seaboum, and Joseph
Gobel from Sandra
Bruce; November 13,
1997
MRICI Minutes;
December 17· 1997
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Paul Traughber;
January s, 1998

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; January 14,
1998
Letter to MRIA
Boardmembers from
Mike Czech; February
13, 1998
MRICI Minutes;
February 18, 1998

Office of the
CFO
SARMC02S97·
2614; Bruce Ex
6; Seaboum Ex 4
(same as Giles
00002 - 19; I.
Davey Ex. No. 3,
N. Davey Ex 2,
Trauidlber Ex 3)
IMIRP/00443840

000413-20;
BruceEx32
Office of the
President
SARMCI0170.2;
Bruce Ex 33
000388; Bruce
Ex34
r

IMIRP/004401-3
Officeofthe
CFO
SARMC06142-3;
Bruce Ex36
Office of
President
SARMCl 0 169;
Bruce Ex 37

02 1306-8; Bruce
Ex38
Office of the
CFO
SARMC06066;
Bruce Ex 39
(same as Office
of the President
SARMC I 0 168,;
Trauahber Ex 4)
GSREX/0265-8;
Garabedian Ex 6
000509; Gobel
Ex4
021269-71;
Bruce40

4

005400

4046

Capital Expenditure
Third Cf Scanner
System Executive
Summary, SARMC
Planning/Finance
~ittee; April 1,

Office of the
CFO
SARMC0862743; Reilly Ex 42

Admit" GSR Executive
Committee Minutes;
May II, 199_1
Admit
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; May 13,
1998

GSREX/0036-9;
Krogstad Ex 2

.

4047

4048

4049

SARMC Lea4ership
hierarchy charts; June
I, 1998 8Jld vprious

Fourth Amen~t to
Articles ofPa{tnership'
ofMRI Assoclates;
July JS, 1998
GSR Group ~eeting
Minutes; July 127, 1998

4050

Admit

4051

Admit

4052

Admit

40S3

Admit

4054

Admit

~s

Admit

4056

Admit,/ MRI Center of Idaho
Newsletter; September
1998
GSR
Group Meeting
AdrnitJ
Minutes; September 9,
1998

i

4057

4058

~

~

4-~'

5

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; July_ 30, 1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; August I 0,
1998
MRICI and MRIM
Meeting Minutes;
August 19, 1998
Handwritten notes and
news clipping; August
20, 1998

Memo to Cindy
Schamp from Sandy
Cruise; September J6,
1998
Email to Cindy
Schamp from Sandra
Bruce re: RadiologyReply; September 21,
1998

GSR/0593-600;
Newton Depo Ex.
No. 2, Traughber
Ex5
Office of the
President
SARMC118S5,
10721, 10719,
10718, 10717,
I 071 5; Kelly Hall
Ex2
016029-33;
Bruce Ex IS
GSR/0612- 614;
Newton Ex 3,
Traughber Ex 6
'
GSR/0616-8;
Newton Ex4
GSR/0633-S
;

021068-73;
Bruce Ex3
Office of the
President
SARMCOI 0620I; Bruce Ex 4
021042-7
GSR/0638-44;
Knochel Ex 5,
Traughber Depo
Ex. No.7
Office of the
CFO
SARMC02657;
Henson Ex3
Office of the
CFO
SARMC02649;
Schamp Ex J

005401

4060

Holy Cross Health
System Corporation
Capital Project
Summary, SARMC
Budget Year Ended
May 31, 2000;
September 24, 1998
Admit
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; October 14,
1998
Admit./ MRICI Minutes;
October 22, 1998 ·
GSR Group Meeting
Admit
Minutes; October 28,
1998
Admit
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; November 3,
1998

4061
~
4()63

4064

4065

Admit

GSR Group Meeting

Office of the
CFO
SARMC0861626; Reilly Ex 45

GSR/0647-53;
Knochel Ex· 6
020943-5; Bruce
Ex5
GSR/0656-7
GSR/0663-4;
Knochel Ex 7,
Traughber Depo
Ex.No.l4
GSR/0665-6

~~inutes, November 9,

Admit.;

4066

07

·~II

1998
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, attac:hed draft
outline of letter;
November It, 1998
Letter to Cindy
Schamp from David
Giles re: November
13, 1998 meeting; not
dated (fax date May 6,

GSR/0667-72

GSRRP0018657; Traughber Ex
15

1999)

4068

Admit

4069

40?0

4071

4072

Admit

4073

Admit

4074

Admit

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; December 9,
1998
MRICI Financial
Statement 1998
Budget vs. Actual;
December 1998
Radiology Department
Possible Effect of
Losing Volume to
Freestanding Center
based on FY 98
Finincials· not dated
Freestanding Imaging
Center List of Key
Assumptions to
Anticipate Profit; not
dat~ ~)rob. earl)! 1999
GSR Group Meeting
MinUtes; January 13, ·
1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, attached DR
Systems Presentation
ofPACS System;
Feb!~Jl'!Y 3, 1999
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; February 10,
1999

GSR/0673-81
031792

Office of the
CFO
SARMC02650;
Fry Ex 2
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0201832; Fry Ex 3
GSR/0682-6
GSR/0687-99

GSR/0700-2;
Newton Ex 5

6

005402

.

..

..
Admit

Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
March 3, 1999
Admit -.1 MRI Executive
Meeting Minutes;
March 17, 1999
Imaging Center
Admit
Meeting Minutes;
March 31, 1999
Admit
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
April 7, 1999
. AdmitV GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; April 14,
1999
Admit
MRI Executive
.Meeting Minutes;
April21, 1999
Imaging Center
Admit
Meeting Minutes; May
s. 1999
SARMC Holy Cross
Health System
Corporation
Preliminary Budgeted
Consolidated Financial
Statements and
Strategic and Routine
Capital Expenditure ·
SUIIUJliU)' for Year
Ended May 31, 1999
Memo to Giles,
Knochel, Traughber,
Seaboum, from Sarah
Bratlc:y; June 4, 1999
Admit
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes, attached
Term Sheet; June I0,
1999
Admity MRI Executive
Meeting Minutes; June
16, 1999
GSR Executive
Admit
Committee Meeting
Minutes;.JuJy26, 1999
Admit
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes; July
7, 1999
Admit
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes; July
22, 1999
Articles of
Organization Limited
Liability Company;
July 23, 1999
Admit
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes; July
27, 1999
IMI Center Meeting
Notes; Juty28, 1999

407S
4076
4CfT7

4078

4079
4(8)

4(11)

400

..
r~f

41113

-.;

4014

OS
4(116

07

4(118

4(111)

4000
4091

IMIRP/0047S762; Noyes Ex 4
001064; Henson
Ex4
IMIRP/00477S86
IMIRP/004787804; Noyes Ex 8
GSR/072S-9
001093-4; Cliff
Ex 11
IMIRP/004927-8
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08685-8;
Reilly Ex 44

GSRRPOOISS I 18S6; Traughber
Ex 17
GSR/0730..7

02S322-4; Cliff
Ex 12
GSRRP/00017417S; I. Davey Ex
2
IMIRP/0049S6-8;
NoyesEx9
IMIRP/0049S9·
61
IMI/0336-7; Clift'
Ex 13
IMIRP/000784 •
786; I. Davey Ex.
II
IMIRP/00466470; Noyes Ex 11

7

005403

.

"-

..
4092

Admit

4093

4094

us Bank Loan:
Facility Page: Imaging
Center Radiologists
and Unifonn Credit
Analysis Borrower
Profit~ Jujy 28, 1999
Draft PWC Fair
Market Val~ of a 20
Percent Partnership
Interest in DMR's 45
Percent Interest in ,
MRI~July31, 1999
USB Business Loan
Transmittal; August S,
1999

/

4(Jj5

Admit

4096

Admit

4097

Admit

4008

Admit

4091)

Admit

4100

Admit

4101

Admit

Fax to Carl Harder
ftom Jeff Cliff, August
10, 1999
List of Referring
Physicians; August 12,
1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
August 18, 1999
SARMC Board of
Trustees Board
Meeting; August 18,
1999
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; August 23,
1999
Notes re: histor,y and
structure of MRJCI
and MRJ Mobile and
how they relate to
SARMC; August 1999
Imaging Center
Meeting Minutes;
August 24, 1999

Denning Ex I

023949-99;
Fisher Ex II

USB00979-96,
S0-53; Noyes Ex
3, Traughber Ex.
II, N. Davey Ex.
10
033755-6;

Knochel Ex 9,
Traughber Ex.
10 Newton Ex. 7
IMIRP/004458SO I; Sc:ales Ex 4
IMIRP/000804-6
Office oftbe
President
SARMC07e6776; Reilly Ex 12:
FisherEx4
GSRRP/00018490(sameas

GSR/0056;
Trau&hber Ex 8)
032259-61;
Bruce Ex 16

IMIRP/000811-2;
Gobel ExS,
Scales Ex 8
(same as

4102

Admit

4103

Letter to Ridgley
~ing from David
Giles; August 24, 1999
IMI Financial
Statement Budget vs.
Actual Income- MRI;
September 1999

IMV0699;
TI'IW8hber Ex.
13)
GSRRPOOIS958; Denning Ex 2
GSRRP/000149

8

005404

.

.

.

,~

4104

.

Admit

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; September 8,
1999

Admit

MRICI and MRIM
Minutes; September
IS, 1999
IMI Financial
Statement - MRI
Budget vs. Actual
lncomei(Loss);
October 1999
Letter to Vicken
Garabedian from IMI;
October 4, 1999

'

410S
4106

4107

Admit

410l

Admit

4109

Admit

4110

4111

Admit

4112

4113

Admit

4114

4llS

Admit

4116

-

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October 4,
1999
Board of Directors
Annual Meeting
Minutes; October II,
1999
Letter to MRIA
Boardmembers from
Mike Czech; October
16 1999
MRICI Meeting
Minutes and
attachment; October
20, 1999
Letter to Cindy
Schamp from Allen
Hahn/PWC re:
qualifications; October
2S, 1999
IMI Balance Sheets As
ofOctober 31, 1999
IMI Financial
Statement- MRI
Budget vs. Actual
Income!( Loss);
November 1999
Draft of IMI Operating
Agreement; November
3, 1999
Joint Venture Imaging
Center SARG and
.SARMC; November
II, 1999

GSRRP/0001226; Gobel Ex 6, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 12, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No. 7, Newton
Depo Ex. No. 6
001260-1;
Garabedian Ex 13
GSRRP/000160

GSRRP/0002189; Hall Ex 7, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 13,
GSRRP/000212
R -27; Noyes Ex
21, ,I. Davey
Depo. Ex. No.
28
Office of the
President
SARMC12746-9;
Fugate Ex2
001258;
Garabedian Ex 14
023416-8,
00130S
Office of the
CFO
SARMCO 182236
GSRRP/00015866; Cliff Ex 22
IMIRP/000104

GSR/0380-431;
Bruce Ex 10,
Scham_p Ex 3
Office of the
President
SARMC0684781; Clift'Ex23;
Fisher Ex6

9

005405

..
4117

p./.1.
~-~ll

4118

IMI: A JV Partnership
between SARG and
SARMC PowerPoint
Presentation;
November II, 1999

Admit./ Restructuring of
MRIA General
Partnership
Confidential Draft for
Discussion; November
29, 1999
MRICI Financial
Statement Budget vs.
Actual; December
1999
IMI Financial
Statement- MRI
Budget vs. Actual
Income!( Loss);
December 1999
IMI Financial
Statement- MRI
Budget vs. Actual
Income/( Loss);
December 1999
Admit
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Thomas Henson;
December 6, 1999
Admit
H~tten Notes re:
12/16199 Meeting;
December 16, 1999

4119

4120

4121

4122
4123

4124

Handwritten Notes by
Jim Prochaska re:
December 12, 1999
·meeting
Admit./ Draft of IMI Operating
Agreement; December
17; 1999
Email to Jim
Admit
Prochaska and Roger
Curran from David
Giles; December 18,
1999
·Admit
IMI Referrals by
Procedures
PowerPoint by D.
Benion; December 21,
1999
GSR Group Meeting
Admit
Minutes; December
22, 1999

412S
4126

4127

4128

IMI Financial
Statements; December
31, 1999

4129

Office of the
President
SARMC0684966; Bruce Ex 20,
Schamp Ex2;
Fisher Ex 7
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0635867; Biuce Ex II,
SchampEx4
012278

IMIRP/000108

GSRRP/000283

032441; Henson
Ex6
Office of the
President
SARMC09913-5;
BruceEx6
001366-7;
Prochaska Ex 21
IMI/0528·81 ;
Cliff Ex 7
001364; Giles Ex
19

IMIRP/00480S10

GSRRP/0001679; Cliff Ex 6, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 16, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No. 13
IMIRP/00320413

10

005406

..
4130

SARMCBoard
Committee Structure
for2000

1.

I

SARMC ION FY ()().
02 Strategic Plan
Presentation; not dated

4131

'

4132

i

Capital Budget
Analysis - FY 2000,
not dated

4133

Consolidated
Operations Capital
Budget Analysis- FY
2000,notdated
Capital Plan FYOO.
FY02; not dated

i
!

4134
·,

i

413S

Consolidated
Operations Capital
Budget Analysis, not
dated
IMI MRI 2000 Income
Budget
Admit;;/ Letter to Sandra Bruce
from James Prochaska;
January 4, 2000

i.

4136
4137
I

4138

Admit

Email to Sarach
Bratley from Allen
Hahn re: Engagement
Documents, PWC
Valuation of SO
Percent Interest in IMI
Draft; January 5, 2000
Email to James
Procbaksa. Roger
Curran, and David
Giles from Carl
Harder; January 6,
2000
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Carl Harder;
January 6, 2000
Admit../ GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; January 12,
2000
MRICI Minutes;
Admit
January 19, 2000
Admit
GSR Executive
Committee Minutes;
January 24, 2000
Meeting with Jeff Cliff
Admit
Purchase/Restructuring
Options for MRIA;
January 26, 2000

'

4139

I
'

4140
4141

'

4142
4143
4144

Office of the
President
SARMC 12798;
Fisher Ex 2
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08700-I;
Reilly Ex46
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0869S;
Reilly Ex 2S
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08699;
Reilly Ex 26
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08701;
Reilly .Ex 27
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08704;
Reilly Ex. 28
GSRRP/000284
Office of the
CFO
SARMC00640-l;
Bruce Ex28,
Schamp Ex 7
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0804762; Fry Ex 6,
Schamp Ex6;
Fisher Ex 14
038786

032442-4; Bruce
Ex 29. Schamp
Ex8
GSRRP/0002737; Scales Ex 7
001492-3; Bruce
43
GSRRP/00042433; Hall Ex 8
Office of the
CFO
SARMCO 1239;
Fry Ex 19

.

II

005407

..
I

414S

Admit

!

-

4146

Admit

I
i

4147

Admit
'

4148

.

Admit

I
I

Schamp

I

Purchase/Restructuring
Options for MRIA;
FebrUary I, 2000
SARMC Senior
Management Team
Agenda and
PowerPoint slides;
Febl'\llll'y l, 2000
An Introduction to

i

4149

Admit

!

!

41SO

GSR Group Meeting
Minute; January 26,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting.
Minutes; January 31,
2000
Email to Sarah Bratley
from Allen Hahn re;
SARMCDraft
Presentation,
Presentation: An
Introduction to MRI
Associates Legal
Ownership ofthe
Partnerships; Janurary
31,2000
Outline tor Discussion
Presentation by Cindy

Admit

I!

MRIALegal

Ownership of the
Partnerships; February
It, 2000
Email to Janelle Reilly
from Sarah Bratley;
February 7, 2000

i

41St

41S2

'
'

Admit

I

41S3

Admit
i

I

L.~

41S4
4lSS

rAdmit

I

i

41S6

Admit

4157
i,

41.58
. 41S9

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; February 9,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 14,
2000
Handwritten notes;
February 14,2000
MRICI Minutes;
'February 16, 2000
" MRIM Minutes;
February 16, 2000
SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Minutes; February 22, ·
2000
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Thomas Henson;
February 23, 2000
PACS/DR Expenses March 2000 to July
2001

Admit

'
i

GSRRP/000288291; I. Davey Ex
IS

GSRRP/000434;
Cliff Ex 8
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0802939; Schamp Ex 9
(same as Office
oftheCFO
SARMC0126S76)
Office of the
CFO
SARMC01240-2,
63S.9, 964-73;
Fry Ex It
Office of the
President
SARMCt 1927~
32; ReiDy Ex 7
Office of the
President
SARMC09891-8;
Bn~ce Ex 13
Office of the
CFO
SARMC07994;
Reilly Ex 14
GSRRP/000292
R-4 R; Gobel Ex
7
GSRRP/00043S

014066-7
001472-3; Bruce
Ex44
001474-6; Cliff
Ex9
Office of the
President
SARMC 11866-8;
Reilly Ex IS
032432; Henson
Ex8
OffiCe of the-CIO
SARMCOI910,
L.K. Hall Ex 28

12

005408

·'

•

•

.
4160

e· .

I

Admit

GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; March 8,
2000

Admit

SARMC
Planning/Finance
Committee Minutes;
March I0, 2000
GSR Executive
Committee. Meeting
Minutes; March 13,
2000
Handwritten notes
MRI Restructuring
Meeting; March IS,
2000
SARMC
Planning/Finance
Committee Minutes;
March 16, 2000

I

I
I

4161

;

4162

Admit

4163

Admit

4164

Admit

.416S

Admit

IMI: A Joint Venture
Partnership between
SARG and SARMC;
March 16, 2000

4166

Admit

4167

Admit

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; March 20,
2000
Handwritten letter to
Carl Harder from
Roger Curran; March
22,2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; April 4, 2000
SARMC Board of
Trustees Minutes;
April II, 2000

11

'
I

4168

Admit

4169

Admit

4170

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; April 17,
2000
Admit.,; GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; May I 0,
2000
Admit

I

:

4171
I
I
I

4172

Admit

I

Office of the
CFO
SARMC06768-9;
Fry Ex 18
GSRRP/000298301; Hall Ex II
Office of the
President
SARMC12800,
12804-S; Reilly
Ex 17; Fisher Ex
10
GSRRP/000458
R-9
GSRRP/000302
R-307; Hall Ex
10,1. Davey
Depo. Ex. No.
19
Knochel Ex 13

11 for IMI; May 23, 2000

I

Admit \ GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; May 30,
2000
Email to Roger Curran
Admit
from Henson; June $,
2000

'

1

4174

Office of the
CFO
SARMCO 1202;
Fry Ex 20
Otlice of the
President
SARMC 12852-S;
Fisher Ex 9, Fl)'
Ex27
Office of the
President
SARMCI288792; Reilly Ex 18;
FisherEx8
GSRRP/0004SS6

Annual Report fonn

I
I

4173

Secretal)' of State

GSRRP/00029S7 R; Cliff Ex 10, ,
N. Davey Depo
Ex. No.l4
Office of the
President
SARMC0683S40; Fry Ex 22
GSRRP/000441

I

GSRRP/0003789; Halt Ex 13
0314 II; Henson
Ex 10

13

005409

..

•

417S

i

Notes '"Next IMJ
Meet"· June 6. 2000
Admit
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; June 12,
2000
Draft of IMI Operating
Admit
Agreement; June 28,
2000
Admit
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; June 29,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Admit
Minutes; Julv 12. 2000
Admit.,; Letter to Roger Curran
from letT ClifT; July
17,2000
US Bank Commercial ,
Loan Credit DisplayExecutive Summary,
Highlights of Key
Findings; July 20,
2000
Draft of IMI Operating
Admit
Agreement; August 4,
2000
AdmiJ/ GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; August 8,
2000
GSR Executive
Admit
Committee Meeting
Minutes; August 21,
2000

i

4176

!

i

4177

I

;
I

4178

I

I

4liiiJ
i

4111>
I

4181
I

I
4182
I

4183
i

4184
i.
I

!

418S

-'i

4186

Admit
I

Admit .J

4187

4188

Admit

I

i

4189

Admit

I

I

I

4190

I

Admit

i

IMIRP/0047334SR· Scales Ex 6
GSRRP/0003802
IMI/0022S-69;
ClifT Ex 34
GSRRP/0003836; Hall Ex IS
GSRRP/0003146;Hall Ex 18
022512-3; Bruce
Ex47
USB00821-40

IMU0()090-139;
Hall Ex 23,
Schamp Ex 17
GSRRP/000336340; I. Davey Ex.
18
GSIV0103•5;
BruceEx49

(same as
GSRRP/000387000389,
Seabourn Depo
Ex. 7, I. Davey
Ex. 17)
014891-S

Memo to Mike Czech
from Bob Bell; August
25,2000
GSR/0080-1;
GSR Executive
Committee Meetl~g
·Hall Ex 16
Minutes; August 30,
·2000
GSR Executive
OSRRP/000390
Committee Meeting
R-4
Minutes; August 31,
2000
GSR Executive ·
GSRRP/00046971; Hall Ex 17
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September 6,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
GSR/OOS2;
Minutes, September 8, Traughber Ex. 12
1999
GSR Executive
GSRRP/000395
Committee Meeting
R-9(sameas
Minutes; September 8, GSR/0111-4;
Schamp Ex 18)
2000

14

005410

...

•

I

4191

Admit

GSR Group Meeting
Agenda and Minutes;
September 13, 2000

4192

Admit

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September
19,2000

Admit

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting .
Minutes with
handwritten notes;
September 19, 2000
GSR Group Meeting
Agenda; October 11,
2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; October 11,
2000
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October 16,
2000
Release and
Reaffirmation
Agreement; October
18 2000
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; NovemberIS,2000
GSR Executive
Committee Minutes;
November 1·9, 2000

I
I

i.

4193
i
I

4194
419S

Admit
Admit

I,

4196

Admit
I

I

4197

Admit
I

4198
4199

Admit
Admit

i

I

4200
!

4101
!

:

4200
'

I

Admit

4203

MRICI Financial
Statement Budget vs.
Actual; December
2000
Letter to Vicken
Garabedian from
Committee on MRI
Accreditation;
December I 8, 2000
IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2000
SARMC Board &
Committee Structure
2001

GSRRP/000345·
3SO; Gobel Ex 9.
, I. Davey Depo.
Ex. No.8, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No.S
GSR/011S-6;
Bnace Ex S2,
· Seaboum Depo
Ex. No.8, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
·No. 4, N. Davey
Depo Ex. No. 3,
Newton Depo Ex.
No.9
GSRRP/0004003; Lindauer Ex 4,
Schamp Ex 10
GSRRP/000367377; I. Davey Ex.

s

GSRRP/00036877
GSR/0117-8;
Bruce ExS4,
Newton Depo Ex.
No.IO
GILESE00283287
GSRRP/00031827; Gobel Ex 10
GSRRP/000413- ·
41S; Newton Ex
ll, Schamp Ex S
(same as
GSR/0119-121;
Bruce Ex SS,
Seaboum Depo
Ex. No.9)
012278

IMIRP/003982-3;
Garabedian Ex 4

IMIRP/00321S·
24
Office of the
President
SARMC 12961-3;
Fisher Ex 3

15

005411

...
4204

FY 0 l Capital Budget
Analysis; not dated

4205

FY 0 I Capital
Strategic Requests. not
dated

I

4206

4'1J17

FY 0 I Capital Budget.
not dated
Admit

I'

4201

4~

Admit

Admit

i

-1

GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; January 8,
2001
GSR Operations
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 8,
2001
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 12,
2001
GSR Executive
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 13,
2001

4210

Admit

4211

Admit t.J Radiology Strategy
. Meeting Record;
February 13, 2001

4212

MRICUMRIM
Strategic Planning
Meeting Notes;
February 16, 2001
GSR Marketing
Admit
Committee Meeting
Minutes; February 22,
2001
Admit
GSR Group Meeting
Agenda; March 14,
2001
Admit.J MRI Mobile Board
Meeting Minutes;
March 21, 2001
GSRIIMI
Admit
Operations/Finance &
Fees Committee
Minutes; March 23, ·
2001
Fax to Patty Harneck
from Jeff Cliff; April
4,2001
Admit

4213

4214
·,

421S
4216

4217

4218

Admit

t

.1

Memo to DMR from
Thomas Henson; April
s, 2001

Office of the
CFO
SARMC08734
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0872S;
Reilly Ex 31
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08724;
Reilly Ex 30
GSRRP~S..

9; I. Davey Ex 23
and N. Davey Ex
17
GSRRP/000663- .
9; Noyes Ex 16
GSRRP/0006903 (same as
GSR/0130;
Sc~Ex 13}_
GSRRP/0007224; I. Davey Ex.
20, N. Davey
Depo Ex. No. IS,
Schamp Ex 12,
Reilly Ex29
Office of the
CFO
SARMCOI94S-6;
Kelly Hall Ex 12
0124S6-60;
Bruce Ex S6
GSRRP/0064S;
Noyes Ex 17
GSRRP/OOOS41
002014-7; Bruce
ExS7
GSRRPIOOOS06;
L.K. Hall Ex 19

Office of the CIO
SARMC0033740; Kelly Hall Ex
6
033023-S;
Henson EK 9 and
MessmerEx3

!

16

005412

...

•
I

4219

!

4220

I

4221

'

Admit

IMI Finance & Fees
Committee
Meeting
./
Minutes; April 18,
2001
GSR Group Meeting
Admit
Minutes; May 9, 2001

Admi~

4222

Admit

I

'

4223

Admit
i

4224

MRI Mobile Board
Meeting Minutes; May
16,2001
Email to Cindy
Schamp and Sandra
Bruce from Ken Fry
rc: IMI
agreement/Radiology
Contract/MRI; May
30,2001
Letter to Michael
Hammond from Pat
Miller rc: Retention
Letter; June 14,2001

Email to James
Prochaska from Roger
Curran and
attachment; June 26,
2001
Admit.j Shattuck Hammond
Engagement Letter;
June 26, 200 I
Admit

422S
I

4226

Admit

'I/

Operating Agreement
ofiMI; July I, 2001

!

4227

Admit

4228

Admit

4229

Admit

4230

Admit

Operating Agreement
of lntcnnountain
Medical Imaging,
LLC July I 200 I
Operating Agreement
of Intcnnountain
Medical Imaging,
LLC; July I, 2001
Professional Services
Agreement for
Radiology Services
between SARMC and
GSR/SARG; July I,
2001
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; July II, 2001

GSRRP/000508I0; Schamp Ex
II; Fisher Ex 12
GSRRP/00056873; Kelly Hall Ex
21, I. Davey
Depo. Ex. No.
30
002092-6; Bruce
Ex S8, Schamp
Ex IS
Office of the
CFO
SARMCOI886;
Bruce Ex 18

Office of the
CFO
SARMC081712; Chamberlain
Ex 17
036811-4,
036802

Office of the
CFO
SARMC06602I0; Schamp Ex
20
Office of the
CFO
SARMC021632238; Bruce Ex 8
IMI/000700089; L.K. Hall .
Ex. No.3,
Schamp Ex 16
Corporate
Development
SARMC00379436; Traughber
Ex. No.I6
GSR/0168- 0216
, Scaboum Ex.
No. S, Schamp
Ex 19
GSRRP/000583 90; N. Davey Ex
9

.

17

005413

.

''

4231.

Admit
I

""

IMI Management
Committee Minutes;
August 14, 2001

I
I

!

:

.tm

Admit

v'
I

MRICI Board Meeting
Minutes; August 15,
2001

'

4233

Letter to Ken Fry from

Admit

J

I
I

(

Jack Floyd following

meeting of August I 5,
2001

I

4234

Admit

Memorandum to Grant
Chamberlain and
Michael Hammond
from Michael Finnerty
and Bill Appleyard re:
SL Alphonsus and
MRIA Overview;
August 30, 200 I
Radiology Group
Admit
Meeting Minutes;
September 12, 2001
Admit
GSR Fees & Finam:c
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September
13,2001·
Finnerty Interview
Notes- Meetings with
MRIA Stakeholders;
September 18-20,
2001
SARMC IT System
Admit
Support for IMI
Meeting Minutes; ·
September 24, 2001
Admit,/ Memorandum to Grant
Chamberlain and
Michael Hammond
from Mike Finnerty
and Bill Appleyard;
~tembcr 25,2001
Admit-J IMI Management
Committee Meeting
Minutes; September
26,2001

I
I
I
'
'

I
'

4235

I
I

4236

I

I
I

4237

I

I

4238

"

i
I

4239

4240

J
I

IMIRP/000886-9;
FryEx 12,
Seabourn Depo
Ex. No. i7, L.K.
Hall Depo Ex.
No. 5, N. Davey
Depo Ex. No. 12,
I. Davey Depo.
Ex. No. 14
002145-8 (same
as019350019353; L.K.
Hall Ex 24)
Office of the
CFO
SARMC00182-6;
Fry Ex 32, L.K.
Hall Depo Ex.
No.23
SH1886-1894;
Schamp Ex 14
(same as
SH0776-86;
Newton Ex 12,
Traughber Ex 9)
GSRRP/000602 611; I. Davey Ex

27
GSRRP/0005223
SH0089-90,
Schamp Ex 22

IMIRP/000890-7;
Kelly Hall Ex 18
SH 0763- 0775;
N. Davey Ex 4, I.
Davey Ex 7,
Schamp Ex21
IMIRP/000898000922;
Seaboum Ex 18',
L.K. Hall Ex 14,
N. Davey_ Ex 19

18

005414

..

~

'

IMI rr Reports;
various dates
beginning October I,
2001

4241

Admit

4242

IMI Fees cl Finance
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October S,
2001
IMI Management
Meeting Minutes;
October 31, 2001

I

!

i

4243

Admit

I
I,

I

Admit

4244

../

i

I

!

I

4245

Admit

4246

Admit

St Alphonsus'
Request for Financing
Proposal MRI Limited
Partnership; November
2001

IMI Operations
Committee Meeting
Minutes; November S,
2001

v

Valuation Analysis of
MRIA,GPand
Affiliates for SARMC
by Shattuck Hammond
Partners; November 6,
2001
Admit-.- Shattuck Haminond
Partners Presentation
of Strategic Options of
MRIA Ownership
Interest for SARMC;
November 6, 200 I

I

I
:

.4247

i
I'

I

i
I
I

Admit

4248

IMI Marketing
Committee Meeting
Minutes; November
28.2001

Office of the CIO
SARMCOI86S74, 01861-3,
01667-8,
IMIRP/001030,
IMIRP/001040-1,
IMIRP/001051-2.
lMIRP/00106891,
IMIRP/001110-2,
IMIRP/001122,
lMIRP/001134,
IMIRP/001144;
Kelly Hall Ex 8
and Sulc
(Hamec~) Ex S
GSRRP/000524S2S; I. Davey Ex
9
IMIRP/000923-4;
SeabOum Depo
Ex. No. 19, L.K.
Hall Depo Ex.
No.27
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0065915; Bruce Ex 61
(same as Ofticc
oftheCFO
SARMC07681-S;
Fisher Ex IS)
GSRRP/0006813; Scales Ex 5, I.
Davey Depo. Ex.
10 (same as
GSR/0128;
Seaboum. Ex II)
SH2436-86

Office of the ·

CFO
SARMC0644280; Fry Ex36
(same as
SH0224-270
Schamp Ex 23);
Fisher Ex 13
GSRRP/000661 •
4; Kelly Hall Ex
20, L.K. Hall
Depo Ex. No. 20,
I. Davey Depo.
Ex. No. 25, N.
Davey Depo Ex.
No.l8

19

005415

...
I

4249

Admit

I,

' .
i

4250

Admit

I
I

I

4251

Admit

I

4252

Admit

4253

Admit

MRICI Financial
Statement Budge vs.
Actual; December
2001
Email to Cindy
Schamp and Ken Fry
from Grant
Chamberlain re:
Financing Proposals;
December I 0, 200 I
Memorandum to Ken
Fry and Cindy Schamp
from Grant
Chamberlain, Mike
Finnerty and Bill
Appleyard re: Debt
and Distribution
Analyses; December
12,2001
Email to Cindy
Schmap and Ken Fry
from Bill Appleyard
re: SARMC debt and
distribution analysis;
December 13, 2001
IMUSARMCIT
Meeting Minutes;
Decenlber 18, 2001

I

·•

4254

IMI Financial
Statements December
31 2001
2002 vs. 200 I
Comparison Center
Income; not dated

I
'

4255

4256

I
!

FY 02 Capital
Analysis Budget
(tentative) vs. Actual;
not dated
FY 02 Capital
Analysis Budget vs.
Actual; not dated

I
:

4'1SI

I
I

4258

FY 02 Capital
Analysis Budget vs.
Actual; not dated

I

Local Pool Capital FY
02; nOt dated

4259

I

4260

Admit

!

'I

Handwritten notes re:
MRI Restructure;
January 2002

031021

Office of the
CFO
SARMC07665;
Fry Ex38
SHII78-9;
Finnerty Ex 8

Office of the
CFO
SARMC06596-8;
Fry Ex 41
GSRRP/00686-7;
Kelly Hall Ex 22,
I. Davey Depo.
Ex. No. 29, N.
Davey Depe Ex.
No. 20, Suk
(Hameck) Depo
Ex. 4, Seaboum
DeJJO Ex. No. 20
IMIRP/00322534
Office of the
CFO
SARMCOOin-8;
Fry Ex 15
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08838;
Reilly Ex 33
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08867;
Reilly Ex 35
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08878;
ReillyEx36
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08924;
Reilly Ex 38
Office of the
CFO
SAJWC07696;
fry Ex39

I

20

005416

.

•

...
4261
4262

Admit

i

Admit

I
I

I

4263

Admit
I

'

!

4264

4265

!

4266

'

Admit

I
I

i

4267

Admit
'
'

4268

Admit
I
I

4269

Admit

i
4270

Admit
I

4271

Admit
I

I

4272

Admit
I
!

.;

IMI Marketing
Committee Report;
January 2002,
PACS Meeting
Minutes; January 4,
2002
Email to Grant
Chamberlain and
William Appleyard
from Michael FiMerty
re: Distributions;
January 14, 2002
Memo to Leslie Kelly
Hall from Patti
Hameck re: DR
Systems Status Report;
January 23 2002
Email to Cindy
Schamp from Ken Fry
re: MRIA; January 29,
2002
Memo to Leslie Kelly
Hall from Patti
Hameckre:
Comparison of options
IMI West DR
Acquisition Server;
January 31,2002
IMI Management
Committee Meeting
Minutes; ~anuary 31,
2002
Fax to Gwen Moore
(Trinity Health) from
Tiffany Albanese
(Administrative
Assistant, Finance) re:
Shattuck Hammond
Memo; February 6,
2002
·McmorandUlll to Ken
Fry from Grant
Chamberlain re: Work
Plan/Next Steps;
February 12, 2002
Email To Grant
Chamberlain from
Michael FiMerty re:
St. Alphonsus;
February 13, 2002
Email to Ken Fry and
Cindy Schamp from
Grant Chamberlain re:
Work Plan Timeline;
February 1S, 2002
St. Alphonsus- MRIA
Restructure Proposal
Discussion Outline
w/Dr. Curran; April 9,
2002

IMIRP/000973; I.
Davey Ex. 26
Office of the CIO
SARMCOI841-4;
Kelly Hall Ex IS
SHI79S-7;
Finnerty Ex 10

Office of the CIO
SARMCOI847-9;
Kelly Hall9
SH1804;
Chamberlain Ex
9
GSRRP/00082830;
Sulc(Hamcck) Ex
6

IMIRP/000976981; I. Davey Ex.
24
Officeofthc
CFO
SARMC06S71-3;
FryEx42

SHOOOI-2, 134-6;
Chamberlain Ex
10
SH180S-8;
Finnerty Ex 14

Office of the
CFO
SARMC07SS3;
FryEx43
SH1200-l;
Chamberlain Ex
12

21

005417

...
4273

Admit

4274

Admit

GSR Fees & Finance
Committee Meeting
Minutes; April 12,
2002
Email to Grant
Chamberlain from
Roger Curran re:

GSRRP/0007303
SHI809;
Chamberlain Ex
13

Upd~e;~ril29,2002

4275

Admit
I

A_genda; May 30, 2002
Fifth Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
lf.uMRI Associates;
lgust 2002
AdmittJ Letter to MRICI
Scheduling
Department,
Radiology Scbeduling
Department from
Radiologistlflim Hall;
August 7, 2002
Admiy Email to Dave Giles,
Roger Curran and Jack
Floyd from Mark
Lawrence re: Gem
Radiology; August 19,
2002
Email to Ken Fry from
Admit
Mark Lawrence re:
Weekend Issues;
August_2~ 2002
Admitj Radiology-MRI
Meeting Record;
August 30, 2002

4276

Admit

I
'

4277
'

i

. 4278
i

4279
i

I

418)

4281

4282

IMI Management
J Committee
Meeting

Admit

Admit

i

'

;

4283

4284

ID-IJ.-11
'
'

!

Admit

4285
4286
i

IMIRP/00 I004,
IMIRP/OOIOIS;
Fry Ex 26
02SOIS-21

016331

000061

Office of the
'
CFO
SARMC07362;
fry Ex28
Office ofthe
CFO
SARMC07228-9;
V".
ExS
014111-4;
Garabedian Ex 8

MRI Center ofldaho
Board Meeting
Minutes; September
17,2002
Email to Carolyn
PmentCare
Services
Corbett from Teny
Krogstad Re:
SARMCOOS6S;
Radiology/MRI
CorbettEx3
Meeting; September
24,2002
163311-2
MRI Center of rdaho
Exam Report, Dr.
Garabedian;
September 2S, 2002
033607;
Email to Jack Floyd
Garabedian Ex 19
from Debra Scott re:
Personal Service;
September 27, 2002
Handwritten Notes re:
033597; Murray
Ben Murray I0/18/02;
Ex8
October 18 2002
Email to Ken Fry from SHI443-1449;
· Chamberlain Ex
Richard Presnell re:
MRI Distributions;
14
October 22, 2002

I

22

005418

..
'

4287

I

/0--11-f f
4288
i

',

4289

Admit
I

I

4290
4291
'

4292

Admit

I

4293

Email to Ken Fry from
Jack Floyd re: New
Pad Site Approval;
October22,2002
Email to Ken Fry and
Stephanie Westenneir
from Patrick Miller re:
Partnership DutiesMRI; October 25,
2002
DR Usage Percentage
by Location;
November I 2002
IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2002
MRICIIncome
Statement; December
31,2002.
November MRI Board
Topics for Discussion
and Follow Up;
November I, 2002
FY 03 Capital Budget
Local Pool; not dated

4294

FY 03 Capital
Analysis Budget vs.
Actual; not dated

4295

FY 03 Capital Budget
Status; not dated

4296

Admit

'

4297

Admit
I'

4298

Admit
'
'

i

4299

.

1

4300

Admit
i

I

4301
i

IMI Marketing
Committee Meeting
Minutes; April 2, 2003
Sixth Amendment to
Articles of Partnership
of MRI Associates;
April I 5, 2003
Memorandum to Grant
Chamberlain from Ken
Fryre: MRI
Discussions; April 18,
2003
Draft Letter to Sandra
Bruce from Roger
Curran;Mayl,2003
Email to Roger
Curran, J.ames
Prochaska, and David
Giles from Jack
Havlin& re: DMR
Agreement and Rads;
MayS, 2003
Email to Rick Presnell
from Jack Floyd re: redirected Patient; June
3,2003

Office of the
CFO
SARMC06776;
Fry_Ex29
SHI434,
Chamberalain Ex
16

033627,040250,
034116, 014825;
Fry Ex 33
IMIRP/00323544 Office of the
CFO
030946
SARMC07382·7;
BruceEx62
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08864;
ReUiyEx34
Office of the
CFO
SARMCOII901;
Reilly Ex 37
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08925;
Reilly Ex 39
GSRRP/0008969; N. Davey Ex 6
025022-35

SHI435-42;
Chamberlain Ex
15

014879-80
037250: Havlina
Ex2

034325, Hopkins
Ex16

23

005419

..

I

i

Admiv Letter to Sandra Bruce 014191-2
from Roger Curran;
June 3 2003
GSRRP/000940.
IMI Operations
Admit
S; Garabedian Ex
Committee Meeting
·Minutes; June 20,
22
2003
·Office of the
MFP Management
Admit
President
Steering Committee
SARMCI219o-3;
Meeting Summary;
CorbettEx4
June 24, 2003
DR Systems Invoice to Office of the CIO
Admit
SARMCOI336-8;
SARMC; June 24,
Kelly Halt Ex 25
2003
Admit
IMI Operations
GSRRP/000947Committee Meeting
8; Corbett Ex 5
Minutes; July 16,2003
Email to J~K:k Floyd
036222-38;
Admit
Henson Ex II
from Thomas Henson
re: Agreement for MRI
Services; July 18, 2003
034 I 72; Hopkins
Email to J~K:k Floyd
from Julli Hopkins re:
Ex3
list; September 4 2003
028043-6;
Admit
MRI ofldaho Special
Corbett Ex6
Meeting Minutes and
Agenda; September 8,
2003
Admit \1' Negotiating Timeline; Office of die
President
September 8, 2003
SARMCOJ0658;
Bruce Ex65
014188-9
Admit
MRI Center of Idaho
Board Meeting
Minutes; September 8,
2003
Surgeries Within 8
Garabedian Ex 10
Weeks that are Safe to
Scan; September 19,
2003
CEO Report; ·
Admit
Office of the
September 30, 2003
President
SARMC07043-4;
BruceEx22.
Fisher Ex 17
IMI Management
IMIRP/001062;
Admit
Sulc(Hameck) Ex
Committee Meeting
Minutes; October 28,
3
2003
Admit..; Presentation to Trinity Office of the
Health: Overview of
CFO
the Restructuring of
SARMC06m86; Bruce Ex 64,
the MRIA Limited
Seaboum Depo ·
Partnership & the
Simultaneous Merger
Ex. No. I 2, I.
of MRICI and IMI;
Davey Depo. Ex.
No. 32, N.
October 30, 2003
Davey Depo Ex.
No. 21; Fisher Ex
16

4302
4303
i
i

4304
!

i
;

4305

I

4306

I
I

4307

1:

I

4D
!

43®
I
I

4310

4311

•.

I
I

4312
I
'

4313

i
I

I
I

4314
!

4315
I

.
1,

I
I

I
I
!
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4316

Admit

\

I
'

4317
I

4318

Admit

:

:

Admit·

4319
43:!)
F

I

4321

i

IMI Fees & Finance
Committee Meeting
Minutes; December I, ·
2003
Handwritten _meeting
notes by Dr. Curran;
December 17 2003
Letter to Tom
Banducci from Pat
Miller and follow-up
correspondence;
December 22, 2003,
February 20,2004, and
February 24, 2004
MRICI Income
Statement; December
31,2003
IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2003
FY 04 Capital Budget
Status; updated July
20,2004

i

4322
4323

024271-9
OIS6S9, 02SS73;
014.547; Bruce
Ex68

015477
IMIRP/003245-

S1
Office of the
CFO
SARMC08926;
Reilly Ex40

WITHDRAWN

I
I

I
!

4324
'
I

'

432S -

Admit

4326

Admit

4327

OSRRP/0008847; Gobel Ex 14

Admit

!

Admit

4328

GSR Charges by Year
and Amounts Applied
Charges Dated 20012004
GSR Fees & Finances
Committee Meeting
Minutes; January 12,
2004
Email to David Giles,
Roger Curran, and
James Prochaska from
Jack Havlina re: MRI;
January 12, 2004
Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Julli Hopkins,
and Robin Cioffi from
Ben Murray re:
JCAHO; January 14,
2004
SARMC Monthly
Imaging Strategy
Meeting; January 20,
2004
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; January 20,
2004

Admit \ "Letter to Roger Curran
from Sandra Bruce re:
Notice of Withdrawal;
February 24, 2004

4329

Cliff30(b)(6) Ex
I
GSRRP/000970I; Gobel Ex IS
03S919; Havlina
Ex 3 and Giles
Ex20
Patient Care
Services
SARMCOOSI2;
Murray Ex 37
Corporate
Development
SARMC0012S-7;
.I. Davey Ex. 22
and N. Davey Ex.
16
GSRRP/000988
R-92; Gobel Ex
12, N. Davey Ex
II (Redacted
version
GSR/0 138 used
as Bruce Ex 17)
0216S7-8; Bruce
Ex21

25

005421

.

.
•

Letter to Patrick Miller
from Tom Banducci
re: MRI Associates;
February 25, 2004
GSR Group Meeting
Admit
Minutes; February 25,
2004
Admit
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Mark Adams,
Mark Dalley, and
f~l Joseph
Messmer re:
officer to sell MRICI
and buy SARMC's
share in MRIM; March
5,2004
Admit 't 'Letter to Mark Adams,
Mark Dalley, and Joe
Messmer from Sandra
Bruce re: Saint
Alphonsus
Withdrawal; March
10,2004
Admit
PACS Team Meeting
Minutes; March 12,
2004 and various dates

4330

Admit

I

4331
I

4332

!

'

!

4333

4334
'

4335

Admit

!
I

!

4336

4337

Admit

'

'

4338
I

',

I
I
I

4339

Admit
I

IMI Marketing
Committee Minutes;
March I Q, 2004
IMI Strategy Session
Minutes; March 16,
2004
Email to Janelle Reilly
and Ken Fry from
Carolyn Corbett re:
MRI; March 17,2004
Email to Carolyn
Corbett from Mike
Boydre:MRI
Contract, Agreement
for MRI Services
between SARMC and
BP Consulting; March
18,2004
Handwritten notes;
M~ch 22, 2004

I

4340

Admit
'
'

'

4341

Admit

l

4342

Admit
I

I

SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Meeting Summary;
March 23, 2004
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Roger Curran re:
response to withdraw!;
March 23, 2004
Email to Sandra Bruce
from Carolyn Corbett
re: MRI conversation;
March 26, 2004

032376

GSRRP/000993
R-5; Noyes Ex 32
021742-3

Office of the
President
SARMCO I06467; Bruce E~ 23,
fisher Ex 18
Office of the CIO
SARMCO 1789838; Kelly Hall
Ex to
GSRRP/0010402; Noyes Ex 33
Patient Care
Services
SARMC00845-6;
Bruce Ex25
Department of
Radiology
SARMC00758;
Ex8
"'"
Patient Care
Services
SARMC0038595; Bruce Ex 26

Office of the
President
SARMC010645;
Seaboum Ex 16
Office of the
President
SARMC 1203941; Corbett Ex 10
003020-2

Office of the
President
SARMC 010643;
HopkinsEx6

26

005422

.

.
•
4343

Admit

!

i
i

4344

Admit
I

4345

Admit
I

4346

Admit
!

',

4347

I

Admit

i.

4348

I

Admit

I

I
I

4349

Admit

I
I
I

I

43~

Admit
'

4351

Admit
'

I

Admit

'

',

4353

Admit

I

I

4354

Admit
'

4355

GSRRP/001043·
4; N. Davey Ex 8
GSRRP/000999I002; Gobel Ex
16
Office of the
President
SARMC 12270;
Corbett Ex II
GSRRP/001 0035; Gobel Ex 11
034308
Patient Care
Services
SARMC00735;
Scales Ex
042584-90, 9293, 96; Hopkins
Ex I
IMIRP/001 1661282; Reilly Ex
21
039031-7

attachments;

'

4352

Radiology Marketing
Committee Meeting
Minutes; March 30,
2004
GSR Group Meeting
Minutes; April 20,
2004
SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Meeting Summary;
April27, 2004
Radiology Group
Meeting Minutes; June
2,2004
Letter to Jack Floyd
from Bill Radaj;
Auaust 6, 2004
Letter to Joseph Gobel
from Carolyn Corbett
re: Medical Director;
August 10, 2004
Email to Julli Hopkins
from Joseph Gobel re:
Exam Protocol and
various; August 28,
2004 and various
Imaging Strategic Plan
Environmental
Assessment, Imaging
Planning Team;
August 31, 2004
Letter to Pat Miller
from Mark Ellison and

i

4356
'

I

September 3, 2004
Seventh Amendment
to Articles of
Partnership of MRI
Associates LLP;
November 10, 2004
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from MRICI Board of
Directors; December
3 2004
SARMC Senior
Leadership Team
Meeting Summary;
December 7 2004
Email to Julli Hopkins
from Tim Hall re: MRI
Scheduling; December
14,2004
MRICI Radiology
Report by Jeff
Seaboum"MRiofthe
Liver with and without
Contrast"; December
17,2004

036987-92

025045; Berger
Ex6
Office of the
President
SARMC12081·3
0341 73; Hopkins
Ex8
042160.042162
, Seaboum Depo
Ex. No. 6,1.
Davey Depo. Ex.
No.6
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4357

Admit

'
!
',

4358
4359

Admit
i
I''

4360

'

4361

4362

4363

Admit

Admit

I
'

4364

4365

...
4366

Admit

4367

'

4368

l

Admit

'

Memo to Saint
Alponsus Medical
Staff from Sandra
Bruce; December 20,
2004
IMI Financial
Statements December
31,2004
Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Jeff Cliff and
Tim Hall from Jeffi'ey
Seaboum re: MRICI
patients on DR;
January 10, 2005
Email to Robin Cioffi
and Julli Hopkins from
Scott Berger re:
SARMC Issues;
January 27, 2005
SARMC"MRI
Meeting" Minutes;
February 21, 2005
SARMCMRI
Operations Team
Meeting Minutes;
March 21 2005
Letter to ICR from
Sandra Bruce; March
22._2005
Defendant's First Set
of Interrogatories and
Requests for
Production; May 20,
2005
DR Invoices to MRICI
from Saint Alphonsus;
June 22,2005 and
various
SARMC Board of
Trustees Meeting
Minutes; September
20 2005
Email to Ben Murray,
Carolyn Corbett,
Robert Polk, Janelle
Reilly, Jean Basom,
and Sandra Bruce from
Ken Fry re: Mobile
MR1 at SARMC;
October 6, 200.5
WITHDRAWN

Patient Care
Services
SARMC00175
IMIRP/001787·
97
Patient Care
Services
SARMCO l 036;
Kelly Hall Ex 30
042153; Berger
Ex5

Patient Care
Services
SARMC00003-4;
Corbett Ex 12
Patient Care
Services
SARMC00002;
Corbett Ex 13
BruceEx67
L.K. Hall
(30(b)(6)) Ex.
No.2
040229-41;
Cioffi Ex 7
Office of the
President
SARMC 11642-8
Director of
Nursing
SARMCOOOll;
Murray Ex 12
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005424

..
4369

4370

''

4371

:

4372

I
!

I
'

4373

Admit

4374

Admit
1.

4375

Admit
!

4376

Admit

I

4377

Admit

I

4378
I
I

!

Email to Ben Murray,
Dennis Adams, Karen
Noyes, Kendall Miller,
Laurea Howell, Sarah
Berg; Scott
Chirstensen from
Terry Krogstad re:
MRI Communications
Plan & Physician
Letter; November 8,
2005
. Clinical Operations
Team Meeting Agenda
(SARMCIIMI MRI);
November 22, 2005
Email to Ben Murray
from Sandra Bruce re:
MRI; December 5,
2005
Email to Ben Murray
from Sandra Bruce re:
MRI Update;
December 9, 2005
Agreement for MRI
Services between
SARMC and IMI;
December 9, 2005
First Amendment to
Operating Agreement
of Intermountain
Medical Imaging,
LLC; December9,
2005
Option and Purchase
Agreement between
ICR and SADC;
December 9, 2005
Email to Carolyn
Corbett from Ben
Murray re: MRI
Letter; December II,
2005
Email to BCC, Front
.Office, Gen Rad
Techs, Nuc Med
Group, Nurses, Rad
Admin, Rad
Assistants, Specials.
Ultrasound from Scott
Christensen re: New
MRI Services;
December 12, 2005
Email to Jack Gjording
from Manfred Steiner
re: MRI; ~ber
14,2005

Department of
Radiology
SARMC00924-5;
Murray Ex 14

Office of the
General Counsel
SARMC0029S-6;
Murray Ex38
Director of
NUrsing
SARMCOOOIJ;
Murray Ex 16
Director of
Nursing
SARMCOOO I5;
Murray Ex21
IMIRP/00171936; Kelly Hall Ex
4
IMIRP/00166977; Bruce Ex,66

Office of General
Counsel
SARMC00259264
Director of
Nursing
SARMC00093-4;
MurrayEx22
Department of
Radiology
SARMCOI472-4;
Murray Ex 23

Steiner Ex II

I
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"
~·

Admit

4379
i

I
',

43a)
'

Admit

4381

'

i
!

4382

i

4383

I

.
4384

438S

I

4386

I

i

I

Admit

4387
!

!

i
4388

;

I
I

Director of
Email to Ben Murray,
Nursing
Carolyn Corbett,
Dennis Adams, Joseph SARMCOOOI7;
Murray Ex 17
Gobel, Kevin Dwello,
Karen Noyes, and
Sandra Bruce from
Neil Hamilton re: MRI
Issues; December IS,
200S
Office ofthe
Email to All nurse,
CNA's, et a1 from Ben CFO
SARMC08320;
Murray re: MRI
Murray Ex24
Opening; December
16,200S
Email to Adam Feider, Department of
.Radiology
Connie Stem, Dennis
Adams, Gama Barker, SARMCOI49S;
et al. from Ben Murray Murray Ex 19
re: MRI Agenda and
Minutes; December
19. 200S
Email to Adam Feider, Director of
Nursing
Carolyn Corbett,
SARMCOOIIO;
Connie Stem, et al.
MurrayEx26
from Ben Murray re:
MRI update;
December 20, 200S
Director of.
Email to Ben Murray
Nursing
from Robin Cioffi re:
Service; December 20, SARMCOOIU9;
Murray Ex2S
200S
Email to Adam Feider, Director of
Nursing
Connie Stem, Dennis
Adams, et al. from Ben SARMCOO Ill;
Murray Ex20
Murray re: MRI
Launch- IMMED
ATIN; December 21,
200S
Director of
Email to Robin Cioffi
Nursing
from Ben Murray re;
SARMC00117-8;
Undeliverable: MRI
Discussion; December · Murray Ex 27
21, 200S
Department of
Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Karen Noyes,
Radiology
SARMC01734-6;
Adam Feider, Ben
Murray Ex 18
Murray, Darrell
Fugate, Dennis Adams
from Joseph Gobel re:
MRI Concerns;
December 30, 200S
MRI Center of Idaho
Business I Income
Statement; December
31,2005
IMIRP/0032S8IMI Financial
Statements; December 70
31, 200S and 2004

I
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•
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4389

4390

Admit

4391
4392

4393

4394

Email to Diana
Trujillo from Ben
Murray re: MRI
Transport; January 3,
2006
New Saint Alphonsus
MRI Launches;
January 9, 2006
MRI Associates'
Motion to Compel;
January 13, 2006
Memorandum in
Support of MRI
Associates' Motion to
Compel; January 13,
2006
Handwritten notes re:
GSR-Radiologists;
January 22, 2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Teny Krogstad;
January 25, 2006

I

4m

Email to Ben Murray
from Teny Krogstad
re: MRI Coverage
Thursday night;
January 26, 2006
Letter/Fax to Thomas
Banducci from Trudy
Hanson Fouser re:
Motion to Compel;
January 31,2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Robin Cioffi re:
Sedation Cases;
February 3, 2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Robin Cioffi re:
Sedation Cases;
FebN8J'Y 6, 2006
List of Documents
Delivered to Manfred
Steiner; February 28,
2006
Email to Carolyn
Corbett, Directors,
MRIGroup from Ben
Murray re: MRI
Coverage on Wed
March I st; February
28,2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Robin Cioffi; re:
recap; March 3, 2006
Email to Ben Murray
from Terry Krogstad
re: MRI Coverage
Wednesday; March 7,
2006

4396

43'¥1

4398

4399

4400

4401

I

4402

i

Director of
Nursing
SARMCOO 121;
Murray Ex29
Cioffi Ex 3

Reinstein Ex 5
Department of
Radiology
SARMC00985~

Murray Ex 30
Department of
Radiology
SARMC00993;
MurrayEx31

042177; Murray
Ex32
042175-6;
MurrayEx33
Steiner Ex 6

Department of
Radiology
SARMCO 1248;
MurrayEx34

042178; Murray
Ex35
Department of
Radiology
SARMCO I021;
Murray Ex36

I
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4403

Admit

!

'

4404
~

i
'
'

l
4405

i

'

4406
4407
I

I

401
I
'

~

4410

Admit

i

I

i

44ll
'
'

4412

Admit

',

4413
4414

Admit

'

'
I

44lS

1.

!

i

4416
'

4417

I
'

4417(a)

Admit

4tff1 a.4

Assignment of
Office of General
Counsel
Membership Interest
SARMCOOSS4-S
between ICR and
SADC; April I, 2006
Trinity Health
Consolidated Financial
Statements for the
Years Ended June 30,
2006 and 200S and
Independent Auditors'
Report
DEPT#'s 89914 (MRI Wellspring
SARMC020;
Billable Cost) &
Stein Ex 7
8991S (MRI Mobile
Unit); 2006
L.K. Hall Ex. No.
Hand-Drawn Sketch;
September 20, 2006
II
Handwritten notes re:
Steiner Ex I
St. Als; October 26,
2006
Preliminary Expert
. Reinstein Ex 8
Witness Report MSN
v. Compunet;
September S 2006
Seabourn Ex. No.
Curriculum Vitae of
Jeffrey Todd
2
SeaboUl'll, M.D.; 2006
Seaboum Ex. No.
Internet Printout from
aboutimi.com Re:
3
Jeffrey T. Scaboum,
M.D.; printed October
3,2006
Transcript of
Reinstein Ex 9
Deposition of Dennis
Reinstein for MSN v.
Compunet; October S,
2006
Resume of Joseph A.
MessmerEx2
Messmer; 2007
Curriculum Vitae of
Traughber Ex.
Paul D. Traughber,
No.2
M.D.;2007
Reinstein Ex l
Invoices from Hooper
Cornell to Eberle
Berlin; January 3 l ,
2007 and various
Letter to Daniel
Reilly Ex24
Gordon from Jack
Gjording re: Saint
Alphonsus Capital
Budgets; February 23,
2007
Handwritten notes re:
Reinstein Ex 10
Meeting with Jeff;
March 3, 2007
Expert Report of
Bruce Budge; March
12,2007
Excerpt of Budge
Report - Schedule B

I0--t c./-11
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4418
4419
4420
4421
4422
4423
4424
442S

I
I
I

i
I

I
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'

I.

.l.

1
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/
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... (
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4426

Admit

-·......
-~~·

4427

Timeline of Events;
2007
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
PMI Data -IMI MRI
Exams 200 1- current
spreadsheet
IMI Financial Data;
1999-2005
MRICI Accounts
Receivable
Transaction
Surnnuuies; 19852006

I

Admit

MRICI Charges by
Referring Pbysician;
1998- March 31,
2001

4429

Admit

MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 1991 and 1990

4430

Admit

4431

Admit

MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 1991
and 1990
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 1997 and 1996
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 3 I, 1997
and 1996
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 1998 and 1997
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 1998
and 1997
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 1999 and 1998

4428

I

Reinstein Ex 4

PMI000288-1488
IMIRP/000 I 04681
Office of the
President
SARMC00654,
008141, Office
the President
SARMC05977,
018290, Office of
theCFO
SARMC03095,
031776, 031809,
031537, 012279,
' 031036,
042337-9,
042206-7,
042265-6,
042319-20
031936, 03l840,
03 I 795, 031539,
011880-l,
011919,0122801, 012307-8
Office of the
President
SARMC0053140

4432

Admit

i
I

'
I

4433

Admit

I

I

I
I

4434

Admit

I
I
I

4435

!

iI
!

Admit

I

i

I

Office of the
President
SARMC0054151
032188-99
032176-86

032152-62
032164-74

012052-61

I
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..

•
4436

Admit

4437

Admit
'

4438

Admit

4439

Admit

4440

Admit

4441

Admit

4442

Admit

4443

Admit

4444

Admit

4445

Admit

4446

Admit
'

4447

Admit

4448

Admit

4449

Admit

4450

Admit

4451

Admit

4452

i

Admit

4453

MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 1999
and 1998
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31 2000 and 1999
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2000
and 1999
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2001 and 2000
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 200 I
and2000
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31,2002 and 2001
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2002
and 2001
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2003 and 2002
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2003
and2002
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2004 and 2003
MRI Mobile LP;
December 31, 2004
and2003
MRI LP Financial
Statements; December
31, 2005 and 2004
MRI Mobile LP
Financial Statements;
December 31, 2005
and2004
MRICI Business I
Balance Sheet; July
31,2006
MRICI Business I
Income Statement;
July 31, 2006
MRIM Business II
Balance Sheets; July
21,2006
MRIM Business II
Income Statement;
July 31, 2006
Data Fonn for daily
MRI equipment QC;
not dated

032142-50

019776-85
019787-96

013100-9
013090-9

032015~24

013845-54

015673-82

.

024250-9 (SIIIliC
as021439-4B)
040197-207
040208-18
042191-200
042181-90

042315
042317
042325
042327
043511-20
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.·

"
Data Fonn for daily

4454
4455
I
I

44S6

I

4457

44S8
'

I

44S9
I

4460

I

4461

I'

4462
'

4463

4464

I

4465
II

4466

I

4467

4468

I

4469

4470

Admit

I

MRI equipment QC;
not dated
Laser film printer
control chart; not~
ACRAnnual
Perfonnance Analysis:
1.5 T Symphony
MRICI (with
handwritten notes);
October 18, 2004
ACRAnnual
Perfonnance Analysis:
l.S T GE Signa
MRICI; October 18,
2004
ACR Certificate for
MRI Center: GE
Twinspeed; March 11,
2007
ACR Certificate for
MRI Center: Siemens
Symphony; March 11,
2007
MRI Center ACR
accreditation
certificate for 1998
Siemens System
MRI Scanner
Evaluation- GE 1.5T:
November 8, 2006
MRI Scanner
Evaluation - GE 1.ST:
November 8, 2006
MRI Scanner
Evaluation - Siemens
1.5T: November 8,
2006
MRI Scanner
Evaluation - Siemens
l.ST:
November 8, 2006
MRI Center ACR
accreditation:
December 8, 2000
Siemens Symphony
service records 20002006: not dated
ACRIMRI annual
perfonnance review
verification:
November 21, 2006
GE Service Records:
Various Dates
GE Service Records:
Various Dates
CVofBob Bell

043521-31
043532-35
043536-49

043550-65

043597

043598

056643

056658-63
056664-70
056671-76

056677-83

056694-95
056899-057073
057074-75

057115-406
057410-058431
Bell Ex 2
(replace?)

I
I
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,.
I

4471

ACR Perfonnance
Analysis of the 1.5 T
Symphony at MRICI;
October 18,2004
Siemens Service
Records
ACR Perfonnance
Review of Siemens 1.5
T Symphony MRI at
the MRI Center of
Idaho; January 25,
2007
ACR Perfonnance
ReviewofGE
Twinspeed 1.5 T
Excite; January 25,
2007
AtiiTPACS
Committee Meeting
Minutes; various dates
AtiSARMC
Discovery Responses
Fax to Mark Adams,
Milt Kutsurelis, and
Marty Hutson from
Cindy Schamp re:
PWC estimates of fair
market value ofMRI
Mobie; June 8, 2000
Memo to Sandra Bruce
and Cindy Schamp
from Roger Curran
"Negotiating with the
Radiologists"; October
27, 1999
IMI's Supplemental
Responses to MRIA's
First Requests for .
Production of
Documents; November
16,2006
Saint Alphonsus
Building Company
Board of Directors
Annual Meeting;
October II, 1999
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN
WITHDRAWN

'

4472
4473

4474

'

4475
!

4476

I,
I

44'T7
I

'4478

4479

48)

'

4481
4482
4483

44M
4485
4486
4487

i
i

I
I

043566-79

043580-2
Bell Ex4

Bell Ex 5

Various
Various
Office of the
CFO
SARMC0776670; Kutsurelis Ex
5
Office of the:'.
CFO
SARMC07417;
Kutsurelis Ex 6

Office of the
President
SARMC12750;
Fugate Ex I

'
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i

•

..

4488

Admit

4489

4490

4491
4492
4493
4494

Meeting with Jeff Cliff
and Outline for
Discussion
Presentation by Cindy
Schamp
Purchase/Restructuring
Options for MRI
AssocillleS; January 26
and February I, 2000
Certified copies of
Idaho Secretary of
State Annual Report
Forms -IMI; 2002;
2002
REINSTATEMENT;
2003 and 2004
Memorandum
Decision on Plaintiff's
Motions to Strike,
Cross-Motions for
Summary Judgement,
and Plaintiff/Third
Party Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss
CV Charles Wilhoite
Expert Opinion of
Charles Wilhoite
Expert Opinion of
Charles Wilhoite;
Rebuttal
Documents

Considered by C.
Wilhoite
Expert Opinion of
Bruce Budge
Su})Piemental
Expert Opinion of
Bruce Budge
Amended
MRI Limited
Financial Statement

4493
I

4496
4497

~007

~/

4498

4499

4500
4501.
Admit

4502
4503

Email from Roger
Curran to MRIA
Board and attached
letter to Sandra Bruce
from Roger Curran;
May6, 2003
MRI.Center Financials
2005
MRILimited
Financials 2010
MRI Limited Financial
Statement 2009
Trinity Health
Integrity Program
9/1/99 Statement for
Services from C.
Harder

03692-4

Denning4;
GSRRPOOI594
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t

,,

•

4S04

4SOS

Adtnit

4S06
4S07
4S08

4S09
4SIO
4SII

Admit

4SI2

Admit

4S13

Admit

4SI4
. 4SIS

4Sl6

4SI7

4SI8

4Sl9
4S20
4S21
4S22
4S23
Admit

4S24

8/19199 Letter toR.
Denning from Dr.
Giles
Letter to Sandra Bruce
from Gem State
Radiology, 3/24/0S
CV of Bruce Bu(ige
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
RESERVED
Memo to Fry and
Schamp from
Chamberlin dated
12/ll/01
CD of Schamp Video
Clips
Cindy Schamp Video
Designations
GSR Charges by Year
and Amounts Applied
2001-2004
SARDC Answers and
Objections to MRIA's
First Set of
Interrogatories 3/24/ll
SARDC Answers and
Objections to MRIA's
Second Set of
Interrogatories and
Requests for
Production 4/IS/11
SADC Answers and
Objections to MRIA's
Third Set of
Interrogatories and
Requests for
Production 4/27111
SADC Answers and
Objections to MRIA's
Sth Set of
Interrogatories and
Requests for
Production S/12/11
2120/2004 Email from
R. Hudspeth to C.
Corbett
812512000 Memo to
M. Czech from B. Bell
1/31/2002 Memo to
LK Hall from P.
Hameck
Expert Opinion of
Charles Wilhoite dated
3/12/07
MRI v.IMI Cash Flow
and Balance Sheets

Denning6;
GSRRPOOI602-3

SARMC00509
Ol489l-9S
SARMC00167169

SARMC0641730Office of CFO

Appendix B to Charles
Wilhoite Opinion
dated 3/12/07
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•

•

•

4525

12117/2002 MRI
Mobile Board
6/24/2007 MRIC
Minutes
7121/99 MRI Board
~~ Minutes
1211612003 MRIC
Board Minutes
1120/2004 MRI
Mobile Minutes
6121/2000 MRI
Mobile Minutes
8/2002 Executive
Session Minutes MRI
11/13/2002 Letter to J.
J0--11 .. 11 Floyd
from S. Bruce
Admityl' 114/05 Letter from
Seaboum to
Colleagues
IT Chart
Admit./ 12/18/00 Letter to Dr.
Garabedian at IMI
fromACR
Einail from J. Floyd to
K.. Fry re Assistance
Email from J. Floyd to
K. Fry re New Pad Site
Approval
10/14/2002 September
Monthly
MRICIIMIRM Results
Summary
8/1212002 Letter to
Tim Hall from M.
Lawrence
2002 St. AJ's
Investment Analysis
Scenario No.1
Schedule of Expected
Net Cash Flows
Scenario No. 1
Schedule of Expected
Net CAsh Flows
1/21/2004 Letter to J.
Cliff from R. Cioffi
1/6199 Email from S.
Bruce to L. Chatterton
re Phase II Reply
513199 Memo to L.
Hall from L.
Chatterton re Interface
Minutes of
~-,+;, '3/15/2000
'.MRI Center
1117/2000 Email from
L. Hall to L.
Chatterton re Update
toPACS
12113199 Email from
R. Rorer to L.
Chatterton re
Greetings

4526
4527
4S28
4529
4530
4531
4532
4533
4534
4535
4536
4537
4538

4539
4540
4541
4542
4543
4544

,........ '

4545
4546
4547

"

4548

016356-58
011568-70
023573-75
014181-84
002845-47
022518-21
002559
002595

015306

03552
033551
. 019011-12

000060

002644
016446
014519
014778
033698
033734
001525-27
033727

033692
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•

4549

9/13/99 Email from L.
Hall to L. Chatterton
re MRI Connectivity
8/19/99 Email to C.
Schamp/L. Chatterton
from P. Hameck
8119/99 Email from L.
!b.Vtl Chatterton to P.
Hameck re Desktop
. 8118199 Minutes of
~I. MRI Center
7/28199 Email from L.
Hall to R. Curran re
Computer Start Date
7/29/99 Email from L.
Chatterton to L. Hall
reMRI
7/29/99 Email from L.
fo-(...1I Chatterton to
C. Schamp/S. Bruce re
MIRIC Database
Connectivity
9/10/99 Email from D.
.MILGiles to R. Curran, etc.
re PAC with SARMC
12/14/98 Email from
L. Chatterton to L.
Hall MRI Phase II
9/12/01 Memo to L.
Hallfrom M. Glenn
1/26/05 Letter to
/tJ-11-1 I Colleagues from
Seaboum
1212 1/04 Letter to Our
Valued Referring
JO-J-fl Physicians from J.
Floyd
SIGNA Upgrade
History

4550

4551
4552
4553
4554
4555

4556

1p

4551
4558

i

4559
4560

4561

4562
4563
4564
4565
4566
4567
4568
4569
4570

Summary Info
data'r(p~

033688
033728
033694
001232-33
033671
033695
033726

024023-24
033696
SARMC01892
Seabourn Depo.
Ex. 14

OIS440

000592

10-17-11

~~
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5000

5011
5011a
5012
5012a
5012b
5013

5027

•

Chart Referral

graph
graph
chart

chart

5043

admitted

Chart

5031

~037

10-14-11
10-14-11
10-14-11
10-14-1}
10-14-11
prev admitted

Graph lost profits

Component part

5036

10-14-11

Gnmh lost profits

5029

5033

•

9/9/11
prev admitted
10/25/11

lnves1ments made
Chart Hospital Partners
Chart Dr. votes

MAp of Mobile Units

9/9111
9/2l11

9/14/11
9112/11

5044
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~

.

,_

5060
5061
5062
5063
5064
5065
5066
5067Rl-R2
5068
5069
5070
5071
5072
5073
5074
5075
5076
5077
5078 R
5079
5080
5081
5082
5083
5084
5085
5086
5087
5088
5089
5092

Chart
Chart
Chart
Chart
Chart

9/21111
9/21111
10/5/11
10/5111

SRread Sheets Rrofits
Summm:y MRIA scans
Summm:y of analysis

10-14-11
10-14-11
10-14-11

Chart
Earning Chart
Revenue chart
RTOfitability
Chart

10-14-11
10-17-11
10-17-11
10-17-11
10-17-11
10-17-11

Damages doc

10-17-11

Market Analysis
Estimated Allocated Losses
Profit calculations
Lost RrQfit sheet
Rrofit
RrQfits sheet
Lost RTOfits sheet
Magic View West calculation
Magic View West calculation
Lost Profits Re1>9rt

10-17-11
10-17-11
10-17-11
10-14-11
10-14-11
10-14-11
10-14-11
10-14-11
10-14-11
10-14-11

Summ~

10-14-11

Chart
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an Idaho
nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No. 40012-2012
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, an
Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counterdefendant-Appellant,

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited liability partnership;
MRI LIMITED, an Idaho limited partnership; MRI MOBILE
LIMITED, an Idaho limited partnership,
Defendants-Counterciaimants-Respondents-Cross Appellants,

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTERS' TRANSCRIPTS
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
JACK S. GJORDING

THOMAS A. BANDUCCI

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

Date of Service:

JAN 1 6 2013

------------------

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

005439

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., an Idaho
nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No. 40012-2012
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

and
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, an
Idaho nonprofit corporation,
Counterdefendant-Appellant,

vs.
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP., an Idaho limited liability partnership;
MRI LIMITED, an Idaho limited partnership; MRI MOBILE
LIMITED, an Idaho limited partnership,
Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents-Cross Appellants,

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court ofthe Fourth Judicial District ofthe
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction as, and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
as well as those requested by Counsels.

I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
30th day of May 2012.

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

005440

